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-The Project Gutenberg EBook of Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,
-3rd ed. Volume III (of 4), by George Grote
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
-almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
-re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
-with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
-
-
-Title: Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume III (of 4)
-
-Author: George Grote
-
-Release Date: August 7, 2012 [EBook #40437]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO, COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, VOL III ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40437 ***
 
 PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
 
@@ -73,10 +42,10 @@ CONTENTS.
 
 CHAPTER XXVI.
 
-PHÆDRUS--SYMPOSION.
+PHÃ†DRUS--SYMPOSION.
 
 
-These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the
+These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. PhÃ¦drus is the
 originator of both   1
 
 Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in
@@ -105,17 +74,17 @@ with several different views of it previously enunciated by the
 other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the
 drunken Alkibiades   8
 
-Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus,
+Views of Eros presented by PhÃ¦drus, Pausanias, Eryximachus,
 Aristophanes, Agathon   9
 
 Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes
-Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men,
+Eros as not a God, but an intermediate DÃ¦mon between Gods and men,
 constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it   9
 
 Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who
 knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge   10
 
-Eros as presented in the Phædrus--Discourse of Lysias, and
+Eros as presented in the PhÃ¦drus--Discourse of Lysias, and
 counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is seized
 with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros   11
 
@@ -137,11 +106,11 @@ Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the
 aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the
 world of sense and the world of Ideas   14
 
-Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to
+Elevating influence ascribed, both in PhÃ¦drus and Symposion, to
 Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy
 and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory   15
 
-Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions
+Differences between Symposion and PhÃ¦drus. In-dwelling conceptions
 assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter   17
 
 Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion _ib._
@@ -149,9 +118,9 @@ Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion _ib._
 Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in
 Symposion   18
 
-Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the
-initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised in Phædon,
-Theætêtus, and elsewhere   _ib._
+Eros recognised, both in PhÃ¦drus and Symposion, as affording the
+initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised in PhÃ¦don,
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus, and elsewhere   _ib._
 
 Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the
 Symposion--Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome
@@ -163,7 +132,7 @@ trial   20
 Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion--Sokrates is
 not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process   21
 
-Symposion and Phædon--each is the antithesis and complement of the
+Symposion and PhÃ¦don--each is the antithesis and complement of the
 other   22
 
 Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon    _ib._
@@ -173,7 +142,7 @@ Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion   24
 Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the
 Xenophontic   25
 
-Second half of the Phædrus--passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros
+Second half of the PhÃ¦drus--passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros
 is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise   26
 
 Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt
@@ -225,7 +194,7 @@ teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer   37
 Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a
 philosopher   38
 
-Date of the Phædrus--not an early dialogue _ib._
+Date of the PhÃ¦drus--not an early dialogue _ib._
 
 Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses--His theory of
 Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic   _ib._
@@ -243,11 +212,11 @@ He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of
 persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on
 the one to the other in each particular case   41
 
-Plato's _Idéal_ of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part
+Plato's _IdÃ©al_ of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part
 incompatible conditions--the Wise man or philosopher will never be
 listened to by the public   _ib._
 
-The other part of the Platonic _Idéal_ is grand but
+The other part of the Platonic _IdÃ©al_ is grand but
 unattainable--breadth of psychological data and classified
 modes of discourse   42
 
@@ -270,7 +239,7 @@ works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a
 private circle   47
 
 No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias
-and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus  48
+and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the PhÃ¦drus  48
 
 Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a
 means of instruction to the ignorant   49
@@ -284,11 +253,11 @@ No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties
 raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein
 of philosophy _ib._
 
-Plato's _idéal_ philosopher can only be realised under the
+Plato's _idÃ©al_ philosopher can only be realised under the
 hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into
 full reminiscence here   52
 
-Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus   53
+Different proceeding of Plato in the TimÃ¦us   53
 
 Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's mind--Extreme of the
 Transcendental or Absolute--Extreme of specialising adaptation to
@@ -363,19 +332,19 @@ the Platonic dialogues   _ib._
 
 Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato
 would never make such objections against his own theory, and
-denies the authenticity of the Parmenidês   69
+denies the authenticity of the ParmenidÃªs   69
 
 Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive system of
 his own   70
 
 Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search   _ib._
 
-The Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the negative
+The ParmenidÃªs is the extreme manifestation of the negative
 element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth
 the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural
 71
 
-Force of the negative case in the Parmenidês. Difficulties about
+Force of the negative case in the ParmenidÃªs. Difficulties about
 participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas   _ib._
 
 Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are
@@ -506,12 +475,12 @@ conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not   _ib._
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII.
 
-THEÆTETUS.
+THEÃ†TETUS.
 
-Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus   110
+Subjects and personages in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus   110
 
 Question raised by Sokrates--What is knowledge or Cognition? First
-answer of Theætêtus, enumerating many different cognitions.
+answer of TheÃ¦tÃªtus, enumerating many different cognitions.
 Corrected by Sokrates   111
 
 Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given.
@@ -522,10 +491,10 @@ cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds
 Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates--He is
 forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge   113
 
-Answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates
+Answer of TheÃ¦tÃªtus--Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates
 says that this is the same doctrine as the _Homo Mensura_ laid
 down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the
-doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except
+doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, EmpedoklÃªs, &c., all except
 Parmenides   _ib._
 
 Plato here blends together three distinct theories for the purpose
@@ -679,7 +648,7 @@ first to Opinion, then to Cognition   164
 Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from
 facts of sense, as either necessary or possible   168
 
-Second definition given by Theætêtus--That Cognition consists in
+Second definition given by TheÃ¦tÃªtus--That Cognition consists in
 right or true opinion   _ib._
 
 Objection by Sokrates--This definition assumes that there are
@@ -698,7 +667,7 @@ He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it
 actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons
 turned into it and flying about   _ib._
 
-Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theætêtus--That there may be
+Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of TheÃ¦tÃªtus--That there may be
 non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false
 opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates
 rejects this   171
@@ -707,7 +676,7 @@ He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same
 as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but
 they do not teach or communicate knowledge   172
 
-New answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is true opinion, coupled with
+New answer of TheÃ¦tÃªtus--Cognition is true opinion, coupled with
 rational explanation   173
 
 Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words,
@@ -734,7 +703,7 @@ Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of
 knowledge removed. Importance of such removal   _ib._
 
 Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's minds, value
-of the Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own
+of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own
 suggestions   177
 
 Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is
@@ -745,7 +714,7 @@ The Philosopher is master of his own debates   179
 Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search
 _ib._
 
-Difficulties of the Theætêtus are not solved in any other Dialogue
+Difficulties of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus are not solved in any other Dialogue
 180
 
 Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest
@@ -762,7 +731,7 @@ SOPHISTES--POLITIKUS.
 
 Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues   185
 
-Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus   187
+Relation of the two dialogues to the TheÃ¦tÃªtus   187
 
 Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in
 logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to
@@ -932,7 +901,7 @@ sense   218
 Universal knowledge--was professed at that time by all
 Philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, &c.   219
 
-Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He says that
+Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the SophistÃªs. He says that
 the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for
 speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who
 maintains false propositions to be impossible   220
@@ -945,7 +914,7 @@ Misconception of the function of the copula in predication   _ib._
 No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or
 classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle   222
 
-Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês--To confute the various
+Plato's declared purpose in the SophistÃªs--To confute the various
 schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists,
 &c.   223
 
@@ -969,7 +938,7 @@ The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute,
 and a full establishment of the Relative   227
 
 Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the
-Theætêtus   _ib._
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus   _ib._
 
 The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely
 unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains
@@ -1015,20 +984,20 @@ Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense   240
 Errors of Antisthenes--depended partly on the imperfect formal
 logic of that day   241
 
-Doctrine of the Sophistês--contradicts that of other Platonic
+Doctrine of the SophistÃªs--contradicts that of other Platonic
 dialogues   242
 
 The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those
-who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phædon,
+who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in PhÃ¦don,
 Republic, &c.   246
 
-The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and
+The SophistÃªs recedes from the Platonic point of view, and
 approaches the Aristotelian   247
 
 Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions
 true, others false   249
 
-Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task--He could
+Plato in the SophistÃªs has undertaken an impossible task--He could
 not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there _are_
 false propositions   _ib._
 
@@ -1039,21 +1008,21 @@ expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which
 Antisthenes discarded   252
 
 Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the
-Sophistês   253
+SophistÃªs   253
 
 Recommendation of logical bipartition   254
 
-Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus   _ib._
+Precepts illustrated by the PhilÃªbus   _ib._
 
 Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived
 by sense   255
 
 Province of sensible perception--is not so much narrowed by Plato
-here as it is in the Theætêtus   256
+here as it is in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus   256
 
-Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus   257
+Comparison of the SophistÃªs with the PhÃ¦drus   257
 
-Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês   258
+Comparison of the Politikus with the ParmenidÃªs   258
 
 Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of Plato   259
 
@@ -1063,13 +1032,13 @@ CHAPTER XXX.
 POLITIKUS.
 
 
-The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês   260
+The Politikus by itself, apart from the SophistÃªs   260
 
 Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each
 other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the
 purpose to be attained is the standard   _ib._
 
-Purpose in the Sophistês and Politikus is--To attain dialectic
+Purpose in the SophistÃªs and Politikus is--To attain dialectic
 aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge
 whether the means employed are suitable   261
 
@@ -1077,7 +1046,7 @@ Plato's defence of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that
 the critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of
 comparison is   262
 
-Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon, Philêbus, &c.
+Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, PhÃ¦don, PhilÃªbus, &c.
 _ib._
 
 Definition of the statesman, or Governor. Scientific competence.
@@ -1160,8 +1129,8 @@ former to social administration--in the latter to the formation
 and modification of names   281
 
 Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice
-taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and
-Charmidês   282
+taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in LachÃªs and
+CharmidÃªs   282
 
 Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of Search--To
 stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not
@@ -1293,7 +1262,7 @@ Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum
 and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other
 Sophists   _ib._
 
-Theory laid down by Sokrates _à priori_, in the first part--Great
+Theory laid down by Sokrates _Ã  priori_, in the first part--Great
 difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into harmony with
 facts   322
 
@@ -1314,7 +1283,7 @@ Politikus compared with Kratylus   328
 Ideal of Plato--Postulate of the One Wise Man--Badness of all
 reality   329
 
-Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in treatment of
+Comparison of Kratylus, TheÃ¦tÃªtus, and SophistÃªs, in treatment of
 the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false
 propositions   331
 
@@ -1330,13 +1299,13 @@ CHAPTER XXXII.
 
 PHILEBUS.
 
-Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus   334
+Character, Personages, and Subject of the PhilÃªbus   334
 
 Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative
 procedure   335
 
 Enquiry--What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy
-life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus
+life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive. PhilÃªbus
 declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence   _ib._
 
 Good--object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals,
@@ -1519,7 +1488,7 @@ Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification
 Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended--yet
 feebly applied--in this dialogue   369
 
-What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic.
+What is the Good? Discussed both in PhilÃªbus and in Republic.
 Comparison   370
 
 Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known,
@@ -1528,7 +1497,7 @@ about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes
 ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently   _ib._
 
 Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the
-answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests   371
+answer in the PhilÃªbus does not satisfy those tests   371
 
 Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question--The
 alternative which he tenders has no fair application   372
@@ -1545,7 +1514,7 @@ Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by
 Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of more value.
 This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis   375
 
-Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between pleasure and avoidance
+Marked antithesis in the PhilÃªbus between pleasure and avoidance
 of pain   377
 
 The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction--They included
@@ -1555,13 +1524,13 @@ Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures--The Hedonists
 enforced the same reasonable view   378
 
 Different points of view worked out by Plato in different
-dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus--True and False Pleasures
+dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, PhilÃªbus--True and False Pleasures
 379
 
-Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about Gorgias and
+Opposition between the Gorgias and PhilÃªbus, about Gorgias and
 Rhetoric   380
 
-Peculiarity of the Philêbus--Plato applies the same principle of
+Peculiarity of the PhilÃªbus--Plato applies the same principle of
 classification--true and false--to Cognitions and Pleasures   382
 
 Distinction of true and false--not applicable to pleasures   _ib._
@@ -1576,13 +1545,13 @@ disallowed pleasures altogether   387
 Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these
 Pleasure-haters   389
 
-Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics--defect of the Philêbus
+Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics--defect of the PhilÃªbus
 391
 
 Directive sovereignty of Measure--how explained and applied in the
 Protagoras   _ib._
 
-How explained in Philêbus--no statement to what items it is
+How explained in PhilÃªbus--no statement to what items it is
 applied   393
 
 Classification of true and false--how Plato applies it to
@@ -1591,9 +1560,9 @@ Cognitions   394
 Valuable principles of this classification--difference with other
 dialogues   395
 
-Close of the Philêbus--Graduated elements of Good   397
+Close of the PhilÃªbus--Graduated elements of Good   397
 
-Contrast between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and Symposion, in
+Contrast between the PhilÃªbus and the PhÃ¦drus, and Symposion, in
 respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally   398
 
 
@@ -1725,17 +1694,17 @@ PLATO.
 
 CHAPTER XXVI.
 
-PHÆDRUS--SYMPOSION.
+PHÃ†DRUS--SYMPOSION.
 
 
 [Side-note: These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato.
-Phædrus is the originator of both.]
+PhÃ¦drus is the originator of both.]
 
 I put together these two dialogues, as distinguished by a marked
 peculiarity. They are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. They have
 one great and interesting subject common to both: though in the
-Phædrus, this subject is blended with, and made contributory to,
-another. They agree also in the circumstance, that Phædrus is, in
+PhÃ¦drus, this subject is blended with, and made contributory to,
+another. They agree also in the circumstance, that PhÃ¦drus is, in
 both, the person who originates the conversation. But they differ
 materially in the manner of handling, in the comparisons and
 illustrations, and in the apparent purpose.
@@ -1768,7 +1737,7 @@ satisfaction to the senses, but little beyond. It was the
 masculine beauty of youth that fired the Hellenic imagination with
 glowing and impassioned sentiment. The finest youths, and those
 too of the best families and education, were seen habitually
-uncovered in the Palæstra and at the public festival-matches;
+uncovered in the PalÃ¦stra and at the public festival-matches;
 engaged in active contention and graceful exercise, under the
 direction of professional trainers. The sight of the living form,
 in such perfection, movement, and variety, awakened a powerful
@@ -1783,27 +1752,27 @@ denounce and forbid.[3] In their view, it was an idealising
 passion, which tended to raise a man above the vulgar and selfish
 pursuits of life, and even above the fear of death. The devoted
 attachments which it inspired were dreaded by the despots, who
-forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the palæstra.[4]
+forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the palÃ¦stra.[4]
 
 [Footnote 1: Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Symp. p. 367) describes
 this view of Eros as Hellenic, and as "gerade den anti-modernen
 and anti-christlichen Pol der Platonischen Denkungsart". Aristotle
-composed [Greek: The/seis E)rôtikai\] or [Greek: E)rôtika/s],
+composed [Greek: The/seis E)rÃ´tikai\] or [Greek: E)rÃ´tika/s],
 Diogenes Laert. v. 22-24. See Bernays, Die Dialoge des
 Aristoteles, p. 133, Berlin, 1863.
 
-Compare the dialogue called [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], among the works
+Compare the dialogue called [Greek: E)rÃ´tiko/s], among the works
 of Plutarch, p. 750 seq., where some of the speakers, especially
 Protogenes, illustrate and enlarge upon this Platonic construction
-of Eros--[Greek: a)lêthinou= de\ E)/rôtos ou)d' o(tiou=n tê=|
-gunaikôni/tidi me/testin], &c. (750 C, 761 B, &c.)
+of Eros--[Greek: a)lÃªthinou= de\ E)/rÃ´tos ou)d' o(tiou=n tÃª=|
+gunaikÃ´ni/tidi me/testin], &c. (750 C, 761 B, &c.)
 
 In the Treatise De Educatione Puerorum (c. 15, p. 11 D-F) Plutarch
 hesitates to give a decided opinion on the amount of restriction
 proper to be imposed on youth: he is much impressed with the
-authority of Sokrates, Plato, Xenophon, Æschines, Kebês, [Greek:
-kai\ to\n pa/nta cho/ron e)kei/nôn tô=n a)ndrô=n, oi( tou\s
-a)/r)r(enas e)doki/masan e)/rôtas], &c. See the anecdote about
+authority of Sokrates, Plato, Xenophon, Ã†schines, KebÃªs, [Greek:
+kai\ to\n pa/nta cho/ron e)kei/nÃ´n tÃ´=n a)ndrÃ´=n, oi( tou\s
+a)/r)r(enas e)doki/masan e)/rÃ´tas], &c. See the anecdote about
 Episthenes, an officer among the Ten Thousand Greeks under
 Xenophon, in Xenophon, Anabasis, vii. 4, 7, and a remarkable
 passage about Zeno the Stoic, Diog. Laert. vii. 13. Respecting the
@@ -1816,28 +1785,28 @@ necessary. In appreciating the evidence upon this point, we cannot
 be too careful to keep in mind what Sokrates says (in the
 Xenophontic Symposion, viii. 34) when comparing the Thebans and
 Eleians on one side with the Athenians and Spartans on the
-other--[Greek: E)kei/nois me\n ga\r tau=ta no/mima, ê(mi=n de\
+other--[Greek: E)kei/nois me\n ga\r tau=ta no/mima, Ãª(mi=n de\
 e)ponei/dista.] We must interpret passages of the classical
 authors according to their fair and real meanings, not according
 to the conclusions which we might wish to find proved.
 
-If we read the oration of Demosthenes against Neæra (which is full
+If we read the oration of Demosthenes against NeÃ¦ra (which is full
 of information about Athenian manners), we find the speaker
-Apollodôrus distributing the relations of men with women in the
+ApollodÃ´rus distributing the relations of men with women in the
 following manner (p. 1386)--[Greek: to\ ga\r sunoikei=n tou=t'
-e)sti/n, o(\s a)\n paidopoiê=tai kai\ ei)sa/gê| ei)/s te tou\s
-dêmo/tas kai\ tou\s phra/toras tou\s ui(ei=s, kai\ ta\s
-thugate/ras e)kdidô=| ô(s au)tou= ou)/sas toi=s a)ndra/si. Ta\s
-me\n ga\r e(tai/ras, ê(donê=s e(/neka e)/chomen--ta\s de\
-pallaka/s, tê=s kath' ê(me/ran therapei/as tou= sô/matos--ta\s de\
-gunai=kas, tou= paidopoiei=sthai gnêsi/ôs, kai\ tô=n e(/ndon
-phu/laka pi/stên e)/chein.]
+e)sti/n, o(\s a)\n paidopoiÃª=tai kai\ ei)sa/gÃª| ei)/s te tou\s
+dÃªmo/tas kai\ tou\s phra/toras tou\s ui(ei=s, kai\ ta\s
+thugate/ras e)kdidÃ´=| Ã´(s au)tou= ou)/sas toi=s a)ndra/si. Ta\s
+me\n ga\r e(tai/ras, Ãª(donÃª=s e(/neka e)/chomen--ta\s de\
+pallaka/s, tÃª=s kath' Ãª(me/ran therapei/as tou= sÃ´/matos--ta\s de\
+gunai=kas, tou= paidopoiei=sthai gnÃªsi/Ã´s, kai\ tÃ´=n e(/ndon
+phu/laka pi/stÃªn e)/chein.]
 
 To the same purpose, the speaker in Lysias ([Greek: U(pe\r tou=
 E)ratosthe/nous pho/nou]--sect. 7), describing his wife,
-says--[Greek: e)n me\n ou)=n tô=| prô/tô| chro/nô| pasô=n ê)=n
-belti/stê; kai\ ga\r oi)kono/mos deinê\ kai\ pheidôlo\s a)gathê\
-kai\ a)kribô=s pa/nta dioikou=sa.]
+says--[Greek: e)n me\n ou)=n tÃ´=| prÃ´/tÃ´| chro/nÃ´| pasÃ´=n Ãª)=n
+belti/stÃª; kai\ ga\r oi)kono/mos deinÃª\ kai\ pheidÃ´lo\s a)gathÃª\
+kai\ a)kribÃ´=s pa/nta dioikou=sa.]
 
 Neither of these three relations lent itself readily to the
 Platonic vein of sentiment and ideality: neither of them led to
@@ -1851,57 +1820,57 @@ in his Oeconomicus, enlarges much (in the discourse of
 Ischomachus) upon the value of the conjugal union, with a view to
 prudential results and good management of the household; while he
 illustrates the sentimental and affectionate side of it, in the
-story of Pantheia and Abradates (Cyropædia).]
+story of Pantheia and Abradates (CyropÃ¦dia).]
 
 [Footnote 2: See the Oeconomicus of Xenophon, cap. iii. 12, vii.
 5.]
 
-[Footnote 3: The beginning of the Platonic Charmidês illustrates
+[Footnote 3: The beginning of the Platonic CharmidÃªs illustrates
 what is here said, pp. 154-155; also that of the Protagoras and
 Lysis, pp. 205-206.
 
 Xenophon, Sympos. i. 8-11; iv. 11, 15. Memorab. i. 3, 8-14 (what
-Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Kritobulus). Dikæarchus
+Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Kritobulus). DikÃ¦archus
 (companion of Aristotle) disapproved the important influence which
 Plato assigned to Eros (Cicero, Tusc. D. iv. 34-71).
 
 If we pass to the second century after the Christian Era, we find
-some speakers in Athenæus blaming severely the amorous sentiments
+some speakers in AthenÃ¦us blaming severely the amorous sentiments
 of Sokrates and the narrative of Alkibiades, as recited in the
-Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 506-508 C). Athenæus remarks
+Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 506-508 C). AthenÃ¦us remarks
 farther, that Plato, writing in this strain, had little right to
 complain (as we read in the Republic) of the licentious
 compositions of Homer and other poets, and to exclude them from
 his model city. Maximus Tyrius, in one of his four discourses
-(23-5) on the [Greek: e)rôtikê\] of Sokrates, makes the same remark as
-Athenæus about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from
+(23-5) on the [Greek: e)rÃ´tikÃª\] of Sokrates, makes the same remark as
+AthenÃ¦us about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from
 the model city, and composing what we read in the Symposion; he
 farther observes that the erotic dispositions of Sokrates provoked
 no censure from his numerous enemies at the time (though they
 assailed him upon so many other points), but had incurred great
 censure from contemporaries of Maximus himself, to whom he
-replies--[Greek: tou\s nuni\ katêgo/rous] (23, 6-7). The
+replies--[Greek: tou\s nuni\ katÃªgo/rous] (23, 6-7). The
 comparisons which he institutes (23, 9) between the sentiments and
 phrases of Sokrates, and those of Sappho and Anakreon, are very
 curious.
 
-Dionysius of Halikarnassus speaks of the [Greek: e)gkô/mia] on
+Dionysius of Halikarnassus speaks of the [Greek: e)gkÃ´/mia] on
 Eros in the Symposion, as "unworthy of serious handling or of
 Sokrates". (De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1027.)
 
 But the most bitter among all the critics of Plato, is
-Herakleitus--author of the Allegoriæ Homericæ. Herakleitus repels,
+Herakleitus--author of the AllegoriÃ¦ HomericÃ¦. Herakleitus repels,
 as unjust and calumnious, the sentence of banishment pronounced by
 Plato against Homer, from whom all mental cultivation had been
 derived. He affirms, and tries to show, that the poems of
 Homer--which he admits to be full of immorality if literally
 understood--had an allegorical meaning. He blames Plato for not having
 perceived this; and denounces him still more severely for the
-character of his own writings--[Greek: e)r)r(i/phthô de\ kai\
-Pla/tôn o( ko/lax, O(mê/rou sukopha/ntês--Tou\s de\ Pla/tônos
-dialo/gous, a)/nô kai\ ka/tô paidikoi\ kathubri/zousin e)/rôtes,
-ou)damou= de ou)chi tê=s a)r)r(e/nos e)pithumi/as mesto/s e)stin
-o( a)nê/r] (Herakl. All. Hom., c. 4-74, ed. Mehler, Leiden,
+character of his own writings--[Greek: e)r)r(i/phthÃ´ de\ kai\
+Pla/tÃ´n o( ko/lax, O(mÃª/rou sukopha/ntÃªs--Tou\s de\ Pla/tÃ´nos
+dialo/gous, a)/nÃ´ kai\ ka/tÃ´ paidikoi\ kathubri/zousin e)/rÃ´tes,
+ou)damou= de ou)chi tÃª=s a)r)r(e/nos e)pithumi/as mesto/s e)stin
+o( a)nÃª/r] (Herakl. All. Hom., c. 4-74, ed. Mehler, Leiden,
 1851).]
 
 [Footnote 4: Plato, Sympos. 182 C. The proceedings of Harmodius
@@ -1920,7 +1889,7 @@ presented itself in the light of a stimulus introductory to the
 work of philosophy--an impulse at first impetuous and
 undistinguishing, but afterwards regulated towards improving
 communion and colloquy with an improvable youth. Personal beauty
-(this is[5] the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the Phædrus) is
+(this is[5] the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the PhÃ¦drus) is
 the main point of visible resemblance between the world of sense
 and the world of Ideas: the Idea of Beauty has a brilliant
 representative of itself among concrete objects--the Ideas of
@@ -1956,13 +1925,13 @@ less approach to it: and the nearer any one approached, the
 greater measure would he ensure to himself of real good and
 happiness.[6]
 
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 E, 250 B-E.]
+[Footnote 5: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 249 E, 250 B-E.]
 
 [Footnote 6: Plato, Sympos. pp. 210-211.
 
 Respecting the Beautiful, I transcribe here a passage from
 Ficinus, in his Argument prefixed to the Hippias Major, p. 757.
-"Unumquodque è singulis pulchris, _pulchrum hoc_ Plato vocat:
+"Unumquodque Ã¨ singulis pulchris, _pulchrum hoc_ Plato vocat:
 formam in omnibus, pulchritudinem; speciem et ideam supra omnia,
 ipsum pulchrum. Primum sensus attingit opinioque. Secundum ratio
 cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur.
@@ -1970,7 +1939,7 @@ cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur.
 "Quid ipsum Bonum? Ipsum rerum omnium principium, actus purus,
 actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum Pulchrum? Vivificus
 actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens, Mentem primo divinam idearum
-ordine infinité decorans, Numina deinde sequentia mentesque
+ordine infinitÃ© decorans, Numina deinde sequentia mentesque
 rationum serie complens, Animas tertio numerosis discursibus
 ornans, Naturas quarto seminibus, formis quinto materiam."]
 
@@ -2015,21 +1984,21 @@ As this is true of the individual, so it is still more true of the
 species: continuance or immortality is secured only by perpetual
 generation of new individuals.
 
-[Footnote 7: Plato, Sympos. pp. 204-205. [Greek: Phe/re, o( e)rô=n
-tô=n a)gathô=n, ti/ e)ra=|? Gene/sthai, ê)=n d' e)gô/, au)tô=|.
-Kai\ ti/ e)/stai e)kei/nô| ô(=| a)\n ge/nêtai ta)gatha/? Tou=t'
-eu)porô/teron, ê)=n d' e)gô/, e)/chô a)pokri/nasthai, o(/ti
-eu)dai/môn e)/stai. Ktê/sei ga/r, e)/phê, a)gathô=n, oi(
+[Footnote 7: Plato, Sympos. pp. 204-205. [Greek: Phe/re, o( e)rÃ´=n
+tÃ´=n a)gathÃ´=n, ti/ e)ra=|? Gene/sthai, Ãª)=n d' e)gÃ´/, au)tÃ´=|.
+Kai\ ti/ e)/stai e)kei/nÃ´| Ã´(=| a)\n ge/nÃªtai ta)gatha/? Tou=t'
+eu)porÃ´/teron, Ãª)=n d' e)gÃ´/, e)/chÃ´ a)pokri/nasthai, o(/ti
+eu)dai/mÃ´n e)/stai. KtÃª/sei ga/r, e)/phÃª, a)gathÃ´=n, oi(
 eu)dai/mones eu)dai/mones; Kai\ ou)ke/ti prosdei= e)re/sthai,
-i(/na ti/ de\ bou/letai eu)dai/môn ei)=nai o( boulo/menos, a)lla\
-te/los dokei= e)/chein ê( a)po/krisis. . . . Tau/tên dê\ tê\n
-bou/lêsin kai\ to\n e)/rôta tou=ton, po/tera koino\n ei)=nai
-pa/ntôn a)nthrô/pôn, kai\ pa/ntas ta)gatha\ bou/lesthai au)toi=s
-ei)=nai a)ei/, ê)\ pô=s le/geis? Ou(/tôs, ê)=n d' e)gô/, koino\n
-ei)=nai pa/ntôn.]]
+i(/na ti/ de\ bou/letai eu)dai/mÃ´n ei)=nai o( boulo/menos, a)lla\
+te/los dokei= e)/chein Ãª( a)po/krisis. . . . Tau/tÃªn dÃª\ tÃª\n
+bou/lÃªsin kai\ to\n e)/rÃ´ta tou=ton, po/tera koino\n ei)=nai
+pa/ntÃ´n a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n, kai\ pa/ntas ta)gatha\ bou/lesthai au)toi=s
+ei)=nai a)ei/, Ãª)\ pÃ´=s le/geis? Ou(/tÃ´s, Ãª)=n d' e)gÃ´/, koino\n
+ei)=nai pa/ntÃ´n.]]
 
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 A. [Greek: ô(s ou)de/n ge
-a)/llo e)sti\n ou)= e)rô=sin a)/nthrôpoi ê)\ tou= a)gathou=.]]
+[Footnote 8: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 A. [Greek: Ã´(s ou)de/n ge
+a)/llo e)sti\n ou)= e)rÃ´=sin a)/nthrÃ´poi Ãª)\ tou= a)gathou=.]]
 
 [Footnote 9: Plato, Sympos. p. 207 C.]
 
@@ -2070,11 +2039,11 @@ that they can hardly live apart: so anxious are both of them to
 foster and confirm the newly acquired mental force of which each
 is respectively conscious in himself.[12]
 
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 E. [Greek: o(/then dê\ tô=|
-kuou=nti/ te kai\ ê)/dê spargô=nti pollê\ ê( pto/êsis ge/gone
-peri\ to\ kalo\n dia\ to\ mega/lês ô)di=nos a)polu/ein to\n
-e)/chonta. E)sti\ ga\r ou) tou= kalou= o( e)/rôs, a)lla\--tê=s
-gennê/seôs kai\ tou= to/kou e)n tô=| kalô=|.]]
+[Footnote 11: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 E. [Greek: o(/then dÃª\ tÃ´=|
+kuou=nti/ te kai\ Ãª)/dÃª spargÃ´=nti pollÃª\ Ãª( pto/Ãªsis ge/gone
+peri\ to\ kalo\n dia\ to\ mega/lÃªs Ã´)di=nos a)polu/ein to\n
+e)/chonta. E)sti\ ga\r ou) tou= kalou= o( e)/rÃ´s, a)lla\--tÃª=s
+gennÃª/seÃ´s kai\ tou= to/kou e)n tÃ´=| kalÃ´=|.]]
 
 [Footnote 12: Plato, Sympos. p. 209.]
 
@@ -2103,9 +2072,9 @@ youth.[14]
 
 [Footnote 13: Plato, Symposion, p. 211.]
 
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, p. 211 B. [Greek: o(/tan dê/ tis
-a)po\ tô=nde dia\ to\ o)rthô=s paiderastei=n e)paniô\n e)kei=no
-to\ kalo\n a)/rchêtai kathora=|n, schedo\n a)/n ti a(/ptoito tou=
+[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, p. 211 B. [Greek: o(/tan dÃª/ tis
+a)po\ tÃ´=nde dia\ to\ o)rthÃ´=s paiderastei=n e)paniÃ´\n e)kei=no
+to\ kalo\n a)/rchÃªtai kathora=|n, schedo\n a)/n ti a(/ptoito tou=
 te/lous], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic
@@ -2123,7 +2092,7 @@ purpose of the Symposion is to contrast this Platonic view of Eros
 or Love--which is assigned to Sokrates in the dialogue, and is
 repeated by him from the communication of a prophetic woman named
 Diotima[15]--with different views assigned to other speakers. Each
-of the guests at the Banquet--Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus,
+of the guests at the Banquet--PhÃ¦drus, Pausanias, Eryximachus,
 Aristophanes, Agathon, Sokrates--engages to deliver a panegyric on
 Eros: while Alkibiades, entering intoxicated after the speeches
 are finished, delivers a panegyric on Sokrates, in regard to
@@ -2135,18 +2104,18 @@ had acquired over that insolent youth, who seeks in every
 conceivable manner to render himself acceptable to Sokrates--are
 emphatically extolled, and illustrated by singular details.
 
-[Footnote 15: Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikê=s
-Dioti/mas, ê( tau=ta/ te sophê\ ê)=n kai\ a)/lla polla/, kai\
-A)thênai/ois pote\ thusame/nois pro\ tou= loimou= de/ka e)/tê
-a)nabolê\n e)poi/êse tê=s no/sou, ê)\ dê\ kai\ e)me\ ta\ e)rôtika\
+[Footnote 15: Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikÃª=s
+Dioti/mas, Ãª( tau=ta/ te sophÃª\ Ãª)=n kai\ a)/lla polla/, kai\
+A)thÃªnai/ois pote\ thusame/nois pro\ tou= loimou= de/ka e)/tÃª
+a)nabolÃª\n e)poi/Ãªse tÃª=s no/sou, Ãª)\ dÃª\ kai\ e)me\ ta\ e)rÃ´tika\
 e)di/daxen.]
 
-Instead of [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikê=s], which was the old
+Instead of [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikÃª=s], which was the old
 reading, Stallbaum and other editors prefer to write [Greek:
-gunaiko\s Mantinikê=s], also 211 D. I cannot but think that
-[Greek: mantikê=s] is right. There is no pertinence or fit
-meaning in [Greek: Mantinikê=s], whereas the word [Greek:
-mantikê=s] is in full keeping with what is said about the special
+gunaiko\s MantinikÃª=s], also 211 D. I cannot but think that
+[Greek: mantikÃª=s] is right. There is no pertinence or fit
+meaning in [Greek: MantinikÃª=s], whereas the word [Greek:
+mantikÃª=s] is in full keeping with what is said about the special
 religious privileges and revelations of Diotima--that she procured
 for the Athenians an adjournment of the plague for ten years. The
 Delphian oracle assured the Lydian king Kroesus that Apollo had
@@ -2154,17 +2123,17 @@ obtained from the [Greek: Moi=rai] a postponement of the ruin of
 the Lydian kingdom for three years, but that he could obtain from
 them no more (Herodot. i. 91).]
 
-[Side-note: Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias,
+[Side-note: Views of Eros presented by PhÃ¦drus, Pausanias,
 Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon.]
 
-Both Phædrus[16] and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon
+Both PhÃ¦drus[16] and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon
 Eros, dwell upon that God as creating within the human bosom by
 his inspirations the noblest self-denial and the most devoted
 heroism, together with the strongest incentives to virtuous
 behaviour. Pausanias however makes distinctions: recognising and
 condemning various erotic manifestations as abusive, violent,
 sensual--and supposing for these a separate inspiring Deity--Eros
-Pandêmus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius[17]
+PandÃªmus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius[17]
 or Coelestis. In regard to the different views taken of Eros by
 Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon--the first is medical,
 physiological, cosmical[18]--the second is comic and imaginative,
@@ -2176,14 +2145,14 @@ enunciate the opinions communicated to him by the prophetess
 Diotima.
 
 [Footnote 16: Sydenham conceives and Boeckh (ad Plat. Legg. iii.
-694) concurs with him, that this discourse, assigned to Phædrus,
+694) concurs with him, that this discourse, assigned to PhÃ¦drus,
 is intended by Plato as an imitation of the style of Lysias. This
 is sufficiently probable. The encomium on Eros delivered by
 Agathon, especially the concluding part of it (p. 197), mimics the
 style of florid effeminate poetry, overcharged with balanced
-phrases ([Greek: i)so/kôla, a)nti/theta]), which Aristophanes
+phrases ([Greek: i)so/kÃ´la, a)nti/theta]), which Aristophanes
 parodies in Agathon's name at the beginning of the
-Thesmophoriazusæ, Athenæus, v. 187 C.]
+ThesmophoriazusÃ¦, AthenÃ¦us, v. 187 C.]
 
 [Footnote 17: Plato, Sympos. pp. 180-181.]
 
@@ -2195,7 +2164,7 @@ invocation with which the poem of Lucretius opens, and the
 fragmentary exordium remaining from the poem of Parmenides.]
 
 [Side-note: Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He
-describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between
+describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate DÃ¦mon between
 Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining
 it.]
 
@@ -2203,7 +2172,7 @@ Sokrates treats most of the preceding panegyrics as pleasing
 fancies not founded in truth. In his representation (cited from
 Diotima) Eros is neither beautiful, nor good, nor happy; nor is he
 indeed a God at all. He is one of the numerous intermediate body
-of Dæmons, inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as
+of DÃ¦mons, inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as
 interpreting agents of communication between the two.[19] Eros is
 the offspring of Poverty and Resource (Porus).[20] He represents
 the state of aspiration and striving, with ability and energy,
@@ -2227,22 +2196,22 @@ towards a goal never attained.[22]
 
 [Footnote 20: What Sokrates says here in the Symposion about Eros
 is altogether at variance with what Sokrates says about Eros in
-Phædrus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence
-and awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of Aphroditê (Phædrus,
+PhÃ¦drus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence
+and awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of AphroditÃª (PhÃ¦drus,
 pp. 242 D, 243 D, 257 A).]
 
-[Footnote 21: Plato, Symposion, pp. 199-200. [Greek: O( E)/rôs
-e)/rôs e)sti\n ou)deno\s ê(\ tino/s? Pa/nu me\n ou)=n
-e)/stin. . . . Po/teron o( E)/rôs e)kei/nou ou(= e)/stin e)/rôs,
-e)pithumei= au)tou= ê)\ ou)/? Pa/nu ge. . . . A)na/gkê to\
-e)pithumou=n e)pithumei=n ou)= e)ndee/s e)stin, ê)\ mê\
-e)pithumei=n, e)a\n mê\ e)ndee\s ê)=|.]]
+[Footnote 21: Plato, Symposion, pp. 199-200. [Greek: O( E)/rÃ´s
+e)/rÃ´s e)sti\n ou)deno\s Ãª(\ tino/s? Pa/nu me\n ou)=n
+e)/stin. . . . Po/teron o( E)/rÃ´s e)kei/nou ou(= e)/stin e)/rÃ´s,
+e)pithumei= au)tou= Ãª)\ ou)/? Pa/nu ge. . . . A)na/gkÃª to\
+e)pithumou=n e)pithumei=n ou)= e)ndee/s e)stin, Ãª)\ mÃª\
+e)pithumei=n, e)a\n mÃª\ e)ndee\s Ãª)=|.]]
 
 [Footnote 22: Plato, Sympos. p. 204 A. [Greek: Ti/nes ou)=n oi(
-philosophou=ntes, ei) mê/te oi( sophoi\ mê/te oi( a)mathei=s?
-. . . Oi( metaxu\ tou/tôn a)mphote/rôn, ô(=n au)= kai\ o( E)/rôs.
-E)sti\ ga\r dê\ tô=n kalli/stôn ê( sophi/a, E)/rôs d' e)sti\n
-e)/rôs peri\ to\ kalo/n; ô(/ste a)nagkai=on E)/rôta philo/sophon
+philosophou=ntes, ei) mÃª/te oi( sophoi\ mÃª/te oi( a)mathei=s?
+. . . Oi( metaxu\ tou/tÃ´n a)mphote/rÃ´n, Ã´(=n au)= kai\ o( E)/rÃ´s.
+E)sti\ ga\r dÃª\ tÃ´=n kalli/stÃ´n Ãª( sophi/a, E)/rÃ´s d' e)sti\n
+e)/rÃ´s peri\ to\ kalo/n; Ã´(/ste a)nagkai=on E)/rÃ´ta philo/sophon
 ei)=nai, philo/sophon de\ o)/nta metaxu\ ei)=nai sophou= kai\
 a)mathou=s.]]
 
@@ -2267,13 +2236,13 @@ elements--moreover the object of the one and supreme science.[23]
 
 [Footnote 23: Plato, Symposion, pp. 210-211.]
 
-[Side-note: Eros as presented in the Phædrus--Discourse of Lysias,
+[Side-note: Eros as presented in the PhÃ¦drus--Discourse of Lysias,
 and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is
 seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on
 Eros.]
 
-I will now compare the Symposion with the Phædrus. In the first
-half of the Phædrus also, Eros, and the Self-Beautiful or the pure
+I will now compare the Symposion with the PhÃ¦drus. In the first
+half of the PhÃ¦drus also, Eros, and the Self-Beautiful or the pure
 Idea of the Beautiful, are brought into close coalescence with
 philosophy and dialectic--but they are presented in a different
 manner. Plato begins by setting forth the case against Eros in two
@@ -2292,13 +2261,13 @@ feeling, Sokrates becomes ashamed of having thus slandered the
 divine Eros, and proceeds to deliver a counter-panegyric or
 palinode upon that God.[26]
 
-[Footnote 24: Plato, Phædrus, p. 230 seq.]
+[Footnote 24: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 230 seq.]
 
-[Footnote 25: Plato, Phædrus, p. 237 seq.]
+[Footnote 25: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 237 seq.]
 
-[Footnote 26: Eros, in the Phædrus, is pronounced to be a God, son
-of Aphroditê (p. 242 E); in the Symposion he is not a God but a
-Dæmon, offspring of Porus and Penia, and attendant on Aphroditê,
+[Footnote 26: Eros, in the PhÃ¦drus, is pronounced to be a God, son
+of AphroditÃª (p. 242 E); in the Symposion he is not a God but a
+DÃ¦mon, offspring of Porus and Penia, and attendant on AphroditÃª,
 according to Diotima and Sokrates (p. 203).]
 
 [Side-note: Panegyric--Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros
@@ -2323,30 +2292,30 @@ concentration upon narrow objects which is so much praised by
 mankind generally.[30] The inspired and exalted lover deserves
 every preference over the unimpassioned friend.
 
-[Footnote 27: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. [Greek: to\ a)/phron
-tê=s dianoi/as e(/n ti koinê=| ei)=dos. . . . to\ tê=s paranoi/as
-ô(s e(\n e)n ê(mi=n pephuko\s ei)=dos.] Compare p. 236 A.]
+[Footnote 27: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 265-266. [Greek: to\ a)/phron
+tÃª=s dianoi/as e(/n ti koinÃª=| ei)=dos. . . . to\ tÃª=s paranoi/as
+Ã´(s e(\n e)n Ãª(mi=n pephuko\s ei)=dos.] Compare p. 236 A.]
 
-[Footnote 28: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: Mani/as de/ ge
-ei)/dê du/o; tê\n me/n, u(po\ nosêma/tôn a)nthrôpi/nôn, tê\n de/,
-u(po\ thei/as e)xallagê=s tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn gignome/nên.]
+[Footnote 28: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 265 A. [Greek: Mani/as de/ ge
+ei)/dÃª du/o; tÃª\n me/n, u(po\ nosÃªma/tÃ´n a)nthrÃ´pi/nÃ´n, tÃª\n de/,
+u(po\ thei/as e)xallagÃª=s tÃ´=n ei)Ã´tho/tÃ´n nomi/mÃ´n gignome/nÃªn.]
 Compare 249 D.]
 
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Phædrus, p. 244 A. [Greek: ei) me\n ga\r ê)=n
-a(plou=n to\ mani/an kako\n ei)=nai, kalô=s a)\n e)le/geto; nu=n
-de\ ta\ me/gista tô=n a)gathô=n ê(mi=n gi/gnetai dia\ mani/as,
-thei/a| me/ntoi do/sei didome/nês.]
+[Footnote 29: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 244 A. [Greek: ei) me\n ga\r Ãª)=n
+a(plou=n to\ mani/an kako\n ei)=nai, kalÃ´=s a)\n e)le/geto; nu=n
+de\ ta\ me/gista tÃ´=n a)gathÃ´=n Ãª(mi=n gi/gnetai dia\ mani/as,
+thei/a| me/ntoi do/sei didome/nÃªs.]
 
-Compare Plutarch, [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], c. 16. pp. 758-759, &c.]
+Compare Plutarch, [Greek: E)rÃ´tiko/s], c. 16. pp. 758-759, &c.]
 
-[Footnote 30: Plato, Phædrus, p. 245 B. [Greek: mêde/ tis ê(ma=s
-lo/gos thorubei/tô deditto/menos ô(s pro\ tou= kekinême/nou to\n
-sô/phrona dei= proairei=sthai phi/lon.]
+[Footnote 30: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 245 B. [Greek: mÃªde/ tis Ãª(ma=s
+lo/gos thorubei/tÃ´ deditto/menos Ã´(s pro\ tou= kekinÃªme/nou to\n
+sÃ´/phrona dei= proairei=sthai phi/lon.]
 
-P. 256 E; [Greek: ê( de\ a)po\ tou= mê\ e)rô=ntos oi)keio/tês,
-sôphrosu/nê| thnêtê=| kekrame/nê, thnêta/ te kai\ pheidôla\
-oi)konomou=sa, a)neleutheri/an u(po\ plê/thous e)panoume/nên ô(s
-a)retê\n tê=| phi/lê|** psuchê=| e)ntekou=sa], &c.]
+P. 256 E; [Greek: Ãª( de\ a)po\ tou= mÃª\ e)rÃ´=ntos oi)keio/tÃªs,
+sÃ´phrosu/nÃª| thnÃªtÃª=| kekrame/nÃª, thnÃªta/ te kai\ pheidÃ´la\
+oi)konomou=sa, a)neleutheri/an u(po\ plÃª/thous e)panoume/nÃªn Ã´(s
+a)retÃª\n tÃª=| phi/lÃª|** psuchÃª=| e)ntekou=sa], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the
 immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal
@@ -2378,11 +2347,11 @@ horses: some however succeed partially, obtaining glimpses of
 Truth and of the general Ideas, though in a manner transient and
 incomplete.
 
-[Footnote 31: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 245-246. Compare Krische, De
-Platonis Phædro, pp. 49-50 (Göttingen, 1848).
+[Footnote 31: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 245-246. Compare Krische, De
+Platonis PhÃ¦dro, pp. 49-50 (GÃ¶ttingen, 1848).
 
 Plato himself calls this panegyric in the mouth of Sokrates a
-[Greek: muthiko/s tis u(/mnos] (Phædr. p. 265 D).]
+[Greek: muthiko/s tis u(/mnos] (PhÃ¦dr. p. 265 D).]
 
 [Footnote 32: The reader will recollect Homer, Iliad, xvi. 152,
 where the chariot and horses of Patroklus are described, when he
@@ -2420,18 +2389,18 @@ Hence he is set down as a madman by the generality of mankind,
 whose minds have not ascended beyond particular and present
 phenomena to the revival of the anterior Ideas.
 
-[Footnote 33: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249-250. [Greek: pa=sa me\n
-a)nthrô/pou psuchê\ phu/sei tethe/atai ta\ o)/nta--ê)\ ou)k a)\n
-ê)=lthen ei)s to/de** to\ zô=on; a)namimnê/skesthai d' e)k tô=nde
-e)kei=na ou) r(a/|dion a(pa/sê|], &c.]
+[Footnote 33: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 249-250. [Greek: pa=sa me\n
+a)nthrÃ´/pou psuchÃª\ phu/sei tethe/atai ta\ o)/nta--Ãª)\ ou)k a)\n
+Ãª)=lthen ei)s to/de** to\ zÃ´=on; a)namimnÃª/skesthai d' e)k tÃ´=nde
+e)kei=na ou) r(a/|dion a(pa/sÃª|], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 34: Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 B. [Greek: Ou) ga\r ê(/ ge
-mê/ pote i)dou=sa tê\n a)lê/theian ei)s to/de ê(/xei to\ schê=ma.
-Dei= ga\r a)/nthrôpon xunie/nai kat' ei)=dos lego/menon, e)k
-pollô=n i)o\n ai)sthê/seôn ei)s e(\n logismô=| xunairou/menon.
-Tou=to de/ e)stin a)na/mnêsis e)kei/nôn, a(/ pot' ei)=den ê(mô=n
-ê( psuchê\ sumporeuthei=sa theô=| kai\ u(peridou=sa a(\ nu=n
-ei)=nai/ phamen, kai\ a)naku/psasa ei)s to\ o)\n o)/ntôs.]]
+[Footnote 34: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 249 B. [Greek: Ou) ga\r Ãª(/ ge
+mÃª/ pote i)dou=sa tÃª\n a)lÃª/theian ei)s to/de Ãª(/xei to\ schÃª=ma.
+Dei= ga\r a)/nthrÃ´pon xunie/nai kat' ei)=dos lego/menon, e)k
+pollÃ´=n i)o\n ai)sthÃª/seÃ´n ei)s e(\n logismÃ´=| xunairou/menon.
+Tou=to de/ e)stin a)na/mnÃªsis e)kei/nÃ´n, a(/ pot' ei)=den Ãª(mÃ´=n
+Ãª( psuchÃª\ sumporeuthei=sa theÃ´=| kai\ u(peridou=sa a(\ nu=n
+ei)=nai/ phamen, kai\ a)naku/psasa ei)s to\ o)\n o)/ntÃ´s.]]
 
 [Side-note: Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the
 philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great
@@ -2469,27 +2438,27 @@ developing the highest powers and virtues of the mind; which must
 spring, not from human prudence and sobriety, but from divine
 madness or erotic inspiration.[35]
 
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 B. [Greek: ou(= mei=zon
-a)gatho\n ou)/te sôphrosu/nê a)nthrôpi/nê ou)/te thei/a mani/a
-dunatê\ pori/sai a)nthrô/pô|.]--245 B: [Greek: e)p' eu)tuchi/a
-tê=| megi/stê| para\ theô=n ê( toiau/tê mani/a di/dotai.]
+[Footnote 35: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 256 B. [Greek: ou(= mei=zon
+a)gatho\n ou)/te sÃ´phrosu/nÃª a)nthrÃ´pi/nÃª ou)/te thei/a mani/a
+dunatÃª\ pori/sai a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´|.]--245 B: [Greek: e)p' eu)tuchi/a
+tÃª=| megi/stÃª| para\ theÃ´=n Ãª( toiau/tÃª mani/a di/dotai.]
 
 The long and highly poetical mythe, of which I have given some of
 the leading points, occupies from c. 51 to c. 83 (pp. 244-257) of
 the dialogue. It is adapted to the Hellenic imagination, and
-requires the reader to keep before him the palæstræ of Athens, as
-described in the Lysis, Erastæ, and Charmidês of Plato--visited
+requires the reader to keep before him the palÃ¦strÃ¦ of Athens, as
+described in the Lysis, ErastÃ¦, and CharmidÃªs of Plato--visited
 both by men like Sokrates and by men like Kritias (Xenoph. Memor.
 i. 2, 29).]
 
-Such is the general tenor of the dialogue Phædrus, in its first
+Such is the general tenor of the dialogue PhÃ¦drus, in its first
 half: which presents to us the Platonic love, conceived as the
 source and mainspring of exalted virtue--as the only avenue to
 philosophy--as contrasted, not merely with sensual love, but also
 with the sobriety of the decent citizen who fully conforms to the
 teaching of Law and Custom. In the Symposion, the first of these
 contrasts appears prominently, while the second is less noticed.
-In the Phædrus, Sokrates declares emphatically that madness, of a
+In the PhÃ¦drus, Sokrates declares emphatically that madness, of a
 certain sort, is greatly preferable to sobriety: that the
 temperate, respectable, orthodox citizen, is on the middle line,
 some madmen being worse than he, but others better: that madness
@@ -2503,7 +2472,7 @@ or some other God. This last contrast, as I have just observed, is
 little marked in the Symposion. But on the other hand, the
 Symposion (especially the discourse of Sokrates and his repetition
 of the lessons of Diotima), insists much more upon the
-generalisation of the erotic impulse. In the Phædrus, we still
+generalisation of the erotic impulse. In the PhÃ¦drus, we still
 remain on the ground of fervent attachment between two
 individuals--an attachment sentimental and virtuous, displaying
 itself in an intercourse which elicits from both of them active
@@ -2516,7 +2485,7 @@ and enlarging itself not merely to embrace pursuits, and
 institutions, but also to the plenitude and great ocean of Beauty
 in its largest sense.
 
-[Side-note: Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and
+[Side-note: Elevating influence ascribed, both in PhÃ¦drus and
 Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of
 poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory.]
 
@@ -2545,9 +2514,9 @@ Absolute--[Greek: to\ Kalo\n--to\ au)to\-kalo\n]--the "full sea of
 the beautiful". Not without reason does Diotima express a doubt
 whether Sokrates (if we mean thereby the historical Sokrates)
 could have followed so bold a flight. His wings might probably
-have failed and dropped him: as we read in the Phædrus respecting
+have failed and dropped him: as we read in the PhÃ¦drus respecting
 the unprepared souls who try to rise aloft in company with the
-Gods. Plato alone is the true Dædalus equal to this flight, borne
+Gods. Plato alone is the true DÃ¦dalus equal to this flight, borne
 up by wings not inferior to those of Pindar[37]--according to the
 comparison of Dionysius of Halikarnassus.
 
@@ -2559,41 +2528,41 @@ which appear to us unconnected and even discordant, is certainly
 remarkable. We have to recognise material differences in the turn
 of imagination, as between different persons and ages. The
 following remark of Professor Mohl, respecting the Persian lyric
-poet Hafiz, illustrates this point. "Au reste, quand même nous
-serions mieux renseignés sur sa vie, il resterait toujours pour
-nous le singulier spectacle d'un homme qui tantôt célèbre
-l'absorption de l'âme dans l'essence de Dieu, tantôt chante le vin
-et l'amour, sans grossièreté, il est vrai, mais avec un laisser
-aller et un naturel qui exclut toute idée de symbolisme--et qui
-généralement glisse de l'une dans l'autre de ces deux manières de
-sentir, qui nous paraissent si différentes, sans s'apercevoir
-lui-même qu'il change de sujet. Les Orientaux ont cherché la solution
-de cette difficulté dans une interprétation mystique de toutes ses
-poésies; mais les textes s'y refusent. Des critiques modernes ont
+poet Hafiz, illustrates this point. "Au reste, quand mÃªme nous
+serions mieux renseignÃ©s sur sa vie, il resterait toujours pour
+nous le singulier spectacle d'un homme qui tantÃ´t cÃ©lÃ¨bre
+l'absorption de l'Ã¢me dans l'essence de Dieu, tantÃ´t chante le vin
+et l'amour, sans grossiÃ¨retÃ©, il est vrai, mais avec un laisser
+aller et un naturel qui exclut toute idÃ©e de symbolisme--et qui
+gÃ©nÃ©ralement glisse de l'une dans l'autre de ces deux maniÃ¨res de
+sentir, qui nous paraissent si diffÃ©rentes, sans s'apercevoir
+lui-mÃªme qu'il change de sujet. Les Orientaux ont cherchÃ© la solution
+de cette difficultÃ© dans une interprÃ©tation mystique de toutes ses
+poÃ©sies; mais les textes s'y refusent. Des critiques modernes ont
 voulu l'expliquer en supposant une hypocrisie de l'auteur, qui lui
-aurait fait mêler une certaine dose de piété mystique, à ses vers
-plus légers, pour les faire passer: mais ce calcul parait étranger
-à la nature de l'homme. Je crois qu'il faut trouver le mot de
-l'énigme dans l'état général des esprits et de la culture de son
-temps: et la difficulté pour nous est seulement de nous
-réprésenter assez vivement l'état des esprits en Perse à cette
-époque, et la nature de l'influence que le Soufisme y exerçait
-depuis des siècles sur toutes les classes cultivées de la
-nation."--Mohl (Rapport Annuel à la Société Asiatique, 1861, p.
+aurait fait mÃªler une certaine dose de piÃ©tÃ© mystique, Ã  ses vers
+plus lÃ©gers, pour les faire passer: mais ce calcul parait Ã©tranger
+Ã  la nature de l'homme. Je crois qu'il faut trouver le mot de
+l'Ã©nigme dans l'Ã©tat gÃ©nÃ©ral des esprits et de la culture de son
+temps: et la difficultÃ© pour nous est seulement de nous
+rÃ©prÃ©senter assez vivement l'Ã©tat des esprits en Perse Ã  cette
+Ã©poque, et la nature de l'influence que le Soufisme y exerÃ§ait
+depuis des siÃ¨cles sur toutes les classes cultivÃ©es de la
+nation."--Mohl (Rapport Annuel Ã  la SociÃ©tÃ© Asiatique, 1861, p.
 89.)]
 
 [Footnote 37: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosth., p. 972,
 Reiske.]
 
 Various remarks may be made, in comparing this exposition of
-Diotima in the Symposion with that which we read in the Phædrus
-and Phædon.
+Diotima in the Symposion with that which we read in the PhÃ¦drus
+and PhÃ¦don.
 
-[Side-note: Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling
+[Side-note: Differences between Symposion and PhÃ¦drus. In-dwelling
 conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the
 latter.]
 
-First, in the Phædrus and Phædon (also in the Timæus and
+First, in the PhÃ¦drus and PhÃ¦don (also in the TimÃ¦us and
 elsewhere), the pre-existence of the soul, and its antecedent
 familiarity, greater or less, with the world of Ideas,--are
 brought into the foreground; so as to furnish a basis for that
@@ -2616,8 +2585,8 @@ in-dwelling conceptions.
 [Side-note: Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in
 Symposion.]
 
-Secondly, in the Phædrus and Phædon, the soul is declared to be
-immortal, _à parte post_ as well as _à parte ante_. But in the
+Secondly, in the PhÃ¦drus and PhÃ¦don, the soul is declared to be
+immortal, _Ã  parte post_ as well as _Ã  parte ante_. But in the
 Symposion, this is affirmed to be impossible.[38] The soul yearns
 for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only
 reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific
@@ -2631,7 +2600,7 @@ in the memory of others.
 [Side-note: Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively
 in Symposion.]
 
-Thirdly, in Phædrus, Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato
+Thirdly, in PhÃ¦drus, PhÃ¦don, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato
 recognises many distinct Forms or Ideas--a world or aggregate of
 such Entia Rationis[39]--among which Beauty is one, but only one.
 It is the exalted privilege of the philosophic mind to come into
@@ -2644,21 +2613,21 @@ were the sole occupation of the most exalted philosophy.
 a)/dikon, kako/n, ai)schro/n], as well as Forms of [Greek:
 di/kaion, a)gatho/n, kalo/n], &c.]
 
-[Side-note: Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as
+[Side-note: Eros recognised, both in PhÃ¦drus and Symposion, as
 affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised
-in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere.]
+in PhÃ¦don, TheÃ¦tÃªtus, and elsewhere.]
 
-Fourthly, The Phædrus and Symposion have, both of them in common,
+Fourthly, The PhÃ¦drus and Symposion have, both of them in common,
 the theory of Eros as the indispensable, initiatory, stimulus to
 philosophy. The spectacle of a beautiful youth is considered
 necessary to set light to various elements in the mind, which
 would otherwise remain dormant and never burn: it enables the
 pregnant and capable mind to bring forth what it has within and to
-put out its hidden strength. But if we look to the Phædon,
-Theætêtus, Sophistês, or Republic, we shall not find Eros invoked
+put out its hidden strength. But if we look to the PhÃ¦don,
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus, SophistÃªs, or Republic, we shall not find Eros invoked
 for any such function. The Republic describes an elaborate scheme
 for generating and developing the philosophic capacity: but Eros
-plays no part in it. In the Theætêtus, the young man so named is
+plays no part in it. In the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, the young man so named is
 announced as having a pregnant mind requiring to be disburthened,
 and great capacity which needs foreign aid to develop it: the
 service needed is rendered by Sokrates, who possesses an obstetric
@@ -2668,7 +2637,7 @@ personal ugliness of both persons in the dialogue is emphatically
 signified.
 
 I note these peculiarities, partly of the Symposion, partly of the
-Phædrus along with it--to illustrate the varying points of view
+PhÃ¦drus along with it--to illustrate the varying points of view
 which the reader must expect to meet in travelling through the
 numerous Platonic dialogues.
 
@@ -2727,18 +2696,18 @@ the same mixture of humble veneration and earnest attachment.
 
 [Footnote 41: Plato, Sympos. p. 219. See also, respecting the
 historical Alkibiades and his characte, Thucyd. vi. 15; Xenoph.
-Memor. i. 1; Antisthenes, apud Athenæum, xii. 534.
+Memor. i. 1; Antisthenes, apud AthenÃ¦um, xii. 534.
 
 The invention of Plato goes beyond that of those ingenious men who
-recounted how Phrynê and Lais had failed in attempts to overcome
+recounted how PhrynÃª and Lais had failed in attempts to overcome
 the continence of Xenokrates, Diog. L. iv. 7: and the saying of
-Lais, [Greek: ô(s ou)k a)p' a)ndro/s, a)ll' a)p' a)ndri/antos,
-a)nastai/ê.] Quintilian (viii. 4, 22-23) aptly enough compares the
+Lais, [Greek: Ã´(s ou)k a)p' a)ndro/s, a)ll' a)p' a)ndri/antos,
+a)nastai/Ãª.] Quintilian (viii. 4, 22-23) aptly enough compares the
 description given by Alkibiades--as the maximum of testimony to
 the "invicta continentia" of Sokrates--with the testimony to the
 surpassing beauty of Helen, borne by such witnesses as the Trojan
-[Greek: dêmoge/rontes] and Priam himself (Hom. Iliad iii. 156).
-One of the speakers in Athenæus censures severely this portion of
+[Greek: dÃªmoge/rontes] and Priam himself (Hom. Iliad iii. 156).
+One of the speakers in AthenÃ¦us censures severely this portion of
 the Platonic Symposion, xi. 506 C, 508 D, v. 187 D. Porphyry (in
 his life of Plotinus, 15) tells us that the rhetor Diophanes
 delivered an apology for Alkibiades, in the presence of Plotinus;
@@ -2752,17 +2721,17 @@ despot Hieron and the poet Simonides--the poet, exhorting Hieron
 to govern his subjects in a mild, beneficent, and careful spirit,
 expatiates upon the popularity and warm affection which he will
 thereby attract to himself from them. Of this affection one
-manifestation will be (he says) as follows:--[Greek: ô(/ste ou)
-mo/non philoi=o a)/n, a)lla\ kai\ e)rô=|o, u(p' a)nthrô/pôn; _kai\
-tou\s kalou\s ou) peira=|n, a)lla\ peirô/menon u(p' au)tô=n
+manifestation will be (he says) as follows:--[Greek: Ã´(/ste ou)
+mo/non philoi=o a)/n, a)lla\ kai\ e)rÃ´=|o, u(p' a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n; _kai\
+tou\s kalou\s ou) peira=|n, a)lla\ peirÃ´/menon u(p' au)tÃ´=n
 a)ne/chesthai a)/n se de/oi_], &c.
 
 These words illustrate the adventure described by Alkibiades in
 the Platonic Symposion.
 
-Herakleides of Pontus, Dikæarchus, and the Peripatetic Hieronymus,
-all composed treatises [Greek: Peri\ E)rôtos], especially [Greek:
-peri\ paidikô=n e)rô/tôn] (Athenæ. xiii. 602-603).]
+Herakleides of Pontus, DikÃ¦archus, and the Peripatetic Hieronymus,
+all composed treatises [Greek: Peri\ E)rÃ´tos], especially [Greek:
+peri\ paidikÃ´=n e)rÃ´/tÃ´n] (AthenÃ¦. xiii. 602-603).]
 
 [Side-note: Perfect self-command of Sokrates--proof against every
 sort of trial.]
@@ -2782,7 +2751,7 @@ soul-subduing,[43] and provocative in its effects.
 [Footnote 43: Plato, Sympos. pp. 221-222.
 
 Alkibiades recites acts of distinguished courage performed by
-Sokrates, at the siege of Potidæa as well as at the battle of
+Sokrates, at the siege of PotidÃ¦a as well as at the battle of
 Delium.
 
 About the potent effect produced by the conversation of Sokrates
@@ -2790,7 +2759,7 @@ upon his companions, compare Sympos. p. 173 C-D.
 
 In the Xenophontic Apology (s. 18), Sokrates adverts to the
 undisturbed equanimity which he had shown during the long blockade
-of Athens after the battle of Ægospotami, while others were
+of Athens after the battle of Ã†gospotami, while others were
 bewailing the famine and other miseries.]
 
 [Side-note: Drunkenness of others at the close of the
@@ -2801,7 +2770,7 @@ After the speech of Alkibiades is concluded, the close of the
 banquet is described by the primary narrator. He himself, with
 Agathon and Aristophanes, and several other fresh revellers,
 continue to drink wine until all of them become dead drunk. While
-Phædrus, Eryximachus, and others retire, Sokrates remains. His
+PhÃ¦drus, Eryximachus, and others retire, Sokrates remains. His
 competency to bear the maximum of wine without being disturbed by
 it, is tested to the full. Although he had before, in acceptance
 of the challenge of Alkibiades, swallowed the contents of the wine
@@ -2817,12 +2786,12 @@ activity--bathes--and then visits the gymnasium at the Lykeion;
 where he passes all the day in his usual abundant colloquy.[45]
 
 [Footnote 44: In Sympos. p. 176 B, Sokrates is recognised as
-[Greek: dunatô/tatos pi/nein], above all the rest: no one can be
+[Greek: dunatÃ´/tatos pi/nein], above all the rest: no one can be
 compared with him. In the two first books of the Treatise De
 Legibus, we shall find much to illustrate what is here said (in
 the Symposion) about the power ascribed to him of drinking more
 wine than any one else, without being at all affected by it. Plato
-discusses the subject of strong potations ([Greek: me/thê]) at
+discusses the subject of strong potations ([Greek: me/thÃª]) at
 great length; indeed he seems to fear that his readers will think
 he says too much upon it (i. 642 A). He considers it of great
 advantage to have a test to apply, such as wine, for the purpose
@@ -2831,7 +2800,7 @@ determining how much wine is sufficient to overthrow it, in each
 different case (i. 649 C-E). You can make this trial (he argues)
 in each case, without any danger or harm; and you can thus escape
 the necessity of making the trial in a real case of emergency.
-Plato insists upon the [Greek: chrei/a tê=s me/thês], as a genuine
+Plato insists upon the [Greek: chrei/a tÃª=s me/thÃªs], as a genuine
 test, to be seriously employed for the purpose of testing men's
 reason and force of character (ii. p. 673). In the Republic, too
 (iii. p. 413 E), the [Greek: phu/lakes] are required to be tested,
@@ -2839,7 +2808,7 @@ in regard to their capacity of resisting pleasurable temptation,
 as well as pain and danger.
 
 Among the titles of the lost treatises of Theophrastus, we find
-one [Greek: Peri\ Me/thês] (Diog. L. v. 44). It is one of the
+one [Greek: Peri\ Me/thÃªs] (Diog. L. v. 44). It is one of the
 compliments that the Emperor Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) pays to his
 father--That he was, like Sokrates, equally competent both to
 partake of, and to abstain from, the most seductive enjoyments,
@@ -2847,15 +2816,15 @@ without ever losing his calmness and self-mastery.]
 
 [Footnote 45: Plato, Sympos. p. 223.]
 
-[Side-note: Symposion and Phædon--each is the antithesis and
+[Side-note: Symposion and PhÃ¦don--each is the antithesis and
 complement of the other.]
 
 The picture of Sokrates, in the Symposion, forms a natural
-contrast and complement to the picture of him in the Phædon;
+contrast and complement to the picture of him in the PhÃ¦don;
 though the conjecture of Schleiermacher[46]--that the two together
 are intended to make up the Philosophus, or third member of the
-trilogy promised in the Sophistês--is ingenious rather than
-convincing. The Phædon depicts Sokrates in his last conversation
+trilogy promised in the SophistÃªs--is ingenious rather than
+convincing. The PhÃ¦don depicts Sokrates in his last conversation
 with his friends, immediately before his death; the Symposion
 presents him in the exuberance of life, health, and cheerfulness:
 in both situations, we find the same attributes
@@ -2870,8 +2839,8 @@ madness.[47]
 
 [Footnote 46: Einleitung zum Gastmahl, p. 359 seq.]
 
-[Footnote 47: Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 C-E. [Greek: sôphrosu/nê
-thnêtê/--e)rôtikê\ mani/a: sôphrosu/nê a)nthrôpi/nê--thei/a
+[Footnote 47: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 256 C-E. [Greek: sÃ´phrosu/nÃª
+thnÃªtÃª/--e)rÃ´tikÃª\ mani/a: sÃ´phrosu/nÃª a)nthrÃ´pi/nÃª--thei/a
 mani/a.] Compare p. 244 B.]
 
 [Side-note: Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon.]
@@ -2932,16 +2901,16 @@ preventing confusion and ill-temper from spreading among the
 company:[52] while he at the same time gives prudent advice to the
 Syracusan about the exhibitions likely to be acceptable.
 
-[Footnote 48: Pontianus, one of the speakers in Athenæus (xi.
+[Footnote 48: Pontianus, one of the speakers in AthenÃ¦us (xi.
 504), touches upon some points of this comparison, with a view of
 illustrating the real or supposed enmity between Plato and
 Xenophon; an enmity not in itself improbable, yet not sufficiently
 proved.
 
-Athenæus had before him the Symposion of Epikurus (not preserved)
+AthenÃ¦us had before him the Symposion of Epikurus (not preserved)
 as well as those of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle (xv. 674); and
 we learn from him some of its distinctive points. Masurius (the
-speaker in Athenæus, v. init.) while he recognises in the Symposia
+speaker in AthenÃ¦us, v. init.) while he recognises in the Symposia
 of Xenophon and Plato a dramatic variety of characters and
 smartness--finds fault with both, but especially with Plato, for
 levity, rudeness, indecency, vulgarity, sneering, &c. The talk was
@@ -2949,14 +2918,14 @@ almost entirety upon love and joviality. In the Symposion of
 Epikurus, on the contrary, nothing was said about these topics;
 the guests were fewer, the conversation was grave and dull, upon
 dry topics of science, such as the atomic theory ([Greek:
-prophê/tas a)to/môn], v. 3, 187 B, 177 B. [Greek: E)pi/kouros de\
-sumpo/sion philoso/phôn mo/non pepoi/êtai]), and even upon bodily
+prophÃª/tas a)to/mÃ´n], v. 3, 187 B, 177 B. [Greek: E)pi/kouros de\
+sumpo/sion philoso/phÃ´n mo/non pepoi/Ãªtai]), and even upon bodily
 ailments, such as indigestion or fever (187 C). The philosophers
 present were made by Epikurus to carry on their debate in so
 friendly a spirit, that the critic calls them "flatterers praising
 each other"; while he terms the Platonic guests "sneerers
-insulting each other" ([Greek: muktêristô=n a)llê/lous
-tôthazo/ntôn], 182 A), though this is much more true about the
+insulting each other" ([Greek: muktÃªristÃ´=n a)llÃª/lous
+tÃ´thazo/ntÃ´n], 182 A), though this is much more true about the
 Xenophontic Symposion than about the Platonic. He remarks farther
 that the Symposion of Epikurus included no libation or offering to
 the Gods (179 D).
@@ -2967,21 +2936,21 @@ philosophy represent as thinking about nothing but convivial and
 sexual pleasure.]
 
 [Footnote 49: Xenophon, Sympos. vii. 1; ii. 18-19. [Greek:
-proga/stôr], &c.]
+proga/stÃ´r], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 50: The taunt ascribed to the jester Philippus, about
 the cowardice of the demagogue Peisander, is completely
 Aristophanic, ii. 14; also that of Antisthenes respecting the bad
-temper of Xanthippê, ii. 10; and the caricature of the movements
-of the [Greek: o)rchêstri\s] by Philippus, ii. 21. Compare also
+temper of XanthippÃª, ii. 10; and the caricature of the movements
+of the [Greek: o)rchÃªstri\s] by Philippus, ii. 21. Compare also
 iii. 11.]
 
 [Footnote 51: Xen. Symp. c. 4-5.]
 
-[Footnote 52: Xen. Symp. vi. [Greek: Au)tê\ me\n ê( paroini/a
-ou(/tô katesbe/sthê], vii. 1-5.
+[Footnote 52: Xen. Symp. vi. [Greek: Au)tÃª\ me\n Ãª( paroini/a
+ou(/tÃ´ katesbe/sthÃª], vii. 1-5.
 
-Epiktêtus insists upon this feature in the character of Sokrates--his
+EpiktÃªtus insists upon this feature in the character of Sokrates--his
 patience and power of soothing angry men (ii. 12-14).]
 
 [Side-note: Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic
@@ -2995,18 +2964,18 @@ pointedly distinguishes the sentimental from the sensual. He
 denounces the latter, and confines his panegyric to the
 former--selecting Kallias and Autolykus as honourable examples of it.[54]
 
-[Footnote 53: Xen. Symp. iv. 28. [Greek: a)nami\x e)skôpsa/n te
+[Footnote 53: Xen. Symp. iv. 28. [Greek: a)nami\x e)skÃ´psa/n te
 kai\ e)spou/dasan], viii. 41.]
 
 [Footnote 54: Xen. Symp. viii. 24. The argument against the
 sensual is enforced with so much warmth that Sokrates is made to
 advert to the fact of his being elate with wine--[Greek: o(/ te
-ga\r oi)=nos sunepai/rei, kai\ o( a)ei\ su/noikos e)moi\ e)/rôs
-kentri/zei ei)s to\n a)nti/palon e)/rôta au)tou=
-par)r(êsia/zesthai.]
+ga\r oi)=nos sunepai/rei, kai\ o( a)ei\ su/noikos e)moi\ e)/rÃ´s
+kentri/zei ei)s to\n a)nti/palon e)/rÃ´ta au)tou=
+par)r(Ãªsia/zesthai.]
 
 The contrast between the customs of the Thebans and Eleians, and
-those of the Lacedæmonians, is again noted by Xenophon, Rep.
+those of the LacedÃ¦monians, is again noted by Xenophon, Rep.
 Laced. ii. 13. Plato puts (Symp. 182) a like contrast into the
 mouth of Pausanias, assimilating the customs of Athens in this
 respect to those of Sparta. The comparison between Plato and
@@ -3014,7 +2983,7 @@ Xenophon is here curious; we see how much more copious and
 inventive is the reasoning of Plato.]
 
 The Xenophontic Symposion closes with a pantomimic scene of
-Dionysus and Ariadnê as lovers represented (at the instance of
+Dionysus and AriadnÃª as lovers represented (at the instance of
 Sokrates) by the Syracusan ballet-master and his staff. This is
 described as an exciting spectacle to most of the hearers, married
 as well as unmarried, who retire with agreeable emotions. Sokrates
@@ -3035,7 +3004,7 @@ departs farther from common practice and sentiment, than the
 Xenophontic. It discards all the common accessories of a banquet
 (musical or dancing artists), and throws the guests altogether
 upon their own powers of rhetoric and dialectic, for amusement. If
-we go through the different encomiums upon Eros, by Phædrus,
+we go through the different encomiums upon Eros, by PhÃ¦drus,
 Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Diotima--we shall
 appreciate the many-coloured forms and exuberance of the Platonic
 imagination, as compared with the more restricted range and
@@ -3059,13 +3028,13 @@ yet enjoying a convivial hour, and contributing more than any one
 else to the general hilarity.
 
 [Footnote 56: The difference between the two coincides very much
-with that which is drawn by Plato himself in the Phædrus--[Greek:
-thei/a mani/a] as contrasted with [Greek: sôphrosu/nê thnêtê\] (p.
-256 E). Compare Athenæus, v. 187 B.]
+with that which is drawn by Plato himself in the PhÃ¦drus--[Greek:
+thei/a mani/a] as contrasted with [Greek: sÃ´phrosu/nÃª thnÃªtÃª\] (p.
+256 E). Compare AthenÃ¦us, v. 187 B.]
 
-[Footnote 57: Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 D. [Greek: nouthetei=tai me\n
-u(po\ tô=n pollô=n ô(s parakinô=n, e)nthousia/zôn de\ le/lêthe
-tou\s pollou\s. . . . ai)ti/an e)/chei ô(s manikô=s
+[Footnote 57: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 249 D. [Greek: nouthetei=tai me\n
+u(po\ tÃ´=n pollÃ´=n Ã´(s parakinÃ´=n, e)nthousia/zÃ´n de\ le/lÃªthe
+tou\s pollou\s. . . . ai)ti/an e)/chei Ã´(s manikÃ´=s
 diakei/menos.]]
 
 Such are the points of comparison which present themselves between
@@ -3088,23 +3057,23 @@ re-established as a city. The Xenophontic Symposion affords no mark
 of date of composition: Xenophon reports it as having been himself
 present. It does indeed contain, in the speech delivered by
 Sokrates (viii. 32), an allusion to, and a criticism upon, an
-opinion supported by Pausanias [Greek: o( A)ga/thônos tou=
-poiêtou= e)rastê/s], who discourses in the Platonic Symposion: and
+opinion supported by Pausanias [Greek: o( A)ga/thÃ´nos tou=
+poiÃªtou= e)rastÃª/s], who discourses in the Platonic Symposion: and
 several critics think that this is an allusion by Xenophon to the
 Platonic Symposion. I think this opinion improbable. It would
 require us to suppose that Xenophon is inaccurate, since the
 opinion which he ascribes to Pausanias is not delivered by
-Pausanias in the Platonic Symposion, but by Phædrus. Athenæus (v.
+Pausanias in the Platonic Symposion, but by PhÃ¦drus. AthenÃ¦us (v.
 216) remarks that the opinion is not delivered by Pausanias, but
-he does not mention that it _is_ delivered by Phædrus. He remarks
+he does not mention that it _is_ delivered by PhÃ¦drus. He remarks
 that there was no known written composition of Pausanias himself:
 and he seems to suppose that Xenophon must have alluded to the
 Platonic Symposion, but that he quoted it inaccurately or out of
-another version of it, different from what we now read. Athenæus
+another version of it, different from what we now read. AthenÃ¦us
 wastes reasoning in proving that the conversation described in the
 Platonic Symposion cannot have really occurred at the time to
 which Plato assigns it. This is unimportant: the speeches are
-doubtless all composed by Plato. If Athenæus was anxious to prove
+doubtless all composed by Plato. If AthenÃ¦us was anxious to prove
 anachronism against Plato, I am surprised that he did not notice
 that of the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia mentioned in a
 conversation supposed to have taken place in the presence of
@@ -3114,19 +3083,19 @@ I incline to believe that the allusion of Xenophon is not intended
 to apply to the Symposion of Plato. Xenophon ascribes one opinion
 to Pausanias, Plato ascribes another; this is noway inconceivable.
 I therefore remain in doubt whether the Xenophontic or the
-Platonic Symposion is earliest. Compare the Præf. of Schneider to
+Platonic Symposion is earliest. Compare the PrÃ¦f. of Schneider to
 the former, pp. 140-143.]
 
-[Side-note: Second half of the Phædrus--passes into a debate on
+[Side-note: Second half of the PhÃ¦drus--passes into a debate on
 Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical
 exercise.]
 
-I have already stated that the first half of the Phædrus differs
+I have already stated that the first half of the PhÃ¦drus differs
 materially from the second; and that its three discourses on the
 subject of Eros (the first two depreciating Eros, the third being
 an effusion of high-flown and poetical panegyric on the same
 theme) may be better understood by being looked at in conjunction
-with the Symposion. The second half of the Phædrus passes into a
+with the Symposion. The second half of the PhÃ¦drus passes into a
 different discussion, criticising the discourse of Lysias as a
 rhetorical composition: examining the principles upon which the
 teaching of Rhetoric as an Art either is founded, or ought to be
@@ -3137,7 +3106,7 @@ generally, as a means of working upon or instructing other minds.
 Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only
 question is, Whether a man writes well or ill.]
 
-I heard one of our active political citizens (says Phædrus)
+I heard one of our active political citizens (says PhÃ¦drus)
 severely denounce Lysias, and fasten upon him with contempt, many
 times over, the title of a logographer. Active politicians will
 not consent to compose and leave behind them written discourses,
@@ -3153,12 +3122,12 @@ does a man succeed only by unsystematic knack or practice, such as
 he can neither realise distinctly to his own consciousness, nor
 describe to others?
 
-[Footnote 59: Plato, Phædrus, p. 257 C.]
+[Footnote 59: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 257 C.]
 
-[Footnote 60: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 257 E, 258 D.
+[Footnote 60: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 257 E, 258 D.
 
 The two appellations--[Greek: logogra/phos] and [Greek:
-sophistê/s]--are here coupled together as terms of reproach, just
+sophistÃª/s]--are here coupled together as terms of reproach, just
 as they stand coupled in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 417. It is
 plain that both appellations acquired their discreditable import
 mainly from the collateral circumstance that the persons so
@@ -3174,7 +3143,7 @@ omitting to notice the collateral association which really gave
 point to it and made it serve the purpose of a hostile speaker.
 This is the more remarkable, because we find Plato multiplying
 opportunities, even on unsuitable occasions, of taunting the
-Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the Phædrus,
+Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the PhÃ¦drus,
 we should have expected that if he noticed the imputation at all,
 he would notice it in the sense intended by the speaker. In this
 sense, indeed, it would not have suited the purpose of his
@@ -3185,14 +3154,14 @@ instruction.
 Heindorf observes, that Plato has used a similar liberty in
 comparing the [Greek: logogra/phos] to the proposer of a law or
 decree. "Igitur, quum solemne legum initium ejusmodi esset,
-[Greek: e)/doxe tê=| boulê=|], &c., Plato aliter longé quam vulgo
-acciperetur, neque sine calumniâ quâdam, interpretatus est" (ad p.
+[Greek: e)/doxe tÃª=| boulÃª=|], &c., Plato aliter longÃ© quam vulgo
+acciperetur, neque sine calumniÃ¢ quÃ¢dam, interpretatus est" (ad p.
 258).]
 
-[Footnote 61: Plato, Phædrus, p. 259 E. [Greek: o(/pê| kalô=s
-e)/chei le/gein te kai\ gra/phein, kai\ o(/pê| mê/,
-skepte/on.]--p. 258 D. [Greek: ti/s o( tro/pos tou= kalô=s te
-kai\ mê\ gra/phein.]]
+[Footnote 61: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 259 E. [Greek: o(/pÃª| kalÃ´=s
+e)/chei le/gein te kai\ gra/phein, kai\ o(/pÃª| mÃª/,
+skepte/on.]--p. 258 D. [Greek: ti/s o( tro/pos tou= kalÃ´=s te
+kai\ mÃª\ gra/phein.]]
 
 [Side-note: Question about teaching the art of writing well or
 speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does
@@ -3206,7 +3175,7 @@ enough if he knows what the audience or the people generally
 believe to be so: and that to that standard he must accommodate
 himself, if he wishes to persuade.[62]
 
-[Footnote 62: Plato, Phædrus, p. 260 A.]
+[Footnote 62: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 260 A.]
 
 [Side-note: Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be
 founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of
@@ -3242,9 +3211,9 @@ difficult. An extensive acquaintance with the real resemblances of
 things, or in other words with truth, constitutes the necessary
 basis on which all oratorical art must proceed.[64]
 
-[Footnote 63: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 260-261.]
+[Footnote 63: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 260-261.]
 
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Phædrus, p. 262.]
+[Footnote 64: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 262.]
 
 [Side-note: Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of
 Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates
@@ -3273,10 +3242,10 @@ the successive points in the discourse of Lysias do not hang
 together by any thread of necessary connection, as they ought to
 do, if the discourse were put together according to rule.[66]
 
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 B. Compare Plato, Alkibiad.
+[Footnote 65: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 263 B. Compare Plato, Alkibiad.
 i. p. 109.]
 
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-265.]
+[Footnote 66: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 263-265.]
 
 [Side-note: Logical processes--Definition and Division--both of
 them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates.]
@@ -3292,7 +3261,7 @@ sub-species, according to the God from whom the inspiration
 proceeded, and according to the character of the inspiration--the
 prophetic, emanating from Apollo--the ritual or mystic, from
 Dionysus--the poetic, from the Muses--the amatory, from Eros and
-Aphroditê.[68] Now both these processes, definition and division,
+AphroditÃª.[68] Now both these processes, definition and division,
 are familiar to the true dialectician or philosopher: but they are
 not less essential in rhetoric also, if the process is performed
 with genuine art. The speaker ought to embrace in his view many
@@ -3310,33 +3279,33 @@ contemplating the One and the Many as they stand in nature--I
 follow in the footsteps of that man as in those of a God. I call
 such a man, rightly or wrongly, a Dialectician."[70]
 
-[Footnote 67: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: u(po\ thei/as
-e)xallagê=s tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn.]]
+[Footnote 67: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 265 A. [Greek: u(po\ thei/as
+e)xallagÃª=s tÃ´=n ei)Ã´tho/tÃ´n nomi/mÃ´n.]]
 
-[Footnote 68: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265.]
+[Footnote 68: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 265.]
 
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. 265 D: [Greek: ei)s
-mi/an te i)de/an sunorô=nta a)/gein ta\ pollachê= diesparme/na,
-i(/n' e(/kaston o(rizo/menos dê=lon poi=ê| peri\ ou(= a)\n a)ei\
-dida/skein e)the/lê|.] 265 E: [Greek: to\ pa/lin kat' ei)/dê
-du/nasthai te/mnein kat' a)/rthra, ê(=| pe/phuke, kai\ mê\
-e)picheirei=n katagnu/nai me/ros mêde/n, kakou= magei/rou tro/pô|
-chrô/menon.]
+[Footnote 69: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 265-266. 265 D: [Greek: ei)s
+mi/an te i)de/an sunorÃ´=nta a)/gein ta\ pollachÃª= diesparme/na,
+i(/n' e(/kaston o(rizo/menos dÃª=lon poi=Ãª| peri\ ou(= a)\n a)ei\
+dida/skein e)the/lÃª|.] 265 E: [Greek: to\ pa/lin kat' ei)/dÃª
+du/nasthai te/mnein kat' a)/rthra, Ãª(=| pe/phuke, kai\ mÃª\
+e)picheirei=n katagnu/nai me/ros mÃªde/n, kakou= magei/rou tro/pÃ´|
+chrÃ´/menon.]
 
 Seneca, Epist. 89, p. 395, ed. Gronov. "Faciam ergo quod exigis,
 et philosophiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam. Dividi enim
 illam, non concidi, utile est."]
 
-[Footnote 70: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. [Greek: Tou/tôn dê\
-e)/gôge au)to/s te e)rastê/s, ô)= Phai=dre, tô=n diaire/seôn kai\
-sunagôgô=n, i(/n' oi(=o/s te ô)= le/gein te kai\ phronei=n; e)a/n
-te/ tin' a)/llon ê(gê/sômai dunato\n ei)s e(\n kai\ e)pi\ polla\
-pephuko\s o(ra=|n, tou=ton diô/kô kato/pisthe met' i)/chnion
-ô(/ste theoi=o. kai\ me/ntoi kai\ tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n
-ei) me\n o)rthô=s ê)\ mê\ prosagoreu/ô, theo\s oi)=de; kalô= de\
+[Footnote 70: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 266 B. [Greek: Tou/tÃ´n dÃª\
+e)/gÃ´ge au)to/s te e)rastÃª/s, Ã´)= Phai=dre, tÃ´=n diaire/seÃ´n kai\
+sunagÃ´gÃ´=n, i(/n' oi(=o/s te Ã´)= le/gein te kai\ phronei=n; e)a/n
+te/ tin' a)/llon Ãª(gÃª/sÃ´mai dunato\n ei)s e(\n kai\ e)pi\ polla\
+pephuko\s o(ra=|n, tou=ton diÃ´/kÃ´ kato/pisthe met' i)/chnion
+Ã´(/ste theoi=o. kai\ me/ntoi kai\ tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n
+ei) me\n o)rthÃ´=s Ãª)\ mÃª\ prosagoreu/Ã´, theo\s oi)=de; kalÃ´= de\
 ou)=n me/chri tou=de dialektikou/s.]]
 
-This is Dialectic (replies Phædrus); but it is not Rhetoric, as
+This is Dialectic (replies PhÃ¦drus); but it is not Rhetoric, as
 Thrasymachus and other professors teach the art.
 
 [Side-note: View of Sokrates--that there is no real Art of
@@ -3366,13 +3335,13 @@ the art of rhetoric consists. And this is precisely the thing
 which the teacher does not teach, but supposes the learner to
 acquire for himself.[73]
 
-[Footnote 71: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 267-268.]
+[Footnote 71: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 267-268.]
 
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Phædrus, p. 268 B. [Greek: e)re/sthai ei)
-prosepi/statai kai\ ou(sti/nas dei= kai\ o(po/te e(/kasta tou/tôn
+[Footnote 72: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 268 B. [Greek: e)re/sthai ei)
+prosepi/statai kai\ ou(sti/nas dei= kai\ o(po/te e(/kasta tou/tÃ´n
 poiei=n, kai\ me/chri o(po/sou?]]
 
-[Footnote 73: Plato, Phædrus, p. 269.]
+[Footnote 73: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 269.]
 
 [Side-note: What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be--Analogy of
 Hippokrates and the medical Art.]
@@ -3396,15 +3365,15 @@ body, distinguishing its varieties, and bringing the medical art
 to bear upon each, according to its different properties. This is
 the only scientific or artistic way of proceeding.
 
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Phædrus, p. 270 D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)ch ô(=de
-dei= dianoei=sthai peri\ o(touou=n phu/seôs? Prô=ton me\n,
-a(plou=n ê)\ polueide/s e)stin, ou(= peri\ boulêso/metha ei)=nai
+[Footnote 74: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 270 D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)ch Ã´(=de
+dei= dianoei=sthai peri\ o(touou=n phu/seÃ´s? PrÃ´=ton me\n,
+a(plou=n Ãª)\ polueide/s e)stin, ou(= peri\ boulÃªso/metha ei)=nai
 au)toi\ technikoi\ kai\ a)/llon dunatoi\ poiei=n? e)/peita de/,
-e)a\n me\n a(plou=n ê)=|, skopei=n tê\n du/namin au)tou=, ti/na
-pro\s ti/ pe/phuken ei)s to\ dra=|n e)/chon ê)\ ti/na ei)s to\
-pathei=n u(po\ tou=? e)a\n de\ plei/ô ei)/dê e)/chê|, tau=ta
-a)rithmêsa/menos, o(/per e)ph' e(no/s, tou=t' i)dei=n e)ph'
-e(ka/stou, tô=| ti/ poiei=n au)to\ pe/phuken ê)\ tô=| ti/ pathei=n
+e)a\n me\n a(plou=n Ãª)=|, skopei=n tÃª\n du/namin au)tou=, ti/na
+pro\s ti/ pe/phuken ei)s to\ dra=|n e)/chon Ãª)\ ti/na ei)s to\
+pathei=n u(po\ tou=? e)a\n de\ plei/Ã´ ei)/dÃª e)/chÃª|, tau=ta
+a)rithmÃªsa/menos, o(/per e)ph' e(no/s, tou=t' i)dei=n e)ph'
+e(ka/stou, tÃ´=| ti/ poiei=n au)to\ pe/phuken Ãª)\ tÃ´=| ti/ pathei=n
 u(po\ tou=?]]
 
 [Side-note: Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic
@@ -3434,34 +3403,34 @@ those subordinate artifices of speech on which the professors
 insist; and he must also be aware of the proper season and limit
 within which each can be safely employed.[78]
 
-[Footnote 75: Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 B. [Greek: o(risa/meno/s te
-pa/lin kat' ei)/dê me/chri tou= a)tmê/tou te/mnein e)pistêthê=|.]]
+[Footnote 75: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 277 B. [Greek: o(risa/meno/s te
+pa/lin kat' ei)/dÃª me/chri tou= a)tmÃª/tou te/mnein e)pistÃªthÃª=|.]]
 
-[Footnote 76: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 A. [Greek: _Prô=ton_, pa/sê|
-a)kribei/a| gra/psei te kai\ poiê/sei psuchê\n i)dei=n, po/teron
-e(\n kai\ o(/moion pe/phuken ê)\ kata\ sô/matos morphê\n
+[Footnote 76: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 271 A. [Greek: _PrÃ´=ton_, pa/sÃª|
+a)kribei/a| gra/psei te kai\ poiÃª/sei psuchÃª\n i)dei=n, po/teron
+e(\n kai\ o(/moion pe/phuken Ãª)\ kata\ sÃ´/matos morphÃª\n
 polueide/s; tou=to ga/r phamen _phu/sin_ ei)=nai deiknu/nai.
 
-_Deu/teron_ de/ ge, o(/tô| ti/ poiei=n ê)\ pathei=n u(po\ tou=
+_Deu/teron_ de/ ge, o(/tÃ´| ti/ poiei=n Ãª)\ pathei=n u(po\ tou=
 pe/phuken.
 
-_Tri/ton_ de\ dê\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gôn te kai\ psuchê=s ge/nê
-kai\ ta\ tou/tôn pathê/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/ttôn
-e(/kaston e(ka/stô|, kai\ dida/skôn oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/ôn
-lo/gôn di' ê(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkês ê( me\n pei/thetai, ê( de\
+_Tri/ton_ de\ dÃª\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gÃ´n te kai\ psuchÃª=s ge/nÃª
+kai\ ta\ tou/tÃ´n pathÃª/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/ttÃ´n
+e(/kaston e(ka/stÃ´|, kai\ dida/skÃ´n oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/Ã´n
+lo/gÃ´n di' Ãª(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkÃªs Ãª( me\n pei/thetai, Ãª( de\
 a)peithei=.]]
 
-[Footnote 77: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D. [Greek: dei= mê\ tau=ta
-i(kanô=s noê/santa, meta\ tau=ta theô/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s
-pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, _o)xe/ôs_ tê=| ai)sthê/sei
+[Footnote 77: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 271 D. [Greek: dei= mÃª\ tau=ta
+i(kanÃ´=s noÃª/santa, meta\ tau=ta theÃ´/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s
+pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, _o)xe/Ã´s_ tÃª=| ai)sthÃª/sei
 du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 78: Plato, Phædrus, p. 272 A. [Greek: tau=ta de\ ê)/dê
+[Footnote 78: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 272 A. [Greek: tau=ta de\ Ãª)/dÃª
 pa/nt' e)/chonti, _proslabo/nti kairou\s tou= po/te lekte/on kai\
 e)pischete/on_, brachulogi/as te au)= kai\ e)leeinologi/as kai\
-deinô/seôs, e(ka/stôn te o(/s' a)\n ei)/dê ma/thê| lo/gôn, tou/tôn
-_tê\n eu)kairi/an te kai\ a)kairi/an diagno/nti_, kalô=s te kai\
-tele/ôs e)sti\n ê( te/chnê a)peirgasme/nê, _pro/teron d' ou)/_.]]
+deinÃ´/seÃ´s, e(ka/stÃ´n te o(/s' a)\n ei)/dÃª ma/thÃª| lo/gÃ´n, tou/tÃ´n
+_tÃª\n eu)kairi/an te kai\ a)kairi/an diagno/nti_, kalÃ´=s te kai\
+tele/Ã´s e)sti\n Ãª( te/chnÃª a)peirgasme/nÃª, _pro/teron d' ou)/_.]]
 
 [Side-note: The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of
 real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be
@@ -3485,7 +3454,7 @@ all the trouble necessary for acquiring it. But the power of
 speaking agreeably and effectively to men, is not of sufficient
 moment to justify the expenditure of so much time and labour.[79]
 
-[Footnote 79: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 273-274.]
+[Footnote 79: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 273-274.]
 
 [Side-note: Question about Writing--As an Art, for the purpose of
 instruction, it can do little--Reasons why. Writing may remind the
@@ -3511,14 +3480,14 @@ against all assailants. It supersedes and enfeebles the memory,
 implanting only a false persuasion of knowledge without the
 reality.[80]
 
-[Footnote 80: Plato, Phædrus, p. 275 D-E. [Greek: tau)to\n de\
-kai\ oi( lo/goi (oi( gegramme/noi); do/xais me\n a)\n ô(/s ti
-phronou=ntas au)tou\s le/gein e)a\n de/ ti e(/rê| tô=n legome/nôn
-boulo/menos mathei=n, e(/n ti sêmai/nei mo/non tau)to\n a)ei/.
-O(/tan de\ a(/pax graphê=|, kulindei=tai me\n pantachou= pa=s
-lo/gos o(moi/ôs para\ toi=s e)pai+/ousin, ô(s d' au)tô=s par'
-oi(=s ou)de\n prosê/kei, kai\ ou)k e)pi/statai le/gein oi(=s dei=
-ge kai\ mê/.]]
+[Footnote 80: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 275 D-E. [Greek: tau)to\n de\
+kai\ oi( lo/goi (oi( gegramme/noi); do/xais me\n a)\n Ã´(/s ti
+phronou=ntas au)tou\s le/gein e)a\n de/ ti e(/rÃª| tÃ´=n legome/nÃ´n
+boulo/menos mathei=n, e(/n ti sÃªmai/nei mo/non tau)to\n a)ei/.
+O(/tan de\ a(/pax graphÃª=|, kulindei=tai me\n pantachou= pa=s
+lo/gos o(moi/Ã´s para\ toi=s e)pai+/ousin, Ã´(s d' au)tÃ´=s par'
+oi(=s ou)de\n prosÃª/kei, kai\ ou)k e)pi/statai le/gein oi(=s dei=
+ge kai\ mÃª/.]]
 
 [Side-note: Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will
 produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and
@@ -3560,37 +3529,37 @@ own nature, communicable indefinitely from every new disciple to
 others, and forming a source of intelligence and happiness to
 all.[85]
 
-[Footnote 81: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 277-278. [Greek: ô(s oi(
-r(apsô|dou/menoi (lo/goi) a)/neu a)nakri/seôs kai\ didachê=s
-peithou=s e(/neka e)le/chthêsan], &c.]
+[Footnote 81: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 277-278. [Greek: Ã´(s oi(
+r(apsÃ´|dou/menoi (lo/goi) a)/neu a)nakri/seÃ´s kai\ didachÃª=s
+peithou=s e(/neka e)le/chthÃªsan], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 82: Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A. [Greek: a)/llon o(rô=men
-lo/gon tou/tou a)delpho\n gnê/sion tô=| tro/pô| te gi/gnetai, kai\
-o(/sô| a)mei/nôn kai\ dunatô/teros tou/tou phu/etai? . . . . O(/s
-met' e)pistê/mês gra/phetai e)n tê=| tou= mantha/nontos psuchê=|,
-dunato\s me\n a)mu=nai e(autô=|, e)pistê/môn de\ le/gein te kai\
+[Footnote 82: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 276 A. [Greek: a)/llon o(rÃ´=men
+lo/gon tou/tou a)delpho\n gnÃª/sion tÃ´=| tro/pÃ´| te gi/gnetai, kai\
+o(/sÃ´| a)mei/nÃ´n kai\ dunatÃ´/teros tou/tou phu/etai? . . . . O(/s
+met' e)pistÃª/mÃªs gra/phetai e)n tÃª=| tou= mantha/nontos psuchÃª=|,
+dunato\s me\n a)mu=nai e(autÃ´=|, e)pistÃª/mÃ´n de\ le/gein te kai\
 siga=|n pro\s ou(\s dei=. To\n tou= ei)do/tos lo/gon le/geis
-zô=nta kai\ e)/mpsuchon, ou(= o( gegramme/nos ei)/dôlon a)/n ti
-le/goito dikai/ôs], &c. 278 A.]
+zÃ´=nta kai\ e)/mpsuchon, ou(= o( gegramme/nos ei)/dÃ´lon a)/n ti
+le/goito dikai/Ã´s], &c. 278 A.]
 
-[Footnote 83: Plato, Phædrus, p. 278 C. [Greek: ei) me\n ei)dô\s
-ê(=| ta)lêthe\s e)/chei sune/thêke tau=ta (ta\ suggra/mmata) kai\
-e)/chôn boêthei=n, ei)s e)/legchon i)ô\n peri\ ô(=n e)/grapse,
-kai\ le/gôn au)to\s dunato\s ta\ gegramme/na phau=la a)podei=xai],
+[Footnote 83: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 278 C. [Greek: ei) me\n ei)dÃ´\s
+Ãª(=| ta)lÃªthe\s e)/chei sune/thÃªke tau=ta (ta\ suggra/mmata) kai\
+e)/chÃ´n boÃªthei=n, ei)s e)/legchon i)Ã´\n peri\ Ã´(=n e)/grapse,
+kai\ le/gÃ´n au)to\s dunato\s ta\ gegramme/na phau=la a)podei=xai],
 &c.]
 
-[Footnote 84: Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A.]
+[Footnote 84: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 276 A.]
 
-[Footnote 85: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 276-277.]
+[Footnote 85: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 276-277.]
 
 This blending of philosophy with rhetoric, which pervades the
-criticisms on Lysias in the Phædrus, is farther illustrated by the
+criticisms on Lysias in the PhÃ¦drus, is farther illustrated by the
 praise bestowed upon Isokrates in contrast with Lysias. Isokrates
-occupied that which Plato in Euthydêmus calls "the border country
+occupied that which Plato in EuthydÃªmus calls "the border country
 between philosophy and politics". Many critics declare (and I
 think with probable reason[86]) that Isokrates is the person
 intended (without being named) in the passage just cited from the
-Euthydêmus. In the Phædrus, Isokrates is described as the intimate
+EuthydÃªmus. In the PhÃ¦drus, Isokrates is described as the intimate
 friend of Sokrates, still young; and is pronounced already
 superior in every way to Lysias--likely to become superior in
 future to all the rhetors that have ever flourished--and destined
@@ -3598,9 +3567,9 @@ probably to arrive even at the divine mysteries of philosophy.[87]
 
 [Footnote 86: See above, vol. ii. ch. xxi. p. 227.]
 
-[Footnote 87: Plato, Phædrus, p. 279 A.]
+[Footnote 87: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 279 A.]
 
-When we consider that the Phædrus was pretty sure to bring upon
+When we consider that the PhÃ¦drus was pretty sure to bring upon
 Plato a good deal of enmity--since it attacked, by name, both
 Lysias, a resident at Athens of great influence and ability, and
 several other contemporary rhetors more or less celebrated--we can
@@ -3623,13 +3592,13 @@ philosophical: at the same time receiving numerous pupils from
 different cities of Greece. Through such change, he came into a
 sort of middle position between the rhetoric of Lysias and the
 dialectic of Plato: insomuch that the latter, at the time when he
-composed the Phædrus, had satisfaction in contrasting him
+composed the PhÃ¦drus, had satisfaction in contrasting him
 favourably with Lysias, and in prophesying that he would make yet
 greater progress towards philosophy. But at the time when Plato
-composed the Euthydêmus, his feeling was different.[89] In the
-Phædrus, Isokrates is compared with Lysias and other rhetors, and
+composed the EuthydÃªmus, his feeling was different.[89] In the
+PhÃ¦drus, Isokrates is compared with Lysias and other rhetors, and
 in that comparison Plato presents him as greatly superior: in the
-Euthydêmus, he is compared with philosophers as well as with
+EuthydÃªmus, he is compared with philosophers as well as with
 rhetors, and is even announced as disparaging philosophy
 generally: Plato then declares him to be a presumptuous half-bred,
 and extols against him even the very philosopher whom he himself
@@ -3639,8 +3608,8 @@ an ape compared with the Gods:[90] the same intermediate position
 between rhetoric and philosophy is assigned by Plato to Isokrates.
 
 [Footnote 88: Dion. Hal. De Isocrate Judicium, p. 576. [Greek:
-desma\s pa/nu polla\s dikanikô=n lo/gôn periphe/resthai/ phêsin
-u(po\ tô=n bibliopôlô=n A)ristote/lês], &c.
+desma\s pa/nu polla\s dikanikÃ´=n lo/gÃ´n periphe/resthai/ phÃªsin
+u(po\ tÃ´=n bibliopÃ´lÃ´=n A)ristote/lÃªs], &c.
 
 Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. pp. 837-838.
 
@@ -3660,9 +3629,9 @@ five are composed to be spoken by pleaders before the dikastery.
 They are such discourses as the logographers, Lysias among the
 rest, were called upon to furnish, and paid for furnishing.]
 
-[Footnote 89: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 306. I am inclined to agree with
-Ueberweg in thinking that the Euthydêmus is later than the
-Phædrus. Ueberweg, Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, pp.
+[Footnote 89: Plato, EuthydÃªm. p. 306. I am inclined to agree with
+Ueberweg in thinking that the EuthydÃªmus is later than the
+PhÃ¦drus. Ueberweg, Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, pp.
 256-259-265.]
 
 [Footnote 90: Plato, Hipp. Major, p. 289.]
@@ -3682,7 +3651,7 @@ gradually kindling into rivalry. Such rivalry became vehement
 during the last ten years of Plato's life, when his scholar
 Aristotle, then an aspiring young man of twenty-five, proclaimed a
 very contemptuous opinion of Isokrates, and commenced a new school
-of rhetoric in opposition to him.[92] Kephisodôrus, a pupil of
+of rhetoric in opposition to him.[92] KephisodÃ´rus, a pupil of
 Isokrates, retaliated; publishing against Aristotle, as well as
 against Plato, an acrimonious work which was still read some
 centuries afterwards. Theopompus, another eminent pupil of
@@ -3693,15 +3662,15 @@ Isokratean school.[93]
 [Footnote 91: Isokrates, Orat. x. 1 (Hel. Enc.); Orat. v.
 (Philipp.) 12; Or. xiii. (Sophist.) 9-24; Orat. xv. (Permut.)
 sect. 285-290. [Greek: philosophi/an me\n ou)=n ou)k oi)=mai dei=n
-prosagoreu/ein tê\n mêde\n e)n tô=| paro/nti mê/te pro\s to\
-le/gein mê/te pro\s to\ pra/ttein ô(/phelou=san--tê\n kaloume/nên
-u(po/ tinôn philosophi/an ou)k ei)=nai phêmi/], &c.]
+prosagoreu/ein tÃª\n mÃªde\n e)n tÃ´=| paro/nti mÃª/te pro\s to\
+le/gein mÃª/te pro\s to\ pra/ttein Ã´(/phelou=san--tÃª\n kaloume/nÃªn
+u(po/ tinÃ´n philosophi/an ou)k ei)=nai phÃªmi/], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 92: Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 35, 141; Orator. 19, 62;
-Numenius, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 6, 9. See Stahr,
+Numenius, ap. Euseb. PrÃ¦p. Evang. xiv. 6, 9. See Stahr,
 Aristotelia, i. p. 63 seq., ii. p. 44 seq.
 
-Schroeder's Quæstiones Isocrateæ (Utrecht, 1859), and Spengel's
+Schroeder's QuÃ¦stiones IsocrateÃ¦ (Utrecht, 1859), and Spengel's
 work, Isokrates und Plato, are instructive in regard to these two
 contemporary luminaries of the intellectual world at Athens. But,
 unfortunately, we can make out few ascertainable facts. When I
@@ -3712,7 +3681,7 @@ that many of his complaints about unfriendly and bitter criticism
 refer to the Platonic School of that day, Aristotle being one of
 its members. See sections 48-90-276, and seq. He certainly means
 the Sokratic men, and Plato as the most celebrated of them, when
-he talks of [Greek: oi( peri\ ta\s e)rôtê/seis kai\ a)pokri/seis,
+he talks of [Greek: oi( peri\ ta\s e)rÃ´tÃª/seis kai\ a)pokri/seis,
 ou(\s a)ntilogikou\s kalou=sin--oi( peri\ ta\s e)/ridas
 spouda/zontes]--those who are powerful in contentious dialectic,
 and at the same time cultivate geometry and astronomy, which
@@ -3721,10 +3690,10 @@ others call [Greek: a)doleschi/a] and [Greek: mikrologi/a]
 nothing, and about which they themselves were in dispute. When he
 complains of the [Greek: perittolo/giai] of the ancient Sophists,
 Empedokles, Ion, Parmenides, Melissus, &c., we cannot but suppose
-that he had in his mind the Timæus of Plato also, though he avoids
+that he had in his mind the TimÃ¦us of Plato also, though he avoids
 mention of the name.]
 
-[Footnote 93: Athenæus, iii. p. 122, ii. 60; Dionys. Hal. Epistol.
+[Footnote 93: AthenÃ¦us, iii. p. 122, ii. 60; Dionys. Hal. Epistol.
 ad Cn. Pomp. p. 757.]
 
 [Side-note: The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who
@@ -3745,9 +3714,9 @@ better than a writer, and ought to be called a philosopher. But if
 he can do no more than write, he is no philosopher: he is only a
 poet, or nomographer, or logographer.[95]
 
-[Footnote 94: Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 D-E.]
+[Footnote 94: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 277 D-E.]
 
-[Footnote 95: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 278-279.]
+[Footnote 95: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 278-279.]
 
 [Side-note: Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to
 become a philosopher.]
@@ -3757,17 +3726,17 @@ something better from Isokrates, who gives promise of aspiring one
 day to genuine philosophy.[96]
 
 [Footnote 96: Respecting the manner in which Plato speaks of
-Isokrates in the Phædrus, see what I have already observed upon
-the Euthydêmus, vol. ii. ch. xxi. pp. 227-229.]
+Isokrates in the PhÃ¦drus, see what I have already observed upon
+the EuthydÃªmus, vol. ii. ch. xxi. pp. 227-229.]
 
 
 *  *  *  *  *
 
 
-[Side-note: Date of the Phædrus--not an early dialogue.]
+[Side-note: Date of the PhÃ¦drus--not an early dialogue.]
 
 I have already observed that I dissent from the hypothesis of
-Schleiermacher, Ast, and others, who regard the Phædrus either as
+Schleiermacher, Ast, and others, who regard the PhÃ¦drus either as
 positively the earliest, or at least among the earliest, of the
 Platonic dialogues, composed several years before the death of
 Sokrates. I agree with Hermann, Stallbaum, and those other
@@ -3782,7 +3751,7 @@ as a means of instruction, are very interesting and remarkable.
 theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic.]
 
 The written discourse of Lysias (presented to us as one greatly
-admired at the time by his friends, Phædrus among them) is
+admired at the time by his friends, PhÃ¦drus among them) is
 contrasted first with a pleading on the same subject (though not
 directed towards the attainment of the same end) by Sokrates
 (supposed to be improvised on the occasion); next with a second
@@ -3794,7 +3763,7 @@ Sokrates, far from being Sokratic in tenor, is the most exuberant
 effusion of mingled philosophy, poetry, and mystic theology, that
 ever emanated from Plato.
 
-[Footnote 97: Plato, Phædrus, p. 235 A.]
+[Footnote 97: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 235 A.]
 
 [Side-note: His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already
 assured--it assumes that all the doubts have been already
@@ -3803,7 +3772,7 @@ removed.]
 The theory of rhetoric too is far more Platonic than Sokratic. The
 peculiar vein of Sokrates is that of confessed ignorance, ardour
 in enquiry, and testing cross-examination of all who answer his
-questions. But in the Phædrus we find Plato (under the name of
+questions. But in the PhÃ¦drus we find Plato (under the name of
 Sokrates) assuming, as the basis of his theory, that an expositor
 shall be found who _knows_ what is really and truly just and
 unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable--distinct
@@ -3814,7 +3783,7 @@ words) that all the doubts and difficulties, suggested by the
 Sokratic cross-examination, have been already considered, elucidated,
 and removed.
 
-[Footnote 98: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 259 E, 260 E, and 262 B.]
+[Footnote 98: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 259 E, 260 E, and 262 B.]
 
 [Side-note: The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process,
 teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn.]
@@ -3830,13 +3799,13 @@ feature.[99] This is the only way to follow out truth in a manner
 clear and consistent with itself: and truth is equally honourable
 in matters small or great.[100]
 
-[Footnote 99: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266.]
+[Footnote 99: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 266.]
 
-[Footnote 100: Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 A.
+[Footnote 100: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 261 A.
 
 That truth upon matters small and contemptible deserves to be
 sought out and proved as much as upon matters great and sublime,
-is a doctrine affirmed in the Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês:
+is a doctrine affirmed in the SophistÃªs, Politikus, ParmenidÃªs:
 Sophist. pp. 218 E, 227 A; Politik. 266 D; Parmenid. 130 E.]
 
 Thus far we are in dialectic: logical exposition proceeding by way
@@ -3853,7 +3822,7 @@ here that men are liable to be deceived, and require to be
 undeceived--contradict each other, and argue on opposite sides:
 such disputes belong to the province of Rhetoric.
 
-[Footnote 101: Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 A.]
+[Footnote 101: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 263 A.]
 
 [Side-note: The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with
 minds pre-occupied--guiding them methodically from error to
@@ -3884,10 +3853,10 @@ this like an artist (on system and by pre-determination), unless
 you know what the truth is.[103] By anyone who does not know, the
 process will be performed without art, or at haphazard.
 
-[Footnote 102: Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 A. [Greek: ê( r(êtorikê\
-te/chnê psuchagôgi/a tis dia\ lo/gôn], &c.]
+[Footnote 102: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 261 A. [Greek: Ãª( r(ÃªtorikÃª\
+te/chnÃª psuchagÃ´gi/a tis dia\ lo/gÃ´n], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 103: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 262 A-D, 273 D.]
+[Footnote 103: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 262 A-D, 273 D.]
 
 [Side-note: He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and
 the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know
@@ -3919,28 +3888,28 @@ assemblage of varied capacities as Hippokrates declares to be
 necessary for a physician, the artist for curing or preserving the
 body.[106]
 
-[Footnote 104: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 270 E, 271 A-D. [Greek: Tri/ton
-de\ dê\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gôn te kai\ psuchê=s ge/nê, kai\ ta\
-tou/tôn pathê/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/ttôn e(/kaston
-e(ka/stô|, kai\ dida/skôn oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/ôn lo/gôn di'
-ê(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkês ê( me\n pei/thetai, ê( de\
+[Footnote 104: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 270 E, 271 A-D. [Greek: Tri/ton
+de\ dÃª\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gÃ´n te kai\ psuchÃª=s ge/nÃª, kai\ ta\
+tou/tÃ´n pathÃª/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/ttÃ´n e(/kaston
+e(ka/stÃ´|, kai\ dida/skÃ´n oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/Ã´n lo/gÃ´n di'
+Ãª(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkÃªs Ãª( me\n pei/thetai, Ãª( de\
 a)peithei=.]]
 
-[Footnote 105: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D-E. [Greek: dei= dê\ tau=ta
-i(kanô=s noê/santa, meta\ tau=ta theô/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s
-pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, _o)xe/ôs tê=| ai)sthê/sei
-du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n_, ê)\ mêde\ ei)de/nai pô ple/on au)tô=n
-ô(=n to/te ê)/koue lo/gôn xunô/n.]]
+[Footnote 105: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 271 D-E. [Greek: dei= dÃª\ tau=ta
+i(kanÃ´=s noÃª/santa, meta\ tau=ta theÃ´/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s
+pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, _o)xe/Ã´s tÃª=| ai)sthÃª/sei
+du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n_, Ãª)\ mÃªde\ ei)de/nai pÃ´ ple/on au)tÃ´=n
+Ã´(=n to/te Ãª)/koue lo/gÃ´n xunÃ´/n.]]
 
-[Footnote 106: Plato, Phædrus, p. 270 C.]
+[Footnote 106: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 270 C.]
 
-[Side-note: Plato's _Idéal_ of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part
+[Side-note: Plato's _IdÃ©al_ of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part
 incompatible conditions--the Wise man or philosopher will never be
 listened to by the public.]
 
 The total, thus summed up by Plato, of what is necessary to
 constitute an Art of Rhetoric, is striking and comprehensive. It
-is indeed an _idéal_, not merely unattainable by reason of its
+is indeed an _idÃ©al_, not merely unattainable by reason of its
 magnitude, but also including impracticable conditions. He begins
 by postulating a perfectly wise man, who knows all truth on the
 most important social subjects; on which his country-men hold
@@ -3967,7 +3936,7 @@ first step to be taken is to disabuse men's minds of their false
 persuasion of knowledge--to make them conscious of ignorance--and
 thus to open their minds for the reception of truth. But if this
 be the fact, we must set aside as impracticable the postulate
-advanced by Sokrates here in the Phædrus--of a perfectly wise man
+advanced by Sokrates here in the PhÃ¦drus--of a perfectly wise man
 as the employer of rhetorical artifices. Moreover I do not agree
 with what Sokrates is here made to lay down as the philosophy of
 Error:--that it derives its power of misleading from resemblance
@@ -3977,7 +3946,7 @@ incomplete as an account of the generating causes of error.
 [Footnote 107: Plato, Gorg. p. 513 B, see supra, ch. xxiv.;
 Republic, vi. pp. 495-496.]
 
-[Side-note: The other part of the Platonic _Idéal_ is grand but
+[Side-note: The other part of the Platonic _IdÃ©al_ is grand but
 unattainable--breadth of psychological data and classified modes
 of discourse.]
 
@@ -4009,24 +3978,24 @@ much towards the first: being all of them defective in breadth of
 psychological theory. Nor has Plato himself done anything to work
 out his conception in detail or to provide suitable rules for it.
 We read it only as an impressive sketch--a grand but unattainable
-_idéal_--"qualem nequeo monstrare et sentio tantum".
+_idÃ©al_--"qualem nequeo monstrare et sentio tantum".
 
-[Footnote 108: I repeat the citation from the Phædrus, one of the
+[Footnote 108: I repeat the citation from the PhÃ¦drus, one of the
 most striking passages in Plato, p. 271 D.
 
-[Greek: e)/peidê\ lo/gou du/namis tugcha/nei psuchagôgi/a ou)=sa,
-to\n me/llonta r(êtoriko\n e)/sesthai a)na/gkê ei)de/nai psuchê\
-o(/sa ei)/dê e)/chei. e)/stin ou)=n to/sa kai\ to/sa, kai\ toi=a
+[Greek: e)/peidÃª\ lo/gou du/namis tugcha/nei psuchagÃ´gi/a ou)=sa,
+to\n me/llonta r(Ãªtoriko\n e)/sesthai a)na/gkÃª ei)de/nai psuchÃª\
+o(/sa ei)/dÃª e)/chei. e)/stin ou)=n to/sa kai\ to/sa, kai\ toi=a
 kai\ toi=a; o(/then oi( me\n toioi/de, oi( de\ toioi/de
-gi/gnontai. tou/tôn de\ dê\ diê|rême/nôn, lo/gôn au)= to/sa kai\
-to/sa e)/stin ei)/dê, toio/nde e(/kaston. oi( me\n ou)=n toioi/de
-u(po\ tô=n toiô=nde logôn dia\ tê/nde tê\n aiti/an e)s ta\ toia/de
+gi/gnontai. tou/tÃ´n de\ dÃª\ diÃª|rÃªme/nÃ´n, lo/gÃ´n au)= to/sa kai\
+to/sa e)/stin ei)/dÃª, toio/nde e(/kaston. oi( me\n ou)=n toioi/de
+u(po\ tÃ´=n toiÃ´=nde logÃ´n dia\ tÃª/nde tÃª\n aiti/an e)s ta\ toia/de
 eu)peithei=s, oi( de\ toioi/de dia\ ta/de duspeithei=s], &c. Comp.
 p. 261 A.
 
 The relation of Art to Science is thus perspicuously stated by Mr.
 John Stuart Mill, in the concluding chapter of his System of
-Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Book vi. ch. xii. § 2):
+Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Book vi. ch. xii. Â§ 2):
 
 "The relation in which rules of Art stand to doctrines of Science
 may be thus characterised. The Art proposes to itself an end to be
@@ -4090,16 +4059,16 @@ saying--What does this signify, provided you are just and virtuous?
 Such consolation failed to satisfy: as it would fail to satisfy the
 sick, the lame, or the blind.
 
-[Footnote 109: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 273-274. [Greek: ê(\n ou)ch
-e(/neka tou= le/gein kai\ pra/ttein pro\s a)nthrô/pous dei=
-diaponei=sthai to\n sô/phrona, a)lla\ tou= theoi=s kecharisme/na
+[Footnote 109: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 273-274. [Greek: Ãª(\n ou)ch
+e(/neka tou= le/gein kai\ pra/ttein pro\s a)nthrÃ´/pous dei=
+diaponei=sthai to\n sÃ´/phrona, a)lla\ tou= theoi=s kecharisme/na
 me\n le/gein du/nasthai], &c. (273 E).]
 
 [Footnote 110: Thucyd. ii. 39-40-41.]
 
-[Footnote 111: Plato, Phædrus, p. 288 A.]
+[Footnote 111: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 288 A.]
 
-[Footnote 112: See what is said by Aristotle about [Greek: ê(
+[Footnote 112: See what is said by Aristotle about [Greek: Ãª(
 Gorgi/ou pragmatei/a] in the last chapter of De Sophisticis
 Elenchis.]
 
@@ -4122,7 +4091,7 @@ The teaching of these rhetors thus contributed to the security,
 dignity, and usefulness of the citizens, by arming them for public
 speech and action. But it was essentially practical, or empirical:
 it had little system, and was founded upon a narrow theory. Upon
-these points Plato in the Phædrus attacks them. He sets little
+these points Plato in the PhÃ¦drus attacks them. He sets little
 value upon the accomplishments arming men for speech and action
 ([Greek: lektikou\s kai\ praktikou\s ei)=nai])--and he will not
 allow such teaching to be called an Art. He explains, in
@@ -4180,28 +4149,28 @@ for the multiplicity of particular cases; the analogy of the medical
 art, which he here instructively invokes, would be against him on this
 point.
 
-[Footnote 114: Plato, Phædr. pp. 268 B, 272 A.]
+[Footnote 114: Plato, PhÃ¦dr. pp. 268 B, 272 A.]
 
 [Footnote 115: What Longinus says about critical skill is
-applicable here also--[Greek: pollê=s e)/sti pei/ras teleutai=on
-e)pige/nnêma.] Isokrates (De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 290-312-316)
+applicable here also--[Greek: pollÃª=s e)/sti pei/ras teleutai=on
+e)pige/nnÃªma.] Isokrates (De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 290-312-316)
 has some good remarks about the impossibility of [Greek:
-e)pistê/mê] respecting particulars. Plato, in the Gorgias, puts
-[Greek: te/chnê], which he states to depend upon reason and
+e)pistÃª/mÃª] respecting particulars. Plato, in the Gorgias, puts
+[Greek: te/chnÃª], which he states to depend upon reason and
 foreknowledge, in opposition to [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] and [Greek:
-tribê/], which he considers as dependant on the [Greek: phu/sis
-stochastikê/]. But in applying the knowledge or skill called Art to
-particular cases, the [Greek: phu/sis stochastikê\] is the best
-that can be had (p. 463 A-B). The conception of [Greek: te/chnê]
+tribÃª/], which he considers as dependant on the [Greek: phu/sis
+stochastikÃª/]. But in applying the knowledge or skill called Art to
+particular cases, the [Greek: phu/sis stochastikÃª\] is the best
+that can be had (p. 463 A-B). The conception of [Greek: te/chnÃª]
 given in the Gorgias is open to the same remark as that which we
-find in the Phædrus. Plato, in another passage of the Phædrus,
-speaks of the necessity that [Greek: phu/sis, e)pistê/mê], and
-[Greek: mele/tê], shall concur to make an accomplished orator.
+find in the PhÃ¦drus. Plato, in another passage of the PhÃ¦drus,
+speaks of the necessity that [Greek: phu/sis, e)pistÃª/mÃª], and
+[Greek: mele/tÃª], shall concur to make an accomplished orator.
 This is very true; and Lysias, Isokrates, and all the other
 rhetors whom Plato satirises, would have concurred in it. In his
-description of [Greek: te/chnê] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê], and in
+description of [Greek: te/chnÃª] and [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª], and in
 the estimate which he gives of all that it comprises, he leaves no
-outlying ground for [Greek: mele/tê]. Compare Xenophon, Memor.
+outlying ground for [Greek: mele/tÃª]. Compare Xenophon, Memor.
 iii. 1, 11; also Isokrates contra Sophistas, a. 16; and a good
 passage of Dionysius Halik. De Compos. Verborum, in which that
 rhetor remarks that [Greek: kairo\s] or opportunity neither has
@@ -4231,16 +4200,16 @@ their parts, not in speculative debate on philosophy, but in
 active citizenship; and they succeeded in this object to a great
 degree. The rhetorical ability of Lysias personally is attested
 not merely by the superlative encomium on him assigned to
-Phædrus,[118] but also by his great celebrity--by the frequent
+PhÃ¦drus,[118] but also by his great celebrity--by the frequent
 demand for his services as a logographer or composer of discourses
 for others--by the number of his discourses preserved and studied
 after his death. He, and a fair proportion of the other rhetors
-named in the Phædrus, performed well the useful work which they
+named in the PhÃ¦drus, performed well the useful work which they
 undertook.
 
 [Footnote 117: Plato, Gorg. 521 D.]
 
-[Footnote 118: Plato, Phædr. p. 228 A.]
+[Footnote 118: Plato, PhÃ¦dr. p. 228 A.]
 
 [Side-note: Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his
 greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for
@@ -4276,10 +4245,10 @@ minds and different persuasive apparatus, which Plato considers
 essential to a thorough comprehension and mastery of the
 principle.
 
-[Footnote 119: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-264.]
+[Footnote 119: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 263-264.]
 
-[Footnote 120: Dionysius (Judicium De Lysiâ, pp. 487-493) gives an
-elaborate criticism on the [Greek: pragmatiko\s charaktê\r] of
+[Footnote 120: Dionysius (Judicium De LysiÃ¢, pp. 487-493) gives an
+elaborate criticism on the [Greek: pragmatiko\s charaktÃª\r] of
 Lysias. The special excellence of Lysias (according to this
 critic) lay in his judicial orations, which were highly persuasive
 and plausible: the manner of presenting thoughts was ingenious and
@@ -4287,7 +4256,7 @@ adapted to the auditors: the narration of facts and details,
 especially, was performed with unrivalled skill. But as to the
 marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, Dionysius
 considers Lysias as inferior to some other orators--and still more
-inferior in respect to [Greek: deinotê\s] and to strong emotional
+inferior in respect to [Greek: deinotÃª\s] and to strong emotional
 effects.]
 
 [Footnote 121: Dionys. Hal. (Ars Rhetorica, p. 381) notices the
@@ -4295,20 +4264,20 @@ severe exigencies which Plato here imposes upon the Rhetor,
 remarking that scarcely any rhetorical discourse could be produced
 which came up to them. The defect did not belong to Lysias alone,
 but to all other rhetors also--[Greek: o(po/te ga\r _kai\ Lusi/an_
-e)le/gchei, pa=san tê\n ê(mete/ran r(êtorikê\n e)/oiken
+e)le/gchei, pa=san tÃª\n Ãª(mete/ran r(ÃªtorikÃª\n e)/oiken
 e)le/gchein.] Demosthenes almost alone (in the opinion of
 Dionysius) contrived to avoid the fault, because he imitated
 Plato.]
 
 [Side-note: No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise
 of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the
-Phædrus.]
+PhÃ¦drus.]
 
 The first discourse assigned by Plato to Sokrates professes to be
 placed in competition with the discourse of Lysias, and to aim at
 the same object. But in reality it aims at a different object: it
 gives the dissuasive arguments, but omits the persuasive--as
-Phædrus is made to point out: so that it cannot be fairly compared
+PhÃ¦drus is made to point out: so that it cannot be fairly compared
 with the discourse of Lysias. Still more may this be said
 respecting the second discourse of Sokrates: which is of a
 character and purpose so totally disparate, that no fair
@@ -4319,13 +4288,13 @@ a rhetorical judge like Dionysius as altogether inconsistent with
 the scope and purpose of reasonable discourse.[122] In the
 Menexenus, Plato has brought himself again into competition with
 Lysias, and there the competition is fairer:[123] for Plato has
-there entirely neglected the exigencies enforced in the Phædrus,
+there entirely neglected the exigencies enforced in the PhÃ¦drus,
 and has composed a funeral discourse upon the received type; which
 Lysias and other orators before him had followed, from Perikles
-downward. But in the Phædrus, Plato criticises Lysias upon
+downward. But in the PhÃ¦drus, Plato criticises Lysias upon
 principles which are a medley between philosophy and rhetoric.
 Lysias, in defending himself, might have taken the same ground as
-we find Sokrates himself taking in the Euthydêmus. "Philosophy and
+we find Sokrates himself taking in the EuthydÃªmus. "Philosophy and
 politics are two distinct walks, requiring different aptitudes,
 and having each its own practitioners. A man may take whichever he
 pleases; but he must not arrogate to himself superiority by an
@@ -4337,12 +4306,12 @@ Pompey--De Platone--pp. 755-765.]
 [Footnote 123: Plato, Menexen. p. 237 seq. Stallbaum, Comm. in
 Menexenum, pp. 10-11.]
 
-[Footnote 124: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 306 A-C.]
+[Footnote 124: Plato, EuthydÃªm. p. 306 A-C.]
 
 [Side-note: Continuous discourse, either written or spoken,
 inefficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant.]
 
-Another important subject is also treated in the Phædrus. Sokrates
+Another important subject is also treated in the PhÃ¦drus. Sokrates
 delivers views both original and characteristic, respecting the
 efficacy of continuous discourse--either written to be read, or
 spoken to be heard without cross-examination--as a means of
@@ -4383,8 +4352,8 @@ knowledge.[126]
 
 [Footnote 125: Plato, Epistol. vii. pp. 341-344.]
 
-[Footnote 126: Schleiermacher, in his Introduction to the Phædrus,
-justly characterises this doctrine as genuine Sokratism--"die ächt
+[Footnote 126: Schleiermacher, in his Introduction to the PhÃ¦drus,
+justly characterises this doctrine as genuine Sokratism--"die Ã¤cht
 Sokratische erhabene Verachtung alles Schreibens and alles
 rednerischen Redens," p. 70.]
 
@@ -4413,7 +4382,7 @@ commit to memory, are in his view elegant recreations, but nothing
 more. But while, on this point, Plato's didactic theories deserve
 admiration, we must remark on the other hand that they are pitched
 so high as to exceed human force, and to overpass all possibility
-of being realised.[127] They mark out an _idéal_, which no person
+of being realised.[127] They mark out an _idÃ©al_, which no person
 ever attained, either then or since--like the Platonic theory of
 rhetoric. To be master of any subject, in the extent and
 perfection required for sustaining and administering a Sokratic
@@ -4423,10 +4392,10 @@ Assuredly, Plato himself never fulfilled it.
 
 [Footnote 127: A remark made by Sextus Empiricus (upon another
 doctrine which he is discussing) may be applied to this view of
-Plato--[Greek: to\ de\ le/gein o(/ti tê=| diomalismô=| tô=n
-pra/xeôn katalamba/nomen to\n e)/chonta tê\n peri\ to\n bi/on
-te/chnên, _u(perphtheggome/nôn e)/sti tê\n a)nthrô/pôn phu/sin_,
-kai\ eu)chome/nôn ma=llon ê)\ a)lêthê= lego/ntôn] (Pyrrh. Hyp.
+Plato--[Greek: to\ de\ le/gein o(/ti tÃª=| diomalismÃ´=| tÃ´=n
+pra/xeÃ´n katalamba/nomen to\n e)/chonta tÃª\n peri\ to\n bi/on
+te/chnÃªn, _u(perphtheggome/nÃ´n e)/sti tÃª\n a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n phu/sin_,
+kai\ eu)chome/nÃ´n ma=llon Ãª)\ a)lÃªthÃª= lego/ntÃ´n] (Pyrrh. Hyp.
 iii. 244).]
 
 [Side-note: No one has ever been found competent to solve the
@@ -4441,7 +4410,7 @@ philosophy, as it appears in Plato, Aristotle, and Sextus
 Empiricus--and when we recollect that between the second and the
 third of these names, there appeared three other philosophers
 equally or more formidable in the same vein, all whose arguments
-have perished (Arkesilaus, Karneades, Ænesidêmus)--we shall see
+have perished (Arkesilaus, Karneades, Ã†nesidÃªmus)--we shall see
 that no man has ever been known competent both to strike and parry
 with these weapons, in a manner so skilful and ready as to amount
 to knowledge in the Platonic sense. But in so far as such
@@ -4473,18 +4442,18 @@ the theorising intelligence, as well as to any complete
 discrimination between sufficient and insufficient evidence. Such
 they still remain, overlooked yet not defunct.
 
-[Side-note: Plato's _idéal_ philosopher can only be realised under
+[Side-note: Plato's _idÃ©al_ philosopher can only be realised under
 the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated
 into full reminiscence here.]
 
-Now all these questions would be solved by the _idéal_ philosopher
-whom Plato in the Phædrus conceives as possessing knowledge: a
+Now all these questions would be solved by the _idÃ©al_ philosopher
+whom Plato in the PhÃ¦drus conceives as possessing knowledge: a
 person who shall be at once a negative Sokrates in excogitating
 and enforcing all the difficulties--and an affirmative match for
 Sokrates, as respondent in solving them: a person competent to
 apply this process to all the indefinite variety of individual
 minds, under the inspirations of the moment. This is a magnificent
-_idéal_. Plato affirms truly, that those teachers who taught
+_idÃ©al_. Plato affirms truly, that those teachers who taught
 rhetoric and philosophy by writing, could never produce such a
 pupil: and that even the Sokratic dialectic training, though
 indispensable and far more efficacious, would fail in doing so,
@@ -4499,25 +4468,25 @@ whom he despises as aiming at low practical ends--might at any
 rate reply that they avoided losing themselves in such unmeasured
 and unwarranted hypotheses.
 
-[Side-note: Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus.]
+[Side-note: Different proceeding of Plato in the TimÃ¦us.]
 
 One remark yet remains to be made upon the doctrine here set forth
 by Plato: that no teaching is possible by means of continuous
 discourse spoken or written--none, except through prolonged and
 varied oral dialectic.[128] To this doctrine Plato does not
 constantly conform in his practice: he departs from it on various
-important occasions. In the Timæus, Sokrates calls upon the
+important occasions. In the TimÃ¦us, Sokrates calls upon the
 philosopher so named for an exposition on the deepest and most
-mysterious cosmical subjects. Timæus delivers the exposition in a
+mysterious cosmical subjects. TimÃ¦us delivers the exposition in a
 continuous harangue, without a word of remark or question
 addressed by any of the auditors: while at the beginning of the
 Kritias (the next succeeding dialogue) Sokrates greatly commends
-what Timæus had spoken. The Kritias itself too (though unfinished)
-is given in the form of continuous exposition. Now, as the Timæus
+what TimÃ¦us had spoken. The Kritias itself too (though unfinished)
+is given in the form of continuous exposition. Now, as the TimÃ¦us
 is more abstruse than any other Platonic writing, we cannot
 imagine that Plato, at the time when he composed it, thought so
 meanly about continuous exposition, as a vehicle of instruction,
-as we find him declaring in the Phædrus. I point this out, because
+as we find him declaring in the PhÃ¦drus. I point this out, because
 it illustrates my opinion that the different dialogues of Plato
 represent very different, sometimes even opposite, points of view:
 and that it is a mistake to treat them as parts of one
@@ -4530,7 +4499,7 @@ E): and he disclaimed the possession of knowledge. Aristotle too
 considers teaching as a presentation of truths, ready made and
 supposed to be known, by the teacher to learners, who are bound to
 believe them, [Greek: dei= ga\r pisteu/ein to\n mantha/nonta]. The
-Platonic Sokrates, in the Phædrus and Symposion, differs from
+Platonic Sokrates, in the PhÃ¦drus and Symposion, differs from
 both; he recognises no teaching except the perpetual generation of
 new thoughts and feelings, by means of stimulating dialectic
 colloquy, and the revival in the mind thereby of the experience of
@@ -4550,9 +4519,9 @@ one else. There is no doubt that Plato often talks in that strain:
 but the method followed in his dialogues, and the general
 principles of method which he lays down, here as well as
 elsewhere, point to a directly opposite conclusion. Of this the
-Phædrus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of
+PhÃ¦drus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of
 generality, it proclaims the extreme of specialty. The objection
-which the Sokrates of the Phædrus advances against the didactic
+which the Sokrates of the PhÃ¦drus advances against the didactic
 efficacy of written discourse, is founded on the fact, that it is
 the same to all readers--that it takes no cognizance of the
 differences of individual minds nor of the same mind at different
@@ -4604,7 +4573,7 @@ PARMENIDES.
 [Side-note: Character of dialogues immediately preceding--much
 transcendental assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides.]
 
-In the dialogues immediately preceding--Phædon, Phædrus,
+In the dialogues immediately preceding--PhÃ¦don, PhÃ¦drus,
 Symposion--we have seen Sokrates manifesting his usual dialectic,
 which never fails him: but we have also seen him indulging in a
 very unusual vein of positive affirmation and declaration. He has
@@ -4651,7 +4620,7 @@ and substantive nature, of Ideas--stands exposed to many grave
 objections, which he (Sokrates) has not considered and cannot
 meet. So far, Parmenides performs towards Sokrates the same
 process of cross-examining refutation as Sokrates himself applies
-to Theætêtus and other young men elsewhere. But we find in this
+to TheÃ¦tÃªtus and other young men elsewhere. But we find in this
 dialogue something ulterior and even peculiar. Having warned
 Sokrates that his intellectual training has not yet been carried
 to a point commensurate with the earnestness of his
@@ -4673,15 +4642,15 @@ respondent.
 
 [Footnote 1: This dramatic introduction is extremely complicated.
 The whole dialogue, from beginning to end, is recounted by
-Kephalus of Klazomenæ; who heard it from the Athenian Antiphon--who
-himself had heard it from Pythodôrus, a friend of Zeno,
+Kephalus of KlazomenÃ¦; who heard it from the Athenian Antiphon--who
+himself had heard it from PythodÃ´rus, a friend of Zeno,
 present when the conversation was held. A string of circumstances
 are narrated by Kephalus, to explain how he came to wish to hear
 it, and to find out Antiphon. Plato appears anxious to throw the
 event back as far as possible into the past, in order to justify
 the bringing Sokrates into personal communication with Parmenides:
 for some unfriendly critics tried to make out that the two could
-not possibly have conversed on philosophy (Athenæus, xi. 505).
+not possibly have conversed on philosophy (AthenÃ¦us, xi. 505).
 Plato declares the ages of the persons with remarkable exactness:
 Parmenides was 65, completely grey-headed, but of noble mien: Zeno
 about 40, tall and graceful: Sokrates very young. (Plat. Parmen.
@@ -4758,16 +4727,16 @@ different and opposite denominations. I am one and many--like and
 unlike--great and little--all at the same time. But no such
 combination is possible between the Forms themselves,
 self-existent and opposite: the Form of Likeness cannot become unlike,
-nor _vice versâ_. The Forms themselves stand permanently apart,
+nor _vice versÃ¢_. The Forms themselves stand permanently apart,
 incapable of fusion or coalescence with each other: but different
 and even opposite Forms may lend themselves to participation and
 partnership in the same sensible individual object."[4]
 
 [Footnote 3: Plato, Parmenid. p. 129 A. [Greek: ou) nomi/zeis
-ei)=nai au)to\ kath' au)to\ ei)=do/s ti o(moio/têtos, kai\ tô=|
-toiou/tô| ai)= a)/llo ti e)nanti/on, o(\ e)/stin a)no/moion?
+ei)=nai au)to\ kath' au)to\ ei)=do/s ti o(moio/tÃªtos, kai\ tÃ´=|
+toiou/tÃ´| ai)= a)/llo ti e)nanti/on, o(\ e)/stin a)no/moion?
 tou/toin de\ duoi=n o)/ntoin kai\ e)me\ kai\ se\ kai\ ta\ a)/lla
-a(\ dê\ polla\ kalou=men, metalamba/nein?]]
+a(\ dÃª\ polla\ kalou=men, metalamba/nein?]]
 
 [Footnote 4: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 129-130.]
 
@@ -4782,10 +4751,10 @@ of sensible objects, participating in these Forms. "Your ardour
 for philosophy" (observes Parmenides to Sokrates), "is admirable.
 Is this distinction your own?"[5]
 
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Parmenid. p. 130 A. [Greek: Ô)= Sô/krates, ô(s
-a)/xios ei)= a)/gasthai tê=s o(rmê=s tê=s e)pi\ tou\s lo/gous;
-kai/ moi ei)pe/, _au)to\s su\ ou(/tô diê/|rêsai_ ô(s le/geis,
-chôri\s me\n ei)/dê au)ta\ a)/tta, chôri\s de\ ta\ tou/tôn au)=
+[Footnote 5: Plato, Parmenid. p. 130 A. [Greek: Ã”)= SÃ´/krates, Ã´(s
+a)/xios ei)= a)/gasthai tÃª=s o(rmÃª=s tÃª=s e)pi\ tou\s lo/gous;
+kai/ moi ei)pe/, _au)to\s su\ ou(/tÃ´ diÃª/|rÃªsai_ Ã´(s le/geis,
+chÃ´ri\s me\n ei)/dÃª au)ta\ a)/tta, chÃ´ri\s de\ ta\ tou/tÃ´n au)=
 mete/chonta?]]
 
 Plato now puts into the mouth of Parmenides--the advocate of One
@@ -4821,10 +4790,10 @@ reflections cross my mind, I shrink from the absurdity of the
 doctrine, and try to confine my attention to Forms like those
 which you mentioned first.
 
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Parmenid. p. 130 D. [Greek: Ou)damô=s, pha/nai
-to\n Sôkra/tên, a)lla\ tau=ta me/n ge, a(/per o(rô=men, tau=ta
-kai\ ei)=nai; ei)=dos de/ ti au)tô=n oi)êthê=nai ei)=nai mê\ li/an
-ê)=| a)/topon.]
+[Footnote 6: Plato, Parmenid. p. 130 D. [Greek: Ou)damÃ´=s, pha/nai
+to\n SÃ´kra/tÃªn, a)lla\ tau=ta me/n ge, a(/per o(rÃ´=men, tau=ta
+kai\ ei)=nai; ei)=dos de/ ti au)tÃ´=n oi)ÃªthÃª=nai ei)=nai mÃª\ li/an
+Ãª)=| a)/topon.]
 
 Alexander, who opposes the doctrine of the Platonists about Ideas,
 treats it as understood that they did not recognise Ideas of
@@ -4840,10 +4809,10 @@ philosophy will take stronger hold of you, and will teach you that
 no object in nature is mean or contemptible in her view.[7]
 
 [Footnote 7: Plato, Parmenid. p. 130 E. [Greek: Ne/os ga\r ei)=
-e)/ti, kai\ ou(/pô sou a)ntei/lêptai philosophi/a ô(s e(/ti
-a)ntilê/psetai, kat' e)mê\n do/xan, o(/te _ou)de\n au)tô=n_
-a)tima/seis; nu=n de\ e)/ti _pro\s a)nthrô/pôn a)poble/peis
-do/xas_ dia\ tê\n ê(liki/an.]]
+e)/ti, kai\ ou(/pÃ´ sou a)ntei/lÃªptai philosophi/a Ã´(s e(/ti
+a)ntilÃª/psetai, kat' e)mÃª\n do/xan, o(/te _ou)de\n au)tÃ´=n_
+a)tima/seis; nu=n de\ e)/ti _pro\s a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n a)poble/peis
+do/xas_ dia\ tÃª\n Ãª(liki/an.]]
 
 
 *  *  *  *  *
@@ -4884,27 +4853,27 @@ causes or remedies, because of the strong repugnances connected
 with them. This emotional view of nature is here noted by Plato as
 conflicting with the scientific. No object (he says) is mean in
 the eyes of philosophy. He remarks to the same effect in the
-Sophistês and Politikus, and the remark is illustrated by the
+SophistÃªs and Politikus, and the remark is illustrated by the
 classifying processes there exhibited:[10] mean objects and
 esteemed objects being placed side by side.
 
 [Footnote 8: Plato, himself, however, occasionally appeals [Greek:
-pro\s a)nthrô/pôn do/xas], and becomes [Greek: a)technô=s
-dêmê/goros], when it suits his argument; see Gorgias, 494 C.]
+pro\s a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n do/xas], and becomes [Greek: a)technÃ´=s
+dÃªmÃª/goros], when it suits his argument; see Gorgias, 494 C.]
 
 [Footnote 9: Aristophan. Nubes, 145-170-1490.
 
 [Greek: ti/ ga\r matho/nt' e)s tou\s theou\s u(bri/zeton,
-kai\ tê=s selê/nês e)skopei=sthe tê\n e)/dran?]
+kai\ tÃª=s selÃª/nÃªs e)skopei=sthe tÃª\n e)/dran?]
 
 Compare Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 11-13, iv. 7, 6-7; Plutarch,
 Perikles, 23; also the second chapter of the first Book of
 Macrobius, about the discredit which is supposed to be thrown upon
 grand and solemn subjects by a plain and naked exposition.
-"Inimicam esse naturæ nudam expositionem sui."]
+"Inimicam esse naturÃ¦ nudam expositionem sui."]
 
 [Footnote 10: Plato, Sophist. p. 227 B; Politik. p. 266 D; also
-Theætêt. p. 174 D.
+TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 174 D.
 
 Both the Platonic Sokrates, and the Xenophontic Sokrates,
 frequently illustrate the education of men by comparison with the
@@ -4912,13 +4881,13 @@ bringing up of young animals as well as with the training of
 horses: they also compare the educator of young men with the
 trainer of young horses. Indeed this comparison occurs so
 frequently, that it excites much displeasure among various modern
-critics (Forchhammer, Köchly, Socher, &c.), who seem to consider
+critics (Forchhammer, KÃ¶chly, Socher, &c.), who seem to consider
 it as unseemly and inconsistent with "the dignity of human
 nature". The frequent allusions made by Plato to the homely arts
 and professions are noted by his interlocutors as tiresome.
 
-See Plato, Apolog. Sokr. p. 20 A. [Greek: ô)= Kalli/a, ei) me/n
-sou tô\ ui(e/e pô/lô ê)\ mo/schô e)gene/sthên], &c.
+See Plato, Apolog. Sokr. p. 20 A. [Greek: Ã´)= Kalli/a, ei) me/n
+sou tÃ´\ ui(e/e pÃ´/lÃ´ Ãª)\ mo/schÃ´ e)gene/sthÃªn], &c.
 
 The Zoological works of Aristotle exhibit a memorable example of
 scientific intelligence, overcoming all the contempt and disgust
@@ -4987,9 +4956,9 @@ you will never reach the topmost.[13]
 
 [Footnote 12: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132. [Greek: Oi)=mai se e)k tou=
 toiou=de e(\n e(/kaston ei)=dos oi)/esthai ei)=nai. O(/tan _po/ll'
-a)/tta mega/la soi do/xê|_ ei)=nai, _mi/a tis i)/sôs dokei=
-i)de/a_ ê( au)tê\ ei)=nai _e)pi\ pa/nta i)do/nti_, o(/then _e(\n
-to\ me/ga ê(gei= ei)=nai_.]]
+a)/tta mega/la soi do/xÃª|_ ei)=nai, _mi/a tis i)/sÃ´s dokei=
+i)de/a_ Ãª( au)tÃª\ ei)=nai _e)pi\ pa/nta i)do/nti_, o(/then _e(\n
+to\ me/ga Ãª(gei= ei)=nai_.]]
 
 [Footnote 13: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 A. See this process, of
 comparing the Form with particular objects denominated after the
@@ -5013,20 +4982,20 @@ comparisons to a different general conception."
 The comparison, which the argument of the Platonic Parmenides
 assumes to be instituted, between [Greek: to\ ei)=dos] and [Greek:
 ta\ mete/chonta au)tou=], is denied by Proklus; who says that
-there can be no comparison, nor any [Greek: koino/tês], except
-between [Greek: ta\ o(motagê=]: and that the Form is not [Greek:
+there can be no comparison, nor any [Greek: koino/tÃªs], except
+between [Greek: ta\ o(motagÃª=]: and that the Form is not [Greek:
 o(motage\s] with its participant particulars. (Proklus ad
 Parmenidem, p. 125, p. 684 ed. Stallbaum.)
 
 This argument of Parmenides is the memorable argument known under
-the name of [Greek: o( tri/tos a)/nthrôpos]. Against the Platonic
-[Greek: ei)/dê] considered as [Greek: chôrista/], it is a forcible
+the name of [Greek: o( tri/tos a)/nthrÃ´pos]. Against the Platonic
+[Greek: ei)/dÃª] considered as [Greek: chÃ´rista/], it is a forcible
 argument. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 15 seq., where it is
-numbered among [Greek: oi( a)kribe/steroi tô=n lo/gôn]. We find
+numbered among [Greek: oi( a)kribe/steroi tÃ´=n lo/gÃ´n]. We find
 from the Scholion of Alexander (p. 566 Brandis), that it was
 advanced in several different ways by Aristotle, in his work
-[Greek: Peri\ I)deô=n]: by his scholar Eudemus [Greek: e)n toi=s
-peri\ Le/xeôs]: and by a contemporary [Greek: sophistê\s] named
+[Greek: Peri\ I)deÃ´=n]: by his scholar Eudemus [Greek: e)n toi=s
+peri\ Le/xeÃ´s]: and by a contemporary [Greek: sophistÃª\s] named
 Polyxenus, as well as by other Sophists.]
 
 [Side-note: Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing
@@ -5047,27 +5016,27 @@ and are therefore themselves Concipients: or else that these
 Forms, though Conceptions, are incapable of conceiving. Neither
 one nor the other is admissible.[15]
 
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 B. [Greek: mê\ _tô=n
-ei)dô=n_ e(/kaston ê)=| _tou/tôn noê/ma_, kai\ _ou)damou= au)tô=|
-prosê/kê e)ggi/gnesthai a)/llothi ê)\ e)n psuchai=s_. . . . Ti/
-ou)=n? pha/nai, e(\n e(/kasto/n e)sti tô=n noêma/tôn, no/êma de\
+[Footnote 14: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 B. [Greek: mÃª\ _tÃ´=n
+ei)dÃ´=n_ e(/kaston Ãª)=| _tou/tÃ´n noÃª/ma_, kai\ _ou)damou= au)tÃ´=|
+prosÃª/kÃª e)ggi/gnesthai a)/llothi Ãª)\ e)n psuchai=s_. . . . Ti/
+ou)=n? pha/nai, e(\n e(/kasto/n e)sti tÃ´=n noÃªma/tÃ´n, no/Ãªma de\
 ou)deno/s? A)ll' a)du/naton, ei)pei=n. A)lla\ tino/s? Nai/.
-O)/ntos ê)\ ou)k o)/ntos? O)/ntos. Ou)ch e(no/s tinos, o(\ e)pi\
-pa=sin e)kei=no to\ no/êma e)po\n noei=, mi/an tina\ ou)=san
+O)/ntos Ãª)\ ou)k o)/ntos? O)/ntos. Ou)ch e(no/s tinos, o(\ e)pi\
+pa=sin e)kei=no to\ no/Ãªma e)po\n noei=, mi/an tina\ ou)=san
 i)de/an? Nai/.]
 
 Aristotle (Topic. ii. 113, a. 25) indicates one way of meeting
 this argument, if advanced by an adversary in dialectic
-debate--[Greek: ei) ta\s i)de/as _e)n ê(mi=n_ e)/phêsen ei)=nai].]
+debate--[Greek: ei) ta\s i)de/as _e)n Ãª(mi=n_ e)/phÃªsen ei)=nai].]
 
-[Footnote 15: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 D. [Greek: ou)k a)na/gkê,
-ei) ta)/lla phê\| tô=n ei)dô=n mete/chein, ê)\ dokei=n soi e)k
-noê/mata o)/nta a)no/êta ei)=nai? A)ll' ou)de\ tou=to, pha/nai,
+[Footnote 15: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 D. [Greek: ou)k a)na/gkÃª,
+ei) ta)/lla phÃª\| tÃ´=n ei)dÃ´=n mete/chein, Ãª)\ dokei=n soi e)k
+noÃª/mata o)/nta a)no/Ãªta ei)=nai? A)ll' ou)de\ tou=to, pha/nai,
 e)/chei lo/gon.]
 
-The word [Greek: a)no/êta] here is used in its ordinary sense, in
-which it is the negation, not of [Greek: noêto/s] but of [Greek:
-noêtiko/s]. There is a similar confusion, Plato, Phædon, p. 80 B.
+The word [Greek: a)no/Ãªta] here is used in its ordinary sense, in
+which it is the negation, not of [Greek: noÃªto/s] but of [Greek:
+noÃªtiko/s]. There is a similar confusion, Plato, PhÃ¦don, p. 80 B.
 Proklus (pp. 699-701, Stall.) is prolix but very obscure.]
 
 [Side-note: The Ideas are types or exemplars, and objects partake
@@ -5094,7 +5063,7 @@ Scholion of Alexander, pp. 574-575, Brandis.]
 [Footnote 17: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 132-133.
 
 This is again a repetition, though differently presented, of the
-same argument--[Greek: o( tri/tos a)/nthrôpos]--enunciated p. 132
+same argument--[Greek: o( tri/tos a)/nthrÃ´pos]--enunciated p. 132
 A.]
 
 [Side-note: If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can
@@ -5147,26 +5116,26 @@ Pulchrum per se_, and the other self-existent Forms or Ideas, are
 to us altogether unknowable.[20]
 
 [Footnote 19: Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\
-e)pistê/mê, au)tê\ me\n o(\ e)/stin e)pistê/mê, tê=s o(\ e)/stin
-a)lê/theia, au)tê=s a)\n e)kei/nês ei)/ê e)pistê/mê? . . . Ê( de\
-par' ê(mi=n e)pistê/mê ou) tê=s par' ê(mi=n a)\n a)lêthei/as
-ei)/ê? kai\ au)= e(ka/stê ê( par' ê(mi=n e)pistê/mê tô=n par'
-ê(mi=n o)/ntôn e(ka/stou a)\n e)pistê/mê su/mbainoi ei)=nai?]
+e)pistÃª/mÃª, au)tÃª\ me\n o(\ e)/stin e)pistÃª/mÃª, tÃª=s o(\ e)/stin
+a)lÃª/theia, au)tÃª=s a)\n e)kei/nÃªs ei)/Ãª e)pistÃª/mÃª? . . . ÃŠ( de\
+par' Ãª(mi=n e)pistÃª/mÃª ou) tÃª=s par' Ãª(mi=n a)\n a)lÃªthei/as
+ei)/Ãª? kai\ au)= e(ka/stÃª Ãª( par' Ãª(mi=n e)pistÃª/mÃª tÃ´=n par'
+Ãª(mi=n o)/ntÃ´n e(ka/stou a)\n e)pistÃª/mÃª su/mbainoi ei)=nai?]
 
 Aristotle (Topica, vi. p. 147, a. 6) adverts to this as an
 argument against the theory of Ideas, but without alluding to the
 Parmenides; indeed he puts the argument in a different
 way--[Greek: to\ d' ei)=dos pro\s to\ ei)=dos dokei= le/gesthai, oi(=on
-au)tê\ e)pithumi/a au)tou= ê(de/os, kai\ au)tê\ bou/lêsis au)tou=
+au)tÃª\ e)pithumi/a au)tou= Ãª(de/os, kai\ au)tÃª\ bou/lÃªsis au)tou=
 a)gathou=.] Aristotle argues that there is no place in this
 doctrine for the [Greek: phaino/menon a)gatho/n], which
 nevertheless men often wish for, and he remarks, in the Nikom.
 Ethica, i. 4, 1096 b. 33--that the [Greek: au)to\-a)gatho\n] is
-neither [Greek: prakto\n] nor [Greek: ktêto\n a)nthrô/pô|].]
+neither [Greek: prakto\n] nor [Greek: ktÃªto\n a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´|].]
 
-[Footnote 20: Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 C. [Greek: A)/gnôston a)/ra
-ê(mi=n kai\ au)to\ to\ kalo\n o(\ e)/sti, kai\ to\ a)gatho/n, kai\
-pa/nta a(\ dê\ ô(s i)de/as au)ta\s ou)/sas u(polamba/nomen.]]
+[Footnote 20: Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 C. [Greek: A)/gnÃ´ston a)/ra
+Ãª(mi=n kai\ au)to\ to\ kalo\n o(\ e)/sti, kai\ to\ a)gatho/n, kai\
+pa/nta a(\ dÃª\ Ã´(s i)de/as au)ta\s ou)/sas u(polamba/nomen.]]
 
 [Side-note: Form of cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs
 to the Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us.]
@@ -5195,14 +5164,14 @@ with them.[22]
 
 [Footnote 21: An argument very similar is urged by Aristotle
 (Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 1050, b. 34) [Greek: ei) a)/ra tine/s ei)si
-phu/seis toiau=tai ê)\ ou)si/ai oi(/as le/gousin oi( e)n toi=s
-lo/gois ta\s i)de/as, polu\ ma=llon e)pistê=mon a)/n ti ei)/ê ê(
-au)toepistê/mê kai\ kinou/menon ê( ki/nêsis.]]
+phu/seis toiau=tai Ãª)\ ou)si/ai oi(/as le/gousin oi( e)n toi=s
+lo/gois ta\s i)de/as, polu\ ma=llon e)pistÃª=mon a)/n ti ei)/Ãª Ãª(
+au)toepistÃª/mÃª kai\ kinou/menon Ãª( ki/nÃªsis.]]
 
 [Footnote 22: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 A. [Greek: Tau=ta me\ntoi,
-ô)= Sô/krates, e)/phê o( Parmeni/dês, _kai\ e)/ti a)/lla pro\s
-tou/tois pa/nu polla\ a)nagkai=on e)/chein ta\ ei)/dê_, ei)
-ei)si\n au)tai ai( i)de/ai tô=n o)/ntôn], &c.]
+Ã´)= SÃ´/krates, e)/phÃª o( Parmeni/dÃªs, _kai\ e)/ti a)/lla pro\s
+tou/tois pa/nu polla\ a)nagkai=on e)/chein ta\ ei)/dÃª_, ei)
+ei)si\n au)tai ai( i)de/ai tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But
 if we do not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable,
@@ -5219,29 +5188,29 @@ affirmative; and still more wonderful ingenuity to find arguments
 for the satisfaction of others, respecting this question.
 
 [Footnote 23: Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 D-E. [Greek: Ou)/koun ei)
-para\ tô=| theô=| au(/tê e)/stin ê( a)kribesta/tê despotei/a kai\
-au(/tê ê( a)kribesta/tê e)pistê/mê, ou)/t' a)\n ê( despotei/a ê(
-e)kei/nôn] (i.e. [Greek: tô=n theô=n]) [Greek: ê(mô=n pote\ a)\n
-despo/seien, _ou)/t' a)\n ê( e)pistê/mê ê(ma=s gnoi/ê ou)de/ ti
-a)/llo tô=n par' ê(mi=n_; a)lla\ o(moi/ôs ê(mei=s t' e)kei/nôn
-ou)k a)/rchomen tê=| par' ê(mi=n a)rchê=|, ou)de gignô/skomen tou=
-thei/ou ou)de\n tê=| ê(mete/ra| e)pistê/mê, _e)kei=noi/ te au)=_]
+para\ tÃ´=| theÃ´=| au(/tÃª e)/stin Ãª( a)kribesta/tÃª despotei/a kai\
+au(/tÃª Ãª( a)kribesta/tÃª e)pistÃª/mÃª, ou)/t' a)\n Ãª( despotei/a Ãª(
+e)kei/nÃ´n] (i.e. [Greek: tÃ´=n theÃ´=n]) [Greek: Ãª(mÃ´=n pote\ a)\n
+despo/seien, _ou)/t' a)\n Ãª( e)pistÃª/mÃª Ãª(ma=s gnoi/Ãª ou)de/ ti
+a)/llo tÃ´=n par' Ãª(mi=n_; a)lla\ o(moi/Ã´s Ãª(mei=s t' e)kei/nÃ´n
+ou)k a)/rchomen tÃª=| par' Ãª(mi=n a)rchÃª=|, ou)de gignÃ´/skomen tou=
+thei/ou ou)de\n tÃª=| Ãª(mete/ra| e)pistÃª/mÃª, _e)kei=noi/ te au)=_]
 (sc. [Greek: oi( theoi/]) [Greek: kata\ to\n au)to\n lo/gon ou)/te
-despo/tai ê(mô=n ei)si\n _ou)/te gignô/skousi ta\ a)nthrô/peia
-pra/gmata theoi\ o)/ntes_. A)lla\ mê\ li/an, e)/phê] (Sokrates),
-[Greek: ê)=| thaumasto\s o( lo/gos, ei)/ tis theo\n a)posterê/seis
+despo/tai Ãª(mÃ´=n ei)si\n _ou)/te gignÃ´/skousi ta\ a)nthrÃ´/peia
+pra/gmata theoi\ o)/ntes_. A)lla\ mÃª\ li/an, e)/phÃª] (Sokrates),
+[Greek: Ãª)=| thaumasto\s o( lo/gos, ei)/ tis theo\n a)posterÃª/seis
 tou= ei)de/nai.]
 
 The inference here drawn by Parmenides supplies the first mention
 of a doctrine revived by (if not transmitted to) Averroes and
 various scholastic doctors of the middle ages, so as to be
 formally condemned by theological councils. M. Renan tells us--"En
-1269, Étienne Tempier, évêque de Paris, ayant rassemblé le conseil
-des maîtres en théologie . . . condamna, de concert avec eux,
+1269, Ã‰tienne Tempier, Ã©vÃªque de Paris, ayant rassemblÃ© le conseil
+des maÃ®tres en thÃ©ologie . . . condamna, de concert avec eux,
 treize propositions qui ne sont presque toutes que les axiomes
-familiers de l'averroïsme: Quod intellectus hominum est unus et
-idem numero. Quod mundus est æternus. Quod nunquam fuit primus
-homo. _Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia_," &c. (Renan, Averroès,
+familiers de l'averroÃ¯sme: Quod intellectus hominum est unus et
+idem numero. Quod mundus est Ã¦ternus. Quod nunquam fuit primus
+homo. _Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia_," &c. (Renan, AverroÃ¨s,
 p. 213, 2nd ed., p. 268.)]
 
 Nevertheless, on the other side (continues Parmenides), unless we
@@ -5287,20 +5256,20 @@ ingenious and plausible, yet having no application to the genuine
 Platonic doctrine about Ideas, might easily have been answered if
 Plato had thought fit, and are answered in other dialogues.[25]
 But to me it appears, that the doctrine which is challenged in the
-Parmenidês is the genuine Platonic doctrine about Ideas, as
-enunciated by Plato in the Republic, Phædon, Philêbus, Timæus, and
+ParmenidÃªs is the genuine Platonic doctrine about Ideas, as
+enunciated by Plato in the Republic, PhÃ¦don, PhilÃªbus, TimÃ¦us, and
 elsewhere--though a very different doctrine is announced in the
-Sophistês. Objections are here made against it in the Parmenidês.
+SophistÃªs. Objections are here made against it in the ParmenidÃªs.
 In what other dialogue has Plato answered them? and what proof can
 be furnished that he was able to answer them? There are indeed
 many other dialogues in which a real world of Ideas absolute and
 unchangeable, is affirmed strenuously and eloquently, with various
 consequences and accompaniments traced to it: but there are none
 in which the Parmenidean objections are elucidated, or even
-recited. In the Phædon, Phædrus, Timæus, Symposion, &c., and
+recited. In the PhÃ¦don, PhÃ¦drus, TimÃ¦us, Symposion, &c., and
 elsewhere, Sokrates is made to talk confidently about the
 existence and even about the cognoscibility of these Ideas; just
-as if no such objections as those which we read in the Parmenidês
+as if no such objections as those which we read in the ParmenidÃªs
 could be produced.[26] In these other dialogues, Plato accepts
 implicitly one horn of the Parmenidean dilemma; but without
 explaining to us upon what grounds he allows himself to neglect
@@ -5309,7 +5278,7 @@ the other.
 [Footnote 25: Stallbaum, Prolegom. pp. 52-286-332.]
 
 [Footnote 26: According to Stallbaum (Prolegg. pp. 277-337) the
-Parmenidês is the only dialogue in which Plato has discussed, with
+ParmenidÃªs is the only dialogue in which Plato has discussed, with
 philosophical exactness, the theory of Ideas; in all the other
 dialogues he handles it in a popular and superficial manner. There
 is truth in this--indeed more truth (I think) than Stallbaum
@@ -5326,13 +5295,13 @@ agree with his inference about the spuriousness of the dialogue.]
 
 [Side-note: Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains
 that Plato would never make such objections against his own
-theory, and denies the authenticity of the Parmenidês.]
+theory, and denies the authenticity of the ParmenidÃªs.]
 
 Socher has so much difficulty in conceiving that Plato can have
 advanced such forcible objections against a doctrine, which
 nevertheless in other Platonic dialogues is proclaimed as true and
-important,--that he declares the Parmenidês (together with the
-Sophistês and Politikus) not to be genuine, but to have been
+important,--that he declares the ParmenidÃªs (together with the
+SophistÃªs and Politikus) not to be genuine, but to have been
 composed by some unknown Megaric contemporary. To pass over the
 improbability that any unknown author should have been capable of
 composing works of so much ability as these--Socher's decision
@@ -5380,14 +5349,14 @@ value and importance of its own, apart from the affirmative. He is
 anxious to set forth what can be said against a given conclusion;
 even though not prepared to establish any thing in its place.
 
-[Side-note: The Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the
+[Side-note: The ParmenidÃªs is the extreme manifestation of the
 negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting
 forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not
 unnatural.]
 
 Such negative element, manifested as it is in so many of the
 Platonic dialogues, has its extreme manifestation in the
-Parmenidês. When we see it here applied to a doctrine which Plato
+ParmenidÃªs. When we see it here applied to a doctrine which Plato
 in other dialogues insists upon as truth, we must call to mind
 (what sincere believers are apt to forget) that a case may always
 be made out against truth as well as in its favour: and that its
@@ -5404,7 +5373,7 @@ dialogues has its own point of view, worked out on that particular
 occasion; what is common to them all, is the process of
 philosophising applied in various ways to the same general topics.
 
-Those who, like Socher, deny Plato's authorship of the Parmenidês,
+Those who, like Socher, deny Plato's authorship of the ParmenidÃªs,
 on the ground of what is urged therein against the theory of
 Ideas, must suppose, either that he did not know that a negative
 case could be made out against that theory; or that knowing it, he
@@ -5412,11 +5381,11 @@ refrained from undertaking the duty.[27] Neither supposition is
 consistent with what we know both of his negative ingenuity, and
 of his multifarious manner of handling.
 
-[Footnote 27: Plato, Philêbus, p. 14, where the distinction taken
+[Footnote 27: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 14, where the distinction taken
 coincides accurately enough with that which we read in Plato,
 Parmenid. p. 129 A-D.
 
-Strümpell thinks that the Parmenidês was composed at a time of
+StrÃ¼mpell thinks that the ParmenidÃªs was composed at a time of
 Plato's life when he had become sensible of the difficulties and
 contradictions attaching to his doctrine of self-existent Forms or
 Ideas, and when he was looking about for some way of extrication
@@ -5428,18 +5397,18 @@ no sufficient ground for affirming it. Nor can I see how the
 doctrine which Aristotle ascribes to Plato about the Ideas (that
 they are generated by two [Greek: stoichei=a] or elements, [Greek:
 to\ e(/n] along with [Greek: to\ me/ga kai\ to\ mikro/n]) affords
-any escape from the difficulties started in the Parmenidês.
+any escape from the difficulties started in the ParmenidÃªs.
 
-Strümpell considers the dialogue Parmenidês to have been composed
-"ganz ausdrücklich zur dialektischen Uebung," ib. s. 96, 2, p.
+StrÃ¼mpell considers the dialogue ParmenidÃªs to have been composed
+"ganz ausdrÃ¼cklich zur dialektischen Uebung," ib. s. 96, 2, p.
 128.]
 
 
-[Side-note: Force of the negative case in the Parmenidês.
+[Side-note: Force of the negative case in the ParmenidÃªs.
 Difficulties about participation of sensible objects in the world
 of Ideas.]
 
-The negative case, made out in the Parmenidês against the theory
+The negative case, made out in the ParmenidÃªs against the theory
 of Ideas, is indeed most powerful. The hypothesis of the Ideal
 World is unequivocally affirmed by Sokrates, with its four
 principal characteristics. 1. Complete essential separation from
@@ -5447,7 +5416,7 @@ the world of sense. 2. Absolute self-existence. 3. Plurality of
 constituent items, several contrary to each other. 4. Unchangeable
 sameness and unity of each and all of them.--Here we have full
 satisfaction given to the Platonic sentiment, which often delights
-in soaring above the world of sense, and sometimes (see Phædon) in
+in soaring above the world of sense, and sometimes (see PhÃ¦don) in
 heaping contemptuous metaphors upon it. But unfortunately Sokrates
 cannot disengage himself from this world of sense: he is obliged
 to maintain that it partakes of, or is determined by, these
@@ -5464,7 +5433,7 @@ separated from that of which it is the essence? How can the Form,
 essentially One, belong at once to a multitude of particulars?
 
 [Footnote 28: Arist. Met. A. 991, b. 1. [Greek: a)du/naton,
-chôri\s ei)=nai tê\n ou)si/an kai\ ou)= ê( ou)si/a.]]
+chÃ´ri\s ei)=nai tÃª\n ou)si/an kai\ ou)= Ãª( ou)si/a.]]
 
 Two points deserve notice in this debate respecting the doctrine
 of Ideas:--
@@ -5486,15 +5455,15 @@ or the Form of a cognizant Subject: that is, by God or the Gods.
 Even thus, to call them _absolute_ is a misnomer: they are
 relative to the Subject, and the Subject is relative to them.
 
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Parmenid. 133 B. [Greek: ei)/ tis phai/ê
-mêde\ prosê/kein au)ta\ gignô/skesthai o)/nta toiau=ta oi(=a/
-phamen dei=n ei)=nai ta\ ei)/dê. . . . a)pi/thanos a)\n ei)/ê o(
-a)/gnôsta au)ta\ a)nagka/zôn ei)=nai.] 134 A. [Greek: ê( de\ par'
-ê(mi=n e)pistê/mê ou) tê=s par' ê(mi=n a)\n a)lêthei/as ei)/ê?
-kai\ au)= e(ka/stê ê( par' ê(mi=n e(pistê/mê tô=n par' ê(mi=n
-o)/ntôn e(ka/stou a)\n e)pistê/mê xu/mbainoi ei)=nai?] 134 C.
-[Greek: a)/gnôston a)/ra ê(mi=n e)/sti kai\ au)to\ to\ kalo\n o(\
-e)/sti, kai\ to\ a)gatho/n, kai\ pa/nta a(\ dê\ ô(s i)de/as
+[Footnote 29: Plato, Parmenid. 133 B. [Greek: ei)/ tis phai/Ãª
+mÃªde\ prosÃª/kein au)ta\ gignÃ´/skesthai o)/nta toiau=ta oi(=a/
+phamen dei=n ei)=nai ta\ ei)/dÃª. . . . a)pi/thanos a)\n ei)/Ãª o(
+a)/gnÃ´sta au)ta\ a)nagka/zÃ´n ei)=nai.] 134 A. [Greek: Ãª( de\ par'
+Ãª(mi=n e)pistÃª/mÃª ou) tÃª=s par' Ãª(mi=n a)\n a)lÃªthei/as ei)/Ãª?
+kai\ au)= e(ka/stÃª Ãª( par' Ãª(mi=n e(pistÃª/mÃª tÃ´=n par' Ãª(mi=n
+o)/ntÃ´n e(ka/stou a)\n e)pistÃª/mÃª xu/mbainoi ei)=nai?] 134 C.
+[Greek: a)/gnÃ´ston a)/ra Ãª(mi=n e)/sti kai\ au)to\ to\ kalo\n o(\
+e)/sti, kai\ to\ a)gatho/n, kai\ pa/nta a(\ dÃª\ Ã´(s i)de/as
 au)ta\s ou)/sas u(polamba/nomen.]]
 
 The opinion here advanced by the Platonic Parmenides asserts, in
@@ -5503,7 +5472,7 @@ Protagoras--"Man is the measure of all things--of things existent,
 that they do exist--and of things non-existent, that they do not
 exist". This dictum affirms universal relativity, and nothing
 else: though Plato, as we shall see in the elaborate argument
-against it delivered by Sokrates in the Theætêtus, mixed it up
+against it delivered by Sokrates in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, mixed it up
 with another doctrine altogether distinct and independent--the
 doctrine that knowledge is sensible perception.[30] Parmenides
 here argues that if these Forms or Ideas are known by us, they can
@@ -5511,7 +5480,7 @@ be known only as relative to us: and that if they be not relative
 to us, they cannot be known by us at all. Such relativity belongs
 as much to the world of Conception, as to the world of Perception.
 And it is remarkable that Plato admits this essential relativity
-not merely here, but also in the Sophistês: in which latter
+not merely here, but also in the SophistÃªs: in which latter
 dialogue he denies the Forms or Ideas to be absolute existences,
 on the special ground that they are known:--and on the farther
 ground that what is known must act upon the knowing mind, and must
@@ -5522,9 +5491,9 @@ declares to constitute _existence_:[31] defining existence to mean
 potentiality.
 
 [Footnote 30: I shall discuss this in the coming chapter upon the
-Theætêtus.]
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus.]
 
-[Footnote 31: Plato, Sophistês, pp. 248-249. This reasoning is put
+[Footnote 31: Plato, SophistÃªs, pp. 248-249. This reasoning is put
 into the mouth of the Eleatic Stranger, the principal person in
 that dialogue.]
 
@@ -5532,7 +5501,7 @@ that dialogue.]
 the mind. Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped.]
 
 2. The second point which deserves notice in this portion of the
-Parmenidês, is the answer of Sokrates (when embarrassed by some of
+ParmenidÃªs, is the answer of Sokrates (when embarrassed by some of
 the questions of the Eleatic veteran)--"That these Forms or Ideas
 are conceptions of the mind, and have no existence out of the
 mind". This answer gives us the purely Subjective, or negation of
@@ -5552,7 +5521,7 @@ many distinct similar Percepta.
 
 [Footnote 32: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 A-B.
 
-The doctrine, that [Greek: poio/têtes] were [Greek: philai\
+The doctrine, that [Greek: poio/tÃªtes] were [Greek: philai\
 e)/nnoiai], having no existence without the mind, was held by
 Antisthenes as well as by the Eretrian sect of philosophers,
 contemporary with Plato and shortly after him. Simplikius, Schol.
@@ -5560,21 +5529,21 @@ ad Aristot. Categ. p. 68, a. 30, Brandis. See, respecting
 Antisthenes, the first volume of the present work, p. 165.]
 
 [Footnote 33: See the beginning of Porphyry's Introduction to the
-Categories of Aristotle. [Greek: bathuta/tê ou)/sês tê=s toiau/tês
+Categories of Aristotle. [Greek: bathuta/tÃª ou)/sÃªs tÃª=s toiau/tÃªs
 pragmatei/as], &c. Simplikius (in Schol. ad Aristot. Categ. p. 68,
 a. 28, ed. Brandis) alludes to the Eretrian philosophers and
-Theopompus, who considered [Greek: ta\s poio/têtas] as [Greek:
-phila\s mo/nas e)nnoi/as diakenô=s legome/nas kat' ou)demi/as
-u(posta/seôs, oi(=on a)nthrôpo/têta ê)\ i(ppo/têta], &c.]
+Theopompus, who considered [Greek: ta\s poio/tÃªtas] as [Greek:
+phila\s mo/nas e)nnoi/as diakenÃ´=s legome/nas kat' ou)demi/as
+u(posta/seÃ´s, oi(=on a)nthrÃ´po/tÃªta Ãª)\ i(ppo/tÃªta], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 34: Compare Republic, v. p. 476 B. [Greek: o( gignô/skôn
-gignô/skei ti\ ê)\ ou)de\n? Gignô/skei ti/], &c.
+[Footnote 34: Compare Republic, v. p. 476 B. [Greek: o( gignÃ´/skÃ´n
+gignÃ´/skei ti\ Ãª)\ ou)de\n? GignÃ´/skei ti/], &c.
 
 The following passage in the learned work of Cudworth bears on the
-portion of the Parmenidês which we are now considering. Cudworth,
+portion of the ParmenidÃªs which we are now considering. Cudworth,
 Treatise of Immutable Morality, pp. 243-245.
 
-"But if any one demand here, where this [Greek: a)ki/nêtos
+"But if any one demand here, where this [Greek: a)ki/nÃªtos
 ou)si/a], these immutable Entities do exist? I answer, first, that
 as they are considered formally, they do not properly exist in the
 Individuals without us, as if they were from them imprinted upon
@@ -5589,7 +5558,7 @@ unskilfully attributes to Plato. . . . Wherefore these
 Intelligible Ideas or Essences of Things, those Forms by which we
 understand all Things, exist nowhere but in the mind itself; for
 it was very well determined long ago by Socrates, in Plato's
-Parmenidês, that these things are nothing else but Noemata: 'These
+ParmenidÃªs, that these things are nothing else but Noemata: 'These
 Species or Ideas are all of them nothing but Noemata or Notions
 that exist nowhere but in the Soul itself'. . . .
 
@@ -5600,17 +5569,17 @@ Understanding. . . .
 "It is evident that though the Mind thinks of these Things at
 pleasure, yet they are not arbitrarily framed by the Mind, but
 have certain, determinate, and immutable Natures of their own,
-which are independent upon the Mind, and which are blown (quære
+which are independent upon the Mind, and which are blown (quÃ¦re
 _not blown_) away into Nothing at the pleasure of the same Being
 that arbitrarily made them."
 
 It is an inadvertence on the part of Cudworth to cite this passage
-of the Parmenidês as authenticating Plato's opinion that Forms or
+of the ParmenidÃªs as authenticating Plato's opinion that Forms or
 Ideas existed only in the mind. Certainly Sokrates is here made to
 express that opinion, among others; but the opinion is refuted by
-Parmenidês and dropped by Sokrates. But the very different
+ParmenidÃªs and dropped by Sokrates. But the very different
 opinion, which Cudworth accuses Aristotle of _wrongly_ attributing
-to Plato, is repeated by Sokrates in the Phædon, Republic, and
+to Plato, is repeated by Sokrates in the PhÃ¦don, Republic, and
 elsewhere, and never refuted.]
 
 This reply, though scanty and undeveloped, is in my judgment both
@@ -5651,8 +5620,8 @@ perceived) to be "_out of the mind_": for both Concepts and
 Percepts are "_of the mind_, or _relative to the mind_".[36]
 
 [Footnote 35: On this point the argument in the dialogue itself,
-as stated by Parmenides, is not clear to follow. Strümpell remarks
-on the terms employed by Plato. "Der Umstand, dass die Ausdrücke
+as stated by Parmenides, is not clear to follow. StrÃ¼mpell remarks
+on the terms employed by Plato. "Der Umstand, dass die AusdrÃ¼cke
 [Greek: ei)=dos] und [Greek: i)de/a] nicht sowie [Greek: lo/gos]
 den Unterschied, zwischen Begriff und dem durch diesen begriffenen
 Realen, hervortreten lassen--sondern, weil dieselben bald im
@@ -5672,14 +5641,14 @@ in time or real existence, but simply a _priority in nature_ or
 _logical priority_; and he also declares the two to be relatives
 or reciproca. The Prius is relative to the Posterius, as the
 Posterius is relative to the Prius.--Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 1010,
-b. 36 seq. [Greek: a)ll' e)/sti ti kai\ e(/teron para\ tê\n
-ai)/sthêsin, o(\ a)nagkê pro/teron ei)=nai tê=s ai)sthê/seô=s; to\
+b. 36 seq. [Greek: a)ll' e)/sti ti kai\ e(/teron para\ tÃª\n
+ai)/sthÃªsin, o(\ a)nagkÃª pro/teron ei)=nai tÃª=s ai)sthÃª/seÃ´=s; to\
 ga\r kinou=n tou= kinoume/nou _phu/sei pro/tero/n_ e)sti; ka)\n
-ei) le/getai pro\s a)/llêla tau=ta, ou)de\n ê(=tton.]
+ei) le/getai pro\s a)/llÃªla tau=ta, ou)de\n Ãª(=tton.]
 
 See respecting the [Greek: pro/teron phu/sei], Aristot. Categor.
 p. 12, b. 5-15, and Metaphys. [Greek: D]. 1018, b. 12--[Greek:
-a(plô=s kai\ tê=| phu/sei pro/teron].]
+a(plÃ´=s kai\ tÃª=| phu/sei pro/teron].]
 
 [Side-note: Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from
 ancient times to the present day--Different views of Plato and
@@ -5696,7 +5665,7 @@ enable any one to define.[37] But I see no ground for believing
 that Sokrates ever put to himself the question--Whether that which
 an abstract term denotes is a mental conception, or a separate and
 self-existent reality. That question was raised by Plato, and
-first stands clearly brought to view here in the Parmenidês.
+first stands clearly brought to view here in the ParmenidÃªs.
 
 [Footnote 37: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 3. M. 1078, b.
 18-32.]
@@ -5724,11 +5693,11 @@ term, and its corresponding abstract, stand for the same facts of
 sense differently conceived. Now the word _one_, when applied to the
 attribute, has a different meaning from _one_ when applied to an
 individual object. Plato speaks sometimes elsewhere as if he felt
-this diversity of meaning: not however in the Parmenidês, though
+this diversity of meaning: not however in the ParmenidÃªs, though
 there is great demand for it. But Aristotle (in this respect far
 superior) takes much pains to point out that _Unum Ens_--and the
 preposition _In_ (to be _in_ any thing)--are among the [Greek:
-pollachô=s lego/mena], having several different meanings derived
+pollachÃ´=s lego/mena], having several different meanings derived
 from one primary or radical by diverse and distant
 ramifications.[39] The important logical distinction between _Unum
 numero_ and _Unum specie_ (or _genere_, &c.) belongs first to
@@ -5744,16 +5713,16 @@ a. 18 seq., with the Scholia, p. 373 Brandis, and p. 446, 10
 Brand. The commentators made out, variously, nine, eleven, sixteen
 distinct [Greek: tro/pous tou= e)/n tini ei)=nai]. In the language
 of Aristotle, _genus_, _species_, [Greek: ei)=dos], and even
-_differentia_ are not [Greek: e)n u(pokeime/nô|], but are
+_differentia_ are not [Greek: e)n u(pokeime/nÃ´|], but are
 predicated [Greek: kath' u(pokeime/nou] (see Cat. p. 3, a. 20).
 The _proprium_ and _accidens_ alone are [Greek: e)n
-u(pokeime/nô|]. Here is a difference between his language and that
+u(pokeime/nÃ´|]. Here is a difference between his language and that
 of Plato, according to whom [Greek: to\ ei)=dos] is [Greek: e)n
-e(ka/stô| tô=n pollô=n] (Parmenid. 131 A). But we remark in that
+e(ka/stÃ´| tÃ´=n pollÃ´=n] (Parmenid. 131 A). But we remark in that
 same dialogue, that when Parmenides questions Sokrates whether he
-recognises [Greek: ei)/dê au)ta\ kath' au)ta/] he first asks
+recognises [Greek: ei)/dÃª au)ta\ kath' au)ta/] he first asks
 whether Sokrates admits [Greek: dikai/ou ti ei)=dos au)to\ kath'
-au(to/, kai\ kalou=, kai\ a)gathou=, kai\ pa/ntôn tô=n toiou/tôn].
+au(to/, kai\ kalou=, kai\ a)gathou=, kai\ pa/ntÃ´n tÃ´=n toiou/tÃ´n].
 Sokrates answers without hesitation, _Yes_. Then Parmenides
 proceeds to ask, Do you recognise an [Greek: ei)=dos] of man,
 separate and apart from all of us individual men?--or an [Greek:
@@ -5765,7 +5734,7 @@ Aristotle would call _second substances_. We thus see that the
 conception of a self-existent [Greek: ei)=dos] realised itself
 most easily and distinctly to the mind of Plato in the case of
 _accidents_. He would, therefore, naturally conceive [Greek: ta\
-ei)/dê] as being [Greek: e)n u(pokeime/nô|], agreeing
+ei)/dÃª] as being [Greek: e)n u(pokeime/nÃ´|], agreeing
 substantially, though not in terms, with Aristotle. It is in the
 case of accidents or attributes that abstract names are most
 usually invented; and it is the abstract name, or the neuter
@@ -5773,9 +5742,9 @@ adjective used as its equivalent, which suggests the belief in an
 [Greek: ei)=dos].]
 
 [Footnote 39: Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. 1015-1016, I. 1052,
-a. 29 seq. [Greek: ta\ me\n dê\ ou(/tôs e(\n ê)\ suneche\s ê)\
-o(/lon; ta\ de\ ô(=n a)\n o( lo/gos ei(=s ê)=|; toiau=ta de\ ô(=n
-ê( no/êsis mi/a], &c.
+a. 29 seq. [Greek: ta\ me\n dÃª\ ou(/tÃ´s e(\n Ãª)\ suneche\s Ãª)\
+o(/lon; ta\ de\ Ã´(=n a)\n o( lo/gos ei(=s Ãª)=|; toiau=ta de\ Ã´(=n
+Ãª( no/Ãªsis mi/a], &c.
 
 About abstract names, or the names of attributes, see Mr. John
 Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' i. 2, 4, p. 30, edit. 5th. "When
@@ -5795,8 +5764,8 @@ _undistinguishable likeness_ and _positive identity_, becomes in
 these cases imperceptible or forgotten.
 
 Aristotle, however, in the beginning of the Categories ranks
-[Greek: ê( ti/s grammatikê\] as [Greek: a)/tomon kai\ _e(\n
-a)rithmô=|_] (pp. 1, 6, 8), which I do not understand; and it
+[Greek: Ãª( ti/s grammatikÃª\] as [Greek: a)/tomon kai\ _e(\n
+a)rithmÃ´=|_] (pp. 1, 6, 8), which I do not understand; and it
 seems opposed to another passage, pp. 3, 6, 15.
 
 The argument between two such able thinkers as Mr. Mill and Mr.
@@ -5814,12 +5783,12 @@ x. p. 130 seq. Aristotle and Theophrastus both dwelt upon it.]
 facts of sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded.]
 
 Plato has not followed out the hint which he has here put into the
-mouth of Sokrates in the Parmenidês--That the Ideas or Forms are
+mouth of Sokrates in the ParmenidÃªs--That the Ideas or Forms are
 conceptions existing only in the mind. Though the opinion thus
 stated is not strictly correct (and is so pointed out by himself),
 as falling back too exclusively on the subjective--yet if followed
 out, it might have served to modify the too objective and absolute
-character which in most dialogues (though not in the Sophistês) he
+character which in most dialogues (though not in the SophistÃªs) he
 ascribes to his Forms or Ideas: laying stress upon them as
 objects--and as objects not of sensible perception--but
 overlooking or disallowing the fact of their being relative to the
@@ -5832,7 +5801,7 @@ the extreme abstractions which he handles, he reverts often to the
 comparison of them with sensible particulars: indeed Substantia
 Prima was by him, for the first time in the history of philosophy,
 brought down to designate the concrete particular object of sense:
-in Plato's Phædon, Republic, &c, the only Substances are the Forms
+in Plato's PhÃ¦don, Republic, &c, the only Substances are the Forms
 or Ideas.
 
 [Side-note: Continuation of the Dialogue--Parmenides admonishes
@@ -5854,14 +5823,14 @@ however right in bestowing your attention, not on the objects of
 sense, but on those objects which we can best grasp in discussion,
 and which we presume to exist as Forms.[42]
 
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 C. [Greek: Prô\| ga/r, pri\n
-gumnasthê=nai, ô)= Sô/krates, o(ri/zesthai e)picheirei=s kalo/n
-te/ ti kai\ di/kaion kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ e(\n e(/kaston tô=n
-ei)dô=n . . . kalê\ me\n ou)=n kai\ thei/a, ei)= i)/sthi, ê(
-o(rmê\ ê(\n o(rma=|s e)pi\ tou\s lo/gous; e(/lkuson de\ sauto\n
-kai\ gumna/sai, ma=llon dia\ tê=s dokou/sês a)chrê/stou ei)=nai
-kai\ kaloume/nês u(po\ tô=n pollô=n a)doleschi/as, e(/ôs e)/ti
-ne/os ei)=; ei) de\ mê\, se\ diapheu/xetai ê( a)lê/theia.]]
+[Footnote 41: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 C. [Greek: PrÃ´\| ga/r, pri\n
+gumnasthÃª=nai, Ã´)= SÃ´/krates, o(ri/zesthai e)picheirei=s kalo/n
+te/ ti kai\ di/kaion kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ e(\n e(/kaston tÃ´=n
+ei)dÃ´=n . . . kalÃª\ me\n ou)=n kai\ thei/a, ei)= i)/sthi, Ãª(
+o(rmÃª\ Ãª(\n o(rma=|s e)pi\ tou\s lo/gous; e(/lkuson de\ sauto\n
+kai\ gumna/sai, ma=llon dia\ tÃª=s dokou/sÃªs a)chrÃª/stou ei)=nai
+kai\ kaloume/nÃªs u(po\ tÃ´=n pollÃ´=n a)doleschi/as, e(/Ã´s e)/ti
+ne/os ei)=; ei) de\ mÃª\, se\ diapheu/xetai Ãª( a)lÃª/theia.]]
 
 [Footnote 42: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 E.]
 
@@ -5891,10 +5860,10 @@ exercise which will qualify you for completely seeing through the
 truth.[44]
 
 [Footnote 43: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 A. [Greek: kai\ au)=this
-au)= e)a\n u(pothê=|, ei) e)/stin o(moio/tês ê)\ ei) mê/ e)sti,
-ti/ e)ph' e(kate/ras tê=s u(pothe/seôs sumbê/setai, kai\ au)toi=s
+au)= e)a\n u(pothÃª=|, ei) e)/stin o(moio/tÃªs Ãª)\ ei) mÃª/ e)sti,
+ti/ e)ph' e(kate/ras tÃª=s u(pothe/seÃ´s sumbÃª/setai, kai\ au)toi=s
 toi=s u(potethei=si kai\ toi=s a)/llois kai\ pro\s au(ta\ kai\
-pro\s a)/llêla.]]
+pro\s a)/llÃªla.]]
 
 [Footnote 44: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B.]
 
@@ -5915,11 +5884,11 @@ survey and travelling over the whole field, we cannot possibly
 attain truth or acquire intelligence.[45]
 
 [Footnote 45: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 D. [Greek: ei) me\n ou)=n
-plei/ous ê)=men, ou)k a)\n a)/xion ê)=n dei=sthai; _a)prepê= ga\r
-ta\ toiau=ta pollô=n e)nanti/on le/gein_, a)/llôs te kai\
-têlikou/tô|; a)gnoou=si ga\r oi( polloi\ o(/ti a)/neu tau/tês tê=s
-dia\ pa/ntôn diexo/dou kai\ pla/nês, a)du/naton e)ntucho/nta tô=|
-a)lêthei= nou=n schei=n.] Hobbes remarks (Computatio sive Logica,
+plei/ous Ãª)=men, ou)k a)\n a)/xion Ãª)=n dei=sthai; _a)prepÃª= ga\r
+ta\ toiau=ta pollÃ´=n e)nanti/on le/gein_, a)/llÃ´s te kai\
+tÃªlikou/tÃ´|; a)gnoou=si ga\r oi( polloi\ o(/ti a)/neu tau/tÃªs tÃª=s
+dia\ pa/ntÃ´n diexo/dou kai\ pla/nÃªs, a)du/naton e)ntucho/nta tÃ´=|
+a)lÃªthei= nou=n schei=n.] Hobbes remarks (Computatio sive Logica,
 i. 3, 12): "Learners ought to go through logical exercises
 silently and by themselves: for it will be thought both ridiculous
 and absurd, for a man to use such language publicly". Proklus
@@ -5939,13 +5908,13 @@ proceeds to trace out the consequences which flow, first, from
 assuming the affirmative thesis, _Unum Est_: next, from assuming
 the negative thesis, or the Antithesis, _Unum non Est_. The
 consequences are to be deduced from each hypothesis, not only as
-regards _Unum_ itself, but as regards _Cætera_, or other things
+regards _Unum_ itself, but as regards _CÃ¦tera_, or other things
 besides _Unum_. The youngest man of the party, Aristoteles,
 undertakes the duty of respondent.
 
 [Footnote 46: Plato, Parmenid. p. 137 A. [Greek: dei= ga\r
-chari/zesthai, _e)peidê\_ kai\ o(\ Zê/nôn le/gei, _au)toi/ e)smen_
-. . . ê)\ bou/lesthe _e)peidê/per dokei= pragmateiô/dê paidia\n
+chari/zesthai, _e)peidÃª\_ kai\ o(\ ZÃª/nÃ´n le/gei, _au)toi/ e)smen_
+. . . Ãª)\ bou/lesthe _e)peidÃª/per dokei= pragmateiÃ´/dÃª paidia\n
 pai/zein_,] &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Exhibition of Parmenides--Nine distinct deductions or
@@ -5957,10 +5926,10 @@ Parmenides. The first five start from the assumption, _Unum Est_:
 the last four from the assumption, _Unum non Est_. The three first
 draw out the deductions from _Unum Est_, in reference to _Unum_:
 the fourth and fifth draw out the consequences from the same
-premiss, in reference to _Cætera_. Again, the sixth and seventh
+premiss, in reference to _CÃ¦tera_. Again, the sixth and seventh
 start from _Unum non Est_, to trace what follows in regard to
 _Unum_: the eighth and ninth adopt the same hypothesis, and reason
-it out in reference to _Cætera_.
+it out in reference to _CÃ¦tera_.
 
 [Side-note: The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or
 Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without
@@ -5984,7 +5953,7 @@ and fifth, sixth and seventh, eighth and ninth, no hint is given
 that they can be, or afterwards will be, reconciled. The dialogue
 concludes abruptly at the end of the ninth demonstration, with
 these words: "We thus see that--whether Unum exists or does not
-exist--Unum and Cætera both are, and are not, all things in every
+exist--Unum and CÃ¦tera both are, and are not, all things in every
 way--both appear, and do not appear, all things in every way--each
 in relation to itself, and each in relation to the other".[48]
 Here is an unqualified and even startling announcement of double
@@ -6011,14 +5980,14 @@ faultless.
 
 [Footnote 47: See the connecting words between the first and
 second demonstration, pp. 142 A, 159. [Greek: Ou)kou=n tau=ta me\n
-ê)/dê e)ô=men ô(s phanera/, e)piskopô=men de\ pa/lin, e(\n ei)
-e)/stin, _a)=ra kai\ ou)ch ou(/tôs e)/chei ta)/lla tou= e(no\s ê)\
-ou(/tô mo/non?_] Also p. 163 B.]
-
-[Footnote 48: Plato, Parmenid. ad fin. [Greek: Ei)rê/sthô toi/nun
-tou=to/ te kai\ o(/ti, ô(s e)/oiken, e(\n ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te
-mê\ e)/stin, au)to/ te kai\ ta)/lla kai\ pro\s au(ta\ kai\ pro\s
-a)/llêla pa/nta pa/ntôs e)sti/ te kai\ ou)k e)sti kai\ phai/netai/
+Ãª)/dÃª e)Ã´=men Ã´(s phanera/, e)piskopÃ´=men de\ pa/lin, e(\n ei)
+e)/stin, _a)=ra kai\ ou)ch ou(/tÃ´s e)/chei ta)/lla tou= e(no\s Ãª)\
+ou(/tÃ´ mo/non?_] Also p. 163 B.]
+
+[Footnote 48: Plato, Parmenid. ad fin. [Greek: Ei)rÃª/sthÃ´ toi/nun
+tou=to/ te kai\ o(/ti, Ã´(s e)/oiken, e(\n ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te
+mÃª\ e)/stin, au)to/ te kai\ ta)/lla kai\ pro\s au(ta\ kai\ pro\s
+a)/llÃªla pa/nta pa/ntÃ´s e)sti/ te kai\ ou)k e)sti kai\ phai/netai/
 te kai\ ou) phai/netai.]]
 
 [Side-note: Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the
@@ -6065,20 +6034,20 @@ antinomies of its close, and even in the dramatic details of
 places, persons, and incidents, with which it begins.[52]
 
 [Footnote 49: Plato, Euthydem. p. 300 C. [Greek: A)ll' ou) tou=to
-e)rôtô=, a)lla\ ta\ pa/nta siga=| ê)\ le/gei? _Ou)de/tera kai\
-a)mpho/tera_, e)/phê u(pharpa/sas o( Dionuso/dôros; eu)= ga\r
-oi)=da o(/ti tê=| a)pokri/sei ou)ch e(/xeis o(/, ti chrê=|.]]
-
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B. [Greek: ei)/te ô(s ti
-chalepo\n katanenoêkô\s chai/rei, tote\ me\n e)pi\ tha/tera tote\
-d' e)pi\ tha/tera tou\s lo/gous e(/lkôn, ou)k a)/xia pollê=s
-spoudê=s e)spou/daken, ô(s oi( nu=n lo/goi phasi/n.]--Also p. 259
-D. [Greek: To\ de\ tau)to\n e(/teron a)pophai/nein a(mê=| ge/ pê|,
+e)rÃ´tÃ´=, a)lla\ ta\ pa/nta siga=| Ãª)\ le/gei? _Ou)de/tera kai\
+a)mpho/tera_, e)/phÃª u(pharpa/sas o( Dionuso/dÃ´ros; eu)= ga\r
+oi)=da o(/ti tÃª=| a)pokri/sei ou)ch e(/xeis o(/, ti chrÃª=|.]]
+
+[Footnote 50: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B. [Greek: ei)/te Ã´(s ti
+chalepo\n katanenoÃªkÃ´\s chai/rei, tote\ me\n e)pi\ tha/tera tote\
+d' e)pi\ tha/tera tou\s lo/gous e(/lkÃ´n, ou)k a)/xia pollÃª=s
+spoudÃª=s e)spou/daken, Ã´(s oi( nu=n lo/goi phasi/n.]--Also p. 259
+D. [Greek: To\ de\ tau)to\n e(/teron a)pophai/nein a(mÃª=| ge/ pÃª|,
 kai\ to\ tha/teron tau)to/n, kai\ to\ me/ga smikro/n, kai\ to\
-o(/moion a)no/moion, kai\ chai/rein ou(/tô ta)nanti/a a)ei\
+o(/moion a)no/moion, kai\ chai/rein ou(/tÃ´ ta)nanti/a a)ei\
 prophe/ronta e)n toi=s lo/gois, ou)/ te/ tis e)/legchos ou(=tos
-a)lêthino/s, a)/rti te tô=n o)/ntôn tino\s e)phaptome/nou dê=los
-neogenê\s ô)/n.]]
+a)lÃªthino/s, a)/rti te tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n tino\s e)phaptome/nou dÃª=los
+neogenÃª\s Ã´)/n.]]
 
 [Footnote 51: Proklus, ad Platon. Parmen. p. 953, ed. Stallb.;
 compare p. 976 in the last book of the commentary, probably
@@ -6087,12 +6056,12 @@ Platon. Philos. p. 507.]
 
 [Footnote 52: This commentary is annexed to Stallbaum's edition of
 the Parmenides. Compare also the opinion of Marinus (disciple and
-biographer of Proklus) about the Parmenidês--Suidas v. [Greek:
+biographer of Proklus) about the ParmenidÃªs--Suidas v. [Greek:
 Mari=nos]. Jamblichus declared that Plato's entire theory of
 philosophy was embodied in the two dialogues, Parmenides and
-Timæus: in the Parmenides, all the intelligible or universal Entia
-were deduced from [Greek: to\ e(/n]: in the Timæus, all cosmical
-realities were deduced from the Demiurgus. Proklus ad Timæeum, p.
+TimÃ¦us: in the Parmenides, all the intelligible or universal Entia
+were deduced from [Greek: to\ e(/n]: in the TimÃ¦us, all cosmical
+realities were deduced from the Demiurgus. Proklus ad TimÃ¦eum, p.
 5 A, p. 10 Schneider.
 
 Alkinous, in his Introduction to the Platonic Dialogues (c. 6, p.
@@ -6109,25 +6078,25 @@ original.
 I transcribe a few sentences from the argument of Ficinus, to show
 what different meanings may be discovered in the same words by
 different critics. (Ficini Argum. in Plat. Parmen. p. 756.) "Cum
-Plato per omnes ejus dialogos totius sapientiæ semina sparserit,
-in libris De Republicâ cuncta moralis philosophiæ instituta
-collegit, omnem naturalium rerum scientiam in Timæo, universam in
+Plato per omnes ejus dialogos totius sapientiÃ¦ semina sparserit,
+in libris De RepublicÃ¢ cuncta moralis philosophiÃ¦ instituta
+collegit, omnem naturalium rerum scientiam in TimÃ¦o, universam in
 Parmenide complexus est Theologiam. Cumque in aliis longo
-intervallo cæteros philosophos antecesserit, in hoc tandem seipsum
-superasse videtur. Hic enim divus Plato de ipso Uno subtilissimé
+intervallo cÃ¦teros philosophos antecesserit, in hoc tandem seipsum
+superasse videtur. Hic enim divus Plato de ipso Uno subtilissimÃ©
 disputat: quemadmodum Ipsum Unum rerum omnium principium est,
 super omnia, omniaque ab illo: quo pacto ipsum extra omnia sit et
 in omnibus: omniaque ex illo, per illud, atque ad illud. Ad hujus,
 quod super essentiam est, Unius intelligentiam gradatim ascendit.
-In iis quæ fluunt et sensibus subjiciuntur et sensibilia
+In iis quÃ¦ fluunt et sensibus subjiciuntur et sensibilia
 nominantur: In iis etiam quas semper eadem sunt et sensibilia
-nuncupantur, non sensibus amplius sed solâ mente percipienda: Nec
+nuncupantur, non sensibus amplius sed solÃ¢ mente percipienda: Nec
 in iis tantum, verum etiam supra sensum et sensibilia,
 intellectumque et intelligibilia:--ipsum Unum existit.--Illud
 insuper advertendum est, quod in hoc dialogo cum dicitur _Unum_,
-Pythagoreorum more quæque substantia a materiâ penitus absoluta
+Pythagoreorum more quÃ¦que substantia a materiÃ¢ penitus absoluta
 significari potest: ut Deus, Mens, Anima. Cum vero dicitur Aliud
-et Alia, tam materia, quam illa quæ in materiâ fiunt, intelligere
+et Alia, tam materia, quam illa quÃ¦ in materiÃ¢ fiunt, intelligere
 licet."
 
 The Prolegomena, prefixed by Thomson to his edition of the
@@ -6163,7 +6132,7 @@ Platonico, and that of Zeller, Platonische Studien, p. 169 seqq.
 Kuno Fischer (pp. 102-103) after Hegel (Gesch. der Griech. Phil.
 I. p. 202), and some of the followers of Hegel, extol the
 Parmenides as a masterpiece of dialectics, though they complain
-that "der philosophirende Pöbel" misunderstand it, and treat it as
+that "der philosophirende PÃ¶bel" misunderstand it, and treat it as
 obscure. Werder, Logik, pp. 92-176, Berlin, 1841. Carl Beck,
 Platon's Philosophie im Abriss ihrer genetischen Entwickelung, p.
 75, Reutlingen, 1852. Marbach, Gesch. der Griech. Phil. sect. 96,
@@ -6221,7 +6190,7 @@ dialogue) against the separate substantiality of Forms or Ideas,
 though noway answered in the dialogue itself, are sufficiently
 answered in other dialogues (which he considers later in time),
 especially in the Sophistes (though, according to Brandis, Handb.
-Gr.-Röm. Phil. p. 241, the Sophistes is earlier than the
+Gr.-RÃ¶m. Phil. p. 241, the Sophistes is earlier than the
 Parmenides). Zeller, on the other hand, denies that these
 objections are at all answered in the Sophistes; but he maintains
 that the second part of the Parmenides itself clears up the
@@ -6230,9 +6199,9 @@ analysis (in the Platon. Studien, pp. 168-178) of the Antinomies
 or contradictory Demonstrations in the concluding part of the
 dialogue, Zeller affirms the purpose of them to be "die richtige
 Ansicht von den Ideen als der Einheit in dem Mannichfaltigen der
-Erscheinung dialektisch zu begründen, die Ideenlehre möglichen
-Einwürfen und Missverständnissen gegenüber dialektisch zu
-begründen" (pp. 180-182). This solution has found favour with some
+Erscheinung dialektisch zu begrÃ¼nden, die Ideenlehre mÃ¶glichen
+EinwÃ¼rfen und MissverstÃ¤ndnissen gegenÃ¼ber dialektisch zu
+begrÃ¼nden" (pp. 180-182). This solution has found favour with some
 subsequent commentators. See Susemihl, Die genetische Entwickelung
 der Platon. Philosophie, pp. 341-353; Heinrich Stein,
 Vorgeschichte und System des Platonismus, pp. 217-220.
@@ -6246,7 +6215,7 @@ what Aristeides calls (Or. xlvii. p. 430) "the One and Many,
 the multiplied twists and doublings, of this divine dialogue". I
 confess that I am unable to perceive therein what Zeller has
 either found or elicited. Objections and misunderstandings
-(Einwürfe und Missverständnisse), far from being obviated or
+(EinwÃ¼rfe und MissverstÃ¤ndnisse), far from being obviated or
 corrected, are accumulated from the beginning to the end of these
 Antinomies, and are summed up in a formidable total by the final
 sentence of the dialogue. Moreover, none of these objections which
@@ -6332,7 +6301,7 @@ hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared.]
 
 Such, in my judgment, is the drift of the contradictory
 demonstrations here put into the mouth of Parmenides respecting
-Unum and Cætera. Thus far at least, we are perfectly safe: for we
+Unum and CÃ¦tera. Thus far at least, we are perfectly safe: for we
 are conforming strictly to the language of Plato himself in the
 dialogue: we have no proof that he meant anything more. Those who
 presume that he must have had some ulterior dogmatical purpose,
@@ -6343,7 +6312,7 @@ dropped in. The number of discordant hypotheses attests[56] the
 difficulty of the problem. I agree with those early Platonic
 commentators (mentioned and opposed by Proklus) who could see no
 other purpose in these demonstrations than that of dialectical
-exercise. In this view Schleiermacher, Ast, Strümpell, and others
+exercise. In this view Schleiermacher, Ast, StrÃ¼mpell, and others
 mainly concur: the two former however annexing to it a farther
 hypothesis--which I think improbable--that the dialogue has come
 to us incomplete; having once contained at the end (or having been
@@ -6368,14 +6337,14 @@ copious upon the subject of exercise in dialectic method.
 Stallbaum, after reciting many different hypothetical
 interpretations from those interpreters who had preceded him, says
 (Prolegg. p. 265), "En lustravimus tandem varias interpretum de
-hoc libro opiniones. Quid igitur? verusne fui, quum suprà dicerem,
+hoc libro opiniones. Quid igitur? verusne fui, quum suprÃ  dicerem,
 tantam fuisse hominum eruditorum in eo explicando fluctuationem
 atque dissensionem, ut quamvis plurimi de eo disputaverint, tamen
-ferè alius aliter judicaverit? Nimirum his omnibus cognitis,
-facilè alicui in mentem veniat Terentianum illud--_Fecisti propé,
+ferÃ¨ alius aliter judicaverit? Nimirum his omnibus cognitis,
+facilÃ¨ alicui in mentem veniat Terentianum illud--_Fecisti propÃ©,
 multo sim quam dudum incertior_."
 
-Brandis (Handbuch Gr.-Röm. Phil. s. 105, pp. 257-258) cannot bring
+Brandis (Handbuch Gr.-RÃ¶m. Phil. s. 105, pp. 257-258) cannot bring
 himself to believe that dialectical exercise was the only purpose
 with which Plato composed the Parmenides. He then proceeds to
 state what Plato's ulterior purpose was, but in such very vague
@@ -6385,7 +6354,7 @@ language, p. 241, where he treats these Antinomies as preparatory
 [Greek: a)pori/ai].]
 
 [Footnote 57: Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 239-244;
-Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Parmen. pp. 94-99; Strümpell,
+Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Parmen. pp. 94-99; StrÃ¼mpell,
 Geschichte der Theoretischen Philosophie der Griechen, sect. 96,
 pp. 128-129.
 
@@ -6398,7 +6367,7 @@ is an unfinished fragment (Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p.
 dialogue as a dramatic or literary composition undoubtedly lacks a
 proper close; it is [Greek: a)/pous] or [Greek: kolobo\s]
 (Aristot. Rhetor. iii. 8), sinning against the strict exigence
-which Plato in the Phædrus applies to the discourse of Lysias.]
+which Plato in the PhÃ¦drus applies to the discourse of Lysias.]
 
 [Side-note: The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They
 include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of
@@ -6464,7 +6433,7 @@ difficulties and contradictions. But that he shall not extricate
 himself without arduous mental effort, is the express intention of
 Parmenides: just as the Xenophontic Sokrates proceeds with the
 youthful Euthydemus and the Platonic Sokrates with Lysis,
-Theætetus, and others. Plausible subtlety was not unsuitable for
+TheÃ¦tetus, and others. Plausible subtlety was not unsuitable for
 such a lesson.[59] Moreover, in the Parmenides, Plato proclaims
 explicitly that the essential condition of the lesson is to be
 strictly private: that a process so roundabout and tortuous cannot
@@ -6487,7 +6456,7 @@ introduced as predicting that the youthful Sokrates will become
 more and more absorbed in philosophy as he advances in years.
 
 Proklus observes in his commentary on the dialogue--[Greek: o(
-ga\r Sôkra/tês a)/gatai ta\s a)pori/as], &c. (L. v. p. 252).]
+ga\r SÃ´kra/tÃªs a)/gatai ta\s a)pori/as], &c. (L. v. p. 252).]
 
 [Footnote 59: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, ad fin.]
 
@@ -6502,11 +6471,11 @@ here enjoined by the Platonic Parmenides is so prodigious, that no
 one after Plato employed it (Prokl. ad Parmenid. p. 306, p. 801,
 Stallb.).
 
-[Greek: ei) me\n ou)=n plei/ous ê)=men, ou)k a)\n a)/xion ê)=n
-dei=sthai. a)prepê= ga\r ta\ toiau=ta pollô=n e)nanti/on le/gein,
-a)/llôs te kai\ têlikou/tô|; a)gnoou=si ga\r oi( polloi\ o(/ti
-a)neu tau/tês tê=s dia\ pa/ntôn diexo/dou kai\ pla/nês a)du/naton
-e)ntucho/nta tô=| a)lêthei= nou=n schei=n.]]
+[Greek: ei) me\n ou)=n plei/ous Ãª)=men, ou)k a)\n a)/xion Ãª)=n
+dei=sthai. a)prepÃª= ga\r ta\ toiau=ta pollÃ´=n e)nanti/on le/gein,
+a)/llÃ´s te kai\ tÃªlikou/tÃ´|; a)gnoou=si ga\r oi( polloi\ o(/ti
+a)neu tau/tÃªs tÃª=s dia\ pa/ntÃ´n diexo/dou kai\ pla/nÃªs a)du/naton
+e)ntucho/nta tÃ´=| a)lÃªthei= nou=n schei=n.]]
 
 [Footnote 61: Plato, Parmenides, p. 137 B; compare Sophistes, p.
 217 D.
@@ -6516,7 +6485,7 @@ contrast it with the precepts given by Aristotle in the Topica for
 dialectic debate: precepts teaching the questioner how to puzzle,
 and the respondent how to avoid being puzzled. Such precautions
 are advised to the respondent by Aristotle, not merely in the
-Topica but also in the Analytica--[Greek: chrê\ d' o(/per
+Topica but also in the Analytica--[Greek: chrÃª\ d' o(/per
 phula/ttesthai paragge/llomen a)pokrinome/nous, au)tou\s
 e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein] (Anal. Priora, ii. p.
 66, a. 33).]
@@ -6590,7 +6559,7 @@ Sextus Empiricus, who rests his theory of scepticism upon the
 general fact, that there are opposite and contradictory
 conclusions, both of them supported by evidence equally good: the
 affirmative no more worthy of belief than the negative.[65] Zeno
-(or, as Plato calls him, the Eleatic Palamêdes[66]) did not
+(or, as Plato calls him, the Eleatic PalamÃªdes[66]) did not
 profess any systematic theory of scepticism; but he could prove by
 ingenious and varied dialectic, both the thesis and the antithesis
 on several points of philosophy, by reasons which few, if any,
@@ -6604,8 +6573,8 @@ no tenable positive result will ever be attained--or at least it
 will not be attained until after such an amount of sagacity and
 patient exercise as Sokrates himself declares to be hardly
 practicable.[67] Herein we may see the germ and premisses of that
-theory which was afterwards formally proclaimed by Ænesidemus and
-the professed Sceptics: the same holding back ([Greek: e)pochê\]),
+theory which was afterwards formally proclaimed by Ã†nesidemus and
+the professed Sceptics: the same holding back ([Greek: e)pochÃª\]),
 and protest against precipitation in dogmatising,[68] which these
 latter converted into a formula and vindicated as a system.
 
@@ -6620,27 +6589,27 @@ to the work of affirmative exposition (Simplikius, Schol. ad
 Categ. Aristot. p. 40, a. 22-30; Schol. Brandis). David the
 Armenian, in his Scholia on the Categories (p. 27, b. 41,
 Brandis), defends the Topica of Aristotle as having been composed
-[Greek: gumnasi/as cha/rin, i(/na thlibome/nê ê( psuchê\ e)k tô=n
-e)ph' e(ka/tera e)picheirêma/tôn a)pogennê/sê| to\ tê=s
-a)lêthei/as phô=s.]]
+[Greek: gumnasi/as cha/rin, i(/na thlibome/nÃª Ãª( psuchÃª\ e)k tÃ´=n
+e)ph' e(ka/tera e)picheirÃªma/tÃ´n a)pogennÃª/sÃª| to\ tÃª=s
+a)lÃªthei/as phÃ´=s.]]
 
 [Footnote 65: Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. i. 8-12. [Greek: E)/sti de\
-ê( skeptikê\ du/namis a)ntithetikê\ phainome/nôn te kai\
-nooume/nôn kath' oi(ondê/pote tro/pon, a)ph' ê(=s e)rcho/metha,
-dia\ tê\n e)n toi=s a)ntikeime/nois pra/gmasi kai\ lo/gois
-i)sosthe/neian, to\ me\n prô=ton ei)s e)pochê\n to\ de\ meta\
-tou=to ei)s a)taraxi/an . . . _i)sosthe/neian_ de\ le/gomen tê\n
-kata\ pi/stin kai\ a)pisti/an i)so/têta, ô(s mêde/na mêdeno\s
-prokei=sthai tô=n machome/nôn lo/gôn ô(s pisto/teron . . .
-susta/seôs de\ tê=s skeptikê=s e)stin a)rchê\ ma/lista _to\ panti\
-lo/gô| lo/gon i)/son a)ntikei=sthai_.]]
-
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 D.]
+Ãª( skeptikÃª\ du/namis a)ntithetikÃª\ phainome/nÃ´n te kai\
+nooume/nÃ´n kath' oi(ondÃª/pote tro/pon, a)ph' Ãª(=s e)rcho/metha,
+dia\ tÃª\n e)n toi=s a)ntikeime/nois pra/gmasi kai\ lo/gois
+i)sosthe/neian, to\ me\n prÃ´=ton ei)s e)pochÃª\n to\ de\ meta\
+tou=to ei)s a)taraxi/an . . . _i)sosthe/neian_ de\ le/gomen tÃª\n
+kata\ pi/stin kai\ a)pisti/an i)so/tÃªta, Ã´(s mÃªde/na mÃªdeno\s
+prokei=sthai tÃ´=n machome/nÃ´n lo/gÃ´n Ã´(s pisto/teron . . .
+susta/seÃ´s de\ tÃª=s skeptikÃª=s e)stin a)rchÃª\ ma/lista _to\ panti\
+lo/gÃ´| lo/gon i)/son a)ntikei=sthai_.]]
+
+[Footnote 66: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 261 D.]
 
 [Footnote 67: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 C-D.]
 
-[Footnote 68: Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 20-212. [Greek: tê\n tô=n
-dogmatikô=n prope/teian--tê\n dogmatikê\n prope/teian.]]
+[Footnote 68: Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 20-212. [Greek: tÃª\n tÃ´=n
+dogmatikÃ´=n prope/teian--tÃª\n dogmatikÃª\n prope/teian.]]
 
 [Side-note: In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies,
 we ought to have before us the problems of the Megarics and
@@ -6661,7 +6630,7 @@ the problems ingenious and perplexing, the purpose of the author
 is satisfied. To search in the dialogue for some positive result,
 not indeed directly enunciated but discoverable by groping and
 diving--would be to expect a species of fruit inconsistent with
-the nature of the tree. [Greek: Zêtô=n eu(rê/seis ou) r(o/don
+the nature of the tree. [Greek: ZÃªtÃ´=n eu(rÃª/seis ou) r(o/don
 a)lla\ ba/ton.]
 
 [Footnote 69: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Parmen. pp. 97-99.]
@@ -6676,9 +6645,9 @@ Sokrates had called in question (p. 129 C-E).
 
 The Aristotelian treatise (whether by Aristotle, Theophrastus, or
 any other author) De Zenone, Melisso, Xenophane, et
-Gorgiâ--affords some curious comparisons with the Parmenides of Plato.
+GorgiÃ¢--affords some curious comparisons with the Parmenides of Plato.
 Aristotel. p. 974 seq. Bekk.; also Fragmenta Philosophorum
-Græcorum, ed. Didot, pp. 278-309.]
+GrÃ¦corum, ed. Didot, pp. 278-309.]
 
 [Side-note: Assumptions of Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey
 the minimum of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these
@@ -6716,33 +6685,33 @@ but also to assist in clearing them up.
 [Footnote 71: Aristot. Metaphys. iv. 1015-1017, ix. 1052, a. 15;
 Anal. Poster. ii. p. 92, b. 14. [Greek: to\ d' ei)=nai ou)k
 ou)si/a ou)deni/. ou) ga\r ge/nos to\ o)/n.]--Topica, iv. p. 127,
-a. 28. [Greek: plei/ô ga\r ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena; oi(=on to\ o)\n
-kai\ to\ e(\n tô=n pa=sin e(pome/nôn e)/stin], Physica, i. p.
+a. 28. [Greek: plei/Ã´ ga\r ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena; oi(=on to\ o)\n
+kai\ to\ e(\n tÃ´=n pa=sin e(pome/nÃ´n e)/stin], Physica, i. p.
 185, b. 6.
 
 Simplikius noted it as one among the differences between Plato and
 Aristotle--That Plato admitted Unum as having only one meaning,
 not being aware of the diversity of meanings which it bore; while
-Aristotle expressly pointed it out as a [Greek: pollakô=s
+Aristotle expressly pointed it out as a [Greek: pollakÃ´=s
 lego/menon] (Schol. ad Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 320, b. 3,
 Brandis). Aristotle farther remarks that Plato considered [Greek:
-to\ ge/nos] as [Greek: e(\n a)rithmô=|], and that this was an
+to\ ge/nos] as [Greek: e(\n a)rithmÃ´=|], and that this was an
 error; we ought rather to say that Plato did not clearly
-discriminate [Greek: e(\n a)rithmô=|] from [Greek: e(\n ei)/dei]
+discriminate [Greek: e(\n a)rithmÃ´=|] from [Greek: e(\n ei)/dei]
 (Aristot. Topic. vi. 143, b. 30).
 
 Simplikius farther remarks, that it was Aristotle who first
 rendered to Logic the important service of bringing out clearly
-and emphatically the idea of [Greek: to\ o(mô/numon]--the same
+and emphatically the idea of [Greek: to\ o(mÃ´/numon]--the same
 word with several meanings either totally distinct and disparate,
 or ramifying in different directions from the same root, so that
 there came to be little or no affinity between many of them. It
 was Aristotle who first classified and named these distinctions
-([Greek: sunô/numon--o(mô/numon], and the intermediate [Greek:
+([Greek: sunÃ´/numon--o(mÃ´/numon], and the intermediate [Greek:
 kat' a)nalogi/an]), though they had been partially noticed by
-Plato and even by Sokrates. [Greek: e(/ôs A)ristote/lous ou)
-pa/mpan e)/kdêlon ê)=n to\ o(mô/numon; a)lla\ Pla/tôn te ê)/rxato
-peri\ tou/tou ê)\ ma=llon e)kei/nou Sôkra/tês], Schol. ad Aristot.
+Plato and even by Sokrates. [Greek: e(/Ã´s A)ristote/lous ou)
+pa/mpan e)/kdÃªlon Ãª)=n to\ o(mÃ´/numon; a)lla\ Pla/tÃ´n te Ãª)/rxato
+peri\ tou/tou Ãª)\ ma=llon e)kei/nou SÃ´kra/tÃªs], Schol. ad Aristot.
 Physic. p. 323, b. 24, Brandis.]
 
 [Side-note: In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in
@@ -6830,13 +6799,13 @@ the purpose of Plato in the Parmenides was to demonstrate this
 It is not easy to find any common bearing between the
 demonstrations given in this dialogue respecting [Greek: E(\n] and
 [Greek: Polla\]--and the observations which Plato makes in the
-Philêbus upon [Greek: E(\n] and [Greek: Polla/]. Would he mean to
+PhilÃªbus upon [Greek: E(\n] and [Greek: Polla/]. Would he mean to
 include the demonstrations which we read in the Parmenides, in the
-category of what he calls in Philêbus "childish, easy, and
-irrational debates on that vexed question?" (Plato, Philêbus, p.
+category of what he calls in PhilÃªbus "childish, easy, and
+irrational debates on that vexed question?" (Plato, PhilÃªbus, p.
 14 D). Hardly: for they are at any rate most elaborate as well as
 ingenious and suggestive. Yet neither do they suit the description
-which he gives in Philêbus of the genuine, serious, and difficult
+which he gives in PhilÃªbus of the genuine, serious, and difficult
 debates on the same question.]
 
 [Side-note: Second Demonstration.]
@@ -6872,13 +6841,13 @@ both Unum and Multa--both Totum and Partes--both finite and
 infinite in multitude.[80]
 
 [Footnote 77: Plato, Parmenid. p. 142 A. [Greek: Bou/lei ou)=n
-e)pi\ tê\n u(po/thesin pa/lin e)x a)rchê=s e)pane/lthômen, e)a/n
-ti ê(mi=n e)paniou=sin a)lloi=on phanê=|?]]
+e)pi\ tÃª\n u(po/thesin pa/lin e)x a)rchÃª=s e)pane/lthÃ´men, e)a/n
+ti Ãª(mi=n e)paniou=sin a)lloi=on phanÃª=|?]]
 
 [Footnote 78: This shifting of the real hypothesis, though the
 terms remain unchanged, is admitted by implication a little
-afterwards, p. 142 B. [Greek: _nu=n de\_ ou)ch au(/tê e)/stin ê(
-u(po/thesis, _ei) e(\n e(\n_, ti/ chrê\ sumbai/nein, a)ll' _ei)
+afterwards, p. 142 B. [Greek: _nu=n de\_ ou)ch au(/tÃª e)/stin Ãª(
+u(po/thesis, _ei) e(\n e(\n_, ti/ chrÃª\ sumbai/nein, a)ll' _ei)
 e(\n e)/stin_.]]
 
 [Footnote 79: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 142-143. This is exactly what
@@ -6913,17 +6882,17 @@ Parmenides proceeds to show that Unum has beginning, middle, and
 end--together with some figure, straight or curved: and that it is
 both in itself, and in other things: that it is always both in
 motion and at rest:[81] that it is both the same with itself and
-different from itself--both the same with Cætera, and different
-from Cætera:[82] both like to itself, and unlike to itself--both
-like to Cætera, and unlike to Cætera:[83] that it both touches,
-and does not touch, both itself and Cætera:[84] that it is both
+different from itself--both the same with CÃ¦tera, and different
+from CÃ¦tera:[82] both like to itself, and unlike to itself--both
+like to CÃ¦tera, and unlike to CÃ¦tera:[83] that it both touches,
+and does not touch, both itself and CÃ¦tera:[84] that it is both
 equal, greater, and less, in number, as compared with itself and
-as compared with Cætera:[85] that it is both older than itself,
+as compared with CÃ¦tera:[85] that it is both older than itself,
 younger than itself, and of the same age with itself--both older
-than Cætera, younger than Cætera, and of the same age as
-Cætera--also that it is not older nor younger either than itself or
-than Cætera:[86] that it grows both older and younger than itself,
-and than Cætera.[87] Lastly, Unum was, is, and will be; it has been,
+than CÃ¦tera, younger than CÃ¦tera, and of the same age as
+CÃ¦tera--also that it is not older nor younger either than itself or
+than CÃ¦tera:[86] that it grows both older and younger than itself,
+and than CÃ¦tera.[87] Lastly, Unum was, is, and will be; it has been,
 is, and will be generated: it has had, has now, and will have,
 attributes and predicates: it can be named, and can be the object
 of perception, conception, opinion, reasoning, and cognition.[88]
@@ -6940,11 +6909,11 @@ of perception, conception, opinion, reasoning, and cognition.[88]
 
 [Footnote 86: Plato, Parmen. pp. 152-153-154 A.]
 
-[Footnote 87: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 154 B, 155 C. [Greek: kata\ dê\
-pa/nta tau=ta, to\ e(\n au)to/ te au(tou= kai\ tô=n a)/llôn
-presbu/teron kai\ neô/teron e)/sti te kai\ gi/gnetai, kai\ ou(/te
-presbu/teron ou(/te neô/teron ou(/t' e)/stin ou(/te gi/gnetai
-ou(/te au(tou= ou(/te tô=n a)/llôn.]]
+[Footnote 87: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 154 B, 155 C. [Greek: kata\ dÃª\
+pa/nta tau=ta, to\ e(\n au)to/ te au(tou= kai\ tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n
+presbu/teron kai\ neÃ´/teron e)/sti te kai\ gi/gnetai, kai\ ou(/te
+presbu/teron ou(/te neÃ´/teron ou(/t' e)/stin ou(/te gi/gnetai
+ou(/te au(tou= ou(/te tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n.]]
 
 [Footnote 88: Plato, Parmenid. p. 155 C-D.]
 
@@ -6989,12 +6958,12 @@ pp. 70-71-73) maintains, if I rightly understand him, not only
 that Plato did not adopt the _principium identitatis et
 contradictionis_ as the basis of his reasonings, but that one of
 Plato's express objects was to demonstrate the contrary of it,
-partly in the Philêbus, but especially in the Parmenides:--
+partly in the PhilÃªbus, but especially in the Parmenides:--
 
-"Eine arge Täuschung ist es, zu glauben, dass das principium
+"Eine arge TÃ¤uschung ist es, zu glauben, dass das principium
 identitatis et contradictionis oberstes logisches Princip des
 Plato sei . . Es ist gerade eine Hauptaufgabe, welche sich Plato
-stellen musste, die Coexistenz der Gegensätze nachzuweisen, wie
+stellen musste, die Coexistenz der GegensÃ¤tze nachzuweisen, wie
 diess bekanntlich im Philebus und _besonders im Parmenides_
 geschieht."
 
@@ -7005,7 +6974,7 @@ addition to the positive knowledge of Sokrates. I confess that
 this to me is unintelligible. I understand these Antinomies as
 [Greek: a)pori/ai] to be cleared up, but in no other character.
 
-Prantl speaks (p. 73) of "die antinomische Begründung der
+Prantl speaks (p. 73) of "die antinomische BegrÃ¼ndung der
 Ideenlehre im Parmenides," &c. This is the same language as that
 used by Zeller, upon which I have already remarked.]
 
@@ -7032,7 +7001,7 @@ then can the change occur at all?[91]
 
 [Footnote 90: This is a distinction analogous to that which Plato
 points out in the Sophistes (pp. 242-243) between the theories of
-Herakleitus and Empedoklês.]
+Herakleitus and EmpedoklÃªs.]
 
 [Footnote 91: Plato, Parmenid. p. 156.]
 
@@ -7066,18 +7035,18 @@ _Suddenly_, enables Parmenides to uphold both the double negative
 of the first Demonstration, and the double affirmative of the
 second.
 
-[Footnote 92: Plato, Parmenid. p. 156 E. [Greek: a)ll' ê(
-_e)xai/phnês au(/tê phu/sis a)/topo/s tis e)gka/thêtai metaxu\
-tê=s kinê/seô/s te kai\ sta/seôs_, e)n chro/nô| ou)deni\ ou)=sa,
-kai\ ei)s tau/tên dê\ kai\ e)k tau/tês to/ te kinou/menon
+[Footnote 92: Plato, Parmenid. p. 156 E. [Greek: a)ll' Ãª(
+_e)xai/phnÃªs au(/tÃª phu/sis a)/topo/s tis e)gka/thÃªtai metaxu\
+tÃª=s kinÃª/seÃ´/s te kai\ sta/seÃ´s_, e)n chro/nÃ´| ou)deni\ ou)=sa,
+kai\ ei)s tau/tÃªn dÃª\ kai\ e)k tau/tÃªs to/ te kinou/menon
 metaba/llei e)pi\ to\ e(sta/nai, kai\ to\ e(sto\s e)pi\ to\
-kinei=sthai. . . . kai\ to\ e(\n dê/, ei)/per e(/stêke/ te kai\
-kinei=tai, metaba/lloi a)\n e)ph' e(ka/tera; mo/nôs ga\r a)\n
-ou(/tôs a)mpho/tera poioi=; metaba/llon d' e)xai/phnês
-metaba/llei, kai\ o(/te metaba/llei, e)n ou)deni\ chro/nô| a)\n
-ei)/ê, ou)de\ kinoi=t' a)\n to/te, ou)d' a)\n stai/ê.]
+kinei=sthai. . . . kai\ to\ e(\n dÃª/, ei)/per e(/stÃªke/ te kai\
+kinei=tai, metaba/lloi a)\n e)ph' e(ka/tera; mo/nÃ´s ga\r a)\n
+ou(/tÃ´s a)mpho/tera poioi=; metaba/llon d' e)xai/phnÃªs
+metaba/llei, kai\ o(/te metaba/llei, e)n ou)deni\ chro/nÃ´| a)\n
+ei)/Ãª, ou)de\ kinoi=t' a)\n to/te, ou)d' a)\n stai/Ãª.]
 
-[Greek: To\ e)xai/phnês--ê( e)xai/phnês phu/sis a)/topo/s
+[Greek: To\ e)xai/phnÃªs--Ãª( e)xai/phnÃªs phu/sis a)/topo/s
 tis]--may be compared to an infinitesimal; analogous to what is
 recognised in the theory of the differential calculus.]
 
@@ -7090,8 +7059,8 @@ volumes of Lassalle upon Herakleitus, especially i. p. 358, ii. p.
 258. He scarcely however takes notice of the Platonic Parmenides.
 
 Some of the Stoics considered [Greek: to\ nu=n] as [Greek:
-mêde/n]--and nothing in time to be real except [Greek: to\
-parô|chêko\s] and [Greek: to\ me/llon] (Plutarch, De Commun.
+mÃªde/n]--and nothing in time to be real except [Greek: to\
+parÃ´|chÃªko\s] and [Greek: to\ me/llon] (Plutarch, De Commun.
 Notitiis contra Stoicos, p. 1081 D).]
 
 [Side-note: Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or
@@ -7108,10 +7077,10 @@ form a corresponding pair, branching off from the same root or
 hypothetical proposition (at least the same in terms), respecting
 the subject _Unum_; and destined to prove, one the Neither, the
 other the Both, of several different predicates. So also the
-fourth and fifth form a pair applying to the subject Cætera; and
+fourth and fifth form a pair applying to the subject CÃ¦tera; and
 destined to prove, that from the same hypothetical root--_Si Unum
 est_--we can deduce the Neither as well as the Both, of various
-predicates of Cætera. When we pass on to the four last
+predicates of CÃ¦tera. When we pass on to the four last
 Demonstrations, we find that in all four, the hypothesis _Si Unum
 non est_ is substituted for that of _Si Unum est_: but the
 parallel couples, with the corresponding purpose, are still kept
@@ -7119,7 +7088,7 @@ up. The sixth and seventh apply to the subject _Unum_, and
 demonstrate respecting that subject (proceeding from the
 hypothesis _Si Unum non est_) first the _Both_, then the
 _Neither_, of various predicates: the eighth and ninth arrive at
-the same result, respecting the subject _Cætera_. And a sentence
+the same result, respecting the subject _CÃ¦tera_. And a sentence
 at the close sums up in few words the result of all the four pairs
 (1-2, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, that is, of all the Demonstrations excepting
 the third)--the Neither and the Both respecting all of them.
@@ -7150,15 +7119,15 @@ others--for the puzzle continued to be a puzzle long after--and that
 it did not even satisfy Plato, except at the time when he composed
 the Parmenides--since neither the doctrine itself (the
 extra-temporal break or transition) nor the very peculiar phrase
-in which it is embodied ([Greek: to\ e)xai/phnês, a)/topo/s tis
+in which it is embodied ([Greek: to\ e)xai/phnÃªs, a)/topo/s tis
 phu/sis]) occur in any of his other dialogues. If the doctrine
 were really tenable, it would have been of use in dialectic, and
 as such, would have been called in to remove the theoretical
 difficulties raised among dialectical disputants, respecting time
 and motion. Yet Plato does not again advert to it, either in
-Sophistes or Timæus, in both of which there is special demand for
+Sophistes or TimÃ¦us, in both of which there is special demand for
 it.[94] Aristotle, while he adopts a doctrine like it (yet without
-employing the peculiar phrase [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnês]) to explain
+employing the peculiar phrase [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnÃªs]) to explain
 qualitative change, does not admit the same either as to
 quantitative change, or as to local motion, or as to generation
 and destruction.[95] The doctrine served the purpose of the
@@ -7167,8 +7136,8 @@ intellectual effort: but it did not acquire any permanent footing
 in Grecian dialectics.
 
 [Footnote 94: Steinhart represents this idea of [Greek: to\
-e)xai/phnês]--the extra-temporal break or zero of transition--as
-an important progress made by Plato, compared with the Theætêtus,
+e)xai/phnÃªs]--the extra-temporal break or zero of transition--as
+an important progress made by Plato, compared with the TheÃ¦tÃªtus,
 because it breaks down the absoluten Gegensatz between Sein and
 Werden, Ruhe and Bewegung (Einleitung zum Parmen. p. 309).
 
@@ -7180,8 +7149,8 @@ the case.]
 of Simplikius, p. 410, b. 20, Brandis.
 
 The discussion occupies two or three pages of Aristotle's Physica.
-In regard to [Greek: a)lloi/ôsis] or qualitative change, he
-recognised what he called [Greek: a)thro/an metabolê/n]--a change
+In regard to [Greek: a)lloi/Ã´sis] or qualitative change, he
+recognised what he called [Greek: a)thro/an metabolÃª/n]--a change
 _all at once_, which occupied no portion of time. It is plain,
 however, that even his own scholars Theophrastus and Eudemus had
 great difficulty in accepting the doctrine; see Scholia, pp.
@@ -7192,7 +7161,7 @@ common, for their point of departure, the negative proposition,
 _Si Unum non est_: and are likewise put together in parallel
 couples (6-7, 8-9), a Demonstration and a Counter-Demonstration--a
 Both and a Neither: first with reference to the subject
-_Unum_--next with reference to the subject _Cætera_.
+_Unum_--next with reference to the subject _CÃ¦tera_.
 
 [Side-note: Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI.
 and VII.]
@@ -7204,7 +7173,7 @@ such a proposition as the second, not merely difficult, but
 impossible. Nevertheless the ingenious dialectic of Plato
 accomplishes the task, and elicits from each proposition a Both,
 and a Neither, respecting several predicates of Unum as well as of
-Cætera. When you say _Unum non est_ (so argues the Platonic
+CÃ¦tera. When you say _Unum non est_ (so argues the Platonic
 Parmenides in Demonstration 6), you deny existence respecting
 Unum: but the proposition _Unum non est_, is distinguishable from
 _Magnitudo non est_--_Parvitudo non est_--and such like:
@@ -7222,13 +7191,13 @@ changes: it both moves and is at rest: it is generated and
 destroyed, yet is also neither generated nor destroyed.[98]
 
 [Footnote 96: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 160-161 A. [Greek: ei)=nai me\n
-dê\ tô=| e(ni\ ou)ch oi(=o/n te, ei)/per ge mê\ e)/sti, mete/chein
-de\ pollô=n ou)de\n kôlu/ei, a)lla\ kai\ a)na/gkê, ei)/per to/ ge
-e(\n e)kei=no kai\ mê\ a)/llo mê\ e)/stin. ei) me/ntoi mê/te to\
-e(\n mê/t' _e)kei=no_ mê\ e)/stai, a)lla\ peri\ a)/llou tou o(
+dÃª\ tÃ´=| e(ni\ ou)ch oi(=o/n te, ei)/per ge mÃª\ e)/sti, mete/chein
+de\ pollÃ´=n ou)de\n kÃ´lu/ei, a)lla\ kai\ a)na/gkÃª, ei)/per to/ ge
+e(\n e)kei=no kai\ mÃª\ a)/llo mÃª\ e)/stin. ei) me/ntoi mÃª/te to\
+e(\n mÃª/t' _e)kei=no_ mÃª\ e)/stai, a)lla\ peri\ a)/llou tou o(
 lo/gos, ou)de\ phthe/ggesthai dei= ou)de/n; ei) de\ to\ e(\n
-e)kei=no kai\ mê\ a)/llo u(pokei=tai mê\ ei)=nai, kai\ tou=
-_e)kei/nou_ kai\ a)/llôn pollô=n a)na/gkê au)tô=| metei=nai.]]
+e)kei=no kai\ mÃª\ a)/llo u(pokei=tai mÃª\ ei)=nai, kai\ tou=
+_e)kei/nou_ kai\ a)/llÃ´n pollÃ´=n a)na/gkÃª au)tÃ´=| metei=nai.]]
 
 [Footnote 97: Plato, Parmenid. p. 161 C-D.]
 
@@ -7322,22 +7291,22 @@ his series of contradictory affirmations respecting Unum.
 
 The last couple of Demonstrations--8 and 9--composing the fourth
 Antinomy, are in some respects the most ingenious and singular of
-all the nine. Si _Unum non est_, what is true about Cætera? The
+all the nine. Si _Unum non est_, what is true about CÃ¦tera? The
 eighth demonstrates the _Both_ of the affirmative predicates, the
 ninth proves the _Neither_.
 
 [Side-note: Demonstrations VIII. and IX.--Analysis of Demonstration
 VIII.]
 
-Si _Unum non est_ (is the argument of the eighth), Cætera must
-nevertheless somehow still be Cætera: otherwise you could not talk
-about Cætera.[103] (This is an argument like that in Demonstration
-6: What is talked about must exist, somehow.) But if Cætera can be
+Si _Unum non est_ (is the argument of the eighth), CÃ¦tera must
+nevertheless somehow still be CÃ¦tera: otherwise you could not talk
+about CÃ¦tera.[103] (This is an argument like that in Demonstration
+6: What is talked about must exist, somehow.) But if CÃ¦tera can be
 named and talked about, they must be different from something,--and
 from something, which is also different from them. What can
 this Something be? Not certainly Unum: for Unum, by the
 Hypothesis, does not exist, and cannot therefore be the term of
-comparison. _Cætera_ therefore must be different among themselves
+comparison. _CÃ¦tera_ therefore must be different among themselves
 and from each other. But they cannot be compared with each other
 by units: for Unum does not exist. They must therefore be compared
 with each other by heaps or multitudes: each of which will appear
@@ -7359,29 +7328,29 @@ rest and moving, separate and coalescing: in short, invested with
 an indefinite number of opposite attributes.[106]
 
 [Footnote 103: Plato, Parmenid. p. 164 B. [Greek: A)/lla me/n pou
-dei= au)ta\ ei)=nai; ei) ga\r mêde\ a)/lla e)sti/n, ou)k a)\n
-peri\ tô=n a)/llôn le/goito.]]
+dei= au)ta\ ei)=nai; ei) ga\r mÃªde\ a)/lla e)sti/n, ou)k a)\n
+peri\ tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n le/goito.]]
 
 [Footnote 104: Plato, Parmenid. p. 164 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n polloi\
-o)/gkoi e)/santai, ei)=s e(/kastos phaino/menos, ô)\n de\ ou)/,
-ei)/per e(\n mê\ e)/stai. Ou(/tôs.]]
+o)/gkoi e)/santai, ei)=s e(/kastos phaino/menos, Ã´)\n de\ ou)/,
+ei)/per e(\n mÃª\ e)/stai. Ou(/tÃ´s.]]
 
 [Footnote 105: Plato, Parmenid. p. 165 A. [Greek: O(/ti a)ei\
-au)tô=n o(/tan ti/s ti la/bê| tê=| dianoi/a| ô(/s ti tou/tôn o(/n,
-pro/ te tê=s a)rchê=s a)/llê a)ei\ phai/netai a)rchê/, meta/ te
-tê\n teleutê\n e(te/ra u(poleipome/nê teleutê/, e(/n te tô=|
-me/sô| a)/lla mesai/tera tou= me/sou, smikro/tera de\ dia\ to\ mê\
-du/nasthai e(no\s au)tô=n e(ka/stou lamba/nesthai, a)/te ou)k
+au)tÃ´=n o(/tan ti/s ti la/bÃª| tÃª=| dianoi/a| Ã´(/s ti tou/tÃ´n o(/n,
+pro/ te tÃª=s a)rchÃª=s a)/llÃª a)ei\ phai/netai a)rchÃª/, meta/ te
+tÃª\n teleutÃª\n e(te/ra u(poleipome/nÃª teleutÃª/, e(/n te tÃ´=|
+me/sÃ´| a)/lla mesai/tera tou= me/sou, smikro/tera de\ dia\ to\ mÃª\
+du/nasthai e(no\s au)tÃ´=n e(ka/stou lamba/nesthai, a)/te ou)k
 o)/ntos tou= e(no/s.]]
 
 [Footnote 106: Plato, Parmenid. p. 165 E. Compare p. 158 E.
-[Greek: toi=s a)/llois dê\ tou= e(no\s. . . . ê( de\ au)tô=n
+[Greek: toi=s a)/llois dÃª\ tou= e(no\s. . . . Ãª( de\ au)tÃ´=n
 phu/sis kath' e(auta\ a)peiri/an (pa/resche).]]
 
 [Side-note: Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian.]
 
 This Demonstration 8, with its strange and subtle chain of
-inferences, purporting to rest upon the admission of Cætera
+inferences, purporting to rest upon the admission of CÃ¦tera
 without Unum, brings out the antithesis of the Apparent and the
 Real, which had not been noticed in the preceding demonstrations.
 Demonstration 8 is in its character Zenonian. It probably
@@ -7400,26 +7369,26 @@ according to the point of view of the subject.
 
 [Footnote 107: Plato, Parmenid. p. 127 E; compare this with the
 close of the eighth Demonstration, p. 165 E--[Greek: ei) e(no\s
-mê\ o)/ntos polla\ e)/stin].]
+mÃª\ o)/ntos polla\ e)/stin].]
 
 [Side-note: Demonstration IX. _Neither_ following _Both_.]
 
 To the eighth Demonstration, ingenious as it is, succeeds a
 countervailing reversal in the ninth: the Neither following the
 Both. The fundamental supposition is in terms the same. _Si Unum
-non est_, what is to become of _Cætera_? _Cætera_ are not _Unum_:
+non est_, what is to become of _CÃ¦tera_? _CÃ¦tera_ are not _Unum_:
 yet neither are they _Multa_: for if there were any Multa, Unum
 would be included in them. If none of the Multa were Unum, all of
 them would be nothing at all, and there would be no Multa. If
-therefore Unum be not included in Cætera, Cætera would be neither
+therefore Unum be not included in CÃ¦tera, CÃ¦tera would be neither
 Unum nor Multa: nor would they appear to be either Unum or Multa:
-for Cætera can have no possible communion with Non-Entia: nor can
-any of the Non-Entia be present along with any of Cætera--since
+for CÃ¦tera can have no possible communion with Non-Entia: nor can
+any of the Non-Entia be present along with any of CÃ¦tera--since
 Non-Entia have no parts. We cannot therefore conceive or represent
-to ourselves Non-Ens as along with or belonging to Cætera.
-Therefore, _Si Unum non est_, nothing among _Cætera_ is conceived
+to ourselves Non-Ens as along with or belonging to CÃ¦tera.
+Therefore, _Si Unum non est_, nothing among _CÃ¦tera_ is conceived
 either as Unum or as Multa: for to conceive Multa without Unum is
-impossible. It thus appears, _Si Unum non est_, that Cætera
+impossible. It thus appears, _Si Unum non est_, that CÃ¦tera
 neither are Unum nor Multa. Nor are they conceived either as Unum
 or Multa--either as like or as unlike--either as the same or as
 different--either as in contact or as apart.--In short, all those
@@ -7428,13 +7397,13 @@ _to belong to them_ in appearance, are now shown _not to belong_
 to them either in appearance or in reality.[108]
 
 [Footnote 108: Plato, Parmenid. p. 166 A-B. [Greek: E(\n a)/ra ei)
-mê\ e)/sti, ta)/lla ou)/te e)/stin ou)/te doxa/zetai e(\n ou)/te
+mÃª\ e)/sti, ta)/lla ou)/te e)/stin ou)/te doxa/zetai e(\n ou)/te
 polla/. . . . Ou)/d' a)/ra o(/moia ou)de\ a)no/moia. . . . Ou)de\
-mê\n ta\ au)ta/ ge ou)d' e(/tera, ou)de\ a(pto/mena ou)de\
-chôri/s, _ou)de\ a)/ll' o(/sa e)n toi=s pro/sthen diê/lthomen_]
-(compare [Greek: dielthei=n], p. 165 E) [Greek: _ô(s phaino/mena
-au)ta/, tou/tôn ou)/te ti e)/stin ou)/te phai/netai ta)/lla, e(\n
-ei) mê\ e)/stin_.]]
+mÃª\n ta\ au)ta/ ge ou)d' e(/tera, ou)de\ a(pto/mena ou)de\
+chÃ´ri/s, _ou)de\ a)/ll' o(/sa e)n toi=s pro/sthen diÃª/lthomen_]
+(compare [Greek: dielthei=n], p. 165 E) [Greek: _Ã´(s phaino/mena
+au)ta/, tou/tÃ´n ou)/te ti e)/stin ou)/te phai/netai ta)/lla, e(\n
+ei) mÃª\ e)/stin_.]]
 
 [Side-note: Concluding words of the Parmenides--Declaration that he
 has demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different
@@ -7447,17 +7416,17 @@ assumption.[109] He declares, in the concluding words, that--on
 the hypothesis of _Unum est_, as well as on that of _Unum non
 est_--he has succeeded in demonstrating the Both and the Neither
 of many distinct propositions, respecting Unum and respecting
-Cætera.
+CÃ¦tera.
 
 [Footnote 109: Compare, with the passage cited in the last note,
 another passage, p. 159 B, at the beginning of Demonstration 5.
 
-[Greek: Ou)kou=n tau=ta me\n ê)/dê e)ô=men ô(s phanera/,
-e)piskopô=men de\ pa/lin, e(\n ei) e)/stin, a)=ra _kai\ ou)ch
-ou(/tôs e)/chei ta)/lla tou= e(no\s ê)\ ou(/tô mo/non_?]
+[Greek: Ou)kou=n tau=ta me\n Ãª)/dÃª e)Ã´=men Ã´(s phanera/,
+e)piskopÃ´=men de\ pa/lin, e(\n ei) e)/stin, a)=ra _kai\ ou)ch
+ou(/tÃ´s e)/chei ta)/lla tou= e(no\s Ãª)\ ou(/tÃ´ mo/non_?]
 
-Here the purpose to prove [Greek: _ou)ch ou(/tôs_], immediately on
-the heels of [Greek: _ou(/tôs_], is plainly enunciated.]
+Here the purpose to prove [Greek: _ou)ch ou(/tÃ´s_], immediately on
+the heels of [Greek: _ou(/tÃ´s_], is plainly enunciated.]
 
 [Side-note: Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an
 enigma of the Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma
@@ -7488,9 +7457,9 @@ Aristoteles.
 
 [Footnote 110: Plato, Republ. v. 479 C. The allusion was to an
 eunuch knocking down a bat seated upon a reed. [Greek: Ai)no/s tis
-e)/stin ô(s a)nê/r te kou)k a)nê/r, O)/rnitha/ te kou)k o)/rnith'
-i)dô/n te kou)k i)dô/n, E)pi\ xu/lou te kou) xu/lou kathême/nên
-Li/thô| te kou) li/thô| ba/loi te kou) ba/loi.]
+e)/stin Ã´(s a)nÃª/r te kou)k a)nÃª/r, O)/rnitha/ te kou)k o)/rnith'
+i)dÃ´/n te kou)k i)dÃ´/n, E)pi\ xu/lou te kou) xu/lou kathÃªme/nÃªn
+Li/thÃ´| te kou) li/thÃ´| ba/loi te kou) ba/loi.]
 
 I read with astonishment the amount of positive philosophy which a
 commentator like Steinhart extracts from the concluding enigma of
@@ -7503,10 +7472,10 @@ of the dialogue can possibly miss (Einleitung zum Parmenides, pp.
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII.
 
-THEÆTETUS.
+THEÃ†TETUS.
 
 
-[Side-note: Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus.]
+[Side-note: Subjects and personages in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus.]
 
 In this dialogue, as in the Parmenides immediately preceding,
 Plato dwells upon the intellectual operations of mind: introducing
@@ -7517,28 +7486,28 @@ distinct points of view, and examining three or four different
 answers to the question--all these answers are successively
 rejected, and the problem remains unsolved.
 
-The two persons who converse with Sokrates are, Theodôrus, an
+The two persons who converse with Sokrates are, TheodÃ´rus, an
 elderly man, eminent as a geometrician, astronomer, &c., and
-teaching those sciences--and Theætêtus, a young man of great merit
+teaching those sciences--and TheÃ¦tÃªtus, a young man of great merit
 and still greater promise: acute, intelligent, and
 inquisitive--high-principled and courageous in the field, yet gentle
 and conciliatory to all: lastly, resembling Sokrates in physiognomy
 and in the flatness of his nose. The dialogue is supposed to have
 taken place during the last weeks of the life of Sokrates, when
 his legal appearance as defendant is required to answer the
-indictment of Melêtus, already entered in the official record.[1]
+indictment of MelÃªtus, already entered in the official record.[1]
 The dialogue is here read aloud to Eukleides of Megara and his
 fellow-citizen Terpsion, by a slave of Eukleides: this last person
 had recorded it in writing from narrative previously made to him
 by Sokrates.[2] It is prefaced by a short discourse between
 Eukleides and Terpsion, intended to attract our sympathy and
-admiration towards the youthful Theætêtus.
+admiration towards the youthful TheÃ¦tÃªtus.
 
-[Footnote 1: Plato, Theætêt. ad fin. p. 210.]
+[Footnote 1: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. ad fin. p. 210.]
 
-[Footnote 2: Plato, Theætêt. i. pp. 142 E, 143 A. Plato hardly
+[Footnote 2: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. i. pp. 142 E, 143 A. Plato hardly
 keeps up the fiction about the time of this dialogue with perfect
-consistency. When it took place, the indictment of Melêtus had
+consistency. When it took place, the indictment of MelÃªtus had
 already been recorded: Sokrates breaks off the conversation for
 the purpose of going to answer it: Eukleides hears the dialogue
 from the mouth of Sokrates afterwards. "Immediately on getting
@@ -7557,7 +7526,7 @@ Schriften, p. 251.)
 
 Mr. Lewis Campbell, in the Preface to his very useful edition of
 this dialogue (p. lxxi. Oxford, 1861), considers that the battle
-in which Theætêtus is represented as having been wounded, is
+in which TheÃ¦tÃªtus is represented as having been wounded, is
 probably meant for that battle in which Iphikrates and his
 peltasts destroyed the Spartan Mora, B.C. 390: if not that, then
 the battle at the Isthmus of Corinth against Epaminondas. B.C.
@@ -7567,30 +7536,30 @@ under Iphikrates. The point can hardly be determined. Still less
 can we fix the date at which the dialogue was written, though the
 mention of the battle of Corinth certifies that it was later than
 394 B.C. Ast affirms confidently that it was the first dialogue
-composed by Plato after the Phædon, which last was composed
+composed by Plato after the PhÃ¦don, which last was composed
 immediately after the death of Sokrates (Ast, Platon's Leben, &c.,
 p. 192). I see no ground for this affirmation. Most of the
 commentators rank it among the dialectical dialogues, which they
 consider to belong to a later period of Plato's life than the
 ethical, but to an earlier period than the constructive, such as
-Republic, Timæus, &c. Most of them place the Theætêtus in one or
+Republic, TimÃ¦us, &c. Most of them place the TheÃ¦tÃªtus in one or
 other of the years between 393-383 B.C., though they differ much
 among themselves whether it is to be considered as later or
 earlier than other dialogues--Kratylus, Euthydemus, Menon,
-Gorgias, &c. (Stallbaum, Proleg. Theæt. pp. 6-10; Steinhart,
-Einleit. zum Theæt. pp. 100-213.) Munk and Ueberweg, on the
-contrary, place the Theætêtus at a date considerably later,
+Gorgias, &c. (Stallbaum, Proleg. TheÃ¦t. pp. 6-10; Steinhart,
+Einleit. zum TheÃ¦t. pp. 100-213.) Munk and Ueberweg, on the
+contrary, place the TheÃ¦tÃªtus at a date considerably later,
 subsequent to 368 B.C. Munk assigns it to 358 or 357 B.C. after
-Plato's last return from Sicily (Munk, Die natürliche Ordnung der
+Plato's last return from Sicily (Munk, Die natÃ¼rliche Ordnung der
 Platon. Schr. pp. 357-597: Ueberweg, Ueber die Aechtheit der
 Platon. Schr. pp. 228-236).]
 
 [Side-note: Question raised by Sokrates--What is knowledge or
-Cognition? First answer of Theætêtus, enumerating many different
+Cognition? First answer of TheÃ¦tÃªtus, enumerating many different
 cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates.]
 
 In answer to the question put by Sokrates--What is Knowledge or
-Cognition? Theætêtus at first replies--That there are many and
+Cognition? TheÃ¦tÃªtus at first replies--That there are many and
 diverse cognitions:--of geometry, of arithmetic, of arts and
 trades, such as shoemaking, joinery, &c. Sokrates points out (as
 in the Menon, Hippias Major, and other dialogues) that such an
@@ -7608,12 +7577,12 @@ proper way of defining them. For this purpose he brings into
 contrast the misconceptions likely to arise in the minds of
 persons not accustomed to dialectic.
 
-[Footnote 3: Plato, Theætêt. p. 147 A.
+[Footnote 3: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 147 A.
 
-[Greek: Ou)d' a)/ra e)pistê/mên u(podêma/tôn suni/êsin, o(
-e)pistê/mên mê\ ei)dio/s? Ou) ga/r.]]
+[Greek: Ou)d' a)/ra e)pistÃª/mÃªn u(podÃªma/tÃ´n suni/Ãªsin, o(
+e)pistÃª/mÃªn mÃª\ ei)dio/s? Ou) ga/r.]]
 
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Theætêt. p. 148. Oblong ([Greek: promê/keis])
+[Footnote 4: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 148. Oblong ([Greek: promÃª/keis])
 numbers are such as can be produced only from two unequal factors.
 The explanation of this difficult passage, requiring us to keep in
 mind the geometrical conception of numbers usual among the Greek
@@ -7625,19 +7594,19 @@ given. Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy--mental
 obstetric--He cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of
 pregnant minds.]
 
-Theætêtus, before he attempts a second answer, complains how much
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus, before he attempts a second answer, complains how much
 the subject had embarrassed him. Impressed with what he had heard
 about the interrogatories of Sokrates, he had tried to solve this
 problem: but he had not been able to satisfy himself with any
 attempted solution--nor yet to relinquish the search altogether.
-"You are in distress, Theætêtus" (observes Sokrates), "because you
+"You are in distress, TheÃ¦tÃªtus" (observes Sokrates), "because you
 are not empty, but pregnant.[5] You have that within you, of which
 you need to be relieved; and you cannot be relieved without
 obstetric aid. It is my peculiar gift from the Gods to afford such
 aid, and to stimulate the parturition of pregnant minds which
 cannot of themselves bring forth what is within them.[6] I can
 produce no truth myself: but I can, by my art inherited from my
-mother the midwife Phænaretê, extract truth from others, and test
+mother the midwife PhÃ¦naretÃª, extract truth from others, and test
 the answers given by others: so as to determine whether such
 answers are true and valuable, or false and worthless. I can teach
 nothing: I only bring out what is already struggling in the minds
@@ -7659,26 +7628,26 @@ companions wish to return to me afterwards--but my divine sign
 forbids me to receive them: where such obstacle does not
 intervene, they begin again to make progress."[8]
 
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Theætêt. p. 148 E. [Greek: ô)di/neis, dia\ to\
-mê\ keno\s a)ll' e)gku/môn ei)=nai.]]
+[Footnote 5: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 148 E. [Greek: Ã´)di/neis, dia\ to\
+mÃª\ keno\s a)ll' e)gku/mÃ´n ei)=nai.]]
 
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Theætêt. p. 149 A, p. 150 A.]
+[Footnote 6: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 149 A, p. 150 A.]
 
-[Footnote 7: Plato, Theætêt. p. 149 A. [Greek: oi( de/, a)/te ou)k
+[Footnote 7: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 149 A. [Greek: oi( de/, a)/te ou)k
 ei)do/tes, tou=to me\n ou) le/gousi peri\ e)mou=, o(/ti de\
-a)topô/tato/s ei)mi, kai\ poiô= tou\s a)nthrô/pous a)porei=n.] 150
-B-C [Greek: me/giston de\ tou=t' e(/ni tê=| ê(mete/ra| te/chnê|,
-basani/zein dunato\n ei)=nai panti\ tro/pô|, po/teron ei)/dôlon
-ê)\ pseu=dos a)poti/ktei tou= ne/ou ê( dianoi/a, ê)\ go/nimo/n te
-kai\ a)lêthe/s; e)pei\ to/de ge kai\ e)moi\ u(pa/rchei o(/per
+a)topÃ´/tato/s ei)mi, kai\ poiÃ´= tou\s a)nthrÃ´/pous a)porei=n.] 150
+B-C [Greek: me/giston de\ tou=t' e(/ni tÃª=| Ãª(mete/ra| te/chnÃª|,
+basani/zein dunato\n ei)=nai panti\ tro/pÃ´|, po/teron ei)/dÃ´lon
+Ãª)\ pseu=dos a)poti/ktei tou= ne/ou Ãª( dianoi/a, Ãª)\ go/nimo/n te
+kai\ a)lÃªthe/s; e)pei\ to/de ge kai\ e)moi\ u(pa/rchei o(/per
 tai=s mai/ais; a)/gono/s ei)mi sophi/as], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 150 E, 151 A. [Greek: e)ni/ois
-me\n to\ gigno/meno/n moi daimo/nion a)pokôlu/ei xunei=nai,
+[Footnote 8: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 150 E, 151 A. [Greek: e)ni/ois
+me\n to\ gigno/meno/n moi daimo/nion a)pokÃ´lu/ei xunei=nai,
 e)ni/ois de\ e)a=|; kai\ pa/lin ou(=toi e)pidido/asin.]
 
 We here see (what I have already adverted to in reviewing the
-Theagês, vol. ii. ch. xv. pp. 105-7) the character of mystery,
+TheagÃªs, vol. ii. ch. xv. pp. 105-7) the character of mystery,
 unaccountable and unpredictable in its working on individuals,
 with which Plato invests the colloquy of Sokrates.]
 
@@ -7701,15 +7670,15 @@ put aside truth."[9] Here we have a suitable prelude to a dialogue
 in which four successive answers are sifted and rejected, without
 reaching, even at last, any satisfactory solution.
 
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Theætêt. p. 151 D.]
+[Footnote 9: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 151 D.]
 
-[Side-note: Answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is sensible perception:
+[Side-note: Answer of TheÃ¦tÃªtus--Cognition is sensible perception:
 Sokrates says that this is the same doctrine as the _Homo Mensura_
 laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with
-the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except
+the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, EmpedoklÃªs, &c., all except
 Parmenides.]
 
-The first answer given by Theætêtus is--"Cognition is sensation
+The first answer given by TheÃ¦tÃªtus is--"Cognition is sensation
 (or sensible perception)". Upon this answer Sokrates remarks, that
 it is the same doctrine, though in other words, as what was laid
 down by Protagoras--"Man is the measure of all things: of things
@@ -7717,7 +7686,7 @@ existent, that they exist: of things non-existent, that they do
 not exist. As things appear to me, so they are to me: as they
 appear to you, so they are to you."[10] Sokrates then proceeds to
 say, that these two opinions are akin to, or identical with, the
-general view of nature entertained by Herakleitus, Empedoklês, and
+general view of nature entertained by Herakleitus, EmpedoklÃªs, and
 other philosophers, countenanced moreover by poets like Homer and
 Epicharmus. The philosophers here noticed (he continues), though
 differing much in other respects, all held the doctrine that
@@ -7730,25 +7699,25 @@ and unchangeable: that all change was unreal, apparent, illusory,
 not capable of being certainly known, but only matter of uncertain
 opinion or estimation.
 
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 151 E--152 A.
+[Footnote 10: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 151 E--152 A.
 
-_Theætêt._ [Greek: ou)k a)/llo ti/ e)stin e)pistê/mê ê)\
-ai)/sthêsis. . . .]
+_TheÃ¦tÃªt._ [Greek: ou)k a)/llo ti/ e)stin e)pistÃª/mÃª Ãª)\
+ai)/sthÃªsis. . . .]
 
 _Sokrat._ [Greek: Kinduneu/eis me/ntoi lo/gon ou) phau=lon
-ei)rêke/nai peri\ e)pistê/mês, a)ll' o(/n e)/lege kai\
-Prôtago/ras; _tro/pon de/ tina a)/llon ei)/rêke ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta.
-Phêsi\ ga/r pou--Pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn me/tron a)/nthrôpon ei)=nai,
-tô=n me\n o)/ntôn, ô(s e)/sti--tô=n de\ mê\ o)/ntôn, ô(s ou)k
-e)/stin._ A)ne/gnôkas ga/r pou?]
+ei)rÃªke/nai peri\ e)pistÃª/mÃªs, a)ll' o(/n e)/lege kai\
+PrÃ´tago/ras; _tro/pon de/ tina a)/llon ei)/rÃªke ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta.
+PhÃªsi\ ga/r pou--Pa/ntÃ´n chrÃªma/tÃ´n me/tron a)/nthrÃ´pon ei)=nai,
+tÃ´=n me\n o)/ntÃ´n, Ã´(s e)/sti--tÃ´=n de\ mÃª\ o)/ntÃ´n, Ã´(s ou)k
+e)/stin._ A)ne/gnÃ´kas ga/r pou?]
 
-_Theætêt._ [Greek: A)ne/gnôka kai\ polla/kis.]
+_TheÃ¦tÃªt._ [Greek: A)ne/gnÃ´ka kai\ polla/kis.]
 
-_Sokrat._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou(/tô pôs le/gei, ôs oi(=a me\n
+_Sokrat._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou(/tÃ´ pÃ´s le/gei, Ã´s oi(=a me\n
 e(/kasta e)moi\ phai/netai, toiau=ta me/n e)stin e)moi\--oi(=a de\
-soi/, toiau=ta de\ au)= soi/; a)nthrôpos de\ su/ te ka)gô/.]
+soi/, toiau=ta de\ au)= soi/; a)nthrÃ´pos de\ su/ te ka)gÃ´/.]
 
-_Theætêt._ [Greek: Le/gei ga\r ou)=n ou(/tôs.]
+_TheÃ¦tÃªt._ [Greek: Le/gei ga\r ou)=n ou(/tÃ´s.]
 
 Here Plato appears to transcribe the words of Protagoras (compare
 p. 161 B, and the Kratylus, p. 386 A) which distinctly affirm the
@@ -7762,11 +7731,11 @@ the treatise of Protagoras any more express or peremptory
 affirmation of the doctrine "that knowledge is sensible
 perception," Plato would probably have given it here.]
 
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Theætêt. p. 152 E. [Greek: kai\ peri\ tou/tou
-_pa/ntes e(xê=s oi( sophoi\ plê\n Parmeni/dou xumphere/sthôn_,
-Prôtago/ras te kai\ Ê(ra/kleitos kai\ E)mpedoklê=s, kai\ tô=n
-poiêtô=n oi( a)/kroi tê=s poiê/seôs e(kate/ras, kômô|di/as me\n
-E)pi/charmos, tragô|di/as de\ O(/mêros.]]
+[Footnote 11: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 152 E. [Greek: kai\ peri\ tou/tou
+_pa/ntes e(xÃª=s oi( sophoi\ plÃª\n Parmeni/dou xumphere/sthÃ´n_,
+PrÃ´tago/ras te kai\ ÃŠ(ra/kleitos kai\ E)mpedoklÃª=s, kai\ tÃ´=n
+poiÃªtÃ´=n oi( a)/kroi tÃª=s poiÃª/seÃ´s e(kate/ras, kÃ´mÃ´|di/as me\n
+E)pi/charmos, tragÃ´|di/as de\ O(/mÃªros.]]
 
 [Side-note: Plato here blends together three distinct theories for
 the purpose of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what
@@ -7778,8 +7747,8 @@ expressly declares) is the doctrine--That Cognition is sensible
 perception. Nevertheless upon all the three opinions, thus
 represented as cognate or identical,[13] Sokrates bestows a
 lengthened comment (occupying a half of the dialogue) in
-conversation, principally with Theætêtus, but partly also with
-Theodôrus. His strictures are not always easy to follow with
+conversation, principally with TheÃ¦tÃªtus, but partly also with
+TheodÃ´rus. His strictures are not always easy to follow with
 assurance, because he often passes with little notice from one to
 the other of the three doctrines which he is examining: because he
 himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to take
@@ -7787,7 +7756,7 @@ them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: and further
 because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his own, he sometimes
 leaves us in doubt what is his real purpose--whether to expound,
 or to deride, the opinions of others--whether to enlighten
-Theætêtus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies.[14] We
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies.[14] We
 cannot always distinguish between the ironical and the serious.
 Lastly, it is a still greater difficulty, that we have not before
 us either of the three opinions as set forth by their proper
@@ -7797,25 +7766,25 @@ upon which Plato is commenting--nor whether these authors would
 have admitted as just the view which he takes of their
 opinions.[15]
 
-[Footnote 12: Plato, Theætêt. p. 163 A.]
+[Footnote 12: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 163 A.]
 
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Theætêt. p. 160 D. _Sokrat._ [Greek:
-Pagka/lôs a)/ra soi ei)/rêtai o(/ti e)pistê/mê ou)k a)/llo ti/
-e)stin ê)\ ai)/sthêsis; kai\ _ei)s tau)to\n sumpe/ptôke_, kata\
-me\n O(/mêron kai\ Ê(ra/kleiton kai\ pa=n to\ toiou=ton phu=lon,
-oi(=on r(eu/mata kinei=sthai ta\ pa/nta--kata\ de\ Prôtago/ran
-to\n sophô/taton, pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn a)/nthrôpon me/tron
-ei)=nai--kata\ de\ Theai/têton, tou/tôn ou(=tôs e)cho/ntôn,
-ai)/sthêsin e)pistê/mên gi/gnesthai.]]
+[Footnote 13: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 160 D. _Sokrat._ [Greek:
+Pagka/lÃ´s a)/ra soi ei)/rÃªtai o(/ti e)pistÃª/mÃª ou)k a)/llo ti/
+e)stin Ãª)\ ai)/sthÃªsis; kai\ _ei)s tau)to\n sumpe/ptÃ´ke_, kata\
+me\n O(/mÃªron kai\ ÃŠ(ra/kleiton kai\ pa=n to\ toiou=ton phu=lon,
+oi(=on r(eu/mata kinei=sthai ta\ pa/nta--kata\ de\ PrÃ´tago/ran
+to\n sophÃ´/taton, pa/ntÃ´n chrÃªma/tÃ´n a)/nthrÃ´pon me/tron
+ei)=nai--kata\ de\ Theai/tÃªton, tou/tÃ´n ou(=tÃ´s e)cho/ntÃ´n,
+ai)/sthÃªsin e)pistÃª/mÃªn gi/gnesthai.]]
 
-[Footnote 14: See the answer of Theætêtus and the words of
+[Footnote 14: See the answer of TheÃ¦tÃªtus and the words of
 Sokrates following, p. 157 C.]
 
 [Footnote 15: It would be hardly necessary to remark, that when
 Plato professes to put a pleading into the mouth of Protagoras
 (pp. 165-166) we have no other real speaker than Plato himself, if
 commentators did not often forget this. Steinhart indeed tells us
-(Einleit. zum Theætêt. pp. 36-47) positively--that Plato in this
+(Einleit. zum TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 36-47) positively--that Plato in this
 pleading keeps in the most accurate manner (auf das genaueste) to
 the thoughts of Protagoras, perhaps even to his words. How
 Steinhart can know this I am at a loss to understand. To me it
@@ -7845,22 +7814,22 @@ one who rejected that definition of knowledge.[17] And though
 Plato tries to refute both, yet the reasonings which he brings
 against one do not at all tell against the other.
 
-[Footnote 16: See Theætêt. p. 152 A. This is admitted (to be a
+[Footnote 16: See TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 152 A. This is admitted (to be a
 construction put by Plato himself) by Steinhart in his note 7, p.
-214, Einleitung zum Theætêtus, though he says that Plato's
+214, Einleitung zum TheÃ¦tÃªtus, though he says that Plato's
 construction is the right one.]
 
 [Footnote 17: Dr. Routh, in a note upon his edition of the
-Euthydêmus of Plato (p. 286 C) observes:--"Protagoras docebat,
-[Greek: Pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn me/tron a)/nthrôpon ei)=nai, tô=n me\n
-o)/ntôn, ô(s e)/sti; tô=n de\ mê\ o)/ntôn, ô(s ou)k e)/sti.] Quâ
+EuthydÃªmus of Plato (p. 286 C) observes:--"Protagoras docebat,
+[Greek: Pa/ntÃ´n chrÃªma/tÃ´n me/tron a)/nthrÃ´pon ei)=nai, tÃ´=n me\n
+o)/ntÃ´n, Ã´(s e)/sti; tÃ´=n de\ mÃª\ o)/ntÃ´n, Ã´(s ou)k e)/sti.] QuÃ¢
 quidem opinione qualitatum sensilium sine animi perceptione
 existentiam sustulisse videtur."
 
 The definition here given by Routh is correct as far as it goes,
 though too narrow. But it is sufficient to exhibit the Protagorean
 doctrine as quite distinct from the other doctrine, [Greek: o(/ti
-e)pistê/mê ou)k a)/llo ti/ e)stin ê)\ ai)/sthêsis.]]
+e)pistÃª/mÃª ou)k a)/llo ti/ e)stin Ãª)\ ai)/sthÃªsis.]]
 
 [Side-note: Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras--_Homo
 Mensura_.]
@@ -7970,9 +7939,9 @@ suffer has its objective or differential peculiarity,
 distinguishing it from other sensations, correlating with the same
 sentient Subject.
 
-[Footnote 19: "Nobiscum semper est ipsa quam quærimus (anima);
+[Footnote 19: "Nobiscum semper est ipsa quam quÃ¦rimus (anima);
 adest, tractat, loquitur--et, si fas est dicere, inter ista
-nescitur." (Cassiodorus, De Animâ, c. 1, p. 594, in the edition of
+nescitur." (Cassiodorus, De AnimÃ¢, c. 1, p. 594, in the edition of
 his Opera Omnia, Venet. 1729).
 
 "In the primitive dualism of consciousness, the Subject and Object
@@ -8006,10 +7975,10 @@ intelligible Entia or Ideas distinct from the world of sense: or
 let us assume that Kant and Reid in the eighteenth century, and M.
 Cousin with other French writers in the nineteenth, have destroyed
 the Lockian philosophy, which took account (they say) of nothing
-but the _à posteriori_ element of cognition--and have established
-the existence of other elements of cognition _à priori_: intuitive
+but the _Ã  posteriori_ element of cognition--and have established
+the existence of other elements of cognition _Ã  priori_: intuitive
 beliefs, first principles, primary or inexplicable Concepts of
-Reason.[20] Still we must recollect that all such _à priori_
+Reason.[20] Still we must recollect that all such _Ã  priori_
 Concepts, Intuitions, Beliefs, &c., are summed up in the mind: and
 that thus each man's mind, with its peculiar endowments, natural
 or supernatural, is still the measure or limit of his cognitions,
@@ -8030,74 +7999,74 @@ two opposite aspects is indivisible. Without Subject, Object
 vanishes: without Object (some object or other, for this side of
 the fact is essentially variable), Subject vanishes.
 
-[Footnote 20: See M. Jouffroy, Préface à sa Traduction des
+[Footnote 20: See M. Jouffroy, PrÃ©face Ã  sa Traduction des
 OEuvres de Reid, pp. xcvii.-ccxiv.
 
-M. Jouffroy, following in the steps of Kant, declares these _à
+M. Jouffroy, following in the steps of Kant, declares these _Ã 
 priori_ beliefs or intuitions to be altogether relative to the
-human mind. "Kant, considérant que les conceptions de la raison
+human mind. "Kant, considÃ©rant que les conceptions de la raison
 sont des croyances aveugles auxquelles notre esprit se sent
-fatalement déterminé par sa nature, en conclut qu'elles sont
-rélatives à cette nature: que si notre nature était autre, elles
-pourraient être différentes: que par conséquent, elles n'ont
-aucune valeur absolue: et qu'ainsi notre vérité, notre science,
-notre certitude, sont une vérité, une science, une certitude,
-purement _subjective_, purement humaine--à laquelle nous sommes
-déterminés à nous fier par notre nature, mais qui ne supporte pas
+fatalement dÃ©terminÃ© par sa nature, en conclut qu'elles sont
+rÃ©latives Ã  cette nature: que si notre nature Ã©tait autre, elles
+pourraient Ãªtre diffÃ©rentes: que par consÃ©quent, elles n'ont
+aucune valeur absolue: et qu'ainsi notre vÃ©ritÃ©, notre science,
+notre certitude, sont une vÃ©ritÃ©, une science, une certitude,
+purement _subjective_, purement humaine--Ã  laquelle nous sommes
+dÃ©terminÃ©s Ã  nous fier par notre nature, mais qui ne supporte pas
 l'examen et n'a aucune valeur _objective_" (p. clxvii.) . . .
-"C'est ce que répéte Kant quand il soutient que l'on ne peut
-_objectiver le subjectif_: c'est à dire, faire que la vérité
-humaine cesse d'être humaine, puisque la raison qui la trouve est
-humaine. On peut exprimer de vingt manières différentes cette
-impossibilité: elle reste toujours la même, et demeure toujours
+"C'est ce que rÃ©pÃ©te Kant quand il soutient que l'on ne peut
+_objectiver le subjectif_: c'est Ã  dire, faire que la vÃ©ritÃ©
+humaine cesse d'Ãªtre humaine, puisque la raison qui la trouve est
+humaine. On peut exprimer de vingt maniÃ¨res diffÃ©rentes cette
+impossibilitÃ©: elle reste toujours la mÃªme, et demeure toujours
 insurmontable," p. cxc. Compare p. xcvii. of the same Preface.
 
 M. Pascal Galuppi (in his Lettres Philosophiques sur les
 Vicissitudes de la Philosophie, translated from the Italian by M.
-Peisse, Paris, 1844) though not agreeing in this variety of _à
-priori_ philosophy, agrees with Kant in declaring the _à priori_
+Peisse, Paris, 1844) though not agreeing in this variety of _Ã 
+priori_ philosophy, agrees with Kant in declaring the _Ã  priori_
 element of cognition to be purely subjective, and the objective
-element to be _à posteriori_ (Lett. xiv. pp. 337-338), or the
-facts of sense and experience. "L'ordre _à priori_, que Kant
-appelle _transcendental_, est purement idéal, et dépourvu de toute
-réalité. Je vis, qu'en fondant la connaissance sur l'ordre _à
-priori_, on arrive nécessairement au scepticisme: et je reconnus
-que la doctrine Écossaise est la mère légitime du Criticisme
-Kantien, et par conséquent, du scepticisme, qui est la conséquence
-de la philosophie critique. Je considérai comme de haute
-importance ce problème de Kant. Il convient de déterminer ce qu'il
+element to be _Ã  posteriori_ (Lett. xiv. pp. 337-338), or the
+facts of sense and experience. "L'ordre _Ã  priori_, que Kant
+appelle _transcendental_, est purement idÃ©al, et dÃ©pourvu de toute
+rÃ©alitÃ©. Je vis, qu'en fondant la connaissance sur l'ordre _Ã 
+priori_, on arrive nÃ©cessairement au scepticisme: et je reconnus
+que la doctrine Ã‰cossaise est la mÃ¨re lÃ©gitime du Criticisme
+Kantien, et par consÃ©quent, du scepticisme, qui est la consÃ©quence
+de la philosophie critique. Je considÃ©rai comme de haute
+importance ce problÃ¨me de Kant. Il convient de dÃ©terminer ce qu'il
 y a d'objectif, et ce qu'il y a de subjectif, dans la
 connaissance. Les Empiriques n'admettent dans la connaissance
-d'autres élémens que les objectifs," &c.]
+d'autres Ã©lÃ©mens que les objectifs," &c.]
 
 [Footnote 21: See this point handled in Sextus Empiric. adv.
 Mathemat. viii. 355-362. We may here cite a remark of Simplikius
 in his Commentary on the Categories of Aristotle (p. 64, a. in
-Schol. Brandis). Aristotle (De Animâ, iii. 2, 426, a. 19; Categor.
+Schol. Brandis). Aristotle (De AnimÃ¢, iii. 2, 426, a. 19; Categor.
 p. 7, b. 23) lays down the doctrine that in most cases Relata or
-([Greek: ta\ pro/s ti]) are "simul Naturâ, [Greek: kai\
-sunanairei= a)/llêla]": but that in some Relata this is not true:
-for example, [Greek: to\ e)pistêto\n] is relative to [Greek:
-e)pistê/mê], yet still _it would seem prior_ to [Greek: e)pistê/mê
-(pro/teron a)\n do/xeie tê=s e)pistê/mês ei)=nai)]. There cannot
-be [Greek: e)pistê/mê] without some [Greek: e)pistêto/n]: but
-there may be [Greek: e)pistêto\n] without any [Greek: e)pistê/mê].
+([Greek: ta\ pro/s ti]) are "simul NaturÃ¢, [Greek: kai\
+sunanairei= a)/llÃªla]": but that in some Relata this is not true:
+for example, [Greek: to\ e)pistÃªto\n] is relative to [Greek:
+e)pistÃª/mÃª], yet still _it would seem prior_ to [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª
+(pro/teron a)\n do/xeie tÃª=s e)pistÃª/mÃªs ei)=nai)]. There cannot
+be [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª] without some [Greek: e)pistÃªto/n]: but
+there may be [Greek: e)pistÃªto\n] without any [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª].
 There are few things, if any (he says), in which the [Greek:
-e)pistêto\n] (cognoscibile) is _simul naturâ_ with [Greek:
-e)pistê/mê] (or cognitio) and cannot be without it.
+e)pistÃªto\n] (cognoscibile) is _simul naturÃ¢_ with [Greek:
+e)pistÃª/mÃª] (or cognitio) and cannot be without it.
 
 Upon which Simplikius remarks, What are these few things? [Greek:
-Ti/na de\ ta\ o)li/ga e)sti/n, e)ph' ô(=n a(/ma tô=| e)pistêtô=|
-ê( e)pistê/mê e)sti/n? Ta\ a)/neu u(/lês, ta\ noêta/, a(/ma tô=|
-kat' e)nergei/an a)ei\ e)stô/sê| e)pistê/mê e)/stin, ei)/te kai\
-e)n ê(mi=n e)sti/ tis toiau/tê a)ei\ a)/nô me/nousa, . . . ei)/te
-kai\ e)n tô=| kat' e)nergei/an vô=| ei)/ tis kai\ tê\n no/êsin
-e)kei/nên e)pistê/mên e(/loito kalei=n. du/natai de\ kai\ dia\
-tê\n tô=n koinô=n u(po/stasin ei)rê=sthai, tê\n e)x a)phaire/seôs;
-a(/ma ga\r tê=| u(posta/sei tou/tôn kai\ ê( e)pistê/mê e)sti/n.
-a)lêthe\s de\ kai\ e)pi\ tô=n a)naplasma/tôn tô=n te e)n tê=|
-phantasi/a| kai\ tô=n technitô=n; a(/ma ga\r chi/maira kai\ ê(
-e)pistê/mê chimai/ras.]
+Ti/na de\ ta\ o)li/ga e)sti/n, e)ph' Ã´(=n a(/ma tÃ´=| e)pistÃªtÃ´=|
+Ãª( e)pistÃª/mÃª e)sti/n? Ta\ a)/neu u(/lÃªs, ta\ noÃªta/, a(/ma tÃ´=|
+kat' e)nergei/an a)ei\ e)stÃ´/sÃª| e)pistÃª/mÃª e)/stin, ei)/te kai\
+e)n Ãª(mi=n e)sti/ tis toiau/tÃª a)ei\ a)/nÃ´ me/nousa, . . . ei)/te
+kai\ e)n tÃ´=| kat' e)nergei/an vÃ´=| ei)/ tis kai\ tÃª\n no/Ãªsin
+e)kei/nÃªn e)pistÃª/mÃªn e(/loito kalei=n. du/natai de\ kai\ dia\
+tÃª\n tÃ´=n koinÃ´=n u(po/stasin ei)rÃª=sthai, tÃª\n e)x a)phaire/seÃ´s;
+a(/ma ga\r tÃª=| u(posta/sei tou/tÃ´n kai\ Ãª( e)pistÃª/mÃª e)sti/n.
+a)lÃªthe\s de\ kai\ e)pi\ tÃ´=n a)naplasma/tÃ´n tÃ´=n te e)n tÃª=|
+phantasi/a| kai\ tÃ´=n technitÃ´=n; a(/ma ga\r chi/maira kai\ Ãª(
+e)pistÃª/mÃª chimai/ras.]
 
 We see from hence that Simplikius recognises Concepts,
 Abstractions, and Fictions, to be dependent on the Conceiving,
@@ -8117,13 +8086,13 @@ against the Protagorean doctrine (Metaphysic. [Greek: G]. pp.
 the theory that Cognition is Sensible Perception.
 
 Simplikius farther observes (p. 65, b. 14) that Aristotle is not
-accurate in making [Greek: e)pistêto\n] correlate with [Greek:
-e)pistê/mê]: that in Relata, the potential correlates with the
+accurate in making [Greek: e)pistÃªto\n] correlate with [Greek:
+e)pistÃª/mÃª]: that in Relata, the potential correlates with the
 potential, and the actual with the actual. The Cognoscible is
-correlative, not with actual cognition ([Greek: e)pistê/mê]) but
+correlative, not with actual cognition ([Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª]) but
 with potential Cognition, or with a potential Cognoscens.
 Aristotle therefore is right in saying that there may be [Greek:
-e)pistêto\n] without [Greek: e)pistê/mê], but this does not prove
+e)pistÃªto\n] without [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª], but this does not prove
 what he wishes to establish.
 
 Themistius, in another passage of the Aristotelian Scholia,
@@ -8131,12 +8100,12 @@ reasoning against Boethus, observes to the same effect as
 Simplikius, that in relatives, the actual correlates with the
 actual, and the potential with the potential:--
 
-[Greek: Kai/toi, phêsi/ ge o( Boêtho/s, ou)de\n kôlu/ei to\n
-a)rithmo\n ei)=nai kai\ di/cha tou= a)rithmou=ntos, ô(/sper
-oi)=mai to\ ai)sthêto\n kai\ di/cha tou= ai)sthanome/nou;
+[Greek: Kai/toi, phÃªsi/ ge o( BoÃªtho/s, ou)de\n kÃ´lu/ei to\n
+a)rithmo\n ei)=nai kai\ di/cha tou= a)rithmou=ntos, Ã´(/sper
+oi)=mai to\ ai)sthÃªto\n kai\ di/cha tou= ai)sthanome/nou;
 spha/lletai de/, a(/ma ga\r ta\ pro\s ti/, kai\ ta\ duna/mei pro\s
-ta\ duna/mei; ô(/ste ei) mê\ kai\ a)rithmêtiko/n, ou)de\ to\
-a)rithmêto/n] (Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 223, a. p. 393,
+ta\ duna/mei; Ã´(/ste ei) mÃª\ kai\ a)rithmÃªtiko/n, ou)de\ to\
+a)rithmÃªto/n] (Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 223, a. p. 393,
 Schol. Brandis).
 
 Compare Aristotel. Metaphysic. M. 1087, a. 15, about [Greek: to\
@@ -8154,15 +8123,15 @@ That this general doctrine is true, not merely respecting the
 facts of sense, but also respecting the facts of mental
 conception, opinion, intellection, cognition--may be seen by the
 reasoning of Plato himself in other dialogues. How, for example,
-does Plato prove, in his Timæus, the objective reality of Ideas or
+does Plato prove, in his TimÃ¦us, the objective reality of Ideas or
 Forms? He infers them from the subjective facts of his own mind.
 The subjective fact called Cognition (he argues) is generically
 different from the subjective fact called True Opinion: therefore
 the Object correlating with the One must be distinct from the
 Object correlating with the other: there must be a Noumenon or
-[Greek: noêto/n ti] correlating with Nous, distinct from the
+[Greek: noÃªto/n ti] correlating with Nous, distinct from the
 [Greek: doxasto/n ti] which correlates with [Greek: do/xa].[22] So
-again, in the Phædon,[23] Sokrates proves the pre-existence of the
+again, in the PhÃ¦don,[23] Sokrates proves the pre-existence of the
 human soul from the fact that there were pre-existent cognizable
 Ideas: if there were knowable Objects, there must also have been a
 Subject Cognoscens or Cognitionis capax. The two are different
@@ -8172,7 +8141,7 @@ though they cannot be separated in fact. Now Both these two
 inferences of Plato rest on the assumed implication of Subject and
 Object.[24]
 
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Timæus, p. 51 B-E, compare Republic, v. p.
+[Footnote 22: Plato, TimÃ¦us, p. 51 B-E, compare Republic, v. p.
 477.
 
 See this reasoning of Plato set forth in Zeller, Die Phil. der
@@ -8180,40 +8149,40 @@ Griech. vol. ii. pp. 412-416, ed. 2nd.
 
 _Nous_, according to Plato (Tim. 51 E), belongs only to the Gods
 and to a select few among mankind. It is therefore only _to_ the
-Gods and _to_ these few men that [Greek: Noêta\] exist. To the
-rest of mankind [Greek: Noêta\] are non-apparent and
+Gods and _to_ these few men that [Greek: NoÃªta\] exist. To the
+rest of mankind [Greek: NoÃªta\] are non-apparent and
 non-existent.]
 
-[Footnote 23: Plato, Phædon, pp. 76-77. [Greek: i)/sê a)na/gkê
-tau=ta/ te] (Ideas or Forms) [Greek: ei)=nai, kai\ ta\s ê(mete/ras
-psucha\s pri\n kai\ ê(ma=s gegone/nai--kai\ ei) mê\ tau=ta, ou)de\
-ta/de. U(perphuô=s, e)/phê o( Simmi/as, dokei= moi ê( au)tê\
-a)na/gkê ei)=nai, kai\ ei)s kalo/n ge katapheu/gei o( lo/gos ei)s
-to\ o(moi/ôs ei)=nai tê/n te psuchê\n ê(mô=n pri\n gene/sthai
-ê(ma=s kai\ tê\n ou)si/an ê(\n su\ nu=n le/geis.]
+[Footnote 23: Plato, PhÃ¦don, pp. 76-77. [Greek: i)/sÃª a)na/gkÃª
+tau=ta/ te] (Ideas or Forms) [Greek: ei)=nai, kai\ ta\s Ãª(mete/ras
+psucha\s pri\n kai\ Ãª(ma=s gegone/nai--kai\ ei) mÃª\ tau=ta, ou)de\
+ta/de. U(perphuÃ´=s, e)/phÃª o( Simmi/as, dokei= moi Ãª( au)tÃª\
+a)na/gkÃª ei)=nai, kai\ ei)s kalo/n ge katapheu/gei o( lo/gos ei)s
+to\ o(moi/Ã´s ei)=nai tÃª/n te psuchÃª\n Ãª(mÃ´=n pri\n gene/sthai
+Ãª(ma=s kai\ tÃª\n ou)si/an Ãª(\n su\ nu=n le/geis.]
 
 Compare p. 92 E of the same dialogue with the notes of Wyttenbach
 and Heindorf--"Haec autem [Greek: ou)si/a] Idearum, rerum
-intelligibilium, [Greek: au)tê=s e)sti\n] (_sc._ [Greek: tê=s
-psuchê=s]) ut hoc loco dicitur, est propria et possessio animæ
-nostræ," &c.
+intelligibilium, [Greek: au)tÃª=s e)sti\n] (_sc._ [Greek: tÃª=s
+psuchÃª=s]) ut hoc loco dicitur, est propria et possessio animÃ¦
+nostrÃ¦," &c.
 
 About the essential implication of [Greek: Nou=s] with the [Greek:
-Noêta/], as well as of [Greek: to\ do/xazon] with [Greek: ta\
+NoÃªta/], as well as of [Greek: to\ do/xazon] with [Greek: ta\
 doxazo/mena], and of [Greek: to\ ai)sthano/menon] with [Greek: ta\
-ai)sthêta/], see Plutarch, De Animæ Procreat. in Timæo, pp.
+ai)sthÃªta/], see Plutarch, De AnimÃ¦ Procreat. in TimÃ¦o, pp.
 1012-1024; and a curious passage from Joannes Philoponus ad Aristot.
 Physica, cited by Karsten in his Commentatio De Empedoclis
-Philosophiâ, p. 372, and Olympiodorus ad Platon. Phædon, p. 21.
-[Greek: to\n nou=n phame\n a)kribô=s ginô/skein, dio/ti au)to/s
-e)sti to\ noêto/n.]
+PhilosophiÃ¢, p. 372, and Olympiodorus ad Platon. PhÃ¦don, p. 21.
+[Greek: to\n nou=n phame\n a)kribÃ´=s ginÃ´/skein, dio/ti au)to/s
+e)sti to\ noÃªto/n.]
 
-Sydenham observes, in a note upon his translation of the Philêbus
+Sydenham observes, in a note upon his translation of the PhilÃªbus
 (note 76, p. 118), "Being Intelligent and Being Intelligible are
 not only correlatives, but are so in their very essence: neither
 of them can be at all, without the Being of the other".]
 
-[Footnote 24: I think that the inference in the Phædon is not
+[Footnote 24: I think that the inference in the PhÃ¦don is not
 necessary to prove that conclusion, nor in itself just. For when I
 speak of Augustus and Antony as having once lived, and as having
 fought the battle of Actium, it is noway necessary that I should
@@ -8255,10 +8224,10 @@ independent.
 
 [Footnote 25: Bacon remarks that the processes called mental or
 intellectual are quite as much relative to man as those called
-sensational or perceptive. "Idola Tribûs sunt fundata in ipsâ
-naturâ humanâ. Falso enim asseritur, Sensum humanum esse mensuram
-rerum: quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam Sensûs quam Mentis,
-sunt ex analogiâ hominis, non ex analogiâ Universi."
+sensational or perceptive. "Idola TribÃ»s sunt fundata in ipsÃ¢
+naturÃ¢ humanÃ¢. Falso enim asseritur, Sensum humanum esse mensuram
+rerum: quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam SensÃ»s quam Mentis,
+sunt ex analogiÃ¢ hominis, non ex analogiÃ¢ Universi."
 
 Nemesius, the Christian Platonist, has a remark bearing upon this
 question. He says that the lower animals have their intellectual
@@ -8268,11 +8237,11 @@ wholly determined by Nature; it has a freer range, larger stores
 of ideas, and more varied combinations: hence its manifestations
 are not the same in all, but different in different
 individuals--[Greek: e)leu/theron ga/r ti kai\ au)texou/sion to\
-logiko/n, o(/then ou)ch e(\n kai\ tau)to\n pa=sin e)/rgon a)nthrô/pois,
-ô(s e(ka/stô| ei)/dei tô=n a)lo/gôn zô/ôn; phu/sei ga\r mo/nê| ta\
-toiau=ta kinei=tai, ta\ de\ phu/sei o(moi/ôs para\ pa=si/n e)stin;
+logiko/n, o(/then ou)ch e(\n kai\ tau)to\n pa=sin e)/rgon a)nthrÃ´/pois,
+Ã´(s e(ka/stÃ´| ei)/dei tÃ´=n a)lo/gÃ´n zÃ´/Ã´n; phu/sei ga\r mo/nÃª| ta\
+toiau=ta kinei=tai, ta\ de\ phu/sei o(moi/Ã´s para\ pa=si/n e)stin;
 ai( de\ logikai\ pra/xeis a)/llai par' a)/llois kai\ ou)k e)x
-a)na/gkês ai( au(=tai para\ pa=sin] (De Nat. Hom., c. ii. p. 53.
+a)na/gkÃªs ai( au(=tai para\ pa=sin] (De Nat. Hom., c. ii. p. 53.
 ed. 1565).]
 
 A man conceives objects, like houses and trees, as existing when
@@ -8400,27 +8369,27 @@ Though this note is already long, I shall venture to add from an
 eminent German critic--Trendelenburg--a passage which goes to the
 same point.
 
-"Das Sein ist als die absolute Position erklärt worden. Der
-Begriff des Seins drücke blos das aus: es werde bei dem einfachen
+"Das Sein ist als die absolute Position erklÃ¤rt worden. Der
+Begriff des Seins drÃ¼cke blos das aus: es werde bei dem einfachen
 Setzen eines _Was_ sein Bewenden haben. Es hat sich hier die
 abstracte Vorstellung des Seins nur in eine verwandte Anschauung
 umgekleidet; denn das Gesetzte steht in dem Raum da; und insofern
 fordert die absolute Position schon den Begriff des seiendem
 Etwas, das gesetzt wird. _Fragt man weiter, so ist in der
 absoluten Position schon derjenige mitgedacht, der da setzt._ Das
-Sein wird also _nicht unabhängig aus sich selbst bestimmt_,
-sondern zur Erklärung _ein Verhältniss zu der Thätigkeit des
+Sein wird also _nicht unabhÃ¤ngig aus sich selbst bestimmt_,
+sondern zur ErklÃ¤rung _ein VerhÃ¤ltniss zu der ThÃ¤tigkeit des
 Gedankens herbeigezogen_.
 
-"Aehnlich würde jede von vorn herein versuchte Bestimmung des
-Denkens ausfallen. Man würde es nur durch einen Bezug zu den
-Dingen erläutern können, welche in dem Denken Grund und Mass
-finden. Wir begeben uns daher jeder Erklärung, und setzen eine
+"Aehnlich wÃ¼rde jede von vorn herein versuchte Bestimmung des
+Denkens ausfallen. Man wÃ¼rde es nur durch einen Bezug zu den
+Dingen erlÃ¤utern kÃ¶nnen, welche in dem Denken Grund und Mass
+finden. Wir begeben uns daher jeder ErklÃ¤rung, und setzen eine
 Vorstellung des Denkens und Seins voraus, in der Hoffnung dass
 beide mit jedem Schritt der Untersuchung sich in sich selbst
 bestimmen werden." "Indem wir Denken und Sein unterscheiden,
-fragen wir, wie ist es möglich, dass sich im Erkennen Denken und
-Sein vereinigt? _Diese Vereinigung sprechen wir vorläufig als eine
+fragen wir, wie ist es mÃ¶glich, dass sich im Erkennen Denken und
+Sein vereinigt? _Diese Vereinigung sprechen wir vorlÃ¤ufig als eine
 Thatsache aus, die das Theoretische wie das Praktische
 beherrscht._" Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, sect. 3, pp.
 103-104, Berlin, 1840.]
@@ -8431,14 +8400,14 @@ other, impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes.]
 I cannot therefore agree with Plato in regarding the Protagorean
 doctrine--Homo Mensura--as having any dependance upon, or any
 necessary connection with, the other theory (canvassed in the
-Theætêtus) which pronounces cognition to be sensible perception.
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus) which pronounces cognition to be sensible perception.
 Objects of thought exist in relation to a thinking Subject; as
 Objects of sight or touch exist in relation to a seeing or
 touching Subject. And this we shall find Plato himself declaring
 in the Sophistes (where his Eleatic disputant is introduced as
 impugning a doctrine substantially the same as that of Plato
-himself in the Phædon, Timæus, and elsewhere) as well as here in
-the Theætêtus. In the Sophistes, certain philosophers (called the
+himself in the PhÃ¦don, TimÃ¦us, and elsewhere) as well as here in
+the TheÃ¦tÃªtus. In the Sophistes, certain philosophers (called the
 Friends of Forms or Ideas) are noticed, who admitted that all
 sensible or perceivable existence ([Greek: ge/nesis]--Fientia) was
 relative to a (capable) sentient or percipient--but denied the
@@ -8450,8 +8419,8 @@ much relative to an Intelligent or Cogitant subject, as
 perceivable existence was relative to a Subject capable of
 perceiving--That Existence, under both varieties, was nothing more
 than a potentiality, correlating with a counter-potentiality
-([Greek: to\ gnôsto\n] with [Greek: to\ gnôstiko/n], [Greek: to\
-ai)sthêto\n] with [Greek: to\ ai)sthêtiko/n], and never realised
+([Greek: to\ gnÃ´sto\n] with [Greek: to\ gnÃ´stiko/n], [Greek: to\
+ai)sthÃªto\n] with [Greek: to\ ai)sthÃªtiko/n], and never realised
 except in implication therewith.[27]
 
 [Footnote 27: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 247-248.
@@ -8462,13 +8431,13 @@ instructive; see especially pp. 65-66 (ed. 4th).
 
 Aristippus (one of the Sokratici viri, contemporary of Plato) and
 the Kyrenaic sect affirmed the doctrine--[Greek: o(/ti mo/na ta\
-pa/thê katalêpta/]. Aristokles refutes them by saying that there
+pa/thÃª katalÃªpta/]. Aristokles refutes them by saying that there
 can be no [Greek: pa/thos] without both Object and
 Subject--[Greek: poiou=n] and [Greek: pa/schon]. And he goes on
 to declare that these three are of necessary co-existence or
-consubstantiality. [Greek: A)lla\ mê\n a)na/gkê ge tri/a tau=ta
+consubstantiality. [Greek: A)lla\ mÃª\n a)na/gkÃª ge tri/a tau=ta
 sunuphi/stasthai--to/ te pa/thos au)to/, kai\ to\ poiou=n, kai\
-to\ pa/schon] (ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xiv. 19, 1).
+to\ pa/schon] (ap. Eusebium, PrÃ¦p. Ev. xiv. 19, 1).
 
 I apprehend that Aristokles by these words does not really refute
 what Aristippus meant to affirm. Aristippus meant to affirm the
@@ -8498,7 +8467,7 @@ stationary: that all existences are in perpetual flux, motion,
 change--acting and reacting upon each other, combining with or
 disjoining from each other.[28]
 
-[Footnote 28: Plato, Theætêt. p. 152 D.
+[Footnote 28: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 152 D.
 
 Though Plato states the grounds of this theory in his ironical
 way, as if it were an absurd fancy, yet it accidentally coincides
@@ -8527,9 +8496,9 @@ positive and permanent attribute either in Object or Subject, but
 a passing result or impression generated between the two, relative
 to both and variable with either.[29]
 
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 153-154. [Greek: o(\ dê\
-e(/kaston ei)=nai/ phamen chrô=ma, ou)/te to\ prosba/llon ou)/te
-to\ prosballo/menon e)/stai, a)lla\ metaxu/ ti e(kastô| i)/dion
+[Footnote 29: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 153-154. [Greek: o(\ dÃª\
+e(/kaston ei)=nai/ phamen chrÃ´=ma, ou)/te to\ prosba/llon ou)/te
+to\ prosballo/menon e)/stai, a)lla\ metaxu/ ti e(kastÃ´| i)/dion
 gegono/s.]]
 
 [Side-note: Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply
@@ -8547,8 +8516,8 @@ the time unaltered, and equal to themselves. How then can either
 of them become either greater or less? or how can either _really
 be_ so, when they were not so before?[30]
 
-[Footnote 30: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 154-155. Compare the reasoning
-in the Phædon, pp. 96-97-101.]
+[Footnote 30: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 154-155. Compare the reasoning
+in the PhÃ¦don, pp. 96-97-101.]
 
 [Side-note: Relativity twofold--to the comparing Subject--to
 another object, besides the one directly described.]
@@ -8586,7 +8555,7 @@ by the Protagorean doctrine.
 
 Occasionally Aristotle passes from relativity in the former sense
 to relativity in the latter; as when he discusses [Greek:
-e)pistêto\n] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê], alluded to in one of my
+e)pistÃªto\n] and [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª], alluded to in one of my
 former notes on this dialogue. But he seems unconscious of any
 transition. In the Categories, Object, as implicated with Subject
 does not seem to have been distinctly present to his reflection.
@@ -8641,29 +8610,29 @@ force also passes out of its abstract and indeterminate state into
 concrete--so that it is no longer whiteness, but a piece of white
 stone or wood actually seen.[34]
 
-[Footnote 32: Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 A. [Greek: ô(s to\ pa=n
-ki/nêsis ê)=n, kai\ a)/llo para\ tou=to ou)de/n, tê=s de\
-kinê/seôs du/o ei)/dê, plê/thei me\n a)/peiron e(ka/teron,
+[Footnote 32: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 156 A. [Greek: Ã´(s to\ pa=n
+ki/nÃªsis Ãª)=n, kai\ a)/llo para\ tou=to ou)de/n, tÃª=s de\
+kinÃª/seÃ´s du/o ei)/dÃª, plÃª/thei me\n a)/peiron e(ka/teron,
 du/namin de\ to\ me\n poiei=n e)/chon, to\ de\ pa/schein. E)k de\
-tê=s tou/tôn o(mili/as te kai\ tri/pseôs pro\s a)/llêla gi/gnetai
-e)/kgona] plê/thei me\n a)/peira, di/duma de/--to\ me\n
-ai)sthêto/n, to\ de\ ai)/sthêsis], a)ei\ sunekpi/ptousa kai\
-gennôme/nê meta\ tou= ai)sthêtou=.]]
+tÃª=s tou/tÃ´n o(mili/as te kai\ tri/pseÃ´s pro\s a)/llÃªla gi/gnetai
+e)/kgona] plÃª/thei me\n a)/peira, di/duma de/--to\ me\n
+ai)sthÃªto/n, to\ de\ ai)/sthÃªsis], a)ei\ sunekpi/ptousa kai\
+gennÃ´me/nÃª meta\ tou= ai)sthÃªtou=.]]
 
-[Footnote 33: Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 B.]
+[Footnote 33: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 156 B.]
 
-[Footnote 34: Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 E. [Greek: o( me\n
-o)phthalmo\s a)/ra o)/pseôs e)/mpleôs e)ge/neto kai\ o(ra=| dê\
-to/te kai\ _e)ge/neto ou)/ ti o)/psis a)lla\ o)phthalmo\s o(rô=n_,
-to\ de\ xuggennê=san to\ chrô=ma leuko/têtos perieplê/sthê kai\
-_e)ge/neto ou) leuko/tês au)=_ a)lla\ leuko/n, ei)/te xu/lon
-ei)/te li/thos ei)/te o(tiou=n xune/bê chrê=ma chrôsthê=nai tô=|
-toiou/tô| chrô/mati.]
+[Footnote 34: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 156 E. [Greek: o( me\n
+o)phthalmo\s a)/ra o)/pseÃ´s e)/mpleÃ´s e)ge/neto kai\ o(ra=| dÃª\
+to/te kai\ _e)ge/neto ou)/ ti o)/psis a)lla\ o)phthalmo\s o(rÃ´=n_,
+to\ de\ xuggennÃª=san to\ chrÃ´=ma leuko/tÃªtos perieplÃª/sthÃª kai\
+_e)ge/neto ou) leuko/tÃªs au)=_ a)lla\ leuko/n, ei)/te xu/lon
+ei)/te li/thos ei)/te o(tiou=n xune/bÃª chrÃª=ma chrÃ´sthÃª=nai tÃ´=|
+toiou/tÃ´| chrÃ´/mati.]
 
 Plato's conception of the act of vision was--That fire darted
 forth from the eyes of the percipient and came into confluence or
 coalescence with fire approaching from the perceived object
-(Plato, Timæus, pp. 45 C, 67 C).]
+(Plato, TimÃ¦us, pp. 45 C, 67 C).]
 
 [Side-note: Agent and Patient--No absolute Ens.]
 
@@ -8688,24 +8657,24 @@ therefore say that any thing _is_, absolutely and perpetually,
 good, honourable, hot, white, hard, great--but only that it is so
 felt or esteemed by certain subjects more or less numerous.[39]
 
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. [Greek: e)pei\ kai\ to\
-poiou=n ei)=nai ti kai\ to\ pa/schon au)= ti e)pi\ e(no\s noê=sai,
-ô(/s phasin, ou)k ei)=nai pagi/ôs. Ou)/te ga\r poiou=n e)sti/ ti,
-pri\n a)\n tô=| pa/schonti xune/lthê|--ou)/te pa/schon, pri\n a)\n
-tô=| poiou=nti], &c.]
+[Footnote 35: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 157 A. [Greek: e)pei\ kai\ to\
+poiou=n ei)=nai ti kai\ to\ pa/schon au)= ti e)pi\ e(no\s noÃª=sai,
+Ã´(/s phasin, ou)k ei)=nai pagi/Ã´s. Ou)/te ga\r poiou=n e)sti/ ti,
+pri\n a)\n tÃ´=| pa/schonti xune/lthÃª|--ou)/te pa/schon, pri\n a)\n
+tÃ´=| poiou=nti], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 36: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. [Greek: to/ te/ tini
-xuneltho\n kai\ poiou=n a)/llô| au)= prospeso\n pa/schon
-a)nepha/nê.]]
+[Footnote 36: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 157 A. [Greek: to/ te/ tini
+xuneltho\n kai\ poiou=n a)/llÃ´| au)= prospeso\n pa/schon
+a)nepha/nÃª.]]
 
-[Footnote 37: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. [Greek: ou)de\n ei)=nai
+[Footnote 37: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 157 A. [Greek: ou)de\n ei)=nai
 e(\n au)to\ kath' au(to/, a)lla/ tini a)ei\ gi/gnesthai, to\ d'
 ei)=nai panta/chothen e)xairete/on], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 38: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 B. [Greek: dei= de\ kai\
-kata\ me/ros ou(/tô le/gein kai\ peri\ pollô=n a)throisthe/ntôn,
-ô(=| dê\ a)throi/smati a)/nthrôpo/n te ti/thentai kai\ li/thon
-kai\ e(/kaston zô=o/n te kai\ ei)=dos.]
+[Footnote 38: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 157 B. [Greek: dei= de\ kai\
+kata\ me/ros ou(/tÃ´ le/gein kai\ peri\ pollÃ´=n a)throisthe/ntÃ´n,
+Ã´(=| dÃª\ a)throi/smati a)/nthrÃ´po/n te ti/thentai kai\ li/thon
+kai\ e(/kaston zÃ´=o/n te kai\ ei)=dos.]
 
 In this passage I follow Heindorf's explanation which seems
 dictated by the last word [Greek: ei)=dos]. Yet I am not sure that
@@ -8715,7 +8684,7 @@ separate sensations. He may perhaps here mean simply individual
 things as aggregates or [Greek: a)throi/smata]--a _man_, a
 _stone_, &c.]
 
-[Footnote 39: Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 E.]
+[Footnote 39: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 157 E.]
 
 [Side-note: Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be
 answered.]
@@ -8741,18 +8710,18 @@ and no name can be truly predicated of either, which implies
 existence (either perpetual or temporary) apart from the
 other.[42]
 
-[Footnote 40: Plato, Theætêt. p. 159.]
+[Footnote 40: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 159.]
 
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Theætêt. p. 160 A.]
+[Footnote 41: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 160 A.]
 
-[Footnote 42: Plato, Theætêt. p. 160 B. [Greek: e)/peiper ê(mô=n
-ê( a)na/gkê tê\n ou)si/an sundei= me/n, sundei= de ou)deni\ tô=n
-a)/llôn, ou)d' au)= ê(mi=n au)toi=s; a)llê/lois dê\ lei/petai
+[Footnote 42: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 160 B. [Greek: e)/peiper Ãª(mÃ´=n
+Ãª( a)na/gkÃª tÃª\n ou)si/an sundei= me/n, sundei= de ou)deni\ tÃ´=n
+a)/llÃ´n, ou)d' au)= Ãª(mi=n au)toi=s; a)llÃª/lois dÃª\ lei/petai
 sundede/sthai] (_i. e._ [Greek: to\n ai)sthano/menon] and [Greek:
-to\ poiou=n ai)stha/nesthai]). [Greek: Ô/ste ei)/te _tis ei)=nai
-ti/ o)noma/zei, tini\ ei)=nai, ê)\ tino/s, ê)\ pro/s ti, r(ête/on
-au)tô=|, ei)/te gi/gnesthai; au)to\ de\ e)ph' au(tou= ti ê)\ o)\n
-ê)\ gigno/menon ou)/te au)tô=| lekte/on, ou)/t' a)/llou le/gontos
+to\ poiou=n ai)stha/nesthai]). [Greek: Ã”/ste ei)/te _tis ei)=nai
+ti/ o)noma/zei, tini\ ei)=nai, Ãª)\ tino/s, Ãª)\ pro/s ti, r(Ãªte/on
+au)tÃ´=|, ei)/te gi/gnesthai; au)to\ de\ e)ph' au(tou= ti Ãª)\ o)\n
+Ãª)\ gigno/menon ou)/te au)tÃ´=| lekte/on, ou)/t' a)/llou le/gontos
 a)podekte/on_.]
 
 Compare Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 6, p. 1011, a. 23.]
@@ -8814,7 +8783,7 @@ from these very acts,--resulting from multiplied comparisons,--and
 ultimately exaggerated into an illusion which treats the logical
 separation as if it were bisection in fact and reality.
 
-[Footnote 43: Aristotle, in a passage of the treatise De Animâ
+[Footnote 43: Aristotle, in a passage of the treatise De AnimÃ¢
 (iii. 1, 2-4-7-8, ed. Trendelenburg, p. 425, b. 25, p. 426, a.
 15-25, Bekk.), impugns an opinion of certain antecedent [Greek:
 phusio/logoi] whom he does not specify; which opinion seems
@@ -8825,14 +8794,14 @@ partly right, partly wrong. They were right in regard to the
 actual, wrong in regard to the potential. The actual manifestation
 of the perceived is one and the same with that of the percipient,
 though the two are not the same logically in the view of the
-reflecting mind ([Greek: ê( de\ tou= ai)sthêtou= e)ne/rgeia kai\
-tê=s ai)sthê/seôs ê( au)tê\ me/n e)sti kai\ mi/a, to\ d' ei)=nai
+reflecting mind ([Greek: Ãª( de\ tou= ai)sthÃªtou= e)ne/rgeia kai\
+tÃª=s ai)sthÃª/seÃ´s Ãª( au)tÃª\ me/n e)sti kai\ mi/a, to\ d' ei)=nai
 ou) tau)to\n au)tai=s]). But this is not true when we speak of
-them potentially--[Greek: dichô=s ga\r legome/nês tê=s
-ai)sthê/seôs kai\ tou= ai)sthêtou=, tô=n me\n kata\ du/namin tô=n
-de\ kat' e)ne/rgeian, e)pi/ tou/tôn me\n sumbai/nei to\ lechthe/n,
-e)pi\ de\ tô=n e(te/rôn ou) sumbai/nei. A)ll' e)kei=noi a(plô=s
-e)/legon peri\ tô=n legome/nôn ou)ch a(plô=s.]
+them potentially--[Greek: dichÃ´=s ga\r legome/nÃªs tÃª=s
+ai)sthÃª/seÃ´s kai\ tou= ai)sthÃªtou=, tÃ´=n me\n kata\ du/namin tÃ´=n
+de\ kat' e)ne/rgeian, e)pi/ tou/tÃ´n me\n sumbai/nei to\ lechthe/n,
+e)pi\ de\ tÃ´=n e(te/rÃ´n ou) sumbai/nei. A)ll' e)kei=noi a(plÃ´=s
+e)/legon peri\ tÃ´=n legome/nÃ´n ou)ch a(plÃ´=s.]
 
 I think that the distinction, which Aristotle insists upon as a
 confutation of these philosophers, is not well founded. What he
@@ -8847,7 +8816,7 @@ to perceive. The perceivable or cogitable has no meaning except in
 relation to some Capax Percipiendi or Capax Cogitandi.]
 
 [Footnote 44: The terms Ego and Mecum, to express the antithesis
-of these two [Greek: lo/gô| mo/non chôrista\], are used by
+of these two [Greek: lo/gÃ´| mo/non chÃ´rista\], are used by
 Professor Ferrier in his very acute treatise, the Institutes of
 Metaphysic, pp. 93-96. The same antithesis is otherwise expressed
 by various modern writers in the terms Ego and non-Ego--le moi et
@@ -8860,10 +8829,10 @@ use a distinction recognised in the scholastic logic.
 
 The implication of Subject and Object is expressed in a peculiar
 manner (though still clearly) by Aristotle in the treatise De
-Animâ, iii. 8, 1, 431, b. 21. [Greek: ê( psuchê\ ta\ o)/nta _pô/s_
-e)sti pa/nta; ê)\ ga\r ai)sthêta\ ta\ o)/nta ê)\ noêta/. e)sti\ d'
-ê( e)pistê/mê me\n ta\ e)pistêta/ _pôs_, ê( d' ai)/sthêsis ta\
-ai)sthêta/.] The adverb [Greek: pôs] ([Greek: tro/pon tina/], as
+AnimÃ¢, iii. 8, 1, 431, b. 21. [Greek: Ãª( psuchÃª\ ta\ o)/nta _pÃ´/s_
+e)sti pa/nta; Ãª)\ ga\r ai)sthÃªta\ ta\ o)/nta Ãª)\ noÃªta/. e)sti\ d'
+Ãª( e)pistÃª/mÃª me\n ta\ e)pistÃªta/ _pÃ´s_, Ãª( d' ai)/sthÃªsis ta\
+ai)sthÃªta/.] The adverb [Greek: pÃ´s] ([Greek: tro/pon tina/], as
 Simplikius explains it, fol. 78, b. 1) here deserves attention.
 "The soul is all existing things _in a certain way_ (or looked at
 under a certain aspect). All things are either Percepta or
@@ -8875,13 +8844,13 @@ for they have no matter (iii. 4, 12, p. 430, a. 3, with the
 commentary of Simplikius p. 78, b. 17, f. 19, a. 12). This is in
 other words the Protagorean doctrine--That the mind is the measure
 of all existences; and that this is even more true about [Greek:
-noêta\] than about [Greek: ai)sthêta/]. That doctrine is
-completely independent of the theory, that [Greek: e)pistê/mê] is
-[Greek: ai)/sthêsis].
+noÃªta\] than about [Greek: ai)sthÃªta/]. That doctrine is
+completely independent of the theory, that [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª] is
+[Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis].
 
 It is in conformity with this affirmation of Aristotle (partially
 approved even by Cudworth--see Mosheim's Transl. of Intell. Syst.
-Vol. II. ch. viii. pp. 27-28)--[Greek: ê( psuchê\ ta\ o)/nta pô/s
+Vol. II. ch. viii. pp. 27-28)--[Greek: Ãª( psuchÃª\ ta\ o)/nta pÃ´/s
 e)sti pa/nta]--that Mr. John Stuart Mill makes the following
 striking remark about the number of ultimate Laws of Nature:--
 
@@ -8975,52 +8944,52 @@ has been the theory generally adopted by philosophers. The
 passages which he cites from other authors are altogether
 insufficient to prove such an affirmation.]
 
-[Footnote 46: Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 A. [Greek: tê=s de\ kinê/seôs
-du/o ei)/dê, plê/thei me\n a)/peiron e(ka/teron, du/namin de\ to\
+[Footnote 46: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 156 A. [Greek: tÃª=s de\ kinÃª/seÃ´s
+du/o ei)/dÃª, plÃª/thei me\n a)/peiron e(ka/teron, du/namin de\ to\
 me\n poiei=n e)/chon, to\ de\ pa/schein.]]
 
 [Footnote 47: In that distinction, upon which Aristotle lays so
 much stress, between Actus and Potentia, he declares Actus or
 actuality to be the Prius--Potentia or potentiality to be the
 Posterius. See Metaphysica, [Greek: Th]. 8, 1049, b. 5 seqq.; De
-Animâ, ii. 4, 415, a. 17. The Potential is a derivative from the
+AnimÃ¢, ii. 4, 415, a. 17. The Potential is a derivative from the
 Actual--derived by comparison, abstraction, and logical analysis:
 a Mental concept, helping us to describe, arrange, and reason
 about, the multifarious acts of sense or consciousness--but not an
 anterior generating reality.
 
 Turgot observes (OEuvres, vol. iii. pp. 108-110; Article in the
-Encyclopédie, _Existence_):--
+EncyclopÃ©die, _Existence_):--
 
 "Le premier fondement de la notion de l'_existence_ est la
 conscience de notre propre sensation, et le sentiment du _moi_ qui
-résulte de cette conscience. La relation nécessaire entre l'être
-appercevant, et l'être apperçu considéré hors du _moi_, suppose
-dans les deux termes la même réalité. Il y a dans l'un et dans
+rÃ©sulte de cette conscience. La relation nÃ©cessaire entre l'Ãªtre
+appercevant, et l'Ãªtre apperÃ§u considÃ©rÃ© hors du _moi_, suppose
+dans les deux termes la mÃªme rÃ©alitÃ©. Il y a dans l'un et dans
 l'autre un fondement de cette relation, que l'homme, s'il avoit un
-langage, pourroit désigner par le nom commun d'_existence_ ou de
-_présence_: car ces deux notions ne seroient point encore
-distinguées l'une de l'autre. . . .
-
-"Mais il est très-important d'observer que ni la simple sensation
-des objets présens, ni la peinture que fait l'imagination des
-objets absens, ni le simple rapport de distance ou d'activité
-réciproque, commun aux uns et aux autres, ne sont précisément la
-chose que l'esprit voudroit désigner par le nom général
-d'_existence_; c'est le fondement même de ces rapports, supposé
-commun au _moi_, à l'objet vu et à l'objet simplement distant,
-sur lequel tombe véritablement et le nom d'_existence_ et notre
+langage, pourroit dÃ©signer par le nom commun d'_existence_ ou de
+_prÃ©sence_: car ces deux notions ne seroient point encore
+distinguÃ©es l'une de l'autre. . . .
+
+"Mais il est trÃ¨s-important d'observer que ni la simple sensation
+des objets prÃ©sens, ni la peinture que fait l'imagination des
+objets absens, ni le simple rapport de distance ou d'activitÃ©
+rÃ©ciproque, commun aux uns et aux autres, ne sont prÃ©cisÃ©ment la
+chose que l'esprit voudroit dÃ©signer par le nom gÃ©nÃ©ral
+d'_existence_; c'est le fondement mÃªme de ces rapports, supposÃ©
+commun au _moi_, Ã  l'objet vu et Ã  l'objet simplement distant,
+sur lequel tombe vÃ©ritablement et le nom d'_existence_ et notre
 affirmation, lorsque nous disons qu'une chose _existe_. Ce
-fondement n'est ni ne peut être connu immédiatement, et ne nous
-est indiqué que par les rapports différents qui le supposent: nous
-nous en formons cependant une espèce d'idée que nous tirons par
-voie d'abstraction du témoignage que la conscience nous rend de
-nous-mêmes et de notre sensation actuelle: c'est-à-dire, que nous
+fondement n'est ni ne peut Ãªtre connu immÃ©diatement, et ne nous
+est indiquÃ© que par les rapports diffÃ©rents qui le supposent: nous
+nous en formons cependant une espÃ¨ce d'idÃ©e que nous tirons par
+voie d'abstraction du tÃ©moignage que la conscience nous rend de
+nous-mÃªmes et de notre sensation actuelle: c'est-Ã -dire, que nous
 transportons en quelque sorte cette conscience du _moi_ sur les
-objets extérieurs, par une espèce d'assimilation vague, démentie
-aussitôt** par la séparation de tout ce qui caractérise le _moi_,
+objets extÃ©rieurs, par une espÃ¨ce d'assimilation vague, dÃ©mentie
+aussitÃ´t** par la sÃ©paration de tout ce qui caractÃ©rise le _moi_,
 mais qui ne suffit pas moins pour devenir le fondement _d'une
-abstraction ou d'un signe commun, et pour être l'objet de nos
+abstraction ou d'un signe commun, et pour Ãªtre l'objet de nos
 jugemens_."]
 
 It is to be remembered, that the doctrine here criticised is
@@ -9048,12 +9017,12 @@ as wise as Protagoras and has no need to seek instruction from
 Protagoras.[48] Reflection, study, and dialectic discussion, are
 superfluous and useless to him: he is a measure to himself on the
 subject of geometry, and need not therefore consult a professed
-geometrician like Theodôrus.[49]
+geometrician like TheodÃ´rus.[49]
 
-[Footnote 48: Plato, Theætêt. p. 161. Compare Plato, Kratylus, p.
+[Footnote 48: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 161. Compare Plato, Kratylus, p.
 386 C, where the same argument is employed.]
 
-[Footnote 49: Plato, Theætêt. p. 169 A.]
+[Footnote 49: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 169 A.]
 
 The doctrine is contradicted (continues Sokrates) by the common
 opinions of mankind: for no man esteems himself a measure on all
@@ -9067,13 +9036,13 @@ common man, is a measure; but only those men, who have gone
 through special study and instruction in the matter upon which
 they pronounce.[52]
 
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Theætêt. p. 170.]
+[Footnote 50: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 170.]
 
-[Footnote 51: Plato, Theætêt. p. 171 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n tê\n
-au(tou= a)\n pseudê= xugchôroi=, ei) tê\n tô=n ê(goume/nôn au)to\n
-pseu/desthai o(mologei= a)lêthê= ei)=nai?]]
+[Footnote 51: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 171 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n tÃª\n
+au(tou= a)\n pseudÃª= xugchÃ´roi=, ei) tÃª\n tÃ´=n Ãª(goume/nÃ´n au)to\n
+pseu/desthai o(mologei= a)lÃªthÃª= ei)=nai?]]
 
-[Footnote 52: Plato, Theætêt. p. 171 C.]
+[Footnote 52: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 171 C.]
 
 [Side-note: In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for
 himself. Where future consequences are involved special knowledge
@@ -9094,9 +9063,9 @@ anticipates to promise good or profit, will necessarily realise
 such anticipations. In such cases, not merely present sentiment,
 but future consequences are involved.
 
-[Footnote 53: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 172 A, 177 E.]
+[Footnote 53: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 172 A, 177 E.]
 
-[Footnote 54: Plato, Theætêt. p. 172.]
+[Footnote 54: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 172.]
 
 Here then we discover the distinction which Plato would draw.[55]
 Where present sentiment alone is involved, as in hot and cold,
@@ -9113,27 +9082,27 @@ of every man is true. Another objection is, that opinions of
 different men are opposite and contradictory,[58] some of them
 contradicting the Protagorean dictum itself.
 
-[Footnote 55: Plato, Theætêt. p. 178.]
+[Footnote 55: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 178.]
 
-[Footnote 56: Plato, Theætêt. p. 179. [Greek: ei)/ pê| tou\s
+[Footnote 56: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 179. [Greek: ei)/ pÃª| tou\s
 suno/ntas e)/peithen, o(/ti kai\ to\ me/llon e)/sesthai/ te kai\
 do/xein ou)/te ma/ntis ou)/te tis a)/llos a)/meinon kri/neien a)\n
-ê)\ au)to\s au(tô=|.]]
+Ãª)\ au)to\s au(tÃ´=|.]]
 
-[Footnote 57: Plato, Theætêt. p. 178.]
+[Footnote 57: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 178.]
 
-[Footnote 58: Plato, Theætêt. p. 179 B.
+[Footnote 58: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 179 B.
 
-_Theodor._ [Greek: E)kei/nê| moi dokei= ma/lista a(li/skesthai o(
-lo/gos, a(lisko/menos kai\ tau/tê|, ê)=| ta\s tô=n a)/llôn do/xas
-kuri/as poiei=, au(=tai de\ e)pha/nêsan tou\s e)kei/nou lo/gous
-ou)damê=| a)lêthei=s ê(gou/menai.]
+_Theodor._ [Greek: E)kei/nÃª| moi dokei= ma/lista a(li/skesthai o(
+lo/gos, a(lisko/menos kai\ tau/tÃª|, Ãª)=| ta\s tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n do/xas
+kuri/as poiei=, au(=tai de\ e)pha/nÃªsan tou\s e)kei/nou lo/gous
+ou)damÃª=| a)lÃªthei=s Ãª(gou/menai.]
 
-_Sokrat._ [Greek: Pollachê=| kai\ a)/llê| a)\n to/ ge toiou=ton
-a(loi/ê, mê\ pa=san panto\s a)lêthê= do/xan ei)=nai; peri\ de\ to\
-paro\n e(ka/stô| pa/thos, e)x ô(=n ai( ai)sthê/seis kai\ ai( kata\
-tau/tas do/xai gi/gnontai . . . I)/sôs de\ ou)de\n le/gô,
-a)na/lôtoi ga/r, ei) e)/tuchon, ei)si/n.]]
+_Sokrat._ [Greek: PollachÃª=| kai\ a)/llÃª| a)\n to/ ge toiou=ton
+a(loi/Ãª, mÃª\ pa=san panto\s a)lÃªthÃª= do/xan ei)=nai; peri\ de\ to\
+paro\n e(ka/stÃ´| pa/thos, e)x Ã´(=n ai( ai)sthÃª/seis kai\ ai( kata\
+tau/tas do/xai gi/gnontai . . . I)/sÃ´s de\ ou)de\n le/gÃ´,
+a)na/lÃ´toi ga/r, ei) e)/tuchon, ei)si/n.]]
 
 [Side-note: Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras,
 states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging
@@ -9183,23 +9152,23 @@ subsequent operative causes: by new supervening sensations,
 emotions, intellectual comparisons, authoritative teaching, or
 society, and so forth.
 
-[Footnote 59: Plato, Theætêt. p. 152 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou(/tô
-pôs le/gei] (Protagoras) [Greek: ô(s oi(=a me\n e(/kasta e)moi\
+[Footnote 59: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 152 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou(/tÃ´
+pÃ´s le/gei] (Protagoras) [Greek: Ã´(s oi(=a me\n e(/kasta e)moi\
 phai/netai, toiau=ta me/n e)stin e)moi/--oi(=a de\ soi/, toiau=ta
-de\ au)= soi/.] 158 A. [Greek: ta\ phaino/mena e(ka/stô| tau=ta
-kai\ ei)=nai tou/tô| ô(=| phai/netai.] 160 C. [Greek: A)lêthê\s
-a)/ra e)moi\ ê( e)mê\ ai)/sthêsis; tê=s ga\r e)mê=s ou)si/as a)ei/
-e)sti; kai\ e)gô\ kritê\s kata\ to\n Prôtago/ran tô=n te o)/ntôn
-e)moi/, ô(s e)/sti, kai\ tô=n mê\ o)/ntôn, ô(s ou)k e)/stin.]
+de\ au)= soi/.] 158 A. [Greek: ta\ phaino/mena e(ka/stÃ´| tau=ta
+kai\ ei)=nai tou/tÃ´| Ã´(=| phai/netai.] 160 C. [Greek: A)lÃªthÃª\s
+a)/ra e)moi\ Ãª( e)mÃª\ ai)/sthÃªsis; tÃª=s ga\r e)mÃª=s ou)si/as a)ei/
+e)sti; kai\ e)gÃ´\ kritÃª\s kata\ to\n PrÃ´tago/ran tÃ´=n te o)/ntÃ´n
+e)moi/, Ã´(s e)/sti, kai\ tÃ´=n mÃª\ o)/ntÃ´n, Ã´(s ou)k e)/stin.]
 
 Comp. also pp. 166 D, 170 A, 177 C.
 
-Instead of saying [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] (in the passage just cited,
-p. 160 D), we might with quite equal truth put [Greek: A)lêthê\s
-a)/ra e)moi\ ê( e)mê\ _no/êsis_; tê=s ga\r e)mê=s ou)si/as a)ei/
-e)/stin]. In this respect [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] and [Greek:
-no/êsis] are on a par. [Greek: No/êsis] is just as much relative
-to [Greek: o( noô=n] as [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] to [Greek: o(
+Instead of saying [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis] (in the passage just cited,
+p. 160 D), we might with quite equal truth put [Greek: A)lÃªthÃª\s
+a)/ra e)moi\ Ãª( e)mÃª\ _no/Ãªsis_; tÃª=s ga\r e)mÃª=s ou)si/as a)ei/
+e)/stin]. In this respect [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis] and [Greek:
+no/Ãªsis] are on a par. [Greek: No/Ãªsis] is just as much relative
+to [Greek: o( noÃ´=n] as [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis] to [Greek: o(
 ai)sthano/menos].
 
 Sextus Empiricus adverts to the doctrines of Protagoras (mainly to
@@ -9213,12 +9182,12 @@ opinions, are _true_. Sextus reasons at some length (390 seq.)
 against this doctrine No. 2, and reasons very much as Protagoras
 himself would have reasoned, since he appeals to individual
 sentiment and movement of the individual mind ([Greek: ou)k
-ô(sau/tôs ga\r kinou/metha], 391-400). It appears to me perfectly
+Ã´(sau/tÃ´s ga\r kinou/metha], 391-400). It appears to me perfectly
 certain that Protagoras advanced the general thesis of Relativity:
 we see this as well from Plato as from Sextus--[Greek: kai\
-ou(/tôs ei)sa/gei to\ pro/s ti--tô=n pro/s ti ei)=nai tê\n
-a)lêthei/an] (Steinhart is of opinion that these words [Greek:
-tô=n pro/s ti ei)=nai tê\n a)lêthei/an] are an addition of Sextus
+ou(/tÃ´s ei)sa/gei to\ pro/s ti--tÃ´=n pro/s ti ei)=nai tÃª\n
+a)lÃªthei/an] (Steinhart is of opinion that these words [Greek:
+tÃ´=n pro/s ti ei)=nai tÃª\n a)lÃªthei/an] are an addition of Sextus
 himself, and do not describe the doctrine of Protagoras; an
 opinion from which I dissent, and which is contradicted by Plato
 himself: Steinhart, Einleitung, note 8). If Protagoras also
@@ -9239,9 +9208,9 @@ qualification annexed by Protagoras. Metaphysic. [Greek: G]. p.
 1009, a. 6. Compare hereupon Bonitz's note upon the passage, p.
 199 of his edition.
 
-This transition without warning, _à dicto secundum quid ad dictum
+This transition without warning, _Ã  dicto secundum quid ad dictum
 simpliciter_, is among the artifices ascribed by Plato to the
-Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus (Plat. Euthyd. p. 297 D).]
+Sophists EuthydÃªmus and DionysodÃ´rus (Plat. Euthyd. p. 297 D).]
 
 [Footnote 61: The argument produced by Plato to discredit the
 Protagorean theory--that it puts the dog or the horse on a level
@@ -9290,7 +9259,7 @@ evidence which guides my own mind. Each reader must determine for
 himself whether he accepts it or not. I might indeed clothe my own
 judgments in oracular and vehement language: I might proclaim them
 as authoritative dicta: I might speak as representing the Platonic
-Ideal, Typical Man,--or as inspired by a [Greek: dai/môn] like
+Ideal, Typical Man,--or as inspired by a [Greek: dai/mÃ´n] like
 Sokrates: I might denounce opponents as worthless men, deficient
 in all the sentiments which distinguish men from brutes, and
 meriting punishment as well as disgrace. If I used all these harsh
@@ -9306,47 +9275,47 @@ Protagorean limit or measures.[63]
 
 [Footnote 62: M. Destutt Tracy observes as follows:--
 
-"De même que toutes nos propositions peuvent être ramenées à la
-forme de propositions énonciatives, parce qu'au fond elles
-expriment toutes un jugement; de même, toutes nos propositions
-énonciatives peuvent ensuite être toujours réduites à n'être
-qu'une de celles-ci: 'je pense, je sens, ou je perçois, que telle
-chose est de telle manière, ou que tel être produit tel
-effet'--_propositions dont nous sommes nous-mêmes le sujet, parce
+"De mÃªme que toutes nos propositions peuvent Ãªtre ramenÃ©es Ã  la
+forme de propositions Ã©nonciatives, parce qu'au fond elles
+expriment toutes un jugement; de mÃªme, toutes nos propositions
+Ã©nonciatives peuvent ensuite Ãªtre toujours rÃ©duites Ã  n'Ãªtre
+qu'une de celles-ci: 'je pense, je sens, ou je perÃ§ois, que telle
+chose est de telle maniÃ¨re, ou que tel Ãªtre produit tel
+effet'--_propositions dont nous sommes nous-mÃªmes le sujet, parce
 qu'au fond nous sommes toujours le subjet de tous nos jugemens_,
 puisqu'ils n'expriment jamais qu'une impression que nous
-éprouvons." (Idéologie: Supplément à la première Section, vol. iv.
+Ã©prouvons." (IdÃ©ologie: SupplÃ©ment Ã  la premiÃ¨re Section, vol. iv.
 p. 165, ed. 1825 duodec.)
 
-"On peut même dire que comme nous ne sentons, ne savons, et ne
-connaissons, rien que par rapport à nous, l'idée, sujet de la
-proposition, est toujours en définitif notre moi; car quand je dis
-_cet arbre est vert_, je dis réellement _je sens, je sais, je
-vois, que cet arbre est vert_. Mais _précisément parce que ce
-préambule se trouve toujours et nécessairement compris dans toutes
+"On peut mÃªme dire que comme nous ne sentons, ne savons, et ne
+connaissons, rien que par rapport Ã  nous, l'idÃ©e, sujet de la
+proposition, est toujours en dÃ©finitif notre moi; car quand je dis
+_cet arbre est vert_, je dis rÃ©ellement _je sens, je sais, je
+vois, que cet arbre est vert_. Mais _prÃ©cisÃ©ment parce que ce
+prÃ©ambule se trouve toujours et nÃ©cessairement compris dans toutes
 nos propositions, nous le supprimons quand nous voulons_; et toute
-idée peut être le sujet de la proposition." (Principes Logiques,
+idÃ©e peut Ãªtre le sujet de la proposition." (Principes Logiques,
 vol. iv. ch. viii. p. 231.)]
 
 [Footnote 63: Sokrates himself states as much as this in the
-course of his reply to the doctrine of Protagoras, Theætêt. 171
-D.: [Greek: a)ll' ê(mi=n a)na/gkê, oi)=mai, chrê=sthai ê(mi=n
+course of his reply to the doctrine of Protagoras, TheÃ¦tÃªt. 171
+D.: [Greek: a)ll' Ãª(mi=n a)na/gkÃª, oi)=mai, chrÃª=sthai Ãª(mi=n
 au)toi=s . . . kai\ ta\ dokou=nta a)ei/, tau=ta le/gein.]
 
-The necessity ([Greek: a)na/gkê]) to which Sokrates here adverts,
-is well expressed by M. Degérando. "En jugeant ce que pensent les
-autres hommes, en comprenant ce qu'ils éprouvent, nous ne sortons
-point en effet de nous-mêmes, comme on seroit tenté de le croire.
-C'est dans nos propres idées que nous voyons leurs idées, leurs
-manières d'être, leur existence même. Le monde entier ne nous est
+The necessity ([Greek: a)na/gkÃª]) to which Sokrates here adverts,
+is well expressed by M. DegÃ©rando. "En jugeant ce que pensent les
+autres hommes, en comprenant ce qu'ils Ã©prouvent, nous ne sortons
+point en effet de nous-mÃªmes, comme on seroit tentÃ© de le croire.
+C'est dans nos propres idÃ©es que nous voyons leurs idÃ©es, leurs
+maniÃ¨res d'Ãªtre, leur existence mÃªme. Le monde entier ne nous est
 connu que dans une sorte de chambre obscure: et lorsqu'au sortir
-d'une société nombreuse nous croyons avoir lu dans les esprits et
-dans les coeurs, avoir observé des caractères, et senti (si je
+d'une sociÃ©tÃ© nombreuse nous croyons avoir lu dans les esprits et
+dans les coeurs, avoir observÃ© des caractÃ¨res, et senti (si je
 puis dire ainsi) la vie d'un grand nombre d'hommes--nous ne
 faisons en effet que sortir d'une grande galerie dont notre
-imagination a fait tous les frais; dont elle a créé tous les
-personnages, et dessiné, avec plus ou moins de vérité, tous les
-tableaux." (Degérando, Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser, vol. i.
+imagination a fait tous les frais; dont elle a crÃ©Ã© tous les
+personnages, et dessinÃ©, avec plus ou moins de vÃ©ritÃ©, tous les
+tableaux." (DegÃ©rando, Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser, vol. i.
 ch. v. p. 132.)]
 
 [Side-note: Argument--That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all
@@ -9402,9 +9371,9 @@ life are such as to generate this predisposition in every one's
 mind to a greater or less degree, and towards some persons more
 than towards others.
 
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Theætêt. p. 161 D. [Greek: o( d' a)/ra
-e)tu/gchanen ô)\n ei)s phro/nêsin ou)de\n belti/ôn batra/chou
-guri/nou, mê\ o(/ti a)/llou tou a)nthrô/pôn.] I substitute the dog
+[Footnote 64: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 161 D. [Greek: o( d' a)/ra
+e)tu/gchanen Ã´)\n ei)s phro/nÃªsin ou)de\n belti/Ã´n batra/chou
+guri/nou, mÃª\ o(/ti a)/llou tou a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n.] I substitute the dog
 or horse as illustrations.]
 
 [Side-note: Belief on authority is true to the believer
@@ -9449,7 +9418,7 @@ every other opinion, is false to those who dissent from it: but it
 is not false absolutely, any more than any other doctrine. Plato
 therefore does not make out his charge of contradiction.
 
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Theætêt. p. 171 A. Sextus Empiric. (adv.
+[Footnote 65: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 171 A. Sextus Empiric. (adv.
 Mathem. vii. 61) gives a pertinent answer to this objection.]
 
 [Side-note: Plato's argument--That the wise man alone is a
@@ -9461,7 +9430,7 @@ Others have not done the like, but remain ignorant. It is the wise
 man only who is a measure: the ignorant man neither is so, nor
 believes himself to be so, but seeks guidance from the wise.[66]
 
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 171 C, 179 B.]
+[Footnote 66: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 171 C, 179 B.]
 
 Upon this we may remark--First, that even when the untaught men
 are all put aside, and the erudites or Experts remain alone--still
@@ -9494,43 +9463,43 @@ authorities.
 
 [Footnote 67: "Nam, quod dicunt omnino, se credere ei quem
 judicent fuisse sapientem--probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti
-judicare potuissent (statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximé
+judicare potuissent (statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximÃ©
 videtur esse sapientis). _Sed, ut potuerint, potuerunt, omnibus
 rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis: judicaverunt
-autem re semel auditâ, atque ad unius se auctoritatem
+autem re semel auditÃ¢, atque ad unius se auctoritatem
 contulerunt._" (Cicero, Acad. Priora, ii. 3, 9.)]
 
-[Footnote 68: Plato, Theætêt. p. 171 E. I transcribe the following
+[Footnote 68: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 171 E. I transcribe the following
 from the treatise of Fichte (Beruf des Menschen, Destination de
-l'Homme; Traduction de Barchou de Penhoën, ch. i. Le Doute, pp.
+l'Homme; Traduction de Barchou de PenhoÃ«n, ch. i. Le Doute, pp.
 54-55):--
 
 "De la conscience de chaque individu, la nature se contemplant
-sous un point de vue différent, il en résulte que je m'appelle
+sous un point de vue diffÃ©rent, il en rÃ©sulte que je m'appelle
 _moi_, et que tu t'appelles _toi_. Pour toi, je suis hors de toi;
 et pour moi, tu es hors de moi. Dans ce qui est hors de moi, je me
 saisis d'abord de ce qui m'avoisine le plus, de ce qui est le plus
-à ma portée: toi, tu fais de même. Chacun de notre côté, nous
-allons ensuite au delà. Puis, ayant commencé à cheminer ainsi dans
-le monde de deux points de départ différens, nous suivons, pendant
-le reste de notre vie, des routes qui se coupent çà et là, mais
-qui jamais ne suivent exactement la même direction, jamais ne
-courent parallèlement l'une à l'autre. Tous les individus
-possibles peuvent être: par conséquent aussi, tous les points de
+Ã  ma portÃ©e: toi, tu fais de mÃªme. Chacun de notre cÃ´tÃ©, nous
+allons ensuite au delÃ . Puis, ayant commencÃ© Ã  cheminer ainsi dans
+le monde de deux points de dÃ©part diffÃ©rens, nous suivons, pendant
+le reste de notre vie, des routes qui se coupent Ã§Ã  et lÃ , mais
+qui jamais ne suivent exactement la mÃªme direction, jamais ne
+courent parallÃ¨lement l'une Ã  l'autre. Tous les individus
+possibles peuvent Ãªtre: par consÃ©quent aussi, tous les points de
 vue de conscience possibles. _La somme de ces consciences
 individuelles fait la conscience universelle: il n'y a pas
-d'autre._ Ce n'est en effet que dans l'individu que se trouve à la
-fois et la limitation et la réalité. Dans l'individu la conscience
-est entièrement déterminée par la nature intime de l'individu. Il
-n'est donné à personne de savoir autre chose que ce qu'il sait. Il
-ne pourrait pas davantage savoir les mêmes choses d'une autre
-façon qu'il ne les sait."
+d'autre._ Ce n'est en effet que dans l'individu que se trouve Ã  la
+fois et la limitation et la rÃ©alitÃ©. Dans l'individu la conscience
+est entiÃ¨rement dÃ©terminÃ©e par la nature intime de l'individu. Il
+n'est donnÃ© Ã  personne de savoir autre chose que ce qu'il sait. Il
+ne pourrait pas davantage savoir les mÃªmes choses d'une autre
+faÃ§on qu'il ne les sait."
 
 The same doctrine is enforced with great originality and acuteness
-in a recent work of M. Eugène Véron, Du Progrès Intellectuel dans
-l'Humanité, Supériorité des Arts Modernes sur les Arts Anciens
-(Paris, 1862, Guillaumin). M. Véron applies his general doctrine
-mainly to the theory of Art and Æsthetics: moreover he affirms
+in a recent work of M. EugÃ¨ne VÃ©ron, Du ProgrÃ¨s Intellectuel dans
+l'HumanitÃ©, SupÃ©rioritÃ© des Arts Modernes sur les Arts Anciens
+(Paris, 1862, Guillaumin). M. VÃ©ron applies his general doctrine
+mainly to the theory of Art and Ã†sthetics: moreover he affirms
 more than I admit respecting human progress as a certain and
 constant matter of fact. But he states clearly, as an universal
 truth, the relative point of view--the necessary measurement for
@@ -9538,46 +9507,46 @@ itself, of each individual mind--and the consequent obligation, on
 each, to allow to other minds the like liberty. We read, pp.
 14-16-17:--
 
-"Cela revient à dire que dans quelque cas que nous supposions,
-nous ne pouvons sentir que dans la mesure de notre sensibilité,
+"Cela revient Ã  dire que dans quelque cas que nous supposions,
+nous ne pouvons sentir que dans la mesure de notre sensibilitÃ©,
 comprendre et juger que dans la mesure de notre intelligence; et
-que nos facultés étant en perpetuel developpement, les variations
-de notre personnalité entrainent nécessairement celles de nos
-jugemens, même quand nous n'en avons pas conscience. . . Chaque
+que nos facultÃ©s Ã©tant en perpetuel developpement, les variations
+de notre personnalitÃ© entrainent nÃ©cessairement celles de nos
+jugemens, mÃªme quand nous n'en avons pas conscience. . . Chaque
 homme a son esprit particulier. Ce que l'un comprend sans peine,
-un autre ne le peut saisir; ce qui répugne à l'un, plait à
+un autre ne le peut saisir; ce qui rÃ©pugne Ã  l'un, plait Ã 
 l'autre: ce qui ce me parait odieux, mon voisin l'approuve.
 Quelque bonne envie que nous semblions avoir de nous perdre dans
-la foule, de dépouiller notre individualité pour emprunter des
-jugemens tout faits et des opinions taillées à la mesure et à
+la foule, de dÃ©pouiller notre individualitÃ© pour emprunter des
+jugemens tout faits et des opinions taillÃ©es Ã  la mesure et Ã 
 l'usage du public--il est facile de voir que, tout en ayant l'air
-de répéter la leçon apprise, nous jugeons à notre manière, quand
-nous jugeons: que notre jugement, tout en paraissant être celui de
+de rÃ©pÃ©ter la leÃ§on apprise, nous jugeons Ã  notre maniÃ¨re, quand
+nous jugeons: que notre jugement, tout en paraissant Ãªtre celui de
 tout le monde, n'en reste pas moins personnel, et n'est pas une
-simple imitation: que cette ressemblance même est souvent plus
-apparente que réelle: que l'identité extérieure des formules et
-des expressions ne prouve pas absolument celle de la pensée. Rien
-n'est élastique comme les mots, et comme les principes généraux
+simple imitation: que cette ressemblance mÃªme est souvent plus
+apparente que rÃ©elle: que l'identitÃ© extÃ©rieure des formules et
+des expressions ne prouve pas absolument celle de la pensÃ©e. Rien
+n'est Ã©lastique comme les mots, et comme les principes gÃ©nÃ©raux
 dans lesquels on pense enfermer les intelligences. C'est souvent
 quand le langage est le plus semblable qu'on est le plus loin de
 s'entendre.
 
-"Du reste, quand même cette ressemblance serait aussi réelle
-qu'elle est fausse, en quoi prouverait-il l'identité nécessaire
-des intelligences? Qu'y aurait-il d'étonnant qu'au milieu de ce
-communisme intellectual qui régit l'éducation de chaque classe, et
-détermine nos habitudes intellectuelles et morales, les
-distinctions natives disparussent ou s'atténuassent? Ne faut-il
-pas plutôt admirer l'opiniâtre vitalité des différences
-originelles qui résistent à tant de causes de nivellement?
-L'identité primitive des intelligences n'est qu'une fiction
-logique sans réalité--une simple abstraction de langage, _qui ne
-repose que sur l'identité du mot avec lui-même_. Tout se reduit à
-la possibilité abstraite des mêmes développemens, dans les mêmes
-conditions d'hérédité et d'éducation--mais aussi de développemens
-différens dans des circonstances différentes: c'est à dire, que
-l'intelligence de chacun n'est identique à celle de tous, qu'au
-moment où elle n'est pas encore proprement une intelligence."]
+"Du reste, quand mÃªme cette ressemblance serait aussi rÃ©elle
+qu'elle est fausse, en quoi prouverait-il l'identitÃ© nÃ©cessaire
+des intelligences? Qu'y aurait-il d'Ã©tonnant qu'au milieu de ce
+communisme intellectual qui rÃ©git l'Ã©ducation de chaque classe, et
+dÃ©termine nos habitudes intellectuelles et morales, les
+distinctions natives disparussent ou s'attÃ©nuassent? Ne faut-il
+pas plutÃ´t admirer l'opiniÃ¢tre vitalitÃ© des diffÃ©rences
+originelles qui rÃ©sistent Ã  tant de causes de nivellement?
+L'identitÃ© primitive des intelligences n'est qu'une fiction
+logique sans rÃ©alitÃ©--une simple abstraction de langage, _qui ne
+repose que sur l'identitÃ© du mot avec lui-mÃªme_. Tout se reduit Ã 
+la possibilitÃ© abstraite des mÃªmes dÃ©veloppemens, dans les mÃªmes
+conditions d'hÃ©rÃ©ditÃ© et d'Ã©ducation--mais aussi de dÃ©veloppemens
+diffÃ©rens dans des circonstances diffÃ©rentes: c'est Ã  dire, que
+l'intelligence de chacun n'est identique Ã  celle de tous, qu'au
+moment oÃ¹ elle n'est pas encore proprement une intelligence."]
 
 [Side-note: Plato's argument as to the distinction between present
 sensation and anticipation of the future.]
@@ -9618,9 +9587,9 @@ thus follow an ignorant physician, believing him to be instructed
 and competent: a fourth, instead of consulting a physician, may
 consult a prophet, whom Plato[70] here reckons among the
 authoritative infallible measures in respect to future events: a
-fifth may (like the rhetor Ælius Aristeides[71]) disregard the
+fifth may (like the rhetor Ã†lius Aristeides[71]) disregard the
 advice of physicians, and follow prescriptions enjoined to him in
-his own dreams, believing them to be sent by Æsculapius the
+his own dreams, believing them to be sent by Ã†sculapius the
 Preserving God. Each of these persons judges differently about the
 road to future health: but each is alike a measure to himself: the
 belief of each is relative to his own mental condition and
@@ -9628,17 +9597,17 @@ predispositions. You, or I, may believe that one or other of them
 is mistaken: but here another measure is introduced--_your_ mind
 or _mine_.
 
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Theætêt. p. 179 A. [Greek: pa=s a)\n
+[Footnote 69: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 179 A. [Greek: pa=s a)\n
 o(mologoi=].]
 
-[Footnote 70: Plato, Theætêt. p. 179 A, where Mr. Campbell
+[Footnote 70: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 179 A, where Mr. Campbell
 observes in his note--"The [Greek: ma/ntis] is introduced as being
-[Greek: e)pistê/môn] of the future generally; just as the
+[Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃ´n] of the future generally; just as the
 physician is of future health and disease, the musician of future
 harmony," &c.]
 
 [Footnote 71: See the five discourses of the rhetor
-Aristeides--[Greek: I(erô=n Lo/goi], Oratt. xxiii.-xxvii.--containing
+Aristeides--[Greek: I(erÃ´=n Lo/goi], Oratt. xxiii.-xxvii.--containing
 curious details about his habits and condition, and illustrating his
 belief; especially Or. xxiii. p. 462 seqq. The perfect faith which
 he reposed in his dreams, and the confidence with which he speaks
@@ -9691,17 +9660,17 @@ the hearer's own mind; and he thus recognises that mind as a
 measure for itself. But the Sokratic Dialectic embodies the same
 recognition, and the same essential relativity to the hearer's
 mind, more forcibly than any rhetoric. And the Platonic Sokrates
-(in the Phædrus) makes it one of his objections against orators
+(in the PhÃ¦drus) makes it one of his objections against orators
 who addressed multitudes, that they did not discriminate either
 the specialties of different minds, or the specialties of
 discourse applicable to each.[74]
 
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Theætêt. p. 161 E.]
+[Footnote 72: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 161 E.]
 
 [Footnote 73: Read the animated passage in the conversation with
-Pôlus: Plato, Gorg. 472, and Theætêt. 161 A, pp. 375, 376.
+PÃ´lus: Plato, Gorg. 472, and TheÃ¦tÃªt. 161 A, pp. 375, 376.
 
-In this very argument of Sokrates (in the Theætêtus) against the
+In this very argument of Sokrates (in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus) against the
 Protagorean theory, we find him unconsciously adopting (as I have
 already remarked) the very language of that theory, as a
 description of his own procedure, p. 171 D. Compare with this a
@@ -9710,7 +9679,7 @@ in Republic, i. 337 C.
 
 Moreover, the long and striking contrast between the philosopher
 and the man of the world, which Plato embodies in this dialogue
-(the Theætêtus, from p. 172 to p. 177), is so far from assisting
+(the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, from p. 172 to p. 177), is so far from assisting
 his argument against Protagoras, that it rather illustrates the
 Protagorean point of view. The beliefs and judgments of the man of
 the world are presented as flowing from _his_ mental condition and
@@ -9725,7 +9694,7 @@ measure for myself, I speak and act accordingly. But the opponents
 have not agreed to accept _me_ any more than Plato as their judge.
 The case remains unsettled as before.]
 
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D-E; compare 258 A.]
+[Footnote 74: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 271 D-E; compare 258 A.]
 
 [Side-note: Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus--Plato assumes
 infallible authority--sets aside Dialectic.]
@@ -9789,7 +9758,7 @@ well as the Proposition which he intends to affirm and prove.]
 
 [Footnote 76: Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikomach. x. 1176, a. 15)
 [Greek: dokei= d' e)n a(/pasi toi=s toiou/tois _ei)=nai to\
-phaino/menon tô=| spoudai/ô|_.] "That _is_, which _appears to be_
+phaino/menon tÃ´=| spoudai/Ã´|_.] "That _is_, which _appears to be_
 in the judgment of the wise or virtuous man." The ultimate appeal
 is thus acknowledged to be, not to an abstraction, but to some one
 or more individual persons whom Aristotle recognises as wise.
@@ -9797,7 +9766,7 @@ _That_ is truth which this wise man declares to be truth. You
 cannot escape from the Relative by any twist of reasoning.
 
 What Platonic critics call "Der Gegensatz des Seins und des
-Scheins" (see Steinhart, Einleit. zum Theætêt. p. 37) is
+Scheins" (see Steinhart, Einleit. zum TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 37) is
 unattainable. All that is attainable is the antithesis between
 that which appears to one person, and that which appears to one or
 more others, choose them as you will: between that which appears
@@ -9808,8 +9777,8 @@ appears to the person or persons whom we judge to be wise, under
 these latter favourable circumstances.
 
 Epiktetus, i. 28, 1. [Greek: Ti/ e)/stin ai)/tion tou=
-sugkatati/thesthai/ tini? To\ phai/nesthai o(/ti u(pa/rchei. Tô=|
-ou)=n phainome/nô| o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei, sugkatati/thesthai
+sugkatati/thesthai/ tini? To\ phai/nesthai o(/ti u(pa/rchei. TÃ´=|
+ou)=n phainome/nÃ´| o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei, sugkatati/thesthai
 ou)ch oi(=o/n te.]]
 
 [Side-note: Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we
@@ -9877,7 +9846,7 @@ Hindoos, implicitly believe, not only every word of this poem, but
 every word of every poem that has ever been written in Sanscrit.
 If you ask a man whether he really believes any very egregious
 absurdity quoted from these books, he replies with the greatest
-_naïveté_ in the world, 'Is it not written in the book; and how
+_naÃ¯vetÃ©_ in the world, 'Is it not written in the book; and how
 should it be there written if not true?' . . . The greater the
 improbability, the more monstrous and preposterous the fiction,
 the greater is the charm that it has over their minds; and the
@@ -9966,22 +9935,22 @@ as unanimous and unerring, I transcribe from another eminent
 historian of philosophy a description of what philosophy has been
 from ancient times down to the present.
 
-Degérando, Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie, vol. i.
-p. 48:--"Une multitude d'hypothèses, élevées en quelque sorte au
-hasard, et rapidement détruites; une diversité d'opinions,
-d'autant plus sensible que la philosophie a été plus developpée;
-des sectes, des partis même, des disputes interminables, des
-spéculations stériles, des erreurs maintenues et transmises par
-une imitation aveugle; quelques découvertes obtenues avec lenteur,
-et mélangées d'idees fausses; des réformes annoncées à chaque
-siècle et jamais accomplies; une succession de doctrines qui se
+DegÃ©rando, Histoire ComparÃ©e des SystÃ¨mes de Philosophie, vol. i.
+p. 48:--"Une multitude d'hypothÃ¨ses, Ã©levÃ©es en quelque sorte au
+hasard, et rapidement dÃ©truites; une diversitÃ© d'opinions,
+d'autant plus sensible que la philosophie a Ã©tÃ© plus developpÃ©e;
+des sectes, des partis mÃªme, des disputes interminables, des
+spÃ©culations stÃ©riles, des erreurs maintenues et transmises par
+une imitation aveugle; quelques dÃ©couvertes obtenues avec lenteur,
+et mÃ©langÃ©es d'idees fausses; des rÃ©formes annoncÃ©es Ã  chaque
+siÃ¨cle et jamais accomplies; une succession de doctrines qui se
 renversent les unes les autres sans pouvoir obtenir plus de
-solidité: la raison humaine ainsi promenée dans un triste cercle
-de vicissitudes, et ne s'élevant à quelques époques fortunées que
-pour retomber bientôt dans de nouveaux écarts, &c. . . . les mêmes
-questions, enfin, qui partagèrent il y a plus de vingt siècles les
-premiers génies de la Grèce, agitées encore aujourd'hui** après tant
-de volumineux écrits consacrés à les discuter".]
+soliditÃ©: la raison humaine ainsi promenÃ©e dans un triste cercle
+de vicissitudes, et ne s'Ã©levant Ã  quelques Ã©poques fortunÃ©es que
+pour retomber bientÃ´t dans de nouveaux Ã©carts, &c. . . . les mÃªmes
+questions, enfin, qui partagÃ¨rent il y a plus de vingt siÃ¨cles les
+premiers gÃ©nies de la GrÃ¨ce, agitÃ©es encore aujourd'hui** aprÃ¨s tant
+de volumineux Ã©crits consacrÃ©s Ã  les discuter".]
 
 This state of mind in reference to belief is usual with most men,
 not less at the present day than in the time of Plato and
@@ -10010,7 +9979,7 @@ but it enunciates the appeal to which all of them must be
 submitted--the subjective condition of satisfying the judgment of
 each hearer. Its protest is entered only when that condition is
 overleaped, and when the dogmatist enacts his canon of belief as
-imperative, peremptory, binding upon all (allgemeingültig) both
+imperative, peremptory, binding upon all (allgemeingÃ¼ltig) both
 assentient and dissentient. I am grateful to Aristotle for his
 efforts to lay down objective canons in the research of truth; but
 I claim the right of examining those canons for myself, and of
@@ -10028,10 +9997,10 @@ conventional, or varied according to circumstances, or according
 to the diversity of the percipient Subject; but there was an
 objective reality--minute, solid, invisible atoms, differing in
 figure, position, and movement, and vacuum along with them. Such
-reality was intelligible only by Reason. [Greek: No/mô| gluku/,
-no/mô| pikro/n, no/mô| thermo/n, no/mô| psuchro/n, no/mô| chroiê/;
-e)te/ê| de\ a)/toma kai\ keno/n. A(/per nomi/zetai me\n ei)=nai
-kai\ doxa/zetai ta\ ai)sthêta/, ou)k e)/sti de\ kata\ a)lêthei/an
+reality was intelligible only by Reason. [Greek: No/mÃ´| gluku/,
+no/mÃ´| pikro/n, no/mÃ´| thermo/n, no/mÃ´| psuchro/n, no/mÃ´| chroiÃª/;
+e)te/Ãª| de\ a)/toma kai\ keno/n. A(/per nomi/zetai me\n ei)=nai
+kai\ doxa/zetai ta\ ai)sthÃªta/, ou)k e)/sti de\ kata\ a)lÃªthei/an
 tau=ta; a)lla\ ta\ a)/toma mo/non kai\ ke/non.]
 
 Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 135-139; Diog. Laert. ix. 72.
@@ -10040,7 +10009,7 @@ See Mullach, Democriti Fragm. pp. 204-208.
 The discourse of Protagoras [Greek: Peri\ tou= o)/ntos], was read
 by Porphyry, who apparently cited from it a passage verbatim,
 which citation Eusebius unfortunately has not preserved (Eusebius,
-Præpar. Evang. x. 3, 17). One of the speakers in Porphyry's
+PrÃ¦par. Evang. x. 3, 17). One of the speakers in Porphyry's
 dialogue (describing a repast at the house of Longinus at Athens to
 celebrate Plato's birthday) accused Plato of having copied largely
 from the arguments of Protagoras--[Greek: pro\s tou\s e(\n to\
@@ -10056,7 +10025,7 @@ which are different with different Percipients.]
 After thus criticising the formula--Homo Mensura--Plato proceeds
 to canvass the other doctrine, which he ascribes to Protagoras
 along with others, and which he puts into the mouth of
-Theætêtus--"That knowledge is sensible perception". He connects that
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus--"That knowledge is sensible perception". He connects that
 doctrine with the above-mentioned formula, by illustrations which
 exhibit great divergence between one percipient Subject and another.
 He gives us, as examples of sensible perception, the case of the
@@ -10070,7 +10039,7 @@ under the same conditions--yet where they judge differently, each
 stands forth in his own individuality, and the relativity of the
 judgment is less likely to be disputed.
 
-[Footnote 81: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 152 A, 159 C.]
+[Footnote 81: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 152 A, 159 C.]
 
 [Side-note: Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The
 conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of
@@ -10088,7 +10057,7 @@ capable of being so exhibited that no two persons shall either see
 them differently or mistrust them. Of two persons exposed to the
 same wind, one may feel cold, and the other not: but both of them
 will see the barometer or thermometer alike.[83] [Greek: Pa/nta
-me/trô| kai\ a)rithmô=| kai\ stathmô=|]--would be the perfection
+me/trÃ´| kai\ a)rithmÃ´=| kai\ stathmÃ´=|]--would be the perfection
 of science, if it could be obtained. Plato himself recognises, in
 more than one place, the irresistible efficacy of weight and
 measure in producing unanimity; and in forestalling those disputes
@@ -10101,28 +10070,28 @@ we must seek for the basis of knowledge or cognition.
 
 [Footnote 82: Aristotle (Metaphysic. [Greek: G]. p. 1010, a. 25
 seq.) in arguing against Herakleitus and his followers, who dwelt
-upon [Greek: ta\ ai)sthêta\] as ever fluctuating and undefinable,
+upon [Greek: ta\ ai)sthÃªta\] as ever fluctuating and undefinable,
 urges against them that this is not true of _all_ [Greek:
-ai)sthêta/], but only of those in the sublunary region of the
+ai)sthÃªta/], but only of those in the sublunary region of the
 Kosmos. But this region is (he says) only an imperceptibly small
 part of the entire Kosmos; the objects in the vast superlunary or
 celestial region of the Kosmos were far more numerous, and were
 also eternal and unchangeable, in constant and uniform circular
 rotation. Accordingly, if you predicate one or other about [Greek:
-ai)sthêta\] generally, you ought to predicate constancy and
+ai)sthÃªta\] generally, you ought to predicate constancy and
 unchangeability, not flux and variation, since the former
 predicates are true of much the larger proportion of [Greek:
-ai)sthêta/]. See the Scholia on the above passage of Aristotle's
+ai)sthÃªta/]. See the Scholia on the above passage of Aristotle's
 Metaphysica, and also upon Book A. 991, a. 9.]
 
-[Footnote 83: Mr. Campbell, in his Preface to the Theætêtus (p.
+[Footnote 83: Mr. Campbell, in his Preface to the TheÃ¦tÃªtus (p.
 lxxxiii.), while comparing the points in the dialogue with modern
 metaphysical views, observes. "Modern Experimental Science is
 equally distrustful of individual impressions of sense, but has
 found means of measuring the motions by which they are caused,
 through _the effect of the same motions upon other things besides
 our senses_. When the same wind is blowing one of us feels warm
-and another cold (Theætêt. p. 152), but the mercury of the
+and another cold (TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 152), but the mercury of the
 thermometer tells the same tale to all. And though the individual
 consciousness remains the sole judge of the exact impression
 momentarily received by each person, yet we are certain that the
@@ -10140,7 +10109,7 @@ persons. The certainty about "universal law governing the
 sensations of heat and cold," was not at all felt in the days of
 Plato.]
 
-[Footnote 84: Thus in the Philêbus (pp. 55-56) Plato declares that
+[Footnote 84: Thus in the PhilÃªbus (pp. 55-56) Plato declares that
 numbering, measuring, and weighing, are the characteristic marks
 of all the various processes which deserve the name of Arts; and
 that among the different Arts those of the carpenter, builder,
@@ -10150,7 +10119,7 @@ first-named employ more measurement and a greater number of
 measuring instruments, the rule, line, plummet, compass, &c.
 
 "When we talk about iron or silver" (says Sokrates in the Platonic
-Phædrus, p. 263 A-B) "we are all of one mind, but when we talk
+PhÃ¦drus, p. 263 A-B) "we are all of one mind, but when we talk
 about the Just and the Good we are all at variance with each
 other, and each man is at variance with himself". Compare an
 analogous passage, Alkibiad. I. p. 109.
@@ -10174,21 +10143,21 @@ hearing, we at the same time _know_ them all? When foreigners talk
 to us in a strange language, are we to say that we do not hear what
 they say, or that we both hear and know it? When unlettered men look
 at an inscription, shall we contend that they do not see the writing,
-or that they both see and know it? _Theætêt._--We shall say, under
+or that they both see and know it? _TheÃ¦tÃªt._--We shall say, under
 these supposed circumstances, that what we see and hear, we also
 know. We hear and we know the pitch and intonation of the
 foreigner's voice. The unlettered man sees, and also knows, the
 colour, size, forms, of the letters. But that which the
 schoolmaster and the interpreter could tell us respecting their
 meaning, _that_ we neither see, nor hear, nor know.
-_Sokr._--Excellent, Theætêtus. I have nothing to say against your
+_Sokr._--Excellent, TheÃ¦tÃªtus. I have nothing to say against your
 answer.[86]
 
-[Footnote 85: Plato, Theætêt. p. 163 A. [Greek: ei)s ga\r tou=to/
-pou pa=s o( lo/gos ê(mi=n e)/teine, kai\ tou/tou cha/rin ta\
-polla\ kai\ a)/topa tau=ta e)kinê/samen.]]
+[Footnote 85: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 163 A. [Greek: ei)s ga\r tou=to/
+pou pa=s o( lo/gos Ãª(mi=n e)/teine, kai\ tou/tou cha/rin ta\
+polla\ kai\ a)/topa tau=ta e)kinÃª/samen.]]
 
-[Footnote 86: Plato, Theætêt. p. 163 C.]
+[Footnote 86: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 163 C.]
 
 This is an important question and answer, which Plato
 unfortunately does not follow up. It brings to view, though
@@ -10216,7 +10185,7 @@ sense is the same to all, and therefore, though really relative,
 has more the look of an absolute; but the mental associations with
 that fact are different with different persons, and therefore are
 more obviously and palpably relative.--Dugald Stewart, First
-Preliminary Dissertation to Encyclopæd. Britannica, pp. 66, 8th
+Preliminary Dissertation to EncyclopÃ¦d. Britannica, pp. 66, 8th
 ed.
 
 "To this reference of the sensation of colour to the external
@@ -10260,11 +10229,11 @@ Sokrates turns to another argument. If knowledge be the same thing
 as sensible perception, then it follows, that so soon as a man
 ceases to see and hear, he also ceases to know. The memory of what
 he has seen or heard, upon that supposition, is not knowledge. But
-Theætêtus admits that a man who remembers what he has seen or
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus admits that a man who remembers what he has seen or
 heard does know it. Accordingly, the answer that knowledge is
 sensible perception, cannot be maintained.[88]
 
-[Footnote 88: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 163, 164.]
+[Footnote 88: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 163, 164.]
 
 Here Sokrates makes out a good case against the answer in its
 present wording. But we may fairly doubt whether those who
@@ -10289,7 +10258,7 @@ your eyes, and look only with the other. But it is impossible
 to know a thing, and not to know it at the same time. Therefore
 _to know_ is not the same as _to see_.[89]
 
-[Footnote 89: Plato, Theætêt. p. 165 B.]
+[Footnote 89: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 165 B.]
 
 This argument is proclaimed by Plato as a terrible puzzle, leaving
 no escape.[90] Perhaps he meant to speak ironically. In reality,
@@ -10306,30 +10275,30 @@ qualification. I see an object with my open eye: I do not see it
 with my closed eye. From this double proposition, alike
 intelligible and true, Plato thinks himself authorised to discard
 the qualification, and to tell me that I see a thing and do not
-see it--passing _à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_.
+see it--passing _Ã  dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_.
 This is the same liberty which he took with the Protagorean
 doctrine. Protagoras having said--"Every thing which any man
 believes is true _to that man_"--Plato reasons against him as if
 he had said--"Every thing which any man believes is _true_".
 
-[Footnote 90: Plato, Theætêt. p. 165 B. [Greek: to\ deino/taton
-e)rô/têma--a)phu/ktô| e)rôtê/mati], &c.
+[Footnote 90: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 165 B. [Greek: to\ deino/taton
+e)rÃ´/tÃªma--a)phu/ktÃ´| e)rÃ´tÃª/mati], &c.
 
 Mr. Campbell observes upon this passage:--"Perhaps there is here a
 trace of the spirit which was afterwards developed in the sophisms
-of Eubulidês". Stallbaum, while acknowledging the many subtleties
+of EubulidÃªs". Stallbaum, while acknowledging the many subtleties
 of Sokrates in this dialogue, complains that other commentators
 make the ridiculous mistake ("errore perquam ridiculo") of
 accepting all the reasoning of Sokrates as seriously meant,
 whereas much of it (he says) is mere mockery and sarcasm, intended
 to retort upon the Sophists their own argumentative tricks and
-quibbles.--"Itaquè sæpe per petulantiam quandam argutiis indulget
-(Socrates), quibus isti haudquaquam abstinebant: sæpè ex
+quibbles.--"ItaquÃ¨ sÃ¦pe per petulantiam quandam argutiis indulget
+(Socrates), quibus isti haudquaquam abstinebant: sÃ¦pÃ¨ ex
 adversariorum mente disputat, sed ita tamen disputat, ut eos suis
-ipsorum capiat laqueis; sæpè denique in disputando iisdem
+ipsorum capiat laqueis; sÃ¦pÃ¨ denique in disputando iisdem
 artificiis utitur, quibus illi uti consueverant, sicuti etiam in
 Menone, Cratylo, Euthydemo, fieri meminimus". (Stallbaum, Proleg.
-ad Theæt. pp. 12-13, 22-29).
+ad TheÃ¦t. pp. 12-13, 22-29).
 
 Stallbaum pushes this general principle so far as to contend that
 the simile of the waxen tablet (p. 191 C), and that of the
@@ -10360,16 +10329,16 @@ mystical riddles one after another),[92] Sokrates returns back to
 the same debate, and produces more serious arguments, as
 follows:--
 
-[Footnote 91: Plato, Theætêt. p. 165 D. The reasonings here given
+[Footnote 91: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 165 D. The reasonings here given
 by Plato from the mouth of Sokrates, are compared by Steinhart to
-the Trug-schlüsse, which in the Euthydêmus he ascribes to that
+the Trug-schlÃ¼sse, which in the EuthydÃªmus he ascribes to that
 Sophist and Dionysodorus. But Steinhart says that Plato is here
 reasoning in the style of Protagoras: an assertion thoroughly
 gratuitous, for which there is no evidence at all (Steinhart,
-Einleitung zum Theætêt. p. 53).]
+Einleitung zum TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 53).]
 
-[Footnote 92: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 179-183. The description which
-we read here (put into the mouth of the geometer Theodôrus) of the
+[Footnote 92: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 179-183. The description which
+we read here (put into the mouth of the geometer TheodÃ´rus) of the
 persons in Ephesus and other parts of Ionia, who speculated in the
 vein of Herakleitus--is full of vivid fancy and smartness, but is
 for that reason the less to be trusted as accurate.
@@ -10382,7 +10351,7 @@ depicted as half mad--incapable of continuous attention--hating
 all systematic speech and debate--answering, when addressed, only
 in brief, symbolical, enigmatic phrases, of which they had a
 quiver-full, but which they never condescended to explain ([Greek:
-ô(/sper e)k phare/tras r(êmati/skia ai)nigmatô/dê a)naspô=ntes
+Ã´(/sper e)k phare/tras r(Ãªmati/skia ai)nigmatÃ´/dÃª a)naspÃ´=ntes
 a)potoxeu/ousin], see Lassalle, vol. i. pp. 32-39--springing up by
 spontaneous inspiration, despising instruction, p. 180 A), and
 each looking down upon the others as ignorant. If** we compare the
@@ -10395,9 +10364,9 @@ attempts to establish the philosophical affinity between
 Herakleitus and Protagoras: but in my judgment unsuccessfully.
 According to Lassalle's own representation of the doctrine of
 Herakleitus, it is altogether opposed to the most eminent
-Protagorean doctrine, [Greek: A)/nthrôpos e(autô=| me/tron]--and
+Protagorean doctrine, [Greek: A)/nthrÃ´pos e(autÃ´=| me/tron]--and
 equally opposed to that which Plato seems to imply as
-Protagorean--[Greek: Ai)/sthêsis = E)pistê/mê]. The elucidation
+Protagorean--[Greek: Ai)/sthÃªsis = E)pistÃª/mÃª]. The elucidation
 given by Lassalle of Herakleitus, through the analogy of Hegel, is
 certainly curious and instructive. The Absolute Process of
 Herakleitus is at variance with Protagoras, not less than the
@@ -10415,7 +10384,7 @@ _Sokr._--If you are asked, With what does a man perceive white and
 black? you will answer, with his eyes: shrill or grave sounds?
 with his ears. Does it not seem to you more correct to say, that
 we see _through_ our eyes rather than _with_ our eyes:--that we
-hear _through_ our ears, not _with_ our ears. _Theætêt._--I think
+hear _through_ our ears, not _with_ our ears. _TheÃ¦tÃªt._--I think
 it is more correct. _Sokr._--It would be strange if there were in
 each man many separate reservoirs, each for a distinct class of
 perceptions.[93] All perceptions must surely converge towards one
@@ -10423,12 +10392,12 @@ common form or centre, call it soul or by any other name, which
 perceives _through_ them, as organs or instruments, all
 perceptible objects.--
 
-[Footnote 93: Plato, Theætêt. p. 184 D. [Greek: deino\n ga/r pou,
-ei) pollai/ tines e)n ê(mi=n, ô(/sper e)n dourei/ois i(/ppois,
-ai)sthê/sis e)gkathêntai, a)lla\ mê\ ei)s mi/an tina\ i)de/an,
-ei)/te psuchê\n ei)/te o(/, ti dei= kalei=n, pa/nta tau=ta
-xuntei/nei, ê(=| dia\ tou/tôn oi(=on o)rga/nôn ai)sthano/metha
-o(/sa ai)sthêta/.]]
+[Footnote 93: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 184 D. [Greek: deino\n ga/r pou,
+ei) pollai/ tines e)n Ãª(mi=n, Ã´(/sper e)n dourei/ois i(/ppois,
+ai)sthÃª/sis e)gkathÃªntai, a)lla\ mÃª\ ei)s mi/an tina\ i)de/an,
+ei)/te psuchÃª\n ei)/te o(/, ti dei= kalei=n, pa/nta tau=ta
+xuntei/nei, Ãª(=| dia\ tou/tÃ´n oi(=on o)rga/nÃ´n ai)sthano/metha
+o(/sa ai)sthÃªta/.]]
 
 We thus perceive objects of sense, according to Plato's language,
 _with_ the central form or soul, and _through_ various organs of
@@ -10441,7 +10410,7 @@ special to either. If we conceive any thing common both to sound
 and colour, we cannot conceive it either through the auditory or
 through the visual organ.[94]
 
-[Footnote 94: Plato, Theætêt. p. 184-185.]
+[Footnote 94: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 184-185.]
 
 Now there are certain judgments (Sokrates argues) which we make
 common to both, and not exclusively belonging to either. First, we
@@ -10456,10 +10425,10 @@ judgments respecting what is common to all? There is no special
 organ: the mind perceives, through itself these common
 properties.[95]
 
-[Footnote 95: Plato, Theætêt. p. 185 D. [Greek: dokei= tê\n
-a)rchê\n ou)d' ei)=nai toiou=ton ou)de\n tou/tois o)/rganon
-i)/dion, ô(/sper e)kei/nois, a)ll' au)tê\ di' au(tê=s ê( psuchê\
-ta\ koina/ moi phai/netai peri\ pa/ntôn e)piskopei=n.]]
+[Footnote 95: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 185 D. [Greek: dokei= tÃª\n
+a)rchÃª\n ou)d' ei)=nai toiou=ton ou)de\n tou/tois o)/rganon
+i)/dion, Ã´(/sper e)kei/nois, a)ll' au)tÃª\ di' au(tÃª=s Ãª( psuchÃª\
+ta\ koina/ moi phai/netai peri\ pa/ntÃ´n e)piskopei=n.]]
 
 [Side-note: Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by
 itself--It perceives Existence, Difference, &c.]
@@ -10487,17 +10456,17 @@ most men. But without them, no one can apprehend real existence
 (essence, or substance), or arrive at truth: and without truth,
 there can be no knowledge.
 
-[Footnote 96: Plato, Theætêt. p. 186 B. [Greek: Tê\n de/ ge
-ou)si/an kai\ o(/ ti e)/ston kai\ tê\n e)nantio/têta pro\s
-a)llê/lô] (of hardness and softness) [Greek: kai\ tê\n ou)si/an
-au)= tê=s e)nantio/têtos, au)tê\ ê( psuchê\ _e)paniou=sa kai\
-xumba/llousa pro\s a)/llêla kri/nein peira=tai ê(mi=n_ . . .
+[Footnote 96: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 186 B. [Greek: TÃª\n de/ ge
+ou)si/an kai\ o(/ ti e)/ston kai\ tÃª\n e)nantio/tÃªta pro\s
+a)llÃª/lÃ´] (of hardness and softness) [Greek: kai\ tÃª\n ou)si/an
+au)= tÃª=s e)nantio/tÃªtos, au)tÃª\ Ãª( psuchÃª\ _e)paniou=sa kai\
+xumba/llousa pro\s a)/llÃªla kri/nein peira=tai Ãª(mi=n_ . . .
 Ou)kou=n ta\ me\n eu)thu\s genome/nois pa/resti phu/sei
-ai)stha/nesthai a)nthrô/pois te kai\ thêri/ois, o(/sa dia\ tou=
-sô/matos pathê/mata e)pi\ tê\n psuchê\n tei/nei; _ ta\ de\ peri\
-tou/tôn a)nalogi/smata_, pro/s te ou)si/an kai\ ô)phelei/an
-_mo/gis_ kai\ e)n pollô=| chro/nô| dia\ pollô=n _pragma/tôn kai\
-paidei/as paragi/gnetai, oi(=s a)\n kai\ paragi/gnêtai.]]
+ai)stha/nesthai a)nthrÃ´/pois te kai\ thÃªri/ois, o(/sa dia\ tou=
+sÃ´/matos pathÃª/mata e)pi\ tÃª\n psuchÃª\n tei/nei; _ ta\ de\ peri\
+tou/tÃ´n a)nalogi/smata_, pro/s te ou)si/an kai\ Ã´)phelei/an
+_mo/gis_ kai\ e)n pollÃ´=| chro/nÃ´| dia\ pollÃ´=n _pragma/tÃ´n kai\
+paidei/as paragi/gnetai, oi(=s a)\n kai\ paragi/gnÃªtai.]]
 
 [Side-note: Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not
 in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add
@@ -10513,32 +10482,32 @@ and evil, honourable and base, &c., to be among matters most
 especially relative, perceived by the mind computing past and
 present in reference to future.[98]
 
-[Footnote 97: Plato, Theætêt. p. 186 D.** [Greek: e)n me\n a)/ra
-toi=s pathê/masin ou)k e)/ni e)pistê/mê, _e)n de\ tô=| peri\
-e)kei/nôn sullogismô=|_; ou)si/as ga\r kai\ a)lêthei/as e)ntau=tha
-me/n, ô(s e)/oike, dunato\n a(/psasthai, e)kei= de\ a)du/naton.]
+[Footnote 97: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 186 D.** [Greek: e)n me\n a)/ra
+toi=s pathÃª/masin ou)k e)/ni e)pistÃª/mÃª, _e)n de\ tÃ´=| peri\
+e)kei/nÃ´n sullogismÃ´=|_; ou)si/as ga\r kai\ a)lÃªthei/as e)ntau=tha
+me/n, Ã´(s e)/oike, dunato\n a(/psasthai, e)kei= de\ a)du/naton.]
 The term [Greek: sullogismo\s] is here interesting, before it had
 received that technical sense which it has borne from Aristotle
 downwards. Mr. Campbell explains it properly as "nearly equivalent
-to abstraction and generalisation" (Preface to Theætêtus, p.
+to abstraction and generalisation" (Preface to TheÃ¦tÃªtus, p.
 lxxiv., also note, p. 144).]
 
-[Footnote 98: Plato, Theætêt. p. 186 A. [Greek: kalo\n kai\
-ai)schro/n, kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ kako/n. Kai\ tou/tôn moi dokei=
-_e)n toi=s ma/lista pro\s a)/llêla skopei=sthai tê\n ou)si/an,
-a)nalogizome/nê_ (ê( psuchê\) _e)n e(autê=| ta\ gegono/ta kai\ ta\
+[Footnote 98: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 186 A. [Greek: kalo\n kai\
+ai)schro/n, kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ kako/n. Kai\ tou/tÃ´n moi dokei=
+_e)n toi=s ma/lista pro\s a)/llÃªla skopei=sthai tÃª\n ou)si/an,
+a)nalogizome/nÃª_ (Ãª( psuchÃª\) _e)n e(autÃª=| ta\ gegono/ta kai\ ta\
 paro/nta pro\s ta\ me/llonta_.]
 
 Base and honourable, evil and good, are here pointed out by
 Sokrates as most evidently and emphatically _relative_. In the
 train of reasoning here terminated, Plato had been combating the
-doctrine [Greek: Ai)/sthêsis = E)pistê/mê]. In his sense of the
-word [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] he has refuted the doctrine. But what
+doctrine [Greek: Ai)/sthÃªsis = E)pistÃª/mÃª]. In his sense of the
+word [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis] he has refuted the doctrine. But what
 about the other doctrine, which he declares to be a part of the
 same programme--_Homo Mensura_--the Protagorean formula? That
 formula, so far from being refuted, is actually sustained and
 established by this train of reasoning. Plato has declared [Greek:
-ou)si/a, a)lêthei/a, e)nantio/tês, a)gatho/n, kako/n], &c., to be
+ou)si/a, a)lÃªthei/a, e)nantio/tÃªs, a)gatho/n, kako/n], &c., to be
 a distinct class of Objects not perceived by Sense. But he also
 tells us that they are apprehended by the Mind through its own
 working, and that they are apprehended always in relation to each
@@ -10547,7 +10516,7 @@ concipient mind, as the Objects of sense are to the percipient and
 sentient mind. The Subject is the correlative limit or measure (to
 use Protagorean phrases) of one as well as of the other. This
 confirms what I observed above, that the two doctrines, 1. Homo
-Mensura, 2. [Greek: Ai)/sthêsis = E)pistê/mê],--are completely
+Mensura, 2. [Greek: Ai)/sthÃªsis = E)pistÃª/mÃª],--are completely
 distinct and independent, though Plato has chosen to implicate or
 identify them.]
 
@@ -10566,11 +10535,11 @@ intelligence as a mental phenomenon. He regards both as belonging
 to the mind or soul. He considers that the mind is sentient as
 well as intelligent: and moreover, that the sentient mind is the
 essential basis and preliminary--universal among men and animals,
-as well as coæval with birth--furnishing all the matter, upon
+as well as coÃ¦val with birth--furnishing all the matter, upon
 which the intelligent mind has to work. He says nothing, in this
 dialogue, about the three distinct souls or minds (rational,
 courageous, and appetitive), in one and the same body, which form
-so capital a feature in his Timæus and Republic: nothing about
+so capital a feature in his TimÃ¦us and Republic: nothing about
 eternal, self-existent, substantial Ideas, or about the
 pre-existence of the soul and its reminiscence as the process of
 acquiring knowledge. Nor does he countenance the doctrine of
@@ -10592,7 +10561,7 @@ special bodily organ.
 [Side-note: Different views given by Plato in other dialogues.]
 
 But this distinction, in the first place, is not consistent with
-Timæus--wherein Plato assigns to each of his three human souls a
+TimÃ¦us--wherein Plato assigns to each of his three human souls a
 separate and special region of the bodily organism, as its
 physical basis. Nor, in the second place, is it consistent with
 that larger range of observed facts which the farther development
@@ -10623,8 +10592,8 @@ remarkable advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from
 Sensation, first to Opinion, then to Cognition.]
 
 Putting ourselves back to the Platonic period, we must recognise
-that the discussion of the theory [Greek: Ai)/sthêsis =
-E)pistê/mê], as it is conducted by Plato, exhibits a remarkable
+that the discussion of the theory [Greek: Ai)/sthÃªsis =
+E)pistÃª/mÃª], as it is conducted by Plato, exhibits a remarkable
 advance in psychological analysis. In analysing the mental
 phenomena, Plato displayed much more subtlety and acuteness than
 his predecessors--as far at least as we have the means of
@@ -10639,7 +10608,7 @@ or sequence, and apprehension of other relations between them,
 to sense. But the language of psychology is, and always has been,
 so indeterminate, that it is difficult to say how much any writer
 means to include under the terms Sense[99]--Sensation--Sensible
-Perception--[Greek: Ai)/sthêsis]. The propositions in which our
+Perception--[Greek: Ai)/sthÃªsis]. The propositions in which our
 knowledge is embodied, affirm--not sensations detached and
 isolated, but--various relations of antecedence and consequence,
 likeness, difference, &c., between two or more sensations or facts
@@ -10670,7 +10639,7 @@ consistency under cross-examination, and can test the consistency
 of others by cross-examining them ([Greek: lo/gon dou=nai kai\
 de/xasthai]).
 
-[Footnote 99: The discussion in pp. 184-186-186 of the Theætêtus
+[Footnote 99: The discussion in pp. 184-186-186 of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus
 is interesting as the earliest attempt remaining to classify
 psychological phenomena. What Demokritus and others proposed with
 the same view--the analogy or discrepancy between [Greek: to\
@@ -10702,12 +10671,12 @@ belong (in Plato's view) to mental powers beyond and apart from
 sense; much more, of course, apprehension of the common properties
 of all, and of those extreme abstractions to which we apply the
 words Ens and Non-Ens ([Greek: to/ t' e)pi\ pa=si koino\n kai\ to\
-e)pi\ tou/tois, ô(=| to\ e)/stin e)ponoma/zeis kai\ to\ ou)k
+e)pi\ tou/tois, Ã´(=| to\ e)/stin e)ponoma/zeis kai\ to\ ou)k
 e)/stin], p. 185 C).
 
-When Plato thus narrows the sense of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis], it is
-easy to prove that [Greek: e)pistê/mê] is not [Greek:
-ai)/sthêsis]; but I doubt whether those who affirmed this
+When Plato thus narrows the sense of [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis], it is
+easy to prove that [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª] is not [Greek:
+ai)/sthÃªsis]; but I doubt whether those who affirmed this
 proposition intended what he here refutes. Neither unreflecting
 men, nor early theorizers, would distinguish the impressions of
 sense from the feeling of such impressions being _successive,
@@ -10733,10 +10702,10 @@ of succession."
 
 By all ordinary (non-theorising) persons, these familiar
 relations, _involved_ in the facts of sense, are conceived as an
-essential part of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]: and are so conceived by
+essential part of [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis]: and are so conceived by
 those modern theorists who trace all our knowledge to sense--as
 well as (probably) by those ancient theorists who defined [Greek:
-e)pistê/mê] to be [Greek: ai)/sthêsis], and against whom Plato
+e)pistÃª/mÃª] to be [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis], and against whom Plato
 here reasons. These theorists would have said (as ordinary
 language recognises)--"We _see_ the _dissimilarity_ of the black
 hands from the white face of the clock; we _hear_ the _likeness_
@@ -10753,7 +10722,7 @@ to Reid's _Sensation_ plus _Perception_. This is manifest even by
 the passages adduced in the text" (note to p. 289). But Reid in
 his remarks omits to notice this difference in the meaning of the
 same word. The case is similar with Plato when he refutes those
-who held the doctrine [Greek: E)pistê/mê = Ai)/sthêsis]. The
+who held the doctrine [Greek: E)pistÃª/mÃª = Ai)/sthÃªsis]. The
 last-mentioned word, in his construction, includes only a part of
 the meaning which they attributed to it; but he takes no notice of
 this verbal difference. Sir William Hamilton remarks, respecting
@@ -10761,28 +10730,28 @@ M. Royer Collard's doctrine, which narrows prodigiously the
 province of Sense,--"_Sense_ he so limits that, if rigorously
 carried out, no sensible perception, as no consciousness, could be
 brought to bear". This is exactly true about Plato's doctrine
-narrowing [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]. See Hamilton's edit. of Reid,
+narrowing [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis]. See Hamilton's edit. of Reid,
 Appendix, p. 844.
 
-Aristotle understands [Greek: ai)/sthêsis--ai)sthêtikê\ psuchê\]
-or [Greek: zôê/]--as occupying a larger sphere than that which
-Plato assigns to them in the Theætêtus. Aristotle recognises the
-five separate [Greek: ai)sthê/seis], each correlating with and
-perceiving its [Greek: i)/dion ai)sthêto/n]: he also recognises
-[Greek: ê( koinê\ ai)/sthêsis]--common sensation or
+Aristotle understands [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis--ai)sthÃªtikÃª\ psuchÃª\]
+or [Greek: zÃ´Ãª/]--as occupying a larger sphere than that which
+Plato assigns to them in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus. Aristotle recognises the
+five separate [Greek: ai)sthÃª/seis], each correlating with and
+perceiving its [Greek: i)/dion ai)sthÃªto/n]: he also recognises
+[Greek: Ãª( koinÃª\ ai)/sthÃªsis]--common sensation or
 perception--correlating with (or perceiving) [Greek: ta\ koina\
-ai)sthêta/], which are _motion_, _rest_, _magnitude_, _figure_,
-_number_. The [Greek: koinê\ ai)/sthêsis] is not a distinct or sixth
+ai)sthÃªta/], which are _motion_, _rest_, _magnitude_, _figure_,
+_number_. The [Greek: koinÃª\ ai)/sthÃªsis] is not a distinct or sixth
 sense, apart from the five, but a general power inhering in all of
-them. He farther recognises [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] as discriminating,
+them. He farther recognises [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis] as discriminating,
 judging, comparing, knowing: this characteristic, [Greek: to\
-kritoko\n] and [Greek: gnôstiko/n], is common to [Greek:
-ai)/sthêsis, phantasi/a, no/êsis], and distinguishes them all from
-appetite--[Greek: to\ o)rektiko/n, kinêtiko/n], &c. See the first
-and second chapters of the third Book of the Treatise De Animâ,
+kritoko\n] and [Greek: gnÃ´stiko/n], is common to [Greek:
+ai)/sthÃªsis, phantasi/a, no/Ãªsis], and distinguishes them all from
+appetite--[Greek: to\ o)rektiko/n, kinÃªtiko/n], &c. See the first
+and second chapters of the third Book of the Treatise De AnimÃ¢,
 and the Commentary of Simplikius upon that Treatise, especially p.
 56, b. Aristotle tells us that all animals [Greek: e)/chei
-du/namin su/mphuton kritikê/n, ê(\n kalou=sin ai)/sthêsin.] Anal.
+du/namin su/mphuton kritikÃª/n, Ãª(\n kalou=sin ai)/sthÃªsin.] Anal.
 Poster. ii. p. 99, b. 35. And Sir William Hamilton adopts a
 similar view, when he remarks, that Judgment is implied in every
 act of Consciousness.
@@ -10791,41 +10760,41 @@ Occasionally indeed Aristotle partitions the soul between [Greek:
 nou=s] and [Greek: o)/rexis]--Intelligence and
 Appetite--recognising Sense as belonging to the head of Intelligence--see
 De Motu Animalium, 6, p. 700, b. 20. [Greek: tau=ta de\ pa/nta
-a)na/getai ei)s nou=n kai\ o)/rexin; kai\ ga\r ê( phantasi/a kai\
-ê( ai)/sthêsis tê\n au)tê\n tô=| nô=| chô/ran e)/chousi; _kritika\
+a)na/getai ei)s nou=n kai\ o)/rexin; kai\ ga\r Ãª( phantasi/a kai\
+Ãª( ai)/sthÃªsis tÃª\n au)tÃª\n tÃ´=| nÃ´=| chÃ´/ran e)/chousi; _kritika\
 ga\r pa/nta_.] Compare also the Topica, ii. 4, p. 111, a. 18.
 
 It will thus be seen that while Plato severs pointedly [Greek:
-ai)/sthêsis] from anything like discrimination, comparison,
+ai)/sthÃªsis] from anything like discrimination, comparison,
 judgment, even in the most rudimentary form--Aristotle refuses to
 adopt this extreme abstraction as his basis for classifying the
 mental phenomena. He recognises a certain measure of
 discrimination, comparison, and judgment, as implicated in
-sensible perceptions. Moreover, that which he calls [Greek: koinê\
-ai)/sthêsis] is unknown to Plato, who isolates each sense, and
+sensible perceptions. Moreover, that which he calls [Greek: koinÃª\
+ai)/sthÃªsis] is unknown to Plato, who isolates each sense, and
 indeed each act of each sense, as much as possible. Aristotle is
-opposed, as Plato is, to the doctrine [Greek: E)pistê/mê =
-Ai)/sthêsis], but he employs a different manner of reasoning
+opposed, as Plato is, to the doctrine [Greek: E)pistÃª/mÃª =
+Ai)/sthÃªsis], but he employs a different manner of reasoning
 against it. See, _inter alia_, Anal. Poster. i. 31, p. 87, b. 28.
-He confines [Greek: e)pistê/mê] to one branch of the [Greek:
-noêtikê/].
+He confines [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª] to one branch of the [Greek:
+noÃªtikÃª/].
 
 The Peripatetic Straton, the disciple of Theophrastus, denied that
 there was any distinct line of demarcation between [Greek: to\
 ai)stha/nesthai] and [Greek: to\ noei=n]: maintaining that the
 former was impossible without a certain measure of the latter. His
-observation is very worthy of note. Plutarch, De Solertiâ
-Animalium, iii. 6, p. 961 A. [Greek: Kai/toi Stra/tôno/s ge tou=
-phusikou= lo/gos e)sti/n, a)podeiknu/ôn ô(s ou)d' ai)stha/nesthai
+observation is very worthy of note. Plutarch, De SolertiÃ¢
+Animalium, iii. 6, p. 961 A. [Greek: Kai/toi Stra/tÃ´no/s ge tou=
+phusikou= lo/gos e)sti/n, a)podeiknu/Ã´n Ã´(s ou)d' ai)stha/nesthai
 topara/pan a)/neu tou= noei=n u(pa/rchei; kai\ ga\r gra/mmata
-polla/kis e)piporeuo/mena tê=| o)/psei, kai\ lo/goi prospi/ptontes
-tê=| a)koiê=| _dialantha/nousin ê(ma=s_ kai\ _diapheu/gousi pro\s
-e(te/rois to\n nou=n e)/chontas_; ei)=t' _au)=this e)panê=lthe_
-kai\ _metathei= kai\ metadiô/kei tô=n proïeme/nôn e(/kaston
-a)nalego/menos_; ê(=| kai\ le/lektai. _Nou=s o(rê=|, kai\ nou=s
-a)kou/ei, ta\ de\ a)/lla kôpha\ kai\ tuphla/_;** ô(s tou= peri\ ta\
-o)/mmata kai\ ô)=ta pa/thous, a)\n mê\ parê=| to\ phronou=n,
-ai)/sthêsin ou) poiou=ntos.]
+polla/kis e)piporeuo/mena tÃª=| o)/psei, kai\ lo/goi prospi/ptontes
+tÃª=| a)koiÃª=| _dialantha/nousin Ãª(ma=s_ kai\ _diapheu/gousi pro\s
+e(te/rois to\n nou=n e)/chontas_; ei)=t' _au)=this e)panÃª=lthe_
+kai\ _metathei= kai\ metadiÃ´/kei tÃ´=n proÃ¯eme/nÃ´n e(/kaston
+a)nalego/menos_; Ãª(=| kai\ le/lektai. _Nou=s o(rÃª=|, kai\ nou=s
+a)kou/ei, ta\ de\ a)/lla kÃ´pha\ kai\ tuphla/_;** Ã´(s tou= peri\ ta\
+o)/mmata kai\ Ã´)=ta pa/thous, a)\n mÃª\ parÃª=| to\ phronou=n,
+ai)/sthÃªsin ou) poiou=ntos.]
 
 Straton here notices that remarkable fact (unnoticed by Plato and
 even by Aristotle, so far as I know) in the process of
@@ -10834,21 +10803,21 @@ they occur, but force themselves upon the attention afterwards,
 and are recalled by the mind in the order in which they occurred
 at first.]
 
-[Footnote 100: Plato, Theæt. p. 187 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: o(/môs de\
-tosou=to/n ge probebê/kamen, ô(/ste mê\ zêtei=n au)tê\n
-(e)pistê/mên) e)n ai)sthê/sei topara/pan, a)ll' e)n e)kei/nô| tô=|
-o)no/mati, o(/, ti pot' e)/chei ê( psuchê/, o(/tan au)tê\ kath'
-au(tê\n pragmateu/êtai peri\ ta\ o)/nta.] _Theæt._ [Greek: A)lla\
-mê\n tou=to/ ge kalei=tai, ô(s e)gô)=|mai, _doxa/zein_.] _Sokr._
-[Greek: O)rthô=s ga\r oi)/ei.]
+[Footnote 100: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 187 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: o(/mÃ´s de\
+tosou=to/n ge probebÃª/kamen, Ã´(/ste mÃª\ zÃªtei=n au)tÃª\n
+(e)pistÃª/mÃªn) e)n ai)sthÃª/sei topara/pan, a)ll' e)n e)kei/nÃ´| tÃ´=|
+o)no/mati, o(/, ti pot' e)/chei Ãª( psuchÃª/, o(/tan au)tÃª\ kath'
+au(tÃª\n pragmateu/Ãªtai peri\ ta\ o)/nta.] _TheÃ¦t._ [Greek: A)lla\
+mÃª\n tou=to/ ge kalei=tai, Ã´(s e)gÃ´)=|mai, _doxa/zein_.] _Sokr._
+[Greek: O)rthÃ´=s ga\r oi)/ei.]
 
 Plato is quite right in distinguishing between [Greek:
-ai)/sthêsis] and [Greek: do/xa], looking at the point as a
+ai)/sthÃªsis] and [Greek: do/xa], looking at the point as a
 question of psychological classification. It appears to me,
 however, most probable that those who maintained the theory
-[Greek: E)pistê/mê = Ai)/sthêsis], made no such distinction, but
+[Greek: E)pistÃª/mÃª = Ai)/sthÃªsis], made no such distinction, but
 included that which he calls [Greek: do/xa] in [Greek:
-ai)/sthêsis]. Unfortunately we do not possess their own
+ai)/sthÃªsis]. Unfortunately we do not possess their own
 exposition; but it cannot have included much of psychological
 analysis.]
 
@@ -10857,21 +10826,21 @@ Knowledge (the region of infallibility, you either possess it or
 not) from Opinion (the region of fallibility, true or false, as
 the case may be) by a broad and impassable line--
 
-"Auch hieraus erwächst eine sehr entscheidende, nur ebenfalls
-nicht ausdrücklich gezogene, Folgerung, dass die reine Erkenntniss
-gar nicht auf demselben Gebiet liegen könne mit dem Irrthum--und
+"Auch hieraus erwÃ¤chst eine sehr entscheidende, nur ebenfalls
+nicht ausdrÃ¼cklich gezogene, Folgerung, dass die reine Erkenntniss
+gar nicht auf demselben Gebiet liegen kÃ¶nne mit dem Irrthum--und
 es in Beziehung auf sie kein Wahr und Falsch gebe, sondern nur ein
-Haben oder Nicht Haben." (Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theæt. p.
+Haben oder Nicht Haben." (Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum TheÃ¦t. p.
 176.)
 
-Steinhart (in his Einleit. zum Theæt. p. 94) contests this opinion
+Steinhart (in his Einleit. zum TheÃ¦t. p. 94) contests this opinion
 of Schleiermacher (though he seems to give the same opinion
 himself, p. 92). He thinks that Plato does not recognise so very
 marked a separation between Knowledge and Opinion: that he
 considers Knowledge as the last term of a series of mental
 processes, developed gradually according to constant laws, and
 ascending from Sensible Perception through Opinion to Knowledge:
-that the purpose of the Theætêtus is to illustrate this theory.
+that the purpose of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus is to illustrate this theory.
 
 Ueberweg, on the contrary, defends the opinion of Schleiermacher
 and maintains that Steinhart is mistaken (Aechtheit und Zeit.
@@ -10879,21 +10848,21 @@ Platon. Schriften, p. 279).
 
 Passages may be produced from Plato's writings to support both
 these views: that of Schleiermacher, as well as that of Steinhart.
-In Timæus, p. 51 E, the like infallibility is postulated for
-[Greek: Nou=s] (which there represents [Greek: E)pistê/mê]) as
+In TimÃ¦us, p. 51 E, the like infallibility is postulated for
+[Greek: Nou=s] (which there represents [Greek: E)pistÃª/mÃª]) as
 contrasted with [Greek: do/xa]. But I think that Steinhart
-ascribes to the Theætêtus more than can fairly be discovered in
+ascribes to the TheÃ¦tÃªtus more than can fairly be discovered in
 it. That dialogue is purely negative. It declares that [Greek:
-e)pistê/mê] is _not_ [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]. It then attempts to go
+e)pistÃª/mÃª] is _not_ [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis]. It then attempts to go
 a step farther towards the affirmative, by declaring also that
-[Greek: e)pistê/mê] is a mental process of computation, respecting
-the impressions of [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]--that it is [Greek: to\
+[Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª] is a mental process of computation, respecting
+the impressions of [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis]--that it is [Greek: to\
 sullogi/zesthai], which is equivalent to [Greek: to\ doxa/zein]:
-compare Phædrus, 249 B. But this affirmative attempt breaks down:
+compare PhÃ¦drus, 249 B. But this affirmative attempt breaks down:
 for Sokrates cannot explain what [Greek: to\ doxa/zein] is, nor
-how [Greek: to\ doxa/zein pseudê=] is possible; in fact he says
+how [Greek: to\ doxa/zein pseudÃª=] is possible; in fact he says
 (p. 200 B) that this cannot be explained until we know what
-[Greek: e)pistê/mê] is. The entire result of the dialogue is
+[Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª] is. The entire result of the dialogue is
 negative, as the closing words proclaim emphatically. On this
 point many of the commentators agree--Ast, Socher, Stallbaum,
 Ueberweg, Zeller, &c.
@@ -10943,18 +10912,18 @@ harmony with it. Plato certainly would not have surrendered any
 [Greek: sullogismo\s] under the same respect to observed facts.
 Aristotle might probably have done so; but this is uncertain.]
 
-[Side-note: Second definition given by Theætêtus--That Cognition
+[Side-note: Second definition given by TheÃ¦tÃªtus--That Cognition
 consists in right or true opinion.]
 
 We have thus, in enquiring--What is Knowledge or Cognition?
 advanced so far as to discover--That it does not consist in
 sensible perception, but in some variety of that purely mental
 process which is called opining, believing, judging, conceiving,
-&c. And here Theætêtus, being called upon for a second definition,
+&c. And here TheÃ¦tÃªtus, being called upon for a second definition,
 answers--_That Knowledge consists in right or true opinion_. All
 opinion is not knowledge, because opinion is often false.[104]
 
-[Footnote 104: Plato, Theæt. p. 187 B. It is scarcely possible to
+[Footnote 104: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 187 B. It is scarcely possible to
 translate [Greek: doxa/zein] always by the same English word.]
 
 [Side-note: Objection by Sokrates--This definition assumes that
@@ -10975,9 +10944,9 @@ known: or one unknown for another unknown. But to form a false
 opinion, he must err in one or other of these four ways. It is
 therefore impossible that he can form a false opinion.[106]
 
-[Footnote 105: Plato, Theæt. p. 187 C.]
+[Footnote 105: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 187 C.]
 
-[Footnote 106: Plato, Theæt. p. 188.]
+[Footnote 106: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 188.]
 
 If indeed a man ascribed to any subject a predicate which was
 non-existent, this would be evidently a false opinion. But how
@@ -10986,7 +10955,7 @@ _something_: just as he who sees or touches, must see or touch
 _something_. He cannot see or touch the non-existent: for that
 would be to see or touch nothing: in other words, not to see or
 touch at all. In the same manner, to conceive the non-existent, or
-_nothing_, is impossible.[107] _Theæt._--Perhaps he conceives two
+_nothing_, is impossible.[107] _TheÃ¦t._--Perhaps he conceives two
 realities, but confounds them together, mistaking the one for the
 other. _Sokr._--Impossible. If he conceives two distinct
 realities, he cannot suppose the one to be the other. Suppose him
@@ -10996,9 +10965,9 @@ again, he conceives one of the two alone and singly, neither could
 he on that hypothesis suppose it to be the other: for that would
 imply that he conceived the other also.
 
-[Footnote 107: Plato, Theæt. p. 188-189.]
+[Footnote 107: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 188-189.]
 
-[Footnote 108: Plato, Theæt. p. 190.]
+[Footnote 108: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 190.]
 
 [Side-note: Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past
 impressions are engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly
@@ -11010,7 +10979,7 @@ man to conceive, that a thing, which he knows, is another thing
 which he does not know? Let us see. Grant me the hypothesis (for
 the sake of illustration), that each man has in his mind a waxen
 tablet--the wax of one tablet being larger, firmer, cleaner, and
-better in every way, than that of another: the gift of Mnemosynê,
+better in every way, than that of another: the gift of MnemosynÃª,
 for inscribing and registering our sensible perceptions and
 thoughts. Every man remembers and knows these, so long as the
 impressions of them remain upon his tablet: as soon as they are
@@ -11021,18 +10990,18 @@ has seen before, may come to see one of these objects again; but
 he may by mistake identify the present sensation with the wrong
 past impression, or with that past impression to which it does not
 belong. Thus on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it with the
-past impression B, instead of A: or _vice versâ_.[110] False
+past impression B, instead of A: or _vice versÃ¢_.[110] False
 opinion will thus lie, not in the conjunction or identification of
 sensations with sensations--nor of thoughts (or past impressions)
 with thoughts--but in that of present sensations with past
 impressions or thoughts.[111]
 
-[Footnote 109: Plato, Theæt. p. 191 C. [Greek: kê/rinon
+[Footnote 109: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 191 C. [Greek: kÃª/rinon
 e)kmogei=on].]
 
-[Footnote 110: Plato, Theæt. p. 193-194.]
+[Footnote 110: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 193-194.]
 
-[Footnote 111: Plato, Theæt. p. 195 D.]
+[Footnote 111: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 195 D.]
 
 [Side-note: Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false
 opinion is impossible, or else a man may know what he does not
@@ -11052,9 +11021,9 @@ We are thus placed in this dilemma--Either false opinion is an
 impossibility:--Or else, it is possible that what a man knows, he
 may not know. Which of the two do you choose?[112]
 
-[Footnote 112: Plato, Theæt. p. 196 C. [Greek: nu=n de\ ê)/toi
-ou)k e)/sti pseudê\s do/xa, ê)\ a(/ tis oi)=den, oi(=o/n te mê\
-ei)de/nai; kai\ tou/tôn po/tera ai(rei=?]]
+[Footnote 112: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 196 C. [Greek: nu=n de\ Ãª)/toi
+ou)k e)/sti pseudÃª\s do/xa, Ãª)\ a(/ tis oi)=den, oi(=o/n te mÃª\
+ei)de/nai; kai\ tou/tÃ´n po/tera ai(rei=?]]
 
 [Side-note: He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and
 having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught
@@ -11062,7 +11031,7 @@ pigeons turned into it and flying about.]
 
 To this question no answer is given. But Sokrates,--after
 remarking on the confused and unphilosophical manner in which the
-debate has been conducted, both he and Theætêtus having
+debate has been conducted, both he and TheÃ¦tÃªtus having
 perpetually employed the words _know_, _knowledge_, and their
 equivalents, as if the meaning of the words were ascertained,
 whereas the very problem debated is, to ascertain their
@@ -11083,14 +11052,14 @@ cognition, he may confound it with another: and this constitutes
 false opinion--the confusion of two _cognita_ one with
 another.[115]
 
-[Footnote 113: Plato, Theæt. p. 196 D.]
+[Footnote 113: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 196 D.]
 
-[Footnote 114: Plato, Theæt. p. 197-198.]
+[Footnote 114: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 197-198.]
 
-[Footnote 115: Plato, Theæt. p. 199 C. [Greek: ê( tô=n e)pistêmô=n
-metallagê/].]
+[Footnote 115: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 199 C. [Greek: Ãª( tÃ´=n e)pistÃªmÃ´=n
+metallagÃª/].]
 
-[Side-note: Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theætêtus--That
+[Side-note: Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of TheÃ¦tÃªtus--That
 there may be non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and
 that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other.
 Sokrates rejects this.]
@@ -11100,7 +11069,7 @@ replies to himself.) How can knowledge betray a man into such
 error? If he knows A, and knows B--how can he mistake A for B?
 Upon this supposition, knowledge produces the effect of ignorance:
 and we might just as reasonably imagine ignorance to produce the
-effects of knowledge.[116]--Perhaps (suggests Theætêtus), he may
+effects of knowledge.[116]--Perhaps (suggests TheÃ¦tÃªtus), he may
 have _non-cognitions_ in his mind, mingled with the cognitions:
 and in hunting for a cognition, he may catch a non-cognition.
 Herein may lie false opinion.--That can hardly be (replies
@@ -11108,20 +11077,20 @@ Sokrates). If the man catches what is really a non-cognition, he
 will not suppose it to be such, but to be a cognition. He will
 believe himself fully to _know_, that in which he is mistaken. But
 how is it possible that he should confound a non-cognition with a
-cognition, or _vice versâ_? Does not he know the one from the
+cognition, or _vice versÃ¢_? Does not he know the one from the
 other? We must then require him to have a separate cognition of
 his own cognitions or non-cognitions--and so on _ad
 infinitum_.[117] The hypothesis cannot be admitted.
 
-[Footnote 116: Plato, Theæt. p. 199 E.]
+[Footnote 116: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 199 E.]
 
-[Footnote 117: Plato, Theæt. p. 200 B.]
+[Footnote 117: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 200 B.]
 
 We cannot find out (continues Sokrates) what false opinion is: and
 we have plainly done wrong to search for it, until we have first
 ascertained what knowledge is.[118]
 
-[Footnote 118: Plato, Theæt. p. 200 C.]
+[Footnote 118: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 200 C.]
 
 [Side-note: He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is
 not the same as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true
@@ -11144,19 +11113,19 @@ cognition.[120] Accordingly, they have acquired true and right
 opinions; yet without acquiring knowledge. Therefore the two are
 not the same.[121]
 
-[Footnote 119: Plato, Theæt. p. 201 A. [Greek: ou(=toi ga/r pou
-tê=| e(autô=n te/chnê| pei/thousin, ou) dida/skontes, a)lla\
-doxa/zein poiou=ntes a(\ a)\n bou/lôntai.]]
+[Footnote 119: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 201 A. [Greek: ou(=toi ga/r pou
+tÃª=| e(autÃ´=n te/chnÃª| pei/thousin, ou) dida/skontes, a)lla\
+doxa/zein poiou=ntes a(\ a)\n bou/lÃ´ntai.]]
 
-[Footnote 120: Plato, Theæt. p. 201 B-C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o(/tan
-dikai/ôs peisthô=si dikastai\ peri\ _ô(=n i)do/nti mo/non e)/stin
-ei)de/nai, a)/llôs de\ mê/_, tau=ta to/te _e)x a)koê=s
-kri/nontes_, a)lêthê= do/xan labo/ntes, a)/neu e)pistê/mês
+[Footnote 120: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 201 B-C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o(/tan
+dikai/Ã´s peisthÃ´=si dikastai\ peri\ _Ã´(=n i)do/nti mo/non e)/stin
+ei)de/nai, a)/llÃ´s de\ mÃª/_, tau=ta to/te _e)x a)koÃª=s
+kri/nontes_, a)lÃªthÃª= do/xan labo/ntes, a)/neu e)pistÃª/mÃªs
 e)/krinan, o)rtha\ peisthe/ntes, ei)/per eu)= e)di/kasan?]]
 
 [Footnote 121: The distinction between persuading and
 teaching--between creating opinion and imparting knowledge--has been
-brought to view in the Gorgias, and is noted also in the Timæus. As
+brought to view in the Gorgias, and is noted also in the TimÃ¦us. As
 it stands here, it deserves notice, because Plato not only professes
 to affirm what _knowledge_ is, but also identifies it with
 sensible perception. The Dikasts (according to Sokrates) would
@@ -11168,7 +11137,7 @@ Hearing the case only by the narration of speakers, they can
 acquire nothing more than a _true opinion_. Hence we learn wherein
 consists the difference between the two. That which I see, hear,
 or apprehend by any sensible perception, I _know_: compare a
-passage in Sophistes, p. 267 A-B, where [Greek: to\ gignô/skein]
+passage in Sophistes, p. 267 A-B, where [Greek: to\ gignÃ´/skein]
 is explained in the same way. But that which I learn from the
 testimony of others amounts to nothing more than opinion; and at
 best to a true opinion.
@@ -11185,29 +11154,29 @@ man who, never having been there, opines correctly which the road
 is. And in the Sophistes (p. 263) when Plato is illustrating the
 doctrine that false propositions, as well as true propositions,
 are possible, and really occur, he selects as his cases, [Greek:
-Theai/têtos ka/thêtai, Theai/têtos pe/tetai]. That one of these
+Theai/tÃªtos ka/thÃªtai, Theai/tÃªtos pe/tetai]. That one of these
 propositions is false and the other true, can be known only by
-[Greek: ai)/sthêsis]--in the sense of that word commonly
+[Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis]--in the sense of that word commonly
 understood.]
 
-[Side-note: New answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is true opinion,
+[Side-note: New answer of TheÃ¦tÃªtus--Cognition is true opinion,
 coupled with rational explanation.]
 
-Theætêtus now recollects another definition of knowledge, learnt
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus now recollects another definition of knowledge, learnt
 from some one whose name he forgets. Knowledge is (he says) true
 opinion, coupled with rational explanation. True opinion without
 such rational explanation, is not knowledge. Those things which do
 not admit of rational explanation, are not knowable.[122]
 
-[Footnote 122: Plato, Theætêt. p. 201 D. [Greek: tê\n me\n meta\
-lo/gou a)lêthê= do/xan e)pistê/mên ei)=nai; tê\n de\ a)/logon,
-e)kto\s e)pistê/mês; kai\ ô(=n me\n mê/ e)sti lo/gos, ou)k
-e)pistêta\ ei)=nai, _ou(tôsi\ kai\ o)noma/zôn_, a)\ d' e)/chei,
-e)pistêta/.]
+[Footnote 122: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 201 D. [Greek: tÃª\n me\n meta\
+lo/gou a)lÃªthÃª= do/xan e)pistÃª/mÃªn ei)=nai; tÃª\n de\ a)/logon,
+e)kto\s e)pistÃª/mÃªs; kai\ Ã´(=n me\n mÃª/ e)sti lo/gos, ou)k
+e)pistÃªta\ ei)=nai, _ou(tÃ´si\ kai\ o)noma/zÃ´n_, a)\ d' e)/chei,
+e)pistÃªta/.]
 
-The words [Greek: ou(tôsi\ kai\ o)noma/zôn] are intended,
+The words [Greek: ou(tÃ´si\ kai\ o)noma/zÃ´n] are intended,
 according to Heindorf and Schleiermacher, to justify the use of
-the word [Greek: e)pistêta/], which was then a neologism. Both
+the word [Greek: e)pistÃªta/], which was then a neologism. Both
 this definition, and the elucidation of it which Sokrates proceeds
 to furnish, are announced as borrowed from other persons not
 named.]
@@ -11235,18 +11204,18 @@ then you do not know them. You can only be said to know them, when
 besides conceiving them correctly, you can also specify their
 component elements[124]--or give explanation.
 
-[Footnote 123: Plato, Theæt. pp. 201 E--202 A. [Greek: au)to\ ga\r
-kath' au(to\ e(/kaston o)noma/sai mo/non ei)/ê, proseipei=n de\
-ou)de\n a)/llo dunato/n, ou)/th' ô(s e)/stin, ou)/th' ô(s ou)k
-e)/stin' ê)/dê ga\r a)\n ou)si/an ê)\ mê\ ou)si/an au)tô=|
+[Footnote 123: Plato, TheÃ¦t. pp. 201 E--202 A. [Greek: au)to\ ga\r
+kath' au(to\ e(/kaston o)noma/sai mo/non ei)/Ãª, proseipei=n de\
+ou)de\n a)/llo dunato/n, ou)/th' Ã´(s e)/stin, ou)/th' Ã´(s ou)k
+e)/stin' Ãª)/dÃª ga\r a)\n ou)si/an Ãª)\ mÃª\ ou)si/an au)tÃ´=|
 prosti/thesthai, dei=n de\ ou)de\n prosphe/rein, ei)/per au)to\
 e)kei=no mo/non tis e)rei=; e)pei\ ou)de\ to\ _au)to/_, ou)de/ to\
 _e)kei=no_, ou)de\ to _e(/kaston_, ou)de\ to _mo/non_, ou)de\ to\
 _tou=to_, prosoiste/on, ou)d' a)/lla polla\ toiau=ta; tau=ta me\n
 ga\r peritre/chonta pa=si prosphe/resthai, e(/tera o)/nta
-e(kei/nôn oi(=s prosti/thetai.] Also p. 205 C.]
+e(kei/nÃ´n oi(=s prosti/thetai.] Also p. 205 C.]
 
-[Footnote 124: Plato, Theæt. p. 202.]
+[Footnote 124: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 202.]
 
 [Side-note: Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are
 unknowable, the compound must be unknowable also.]
@@ -11268,13 +11237,13 @@ unknowable for the same reason as the elements are so: it can only
 be named by its own substantive name, but nothing can be
 predicated respecting it.[125]
 
-[Footnote 125: Plato, Theæt. pp. 203-206.]
+[Footnote 125: Plato, TheÃ¦t. pp. 203-206.]
 
 Nor can it indeed be admitted as true--That the elements are
 unknowable, and the compound alone knowable. On the contrary, the
 elements are more knowable than the compound.[126]
 
-[Footnote 126: Plato, Theæt. p. 206.]
+[Footnote 126: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 206.]
 
 [Side-note: Rational explanation may have one of three different
 meanings. 1. Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration
@@ -11298,16 +11267,16 @@ or rational explanation. But neither in this sense will the
 proposition hold--That knowledge is right opinion coupled with
 rational explanation. For suppose that a man can enumerate, spell,
 and write correctly, all the syllables of the name
-_Theætêtus_--which would fulfil the conditions of this definition:
+_TheÃ¦tÃªtus_--which would fulfil the conditions of this definition:
 yet, if he mistakes and spells wrongly in any other name, such as
-_Theodôrus_, you will not give him credit for knowledge. You will
-say that he writes _Theætêtus_ correctly, by virtue of right
+_TheodÃ´rus_, you will not give him credit for knowledge. You will
+say that he writes _TheÃ¦tÃªtus_ correctly, by virtue of right
 opinion simply. It is therefore possible to have right opinion
 coupled with rational explanation, in this second sense also,--yet
 without possessing knowledge.[127]
 
-[Footnote 127: Plato, Theæt. p. 207-208 B. [Greek: e)/stin a)/ra
-meta\ lo/gou o)rthê\ do/xa, ê(\n ou)/pô dei= _e)pistê/mên_
+[Footnote 127: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 207-208 B. [Greek: e)/stin a)/ra
+meta\ lo/gou o)rthÃª\ do/xa, Ãª(\n ou)/pÃ´ dei= _e)pistÃª/mÃªn_
 kalei=n.]]
 
 [Side-note: Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing
@@ -11328,7 +11297,7 @@ plausible at first sight (says Sokrates), it will not bear close
 scrutiny. For in order to have a true opinion about any thing, I
 must have in my mind not only what it possesses in common with
 other things, but what it possesses peculiar to itself also. Thus
-if I have a true opinion about Theætêtus, I must have in my mind
+if I have a true opinion about TheÃ¦tÃªtus, I must have in my mind
 not only the attributes which belong to him in common with other
 men, but also those which belong to him specially and exclusively.
 Rational explanation ([Greek: lo/gos]) in this sense is already
@@ -11336,11 +11305,11 @@ comprehended in true opinion, and is an essential ingredient in
 it--not any new element superadded. It will not serve therefore as
 a distinction between true opinion and knowledge.[129]
 
-[Footnote 128: Plato, Theætêt. p. 208 C. [Greek: O(/per a)\n oi(
-polloi\ ei)/poien, to\ e)/chein ti sêmei=on ei)pei=n ô(=| tô=n
-a(pa/ntôn diaphe/rei to\ e)rôtêthe/n.]]
+[Footnote 128: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 208 C. [Greek: O(/per a)\n oi(
+polloi\ ei)/poien, to\ e)/chein ti sÃªmei=on ei)pei=n Ã´(=| tÃ´=n
+a(pa/ntÃ´n diaphe/rei to\ e)rÃ´tÃªthe/n.]]
 
-[Footnote 129: Plato, Theætêt. p. 209.]
+[Footnote 129: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 209.]
 
 [Side-note: Conclusion of the dialogue--Summing up by
 Sokrates--Value of the result, although purely negative.]
@@ -11349,9 +11318,9 @@ Such is the result (continues Sokrates) of our researches
 concerning knowledge. We have found that it is neither sensible
 perception--nor true opinion--nor true opinion along with rational
 explanation. But what it is, we have not found. Are we still
-pregnant with any other answer, Theætêtus, or have we brought
+pregnant with any other answer, TheÃ¦tÃªtus, or have we brought
 forth all that is to come?--_I_ have brought forth (replies
-Theætêtus) more than I had within me, through your furtherance.
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus) more than I had within me, through your furtherance.
 Well (rejoins Sokrates)--and my obstetric science has pronounced
 all your offspring to be mere wind, unworthy of being
 preserved![130] If hereafter you should again become pregnant,
@@ -11361,14 +11330,14 @@ barren, you will be more amiable and less vexatious to your
 companions--by having a just estimate of yourself and by not
 believing yourself to know what you really do not know.[131]
 
-[Footnote 130: Plato, Theætêt. p. 210 B. [Greek: ou)kou=n tau=ta
-me\n a(/panta ê( maieutikê\ ê(mi=n te/chnê a)nemiai=a/ phêsi
-gegenê=sthai kai\ ou)k a)/xia trophê=s?]]
+[Footnote 130: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 210 B. [Greek: ou)kou=n tau=ta
+me\n a(/panta Ãª( maieutikÃª\ Ãª(mi=n te/chnÃª a)nemiai=a/ phÃªsi
+gegenÃª=sthai kai\ ou)k a)/xia trophÃª=s?]]
 
-[Footnote 131: Plato, Theæt. p. 210 C. [Greek: e)a/n te gi/gnê|
-(e)gku/môn), beltio/nôn e)/sei plê/rês dia\ tê\n nu=n e)xe/tasin;
-e)a/n te keno\s ê)=s, ê(=tton e)/sei baru\s toi=s sunou=si kai\
-ê(merô/teros, sôphro/nôs ou)k oi)o/menos ei)de/nai a(\ mê\
+[Footnote 131: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 210 C. [Greek: e)a/n te gi/gnÃª|
+(e)gku/mÃ´n), beltio/nÃ´n e)/sei plÃª/rÃªs dia\ tÃª\n nu=n e)xe/tasin;
+e)a/n te keno\s Ãª)=s, Ãª(=tton e)/sei baru\s toi=s sunou=si kai\
+Ãª(merÃ´/teros, sÃ´phro/nÃ´s ou)k oi)o/menos ei)de/nai a(\ mÃª\
 oi)=stha.]
 
 Compare also an earlier passage in the dialogue, p. 187 B.]
@@ -11380,7 +11349,7 @@ persuasion of knowledge removed. Importance of such removal.]
 
 The concluding observations of this elaborate dialogue deserve
 particular attention as illustrating Plato's point of view, at the
-time when he composed the Theætêtus. After a long debate, set
+time when he composed the TheÃ¦tÃªtus. After a long debate, set
 forth with all the charm of Plato's style, no result is attained.
 Three different explanations of knowledge have been rejected as
 untenable.[132] No other can be found; nor is any suggestion
@@ -11388,7 +11357,7 @@ offered, showing in what quarter we are to look for the true one.
 What then is the purpose or value of the dialogue? Many persons
 would pronounce it to be a mere piece of useless ingenuity and
 elegance: but such is not the opinion of Plato himself. Sufficient
-gain (in his view) will have been ensured, if Theætêtus has
+gain (in his view) will have been ensured, if TheÃ¦tÃªtus has
 acquired a greater power of testing any fresh explanation which he
 may attempt of this difficult subject: or even if he should
 attempt none such, by his being disabused, at all events, of the
@@ -11423,19 +11392,19 @@ perception.]
 [Footnote 133: See the emphatic passage, p. 195 B-C.]
 
 [Side-note: Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's
-minds, value of the Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing
+minds, value of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing
 his own suggestions.]
 
 To form in men's minds this testing or verifying power, is one
 main purpose in Plato's dialogues of Search--and in some of them
 the predominant purpose; as he himself announces it to be in the
-Theætêtus. I have already made the same remark before, and I
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus. I have already made the same remark before, and I
 repeat it here; since it is absolutely necessary for appreciating
 these dialogues of Search in their true bearing and value. To one
 who does not take account of the negative arm of philosophy, as an
 auxiliary without which the positive arm will strike at
 random--half of the Platonic dialogues will teach nothing, and will
-even appear as enigmas--the Theætêtus among the foremost. Plato excites
+even appear as enigmas--the TheÃ¦tÃªtus among the foremost. Plato excites
 and strengthens the interior mental wakefulness of the hearer, to
 judge respecting all affirmative theories, whether coming from
 himself or from others. This purpose is well served by the manner
@@ -11447,13 +11416,13 @@ makes the theory look well from a distance: we must inspect
 closely, and make sure that there are no counter-arguments in the
 background.[134] The way in which Sokrates pulls to pieces his own
 theories, is farther instructive, as it illustrates the
-exhortation previously addressed by him to Theætêtus--not to take
+exhortation previously addressed by him to TheÃ¦tÃªtus--not to take
 offence when his answers were canvassed and shown to be
 inadmissible.[135]
 
-[Footnote 134: Plato, Theætêt. p. 208 E.]
+[Footnote 134: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 208 E.]
 
-[Footnote 135: Plato, Theætêt. p. 151 C.]
+[Footnote 135: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 151 C.]
 
 [Side-note: Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The
 Rhetor is enslaved to the opinions of auditors.]
@@ -11481,13 +11450,13 @@ their minds. They become careless of true and sound
 reasoning--slaves to the sentiment of those whom they address--and
 adepts in crooked artifice which they take for wisdom.[137]
 
-[Footnote 136: Plato, Theæt. p. 155. [Greek: ô(s pa/nu pollê\n
-scholê\n a)/gontes, pa/lin e)panaskepso/metha], &c.; also p. 172.]
+[Footnote 136: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 155. [Greek: Ã´(s pa/nu pollÃª\n
+scholÃª\n a)/gontes, pa/lin e)panaskepso/metha], &c.; also p. 172.]
 
-[Footnote 137: Plato, Theætêt. p. 172-173.
+[Footnote 137: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 172-173.
 
 I give only an abstract of this eloquent passage, not an exact
-translation. Steinhart (Einleitung zum Theætêt. p. 37) calls it "a
+translation. Steinhart (Einleitung zum TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 37) calls it "a
 sublime Hymn" (einen erhabenen Hymnus). It is a fine piece of
 poetry or rhetoric, and shows that Plato was by nature quite as
 rhetorical as the rhetors whom he depreciates--though he had also,
@@ -11524,11 +11493,11 @@ philosopher is noway ashamed of his incompetence for slavish
 pursuits, while he is passing a life of freedom and leisure among
 his own dialectics.[140]
 
-[Footnote 138: Plato, Theæt. pp. 175-176.]
+[Footnote 138: Plato, TheÃ¦t. pp. 175-176.]
 
-[Footnote 139: Plato, Theæt. p. 177 B.]
+[Footnote 139: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 177 B.]
 
-[Footnote 140: Plato, Theæt. p. 175 E.]
+[Footnote 140: Plato, TheÃ¦t. p. 175 E.]
 
 [Side-note: Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of
 philosophical Search.]
@@ -11563,24 +11532,24 @@ aids Plato's negative dialogues are well calculated to afford: and
 when we thus look at his purpose, we shall see clearly that it did
 not require the presentation of any positive result.
 
-[Footnote 141: Plato, Sophistês, p. 253 C: [Greek: ê( tô=n
-e)leuthe/rôn e)pistê/mê].]
+[Footnote 141: Plato, SophistÃªs, p. 253 C: [Greek: Ãª( tÃ´=n
+e)leuthe/rÃ´n e)pistÃª/mÃª].]
 
-[Side-note: Difficulties of the Theætêtus are not solved in any
+[Side-note: Difficulties of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus are not solved in any
 other Dialogue.]
 
-The course of this dialogue--the Theætêtus--has been already
+The course of this dialogue--the TheÃ¦tÃªtus--has been already
 described as an assemblage of successive perplexities without any
 solution. But what deserves farther notice is--That the
 perplexities, as they are not solved in this dialogue, so they are
 not solved in any other dialogue. The view taken by Schleiermacher
 and other critics--that Plato lays out the difficulties in one
 anterior dialogue, in order to furnish the solution in another
-posterior--is not borne out by the facts. In the Theætêtus, many
+posterior--is not borne out by the facts. In the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, many
 objections are propounded against the doctrine, That Opinion is
 sometimes true, sometimes false. Sokrates shows that false opinion
 is an impossibility: either therefore all opinions are true, or no
-opinion is either true or false. If we turn to the Sophistês, we
+opinion is either true or false. If we turn to the SophistÃªs, we
 shall find this same question discussed by the Eleatic Stranger
 who conducts the debate. He there treats the doctrine--That false
 opinion is an impossibility and that no opinion could be false--as
@@ -11593,72 +11562,72 @@ I shall examine elsewhere), he arrives at the conclusion--That
 Non-Ens exists in a certain fashion, as well as Ens: That false
 opinions are possible: That there may be false opinions as well as
 true. But what deserves most notice here, in illustration of
-Plato's manner, is--that though the Sophistês[142] is announced as
-a continuation of the Theætêtus (carried on by the same speakers,
+Plato's manner, is--that though the SophistÃªs[142] is announced as
+a continuation of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus (carried on by the same speakers,
 with the addition of the Eleate), yet the objections taken by
-Sokrates in the Theætêtus against the possibility of false
-opinion, are not even noticed in the Sophistês--much less removed.
+Sokrates in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus against the possibility of false
+opinion, are not even noticed in the SophistÃªs--much less removed.
 Other objections to it are propounded and dealt with: but not
 those objections which had arrested the march of Sokrates in the
-Theætêtus.[143] Sokrates and Theætêtus hear the Eleatic Stranger
-discussing this same matter in the Sophistês, yet neither of them
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus.[143] Sokrates and TheÃ¦tÃªtus hear the Eleatic Stranger
+discussing this same matter in the SophistÃªs, yet neither of them
 allude to those objections against his conclusion which had
 appeared to both of them irresistible in the preceding dialogue
-known as Theætêtus. Nor are the objections refuted in any other of
+known as TheÃ¦tÃªtus. Nor are the objections refuted in any other of
 the Platonic dialogues.
 
-[Footnote 142: See the end of the Theætêtus and the opening of the
-Sophistês. Note, moreover, that the Politikus makes reference not
-only to the Sophistês, but also to the Theætêtus (pp. 258 A, 266
+[Footnote 142: See the end of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus and the opening of the
+SophistÃªs. Note, moreover, that the Politikus makes reference not
+only to the SophistÃªs, but also to the TheÃ¦tÃªtus (pp. 258 A, 266
 D, 284 B, 286 B).]
 
-[Footnote 143: In the Sophistês, the Eleate establishes (to his
-own satisfaction) that [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n] is not [Greek:
+[Footnote 143: In the SophistÃªs, the Eleate establishes (to his
+own satisfaction) that [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)\n] is not [Greek:
 e)nanti/on tou= o)/ntos], but [Greek: e(/teron tou= o)/ntos] (p.
 257 B), that it is one [Greek: ge/nos] among the various [Greek:
-ge/nê] (p. 260 B), and that it ([Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n koinônei=])
+ge/nÃª] (p. 260 B), and that it ([Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)\n koinÃ´nei=])
 enters into communion or combination with [Greek: do/xa, lo/gos,
 phantasi/a], &c. It is therefore possible that there may be
-[Greek: pseudê\s do/xa] or [Greek: pseudê\s lo/gos], when you
-affirm, respecting any given subject, [Greek: e(/tera tô=n
-o)/ntôn] or [Greek: ta\ mê\ o)/nta ô(s o)/nta] (p. 263 B-C). Plato
+[Greek: pseudÃª\s do/xa] or [Greek: pseudÃª\s lo/gos], when you
+affirm, respecting any given subject, [Greek: e(/tera tÃ´=n
+o)/ntÃ´n] or [Greek: ta\ mÃª\ o)/nta Ã´(s o)/nta] (p. 263 B-C). Plato
 considers that the case is thus made out against the Sophist, as
 the impostor and dealer in falsehoods; false opinion being proved
 to be possible and explicable.
 
-But if we turn to the Theætêtus (p. 189 seq.), we shall see that
-this very explication of [Greek: pseudê\s do/xa] is there
+But if we turn to the TheÃ¦tÃªtus (p. 189 seq.), we shall see that
+this very explication of [Greek: pseudÃª\s do/xa] is there
 enunciated and impugned by Sokrates in a long argument. He calls
 it there [Greek: a)llodoxi/a, e(terodoxi/a, to\ e(terodoxei=n]
 (pp. 189 A, 190 E, 193 D). No man (he says) can mistake one thing
 for another; if this were so, he must be supposed both to know and
 not to know the same thing, which is impossible (pp. 196 A, 200
-A). Therefore [Greek: pseudê\s do/xa] is impossible.
+A). Therefore [Greek: pseudÃª\s do/xa] is impossible.
 
-Of these objections, urged by Sokrates in the Theætêtus, against
+Of these objections, urged by Sokrates in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, against
 the possibility of [Greek: a)llodoxi/a], no notice is taken in the
-Sophistês either by Sokrates, or by Theætêtus, or by the Eleate in
-the Sophistês. Indeed the Eleate congratulates himself upon the
+SophistÃªs either by Sokrates, or by TheÃ¦tÃªtus, or by the Eleate in
+the SophistÃªs. Indeed the Eleate congratulates himself upon the
 explanation as more satisfactory than he had expected to find (p.
 264 B): and speaks with displeasure of the troublesome persons who
 stir up doubts and contradictions (p. 259 C): very different from
-the tone of Sokrates in the Theætêtus (p. 195, B-C).
+the tone of Sokrates in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus (p. 195, B-C).
 
 I may farther remark that Plato, in the Republic, reasons about
-[Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n] in the Parmenidean sense, and not in the
-sense which he ascribed to it in the Sophistês, and which he
+[Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)\n] in the Parmenidean sense, and not in the
+sense which he ascribed to it in the SophistÃªs, and which he
 recognises in the Politikus, p. 284 B. (Republic, v. pp. 477 A,
 478 C.)
 
 Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 260-270) points out the
-discrepancy between the doctrines of the Eleate in the Sophistês,
+discrepancy between the doctrines of the Eleate in the SophistÃªs,
 and those maintained by Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues;
-inferring from thence that the Sophistês and Politikus are not
-compositions of Plato. As between the Theætêtus and the Sophistês,
+inferring from thence that the SophistÃªs and Politikus are not
+compositions of Plato. As between the TheÃ¦tÃªtus and the SophistÃªs,
 I think a stronger case of discrepancy might be set forth than he
 has stated; though the end of the former is tied to the beginning
 of the latter plainly, directly, and intentionally. But I do not
-agree in his inference. He concludes that the Sophistês is not
+agree in his inference. He concludes that the SophistÃªs is not
 Plato's composition: I conclude, that the scope for dissident
 views and doctrine, within the long philosophical career and
 numerous dialogues of Plato, is larger than his commentators
@@ -11699,7 +11668,7 @@ a strict and compulsory orthodoxy.
 statesman--between Knowledge and Opinion.]
 
 The contrast between the philosopher and the man engaged in active
-life--which is so emphatically set forth in the Theætêtus[144]--falls
+life--which is so emphatically set forth in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus[144]--falls
 in with the distinction between Knowledge and Opinion--The
 Infallible and the Fallible. It helps the purpose of the dialogue,
 to show what knowledge is _not_: and it presents the distinction
@@ -11730,7 +11699,7 @@ manifest even to the common-place citizens. But if _they_ meddle
 with his speculations, they fail not less disgracefully; though
 their failure is not appreciated by the unphilosophical spectator.
 
-[Footnote 144: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 173-176. Compare Republic, v.
+[Footnote 144: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 173-176. Compare Republic, v.
 pp. 476-477, vii. p. 517.]
 
 [Footnote 145: See above, chap. xxiv. p. 355.]
@@ -11751,31 +11720,31 @@ Non-Ens.[147]
 
 [Footnote 147: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 478-479.
 
-The Theætêtus is more in harmony (in reference to [Greek: do/xa]
-and [Greek: e)pistê/mê]) with the Republic, than with the
-Sophistês and Politikus. In the Politikus (p. 309 C) [Greek:
-a)lêthê\s do/xa meta\ bebaiô/seôs] is placed very nearly on a par
+The TheÃ¦tÃªtus is more in harmony (in reference to [Greek: do/xa]
+and [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª]) with the Republic, than with the
+SophistÃªs and Politikus. In the Politikus (p. 309 C) [Greek:
+a)lÃªthÃª\s do/xa meta\ bebaiÃ´/seÃ´s] is placed very nearly on a par
 with knowledge: in the Menon also, the difference between the two,
 though clearly declared, is softened in degree, pp. 97-98.
 
 The Alexandrine physician Herophilus attempted to draw, between
-[Greek: pro/r)r(êsis] and [Greek: pro/gnôsis], the same
+[Greek: pro/r)r(Ãªsis] and [Greek: pro/gnÃ´sis], the same
 distinction as that which Plato draws between [Greek: do/xa] and
-[Greek: e)pistê/mê]--The Fallible as contrasted with the
+[Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª]--The Fallible as contrasted with the
 Infallible. Galen shows that the distinction is untenable (Prim.
 Commentat. in Hippokratis Prorrhetica, Tom. xvi. p. 487. ed.
-Kühn).
+KÃ¼hn).
 
 Bonitz, in his Platonische Studien (pp. 41-78), has given an
-instructive analysis and discussion of the Theætêtus. I find more
+instructive analysis and discussion of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus. I find more
 to concur with in his views, than in those of Schleiermacher or
 Steinhart. He disputes altogether the assumption of other Platonic
 critics, that a purely negative result is unworthy of Plato; and
 that the negative apparatus is an artifice to recommend, and a
 veil to conceal, some great affirmative truth, which acute
 expositors can detect and enunciate plainly (Schleiermacher,
-Einleit. zum Theætêt. p. 124 seq.) Bonitz recognises the result of
-the Theætêtus as purely negative, and vindicates the worth of it
+Einleit. zum TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 124 seq.) Bonitz recognises the result of
+the TheÃ¦tÃªtus as purely negative, and vindicates the worth of it
 as such. Moreover, instead of denouncing the opinions which Plato
 combats, as if they were perverse heresies of dishonest
 pretenders, he adverts to the great difficulty of those problems
@@ -11798,45 +11767,45 @@ SOPHISTES--POLITIKUS.
 [Side-note: Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues.]
 
 These two dialogues are both of them announced by Plato as forming
-sequel to the Theætêtus. The beginning of the Sophistês fits on to
-the end of the Theætêtus: and the Politikus is even presented as a
-second part or continuation of the Sophistês.[1] In all the three,
+sequel to the TheÃ¦tÃªtus. The beginning of the SophistÃªs fits on to
+the end of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus: and the Politikus is even presented as a
+second part or continuation of the SophistÃªs.[1] In all the three,
 the same interlocutors are partially maintained. Thus Sokrates,
-Theodôrus, and Theætêtus are present in all three: and Theætêtus
+TheodÃ´rus, and TheÃ¦tÃªtus are present in all three: and TheÃ¦tÃªtus
 makes the responses, not only in the dialogue which bears his
-name, but also in the Sophistês. Both in the Sophistês and
+name, but also in the SophistÃªs. Both in the SophistÃªs and
 Politikus, however, Sokrates himself descends from the part of
 principal speaker to that of listener: it is he, indeed, who by
 his question elicits the exposition, but he makes no comment
 either during the progress of it or at the close. In both the
 dialogues, the leading and expository function is confided to a
-new personage introduced by Theodôrus:--a stranger not named, but
+new personage introduced by TheodÃ´rus:--a stranger not named, but
 announced as coming from Elea--the friend and companion of
 Parmenides and Zeno. Perhaps (remarks Sokrates) your friend may,
 without your knowledge, be a God under human shape; as Homer tells
 us that the Gods often go about, in the company of virtuous men,
 to inspect the good and bad behaviour of mankind. Perhaps your
 friend may be a sort of cross-examining God, coming to test and
-expose our feebleness in argument. No (replies Theodôrus) that is
+expose our feebleness in argument. No (replies TheodÃ´rus) that is
 not his character. He is less given to dispute than his
 companions. He is far from being a God, but he is a divine man:
 for I call all true philosophers divine.[2]
 
 [Footnote 1: At the beginning of the Politikus, Plato makes
-Sokrates refer both to the Theætêtus and to the Sophistês (p. 258
+Sokrates refer both to the TheÃ¦tÃªtus and to the SophistÃªs (p. 258
 A). In more than one passage of the Politikus (pp. 266 D, 284 B,
-286 B), he even refers to the Sophistês directly and by name,
+286 B), he even refers to the SophistÃªs directly and by name,
 noticing certain points touched in it--a thing very unusual with
-him. In the Sophistês also (p. 233 B), express reference is made
-to a passage in the Theætêtus.
+him. In the SophistÃªs also (p. 233 B), express reference is made
+to a passage in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus.
 
-See also the allusion in Sophistês (to the appearance of the
+See also the allusion in SophistÃªs (to the appearance of the
 younger Sokrates as respondent), p. 218 B.
 
 Socher (in his work, Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 258-294)
-maintains that neither the Sophistês, nor the Politikus, nor the
-Parmenidês, are genuine works of Plato. He conceives the two
-dialogues to be contemporary with the Theætêtus (which he holds to
+maintains that neither the SophistÃªs, nor the Politikus, nor the
+ParmenidÃªs, are genuine works of Plato. He conceives the two
+dialogues to be contemporary with the TheÃ¦tÃªtus (which he holds to
 have been written by Plato), but to have been composed by some
 acute philosopher of the Megaric school, conversant with the
 teachings of Sokrates and with the views of Plato, after the visit
@@ -11847,13 +11816,13 @@ Even if we grant the exclusion of Plato's authorship, the
 hypothesis of an author belonging to the Megaric school is highly
 improbable: the rather, since many critics suppose (I think
 erroneously) that the Megarici are among those attacked in the
-dialogue. The suspicion that Plato is not the author of Sophistês
+dialogue. The suspicion that Plato is not the author of SophistÃªs
 and Politikus has undoubtedly more appearance of reason than the
 same suspicion as applied to other dialogues--though I think the
 reasons altogether insufficient. Socher observes, justly: 1. That
 the two dialogues are peculiar, distinguished from other Platonic
 dialogues by the profusion of logical classification, in practice
-as well as in theory. 2. That both, and especially the Sophistês,
+as well as in theory. 2. That both, and especially the SophistÃªs,
 advance propositions and conclusions discrepant from what we read
 in other Platonic dialogues.--But these two reasons are not
 sufficient to make me disallow them. I do not agree with those who
@@ -11861,12 +11830,12 @@ require so much uniformity, either of matter or of manner, in the
 numerous distinct dialogues of Plato. I recognise a much wider
 area of admissible divergence.
 
-The plain announcement contained in the Theætêtus, Sophistês, and
+The plain announcement contained in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, SophistÃªs, and
 Politikus themselves, that the two last are intended as sequel to
 the first, is in my mind a proof of sameness of authorship, not
 counterbalanced by Socher's objections. Why should a Megaric
 author embody in his two dialogues a false pretence and assurance,
-that they are sequel of the Platonic Theætêtus? Why should so
+that they are sequel of the Platonic TheÃ¦tÃªtus? Why should so
 acute a writer (as Socher admits him to be) go out of his way to
 suppress his own personality, and merge his fame in that of Plato?
 
@@ -11877,19 +11846,19 @@ Politikus to be spurious; composed by some fraudulent author, who
 wished to give to his dialogue the false appearance of being a
 continuation of the Sophistes: he admits (p. 93) that it must be a
 deliberate deceit, if the Politikus be really the work of a
-different author from the Sophistês; for identity of authorship is
+different author from the SophistÃªs; for identity of authorship is
 distinctly affirmed in it.
 
 Suckow gives two reasons for believing that the Politikus is not
 by Plato:--1. That the doctrines respecting government are
 different from those of the Republic, and the cosmology of the
 long mythe which it includes different from the cosmology of the
-Timæus. These are reasons similar to those advanced by Socher, and
+TimÃ¦us. These are reasons similar to those advanced by Socher, and
 (in my judgment) insufficient reasons. 2. That Aristotle, in a
 passage of the Politica (iv. 2, p. 1289, b. 5), alludes to an
 opinion, which is found in the Politikus in the following terms:
-[Greek: ê)/dê me\n ou)=n tis a)pephê/nato kai\ tô=n pro/teron
-ou(/tôs], &c. Suckow maintains that Aristotle could never have
+[Greek: Ãª)/dÃª me\n ou)=n tis a)pephÃª/nato kai\ tÃ´=n pro/teron
+ou(/tÃ´s], &c. Suckow maintains that Aristotle could never have
 alluded to Plato in these terms, and that he must have believed
 the Politikus to be composed by some one else. But I think this
 inference is not justified by the premisses. It is noway
@@ -11919,21 +11888,21 @@ arguments than those of these two critics to overthrow.]
 [Footnote 2: Plato, Sophist. p. 216 B-C.]
 
 This Eleate performs the whole task of exposition, by putting
-questions to Theætêtus, in the Sophistês--to the younger Sokrates
+questions to TheÃ¦tÃªtus, in the SophistÃªs--to the younger Sokrates
 in the Politikus. Since the true Sokrates is merely listener in
 both dialogues, Plato provides for him an additional thread of
 connection with both; by remarking that the youthful Sokrates is
-his namesake, and that Theætêtus resembles him in flat nose and
+his namesake, and that TheÃ¦tÃªtus resembles him in flat nose and
 physiognomy.[3]
 
 [Footnote 3: Plato, Politik. p. 257 E.]
 
-[Side-note: Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus.]
+[Side-note: Relation of the two dialogues to the TheÃ¦tÃªtus.]
 
-Though Plato himself plainly designates the Sophistês as an
-intended sequel to the Theætêtus, yet the method of the two is
+Though Plato himself plainly designates the SophistÃªs as an
+intended sequel to the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, yet the method of the two is
 altogether different, and in a certain sense even opposite. In the
-Theætêtus, Sokrates extracts answers from the full and pregnant
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus, Sokrates extracts answers from the full and pregnant
 mind of that youthful respondent: he himself professes to teach
 nothing, but only to canvass every successive hypothesis elicited
 from his companion. But the Eleate is presented to us in the most
@@ -11943,35 +11912,35 @@ in the task of exposition which Sokrates entreats him to
 undertake. He is, from beginning to end, affirmative and
 dogmatical: and if he declines to proceed by continuous lecture,
 this is only because he is somewhat ashamed to appropriate all the
-talk to himself.[5] He therefore prefers to accept Theætêtus as
-respondent. But Theætêtus is no longer pregnant, as in the
+talk to himself.[5] He therefore prefers to accept TheÃ¦tÃªtus as
+respondent. But TheÃ¦tÃªtus is no longer pregnant, as in the
 preceding dialogue. He can do no more than give answers signifying
 assent and dissent, which merely serve to break and diversify the
-exposition. In fact, the dialogue in the Sophistês and Politikus
-is assimilated by Plato himself,[6] not to that in the Theætêtus,
+exposition. In fact, the dialogue in the SophistÃªs and Politikus
+is assimilated by Plato himself,[6] not to that in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus,
 but to that in the last half of the Parmenides; wherein
-Aristotelês the respondent answers little more than Ay or No, to
+AristotelÃªs the respondent answers little more than Ay or No, to
 leading questions from the interrogator.
 
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Sophist. p. 217 B. [Greek: e)pei\ diakêkoe/nai
-ge/ phêsin i(kanô=s kai\ ou)k a)mnêmonei=n.]]
+[Footnote 4: Plato, Sophist. p. 217 B. [Greek: e)pei\ diakÃªkoe/nai
+ge/ phÃªsin i(kanÃ´=s kai\ ou)k a)mnÃªmonei=n.]]
 
 [Footnote 5: Plato, Sophist. pp. 216-217.]
 
 [Footnote 6: Plato, Sophist. p. 217 C. The words of Sokrates show
-that he alludes to the last half of the Parmenidês, in which he is
+that he alludes to the last half of the ParmenidÃªs, in which he is
 only present as a listener--not to the first half, in which he
-takes an active part. Compare the Parmenidês, p. 137 C. In this
-last-mentioned dialogue, Sokrates (then a youth) and Aristotelês
-are the parallel of Theætêtus and the younger Sokrates in the
-Sophistês and Politikus. (See p. 135 D.)]
+takes an active part. Compare the ParmenidÃªs, p. 137 C. In this
+last-mentioned dialogue, Sokrates (then a youth) and AristotelÃªs
+are the parallel of TheÃ¦tÃªtus and the younger Sokrates in the
+SophistÃªs and Politikus. (See p. 135 D.)]
 
 [Side-note: Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer
 a lesson in logical method: the special question chosen, being
 subordinate to that purpose.]
 
 In noticing the circumlocutory character, and multiplied negative
-criticism, of the Theætêtus, without any ultimate profit realised
+criticism, of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, without any ultimate profit realised
 in the form of positive result--I remarked, that Plato appreciated
 dialogues, not merely as the road to a conclusion, but for the
 mental discipline and suggestive influence of the tentative and
@@ -12001,17 +11970,17 @@ only a secondary object.
 
 [Footnote 8: Plato, Politikus, p. 285 D.
 
-[Greek: _Xen_.--Ti/ d' au)=? nu=n ê(mi=n ê( peri\ tou= politikou=
-zê/têsis e(/neka au)tou= tou/tou probe/blêtai ma=llon ê)\ tou=
-peri\ pa/nta dialektikôte/rois gi/gnesthai?
+[Greek: _Xen_.--Ti/ d' au)=? nu=n Ãª(mi=n Ãª( peri\ tou= politikou=
+zÃª/tÃªsis e(/neka au)tou= tou/tou probe/blÃªtai ma=llon Ãª)\ tou=
+peri\ pa/nta dialektikÃ´te/rois gi/gnesthai?
 
-_Ne/os Sôkr_.--Kai\ tou=to dê=lon o(/ti tou= peri\ pa/nta.]
+_Ne/os SÃ´kr_.--Kai\ tou=to dÃª=lon o(/ti tou= peri\ pa/nta.]
 
-Again, p. 288 D. [Greek: to/ te au)= pro\s tê\n tou=
-problêthe/ntos zê/têsin, ô(s a)\n r(a=|sta kai\ ta/chista
-eu)/roimen, deu/teron a)ll' ou) prô=ton o( lo/gos a)gapa=|n
-paragge/lei, polu\ de\ ma/lista kai\ prô=ton tê\n me/thodon
-au)tê\n tima=|n, tou= kat' ei)/dê dunato\n ei)=nai diairei=n],
+Again, p. 288 D. [Greek: to/ te au)= pro\s tÃª\n tou=
+problÃªthe/ntos zÃª/tÃªsin, Ã´(s a)\n r(a=|sta kai\ ta/chista
+eu)/roimen, deu/teron a)ll' ou) prÃ´=ton o( lo/gos a)gapa=|n
+paragge/lei, polu\ de\ ma/lista kai\ prÃ´=ton tÃª\n me/thodon
+au)tÃª\n tima=|n, tou= kat' ei)/dÃª dunato\n ei)=nai diairei=n],
 &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Method of logical Definition and Division.]
@@ -12090,17 +12059,17 @@ of the function to which the name is attached.[13]
 
 [Footnote 10: Plato, Sophist. p. 218 E.]
 
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Sophist. p. 220 B. [Greek: Neustikou= mê\n
-to\ me\n ptêno\n phu=lon o(rô=men, to\ de\ e)/nudron.]
+[Footnote 11: Plato, Sophist. p. 220 B. [Greek: Neustikou= mÃª\n
+to\ me\n ptÃªno\n phu=lon o(rÃ´=men, to\ de\ e)/nudron.]
 
 It deserves notice that Plato here considers the air as a fluid in
 which birds swim.]
 
 [Footnote 12: Plato, Sophist. pp. 219-221.]
 
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Sophist. p. 221 A-B. [Greek: Nu=n a)/ra tê=s
-a)spalieutikê=s--ou) mo/non tou)/noma, a)lla\ kai\ to\n lo/gon
-peri\ au)to\ tou)/rgon, ei)lê/phamen i(kanô=s.]]
+[Footnote 13: Plato, Sophist. p. 221 A-B. [Greek: Nu=n a)/ra tÃª=s
+a)spalieutikÃª=s--ou) mo/non tou)/noma, a)lla\ kai\ to\n lo/gon
+peri\ au)to\ tou)/rgon, ei)lÃª/phamen i(kanÃ´=s.]]
 
 [Side-note: Such a lesson in logical classification was at that
 time both novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed.]
@@ -12181,15 +12150,15 @@ virtue, but really looking to his own profit.[17]
 It illustrates the sentiment of Plato's age respecting
 classification, when we see the great diversity of particulars
 which he himself, here as well as elsewhere, ranks under the
-general name [Greek: thê/ra], _hunting_--[Greek: thê/ra ga\r
-pampolu/ ti pra=gma/ e)sti, perieilêmme/non o)no/mati nu=n
+general name [Greek: thÃª/ra], _hunting_--[Greek: thÃª/ra ga\r
+pampolu/ ti pra=gma/ e)sti, perieilÃªmme/non o)no/mati nu=n
 schedo\n e(ni/] (Plato, Legg. viii. 822-823-824, and Euthyd. p.
-290 B). He includes both [Greek: stratêgikê\] and [Greek:
-phtheiristikê\] as varieties of [Greek: thêreutikê/], Sophist. p.
+290 B). He includes both [Greek: stratÃªgikÃª\] and [Greek:
+phtheiristikÃª\] as varieties of [Greek: thÃªreutikÃª/], Sophist. p.
 227 B.
 
-Compare also the interesting conversation about [Greek: thê/ra
-a)nthrô/pôn] between Sokrates and Theodotê, Xenophon, Memorab.
+Compare also the interesting conversation about [Greek: thÃª/ra
+a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n] between Sokrates and TheodotÃª, Xenophon, Memorab.
 iii. 11, 7; and between Sokrates and Kritobulus, ii. 6, 29.]
 
 [Footnote 17: Plato, Sophist. p. 223 A.]
@@ -12256,14 +12225,14 @@ is the Sophist.[22]
 [Footnote 20: Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C.
 
 [Greek: _Xe/nos_.--Tou= de\ a)ntilogikou=, to\ me\n o(/son peri\
-ta\ xumbolai=a a)mphisbêtei=tai me/n, ei)kê= de\ kai\ a)technô=s
+ta\ xumbolai=a a)mphisbÃªtei=tai me/n, ei)kÃª= de\ kai\ a)technÃ´=s
 peri\ au)to\ pra/ttetai, tau=ta _thete/on me\n ei)=dos_, e)pei/per
-au)to\ die/gnôken ô(s e(/teron o)\n o( lo/gos; a)ta\r e)pônumi/as
-ou)/th' u(po\ tô=n e)/mprosthen e)/tuchen, ou)/te nu=n u(ph'
-ê(mô=n tuchei=n a)/xion.
+au)to\ die/gnÃ´ken Ã´(s e(/teron o)\n o( lo/gos; a)ta\r e)pÃ´numi/as
+ou)/th' u(po\ tÃ´=n e)/mprosthen e)/tuchen, ou)/te nu=n u(ph'
+Ãª(mÃ´=n tuchei=n a)/xion.
 
-_Theaitêt_.--A)lêthê=; kata\ _smikra\_ ga\r li/an kai\
-_pantodapa\_ diê/|rêtai.]
+_TheaitÃªt_.--A)lÃªthÃª=; kata\ _smikra\_ ga\r li/an kai\
+_pantodapa\_ diÃª/|rÃªtai.]
 
 These words illustrate Plato's view of an [Greek: ei)=dos] or
 species. Any distinguishable attributes, however petty, and
@@ -12272,8 +12241,8 @@ if they were petty and multifarious, there was no advantage in
 bestowing a specific name.]
 
 [Footnote 21: Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C. [Greek: to\ de/ ge
-e)/ntechnon, kai\ peri\ _dikai/ôn au)tô=n_ kai\ a)di/kôn kai\
-peri\ tô=n _a)/llôn o(/lôs_ a)mphisbêtou=n, a)=r' ou)k e)ristiko\n
+e)/ntechnon, kai\ peri\ _dikai/Ã´n au)tÃ´=n_ kai\ a)di/kÃ´n kai\
+peri\ tÃ´=n _a)/llÃ´n o(/lÃ´s_ a)mphisbÃªtou=n, a)=r' ou)k e)ristiko\n
 au)= le/gein ei)thi/smetha?]]
 
 [Footnote 22: Plato, Sophist. p. 225 E.]
@@ -12303,37 +12272,37 @@ exhibit that real likeness which legitimates them as members of
 the same class--purifiers of body: the correlate of that other
 class which we now proceed to study--purifiers of mind.[23]
 
-[Footnote 23: Plato, Sophist. pp. 226-227. 227 A: [Greek: tê=|
-tô=n lo/gôn metho/dô| spoggistikê=s ê)\ pharmakoposi/as ou)de\n
-ê(=tton ou)de/ ti ma=llon tugcha/nei me/lon, ei) to\ me\n smikra/,
-to\ de\ mega/la ê(ma=s ô)phelei= kathai=ron. _Tou= ktê/sasthai
-ga\r e(/neken nou=n pasô=n technô=n to\ xuggene\s kai\ to\ mê\
-xuggene\s katanoei=n peirôme/nê, tima=| pro\s tou=to, e)x i)/sou
-pa/sas_, kai\ tha/tera tô=n e(te/rôn kata\ tê\n o(moio/têta
-ou)de\n ê(gei=tai geloio/tera, _semno/teron de/ ti to\n dia\
-stratêmikê=s ê)\ phtheiristikê=s dêlou=nta thêreutikê\n ou)de\n
-neno/miken_, a)ll' _ô(s to\ polu\ chauno/teron_. Kai\ dê\ kai\
-nu=n, o(/per ê)/rou, ti/ proserou=men o)/noma xumpa/sas duna/meis,
-o(/sai sô=ma ei)/te e)/mpsuchon ei)/te a)/psuchon ei)lê/chasi
-kathai/rein, ou)de\n au)tê=| dioi/sei, poi=on ti lechthe\n
-eu)prepe/staton ei)=nai do/xei; _mo/non e)che/tô chôri\s_ tô=n
-tê=s psuchê=s katha/rseôn pa/nta xundê=san o(/sa a)/llo ti
+[Footnote 23: Plato, Sophist. pp. 226-227. 227 A: [Greek: tÃª=|
+tÃ´=n lo/gÃ´n metho/dÃ´| spoggistikÃª=s Ãª)\ pharmakoposi/as ou)de\n
+Ãª(=tton ou)de/ ti ma=llon tugcha/nei me/lon, ei) to\ me\n smikra/,
+to\ de\ mega/la Ãª(ma=s Ã´)phelei= kathai=ron. _Tou= ktÃª/sasthai
+ga\r e(/neken nou=n pasÃ´=n technÃ´=n to\ xuggene\s kai\ to\ mÃª\
+xuggene\s katanoei=n peirÃ´me/nÃª, tima=| pro\s tou=to, e)x i)/sou
+pa/sas_, kai\ tha/tera tÃ´=n e(te/rÃ´n kata\ tÃª\n o(moio/tÃªta
+ou)de\n Ãª(gei=tai geloio/tera, _semno/teron de/ ti to\n dia\
+stratÃªmikÃª=s Ãª)\ phtheiristikÃª=s dÃªlou=nta thÃªreutikÃª\n ou)de\n
+neno/miken_, a)ll' _Ã´(s to\ polu\ chauno/teron_. Kai\ dÃª\ kai\
+nu=n, o(/per Ãª)/rou, ti/ proserou=men o)/noma xumpa/sas duna/meis,
+o(/sai sÃ´=ma ei)/te e)/mpsuchon ei)/te a)/psuchon ei)lÃª/chasi
+kathai/rein, ou)de\n au)tÃª=| dioi/sei, poi=on ti lechthe\n
+eu)prepe/staton ei)=nai do/xei; _mo/non e)che/tÃ´ chÃ´ri\s_ tÃ´=n
+tÃª=s psuchÃª=s katha/rseÃ´n pa/nta xundÃª=san o(/sa a)/llo ti
 kathai/rei.] To maintain the equal scientific position of [Greek:
-phtheiristikê/], as two different species under the genus [Greek:
-thêreutikê/], is a strong illustration.
+phtheiristikÃª/], as two different species under the genus [Greek:
+thÃªreutikÃª/], is a strong illustration.
 
 Compare also Plato, Politikus, p. 266 D.
 
-A similar admonition is addressed (in the Parmenidês, p. 130 E**) by
+A similar admonition is addressed (in the ParmenidÃªs, p. 130 E**) by
 the old Parmenides to the youthful Sokrates, when the latter
-cannot bring himself to admit that there exist [Greek: ei)=dê] or
+cannot bring himself to admit that there exist [Greek: ei)=dÃª] or
 Forms of vulgar and repulsive objects, such as [Greek: thri\x] and
-[Greek: pê=los]. [Greek: Neos ga\r ei)= e)/ti, kai\ ou)/pô sou=
-a)ntei/lêptai philosophi/a ô(s e)/ti a)ntilê/psetai kat' e)mê\n
-do/xan, o(/te ou)de\n au)tô=n a)tima/seis; nu=n d' e)/ti pro\s
-a)nthrô/pôn a)poble/peis do/xas dia\ tê\n ê(liki/an.]
+[Greek: pÃª=los]. [Greek: Neos ga\r ei)= e)/ti, kai\ ou)/pÃ´ sou=
+a)ntei/lÃªptai philosophi/a Ã´(s e)/ti a)ntilÃª/psetai kat' e)mÃª\n
+do/xan, o(/te ou)de\n au)tÃ´=n a)tima/seis; nu=n d' e)/ti pro\s
+a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n a)poble/peis do/xas dia\ tÃª\n Ãª(liki/an.]
 
-See above, ch. xxvii. p. 60, in my review of the Parmenidês.]
+See above, ch. xxvii. p. 60, in my review of the ParmenidÃªs.]
 
 [Side-note: In a logical classification, low and vulgar items
 deserve as much attention as grand ones. Conflict between
@@ -12377,10 +12346,10 @@ in the same logical compartment with objects hurtful or ludicrous.
 We must examine only whether the resemblance is true and real,
 justifying itself to the comparing intellect: and whether the
 class-term chosen be such as to comprise all these resemblances,
-holding them apart ([Greek: mo/non e)che/tô chôri\s]) from the
+holding them apart ([Greek: mo/non e)che/tÃ´ chÃ´ri\s]) from the
 correlative and opposing class.[25]
 
-[Footnote 24: Compare Politikus, p. 266 D; Parmenidês, p. 130 E.
+[Footnote 24: Compare Politikus, p. 266 D; ParmenidÃªs, p. 130 E.
 
 We see that Plato has thus both anticipated and replied to the
 objection of Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 260-262), who
@@ -12396,7 +12365,7 @@ handicraft, at a time when no scientific survey of physical facts
 had been attempted; that the allusion to such vulgar trades is
 quite in the manner of Plato, and of Sokrates before him.
 
-Stallbaum, in his elaborate Prolegomena both to the Sophistês and
+Stallbaum, in his elaborate Prolegomena both to the SophistÃªs and
 to the Politikus, rejects the conclusion of Socher, and maintains
 that both dialogues are the work of Plato. Yet he agrees to a
 certain extent in Socher's premisses. He thinks that minuteness
@@ -12410,7 +12379,7 @@ But how do Socher and Stallbaum know that this extreme minuteness
 of subdivision into classes _was_ a characteristic of the Megaric
 philosophers? Neither of them produce any proof of it. Indeed
 Stallbaum himself says, most truly (Proleg. ad Politic. p. 55)
-"Quæ de Megaricorum arte dialecticâ accepimus, sane quam sunt
+"QuÃ¦ de Megaricorum arte dialecticÃ¢ accepimus, sane quam sunt
 paucissima". He might have added, that the little which we do hear
 about their dialectic, is rather adverse to this supposed
 minuteness of positive classification, than consonant with it.
@@ -12426,10 +12395,10 @@ But we do not hear that Eukleides acknowledged a series of
 subordinate Genera or Species, expanding by logical procession
 below this primary Unum. As far as we can judge, this seems to
 have been wanting in his philosophy. Yet it is exactly these
-subordinate Genera or Species, which the Platonic Sophistês and
+subordinate Genera or Species, which the Platonic SophistÃªs and
 Politikus supply in abundance, and even excess, conformably to the
-precept laid down by Plato in the Philêbus (p. 14). The words of
-the Sophistês (p. 216 D) rather indicate that the Eleatic Stranger
+precept laid down by Plato in the PhilÃªbus (p. 14). The words of
+the SophistÃªs (p. 216 D) rather indicate that the Eleatic Stranger
 is declared _not_ to possess the character and attributes of
 Megaric disputation.]
 
@@ -12452,7 +12421,7 @@ represent this improving process--that is, the high and true bred
 Sophist."
 
 It will be seen that Plato's remark here about [Greek:
-o(moio/têtes] contradicts what he had himself said before (p. 227
+o(moio/tÃªtes] contradicts what he had himself said before (p. 227
 B). The reluctance to rank _dog_ and _wolf_ together, in the same
 class, is an exact specimen of that very mistake which he had been
 just pointing out for correction. The scientific resemblance
@@ -12480,8 +12449,8 @@ accompanied with the false persuasion of knowledge.[27]
 [Footnote 26: Plato, Sophist. pp. 228-229.]
 
 [Footnote 27: Plat. Soph. p. 229 C. [Greek: A)gnoi/as d' ou)=n
-me/ga ti/ moi dokô= kai\ chalepo\n a)phôrisme/non o(ra=|n ei)=dos,
-pa=si toi=s a)/llois au)tê=s a)nti/stathmon me/resi . . . To\ mê\
+me/ga ti/ moi dokÃ´= kai\ chalepo\n a)phÃ´risme/non o(ra=|n ei)=dos,
+pa=si toi=s a)/llois au)tÃª=s a)nti/stathmon me/resi . . . To\ mÃª\
 kateido/ta ti, dokei=n ei)de/nai.]]
 
 [Side-note: Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil.
@@ -12533,10 +12502,10 @@ a sort of juggler: an imitator who palms off upon persons what
 appears like reality when seen from a distance, but what is seen
 to be not like reality when contemplated closely.[31]
 
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Sophist. p. 231 B. [Greek: tê=s de\
-paideutikê=s a( peri\ tê\n ma/taion doxosophi/an gigno/menos
-e)/legchos e)n tô=| nu=n lo/gô| paraphane/nti mêde\n a)/ll' ê(mi=n
-ei)=nai lege/sthô plê\n ê( ge/nei gennai/a sophistikê/.]]
+[Footnote 29: Plato, Sophist. p. 231 B. [Greek: tÃª=s de\
+paideutikÃª=s a( peri\ tÃª\n ma/taion doxosophi/an gigno/menos
+e)/legchos e)n tÃ´=| nu=n lo/gÃ´| paraphane/nti mÃªde\n a)/ll' Ãª(mi=n
+ei)=nai lege/sthÃ´ plÃª\n Ãª( ge/nei gennai/a sophistikÃª/.]]
 
 [Footnote 30: Plato, Sophist. pp. 232-233 C, 235 A. Sokrates tells
 us in the Platonic Apology (p. 23 A) that this was the exact
@@ -12576,15 +12545,15 @@ Such an assumption involves great and often debated difficulties.
 It has been pronounced by Parmenides altogether inadmissible.[32]
 
 [Footnote 32: Plato, Sophist. pp. 236 E--237 A. [Greek: pa/nta
-tau=ta e)sti mesta\ a)pori/as a)ei\ e)n tô=| pro/sthen chro/nô|
-kai\ nu=n. O(/pôs ga\r ei)po/nta chrê\ pseudê= le/gein ê)\
-doxa/zein o)/ntôs ei)=nai, kai\ tou=to phthegxa/menon
-e)nantiologi/a| mê\ xune/chesthai, panta/pasi chalepo/n . . .
-Teto/lmêken o( lo/gos ou(=tos u(pothe/sthai to\ mê\ o)\n ei)=nai;
-pseu=dos ga\r ou)k a)\n a)/llôs e)gi/gneto o)/n.]]
+tau=ta e)sti mesta\ a)pori/as a)ei\ e)n tÃ´=| pro/sthen chro/nÃ´|
+kai\ nu=n. O(/pÃ´s ga\r ei)po/nta chrÃª\ pseudÃª= le/gein Ãª)\
+doxa/zein o)/ntÃ´s ei)=nai, kai\ tou=to phthegxa/menon
+e)nantiologi/a| mÃª\ xune/chesthai, panta/pasi chalepo/n . . .
+Teto/lmÃªken o( lo/gos ou(=tos u(pothe/sthai to\ mÃª\ o)\n ei)=nai;
+pseu=dos ga\r ou)k a)\n a)/llÃ´s e)gi/gneto o)/n.]]
 
 We have already seen that Plato discussed this same question in
-the Theætêtus, and that after trying and rejecting many successive
+the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, and that after trying and rejecting many successive
 hypotheses to show how false supposition, or false affirmation,
 might be explained as possible, by a theory involving no
 contradiction, he left the question unsolved. He now resumes it at
@@ -12607,7 +12576,7 @@ therefore if you try to speak of Non-Ens, you are trying to speak
 nothing--which is equivalent to not speaking at all.[34] Moreover,
 to every Something, you can add something farther: but to Non-Ens,
 or Nothing, you cannot add any thing. (Non-Entis nulla sunt
-prædicata.) Now Number is something, or included among the Entia:
+prÃ¦dicata.) Now Number is something, or included among the Entia:
 you cannot therefore apply number, either singular or plural, to
 Non-Ens: and inasmuch as every thing conceived or described must
 be either one or many, it is impossible either to conceive or
@@ -12651,17 +12620,17 @@ than once that Non-Ens can neither be described in language by
 itself, nor joined on in any manner to Ens.[38]
 
 [Footnote 36: Plato, Sophist. pp. 239-240. [Greek: katagela/setai/
-sou tô=n lo/gôn, o(/tan ô(s ble/ponti le/gê|s au)tô=|,
-prospoiou/menos ou)/te ka/toptra ou)/te u(/data gignô/skein,
-ou)/te to\ para/pan o)/psin; to\ d' e)k tô=n lo/gôn e)rôtê/sei se
+sou tÃ´=n lo/gÃ´n, o(/tan Ã´(s ble/ponti le/gÃª|s au)tÃ´=|,
+prospoiou/menos ou)/te ka/toptra ou)/te u(/data gignÃ´/skein,
+ou)/te to\ para/pan o)/psin; to\ d' e)k tÃ´=n lo/gÃ´n e)rÃ´tÃª/sei se
 mo/non.]]
 
 [Footnote 37: Plato, Sophist. p. 240 B.]
 
-[Footnote 38: Plato, Sophist. p. 241 B. [Greek: tô=| ga\r mê\
-o)/nti to\ o)\n prosa/ptein ê(ma=s polla/kis a)nagka/zesthai,
-diomologêsame/nous nu=n dê/ pou tou=to ei)=nai pa/ntôn
-a)dunatô/taton.]]
+[Footnote 38: Plato, Sophist. p. 241 B. [Greek: tÃ´=| ga\r mÃª\
+o)/nti to\ o)\n prosa/ptein Ãª(ma=s polla/kis a)nagka/zesthai,
+diomologÃªsame/nous nu=n dÃª/ pou tou=to ei)=nai pa/ntÃ´n
+a)dunatÃ´/taton.]]
 
 Stating the case in this manner, we find that to suppose falsely,
 or affirm falsely, is a contradiction. But there is yet another
@@ -12763,8 +12732,8 @@ Essentia.[44]
 [Footnote 43: Plato, Sophist. p. 245 E.]
 
 [Footnote 44: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 A. [Greek: e)/oike/ ge e)n
-au)toi=s oi(=on gigantomachi/a tis ei)=nai dia\ tê\n
-a)mphisbê/têsin peri\ tê=s ou)si/as pro\s allê/lous.]]
+au)toi=s oi(=on gigantomachi/a tis ei)=nai dia\ tÃª\n
+a)mphisbÃª/tÃªsin peri\ tÃª=s ou)si/as pro\s allÃª/lous.]]
 
 [Side-note: 1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of
 Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real
@@ -12786,12 +12755,12 @@ these last are understood (so Schleiermacher and others think,
 though in my judgment erroneously) Eukleides and the Megaric
 school of philosophers.
 
-[Footnote 45: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 B-C. [Greek: noêta\ a)/tta
-kai\ a)sô/mata ei)/dê biazo/menoi tê\n a)lêthinê\n ou)si/an
-ei)=nai; ta\ de\ e)kei/nôn sô/mata kai\ tê\n legome/nên u(p'
-au)tô=n] (_i. e._ the Materialists) [Greek: a)lê/theian kata\
+[Footnote 45: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 B-C. [Greek: noÃªta\ a)/tta
+kai\ a)sÃ´/mata ei)/dÃª biazo/menoi tÃª\n a)lÃªthinÃª\n ou)si/an
+ei)=nai; ta\ de\ e)kei/nÃ´n sÃ´/mata kai\ tÃª\n legome/nÃªn u(p'
+au)tÃ´=n] (_i. e._ the Materialists) [Greek: a)lÃª/theian kata\
 smikra\ diathrau/ontes e)n toi=s lo/gois, ge/nesin a)nt' ou)si/as
-pherome/nên tina\ prosagoreu/ousin.]]
+pherome/nÃªn tina\ prosagoreu/ousin.]]
 
 [Side-note: Argument against the Materialists--Justice must be
 something, since it may be either present or absent, making
@@ -12818,25 +12787,25 @@ imprudence, as well as the mind in which the one or the other
 inheres, are neither visible or tangible, nor have they any body:
 they are all invisible.
 
-[Footnote 46: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 C. [Greek: para\ me\n tô=n
-e)n ei)/desin au)tê\n (tê\n ou)si/an) titheme/nôn r(a=|on;
-ê(merô/teroi ga/r; para\ de\ tô=n ei)s sô=ma pa/nta e(lko/ntôn
-bi/a|, chalepô/teron; _i)/sôs de\ kai\ schedo\n a)du/naton_. A)ll'
-ô(=de/ moi dokei= peri\ au)tô=n dra=|n . . . Ma/lista me/n, ei)/
-pê| dunato\n ê)=n, _e)/rgô| belti/ous_ au)tou\s poiei=n; ei) de\
-tou=to mê\ e)gchôrei=, _lo/gô| poiô=men_, u(potithe/menoi
-_nomimô/teron_ au)tou\s ê)\ _nu=n e)the/lontas a)\n
+[Footnote 46: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 C. [Greek: para\ me\n tÃ´=n
+e)n ei)/desin au)tÃª\n (tÃª\n ou)si/an) titheme/nÃ´n r(a=|on;
+Ãª(merÃ´/teroi ga/r; para\ de\ tÃ´=n ei)s sÃ´=ma pa/nta e(lko/ntÃ´n
+bi/a|, chalepÃ´/teron; _i)/sÃ´s de\ kai\ schedo\n a)du/naton_. A)ll'
+Ã´(=de/ moi dokei= peri\ au)tÃ´=n dra=|n . . . Ma/lista me/n, ei)/
+pÃª| dunato\n Ãª)=n, _e)/rgÃ´| belti/ous_ au)tou\s poiei=n; ei) de\
+tou=to mÃª\ e)gchÃ´rei=, _lo/gÃ´| poiÃ´=men_, u(potithe/menoi
+_nomimÃ´/teron_ au)tou\s Ãª)\ _nu=n e)the/lontas a)\n
 a)pokri/nasthai_.]]
 
-[Footnote 47: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 A. [Greek: A)lla\ mê\n to/ ge
-dunato/n tô| paragi/gnesthai kai\ a)pogi/gnesthai, pa/ntôs
-ei)=nai/ ti phê/sousin.]]
+[Footnote 47: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 A. [Greek: A)lla\ mÃª\n to/ ge
+dunato/n tÃ´| paragi/gnesthai kai\ a)pogi/gnesthai, pa/ntÃ´s
+ei)=nai/ ti phÃª/sousin.]]
 
 [Side-note: At least many of them will concede this point, though
 not all Ens is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is
 equivalent to potentiality.]
 
-Probably (replies Theætêtus) these philosophers would contend that
+Probably (replies TheÃ¦tÃªtus) these philosophers would contend that
 the soul or mind had a body; but they would be ashamed either to
 deny that justice, prudence, &c., existed as realities--or to
 affirm that justice, prudence, &c. were all bodies.[48] These
@@ -12856,24 +12825,24 @@ thing is true and real Ens. The characteristic mark or definition
 of Ens or the Real is, power or potentiality.[50]
 
 [Footnote 48: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 B. [Greek: A)pokri/nontai
-. . . tê\n me\n psuchê\n au)tê\n dokei=n sphi/si sô=ma/ ti
-kektê=sthai, phro/nêsin de\ kai\ tô=n a)/llôn e(/kaston ô(=n
-ê)rô/têkas, ai)schu/nontai to\ tolma=|n ê)\ mêde\n tô=n o)/ntôn
-au)ta\ o(mologei=n, ê)\ pa/nt' ei)=nai sô/mata
+. . . tÃª\n me\n psuchÃª\n au)tÃª\n dokei=n sphi/si sÃ´=ma/ ti
+kektÃª=sthai, phro/nÃªsin de\ kai\ tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n e(/kaston Ã´(=n
+Ãª)rÃ´/tÃªkas, ai)schu/nontai to\ tolma=|n Ãª)\ mÃªde\n tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n
+au)ta\ o(mologei=n, Ãª)\ pa/nt' ei)=nai sÃ´/mata
 dii+schuri/zesthai.]]
 
 [Footnote 49: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 C-D. [Greek: ei) ga/r ti kai\
-smikro\n e)the/lousi tô=n o)/ntôn sugchôrei=n a)sô/maton,
+smikro\n e)the/lousi tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n sugchÃ´rei=n a)sÃ´/maton,
 e)xarkei=. to\ ga\r e)pi/ te tou/tois a(/ma kai\ e)p' e)kei/nois
-o(/sa e)/chei sô=ma xumphue\s gegono/s, ei)s o(\ ble/pontes
-a)mpho/tera _ei)=nai_ le/gousi, tou=to au)toi=s r(ête/on.]]
+o(/sa e)/chei sÃ´=ma xumphue\s gegono/s, ei)s o(\ ble/pontes
+a)mpho/tera _ei)=nai_ le/gousi, tou=to au)toi=s r(Ãªte/on.]]
 
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. [Greek: le/gô dê\ to\
-kai\ o(poianou=n kektême/non _du/namin_, ei)/t' ei)s to\ poiei=n
+[Footnote 50: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. [Greek: le/gÃ´ dÃª\ to\
+kai\ o(poianou=n kektÃªme/non _du/namin_, ei)/t' ei)s to\ poiei=n
 e(/teron o(tiou=n pephuko\s ei)/t' ei)s to\ pathei=n kai\
 smikro/taton u(po\ tou= phaulota/tou, ka)\n ei) mo/non ei)sa/pax,
-pa=n tou=to o)/ntôs ei)=nai; ti/themai ga\r o(/ron o(ri/zein ta\
-o)/nta, ô(s e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti plê\n _du/namis_.]]
+pa=n tou=to o)/ntÃ´s ei)=nai; ti/themai ga\r o(/ron o(ri/zein ta\
+o)/nta, Ã´(s e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti plÃª\n _du/namis_.]]
 
 [Side-note: Argument against the Idealists--who distinguish Ens
 from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former
@@ -12893,7 +12862,7 @@ passion produced by a certain power of agent and patient coming
 into co-operation with each other? and is not this the definition
 which we just now laid down, of Ens or the Real.
 
-[Footnote 51: Plato, Sophist. p. 248 A. [Greek: tou\s tô=n ei)dô=n
+[Footnote 51: Plato, Sophist. p. 248 A. [Greek: tou\s tÃ´=n ei)dÃ´=n
 phi/lous].]
 
 [Side-note: Holding communion--What? Implies Relativity. Ens is
@@ -12985,7 +12954,7 @@ one with the other. 2. Or no Forms admit of such intercommunion.
 3. Or some Forms do admit of it, and others not. Between these
 three an option must be made.[55]
 
-[Footnote 54: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B. [Greek: ô(s a)du/naton ta/
+[Footnote 54: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B. [Greek: Ã´(s a)du/naton ta/
 te polla\ e(\n kai\ to\ e(\n polla\ ei)=nai], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 55: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 E.]
@@ -13059,17 +13028,17 @@ opposite reason--from the darkness of that region of Non-Ens or
 Non-Reality wherein he carries on his routine-work.[60]
 
 [Footnote 58: Plato, Sophist. p. 253 B. [Greek: a)=r' ou) met'
-e)pistê/mês tino\s a)nagkai=on dia\ tô=n lo/gôn poreu/esthai to\n
-o)rthô=s me/llonta dei/xein poi=a poi/ois sumphônei= tô=n genô=n
-kai\ poi=a a)/llêla ou) de/chetai?]]
+e)pistÃª/mÃªs tino\s a)nagkai=on dia\ tÃ´=n lo/gÃ´n poreu/esthai to\n
+o)rthÃ´=s me/llonta dei/xein poi=a poi/ois sumphÃ´nei= tÃ´=n genÃ´=n
+kai\ poi=a a)/llÃªla ou) de/chetai?]]
 
 [Footnote 59: Plato, Sophist. p. 253 D-E.]
 
 [Footnote 60: Plato, Sophist. p. 254 A. [Greek: O( de/ ge
-philo/sophos, tê=| tou= o)/ntos a)ei\ dia\ logismô=n proskei/menos
-i)de/a|, dia\ to\ lampro\n au)= tê=s chô/ras ou)damô=s eu)pe/tês
-o)phthê=nai; ta\ ga\r tê=s tô=n pollô=n psuchê=s o)/mmata
-karterei=n pro\s to\ thei=on a)phorô=nta a)du/nata.]]
+philo/sophos, tÃª=| tou= o)/ntos a)ei\ dia\ logismÃ´=n proskei/menos
+i)de/a|, dia\ to\ lampro\n au)= tÃª=s chÃ´/ras ou)damÃ´=s eu)pe/tÃªs
+o)phthÃª=nai; ta\ ga\r tÃª=s tÃ´=n pollÃ´=n psuchÃª=s o)/mmata
+karterei=n pro\s to\ thei=on a)phorÃ´=nta a)du/nata.]]
 
 [Side-note: He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for
 examination five principal
@@ -13109,15 +13078,15 @@ Genera--Ens, Motion, Rest, Idem, Diversum: each distinct from and
 independent of all the rest.[64]
 
 [Footnote 61: Plato, Sophist. p. 254 D. [Greek: to\ de/ ge o)\n
-mikto\n a)mphoi=n; _e)sto\n_ ga\r a)/mphô pou.]]
+mikto\n a)mphoi=n; _e)sto\n_ ga\r a)/mphÃ´ pou.]]
 
 [Footnote 62: Plato, Sophist. p. 254 E. [Greek: ti/ pot' au)= nu=n
-ou(/tôs ei)rê/kamen to/ te tau)to\n kai\ tha/teron? po/tera du/o
-ge/nê tine\ au)tô/, tô=n me\n triô=n a)/llô], &c.]
+ou(/tÃ´s ei)rÃª/kamen to/ te tau)to\n kai\ tha/teron? po/tera du/o
+ge/nÃª tine\ au)tÃ´/, tÃ´=n me\n triÃ´=n a)/llÃ´], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 63: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B. [Greek: mete/cheton mê\n
-a)/mphô tau)tou= kai\ thate/rou . . . Mê\ toi/nun le/gômen
-ki/nêsi/n _g' ei)=nai_ tau)to\n ê)\ tha/teron, mêd' au)=
+[Footnote 63: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B. [Greek: mete/cheton mÃª\n
+a)/mphÃ´ tau)tou= kai\ thate/rou . . . MÃª\ toi/nun le/gÃ´men
+ki/nÃªsi/n _g' ei)=nai_ tau)to\n Ãª)\ tha/teron, mÃªd' au)=
 sta/sin.]]
 
 [Footnote 64: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 D.]
@@ -13142,14 +13111,14 @@ but this is impossible: for we have already said that some Forms
 cannot come into intercommunion--that they absolutely exclude each
 other.
 
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. [Greek: kai\ dia\ pa/ntôn
-ge au)tê\n phê/somen ei)=nai dielêluthui=an (tê\n thate/rou
-phu/sin) e(\n e(/kaston ga\r e(/teron ei)=nai tô=n a)/llôn, _ou)
-dia\ tê\n au)tou= phu/sin_, a)lla\ dia\ to\ mete/chein tê=s
-i)de/as tê=s thate/rou.]]
+[Footnote 65: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. [Greek: kai\ dia\ pa/ntÃ´n
+ge au)tÃª\n phÃª/somen ei)=nai dielÃªluthui=an (tÃª\n thate/rou
+phu/sin) e(\n e(/kaston ga\r e(/teron ei)=nai tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n, _ou)
+dia\ tÃª\n au)tou= phu/sin_, a)lla\ dia\ to\ mete/chein tÃª=s
+i)de/as tÃª=s thate/rou.]]
 
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 A. [Greek: tê\n ki/nêsin dê\
-tau)to/n t' ei)=nai kai\ mê\ tau)to\n o(mologête/on kai\ ou)
+[Footnote 66: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 A. [Greek: tÃª\n ki/nÃªsin dÃª\
+tau)to/n t' ei)=nai kai\ mÃª\ tau)to\n o(mologÃªte/on kai\ ou)
 duscherante/on], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum.
@@ -13173,14 +13142,14 @@ different from the other four, and so far as these others go, it
 is Non-Ens.[69]
 
 [Footnote 67: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 C. [Greek: ou)ch e(/teron
-a)]r' e)sti/ pê| kai\ e(/teron kata\ to\n nu=n dê\ lo/gon.]]
+a)]r' e)sti/ pÃª| kai\ e(/teron kata\ to\n nu=n dÃª\ lo/gon.]]
 
-[Footnote 68: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 D. [Greek: ou)kou=n dê\
-saphô=s ê( ki/nêsis o)/ntôs ou)k o)/n e)sti kai\ o)\n, e)pei/per
+[Footnote 68: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 D. [Greek: ou)kou=n dÃª\
+saphÃ´=s Ãª( ki/nÃªsis o)/ntÃ´s ou)k o)/n e)sti kai\ o)\n, e)pei/per
 tou= o)/ntos mete/chei?]]
 
 [Footnote 69: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 A. [Greek: kai\ to\ o)/n
-a)/r' ê(mi=n, o(/sa per e)/sti ta\ a)/lla, kata\ tosau=ta ou)k
+a)/r' Ãª(mi=n, o(/sa per e)/sti ta\ a)/lla, kata\ tosau=ta ou)k
 e)/stin; e)kei=na ga\r ou)k o)\n e(\n me\n au)to/ e)stin,
 a)pe/ranta de\ to\n a)rithmo\n ta)/lla ou)k e)/stin au)=.]]
 
@@ -13209,30 +13178,30 @@ Genus, all its varieties must be real also. Accordingly Different
 from Ens is just as much a real Form as Ens itself:[72] and this
 is what we mean by Non-Ens:--not any thing contrary to Ens.
 
-[Footnote 70: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. [Greek: O(po/tan to\ mê\
-o)\n le/gômen, ô(s e)/oiken, ou)k e)nanti/on ti le/gomen tou=
-o)/ntos, a)ll' e(/teron mo/non . . . Oi(=on o(/tan ei)pôme/n _ti
-mê\ me/ga_, to/te ma=llo/n ti/ soi phaino/metha to\ smikro\n ê)\
-to\ i)/son dêlou=n tô=| r(ê/mati.]
+[Footnote 70: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. [Greek: O(po/tan to\ mÃª\
+o)\n le/gÃ´men, Ã´(s e)/oiken, ou)k e)nanti/on ti le/gomen tou=
+o)/ntos, a)ll' e(/teron mo/non . . . Oi(=on o(/tan ei)pÃ´me/n _ti
+mÃª\ me/ga_, to/te ma=llo/n ti/ soi phaino/metha to\ smikro\n Ãª)\
+to\ i)/son dÃªlou=n tÃ´=| r(Ãª/mati.]
 
 Plato here means to imply that [Greek: to\ smikro\n] is the real
-contrary of [Greek: to\ me/ga]. When we say [Greek: mê\ me/ga], we
+contrary of [Greek: to\ me/ga]. When we say [Greek: mÃª\ me/ga], we
 do not necessarily mean [Greek: smikro/n]--we may mean [Greek:
-i)/son]. Therefore [Greek: to\ mê\ me/ga] does not (in his view)
+i)/son]. Therefore [Greek: to\ mÃª\ me/ga] does not (in his view)
 imply the contrary of [Greek: me/ga].]
 
 [Footnote 71: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. [Greek: Ou)k a)/r'
-e)nanti/on, o(/tan a)po/phasis le/gêtai, sêmai/nein
-sugchôrêso/metha, tosou=ton de\ mo/non, o(/ti tô=n a)/llôn ti
-mênu/ei to\ mê\ kai\ to\ ou) protithe/mena tô=n e)pio/ntôn
-o)noma/tôn, ma=llon de\ tô=n pragma/tôn peri\ a)/tt' a)\n ke/êtai
-ta\ e)piphtheggo/mena u(/steron tê=s a)popha/seôs o)no/mata.]]
-
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. [Greek: ê( tê=s thate/rou
-mori/ou phu/seôs kai\ tê=s tou= o)/ntos pro\s a)/llêla
-a)ntikeime/nôn a)ntithesis ou)de\n ê)=tton, ei) the/mis ei)pei=n
-au)tou= tou= o)/ntos ou)si/a e)sti/n; ou)k e)nanti/on e)kei/nô|
-sêmai/nousa, a)lla\ tosou=ton mo/non, e(/teron e)kei/nou.]]
+e)nanti/on, o(/tan a)po/phasis le/gÃªtai, sÃªmai/nein
+sugchÃ´rÃªso/metha, tosou=ton de\ mo/non, o(/ti tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n ti
+mÃªnu/ei to\ mÃª\ kai\ to\ ou) protithe/mena tÃ´=n e)pio/ntÃ´n
+o)noma/tÃ´n, ma=llon de\ tÃ´=n pragma/tÃ´n peri\ a)/tt' a)\n ke/Ãªtai
+ta\ e)piphtheggo/mena u(/steron tÃª=s a)popha/seÃ´s o)no/mata.]]
+
+[Footnote 72: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. [Greek: Ãª( tÃª=s thate/rou
+mori/ou phu/seÃ´s kai\ tÃª=s tou= o)/ntos pro\s a)/llÃªla
+a)ntikeime/nÃ´n a)ntithesis ou)de\n Ãª)=tton, ei) the/mis ei)pei=n
+au)tou= tou= o)/ntos ou)si/a e)sti/n; ou)k e)nanti/on e)kei/nÃ´|
+sÃªmai/nousa, a)lla\ tosou=ton mo/non, e(/teron e)kei/nou.]]
 
 [Side-note: The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to
 have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is.]
@@ -13256,19 +13225,19 @@ drop altogether the idea of contrariety, without enquiring whether
 it be reasonably justifiable or not: we attach ourselves entirely
 to the Form--_Different_.[74]
 
-[Footnote 73: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B-C. [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n
-bebai/ôs e)sti\ tê\n au)tou= phu/sin e)/chon . . . e)na/rithmon
-tô=n pollô=n o)/ntô=n ei)=dos e(/n.]]
+[Footnote 73: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B-C. [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)\n
+bebai/Ã´s e)sti\ tÃª\n au)tou= phu/sin e)/chon . . . e)na/rithmon
+tÃ´=n pollÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´=n ei)=dos e(/n.]]
 
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E--259 A. [Greek: ê(mei=s
-ga\r peri\ me\n e)nanti/ou tino\s au)tô=| chai/rein pa/lai
-le/gomen, ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te mê\ lo/gon e)/chon ê)\ kai\
+[Footnote 74: Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E--259 A. [Greek: Ãª(mei=s
+ga\r peri\ me\n e)nanti/ou tino\s au)tÃ´=| chai/rein pa/lai
+le/gomen, ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te mÃª\ lo/gon e)/chon Ãª)\ kai\
 panta/pasin a)/logon], &c.
 
 [Greek: to\ me\n e(/teron metascho\n tou= o)/ntos _e)/sti_ me\n
-dia\ tau/tên tê\n me/thexin, ou) mê\n e)kei=no ge ou)= me/teschen,
+dia\ tau/tÃªn tÃª\n me/thexin, ou) mÃª\n e)kei=no ge ou)= me/teschen,
 a)ll' e(/teron, e(/teron de\ tou= o)/ntos o)/n e)sti saphe/stata
-e)x a)na/gkês ei)=nai mê\ o)/n], &c.]
+e)x a)na/gkÃªs ei)=nai mÃª\ o)/n], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which
 justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate
@@ -13294,34 +13263,34 @@ Forms or Genera. Among these true Forms or Genera, Non-Ens is
 included as one.[78]
 
 [Footnote 75: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 A-C. [Greek: o(\ de\ nu=n
-ei)rê/kamen ei)=nai to\ mê\ o)/n, ê)\ peisa/tô tis ô(s ou) kalô=s
-le/gomen e)le/gxas, ê)\ me/chri per a)\n a)dunatê=|, lekte/on kai\
-e)kei=nô| katha/per ê(mei=s le/gomen . . . to\ tau=ta _e)a/santa
-ô(s dunata/_. . . .]
+ei)rÃª/kamen ei)=nai to\ mÃª\ o)/n, Ãª)\ peisa/tÃ´ tis Ã´(s ou) kalÃ´=s
+le/gomen e)le/gxas, Ãª)\ me/chri per a)\n a)dunatÃª=|, lekte/on kai\
+e)kei=nÃ´| katha/per Ãª(mei=s le/gomen . . . to\ tau=ta _e)a/santa
+Ã´(s dunata/_. . . .]
 
 The language of the Eleate here is altogether at variance with the
 spirit of Plato in his negative or Searching Dialogues. To say, as
 he does, "Either accept the explanation which I give, or propose a
 better of your own"--is a dilemma which the Sokrates of the
-Theætêtus, and other dialogues, would have declined altogether.
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus, and other dialogues, would have declined altogether.
 The complaint here made by the Eleate, against disputants who did
 nothing but propound difficulties--is the same as that which the
-hearers of Sokrates made against _him_ (see Plato, Philêbus, p. 20
+hearers of Sokrates made against _him_ (see Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 20
 A, where the remark is put into the mouth, not of an opponent, but
 of a respectful young listener); and many a reader of the Platonic
-Parmenidês has indulged in the complaint.]
+ParmenidÃªs has indulged in the complaint.]
 
-[Footnote 76: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 D. [Greek: e)kei/nê| kai\
-kat' e)kei=no o(/ phêsi tou/tôn peponthe/nai po/teron.]]
+[Footnote 76: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 D. [Greek: e)kei/nÃª| kai\
+kat' e)kei=no o(/ phÃªsi tou/tÃ´n peponthe/nai po/teron.]]
 
-[Footnote 77: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B, E. [Greek: dia\ ga\r tê\n
-a)llê/lôn tô=n ei)dô=n sumplokê\n o( lo/gos ge/gonen ê(mi=n.] 252
-B: [Greek: oi( mêde\n e)ô=ntes koinôni/a| pathê/matos e(te/rou
+[Footnote 77: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B, E. [Greek: dia\ ga\r tÃª\n
+a)llÃª/lÃ´n tÃ´=n ei)dÃ´=n sumplokÃª\n o( lo/gos ge/gonen Ãª(mi=n.] 252
+B: [Greek: oi( mÃªde\n e)Ã´=ntes koinÃ´ni/a| pathÃª/matos e(te/rou
 tha/teron prosagoreu/ein.]]
 
 [Footnote 78: Plato, Sophist. p. 260 A. [Greek: pro\s to\ to\n
-lo/gon ê(mi=n tô=n o)/ntôn e(/n ti genô=n ei)=nai.] 258 B: [Greek:
-to\ mê\ o)\n bebai/ôs e)sti\ tê\n au(tou= phu/sin e)/chon.]]
+lo/gon Ãª(mi=n tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n e(/n ti genÃ´=n ei)=nai.] 258 B: [Greek:
+to\ mÃª\ o)\n bebai/Ã´s e)sti\ tÃª\n au(tou= phu/sin e)/chon.]]
 
 [Side-note: Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into
 intercommunion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment.]
@@ -13355,15 +13324,15 @@ in order to signify something respecting things existing, or
 events past, present, and future.[80] Now every proposition must
 be a proposition about something, or belonging to a certain
 subject: every proposition must also be of a certain quality.[81]
-_Theætêtus is sitting down_--_Theætêtus is flying._ Here are two
+_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is sitting down_--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is flying._ Here are two
 propositions, both belonging to the same subject, but with
 opposite qualities: the former true, the latter false. The true
-proposition affirms respecting Theætêtus real things as they are;
+proposition affirms respecting TheÃ¦tÃªtus real things as they are;
 the false proposition affirms respecting him things different from
 real, or non-real, as being real. The attribute of _flying_ is
 just as real in itself as the attribute of _sitting_: but as
-respects Theætêtus, or as predicated concerning him, it is
-different from the reality, or non-real.[82] But still Theætêtus
+respects TheÃ¦tÃªtus, or as predicated concerning him, it is
+different from the reality, or non-real.[82] But still TheÃ¦tÃªtus
 is the subject of the proposition, though the predicate _flying_
 does not really belong to him: for there is no other subject than
 he, and without a subject the proposition would be no proposition
@@ -13374,15 +13343,15 @@ subject, the proposition so affirming is false.[83]
 [Footnote 80: Plato, Sophist. pp. 261-262.]
 
 [Footnote 81: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 E. [Greek: lo/gon
-a)nagkai=on, o(/tan per ê)=|, tino\s ei)=nai lo/gon; mê\ de/ tinos
+a)nagkai=on, o(/tan per Ãª)=|, tino\s ei)=nai lo/gon; mÃª\ de/ tinos
 a)du/naton . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ _poi=o/n tina_ au)to\n ei)=nai
 dei=?]]
 
-[Footnote 82: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B [Greek: O)/ntôn de/ ge
+[Footnote 82: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B [Greek: O)/ntÃ´n de/ ge
 o)/nta e(/tera peri\ sou=.]
 
-That is, [Greek: e(/tera tô=n o)/ntôn],--being the explanation
-given by Plato of [Greek: ta\ mê\ o)/nta].]
+That is, [Greek: e(/tera tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n],--being the explanation
+given by Plato of [Greek: ta\ mÃª\ o)/nta].]
 
 [Footnote 83: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D.]
 
@@ -13403,11 +13372,11 @@ Genus--Proposition, Judgment, Opinion--comes properly and naturally
 into partnership with the Form Non-Ens.
 
 [Footnote 84: Plato, Sophist. pp. 263-264. 264 A-B: [Greek:
-Ou)kou=n e)/peiper lo/gos a)lêthê\s ê)=n kai\ pseudê/s, tou/tôn d'
-e)pha/nê dia/noia me\n au)tê=s pro\s e(autê\n psuchê=s dia/logos,
-do/xa de\ dianoi/as a)poteleu/têsis, phai/netai de\ o(\ le/gomen
-(phantasi/a) su/mmixis ai)sthê/seôs kai\ do/xês, a)na/gkê dê\ kai\
-tou/tôn tô=| lo/gô| xuggenô=n o)/ntôn pseudê= te au)tô=n e)/nia
+Ou)kou=n e)/peiper lo/gos a)lÃªthÃª\s Ãª)=n kai\ pseudÃª/s, tou/tÃ´n d'
+e)pha/nÃª dia/noia me\n au)tÃª=s pro\s e(autÃª\n psuchÃª=s dia/logos,
+do/xa de\ dianoi/as a)poteleu/tÃªsis, phai/netai de\ o(\ le/gomen
+(phantasi/a) su/mmixis ai)sthÃª/seÃ´s kai\ do/xÃªs, a)na/gkÃª dÃª\ kai\
+tou/tÃ´n tÃ´=| lo/gÃ´| xuggenÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n pseudÃª= te au)tÃ´=n e)/nia
 kai\ e)ni/ote ei)=nai?]]
 
 This was the point which Plato's Eleate undertook to prove against
@@ -13456,9 +13425,9 @@ others as if they did know.[86]
 [Footnote 85: Plato, Sophist. p. 267 A-D.]
 
 [Footnote 86: Plato, Sophist. p. 268 A. [Greek: to\ de\ thate/rou
-schê=ma, dia\ tê\n e)n toi=s lo/gois kuli/ndêsin, e)/chei pollê\n
-u(popsi/an kai\ pho/bon ô(s a)gnoei= tau=ta a(\ pro\s tou\s
-a)/llous ô(s ei)dô\s e)schêma/tistai.]]
+schÃª=ma, dia\ tÃª\n e)n toi=s lo/gois kuli/ndÃªsin, e)/chei pollÃª\n
+u(popsi/an kai\ pho/bon Ã´(s a)gnoei= tau=ta a(\ pro\s tou\s
+a)/llous Ã´(s ei)dÃ´\s e)schÃªma/tistai.]]
 
 [Side-note: Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous
 auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select
@@ -13475,10 +13444,10 @@ knowledge, is not the truly wise man, since he has no real
 knowledge--but the imitator of the wise man, or Sophist.
 
 [Footnote 87: Plato, Sophist. p. 268 B. [Greek: to\n me\n
-dêmosi/a| te kai\ makroi=s lo/gois pro\s plê/thê dunato\n
-_ei)rôneu/esthai_ kathorô=; to\n de\ i)di/a| te kai\ brache/si
+dÃªmosi/a| te kai\ makroi=s lo/gois pro\s plÃª/thÃª dunato\n
+_ei)rÃ´neu/esthai_ kathorÃ´=; to\n de\ i)di/a| te kai\ brache/si
 lo/gois a)nagka/zonta to\n prosdialego/menon e)nantiologei=n
-au)to\n au)tô=|.]]
+au)to\n au)tÃ´=|.]]
 
 *  *  *  *  *
 
@@ -13486,7 +13455,7 @@ au)to\n au)tô=|.]]
 ascribed to a Sophist.]
 
 We have here the conclusion of this abstruse and complicated
-dialogue, called Sophistês. It ends by setting forth, as the
+dialogue, called SophistÃªs. It ends by setting forth, as the
 leading characteristics of the Sophist--that he deals in short
 question and answer so as to make the respondent contradict
 himself: That he talks with small circles of listeners, upon a
@@ -13494,7 +13463,7 @@ large variety of subjects, on which he possesses no real
 knowledge: That he mystifies or imposes upon his auditors; not
 giving his own sincere convictions, but talking for the production
 of a special effect. He is [Greek: e)nantiopoiologiko\s] and
-[Greek: ei)/rôn], to employ the two original Platonic words,
+[Greek: ei)/rÃ´n], to employ the two original Platonic words,
 neither of which is easy to translate.
 
 [Side-note: These characteristics may have belonged to other
@@ -13509,7 +13478,7 @@ prominent both in the Platonic and in the Xenophontic dialogues.
 The attribute which Xenophon directly predicates about him, that
 "in conversation he dealt with his interlocutors just as he
 pleased,"[88] is amply exemplified by Plato in the Protagoras,
-Gorgias, Euthyphron, Lachês, Charmides, Lysias, Alkibiadês I. and
+Gorgias, Euthyphron, LachÃªs, Charmides, Lysias, AlkibiadÃªs I. and
 II., Hippias I. and II., &c. That he cross-examined and puzzled
 every one else without knowing the subjects on which he talked,
 better than they did--is his own declaration in the Apology. That
@@ -13522,14 +13491,14 @@ says in the Apology, and by other passages of Plato and
 Xenophon.[89]
 
 [Footnote 88: Xen. Memor. i. 2, 14, [Greek: toi=s de\
-dialegome/nois au)tô=| pa=si chrô/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/pôs
+dialegome/nois au)tÃ´=| pa=si chrÃ´/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/pÃ´s
 bou/loito.]
 
 Compare, to the same purpose, i. 4, 1, where we are told that
 Sokrates employed his colloquial Elenchus as a means of chastising
-([Greek: kolastêri/ou e(/neka]) those who thought that they knew
+([Greek: kolastÃªri/ou e(/neka]) those who thought that they knew
 every thing: and the conversation of Sokrates with the youthful
-Euthydêmus, especially what is said by Xenophon at the close of it
+EuthydÃªmus, especially what is said by Xenophon at the close of it
 (iv. 4, 39-40).
 
 The power of Sokrates to vanquish in dialogue the persons called
@@ -13541,42 +13510,42 @@ for Protagoras in long speaking. If Protagoras on his side
 confesses himself inferior to Sokrates in dialogue, Sokrates is
 satisfied."]
 
-[Footnote 89: Plato, Apolog. p. 37 E. [Greek: e)a/n te ga\r le/gô,
-o(/ti tô=| theô=| a)peithei=n tou=t' e)/stin, kai\ dia\ tou=t'
-a)du/naton ê(suchi/an a)/gein, ou) pei/sesthe/ moi ô(s
-ei)rôneuome/nô|.]
+[Footnote 89: Plato, Apolog. p. 37 E. [Greek: e)a/n te ga\r le/gÃ´,
+o(/ti tÃ´=| theÃ´=| a)peithei=n tou=t' e)/stin, kai\ dia\ tou=t'
+a)du/naton Ãª(suchi/an a)/gein, ou) pei/sesthe/ moi Ã´(s
+ei)rÃ´neuome/nÃ´|.]
 
 Xen. Memor. iv. 4, 9. [Greek: a)rkei= ga\r] (says Hippias to
-Sokrates), [Greek: o(/ti tô=n a)/llôn katagela=|s, e)rôtô=n kai\
-e)le/gchôn pa/ntas, au)to\s de\ ou)deni\ the/lôn u(pe/chein
-lo/gon, ou)de\ gnô/mên a)pophai/nesthai peri\ ou)deno/s.] See also
+Sokrates), [Greek: o(/ti tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n katagela=|s, e)rÃ´tÃ´=n kai\
+e)le/gchÃ´n pa/ntas, au)to\s de\ ou)deni\ the/lÃ´n u(pe/chein
+lo/gon, ou)de\ gnÃ´/mÃªn a)pophai/nesthai peri\ ou)deno/s.] See also
 Memorab. iii. 5, 24.
 
 Compare a striking passage in Plato's Menon, p. 80 A; also
-Theætêt. p. 149; and Plutarch, Quæst. Platonic. p. 1000.
+TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 149; and Plutarch, QuÃ¦st. Platonic. p. 1000.
 
-The attribute [Greek: ei)rônei/a], which Plato here declares as
+The attribute [Greek: ei)rÃ´nei/a], which Plato here declares as
 one of the main characteristics of the Sophists, is applied to
 Sokrates in a very special manner, not merely in the Platonic
 dialogues, but also by Timon in the fragments of his Silli
-remaining--[Greek: Au)tê\ e)kei/nê ê( eiôthui=a _ei)rônei/a
-Sôkra/tous_] (Plato, Repub. i. p. 337 A); and again--[Greek:
-prou)/legon o(/ti su\ a)pokri/nasthai me\n ou)k e)thelêsois,
-_ei)rôneu/soio_ de\ kai\ pa/nta ma=llon poiê/sois ê)\
-a)pokri/noio, ei)/ tis ti/ se e)rôta=|.] So also in the Symposion,
-p. 216 E, Alkibiades says about Sokrates [Greek: _ei)rôneuo/menos_
-de\ kai\ pai/zôn pa/nta to\n bi/on pro\s tou\s a)nthrô/pous
+remaining--[Greek: Au)tÃª\ e)kei/nÃª Ãª( eiÃ´thui=a _ei)rÃ´nei/a
+SÃ´kra/tous_] (Plato, Repub. i. p. 337 A); and again--[Greek:
+prou)/legon o(/ti su\ a)pokri/nasthai me\n ou)k e)thelÃªsois,
+_ei)rÃ´neu/soio_ de\ kai\ pa/nta ma=llon poiÃª/sois Ãª)\
+a)pokri/noio, ei)/ tis ti/ se e)rÃ´ta=|.] So also in the Symposion,
+p. 216 E, Alkibiades says about Sokrates [Greek: _ei)rÃ´neuo/menos_
+de\ kai\ pai/zÃ´n pa/nta to\n bi/on pro\s tou\s a)nthrÃ´/pous
 diatelei=.] And Gorgias, p. 489 E. In another part of the Gorgias
-(p. 481 B), Kallikles says, "Tell me, Chærephon, does Sokrates
+(p. 481 B), Kallikles says, "Tell me, ChÃ¦rephon, does Sokrates
 mean seriously what he says, or is he bantering?" [Greek:
-spouda/zei tau=ta Sôkra/tês ê)\ pai/zei?] Protagoras, Prodikus,
-Hippias, &c., do not seem to have been [Greek: ei)/rônes] at all,
+spouda/zei tau=ta SÃ´kra/tÃªs Ãª)\ pai/zei?] Protagoras, Prodikus,
+Hippias, &c., do not seem to have been [Greek: ei)/rÃ´nes] at all,
 as far as our scanty knowledge goes.
 
-The words [Greek: ei)/rôn, ei)rôniko/s, ei)rônei/a] seem to
+The words [Greek: ei)/rÃ´n, ei)rÃ´niko/s, ei)rÃ´nei/a] seem to
 include more than is implied in our words _irony_, _ironical_.
-Schleiermacher translates the words [Greek: a(plou=n mimê/tên,
-ei)rôniko\n mimê/tên], at the end of the Sophistês, by "den
+Schleiermacher translates the words [Greek: a(plou=n mimÃª/tÃªn,
+ei)rÃ´niko\n mimÃª/tÃªn], at the end of the SophistÃªs, by "den
 ehrlichen, den Schlauen, Nachahmer"; which seems to me near the
 truth,--meaning one who either speaks what he does not think, or
 evades speaking what he does think, in order to serve some special
@@ -13591,7 +13560,7 @@ indicated in the earlier part of it, we shall find that many of
 them fit Sokrates as well as they could have fitted any one else.
 If the Sophists hunted after rich young men,[90] Sokrates did the
 same; seeking opportunities for conversation with them by
-assiduous frequentation of the palæstræ, as well as in other ways.
+assiduous frequentation of the palÃ¦strÃ¦, as well as in other ways.
 We see this amply attested by Plato and Xenophon:[91] we see
 farther that Sokrates announces it as a propensity natural to him,
 and meritorious rather than otherwise. Again, the argumentative
@@ -13610,15 +13579,15 @@ made mainly to turn. To ask or receive a fee for communicating
 knowledge, virtue, aptitude in debate, was in the view of Sokrates
 and Plato a grave enormity: a kind of simoniacal practice.[94]
 
-[Footnote 90: Plato, Sophist. p. 223. [Greek: ne/ôn plousi/ôn kai\
-e)ndo/xôn thê/ra].]
+[Footnote 90: Plato, Sophist. p. 223. [Greek: ne/Ã´n plousi/Ã´n kai\
+e)ndo/xÃ´n thÃª/ra].]
 
 [Footnote 91: In the opening words of the Platonic Protagoras, we
 read as a question from the friend or companion of Sokrates,
-[Greek: Po/then, ô)= Sô/krates, phai/nei? ê)\ _a)po\ kunêgesi/ou
-tou=_ peri\ tê\n A)lkibia/dou ô(/ran?]
+[Greek: Po/then, Ã´)= SÃ´/krates, phai/nei? Ãª)\ _a)po\ kunÃªgesi/ou
+tou=_ peri\ tÃª\n A)lkibia/dou Ã´(/ran?]
 
-See also the opening of the Charmides, Lysis, Alkibiadês I., and
+See also the opening of the Charmides, Lysis, AlkibiadÃªs I., and
 the speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion.
 
 Compare also Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2, 1-2-6, with the
@@ -13629,28 +13598,28 @@ reputation alone, and as eagerly soliciting Sokrates to present
 him to Protagoras (Protag. pp. 310-311).]
 
 [Footnote 92: Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C. [Greek: To\ de/ ge
-e)/ntechnon kai\ peri\ dikai/ôn au)tôn kai\ a)di/kôn kai\ peri\
-tô=n a)/llôn o(/lôs a)mphisbêtou=n.]
-
-Spengel says truly--in his [Greek: Sunagôgê\ Technô=n]
-p. 40--"Quod si sermo et locus hic esset de Sophistarum doctrinâ et
-philosophiâ, odium quod nunc vulgo in eos vertunt, majore ex parte
-sine causâ et ratione esse conceptum, eosque laude magis quam
-vituperatione dignos esse censendos--haud multâ cum operâ exponi
+e)/ntechnon kai\ peri\ dikai/Ã´n au)tÃ´n kai\ a)di/kÃ´n kai\ peri\
+tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n o(/lÃ´s a)mphisbÃªtou=n.]
+
+Spengel says truly--in his [Greek: SunagÃ´gÃª\ TechnÃ´=n]
+p. 40--"Quod si sermo et locus hic esset de Sophistarum doctrinÃ¢ et
+philosophiÃ¢, odium quod nunc vulgo in eos vertunt, majore ex parte
+sine causÃ¢ et ratione esse conceptum, eosque laude magis quam
+vituperatione dignos esse censendos--haud multÃ¢ cum operÃ¢ exponi
 posset. Sic, quo proscinduntur convicio, juvenes non nisi magno
-pretio eruditos esse, levissimum est: immo hoc sophistas suæ
-ipsorum scientiæ satis confisos esse neque eam despexisse, docet:
+pretio eruditos esse, levissimum est: immo hoc sophistas suÃ¦
+ipsorum scientiÃ¦ satis confisos esse neque eam despexisse, docet:
 et vitium, si modo vitium dicendum, commune est vel potius ortum
-optimis lyricæ poeseos asseclis, Simonide, Pindaro, aliis."]
+optimis lyricÃ¦ poeseos asseclis, Simonide, Pindaro, aliis."]
 
-[Footnote 93: Plato, Theætet. p. 175 C.]
+[Footnote 93: Plato, TheÃ¦tet. p. 175 C.]
 
 [Footnote 94: It is to be remembered, however, that Plato, though
 doubtless exacting no fee, received presents from rich admirers
 like Dion and Dionysius: and there were various teachers who found
 presents more lucrative than fees. "M. Antonius Guipho, fuisse
-dicitur ingenii magni, memoriæ singularis, nec minus Graicé, quam
-Latino, doctus: præterea comi fucilique naturâ, _nec unquam de
+dicitur ingenii magni, memoriÃ¦ singularis, nec minus GraicÃ©, quam
+Latino, doctus: prÃ¦terea comi fucilique naturÃ¢, _nec unquam de
 mercedibus pactus--eoque plura ex liberalitate discentium
 consecutus._" (Sueton. De Illustr. Grammat. 7.)]
 
@@ -13660,8 +13629,8 @@ Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not
 Sophists in this sense.]
 
 We have seen also that Plato assigns to what he terms "the
-thoroughbred and noble Sophistic Art" ([Greek: ê( ge/nei gennai/a
-sophistikê\]), the employment of the Elenchus, for the purpose of
+thoroughbred and noble Sophistic Art" ([Greek: Ãª( ge/nei gennai/a
+sophistikÃª\]), the employment of the Elenchus, for the purpose of
 destroying, in the minds of others, that false persuasion of
 existing knowledge which was the radical impediment to their
 imbibing acquisitions of real knowledge from the teacher.[95] Here
@@ -13693,10 +13662,10 @@ far as we know, made it their business to drive the respondent to
 contradictions.
 
 [Footnote 95: Plato, Sophist. p. 230 D. [Greek: pri\n a)\n
-e)le/gchôn tis to\n e)legcho/menon ei)s ai)schu/nên katastê/sas,
-ta\s toi=s mathê/masin e)mpodi/ous do/xas e)xelô/n, katharo\n
-a)pophê/nê| kai\ tau=ta ê(gou/menon, a(/per oi)=den ei)de/nai
-mo/na, plei/ô de\ mê/.]]
+e)le/gchÃ´n tis to\n e)legcho/menon ei)s ai)schu/nÃªn katastÃª/sas,
+ta\s toi=s mathÃª/masin e)mpodi/ous do/xas e)xelÃ´/n, katharo\n
+a)pophÃª/nÃª| kai\ tau=ta Ãª(gou/menon, a(/per oi)=den ei)de/nai
+mo/na, plei/Ã´ de\ mÃª/.]]
 
 [Footnote 96: Plato, Sophist. p. 231 C.]
 
@@ -13730,7 +13699,7 @@ range of books to be studied; no stock of facts or experience to
 be mastered. Every philosopher wove his own tissue of theory for
 himself, without any restraint upon his intellectual impulse, in
 regard to all the problems then afloat. What the theories of the
-Sophists were, we do not know: but Plato, author of the Timæus,
+Sophists were, we do not know: but Plato, author of the TimÃ¦us,
 Republic, Leges, Kratylus, Menon--who affirmed the pre-existence
 as well as post-existence of the mind, and the eternal
 self-existence of Ideas--has no fair ground for reproaching them with
@@ -13738,31 +13707,31 @@ blamable rashness in the extent and diversity of topics which they
 presumed to discuss. They obtained indeed (he says justly) no
 truth or knowledge, but merely a fanciful semblance of knowledge--an
 equivocal show or imitation of reality.[98] But Plato himself
-obtains nothing more in the Timæus: and we shall find Aristotle
+obtains nothing more in the TimÃ¦us: and we shall find Aristotle
 pronouncing the like condemnation on the Platonic self-existent
 Ideas. If the Sophists professed to be encyclopedists, this was an
 error natural to the age; and was the character of Grecian
 philosophy generally, even in its most illustrious manifestations.
 
-[Footnote 98: Plato, Sophistês, p. 233 C. [Greek: doxastikê\n
-a)/ra tina\ peri\ pa/ntôn e)pistê/mên o( sophistê\s ê(mi=n, a)ll'
-ou)k a)lêthei/an e)/chôn a)nape/phantai.] 234 B: [Greek: mimê/mata
-kai\ o(mô/numa tô=n o)/ntôn.]
+[Footnote 98: Plato, SophistÃªs, p. 233 C. [Greek: doxastikÃª\n
+a)/ra tina\ peri\ pa/ntÃ´n e)pistÃª/mÃªn o( sophistÃª\s Ãª(mi=n, a)ll'
+ou)k a)lÃªthei/an e)/chÃ´n a)nape/phantai.] 234 B: [Greek: mimÃª/mata
+kai\ o(mÃ´/numa tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n.]
 
 When the Eleate here says about the Sophists (p. 233 B), [Greek:
-dokou=si pro\s tau=ta e)pistêmo/nôs e)/chein au)toi\ pro\s a(/per
+dokou=si pro\s tau=ta e)pistÃªmo/nÃ´s e)/chein au)toi\ pro\s a(/per
 a)ntile/gousin], this is exactly what Sokrates, in the Platonic
 Apology, tells us about the impression made by his own dialectics
 or refutative conversation, Plato, Apolog. p. 23 A.
 
-[Greek: e)k tau/têsi dê\ tê=s e)xeta/seôs pollai\ me\n
-a)pe/chtheiai/ moi gego/nasi kai\ oi(=ai chalepô/tatai kai\
-baru/tatai, ô(/ste polla\s diabola\s a)p' au)tô=n gegone/nai,
+[Greek: e)k tau/tÃªsi dÃª\ tÃª=s e)xeta/seÃ´s pollai\ me\n
+a)pe/chtheiai/ moi gego/nasi kai\ oi(=ai chalepÃ´/tatai kai\
+baru/tatai, Ã´(/ste polla\s diabola\s a)p' au)tÃ´=n gegone/nai,
 o)/noma/ te tou=to le/gesthai, sopho\s ei)=nai; oi)=ontai ga/r me
 e(ka/stoth' oi( paro/ntes tau=t' ei)=nai sopho\n a(\ a)\n a)/llon
-e)xele/gxô.]]
+e)xele/gxÃ´.]]
 
-[Side-note: Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He
+[Side-note: Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the SophistÃªs. He
 says that the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every
 one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one
 who maintains false propositions to be impossible.]
@@ -13801,7 +13770,7 @@ cannot say--Sokrates is good, brave, old, stout, flat-nosed, &c.,
 because you thereby multiply the one Sokrates into many. One thing
 cannot be many, nor many things one.[100]
 
-[Footnote 100: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B-C. Compare Plato, Philêbus,
+[Footnote 100: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B-C. Compare Plato, PhilÃªbus,
 p. 14 C.]
 
 [Side-note: Misconception of the function of the copula in
@@ -13859,11 +13828,11 @@ propositions in reasoning, is best shown by such misconceptions as
 this of Antisthenes; which naturally arise among argumentative men
 yet untrained in the generalities of grammar and logic.
 
-[Side-note: Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês--To confute
+[Side-note: Plato's declared purpose in the SophistÃªs--To confute
 the various schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the
 Materialists, &c.]
 
-Plato announces his intention, in this portion of the Sophistês,
+Plato announces his intention, in this portion of the SophistÃªs,
 to confute all these different schools of thinkers, to whom he has
 made allusion.[101] His first purpose, in reasoning against those
 who maintained Non-Ens to be an incogitable absurdity, is, to show
@@ -13876,10 +13845,10 @@ contradict themselves: they call their two elementary principles
 _one_. What do they mean by existence, if this be not so?
 
 [Footnote 101: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 C-D. [Greek: I(/na toi/nun
-pro\s a(/pantas ê(mi=n o( lo/gos ê)=| tou\s pô/pote peri\ ou)si/as
-kai\ o(tiou=n dialechthe/ntas, e)/stô kai\ pro\s tou/tous kai\
+pro\s a(/pantas Ãª(mi=n o( lo/gos Ãª)=| tou\s pÃ´/pote peri\ ou)si/as
+kai\ o(tiou=n dialechthe/ntas, e)/stÃ´ kai\ pro\s tou/tous kai\
 pro\s tou\s a)/llous, o(/sois e)/mprosthen dieile/gmetha, ta\ nu=n
-ô(s e)n e)rôtê/sei lechthêso/mena.]]
+Ã´(s e)n e)rÃ´tÃª/sei lechthÃªso/mena.]]
 
 Then again, Parmenides--and those who affirm that Ens Totum was
 essentially Unum, denying all plurality--had difficulties on their
@@ -13940,12 +13909,12 @@ characteristic mark of existence is, power or potentiality.
 Whatever has power to act upon any thing else, or to be acted on
 by any thing else, is a real Ens or existent something.[103]
 
-[Footnote 103: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. [Greek: le/gô dê\ to\
-kai\ o(poianou=n kektême/non _du/namin_, ei)/t' ei)s to\ poiei=n
+[Footnote 103: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. [Greek: le/gÃ´ dÃª\ to\
+kai\ o(poianou=n kektÃªme/non _du/namin_, ei)/t' ei)s to\ poiei=n
 e(/teron o(tiou=n pephuko\s ei)/t' ei)s to\ pathei=n** kai\
 smikro/taton u(po\ tou= phaulota/tou, ka)\n ei) mo/non ei)sa/pax,
-pa=n tou=to o)/ntôs ei)=nai; ti/themai ga\r o(/ron o(ri/zein ta\
-o)/nta, ô(s e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti plê\n _du/namis_.]]
+pa=n tou=to o)/ntÃ´s ei)=nai; ti/themai ga\r o(/ron o(ri/zein ta\
+o)/nta, Ã´(s e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti plÃª\n _du/namis_.]]
 
 [Side-note: Reply open to the Materialists.]
 
@@ -13968,7 +13937,7 @@ way, which constitutes the difference between the real and unreal.
 Of this difference Plato's definition takes no account.[104]
 
 [Footnote 104: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 E. [Greek: to\ kai\
-o(poianou=n kektême/non du/namin], &c.]
+o(poianou=n kektÃªme/non du/namin], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of
 Forms. Their point of view against him.]
@@ -14013,9 +13982,9 @@ definition as applying to Ens, the world of intelligible Forms--not
 less than to Fiens, the world of sensible phenomena.
 
 [Footnote 106: Plato, Sophist. p. 248 D. [Greek: ei)
-prosomologou=si tê\n me\n psuchê\n ginô/skein, tê\n d' ou)si/an
-gignô/skesthai . . . Ti/ de/? to\ ginô/skein ê)\ gignô/skesthai
-phate\ poi/êma ê)\ pa/thos ê)\ a)mpho/teron?]]
+prosomologou=si tÃª\n me\n psuchÃª\n ginÃ´/skein, tÃª\n d' ou)si/an
+gignÃ´/skesthai . . . Ti/ de/? to\ ginÃ´/skein Ãª)\ gignÃ´/skesthai
+phate\ poi/Ãªma Ãª)\ pa/thos Ãª)\ a)mpho/teron?]]
 
 The definition of _existence_, here given by Plato, and the way in
 which he employs it against the two different sects of
@@ -14039,7 +14008,7 @@ reasons, though in various other dialogues he gives it as his own
 opinion, or at least, as the opinion of his representative
 spokesman.
 
-In this portion of the present dialogue (Sophistês) the point
+In this portion of the present dialogue (SophistÃªs) the point
 which he makes is, to show to the Idealists, or Absolutists, that
 their Forms are not really absolute, or independent of the mind:
 that the existence of these forms is relative, just as much as
@@ -14081,29 +14050,29 @@ is, it exists only in communion with a mind or Subject, but with a
 Cogitant or intelligent Subject, not a percipient Subject.
 
 [Side-note: Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of
-Protagoras in the Theætêtus.]
+Protagoras in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus.]
 
 The argument here urged by Plato coincides in its drift and result
 with the dictum of Protagoras--Man is the measure of all things.
-In my remarks on the Theætêtus,[107] I endeavoured to make it
+In my remarks on the TheÃ¦tÃªtus,[107] I endeavoured to make it
 appear that the Protagorean dictum was really a negation of the
 Absolute, of the Thing in itself, of the Object without a
 Subject:--and an affirmation of the Relative, of the Thing in
 communion with a percipient or concipient mind, of Object
 implicated with Subject--as two aspects or sides of one and the
-same conception or cognition. Though Plato in the Theætêtus argued
+same conception or cognition. Though Plato in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus argued
 at length against Protagoras, yet his reasoning here in the
-Sophistês establishes by implication the conclusion of Protagoras.
+SophistÃªs establishes by implication the conclusion of Protagoras.
 Here Plato impugns the doctrine of those who (like Sokrates in his
-own Theætêtus) held that the sensible world alone was relative,
+own TheÃ¦tÃªtus) held that the sensible world alone was relative,
 but that the intelligible world or Forms were absolute. He shows
 that the latter were no less relative to a mind than the former;
 and that mind, either percipient or cogitant, could never be
 eliminated from "communion" with them.
 
-[Footnote 107: See my notice of the Theætêtus, in the chapter
+[Footnote 107: See my notice of the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, in the chapter
 immediately preceding, where I have adverted to Plato's reasoning
-in the Sophistês.]
+in the SophistÃªs.]
 
 [Side-note: The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were
 entirely unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and
@@ -14128,8 +14097,8 @@ opposite Forms--change and unchangeableness--motion and
 rest--different and same.[109]
 
 [Footnote 108: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. [Greek: xumbai/nei d'
-ou)=n a)kinê/tôn te o)/ntôn nou=n mêdeni\ peri\ mêdeno\s ei)=nai
-mêdamou=.]]
+ou)=n a)kinÃª/tÃ´n te o)/ntÃ´n nou=n mÃªdeni\ peri\ mÃªdeno\s ei)=nai
+mÃªdamou=.]]
 
 [Footnote 109: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C.]
 
@@ -14224,16 +14193,16 @@ Ens, applying to all cases. The contrast between him and Aristotle
 is shown in the more cautious procedure of the latter, who
 entirely renounces the possibility of giving any one definition
 fitting all cases. Aristotle declares Ens to be an equivocal word
-([Greek: o(mô/numon]), and discriminates several different
+([Greek: o(mÃ´/numon]), and discriminates several different
 significations which it bears: all these significations having
 nevertheless an analogical affinity, more or less remote, with
 each other. See Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. 1017, a. 7, seq.;
 vi. 1028, a. 10.
 
 It is declared by Aristotle to be the question first and most
-disputed in Philosophia Prima, Quid est Ens? [Greek: kai\ dê\ kai\
-to\ pa/lai te kai\ nu=n kai\ a)ei\ zêtou/menon kai\ a)ei\
-a)porou/menon, tou=to e)sti, ti/s ê( ou)si/a] (p. 1028, b. 2).
+disputed in Philosophia Prima, Quid est Ens? [Greek: kai\ dÃª\ kai\
+to\ pa/lai te kai\ nu=n kai\ a)ei\ zÃªtou/menon kai\ a)ei\
+a)porou/menon, tou=to e)sti, ti/s Ãª( ou)si/a] (p. 1028, b. 2).
 Compare, B. 1001, a. 6, 31.
 
 This subject is well treated by Brentano, in his Dissertation
@@ -14248,7 +14217,7 @@ The analogical varieties of Ens or Essence are graduated,
 according to Aristotle: Complete, Proper, typical, [Greek:
 ou)si/a], stands at the head: there are then other varieties more
 or less approaching to this proper type: some of them which
-[Greek: mikro\n ê)\ ou)the\n e)/chei tou= o)/ntos.] (Metaphys. vi.
+[Greek: mikro\n Ãª)\ ou)the\n e)/chei tou= o)/ntos.] (Metaphys. vi.
 1029, b. 9.)]
 
 [Side-note: Different definitions of Ens--by Plato--the
@@ -14308,38 +14277,38 @@ identical with itself: but you cannot say, motion _is_ different,
 motion _is_ the same; because the subject and the predicate are
 essentially distinct and not identical.[113]
 
-[Footnote 112: In the Timæus (pp. 35-36-37), Plato declares these
+[Footnote 112: In the TimÃ¦us (pp. 35-36-37), Plato declares these
 three elements--[Greek: Tau)to/n, Tha/teron, Ou)si/a]--to be the
 three constituent elements of the cosmical soul, and of the human
 rational soul.]
 
 [Footnote 113: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B.
 
-[Greek: Mete/cheton mê\n a)/mphô (ki/nêsis kai\ sta/sis) tau)tou=
+[Greek: Mete/cheton mÃª\n a)/mphÃ´ (ki/nÃªsis kai\ sta/sis) tau)tou=
 kai\ thate/rou. . . .]
 
-[Greek: Mê\ toi/nun le/gômen ki/nêsin g' _ei)=nai_ tau)to\n ê)\
-tha/teron, mêd' au)= sta/sin.] He had before said--[Greek: A)ll'
-ou)/ ti mê\n ki/nêsi/s ge kai\ sta/sis ou)th' e(/teron ou)/te
+[Greek: MÃª\ toi/nun le/gÃ´men ki/nÃªsin g' _ei)=nai_ tau)to\n Ãª)\
+tha/teron, mÃªd' au)= sta/sin.] He had before said--[Greek: A)ll'
+ou)/ ti mÃª\n ki/nÃªsi/s ge kai\ sta/sis ou)th' e(/teron ou)/te
 tau)to/n _e)stin_] (p. 255 A).
 
-Plato here says, It is true that [Greek: ki/nêsis _mete/chei_
-tau)tou=], but it is not true that [Greek: ki/nêsi/s e)sti
+Plato here says, It is true that [Greek: ki/nÃªsis _mete/chei_
+tau)tou=], but it is not true that [Greek: ki/nÃªsi/s e)sti
 tau)to/n]. Again, p. 259 A. [Greek: to\ me\n e(/teron metascho\n
-tou= o)/ntos _e)/sti_ me\n dia\ tau/tên tê\n me/thexin, ou) mê\n
+tou= o)/ntos _e)/sti_ me\n dia\ tau/tÃªn tÃª\n me/thexin, ou) mÃª\n
 e)kei=no/ ge ou)= mete/schen a)ll' e(/teron.] He understands,
 therefore, that [Greek: e)sti], when used as copula, implies
 identity between the predicate and the subject.
 
 This is the same point of view from which Antisthenes looked, when
-he denied the propriety of saying [Greek: A)/nthrôpo/s _e)stin_
-a)gatho/s--A)/nthrôpo/s _e)sti_ kako/s]: and when he admitted only
-identical propositions, such as [Greek: A)/nthrôpo/s _e)stin_
-a)/nthrôpos--A)/gatho/s _e)stin_ a)gatho/s.] He assumed that
+he denied the propriety of saying [Greek: A)/nthrÃ´po/s _e)stin_
+a)gatho/s--A)/nthrÃ´po/s _e)sti_ kako/s]: and when he admitted only
+identical propositions, such as [Greek: A)/nthrÃ´po/s _e)stin_
+a)/nthrÃ´pos--A)/gatho/s _e)stin_ a)gatho/s.] He assumed that
 [Greek: e)sti], when intervening between the subject and the
 predicate, implies identity between them; and the same assumption
 is made by Plato in the passage now before us. Whether Antisthenes
-would have allowed the proposition--[Greek: A)/nthrôpos
+would have allowed the proposition--[Greek: A)/nthrÃ´pos
 _mete/chei_ kaki/as], or other propositions in which [Greek:
 e)sti] does not appear as copula, we do not know enough of his
 opinions to say.
@@ -14359,11 +14328,11 @@ Different.[115] So, in like manner, the Form or Idea of Idem (or
 Same) runs through all other things: since each thing is both
 different from all others, and is also the same with itself.
 
-[Footnote 114: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 C-D. [Greek: tô=n o)/ntôn
-ta\ me\n au)ta\ kath' au(ta/, ta/ de\ pro\s a)/llêla a)ei\
+[Footnote 114: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 C-D. [Greek: tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n
+ta\ me\n au)ta\ kath' au(ta/, ta/ de\ pro\s a)/llÃªla a)ei\
 _le/gesthai_ . . . To\ d' e(/teron a)ei\ pro\s e(/teron . . . Nu=n
-de\ a)technô=s ê(mi=n o(/, ti per a)\n e(/teron ê)=|, sumbe/bêken
-e)x a)na/gkês _e(te/rou tou=to o(/per e)sti\n ei)=nai_.] These
+de\ a)technÃ´=s Ãª(mi=n o(/, ti per a)\n e(/teron Ãª)=|, sumbe/bÃªken
+e)x a)na/gkÃªs _e(te/rou tou=to o(/per e)sti\n ei)=nai_.] These
 last words partly anticipate Aristotle's explanation of [Greek:
 ta\ pro/s ti] (Categor. p. 6, a. 38).
 
@@ -14375,12 +14344,12 @@ ei)=nai] as equivalent; which is not very consistent with the
 sense which he assigns to [Greek: e)stin] in predication: see the
 note immediately preceding.]
 
-[Footnote 115: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. [Greek: pe/mpton dê\ tê\n
+[Footnote 115: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. [Greek: pe/mpton dÃª\ tÃª\n
 thate/rou phu/sin lekte/on e)n toi=s ei)/desin ou)=san, e)n oi(=s
-proairou/metha . . . kai\ dia\ pa/ntôn ge au)tê\n au)tô=n
-phê/somen ei)=nai dielêluthui=an; e(\n e(/kaston ga\r e(/teron
-ei)=nai tô=n a)/llôn ou) dia\ tê\n au(tou= phu/sin, a)lla\ dia\
-to\ _mete/chein tê=s i)de/as tê=s thate/rou_.]]
+proairou/metha . . . kai\ dia\ pa/ntÃ´n ge au)tÃª\n au)tÃ´=n
+phÃª/somen ei)=nai dielÃªluthui=an; e(\n e(/kaston ga\r e(/teron
+ei)=nai tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n ou) dia\ tÃª\n au(tou= phu/sin, a)lla\ dia\
+to\ _mete/chein tÃª=s i)de/as tÃª=s thate/rou_.]]
 
 [Side-note: His review of the select Five Forms.]
 
@@ -14402,7 +14371,7 @@ Ens, and Non-Ens.
 
 [Footnote 116: Plato, Sophist. pp. 255-256.]
 
-Here we arrive at Plato's explanation of Non-Ens, [Greek: to\ mê\
+Here we arrive at Plato's explanation of Non-Ens, [Greek: to\ mÃª\
 o)\n]: the main problem which he is now setting to himself.
 Non-Ens is equivalent to, _different from Ens_. It is the Form or Idea
 of Diversum, considered in reference to Ens. Every thing is Ens,
@@ -14437,10 +14406,10 @@ _Not-great_, _Not-just_, &c., are each of them permanent Forms,
 among the many other Forms or Entia, having each a true and
 distinct nature of its own.[118]
 
-[Footnote 118: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 C. [Greek: o(/ti to\ mê\
-o)\n bebai/ôs e)sti\ tê\n au)tou= phu/sin e)/chon . . . ou(/tô de\
-kai\ to\ mê\ o)\n kata\ tau)to\n ê)=n te kai\ e)/stin mê\ o)/n,
-e)na/rithmon tô=n pollô=n o)/ntôn ei)=dos e(/n.]]
+[Footnote 118: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 C. [Greek: o(/ti to\ mÃª\
+o)\n bebai/Ã´s e)sti\ tÃª\n au)tou= phu/sin e)/chon . . . ou(/tÃ´ de\
+kai\ to\ mÃª\ o)\n kata\ tau)to\n Ãª)=n te kai\ e)/stin mÃª\ o)/n,
+e)na/rithmon tÃ´=n pollÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n ei)=dos e(/n.]]
 
 I say nothing about contrariety (concludes Plato), or about any
 thing contrary to Ens; nor will I determine whether Non-Ens in
@@ -14453,10 +14422,10 @@ Non-Ens in reference to them all, or an indefinite number of
 times[119] (_i.e._ an indefinite number of negative predications
 may be made concerning it).
 
-[Footnote 119: Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E-259 A. [Greek: ê(mei=s
-ga\r peri\ me\n e)nanti/ou tino\s au)tô=| (tô=| o)/nti) chai/rein
-pa/lai le/gomen, ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te mê\ lo/gon e)/chon ê)\ kai\
-panta/pasin a)/logon; o(\ de\ nu=n ei)rê/kamen ei)=nai to\ mê\
+[Footnote 119: Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E-259 A. [Greek: Ãª(mei=s
+ga\r peri\ me\n e)nanti/ou tino\s au)tÃ´=| (tÃ´=| o)/nti) chai/rein
+pa/lai le/gomen, ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te mÃª\ lo/gon e)/chon Ãª)\ kai\
+panta/pasin a)/logon; o(\ de\ nu=n ei)rÃª/kamen ei)=nai to\ mÃª\
 o)/n], &c.]
 
 Non-Ens being thus shown to be one among the many other Forms,
@@ -14483,8 +14452,8 @@ and a verb put together: the noun indicating the agent, the verb
 indicating the act. Every proposition must be a proposition
 concerning something, or must have a logical subject: every
 proposition must also be of a certain quality. Let us take (he
-proceeds) two simple propositions: _Theætêtus is sitting
-down_--_Theætêtus is flying._[121] Of both these two, the subject is
+proceeds) two simple propositions: _TheÃ¦tÃªtus is sitting
+down_--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is flying._[121] Of both these two, the subject is
 the same: but the first is true, the second is false. The first gives
 things existing as they are, respecting the subject: the second
 gives respecting the subject, things different from those
@@ -14493,22 +14462,22 @@ exist.[122] A false proposition is that which gives things
 different as if they were the same, and things non-existent as if
 they were existent, respecting the subject.[123]
 
-[Footnote 121: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 A. [Greek: Theai/têtos
-ka/thêtai . . . Theai/têtos pe/tetai.]]
+[Footnote 121: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 A. [Greek: Theai/tÃªtos
+ka/thÃªtai . . . Theai/tÃªtos pe/tetai.]]
 
 [Footnote 122: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B. [Greek: le/gei de\
-au)tô=n] ([Greek: tô=n lo/gôn] of the two propositions) [Greek: o(
-me\n a)lêthê\s ta\ o)/nta, ô(s e)sti peri\ sou= . . . O( de\ dê\
-pseudê\s e(/tera tô=n o)/ntôn . . . Ta\ mê\ o)/nt' a)/ra ô(s
-o)/nta le/gei . . . O)/ntôn de/ ge o)/nta e(/tera peri\ sou=.
+au)tÃ´=n] ([Greek: tÃ´=n lo/gÃ´n] of the two propositions) [Greek: o(
+me\n a)lÃªthÃª\s ta\ o)/nta, Ã´(s e)sti peri\ sou= . . . O( de\ dÃª\
+pseudÃª\s e(/tera tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n . . . Ta\ mÃª\ o)/nt' a)/ra Ã´(s
+o)/nta le/gei . . . O)/ntÃ´n de/ ge o)/nta e(/tera peri\ sou=.
 Polla\ me\n ga\r e)/phamen o)/nta peri\ e(/kaston ei)=nai/ pou,
 polla\ de\ ou)k o)/nta.]]
 
-[Footnote 123: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D. [Greek: Peri\ dê\ sou=
-lego/mena me/ntoi tha/tera ô(s ta\ au)ta/, kai\ mê\ o)/nta ô(s
-o)/nta, panta/pasin, ô(s e)/oiken, ê( toiau/tê su/nthesis e)/k te
-r(êma/tôn gignome/nê kai\ o)noma/tôn o)/ntôs te kai\ a)lêthô=s
-gi/gnesthai lo/gos pseudê/s.]
+[Footnote 123: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D. [Greek: Peri\ dÃª\ sou=
+lego/mena me/ntoi tha/tera Ã´(s ta\ au)ta/, kai\ mÃª\ o)/nta Ã´(s
+o)/nta, panta/pasin, Ã´(s e)/oiken, Ãª( toiau/tÃª su/nthesis e)/k te
+r(Ãªma/tÃ´n gignome/nÃª kai\ o)noma/tÃ´n o)/ntÃ´s te kai\ a)lÃªthÃ´=s
+gi/gnesthai lo/gos pseudÃª/s.]
 
 It is plain that this explanation takes no account of negative
 propositions: it applies only to affirmative propositions.]
@@ -14553,7 +14522,7 @@ Plato's expressions[125] lead me to suspect that his satisfaction
 was not thus unqualified: but whether he was himself satisfied or
 not, I cannot think that the explanation ought to satisfy others.
 
-[Footnote 125: Plato, Sophistês, p. 259 A-B. Schleiermacher,
+[Footnote 125: Plato, SophistÃªs, p. 259 A-B. Schleiermacher,
 Einleitung zum Sophistes, vol. iv. p. 134, of his translation of
 Plato.]
 
@@ -14612,12 +14581,12 @@ own, as to exclude the affirmative: both cannot be true together.
 _Not-great_ is certainly different from _great_: so also, _white_,
 _hard_, _rough_, _just_, _valiant_, &c, are all different from
 _great_. But there is nothing in these latter epithets to exclude
-the co-existence of great. _Theætêtus is great_--_Theætêtus is
+the co-existence of great. _TheÃ¦tÃªtus is great_--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is
 white_; in the second of these two propositions I affirm something
-respecting Theætêtus quite different from what I affirm in the
+respecting TheÃ¦tÃªtus quite different from what I affirm in the
 first, yet nevertheless noway excluding what is affirmed in the
 first.[128] The two propositions may both be true. But when I
-say--_Theætêtus is dead_--_Theætêtus is not dead_: here are two
+say--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is dead_--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is not dead_: here are two
 propositions which cannot both be true, from the very form of the
 words. To explain _not-great_, as Plato does, by saying that it
 means _only_ something different from great,[129] is to suppress
@@ -14635,16 +14604,16 @@ opinion, is a conception logically erroneous. Negative stands
 opposed to affirmative, as one of the modes of distributing both
 terms and propositions. A purely negative term cannot stand alone
 in the subject of a proposition: _Non-Entis nulla sunt
-prædicata_--was the scholastic maxim. The apparent exceptions to
+prÃ¦dicata_--was the scholastic maxim. The apparent exceptions to
 this rule arise only from the fact, that many terms negative in
 their form have taken on an affirmative signification.
 
-[Footnote 128: Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenidês (p.
+[Footnote 128: Proklus, in his Commentary on the ParmenidÃªs (p.
 281, p. 785, Stallbaum), says, with reference to the doctrine laid
-down by Plato in the Sophistês, [Greek: o(/lôs ga\r ai(
-a)potha/seis e)ggonoi/ ei)si tê=s e(tero/têtos tê=s noera=s; dia\
+down by Plato in the SophistÃªs, [Greek: o(/lÃ´s ga\r ai(
+a)potha/seis e)ggonoi/ ei)si tÃª=s e(tero/tÃªtos tÃª=s noera=s; dia\
 tou=to ga\r _ou)ch i(/ppos_, o(/ti e(/teron--kai\ dia\ tou=to
-_ou)k a)/nthrôpos_, o(/ti a)/llo.]
+_ou)k a)/nthrÃ´pos_, o(/ti a)/llo.]
 
 Proklus here adopts and repeats Plato's erroneous idea of the
 negative proposition and its function. When I deny that Caius is
@@ -14654,52 +14623,52 @@ fifty _different_ attributes, co-existent and consistent with
 justice and wisdom.
 
 To employ the language of Aristotle (see a pertinent example,
-Physic. i. 8, 191, b. 15, where he distinguishes [Greek: to\ mê\
-o)\n kath' au(to\] from [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n kata\ sumbebêko/s]),
+Physic. i. 8, 191, b. 15, where he distinguishes [Greek: to\ mÃª\
+o)\n kath' au(to\] from [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)\n kata\ sumbebÃªko/s]),
 we may say that it is not of the essence of the Different to deny
 or exclude that from which it is different: the Different may deny
 or exclude, but that is only by _accident_--[Greek: kata\
-sumbebêko/s]. Plato includes, in the essence of the Different,
+sumbebÃªko/s]. Plato includes, in the essence of the Different,
 that which belongs to it only by accident.
 
 Aristotle in more than one place distinguishes [Greek: diaphora\]
-from [Greek: e)nanti/ôsis]--not always in the same language. In
+from [Greek: e)nanti/Ã´sis]--not always in the same language. In
 Metaphysic. I. p. 1055 a. 33, he considers that the root of all
-[Greek: e)nanti/ôsis] is [Greek: e(/xis] and [Greek: ste/rêsis],
+[Greek: e)nanti/Ã´sis] is [Greek: e(/xis] and [Greek: ste/rÃªsis],
 understood in the widest sense, _i.e._ affirmative and negative.
 See Bonitz, not. ad loc., and Waitz, ad Categor. p. 12, a. 26. The
-last portion of the treatise [Greek: Peri\ E(rmênei/as] was
+last portion of the treatise [Greek: Peri\ E(rmÃªnei/as] was
 interpreted by Syrianus with a view to uphold Plato's opinion here
 given in the Sophistes (Schol. ad Aristot. p. 136, a. 15
 Brandis).]
 
 [Footnote 129: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. [Greek: ou)k e)nanti/on
-e)kei/nô| sêmai/nousa, a)lla\ _tosou=ton mo/non_, e(/teron
+e)kei/nÃ´| sÃªmai/nousa, a)lla\ _tosou=ton mo/non_, e(/teron
 e)kei/nou.]
 
-If we look to the Euthydêmus we shall see that this confusion
+If we look to the EuthydÃªmus we shall see that this confusion
 between what is different from A, and what is incompatible with or
 exclusive of A, is one of the fallacies which Plato puts into the
-mouth of the two Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus, whom he
+mouth of the two Sophists EuthydÃªmus and DionysodÃ´rus, whom he
 exhibits and exposes in that dialogue. [Greek: A)/llo ti ou)=n
-e(/teros, ê)= d' o(/s] (Dionysodorus), [Greek: ô)\n li/thou, ou)
-li/thos ei)=? kai\ e(/teros ô)\n chrusou=, ou) chruso\s ei)=?
-E)/sti tau=ta. Ou)kou=n kai\ o( Chaire/dêmos, e)/phê, e(/teros
-ô)\n patro/s, ou)k a)\n patê\r ei)/ê?] (Plat. Euthydem. p. 298
+e(/teros, Ãª)= d' o(/s] (Dionysodorus), [Greek: Ã´)\n li/thou, ou)
+li/thos ei)=? kai\ e(/teros Ã´)\n chrusou=, ou) chruso\s ei)=?
+E)/sti tau=ta. Ou)kou=n kai\ o( Chaire/dÃªmos, e)/phÃª, e(/teros
+Ã´)\n patro/s, ou)k a)\n patÃª\r ei)/Ãª?] (Plat. Euthydem. p. 298
 A).]
 
 [Footnote 130: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B.]
 
 [Footnote 131: Plato, Sophist. pp. 257 E, 258 A.
 
-[Greek: O)/ntos dê\ pro\s o)\n a)nti/thesis, ô(s e)/oik', ei)=nai
-xumbai/nei to\ _mê\ kalo/n_. . . .
+[Greek: O)/ntos dÃª\ pro\s o)\n a)nti/thesis, Ã´(s e)/oik', ei)=nai
+xumbai/nei to\ _mÃª\ kalo/n_. . . .
 
-O(moi/ôs a)/ra to\ mê\ me/ga, kai\ to\ me/ga au)to\ _ei)=nai_
+O(moi/Ã´s a)/ra to\ mÃª\ me/ga, kai\ to\ me/ga au)to\ _ei)=nai_
 lekte/on.]
 
-Plato distinctly recognises here Forms or Ideas [Greek: tô=n
-a)popha/seôn], which the Platonists professed not to do, according
+Plato distinctly recognises here Forms or Ideas [Greek: tÃ´=n
+a)popha/seÃ´n], which the Platonists professed not to do, according
 to Aristotle, Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13--see the instructive Scholia
 of Alexander, p. 565, a. Brandis.]
 
@@ -14724,8 +14693,8 @@ the first: proof must be given of such incompatibility.
 Plato--How do we know that one is true, the other false?]
 
 We may illustrate this remark by looking at the two propositions
-which Plato gives as examples of true and false. _Theætêtus is
-sitting down_--_Theætêtus is flying_. Both the examples are of
+which Plato gives as examples of true and false. _TheÃ¦tÃªtus is
+sitting down_--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is flying_. Both the examples are of
 affirmative propositions: and it seems clear that Plato, in all
 this reasoning, took no account of negative propositions: those
 which simply deny, affirming nothing. The second of these
@@ -14742,7 +14711,7 @@ with the same subject, but different predicates. These two
 propositions therefore do not serve to illustrate the real nature
 of the negative, which consists precisely in this formal
 incompatibility. The proper negative belonging to the
-proposition--_Theætêtus is sitting down_--would be, _Theætêtus
+proposition--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is sitting down_--would be, _TheÃ¦tÃªtus
 is not sitting down_. Plato ought to maintain, if he followed out
 his previous argument, that Not-Sitting down is as good a Form as
 Sitting-down, and that it meant merely--Different from Sitting down.
@@ -14781,9 +14750,9 @@ attributes, the one as matter of fact incompatible with the other.
 
 [Side-note: Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense.]
 
-But how do we know that the first proposition--_Theætêtus is
+But how do we know that the first proposition--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is
 sitting down_--affirms what is:--and that the second
-proposition--_Theætêtus is flying_--affirms what is not? If present,
+proposition--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is flying_--affirms what is not? If present,
 our senses testify to us the truth of the first, and the falsehood
 of the second: if absent, we have the testimony of a witness, combined
 with our own past experience attesting the frequency of facts
@@ -14804,8 +14773,8 @@ or conceived by the mind: and he speaks very harshly of those who
 admit the reality of things perceived, but refuse to admit equal
 reality to things only conceived. Proceeding then upon this
 definition, we can allow no distinction as to truth or falsehood
-between the two propositions--_Theætêtus is sitting
-down_--_Theætêtus is flying_: the predicate of the second affirms
+between the two propositions--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is sitting
+down_--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is flying_: the predicate of the second affirms
 what is, just as much as the predicate of the first: for it affirms
 something which, though neither perceived nor perceivable by
 sense, is distinctly conceivable and conceived by the mind. When
@@ -14842,78 +14811,78 @@ performing the simple function of copula in predication: on the
 contrary he distinguishes [Greek: e)/stin], as marking identity
 between subject and predicate--from [Greek: mete/chei], as marking
 accidental communion between the two. Again, there were men in
-Plato's day who maintained that Non-Ens ([Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n])
+Plato's day who maintained that Non-Ens ([Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)\n])
 was inconceivable and impossible. Plato, in refuting these
 philosophers, gives a definition of Ens ([Greek: to\ o)\n]), which
 puts them in the right--fails in stating what the true negative
 is--and substitutes, in place of simple denial, a second
 affirmation to overlay and supplant the first.
 
-[Side-note: Doctrine of the Sophistês--contradicts that of other
+[Side-note: Doctrine of the SophistÃªs--contradicts that of other
 Platonic dialogues.]
 
-To complete the examination of this doctrine of the Sophistês,
+To complete the examination of this doctrine of the SophistÃªs,
 respecting Non-Ens, we must compare it with the doctrine on the
 same subject laid down in other Platonic dialogues. It will be
 found to contradict, very distinctly, the opinion assigned by
-Plato to Sokrates both in the Theætêtus and in the fifth Book of
+Plato to Sokrates both in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus and in the fifth Book of
 the Republic:[134] where Sokrates deals with Non-Ens in its usual
 sense as the negation of Ens: laying down the position that
 Non-Ens can be neither the object of the cognizing Mind, nor the
-object of the opining ([Greek: doxa/zôn]) or cogitant Mind: that
+object of the opining ([Greek: doxa/zÃ´n]) or cogitant Mind: that
 it is uncognizable and incogitable, correlating only with
 Non-Cognition or Ignorance. Now we find that this doctrine (of
-Sokrates, in Theætêtus and Republic) is the very same as that
-which is affirmed, in the Sophistês, to be taken up by the
+Sokrates, in TheÃ¦tÃªtus and Republic) is the very same as that
+which is affirmed, in the SophistÃªs, to be taken up by the
 delusive Sophist: the same as that which the Eleate spends much
 ingenuity in trying to refute, by proving that Non-Ens is not the
 negation of Ens, but only that which differs from Ens, being
 itself a particular variety of Ens. It is also the same doctrine
-as is declared, both by the Eleate in the Sophistês and by
-Sokrates in the Theætêtus, to imply as an undeniable consequence,
+as is declared, both by the Eleate in the SophistÃªs and by
+Sokrates in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, to imply as an undeniable consequence,
 that the falsehood of any proposition is impossible. "A false
 proposition is that which speaks the thing that is not ([Greek:
-to\ mê\ o)/n]). But this is an impossibility. You can neither
+to\ mÃª\ o)/n]). But this is an impossibility. You can neither
 know, nor think, nor speak, the thing that is not. You cannot know
 without knowing something: you cannot speak without speaking
 something (_i. e._ something that is)." Of this consequence--which
 is expressly announced as included in the doctrine, both by the
-Eleate in the Sophistês and by the Platonic Sokrates in the
-Theætêtus--no notice is taken in the Republic.[135]
+Eleate in the SophistÃªs and by the Platonic Sokrates in the
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus--no notice is taken in the Republic.[135]
 
-[Footnote 134: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 477-478. Theætêt. pp.
-188-189. Parmenidês, pp. 160 C, 163 C. Euthydêmus, p. 284 B-C.
+[Footnote 134: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 477-478. TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp.
+188-189. ParmenidÃªs, pp. 160 C, 163 C. EuthydÃªmus, p. 284 B-C.
 
 Aristotle (De Interpretat. p. 21, a. 22) briefly expresses his
 dissent from an opinion, the same as what is given in the Platonic
-Sophistês--that [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n] is [Greek: o)/n ti]. He
+SophistÃªs--that [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)/n] is [Greek: o)/n ti]. He
 makes no mention of Plato, but Ammonius in the Scholia alludes to
 Plato (p. 129, b. 20, Schol. Bekk.).
 
-We must note that the Eleate in the Sophistês states both opinions
-respecting [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n]: first that which he
+We must note that the Eleate in the SophistÃªs states both opinions
+respecting [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)/n]: first that which he
 refutes--next that which he advances. The Scholiast may, therefore,
-refer to both opinions, as _stated_ in the Sophistês, though one of
+refer to both opinions, as _stated_ in the SophistÃªs, though one of
 them is stated only for the purpose of being refuted.
 
-We may contrast with these views of Plato (in the Sophistês)
-respecting [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n], as not being a negation [Greek:
+We may contrast with these views of Plato (in the SophistÃªs)
+respecting [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)/n], as not being a negation [Greek:
 tou= o)/ntos], but simply a something [Greek: e(/teron tou=
-o)/ntos], the different views of Aristotle about [Greek: to\ mê\
+o)/ntos], the different views of Aristotle about [Greek: to\ mÃª\
 o)/n], set forth in the instructive Commentary of M. Ravaisson,
-Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, p. 360.
+Essai sur la MÃ©taphysique d'Aristote, p. 360.
 
-"Le non-être s'oppose à l'être, comme sa négation: ce n'est donc
-pas, non plus que l'être, une chose simple; et autant il y a de
-genres de l'être, autant il faut que le non-être ait de genres.
-Cependant l'opposition de l'être et du non-être, différente, en
-realité, dans chacune des catégories, est la même dans toutes par
+"Le non-Ãªtre s'oppose Ã  l'Ãªtre, comme sa nÃ©gation: ce n'est donc
+pas, non plus que l'Ãªtre, une chose simple; et autant il y a de
+genres de l'Ãªtre, autant il faut que le non-Ãªtre ait de genres.
+Cependant l'opposition de l'Ãªtre et du non-Ãªtre, diffÃ©rente, en
+realitÃ©, dans chacune des catÃ©gories, est la mÃªme dans toutes par
 sa forme. Dans cette forme, le second terme n'exprime pas autre
-chose que l'absence du premier. Le rapport de l'être et du
-non-être consiste donc dans une pure contradiction: dernière forme
-à laquelle toute opposition doit se ramener."
+chose que l'absence du premier. Le rapport de l'Ãªtre et du
+non-Ãªtre consiste donc dans une pure contradiction: derniÃ¨re forme
+Ã  laquelle toute opposition doit se ramener."
 
-Aristotle seems to allude to the Sophistês, though not mentioning
+Aristotle seems to allude to the SophistÃªs, though not mentioning
 it by its title, in three passages of the Metaphysica--E. 1026, b.
 14; K. 1064, b. 29; N. 1089, a. 5 (see the note of Bonitz on the
 latter passage)--perhaps also elsewhere (see Ueberweg, pp.
@@ -14921,70 +14890,70 @@ latter passage)--perhaps also elsewhere (see Ueberweg, pp.
 another, to the doctrine of Parmenides, who banished Non-Ens as
 incogitable. Leukippus maintained that Non-Ens equivalent to
 [Greek: to\ keno/n], and that the two elements of things were
-[Greek: to\ plê=res] and [Greek: to\ keno/n], for which he used
+[Greek: to\ plÃª=res] and [Greek: to\ keno/n], for which he used
 the expressions [Greek: de\n] and [Greek: ou)de/n]. Plato replied
-as we read in the Sophistês: thus both he and Leukippus tried in
+as we read in the SophistÃªs: thus both he and Leukippus tried in
 different ways to demonstrate a positive nature and existence for
 Non-Ens. See Aristot. Metaph. A. 985, b. 4, with the Scholia, p.
-538, Brandis. The Scholiast cites Plato [Greek: e)n tê=|
-Politei/a|], which seems a mistake for [Greek: e)n tô=|
-Sophi/stê|].]
+538, Brandis. The Scholiast cites Plato [Greek: e)n tÃª=|
+Politei/a|], which seems a mistake for [Greek: e)n tÃ´=|
+Sophi/stÃª|].]
 
 [Footnote 135: Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 264-265) is
 upon this point more satisfactory than the other Platonic
 commentators. He points out--not only without disguise, but even
 with emphasis--the discrepancies and contradictions between the
-doctrines ascribed to the Eleate in the Sophistês, and those
-ascribed to Sokrates in the Republic, Phædon, and other Platonic
+doctrines ascribed to the Eleate in the SophistÃªs, and those
+ascribed to Sokrates in the Republic, PhÃ¦don, and other Platonic
 dialogues. These are the main premisses upon which Socher rests
-his inference, that the Sophistês is not the composition of Plato.
+his inference, that the SophistÃªs is not the composition of Plato.
 I do not admit his inference: but the premisses, as matters of
 fact, appear to me undeniable. Stallbaum, in his Proleg. to the
-Sophistês, p. 40 seq., attempts to explain away these
+SophistÃªs, p. 40 seq., attempts to explain away these
 discrepancies--in my opinion his remarks are obscure and
 unsatisfactory. Various other commentators, also holding the
-Sophistês to be a genuine work of Plato, overlook or extenuate
+SophistÃªs to be a genuine work of Plato, overlook or extenuate
 these premisses, which they consider unfavourable to that
-conclusion. Thus Alkinous, in his [Greek: Ei)sagôgê/], sets down
-the explanation of [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n] which is given in the
-Sophistês, as if it were the true and Platonic explanation, not
+conclusion. Thus Alkinous, in his [Greek: Ei)sagÃ´gÃª/], sets down
+the explanation of [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)\n] which is given in the
+SophistÃªs, as if it were the true and Platonic explanation, not
 adverting to what is said in the Republic and elsewhere (Alkin. c.
 35, p. 189 in the Appendix Platonica annexed to the edition of
 Plato by K. F. Hermann). The like appears in the [Greek:
-Prolego/mena tê=s Pla/tônos philosophi/as]: c. 21, p. 215 of the
-same edition. Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenidês, speaks
-in much the same manner about [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n]--considering
-the doctrine advanced and defended by the Eleate in the Sophistês,
+Prolego/mena tÃª=s Pla/tÃ´nos philosophi/as]: c. 21, p. 215 of the
+same edition. Proklus, in his Commentary on the ParmenidÃªs, speaks
+in much the same manner about [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)\n]--considering
+the doctrine advanced and defended by the Eleate in the SophistÃªs,
 to represent the opinion of Plato (p. 785 ed. Stallbaum; see also
-the Commentary of Proklus on the Timæus, b. iii. p. 188 E, 448 ed.
+the Commentary of Proklus on the TimÃ¦us, b. iii. p. 188 E, 448 ed.
 Schneid.). So likewise Simplikius and the commentators on
 Aristotle, appear to consider it--see Schol. ad Aristotel.
 Physica, p. 332, a. 8, p. 333, b., 334, a., 343, a. 5. It is plain
 from these Scholia that the commentators were much embarrassed in
-explaining [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n]. They take the Sophistês as if it
+explaining [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)/n]. They take the SophistÃªs as if it
 delivered Plato's decisive opinion upon that point (Porphyry
-compares what Plato says in the Timæus, but not what he says in
-the Republic or in Theætêtus, p. 333, b. 25); and I think that
+compares what Plato says in the TimÃ¦us, but not what he says in
+the Republic or in TheÃ¦tÃªtus, p. 333, b. 25); and I think that
 they accommodate Plato to Aristotle, in such manner as to obscure
-the real antithesis which Plato insists upon in the Sophistês--I
+the real antithesis which Plato insists upon in the SophistÃªs--I
 mean the antithesis according to which Plato excludes what is
 [Greek: e)nanti/on tou= o)/ntos] and admits only what is [Greek:
 e(/teron tou= o)/ntos].
 
 Ritter gives an account (Gesch. der Philos. part ii. pp. 288-289)
-of Plato's doctrine in the Sophistês respecting Non-Ens; but by no
+of Plato's doctrine in the SophistÃªs respecting Non-Ens; but by no
 means an adequate account. K. F. Hermann also omits (Geschichte
 und System der Platonischen Philos. pp. 504-505-507) to notice the
-discrepancy between the doctrine of the Sophistês, and the
-doctrine of the Republic, and Theætêtus, respecting [Greek: to\
-mê\ o)/n]--though he pronounces elsewhere that the Republic is
+discrepancy between the doctrine of the SophistÃªs, and the
+doctrine of the Republic, and TheÃ¦tÃªtus, respecting [Greek: to\
+mÃª\ o)/n]--though he pronounces elsewhere that the Republic is
 among the most indisputably positive of all Plato's compositions
 (p. 536).]
 
-Again, the doctrine maintained by the Eleate in the Sophistês
+Again, the doctrine maintained by the Eleate in the SophistÃªs
 respecting Ens, as well as respecting Ideas or Forms, is in other
 ways inconsistent with what is laid down in other Platonic
-dialogues. The Eleate in the Sophistês undertakes to refute two
+dialogues. The Eleate in the SophistÃªs undertakes to refute two
 different classes of opponents; first, the Materialists, of whom
 he speaks with derision and antipathy--secondly, others of very
 opposite doctrines, whom he denominates the Friends of Ideas or
@@ -14995,7 +14964,7 @@ other critics (except Ritter), have taken up this opinion. But to
 me it seems that Socher is right in declaring the doctrine,
 ascribed to these Friends of Ideas, to be the very same as that
 which is laid down by Plato himself in other important
-dialogues--Republic, Timæus, Phædon, Phædrus, Kratylus, &c.--and
+dialogues--Republic, TimÃ¦us, PhÃ¦don, PhÃ¦drus, Kratylus, &c.--and
 which is generally understood as that of the Platonic Ideas.[136]
 In all these dialogues, the capital contrast and antithesis is that
 between Ens or Entia on one side, and Fientia (the transient, ever
@@ -15003,14 +14972,14 @@ generated and ever perishing), on the other: between the eternal,
 unchangeable, archetypal Forms or Ideas--and the ever-changing
 flux of particulars, wherein approximative likeness of these
 archetypes is imperfectly manifested. Now it is exactly this
-antithesis which the Friends of Forms in the Sophistês are
+antithesis which the Friends of Forms in the SophistÃªs are
 represented as upholding, and which the Eleate undertakes to
 refute.[137] We shall find Aristotle, over and over again,
 impugning the total separation or demarcation between Ens and
-Fientia ([Greek: ei)/dê--ge/nesis--chôrista/]), both as the
+Fientia ([Greek: ei)/dÃª--ge/nesis--chÃ´rista/]), both as the
 characteristic dogma, and the untenable dogma, of the Platonic
 philosophy: it is exactly the same issue which the Eleate in the
-Sophistês takes with the Friends of Forms. He proves that Ens is
+SophistÃªs takes with the Friends of Forms. He proves that Ens is
 just as full of perplexity, and just as difficult to understand,
 as Non-Ens:[138] whereas, in the other Platonic dialogues, Ens is
 constantly spoken of as if it were plain and intelligible. In
@@ -15018,7 +14987,7 @@ fact, he breaks down the barrier between Ens and Fientia, by
 including motion, change, the moving or variable, among the world
 of Entia.[139] Motion or Change belongs to Fieri; and if it be
 held to belong to Esse also (by recognising a Form or Idea of
-Motion or Change, as in the Sophistês), the antithesis between the
+Motion or Change, as in the SophistÃªs), the antithesis between the
 two, which is so distinctly declared in other Platonic dialogues,
 disappears.[140]
 
@@ -15029,8 +14998,8 @@ notes.
 Schleiermacher gives this as little more than a conjecture; and
 distinctly admits that any man may easily suppose the doctrine
 ascribed to these Friends of Forms to be Plato's own
-doctrine--"Nicht zu verwundern wäre es, wenn Mancher auf den Gedanken
-käme, Platon meinte hier sich selbst und seine eigene Lehre," &c.
+doctrine--"Nicht zu verwundern wÃ¤re es, wenn Mancher auf den Gedanken
+kÃ¤me, Platon meinte hier sich selbst und seine eigene Lehre," &c.
 
 But most of the subsequent critics have taken up Schleiermacher's
 conjecture (that the Megarici are intended), as if it were
@@ -15038,66 +15007,66 @@ something proved and indubitable.
 
 It is curious that while Schleiermacher thinks that the opinions
 of the Megaric philosophers are impugned and refuted in the
-Sophistês, Socher fancies that the dialogue was composed by a
+SophistÃªs, Socher fancies that the dialogue was composed by a
 Megaric philosopher, not by Plato. Ueberweg (Aechtheit der Platon.
 Schr. pp. 275-277) points out as explicitly as Socher, the
-discrepancy between the Sophistês and several other Platonic
+discrepancy between the SophistÃªs and several other Platonic
 dialogues, in respect to what is said about Forms or Ideas. But he
 draws a different inference: he infers from it a great change in
-Plato's own opinion, and he considers that the Sophistês is later
+Plato's own opinion, and he considers that the SophistÃªs is later
 in its date of composition than those other dialogues which it
 contradicts. I think this opinion about the late composition of
-the Sophistês, is not improbable; but the premisses are not
+the SophistÃªs, is not improbable; but the premisses are not
 sufficient to prove it.
 
-My view of the Platonic Sophistês differs from the elaborate
+My view of the Platonic SophistÃªs differs from the elaborate
 criticism on it given by Steinhart (Einleitung zum Soph. p. 417
 seq.) Moreover, there is one assertion in that Einleitung which I
 read with great surprise. Steinhart not only holds it for certain
-that the Sophistes was composed after the Parmenidês, but also
+that the Sophistes was composed after the ParmenidÃªs, but also
 affirms that it solves the difficulties propounded in the
-Parmenidês--discusses the points of difficulty "in the best
-possible way" ("in der wünschenwerthesten Weise" (pp. 470-471).
+ParmenidÃªs--discusses the points of difficulty "in the best
+possible way" ("in der wÃ¼nschenwerthesten Weise" (pp. 470-471).
 
 I confess I cannot find that the difficulties started in the
-Parmenidês are even noticed, much less solved, in the Sophistês.
-And Steinhart himself tells that the Parmenidês places us in a
+ParmenidÃªs are even noticed, much less solved, in the SophistÃªs.
+And Steinhart himself tells that the ParmenidÃªs places us in a
 circle both of persons and doctrines entirely different from those
-of the Sophistês (p. 472). It is plain also that the other
+of the SophistÃªs (p. 472). It is plain also that the other
 Platonic commentators do not agree with Steinhart in finding the
-Sophistês a key to the Parmenidês: for most of them (Ast, Hermann,
-Zeller, Stallbaum, Brandis, &c.) consider the Parmenidês to have
-been composed at a later date than the Sophistês (as Steinhart
+SophistÃªs a key to the ParmenidÃªs: for most of them (Ast, Hermann,
+Zeller, Stallbaum, Brandis, &c.) consider the ParmenidÃªs to have
+been composed at a later date than the SophistÃªs (as Steinhart
 himself intimates; compare his Einleitung zum Parmenides, p. 312
 seq.). Ueberweg, the most recent enquirer (posterior to
-Steinhart), regards the Parmenidês as the latest of all Plato's
+Steinhart), regards the ParmenidÃªs as the latest of all Plato's
 compositions--if indeed it be genuine, of which he rather doubts.
 (Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift. pp. 182-183.)
 
-M. Mallet (Histoire de l'École de Megare, Introd. pp. xl.-lviii.,
+M. Mallet (Histoire de l'Ã‰cole de Megare, Introd. pp. xl.-lviii.,
 Paris, 1845) differs from all the three opinions of
 Schleiermacher, Ritter, and Socher. He thinks that the
 philosophers, designated as Friends of Forms, are intended for the
 Pythagoreans. His reasons do not satisfy me.]
 
 [Footnote 137: Plato, Sophist. pp. 246 B, 248 B. The same opinion
-is advanced by Sokrates in the Republic, v. p. 479 B-C. Phædon,
+is advanced by Sokrates in the Republic, v. p. 479 B-C. PhÃ¦don,
 pp. 78-79. Compare Sophist, p. 248 C with Symposion, p. 211 B. In
 the former passage, [Greek: to\ pa/schein] is affirmed of the
-Ideas: in the latter passage, [Greek: to\ pa/schein mêde/n].]
+Ideas: in the latter passage, [Greek: to\ pa/schein mÃªde/n].]
 
 [Footnote 138: Plato, Sophist p. 245 E. Yet he afterwards talks of
 [Greek: to\ lampro\n tou= o)/ntos a)ei\] as contrasted with
-[Greek: to\ skoteino\n tou= mê\ o)/ntos], p. 254 A, which seems
+[Greek: to\ skoteino\n tou= mÃª\ o)/ntos], p. 254 A, which seems
 not consistent.]
 
-[Footnote 139: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. "Ipsæ ideæ per se
-simplices sunt et immutabiles: sunt æternæ, ac semper fuerunt ab
-omni liberæ mutatione," says Stallbaum ad Platon. Republ. v. p.
-476; see also his Prolegg. to the Parmenidês, pp. 39-40. This is
-the way in which the Platonic Ideas are presented in the Timæus,
-Republic, Phædon, &c., and the way in which they are conceived by
-the [Greek: ei)dô=n phi/loi] in the Sophistês, whom the Eleate
+[Footnote 139: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. "IpsÃ¦ ideÃ¦ per se
+simplices sunt et immutabiles: sunt Ã¦ternÃ¦, ac semper fuerunt ab
+omni liberÃ¦ mutatione," says Stallbaum ad Platon. Republ. v. p.
+476; see also his Prolegg. to the ParmenidÃªs, pp. 39-40. This is
+the way in which the Platonic Ideas are presented in the TimÃ¦us,
+Republic, PhÃ¦don, &c., and the way in which they are conceived by
+the [Greek: ei)dÃ´=n phi/loi] in the SophistÃªs, whom the Eleate
 seeks to confute.
 
 Zeller's chapter on Plato seems to me to represent not so much
@@ -15108,34 +15077,34 @@ down all the inconsistencies (see Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. pp.
 394-415-429 ed. 2nd).]
 
 [Footnote 140: See a striking passage about the unchangeableness
-of Forms or Ideas in the Kratylus, p. 439 D-E; also Philêbus, p.
+of Forms or Ideas in the Kratylus, p. 439 D-E; also PhilÃªbus, p.
 15.
 
-In the Parmenidês (p. 132 D) the supposition [Greek: ta\ ei)/dê
-e)sta/nai e)n tê=| phu/sei] is one of those set up by Sokrates and
+In the ParmenidÃªs (p. 132 D) the supposition [Greek: ta\ ei)/dÃª
+e)sta/nai e)n tÃª=| phu/sei] is one of those set up by Sokrates and
 impugned by Parmenides. Nevertheless in an earlier passage of that
-dialogue Sokrates is made to include [Greek: ki/nêsis] and [Greek:
-sta/sis] among the [Greek: ei)/dê] (p. 129 E). It will be found,
+dialogue Sokrates is made to include [Greek: ki/nÃªsis] and [Greek:
+sta/sis] among the [Greek: ei)/dÃª] (p. 129 E). It will be found,
 however, that when Parmenides comes to question Sokrates, What
-[Greek: ei)/dê] do you recognise? attributes and subjects only
+[Greek: ei)/dÃª] do you recognise? attributes and subjects only
 (the latter with hesitation) are included: no such thing as
 actions, processes, events--[Greek: to\ poiei=n kai\ pa/schein]
 (p. 130). In Republic vii. 529 D, we find mention made of [Greek:
-to\ o)\n ta/chos] and [Greek: ê( ou)=sa bradu/tês], which implies
-[Greek: ki/nêsis] as among the [Greek: ei)/dê]. In Theætêt. pp.
-152 D, 156 A, [Greek: ki/nêsis] is noted as the constituent and
+to\ o)\n ta/chos] and [Greek: Ãª( ou)=sa bradu/tÃªs], which implies
+[Greek: ki/nÃªsis] as among the [Greek: ei)/dÃª]. In TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp.
+152 D, 156 A, [Greek: ki/nÃªsis] is noted as the constituent and
 characteristic of Fieri--[Greek: to\ gigno/menon]--which belongs
 to the domain of sensible perception, as distinguished from
 permanent and unchangeable Ens.]
 
 [Side-note: The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms
 are those who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in
-Phædon, Republic, &c.]
+PhÃ¦don, Republic, &c.]
 
-If we examine the reasoning of the Eleate, in the Sophistês,
+If we examine the reasoning of the Eleate, in the SophistÃªs,
 against the persons whom he calls the Friends of Forms, we shall
 see that these latter are not Parmenideans only, but also Plato
-himself in the Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere. We shall also see
+himself in the PhÃ¦don, Republic, and elsewhere. We shall also see
 that the ground, taken up by the Eleate, is much the same as that
 which was afterwards taken up by Aristotle against the Platonic
 Ideas. Plato, in most of his dialogues, declares Ideas, Forms,
@@ -15151,14 +15120,14 @@ poetical metaphor, introduced in order to elude the consequences
 of the original fallacy.[141] He maintains that the two (Entia and
 Fientia--Universals and Particulars) have no reality except in
 conjunction and implication together; though they are separable by
-reason ([Greek: lo/gô| chôrista\--tô=| ei)nai, chôrista/]) or
+reason ([Greek: lo/gÃ´| chÃ´rista\--tÃ´=| ei)nai, chÃ´rista/]) or
 abstraction, and though we may reason about them apart, and must
 often reason about them apart.[142] Now it is this implication and
 conjunction of the Universal with its particulars, which is the
-doctrine of the Sophistês, and which distinguishes it from other
+doctrine of the SophistÃªs, and which distinguishes it from other
 Platonic dialogues, wherein the Universal is
 transcendentalized--lodged in a separate world from particulars. No
-science or intelligence is possible (says the Eleate in the Sophistês)
+science or intelligence is possible (says the Eleate in the SophistÃªs)
 either upon the theory of those who pronounce all Ens to be constant
 and unchangeable, or upon that of those who declare all Ens to be
 fluent and variable. We must recognise both together, the constant
@@ -15172,32 +15141,32 @@ Aristotle distinguishes his own teaching from that of his master.
 
 [Footnote 142: Aristot. Metaph. vi. 1038, a-b. The Scholion of
 Alexander here (p. 763, b. 36, Brandis) is clearer than Aristotle
-himself. [Greek: To\ prokei/meno/n e)sti dei=xai ô(s ou)de\n tô=n
-katho/lou ou)si/a e)/stin; ou)/te ga\r o( katho/lou a)/nthrôpos
-ê)\ o( katho/lou i(/ppos, ou)/te a)/llo ou)de/n; a)ll' e(/kaston
-au)tôn _dianoi/as a)po/maxi/s_ e)stin _a)po\ tô=n kath' e(/kasta_
-kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nôn ou)siô=n kai\ o(moi/ôma.]]
-
-[Footnote 143: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C-D. [Greek: Tô=| dê\
-philoso/phô| kai\ tau=ta ma/lista timô=nti pa=sa a)na/gkê dia\
-tau=ta mê/te tô=n e(\n ê)\ kai\ ta\ polla\ ei)/dê lego/ntôn to\
-pa=n e(stêko\s a)pode/chesthai, tô=n te au)= pantachê=| to\ o)\n
-kinou=ntôn mêde\ to\ para/pan a)kou/ein; a)lla\ kata\ tê\n tô=n
-pai/dôn eu)chê/n, o(/sa a)ki/nêta/ te kai\ kekinême/na, to\ o)/n
+himself. [Greek: To\ prokei/meno/n e)sti dei=xai Ã´(s ou)de\n tÃ´=n
+katho/lou ou)si/a e)/stin; ou)/te ga\r o( katho/lou a)/nthrÃ´pos
+Ãª)\ o( katho/lou i(/ppos, ou)/te a)/llo ou)de/n; a)ll' e(/kaston
+au)tÃ´n _dianoi/as a)po/maxi/s_ e)stin _a)po\ tÃ´=n kath' e(/kasta_
+kai\ prÃ´/tÃ´s kai\ ma/lista legome/nÃ´n ou)siÃ´=n kai\ o(moi/Ã´ma.]]
+
+[Footnote 143: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C-D. [Greek: TÃ´=| dÃª\
+philoso/phÃ´| kai\ tau=ta ma/lista timÃ´=nti pa=sa a)na/gkÃª dia\
+tau=ta mÃª/te tÃ´=n e(\n Ãª)\ kai\ ta\ polla\ ei)/dÃª lego/ntÃ´n to\
+pa=n e(stÃªko\s a)pode/chesthai, tÃ´=n te au)= pantachÃª=| to\ o)\n
+kinou=ntÃ´n mÃªde\ to\ para/pan a)kou/ein; a)lla\ kata\ tÃª\n tÃ´=n
+pai/dÃ´n eu)chÃª/n, o(/sa a)ki/nÃªta/ te kai\ kekinÃªme/na, to\ o)/n
 te kai\ to\ pa=n, xunampho/tera le/gein.]
 
-Ritter states the result of this portion of the Sophistês
+Ritter states the result of this portion of the SophistÃªs
 correctly. "Es bleibt uns als Ergebniss aller dieser
-Untersuchungen über das Seyn, dass die Wahrheit sowohl des
-Werdens, als auch des beharrlichen Seyns, anerkannt werden müsse"
+Untersuchungen Ã¼ber das Seyn, dass die Wahrheit sowohl des
+Werdens, als auch des beharrlichen Seyns, anerkannt werden mÃ¼sse"
 (Geschichte der Philos. ii. p. 281).]
 
-[Side-note: The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view,
+[Side-note: The SophistÃªs recedes from the Platonic point of view,
 and approaches the Aristotelian.]
 
 That the Eleate in the Sophistes recedes from the Platonic point
 of view and approaches towards the Aristotelian, will be seen also
-if we look at the lesson of logic which he gives to Theætêtus. In
+if we look at the lesson of logic which he gives to TheÃ¦tÃªtus. In
 his analysis of a proposition--and in discriminating such
 conjunctions of words as are significant, from such as are
 insignificant--he places himself on the same ground as that which
@@ -15216,7 +15185,7 @@ employs it up to a certain point, but as means towards another and
 an independent purpose--towards the solution of a particular
 difficulty, which has presented itself in the course of the
 dialogue.--"_Nosti morem dialogorum._" Aristotle is demonstrative:
-Plato is dialectical. In our present dialogue (the Sophistês), the
+Plato is dialectical. In our present dialogue (the SophistÃªs), the
 Eleate has been giving a long explanation of Non-Ens; an
 explanation intended to prove that Non-Ens was a particular sort
 of Ens, and that there was therefore no absurdity (though
@@ -15249,23 +15218,23 @@ false.[146]
 [Footnote 145: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 C.]
 
 [Footnote 146: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 E. [Greek: Lo/gon
-a)nagkai=on, o(/tan per ê)=|, tino\s ei)=nai lo/gon, _mê\ de/
+a)nagkai=on, o(/tan per Ãª)=|, tino\s ei)=nai lo/gon, _mÃª\ de/
 tinos_, a)du/naton . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ poio/n tina au)to\n ei)=nai
 dei=?] Compare p. 237 E.
 
 In the words here cited Plato unconsciously slides back into the
-ordinary acceptation of [Greek: mê/ ti]: that is, to [Greek: mê\]
+ordinary acceptation of [Greek: mÃª/ ti]: that is, to [Greek: mÃª\]
 in the sense of negation. If we adopt that peculiar sense of
-[Greek: mê/], which the Eleate has taken so much pains to prove
-just before in the case of [Greek: to\ mê\ o)\n] (that is, if we
-take [Greek: mê\] as signifying not negation but simply
+[Greek: mÃª/], which the Eleate has taken so much pains to prove
+just before in the case of [Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)\n] (that is, if we
+take [Greek: mÃª\] as signifying not negation but simply
 difference), the above argument will not hold. If [Greek: ti/s]
-signifies one subject (A), and [Greek: mê/ tis] signifies simply
+signifies one subject (A), and [Greek: mÃª/ tis] signifies simply
 another subject (B) different from A ([Greek: e(/teron]), the
 predicate [Greek: a)du/naton] cannot be affirmed. But if we take
-[Greek: mê/ tis] in its proper sense of negation, the [Greek:
-a)du/naton] will be so far true that [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos, ou)
-Theai/têtos], cannot be the subject of a proposition. Aristotle
+[Greek: mÃª/ tis] in its proper sense of negation, the [Greek:
+a)du/naton] will be so far true that [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrÃ´pos, ou)
+Theai/tÃªtos], cannot be the subject of a proposition. Aristotle
 says the same in the beginning of the Treatise De Interpretatione
 (p. 16, a. 30).]
 
@@ -15289,11 +15258,11 @@ Ammonius, p. 98, Bekk.]
 names may be true or false as well as propositions, pp. 385 D, 431
 B.]
 
-[Side-note: Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible
+[Side-note: Plato in the SophistÃªs has undertaken an impossible
 task--He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary,
 that there _are_ false propositions.]
 
-The proceeding of Plato in the Sophistês is different. He supposes
+The proceeding of Plato in the SophistÃªs is different. He supposes
 a Sophist who maintains that no proposition either is false or can
 be false, and undertakes to prove against him that there are false
 propositions: he farther supposes this antagonist to reject the
@@ -15307,7 +15276,7 @@ Ens: assuming that such predication of Non-Ens constitutes a false
 proposition. But the proof fails. It serves only to show that the
 peculiar meaning ascribed by the Eleate to Non-Ens is
 inadmissible. The Eleate compares two distinct
-propositions--_Theætêtus is sitting down_--_Theætêtus is flying_. The
+propositions--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is sitting down_--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is flying_. The
 first is true: the second is false. Why? Because (says the Eleate)
 the first predicates Ens, the second predicates Non-Ens, or (to
 substitute his definition of Non-Ens) another Ens different from
@@ -15327,23 +15296,23 @@ the Sophist to do), you cannot prove that the second proposition
 is false--nor indeed that the first proposition is true. Plato has
 therefore failed in giving that dialectic proof which he promised.
 The Eleate is forced to rely (without formally confessing it), on
-the testimony of sense, which he had forbidden Theætêtus to
+the testimony of sense, which he had forbidden TheÃ¦tÃªtus to
 invoke, twenty pages before.[151] The long intervening piece of
 dialectic about Ens and Non-Ens is inconclusive for his purpose,
-and might have been omitted. The proposition--_Theætêtus is
+and might have been omitted. The proposition--_TheÃ¦tÃªtus is
 flying_--does undoubtedly predicate attributes _which are not_ as
 if they were,[152] and is thus false. But then we must consult and
 trust the evidence of our perception: we must farther accept _are
 not_ in the ordinary sense of the words, and not in the sense
-given to them by the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistês. His attempt
+given to them by the Eleate in the Platonic SophistÃªs. His attempt
 to banish the specific meaning of the negative particle, and to
 treat it as signifying nothing more than difference, appears to me
 fallacious.[153]
 
 [Footnote 149: Plato, Sophist. p. 240 A. It deserves note that
 here Plato presents to us the Sophist as rejecting the evidence of
-sense: in the Theætêtus he presents to us the Sophist as holding
-the doctrine [Greek: e)pistê/mê = ai)/sthêsis]. How these
+sense: in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus he presents to us the Sophist as holding
+the doctrine [Greek: e)pistÃª/mÃª = ai)/sthÃªsis]. How these
 propositions can both be true respecting the Sophists as a class I
 do not understand. The first may be true respecting some of them;
 the second may be true respecting others; respecting a third class
@@ -15352,17 +15321,17 @@ is hardly a single proposition which can be safely affirmed.]
 
 [Footnote 150: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 C.]
 
-[Footnote 151: Theætêtus makes this attempt and is checked by the
+[Footnote 151: TheÃ¦tÃªtus makes this attempt and is checked by the
 Eleate, pp. 239-240. It is in p. 261 A that the Eleate begins his
 proof in refutation of the supposed Sophist--that [Greek: do/xa]
 and [Greek: lo/gos] may be false. The long interval between the
 two is occupied with the reasoning about Ens and Non-Ens.]
 
-[Footnote 152: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 E. [Greek: ta\ mê\ o)/nta
-ô(s o)/nta lego/mena], &c.
+[Footnote 152: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 E. [Greek: ta\ mÃª\ o)/nta
+Ã´(s o)/nta lego/mena], &c.
 
 The distinction between these two propositions, the first as true,
-the second as false (Theætêtus is sitting down, Theætêtus is
+the second as false (TheÃ¦tÃªtus is sitting down, TheÃ¦tÃªtus is
 flying), is in noway connected with the distinction which Plato
 had so much insisted upon before respecting the intercommunion of
 Forms, Ideas, General Notions, &c., that some Forms will come into
@@ -15370,7 +15339,7 @@ communion with each other, while others will not (pp. 252-253).
 
 There is here no question of repugnancy or intercommunion of
 Forms: the question turns upon the evidence of vision, which
-informs us that Theætêtus is sitting down and not standing up or
+informs us that TheÃ¦tÃªtus is sitting down and not standing up or
 flying. If any predicate be affirmed of a subject, contrary to
 what is included in the definition of that subject, then indeed
 repugnancy of Forms might be urged.]
@@ -15387,7 +15356,7 @@ expressed: that there are certain propositions which he believes--in
 other words, which he regards as true: that there are certain
 other propositions which he disbelieves, or regards as false: that
 he has had experience of the transition from belief to disbelief,
-and _vice versâ_--in other words, of having fallen into error and
+and _vice versÃ¢_--in other words, of having fallen into error and
 afterwards come to perceive that it was error. These are the
 mental facts realised in each man and assumed by him to be also
 realised in his neighbours, when communication takes place by
@@ -15408,8 +15377,8 @@ refuting him, except by showing that his fundamental theory is
 erroneous.
 
 [Footnote 154: Aristotel. Metaphys. vii. 1043, b. 25. [Greek:
-ô(/ste ê( a)pori/a ê(\n oi( A)ntisthe/neioi kai\ oi( ou(/tôs
-_a)pai/deutoi_ ê)po/roun, e)/chei tina\ kairo/n], &c.
+Ã´(/ste Ãª( a)pori/a Ãª(\n oi( A)ntisthe/neioi kai\ oi( ou(/tÃ´s
+_a)pai/deutoi_ Ãª)po/roun, e)/chei tina\ kairo/n], &c.
 
 Compare respecting this paradox or [Greek: the/sis] of
 Antisthenes, the scholia of Alexander on the passage of
@@ -15422,7 +15391,7 @@ show, in a previous note on this dialogue, that a misconception
 lay at the bottom of the Antisthenean theory respecting identical
 predication. Compare Aristotel. Physic. i. p. 185, b. 28, together
 with the Scholia of Simplikius, pp. 329-330, ed. Bekk., and
-Plato, Sophistês, p. 245.]
+Plato, SophistÃªs, p. 245.]
 
 [Side-note: Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and
 disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply
@@ -15461,7 +15430,7 @@ granted.
 
 [Footnote 155: See the remarks in Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: G].
 1005, b. 2, 1006, a. 6. He calls it [Greek: a)paideusi/a--a)paideusi/a
-tô=n a)nalutikô=n]--not to be able to distinguish
+tÃ´=n a)nalutikÃ´=n]--not to be able to distinguish
 those matters which can be proved and require to be proved, from
 those matters which are true, but require no proof and are
 incapable of being proved. But this distinction has been one of
@@ -15474,13 +15443,13 @@ Aristotle calls Antisthenes and his followers [Greek:
 a)pai/deutoi], in the passage cited in the preceding note.]
 
 [Side-note: Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated
-in the Sophistês.]
+in the SophistÃªs.]
 
-The long and varied predicamental series, given in the Sophistês,
+The long and varied predicamental series, given in the SophistÃªs,
 illustrates the process of logical partition, as Plato conceived
 it, and the definition of a class-name founded thereupon. You take
 a logical whole, and you subtract from it part after part until
-you find the _quæsitum_ isolated from every thing else.[156] But
+you find the _quÃ¦situm_ isolated from every thing else.[156] But
 you must always divide into two parts (he says) wherever it can be
 done: dichotomy or bipartition is the true logical partition:
 should this be impracticable, trichotomy, or division into the
@@ -15496,7 +15465,7 @@ the line.[159] This is the longest way of proceeding, but the
 safest. It is a logical mistake to divide into two parts very
 unequal: you may find a form on one side of the line, but you
 obtain none on the other side. Thus, it is bad classification to
-distribute the human race into Hellênes + Barbari: the _Barbari_
+distribute the human race into HellÃªnes + Barbari: the _Barbari_
 are of infinite number and diversity, having no one common form to
 which the name can apply. It is also improper to distribute Number
 into the myriad on side, and all other numbers on the other--for a
@@ -15514,11 +15483,11 @@ particulars under _animal_.
 
 [Footnote 156: Plato, Politikus, p. 268 D. [Greek: me/ros a)ei\
 me/rous a)phairoume/nous e)p' a)/kron e)phiknei=sthai to\
-zêtou/menon.]
+zÃªtou/menon.]
 
 Ueberweg thinks that Aristotle, when he talks of [Greek: ai(
 gegramme/nai diaire/seis] alludes to these logical distributions
-in the Sophistês and Politikus (Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp.
+in the SophistÃªs and Politikus (Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp.
 153-154).]
 
 [Footnote 157: Politik. p. 287 C.]
@@ -15526,7 +15495,7 @@ in the Sophistês and Politikus (Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp.
 [Footnote 158: Politik. p. 263 C.]
 
 [Footnote 159: Politik. pp. 262 B, 265 A. [Greek: dei= mesotomei=n
-ô(s ma/lista], &c.]
+Ã´(s ma/lista], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 160: Politikus, p. 262 D-E.]
 
@@ -15544,7 +15513,7 @@ more comprehensive to the less comprehensive. It is only when you
 can find no more parts which are forms, that you must be content
 to divide into parts which are not forms. Thus after all the
 characteristic forms, for dividing the human race, have been gone
-through, they may at last be partitioned into Hellênes and
+through, they may at last be partitioned into HellÃªnes and
 Barbari, Lydians and non-Lydians, Phrygians and non-Phrygians: in
 which divisions there is no guiding form at all, but only a
 capricious distribution into fractions with separate
@@ -15553,16 +15522,16 @@ feeling or circumstance peculiar to the distributor, or shared by him
 only with a few others; such as the fact, that he is himself a Lydian
 or a Phrygian, &c.
 
-[Footnote 162: Politikus, p. 262 E. [Greek: Ludou\s de\ ê)\
-Phru/gas ê)/ tinas e(te/rous pro\s a(/pantas ta/ttôn a)po/schizoi
-to/te, ê(ni/ka a)poroi= ge/nos a)/ma kai\ me/ros eu(ri/skein
-e(ka/teron tô=n schisthe/ntôn.]]
+[Footnote 162: Politikus, p. 262 E. [Greek: Ludou\s de\ Ãª)\
+Phru/gas Ãª)/ tinas e(te/rous pro\s a(/pantas ta/ttÃ´n a)po/schizoi
+to/te, Ãª(ni/ka a)poroi= ge/nos a)/ma kai\ me/ros eu(ri/skein
+e(ka/teron tÃ´=n schisthe/ntÃ´n.]]
 
-[Side-note: Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus.]
+[Side-note: Precepts illustrated by the PhilÃªbus.]
 
-These precepts in the Sophistês and Politikus, respecting the
+These precepts in the SophistÃªs and Politikus, respecting the
 process of classification, are illustrated by an important passage
-of the Philêbus:[163] wherein Plato tells us that the constitution
+of the PhilÃªbus:[163] wherein Plato tells us that the constitution
 of things includes the Determinate and the Indeterminate
 implicated with each other, and requiring study to disengage them.
 Between the highest One, Form, or Genus--and the lowest array of
@@ -15585,18 +15554,18 @@ can be found to cover the whole field. When no more forms can be
 found, then and not till then, you must be content with nothing
 better than the countless indeterminate particulars.
 
-[Footnote 163: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 16-17.
+[Footnote 163: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 16-17.
 
 The notes of Dr. Badham upon this passage in his edition of the
-Philêbus, p. 11, should be consulted as a just correction of
-Stallbaum in regard to [Greek: pe/ras] and [Greek: tô=n e(\n
-e)kei/nôn].]
+PhilÃªbus, p. 11, should be consulted as a just correction of
+Stallbaum in regard to [Greek: pe/ras] and [Greek: tÃ´=n e(\n
+e)kei/nÃ´n].]
 
-This instructive passage of the Philêbus--while it brings to view
+This instructive passage of the PhilÃªbus--while it brings to view
 a widespread tendency of the human mind, to pass from the largest
 and vaguest generalities at once into the region of particulars,
 and to omit the distinctive sub-classes which lie
-between--illustrates usefully the drift of the Sophistês and Politikus.
+between--illustrates usefully the drift of the SophistÃªs and Politikus.
 In these two last dialogues it is the method itself of good logical
 distribution which Plato wishes to impress upon his readers: the
 formal part of the process.[164] With this view, he not only makes
@@ -15630,26 +15599,26 @@ objects as an easier preparatory mode of a process substantially
 the same in both.[166]
 
 [Footnote 166: Plato, Politik. pp. 285 E--286 A. [Greek: tou\s
-plei/stous le/lêthen o(/ti toi=s me\n tô=n o)/ntôn r(a|di/ôs
-katamathei=n ai)sthêtai/ tines o(moio/têtes pephu/kasin, a(\s
-ou)de\n chalepo\n dêlou=n, o(/tan au)tô=n tis boulê/thê| tô=|
-lo/gon ai)tou=nti peri\ tou, mê\ meta\ pragma/tôn a)lla\ chôri\s
-lo/gou r(a|di/ôs e)ndei/xasthai; toi=s d' au)= megi/stois ou)=si
-kai\ timiôta/tois ou)k e)/stin ei)/dôlon ou)de\n pro\s tou\s
-a)nthrô/pous ei)rgasme/non e)nargô=s, ou(= deichthe/ntos], &c.
-
-About the [Greek: ei)/dôlon ei)rgasme/non e)nargô=s], which is
+plei/stous le/lÃªthen o(/ti toi=s me\n tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n r(a|di/Ã´s
+katamathei=n ai)sthÃªtai/ tines o(moio/tÃªtes pephu/kasin, a(\s
+ou)de\n chalepo\n dÃªlou=n, o(/tan au)tÃ´=n tis boulÃª/thÃª| tÃ´=|
+lo/gon ai)tou=nti peri\ tou, mÃª\ meta\ pragma/tÃ´n a)lla\ chÃ´ri\s
+lo/gou r(a|di/Ã´s e)ndei/xasthai; toi=s d' au)= megi/stois ou)=si
+kai\ timiÃ´ta/tois ou)k e)/stin ei)/dÃ´lon ou)de\n pro\s tou\s
+a)nthrÃ´/pous ei)rgasme/non e)nargÃ´=s, ou(= deichthe/ntos], &c.
+
+About the [Greek: ei)/dÃ´lon ei)rgasme/non e)nargÃ´=s], which is
 affirmed in one of these two cases and denied in the other,
-compare a striking analogy in the Phædrus, p. 250 A-E.]
+compare a striking analogy in the PhÃ¦drus, p. 250 A-E.]
 
 [Side-note: Province of sensible perception--is not so much
-narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theætêtus.]
+narrowed by Plato here as it is in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus.]
 
 This explanation given by Plato, in itself just, deserves to be
 compared with his view of sensible objects as knowable, and of
 sense as a source of knowledge. I noticed in a preceding chapter
 the position which Sokrates is made to lay down in the
-Theætêtus,[167]--That ([Greek: ai)/sthêsis]) sensible perception
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus,[167]--That ([Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis]) sensible perception
 reaches only to the separate impressions of sense, and does not
 apprehend the likeness and other relations between them. I have
 also noticed the contrast which he establishes elsewhere between
@@ -15658,7 +15627,7 @@ is knowable, and the perpetual flux of Fientia which is not
 knowable at all, but is only matter of opinion or guess-work. Now
 in the dialogue before us, the Politikus, there is no such marked
 antithesis between opinion and knowledge. Nor is the province of
-[Greek: ai)/sthêsis] so strictly confined: on the contrary, Plato
+[Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis] so strictly confined: on the contrary, Plato
 here considers sensible perception as dealing with Entia, and as
 appreciating resemblances and other relations between them. It is
 by an attentive study and comparison of these facts of sense that
@@ -15671,21 +15640,21 @@ these Many, he must not rest contented until he has confined all
 such as are really cognate within one resemblance, tied together
 by the essence of one common Form."[168]
 
-[Footnote 167: Plato, Theæt. pp. 185-186. See above p. 161.]
+[Footnote 167: Plato, TheÃ¦t. pp. 185-186. See above p. 161.]
 
 [Footnote 168: Plato, Politikus, p. 285 B. [Greek: de/on, o(/tan
-me\n tê\n tô=n pollô=n tis pro/teron ai)/sthêtai koinôni/an, mê\
-proaphi/stasthai pri\n a)\n e)n au)tê=| ta\s diaphora\s i)/dê|
+me\n tÃª\n tÃ´=n pollÃ´=n tis pro/teron ai)/sthÃªtai koinÃ´ni/an, mÃª\
+proaphi/stasthai pri\n a)\n e)n au)tÃª=| ta\s diaphora\s i)/dÃª|
 pa/sas o(po/sai per e)n ei)/desi kei=ntai; ta\s de\ au)=
-pantodapa\s a)nomoio/têtas, o(/tan e)n plê/thesin o)phthô=si, mê\
-dunato\n ei)=nai dusôpou/menon pau/esthai, pri\n a)\n xu/mpanta
-ta\ oi)kei=a e)nto\s mia=s o(moio/têtos e(/rxas ge/nous tino\s
-ou)si/a| periba/lêtai.]]
+pantodapa\s a)nomoio/tÃªtas, o(/tan e)n plÃª/thesin o)phthÃ´=si, mÃª\
+dunato\n ei)=nai dusÃ´pou/menon pau/esthai, pri\n a)\n xu/mpanta
+ta\ oi)kei=a e)nto\s mia=s o(moio/tÃªtos e(/rxas ge/nous tino\s
+ou)si/a| periba/lÃªtai.]]
 
-[Side-note: Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus.]
+[Side-note: Comparison of the SophistÃªs with the PhÃ¦drus.]
 
 These passages may be compared with others of similar import in
-the Phædrus.[169] Plato here considers the Form, not as an Entity
+the PhÃ¦drus.[169] Plato here considers the Form, not as an Entity
 _per se_ separate from and independent of the particulars, but as
 implicated in and with the particulars: as a result reached by the
 mind through the attentive observation and comparison of
@@ -15694,7 +15663,7 @@ abstraction and generalisation. The self-existent Platonic Ideas
 do not appear in the Politikus:[170] which approximates rather to
 the Aristotelian doctrine:--that is, the doctrine of the
 universal, logically distinguishable from its particulars, but
-having no reality apart from them ([Greek: chôrista\ lo/gô|
+having no reality apart from them ([Greek: chÃ´rista\ lo/gÃ´|
 mo/non]). But in other dialogues of Plato, the separation between
 the two is made as complete as possible, especially in the
 striking passages of the Republic: wherein we read that the facts
@@ -15704,13 +15673,13 @@ from the sensible world, to contemplate Ideas, the separate and
 unchangeable furniture of the intelligible world--and that the
 whole process of acquiring true Cognition, consists in passing
 from the higher to the lower Forms or Ideas, without any
-misleading illustrations of sense.[171] Here, in the Sophistês and
+misleading illustrations of sense.[171] Here, in the SophistÃªs and
 Politikus, instead of having the Universal behind our backs when
 the particulars are before our faces, we see it _in and amidst_
 particulars: the illustrations of sense, instead of deluding us,
 being declared to conduce, wherever they can be had, to the
 clearness and facility of the process.[172] Here, as well as in
-the Phædrus, we find the process of Dialectic emphatically
+the PhÃ¦drus, we find the process of Dialectic emphatically
 recommended, but described as consisting mainly in logical
 classification of particulars, ascending and descending divisions
 and conjunctions, as Plato calls them[173]--analysis and
@@ -15720,7 +15689,7 @@ which can no longer be divided: also, conversely, to conjoin
 synthetically the subordinate species until the highest genus is
 attained, but taking care not to omit any of the intermediate
 species, in their successive gradations.[174] Throughout all this
-process, as described both in the Phædrus and in the Politikus,
+process, as described both in the PhÃ¦drus and in the Politikus,
 the eye is kept fixed upon the constituent individuals. The Form
 is studied in and among the particulars which it comprehends: the
 particulars are looked at in groups put together suitably to each
@@ -15730,7 +15699,7 @@ according to Forms, and not according to fractions which are not
 legitimate Forms.[175] Any other method, we are told, would be
 like the wandering of a blind man.
 
-[Footnote 169: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 C, 265 D-E.]
+[Footnote 169: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 249 C, 265 D-E.]
 
 [Footnote 170: This remark is made by Stallbaum in his Prolegg. ad
 Politicum, p. 81; and it is just, though I do not at all concur in
@@ -15740,34 +15709,34 @@ dialogue as intended to deride the Megaric philosophers.]
 [Footnote 171: See the Republic, v. pp. 476-479, vi. pp.
 508-510-511, and especially the memorable simile about the cave
 and the shadows within it, in Book vii. pp. 518-519, together with
-the [Greek: periagôgê\] which he there prescribes--[Greek: a)po\ tou=
+the [Greek: periagÃ´gÃª\] which he there prescribes--[Greek: a)po\ tou=
 gignome/nou ei)s to\ o)/n]--and the remarks respecting
 observations in astronomy and acoustics, p. 529.]
 
-[Footnote 172: Compare the passage of the Phædrus (p. 263 A-C)
+[Footnote 172: Compare the passage of the PhÃ¦drus (p. 263 A-C)
 where Plato distinguishes the sensible particulars on which men
 mostly agree, from the abstractions (Just and Unjust, &c.,
-corresponding with the [Greek: a)sô/mata, ka/llista, me/gista,
-timiô/tata], Politikus, p. 286 A) on which they are perpetually
+corresponding with the [Greek: a)sÃ´/mata, ka/llista, me/gista,
+timiÃ´/tata], Politikus, p. 286 A) on which they are perpetually
 dissenting.]
 
-[Footnote 173: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. [Greek: tou/tôn dê\
-e)/gôge au)to/s te e)rastê\s tô=n diaire/seôn kai\ sunagôgô=n
-. . . tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n . . . kalô= dialektikou/s.]
-The reason which Sokrates gives in the Phædrus for his attachment
+[Footnote 173: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 266 B. [Greek: tou/tÃ´n dÃª\
+e)/gÃ´ge au)to/s te e)rastÃª\s tÃ´=n diaire/seÃ´n kai\ sunagÃ´gÃ´=n
+. . . tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n . . . kalÃ´= dialektikou/s.]
+The reason which Sokrates gives in the PhÃ¦drus for his attachment
 to dialectics, that he may become competent in discourse and in
-wisdom ([Greek: i(/n' oi(=o/s te ô)= le/gein kai\ phronei=n]), is
+wisdom ([Greek: i(/n' oi(=o/s te Ã´)= le/gein kai\ phronei=n]), is
 the same as that which the Eleate assigns in recommendation of the
 logical exercises in the Politikus.]
 
-[Footnote 174: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 271 D, 277 B. [Greek:
-o(risa/meno/s te pa/lin kat' ei)/dê me/chri tou= a)tmê/tou
-te/mnein e)pistê/thê|.]]
+[Footnote 174: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 271 D, 277 B. [Greek:
+o(risa/meno/s te pa/lin kat' ei)/dÃª me/chri tou= a)tmÃª/tou
+te/mnein e)pistÃª/thÃª|.]]
 
-[Footnote 175: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265 E, 270 E. [Greek: e)oi/koi
-a)\n ô(/sper tuphlou= porei/a|.]]
+[Footnote 175: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, pp. 265 E, 270 E. [Greek: e)oi/koi
+a)\n Ã´(/sper tuphlou= porei/a|.]]
 
-What distinguishes the Sophistês and Politikus from most other
+What distinguishes the SophistÃªs and Politikus from most other
 dialogues of Plato, is, that the method of logical classification
 is illustrated by setting the classifier to work upon one or a few
 given subjects, some in themselves trivial, some important. Though
@@ -15776,33 +15745,33 @@ their application to the special example is kept constantly before
 us; so that we are never permitted, much less required, to divorce
 the Universal from its Particulars.
 
-[Side-note: Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês.]
+[Side-note: Comparison of the Politikus with the ParmenidÃªs.]
 
 As a dialogue illustrative of this method, the Politikus (as I
-have already pointed out) may be compared to the Phædrus: in
+have already pointed out) may be compared to the PhÃ¦drus: in
 another point of view, we shall find instruction in comparing it
-to the Parmenidês. This last too is a dialogue illustrative of
+to the ParmenidÃªs. This last too is a dialogue illustrative of
 method, but of a different variety of method.
 
 [Side-note: Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of
 Plato.]
 
-What the Sophistês and Politikus are for the enforcement of
-logical classification, the Parmenidês is for another part of the
+What the SophistÃªs and Politikus are for the enforcement of
+logical classification, the ParmenidÃªs is for another part of the
 philosophising process--laborious evolution of all the
 consequences deducible from the affirmative as well as from the
 negative of every hypothesis bearing upon the problem. And we note
-the fact, that both in the Politikus and Parmenidês, Plato
+the fact, that both in the Politikus and ParmenidÃªs, Plato
 manifests the consciousness that readers will complain of him as
 prolix, tiresome, and wasting ingenuity upon unprofitable
-matters.[176] In the Parmenidês, he even goes the length of saying
+matters.[176] In the ParmenidÃªs, he even goes the length of saying
 that the method ought only to be applied before a small and select
 audience; to most people it would be repulsive, since they cannot
 be made to comprehend the necessity for such circuitous
 preparation in order to reach truth.[177]
 
-[Footnote 176: Plato, Politikus, p. 283 B. [Greek: pro\s dê\ to\
-no/sêma to\ toiou=ton], and the long series of questions and
+[Footnote 176: Plato, Politikus, p. 283 B. [Greek: pro\s dÃª\ to\
+no/sÃªma to\ toiou=ton], and the long series of questions and
 answers which follows to show that the prolixity is unavoidable,
 pp. 285 C, 286 B-E.]
 
@@ -15816,14 +15785,14 @@ CHAPTER XXX.
 POLITIKUS.
 
 
-[Side-note: The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês.]
+[Side-note: The Politikus by itself, apart from the SophistÃªs.]
 
 I have examined in the preceding sections both that which the
-Sophistês and Politikus present in common--(_viz._ a lesson, as
+SophistÃªs and Politikus present in common--(_viz._ a lesson, as
 well as a partial theory, of the logical processes called
-Definition and Division)--and that which Sophistês presents apart
+Definition and Division)--and that which SophistÃªs presents apart
 from the Politikus. I now advert to two matters which we find in
-the Politikus, but not in the Sophistês. Both of them will be
+the Politikus, but not in the SophistÃªs. Both of them will be
 found to illustrate the Platonic mode of philosophising.
 
 [Side-note: Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against
@@ -15882,13 +15851,13 @@ Senses and The Intellect, 3rd edition, p. 93. This explanation
 forms an item in the copious enumeration given by Mr. Bain of the
 fundamental sensations of our nature.]
 
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Politik. p. 283 D. [Greek: kata\ tê\n tê=s
-gene/seôs a)nagkai/an ou)si/an].--284 A-C. [Greek: pro\s tê\n tou=
+[Footnote 4: Plato, Politik. p. 283 D. [Greek: kata\ tÃª\n tÃª=s
+gene/seÃ´s a)nagkai/an ou)si/an].--284 A-C. [Greek: pro\s tÃª\n tou=
 metri/ou ge/nesin].]
 
 [Footnote 5: Plato, Politik. p. 284 C.]
 
-[Side-note: Purpose in the Sophistês and Politikus is--To attain
+[Side-note: Purpose in the SophistÃªs and Politikus is--To attain
 dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to
 judge whether the means employed are suitable.]
 
@@ -15906,7 +15875,7 @@ illustrations. If he cannot show this, we shall disregard his
 censure as inapplicable.[6]
 
 [Footnote 6: Plato, Politik. pp. 286 D, 287 A. Compare Plato,
-Philêbus, p. 36 D.]
+PhilÃªbus, p. 36 D.]
 
 [Side-note: Plato's defence of the Politikus against critics.
 Necessity that the critic shall declare explicitly what his
@@ -15942,22 +15911,22 @@ times.
 
 [Footnote 7: Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 7, iii. 10, 12.]
 
-[Side-note: Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon,
-Philêbus, &c.]
+[Side-note: Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, PhÃ¦don,
+PhilÃªbus, &c.]
 
 To this relative side of Plato's mind belong his frequent
 commendations of measurement, numbering, computation, comparison,
 &c. In the Protagoras,[8] he describes the art of measurement as
 the main guide and protector of human life: it is there treated as
 applicable to the correct estimation of pleasures and pains. In
-the Phædon,[9] it is again extolled: though the elements to be
-calculated are there specified differently. In the Philêbus, the
+the PhÃ¦don,[9] it is again extolled: though the elements to be
+calculated are there specified differently. In the PhilÃªbus, the
 antithesis of [Greek: Pe/ras] and [Greek: A)/peiron] (the
 Determinant or Limit, and the Indeterminate or Infinite) is one of
 the leading points of the dialogue. We read in it moreover a
 bipartite division of Mensuration or Arithmetic,[10] which is
 quite different from the bipartite division just cited out of the
-Politikus. Plato divides it there (in the Philêbus) into
+Politikus. Plato divides it there (in the PhilÃªbus) into
 arithmetic for theorists, and arithmetic for practical life:
 besides which, he distinguishes the various practical arts as
 being more or less accurate, according as they have more or less
@@ -15974,11 +15943,11 @@ sentiment unsystematic and unanalysed.
 
 [Footnote 8: Plato, Protagor. p. 357 B.]
 
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Phædon, p. 69 B.]
+[Footnote 9: Plato, PhÃ¦don, p. 69 B.]
 
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 25 C, 27 D, 57. [Greek: du/o
-a)rithmêtikai\ kai\ du/o metrêtikai/ . . . tê\n didumo/têta
-e)/chousai tau/tên, o)no/matos de\ e(no\s kekoinôme/nai.]
+[Footnote 10: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 25 C, 27 D, 57. [Greek: du/o
+a)rithmÃªtikai\ kai\ du/o metrÃªtikai/ . . . tÃª\n didumo/tÃªta
+e)/chousai tau/tÃªn, o)no/matos de\ e(no\s kekoinÃ´me/nai.]
 
 This same bipartition, however, is noticed in another passage of
 the Politikus, p. 258 D-E.]
@@ -16001,7 +15970,7 @@ Memorabilia of Xenophon,[12] Sokrates makes the same express
 declaration.) The King knows, but does not act: yet he is not a
 simple critic or spectator--he gives orders: and those orders are
 not suggested to him by any one else (as in the case of the
-Herald, the Keleustês, and others),[13] but spring from his own
+Herald, the KeleustÃªs, and others),[13] but spring from his own
 bosom and his own knowledge. From thence Plato carries us through
 a series of descending logical subdivisions, until we come to
 define the King as the shepherd and feeder of the flock of human
@@ -16018,8 +15987,8 @@ unsuitable.[16]
 
 [Footnote 12: Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 9, 10.]
 
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Politik. p. 260 C-E. [Greek: to\ me\n tô=n
-basile/ôn ge/nos ei)s tê\n au)tepitaktikê\n the/ntes], &c.]
+[Footnote 13: Plato, Politik. p. 260 C-E. [Greek: to\ me\n tÃ´=n
+basile/Ã´n ge/nos ei)s tÃª\n au)tepitaktikÃª\n the/ntes], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 14: Plato, Politik. pp. 267 B, 268 C.]
 
@@ -16050,7 +16019,7 @@ the King of the present or human period.[17] At the first
 commencement of the present period, the human flock, left to
 themselves without superintendance from the Gods, suffered great
 misery: but various presents from some Gods (fire from Prometheus,
-arts from Hephæstus and Athênê, plants and seeds from Dêmêtêr)
+arts from HephÃ¦stus and AthÃªnÃª, plants and seeds from DÃªmÃªtÃªr)
 rendered their condition more endurable, though still full of
 difficulty and hardship.[18]
 
@@ -16063,23 +16032,23 @@ and remarkable mythe--theological, cosmical, zoological,
 social--which occupies six pages of the Politikus (268 D--274 E).
 Meiners and Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 273-275) point out
 that the theology of Plato in this fable differs much from what we
-read in the Phædon, Republic, &c.: and Socher insists upon such
+read in the PhÃ¦don, Republic, &c.: and Socher insists upon such
 discrepancy as one of his arguments against the genuineness of the
 Politikus. I have already observed that I do not concur in his
 inference. I do not expect uniformity of doctrine in the various
 Platonic dialogues: more especially on a subject so much beyond
 experience, and so completely open to the conjectures of a rich
-imagination, as theology and cosmogony. In the Sophistês, pp.
+imagination, as theology and cosmogony. In the SophistÃªs, pp.
 242-243, Plato had talked in a sort of contemptuous tone about those
 who dealt with philosophical doctrine in the way of mythe, as a
 proceeding fit only for boys: (not unlike the manner of Aristotle,
-when he speaks of [Greek: oi( muthikô=s sophizo/menoi--ta\ u(pe\r
-ê(ma=s], Metaphys. B. 1000, a. 15-18, [Greek: L]. 1071, b. 27): while
+when he speaks of [Greek: oi( muthikÃ´=s sophizo/menoi--ta\ u(pe\r
+Ãª(ma=s], Metaphys. B. 1000, a. 15-18, [Greek: L]. 1071, b. 27): while
 here, in the Politikus, he dilates upon what he admits to be a
 boyish mythe, partly because a certain portion of it may be made
 available in illustration of his philosophical purpose, partly
 because he wishes to enliven the monotony of a long-continued
-classification. Again, in the Phædrus (**p. 229 C), the Platonic
+classification. Again, in the PhÃ¦drus (**p. 229 C), the Platonic
 Sokrates is made to censure as futile any attempt to find rational
 explanations for the popular legends ([Greek: sophi/zesthai]): but
 here, in the Politikus, the Eleate expressly adapts his theory
@@ -16088,7 +16057,7 @@ explanation of the popular legends--about earthborn men, and about
 Helios turning back his chariot, in order to escape the shocking
 spectacle of the Thyestean banquet: which legends, when so
 explained, Plato declares that people would be wrong to disbelieve
-([Greek: oi( nu=n u(po\ pollô=n ou)k o)rthô=s a)pistou=ntai], pp.
+([Greek: oi( nu=n u(po\ pollÃ´=n ou)k o)rthÃ´=s a)pistou=ntai], pp.
 271 B, 268 A, B, C).
 
 The differences of doctrine and handling, between the various
@@ -16096,7 +16065,7 @@ Platonic dialogues, are facts not less worthy to be noted than the
 similarities. Here, in the mythe of the Politikus, we find a
 peculiar theological view, and a very remarkable cosmical
 doctrine--the rotation and counter-rotation of the Kosmos. The
-Kosmos is here declared (as in the Timæus) to be a living and
+Kosmos is here declared (as in the TimÃ¦us) to be a living and
 intelligent Subject; having received these mental gifts from its
 Demiurgus. But the Kosmos is also Body as well as Mind; so that it
 is incapable of that constant sameness or uniformity which belongs
@@ -16105,13 +16074,13 @@ disorder (p. 269 D). The Kosmos is perpetually in movement; but
 its movement is only rotatory or circular in the same place: which
 is the nearest approximation to uniformity of movement. It does
 not always revolve by itself; nor is it always made to revolve by
-the Divine Steersman ([Greek: kubernê/tês], p. 272 E), but
+the Divine Steersman ([Greek: kubernÃª/tÃªs], p. 272 E), but
 alternately the one and the other. This Divine Steersman presides
 over its rotation for a certain time, and along with him many
-subordinate Deities or Dæmons; until an epoch fixed by some
+subordinate Deities or DÃ¦mons; until an epoch fixed by some
 unassigned destiny has been reached (p. 272 E). Then the Steersman
 withdraws from the process to his own watch-tower ([Greek: ei)s
-tê\n au)tou= periôpê\n]), and the other Deities along with him.
+tÃª\n au)tou= periÃ´pÃª\n]), and the other Deities along with him.
 The Kosmos, being left to itself, ceases to revolve in the same
 direction, and begins its counter rotation; revolving by itself
 backwards, or in the contrary direction. By such violent revulsion
@@ -16140,7 +16109,7 @@ men are under human rule, and not divine: there is no such marked
 superiority of the Ruler to his subjects. The human race has been
 on the point of becoming extinct; and has only been saved by
 beneficent presents from various Gods--fire from Prometheus,
-handicraft from Hephæstus and Athênê (pp. 272 C, 274 C).
+handicraft from HephÃ¦stus and AthÃªnÃª (pp. 272 C, 274 C).
 
 All this prodigious bulk of mythical invention ([Greek:
 thaumasto\s o)/gkos], p. 277 B) seems to be introduced here for
@@ -16164,8 +16133,8 @@ i)e/nai], p. 270 A), with an inverted reproduction of past
 phenomena, appears to me one of the most singular fancies in the
 Greek mythology. I cannot tell how far it may have been suggested
 by any such statement as that of the Egyptian priests (Herodot.
-ii. 142). I can only repeat the observation made by Phædrus to the
-Platonic Sokrates, in the dialogue Phædrus (p. 275 A): "You,
+ii. 142). I can only repeat the observation made by PhÃ¦drus to the
+Platonic Sokrates, in the dialogue PhÃ¦drus (p. 275 A): "You,
 Sokrates, construct easily enough Egyptian tales, or any other
 tales that you please".]
 
@@ -16218,7 +16187,7 @@ men by comparing them to lions, centaurs, satyrs, wild beasts,
 feeble and crafty. This is not very intelligible, but I presume
 that it alludes to the variety of functions, and the frequent
 alternation of functions. I cannot think that such an obscure jest
-deserves Stallbaum's compliment:--"Ceterum lepidissima hæc est
+deserves Stallbaum's compliment:--"Ceterum lepidissima hÃ¦c est
 istorum hominum irrisio, qui cum leonibus, Centauris, Satyris,
 aliisque monstris comparantur". Plato repeats it p. 303 C.]
 
@@ -16255,10 +16224,10 @@ approaches to it, more or less defective or objectionable.[26]
 
 [Footnote 25: Plato, Politik. pp. 292 C, 293 B.]
 
-[Footnote 26: Plato, Politik. p. 293 E. [Greek: tau/tên to/te kai\
-kata\ tou\s toiou/tous o(/rous ê(mi=n mo/nên o)rthê\n politei/an
-ei)=nai r(ête/on, o(/sas de\ a)/llas le/gomen, ou) gnêsi/as ou)d'
-o)/ntôs ou)/sas lekte/on.]]
+[Footnote 26: Plato, Politik. p. 293 E. [Greek: tau/tÃªn to/te kai\
+kata\ tou\s toiou/tous o(/rous Ãª(mi=n mo/nÃªn o)rthÃª\n politei/an
+ei)=nai r(Ãªte/on, o(/sas de\ a)/llas le/gomen, ou) gnÃªsi/as ou)d'
+o)/ntÃ´s ou)/sas lekte/on.]]
 
 [Side-note: Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government
 by any numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one
@@ -16301,7 +16270,7 @@ instead of worse.[32]
 [Footnote 28: Plato, Politik. p. 293 B-E.]
 
 [Footnote 29: Plato, Politik. p. 297 A. [Greek: ou) gra/mmata
-tithei\s a)lla\ tê\n te/chnên no/mon parecho/menos.]]
+tithei\s a)lla\ tÃª\n te/chnÃªn no/mon parecho/menos.]]
 
 [Footnote 30: Plato, Politik. pp. 300 C, 295 B-C.]
 
@@ -16334,25 +16303,25 @@ altogether intolerable. Yet these are the trammels under which in
 actual cities the political Art is exercised.[35]
 
 [Footnote 33: Plato, Politik. pp. 298-299. 299 B: [Greek: Kai\
-toi/nun e)/ti deê/sei the/sthai no/mon e)pi\ pa=si tou/tois, a)/n
-tis kubernêtikê\n kai\ to\ nautiko\n ê)\ to\ u(gieino\n kai\
-i)atrikê=s a)lêthei/an . . . zêtô=n phai/nêtai para\ ta\ gra/mmata
-kai\ sophizo/menos o(tiou=n peri\ ta\ toiau=ta, prô=ton me\n mê/te
-i)atriko\n au)to\n mê/te kubernêtiko\n o)noma/zein, a)lla\
-meteôro/logon a)dole/schên tina\ sophistê\n ei)=th' ô(s
-diaphthei/ronta a)/llous neôte/rous kai\ a)napei/thonta
-e)piti/thesthai kubernêtikê=|], &c.]
+toi/nun e)/ti deÃª/sei the/sthai no/mon e)pi\ pa=si tou/tois, a)/n
+tis kubernÃªtikÃª\n kai\ to\ nautiko\n Ãª)\ to\ u(gieino\n kai\
+i)atrikÃª=s a)lÃªthei/an . . . zÃªtÃ´=n phai/nÃªtai para\ ta\ gra/mmata
+kai\ sophizo/menos o(tiou=n peri\ ta\ toiau=ta, prÃ´=ton me\n mÃª/te
+i)atriko\n au)to\n mÃª/te kubernÃªtiko\n o)noma/zein, a)lla\
+meteÃ´ro/logon a)dole/schÃªn tina\ sophistÃª\n ei)=th' Ã´(s
+diaphthei/ronta a)/llous neÃ´te/rous kai\ a)napei/thonta
+e)piti/thesthai kubernÃªtikÃª=|], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 34: Plato, Polit. p. 299 C. [Greek: a)\n de\ para\ tou\s
-no/mous kai\ ta\ gegramme/na do/xê| pei/thein ei)/te ne/ous ei)/te
-presbu/tas, kola/zein toi=s e)scha/tois. Ou)de\n ga\r dei=n tô=n
-no/môn, ei)=nai sophô/teron; ou)de/na ga\r a)gnoei=n to/ te
-i)atriko\n kai\ to\ u(gieino\n ou)de\ to\ kubernêtiko\n kai\
-nautiko/n; e)xei=nai ga\r tô=| boulome/nô| mantha/nein gegramme/na
-kai\ pa/tria e)/thê kei/mena.]]
-
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Polit. p. 299 D-E. [Greek: ô(/ste o( bi/os,
-ô(n kai\ nu=n chalepo/s, ei)s to\n chro/non e)kei=non a)bi/ôtos
+no/mous kai\ ta\ gegramme/na do/xÃª| pei/thein ei)/te ne/ous ei)/te
+presbu/tas, kola/zein toi=s e)scha/tois. Ou)de\n ga\r dei=n tÃ´=n
+no/mÃ´n, ei)=nai sophÃ´/teron; ou)de/na ga\r a)gnoei=n to/ te
+i)atriko\n kai\ to\ u(gieino\n ou)de\ to\ kubernÃªtiko\n kai\
+nautiko/n; e)xei=nai ga\r tÃ´=| boulome/nÃ´| mantha/nein gegramme/na
+kai\ pa/tria e)/thÃª kei/mena.]]
+
+[Footnote 35: Plato, Polit. p. 299 D-E. [Greek: Ã´(/ste o( bi/os,
+Ã´(n kai\ nu=n chalepo/s, ei)s to\n chro/non e)kei=non a)bi/Ã´tos
 gi/gnoit' a)\n to\ para/pan.]]
 
 [Side-note: Government by fixed laws is better than lawless
@@ -16386,8 +16355,8 @@ plou=s].]
 
 [Footnote 38: Plato, Politik. p. 301 D.]
 
-[Footnote 39: Plato, Polit. p. 302 A. [Greek: ê)\ e)kei=no ê(mi=n
-thaumaste/on ma=llon, ô(s i)schuro/n ti po/lis e)sti\ phu/sei?]]
+[Footnote 39: Plato, Polit. p. 302 A. [Greek: Ãª)\ e)kei=no Ãª(mi=n
+thaumaste/on ma=llon, Ã´(s i)schuro/n ti po/lis e)sti\ phu/sei?]]
 
 [Side-note: Comparison of unscientific governments. The one despot
 is the worse. Democracy is the least bad, because it is least of a
@@ -16420,15 +16389,15 @@ of the six varieties of sham-polity. Assuming the presence of
 laws, it is the worst of them.[41]
 
 [Footnote 40: Plato, Polit. pp. 302-303 B-C. [Greek: tou\s
-koinônou\s tou/tôn tô=n politeiô=n pasô=n, plê\n tê=s
-e)pistê/monos, a)phairete/on ô(s ou)k o)/ntas politikou\s a)lla\
-stasiastikou/s, kai\ ei)dô/lôn megi/stôn prosta/tas o)/ntas kai\
-au)tou\s ei)=nai toiou/tous, megi/stous de\ o)/ntas mimêta\s kai\
-go/êtas megi/stous gi/gnesthai tô=n sophistô=n sophista/s.]]
+koinÃ´nou\s tou/tÃ´n tÃ´=n politeiÃ´=n pasÃ´=n, plÃª\n tÃª=s
+e)pistÃª/monos, a)phairete/on Ã´(s ou)k o)/ntas politikou\s a)lla\
+stasiastikou/s, kai\ ei)dÃ´/lÃ´n megi/stÃ´n prosta/tas o)/ntas kai\
+au)tou\s ei)=nai toiou/tous, megi/stous de\ o)/ntas mimÃªta\s kai\
+go/Ãªtas megi/stous gi/gnesthai tÃ´=n sophistÃ´=n sophista/s.]]
 
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Polit. p. 302 B. [Greek: ti/s dê\ tô=n ou)k
-o)rthô=n politeiô=n tou/tôn ê(/kista chalepê\ suzê=n, pasô=n
-chalepô=n ou)sô=n, kai\ ti/s baruta/tê?] Also p. 303 A-B.]
+[Footnote 41: Plato, Polit. p. 302 B. [Greek: ti/s dÃª\ tÃ´=n ou)k
+o)rthÃ´=n politeiÃ´=n tou/tÃ´n Ãª(/kista chalepÃª\ suzÃª=n, pasÃ´=n
+chalepÃ´=n ou)sÃ´=n, kai\ ti/s baruta/tÃª?] Also p. 303 A-B.]
 
 [Side-note: The true governor distinguished from the General, the
 Rhetor, &c. They are all properly his subordinates and
@@ -16465,10 +16434,10 @@ restraining their interference.[43]
 
 [Footnote 42: Plato, Polit. pp. 304-305.]
 
-[Footnote 43: Plato, Polit. p. 305 D. [Greek: tê\n ga\r o)/ntôs
-ou)=san basilikê\n ou)k au)tê\n dei= pra/ttein, a)ll' a)/rchein
-tô=n duname/nôn pra/ttein, gignô/skousan tê\n a)rchê/n te kai\
-o(rmê\n tô=n megi/stôn e)n tai=s po/lesin e)gkairi/as te pe/ri
+[Footnote 43: Plato, Polit. p. 305 D. [Greek: tÃª\n ga\r o)/ntÃ´s
+ou)=san basilikÃª\n ou)k au)tÃª\n dei= pra/ttein, a)ll' a)/rchein
+tÃ´=n duname/nÃ´n pra/ttein, gignÃ´/skousan tÃª\n a)rchÃª/n te kai\
+o(rmÃª\n tÃ´=n megi/stÃ´n e)n tai=s po/lesin e)gkairi/as te pe/ri
 kai\ a)kairi/as, ta\s d' a)/llas ta\ prostachthe/nta dra=|n.]]
 
 [Side-note: What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at
@@ -16499,8 +16468,8 @@ lest the breed should in time become too violent--nor the gentle
 and quiet families to do the like, lest the offspring should
 degenerate into stupidity.[46]
 
-[Footnote 44: Plato, Polit. pp. 306-307. [Greek: tê\n basilikê\n
-sumplokê/n].]
+[Footnote 44: Plato, Polit. pp. 306-307. [Greek: tÃª\n basilikÃª\n
+sumplokÃª/n].]
 
 [Footnote 45: Plato, Polit. pp. 306 A-B, 307 C, 308 B.]
 
@@ -16560,7 +16529,7 @@ Plato and Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action.]
 From Sokrates the idea passed both to Plato and to Xenophon: and
 the contrast between the two is shown forcibly by the different
 way in which they deal with it. Xenophon has worked it out on a
-large scale, in the Cyropædia--on a small scale, in the
+large scale, in the CyropÃ¦dia--on a small scale, in the
 OEconomicus. Cyrus in the former, Ischomachus in the latter,
 knows better than any one else what is to be done, and gives
 orders accordingly. But both the one and the other are also
@@ -16595,11 +16564,11 @@ circumstances alike unexpected and perilous.
 
 [Footnote 50: Plato, Polit. pp. 259 C-D, 305 D.]
 
-[Footnote 51: See the preface to Xenophon's Cyropædia; also
-Cyropæd. i. 6, 20; and his Oecon. c. 21, and c. 13, 4, where we
+[Footnote 51: See the preface to Xenophon's CyropÃ¦dia; also
+CyropÃ¦d. i. 6, 20; and his Oecon. c. 21, and c. 13, 4, where we
 see the difference between the Xenophontic idea, and the Platonic
-idea, of [Greek: o( a)rchiko\s a)nthrô/pôn, oi( thei=oi kai\
-a)gathoi\ kai\ e)pistê/mones a)/rchontes].]
+idea, of [Greek: o( a)rchiko\s a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n, oi( thei=oi kai\
+a)gathoi\ kai\ e)pistÃª/mones a)/rchontes].]
 
 [Side-note: The theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to
 that theory which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras.]
@@ -16612,7 +16581,7 @@ practise them. The knowledge possessed by such one or few,
 suffices for all the remaining community; who benefit by it, but
 are altogether ignorant on the matter, and follow orders
 blindfold. As this one Artist is the only competent person for the
-task, so he is assumed _quâ_ Artist, to be infallible in the
+task, so he is assumed _quÃ¢_ Artist, to be infallible in the
 performance of the task--never to go wrong, nor to abuse his
 power, nor to aim at any collateral end.[52] Such is Plato's
 theory of government in the Politikus. But if we turn to the
@@ -16714,14 +16683,14 @@ institutions of society into contempt, and encourages violators of
 the law.[57]
 
 [Footnote 57: Plato, Politik. p. 299 B. [Greek: a)\n tis . . .
-zêtô=n phai/nêtai para\ ta\ gra/mmata kai\ sophizo/menos o(tiou=n
+zÃªtÃ´=n phai/nÃªtai para\ ta\ gra/mmata kai\ sophizo/menos o(tiou=n
 peri\ ta\ toiau=ta.]
 
 In the seventh book of Republic (p. 520 B), Plato describes the
 position of the philosopher in an established society, springing
 up by his own internal force, against the opposition of all the
-social influences--[Greek: au)to/matoi ga\r e)mphu/ontai a)kou/sês
-tê=s e)n e(ka/stê| (po/lei) politei/as], &c.]
+social influences--[Greek: au)to/matoi ga\r e)mphu/ontai a)kou/sÃªs
+tÃª=s e)n e(ka/stÃª| (po/lei) politei/as], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato
 complains of the assumption of infallibility in existing
@@ -16737,7 +16706,7 @@ not to be denied: but they were less intolerant than any of their
 contemporaries. Nowhere else except at Athens could Sokrates have
 gone on until seventy years of age talking freely in the
 market-place against the received political and religious orthodoxy.
-There was more free speech ([Greek: par)r(êsi/a])[58] at Athens
+There was more free speech ([Greek: par)r(Ãªsi/a])[58] at Athens
 than in any part of the contemporary world. Plato, Xenophon, and
 the other companions of Sokrates, proclaimed by lectures and
 writings that they thought themselves wiser than the laws of
@@ -16773,14 +16742,14 @@ something worse.
 
 [Footnote 58: See Euripides, Ion, 671.
 
- [Greek: e)k tô=n A)thênô=n m' ê( tekou=s' ei)/ê gunê/,
-ô(/s moi ge/noito mêtro/then par)r(êsi/a.]
+ [Greek: e)k tÃ´=n A)thÃªnÃ´=n m' Ãª( tekou=s' ei)/Ãª gunÃª/,
+Ã´(/s moi ge/noito mÃªtro/then par)r(Ãªsi/a.]
 
 Also Euripid. Hippolyt. 424, and Plato, Gorgias, p. 461 E, where
 Sokrates says to Polus--[Greek: deina\ me/nt' a)\n pa/thois, ei)
-A)thê/naze a)phiko/menos, ou)= tê=s E(lla/dos, plei/stê e)sti\n
+A)thÃª/naze a)phiko/menos, ou)= tÃª=s E(lla/dos, plei/stÃª e)sti\n
 e)xousi/a tou= le/gein, e)/peita su\ e)ntau=tha tou/tou mo/nos
-a)tuchê/sais], &c.]
+a)tuchÃª/sais], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 59: Plato, Polit. p. 299 E.]
 
@@ -16821,7 +16790,7 @@ exorbitant ambition and unmeasured desires.
 This is put forward as the worst scheme of all: as the greatest
 depravation of society, and the greatest forfeiture of public as
 well as private happiness. We have here the proposition which
-Pôlus and Kalliklês are introduced as defending in the Gorgias,
+PÃ´lus and KalliklÃªs are introduced as defending in the Gorgias,
 and Thrasymachus in the Republic. In both dialogues, Sokrates
 undertakes to expose it. The great benefit conferred by King
 Nomos, is, that he protects society against the maximum of evil.
@@ -16877,7 +16846,7 @@ of command belongs to every art in its own province and over its
 own subject-matter (which is the cardinal point in the
 Politikus)--but he farther proclaims that each individual neither can
 exercise, nor ought to exercise, more than one art. He allows no
-double men or triple men[61]--"Quam quisque novit artem, in eâ se
+double men or triple men[61]--"Quam quisque novit artem, in eÃ¢ se
 exerceat". He would not have respected the Xenophontic Cyrus or
 Ischomachus. He carries the principle of specialization to its
 extreme point. His Republic is an aggregate of special artists and
@@ -16890,13 +16859,13 @@ each man, and each of the three souls composing each man, shall do
 his own business and his own business only: this is his definition
 of Justice, in the Republic.[62]
 
-[Footnote 60: Plato, Republ. i. p. 342 C. [Greek: A)lla\ mê\n
+[Footnote 60: Plato, Republ. i. p. 342 C. [Greek: A)lla\ mÃª\n
 a)/rchousi ge ai( te/chnai kai\ kratou=sin e)kei/nou ou)= per
 ei)si\ te/chnai.]]
 
 [Footnote 61: Plato, Republ. ii. pp. 370 B, 374 B--395-397 E.
-[Greek: ou)k e)/sti diplou=s a)nê\r par' ê(mi=n ou)de\
-pollaplou=s, e)peidê\ e(/kastos e(\n pra/ttei] (p. 397 E).]
+[Greek: ou)k e)/sti diplou=s a)nÃª\r par' Ãª(mi=n ou)de\
+pollaplou=s, e)peidÃª\ e(/kastos e(\n pra/ttei] (p. 397 E).]
 
 [Footnote 62: Plato, Republ. iv. p. 433.]
 
@@ -16914,11 +16883,11 @@ of names. Right and legitimate name-giving is declared to be an
 affair of science or art, like right and legitimate polity: it can
 only be performed by the competent scientific or artistic
 name-giver, or by the lawgiver considered in that special capacity.
-The second title of the dialogue Kratylus is [Greek: Peri\ O)noma/tôn
-O)rtho/têtos]--On the Rectitude or legitimacy of names. What
+The second title of the dialogue Kratylus is [Greek: Peri\ O)noma/tÃ´n
+O)rtho/tÃªtos]--On the Rectitude or legitimacy of names. What
 constitutes right and legitimate Name-giving? In like manner, we
 might provide a second title for the Politikus--[Greek: Peri\
-Politei/as O)rtho/têtos]--On the rectitude or legitimacy of polity
+Politei/as O)rtho/tÃªtos]--On the rectitude or legitimacy of polity
 or sociality. What constitutes right or legitimate sociality?[63]
 Plato answers--It is the constant dictation and supervision of art
 or science--or of the scientific, artistic, dictator, who alone
@@ -16941,14 +16910,14 @@ to a _second-best_, an inferior and vulgar principle approximating
 more or less, to rectitude--that is, custom and convention.[67]
 
 [Footnote 63: The exact expression occurs in Politikus, pp. 293 E,
-294 A. [Greek: nu=n de\ ê)/dê phanero\n o(/ti tou=to
-boulêso/metha, to\ peri\ tê=s tô=n a)/neu no/môn a)rcho/ntôn
-o)rtho/têtos dielthei=n ê(ma=s.]
+294 A. [Greek: nu=n de\ Ãª)/dÃª phanero\n o(/ti tou=to
+boulÃªso/metha, to\ peri\ tÃª=s tÃ´=n a)/neu no/mÃ´n a)rcho/ntÃ´n
+o)rtho/tÃªtos dielthei=n Ãª(ma=s.]
 
-The [Greek: o)rthê/, a)lêthinê/, gnêsi/a, politei/a] are phrases
+The [Greek: o)rthÃª/, a)lÃªthinÃª/, gnÃªsi/a, politei/a] are phrases
 employed several times--pp. 292 A-C, 293 B-E, 296 E, 297 B-D. 300
-D-E: [Greek: o( a)lêthino/s, o( e)/ntechnos]. 300 E: [Greek: tê\n
-a)lêthinê\n e)kei/nên, tê\n tou= e(no\s meta\ te/chnês a)/rchontos
+D-E: [Greek: o( a)lÃªthino/s, o( e)/ntechnos]. 300 E: [Greek: tÃª\n
+a)lÃªthinÃª\n e)kei/nÃªn, tÃª\n tou= e(no\s meta\ te/chnÃªs a)/rchontos
 politei/an]. 302 A-E.
 
 Plato sometimes speaks as if a bad [Greek: politei/a] were no
@@ -16957,13 +16926,13 @@ Plato sometimes speaks as if a bad [Greek: politei/a] were no
 I have touched on this point in reviewing the Minos. This is a
 frequent and perplexing confusion, but purely verbal. Compare
 Aristotel. Polit. iii. 2. p. 1276, a. 1, where he deals with the
-like confusion--[Greek: a)=r' ei) mê\ dikai/ôs poli/tês, ou)
-poli/tês?]]
+like confusion--[Greek: a)=r' ei) mÃª\ dikai/Ã´s poli/tÃªs, ou)
+poli/tÃªs?]]
 
 [Footnote 64: Plato, Kratylus, p. 388 E. [Greek: Ou)/k a)/ra
 panto\s a)ndro\s o)/noma the/sthai e)/stin, a)lla/ tinos
-o)nomatourgou/; ou(=tos d' e)/stin, ô(s e)/oiken, o( nomothe/tês,
-o(\s dê\ tô=n dêmiourgô=n spaniô/tatos e)n a)nthrô/pois
+o)nomatourgou/; ou(=tos d' e)/stin, Ã´(s e)/oiken, o( nomothe/tÃªs,
+o(\s dÃª\ tÃ´=n dÃªmiourgÃ´=n spaniÃ´/tatos e)n a)nthrÃ´/pois
 gi/gnetai.] Compare Politik. p. 292 D.]
 
 [Footnote 65: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 430, 431 D, 430 C.]
@@ -16975,7 +16944,7 @@ gi/gnetai.] Compare Politik. p. 292 D.]
 So in the Protagoras (p. 328 A) we find the Platonic Protagoras
 comparing the self-originated and self-sustaining traditional
 ethics, to the traditional language--[Greek: ti/s dida/skalo/s
-e)sti tou= E(llêni/zein?]]
+e)sti tou= E(llÃªni/zein?]]
 
 We see thus that in the Kratylus also, as well as in the
 Politikus, the systematic dictation of the Man of Science or Art
@@ -16988,8 +16957,8 @@ community, and resting upon their common sentiment, memory, and
 tradition.
 
 [Side-note: Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No
-notice taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and
-Charmidês.]
+notice taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in LachÃªs and
+CharmidÃªs.]
 
 This is the true Platonic point of view, considering human affairs
 in every department, the highest as well as the lowest, as
@@ -17010,18 +16979,18 @@ these two forms the true Regal Web of social life.[69]
 [Footnote 68:The want of coherence, or of reference to any common
 and distinct End, among the bundle of established [Greek: No/mima]
 is noted by Aristotle, Polit. vii. 2, 1324, b. 5: [Greek: dio\ kai\
-tô=n plei/stôn nomi/môn chu/dên, ô(s ei)pei=n _keime/nôn_ para\
-toi=s plei/stois, o(/môs, ei)/ pou/ ti pro\s e(\n oi( no/moi
-ble/pousi, tou= kratei=n stocha/zontai Krê/tê| pro\s tou\s
-pole/mous sunte/taktai schedo\n ê)\ te paidei/a kai\ to\ tô=n
-no/môn plê=thos.]
+tÃ´=n plei/stÃ´n nomi/mÃ´n chu/dÃªn, Ã´(s ei)pei=n _keime/nÃ´n_ para\
+toi=s plei/stois, o(/mÃ´s, ei)/ pou/ ti pro\s e(\n oi( no/moi
+ble/pousi, tou= kratei=n stocha/zontai KrÃª/tÃª| pro\s tou\s
+pole/mous sunte/taktai schedo\n Ãª)\ te paidei/a kai\ to\ tÃ´=n
+no/mÃ´n plÃª=thos.]
 
 Custom and education surround all prohibitions with the like
 sanctity--both those most essential to the common security, and
 those which emanate from capricious or local antipathy--in the
 minds of docile citizens.
 
-[Greek: I)=so/n toi kua/mous te phagei=n, kephala/s te tokê/ôn.]
+[Greek: I)=so/n toi kua/mous te phagei=n, kephala/s te tokÃª/Ã´n.]
 
 Aristotle dissents from Plato on the point of always vesting the
 governing functions in the same hands. He considers such a
@@ -17029,11 +16998,11 @@ provision dangerous and intolerable to the governed.
 
 Aristot. Polit. ii. 5, 1264, b. 6.]
 
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Polit. p. 306 A. [Greek: basilikê\
-sumplokê/], &c.
+[Footnote 69: Plato, Polit. p. 306 A. [Greek: basilikÃª\
+sumplokÃª/], &c.
 
 Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the Politikus (pp. 254-256)
-treats this [Greek: basilikê\ sumplokê\] as a poor and
+treats this [Greek: basilikÃª\ sumplokÃª\] as a poor and
 insignificant function, for the political Artist determined and
 installed by so elaborate a method and classification. But the
 dialogue was already so long that Plato could not well lengthen it
@@ -17053,10 +17022,10 @@ had never seen any one else who did know: that it was impossible
 to say how virtue could be communicated, until you knew what
 virtue was--and impossible to determine any one of the parts of
 virtue, until virtue had been determined as a whole. In the
-Charmidês, Sokrates had affirmed that he did not know what
+CharmidÃªs, Sokrates had affirmed that he did not know what
 Temperance was; he then tested several explanations thereof,
 propounded by Charmides and Kritias: but ending only in universal
-puzzle and confessed ignorance. In the Lachês, he had done the
+puzzle and confessed ignorance. In the LachÃªs, he had done the
 same with Courage: not without various expressions of regret for
 his own ignorance, and of surprise at those who talked freely
 about generalities which they had never probed to the bottom.
@@ -17069,7 +17038,7 @@ Here then would have been the opportunity for Sokrates to
 reproduce all his unsolved perplexities, and to get them cleared
 up by the divine Stranger who is travelling on a mission of
 philosophy. The third dialogue, to be called the Philosophus,
-which Plato promises as sequel to the Sophistês and Politikus,
+which Plato promises as sequel to the SophistÃªs and Politikus,
 would have been well employed in such a work of elucidation.
 
 [Side-note: Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of
@@ -17082,7 +17051,7 @@ had merely tied knots in one dialogue, in order to untie them in
 another. But we find nothing of the kind, nor is such a picture of
 Plato correct. The dialogue Philosophus does not exist, and
 probably was never written. Respecting the embarrassments of the
-Menon, Lachês, Charmidês, Alkibiadês I., Protagoras,
+Menon, LachÃªs, CharmidÃªs, AlkibiadÃªs I., Protagoras,
 Euthyphron--Sokrates says not a word--[Greek: ou)de\ gru/]--to urge
 them upon the attention of the Eleate: who even alludes with
 displeasure to contentious disputants as unfair enemies. For the
@@ -17165,9 +17134,9 @@ if this were done.]
 [Footnote 2: The question between Hermogenes and Kratylus was much
 debated among the philosophers and literary men throughout
 antiquity (Aul. Gell. x. 4). Origen says (contra Celsum, i. c.
-24)--[Greek: lo/gos bathu\s kai\ a)po/r)r(êtos o( peri\ phu/seôs
-o)noma/tôn, po/teron, ô(s oi)/etai A)ristote/lês, the/sei ei)=nai
-ta\ o)no/mata, ê)\, ô(s nomi/zousin oi( a)po\ tê=s Stoa=s,
+24)--[Greek: lo/gos bathu\s kai\ a)po/r)r(Ãªtos o( peri\ phu/seÃ´s
+o)noma/tÃ´n, po/teron, Ã´(s oi)/etai A)ristote/lÃªs, the/sei ei)=nai
+ta\ o)no/mata, Ãª)\, Ã´(s nomi/zousin oi( a)po\ tÃª=s Stoa=s,
 phu/sei.]
 
 Aristotle assumes the question in favour of [Greek: the/sei], in
@@ -17217,19 +17186,19 @@ lawgiver or the gifted name-maker, the rarest of all existing
 artists.[10]
 
 [Footnote 4: Aristot. De Interpretat. ii. 1-2: [Greek: O)/noma
-me\n ou)=n e)sti\ phônê\ sêmantikê\ kata\ sunthê/kên a)/neu
-chro/nou . . . to\ de\ kata\ sunthê/kên, o(/ti phu/sei tô=n
-o)noma/tôn ou)de/n e)stin], &c.
+me\n ou)=n e)sti\ phÃ´nÃª\ sÃªmantikÃª\ kata\ sunthÃª/kÃªn a)/neu
+chro/nou . . . to\ de\ kata\ sunthÃª/kÃªn, o(/ti phu/sei tÃ´=n
+o)noma/tÃ´n ou)de/n e)stin], &c.
 
 This is the same doctrine which Plato puts into the mouth of
 Hermogenes (Kratylus, p. 384 E), and which Sokrates himself, in
 the latter half of the dialogue, admits as true to a large extent:
 that is, he admits that names are significant [Greek: kata\
-sunthê/kên], though he does not deny that they are or may be
+sunthÃª/kÃªn], though he does not deny that they are or may be
 significant [Greek: phu/sei].
 
 [Greek: To\ a)po\ tau)toma/tou] (p. 397 A) is another phrase for
-expressing the opinion opposed to [Greek: o)noma/tôn o)rtho/tês].]
+expressing the opinion opposed to [Greek: o)noma/tÃ´n o)rtho/tÃªs].]
 
 [Footnote 5: Plato, Kratyl. p. 385.
 
@@ -17238,30 +17207,30 @@ exactness than Plato) that propositions alone are true or false;
 and that a name taken by itself is neither. (De Interpret. i. 2.)
 
 The mistake of Plato in affirming Names to be true or false, is
-analogous to that which we read in the Philêbus, where Pleasures
+analogous to that which we read in the PhilÃªbus, where Pleasures
 are distinguished as true and false.]
 
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Kratyl. p. 386 D. [Greek: dê=lon dê\ o(/ti
-au)ta\ au(tô=n ou)si/an e)/chonta/ tina be/baio/n e)sti ta\
-pra/gmata, ou) pro\s ê(ma=s ou)de\ u(ph' ê(mô=n, e)lko/mena a)/nô
-kai\ ka/tô tô=| ê(mete/rô| phanta/smati, a)lla\ kath' au(ta\ pro\s
-tê\n au(tôn ou)si/an e)/chonta ê(=|per pe/phuken.]]
+[Footnote 6: Plato, Kratyl. p. 386 D. [Greek: dÃª=lon dÃª\ o(/ti
+au)ta\ au(tÃ´=n ou)si/an e)/chonta/ tina be/baio/n e)sti ta\
+pra/gmata, ou) pro\s Ãª(ma=s ou)de\ u(ph' Ãª(mÃ´=n, e)lko/mena a)/nÃ´
+kai\ ka/tÃ´ tÃ´=| Ãª(mete/rÃ´| phanta/smati, a)lla\ kath' au(ta\ pro\s
+tÃª\n au(tÃ´n ou)si/an e)/chonta Ãª(=|per pe/phuken.]]
 
 [Footnote 7: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 A.]
 
 [Footnote 8: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ to\
 o)noma/zein pra=xis ti/s e)stin, ei)/per kai\ to\ le/gein pra=xis
-tis ê)=n peri\ ta\ pra/gmata? . . . Ai( de\ pra/xeis e)pha/nêsan
-ê(mi=n ou) pro\s ê(ma=s ou)=sai, a)ll' au(tô=n tina i)di/an
-phu/sin e)/chousai? . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ o)nomaste/on ê(=| pe/phuke
-ta\ pra/gmata o)noma/zein te kai\ o)noma/zesthai, kai\ ô(=|, a)ll'
-ou)ch ê(=| a)\n ê(mei=s boulêthô=men, ei)/per ti toi=s
-e)/mprosthen me/llei o(mologou/menon ei)=nai? kai\ ou(/tô me\n
-a)\n ple/on ti poioi=men kai\ o)noma/zoimen, a)/llôs de\ ou)/?]
+tis Ãª)=n peri\ ta\ pra/gmata? . . . Ai( de\ pra/xeis e)pha/nÃªsan
+Ãª(mi=n ou) pro\s Ãª(ma=s ou)=sai, a)ll' au(tÃ´=n tina i)di/an
+phu/sin e)/chousai? . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ o)nomaste/on Ãª(=| pe/phuke
+ta\ pra/gmata o)noma/zein te kai\ o)noma/zesthai, kai\ Ã´(=|, a)ll'
+ou)ch Ãª(=| a)\n Ãª(mei=s boulÃªthÃ´=men, ei)/per ti toi=s
+e)/mprosthen me/llei o(mologou/menon ei)=nai? kai\ ou(/tÃ´ me\n
+a)\n ple/on ti poioi=men kai\ o)noma/zoimen, a)/llÃ´s de\ ou)/?]
 
 Speaking and naming are regarded by Plato as acts whereby the
 thing (spoken of or) named is acted upon or suffers. So in the
-Sophistês (p. 248) he considers Knowing as an act performed,
+SophistÃªs (p. 248) he considers Knowing as an act performed,
 whereby the thing known suffers. Deuschle (Die Platonische
 Sprach-philosophie, p. 59, Marpurg. 1859) treats this comparison
 made by Plato between naming and material agencies, as if it were
@@ -17270,17 +17239,17 @@ thinks it seriously meant and Platonic; and I fully agree with him
 (Schl. p. 456).]
 
 [Footnote 9: Plato, Kratyl. p. 388 C. [Greek: O)/noma a)/ra
-didaskaliko/n ti/ e)stin o)/rganon, kai\ diakritiko\n tê=s
-ou)si/as, ô(/sper kerki\s u(pha/smatos.] See Boethius ap. Schol.
+didaskaliko/n ti/ e)stin o)/rganon, kai\ diakritiko\n tÃª=s
+ou)si/as, Ã´(/sper kerki\s u(pha/smatos.] See Boethius ap. Schol.
 ad Aristot. Interp. p. 108, a. 40. Aristotle (De Interpr. iv. 3)
-says: [Greek: e)/sti de\ lo/gos a(/pas me\n sêmantiko/s, ou)ch ô(s
-o)/rganon de/, a)lla\ kata\ sunthê/kên.] Several even of the
+says: [Greek: e)/sti de\ lo/gos a(/pas me\n sÃªmantiko/s, ou)ch Ã´(s
+o)/rganon de/, a)lla\ kata\ sunthÃª/kÃªn.] Several even of the
 Platonic critics consider Plato's choice of the metaphor [Greek:
 o)/rganon] as inappropriate: but modern writers on logic and
 psychology often speak of names as "_instruments_ of thought".]
 
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 A. [Greek: o( nomothe/tês,
-o(\s dê\ tô=n dêmiourgô=n spaniô/tatos e)n a)nthrô=pois
+[Footnote 10: Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 A. [Greek: o( nomothe/tÃªs,
+o(\s dÃª\ tÃ´=n dÃªmiourgÃ´=n spaniÃ´/tatos e)n a)nthrÃ´=pois
 gi/gnetai.]]
 
 [Side-note: The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the
@@ -17301,8 +17270,8 @@ type, prescribed by nature, in the iron, wood, or other material
 of which the instrument is made.[11]
 
 [Footnote 11: Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 B-C. [Greek: au)to\ o( e)/sti
-kerki/s . . . pa/sas me\n dei= to\ tê=s kerki/dos e)/chein ei)=dos
-. . . ou)ch oi(=on a)\n au)to\s boulê/thê, a)ll' oi(=on
+kerki/s . . . pa/sas me\n dei= to\ tÃª=s kerki/dos e)/chein ei)=dos
+. . . ou)ch oi(=on a)\n au)to\s boulÃª/thÃª, a)ll' oi(=on
 e)pephu/kei.]]
 
 So about names: the lawgiver, in distributing names, must look to
@@ -17329,17 +17298,17 @@ study to use names skilfully: that is, by the dialectician or
 philosopher, competent to ask and answer questions.[14]
 
 [Footnote 12: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 389 D, 390 A. [Greek: to\
-e(ka/stô| phu/sei pephuko\s o)/noma to\n nomothe/tên e)kei=non
+e(ka/stÃ´| phu/sei pephuko\s o)/noma to\n nomothe/tÃªn e)kei=non
 ei)s tou\s phtho/ggous kai\ ta\s sullaba\s dei= e)pi/stasthai
 tithe/nai, kai\ ble/ponta _pro\s au)to\ e)kei=no o(\ e)/stin
 o)/noma_, pa/nta ta\ o)no/mata poiei=n te kai\ ti/thesthai, _ei)
-me/llei ku/rios ei)=nai o)noma/tôn the/tês_. . . .
+me/llei ku/rios ei)=nai o)noma/tÃ´n the/tÃªs_. . . .
 
-Ou(/tôs a)xiô/seis kai\ to\n nomothe/tên to/n te e)ntha/de kai\
-to\n e)n toi=s barba/rois, e(/ôs a)\n to\ _tou= o)no/matos
-ei)=dos_ a)podidô=| _to\ prosê=kon e(ka/stô| e)n o(poiaisou=n
-sullabai=s_, ou)de\n chei/rô nomothe/tên ei)=nai to\n e)ntha/de
-ê)\ to\n o(pouou=n a)/llothi?]]
+Ou(/tÃ´s a)xiÃ´/seis kai\ to\n nomothe/tÃªn to/n te e)ntha/de kai\
+to\n e)n toi=s barba/rois, e(/Ã´s a)\n to\ _tou= o)no/matos
+ei)=dos_ a)podidÃ´=| _to\ prosÃª=kon e(ka/stÃ´| e)n o(poiaisou=n
+sullabai=s_, ou)de\n chei/rÃ´ nomothe/tÃªn ei)=nai to\n e)ntha/de
+Ãª)\ to\n o(pouou=n a)/llothi?]]
 
 [Footnote 13: Plato, Kratyl. p. 424 D-E.]
 
@@ -17389,16 +17358,16 @@ colours, sounds, and every thing else which is nameable.
 
 [Footnote 17: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 393 D, 432.]
 
-[Footnote 18: Plato, Kratyl. p. 422 D. [Greek: tô=n o)noma/tôn ê(
-o)rtho/tês toiau/tê tis e)bou/leto ei)=nai, oi(=a dêlou=n oi(=on
-e(/kasto/n e)sti tô=n o)/ntôn.]--423 D: [Greek: ou) kai\ _ou)si/a
-dokei=_ soi ei)=nai e(ka/stô|, ô(/sper kai\ chrô=ma kai\ a(\ nu=n
-dê\ e)le/gomen? prô=ton au)tô=| tô=| chrô/mati kai\ tê=| phônê=|
-ou)k e)/stin ou)si/a tis e(kate/rô| au)tô=n kai\ toi=s a)/llois
-pa=sin, _o(/sa êxi/ôtai tau/tês tê=s prosrê/seôs tou= ei)=nai?_
+[Footnote 18: Plato, Kratyl. p. 422 D. [Greek: tÃ´=n o)noma/tÃ´n Ãª(
+o)rtho/tÃªs toiau/tÃª tis e)bou/leto ei)=nai, oi(=a dÃªlou=n oi(=on
+e(/kasto/n e)sti tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n.]--423 D: [Greek: ou) kai\ _ou)si/a
+dokei=_ soi ei)=nai e(ka/stÃ´|, Ã´(/sper kai\ chrÃ´=ma kai\ a(\ nu=n
+dÃª\ e)le/gomen? prÃ´=ton au)tÃ´=| tÃ´=| chrÃ´/mati kai\ tÃª=| phÃ´nÃª=|
+ou)k e)/stin ou)si/a tis e(kate/rÃ´| au)tÃ´=n kai\ toi=s a)/llois
+pa=sin, _o(/sa Ãªxi/Ã´tai tau/tÃªs tÃª=s prosrÃª/seÃ´s tou= ei)=nai?_
 . . . Ti/ ou)=n?** ei)/ tis au)to\ tou=to mimei=sthai du/naito,
-e(ka/stou** tê\n ou)si/an, gra/mmasi/ te kai\ sullabai=s, a)=r' ou)k
-a)\n dêloi= e(/kaston o(\ e)/stin?] Compare p. 433.
+e(ka/stou** tÃª\n ou)si/an, gra/mmasi/ te kai\ sullabai=s, a)=r' ou)k
+a)\n dÃªloi= e(/kaston o(\ e)/stin?] Compare p. 433.
 
 The story given by Herodotus (ii. 2) about the experiment made by
 the Egyptian king Psammetichus, is curious. He wished to find out
@@ -17433,10 +17402,10 @@ without much artificial help.[20]
 [Footnote 19: Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 D. Respecting the person
 called [Greek: o( dialektiko/s], whom Plato describes as grasping
 Ideas, or Forms, Essences, and employing nothing else in his
-reasoning--[Greek: lo/gon didou\s kai\ lamba/nôn tê=s
+reasoning--[Greek: lo/gon didou\s kai\ lamba/nÃ´n tÃª=s
 ou)si/as]--see Republic, vi. p. 511 B, vii. pp. 533-534-537 C.]
 
-[Footnote 20: Plato, Kratyl. p. 426 A. [Greek: o( peri\ o)noma/tôn
+[Footnote 20: Plato, Kratyl. p. 426 A. [Greek: o( peri\ o)noma/tÃ´n
 techniko/s], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to
@@ -17468,7 +17437,7 @@ impugns--the Protagorean doctrine--Homo Mensura.]
 In laying down the basis of his theory respecting names, Plato
 states another doctrine as opposed to it: _viz._, the Protagorean
 doctrine--Man is the Measure of all things. I have already said
-something about this doctrine, in reviewing the Theætêtus, where
+something about this doctrine, in reviewing the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, where
 Plato impugns it: but as he here impugns it again, by arguments in
 part different--a few words more will not be misplaced.
 
@@ -17506,10 +17475,10 @@ different grounds.
 a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance.]
 
 This will show us--what I have already remarked in commenting on
-the Theætêtus--that Plato has not been very careful in
+the TheÃ¦tÃªtus--that Plato has not been very careful in
 appreciating the real bearing of the Protagorean doctrine. He
 impugns it here by the same argument which we also read in the
-Theætêtus. "Everyone admits" (he says) "that there are some men
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus. "Everyone admits" (he says) "that there are some men
 wise and good--others foolish and wicked. Now if you admit this,
 you disallow the Protagorean doctrine. If I contend that as things
 appear to me, so they truly are to me--as things appear to you or
@@ -17543,15 +17512,15 @@ disagree.
 ed. 1825:
 
 
-"En effet, on ne saurait trop le redire, chacun de nous, et même
-tout être animé quelconque, est pour lui-même le centre de tout.
-Il ne perçoit par un sentiment direct et une conscience intime,
-que ce qui affecte et émeut sa sensibilité. Il ne conçoit et ne
-connaît son existence que par ce qu'il sent, et celle des autres
-êtres que parce qu'ils lui font sentir. Il n'y a de réel pour lui
-que ses perceptions, ses affections, ses idées: et tout ce qu'il
+"En effet, on ne saurait trop le redire, chacun de nous, et mÃªme
+tout Ãªtre animÃ© quelconque, est pour lui-mÃªme le centre de tout.
+Il ne perÃ§oit par un sentiment direct et une conscience intime,
+que ce qui affecte et Ã©meut sa sensibilitÃ©. Il ne conÃ§oit et ne
+connaÃ®t son existence que par ce qu'il sent, et celle des autres
+Ãªtres que parce qu'ils lui font sentir. Il n'y a de rÃ©el pour lui
+que ses perceptions, ses affections, ses idÃ©es: et tout ce qu'il
 peut jamais savoir, n'est toujours que des consequences et des
-combinaisons de ces premières perceptions ou idees."
+combinaisons de ces premiÃ¨res perceptions ou idees."
 
 The doctrine of the Sceptical philosophers, is explicitly
 announced by Sextus Empiricus as his personal belief: that which
@@ -17560,16 +17529,16 @@ passage deserves to be cited.
 
 Sextus Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i. Sect. 197-199.
 
-[Greek: O(/tan ou)=n ei)/pê| o( skeptiko\s "_ou)de\n o(ri/zô_"
-. . . tou=to/ phêsi le/gôn to\ _e(autô=| phaino/menon peri\
-tô=n prokeime/nôn_, ou)k a)paggeltikô=s, meta\ pepoithê/seôs
-a)pophaino/menos, a)ll' o(\ pa/schei, diêgou/menos. . . . Kai\
-ô(/sper o(le/gôn "_peripatô=_," ou(/tôs o( le/gôn "_pa/nta
-e)sti\n a)o/rista_" sussêmai/nei kath' ê(ma=s to\ ô(s _pro\s e)me
-ê)\ ô(s e)moi\ phai/netai_; ô(s ei)=nai to\ lego/menon toiou=ton
-"o(/sa e)pêlthon tô=n dogmatikô=s zêtoume/nôn, toiau=ta/ moi
-phai/netai_, ô(s mêde\n au)tô=n tou= machome/nou prou)/chein moi\
-dokei=n kata\ pi/stin ê)\ a)pisti/an".]]
+[Greek: O(/tan ou)=n ei)/pÃª| o( skeptiko\s "_ou)de\n o(ri/zÃ´_"
+. . . tou=to/ phÃªsi le/gÃ´n to\ _e(autÃ´=| phaino/menon peri\
+tÃ´=n prokeime/nÃ´n_, ou)k a)paggeltikÃ´=s, meta\ pepoithÃª/seÃ´s
+a)pophaino/menos, a)ll' o(\ pa/schei, diÃªgou/menos. . . . Kai\
+Ã´(/sper o(le/gÃ´n "_peripatÃ´=_," ou(/tÃ´s o( le/gÃ´n "_pa/nta
+e)sti\n a)o/rista_" sussÃªmai/nei kath' Ãª(ma=s to\ Ã´(s _pro\s e)me
+Ãª)\ Ã´(s e)moi\ phai/netai_; Ã´(s ei)=nai to\ lego/menon toiou=ton
+"o(/sa e)pÃªlthon tÃ´=n dogmatikÃ´=s zÃªtoume/nÃ´n, toiau=ta/ moi
+phai/netai_, Ã´(s mÃªde\n au)tÃ´=n tou= machome/nou prou)/chein moi\
+dokei=n kata\ pi/stin Ãª)\ a)pisti/an".]]
 
 [Side-note: Each man believes others to be wiser on various points
 than himself--Belief on authority--not inconsistent with the
@@ -17647,7 +17616,7 @@ less than the objective, to belief and disbelief.
 [Footnote 23: Proklus, in his Scholia on the Kratylus, p. 32, ed.
 Boisson, cites the argument used by Aristotle against Plato on
 this very subject of names--[Greek: _ta\ me\n phu/sei, para\ pa=si
-ta\ au)ta/_; ta\ de\ o)no/mata ou) para\ pa=si ta\ au)ta/; ô/ste
+ta\ au)ta/_; ta\ de\ o)no/mata ou) para\ pa=si ta\ au)ta/; Ã´/ste
 ta\ phu/sei o)/nta ou)/k e)stin o)no/mata, kai\ ta\ o)no/mata ou)k
 ei)si phu/sei.] Ammonius ad Aristot. De Interpretat. p. 100, a.
 28, Schol. Bekk. Sextus Empiricus adv. Mathemat. i. 145-147, p.
@@ -17659,8 +17628,8 @@ to all, or _are by nature_: naming is not the same to all, and is
 therefore not by nature.
 
 We find here the test pointed out to distinguish what _is by
-nature_ (that which Plato calls the [Greek: ou)si/an be/baion tô=n
-pragma/tôn]--p. 386 E),--_viz._ That it is the same to all or
+nature_ (that which Plato calls the [Greek: ou)si/an be/baion tÃ´=n
+pragma/tÃ´n]--p. 386 E),--_viz._ That it is the same to all or
 among all. What it is to one individual, it is to another also.
 There are a multitude of different judging subjects, but no
 dissentient subjects: myself, and in my belief all other subjects,
@@ -17751,14 +17720,14 @@ judging Subject, I had transcribed a passage from Steinthal's work
 on the Classification of Human languages; but I find it too long
 for a note.
 
-Steinthal, Charakteristik der Hauptsächlichen Typen des
+Steinthal, Charakteristik der HauptsÃ¤chlichen Typen des
 Sprachbaues, 2nd ed. Berlin, 1860, pp. 313-314-315.]
 
 [Footnote 25: See the striking passages in the Gorgias, pp. 472 B,
-474 B, 482 B; Theætêtus, p. 171 D.
+474 B, 482 B; TheÃ¦tÃªtus, p. 171 D.
 
 Also in proclaiming the necessity of specialty of adaptation to
-individual minds--Plat. Phædr. pp. 271-272, 277 B.]
+individual minds--Plat. PhÃ¦dr. pp. 271-272, 277 B.]
 
 [Side-note: Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon
 the will or inclination of each individual but that it was
@@ -17794,15 +17763,15 @@ relative simply to his wishes, or that he believes and disbelieves
 what he chooses.
 
 [Footnote 26: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 387-389, where [Greek: pro\s
-ê(ma=s] is considered as equivalent to [Greek: ô(s a)\n ê(mei=s
-boulô/metha--ê(=| a)\n ê(mei=s boulê/thômen]--both of them being
+Ãª(ma=s] is considered as equivalent to [Greek: Ã´(s a)\n Ãª(mei=s
+boulÃ´/metha--Ãª(=| a)\n Ãª(mei=s boulÃª/thÃ´men]--both of them being
 opposed to [Greek: oi(=on e)pephu/kei--to\ kata\ phu/sin--i)di/an
-au)tô=n phu/sin e)/chousai.]
+au)tÃ´=n phu/sin e)/chousai.]
 
 The error here noted is enumerated by by Mr. John Stuart Mill,
 among the specimens of Fallacies of Confusion, in his System of
-Logic, Book v. ch. vii. § 1: "The following is an argument of
-Descartes to prove, in his _à priori_ manner, the being of a God.
+Logic, Book v. ch. vii. Â§ 1: "The following is an argument of
+Descartes to prove, in his _Ã  priori_ manner, the being of a God.
 The conception, says he, of an infinite Being proves the real
 existence of such a Being. For if there is not really any such
 Being, _I_ must have made the conception: but if I could make it,
@@ -17830,12 +17799,12 @@ misconceived, as if Protagoras had said that things were to each
 individual what he was pleased or chose to represent them as
 being, I transcribe the following passage from Lassalle's
 elaborate work on Herakleitus (vol. ii. p. 381):--"Des Protagoras
-Prinzip ist es, dass überhaupt Nichts Objektives ist; dass
-vielmehr alles Beliebige was Einem scheint, auch für ihn sei. Dies
+Prinzip ist es, dass Ã¼berhaupt Nichts Objektives ist; dass
+vielmehr alles Beliebige was Einem scheint, auch fÃ¼r ihn sei. Dies
 Selbstsetzen des Subjekts ist die einzige Wahrheit der Dinge,
 welche an sich selbst Nichts Objektives haben, sondern zur
-gleichgültigen Fläche geworden sind, auf die das Subjekt
-willkührlich und beliebig seine Charaktere schreibt."
+gleichgÃ¼ltigen FlÃ¤che geworden sind, auf die das Subjekt
+willkÃ¼hrlich und beliebig seine Charaktere schreibt."
 
 Protagoras does not (as is here asserted) deny the Objective: he
 only insists on looking at it in conjunction with, or measured by,
@@ -17876,43 +17845,43 @@ absolute and not relative to any Subject--but that the agencies or
 properties of Objects are also absolute--he carries the doctrine
 farther than modern defenders of the absolute. M. Cousin, in the
 eighth and ninth Lectures of his Cours d'Hist. de la Philosophie
-Morale au 18me Siècle, lays down the contrary, maintaining that
+Morale au 18me SiÃ¨cle, lays down the contrary, maintaining that
 objects and essences alone are absolute, though unknowable; but
 that their agencies are relative and knowable.
 
 "Nous savons qu'il exists quelque chose hors de nous, parceque
-nous ne pouvons expliquer nos perceptions sans les rattacher à des
-causes distinctes de nous mêmes: nous savons de plus que ces
+nous ne pouvons expliquer nos perceptions sans les rattacher Ã  des
+causes distinctes de nous mÃªmes: nous savons de plus que ces
 causes, dont nous ne connaissons pas d'ailleurs l'essence,
 _produisent les effets les plus variables, les plus divers, et
-même les plus contraires, selon qu'elles rencontrent telle nature
+mÃªme les plus contraires, selon qu'elles rencontrent telle nature
 ou telle disposition du sujet._ Mais savons-nous quelque chose de
-plus? et même, vu le caractère indéterminé des causes que nous
-concevons dans les corps, y-a-t-il quelque chose de plus à savoir?
-Y-a-t-il lieu de nous enquérir si nous percevons _les choses
-telles qu'elles sont? Non, évidemment. . . Je ne dis pas que le
-problème est insoluble: je dis qu'il est absurde, et renferme une
+plus? et mÃªme, vu le caractÃ¨re indÃ©terminÃ© des causes que nous
+concevons dans les corps, y-a-t-il quelque chose de plus Ã  savoir?
+Y-a-t-il lieu de nous enquÃ©rir si nous percevons _les choses
+telles qu'elles sont? Non, Ã©videmment. . . Je ne dis pas que le
+problÃ¨me est insoluble: je dis qu'il est absurde, et renferme une
 contradiction._ Nous ne savons pas ce que ces causes sont en
-elles-mêmes, et la raison nous défend de chercher à les connaître:
-mais il est bien évident _à priori_ qu'elles ne sont pas en
-elles-mêmes ce qu'elles sont par rapport à nous, _puisque la présence
-du sujet modifie nécessairement leur action_. Supprimez tout sujet
+elles-mÃªmes, et la raison nous dÃ©fend de chercher Ã  les connaÃ®tre:
+mais il est bien Ã©vident _Ã  priori_ qu'elles ne sont pas en
+elles-mÃªmes ce qu'elles sont par rapport Ã  nous, _puisque la prÃ©sence
+du sujet modifie nÃ©cessairement leur action_. Supprimez tout sujet
 sentant, il est certain que ces causes agiraient encore,
 puisqu'elles continueraient d'exister: mais elles agiraient
-autrement; elles seraient encore des qualités et des propriétés,
-mais qui ne ressembleraient à rien de ce que nous connaissons. Le
-feu ne manifesterait plus aucune des propriétés que nous lui
+autrement; elles seraient encore des qualitÃ©s et des propriÃ©tÃ©s,
+mais qui ne ressembleraient Ã  rien de ce que nous connaissons. Le
+feu ne manifesterait plus aucune des propriÃ©tÃ©s que nous lui
 connaissons: que serait-il? C'est ce que nous ne saurons jamais.
-C'est d'ailleurs peut-être un problème qui ne répugne pas
-seulement à la nature de notre esprit mais à l'essence même des
-choses. Quand même en effet on supprimerait par la pensée tous les
+C'est d'ailleurs peut-Ãªtre un problÃ¨me qui ne rÃ©pugne pas
+seulement Ã  la nature de notre esprit mais Ã  l'essence mÃªme des
+choses. Quand mÃªme en effet on supprimerait par la pensÃ©e tous les
 sujets sentants, il faudrait encore admettre que nul corps ne
-manifesterait ses propriétés autrement qu'en relation avec un
-sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas _ses propriétés ne seraient
-encore que relatives_: en sorte qu'il me paraît fort raisonnable
-d'admettre que les propriétés déterminées des corps _n'existent
-pas indépendamment d'un sujet quelconque_." (2de Partie, 8me
-Leçon, pp. 216-218, ed. Danton et Vacherot, Bruxelles, 1841.)]
+manifesterait ses propriÃ©tÃ©s autrement qu'en relation avec un
+sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas _ses propriÃ©tÃ©s ne seraient
+encore que relatives_: en sorte qu'il me paraÃ®t fort raisonnable
+d'admettre que les propriÃ©tÃ©s dÃ©terminÃ©es des corps _n'existent
+pas indÃ©pendamment d'un sujet quelconque_." (2de Partie, 8me
+LeÃ§on, pp. 216-218, ed. Danton et Vacherot, Bruxelles, 1841.)]
 
 *  *  *  *  *
 
@@ -17952,7 +17921,7 @@ forced, arbitrary, and fanciful. The transitions of meaning
 imagined, and the structural transformations of words, are alike
 strange and violent.[30]
 
-[Footnote 29: See the Introduction to Pape's Wörterbuch der
+[Footnote 29: See the Introduction to Pape's WÃ¶rterbuch der
 Griechischen Eigennamen.
 
 Thus Proklus observes:--"The recklessness about proper names, is
@@ -17960,36 +17929,36 @@ shown in the case of the man who gave to his son the name of
 Athanasius" (Proklus, Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 5, ed. Boiss.) Proklus
 adopts the distinction between divine and human names, citing the
 authority of Plato in Kratylus. The words of Proklus are
-remarkable, ad Timæum, ii. p. 197. Schneid. [Greek: Oi)kei=a ga/r
-e)stin o)no/mata pa/sê| ta/xei tô=n pragma/tôn, thei=a me\n toi=s
-thei/ois, dianoêta\ de\ toi=s dianoêtoi=s, doxasta\ de\ toi=s
-doxastoi=s.] See Timæus, p. 29 B. Compare also Kratylus, p. 400 E,
-and Philêbus, p. 12 C.
+remarkable, ad TimÃ¦um, ii. p. 197. Schneid. [Greek: Oi)kei=a ga/r
+e)stin o)no/mata pa/sÃª| ta/xei tÃ´=n pragma/tÃ´n, thei=a me\n toi=s
+thei/ois, dianoÃªta\ de\ toi=s dianoÃªtoi=s, doxasta\ de\ toi=s
+doxastoi=s.] See TimÃ¦us, p. 29 B. Compare also Kratylus, p. 400 E,
+and PhilÃªbus, p. 12 C.
 
-When Plato (Kratylus, pp. 391-392; compare Phædrus, p. 252 A)
+When Plato (Kratylus, pp. 391-392; compare PhÃ¦drus, p. 252 A)
 cites the lines of Homer mentioning appellations bestowed by the
-Gods, I do not understand him, as Gräfenhahn and others do, to
-speak in mockery, but _bonâ fide_. The affirmation of Clemens
+Gods, I do not understand him, as GrÃ¤fenhahn and others do, to
+speak in mockery, but _bonÃ¢ fide_. The affirmation of Clemens
 Alexandrinus (Stromat. i. 104) gives a probable account of Plato's
-belief:--[Greek: O( Pla/tôn kai\ toi=s theoi=s dialekto\n
-a)pone/mei tina/, ma/lista me\n a)po\ tô=n o)neira/tôn
-tekmairo/menos kai\ tô=n chrêsmô=n.] See Gräfenhahn, Gesch. der
+belief:--[Greek: O( Pla/tÃ´n kai\ toi=s theoi=s dialekto\n
+a)pone/mei tina/, ma/lista me\n a)po\ tÃ´=n o)neira/tÃ´n
+tekmairo/menos kai\ tÃ´=n chrÃªsmÃ´=n.] See GrÃ¤fenhahn, Gesch. der
 Klassischen Philologie, vol. i. p. 176.
 
 When we read the views of some learned modern philologists, such
 as Godfrey Hermann, we cannot be surprised that many Greeks in the
-Platonic age should believe in an [Greek: o)rtho/tês o)noma/tôn]
+Platonic age should believe in an [Greek: o)rtho/tÃªs o)noma/tÃ´n]
 applicable to their Gods and Heroes:--"Unde intelligitur, ex
 nominibus naturam et munia esse cognoscenda Deorum: Nec Deorum
-tantum, sed etiam heroum, omninoque rerum omnium, nominibus quæ
-propria vocantur appellatarum" (De Mythologia Græcorum
-Antiquissimâ--in Opuscula, vol. ii. p. 167).
+tantum, sed etiam heroum, omninoque rerum omnium, nominibus quÃ¦
+propria vocantur appellatarum" (De Mythologia GrÃ¦corum
+AntiquissimÃ¢--in Opuscula, vol. ii. p. 167).
 
 "Bei euch, Ihr Herrn, kann man das Wesen
-Gewöhnlich aus dem Namen lesen," &c.
+GewÃ¶hnlich aus dem Namen lesen," &c.
 _Goethe_, Faust.
 
-See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, c. 22, p. 1119
+See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, adv. KolÃ´ten, c. 22, p. 1119
 E, respecting the essential rectitude and indispensable employment
 of the surnames and appellations of the Gods.
 
@@ -17997,74 +17966,74 @@ The supposition of a mysterious inherent relation, between Names
 and the things named, has found acceptance among expositors of
 many different countries.
 
-M. Jacob Salvador (Histoire des Institutions de Moïse, Liv. x.,
+M. Jacob Salvador (Histoire des Institutions de MoÃ¯se, Liv. x.,
 ch. ii.; vol. iii. p. 136) says respecting the Jewish
 Cabbala:--"Que dirai-je de leur _Cabale_? mot signifiant aussi
 _tradition_. Elle se composait originairement de tous les principes
-abstraits qui ne se répandent pas chez le vulgaire: elle tomba bientôt
-dans la folie. Cacher quelques idées metaphysiques sous les figures
+abstraits qui ne se rÃ©pandent pas chez le vulgaire: elle tomba bientÃ´t
+dans la folie. Cacher quelques idÃ©es metaphysiques sous les figures
 les plus bizarres, et prendre ensuite une peine infinie pour retrouver
-ces idées premières: s'imaginer qu'il existe entre les noms et les
-choses une corrélation inévitable, et que la contexture littérale
-des livres sacrés par exemple, doit éclairer sur l'essence même et
-sur tous les secrets du Dieu qui les a dictés: tourmenter dès-lors
-chaque phrase, chaque mot, chaque lettre, avec la même ardeur
-qu'on en met de nos jours à décomposer et à recomposer tous les
-corps de la nature: enfin, après avoir établi la corrélation entre
+ces idÃ©es premiÃ¨res: s'imaginer qu'il existe entre les noms et les
+choses une corrÃ©lation inÃ©vitable, et que la contexture littÃ©rale
+des livres sacrÃ©s par exemple, doit Ã©clairer sur l'essence mÃªme et
+sur tous les secrets du Dieu qui les a dictÃ©s: tourmenter dÃ¨s-lors
+chaque phrase, chaque mot, chaque lettre, avec la mÃªme ardeur
+qu'on en met de nos jours Ã  dÃ©composer et Ã  recomposer tous les
+corps de la nature: enfin, aprÃ¨s avoir Ã©tabli la corrÃ©lation entre
 les mots et les choses, croire qu'en changeant, disposant,
-combinant, ces mots, on traverse de prétendus _canaux_ d'influence
-qui les unissent à ces choses, et qu'on agit sur elles: voilà, ce
-me semble, les principales prétentions de cette espèce de science
-occulte, échappée de l'Égypte, qui a dévoré beaucoup de bons
-esprits, et qui, d'une part, donne la main à la théologie, d'autre
-part, à l'astrologie et aux combinaisons magiques."]
+combinant, ces mots, on traverse de prÃ©tendus _canaux_ d'influence
+qui les unissent Ã  ces choses, et qu'on agit sur elles: voilÃ , ce
+me semble, les principales prÃ©tentions de cette espÃ¨ce de science
+occulte, Ã©chappÃ©e de l'Ã‰gypte, qui a dÃ©vorÃ© beaucoup de bons
+esprits, et qui, d'une part, donne la main Ã  la thÃ©ologie, d'autre
+part, Ã  l'astrologie et aux combinaisons magiques."]
 
 [Footnote 30: I cite various specimens of the etymologies given by
 Plato:--
 
-1. [Greek: A)game/mnôn--o( a)gasto\s kata\ tê\n e)pimonê/n]--in
-consequence of his patience in remaining ([Greek: monê\]) with his
+1. [Greek: A)game/mnÃ´n--o( a)gasto\s kata\ tÃª\n e)pimonÃª/n]--in
+consequence of his patience in remaining ([Greek: monÃª\]) with his
 army before Troy (p. 395 A).
 
 2. [Greek: A)treu\s--kata\ to\ a)teire/s, kai\ kata\ to\
-a)/treston, kai\ kata\ to\ a)têro/n] (p. 395 C).
+a)/treston, kai\ kata\ to\ a)tÃªro/n] (p. 395 C).
 
-3. [Greek: Pe/lops--o( to\ e)ggu\s (pe/las) mo/non o(rô=n kai\ to\
-parachrê=ma] (p. 395 D).
+3. [Greek: Pe/lops--o( to\ e)ggu\s (pe/las) mo/non o(rÃ´=n kai\ to\
+parachrÃª=ma] (p. 395 D).
 
 4. [Greek: Ta/ntalos--tala/ntatos] (p. 395 E).
 
-5. [Greek: Zeu\s--Di/a--Zê=na--di' o(\n _zê=n_ a)ei\ pa=si toi=s
-zô=sin u(pa/rchei]--ut proprie unum debuerit esse vocabulum
-[Greek: Diazê=na]. Stallbaum, ad. p. 396 A. Proklus admired these
-etymologies (ad Timæum, ii. p. 226, ed. Schneid.).
+5. [Greek: Zeu\s--Di/a--ZÃª=na--di' o(\n _zÃª=n_ a)ei\ pa=si toi=s
+zÃ´=sin u(pa/rchei]--ut proprie unum debuerit esse vocabulum
+[Greek: DiazÃª=na]. Stallbaum, ad. p. 396 A. Proklus admired these
+etymologies (ad TimÃ¦um, ii. p. 226, ed. Schneid.).
 
 6. [Greek: Oi( theoi\]--Sun, Moon, Earth, Stars, Uranus--[Greek:
-a(/te au)ta\ o(rôntes pa/nta a)ei\ i)o/nta dro/mô| kai\ the/onta,
-a)po\ tau/tês tê=s phu/seôs tê=s tou= thei=n _theou\s_ au)tou\s
+a(/te au)ta\ o(rÃ´ntes pa/nta a)ei\ i)o/nta dro/mÃ´| kai\ the/onta,
+a)po\ tau/tÃªs tÃª=s phu/seÃ´s tÃª=s tou= thei=n _theou\s_ au)tou\s
 e)ponoma/sai] (p. 397 D).
 
-7. [Greek: Dai/mones--o(/ti phro/nimoi kai\ daê/mones ê)=san,
-dai/monas au)tou\s ôno/masen] (Hesiod) (p. 398 B).
+7. [Greek: Dai/mones--o(/ti phro/nimoi kai\ daÃª/mones Ãª)=san,
+dai/monas au)tou\s Ã´no/masen] (Hesiod) (p. 398 B).
 
-8. [Greek: Ê)/rôs]--either from [Greek: e)/rôs], as one sprung
+8. [Greek: ÃŠ)/rÃ´s]--either from [Greek: e)/rÃ´s], as one sprung
 from the union of Gods with human females: or from [Greek:
-e)rôta=|n] or [Greek: ei)/rein],--from oral or rhetorical
-attributes, as being [Greek: r(ê/tores kai\ e)rôtêtikoi/] (p. 398
+e)rÃ´ta=|n] or [Greek: ei)/rein],--from oral or rhetorical
+attributes, as being [Greek: r(Ãª/tores kai\ e)rÃ´tÃªtikoi/] (p. 398
 D).
 
 9. [Greek: Di/philos--Dii+\ phi/los] (p. 399 B).
 
-10. [Greek: A)/nthrôpos--o( a)nathrô=n a(\ o)/pôpen] (p. 399 C).
+10. [Greek: A)/nthrÃ´pos--o( a)nathrÃ´=n a(\ o)/pÃ´pen] (p. 399 C).
 
-11. [Greek: Psuchê\]--a double derivation is proposed: first,
-[Greek: to\ a)na/psuchon], next, a second, _i.e._ [Greek: psuchê\
-= phuse/chê, ê)\ phu/sin o)chei= kai\ e)/chei], which second is
-declared to be [Greek: technikô/teron], and the former to be
+11. [Greek: PsuchÃª\]--a double derivation is proposed: first,
+[Greek: to\ a)na/psuchon], next, a second, _i.e._ [Greek: psuchÃª\
+= phuse/chÃª, Ãª)\ phu/sin o)chei= kai\ e)/chei], which second is
+declared to be [Greek: technikÃ´/teron], and the former to be
 ridiculous (pp. 399 E, 400 A-B).
 
-12. [Greek: Sô=ma = to\ sê=ma tê=s phuchê=s], because the soul is
-buried in the body. Or [Greek: sô=ma], that is, preserved or
+12. [Greek: SÃ´=ma = to\ sÃª=ma tÃª=s phuchÃª=s], because the soul is
+buried in the body. Or [Greek: sÃ´=ma], that is, preserved or
 guarded, by the body as by an exterior wall, in order that it may
 expiate wrongs of a preceding life (p. 400 C).
 
@@ -18074,39 +18043,39 @@ this theory he gave to various Gods the names Kronos, Rhea,
 Tethys, &c., all signifying flux (p. 402 A-D).
 
 14. Various derivations of the names Poseidon, Hades or Pluto,
-Persephonê or Pherrephatta, &c., are given (pp. 404-405); also of
+PersephonÃª or Pherrephatta, &c., are given (pp. 404-405); also of
 Apollo, so as to fit on to the four functions of the last-named
-God, [Greek: mousikê/, mantikê/, i)atrikê/, toxikê/] (p. 405).
+God, [Greek: mousikÃª/, mantikÃª/, i)atrikÃª/, toxikÃª/] (p. 405).
 
-15. [Greek: Mou=sa--mousikê\], from [Greek: mô=sthai] (recognised
-in Liddell and Scott from [Greek: ma/ô] p. 406 A). [Greek:
-A)phrodi/tê] from [Greek: a)phrou= ge/nesin], the Hesiodic
+15. [Greek: Mou=sa--mousikÃª\], from [Greek: mÃ´=sthai] (recognised
+in Liddell and Scott from [Greek: ma/Ã´] p. 406 A). [Greek:
+A)phrodi/tÃª] from [Greek: a)phrou= ge/nesin], the Hesiodic
 derivation (p. 406 B-D).
 
-16. [Greek: A)ê\r--o(/ti ai)/rei ta\ a)po\ tê=s gê=s--ê)\ o(/ti
-a)ei\ r(ei=--ê)\ o(/ti pneu=ma e)x au)tou= gi/gnetai
-r(e/ontos]--quasi [Greek: a)êto/r)r(oun. Ai)thê\r--o(/ti a)ei\
-thei= peri\ to\n a)e/ra r(e/ôn] (p. 410 B).
+16. [Greek: A)Ãª\r--o(/ti ai)/rei ta\ a)po\ tÃª=s gÃª=s--Ãª)\ o(/ti
+a)ei\ r(ei=--Ãª)\ o(/ti pneu=ma e)x au)tou= gi/gnetai
+r(e/ontos]--quasi [Greek: a)Ãªto/r)r(oun. Ai)thÃª\r--o(/ti a)ei\
+thei= peri\ to\n a)e/ra r(e/Ã´n] (p. 410 B).
 
-17. [Greek: Phro/nêsis--phora=s kai\ r(ou= no/êsis u(polabei=n
+17. [Greek: Phro/nÃªsis--phora=s kai\ r(ou= no/Ãªsis u(polabei=n
 phora=s]. This and the following are put as derivatives from the
-Herakleitean theory (p. 411 D-E). [Greek: No/êsis = tou= ne/ou
-e)/sis. Sôphrosu/nê--sôtêri/a phronê/seôs]. This is recognised by
+Herakleitean theory (p. 411 D-E). [Greek: No/Ãªsis = tou= ne/ou
+e)/sis. SÃ´phrosu/nÃª--sÃ´tÃªri/a phronÃª/seÃ´s]. This is recognised by
 Aristotle in the Nikom. Ethica, vi. 5.
 
-18. [Greek: E)pistê/mê = e)pistême/nê--ô(s pherome/nois toi=s
-pra/gmasin e(pome/nês tê=s psuchê=s] (p. 412 A).
+18. [Greek: E)pistÃª/mÃª = e)pistÃªme/nÃª--Ã´(s pherome/nois toi=s
+pra/gmasin e(pome/nÃªs tÃª=s psuchÃª=s] (p. 412 A).
 
-19. [Greek: Dikaiosu/nê--e)pi\ tê=| tou= dikai/ou sune/sei] (p.
+19. [Greek: Dikaiosu/nÃª--e)pi\ tÃª=| tou= dikai/ou sune/sei] (p.
 412 C).
 
-20. [Greek: Kaki/a = to\ kakô=s i)o/n. Deili/a--tê=s psuchê=s
-desmo\s i)schuro/s--o(\ dei= li/an. A)retê\ = a)eirei/tê]--that
-which has an easy and constant flux, or perhaps [Greek: ai(retê/]
+20. [Greek: Kaki/a = to\ kakÃ´=s i)o/n. Deili/a--tÃª=s psuchÃª=s
+desmo\s i)schuro/s--o(\ dei= li/an. A)retÃª\ = a)eirei/tÃª]--that
+which has an easy and constant flux, or perhaps [Greek: ai(retÃª/]
 (p. 415 B-D). [Greek: Ai)schro\n = to\ a)eischorou=n--to\ a)ei\
-i)/schon to\n r(ou=n] (p. 416 B). [Greek: Su/mphero\n = tê\ a(/ma
-phora\n tê=s psuchê=s meta\ tô=n pragma/tôn] (p. 417 A). [Greek:
-Lusite/loun = to\ tê=s phora=s lu/on to\ te/los] (p. 417 C-E).
+i)/schon to\n r(ou=n] (p. 416 B). [Greek: Su/mphero\n = tÃª\ a(/ma
+phora\n tÃª=s psuchÃª=s meta\ tÃ´=n pragma/tÃ´n] (p. 417 A). [Greek:
+Lusite/loun = to\ tÃª=s phora=s lu/on to\ te/los] (p. 417 C-E).
 [Greek: Blabero\n = to\ bla/pton to\n r(ou=n].
 
 The names of favourable import are such as designate facility of
@@ -18115,18 +18084,18 @@ names of unfavourable import designate obstruction of the flux.
 
 21. [Greek: Zugo\n = duogo/n] (p. 418 D).
 
-22. [Greek: Eu)phrosu/nê--a)po\ tou= eu)= pra/gmasi tê\n psuchê\n
-xumphe/resthai = eu)pherosu/nê] (p. 419 D).
+22. [Greek: Eu)phrosu/nÃª--a)po\ tou= eu)= pra/gmasi tÃª\n psuchÃª\n
+xumphe/resthai = eu)pherosu/nÃª] (p. 419 D).
 
-23. [Greek: Thumo\s--a)po\ tê=s thu/seôs kai\ ze/seôs tê=s
-psuchê=s. E)pithumi/a--ê( e)pi\ to\n thumo\n i)ou=sa du/namis] (p.
+23. [Greek: Thumo\s--a)po\ tÃª=s thu/seÃ´s kai\ ze/seÃ´s tÃª=s
+psuchÃª=s. E)pithumi/a--Ãª( e)pi\ to\n thumo\n i)ou=sa du/namis] (p.
 419 E).
 
-24. [Greek: To\ o)/n = to\ ou)= tugcha/nei zê/têma, to\ o)/noma.
-O)nomasto\n = o)/n, ou)= ma/sma e)sti/n. (Ma/sma = zê/têma:
-mai/esthai = zêtei=n)] (p. 421 A).
+24. [Greek: To\ o)/n = to\ ou)= tugcha/nei zÃª/tÃªma, to\ o)/noma.
+O)nomasto\n = o)/n, ou)= ma/sma e)sti/n. (Ma/sma = zÃª/tÃªma:
+mai/esthai = zÃªtei=n)] (p. 421 A).
 
-25. [Greek: A)lêthei/a--thei/a a)/lê], or [Greek: ê( thei/a tou=
+25. [Greek: A)lÃªthei/a--thei/a a)/lÃª], or [Greek: Ãª( thei/a tou=
 o)/ntos phora/. Pseu=dos] from [Greek: eu(/dein], with [Greek:
 psi=] prefixed, as being the opposite of movement and flux (p. 421
 B-C).
@@ -18135,27 +18104,27 @@ B-C).
 upon the theory opposed to Herakleitus--_i.e._, the theory that
 things were not in perpetual flux, but stationary:--
 
-[Greek: E)pistê/mê--o(/ti i(/stêsin ê(mô=n e)pi\ toi=s pra/gmasi
-tê\n psuchê/n.
+[Greek: E)pistÃª/mÃª--o(/ti i(/stÃªsin Ãª(mÃ´=n e)pi\ toi=s pra/gmasi
+tÃª\n psuchÃª/n.
 
-I(stori/a--o(/ti i(/stêsi to\n r(ou=n.
+I(stori/a--o(/ti i(/stÃªsi to\n r(ou=n.
 
-Pisto\n--i(sta=|n panta/pasi sêmai/nei.
+Pisto\n--i(sta=|n panta/pasi sÃªmai/nei.
 
-Mnê/mê--monê\ e)n tê=| psuchê=|] (437 A-C).
+MnÃª/mÃª--monÃª\ e)n tÃª=| psuchÃª=|] (437 A-C).
 
 27. We found before that some names of _good_ attributes were
 founded on the Herakleitean theory. But there are also names of
 _bad_ attributes founded on it.
 
-[Greek: A)mathi/a = ê( tou= a(/ma theô=| i)o/ntos porei/a.
+[Greek: A)mathi/a = Ãª( tou= a(/ma theÃ´=| i)o/ntos porei/a.
 
-A)kolasi/a = ê( a)kolouthi/a toi=s pra/gmasin] (p. 437 C).
+A)kolasi/a = Ãª( a)kolouthi/a toi=s pra/gmasin] (p. 437 C).
 
 Sokrates contrasts the two theories of [Greek: sta/sis] and
-[Greek: ki/nêsis], and says that he believes the first Name-Givers
+[Greek: ki/nÃªsis], and says that he believes the first Name-Givers
 to have apportioned names in conformity to the theory of [Greek:
-ki/nêsis], but that he thinks they were mistaken in adopting that
+ki/nÃªsis], but that he thinks they were mistaken in adopting that
 theory (p. 439 C).]
 
 [Side-note: These transitions appear violent to a modern reader.
@@ -18187,9 +18156,9 @@ Protagoras, or Prodikus, with others; according to Schleiermacher,
 Antisthenes among them.[33]
 
 [Footnote 31: Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verb. a. 16, p. 196, Schaefer.
-[Greek: ta\ kra/tista de\ ne/mô, ô(s prô/tô| to\n u(pe\r
-e)tumologi/as ei)sa/gonti lo/gon, Pla/tôni tô=| Sôkratikô=|,
-pollachê=| me\n kai\ a)/llothi, ma/lista de\ e)n tô=| Kratu/lô|.]
+[Greek: ta\ kra/tista de\ ne/mÃ´, Ã´(s prÃ´/tÃ´| to\n u(pe\r
+e)tumologi/as ei)sa/gonti lo/gon, Pla/tÃ´ni tÃ´=| SÃ´kratikÃ´=|,
+pollachÃª=| me\n kai\ a)/llothi, ma/lista de\ e)n tÃ´=| Kratu/lÃ´|.]
 
 About Plato's etymologies, as seriously intended, see Plutarch, De
 Iside et Osiride, p. 375 C-D-E, with the note of Wyttenbach.
@@ -18198,7 +18167,7 @@ etymologies of Plato in the Kratylus as being ingenious, though
 disputable, but not at all as being derisory caricatures. Indeed
 the etymology of _Scientia_, which he cites from Scaliger, p. 370,
 is quite as singular as any in the Kratylus. Sydenham (Notes to
-the translation of Plato's Philêbus, p. 35) calls the Kratylus "a
+the translation of Plato's PhilÃªbus, p. 35) calls the Kratylus "a
 dialogue, in which is taught the nature of things, as well the
 permanent as the transient, from a supposed etymology of names and
 words.
@@ -18207,16 +18176,16 @@ I find, in the very instructive comments of Bishop Colenso on the
 Pentateuch (Part iv. ch. 24, p. 250), a citation from St.
 Augustine, illustrating the view which I believe Plato to have
 taken of these etymologies: "Quo loco prorsus non arbitror
-prætereundum, quod pater Valerius animadvertit admirans, in
+prÃ¦tereundum, quod pater Valerius animadvertit admirans, in
 quorundam rusticanorum (_i.e._, Africans, near Carthage)
-collocutione. Cum enim alter alteri dixisset _Salus_--quæsivit ab
-eo, qui et Latiné nosset et Punicé, quid esset _Salus_: responsum
+collocutione. Cum enim alter alteri dixisset _Salus_--quÃ¦sivit ab
+eo, qui et LatinÃ© nosset et PunicÃ©, quid esset _Salus_: responsum
 est, _Tria_. Tum ille agnoscens cum gaudio, salutem nostram esse
 Trinitatem, convenientiam linguarum non fortuitu sic sonuisse
-arbitratus est, sed occultissimâ dispensatione divinæ
-providentiæ--ut cum Latiné nominatur _Salus_, à Punicis intelligantur
-_Tria_--et cum Punici linguâ suâ _Tria_ nominant, Latiné intelligatur
-_Salus_ . . . Sed _hæc verborum consonantia_, sive provenerit sive
+arbitratus est, sed occultissimÃ¢ dispensatione divinÃ¦
+providentiÃ¦--ut cum LatinÃ© nominatur _Salus_, Ã  Punicis intelligantur
+_Tria_--et cum Punici linguÃ¢ suÃ¢ _Tria_ nominant, LatinÃ© intelligatur
+_Salus_ . . . Sed _hÃ¦c verborum consonantia_, sive provenerit sive
 provisa sit, _non pugnaciter agendum est ut ei quisque consentiat,
 sed quantum interpretantis elegantiam hilaritas audientis
 admittit._"
@@ -18231,39 +18200,39 @@ absurdities piled up with a view to caricature.]
 [Footnote 32: Schleiermacher, Introduction to Kratylus, vol. iv.
 p. 6: "Dagegen ist viel gewonnen durch die Entdeckung neuerer
 Zeiten," &c. To the same purpose, Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., part
-ii. p. 402, edit. 2nd, and Brandis, Gesch. Gr. Röm. Phil., part
+ii. p. 402, edit. 2nd, and Brandis, Gesch. Gr. RÃ¶m. Phil., part
 ii. sect. cvii. p. 285.
 
 Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Cratylum, p. 4, says: "Quod mirum
 est non esse ab iis animadversum, qui Platonem putaverunt de
-linguæ et vocabulorum origine hoc libro suam sententiam explicare
+linguÃ¦ et vocabulorum origine hoc libro suam sententiam explicare
 voluisse. Isti enim adeo nihil senserunt irrisionis, ut omnia
 atque singula pro philosophi decretis venditarint, ideoque ei
-absurdissima quæque commenta affinxerint. Ita Menagius. . . . Nec
+absurdissima quÃ¦que commenta affinxerint. Ita Menagius. . . . Nec
 Tiedemannus Argum, Dial. Plat. multo rectius judicat. Irrisionem
 primi senserunt Garnierius et Tennemann." &c. Stallbaum, moreover,
 is perpetually complaining in his notes, that the Etymological
-Lexicons adopt Plato's derivations as genuine. Ménage (ad Diogen.
+Lexicons adopt Plato's derivations as genuine. MÃ©nage (ad Diogen.
 Laert. iii. 25) declares most of the etymologies of Plato in the
 Kratylus to be [Greek: pseude/tuma], but never hints at the
 supposition that they are intended as caricatures. During the
-centuries between Plato and Ménage, men had become more critical
-on the subject of etymology: in the century after Ménage, they had
+centuries between Plato and MÃ©nage, men had become more critical
+on the subject of etymology: in the century after MÃ©nage, they had
 become more critical still, as we may see by the remarks of Turgot
-on the etymologies of Ménage himself.
+on the etymologies of MÃ©nage himself.
 
 The following are the remarks of Turgot, in the article
 'Etymologie' (Encycl. Franc. in Turgot's collected works, vol.
-iii. p. 33): "Ménage est un exemple frappant des absurdités dans
-lesquelles on tombe, en adoptant sans choix ce que suggère la
-malheureuse facilité de supposer tout ce qui est possible: car il
-est très vrai qu'il ne fait aucune supposition dont la possibilité
-ne soit justifiée par des exemples. Mais nous avons prouvé qu'en
-multipliant à volonté les altérations intermédiaires, soit dans le
-son, soit dans la signification, il est aisé de dériver un mot
-quelconque de tout autre mot donné: c'est le moyen _d'expliquer
-tout, et dès-lors de ne rien expliquer_; c'est le moyen aussi de
-justifier tous les mépris de l'ignorance."
+iii. p. 33): "MÃ©nage est un exemple frappant des absurditÃ©s dans
+lesquelles on tombe, en adoptant sans choix ce que suggÃ¨re la
+malheureuse facilitÃ© de supposer tout ce qui est possible: car il
+est trÃ¨s vrai qu'il ne fait aucune supposition dont la possibilitÃ©
+ne soit justifiÃ©e par des exemples. Mais nous avons prouvÃ© qu'en
+multipliant Ã  volontÃ© les altÃ©rations intermÃ©diaires, soit dans le
+son, soit dans la signification, il est aisÃ© de dÃ©river un mot
+quelconque de tout autre mot donnÃ©: c'est le moyen _d'expliquer
+tout, et dÃ¨s-lors de ne rien expliquer_; c'est le moyen aussi de
+justifier tous les mÃ©pris de l'ignorance."
 
 Steinhart (Einleitung zum Kratylus, pp. 551-552) agrees with
 Stallbaum to a certain extent, that Plato in the Kratylus intended
@@ -18282,7 +18251,7 @@ the etymological examples given in this dialogue, though Sokrates
 announces them as proving and illustrating his own theory
 seriously laid down, are really bitter jests and mockery, intended
 to destroy it--"hanc sententiam facetissimis et irrisione plenis
-exemplis, dum comprobare videtur, reverâ infringit" (p. 12).
+exemplis, dum comprobare videtur, reverÃ¢ infringit" (p. 12).
 Dittrich admits that Kratylus, who holds the theory derided,
 understands nothing of this _acerbissima irrisio_ (p. 18). He
 thinks that Protagoras, not Prodikus nor Antisthenes, is the
@@ -18319,7 +18288,7 @@ upon them a discreditable imputation without some evidence. Of
 Prodikus we know (and that too chiefly from some sarcasms of
 Plato) that he took pains to distinguish words apparently, but not
 really, equivalent: and that such accurate distinction was what he
-meant by "rectitude of names" (Plato, Euthydêm. 277 E.) Of
+meant by "rectitude of names" (Plato, EuthydÃªm. 277 E.) Of
 Protagoras we know that he taught, by precept or example, correct
 speaking or writing: but we have no information that either of
 them pursued etymological researches, successfully or
@@ -18338,9 +18307,9 @@ Platon. Euthydemum, p. xlvii., respecting Protagoras and Prodikus,
 as writers and critics on language.
 
 Stallbaum says, Proleg. ad Krat. p. 11:--"Quibus verbis _haud
-dubié_ notantur Sophistæ; qui, neglectis linguæ elementis,
-derivatorum et compositorum verborum originationem temeré ad suum
-arbitrium tractabant". Ibid. p. 4:--"In Cratylo ineptæ etymologiæ
+dubiÃ©_ notantur SophistÃ¦; qui, neglectis linguÃ¦ elementis,
+derivatorum et compositorum verborum originationem temerÃ© ad suum
+arbitrium tractabant". Ibid. p. 4:--"In Cratylo ineptÃ¦ etymologiÃ¦
 specimina exhibentur, ita quidem ut _haudquaquam dubitari liceat_,
 quin ista omnia ad mentem sophistarum maximeque Protagoreorum
 _joculari imitatione_ explicata sint".
@@ -18354,23 +18323,23 @@ parum exploratum habetur_". He goes on to say that neither
 Prodikus nor Antisthenes is meant, but Protagoras and the
 Protagoreans. To prove this he infers, from a passage in this
 dialogue (c. 11, p. 391 C), that Protagoras had written a book
-[Greek: peri\ o)rtho/têtos tô=n o)noma/tôn] (Heindorf and
+[Greek: peri\ o)rtho/tÃªtos tÃ´=n o)noma/tÃ´n] (Heindorf and
 Schleiermacher, with better reason, infer from the passage nothing
 more than the circumstance that Protagoras taught [Greek:
 o)rthoepei/an] or correct speaking and writing). The passage does
 not prove this; but if it did, what did Protagoras teach in the
-book? Stallbaum tells us (p. 16):--"Jam si quæras, quid tandem
-Protagoras ipse de nominum ortu censuerit, _fateor unâ conjecturâ
-nitendum esse, ut de hâc re aliquid eruatur_". He then proceeds to
+book? Stallbaum tells us (p. 16):--"Jam si quÃ¦ras, quid tandem
+Protagoras ipse de nominum ortu censuerit, _fateor unÃ¢ conjecturÃ¢
+nitendum esse, ut de hÃ¢c re aliquid eruatur_". He then proceeds to
 _conjecture_, from the little which we know respecting Protagoras,
 what that Sophist must have laid down upon the origin of names;
 and he finishes by assuming the very point which he ought to have
 proved (p. 17):--"_ex ipso Cratylo intelligimus et cognoscimus_,
-mox inter Protagoræ amicos exstitisse qui inepté hæc studia
-persequentes, non e verbis et nominibus mentis humanæ notiones
+mox inter ProtagorÃ¦ amicos exstitisse qui ineptÃ© hÃ¦c studia
+persequentes, non e verbis et nominibus mentis humanÃ¦ notiones
 elicere et illustrare, sed in verba et nomina sua ipsi decreta
 transferre et sic ea probare et confirmare niterentur. Quid quidem
-homines à Platone hoc libro _facetissimâ irrisione_ exagitantur,"
+homines Ã  Platone hoc libro _facetissimÃ¢ irrisione_ exagitantur,"
 &c. I repeat, that in spite of Stallbaum's confident assertions,
 he fails in giving the smallest proof that Protagoras or the
 Sophists proposed etymologies such as to make them a suitable butt
@@ -18473,15 +18442,15 @@ Herakleit. ii. p. 387.]
 
 [Footnote 39: See, as an example, his derivation of [Greek:
 _Di/philos_] from [Greek: Dii+/ phi/los], p. 399: [Greek:
-_Mou=sa_], p. 406: [Greek: dai/môn] from [Greek: daê/môn], p. 398:
-for [Greek: _A)phrodi/tê_] he takes the Hesiodic etymology, p.
-406. [Greek: _A)/rês_] and [Greek: _a)/r)r(ên_] (p. 407). His
-derivation of [Greek: _ai)thê/r_--a)po\ tou= a)ei\ the/ein] (p.
+_Mou=sa_], p. 406: [Greek: dai/mÃ´n] from [Greek: daÃª/mÃ´n], p. 398:
+for [Greek: _A)phrodi/tÃª_] he takes the Hesiodic etymology, p.
+406. [Greek: _A)/rÃªs_] and [Greek: _a)/r)r(Ãªn_] (p. 407). His
+derivation of [Greek: _ai)thÃª/r_--a)po\ tou= a)ei\ the/ein] (p.
 410) is given twice by Aristotle (De Coelo, i. 3, p. 270, b. 22;
 Meteorol. i. 3, p. 339, b. 25) as well as in the Pseudo-Aristotle,
 De Mundo, p. 392, a. 8. None of the Platonic etymologies is more
-strange than that of [Greek: psuchê/], quasi [Greek: phuse/chê,
-a)po\ tou= tê\n phu/sin o)chei=n kai\ e)/chein] (Kratyl. p. 400).
+strange than that of [Greek: psuchÃª/], quasi [Greek: phuse/chÃª,
+a)po\ tou= tÃª\n phu/sin o)chei=n kai\ e)/chein] (Kratyl. p. 400).
 Yet Proklus cites this as serious, Scholia in Kratylum, p. 4, ed.
 Boissonnade. Plato, in the Treatise De Legibus, derives [Greek:
 cho/ros] from [Greek: chara/] and [Greek: no/mos] from [Greek:
@@ -18500,8 +18469,8 @@ I venture to say that none of those Platonic etymologies, which
 Lassalle regards as caricatures, are more absurd than those which
 he here accepts as serious. Liddell and Scott in their Lexicon say
 about [Greek: thumo/s], "probably rightly derived from [Greek:
-thu/ô] by Plat. Crat. 419 E, [Greek: a)po\ tê=s thu/seôs kai\
-ze/seôs tê=s psuchê=s.]" The manner in which Schleiermacher and
+thu/Ã´] by Plat. Crat. 419 E, [Greek: a)po\ tÃª=s thu/seÃ´s kai\
+ze/seÃ´s tÃª=s psuchÃª=s.]" The manner in which Schleiermacher and
 Steinhart also (Einleit. zum Kratylos, pp. 552-554), analysing
 this dialogue, represent Plato as passing backwards and forwards
 from mockery to earnest and from earnest to mockery, appears to me
@@ -18509,7 +18478,7 @@ very singular: as well as the principle which Schleiermacher lays
 down (Introduct. p. 10), that Plato intended the general doctrines
 to be seriously understood, and the particular etymological
 applications to be mere mockery and extravagance (um wer weiss
-welche Komödie aufzuführen). What other philosopher has ever
+welche KomÃ¶die aufzufÃ¼hren). What other philosopher has ever
 propounded serious doctrines, and then followed them up by
 illustrations knowingly and intentionally caricatured so as to
 disparage the doctrines instead of recommending them?
@@ -18520,7 +18489,7 @@ absurd.
 
 As a specimen of the view entertained by able men of the
 seventeenth century respecting the Platonic and Aristotelian
-etymologies, see the Institutiones Logicæ of Burgersdicius, Lib.
+etymologies, see the Institutiones LogicÃ¦ of Burgersdicius, Lib.
 i. c. 25, not. 1. Lehrsch (Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten, Part
 i. p. 34-35) agrees with the other commentators, that the Platonic
 etymologies in the Kratylus are caricatured to deride the boastful
@@ -18536,20 +18505,20 @@ represented as understanding seriously these etymologies which are
 now affirmed to be meant as caricatures.
 
 As specimens of Plato's view respecting admissible etymologies, we
-find him in Timæus, p. 43 C, deriving [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] from
-[Greek: a)i+/ssô]: again in the same dialogue, p. 62 A, [Greek:
+find him in TimÃ¦us, p. 43 C, deriving [Greek: ai)/sthÃªsis] from
+[Greek: a)i+/ssÃ´]: again in the same dialogue, p. 62 A, [Greek:
 thermo\s] from [Greek: kermati/zein]. In Legg. iv. 714, we have
-[Greek: tê\n tou= nou= dianomê\n e)ponoma/zontas no/mon]. In
-Phædrus, p. 238 C, we find [Greek: e)/rôs] derived from [Greek:
-e)r)r(ôme/nôs r(ôsthei=sa].
+[Greek: tÃª\n tou= nou= dianomÃª\n e)ponoma/zontas no/mon]. In
+PhÃ¦drus, p. 238 C, we find [Greek: e)/rÃ´s] derived from [Greek:
+e)r)r(Ã´me/nÃ´s r(Ã´sthei=sa].
 
 Aristotle derives [Greek: o)/sphus] from [Greek: i)sophue/s],
 Histor. Animal. i. 13, p. 493, a. 22: also [Greek: di/kaion] from
 [Greek: di/cha], Ethic. Nikom. v. 7, 1132, a. 31; [Greek:
-methu/ein--meta\ to\ thu/ein], Athenæus, ii. 40. The
+methu/ein--meta\ to\ thu/ein], AthenÃ¦us, ii. 40. The
 Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise [Greek: Peri\ Ko/smou] (p. 401, a. 15)
-adopts the Platonic etymology of [Greek: Di/a-Zê=na] as [Greek:
-di' o(\n zô=men]
+adopts the Platonic etymology of [Greek: Di/a-ZÃª=na] as [Greek:
+di' o(\n zÃ´=men]
 
 Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, c. 9, p. 948, derives [Greek: kne/phas]
 from [Greek: keno\n pha/ous].
@@ -18558,15 +18527,15 @@ The Emperor Marcus Antoninus derives [Greek: a)kti/s], the ray of
 the Sun, [Greek: a)po\ tou= e)ktei/nesthai], Meditat. viii. 57.
 
 The Stoics, who were fond of etymologising, borrowed many
-etymologies from the Platonic Kratylus (Villoison, de Theologiâ
-Physicâ Stoicorum, in Osann's edition of Cornutus De Naturâ
+etymologies from the Platonic Kratylus (Villoison, de TheologiÃ¢
+PhysicÃ¢ Stoicorum, in Osann's edition of Cornutus De NaturÃ¢
 Deorum, p. 512). Specimens of the Stoic etymologies are given by
 the Stoic Balbus in Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, ii. 25-29 (64-73).
 
-Dähne (in his Darstellung der Judisch-Alexandrinischen
+DÃ¤hne (in his Darstellung der Judisch-Alexandrinischen
 Religions-Philosophie, i. p. 73 seq.) remarks on the numerous
 etymologies not merely propounded, but assumed as grounds of
-reasoning by Philo Judæus in commenting upon the Pentateuch,
+reasoning by Philo JudÃ¦us in commenting upon the Pentateuch,
 etymologies totally inadmissible and often ridiculous.]
 
 [Side-note: Plato intended his theory as serious, but his
@@ -18586,12 +18555,12 @@ appeals to particulars, except when he has a theory to attack.
 When he has a theory to lay down, he does not generally recognise
 the necessity of either proving or verifying it by application to
 particular cases. His proof is usually deductive or derived from
-some more general principle asserted _à priori_--some internal
+some more general principle asserted _Ã  priori_--some internal
 sentiment enunciated as a self-justifying maxim. Particular
 examples serve to illustrate what the principle is, but are not
 required to establish its validity.[42] But I believe that he
-intended his particular etymologies as _bonâ fide_ guesses, more
-or less probable (like the developments in the Timæus, which
+intended his particular etymologies as _bonÃ¢ fide_ guesses, more
+or less probable (like the developments in the TimÃ¦us, which
 he[43] repeatedly designates as [Greek: ei)ko/ta], and nothing
 beyond): some certain, some doubtful, some merely novel and
 ingenious: such as would naturally spring from the originating
@@ -18617,10 +18586,10 @@ particulars (Herakleitos, p. 406).]
 
 [Footnote 43: Spengel justly remarks (Art. Scr. p. 52) respecting
 the hypotheses of the Platonic commentators:--"Platonem quidem
-liberare gestiunt, falsâ, ironiâ, non ex animi sententiâ omnia in
-Cratylo prolata esse dicentes. Sed præter alia multa et hoc
+liberare gestiunt, falsÃ¢, ironiÃ¢, non ex animi sententiÃ¢ omnia in
+Cratylo prolata esse dicentes. Sed prÃ¦ter alia multa et hoc
 neglexerunt viri docti, easdem verborum originationes, quas in
-Cratylo, in cæteris quoque dialogis, ubi nullus est facetiis
+Cratylo, in cÃ¦teris quoque dialogis, ubi nullus est facetiis
 locus, et seria omnia aguntur, recurrere."
 
 This passage is cited by K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. d.
@@ -18642,15 +18611,15 @@ Philolaus, pp. 168-175), and repeated by Clemens Alexandrinus, is
 not more absurd than that of [Greek: theo\s a)po\ tou= thei=nai],
 given by Herodot. ii. 52, and also repeated by Clemens, see
 Wesseling's note. None of the etymologies of the Kratylus is more
-strange than that of [Greek: Zeu\s-Di/a-Zê=na] (p. 396 B). Yet
+strange than that of [Greek: Zeu\s-Di/a-ZÃª=na] (p. 396 B). Yet
 this is reproduced in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise, [Greek:
 Peri\ Ko/smou] (p. 401, a. 15), as well as by the Stoic Zeno
 (Diogen. Laert. vii. 147). The treatise of Cornutus, De Nat. Deor.
 with Osann's Commentary, is instructive in enabling us to
 appreciate the taste of ancient times as to what was probable or
 admissible in etymology. There are few of the etymologies in the
-Kratylus more singular than that of [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] from
-[Greek: a)nathrô=n a)\ o(/pôpen]. Yet this is cited by Ammonius as
+Kratylus more singular than that of [Greek: a)/nthrÃ´pos] from
+[Greek: a)nathrÃ´=n a)\ o(/pÃ´pen]. Yet this is cited by Ammonius as
 a perfectly good derivation, ad Aristot. De Interpret. p. 103, b.
 8, Schol. Bekk., and also in the Etymologicon Magnum.]
 
@@ -18658,12 +18627,12 @@ a perfectly good derivation, ad Aristot. De Interpret. p. 103, b.
 invention often pass in Plato as the workings of an ordinary mind
 (sometimes even a feeble mind) worked upon from without by divine
 inspiration, quite distinct from the internal force, reasoning,
-judging, testing, which belongs to a powerful mind. See Phædrus,
-pp. 235 C, 238 D, 244 A; Timæus, p. 72 A; Menon, p. 81 A.]
+judging, testing, which belongs to a powerful mind. See PhÃ¦drus,
+pp. 235 C, 238 D, 244 A; TimÃ¦us, p. 72 A; Menon, p. 81 A.]
 
 [Footnote 45: I have made some remarks to this effect upon the
-Platonic mythes in my notice of the Phædon, see ch. xxv. p. 415,
-ad Phædon, p. 114.]
+Platonic mythes in my notice of the PhÃ¦don, see ch. xxv. p. 415,
+ad PhÃ¦don, p. 114.]
 
 [Side-note: Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other
 etymologists of ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as
@@ -18712,14 +18681,14 @@ Proklus advises that those who wish to become dialecticians should
 begin with the study of the Kratylus (Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 3, ed.
 Boiss.).
 
-We read in the Phædrus of Plato (p. 244 B) in the second speech
-ascribed to Sokrates, two etymologies:--1. [Greek: mantikê\]
-derived from [Greek: manikê\] by the insertion of [Greek: t],
+We read in the PhÃ¦drus of Plato (p. 244 B) in the second speech
+ascribed to Sokrates, two etymologies:--1. [Greek: mantikÃª\]
+derived from [Greek: manikÃª\] by the insertion of [Greek: t],
 which Sokrates declares to be done in bad taste, [Greek: oi( de\
-nu=n a)peiroka/lôs to\ _tau=_ e)pemba/llontes mantikê\n
-e)ka/lasan.] 2. [Greek: oi)ônistikê\], quasi [Greek:
-oi)onoi+stikê\], from [Greek: oi)/êsis, nou=s, i(stori/a]. Compare
-the etymology of [Greek: E)/rôs], p. 238 C. That these are real
+nu=n a)peiroka/lÃ´s to\ _tau=_ e)pemba/llontes mantikÃª\n
+e)ka/lasan.] 2. [Greek: oi)Ã´nistikÃª\], quasi [Greek:
+oi)onoi+stikÃª\], from [Greek: oi)/Ãªsis, nou=s, i(stori/a]. Compare
+the etymology of [Greek: E)/rÃ´s], p. 238 C. That these are real
 word-changes, which Plato believes to have taken place, is the
 natural and reasonable interpretation of the passage. Cicero
 (Divinat. i. 1) alludes to the first of the two as Plato's real
@@ -18730,14 +18699,14 @@ contrary, declare that these two etymologies are mere irony and
 mockery, spoken by Plato, _ex mente Sophistarum_, and intended as
 a sneer at the perverse and silly Sophists. No reason is produced
 by Ast and Stallbaum to justify this hypothesis, except that you
-cannot imagine "_Platonem tam cæcum fuisse_," &c. To me this
+cannot imagine "_Platonem tam cÃ¦cum fuisse_," &c. To me this
 reason is utterly insufficient; and I contend, moreover, that
 sneers at the Sophists would be quite out of place in a speech,
 such as the palinode of Sokrates about Eros.]
 
-[Footnote 47: See what Aristotle says about [Greek: Pa/ntê] in the
+[Footnote 47: See what Aristotle says about [Greek: Pa/ntÃª] in the
 first chapter of the treatise De Coelo; also about [Greek:
-au)to/maton] from [Greek: au)to\ ma/tên], Physic. ii. 5, p. 197,
+au)to/maton] from [Greek: au)to\ ma/tÃªn], Physic. ii. 5, p. 197,
 b. 30.
 
 Stallbaum, after having complimented Plato for his talent in
@@ -18746,13 +18715,13 @@ find Aristotle reproducing some of these very caricatures as
 serious, see Stallbaum's note on Kratyl. p. 411 E.
 
 Respecting the etymologies proposed by learned and able Romans in
-and before the Ciceronian and Augustan age, Ælius Stilo, Varro,
+and before the Ciceronian and Augustan age, Ã†lius Stilo, Varro,
 Labeo, Nigidius, &c., see Aulus Gellius, xiii. 10; Quintilian,
-Inst. Or. i. 5; Varro, de Linguâ Latinâ.
+Inst. Or. i. 5; Varro, de LinguÃ¢ LatinÃ¢.
 
 Even to Quintilian, the etymologies of Varro appeared
 preposterous; and he observes, in reference to those proposed by
-Ælius Stilo and by others afterwards, "Cui non post Varronem sit
+Ã†lius Stilo and by others afterwards, "Cui non post Varronem sit
 venia?" (i. 6, 37). This critical remark, alike good tempered and
 reasonable, might be applied with still greater pertinence to the
 Kratylus of Plato. In regard to etymology, more might have been
@@ -18763,36 +18732,36 @@ conjectures had been hazarded by various scholars, and more or
 less of improvement might be hoped from the conflict of opposite
 opinions and thinkers.
 
-M. Gaston Boissier (in his interesting Étude sur la vie et les
+M. Gaston Boissier (in his interesting Ã‰tude sur la vie et les
 Ouvrages de M. Terentius Varron, p. 152, Paris, 1861) observes
 respecting Varro, what is still more applicable to
-Plato:--"Gardons nous bien d'ailleurs de demander à Varron ce qu'exige
-la science moderne: pour n'être pas trop sévères, remettons-le dans
-son époque et jugeons-le avec l'esprit de son temps.** Il ne semble
-pas qu'alors on réclamât, de ceux qui recherchaient les
-étymologies, beaucoup d'exactitude et de sévérité. _On se piquait
-moins d'arriver à l'origine réelle du mot, que de le décomposer
-d'une manière ingénieuse et qui en gravât le sens dans la
-mémoire._ Les jurisconsultes eux-mêmes, malgré la gravité de leur
+Plato:--"Gardons nous bien d'ailleurs de demander Ã  Varron ce qu'exige
+la science moderne: pour n'Ãªtre pas trop sÃ©vÃ¨res, remettons-le dans
+son Ã©poque et jugeons-le avec l'esprit de son temps.** Il ne semble
+pas qu'alors on rÃ©clamÃ¢t, de ceux qui recherchaient les
+Ã©tymologies, beaucoup d'exactitude et de sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ©. _On se piquait
+moins d'arriver Ã  l'origine rÃ©elle du mot, que de le dÃ©composer
+d'une maniÃ¨re ingÃ©nieuse et qui en gravÃ¢t le sens dans la
+mÃ©moire._ Les jurisconsultes eux-mÃªmes, malgrÃ© la gravitÃ© de leur
 profession et l'importance pratique de leurs recherches, ne
-suivaient pas une autre méthode. Trebatius trouvait dans
-_sacellum_ les deux mots _sacra cella_: et Labéon faisait venir
-_soror_ de _seorsum_, parce que la jeune fille se sépare de le
-maison paternelle pours suivre son époux: tout comme Nigidius
-trouvoit dans _frater ferè alter_--c'est à dire, un autre
-soi-même," &c.
-
-Lobeck has similar remarks in his Aglaophamus (pp. 867-869):--"Sané
+suivaient pas une autre mÃ©thode. Trebatius trouvait dans
+_sacellum_ les deux mots _sacra cella_: et LabÃ©on faisait venir
+_soror_ de _seorsum_, parce que la jeune fille se sÃ©pare de le
+maison paternelle pours suivre son Ã©poux: tout comme Nigidius
+trouvoit dans _frater ferÃ¨ alter_--c'est Ã  dire, un autre
+soi-mÃªme," &c.
+
+Lobeck has similar remarks in his Aglaophamus (pp. 867-869):--"SanÃ©
 ita J. Capellus veteres juris consultos excusat, _mutuum_
 interpretantes _quod ex meo tuum fiat, testamentum_ autem
 _testationem mentis_, non quod eam verborum originem esse
 putarent, sed ut significationem eorum altius in legentium animis
 defigerent. Similiterque ecclesiastici quidam auctores, quum nomen
-Pascha a græco verbo [Greek: pa/schein] repetunt, non per
+Pascha a grÃ¦co verbo [Greek: pa/schein] repetunt, non per
 ignorantiam lapsi, sed allusionis quandam gratiam aucupati
 videntur."]
 
-[Footnote 48: Gräfenhahn (Gesch. d. classichen Philologie, vol. i.
+[Footnote 48: GrÃ¤fenhahn (Gesch. d. classichen Philologie, vol. i.
 sect. 36, pp. 151-164) points out how common was the hypothesis of
 fanciful derivation of names or supposed etymologies among the
 Greek poets, and how it passed from them to the prose writers. He
@@ -18806,7 +18775,7 @@ diffused among the ancient literati generally, was especially
 likely to belong to those who held the Platonic theory about
 language:--"Is intelligat necesse est, hoc universum genus ab
 antiquitatis** ingenio non alienum, ei vero, qui imagines rerum in
-vocabulis sic ut in cerâ expressas putaret, convenientissimum
+vocabulis sic ut in cerÃ¢ expressas putaret, convenientissimum
 fuisse" (Aglaophamus, p. 870).]
 
 [Side-note: Continuance of the dialogue--Sokrates endeavours to
@@ -18815,7 +18784,7 @@ disguised and spoiled.]
 
 Having expressed my opinion that the etymologies propounded by
 Sokrates in the Kratylus are not intended as caricatures, but as
-_bonâ fide_ specimens of admissible etymological conjecture, or,
+_bonÃ¢ fide_ specimens of admissible etymological conjecture, or,
 at the least, of discoverable analogy--I resume the thread of the
 dialogue.
 
@@ -18827,7 +18796,7 @@ with the names actually received and current. The contrast between
 the sameness and perfection postulated in the theory, and the
 confusion of actual practice, is not less manifest than the
 contrast between the benevolent purposes ascribed to the Demiurgus
-(in the Timæus) and the realities of man and society:--requiring
+(in the TimÃ¦us) and the realities of man and society:--requiring
 intermediate assumptions, more or less ingenious, to explain or
 attenuate the glaring inconsistencies. Respecting the Name-Form,
 Sokrates intimates that it may often be so disguised by difference
@@ -18859,23 +18828,23 @@ several conjoined. The rectitude of the compound names will depend
 upon that of the simple and primordial.[51] This is the only way
 in which we can track out the rectitude of names: for it is no
 account of the matter to say that the Gods bestowed them, and that
-therefore they are right: such recourse to a _Deus ex machinâ_ is
+therefore they are right: such recourse to a _Deus ex machinÃ¢_ is
 only one among the pretexts for evading the necessity of
 explanation.[52]
 
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Kratyl. p. 425 A. [Greek: tê=| o)nomastikê=|,
-ê)\ r(êtorikê=|, ê)\ ê(/tis e)sti\n ê( te/chnê.]]
+[Footnote 50: Plato, Kratyl. p. 425 A. [Greek: tÃª=| o)nomastikÃª=|,
+Ãª)\ r(ÃªtorikÃª=|, Ãª)\ Ãª(/tis e)sti\n Ãª( te/chnÃª.]]
 
 [Footnote 51: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 424 B-E, 426 A, 434 A.]
 
 [Footnote 52: Plato, Kratyl. p. 425 E.]
 
 This extreme postulate of analysis and adaptation may be compared
-with that which Sokrates lays down, in the Phædrus, in regard to
+with that which Sokrates lays down, in the PhÃ¦drus, in regard to
 the art of Rhetoric. You must first distinguish all the different
 forms of mind--then all the different forms of speech; you must
 assign the sort of speech which is apt for persuading each
-particular sort of mind. Phædrus, pp. 271-272.]
+particular sort of mind. PhÃ¦drus, pp. 271-272.]
 
 [Side-note: Essential significant aptitude consists in
 resemblance.]
@@ -18904,8 +18873,8 @@ Grimm (in his Dissertation Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache,
 Berlin, 1858, ed. 4) give views very similar to those of Plato,
 respecting the primordial growth of language, and the original
 significant or symbolising power supposed to be inherent in each
-letter (Kein Buchstabe, "ursprünglich steht bedeutungslos oder
-ueberflüssig," pp. 39-40). Leibnitz and Grimm say (as Plato here
+letter (Kein Buchstabe, "ursprÃ¼nglich steht bedeutungslos oder
+ueberflÃ¼ssig," pp. 39-40). Leibnitz and Grimm say (as Plato here
 also affirms) that Rho designates the Rough--Lambda, the Smooth:
 see also what he says about Alpha, Iota, Hypsilon. Compare,
 besides, M. Renan, Orig. du Langage, vi. p. 137.
@@ -18946,9 +18915,9 @@ facilitates, or falls in with, the law of universal movement: the
 names of things bad or hurtful, denote what obstructs or retards
 movement.[57]
 
-[Footnote 56: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 401 C--402 B. 436 E: [Greek: ô(s
+[Footnote 56: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 401 C--402 B. 436 E: [Greek: Ã´(s
 tou= panto\s i)o/ntos te kai\ pherome/non kai\ r(e/ontos phame\n
-sêmai/nein ê(mi=n tê\n ou)si/an ta\ o)no/mata.] Also p. 439 B.]
+sÃªmai/nein Ãª(mi=n tÃª\n ou)si/an ta\ o)no/mata.] Also p. 439 B.]
 
 [Footnote 57: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 415-416-417, &c.]
 
@@ -18973,14 +18942,14 @@ names bestowed will be consistent with themselves, founded on the
 same theory.
 
 [Footnote 58: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 409**-411 C. [Greek:
-Ai)tiô=ntai dê\ ou) to\ e)/ndon to\ para\ sphi/si pa/thos ai)/tion
-ei)=nai tau/tês tê=s do/xês, a)ll' au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata ou(/tô
+Ai)tiÃ´=ntai dÃª\ ou) to\ e)/ndon to\ para\ sphi/si pa/thos ai)/tion
+ei)=nai tau/tÃªs tÃª=s do/xÃªs, a)ll' au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata ou(/tÃ´
 pephuke/nai], &c.
 
 "He that is giddy thinks the world turns round," &c.]
 
 [Footnote 59: Plato, Kratyl. p. 418 C. [Greek: Oi)=stha ou)=n o(/ti
-mo/non tou=to dêloi= to\ a)rchai=on o)/noma tê\n dia/noian tou=
+mo/non tou=to dÃªloi= to\ a)rchai=on o)/noma tÃª\n dia/noian tou=
 theme/nou?] Also p. 419 A.]
 
 [Side-note: Changes and transpositions introduced in the name--hard
@@ -19065,20 +19034,20 @@ things, except through their names.[65]
 
 [Footnote 63: Plato, Kratyl. p. 429 B-C.
 
-_Sokr._ [Greek: Pa/nta a)/ra ta\ o)no/mata o)rthôs kei=tai?]
+_Sokr._ [Greek: Pa/nta a)/ra ta\ o)no/mata o)rthÃ´s kei=tai?]
 
 _Krat._ [Greek: O(/sa ge o)no/mata e)/sti.]
 
-_Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? E(rmoge/nei tô=|de po/teron mêde\
-o)/noma tou=to kei=sthai phô=men, ei) mê/ ti au)tô=| E(rmou=
-gene/seôs prosê/kei, ê)\ kei=sthai me/n, ou) me/ntoi o)rthô=s ge?]
+_Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? E(rmoge/nei tÃ´=|de po/teron mÃªde\
+o)/noma tou=to kei=sthai phÃ´=men, ei) mÃª/ ti au)tÃ´=| E(rmou=
+gene/seÃ´s prosÃª/kei, Ãª)\ kei=sthai me/n, ou) me/ntoi o)rthÃ´=s ge?]
 
 _Krat._ [Greek: Ou)de\ kei=sthai e)/moige dokei=, _a)lla\ dokei=n
-kei=sthai_. ei)=nai de\ e(te/rou tou=to tou)/noma, ou(=per kai\ ê(
-phu/sis ê( to\ o)/noma dêlou=sa.]
+kei=sthai_. ei)=nai de\ e(te/rou tou=to tou)/noma, ou(=per kai\ Ãª(
+phu/sis Ãª( to\ o)/noma dÃªlou=sa.]
 
 The critics say that these last words ought to be read [Greek:
-ê)\n to\ o)/noma dêloi=], as Ficinus has translated, and
+Ãª)\n to\ o)/noma dÃªloi=], as Ficinus has translated, and
 Schleiermacher after him. They are probably in the right; at the
 same time, reasoning upon the theory of Kratylus, we say without
 impropriety, that "the thing indicates the name".
@@ -19092,13 +19061,13 @@ above, ch. xiv. p. 88.**
 Compare the like argument about [Greek: no/mos] in Xenoph.
 Memorab. i. 2, 42-47, and Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 392.]
 
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Krat. p. 436 C. [Greek: A)lla\ mê ou)ch
-ou(/tôs e)/chê|, a)ll' a)nagkai=on ê)=|, ei)do/ta ti/thesthai to\n
-tithe/menon ta\ o)no/mata; ei) de\ mê/, o(/per pa/lai e)gô\
-e)/legon, ou)d' a)\n o)no/mata ei)/ê. Me/giston de/ soi e)/stô
-tekmê/rion o(/ti ou)k e)/sphaltai tê=s a)lêthei/as o( tithe/menos;
-ou) ga\r a)\n pote ou(/tô xu/mphôna ê)=n au)tô=| a(/panta. ê)\
-_ou)k e)neno/eis au)to\s le/gôn ô(s pa/nta kat' au)to\ kai\ e)pi\
+[Footnote 64: Plato, Krat. p. 436 C. [Greek: A)lla\ mÃª ou)ch
+ou(/tÃ´s e)/chÃª|, a)ll' a)nagkai=on Ãª)=|, ei)do/ta ti/thesthai to\n
+tithe/menon ta\ o)no/mata; ei) de\ mÃª/, o(/per pa/lai e)gÃ´\
+e)/legon, ou)d' a)\n o)no/mata ei)/Ãª. Me/giston de/ soi e)/stÃ´
+tekmÃª/rion o(/ti ou)k e)/sphaltai tÃª=s a)lÃªthei/as o( tithe/menos;
+ou) ga\r a)\n pote ou(/tÃ´ xu/mphÃ´na Ãª)=n au)tÃ´=| a(/panta. Ãª)\
+_ou)k e)neno/eis au)to\s le/gÃ´n Ã´(s pa/nta kat' au)to\ kai\ e)pi\
 tau)to\n e)gi/gneto ta\ o)no/mata?_]
 
 These last words allude to the various particular etymologies
@@ -19138,20 +19107,20 @@ holding-ground, recourse must be had by way of supplement to the
 less perfect rectitude (of names) presented by customary or
 conventional significance.[68]
 
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. [Greek: e)a\n de\ mê/,
-e)xamartê/setai/ te kai\ ou)de\n poiê/sei.] Compare p. 389 A.]
+[Footnote 66: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. [Greek: e)a\n de\ mÃª/,
+e)xamartÃª/setai/ te kai\ ou)de\n poiÃª/sei.] Compare p. 389 A.]
 
-[Footnote 67: Plato, Kratyl. p. 430 A. [Greek: phe/re dê/, e)a/n
-pê| diallachthô=men, ô= Kra/tule], &c.]
+[Footnote 67: Plato, Kratyl. p. 430 A. [Greek: phe/re dÃª/, e)a/n
+pÃª| diallachthÃ´=men, Ã´= Kra/tule], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 68: Plato, Krat. p. 435 C. [Greek: e)moi\ me\n ou)=n
-kai\ au)tô=| a)re/skei me\n kata\ to\ dunato\n o(/moia ei)=nai ta\
-o)no/mata toi=s pra/gmasin; a)lla\ mê\ ô(s a)lêthô=s glischra\
-ê)=| ê( o)lkê\ au)tê\ tê=s o(moio/têtos, a)nagkai=on de\ ê)=| kai\
-tô=| phortikô=| tou/tô| proschrê=sthai, tê=| xunthê/kê|, ei)s
-o)noma/tôn o)rtho/têta; e)pei\ i)/sôs kata/ ge to\ dunato\n
-ka/llist' a)\n le/goito, o(/tan ê)\ pa=sin ê)\ ô(s plei/stois
-o(moi/ois le/gêtai, tou=to d' e)sti\ prosêkousin, ai)/schista de\
+kai\ au)tÃ´=| a)re/skei me\n kata\ to\ dunato\n o(/moia ei)=nai ta\
+o)no/mata toi=s pra/gmasin; a)lla\ mÃª\ Ã´(s a)lÃªthÃ´=s glischra\
+Ãª)=| Ãª( o)lkÃª\ au)tÃª\ tÃª=s o(moio/tÃªtos, a)nagkai=on de\ Ãª)=| kai\
+tÃ´=| phortikÃ´=| tou/tÃ´| proschrÃª=sthai, tÃª=| xunthÃª/kÃª|, ei)s
+o)noma/tÃ´n o)rtho/tÃªta; e)pei\ i)/sÃ´s kata/ ge to\ dunato\n
+ka/llist' a)\n le/goito, o(/tan Ãª)\ pa=sin Ãª)\ Ã´(s plei/stois
+o(moi/ois le/gÃªtai, tou=to d' e)sti\ prosÃªkousin, ai)/schista de\
 tou)nanti/on.]]
 
 [Side-note: There are names better--more like, or less like to the
@@ -19217,12 +19186,12 @@ itself to good and evil alike; it cannot therefore be received as
 true--whether the name-giver believed in it or not.[72]
 
 [Footnote 71: Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 B-C. [Greek: E)/ti toi/nun
-to/de skepsômetha, o(/pôs mê\ ê(ma=s ta\ polla\ tau=ta o)no/mata
-e)s tauto\n tei/nonta e)xapata=|, kai\ tô=| o)/nti me\n oi(
-the/menoi au(ta\ _dianoêthe/ntes te e)/thento_ ô(s i)o/ntôn
-a)pa/ntôn a)ei\ kai\ r(eo/ntôn--_phai/nontai ga\r e)/moige kai\
-au)toi\ ou)/tô dianoêthê=nai_--to\ d', ei) e)/tuchen, ou)ch
-ou)/tôs e)/chei], &c.
+to/de skepsÃ´metha, o(/pÃ´s mÃª\ Ãª(ma=s ta\ polla\ tau=ta o)no/mata
+e)s tauto\n tei/nonta e)xapata=|, kai\ tÃ´=| o)/nti me\n oi(
+the/menoi au(ta\ _dianoÃªthe/ntes te e)/thento_ Ã´(s i)o/ntÃ´n
+a)pa/ntÃ´n a)ei\ kai\ r(eo/ntÃ´n--_phai/nontai ga\r e)/moige kai\
+au)toi\ ou)/tÃ´ dianoÃªthÃª=nai_--to\ d', ei) e)/tuchen, ou)ch
+ou)/tÃ´s e)/chei], &c.
 
 These words appear to me to imply that Sokrates is perfectly
 serious, and not ironical, in delivering his opinion, that the
@@ -19253,7 +19222,7 @@ names must have been imposed upon the same theory: there could not
 have been any contradiction between one name and another.]
 
 [Footnote 74: Plato, Krat. pp. 438-439. 438 E:--[Greek: di'
-a)llê/lôn ge, ei)/ pê| xuggenê= e)sti/, kai\ au)ta\ di' au(tô=n.]]
+a)llÃª/lÃ´n ge, ei)/ pÃª| xuggenÃª= e)sti/, kai\ au)ta\ di' au(tÃ´=n.]]
 
 [Side-note: Unchangeable Platonic Forms--opposed to the
 Herakleitean flux, which is true only respecting sensible
@@ -19268,12 +19237,12 @@ things--particular good things--are in perpetual change or flux: but
 The Beautiful, The Good--The Ideas or Forms of these and such
 like--remain always what they are, always the same.
 
-[Footnote 75: Plato, Krat. p. 439 C-D. [Greek: ske/psai o( e)/gôge
-polla/kis o)neirô/ttô, po/teron phô=me/n ti ei)=nai au)to\ kalo\n
-kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ e(\n e(/kaston tô=n o)/ntôn ou(/tôs, ê)\ mê/?
+[Footnote 75: Plato, Krat. p. 439 C-D. [Greek: ske/psai o( e)/gÃ´ge
+polla/kis o)neirÃ´/ttÃ´, po/teron phÃ´=me/n ti ei)=nai au)to\ kalo\n
+kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ e(\n e(/kaston tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n ou(/tÃ´s, Ãª)\ mÃª/?
 . . .
 
-mê\ ei) pro/sôpo/n ti/ e)sti kalo\n ê)/ ti tô=n toiou=tôn, kai\
+mÃª\ ei) pro/sÃ´po/n ti/ e)sti kalo\n Ãª)/ ti tÃ´=n toiou=tÃ´n, kai\
 dokei= tau=ta pa/nta r(ei=n; a)ll' au)to\ to\ kalo\n ou) toiou=ton
 a)ei/ e)stin oi(=o/n e)stin?]]
 
@@ -19289,15 +19258,15 @@ as well as the Form of the known object, must both remain fixed
 and eternal, otherwise there can be no knowledge at all.
 
 [Footnote 76: Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 D--440 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n
-oi(=o/n te _proseipei=n au)to\ o)rthôs_, ei) a)ei\ u(pexe/rchetai,
-prô=ton me\n o(/ti, e)keino/ e)stin, e)/peita o(/ti toiou=tôn? ê)\
-a)na/gkê a)/ma ê(mô=n lego/ntôn a)/llo au)to\ eu)thu\s gi/gnesthai
-kai\ u(pexie/nai, kai\ mêke/ti ou(/tôs e)/chein? . . .
+oi(=o/n te _proseipei=n au)to\ o)rthÃ´s_, ei) a)ei\ u(pexe/rchetai,
+prÃ´=ton me\n o(/ti, e)keino/ e)stin, e)/peita o(/ti toiou=tÃ´n? Ãª)\
+a)na/gkÃª a)/ma Ãª(mÃ´=n lego/ntÃ´n a)/llo au)to\ eu)thu\s gi/gnesthai
+kai\ u(pexie/nai, kai\ mÃªke/ti ou(/tÃ´s e)/chein? . . .
 
-A)lla\ mê\n ou)d' a)\n gnôsthei/ê ge u(p' ou)deno/s. . . .
+A)lla\ mÃª\n ou)d' a)\n gnÃ´sthei/Ãª ge u(p' ou)deno/s. . . .
 
-A)ll' ou)de\ gnôsin ei)=nai pha/nai ei)ko/s, ei) metapi/ptei
-pa/nta chrê/mata kai\ mêde\n me/nei.]]
+A)ll' ou)de\ gnÃ´sin ei)=nai pha/nai ei)ko/s, ei) metapi/ptei
+pa/nta chrÃª/mata kai\ mÃªde\n me/nei.]]
 
 [Side-note: Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We
 must not put implicit faith in names.]
@@ -19314,14 +19283,14 @@ you are still young, and have time enough before you. If you find
 it out, give to me also the benefit of your solution.[78]
 
 [Footnote 77: Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 C. [Greek: Tau=t' ou)=n
-po/tero/n pote ou(/tôs e)/chei, ê)\ e)kei/nôs ô(s oi( peri\
-Ê(ra/kleito/n te le/gousi kai\ a)/lloi polloi/, mê\ ou) r(a=|dion
-ê)=| e)piske/psasthai, ou)de\ pa/nu nou=n e)/chontos _a)nthrô/pou
-e)pitre/psanta o)no/masin au(to\n kai\ tê\ au(tou= psuchê\n
+po/tero/n pote ou(/tÃ´s e)/chei, Ãª)\ e)kei/nÃ´s Ã´(s oi( peri\
+ÃŠ(ra/kleito/n te le/gousi kai\ a)/lloi polloi/, mÃª\ ou) r(a=|dion
+Ãª)=| e)piske/psasthai, ou)de\ pa/nu nou=n e)/chontos _a)nthrÃ´/pou
+e)pitre/psanta o)no/masin au(to\n kai\ tÃª\ au(tou= psuchÃª\n
 therapeu/ein_, pepisteuko/ta e)kei/nois kai\ toi=s theme/nois
-_au)ta/_, dii+schuri/zesthai ô(s ti ei)do/ta, kai\ au)tou= te kai\
-tô=n o)/ntôn katagignô/skein, ô(s ou)de\n u(gie\s ou)deno/s,
-a(lla\ pa/nta ô/sper kera/mia r(ei=], &c.]
+_au)ta/_, dii+schuri/zesthai Ã´(s ti ei)do/ta, kai\ au)tou= te kai\
+tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n katagignÃ´/skein, Ã´(s ou)de\n u(gie\s ou)deno/s,
+a(lla\ pa/nta Ã´/sper kera/mia r(ei=], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 78: Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 D.]
 
@@ -19378,11 +19347,11 @@ established) cannot be Protagoras and the Protagoreans
 
 [Footnote 81: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 428 A, 440 D.]
 
-[Footnote 82: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 C. 391 A. [Greek: suzêtei=n
-e(/toimo/s ei)mi kai\ soi\ kai\ Kratu/lô| koinê=| . . . o(/ti ou)k
-ei)dei/ên a)lla\ skepsoi/mên meta\ sou=.]]
+[Footnote 82: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 C. 391 A. [Greek: suzÃªtei=n
+e(/toimo/s ei)mi kai\ soi\ kai\ Kratu/lÃ´| koinÃª=| . . . o(/ti ou)k
+ei)dei/Ãªn a)lla\ skepsoi/mÃªn meta\ sou=.]]
 
-[Side-note: Theory laid down by Sokrates _à priori_, in the first
+[Side-note: Theory laid down by Sokrates _Ã  priori_, in the first
 part--Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into
 harmony with facts.]
 
@@ -19394,7 +19363,7 @@ thing, and to no other: this is its rectitude: none but that rare
 person, the artistic name-giver, can detect the essence of each
 thing, and the essence of each name, so as to apply the name
 rightly. Here we have a theory truly Platonic: impressed upon
-Plato's mind by a sentiment _à priori_, and not from any survey or
+Plato's mind by a sentiment _Ã  priori_, and not from any survey or
 comparison of particulars. Accordingly when Sokrates is called
 upon to apply his theory to existing current words, and to make
 out how any such rectitude can be shown to belong to them--he
@@ -19412,7 +19381,7 @@ movement:[85] That the names originally bestowed have become
 disguised by a variety of metamorphoses, but may be brought back
 to their original by probable suppositions, and shown to possess
 the rectitude sought. All these hypotheses are only violent
-efforts to reconcile the Platonic _à priori_ theory, in some way
+efforts to reconcile the Platonic _Ã  priori_ theory, in some way
 or other, with existing facts of language. To regard them as
 intentional caricatures, would be to suppose that Plato is seeking
 intentionally to discredit and deride his own theory of the
@@ -19430,18 +19399,18 @@ grounds dependant on or relative to the knowledge or belief of the
 Name-givers. Kratylus, pp. 397 B, 399 A, 401 A-B, 411 B, 436 B.
 
 The like doctrine is affirmed in the Republic, vi. p. 515 B.
-[Greek: dê=lon o(/ti o( the/menos prô=tos ta\ o)no/mata, oi(=a
-ê(gei=to ei)=nai ta\ pra/gmata, toiau=ta e)ti/theto kai\ ta\
+[Greek: dÃª=lon o(/ti o( the/menos prÃ´=tos ta\ o)no/mata, oi(=a
+Ãª(gei=to ei)=nai ta\ pra/gmata, toiau=ta e)ti/theto kai\ ta\
 o)no/mata.]
 
 Leibnitz conceived an idea of a "Lingua Characterica Universalis,
-quæ simul sit ars inveniendi et judicandi" (see Leibnitz Opp.
+quÃ¦ simul sit ars inveniendi et judicandi" (see Leibnitz Opp.
 Erdmann, pp. 162-163), and he alludes to a conception of Jacob
-Böhme, that there once existed a Lingua Adamica or Natur-Sprache,
+BÃ¶hme, that there once existed a Lingua Adamica or Natur-Sprache,
 through which the essences of things might be contemplated and
-understood. "Lingua Adamica vel certé vis ejus, quam quidam se
+understood. "Lingua Adamica vel certÃ© vis ejus, quam quidam se
 nosse, et in nominibus ab Adamo impositis essentias rerum intueri
-posse contendunt--nobis certé ignota est" (Opp. p. 93). Leibnitz
+posse contendunt--nobis certÃ© ignota est" (Opp. p. 93). Leibnitz
 seems to have thought that it was possible to construct a
 philosophical language, based upon an Alphabetum Cogitationum
 Humanarum, through which problems on all subjects might be
@@ -19451,7 +19420,7 @@ compare also p. 356).
 
 This is very analogous to the affirmations of Sokrates, in the
 first part of the Kratylus, about the essentiality of Names
-discovered and declared by the [Greek: nomothe/tês techniko/s]]
+discovered and declared by the [Greek: nomothe/tÃªs techniko/s]]
 
 [Footnote 84: Plato, Kratyl. p. 436 D.]
 
@@ -19468,7 +19437,7 @@ Philosophie--durch die Lehre Platons vermittelt--p. 178, Berlin,
 Proklus, in his Commentary, says that the scope of this dialogue
 is to exhibit the imitative or generative faculty which
 essentially belongs to the mind, and whereby the mind (aided by
-the vocal or pronunciative imagination--[Greek: lektikê\
+the vocal or pronunciative imagination--[Greek: lektikÃª\
 phantasi/a]) constructs names which are natural transcripts of the
 essences of things (Proklus, Schol. ad Kratyl. pp. 1-21 ed.
 Boissonnade; Alkinous, Introd. ad Platon. c. 6).
@@ -19480,7 +19449,7 @@ treats the etymologies in the Kratylus as seriously intended. He
 says not a word about any intention on the part of Plato to deride
 the Sophists or any other Etymologists.
 
-So also Sydenham, in his translation of Plato's Philêbus (p. 33),
+So also Sydenham, in his translation of Plato's PhilÃªbus (p. 33),
 designates the Kratylus as "a dialogue in which is taught the
 nature of things, as well the permanent as the transient, by a
 supposed etymology of Names and Words".]
@@ -19521,7 +19490,7 @@ knowable: but we cannot know them through names: we must study
 them by themselves and by their own affinities.
 
 [Footnote 87: Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n oi(=on
-te proseipei=n au)to\ o)rthôs, ei) a)ei\ u(pexe/chetai?]]
+te proseipei=n au)to\ o)rthÃ´s, ei) a)ei\ u(pexe/chetai?]]
 
 [Footnote 88: Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 C. Compare pp. 436 D, 439 B.
 
@@ -19530,7 +19499,7 @@ the knowledge of names to be not only indispensable to the
 knowledge of things, but equivalent to and essentially embodying
 that knowledge. (Herakleitos, vol. ii. pp. 363-368-387.) See also
 a passage of Proklus, in his Commentary on the Platonic
-Parmenidês, p. 476, ed. Stallbaum.
+ParmenidÃªs, p. 476, ed. Stallbaum.
 
 The remarkable passage in the first book of Aristotle's
 Metaphysica, wherein he speaks of Plato and Plato's early
@@ -19568,7 +19537,7 @@ Such is the ideal of perfect or philosophical Naming, as Plato
 conceives it--disengaged from those divinations of the origin and
 metamorphoses of existing names, which occupy so much of the
 dialogue.[89] He does not indeed attempt to construct a body of
-true names _à priori_, but he sets forth the real nameable
+true names _Ã  priori_, but he sets forth the real nameable
 permanent essences, to which these names might be assimilated: the
 principles upon which the construction ought to be founded, by the
 philosophic lawgiver following out a good theory:[90] and he
@@ -19579,8 +19548,8 @@ subjects, deserves a few words of illustration.
 [Footnote 89: Deuschle (Die Platonische Sprachphilosophie, p. 57)
 tells us that in this dialogue "Plato _intentionally_ presented
 many of his thoughts in a covert or contradictory and
-unintelligible manner". (Vieles absichtlich verhüllt oder
-widersprechend und missverständlich dargestellt wird.)
+unintelligible manner". (Vieles absichtlich verhÃ¼llt oder
+widersprechend und missverstÃ¤ndlich dargestellt wird.)
 
 I see no probability in such an hypothesis.
 
@@ -19609,41 +19578,41 @@ origin, and tries to apply the principle to particular English
 words. Mr. F. W. Farrar, in his recent interesting work (Chapters
 on Language) has explained and enforced copiously the like
 thesis--onomatopoeic origin for language generally. He has combated
-the objections of Professor Max Müller, who considers the principle to
+the objections of Professor Max MÃ¼ller, who considers the principle to
 be of little applicability or avail. But M. Renan assigns to it
 not less importance than Mr. Wedgwood and Mr. Farrar. (See sixth
 chapter of his ingenious dissertation De l'Origine du Langage, pp.
 135-146-148.)
 
-"L'imitation, ou l'onomatopée, paraît avoir été le procédé
-ordinaire d'après lequel les premiers nomenclateurs formèrent les
+"L'imitation, ou l'onomatopÃ©e, paraÃ®t avoir Ã©tÃ© le procÃ©dÃ©
+ordinaire d'aprÃ¨s lequel les premiers nomenclateurs formÃ¨rent les
 appellations. . . D'ailleurs, comme le choix de l'appellation
-n'est point arbitraire, et que jamais l'homme ne se décide à
+n'est point arbitraire, et que jamais l'homme ne se dÃ©cide Ã 
 assembler des sons au hasard pour en faire les signes de la
-pensée, on peut affirmer que de tous les mots actuellement usités,
+pensÃ©e, on peut affirmer que de tous les mots actuellement usitÃ©s,
 il n'en est pas un seul qui _n'ait eu sa raison suffisante_, et ne
-se rattache, à travers mille transformations, à _une élection
-primitive_. Or, le motif déterminant pour le choix des mots a dû
-être, dans la plupart des cas, le désir d'imiter l'objet qu'on
+se rattache, Ã  travers mille transformations, Ã  _une Ã©lection
+primitive_. Or, le motif dÃ©terminant pour le choix des mots a dÃ»
+Ãªtre, dans la plupart des cas, le dÃ©sir d'imiter l'objet qu'on
 voulait exprimer. L'instinct de certains animaux suffit pour les
-porter à ce genre d'imitation, qui, faute de principes rationnels,
-reste chez eux infécond. . .
+porter Ã  ce genre d'imitation, qui, faute de principes rationnels,
+reste chez eux infÃ©cond. . .
 
-"En résumé, _le caprice_ n'a eu aucune part dans la formation du
+"En rÃ©sumÃ©, _le caprice_ n'a eu aucune part dans la formation du
 langage. Sans doute, on ne peut admettre qu'il y ait une relation
-intrinsèque entre le nom et la chose. Le système que Platon a si
-subtilement développé dans le Cratyle--cette thèse qu'il y a des
-dénominations naturelles, et que la propriété des mots se
-reconnaîlt à l'imitation plus ou moins exacte de
-l'objet,--pourrait tout au plus s'appliquer aux noms formés par
-onomatopée, et pour ceux-ci mêmes, la loi dont nous parlous n'établit
+intrinsÃ¨que entre le nom et la chose. Le systÃ¨me que Platon a si
+subtilement dÃ©veloppÃ© dans le Cratyle--cette thÃ¨se qu'il y a des
+dÃ©nominations naturelles, et que la propriÃ©tÃ© des mots se
+reconnaÃ®lt Ã  l'imitation plus ou moins exacte de
+l'objet,--pourrait tout au plus s'appliquer aux noms formÃ©s par
+onomatopÃ©e, et pour ceux-ci mÃªmes, la loi dont nous parlous n'Ã©tablit
 qu'une convenance. _Les appellations n'ont pas uniquement leur cause
-dans l'objet appelé_ (sans quoi, elles seraient les mêmes dans toutes
-les langues), _mais dans l'objet appelé, vu à travers les
+dans l'objet appelÃ©_ (sans quoi, elles seraient les mÃªmes dans toutes
+les langues), _mais dans l'objet appelÃ©, vu Ã  travers les
 dispositions personnelles du sujet appelant_. . . La raison qui a
-déterminé le choix des premiers hommes peut nous échapper; mais
-elle a existé. La liaison du sens et du mot n'est jamais
-_nécessaire_, jamais _arbitraire_; toujours elle est motivée."
+dÃ©terminÃ© le choix des premiers hommes peut nous Ã©chapper; mais
+elle a existÃ©. La liaison du sens et du mot n'est jamais
+_nÃ©cessaire_, jamais _arbitraire_; toujours elle est motivÃ©e."
 
 When M. Renan maintains the Protagorean doctrine, that it is not
 the Object which is cause of the denomination given, but the
@@ -19656,22 +19625,22 @@ for the first time (pp. 429 A-B, 431 E), and brought more and more
 into the foreground (pp. 436 B-D--437 C--439 C).
 
 The distinction drawn by M. Renan between _l'arbitraire_ and _le
-motivé_ appears to me unfounded: at least, it requires a peculiar
+motivÃ©_ appears to me unfounded: at least, it requires a peculiar
 explanation of the two words--for if by _le caprice_ and
 _l'arbitraire_ be meant the exclusion of _all_ motive, such a
 state of mind could not be a preliminary to any proceeding at all.
 M. Renan can only mean that the motive which led to the original
 choice of the name, was peculiar to the occasion, and has since
 been forgotten. And this is what he himself says in a note to his
-Preface (pp. 18-19), replying to M. Littré: "L'Arien primitif a eu
-un motif pour appeler le frère _bhratr_ ou _fratr_, et le Sémite
-pour l'appeler _ah_: peut on dire que cette différence résulte ou
-des aptitudes différentes de leur esprit, ou du spectacle
-extérieur? Chaque objet, les circonstances restant les mêmes, a
-été susceptible d'une foule de dénominations: le choix qui a été
-fait de l'une d'elles tient à des causes impossibles à saisir."]
-
-[Footnote 90: Plato (in Timæus, p. 29 B) recognises an essential
+Preface (pp. 18-19), replying to M. LittrÃ©: "L'Arien primitif a eu
+un motif pour appeler le frÃ¨re _bhratr_ ou _fratr_, et le SÃ©mite
+pour l'appeler _ah_: peut on dire que cette diffÃ©rence rÃ©sulte ou
+des aptitudes diffÃ©rentes de leur esprit, ou du spectacle
+extÃ©rieur? Chaque objet, les circonstances restant les mÃªmes, a
+Ã©tÃ© susceptible d'une foule de dÃ©nominations: le choix qui a Ã©tÃ©
+fait de l'une d'elles tient Ã  des causes impossibles Ã  saisir."]
+
+[Footnote 90: Plato (in TimÃ¦us, p. 29 B) recognises an essential
 affinity between the eternal Forms and the words or propositions
 in which they become subjects of discourse.]
 
@@ -19693,7 +19662,7 @@ antithesis depreciated and discredited by Plato. The view most
 satisfactory to him contemplates the analogy of a human artist or
 professional man; which he enlarges into the idea of an
 originating, intelligent, artistic, Constructor, as the source of
-all good. This view is exhibited to us in the Timæus, where we
+all good. This view is exhibited to us in the TimÃ¦us, where we
 find the Demiurgus, building up by his own fiat all that is good
 in the Kosmos: in the Politikus, where we find the individual
 dictator producing by his uncontrolled ordinance all that is
@@ -19719,7 +19688,7 @@ artist.[93]
 [Footnote 92: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 seq., where the [Greek:
 ge/nesis] of a social community, out of common necessity and
 desire acting upon all and each of the individual citizens, is
-depicted in a striking way. The [Greek: a)rchê] of the City (p.
+depicted in a striking way. The [Greek: a)rchÃª] of the City (p.
 369 B) as Plato there presents it, is Aristotelian rather than
 Platonic.]
 
@@ -19730,34 +19699,34 @@ intellectual, in the first formation of language.
 "Dans l'origine du langage d'action, un seul geste dit--je veux
 cela, ou je vous montre cela, ou je vous demande secours; un seul
 cri dit, je vous appelle, ou je souffre, ou je suis content, &c.;
-mais sans distinguer aucune des idées qui composent ses
-propositions. Ce n'est point par le détail, mais par les masses,
+mais sans distinguer aucune des idÃ©es qui composent ses
+propositions. Ce n'est point par le dÃ©tail, mais par les masses,
 que, commencent toutes nos expressions, ainsi que toutes nos
-connaissances. Si quelques langages possèdent des signes propres à
-exprimer des idées isolées, ce n'est donc que par l'effet de la
-décomposition qui s'est opérée dans ces langages; et ces signes,
-ou noms propres d'idées, ne sont, pour ainsi dire, que des débris,
-des fragmens, ou du moins des émanations de ceux qui d'abord
-exprimaient, bien ou mal, les propositions tout entières."
+connaissances. Si quelques langages possÃ¨dent des signes propres Ã 
+exprimer des idÃ©es isolÃ©es, ce n'est donc que par l'effet de la
+dÃ©composition qui s'est opÃ©rÃ©e dans ces langages; et ces signes,
+ou noms propres d'idÃ©es, ne sont, pour ainsi dire, que des dÃ©bris,
+des fragmens, ou du moins des Ã©manations de ceux qui d'abord
+exprimaient, bien ou mal, les propositions tout entiÃ¨res."
 (Destutt de Tracy, Grammaire, ch. i. p. 23, ed. 1825; see also the
-Idéologie of the same author, ch. xvi. p. 215.)
+IdÃ©ologie of the same author, ch. xvi. p. 215.)
 
 M. Renan enunciates in the most explicit terms this comparison of
 the formation of language to the growth and development of a
-germ:--"Les langues doivent êtres comparées, non au cristal qui se
-forme par agglomération autour d'un noyau, mais au germe qui se
-développe par sa force intime, et par l'appel nécessaire de ses
+germ:--"Les langues doivent Ãªtres comparÃ©es, non au cristal qui se
+forme par agglomÃ©ration autour d'un noyau, mais au germe qui se
+dÃ©veloppe par sa force intime, et par l'appel nÃ©cessaire de ses
 parties". (De l'Origine du Langage, ch. iii. p. 101; also ch. iv.
 pp. 115-117.)
 
 The theory of M. Renan, in this ingenious treatise, is, that
-language is the product of "la raison spontanée, la raison
+language is the product of "la raison spontanÃ©e, la raison
 populaire," without reflexion. "La reflexion n'y peut rien: les
-langues sont sorties toutes faites du moule même de l'esprit
+langues sont sorties toutes faites du moule mÃªme de l'esprit
 humain, comme Minerve du cerveau de Jupiter." "Maintenant que la
-raison réfléchie a remplacé l'instinct créateur, à peine le génie
+raison rÃ©flÃ©chie a remplacÃ© l'instinct crÃ©ateur, Ã  peine le gÃ©nie
 suffit-il pour analyser ce que les l'esprit des premiers hommes
-enfanta de toutes pièces, et sans y songer" (pp. 98-99). This
+enfanta de toutes piÃ¨ces, et sans y songer" (pp. 98-99). This
 theory appears to me very doubtful; as much as there is proved in
 it, is stated in a good passage cited by M. Renan from Will. von
 Humboldt (pp. 106-107). But there are two remarks to be made, in
@@ -19855,13 +19824,13 @@ various causes which deprave the Right Names into that imperfect
 and semi-significant condition, which is the best that existing
 languages present.[99]
 
-[Footnote 97: Plato, Timæus, p. 68 E.]
+[Footnote 97: Plato, TimÃ¦us, p. 68 E.]
 
 [Footnote 98: See my remarks on the Politikus, in the last
 chapter: also Protagoras, p. 320 seq.
 
-Compare Plato, Kriton, p. 48 A. [Greek: o( e)pai+/ôn peri\ tô
-dikai/ôn, o( ei(=s.]
+Compare Plato, Kriton, p. 48 A. [Greek: o( e)pai+/Ã´n peri\ tÃ´
+dikai/Ã´n, o( ei(=s.]
 
 In the Menon also the same question is broached as in the
 Protagoras, whether virtue is teachable or not? and how any virtue
@@ -19872,23 +19841,23 @@ propagates itself unconsciously, without special initiative--and
 that which is deliberately prescribed and imparted by the wise
 individual: common sense versus professional specialty.]
 
-[Footnote 99: See the conditions of the [Greek: o)rthê\
+[Footnote 99: See the conditions of the [Greek: o)rthÃª\
 politei/a], and its gradual depravation and degeneracy into the
 state of actual governments, in Republic, v. init. p. 449 B, vii.
 544 A-B.]
 
-[Side-note: Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in
+[Side-note: Comparison of Kratylus, TheÃ¦tÃªtus, and SophistÃªs, in
 treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility
 of false propositions.]
 
 One more remark, in reference to the general spirit and reciprocal
 bearing of Plato's dialogues. In three comparison distinct
-dialogues--Kratylus, Theætêtus, Sophistês--one and the same
+dialogues--Kratylus, TheÃ¦tÃªtus, SophistÃªs--one and the same
 question is introduced into the discussion: a question keenly
 debated among the contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle. How is a
 false proposition possible? Many held that a false proposition and
 a false name were impossible: that you could not speak the thing
-that _is not_, or Non-Ens ([Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n]): that such a
+that _is not_, or Non-Ens ([Greek: to\ mÃª\ o)/n]): that such a
 proposition would be an empty sound, without meaning or
 signification: that speech may be significant or insignificant,
 but could not be false, except in the sense of being
@@ -19896,54 +19865,54 @@ unmeaning.[100]
 
 [Footnote 100: Plato, Kratyl. p. 429.
 
-Ammonius, Scholia [Greek: ei)s ta\s Katêgori/as] of Aristotle
+Ammonius, Scholia [Greek: ei)s ta\s KatÃªgori/as] of Aristotle
 (Schol. Brandis, p. 60, a. 10).
 
-[Greek: Tine/s phasi mêde\n ei)=nai tô=n pro/s ti phu/sei, a)lla\
-a)na/plasma ei)=nai tau=ta tê=s ê(mete/ras dianoi/as, le/gontes
-o(/ti ou(/tôs ou)k e)sti\ phu/sei ta\ pro/s ti a)lla\ the/sei
+[Greek: Tine/s phasi mÃªde\n ei)=nai tÃ´=n pro/s ti phu/sei, a)lla\
+a)na/plasma ei)=nai tau=ta tÃª=s Ãª(mete/ras dianoi/as, le/gontes
+o(/ti ou(/tÃ´s ou)k e)sti\ phu/sei ta\ pro/s ti a)lla\ the/sei
 . . . Tine\s de/, e)k diame/trou tou/tois e)/chontes, pa/nta ta\
-o)/nta pro/s ti e)/legon. Ô(=n ei)=s ê)=n Prôtago/ras o(
-sophistê/s; . . . dio\ kai\ e)/legen o(/ti ou)k e)/sti tina\
-pseudê= le/gein; e(/kastos ga\r kata\ to\ phaino/menon au)tô=|
-kai\ dokou=n a)pophai/netai peri\ tô=n pragma/tôn, ou)k e)cho/ntôn
-ô(risme/nên phu/sin a)ll' e)n tê=| pro\s ê(ma=s sche/sei to\
-ei)=nai e)cho/ntôn.]]
-
-Now this doctrine is dealt with in the Theætêtus, Sophistês, and
-Kratylus. In the Theætêtus,[101] Sokrates examines it at great
+o)/nta pro/s ti e)/legon. Ã”(=n ei)=s Ãª)=n PrÃ´tago/ras o(
+sophistÃª/s; . . . dio\ kai\ e)/legen o(/ti ou)k e)/sti tina\
+pseudÃª= le/gein; e(/kastos ga\r kata\ to\ phaino/menon au)tÃ´=|
+kai\ dokou=n a)pophai/netai peri\ tÃ´=n pragma/tÃ´n, ou)k e)cho/ntÃ´n
+Ã´(risme/nÃªn phu/sin a)ll' e)n tÃª=| pro\s Ãª(ma=s sche/sei to\
+ei)=nai e)cho/ntÃ´n.]]
+
+Now this doctrine is dealt with in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, SophistÃªs, and
+Kratylus. In the TheÃ¦tÃªtus,[101] Sokrates examines it at great
 length, and proposes several different hypotheses to explain how a
 false proposition might be possible: but ends in pronouncing them
 all inadmissible. He declares himself incompetent, and passes on
-to something else. Again, in the Sophistês, the same point is
+to something else. Again, in the SophistÃªs, the same point is
 taken up, and discussed there also very copiously.[102] The Eleate
 in that dialogue ends by finding a solution which satisfies him
-(_viz._: that [Greek: to\ mê o)\n = to\ e(/teron o)/ntos]). But
+(_viz._: that [Greek: to\ mÃª o)\n = to\ e(/teron o)/ntos]). But
 what is remarkable is, that the solution does not meet any of the
-difficulties propounded in the Theætêtus; nor are those
-difficulties at all adverted to in the Sophistês. Finally, in the
+difficulties propounded in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus; nor are those
+difficulties at all adverted to in the SophistÃªs. Finally, in the
 Kratylus, we have the very same doctrine, that false affirmations
-are impossible--which both in the Theætêtus and in the Sophistês
+are impossible--which both in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus and in the SophistÃªs
 is enunciated, not as the decided opinion of the speaker, but as a
 problem which embarrasses him--we have this same doctrine averred
 unequivocally by Kratylus as his own full conviction. And Sokrates
 finds that a very short argument, and a very simple comparison,
 suffice to refute him.[103] The supposed "aggressive
-cross-examiner," who presses Sokrates so hard in the Theætêtus, is
+cross-examiner," who presses Sokrates so hard in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, is
 not allowed to put his puzzling questions in the Kratylus.[104]
 
-[Footnote 101: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 187 D to 201 D. The discussion
+[Footnote 101: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. pp. 187 D to 201 D. The discussion
 of the point is continued through thirteen pages of Stephan.
 Edit.]
 
-[Footnote 102: Plato, Sophistês, pp. 237 A, 264 B, through
+[Footnote 102: Plato, SophistÃªs, pp. 237 A, 264 B, through
 twenty-seven pages of Steph. edit.--though there are some digressions
 included herein.]
 
 [Footnote 103: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 430-431 A-B.]
 
-[Footnote 104: Plato, Theætêt. p. 200 A. [Greek: o( ga\r
-e)legktiko\s e)kei=nos gela/sas phê/sei.]]
+[Footnote 104: Plato, TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 200 A. [Greek: o( ga\r
+e)legktiko\s e)kei=nos gela/sas phÃª/sei.]]
 
 [Side-note: Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his
 manner of handling the same subject.]
@@ -19952,17 +19921,17 @@ How are we to explain these three different modes of handling the
 same question by the same philosopher? If the question about
 Non-Ens can be disposed of in the summary way which we read in the
 Kratylus, what is gained by the string of unsolved puzzles in the
-Theætêtus--or by the long discursive argument in the Sophistês,
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus--or by the long discursive argument in the SophistÃªs,
 ushering in a new solution noway satisfactory? If, on the
-contrary, the difficulties which are unsolved in the Theætêtus,
-and imperfectly solved in the Sophistês, are real and
+contrary, the difficulties which are unsolved in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus,
+and imperfectly solved in the SophistÃªs, are real and
 pertinent--how are we to explain the proceeding of Plato in the
 Kratylus, when he puts into the mouth of Kratylus a distinct averment
 of the opinion, about Non-Ens, yet without allowing him, when it is
 impugned by Sokrates, to urge any of these pertinent arguments in
-defence of it? If the peculiar solution given in the Sophistês be
+defence of it? If the peculiar solution given in the SophistÃªs be
 the really genuine and triumphant solution, why is it left
-unnoticed both in the Kratylus and the Theætêtus, and why is it
+unnoticed both in the Kratylus and the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, and why is it
 contradicted in other dialogues? Which of the three dialogues
 represents Plato's real opinion on the question?
 
@@ -19987,7 +19956,7 @@ exhibit neither identity of the teacher, nor identity of the
 matter taught: the composer (to use various Platonic comparisons)
 is Many, and not One--he is more complex than Typhos.[105]
 
-[Footnote 105: Plato, Phædrus, p. 230 A.]
+[Footnote 105: Plato, PhÃ¦drus, p. 230 A.]
 
 If we are to find any common purpose pervading and binding
 together all the dialogues, it must not be a didactic purpose, in
@@ -20007,8 +19976,8 @@ interest in the process of dialectic scrutiny ([Greek: to\
 philomathe/s, philo/logon])[106] which will enable him to perceive
 beauties in what would appear tiresome to others.
 
-[Footnote 106: 	Plato, Republic, v. p. 475; compare Phædon,
-pp. 89-90. Phædrus, p. 230 E.]
+[Footnote 106: 	Plato, Republic, v. p. 475; compare PhÃ¦don,
+pp. 89-90. PhÃ¦drus, p. 230 E.]
 
 Such manner of proceeding may be judicious or not, according to
 the sentiment of the critic. But it is at any rate Platonic. And
@@ -20033,24 +20002,24 @@ CHAPTER XXXII
 PHILEBUS.
 
 
-The Philêbus, which we are now about to examine, is not merely a
+The PhilÃªbus, which we are now about to examine, is not merely a
 Dialogue of Search, but a Dialogue of Exposition, accompanied with
 more or less of search made subservient to the exposition. It
 represents Sokrates from the first as advancing an affirmative
-opinion--maintaining it against Philêbus and Protarchus--and
+opinion--maintaining it against PhilÃªbus and Protarchus--and
 closing with a result assumed to be positively established.[1]
 
-[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher says, about the Philêbus (Einleit. p.
+[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher says, about the PhilÃªbus (Einleit. p.
 136)--"Das Ganze liegt fertig in dem Haupte des Sokrates, und
-tritt mit der ganzen Persönlichkeit und Willkühr einer
-zusammenhängenden Rede heraus," &c.]
+tritt mit der ganzen PersÃ¶nlichkeit und WillkÃ¼hr einer
+zusammenhÃ¤ngenden Rede heraus," &c.]
 
-[Side-note: Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus.]
+[Side-note: Character, Personages, and Subject of the PhilÃªbus.]
 
 The question is, Wherein consists the Good--The Supreme
 Good--Summum Bonum. Three persons stand before us: the youthful
-Philêbus: Protarchus, somewhat older, yet still a young man: and
-Sokrates. Philêbus declares that The Good consists in pleasure or
+PhilÃªbus: Protarchus, somewhat older, yet still a young man: and
+Sokrates. PhilÃªbus declares that The Good consists in pleasure or
 enjoyment; and Protarchus his friend advocates the same thesis,
 though in a less peremptory manner. On the contrary, Sokrates
 begins by proclaiming that it consists in wisdom or intelligence.
@@ -20085,25 +20054,25 @@ close the discussion by finding ourselves in one common puzzle and
 confusion. If _we_ cannot solve the difficulty, you must solve it
 for us."[2]
 
-[Footnote 2: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 19 E--20 A. [Greek: pau=sai dê\
-to\n tro/pon ê(mi=n a)pantô=n tou=ton e)pi\ ta\ nu=n lego/mena
-. . . ei)s a)pori/an e)mba/llôn kai\ a)nerôtô=n ô(=n mê\
-dunai/meth' a)\n i(kanê\n a)po/krisin e)n tô=| paro/nti dido/nai
-soi. mê\ ga\r oi)ô/metha te/los ê(mi=n ei)=nai tô=n nu=n tê\n
-pa/ntôn ê(mô=n a)pori/an, a)ll' ei) dra=|n tou=th' ê(mei=s
+[Footnote 2: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 19 E--20 A. [Greek: pau=sai dÃª\
+to\n tro/pon Ãª(mi=n a)pantÃ´=n tou=ton e)pi\ ta\ nu=n lego/mena
+. . . ei)s a)pori/an e)mba/llÃ´n kai\ a)nerÃ´tÃ´=n Ã´(=n mÃª\
+dunai/meth' a)\n i(kanÃª\n a)po/krisin e)n tÃ´=| paro/nti dido/nai
+soi. mÃª\ ga\r oi)Ã´/metha te/los Ãª(mi=n ei)=nai tÃ´=n nu=n tÃª\n
+pa/ntÃ´n Ãª(mÃ´=n a)pori/an, a)ll' ei) dra=|n tou=th' Ãª(mei=s
 a)dunatou=men, soi\ draste/on.]
 
 There is a remarkable contrast between the method here proclaimed
-and that followed in the Theætêtus, though some eminent
-commentators have represented the Philêbus as a sequel of the
-Theætêtus.]
+and that followed in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus, though some eminent
+commentators have represented the PhilÃªbus as a sequel of the
+TheÃ¦tÃªtus.]
 
 [Side-note: Enquiry--What mental condition will ensure to all men a
 happy life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive.
-Philêbus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence.]
+PhilÃªbus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence.]
 
 Conformably to this requisition, Sokrates, while applying his
-cross-examining negative test to the doctrine of Philêbus, sets
+cross-examining negative test to the doctrine of PhilÃªbus, sets
 against it a counter-doctrine of his own, and prescribes, farther,
 a positive method of enquiry. "You and I" (he says) "will each try
 to assign what permanent habit of mind, and what particular mental
@@ -20115,7 +20084,7 @@ feel Happiness. The same fact or condition, looked at objectively,
 is denominated Good: looked at subjectively, is denominated
 Happiness.
 
-[Footnote 3: Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 D.]
+[Footnote 3: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 11 D.]
 
 [Side-note: Good--object of universal choice and attachment by men,
 animals, and plants--all-sufficient--satisfies all desires.]
@@ -20133,28 +20102,28 @@ is, That it is desired, loved, and sought by all, and that, if
 attained, it satisfies all the wishes and aspirations of human
 nature.
 
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 C. 20 C-D: [Greek: Tê\n
-ta)gathou= moi=ran po/teron a)na/gkê te/leon ê)\ mê\ te/leon
-ei)=nai? Pa/ntôn dê/pou teleô/taton. Ti/ de/; i(kano\n ta)gatho/n?
-Pô=s ga\r ou)/? kai\ pa/ntôn ge ei)s tou=to diaphe/rein tô=n
-o)/ntô=n. To/de ge mê\n, ô(s oi)=mai, peri\ au)tou=
-a)nagkaio/taton ei)=nai le/gein, ô(s pa=n to\ gignô=skon au)to\
-thêreu/ei kai\ e)phi/etai boulo/menon e(lei=n kai\ peri\ au(to\
-ktê/sasthai, kai\ tô=n a)/llôn ou)de\n phronti/zei plê\n tô=n
-a)poteloume/nôn a)/ma a)gathoi=s.]
+[Footnote 4: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 11 C. 20 C-D: [Greek: TÃª\n
+ta)gathou= moi=ran po/teron a)na/gkÃª te/leon Ãª)\ mÃª\ te/leon
+ei)=nai? Pa/ntÃ´n dÃª/pou teleÃ´/taton. Ti/ de/; i(kano\n ta)gatho/n?
+PÃ´=s ga\r ou)/? kai\ pa/ntÃ´n ge ei)s tou=to diaphe/rein tÃ´=n
+o)/ntÃ´=n. To/de ge mÃª\n, Ã´(s oi)=mai, peri\ au)tou=
+a)nagkaio/taton ei)=nai le/gein, Ã´(s pa=n to\ gignÃ´=skon au)to\
+thÃªreu/ei kai\ e)phi/etai boulo/menon e(lei=n kai\ peri\ au(to\
+ktÃª/sasthai, kai\ tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n ou)de\n phronti/zei plÃª\n tÃ´=n
+a)poteloume/nÃ´n a)/ma a)gathoi=s.]
 
 22 B: [Greek: i(kano\s kai\ te/leos kai\ pa=si phutoi=s kai\
-zô/ois ai(reto/s, oi(=sper dunato\n ê)=n ou(/tôs a)ei\ dia\ bi/ou
-zê=n; ei) de/ tis a)/lla ê(|rei=th' ê(mô=n, para\ phu/sin a)\n
-tê\n tou= a)lêthou=s ai(retou= e)la/mbanen a)/kôn e)x a)gnoi/as
-ê)/ tinos a)na/gkês ou)k eu)dai/monos.]
+zÃ´/ois ai(reto/s, oi(=sper dunato\n Ãª)=n ou(/tÃ´s a)ei\ dia\ bi/ou
+zÃª=n; ei) de/ tis a)/lla Ãª(|rei=th' Ãª(mÃ´=n, para\ phu/sin a)\n
+tÃª\n tou= a)lÃªthou=s ai(retou= e)la/mbanen a)/kÃ´n e)x a)gnoi/as
+Ãª)/ tinos a)na/gkÃªs ou)k eu)dai/monos.]
 
-60 C, 61 A. 61 E: [Greek: to\n a)gapêto/taton bi/on]. 64 C:
-[Greek: tou= pa=si gegone/nai prosphilê= tê\n toiau/tên
+60 C, 61 A. 61 E: [Greek: to\n a)gapÃªto/taton bi/on]. 64 C:
+[Greek: tou= pa=si gegone/nai prosphilÃª= tÃª\n toiau/tÃªn
 dia/thesin.] 67 A.
 
-"Omnibus naturæ humanæ desideriis prorsus satisfacere" (Stallbaum
-ad Philêb. p. 18 D-E, page 139).]
+"Omnibus naturÃ¦ humanÃ¦ desideriis prorsus satisfacere" (Stallbaum
+ad PhilÃªb. p. 18 D-E, page 139).]
 
 [Side-note: Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite
 cognitions are so likewise.]
@@ -20188,11 +20157,11 @@ That Pleasure, which you affirm to be The Good--and Intelligence,
 which I declare to be so--is at once both Unum, and Multa et
 Diversa.[7]
 
-[Footnote 5: Plat. Philêb. p. 12 D-E.]
+[Footnote 5: Plat. PhilÃªb. p. 12 D-E.]
 
-[Footnote 6: Plat. Philêb. pp. 13 D-E, 14 A.]
+[Footnote 6: Plat. PhilÃªb. pp. 13 D-E, 14 A.]
 
-[Footnote 7: Plat. Philêb. p. 14 B.]
+[Footnote 7: Plat. PhilÃªb. p. 14 B.]
 
 [Side-note: Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this
 description? Appeal to individual choice.]
@@ -20210,16 +20179,16 @@ choose this joint life in preference to either of them separately.
 It is not one man who will choose it, and another who will reject
 it: but every man will choose it alike."[8]
 
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Philêbus, p. 21 A. [Greek: de/xai' a)\n su/,
-Prô/tarche, zê=n to\n bi/on a(/panta ê(do/menos ê(dona\s ta\s
-megi/stas?] 21 D-E: [Greek: ei)/ tis de/xait' a)\n au)= zê=n
-ê(mô=n], &c. 22 A: [Greek: Pa=s dê/pou tou=to/n ge ai(rê/setai
-pro/teron ê)\ e)kei/nôn o(poteronou=n, kai\ pro\s tou/tois ge
-ou)ch o( me/n, o( d' ou)/.] 60 D: [Greek: ei)/ tis a)/neu tou/tôn
+[Footnote 8: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 21 A. [Greek: de/xai' a)\n su/,
+PrÃ´/tarche, zÃª=n to\n bi/on a(/panta Ãª(do/menos Ãª(dona\s ta\s
+megi/stas?] 21 D-E: [Greek: ei)/ tis de/xait' a)\n au)= zÃª=n
+Ãª(mÃ´=n], &c. 22 A: [Greek: Pa=s dÃª/pou tou=to/n ge ai(rÃª/setai
+pro/teron Ãª)\ e)kei/nÃ´n o(poteronou=n, kai\ pro\s tou/tois ge
+ou)ch o( me/n, o( d' ou)/.] 60 D: [Greek: ei)/ tis a)/neu tou/tÃ´n
 de/xait' a)/n], &c.
 
 Here again in appealing to the individual choice and judgment, the
-Platonic Sokrates indirectly recognises what, in the Theætêtus and
+Platonic Sokrates indirectly recognises what, in the TheÃ¦tÃªtus and
 other dialogues, we have seen him formally rejecting and
 endeavouring to confute--the Protagorean canon or measure.
 Protarchus is the measure of truth or falsehood, of belief or
@@ -20238,7 +20207,7 @@ superiority of dialectic colloquy as compared with written
 treatise or rhetorical discourse--both of which address the same
 terms to a multitude of hearers or readers differing among
 themselves, without possibility of separate adaptation to each.
-(See above, ch. xxvi. pp. 50-54, on Phædrus.)]
+(See above, ch. xxvi. pp. 50-54, on PhÃ¦drus.)]
 
 [Side-note: First Question submitted to Protarchus--Intense
 Pleasure, without any intelligence--He declines to accept it.]
@@ -20256,7 +20225,7 @@ pleasure?" The question being put with these additions, Protarchus
 alters his view, and replies in the negative: at the same time
 expressing his surprise at the strangeness of the hypothesis.[9]
 
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Philêbus, p. 21.
+[Footnote 9: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 21.
 
 Such an hypothesis does indeed depart so totally from the
 conditions of human life, that it cannot be considered as a fair
@@ -20266,7 +20235,7 @@ A man cannot realise to himself that which the hypothesis
 promises; much less can he realise it without those accompaniments
 which it assumes him to renounce. The loss stands out far more
 palpably than the gain. It is no refutation of the theory of
-Philêbus; who, announcing pleasure as the Summum Bonum, is
+PhilÃªbus; who, announcing pleasure as the Summum Bonum, is
 entitled to call for pleasure in all its varieties, and for
 exemption from all pains. Sokrates himself had previously insisted
 on the great variety as well as on the great dissimilarity of the
@@ -20286,7 +20255,7 @@ includes these pleasures nor eliminates these pains. It includes
 only the pleasures of sense; and it is tendered to one who has
 rooted in his mind desires for other pleasures, and aversions for
 other pains, besides those of sense. It does not therefore come up
-to the requirements fairly implied in the theory of Philêbus.]
+to the requirements fairly implied in the theory of PhilÃªbus.]
 
 [Side-note: Second Question--Whether he will accept a life of
 Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer--_No_.]
@@ -20299,7 +20268,7 @@ life.[10] Both of them agree that the Summum Bonum ought to be
 sought neither in pleasure singly, nor in intelligence singly, but
 in both combined.
 
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 21-22.
+[Footnote 10: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 21-22.
 
 It is to be remarked, however, that there was more than one
 Grecian philosopher who described the Summum Bonum as consisting
@@ -20370,7 +20339,7 @@ a multitude of transitory individuals, each successively generated
 and perishing? How does this One become Many, or how do these Many
 become One?[11]
 
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Philêbus, p. 15 B.]
+[Footnote 11: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 15 B.]
 
 [Side-note: Active disputes upon this question at the time.]
 
@@ -20381,18 +20350,18 @@ more. Youthful speculators, especially, are fond of trying their
 first efforts of dialectical ingenuity in arguing upon this
 paradox--How the One can be Many, and the Many One.[12]
 
-[Footnote 12: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 15-16.
+[Footnote 12: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 15-16.
 
 In reading the difficulties thus started by Sokrates, we perceive
 them to be the same as those which we have seen set forth in the
-dialogue called Parmenidês, where they are put into the mouth of
+dialogue called ParmenidÃªs, where they are put into the mouth of
 the philosopher so-called; as objections requiring to be removed
 by Sokrates, before the Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas,
 universal, eternal and unchangeable, can be admitted. We might
 expect that Plato having so emphatically and repeatedly announced
 his own sense of the difficulty, would proceed to suggest some
-mode of replying to it. But this he never does. In the Parmenidês,
-he does not even promise any explanation; in the Philêbus, he
+mode of replying to it. But this he never does. In the ParmenidÃªs,
+he does not even promise any explanation; in the PhilÃªbus, he
 seems to promise one, but all the explanation which he gives
 ignores or jumps over the difficulty, enjoining us to proceed as
 if no such difficulty existed.]
@@ -20400,7 +20369,7 @@ if no such difficulty existed.]
 [Side-note: Order of Nature--Coalescence of the Finite with the
 Infinite. The One--The Finite Many--The Infinite Many.]
 
-It is a primæval inspiration (he says) granted by the Gods to man
+It is a primÃ¦val inspiration (he says) granted by the Gods to man
 along with the fire of Prometheus, and handed down to us as a
 tradition from that heroic race who were in nearer kindred with
 the Gods--That all things said to exist are composed of Unity and
@@ -20428,22 +20397,22 @@ Highest Form: The Many, a definite number of Species or
 sub-Species or subordinate Forms: The Infinite, a countless heap of
 Individuals.
 
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Philêbus, p. 16 C. [Greek: ô(s e)x e(no\s
-me\n kai\ e)k pollô=n o)/ntôn tô=n a)ei\ legome/nôn ei)=nai,
-pe/ras de\ kai\ a)peiri/an e(n au(toi=s xu/mphuton e)cho/ntôn.]]
-
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Philêbus, p. 16 D. [Greek: dei=n ou)=n ê(ma=s
-_tou/tôn ou(/tô diakerosmême/nôn_, a)ei\ _mi/an i)de/an_ peri\
-panto\s e(ka/stote _theme/nous zêtei=n; eu(rê/sein ga\r
-e)nou=san_; e)a\n ou)=n metala/bômen, meta\ mi/an du/o, ei)/ pôs
-ei)si/, skopei=n, ei) de\ mê/, trei=s ê)/ tina a)/llon a)rithmo/n,
-kai\ to\ e(\n e)kei/nôn e(/kaston pa/lin ô(sau/tôs, me/chri per
-a)\n to\ kat' a)rcha\s e(\n mê\ o(/ti e(\n kai\ polla\ kai\
-a)/peira/ e)sti mo/non i)/dê| tis a)lla\ kai\ o(/posa; _tê\n de\
-tou= a)pei/rou i)de/an_ pro\s to\ plê=thos mê\ prosphe/rein, pri\n
-a)/n tis to\n a)rithmo\n au)tou= pa/nta kati/dê| to\n metaxu\ tou=
-a)pei/rou te kai\ tou= e(no/s; to/te d' ê)/dê to\ e(\n e(/kaston
-tô=n pa/ntôn ei)s to\ a)/peiron methe/nta chai/rein e)a=|n.]
+[Footnote 13: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 16 C. [Greek: Ã´(s e)x e(no\s
+me\n kai\ e)k pollÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n tÃ´=n a)ei\ legome/nÃ´n ei)=nai,
+pe/ras de\ kai\ a)peiri/an e(n au(toi=s xu/mphuton e)cho/ntÃ´n.]]
+
+[Footnote 14: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 16 D. [Greek: dei=n ou)=n Ãª(ma=s
+_tou/tÃ´n ou(/tÃ´ diakerosmÃªme/nÃ´n_, a)ei\ _mi/an i)de/an_ peri\
+panto\s e(ka/stote _theme/nous zÃªtei=n; eu(rÃª/sein ga\r
+e)nou=san_; e)a\n ou)=n metala/bÃ´men, meta\ mi/an du/o, ei)/ pÃ´s
+ei)si/, skopei=n, ei) de\ mÃª/, trei=s Ãª)/ tina a)/llon a)rithmo/n,
+kai\ to\ e(\n e)kei/nÃ´n e(/kaston pa/lin Ã´(sau/tÃ´s, me/chri per
+a)\n to\ kat' a)rcha\s e(\n mÃª\ o(/ti e(\n kai\ polla\ kai\
+a)/peira/ e)sti mo/non i)/dÃª| tis a)lla\ kai\ o(/posa; _tÃª\n de\
+tou= a)pei/rou i)de/an_ pro\s to\ plÃª=thos mÃª\ prosphe/rein, pri\n
+a)/n tis to\n a)rithmo\n au)tou= pa/nta kati/dÃª| to\n metaxu\ tou=
+a)pei/rou te kai\ tou= e(no/s; to/te d' Ãª)/dÃª to\ e(\n e(/kaston
+tÃ´=n pa/ntÃ´n ei)s to\ a)/peiron methe/nta chai/rein e)a=|n.]
 
 Plato here recognises a Form of the Infinite, [Greek: a)pei/rou
 i)de/an]; again, p. 18 A, [Greek: a)pei/rou phu/sin].]
@@ -20467,19 +20436,19 @@ individuals from another. Yet it is exactly upon these
 discriminating marks that the difference turns, between genuine
 dialectical argument and controversy without result.[16]
 
-[Footnote 15: Plato, Philêbus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi( de\ nu=n tô=n
-a)nthrô/pôn sophoi\ _e(\n me/n, o(/pôs a)\n tu/chôsi_, kai\ polla\
+[Footnote 15: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi( de\ nu=n tÃ´=n
+a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n sophoi\ _e(\n me/n, o(/pÃ´s a)\n tu/chÃ´si_, kai\ polla\
 tha=tton kai\ bradu/teron poiou=si tou= de/ontos, _meta\ de\ to\
 e(\n a)/peira eu)thu/s_, ta\ de\ me/sa au)tou\s e)kpheu/gei], &c.
 
 Stallbaum conjectures that the words [Greek: kai\ polla\] after
-[Greek: tu/chôsi] ought not to be in the text. He proposes to
+[Greek: tu/chÃ´si] ought not to be in the text. He proposes to
 expunge them. The meaning of the passage certainly seems clearer
 without them.]
 
-[Footnote 16: Plato, Philêbus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi(=s
-diakechô/ristai to/ te dialektikô=s pa/lin kai\ to\ e)ristikô=s
-ê(ma=s poiei=sthai pro\s a)llê/lous tou\s lo/gous.]]
+[Footnote 16: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi(=s
+diakechÃ´/ristai to/ te dialektikÃ´=s pa/lin kai\ to\ e)ristikÃ´=s
+Ãª(ma=s poiei=sthai pro\s a)llÃª/lous tou\s lo/gous.]]
 
 [Side-note: Illustration from Speech and Music.]
 
@@ -20508,12 +20477,12 @@ together make up scientific knowledge. You cannot know one portion
 separately, without knowing the remainder: all of them being
 connected into one by the common bond of the highest Genus.[17]
 
-[Footnote 17: Plato, Philêbus, p. 18 C-D. [Greek: kathorô=n de\
-ô(s ou)dei\s ê(mô=n ou)d' a)\n e(\n au)to\ kath' au(to\ a)/neu
-pa/ntôn au)tô=n ma/thoi, tou=ton to\n desmo\n au)= logisa/menos
-ô(s o)/nta e(/na kai\ pa/nta tau=ta e(\n pôs poiou=nta, mi/an e)p'
-au)toi=s ô(s ou)=san grammatikê\n te/chnên e)pephthe/gxato
-proseipô/n.]]
+[Footnote 17: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 18 C-D. [Greek: kathorÃ´=n de\
+Ã´(s ou)dei\s Ãª(mÃ´=n ou)d' a)\n e(\n au)to\ kath' au(to\ a)/neu
+pa/ntÃ´n au)tÃ´=n ma/thoi, tou=ton to\n desmo\n au)= logisa/menos
+Ã´(s o)/nta e(/na kai\ pa/nta tau=ta e(\n pÃ´s poiou=nta, mi/an e)p'
+au)toi=s Ã´(s ou)=san grammatikÃª\n te/chnÃªn e)pephthe/gxato
+proseipÃ´/n.]]
 
 [Side-note: Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties
 which he had himself recognised as existing.]
@@ -20533,8 +20502,8 @@ essence among infinite particulars--least of all is it shown, how
 such multiplication or division can take place, consistently with
 the fundamental and eternal sameness of the Universal Monad. The
 explanation assumes these difficulties to be eliminated, but does
-not suggest the means of eliminating them. The Philêbus, like the
-Parmenidês, recognises the difficulties as existing, but leaves
+not suggest the means of eliminating them. The PhilÃªbus, like the
+ParmenidÃªs, recognises the difficulties as existing, but leaves
 them unsolved, though the dogmas to which they attach are the
 cardinal and peculiar tenets of Platonic speculation. Plato shows
 that he is aware of the embarrassments: yet he is content to
@@ -20547,14 +20516,14 @@ dialectic debate, and will continue to the end of it, as a
 stimulating puzzle which especially captivates the imagination of
 youth.[19]
 
-[Footnote 18: Plato, Philêbus, p. 15 B-C.]
+[Footnote 18: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 15 B-C.]
 
-[Footnote 19: Plato, Philêbus, p. 15 D. [Greek: phame/n pou
-tau)to\n e(\n kai\ polla\ u(po\ lo/gôn gigno/mena peritre/chein
-pa/ntê| kath' e(/kaston tô=n legome/nôn a)ei\ kai\ pa/lai kai\
-nu=n. kai\ tou=to ou)/te mê\ pau/sêtai/ pote ou)/te ê)/rxato nu=n,
-a)ll' e)/sti to\ toiou=ton, ô(s e)moi\ phai/netai, tô=n lo/gôn
-au)tô=n a)tha/nato/n ti kai\ a)gê/rôn pa/thos e)n ê(mi=n.]
+[Footnote 19: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 15 D. [Greek: phame/n pou
+tau)to\n e(\n kai\ polla\ u(po\ lo/gÃ´n gigno/mena peritre/chein
+pa/ntÃª| kath' e(/kaston tÃ´=n legome/nÃ´n a)ei\ kai\ pa/lai kai\
+nu=n. kai\ tou=to ou)/te mÃª\ pau/sÃªtai/ pote ou)/te Ãª)/rxato nu=n,
+a)ll' e)/sti to\ toiou=ton, Ã´(s e)moi\ phai/netai, tÃ´=n lo/gÃ´n
+au)tÃ´=n a)tha/nato/n ti kai\ a)gÃª/rÃ´n pa/thos e)n Ãª(mi=n.]
 
 The sequel (too long to transcribe) of this passage (setting forth
 the manner in which this apparent paradox worked upon the
@@ -20630,14 +20599,14 @@ triple point of view which Plato requires:--the highest
 Genus,--the definite number of species and sub-species,--the
 undefined number of individuals.
 
-[Footnote 20: Plato, Philêbus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi( de\ nu=n tô=n
-a)nthrô/pôn sophoi\ e(\n me/n, o(/pôs a)\n tu/chôsi, kai\ polla\
+[Footnote 20: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi( de\ nu=n tÃ´=n
+a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´n sophoi\ e(\n me/n, o(/pÃ´s a)\n tu/chÃ´si, kai\ polla\
 tha=tton kai\ bradu/teron poiou=si tou= de/ontos, meta\ de\ to\
 e(\n a)/peira eu)thu/s, ta\ de\ me/sa au)tou\s e)kpheu/gei, oi(=s
-diakechôristai to/ te dialektikô=s pa/lon kai\ to\ e)ristikô=s
-ê(ma=s poiei=sthai pro\s a)llê/lous tou\s lo/gous.]]
+diakechÃ´ristai to/ te dialektikÃ´=s pa/lon kai\ to\ e)ristikÃ´=s
+Ãª(ma=s poiei=sthai pro\s a)llÃª/lous tou\s lo/gous.]]
 
-[Footnote 21: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 13 B, 14 A.]
+[Footnote 21: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 13 B, 14 A.]
 
 [Side-note: Classification--unconscious and conscious.]
 
@@ -20649,7 +20618,7 @@ deliberate process, and framed upon principles predetermined as
 essential to the accomplishment of a scientific end. This was a
 conception new in the Sokratic age. Plato seized upon it with
 ardour. He has not only emphatically insisted upon it in the
-Philêbus and elsewhere, but he has also given (in the Sophistês
+PhilÃªbus and elsewhere, but he has also given (in the SophistÃªs
 and Politikus) elaborate examples of systematic logical
 subdivision applied to given subjects.
 
@@ -20668,7 +20637,7 @@ than with it. Classification does not depend upon his
 hypothesis--That Ideas are not simply Concepts of the Reason, but
 absolute existences apart from the Reason (Entia Rationis apart from
 the Ratio)--and that these Ideas correspond to the words _Unum_,
-_Multa definité_, _Multa indefinité_, which are put together to
+_Multa definitÃ©_, _Multa indefinitÃ©_, which are put together to
 compose the totality of what we see and feel in the Kosmos.
 
 Applying this general doctrine (about the necessity of
@@ -20680,7 +20649,7 @@ first under the Genus Pleasure--next, under the Genus Intelligence
 (or Cognition). And so indeed the dialogue seems to promise[22] in
 tolerably explicit terms.
 
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Philêbus, p. 19 B, p. 20 A.]
+[Footnote 22: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 19 B, p. 20 A.]
 
 [Side-note: Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite.
 2. The Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or
@@ -20702,7 +20671,7 @@ moist, great, &c., than any given positive standard. The second,
 or the Determinans, is also a Genus, or One and Many: including
 equal, double, triple, and all fixed ratios.[23]
 
-[Footnote 23: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 24-25.]
+[Footnote 23: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 24-25.]
 
 The third Genus is laid down by Plato as generated by a mixture or
 combination of these two first--the Infinite and the Determinans.
@@ -20712,7 +20681,7 @@ fine weather, good temperature:[24] all agreeing, each in its
 respective sphere, in presenting a right measure or proportion as
 opposed to excess or deficiency.
 
-[Footnote 24: Plato, Philêbus, p. 26 A-B.]
+[Footnote 24: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 26 A-B.]
 
 Fourthly, Plato assumes a distinct element of causal agency which
 operates such mixture of the Determinans with the Infinite, or
@@ -20734,7 +20703,7 @@ Cognition belong? It belongs to the fourth, or to the nature of
 Cause, the productive agency whereby definite combinations are
 brought about.[25]
 
-[Footnote 25: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 27-28, p. 31 A.]
+[Footnote 25: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 27-28, p. 31 A.]
 
 [Side-note: In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence
 with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two
@@ -20764,17 +20733,17 @@ intelligent, having body and mind like man, but in far higher
 measure and perfection. It is from this source alone that man can
 derive his supply of mind and intelligence.[27]
 
-[Footnote 26: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 27-28.
+[Footnote 26: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 27-28.
 
 The argument of Plato is here very obscure and difficult to
 follow. Stallbaum in his note even intimates that Plato uses the
 word [Greek: a)/peiron] in a sense different from that in which he
 had used it before: which I think doubtful.]
 
-[Footnote 27: Plato, Philêbus, p. 29 C. 30 A: [Greek: To\ par'
-ê(mi=n sô=ma a)=r' ou) psuchê\n phê/somen e)/chein? . . . Po/then
-labo/n, ei)/per mê\ to/ ge tou= panto\s sô=ma e)/mpsuchon o)\n
-e)tu/gchane, tau)ta/ ge e)/chon tou/tô| kai\ e)/ti pa/ntê
+[Footnote 27: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 29 C. 30 A: [Greek: To\ par'
+Ãª(mi=n sÃ´=ma a)=r' ou) psuchÃª\n phÃª/somen e)/chein? . . . Po/then
+labo/n, ei)/per mÃª\ to/ ge tou= panto\s sÃ´=ma e)/mpsuchon o)\n
+e)tu/gchane, tau)ta/ ge e)/chon tou/tÃ´| kai\ e)/ti pa/ntÃª
 kalli/ona?]]
 
 [Side-note: Intelligence is the regulating principle--Pleasure is
@@ -20788,11 +20757,11 @@ regulating power in itself.[28] He now proceeds to investigate
 pleasure and intelligence as phenomena: to enquire in what each of
 them resides, and through what affection they are generated.[29]
 
-[Footnote 28: Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 A.]
+[Footnote 28: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 31 A.]
 
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 B. [Greek: dei= dê\ to\ meta\
-tou=to, e)n ô(=| te/ e)stin e(ka/teron au)toi=n kai\ dia\ ti/
-pa/thos gi/gnesthon, o(po/tan gi/gnêsthon, i)dei=n ê(ma=s.]]
+[Footnote 29: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 31 B. [Greek: dei= dÃª\ to\ meta\
+tou=to, e)n Ã´(=| te/ e)stin e(ka/teron au)toi=n kai\ dia\ ti/
+pa/thos gi/gnesthon, o(po/tan gi/gnÃªsthon, i)dei=n Ãª(ma=s.]]
 
 [Side-note: Pleasure and Pain must be explained together--Pain
 arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the
@@ -20813,18 +20782,18 @@ break up the fundamental harmony of animal nature: while eating,
 drinking, cooling under extreme heat, or warming under extreme
 cold, are pleasurable, because they restore the disturbed harmony.
 
-[Footnote 30: Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 C. [Greek: _e)n tô=| koinô=|
-moi ge/nei_ a(/ma phai/nesthon lu/pê te kai\ ê(donê\ _gi/gnesthai_
-kata\ phu/sin . . . koino\n toi/nun u(pakou/ômen o(\ dê\ tô=n
-tetta/rôn tri/ton e)le/gomen.] Compare p. 32 A-B: [Greek: to\ e)k
+[Footnote 30: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 31 C. [Greek: _e)n tÃ´=| koinÃ´=|
+moi ge/nei_ a(/ma phai/nesthon lu/pÃª te kai\ Ãª(donÃª\ _gi/gnesthai_
+kata\ phu/sin . . . koino\n toi/nun u(pakou/Ã´men o(\ dÃª\ tÃ´=n
+tetta/rÃ´n tri/ton e)le/gomen.] Compare p. 32 A-B: [Greek: to\ e)k
 tou= a)pei/rou kai\ pe/ratos kata\ phu/sin e)/mpsuchon gegono\s
 ei)=dos.]
 
-Plato had before said that [Greek: ê(donê\] belonged to the
+Plato had before said that [Greek: Ãª(donÃª\] belonged to the
 Infinite (compare p. 41 D), or to the _first_ of the four
 above-mentioned genera, not to the third.]
 
-[Footnote 31: Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 D.]
+[Footnote 31: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 31 D.]
 
 [Side-note: Pleasure presupposes Pain.]
 
@@ -20848,11 +20817,11 @@ heat and cold, desirable or undesirable according to
 circumstances--_i.e._ not good in their own nature, but sometimes
 good and sometimes not.[33]
 
-[Footnote 32: Plato, Philêbus, p. 32 C. [Greek: ê(donê=s kai\
-lu/pês e(/teron ei)=dos, to\ chôri\s tou= sô/matos au)tê=s tê=s
-psuchê=s dia\ prosdoki/as gigno/menon.]]
+[Footnote 32: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 32 C. [Greek: Ãª(donÃª=s kai\
+lu/pÃªs e(/teron ei)=dos, to\ chÃ´ri\s tou= sÃ´/matos au)tÃª=s tÃª=s
+psuchÃª=s dia\ prosdoki/as gigno/menon.]]
 
-[Footnote 33: Plato, Philêbus, p. 32 D.]
+[Footnote 33: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 32 D.]
 
 [Side-note: A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without
 pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is
@@ -20868,9 +20837,9 @@ to the nature of the Gods, who cannot be supposed without
 indecency to feel either joy or sorrow.[34] At any rate, if not
 the best life of all, it will be the second-best.
 
-[Footnote 34: Plato, Philêbus, p. 33 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei)ko/s
+[Footnote 34: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 33 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei)ko/s
 ge ou)/te chai/rein theou\s ou)/te to\ e)nanti/on? Pa/nu me\n
-ou)=n ou)k ei)ko/s; a)/schêmon gou=n au)tôn e(ka/teron
+ou)=n ou)k ei)ko/s; a)/schÃªmon gou=n au)tÃ´n e(ka/teron
 gigno/meno/n e)stin.]]
 
 [Side-note: Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily
@@ -20910,28 +20879,28 @@ pleasure: and it may perhaps be a state of pain only, under two
 distinct forms.[38] Life composed of a succession of these states
 can afford no true or pure pleasure.
 
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 33 E--34 A. [Greek:
-a)naisthêsi/an e)pono/mason . . . to\ de\ e)n e(ni\ pa/thei tê\n
-psuchê\n kai\ to\ sô=ma koinê=| gigno/menon koinê=| kai\
-kinei=sthai, tau/tên d' au)= tê\n ki/nêsin o)noma/zôn
-_ai)/sthêsin_ ou)k a)po\ tro/pou phthe/ggoi' a)/n.]]
+[Footnote 35: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 33 E--34 A. [Greek:
+a)naisthÃªsi/an e)pono/mason . . . to\ de\ e)n e(ni\ pa/thei tÃª\n
+psuchÃª\n kai\ to\ sÃ´=ma koinÃª=| gigno/menon koinÃª=| kai\
+kinei=sthai, tau/tÃªn d' au)= tÃª\n ki/nÃªsin o)noma/zÃ´n
+_ai)/sthÃªsin_ ou)k a)po\ tro/pou phthe/ggoi' a)/n.]]
 
-[Footnote 36: Plato, Philêbus, p. 34 A-B. [Greek: sôtêri/an
-ai)sthê/seôs tê\n mnê/mên.]
+[Footnote 36: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 34 A-B. [Greek: sÃ´tÃªri/an
+ai)sthÃª/seÃ´s tÃª\n mnÃª/mÃªn.]
 
-[Greek: Mnê/mê] and [Greek: a)na/mnêsis] are pronounced to be
+[Greek: MnÃª/mÃª] and [Greek: a)na/mnÃªsis] are pronounced to be
 different.]
 
-[Footnote 37: Plato, Philêbus, p. 35 C. [Greek: tê\n psuchê\n
-a)/ra tê=s plêrô/seôs e)pha/ptesthai loipo/n, tê=| mnê/mê| dê=lon
-o(/ti; tô=| ga\r a)\n e)/t' a)/llô| e)pha/psaito?]
+[Footnote 37: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 35 C. [Greek: tÃª\n psuchÃª\n
+a)/ra tÃª=s plÃªrÃ´/seÃ´s e)pha/ptesthai loipo/n, tÃª=| mnÃª/mÃª| dÃª=lon
+o(/ti; tÃ´=| ga\r a)\n e)/t' a)/llÃ´| e)pha/psaito?]
 
-35 D. [Greek: tê\n a)/r' e)pa/gousan e)pi\ ta\ e)pithumou/mena
-a)podei/xas mnê/mên, o( lo/gos psuchê=s xu/mpasan tê/n te o(rmê\n
-kai\ e)pithumi/an kai\ tê\n a)rchê\n tou= zô/ou panto\s
-a)pe/phê|nen.]
+35 D. [Greek: tÃª\n a)/r' e)pa/gousan e)pi\ ta\ e)pithumou/mena
+a)podei/xas mnÃª/mÃªn, o( lo/gos psuchÃª=s xu/mpasan tÃª/n te o(rmÃª\n
+kai\ e)pithumi/an kai\ tÃª\n a)rchÃª\n tou= zÃ´/ou panto\s
+a)pe/phÃª|nen.]
 
-[Footnote 38: Plato, Philêbus, p. 36 A-B.
+[Footnote 38: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 36 A-B.
 
 This analysis of desire is in the main just: antecedent to all
 gratification, it is simple uneasiness: gratification having been
@@ -20966,7 +20935,7 @@ sometimes along with a true one.
 Yes (replies Protarchus), but we then call _the opinion_ true or
 false--not _the pleasure_.[39]
 
-[Footnote 39: Plato, Philêbus, p. 37.]
+[Footnote 39: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 37.]
 
 [Side-note: Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true
 opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the
@@ -20996,20 +20965,20 @@ identical with true or false opinions: so also are good or bad
 pleasures, identical with true or false pleasures: there is no
 other ground for their being good or bad.
 
-[Footnote 40: Plato, Philêbus, p. 38 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n e)k
-mnê/mês te kai\ ai)sthê/seôs do/xa ê(mi=n kai\ to\ diadoxa/zein
+[Footnote 40: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 38 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n e)k
+mnÃª/mÃªs te kai\ ai)sthÃª/seÃ´s do/xa Ãª(mi=n kai\ to\ diadoxa/zein
 e)gcheirei=n gi/gneth' e(ka/stote?]]
 
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 38 E, 39. [Greek: dokei= moi
-to/te ê(mô=n ê( psuchê\ bibli/ô| tini\ proseoike/nai . . . ê(
-mnê/mê tai=s ai)sthê/sesi xumpi/ptousa ei)s tau)to/n, ka)kei=na
-a)\ peri\ tau=ta/ e)sti ta\ pathê/mata, phai/nontai/ moi schedo\n
-oi(=on gra/phein ê(mô=n e)n tai=s psuchai=s to/te lo/gous. . .
+[Footnote 41: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 38 E, 39. [Greek: dokei= moi
+to/te Ãª(mÃ´=n Ãª( psuchÃª\ bibli/Ã´| tini\ proseoike/nai . . . Ãª(
+mnÃª/mÃª tai=s ai)sthÃª/sesi xumpi/ptousa ei)s tau)to/n, ka)kei=na
+a)\ peri\ tau=ta/ e)sti ta\ pathÃª/mata, phai/nontai/ moi schedo\n
+oi(=on gra/phein Ãª(mÃ´=n e)n tai=s psuchai=s to/te lo/gous. . .
 
-A)pode/chou dê\ kai\ e(/teron dêmiourgo\n ê(mô=n e)n tai=s
-psuchai=s e)n tô=| to/te chro/nô| gigno/menon . . . Zôgra/phon,
-o(\s meta\ to\n grammatistê\n tô=n legome/nôn ei)ko/nas e)n tê=|
-psuchê=| tou/tôn gra/phei.]
+A)pode/chou dÃª\ kai\ e(/teron dÃªmiourgo\n Ãª(mÃ´=n e)n tai=s
+psuchai=s e)n tÃ´=| to/te chro/nÃ´| gigno/menon . . . ZÃ´gra/phon,
+o(\s meta\ to\n grammatistÃª\n tÃ´=n legome/nÃ´n ei)ko/nas e)n tÃª=|
+psuchÃª=| tou/tÃ´n gra/phei.]
 
 It seems odd that Plato here puts the painter _after_ the scribe,
 and not _before_ him. The images or phantasm of sense must be
@@ -21017,21 +20986,21 @@ painted on the mind before any words are written upon it if we are
 to adopt both these metaphors).
 
 The comparison of the mind to a sheet of paper or a book begins
-with the poets (Æschyl. Prometh. 790), and passes into philosophy
+with the poets (Ã†schyl. Prometh. 790), and passes into philosophy
 with Plato.]
 
-[Footnote 42: Plato, Philêbus, p. 39 E. [Greek: ê(mei=s d' au)=
-dia\ panto\s tou= bi/ou a)ei\ ge/momen e)lpi/dôn.] 40 E. [Greek:
-ou)kou=n o( au)to\s lo/gos a)\n ei)/ê peri\ pho/bôn** te kai\
-thumô=n], &c. Also 40 D.]
+[Footnote 42: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 39 E. [Greek: Ãª(mei=s d' au)=
+dia\ panto\s tou= bi/ou a)ei\ ge/momen e)lpi/dÃ´n.] 40 E. [Greek:
+ou)kou=n o( au)to\s lo/gos a)\n ei)/Ãª peri\ pho/bÃ´n** te kai\
+thumÃ´=n], &c. Also 40 D.]
 
-[Footnote 43: Plato, Philêbus, p. 40 A-B.
+[Footnote 43: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 40 A-B.
 
 Prophets and prophecies, inspired by the Gods, were phenomena
 received as frequently occurring in the days of Plato.]
 
-[Footnote 44: Plato, Philêbus, p. 40 C. [Greek: memimême/nai
-me/ntoi ta\s a)lêthei=s e)pi\ ta\ geloio/tera.]]
+[Footnote 44: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 40 C. [Greek: memimÃªme/nai
+me/ntoi ta\s a)lÃªthei=s e)pi\ ta\ geloio/tera.]]
 
 [Side-note: Protarchus disputes this--He thinks that there are some
 pleasures bad, but none false--Sokrates does not admit this, but
@@ -21046,10 +21015,10 @@ pleasures bad on other grounds.[45] I am now endeavouring to show
 that there are some pleasures which are _false_: and I proceed to
 another way of viewing the subject.
 
-[Footnote 45: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 40 E-41 A. _Sokr._ [Greek:
-Ou)d' ê(dona/s g', oi)=mai, katanoou=men ô(s a)/llon tina\ tro/pon
-ei)si\ ponêrai\ plê\n tô=| pseudei=s ei)=nai.] _Protarch._ [Greek:
-Pa/nu me\n ou)=n tou)nanti/on ei)/rêkas], &c.]
+[Footnote 45: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 40 E-41 A. _Sokr._ [Greek:
+Ou)d' Ãª(dona/s g', oi)=mai, katanoou=men Ã´(s a)/llon tina\ tro/pon
+ei)si\ ponÃªrai\ plÃª\n tÃ´=| pseudei=s ei)=nai.] _Protarch._ [Greek:
+Pa/nu me\n ou)=n tou)nanti/on ei)/rÃªkas], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains--False
 estimate habitual--These are the false pleasures.]
@@ -21071,7 +21040,7 @@ pleasures and pains counted as greater or less than they really
 are: in other words, false pleasures and pains. We thus see that
 pleasures may be true or false, no less than opinions.[46]
 
-[Footnote 46: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 41-42.]
+[Footnote 46: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 41-42.]
 
 [Side-note: Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and
 gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as
@@ -21095,27 +21064,27 @@ states of life[49]--painful--pleasurable--neither painful nor
 pleasurable. But _no pain_ (absence of pain) is not identical with
 pleasure: it is a third and distinct state.[50]
 
-[Footnote 47: Plato, Philêbus, p. 42 C. [Greek: Tou/tôn toi/nun
-e(xê=s o)pso/metha, e)a\n tê=|de a)pantô=men ê(dona\s kai\ lu/pas
-pseudei=s e(/ti ma=llon ê)\ tau/tas phainome/nas te kai\ ou)/sas
-e)n toi=s zô/ois.]
+[Footnote 47: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 42 C. [Greek: Tou/tÃ´n toi/nun
+e(xÃª=s o)pso/metha, e)a\n tÃª=|de a)pantÃ´=men Ãª(dona\s kai\ lu/pas
+pseudei=s e(/ti ma=llon Ãª)\ tau/tas phainome/nas te kai\ ou)/sas
+e)n toi=s zÃ´/ois.]
 
 This argument is continued, though in a manner desultory and
 difficult to follow, down to p. 51 A: [Greek: pro\s to\ tina\s
-ê(dona\s ei)=nai dokou/sas, ou)sas d' ou)damô=s; kai\ mega/las
+Ãª(dona\s ei)=nai dokou/sas, ou)sas d' ou)damÃ´=s; kai\ mega/las
 e(te/ras tina\s a)/ma kai\ polla\s phantasthei/sas, ei)=nai d'
 au)ta\s sumpephurme/nas o(mou= lu/pais te kai\ a)napau/sesin
-o)dunô=n tô=n megi/stôn peri/ te sô/matos kai\ psuchê=s
+o)dunÃ´=n tÃ´=n megi/stÃ´n peri/ te sÃ´/matos kai\ psuchÃª=s
 a)pori/as.]]
 
-[Footnote 48: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 42-43.]
+[Footnote 48: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 42-43.]
 
-[Footnote 49: Plato, Philêbus, p. 43 D. [Greek: trittou\s bi/ous,
-e(/na me\n ê(du/n, to\n d' au)= lupêro/n, to\n d' e(/na
-mêde/tera.]]
+[Footnote 49: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 43 D. [Greek: trittou\s bi/ous,
+e(/na me\n Ãª(du/n, to\n d' au)= lupÃªro/n, to\n d' e(/na
+mÃªde/tera.]]
 
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Philêbus, p. 43 D. [Greek: ou)k a)\n ei)/ê
-to\ mê\ lupei=sthai/ pote tau)to\n tô=| chai/rein.]]
+[Footnote 50: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 43 D. [Greek: ou)k a)\n ei)/Ãª
+to\ mÃª\ lupei=sthai/ pote tau)to\n tÃ´=| chai/rein.]]
 
 [Side-note: Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers--That
 pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle--no reality except pain,
@@ -21134,10 +21103,10 @@ impair, often countervail, sometimes far more than countervail,
 its effect. Pain is regarded by them as the evil--removal or
 mitigation of pain as the good--of human life.
 
-[Footnote 51: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 B-C. [Greek: kai\ ma/la
-deinou\s legome/nous ta\ peri\ phu/sin, oi( to\ para/pan ê(dona\s
-ou)/ phasin ei)=nai . . . lupô=n tau/tas ei)=nai pa/sas
-a)pothuga/s, a(\s nu=n oi( peri\ Phi/lêbon ê(dona\s
+[Footnote 51: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 44 B-C. [Greek: kai\ ma/la
+deinou\s legome/nous ta\ peri\ phu/sin, oi( to\ para/pan Ãª(dona\s
+ou)/ phasin ei)=nai . . . lupÃ´=n tau/tas ei)=nai pa/sas
+a)pothuga/s, a(\s nu=n oi( peri\ Phi/lÃªbon Ãª(dona\s
 e)ponoma/zousin.]]
 
 [Side-note: Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly.]
@@ -21157,9 +21126,9 @@ true and unmixed with pain. Which these are (continues Sokrates),
 I will presently explain: but I shall first state the case of the
 pleasure-hating philosophers, so far as I go along with it.
 
-[Footnote 52: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 C. [Greek: ô(/sper ma/ntesi
-proschrê=sthai/ tisi, manteuome/nois ou) te/chnê|, a)lla/ tini
-duscherei/a phu/seôs ou)k a)gennou=s], &c. Also p. 51 A.]
+[Footnote 52: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 44 C. [Greek: Ã´(/sper ma/ntesi
+proschrÃª=sthai/ tisi, manteuome/nois ou) te/chnÃª|, a)lla/ tini
+duscherei/a phu/seÃ´s ou)k a)gennou=s], &c. Also p. 51 A.]
 
 [Side-note: Theory of the pleasure-haters--We must learn what
 pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures--These are
@@ -21196,22 +21165,22 @@ anger, jealousy, envy, fear, sorrow, &c.: all of them embody
 pleasures mixed with pain, and the magnitude of the pleasure is
 proportioned to that of the accompanying pain.[56]
 
-[Footnote 53: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 E. [Greek: ô(s ei)
-boulê/theimen o(touou=n ei)=dous tê\n phu/sin i)dei=n, oi(=on tê\n
-tou= sklêrou=, po/teron ei)s ta\ sklêro/tta a)poble/pontes ou(/tôs
-a)\n ma=llon sunnoê/saimen ê)\ pro\s ta\ pollosta\ sklêro/têti?]
-Answer: [Greek: pro\s ta\ prô=ta mege/thei.]]
+[Footnote 53: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 44 E. [Greek: Ã´(s ei)
+boulÃª/theimen o(touou=n ei)=dous tÃª\n phu/sin i)dei=n, oi(=on tÃª\n
+tou= sklÃªrou=, po/teron ei)s ta\ sklÃªro/tta a)poble/pontes ou(/tÃ´s
+a)\n ma=llon sunnoÃª/saimen Ãª)\ pro\s ta\ pollosta\ sklÃªro/tÃªti?]
+Answer: [Greek: pro\s ta\ prÃ´=ta mege/thei.]]
 
-[Footnote 54: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 45-46.]
+[Footnote 54: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 45-46.]
 
-[Footnote 55: Plato, Philêbus, p. 47 A.]
+[Footnote 55: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 47 A.]
 
-[Footnote 56: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 49-50 D. Plato here introduces,
+[Footnote 56: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 49-50 D. Plato here introduces,
 at some length, an analysis of the mixed sentiment of pleasure and
 pain with which we regard scenic representations, tragedy and
 comedy--especially the latter. The explanation which he gives of
 the sentiment of the ludicrous is curious, and is intended to
-elucidate an obscure psychological phenomenon ([Greek: o(/sô|
+elucidate an obscure psychological phenomenon ([Greek: o(/sÃ´|
 skoteino/tero/n e)sti], p. 48 B). But his explanation is not
 clear, and the sense which he gives to the word [Greek: phtho/nos]
 is a forced one. He states truly that the natural object (at least
@@ -21226,7 +21195,7 @@ said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here, or how he
 can be said to feel [Greek: phtho/nos], I do not clearly see. At
 least [Greek: phtho/nos] is here used in the very unusual sense
 (to use Stallbaum's words, note p. 48 B, page 278) of "injusta
-lætitia de malis eorum, quibus bene cupere debemus": a sense
+lÃ¦titia de malis eorum, quibus bene cupere debemus": a sense
 altogether contrary to that which the word bears in Xen. Memor.
 iii. 9, 8; which Stallbaum himself cites, as if the definition of
 [Greek: phtho/nos] were the same in both.]
@@ -21249,14 +21218,14 @@ pleasures: in fact, they are pleasures only in seeming, but not in
 truth and reality. To-morrow I will give you fuller proofs on the
 subject.[58]
 
-[Footnote 57: Plato, Philêbus, p. 45 C-E. [Greek: mê/ me ê(gê=|
-dianoou/menon e)rôta=|n se, ei) _plei/ô chai/rousin_ oi( spho/dra
-nosou=ntes tô=n u(giaino/ntôn, a)ll' oi)/ou _me/getho/s_ me
-zêtei=n ê(donê=s, kai\ _to\ spho/dra_ peri\ tou= toiou/tou pou=
+[Footnote 57: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 45 C-E. [Greek: mÃª/ me Ãª(gÃª=|
+dianoou/menon e)rÃ´ta=|n se, ei) _plei/Ã´ chai/rousin_ oi( spho/dra
+nosou=ntes tÃ´=n u(giaino/ntÃ´n, a)ll' oi)/ou _me/getho/s_ me
+zÃªtei=n Ãª(donÃª=s, kai\ _to\ spho/dra_ peri\ tou= toiou/tou pou=
 pote\ gi/gnetai e(ka/stote], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 58: Plato, Philêbus, p. 50 E. [Greek: tou/tôn ga\r
-a(pa/ntôn au(/rion e)thelê/sô soi lo/gon dou=nai], &c.]
+[Footnote 58: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 50 E. [Greek: tou/tÃ´n ga\r
+a(pa/ntÃ´n au(/rion e)thelÃª/sÃ´ soi lo/gon dou=nai], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true.
 Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c.
@@ -21286,15 +21255,15 @@ if the knowledge acquired be lost. This too is one of the unmixed
 or pure pleasures; though it is not attainable by most men, but
 only by a select few.[61]
 
-[Footnote 59: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 A.]
+[Footnote 59: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 51 A.]
 
-[Footnote 60: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 E. [Greek: to\ de\ peri\ ta\s
-o)sma\s ê(=tton me\n tou/tôn thei=on ge/nos ê(donô=n; to\ de\ mê\
+[Footnote 60: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 51 E. [Greek: to\ de\ peri\ ta\s
+o)sma\s Ãª(=tton me\n tou/tÃ´n thei=on ge/nos Ãª(donÃ´=n; to\ de\ mÃª\
 summemi/chthai e)n au)tai=s a)nagkai/ous lu/pas], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 61: Plato, Philêbus, p. 52 B. [Greek: tau/tas toi/nun
-ta\s tô=n mathêma/tôn ê(dona\s a)mi/ktous te ei)=nai lu/pais
-r(ête/on, kai\ ou)damô=s tô=n spho/dra o)li/gôn.]]
+[Footnote 61: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 52 B. [Greek: tau/tas toi/nun
+ta\s tÃ´=n mathÃªma/tÃ´n Ãª(dona\s a)mi/ktous te ei)=nai lu/pais
+r(Ãªte/on, kai\ ou)damÃ´=s tÃ´=n spho/dra o)li/gÃ´n.]]
 
 [Side-note: Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and
 proportion.]
@@ -21311,7 +21280,7 @@ clouded and troubled white. In like manner, gentle pleasure, free
 from all pain, is more pleasurable, truer, and more beautiful,
 than intense pleasure coupled with pain.[62]
 
-[Footnote 62: Plato, Philêbus, p. 53 B-C.]
+[Footnote 62: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 53 B-C.]
 
 [Side-note: Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it
 cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means
@@ -21329,23 +21298,23 @@ or change, never attaining essence or permanence.[63] But
 generation or transition is always for the sake of the thing to be
 generated, or for Substance--not substance for the sake of
 generation: the transitory serves as a road to the permanent, not
-_vice versà_. Pleasure is thus a means, not an End. It cannot
+_vice versÃ _. Pleasure is thus a means, not an End. It cannot
 therefore partake of the essential nature and dignity of Good: it
 belongs to a subordinate and imperfect category.[64]
 
-[Footnote 63: Plato, Philêbus, p. 53 C. [Greek: a)=ra peri\
-ê(donê=s ou)k a)kêko/amen ô(s a)ei\ ge/nesi/s e)stin, ou)si/a de\
-ou)k e)/sti to\ para/pan ê(dona=s; kompsoi\ ga\r dê/ tines au)=
-tou=ton to\n lo/gon e)picheirou=si mênu/ein ê(mi=n, oi(=s dei=
+[Footnote 63: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 53 C. [Greek: a)=ra peri\
+Ãª(donÃª=s ou)k a)kÃªko/amen Ã´(s a)ei\ ge/nesi/s e)stin, ou)si/a de\
+ou)k e)/sti to\ para/pan Ãª(dona=s; kompsoi\ ga\r dÃª/ tines au)=
+tou=ton to\n lo/gon e)picheirou=si mÃªnu/ein Ãª(mi=n, oi(=s dei=
 cha/rin e)/chein. . . .]
 
-53 D: [Greek: e)sto\n dê/ tine du/o, to\ me\n au)to\ kath' au(to/,
+53 D: [Greek: e)sto\n dÃª/ tine du/o, to\ me\n au)to\ kath' au(to/,
 to\ de\ a)ei\ e)phie/menon a)/llou . . . to\ me\n semno/taton
 a)ei\ pephuko/s, to\ de\ e)llipe\s e)kei/nou.]]
 
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Philêbus, p. 54 D. [Greek: ê(donê\ ei)/per
-ge/nesi/s e)stin, ei)s a)/llên ê)\ tê\n tou= a)gathou= moi=ran
-au)tê\n tithe/ntes o)rthô=s thê/somen.]]
+[Footnote 64: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 54 D. [Greek: Ãª(donÃª\ ei)/per
+ge/nesi/s e)stin, ei)s a)/llÃªn Ãª)\ tÃª\n tou= a)gathou= moi=ran
+au)tÃª\n tithe/ntes o)rthÃ´=s thÃª/somen.]]
 
 [Side-note: Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good.]
 
@@ -21356,7 +21325,7 @@ temperance, &c., are not good:--nor that a man is good only while
 he is enjoying pleasure, and bad while suffering pain, whatever
 may be his character and merits.[65]
 
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Philêbus, p. 55 B.]
+[Footnote 65: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 55 B.]
 
 [Side-note: Distinction and classification of the varieties of
 Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than
@@ -21391,7 +21360,7 @@ upon knack and conjecture, than the three former.[66] They
 approach nearer to the purity of science, and include less of the
 non-scientific, variable, conjectural, elements.
 
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 55-56.]
+[Footnote 66: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 55-56.]
 
 [Side-note: Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the
 philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan.]
@@ -21413,25 +21382,25 @@ too, always falls short of accuracy.[68] There are in short two
 arithmetics and two geometries[69]--very different from each
 other, though bearing a common name.
 
-[Footnote 67: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: A)rithmêtikê\n
-prô=ton a)=r' ou)k a)/llên me/n tina tê\n tô=n pollô=n phate/on,
-a)/llên d' au)= tê\n tô=n philosophou/ntôn? . . .
+[Footnote 67: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: A)rithmÃªtikÃª\n
+prÃ´=ton a)=r' ou)k a)/llÃªn me/n tina tÃª\n tÃ´=n pollÃ´=n phate/on,
+a)/llÃªn d' au)= tÃª\n tÃ´=n philosophou/ntÃ´n? . . .
 
-logistikê\ kai\ metrêtikê\ ê( kata\ tektonikê\n kai\ kat'
-e)mporikê\n tê=s kata\ philosophi/an geômetri/as te kai\ logismô=n
-katameletôme/nôn--po/teron ô(s mi/a e(kate/ra lekte/on, ê)\ du/o
-tithô=men?]
+logistikÃª\ kai\ metrÃªtikÃª\ Ãª( kata\ tektonikÃª\n kai\ kat'
+e)mporikÃª\n tÃª=s kata\ philosophi/an geÃ´metri/as te kai\ logismÃ´=n
+katameletÃ´me/nÃ´n--po/teron Ã´(s mi/a e(kate/ra lekte/on, Ãª)\ du/o
+tithÃ´=men?]
 
 Compare Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7, p. 1098, a. 30.]
 
-[Footnote 68: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: oi( me\n ga/r
-pou mona/das a)ni/sous katarithmou=ntai tô=n peri\ a)rithmo/n,
+[Footnote 68: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: oi( me\n ga/r
+pou mona/das a)ni/sous katarithmou=ntai tÃ´=n peri\ a)rithmo/n,
 oi(=on strato/peda du/o kai\ bou=s du/o kai\ du/o ta\ smikro/tata
-ê)\ kai\ ta\ pa/ntôn me/gista; oi( d' ou)k a)/n pote au)toi=s
-sunakolouthê/seian, ei) mê\ mona/da mona/dos e(ka/stês tô=n
-muri/ôn mêdemi/an a)/llên a)/llês diaphe/rousa/n tis thê/sei.]]
+Ãª)\ kai\ ta\ pa/ntÃ´n me/gista; oi( d' ou)k a)/n pote au)toi=s
+sunakolouthÃª/seian, ei) mÃª\ mona/da mona/dos e(ka/stÃªs tÃ´=n
+muri/Ã´n mÃªdemi/an a)/llÃªn a)/llÃªs diaphe/rousa/n tis thÃª/sei.]]
 
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Philêbus, p. 57 D.]
+[Footnote 69: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 57 D.]
 
 [Side-note: Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions.
 Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are
@@ -21455,7 +21424,7 @@ eternal and invariable--_Ens semper Idem_--presiding over those
 subordinate sciences which bear upon the like matter in partial
 and separate departments.[70]
 
-[Footnote 70: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 57-58.]
+[Footnote 70: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 57-58.]
 
 [Side-note: Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for
 Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness
@@ -21484,16 +21453,16 @@ mankind: yet they, and only they, will satisfy both the demands of
 intelligence, and the impulse within us, in so far as we have an
 impulse to love and strain after truth.[72]
 
-[Footnote 71: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B. [Greek: Ou) tou=t' e)/gôge
-e)zê/toun pô, ti/s te/chnê ê)\ ti/s e)pistê/mê pasô=n diaphe/rei
-tô=| megi/stê kai\ a)ri/stê kai\ plei=sta ô)phelou=sa ê(ma=s.
+[Footnote 71: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 58 B. [Greek: Ou) tou=t' e)/gÃ´ge
+e)zÃª/toun pÃ´, ti/s te/chnÃª Ãª)\ ti/s e)pistÃª/mÃª pasÃ´=n diaphe/rei
+tÃ´=| megi/stÃª kai\ a)ri/stÃª kai\ plei=sta Ã´)phelou=sa Ãª(ma=s.
 a)lla\ ti/s pote to\ saphe\s kai\ ta)kribe\s kai\ to\
-a)lêthe/staton e)piskopei=, ka)\n ê)=| smikra\ kai\ smikra\
-o)ni/nasa. Tou=t' e)sti\n o(\ nu=n dê\ zêtou=men.]]
+a)lÃªthe/staton e)piskopei=, ka)\n Ãª)=| smikra\ kai\ smikra\
+o)ni/nasa. Tou=t' e)sti\n o(\ nu=n dÃª\ zÃªtou=men.]]
 
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 D. [Greek: a)ll' ei)/ tis
-pe/phuke tê=s psuchê=s ê(mô=n du/namis e)ra=|n te tou= a)lêthou=s
-kai\ pa/nta e(/neka tou/tou pra/ttein, tau/tên ei)/pômen], &c.]
+[Footnote 72: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 58 D. [Greek: a)ll' ei)/ tis
+pe/phuke tÃª=s psuchÃª=s Ãª(mÃ´=n du/namis e)ra=|n te tou= a)lÃªthou=s
+kai\ pa/nta e(/neka tou/tou pra/ttein, tau/tÃªn ei)/pÃ´men], &c.]
 
 As far as straining after truth is concerned (says Protarchus),
 Dialectic and the kindred sciences have an incontestable
@@ -21514,12 +21483,12 @@ truth, corresponding to those highest mental endowments, Reason
 and Intelligence--can be found only in essences, eternal and
 unchangeable, or in matters most akin to them.[74]
 
-[Footnote 73: Plato, Philêbus, p. 59. [Greek: ei) de\ kai\ peri\
-phu/seôs ê(gei=tai/ tis zêtei=n, oi)=sth' o(/ti ta\ peri\ to\n
-ko/smon to/nde, o(/pê| te ge/gone kai\ o(/pê| pa/schei ti kai\
-o(/pê| poiei=, tau=ta zêtei= dia\ bi/ou?]]
+[Footnote 73: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 59. [Greek: ei) de\ kai\ peri\
+phu/seÃ´s Ãª(gei=tai/ tis zÃªtei=n, oi)=sth' o(/ti ta\ peri\ to\n
+ko/smon to/nde, o(/pÃª| te ge/gone kai\ o(/pÃª| pa/schei ti kai\
+o(/pÃª| poiei=, tau=ta zÃªtei= dia\ bi/ou?]]
 
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Philêbus, p. 59.]
+[Footnote 74: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 59.]
 
 [Side-note: Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure
 separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two--Intelligence
@@ -21548,24 +21517,24 @@ cognizant of the divine Ideas of Circle, Sphere, and other
 figures; and to employ them in architecture, not knowing anything
 of human circles and figures as they exist in practical life?[78]
 
-[Footnote 75: Plato, Philêbus, p. 60 C. [Greek: tê\n ta)gathou=
-diaphe/rein phu/sin tô=|de tô=n a)/llôn . . . ô(=| parei/ê tou=t'
-a)ei\ tô=n zô/ôn dia\ te/lous pa/ntôs kai\ pa/ntê|, mêdeno\s
-e(te/rou pote\ e)/ti prosdei=sthai, to\ de\ i(kano\n teleô/taton
+[Footnote 75: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 60 C. [Greek: tÃª\n ta)gathou=
+diaphe/rein phu/sin tÃ´=|de tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n . . . Ã´(=| parei/Ãª tou=t'
+a)ei\ tÃ´=n zÃ´/Ã´n dia\ te/lous pa/ntÃ´s kai\ pa/ntÃª|, mÃªdeno\s
+e(te/rou pote\ e)/ti prosdei=sthai, to\ de\ i(kano\n teleÃ´/taton
 e)/chein.]]
 
-[Footnote 76: Plato, Philêbus, p. 61 E.]
+[Footnote 76: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 61 E.]
 
-[Footnote 77: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 A. [Greek: E)/stô dê/ tis
-ê(mi=n phronô=n a)/nthrôpos au)tê=s peri\ dikaiosu/nês, o(/, ti
-e)/sti, kai\ lo/gon e)/chôn e(po/menon tô=| noei=n, kai\ dê\ kai\
-peri\ tô=n a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn tô=n o)/ntôn ô(sau/tôs
+[Footnote 77: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 62 A. [Greek: E)/stÃ´ dÃª/ tis
+Ãª(mi=n phronÃ´=n a)/nthrÃ´pos au)tÃª=s peri\ dikaiosu/nÃªs, o(/, ti
+e)/sti, kai\ lo/gon e)/chÃ´n e(po/menon tÃ´=| noei=n, kai\ dÃª\ kai\
+peri\ tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n a(pa/ntÃ´n tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n Ã´(sau/tÃ´s
 dianoou/menos?]]
 
-[Footnote 78: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n
-ou(=tos i(kanô=s e)pistê/mês e(/xei ku/klou me\n kai\ sphai/ras
-au)tê=s tê=s thei/as to\n lo/gon e)/chôn, tê\n de\ a)nthrôpi/nên
-tau/tên sphai=ran kai\ tou\s ku/klous tou/tous a)gnoô=n], &c.]
+[Footnote 78: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 62 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n
+ou(=tos i(kanÃ´=s e)pistÃª/mÃªs e(/xei ku/klou me\n kai\ sphai/ras
+au)tÃª=s tÃª=s thei/as to\n lo/gon e)/chÃ´n, tÃª\n de\ a)nthrÃ´pi/nÃªn
+tau/tÃªn sphai=ran kai\ tou\s ku/klous tou/tous a)gnoÃ´=n], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: We must include all Cognitions, not merely the truest,
 but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both.]
@@ -21581,8 +21550,8 @@ Certainly (says Protarchus), we all must have this farther
 cognition, if we are to find our way from hence to our own
 homes.[79]
 
-[Footnote 79: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 B. [Greek: A)nagkai=on ga/r,
-ei) me/llei tis ê(mô=n kai\ tê\n o(do\n e(ka/stote e)xeurê/sein
+[Footnote 79: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 62 B. [Greek: A)nagkai=on ga/r,
+ei) me/llei tis Ãª(mÃ´=n kai\ tÃª\n o(do\n e(ka/stote e)xeurÃª/sein
 oi)/kade.]]
 
 Must we then admit (says Sokrates) those cognitions also in music,
@@ -21618,11 +21587,11 @@ others in company with Reason and Truth--we shall secure that
 perfect and harmonious mixture which makes the nearest
 approximation to Good.[81]
 
-[Footnote 80: Plato, Philêbus, p. 63 A. [Greek: ei)/per pa/sas
-ê(dona\s ê(/desthai dia\ bi/ou sumphe/ron te ê(mi=n e)sti\ kai\
+[Footnote 80: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 63 A. [Greek: ei)/per pa/sas
+Ãª(dona\s Ãª(/desthai dia\ bi/ou sumphe/ron te Ãª(mi=n e)sti\ kai\
 a)blabe\s a(/pasi, pa/sas xugkrate/on.]]
 
-[Footnote 81: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 63-64.]
+[Footnote 81: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 63-64.]
 
 [Side-note: What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is
 Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than
@@ -21645,31 +21614,31 @@ be no doubt that to all the three, Reason is more akin than Pleasure:
 and that the intense pleasures are in strong repugnance and
 antipathy to all the three.[85]
 
-[Footnote 82: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 C. [Greek: Ti/ dê=ta e)n tê=|
-xummi/xei timiô/taton a(/ma kai\ ma/list' ai)/tion ei)=nai
-do/xeien a)\n ê(mi=n, _tou= pa=si gegone/nai prosphilê=_ tê\n
-toiau/tên dia/thesin?]]
+[Footnote 82: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 64 C. [Greek: Ti/ dÃª=ta e)n tÃª=|
+xummi/xei timiÃ´/taton a(/ma kai\ ma/list' ai)/tion ei)=nai
+do/xeien a)\n Ãª(mi=n, _tou= pa=si gegone/nai prosphilÃª=_ tÃª\n
+toiau/tÃªn dia/thesin?]]
 
-[Footnote 83: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 E. [Greek: nu=n dê\
-katape/pheugen ê(mi=n ê( ta)gathou= du/namis ei)s tê\n tou= kalou=
-phu/sin; metrio/tês ga\r kai\ xummetri/a ka/llos dê/pou kai\
-a)retê\ pantachou= xumbai/nei gi/gnesthai.]]
+[Footnote 83: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 64 E. [Greek: nu=n dÃª\
+katape/pheugen Ãª(mi=n Ãª( ta)gathou= du/namis ei)s tÃª\n tou= kalou=
+phu/sin; metrio/tÃªs ga\r kai\ xummetri/a ka/llos dÃª/pou kai\
+a)retÃª\ pantachou= xumbai/nei gi/gnesthai.]]
 
-[Footnote 84: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 E-65 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei)
-mê\ mia=| duna/metha i)de/a| to\ a)gatho\n thêreu=sai, su\n trisi\
-labo/ntes, ka/llei kai\ xummetri/a| kai\ a)lêthei/a|, le/gômen ô(s
-tou=to oi(=on e(\n o)rtho/tat' a)\n ai)tiasai/meth' a)\n tô=n e)n
-tê=| xummi/xei, kai\ dia\ tou=to ô(s a)gatho\n o)\n toiau/tên
-au)tê\n gegone/nai.]]
+[Footnote 84: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 64 E-65 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei)
+mÃª\ mia=| duna/metha i)de/a| to\ a)gatho\n thÃªreu=sai, su\n trisi\
+labo/ntes, ka/llei kai\ xummetri/a| kai\ a)lÃªthei/a|, le/gÃ´men Ã´(s
+tou=to oi(=on e(\n o)rtho/tat' a)\n ai)tiasai/meth' a)\n tÃ´=n e)n
+tÃª=| xummi/xei, kai\ dia\ tou=to Ã´(s a)gatho\n o)\n toiau/tÃªn
+au)tÃª\n gegone/nai.]]
 
-[Footnote 85: Plato, Philêbus, p. 65 C.]
+[Footnote 85: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 65 C.]
 
 [Side-note: Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1.
 Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right
 Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures.]
 
 We thus see (says Sokrates in conclusion), in reference to the
-debate with Philêbus, that Pleasure stands neither first nor
+debate with PhilÃªbus, that Pleasure stands neither first nor
 second in the scale of approximation to Good. First comes
 Measure--the Moderate--the Seasonable--and all those eternal Forms
 and Ideas which are analogous to these.[86] Secondly, come the
@@ -21681,19 +21650,19 @@ Fifthly, those pleasures which we have discriminated as pure
 pleasures without admixture of pain; belonging to the mind itself
 but consequent on the sensations of sight, hearing, smell.[88]
 
-[Footnote 86: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 A. [Greek: ô(s ê(donê\ ktê=ma
-ou)k e)/sti prô=ton ou)d' au)= deu/teron, a)lla\ prô=ton me/n pê|
+[Footnote 86: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 66 A. [Greek: Ã´(s Ãª(donÃª\ ktÃª=ma
+ou)k e)/sti prÃ´=ton ou)d' au)= deu/teron, a)lla\ prÃ´=ton me/n pÃª|
 peri\ me/tron kai\ to\ me/trion kai\ kai/rion kai\ pa/nta o(po/sa
-chrê\ toiau=ta nomi/zein tê\n a)i+/dion ê(|rê=sthai phu/sin.]]
+chrÃª\ toiau=ta nomi/zein tÃª\n a)i+/dion Ãª(|rÃª=sthai phu/sin.]]
 
-[Footnote 87: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 B. [Greek: deu/teron mê\n
+[Footnote 87: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 66 B. [Greek: deu/teron mÃª\n
 peri\ to\ su/mmetron kai\ kalo\n kai\ to\ te/leon kai\ i(kano\n,
-kai\ pa/nth' o(po/sa tê=s genea=s au)= tau/tês e)sti/n.]]
+kai\ pa/nth' o(po/sa tÃª=s genea=s au)= tau/tÃªs e)sti/n.]]
 
-[Footnote 88: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 C.]
+[Footnote 88: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 66 C.]
 
 It is not necessary to trace the descending scale farther. It has
-been shown, against Philêbus--That though neither Intelligence
+been shown, against PhilÃªbus--That though neither Intelligence
 separately, nor Pleasure separately, is an adequate embodiment of
 Good, which requires both of them conjointly--yet Intelligence is
 more akin to Good, and stands nearer to it in nature, than
@@ -21702,27 +21671,27 @@ Pleasure.
 *  *  *  *  *
 
 Dionysius of Halikarnassus, while blaming the highflown metaphor
-and poetry of the Phædrus and other Platonic dialogues, speaks
+and poetry of the PhÃ¦drus and other Platonic dialogues, speaks
 with great admiration of Plato in his appropriate walk of the
-Sokratic dialogues; and selects specially the Philêbus, as his
+Sokratic dialogues; and selects specially the PhilÃªbus, as his
 example of these latter. I confess that this selection surprises
-me: for the Philêbus, while it explicitly renounces the peculiar
+me: for the PhilÃªbus, while it explicitly renounces the peculiar
 Sokratic vein, and becomes didactic--cannot be said to possess
 high merit as a didactic composition. It is neither clear, nor
 orderly, nor comparable in animation to the expository books of
 the Republic.[89] Every commentator of Plato, from Galen
-downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the Philêbus.
+downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the PhilÃªbus.
 
 [Footnote 89: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. ap. Demosth. p. 1025.
 
 Schleiermacher (Einleit. p. 136) admits the comparatively tiresome
-character and negligent execution of the Philêbus.
+character and negligent execution of the PhilÃªbus.
 
-Galen had composed a special treatise, [Greek: Peri\ tô=n e)n
-Philê/bô| metaba/seôn], now lost (Galen, De Libris Propriis, 13,
-vol. xix. 46, ed. Kühn).
+Galen had composed a special treatise, [Greek: Peri\ tÃ´=n e)n
+PhilÃª/bÃ´| metaba/seÃ´n], now lost (Galen, De Libris Propriis, 13,
+vol. xix. 46, ed. KÃ¼hn).
 
-We have the advantage of two recent editions of the Philêbus by
+We have the advantage of two recent editions of the PhilÃªbus by
 excellent English scholars, Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste; both are
 valuable, and that of Dr. Badham is distinguished by sagacious
 critical remarks and conjectures, but the obscurity of the
@@ -21744,9 +21713,9 @@ Idea, but only the quasi-unity of analogy between its diverse
 elements; which are attached by different threads to the same
 root, with an order of priority and posteriority.[91]
 
-[Footnote 90: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 C.]
+[Footnote 90: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 66 C.]
 
-[Footnote 91: Plato, Philêbus, p. 65 A. The passage is cited in
+[Footnote 91: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 65 A. The passage is cited in
 note 5, p. 363.
 
 About the difference, recognised partly by Plato but still more
@@ -21756,7 +21725,7 @@ mi/an tina\ phu/sin)], see my note towards the close of the Lysis,
 vol. ii. ch. xx.
 
 Aristotle says about Plato (Eth. Nikom. i. 6): [Greek: Oi( de\
-komi/santes tê\n do/xan tau/tên, ou)k e)poi/oun i)de/as e)n oi(=s
+komi/santes tÃª\n do/xan tau/tÃªn, ou)k e)poi/oun i)de/as e)n oi(=s
 to\ pro/teron kai\ to\ u(/steron e)/legon], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute
@@ -21780,7 +21749,7 @@ altogether dissimilar to each other, yet each having reference to
 some human want or desire: sometimes relieving or preventing pain,
 sometimes conferring pleasure. That which neither contributes to
 relieve any pain or want, nor to confer pleasure, is not Good at
-all."[92] In the Philêbus, Plato borrows in part from both of
+all."[92] In the PhilÃªbus, Plato borrows in part from both of
 these points of view, though inclining much more to the first than
 to the last. He produces a new eclectic doctrine, comprising
 something from both, and intended to harmonise both; announced as
@@ -21790,18 +21759,18 @@ Universe.[93]
 [Footnote 92: Diogen. Laert. ii. 106; Cicero, Academic. ii. 42;
 Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 3-5.]
 
-[Footnote 93: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 A. [Greek: e)n tau/tê|
-mathei=n peira=sthai, ti/ _pote e(\n te a)nthrô/pô| kai\ tô=|
-panti\ pe/phuken a)gatho/n_, kai\ ti/na i)de/an au)tê\n ei)=nai/
+[Footnote 93: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 64 A. [Greek: e)n tau/tÃª|
+mathei=n peira=sthai, ti/ _pote e(\n te a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´| kai\ tÃ´=|
+panti\ pe/phuken a)gatho/n_, kai\ ti/na i)de/an au)tÃª\n ei)=nai/
 pote manteute/on.]
 
-Schleiermacher observes about the Philêbus:--"Dieses also lag ihm
-(Plato) am Herzen, das Gute zu bestimmen nicht nur für das Leben
-des Menschen, sondern auch zumal für das ganze Gebiet des
+Schleiermacher observes about the PhilÃªbus:--"Dieses also lag ihm
+(Plato) am Herzen, das Gute zu bestimmen nicht nur fÃ¼r das Leben
+des Menschen, sondern auch zumal fÃ¼r das ganze Gebiet des
 gewordenen Seins," &c.
 
 The partial affinity between the Kosmos and the human soul is set
-forth in the Timæus, pp. 37-43-44.]
+forth in the TimÃ¦us, pp. 37-43-44.]
 
 [Side-note: Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with
 Ethics.]
@@ -21823,13 +21792,13 @@ and plants. The fault appears to me to lie in the very scheme of
 the dialogue. Attempts to discuss Ontology and Ethics in one and
 the same piece of reasoning, instead of elucidating both, only
 serve to darken both. Aristotle has already made a similar remark:
-and it is after reading the Philêbus that we feel most distinctly
+and it is after reading the PhilÃªbus that we feel most distinctly
 the value of his comments on Plato in the first book of the
 Nikomachean Ethics. Aristotle has discussed Ontology in the
 Metaphysica and in other treatises: but he proclaims explicitly
 the necessity of discussing Ethics upon their own principles:
 looking at what is good for man, and what is attainable by
-man.[94] We find in the Philêbus many just reflections upon
+man.[94] We find in the PhilÃªbus many just reflections upon
 pleasure and its varieties: but these might have been better and
 more clearly established, without any appeal to the cosmical
 dogmas. The parallelism between Man and the Kosmos is overstrained
@@ -21839,22 +21808,22 @@ collective commonwealth and the individual citizen.
 [Footnote 94: See especially Ethic. Nikom. i. 4, 1096-1097.
 Aristotle reasons there directly against the Platonic [Greek:
 i)de/a a)gathou=], but his arguments have full application to the
-exposition in the Philêbus. He distinguishes pointedly the ethical
+exposition in the PhilÃªbus. He distinguishes pointedly the ethical
 from the physical point of view. In his discussion of friendship,
 after touching upon various comparisons of the physiological
 poets, and of Plato himself repeating them, he says:--[Greek: ta\
-me\n ou)=n phusika\ tô=n a)porêma/tôn paraphei/sthô; ou) ga\r
-oi)kei=a tê=s parou/sês ske/pseôs; o(/sa d' e)sti\n a)nthrôpika/
-kai\ a)nê/kei ei)s ta\ ê)/thê kai\ ta\ pa/thê, tau=t'
-e)piskepsô/metha], Ethic. Nikom. viii. 1, 1155, b. 10.
+me\n ou)=n phusika\ tÃ´=n a)porÃªma/tÃ´n paraphei/sthÃ´; ou) ga\r
+oi)kei=a tÃª=s parou/sÃªs ske/pseÃ´s; o(/sa d' e)sti\n a)nthrÃ´pika/
+kai\ a)nÃª/kei ei)s ta\ Ãª)/thÃª kai\ ta\ pa/thÃª, tau=t'
+e)piskepsÃ´/metha], Ethic. Nikom. viii. 1, 1155, b. 10.
 
 The like contrast is brought out (though less clearly) in the
 Eudemian Ethics, viii. 1. 1235, a. 30.
 
 He animadverts upon Plato on the same ground in the Ethica Magna,
-i. 1, 1182, a. 23-30. [Greek: u(pe\r ga\r tô=n o)/ntôn kai\
-a)lêthei/as le/gonta, ou)k e)/dei u(pe\r a)retê=s phra/zein;
-ou)de\n ga\r tou/tô| ka)kei/nô| koino/n.]]
+i. 1, 1182, a. 23-30. [Greek: u(pe\r ga\r tÃ´=n o)/ntÃ´n kai\
+a)lÃªthei/as le/gonta, ou)k e)/dei u(pe\r a)retÃª=s phra/zein;
+ou)de\n ga\r tou/tÃ´| ka)kei/nÃ´| koino/n.]]
 
 [Side-note: Comparison of Man to the Kosmos, which has reason, but
 no emotion, is unnecessary and confusing.]
@@ -21883,24 +21852,24 @@ certain abstract constituent _principia_--(the Finient or
 Determinant--and the Infinite or Indeterminate)--this too seems to
 have been borrowed by Plato from Philolaus.[97]
 
-[Footnote 95: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 20-30.]
+[Footnote 95: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 20-30.]
 
 [Footnote 96: Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 11, 27: De Senectute, 21,
 78; Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 7-8; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 6, 18;
-Plato, Timæus, pp. 37-38, &c.
+Plato, TimÃ¦us, pp. 37-38, &c.
 
 In the Xenophontic dialogue here referred to, Sokrates inverts the
 premiss and the conclusion: he infers that Mind and Reason govern
 the Kosmos, because the mind and reason of man govern the body of
 man.]
 
-[Footnote 97: See Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Philêb. pp. 41-42.]
+[Footnote 97: See Stallbaum, Prolegg. in PhilÃªb. pp. 41-42.]
 
 [Side-note: Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their
 doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic
 classification.]
 
-But here in the Philêbus, that analysis appears expanded into a
+But here in the PhilÃªbus, that analysis appears expanded into a
 larger scheme going beyond Philolaus or the Pythagoreans: _viz._
 the recognition of a graduated scale of limits, or a definite
 number of species and sub-species--intermediate between the One or
@@ -21921,9 +21890,9 @@ important in the history of science. He lays as much stress upon
 the searching out of the intermediate species, as Bacon does upon
 the Axiomata Media of scientific enquiry.[99]
 
-[Footnote 98: Ueberweg (Æchtheit und Zeitf. Platon. Schriften, pp.
-204-207) considers the Philêbus, as well as the Sophistês and
-Timæus, to be compositions of Plato's very late age--partly on the
+[Footnote 98: Ueberweg (Ã†chtheit und Zeitf. Platon. Schriften, pp.
+204-207) considers the PhilÃªbus, as well as the SophistÃªs and
+TimÃ¦us, to be compositions of Plato's very late age--partly on the
 ground of their didactic and expository style, the dialogue
 serving only as form to the exponent Sokrates--partly because he
 thinks that the nearest approach is made in them to that manner of
@@ -21931,18 +21900,18 @@ conceiving the doctrine of Ideas which Aristotle ascribes to Plato
 in his old age--that is, the two [Greek: stoichei=a] or factors of
 the Ideas. 1. [Greek: To\ e(\n]. 2. [Greek: To\ me/ga kai\
 mikro/n]. This last argument seems to me far-fetched. I see no
-real and sensible approach in the Philêbus to this Platonic
+real and sensible approach in the PhilÃªbus to this Platonic
 doctrine of the [Greek: stoichei=a] of the Ideas: at least, the
 approach is so vague, that one can hardly make it a basis of
 reasoning. But the didactic tone is undoubtedly a characteristic
-of the Philêbus, and seems to indicate that the dialogue was
+of the PhilÃªbus, and seems to indicate that the dialogue was
 composed after Plato had been so long established in his school,
 as to have acquired a pedagogic ostentation.]
 
 [Footnote 99: Bacon, Augment. Scient. v. 2. Nov. Organ. Aph. 105.
-"At Plato non semel innuit particularia infinita esse maximé:
+"At Plato non semel innuit particularia infinita esse maximÃ©:
 rursus generalia minus certa documenta exhibere. Medullam igitur
-scientiarum, quâ artifex ab imperito distinguitur, in mediis
+scientiarum, quÃ¢ artifex ab imperito distinguitur, in mediis
 propositionibus consistere, quas per singulas scientias tradidit
 et docuit experientia."]
 
@@ -21953,11 +21922,11 @@ Though there are several other passages of the Platonic dialogues
 in which the method of logical division is inculcated, there is
 none (I think) in which it is prescribed so formally, or
 enunciated with such comprehensive generality, as this before us
-in the Philêbus. Yet the method, after being emphatically
+in the PhilÃªbus. Yet the method, after being emphatically
 announced, is but feebly and partially applied, in the distinction
 of different species, both of pleasure and of cognition.[100] The
 announcement would come more suitably, as a preface to the
-Sophistês and Politikus: wherein the process is applied to given
+SophistÃªs and Politikus: wherein the process is applied to given
 subjects in great detail, and at a length which some critics
 consider excessive: and wherein moreover the particular enquiry is
 expressly proclaimed as intended to teach as well as to exemplify
@@ -21967,17 +21936,17 @@ the general method.[101]
 of pleasure is intimated, yet seemingly not considered as
 indispensable, by Sokrates; and it is executed certainly in a very
 unsystematic and perfunctory manner, compared with what we read in
-the Sophistês and Politikus. (Philêbus, pp. 19 B, 20 C, 32 B-C.)
+the SophistÃªs and Politikus. (PhilÃªbus, pp. 19 B, 20 C, 32 B-C.)
 
 Mr. Poste, in his note on p. 55 A, expresses surprise at this
 point; and notices it as one among other grounds for suspecting
-that the Philêbus is a composition of two distinct fragments,
+that the PhilÃªbus is a composition of two distinct fragments,
 rather carelessly soldered together:--"Again after Division and
 Generalization have been propounded as the only satisfactory
 method, it is somewhat strange that both the original problems are
 solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to
 classification. All this becomes intelligible if we assume the
-Philêbus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two
+PhilÃªbus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two
 originally separate dialogues."
 
 Acknowledging the want of coherence in the dialogue, I have
@@ -21986,28 +21955,28 @@ out of which it was compounded. Schleiermacher (Einleit. pp.
 136-137) also points out the negligent execution and heavy march of
 the dialogue.]
 
-[Footnote 101: See Politikus, pp. 285-286; Phædrus, p. 265;
+[Footnote 101: See Politikus, pp. 285-286; PhÃ¦drus, p. 265;
 Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 12.
 
 I have already observed that Socher (Ueber Platon. pp. 260-270)
 and Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Politik. pp. 52-54-65-67, &c.) agree in
 condemning the extreme minuteness, the tiresome monotony, the
 useless and petty comparisons, which Plato brings together in the
-multiplied bifurcate divisions of the Sophistês and Politikus.
+multiplied bifurcate divisions of the SophistÃªs and Politikus.
 Socher adduces this as one among his reasons for rejecting the
 dialogue as spurious.]
 
-[Side-note: What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in
+[Side-note: What is the Good? Discussed both in PhilÃªbus and in
 Republic. Comparison.]
 
-The same question as that which is here discussed in the Philêbus,
+The same question as that which is here discussed in the PhilÃªbus,
 is also started in the sixth book of the Republic. It is worth
 while to compare the different handling, here and there. "Whatever
 else we possess (says Sokrates in the Republic), and whatever else
 we may know is of no value, unless we also possess and know Good.
 In the opinion of most persons, Pleasure is The Good: in the
 opinion of accomplished and philosophical men, intelligence
-([Greek: phro/nêsis]) is the Good. But when we ask Intelligence,
+([Greek: phro/nÃªsis]) is the Good. But when we ask Intelligence,
 _of what_? these philosophers cannot inform us: they end by
 telling us, ridiculously enough, Intelligence of _The Good_. Thus,
 while blaming us for not knowing what The Good is, they make an
@@ -22020,12 +21989,12 @@ to be the same. It is plain therefore that there are many and
 grave disputes what The Good is."[102]
 
 [Footnote 102: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 B-C. [Greek: oi( tou=to
-ê(gu/menoi ou)k e)/chousi dei=xai ê(/ _tis phro/nêsis, a)ll'_
-a)nagka/zontai teleutô=ntes tê\n tou= a)gathou= pha/nai . . .
+Ãª(gu/menoi ou)k e)/chousi dei=xai Ãª(/ _tis phro/nÃªsis, a)ll'_
+a)nagka/zontai teleutÃ´=ntes tÃª\n tou= a)gathou= pha/nai . . .
 o)neidi/zonte/s ge o(/ti ou)k i)/smen to\ a)gatho/n, le/gousi
-pa/lin ô(s ei)do/si; phro/nêsin ga\r au)to/ phasin ei)=nai
-a)gathou=, ô(s au)= sunie/ntôn ê(mô=n o(/, ti le/gousin, e)peida\n
-to\ tou= a)gathou= phthe/gxôntai o)/noma.]
+pa/lin Ã´(s ei)do/si; phro/nÃªsin ga\r au)to/ phasin ei)=nai
+a)gathou=, Ã´(s au)= sunie/ntÃ´n Ãª(mÃ´=n o(/, ti le/gousin, e)peida\n
+to\ tou= a)gathou= phthe/gxÃ´ntai o)/noma.]
 
 In the Symposion, there is a like tenor of questions about Eros or
 Love. Love must be Love of something: the term is relative. You
@@ -22034,9 +22003,9 @@ C, 204 C.
 
 When we read the objection here advanced by Plato (in the above
 passage of the Republic) as conclusive against the appeal to
-[Greek: phro/nêsis] absolutely (without specifying [Greek:
-phro/nêsis] _of what_), we are surprised to see that it is not
-even mentioned in the Philêbus.]
+[Greek: phro/nÃªsis] absolutely (without specifying [Greek:
+phro/nÃªsis] _of what_), we are surprised to see that it is not
+even mentioned in the PhilÃªbus.]
 
 [Side-note: Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it
 were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself
@@ -22046,7 +22015,7 @@ professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently.]
 In this passage of the Republic Plato points out that Intelligence
 cannot be understood, except as determined by or referring to some
 Object or End: and that those who tendered Intelligence _per se_
-for an explanation of The Good (as Sokrates does in the Philêbus),
+for an explanation of The Good (as Sokrates does in the PhilÃªbus),
 assumed as known the very point in dispute which they professed to
 explain. This is an important remark in regard to ethical
 discussions: and it were to be wished that Plato had himself
@@ -22079,17 +22048,17 @@ but clear and well-understood by every one.
 
 [Footnote 103: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 E.
 
-Compare also Republic, vii. p. 533 C. [Greek: ô)=| ga\r a)rchê\
-me\n o(\ mê\ oi)=de, teleutê\ de\ kai\ ta\ metaxu\ e)x ou)= mê\
-oi)=de sumpe/plektai, ti/s mêchanê\ tê\n toiau=tên o(mologi/an
-pote\ e)pistê/mên gi/gnesthai?]]
+Compare also Republic, vii. p. 533 C. [Greek: Ã´)=| ga\r a)rchÃª\
+me\n o(\ mÃª\ oi)=de, teleutÃª\ de\ kai\ ta\ metaxu\ e)x ou)= mÃª\
+oi)=de sumpe/plektai, ti/s mÃªchanÃª\ tÃª\n toiau=tÃªn o(mologi/an
+pote\ e)pistÃª/mÃªn gi/gnesthai?]]
 
 [Footnote 104: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 356-7.]
 
 [Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357 B.]
 
 [Side-note: Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined:
-but the answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests.]
+but the answer in the PhilÃªbus does not satisfy those tests.]
 
 In the present dialogue, Plato lays down certain characteristic
 marks whereby The Supreme Good may be known. These marks are
@@ -22119,12 +22088,12 @@ of all other persons besides. It may be Good, in reference to the
 philosophers themselves: but it will fail to answer those larger
 conditions which Plato has just laid down.
 
-[Footnote 106: Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 E.]
+[Footnote 106: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 11 E.]
 
-[Footnote 107: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 20 D-E, 61 C, 67 A. [Greek:
+[Footnote 107: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 20 D-E, 61 C, 67 A. [Greek:
 au)tarkei/a], &c.
 
-Sydenham, Translation of Philêbus, note, p. 48, observes--"Whether
+Sydenham, Translation of PhilÃªbus, note, p. 48, observes--"Whether
 Happiness be to be found in Speculative Wisdom or in Pleasure, or
 in some other possession or enjoyment, it can be seated nowhere
 but in the soul. For Happiness has no existence anywhere but where
@@ -22133,10 +22102,10 @@ soul is sensible of pain and pleasure, than it is, that only the
 soul is capable of knowledge, and of thinking either foolishly or
 wisely."]
 
-[Footnote 108: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 22 B, 61 A.]
+[Footnote 108: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 22 B, 61 A.]
 
-[Footnote 109: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 61 E, 64 C. [Greek: to\n
-a)gapêto/taton bi/on pa=si prosphilê=].
+[Footnote 109: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 61 E, 64 C. [Greek: to\n
+a)gapÃªto/taton bi/on pa=si prosphilÃª=].
 
 Aristotle, Ethic. Nikomach. i. init. [Greek: ta)gatho/n, ou)=
 pa/nta e)phi/etai].
@@ -22184,9 +22153,9 @@ must of course understand that the pleasures of intelligence will
 disappear along with intelligence itself,[111] and that the pains
 of conscious want of intelligence will be felt instead of them.
 
-[Footnote 110: Plato, Philêbus, p. 12 D.]
+[Footnote 110: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 12 D.]
 
-[Footnote 111: Plato, Philêbus, p. 21 C.]
+[Footnote 111: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 21 C.]
 
 [Side-note: Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly
 compared--Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be
@@ -22214,7 +22183,7 @@ condition to the attainment of pleasure in its largest sense--that
 is, including avoidance or alleviation of pain or suffering: if
 therefore you choose to understand pleasure in a narrower sense,
 not including therein avoidance of pain (as Plato understands it
-in this portion of the Philêbus), the comprehensive end to which
+in this portion of the PhilÃªbus), the comprehensive end to which
 Intelligence corresponds may be compared with Pleasure and
 declared more valuable--but Intelligence itself cannot with
 propriety be so compared. Such a comparison can only be properly
@@ -22232,20 +22201,20 @@ in a previous note); also Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 3, 1095, b.
 
 Respecting the value of Intelligence or Cognition, when the end
 towards which it is to be exercised is undetermined, see the
-dialogue between Sokrates and Kleinias--Plato, Euthydêm. pp.
+dialogue between Sokrates and Kleinias--Plato, EuthydÃªm. pp.
 289-292 B-E.
 
 Aristotle, in the Nikomach. Ethic. (i. 4, 1096, b. 10), makes a
-distinction between--1. [Greek: ta\ kath' au(ta\ diôko/mena kai\
-a)gapô/mena]--2. [Greek: ta\ poiêtika\ tou/tôn ê)\ phulaktika\ ê)\
-tô=n e)nanti/ôn kôlutika/]: and Plato himself makes the same
+distinction between--1. [Greek: ta\ kath' au(ta\ diÃ´ko/mena kai\
+a)gapÃ´/mena]--2. [Greek: ta\ poiÃªtika\ tou/tÃ´n Ãª)\ phulaktika\ Ãª)\
+tÃ´=n e)nanti/Ã´n kÃ´lutika/]: and Plato himself makes the same
 distinction at the beginning of the second book of the Republic.
 But though it is convenient to draw attention to this distinction,
 for the clear understanding of the subject, you cannot ask with
 propriety which of the two lots is most valuable. The value of the
 two is equal: the one cannot be had without the other.]
 
-[Footnote 113: Plato, Philêb. p. 12 D.]
+[Footnote 113: Plato, PhilÃªb. p. 12 D.]
 
 [Side-note: The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of
 pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the
@@ -22282,17 +22251,17 @@ agent over the human mind.
 
 [Footnote 114: Eudoxus is cited by Aristotle (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2)
 as the great champion of the Hedonistic theory. He is
-characterised by Aristotle as [Greek: diaphero/ntôs sô/phrôn].]
+characterised by Aristotle as [Greek: diaphero/ntÃ´s sÃ´/phrÃ´n].]
 
 [Footnote 115: The implication of the intelligent and emotional is
 well stated by Aristotle (Eth. Nikom. x. 8, 1178, a. 16). [Greek:
-sune/zeuktai de\ kai\ ê( phro/nêsis tê=| tou= ê)/thous a)retê=|,
-kai\ au)/tê tê=| phronê/sei, ei)/per ai( me\n tê=s phronê/seôs
-a)rchai\ kata\ ta\s ê)thika/s ei)sin a)reta/s, to\ d' o)rtho\n
-tô=n ê=thikô=n kata\ tê\n phro/nêsin. sunêrtême/nai d' au)=tai
+sune/zeuktai de\ kai\ Ãª( phro/nÃªsis tÃª=| tou= Ãª)/thous a)retÃª=|,
+kai\ au)/tÃª tÃª=| phronÃª/sei, ei)/per ai( me\n tÃª=s phronÃª/seÃ´s
+a)rchai\ kata\ ta\s Ãª)thika/s ei)sin a)reta/s, to\ d' o)rtho\n
+tÃ´=n Ãª=thikÃ´=n kata\ tÃª\n phro/nÃªsin. sunÃªrtÃªme/nai d' au)=tai
 kai\ toi=s pa/thesi peri\ to\ su/ntheton a)\n ei)=en; ai( de\ tou=
-sunthe/tou a)retai\ a)nthrôpikai/. kai\ o( bi/os dê\ o( kat'
-au)ta\s kai\ ê( eu)daimoni/a. ê( de\ tou= nou= kechôrisme/nê], &c.
+sunthe/tou a)retai\ a)nthrÃ´pikai/. kai\ o( bi/os dÃª\ o( kat'
+au)ta\s kai\ Ãª( eu)daimoni/a. Ãª( de\ tou= nou= kechÃ´risme/nÃª], &c.
 Compare also the first two or three sentences of the tenth Book of
 Eth. Nik.]
 
@@ -22305,7 +22274,7 @@ properly treated as distinct phenomena requiring to be explained
 separately, though perpetually co-existent and interfering with
 each other. But in an ethical discourse about Summum Bonum, the
 antithesis between Pleasure and Intelligence, on which the
-Philêbus turns, is from the outset illogical. What gives to it an
+PhilÃªbus turns, is from the outset illogical. What gives to it an
 apparent plausibility, is, That the exercise of Intelligence has
 pleasures and pains of its own, and includes therefore in itself a
 part of the End, besides being the constant and indispensable
@@ -22327,21 +22296,21 @@ Epikurus himself.
 
 [Footnote 116: See Republic, ix. pp. 581-582, where he compares
 the pleasures of the three different lives. 1. [Greek: O(
-philo/sophos] or [Greek: philomathê/s]. 2. [Greek: O(
-philu/timos]. 3. [Greek: O( philokerdê/s].
+philo/sophos] or [Greek: philomathÃª/s]. 2. [Greek: O(
+philu/timos]. 3. [Greek: O( philokerdÃª/s].
 
-Again in the Phædon, he tells us that we are not to weigh
+Again in the PhÃ¦don, he tells us that we are not to weigh
 pleasures against pleasures, or pains against pains, but all of
-them against [Greek: phro/nêsis] or Intelligence (p. 69 A-B). This
+them against [Greek: phro/nÃªsis] or Intelligence (p. 69 A-B). This
 appears distinctly to contradict what Sokrates affirms in the
-Protagoras. But when we turn to another passage of the Phædon (p.
+Protagoras. But when we turn to another passage of the PhÃ¦don (p.
 114 E), we find Sokrates recognising a class of pleasures attached
 to the exercise of Intelligence, and declaring them to be more
 valuable than the pleasures of sense, or any others. This is a
 very different proposition: but in both passages Plato had
 probably the same comparison in his mind.
 
-Sydenham, in a note to his translation of the Philêbus (pp.
+Sydenham, in a note to his translation of the PhilÃªbus (pp.
 42-43), observes--"if Protarchus, when he took on himself to be an
 advocate for pleasure, had included, in his meaning of the word,
 all such pleasures as are purely mental, his opinion, fairly and
@@ -22369,7 +22338,7 @@ neither by the Sun, nor by the warmth which his rays afforded
 them, but by the joy or pleasure which they felt from the return
 of the Sun and warmth."]
 
-[Footnote 117: Plato, in Philêbus, p. 63 C-D, denounces and
+[Footnote 117: Plato, in PhilÃªbus, p. 63 C-D, denounces and
 discards the vehement pleasures because they disturb the right
 exercise of Reason and Intelligence. Aristotle, after alluding to
 this doctrine, presents the same fact under a different point of
@@ -22388,18 +22357,18 @@ e)nergei=ai]. Study often hurts health or good management of
 property; but if a man has pleasure in study, he will perform that
 work with better fruit and result.
 
-This is a juster view of [Greek: ê(donê\] than what we read in the
-Philêbus. The illogical antithesis of Pleasure _in genere_,
+This is a juster view of [Greek: Ãª(donÃª\] than what we read in the
+PhilÃªbus. The illogical antithesis of Pleasure _in genere_,
 against Intelligence, finds no countenance from Aristotle.
 
 See Ethic. Nikom. vii. 13, 1153, a. 20; x. 5, p. 1175; also Ethic.
 Magna, ii. p. 1206, a. 3.]
 
-[Side-note: Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between pleasure and
+[Side-note: Marked antithesis in the PhilÃªbus between pleasure and
 avoidance of pain.]
 
 Another remark may be made on the way in which Plato argues the
-question in the Philêbus against the Hedonists. He draws a marked
+question in the PhilÃªbus against the Hedonists. He draws a marked
 line of separation between Pleasure--and avoidance, relief, or
 mitigation, of Pain. He does not merely distinguish the two, but
 sets them in opposing antithesis. Wherever there is pain to be
@@ -22415,7 +22384,7 @@ accompanying pains. His catalogue of pleasures is thus reduced to
 a chosen few, and these too enjoyable only by a chosen few among
 mankind.
 
-[Footnote 118: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 B.]
+[Footnote 118: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 44 B.]
 
 [Side-note: The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction--They
 included both in their acknowledged End.]
@@ -22424,16 +22393,16 @@ Now this very restricted sense of the word Pleasure is peculiar to
 Plato, and peculiar even to some of the Platonic dialogues. Those
 who affirmed Pleasure to be the Good, did not understand the word
 in the same restricted sense. When Sokrates in the Protagoras
-affirms, and when Sokrates in the Philêbus denies, that Pleasure
+affirms, and when Sokrates in the PhilÃªbus denies, that Pleasure
 is identical with Good,--the affirmation and the denial do not
 bear upon the same substantial meaning.[119]
 
 [Footnote 119: Among the arguments employed by Sokrates in the
-Philêbus to disprove the identity between [Greek: ê(donê\] and
-[Greek: a)gatho/n], one is, that [Greek: ê(donê\] is a [Greek:
+PhilÃªbus to disprove the identity between [Greek: Ãª(donÃª\] and
+[Greek: a)gatho/n], one is, that [Greek: Ãª(donÃª\] is a [Greek:
 ge/nesis], and is therefore essentially a process of imperfection
 or transition into some ulterior [Greek: ou)si/a], for the sake of
-which alone it existed (Philêbus, pp. 53-55); whereas Good is
+which alone it existed (PhilÃªbus, pp. 53-55); whereas Good is
 essentially an [Greek: ou)si/a]--perfect, complete,
 all-sufficient--and must not be confounded with the process whereby it
 is brought about. He illustrates this by telling us that the
@@ -22468,14 +22437,14 @@ which he throws out against Aristippus.
 
 The reasoning of Aristotle (E. N. x. 3-4; compare Eth. Magn. ii.
 1204-1205) against the doctrine, that pleasure is [Greek:
-ge/nesis] or [Greek: ki/nêsis], is drawn from a different point of
+ge/nesis] or [Greek: ki/nÃªsis], is drawn from a different point of
 view, and is quite as unfavourable to the opinions of Plato as to
 those of Aristippus. His language however in the Rhetoric is
 somewhat different (i. p. 1370, b. 33).
 
 Aristippus is said to have defined pleasure as [Greek: lei/a
-ki/nêsis], and pain as [Greek: trachei=a ki/nêsis] (Diog. L. ii.
-86-89). The word [Greek: ki/nêsis] is so vague, that one can
+ki/nÃªsis], and pain as [Greek: trachei=a ki/nÃªsis] (Diog. L. ii.
+86-89). The word [Greek: ki/nÃªsis] is so vague, that one can
 hardly say what it means, without some words of context: but I
 doubt whether he meant anything more than "_a marked change of
 consciousness_". The word [Greek: ge/nesis] is also very obscure:
@@ -22519,11 +22488,11 @@ do not avail against the Hedonistic theory, as explained either by
 Plato himself (Protagoras) or by any theorists of the Platonic
 century.
 
-[Footnote 120: Plato, Philêbus, p. 47 B.]
+[Footnote 120: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 47 B.]
 
 [Footnote 121: I have already remarked that Eudoxus is
-characterised by Aristotle as being [Greek: diaphero/ntôs
-sô/phrôn] (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2). The strong interest which he felt
+characterised by Aristotle as being [Greek: diaphero/ntÃ´s
+sÃ´/phrÃ´n] (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2). The strong interest which he felt
 in scientific pursuits is marked by a story in Plutarch (Non Posse
 Suaviter Vivi; see Epicur. p. 1094 A).]
 
@@ -22557,7 +22526,7 @@ great charms of life (1097 F-1098 E-1092 E-1093-1094). Plutarch
 attacks Epikurus upon grounds really Hedonistic.]
 
 [Side-note: Different points of view worked out by Plato in
-different dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus--True and False
+different dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, PhilÃªbus--True and False
 Pleasures.]
 
 We find Plato in his various dialogues working out different
@@ -22572,7 +22541,7 @@ Evil, resolve themselves into elements generically the same as
 those of the Immediate and Transient--Pleasure and Pain: so that
 all which we require is, a calculating Intelligence to assess and
 balance correctly the pleasures and pains in every given case. In
-the Philêbus, Sokrates takes a third line, distinct from both the
+the PhilÃªbus, Sokrates takes a third line, distinct from both the
 other two dialogues: he insists upon a new antithesis, between
 True Pleasures--and False Pleasures. If a Pleasure be associated
 with any proportion, however small, of Pain or Uneasiness--or with
@@ -22585,10 +22554,10 @@ The attainment of Good--the object of the practical aspirations--is
 presented as a secondary appendage of the attainment of Truth--the
 object of the speculative or intellectual energies.
 
-[Side-note: Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about
+[Side-note: Opposition between the Gorgias and PhilÃªbus, about
 Gorgias and Rhetoric.]
 
-How much the Philêbus differs in its point of view from the
+How much the PhilÃªbus differs in its point of view from the
 Gorgias,[124] is indicated by Plato himself in a remarkable
 passage. "I have often heard Gorgias affirm" (says Protarchus)
 "that among all arts, the art of persuasion stands greatly
@@ -22616,19 +22585,19 @@ says) go together but good and evil cannot go together: therefore
 pleasure cannot be good, pain cannot be evil (Gorgias, pp.
 496-497). But he distinguishes pleasures into the good and the bad;
 not into the true and the false, as they are distinguished in the
-Philêbus and the Republic (ix. pp. 583-585).]
-
-[Footnote 125: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B-D-E. [Greek: Ou) tou=to
-e(/gôge e)zê/toun pô, ti/s te/chnê ê)\ ti/s e)pistê/mê pasô=n
-diaphe/rei tô=| megi/stê kai\ a)ri/stê kai\ plei=sta ô)phelou=sa
-ê(ma=s, a)lla\ ti/s pote to\ saphe\s kai\ ta)kribe\s kai\ to\
-a)lêthe/staton e)piskopei=, ka)\n ei) smikra\ kai\ smikra\
-o)ni/nasa . . . A)ll' o(/ra; ou)de\ ga\r a)pechthê/sei Gorgi/a|,
-tê=| me\n e)kei/nou u(pere/chein te/chnê| didou\s pro\s chrei/an
-toi=s a)nthrô/pois, pro\s a)kribei/an de\ ê)=| ei)=pon e)gô\ nu=n
-pragmatei/a| . . . mê/t' ei)/s tinas ô)phelei/as e)pistêmô=n
-ble/psantes mê/te tina\s eu)dokimi/as, a)ll' ei)/ tis pe/phuke
-tê=s psuchê=s ê(mô=n du/namis e)ra=|n te tou= a)lêthou=s kai\
+PhilÃªbus and the Republic (ix. pp. 583-585).]
+
+[Footnote 125: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 58 B-D-E. [Greek: Ou) tou=to
+e(/gÃ´ge e)zÃª/toun pÃ´, ti/s te/chnÃª Ãª)\ ti/s e)pistÃª/mÃª pasÃ´=n
+diaphe/rei tÃ´=| megi/stÃª kai\ a)ri/stÃª kai\ plei=sta Ã´)phelou=sa
+Ãª(ma=s, a)lla\ ti/s pote to\ saphe\s kai\ ta)kribe\s kai\ to\
+a)lÃªthe/staton e)piskopei=, ka)\n ei) smikra\ kai\ smikra\
+o)ni/nasa . . . A)ll' o(/ra; ou)de\ ga\r a)pechthÃª/sei Gorgi/a|,
+tÃª=| me\n e)kei/nou u(pere/chein te/chnÃª| didou\s pro\s chrei/an
+toi=s a)nthrÃ´/pois, pro\s a)kribei/an de\ Ãª)=| ei)=pon e)gÃ´\ nu=n
+pragmatei/a| . . . mÃª/t' ei)/s tinas Ã´)phelei/as e)pistÃªmÃ´=n
+ble/psantes mÃª/te tina\s eu)dokimi/as, a)ll' ei)/ tis pe/phuke
+tÃª=s psuchÃª=s Ãª(mÃ´=n du/namis e)ra=|n te tou= a)lÃªthou=s kai\
 pa/nta e(/neka tou/tou pra/ttein.]
 
 Here, as elsewhere, I translate the substance of the passage,
@@ -22647,7 +22616,7 @@ advances: but while Sokrates here admits it, in the Gorgias he
 repudiates it with emphasis, and even with contumely: ranking
 rhetoric among those employments which minister only to present
 pleasure, but which are neither intended to yield, nor ever do
-yield, any profitable result. Here in the Philêbus, the antithesis
+yield, any profitable result. Here in the PhilÃªbus, the antithesis
 between immediate pleasure and distant profit is scarcely noticed.
 Sokrates resigns to Gorgias and to others of the like stamp, a
 superiority not merely in the art of flattering and tricking the
@@ -22662,13 +22631,13 @@ happiness on mankind generally, and claims for it only the pure
 delight of satisfying the truth-seeking aspirations. Now these
 aspirations have little force except in a few chosen minds; in the
 bulk of mankind the love of truth is feeble, and the active search
-for truth almost unknown. We thus see that in the Philêbus it is
+for truth almost unknown. We thus see that in the PhilÃªbus it is
 the speculative few who are present to the imagination of Plato,
 more than the ordinary working, suffering, enjoying Many.
 
 [Footnote 126: Plato, Republ. v. 473 D.]
 
-[Side-note: Peculiarity of the Philêbus--Plato applies the same
+[Side-note: Peculiarity of the PhilÃªbus--Plato applies the same
 principle of classification--true and false--to Cognitions and
 Pleasures.]
 
@@ -22677,7 +22646,7 @@ Metaphysics or First Philosophy to the reader, by affirming that,
 though other studies are more useful or more necessary to man,
 none is equal to it in respect of truth and exactness,[127]
 because it teaches us to understand First Causes and Principles.
-The like pretension is put forward by Plato in the Philêbus[128]
+The like pretension is put forward by Plato in the PhilÃªbus[128]
 on behalf of dialectic; which he designates as the science of all
 real, permanent, unchangeable, Entia. Taking Dialectic as the
 maximum or Verissimum, Plato classifies other sciences or
@@ -22687,7 +22656,7 @@ and less of conjecture. Sciences or cognitions are thus classified
 according as they are more or less true and pure. But because this
 principle of classification is fairly applicable to cognitions,
 Plato conceives that it may be made applicable to Pleasures also.
-One characteristic feature of the Philêbus is the attempt to apply
+One characteristic feature of the PhilÃªbus is the attempt to apply
 the predicates, _true_ or _false_, to pleasures and pains, as they
 are applicable to cognitions or opinions: an attempt against which
 Protarchus is made to protest, and which Sokrates altogether fails
@@ -22696,27 +22665,27 @@ long and diversified.
 
 [Footnote 127: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. p. 983, a. 25, b. 10.]
 
-[Footnote 128: Plato, Philêb. pp. 57-58. Compare Republic, vii.
+[Footnote 128: Plato, PhilÃªb. pp. 57-58. Compare Republic, vii.
 pp. 531-532.]
 
-[Footnote 129: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 36 C. 38 A.
+[Footnote 129: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 36 C. 38 A.
 
 The various arguments, intended to prove this conclusion, are
 continued from p. 36 to p. 51. The same doctrine is advocated by
 Sokrates in the Republic, ix. pp. 583-584.
 
 The doctrine is briefly stated by the Platonist Nemesius, De
-Natur. Hominis, p. 223. [Greek: kai\ ga\r kata\ Pla/tôna tô=n
-ê(donô=n ai( me/n ei)si pseudei=s, ai( de\ a)lêthei=s. Pseudei=s
-me/n, o(/sai met' ai)sthê/seôs gi/gnontai kai\ do/xês ou)k
-a)lêthou=s, kai\ lu/pas e)/chousi sumpeplegme/nas; a)lêthei=s de/,
-o(/sai tê=s psuchê=s ei)si mo/nês au)tê=s kath' e(autê\n met'
-e)pistê/mês kai\ nou= kai\ phronê/seôs, katharai\ kai\
-a)nepi/miktoi lu/pês, ai)=s ou)demi/a meta/noia parakolouthei=
+Natur. Hominis, p. 223. [Greek: kai\ ga\r kata\ Pla/tÃ´na tÃ´=n
+Ãª(donÃ´=n ai( me/n ei)si pseudei=s, ai( de\ a)lÃªthei=s. Pseudei=s
+me/n, o(/sai met' ai)sthÃª/seÃ´s gi/gnontai kai\ do/xÃªs ou)k
+a)lÃªthou=s, kai\ lu/pas e)/chousi sumpeplegme/nas; a)lÃªthei=s de/,
+o(/sai tÃª=s psuchÃª=s ei)si mo/nÃªs au)tÃª=s kath' e(autÃª\n met'
+e)pistÃª/mÃªs kai\ nou= kai\ phronÃª/seÃ´s, katharai\ kai\
+a)nepi/miktoi lu/pÃªs, ai)=s ou)demi/a meta/noia parakolouthei=
 pote/.]
 
 A brief but clear abstract of the argument will be found in Dr.
-Badham's Preface to the Philêbus (pp. viii.-xi.). Compare also
+Badham's Preface to the PhilÃªbus (pp. viii.-xi.). Compare also
 Stallbaum's Prolegg. ch. v. p. 50, seq.]
 
 [Side-note: Distinction of true and false--not applicable to
@@ -22756,11 +22725,11 @@ be properly called (as Plato calls them) "apparent pleasures which
 have no reality".[132]
 
 [Footnote 130: This is what Aristotle means when he says:--[Greek:
-tê=s ê(donê=s d' e)n o(tô|ou=n chro/nô| te/leion to\ ei)=dos . . .
-tô=n o(/lôn ti kai\ telei/ôn ê( ê(donê/] (Eth. Nik. x. 3, 1174, b.
+tÃª=s Ãª(donÃª=s d' e)n o(tÃ´|ou=n chro/nÃ´| te/leion to\ ei)=dos . . .
+tÃ´=n o(/lÃ´n ti kai\ telei/Ã´n Ãª( Ãª(donÃª/] (Eth. Nik. x. 3, 1174, b.
 4).]
 
-[Footnote 131: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 43-44; Republic, ix. p. 583.
+[Footnote 131: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 43-44; Republic, ix. p. 583.
 
 I copy the following passage from Professor Bain's work on "The
 Emotions and the Will," the fullest and most philosophical account
@@ -22827,15 +22796,15 @@ hindered. This doctrine of spontaneous activity, employed by Mr.
 Bain successfully to explain a large variety of mental phenomena,
 is an important and valuable extension of that which Aristotle
 lays down in the Ethics, that pleasure is an accessory or adjunct
-of [Greek: e)ne/rgeia a)nempo/distos (e)ne/rgeia tê=s kata\
-phu/sin e(/xeôs] Eth. N. vii. 13, 1153, a. 15), without any view
+of [Greek: e)ne/rgeia a)nempo/distos (e)ne/rgeia tÃª=s kata\
+phu/sin e(/xeÃ´s] Eth. N. vii. 13, 1153, a. 15), without any view
 to obtain any separate extraneous pleasure or to relieve any
 separate extraneous pain ([Greek: kath' au(ta\s d' ei)si\n
-ai(retai/, a)ph' ô)=n mêde\n e)pizêtei=tai para\ tê\n
+ai(retai/, a)ph' Ã´)=n mÃªde\n e)pizÃªtei=tai para\ tÃª\n
 e)ne/rgeian], E. N. x. 6, 1176, b. 6).]
 
-[Footnote 132: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 A. [Greek: pro\s to\ tina\s
-ê(dona\s ei)=nai dokou/sas, ou)/sas d' ou)damô=s], &c. [Greek: to\
+[Footnote 132: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 51 A. [Greek: pro\s to\ tina\s
+Ãª(dona\s ei)=nai dokou/sas, ou)/sas d' ou)damÃ´=s], &c. [Greek: to\
 phaino/menon a)ll' ou)k o)/n], p. 42 C, which last sentence is
 better explained (I think) in the note of Dr. Badham than in that
 of Mr. Poste.
@@ -22849,18 +22818,18 @@ therefore does not dwell upon this point, though Protarchus allows
 the expression to pass." The last phrase of the passage which I
 have thus transcribed ("Sokrates _therefore_ does not dwell upon
 this point") is less accurate than that which precedes: for it
-seems to imply that the Sokrates of Philêbus _admits_ the
+seems to imply that the Sokrates of PhilÃªbus _admits_ the
 inaccuracy of the expression, which seems to me not borne out by
 the text of the dialogue. Both here and elsewhere in the dialogue,
 the doctrine, that many pleasures are false, is maintained by
-Sokrates distinctly--[Greek: to\ ê(/desthai] is put upon the same
+Sokrates distinctly--[Greek: to\ Ãª(/desthai] is put upon the same
 footing as [Greek: to\ doxa/zein], which may be either [Greek:
-a)lêthô=s] or [Greek: pseudô=s].
+a)lÃªthÃ´=s] or [Greek: pseudÃ´=s].
 
 When Sokrates (p. 37 B) puts the question, "You admit that [Greek:
-do/xa] may be either [Greek: a)lêthê\s] or [Greek: pseudê/s]: how
-then can you argue that [Greek: ê(donê/] must be always [Greek:
-a)lêthê/s]?" the answer is, that pleasure is not, if we speak
+do/xa] may be either [Greek: a)lÃªthÃª\s] or [Greek: pseudÃª/s]: how
+then can you argue that [Greek: Ãª(donÃª/] must be always [Greek:
+a)lÃªthÃª/s]?" the answer is, that pleasure is not, if we speak
 correctly, either true or false: neither one predicate nor the
 other is properly applicable to it: we can only so apply them by a
 metaphor, altogether misleading in philosophical reasoning. When
@@ -22900,25 +22869,25 @@ their pleasurable character from satisfying any previous uneasy
 appetite, nor do they leave behind them any pain if they happen to
 be forgotten.[134]
 
-[Footnote 133: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 C. [Greek: tau=ta ga\r ou)k
-ei)=nai pro/s ti kala\ le/gô, katha/per a)/lla, a)ll' a)ei\ kala\
-kath' au(ta\ pephuke/nai, kai/ tinas ê(dona\s oi)kei/as e)/chein,
-ou)de\n tai=s tô=n knê/seôn prospherei=s.]
+[Footnote 133: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 51 C. [Greek: tau=ta ga\r ou)k
+ei)=nai pro/s ti kala\ le/gÃ´, katha/per a)/lla, a)ll' a)ei\ kala\
+kath' au(ta\ pephuke/nai, kai/ tinas Ãª(dona\s oi)kei/as e)/chein,
+ou)de\n tai=s tÃ´=n knÃª/seÃ´n prospherei=s.]
 
-51 D: [Greek: ta\s tô=n phônô=n ta\s lei/as kai\ lampra/s, ta\s
+51 D: [Greek: ta\s tÃ´=n phÃ´nÃ´=n ta\s lei/as kai\ lampra/s, ta\s
 e(/n ti katharo\n i(ei/sas me/los, ou) pro\s e(/teron kala\s a)ll'
-au)ta\s kath' au(ta\s ei)=nai, kai\ tou/tôn xumphu/tous ê(dona\s
+au)ta\s kath' au(ta\s ei)=nai, kai\ tou/tÃ´n xumphu/tous Ãª(dona\s
 e(pome/nas.]]
 
-[Footnote 134: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 B.
+[Footnote 134: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 62 B.
 
-We may illustrate the doctrine of the Philêbus about pleasures and
+We may illustrate the doctrine of the PhilÃªbus about pleasures and
 pains, by reference to a dictum of Sokrates quoted in the
 Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 13).
 
 Some person complained to Sokrates that he had lost his
 appetite--that he no longer ate with any pleasure ([Greek: o(/ti
-a)êdô=s e)/sthioi])--"The physician Akumenus (so replied Sokrates) teaches
+a)ÃªdÃ´=s e)/sthioi])--"The physician Akumenus (so replied Sokrates) teaches
 us a good remedy in such a case. Leave off eating: after you have
 left off, you will come back into a more pleasurable, easy, and
 healthful condition."
@@ -22929,14 +22898,14 @@ Platonic Sokrates. What would have been _his_ answer?
 The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have regarded the complainant
 as suffering under a misfortune, and would have tried to suggest
 some remedy: either the prescription of Akumenus, or any other
-more promising that he could think of. The Sokrates of the Phædon,
+more promising that he could think of. The Sokrates of the PhÃ¦don,
 on the contrary, would have congratulated him on the improvement
 in his condition, inasmuch as the misguiding and degrading
 ascendancy, exercised by his body over his mind, was suppressed in
 one of its most influential channels: just as Kephalus, in the
 Republic (i. 329), is made to announce it as one of the blessings
 of old age, that the sexual appetite has left him. The Sokrates of
-the Philêbus, also, would have treated the case as one for
+the PhilÃªbus, also, would have treated the case as one for
 congratulation, but he would have assigned a different reason. He
 would have replied: "The pleasures of eating are altogether false.
 You never really had any pleasure in eating. If you believed
@@ -22978,12 +22947,12 @@ of falsifying theory in order to work upon men's minds by edifying
 imposture; while Plato approves and employs this scheme in the
 Republic. Aristotle even recognises it as a fault in various
 persons, that they take too little delight in bodily
-pleasures--that a man is [Greek: toiou=tos oi(=os ê(=tton ê)\ dei=
-toi=s sômatikoi=s chai/rôn] (Ethic. Nikom. vii. 11, 1151, b. 24).]
+pleasures--that a man is [Greek: toiou=tos oi(=os Ãª(=tton Ãª)\ dei=
+toi=s sÃ´matikoi=s chai/rÃ´n] (Ethic. Nikom. vii. 11, 1151, b. 24).]
 
 These few are all the varieties of pleasure which Plato admits as
 true: they are alleged as cases of the absolutely pleasurable
-([Greek: Au)to-ê(du/])--that which is pleasurable _per se_, and
+([Greek: Au)to-Ãª(du/])--that which is pleasurable _per se_, and
 always, without relation to any thing else, without dependence on
 occasion or circumstance, and without any antecedent or
 concomitant pain. All other pleasures are pleasurable relatively
@@ -22997,22 +22966,22 @@ Ens and Non-Ens, belonging as much to the first as to the last.
 
 [Footnote 135: Compare, respecting this Platonic view, Republic,
 v. pp. 478-479, and pp. 583-585, where Plato contrasts the [Greek:
-panalêthê\s] or [Greek: gnêsi/a ê(donê/], which arises from the
+panalÃªthÃª\s] or [Greek: gnÃªsi/a Ãª(donÃª/], which arises from the
 acquisition of knowledge (when the mind nourishes itself with real
-essence), with the [Greek: no/thê] (p. 587 B) or [Greek:
-e)skiagraphême/nê ê(donê/, ei)/dôlon tê=s a)lêthou=s ê(donê=s],
+essence), with the [Greek: no/thÃª] (p. 587 B) or [Greek:
+e)skiagraphÃªme/nÃª Ãª(donÃª/, ei)/dÃ´lon tÃª=s a)lÃªthou=s Ãª(donÃª=s],
 arising from the pursuits of wealth, power, and other objects of
 desire.
 
 The comic poet Alexis adverts to this Platonic doctrine of the
 absolutely pleasurable, here, there, and everywhere,--[Greek: to\
-d' ê(du\ pa/ntôs ê(du/, ka)kei= ka)ntha/de], Athenæ. viii. 354;
+d' Ãª(du\ pa/ntÃ´s Ãª(du/, ka)kei= ka)ntha/de], AthenÃ¦. viii. 354;
 Meineke, Com. Frag. p. 453.
 
-In the Phædrus (258 E), we find this same class of pleasures,
+In the PhÃ¦drus (258 E), we find this same class of pleasures,
 those which cannot be enjoyed unless preceded by some pain,
 asserted to be called _for that reason slavish_ ([Greek:
-a)ndrapodô/deis]), and depreciated as worthless. Nearly all the
+a)ndrapodÃ´/deis]), and depreciated as worthless. Nearly all the
 pleasures connected with the body are said to belong to this
 class; but those of rhetoric and dialectic are exempted from it,
 and declared to be of superior order.
@@ -23024,7 +22993,7 @@ with this opinion. But this pleasure ought in Plato's view to pass
 for a false pleasure; since it was invariably preceded by the most
 painful, long-continued training.
 
-The reasoning of Sokrates in the Philêbus (see especially pp.
+The reasoning of Sokrates in the PhilÃªbus (see especially pp.
 46-47) against the intense and extatic pleasures, as being never
 pure, but always adulterated by accompanying pain, misfortune,
 disappointment, &c., is much the same as that of Epikurus and his
@@ -23074,14 +23043,14 @@ by Plato for declaring pleasures to be false.[137]
 
 The Sokratic method, in creating consciousness of ignorance, is
 exhibited not less in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (iv. 2, 40) than
-in various Platonic dialogues, Alkibiades I., Theætêtus, &c. We
+in various Platonic dialogues, Alkibiades I., TheÃ¦tÃªtus, &c. We
 read it formally proclaimed by Sokrates in the Platonic Apology.
 
-Aristotle repeats the assertion contained in the Philêbus about
+Aristotle repeats the assertion contained in the PhilÃªbus about
 the list of painless pleasures--[Greek: a)/lupoi ga/r ei)sin ai(/
-te mathêmatikai\], &c. (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2, 1173, b. 16; 7, 1177,
+te mathÃªmatikai\], &c. (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2, 1173, b. 16; 7, 1177,
 a. 25.) He himself says in another place (vii. 13, 1153, a. 20)
-that [Greek: to\ theôrei=n] sometimes hurts the health, and if he
+that [Greek: to\ theÃ´rei=n] sometimes hurts the health, and if he
 had examined the lives of mathematicians, especially that of
 Kepler, he would hardly have imagined that mathematical
 investigations have no pains attached to them. He probably means
@@ -23093,20 +23062,20 @@ regular life and in easy circumstances, knows little of hunger and
 thirst as pains: he knows them only as appetites which give relish
 to his periodical meals. It is only when this periodical
 satisfaction is withheld that his appetite grows to a painful and
-distressing height. So too the [Greek: philomathê/s]; his appetite
+distressing height. So too the [Greek: philomathÃª/s]; his appetite
 for study, when regularly gratified to an extent consistent with
 health and other considerations, is not painful; but it will rise
 to the height of a most distressing privation if he be debarred
 from gratifying it, excluded from books and papers, disturbed by
 noises and intrusions. Kepler, if interdicted from pursuing his
-calculations, would have been miserable. Jason of Pheræ was heard
+calculations, would have been miserable. Jason of PherÃ¦ was heard
 to say that he felt hungry so long as he was not in possession of
-supreme power--[Greek: peinê=|n, o(/te mê\ turannoi=], Aristot.
+supreme power--[Greek: peinÃª=|n, o(/te mÃª\ turannoi=], Aristot.
 Politic. iii. 4, 1277, a. 24; thus intimating that the acquired
 appetite of ambition had in his mind reached the same intensity as
 the natural appetite of hunger.]
 
-[Footnote 137: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 41-42. In the Phædon (p. 60 B)
+[Footnote 137: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 41-42. In the PhÃ¦don (p. 60 B)
 Sokrates makes a striking remark on the inseparable conjunction of
 pleasure with pain generally.]
 
@@ -23121,7 +23090,7 @@ perfect life: that the Gods and the divine Kosmos have no
 enjoyment and no suffering.[138] The emotional department of human
 nature is here regarded as a degenerate and obstructive appendage:
 so that it was an inauspicious act of the sons of the Demiurgus
-(in the Timæus[139]) when they attached the spherical head (the
+(in the TimÃ¦us[139]) when they attached the spherical head (the
 miniature parallel of the Kosmos, with the rotatory movements of
 the immortal soul in the brain within) at the summit of a bodily
 trunk and limbs, containing the thoracic and abdominal cavities:
@@ -23135,7 +23104,7 @@ unfeeling, undisturbed. The Pleasure-haters, together with
 Speusippus and others, declared that pleasure and pain were both
 alike enemies to be repelled, and that neutrality was the
 condition to be aimed at.[140] And such appears to me to be the
-drift of Plato's reasonings in the Philêbus: though he relaxes
+drift of Plato's reasonings in the PhilÃªbus: though he relaxes
 somewhat the severity of his requirements in favour of a few
 pleasures, towards which he feels the same indulgence as towards
 Homer in the Republic.[141] When Ethics are discussed, not upon
@@ -23143,26 +23112,26 @@ principles of their own ([Greek: oi)kei=ai a)rchai\]), but upon
 principles of Kosmology or Ontology, no emotion of any kind can
 find consistent place.
 
-[Footnote 138: Plato, Philêbus, p. 33 B.]
+[Footnote 138: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 33 B.]
 
-[Footnote 139: Plato, Timæus, pp. 43 A, 44 D, 69 D, 70-71. The
+[Footnote 139: Plato, TimÃ¦us, pp. 43 A, 44 D, 69 D, 70-71. The
 same fundamental idea though embodied in a different illustration,
-appears also in the Phædon; where Sokrates depicts life as a
+appears also in the PhÃ¦don; where Sokrates depicts life as a
 period of imprisonment, to which the immortal rational soul is
 condemned, in a corrupt and defective body, with perpetual stream
-of disturbing sensations and emotions (Phædon, pp. 64-65).
+of disturbing sensations and emotions (PhÃ¦don, pp. 64-65).
 
-Aristotle observes, De Animâ, i. p. 407, b. 2:--[Greek: e)pi/ponon
-de\ kai\ to\ memi/chthai tô=| sô/mati mê\ duna/menon
-a)poluthê=nai, kai\ prose/ti pheukto/n, ei)/per be/ltion tô=| nô=|
-mê\ meta\ sô/matos ei)=nai, katha/per ei)/ôthe/ te le/gesthai kai\
+Aristotle observes, De AnimÃ¢, i. p. 407, b. 2:--[Greek: e)pi/ponon
+de\ kai\ to\ memi/chthai tÃ´=| sÃ´/mati mÃª\ duna/menon
+a)poluthÃª=nai, kai\ prose/ti pheukto/n, ei)/per be/ltion tÃ´=| nÃ´=|
+mÃª\ meta\ sÃ´/matos ei)=nai, katha/per ei)/Ã´the/ te le/gesthai kai\
 polloi=s sundokei=.]
 
 We find in one of the Fragments of Cicero, quoted by Augustin from
 the lost work Hortensius (p. 485, ed. Orelli):--"An vero, inquit,
-voluptates corporis expetendæ, quæ veré et graviter dictæ sunt à
-Platone illecebræ et escæ malorum? Quis autem bonâ mente præditus,
-non mallet nullas omnino nobis à naturâ voluptates esse datas?"
+voluptates corporis expetendÃ¦, quÃ¦ verÃ© et graviter dictÃ¦ sunt Ã 
+Platone illecebrÃ¦ et escÃ¦ malorum? Quis autem bonÃ¢ mente prÃ¦ditus,
+non mallet nullas omnino nobis Ã  naturÃ¢ voluptates esse datas?"
 This is the same doctrine as what is ascribed to Speusippus.]
 
 [Footnote 140: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. vii. 14, p. 1153, b. 5; x.
@@ -23170,7 +23139,7 @@ This is the same doctrine as what is ascribed to Speusippus.]
 Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter
 se: bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret."
 
-Compare Plato, Philêbus, pp. 43 D-E, 33 B.
+Compare Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 43 D-E, 33 B.
 
 To whom does Plato here make allusion, under the general title of
 the Fastidious ([Greek: oi( duscherei=s]) Pleasure-haters?
@@ -23178,23 +23147,23 @@ Schleiermacher (note to his translation, p. 487), Stallbaum, and
 most critics down to Dr. Badham inclusive, are of opinion, that he
 alludes to Antisthenes--among whose _dicta_ we certainly read
 declarations expressing positive aversion to pleasure--[Greek:
-manei/ên ma=llon ê)\ ê(sthei/ên] Diog. L. vi. 3; compare ix. 101,
+manei/Ãªn ma=llon Ãª)\ Ãª(sthei/Ãªn] Diog. L. vi. 3; compare ix. 101,
 and Winckelmann, Frag. Antisthen. xii. Mr. Poste, on the contrary,
 thinks it improbable that Antisthenes is alluded to (see p. 80 of
-his Philêbus). I confess that I think so too. Mr. Poste points out
+his PhilÃªbus). I confess that I think so too. Mr. Poste points out
 that these [Greek: duscherei=s] are characterised by Plato (p. 44
 B), as [Greek: ma/la deinou\s legome/nous peri\ phu/sin]:--whereas
 we are informed that speculations on [Greek: phu/sis] were
 neglected by Antisthenes, who confined his attention to [Greek:
-ta\ ê)thika/]. This is a strong reason for believing that
+ta\ Ãª)thika/]. This is a strong reason for believing that
 Antisthenes cannot be here meant; and there are some other reasons
 also.
 
 First, in describing the [Greek: duscherei=s], Plato notes it as
 one among their attributes, that they _hold in thorough
-detestation the indecorous pleasures_ ([Greek: ta\s tô=n
-a)schêmo/nôn ê(dona/s, a(\s ou(\s ei)/pomen duscherei=s misou=si
-pantelô=s], p. 46 A). Now this is surely not likely to have been
+detestation the indecorous pleasures_ ([Greek: ta\s tÃ´=n
+a)schÃªmo/nÃ´n Ãª(dona/s, a(\s ou(\s ei)/pomen duscherei=s misou=si
+pantelÃ´=s], p. 46 A). Now this is surely not likely to have been
 affirmed about Antisthenes. It was the conspicuous characteristic
 of the Cynic sect, begun by Antisthenes, and carried still farther
 by his pupil Diogenes, that they reduced to its minimum the
@@ -23205,16 +23174,16 @@ were, are spoken of with much respect by Plato, even while he
 combats their doctrine (p. 44 C). I think it not likely that he
 would have spoken thus of Antisthenes. We are told that there
 prevailed between the two a great and reciprocal acrimony. And
-this sentiment is manifested in the Sophistês (p. 251 B), where
+this sentiment is manifested in the SophistÃªs (p. 251 B), where
 the opponents whom Plato is refuting are described with the most
 contemptuous bitterness--and where Schleiermacher, and the critics
 generally, declare that he alludes to Antisthenes. The passage in
-the Sophistês represents, in my judgment, the probable sentiment
-of Plato towards Antisthenes: the passage in the Philêbus is at
+the SophistÃªs represents, in my judgment, the probable sentiment
+of Plato towards Antisthenes: the passage in the PhilÃªbus is at
 variance with it.
 
 I imagine that the [Greek: duscherei=s] to whom Plato makes
-allusion in the Philêbus, are the persons from whom his nephew and
+allusion in the PhilÃªbus, are the persons from whom his nephew and
 successor Speusippus derived the doctrine declared in the first
 portion of this note. The "vetus omnia Academia" of Aulus Gellius
 is an exaggerated phrase; but many of the old Academy, or
@@ -23231,27 +23200,27 @@ antipathies, in respect to alimentation and other physical
 circumstances of life--which were held to be of the most
 imperative force and necessity; so that offences against them were
 of all others the most intolerable. A remarkable fragment of the
-[Greek: Krê=tes] of Euripides (ed. Dind., vol. ii. p. 912)
+[Greek: KrÃª=tes] of Euripides (ed. Dind., vol. ii. p. 912)
 describes a variety of this _purism_ analogous to the Orphic
-and Pythagorean:--[Greek: Pa/lleuka d' e)/chôn ei)/mata, pheu/gô
-ge/nesi/n te bro/tôn, kai\ nekrothê/kês ou) chrimpto/menos; tê\n
-t' e)mpsu/chôn brô=sin e)destô=n pephu/lagmai.] Compare Eurip.
-Hippol. 957; Alexis Comicus, ap. Athenæ, iv. p. 161. See the work
-of M. Alfred Maury, Histoire des Religions de la Grèce Antique,
+and Pythagorean:--[Greek: Pa/lleuka d' e)/chÃ´n ei)/mata, pheu/gÃ´
+ge/nesi/n te bro/tÃ´n, kai\ nekrothÃª/kÃªs ou) chrimpto/menos; tÃª\n
+t' e)mpsu/chÃ´n brÃ´=sin e)destÃ´=n pephu/lagmai.] Compare Eurip.
+Hippol. 957; Alexis Comicus, ap. AthenÃ¦, iv. p. 161. See the work
+of M. Alfred Maury, Histoire des Religions de la GrÃ¨ce Antique,
 vol. iii. pp. 368-384.
 
 It appears to me that the [Greek: duscherei=s], to whom Plato
-alludes in the Philêbus, were most probably pythagorising friends
+alludes in the PhilÃªbus, were most probably pythagorising friends
 of his own; who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour,
 distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies
-towards [Greek: ta\s ê(dona\s ta\s tô=n a)schêmo/nôn]. Plato
+towards [Greek: ta\s Ãª(dona\s ta\s tÃ´=n a)schÃªmo/nÃ´n]. Plato
 speaks of them with respect; partly because ethical theorists, who
 denounce _pleasure_, are usually characterised in reverential
 terms, as persons of exalted principle, even by those who think
 their reasonings inconclusive; partly because these men only
 pushed the consequences of Plato's own reasonings, rather farther
 than Plato himself did. In fact they were more consistent than
-Plato was: for the principles laid down in the Philêbus, if
+Plato was: for the principles laid down in the PhilÃªbus, if
 carried out strictly, would go to the exclusion of all
 pleasures--not less of the few which he tolerates, than of the many
 which he banishes.
@@ -23264,10 +23233,10 @@ numerical and geometrical symbolism.]
 [Footnote 141: Plato, Republic, x. p. 607.]
 
 [Side-note: Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics--defect of
-the Philêbus.]
+the PhilÃªbus.]
 
 In my judgment, this is one main defect pervading the Platonic
-Philêbus--the forced conjunction between Kosmology and Ethics--the
+PhilÃªbus--the forced conjunction between Kosmology and Ethics--the
 violent pressure employed to force Pleasures and Pains into the
 same classifying framework as cognitive Beliefs--the true and the
 false. In respect to the various pleasures, the dialogue contains
@@ -23299,11 +23268,11 @@ Will on one side, and the Understanding on the other.
 Good is the object of the Will; Truth the object of the
 Understanding."]
 
-[Footnote 143: Plato, Philêbus, p. 45 D. [Greek: e)n u(/brei
-mei/zous ê(dona/s, ou) plei/ous le/gô], &c.
+[Footnote 143: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 45 D. [Greek: e)n u(/brei
+mei/zous Ãª(dona/s, ou) plei/ous le/gÃ´], &c.
 
-So in the Republic, also, [Greek: ê(donê\ u(perba/llousa] is
-declared to be inconsistent with [Greek: sôphrosu/nê] (iii. 402
+So in the Republic, also, [Greek: Ãª(donÃª\ u(perba/llousa] is
+declared to be inconsistent with [Greek: sÃ´phrosu/nÃª] (iii. 402
 E).]
 
 [Side-note: Directive sovereignty of Measure--how explained and
@@ -23349,37 +23318,37 @@ Good, but the one condition which is constant as well as
 indispensable to any tolerable approach towards Good.
 
 [Footnote 144: This argument is carried on by Sokrates from p. 351
-until the close of the Protagoras, p. 357 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ de\
-ê(donê=s te kai\ lu/pês e)n o)rthê=| _tê=| ai(re/sei e)pha/nê
-ê(mi=n ê( sôtêri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa_, tou= te ple/onos kai\
-e)la/ttonos kai\ mei/zonos kai\ smikroterou= kai\ por)r(ôte/rô
-kai\ e)ggute/rô, a)=ra prô=ton me\n _ou) metrêtikê\ phai/netai_,
-u(perbolê=s te kai\ e)ndei/as ou)=sa kai\ i)so/têtos pro\s
-a)llê/las ske/psis? . . . E)pei\ de\ metrêtikê/, a)na/gkê| dê/pou
-te/chnê kai\ e)pistê/mê.]
-
-Yet Plato in the Philêbus, imputing to the Hedonistic theory that
+until the close of the Protagoras, p. 357 A. [Greek: e)peidÃª\ de\
+Ãª(donÃª=s te kai\ lu/pÃªs e)n o)rthÃª=| _tÃª=| ai(re/sei e)pha/nÃª
+Ãª(mi=n Ãª( sÃ´tÃªri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa_, tou= te ple/onos kai\
+e)la/ttonos kai\ mei/zonos kai\ smikroterou= kai\ por)r(Ã´te/rÃ´
+kai\ e)ggute/rÃ´, a)=ra prÃ´=ton me\n _ou) metrÃªtikÃª\ phai/netai_,
+u(perbolÃª=s te kai\ e)ndei/as ou)=sa kai\ i)so/tÃªtos pro\s
+a)llÃª/las ske/psis? . . . E)pei\ de\ metrÃªtikÃª/, a)na/gkÃª| dÃª/pou
+te/chnÃª kai\ e)pistÃª/mÃª.]
+
+Yet Plato in the PhilÃªbus, imputing to the Hedonistic theory that
 it sets aside all idea of measure, regulation, limit, advances as
 an argument in the case, that Pleasure and Pain in their own
-nature have no limit (Philêbus, pp. 25-26 B, 27 E. Compare Dr.
+nature have no limit (PhilÃªbus, pp. 25-26 B, 27 E. Compare Dr.
 Badham's note, p. 30 of his edition).
 
 The imputation is unfounded, and the argument without application,
 in regard to the same theory as expounded by Sokrates in the
 Protagoras.
 
-At the end of the Philêbus (p. 67 B) Plato makes Sokrates exclaim,
+At the end of the PhilÃªbus (p. 67 B) Plato makes Sokrates exclaim,
 "We cannot put Pleasure first among the items of Good, even though
 all oxen, horses, and other beasts affirm it". This rhetorical
-flourish is altogether misplaced in the Philêbus: for Plato had
+flourish is altogether misplaced in the PhilÃªbus: for Plato had
 already specified it as one of the conditions of the Good, That it
 must be acceptable and must give satisfaction to all animals, and
 even to all plants (pp. 22 B, 60 C), as well as to men.]
 
-[Side-note: How explained in Philêbus--no statement to what items
+[Side-note: How explained in PhilÃªbus--no statement to what items
 it is applied.]
 
-In the Philêbus, too, Measure--The Exact Quantum--The Exact
+In the PhilÃªbus, too, Measure--The Exact Quantum--The Exact
 Moment--are proclaimed as the chief item in the complex
 called--The Good.[145] But to what Items does Sokrates intend the
 measure to be applied? Not certainly to pleasures: the comparison of
@@ -23401,17 +23370,17 @@ which men usually pursue in life:[146] he claims for it only the
 privilege of satisfying the aspiration for truth, in minds wherein
 such aspiration is preponderant over all others.
 
-[Footnote 145: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 A. [Greek: me/tron--to\
+[Footnote 145: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 66 A. [Greek: me/tron--to\
 me/trion--to\ kai/rion].]
 
-[Footnote 146: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B-D.]
+[Footnote 146: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 58 B-D.]
 
-Comparing the Philêbus with the Protagoras, therefore, we see that
+Comparing the PhilÃªbus with the Protagoras, therefore, we see that
 though, in both, Measuring Science or Intelligence is proclaimed
-as supreme, the province assigned to it in the Philêbus is
+as supreme, the province assigned to it in the PhilÃªbus is
 comparatively narrow. Moreover the practical side or activities of
 life (which are prominent in the Protagoras) appear in the
-Philêbus thrust into a corner; where scanty room is found for them
+PhilÃªbus thrust into a corner; where scanty room is found for them
 on ground nearly covered by the speculative, or theorising,
 truth-seeking, pursuits. Practical reason is forced into the same
 categories as theoretical.
@@ -23432,29 +23401,29 @@ Truth and Purity. Where the Objects are shifting, variable, mixed
 or confounded together, there Reason cannot apply herself; no pure
 or exact truth can be attained.[147] These unchangeable Entities
 are what in other dialogues Plato terms Ideas or Forms--a term
-scarcely used in the Philêbus.
-
-[Footnote 147: Plato, Philêbus, p. 59 C. [Greek: ô(s ê)\ peri\
-e)kei=na e)/sth' ê(mi=n to/ te be/baion kai\ to\ katharo\n kai\
-to\ a)lêthe\s kai\ o(\ dê\ le/gomen ei)likrine/s, peri\ ta\ a)ei\
-kata\ ta\ au)ta\ ô(sau/tôs a)mikto/tata e)/chonta--ê)\ deute/rôs
-e)kei/nôn o(/ ti ma/lista/ e)sti xuggene/s; ta\ d' a)/lla pa/nta
-deu/tera/ te kai\ u(/stera lekte/on.] 62 A: [Greek: phronô=n
-a)/nthrôpos _au(tê=s peri\ dikaiosu/nês_, o(/, ti e)/sti, kai\
-lo/gon e)/chôn e(po/menon tô=| noei=n . . . ku/klou me\n kai\
-sphai/ras au)tê=s tê=s thei/as to\n lo/gon e)/chôn.]]
+scarcely used in the PhilÃªbus.
+
+[Footnote 147: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 59 C. [Greek: Ã´(s Ãª)\ peri\
+e)kei=na e)/sth' Ãª(mi=n to/ te be/baion kai\ to\ katharo\n kai\
+to\ a)lÃªthe\s kai\ o(\ dÃª\ le/gomen ei)likrine/s, peri\ ta\ a)ei\
+kata\ ta\ au)ta\ Ã´(sau/tÃ´s a)mikto/tata e)/chonta--Ãª)\ deute/rÃ´s
+e)kei/nÃ´n o(/ ti ma/lista/ e)sti xuggene/s; ta\ d' a)/lla pa/nta
+deu/tera/ te kai\ u(/stera lekte/on.] 62 A: [Greek: phronÃ´=n
+a)/nthrÃ´pos _au(tÃª=s peri\ dikaiosu/nÃªs_, o(/, ti e)/sti, kai\
+lo/gon e)/chÃ´n e(po/menon tÃ´=| noei=n . . . ku/klou me\n kai\
+sphai/ras au)tÃª=s tÃª=s thei/as to\n lo/gon e)/chÃ´n.]]
 
 Though pure truth belongs exclusively to Dialectic and to the
 Objects thereof, there are other Sciences which, having more or
 less of affinity to Dialectic, may thus be classified according to
 the degree of such affinity. Mathematics approach most nearly to
 Dialectic. Under Mathematics are included the Sciences or Arts of
-numbering, measuring, weighing--Arithmetic, Metrêtic,
+numbering, measuring, weighing--Arithmetic, MetrÃªtic,
 Static--which are applied to various subordinate arts, and impart to
 these latter all the scientific guidance and certainty which is found
 in them. Without Arithmetic, the subordinate arts would be little
 better than vague guesswork or knack. But Plato distinguishes two
-varieties of Arithmetic and Metrêtic: one purely theoretical,
+varieties of Arithmetic and MetrÃªtic: one purely theoretical,
 prosecuted by philosophers, and adapted to satisfy the love of
 abstract truth--the other applied to some department of practice,
 and employed by the artist as a guide to the execution of his
@@ -23464,7 +23433,7 @@ with every other unit: while practical Arithmetic adds together
 concrete realities, whether like and equal to each other or
 not.[148]
 
-[Footnote 148: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 E.]
+[Footnote 148: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 56 E.]
 
 It is thus that the theoretical geometer and arithmetician, though
 not coming up to the full and pure truth of Dialectic, is
@@ -23478,17 +23447,17 @@ commander, neither of whom can apply to their processes either
 numeration or measurement: all of them are forced to be contented
 with vague estimate, conjecture, a practised eye and ear.[149]
 
-[Footnote 149: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 A-B.]
+[Footnote 149: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 56 A-B.]
 
 [Side-note: Valuable principles of this classification--difference
 with other dialogues.]
 
 The foregoing classification of Sciences and Arts is among the
-most interesting points in the Philêbus. It coincides to a great
+most interesting points in the PhilÃªbus. It coincides to a great
 degree with that which we read in the sixth and seventh books of
 the Republic, though it is also partially different: it differs
 too in some respects from doctrines advanced in other dialogues.
-Thus we find here (in the Philêbus) that the science or art of the
+Thus we find here (in the PhilÃªbus) that the science or art of the
 physician, the pilot, the general, &c., is treated as destitute of
 measure and as an aggregate of unscientific guesses: whereas in
 the Gorgias[150] and elsewhere, these are extolled as genuine
@@ -23527,7 +23496,7 @@ and in the Republic.[153]
 
 [Footnote 152: Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7, 2-8. The contrast drawn
 in this chapter of the Memorabilia appears to me to coincide
-pretty exactly with that which is taken in the Philêbus, though
+pretty exactly with that which is taken in the PhilÃªbus, though
 the preference is reversed. Dr. Badham (p. 78) and Mr. Poste (pp.
 106-113) consider Plato as pointing to a contrast between pure and
 applied Mathematics: which I do not understand to be his meaning.
@@ -23536,10 +23505,10 @@ Poste is different, and does really designate Pure and Applied
 Mathematics. Mr. Poste would have found a better comparison in
 Ethic. Nikom. i. 7, 1098, a. 29.]
 
-[Footnote 153: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 E. [Greek: oi( d' ou)k a)/n
-pote au)toi=s sunakolouthê/seian, ei) mê\ mona/da mona/dos
-e(ka/stês tô=n muri/ôn mêdemi/an a)/llên a)/llês diaphe/rousa/n
-tis thê/sei]--where it is formally proclaimed as an assumption or
+[Footnote 153: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 56 E. [Greek: oi( d' ou)k a)/n
+pote au)toi=s sunakolouthÃª/seian, ei) mÃª\ mona/da mona/dos
+e(ka/stÃªs tÃ´=n muri/Ã´n mÃªdemi/an a)/llÃªn a)/llÃªs diaphe/rousa/n
+tis thÃª/sei]--where it is formally proclaimed as an assumption or
 postulate. See Republic, vii. pp. 525-526, vi. p. 510 C.
 
 Mr. John Stuart Mill thus calls attention to the same remark in
@@ -23574,7 +23543,7 @@ One actual pound weight is not exactly equal to another, nor one
 mile's length to another; a nicer balance or more exact measuring
 instruments would always detect some difference."]
 
-The long preliminary discussion of the Philêbus thus brings us to
+The long preliminary discussion of the PhilÃªbus thus brings us to
 the conclusion--That a descending scale of value, relatively to
 truth and falsehood, must be recognised in cognitions as well as
 in pleasures: many cognitions are not entirely true, but tainted
@@ -23584,9 +23553,9 @@ or delusions or both: moreover, all the intense pleasures are
 incompatible with Measure, or a fixed standard,[154] and must
 therefore be excluded from the category of Good.
 
-[Footnote 154: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 52 D--57 B.]
+[Footnote 154: Plato, PhilÃªbus, pp. 52 D--57 B.]
 
-[Side-note: Close of the Philêbus--Graduated elements of Good.]
+[Side-note: Close of the PhilÃªbus--Graduated elements of Good.]
 
 In arranging the quintuple scale of elements or conditions of the
 Good, Plato adopts the following descending order: I report them
@@ -23622,20 +23591,20 @@ The four first elements belong to the Kosmos as well as to man:
 for the Kosmos has an intelligent soul. The fifth marks the
 emotional nature of man.
 
-[Footnote 155: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 A.
+[Footnote 155: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 66 A.
 
 The Appendix B, subjoined by Mr. Poste to his edition of the
-Philêbus (pp. 149-165), is a very valuable Dissertation, comparing
+PhilÃªbus (pp. 149-165), is a very valuable Dissertation, comparing
 and explaining the abstract theories of Plato and Aristotle. He
-remarks, justly contrasting the Philêbus with the Timæus, as to
-the doctrine of Limit: "In the Philêbus the limit is always
+remarks, justly contrasting the PhilÃªbus with the TimÃ¦us, as to
+the doctrine of Limit: "In the PhilÃªbus the limit is always
 quantitative. Quality, including all the elementary forces, is the
 substratum that has to receive the quantitative determination.
 Just, however, as Quality underlies quantity, we can conceive a
-substratum underlying quality. This Plato in the Timæus calls the
+substratum underlying quality. This Plato in the TimÃ¦us calls the
 Vehicle or Receptacle ([Greek: to\ dektiko/n]), and Aristotle in
-his writings the primary Matter ([Greek: prô/tê u(/lê]). The
-Philêbus, however, does not carry the analysis so far. It regards
+his writings the primary Matter ([Greek: prÃ´/tÃª u(/lÃª]). The
+PhilÃªbus, however, does not carry the analysis so far. It regards
 quality as the ultimate matter, the substratum to be moulded and
 measured out in due quantity by the quantitative limit" (p. 160).
 
@@ -23653,11 +23622,11 @@ Cousin.]
 [Footnote 156: Neither the Introduction of Schleiermacher (p. 134
 seq.), nor the elucidation of Trendelenburg (De Philebi Consilio,
 pp. 16-23), nor the Prolegomena of Stallbaum (pp. 76-77 seq.),
-succeed in making this obscure close of the Philêbus clearly
+succeed in making this obscure close of the PhilÃªbus clearly
 intelligible. Stallbaum, after indicating many commentators who
 have preceded him, observes respecting the explanations which they
 have given: "Ea sunt adeo varia atque inter se diversa, ut
-tanquam adversâ fronte inter ipsa pugnare dicenda sint" (p. 72).]
+tanquam adversÃ¢ fronte inter ipsa pugnare dicenda sint" (p. 72).]
 
 I see no sufficient ground for the hypothesis of Stallbaum and
 some other critics, who, considering the last result abrupt and
@@ -23672,21 +23641,21 @@ them from the list of constituents of Good. If among Plato's
 contemporaries who advocated the Hedonistic doctrine, there were
 any who laid their main stress upon these intense pleasures, he
 may be considered to have replied to them under the name of
-Philêbus. But certainly this result might have been attained with
+PhilÃªbus. But certainly this result might have been attained with
 a smaller array of preliminaries.
 
 [Footnote 157: Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 10.]
 
-[Side-note: Contrast between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and
+[Side-note: Contrast between the PhilÃªbus and the PhÃ¦drus, and
 Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions
 generally.]
 
 Moreover, in regard to these same intense emotions we have to
 remark that Plato in other dialogues holds a very different
 opinion respecting them--or at least respecting some of them. We
-have seen that at the close of the Philêbus he connects Bonum and
+have seen that at the close of the PhilÃªbus he connects Bonum and
 Pulchrum principally, and almost exclusively, with the Reason; but
-we find him, in the Phædrus and Symposion, taking a different,
+we find him, in the PhÃ¦drus and Symposion, taking a different,
 indeed an opposite, view of the matter; and presenting Bonum and
 Pulchrum as objects, not of the unimpassioned and calculating
 Reason, but of ardent aspiration and even of extatic love. Reason
@@ -23701,24 +23670,24 @@ generating intellectual sympathies and recollections of the world
 of Ideas. He is represented as experiencing in the fullest measure
 those intense excitements and disturbances which Eros alone can
 provoke.[158] It is true that Plato here repudiates sensual
-excitements. In this respect the Phædrus and Symposion agree with
-the Philêbus. But as between Reason and Emotion, they disagree
+excitements. In this respect the PhÃ¦drus and Symposion agree with
+the PhilÃªbus. But as between Reason and Emotion, they disagree
 with it altogether: for they dwell upon ideal excitements of the
 most vehement character. They describe the highest perfection of
 human nature as growing out of the better variety of madness--out
 of the glowing inspirations of Eros: a state replete with the most
 intense alternating emotions of pain and pleasure. How opposite is
-the tone of Sokrates in the Philêbus, where he denounces all the
+the tone of Sokrates in the PhilÃªbus, where he denounces all the
 intense pleasures as belonging to a distempered condition--as
 adulterated with pain, and as impeding the tranquil process of
 Reason--and where he tolerates only such gentle pleasures as are
 at once unmixed with pain and easily controuled by Reason! In the
-Phædrus and Symposion, we are told that Bonum and Pulchrum are
+PhÃ¦drus and Symposion, we are told that Bonum and Pulchrum are
 attainable only under the stimulus of Eros, through a process of
 emotion, feverish and extatic, with mingled pleasure and pain: and
 that they crown such aspirations, if successfully prosecuted, with
 an emotional recompense, or with pleasure so intense as to surpass
-all other pleasures. In the Philêbus, Bonum and Pulchrum come
+all other pleasures. In the PhilÃªbus, Bonum and Pulchrum come
 before us as measure, proportion, seasonableness: as approachable
 only through tranquil Reason--addressing their ultimate recompense
 to Reason alone--excluding both vehement agitations and intense
@@ -23727,48 +23696,48 @@ unmixed pleasures.[159]
 
 [Footnote 158: See in the Symposion the doctrines of the
 prophetess Diotima, as recited by Sokrates, pp. 204-212: also the
-Phædrus, the second [Greek: e)gkô/mion] delivered by Sokrates upon
+PhÃ¦drus, the second [Greek: e)gkÃ´/mion] delivered by Sokrates upon
 Eros, pp. 36-60, repeated briefly and confirmed by Sokrates, pp.
 77-78.
 
-Compare these with the latter portion of the Philêbus; the
+Compare these with the latter portion of the PhilÃªbus; the
 difference of spirit and doctrine will appear very manifest.
 
-To illustrate the contrast between the Phædrus and the Philêbus,
+To illustrate the contrast between the PhÃ¦drus and the PhilÃªbus,
 we may observe that the former compares the excitement and
 irritation of the inspired soul when its wings are growing to
-ascend to Bonum and Pulchrum, with the [Greek: knê=sis] or
+ascend to Bonum and Pulchrum, with the [Greek: knÃª=sis] or
 irritation of the gums when a child is cutting teeth--[Greek: zei=
-ou)=n e)n tou/tô| o(/lê kai\ a)nakêki/ei, kai\ o(/per to\ tô=n
-o)dontophuou/ntôn pa/thos peri\ tou\s o)do/ntas gi/gnetai o(/tan
-a)/rti phuô=si knê=si/s te kai\ a)gana/ktêsis peri\ ta\ ou)=la,
-tau)to\n dê\ pe/ponthen ê( tou= pterophuei=n a)rchome/nou psuchê/;
+ou)=n e)n tou/tÃ´| o(/lÃª kai\ a)nakÃªki/ei, kai\ o(/per to\ tÃ´=n
+o)dontophuou/ntÃ´n pa/thos peri\ tou\s o)do/ntas gi/gnetai o(/tan
+a)/rti phuÃ´=si knÃª=si/s te kai\ a)gana/ktÃªsis peri\ ta\ ou)=la,
+tau)to\n dÃª\ pe/ponthen Ãª( tou= pterophuei=n a)rchome/nou psuchÃª/;
 zei= te kai\ a)ganaktei= kai\ gargali/zetai phu/ousa ta\ ptera/]
-(Phædrus, p. 251). These are specimens of the strong metaphors
+(PhÃ¦drus, p. 251). These are specimens of the strong metaphors
 used by Plato to describe the emotional condition of the mind
 during its fervour of aspiration towards Bonum and Pulchrum. On
-the other hand, in the Philêbus, [Greek: knê=sis] and [Greek:
+the other hand, in the PhilÃªbus, [Greek: knÃª=sis] and [Greek:
 gargalismo\s] are noted as manifestations of that distempered
 condition which produces indeed moments of intense pleasure, but
 is quite inconsistent with Reason and the attainment of Good. See
-Philêbus, pp. 46 E, 51 D, and Gorgias, p. 494.]
+PhilÃªbus, pp. 46 E, 51 D, and Gorgias, p. 494.]
 
-[Footnote 159: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66.]
+[Footnote 159: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 66.]
 
-The comparison, here made, of the Philêbus with the Phædrus and
+The comparison, here made, of the PhilÃªbus with the PhÃ¦drus and
 Symposion, is one among many proofs of the different points of
 view with which Plato, in his different dialogues,[160] handled
 the same topics of ethical and psychological discussion. And upon
 this point of dissent, Eudoxus and Epikurus, would have agreed
-with the Sokrates of the Philêbus, in deprecating that extatic
-vein of emotion which is so greatly extolled in the Phædrus and
+with the Sokrates of the PhilÃªbus, in deprecating that extatic
+vein of emotion which is so greatly extolled in the PhÃ¦drus and
 Symposion.
 
 [Footnote 160: Maximus Tyrius remarks this difference (between the
 erotic dialogues of Plato and many of the others) in one of his
-discourses about the [Greek: e)rôtikê\] of Sokrates. [Greek:
-Ou)de\n ga\r au)to\s au(tô=| o(/moios o( Sôkra/tês e)rô=n tô=|
-sôphronou=nti, kai\ o( e)kplêtto/menos tou\s kalou\s tô=|
+discourses about the [Greek: e)rÃ´tikÃª\] of Sokrates. [Greek:
+Ou)de\n ga\r au)to\s au(tÃ´=| o(/moios o( SÃ´kra/tÃªs e)rÃ´=n tÃ´=|
+sÃ´phronou=nti, kai\ o( e)kplÃªtto/menos tou\s kalou\s tÃ´=|
 e)le/gchonti tou\s a)/phronas], &c. (Diss. xxiv. 5, p. 466 ed.
 Reiske).]
 
@@ -23870,18 +23839,18 @@ Indeed, I could hardly refuse, if you requested me to strip naked
 and dance--since we are here alone.[7]
 
 [Footnote 3: Plat. Menex. p. 235 C. [Greek: A)ei\ su\
-prospai/zeis, ô)= Sô/krates, tou\s r(ê/toras.]]
+prospai/zeis, Ã´)= SÃ´/krates, tou\s r(Ãª/toras.]]
 
 [Footnote 4: Plat. Menex. p. 235 D.
 
 Aristotle refers twice to this dictum as being a true remark made
-by [Greek: Sôkra/tês e)n tô=| E)pitaphi/ô|], Rhetoric, i. 9, p.
+by [Greek: SÃ´kra/tÃªs e)n tÃ´=| E)pitaphi/Ã´|], Rhetoric, i. 9, p.
 1367, b. 8, iii. 14, p. 1415, b. 30.]
 
 [Footnote 5: Plat. Menex. p. 236 A.]
 
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Menex. p. 236 C. [Greek: A)ll' i)/sôs mou
-katagela/sei, a)/n soi do/xô presbu/tês ô)\n e)/ti pai/zein.]]
+[Footnote 6: Plato, Menex. p. 236 C. [Greek: A)ll' i)/sÃ´s mou
+katagela/sei, a)/n soi do/xÃ´ presbu/tÃªs Ã´)\n e)/ti pai/zein.]]
 
 [Footnote 7: Plat. Menex. pp. 234 C, 236 C.]
 
@@ -23968,14 +23937,14 @@ deeply lodged in every one's bosom.
 
 [Footnote 10: Thucyd. ii. 34.]
 
-[Footnote 11: Thucyd. ii. 34. [Greek: o(\s a)\n gnô/mê| te dokê=|
-mê\ a)xu/netos ei)=nai, kai\ a)xiô/mati proê/kê|.]]
+[Footnote 11: Thucyd. ii. 34. [Greek: o(\s a)\n gnÃ´/mÃª| te dokÃª=|
+mÃª\ a)xu/netos ei)=nai, kai\ a)xiÃ´/mati proÃª/kÃª|.]]
 
 [Footnote 12: Aristotel. Rhetoric. i. 5, p. 1360, b. 31, i. 9, p.
 1367. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetoric. c. 6, pp. 260-267.
 
 "Nec enim artibus inventis factum est, ut argumenta inveniremus;
-sed dicta sunt omnia, antequam præciperentur: mox ea scriptores
+sed dicta sunt omnia, antequam prÃ¦ciperentur: mox ea scriptores
 observata et collecta ediderunt" (Quintilian, Inst. Or. v. 10).]
 
 [Side-note: Plato in this harangue conforms to the established
@@ -23992,7 +23961,7 @@ strange animals and plants, gave birth to an admirable breed of
 men, as well as to wheat and barley for their nourishment, and to
 the olive for assisting their bodily exercises.[14] Attica was
 from the beginning favoured by the Gods; and the acropolis had
-been an object of competition between Athênê and Poseidon.[15] She
+been an object of competition between AthÃªnÃª and Poseidon.[15] She
 was the common and equal mother of all the citizens, who, from
 such community of birth and purity of Hellenic origin, had derived
 the attributes which they had ever since manifested--attachment to
@@ -24005,8 +23974,8 @@ common origin.
 
 [Footnote 13: Plat. Menex. pp. 237-245. 245 D: [Greek: ou) ga/r
 Pe/lopes ou)de\ Ka/dmoi ou)de\ Ai)/guptoi/ te kai\ Danaoi\ ou)de\
-a)/lloi polloi/, phu/sei me\n ba/rbaroi o)/ntes, no/mô| de\
-E(/llênes, sunoikou=sin ê(mi=n, a)ll' au)toi\ E(/llênes, ou)
+a)/lloi polloi/, phu/sei me\n ba/rbaroi o)/ntes, no/mÃ´| de\
+E(/llÃªnes, sunoikou=sin Ãª(mi=n, a)ll' au)toi\ E(/llÃªnes, ou)
 mixoba/rbaroi oi)kou=men], &c.]
 
 [Footnote 14: Plat. Menex. pp. 237 D, 238 A.]
@@ -24014,15 +23983,15 @@ mixoba/rbaroi oi)kou=men], &c.]
 [Footnote 15: Plat. Menex. p. 237 C.]
 
 [Footnote 16: Plat. Menex. pp. 238 D, 239 A, 245 C-D. 239 A:
-[Greek: ê( i)sogoni/a ê(ma=s ê( kata\ phu/sin i)sonomi/an
-a)nagka/zei zêtei=n kata\ no/mon, kai\ mêdeni\ a)/llô| u(pei/kein
-a)llê/lois ê)\ a)retê=s do/xê| kai\ phronê/seôs.] 245 D: [Greek:
-o(/then katharo\n to\ mi=sos e)nte/têke tê=| po/lei tê=s
-a)llotri/as phu/seôs] (_i.e._ of the [Greek: ba/rbaroi]).]
+[Greek: Ãª( i)sogoni/a Ãª(ma=s Ãª( kata\ phu/sin i)sonomi/an
+a)nagka/zei zÃªtei=n kata\ no/mon, kai\ mÃªdeni\ a)/llÃ´| u(pei/kein
+a)llÃª/lois Ãª)\ a)retÃª=s do/xÃª| kai\ phronÃª/seÃ´s.] 245 D: [Greek:
+o(/then katharo\n to\ mi=sos e)nte/tÃªke tÃª=| po/lei tÃª=s
+a)llotri/as phu/seÃ´s] (_i.e._ of the [Greek: ba/rbaroi]).]
 
 Alluding briefly to the victories over Eumolpus and the Amazons,
 the orator passes on to the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and
-Platæa, which he celebrates with the warmth of an Hellenic
+PlatÃ¦a, which he celebrates with the warmth of an Hellenic
 patriot.[17] He eulogizes the generous behaviour of Athens towards
 the Greeks, during the interval between the Persian and the
 Peloponnesian wars, contrasting it with the unworthy requital
@@ -24049,7 +24018,7 @@ Athens had recovered her walls and her ships--had put down the
 Spartan superiority at sea--and had rescued even the Great King
 from Spartan force.[21] He laments the disasters of Athenian
 soldiers at Corinth, through difficulties of the ground--and at
-Lechæum, through treachery. These are the latest political events
+LechÃ¦um, through treachery. These are the latest political events
 to which he alludes.[22]
 
 [Footnote 17: Plat. Menex. pp. 240-241.]
@@ -24059,9 +24028,9 @@ to which he alludes.[22]
 [Footnote 19: Plat. Menex. pp. 243-244.]
 
 [Footnote 20: Plat. Menex. pp. 244-245. 244 E: [Greek: ei)/ tis
-bou/loito tê=s po/leôs katêgorê=sai dikai/ôs, tou=t' a)\n mo/non
-le/gôn o)rthô=s a)\n katêgoroi/ê, ô(s a)ei\ li/an philoikti/rmôn
-e)sti/, kai\ tou= ê(/ttonos therapi/s.] Isokrates also, in the
+bou/loito tÃª=s po/leÃ´s katÃªgorÃª=sai dikai/Ã´s, tou=t' a)\n mo/non
+le/gÃ´n o)rthÃ´=s a)\n katÃªgoroi/Ãª, Ã´(s a)ei\ li/an philoikti/rmÃ´n
+e)sti/, kai\ tou= Ãª(/ttonos therapi/s.] Isokrates also, in the
 Oratio Panegyrica (Or. iv.), dwells upon this point, as well as on
 the pronounced hatred towards [Greek: ba/rbaroi], as standing
 features in the Athenian character (sect. 59-184). The points
@@ -24112,9 +24081,9 @@ dialectics.
 
 [Footnote 25: Cicero, Orator. c. 44, 151. "At non Thucydides: ne
 ille quidem, haud paullo major scriptor, Plato: nec solum in his
-sermonibus, qui dialogi dicuntur, ubi etiam de industriâ id
-faciendum fuit, sed in populari oratione, quâ est Athenis laudari
-in concione eos, qui sint in præliis interfecti: quæ sic probata
+sermonibus, qui dialogi dicuntur, ubi etiam de industriÃ¢ id
+faciendum fuit, sed in populari oratione, quÃ¢ est Athenis laudari
+in concione eos, qui sint in prÃ¦liis interfecti: quÃ¦ sic probata
 est, ut eam quotannis, ut scis, illo die recitari necesse sit."
 
 See Plato, Menex. p. 249 B, about these yearly funereal rites, and
@@ -24149,15 +24118,15 @@ probably composed not long after the peace of Antalkidas, in
 competition with the harangue of Lysias now remaining on the same
 subject. Though the name of Lysias is not mentioned in the
 Menexenus, yet the rivalry between him and Plato is clearly
-proclaimed in the Platonic Phædrus: and the two funeral harangues
+proclaimed in the Platonic PhÃ¦drus: and the two funeral harangues
 go so completely over the same ground, that intentional
 competition on the part of the latest, is the most natural of all
 hypotheses.
 
 [Footnote 27: Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pomp. De Platon. p. 762. [Greek:
-traphei\s me\n e)n toi=s Sôkratikoi=s dialo/gois i)schnota/tois
+traphei\s me\n e)n toi=s SÃ´kratikoi=s dialo/gois i)schnota/tois
 ou)=si kai\ a)kribesta/tois, ou) mei/nas d' e)n au)toi=s, a)lla\
-tê=s Gorgi/ou kai\ Thoukudi/dou kataskeuê=s e)rasthei/s.] Compare
+tÃª=s Gorgi/ou kai\ Thoukudi/dou kataskeuÃª=s e)rasthei/s.] Compare
 p. 761, the passage immediately preceding, and De Adm. Vi Dicendi
 in Demosthene, pp. 1025-1031.
 
@@ -24165,7 +24134,7 @@ To many critics Plato appeared successful in the figurative and
 metaphorical style--[Greek: deino\s peri\ to\ tropiko/n]. But
 Dionysius thinks him very inferior to Demosthenes even on this
 point, though it was not the strongest point of Demosthenes, whose
-main purpose was [Greek: o( a)lêthino\s a)gô/n] (Dionys. ibid. p.
+main purpose was [Greek: o( a)lÃªthino\s a)gÃ´/n] (Dionys. ibid. p.
 1057).]
 
 [Footnote 28: Isokrates, in his last composition (Panathen. Or.
@@ -24173,16 +24142,16 @@ xii.) written in very old age, shows how keenly he felt the
 aspersions of jealous rivals--Sophists less successful than
 himself--who publicly complained that he despised the lessons of
 the poets, and thought no teaching worth having except his
-own--[Greek: a)podexame/nôn de\ tô=n periestô/tôn tê\n diatribê\n
-au)tô=n, e(/na to\n tolmêro/teron e)picheirê=sai e)me\
-diaba/llein, le/gonth' ô(s e)gô\ pa/ntôn kataphronô= ô=n
-toiou/tôn, kai\ ta/s te philosophi/as ta\s tô=n a)/llôn kai\ ta\s
-paidei/as a(pa/sas a)nairô=, kai\ phêmi\ pa/ntas lêrei=n plê\n
-tou\s meteschêko/tas tê=s e)mê=s diatribê=s] (sect. 22). That
+own--[Greek: a)podexame/nÃ´n de\ tÃ´=n periestÃ´/tÃ´n tÃª\n diatribÃª\n
+au)tÃ´=n, e(/na to\n tolmÃªro/teron e)picheirÃª=sai e)me\
+diaba/llein, le/gonth' Ã´(s e)gÃ´\ pa/ntÃ´n kataphronÃ´= Ã´=n
+toiou/tÃ´n, kai\ ta/s te philosophi/as ta\s tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n kai\ ta\s
+paidei/as a(pa/sas a)nairÃ´=, kai\ phÃªmi\ pa/ntas lÃªrei=n plÃª\n
+tou\s meteschÃªko/tas tÃª=s e)mÃª=s diatribÃª=s] (sect. 22). That
 which Isokrates complains of these teachers for saying in their
 talk with each other, the rhetorical teachers would vehemently
 complain of in Plato, when he expressed forcibly his contempt for
-rhetoric in the Gorgias and the Phædrus. One way of expressing
+rhetoric in the Gorgias and the PhÃ¦drus. One way of expressing
 their resentment would be to affirm that Plato could not compose a
 regular rhetorical discourse; which affirmation Plato would best
 contradict by composing one in the received manner.]
@@ -24219,7 +24188,7 @@ dwells upon and enforces sympathies, antipathies, and convictions,
 already established in their minds.[31] A first-rate orator like
 Perikles, touching the chords of cherished national sentiment,
 might hope, by such a discourse as that which we read in
-Thucydides, "adjecisse aliquid receptæ religioni".[32] No public
+Thucydides, "adjecisse aliquid receptÃ¦ religioni".[32] No public
 orator ever appointed by the Senate to pronounce the funeral
 harangue, could have expatiated more warmly than Plato has here
 done, upon the excellence of the Athenian constitution, and upon
@@ -24232,7 +24201,7 @@ is quite as highflown and unreserved.
 
 [Footnote 30: Compare also the majestic picture which Plato
 presents of the ancient character and exploits of the early
-Athenians, in the mythe commenced in the Timæus (pp. 23-24),
+Athenians, in the mythe commenced in the TimÃ¦us (pp. 23-24),
 prosecuted in the Kritias (pp. 113-114 seq.), but left by the
 author incomplete.]
 
@@ -24290,7 +24259,7 @@ vein, and takes pains to deliver one really good and excellent in
 its kind. His triumph is thus doubled. He tells the Rhetors that
 their business is a trifling and despicable one: at the same time
 showing them that, despicable as it is, he can surpass them in it,
-as he professes to surpass Lysias in the Phædrus.[36]
+as he professes to surpass Lysias in the PhÃ¦drus.[36]
 
 [Footnote 33: Aristoph. Acharn. 615, Equit. 640-887.
 
@@ -24309,10 +24278,10 @@ without knowing the history of Thucydides. When I see the extreme
 liberty which Plato takes throughout his harangue in regard to the
 history of the past, I can hardly believe that he ever read
 Thucydides; if he ever read the history, he certainly disregarded
-it altogether, and threw himself [Greek: e)pi\ to\ prosagôgo/teron
-tê=| a)kroa/sei ê)\ a)lêthe/steron]: like the [Greek:
+it altogether, and threw himself [Greek: e)pi\ to\ prosagÃ´go/teron
+tÃª=| a)kroa/sei Ãª)\ a)lÃªthe/steron]: like the [Greek:
 logogra/phoi] of whom Thucydides speaks, i. 21, Lysias among them,
-though in a less degree than Plato. Æschines Sokraticus had
+though in a less degree than Plato. Ã†schines Sokraticus had
 composed among his dialogues one entitled [Greek: A)spasi/a]. See
 Xenophon, Oeconom. i. 14; Cicero de Inventione, i. 31: Plutarch,
 Perikles, c. 24-32: also Bergk, De Reliquiis Comoed. Attic.
@@ -24328,11 +24297,11 @@ generation. He notices not only Plato's asperity in ridiculing
 most of his distinguished contemporaries, but also his marked
 rivalry against Lysias.
 
-[Greek: ê)=n ga/r, ê)=n me\n tê=| Pla/tônos phu/sei polla\s
-a)reta\s e)chou/sê| to\ philo/timon], &c. (p. 756).
+[Greek: Ãª)=n ga/r, Ãª)=n me\n tÃª=| Pla/tÃ´nos phu/sei polla\s
+a)reta\s e)chou/sÃª| to\ philo/timon], &c. (p. 756).
 
 See this subject well handled in an instructive Dissertation by M.
-Lebeau (Stuttgart, 1863, Lysias' Epitaphios als ächt erwiesen, pp.
+Lebeau (Stuttgart, 1863, Lysias' Epitaphios als Ã¤cht erwiesen, pp.
 42-46 seq.).]
 
 [Side-note: Anachronism of the Menexenus--Plato careless on this
@@ -24361,7 +24330,7 @@ dialogues which he disallows as spurious; and Suckow, Steinhart,
 and Ueberweg, are also inclined to disallow it. See Ueberweg, Die
 Aechtheit der Platonischen Schriften, pp. 143-148. These critics
 make light of the allusion of Aristotle in the Rhetoric--[Greek:
-Sôkra/tês e)n tô=| E)pitaphi/ô|]--which appears to me, I confess,
+SÃ´kra/tÃªs e)n tÃ´=| E)pitaphi/Ã´|]--which appears to me, I confess,
 of more weight than all the grounds of suspicion adduced by them
 to prove the dialogue spurious. The presumption in favour of the
 catalogue of Thrasyllus counts with them, here as elsewhere, for
@@ -24448,19 +24417,19 @@ reason shows you that wrong-doing is taken up unwillingly, and
 that greater precautions ought to be taken upon the subject, both
 by individuals and by cities."[4]
 
-[Footnote 2: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 A. [Greek: e)gô\ ga/r, ô)=
-Sô/krates, soi\ suggigno/menos, polla/kis e)xeplêtto/mên a)kou/ôn;
-kai/ moi e)do/keis para\ tou\s a)/llous a)nthrô/pous ka/llista
-le/gein, o(po/te e)pitimô=n toi=s a)nthrô/pois, ô(/sper e)pi\
-mêchanê=s tragikê=s theo/s, u(mei=s, le/gôn, poi= pheresthe,
-a)/nthrôpoi?] &c.]
+[Footnote 2: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 A. [Greek: e)gÃ´\ ga/r, Ã´)=
+SÃ´/krates, soi\ suggigno/menos, polla/kis e)xeplÃªtto/mÃªn a)kou/Ã´n;
+kai/ moi e)do/keis para\ tou\s a)/llous a)nthrÃ´/pous ka/llista
+le/gein, o(po/te e)pitimÃ´=n toi=s a)nthrÃ´/pois, Ã´(/sper e)pi\
+mÃªchanÃª=s tragikÃª=s theo/s, u(mei=s, le/gÃ´n, poi= pheresthe,
+a)/nthrÃ´poi?] &c.]
 
 [Footnote 3: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 B-C.]
 
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 D-E. [Greek: ô(/ste e)k
+[Footnote 4: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 D-E. [Greek: Ã´(/ste e)k
 panto\s tro/pou to/ ge a)dikei=n a)kou/sion o( lo/gos ai(rei=,
-kai\ dei=n e)pime/leian tê=s nu=n plei/ô poiei=sthai pa/nt'
-a)/ndra i)di/a| th' a(/ma kai\ dêmosi/a| xumpa/sas ta\s po/leis.]]
+kai\ dei=n e)pime/leian tÃª=s nu=n plei/Ã´ poiei=sthai pa/nt'
+a)/ndra i)di/a| th' a(/ma kai\ dÃªmosi/a| xumpa/sas ta\s po/leis.]]
 
 [Side-note: The observations made by Sokrates have been most
 salutary and stimulating in awakening ardour for virtue. Arguments
@@ -24487,9 +24456,9 @@ one else who knows the art of piloting men: which art you,
 Sokrates, denominate often the political art, sometimes the
 judicial art or justice.[5]
 
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 B. [Greek: ê)=n dê\ su\
-politikê/n, ô)= Sô/krates, o)noma/zeis polla/kis, tê\n au)tê\n dê\
-tau/tên dikastikê/n te kai\ dikaiosu/nên ô(s e)/sti le/gôn.]]
+[Footnote 5: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 B. [Greek: Ãª)=n dÃª\ su\
+politikÃª/n, Ã´)= SÃ´/krates, o)noma/zeis polla/kis, tÃª\n au)tÃª\n dÃª\
+tau/tÃªn dikastikÃª/n te kai\ dikaiosu/nÃªn Ã´(s e)/sti le/gÃ´n.]]
 
 [Side-note: But Sokrates does not explain what virtue is, nor how
 it is to be attained. Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and
@@ -24518,16 +24487,16 @@ were the arts prescribing how we should proceed? He would
 reply--The gymnastic and medical arts. How will Sokrates or his
 friends answer the corresponding question in their case?
 
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 C. [Greek: tou/tôn ga\r tou/s
-ti ma/lista ei)=nai doxazome/nous u(po\ sou= prô/tous
-e)panêrô/tôn, punthano/menos ti/s o( meta\ tau=t' ei)/ê lo/gos,
-_kai\ kata\ se\ tro/pon tina\ u(potei/nôn au)toi=s_], &c.]
+[Footnote 6: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 C. [Greek: tou/tÃ´n ga\r tou/s
+ti ma/lista ei)=nai doxazome/nous u(po\ sou= prÃ´/tous
+e)panÃªrÃ´/tÃ´n, punthano/menos ti/s o( meta\ tau=t' ei)/Ãª lo/gos,
+_kai\ kata\ se\ tro/pon tina\ u(potei/nÃ´n au)toi=s_], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 7: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 408 D-E. [Greek: ê)\ dei= to\n
-Sôkra/tên kai\ a)llê/lous ê(ma=s to\ meta\ tou=t' e)panerôta=|n,
-o(mologê/santas tou=t' au)to\ a)nthrô/pô| prakte/on ei)=nai. _Ti/
-tou)nteu=then_? pô=s a)/rchesthai dei=n phame\n dikaiosu/nês peri\
-mathê/seôs?]]
+[Footnote 7: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 408 D-E. [Greek: Ãª)\ dei= to\n
+SÃ´kra/tÃªn kai\ a)llÃª/lous Ãª(ma=s to\ meta\ tou=t' e)panerÃ´ta=|n,
+o(mologÃª/santas tou=t' au)to\ a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´| prakte/on ei)=nai. _Ti/
+tou)nteu=then_? pÃ´=s a)/rchesthai dei=n phame\n dikaiosu/nÃªs peri\
+mathÃª/seÃ´s?]]
 
 [Side-note: Questions addressed by Kleitophon with this view, both
 to the companions of Sokrates and to Sokrates himself.]
@@ -24548,8 +24517,8 @@ succession of just men: but what is its working province? what is
 the work which the just man does for us?
 
 [Footnote 8: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 A. [Greek: ei)po/ntos de\
-mou=, Mê/ moi to\ o)/noma mo/non ei)pê=|s, a)lla\ ô)=de--I)atrikê/
-pou/ tis le/getai te/chnê], &c,]
+mou=, MÃª/ moi to\ o)/noma mo/non ei)pÃª=|s, a)lla\ Ã´)=de--I)atrikÃª/
+pou/ tis le/getai te/chnÃª], &c,]
 
 [Side-note: Replies made by the friends of Sokrates
 unsatisfactory.]
@@ -24568,14 +24537,14 @@ is the special work, corresponding thereunto, of the art called
 Justice?
 
 [Footnote 9: Plato, Kleitoph. 409 B. [Greek: to\ d' e(/teron, o(\
-du/natai poiei=n ê(mi=n e)/rgon o( di/kaios, ti/ tou=to/ phamen?
-ei)=pe. Ou(=tos me/n, ô(s oi)=mai, _to\ sumphe/ron_ a)pekri/nato;
-a)/llos de/, _to\ de/on_; e(/teros de/, to\ _ô)phe/limon_; o( de/,
-to\ _lusitelou=n_. e)panê/|ein dê\ e)gô\ le/gôn o(/ti ka)kei=na/
-ge o)no/mata tau=t' e)sti\n e)n e(ka/stê| tô=n technô=n, o)rthô=s
-pra/ttein, lusitelou=nta, ô)phe/lima, kai\ ta)/lla ta\ toiau=ta;
+du/natai poiei=n Ãª(mi=n e)/rgon o( di/kaios, ti/ tou=to/ phamen?
+ei)=pe. Ou(=tos me/n, Ã´(s oi)=mai, _to\ sumphe/ron_ a)pekri/nato;
+a)/llos de/, _to\ de/on_; e(/teros de/, to\ _Ã´)phe/limon_; o( de/,
+to\ _lusitelou=n_. e)panÃª/|ein dÃª\ e)gÃ´\ le/gÃ´n o(/ti ka)kei=na/
+ge o)no/mata tau=t' e)sti\n e)n e(ka/stÃª| tÃ´=n technÃ´=n, o)rthÃ´=s
+pra/ttein, lusitelou=nta, Ã´)phe/lima, kai\ ta)/lla ta\ toiau=ta;
 a)lla\ pro\s o(/, ti tau=ta pa/nta tei/nei, e)rei= to\ i)/dion
-e(ka/stê| te/chnê|], &c.]
+e(ka/stÃª| te/chnÃª|], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: None of them could explain what the special work of
 justice or virtue was.]
@@ -24591,10 +24560,10 @@ friendship was, sameness of reason and intelligence: not sameness
 of opinion, which was often hurtful--but knowledge and reason
 agreeing, in different persons.[11]
 
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 D. [Greek: Teleutô=n
-a)pekri/nato/ tis, ô)= Sô/krates, moi\ tô=n sô=n e(tai/rôn, o(\s
-dê\ kompso/tata e)/doxen ei)pei=n, o(/ti tou=t' ei)/ê to\ tê=s
-dikaiosu/nês i)/dion e)/rgon, o(\ tô=n a)/llôn ou)demia=s,
+[Footnote 10: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 D. [Greek: TeleutÃ´=n
+a)pekri/nato/ tis, Ã´)= SÃ´/krates, moi\ tÃ´=n sÃ´=n e(tai/rÃ´n, o(\s
+dÃª\ kompso/tata e)/doxen ei)pei=n, o(/ti tou=t' ei)/Ãª to\ tÃª=s
+dikaiosu/nÃªs i)/dion e)/rgon, o(\ tÃ´=n a)/llÃ´n ou)demia=s,
 phili/an e)n tai=s po/lesi poiei=n.]]
 
 [Footnote 11: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 E.]
@@ -24610,11 +24579,11 @@ been called Justice, no one could see to what purpose it tended,
 nor what was its special work.[12]
 
 [Footnote 12: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 410 A. [Greek: kai\ e)/legon]
-(_i.e._ the hearers said) [Greek: o(/ti kai\ ê( i)atrikê\
+(_i.e._ the hearers said) [Greek: o(/ti kai\ Ãª( i)atrikÃª\
 o(mo/noia/ ti/s e)sti, kai\ a(/pasai ai( te/chnai, kai\ peri\
-o(/tou ei)si/n, e)/chousi le/gein; tê\n de\ u(po\ sou= legome/nên
-dikaiosu/nên ê)\ o(mo/noian, o(/poi tei/nousa/ e)sti,
-diape/pheuge, kai\ a)/dêlon au)tê=s o(/, ti po/t e)sti\ to\
+o(/tou ei)si/n, e)/chousi le/gein; tÃª\n de\ u(po\ sou= legome/nÃªn
+dikaiosu/nÃªn Ãª)\ o(mo/noian, o(/poi tei/nousa/ e)sti,
+diape/pheuge, kai\ a)/dÃªlon au)tÃª=s o(/, ti po/t e)sti\ to\
 e)/rgon.]]
 
 [Side-note: Kleitophon at length asked the question from Sokrates
@@ -24654,14 +24623,14 @@ other objects are treasured up. Put me down as having already
 given my adhesion to all these views of yours.
 
 [Footnote 13: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 B. [Greek: Tau=ta de\
-ou)ch a(/pax ou)de\ di\s a)lla\ polu\n dê\ u(pomei/nas chro/non
-kai\ liparô=n a)pei/rêka], &c.]
+ou)ch a(/pax ou)de\ di\s a)lla\ polu\n dÃª\ u(pomei/nas chro/non
+kai\ liparÃ´=n a)pei/rÃªka], &c.]
 
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 C. [Greek: dia\ tau=ta dê\
+[Footnote 14: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 C. [Greek: dia\ tau=ta dÃª\
 kai\ pro\s Thrasu/machon, oi)=mai, poreu/somai, kai\ a)/llose
-o(/poi du/namai, a)porô=n--e)pei\ ei)/ g' e)the/lois su\ tou/tôn
-me\n ê)/dê pau/sasthai pro\s e)me\ tô=n lo/gôn tô=n
-protreptikô=n], &c.]
+o(/poi du/namai, a)porÃ´=n--e)pei\ ei)/ g' e)the/lois su\ tou/tÃ´n
+me\n Ãª)/dÃª pau/sasthai pro\s e)me\ tÃ´=n lo/gÃ´n tÃ´=n
+protreptikÃ´=n], &c.]
 
 [Side-note: Kleitophon is on the point of leaving Sokrates and
 going to Thrasymachus. But before leaving he addresses one last
@@ -24676,10 +24645,10 @@ to one who has already been stimulated, it is rather a hindrance
 than a help, to his realising the full acquisition of virtue, and
 thus becoming happy.[15]
 
-[Footnote 15: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 E. [Greek: mê\ me\n ga\r
-protetramme/nô| se\ a)nthrô/pô|, ô)= Sô/krates, a)/xion ei)=nai
-tou= panto\s phê/sô, protetramme/nô| de/, schedo\n kai\ e)mpo/dion
-tou= pro\s te/los a)retê=s e)ltho/nta eu)dai/mona gene/sthai.]]
+[Footnote 15: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 E. [Greek: mÃª\ me\n ga\r
+protetramme/nÃ´| se\ a)nthrÃ´/pÃ´|, Ã´)= SÃ´/krates, a)/xion ei)=nai
+tou= panto\s phÃª/sÃ´, protetramme/nÃ´| de/, schedo\n kai\ e)mpo/dion
+tou= pro\s te/los a)retÃª=s e)ltho/nta eu)dai/mona gene/sthai.]]
 
 *  *  *  *  *
 
@@ -24690,7 +24659,7 @@ with Kritias, the other fragment.]
 The fragment called Kleitophon (of which I have given an abstract
 comparatively long), is in several ways remarkable. The
 Thrasyllean catalogue places it first in the eighth Tetralogy; the
-three other members of the same Tetralogy being, Republic, Timæus,
+three other members of the same Tetralogy being, Republic, TimÃ¦us,
 Kritias.[16] Though it is both short, and abrupt in its close, we
 know that it was so likewise in antiquity: the ancient Platonic
 commentators observing, that Sokrates disdained to make any reply
@@ -24707,10 +24676,10 @@ minus falsum est, quod _spurium_ Clitophontem plerique omnes
 mutilatum putant; quem ex auctoris manibus truncum excidisse inde
 intelligitur, quod ne vetusti quidem Platonici philosophi, quibus
 antiquissima exemplaria ad manum erant, habuerunt integriorem.
-Proclus in Timæ, i. p. 7. [Greek: Ptolemai=os de\ o( Platôniko\s
-Kleitophô=nta au)to\n oi)/etai ei)=nai. tou=ton ga\r e)n tô=|
-o(mônu/mô| dialo/gô| mêd' a)pokri/seôs ê)xiô=sthai para\
-Sôkra/tous.] Plané ut in Critiâ, quem ab ipso Platone non
+Proclus in TimÃ¦, i. p. 7. [Greek: Ptolemai=os de\ o( PlatÃ´niko\s
+KleitophÃ´=nta au)to\n oi)/etai ei)=nai. tou=ton ga\r e)n tÃ´=|
+o(mÃ´nu/mÃ´| dialo/gÃ´| mÃªd' a)pokri/seÃ´s Ãª)xiÃ´=sthai para\
+SÃ´kra/tous.] PlanÃ© ut in CritiÃ¢, quem ab ipso Platone non
 absolutum docet Plutarchus in Solone."
 
 M. Boeckh here characterises the Kleitophon as _spurious_, in
@@ -24752,7 +24721,7 @@ other critics of the present century. I see no ground for this
 opinion, and I believe the dialogue to be genuine. If it be asked,
 how can we imagine Plato to have composed a polemic argument, both
 powerful and unanswered, against Sokrates,--I reply, that this is
-not so surprising as the Parmenidês: in which Plato has introduced
+not so surprising as the ParmenidÃªs: in which Plato has introduced
 the veteran so named as the successful assailant not only of
 Sokrates, but of the Platonic theory of Ideas defended by
 Sokrates.
@@ -24798,11 +24767,11 @@ an answer to the respectful, yet emphatic, requisition of
 Kleitophon. The case against Sokrates has been made so strong,
 that I doubt whether Plato himself could have answered it to his
 own satisfaction. It resembles the objections which he advances in
-the Parmenidês against the theory of Ideas: objections which he
+the ParmenidÃªs against the theory of Ideas: objections which he
 has nowhere answered, and which I do not believe that he could
 answer. The characteristic attribute of which Kleitophon complains
 in Sokrates is, that of a one-sided and incomplete
-efficiency--([Greek: phu/sis mono/kôlos])--"You are perpetually stirring
+efficiency--([Greek: phu/sis mono/kÃ´los])--"You are perpetually stirring
 us up and instigating us: you do this most admirably: but when we have
 become full of fervour, you do not teach us how we are to act, nor
 point out the goal towards which we are to move".[18] Now this is
@@ -24845,16 +24814,16 @@ addressed by Cicero to Varro, and coinciding substantially with
 that of Kleitophon here.]
 
 [Footnote 19: Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 28 E, 29 D-E, 30 A-E. 30 E:
-[Greek: proskei/menon tê=| po/lei u(po\ tou= theou= ô(/sper
-i(/ppô| mega/lô| me\n kai\ gennai/ô|, u(po\ mege/thous de\
-nôtheste/rô| kai\ deome/nô| e)gei/resthai u(po\ mu/ôpo/s tinos;
-oi(=on dê/ moi dokei= o( theo\s e)me\ tê=| po/lei prostetheike/nai
-toiou=to/n tina, o(\s u(ma=s e)gei/rôn kai\ pei/thôn kai\
-o)neidi/zôn e(/na e(/kaston ou)de\n pau/omai tê\n ê(me/ran o(/lên
-pantachou= proskathi/zôn.] Also pp. 36 D, 41 E.]
+[Greek: proskei/menon tÃª=| po/lei u(po\ tou= theou= Ã´(/sper
+i(/ppÃ´| mega/lÃ´| me\n kai\ gennai/Ã´|, u(po\ mege/thous de\
+nÃ´theste/rÃ´| kai\ deome/nÃ´| e)gei/resthai u(po\ mu/Ã´po/s tinos;
+oi(=on dÃª/ moi dokei= o( theo\s e)me\ tÃª=| po/lei prostetheike/nai
+toiou=to/n tina, o(\s u(ma=s e)gei/rÃ´n kai\ pei/thÃ´n kai\
+o)neidi/zÃ´n e(/na e(/kaston ou)de\n pau/omai tÃª\n Ãª(me/ran o(/lÃªn
+pantachou= proskathi/zÃ´n.] Also pp. 36 D, 41 E.]
 
-[Footnote 20: Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 21 D-22 D, 33 A: [Greek: e)gô\
-de\ dida/skalos ou)deno\s pô/pot' e)geno/mên.]]
+[Footnote 20: Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 21 D-22 D, 33 A: [Greek: e)gÃ´\
+de\ dida/skalos ou)deno\s pÃ´/pot' e)geno/mÃªn.]]
 
 [Footnote 21: Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 23 A, 28 A.]
 
@@ -24872,7 +24841,7 @@ by finding some tenable result: but the didactic supplement is not
 forthcoming. Sokrates ends by creating a painful feeling of
 perplexity in the hearers, but he himself shares the feeling along
 with them.--It is this which the youth Protarchus deprecates, at
-the beginning of the Platonic Philêbus;[22] and with which Hippias
+the beginning of the Platonic PhilÃªbus;[22] and with which Hippias
 taunts Sokrates, in one of the Xenophontic
 conversations[23]--insomuch that Sokrates replies to the taunt by
 giving a definition of the Just ([Greek: to\ di/kaion]), upon which
@@ -24885,24 +24854,24 @@ Elenchus to it.[24] Lastly, Xenophon expressly tells us, that
 there were others also, who, both in speech and writing, imputed
 to Sokrates the same deficiency on the affirmative side.[25]
 
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Philêbus, p. 20 A.]
+[Footnote 22: Plato, PhilÃªbus, p. 20 A.]
 
 [Footnote 23: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 9-11.]
 
 [Footnote 24: We need only compare the observations made by
 Hippias in that dialogue, to the objections raised by Sokrates
-himself in his conversation with Euthydêmus, Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2,
+himself in his conversation with EuthydÃªmus, Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2,
 and to the dialogue of the youthful Alkibiades (evidently borrowed
 from Sokrates) with Perikles, ib. i. 2, 40-47.]
 
 [Footnote 25: Xenoph. Memor. i. 4, 1. [Greek: ei) de/ tines
-Sôkra/tên nomi/zousin, ô(s e(/nioi gra/phousi/ te kai\ le/gousi
-peri\ au)tou= tekmairo/menoi, protre/psasthai me\n a)nthrô/pous
-e)p' a)retê\n kra/tiston gegone/nai, proagagei=n de\ e)p' au)tê\n
-ou)ch i(kano/n--skepsa/menoi mê\ mo/non], &c.
+SÃ´kra/tÃªn nomi/zousin, Ã´(s e(/nioi gra/phousi/ te kai\ le/gousi
+peri\ au)tou= tekmairo/menoi, protre/psasthai me\n a)nthrÃ´/pous
+e)p' a)retÃª\n kra/tiston gegone/nai, proagagei=n de\ e)p' au)tÃª\n
+ou)ch i(kano/n--skepsa/menoi mÃª\ mo/non], &c.
 
 See also Cicero, De Oratore, i. 47, 204, in which Sokrates is
-represented as saying that _concitatio_ ([Greek: protropê\]) was
+represented as saying that _concitatio_ ([Greek: protropÃª\]) was
 all that people required: they did not need guidance: they would
 find out the way for themselves: and Yxem, Ueber Platon's
 Kleitophon, pp. 5-12.]
@@ -24952,8 +24921,8 @@ Sokrates employs (Repub. i. p. 332 C) in characterising the
 definition of Justice furnished by (or ascribed to) the poet
 Simonides:--
 
-[Greek: ê)|ni/xato, ô(s e)/oiken, o( Simôni/dês poiêtikô=s to\
-di/kaion o(\ ei)/ê.]]
+[Greek: Ãª)|ni/xato, Ã´(s e)/oiken, o( SimÃ´ni/dÃªs poiÃªtikÃ´=s to\
+di/kaion o(\ ei)/Ãª.]]
 
 [Side-note: The Kleitophon represents a point of view which many
 objectors must have insisted on against Sokrates and Plato.]
@@ -25018,7 +24987,7 @@ the objections raised by a Sokratic cross-examiner.[29]
 man to hurt any one, either friend or foe, Repub. p. 335 D.
 
 Thrasymachus derides any such definitions of [Greek: to\ di/kaion]
-as the following--[Greek: to\ de/on--to\ ô)phe/limon--to\
+as the following--[Greek: to\ de/on--to\ Ã´)phe/limon--to\
 lusitelou=n--to\ xumphe/ron--to\ kerda/leon], Repub. i. p. 336,
 C-D.
 
@@ -25069,24 +25038,24 @@ For the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used:
 ) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute
 accent; \ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript.
 ch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta;
-ê for eta and ô for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases.
+Ãª for eta and Ã´ for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases.
 
 Corrections to the text, indicated in text with **:
 
 Location             Text of scan of 3rd edition   Correction
 ToC, Ch. 31          admissable                    admissible
-Ch. 26 fn. 30        phi/lê=|                      phi/lê|
+Ch. 26 fn. 30        phi/lÃª=|                      phi/lÃª|
 Ch. 26 fn. 33        to/de\                        to/de
 Ch. 26 after fn. 125 fourth                        eighth
-Ch. 28 fn. 47        aussitot                      aussitôt
+Ch. 28 fn. 47        aussitot                      aussitÃ´t
 Ch. 28 fn. 78        ajourd'hui                    aujourd'hui
 Ch. 28 fn. 92        It we compare                 If we compare
-Ch. 28 fn. 97        Theætêt. p. 186 C.            Theætêt. p. 186 D.
+Ch. 28 fn. 97        TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 186 C.            TheÃ¦tÃªt. p. 186 D.
 Ch. 28 fn. 99        tuphra/                       tuphla/
 Ch. 28 after fn. 143 Chapter VI                    Chapter VIII
 Ch. 29 fn. 23        p. 130 D                      p. 130 E
 Ch. 29 fn. 102       paphei=n                      pathei=n
-Ch. 30 fn. 18        Phædrus p. 229 C),            Phædrus (p. 229 C),
+Ch. 30 fn. 18        PhÃ¦drus p. 229 C),            PhÃ¦drus (p. 229 C),
 Ch. 31 fn. 18        e(u)=n                        ou)=n
 Ch. 31 fn. 18        oka/stou                      e(ka/stou
 Ch. 31 fn. 40        Is is                         It is
@@ -25094,7 +25063,7 @@ Ch. 31 fn. 47        tems                          temps
 Ch. 31 fn. 48        ab-antiquitatis               ab antiquitatis
 Ch. 31 fn. 58        429-411 C.                    409-411 C.
 Ch. 31 fn. 63        p. .                          p. 88
-Ch. 32 fn. 42        pho/bpn                       pho/bôn
+Ch. 32 fn. 42        pho/bpn                       pho/bÃ´n
 Ch. 33 fn. 31        p. 373                        p. 359
 
 
@@ -25104,357 +25073,4 @@ Ch. 33 fn. 31        p. 373                        p. 359
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+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40437 ***
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     <title>eBook of George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of
       Sokrates: Vol. 3 of 4</title>
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-Title: Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume III (of 4)
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-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO, COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, VOL III ***
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+<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40437 ***</div>
 
    <h3>PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.</h3><p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p>
 <div class="title">
@@ -35361,379 +35327,6 @@ yet
    <h4>Transcriber&rsquo;s Note</h4>
    <p>This HTML version was prepared initially for the on-line Grote Project by Ed Brandon from volumes in the Internet Archive. It owes a very great deal (its style sheet) to the Project Gutenberg versions of the 1911 <i>Encyclopedia Britannica</i> produced by Don Kretz and others. Don provided a revised style for the side-notes to accommodate Grote&rsquo;s predilection for very long notes. (Even so there are a few occasions where the appearance may yet be bad in some browsers because the side-note extends over more lines than its accompanying paragraph. If there are also footnotes in the paragraph I have had to guess at how much blank space should be inserted for the footnote not to overlap the side-note.) I have modified it in one respect to permit Grote&rsquo;s use of italics in some side-notes.</p>
 
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+<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40437 ***</div>
+</body>
 </html>
diff --git a/40437.txt b/40437.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index ceadf74..0000000
--- a/40437.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25460 +0,0 @@
-The Project Gutenberg EBook of Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,
-3rd ed. Volume III (of 4), by George Grote
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
-almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
-re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
-with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
-
-
-Title: Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume III (of 4)
-
-Author: George Grote
-
-Release Date: August 7, 2012 [EBook #40437]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: ASCII
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO, COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, VOL III ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
-
-
-
-
-PLATO,
-
-AND THE
-
-OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
-
-
-
-BY
-
-GEORGE GROTE
-
-AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.
-
-
-
-_A NEW EDITION._
-
-IN FOUR VOLUMES.
-
-VOL. III.
-
-LONDON:
-
-JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
-
-1888.
-
-_The right of Translation is reserved._
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS.
-
-CHAPTER XXVI.
-
-PHAEDRUS--SYMPOSION.
-
-
-These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phaedrus is the
-originator of both   1
-
-Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in
-Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in
-Greece   _ib._
-
-Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical
-communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation
-between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual
-generalisation of the sentiment   4
-
-All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it
-by various means. The name _Eros_ is confined to one special case
-of this large variety   5
-
-Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only
-attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal
-beauty as an originating stimulus   6
-
-Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged
-minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty in general.
-This is the most absorbing sentiment of all   7
-
-Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros
-with several different views of it previously enunciated by the
-other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the
-drunken Alkibiades   8
-
-Views of Eros presented by Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus,
-Aristophanes, Agathon   9
-
-Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes
-Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Daemon between Gods and men,
-constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it   9
-
-Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who
-knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge   10
-
-Eros as presented in the Phaedrus--Discourse of Lysias, and
-counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is seized
-with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros   11
-
-Panegyric--Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety
-of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness,
-both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than
-sobriety   _ib._
-
-Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality
-and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of
-partial companionship with
-Gods and eternal Ideas   12
-
-Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the Intellectual
-faculties of man--Comparison and combination of particular
-sensations indispensable--Reminiscence   13
-
-Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the
-aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the
-world of sense and the world of Ideas   14
-
-Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phaedrus and Symposion, to
-Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy
-and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory   15
-
-Differences between Symposion and Phaedrus. In-dwelling conceptions
-assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter   17
-
-Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion _ib._
-
-Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in
-Symposion   18
-
-Eros recognised, both in Phaedrus and Symposion, as affording the
-initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised in Phaedon,
-Theaetetus, and elsewhere   _ib._
-
-Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the
-Symposion--Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome
-youths   19
-
-Perfect self-command of Sokrates--proof against every sort of
-trial   20
-
-Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion--Sokrates is
-not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process   21
-
-Symposion and Phaedon--each is the antithesis and complement of the
-other   22
-
-Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon    _ib._
-
-Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion   24
-
-Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the
-Xenophontic   25
-
-Second half of the Phaedrus--passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros
-is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise   26
-
-Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt
-conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is,
-Whether a man writes well or ill   27
-
-Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well.
-Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful
-Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?   28
-
-Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be founded
-upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to
-the truth _ib._
-
-Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and
-his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he
-meant by it: Lysias did not define   29
-
-Logical processes--Definition and Division--both of them
-exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates   _ib._
-
-View of Sokrates--that there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except
-what is already comprised in Dialectic--The rhetorical teaching is
-empty and useless   30
-
-What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be--Analogy of Hippokrates and
-the medical Art   31
-
-Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of
-minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their
-varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other,
-suitably to each particular case   32
-
-The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth,
-as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not
-sufficiently rewarded for this labour   33
-
-Question about Writing--As an Art, for the purpose of instruction,
-it can do little--Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of
-what he already knows   _ib._
-
-Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will produce any
-serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are
-necessary   34
-
-The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really
-teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer   37
-
-Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a
-philosopher   38
-
-Date of the Phaedrus--not an early dialogue _ib._
-
-Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses--His theory of
-Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic   _ib._
-
-His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured--it
-assumes that all the doubts have been already removed   39
-
-The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds
-unoccupied and willing to learn   _ib._
-
-The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds
-pre-occupied--guiding them methodically from error to truth   40
-
-He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of
-persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on
-the one to the other in each particular case   41
-
-Plato's _Ideal_ of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part
-incompatible conditions--the Wise man or philosopher will never be
-listened to by the public   _ib._
-
-The other part of the Platonic _Ideal_ is grand but
-unattainable--breadth of psychological data and classified
-modes of discourse   42
-
-Plato's ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical
-teachers--Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an
-accomplished man   44
-
-The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato
-conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required
-to be explained to all learners   45
-
-Plato includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof
-to new particular cases. This can never be taught by rule   46
-
-Plato's charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out
-47
-
-Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater
-works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a
-private circle   47
-
-No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias
-and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phaedrus  48
-
-Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a
-means of instruction to the ignorant   49
-
-Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know--or
-as an elegant pastime   50
-
-Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised   51
-
-No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties
-raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein
-of philosophy _ib._
-
-Plato's _ideal_ philosopher can only be realised under the
-hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into
-full reminiscence here   52
-
-Different proceeding of Plato in the Timaeus   53
-
-Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's mind--Extreme of the
-Transcendental or Absolute--Extreme of specialising adaptation to
-individuals and occasions   54
-
-
-CHAPTER XXVII.
-
-PARMENIDES.
-
-Character of dialogues immediately preceding--much transcendental
-assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides   56
-
-Sokrates is the juvenile defendant--Parmenides the veteran censor
-and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises to be
-performed by the philosophical aspirant   _ib._
-
-Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides   57
-
-Manner in which the doctrine of Parmenides was impugned. Manner in
-which his partisan Zeno defended him   58
-
-Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the
-Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet
-participable by them   60
-
-Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates.
-Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of
-Ideas   60
-
-What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and Good? Yes. Of
-Man, Horse, &c.? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c.? No   _ib._
-
-Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to the
-philosopher   61
-
-Remarks upon this--Contrast between emotional and scientific
-classification   _ib._
-
-Objections of Parmenides--How can objects participate in the
-Ideas. Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof   62
-
-Comparing the Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the
-Idea, there is a likeness between them which must be  represented
-by a higher Idea--and so on _ad infinitum_   63
-
-Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more?
-Impossible   64
-
-The Ideas are types or exemplars, and objects partake of them by
-being likened to them. Impossible   65
-
-If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know only
-what is relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative to
-individuals: Ideas relative to Ideas   _ib._
-
-Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do
-not possess   66
-
-Form of cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs to the Gods.
-We cannot know them, nor can they know us   _ib._
-
-Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do
-not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can
-be no dialectic discussion   67
-
-Dilemma put by Parmenides--Acuteness of his objections   68
-
-The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic
-theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of
-the Platonic dialogues   _ib._
-
-Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato
-would never make such objections against his own theory, and
-denies the authenticity of the Parmenides   69
-
-Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive system of
-his own   70
-
-Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search   _ib._
-
-The Parmenides is the extreme manifestation of the negative
-element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth
-the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural
-71
-
-Force of the negative case in the Parmenides. Difficulties about
-participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas   _ib._
-
-Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are
-absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they
-must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura   72
-
-Answer of Sokrates--That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind.
-Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped   73
-
-Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times
-to the present day--Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon it
-76
-
-Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of
-sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded   78
-
-Continuation of the Dialogue--Parmenides admonishes Sokrates that
-he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient
-preliminary exercise   79
-
-What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume
-provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many
-hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the
-consequences of each   _ib._
-
-Impossible to do this before a numerous audience--Parmenides is
-entreated to give a specimen--After much solicitation he agrees
-80
-
-Parmenides elects his own theory of the _Unum_, as the topic for
-exhibition--Aristoteles becomes respondent   _ib._
-
-Exhibition of Parmenides--Nine distinct deductions or
-Demonstrations, first from _Unum Est_--next from _Unum non Est_
-81
-
-The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies.
-Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any
-explanation   _ib._
-
-Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies
-and the dialogue generally   82
-
-No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the dialogue.
-The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the
-difficulties of theorising   85
-
-This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself. All
-dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and
-even inconsistent with what is declared   87
-
-The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much
-unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained
-perplexities or [Greek: a)pori/ai]   88
-
-Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still
-choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a
-forward affirmative aspirant   89
-
-The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as
-illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied to many
-other Antinomies   91
-
-These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the
-sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric philosophers
-_ib._
-
-In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we ought to
-have before us the problems of the Megarics and others.
-Uselessness of searching for a positive result   93
-
-Assumptions of Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey the minimum
-of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these
-indeterminate predicates, Ens,  Unum, &c.   94
-
-In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words is
-made to bear very different meanings   95
-
-First demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative conclusions.
-_Reductio ad Absurdum_, of the assumption--Unum non Multa   96
-
-Second Demonstration   97
-
-It ends in demonstrating _Both_, of that which the first
-Demonstration had demonstrated _Neither_   98
-
-Startling paradox--Open offence against logical canon--No logical
-canon had then been laid down   99
-
-Demonstration third--Attempt to reconcile the contradiction of
-Demonstrations I. and II.   100
-
-Plato's imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous--Breaches or
-momentary stoppages in the course of time   _ib._
-
-Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in
-each, the first proves the Neither, the second proves the Both
-101
-
-The third Demonstration is mediatorial but not satisfactory--The
-hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no favour   102
-
-Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VII.
-103
-
-Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of
-Parmenides   104
-
-Demonstrations VI. and VII. considered--Unwarrantable steps in the
-reasoning--The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though
-the same in words   105
-
-Demonstrations VIII. and IX.--Analysis of Demonstration VIII.
-106
-
-Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian   107
-
-Demonstration IX. _Neither_ following _Both_   _ib._
-
-Concluding words of the Parmenides--Declaration that he has
-demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different
-propositions   108
-
-Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the
-Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma adapted its
-conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not   _ib._
-
-
-CHAPTER XXVIII.
-
-THEAETETUS.
-
-Subjects and personages in the Theaetetus   110
-
-Question raised by Sokrates--What is knowledge or Cognition? First
-answer of Theaetetus, enumerating many different cognitions.
-Corrected by Sokrates   111
-
-Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given.
-Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy--mental obstetric--He
-cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds
-112
-
-Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates--He is
-forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge   113
-
-Answer of Theaetetus--Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates
-says that this is the same doctrine as the _Homo Mensura_ laid
-down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the
-doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedokles, &c., all except
-Parmenides   _ib._
-
-Plato here blends together three distinct theories for the purpose
-of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be said
-in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition   114
-
-The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other
-doctrines. The identification of them as one and the same is only
-constructive--the interpretation of Plato himself   115
-
-Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras--_Homo Mensura_   116
-
-Perpetual implication of Subject with Object--Relate and Correlate
-118
-
-Such relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative
-combinations of each individual, than in regard to his percipient
-capacities   _ib._
-
-Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in
-regard to the intelligible world   121
-
-The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in reference to
-the intelligible world than in reference to sense   122
-
-Object always relative to Subject--Either without the other,
-impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes   126
-
-Plato's representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate
-conjunction with the Herakleitean   126
-
-Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him   _ib._
-
-Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply without a
-comparing subject   127
-
-Relativity twofold--to the comparing Subject--to another object,
-besides the one directly described   _ib._
-
-Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus--yet so as to implicate
-it with that of Protagoras   128
-
-Agent and Patient--No absolute Ens   129
-
-Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered   130
-
-Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates
-is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of
-consciousness by independent Subject and Object   131
-
-Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double
-potentiality--Subjective and Objective   133
-
-Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the
-Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on
-a par--that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every
-one, but the wise man only, is a measure   135
-
-In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself.
-Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is
-required   136
-
-Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that
-doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All
-belief relative to the condition of the believing mind   137
-
-All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual
-judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical
-forms of language   139
-
-Argument--That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and
-animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain
-Plato's objection   141
-
-Belief on authority is true to the believer himself--The efficacy
-of authority resides in the believer's own mind   142
-
-Protagorean formula--is false, to those who dissent from it   143
-
-Plato's argument that the wise man alone is a measure--Reply to it
-_ib._
-
-Plato's argument as to the distinction between present sensation
-and anticipation of the future   145
-
-The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes
-himself to be infallible   _ib._
-
-Plato's argument is untenable--That if the Protagorean formula be
-admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled--The reverse is
-true--Dialectic recognises the autonomy of the Individual mind
-146
-
-Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus--Plato assumes infallible
-authority--sets aside dialectic   148
-
-Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the
-measure for all. Counter proposition to the formula   _ib._
-
-Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state
-explicitly the counter-proposition   150
-
-Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula--Most believers insist
-upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for
-themselves. Appeal to Abstractions   150
-
-Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the Protagorean
-formula--Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of
-examining for himself Aristotle's canons of truth   152
-
-Plato's examination of the other doctrine--That knowledge is
-Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are
-different with different Percipients   153
-
-Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions
-of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense--weighing,
-measuring, &c.   154
-
-Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence
-between one man and another arises, not merely from different
-sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference
-155
-
-Argument--That sensible Perception does not include
-memory--Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include
-memory   157
-
-Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same
-time   _ib._
-
-Sokrates maintains that we do not see _with_ our eyes, but that
-the mind sees _through_ the eyes: that the mind often conceives
-and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily organ   159
-
-Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by itself--It
-perceives Existence, Difference, &c.   160
-
-Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the
-Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add
-computations of the mind respecting them   161
-
-Examination of this view--Distinction from the views of modern
-philosophers   162
-
-Different views given by Plato in other dialogues   163
-
-Plato's discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable
-advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation,
-first to Opinion, then to Cognition   164
-
-Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from
-facts of sense, as either necessary or possible   168
-
-Second definition given by Theaetetus--That Cognition consists in
-right or true opinion   _ib._
-
-Objection by Sokrates--This definition assumes that there are
-false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we
-conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct realities?
-_ib._
-
-Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are
-engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present
-sensations with past impressions   169
-
-Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is
-impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know   170
-
-He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it
-actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons
-turned into it and flying about   _ib._
-
-Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theaetetus--That there may be
-non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false
-opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates
-rejects this   171
-
-He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same
-as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but
-they do not teach or communicate knowledge   172
-
-New answer of Theaetetus--Cognition is true opinion, coupled with
-rational explanation   173
-
-Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words,
-primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained:
-compounds alone can be explained   _ib._
-
-Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable,
-the compound must be unknowable also   174
-
-Rational explanation may have one of three different meanings. 1.
-Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration of all the
-component elements in the compound. In neither of these meanings
-will the definition of Cognition hold   _ib._
-
-Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be
-explained differs from everything else. The definition will not
-hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included
-in true opinion   175
-
-Conclusion of the dialogue--Summing up by Sokrates--Value of the
-result, although purely negative   176
-
-Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of
-knowledge removed. Importance of such removal   _ib._
-
-Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's minds, value
-of the Theaetetus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own
-suggestions   177
-
-Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is
-enslaved to the opinions of auditors   178
-
-The Philosopher is master of his own debates   179
-
-Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search
-_ib._
-
-Difficulties of the Theaetetus are not solved in any other Dialogue
-180
-
-Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest
-occupation of life   182
-
-Contrast between the philosopher and the practical
-statesman--between Knowledge and Opinion   183
-
-
-CHAPTER XXIX.
-
-SOPHISTES--POLITIKUS.
-
-
-Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues   185
-
-Relation of the two dialogues to the Theaetetus   187
-
-Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in
-logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to
-that purpose   188
-
-Method of logical Definition and Division   _ib._
-
-Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a
-vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the
-Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division   189
-
-Such a lesson in logical classification was at that time both
-novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed   190
-
-Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces
-the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus
-of art   191
-
-The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different
-descending subdivision   192
-
-Also, by a third   193
-
-The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or
-discriminating art   194
-
-In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much
-attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific
-classification   195
-
-The purifier--a species under the genus discriminator--separates
-good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is,
-Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge   197
-
-Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil.
-Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear
-upon it. This is the sovereign purifier   _ib._
-
-The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist,
-looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a
-juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about every thing--who palms
-off falsehood for truth   198
-
-Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to
-think or to speak falsely?   199
-
-He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of
-questions   _ib._
-
-The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming
-that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make
-out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens   200
-
-The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various
-philosophers about Ens   _ib._
-
-Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens   201
-
-Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about
-One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them   201
-
-Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia
-or elements. Two classes thereof   202
-
-1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or
-Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia   _ib._
-
-Argument against the Materialists--Justice must be something,
-since it may be either present or absent, making sensible
-difference--But Justice is not a body   203
-
-At least many of them will concede this point, though not all Ens
-is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent
-to potentiality   204
-
-Argument against the Idealists--who distinguish Ens from the
-generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through
-our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses   _ib._
-
-Holding communion--What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the
-mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both
-the unchangeable and the changeable   205
-
-Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in
-Ens. Ens is a _tertium quid_--distinct from both. But how can
-anything be distinct from both?   206
-
-Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his
-purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens   _ib._
-
-Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate,
-except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each
-other   _ib._
-
-No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common
-speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis   207
-
-Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms--inadmissible   _ib._
-
-Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only
-admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables   _ib._
-
-Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of
-intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special
-intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of
-Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens   208
-
-He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five
-principal Forms--Motion--Rest--Ens--Same--Different   _ib._
-
-Form of Diversum pervades all the others   209
-
-Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is
-different from Ens--in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these
-Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens   210
-
-By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens--we mean only
-something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as
-Ens   _ib._
-
-The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown
-both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is   211
-
-The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies
-predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different
-from the subject   212
-
-Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion
-with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment   213
-
-Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and
-a verb--it must be proposition of _Something_. False propositions,
-involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject
-_ib._
-
-Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be
-also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens   214
-
-It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically
-possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the
-Sophist, engaged in producing it   _ib._
-
-Logical distribution of Imitators--those who imitate what they
-know, or what they do not know--of these last, some sincerely
-believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not
-know, and designedly impose upon others   215
-
-Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous auditors by long
-discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select auditors, by
-short question and answer, making the respondent contradict
-himself--the Sophist   215
-
-Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a
-Sophist   216
-
-These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they
-belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself   _ib._
-
-The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a
-fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person   217
-
-The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical
-Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was
-peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this
-sense   218
-
-Universal knowledge--was professed at that time by all
-Philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, &c.   219
-
-Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistes. He says that
-the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for
-speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who
-maintains false propositions to be impossible   220
-
-Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens--No predications except identical
-221
-
-Misconception of the function of the copula in predication   _ib._
-
-No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or
-classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle   222
-
-Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistes--To confute the various
-schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists,
-&c.   223
-
-Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes
-_ib._
-
-Plato's argument against the Materialists   224
-
-Reply open to the Materialists   _ib._
-
-Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their
-point of view against him   225
-
-Plato argues--That to know, and be known, is action and passion, a
-mode of relativity   226
-
-Plato's reasoning--compared with the points of view of both
-_ib._
-
-The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute,
-and a full establishment of the Relative   227
-
-Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the
-Theaetetus   _ib._
-
-The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely
-unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains
-that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable   228
-
-Plato's reasoning against the Materialists   _ib._
-
-Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made
-conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to
-Ens--comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of
-Conception besides   229
-
-Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens--they included only
-Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato   _ib._
-
-Different definitions of Ens--by Plato--the Materialists, the
-Idealists   231
-
-Plato's views about Non-Ens examined   _ib._
-
-His review of the select Five Forms   233
-
-Plato's doctrine--That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from
-Ens   _ib._
-
-Communion of Non-Ens with proposition--possible and explicable
-235
-
-Imperfect analysis of a proposition--Plato does not recognise the
-predicate   _ib._
-
-Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory--Objections to
-it   236
-
-Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of
-contradiction   239
-
-Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato--How
-do we know that one is true, the other false?   _ib._
-
-Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense   240
-
-Errors of Antisthenes--depended partly on the imperfect formal
-logic of that day   241
-
-Doctrine of the Sophistes--contradicts that of other Platonic
-dialogues   242
-
-The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those
-who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phaedon,
-Republic, &c.   246
-
-The Sophistes recedes from the Platonic point of view, and
-approaches the Aristotelian   247
-
-Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions
-true, others false   249
-
-Plato in the Sophistes has undertaken an impossible task--He could
-not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there _are_
-false propositions   _ib._
-
-What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion   251
-
-Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and disbelief,
-expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which
-Antisthenes discarded   252
-
-Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the
-Sophistes   253
-
-Recommendation of logical bipartition   254
-
-Precepts illustrated by the Philebus   _ib._
-
-Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived
-by sense   255
-
-Province of sensible perception--is not so much narrowed by Plato
-here as it is in the Theaetetus   256
-
-Comparison of the Sophistes with the Phaedrus   257
-
-Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenides   258
-
-Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of Plato   259
-
-
-CHAPTER XXX.
-
-POLITIKUS.
-
-
-The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistes   260
-
-Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each
-other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the
-purpose to be attained is the standard   _ib._
-
-Purpose in the Sophistes and Politikus is--To attain dialectic
-aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge
-whether the means employed are suitable   261
-
-Plato's defence of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that
-the critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of
-comparison is   262
-
-Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phaedon, Philebus, &c.
-_ib._
-
-Definition of the statesman, or Governor. Scientific competence.
-Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing
-263
-
-King during the Saturnian period, was of a breed superior to the
-people--not so any longer   264
-
-Distinction of causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is
-the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be
-principal also   266
-
-Plato does not admit the received classification of government. It
-does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to
-be founded--Scientific or Unscientific   267
-
-Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government by any
-numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one
-scientific man is the true government   268
-
-Fixed laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are mischievous, as
-they would be for the physician and the steersman. Absurdity of
-determining medical practice by laws, and presuming every one to
-know it   269
-
-Government by fixed laws is better than lawless government by
-unscientific men, but worse than lawless government by scientific
-men. It is a second-best   _ib._
-
-Comparison of unscientific governments. The one despot is the
-worse. Democracy is the least bad, because it is least of a
-government   270
-
-The true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor, &c.
-They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries   271
-
-What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the formation
-of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the energetic virtues
-with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence between them   272
-
-If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be
-killed or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave.
-The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an
-unanimous standard of ethical orthodoxy   272
-
-Remarks--Sokratic Ideal--Title to govern mankind derived
-exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual person
-273
-
-Different ways in which this ideal is worked out by Plato and
-Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action   _ib._
-
-The theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to that theory
-which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras   274
-
-Points of the Protagorean theory--rests upon common sentiment
-275
-
-Counter-Theory in the Politikus. The exigencies of the Eleate in
-the Politikus go much farther than those of Protagoras   276
-
-The Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory no adverse
-criticism is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned to silence
-or punished   _ib._
-
-Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains
-of the assumption of infallibility in existing societies, but
-exacts it severely in that which he himself constructs   277
-
-Theory of the Politikus--distinguished three gradations of polity.
-Gigantic individual force the worst   278
-
-Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy
-and difference   279
-
-Comparison of the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial,
-constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the
-former to social administration--in the latter to the formation
-and modification of names   281
-
-Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice
-taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Laches and
-Charmides   282
-
-Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of Search--To
-stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not
-give solutions   284
-
-
-CHAPTER XXXI.
-
-KRATYLUS.
-
-
-Persons and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus--Sokrates has no
-formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others   285
-
-Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes--all proceedings of nature
-are conducted according to fixed laws--speaking and naming among
-the rest   286
-
-The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver
-upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as
-appreciated, by the philosopher   287
-
-Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not
-another   289
-
-Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable--essence of
-the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum   _ib._
-
-Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these
-essences, and to apportion names rightly   290
-
-Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns--the
-Protagorean doctrine--Homo Mensura   291
-
-Objection by Sokrates--That Protagoras puts all men on a level as
-to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance   292
-
-Objection unfounded--What the Protagorean theory really
-affirms--Belief always relative to the believer's mind   _ib._
-
-Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than
-himself--Belief on authority--not inconsistent with the
-affirmation of Protagoras   293
-
-Analogy of physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by
-Sokrates--does not sustain his inference against Protagoras   294
-
-Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections   295
-
-Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief, common to all men--Grounds of
-belief and disbelief, different with different men and different
-ages   295
-
-Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or
-inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the
-circumstances of each individual mind   297
-
-Facts of sense--some are the same to all sentient subjects, others
-are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity   298
-
-Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the
-Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many
-existing names. His etymological transitions   299
-
-These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not
-appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern
-discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the
-Sophists   302
-
-Dissent from this theory--No proof that the Sophists ever proposed
-etymologies   304
-
-Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any
-one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes
-nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature   306
-
-Plato intended his theory as serious, but his exemplifications as
-admissible** guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proofs of
-a theory, but only as illustrating what he means   308
-
-Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of
-ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as those of Plato   310
-
-Continuance of the dialogue--Sokrates endeavours to explain how it
-is that the Names originally right have become so disguised and
-spoiled   312
-
-Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their
-essential properties, each must be
-adapted to each   313
-
-Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance   _ib._
-
-Sokrates assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a believer in
-the Herakleitean theory   314
-
-But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent--the rectitude
-of the name depends upon his knowledge   315
-
-Changes and transpositions introduced in the name--hard to follow
-315
-
-Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis   316
-
-Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus; who upholds that original
-thesis without any qualification   _ib._
-
-Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it   317
-
-There are names better and worse--more like, or less like to the
-things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always
-be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior
-way   318
-
-All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some
-are opposed to it   319
-
-It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their
-names   320
-
-Unchangeable Platonic Forms--opposed to the Herakleitean flux,
-which is true only respecting
-sensible particulars   _ib._
-
-Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not
-put implicit faith in names   321
-
-Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum
-and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other
-Sophists   _ib._
-
-Theory laid down by Sokrates _a priori_, in the first part--Great
-difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into harmony with
-facts   322
-
-Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue--he
-disconnects his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine
-324
-
-Ideal of the best system of naming--the Name-Giver ought to be
-familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his
-names according to resemblances among them   325
-
-Comparison of Plato's views about naming with those upon social
-institutions. Artistic, systematic construction--contrasted with
-unpremeditated unsystematic growth   327
-
-Politikus compared with Kratylus   328
-
-Ideal of Plato--Postulate of the One Wise Man--Badness of all
-reality   329
-
-Comparison of Kratylus, Theaetetus, and Sophistes, in treatment of
-the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false
-propositions   331
-
-Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of
-handling the same subject   332
-
-No common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues--each is a
-distinct composition, working out its own peculiar argument
-_ib._
-
-
-CHAPTER XXXII.
-
-PHILEBUS.
-
-Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philebus   334
-
-Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative
-procedure   335
-
-Enquiry--What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy
-life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive. Philebus
-declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence   _ib._
-
-Good--object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals,
-and plants--all-sufficient--satisfies all desires   _ib._
-
-Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions
-are so likewise   336
-
-Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description?
-Appeal to individual choice   337
-
-First Question submitted to Protarchus--Intense Pleasure, without
-any intelligence--He declines to accept it   338
-
-Second Question--Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence
-purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer--_No_   _ib._
-
-It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid.
-But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate
-with it than Pleasure   339
-
-Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can
-the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic
-Unity--how it is distributed among species and individuals   _ib._
-
-Active disputes upon this question at the time   340
-
-Order of Nature--Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The
-One--The Finite Many--The Infinite Many   _ib._
-
-Mistake commonly made--To look only for the One, and the Infinite
-Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions   341
-
-Illustration from Speech and Music   342
-
-Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had
-himself recognised as existing   343
-
-It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and
-classification   344
-
-At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification
-as a logical process   _ib._
-
-Classification--unconscious and conscious   345
-
-Plato's doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected
-with his Theory of Ideas   _ib._
-
-Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The
-Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency
-346
-
-Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four
-Classes--Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth   347
-
-In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with
-Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two
-constituents   _ib._
-
-Intelligence is the regulating principle--Pleasure is the
-Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated   348
-
-Pleasure and Pain must be explained together--Pain arises from the
-disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system--Pleasure
-from the restoration of it   _ib._
-
-Pleasure presupposes Pain   349
-
-Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind
-alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain   _ib._
-
-A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure,
-is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best
-_ib._
-
-Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and
-the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and
-body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein   350
-
-Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are
-so   351
-
-Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions,
-are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will
-have true visions sent to him   _ib._
-
-Protarchus disputes this--He thinks that there are some pleasures
-bad, but none false--Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves
-the question   352
-
-No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains--False estimate
-habitual--These are the false pleasures   _ib._
-
-Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual
-changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure
-or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure   353
-
-Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers--That pleasure is no
-reality, but a mere juggle. There is no reality except pain, and
-the relief from pain   354
-
-Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly   _ib._
-
-Theory of the pleasure-haters--We must learn what pleasure is by
-looking at the intense pleasures--These are connected with
-distempered body and mind   355
-
-The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is
-more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health   356
-
-Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of
-beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of
-acquiring knowledge   _ib._
-
-Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion   357
-
-Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it cannot
-therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means
-towards substance--Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good   _ib._
-
-Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good   358
-
-Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or
-Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according
-as they admit more or less of measuring and computation   _ib._
-
-Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher
-and teacher: As applied by the artisan   359
-
-Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy
-between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of
-truth and purity   360
-
-Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric.
-Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and
-celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying
-the lover of truth   _ib._
-
-Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal
-manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable
-essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained   361
-
-Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the
-Good, but a mixture of the two--Intelligence being the most
-important. How are they to be mixed?   _ib._
-
-We must include all Cognitions--not merely the truest, but the
-others also. Life cannot be carried on without both   362
-
-But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and
-necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or
-Intelligence--especially the intense sexual pleasures   _ib._
-
-What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure,
-Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than Pleasure
-363
-
-Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure.
-2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right
-Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures   364
-
-Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea,
-but a quasi-unity of analogy   365
-
-Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view,
-maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic
-Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine
-_ib._
-
-Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics   366
-
-Comparison of Man to the Kosmos (which has reason, but no emotion)
-is unnecessary and confusing   367
-
-Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine.
-Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification
-368
-
-Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended--yet
-feebly applied--in this dialogue   369
-
-What is the Good? Discussed both in Philebus and in Republic.
-Comparison   370
-
-Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known,
-while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers
-about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes
-ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently   _ib._
-
-Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the
-answer in the Philebus does not satisfy those tests   371
-
-Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question--The
-alternative which he tenders has no fair application   372
-
-Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared--Pleasure is
-an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with
-Pleasure, except some other End   373
-
-The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and
-diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing
-agency   374
-
-Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by
-Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of more value.
-This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis   375
-
-Marked antithesis in the Philebus between pleasure and avoidance
-of pain   377
-
-The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction--They included
-both in their acknowledged End   _ib._
-
-Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures--The Hedonists
-enforced the same reasonable view   378
-
-Different points of view worked out by Plato in different
-dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, Philebus--True and False Pleasures
-379
-
-Opposition between the Gorgias and Philebus, about Gorgias and
-Rhetoric   380
-
-Peculiarity of the Philebus--Plato applies the same principle of
-classification--true and false--to Cognitions and Pleasures   382
-
-Distinction of true and false--not applicable to pleasures   _ib._
-
-Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the
-Absolute--Pleasures which he admits to be true--and why   385
-
-Plato could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon
-his own admission, against his opponents--the Pleasure-haters, who
-disallowed pleasures altogether   387
-
-Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these
-Pleasure-haters   389
-
-Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics--defect of the Philebus
-391
-
-Directive sovereignty of Measure--how explained and applied in the
-Protagoras   _ib._
-
-How explained in Philebus--no statement to what items it is
-applied   393
-
-Classification of true and false--how Plato applies it to
-Cognitions   394
-
-Valuable principles of this classification--difference with other
-dialogues   395
-
-Close of the Philebus--Graduated elements of Good   397
-
-Contrast between the Philebus and the Phaedrus, and Symposion, in
-respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally   398
-
-
-CHAPTER XXXIII.
-
-MENEXENUS.
-
-
-Persons and situation of the dialogue   401
-
-Funeral harangue at Athens--Choice of a public orator--Sokrates
-declares the task of the public orator to be easy--Comic
-exaggeration of the effects of the harangue   401
-
-Sokrates professes to have learnt a funeral harangue from Aspasia,
-and to be competent to recite it himself. Menexenus entreats him
-to do so   402
-
-Harangue recited by Sokrates   403
-
-Compliments of Menexenus after Sokrates has finished, both to the
-harangue itself and to Aspasia   _ib._
-
-Supposed period--shortly after the peace of Antalkidas   _ib._
-
-Custom of Athens about funeral harangues. Many such harangues
-existed at Athens, composed by distinguished orators or
-logographers--Established type of the harangue   404
-
-Plato in this harangue conforms to the established type--Topics on
-which he insists   405
-
-Consolation and exhortation to surviving relatives   407
-
-Admiration felt for this harangue, both at the time and afterwards
-407
-
-Probable motives of Plato in composing it, shortly after he
-established himself at Athens as a teacher--His competition with
-Lysias--Desire for celebrity both as rhetor and as dialectician
-_ib._
-
-Menexenus compared with the view of rhetoric presented in the
-Gorgias--Necessity for an orator to conform to established
-sentiments   409
-
-Colloquial portion of the Menexenus is probably intended as
-ridicule and sneer at Rhetoric--The harangue itself is serious,
-and intended as an evidence of Plato's ability   410
-
-Anachronism of the Menexenus--Plato careless on this point   411
-
-
-CHAPTER XXXIV.
-
-KLEITOPHON.
-
-
-Persons and circumstances of Kleitophon   413
-
-Conversation of Sokrates with Kleitophon alone: he alludes to
-observations of an unfavourable character recently made by
-Kleitophon, who asks permission to explain   _ib._
-
-Explanation given. Kleitophon expresses gratitude and admiration
-for the benefit which he has derived from long companionship with
-Sokrates   414
-
-The observations made by Sokrates have been most salutary and
-stimulating in awakening ardour for virtue. Arguments and
-analogies commonly used by Sokrates   _ib._
-
-But Sokrates does not explain what virtue is, nor how it is to be
-attained. Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and now wants
-information how he is to act   415
-
-Questions addressed by Kleitophon with this view, both to the
-companions of Sokrates and to Sokrates himself   416
-
-Replies made by the friends of Sokrates unsatisfactory   _ib._
-
-None of them could explain what the special work of justice or
-virtue was   417
-
-Kleitophon at length asked the question from Sokrates himself. But
-Sokrates did not answer clearly. Kleitophon believes that Sokrates
-knows, but will not tell   417
-
-Kleitophon is on the point of leaving Sokrates and going to
-Thrasymachus. But before leaving he addresses one last entreaty,
-that Sokrates will speak out clearly and explicitly   418
-
-Remarks on the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in the eighth
-Tetralogy immediately before the Republic, and along with Kritias,
-the other fragment   419
-
-Kleitophon is genuine, and perfectly in harmony with a just theory
-of Plato   420
-
-It could not have been published until after Plato's death   _ib._
-
-Reasons why the Kleitophon was never finished. It points out the
-defects of Sokrates, just as he himself confesses them in the
-Apology   421
-
-The same defects also confessed in many of the Platonic and
-Xenophontic dialogues   422
-
-Forcible, yet respectful, manner in which these defects are set
-forth in the Kleitophon. Impossible to answer them in such a way
-as to hold out against the negative Elenchus of a Sokratic pupil
-423
-
-The Kleitophon represents a point of view which many objectors
-must have insisted on against Sokrates and Plato   424
-
-The Kleitophon was originally intended as a first book of the
-Republic, but was found too hard to answer. Reasons why the
-existing first book was substituted   _ib._
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XXVI.
-
-
-PLATO.
-
-
-CHAPTER XXVI.
-
-PHAEDRUS--SYMPOSION.
-
-
-[Side-note: These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato.
-Phaedrus is the originator of both.]
-
-I put together these two dialogues, as distinguished by a marked
-peculiarity. They are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. They have
-one great and interesting subject common to both: though in the
-Phaedrus, this subject is blended with, and made contributory to,
-another. They agree also in the circumstance, that Phaedrus is, in
-both, the person who originates the conversation. But they differ
-materially in the manner of handling, in the comparisons and
-illustrations, and in the apparent purpose.
-
-[Side-note: Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment
-prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of
-women in Greece.]
-
-The subject common to both is, Love or Eros in its largest sense,
-and with its manifold varieties. Under the totally different vein
-of sentiment which prevails in modern times, and which recognises
-passionate love as prevailing only between persons of different
-sex--it is difficult for us to enter into Plato's eloquent
-exposition of the feeling as he conceives it. In the Hellenic
-point of view,[1] upon which Plato builds, the attachment of man
-to woman was regarded as a natural impulse, and as a domestic,
-social, sentiment; yet as belonging to a common-place rather than
-to an exalted mind, and seldom or never rising to that pitch of
-enthusiasm which overpowers all other emotions, absorbs the whole
-man, and aims either at the joint performance of great exploits or
-the joint prosecution of intellectual improvement by continued
-colloquy. We must remember that the wives and daughters of
-citizens were seldom seen abroad: that the wife was married very
-young: that she had learnt nothing except spinning and weaving:
-that the fact of her having seen as little and heard as little as
-possible, was considered as rendering her more acceptable to her
-husband:[2] that her sphere of duty and exertion was confined to
-the interior of the family. The beauty of women yielded
-satisfaction to the senses, but little beyond. It was the
-masculine beauty of youth that fired the Hellenic imagination with
-glowing and impassioned sentiment. The finest youths, and those
-too of the best families and education, were seen habitually
-uncovered in the Palaestra and at the public festival-matches;
-engaged in active contention and graceful exercise, under the
-direction of professional trainers. The sight of the living form,
-in such perfection, movement, and variety, awakened a powerful
-emotional sympathy, blended with aesthetic sentiment, which in the
-more susceptible natures was exalted into intense and passionate
-devotion. The terms in which this feeling is described, both by
-Plato and Xenophon, are among the strongest which the language
-affords--and are predicated even of Sokrates himself. Far from
-being ashamed of the feeling, they consider it admirable and
-beneficial; though very liable to abuse, which they emphatically
-denounce and forbid.[3] In their view, it was an idealising
-passion, which tended to raise a man above the vulgar and selfish
-pursuits of life, and even above the fear of death. The devoted
-attachments which it inspired were dreaded by the despots, who
-forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the palaestra.[4]
-
-[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Symp. p. 367) describes
-this view of Eros as Hellenic, and as "gerade den anti-modernen
-and anti-christlichen Pol der Platonischen Denkungsart". Aristotle
-composed [Greek: The/seis E)rotikai\] or [Greek: E)rotika/s],
-Diogenes Laert. v. 22-24. See Bernays, Die Dialoge des
-Aristoteles, p. 133, Berlin, 1863.
-
-Compare the dialogue called [Greek: E)rotiko/s], among the works
-of Plutarch, p. 750 seq., where some of the speakers, especially
-Protogenes, illustrate and enlarge upon this Platonic construction
-of Eros--[Greek: a)lethinou= de\ E)/rotos ou)d' o(tiou=n te=|
-gunaikoni/tidi me/testin], &c. (750 C, 761 B, &c.)
-
-In the Treatise De Educatione Puerorum (c. 15, p. 11 D-F) Plutarch
-hesitates to give a decided opinion on the amount of restriction
-proper to be imposed on youth: he is much impressed with the
-authority of Sokrates, Plato, Xenophon, AEschines, Kebes, [Greek:
-kai\ to\n pa/nta cho/ron e)kei/non to=n a)ndro=n, oi( tou\s
-a)/r)r(enas e)doki/masan e)/rotas], &c. See the anecdote about
-Episthenes, an officer among the Ten Thousand Greeks under
-Xenophon, in Xenophon, Anabasis, vii. 4, 7, and a remarkable
-passage about Zeno the Stoic, Diog. Laert. vii. 13. Respecting the
-general subject of [Greek: paiderasti/a] in Greece, there is a
-valuable Excursus in Bekker's Charikles, vol. i. pp. 347-377,
-Excurs. ii. I agree generally with his belief about the practice
-in Greece, see Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 33, 70. Bekker quotes
-abundant authorities, which might be farther multiplied if
-necessary. In appreciating the evidence upon this point, we cannot
-be too careful to keep in mind what Sokrates says (in the
-Xenophontic Symposion, viii. 34) when comparing the Thebans and
-Eleians on one side with the Athenians and Spartans on the
-other--[Greek: E)kei/nois me\n ga\r tau=ta no/mima, e(mi=n de\
-e)ponei/dista.] We must interpret passages of the classical
-authors according to their fair and real meanings, not according
-to the conclusions which we might wish to find proved.
-
-If we read the oration of Demosthenes against Neaera (which is full
-of information about Athenian manners), we find the speaker
-Apollodorus distributing the relations of men with women in the
-following manner (p. 1386)--[Greek: to\ ga\r sunoikei=n tou=t'
-e)sti/n, o(\s a)\n paidopoie=tai kai\ ei)sa/ge| ei)/s te tou\s
-demo/tas kai\ tou\s phra/toras tou\s ui(ei=s, kai\ ta\s
-thugate/ras e)kdido=| o(s au)tou= ou)/sas toi=s a)ndra/si. Ta\s
-me\n ga\r e(tai/ras, e(done=s e(/neka e)/chomen--ta\s de\
-pallaka/s, te=s kath' e(me/ran therapei/as tou= so/matos--ta\s de\
-gunai=kas, tou= paidopoiei=sthai gnesi/os, kai\ to=n e(/ndon
-phu/laka pi/sten e)/chein.]
-
-To the same purpose, the speaker in Lysias ([Greek: U(pe\r tou=
-E)ratosthe/nous pho/nou]--sect. 7), describing his wife,
-says--[Greek: e)n me\n ou)=n to=| pro/to| chro/no| paso=n e)=n
-belti/ste; kai\ ga\r oi)kono/mos deine\ kai\ pheidolo\s a)gathe\
-kai\ a)kribo=s pa/nta dioikou=sa.]
-
-Neither of these three relations lent itself readily to the
-Platonic vein of sentiment and ideality: neither of them led to
-any grand results either in war--or political ambition--or
-philosophical speculation; the three great roads, in one or other
-of which the Grecian ideality travelled. We know from the Republic
-that Plato did not appreciate the value of the family life, or the
-purposes for which men marry, according to the above passage cited
-from Demosthenes. In this point, Plato differs from Xenophon, who,
-in his Oeconomicus, enlarges much (in the discourse of
-Ischomachus) upon the value of the conjugal union, with a view to
-prudential results and good management of the household; while he
-illustrates the sentimental and affectionate side of it, in the
-story of Pantheia and Abradates (Cyropaedia).]
-
-[Footnote 2: See the Oeconomicus of Xenophon, cap. iii. 12, vii.
-5.]
-
-[Footnote 3: The beginning of the Platonic Charmides illustrates
-what is here said, pp. 154-155; also that of the Protagoras and
-Lysis, pp. 205-206.
-
-Xenophon, Sympos. i. 8-11; iv. 11, 15. Memorab. i. 3, 8-14 (what
-Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Kritobulus). Dikaearchus
-(companion of Aristotle) disapproved the important influence which
-Plato assigned to Eros (Cicero, Tusc. D. iv. 34-71).
-
-If we pass to the second century after the Christian Era, we find
-some speakers in Athenaeus blaming severely the amorous sentiments
-of Sokrates and the narrative of Alkibiades, as recited in the
-Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 506-508 C). Athenaeus remarks
-farther, that Plato, writing in this strain, had little right to
-complain (as we read in the Republic) of the licentious
-compositions of Homer and other poets, and to exclude them from
-his model city. Maximus Tyrius, in one of his four discourses
-(23-5) on the [Greek: e)rotike\] of Sokrates, makes the same remark as
-Athenaeus about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from
-the model city, and composing what we read in the Symposion; he
-farther observes that the erotic dispositions of Sokrates provoked
-no censure from his numerous enemies at the time (though they
-assailed him upon so many other points), but had incurred great
-censure from contemporaries of Maximus himself, to whom he
-replies--[Greek: tou\s nuni\ katego/rous] (23, 6-7). The
-comparisons which he institutes (23, 9) between the sentiments and
-phrases of Sokrates, and those of Sappho and Anakreon, are very
-curious.
-
-Dionysius of Halikarnassus speaks of the [Greek: e)gko/mia] on
-Eros in the Symposion, as "unworthy of serious handling or of
-Sokrates". (De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1027.)
-
-But the most bitter among all the critics of Plato, is
-Herakleitus--author of the Allegoriae Homericae. Herakleitus repels,
-as unjust and calumnious, the sentence of banishment pronounced by
-Plato against Homer, from whom all mental cultivation had been
-derived. He affirms, and tries to show, that the poems of
-Homer--which he admits to be full of immorality if literally
-understood--had an allegorical meaning. He blames Plato for not having
-perceived this; and denounces him still more severely for the
-character of his own writings--[Greek: e)r)r(i/phtho de\ kai\
-Pla/ton o( ko/lax, O(me/rou sukopha/ntes--Tou\s de\ Pla/tonos
-dialo/gous, a)/no kai\ ka/to paidikoi\ kathubri/zousin e)/rotes,
-ou)damou= de ou)chi te=s a)r)r(e/nos e)pithumi/as mesto/s e)stin
-o( a)ne/r] (Herakl. All. Hom., c. 4-74, ed. Mehler, Leiden,
-1851).]
-
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Sympos. 182 C. The proceedings of Harmodius
-and Aristogeiton, which illustrate this feeling, are recounted by
-Thucydides, vi. 54-57. These two citizens were gratefully
-recollected and extensively admired by the Athenian public.]
-
-[Side-note: Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving
-philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of
-approximation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas.
-Gradual generalisation of the sentiment.]
-
-Especially to Plato, who combined erotic and poetical imagination
-with Sokratic dialectics and generalising theory--this passion
-presented itself in the light of a stimulus introductory to the
-work of philosophy--an impulse at first impetuous and
-undistinguishing, but afterwards regulated towards improving
-communion and colloquy with an improvable youth. Personal beauty
-(this is[5] the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the Phaedrus) is
-the main point of visible resemblance between the world of sense
-and the world of Ideas: the Idea of Beauty has a brilliant
-representative of itself among concrete objects--the Ideas of
-Justice and Temperance have none. The contemplation of a beautiful
-youth, and the vehement emotion accompanying it, was the only way
-of reviving in the soul the Idea of Beauty which it had seen in
-its antecedent stage of existence. This was the first stage
-through which every philosopher must pass; but the emotion of love
-thus raised, became gradually in the better minds both expanded
-and purified. The lover did not merely admire the person, but also
-contracted the strongest sympathy with the feelings and character,
-of the beloved youth: delighting to recognise and promote in him
-all manifestations of mental beauty which were in harmony with the
-physical, so as to raise him to the greatest attainable perfection
-of human nature. The original sentiment of admiration, having been
-thus first transferred by association from beauty in the person to
-beauty in the mind and character, became gradually still farther
-generalised; so that beauty was perceived not as exclusively
-specialised in any one individual, but as invested in all
-beautiful objects, bodies as well as minds. The view would
-presently be farther enlarged. The like sentiment would be
-inspired, so as to worship beauty in public institutions, in
-administrative arrangements, in arts and sciences. And the mind
-would at last be exalted to the contemplation of that which
-pervades and gives common character to all these
-particulars--Beauty in the abstract--or the Self-Beautiful--the Idea
-or Form of the Beautiful. To reach this highest summit, after mounting
-all the previous stages, and to live absorbed in the contemplation of
-"the great ocean of the beautiful," was the most glorious
-privilege attainable by any human being. It was indeed attainable
-only by a few highly gifted minds. But others might make more or
-less approach to it: and the nearer any one approached, the
-greater measure would he ensure to himself of real good and
-happiness.[6]
-
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 249 E, 250 B-E.]
-
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Sympos. pp. 210-211.
-
-Respecting the Beautiful, I transcribe here a passage from
-Ficinus, in his Argument prefixed to the Hippias Major, p. 757.
-"Unumquodque e singulis pulchris, _pulchrum hoc_ Plato vocat:
-formam in omnibus, pulchritudinem; speciem et ideam supra omnia,
-ipsum pulchrum. Primum sensus attingit opinioque. Secundum ratio
-cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur.
-
-"Quid ipsum Bonum? Ipsum rerum omnium principium, actus purus,
-actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum Pulchrum? Vivificus
-actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens, Mentem primo divinam idearum
-ordine infinite decorans, Numina deinde sequentia mentesque
-rationum serie complens, Animas tertio numerosis discursibus
-ornans, Naturas quarto seminibus, formis quinto materiam."]
-
-[Side-note: All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they
-pursue it by various means. The name _Eros_ is confined to one
-special case of this large variety.]
-
-Such is Plato's conception of Eros or Love and its object. He
-represents it as one special form or variety of the universal law
-of gravitation pervading all mankind. Every one loves, desires, or
-aspires to _happiness_: this is the fundamental or primordial law
-of human nature, beyond which we cannot push enquiry. Good, or
-good things, are nothing else but the means to happiness:[7]
-accordingly, every man, loving happiness, loves good also, and
-desires not only full acquisition, but perpetual possession of
-good. In this wide sense, love belongs to all human beings: every
-man loves good and happiness, with perpetual possession of
-them--and nothing else.[8] But different men have different ways of
-pursuing this same object. One man aspires to good or happiness by
-way of money-getting, another by way of ambition, a third by
-gymnastics--or music--or philosophy. Still no one of these is said
-to love, or to be under the influence of Eros. That name is
-reserved exclusively for one special variety of it--the impulse
-towards copulation, generation, and self-perpetuation, which
-agitates both bodies and minds throughout animal nature. Desiring
-perpetual possession of good, all men desire to perpetuate
-themselves, and to become immortal. But an individual man or
-animal cannot be immortal: he can only attain a quasi-immortality
-by generating a new individual to replace himself.[9] In fact even
-mortal life admits no continuity, but is only a succession of
-distinct states or phenomena: one always disappearing and another
-always appearing, each generated by its antecedent and generating
-its consequent. Though a man from infancy to old age is called the
-same, yet he never continues the same for two moments together,
-either in body or mind. As his blood, flesh, bones, &c., are in
-perpetual disappearance and renovation, always coming and going--so
-likewise are his sensations, thoughts, emotions, dispositions,
-cognitions, &c. Neither mentally nor physically does he ever
-continue the same during successive instants. The old man of this
-instant perishes and is replaced by a new man during the next.[10]
-As this is true of the individual, so it is still more true of the
-species: continuance or immortality is secured only by perpetual
-generation of new individuals.
-
-[Footnote 7: Plato, Sympos. pp. 204-205. [Greek: Phe/re, o( e)ro=n
-to=n a)gatho=n, ti/ e)ra=|? Gene/sthai, e)=n d' e)go/, au)to=|.
-Kai\ ti/ e)/stai e)kei/no| o(=| a)\n ge/netai ta)gatha/? Tou=t'
-eu)poro/teron, e)=n d' e)go/, e)/cho a)pokri/nasthai, o(/ti
-eu)dai/mon e)/stai. Kte/sei ga/r, e)/phe, a)gatho=n, oi(
-eu)dai/mones eu)dai/mones; Kai\ ou)ke/ti prosdei= e)re/sthai,
-i(/na ti/ de\ bou/letai eu)dai/mon ei)=nai o( boulo/menos, a)lla\
-te/los dokei= e)/chein e( a)po/krisis. . . . Tau/ten de\ te\n
-bou/lesin kai\ to\n e)/rota tou=ton, po/tera koino\n ei)=nai
-pa/nton a)nthro/pon, kai\ pa/ntas ta)gatha\ bou/lesthai au)toi=s
-ei)=nai a)ei/, e)\ po=s le/geis? Ou(/tos, e)=n d' e)go/, koino\n
-ei)=nai pa/nton.]]
-
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 A. [Greek: o(s ou)de/n ge
-a)/llo e)sti\n ou)= e)ro=sin a)/nthropoi e)\ tou= a)gathou=.]]
-
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Sympos. p. 207 C.]
-
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.]
-
-[Side-note: Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the
-only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of
-personal beauty as an originating stimulus.]
-
-The love of immortality thus manifests itself in living beings
-through the copulative and procreative impulse, which so
-powerfully instigates living man in mind as well as in body.
-Beauty in another person exercises an attractive force which
-enables this impulse to be gratified: ugliness on the contrary
-repels and stifles it. Hence springs the love of beauty--or
-rather, of procreation in the beautiful--whereby satisfaction is
-obtained for this restless and impatient agitation.[11] With some,
-this erotic impulse stimulates the body, attracting them towards
-women, and inducing them to immortalise themselves by begetting
-children: with others, it acts far more powerfully on the mind,
-and determines them to conjunction with another mind for the
-purpose of generating appropriate mental offspring and products.
-In this case as well as in the preceding, the first stroke of
-attraction arises from the charm of physical, visible, and
-youthful beauty: but when, along with this beauty of person, there
-is found the additional charm of a susceptible, generous,
-intelligent mind, the effect produced by the two together is
-overwhelming; the bodily sympathy becoming spiritualised and
-absorbed by the mental. With the inventive and aspiring
-intelligences--poets like Homer and Hesiod, or legislators like
-Lykurgus and Solon--the erotic impulse takes this turn. They look
-about for some youth, at once handsome and improvable, in
-conversation with whom they may procreate new reasonings
-respecting virtue and goodness--new excellences of
-disposition--and new force of intellectual combination, in both
-the communicants. The attachment between the two becomes so strong
-that they can hardly live apart: so anxious are both of them to
-foster and confirm the newly acquired mental force of which each
-is respectively conscious in himself.[12]
-
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 E. [Greek: o(/then de\ to=|
-kuou=nti/ te kai\ e)/de spargo=nti polle\ e( pto/esis ge/gone
-peri\ to\ kalo\n dia\ to\ mega/les o)di=nos a)polu/ein to\n
-e)/chonta. E)sti\ ga\r ou) tou= kalou= o( e)/ros, a)lla\--te=s
-genne/seos kai\ tou= to/kou e)n to=| kalo=|.]]
-
-[Footnote 12: Plato, Sympos. p. 209.]
-
-[Side-note: Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few
-privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty
-_in genere_. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all.]
-
-Occasionally, and in a few privileged natures, this erotic impulse
-rises to a still higher exaltation, losing its separate and
-exclusive attachment to one individual person, and fastening upon
-beauty in general, or that which all beautiful persons and
-beautiful minds have in common. The visible charm of beautiful
-body, though it was indispensable as an initial step, comes to be
-still farther sunk and undervalued, when the mind has ascended to
-the contemplation of beauty _in genere_, not merely in bodies and
-minds, but in laws, institutions, and sciences. This is the
-highest pitch of philosophical love, to which a few minds only are
-competent, and that too by successive steps of ascent: but which,
-when attained, is thoroughly soul-satisfying. If any man's vision
-be once sharpened so that he can see beauty pure and absolute, he
-will have no eyes for the individual manifestations of it in gold,
-fine raiment, brilliant colours, or beautiful youths.[13] Herein
-we have the climax or consummation of that erotic aspiration which
-first shows itself in the form of virtuous attachment to
-youth.[14]
-
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Symposion, p. 211.]
-
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, p. 211 B. [Greek: o(/tan de/ tis
-a)po\ to=nde dia\ to\ o)rtho=s paiderastei=n e)panio\n e)kei=no
-to\ kalo\n a)/rchetai kathora=|n, schedo\n a)/n ti a(/ptoito tou=
-te/lous], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic
-view of Eros with several different views of it previously
-enunciated by the other speakers; closing with a panegyric on
-Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades.]
-
-It is thus that Plato, in the Symposion, presents Love, or erotic
-impulse: a passion taking its origin in the physical and mental
-attributes common to most men, and concentrated at first upon some
-individual person--but gradually becoming both more intense and
-more refined, as it ascends in the scale of logical generalisation
-and comes into intimate view of the pure idea of Beauty. The main
-purpose of the Symposion is to contrast this Platonic view of Eros
-or Love--which is assigned to Sokrates in the dialogue, and is
-repeated by him from the communication of a prophetic woman named
-Diotima[15]--with different views assigned to other speakers. Each
-of the guests at the Banquet--Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus,
-Aristophanes, Agathon, Sokrates--engages to deliver a panegyric on
-Eros: while Alkibiades, entering intoxicated after the speeches
-are finished, delivers a panegyric on Sokrates, in regard to
-energy and self-denial generally, but mainly and specially in the
-character of Erastes. The pure and devoted attachment of Sokrates
-towards Alkibiades himself--his inflexible self-command under the
-extreme of trial and temptation--the unbounded ascendancy which he
-had acquired over that insolent youth, who seeks in every
-conceivable manner to render himself acceptable to Sokrates--are
-emphatically extolled, and illustrated by singular details.
-
-[Footnote 15: Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. [Greek: gunaiko\s mantike=s
-Dioti/mas, e( tau=ta/ te sophe\ e)=n kai\ a)/lla polla/, kai\
-A)thenai/ois pote\ thusame/nois pro\ tou= loimou= de/ka e)/te
-a)nabole\n e)poi/ese te=s no/sou, e)\ de\ kai\ e)me\ ta\ e)rotika\
-e)di/daxen.]
-
-Instead of [Greek: gunaiko\s mantike=s], which was the old
-reading, Stallbaum and other editors prefer to write [Greek:
-gunaiko\s Mantinike=s], also 211 D. I cannot but think that
-[Greek: mantike=s] is right. There is no pertinence or fit
-meaning in [Greek: Mantinike=s], whereas the word [Greek:
-mantike=s] is in full keeping with what is said about the special
-religious privileges and revelations of Diotima--that she procured
-for the Athenians an adjournment of the plague for ten years. The
-Delphian oracle assured the Lydian king Kroesus that Apollo had
-obtained from the [Greek: Moi=rai] a postponement of the ruin of
-the Lydian kingdom for three years, but that he could obtain from
-them no more (Herodot. i. 91).]
-
-[Side-note: Views of Eros presented by Phaedrus, Pausanias,
-Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon.]
-
-Both Phaedrus[16] and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon
-Eros, dwell upon that God as creating within the human bosom by
-his inspirations the noblest self-denial and the most devoted
-heroism, together with the strongest incentives to virtuous
-behaviour. Pausanias however makes distinctions: recognising and
-condemning various erotic manifestations as abusive, violent,
-sensual--and supposing for these a separate inspiring Deity--Eros
-Pandemus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius[17]
-or Coelestis. In regard to the different views taken of Eros by
-Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon--the first is medical,
-physiological, cosmical[18]--the second is comic and imaginative,
-even to exuberance--the third is poetical or dithyrambic:
-immediately upon which follows the analytical and philosophical
-exposition ascribed to Sokrates, opened in his dialectic manner by
-a cross-examination of his predecessor, and proceeding to
-enunciate the opinions communicated to him by the prophetess
-Diotima.
-
-[Footnote 16: Sydenham conceives and Boeckh (ad Plat. Legg. iii.
-694) concurs with him, that this discourse, assigned to Phaedrus,
-is intended by Plato as an imitation of the style of Lysias. This
-is sufficiently probable. The encomium on Eros delivered by
-Agathon, especially the concluding part of it (p. 197), mimics the
-style of florid effeminate poetry, overcharged with balanced
-phrases ([Greek: i)so/kola, a)nti/theta]), which Aristophanes
-parodies in Agathon's name at the beginning of the
-Thesmophoriazusae, Athenaeus, v. 187 C.]
-
-[Footnote 17: Plato, Sympos. pp. 180-181.]
-
-[Footnote 18: Respecting this view of Eros or Aphrodite, as a
-cosmical, all-pervading, procreative impulse, compare Euripides,
-Frag. Incert. 3, 6, assigned by Welcker (Griech. Trag. p. 737) to
-the lost drama--the first Hippolytus; also the beautiful
-invocation with which the poem of Lucretius opens, and the
-fragmentary exordium remaining from the poem of Parmenides.]
-
-[Side-note: Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He
-describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Daemon between
-Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining
-it.]
-
-Sokrates treats most of the preceding panegyrics as pleasing
-fancies not founded in truth. In his representation (cited from
-Diotima) Eros is neither beautiful, nor good, nor happy; nor is he
-indeed a God at all. He is one of the numerous intermediate body
-of Daemons, inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as
-interpreting agents of communication between the two.[19] Eros is
-the offspring of Poverty and Resource (Porus).[20] He represents
-the state of aspiration and striving, with ability and energy,
-after goodness and beauty, but never actually possessing them: a
-middle condition, preferable to that of the person who neither
-knows that he is deficient in them, nor cares to possess them: but
-inferior to the condition of him who is actually in possession.
-Eros is always Love of something--in relation to something yet
-unattained, but desired: Eros is to be distinguished carefully
-from the object desired.[21] He is the parallel of the
-philosopher, who is neither ignorant nor wise: not ignorant,
-because genuine ignorance is unconscious of itself and fancies
-itself to be knowledge: not wise, because he does not possess
-wisdom, and is well aware that he does not possess it. He is in
-the intermediate stage, knowing that he does not possess wisdom,
-but constantly desiring it and struggling after it. Eros, like
-philosophy, represents this continual aspiration and advance
-towards a goal never attained.[22]
-
-[Footnote 19: Plato, Sympos. pp. 202-203.]
-
-[Footnote 20: What Sokrates says here in the Symposion about Eros
-is altogether at variance with what Sokrates says about Eros in
-Phaedrus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence
-and awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of Aphrodite (Phaedrus,
-pp. 242 D, 243 D, 257 A).]
-
-[Footnote 21: Plato, Symposion, pp. 199-200. [Greek: O( E)/ros
-e)/ros e)sti\n ou)deno\s e(\ tino/s? Pa/nu me\n ou)=n
-e)/stin. . . . Po/teron o( E)/ros e)kei/nou ou(= e)/stin e)/ros,
-e)pithumei= au)tou= e)\ ou)/? Pa/nu ge. . . . A)na/gke to\
-e)pithumou=n e)pithumei=n ou)= e)ndee/s e)stin, e)\ me\
-e)pithumei=n, e)a\n me\ e)ndee\s e)=|.]]
-
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Sympos. p. 204 A. [Greek: Ti/nes ou)=n oi(
-philosophou=ntes, ei) me/te oi( sophoi\ me/te oi( a)mathei=s?
-. . . Oi( metaxu\ tou/ton a)mphote/ron, o(=n au)= kai\ o( E)/ros.
-E)sti\ ga\r de\ to=n kalli/ston e( sophi/a, E)/ros d' e)sti\n
-e)/ros peri\ to\ kalo/n; o(/ste a)nagkai=on E)/rota philo/sophon
-ei)=nai, philo/sophon de\ o)/nta metaxu\ ei)=nai sophou= kai\
-a)mathou=s.]]
-
-[Side-note: Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the
-philosopher, who knows his own ignorance and thirsts for
-knowledge.]
-
-It is thus that the truly Platonic conception of Love is brought
-out, materially different from that of the preceding
-speakers--Love, as a state of conscious want, and of aspiration or
-endeavour to satisfy that want, by striving after good or
-happiness--Philosophy as the like intermediate state, in regard to
-wisdom. And Plato follows out this coalescence of love and philosophy
-in the manner which has been briefly sketched above: a vehement
-impulse towards mental communion with some favoured youth, in the
-view of producing mental improvement, good, and happiness to both
-persons concerned: the same impulse afterwards expanding, so as to
-grasp the good and beautiful in a larger sense, and ultimately to
-fasten on goodness and beauty in the pure Idea: which is
-absolute--independent of time, place, circumstances, and all variable
-elements--moreover the object of the one and supreme science.[23]
-
-[Footnote 23: Plato, Symposion, pp. 210-211.]
-
-[Side-note: Eros as presented in the Phaedrus--Discourse of Lysias,
-and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is
-seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on
-Eros.]
-
-I will now compare the Symposion with the Phaedrus. In the first
-half of the Phaedrus also, Eros, and the Self-Beautiful or the pure
-Idea of the Beautiful, are brought into close coalescence with
-philosophy and dialectic--but they are presented in a different
-manner. Plato begins by setting forth the case against Eros in two
-competing discourses (one cited from Lysias,[24] the other
-pronounced by Sokrates himself as competitor with Lysias in
-eloquence) supposed to be addressed to a youth, and intended to
-convince him that the persuasions of a calm and intelligent friend
-are more worthy of being listened to than the exaggerated promises
-and protestations of an impassioned lover, from whom he will
-receive more injury than benefit: that the inspirations of Eros
-are a sort of madness, irrational and misguiding as well as
-capricious and transitory: while the calm and steady friend,
-unmoved by any passionate inspiration, will show himself worthy of
-permanent esteem and gratitude.[25] By a sudden revulsion of
-feeling, Sokrates becomes ashamed of having thus slandered the
-divine Eros, and proceeds to deliver a counter-panegyric or
-palinode upon that God.[26]
-
-[Footnote 24: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 230 seq.]
-
-[Footnote 25: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 237 seq.]
-
-[Footnote 26: Eros, in the Phaedrus, is pronounced to be a God, son
-of Aphrodite (p. 242 E); in the Symposion he is not a God but a
-Daemon, offspring of Porus and Penia, and attendant on Aphrodite,
-according to Diotima and Sokrates (p. 203).]
-
-[Side-note: Panegyric--Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros
-is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties
-of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better
-than sobriety.]
-
-Eros (he says) is, mad, irrational, superseding reason and
-prudence in the individual mind.[27] This is true: yet still Eros
-exercises a beneficent and improving influence. Not all madness is
-bad. Some varieties of it are bad, but others are good. Some arise
-from human malady, others from the inspirations of the Gods: both
-of them supersede human reason and the orthodoxy of established
-custom[28]--but the former substitute what is worse, the latter
-what is better. The greatest blessings enjoyed by man arise from
-madness, when it is imparted by divine inspiration. And it is so
-imparted in four different phases and by four different Gods:
-Apollo infuses the prophetic madness--Dionysus, the ritual or
-religious--The Muses, the poetical--and Eros, the erotic.[29] This
-last sort of madness greatly transcends the sober reason and
-concentration upon narrow objects which is so much praised by
-mankind generally.[30] The inspired and exalted lover deserves
-every preference over the unimpassioned friend.
-
-[Footnote 27: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 265-266. [Greek: to\ a)/phron
-te=s dianoi/as e(/n ti koine=| ei)=dos. . . . to\ te=s paranoi/as
-o(s e(\n e)n e(mi=n pephuko\s ei)=dos.] Compare p. 236 A.]
-
-[Footnote 28: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: Mani/as de/ ge
-ei)/de du/o; te\n me/n, u(po\ nosema/ton a)nthropi/non, te\n de/,
-u(po\ thei/as e)xallage=s to=n ei)otho/ton nomi/mon gignome/nen.]
-Compare 249 D.]
-
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 244 A. [Greek: ei) me\n ga\r e)=n
-a(plou=n to\ mani/an kako\n ei)=nai, kalo=s a)\n e)le/geto; nu=n
-de\ ta\ me/gista to=n a)gatho=n e(mi=n gi/gnetai dia\ mani/as,
-thei/a| me/ntoi do/sei didome/nes.]
-
-Compare Plutarch, [Greek: E)rotiko/s], c. 16. pp. 758-759, &c.]
-
-[Footnote 30: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 245 B. [Greek: mede/ tis e(ma=s
-lo/gos thorubei/to deditto/menos o(s pro\ tou= kekineme/nou to\n
-so/phrona dei= proairei=sthai phi/lon.]
-
-P. 256 E; [Greek: e( de\ a)po\ tou= me\ e)ro=ntos oi)keio/tes,
-sophrosu/ne| thnete=| kekrame/ne, thneta/ te kai\ pheidola\
-oi)konomou=sa, a)neleutheri/an u(po\ ple/thous e)panoume/nen o(s
-a)rete\n te=| phi/le|** psuche=| e)ntekou=sa], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the
-immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal
-condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas.]
-
-Plato then illustrates, by a highly poetical and imaginative
-mythe, the growth and working of love in the soul. All soul or
-mind is essentially self-moving, and the cause of motion to other
-things. It is therefore immortal, without beginning or end: the
-universal or cosmic soul, as well as the individual souls of Gods
-and men.[31] Each soul may be compared to a chariot with a winged
-pair of horses. In the divine soul, both the horses are excellent,
-with perfect wings: in the human soul, one only of them is good,
-the other is violent and rebellious, often disobedient to the
-charioteer, and with feeble or half-grown wings.[32] The Gods, by
-means of their wings, are enabled to ascend up to the summit of
-the celestial firmament--to place themselves upon the outer
-circumference or back of the heaven--and thus to be carried round
-along with the rotation of the celestial sphere round the Earth.
-In the course of this rotation they contemplate the pure essences
-and Ideas, truth and reality without either form or figure or
-colour: they enjoy the vision of the Absolute--Justice,
-Temperance, Beauty, Science. The human souls, with their defective
-wings, try to accompany the Gods; some attaching themselves to one
-God, some to another, in this ascent. But many of them fail in the
-object, being thrown back upon earth in consequence of their
-defective equipment, and the unruly character of one of the
-horses: some however succeed partially, obtaining glimpses of
-Truth and of the general Ideas, though in a manner transient and
-incomplete.
-
-[Footnote 31: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 245-246. Compare Krische, De
-Platonis Phaedro, pp. 49-50 (Goettingen, 1848).
-
-Plato himself calls this panegyric in the mouth of Sokrates a
-[Greek: muthiko/s tis u(/mnos] (Phaedr. p. 265 D).]
-
-[Footnote 32: The reader will recollect Homer, Iliad, xvi. 152,
-where the chariot and horses of Patroklus are described, when he
-is about to attack the Trojans; the mortal horse Pedasus is
-harnessed to it alongside of the two immortal horses Xanthus and
-Balius.]
-
-[Side-note: Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the
-Intellectual faculties of man--Comparison and combination of
-particular sensations indispensable--Reminiscence.]
-
-Those souls which have not seen Truth or general Ideas at all, can
-never be joined with the body of a man, but only with that of some
-inferior animal. It is essential that some glimpse of truth should
-have been obtained, in order to qualify the soul for the condition
-of man:[33] for the mind of man must possess within itself the
-capacity of comparing and combining particular sensations, so as
-to rise to one general conception brought together by reason.[34]
-This is brought about by the process of reminiscence; whereby it
-recalls those pure, true, and beautiful Ideas which it had
-partially seen during its prior extra-corporeal existence in
-companionship with the Gods. The rudimentary faculty of thus
-reviving these general Conceptions--the visions of a prior state
-of existence--belongs to all men, distinguishing them from other
-animals: but in most men the visions have been transient, and the
-power of reviving them is faint and dormant. It is only some few
-philosophers, whose minds, having been effectively winged in their
-primitive state for ascent to the super-celestial regions, have
-enjoyed such a full contemplation of the divine Ideas as to be
-able to recall them with facility and success, during the
-subsequent corporeal existence. To the reminiscence of the
-philosopher, these Ideas present themselves with such brilliancy
-and fascination, that he forgets all other pursuits and interests.
-Hence he is set down as a madman by the generality of mankind,
-whose minds have not ascended beyond particular and present
-phenomena to the revival of the anterior Ideas.
-
-[Footnote 33: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 249-250. [Greek: pa=sa me\n
-a)nthro/pou psuche\ phu/sei tethe/atai ta\ o)/nta--e)\ ou)k a)\n
-e)=lthen ei)s to/de** to\ zo=on; a)namimne/skesthai d' e)k to=nde
-e)kei=na ou) r(a/|dion a(pa/se|], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 34: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 249 B. [Greek: Ou) ga\r e(/ ge
-me/ pote i)dou=sa te\n a)le/theian ei)s to/de e(/xei to\ sche=ma.
-Dei= ga\r a)/nthropon xunie/nai kat' ei)=dos lego/menon, e)k
-pollo=n i)o\n ai)sthe/seon ei)s e(\n logismo=| xunairou/menon.
-Tou=to de/ e)stin a)na/mnesis e)kei/non, a(/ pot' ei)=den e(mo=n
-e( psuche\ sumporeuthei=sa theo=| kai\ u(peridou=sa a(\ nu=n
-ei)=nai/ phamen, kai\ a)naku/psasa ei)s to\ o)\n o)/ntos.]]
-
-[Side-note: Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the
-philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great
-link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas.]
-
-It is by the aspect of visible beauty, as embodied in
-distinguished youth, that this faculty of reminiscence is first
-kindled in minds capable of the effort. It is only the embodiment
-of beauty, acting as it does powerfully upon the most intellectual
-of our senses, which has sufficient force to kindle up the first
-act or stage of reminiscence in the mind, leading ultimately to
-the revival of the Idea of Beauty. The embodiments of justice,
-wisdom, temperance, &c., in particular men, do not strike forcibly
-on the senses, nor approximate sufficiently to the original Idea,
-to effect the first stroke of reminiscence in an unprepared mind.
-It is only the visible manifestation of beauty, which strikes with
-sufficient shock at once on the senses and the intellect, to
-recall in the mind an adumbration of the primitive Idea of Beauty.
-The shock thus received first develops the reminiscent faculty in
-minds apt and predisposed to it, and causes the undeveloped wings
-of the soul to begin growing. It is a passion of violent and
-absorbing character; which may indeed take a sensual turn, by the
-misconduct of the unruly horse in the team, producing in that case
-nothing but corruption and mischief--but which may also take a
-virtuous, sentimental, imaginative turn, and becomes in that case
-the most powerful stimulus towards mental improvement in both the
-two attached friends. When thus refined and spiritualised, it can
-find its satisfaction only in philosophical communion, in the
-generation of wisdom and virtue; as well as in the complete
-cultivation of that reminiscent power, which vivifies in the mind
-remembrance of Forms or Ideas seen in a prior existence. To attain
-such perfection, is given to few; but a greater or less
-approximation may be made to it. And it is the only way of
-developing the highest powers and virtues of the mind; which must
-spring, not from human prudence and sobriety, but from divine
-madness or erotic inspiration.[35]
-
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 256 B. [Greek: ou(= mei=zon
-a)gatho\n ou)/te sophrosu/ne a)nthropi/ne ou)/te thei/a mani/a
-dunate\ pori/sai a)nthro/po|.]--245 B: [Greek: e)p' eu)tuchi/a
-te=| megi/ste| para\ theo=n e( toiau/te mani/a di/dotai.]
-
-The long and highly poetical mythe, of which I have given some of
-the leading points, occupies from c. 51 to c. 83 (pp. 244-257) of
-the dialogue. It is adapted to the Hellenic imagination, and
-requires the reader to keep before him the palaestrae of Athens, as
-described in the Lysis, Erastae, and Charmides of Plato--visited
-both by men like Sokrates and by men like Kritias (Xenoph. Memor.
-i. 2, 29).]
-
-Such is the general tenor of the dialogue Phaedrus, in its first
-half: which presents to us the Platonic love, conceived as the
-source and mainspring of exalted virtue--as the only avenue to
-philosophy--as contrasted, not merely with sensual love, but also
-with the sobriety of the decent citizen who fully conforms to the
-teaching of Law and Custom. In the Symposion, the first of these
-contrasts appears prominently, while the second is less noticed.
-In the Phaedrus, Sokrates declares emphatically that madness, of a
-certain sort, is greatly preferable to sobriety: that the
-temperate, respectable, orthodox citizen, is on the middle line,
-some madmen being worse than he, but others better: that madness
-springing from human distemper is worse, but that when it springs
-from divine inspiration, it is in an equal degree better, than
-sobriety: that the philosophical _oestrus_, and the reminiscence
-of the eternal Ideas (considered by Plato as the only true and
-real Entia), is inconsistent with that which is esteemed as
-sobriety: and is generated only by special inoculation from Eros
-or some other God. This last contrast, as I have just observed, is
-little marked in the Symposion. But on the other hand, the
-Symposion (especially the discourse of Sokrates and his repetition
-of the lessons of Diotima), insists much more upon the
-generalisation of the erotic impulse. In the Phaedrus, we still
-remain on the ground of fervent attachment between two
-individuals--an attachment sentimental and virtuous, displaying
-itself in an intercourse which elicits from both of them active
-intelligence and exalted modes of conduct: in the Symposion, such
-intercourse is assimilated explicitly to copulation with
-procreative consequences, but it is represented as the first stage
-of a passion which becomes more and more expanded and
-comprehensive: dropping all restriction to any single individual,
-and enlarging itself not merely to embrace pursuits, and
-institutions, but also to the plenitude and great ocean of Beauty
-in its largest sense.
-
-[Side-note: Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phaedrus and
-Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of
-poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory.]
-
-The picture here presented by Plato, of the beneficent and
-elevating influence of Eros Philosophus, is repeated by Sokrates
-as a revelation made to him by the prophetess Diotima. It was much
-taken to heart by the Neo-Platonists.[36] It is a striking
-manifestation of the Platonic characteristics: transition from
-amorous impulse to religious and philosophical
-mysticism--implication of poetical fancy with the conception of the
-philosophising process--surrender of the mind to metaphor and
-analogy, which is real up to a certain point, but is forcibly
-stretched and exaggerated to serve the theorising purpose of the
-moment. Now we may observe, that the worship of youthful masculine
-beauty, and the belief that contemplation of such a face and form
-was an operative cause, not only raising the admiration but also
-quickening the intelligence of the adult spectator, and serving as
-a provocative to instructive dialogue--together with a decided
-attempt to exalt the spiritual side of this influence and
-depreciate the sensual--both these are common to Plato with
-Sokrates and Xenophon. But what is peculiar to Plato is, that he
-treats this merely as an initial point to spring from, and soars
-at once into the region of abstractions, until he gets clear of
-all particulars and concomitants, leaving nothing except Beauty
-Absolute--[Greek: to\ Kalo\n--to\ au)to\-kalo\n]--the "full sea of
-the beautiful". Not without reason does Diotima express a doubt
-whether Sokrates (if we mean thereby the historical Sokrates)
-could have followed so bold a flight. His wings might probably
-have failed and dropped him: as we read in the Phaedrus respecting
-the unprepared souls who try to rise aloft in company with the
-Gods. Plato alone is the true Daedalus equal to this flight, borne
-up by wings not inferior to those of Pindar[37]--according to the
-comparison of Dionysius of Halikarnassus.
-
-[Footnote 36: Porphyry, Vit. Plotini, 23.
-
-Plato's way of combining, in these two dialogues--so as to pass by
-an easy thread of association from one to the other--subjects
-which appear to us unconnected and even discordant, is certainly
-remarkable. We have to recognise material differences in the turn
-of imagination, as between different persons and ages. The
-following remark of Professor Mohl, respecting the Persian lyric
-poet Hafiz, illustrates this point. "Au reste, quand meme nous
-serions mieux renseignes sur sa vie, il resterait toujours pour
-nous le singulier spectacle d'un homme qui tantot celebre
-l'absorption de l'ame dans l'essence de Dieu, tantot chante le vin
-et l'amour, sans grossierete, il est vrai, mais avec un laisser
-aller et un naturel qui exclut toute idee de symbolisme--et qui
-generalement glisse de l'une dans l'autre de ces deux manieres de
-sentir, qui nous paraissent si differentes, sans s'apercevoir
-lui-meme qu'il change de sujet. Les Orientaux ont cherche la solution
-de cette difficulte dans une interpretation mystique de toutes ses
-poesies; mais les textes s'y refusent. Des critiques modernes ont
-voulu l'expliquer en supposant une hypocrisie de l'auteur, qui lui
-aurait fait meler une certaine dose de piete mystique, a ses vers
-plus legers, pour les faire passer: mais ce calcul parait etranger
-a la nature de l'homme. Je crois qu'il faut trouver le mot de
-l'enigme dans l'etat general des esprits et de la culture de son
-temps: et la difficulte pour nous est seulement de nous
-representer assez vivement l'etat des esprits en Perse a cette
-epoque, et la nature de l'influence que le Soufisme y exercait
-depuis des siecles sur toutes les classes cultivees de la
-nation."--Mohl (Rapport Annuel a la Societe Asiatique, 1861, p.
-89.)]
-
-[Footnote 37: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosth., p. 972,
-Reiske.]
-
-Various remarks may be made, in comparing this exposition of
-Diotima in the Symposion with that which we read in the Phaedrus
-and Phaedon.
-
-[Side-note: Differences between Symposion and Phaedrus. In-dwelling
-conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the
-latter.]
-
-First, in the Phaedrus and Phaedon (also in the Timaeus and
-elsewhere), the pre-existence of the soul, and its antecedent
-familiarity, greater or less, with the world of Ideas,--are
-brought into the foreground; so as to furnish a basis for that
-doctrine of reminiscence, which is one of the peculiar
-characteristics of Plato. The Form or Idea, when once disengaged
-from the appendages by which it has been overgrown, is said to be
-recognised by the mind and welcomed as an old acquaintance. But in
-the Symposion, no such doctrine is found. The mind is described as
-rising by gradual steps from the concrete and particular to the
-abstract and general, by recognising the sameness of one attribute
-as pervading many particulars, and by extending its comparisons
-from smaller groups of particulars to larger; until at length one
-and the same attribute is perceived to belong to all. The mind is
-supposed to evolve out of itself, and to generate in some
-companion mind, certain abstract or general conceptions,
-correlating with the Forms or Concepta without. The fundamental
-postulate here is, not that of pre-existence, but that of
-in-dwelling conceptions.
-
-[Side-note: Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in
-Symposion.]
-
-Secondly, in the Phaedrus and Phaedon, the soul is declared to be
-immortal, _a parte post_ as well as _a parte ante_. But in the
-Symposion, this is affirmed to be impossible.[38] The soul yearns
-for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only
-reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific
-operation--by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in
-other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble
-thoughts and feelings--by leaving a name and reputation to survive
-in the memory of others.
-
-[Footnote 38: Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.]
-
-[Side-note: Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively
-in Symposion.]
-
-Thirdly, in Phaedrus, Phaedon, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato
-recognises many distinct Forms or Ideas--a world or aggregate of
-such Entia Rationis[39]--among which Beauty is one, but only one.
-It is the exalted privilege of the philosophic mind to come into
-contemplation and cognition of these Forms generally. But in the
-Symposion, the Form of Beauty ([Greek: to\ kalo\n]) is presented
-singly and exclusively--as if the communion with this one Form
-were the sole occupation of the most exalted philosophy.
-
-[Footnote 39: Plat. Repub. v. 476. He recognises Forms of [Greek:
-a)/dikon, kako/n, ai)schro/n], as well as Forms of [Greek:
-di/kaion, a)gatho/n, kalo/n], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Eros recognised, both in Phaedrus and Symposion, as
-affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised
-in Phaedon, Theaetetus, and elsewhere.]
-
-Fourthly, The Phaedrus and Symposion have, both of them in common,
-the theory of Eros as the indispensable, initiatory, stimulus to
-philosophy. The spectacle of a beautiful youth is considered
-necessary to set light to various elements in the mind, which
-would otherwise remain dormant and never burn: it enables the
-pregnant and capable mind to bring forth what it has within and to
-put out its hidden strength. But if we look to the Phaedon,
-Theaetetus, Sophistes, or Republic, we shall not find Eros invoked
-for any such function. The Republic describes an elaborate scheme
-for generating and developing the philosophic capacity: but Eros
-plays no part in it. In the Theaetetus, the young man so named is
-announced as having a pregnant mind requiring to be disburthened,
-and great capacity which needs foreign aid to develop it: the
-service needed is rendered by Sokrates, who possesses an obstetric
-patent, and a marvellous faculty of cross-examination. Yet instead
-of any auxiliary stimulus arising from personal beauty, the
-personal ugliness of both persons in the dialogue is emphatically
-signified.
-
-I note these peculiarities, partly of the Symposion, partly of the
-Phaedrus along with it--to illustrate the varying points of view
-which the reader must expect to meet in travelling through the
-numerous Platonic dialogues.
-
-[Side-note: Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the
-Symposion--Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome
-youths.]
-
-In the strange scene with which the Symposion is wound up, the
-main purpose of the dialogue is still farther worked out. The
-spirit and ethical character of Eros Philosophus, after having
-been depicted in general terms by Diotima, are specially
-exemplified in the personal history of Sokrates, as recounted and
-appreciated by Alkibiades. That handsome, high-born, and insolent
-youth, being in a complete state of intoxication, breaks in
-unexpectedly upon the company, all of whom are as yet sober: he
-enacts the part of a drunken man both in speech and action, which
-is described with a vivacity that would do credit to any
-dramatist. His presence is the signal for beginning to drink hard,
-and he especially challenges Sokrates to drink off, after him, as
-much wine as will fill the large water-vessel serving as cooler;
-which challenge Sokrates forthwith accepts and executes, without
-being the least affected by it. Alkibiades instead of following
-the example of the others by delivering an encomium on Eros,
-undertakes to deliver one upon Sokrates. He proceeds to depict
-Sokrates as the votary of Eros Philosophus, wrapped up in the
-contemplation of beautiful youths, and employing his whole time in
-colloquy with them--yet as never losing his own self-command, even
-while acquiring a magical ascendency over these companions.[40]
-The abnormal exterior of Sokrates, resembling that of a Satyr,
-though concealing the image of a God within--the eccentric
-pungency of his conversation, blending banter with seriousness,
-homely illustrations with impressive principles--has exercised an
-influence at once fascinating, subjugating, humiliating. The
-impudent Alkibiades has been made to feel painfully his own
-unworthiness, even while receiving every mark of admiration from
-others. He has become enthusiastically devoted to Sokrates, whom
-he has sought to attach to himself, and to lay under obligation,
-by tempting offers of every kind. The details of these offers are
-given with a fulness which cannot be translated to modern readers,
-and which even then required to be excused as the revelations of a
-drunken man. They present one of the boldest fictions in the Greek
-language--if we look at them in conjunction with the real
-character of Alkibiades as an historical person.[41] Sokrates is
-found proof against every variety of temptation, however seductive
-to Grecian feeling. In his case, Eros Philosophus maintains his
-dignity as exclusively pure, sentimental, and spiritual: while
-Alkibiades retires more humiliated than ever. We are given to
-understand that the like offers had been made to Sokrates by many
-other handsome youths also--especially by Charmides and
-Euthydemus--all of them being treated with the same quiet and
-repellent indifference.[42] Sokrates had kept on the
-vantage-ground as regards all:--and was regarded by all with
-the same mixture of humble veneration and earnest attachment.
-
-[Footnote 40: Plato, Sympos. p. 216 C-D.]
-
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Sympos. p. 219. See also, respecting the
-historical Alkibiades and his characte, Thucyd. vi. 15; Xenoph.
-Memor. i. 1; Antisthenes, apud Athenaeum, xii. 534.
-
-The invention of Plato goes beyond that of those ingenious men who
-recounted how Phryne and Lais had failed in attempts to overcome
-the continence of Xenokrates, Diog. L. iv. 7: and the saying of
-Lais, [Greek: o(s ou)k a)p' a)ndro/s, a)ll' a)p' a)ndri/antos,
-a)nastai/e.] Quintilian (viii. 4, 22-23) aptly enough compares the
-description given by Alkibiades--as the maximum of testimony to
-the "invicta continentia" of Sokrates--with the testimony to the
-surpassing beauty of Helen, borne by such witnesses as the Trojan
-[Greek: demoge/rontes] and Priam himself (Hom. Iliad iii. 156).
-One of the speakers in Athenaeus censures severely this portion of
-the Platonic Symposion, xi. 506 C, 508 D, v. 187 D. Porphyry (in
-his life of Plotinus, 15) tells us that the rhetor Diophanes
-delivered an apology for Alkibiades, in the presence of Plotinus;
-who was much displeased, and directed Porphyry to compose a
-reply.]
-
-[Footnote 42: Plato, Symp. p. 222 B.
-
-In the Hieron of Xenophon (xi. 11)--a conversation between the
-despot Hieron and the poet Simonides--the poet, exhorting Hieron
-to govern his subjects in a mild, beneficent, and careful spirit,
-expatiates upon the popularity and warm affection which he will
-thereby attract to himself from them. Of this affection one
-manifestation will be (he says) as follows:--[Greek: o(/ste ou)
-mo/non philoi=o a)/n, a)lla\ kai\ e)ro=|o, u(p' a)nthro/pon; _kai\
-tou\s kalou\s ou) peira=|n, a)lla\ peiro/menon u(p' au)to=n
-a)ne/chesthai a)/n se de/oi_], &c.
-
-These words illustrate the adventure described by Alkibiades in
-the Platonic Symposion.
-
-Herakleides of Pontus, Dikaearchus, and the Peripatetic Hieronymus,
-all composed treatises [Greek: Peri\ E)rotos], especially [Greek:
-peri\ paidiko=n e)ro/ton] (Athenae. xiii. 602-603).]
-
-[Side-note: Perfect self-command of Sokrates--proof against every
-sort of trial.]
-
-Not merely upon this point but upon others also, Alkibiades
-recounts anecdotes of the perfect self-mastery of Sokrates: in
-endurance of cold, heat, hunger, and fatigue--in contempt of the
-dangers of war, in bravery on the day of battle--even in the power
-of bearing more wine than any one else, without being intoxicated,
-whenever the occasion was such as to require him to drink: though
-he never drank much willingly. While all his emotions are thus
-described as under the full control of Reason and Eros
-Philosophus--his special gift and privilege was that of
-conversation--not less eccentric in manner, than potent,
-soul-subduing,[43] and provocative in its effects.
-
-[Footnote 43: Plato, Sympos. pp. 221-222.
-
-Alkibiades recites acts of distinguished courage performed by
-Sokrates, at the siege of Potidaea as well as at the battle of
-Delium.
-
-About the potent effect produced by the conversation of Sokrates
-upon his companions, compare Sympos. p. 173 C-D.
-
-In the Xenophontic Apology (s. 18), Sokrates adverts to the
-undisturbed equanimity which he had shown during the long blockade
-of Athens after the battle of AEgospotami, while others were
-bewailing the famine and other miseries.]
-
-[Side-note: Drunkenness of others at the close of the
-Symposion--Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic
-process.]
-
-After the speech of Alkibiades is concluded, the close of the
-banquet is described by the primary narrator. He himself, with
-Agathon and Aristophanes, and several other fresh revellers,
-continue to drink wine until all of them become dead drunk. While
-Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and others retire, Sokrates remains. His
-competency to bear the maximum of wine without being disturbed by
-it, is tested to the full. Although he had before, in acceptance
-of the challenge of Alkibiades, swallowed the contents of the wine
-cooler, he nevertheless continues all the night to drink wine in
-large bowls, along with the rest. All the while, however, he goes
-on debating his ordinary topics, even though no one is
-sufficiently sober to attend to him. His companions successively
-fall asleep, and at day-break, he finds himself the only person
-sober,[44] except Aristodemus (the narrator of the whole scene),
-who has recently waked after a long sleep. Sokrates quits the
-house of Agathon, with unclouded senses and undiminished
-activity--bathes--and then visits the gymnasium at the Lykeion;
-where he passes all the day in his usual abundant colloquy.[45]
-
-[Footnote 44: In Sympos. p. 176 B, Sokrates is recognised as
-[Greek: dunato/tatos pi/nein], above all the rest: no one can be
-compared with him. In the two first books of the Treatise De
-Legibus, we shall find much to illustrate what is here said (in
-the Symposion) about the power ascribed to him of drinking more
-wine than any one else, without being at all affected by it. Plato
-discusses the subject of strong potations ([Greek: me/the]) at
-great length; indeed he seems to fear that his readers will think
-he says too much upon it (i. 642 A). He considers it of great
-advantage to have a test to apply, such as wine, for the purpose
-of measuring the reason and self-command of different men, and of
-determining how much wine is sufficient to overthrow it, in each
-different case (i. 649 C-E). You can make this trial (he argues)
-in each case, without any danger or harm; and you can thus escape
-the necessity of making the trial in a real case of emergency.
-Plato insists upon the [Greek: chrei/a te=s me/thes], as a genuine
-test, to be seriously employed for the purpose of testing men's
-reason and force of character (ii. p. 673). In the Republic, too
-(iii. p. 413 E), the [Greek: phu/lakes] are required to be tested,
-in regard to their capacity of resisting pleasurable temptation,
-as well as pain and danger.
-
-Among the titles of the lost treatises of Theophrastus, we find
-one [Greek: Peri\ Me/thes] (Diog. L. v. 44). It is one of the
-compliments that the Emperor Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) pays to his
-father--That he was, like Sokrates, equally competent both to
-partake of, and to abstain from, the most seductive enjoyments,
-without ever losing his calmness and self-mastery.]
-
-[Footnote 45: Plato, Sympos. p. 223.]
-
-[Side-note: Symposion and Phaedon--each is the antithesis and
-complement of the other.]
-
-The picture of Sokrates, in the Symposion, forms a natural
-contrast and complement to the picture of him in the Phaedon;
-though the conjecture of Schleiermacher[46]--that the two together
-are intended to make up the Philosophus, or third member of the
-trilogy promised in the Sophistes--is ingenious rather than
-convincing. The Phaedon depicts Sokrates in his last conversation
-with his friends, immediately before his death; the Symposion
-presents him in the exuberance of life, health, and cheerfulness:
-in both situations, we find the same attributes
-manifested--perfect equanimity and self-command, proof against every
-variety of disturbing agency--whether tempting or terrible--absorbing
-interest in philosophical dialectic. The first of these two
-elements, if it stood alone, would be virtuous sobriety, yet not
-passing beyond the limit of mortal virtue: the last of the two
-superadds a higher element, which Plato conceives to transcend the
-limit of mortal virtue, and to depend upon divine inspiration or
-madness.[47]
-
-[Footnote 46: Einleitung zum Gastmahl, p. 359 seq.]
-
-[Footnote 47: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 256 C-E. [Greek: sophrosu/ne
-thnete/--e)rotike\ mani/a: sophrosu/ne a)nthropi/ne--thei/a
-mani/a.] Compare p. 244 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon.]
-
-The Symposion of Plato affords also an interesting subject of
-comparison with that of his contemporary Xenophon, as to points of
-agreement as well as of difference.[48] Xenophon states in the
-beginning that he intends to describe what passed in a scene where
-he himself was present; because he is of opinion that the
-proceedings of excellent men, in hours of amusement, are not less
-worthy of being recorded than those of their serious hours. Both
-Plato and Xenophon take for their main subject a festive banquet,
-destined to celebrate the success of a young man in a competitive
-struggle. In Plato, the success is one of mind and genius--Agathon
-has gained the prize of tragedy: in Xenophon, it is one of bodily
-force and skill--Autolykus victor in the pankration. The Symposion
-of Xenophon differs from that of Plato, in the same manner as the
-Memorabilia of Xenophon generally differ from the Sokratic
-dialogues of Plato--that is, by approaching much nearer to common
-life and reality. It describes a banquet such as was likely enough
-to take place, with the usual accompaniments--a professional
-jester, and a Syracusan ballet-master who brings with him a
-dancing-girl, a girl to play on the flute and harp, and a handsome
-youth. These artists contribute to the amusement of the company by
-music, dancing, throwing up balls and catching them again, jumping
-into and out of a circle of swords. All this would have occurred
-at an ordinary banquet: here, it is accompanied and followed by
-remarks of pleasantry, buffoonery and taunt, interchanged between
-the guests. Nearly all the guests take part, more or less: but
-Sokrates is made the prominent figure throughout. He repudiates
-the offer of scented unguents: but he recommends the drinking of
-wine, though moderately, and in small cups. The whole company are
-understood to be somewhat elevated with wine, but not one of them
-becomes intoxicated. Sokrates not only talks as much fun as the
-rest, but even sings, and speaks of learning to dance, jesting on
-his own corpulence.[49] Most part of the scene is broad farce, in
-the manner, though not with all the humour, of Aristophanes.[50]
-The number and variety of the persons present is considerable,
-greater than in most of the Aristophanic plays.[51] Kallias,
-Lykon, Autolykus, Sokrates, Antisthenes, Hermogenes, Nikeratus,
-Kritobulus, have each his own peculiarity: and a certain amount of
-vivacity and amusement arises from the way in which each of them
-is required, at the challenge of Sokrates, to declare on what it
-is that he most prides himself. Sokrates himself carries the
-burlesque farther than any of them; pretending to be equal in
-personal beauty to Kritobulus, and priding himself upon the
-function of a pander, which he professes to exercise. Antisthenes,
-however, is offended, when Sokrates fastens upon him a similar
-function: but the latter softens the meaning of the term so as to
-appease him. In general, each guest is made to take pride in
-something the direct reverse of that which really belongs to him;
-and to defend his thesis in a strain of humorous parody.
-Antisthenes, for example, boasts of his wealth. The Syracusan
-ballet-master is described as jealous of Sokrates, and as
-addressing to him some remarks of offensive rudeness; which
-Sokrates turns off, and even begins to sing, for the purpose of
-preventing confusion and ill-temper from spreading among the
-company:[52] while he at the same time gives prudent advice to the
-Syracusan about the exhibitions likely to be acceptable.
-
-[Footnote 48: Pontianus, one of the speakers in Athenaeus (xi.
-504), touches upon some points of this comparison, with a view of
-illustrating the real or supposed enmity between Plato and
-Xenophon; an enmity not in itself improbable, yet not sufficiently
-proved.
-
-Athenaeus had before him the Symposion of Epikurus (not preserved)
-as well as those of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle (xv. 674); and
-we learn from him some of its distinctive points. Masurius (the
-speaker in Athenaeus, v. init.) while he recognises in the Symposia
-of Xenophon and Plato a dramatic variety of characters and
-smartness--finds fault with both, but especially with Plato, for
-levity, rudeness, indecency, vulgarity, sneering, &c. The talk was
-almost entirety upon love and joviality. In the Symposion of
-Epikurus, on the contrary, nothing was said about these topics;
-the guests were fewer, the conversation was grave and dull, upon
-dry topics of science, such as the atomic theory ([Greek:
-prophe/tas a)to/mon], v. 3, 187 B, 177 B. [Greek: E)pi/kouros de\
-sumpo/sion philoso/phon mo/non pepoi/etai]), and even upon bodily
-ailments, such as indigestion or fever (187 C). The philosophers
-present were made by Epikurus to carry on their debate in so
-friendly a spirit, that the critic calls them "flatterers praising
-each other"; while he terms the Platonic guests "sneerers
-insulting each other" ([Greek: mukteristo=n a)lle/lous
-tothazo/nton], 182 A), though this is much more true about the
-Xenophontic Symposion than about the Platonic. He remarks farther
-that the Symposion of Epikurus included no libation or offering to
-the Gods (179 D).
-
-It is curious to note these peculiarities in the compositions (now
-lost) of a philosopher like Epikurus, whom many historians of
-philosophy represent as thinking about nothing but convivial and
-sexual pleasure.]
-
-[Footnote 49: Xenophon, Sympos. vii. 1; ii. 18-19. [Greek:
-proga/stor], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 50: The taunt ascribed to the jester Philippus, about
-the cowardice of the demagogue Peisander, is completely
-Aristophanic, ii. 14; also that of Antisthenes respecting the bad
-temper of Xanthippe, ii. 10; and the caricature of the movements
-of the [Greek: o)rchestri\s] by Philippus, ii. 21. Compare also
-iii. 11.]
-
-[Footnote 51: Xen. Symp. c. 4-5.]
-
-[Footnote 52: Xen. Symp. vi. [Greek: Au)te\ me\n e( paroini/a
-ou(/to katesbe/sthe], vii. 1-5.
-
-Epiktetus insists upon this feature in the character of Sokrates--his
-patience and power of soothing angry men (ii. 12-14).]
-
-[Side-note: Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic
-Symposion.]
-
-Though the Xenophontic Symposion is declared to be an alternate
-mixture of banter and seriousness,[53] yet the only long serious
-argument or lecture delivered is by Sokrates; in which he
-pronounces a professed panegyric upon Eros, but at the same time
-pointedly distinguishes the sentimental from the sensual. He
-denounces the latter, and confines his panegyric to the
-former--selecting Kallias and Autolykus as honourable examples of it.[54]
-
-[Footnote 53: Xen. Symp. iv. 28. [Greek: a)nami\x e)skopsa/n te
-kai\ e)spou/dasan], viii. 41.]
-
-[Footnote 54: Xen. Symp. viii. 24. The argument against the
-sensual is enforced with so much warmth that Sokrates is made to
-advert to the fact of his being elate with wine--[Greek: o(/ te
-ga\r oi)=nos sunepai/rei, kai\ o( a)ei\ su/noikos e)moi\ e)/ros
-kentri/zei ei)s to\n a)nti/palon e)/rota au)tou=
-par)r(esia/zesthai.]
-
-The contrast between the customs of the Thebans and Eleians, and
-those of the Lacedaemonians, is again noted by Xenophon, Rep.
-Laced. ii. 13. Plato puts (Symp. 182) a like contrast into the
-mouth of Pausanias, assimilating the customs of Athens in this
-respect to those of Sparta. The comparison between Plato and
-Xenophon is here curious; we see how much more copious and
-inventive is the reasoning of Plato.]
-
-The Xenophontic Symposion closes with a pantomimic scene of
-Dionysus and Ariadne as lovers represented (at the instance of
-Sokrates) by the Syracusan ballet-master and his staff. This is
-described as an exciting spectacle to most of the hearers, married
-as well as unmarried, who retire with agreeable emotions. Sokrates
-himself departs with Lykon and Kallias, to be present at the
-exercise of Autolykus.[55]
-
-[Footnote 55: Xen. Symp. viii. 5, ix. 7. The close of the
-Xenophontic Symposion is, to a great degree, in harmony with
-modern sentiment, though what is there expressed would probably be
-left to be understood. The Platonic Symposion departs altogether
-from that sentiment.]
-
-[Side-note: Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than
-the Xenophontic.]
-
-We see thus that the Platonic Symposion is much more ideal, and
-departs farther from common practice and sentiment, than the
-Xenophontic. It discards all the common accessories of a banquet
-(musical or dancing artists), and throws the guests altogether
-upon their own powers of rhetoric and dialectic, for amusement. If
-we go through the different encomiums upon Eros, by Phaedrus,
-Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Diotima--we shall
-appreciate the many-coloured forms and exuberance of the Platonic
-imagination, as compared with the more restricted range and
-common-place practical sense of Xenophon.[56] All the Platonic
-speakers are accomplished persons--a man of letters, a physician,
-two successful poets, a prophetess: the Xenophontic personages,
-except Sokrates and Antisthenes, are persons of ordinary capacity.
-The Platonic Symposion, after presenting Eros in five different
-points of view, gives pre-eminence and emphasis to a sixth, in
-which Eros is regarded as the privileged minister and conductor to
-the mysteries of philosophy, both the lowest and the highest: the
-Xenophontic Symposion dwells upon one view only of Eros (developed
-by Sokrates) and cites Kallias as example of it, making no mention
-of philosophy. The Platonic Symposion exalts Sokrates, as the
-representative of Eros Philosophus, to a pinnacle of elevation
-which places him above human fears and weaknesses[57]--coupled
-however with that eccentricity which makes the vulgar regard a
-philosopher as out of his mind: the Xenophontic Symposion presents
-him only as a cheerful, amiable companion, advising temperance,
-yet enjoying a convivial hour, and contributing more than any one
-else to the general hilarity.
-
-[Footnote 56: The difference between the two coincides very much
-with that which is drawn by Plato himself in the Phaedrus--[Greek:
-thei/a mani/a] as contrasted with [Greek: sophrosu/ne thnete\] (p.
-256 E). Compare Athenaeus, v. 187 B.]
-
-[Footnote 57: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 249 D. [Greek: nouthetei=tai me\n
-u(po\ to=n pollo=n o(s parakino=n, e)nthousia/zon de\ le/lethe
-tou\s pollou\s. . . . ai)ti/an e)/chei o(s maniko=s
-diakei/menos.]]
-
-Such are the points of comparison which present themselves between
-the same subject as handled by these two eminent contemporaries,
-both of them companions, and admirers of Sokrates: and each
-handling it in his own manner.[58]
-
-[Footnote 58: Which of these two Symposia was the latest in date
-of composition we cannot determine with certainty: though it seems
-certain that the latest of the two was not composed in imitation
-of the earliest.
-
-From the allusion to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia (p. 193
-A) we know that the Platonic Symposion must have been composed
-after 385 B.C.: there is great probability also, though not full
-certainty, that it was composed during the time when Mantineia was
-still an aggregate of separate villages and not a town--that is,
-between 385-370 B.C., in which latter year Mantineia was
-re-established as a city. The Xenophontic Symposion affords no mark
-of date of composition: Xenophon reports it as having been himself
-present. It does indeed contain, in the speech delivered by
-Sokrates (viii. 32), an allusion to, and a criticism upon, an
-opinion supported by Pausanias [Greek: o( A)ga/thonos tou=
-poietou= e)raste/s], who discourses in the Platonic Symposion: and
-several critics think that this is an allusion by Xenophon to the
-Platonic Symposion. I think this opinion improbable. It would
-require us to suppose that Xenophon is inaccurate, since the
-opinion which he ascribes to Pausanias is not delivered by
-Pausanias in the Platonic Symposion, but by Phaedrus. Athenaeus (v.
-216) remarks that the opinion is not delivered by Pausanias, but
-he does not mention that it _is_ delivered by Phaedrus. He remarks
-that there was no known written composition of Pausanias himself:
-and he seems to suppose that Xenophon must have alluded to the
-Platonic Symposion, but that he quoted it inaccurately or out of
-another version of it, different from what we now read. Athenaeus
-wastes reasoning in proving that the conversation described in the
-Platonic Symposion cannot have really occurred at the time to
-which Plato assigns it. This is unimportant: the speeches are
-doubtless all composed by Plato. If Athenaeus was anxious to prove
-anachronism against Plato, I am surprised that he did not notice
-that of the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia mentioned in a
-conversation supposed to have taken place in the presence of
-Sokrates, who died in 399 B.C.
-
-I incline to believe that the allusion of Xenophon is not intended
-to apply to the Symposion of Plato. Xenophon ascribes one opinion
-to Pausanias, Plato ascribes another; this is noway inconceivable.
-I therefore remain in doubt whether the Xenophontic or the
-Platonic Symposion is earliest. Compare the Praef. of Schneider to
-the former, pp. 140-143.]
-
-[Side-note: Second half of the Phaedrus--passes into a debate on
-Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical
-exercise.]
-
-I have already stated that the first half of the Phaedrus differs
-materially from the second; and that its three discourses on the
-subject of Eros (the first two depreciating Eros, the third being
-an effusion of high-flown and poetical panegyric on the same
-theme) may be better understood by being looked at in conjunction
-with the Symposion. The second half of the Phaedrus passes into a
-different discussion, criticising the discourse of Lysias as a
-rhetorical composition: examining the principles upon which the
-teaching of Rhetoric as an Art either is founded, or ought to be
-founded: and estimating the efficacy of written discourse
-generally, as a means of working upon or instructing other minds.
-
-[Side-note: Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians.
-Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only
-question is, Whether a man writes well or ill.]
-
-I heard one of our active political citizens (says Phaedrus)
-severely denounce Lysias, and fasten upon him with contempt, many
-times over, the title of a logographer. Active politicians will
-not consent to compose and leave behind them written discourses,
-for fear of being called Sophists.[59] To write discourses
-(replies Sokrates) is noway discreditable: the real question is,
-whether he writes them well.[60] And the same question is the only
-one proper to be asked about other writers on all subjects--public
-or private, in prose or in verse. How to speak _well_,
-and how to write _well_--is the problem.[61] Is there any art or
-systematic method, capable of being laid down beforehand and
-defended upon principle, for accomplishing the object _well_? Or
-does a man succeed only by unsystematic knack or practice, such as
-he can neither realise distinctly to his own consciousness, nor
-describe to others?
-
-[Footnote 59: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 257 C.]
-
-[Footnote 60: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 257 E, 258 D.
-
-The two appellations--[Greek: logogra/phos] and [Greek:
-sophiste/s]--are here coupled together as terms of reproach, just
-as they stand coupled in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 417. It is
-plain that both appellations acquired their discreditable import
-mainly from the collateral circumstance that the persons so
-denominated took money for their compositions or teaching. The
-[Greek: logogra/phos] wrote for pay, and on behalf of any client
-who could pay him. In the strict etymological sense, neither of
-the two terms would imply any reproach.
-
-Yet Plato, in this dialogue, when he is discussing the worth of
-the reproachful imputation fastened on Lysias, takes the term
-[Greek: logogra/phos] only in this etymological, literal sense,
-omitting to notice the collateral association which really gave
-point to it and made it serve the purpose of a hostile speaker.
-This is the more remarkable, because we find Plato multiplying
-opportunities, even on unsuitable occasions, of taunting the
-Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the Phaedrus,
-we should have expected that if he noticed the imputation at all,
-he would notice it in the sense intended by the speaker. In this
-sense, indeed, it would not have suited the purpose of his
-argument, since he wishes to make it an introduction to a
-philosophical estimate of the value of writing as a means of
-instruction.
-
-Heindorf observes, that Plato has used a similar liberty in
-comparing the [Greek: logogra/phos] to the proposer of a law or
-decree. "Igitur, quum solemne legum initium ejusmodi esset,
-[Greek: e)/doxe te=| boule=|], &c., Plato aliter longe quam vulgo
-acciperetur, neque sine calumnia quadam, interpretatus est" (ad p.
-258).]
-
-[Footnote 61: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 259 E. [Greek: o(/pe| kalo=s
-e)/chei le/gein te kai\ gra/phein, kai\ o(/pe| me/,
-skepte/on.]--p. 258 D. [Greek: ti/s o( tro/pos tou= kalo=s te
-kai\ me\ gra/phein.]]
-
-[Side-note: Question about teaching the art of writing well or
-speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does
-the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?.]
-
-First let us ask--When an orator addresses himself to a listening
-crowd upon the common themes--Good and Evil, Just and Unjust--is
-it necessary that he should know what is really and truly good and
-evil, just and unjust? Most rhetorical teachers affirm, that it is
-enough if he knows what the audience or the people generally
-believe to be so: and that to that standard he must accommodate
-himself, if he wishes to persuade.[62]
-
-[Footnote 62: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 260 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be
-founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of
-resemblance to the truth.]
-
-He may persuade the people under these circumstances (replies
-Sokrates), but if he does so, it will be to their misfortune and
-to his own. He ought to know the real truth--not merely what the
-public whom he addresses believe to be the truth--respecting just
-and unjust, good and evil, &c. There can be no genuine art of
-speaking, which is not founded upon knowledge of the truth, and
-upon adequate philosophical comprehension of the
-subject-matter.[63] The rhetorical teachers take too narrow a view of
-rhetoric, when they confine it to public harangues addressed to
-the assembly or to the Dikastery. Rhetoric embraces all guidance
-of the mind through words, whether in public harangue or private
-conversation, on matters important or trivial. Whether it be a
-controversy between two litigants in a Dikastery, causing the
-Dikasts to regard the same matters now as being just and good,
-presently as being unjust and evil: or between two dialecticians
-like Zeno, who could make his hearers view the same subjects as
-being both like and unlike--both one and many--both in motion and
-at rest: in either case the art (if there be any art) and its
-principles are the same. You ought to assimilate every thing to
-every thing, in all cases where assimilation is possible: if your
-adversary assimilates in like manner, concealing the process from
-his hearers, you must convict and expose his proceedings. Now the
-possibility or facility of deception in this way will depend upon
-the extent of likeness between things. If there be much real
-likeness, deception is easy, and one of them may easily be passed
-off as the other: if there be little likeness, deception will be
-difficult. An extensive acquaintance with the real resemblances of
-things, or in other words with truth, constitutes the necessary
-basis on which all oratorical art must proceed.[64]
-
-[Footnote 63: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 260-261.]
-
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 262.]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of
-Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates
-defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define.]
-
-Sokrates then compares the oration of Lysias with his own two
-orations (the first depreciating, the second extolling, Eros) in
-the point of view of art; to see how far they are artistically
-constructed. Among the matters of discourse, there are some on
-which all men are agreed, and on which therefore the speaker may
-assume established unanimity in his audience: there are others on
-which great dissension and discord prevail. Among the latter (the
-topics of dissension), questions about just and unjust, good and
-evil, stand foremost:[65] it is upon these that deception is most
-easy, and rhetorical skill most efficacious. Accordingly, an
-orator should begin by understanding to which of these two
-categories the topic which he handles belongs: If it belongs to
-the second category (those liable to dissension) he ought, at the
-outset, to define what he himself means by it, and what he intends
-the audience to understand. Now Eros is a topic on which great
-dissension prevails. It ought therefore to have been defined at
-the commencement of the discourse. This Sokrates in his discourse
-has done: but Lysias has omitted to do it, and has assumed Eros to
-be obviously and unanimously apprehended by every one. Besides,
-the successive points in the discourse of Lysias do not hang
-together by any thread of necessary connection, as they ought to
-do, if the discourse were put together according to rule.[66]
-
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 263 B. Compare Plato, Alkibiad.
-i. p. 109.]
-
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 263-265.]
-
-[Side-note: Logical processes--Definition and Division--both of
-them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates.]
-
-Farthermore, in the two discourses of Sokrates, not merely was the
-process of _logical definition_ exemplified in the case of Eros--but
-also the process of _logical division_, in the case of Madness
-or Irrationality. This last extensive genus was divided first into
-two species--Madness, from human distemper--Madness, from divine
-inspiration, carrying a man out of the customary orthodoxy.[67]
-Next, this last species was again divided into four branches or
-sub-species, according to the God from whom the inspiration
-proceeded, and according to the character of the inspiration--the
-prophetic, emanating from Apollo--the ritual or mystic, from
-Dionysus--the poetic, from the Muses--the amatory, from Eros and
-Aphrodite.[68] Now both these processes, definition and division,
-are familiar to the true dialectician or philosopher: but they are
-not less essential in rhetoric also, if the process is performed
-with genuine art. The speaker ought to embrace in his view many
-particular cases, to gather together what is common to all, and to
-combine them into one generic concept, which is to be embodied in
-words as the definition. He ought also to perform the
-counter-process: to divide the genus not into parts arbitrary and
-incoherent (like a bad cook cutting up an animal without regard to
-the joints) but into legitimate species;[69] each founded on some
-positive and assignable characteristic. "It is these divisions and
-combinations (says Sokrates) to which I am devotedly attached, in
-order that I may become competent for thought and discourse: and
-if there be any one else whom I consider capable of thus
-contemplating the One and the Many as they stand in nature--I
-follow in the footsteps of that man as in those of a God. I call
-such a man, rightly or wrongly, a Dialectician."[70]
-
-[Footnote 67: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: u(po\ thei/as
-e)xallage=s to=n ei)otho/ton nomi/mon.]]
-
-[Footnote 68: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 265.]
-
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 265-266. 265 D: [Greek: ei)s
-mi/an te i)de/an sunoro=nta a)/gein ta\ pollache= diesparme/na,
-i(/n' e(/kaston o(rizo/menos de=lon poi=e| peri\ ou(= a)\n a)ei\
-dida/skein e)the/le|.] 265 E: [Greek: to\ pa/lin kat' ei)/de
-du/nasthai te/mnein kat' a)/rthra, e(=| pe/phuke, kai\ me\
-e)picheirei=n katagnu/nai me/ros mede/n, kakou= magei/rou tro/po|
-chro/menon.]
-
-Seneca, Epist. 89, p. 395, ed. Gronov. "Faciam ergo quod exigis,
-et philosophiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam. Dividi enim
-illam, non concidi, utile est."]
-
-[Footnote 70: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 266 B. [Greek: Tou/ton de\
-e)/goge au)to/s te e)raste/s, o)= Phai=dre, to=n diaire/seon kai\
-sunagogo=n, i(/n' oi(=o/s te o)= le/gein te kai\ phronei=n; e)a/n
-te/ tin' a)/llon e(ge/somai dunato\n ei)s e(\n kai\ e)pi\ polla\
-pephuko\s o(ra=|n, tou=ton dio/ko kato/pisthe met' i)/chnion
-o(/ste theoi=o. kai\ me/ntoi kai\ tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n
-ei) me\n o)rtho=s e)\ me\ prosagoreu/o, theo\s oi)=de; kalo= de\
-ou)=n me/chri tou=de dialektikou/s.]]
-
-This is Dialectic (replies Phaedrus); but it is not Rhetoric, as
-Thrasymachus and other professors teach the art.
-
-[Side-note: View of Sokrates--that there is no real Art of
-Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic--The
-rhetorical teaching is empty and useless.]
-
-What else is there worth having (says Sokrates), which these
-professors teach? The order and distribution of a discourse:
-first, the exordium, then recital, proof, second proof,
-refutation, recapitulation at the close: advice how to introduce
-maxims or similes: receipts for moving the anger or compassion of
-the dikasts. Such teaching doubtless enables a speaker to produce
-considerable effect upon popular assemblies:[71] but it is not the
-art of rhetoric. It is an assemblage of preliminary
-accomplishments, necessary before a man can acquire the art: but
-it is not the art itself. You must know when, how far, in what
-cases, and towards what persons, to employ these
-accomplishments:[72] otherwise you have not learnt the art of
-rhetoric. You may just as well consider yourself a physician
-because you know how to bring about vomit and purging--or a
-musician, because you know how to wind up or unwind the chords of
-your lyre. These teachers mistake the preliminaries or antecedents
-of the art, for the art itself. It is in the right, measured,
-seasonable, combination and application of these preliminaries, in
-different doses adapted to each special matter and audience--that
-the art of rhetoric consists. And this is precisely the thing
-which the teacher does not teach, but supposes the learner to
-acquire for himself.[73]
-
-[Footnote 71: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 267-268.]
-
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 268 B. [Greek: e)re/sthai ei)
-prosepi/statai kai\ ou(sti/nas dei= kai\ o(po/te e(/kasta tou/ton
-poiei=n, kai\ me/chri o(po/sou?]]
-
-[Footnote 73: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 269.]
-
-[Side-note: What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be--Analogy of
-Hippokrates and the medical Art.]
-
-The true art of rhetoric (continues Sokrates) embraces a larger
-range than these teachers imagine. It deals with mind, as the
-medical researches of Hippokrates deal with body--as a generic
-total with all its species and varieties, and as essentially
-relative to the totality of external circumstances. First,
-Hippokrates investigates how far the body is, in every particular
-man, simple, homogeneous, uniform: and how far it is complex,
-heterogeneous, multiform, in the diversity of individuals. If it
-be one and the same, or in so far as it is one and the same, he
-examines what are its properties in relation to each particular
-substance acting upon it or acted upon by it. In so far as it is
-multiform and various, he examines and compares each of the
-different varieties, in the same manner, to ascertain its
-properties in relation to every substance.[74] It is in this way
-that Hippokrates discovers the nature or essence of the human
-body, distinguishing its varieties, and bringing the medical art
-to bear upon each, according to its different properties. This is
-the only scientific or artistic way of proceeding.
-
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 270 D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)ch o(=de
-dei= dianoei=sthai peri\ o(touou=n phu/seos? Pro=ton me\n,
-a(plou=n e)\ polueide/s e)stin, ou(= peri\ bouleso/metha ei)=nai
-au)toi\ technikoi\ kai\ a)/llon dunatoi\ poiei=n? e)/peita de/,
-e)a\n me\n a(plou=n e)=|, skopei=n te\n du/namin au)tou=, ti/na
-pro\s ti/ pe/phuken ei)s to\ dra=|n e)/chon e)\ ti/na ei)s to\
-pathei=n u(po\ tou=? e)a\n de\ plei/o ei)/de e)/che|, tau=ta
-a)rithmesa/menos, o(/per e)ph' e(no/s, tou=t' i)dei=n e)ph'
-e(ka/stou, to=| ti/ poiei=n au)to\ pe/phuken e)\ to=| ti/ pathei=n
-u(po\ tou=?]]
-
-[Side-note: Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic
-classification of minds with all their varieties, and of
-discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to
-apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case.]
-
-Now the true rhetor ought to deal with the human mind in like
-manner. His task is to work persuasion in the minds of certain men
-by means of discourse. He has therefore, first, to ascertain how
-far all mind is one and the same, and what are the affections
-belonging to it universally in relation to other things: next, to
-distinguish the different varieties of minds, together with the
-properties, susceptibilities, and active aptitudes, of each:
-carrying the subdivision down until he comes to a variety no
-longer admitting division.[75] He must then proceed to distinguish
-the different varieties of discourse, noting the effects which
-each is calculated to produce or to hinder, and the different ways
-in which it is likely to impress different minds.[76] Such and
-such men are persuadable by such and such discourses--or the
-contrary. Having framed these two general classifications, the
-rhetor must on each particular occasion acquire a rapid tact in
-discerning to which class of minds the persons whom he is about to
-address belong: and therefore what class of discourses will be
-likely to operate on them persuasively.[77] He must farther know
-those subordinate artifices of speech on which the professors
-insist; and he must also be aware of the proper season and limit
-within which each can be safely employed.[78]
-
-[Footnote 75: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 277 B. [Greek: o(risa/meno/s te
-pa/lin kat' ei)/de me/chri tou= a)tme/tou te/mnein e)pistethe=|.]]
-
-[Footnote 76: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 271 A. [Greek: _Pro=ton_, pa/se|
-a)kribei/a| gra/psei te kai\ poie/sei psuche\n i)dei=n, po/teron
-e(\n kai\ o(/moion pe/phuken e)\ kata\ so/matos morphe\n
-polueide/s; tou=to ga/r phamen _phu/sin_ ei)=nai deiknu/nai.
-
-_Deu/teron_ de/ ge, o(/to| ti/ poiei=n e)\ pathei=n u(po\ tou=
-pe/phuken.
-
-_Tri/ton_ de\ de\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gon te kai\ psuche=s ge/ne
-kai\ ta\ tou/ton pathe/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/tton
-e(/kaston e(ka/sto|, kai\ dida/skon oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/on
-lo/gon di' e(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkes e( me\n pei/thetai, e( de\
-a)peithei=.]]
-
-[Footnote 77: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 271 D. [Greek: dei= me\ tau=ta
-i(kano=s noe/santa, meta\ tau=ta theo/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s
-pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, _o)xe/os_ te=| ai)sthe/sei
-du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 78: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 272 A. [Greek: tau=ta de\ e)/de
-pa/nt' e)/chonti, _proslabo/nti kairou\s tou= po/te lekte/on kai\
-e)pischete/on_, brachulogi/as te au)= kai\ e)leeinologi/as kai\
-deino/seos, e(ka/ston te o(/s' a)\n ei)/de ma/the| lo/gon, tou/ton
-_te\n eu)kairi/an te kai\ a)kairi/an diagno/nti_, kalo=s te kai\
-tele/os e)sti\n e( te/chne a)peirgasme/ne, _pro/teron d' ou)/_.]]
-
-[Side-note: The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of
-real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be
-truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour.]
-
-Nothing less than this assemblage of acquirements (says Sokrates)
-will suffice to constitute a real artist, either in speaking or
-writing. Arduous and fatiguing indeed the acquisition is: but
-there is no easier road. And those who tell us that the rhetor
-need not know what is really true, but only what his audience will
-believe to be true--must be reminded that this belief, on the part
-of the audience, arises from the likeness of that which they
-believe, to the real truth. Accordingly, he who knows the real
-truth will be cleverest in suggesting apparent or quasi-truth
-adapted to their feelings. If a man is bent on becoming an artist
-in rhetoric, he must go through the process here marked out: yet
-undoubtedly the process is so laborious, that rhetoric, when he
-has acquired it, is no adequate reward. We ought to learn how to
-speak and act in a way agreeable to the Gods, and this is worth
-all the trouble necessary for acquiring it. But the power of
-speaking agreeably and effectively to men, is not of sufficient
-moment to justify the expenditure of so much time and labour.[79]
-
-[Footnote 79: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 273-274.]
-
-[Side-note: Question about Writing--As an Art, for the purpose of
-instruction, it can do little--Reasons why. Writing may remind the
-reader of what he already knows.]
-
-We have now determined what goes to constitute genuine art, in
-speaking or in writing. But how far is writing, even when art is
-applied to it, capable of producing real and permanent effect? or
-indeed of having art applied to it at all? Sokrates answers
-himself--Only to a small degree. Writing will impart amusement and
-satisfaction for the moment: it will remind the reader of
-something which he knew before, if he really did know. But in
-respect to any thing which he did not know before, it will neither
-teach nor persuade him: it may produce in him an impression or
-fancy that he is wiser than he was before, but such impression is
-illusory, and at best only transient. Writing is like painting--one
-and the same to all readers, whether young or old, well or ill
-informed. It cannot adapt itself to the different state of mind of
-different persons, as we have declared that every finished speaker
-ought to do. It cannot answer questions, supply deficiencies,
-reply to objections, rectify misunderstanding. It is defenceless
-against all assailants. It supersedes and enfeebles the memory,
-implanting only a false persuasion of knowledge without the
-reality.[80]
-
-[Footnote 80: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 275 D-E. [Greek: tau)to\n de\
-kai\ oi( lo/goi (oi( gegramme/noi); do/xais me\n a)\n o(/s ti
-phronou=ntas au)tou\s le/gein e)a\n de/ ti e(/re| to=n legome/non
-boulo/menos mathei=n, e(/n ti semai/nei mo/non tau)to\n a)ei/.
-O(/tan de\ a(/pax graphe=|, kulindei=tai me\n pantachou= pa=s
-lo/gos o(moi/os para\ toi=s e)pai+/ousin, o(s d' au)to=s par'
-oi(=s ou)de\n prose/kei, kai\ ou)k e)pi/statai le/gein oi(=s dei=
-ge kai\ me/.]]
-
-[Side-note: Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will
-produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and
-cross-examination are necessary.]
-
-Any writer therefore, in prose or verse--Homer, Solon, or
-Lysias--who imagines that he can by a ready-made composition, however
-carefully turned,[81] _if simply heard or read without
-cross-examination or oral comment_, produce any serious and permanent
-effect in persuading or teaching, beyond a temporary
-gratification--falls into a disgraceful error. If he intends to
-accomplish any thing serious, he must be competent to originate
-spoken discourse more effective than the written. The written word
-is but a mere phantom or ghost of the spoken word: which latter is
-the only legitimate offspring of the teacher, springing fresh and
-living out of his mind, and engraving itself profoundly on the
-mind of the hearer.[82] The speaker must know, with discriminative
-comprehension, and in logical subdivision, both the matter on
-which he discourses, and the minds of the particular hearers to
-whom he addresses himself. He will thus be able to adapt the
-order, the distribution, the manner of presenting his subject, to
-the apprehension of the particular hearers and the exigencies of
-the particular moment. He will submit to cross-examination,[83]
-remove difficulties, and furnish all additional explanations which
-the case requires. By this process he will not indeed produce that
-immediate, though flashy and evanescent, impression of suddenly
-acquired knowledge, which arises from the perusal of what is
-written. He will sow seed which for a long time appears buried
-under ground; but which, after such interval, springs up and
-ripens into complete and lasting fruit.[84] By repeated dialectic
-debate, he will both familiarise to his own mind and propagate in
-his fellow-dialogists, full knowledge; together with all the
-manifold reasonings bearing on the subject, and with the power
-also of turning it on many different sides, of repelling
-objections and clearing up obscurities. It is not from writing,
-but from dialectic debate, artistically diversified and adequately
-prolonged, that full and deep teaching proceeds; prolific in its
-own nature, communicable indefinitely from every new disciple to
-others, and forming a source of intelligence and happiness to
-all.[85]
-
-[Footnote 81: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 277-278. [Greek: o(s oi(
-r(apso|dou/menoi (lo/goi) a)/neu a)nakri/seos kai\ didache=s
-peithou=s e(/neka e)le/chthesan], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 82: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 276 A. [Greek: a)/llon o(ro=men
-lo/gon tou/tou a)delpho\n gne/sion to=| tro/po| te gi/gnetai, kai\
-o(/so| a)mei/non kai\ dunato/teros tou/tou phu/etai? . . . . O(/s
-met' e)piste/mes gra/phetai e)n te=| tou= mantha/nontos psuche=|,
-dunato\s me\n a)mu=nai e(auto=|, e)piste/mon de\ le/gein te kai\
-siga=|n pro\s ou(\s dei=. To\n tou= ei)do/tos lo/gon le/geis
-zo=nta kai\ e)/mpsuchon, ou(= o( gegramme/nos ei)/dolon a)/n ti
-le/goito dikai/os], &c. 278 A.]
-
-[Footnote 83: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 278 C. [Greek: ei) me\n ei)do\s
-e(=| ta)lethe\s e)/chei sune/theke tau=ta (ta\ suggra/mmata) kai\
-e)/chon boethei=n, ei)s e)/legchon i)o\n peri\ o(=n e)/grapse,
-kai\ le/gon au)to\s dunato\s ta\ gegramme/na phau=la a)podei=xai],
-&c.]
-
-[Footnote 84: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 276 A.]
-
-[Footnote 85: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 276-277.]
-
-This blending of philosophy with rhetoric, which pervades the
-criticisms on Lysias in the Phaedrus, is farther illustrated by the
-praise bestowed upon Isokrates in contrast with Lysias. Isokrates
-occupied that which Plato in Euthydemus calls "the border country
-between philosophy and politics". Many critics declare (and I
-think with probable reason[86]) that Isokrates is the person
-intended (without being named) in the passage just cited from the
-Euthydemus. In the Phaedrus, Isokrates is described as the intimate
-friend of Sokrates, still young; and is pronounced already
-superior in every way to Lysias--likely to become superior in
-future to all the rhetors that have ever flourished--and destined
-probably to arrive even at the divine mysteries of philosophy.[87]
-
-[Footnote 86: See above, vol. ii. ch. xxi. p. 227.]
-
-[Footnote 87: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 279 A.]
-
-When we consider that the Phaedrus was pretty sure to bring upon
-Plato a good deal of enmity--since it attacked, by name, both
-Lysias, a resident at Athens of great influence and ability, and
-several other contemporary rhetors more or less celebrated--we can
-understand how Plato became disposed to lighten this amount of
-enmity by a compliment paid to Isokrates. This latter rhetor, a
-few years older than Plato, was the son of opulent parents at
-Athens, and received a good education; but when his family became
-impoverished by the disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian
-war, he established himself as a teacher of rhetoric at Chios:
-after some time, however, he returned to Athens, and followed the
-same profession there. He engaged himself also, like Lysias, in
-composing discourses for pleaders before the dikastery[88] and for
-speakers in the assembly; by which practice he acquired both
-fortune and reputation. Later in life, he relinquished these
-harangues destined for real persons on real occasions, and
-confined himself to the composition of discourses (intended, not
-for contentious debate, but for the pleasure and instruction of
-hearers) on general questions--social, political, and
-philosophical: at the same time receiving numerous pupils from
-different cities of Greece. Through such change, he came into a
-sort of middle position between the rhetoric of Lysias and the
-dialectic of Plato: insomuch that the latter, at the time when he
-composed the Phaedrus, had satisfaction in contrasting him
-favourably with Lysias, and in prophesying that he would make yet
-greater progress towards philosophy. But at the time when Plato
-composed the Euthydemus, his feeling was different.[89] In the
-Phaedrus, Isokrates is compared with Lysias and other rhetors, and
-in that comparison Plato presents him as greatly superior: in the
-Euthydemus, he is compared with philosophers as well as with
-rhetors, and is even announced as disparaging philosophy
-generally: Plato then declares him to be a presumptuous half-bred,
-and extols against him even the very philosopher whom he himself
-had just been caricaturing. To apply a Platonic simile, the most
-beautiful ape is ugly compared with man--the most beautiful man is
-an ape compared with the Gods:[90] the same intermediate position
-between rhetoric and philosophy is assigned by Plato to Isokrates.
-
-[Footnote 88: Dion. Hal. De Isocrate Judicium, p. 576. [Greek:
-desma\s pa/nu polla\s dikaniko=n lo/gon periphe/resthai/ phesin
-u(po\ to=n bibliopolo=n A)ristote/les], &c.
-
-Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. pp. 837-838.
-
-The Athenian Polykrates had been forced, by loss of property, to
-quit Athens and undertake the work of a Sophist in Cyprus.
-Isokrates expresses much sympathy for him: it was a misfortune
-like what had happened to himself (Orat. xi. Busiris 1). Compare
-De Permutation. Or. xv. s. 172.
-
-The assertion made by Isokrates--that he did not compose political
-and judicial orations, to be spoken by individuals for real causes
-and public discussions--may be true comparatively, and with
-reference to a certain period of his life. But it is only to be
-received subject to much reserve and qualification. Even out of
-the twenty-one orations of Isokrates which we possess, the last
-five are composed to be spoken by pleaders before the dikastery.
-They are such discourses as the logographers, Lysias among the
-rest, were called upon to furnish, and paid for furnishing.]
-
-[Footnote 89: Plato, Euthydem. p. 306. I am inclined to agree with
-Ueberweg in thinking that the Euthydemus is later than the
-Phaedrus. Ueberweg, Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, pp.
-256-259-265.]
-
-[Footnote 90: Plato, Hipp. Major, p. 289.]
-
-From the pen of Isokrates also, we find various passages
-apparently directed against the viri Socratici including Plato
-(though without his name): depreciating,[91] as idle and
-worthless, new political theories, analytical discussions on the
-principles of ethics, and dialectic subtleties; maintaining that
-the word philosophy was erroneously interpreted and defined by
-many contemporaries, in a sense too much withdrawn from practical
-results: and affirming that his own teaching was calculated to
-impart genuine philosophy. During the last half of Plato's life,
-his school and that of Isokrates were the most celebrated among
-all that existed at Athens. There was competition between them,
-gradually kindling into rivalry. Such rivalry became vehement
-during the last ten years of Plato's life, when his scholar
-Aristotle, then an aspiring young man of twenty-five, proclaimed a
-very contemptuous opinion of Isokrates, and commenced a new school
-of rhetoric in opposition to him.[92] Kephisodorus, a pupil of
-Isokrates, retaliated; publishing against Aristotle, as well as
-against Plato, an acrimonious work which was still read some
-centuries afterwards. Theopompus, another eminent pupil of
-Isokrates, commented unfavourably upon Plato in his writings: and
-other writers who did the same may probably have belonged to the
-Isokratean school.[93]
-
-[Footnote 91: Isokrates, Orat. x. 1 (Hel. Enc.); Orat. v.
-(Philipp.) 12; Or. xiii. (Sophist.) 9-24; Orat. xv. (Permut.)
-sect. 285-290. [Greek: philosophi/an me\n ou)=n ou)k oi)=mai dei=n
-prosagoreu/ein te\n mede\n e)n to=| paro/nti me/te pro\s to\
-le/gein me/te pro\s to\ pra/ttein o(/phelou=san--te\n kaloume/nen
-u(po/ tinon philosophi/an ou)k ei)=nai phemi/], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 92: Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 35, 141; Orator. 19, 62;
-Numenius, ap. Euseb. Praep. Evang. xiv. 6, 9. See Stahr,
-Aristotelia, i. p. 63 seq., ii. p. 44 seq.
-
-Schroeder's Quaestiones Isocrateae (Utrecht, 1859), and Spengel's
-work, Isokrates und Plato, are instructive in regard to these two
-contemporary luminaries of the intellectual world at Athens. But,
-unfortunately, we can make out few ascertainable facts. When I
-read the Oration De Permut., Or. xv. (composed by Isokrates about
-fifteen years before his own death, and about five years before
-the death of Plato, near 353 B.C.), I am impressed with the belief
-that many of his complaints about unfriendly and bitter criticism
-refer to the Platonic School of that day, Aristotle being one of
-its members. See sections 48-90-276, and seq. He certainly means
-the Sokratic men, and Plato as the most celebrated of them, when
-he talks of [Greek: oi( peri\ ta\s e)rote/seis kai\ a)pokri/seis,
-ou(\s a)ntilogikou\s kalou=sin--oi( peri\ ta\s e)/ridas
-spouda/zontes]--those who are powerful in contentious dialectic,
-and at the same time cultivate geometry and astronomy, which
-others call [Greek: a)doleschi/a] and [Greek: mikrologi/a]
-(280)--those who exhorted hearers to virtue about which others knew
-nothing, and about which they themselves were in dispute. When he
-complains of the [Greek: perittolo/giai] of the ancient Sophists,
-Empedokles, Ion, Parmenides, Melissus, &c., we cannot but suppose
-that he had in his mind the Timaeus of Plato also, though he avoids
-mention of the name.]
-
-[Footnote 93: Athenaeus, iii. p. 122, ii. 60; Dionys. Hal. Epistol.
-ad Cn. Pomp. p. 757.]
-
-[Side-note: The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who
-can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a
-writer.]
-
-This is the true philosopher (continues Sokrates)--the man who
-alone is competent to teach truth about the just, good, and
-honourable.[94] He who merely writes, must not delude himself with
-the belief that upon these important topics his composition can
-impart any clear or lasting instruction. To mistake fancy for
-reality hereupon, is equally disgraceful, whether the mistake be
-made by few or by many persons. If indeed the writer can explain
-to others orally the matters written--if he can answer all
-questions, solve difficulties, and supply the deficiencies, of
-each several reader--in that case he is something far more and
-better than a writer, and ought to be called a philosopher. But if
-he can do no more than write, he is no philosopher: he is only a
-poet, or nomographer, or logographer.[95]
-
-[Footnote 94: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 277 D-E.]
-
-[Footnote 95: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 278-279.]
-
-[Side-note: Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to
-become a philosopher.]
-
-In this latter class stands Lysias. I expect (concludes Sokrates)
-something better from Isokrates, who gives promise of aspiring one
-day to genuine philosophy.[96]
-
-[Footnote 96: Respecting the manner in which Plato speaks of
-Isokrates in the Phaedrus, see what I have already observed upon
-the Euthydemus, vol. ii. ch. xxi. pp. 227-229.]
-
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-
-[Side-note: Date of the Phaedrus--not an early dialogue.]
-
-I have already observed that I dissent from the hypothesis of
-Schleiermacher, Ast, and others, who regard the Phaedrus either as
-positively the earliest, or at least among the earliest, of the
-Platonic dialogues, composed several years before the death of
-Sokrates. I agree with Hermann, Stallbaum, and those other
-critics, who refer it to a much later period of Plato's life:
-though I see no sufficient evidence to determine more exactly
-either its date or its place in the chronological series of
-dialogues. The views opened in the second half of the dialogue, on
-the theory of rhetoric and on the efficacy of written compositions
-as a means of instruction, are very interesting and remarkable.
-
-[Side-note: Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses--His
-theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic.]
-
-The written discourse of Lysias (presented to us as one greatly
-admired at the time by his friends, Phaedrus among them) is
-contrasted first with a pleading on the same subject (though not
-directed towards the attainment of the same end) by Sokrates
-(supposed to be improvised on the occasion); next with a second
-pleading of Sokrates directly opposed to the former, and intended
-as a recantation. These three discourses are criticised from the
-rhetorical point of view,[97] and are made the handle for
-introducing to us a theory of rhetoric. The second discourse of
-Sokrates, far from being Sokratic in tenor, is the most exuberant
-effusion of mingled philosophy, poetry, and mystic theology, that
-ever emanated from Plato.
-
-[Footnote 97: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 235 A.]
-
-[Side-note: His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already
-assured--it assumes that all the doubts have been already
-removed.]
-
-The theory of rhetoric too is far more Platonic than Sokratic. The
-peculiar vein of Sokrates is that of confessed ignorance, ardour
-in enquiry, and testing cross-examination of all who answer his
-questions. But in the Phaedrus we find Plato (under the name of
-Sokrates) assuming, as the basis of his theory, that an expositor
-shall be found who _knows_ what is really and truly just and
-unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable--distinct
-from, and independent of, the established beliefs on these
-subjects, traditional among his neighbours and
-fellow-citizens:[98] assuming (to express the same thing in other
-words) that all the doubts and difficulties, suggested by the
-Sokratic cross-examination, have been already considered, elucidated,
-and removed.
-
-[Footnote 98: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 259 E, 260 E, and 262 B.]
-
-[Side-note: The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process,
-teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn.]
-
-The expositor, master of such perfect knowledge, must farther be
-master (so Plato tells us) of the arts of logical definition and
-division: that is, he must be able to gather up many separate
-fragmentary particulars into one general notion, clearly
-identified and embodied in a definition: and he must be farther
-able to subdivide such a general notion into its constituent
-specific notions, each marked by some distinct characteristic
-feature.[99] This is the only way to follow out truth in a manner
-clear and consistent with itself: and truth is equally honourable
-in matters small or great.[100]
-
-[Footnote 99: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 266.]
-
-[Footnote 100: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 261 A.
-
-That truth upon matters small and contemptible deserves to be
-sought out and proved as much as upon matters great and sublime,
-is a doctrine affirmed in the Sophistes, Politikus, Parmenides:
-Sophist. pp. 218 E, 227 A; Politik. 266 D; Parmenid. 130 E.]
-
-Thus far we are in dialectic: logical exposition proceeding by way
-of classifying and declassifying: in which it is assumed that the
-expositor will find minds unoccupied and unprejudiced, ready to
-welcome the truth when he lays it before them. But there are many
-topics on which men's minds are, in the common and natural course
-of things, both pre-occupied and dissentient with each other. This
-is especially the case with Justice, Goodness, the Honourable,
-&c.[101] It is one of the first requisites for the expositor to be
-able to discriminate this class of topics, where error and
-discordance grow up naturally among those whom he addresses. It is
-here that men are liable to be deceived, and require to be
-undeceived--contradict each other, and argue on opposite sides:
-such disputes belong to the province of Rhetoric.
-
-[Footnote 101: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 263 A.]
-
-[Side-note: The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with
-minds pre-occupied--guiding them methodically from error to
-truth.]
-
-The Rhetor is one who does not teach (according to the logical
-process previously described), but persuades; guiding the mind by
-discourse to or from various opinions or sentiments.[102] Now if
-this is to be done _by art_ and methodically--that is, upon
-principle or system explicable and defensible--it pre-supposes
-(according to Plato) a knowledge of truth, and can only be
-performed by the logical expositor. For when men are deceived, it
-is only because they mistake what is like truth for truth itself:
-when they are undeceived, it is because they are made to perceive
-that what they believe to be truth is only an apparent likeness
-thereof. Such resemblances are strong or faint, differing by many
-gradations. Now no one can detect, or bring into account, or
-compare, these shades of resemblance, except he who knows the
-truth to which they all ultimately refer. It is through the slight
-differences that deception is operated. To deceive a man, you must
-carry him gradually away from the truth by transitional stages,
-each resembling that which immediately precedes, though the last
-in the series will hardly at all resemble the first: to undeceive
-him (or to avoid being deceived yourself), you must conduct him
-back by the counter-process from error to truth, by a series of
-transitional resemblances tending in that direction. You cannot do
-this like an artist (on system and by pre-determination), unless
-you know what the truth is.[103] By anyone who does not know, the
-process will be performed without art, or at haphazard.
-
-[Footnote 102: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 261 A. [Greek: e( r(etorike\
-te/chne psuchagogi/a tis dia\ lo/gon], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 103: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 262 A-D, 273 D.]
-
-[Side-note: He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and
-the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know
-how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case.]
-
-The Rhetor--being assumed as already knowing the truth--if he
-wishes to make persuasion an art, must proceed in the following
-manner:--He must distribute the multiplicity of individual minds
-into distinct classes, each marked by its characteristic features
-of differences, emotional and intellectual. He must also
-distribute the manifold modes of discourse into distinct classes,
-each marked in like manner. Each of these modes of discourse is
-well adapted to persuade some classes of mind--badly adapted to
-persuade other classes: for such adaptation or non-adaptation
-there exists a rational necessity,[104] which the Rhetor must
-examine and ascertain, informing himself which modes of discourse
-are adapted to each different class of mind. Having mastered this
-general question, he must, whenever he is about to speak, be able
-to distinguish, by rapid perception,[105] to which class of minds
-the hearer or hearers whom he is addressing belong: and
-accordingly, which mode of discourse is adapted to their
-particular case. Moreover, he must also seize, in the case before
-him, the seasonable moment and the appropriate limit, for the use
-of each mode of discourse. Unless the Rhetor is capable of
-fulfilling all these exigencies, without failing in any one point,
-his Rhetoric is not entitled to be called an Art. He requires, in
-order to be an artist in persuading the mind, as great an
-assemblage of varied capacities as Hippokrates declares to be
-necessary for a physician, the artist for curing or preserving the
-body.[106]
-
-[Footnote 104: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 270 E, 271 A-D. [Greek: Tri/ton
-de\ de\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gon te kai\ psuche=s ge/ne, kai\ ta\
-tou/ton pathe/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/tton e(/kaston
-e(ka/sto|, kai\ dida/skon oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/on lo/gon di'
-e(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkes e( me\n pei/thetai, e( de\
-a)peithei=.]]
-
-[Footnote 105: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 271 D-E. [Greek: dei= de\ tau=ta
-i(kano=s noe/santa, meta\ tau=ta theo/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s
-pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, _o)xe/os te=| ai)sthe/sei
-du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n_, e)\ mede\ ei)de/nai po ple/on au)to=n
-o(=n to/te e)/koue lo/gon xuno/n.]]
-
-[Footnote 106: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 270 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's _Ideal_ of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part
-incompatible conditions--the Wise man or philosopher will never be
-listened to by the public.]
-
-The total, thus summed up by Plato, of what is necessary to
-constitute an Art of Rhetoric, is striking and comprehensive. It
-is indeed an _ideal_, not merely unattainable by reason of its
-magnitude, but also including impracticable conditions. He begins
-by postulating a perfectly wise man, who knows all truth on the
-most important social subjects; on which his country-men hold
-erroneous beliefs, just as sincerely as _he_ holds his true
-beliefs. But Plato has already told us, in the Gorgias, that such
-a person will not be listened to: that in order to address
-auditors with effect, the rhetor must be in genuine harmony of
-belief and character with them, not dissenting from them either
-for the better or the worse: nay, that the true philosopher (so we
-read in one of the most impressive portions of the Republic) not
-only has no chance of guiding the public mind, but incurs public
-obloquy, and may think himself fortunate if he escapes
-persecution.[107] The dissenter will never be allowed to be the
-guide of a body of orthodox believers; and is even likely enough,
-unless he be prudent, to become their victim. He may be permitted
-to lecture or discuss, in the gardens of the Academy, with a few
-chosen friends, and to write eloquent dialogues: but if he
-embodies his views in motions before the public assembly, he will
-find only strenuous opposition, or something worse. This view,
-which is powerfully set forth by Sokrates both in the Gorgias and
-Republic, is founded on a just appreciation of human societies:
-and it is moreover the basis of the Sokratic procedure--That the
-first step to be taken is to disabuse men's minds of their false
-persuasion of knowledge--to make them conscious of ignorance--and
-thus to open their minds for the reception of truth. But if this
-be the fact, we must set aside as impracticable the postulate
-advanced by Sokrates here in the Phaedrus--of a perfectly wise man
-as the employer of rhetorical artifices. Moreover I do not agree
-with what Sokrates is here made to lay down as the philosophy of
-Error:--that it derives its power of misleading from resemblance
-to truth. This is the case to a certain extent: but it is very
-incomplete as an account of the generating causes of error.
-
-[Footnote 107: Plato, Gorg. p. 513 B, see supra, ch. xxiv.;
-Republic, vi. pp. 495-496.]
-
-[Side-note: The other part of the Platonic _Ideal_ is grand but
-unattainable--breadth of psychological data and classified modes
-of discourse.]
-
-But the other portion of Plato's sum total of what is necessary to
-an Art of Rhetoric, is not open to the same objection. It involves
-no incompatible conditions: and we can say nothing against it,
-except that it requires a breadth and logical command of
-scientific data, far greater than there is the smallest chance of
-attaining. That Art is an assemblage of processes, directed to a
-definite end, and prescribed by rules which themselves rest upon
-scientific data--we find first announced in the works of
-Plato.[108] A vast amount of scientific research, both inductive
-and deductive, is here assumed as an indispensable foundation--and
-even as a portion--of what he calls the Art of Rhetoric: first, a
-science of psychology, complete both in its principles and
-details: next, an exhaustive catalogue and classification of the
-various modes of operative speech, with their respective
-impression upon each different class of minds. So prodigious a
-measure of scientific requirement has never yet been filled up: of
-course, therefore, no one has ever put together a body of precepts
-commensurate with it. Aristotle, following partially the large
-conceptions of his master, has given a comprehensive view of many
-among the theoretical postulates of Rhetoric; and has partially
-enumerated the varieties both of persuadable auditors, and of
-persuasive means available to the speaker for guiding them.
-Cicero, Dionysius of Halikarnassus, Quintilian, have furnished
-valuable contributions towards this last category of data, but not
-much towards the first: being all of them defective in breadth of
-psychological theory. Nor has Plato himself done anything to work
-out his conception in detail or to provide suitable rules for it.
-We read it only as an impressive sketch--a grand but unattainable
-_ideal_--"qualem nequeo monstrare et sentio tantum".
-
-[Footnote 108: I repeat the citation from the Phaedrus, one of the
-most striking passages in Plato, p. 271 D.
-
-[Greek: e)/peide\ lo/gou du/namis tugcha/nei psuchagogi/a ou)=sa,
-to\n me/llonta r(etoriko\n e)/sesthai a)na/gke ei)de/nai psuche\
-o(/sa ei)/de e)/chei. e)/stin ou)=n to/sa kai\ to/sa, kai\ toi=a
-kai\ toi=a; o(/then oi( me\n toioi/de, oi( de\ toioi/de
-gi/gnontai. tou/ton de\ de\ die|reme/non, lo/gon au)= to/sa kai\
-to/sa e)/stin ei)/de, toio/nde e(/kaston. oi( me\n ou)=n toioi/de
-u(po\ to=n toio=nde logon dia\ te/nde te\n aiti/an e)s ta\ toia/de
-eu)peithei=s, oi( de\ toioi/de dia\ ta/de duspeithei=s], &c. Comp.
-p. 261 A.
-
-The relation of Art to Science is thus perspicuously stated by Mr.
-John Stuart Mill, in the concluding chapter of his System of
-Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Book vi. ch. xii. Sec. 2):
-
-"The relation in which rules of Art stand to doctrines of Science
-may be thus characterised. The Art proposes to itself an end to be
-attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the Science. The
-Science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be
-studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends
-it back to Art with a theorem of the combinations of circumstances
-by which it could be produced. Art then examines these
-combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or
-are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The
-only one of the premisses, therefore, which Art supplies, is the
-original major premiss, which asserts that the attainment of the
-given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the proposition
-(obtained by a series of inductions or of deductions) that the
-performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these
-premisses Art concludes that the performance of these actions is
-desirable; and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem
-into a rule or precept."]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical
-teachers--Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an
-accomplished man.]
-
-Indeed it seems that Plato himself regarded it as unattainable--and
-as only worth aiming at for the purpose of pleasing the Gods,
-not with any view to practical benefit, arising from either speech
-or action among mankind.[109] This is a point to be considered,
-when we compare his views on Rhetoric with those of Lysias and the
-other rhetors, whom he here judges unfavourably and even
-contemptuously. The work of speech and action among mankind, which
-Plato sets aside as unworthy of attention, was the express object
-of solicitude to Lysias, Isokrates, and rhetors generally: that
-which they practised efficaciously themselves, and which they
-desired to assist, cultivate, and improve in others: that which
-Perikles, in his funeral oration preserved by Thucydides,
-represents as the pride of the Athenian people
-collectively[110]--combination of full freedom of preliminary contentious
-debate, with energy in executing the resolution which might be ultimately
-adopted. These rhetors, by the example of their composed speeches
-as well as by their teaching, did much to impart to young men the
-power of expressing themselves with fluency and effect before
-auditors, either in the assembly or in the dikastery: as Sokrates
-here fully admits.[111] Towards this purpose it was useful to
-analyse the constituent parts of a discourse, and to give an
-appropriate name to each part. Accordingly, all the rhetorical
-teachers (Quintilian included) continued such analysis, though
-differing more or less in their way of performing it, until the
-extinction of Pagan civilisation. Young men were taught to learn
-by heart regular discourses,[112]--to compose the like for
-themselves--to understand the difference between such as were well
-or ill composed--and to acquire a command of oratorical means for
-moving or convincing the hearer. All this instruction had a
-practical value: though Plato, both here and elsewhere, treats it
-as worthless. A citizen who stood mute and embarrassed, unable to
-argue a case with some propriety before an audience, felt himself
-helpless and defective in one of the characteristic privileges of
-a Greek and a freeman: while one who could perform the process
-well, acquired much esteem and influence.[113] The Platonic
-Sokrates in the Gorgias consoles the speechless men by
-saying--What does this signify, provided you are just and virtuous?
-Such consolation failed to satisfy: as it would fail to satisfy the
-sick, the lame, or the blind.
-
-[Footnote 109: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 273-274. [Greek: e(\n ou)ch
-e(/neka tou= le/gein kai\ pra/ttein pro\s a)nthro/pous dei=
-diaponei=sthai to\n so/phrona, a)lla\ tou= theoi=s kecharisme/na
-me\n le/gein du/nasthai], &c. (273 E).]
-
-[Footnote 110: Thucyd. ii. 39-40-41.]
-
-[Footnote 111: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 288 A.]
-
-[Footnote 112: See what is said by Aristotle about [Greek: e(
-Gorgi/ou pragmatei/a] in the last chapter of De Sophisticis
-Elenchis.]
-
-[Footnote 113: I have illustrated this point in my History of
-Greece, by the example of Xenophon in his command of the Cyreian
-army during its retreat.
-
-His democratical education, and his powers of public speaking,
-were of the greatest service not only in procuring influence to
-himself, but also in conducting the army through its many perils
-and difficulties.
-
-See Aristot. Rhet. i. 1, 3, p. 1355, b. 1.]
-
-[Side-note: The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly:
-Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not
-required to be explained to all learners.]
-
-The teaching of these rhetors thus contributed to the security,
-dignity, and usefulness of the citizens, by arming them for public
-speech and action. But it was essentially practical, or empirical:
-it had little system, and was founded upon a narrow theory. Upon
-these points Plato in the Phaedrus attacks them. He sets little
-value upon the accomplishments arming men for speech and action
-([Greek: lektikou\s kai\ praktikou\s ei)=nai])--and he will not
-allow such teaching to be called an Art. He explains, in
-opposition to them, what he himself conceived the Art of Rhetoric
-to be, in the comprehensive way which I have above described.
-
-But if the conception of the Art, as entertained by the Rhetors,
-is too narrow--that of Plato, on the other hand, is too wide.
-
-First, it includes the whole basis of science or theory on which
-the Art rests: it is a Philosophy of Rhetoric, expounded by a
-theorist--rather than an Art of Rhetoric, taught to learners by a
-master. To teach the observance of certain rules or precepts is
-one thing: to set forth the reasons upon which those rules are
-founded, is another--highly important indeed, and proper to be
-known by the teacher; yet not necessarily communicated, or even
-communicable, to all learners. Quintilian, in his Institutio
-Rhetorica, gives both:--an ample theory, as well as an ample
-development of rules, of his professional teaching. But he would
-not have thought himself obliged to give this ample theory to all
-learners. With many, he would have been satisfied to make them
-understand the rules, and to exercise them in the ready observance
-thereof.
-
-[Side-note: Plato includes in his conception of Art, the
-application thereof to new particular cases.--This can never be
-taught by rule.]
-
-Secondly, Plato, in defining the Art of Rhetoric, includes not
-only its foundation of science (which, though intimately connected
-with it, ought not to be considered as a constituent part), but
-also the application of it to particular cases; which application
-lies beyond the province both of science and of art, and cannot be
-reduced to any rule. "The Rhetor" (says Plato) "must teach his
-pupils, not merely to observe the rules whereby persuasion is
-operated, but also to know the particular persons to whom those
-rules are to be applied--on what occasions--within what limits--at
-what peculiar moments, &c.[114] Unless the Rhetor can teach thus
-much, his pretended art is no art at all: all his other teaching
-is of no value." Now this is an amount of exigence which can never
-be realised. Neither art nor science can communicate that which
-Plato here requires. The rules of art, together with many
-different hypothetical applications thereof, may be learnt: when
-the scientific explanation of the rules is superadded, the learner
-will be assisted farther towards fresh applications: but after
-both these have been learnt, the new cases which will arise can
-never be specially foreseen. The proper way of applying the
-general precepts to each case must be suggested by conjecture
-adapted to the circumstances, under the corrections of past
-experience.[115] It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that
-nothing deserves the name of art[116] except what is
-general--capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed
-beforehand--then to include in art the special treatment required
-for the multiplicity of particular cases; the analogy of the medical
-art, which he here instructively invokes, would be against him on this
-point.
-
-[Footnote 114: Plato, Phaedr. pp. 268 B, 272 A.]
-
-[Footnote 115: What Longinus says about critical skill is
-applicable here also--[Greek: polle=s e)/sti pei/ras teleutai=on
-e)pige/nnema.] Isokrates (De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 290-312-316)
-has some good remarks about the impossibility of [Greek:
-e)piste/me] respecting particulars. Plato, in the Gorgias, puts
-[Greek: te/chne], which he states to depend upon reason and
-foreknowledge, in opposition to [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] and [Greek:
-tribe/], which he considers as dependant on the [Greek: phu/sis
-stochastike/]. But in applying the knowledge or skill called Art to
-particular cases, the [Greek: phu/sis stochastike\] is the best
-that can be had (p. 463 A-B). The conception of [Greek: te/chne]
-given in the Gorgias is open to the same remark as that which we
-find in the Phaedrus. Plato, in another passage of the Phaedrus,
-speaks of the necessity that [Greek: phu/sis, e)piste/me], and
-[Greek: mele/te], shall concur to make an accomplished orator.
-This is very true; and Lysias, Isokrates, and all the other
-rhetors whom Plato satirises, would have concurred in it. In his
-description of [Greek: te/chne] and [Greek: e)piste/me], and in
-the estimate which he gives of all that it comprises, he leaves no
-outlying ground for [Greek: mele/te]. Compare Xenophon, Memor.
-iii. 1, 11; also Isokrates contra Sophistas, a. 16; and a good
-passage of Dionysius Halik. De Compos. Verborum, in which that
-rhetor remarks that [Greek: kairo\s] or opportunity neither has
-been nor can be reduced to art and rule.]
-
-[Footnote 116: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 464-465.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not
-made out.]
-
-While therefore Plato's view of the science or theory of Rhetoric
-is far more comprehensive and philosophical than any thing given
-by the rhetorical teachers--he has not made good his charge
-against them, that what they taught as an art of Rhetoric was
-useless and illusory. The charge can only be sustained if we
-grant--what appears to have been Plato's own feeling--that the
-social and political life of the Athenians was a dirty and corrupt
-business, unworthy of a virtuous man to meddle with. This is the
-argument of Sokrates (in the Gorgias,[117] the other great
-anti-rhetorical dialogue), proclaiming himself to stand alone and
-aloof, an isolated, free-thinking dissenter. As representing his
-sincere conviction, and interpreting Plato's plan of life, this
-argument deserves honourable recognition. But we must remember
-that Lysias and the rhetorical teachers repudiated such a point of
-view. They aimed at assisting and strengthening others to perform
-their parts, not in speculative debate on philosophy, but in
-active citizenship; and they succeeded in this object to a great
-degree. The rhetorical ability of Lysias personally is attested
-not merely by the superlative encomium on him assigned to
-Phaedrus,[118] but also by his great celebrity--by the frequent
-demand for his services as a logographer or composer of discourses
-for others--by the number of his discourses preserved and studied
-after his death. He, and a fair proportion of the other rhetors
-named in the Phaedrus, performed well the useful work which they
-undertook.
-
-[Footnote 117: Plato, Gorg. 521 D.]
-
-[Footnote 118: Plato, Phaedr. p. 228 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his
-greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for
-a private circle.]
-
-When Plato selects, out of the very numerous discourses before him
-composed by Lysias, one hardly intended for any real
-auditors--neither deliberative, nor judicial, nor panegyrical, but an
-ingenious erotic paradox for a private circle of friends--this is
-no fair specimen of the author. Moreover Plato criticises it as if
-it were a philosophic exposition instead of an oratorical
-pleading. He complains that Lysias does not begin his discourse by
-defining--but neither do Demosthenes and other great orators
-proceed in that manner. He affirms that there is no organic
-structure, or necessary sequence, in the discourse, and that the
-sentences of it might be read in an inverted order:[119]--and this
-remark is to a certain extent well-founded. In respect to the
-skilful marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, so as
-to give best effect to the whole, Dionysius of Halikarnassus[120]
-declares Lysias to be inferior to some other orators--while
-ascribing to him marked oratorical superiority on various other
-points. Yet Plato, in specifying his objections against the erotic
-discourses of Lysias, does not show that it offends against the
-sound general principle which he himself lays down respecting the
-art of persuasion--That the topics insisted on by the persuader
-shall be adapted to the feelings and dispositions of the
-persuadend. Far from violating this principle, Lysias kept it in
-view, and employed it to the best of his power--as we may see, not
-merely by his remaining orations, but also by the testimonies of
-the critics:[121] though he did not go through the large
-preliminary work of scientific classification, both of different
-minds and different persuasive apparatus, which Plato considers
-essential to a thorough comprehension and mastery of the
-principle.
-
-[Footnote 119: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 263-264.]
-
-[Footnote 120: Dionysius (Judicium De Lysia, pp. 487-493) gives an
-elaborate criticism on the [Greek: pragmatiko\s charakte\r] of
-Lysias. The special excellence of Lysias (according to this
-critic) lay in his judicial orations, which were highly persuasive
-and plausible: the manner of presenting thoughts was ingenious and
-adapted to the auditors: the narration of facts and details,
-especially, was performed with unrivalled skill. But as to the
-marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, Dionysius
-considers Lysias as inferior to some other orators--and still more
-inferior in respect to [Greek: deinote\s] and to strong emotional
-effects.]
-
-[Footnote 121: Dionys. Hal. (Ars Rhetorica, p. 381) notices the
-severe exigencies which Plato here imposes upon the Rhetor,
-remarking that scarcely any rhetorical discourse could be produced
-which came up to them. The defect did not belong to Lysias alone,
-but to all other rhetors also--[Greek: o(po/te ga\r _kai\ Lusi/an_
-e)le/gchei, pa=san te\n e(mete/ran r(etorike\n e)/oiken
-e)le/gchein.] Demosthenes almost alone (in the opinion of
-Dionysius) contrived to avoid the fault, because he imitated
-Plato.]
-
-[Side-note: No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise
-of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the
-Phaedrus.]
-
-The first discourse assigned by Plato to Sokrates professes to be
-placed in competition with the discourse of Lysias, and to aim at
-the same object. But in reality it aims at a different object: it
-gives the dissuasive arguments, but omits the persuasive--as
-Phaedrus is made to point out: so that it cannot be fairly compared
-with the discourse of Lysias. Still more may this be said
-respecting the second discourse of Sokrates: which is of a
-character and purpose so totally disparate, that no fair
-comparison can be taken between it and the ostensible competitor.
-The mixture of philosophy, mysticism, and dithyrambic poetry,
-which the second discourse of Sokrates presents, was considered by
-a rhetorical judge like Dionysius as altogether inconsistent with
-the scope and purpose of reasonable discourse.[122] In the
-Menexenus, Plato has brought himself again into competition with
-Lysias, and there the competition is fairer:[123] for Plato has
-there entirely neglected the exigencies enforced in the Phaedrus,
-and has composed a funeral discourse upon the received type; which
-Lysias and other orators before him had followed, from Perikles
-downward. But in the Phaedrus, Plato criticises Lysias upon
-principles which are a medley between philosophy and rhetoric.
-Lysias, in defending himself, might have taken the same ground as
-we find Sokrates himself taking in the Euthydemus. "Philosophy and
-politics are two distinct walks, requiring different aptitudes,
-and having each its own practitioners. A man may take whichever he
-pleases; but he must not arrogate to himself superiority by an
-untoward attempt to join the two together."[124]
-
-[Footnote 122: See the Epistol. of Dion. Halikarn. to Cneius
-Pompey--De Platone--pp. 755-765.]
-
-[Footnote 123: Plato, Menexen. p. 237 seq. Stallbaum, Comm. in
-Menexenum, pp. 10-11.]
-
-[Footnote 124: Plato, Euthydem. p. 306 A-C.]
-
-[Side-note: Continuous discourse, either written or spoken,
-inefficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant.]
-
-Another important subject is also treated in the Phaedrus. Sokrates
-delivers views both original and characteristic, respecting the
-efficacy of continuous discourse--either written to be read, or
-spoken to be heard without cross-examination--as a means of
-instruction. They are re-stated--in a manner substantially the
-same, though with some variety and fulness of illustration--in
-Plato's seventh Epistle[125] to the surviving friends of Dion. I
-have already touched upon these views in my eighth** Chapter, on the
-Platonic Dialogues generally, and have pointed out how much Plato
-understood to be involved in what he termed _knowledge_. No man
-(in his view) could be said to know, who was not competent to
-sustain successfully, and to apply successfully, a Sokratic
-cross-examination. Now knowledge, involving such a competency,
-certainly cannot be communicated by any writing, or by any fixed and
-unchangeable array of words, whether written or spoken. You must
-familiarise learners with the subject on many different sides, and
-in relation to many different points of view, each presenting more
-or less chance of error or confusion. Moreover, you must apply a
-different treatment to each mind, and to the same mind at
-different stages: no two are exactly alike, and the treatment
-adapted for one will be unsuitable for the other. While it is
-impossible, for these reasons, to employ any set forms of words,
-it will be found that the process of reading or listening leaves
-the reader or listener comparatively passive: there is nothing to
-stir the depths of the mind, or to evolve the inherent forces and
-dormant capacities. Dialectic conversation is the only process
-which can adapt itself with infinite variety to each particular
-case and moment--and which stimulates fresh mental efforts ever
-renewed on the part of each respondent and each questioner.
-Knowledge--being a slow result generated by this stimulating
-operation, when skilfully conducted, long continued, and much
-diversified--is not infused into, but evolved out of, the mind. It
-consists in a revival of those unchangeable Ideas or Forms, with
-which the mind during its state of eternal pre-existence had had
-communion. There are only a few privileged minds, however, that
-have had sufficient communion therewith to render such revival
-possible: accordingly, none but these few can ever rise to
-knowledge.[126]
-
-[Footnote 125: Plato, Epistol. vii. pp. 341-344.]
-
-[Footnote 126: Schleiermacher, in his Introduction to the Phaedrus,
-justly characterises this doctrine as genuine Sokratism--"die aecht
-Sokratische erhabene Verachtung alles Schreibens and alles
-rednerischen Redens," p. 70.]
-
-[Side-note: Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons
-who know--or as an elegant pastime.]
-
-Though knowledge cannot be first communicated by written matters,
-yet if it has been once communicated and subsequently forgotten,
-it may be revived by written matters. Writing has thus a real,
-though secondary, usefulness, as a memorandum. And Plato doubtless
-accounted written dialogues the most useful of all written
-compositions, because they imitated portions of that long oral
-process whereby alone knowledge had been originally generated. His
-dialogues were reports of the conversations purporting to have
-been held by Sokrates with others.
-
-[Side-note: Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high to be
-realised.]
-
-It is an excellent feature in the didactic theories of Plato, that
-they distinguish so pointedly between the passive and active
-conditions of the intellect; and that they postulate as
-indispensable, an habitual and cultivated mental activity, worked
-up by slow, long-continued, colloquy. To read or hear, and then to
-commit to memory, are in his view elegant recreations, but nothing
-more. But while, on this point, Plato's didactic theories deserve
-admiration, we must remark on the other hand that they are pitched
-so high as to exceed human force, and to overpass all possibility
-of being realised.[127] They mark out an _ideal_, which no person
-ever attained, either then or since--like the Platonic theory of
-rhetoric. To be master of any subject, in the extent and
-perfection required for sustaining and administering a Sokratic
-cross-examination--is a condition which scarce any one can ever
-fulfil: certainly no one, except upon a small range of subjects.
-Assuredly, Plato himself never fulfilled it.
-
-[Footnote 127: A remark made by Sextus Empiricus (upon another
-doctrine which he is discussing) may be applied to this view of
-Plato--[Greek: to\ de\ le/gein o(/ti te=| diomalismo=| to=n
-pra/xeon katalamba/nomen to\n e)/chonta te\n peri\ to\n bi/on
-te/chnen, _u(perphtheggome/non e)/sti te\n a)nthro/pon phu/sin_,
-kai\ eu)chome/non ma=llon e)\ a)lethe= lego/nton] (Pyrrh. Hyp.
-iii. 244).]
-
-[Side-note: No one has ever been found competent to solve the
-difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the
-negative vein of philosophy.]
-
-Such a cross-examination involved the mastery of all the openings
-for doubt, difficulty, deception, or refutation, bearing on the
-subject: openings which a man is to profit by, if assailant--to
-keep guarded, if defendant. Now when we survey the Greek negative
-philosophy, as it appears in Plato, Aristotle, and Sextus
-Empiricus--and when we recollect that between the second and the
-third of these names, there appeared three other philosophers
-equally or more formidable in the same vein, all whose arguments
-have perished (Arkesilaus, Karneades, AEnesidemus)--we shall see
-that no man has ever been known competent both to strike and parry
-with these weapons, in a manner so skilful and ready as to amount
-to knowledge in the Platonic sense. But in so far as such
-knowledge is attainable or approachable, Plato is right in saying
-that it cannot be attained except by long dialectic practice.
-Reading books, and hearing lectures, are undoubtedly valuable
-aids, but insufficient by themselves. Modern times recede from it
-even more than ancient. Regulated oral dialectic has become
-unknown; the logical and metaphysical difficulties--which negative
-philosophy required to be solved before it would allow any farther
-progress--are now little heeded, amidst the multiplicity of
-observed facts, and theories adapted to and commensurate with
-those facts. This change in the character of philosophy is
-doubtless a great improvement. It is found that by acquiescing
-provisionally in the _axiomata media_, and by applying at every
-step the control of verification, now rendered possible by the
-multitude of ascertained facts--the sciences may march safely
-onward: notwithstanding that the logical and metaphysical
-difficulties, the puzzles ([Greek: a)pori/ai]) involved in
-_philosophia prima_ and its very high abstractions, are left
-behind unsolved and indeterminate. But though the modern course of
-philosophy is preferable to the ancient, it is not for that reason
-to be considered as satisfactory. These metaphysical difficulties
-are not diminished either in force or relevancy, because modern
-writers choose to leave them unnoticed. Plato and Aristotle were
-quite right in propounding them as problems, the solution of which
-was indispensable to the exigencies and consistent schematism of
-the theorising intelligence, as well as to any complete
-discrimination between sufficient and insufficient evidence. Such
-they still remain, overlooked yet not defunct.
-
-[Side-note: Plato's _ideal_ philosopher can only be realised under
-the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated
-into full reminiscence here.]
-
-Now all these questions would be solved by the _ideal_ philosopher
-whom Plato in the Phaedrus conceives as possessing knowledge: a
-person who shall be at once a negative Sokrates in excogitating
-and enforcing all the difficulties--and an affirmative match for
-Sokrates, as respondent in solving them: a person competent to
-apply this process to all the indefinite variety of individual
-minds, under the inspirations of the moment. This is a magnificent
-_ideal_. Plato affirms truly, that those teachers who taught
-rhetoric and philosophy by writing, could never produce such a
-pupil: and that even the Sokratic dialectic training, though
-indispensable and far more efficacious, would fail in doing so,
-unless in those few cases where it was favoured by very superior
-capacity--understood by him as superhuman, and as a remnant from
-the pre-existing commerce of the soul with the world of Forms or
-Ideas. The foundation therefore of the whole scheme rests upon
-Plato's hypothesis of an antecedent life of the soul, proclaimed
-by Sokrates here in his second or panegyrical discourse on Eros.
-The rhetorical teachers, with whom he here compares himself and
-whom he despises as aiming at low practical ends--might at any
-rate reply that they avoided losing themselves in such unmeasured
-and unwarranted hypotheses.
-
-[Side-note: Different proceeding of Plato in the Timaeus.]
-
-One remark yet remains to be made upon the doctrine here set forth
-by Plato: that no teaching is possible by means of continuous
-discourse spoken or written--none, except through prolonged and
-varied oral dialectic.[128] To this doctrine Plato does not
-constantly conform in his practice: he departs from it on various
-important occasions. In the Timaeus, Sokrates calls upon the
-philosopher so named for an exposition on the deepest and most
-mysterious cosmical subjects. Timaeus delivers the exposition in a
-continuous harangue, without a word of remark or question
-addressed by any of the auditors: while at the beginning of the
-Kritias (the next succeeding dialogue) Sokrates greatly commends
-what Timaeus had spoken. The Kritias itself too (though unfinished)
-is given in the form of continuous exposition. Now, as the Timaeus
-is more abstruse than any other Platonic writing, we cannot
-imagine that Plato, at the time when he composed it, thought so
-meanly about continuous exposition, as a vehicle of instruction,
-as we find him declaring in the Phaedrus. I point this out, because
-it illustrates my opinion that the different dialogues of Plato
-represent very different, sometimes even opposite, points of view:
-and that it is a mistake to treat them as parts of one
-preconceived and methodical system.
-
-[Footnote 128: The historical Sokrates would not allow his oral
-dialectic process to be called teaching. He expressly says "I have
-never been the teacher of any one" (Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 33 A, 19
-E): and he disclaimed the possession of knowledge. Aristotle too
-considers teaching as a presentation of truths, ready made and
-supposed to be known, by the teacher to learners, who are bound to
-believe them, [Greek: dei= ga\r pisteu/ein to\n mantha/nonta]. The
-Platonic Sokrates, in the Phaedrus and Symposion, differs from
-both; he recognises no teaching except the perpetual generation of
-new thoughts and feelings, by means of stimulating dialectic
-colloquy, and the revival in the mind thereby of the experience of
-an antecedent life, during which some communion has been enjoyed
-with the world of Ideas or Forms.]
-
-[Side-note: Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's
-mind--Extreme of the Transcendental or Absolute--Extreme of specialising
-adaptation to individuals and occasions.]
-
-Plato is usually extolled by his admirers, as the champion of the
-Absolute--of unchangeable forms, immutable truth, objective
-necessity cogent and binding on every one. He is praised for
-having refuted Protagoras; who can find no standard beyond the
-individual recognition and belief, of his own mind or that of some
-one else. There is no doubt that Plato often talks in that strain:
-but the method followed in his dialogues, and the general
-principles of method which he lays down, here as well as
-elsewhere, point to a directly opposite conclusion. Of this the
-Phaedrus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of
-generality, it proclaims the extreme of specialty. The objection
-which the Sokrates of the Phaedrus advances against the didactic
-efficacy of written discourse, is founded on the fact, that it is
-the same to all readers--that it takes no cognizance of the
-differences of individual minds nor of the same mind at different
-times. Sokrates claims for dialectic debate the valuable
-privilege, that it is constant action and re-action between two
-individual minds--an appeal by the inherent force and actual
-condition of each, to the like elements in the other--an ever
-shifting presentation of the same topics, accommodated to the
-measure of intelligence and cast of emotion in the talkers and at
-the moment. The individuality of each mind--both questioner and
-respondent--is here kept in view as the governing condition of the
-process. No two minds can be approached by the same road or by the
-same interrogation. The questioner cannot advance a step except by
-the admission of the respondent. Every respondent is the measure
-to himself. He answers suitably to his own belief; he defends by
-his own suggestions; he yields to the pressure of contradiction
-and inconsistency, _when he feels them_, and not before. Each
-dialogist is (to use the Protagorean phrase) the measure to
-himself of truth and falsehood, according as he himself believes
-it. Assent or dissent, whichever it may be, springs only from the
-free working of the individual mind, in its actual condition then
-and there. It is to the individual mind alone, that appeal is
-made, and this is what Protagoras asks for.
-
-We thus find, in Plato's philosophical character, two extreme
-opposite tendencies and opposite poles co-existent. We must
-recognise them both: but they can never be reconciled: sometimes
-he obeys and follows the one, sometimes the other.
-
-If it had been Plato's purpose to proclaim and impose upon every
-one something which he called "Absolute Truth," one and the same
-alike imperative upon all--he would best proclaim it by preaching
-or writing. To modify this "Absolute," according to the varieties
-of the persons addressed, would divest it of its intrinsic
-attribute and excellence. If you pretend to deal with an Absolute,
-you must turn away your eyes from all diversity of apprehending
-intellects and believing subjects.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XXVII.
-
-PARMENIDES.
-
-
-[Side-note: Character of dialogues immediately preceding--much
-transcendental assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides.]
-
-In the dialogues immediately preceding--Phaedon, Phaedrus,
-Symposion--we have seen Sokrates manifesting his usual dialectic,
-which never fails him: but we have also seen him indulging in a
-very unusual vein of positive affirmation and declaration. He has
-unfolded many novelties about the states of pre-existence and
-post-existence: he has familiarised us with Ideas, Forms,
-Essences, eternal and unchangeable, as the causes of all the facts
-and particularities of nature: he has recognised the inspired
-variety of madness, as being more worthy of trust than sober,
-uninspired, intelligence: he has recounted, with the faith of a
-communicant fresh from the mysteries, revelations made to him by
-the prophetess Diotima,--respecting the successive stages of
-exaltation whereby gifted intelligences, under the stimulus of
-Eros Philosophus, ascend into communion with the great sea of
-Beauty. All this is set forth with as much charm as Plato's
-eloquence can bestow. But after all, it is not the true character
-of Sokrates:--I mean, the Sokrates of the Apology, whose mission
-it is to make war against the chronic malady of the human
-mind--false persuasion of knowledge, without the reality. It is, on the
-contrary, Sokrates himself infected with the same chronic malady
-which he combats in others, and requiring medicine against it as
-much as others. Such is the exact character in which Sokrates
-appears in the Parmenides: which dialogue I shall now proceed to
-review.
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates is the juvenile defendant--Parmenides the
-veteran censor and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of
-exercises to be performed by the philosophical aspirant.]
-
-The Parmenides announces its own purpose as intended to repress
-premature forwardness of affirmation, in a young philosophical
-aspirant: who, with meritorious eagerness in the search for truth,
-and with his eyes turned in the right direction to look for
-it--has nevertheless not fully estimated the obstructions besetting
-his path, nor exercised himself in the efforts necessary to
-overcome them. By a curious transposition, or perhaps from
-deference on Plato's part to the Hellenic sentiment of
-Nemesis,--Sokrates, who in most Platonic dialogues stands forward
-as the privileged censor and victorious opponent, is here the juvenile
-defendant under censorship by a superior. It is the veteran
-Parmenides of Elea who, while commending the speculative impulse
-and promise of Sokrates, impresses upon him at the same time that
-the theory which he had advanced--the self-existence, the separate
-and substantive nature, of Ideas--stands exposed to many grave
-objections, which he (Sokrates) has not considered and cannot
-meet. So far, Parmenides performs towards Sokrates the same
-process of cross-examining refutation as Sokrates himself applies
-to Theaetetus and other young men elsewhere. But we find in this
-dialogue something ulterior and even peculiar. Having warned
-Sokrates that his intellectual training has not yet been carried
-to a point commensurate with the earnestness of his
-aspirations--Parmenides proceeds to describe to him what exercises he
-ought to go through, in order to guard himself against premature assertion
-or hasty partiality. Moreover, Parmenides not only indicates in
-general terms what ought to be done, but illustrates it by giving
-a specimen of such exercise, on a topic chosen by himself.
-
-[Side-note: Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides.]
-
-Passing over the dramatic introduction[1] whereby the personages
-discoursing are brought together, we find Sokrates, Parmenides,
-and the Eleatic Zeno (the disciple of Parmenides), engaged in the
-main dialogue. When Parmenides begins his illustrative exercise, a
-person named Aristotle (afterwards one of the Thirty oligarchs at
-Athens), still younger than Sokrates, is made to serve as
-respondent.
-
-[Footnote 1: This dramatic introduction is extremely complicated.
-The whole dialogue, from beginning to end, is recounted by
-Kephalus of Klazomenae; who heard it from the Athenian Antiphon--who
-himself had heard it from Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno,
-present when the conversation was held. A string of circumstances
-are narrated by Kephalus, to explain how he came to wish to hear
-it, and to find out Antiphon. Plato appears anxious to throw the
-event back as far as possible into the past, in order to justify
-the bringing Sokrates into personal communication with Parmenides:
-for some unfriendly critics tried to make out that the two could
-not possibly have conversed on philosophy (Athenaeus, xi. 505).
-Plato declares the ages of the persons with remarkable exactness:
-Parmenides was 65, completely grey-headed, but of noble mien: Zeno
-about 40, tall and graceful: Sokrates very young. (Plat. Parmen.
-p. 127 B-C.)
-
-It required some invention in Plato to provide a narrator,
-suitable for recounting events so long antecedent as the young
-period of Sokrates.]
-
-Sokrates is one among various auditors, who are assembled to hear
-Zeno reading aloud a treatise of his own composition, intended to
-answer and retort upon the opponents of his preceptor Parmenides.
-
-[Side-note: Manner in which the doctrine of Parmenides was
-impugned. Manner in which his partisan Zeno defended him.]
-
-The main doctrine of the real Parmenides was, "That Ens, the
-absolute, real, self-existent, was One and not many": which
-doctrine was impugned and derided by various opponents, deducing
-from it absurd conclusions. Zeno defended his master by showing
-that the opposite doctrine (--"That Ens, the absolute,
-self-existent universe, is Many--") led to conclusions absurd in an
-equal or greater degree. If the Absolute were Many, the many would
-be both like and unlike: but they cannot have incompatible and
-contradictory attributes: therefore Absolute Ens is not Many. Ens,
-as Parmenides conceived it, was essentially homogeneous and
-unchangeable: even assuming it to be Many, all its parts must be
-homogeneous, so that what was predicable of one must be predicable
-of all; it might be all alike, or all unlike: but it could not be
-both. Those who maintained the plurality of Ens, did so on the
-ground of apparent severalty, likeness, and unlikeness, in the
-sensible world. But Zeno, while admitting these phenomena in the
-sensible world, as _relative to us_, apparent, and subject to the
-varieties of individual estimation--denied their applicability to
-absolute and self-existent Ens.[2] Since absolute Ens or Entia are
-Many (said the opponents of Parmenides), they will be both like
-and unlike: and thus we can explain the phenomena of the sensible
-world. The absolute (replied Zeno) cannot be both like and unlike;
-therefore it cannot be many. We must recollect that both
-Parmenides and Zeno renounced all attempt to explain the sensible
-world by the absolute and purely intelligible Ens. They treated
-the two as radically distinct and unconnected. The one was
-absolute, eternal, unchangeable, homogeneous, apprehended only by
-reason. The other was relative, temporary, variable,
-heterogeneous; a world of individual and subjective opinion, upon
-which no absolute truth, no pure objectivity, could be reached.
-
-[Footnote 2: I have already given a short account of the Zenonian
-Dialectic, ch. ii. p. 93 seq.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms
-the Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet
-participable by them.]
-
-Sokrates, depicted here as a young man, impugns this doctrine of
-Zeno: and maintains that the two worlds, though naturally
-disjoined, were not incommunicable. He advances the Platonic
-theory of Ideas: that is, an intelligible world of many separate
-self-existent Forms or Ideas, apprehended by reason only--and a
-sensible world of particular objects, each participating in one or
-more of these Forms or Ideas. "What you say (he remarks to Zeno),
-is true of the world of Forms or Ideas: the Form of Likeness _per
-se_ can never be unlike, nor can the Form of Unlikeness be ever
-like. But in regard to the sensible world, there is nothing to
-hinder you and me, and other objects which rank and are numbered
-as separate individuals, from participating both in the Form of
-likeness and in the Form of unlikeness.[3] In so far as I, an
-individual object, participate in the Form of Likeness, I am
-properly called like; in so far as I participate in the Form of
-Unlikeness, I am called unlike. So about One and Many, Great and
-Little, and so forth: I, the same individual, may participate in
-many different and opposite Forms, and may derive from them
-different and opposite denominations. I am one and many--like and
-unlike--great and little--all at the same time. But no such
-combination is possible between the Forms themselves,
-self-existent and opposite: the Form of Likeness cannot become unlike,
-nor _vice versa_. The Forms themselves stand permanently apart,
-incapable of fusion or coalescence with each other: but different
-and even opposite Forms may lend themselves to participation and
-partnership in the same sensible individual object."[4]
-
-[Footnote 3: Plato, Parmenid. p. 129 A. [Greek: ou) nomi/zeis
-ei)=nai au)to\ kath' au)to\ ei)=do/s ti o(moio/tetos, kai\ to=|
-toiou/to| ai)= a)/llo ti e)nanti/on, o(\ e)/stin a)no/moion?
-tou/toin de\ duoi=n o)/ntoin kai\ e)me\ kai\ se\ kai\ ta\ a)/lla
-a(\ de\ polla\ kalou=men, metalamba/nein?]]
-
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 129-130.]
-
-[Side-note: Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of
-Sokrates. Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic
-theory of Ideas.]
-
-Parmenides and Zeno are represented as listening with surprise and
-interest to this language of Sokrates, recognising two distinct
-worlds: one, of invisible but intelligible Forms,--the other that
-of sensible objects, participating in these Forms. "Your ardour
-for philosophy" (observes Parmenides to Sokrates), "is admirable.
-Is this distinction your own?"[5]
-
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Parmenid. p. 130 A. [Greek: O)= So/krates, o(s
-a)/xios ei)= a)/gasthai te=s o(rme=s te=s e)pi\ tou\s lo/gous;
-kai/ moi ei)pe/, _au)to\s su\ ou(/to die/|resai_ o(s le/geis,
-chori\s me\n ei)/de au)ta\ a)/tta, chori\s de\ ta\ tou/ton au)=
-mete/chonta?]]
-
-Plato now puts into the mouth of Parmenides--the advocate of One
-absolute and unchangeable Ens, separated by an impassable gulf
-from the sensible world of transitory and variable appearances or
-phenomena--objections against what is called the Platonic theory
-of Ideas: that is, the theory of an intelligible world, comprising
-an indefinite number of distinct intelligible and unchangeable
-Forms--in partial relation and communication with another world of
-sensible objects, each of which participates in one or more of
-these Forms. We thus have the Absolute One pitted against the
-Absolute Many.
-
-[Side-note: What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and
-Good? Yes. Of Man, Horse, &c.? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c.? No.]
-
-What number and variety of these intelligible Forms do you
-recognise--(asks Parmenides)? Likeness and Unlikeness--One and
-Many--Just, Beautiful, Good, &c.--are all these Forms absolute and
-existent _per se_? _Sokr._--Certainly they are. _Parm._--Do you
-farther recognise an absolute and self-existent Form of Man, apart
-from us and all other individuals?--or a Form of fire, water, and
-the like? _Sokr._--I do not well know how to answer:--I have often
-been embarrassed with the question. _Parm._--Farther, do there
-exist distinct intelligible Forms of hair, mud, dirt, and all the
-other mean and contemptible objects of sense which we see around?
-_Sokr._--No--certainly--no such Forms as these exist. Such objects
-are as we see them, and nothing beyond: it would be too absurd to
-suppose Forms of such like things.[6] Nevertheless there are times
-when I have misgivings on the point; and when I suspect that there
-must be Forms of them as well as of the others. When such
-reflections cross my mind, I shrink from the absurdity of the
-doctrine, and try to confine my attention to Forms like those
-which you mentioned first.
-
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Parmenid. p. 130 D. [Greek: Ou)damo=s, pha/nai
-to\n Sokra/ten, a)lla\ tau=ta me/n ge, a(/per o(ro=men, tau=ta
-kai\ ei)=nai; ei)=dos de/ ti au)to=n oi)ethe=nai ei)=nai me\ li/an
-e)=| a)/topon.]
-
-Alexander, who opposes the doctrine of the Platonists about Ideas,
-treats it as understood that they did not recognise Ideas of
-worms, gnats, and such like animals. Schol. ad Aristot. Metaphys.
-A. 991 a. p. 575, a. 30 Brandis.]
-
-[Side-note: Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to
-the philosopher.]
-
-_Parm._--You are still young, Sokrates:--you still defer to the
-common sentiments of mankind. But the time will come when
-philosophy will take stronger hold of you, and will teach you that
-no object in nature is mean or contemptible in her view.[7]
-
-[Footnote 7: Plato, Parmenid. p. 130 E. [Greek: Ne/os ga\r ei)=
-e)/ti, kai\ ou(/po sou a)ntei/leptai philosophi/a o(s e(/ti
-a)ntile/psetai, kat' e)me\n do/xan, o(/te _ou)de\n au)to=n_
-a)tima/seis; nu=n de\ e)/ti _pro\s a)nthro/pon a)poble/peis
-do/xas_ dia\ te\n e(liki/an.]]
-
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-
-[Side-note: Remarks upon this--Contrast between emotional and
-scientific classification.]
-
-This remark deserves attention. Plato points out the radical
-distinction, and frequent antipathy between classifications
-constructed by science, and those which grow up spontaneously
-under the associating influence of a common emotion. What he calls
-"the opinions of men,"--in other words, the associations naturally
-working in an untaught and unlettered mind--bring together the
-ideas of objects according as they suggest a like
-emotion--veneration, love, fear, antipathy, contempt, laughter, &c.[8]
-As things which inspire like emotions are thrown into the same
-category and receive the same denomination, so the opposite
-proceeding inspires great repugnance, when things creating
-antipathetic emotions are forced into the same category. A large
-proportion of objects in nature come to be regarded as unworthy of
-any serious attention, and fit only to serve for discharging on
-them our laughter, contempt, or antipathy. The investigation of
-the structure and manifestations of insects is one of the marked
-features which Aristophanes ridicules in Sokrates: moreover the
-same poet also brings odium on the philosopher for alleged study
-of astronomy and meteorology--the heavenly bodies being as it were
-at the opposite emotional pole, objects of such reverential
-admiration and worship, that it was impious to watch or
-investigate them, or calculate their proceedings beforehand.[9]
-The extent to which anatomy and physiology were shut out from
-study in antiquity, and have continued to be partially so even in
-modern times, is well known. And the proportion of phenomena is
-both great and important, connected with the social relations,
-which are excluded both from formal registration and from
-scientific review; kept away from all rational analysis either of
-causes or remedies, because of the strong repugnances connected
-with them. This emotional view of nature is here noted by Plato as
-conflicting with the scientific. No object (he says) is mean in
-the eyes of philosophy. He remarks to the same effect in the
-Sophistes and Politikus, and the remark is illustrated by the
-classifying processes there exhibited:[10] mean objects and
-esteemed objects being placed side by side.
-
-[Footnote 8: Plato, himself, however, occasionally appeals [Greek:
-pro\s a)nthro/pon do/xas], and becomes [Greek: a)techno=s
-deme/goros], when it suits his argument; see Gorgias, 494 C.]
-
-[Footnote 9: Aristophan. Nubes, 145-170-1490.
-
-[Greek: ti/ ga\r matho/nt' e)s tou\s theou\s u(bri/zeton,
-kai\ te=s sele/nes e)skopei=sthe te\n e)/dran?]
-
-Compare Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 11-13, iv. 7, 6-7; Plutarch,
-Perikles, 23; also the second chapter of the first Book of
-Macrobius, about the discredit which is supposed to be thrown upon
-grand and solemn subjects by a plain and naked exposition.
-"Inimicam esse naturae nudam expositionem sui."]
-
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Sophist. p. 227 B; Politik. p. 266 D; also
-Theaetet. p. 174 D.
-
-Both the Platonic Sokrates, and the Xenophontic Sokrates,
-frequently illustrate the education of men by comparison with the
-bringing up of young animals as well as with the training of
-horses: they also compare the educator of young men with the
-trainer of young horses. Indeed this comparison occurs so
-frequently, that it excites much displeasure among various modern
-critics (Forchhammer, Koechly, Socher, &c.), who seem to consider
-it as unseemly and inconsistent with "the dignity of human
-nature". The frequent allusions made by Plato to the homely arts
-and professions are noted by his interlocutors as tiresome.
-
-See Plato, Apolog. Sokr. p. 20 A. [Greek: o)= Kalli/a, ei) me/n
-sou to\ ui(e/e po/lo e)\ mo/scho e)gene/sthen], &c.
-
-The Zoological works of Aristotle exhibit a memorable example of
-scientific intelligence, overcoming all the contempt and disgust
-usually associated with minute and repulsive organisms. To Plato,
-it would be repugnant to arrange in the same class the wolf and
-the dog. See Sophist. p. 231 A.]
-
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-
-Parmenides now produces various objections against the Platonic
-variety of dualism: the two distinct but partially
-inter-communicating worlds--one, of separate, permanent, unchangeable,
-Forms or Ideas--the other, of individual objects, transient and
-variable; participating in, and receiving denomination from, these
-Forms.
-
-[Side-note: Objections of Parmenides--How can objects participate
-in the Ideas. Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part
-thereof.]
-
-1. How (asks Parmenides) can such participation take place? Is the
-entire Form in each individual object? No: for one and the same
-Form cannot be at the same time in many distant objects. A part of
-it therefore must be in one object; another part in another. But
-this assumes that the Form is divisible--or is not essentially
-One. Equality is in all equal objects: but how can a part of the
-Form equality, less than the whole, make objects equal? Again,
-littleness is in all little objects: that is, a part of the Form
-littleness is in each. But the Form littleness cannot have parts;
-because, if it had, the entire Form would be greater than any of
-its parts,--and the Form littleness cannot be greater than any
-thing. Moreover, if one part of littleness were added to other
-parts, the sum of the two would be less, and not greater, than
-either of the factors. It is plain that none of these Forms can be
-divisible, or can have parts. Objects therefore cannot participate
-in the Form by parts or piecemeal. But neither can each object
-possess the entire Form. Accordingly, since there remains no third
-possibility, objects cannot participate in the Forms at all.[11]
-
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Parmenid. p. 131. A similar argument, showing
-the impossibility of such [Greek: me/thexis], appears in Sextus
-Empiric. adv. Arithmeticos, sect. 11-20, p. 334 Fab., p. 724 Bek.]
-
-[Side-note: Comparing the Idea with the sensible objects partaking
-in the Idea, there is a likeness between them which must be
-represented by a higher Idea--and so on _ad infinitum_.]
-
-2. Parmenides now passes to a second argument. The reason why you
-assume that each one of these Forms exists, is--That when you
-contemplate many similar objects, one and the same ideal phantom
-or Concept is suggested by all.[12] Thus, when you see many
-_great_ objects, one common impression of _greatness_ arises from
-all. Hence you conclude that The Great, or the Form of Greatness,
-exists as One. But if you take this Form of Greatness, and
-consider it in comparison with each or all the great individual
-objects, it will have in common with them something that makes it
-great. You must therefore search for some higher Form, which
-represents what belongs in common both to the Form of Greatness
-and to individual great objects. And this higher Form again, when
-compared with the rest, will have something in common which must
-be represented by a Form yet higher: so that there will be an
-infinite series of Forms, ascending higher and higher, of which
-you will never reach the topmost.[13]
-
-[Footnote 12: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132. [Greek: Oi)=mai se e)k tou=
-toiou=de e(\n e(/kaston ei)=dos oi)/esthai ei)=nai. O(/tan _po/ll'
-a)/tta mega/la soi do/xe|_ ei)=nai, _mi/a tis i)/sos dokei=
-i)de/a_ e( au)te\ ei)=nai _e)pi\ pa/nta i)do/nti_, o(/then _e(\n
-to\ me/ga e(gei= ei)=nai_.]]
-
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 A. See this process, of
-comparing the Form with particular objects denominated after the
-Form, described in a different metaphysical language by Mr. John
-Stuart Mill, System of Logic, book iv. ch. 2, sect. 3. "As the
-general conception is itself obtained by a comparison of
-particular phenomena, so, when obtained, the mode in which we
-apply it to other phenomena is again by comparison. We compare
-phenomena with each other to get the conception; and we then
-compare those and other phenomena _with_ the conception. We get
-the conception of an animal by comparing different animals, and
-when we afterwards see a creature resembling an animal, we compare
-it with our general conception of an animal: and if it agrees with
-our general conception, we include it in the class. The conception
-becomes the type of comparison. We may perhaps find that no
-considerable number of other objects agree with this first general
-conception: and that we must drop the conception, and beginning
-again with a different individual case, proceed by fresh
-comparisons to a different general conception."
-
-The comparison, which the argument of the Platonic Parmenides
-assumes to be instituted, between [Greek: to\ ei)=dos] and [Greek:
-ta\ mete/chonta au)tou=], is denied by Proklus; who says that
-there can be no comparison, nor any [Greek: koino/tes], except
-between [Greek: ta\ o(motage=]: and that the Form is not [Greek:
-o(motage\s] with its participant particulars. (Proklus ad
-Parmenidem, p. 125, p. 684 ed. Stallbaum.)
-
-This argument of Parmenides is the memorable argument known under
-the name of [Greek: o( tri/tos a)/nthropos]. Against the Platonic
-[Greek: ei)/de] considered as [Greek: chorista/], it is a forcible
-argument. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 15 seq., where it is
-numbered among [Greek: oi( a)kribe/steroi to=n lo/gon]. We find
-from the Scholion of Alexander (p. 566 Brandis), that it was
-advanced in several different ways by Aristotle, in his work
-[Greek: Peri\ I)deo=n]: by his scholar Eudemus [Greek: e)n toi=s
-peri\ Le/xeos]: and by a contemporary [Greek: sophiste\s] named
-Polyxenus, as well as by other Sophists.]
-
-[Side-note: Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing
-more? Impossible.]
-
-3. Perhaps (suggests Sokrates) each of these Forms is a Conception
-of the mind and nothing beyond: the Form is not competent to exist
-out of the mind.[14] How? (replies Parmenides.) There cannot be in
-the mind any Conception, which is a Conception of nothing. Every
-Conception must be of something really existing: in this case, it
-is a Conception of some one thing, which you conceive as belonging
-in common to each and all the objects considered. The Something
-thus conceived as perpetually One and the same in all, is, the
-Form. Besides, if you think that individual objects participate in
-the Forms, and that these Forms are Conceptions of the mind,--you
-must suppose, either that all objects are made up of Conceptions,
-and are therefore themselves Concipients: or else that these
-Forms, though Conceptions, are incapable of conceiving. Neither
-one nor the other is admissible.[15]
-
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 B. [Greek: me\ _to=n
-ei)do=n_ e(/kaston e)=| _tou/ton noe/ma_, kai\ _ou)damou= au)to=|
-prose/ke e)ggi/gnesthai a)/llothi e)\ e)n psuchai=s_. . . . Ti/
-ou)=n? pha/nai, e(\n e(/kasto/n e)sti to=n noema/ton, no/ema de\
-ou)deno/s? A)ll' a)du/naton, ei)pei=n. A)lla\ tino/s? Nai/.
-O)/ntos e)\ ou)k o)/ntos? O)/ntos. Ou)ch e(no/s tinos, o(\ e)pi\
-pa=sin e)kei=no to\ no/ema e)po\n noei=, mi/an tina\ ou)=san
-i)de/an? Nai/.]
-
-Aristotle (Topic. ii. 113, a. 25) indicates one way of meeting
-this argument, if advanced by an adversary in dialectic
-debate--[Greek: ei) ta\s i)de/as _e)n e(mi=n_ e)/phesen ei)=nai].]
-
-[Footnote 15: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 D. [Greek: ou)k a)na/gke,
-ei) ta)/lla phe\| to=n ei)do=n mete/chein, e)\ dokei=n soi e)k
-noe/mata o)/nta a)no/eta ei)=nai? A)ll' ou)de\ tou=to, pha/nai,
-e)/chei lo/gon.]
-
-The word [Greek: a)no/eta] here is used in its ordinary sense, in
-which it is the negation, not of [Greek: noeto/s] but of [Greek:
-noetiko/s]. There is a similar confusion, Plato, Phaedon, p. 80 B.
-Proklus (pp. 699-701, Stall.) is prolix but very obscure.]
-
-[Side-note: The Ideas are types or exemplars, and objects partake
-of them by being likened to them. Impossible.]
-
-4. Probably the case stands thus (says Sokrates). These Forms are
-constants and fixtures in nature, as models or patterns.
-Particular objects are copies or likenesses of them: and the
-participation of such objects in the Form consists in being made
-like to it.[16] In that case (replies Parmenides), the Form must
-itself be like to the objects which have been made like to it.
-Comparing the Form with the objects, that in which they resemble
-must itself be a Form: and thus you will have a higher Form above
-the first Form--and so upwards in the ascending line. This follows
-necessarily from the hypothesis that the Form is like the objects.
-The participation of objects in the Form, therefore, cannot
-consist in being likened to it.[17]
-
-[Footnote 16: Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 991, a. 20) characterises
-this way of presenting the Platonic Ideas as mere [Greek:
-kenologi/a] and poetical metaphor. See also the remarkable
-Scholion of Alexander, pp. 574-575, Brandis.]
-
-[Footnote 17: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 132-133.
-
-This is again a repetition, though differently presented, of the
-same argument--[Greek: o( tri/tos a)/nthropos]--enunciated p. 132
-A.]
-
-[Side-note: If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can
-know only what is relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative
-to individuals: Ideas relative to Ideas.]
-
-5. Here are grave difficulties (continues Parmenides) opposed to
-this doctrine of yours, affirming the existence of self-existent,
-substantive, unchangeable, yet participated, Forms. But
-difficulties still graver remain behind. Such Forms as you
-describe cannot be cognizable by us: at least it is hard to show
-how they can be cognizable. Being self-existent and substantive,
-they are not _in us_: such of them as are relative, have their
-relation with each other, not with those particular objects among
-us, which are called _great_, _little_, and so forth, from being
-supposed to be similar to or participant in the forms, and bearing
-names the same as those of the Forms. Thus, for example, if I, an
-individual man, am in the relation of master, I bear that relation
-to another individual man who is my servant, not to servantship in
-general (_i.e._ the Form of servantship, the _Servus per se_). My
-servant, again, bears the relation of servant to me, an individual
-man as master,--not to mastership in general (_i.e._ to the Form
-of mastership, the _Dominus per se_). Both terms of the relation
-are individual objects. On the other hand, the Forms also bear
-relation to each other. The Form of servantship (_Servus per se_)
-stands in relation to the Form of mastership (_Dominus per se_).
-Neither of them correlates with an individual object. The two
-terms of the relation must be homogeneous, each of them a
-Form.[18]
-
-[Footnote 18: Plato, Parmenid. p. 133 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition,
-which we do not possess.]
-
-Now apply this to the case of cognition. The Form of Cognition
-correlates exclusively with the Form of Truth: the Form of each
-special Cognition, geometrical or medical, or other, correlates
-with the Form of Geometry or Medicine. But Cognition as we possess
-it, correlates only with Truth relatively to us: also, each
-special Cognition of ours has its special correlating Truth,
-relatively to us.[19] Now the Forms are not in or with us, but
-apart from us: the Form of Cognition is not our Cognition, the
-Form of Truth is not our Truth. Forms can be known only through
-the Form of Cognition, which _we_ do not possess: we cannot
-therefore know Forms. We have our own cognition, whereby we know
-what is relative to us; but we know nothing more. Forms, which are
-not relative to us, lie out of our knowledge. _Bonum per se,
-Pulchrum per se_, and the other self-existent Forms or Ideas, are
-to us altogether unknowable.[20]
-
-[Footnote 19: Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\
-e)piste/me, au)te\ me\n o(\ e)/stin e)piste/me, te=s o(\ e)/stin
-a)le/theia, au)te=s a)\n e)kei/nes ei)/e e)piste/me? . . . E( de\
-par' e(mi=n e)piste/me ou) te=s par' e(mi=n a)\n a)lethei/as
-ei)/e? kai\ au)= e(ka/ste e( par' e(mi=n e)piste/me to=n par'
-e(mi=n o)/nton e(ka/stou a)\n e)piste/me su/mbainoi ei)=nai?]
-
-Aristotle (Topica, vi. p. 147, a. 6) adverts to this as an
-argument against the theory of Ideas, but without alluding to the
-Parmenides; indeed he puts the argument in a different
-way--[Greek: to\ d' ei)=dos pro\s to\ ei)=dos dokei= le/gesthai, oi(=on
-au)te\ e)pithumi/a au)tou= e(de/os, kai\ au)te\ bou/lesis au)tou=
-a)gathou=.] Aristotle argues that there is no place in this
-doctrine for the [Greek: phaino/menon a)gatho/n], which
-nevertheless men often wish for, and he remarks, in the Nikom.
-Ethica, i. 4, 1096 b. 33--that the [Greek: au)to\-a)gatho\n] is
-neither [Greek: prakto\n] nor [Greek: kteto\n a)nthro/po|].]
-
-[Footnote 20: Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 C. [Greek: A)/gnoston a)/ra
-e(mi=n kai\ au)to\ to\ kalo\n o(\ e)/sti, kai\ to\ a)gatho/n, kai\
-pa/nta a(\ de\ o(s i)de/as au)ta\s ou)/sas u(polamba/nomen.]]
-
-[Side-note: Form of cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs
-to the Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us.]
-
-6. Again, if there be a real self-existent Form of Cognition,
-apart from that which we or others possess--it must doubtless be
-far superior in accuracy and perfection to that which we
-possess.[21] The Form of Beauty and the other Forms, must be in
-like manner superior to that which is found under the same name in
-individual objects. This perfect Form of Cognition must therefore
-belong to the Gods, if it belong to any one. But if so, the Gods
-must have a Form of Truth, the proper object of their Form of
-Cognition. They cannot know the truth relatively to us, which
-belongs to _our_ cognition--any more than we can know the more
-perfect truth belonging to them. So too about other Forms. The
-perfect Form of mastership belongs to the Gods, correlating with
-its proper Form of servantship. _Their_ mastership does not
-correlate with individual objects like us: in other words, they
-are not our masters, nor are we their servants. _Their_ cognition,
-again, does not correlate with individual objects like us: in
-other words, they do not know us, nor do we know them. In like
-manner, we in our capacity of masters are not masters of them--we
-as cognizant beings know nothing of them or of that which they
-know. They can in no way correlate with us, nor can we correlate
-with them.[22]
-
-[Footnote 21: An argument very similar is urged by Aristotle
-(Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 1050, b. 34) [Greek: ei) a)/ra tine/s ei)si
-phu/seis toiau=tai e)\ ou)si/ai oi(/as le/gousin oi( e)n toi=s
-lo/gois ta\s i)de/as, polu\ ma=llon e)piste=mon a)/n ti ei)/e e(
-au)toepiste/me kai\ kinou/menon e( ki/nesis.]]
-
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 A. [Greek: Tau=ta me\ntoi,
-o)= So/krates, e)/phe o( Parmeni/des, _kai\ e)/ti a)/lla pro\s
-tou/tois pa/nu polla\ a)nagkai=on e)/chein ta\ ei)/de_, ei)
-ei)si\n au)tai ai( i)de/ai to=n o)/nton], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But
-if we do not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable,
-there can be no dialectic discussion.]
-
-Here are some of the objections, Sokrates (concludes Parmenides),
-which beset your doctrine, that there exist substantive,
-self-standing, Forms of Ideas, each respectively definable. Many
-farther objections might also be urged.[23] So that a man may
-reasonably maintain, either that none such exist--or that,
-granting their existence, they are essentially unknowable by us.
-He must put forth great ingenuity to satisfy himself of the
-affirmative; and still more wonderful ingenuity to find arguments
-for the satisfaction of others, respecting this question.
-
-[Footnote 23: Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 D-E. [Greek: Ou)/koun ei)
-para\ to=| theo=| au(/te e)/stin e( a)kribesta/te despotei/a kai\
-au(/te e( a)kribesta/te e)piste/me, ou)/t' a)\n e( despotei/a e(
-e)kei/non] (i.e. [Greek: to=n theo=n]) [Greek: e(mo=n pote\ a)\n
-despo/seien, _ou)/t' a)\n e( e)piste/me e(ma=s gnoi/e ou)de/ ti
-a)/llo to=n par' e(mi=n_; a)lla\ o(moi/os e(mei=s t' e)kei/non
-ou)k a)/rchomen te=| par' e(mi=n a)rche=|, ou)de gigno/skomen tou=
-thei/ou ou)de\n te=| e(mete/ra| e)piste/me, _e)kei=noi/ te au)=_]
-(sc. [Greek: oi( theoi/]) [Greek: kata\ to\n au)to\n lo/gon ou)/te
-despo/tai e(mo=n ei)si\n _ou)/te gigno/skousi ta\ a)nthro/peia
-pra/gmata theoi\ o)/ntes_. A)lla\ me\ li/an, e)/phe] (Sokrates),
-[Greek: e)=| thaumasto\s o( lo/gos, ei)/ tis theo\n a)postere/seis
-tou= ei)de/nai.]
-
-The inference here drawn by Parmenides supplies the first mention
-of a doctrine revived by (if not transmitted to) Averroes and
-various scholastic doctors of the middle ages, so as to be
-formally condemned by theological councils. M. Renan tells us--"En
-1269, Etienne Tempier, eveque de Paris, ayant rassemble le conseil
-des maitres en theologie . . . condamna, de concert avec eux,
-treize propositions qui ne sont presque toutes que les axiomes
-familiers de l'averroisme: Quod intellectus hominum est unus et
-idem numero. Quod mundus est aeternus. Quod nunquam fuit primus
-homo. _Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia_," &c. (Renan, Averroes,
-p. 213, 2nd ed., p. 268.)]
-
-Nevertheless, on the other side (continues Parmenides), unless we
-admit the existence of such Forms or Ideas--substantive, eternal,
-unchangeable, definable--philosophy and dialectic discussion are
-impossible.[24]
-
-[Footnote 24: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 B.]
-
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-
-[Side-note: Dilemma put by Parmenides--Acuteness of his
-objections.]
-
-Here then, Parmenides entangles himself and his auditors in the
-perplexing dilemma, that philosophical and dialectic speculation
-is impossible, unless these Forms or Ideas, together with the
-participation of sensible objects in them, be granted; while at
-the same time this cannot be granted, until objections, which
-appear at first sight unanswerable, have been disposed of.
-
-The acuteness with which these objections are enforced, is
-remarkable. I know nothing superior to it in all the Platonic
-writings. Moreover the objections point directly against that
-doctrine which Plato in other dialogues most emphatically insists
-upon, and which Aristotle both announces and combats as
-characteristic of Plato--the doctrine of separate, self-existent,
-absolute, Forms or Ideas. They are addressed moreover to Sokrates,
-the chief exponent of that doctrine here as well as in other
-dialogues. And he is depicted as unable to meet them.
-
-[Side-note: The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine
-Platonic theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any
-part of the Platonic dialogues.]
-
-It is true that Sokrates is here introduced as juvenile and
-untrained; or at least as imperfectly trained. And accordingly,
-Stallbaum with others think, that this is the reason of his
-inability to meet the objections: which (they tell us), though
-ingenious and plausible, yet having no application to the genuine
-Platonic doctrine about Ideas, might easily have been answered if
-Plato had thought fit, and are answered in other dialogues.[25]
-But to me it appears, that the doctrine which is challenged in the
-Parmenides is the genuine Platonic doctrine about Ideas, as
-enunciated by Plato in the Republic, Phaedon, Philebus, Timaeus, and
-elsewhere--though a very different doctrine is announced in the
-Sophistes. Objections are here made against it in the Parmenides.
-In what other dialogue has Plato answered them? and what proof can
-be furnished that he was able to answer them? There are indeed
-many other dialogues in which a real world of Ideas absolute and
-unchangeable, is affirmed strenuously and eloquently, with various
-consequences and accompaniments traced to it: but there are none
-in which the Parmenidean objections are elucidated, or even
-recited. In the Phaedon, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Symposion, &c., and
-elsewhere, Sokrates is made to talk confidently about the
-existence and even about the cognoscibility of these Ideas; just
-as if no such objections as those which we read in the Parmenides
-could be produced.[26] In these other dialogues, Plato accepts
-implicitly one horn of the Parmenidean dilemma; but without
-explaining to us upon what grounds he allows himself to neglect
-the other.
-
-[Footnote 25: Stallbaum, Prolegom. pp. 52-286-332.]
-
-[Footnote 26: According to Stallbaum (Prolegg. pp. 277-337) the
-Parmenides is the only dialogue in which Plato has discussed, with
-philosophical exactness, the theory of Ideas; in all the other
-dialogues he handles it in a popular and superficial manner. There
-is truth in this--indeed more truth (I think) than Stallbaum
-himself supposed: otherwise he would hardly have said that the
-objections in the Parmenides could easily have been answered, if
-Plato had chosen.
-
-Stallbaum tells us, not only respecting Socher but respecting
-Schleiermacher (pp. 324-332), "Parmenidem omnino non intellexit".
-In my judgment, Socher understands the dialogue better than
-Stallbaum, when he (Socher) says, that the objections in the first
-half bear against the genuine Platonic Ideas; though I do not
-agree with his inference about the spuriousness of the dialogue.]
-
-[Side-note: Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains
-that Plato would never make such objections against his own
-theory, and denies the authenticity of the Parmenides.]
-
-Socher has so much difficulty in conceiving that Plato can have
-advanced such forcible objections against a doctrine, which
-nevertheless in other Platonic dialogues is proclaimed as true and
-important,--that he declares the Parmenides (together with the
-Sophistes and Politikus) not to be genuine, but to have been
-composed by some unknown Megaric contemporary. To pass over the
-improbability that any unknown author should have been capable of
-composing works of so much ability as these--Socher's decision
-about spuriousness is founded upon an estimate of Plato's
-philosophical character, which I think incorrect. Socher expects
-(or at least reasons as if he expected) to find in Plato a
-preconceived system and a scheme of conclusions to which every
-thing is made subservient.
-
-[Side-note: Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive
-system of his own.]
-
-In most philosophers, doubtless, this is what we do find. Each
-starts with some favourite conclusions, which he believes to be
-true, and which he supports by all the arguments in their favour,
-as far as his power goes. If he mentions the arguments against
-them, he usually answers the weak, slurs over or sneers at the
-strong: at any rate, he takes every precaution that these counter
-arguments shall appear unimportant in the eyes of his readers. His
-purpose is, like that of a speaker in the public assembly, to
-obtain assent and belief: whether the hearers understand the
-question or not, is a matter of comparative indifference: at any
-rate, they must be induced to embrace his conclusion. Unless he
-thus foregoes the character of an impartial judge, to take up that
-of an earnest advocate; unless he bends the whole force of his
-mind to the establishment of the given conclusion--he becomes
-suspected as deficient in faith or sincerity, and loses much in
-persuasive power. For an earnest belief, expressed with eloquence
-and feeling, is commonly more persuasive than any logic.
-
-[Side-note: Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search.]
-
-Now whether this exclusive devotion to the affirmative side of
-certain questions be the true spirit of philosophy or not, it is
-certainly not the spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search;
-wherein he conceives the work of philosophy in a totally
-different manner. He does not begin by stating, even to himself a
-certain conclusion at which he has arrived, and then proceed to
-prove that conclusion to others. The search or debate (as I have
-observed in a preceding chapter) has greater importance in his
-eyes than the conclusion: nay, in a large proportion of his
-dialogues, there is no conclusion at all: we see something
-disproved, but nothing proved. The negative element has with him a
-value and importance of its own, apart from the affirmative. He is
-anxious to set forth what can be said against a given conclusion;
-even though not prepared to establish any thing in its place.
-
-[Side-note: The Parmenides is the extreme manifestation of the
-negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting
-forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not
-unnatural.]
-
-Such negative element, manifested as it is in so many of the
-Platonic dialogues, has its extreme manifestation in the
-Parmenides. When we see it here applied to a doctrine which Plato
-in other dialogues insists upon as truth, we must call to mind
-(what sincere believers are apt to forget) that a case may always
-be made out against truth as well as in its favour: and that its
-privilege as a certified portion of "reasoned truth," rests upon
-no better title than the superiority of the latter case over the
-former. It is for testing the two cases--for determining where the
-superiority lies--and for graduating its amount--that the process
-of philosophising is called for, and that improvements in the
-method thereof become desirable. That Plato should, in one of his
-many diversified dialogues, apply this test to a doctrine which,
-in other dialogues, he holds out as true--is noway inconsistent
-with the general spirit of these compositions. Each of his
-dialogues has its own point of view, worked out on that particular
-occasion; what is common to them all, is the process of
-philosophising applied in various ways to the same general topics.
-
-Those who, like Socher, deny Plato's authorship of the Parmenides,
-on the ground of what is urged therein against the theory of
-Ideas, must suppose, either that he did not know that a negative
-case could be made out against that theory; or that knowing it, he
-refrained from undertaking the duty.[27] Neither supposition is
-consistent with what we know both of his negative ingenuity, and
-of his multifarious manner of handling.
-
-[Footnote 27: Plato, Philebus, p. 14, where the distinction taken
-coincides accurately enough with that which we read in Plato,
-Parmenid. p. 129 A-D.
-
-Struempell thinks that the Parmenides was composed at a time of
-Plato's life when he had become sensible of the difficulties and
-contradictions attaching to his doctrine of self-existent Forms or
-Ideas, and when he was looking about for some way of extrication
-from them: which way he afterwards thought that he found in that
-approximation to Pythagorism--that exchange of Ideas for Ideal
-numbers, &c.--which we find imputed to him by Aristotle (Gesch.
-der Griech. Phil. sect. 96, 3). This is not impossible; but I find
-no sufficient ground for affirming it. Nor can I see how the
-doctrine which Aristotle ascribes to Plato about the Ideas (that
-they are generated by two [Greek: stoichei=a] or elements, [Greek:
-to\ e(/n] along with [Greek: to\ me/ga kai\ to\ mikro/n]) affords
-any escape from the difficulties started in the Parmenides.
-
-Struempell considers the dialogue Parmenides to have been composed
-"ganz ausdruecklich zur dialektischen Uebung," ib. s. 96, 2, p.
-128.]
-
-
-[Side-note: Force of the negative case in the Parmenides.
-Difficulties about participation of sensible objects in the world
-of Ideas.]
-
-The negative case, made out in the Parmenides against the theory
-of Ideas, is indeed most powerful. The hypothesis of the Ideal
-World is unequivocally affirmed by Sokrates, with its four
-principal characteristics. 1. Complete essential separation from
-the world of sense. 2. Absolute self-existence. 3. Plurality of
-constituent items, several contrary to each other. 4. Unchangeable
-sameness and unity of each and all of them.--Here we have full
-satisfaction given to the Platonic sentiment, which often delights
-in soaring above the world of sense, and sometimes (see Phaedon) in
-heaping contemptuous metaphors upon it. But unfortunately Sokrates
-cannot disengage himself from this world of sense: he is obliged
-to maintain that it partakes of, or is determined by, these
-extra-sensible Forms or Ideas. Here commence the series of difficulties
-and contradictions brought out by the Elenchus of Parmenides. Are
-all sensible objects, even such as are vulgar, repulsive, and
-contemptible, represented in this higher world? The Platonic
-sentiment shrinks from the admission: the Platonic sense of
-analogy hesitates to deny it. Then again, how can both assertions
-be true--first that the two worlds are essentially separate, next,
-that the one participates in, and derives its essence from, the
-other? How (to use Aristotelian language[28]) can the essence be
-separated from that of which it is the essence? How can the Form,
-essentially One, belong at once to a multitude of particulars?
-
-[Footnote 28: Arist. Met. A. 991, b. 1. [Greek: a)du/naton,
-chori\s ei)=nai te\n ou)si/an kai\ ou)= e( ou)si/a.]]
-
-Two points deserve notice in this debate respecting the doctrine
-of Ideas:--
-
-[Side-note: Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas
-are absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable,
-they must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura.]
-
-1. Parmenides shows, and Sokrates does not deny, that these Forms
-or Ideas described as absolute, self-existent, unchangeable, must
-of necessity be unknown and unknowable to us.[29] Whatever we do
-know, or can know, is relative to us;--to our actual cognition, or
-to our cognitive power. If you declare an object to be absolute,
-you declare it to be neither known nor knowable by us: if it be
-announced as known or knowable by us, it is thereby implied at the
-same time not to be absolute. If these Forms or Objects called
-absolute are known, they can be known only by an absolute Subject,
-or the Form of a cognizant Subject: that is, by God or the Gods.
-Even thus, to call them _absolute_ is a misnomer: they are
-relative to the Subject, and the Subject is relative to them.
-
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Parmenid. 133 B. [Greek: ei)/ tis phai/e
-mede\ prose/kein au)ta\ gigno/skesthai o)/nta toiau=ta oi(=a/
-phamen dei=n ei)=nai ta\ ei)/de. . . . a)pi/thanos a)\n ei)/e o(
-a)/gnosta au)ta\ a)nagka/zon ei)=nai.] 134 A. [Greek: e( de\ par'
-e(mi=n e)piste/me ou) te=s par' e(mi=n a)\n a)lethei/as ei)/e?
-kai\ au)= e(ka/ste e( par' e(mi=n e(piste/me to=n par' e(mi=n
-o)/nton e(ka/stou a)\n e)piste/me xu/mbainoi ei)=nai?] 134 C.
-[Greek: a)/gnoston a)/ra e(mi=n e)/sti kai\ au)to\ to\ kalo\n o(\
-e)/sti, kai\ to\ a)gatho/n, kai\ pa/nta a(\ de\ o(s i)de/as
-au)ta\s ou)/sas u(polamba/nomen.]]
-
-The opinion here advanced by the Platonic Parmenides asserts, in
-other words, what is equivalent to the memorable dictum of
-Protagoras--"Man is the measure of all things--of things existent,
-that they do exist--and of things non-existent, that they do not
-exist". This dictum affirms universal relativity, and nothing
-else: though Plato, as we shall see in the elaborate argument
-against it delivered by Sokrates in the Theaetetus, mixed it up
-with another doctrine altogether distinct and independent--the
-doctrine that knowledge is sensible perception.[30] Parmenides
-here argues that if these Forms or Ideas are known by us, they can
-be known only as relative to us: and that if they be not relative
-to us, they cannot be known by us at all. Such relativity belongs
-as much to the world of Conception, as to the world of Perception.
-And it is remarkable that Plato admits this essential relativity
-not merely here, but also in the Sophistes: in which latter
-dialogue he denies the Forms or Ideas to be absolute existences,
-on the special ground that they are known:--and on the farther
-ground that what is known must act upon the knowing mind, and must
-be acted upon thereby, _i.e._, must be relative. He there defines
-the existent to be, that which has power to act upon something
-else, or to be acted upon by something else. Such relativeness he
-declares to constitute _existence_:[31] defining existence to mean
-potentiality.
-
-[Footnote 30: I shall discuss this in the coming chapter upon the
-Theaetetus.]
-
-[Footnote 31: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 248-249. This reasoning is put
-into the mouth of the Eleatic Stranger, the principal person in
-that dialogue.]
-
-[Side-note: Answer of Sokrates--That Ideas are mere conceptions of
-the mind. Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped.]
-
-2. The second point which deserves notice in this portion of the
-Parmenides, is the answer of Sokrates (when embarrassed by some of
-the questions of the Eleatic veteran)--"That these Forms or Ideas
-are conceptions of the mind, and have no existence out of the
-mind". This answer gives us the purely Subjective, or negation of
-Object: instead of the purely Objective (Absolute), or negation of
-Subject.[32] Here we have what Porphyry calls the deepest question
-of philosophy[33] explicitly raised: and, as far as we know, for
-the first time. Are the Forms or Ideas mere conceptions of the
-mind and nothing more? Or are they external, separate,
-self-existent realities? The opinion which Sokrates had first given
-declared the latter: that which he now gives declares the former.
-He passes from the pure Objective (_i.e._, without Subject) to the
-pure Subjective (_i.e._, without Object). Parmenides, in his
-reply, points out that there cannot be a conception of nothing:
-that if there be Conceptio, there must be _Conceptum aliquid_:[34]
-and that this Conceptum or Concept is what is common to a great
-many distinct similar Percepta.
-
-[Footnote 32: Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 A-B.
-
-The doctrine, that [Greek: poio/tetes] were [Greek: philai\
-e)/nnoiai], having no existence without the mind, was held by
-Antisthenes as well as by the Eretrian sect of philosophers,
-contemporary with Plato and shortly after him. Simplikius, Schol.
-ad Aristot. Categ. p. 68, a. 30, Brandis. See, respecting
-Antisthenes, the first volume of the present work, p. 165.]
-
-[Footnote 33: See the beginning of Porphyry's Introduction to the
-Categories of Aristotle. [Greek: bathuta/te ou)/ses te=s toiau/tes
-pragmatei/as], &c. Simplikius (in Schol. ad Aristot. Categ. p. 68,
-a. 28, ed. Brandis) alludes to the Eretrian philosophers and
-Theopompus, who considered [Greek: ta\s poio/tetas] as [Greek:
-phila\s mo/nas e)nnoi/as diakeno=s legome/nas kat' ou)demi/as
-u(posta/seos, oi(=on a)nthropo/teta e)\ i(ppo/teta], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 34: Compare Republic, v. p. 476 B. [Greek: o( gigno/skon
-gigno/skei ti\ e)\ ou)de\n? Gigno/skei ti/], &c.
-
-The following passage in the learned work of Cudworth bears on the
-portion of the Parmenides which we are now considering. Cudworth,
-Treatise of Immutable Morality, pp. 243-245.
-
-"But if any one demand here, where this [Greek: a)ki/netos
-ou)si/a], these immutable Entities do exist? I answer, first, that
-as they are considered formally, they do not properly exist in the
-Individuals without us, as if they were from them imprinted upon
-the Understanding, which some have taken to be Aristotle's
-opinion; because no Individual Material thing is either Universal
-or Immutable. . . . Because they perish not together with them, it
-is a certain argument that they exist independently upon them.
-Neither, in the next place, do they exist somewhere else apart
-from the Individual Sensibles, and without the Mind, which is that
-opinion that Aristotle justly condemns, but either unjustly or
-unskilfully attributes to Plato. . . . Wherefore these
-Intelligible Ideas or Essences of Things, those Forms by which we
-understand all Things, exist nowhere but in the mind itself; for
-it was very well determined long ago by Socrates, in Plato's
-Parmenides, that these things are nothing else but Noemata: 'These
-Species or Ideas are all of them nothing but Noemata or Notions
-that exist nowhere but in the Soul itself'. . . .
-
-"And yet notwithstanding, though these Things exist only in the
-Mind, they are not therefore mere Figments of the
-Understanding. . . .
-
-"It is evident that though the Mind thinks of these Things at
-pleasure, yet they are not arbitrarily framed by the Mind, but
-have certain, determinate, and immutable Natures of their own,
-which are independent upon the Mind, and which are blown (quaere
-_not blown_) away into Nothing at the pleasure of the same Being
-that arbitrarily made them."
-
-It is an inadvertence on the part of Cudworth to cite this passage
-of the Parmenides as authenticating Plato's opinion that Forms or
-Ideas existed only in the mind. Certainly Sokrates is here made to
-express that opinion, among others; but the opinion is refuted by
-Parmenides and dropped by Sokrates. But the very different
-opinion, which Cudworth accuses Aristotle of _wrongly_ attributing
-to Plato, is repeated by Sokrates in the Phaedon, Republic, and
-elsewhere, and never refuted.]
-
-This reply, though scanty and undeveloped, is in my judgment both
-valid, as it negatives the Subject pure and simple, and affirms
-that to every conception in the mind, there must correspond a
-Concept out of (or rather along with) the mind (the one
-correlating with or implying the other)--and correct as far as it
-goes, in declaring what that Concept is. Such Concept is, or may
-be, the Form. Parmenides does not show that it is not so. He
-proceeds to impugn, by a second argument, the assertion of
-Sokrates--that the form is a Conception _wholly within_ the mind:
-he goes on to argue that individual things (which are _out_ of the
-mind) cannot participate in these Forms (which are asserted to be
-altogether _in_ the mind): because, if that were admitted, either
-every such thing must be a Concipient, or must run into the
-contradiction of being a _Conceptio non concipiens_.[35] Now this
-argument may refute the affirmation of Sokrates literally taken,
-that the Form is a Conception entirely belonging to the mind, and
-having nothing Objective corresponding to it--but does not refute
-the doctrine that the Form is a Concept correlating with the
-mind--or out of the mind as well as in it. In this as in other
-Concepts, the subjective point of view preponderates over the
-objective, though Object is not altogether eliminated: just as, in
-the particular external things, the objective point of view
-predominates, though Subject cannot be altogether dismissed.
-Neither Subject nor Object can ever entirely disappear: the one is
-the inseparable correlative and complement of the other: but
-sometimes the subjective point of view may preponderate, sometimes
-the objective. Such preponderance (or logical priority), either of
-the one or the other, may be implied or connoted by the
-denomination given. Though the special connotation of the name
-creates an illusion which makes the preponderant point of view
-seem to be all, and magnifies the Relatum so as to eclipse and
-extinguish the Correlatum--yet such preponderance, or logical
-priority, is all that is really meant when the Concepts are said
-to be "_in the mind_"--and the Percepts (Percepta, things
-perceived) to be "_out of the mind_": for both Concepts and
-Percepts are "_of the mind_, or _relative to the mind_".[36]
-
-[Footnote 35: On this point the argument in the dialogue itself,
-as stated by Parmenides, is not clear to follow. Struempell remarks
-on the terms employed by Plato. "Der Umstand, dass die Ausdruecke
-[Greek: ei)=dos] und [Greek: i)de/a] nicht sowie [Greek: lo/gos]
-den Unterschied, zwischen Begriff und dem durch diesen begriffenen
-Realen, hervortreten lassen--sondern, weil dieselben bald im
-subjektiven Sinne den Begriff, bald im objektiven Sinne das Reale
-bezeichnen--bald in der einen bald in der andern Bedeutung zu
-nehmen sind--kann leicht eine Verwechselung und Unklarheit in der
-Auffassung veranlassen," &c. (Gesch. der Gr. Philos. s. 90, p.
-115).]
-
-[Footnote 36: This preponderance of the Objective point of view,
-though without altogether eliminating the Subjective, includes all
-that is true in the assertion of Aristotle, that the _Perceptum_
-is prior to the _Percipient_--the _Percipiendum_ prior to the
-_Perceptionis Capax_. He assimilates the former to a _Movens_, the
-latter to a _Motum_. But he declares that he means not a priority
-in time or real existence, but simply a _priority in nature_ or
-_logical priority_; and he also declares the two to be relatives
-or reciproca. The Prius is relative to the Posterius, as the
-Posterius is relative to the Prius.--Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 1010,
-b. 36 seq. [Greek: a)ll' e)/sti ti kai\ e(/teron para\ te\n
-ai)/sthesin, o(\ a)nagke pro/teron ei)=nai te=s ai)sthe/seo=s; to\
-ga\r kinou=n tou= kinoume/nou _phu/sei pro/tero/n_ e)sti; ka)\n
-ei) le/getai pro\s a)/llela tau=ta, ou)de\n e(=tton.]
-
-See respecting the [Greek: pro/teron phu/sei], Aristot. Categor.
-p. 12, b. 5-15, and Metaphys. [Greek: D]. 1018, b. 12--[Greek:
-a(plo=s kai\ te=| phu/sei pro/teron].]
-
-[Side-note: Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from
-ancient times to the present day--Different views of Plato and
-Aristotle upon it.]
-
-The question--What is the real and precise meaning attached to
-abstract and general words?--has been debated down to this day,
-and is still under debate. It seems to have first derived its
-importance, if not its origin, from Sokrates, who began the
-practice of inviting persons to define the familiar generalities
-of ethics and politics, and then tested by cross-examination the
-definitions given by men who thought that common sense would
-enable any one to define.[37] But I see no ground for believing
-that Sokrates ever put to himself the question--Whether that which
-an abstract term denotes is a mental conception, or a separate and
-self-existent reality. That question was raised by Plato, and
-first stands clearly brought to view here in the Parmenides.
-
-[Footnote 37: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 3. M. 1078, b.
-18-32.]
-
-If we follow up the opinion here delivered by the Platonic
-Sokrates, together with the first correction added to it by
-Parmenides, amounting to this--That the Form is a Conception of
-the mind with its corresponding Concept: if, besides, we dismiss
-the doctrine held by Plato, that the Form is a separate
-self-existent unchangeable Ens ([Greek: e(\n para\ ta\ polla\]):
-there will then be no greater difficulty in understanding how it
-can be partaken by, or be at once in, many distinct particulars,
-than in understanding (what is at bottom the same question) how
-one and the same attribute can belong at once to many different
-objects: how hardness or smoothness can be at once in an indefinite
-number of hard and smooth bodies dispersed everywhere.[38] The
-object and the attribute are both of them relative to the same
-percipient and concipient mind: we may perceive or conceive many
-objects as distinct individuals--we may also conceive them all as
-resembling in a particular manner, making abstraction of the
-individuality of each: both these are psychological facts, and
-the latter of the two is what we mean when we say, that all of them
-possess or participate in one and the same attribute. The concrete
-term, and its corresponding abstract, stand for the same facts of
-sense differently conceived. Now the word _one_, when applied to the
-attribute, has a different meaning from _one_ when applied to an
-individual object. Plato speaks sometimes elsewhere as if he felt
-this diversity of meaning: not however in the Parmenides, though
-there is great demand for it. But Aristotle (in this respect far
-superior) takes much pains to point out that _Unum Ens_--and the
-preposition _In_ (to be _in_ any thing)--are among the [Greek:
-pollacho=s lego/mena], having several different meanings derived
-from one primary or radical by diverse and distant
-ramifications.[39] The important logical distinction between _Unum
-numero_ and _Unum specie_ (or _genere_, &c.) belongs first to
-Aristotle.[40]
-
-[Footnote 38: That "the attribute is in its subject," is explained
-by Aristotle only by saying That it is _in_ its subject, not as a
-part in the whole, yet as that which cannot exist apart from its
-subject (Categor. 1, a. 30-3, a. 30). Compare Hobbes, Comput. or
-Logic. iii. 3, viii. 3. Respecting the number of different modes
-[Greek: tou= e)/n tini ei)=nai], see Aristot. Physic. iii. p. 210,
-a. 18 seq., with the Scholia, p. 373 Brandis, and p. 446, 10
-Brand. The commentators made out, variously, nine, eleven, sixteen
-distinct [Greek: tro/pous tou= e)/n tini ei)=nai]. In the language
-of Aristotle, _genus_, _species_, [Greek: ei)=dos], and even
-_differentia_ are not [Greek: e)n u(pokeime/no|], but are
-predicated [Greek: kath' u(pokeime/nou] (see Cat. p. 3, a. 20).
-The _proprium_ and _accidens_ alone are [Greek: e)n
-u(pokeime/no|]. Here is a difference between his language and that
-of Plato, according to whom [Greek: to\ ei)=dos] is [Greek: e)n
-e(ka/sto| to=n pollo=n] (Parmenid. 131 A). But we remark in that
-same dialogue, that when Parmenides questions Sokrates whether he
-recognises [Greek: ei)/de au)ta\ kath' au)ta/] he first asks
-whether Sokrates admits [Greek: dikai/ou ti ei)=dos au)to\ kath'
-au(to/, kai\ kalou=, kai\ a)gathou=, kai\ pa/nton to=n toiou/ton].
-Sokrates answers without hesitation, _Yes_. Then Parmenides
-proceeds to ask, Do you recognise an [Greek: ei)=dos] of man,
-separate and apart from all of us individual men?--or an [Greek:
-ei)=dos] of fire, water, and such like? Here Sokrates hesitates:
-he will neither admit nor deny it (130 D). The first list, which
-Sokrates at once accepts, is of what Aristotle would call
-_accidents_: the second, which Sokrates doubts about, is of what
-Aristotle would call _second substances_. We thus see that the
-conception of a self-existent [Greek: ei)=dos] realised itself
-most easily and distinctly to the mind of Plato in the case of
-_accidents_. He would, therefore, naturally conceive [Greek: ta\
-ei)/de] as being [Greek: e)n u(pokeime/no|], agreeing
-substantially, though not in terms, with Aristotle. It is in the
-case of accidents or attributes that abstract names are most
-usually invented; and it is the abstract name, or the neuter
-adjective used as its equivalent, which suggests the belief in an
-[Greek: ei)=dos].]
-
-[Footnote 39: Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. 1015-1016, I. 1052,
-a. 29 seq. [Greek: ta\ me\n de\ ou(/tos e(\n e)\ suneche\s e)\
-o(/lon; ta\ de\ o(=n a)\n o( lo/gos ei(=s e)=|; toiau=ta de\ o(=n
-e( no/esis mi/a], &c.
-
-About abstract names, or the names of attributes, see Mr. John
-Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' i. 2, 4, p. 30, edit. 5th. "When
-only one attribute, neither variable in degree nor in kind, is
-designated by the name--as visibleness, tangibleness, equality,
-&c.--though it denotes an attribute of many different objects,
-the attribute itself is always considered as _one_, not as
-_many_." Compare, also, on this point, p. 153, and a note added by
-Mr. Mill to the fifth edition, p. 203, in reply to Mr. Herbert
-Spencer. The _oneness_ of the attribute, in different subjects, is
-not conceded by every one. Mr. Spencer thinks that the same
-abstract word denotes one attribute in Subject A, and another
-attribute, though exactly like it, in Subject B (Principles of
-Psychology, p. 126 seq.) Mr. Mill's view appears the correct one;
-but the distinction (pointed out by Archbishop Whately) between
-_undistinguishable likeness_ and _positive identity_, becomes in
-these cases imperceptible or forgotten.
-
-Aristotle, however, in the beginning of the Categories ranks
-[Greek: e( ti/s grammatike\] as [Greek: a)/tomon kai\ _e(\n
-a)rithmo=|_] (pp. 1, 6, 8), which I do not understand; and it
-seems opposed to another passage, pp. 3, 6, 15.
-
-The argument between two such able thinkers as Mr. Mill and Mr.
-Spencer, illustrates forcibly the extreme nicety of this question
-respecting the One and the Many, under certain supposable
-circumstances. We cannot be surprised that it puzzled the
-dialecticians of the Platonic Aristotelian age, who fastened by
-preference on points of metaphysical difficulty.]
-
-[Footnote 40: See interesting remarks on the application of this
-logical distinction in Galen, De Methodo Medendi, Book iii. vol.
-x. p. 130 seq. Aristotle and Theophrastus both dwelt upon it.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the
-facts of sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded.]
-
-Plato has not followed out the hint which he has here put into the
-mouth of Sokrates in the Parmenides--That the Ideas or Forms are
-conceptions existing only in the mind. Though the opinion thus
-stated is not strictly correct (and is so pointed out by himself),
-as falling back too exclusively on the subjective--yet if followed
-out, it might have served to modify the too objective and absolute
-character which in most dialogues (though not in the Sophistes) he
-ascribes to his Forms or Ideas: laying stress upon them as
-objects--and as objects not of sensible perception--but
-overlooking or disallowing the fact of their being relative to the
-concipient mind. The bent of Plato's philosophy was to dwell upon
-these Forms, and to bring them into harmonious conjunction with
-each other: he neither took pains, nor expected, to make them fit
-on to the world of sense. With Aristotle, on the contrary, this
-last-mentioned purpose is kept very generally in view. Amidst all
-the extreme abstractions which he handles, he reverts often to the
-comparison of them with sensible particulars: indeed Substantia
-Prima was by him, for the first time in the history of philosophy,
-brought down to designate the concrete particular object of sense:
-in Plato's Phaedon, Republic, &c, the only Substances are the Forms
-or Ideas.
-
-[Side-note: Continuation of the Dialogue--Parmenides admonishes
-Sokrates that be has been premature in delivering a doctrine,
-without sufficient preliminary exercise.]
-
-Parmenides now continues the debate. He has already fastened upon
-Sokrates several difficult problems: he now proposes a new one,
-different and worse. Which way are we to turn then, if these Forms
-be beyond our knowledge? I do not see my way (says Sokrates) out
-of the perplexity. The fact is, Sokrates (replies Parmenides), you
-have been too forward in producing your doctrine of Ideas, without
-a sufficient preliminary exercise and enquiry. Your love of
-philosophical research is highly praiseworthy: but you must employ
-your youth in exercising and improving yourself, through that
-continued philosophical discourse which the vulgar call _useless
-prosing_: otherwise you will never attain truth.[41] You are
-however right in bestowing your attention, not on the objects of
-sense, but on those objects which we can best grasp in discussion,
-and which we presume to exist as Forms.[42]
-
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 C. [Greek: Pro\| ga/r, pri\n
-gumnasthe=nai, o)= So/krates, o(ri/zesthai e)picheirei=s kalo/n
-te/ ti kai\ di/kaion kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ e(\n e(/kaston to=n
-ei)do=n . . . kale\ me\n ou)=n kai\ thei/a, ei)= i)/sthi, e(
-o(rme\ e(\n o(rma=|s e)pi\ tou\s lo/gous; e(/lkuson de\ sauto\n
-kai\ gumna/sai, ma=llon dia\ te=s dokou/ses a)chre/stou ei)=nai
-kai\ kaloume/nes u(po\ to=n pollo=n a)doleschi/as, e(/os e)/ti
-ne/os ei)=; ei) de\ me\, se\ diapheu/xetai e( a)le/theia.]]
-
-[Footnote 42: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 E.]
-
-[Side-note: What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume
-provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many
-hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the
-consequences of each.]
-
-What sort of exercise must I go through? asks Sokrates. Zeno
-(replies Parmenides) has already given you a good specimen of it
-in his treatise, when he followed out the consequences flowing
-from the assumption--"That the self-existent and absolute Ens is
-plural". When you are trying to find out the truth on any
-question, you must assume provisionally, first the affirmative and
-then the negative, and you must then follow out patiently the
-consequences deducible from one hypothesis as well as from the
-other. If you are enquiring about the Form of Likeness, whether it
-exists or does not exist, you must assume successively both one
-and the other;[43] marking the deductions which follow, both with
-reference to the thing directly assumed, and with reference to
-other things also. You must do the like if you are investigating
-other Forms--Unlikeness, Motion, and Rest, or even Existence and
-Non-Existence. But you must not be content with following out only
-one side of the hypothesis: you must examine both sides with equal
-care and impartiality. This is the only sort of preparatory
-exercise which will qualify you for completely seeing through the
-truth.[44]
-
-[Footnote 43: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 A. [Greek: kai\ au)=this
-au)= e)a\n u(pothe=|, ei) e)/stin o(moio/tes e)\ ei) me/ e)sti,
-ti/ e)ph' e(kate/ras te=s u(pothe/seos sumbe/setai, kai\ au)toi=s
-toi=s u(potethei=si kai\ toi=s a)/llois kai\ pro\s au(ta\ kai\
-pro\s a)/llela.]]
-
-[Footnote 44: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Impossible to do this before a numerous
-audience--Parmenides is entreated to give a specimen--After much
-solicitation he agrees.]
-
-You propose to me, Parmenides (remarks Sokrates), a work of awful
-magnitude. At any rate, show me an example of it yourself, that I
-may know better how to begin.--Parmenides at first declines, on
-the ground of his old age: but Zeno and the others urge him, so
-that he at length consents.--The process will be tedious (observes
-Zeno); and I would not ask it from Parmenides unless among an
-audience small and select as we are here. Before any numerous
-audience, it would be an unseemly performance for a veteran like
-him. For most people are not aware that, without such discursive
-survey and travelling over the whole field, we cannot possibly
-attain truth or acquire intelligence.[45]
-
-[Footnote 45: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 D. [Greek: ei) me\n ou)=n
-plei/ous e)=men, ou)k a)\n a)/xion e)=n dei=sthai; _a)prepe= ga\r
-ta\ toiau=ta pollo=n e)nanti/on le/gein_, a)/llos te kai\
-telikou/to|; a)gnoou=si ga\r oi( polloi\ o(/ti a)/neu tau/tes te=s
-dia\ pa/nton diexo/dou kai\ pla/nes, a)du/naton e)ntucho/nta to=|
-a)lethei= nou=n schei=n.] Hobbes remarks (Computatio sive Logica,
-i. 3, 12): "Learners ought to go through logical exercises
-silently and by themselves: for it will be thought both ridiculous
-and absurd, for a man to use such language publicly". Proklus
-tells us, that the difficulty of the [Greek: gumnasi/a], here set
-out by the Platonic Parmenides, is so prodigious, that no one
-after Plato employed it. (Prok. ad Parmen. p. 801, Stallb.)]
-
-[Side-note: Parmenides elects his own theory of the _Unum_, as the
-topic for exhibition--Aristoteles becomes respondent.]
-
-It is especially on this ground--the small number and select
-character of the auditors--that Parmenides suffers himself to be
-persuaded to undertake what he calls "amusing ourselves with a
-laborious pastime".[46] He selects, as the subject of his
-dialectical exhibition, his own doctrine respecting the One. He
-proceeds to trace out the consequences which flow, first, from
-assuming the affirmative thesis, _Unum Est_: next, from assuming
-the negative thesis, or the Antithesis, _Unum non Est_. The
-consequences are to be deduced from each hypothesis, not only as
-regards _Unum_ itself, but as regards _Caetera_, or other things
-besides _Unum_. The youngest man of the party, Aristoteles,
-undertakes the duty of respondent.
-
-[Footnote 46: Plato, Parmenid. p. 137 A. [Greek: dei= ga\r
-chari/zesthai, _e)peide\_ kai\ o(\ Ze/non le/gei, _au)toi/ e)smen_
-. . . e)\ bou/lesthe _e)peide/per dokei= pragmateio/de paidia\n
-pai/zein_,] &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Exhibition of Parmenides--Nine distinct deductions or
-Demonstrations, first from _Unum Est_--next from _Unum non Est_.]
-
-The remaining portion of the dialogue, half of the whole, is
-occupied with nine distinct deductions or demonstrations given by
-Parmenides. The first five start from the assumption, _Unum Est_:
-the last four from the assumption, _Unum non Est_. The three first
-draw out the deductions from _Unum Est_, in reference to _Unum_:
-the fourth and fifth draw out the consequences from the same
-premiss, in reference to _Caetera_. Again, the sixth and seventh
-start from _Unum non Est_, to trace what follows in regard to
-_Unum_: the eighth and ninth adopt the same hypothesis, and reason
-it out in reference to _Caetera_.
-
-[Side-note: The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or
-Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without
-any explanation.]
-
-Of these demonstrations, one characteristic feature is, that they
-are presented in antagonising pairs or Antinomies: except the
-third, which professes to mediate between the first and second,
-though only by introducing new difficulties. We have four distinct
-Antinomies: the first and second, the fourth and fifth, the sixth
-and seventh, the eighth and ninth, stand respectively in emphatic
-contradiction with each other. Moreover, to take the
-demonstrations separately--the first, fifth, seventh, ninth, end
-in conclusions purely negative: the other four end in double and
-contradictory conclusions. The purpose is formally proclaimed, of
-showing that the same premisses, ingeniously handled, can be made
-to yield these contradictory results.[47] No attempt is made to
-reconcile the contradictions, except partially by means of the
-third, in reference to the two preceding. In regard to the fourth
-and fifth, sixth and seventh, eighth and ninth, no hint is given
-that they can be, or afterwards will be, reconciled. The dialogue
-concludes abruptly at the end of the ninth demonstration, with
-these words: "We thus see that--whether Unum exists or does not
-exist--Unum and Caetera both are, and are not, all things in every
-way--both appear, and do not appear, all things in every way--each
-in relation to itself, and each in relation to the other".[48]
-Here is an unqualified and even startling announcement of double
-and contradictory conclusions, obtained from the same premisses
-both affirmative and negative: an announcement delivered too as
-the fulfilment of the purpose of Parmenides. Nothing is said at
-the end to intimate how the demonstrations are received by
-Sokrates, nor what lesson they are expected to administer to him:
-not a word of assent, or dissent, or surprise, or acknowledgment
-in any way, from the assembled company, though all of them had
-joined in entreating Parmenides, and had expressed the greatest
-anxiety to hear his dialectic exhibition. Those who think that an
-abrupt close, or an abrupt exordium, is sufficient reason for
-declaring a dialogue not to be the work of Plato (as Platonic
-critics often argue), are of course consistent in disallowing the
-Parmenides. For my part, I do not agree in the opinion. I take
-Plato as I find him, and I perceive both here and in the
-Protagoras and elsewhere, that he did not always think it
-incumbent upon him to adapt the end of his dialogues to the
-beginning. This may be called a defect, but I do not feel called
-upon to make out that Plato's writings are free from defects; and
-to acknowledge nothing as his work unless I can show it to be
-faultless.
-
-[Footnote 47: See the connecting words between the first and
-second demonstration, pp. 142 A, 159. [Greek: Ou)kou=n tau=ta me\n
-e)/de e)o=men o(s phanera/, e)piskopo=men de\ pa/lin, e(\n ei)
-e)/stin, _a)=ra kai\ ou)ch ou(/tos e)/chei ta)/lla tou= e(no\s e)\
-ou(/to mo/non?_] Also p. 163 B.]
-
-[Footnote 48: Plato, Parmenid. ad fin. [Greek: Ei)re/stho toi/nun
-tou=to/ te kai\ o(/ti, o(s e)/oiken, e(\n ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te
-me\ e)/stin, au)to/ te kai\ ta)/lla kai\ pro\s au(ta\ kai\ pro\s
-a)/llela pa/nta pa/ntos e)sti/ te kai\ ou)k e)sti kai\ phai/netai/
-te kai\ ou) phai/netai.]]
-
-[Side-note: Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the
-Antinomies and the dialogue generally.]
-
-The demonstrations or Antinomies in the last half of the
-Parmenides are characterised by K. F. Hermann and others as a
-masterpiece of speculative acuteness. Yet if these same
-demonstrations, constructed with care and labour for the purpose
-of proving that the same premisses will conduct to double and
-contradictory conclusions, had come down to us from antiquity
-under the name either of the Megaric Eukleides, or Protagoras, or
-Gorgias--many of the Platonic critics would probably have said of
-them (what is now said of the sceptical treatise remaining to us
-under the name of Gorgias) that they were poor productions worthy
-of such Sophists, who are declared to have made a trade of
-perverting truth. Certainly the conclusions of the demonstrations
-are specimens of that "Both and Neither," which Plato (in the
-Euthydemus[49]) puts into the mouth of the Sophist Dionysodorus as
-an answer of slashing defiance--and of that intentional evolution
-of contradictions which Plato occasionally discountenances, both
-in the Euthydemus and elsewhere.[50] And we know from Proklus[51]
-that there were critics in ancient times, who depreciated various
-parts of the Parmenides as sophistical. Proklus himself denies the
-charge with some warmth. He as well as the principal
-Neo-Platonists between 200-530 A.D. (especially his predecessors and
-instructors at Athens, Jamblichus, Syrianus, and Plutarchus)
-admired the Parmenides as a splendid effort of philosophical
-genius in its most exalted range, inspired so as to become
-cognizant of superhuman persons and agencies. They all agreed so
-far as to discover in the dialogue a sublime vein of mystic
-theology and symbolism: but along with this general agreement,
-there was much discrepancy in their interpretation of particular
-parts and passages. The commentary of Proklus attests the
-existence of such debates, reporting his own dissent from the
-interpretations sanctioned by his venerated masters, Plutarchus
-and Syrianus. That commentary, in spite of its prolixity, is
-curious to read as a specimen of the fifth century, A.D., in one
-of its most eminent representatives. Proklus discovers a string of
-theological symbols and a mystical meaning throughout the whole
-dialogue: not merely in the acute argumentation which
-characterises its middle part, but also in the perplexing
-antinomies of its close, and even in the dramatic details of
-places, persons, and incidents, with which it begins.[52]
-
-[Footnote 49: Plato, Euthydem. p. 300 C. [Greek: A)ll' ou) tou=to
-e)roto=, a)lla\ ta\ pa/nta siga=| e)\ le/gei? _Ou)de/tera kai\
-a)mpho/tera_, e)/phe u(pharpa/sas o( Dionuso/doros; eu)= ga\r
-oi)=da o(/ti te=| a)pokri/sei ou)ch e(/xeis o(/, ti chre=|.]]
-
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B. [Greek: ei)/te o(s ti
-chalepo\n katanenoeko\s chai/rei, tote\ me\n e)pi\ tha/tera tote\
-d' e)pi\ tha/tera tou\s lo/gous e(/lkon, ou)k a)/xia polle=s
-spoude=s e)spou/daken, o(s oi( nu=n lo/goi phasi/n.]--Also p. 259
-D. [Greek: To\ de\ tau)to\n e(/teron a)pophai/nein a(me=| ge/ pe|,
-kai\ to\ tha/teron tau)to/n, kai\ to\ me/ga smikro/n, kai\ to\
-o(/moion a)no/moion, kai\ chai/rein ou(/to ta)nanti/a a)ei\
-prophe/ronta e)n toi=s lo/gois, ou)/ te/ tis e)/legchos ou(=tos
-a)lethino/s, a)/rti te to=n o)/nton tino\s e)phaptome/nou de=los
-neogene\s o)/n.]]
-
-[Footnote 51: Proklus, ad Platon. Parmen. p. 953, ed. Stallb.;
-compare p. 976 in the last book of the commentary, probably
-composed by Damaskius. K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der
-Platon. Philos. p. 507.]
-
-[Footnote 52: This commentary is annexed to Stallbaum's edition of
-the Parmenides. Compare also the opinion of Marinus (disciple and
-biographer of Proklus) about the Parmenides--Suidas v. [Greek:
-Mari=nos]. Jamblichus declared that Plato's entire theory of
-philosophy was embodied in the two dialogues, Parmenides and
-Timaeus: in the Parmenides, all the intelligible or universal Entia
-were deduced from [Greek: to\ e(/n]: in the Timaeus, all cosmical
-realities were deduced from the Demiurgus. Proklus ad Timaeeum, p.
-5 A, p. 10 Schneider.
-
-Alkinous, in his Introduction to the Platonic Dialogues (c. 6, p.
-159, in the Appendix Platonica attached to K. F. Hermann's edition
-of Plato) quotes several examples of syllogistic reasoning from
-the Parmenides, and affirms that the ten categories of Aristotle
-are exhibited therein.
-
-Plotinus (Ennead. v. 1, 8) gives a brief summary of what he
-understood to be contained in the Antinomies of the Platonic
-Parmenides; but the interpretation departs widely from the
-original.
-
-I transcribe a few sentences from the argument of Ficinus, to show
-what different meanings may be discovered in the same words by
-different critics. (Ficini Argum. in Plat. Parmen. p. 756.) "Cum
-Plato per omnes ejus dialogos totius sapientiae semina sparserit,
-in libris De Republica cuncta moralis philosophiae instituta
-collegit, omnem naturalium rerum scientiam in Timaeo, universam in
-Parmenide complexus est Theologiam. Cumque in aliis longo
-intervallo caeteros philosophos antecesserit, in hoc tandem seipsum
-superasse videtur. Hic enim divus Plato de ipso Uno subtilissime
-disputat: quemadmodum Ipsum Unum rerum omnium principium est,
-super omnia, omniaque ab illo: quo pacto ipsum extra omnia sit et
-in omnibus: omniaque ex illo, per illud, atque ad illud. Ad hujus,
-quod super essentiam est, Unius intelligentiam gradatim ascendit.
-In iis quae fluunt et sensibus subjiciuntur et sensibilia
-nominantur: In iis etiam quas semper eadem sunt et sensibilia
-nuncupantur, non sensibus amplius sed sola mente percipienda: Nec
-in iis tantum, verum etiam supra sensum et sensibilia,
-intellectumque et intelligibilia:--ipsum Unum existit.--Illud
-insuper advertendum est, quod in hoc dialogo cum dicitur _Unum_,
-Pythagoreorum more quaeque substantia a materia penitus absoluta
-significari potest: ut Deus, Mens, Anima. Cum vero dicitur Aliud
-et Alia, tam materia, quam illa quae in materia fiunt, intelligere
-licet."
-
-The Prolegomena, prefixed by Thomson to his edition of the
-Parmenides, interpret the dialogue in the same general way as
-Proklus and Ficinus: they suppose that by Unum is understood
-Summus Deus, and they discover in the concluding Antinomies
-theological demonstrations of the unity, simplicity, and other
-attributes of God. Thomson observes, very justly, that the
-Parmenides is one of the most difficult dialogues in Plato
-(Prolegom. iv.-x.) But in my judgment, his mode of exposition, far
-from smoothing the difficulties, adds new ones greater than those
-in the text.]
-
-The various explanations of it given by more recent commentators
-may be seen enumerated in the learned Prolegomena of
-Stallbaum,[53] who has also set forth his own views at
-considerable length. And the prodigious opposition between the
-views of Proklus (followed by Ficinus in the fifteenth century),
-who extols the Parmenides as including in mystic phraseology
-sublime religious truths--and those of the modern Tiedemann, who
-despises them as foolish subtleties and cannot read them with
-patience--is quite sufficient to inspire a reasonable Platonic
-critic with genuine diffidence.
-
-[Footnote 53: Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Parmen. ii. 1, pp. 244-265.
-Compare K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Phil. pp.
-507-668-670.
-
-To the works which he has there enumerated, may be added the
-Dissertation by Dr. Kuno Fischer, Stuttgart, 1851, De Parmenide
-Platonico, and that of Zeller, Platonische Studien, p. 169 seqq.
-
-Kuno Fischer (pp. 102-103) after Hegel (Gesch. der Griech. Phil.
-I. p. 202), and some of the followers of Hegel, extol the
-Parmenides as a masterpiece of dialectics, though they complain
-that "der philosophirende Poebel" misunderstand it, and treat it as
-obscure. Werder, Logik, pp. 92-176, Berlin, 1841. Carl Beck,
-Platon's Philosophie im Abriss ihrer genetischen Entwickelung, p.
-75, Reutlingen, 1852. Marbach, Gesch. der Griech. Phil. sect. 96,
-pp. 210-211.]
-
-[Side-note: No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the
-dialogue. The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel
-all the difficulties of theorising.]
-
-In so far as these different expositions profess, each in its own
-way, to detect a positive dogmatical result or purpose in the
-Parmenides,[54] none of them carry conviction to my mind, any more
-than the mystical interpretations which we read in Proklus. If
-Plato had any such purpose, he makes no intimation of it, directly
-or indirectly. On the contrary, he announces another purpose not
-only different, but contrary. The veteran Parmenides, while
-praising the ardour of speculative research displayed by Sokrates,
-at the same time reproves gently, but distinctly, the confident
-forwardness of two such immature youths as Sokrates and Aristotle
-in laying down positive doctrines without the preliminary exercise
-indispensable for testing them.[55] Parmenides appears from the
-beginning to the end of the dialogue as a propounder of doubts and
-objections, not as a doctrinal teacher. He seeks to restrain the
-haste of Sokrates--to make him ashamed of premature affirmation
-and the false persuasion of knowledge--to force upon him a keen
-sense of real difficulties which have escaped his notice. To this
-end, a specimen is given of the exercise required. It is certainly
-well calculated to produce the effect intended--of hampering,
-perplexing, and putting to shame, the affirmative rashness of a
-novice in philosophy. It exhibits a tangled skein of ingenious
-contradiction which the novice must somehow bring into order,
-before he is in condition to proclaim any positive dogma. If it
-answers this purpose, it does all that Parmenides promises.
-Sokrates is warned against attaching himself exclusively to one
-side of an hypothesis, and neglecting the opposite: against
-surrendering himself to some pre-conception, traditional, or
-self-originated, and familiarising his mind with its consequences,
-while no pains are taken to study the consequences of the negative
-side, and bring them into comparison. It is this one-sided mental
-activity, and premature finality of assertion, which Parmenides
-seeks to correct. Whether the corrective exercises which he
-prescribes are the best for the purpose, may be contested: but
-assuredly the malady which he seeks to correct is deeply rooted in
-our human nature, and is combated by Sokrates himself, though by
-other means, in several of the Platonic dialogues. It is a rare
-mental endowment to study both sides of a question, and suspend
-decision until the consequences of each are fully known.
-
-[Footnote 54: I agree with Schleiermacher, in considering that the
-purpose of the Parmenides is nothing beyond [Greek: gumnasi/a], or
-exercise in the method and perplexities of philosophising (Einl.
-p. 83): but I do not agree with him, when he says (pp. 90-105)
-that the objections urged by Parmenides (in the middle of the
-dialogue) against the separate substantiality of Forms or Ideas,
-though noway answered in the dialogue itself, are sufficiently
-answered in other dialogues (which he considers later in time),
-especially in the Sophistes (though, according to Brandis, Handb.
-Gr.-Roem. Phil. p. 241, the Sophistes is earlier than the
-Parmenides). Zeller, on the other hand, denies that these
-objections are at all answered in the Sophistes; but he maintains
-that the second part of the Parmenides itself clears up the
-difficulties propounded in the first part. After an elaborate
-analysis (in the Platon. Studien, pp. 168-178) of the Antinomies
-or contradictory Demonstrations in the concluding part of the
-dialogue, Zeller affirms the purpose of them to be "die richtige
-Ansicht von den Ideen als der Einheit in dem Mannichfaltigen der
-Erscheinung dialektisch zu begruenden, die Ideenlehre moeglichen
-Einwuerfen und Missverstaendnissen gegenueber dialektisch zu
-begruenden" (pp. 180-182). This solution has found favour with some
-subsequent commentators. See Susemihl, Die genetische Entwickelung
-der Platon. Philosophie, pp. 341-353; Heinrich Stein,
-Vorgeschichte und System des Platonismus, pp. 217-220.
-
-To me it appears (what Zeller himself remarks in p. 188, upon the
-discovery of Schleiermacher that the objections started in the
-Parmenides are answered in the Sophistes) that it requires all the
-acuteness of so able a writer as Zeller to detect any such result
-as that which he here extracts from the Parmenidean Antinomies--from
-what Aristeides calls (Or. xlvii. p. 430) "the One and Many,
-the multiplied twists and doublings, of this divine dialogue". I
-confess that I am unable to perceive therein what Zeller has
-either found or elicited. Objections and misunderstandings
-(Einwuerfe und Missverstaendnisse), far from being obviated or
-corrected, are accumulated from the beginning to the end of these
-Antinomies, and are summed up in a formidable total by the final
-sentence of the dialogue. Moreover, none of these objections which
-Parmenides had advanced in the earlier part of the dialogue are at
-all noticed, much less answered, in the concluding Antinomies.
-
-The general view taken by Zeller of the Platonic Parmenides, is
-repeated by him in his Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. pp. 394-415-429,
-ed. 2nd. In the first place, I do not think that he sets forth
-exactly (see p. 415) the reasoning as we read it in Plato; but
-even if that were exactly set forth, still what we read in Plato
-is nothing but an assemblage of difficulties and contradictions.
-These are indeed suggestive, and such as a profound critic may
-meditate with care, until he finds himself put upon a train of
-thought conducting him to conclusions sound and tenable in his
-judgment. But the explanations, sufficient or not, belong after
-all not to Plato but to the critic himself. Other critics may
-attach, and have attached, totally different explanations to the
-same difficulties. I see no adequate evidence to bring home any
-one of them to Plato; or to prove (what is the main point to be
-determined) that any one of them was present to his mind when he
-composed the dialogue.
-
-Schwegler also gives an account of what he affirms to be the
-purpose and meaning of the Parmenides--"The positive meaning of
-the antinomies contained in it can only be obtained by inferences
-which Plato does not himself expressly enunciate, but leaves to
-the reader to draw" (Geschichte der Philosophie im Umriss, sect.
-14, 4 c. pp. 52-53, ed. 5).
-
-A learned man like Schwegler, who both knows the views of other
-philosophers, and has himself reflected on philosophy, may perhaps
-find affirmative meaning in the Parmenides; just as Sokrates, in
-the Platonic Protagoras, finds his own ethical doctrine in the
-song of the poet Simonides. But I venture to say that no
-contemporary reader of Plato could have found such a meaning in
-the Parmenides; and that if Plato intended to communicate such a
-meaning, the whole structure of the dialogue would be only an
-elaborate puzzle calculated to prevent nearly all readers from
-reaching it.
-
-By assigning the leadership of the dialogue to Parmenides
-(Schwegler says) Plato intends to signify that the Platonic
-doctrine of Ideas is coincident with the doctrine of Parmenides,
-and is only a farther development thereof. How can this be
-signified, when the discourse assigned to Parmenides consists of a
-string of objections against the doctrine of Ideas, concluding
-with an intimation that there are other objections, yet stronger,
-remaining behind?
-
-The fundamental thought of the Parmenides (says Schwegler) is,
-that the One is not conceivable in complete abstraction from the
-Many, nor the Many in complete abstraction from the One,--that
-each reciprocally supposes and serves as condition to the other.
-Not so: for if we follow the argumentation of Parmenides (p. 131
-E), we shall see that what he principally insists upon, is the
-entire impossibility of any connection or participation between
-the One and the Many--there is an impassable gulf between them.
-
-Is the discussion of [Greek: to\ e(\n] (in the closing Antinomies)
-intended as an example of dialectic investigation--or is it _per
-se_ the special object of the dialogue? This last is clearly the
-truth (says Schwegler). "otherwise the dialogue would end without
-result, and its two portions would be without any internal
-connection". Not so; for if we read the dialogue, we find
-Parmenides clearly proclaiming and singling out [Greek: to\ e(\n]
-as only one among a great many different notions, each of which
-must be made the subject of a bilateral hypothesis, to be followed
-out into its consequences on both sides (p. 136 A). Moreover, I
-think that the "internal connection" between the first and the
-last half of the dialogue, consists in the application of this
-dialectic method, and in nothing else. If the dialogue ends
-without result, this is true of many other Platonic dialogues. The
-student is brought face to face with logical difficulties, and has
-to find out the solution for himself; or perhaps to find out that
-no solution can be obtained.]
-
-[Footnote 55: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 C.]
-
-[Side-note: This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato
-himself. All dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely
-hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared.]
-
-Such, in my judgment, is the drift of the contradictory
-demonstrations here put into the mouth of Parmenides respecting
-Unum and Caetera. Thus far at least, we are perfectly safe: for we
-are conforming strictly to the language of Plato himself in the
-dialogue: we have no proof that he meant anything more. Those who
-presume that he must have had some ulterior dogmatical purpose,
-place themselves upon hypothetical ground: but when they go
-farther and attempt to set forth what this purpose was, they show
-their ingenuity only by bringing out what they themselves have
-dropped in. The number of discordant hypotheses attests[56] the
-difficulty of the problem. I agree with those early Platonic
-commentators (mentioned and opposed by Proklus) who could see no
-other purpose in these demonstrations than that of dialectical
-exercise. In this view Schleiermacher, Ast, Struempell, and others
-mainly concur: the two former however annexing to it a farther
-hypothesis--which I think improbable--that the dialogue has come
-to us incomplete; having once contained at the end (or having been
-originally destined to contain, though the intention may never
-have been realised) an appendix elucidating the perplexities of
-the demonstrations.[57] This would have been inconsistent with the
-purpose declared by Parmenides: who, far from desiring to
-facilitate the onward march of Sokrates by clearing up
-difficulties, admonishes him that he is advancing too rapidly, and
-seeks to keep him back by giving him a heap of manifest
-contradictions to disentangle. Plato conceives the training for
-philosophy or for the highest exercise of intellectual force, to
-be not less laborious than that which was required for the bodily
-perfections of an Olympic athlete. The student must not be helped
-out of difficulties at once: he must work his own way slowly out
-of them.
-
-[Footnote 56: Proklus ad Platon. Parmen. I. pp. 482-485, ed.
-Stallb.; compare pp. 497-498-788-791, where Proklus is himself
-copious upon the subject of exercise in dialectic method.
-
-Stallbaum, after reciting many different hypothetical
-interpretations from those interpreters who had preceded him, says
-(Prolegg. p. 265), "En lustravimus tandem varias interpretum de
-hoc libro opiniones. Quid igitur? verusne fui, quum supra dicerem,
-tantam fuisse hominum eruditorum in eo explicando fluctuationem
-atque dissensionem, ut quamvis plurimi de eo disputaverint, tamen
-fere alius aliter judicaverit? Nimirum his omnibus cognitis,
-facile alicui in mentem veniat Terentianum illud--_Fecisti prope,
-multo sim quam dudum incertior_."
-
-Brandis (Handbuch Gr.-Roem. Phil. s. 105, pp. 257-258) cannot bring
-himself to believe that dialectical exercise was the only purpose
-with which Plato composed the Parmenides. He then proceeds to
-state what Plato's ulterior purpose was, but in such very vague
-language, that I hardly understand what he means, much less can I
-find it in the Antinomies themselves. He has some clearer
-language, p. 241, where he treats these Antinomies as preparatory
-[Greek: a)pori/ai].]
-
-[Footnote 57: Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 239-244;
-Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Parmen. pp. 94-99; Struempell,
-Geschichte der Theoretischen Philosophie der Griechen, sect. 96,
-pp. 128-129.
-
-I do not agree with Socher's conclusion, that the Parmenides is
-not a Platonic composition. But I think he is quite right in
-saying that the dialogue as it now stands performs all that
-Parmenides promises, and leaves no ground for contending that it
-is an unfinished fragment (Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p.
-286), so far as philosophical speculation is concerned. The
-dialogue as a dramatic or literary composition undoubtedly lacks a
-proper close; it is [Greek: a)/pous] or [Greek: kolobo\s]
-(Aristot. Rhetor. iii. 8), sinning against the strict exigence
-which Plato in the Phaedrus applies to the discourse of Lysias.]
-
-[Side-note: The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They
-include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of
-unexplained perplexities or [Greek: a)pori/ai].]
-
-That the demonstrations include assumption both unwarranted and
-contradictory, mingled with sophistical subtlety (in the modern
-sense of the words), is admitted by most of the commentators: and
-I think that the real amount of it is greater than they admit. How
-far Plato was himself aware of this, I will not undertake to say.
-Perhaps he was not. The reasonings which have passed for sublime
-and profound in the estimation of so many readers, may well have
-appeared the same to their author. I have already remarked that
-Plato's ratiocinative force is much greater on the negative side
-than on the positive: more ingenious in suggesting logical
-difficulties than sagacious in solving them. Impressed, as
-Sokrates had been before him, with the duty of combating the false
-persuasion of knowledge, or premature and untested belief,--he
-undertook to set forth the pleadings of negation in the most
-forcible manner. Many of his dialogues manifest this tendency, but
-the Parmenides more than any other. That dialogue is a collection
-of unexplained [Greek: a)pori/ai] (such as those enumerated in the
-second book of Aristotle's Metaphysica) brought against a doctrine
-which yet Plato declares to be the indispensable condition of all
-reasoning. It concludes with a string of demonstrations by which
-contradictory conclusions (Both and Neither) are successively
-proved, and which appear like a _reductio ad absurdum_ of all
-demonstration. But at the time when Plato composed the dialogue, I
-think it not improbable that these difficulties and contradictions
-appeared even to himself unanswerable: in other words, that he did
-not himself see any answers and explanations of them. He had tied
-a knot so complicated, that he could not himself untie it. I speak
-of the state of Plato's mind when he wrote the Parmenides. At the
-dates of other dialogues (whether earlier or later), he wrote
-under different points of view; but no key to the Parmenides does
-he ever furnish.
-
-[Side-note: Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he
-might still choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the
-way of a forward affirmative aspirant.]
-
-If however we suppose that Plato must have had the key present to
-his own mind, he might still think it right to employ, in such a
-dialogue, reasonings recognised by himself as defective. It is the
-task imposed upon Sokrates to find out and expose these defective
-links. There is no better way of illustrating how universal is the
-malady of human intelligence--unexamined belief and over-confident
-affirmation--as it stands proclaimed to be in the Platonic
-Apology. Sokrates is exhibited in the Parmenides as placed under
-the screw of the Elenchus, and no more able than others to
-extricate himself from it, when it is applied by Parmenides:
-though he bears up successfully against Zeno, and attracts to
-himself respectful compliments, even from the aged dialectician
-who tests him. After the Elenchus applied to himself, Sokrates
-receives a farther lesson from the "Neither and Both"
-demonstrations addressed by Parmenides to the still younger
-Aristotle. Sokrates will thus be driven, with his indefatigable
-ardour for speculative research, to work at the problem--to devote
-to it those seasons of concentrated meditation, which sometimes
-exhibited him fixed for hours in the same place and almost in the
-same attitude[58]--until he can extricate himself from such
-difficulties and contradictions. But that he shall not extricate
-himself without arduous mental effort, is the express intention of
-Parmenides: just as the Xenophontic Sokrates proceeds with the
-youthful Euthydemus and the Platonic Sokrates with Lysis,
-Theaetetus, and others. Plausible subtlety was not unsuitable for
-such a lesson.[59] Moreover, in the Parmenides, Plato proclaims
-explicitly that the essential condition of the lesson is to be
-strictly private: that a process so roundabout and tortuous cannot
-be appreciated by ordinary persons, and would be unseemly before
-an audience.[60] He selects as respondent the youngest person in
-the company, one still younger than Sokrates: because (he says)
-such a person will reply with artless simplicity, to each question
-as the question may strike him--not carrying his mind forward to
-the ulterior questions for which his reply may furnish the
-handle--not afraid of being entangled in puzzling inconsistencies--not
-solicitous to baffle the purpose of the interrogator.[61] All this
-betokens the plan of the dialogue--to bring to light all those
-difficulties which do not present themselves except to a
-keen-sighted enquirer.
-
-[Footnote 58: Plato, Symposion, p. 220 C-D: compare pp. 174-175.
-
-In the dialogue Parmenides (p. 130 E), Parmenides himself is
-introduced as predicting that the youthful Sokrates will become
-more and more absorbed in philosophy as he advances in years.
-
-Proklus observes in his commentary on the dialogue--[Greek: o(
-ga\r Sokra/tes a)/gatai ta\s a)pori/as], &c. (L. v. p. 252).]
-
-[Footnote 59: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, ad fin.]
-
-[Footnote 60: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 136 C, 137 A. Hobbes remarks
-(Computatio sive Logica, Part I, ch. iii. s. 12), "Learners ought
-to go through logical exercises silently and by themselves: for it
-will be thought both ridiculous and absurd, for a man to use such
-language publicly".
-
-Proklus tells us, that the difficulty of the [Greek: gumnasi/a]
-here enjoined by the Platonic Parmenides is so prodigious, that no
-one after Plato employed it (Prokl. ad Parmenid. p. 306, p. 801,
-Stallb.).
-
-[Greek: ei) me\n ou)=n plei/ous e)=men, ou)k a)\n a)/xion e)=n
-dei=sthai. a)prepe= ga\r ta\ toiau=ta pollo=n e)nanti/on le/gein,
-a)/llos te kai\ telikou/to|; a)gnoou=si ga\r oi( polloi\ o(/ti
-a)neu tau/tes te=s dia\ pa/nton diexo/dou kai\ pla/nes a)du/naton
-e)ntucho/nta to=| a)lethei= nou=n schei=n.]]
-
-[Footnote 61: Plato, Parmenides, p. 137 B; compare Sophistes, p.
-217 D.
-
-To understand the force of this remark of Parmenides, we should
-contrast it with the precepts given by Aristotle in the Topica for
-dialectic debate: precepts teaching the questioner how to puzzle,
-and the respondent how to avoid being puzzled. Such precautions
-are advised to the respondent by Aristotle, not merely in the
-Topica but also in the Analytica--[Greek: chre\ d' o(/per
-phula/ttesthai paragge/llomen a)pokrinome/nous, au)tou\s
-e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein] (Anal. Priora, ii. p.
-66, a. 33).]
-
-[Side-note: The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited
-only as illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied
-to many other Antinomies.]
-
-We must remark farther, that the two hypotheses here handled at
-length by Parmenides are presented by him only as examples of a
-dialectical process which he enjoins the lover of truth to apply
-equally to many other hypotheses.[62] As he shows that in the case
-of Unum, each of the two assumptions (Unum est--Unum non est) can
-be traced through different threads of deductive reasoning so as
-to bring out double and contradictory results--Both and Neither:
-so also in the case of those other assumptions which remain to be
-tested afterwards in like manner, antinomies of the same character
-may be expected: antinomies apparent at least, if not real--which
-must be formally propounded and dealt with, before we can trust
-ourselves as having attained reasoned truth. Hence we see that,
-negative and puzzling as the dialogue called Parmenides is, even
-now--it would be far more puzzling if all that it prescribes in
-general terms had been executed in detail. While it holds out, in
-the face of an aspirant in philosophy, the necessity of giving
-equal presumptive value to the affirmative and negative sides of
-each hypothesis, and deducing with equal care, the consequences of
-both--it warns him at the same time of the contradictions in which
-he will thereby become involved. These contradictions are
-presented in the most glaring manner: but we must recollect a
-striking passage in the Republic, where Plato declares that to
-confront the aspirant with manifest contradictions, is the best
-way of provoking him to intellectual effort in the higher regions
-of speculation.[63]
-
-[Footnote 62: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B.]
-
-[Footnote 63: Plato, Repub. vii. p. 524 E, and indeed the whole
-passage, pp. 523-524.]
-
-[Side-note: These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any
-of the sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric
-philosophers.]
-
-I have already had occasion, when I touched upon the other _viri
-Socratici_, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Plato, to give
-some account of the Zenonian and Megaric dialecticians, and of
-their sophisms or logical puzzles, which attracted so much
-attention from speculative men, in the fourth and third centuries
-B.C. These Megarics, like the Sophists, generally receive very
-harsh epithets from the historian of philosophy. They took the
-negative side, impugned affirmative dogmas, insisted on doubts and
-difficulties, and started problems troublesome to solve. I have
-tried to show, that such disputants, far from deserving all the
-censure which has been poured upon them, presented one
-indispensable condition to the formation of any tolerable logical
-theory.[64] Their sophisms were challenges to the logician,
-indicating various forms of error and confusion, against which a
-theory of reasoning, in order to be sufficient, was required to
-guard. And the demonstrations given by Plato in the latter half of
-the Parmenides are challenges of the same kind: only more
-ingenious, elaborate, and effective, than any of those (so far as
-we know them) proposed by the Megarics--by Zeno, or Eukleides, or
-Diodorus Kronus. The Platonic Parmenides here shows, that in
-regard to a particular question, those who believe the
-affirmative, those who believe the negative, and those who believe
-neither--can all furnish good reasons for their respective
-conclusions. In each case he gives the proof confidently as being
-good: and whether unimpeachable or not, it is certainly very
-ingenious and subtle. Such demonstrations are in the spirit of
-Sextus Empiricus, who rests his theory of scepticism upon the
-general fact, that there are opposite and contradictory
-conclusions, both of them supported by evidence equally good: the
-affirmative no more worthy of belief than the negative.[65] Zeno
-(or, as Plato calls him, the Eleatic Palamedes[66]) did not
-profess any systematic theory of scepticism; but he could prove by
-ingenious and varied dialectic, both the thesis and the antithesis
-on several points of philosophy, by reasons which few, if any,
-among his hearers could answer. In like manner the Platonic
-Parmenides enunciates his contradictory demonstrations as real
-logical problems, which must exercise the sagacity and hold back
-the forward impulse of an eager philosophical aspirant. Even if
-this dilemma respecting Unum Est and Unum non Est, be solved,
-Parmenides intimates that he has others in reserve: so that either
-no tenable positive result will ever be attained--or at least it
-will not be attained until after such an amount of sagacity and
-patient exercise as Sokrates himself declares to be hardly
-practicable.[67] Herein we may see the germ and premisses of that
-theory which was afterwards formally proclaimed by AEnesidemus and
-the professed Sceptics: the same holding back ([Greek: e)poche\]),
-and protest against precipitation in dogmatising,[68] which these
-latter converted into a formula and vindicated as a system.
-
-[Footnote 64: Among the commentators on the Categories of
-Aristotle, there were several whose principal object it was to
-propound all the most grave and troublesome difficulties which
-they could think of. Simplikius does not commend the style of
-these men, but he expresses his gratitude to them for the pains
-which they had taken in the exposition of the negative case, and
-for the stimulus and opportunity which they had thus administered
-to the work of affirmative exposition (Simplikius, Schol. ad
-Categ. Aristot. p. 40, a. 22-30; Schol. Brandis). David the
-Armenian, in his Scholia on the Categories (p. 27, b. 41,
-Brandis), defends the Topica of Aristotle as having been composed
-[Greek: gumnasi/as cha/rin, i(/na thlibome/ne e( psuche\ e)k to=n
-e)ph' e(ka/tera e)picheirema/ton a)pogenne/se| to\ te=s
-a)lethei/as pho=s.]]
-
-[Footnote 65: Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. i. 8-12. [Greek: E)/sti de\
-e( skeptike\ du/namis a)ntithetike\ phainome/non te kai\
-nooume/non kath' oi(onde/pote tro/pon, a)ph' e(=s e)rcho/metha,
-dia\ te\n e)n toi=s a)ntikeime/nois pra/gmasi kai\ lo/gois
-i)sosthe/neian, to\ me\n pro=ton ei)s e)poche\n to\ de\ meta\
-tou=to ei)s a)taraxi/an . . . _i)sosthe/neian_ de\ le/gomen te\n
-kata\ pi/stin kai\ a)pisti/an i)so/teta, o(s mede/na medeno\s
-prokei=sthai to=n machome/non lo/gon o(s pisto/teron . . .
-susta/seos de\ te=s skeptike=s e)stin a)rche\ ma/lista _to\ panti\
-lo/go| lo/gon i)/son a)ntikei=sthai_.]]
-
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 261 D.]
-
-[Footnote 67: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 C-D.]
-
-[Footnote 68: Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 20-212. [Greek: te\n to=n
-dogmatiko=n prope/teian--te\n dogmatike\n prope/teian.]]
-
-[Side-note: In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies,
-we ought to have before us the problems of the Megarics and
-others. Uselessness of searching for a positive result.]
-
-Schleiermacher has justly observed,[69] that in order to
-understand properly the dialectic manoeuvres of the Parmenides,
-we ought to have had before us the works of that philosopher
-himself, of Zeno, Melissus, Gorgias, and other sceptical reasoners
-of the age immediately preceding--which have unfortunately
-perished. Some reference to these must probably have been present
-to Plato in the composition of this dialogue.[70] At the same
-time, if we accept the dialogue as being (what it declares itself
-to be) a string of objections and dialectical problems, we shall
-take care not to look for any other sort of merit than what such a
-composition requires and admits. If the objections are forcible,
-the problems ingenious and perplexing, the purpose of the author
-is satisfied. To search in the dialogue for some positive result,
-not indeed directly enunciated but discoverable by groping and
-diving--would be to expect a species of fruit inconsistent with
-the nature of the tree. [Greek: Zeto=n eu(re/seis ou) r(o/don
-a)lla\ ba/ton.]
-
-[Footnote 69: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Parmen. pp. 97-99.]
-
-[Footnote 70: Indeed, the second demonstration, among the nine
-given by Parmenides (pp. 143 A, 155 C), coincides to a great
-degree with the conclusion which Zeno is represented as having
-maintained in his published dissertation (p. 127 E); and shows
-that the difficulties and contradictions belong to the world of
-invisible Ideas, as well as to that of sensible particulars, which
-Sokrates had called in question (p. 129 C-E).
-
-The Aristotelian treatise (whether by Aristotle, Theophrastus, or
-any other author) De Zenone, Melisso, Xenophane, et
-Gorgia--affords some curious comparisons with the Parmenides of Plato.
-Aristotel. p. 974 seq. Bekk.; also Fragmenta Philosophorum
-Graecorum, ed. Didot, pp. 278-309.]
-
-[Side-note: Assumptions of Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey
-the minimum of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these
-indeterminate predicates, Ens, Unum, &c.]
-
-It may indeed be useful for the critic to perform for himself the
-process which Parmenides intended Sokrates to perform; and to
-analyse these subtleties with a view to measure their bearing upon
-the work of dogmatic theorising. We see double and contradictory
-conclusions elicited, in four separate Antinomies, from the same
-hypothesis, by distinct chains of interrogatory deduction; each
-question being sufficiently plausible to obtain the acquiescence
-of the respondent. The two assumptions successively laid down by
-Parmenides as _principia_ for deduction--_Si Unum est_--_Si Unum
-non est_--convey the very minimum of determinate meaning. Indeed
-both words are essentially indeterminate. Both Unum and Ens are
-declared by Aristotle to be not univocal or generic words,[71]
-though at the same time not absolutely equivocal: but words
-bearing several distinct transitional meanings, derived either
-from each other, or from some common root, by an analogy more or
-less remote. Aristotle characterises in like manner all the most
-indeterminate predicates, which are not included in any one
-distinct category among the ten, but are made available to
-predication sometimes in one category, sometimes in another: such
-as Ens, Unum, Idem, Diversum, Contrarium, &c. Now in the Platonic
-Parmenides, the two first among these words are taken to form the
-proposition assumed as fundamental datum, and the remaining three
-are much employed in the demonstration: yet Plato neither notices
-nor discriminates their multifarious and fluctuating
-significations. Such contrast will be understood when we recollect
-that the purpose of the Platonic Parmenides is, to propound
-difficulties; while that of Aristotle is, not merely to propound,
-but also to assist in clearing them up.
-
-[Footnote 71: Aristot. Metaphys. iv. 1015-1017, ix. 1052, a. 15;
-Anal. Poster. ii. p. 92, b. 14. [Greek: to\ d' ei)=nai ou)k
-ou)si/a ou)deni/. ou) ga\r ge/nos to\ o)/n.]--Topica, iv. p. 127,
-a. 28. [Greek: plei/o ga\r ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena; oi(=on to\ o)\n
-kai\ to\ e(\n to=n pa=sin e(pome/non e)/stin], Physica, i. p.
-185, b. 6.
-
-Simplikius noted it as one among the differences between Plato and
-Aristotle--That Plato admitted Unum as having only one meaning,
-not being aware of the diversity of meanings which it bore; while
-Aristotle expressly pointed it out as a [Greek: pollako=s
-lego/menon] (Schol. ad Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 320, b. 3,
-Brandis). Aristotle farther remarks that Plato considered [Greek:
-to\ ge/nos] as [Greek: e(\n a)rithmo=|], and that this was an
-error; we ought rather to say that Plato did not clearly
-discriminate [Greek: e(\n a)rithmo=|] from [Greek: e(\n ei)/dei]
-(Aristot. Topic. vi. 143, b. 30).
-
-Simplikius farther remarks, that it was Aristotle who first
-rendered to Logic the important service of bringing out clearly
-and emphatically the idea of [Greek: to\ o(mo/numon]--the same
-word with several meanings either totally distinct and disparate,
-or ramifying in different directions from the same root, so that
-there came to be little or no affinity between many of them. It
-was Aristotle who first classified and named these distinctions
-([Greek: suno/numon--o(mo/numon], and the intermediate [Greek:
-kat' a)nalogi/an]), though they had been partially noticed by
-Plato and even by Sokrates. [Greek: e(/os A)ristote/lous ou)
-pa/mpan e)/kdelon e)=n to\ o(mo/numon; a)lla\ Pla/ton te e)/rxato
-peri\ tou/tou e)\ ma=llon e)kei/nou Sokra/tes], Schol. ad Aristot.
-Physic. p. 323, b. 24, Brandis.]
-
-[Side-note: In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in
-words is made to bear very different meanings.]
-
-Certainly, in Demonstrations 1 and 2 (as well as 4 and 5), the
-foundation assumed is in words the same proposition--_Si Unum
-est_: but we shall find this same proposition used in two very
-different senses. In the first Demonstration, the proposition is
-equivalent to _Si Unum est Unum_:[72] in the second, to _Si Unum
-est Ens_, or _Si Unum existit_. In the first the proposition is
-identical and the verb _est_ serves only as copula: in the second,
-the verb _est_ is not merely a copula but implies Ens as a
-predicate, and affirms existence. We might have imagined that the
-identical proposition--_Unum est Unum_--since it really affirms
-nothing--would have been barren of all consequences: and so indeed
-it is barren of all affirmative consequences. But Plato obtains
-for it one first step in the way of negative predicates--_Si Unum
-est Unum, Unum non est Multa_: and from hence he proceeds, by a
-series of gentle transitions ingeniously managed, to many other
-negative predications respecting the subject _Unum_. Since it is
-not Multa, it can have no parts, nor can it be a whole: it has
-neither beginning, middle, nor end: it has no boundary, or it is
-boundless: it has no figure, it is neither straight nor circular:
-it has therefore no place, being neither in itself, nor in
-anything else: it is neither in motion nor at rest: it is neither
-the same with anything else, nor the same with itself:[73] it is
-neither different from any thing else, nor different from itself:
-it is neither like, nor unlike, to itself, nor to anything else:
-it is neither equal, nor unequal, to itself nor to any thing else:
-it is neither older nor younger, nor of equal age, either with
-itself or with anything else: it exists therefore not in time, nor
-has it any participation with time: it neither has been nor will
-be, nor is: it does not exist in any way: it does not even exist
-so as to be Unum: you can neither name it, nor reason upon it, nor
-know it, nor perceive it, nor opine about it.
-
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 137 C, 142 B.]
-
-[Footnote 73: This part of the argument is the extreme of
-dialectic subtlety, p. 139 C-D-E.]
-
-[Side-note: First demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative
-conclusions. _Reductio ad Absurdum_, of the assumption--Unum non
-Multa.]
-
-All these are impossibilities (concludes Plato). We must therefore
-go back upon the fundamental principle from which we took our
-departure, in order to see whether we shall not obtain, on a
-second trial, any different result.[74]
-
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Parmenid. p. 142 A.]
-
-Here then is a piece of dialectic, put together with ingenuity,
-showing that everything can be denied, and that nothing can be
-affirmed of the subject--Unum. All this follows, if you concede
-the first step, that Unum is not Multa. If Unum be said to have
-any other attribute except that of being Unum, it would become at
-once Multa. It cannot even be declared to be either the same with
-itself, or different from any thing else; because Idem and
-Diversum are distinct natures from Unum, and if added to it would
-convert it into Multa.[75] Nay it cannot even be affirmed to be
-itself: it cannot be named or enunciated: if all predicates are
-denied, the subject is denied along with them: the subject is
-nothing but the sum total of its predicates--and when they are all
-withdrawn, no subject remains. As far as I can understand the
-bearing of this self-contradictory demonstration, it appears a
-_reductio ad absurdum_ of the proposition--_Unum is not Multa_.
-Now _Unum which is not Multa_ designates the [Greek: Au)to\-E(\n]
-or Unum Ideale; which Plato himself affirmed, and which Aristotle
-impugned.[76] If this be what is meant, the dialogue Parmenides
-would present here, as in other places, a statement of
-difficulties understood by Plato as attaching to his own
-doctrines.
-
-[Footnote 75: This is the main point of Demonstration 1, and is
-stated pp. 139 D, 140 A, compared with p. 137 C.]
-
-[Footnote 76: Aristot. Metaph. A. 987, b. 20; A. 992, a. 8; B.
-1001, a. 27; I. 1053, b. 18. Some ancient expositors thought that
-the purpose of Plato in the Parmenides was to demonstrate this
-[Greek: Au)to\-E(\n]; see Schol. ad Aristot. Metaph. p. 786, a.
-10, Brandis.
-
-It is not easy to find any common bearing between the
-demonstrations given in this dialogue respecting [Greek: E(\n] and
-[Greek: Polla\]--and the observations which Plato makes in the
-Philebus upon [Greek: E(\n] and [Greek: Polla/]. Would he mean to
-include the demonstrations which we read in the Parmenides, in the
-category of what he calls in Philebus "childish, easy, and
-irrational debates on that vexed question?" (Plato, Philebus, p.
-14 D). Hardly: for they are at any rate most elaborate as well as
-ingenious and suggestive. Yet neither do they suit the description
-which he gives in Philebus of the genuine, serious, and difficult
-debates on the same question.]
-
-[Side-note: Second Demonstration.]
-
-Parmenides now proceeds to his second demonstration: professing to
-take up again the same hypothesis--_Si Unum est_--from which he
-had started in the first[77]--but in reality taking up a different
-hypothesis under the same words. In the first hypothesis, _Si Unum
-est_, was equivalent to, _Si Unum est Unum_: nothing besides
-_Unum_ being taken into the reasoning, and _est_ serving merely as
-copula. In the second, _Si Unum est_, is equivalent to, _Si Unum
-est Ens_, or exists: so that instead of the isolated _Unum_, we
-have now _Unum Ens_.[78] Here is a duality consisting of _Unum and
-Ens_: which two are considered as separate or separable factors,
-coalescing to form the whole _Unum Ens_, each of them being a part
-thereof. But each of these parts is again dual, containing both
-_Unum and Ens_: so that each part may be again divided into lesser
-parts, each of them alike dual: and so on ad infinitum. _Unum Ens_
-thus contains an infinite number of parts, or is _Multa_.[79] But
-even _Unum_ itself (Parmenides argues), if we consider it
-separately from _Ens_ in which it participates, is not _Unum_
-alone, but _Multa_ also. For it is different from _Ens_, and _Ens_
-is different from it. _Unum_ therefore is not merely _Unum_ but
-also _Diversum_: _Ens_ also is not merely _Ens_ but _Diversum_.
-Now when we speak of _Unum_ and _Ens_--of _Unum_ and _Diversum_--or
-of _Ens_ and _Diversum_--we in each case speak of two distinct
-things, each of which is _Unum_. Since each is _Unum_, the two
-things become three--_Ens_, _Diversum_, _Unum_--_Unum_,
-_Diversum_, _Unum_--_Unum_ being here taken twice. We thus arrive
-at two and three--twice and thrice--odd and even--in short,
-number, with its full extension and properties. Unum therefore is
-both Unum and Multa--both Totum and Partes--both finite and
-infinite in multitude.[80]
-
-[Footnote 77: Plato, Parmenid. p. 142 A. [Greek: Bou/lei ou)=n
-e)pi\ te\n u(po/thesin pa/lin e)x a)rche=s e)pane/lthomen, e)a/n
-ti e(mi=n e)paniou=sin a)lloi=on phane=|?]]
-
-[Footnote 78: This shifting of the real hypothesis, though the
-terms remain unchanged, is admitted by implication a little
-afterwards, p. 142 B. [Greek: _nu=n de\_ ou)ch au(/te e)/stin e(
-u(po/thesis, _ei) e(\n e(\n_, ti/ chre\ sumbai/nein, a)ll' _ei)
-e(\n e)/stin_.]]
-
-[Footnote 79: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 142-143. This is exactly what
-Sokrates in the early part of the dialogue (p. 129 B-D) had
-pronounced to be utterly inadmissible, _viz._: That [Greek: o(\
-e)/stin e(\n] should be [Greek: polla\]--that [Greek: o(\ e)/stin
-o(/moion] should be [Greek: a)no/moion]. The essential
-characteristic of the Platonic Ideas is here denied. However, it
-appears to me that Plato here reasons upon two contradictory
-assumptions; first, that _Unum Ens_ is a total composed of two
-parts separately assignable--_Unum_ and _Ens_; next, that _Unum_
-is not assignable separately from _Ens_, nor _Ens_ from _Unum_.
-Proceeding upon the first, he declares that the division must be
-carried on ad infinitum, because you can never reach either the
-separate _Ens_ or the separate _Unum_. But these two assumptions
-cannot be admitted both together. Plato must make his election;
-either he takes the first, in which case the total Unum Ens is
-divisible, and its two factors, Unum and Ens, can be assigned
-separately; or he takes the second, in which case _Unum_ and _Ens_
-cannot be assigned separately--are not distinguishable factors,--so
-that _Unum Ens_ instead of being infinitely divisible, is not
-divisible at all.
-
-The reasoning as it now stands is, in my judgment, fallacious.]
-
-[Footnote 80: Plato, Parmen. pp. 144 A-E, 145 A.]
-
-[Side-note: It ends in demonstrating _Both_, of that which the
-first Demonstration had demonstrated _Neither_.]
-
-Parmenides proceeds to show that Unum has beginning, middle, and
-end--together with some figure, straight or curved: and that it is
-both in itself, and in other things: that it is always both in
-motion and at rest:[81] that it is both the same with itself and
-different from itself--both the same with Caetera, and different
-from Caetera:[82] both like to itself, and unlike to itself--both
-like to Caetera, and unlike to Caetera:[83] that it both touches,
-and does not touch, both itself and Caetera:[84] that it is both
-equal, greater, and less, in number, as compared with itself and
-as compared with Caetera:[85] that it is both older than itself,
-younger than itself, and of the same age with itself--both older
-than Caetera, younger than Caetera, and of the same age as
-Caetera--also that it is not older nor younger either than itself or
-than Caetera:[86] that it grows both older and younger than itself,
-and than Caetera.[87] Lastly, Unum was, is, and will be; it has been,
-is, and will be generated: it has had, has now, and will have,
-attributes and predicates: it can be named, and can be the object
-of perception, conception, opinion, reasoning, and cognition.[88]
-
-[Footnote 81: Plato, Parmenid. p. 146 A-B.]
-
-[Footnote 82: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 146-147 C.]
-
-[Footnote 83: Plato, Parmenid. p. 148 A-D.]
-
-[Footnote 84: Plato, Parmenid. p. 149 A-D.]
-
-[Footnote 85: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 150-151 D.]
-
-[Footnote 86: Plato, Parmen. pp. 152-153-154 A.]
-
-[Footnote 87: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 154 B, 155 C. [Greek: kata\ de\
-pa/nta tau=ta, to\ e(\n au)to/ te au(tou= kai\ to=n a)/llon
-presbu/teron kai\ neo/teron e)/sti te kai\ gi/gnetai, kai\ ou(/te
-presbu/teron ou(/te neo/teron ou(/t' e)/stin ou(/te gi/gnetai
-ou(/te au(tou= ou(/te to=n a)/llon.]]
-
-[Footnote 88: Plato, Parmenid. p. 155 C-D.]
-
-Here Parmenides finishes the long Demonstratio Secunda, which
-completes the first Antinomy. The last conclusion of all, with
-which it winds up, is the antithesis of that with which the first
-Demonstration wound up: affirming (what the conclusion of the
-first had denied) that Unum is thinkable, perceivable, nameable,
-knowable. Comparing the second Demonstration with the first, we
-see--That the first, taking its initial step, with a negative
-proposition, carries us through a series of conclusions every one
-of which is negative (like those of the second figure of the
-Aristotelian syllogism):--That whereas the conclusions professedly
-established in the first Demonstration are all in _Neither_ (Unum
-is neither in itself nor in any thing else--neither at rest nor in
-motion--neither the same with itself nor different from itself,
-&c.), the conclusions of the second Demonstration are all in
-_Both_ (Unum is both in motion and at rest, both in itself and in
-other things, both the same with itself and different from
-itself):--That in this manner, while the first Demonstration
-denies both of two opposite propositions, the second affirms them
-both.
-
-[Side-note: Startling paradox--Open offence against logical
-canon--No logical canon had then been laid down.]
-
-Such a result has an air of startling paradox. We find it shown,
-respecting various pairs of contradictory propositions, first,
-that both are false--next, that both are true. This offends doubly
-against the logical canon, which declares, that of two
-contradictory propositions, one must be true, the other must be
-false. We must remember, that in the Platonic age, there existed
-no systematic logic--no analysis or classification of
-propositions--no recognised distinction between such as were
-contrary, and such as were contradictory. The Platonic Parmenides
-deals with propositions which are, to appearance at least,
-contradictory: and we are brought, by two different roads, first
-to the rejection of both, next to the admission of both.[89]
-
-[Footnote 89: Prantl (in his Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. s. 3,
-pp. 70-71-73) maintains, if I rightly understand him, not only
-that Plato did not adopt the _principium identitatis et
-contradictionis_ as the basis of his reasonings, but that one of
-Plato's express objects was to demonstrate the contrary of it,
-partly in the Philebus, but especially in the Parmenides:--
-
-"Eine arge Taeuschung ist es, zu glauben, dass das principium
-identitatis et contradictionis oberstes logisches Princip des
-Plato sei . . Es ist gerade eine Hauptaufgabe, welche sich Plato
-stellen musste, die Coexistenz der Gegensaetze nachzuweisen, wie
-diess bekanntlich im Philebus und _besonders im Parmenides_
-geschieht."
-
-According to this view, the Antinomies in the Parmenides are all
-of them good proofs, and the conclusions of all of them, summed up
-as they are in the final sentence of the dialogue, constitute an
-addition to the positive knowledge of Sokrates. I confess that
-this to me is unintelligible. I understand these Antinomies as
-[Greek: a)pori/ai] to be cleared up, but in no other character.
-
-Prantl speaks (p. 73) of "die antinomische Begruendung der
-Ideenlehre im Parmenides," &c. This is the same language as that
-used by Zeller, upon which I have already remarked.]
-
-[Side-note: Demonstration third--Attempt to reconcile the
-contradiction of Demonstrations I. and II.]
-
-How can this be possible? How can these four propositions all be
-true--_Unum est Unum_--_Unum est Multa_--_Unum non est
-Unum_--_Unum non est Multa_? Plato suggests a way out of the difficulty,
-in that which he gives as Demonstration 3. It has been shown that
-Unum "partakes of time"--was, is, and will be. The propositions
-are all true, but true at different times: one at this time,
-another at that time.[90] Unum acquires and loses existence,
-essence, and other attributes: _now_, it exists and is
-Unum--_before_, it did not exist and was not Unum: so too it is
-alternately like and unlike, in motion and at rest. But how is
-such alternation or change intelligible? At each time, whether
-present or past, it must be either in motion or at rest: at no
-time, neither present nor past, can it be _neither_ in motion
-_nor_ at rest. It cannot, while in motion, change to rest--nor,
-while at rest, change to motion. No time can be assigned for the
-change: neither the present, nor the past, nor the future: how
-then can the change occur at all?[91]
-
-[Footnote 90: This is a distinction analogous to that which Plato
-points out in the Sophistes (pp. 242-243) between the theories of
-Herakleitus and Empedokles.]
-
-[Footnote 91: Plato, Parmenid. p. 156.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's imagination of the Sudden or
-Instantaneous--Breaches or momentary stoppages in the course of time.]
-
-To this question the Platonic Parmenides finds an answer in what
-he calls the _Sudden_ or the _Instantaneous_: an anomalous nature
-which lies out of, or apart from, the course of time, being
-neither past, present, nor future. That which changes, changes at
-once and suddenly: at an instant when it is neither in motion nor
-at rest. This _Suddenly_ is a halt or break in the flow of
-time:[92] an extra-temporal condition, in which the subject has no
-existence, no attributes--though it revives again forthwith
-clothed with its new attributes: a point of total negation or
-annihilation, during which the subject with all its attributes
-disappears. At this interval (the _Suddenly_) all predicates may
-be truly denied, but none can be truly affirmed.[93] Unum is
-neither at rest, nor in motion--neither like nor unlike--neither
-the same with itself nor different from itself--neither Unum nor
-Multa. Both predicates and Subject vanish. Thus all the negations
-of the first Demonstration are justified. Immediately before the
-_Suddenly_, or point of change, Unum was in motion--immediately
-after the change, it is at rest: immediately before, it was
-like--equal--the same with itself--Unum, &c.--immediately after,
-it is unlike--unequal--different from itself--Multa, &c. And thus
-the double and contradictory affirmative predications, of which the
-second Demonstration is composed, are in their turn made good, as
-successive in time. This discovery of the extra-temporal point
-_Suddenly_, enables Parmenides to uphold both the double negative
-of the first Demonstration, and the double affirmative of the
-second.
-
-[Footnote 92: Plato, Parmenid. p. 156 E. [Greek: a)ll' e(
-_e)xai/phnes au(/te phu/sis a)/topo/s tis e)gka/thetai metaxu\
-te=s kine/seo/s te kai\ sta/seos_, e)n chro/no| ou)deni\ ou)=sa,
-kai\ ei)s tau/ten de\ kai\ e)k tau/tes to/ te kinou/menon
-metaba/llei e)pi\ to\ e(sta/nai, kai\ to\ e(sto\s e)pi\ to\
-kinei=sthai. . . . kai\ to\ e(\n de/, ei)/per e(/steke/ te kai\
-kinei=tai, metaba/lloi a)\n e)ph' e(ka/tera; mo/nos ga\r a)\n
-ou(/tos a)mpho/tera poioi=; metaba/llon d' e)xai/phnes
-metaba/llei, kai\ o(/te metaba/llei, e)n ou)deni\ chro/no| a)\n
-ei)/e, ou)de\ kinoi=t' a)\n to/te, ou)d' a)\n stai/e.]
-
-[Greek: To\ e)xai/phnes--e( e)xai/phnes phu/sis a)/topo/s
-tis]--may be compared to an infinitesimal; analogous to what is
-recognised in the theory of the differential calculus.]
-
-[Footnote 93: This appears to be an illustration of the doctrine
-which Lassalle ascribes to Herakleitus; perpetual implication of
-negativity and positivity--des Nichtseins mit dem Sein: perpetual
-absorption of each particular into the universal; and perpetual
-reappearance as an opposite particular. See the two elaborate
-volumes of Lassalle upon Herakleitus, especially i. p. 358, ii. p.
-258. He scarcely however takes notice of the Platonic Parmenides.
-
-Some of the Stoics considered [Greek: to\ nu=n] as [Greek:
-mede/n]--and nothing in time to be real except [Greek: to\
-paro|cheko\s] and [Greek: to\ me/llon] (Plutarch, De Commun.
-Notitiis contra Stoicos, p. 1081 D).]
-
-[Side-note: Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or
-Antinomies in each, the first proves the Neither, the second
-proves the Both.]
-
-The theory here laid down in the third Demonstration respecting
-this extra-temporal point--the _Suddenly_--deserves all the more
-attention, because it applies not merely to the first and second
-Demonstration which precede it, but also to the fourth and fifth,
-the sixth and seventh, the eighth and ninth, which follow it. I
-have already observed, that the first and second Demonstration
-form a corresponding pair, branching off from the same root or
-hypothetical proposition (at least the same in terms), respecting
-the subject _Unum_; and destined to prove, one the Neither, the
-other the Both, of several different predicates. So also the
-fourth and fifth form a pair applying to the subject Caetera; and
-destined to prove, that from the same hypothetical root--_Si Unum
-est_--we can deduce the Neither as well as the Both, of various
-predicates of Caetera. When we pass on to the four last
-Demonstrations, we find that in all four, the hypothesis _Si Unum
-non est_ is substituted for that of _Si Unum est_: but the
-parallel couples, with the corresponding purpose, are still kept
-up. The sixth and seventh apply to the subject _Unum_, and
-demonstrate respecting that subject (proceeding from the
-hypothesis _Si Unum non est_) first the _Both_, then the
-_Neither_, of various predicates: the eighth and ninth arrive at
-the same result, respecting the subject _Caetera_. And a sentence
-at the close sums up in few words the result of all the four pairs
-(1-2, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, that is, of all the Demonstrations excepting
-the third)--the Neither and the Both respecting all of them.
-
-[Side-note: The third Demonstration is mediatorial but not
-satisfactory--The hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found
-no favour.]
-
-To understand these nine Demonstrations properly, therefore, we
-ought to consider eight among them (1-2, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9) as four
-Antinomies, or couples establishing dialectic contradictions: and
-the third as a mediator satisfactory between the
-couples--announced as if it reconciled the contradictions of the first
-Antinomy, and capable of being adapted, in the same character with
-certain modifications, to the second, third, and fourth Antinomy.
-Whether it reconciles them successfully--in other words, whether
-the third Demonstration will itself hold good--is a different
-question. It will be found to involve the singular and paradoxical
-(Plato's own phrase) doctrine of the extra-temporal
-_Suddenly_--conceiving Time as a Discretum and not a Continuum. This
-doctrine is intended by Plato here as a means of rendering the fact
-of change logically conceivable and explicable. He first states
-briefly the difficulty (which we know to have been largely
-insisted on by Diodorus Kronus and other Megarics) of logically
-explaining the fact of change--and then enunciates this doctrine
-as the solution. We plainly see that it did not satisfy
-others--for the puzzle continued to be a puzzle long after--and that
-it did not even satisfy Plato, except at the time when he composed
-the Parmenides--since neither the doctrine itself (the
-extra-temporal break or transition) nor the very peculiar phrase
-in which it is embodied ([Greek: to\ e)xai/phnes, a)/topo/s tis
-phu/sis]) occur in any of his other dialogues. If the doctrine
-were really tenable, it would have been of use in dialectic, and
-as such, would have been called in to remove the theoretical
-difficulties raised among dialectical disputants, respecting time
-and motion. Yet Plato does not again advert to it, either in
-Sophistes or Timaeus, in both of which there is special demand for
-it.[94] Aristotle, while he adopts a doctrine like it (yet without
-employing the peculiar phrase [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnes]) to explain
-qualitative change, does not admit the same either as to
-quantitative change, or as to local motion, or as to generation
-and destruction.[95] The doctrine served the purpose of the
-Platonic Parmenides, as ingenious, original, and provocative to
-intellectual effort: but it did not acquire any permanent footing
-in Grecian dialectics.
-
-[Footnote 94: Steinhart represents this idea of [Greek: to\
-e)xai/phnes]--the extra-temporal break or zero of transition--as
-an important progress made by Plato, compared with the Theaetetus,
-because it breaks down the absoluten Gegensatz between Sein and
-Werden, Ruhe and Bewegung (Einleitung zum Parmen. p. 309).
-
-Surely, if Plato had considered it a progress, we should have seen
-the same idea repeated in various other dialogues--which is not
-the case.]
-
-[Footnote 95: Aristotel. Physic. p. 235, b. 32, with the Scholion
-of Simplikius, p. 410, b. 20, Brandis.
-
-The discussion occupies two or three pages of Aristotle's Physica.
-In regard to [Greek: a)lloi/osis] or qualitative change, he
-recognised what he called [Greek: a)thro/an metabole/n]--a change
-_all at once_, which occupied no portion of time. It is plain,
-however, that even his own scholars Theophrastus and Eudemus had
-great difficulty in accepting the doctrine; see Scholia, pp.
-409-410-411, Brandis.]
-
-The two last Antinomies, or four last Demonstrations, have, in
-common, for their point of departure, the negative proposition,
-_Si Unum non est_: and are likewise put together in parallel
-couples (6-7, 8-9), a Demonstration and a Counter-Demonstration--a
-Both and a Neither: first with reference to the subject
-_Unum_--next with reference to the subject _Caetera_.
-
-[Side-note: Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI.
-and VII.]
-
-_Si Unum est_--_Si Unum non est_. Even from such a proposition as
-the first of these, we might have thought it difficult to deduce
-any string of consequences--which Plato has already done: from
-such a proposition as the second, not merely difficult, but
-impossible. Nevertheless the ingenious dialectic of Plato
-accomplishes the task, and elicits from each proposition a Both,
-and a Neither, respecting several predicates of Unum as well as of
-Caetera. When you say _Unum non est_ (so argues the Platonic
-Parmenides in Demonstration 6), you deny existence respecting
-Unum: but the proposition _Unum non est_, is distinguishable from
-_Magnitudo non est_--_Parvitudo non est_--and such like:
-propositions wherein the subject is different, though the
-predicate is the same: so that _Unum non Ens_ is still a Something
-knowable, and distinguishable from other things--a logical subject
-of which various other predicates may be affirmed, though the
-predicate of existence cannot be affirmed.[96] It is both like and
-unlike, equal and unequal--like and equal to itself unlike and
-unequal to other things.[97] These its predicates being all true,
-are also real existences: so that Unum partakes _quodam modo_ in
-existence: though _Unum_ be _non-Ens_, nevertheless, _Unum non-Ens
-est_. Partaking thus both of non-existence and of existence, it
-changes: it both moves and is at rest: it is generated and
-destroyed, yet is also neither generated nor destroyed.[98]
-
-[Footnote 96: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 160-161 A. [Greek: ei)=nai me\n
-de\ to=| e(ni\ ou)ch oi(=o/n te, ei)/per ge me\ e)/sti, mete/chein
-de\ pollo=n ou)de\n kolu/ei, a)lla\ kai\ a)na/gke, ei)/per to/ ge
-e(\n e)kei=no kai\ me\ a)/llo me\ e)/stin. ei) me/ntoi me/te to\
-e(\n me/t' _e)kei=no_ me\ e)/stai, a)lla\ peri\ a)/llou tou o(
-lo/gos, ou)de\ phthe/ggesthai dei= ou)de/n; ei) de\ to\ e(\n
-e)kei=no kai\ me\ a)/llo u(pokei=tai me\ ei)=nai, kai\ tou=
-_e)kei/nou_ kai\ a)/llon pollo=n a)na/gke au)to=| metei=nai.]]
-
-[Footnote 97: Plato, Parmenid. p. 161 C-D.]
-
-[Footnote 98: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 162-163 A.
-
-The steps by which these conclusions are made out are extremely
-subtle, and hardly intelligible to me.]
-
-Having thus deduced from the fundamental principle this string of
-Both opposite predicates, the Platonic Parmenides reverts (in
-Demonstration 7) to the same principium (_Si Unum non est_) to
-deduce by another train of reasoning the Neither of these
-predicates. When you say that _Unum non est_, you must mean that
-it does not partake of existence in any way--absolutely and
-without reserve. It therefore neither acquires nor loses
-existence: it is neither generated nor destroyed: it is neither in
-motion nor at rest: it partakes of nothing existent: it is neither
-equal nor unequal--neither like nor unlike--neither great nor
-little--neither this, nor that: neither the object of perception,
-nor of knowledge, nor of opinion, nor of naming, nor of
-debate.[99]
-
-[Footnote 99: Plato, Parmenid. pp. 163-164 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine
-of Parmenides.]
-
-These two last counter-demonstrations (6 and 7), forming the third
-Antinomy, deserve attention in this respect--That the seventh is
-founded upon the genuine Parmenidean or Eleatic doctrine about
-Non-Ens, as not merely having no attributes, but as being
-unknowable, unperceivable, unnameable: while the sixth is founded
-upon a different apprehension of Non-Ens, which is explained and
-defended by Plato in the Sophistes, as a substitute for, and
-refutation of, the Eleatic doctrine.[100] According to Number 7,
-when you deny, of Unum, the predicate existence, you deny of it
-also all other predicates: and the name Unum is left without any
-subject to apply to. This is the Eleatic dogma. Unum having been
-declared to be Non-Ens, is (like Non-Ens) neither knowable nor
-nameable. According to Number 6, the proposition _Unum est
-non-Ens_, does not carry with it any such consequences. Existence
-is only one predicate, which may be denied of the subject Unum, but
-which, when denied, does not lead to the denial of all other
-predicates--nor, therefore, to the loss of the subject itself.
-Unum still remains Unum, knowable, and different from other
-things. Upon this first premiss are built up several other
-affirmations; so that we thus arrive circuitously at the
-affirmation of existence, in a certain way: _Unum_, though
-non-existent, does nevertheless exist _quodam modo_. This coincides
-with that which the Eleatic stranger seeks to prove in the
-Sophistes, against Parmenides.
-
-[Footnote 100: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 258-259.]
-
-[Side-note: Demonstrations VI. and VII. considered--Unwarrantable
-steps in the reasoning--The fundamental premiss differently
-interpreted, though the same in words.]
-
-If we compare the two foregoing counter-demonstrations (7 and 6),
-we shall see that the negative results of the seventh follow
-properly enough from the assumed premisses: but that the
-affirmative results of the sixth are not obtained without very
-unwarrantable jumps in the reasoning, besides its extreme
-subtlety. But apart from this defect, we farther remark that here
-also (as in Numbers 1 and 2) the fundamental principle assumed is
-in terms the same, in signification materially different. The
-signification of _Unum non est_, as it is construed in Number 7,
-is the natural one, belonging to the words: but as construed in
-Number 6, the meaning of the predicate is altogether effaced (as
-it had been before in Number 1): we cannot tell what it is which
-is really denied about Unum. As, in Number 1, the proposition
-_Unum est_ is so construed as to affirm nothing except _Unum est
-Unum_--so in Number 7, the proposition _Unum non est_ is so
-construed as to deny nothing except _Unum non est Unum_, yet
-conveying along with such denial a farther affirmation--_Unum non
-est Unum, sed tamen est aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis_.[101]
-Here this _aliquid scibile_ is assumed as a substratum underlying
-_Unum_, and remaining even when Unum is taken away: contrary to
-the opinion--that Unum was a separate nature and the fundamental
-Subject of all--which Aristotle announces as having been held by
-Plato.[102] There must be always some meaning (the Platonic
-Parmenides argues) attached to the word Unum, even when you talk
-of _Unum non Ens_: and that meaning is equivalent to _Aliquid
-scibile, differens ab aliis_. From this he proceeds to evolve,
-step by step, though often in a manner obscure and inconclusive,
-his series of contradictory affirmations respecting Unum.
-
-[Footnote 101: Plato, Parmenid. p. 160 C.]
-
-[Footnote 102: Aristot. Metaph. B. 1001, a. 6-20.]
-
-The last couple of Demonstrations--8 and 9--composing the fourth
-Antinomy, are in some respects the most ingenious and singular of
-all the nine. Si _Unum non est_, what is true about Caetera? The
-eighth demonstrates the _Both_ of the affirmative predicates, the
-ninth proves the _Neither_.
-
-[Side-note: Demonstrations VIII. and IX.--Analysis of Demonstration
-VIII.]
-
-Si _Unum non est_ (is the argument of the eighth), Caetera must
-nevertheless somehow still be Caetera: otherwise you could not talk
-about Caetera.[103] (This is an argument like that in Demonstration
-6: What is talked about must exist, somehow.) But if Caetera can be
-named and talked about, they must be different from something,--and
-from something, which is also different from them. What can
-this Something be? Not certainly Unum: for Unum, by the
-Hypothesis, does not exist, and cannot therefore be the term of
-comparison. _Caetera_ therefore must be different among themselves
-and from each other. But they cannot be compared with each other
-by units: for Unum does not exist. They must therefore be compared
-with each other by heaps or multitudes: each of which will appear
-at first sight to be an unit, though it be not an unit in reality.
-There will be numbers of such heaps, each in appearance one,
-though not in reality:[104] numbers odd and even, great and
-little, in appearance: heaps appearing to be greater and less than
-each other, and equal to each other, though not being really so.
-Each of these heaps will appear to have a beginning, middle, and
-end, yet will not really have any such: for whenever you grasp any
-one of them in your thoughts, there will appear another beginning
-before the beginning,[105] another end after the end, another
-centre more centrical than the centre,--minima ever decreasing
-because you cannot reach any stable unit. Each will be a heap
-without any unity; looking like one, at a distance,--but when you
-come near, each a boundless and countless multitude. They will
-thus appear one and many, like and unlike, equal and unequal, at
-rest and moving, separate and coalescing: in short, invested with
-an indefinite number of opposite attributes.[106]
-
-[Footnote 103: Plato, Parmenid. p. 164 B. [Greek: A)/lla me/n pou
-dei= au)ta\ ei)=nai; ei) ga\r mede\ a)/lla e)sti/n, ou)k a)\n
-peri\ to=n a)/llon le/goito.]]
-
-[Footnote 104: Plato, Parmenid. p. 164 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n polloi\
-o)/gkoi e)/santai, ei)=s e(/kastos phaino/menos, o)\n de\ ou)/,
-ei)/per e(\n me\ e)/stai. Ou(/tos.]]
-
-[Footnote 105: Plato, Parmenid. p. 165 A. [Greek: O(/ti a)ei\
-au)to=n o(/tan ti/s ti la/be| te=| dianoi/a| o(/s ti tou/ton o(/n,
-pro/ te te=s a)rche=s a)/lle a)ei\ phai/netai a)rche/, meta/ te
-te\n teleute\n e(te/ra u(poleipome/ne teleute/, e(/n te to=|
-me/so| a)/lla mesai/tera tou= me/sou, smikro/tera de\ dia\ to\ me\
-du/nasthai e(no\s au)to=n e(ka/stou lamba/nesthai, a)/te ou)k
-o)/ntos tou= e(no/s.]]
-
-[Footnote 106: Plato, Parmenid. p. 165 E. Compare p. 158 E.
-[Greek: toi=s a)/llois de\ tou= e(no\s. . . . e( de\ au)to=n
-phu/sis kath' e(auta\ a)peiri/an (pa/resche).]]
-
-[Side-note: Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian.]
-
-This Demonstration 8, with its strange and subtle chain of
-inferences, purporting to rest upon the admission of Caetera
-without Unum, brings out the antithesis of the Apparent and the
-Real, which had not been noticed in the preceding demonstrations.
-Demonstration 8 is in its character Zenonian. It probably
-coincides with the proof which Zeno is reported (in the earlier
-half of this dialogue) to have given against the existence of any
-real Multa. If you assume Multa (Zeno argued), they must be both
-like and unlike, and invested with many other opposite attributes;
-but this is impossible; therefore the assumption is untrue.[107]
-Those against whom Zeno reasoned, contended for real Multa, and
-against a real Unum. Zeno probably showed, and our eighth
-Demonstration here shows also,--that Multa under this supposition
-are nothing real, but an assemblage of indefinite, ever-variable,
-contradictory appearances: an [Greek: A)/peiron], Infinite, or
-Chaos: an object not real and absolute, but relative and variable
-according to the point of view of the subject.
-
-[Footnote 107: Plato, Parmenid. p. 127 E; compare this with the
-close of the eighth Demonstration, p. 165 E--[Greek: ei) e(no\s
-me\ o)/ntos polla\ e)/stin].]
-
-[Side-note: Demonstration IX. _Neither_ following _Both_.]
-
-To the eighth Demonstration, ingenious as it is, succeeds a
-countervailing reversal in the ninth: the Neither following the
-Both. The fundamental supposition is in terms the same. _Si Unum
-non est_, what is to become of _Caetera_? _Caetera_ are not _Unum_:
-yet neither are they _Multa_: for if there were any Multa, Unum
-would be included in them. If none of the Multa were Unum, all of
-them would be nothing at all, and there would be no Multa. If
-therefore Unum be not included in Caetera, Caetera would be neither
-Unum nor Multa: nor would they appear to be either Unum or Multa:
-for Caetera can have no possible communion with Non-Entia: nor can
-any of the Non-Entia be present along with any of Caetera--since
-Non-Entia have no parts. We cannot therefore conceive or represent
-to ourselves Non-Ens as along with or belonging to Caetera.
-Therefore, _Si Unum non est_, nothing among _Caetera_ is conceived
-either as Unum or as Multa: for to conceive Multa without Unum is
-impossible. It thus appears, _Si Unum non est_, that Caetera
-neither are Unum nor Multa. Nor are they conceived either as Unum
-or Multa--either as like or as unlike--either as the same or as
-different--either as in contact or as apart.--In short, all those
-attributes which in the last preceding Demonstration were shown
-_to belong to them_ in appearance, are now shown _not to belong_
-to them either in appearance or in reality.[108]
-
-[Footnote 108: Plato, Parmenid. p. 166 A-B. [Greek: E(\n a)/ra ei)
-me\ e)/sti, ta)/lla ou)/te e)/stin ou)/te doxa/zetai e(\n ou)/te
-polla/. . . . Ou)/d' a)/ra o(/moia ou)de\ a)no/moia. . . . Ou)de\
-me\n ta\ au)ta/ ge ou)d' e(/tera, ou)de\ a(pto/mena ou)de\
-chori/s, _ou)de\ a)/ll' o(/sa e)n toi=s pro/sthen die/lthomen_]
-(compare [Greek: dielthei=n], p. 165 E) [Greek: _o(s phaino/mena
-au)ta/, tou/ton ou)/te ti e)/stin ou)/te phai/netai ta)/lla, e(\n
-ei) me\ e)/stin_.]]
-
-[Side-note: Concluding words of the Parmenides--Declaration that he
-has demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different
-propositions.]
-
-Here we find ourselves at the close of the Parmenides. Plato
-announces his purpose to be, to elicit contradictory conclusions,
-by different trains of reasoning, out of the same fundamental
-assumption.[109] He declares, in the concluding words, that--on
-the hypothesis of _Unum est_, as well as on that of _Unum non
-est_--he has succeeded in demonstrating the Both and the Neither
-of many distinct propositions, respecting Unum and respecting
-Caetera.
-
-[Footnote 109: Compare, with the passage cited in the last note,
-another passage, p. 159 B, at the beginning of Demonstration 5.
-
-[Greek: Ou)kou=n tau=ta me\n e)/de e)o=men o(s phanera/,
-e)piskopo=men de\ pa/lin, e(\n ei) e)/stin, a)=ra _kai\ ou)ch
-ou(/tos e)/chei ta)/lla tou= e(no\s e)\ ou(/to mo/non_?]
-
-Here the purpose to prove [Greek: _ou)ch ou(/tos_], immediately on
-the heels of [Greek: _ou(/tos_], is plainly enunciated.]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an
-enigma of the Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma
-adapted its conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not.]
-
-The close of the Parmenides, as it stands here, may be fairly
-compared to the enigma announced by Plato in his Republic--"A man
-and no man, struck and did not strike, with a stone and no stone,
-a bird and no bird, sitting upon wood and no wood".[110] This is
-an enigma, propounded for youthful auditors to guess: stimulating
-their curiosity, and tasking their intelligence to find it out. As
-far as I can see, the puzzling antinomies in the Parmenides have
-no other purpose. They drag back the forward and youthful Sokrates
-from affirmative dogmatism to negative doubt and embarrassment.
-There is however this difference between the enigma in the
-Republic, and the Antinomies in the Parmenides. The constructor of
-the enigma had certainly a preconceived solution to which he
-adapted the conditions of his problem: whereas we have no
-sufficient ground for asserting that the author of the Antinomies
-had any such solution present or operative in his mind. How much
-of truth Plato may himself have recognised, or may have wished
-others to recognise, in them, we have no means of determining. We
-find in them many equivocal propositions and unwarranted
-inferences--much blending of truth with error, intentionally or
-unintentionally. The veteran Parmenides imposes the severance of
-the two, as a lesson, upon his youthful hearers Sokrates and
-Aristoteles.
-
-[Footnote 110: Plato, Republ. v. 479 C. The allusion was to an
-eunuch knocking down a bat seated upon a reed. [Greek: Ai)no/s tis
-e)/stin o(s a)ne/r te kou)k a)ne/r, O)/rnitha/ te kou)k o)/rnith'
-i)do/n te kou)k i)do/n, E)pi\ xu/lou te kou) xu/lou katheme/nen
-Li/tho| te kou) li/tho| ba/loi te kou) ba/loi.]
-
-I read with astonishment the amount of positive philosophy which a
-commentator like Steinhart extracts from the concluding enigma of
-the Parmenides, and which he even affirms that no attentive reader
-of the dialogue can possibly miss (Einleitung zum Parmenides, pp.
-302-303).]
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XXVIII.
-
-THEAETETUS.
-
-
-[Side-note: Subjects and personages in the Theaetetus.]
-
-In this dialogue, as in the Parmenides immediately preceding,
-Plato dwells upon the intellectual operations of mind: introducing
-the ethical and emotional only in a partial and subordinate way.
-The main question canvassed is, What is Knowledge--Cognition--Science?
-After a long debate, turning the question over in many
-distinct points of view, and examining three or four different
-answers to the question--all these answers are successively
-rejected, and the problem remains unsolved.
-
-The two persons who converse with Sokrates are, Theodorus, an
-elderly man, eminent as a geometrician, astronomer, &c., and
-teaching those sciences--and Theaetetus, a young man of great merit
-and still greater promise: acute, intelligent, and
-inquisitive--high-principled and courageous in the field, yet gentle
-and conciliatory to all: lastly, resembling Sokrates in physiognomy
-and in the flatness of his nose. The dialogue is supposed to have
-taken place during the last weeks of the life of Sokrates, when
-his legal appearance as defendant is required to answer the
-indictment of Meletus, already entered in the official record.[1]
-The dialogue is here read aloud to Eukleides of Megara and his
-fellow-citizen Terpsion, by a slave of Eukleides: this last person
-had recorded it in writing from narrative previously made to him
-by Sokrates.[2] It is prefaced by a short discourse between
-Eukleides and Terpsion, intended to attract our sympathy and
-admiration towards the youthful Theaetetus.
-
-[Footnote 1: Plato, Theaetet. ad fin. p. 210.]
-
-[Footnote 2: Plato, Theaetet. i. pp. 142 E, 143 A. Plato hardly
-keeps up the fiction about the time of this dialogue with perfect
-consistency. When it took place, the indictment of Meletus had
-already been recorded: Sokrates breaks off the conversation for
-the purpose of going to answer it: Eukleides hears the dialogue
-from the mouth of Sokrates afterwards. "Immediately on getting
-home to Megara" (says Eukleides) "I wrote down memoranda (of what
-I had heard): then afterwards I called it back to my mind at
-leisure, and as often as I visited Athens I questioned Sokrates
-about such portions as I did not remember, and made corrections on
-my return here, so that now nearly all the dialogue has been
-written out."
-
-Such a process would require longer time than is consistent with
-the short remainder of the life of Sokrates. Socher indeed tries
-to explain this by assuming a long interval between the indictment
-and the trial, but this is noway satisfactory. (Ueber Platon's
-Schriften, p. 251.)
-
-Mr. Lewis Campbell, in the Preface to his very useful edition of
-this dialogue (p. lxxi. Oxford, 1861), considers that the battle
-in which Theaetetus is represented as having been wounded, is
-probably meant for that battle in which Iphikrates and his
-peltasts destroyed the Spartan Mora, B.C. 390: if not that, then
-the battle at the Isthmus of Corinth against Epaminondas. B.C.
-369. Schleiermacher in his Einleitung to the dialogue (p. 185)
-seems to prefer the supposition of some earlier battle or skirmish
-under Iphikrates. The point can hardly be determined. Still less
-can we fix the date at which the dialogue was written, though the
-mention of the battle of Corinth certifies that it was later than
-394 B.C. Ast affirms confidently that it was the first dialogue
-composed by Plato after the Phaedon, which last was composed
-immediately after the death of Sokrates (Ast, Platon's Leben, &c.,
-p. 192). I see no ground for this affirmation. Most of the
-commentators rank it among the dialectical dialogues, which they
-consider to belong to a later period of Plato's life than the
-ethical, but to an earlier period than the constructive, such as
-Republic, Timaeus, &c. Most of them place the Theaetetus in one or
-other of the years between 393-383 B.C., though they differ much
-among themselves whether it is to be considered as later or
-earlier than other dialogues--Kratylus, Euthydemus, Menon,
-Gorgias, &c. (Stallbaum, Proleg. Theaet. pp. 6-10; Steinhart,
-Einleit. zum Theaet. pp. 100-213.) Munk and Ueberweg, on the
-contrary, place the Theaetetus at a date considerably later,
-subsequent to 368 B.C. Munk assigns it to 358 or 357 B.C. after
-Plato's last return from Sicily (Munk, Die natuerliche Ordnung der
-Platon. Schr. pp. 357-597: Ueberweg, Ueber die Aechtheit der
-Platon. Schr. pp. 228-236).]
-
-[Side-note: Question raised by Sokrates--What is knowledge or
-Cognition? First answer of Theaetetus, enumerating many different
-cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates.]
-
-In answer to the question put by Sokrates--What is Knowledge or
-Cognition? Theaetetus at first replies--That there are many and
-diverse cognitions:--of geometry, of arithmetic, of arts and
-trades, such as shoemaking, joinery, &c. Sokrates points out (as
-in the Menon, Hippias Major, and other dialogues) that such an
-answer involves a misconception of the question: which was
-general, and required a general answer, setting forth the
-characteristic common to all cognitions. No one can know what
-cognition is in shoemaking or any particular case--unless he first
-knows what is cognition generally.[3] Specimens of suitable
-answers to general questions are then given (or of definition of a
-general term), in the case of clay--and of numbers square and
-oblong.[4] I have already observed more than once how important an
-object it was with Plato to impress upon his readers an exact and
-adequate conception of the meaning of general terms, and the
-proper way of defining them. For this purpose he brings into
-contrast the misconceptions likely to arise in the minds of
-persons not accustomed to dialectic.
-
-[Footnote 3: Plato, Theaetet. p. 147 A.
-
-[Greek: Ou)d' a)/ra e)piste/men u(podema/ton suni/esin, o(
-e)piste/men me\ ei)dio/s? Ou) ga/r.]]
-
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Theaetet. p. 148. Oblong ([Greek: prome/keis])
-numbers are such as can be produced only from two unequal factors.
-The explanation of this difficult passage, requiring us to keep in
-mind the geometrical conception of numbers usual among the Greek
-mathematicians, will be found clearly given in Mr. Campbell's
-edition of this dialogue, pp. 20-22.]
-
-[Side-note: Preliminary conversation before the second answer is
-given. Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy--mental
-obstetric--He cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of
-pregnant minds.]
-
-Theaetetus, before he attempts a second answer, complains how much
-the subject had embarrassed him. Impressed with what he had heard
-about the interrogatories of Sokrates, he had tried to solve this
-problem: but he had not been able to satisfy himself with any
-attempted solution--nor yet to relinquish the search altogether.
-"You are in distress, Theaetetus" (observes Sokrates), "because you
-are not empty, but pregnant.[5] You have that within you, of which
-you need to be relieved; and you cannot be relieved without
-obstetric aid. It is my peculiar gift from the Gods to afford such
-aid, and to stimulate the parturition of pregnant minds which
-cannot of themselves bring forth what is within them.[6] I can
-produce no truth myself: but I can, by my art inherited from my
-mother the midwife Phaenarete, extract truth from others, and test
-the answers given by others: so as to determine whether such
-answers are true and valuable, or false and worthless. I can teach
-nothing: I only bring out what is already struggling in the minds
-of youth: and if there be nothing within them, my procedure is
-unavailing. My most important function is, to test the answers
-given, how far they are true or false. But most people, not
-comprehending my drift, complain of me as a most eccentric person,
-who only makes others sceptical. They reproach me, and that truly
-enough, with always asking questions, and never saying any thing
-of my own: because I have nothing to say worth hearing.[7] The
-young companions who frequent my society, often suffer
-long-continued pains of parturition night and day, before they can
-be delivered of what is within them. Some, though apparently stupid
-when they first come to me, make great progress, if my divine
-coadjutor is favourable to them: others again become tired of me,
-and go away too soon, so that the little good which I have done
-them becomes effaced. Occasionally, some of these impatient
-companions wish to return to me afterwards--but my divine sign
-forbids me to receive them: where such obstacle does not
-intervene, they begin again to make progress."[8]
-
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Theaetet. p. 148 E. [Greek: o)di/neis, dia\ to\
-me\ keno\s a)ll' e)gku/mon ei)=nai.]]
-
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Theaetet. p. 149 A, p. 150 A.]
-
-[Footnote 7: Plato, Theaetet. p. 149 A. [Greek: oi( de/, a)/te ou)k
-ei)do/tes, tou=to me\n ou) le/gousi peri\ e)mou=, o(/ti de\
-a)topo/tato/s ei)mi, kai\ poio= tou\s a)nthro/pous a)porei=n.] 150
-B-C [Greek: me/giston de\ tou=t' e(/ni te=| e(mete/ra| te/chne|,
-basani/zein dunato\n ei)=nai panti\ tro/po|, po/teron ei)/dolon
-e)\ pseu=dos a)poti/ktei tou= ne/ou e( dianoi/a, e)\ go/nimo/n te
-kai\ a)lethe/s; e)pei\ to/de ge kai\ e)moi\ u(pa/rchei o(/per
-tai=s mai/ais; a)/gono/s ei)mi sophi/as], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 150 E, 151 A. [Greek: e)ni/ois
-me\n to\ gigno/meno/n moi daimo/nion a)pokolu/ei xunei=nai,
-e)ni/ois de\ e)a=|; kai\ pa/lin ou(=toi e)pidido/asin.]
-
-We here see (what I have already adverted to in reviewing the
-Theages, vol. ii. ch. xv. pp. 105-7) the character of mystery,
-unaccountable and unpredictable in its working on individuals,
-with which Plato invests the colloquy of Sokrates.]
-
-[Side-note: Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates--He
-is forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge.]
-
-This passage, while it forcibly depicts the peculiar intellectual
-gift of Sokrates, illustrates at the same time the Platonic manner
-of describing, full of poetry and metaphor. Cross-examination by
-Sokrates communicated nothing new, but brought out what lay buried
-in the mind of the respondent, and tested the value of his
-answers. It was applicable only to minds endowed and productive:
-but for them it was indispensable, in order to extract what they
-were capable of producing, and to test its value when extracted.
-"Do not think me unkind," (says Sokrates,) "or my procedure
-useless, if my scrutiny exposes your answers as fallacious. Many
-respondents have been violently angry with me for doing so: but I
-feel myself strictly forbidden either to admit falsehood, or to
-put aside truth."[9] Here we have a suitable prelude to a dialogue
-in which four successive answers are sifted and rejected, without
-reaching, even at last, any satisfactory solution.
-
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Theaetet. p. 151 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Answer of Theaetetus--Cognition is sensible perception:
-Sokrates says that this is the same doctrine as the _Homo Mensura_
-laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with
-the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedokles, &c., all except
-Parmenides.]
-
-The first answer given by Theaetetus is--"Cognition is sensation
-(or sensible perception)". Upon this answer Sokrates remarks, that
-it is the same doctrine, though in other words, as what was laid
-down by Protagoras--"Man is the measure of all things: of things
-existent, that they exist: of things non-existent, that they do
-not exist. As things appear to me, so they are to me: as they
-appear to you, so they are to you."[10] Sokrates then proceeds to
-say, that these two opinions are akin to, or identical with, the
-general view of nature entertained by Herakleitus, Empedokles, and
-other philosophers, countenanced moreover by poets like Homer and
-Epicharmus. The philosophers here noticed (he continues), though
-differing much in other respects, all held the doctrine that
-nature consisted in a perpetual motion, change, or flux: that
-there was no real Ens or permanent substratum, but perpetual
-genesis or transition.[11] These philosophers were opposed to
-Parmenides, who maintained (as I have already stated in a previous
-chapter) that there was nothing real except Ens--One, permanent,
-and unchangeable: that all change was unreal, apparent, illusory,
-not capable of being certainly known, but only matter of uncertain
-opinion or estimation.
-
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 151 E--152 A.
-
-_Theaetet._ [Greek: ou)k a)/llo ti/ e)stin e)piste/me e)\
-ai)/sthesis. . . .]
-
-_Sokrat._ [Greek: Kinduneu/eis me/ntoi lo/gon ou) phau=lon
-ei)reke/nai peri\ e)piste/mes, a)ll' o(/n e)/lege kai\
-Protago/ras; _tro/pon de/ tina a)/llon ei)/reke ta\ au)ta\ tau=ta.
-Phesi\ ga/r pou--Pa/nton chrema/ton me/tron a)/nthropon ei)=nai,
-to=n me\n o)/nton, o(s e)/sti--to=n de\ me\ o)/nton, o(s ou)k
-e)/stin._ A)ne/gnokas ga/r pou?]
-
-_Theaetet._ [Greek: A)ne/gnoka kai\ polla/kis.]
-
-_Sokrat._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou(/to pos le/gei, os oi(=a me\n
-e(/kasta e)moi\ phai/netai, toiau=ta me/n e)stin e)moi\--oi(=a de\
-soi/, toiau=ta de\ au)= soi/; a)nthropos de\ su/ te ka)go/.]
-
-_Theaetet._ [Greek: Le/gei ga\r ou)=n ou(/tos.]
-
-Here Plato appears to transcribe the words of Protagoras (compare
-p. 161 B, and the Kratylus, p. 386 A) which distinctly affirm the
-doctrine of _Homo Mensura_--Man is the measure of all things,--but
-do not affirm the doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception.
-The identification between the two doctrines is asserted by Plato
-himself. It is Plato who asserts "that Protagoras affirmed the
-same doctrine in another manner," citing afterwards the manner in
-which he supposed Protagoras to affirm it. If there had been in
-the treatise of Protagoras any more express or peremptory
-affirmation of the doctrine "that knowledge is sensible
-perception," Plato would probably have given it here.]
-
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Theaetet. p. 152 E. [Greek: kai\ peri\ tou/tou
-_pa/ntes e(xe=s oi( sophoi\ ple\n Parmeni/dou xumphere/sthon_,
-Protago/ras te kai\ E(ra/kleitos kai\ E)mpedokle=s, kai\ to=n
-poieto=n oi( a)/kroi te=s poie/seos e(kate/ras, komo|di/as me\n
-E)pi/charmos, trago|di/as de\ O(/meros.]]
-
-[Side-note: Plato here blends together three distinct theories for
-the purpose of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what
-can be said in favour of them. Difficulty of following his
-exposition.]
-
-The one main theme intended for examination here (as Sokrates[12]
-expressly declares) is the doctrine--That Cognition is sensible
-perception. Nevertheless upon all the three opinions, thus
-represented as cognate or identical,[13] Sokrates bestows a
-lengthened comment (occupying a half of the dialogue) in
-conversation, principally with Theaetetus, but partly also with
-Theodorus. His strictures are not always easy to follow with
-assurance, because he often passes with little notice from one to
-the other of the three doctrines which he is examining: because he
-himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to take
-them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: and further
-because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his own, he sometimes
-leaves us in doubt what is his real purpose--whether to expound,
-or to deride, the opinions of others--whether to enlighten
-Theaetetus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies.[14] We
-cannot always distinguish between the ironical and the serious.
-Lastly, it is a still greater difficulty, that we have not before
-us either of the three opinions as set forth by their proper
-supporters. There remains no work either of Protagoras or of
-Herakleitus: so that we do not clearly know the subject matter
-upon which Plato is commenting--nor whether these authors would
-have admitted as just the view which he takes of their
-opinions.[15]
-
-[Footnote 12: Plato, Theaetet. p. 163 A.]
-
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Theaetet. p. 160 D. _Sokrat._ [Greek:
-Pagka/los a)/ra soi ei)/retai o(/ti e)piste/me ou)k a)/llo ti/
-e)stin e)\ ai)/sthesis; kai\ _ei)s tau)to\n sumpe/ptoke_, kata\
-me\n O(/meron kai\ E(ra/kleiton kai\ pa=n to\ toiou=ton phu=lon,
-oi(=on r(eu/mata kinei=sthai ta\ pa/nta--kata\ de\ Protago/ran
-to\n sopho/taton, pa/nton chrema/ton a)/nthropon me/tron
-ei)=nai--kata\ de\ Theai/teton, tou/ton ou(=tos e)cho/nton,
-ai)/sthesin e)piste/men gi/gnesthai.]]
-
-[Footnote 14: See the answer of Theaetetus and the words of
-Sokrates following, p. 157 C.]
-
-[Footnote 15: It would be hardly necessary to remark, that when
-Plato professes to put a pleading into the mouth of Protagoras
-(pp. 165-166) we have no other real speaker than Plato himself, if
-commentators did not often forget this. Steinhart indeed tells us
-(Einleit. zum Theaetet. pp. 36-47) positively--that Plato in this
-pleading keeps in the most accurate manner (auf das genaueste) to
-the thoughts of Protagoras, perhaps even to his words. How
-Steinhart can know this I am at a loss to understand. To me it
-seems very improbable. The mere circumstance that Plato forces
-into partnership three distinct theories, makes it probable that
-he did not adhere to the thoughts or language of any one of them.]
-
-[Side-note: The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from
-the other doctrines. The identification of them as one and the
-same is only constructive--the interpretation of Plato himself.]
-
-It is not improbable that the three doctrines, here put together
-by Plato and subjected to a common scrutiny, may have been
-sometimes held by the same philosophers. Nevertheless, the
-language[16] of Plato himself shows us that Protagoras never
-expressly affirmed knowledge to be sensible Perception: and that
-the substantial identity between this doctrine, and the different
-doctrine maintained by Protagoras, is to be regarded as a
-construction put upon the two by Plato. That the theories of
-Herakleitus and Empedokles differed materially from each other, we
-know certainly: the theory of each, moreover, differed from the
-doctrine of Protagoras--"Man is the measure of all things". How
-this last doctrine was defended by its promulgator, we cannot say.
-But the defence of it noway required him to maintain--That
-knowledge is sensible perception. It might be consistently held by
-one who rejected that definition of knowledge.[17] And though
-Plato tries to refute both, yet the reasonings which he brings
-against one do not at all tell against the other.
-
-[Footnote 16: See Theaetet. p. 152 A. This is admitted (to be a
-construction put by Plato himself) by Steinhart in his note 7, p.
-214, Einleitung zum Theaetetus, though he says that Plato's
-construction is the right one.]
-
-[Footnote 17: Dr. Routh, in a note upon his edition of the
-Euthydemus of Plato (p. 286 C) observes:--"Protagoras docebat,
-[Greek: Pa/nton chrema/ton me/tron a)/nthropon ei)=nai, to=n me\n
-o)/nton, o(s e)/sti; to=n de\ me\ o)/nton, o(s ou)k e)/sti.] Qua
-quidem opinione qualitatum sensilium sine animi perceptione
-existentiam sustulisse videtur."
-
-The definition here given by Routh is correct as far as it goes,
-though too narrow. But it is sufficient to exhibit the Protagorean
-doctrine as quite distinct from the other doctrine, [Greek: o(/ti
-e)piste/me ou)k a)/llo ti/ e)stin e)\ ai)/sthesis.]]
-
-[Side-note: Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras--_Homo
-Mensura_.]
-
-The Protagorean doctrine--Man is the measure of all things--is
-simply the presentation in complete view of a common
-fact--uncovering an aspect of it which the received phraseology hides.
-Truth and Falsehood have reference to some believing subject--and
-the words have no meaning except in that relation. Protagoras
-brings to view this subjective side of the same complex fact, of
-which Truth and Falsehood denote the objective side. He refuses to
-admit the object absolute--the pretended _thing in itself_--Truth
-without a believer. His doctrine maintains the indefeasible and
-necessary involution of the percipient mind in every perception--of
-the concipient mind in every conception--of the cognizant mind
-in every cognition. Farther, Protagoras acknowledges many distinct
-believing or knowing Subjects: and affirms that every object known
-must be relative to (or in his language, _measured by_) the
-knowing Subject: that every _cognitum_ must have its _cognoscens_,
-and every _cognoscibile_ its _cognitionis capax_: that the words
-have no meaning unless this be supposed: that these two names
-designate two opposite poles or aspects of the indivisible fact of
-cognition--actual or potential--not two factors, which are in
-themselves separate or separable, and which come together to make
-a compound product. A man cannot in any case get clear of or
-discard his own mind as a Subject. Self is necessarily
-omnipresent; concerned in every moment of consciousness, and
-equally concerned in all, though more distinctly attended to in
-some than in others.[18] The Subject, self, or Ego, is that which
-all our moments of consciousness have in common and alike: Object
-is that in which they do or may differ--although some object or
-other there always must be. The position laid down by
-Descartes--_Cogito, ergo sum_--might have been stated with equal
-truth--_Cogito, ergo est (cogitatum aliquid)_: _sum cogitans--est
-cogitatum_--are two opposite aspects of the same indivisible
-mental fact--_cogitatio_. In some cases, doubtless, the objective
-aspect may absorb our attention, eclipsing the subjective: in
-other cases, the subjective attracts exclusive notice: but in all
-cases and in every act of consciousness, both are involved as
-co-existent and correlative. That alone exists, to every man, which
-stands, or is believed by him to be capable of standing, in some
-mode of his consciousness as an Object correlative with himself as
-a Subject. If he believes in its existence, his own believing mind
-is part and parcel of such fact of belief, not less than the
-object believed in: if he disbelieves it, his own disbelieving
-mind is the like. Consciousness in all varieties has for its two
-poles Subject and Object: there cannot be one of these poles
-without the opposite pole--north without south--any more than
-there can be concave without convex (to use a comparison familiar
-with Aristotle), or front without back: which are not two things
-originally different and coming into conjunction, but two
-different aspects of the same indivisible fact.
-
-[Footnote 18: In regard to the impossibility of carrying
-abstraction so far as to discard the thinking subject, see Hobbes,
-Computation or Logic, ch. vii. 1.
-
-"In the teaching of natural philosophy I cannot begin better than
-from _privation_; that is, from feigning the world to be
-annihilated. But if such annihilation of all things be supposed,
-it may perhaps be asked what would remain for any man (_whom only
-I except from this universal annihilation of things_) to consider
-as the subject of philosophy, or at all to reason upon; or what to
-give names unto for ratiocination's sake.
-
-"I say, therefore, there would remain to that man ideas of the
-world, and of all such bodies as he had, before their
-annihilation, seen with his eyes, or perceived by any other sense;
-that is to say, the memory and imagination of magnitudes, motions,
-sounds, colours, &c., as also of their order and parts. All which
-things, though they be nothing but ideas and phantasms, happening
-internally to him that imagineth, yet they will appear as if they
-were external and not at all depending upon any power of the mind.
-And these are the things to which he would give names and subtract
-them from, and compound them with one another. For seeing that
-after the destruction of all other things I suppose man still
-remaining, and namely that he thinks, imagines, and remembers,
-there can be nothing for him to think of but what is past. . . .
-Now things may be considered, that is, be brought into account,
-_either as internal accidents of our mind_, in which manner we
-consider them when the question is about _some faculty of the
-mind_: or, as _species of external things, not as really existing,
-but appearing only to exist, or to have a being without us_. And
-in this manner we are now to consider them."]
-
-[Side-note: Perpetual implication of Subject with Object--Relate
-and Correlate.]
-
-In declaring that "Man is the measure of all things"--Protagoras
-affirms that Subject is the measure of Object, or that every
-object is relative to a correlative Subject. When a man affirms,
-believes, or conceives, an object as existing, his own believing
-or concipient mind is one side of the entire fact. It may be the
-dark side, and what is called _the Object_ may be the light side,
-of the entire fact: this is what happens in the case of tangible
-and resisting substances, where Object, being the light side of
-the fact, is apt to appear all in all:[19] a man thinks of the
-Something which resists, without attending to the other aspect of
-the fact of resistance, _viz._: his own energy or pressure, to
-which resistance is made. On the other hand, when we speak of
-enjoying any pleasure or suffering any pain, the enjoying or
-suffering Subject appears all in all, distinguished plainly from
-other Subjects, supposed to be not enjoying or suffering in the
-same way: yet it is no more than the light side of the fact, of
-which Object is the dark side. Each particular pain which we
-suffer has its objective or differential peculiarity,
-distinguishing it from other sensations, correlating with the same
-sentient Subject.
-
-[Footnote 19: "Nobiscum semper est ipsa quam quaerimus (anima);
-adest, tractat, loquitur--et, si fas est dicere, inter ista
-nescitur." (Cassiodorus, De Anima, c. 1, p. 594, in the edition of
-his Opera Omnia, Venet. 1729).
-
-"In the primitive dualism of consciousness, the Subject and Object
-being inseparable, either of them apart from the other must be an
-unknown quantity: the separation of either must be the
-annihilation of both." (F. W. Farrar, Chapters on Language, c. 23,
-p. 292: which chapter contains more on the same topic, well
-deserving of perusal.)]
-
-[Side-note: Such relativity is no less true in regard to the
-ratiocinative combinations of each individual, than in regard to
-his percipient capacities.]
-
-The Protagorean dictum will thus be seen, when interpreted
-correctly, to be quite distinct from that other doctrine with
-which Plato identifies it: that Cognition is nothing else but
-sensible Perception. If, rejecting this last doctrine, we hold
-that cognition includes mental elements distinct from, though
-co-operating with, sensible perception--the principle of relativity
-laid down by Protagoras will not be the less true. My intellectual
-activity--my powers of remembering, imagining, ratiocinating,
-combining, &c., are a part of my mental nature, no less than my
-powers of sensible perception: my cognitions and beliefs must all
-be determined by, or relative to, this mental nature: to the turn
-and development which all these various powers have taken in my
-individual case. However multifarious the mental activities may
-be, each man has his own peculiar allotment and manifestations
-thereof, to which his cognitions must be relative. Let us grant
-(with Plato) that the Nous or intelligent Mind apprehends
-intelligible Entia or Ideas distinct from the world of sense: or
-let us assume that Kant and Reid in the eighteenth century, and M.
-Cousin with other French writers in the nineteenth, have destroyed
-the Lockian philosophy, which took account (they say) of nothing
-but the _a posteriori_ element of cognition--and have established
-the existence of other elements of cognition _a priori_: intuitive
-beliefs, first principles, primary or inexplicable Concepts of
-Reason.[20] Still we must recollect that all such _a priori_
-Concepts, Intuitions, Beliefs, &c., are summed up in the mind: and
-that thus each man's mind, with its peculiar endowments, natural
-or supernatural, is still the measure or limit of his cognitions,
-acquired and acquirable. The Entia Rationis exist relatively to
-Ratio, as the Entia Perceptionis exist relatively to Sense. This
-is a point upon which Plato himself insists, in this very
-dialogue. You do not, by producing this fact of innate mental
-intuitions, eliminate the intuent mind; which must be done in
-order to establish a negative to the Protagorean principle.[21]
-Each intuitive belief whether correct or erroneous--whether held
-unanimously by every one _semper et ubique_, or only held by a
-proportion of mankind--is (or would be, if proved to exist) a fact
-of our nature; capable of being looked at either on the side of
-the believing Subject, which is its point of community with all
-other parts of our nature--or on the side of the Object believed,
-which is its point of difference or peculiarity. The fact with its
-two opposite aspects is indivisible. Without Subject, Object
-vanishes: without Object (some object or other, for this side of
-the fact is essentially variable), Subject vanishes.
-
-[Footnote 20: See M. Jouffroy, Preface a sa Traduction des
-OEuvres de Reid, pp. xcvii.-ccxiv.
-
-M. Jouffroy, following in the steps of Kant, declares these _a
-priori_ beliefs or intuitions to be altogether relative to the
-human mind. "Kant, considerant que les conceptions de la raison
-sont des croyances aveugles auxquelles notre esprit se sent
-fatalement determine par sa nature, en conclut qu'elles sont
-relatives a cette nature: que si notre nature etait autre, elles
-pourraient etre differentes: que par consequent, elles n'ont
-aucune valeur absolue: et qu'ainsi notre verite, notre science,
-notre certitude, sont une verite, une science, une certitude,
-purement _subjective_, purement humaine--a laquelle nous sommes
-determines a nous fier par notre nature, mais qui ne supporte pas
-l'examen et n'a aucune valeur _objective_" (p. clxvii.) . . .
-"C'est ce que repete Kant quand il soutient que l'on ne peut
-_objectiver le subjectif_: c'est a dire, faire que la verite
-humaine cesse d'etre humaine, puisque la raison qui la trouve est
-humaine. On peut exprimer de vingt manieres differentes cette
-impossibilite: elle reste toujours la meme, et demeure toujours
-insurmontable," p. cxc. Compare p. xcvii. of the same Preface.
-
-M. Pascal Galuppi (in his Lettres Philosophiques sur les
-Vicissitudes de la Philosophie, translated from the Italian by M.
-Peisse, Paris, 1844) though not agreeing in this variety of _a
-priori_ philosophy, agrees with Kant in declaring the _a priori_
-element of cognition to be purely subjective, and the objective
-element to be _a posteriori_ (Lett. xiv. pp. 337-338), or the
-facts of sense and experience. "L'ordre _a priori_, que Kant
-appelle _transcendental_, est purement ideal, et depourvu de toute
-realite. Je vis, qu'en fondant la connaissance sur l'ordre _a
-priori_, on arrive necessairement au scepticisme: et je reconnus
-que la doctrine Ecossaise est la mere legitime du Criticisme
-Kantien, et par consequent, du scepticisme, qui est la consequence
-de la philosophie critique. Je considerai comme de haute
-importance ce probleme de Kant. Il convient de determiner ce qu'il
-y a d'objectif, et ce qu'il y a de subjectif, dans la
-connaissance. Les Empiriques n'admettent dans la connaissance
-d'autres elemens que les objectifs," &c.]
-
-[Footnote 21: See this point handled in Sextus Empiric. adv.
-Mathemat. viii. 355-362. We may here cite a remark of Simplikius
-in his Commentary on the Categories of Aristotle (p. 64, a. in
-Schol. Brandis). Aristotle (De Anima, iii. 2, 426, a. 19; Categor.
-p. 7, b. 23) lays down the doctrine that in most cases Relata or
-([Greek: ta\ pro/s ti]) are "simul Natura, [Greek: kai\
-sunanairei= a)/llela]": but that in some Relata this is not true:
-for example, [Greek: to\ e)pisteto\n] is relative to [Greek:
-e)piste/me], yet still _it would seem prior_ to [Greek: e)piste/me
-(pro/teron a)\n do/xeie te=s e)piste/mes ei)=nai)]. There cannot
-be [Greek: e)piste/me] without some [Greek: e)pisteto/n]: but
-there may be [Greek: e)pisteto\n] without any [Greek: e)piste/me].
-There are few things, if any (he says), in which the [Greek:
-e)pisteto\n] (cognoscibile) is _simul natura_ with [Greek:
-e)piste/me] (or cognitio) and cannot be without it.
-
-Upon which Simplikius remarks, What are these few things? [Greek:
-Ti/na de\ ta\ o)li/ga e)sti/n, e)ph' o(=n a(/ma to=| e)pisteto=|
-e( e)piste/me e)sti/n? Ta\ a)/neu u(/les, ta\ noeta/, a(/ma to=|
-kat' e)nergei/an a)ei\ e)sto/se| e)piste/me e)/stin, ei)/te kai\
-e)n e(mi=n e)sti/ tis toiau/te a)ei\ a)/no me/nousa, . . . ei)/te
-kai\ e)n to=| kat' e)nergei/an vo=| ei)/ tis kai\ te\n no/esin
-e)kei/nen e)piste/men e(/loito kalei=n. du/natai de\ kai\ dia\
-te\n to=n koino=n u(po/stasin ei)re=sthai, te\n e)x a)phaire/seos;
-a(/ma ga\r te=| u(posta/sei tou/ton kai\ e( e)piste/me e)sti/n.
-a)lethe\s de\ kai\ e)pi\ to=n a)naplasma/ton to=n te e)n te=|
-phantasi/a| kai\ to=n technito=n; a(/ma ga\r chi/maira kai\ e(
-e)piste/me chimai/ras.]
-
-We see from hence that Simplikius recognises Concepts,
-Abstractions, and Fictions, to be dependent on the Conceiving,
-Abstracting, Imagining, Mind--as distinguished from objects of
-Sense, which he does not recognise as dependent in the like
-manner. He agrees in the doctrine of Protagoras as to the former,
-but not as to the latter. This illustrates what I have affirmed,
-That the Protagorean doctrine of "_Homo Mensura_" is not only
-unconnected with the other principle (that Knowledge is resolvable
-into sensible perception) to which Aristotle and Plato would trace
-it--but that there is rather a repugnance between the two. The
-difficulty of proving the doctrine, and the reluctance to admit
-it, is greatest in the case of material objects, least in the case
-of Abstractions, and General Ideas. Yet Aristotle, in reasoning
-against the Protagorean doctrine (Metaphysic. [Greek: G]. pp.
-1009-1010, &c.) treats it like Plato, as a sort of corollary from
-the theory that Cognition is Sensible Perception.
-
-Simplikius farther observes (p. 65, b. 14) that Aristotle is not
-accurate in making [Greek: e)pisteto\n] correlate with [Greek:
-e)piste/me]: that in Relata, the potential correlates with the
-potential, and the actual with the actual. The Cognoscible is
-correlative, not with actual cognition ([Greek: e)piste/me]) but
-with potential Cognition, or with a potential Cognoscens.
-Aristotle therefore is right in saying that there may be [Greek:
-e)pisteto\n] without [Greek: e)piste/me], but this does not prove
-what he wishes to establish.
-
-Themistius, in another passage of the Aristotelian Scholia,
-reasoning against Boethus, observes to the same effect as
-Simplikius, that in relatives, the actual correlates with the
-actual, and the potential with the potential:--
-
-[Greek: Kai/toi, phesi/ ge o( Boetho/s, ou)de\n kolu/ei to\n
-a)rithmo\n ei)=nai kai\ di/cha tou= a)rithmou=ntos, o(/sper
-oi)=mai to\ ai)stheto\n kai\ di/cha tou= ai)sthanome/nou;
-spha/lletai de/, a(/ma ga\r ta\ pro\s ti/, kai\ ta\ duna/mei pro\s
-ta\ duna/mei; o(/ste ei) me\ kai\ a)rithmetiko/n, ou)de\ to\
-a)rithmeto/n] (Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 223, a. p. 393,
-Schol. Brandis).
-
-Compare Aristotel. Metaphysic. M. 1087, a. 15, about [Greek: to\
-e)pi/stasthai duna/mei] and [Greek: to\ e)pi/stasthai
-e)nergei/a|].
-
-About the essential co-existence of relatives--Sublato uno,
-tollitur alterum--see also Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, vii.
-395, p. 449, Fabric.]
-
-[Side-note: Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and
-Object, in regard to the intelligible world.]
-
-That this general doctrine is true, not merely respecting the
-facts of sense, but also respecting the facts of mental
-conception, opinion, intellection, cognition--may be seen by the
-reasoning of Plato himself in other dialogues. How, for example,
-does Plato prove, in his Timaeus, the objective reality of Ideas or
-Forms? He infers them from the subjective facts of his own mind.
-The subjective fact called Cognition (he argues) is generically
-different from the subjective fact called True Opinion: therefore
-the Object correlating with the One must be distinct from the
-Object correlating with the other: there must be a Noumenon or
-[Greek: noeto/n ti] correlating with Nous, distinct from the
-[Greek: doxasto/n ti] which correlates with [Greek: do/xa].[22] So
-again, in the Phaedon,[23] Sokrates proves the pre-existence of the
-human soul from the fact that there were pre-existent cognizable
-Ideas: if there were knowable Objects, there must also have been a
-Subject Cognoscens or Cognitionis capax. The two are different
-aspects of one and the same conception: upon which we may
-doubtless reason abstractedly under one aspect or under the other,
-though they cannot be separated in fact. Now Both these two
-inferences of Plato rest on the assumed implication of Subject and
-Object.[24]
-
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Timaeus, p. 51 B-E, compare Republic, v. p.
-477.
-
-See this reasoning of Plato set forth in Zeller, Die Phil. der
-Griech. vol. ii. pp. 412-416, ed. 2nd.
-
-_Nous_, according to Plato (Tim. 51 E), belongs only to the Gods
-and to a select few among mankind. It is therefore only _to_ the
-Gods and _to_ these few men that [Greek: Noeta\] exist. To the
-rest of mankind [Greek: Noeta\] are non-apparent and
-non-existent.]
-
-[Footnote 23: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 76-77. [Greek: i)/se a)na/gke
-tau=ta/ te] (Ideas or Forms) [Greek: ei)=nai, kai\ ta\s e(mete/ras
-psucha\s pri\n kai\ e(ma=s gegone/nai--kai\ ei) me\ tau=ta, ou)de\
-ta/de. U(perphuo=s, e)/phe o( Simmi/as, dokei= moi e( au)te\
-a)na/gke ei)=nai, kai\ ei)s kalo/n ge katapheu/gei o( lo/gos ei)s
-to\ o(moi/os ei)=nai te/n te psuche\n e(mo=n pri\n gene/sthai
-e(ma=s kai\ te\n ou)si/an e(\n su\ nu=n le/geis.]
-
-Compare p. 92 E of the same dialogue with the notes of Wyttenbach
-and Heindorf--"Haec autem [Greek: ou)si/a] Idearum, rerum
-intelligibilium, [Greek: au)te=s e)sti\n] (_sc._ [Greek: te=s
-psuche=s]) ut hoc loco dicitur, est propria et possessio animae
-nostrae," &c.
-
-About the essential implication of [Greek: Nou=s] with the [Greek:
-Noeta/], as well as of [Greek: to\ do/xazon] with [Greek: ta\
-doxazo/mena], and of [Greek: to\ ai)sthano/menon] with [Greek: ta\
-ai)stheta/], see Plutarch, De Animae Procreat. in Timaeo, pp.
-1012-1024; and a curious passage from Joannes Philoponus ad Aristot.
-Physica, cited by Karsten in his Commentatio De Empedoclis
-Philosophia, p. 372, and Olympiodorus ad Platon. Phaedon, p. 21.
-[Greek: to\n nou=n phame\n a)kribo=s gino/skein, dio/ti au)to/s
-e)sti to\ noeto/n.]
-
-Sydenham observes, in a note upon his translation of the Philebus
-(note 76, p. 118), "Being Intelligent and Being Intelligible are
-not only correlatives, but are so in their very essence: neither
-of them can be at all, without the Being of the other".]
-
-[Footnote 24: I think that the inference in the Phaedon is not
-necessary to prove that conclusion, nor in itself just. For when I
-speak of Augustus and Antony as having once lived, and as having
-fought the battle of Actium, it is noway necessary that I should
-believe myself to have been then alive and to have seen them: nor
-when I speak of civil war as being now carried on in the United
-States of America, is it necessary that I should believe myself to
-be or to have been on the spot as a percipient witness. I believe,
-on evidence which appears to me satisfactory, that both these are
-real facts: that is, if I had been at Actium on the day of the
-battle, or if I were now in the United States, I should see and
-witness the facts here affirmed. These latter words describe the
-subjective side of the fact, without introducing any supposition
-that I have been myself present and percipient.]
-
-[Side-note: The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in
-reference to the intelligible world than in reference to sense.]
-
-In truth, the Protagorean measure or limit is even more plainly
-applicable to our mental intuitions and mental processes
-(remembering, imagining, conceiving, comparing, abstracting,
-combining of hypotheses, transcendental or inductive) than to the
-matter of our sensible experience.[25] In regard to the Entia
-Rationis, divergence between one theorist and another is quite as
-remarkable as the divergence between one percipient and another in
-the most disputable region of Entia Perceptionis. Upon the
-separate facts of sense, there is a nearer approach to unanimity
-among mankind, than upon the theories whereby theorising men
-connect together those facts to their own satisfaction. An
-opponent of Protagoras would draw his most plausible arguments
-from the undisputed facts of sense. He would appeal to matter and
-what are called its primary qualities, as refuting the doctrine.
-For in describing mental intuitions, Mind or Subject cannot well
-be overlaid or ignored: but in regard to the external world, or
-material substance with its primary qualities, the objective side
-is so lighted up and magnified in the ordinary conception and
-language--and the subjective side so darkened and put out of
-sight--that Object appears as if it stood single, apart, and
-independent.
-
-[Footnote 25: Bacon remarks that the processes called mental or
-intellectual are quite as much relative to man as those called
-sensational or perceptive. "Idola Tribus sunt fundata in ipsa
-natura humana. Falso enim asseritur, Sensum humanum esse mensuram
-rerum: quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam Sensus quam Mentis,
-sunt ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia Universi."
-
-Nemesius, the Christian Platonist, has a remark bearing upon this
-question. He says that the lower animals have their intellectual
-movements all determined by Nature, which acts alike in all the
-individuals of the species, but that the human intellect is not
-wholly determined by Nature; it has a freer range, larger stores
-of ideas, and more varied combinations: hence its manifestations
-are not the same in all, but different in different
-individuals--[Greek: e)leu/theron ga/r ti kai\ au)texou/sion to\
-logiko/n, o(/then ou)ch e(\n kai\ tau)to\n pa=sin e)/rgon a)nthro/pois,
-o(s e(ka/sto| ei)/dei to=n a)lo/gon zo/on; phu/sei ga\r mo/ne| ta\
-toiau=ta kinei=tai, ta\ de\ phu/sei o(moi/os para\ pa=si/n e)stin;
-ai( de\ logikai\ pra/xeis a)/llai par' a)/llois kai\ ou)k e)x
-a)na/gkes ai( au(=tai para\ pa=sin] (De Nat. Hom., c. ii. p. 53.
-ed. 1565).]
-
-A man conceives objects, like houses and trees, as existing when
-he does not actually see or touch them, just as much as when he
-does see or touch them. He conceives them as existing independent
-of any actual sensations of his own: and he proceeds to describe
-them as independent altogether of himself as a Subject--or as
-absolute, not relative, existences. But this distinction, though
-just as applied in ordinary usage, becomes inadmissable when
-brought to contradict the Protagorean doctrine; because the
-speaker professes to exclude, what cannot be excluded, himself as
-concipient Subject.[26] It is he who conceives absent objects as
-real and existing, though he neither sees nor touches them: he
-believes fully, that if he were in a certain position near them,
-he would experience those appropriate sensations of sight and
-touch, whereby they are identified. Though he eliminates himself
-as a _percipient_, he cannot eliminate himself as a _concipient_:
-_i.e._, as conceiving and believing. He can conceive no object
-without being himself the Subject conceiving, nor believe in any
-future contingency without being himself the Subject believing. He
-may part company with himself as percipient, but he cannot part
-company with himself altogether. His conception of an absent
-external object, therefore, when fully and accurately described,
-does not contradict the Protagorean doctrine. But it is far the
-most plausible objection which can be brought against that
-doctrine, and it is an objection deduced from the facts or
-cognitions of sense.
-
-[Footnote 26: Bishop Berkeley observes:--
-
-"But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine
-trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and
-nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so--there is no
-difficulty in it. But what is all this, more than framing in your
-mind certain ideas which you call _books_ and _trees_, and at the
-same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive
-them? _But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the
-while?_ This therefore is nothing to the purpose. It only shows
-you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but
-it doth not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of
-your thought may exist without the mind. _To make out this, it is
-necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought
-of, which is a manifest repugnancy._ When we do our utmost to
-conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while
-only contemplating our own ideas. _But the mind, taking no notice
-of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies
-existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same
-time they are apprehended by or exist in itself._"
-
-Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, sect. xxiii. p. 34, ed.
-of Berkeley's Works, 1820. The same argument is enforced in
-Berkeley's First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, pp. 145-146
-of the same volume.
-
-I subjoin a passage from the work of Professor Bain on Psychology,
-where this difficult subject is carefully analysed (The Senses and
-the Intellect, p. 370). "There is no possible knowledge of the
-world except in reference to our minds. Knowledge means a state of
-mind: the knowledge of material things is a mental thing. We are
-incapable of discussing the existence of an independent material
-world: the very act is a contradiction. We can speak only of a
-world presented to our own minds. By an illusion of language we
-fancy that we are capable of contemplating a world which does not
-enter into our own mental existence: but the attempt belies
-itself, for this contemplation is an effort of mind."
-
-"Solidity, extension, space--the foundation properties of the
-material world--mean, as has been said above, certain movements
-and energies of our own bodies, and exist in our minds in the
-shape of feelings of force, allied with visible and tactile, and
-other sensible impressions. The sense of the external is the
-consciousness of particular energies and activities of our own."
-
-(P. 376). "We seem to have no better way of assuring ourselves and
-all mankind, that with the conscious movement of opening the eyes
-there will always be a consciousness of light, than by saying that
-the light exists as an independent fact, without any eyes to see
-it. But if we consider the fact fairly we shall see that this
-assertion errs, not simply in being beyond any evidence that we
-can have, but also in being a self-contradiction. We are affirming
-_that_ to have an existence out of our minds, which we cannot know
-but as in our minds. In words we assert independent existence,
-while in the very act of doing so we contradict ourselves. Even a
-possible world implies a possible mind to conceive it, just as
-much as an actual world implies an actual mind. The mistake of the
-common modes of expression on this matter is the mistake of
-supposing the abstractions of the mind to have a separate and
-independent existence. Instead of looking upon the doctrine of an
-external and independent world as a generalisation or abstraction
-grounded on our particular experiences, summing up the past and
-predicting the future, we have got into the way of maintaining the
-abstraction to be an independent reality, the foundation, or
-cause, or origin, of all these experiences."
-
-To the same purpose Mr. Mansel remarks in his Bampton Lectures on
-"The Limits of Religious Thought," page 52:
-
-"A second characteristic of Consciousness is, that it is only
-possible in the form of a _relation_. There must be a Subject or
-person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is conscious.
-There can be no consciousness without the union of these two
-factors; and in that union each exists only as it is related to
-the other. The subject is a subject only in so far as it is
-conscious of an object: the object is an object only in so far as
-it is apprehended by a subject: and the destruction of either is
-the destruction of consciousness itself. It is thus manifest that
-a consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory with
-that of the Infinite. . . Our whole notion of Existence is
-necessarily relative, for it is existence as conceived by us. But
-_Existence_, as we conceive it, is but a name for the several ways
-in which objects are presented to our consciousness--a general
-term embracing a variety of relations. . . To assume Absolute
-Existence as an object of thought is thus to suppose a relation
-existing when the related terms exist no longer. An object of
-thought exists, as such, in and through its relation to a thinker;
-while the Absolute, as such, is independent of all relation."
-
-Dr. Henry More has also a passage asserting the essential
-correlation on which I am here insisting (Immortality of the Soul,
-ch. ii. p. 3). And Professor Ferrier, in his Institutes of
-Metaphysic, has given much valuable elucidation respecting the
-essential relativity of cognition.
-
-Though this note is already long, I shall venture to add from an
-eminent German critic--Trendelenburg--a passage which goes to the
-same point.
-
-"Das Sein ist als die absolute Position erklaert worden. Der
-Begriff des Seins druecke blos das aus: es werde bei dem einfachen
-Setzen eines _Was_ sein Bewenden haben. Es hat sich hier die
-abstracte Vorstellung des Seins nur in eine verwandte Anschauung
-umgekleidet; denn das Gesetzte steht in dem Raum da; und insofern
-fordert die absolute Position schon den Begriff des seiendem
-Etwas, das gesetzt wird. _Fragt man weiter, so ist in der
-absoluten Position schon derjenige mitgedacht, der da setzt._ Das
-Sein wird also _nicht unabhaengig aus sich selbst bestimmt_,
-sondern zur Erklaerung _ein Verhaeltniss zu der Thaetigkeit des
-Gedankens herbeigezogen_.
-
-"Aehnlich wuerde jede von vorn herein versuchte Bestimmung des
-Denkens ausfallen. Man wuerde es nur durch einen Bezug zu den
-Dingen erlaeutern koennen, welche in dem Denken Grund und Mass
-finden. Wir begeben uns daher jeder Erklaerung, und setzen eine
-Vorstellung des Denkens und Seins voraus, in der Hoffnung dass
-beide mit jedem Schritt der Untersuchung sich in sich selbst
-bestimmen werden." "Indem wir Denken und Sein unterscheiden,
-fragen wir, wie ist es moeglich, dass sich im Erkennen Denken und
-Sein vereinigt? _Diese Vereinigung sprechen wir vorlaeufig als eine
-Thatsache aus, die das Theoretische wie das Praktische
-beherrscht._" Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, sect. 3, pp.
-103-104, Berlin, 1840.]
-
-[Side-note: Object always relative to Subject--Either without the
-other, impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes.]
-
-I cannot therefore agree with Plato in regarding the Protagorean
-doctrine--Homo Mensura--as having any dependance upon, or any
-necessary connection with, the other theory (canvassed in the
-Theaetetus) which pronounces cognition to be sensible perception.
-Objects of thought exist in relation to a thinking Subject; as
-Objects of sight or touch exist in relation to a seeing or
-touching Subject. And this we shall find Plato himself declaring
-in the Sophistes (where his Eleatic disputant is introduced as
-impugning a doctrine substantially the same as that of Plato
-himself in the Phaedon, Timaeus, and elsewhere) as well as here in
-the Theaetetus. In the Sophistes, certain philosophers (called the
-Friends of Forms or Ideas) are noticed, who admitted that all
-sensible or perceivable existence ([Greek: ge/nesis]--Fientia) was
-relative to a (capable) sentient or percipient--but denied the
-relativity of Ideas, and maintained that Ideas, Concepts,
-Intelligible Entia, were not relative but absolute. The Eleate
-combats these philosophers, and establishes against them--That the
-Cogitable or Intelligible existence, Ens Rationis, was just as
-much relative to an Intelligent or Cogitant subject, as
-perceivable existence was relative to a Subject capable of
-perceiving--That Existence, under both varieties, was nothing more
-than a potentiality, correlating with a counter-potentiality
-([Greek: to\ gnosto\n] with [Greek: to\ gnostiko/n], [Greek: to\
-ai)stheto\n] with [Greek: to\ ai)sthetiko/n], and never realised
-except in implication therewith.[27]
-
-[Footnote 27: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 247-248.
-
-The view taken of this matter by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the
-third chapter of the first Book of his System of Logic, is very
-instructive; see especially pp. 65-66 (ed. 4th).
-
-Aristippus (one of the Sokratici viri, contemporary of Plato) and
-the Kyrenaic sect affirmed the doctrine--[Greek: o(/ti mo/na ta\
-pa/the katalepta/]. Aristokles refutes them by saying that there
-can be no [Greek: pa/thos] without both Object and
-Subject--[Greek: poiou=n] and [Greek: pa/schon]. And he goes on
-to declare that these three are of necessary co-existence or
-consubstantiality. [Greek: A)lla\ me\n a)na/gke ge tri/a tau=ta
-sunuphi/stasthai--to/ te pa/thos au)to/, kai\ to\ poiou=n, kai\
-to\ pa/schon] (ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev. xiv. 19, 1).
-
-I apprehend that Aristokles by these words does not really refute
-what Aristippus meant to affirm. Aristippus meant to affirm the
-Relative, and to decline affirming anything beyond; and in this
-Aristokles agrees, making the doctrine even more comprehensive by
-showing that Object as well as Subject are relative also;
-implicated both with each other and in the [Greek: pa/thos].]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's representation of the Protagorean doctrine in
-intimate conjunction with the Herakleitean.]
-
-This doctrine of the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistes coincides
-with the Protagorean--_Homo Mensura_--construed in its true
-meaning: Object is implicated with, limited or measured by,
-Subject: a doctrine proclaiming the relativeness of all objects
-perceived, conceived, known, or felt--and the omnipresent
-involution of the perceiving, conceiving, knowing, or feeling,
-Subject: the object varying with the Subject. "As things appear to
-me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they are to you."
-This theory is just and important, if rightly understood and
-explained: but whether Protagoras did so explain or understand it,
-we cannot say; nor does the language of Plato enable us to make
-out. Plato passes on from this theory to another, which he
-supposes Protagoras to have held without distinctly stating it:
-That there is no Ens distinguishable in itself or permanent, or
-stationary: that all existences are in perpetual flux, motion,
-change--acting and reacting upon each other, combining with or
-disjoining from each other.[28]
-
-[Footnote 28: Plato, Theaetet. p. 152 D.
-
-Though Plato states the grounds of this theory in his ironical
-way, as if it were an absurd fancy, yet it accidentally coincides
-with the largest views of modern physical science. Absolute rest
-is unknown in nature: all matter is in perpetual movement,
-molecular as well as in masses.]
-
-[Side-note: Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him.]
-
-Turning to the special theory of Protagoras (Homo Mensura), and
-producing arguments, serious or ironical in its defence, Sokrates
-says--What you call colour has no definite place or existence
-either within you or without you. It is the result of the passing
-collision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act
-upon them. It is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but is
-something special and momentary generated in passing between the
-two. It will vary with the subject: it is not the same to you, to
-another man, to a dog or horse, or even to yourself at different
-times. The object measured or touched cannot be in itself either
-great, or white, or hot: for if it were, it would not appear
-different to another Subject. Nor can the Subject touching or
-measuring be in itself great, or white, or hot: for if so, it
-would always be so, and would not be differently modified when
-applied to a different object. _Great_, _white_, _hot_, denote no
-positive and permanent attribute either in Object or Subject, but
-a passing result or impression generated between the two, relative
-to both and variable with either.[29]
-
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 153-154. [Greek: o(\ de\
-e(/kaston ei)=nai/ phamen chro=ma, ou)/te to\ prosba/llon ou)/te
-to\ prosballo/menon e)/stai, a)lla\ metaxu/ ti e(kasto| i)/dion
-gegono/s.]]
-
-[Side-note: Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply
-without a comparing subject.]
-
-To illustrate this farther (continues Sokrates)--suppose we have
-here six dice. If I compare them with three other dice placed by
-the side of them, I shall call the six dice _more_ and _double_:
-if I put twelve other dice by the side of them, I shall call the
-six _fewer_ and _half_. Or take an old man--and put a growing
-youth by his side. Two years ago the old man was taller than the
-youth: now, the youth is grown, so that the old man is the shorter
-of the two. But the old man, and the six dice, have remained all
-the time unaltered, and equal to themselves. How then can either
-of them become either greater or less? or how can either _really
-be_ so, when they were not so before?[30]
-
-[Footnote 30: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 154-155. Compare the reasoning
-in the Phaedon, pp. 96-97-101.]
-
-[Side-note: Relativity twofold--to the comparing Subject--to
-another object, besides the one directly described.]
-
-The illustration here furnished by Sokrates brings out forcibly
-the negation of the absolute, and the affirmation of universal
-relativity in all conceptions, judgments, and predications, which
-he ascribes to Protagoras and Herakleitus. The predication
-respecting the six dice denotes nothing real, independent,
-absolute, inhering in them: for they have undergone no change. It
-is relative, and expresses a mental comparison made by me or some
-one else. It is therefore relative in two different senses:--1. To
-some other object with which the comparison of the dice is
-made:--2. To me as comparing Subject, who determine the objects with
-which the comparison shall be made.[31]--Though relativity in both
-senses is comprehended by the Protagorean affirmation--Homo
-Mensura--yet relativity in the latter sense is all which that
-affirmation essentially requires. And this is true of all
-propositions, comparative or not--whether there be or be not
-reference to any other object beyond that which is directly
-denoted. But Plato was here illustrating the larger doctrine which
-he ascribes to Protagoras in common with Herakleitus: and
-therefore the more complicated case of relativity might suit his
-purpose better.
-
-[Footnote 31: The Aristotelian Category of Relation ([Greek: ta\
-pro\s ti/], Categor. p. 6, a. 36) designates one object
-apprehended and named relatively to some other object--as
-distinguished from object apprehended and named not thus
-relatively, which Aristotle considers as _per se_ [Greek: kath'
-au(to/] (Ethica Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 21). Aristotle omits or
-excludes relativity of the object apprehended to the percipient or
-concipient subject, which is the sort of relativity directly noted
-by the Protagorean doctrine.
-
-Occasionally Aristotle passes from relativity in the former sense
-to relativity in the latter; as when he discusses [Greek:
-e)pisteto\n] and [Greek: e)piste/me], alluded to in one of my
-former notes on this dialogue. But he seems unconscious of any
-transition. In the Categories, Object, as implicated with Subject
-does not seem to have been distinctly present to his reflection.
-In the third book of the Metaphysica, indeed, he discusses
-professedly the opinion of Protagoras; and among his objections
-against it, one is, that it makes everything relative or [Greek:
-pro\s ti/] (Metaph. [Greek: G]. p. 1011, a. 20, b. 5). This is
-hardly true in the sense which [Greek: pro\s ti/] bears as one of
-his Categories: but it is true in the other sense to which I have
-adverted.
-
-A clear and full exposition of what is meant by the Relativity of
-Human Knowledge, will be found in Mr. John Stuart Mill's most
-recent work, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,'
-ch. ii. pp. 6-15.]
-
-Sokrates now re-states that larger doctrine, in general terms, as
-follows.
-
-[Side-note: Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus--yet so as to
-implicate it with that of Protagoras.]
-
-The universe is all flux or motion, divided into two immense
-concurrent streams of force, one active, the other passive;
-adapted one to the other, but each including many varieties. One
-of these is Object: the other is, sentient, cognizant, concipient,
-Subject. Object as well as Subject is, in itself and separately,
-indeterminate and unintelligible--a mere chaotic Agent or Patient.
-It is only by copulation and friction with each other that they
-generate any definite or intelligible result. Every such
-copulation, between parts adapted to each other, generates a twin
-offspring: two correlative and inseparable results infinitely
-diversified, but always born in appropriate pairs:[32] a definite
-perception or feeling, on the subjective side--a definite thing
-perceived or felt, on the objective. There cannot be one of these
-without the other: there can be no objective manifestation without
-its subjective correlate, nor any subjective without its
-objective. This is true not merely about the external
-senses--touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing--but also about the
-internal,--hot and cold, pleasure and pain, desire, fear, and
-all the countless variety of our feelings which have no separate
-names.[33] Each of these varieties of feeling has its own object
-co-existent and correlating with it. Sight, hearing, and smell,
-move and generate rapidly and from afar; touch and taste, slowly
-and only from immediate vicinity: but the principle is the same in
-all. Thus, _e.g._, when the visual power of the eye comes into
-reciprocal action with its appropriate objective agent, the result
-between them is, that the visual power passes out of its abstract
-and indeterminate state into a concrete and particular act of
-vision--the seeing a white stone or wood: while the objective
-force also passes out of its abstract and indeterminate state into
-concrete--so that it is no longer whiteness, but a piece of white
-stone or wood actually seen.[34]
-
-[Footnote 32: Plato, Theaetet. p. 156 A. [Greek: o(s to\ pa=n
-ki/nesis e)=n, kai\ a)/llo para\ tou=to ou)de/n, te=s de\
-kine/seos du/o ei)/de, ple/thei me\n a)/peiron e(ka/teron,
-du/namin de\ to\ me\n poiei=n e)/chon, to\ de\ pa/schein. E)k de\
-te=s tou/ton o(mili/as te kai\ tri/pseos pro\s a)/llela gi/gnetai
-e)/kgona] ple/thei me\n a)/peira, di/duma de/--to\ me\n
-ai)stheto/n, to\ de\ ai)/sthesis], a)ei\ sunekpi/ptousa kai\
-gennome/ne meta\ tou= ai)sthetou=.]]
-
-[Footnote 33: Plato, Theaetet. p. 156 B.]
-
-[Footnote 34: Plato, Theaetet. p. 156 E. [Greek: o( me\n
-o)phthalmo\s a)/ra o)/pseos e)/mpleos e)ge/neto kai\ o(ra=| de\
-to/te kai\ _e)ge/neto ou)/ ti o)/psis a)lla\ o)phthalmo\s o(ro=n_,
-to\ de\ xuggenne=san to\ chro=ma leuko/tetos perieple/sthe kai\
-_e)ge/neto ou) leuko/tes au)=_ a)lla\ leuko/n, ei)/te xu/lon
-ei)/te li/thos ei)/te o(tiou=n xune/be chre=ma chrosthe=nai to=|
-toiou/to| chro/mati.]
-
-Plato's conception of the act of vision was--That fire darted
-forth from the eyes of the percipient and came into confluence or
-coalescence with fire approaching from the perceived object
-(Plato, Timaeus, pp. 45 C, 67 C).]
-
-[Side-note: Agent and Patient--No absolute Ens.]
-
-Accordingly, nothing can be affirmed to exist separately and by
-itself. All existences, come only as twin and correlative
-manifestations of this double agency. In fact neither of these
-agencies can be conceived independently and apart from the other:
-each of them is a nullity without the other.[35] If either of them
-be varied, the result also will vary proportionally: each may be
-in its turn agent or patient, according to the different partners
-with which it comes into confluence.[36] It is therefore improper
-to say--Such or such a thing _exists_. Existence absolute,
-perpetual, and unchangeable is nowhere to be found: and all
-phrases which imply it are incorrect, though we are driven to use
-them by habit and for want of knowing better. All that is real is,
-the perpetual series of changeful and transient conjunctions; each
-Object, with a certain Subject,--each Subject, with a certain
-Object.[37] This is true not merely of individual objects, but
-also of those complex aggregates rationally apprehended which
-receive generic names, _man_, animal, stone, &c.[38] You must not
-therefore say that any thing _is_, absolutely and perpetually,
-good, honourable, hot, white, hard, great--but only that it is so
-felt or esteemed by certain subjects more or less numerous.[39]
-
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Theaetet. p. 157 A. [Greek: e)pei\ kai\ to\
-poiou=n ei)=nai ti kai\ to\ pa/schon au)= ti e)pi\ e(no\s noe=sai,
-o(/s phasin, ou)k ei)=nai pagi/os. Ou)/te ga\r poiou=n e)sti/ ti,
-pri\n a)\n to=| pa/schonti xune/lthe|--ou)/te pa/schon, pri\n a)\n
-to=| poiou=nti], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 36: Plato, Theaetet. p. 157 A. [Greek: to/ te/ tini
-xuneltho\n kai\ poiou=n a)/llo| au)= prospeso\n pa/schon
-a)nepha/ne.]]
-
-[Footnote 37: Plato, Theaetet. p. 157 A. [Greek: ou)de\n ei)=nai
-e(\n au)to\ kath' au(to/, a)lla/ tini a)ei\ gi/gnesthai, to\ d'
-ei)=nai panta/chothen e)xairete/on], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 38: Plato, Theaetet. p. 157 B. [Greek: dei= de\ kai\
-kata\ me/ros ou(/to le/gein kai\ peri\ pollo=n a)throisthe/nton,
-o(=| de\ a)throi/smati a)/nthropo/n te ti/thentai kai\ li/thon
-kai\ e(/kaston zo=o/n te kai\ ei)=dos.]
-
-In this passage I follow Heindorf's explanation which seems
-dictated by the last word [Greek: ei)=dos]. Yet I am not sure that
-Plato does really mean here the _generic_ aggregates. He had
-before talked about sights, sounds, hot, cold, hard, &c., the
-separate sensations. He may perhaps here mean simply individual
-things as aggregates or [Greek: a)throi/smata]--a _man_, a
-_stone_, &c.]
-
-[Footnote 39: Plato, Theaetet. p. 157 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be
-answered.]
-
-The arguments advanced against this doctrine from the phenomena of
-dreams, distempers, or insanity, admit (continues Sokrates) of a
-satisfactory answer. A man who is dreaming, sick, or mad, believes
-in realities different from, and inconsistent with, those which he
-would believe in when healthy. But this is because he is, under
-those peculiar circumstances, a different Subject, unlike what he
-was before. One of the two factors of the result being thus
-changed, the result itself is changed.[40] The cardinal principle
-of Protagoras--the essential correlation, and indefeasible fusion,
-of Subject and Object, exhibits itself in a perpetual series of
-definite manifestations. To say that I (the Subject) perceive,--is
-to say that I perceive some Object: to perceive and perceive
-nothing, is a contradiction. Again, if an Object be sweet, it must
-be sweet to some percipient Subject: sweet, but sweet to no one,
-is impossible.[41] Necessity binds the essence of the percipient
-to that of something perceived: so that every name which you
-bestow upon either of them implies some reference to the other;
-and no name can be truly predicated of either, which implies
-existence (either perpetual or temporary) apart from the
-other.[42]
-
-[Footnote 40: Plato, Theaetet. p. 159.]
-
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Theaetet. p. 160 A.]
-
-[Footnote 42: Plato, Theaetet. p. 160 B. [Greek: e)/peiper e(mo=n
-e( a)na/gke te\n ou)si/an sundei= me/n, sundei= de ou)deni\ to=n
-a)/llon, ou)d' au)= e(mi=n au)toi=s; a)lle/lois de\ lei/petai
-sundede/sthai] (_i. e._ [Greek: to\n ai)sthano/menon] and [Greek:
-to\ poiou=n ai)stha/nesthai]). [Greek: O/ste ei)/te _tis ei)=nai
-ti/ o)noma/zei, tini\ ei)=nai, e)\ tino/s, e)\ pro/s ti, r(ete/on
-au)to=|, ei)/te gi/gnesthai; au)to\ de\ e)ph' au(tou= ti e)\ o)\n
-e)\ gigno/menon ou)/te au)to=| lekte/on, ou)/t' a)/llou le/gontos
-a)podekte/on_.]
-
-Compare Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 6, p. 1011, a. 23.]
-
-[Side-note: Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here
-by Sokrates is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the
-facts of consciousness by independent Subject and Object.]
-
-Such is the exposition which Sokrates is here made to give, of the
-Protagorean doctrine. How far the arguments, urged by him in its
-behalf, are such as Protagoras himself either really urged, or
-would have adopted, we cannot say. In so far as the doctrine
-asserts essential fusion and implication between Subject and
-Object, with actual multiplicity of distinct Subjects--denying the
-reality either of absolute and separate Subject, or of absolute
-and separate Object[43]--I think it true and instructive. We are
-reminded that when we affirm any thing about an Object, there is
-always (either expressed or tacitly implied) a Subject or Subjects
-(one, many, or all), _to whom_ the Object _is_ what it is declared
-to be. This is the fundamental characteristic of consciousness,
-feeling, and cognition, in all their actual varieties. All of them
-are bi-polar or bi-lateral, admitting of being looked at either on
-the subjective or on the objective side. Comparisons and
-contrasts, gradually multiplied, between one consciousness and
-another, lead us to distinguish the one of these points of view
-from the other. In some cases, the objective view is brought into
-light and prominence, and the subjective thrown into the dark and
-put out of sight: in other cases, the converse operation takes
-place. Sometimes the Ego or Subject is prominent, sometimes the
-Mecum or Object.[44] Sometimes the Objective is as it were
-divorced from the Subject, and projected outwards, so as to have
-an illusory appearance of existing apart from and independently of
-any Subject. In other cases, the subjective view is so exclusively
-lighted up and conspicuous, that Object disappears, and we talk of
-a mind conceiving, as if it had no correlative Concept. It is
-possible, by abstraction, to indicate, to name, and to reason
-about, the one of these two points of view without including
-direct notice of the other: this is abstraction or logical
-separation--a mental process useful and largely applicable, yet
-often liable to be mistaken for real distinctness and duality. In
-the present case, the two abstractions become separately so
-familiar to the mind, that this supposed duality is conceived as
-the primordial and fundamental fact: the actual, bilateral,
-consciousness being represented as a temporary derivative state,
-generated by the copulation of two factors essentially independent
-of each other. Such a theory, however, while aiming at an
-impracticable result, amounts only to an inversion of the truth.
-It aims at explaining our consciousness as a whole; whereas all
-that we can really accomplish, is to explain, up to a certain
-point, the conditions of conjunction and sequence between
-different portions of our consciousness. It also puts the
-primordial in the place of the derivative, and transfers the
-derivative to the privilege of the primordial. It attempts to find
-a generation for what is really primordial--the total series of
-our manifold acts of consciousness, each of a bilateral character,
-subjective on one side and objective on the other: and it assigns
-as the generating factors two concepts obtained by abstraction
-from these very acts,--resulting from multiplied comparisons,--and
-ultimately exaggerated into an illusion which treats the logical
-separation as if it were bisection in fact and reality.
-
-[Footnote 43: Aristotle, in a passage of the treatise De Anima
-(iii. 1, 2-4-7-8, ed. Trendelenburg, p. 425, b. 25, p. 426, a.
-15-25, Bekk.), impugns an opinion of certain antecedent [Greek:
-phusio/logoi] whom he does not specify; which opinion seems
-identical with the doctrine of Protagoras. These philosophers
-said, that "there was neither white nor black without vision, nor
-savour without the sense of taste". Aristotle says that they were
-partly right, partly wrong. They were right in regard to the
-actual, wrong in regard to the potential. The actual manifestation
-of the perceived is one and the same with that of the percipient,
-though the two are not the same logically in the view of the
-reflecting mind ([Greek: e( de\ tou= ai)sthetou= e)ne/rgeia kai\
-te=s ai)sthe/seos e( au)te\ me/n e)sti kai\ mi/a, to\ d' ei)=nai
-ou) tau)to\n au)tai=s]). But this is not true when we speak of
-them potentially--[Greek: dicho=s ga\r legome/nes te=s
-ai)sthe/seos kai\ tou= ai)sthetou=, to=n me\n kata\ du/namin to=n
-de\ kat' e)ne/rgeian, e)pi/ tou/ton me\n sumbai/nei to\ lechthe/n,
-e)pi\ de\ to=n e(te/ron ou) sumbai/nei. A)ll' e)kei=noi a(plo=s
-e)/legon peri\ to=n legome/non ou)ch a(plo=s.]
-
-I think that the distinction, which Aristotle insists upon as a
-confutation of these philosophers, is not well founded. What he
-states, in very just language, about _actual perception_ is
-equally true about _potential perception_. As the present fact of
-actual perception implicates essentially a determinate percipient
-subject with a determinate perceived object, and admits of being
-looked at either from the one point of view or from the other--so
-the concept of potential perception implicates in like manner an
-indeterminate perceivable with an indeterminate subject competent
-to perceive. The perceivable or cogitable has no meaning except in
-relation to some Capax Percipiendi or Capax Cogitandi.]
-
-[Footnote 44: The terms Ego and Mecum, to express the antithesis
-of these two [Greek: lo/go| mo/non chorista\], are used by
-Professor Ferrier in his very acute treatise, the Institutes of
-Metaphysic, pp. 93-96. The same antithesis is otherwise expressed
-by various modern writers in the terms Ego and non-Ego--le moi et
-le non-moi. I cannot think that this last is the proper way of
-expressing it. You do not want to negative the Ego, but to declare
-its essential implication with a variable correlate; to point out
-the bilateral character of the act of consciousness. The two are
-not merely _Relata secundum dici_ but _Relata secundum esse_, to
-use a distinction recognised in the scholastic logic.
-
-The implication of Subject and Object is expressed in a peculiar
-manner (though still clearly) by Aristotle in the treatise De
-Anima, iii. 8, 1, 431, b. 21. [Greek: e( psuche\ ta\ o)/nta _po/s_
-e)sti pa/nta; e)\ ga\r ai)stheta\ ta\ o)/nta e)\ noeta/. e)sti\ d'
-e( e)piste/me me\n ta\ e)pisteta/ _pos_, e( d' ai)/sthesis ta\
-ai)stheta/.] The adverb [Greek: pos] ([Greek: tro/pon tina/], as
-Simplikius explains it, fol. 78, b. 1) here deserves attention.
-"The soul is all existing things _in a certain way_ (or looked at
-under a certain aspect). All things are either Percepta or
-Cogitata: now Cognition is in a certain sense the
-Cognita--Perception is the Percepta." He goes on to say that the
-Percipient Mind is the Form of Percepta, while the matter of Percepta
-is without: but that the Cogitant Mind is identical with Cogitata,
-for they have no matter (iii. 4, 12, p. 430, a. 3, with the
-commentary of Simplikius p. 78, b. 17, f. 19, a. 12). This is in
-other words the Protagorean doctrine--That the mind is the measure
-of all existences; and that this is even more true about [Greek:
-noeta\] than about [Greek: ai)stheta/]. That doctrine is
-completely independent of the theory, that [Greek: e)piste/me] is
-[Greek: ai)/sthesis].
-
-It is in conformity with this affirmation of Aristotle (partially
-approved even by Cudworth--see Mosheim's Transl. of Intell. Syst.
-Vol. II. ch. viii. pp. 27-28)--[Greek: e( psuche\ ta\ o)/nta po/s
-e)sti pa/nta]--that Mr. John Stuart Mill makes the following
-striking remark about the number of ultimate Laws of Nature:--
-
-"It is useful to remark, that the ultimate Laws of Nature cannot
-possibly be less numerous than the distinguishable sensations or
-other feelings of our nature: those, I mean, which are
-distinguishable from one another in quality, and not merely in
-quantity or degree. For example, since there is a phenomenon _sui
-generis_ called colour, which our consciousness testifies to be
-not a particular degree of some other phenomenon, as heat, or
-odour, or motion, but intrinsically unlike all others, it follows
-that there are ultimate laws of colour . . The ideal limit
-therefore of the explanation of natural phenomena would be to show
-that each distinguishable variety of our sensations or other
-states of consciousness has only one sort of cause." (System of
-Logic, Book iii. ch. 14, s. 2.)]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference
-to a double potentiality--Subjective and Objective.]
-
-In Plato's exposition of the Protagorean theory, the true doctrine
-held by Protagoras,[45] and the illusory explanation (whether
-belonging to him or to Plato himself), are singularly blended
-together. He denies expressly all separate existence either of
-Subject or Object--all possibility of conceiving or describing the
-one as a reality distinct from the other. He thus acknowledges
-consciousness and cognition as essentially bilateral. Nevertheless
-he also tries to explain the generation of these acts of
-consciousness, by the hypothesis of a _latens processus_ behind
-them and anterior to them--two continuous moving forces, agent and
-patient, originally distinct, conspiring as joint factors to a
-succession of compound results. But when we examine the language
-in which Plato describes these forces, we see that he conceives
-them only as Abstractions and Potentialities;[46] though he
-ascribes to them a metaphorical copulation and generation. "Every
-thing is motion (or change): of which there are two sorts, each
-infinitely manifold: one, having power to act--the other having
-power to suffer." Here instead of a number of distinct facts of
-consciousness, each bilateral--we find ourselves translated by
-abstraction into a general potentiality of consciousness, also
-essentially bilateral and multiple. But we ought to recollect,
-that the Potential is only a concept abstracted from the
-actual,--and differing from it in this respect, that it includes what
-has been and what may be, as well as what is. But it is nothing new
-and distinct by itself: it cannot be produced as a substantive
-antecedent to the actual, and as if it afforded explanation
-thereof. The general proposition about motion or change (above
-cited in the words of Plato), as far as it purports to get behind
-the fact of consciousness and to assign its cause or antecedent--is
-illusory. But if considered as a general expression for that
-fact itself, in the most comprehensive terms--indicating the
-continuous thread of separate, ever-changing acts of
-consciousness, each essentially bilateral, or subjective as well
-as objective--in this point of view the proposition is just and
-defensible.[47]
-
-[Footnote 45: The elaborate Dissertation of Sir William Hamilton,
-on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned (standing first in his
-'Discussions on Philosophy'), is a valuable contribution to
-metaphysical philosophy. He affirms and shows, "That the
-Unconditioned is incognisable and inconceivable: its notion being
-only a negation of the Conditioned, which last can alone be
-positively known and conceived" (p. 12); refuting the opposite
-doctrine as proclaimed, with different modifications, both by
-Schelling and Cousin.
-
-In an Appendix to this Dissertation, contained in the same volume
-(p. 608), Sir W. Hamilton not only re-asserts the doctrine ("Our
-whole knowledge of mind and matter is relative,
-conditioned--relatively conditioned. Of things absolutely or in
-themselves, be they external, be they internal, we know nothing, or
-know them only as incognisable," &c.)--but affirms farther that
-philosophers of every school, with the exception of a few late absolute
-theorisers in Germany, have always held and harmoniously re-echoed
-the same doctrine.
-
-In proof of such unanimous agreement, he cites passages from
-seventeen different philosophers.
-
-The first name on his list stands as follows:--"1. Protagoras--(as
-reported by Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius,
-&c.)--Man is (for himself) the measure of all things".
-
-Sir William Hamilton understands the Protagorean doctrine as I
-understand it, and as I have endeavoured to represent it in the
-present chapter. It has been very generally misconceived.
-
-I cannot, however, agree with Sir William Hamilton, in thinking
-that this theory respecting the Unconditioned and the Absolute,
-has been the theory generally adopted by philosophers. The
-passages which he cites from other authors are altogether
-insufficient to prove such an affirmation.]
-
-[Footnote 46: Plato, Theaetet. p. 156 A. [Greek: te=s de\ kine/seos
-du/o ei)/de, ple/thei me\n a)/peiron e(ka/teron, du/namin de\ to\
-me\n poiei=n e)/chon, to\ de\ pa/schein.]]
-
-[Footnote 47: In that distinction, upon which Aristotle lays so
-much stress, between Actus and Potentia, he declares Actus or
-actuality to be the Prius--Potentia or potentiality to be the
-Posterius. See Metaphysica, [Greek: Th]. 8, 1049, b. 5 seqq.; De
-Anima, ii. 4, 415, a. 17. The Potential is a derivative from the
-Actual--derived by comparison, abstraction, and logical analysis:
-a Mental concept, helping us to describe, arrange, and reason
-about, the multifarious acts of sense or consciousness--but not an
-anterior generating reality.
-
-Turgot observes (OEuvres, vol. iii. pp. 108-110; Article in the
-Encyclopedie, _Existence_):--
-
-"Le premier fondement de la notion de l'_existence_ est la
-conscience de notre propre sensation, et le sentiment du _moi_ qui
-resulte de cette conscience. La relation necessaire entre l'etre
-appercevant, et l'etre appercu considere hors du _moi_, suppose
-dans les deux termes la meme realite. Il y a dans l'un et dans
-l'autre un fondement de cette relation, que l'homme, s'il avoit un
-langage, pourroit designer par le nom commun d'_existence_ ou de
-_presence_: car ces deux notions ne seroient point encore
-distinguees l'une de l'autre. . . .
-
-"Mais il est tres-important d'observer que ni la simple sensation
-des objets presens, ni la peinture que fait l'imagination des
-objets absens, ni le simple rapport de distance ou d'activite
-reciproque, commun aux uns et aux autres, ne sont precisement la
-chose que l'esprit voudroit designer par le nom general
-d'_existence_; c'est le fondement meme de ces rapports, suppose
-commun au _moi_, a l'objet vu et a l'objet simplement distant,
-sur lequel tombe veritablement et le nom d'_existence_ et notre
-affirmation, lorsque nous disons qu'une chose _existe_. Ce
-fondement n'est ni ne peut etre connu immediatement, et ne nous
-est indique que par les rapports differents qui le supposent: nous
-nous en formons cependant une espece d'idee que nous tirons par
-voie d'abstraction du temoignage que la conscience nous rend de
-nous-memes et de notre sensation actuelle: c'est-a-dire, que nous
-transportons en quelque sorte cette conscience du _moi_ sur les
-objets exterieurs, par une espece d'assimilation vague, dementie
-aussitot** par la separation de tout ce qui caracterise le _moi_,
-mais qui ne suffit pas moins pour devenir le fondement _d'une
-abstraction ou d'un signe commun, et pour etre l'objet de nos
-jugemens_."]
-
-It is to be remembered, that the doctrine here criticised is
-brought forward by the Platonic Sokrates as a doctrine not his
-own, but held by others; among whom he ranks Protagoras as one.
-
-Having thus set forth in his own language, and as an advocate, the
-doctrine of Protagoras, Sokrates proceeds to impugn it: in his
-usual rambling and desultory way, but with great dramatic charm
-and vivacity. He directs his attacks alternately against the two
-doctrines: 1. _Homo Mensura_: 2. Cognition is sensible perception.
-
-I shall first notice what he advances against _Homo Mensura_.
-
-[Side-note: Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the
-Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on
-a par--that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every
-one, but the wise man only, is a measure.]
-
-It puts every man (he says) on a par as to wisdom and
-intelligence: and not only every man, but every horse, dog, frog,
-and other animal along with him. Each man is a measure for
-himself: all his judgments and beliefs are true: he is therefore
-as wise as Protagoras and has no need to seek instruction from
-Protagoras.[48] Reflection, study, and dialectic discussion, are
-superfluous and useless to him: he is a measure to himself on the
-subject of geometry, and need not therefore consult a professed
-geometrician like Theodorus.[49]
-
-[Footnote 48: Plato, Theaetet. p. 161. Compare Plato, Kratylus, p.
-386 C, where the same argument is employed.]
-
-[Footnote 49: Plato, Theaetet. p. 169 A.]
-
-The doctrine is contradicted (continues Sokrates) by the common
-opinions of mankind: for no man esteems himself a measure on all
-things. Every one believes that there are some things on which he
-is wiser than his neighbour--and others on which his neighbour is
-wiser than he. People are constantly on the look out for teachers
-and guides.[50] If Protagoras advances an opinion which others
-declare to be false, he must, since he admits their opinion to be
-true, admit his own opinion to be false.[51] No animal, nor any
-common man, is a measure; but only those men, who have gone
-through special study and instruction in the matter upon which
-they pronounce.[52]
-
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Theaetet. p. 170.]
-
-[Footnote 51: Plato, Theaetet. p. 171 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n te\n
-au(tou= a)\n pseude= xugchoroi=, ei) te\n to=n e(goume/non au)to\n
-pseu/desthai o(mologei= a)lethe= ei)=nai?]]
-
-[Footnote 52: Plato, Theaetet. p. 171 C.]
-
-[Side-note: In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for
-himself. Where future consequences are involved special knowledge
-is required.]
-
-In matters of present and immediate sensation, hot, cold, dry,
-moist, sweet, bitter, &c., Sokrates acknowledges that every man
-must judge _for himself_, and that what each pronounces is true
-_for himself_. So too, about honourable or base, just or unjust,
-holy or unholy--whatever rules any city may lay down, are true
-_for itself_: no man, no city,--is wiser upon these matters than
-any other.[53] But in regard to what is good, profitable,
-advantageous, healthy, &c., the like cannot be conceded. Here
-(says Sokrates) one man, and one city, is decidedly wiser, and
-judges more truly, than another. We cannot say that the judgment
-of each is true;[54] or that what every man or every city
-anticipates to promise good or profit, will necessarily realise
-such anticipations. In such cases, not merely present sentiment,
-but future consequences are involved.
-
-[Footnote 53: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 172 A, 177 E.]
-
-[Footnote 54: Plato, Theaetet. p. 172.]
-
-Here then we discover the distinction which Plato would draw.[55]
-Where present sentiment alone is involved, as in hot and cold,
-sweet and bitter, just and unjust, honourable and base, &c., there
-each is a judge for himself, and one man is no better judge than
-another. But where future consequences are to be predicted, the
-ignorant man is incapable: none but the professional Expert, or
-the prophet,[56] is competent to declare the truth. When a dinner
-is on table, each man among the guests can judge whether it is
-good: but while it is being prepared, none but the cook can judge
-whether it _will be_ good.[57] This is one Platonic objection
-against the opinion of Protagoras, when he says that every opinion
-of every man is true. Another objection is, that opinions of
-different men are opposite and contradictory,[58] some of them
-contradicting the Protagorean dictum itself.
-
-[Footnote 55: Plato, Theaetet. p. 178.]
-
-[Footnote 56: Plato, Theaetet. p. 179. [Greek: ei)/ pe| tou\s
-suno/ntas e)/peithen, o(/ti kai\ to\ me/llon e)/sesthai/ te kai\
-do/xein ou)/te ma/ntis ou)/te tis a)/llos a)/meinon kri/neien a)\n
-e)\ au)to\s au(to=|.]]
-
-[Footnote 57: Plato, Theaetet. p. 178.]
-
-[Footnote 58: Plato, Theaetet. p. 179 B.
-
-_Theodor._ [Greek: E)kei/ne| moi dokei= ma/lista a(li/skesthai o(
-lo/gos, a(lisko/menos kai\ tau/te|, e)=| ta\s to=n a)/llon do/xas
-kuri/as poiei=, au(=tai de\ e)pha/nesan tou\s e)kei/nou lo/gous
-ou)dame=| a)lethei=s e(gou/menai.]
-
-_Sokrat._ [Greek: Pollache=| kai\ a)/lle| a)\n to/ ge toiou=ton
-a(loi/e, me\ pa=san panto\s a)lethe= do/xan ei)=nai; peri\ de\ to\
-paro\n e(ka/sto| pa/thos, e)x o(=n ai( ai)sthe/seis kai\ ai( kata\
-tau/tas do/xai gi/gnontai . . . I)/sos de\ ou)de\n le/go,
-a)na/lotoi ga/r, ei) e)/tuchon, ei)si/n.]]
-
-[Side-note: Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras,
-states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging
-to it. All belief relative to the condition of the believing
-mind.]
-
-Such are the objections urged by Sokrates against the Protagorean
-doctrine--_Homo Mensura_. There may have been perhaps in the
-treatise of Protagoras, which unfortunately we do not possess,
-some reasonings or phrases countenancing the opinions against
-which Plato here directs his objections. But so far as I can
-collect, even from the words of Plato himself when he professes to
-borrow the phraseology of his opponent, I cannot think that
-Protagoras ever delivered the opinion which Plato here
-refutes--_That every opinion of every man is true_. The opinion really
-delivered by Protagoras appears to have been[59]--_That every
-opinion delivered by every man is true, to that man himself_. But
-Plato, when he impugns it, leaves out the final qualification;
-falling unconsciously into the fallacy of passing (as logicians
-say) _a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_.[60] The
-qualification thus omitted by Plato forms the characteristic
-feature of the Protagorean doctrine, and is essential to the
-phraseology founded upon it. Protagoras would not declare any
-proposition to be true absolutely, or false absolutely. The
-phraseology belonging to that doctrine is forced upon him by
-Plato. Truth Absolute there is none, according to Protagoras. All
-truth is and must be truth relative to some one or more persons,
-either actually accepting and believing in it, or conceived as
-potential believers under certain circumstances. Moreover since
-these believers are a multitude of individuals, each with his own
-peculiarities--so no truth can be believed in, except under the
-peculiar measure of the believing individual mind. What a man
-adopts as true, and what he rejects as false, are conditioned
-alike by this limit: a limit not merely different in different
-individuals, but variable and frequently varying in the same
-individual. You cannot determine a dog, or a horse, or a child to
-believe in the Newtonian astronomy: you could not determine the
-author of the Principia in 1687 to believe what the child Newton
-had believed in 1647.[61] To say that what is true to one man, is
-false to another--that what _was_ true to an individual as a child
-or as a youth, becomes false to him in his advanced years, is no
-real contradiction: though Plato, by omitting the qualifying
-words, presents it as if it were such. In every man's mind, the
-beliefs of the past have been modified or reversed, and the
-beliefs of the present are liable to be modified or reversed, by
-subsequent operative causes: by new supervening sensations,
-emotions, intellectual comparisons, authoritative teaching, or
-society, and so forth.
-
-[Footnote 59: Plato, Theaetet. p. 152 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou(/to
-pos le/gei] (Protagoras) [Greek: o(s oi(=a me\n e(/kasta e)moi\
-phai/netai, toiau=ta me/n e)stin e)moi/--oi(=a de\ soi/, toiau=ta
-de\ au)= soi/.] 158 A. [Greek: ta\ phaino/mena e(ka/sto| tau=ta
-kai\ ei)=nai tou/to| o(=| phai/netai.] 160 C. [Greek: A)lethe\s
-a)/ra e)moi\ e( e)me\ ai)/sthesis; te=s ga\r e)me=s ou)si/as a)ei/
-e)sti; kai\ e)go\ krite\s kata\ to\n Protago/ran to=n te o)/nton
-e)moi/, o(s e)/sti, kai\ to=n me\ o)/nton, o(s ou)k e)/stin.]
-
-Comp. also pp. 166 D, 170 A, 177 C.
-
-Instead of saying [Greek: ai)/sthesis] (in the passage just cited,
-p. 160 D), we might with quite equal truth put [Greek: A)lethe\s
-a)/ra e)moi\ e( e)me\ _no/esis_; te=s ga\r e)me=s ou)si/as a)ei/
-e)/stin]. In this respect [Greek: ai)/sthesis] and [Greek:
-no/esis] are on a par. [Greek: No/esis] is just as much relative
-to [Greek: o( noo=n] as [Greek: ai)/sthesis] to [Greek: o(
-ai)sthano/menos].
-
-Sextus Empiricus adverts to the doctrines of Protagoras (mainly to
-point out how they are distinguished from those of the Sceptical
-school, to which he himself belongs) in Pyrrhon. Hypot. i. sects.
-215-219; adv. Mathematicos, vii. s. 60-64-388-400. He too imputes
-to Protagoras both the two doctrines. 1. That man is the measure
-of all things: that what appears to each person is, _to him_: that
-all truth is thus relative. 2. That all phantasms, appearances,
-opinions, are _true_. Sextus reasons at some length (390 seq.)
-against this doctrine No. 2, and reasons very much as Protagoras
-himself would have reasoned, since he appeals to individual
-sentiment and movement of the individual mind ([Greek: ou)k
-o(sau/tos ga\r kinou/metha], 391-400). It appears to me perfectly
-certain that Protagoras advanced the general thesis of Relativity:
-we see this as well from Plato as from Sextus--[Greek: kai\
-ou(/tos ei)sa/gei to\ pro/s ti--to=n pro/s ti ei)=nai te\n
-a)lethei/an] (Steinhart is of opinion that these words [Greek:
-to=n pro/s ti ei)=nai te\n a)lethei/an] are an addition of Sextus
-himself, and do not describe the doctrine of Protagoras; an
-opinion from which I dissent, and which is contradicted by Plato
-himself: Steinhart, Einleitung, note 8). If Protagoras also
-advanced the doctrine--all opinions are true--this was not
-consistent with his cardinal principle of relativity. Either he
-himself did not take care always to enunciate the qualifications
-and limitations which his theory requires, and which in common
-parlance are omitted--Or his opponents left out the limitations
-which he annexed, and impugned the opinion as if it stood without
-any. This last supposition I think the most probable.
-
-The doctrine of Protagoras is correctly given by Sextus in the
-Pyrrhon. Hypot.]
-
-[Footnote 60: Aristotle, in commenting on the Protagorean formula,
-falls into a similar inaccuracy in slurring over the restrictive
-qualification annexed by Protagoras. Metaphysic. [Greek: G]. p.
-1009, a. 6. Compare hereupon Bonitz's note upon the passage, p.
-199 of his edition.
-
-This transition without warning, _a dicto secundum quid ad dictum
-simpliciter_, is among the artifices ascribed by Plato to the
-Sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus (Plat. Euthyd. p. 297 D).]
-
-[Footnote 61: The argument produced by Plato to discredit the
-Protagorean theory--that it puts the dog or the horse on a level
-with man--furnishes in reality a forcible illustration of the
-truth of the theory.
-
-Mr. James Harris, the learned Aristotelian of the last century,
-remarks, in his Dialogue on Happiness (Works, ed. 1772, pp.
-143-168):--
-
-"Every particular Species is, itself to itself, the Measure of all
-things in the Universe. As things vary in their relations to it,
-they vary also in their value. If their value be ever doubtful, it
-can noway be adjusted but by recurring with accuracy to the
-natural State of the Species, and to those several Relations which
-such a State of course creates."]
-
-[Side-note: All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of
-individual judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by
-elliptical forms of language.]
-
-The fact, that all exposition and discussion is nothing more than
-an assemblage of individual judgments, depositions, affirmations,
-negations, &c, is disguised from us by the elliptical form in
-which it is conducted. For example:--I, who write this book--can
-give nothing more than my own report, as a witness, of facts known
-to me, and of what has been said, thought, or done by others,--for
-all which I cite authorities:--and my own conviction, belief or
-disbelief, as to the true understanding thereof, and the
-conclusions deducible. I produce the reasons which justify my
-opinion: I reply to those reasons which have been supposed by
-others to justify the opposite. It is for the reader to judge how
-far my reasons appear satisfactory to his mind.[62] To deliver my
-own convictions, is all that is in my power: and if I spoke with
-full correctness and amplitude, it would be incumbent on me to
-avoid pronouncing any opinion to be _true_ or _false_ simply: I
-ought to say, it is _true to me--or false to me_. But to repeat
-this in every other sentence, would be a tiresome egotism. It is
-understood once for all by the title-page of the book: an opponent
-will know what he has to deal with, and will treat the opinions
-accordingly. If any man calls upon me to give him absolute truth,
-and to lay down the canon of evidence for identifying it--I cannot
-comply with the request, any farther than to deliver my own best
-judgment, what is truth--and to declare what is the canon of
-evidence which guides my own mind. Each reader must determine for
-himself whether he accepts it or not. I might indeed clothe my own
-judgments in oracular and vehement language: I might proclaim them
-as authoritative dicta: I might speak as representing the Platonic
-Ideal, Typical Man,--or as inspired by a [Greek: dai/mon] like
-Sokrates: I might denounce opponents as worthless men, deficient
-in all the sentiments which distinguish men from brutes, and
-meriting punishment as well as disgrace. If I used all these harsh
-phrases, I should only imitate what many authors of repute think
-themselves entitled to say, about THEIR beliefs and convictions.
-Yet in reality, I should still be proclaiming nothing beyond my
-own feelings:--the force of emotional association, and antipathy
-towards opponents, which had grown round these convictions in my
-own mind. Whether I speak in accordance with others, or in
-opposition to others, in either case I proclaim my own reports,
-feelings and judgments--nothing farther. I cannot escape from the
-Protagorean limit or measures.[63]
-
-[Footnote 62: M. Destutt Tracy observes as follows:--
-
-"De meme que toutes nos propositions peuvent etre ramenees a la
-forme de propositions enonciatives, parce qu'au fond elles
-expriment toutes un jugement; de meme, toutes nos propositions
-enonciatives peuvent ensuite etre toujours reduites a n'etre
-qu'une de celles-ci: 'je pense, je sens, ou je percois, que telle
-chose est de telle maniere, ou que tel etre produit tel
-effet'--_propositions dont nous sommes nous-memes le sujet, parce
-qu'au fond nous sommes toujours le subjet de tous nos jugemens_,
-puisqu'ils n'expriment jamais qu'une impression que nous
-eprouvons." (Ideologie: Supplement a la premiere Section, vol. iv.
-p. 165, ed. 1825 duodec.)
-
-"On peut meme dire que comme nous ne sentons, ne savons, et ne
-connaissons, rien que par rapport a nous, l'idee, sujet de la
-proposition, est toujours en definitif notre moi; car quand je dis
-_cet arbre est vert_, je dis reellement _je sens, je sais, je
-vois, que cet arbre est vert_. Mais _precisement parce que ce
-preambule se trouve toujours et necessairement compris dans toutes
-nos propositions, nous le supprimons quand nous voulons_; et toute
-idee peut etre le sujet de la proposition." (Principes Logiques,
-vol. iv. ch. viii. p. 231.)]
-
-[Footnote 63: Sokrates himself states as much as this in the
-course of his reply to the doctrine of Protagoras, Theaetet. 171
-D.: [Greek: a)ll' e(mi=n a)na/gke, oi)=mai, chre=sthai e(mi=n
-au)toi=s . . . kai\ ta\ dokou=nta a)ei/, tau=ta le/gein.]
-
-The necessity ([Greek: a)na/gke]) to which Sokrates here adverts,
-is well expressed by M. Degerando. "En jugeant ce que pensent les
-autres hommes, en comprenant ce qu'ils eprouvent, nous ne sortons
-point en effet de nous-memes, comme on seroit tente de le croire.
-C'est dans nos propres idees que nous voyons leurs idees, leurs
-manieres d'etre, leur existence meme. Le monde entier ne nous est
-connu que dans une sorte de chambre obscure: et lorsqu'au sortir
-d'une societe nombreuse nous croyons avoir lu dans les esprits et
-dans les coeurs, avoir observe des caracteres, et senti (si je
-puis dire ainsi) la vie d'un grand nombre d'hommes--nous ne
-faisons en effet que sortir d'une grande galerie dont notre
-imagination a fait tous les frais; dont elle a cree tous les
-personnages, et dessine, avec plus ou moins de verite, tous les
-tableaux." (Degerando, Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser, vol. i.
-ch. v. p. 132.)]
-
-[Side-note: Argument--That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all
-men and animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to
-sustain Plato's objection.]
-
-To this theory Plato imputes as a farther consequence, that it
-equalises all men and all animals. No doubt, the measure or limit
-as generically described, bears alike upon all: but it does not
-mark the same degree in all. Each man's bodily efforts are
-measured or limited by the amount of his physical force: this is
-alike true of all men: yet it does not follow that the physical
-force of all men is equal. The dog, the horse, the new-born child,
-the lunatic, is each a measure of truth to himself: the
-philosopher is so also to himself: this is alike true, whatever
-may be the disparity of intelligence: and is rather more obviously
-true when the disparity is great, because the lower intelligence
-has then a very narrow stock of beliefs, and is little modifiable
-by the higher. But though the Protagorean doctrine declares the
-dog or the child to be a measure of truth--each to himself--it
-does not declare either of them to be a measure of truth to me, to
-you, or to any ordinary by-stander. How far any person is a
-measure of truth to others, depends upon the estimation in which
-he is held by others: upon the belief which they entertain
-respecting his character or competence. Here is a new element let
-in, of which Plato, in his objection to the Protagorean doctrine,
-takes no account. When he affirms that Protagoras by his
-equalising doctrine acknowledged himself to be no better in point
-of wisdom and judgment than a dog or a child, this inference must
-be denied.[64] The Protagorean doctrine is perfectly consistent
-with great diversities of knowledge, intellect, emotion, and
-character, between one man and another. Such diversities are
-recognised in individual belief and estimation, and are thus
-comprehended in the doctrine. Nor does Protagoras deny that men
-are teachable and modifiable. The scholar after being taught will
-hold beliefs different from those which he held before. Protagoras
-professed to know more than others, and to teach them: others on
-their side also believed that he knew more than they, and came to
-learn it. Such belief on both sides, noway contradicts the general
-doctrine here under discussion. What the scholar believes to be
-true, is still true to him: among those things which he believes
-to be true, one is, that the master knows more than he: in coming
-to be taught, he acts upon his own conviction. To say that a man
-is wise, is to say, that he is wise _in some one's estimation_:
-your own or that of some one else. Such estimation is always
-implied, though often omitted in terms. Plato remarks very truly,
-that every one believes some others to be on certain matters wiser
-than himself. In other words, what is called authority--that
-predisposition to assent, with which we hear the statements and
-opinions delivered by some other persons--is one of the most
-operative causes in determining human belief. The circumstances of
-life are such as to generate this predisposition in every one's
-mind to a greater or less degree, and towards some persons more
-than towards others.
-
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Theaetet. p. 161 D. [Greek: o( d' a)/ra
-e)tu/gchanen o)\n ei)s phro/nesin ou)de\n belti/on batra/chou
-guri/nou, me\ o(/ti a)/llou tou a)nthro/pon.] I substitute the dog
-or horse as illustrations.]
-
-[Side-note: Belief on authority is true to the believer
-himself--The efficacy of authority resides in the believer's own mind.]
-
-Belief on authority is true to the believer himself, like all his
-other beliefs, according to the Protagorean doctrine: and in
-acting upon it,--in following the guidance of A, and not following
-the guidance of B,--he is still a measure to himself. It is not to
-be supposed that Protagoras ever admitted all men to be equally
-wise, though Plato puts such an admission into his mouth as an
-inference undeniable and obvious. His doctrine affirms something
-altogether different:--that whether you believe yourself to be
-wise or unwise, in either case the belief is equally your
-own--equally the result of your own mental condition and
-predisposition,--equally true to yourself,--and equally an item
-among the determining conditions of your actions. That the beliefs
-and convictions of one person might be modified by another, was a
-principle held by Protagoras not less than by Sokrates: the former
-employed as his modifying instrument, eloquent lecturing--the
-latter, dialectical cross-examination. Both of them recognise the
-belief of the person to whom they address themselves as true to
-him, yet at the same time as something which may be modified and
-corrected, by appealing to what they thought the better parts of
-it against the worse.
-
-[Side-note: Protagorean formula--is false, to those who dissent
-from it.]
-
-Again--Sokrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras--"Your
-doctrine is pronounced to be false by many persons: but you admit
-that the belief of all persons is true: therefore your doctrine is
-false".[65] Here also Plato omits the qualification annexed by
-Protagoras to his general principle--Every man's belief is
-true--that is, true _to him_. That a belief should be true, to one man,
-and false to another--is not only no contradiction to the formula
-of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula
-contemplates. He of course could only proclaim it as true to
-himself. It is the express purpose of his doctrine to disallow the
-absolutely true and the absolutely false. His own formula, like
-every other opinion, is false to those who dissent from it: but it
-is not false absolutely, any more than any other doctrine. Plato
-therefore does not make out his charge of contradiction.
-
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Theaetet. p. 171 A. Sextus Empiric. (adv.
-Mathem. vii. 61) gives a pertinent answer to this objection.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's argument--That the wise man alone is a
-measure--Reply to it.]
-
-Some men (says Sokrates) have learnt,--have bestowed study on
-special matters,--have made themselves wise upon those matters.
-Others have not done the like, but remain ignorant. It is the wise
-man only who is a measure: the ignorant man neither is so, nor
-believes himself to be so, but seeks guidance from the wise.[66]
-
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 171 C, 179 B.]
-
-Upon this we may remark--First, that even when the untaught men
-are all put aside, and the erudites or Experts remain alone--still
-these very erudites or Experts, the men of special study, are
-perpetually differing among themselves; so that we cannot
-recognise one as a measure, without repudiating the authority of
-the rest.[67] If by a measure, Plato means an infallible measure,
-he will not find it in this way: he is as far from the absolute as
-before. Next, it is perfectly correct that if any man be known to
-have studied or acquired experience on special matters, his
-opinion obtains an authority with others (more or fewer), such as
-the opinion of an ignorant man will not possess. This is a real
-difference between the graduated man and the non-graduated. But it
-is a difference not contradicting the theory of Protagoras; who
-did not affirm that every man's opinion was equally trustworthy in
-the estimation of others, but that every man's opinion was alike a
-measure to the man himself. The authority of the guide resides in
-the belief and opinion of those who follow him, or who feel
-prepared to follow him if necessity arises. A man gone astray on
-his journey, asks the way to his destination from residents whom
-he believes to know it, just as he might look at a compass, or at
-the stars, if no other persons were near. In following their
-direction, he is acting on his own belief, that he himself is
-ignorant on the point in question and that they know. He is a
-measure to himself, both of the extent of his own ignorance, and
-of the extent of his own knowledge. And in this respect all are
-alike--every man, woman, child, and animal;[68] though they are by
-no means alike in the estimation of others, as trustworthy
-authorities.
-
-[Footnote 67: "Nam, quod dicunt omnino, se credere ei quem
-judicent fuisse sapientem--probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti
-judicare potuissent (statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maxime
-videtur esse sapientis). _Sed, ut potuerint, potuerunt, omnibus
-rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis: judicaverunt
-autem re semel audita, atque ad unius se auctoritatem
-contulerunt._" (Cicero, Acad. Priora, ii. 3, 9.)]
-
-[Footnote 68: Plato, Theaetet. p. 171 E. I transcribe the following
-from the treatise of Fichte (Beruf des Menschen, Destination de
-l'Homme; Traduction de Barchou de Penhoen, ch. i. Le Doute, pp.
-54-55):--
-
-"De la conscience de chaque individu, la nature se contemplant
-sous un point de vue different, il en resulte que je m'appelle
-_moi_, et que tu t'appelles _toi_. Pour toi, je suis hors de toi;
-et pour moi, tu es hors de moi. Dans ce qui est hors de moi, je me
-saisis d'abord de ce qui m'avoisine le plus, de ce qui est le plus
-a ma portee: toi, tu fais de meme. Chacun de notre cote, nous
-allons ensuite au dela. Puis, ayant commence a cheminer ainsi dans
-le monde de deux points de depart differens, nous suivons, pendant
-le reste de notre vie, des routes qui se coupent ca et la, mais
-qui jamais ne suivent exactement la meme direction, jamais ne
-courent parallelement l'une a l'autre. Tous les individus
-possibles peuvent etre: par consequent aussi, tous les points de
-vue de conscience possibles. _La somme de ces consciences
-individuelles fait la conscience universelle: il n'y a pas
-d'autre._ Ce n'est en effet que dans l'individu que se trouve a la
-fois et la limitation et la realite. Dans l'individu la conscience
-est entierement determinee par la nature intime de l'individu. Il
-n'est donne a personne de savoir autre chose que ce qu'il sait. Il
-ne pourrait pas davantage savoir les memes choses d'une autre
-facon qu'il ne les sait."
-
-The same doctrine is enforced with great originality and acuteness
-in a recent work of M. Eugene Veron, Du Progres Intellectuel dans
-l'Humanite, Superiorite des Arts Modernes sur les Arts Anciens
-(Paris, 1862, Guillaumin). M. Veron applies his general doctrine
-mainly to the theory of Art and AEsthetics: moreover he affirms
-more than I admit respecting human progress as a certain and
-constant matter of fact. But he states clearly, as an universal
-truth, the relative point of view--the necessary measurement for
-itself, of each individual mind--and the consequent obligation, on
-each, to allow to other minds the like liberty. We read, pp.
-14-16-17:--
-
-"Cela revient a dire que dans quelque cas que nous supposions,
-nous ne pouvons sentir que dans la mesure de notre sensibilite,
-comprendre et juger que dans la mesure de notre intelligence; et
-que nos facultes etant en perpetuel developpement, les variations
-de notre personnalite entrainent necessairement celles de nos
-jugemens, meme quand nous n'en avons pas conscience. . . Chaque
-homme a son esprit particulier. Ce que l'un comprend sans peine,
-un autre ne le peut saisir; ce qui repugne a l'un, plait a
-l'autre: ce qui ce me parait odieux, mon voisin l'approuve.
-Quelque bonne envie que nous semblions avoir de nous perdre dans
-la foule, de depouiller notre individualite pour emprunter des
-jugemens tout faits et des opinions taillees a la mesure et a
-l'usage du public--il est facile de voir que, tout en ayant l'air
-de repeter la lecon apprise, nous jugeons a notre maniere, quand
-nous jugeons: que notre jugement, tout en paraissant etre celui de
-tout le monde, n'en reste pas moins personnel, et n'est pas une
-simple imitation: que cette ressemblance meme est souvent plus
-apparente que reelle: que l'identite exterieure des formules et
-des expressions ne prouve pas absolument celle de la pensee. Rien
-n'est elastique comme les mots, et comme les principes generaux
-dans lesquels on pense enfermer les intelligences. C'est souvent
-quand le langage est le plus semblable qu'on est le plus loin de
-s'entendre.
-
-"Du reste, quand meme cette ressemblance serait aussi reelle
-qu'elle est fausse, en quoi prouverait-il l'identite necessaire
-des intelligences? Qu'y aurait-il d'etonnant qu'au milieu de ce
-communisme intellectual qui regit l'education de chaque classe, et
-determine nos habitudes intellectuelles et morales, les
-distinctions natives disparussent ou s'attenuassent? Ne faut-il
-pas plutot admirer l'opiniatre vitalite des differences
-originelles qui resistent a tant de causes de nivellement?
-L'identite primitive des intelligences n'est qu'une fiction
-logique sans realite--une simple abstraction de langage, _qui ne
-repose que sur l'identite du mot avec lui-meme_. Tout se reduit a
-la possibilite abstraite des memes developpemens, dans les memes
-conditions d'heredite et d'education--mais aussi de developpemens
-differens dans des circonstances differentes: c'est a dire, que
-l'intelligence de chacun n'est identique a celle de tous, qu'au
-moment ou elle n'est pas encore proprement une intelligence."]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's argument as to the distinction between present
-sensation and anticipation of the future.]
-
-A similar remark may be made as to Plato's distinction between the
-different matters to which belief may apply: present sensation or
-sentiment in one case--anticipation of future sensations or
-sentiments, in another. Upon matters of present sensation and
-sentiment (he argues), such as hot or cold, sweet or bitter, just
-or unjust, honourable or base, &c., one man is as good a judge as
-another: but upon matters involving future contingency, such as
-what is healthy or unhealthy,--profitable and good, or hurtful and
-bad,--most men judge badly: only a few persons, possessed of
-special skill and knowledge, judge well, each in his respective
-province.
-
-[Side-note: The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man
-believes himself to be infallible.]
-
-I for my part admit this distinction to be real and important.
-Most other persons admit the same.[69] In acting upon it, I follow
-out my belief,--and so do they. This is a general fact, respecting
-the circumstances which determine individual belief. Like all
-other causes of belief, it operates relatively to the individual
-mind, and thus falls under that general canon of relativity, which
-it is the express purpose of the Protagorean formula to affirm.
-Sokrates impugns the formula of relativity, as if it proclaimed
-every one to believe himself more competent to predict the future
-than any other person. But no such assumption is implied in it. To
-say that a man is a measure to himself, is not to say that he is,
-or, that he believes himself to be, omniscient or infallible. A
-sick man may mistake the road towards future health, in many
-different directions. One patient may over-estimate his own
-knowledge,--that is one way, but only one among several: another
-may be diffident, and may undervalue his own knowledge: a third
-may over-estimate the knowledge of his professional adviser, and
-thus follow an ignorant physician, believing him to be instructed
-and competent: a fourth, instead of consulting a physician, may
-consult a prophet, whom Plato[70] here reckons among the
-authoritative infallible measures in respect to future events: a
-fifth may (like the rhetor AElius Aristeides[71]) disregard the
-advice of physicians, and follow prescriptions enjoined to him in
-his own dreams, believing them to be sent by AEsculapius the
-Preserving God. Each of these persons judges differently about the
-road to future health: but each is alike a measure to himself: the
-belief of each is relative to his own mental condition and
-predispositions. You, or I, may believe that one or other of them
-is mistaken: but here another measure is introduced--_your_ mind
-or _mine_.
-
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Theaetet. p. 179 A. [Greek: pa=s a)\n
-o(mologoi=].]
-
-[Footnote 70: Plato, Theaetet. p. 179 A, where Mr. Campbell
-observes in his note--"The [Greek: ma/ntis] is introduced as being
-[Greek: e)piste/mon] of the future generally; just as the
-physician is of future health and disease, the musician of future
-harmony," &c.]
-
-[Footnote 71: See the five discourses of the rhetor
-Aristeides--[Greek: I(ero=n Lo/goi], Oratt. xxiii.-xxvii.--containing
-curious details about his habits and condition, and illustrating his
-belief; especially Or. xxiii. p. 462 seqq. The perfect faith which
-he reposed in his dreams, and the confidence with which he speaks
-of the benefits derived from acting upon them, are remarkable.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's argument is untenable--That if the Protagorean
-formula be admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled--The
-reverse is true--Dialectic recognises the autonomy of the
-Individual mind.]
-
-But the most unfounded among all Plato's objections to the
-Protagorean formula, is that in which Sokrates is made to allege,
-that if it be accepted, the work of dialectical discussion is at
-an end: that the Sokratic Elenchus, the reciprocal scrutiny of
-opinions between two dialogists, becomes nugatory--since every
-man's opinions are _right_.[72] Instead of _right_, we must add
-the requisite qualification, here as elsewhere, by reading, _right
-to the man himself_. Now, dealing with Plato's affirmation thus
-corrected, we must pronounce not only that it is not true, but
-that the direct reverse of it is true. Dialectical discussion and
-the Sokratic procedure, far from implying the negation of the
-Protagorean formula, involve the unqualified recognition of it.
-Without such recognition the procedure cannot even begin, much
-less advance onward to any result. Dialectic operates altogether
-by question and answer: the questioner takes all his premisses
-from the answers of the respondent, and cannot proceed in any
-direction except that in which the respondent leads him. Appeal is
-always directly made to the affirmative or negative of the
-individual mind, which is thus installed as measure of truth or
-falsehood _for itself_. The peculiar and characteristic excellence
-of the Sokratic Elenchus consists in thus stimulating the interior
-mental activity of the individual hearer, in eliciting from him
-all the positive elements of the debate, and in making him feel a
-shock when one of his answers contradicts the others. Sokrates not
-only does not profess to make himself a measure for the
-respondent, but expressly disclaims doing so: he protests against
-being considered as a teacher, and avows his own entire ignorance.
-He undertakes only the obstetric process of evolving from the
-respondent mind what already exists in it without the means of
-escape--and of applying interrogatory tests to the answer when
-produced: if there be nothing in the respondent's mind, his art is
-inapplicable. He repudiates all appeal to authority, except that
-of the respondent himself.[73] Accordingly there is neither sense
-nor fitness in the Sokratic cross-examination, unless you assume
-that each person, to whom it is addressed, is a measure of truth
-and falsehood to himself. Implicitly indeed, this is assumed in
-rhetoric as well as in dialectic: wherever the speaker aims at
-persuading, he adapts his mode of speech to the predispositions of
-the hearer's own mind; and he thus recognises that mind as a
-measure for itself. But the Sokratic Dialectic embodies the same
-recognition, and the same essential relativity to the hearer's
-mind, more forcibly than any rhetoric. And the Platonic Sokrates
-(in the Phaedrus) makes it one of his objections against orators
-who addressed multitudes, that they did not discriminate either
-the specialties of different minds, or the specialties of
-discourse applicable to each.[74]
-
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Theaetet. p. 161 E.]
-
-[Footnote 73: Read the animated passage in the conversation with
-Polus: Plato, Gorg. 472, and Theaetet. 161 A, pp. 375, 376.
-
-In this very argument of Sokrates (in the Theaetetus) against the
-Protagorean theory, we find him unconsciously adopting (as I have
-already remarked) the very language of that theory, as a
-description of his own procedure, p. 171 D. Compare with this a
-remarkable passage in the colloquy of Sokrates with Thrasymachus,
-in Republic, i. 337 C.
-
-Moreover, the long and striking contrast between the philosopher
-and the man of the world, which Plato embodies in this dialogue
-(the Theaetetus, from p. 172 to p. 177), is so far from assisting
-his argument against Protagoras, that it rather illustrates the
-Protagorean point of view. The beliefs and judgments of the man of
-the world are presented as flowing from _his_ mental condition and
-predispositions: those of the philosopher, from _his_. The two are
-radically dissentient: each appears to the other mistaken and
-misguided. Here is nothing to refute Protagoras. Each of the two
-is a measure for himself.
-
-Yes, it will be said; but Plato's measure is right, and that of
-the man of the world is wrong. Perhaps _I_ may think so. As a
-measure for myself, I speak and act accordingly. But the opponents
-have not agreed to accept _me_ any more than Plato as their judge.
-The case remains unsettled as before.]
-
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 271 D-E; compare 258 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus--Plato assumes
-infallible authority--sets aside Dialectic.]
-
-Though Sokrates, and Plato so far forth as follower of Sokrates,
-employed a colloquial method based on the fundamental assumption
-of the Protagorean formula--autonomy of each individual
-mind--whether they accepted the formula in terms, or not; yet we shall
-find Plato at the end of his career, in his treatise De Legibus,
-constructing an imaginary city upon the attempted deliberate
-exclusion of this formula. We shall find him there monopolising
-all teaching and culture of his citizens from infancy upwards,
-barring out all freedom of speech or writing by a strict
-censorship, and severely punishing dissent from the prescribed
-orthodoxy. But then we shall also find that Plato in that last
-stage of his life--when he constitutes himself as lawgiver, the
-measure of truth or falsehood for all his citizens--has at the
-same time discontinued his early commerce with the Sokratic
-Dialectics.
-
-[Side-note: Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes
-himself the measure for all. Counter-proposition to the formula.]
-
-On the whole then, looking at what Plato says about the
-Protagorean doctrine of Relativity--_Homo Mensura_--first, his
-statement what the doctrine really is, next his strictures upon
-it--we may see that he ascribes to it consequences which it will
-not fairly carry. He impugns it as if it excluded philosophy and
-argumentative scrutiny: whereas, on the contrary, it is the only
-basis upon which philosophy or "reasoned truth" can stand. Whoever
-denies the Protagorean autonomy of the individual judgment, must
-propound as his counter theory some heteronomy, such as he (the
-denier) approves. If I am not allowed to judge of truth and
-falsehood for myself, who is to judge for me? Plato, in the
-Treatise De Legibus, answers very unequivocally:--assuming to
-himself that infallibility which I have already characterised as
-the prerogative of King Nomos: "I, the lawgiver, am the judge for
-all my citizens: you must take my word for what is true or false:
-you shall hear nothing except what my censors approve--and if,
-nevertheless, any dissenters arise, there are stringent penalties
-in store for them". Here is an explicit enunciation of the
-Counter-Proposition,[75] necessary to be maintained by those who
-deny the Protagorean doctrine. If you pronounce a man unfit to be
-the measure of truth for himself, you constitute yourself the
-measure, in his place: either directly as lawgiver--or by
-nominating censors according to your own judgment. As soon as he
-is declared a lunatic, some other person must be appointed to
-manage his property for him. You can only exchange one individual
-judgment for another. You cannot get out of the region of
-individual judgments, more or fewer in number: the King, the Pope,
-the Priest, the Judges or Censors, the author of some book, or the
-promulgator of such and such doctrine. The infallible measure
-which you undertake to provide, must be found in some person or
-persons--if it can be found at all: in some person selected by
-yourself--that is, in the last result, _yourself_.[76]
-
-[Footnote 75: Professor Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic exhibit
-an excellent example of the advantages of setting forth explicitly
-the Counter-Proposition--that which an author intends to deny, as
-well as the Proposition which he intends to affirm and prove.]
-
-[Footnote 76: Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikomach. x. 1176, a. 15)
-[Greek: dokei= d' e)n a(/pasi toi=s toiou/tois _ei)=nai to\
-phaino/menon to=| spoudai/o|_.] "That _is_, which _appears to be_
-in the judgment of the wise or virtuous man." The ultimate appeal
-is thus acknowledged to be, not to an abstraction, but to some one
-or more individual persons whom Aristotle recognises as wise.
-_That_ is truth which this wise man declares to be truth. You
-cannot escape from the Relative by any twist of reasoning.
-
-What Platonic critics call "Der Gegensatz des Seins und des
-Scheins" (see Steinhart, Einleit. zum Theaetet. p. 37) is
-unattainable. All that is attainable is the antithesis between
-that which appears to one person, and that which appears to one or
-more others, choose them as you will: between that which appears
-at a first glance, or at a distance, or on careless inspection--and
-that which appears after close and multiplied observations and
-comparisons, after full discussion, &c. _Das Sein_ is that which
-appears to the person or persons whom we judge to be wise, under
-these latter favourable circumstances.
-
-Epiktetus, i. 28, 1. [Greek: Ti/ e)/stin ai)/tion tou=
-sugkatati/thesthai/ tini? To\ phai/nesthai o(/ti u(pa/rchei. To=|
-ou)=n phainome/no| o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei, sugkatati/thesthai
-ou)ch oi(=o/n te.]]
-
-[Side-note: Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we
-state explicitly the counter-proposition.]
-
-It is only when the Counter-Proposition to the Protagorean formula
-is explicitly brought out, that the full meaning of that formula
-can be discerned. If you deny it, the basis of all free discussion
-and scrutiny is withdrawn: philosophy, or what is properly called
-reasoned truth, disappears. In itself it says little.
-
-[Side-note: Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula--Most believers
-insist upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for
-themselves. Appeal to Abstractions.]
-
-Yet little as its positive import may seem to be, it clashes with
-various illusions, omissions, and exigencies, incident to the
-ordinary dogmatising process. It substitutes the concrete in place
-of the abstract--the complete in place of the elliptical. Instead
-of Truth and Falsehood, which present to us the Abstract and
-impersonal as if it stood alone--the Objective divested of its
-Subject--we are translated into the real world of beliefs and
-disbeliefs, individual believers and disbelievers: matters
-affirmed or denied by some Subject actual or supposable--by you,
-by me, by him or them, perhaps by all persons within our
-knowledge. All men agree in the subjective fact, or in the mental
-states called belief and disbelief; but all men do not agree in
-the matters believed and disbelieved, or in what they speak of as
-Truth and Falsehood. No infallible objective mark, no common
-measure, no canon of evidence, recognised by all, has yet been
-found. What is Truth to one man, is not truth, and is often
-Falsehood, to another: that which governs the mind as infallible
-authority in one part of the globe, is treated with indifference
-or contempt elsewhere.[77] Each man's belief, though in part
-determined by the same causes as the belief of others, is in part
-also determined by causes peculiar to himself. When a man speaks
-of Truth, he means what he himself (along with others, or singly,
-as the case may be) believes to be Truth; unless he expressly
-superadds the indication of some other persons believing in it.
-This is the reality of the case, which the Protagorean formula
-brings into full view; but which most men dislike to recognise,
-and disguise from themselves as well as from others in the common
-elliptical forms of speech. In most instances a believer entirely
-forgets that his own mind is the product of a given time and
-place, and of a conjunction of circumstances always peculiar,
-amidst the aggregate of mankind--for the most part narrow. He
-cannot be content (like Protagoras) to be a measure for himself
-and for those whom his arguments may satisfy. This would be to
-proclaim what some German critics denounce as Subjectivism.[78] He
-insists upon constituting himself--or some authority worshipped by
-himself--or some abstraction interpreted by himself--a measure for
-all others besides, whether assentient or dissentient. That which
-_he_ believes, all ought to believe.
-
-[Footnote 77: Respecting the grounds and conditions of belief
-among the Hindoos, Sir William Sleeman (Rambles and Recollections
-of an Indian Official, ch. xxvi. vol. i. pp. 226-228) observes as
-follows:--
-
-"Every word of this poem (the Ramaen, Ramayana) the people assured
-me was written, if not by the hand of the Deity himself, at least
-by his inspiration, which was the same thing, and it must
-consequently be true. Ninety-nine out of a hundred, among the
-Hindoos, implicitly believe, not only every word of this poem, but
-every word of every poem that has ever been written in Sanscrit.
-If you ask a man whether he really believes any very egregious
-absurdity quoted from these books, he replies with the greatest
-_naivete_ in the world, 'Is it not written in the book; and how
-should it be there written if not true?' . . . The greater the
-improbability, the more monstrous and preposterous the fiction,
-the greater is the charm that it has over their minds; and the
-greater their learning in the Sanscrit, the more are they under
-the influence of this charm. Believing all to be written by the
-Deity, or by his inspirations, and the men and things of former
-days to have been very different from the men and things of the
-present day, and the heroes of these fables to have been demigods,
-or people endowed with powers far superior to those of the
-ordinary men of their own day, the analogies of nature are never
-for a moment considered; nor do questions of probability, or
-possibility, according to those analogies, ever obtrude to dispel
-the charm with which they are so pleasingly bound. They go on
-through life reading and talking of these monstrous fictions,
-which shock the taste and understanding of other nations, without
-once questioning the truth of one single incident, or hearing it
-questioned. There was a time, and that not very distant, when it
-was the same in England and in every other European nation; and
-there are, I am afraid, some parts of Europe where it is so still.
-But the Hindoo faith, so far as religious questions are concerned,
-is not more capacious or absurd than that of the Greeks and Romans
-in the days of Sokrates and Cicero; the only difference is, that
-among the Hindoos a greater number of the questions which interest
-mankind are brought under the head of religion."]
-
-[Footnote 78: This is the objection taken by Schwegler, Prantl,
-and other German thinkers, against the Protagorean doctrine
-(Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, vol. i. p. 12 seq.; Schwegler, Gesch.
-der Philos. im Umriss. s. 11, b. p. 26, ed. 5th). I had
-transcribed from each of these works a passage of some length, but
-I cannot find room for them in this note.
-
-These authors both say, that the Protagorean canon, properly
-understood, is right, but that Protagoras laid it down wrongly.
-They admit the principle of Subjectivity, as an essential aspect
-of the case, in regard to truth; but they say that Protagoras was
-wrong in appealing to individual, empirical, accidental,
-subjectivity of each man at every varying moment, whereas he ought
-to have appealed to an ideal or universal subjectivity. "What
-ought to be held true, right, good, &c.," (says Schwegler) "must
-be decided doubtless by _me_, but by _me_ so far forth as a
-rational, and thinking being. Now _my_ thinking, _my_ reason, is
-not something specially belonging to me, but something common to
-all rational beings, something universal; so far therefore as I
-proceed as a rational and thinking person, my subjectivity is an
-universal subjectivity. Every thinking person has the
-consciousness that what he regards as right, duty, good, evil,
-&c., presents itself not merely to him as such, but also to every
-rational person, and that, consequently, his judgment possesses
-the character of universality, universal validity: in one word,
-Objectivity."
-
-Here it is explicitly asserted, that wherever a number of
-individual men employ their reason, the specialities of each
-disappear, and they arrive at the same conclusions--Reason being a
-guide impersonal as well as infallible. And this same view is
-expressed by Prantl in other language, when he reforms the
-Protagorean doctrine by saying, "Das Denken ist der Mass der
-Dinge".
-
-To me this assertion appears so distinctly at variance with
-notorious facts, that I am surprised when I find it advanced by
-learned historians of philosophy, who recount the very facts which
-contradict it. Can it really be necessary to repeat that the
-reason of one man differs most materially from that of
-another--and the reason of the same person from itself, at different
-times--in respect of the arguments accepted, the authorities obeyed,
-the conclusions embraced? The impersonal Reason is a mere fiction; the
-universal Reason is an abstraction, belonging alike to all
-particular reasoners, consentient or dissentient, sound or
-unsound, &c. Schwegler admits the Protagorean canon only under a
-reserve which nullifies its meaning. To say that the Universal
-Reason is the measure of truth is to assign no measure at all. The
-Universal Reason can only make itself known through an
-interpreter. The interpreters are dissentient; and which of them
-is to hold the privilege of infallibility? Neither Schwegler nor
-Prantl are forward to specify who the interpreter is, who is
-entitled to put dissentients to silence; both of them keep in the
-safe obscurity of an abstraction--"Das Denken"--the Universal
-Reason. Protagoras recognises in each dissentient an equal right
-to exercise his own reason, and to judge for himself.
-
-In order to show how thoroughly incorrect the language of
-Schwegler and Prantl is, when they talk about the Universal Reason
-as unanimous and unerring, I transcribe from another eminent
-historian of philosophy a description of what philosophy has been
-from ancient times down to the present.
-
-Degerando, Histoire Comparee des Systemes de Philosophie, vol. i.
-p. 48:--"Une multitude d'hypotheses, elevees en quelque sorte au
-hasard, et rapidement detruites; une diversite d'opinions,
-d'autant plus sensible que la philosophie a ete plus developpee;
-des sectes, des partis meme, des disputes interminables, des
-speculations steriles, des erreurs maintenues et transmises par
-une imitation aveugle; quelques decouvertes obtenues avec lenteur,
-et melangees d'idees fausses; des reformes annoncees a chaque
-siecle et jamais accomplies; une succession de doctrines qui se
-renversent les unes les autres sans pouvoir obtenir plus de
-solidite: la raison humaine ainsi promenee dans un triste cercle
-de vicissitudes, et ne s'elevant a quelques epoques fortunees que
-pour retomber bientot dans de nouveaux ecarts, &c. . . . les memes
-questions, enfin, qui partagerent il y a plus de vingt siecles les
-premiers genies de la Grece, agitees encore aujourd'hui** apres tant
-de volumineux ecrits consacres a les discuter".]
-
-This state of mind in reference to belief is usual with most men,
-not less at the present day than in the time of Plato and
-Protagoras. It constitutes the natural intolerance prevalent among
-mankind; which each man (speaking generally), in the case of his
-own beliefs, commends and exults in, as a virtue. It flows as a
-natural corollary from the sentiment of belief, though it may be
-corrected by reflection and social sympathy. Hence the doctrine of
-Protagoras--equal right of private judgment to each man for
-himself--becomes inevitably unwelcome.
-
-[Side-note: Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the
-Protagorean formula--Every reader of Aristotle will claim the
-right of examining for himself Aristotle's canons of truth.]
-
-We are told that Demokritus, as well as Plato and Aristotle, wrote
-against Protagoras. The treatise of Demokritus is lost: but we
-possess what the two latter said against the Protagorean formula.
-In my judgment both failed in refuting it. Each of them professed
-to lay down objective, infallible, criteria of truth and
-falsehood: Democritus on his side, and the other dogmatical
-philosophers, professed to do the same, each in his own way--and
-each in a different way.[79] Now the Protagorean formula neither
-allows nor disallows any one of these proposed objective criteria:
-but it enunciates the appeal to which all of them must be
-submitted--the subjective condition of satisfying the judgment of
-each hearer. Its protest is entered only when that condition is
-overleaped, and when the dogmatist enacts his canon of belief as
-imperative, peremptory, binding upon all (allgemeingueltig) both
-assentient and dissentient. I am grateful to Aristotle for his
-efforts to lay down objective canons in the research of truth; but
-I claim the right of examining those canons for myself, and of
-judging whether that, which satisfied Aristotle, satisfies me
-also. The same right which I claim for myself, I am bound to allow
-to all others. The general expression of this compromise is, the
-Protagorean formula. No one demands more emphatically to be a
-measure for himself, even when all authority is opposed to him,
-than Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias.[80]
-
-[Footnote 79: Plutarch, adv. Kolot. p. 1108.
-
-According to Demokritus all sensible perceptions were
-conventional, or varied according to circumstances, or according
-to the diversity of the percipient Subject; but there was an
-objective reality--minute, solid, invisible atoms, differing in
-figure, position, and movement, and vacuum along with them. Such
-reality was intelligible only by Reason. [Greek: No/mo| gluku/,
-no/mo| pikro/n, no/mo| thermo/n, no/mo| psuchro/n, no/mo| chroie/;
-e)te/e| de\ a)/toma kai\ keno/n. A(/per nomi/zetai me\n ei)=nai
-kai\ doxa/zetai ta\ ai)stheta/, ou)k e)/sti de\ kata\ a)lethei/an
-tau=ta; a)lla\ ta\ a)/toma mo/non kai\ ke/non.]
-
-Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 135-139; Diog. Laert. ix. 72.
-See Mullach, Democriti Fragm. pp. 204-208.
-
-The discourse of Protagoras [Greek: Peri\ tou= o)/ntos], was read
-by Porphyry, who apparently cited from it a passage verbatim,
-which citation Eusebius unfortunately has not preserved (Eusebius,
-Praepar. Evang. x. 3, 17). One of the speakers in Porphyry's
-dialogue (describing a repast at the house of Longinus at Athens to
-celebrate Plato's birthday) accused Plato of having copied largely
-from the arguments of Protagoras--[Greek: pro\s tou\s e(\n to\
-o)\n ei)sa/gontas]. Allusion is probably made to the Platonic
-dialogues Parmenides and Sophistes.]
-
-[Footnote 80: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's examination of the other doctrine--That
-knowledge is Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts
-which are different with different Percipients.]
-
-After thus criticising the formula--Homo Mensura--Plato proceeds
-to canvass the other doctrine, which he ascribes to Protagoras
-along with others, and which he puts into the mouth of
-Theaetetus--"That knowledge is sensible perception". He connects that
-doctrine with the above-mentioned formula, by illustrations which
-exhibit great divergence between one percipient Subject and another.
-He gives us, as examples of sensible perception, the case of the
-wind, cold to one man, not cold to another: that of the wine,
-sweet to a man in health, bitter if he be sickly.[81] Perhaps
-Protagoras may have dwelt upon cases like these, as best
-calculated to illustrate the relativity of all affirmations: for
-though the judgments are in reality both equally relative, whether
-two judges pronounce alike, or whether they pronounce differently,
-under the same conditions--yet where they judge differently, each
-stands forth in his own individuality, and the relativity of the
-judgment is less likely to be disputed.
-
-[Footnote 81: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 152 A, 159 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The
-conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of
-sense--weighing, measuring, &c.]
-
-But though some facts of sense are thus equivocal, generating
-dissension rather than unanimity among different individuals--such
-is by no means true of the facts of sense taken generally.[82] On
-the contrary, it is only these facts--the world of reality,
-experience, and particulars--which afford a groundwork and
-assurance of unanimity in human belief, under all varieties of
-teaching or locality. Counting, measuring, weighing, are facts of
-sense simple and fundamental, and comparisons of those facts:
-capable of being so exhibited that no two persons shall either see
-them differently or mistrust them. Of two persons exposed to the
-same wind, one may feel cold, and the other not: but both of them
-will see the barometer or thermometer alike.[83] [Greek: Pa/nta
-me/tro| kai\ a)rithmo=| kai\ stathmo=|]--would be the perfection
-of science, if it could be obtained. Plato himself recognises, in
-more than one place, the irresistible efficacy of weight and
-measure in producing unanimity; and in forestalling those disputes
-which are sure to arise where weight and measure cannot be
-applied.[84] It is therefore among select facts of sense,
-carefully observed and properly compared, that the groundwork of
-unanimity is to be sought, so far as any rational and universal
-groundwork for it is attainable. In other words, it is here that
-we must seek for the basis of knowledge or cognition.
-
-[Footnote 82: Aristotle (Metaphysic. [Greek: G]. p. 1010, a. 25
-seq.) in arguing against Herakleitus and his followers, who dwelt
-upon [Greek: ta\ ai)stheta\] as ever fluctuating and undefinable,
-urges against them that this is not true of _all_ [Greek:
-ai)stheta/], but only of those in the sublunary region of the
-Kosmos. But this region is (he says) only an imperceptibly small
-part of the entire Kosmos; the objects in the vast superlunary or
-celestial region of the Kosmos were far more numerous, and were
-also eternal and unchangeable, in constant and uniform circular
-rotation. Accordingly, if you predicate one or other about [Greek:
-ai)stheta\] generally, you ought to predicate constancy and
-unchangeability, not flux and variation, since the former
-predicates are true of much the larger proportion of [Greek:
-ai)stheta/]. See the Scholia on the above passage of Aristotle's
-Metaphysica, and also upon Book A. 991, a. 9.]
-
-[Footnote 83: Mr. Campbell, in his Preface to the Theaetetus (p.
-lxxxiii.), while comparing the points in the dialogue with modern
-metaphysical views, observes. "Modern Experimental Science is
-equally distrustful of individual impressions of sense, but has
-found means of measuring the motions by which they are caused,
-through _the effect of the same motions upon other things besides
-our senses_. When the same wind is blowing one of us feels warm
-and another cold (Theaetet. p. 152), but the mercury of the
-thermometer tells the same tale to all. And though the individual
-consciousness remains the sole judge of the exact impression
-momentarily received by each person, yet we are certain that the
-sensation of heat and cold, like the expansion and contraction of
-the mercury, is in every case dependent on a universal law."
-
-It might seem from Mr. Campbell's language (I do not imagine that
-he means it so) as if Modern Experimental Science had arrived at
-something more trustworthy than "individual impressions of sense".
-But the expansion or contraction of the mercury are just as much
-facts of sense as the feeling of heat or cold; only they are facts
-of sense determinate and uniform to all, whereas the feeling of
-heat or cold is indeterminate and liable to differ with different
-persons. The certainty about "universal law governing the
-sensations of heat and cold," was not at all felt in the days of
-Plato.]
-
-[Footnote 84: Thus in the Philebus (pp. 55-56) Plato declares that
-numbering, measuring, and weighing, are the characteristic marks
-of all the various processes which deserve the name of Arts; and
-that among the different Arts those of the carpenter, builder,
-&c., are superior to those of the physician, pilot, husbandman,
-military commander, musical composer, &c., because the two
-first-named employ more measurement and a greater number of
-measuring instruments, the rule, line, plummet, compass, &c.
-
-"When we talk about iron or silver" (says Sokrates in the Platonic
-Phaedrus, p. 263 A-B) "we are all of one mind, but when we talk
-about the Just and the Good we are all at variance with each
-other, and each man is at variance with himself". Compare an
-analogous passage, Alkibiad. I. p. 109.
-
-Here Plato himself recognises the verifications of sense as the
-main guarantee for accuracy: and the compared facts of sense, when
-select and simplified, as ensuring the nearest approach to
-unanimity among believers.]
-
-[Side-note: Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question.
-Divergence between one man and another arises, not merely from
-different sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative
-difference.]
-
-A loose adumbration of this doctrine is here given by Plato as the
-doctrine of Protagoras, in the words--Knowledge is sensible
-perception. To sift this doctrine is announced as his main
-purpose;[85] and we shall see how he performs the task.
-_Sokr._--Shall we admit, that when we perceive things by sight or
-hearing, we at the same time _know_ them all? When foreigners talk
-to us in a strange language, are we to say that we do not hear what
-they say, or that we both hear and know it? When unlettered men look
-at an inscription, shall we contend that they do not see the writing,
-or that they both see and know it? _Theaetet._--We shall say, under
-these supposed circumstances, that what we see and hear, we also
-know. We hear and we know the pitch and intonation of the
-foreigner's voice. The unlettered man sees, and also knows, the
-colour, size, forms, of the letters. But that which the
-schoolmaster and the interpreter could tell us respecting their
-meaning, _that_ we neither see, nor hear, nor know.
-_Sokr._--Excellent, Theaetetus. I have nothing to say against your
-answer.[86]
-
-[Footnote 85: Plato, Theaetet. p. 163 A. [Greek: ei)s ga\r tou=to/
-pou pa=s o( lo/gos e(mi=n e)/teine, kai\ tou/tou cha/rin ta\
-polla\ kai\ a)/topa tau=ta e)kine/samen.]]
-
-[Footnote 86: Plato, Theaetet. p. 163 C.]
-
-This is an important question and answer, which Plato
-unfortunately does not follow up. It brings to view, though
-without fully unfolding, the distinction between what is really
-perceived by sense, and what is inferred from such perception:
-either through resemblance or through conjunctions of past
-experience treasured up in memory--or both together. Without
-having regard to such distinction, no one can discuss
-satisfactorily the question under debate.[87] Plato here abandons,
-moreover, the subjective variety of impression which he had before
-noticed as the characteristic of sense:--(the wind which blows
-cold, and the wine which tastes sweet, to one man, but not to
-another). Here it is assumed that all men hear the sounds, and see
-the written letters alike: the divergence between one man and
-another arises from the different prior condition of percipient
-minds, differing from each other in associative and reminiscent
-power.
-
-[Footnote 87: I borrow here a striking passage from Dugald
-Stewart, which illustrates both the passage in Plato's text, and
-the general question as to the relativity of Cognition. Here, the
-fact of relative Cognition is brought out most conspicuously on
-its intellectual side, not on its perceptive side. The fact of
-sense is the same to all, and therefore, though really relative,
-has more the look of an absolute; but the mental associations with
-that fact are different with different persons, and therefore are
-more obviously and palpably relative.--Dugald Stewart, First
-Preliminary Dissertation to Encyclopaed. Britannica, pp. 66, 8th
-ed.
-
-"To this reference of the sensation of colour to the external
-object, I can think of nothing so analogous as the feelings we
-experience in surveying a library of books. We speak of the
-volumes piled up on its shelves as _treasures_ or _magazines_ of
-the knowledge of past ages; and contemplate them with gratitude
-and reverence as inexhaustible _sources_ of instruction and
-delight to the mind. Even in looking at a page of print or
-manuscript, we are apt to say that the ideas we acquire are
-received by the sense of sight; and we are scarcely conscious of a
-metaphor when we apply this language. On such occasions we seldom
-recollect that nothing is perceived by the eye but a multitude of
-_black strokes drawn upon white paper_, and that it is our own
-acquired habits which communicate to these _strokes_ the whole of
-that significancy whereby they are distinguished from the
-unmeaning scrawling of an infant. The knowledge which we conceive
-to be preserved in books, like the fragrance of a rose, or the
-gilding of the clouds, depends, for its existence, on the
-_relation_ between the object and the percipient mind: and the
-only difference between the two cases is, that, in the one, this
-relation is the local and temporary effect of conventional habits:
-in the other, it is the universal and the unchangeable work of
-nature. . . What has now been remarked with respect to _written
-characters_, may be extended very nearly to _oral language_. When
-we listen to the discourse of a public speaker, eloquence and
-persuasion seem to issue from his lips; and we are little aware
-that we ourselves infuse the soul into every word that he utters.
-The case is exactly the same when we enjoy the conversation of a
-friend. We ascribe the charm entirely to his voice and accents;
-but without our co-operation, its potency would vanish. How very
-small the comparative proportion is, which in such cases the words
-spoken contribute to the intellectual and moral effect, I have
-elsewhere endeavoured to show."]
-
-[Side-note: Argument--That sensible Perception does not include
-memory--Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to
-include memory.]
-
-Sokrates turns to another argument. If knowledge be the same thing
-as sensible perception, then it follows, that so soon as a man
-ceases to see and hear, he also ceases to know. The memory of what
-he has seen or heard, upon that supposition, is not knowledge. But
-Theaetetus admits that a man who remembers what he has seen or
-heard does know it. Accordingly, the answer that knowledge is
-sensible perception, cannot be maintained.[88]
-
-[Footnote 88: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 163, 164.]
-
-Here Sokrates makes out a good case against the answer in its
-present wording. But we may fairly doubt whether those who
-affirmed the matter of knowledge to consist in the facts of sense,
-ever meant to exclude memory. They meant probably the facts of
-sense both as perceived and as remembered; though the wording
-cited by Plato does not strictly include so much. Besides, we must
-recollect, that Plato includes in the meaning of the word
-Knowledge or Cognition an idea of perfect infallibility:
-distinguishing it generically from the highest form of opinion.
-But memory is a fallible process: sometimes quite
-trustworthy--under other circumstances, not so. Accordingly, memory,
-in a general sense, cannot be put on a level with present perception,
-nor said to generate what Plato calls knowledge.
-
-[Side-note: Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at
-the same time .]
-
-The next argument of Plato is as follows. You can see, and not
-see, the same thing at the same time: for you may close one of
-your eyes, and look only with the other. But it is impossible
-to know a thing, and not to know it at the same time. Therefore
-_to know_ is not the same as _to see_.[89]
-
-[Footnote 89: Plato, Theaetet. p. 165 B.]
-
-This argument is proclaimed by Plato as a terrible puzzle, leaving
-no escape.[90] Perhaps he meant to speak ironically. In reality,
-this puzzle is nothing but a false inference deduced from a false
-premiss. The inference is false, because if we grant the premiss,
-that it is possible both to _see_ a thing, and _not to see_ it, at
-the same time--there is no reason why it should not also be
-possible to _know_ a thing, and _not to know_ it, at the same
-time. Moreover, the premiss is also false in the ordinary sense
-which the words bear: and not merely false, but logically
-impossible, as a sin against the maxim of contradiction. Plato
-procures it from a true premiss, by omitting an essential
-qualification. I see an object with my open eye: I do not see it
-with my closed eye. From this double proposition, alike
-intelligible and true, Plato thinks himself authorised to discard
-the qualification, and to tell me that I see a thing and do not
-see it--passing _a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_.
-This is the same liberty which he took with the Protagorean
-doctrine. Protagoras having said--"Every thing which any man
-believes is true _to that man_"--Plato reasons against him as if
-he had said--"Every thing which any man believes is _true_".
-
-[Footnote 90: Plato, Theaetet. p. 165 B. [Greek: to\ deino/taton
-e)ro/tema--a)phu/kto| e)rote/mati], &c.
-
-Mr. Campbell observes upon this passage:--"Perhaps there is here a
-trace of the spirit which was afterwards developed in the sophisms
-of Eubulides". Stallbaum, while acknowledging the many subtleties
-of Sokrates in this dialogue, complains that other commentators
-make the ridiculous mistake ("errore perquam ridiculo") of
-accepting all the reasoning of Sokrates as seriously meant,
-whereas much of it (he says) is mere mockery and sarcasm, intended
-to retort upon the Sophists their own argumentative tricks and
-quibbles.--"Itaque saepe per petulantiam quandam argutiis indulget
-(Socrates), quibus isti haudquaquam abstinebant: saepe ex
-adversariorum mente disputat, sed ita tamen disputat, ut eos suis
-ipsorum capiat laqueis; saepe denique in disputando iisdem
-artificiis utitur, quibus illi uti consueverant, sicuti etiam in
-Menone, Cratylo, Euthydemo, fieri meminimus". (Stallbaum, Proleg.
-ad Theaet. pp. 12-13, 22-29).
-
-Stallbaum pushes this general principle so far as to contend that
-the simile of the waxen tablet (p. 191 C), and that of the
-pigeon-house (p. 200 C), are doctrines of opponents, which Sokrates
-pretends to adopt with a view to hold them up to ridicule.
-
-I do not concur in this opinion of Stallbaum, which he reproduces
-in commenting on many other dialogues, and especially on the
-Kratylus, for the purpose of exonerating Plato from the reproach
-of bad reasoning and bad etymology, at the cost of opponents
-"inauditi et indefensi". I see no ground for believing that Plato
-meant to bring forward these arguments as paralogisms obviously
-and ridiculously silly. He produced them, in my judgment, as
-suitable items in a dialogue of search: plausible to a certain
-extent, admitting both of being supported and opposed, and
-necessary to be presented to those who wish to know a question in
-all its bearings.]
-
-Again, argues Plato,[91] you cannot say--I _know_ sharply, dimly,
-near, far, &c.--but you may properly say, I _see_ sharply, dimly,
-near, far, &c.: another reason to show that knowledge and sensible
-perception are not the same. After a digression of some length
-directed against the disciples of Herakleitus--(partly to expose
-their fundamental doctrine that every thing was in flux and
-movement, partly to satirise their irrational procedure in evading
-argumentative debate, and in giving nothing but a tissue of
-mystical riddles one after another),[92] Sokrates returns back to
-the same debate, and produces more serious arguments, as
-follows:--
-
-[Footnote 91: Plato, Theaetet. p. 165 D. The reasonings here given
-by Plato from the mouth of Sokrates, are compared by Steinhart to
-the Trug-schluesse, which in the Euthydemus he ascribes to that
-Sophist and Dionysodorus. But Steinhart says that Plato is here
-reasoning in the style of Protagoras: an assertion thoroughly
-gratuitous, for which there is no evidence at all (Steinhart,
-Einleitung zum Theaetet. p. 53).]
-
-[Footnote 92: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 179-183. The description which
-we read here (put into the mouth of the geometer Theodorus) of the
-persons in Ephesus and other parts of Ionia, who speculated in the
-vein of Herakleitus--is full of vivid fancy and smartness, but is
-for that reason the less to be trusted as accurate.
-
-The characteristic features ascribed to these Herakleiteans are
-quite unlike to the features of Protagoras, so far as we know
-them; though Protagoras, nevertheless, throughout this dialogue,
-is spoken of as if he were an Herakleitean. These men are here
-depicted as half mad--incapable of continuous attention--hating
-all systematic speech and debate--answering, when addressed, only
-in brief, symbolical, enigmatic phrases, of which they had a
-quiver-full, but which they never condescended to explain ([Greek:
-o(/sper e)k phare/tras r(emati/skia ai)nigmato/de a)naspo=ntes
-a)potoxeu/ousin], see Lassalle, vol. i. pp. 32-39--springing up by
-spontaneous inspiration, despising instruction, p. 180 A), and
-each looking down upon the others as ignorant. If** we compare the
-picture thus given by Plato of the Herakleiteans, with the picture
-which he gives of Protagoras in the dialogue so called, we shall
-see that the two are as unlike as possible.
-
-Lassalle, in his elaborate work on the philosophy of Herakleitus,
-attempts to establish the philosophical affinity between
-Herakleitus and Protagoras: but in my judgment unsuccessfully.
-According to Lassalle's own representation of the doctrine of
-Herakleitus, it is altogether opposed to the most eminent
-Protagorean doctrine, [Greek: A)/nthropos e(auto=| me/tron]--and
-equally opposed to that which Plato seems to imply as
-Protagorean--[Greek: Ai)/sthesis = E)piste/me]. The elucidation
-given by Lassalle of Herakleitus, through the analogy of Hegel, is
-certainly curious and instructive. The Absolute Process of
-Herakleitus is at variance with Protagoras, not less than the
-Absolute Object or Substratum of the Eleates, or the Absolute
-Ideas of Plato. Lassalle admits that Herakleitus is the entire
-antithesis to Protagoras, yet still contends that he is the prior
-stage of transition towards Protagoras (vol. i. p. 64).]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates maintains that we do not see _with_ our eyes,
-but that the mind sees _through_ the eyes: that the mind often
-conceives and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily
-organ.]
-
-_Sokr._--If you are asked, With what does a man perceive white and
-black? you will answer, with his eyes: shrill or grave sounds?
-with his ears. Does it not seem to you more correct to say, that
-we see _through_ our eyes rather than _with_ our eyes:--that we
-hear _through_ our ears, not _with_ our ears. _Theaetet._--I think
-it is more correct. _Sokr._--It would be strange if there were in
-each man many separate reservoirs, each for a distinct class of
-perceptions.[93] All perceptions must surely converge towards one
-common form or centre, call it soul or by any other name, which
-perceives _through_ them, as organs or instruments, all
-perceptible objects.--
-
-[Footnote 93: Plato, Theaetet. p. 184 D. [Greek: deino\n ga/r pou,
-ei) pollai/ tines e)n e(mi=n, o(/sper e)n dourei/ois i(/ppois,
-ai)sthe/sis e)gkathentai, a)lla\ me\ ei)s mi/an tina\ i)de/an,
-ei)/te psuche\n ei)/te o(/, ti dei= kalei=n, pa/nta tau=ta
-xuntei/nei, e(=| dia\ tou/ton oi(=on o)rga/non ai)sthano/metha
-o(/sa ai)stheta/.]]
-
-We thus perceive objects of sense, according to Plato's language,
-_with_ the central form or soul, and _through_ various organs of
-the body. The various Percepta or Percipienda of tact, vision,
-hearing--sweet, hot, hard, light--have each its special bodily
-organ. But no one of these can be perceived through the organ
-affected to any other. Whatever therefore we conceive or judge
-respecting any two of them, is not performed through the organ
-special to either. If we conceive any thing common both to sound
-and colour, we cannot conceive it either through the auditory or
-through the visual organ.[94]
-
-[Footnote 94: Plato, Theaetet. p. 184-185.]
-
-Now there are certain judgments (Sokrates argues) which we make
-common to both, and not exclusively belonging to either. First, we
-judge that they are two: that each is one, different from the
-other, and the same with itself: that each _is_ something, or has
-existence, and that one _is not_ the other. Here are
-predicates--existence, non-existence, likeness, unlikeness, unity,
-plurality, sameness, difference, &c., which we affirm, or deny, not
-respecting either of these sensations exclusively, but respecting
-all of them. Through what bodily organ do we derive these
-judgments respecting what is common to all? There is no special
-organ: the mind perceives, through itself these common
-properties.[95]
-
-[Footnote 95: Plato, Theaetet. p. 185 D. [Greek: dokei= te\n
-a)rche\n ou)d' ei)=nai toiou=ton ou)de\n tou/tois o)/rganon
-i)/dion, o(/sper e)kei/nois, a)ll' au)te\ di' au(te=s e( psuche\
-ta\ koina/ moi phai/netai peri\ pa/nton e)piskopei=n.]]
-
-[Side-note: Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by
-itself--It perceives Existence, Difference, &c.]
-
-Some matters therefore there are, which the soul or mind
-apprehends through itself--others, which it perceives through the
-bodily organs. To the latter class belong the sensible qualities,
-hardness, softness, heat, sweetness, &c., which it perceives
-through the bodily organs; and which animals, as well as men, are
-by nature competent to perceive immediately at birth. To the
-former class belong existence (substance, essence), sameness,
-difference, likeness, unlikeness, honourable, base, good, evil,
-&c., which the mind apprehends through itself alone. But the mind
-is not competent to apprehend this latter class, as it perceives
-the former, immediately at birth. Nor does such competence belong
-to all men and animals; but only to a select fraction of men, who
-acquire it with difficulty and after a long time through laborious
-education. The mind arrives at these purely mental apprehensions,
-only by going over, and comparing with each other, the simple
-impressions of sense; by looking at their relations with each
-other; and by computing the future from the present and past.[96]
-Such comparisons and computations are a difficult and gradual
-attainment; accomplished only by a few, and out of the reach of
-most men. But without them, no one can apprehend real existence
-(essence, or substance), or arrive at truth: and without truth,
-there can be no knowledge.
-
-[Footnote 96: Plato, Theaetet. p. 186 B. [Greek: Te\n de/ ge
-ou)si/an kai\ o(/ ti e)/ston kai\ te\n e)nantio/teta pro\s
-a)lle/lo] (of hardness and softness) [Greek: kai\ te\n ou)si/an
-au)= te=s e)nantio/tetos, au)te\ e( psuche\ _e)paniou=sa kai\
-xumba/llousa pro\s a)/llela kri/nein peira=tai e(mi=n_ . . .
-Ou)kou=n ta\ me\n eu)thu\s genome/nois pa/resti phu/sei
-ai)stha/nesthai a)nthro/pois te kai\ theri/ois, o(/sa dia\ tou=
-so/matos pathe/mata e)pi\ te\n psuche\n tei/nei; _ ta\ de\ peri\
-tou/ton a)nalogi/smata_, pro/s te ou)si/an kai\ o)phelei/an
-_mo/gis_ kai\ e)n pollo=| chro/no| dia\ pollo=n _pragma/ton kai\
-paidei/as paragi/gnetai, oi(=s a)\n kai\ paragi/gnetai.]]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not
-in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add
-computations of the mind respecting them.]
-
-The result therefore is (concludes Sokrates), _That knowledge is
-not sensible perception_: that it is not to be found in the
-perceptions of sense themselves, which do not apprehend real
-essence, and therefore not truth--but in the comparisons and
-computations respecting them, and in the relations between them,
-made and apprehended by the mind itself.[97] Plato declares good
-and evil, honourable and base, &c., to be among matters most
-especially relative, perceived by the mind computing past and
-present in reference to future.[98]
-
-[Footnote 97: Plato, Theaetet. p. 186 D.** [Greek: e)n me\n a)/ra
-toi=s pathe/masin ou)k e)/ni e)piste/me, _e)n de\ to=| peri\
-e)kei/non sullogismo=|_; ou)si/as ga\r kai\ a)lethei/as e)ntau=tha
-me/n, o(s e)/oike, dunato\n a(/psasthai, e)kei= de\ a)du/naton.]
-The term [Greek: sullogismo\s] is here interesting, before it had
-received that technical sense which it has borne from Aristotle
-downwards. Mr. Campbell explains it properly as "nearly equivalent
-to abstraction and generalisation" (Preface to Theaetetus, p.
-lxxiv., also note, p. 144).]
-
-[Footnote 98: Plato, Theaetet. p. 186 A. [Greek: kalo\n kai\
-ai)schro/n, kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ kako/n. Kai\ tou/ton moi dokei=
-_e)n toi=s ma/lista pro\s a)/llela skopei=sthai te\n ou)si/an,
-a)nalogizome/ne_ (e( psuche\) _e)n e(aute=| ta\ gegono/ta kai\ ta\
-paro/nta pro\s ta\ me/llonta_.]
-
-Base and honourable, evil and good, are here pointed out by
-Sokrates as most evidently and emphatically _relative_. In the
-train of reasoning here terminated, Plato had been combating the
-doctrine [Greek: Ai)/sthesis = E)piste/me]. In his sense of the
-word [Greek: ai)/sthesis] he has refuted the doctrine. But what
-about the other doctrine, which he declares to be a part of the
-same programme--_Homo Mensura_--the Protagorean formula? That
-formula, so far from being refuted, is actually sustained and
-established by this train of reasoning. Plato has declared [Greek:
-ou)si/a, a)lethei/a, e)nantio/tes, a)gatho/n, kako/n], &c., to be
-a distinct class of Objects not perceived by Sense. But he also
-tells us that they are apprehended by the Mind through its own
-working, and that they are apprehended always in relation to each
-other. We thus see that they are just as much relative to the
-concipient mind, as the Objects of sense are to the percipient and
-sentient mind. The Subject is the correlative limit or measure (to
-use Protagorean phrases) of one as well as of the other. This
-confirms what I observed above, that the two doctrines, 1. Homo
-Mensura, 2. [Greek: Ai)/sthesis = E)piste/me],--are completely
-distinct and independent, though Plato has chosen to implicate or
-identify them.]
-
-[Side-note: Examination of this view--Distinction from the views of
-modern philosophers.]
-
-Such is the doctrine which Plato here lays down, respecting the
-difference between sensible perception, and knowledge or
-cognition. From his time to the present day, the same topic has
-continued to be discussed, with different opinions on the part of
-philosophers. Plato's views are interesting, as far as his
-language enables us to make them out. He does not agree with those
-who treat sensation or sensible perception (in his language, the
-two are not distinguished) as a bodily phenomenon, and
-intelligence as a mental phenomenon. He regards both as belonging
-to the mind or soul. He considers that the mind is sentient as
-well as intelligent: and moreover, that the sentient mind is the
-essential basis and preliminary--universal among men and animals,
-as well as coaeval with birth--furnishing all the matter, upon
-which the intelligent mind has to work. He says nothing, in this
-dialogue, about the three distinct souls or minds (rational,
-courageous, and appetitive), in one and the same body, which form
-so capital a feature in his Timaeus and Republic: nothing about
-eternal, self-existent, substantial Ideas, or about the
-pre-existence of the soul and its reminiscence as the process of
-acquiring knowledge. Nor does he countenance the doctrine of
-innate ideas, instinctive beliefs, immediate mental intuitions,
-internal senses, &c., which have been recognised by many
-philosophers. Plato supposes the intelligent mind to work
-altogether upon the facts of sense; to review and compare them
-with one another; and to compute facts present or past, with a
-view to the future. All this is quite different from the mental
-intuitions and instincts, assumed by various modern philosophers
-as common to all mankind. The operations, which Plato ascribes to
-the intelligent mind, are said to be out of the reach of the
-common man, and not to be attainable except by a few, with
-difficulty and labour. The distinctive feature of the sentient
-mind, according to him, is, that it operates through a special
-bodily organ of sense: whereas the intelligent mind has no such
-special bodily organ.
-
-[Side-note: Different views given by Plato in other dialogues.]
-
-But this distinction, in the first place, is not consistent with
-Timaeus--wherein Plato assigns to each of his three human souls a
-separate and special region of the bodily organism, as its
-physical basis. Nor, in the second place, is it consistent with
-that larger range of observed facts which the farther development
-of physiology has brought to view. To Plato and Aristotle the
-nerves and the nervous system were wholly unknown: but it is now
-ascertained that the optic, auditory, and other nerves of sense,
-are only branches of a complicated system of sensory and motory
-nerves, attached to the brain and spinal cord as a centre: each
-nerve of sense having its own special mode of excitability or
-manifestation. Now the physical agency whereby sensation is
-carried on, is, not the organ of sense alone, but the cerebral
-centre acting along with that organ: whereas in the intellectual
-and memorial processes, the agency of the cerebral centre and
-other internal parts of the nervous system are sufficient, without
-any excitement beginning at the peripheral extremity of the
-special organ of sense, or even though that organ be disabled. We
-know the intelligent mind only in an embodied condition: that is,
-as working along with and through its own physical agency. When
-Plato, therefore, says that the mind thinks, computes, compares,
-&c., by itself--this is true only as signifying that it does so
-without the initiatory stimulus of a special organ of sense; not
-as signifying that it does so without the central nervous force or
-currents--an agency essential alike to thought, to sensation, to
-emotion, and to appetite.
-
-[Side-note: Plato's discussion of this question here exhibits a
-remarkable advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from
-Sensation, first to Opinion, then to Cognition.]
-
-Putting ourselves back to the Platonic period, we must recognise
-that the discussion of the theory [Greek: Ai)/sthesis =
-E)piste/me], as it is conducted by Plato, exhibits a remarkable
-advance in psychological analysis. In analysing the mental
-phenomena, Plato displayed much more subtlety and acuteness than
-his predecessors--as far at least as we have the means of
-appreciating the latter. It is convenient to distinguish intellect
-from sensation (or sensible perception) and emotion, though both
-of them are essential and co-ordinate parts of our mental system,
-and are so recognised by Plato. It is also true that the
-discrimination of our sensations from each other, comparisons of
-likeness or unlikeness between them, observation of co-existence
-or sequence, and apprehension of other relations between them,
-&c., are more properly classified as belonging to intellect than
-to sense. But the language of psychology is, and always has been,
-so indeterminate, that it is difficult to say how much any writer
-means to include under the terms Sense[99]--Sensation--Sensible
-Perception--[Greek: Ai)/sthesis]. The propositions in which our
-knowledge is embodied, affirm--not sensations detached and
-isolated, but--various relations of antecedence and consequence,
-likeness, difference, &c., between two or more sensations or facts
-of sense. We rise thus to a state of mind more complicated than
-simple sensation: including (along with sensation), association,
-memory, discrimination, comparison of sensations, abstraction, and
-generalisation. This is what Plato calls opinion[100] or belief; a
-mental process, which, though presupposing sensations and based
-upon them, he affirms to be carried on by the mind through itself,
-not through any special bodily organ. In this respect it agrees
-with what he calls knowledge or cognition. Opinion or belief is
-the lowest form, possessed in different grades by all men, of this
-exclusively mental process: knowledge or cognition is the highest
-form of the same, attained only by a select few. Both opinion, and
-cognition, consist in comparisons and computations made by the
-mind about the facts of sense. But cognition (in Plato's view) has
-special marks:--
-
-1. That it is infallible, while opinion is fallible. You have
-it[101] or you have it not--but there is no mistake possible.
-
-2. That it apprehends what Plato calls the real essence of things,
-and real truth, which, on the contrary, Opinion does not
-apprehend.
-
-3. That the person who possesses it can maintain his own
-consistency under cross-examination, and can test the consistency
-of others by cross-examining them ([Greek: lo/gon dou=nai kai\
-de/xasthai]).
-
-[Footnote 99: The discussion in pp. 184-186-186 of the Theaetetus
-is interesting as the earliest attempt remaining to classify
-psychological phenomena. What Demokritus and others proposed with
-the same view--the analogy or discrepancy between [Greek: to\
-ai)stha/nesthai] and [Greek: to\ noei=n]--we gather only from the
-brief notices of Aristotle and others. Plato considers himself to
-have established, that "cognition is not to be sought at all in
-sensible perception, but in that function, whatever it be, which
-is predicated of the mind when it busies itself _per se_ (_i.e._
-not through any special bodily organ) about existences" (p. 187
-A). We may here remark, as to the dispute between Plato and
-Protagoras, that Plato here does not at all escape from the region
-of the Relative, or from the Protagorean formula, _Homo Mensura_.
-He passes from Mind Percipient to Mind Cogitant; but these new
-Entia cogitationis (as his language implies) are still relative,
-though relative to the Cogitant and not to the Percipient. He
-reduces Mind Sentient to the narrowest functions, including only
-each isolated impression of one or other among the five senses.
-When we see a clock on the wall and hear it strike twelve--we have
-a visual impression of black from the hands, of white from the
-face, and an audible impression from each stroke. But this is all
-(according to Plato) which we have from sense, or which addresses
-itself to the sentient mind. All beyond this (according to him) is
-apprehended by the cogitant mind: all discrimination, comparison,
-and relation--such as the succession, or one, two, three, &c., of
-the separate impressions, the likeness of one stroke to the
-preceding, the contrast or dissimilarity of the black with the
-white--even the simplest acts of discrimination or comparison
-belong (in Plato's view) to mental powers beyond and apart from
-sense; much more, of course, apprehension of the common properties
-of all, and of those extreme abstractions to which we apply the
-words Ens and Non-Ens ([Greek: to/ t' e)pi\ pa=si koino\n kai\ to\
-e)pi\ tou/tois, o(=| to\ e)/stin e)ponoma/zeis kai\ to\ ou)k
-e)/stin], p. 185 C).
-
-When Plato thus narrows the sense of [Greek: ai)/sthesis], it is
-easy to prove that [Greek: e)piste/me] is not [Greek:
-ai)/sthesis]; but I doubt whether those who affirmed this
-proposition intended what he here refutes. Neither unreflecting
-men, nor early theorizers, would distinguish the impressions of
-sense from the feeling of such impressions being _successive,
-distinct from one another, resembling, &c._ Mr. John Stuart Mill
-observes (Logic, Book i. chap. iii. sects. 10-13)--"The simplest
-of all relations are those expressed by the words antecedent and
-consequent, and by the word simultaneous. If we say dawn preceded
-sunrise, the fact in which the two things dawn and sunrise were
-jointly concerned, consisted only of the two things themselves. No
-third thing entered into the fact or phenomenon at all, unless
-indeed we choose to call the succession of the two objects a third
-thing; _but their succession is not something added to the things
-themselves_, it is something _involved in them_. To have two
-feelings at all, implies having them either successively or
-simultaneously. The relations of succession and simultaneity, of
-likeness and unlikeness, not being grounded on any fact or
-phenomenon distinct from the related objects themselves, do not
-admit of the same kind of analysis. But these relations, though
-not (like other relations) grounded on states of consciousness,
-are themselves states of consciousness. Resemblance is nothing but
-our feeling of resemblance: succession is nothing but our feeling
-of succession."
-
-By all ordinary (non-theorising) persons, these familiar
-relations, _involved_ in the facts of sense, are conceived as an
-essential part of [Greek: ai)/sthesis]: and are so conceived by
-those modern theorists who trace all our knowledge to sense--as
-well as (probably) by those ancient theorists who defined [Greek:
-e)piste/me] to be [Greek: ai)/sthesis], and against whom Plato
-here reasons. These theorists would have said (as ordinary
-language recognises)--"We _see_ the _dissimilarity_ of the black
-hands from the white face of the clock; we _hear_ the _likeness_
-of one stroke of the clock to another, and the _succession_ of the
-strokes one, two, three, one after the other".
-
-The reasoning of Plato against these opponents is thus open to
-many of the remarks made by Sir William Hamilton, in the notes to
-his edition of Reid's works, upon Reid's objections against Locke
-and Berkeley: Reid restricted the word Sensation to a much
-narrower meaning than that given to it by Locke and Berkeley.
-"Berkeley's _Sensation_" (observes S. W. Hamilton) "was equivalent
-to Reid's _Sensation_ plus _Perception_. This is manifest even by
-the passages adduced in the text" (note to p. 289). But Reid in
-his remarks omits to notice this difference in the meaning of the
-same word. The case is similar with Plato when he refutes those
-who held the doctrine [Greek: E)piste/me = Ai)/sthesis]. The
-last-mentioned word, in his construction, includes only a part of
-the meaning which they attributed to it; but he takes no notice of
-this verbal difference. Sir William Hamilton remarks, respecting
-M. Royer Collard's doctrine, which narrows prodigiously the
-province of Sense,--"_Sense_ he so limits that, if rigorously
-carried out, no sensible perception, as no consciousness, could be
-brought to bear". This is exactly true about Plato's doctrine
-narrowing [Greek: ai)/sthesis]. See Hamilton's edit. of Reid,
-Appendix, p. 844.
-
-Aristotle understands [Greek: ai)/sthesis--ai)sthetike\ psuche\]
-or [Greek: zoe/]--as occupying a larger sphere than that which
-Plato assigns to them in the Theaetetus. Aristotle recognises the
-five separate [Greek: ai)sthe/seis], each correlating with and
-perceiving its [Greek: i)/dion ai)stheto/n]: he also recognises
-[Greek: e( koine\ ai)/sthesis]--common sensation or
-perception--correlating with (or perceiving) [Greek: ta\ koina\
-ai)stheta/], which are _motion_, _rest_, _magnitude_, _figure_,
-_number_. The [Greek: koine\ ai)/sthesis] is not a distinct or sixth
-sense, apart from the five, but a general power inhering in all of
-them. He farther recognises [Greek: ai)/sthesis] as discriminating,
-judging, comparing, knowing: this characteristic, [Greek: to\
-kritoko\n] and [Greek: gnostiko/n], is common to [Greek:
-ai)/sthesis, phantasi/a, no/esis], and distinguishes them all from
-appetite--[Greek: to\ o)rektiko/n, kinetiko/n], &c. See the first
-and second chapters of the third Book of the Treatise De Anima,
-and the Commentary of Simplikius upon that Treatise, especially p.
-56, b. Aristotle tells us that all animals [Greek: e)/chei
-du/namin su/mphuton kritike/n, e(\n kalou=sin ai)/sthesin.] Anal.
-Poster. ii. p. 99, b. 35. And Sir William Hamilton adopts a
-similar view, when he remarks, that Judgment is implied in every
-act of Consciousness.
-
-Occasionally indeed Aristotle partitions the soul between [Greek:
-nou=s] and [Greek: o)/rexis]--Intelligence and
-Appetite--recognising Sense as belonging to the head of Intelligence--see
-De Motu Animalium, 6, p. 700, b. 20. [Greek: tau=ta de\ pa/nta
-a)na/getai ei)s nou=n kai\ o)/rexin; kai\ ga\r e( phantasi/a kai\
-e( ai)/sthesis te\n au)te\n to=| no=| cho/ran e)/chousi; _kritika\
-ga\r pa/nta_.] Compare also the Topica, ii. 4, p. 111, a. 18.
-
-It will thus be seen that while Plato severs pointedly [Greek:
-ai)/sthesis] from anything like discrimination, comparison,
-judgment, even in the most rudimentary form--Aristotle refuses to
-adopt this extreme abstraction as his basis for classifying the
-mental phenomena. He recognises a certain measure of
-discrimination, comparison, and judgment, as implicated in
-sensible perceptions. Moreover, that which he calls [Greek: koine\
-ai)/sthesis] is unknown to Plato, who isolates each sense, and
-indeed each act of each sense, as much as possible. Aristotle is
-opposed, as Plato is, to the doctrine [Greek: E)piste/me =
-Ai)/sthesis], but he employs a different manner of reasoning
-against it. See, _inter alia_, Anal. Poster. i. 31, p. 87, b. 28.
-He confines [Greek: e)piste/me] to one branch of the [Greek:
-noetike/].
-
-The Peripatetic Straton, the disciple of Theophrastus, denied that
-there was any distinct line of demarcation between [Greek: to\
-ai)stha/nesthai] and [Greek: to\ noei=n]: maintaining that the
-former was impossible without a certain measure of the latter. His
-observation is very worthy of note. Plutarch, De Solertia
-Animalium, iii. 6, p. 961 A. [Greek: Kai/toi Stra/tono/s ge tou=
-phusikou= lo/gos e)sti/n, a)podeiknu/on o(s ou)d' ai)stha/nesthai
-topara/pan a)/neu tou= noei=n u(pa/rchei; kai\ ga\r gra/mmata
-polla/kis e)piporeuo/mena te=| o)/psei, kai\ lo/goi prospi/ptontes
-te=| a)koie=| _dialantha/nousin e(ma=s_ kai\ _diapheu/gousi pro\s
-e(te/rois to\n nou=n e)/chontas_; ei)=t' _au)=this e)pane=lthe_
-kai\ _metathei= kai\ metadio/kei to=n proieme/non e(/kaston
-a)nalego/menos_; e(=| kai\ le/lektai. _Nou=s o(re=|, kai\ nou=s
-a)kou/ei, ta\ de\ a)/lla kopha\ kai\ tuphla/_;** o(s tou= peri\ ta\
-o)/mmata kai\ o)=ta pa/thous, a)\n me\ pare=| to\ phronou=n,
-ai)/sthesin ou) poiou=ntos.]
-
-Straton here notices that remarkable fact (unnoticed by Plato and
-even by Aristotle, so far as I know) in the process of
-association, that impressions of sense are sometimes unheeded when
-they occur, but force themselves upon the attention afterwards,
-and are recalled by the mind in the order in which they occurred
-at first.]
-
-[Footnote 100: Plato, Theaet. p. 187 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: o(/mos de\
-tosou=to/n ge probebe/kamen, o(/ste me\ zetei=n au)te\n
-(e)piste/men) e)n ai)sthe/sei topara/pan, a)ll' e)n e)kei/no| to=|
-o)no/mati, o(/, ti pot' e)/chei e( psuche/, o(/tan au)te\ kath'
-au(te\n pragmateu/etai peri\ ta\ o)/nta.] _Theaet._ [Greek: A)lla\
-me\n tou=to/ ge kalei=tai, o(s e)go)=|mai, _doxa/zein_.] _Sokr._
-[Greek: O)rtho=s ga\r oi)/ei.]
-
-Plato is quite right in distinguishing between [Greek:
-ai)/sthesis] and [Greek: do/xa], looking at the point as a
-question of psychological classification. It appears to me,
-however, most probable that those who maintained the theory
-[Greek: E)piste/me = Ai)/sthesis], made no such distinction, but
-included that which he calls [Greek: do/xa] in [Greek:
-ai)/sthesis]. Unfortunately we do not possess their own
-exposition; but it cannot have included much of psychological
-analysis.]
-
-[Footnote 101: Schleiermacher represents Plato as discriminating
-Knowledge (the region of infallibility, you either possess it or
-not) from Opinion (the region of fallibility, true or false, as
-the case may be) by a broad and impassable line--
-
-"Auch hieraus erwaechst eine sehr entscheidende, nur ebenfalls
-nicht ausdruecklich gezogene, Folgerung, dass die reine Erkenntniss
-gar nicht auf demselben Gebiet liegen koenne mit dem Irrthum--und
-es in Beziehung auf sie kein Wahr und Falsch gebe, sondern nur ein
-Haben oder Nicht Haben." (Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theaet. p.
-176.)
-
-Steinhart (in his Einleit. zum Theaet. p. 94) contests this opinion
-of Schleiermacher (though he seems to give the same opinion
-himself, p. 92). He thinks that Plato does not recognise so very
-marked a separation between Knowledge and Opinion: that he
-considers Knowledge as the last term of a series of mental
-processes, developed gradually according to constant laws, and
-ascending from Sensible Perception through Opinion to Knowledge:
-that the purpose of the Theaetetus is to illustrate this theory.
-
-Ueberweg, on the contrary, defends the opinion of Schleiermacher
-and maintains that Steinhart is mistaken (Aechtheit und Zeit.
-Platon. Schriften, p. 279).
-
-Passages may be produced from Plato's writings to support both
-these views: that of Schleiermacher, as well as that of Steinhart.
-In Timaeus, p. 51 E, the like infallibility is postulated for
-[Greek: Nou=s] (which there represents [Greek: E)piste/me]) as
-contrasted with [Greek: do/xa]. But I think that Steinhart
-ascribes to the Theaetetus more than can fairly be discovered in
-it. That dialogue is purely negative. It declares that [Greek:
-e)piste/me] is _not_ [Greek: ai)/sthesis]. It then attempts to go
-a step farther towards the affirmative, by declaring also that
-[Greek: e)piste/me] is a mental process of computation, respecting
-the impressions of [Greek: ai)/sthesis]--that it is [Greek: to\
-sullogi/zesthai], which is equivalent to [Greek: to\ doxa/zein]:
-compare Phaedrus, 249 B. But this affirmative attempt breaks down:
-for Sokrates cannot explain what [Greek: to\ doxa/zein] is, nor
-how [Greek: to\ doxa/zein pseude=] is possible; in fact he says
-(p. 200 B) that this cannot be explained until we know what
-[Greek: e)piste/me] is. The entire result of the dialogue is
-negative, as the closing words proclaim emphatically. On this
-point many of the commentators agree--Ast, Socher, Stallbaum,
-Ueberweg, Zeller, &c.
-
-Whether it be true, as Schleiermacher, with several others, thinks
-(Einl. pp. 184-185), that Plato intends to attack Aristippus in
-the first part of the dialogue, and Antisthenes in the latter
-part, we have no means of determining.]
-
-This at least is the meaning which Plato assigns to the two words
-corresponding to Cognition and to Opinion, in the present
-dialogue, and often elsewhere. But he also frequently employs the
-word Cognition in a lower and more general signification, not
-restricted, as it is here, to the highest philosophical reach,
-with infallibility--but comprehending much of what is here treated
-only as _opinion_. Thus, for example, he often alludes to the
-various professional men as possessing _Cognition_, each in his
-respective department: the general, the physician, the gymnast,
-the steersman, the husbandman, &c.[102] But he certainly does not
-mean, that each of them has attained what he calls real essence
-and philosophical truths--or that any of them are infallible.
-
-[Footnote 102: Compare Plato, Sophistes, pp. 232 E, 233 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato did not recognise Verification from experience,
-or from facts of sense, as either necessary or possible.]
-
-One farther remark must be made on Plato's doctrine. His
-remark--That Cognition consists not in the affections of sense, but
-in computation or reasoning respecting those affections, (_i. e._
-abstraction, generalisation, &c.)--is both true and important. But
-he has not added, nor would he have admitted, that if we are to
-decide whether our computation is true and right, or false and
-erroneous--our surest way is to recur to the simple facts of
-sense. Theory must be verified by observation; wherever that
-cannot be done, the best guarantee is wanting. The facts
-themselves are not cognition: yet they are the test by which all
-computations, pretending to be cognitions, must be tried.[103]
-
-[Footnote 103: See the remarks on the necessity of Verification,
-as a guarantee for the Deductive Process, in Mr. John Stuart
-Mill's System of Logic, Book iii. ch. xi. s. 8. Newton puts aside
-his own computation or theory respecting gravity as the force
-which kept the moon in its orbit, because the facts reported by
-observers respecting the lunar motions were for some time not in
-harmony with it. Plato certainly would not have surrendered any
-[Greek: sullogismo\s] under the same respect to observed facts.
-Aristotle might probably have done so; but this is uncertain.]
-
-[Side-note: Second definition given by Theaetetus--That Cognition
-consists in right or true opinion.]
-
-We have thus, in enquiring--What is Knowledge or Cognition?
-advanced so far as to discover--That it does not consist in
-sensible perception, but in some variety of that purely mental
-process which is called opining, believing, judging, conceiving,
-&c. And here Theaetetus, being called upon for a second definition,
-answers--_That Knowledge consists in right or true opinion_. All
-opinion is not knowledge, because opinion is often false.[104]
-
-[Footnote 104: Plato, Theaet. p. 187 B. It is scarcely possible to
-translate [Greek: doxa/zein] always by the same English word.]
-
-[Side-note: Objection by Sokrates--This definition assumes that
-there are false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible?
-How can we conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct
-realities?.]
-
-_Sokr._--But you are here assuming that there _are_ false
-opinions? How is this possible? How can any man judge or opine
-falsely? What mental condition is it which bears that name? I
-confess that I cannot tell: though I have often thought of the
-matter myself, and debated it with others.[105] Every thing comes
-under the head either of what a man knows, or of what he does not
-know. If he conceives, it must be either the known, or the
-unknown. He cannot mistake either one known thing for another
-known thing: or a known thing for an unknown: or an unknown for a
-known: or one unknown for another unknown. But to form a false
-opinion, he must err in one or other of these four ways. It is
-therefore impossible that he can form a false opinion.[106]
-
-[Footnote 105: Plato, Theaet. p. 187 C.]
-
-[Footnote 106: Plato, Theaet. p. 188.]
-
-If indeed a man ascribed to any subject a predicate which was
-non-existent, this would be evidently a false opinion. But how
-can any one conceive the non-existent? He who conceives must conceive
-_something_: just as he who sees or touches, must see or touch
-_something_. He cannot see or touch the non-existent: for that
-would be to see or touch nothing: in other words, not to see or
-touch at all. In the same manner, to conceive the non-existent, or
-_nothing_, is impossible.[107] _Theaet._--Perhaps he conceives two
-realities, but confounds them together, mistaking the one for the
-other. _Sokr._--Impossible. If he conceives two distinct
-realities, he cannot suppose the one to be the other. Suppose him
-to conceive, just and unjust, a horse and an ox--he can never
-believe just to be unjust, or the ox to be the horse.[108] If,
-again, he conceives one of the two alone and singly, neither could
-he on that hypothesis suppose it to be the other: for that would
-imply that he conceived the other also.
-
-[Footnote 107: Plato, Theaet. p. 188-189.]
-
-[Footnote 108: Plato, Theaet. p. 190.]
-
-[Side-note: Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past
-impressions are engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly
-identifying present sensations with past impressions.]
-
-Let us look again in another direction (continues Sokrates). We
-have been hasty in our concessions. Is it really impossible for a
-man to conceive, that a thing, which he knows, is another thing
-which he does not know? Let us see. Grant me the hypothesis (for
-the sake of illustration), that each man has in his mind a waxen
-tablet--the wax of one tablet being larger, firmer, cleaner, and
-better in every way, than that of another: the gift of Mnemosyne,
-for inscribing and registering our sensible perceptions and
-thoughts. Every man remembers and knows these, so long as the
-impressions of them remain upon his tablet: as soon as they are
-blotted out, he has forgotten them and no longer knows them.[109]
-Now false opinion may occur thus. A man having inscribed on his
-memorial tablet the impressions of two objects A and B, which he
-has seen before, may come to see one of these objects again; but
-he may by mistake identify the present sensation with the wrong
-past impression, or with that past impression to which it does not
-belong. Thus on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it with the
-past impression B, instead of A: or _vice versa_.[110] False
-opinion will thus lie, not in the conjunction or identification of
-sensations with sensations--nor of thoughts (or past impressions)
-with thoughts--but in that of present sensations with past
-impressions or thoughts.[111]
-
-[Footnote 109: Plato, Theaet. p. 191 C. [Greek: ke/rinon
-e)kmogei=on].]
-
-[Footnote 110: Plato, Theaet. p. 193-194.]
-
-[Footnote 111: Plato, Theaet. p. 195 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false
-opinion is impossible, or else a man may know what he does not
-know.]
-
-Having laid this down, however, Sokrates immediately proceeds to
-refute it. In point of fact, false conceptions are found to
-prevail, not only in the wrong identification of present
-sensations with past impressions or thoughts, but also in the
-wrong identification of one past impression or thought with
-another. Thus a man, who has clearly engraved on his memorial
-tablet the conceptions of five, seven, eleven, twelve,--may
-nevertheless, when asked what is the sum of seven and five, commit
-error and answer eleven: thus mistaking eleven for twelve.
-
-We are thus placed in this dilemma--Either false opinion is an
-impossibility:--Or else, it is possible that what a man knows, he
-may not know. Which of the two do you choose?[112]
-
-[Footnote 112: Plato, Theaet. p. 196 C. [Greek: nu=n de\ e)/toi
-ou)k e)/sti pseude\s do/xa, e)\ a(/ tis oi)=den, oi(=o/n te me\
-ei)de/nai; kai\ tou/ton po/tera ai(rei=?]]
-
-[Side-note: He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and
-having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught
-pigeons turned into it and flying about.]
-
-To this question no answer is given. But Sokrates,--after
-remarking on the confused and unphilosophical manner in which the
-debate has been conducted, both he and Theaetetus having
-perpetually employed the words _know_, _knowledge_, and their
-equivalents, as if the meaning of the words were ascertained,
-whereas the very problem debated is, to ascertain their
-meaning[113]--takes up another path of enquiry. He distinguishes
-between possessing knowledge,--and having it actually in hand or
-on his person: which distinction he illustrates by comparing the
-mind to a pigeon-cage. A man hunts and catches pigeons, then turns
-them into the cage, within the limits of which they fly about:
-when he wants to catch any one of them for use, he has to go
-through a second hunt, sometimes very troublesome: in which he may
-perhaps either fail altogether, or catch the wrong one instead of
-the right. The first hunt Sokrates compares to the acquisition of
-knowledge: the second, to the getting it into his hand for
-use.[114] A man may _know_, in the first sense, and _not know_, in
-the second: he may have to hunt about for the cognition which (in
-the first sense) he actually possesses. In trying to catch one
-cognition, he may confound it with another: and this constitutes
-false opinion--the confusion of two _cognita_ one with
-another.[115]
-
-[Footnote 113: Plato, Theaet. p. 196 D.]
-
-[Footnote 114: Plato, Theaet. p. 197-198.]
-
-[Footnote 115: Plato, Theaet. p. 199 C. [Greek: e( to=n e)pistemo=n
-metallage/].]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theaetetus--That
-there may be non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and
-that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other.
-Sokrates rejects this.]
-
-Yet how can such a confusion be possible? (Sokrates here again
-replies to himself.) How can knowledge betray a man into such
-error? If he knows A, and knows B--how can he mistake A for B?
-Upon this supposition, knowledge produces the effect of ignorance:
-and we might just as reasonably imagine ignorance to produce the
-effects of knowledge.[116]--Perhaps (suggests Theaetetus), he may
-have _non-cognitions_ in his mind, mingled with the cognitions:
-and in hunting for a cognition, he may catch a non-cognition.
-Herein may lie false opinion.--That can hardly be (replies
-Sokrates). If the man catches what is really a non-cognition, he
-will not suppose it to be such, but to be a cognition. He will
-believe himself fully to _know_, that in which he is mistaken. But
-how is it possible that he should confound a non-cognition with a
-cognition, or _vice versa_? Does not he know the one from the
-other? We must then require him to have a separate cognition of
-his own cognitions or non-cognitions--and so on _ad
-infinitum_.[117] The hypothesis cannot be admitted.
-
-[Footnote 116: Plato, Theaet. p. 199 E.]
-
-[Footnote 117: Plato, Theaet. p. 200 B.]
-
-We cannot find out (continues Sokrates) what false opinion is: and
-we have plainly done wrong to search for it, until we have first
-ascertained what knowledge is.[118]
-
-[Footnote 118: Plato, Theaet. p. 200 C.]
-
-[Side-note: He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is
-not the same as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true
-opinion; but they do not teach or communicate knowledge.]
-
-Moreover, as to the question, Whether knowledge is identical with
-true opinion, Sokrates produces another argument to prove that it
-is not so: and that the two are widely different. You can
-communicate true opinion without communicating knowledge: and the
-powerful class of rhetors and litigants make it their special
-business to do so. They persuade, without teaching, a numerous
-audience.[119] During the hour allotted to them for discourse,
-they create, in the minds of the assembled dikasts, true opinions
-respecting complicated incidents of robbery or other unlawfulness,
-at which none of the dikasts have been personally present. Upon
-this opinion the dikasts decide, and decide rightly. But they
-cannot possibly _know_ the facts without having been personally
-present and looking on. That is essential to knowledge or
-cognition.[120] Accordingly, they have acquired true and right
-opinions; yet without acquiring knowledge. Therefore the two are
-not the same.[121]
-
-[Footnote 119: Plato, Theaet. p. 201 A. [Greek: ou(=toi ga/r pou
-te=| e(auto=n te/chne| pei/thousin, ou) dida/skontes, a)lla\
-doxa/zein poiou=ntes a(\ a)\n bou/lontai.]]
-
-[Footnote 120: Plato, Theaet. p. 201 B-C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o(/tan
-dikai/os peistho=si dikastai\ peri\ _o(=n i)do/nti mo/non e)/stin
-ei)de/nai, a)/llos de\ me/_, tau=ta to/te _e)x a)koe=s
-kri/nontes_, a)lethe= do/xan labo/ntes, a)/neu e)piste/mes
-e)/krinan, o)rtha\ peisthe/ntes, ei)/per eu)= e)di/kasan?]]
-
-[Footnote 121: The distinction between persuading and
-teaching--between creating opinion and imparting knowledge--has been
-brought to view in the Gorgias, and is noted also in the Timaeus. As
-it stands here, it deserves notice, because Plato not only professes
-to affirm what _knowledge_ is, but also identifies it with
-sensible perception. The Dikasts (according to Sokrates) would
-have _known_ the case, had they been present when it occurred, so
-as to see and hear it: there is no other way of acquiring
-knowledge.
-
-Hearing the case only by the narration of speakers, they can
-acquire nothing more than a _true opinion_. Hence we learn wherein
-consists the difference between the two. That which I see, hear,
-or apprehend by any sensible perception, I _know_: compare a
-passage in Sophistes, p. 267 A-B, where [Greek: to\ gigno/skein]
-is explained in the same way. But that which I learn from the
-testimony of others amounts to nothing more than opinion; and at
-best to a true opinion.
-
-Plato's reasoning here involves an admission of the very doctrine
-which he had before taken so much pains to confute--the doctrine
-that Cognition is Sensible Perception. Yet he takes no notice of
-the inconsistency. An occasion for sneering at the Rhetors and
-Dikasts is always tempting to him.
-
-So, in the Menon (p. 97 B), the man who has been at Larissa is
-said to _know_ the road to Larissa; as distinguished from another
-man who, never having been there, opines correctly which the road
-is. And in the Sophistes (p. 263) when Plato is illustrating the
-doctrine that false propositions, as well as true propositions,
-are possible, and really occur, he selects as his cases, [Greek:
-Theai/tetos ka/thetai, Theai/tetos pe/tetai]. That one of these
-propositions is false and the other true, can be known only by
-[Greek: ai)/sthesis]--in the sense of that word commonly
-understood.]
-
-[Side-note: New answer of Theaetetus--Cognition is true opinion,
-coupled with rational explanation.]
-
-Theaetetus now recollects another definition of knowledge, learnt
-from some one whose name he forgets. Knowledge is (he says) true
-opinion, coupled with rational explanation. True opinion without
-such rational explanation, is not knowledge. Those things which do
-not admit of rational explanation, are not knowable.[122]
-
-[Footnote 122: Plato, Theaetet. p. 201 D. [Greek: te\n me\n meta\
-lo/gou a)lethe= do/xan e)piste/men ei)=nai; te\n de\ a)/logon,
-e)kto\s e)piste/mes; kai\ o(=n me\n me/ e)sti lo/gos, ou)k
-e)pisteta\ ei)=nai, _ou(tosi\ kai\ o)noma/zon_, a)\ d' e)/chei,
-e)pisteta/.]
-
-The words [Greek: ou(tosi\ kai\ o)noma/zon] are intended,
-according to Heindorf and Schleiermacher, to justify the use of
-the word [Greek: e)pisteta/], which was then a neologism. Both
-this definition, and the elucidation of it which Sokrates proceeds
-to furnish, are announced as borrowed from other persons not
-named.]
-
-[Side-note: Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters
-and words, primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be
-explained: compounds alone can be explained.]
-
-Taking up this definition, and elucidating it farther, Sokrates
-refers to the analogy of words and letters. Letters answer to the
-primordial elements of things; which are not matters either of
-knowledge, or of true opinion, or of rational explanation--but
-simply of sensible perception. A letter, or a primordial element,
-can only be perceived and called by its name. You cannot affirm of
-it any predicate or any epithet: you cannot call it _existing_, or
-_this_, or _that_, or _each_, or _single_, or by any other name
-than its own:[123] for if you do, you attach to it something
-extraneous to itself, and then it ceases to be an element. But
-syllables, words, propositions--_i. e._, the compounds made up by
-putting together various letters or elements--admit of being
-known, explained, and described, by enumerating the component
-elements. You may indeed conceive them correctly, without being
-able to explain them or to enumerate their component elements: but
-then you do not know them. You can only be said to know them, when
-besides conceiving them correctly, you can also specify their
-component elements[124]--or give explanation.
-
-[Footnote 123: Plato, Theaet. pp. 201 E--202 A. [Greek: au)to\ ga\r
-kath' au(to\ e(/kaston o)noma/sai mo/non ei)/e, proseipei=n de\
-ou)de\n a)/llo dunato/n, ou)/th' o(s e)/stin, ou)/th' o(s ou)k
-e)/stin' e)/de ga\r a)\n ou)si/an e)\ me\ ou)si/an au)to=|
-prosti/thesthai, dei=n de\ ou)de\n prosphe/rein, ei)/per au)to\
-e)kei=no mo/non tis e)rei=; e)pei\ ou)de\ to\ _au)to/_, ou)de/ to\
-_e)kei=no_, ou)de\ to _e(/kaston_, ou)de\ to _mo/non_, ou)de\ to\
-_tou=to_, prosoiste/on, ou)d' a)/lla polla\ toiau=ta; tau=ta me\n
-ga\r peritre/chonta pa=si prosphe/resthai, e(/tera o)/nta
-e(kei/non oi(=s prosti/thetai.] Also p. 205 C.]
-
-[Footnote 124: Plato, Theaet. p. 202.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are
-unknowable, the compound must be unknowable also.]
-
-Having enunciated this definition, as one learnt from another
-person not named, Sokrates proceeds to examine and confute it. It
-rests on the assumption (he says), that the primordial elements
-are themselves unknowable; and that it is only the aggregates
-compounded of them which are knowable. Such an assumption cannot
-be granted. The result is either a real sum total, including both
-the two component elements: or it is a new form, indivisible and
-uncompounded, generated by the two elements, but not identical
-with them nor including them in itself. If the former, it is not
-knowable, because if neither of the elements are knowable, both
-together are not knowable: when you know neither A nor B you
-cannot know either the sum or the product of A and B. If the
-latter, then the result, being indivisible and uncompounded, is
-unknowable for the same reason as the elements are so: it can only
-be named by its own substantive name, but nothing can be
-predicated respecting it.[125]
-
-[Footnote 125: Plato, Theaet. pp. 203-206.]
-
-Nor can it indeed be admitted as true--That the elements are
-unknowable, and the compound alone knowable. On the contrary, the
-elements are more knowable than the compound.[126]
-
-[Footnote 126: Plato, Theaet. p. 206.]
-
-[Side-note: Rational explanation may have one of three different
-meanings. 1. Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration
-of all the component elements in the compound. In neither of these
-meanings will the definition of Cognition hold.]
-
-When you say (continues Sokrates) that knowledge is true opinion
-coupled with rational explanation, you may mean by _rational
-explanation_ one of three things. 1. The power of enunciating the
-opinion in clear and appropriate words. This every one learns to
-do, who is not dumb or an idiot: so that in this sense true
-opinion will always carry with it rational explanation.--2. The
-power of describing the thing in question by its component
-elements. Thus Hesiod says that there are a hundred distinct
-wooden pieces in a waggon: you and I do not know nor can we
-describe them all: we can distinguish only the more obvious
-fractions--the wheels, the axle, the body, the yoke, &c.
-Accordingly, we cannot be said to know a waggon: we have only a
-true opinion about it. Such is the second sense of [Greek: lo/gos]
-or rational explanation. But neither in this sense will the
-proposition hold--That knowledge is right opinion coupled with
-rational explanation. For suppose that a man can enumerate, spell,
-and write correctly, all the syllables of the name
-_Theaetetus_--which would fulfil the conditions of this definition:
-yet, if he mistakes and spells wrongly in any other name, such as
-_Theodorus_, you will not give him credit for knowledge. You will
-say that he writes _Theaetetus_ correctly, by virtue of right
-opinion simply. It is therefore possible to have right opinion
-coupled with rational explanation, in this second sense also,--yet
-without possessing knowledge.[127]
-
-[Footnote 127: Plato, Theaet. p. 207-208 B. [Greek: e)/stin a)/ra
-meta\ lo/gou o)rthe\ do/xa, e(\n ou)/po dei= _e)piste/men_
-kalei=n.]]
-
-[Side-note: Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing
-to be explained differs from everything else. The definition will
-not hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already
-included in true opinion.]
-
-3. A third meaning of this same word [Greek: lo/gos] or rational
-explanation, is, that in which it is most commonly understood-To
-be able to assign some mark whereby the thing to be explained
-differs from every thing else--to differentiate the thing.[128]
-Persons, who understand the word in this way, affirm, that so long
-as you only seize what the thing has in common with other things,
-you have only a _true opinion_ concerning it: but when you seize
-what it has peculiar and characteristic, you then possess
-_knowledge_ of it. Such is their view: but though it seems
-plausible at first sight (says Sokrates), it will not bear close
-scrutiny. For in order to have a true opinion about any thing, I
-must have in my mind not only what it possesses in common with
-other things, but what it possesses peculiar to itself also. Thus
-if I have a true opinion about Theaetetus, I must have in my mind
-not only the attributes which belong to him in common with other
-men, but also those which belong to him specially and exclusively.
-Rational explanation ([Greek: lo/gos]) in this sense is already
-comprehended in true opinion, and is an essential ingredient in
-it--not any new element superadded. It will not serve therefore as
-a distinction between true opinion and knowledge.[129]
-
-[Footnote 128: Plato, Theaetet. p. 208 C. [Greek: O(/per a)\n oi(
-polloi\ ei)/poien, to\ e)/chein ti semei=on ei)pei=n o(=| to=n
-a(pa/nton diaphe/rei to\ e)rotethe/n.]]
-
-[Footnote 129: Plato, Theaetet. p. 209.]
-
-[Side-note: Conclusion of the dialogue--Summing up by
-Sokrates--Value of the result, although purely negative.]
-
-Such is the result (continues Sokrates) of our researches
-concerning knowledge. We have found that it is neither sensible
-perception--nor true opinion--nor true opinion along with rational
-explanation. But what it is, we have not found. Are we still
-pregnant with any other answer, Theaetetus, or have we brought
-forth all that is to come?--_I_ have brought forth (replies
-Theaetetus) more than I had within me, through your furtherance.
-Well (rejoins Sokrates)--and my obstetric science has pronounced
-all your offspring to be mere wind, unworthy of being
-preserved![130] If hereafter you should again become pregnant,
-your offspring will be all the better for our recent
-investigation. If on the other hand you should always remain
-barren, you will be more amiable and less vexatious to your
-companions--by having a just estimate of yourself and by not
-believing yourself to know what you really do not know.[131]
-
-[Footnote 130: Plato, Theaetet. p. 210 B. [Greek: ou)kou=n tau=ta
-me\n a(/panta e( maieutike\ e(mi=n te/chne a)nemiai=a/ phesi
-gegene=sthai kai\ ou)k a)/xia trophe=s?]]
-
-[Footnote 131: Plato, Theaet. p. 210 C. [Greek: e)a/n te gi/gne|
-(e)gku/mon), beltio/non e)/sei ple/res dia\ te\n nu=n e)xe/tasin;
-e)a/n te keno\s e)=s, e(=tton e)/sei baru\s toi=s sunou=si kai\
-e(mero/teros, sophro/nos ou)k oi)o/menos ei)de/nai a(\ me\
-oi)=stha.]
-
-Compare also an earlier passage in the dialogue, p. 187 B.]
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False
-persuasion of knowledge removed. Importance of such removal.]
-
-The concluding observations of this elaborate dialogue deserve
-particular attention as illustrating Plato's point of view, at the
-time when he composed the Theaetetus. After a long debate, set
-forth with all the charm of Plato's style, no result is attained.
-Three different explanations of knowledge have been rejected as
-untenable.[132] No other can be found; nor is any suggestion
-offered, showing in what quarter we are to look for the true one.
-What then is the purpose or value of the dialogue? Many persons
-would pronounce it to be a mere piece of useless ingenuity and
-elegance: but such is not the opinion of Plato himself. Sufficient
-gain (in his view) will have been ensured, if Theaetetus has
-acquired a greater power of testing any fresh explanation which he
-may attempt of this difficult subject: or even if he should
-attempt none such, by his being disabused, at all events, of the
-false persuasion of knowing where he is really ignorant. Such
-false persuasion of knowledge (Plato here intimates) renders a man
-vexatious to associates; while a right estimate of his own
-knowledge and ignorance fosters gentleness and moderation of
-character. In this view, false persuasion of knowledge is an
-ethical defect, productive of positive mischief in a man's
-intercourse with others: the removal of it improves his character,
-even though no ulterior step towards real and positive knowledge
-be made. The important thing is, that he should acquire the power
-of testing and verifying all opinions, old as well as new. This,
-which is the only guarantee against the delusive self-satisfaction
-of sham knowledge, must be firmly established in the mind before
-it is possible to aspire effectively to positive and assured
-knowledge. The negative arm of philosophy is in its application
-prior to the positive, and indispensable, as the single protection
-against error and false persuasion of knowledge. Sokrates is here
-depicted as one in whom the negative vein is spontaneous and
-abundant, even to a pitch of discomfort--as one complaining
-bitterly, that objections thrust themselves upon him, unsought and
-unwelcome, against conclusions which he had himself just
-previously taken pains to prove at length.[133]
-
-[Footnote 132: I have already observed, however, that in one
-passage of the interrogation carried on by Sokrates (p. 201 A-B,
-where he is distinguishing between persuasion and teaching) he
-unconsciously admits the identity between knowledge and sensible
-perception.]
-
-[Footnote 133: See the emphatic passage, p. 195 B-C.]
-
-[Side-note: Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's
-minds, value of the Theaetetus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing
-his own suggestions.]
-
-To form in men's minds this testing or verifying power, is one
-main purpose in Plato's dialogues of Search--and in some of them
-the predominant purpose; as he himself announces it to be in the
-Theaetetus. I have already made the same remark before, and I
-repeat it here; since it is absolutely necessary for appreciating
-these dialogues of Search in their true bearing and value. To one
-who does not take account of the negative arm of philosophy, as an
-auxiliary without which the positive arm will strike at
-random--half of the Platonic dialogues will teach nothing, and will
-even appear as enigmas--the Theaetetus among the foremost. Plato excites
-and strengthens the interior mental wakefulness of the hearer, to
-judge respecting all affirmative theories, whether coming from
-himself or from others. This purpose is well served by the manner
-in which Sokrates more than once in this dialogue first announces,
-proves, and builds up a theory--then unexpectedly changes his
-front, disproves, and demolishes it. We are taught that it is not
-difficult to find a certain stock of affirmative argument which
-makes the theory look well from a distance: we must inspect
-closely, and make sure that there are no counter-arguments in the
-background.[134] The way in which Sokrates pulls to pieces his own
-theories, is farther instructive, as it illustrates the
-exhortation previously addressed by him to Theaetetus--not to take
-offence when his answers were canvassed and shown to be
-inadmissible.[135]
-
-[Footnote 134: Plato, Theaetet. p. 208 E.]
-
-[Footnote 135: Plato, Theaetet. p. 151 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The
-Rhetor is enslaved to the opinions of auditors.]
-
-A portion of the dialogue to which I have not yet adverted,
-illustrates this anxiety for the preliminary training of the
-ratiocinative power, as an indispensable qualification for any
-special research. "We have plenty of leisure for
-investigation[136] (says Sokrates). We are not tied to time, nor
-compelled to march briefly and directly towards some positive
-result. Engaged as we are in investigating philosophical truth, we
-stand in pointed contrast with politicians and rhetors in the
-public assembly or dikastery. We are like freemen; they, like
-slaves. They have before them the Dikasts, as their masters, to
-whose temper and approbation they are constrained to adapt
-themselves. They are also in presence of antagonists, ready to
-entrap and confute them. The personal interests, sometimes even
-the life, of an individual are at stake; so that every thing must
-be sacrificed to the purpose of obtaining a verdict. Men brought
-up in these habits become sharp in observation and emphatic in
-expression; but merely with a view to win the assent and
-approbation of the master before them, as to the case in hand. No
-free aspirations or spontaneous enlargement can have place in
-their minds. They become careless of true and sound
-reasoning--slaves to the sentiment of those whom they address--and
-adepts in crooked artifice which they take for wisdom.[137]
-
-[Footnote 136: Plato, Theaet. p. 155. [Greek: o(s pa/nu polle\n
-schole\n a)/gontes, pa/lin e)panaskepso/metha], &c.; also p. 172.]
-
-[Footnote 137: Plato, Theaetet. p. 172-173.
-
-I give only an abstract of this eloquent passage, not an exact
-translation. Steinhart (Einleitung zum Theaetet. p. 37) calls it "a
-sublime Hymn" (einen erhabenen Hymnus). It is a fine piece of
-poetry or rhetoric, and shows that Plato was by nature quite as
-rhetorical as the rhetors whom he depreciates--though he had also,
-besides, other lofty intellectual peculiarities of his own, beyond
-these rivals.]
-
-[Side-note: The Philosopher is master of his own debates.]
-
-Of all this (continues Sokrates) the genuine philosopher is the
-reverse. He neither possesses, nor cares to possess, the
-accomplishments of the lawyer and politician. He takes no interest
-in the current talk of the city; nor in the scandals afloat
-against individual persons. He does not share in the common ardour
-for acquiring power or money; nor does he account potentates
-either happier or more estimable for possessing them. Being
-ignorant and incompetent in the affairs of citizenship as well as
-of common life, he has no taste for club-meetings or joviality.
-His mind, despising the particular and the practical, is absorbed
-in constant theoretical research respecting universals. He spares
-no labour in investigating--What is man in general? and what are
-the attributes, active and passive, which distinguish man from
-other things? He will be overthrown and humiliated before the
-Dikastery by a clever rhetor. But if this opponent chooses to
-ascend out of the region of speciality, and the particular ground
-of injustice alleged by A against B--into the general question,
-What is justice or injustice? Wherein do they differ from each
-other or from other things? What constitutes happiness and misery?
-How is the one to be attained and the other avoided?--If the
-rhetor will meet the philosopher on this elevated ground, then he
-will find himself put to shame and proved to be incompetent, in
-spite of all the acute stratagems of his petty mind.[138] He will
-look like a child and become ashamed of himself:[139] but the
-philosopher is noway ashamed of his incompetence for slavish
-pursuits, while he is passing a life of freedom and leisure among
-his own dialectics.[140]
-
-[Footnote 138: Plato, Theaet. pp. 175-176.]
-
-[Footnote 139: Plato, Theaet. p. 177 B.]
-
-[Footnote 140: Plato, Theaet. p. 175 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of
-philosophical Search.]
-
-In these words of Sokrates we read a contrast between practice and
-theory--one of the most eloquent passages in the
-dialogues--wherein Plato throws overboard the ordinary concerns and
-purposes both of public and private life, admitting that true philosophers
-are unfit for them. The passage, while it teaches us caution in
-receiving his criticisms on the defects of actual statesmen and
-men of action, informs us at the same time that he regarded
-philosophy as the only true business of life--the single pursuit
-worthy to occupy a freeman.[141] This throws light on the purpose
-of many of his dialogues. He intends to qualify the mind for a
-life of philosophical research, and with this view to bestow
-preliminary systematic training on the ratiocinative power. To
-announce at once his own positive conclusions with their reasons,
-(as I remarked before) is not his main purpose. A pupil who,
-having got all these by heart, supposed himself to have completed
-his course of philosophy, so that nothing farther remained to be
-done, would fall very short of the Platonic exigency. The life of
-the philosopher--as Plato here conceives it--is a perpetual search
-after truth, by dialectic debate and mutual cross-examination
-between two minds, aiding each other to disembroil that confusion
-and inconsistency which grows up naturally in the ordinary mind.
-For such a life a man becomes rather disqualified than prepared,
-by swallowing an early dose of authoritative dogmas and proofs
-dictated by his teacher. The two essential requisites for it are,
-that he should acquire a self-acting ratiocinative power, and an
-earnest, untiring, interest in the dialectic process. Both these
-aids Plato's negative dialogues are well calculated to afford: and
-when we thus look at his purpose, we shall see clearly that it did
-not require the presentation of any positive result.
-
-[Footnote 141: Plato, Sophistes, p. 253 C: [Greek: e( to=n
-e)leuthe/ron e)piste/me].]
-
-[Side-note: Difficulties of the Theaetetus are not solved in any
-other Dialogue.]
-
-The course of this dialogue--the Theaetetus--has been already
-described as an assemblage of successive perplexities without any
-solution. But what deserves farther notice is--That the
-perplexities, as they are not solved in this dialogue, so they are
-not solved in any other dialogue. The view taken by Schleiermacher
-and other critics--that Plato lays out the difficulties in one
-anterior dialogue, in order to furnish the solution in another
-posterior--is not borne out by the facts. In the Theaetetus, many
-objections are propounded against the doctrine, That Opinion is
-sometimes true, sometimes false. Sokrates shows that false opinion
-is an impossibility: either therefore all opinions are true, or no
-opinion is either true or false. If we turn to the Sophistes, we
-shall find this same question discussed by the Eleatic Stranger
-who conducts the debate. He there treats the doctrine--That false
-opinion is an impossibility and that no opinion could be false--as
-one which had long embarrassed himself, and which formed the
-favourite subterfuge of the impostors whom he calls Sophists. He
-then states that this doctrine of the Sophists was founded on the
-Parmenidean dictum--That Non-Ens was an impossible supposition.
-Refuting the dictum of Parmenides (by a course of reasoning which
-I shall examine elsewhere), he arrives at the conclusion--That
-Non-Ens exists in a certain fashion, as well as Ens: That false
-opinions are possible: That there may be false opinions as well as
-true. But what deserves most notice here, in illustration of
-Plato's manner, is--that though the Sophistes[142] is announced as
-a continuation of the Theaetetus (carried on by the same speakers,
-with the addition of the Eleate), yet the objections taken by
-Sokrates in the Theaetetus against the possibility of false
-opinion, are not even noticed in the Sophistes--much less removed.
-Other objections to it are propounded and dealt with: but not
-those objections which had arrested the march of Sokrates in the
-Theaetetus.[143] Sokrates and Theaetetus hear the Eleatic Stranger
-discussing this same matter in the Sophistes, yet neither of them
-allude to those objections against his conclusion which had
-appeared to both of them irresistible in the preceding dialogue
-known as Theaetetus. Nor are the objections refuted in any other of
-the Platonic dialogues.
-
-[Footnote 142: See the end of the Theaetetus and the opening of the
-Sophistes. Note, moreover, that the Politikus makes reference not
-only to the Sophistes, but also to the Theaetetus (pp. 258 A, 266
-D, 284 B, 286 B).]
-
-[Footnote 143: In the Sophistes, the Eleate establishes (to his
-own satisfaction) that [Greek: to\ me\ o)\n] is not [Greek:
-e)nanti/on tou= o)/ntos], but [Greek: e(/teron tou= o)/ntos] (p.
-257 B), that it is one [Greek: ge/nos] among the various [Greek:
-ge/ne] (p. 260 B), and that it ([Greek: to\ me\ o)\n koinonei=])
-enters into communion or combination with [Greek: do/xa, lo/gos,
-phantasi/a], &c. It is therefore possible that there may be
-[Greek: pseude\s do/xa] or [Greek: pseude\s lo/gos], when you
-affirm, respecting any given subject, [Greek: e(/tera to=n
-o)/nton] or [Greek: ta\ me\ o)/nta o(s o)/nta] (p. 263 B-C). Plato
-considers that the case is thus made out against the Sophist, as
-the impostor and dealer in falsehoods; false opinion being proved
-to be possible and explicable.
-
-But if we turn to the Theaetetus (p. 189 seq.), we shall see that
-this very explication of [Greek: pseude\s do/xa] is there
-enunciated and impugned by Sokrates in a long argument. He calls
-it there [Greek: a)llodoxi/a, e(terodoxi/a, to\ e(terodoxei=n]
-(pp. 189 A, 190 E, 193 D). No man (he says) can mistake one thing
-for another; if this were so, he must be supposed both to know and
-not to know the same thing, which is impossible (pp. 196 A, 200
-A). Therefore [Greek: pseude\s do/xa] is impossible.
-
-Of these objections, urged by Sokrates in the Theaetetus, against
-the possibility of [Greek: a)llodoxi/a], no notice is taken in the
-Sophistes either by Sokrates, or by Theaetetus, or by the Eleate in
-the Sophistes. Indeed the Eleate congratulates himself upon the
-explanation as more satisfactory than he had expected to find (p.
-264 B): and speaks with displeasure of the troublesome persons who
-stir up doubts and contradictions (p. 259 C): very different from
-the tone of Sokrates in the Theaetetus (p. 195, B-C).
-
-I may farther remark that Plato, in the Republic, reasons about
-[Greek: to\ me\ o)\n] in the Parmenidean sense, and not in the
-sense which he ascribed to it in the Sophistes, and which he
-recognises in the Politikus, p. 284 B. (Republic, v. pp. 477 A,
-478 C.)
-
-Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 260-270) points out the
-discrepancy between the doctrines of the Eleate in the Sophistes,
-and those maintained by Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues;
-inferring from thence that the Sophistes and Politikus are not
-compositions of Plato. As between the Theaetetus and the Sophistes,
-I think a stronger case of discrepancy might be set forth than he
-has stated; though the end of the former is tied to the beginning
-of the latter plainly, directly, and intentionally. But I do not
-agree in his inference. He concludes that the Sophistes is not
-Plato's composition: I conclude, that the scope for dissident
-views and doctrine, within the long philosophical career and
-numerous dialogues of Plato, is larger than his commentators
-admit.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato considered that the search for Truth was the
-noblest occupation of life.]
-
-Such a string of objections never answered, and of difficulties
-without solution, may appear to many persons nugatory as well as
-tiresome. To Plato they did not appear so. At the time when
-most of his dialogues were composed, he considered that the Search
-after truth was at once the noblest occupation, and the highest
-pleasure, of life. Whoever has no sympathy with such a
-pursuit--whoever cares only for results, and finds the chase in
-itself fatiguing rather than attractive--is likely to take little
-interest in the Platonic dialogues. To repeat what I said in
-Chapter VIII.**--Those who expect from Plato a coherent system in
-which affirmative dogmas are first to be laid down, with the
-evidence in their favour--next, the difficulties and objections
-against them enumerated--lastly, these difficulties solved--will
-be disappointed. Plato is, occasionally, abundant in his
-affirmations: he has also great negative fertility in starting
-objections: but the affirmative current does not come into
-conflict with the negative. His belief is enforced by rhetorical
-fervour, poetical illustration, and a vivid emotional fancy. These
-elements stand to him in the place of positive proof; and when his
-mind is full of them, the unsolved objections, which he himself
-had stated elsewhere, vanish out of sight. Towards the close of
-his life (as we shall see in the Treatise De Legibus), the love of
-dialectic, and the taste for enunciating difficulties even when he
-could not clear them up, died out within him. He becomes
-ultra-dogmatical, losing even the poetical richness and fervour which
-had once marked his affirmations, and substituting in their place
-a strict and compulsory orthodoxy.
-
-[Side-note: Contrast between the philosopher and the practical
-statesman--between Knowledge and Opinion.]
-
-The contrast between the philosopher and the man engaged in active
-life--which is so emphatically set forth in the Theaetetus[144]--falls
-in with the distinction between Knowledge and Opinion--The
-Infallible and the Fallible. It helps the purpose of the dialogue,
-to show what knowledge is _not_: and it presents the distinction
-between the two on the ethical and emotional side, upon which
-Plato laid great stress. The philosopher (or man of Knowledge,
-_i.e._ Knowledge viewed on its subjective side) stands opposed to
-the men of sensible perception and opinion, not merely in regard
-to intellect, but in regard to disposition, feeling, character,
-and appreciation of objects. He neither knows nor cares about
-particular things or particular persons: all his intellectual
-force, and all his emotional interests, are engaged in the
-contemplation of Universals or Real Entia, and of the great
-pervading cosmical forces. He despises the occupations of those
-around him, and the actualities of life, like the Platonic
-Sokrates in the Gorgias:[145] assimilating himself as much as
-possible to the Gods; who have no other occupation (according to
-the Aristotelian[146] Ethics), except that of contemplating and
-theorising. He pursues these objects not with a view to any
-ulterior result, but because the pursuit is in itself a life both
-of virtue and happiness; neither of which are to be found in the
-region of opinion. Intense interest in speculation is his
-prominent characteristic. To dwell amidst these contemplations is
-a self-sufficing life; even without any of the aptitudes or
-accomplishments admired by the practical men. If the philosopher
-meddles with their pursuits, he is not merely found incompetent,
-but also incurs general derision; because his incompetence becomes
-manifest even to the common-place citizens. But if _they_ meddle
-with his speculations, they fail not less disgracefully; though
-their failure is not appreciated by the unphilosophical spectator.
-
-[Footnote 144: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 173-176. Compare Republic, v.
-pp. 476-477, vii. p. 517.]
-
-[Footnote 145: See above, chap. xxiv. p. 355.]
-
-[Footnote 146: Ethic. Nikomach. x. 8, p. 1178, b. 9-25.]
-
-The professors of Knowledge are thus divided by the strongest
-lines from the professors of Opinion. And opinion itself--The
-Fallible--is, in this dialogue, presented as an inexplicable
-puzzle. You talk about true and false opinions: but how can false
-opinions be possible? and if they are not possible, what is the
-meaning of _true_, as applied to opinions? Not only, therefore,
-opinion can never be screwed up to the dignity of knowledge--but
-the world of opinion itself defies philosophical scrutiny. It is a
-chaos in which there is neither true nor false; in perpetual
-oscillation (to use the phrase of the Republic) between Ens and
-Non-Ens.[147]
-
-[Footnote 147: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 478-479.
-
-The Theaetetus is more in harmony (in reference to [Greek: do/xa]
-and [Greek: e)piste/me]) with the Republic, than with the
-Sophistes and Politikus. In the Politikus (p. 309 C) [Greek:
-a)lethe\s do/xa meta\ bebaio/seos] is placed very nearly on a par
-with knowledge: in the Menon also, the difference between the two,
-though clearly declared, is softened in degree, pp. 97-98.
-
-The Alexandrine physician Herophilus attempted to draw, between
-[Greek: pro/r)r(esis] and [Greek: pro/gnosis], the same
-distinction as that which Plato draws between [Greek: do/xa] and
-[Greek: e)piste/me]--The Fallible as contrasted with the
-Infallible. Galen shows that the distinction is untenable (Prim.
-Commentat. in Hippokratis Prorrhetica, Tom. xvi. p. 487. ed.
-Kuehn).
-
-Bonitz, in his Platonische Studien (pp. 41-78), has given an
-instructive analysis and discussion of the Theaetetus. I find more
-to concur with in his views, than in those of Schleiermacher or
-Steinhart. He disputes altogether the assumption of other Platonic
-critics, that a purely negative result is unworthy of Plato; and
-that the negative apparatus is an artifice to recommend, and a
-veil to conceal, some great affirmative truth, which acute
-expositors can detect and enunciate plainly (Schleiermacher,
-Einleit. zum Theaetet. p. 124 seq.) Bonitz recognises the result of
-the Theaetetus as purely negative, and vindicates the worth of it
-as such. Moreover, instead of denouncing the opinions which Plato
-combats, as if they were perverse heresies of dishonest
-pretenders, he adverts to the great difficulty of those problems
-which both Plato and Plato's opponents undertook to elucidate: and
-he remarks that, in those early days, the first attempts to
-explain psychological phenomena were even more liable to error
-than the first attempts to explain physical phenomena (pp. 75-77).
-Such recognition, of the real difficulty of a problem, is rare
-among the Platonic critics.]
-
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XXIX.
-
-SOPHISTES--POLITIKUS.
-
-
-[Side-note: Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues.]
-
-These two dialogues are both of them announced by Plato as forming
-sequel to the Theaetetus. The beginning of the Sophistes fits on to
-the end of the Theaetetus: and the Politikus is even presented as a
-second part or continuation of the Sophistes.[1] In all the three,
-the same interlocutors are partially maintained. Thus Sokrates,
-Theodorus, and Theaetetus are present in all three: and Theaetetus
-makes the responses, not only in the dialogue which bears his
-name, but also in the Sophistes. Both in the Sophistes and
-Politikus, however, Sokrates himself descends from the part of
-principal speaker to that of listener: it is he, indeed, who by
-his question elicits the exposition, but he makes no comment
-either during the progress of it or at the close. In both the
-dialogues, the leading and expository function is confided to a
-new personage introduced by Theodorus:--a stranger not named, but
-announced as coming from Elea--the friend and companion of
-Parmenides and Zeno. Perhaps (remarks Sokrates) your friend may,
-without your knowledge, be a God under human shape; as Homer tells
-us that the Gods often go about, in the company of virtuous men,
-to inspect the good and bad behaviour of mankind. Perhaps your
-friend may be a sort of cross-examining God, coming to test and
-expose our feebleness in argument. No (replies Theodorus) that is
-not his character. He is less given to dispute than his
-companions. He is far from being a God, but he is a divine man:
-for I call all true philosophers divine.[2]
-
-[Footnote 1: At the beginning of the Politikus, Plato makes
-Sokrates refer both to the Theaetetus and to the Sophistes (p. 258
-A). In more than one passage of the Politikus (pp. 266 D, 284 B,
-286 B), he even refers to the Sophistes directly and by name,
-noticing certain points touched in it--a thing very unusual with
-him. In the Sophistes also (p. 233 B), express reference is made
-to a passage in the Theaetetus.
-
-See also the allusion in Sophistes (to the appearance of the
-younger Sokrates as respondent), p. 218 B.
-
-Socher (in his work, Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 258-294)
-maintains that neither the Sophistes, nor the Politikus, nor the
-Parmenides, are genuine works of Plato. He conceives the two
-dialogues to be contemporary with the Theaetetus (which he holds to
-have been written by Plato), but to have been composed by some
-acute philosopher of the Megaric school, conversant with the
-teachings of Sokrates and with the views of Plato, after the visit
-of the latter to Megara in the period succeeding the death of
-Sokrates (p. 268).
-
-Even if we grant the exclusion of Plato's authorship, the
-hypothesis of an author belonging to the Megaric school is highly
-improbable: the rather, since many critics suppose (I think
-erroneously) that the Megarici are among those attacked in the
-dialogue. The suspicion that Plato is not the author of Sophistes
-and Politikus has undoubtedly more appearance of reason than the
-same suspicion as applied to other dialogues--though I think the
-reasons altogether insufficient. Socher observes, justly: 1. That
-the two dialogues are peculiar, distinguished from other Platonic
-dialogues by the profusion of logical classification, in practice
-as well as in theory. 2. That both, and especially the Sophistes,
-advance propositions and conclusions discrepant from what we read
-in other Platonic dialogues.--But these two reasons are not
-sufficient to make me disallow them. I do not agree with those who
-require so much uniformity, either of matter or of manner, in the
-numerous distinct dialogues of Plato. I recognise a much wider
-area of admissible divergence.
-
-The plain announcement contained in the Theaetetus, Sophistes, and
-Politikus themselves, that the two last are intended as sequel to
-the first, is in my mind a proof of sameness of authorship, not
-counterbalanced by Socher's objections. Why should a Megaric
-author embody in his two dialogues a false pretence and assurance,
-that they are sequel of the Platonic Theaetetus? Why should so
-acute a writer (as Socher admits him to be) go out of his way to
-suppress his own personality, and merge his fame in that of Plato?
-
-I make the same remark on the views of Suckow (Form der
-Platonischen Schriften, p. 87, seq., Breslau, 1855), who admits
-the Sophistes to be a genuine work of Plato, but declares the
-Politikus to be spurious; composed by some fraudulent author, who
-wished to give to his dialogue the false appearance of being a
-continuation of the Sophistes: he admits (p. 93) that it must be a
-deliberate deceit, if the Politikus be really the work of a
-different author from the Sophistes; for identity of authorship is
-distinctly affirmed in it.
-
-Suckow gives two reasons for believing that the Politikus is not
-by Plato:--1. That the doctrines respecting government are
-different from those of the Republic, and the cosmology of the
-long mythe which it includes different from the cosmology of the
-Timaeus. These are reasons similar to those advanced by Socher, and
-(in my judgment) insufficient reasons. 2. That Aristotle, in a
-passage of the Politica (iv. 2, p. 1289, b. 5), alludes to an
-opinion, which is found in the Politikus in the following terms:
-[Greek: e)/de me\n ou)=n tis a)pephe/nato kai\ to=n pro/teron
-ou(/tos], &c. Suckow maintains that Aristotle could never have
-alluded to Plato in these terms, and that he must have believed
-the Politikus to be composed by some one else. But I think this
-inference is not justified by the premisses. It is noway
-impossible that Aristotle might allude to Plato sometimes in this
-vague and general way: and I think that he has done so in other
-passages of the same treatise (vii. 2, 1324, a. 29--vii. 7, p.
-1327, b. 37).
-
-Ueberweg (Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift. p. 162, seq.) combats
-with much force the views of Suckow. It would be rash to build so
-much negative inference upon a loose phrase of Aristotle. That he
-should have spoken of Plato in this vague manner is much more
-probable, or much less improbable, than the counter-supposition,
-that the author of a striking and comprehensive dialogue, such as
-the Politikus, should have committed a fraud for the purpose of
-fastening his composition on Plato, and thus abnegating all fame
-for himself.
-
-The explicit affirmation of the Politikus itself ought to be
-believed, in my judgment, unless it can be refuted by greater
-negative probabilities than any which Socher and Suckow produce. I
-do not here repeat, what I have endeavoured to justify in an
-earlier chapter of this work, the confidence which I feel in the
-canon of Thrasyllus; a confidence which it requires stronger
-arguments than those of these two critics to overthrow.]
-
-[Footnote 2: Plato, Sophist. p. 216 B-C.]
-
-This Eleate performs the whole task of exposition, by putting
-questions to Theaetetus, in the Sophistes--to the younger Sokrates
-in the Politikus. Since the true Sokrates is merely listener in
-both dialogues, Plato provides for him an additional thread of
-connection with both; by remarking that the youthful Sokrates is
-his namesake, and that Theaetetus resembles him in flat nose and
-physiognomy.[3]
-
-[Footnote 3: Plato, Politik. p. 257 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Relation of the two dialogues to the Theaetetus.]
-
-Though Plato himself plainly designates the Sophistes as an
-intended sequel to the Theaetetus, yet the method of the two is
-altogether different, and in a certain sense even opposite. In the
-Theaetetus, Sokrates extracts answers from the full and pregnant
-mind of that youthful respondent: he himself professes to teach
-nothing, but only to canvass every successive hypothesis elicited
-from his companion. But the Eleate is presented to us in the most
-imposing terms, as a thoroughly accomplished philosopher: coming
-with doctrines established in his mind,[4] and already practised
-in the task of exposition which Sokrates entreats him to
-undertake. He is, from beginning to end, affirmative and
-dogmatical: and if he declines to proceed by continuous lecture,
-this is only because he is somewhat ashamed to appropriate all the
-talk to himself.[5] He therefore prefers to accept Theaetetus as
-respondent. But Theaetetus is no longer pregnant, as in the
-preceding dialogue. He can do no more than give answers signifying
-assent and dissent, which merely serve to break and diversify the
-exposition. In fact, the dialogue in the Sophistes and Politikus
-is assimilated by Plato himself,[6] not to that in the Theaetetus,
-but to that in the last half of the Parmenides; wherein
-Aristoteles the respondent answers little more than Ay or No, to
-leading questions from the interrogator.
-
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Sophist. p. 217 B. [Greek: e)pei\ diakekoe/nai
-ge/ phesin i(kano=s kai\ ou)k a)mnemonei=n.]]
-
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Sophist. pp. 216-217.]
-
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Sophist. p. 217 C. The words of Sokrates show
-that he alludes to the last half of the Parmenides, in which he is
-only present as a listener--not to the first half, in which he
-takes an active part. Compare the Parmenides, p. 137 C. In this
-last-mentioned dialogue, Sokrates (then a youth) and Aristoteles
-are the parallel of Theaetetus and the younger Sokrates in the
-Sophistes and Politikus. (See p. 135 D.)]
-
-[Side-note: Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer
-a lesson in logical method: the special question chosen, being
-subordinate to that purpose.]
-
-In noticing the circumlocutory character, and multiplied negative
-criticism, of the Theaetetus, without any ultimate profit realised
-in the form of positive result--I remarked, that Plato appreciated
-dialogues, not merely as the road to a conclusion, but for the
-mental discipline and suggestive influence of the tentative and
-verifying process. It was his purpose to create in his hearers a
-disposition to prosecute philosophical research of their own, and
-at the same time to strengthen their ability of doing so with
-effect. This remark is confirmed by the two dialogues now before
-us, wherein Plato defends himself against reproaches seemingly
-made to him at the time.[7] "To what does all this tend? Why do
-you stray so widely from your professed topic? Could you not have
-reached this point by a shorter road?" He replies by distinctly
-proclaiming--That the process, with its improving influence on the
-mind, stands first in his thoughts--the direct conclusion of the
-enquiry, only second: That the special topic which he discusses,
-though in itself important, is nevertheless chosen principally
-with a view to its effect in communicating general method and
-dialectic aptitude: just as a schoolmaster, when he gives out to
-his pupils a word to be spelt, looks mainly, not to their
-exactness in spelling that particular word, but to their command
-of good spelling generally.[8] To form inquisitive, testing minds,
-fond of philosophical debate as a pursuit, and looking at opinions
-on the negative as well as on the positive side, is the first
-object in most of Plato's dialogues: to teach positive truth, is
-only a secondary object.
-
-[Footnote 7: Plato, Politikus, pp. 283 B, 286-287.]
-
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Politikus, p. 285 D.
-
-[Greek: _Xen_.--Ti/ d' au)=? nu=n e(mi=n e( peri\ tou= politikou=
-ze/tesis e(/neka au)tou= tou/tou probe/bletai ma=llon e)\ tou=
-peri\ pa/nta dialektikote/rois gi/gnesthai?
-
-_Ne/os Sokr_.--Kai\ tou=to de=lon o(/ti tou= peri\ pa/nta.]
-
-Again, p. 288 D. [Greek: to/ te au)= pro\s te\n tou=
-problethe/ntos ze/tesin, o(s a)\n r(a=|sta kai\ ta/chista
-eu)/roimen, deu/teron a)ll' ou) pro=ton o( lo/gos a)gapa=|n
-paragge/lei, polu\ de\ ma/lista kai\ pro=ton te\n me/thodon
-au)te\n tima=|n, tou= kat' ei)/de dunato\n ei)=nai diairei=n],
-&c.]
-
-[Side-note: Method of logical Definition and Division.]
-
-Both the Sophistes and the Politikus are lessons and specimens of
-that process which the logical manuals recognise under the
-names--Definition and Division. What is a Sophist? What is a politician
-or statesman? What is a philosopher? In the first place--Are the
-three really distinct characters? for this may seem doubtful:
-since the true philosopher, in his visits of inspection from city
-to city, is constantly misconceived by an ignorant public, and
-confounded with the other two.[9] The Eleate replies that the
-three are distinct. Then what is the characteristic function of
-each? How is he distinguished from other persons or other things?
-To what class or classes does each belong: and what is the
-specific character belonging to the class, so as to mark its place
-in the scheme descending by successive logical subdivision from
-the highest genus down to particulars? What other professions or
-occupations are there analogous to those of Sophist and Statesman,
-so as to afford an illustrative comparison? What is there in like
-manner capable of serving as illustrative contrast?
-
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Sophist. p. 216 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates tries the application of this method, first,
-upon a vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of
-the Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division.]
-
-Such are the problems which it is the direct purpose of the two
-dialogues before us to solve. But a large proportion of both is
-occupied by matters bearing only indirectly upon the solution. The
-process of logical subdivision, or the formation of classes in
-subordination to each other, can be exhibited just as plainly in
-application to an ordinary craft or profession, as to one of grave
-importance. The Eleate Stranger even affirms that the former case
-will be simpler, and will serve as explanatory introduction to the
-latter.[10] He therefore selects the craft of an angler, for which
-to find a place in logical classification. Does not an angler
-belong to the general class--men of art or craft? He is not a mere
-artless, non-professional, private man. This being so, we must
-distribute the class Arts--Artists, into two subordinate classes:
-Artists who construct or put together some new substance or
-compound--Artists who construct nothing new, but are employed in
-getting, or keeping, or employing, substances already made. Thus
-the class Artists is bisected into Constructive--Acquisitive. The
-angler constructs nothing: he belongs to the acquisitive branch.
-We now bisect this latter branch. Acquirers either obtain by
-consent, or appropriate without consent. Now the angler is one of
-the last-mentioned class: which is again bisected into two
-sub-classes, according as the appropriation is by force or
-stratagem--Fighters and Hunters. The angler is a hunter: but many
-other persons are hunters also, from whom he must be distinguished.
-Hunters are therefore divided into, Those who hunt inanimate
-things (such as divers for sponges, &c.), and Those who hunt
-living things or animals, including of course the angler among
-them. The hunters of animals are distinguished into hunters of
-walking animals, and hunters of swimming animals. Of the swimming
-animals some are in air, others in water:[11] hence we get two
-classes, Bird-Hunters and Fish-Hunters; to the last of whom the
-angler belongs. The fish-hunters (or fishermen) again are bisected
-into two classes, according as they employ nets, or striking
-instruments of one kind or another, such as tridents, &c. Of the
-striking fishermen there are two sorts: those who do their work at
-night by torch-light, and those who work by day. All these
-day-fishermen, including among them the angler, use instruments with
-hooks at the end. But we must still make one bisection more. Some
-of them employ tridents, with which they strike from above
-downwards at the fishes, upon any part of the body which may
-present itself: others use hooks, rods, and lines, which they
-contrive to attach to the jaws of the fish, and thereby draw him
-from below upward.[12] This is the special characteristic of the
-angler. We have now a class comprehending the anglers alone, so
-that no farther sub-division is required. We have obtained not
-merely the name of the angler, but also the rational explanation
-of the function to which the name is attached.[13]
-
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Sophist. p. 218 E.]
-
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Sophist. p. 220 B. [Greek: Neustikou= me\n
-to\ me\n pteno\n phu=lon o(ro=men, to\ de\ e)/nudron.]
-
-It deserves notice that Plato here considers the air as a fluid in
-which birds swim.]
-
-[Footnote 12: Plato, Sophist. pp. 219-221.]
-
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Sophist. p. 221 A-B. [Greek: Nu=n a)/ra te=s
-a)spalieutike=s--ou) mo/non tou)/noma, a)lla\ kai\ to\n lo/gon
-peri\ au)to\ tou)/rgon, ei)le/phamen i(kano=s.]]
-
-[Side-note: Such a lesson in logical classification was at that
-time both novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed.]
-
-This is the first specimen which Plato gives of a systematic
-classification descending, by successive steps of bifurcation,
-through many subordinations of genera and species, each founded on
-a real and proclaimed distinction--and ending at last in an
-_infima species_. He repeats the like process in regard to the
-Sophist, the Statesman, and other professions to which he compares
-the one or the other: but it will suffice to have given one
-specimen of his method. If we transport ourselves back to his
-time, I think that such a view of the principles of classification
-implies a new and valuable turn of thought. There existed then no
-treatises on logic; no idea of logic as a scheme of mental
-procedure; no sciences out of which it was possible to abstract
-the conception of a regular method more or less diversified. On no
-subject was there any mass of facts or details collected, large
-enough to demand some regular system for the purpose of arranging
-and rendering them intelligible. Classification to a certain
-extent is of necessity involved, consciously or unconsciously, in
-the use of general terms. But the process itself had never been
-made a subject of distinct consciousness or reflection to any one
-(as far as our knowledge reaches), in the time of Plato. No one
-had yet looked at it as a process natural indeed to the human
-intellect, up to a certain point and in a loose manner,--but
-capable both of great extension and great improvement, and
-requiring especial study, with an end deliberately set before the
-mind, in order that it might be employed with advantage to
-regularise and render intelligible even common and well-known
-facts. To determine a series of descending classes, with
-class-names, each connoting some assignable characteristic--to
-distribute the whole of each class between two correlative
-sub-classes, to compare the different ways in which this could be
-done, and to select such _membra condividentia_ as were most
-suitable for the purpose--this was in the time of Plato an
-important novelty. We know from Xenophon[14] that Sokrates
-considered Dialectic to be founded, both etymologically and
-really, upon the distribution of particular things into genera or
-classes. But we find little or no intentional illustration of this
-process in any of the conversations of the Xenophontic Sokrates:
-and we are farther struck by the fact that Plato, in the two
-dialogues which we are here considering, assigns all the remarks
-on the process of classification, not to Sokrates himself, but to
-the nameless Eleatic Stranger.
-
-[Footnote 14: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 12.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler.
-He traces the Sophist by descending subdivision from the
-acquisitive genus of art.]
-
-After giving the generic deduction of the angler from the
-comprehensive idea of Art, distributed into two sections,
-constructive and acquisitive, Plato proceeds to notice the analogy
-between the Sophist and an angler: after which he deduces the
-Sophist also from the acquisitive section of Art. The Sophist is
-an angler for rich young men.[15] To find his place in the
-preceding descending series, we must take our departure from the
-bisection--hunters of walking animals, hunters of swimming
-animals. The Sophist is a hunter of walking animals: which may be
-divided into two classes, wild and tame. The Sophist hunts a
-species of tame animals--men. Hunters of tame animals are bisected
-into such as hunt by violent means (robbers, enslavers, despots,
-&c.),[16] and such as hunt by persuasive means. Of the hunters by
-means of persuasion there are two kinds: those who hunt the
-public, and those who hunt individuals. The latter again may be
-divided into two classes: those who hunt to their own loss, by
-means of presents, such as lovers, &c., and those who hunt with a
-view to their own profit. To this latter class belongs the
-Sophist: pretending to associate with others for the sake of
-virtue, but really looking to his own profit.[17]
-
-[Footnote 15: Plato, Sophist. p. 222 A.]
-
-[Footnote 16: Plato, Sophist. p. 222 C.
-
-It illustrates the sentiment of Plato's age respecting
-classification, when we see the great diversity of particulars
-which he himself, here as well as elsewhere, ranks under the
-general name [Greek: the/ra], _hunting_--[Greek: the/ra ga\r
-pampolu/ ti pra=gma/ e)sti, perieilemme/non o)no/mati nu=n
-schedo\n e(ni/] (Plato, Legg. viii. 822-823-824, and Euthyd. p.
-290 B). He includes both [Greek: strategike\] and [Greek:
-phtheiristike\] as varieties of [Greek: thereutike/], Sophist. p.
-227 B.
-
-Compare also the interesting conversation about [Greek: the/ra
-a)nthro/pon] between Sokrates and Theodote, Xenophon, Memorab.
-iii. 11, 7; and between Sokrates and Kritobulus, ii. 6, 29.]
-
-[Footnote 17: Plato, Sophist. p. 223 A.]
-
-[Side-note: The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and
-different descending subdivision.]
-
-Again, we may find the Sophist by descending through a different
-string of subordinate classes from the genus--_Acquisitive Art_.
-The professors of this latter may be bisected into two
-sorts--hunters and exchangers. Exchangers are of two sorts--givers
-and sellers. Sellers again sell either their own productions, or the
-productions of others. Those who sell the productions of others
-are either fixed residents in one city, or hawkers travelling
-about from city to city. Hawkers again carry about for sale either
-merchandise for the body, or merchandise for the mind, such as
-music, poetry, painting, exhibitions of jugglery, learning, and
-intellectual accomplishments, and so forth. These latter (hawkers
-for the mind) may be divided into two sorts: those who go about
-teaching; for money, arts and literary accomplishments--and those
-who go about teaching virtue for money. They who go about teaching
-virtue for money are the Sophists.[18] Or indeed if they sell
-virtue and knowledge for money, they are not the less
-Sophists--whether they buy what they sell from others, or prepare it
-for themselves--whether they remain in one city or become itinerant.
-
-[Footnote 18: Plato, Sophist. p. 224 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Also, by a third.]
-
-A third series of subordinate classes will also bring us down from
-the genus--_Acquisitive Art_--down to the _infima
-species_--_Sophist_. In determining the class-place of the angler,
-we recognised a bisection of acquisitive art into acquirers by
-exchange, or mutual consent--and acquirers by appropriation, or
-without consent.[19] These latter we divided according as they
-employed either force or stratagem: contenders and hunters. We
-then proceeded to bisect the class hunters, leaving the contenders
-without farther notice. Now let us take up the class contenders.
-It may be divided into two: competitors for a set prize (pecuniary
-or honorary), and fighters. The fighters go to work either body
-against body, violently--or tongue against tongue, as arguers.
-These arguers again fall into two classes: the pleaders, who make
-long speeches, about just or unjust, before the public assembly
-and dikastery: and the dialogists, who meet each other in short
-question and answer. The dialogists again are divided into two:
-the private, untrained antagonists, quarrelling with each other
-about the particular affairs of life (who form a species by
-themselves, since characteristic attributes may be assigned to
-them; though these attributes are too petty and too indefinite to
-have ever received a name in common language, or to deserve a name
-from us[20])--and the trained practitioners or wranglers, who
-dispute not about particular incidents, but about just and unjust
-in general, and other general matters.[21] Of wranglers again
-there are two sorts: the prosers, who follow the pursuit from
-spontaneous taste and attachment, not only without hope of gain,
-but to the detriment of their private affairs, incurring loss
-themselves, and wearying or bothering their hearers: and those who
-make money by such private dialogues. This last sort of wrangler
-is the Sophist.[22]
-
-[Footnote 19: Plato, Sophist. p. 219 E.]
-
-[Footnote 20: Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C.
-
-[Greek: _Xe/nos_.--Tou= de\ a)ntilogikou=, to\ me\n o(/son peri\
-ta\ xumbolai=a a)mphisbetei=tai me/n, ei)ke= de\ kai\ a)techno=s
-peri\ au)to\ pra/ttetai, tau=ta _thete/on me\n ei)=dos_, e)pei/per
-au)to\ die/gnoken o(s e(/teron o)\n o( lo/gos; a)ta\r e)ponumi/as
-ou)/th' u(po\ to=n e)/mprosthen e)/tuchen, ou)/te nu=n u(ph'
-e(mo=n tuchei=n a)/xion.
-
-_Theaitet_.--A)lethe=; kata\ _smikra\_ ga\r li/an kai\
-_pantodapa\_ die/|retai.]
-
-These words illustrate Plato's view of an [Greek: ei)=dos] or
-species. Any distinguishable attributes, however petty, and
-however multifarious, might be taken to form a species upon; but
-if they were petty and multifarious, there was no advantage in
-bestowing a specific name.]
-
-[Footnote 21: Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C. [Greek: to\ de/ ge
-e)/ntechnon, kai\ peri\ _dikai/on au)to=n_ kai\ a)di/kon kai\
-peri\ to=n _a)/llon o(/los_ a)mphisbetou=n, a)=r' ou)k e)ristiko\n
-au)= le/gein ei)thi/smetha?]]
-
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Sophist. p. 225 E.]
-
-[Side-note: The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of
-separating or discriminating art.]
-
-There is yet another road of class-distribution which will bring
-us down to the Sophist. A great number of common arts (carding
-wool, straining through a sieve, &c.) have, in common, the general
-attribute of separating matters confounded in a heap. Of
-separation there are two sorts: you may separate like from like
-(this has no established name)--or better from worse, which is
-called _purification_. Purification is of two sorts: either of
-body or of mind. In regard to body, the purifying agents are very
-multifarious, comprising not only men and animals, but also
-inanimate things: and thus including many varieties which in
-common estimation are mean, trivial, repulsive, or ludicrous. But
-all these various sentiments (observes Plato) we must disregard.
-We must follow out a real analogy wherever it leads us, and
-recognise a logical affinity wherever we find one; whether the
-circumstances brought together be vile or venerable, or some of
-them vile and some venerable, in the eyes of mankind. Our sole
-purpose is to improve our intelligence. With that view, all
-particulars are of equal value in our eyes, provided only they
-exhibit that real likeness which legitimates them as members of
-the same class--purifiers of body: the correlate of that other
-class which we now proceed to study--purifiers of mind.[23]
-
-[Footnote 23: Plato, Sophist. pp. 226-227. 227 A: [Greek: te=|
-to=n lo/gon metho/do| spoggistike=s e)\ pharmakoposi/as ou)de\n
-e(=tton ou)de/ ti ma=llon tugcha/nei me/lon, ei) to\ me\n smikra/,
-to\ de\ mega/la e(ma=s o)phelei= kathai=ron. _Tou= kte/sasthai
-ga\r e(/neken nou=n paso=n techno=n to\ xuggene\s kai\ to\ me\
-xuggene\s katanoei=n peirome/ne, tima=| pro\s tou=to, e)x i)/sou
-pa/sas_, kai\ tha/tera to=n e(te/ron kata\ te\n o(moio/teta
-ou)de\n e(gei=tai geloio/tera, _semno/teron de/ ti to\n dia\
-stratemike=s e)\ phtheiristike=s delou=nta thereutike\n ou)de\n
-neno/miken_, a)ll' _o(s to\ polu\ chauno/teron_. Kai\ de\ kai\
-nu=n, o(/per e)/rou, ti/ proserou=men o)/noma xumpa/sas duna/meis,
-o(/sai so=ma ei)/te e)/mpsuchon ei)/te a)/psuchon ei)le/chasi
-kathai/rein, ou)de\n au)te=| dioi/sei, poi=on ti lechthe\n
-eu)prepe/staton ei)=nai do/xei; _mo/non e)che/to chori\s_ to=n
-te=s psuche=s katha/rseon pa/nta xunde=san o(/sa a)/llo ti
-kathai/rei.] To maintain the equal scientific position of [Greek:
-phtheiristike/], as two different species under the genus [Greek:
-thereutike/], is a strong illustration.
-
-Compare also Plato, Politikus, p. 266 D.
-
-A similar admonition is addressed (in the Parmenides, p. 130 E**) by
-the old Parmenides to the youthful Sokrates, when the latter
-cannot bring himself to admit that there exist [Greek: ei)=de] or
-Forms of vulgar and repulsive objects, such as [Greek: thri\x] and
-[Greek: pe=los]. [Greek: Neos ga\r ei)= e)/ti, kai\ ou)/po sou=
-a)ntei/leptai philosophi/a o(s e)/ti a)ntile/psetai kat' e)me\n
-do/xan, o(/te ou)de\n au)to=n a)tima/seis; nu=n d' e)/ti pro\s
-a)nthro/pon a)poble/peis do/xas dia\ te\n e(liki/an.]
-
-See above, ch. xxvii. p. 60, in my review of the Parmenides.]
-
-[Side-note: In a logical classification, low and vulgar items
-deserve as much attention as grand ones. Conflict between
-emotional and scientific classification.]
-
-This precept (repeated by Plato also in the Politikus) respecting
-the principles of classification, deserves notice. It protests
-against, and seeks to modify, one of the ordinary turns in the
-associating principles of the human mind. With unreflecting men,
-classification is often emotional rather than intellectual. The
-groups of objects thrown together in such minds, and conceived in
-immediate association, are such as suggest the same or kindred
-emotions: pleasure or pain, love or hatred, hope or fear,
-admiration, contempt, disgust, jealousy, ridicule. Community of
-emotion is a stronger bond of association between different
-objects, than community in any attribute not immediately
-interesting to the emotions, and appreciable only intellectually.
-Thus objects which have nothing else in common, except appeal to
-the same earnest emotion, will often be called by the same general
-name, and will be constituted members of the same class. To attend
-to attributes in any other point of view than in reference to the
-amount and kind of emotion which they excite, is a process
-uncongenial to ordinary taste: moreover, if any one brings
-together, in the same wording, objects really similar, but
-exciting opposite and contradictory emotions, he usually provokes
-either disgust or ridicule. All generalizations, and all general
-terms connoting them, are results brought together by association
-and comparison of particulars somehow resembling. But if we look
-at the process of association in an unreflecting person, the
-resemblances which it fastens upon will be often emotional, not
-intellectual: and the generalizations founded upon such
-resemblances will be emotional also.
-
-It is against this natural propensity that Plato here enters his
-protest, in the name of intellect and science. For the purpose of
-obtaining a classification founded on real, intrinsic affinities,
-we must exclude all reference to the emotions: we must take no
-account whether a thing be pleasing or hateful, sublime or
-mean:[24] we must bring ourselves to rank objects useful or grand
-in the same logical compartment with objects hurtful or ludicrous.
-We must examine only whether the resemblance is true and real,
-justifying itself to the comparing intellect: and whether the
-class-term chosen be such as to comprise all these resemblances,
-holding them apart ([Greek: mo/non e)che/to chori\s]) from the
-correlative and opposing class.[25]
-
-[Footnote 24: Compare Politikus, p. 266 D; Parmenides, p. 130 E.
-
-We see that Plato has thus both anticipated and replied to the
-objection of Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 260-262), who
-is displeased with the minuteness of this classification, and with
-the vulgar objects to which it is applied. Socher contends that
-this is unworthy of Plato, and that it was peculiar to the subtle
-Megaric philosophers.
-
-I think, on the contrary, that the purpose of illustrating the
-process of classification was not unworthy of Plato; that it was
-not unnatural to do this by allusion to vulgar trades or
-handicraft, at a time when no scientific survey of physical facts
-had been attempted; that the allusion to such vulgar trades is
-quite in the manner of Plato, and of Sokrates before him.
-
-Stallbaum, in his elaborate Prolegomena both to the Sophistes and
-to the Politikus, rejects the conclusion of Socher, and maintains
-that both dialogues are the work of Plato. Yet he agrees to a
-certain extent in Socher's premisses. He thinks that minuteness
-and over-refinement in classification were peculiarities of the
-Megaric philosophers, and that Plato intentionally pushes the
-classification into an extreme subtlety and minuteness, in order
-to parody their proceedings and turn them into ridicule. (Proleg.
-ad Sophist. pp. 32-36, ad Politic. pp. 54-55.)
-
-But how do Socher and Stallbaum know that this extreme minuteness
-of subdivision into classes _was_ a characteristic of the Megaric
-philosophers? Neither of them produce any proof of it. Indeed
-Stallbaum himself says, most truly (Proleg. ad Politic. p. 55)
-"Quae de Megaricorum arte dialectica accepimus, sane quam sunt
-paucissima". He might have added, that the little which we do hear
-about their dialectic, is rather adverse to this supposed
-minuteness of positive classification, than consonant with it.
-What we hear is, that they were extremely acute and subtle in
-contentious disputations--able assailants of the position of a
-logical opponent. But this talent has nothing to do with
-minuteness of positive classification: and is even indicative of a
-different turn of mind. Moreover, we hear about Eukleides, the
-chief of the Megaric school, that he enlarged the signification of
-the Summum Genus of Parmenides--the [Greek: E(\n kai\ Pa=n].
-Eukleides called it Unum, Bonum, Simile et Idem Semper, Deus, &c.
-But we do not hear that Eukleides acknowledged a series of
-subordinate Genera or Species, expanding by logical procession
-below this primary Unum. As far as we can judge, this seems to
-have been wanting in his philosophy. Yet it is exactly these
-subordinate Genera or Species, which the Platonic Sophistes and
-Politikus supply in abundance, and even excess, conformably to the
-precept laid down by Plato in the Philebus (p. 14). The words of
-the Sophistes (p. 216 D) rather indicate that the Eleatic Stranger
-is declared _not_ to possess the character and attributes of
-Megaric disputation.]
-
-[Footnote 25: Though the advice here given by Plato about the
-principles of classification is very judicious, yet he has himself
-in this same dialogue set an example of repugnance to act upon it
-(Sophist. p. 231 A-B.) In following out his own descending series
-of partitions, he finds that the Sophist corresponds with the
-great mental purifier--the person who applies the Elenchus or
-cross-examining test, to youthful minds, so as to clear out that
-false persuasion of knowledge which is the great bar to all
-improvement. But though brought by his own process to this point,
-Plato shrinks from admitting it. His dislike towards the Sophist
-will not allow him. "The Sophist is indeed" (he says) "very like
-to this grand educator: but so also a wolf is very like to a
-dog--the most savage of animals to the most gentle. We must always
-be extremely careful about these likenesses: the whole body of them
-are most slippery. Still we cannot help admitting the Sophist to
-represent this improving process--that is, the high and true bred
-Sophist."
-
-It will be seen that Plato's remark here about [Greek:
-o(moio/tetes] contradicts what he had himself said before (p. 227
-B). The reluctance to rank _dog_ and _wolf_ together, in the same
-class, is an exact specimen of that very mistake which he had been
-just pointing out for correction. The scientific resemblance
-between the two animals is very close; but the antithesis of
-sentiment, felt by men towards the one and the other, is extreme.]
-
-[Side-note: The purifier--a species under the genus
-discriminator--separates good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the
-worst sort is, Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge.]
-
-After these just remarks on classification generally, the Eleate
-pursues the subdivision of his own theme. To purify the mind is to
-get rid of the evil, and retain or improve the good. Now evil is
-of two sorts--disease (injustice, intemperance, cowardice, &c.)
-and ignorance. Disease, which in the body is dealt with by the
-physician, is in the mind dealt with by the judicial tribunal:
-ignorance (corresponding to ugliness, awkwardness, disability, in
-the body, which it is the business of the gymnastic trainer to
-correct) falls under the treatment of the teacher or
-instructor.[26] Ignorance again may be distributed into two heads:
-one, though special, being so grave as to counterbalance all the
-rest, and requiring to be set apart by itself--that is--ignorance
-accompanied with the false persuasion of knowledge.[27]
-
-[Footnote 26: Plato, Sophist. pp. 228-229.]
-
-[Footnote 27: Plat. Soph. p. 229 C. [Greek: A)gnoi/as d' ou)=n
-me/ga ti/ moi doko= kai\ chalepo\n a)phorisme/non o(ra=|n ei)=dos,
-pa=si toi=s a)/llois au)te=s a)nti/stathmon me/resi . . . To\ me\
-kateido/ta ti, dokei=n ei)de/nai.]]
-
-[Side-note: Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil.
-Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to
-bear upon it. This is the sovereign purifier.]
-
-To meet this special and gravest case of ignorance, we must
-recognise a special division of the art of instruction or
-education. Exhortation, which is the common mode of instruction,
-and which was employed by our forefathers universally, is of no
-avail against this false persuasion of knowledge: which can only
-be approached and cured by the Elenchus, or philosophical
-cross-examination. So long as a man believes himself to be wise,
-you may lecture for ever without making impression upon him: you do no
-good by supplying food when the stomach is sick. But the examiner,
-questioning him upon those subjects which he professes to know,
-soon entangles him in contradictions with himself, making him feel
-with shame and humiliation his own real ignorance. After having
-been thus disabused--a painful but indispensable process, not to
-be accomplished except by the Elenchus--his mind becomes open and
-teachable, so that positive instruction may be communicated to him
-with profit. The Elenchus is the grand and sovereign purification:
-whoever has not been subjected to it, were he even the Great King,
-is impure, unschooled, and incompetent for genuine happiness.[28]
-
-[Footnote 28: Plato, Sophist. p. 230 D-E.]
-
-[Side-note: The application of this Elenchus is the work of the
-Sophist, looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really
-is, he is a juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about every
-thing--who palms off falsehood for truth.]
-
-This cross-examining and disabusing process, brought to bear upon
-the false persuasion of knowledge and forming the only antidote to
-it, is the business of the Sophist looked at on its best side.[29]
-But Plato will not allow the Elenchus, the great Sokratic
-accomplishment and mission, to be shared by the Sophists: and he
-finds or makes a subtle distinction to keep them off. The Sophist
-(so the Eleate proceeds) is a disputant, and teaches all his
-youthful pupils to dispute about everything as if they knew
-it--about religion, astronomy, philosophy, arts, laws, politics,
-and everything else. He teaches them to argue in each department
-against the men of special science: he creates a belief in the
-minds of others that he really knows all those different subjects,
-respecting which he is able to argue and cross-examine
-successfully: he thus both possesses, and imparts to his pupils, a
-seeming knowledge, an imitation and pretence of reality.[30] He is
-a sort of juggler: an imitator who palms off upon persons what
-appears like reality when seen from a distance, but what is seen
-to be not like reality when contemplated closely.[31]
-
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Sophist. p. 231 B. [Greek: te=s de\
-paideutike=s a( peri\ te\n ma/taion doxosophi/an gigno/menos
-e)/legchos e)n to=| nu=n lo/go| paraphane/nti mede\n a)/ll' e(mi=n
-ei)=nai lege/stho ple\n e( ge/nei gennai/a sophistike/.]]
-
-[Footnote 30: Plato, Sophist. pp. 232-233 C, 235 A. Sokrates tells
-us in the Platonic Apology (p. 23 A) that this was the exact
-effect which his own cross-examination produced upon the hearers:
-they supposed him to be wise on those topics on which he exposed
-ignorance in others. The Memorabilia of Xenophon exhibit the same
-impression as made by the conversation of Sokrates, even when he
-talked with artisans on their own arts. Sokrates indeed professed
-not to teach anyone--and he certainly took no fee for teaching.
-But we see plainly that this disclaimer imposed upon no one; that
-he did teach, though gratuitously; and that what he taught was,
-the art of cross-examination and dispute. We learn this not merely
-from his enemy, Aristophanes, and from the proceedings of his
-opponents, Kritias and Charikles (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2), but also
-from his own statement in the Platonic Apology (pp. 23 C. 37
-E. 39 B), and from the language of Plato and Xenophon throughout.
-Plato is here puzzled to make out a clear line of distinction
-between the Elenchus of Sokrates, and the disputatious arguments
-of those Sophists whom he calls Eristic--name deserved quite as
-much by Sokrates as by any of them. Plato here accuses the
-Sophists of talking upon a great many subjects which they did not
-know, and teaching their pupils to do the same. This is exactly
-what Sokrates passed his life in doing, and what he did better
-than any one--on the negative side.]
-
-[Footnote 31: Plato, Sophist. pp. 235-236.]
-
-[Side-note: Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible
-either to think or to speak falsely?]
-
-Here however (continues Plato) we are involved in a difficulty.
-How can a thing appear to be what it is not? How can a man who
-opines or affirms, opine or affirm falsely--that is, opine or
-affirm the thing that is not? To admit this, we must assume the
-thing that is not (or Non-Ens, Nothing) to have a real existence.
-Such an assumption involves great and often debated difficulties.
-It has been pronounced by Parmenides altogether inadmissible.[32]
-
-[Footnote 32: Plato, Sophist. pp. 236 E--237 A. [Greek: pa/nta
-tau=ta e)sti mesta\ a)pori/as a)ei\ e)n to=| pro/sthen chro/no|
-kai\ nu=n. O(/pos ga\r ei)po/nta chre\ pseude= le/gein e)\
-doxa/zein o)/ntos ei)=nai, kai\ tou=to phthegxa/menon
-e)nantiologi/a| me\ xune/chesthai, panta/pasi chalepo/n . . .
-Teto/lmeken o( lo/gos ou(=tos u(pothe/sthai to\ me\ o)\n ei)=nai;
-pseu=dos ga\r ou)k a)\n a)/llos e)gi/gneto o)/n.]]
-
-We have already seen that Plato discussed this same question in
-the Theaetetus, and that after trying and rejecting many successive
-hypotheses to show how false supposition, or false affirmation,
-might be explained as possible, by a theory involving no
-contradiction, he left the question unsolved. He now resumes it at
-great length. It occupies more than half[33] the dialogue. Near
-the close, but only then, he reverts to the definition of the
-Sophist.
-
-[Footnote 33: From p. 236 D to p. 264 D.]
-
-[Side-note: He pursues the investigation of this problem by a
-series of questions.]
-
-First, the Eleate states the opinion which perplexes him, and
-which he is anxious either to refute or to explain away.
-(Unfortunately, we have no statement of the opinion, nor of the
-grounds on which it was held, from those who actually held it.)
-Non-Ens, or Nothing, is not the name of any existing thing, or of
-any Something. But every one who speaks must speak something:
-therefore if you try to speak of Non-Ens, you are trying to speak
-nothing--which is equivalent to not speaking at all.[34] Moreover,
-to every Something, you can add something farther: but to Non-Ens,
-or Nothing, you cannot add any thing. (Non-Entis nulla sunt
-praedicata.) Now Number is something, or included among the Entia:
-you cannot therefore apply number, either singular or plural, to
-Non-Ens: and inasmuch as every thing conceived or described must
-be either one or many, it is impossible either to conceive or
-describe Non-Ens. You cannot speak of it without falling into a
-contradiction.[35]
-
-[Footnote 34: Plato, Sophist. p. 237 E. The Eleate here recites
-this opinion, not as his own but as entertained by others, and as
-one which he did not clearly see through: in Republic (v. p. 478
-B-C) we find Sokrates advancing a similar doctrine as his own. So
-in the Kratylus, where this same topic is brought under discussion
-(pp. 429 D, 430 A), Kratylus is represented as contending that
-false propositions were impossible: that propositions, improperly
-called false, were in reality combinations of sounds without any
-meaning, like the strokes on a bell.]
-
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Sophist. p. 238-239.]
-
-[Side-note: The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by
-affirming that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us
-to make out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens.]
-
-When therefore we characterise the Sophist as one who builds up
-phantasms for realities--who presents to us what is not, as being
-like to what _is_, and as a false substitute for what _is_--he
-will ask us what we mean? If, to illustrate our meaning, we point
-to images of things in mirrors or clear water, he will pretend to
-be blind, and will refuse the evidence of sense: he will require
-us to make out a rational theory explaining Non-Ens or
-Nothing.[36] But when we try to do this, we contradict ourselves.
-A phantasm is that which, not being a true counterpart of reality,
-is yet so like it as to be mistaken for reality. _Quatenus_
-phantasm, it is Ens: _quatenus_ reality, it is Non-Ens: thus the
-same thing is both Ens, and Non-Ens: which we declared before to
-be impossible.[37] When therefore we accuse the Sophist of passing
-off phantasms for realities, we suppose falsely: we suppose
-matters not existing, or contrary to those which exist: we suppose
-the existent not to exist, or the non-existent to exist But this
-assumes as done what cannot be done: since we have admitted more
-than once that Non-Ens can neither be described in language by
-itself, nor joined on in any manner to Ens.[38]
-
-[Footnote 36: Plato, Sophist. pp. 239-240. [Greek: katagela/setai/
-sou to=n lo/gon, o(/tan o(s ble/ponti le/ge|s au)to=|,
-prospoiou/menos ou)/te ka/toptra ou)/te u(/data gigno/skein,
-ou)/te to\ para/pan o)/psin; to\ d' e)k to=n lo/gon e)rote/sei se
-mo/non.]]
-
-[Footnote 37: Plato, Sophist. p. 240 B.]
-
-[Footnote 38: Plato, Sophist. p. 241 B. [Greek: to=| ga\r me\
-o)/nti to\ o)\n prosa/ptein e(ma=s polla/kis a)nagka/zesthai,
-diomologesame/nous nu=n de/ pou tou=to ei)=nai pa/nton
-a)dunato/taton.]]
-
-Stating the case in this manner, we find that to suppose falsely,
-or affirm falsely, is a contradiction. But there is yet another
-possible way out of the difficulty (the Eleate continues).
-
-[Side-note: The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of
-various philosophers about Ens.]
-
-Let us turn for a moment (he says) from Non-Ens to Ens. The
-various physical philosophers tell us a good deal about Ens. They
-differ greatly among themselves. Some philosophers represent Ens
-as triple, comprising three distinct elements, sometimes in
-harmony, sometimes at variance with each other. Others tell us
-that it is double--wet and dry--or hot and cold. A third sect,
-especially Xenophanes and Parmenides, pronounce it to be
-essentially One. Herakleitus blends together the different
-theories, affirming that Ens is both many and one, always in
-process of disjunction and conjunction: Empedokles adopts a
-similar view, only dropping the _always_, and declaring the
-process of disjunction to alternate with that of conjunction, so
-that Ens is sometimes Many, sometimes One.[39]
-
-[Footnote 39: Plato, Sophist. p. 242 D-E.]
-
-[Side-note: Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about
-Non-Ens.]
-
-Now when I look at these various theories (continues the Eleate),
-I find that I do not follow or understand them; and that I know
-nothing more or better about Ens than about Non-Ens. I thought, as
-a young man, that I understood both: but I now find that I
-understand neither.[39] The difficulties about Ens are just as
-great as those about Non-Ens. What do these philosophers mean by
-saying that Ens is double or triple? that there are two distinct
-existing elements--Hot and Cold--or three? What do you mean by
-saying that Hot and Cold _exist_? Is existence any thing distinct
-from Hot and Cold? If so, then there are three elements in all,
-not two. Do you mean that existence is something belonging to both
-and affirmed of both? Then you pronounce both to be One: and Ens,
-instead of being double, will be at the bottom only One.
-
-[Footnote 40: Plato, Sophist. p. 243 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many?
-Difficulties about One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot
-solve them.]
-
-Such are the questions which the Eleatic spokesman of Plato puts
-to those philosophers who affirm Ens to be plural: He turns next
-to those who affirm Ens to be singular, or Unum. Do you mean that
-Unum is identical with Ens--and are they only two names for the
-same One and only thing? There cannot be two distinct names
-belonging to one and the same thing: and yet, if this be not so,
-one of the names must be the name of nothing. At any rate, if
-there be only one name and one thing, still the name itself is
-different from the thing--so that duality must still be
-recognised. Or if you take the name as identical with the One
-thing, it will either be the name of nothing, or the name of a
-name.[41]
-
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Sophist. p. 244 D.]
-
-Again, as to the Whole:--is the Whole the same with the Ens Unum,
-or different from it. We shall be told that it is the same: but
-according to the description given by Parmenides, the whole is
-spherical, thus having a centre and circumference, and of course
-having parts. Now a whole divisible into parts may have unity
-predicable of it, as an affection or accident in respect to the
-sum of its parts: but it cannot be the genuine, essential,
-self-existent, One, which does not admit of parts or division. If Ens
-be One by accident, it is not identical with One, and we thus have
-two existent things: and if Ens be not really and essentially the
-Whole, while nevertheless the Whole exists--Ens must fall short of
-or be less than itself, and must to this extent be Non-Ens:
-besides that Ens, and Totum, being by nature distinct, we have
-more things than One existing. On the other hand, if we assume
-Totum not to be Ens, the same result will ensue. Ens will still be
-something less than itself;--Ens can never have any quantity, for
-each quantum is necessarily a whole in itself--and Ens can never
-be generated, since everything generated is also necessarily a
-whole.[42]
-
-[Footnote 42: Plato, Sophist. p. 245 A-C.]
-
-[Side-note: Theories of those who do not recognise a definite
-number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof.]
-
-Such is the examination which the Eleate bestows on the theories
-of theories of those philosophers who held one, two, or a definite
-number of self-existent Entia or elements. His purpose is to show,
-that even on their schemes, Ens is just as unintelligible, and
-involves as many contradictions, as Non-Ens. And to complete the
-same demonstration, he proceeds to dissect the theories of those
-who do not recognise any definite or specific number of elements
-or Entia.[43] Of these he distinguishes two classes; in direct and
-strenuous opposition to each other, respecting what constituted
-Essentia.[44]
-
-[Footnote 43: Plato, Sophist. p. 245 E.]
-
-[Footnote 44: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 A. [Greek: e)/oike/ ge e)n
-au)toi=s oi(=on gigantomachi/a tis ei)=nai dia\ te\n
-a)mphisbe/tesin peri\ te=s ou)si/as pro\s alle/lous.]]
-
-[Side-note: 1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of
-Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real
-Entia.]
-
-First, the Materialist Philosophers, who recognise nothing as
-existing except what is tangible; defining Essence as identical
-with Body, and denying all incorporeal essence. Plato mentions no
-names: but he means (according to some commentators) Leukippus and
-Demokritus--perhaps Aristippus also. Secondly, other philosophers
-who, diametrically opposed to the Materialists, affirmed that
-there were no real Entia except certain Forms, Ideas, genera or
-species, incorporeal and conceivable only by intellect: that true
-and real essence was not to be found in those bodies wherein the
-Materialists sought it: that bodies were in constant generation
-and disappearance, affording nothing more than a transitory
-semblance of reality, not tenable[45] when sifted by reason. By
-these last are understood (so Schleiermacher and others think,
-though in my judgment erroneously) Eukleides and the Megaric
-school of philosophers.
-
-[Footnote 45: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 B-C. [Greek: noeta\ a)/tta
-kai\ a)so/mata ei)/de biazo/menoi te\n a)lethine\n ou)si/an
-ei)=nai; ta\ de\ e)kei/non so/mata kai\ te\n legome/nen u(p'
-au)to=n] (_i. e._ the Materialists) [Greek: a)le/theian kata\
-smikra\ diathrau/ontes e)n toi=s lo/gois, ge/nesin a)nt' ou)si/as
-pherome/nen tina\ prosagoreu/ousin.]]
-
-[Side-note: Argument against the Materialists--Justice must be
-something, since it may be either present or absent, making
-sensible difference--But Justice is not a body.]
-
-The Eleate proceeds to comment upon the doctrines held by these
-opposing schools of thinkers respecting Essence or Reality. It is
-easier (he says) to deal with the last-mentioned, for they are
-more gentle. With the Materialists it is difficult, and all but
-impossible, to deal at all. Indeed, before we can deal with them,
-we must assume them to be for this occasion better than they show
-themselves in reality, and ready to answer in a more becoming
-manner than they actually do.[46] These Materialists will admit
-(Plato continues) that man exists--an animated body, or a compound
-of mind and body: they will farther allow that the mind of one man
-differs from that of another:--one is just, prudent, &c., another
-is unjust and imprudent. One man is just, through the habit and
-presence of justice: another is unjust, through the habit and
-presence of injustice. But justice must surely be
-_something_--injustice also must be _something_--if each may be present
-to, or absent from, any thing; and if their presence or absence makes
-so sensible a difference.[47] And justice or injustice, prudence or
-imprudence, as well as the mind in which the one or the other
-inheres, are neither visible or tangible, nor have they any body:
-they are all invisible.
-
-[Footnote 46: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 C. [Greek: para\ me\n to=n
-e)n ei)/desin au)te\n (te\n ou)si/an) titheme/non r(a=|on;
-e(mero/teroi ga/r; para\ de\ to=n ei)s so=ma pa/nta e(lko/nton
-bi/a|, chalepo/teron; _i)/sos de\ kai\ schedo\n a)du/naton_. A)ll'
-o(=de/ moi dokei= peri\ au)to=n dra=|n . . . Ma/lista me/n, ei)/
-pe| dunato\n e)=n, _e)/rgo| belti/ous_ au)tou\s poiei=n; ei) de\
-tou=to me\ e)gchorei=, _lo/go| poio=men_, u(potithe/menoi
-_nomimo/teron_ au)tou\s e)\ _nu=n e)the/lontas a)\n
-a)pokri/nasthai_.]]
-
-[Footnote 47: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 A. [Greek: A)lla\ me\n to/ ge
-dunato/n to| paragi/gnesthai kai\ a)pogi/gnesthai, pa/ntos
-ei)=nai/ ti phe/sousin.]]
-
-[Side-note: At least many of them will concede this point, though
-not all Ens is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is
-equivalent to potentiality.]
-
-Probably (replies Theaetetus) these philosophers would contend that
-the soul or mind had a body; but they would be ashamed either to
-deny that justice, prudence, &c., existed as realities--or to
-affirm that justice, prudence, &c. were all bodies.[48] These
-philosophers must then have become better (rejoins the Eleate):
-for the primitive and genuine leaders of them will not concede
-even so much as that. But let us accept the concession. If they
-will admit any incorporeal reality at all, however small, our case
-is made out. For we shall next call upon them to say, what there
-is in common between these latter, and those other realities which
-have bodies connate with and essential to them--to justify the
-names _real_--_essence_--bestowed upon both.[49] Perhaps they
-would accept the following definition of Ens or the Real--of
-Essence or Reality. Every thing which possesses any sort of power,
-either to act upon any thing else or to be acted upon by any thing
-else, be it only for once or to the smallest degree--every such
-thing is true and real Ens. The characteristic mark or definition
-of Ens or the Real is, power or potentiality.[50]
-
-[Footnote 48: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 B. [Greek: A)pokri/nontai
-. . . te\n me\n psuche\n au)te\n dokei=n sphi/si so=ma/ ti
-kekte=sthai, phro/nesin de\ kai\ to=n a)/llon e(/kaston o(=n
-e)ro/tekas, ai)schu/nontai to\ tolma=|n e)\ mede\n to=n o)/nton
-au)ta\ o(mologei=n, e)\ pa/nt' ei)=nai so/mata
-dii+schuri/zesthai.]]
-
-[Footnote 49: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 C-D. [Greek: ei) ga/r ti kai\
-smikro\n e)the/lousi to=n o)/nton sugchorei=n a)so/maton,
-e)xarkei=. to\ ga\r e)pi/ te tou/tois a(/ma kai\ e)p' e)kei/nois
-o(/sa e)/chei so=ma xumphue\s gegono/s, ei)s o(\ ble/pontes
-a)mpho/tera _ei)=nai_ le/gousi, tou=to au)toi=s r(ete/on.]]
-
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. [Greek: le/go de\ to\
-kai\ o(poianou=n kekteme/non _du/namin_, ei)/t' ei)s to\ poiei=n
-e(/teron o(tiou=n pephuko\s ei)/t' ei)s to\ pathei=n kai\
-smikro/taton u(po\ tou= phaulota/tou, ka)\n ei) mo/non ei)sa/pax,
-pa=n tou=to o)/ntos ei)=nai; ti/themai ga\r o(/ron o(ri/zein ta\
-o)/nta, o(s e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti ple\n _du/namis_.]]
-
-[Side-note: Argument against the Idealists--who distinguish Ens
-from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former
-through our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses.]
-
-The Eleate now turns to the philosophers of the opposite school--the
-Mentalists or Idealists,--whom he terms the friends of Forms,
-Ideas, or species.[51] These men (he says) distinguish the
-generated, transitory and changeable--from Ens or the Real, which
-is eternal, unchanged, always the same: they distinguish
-generation from essence. With the generated (according to their
-doctrine) we hold communion through our bodies and our bodily
-perceptions: with Ens, we hold communion through our mind and our
-intellectual apprehension. But what do they mean (continues the
-Eleate) by this "holding of communion"? Is it not an action or a
-passion produced by a certain power of agent and patient coming
-into co-operation with each other? and is not this the definition
-which we just now laid down, of Ens or the Real.
-
-[Footnote 51: Plato, Sophist. p. 248 A. [Greek: tou\s to=n ei)do=n
-phi/lous].]
-
-[Side-note: Holding communion--What? Implies Relativity. Ens is
-known by the mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens
-includes both the unchangeable and the changeable.]
-
-_No_--these philosophers will reply--we do not admit your
-definition as a definition of Ens: it applies only to the
-generated. Generation does involve, or emanate from, a reciprocity
-of agent and patient: but neither power nor action, nor suffering,
-have any application to Ens or the Real. But you admit (says the
-Eleate) that the mind knows Ens:--and that Ens is known by the
-mind. Now this _knowing_, is it not an action--and is not the
-_being known_, a passion? If _to know_ is an action, then Ens,
-being known, is acted upon, suffers something, or undergoes some
-change,--which would be impossible if we assume Ens to be
-eternally unchanged. These philosophers might reply, that they do
-not admit _to know_ as an action, nor _to be known_ as a passion.
-They affirm Ens to be eternally unchanged, and they hold to their
-other affirmation that Ens is known by the mind. But (urges the
-Eleate) can they really believe that Ens is eternally the same and
-unchanged,--that it has neither life, nor mind, nor intelligence,
-nor change, nor movement? This is incredible. They must concede
-that Change, and the Changeable, are to be reckoned as Entia or
-Realities: for if these be not so reckoned, and if all Entia are
-unchangeable, no Ens can be an object of knowledge to any mind.
-But though the changeable belongs to Ens, we must not affirm that
-_all_ Ens is changeable. There cannot be either intellect or
-knowledge, without something constant and unchangeable. It is
-equally necessary to recognise something as constant and
-unchangeable--something else as moving and changeable: Ens or
-reality includes alike one and the other. The true philosopher
-therefore cannot agree with those "Friends of Forms" who affirm
-all Ens or Reality to be at rest and unchangeable, either under
-one form or under many:--still less can he agree with those
-opposite reasoners, who maintain all reality to be in perpetual
-change and movement. He will acknowledge both and each--rest and
-motion--the constant and the changeable--as making up together
-total reality or Ens Totum.
-
-[Side-note: Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities.
-Both agree in Ens. Ens is a _tertium quid_--distinct from both.
-But how can anything be distinct from both?]
-
-Still, however, we have not got over our difficulties. Motion and
-Rest are contraries; yet we say that each and both are Realities
-or Entia. In what is it that they both agree? Not in moving, nor
-in being at rest, but simply in existence or reality. Existence or
-reality therefore must be a _tertium quid_, apart from motion and
-rest, not the sum total of those two items. Ens or the Real is
-not, in its own proper nature, either in motion or at rest, but is
-distinct from both. Yet how can this be? Surely, whatever is not
-in motion, must be at rest--whatever is not at rest, must be in
-motion. How can any thing be neither in motion nor at rest;
-standing apart from both?[52]
-
-[Footnote 52: Plato, Sophist. p. 250 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He
-declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as
-Non-Ens,]
-
-Here the Eleate breaks off his enquiry, without solving the
-problems which he has accumulated. My purpose was (he says[53]) to
-show that Ens was just as full of difficulties and embarrassments
-as Non-Ens. Enough has been said to prove this clearly. When we
-can once get clear of obscurity about Ens, we may hope to be
-equally successful with Non-Ens.
-
-[Footnote 53: Plato, Sophist. p. 250 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Argument against those who admit no predication to be
-legitimate, except identical. How far Forms admit of
-intercommunion with each other.]
-
-Let us try (he proceeds) another path. We know that it is a common
-practice in our daily speech to apply many different predicates to
-one and the same subject. We say of the same man, that he is fair,
-tall, just, brave, &c., and several other epithets. Some persons
-deny our right to do this. They say that the predicate ought
-always to be identical with the subject: that we can only employ
-with propriety such propositions as the following--man is
-man--good is good, &c.: that to apply many predicates to one and
-the same subject is to make one thing into many things.[54] But in
-reply to these opponents, as well as to those whom we have before
-combated, we shall put before them three alternatives, of which
-they must choose one. 1. Either all Forms admit of intercommunion
-one with the other. 2. Or no Forms admit of such intercommunion.
-3. Or some Forms do admit of it, and others not. Between these
-three an option must be made.[55]
-
-[Footnote 54: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B. [Greek: o(s a)du/naton ta/
-te polla\ e(\n kai\ to\ e(\n polla\ ei)=nai], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 55: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 E.]
-
-[Side-note: No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted.
-Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis.]
-
-If we take the first alternative--that there is no intercommunion
-of Forms--then the Forms _motion_ and _rest_ can have no
-intercommunion with the Forms, _essence_ or _reality_. In other
-words, neither motion nor rest exist: and thus the theory both of
-those who say that all things are in perpetual movement, and of
-those who say that all things are in perpetual rest, becomes
-unfounded and impossible. Besides, these very men, who deny all
-intercommunion of Forms, are obliged to admit it implicitly and
-involuntarily in their common forms of speech. They cannot carry
-on a conversation without it, and they thus serve as a perpetual
-refutation of their own doctrine.[56]
-
-[Footnote 56: Plato, Sophist. p. 252 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms--inadmissible.]
-
-The second alternative--that all Forms may enter into communion
-with each other--is also easily refuted. If this were true, motion
-and rest might be put together: motion would be at rest, and rest
-would be in motion--which is absurd. These and other forms are
-contrary to each other. They reciprocally exclude and repudiate
-all intercommunion.[57]
-
-[Footnote 56: Plato, Sophist. p. 252 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is
-the only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables.]
-
-Remains only the third alternative--that some forms admit of
-intercommunion--others not. This is the real truth (says the
-Eleate). So it stands in regard to letters and words in language:
-some letters come together in words frequently and
-conveniently--others rarely and awkwardly--others never do nor ever can
-come together. The same with the combination of sounds to obtain music.
-It requires skill and art to determine which of these combinations
-are admissible.
-
-[Side-note: Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms
-admit of intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the
-special intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright
-region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens.]
-
-So also, in regard to the intercommunion of Forms, skill and art
-are required to decide which of them will come together, and which
-will not. In every special art and profession the case is similar:
-the ignorant man will fail in deciding this question--the man of
-special skill alone will succeed.--So in regard to the
-intercommunion of Forms or Genera universally with each other, the
-comprehensive science of the true philosopher is required to
-decide.[58] To note and study these Forms, is the purpose of the
-philosopher in his dialectics or ratiocinative debate. He can
-trace the one Form or Idea, stretching through a great many
-separate particulars; he can distinguish it from all different
-Forms: he knows which Forms are not merely distinct from each
-other, but incapable of alliance and reciprocally repulsive--which
-of them are capable of complete conjunction, the one
-circumscribing and comprehending the other--and which of them
-admit conjunction partial and occasional with each other.[59] The
-philosopher thus keeps close to the Form of eternal and
-unchangeable Ens or Reality--a region of such bright light that
-the eyes of the vulgar cannot clearly see him: while the Sophist
-on the other hand is also difficult to be seen, but for an
-opposite reason--from the darkness of that region of Non-Ens or
-Non-Reality wherein he carries on his routine-work.[60]
-
-[Footnote 58: Plato, Sophist. p. 253 B. [Greek: a)=r' ou) met'
-e)piste/mes tino\s a)nagkai=on dia\ to=n lo/gon poreu/esthai to\n
-o)rtho=s me/llonta dei/xein poi=a poi/ois sumphonei= to=n geno=n
-kai\ poi=a a)/llela ou) de/chetai?]]
-
-[Footnote 59: Plato, Sophist. p. 253 D-E.]
-
-[Footnote 60: Plato, Sophist. p. 254 A. [Greek: O( de/ ge
-philo/sophos, te=| tou= o)/ntos a)ei\ dia\ logismo=n proskei/menos
-i)de/a|, dia\ to\ lampro\n au)= te=s cho/ras ou)damo=s eu)pe/tes
-o)phthe=nai; ta\ ga\r te=s to=n pollo=n psuche=s o)/mmata
-karterei=n pro\s to\ thei=on a)phoro=nta a)du/nata.]]
-
-[Side-note: He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for
-examination five principal
-Forms--Motion--Rest--Ens--Same--Different.]
-
-We have still to determine, however (continues Plato), what this
-Non-Ens or Non-Reality is. For this purpose we will take a survey,
-not of all Forms or Genera, but of some few the most important. We
-will begin with the two before noticed--Motion and Rest ( = Change
-and Permanence), which are confessedly irreconcileable and
-reciprocally exclusive. Ens however enters into partnership with
-both: for both of them _are_, or exist.[61] This makes up three
-Forms or Genera--Motion, Rest, Ens: each of the three being the
-same with itself, and different from the other two. Here we have
-pronounced two new words--Same--Different.[62] Do these words
-designate two other Forms, over and above the three before-named,
-yet necessarily always intermingling in partnership with those
-three, so as to make five Forms in all? Or are these two--Same and
-Different--essential appendages of the three before-named? This
-last question must be answered in the negative. Same and Different
-are not essential appendages, or attached as parts, to Motion,
-Rest, Ens. Same and Different may be predicated both of Motion and
-of Rest: and whatever can be predicated alike of two contraries,
-cannot be an essential portion or appendage of either. Neither
-Motion nor Rest therefore _are_ essentially either Same or
-Different: though both of them partake of Same or
-Different--_i.e._, come into accidental co-partnership with one as
-well as the other.[63] Neither can we say that Ens is identical
-with either Idem or Diversum. Not with Idem--for we speak of both
-Motion and Rest as Entia or Existences: but we cannot speak of
-them as the same. Not with Diversum--for _different_ is a name
-relative to something else from which it is different, but Ens is
-not thus relative. Motion and Rest _are_ or exist, each in itself:
-but each is _different_, relatively to the other, and to other
-things generally. Accordingly we have here five Forms or
-Genera--Ens, Motion, Rest, Idem, Diversum: each distinct from and
-independent of all the rest.[64]
-
-[Footnote 61: Plato, Sophist. p. 254 D. [Greek: to\ de/ ge o)\n
-mikto\n a)mphoi=n; _e)sto\n_ ga\r a)/mpho pou.]]
-
-[Footnote 62: Plato, Sophist. p. 254 E. [Greek: ti/ pot' au)= nu=n
-ou(/tos ei)re/kamen to/ te tau)to\n kai\ tha/teron? po/tera du/o
-ge/ne tine\ au)to/, to=n me\n trio=n a)/llo], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 63: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B. [Greek: mete/cheton me\n
-a)/mpho tau)tou= kai\ thate/rou . . . Me\ toi/nun le/gomen
-ki/nesi/n _g' ei)=nai_ tau)to\n e)\ tha/teron, med' au)=
-sta/sin.]]
-
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Form of Diversum pervades all the others.]
-
-This Form of Diversum or Different pervades all the others: for
-each one of them is different from the others, not through any
-thing in its own nature, but because it partakes of the Form of
-Difference.[65] Each of the five is different from others: or, to
-express the same fact in other words, each of them _is not_ any
-one of the others. Thus motion is different from rest, or _is not_
-rest: but nevertheless motion _is_ or exists, because it partakes
-of the Form--Ens. Again, Motion is different from Idem: it _is
-not_ the Same: yet nevertheless it _is_ the same, because it
-partakes of the nature of Idem, or is the same with itself. Thus
-then both predications are true respecting motion: it _is_ the
-same: it _is not_ the same, because it partakes of or enters into
-partnership with both Idem and Diversum.[66] If motion in any way
-partook of Rest, we should be able to talk of stationary motion:
-but this is impossible: for we have already said that some Forms
-cannot come into intercommunion--that they absolutely exclude each
-other.
-
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. [Greek: kai\ dia\ pa/nton
-ge au)te\n phe/somen ei)=nai dieleluthui=an (te\n thate/rou
-phu/sin) e(\n e(/kaston ga\r e(/teron ei)=nai to=n a)/llon, _ou)
-dia\ te\n au)tou= phu/sin_, a)lla\ dia\ to\ mete/chein te=s
-i)de/as te=s thate/rou.]]
-
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 A. [Greek: te\n ki/nesin de\
-tau)to/n t' ei)=nai kai\ me\ tau)to\n o(mologete/on kai\ ou)
-duscherante/on], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum.
-Motion is different from Ens--in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each
-of these Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens.]
-
-Again, Motion is different not only from Rest, and from Idem, but
-also from Diversum itself. In other words, it is both Diversum in
-a certain way, and also not Diversum: different and not
-different.[67] As it is different from Rest, from Idem, from
-Diversum--so also it is different from Ens, the remaining one of
-the five forms or genera. In other words Motion is not Ens,--or is
-Non-Ens. It is both Ens, and Non-Ens: Ens, so far as it partakes
-of Entity or Reality--Non-Ens, so far as it partakes of
-Difference, and is thus different from Ens as well as from the
-other Forms.[68] The same may be said of the other Forms,--Rest,
-Idem, Diversum: each of them is Ens, because it partakes of entity
-or reality: each of them is also Non-Ens, or different from Ens,
-because it partakes of Difference. Moreover, Ens itself is
-different from the other four, and so far as these others go, it
-is Non-Ens.[69]
-
-[Footnote 67: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 C. [Greek: ou)ch e(/teron
-a)]r' e)sti/ pe| kai\ e(/teron kata\ to\n nu=n de\ lo/gon.]]
-
-[Footnote 68: Plato, Sophist. p. 256 D. [Greek: ou)kou=n de\
-sapho=s e( ki/nesis o)/ntos ou)k o)/n e)sti kai\ o)\n, e)pei/per
-tou= o)/ntos mete/chei?]]
-
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 A. [Greek: kai\ to\ o)/n
-a)/r' e(mi=n, o(/sa per e)/sti ta\ a)/lla, kata\ tosau=ta ou)k
-e)/stin; e)kei=na ga\r ou)k o)\n e(\n me\n au)to/ e)stin,
-a)pe/ranta de\ to\n a)rithmo\n ta)/lla ou)k e)/stin au)=.]]
-
-[Side-note: By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens--we
-mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as
-well as Ens.]
-
-Now note the consequence (continues the Eleate). When we speak of
-Non-Ens, we do not mean any thing contrary to Ens, but only
-something different from Ens. When we call any thing _not great_,
-we do not affirm it to be the contrary of great, or to be
-_little_: for it may perhaps be simply equal: we only mean that it
-is different from great.[70] A negative proposition, generally,
-does not signify anything contrary to the predicate, but merely
-something else distinct or different from the predicate.[71] The
-Form of Different, though of one and the same general nature
-throughout, is distributed into many separate parts or
-specialties, according as it is attached to different things. Thus
-_not beautiful_ is a special mode of the general Form or Genus
-Different, placed in antithesis with another Form or Genus, _the
-beautiful_. The antithesis is that of one Ens or Real thing
-against another Ens or Real thing: _not beautiful_, _not great_,
-_not just_, exist just as much and are quite as real, as
-_beautiful_, _great_, _just_. If the Different be a real Form or
-Genus, all its varieties must be real also. Accordingly Different
-from Ens is just as much a real Form as Ens itself:[72] and this
-is what we mean by Non-Ens:--not any thing contrary to Ens.
-
-[Footnote 70: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. [Greek: O(po/tan to\ me\
-o)\n le/gomen, o(s e)/oiken, ou)k e)nanti/on ti le/gomen tou=
-o)/ntos, a)ll' e(/teron mo/non . . . Oi(=on o(/tan ei)pome/n _ti
-me\ me/ga_, to/te ma=llo/n ti/ soi phaino/metha to\ smikro\n e)\
-to\ i)/son delou=n to=| r(e/mati.]
-
-Plato here means to imply that [Greek: to\ smikro\n] is the real
-contrary of [Greek: to\ me/ga]. When we say [Greek: me\ me/ga], we
-do not necessarily mean [Greek: smikro/n]--we may mean [Greek:
-i)/son]. Therefore [Greek: to\ me\ me/ga] does not (in his view)
-imply the contrary of [Greek: me/ga].]
-
-[Footnote 71: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. [Greek: Ou)k a)/r'
-e)nanti/on, o(/tan a)po/phasis le/getai, semai/nein
-sugchoreso/metha, tosou=ton de\ mo/non, o(/ti to=n a)/llon ti
-menu/ei to\ me\ kai\ to\ ou) protithe/mena to=n e)pio/nton
-o)noma/ton, ma=llon de\ to=n pragma/ton peri\ a)/tt' a)\n ke/etai
-ta\ e)piphtheggo/mena u(/steron te=s a)popha/seos o)no/mata.]]
-
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. [Greek: e( te=s thate/rou
-mori/ou phu/seos kai\ te=s tou= o)/ntos pro\s a)/llela
-a)ntikeime/non a)ntithesis ou)de\n e)=tton, ei) the/mis ei)pei=n
-au)tou= tou= o)/ntos ou)si/a e)sti/n; ou)k e)nanti/on e)kei/no|
-semai/nousa, a)lla\ tosou=ton mo/non, e(/teron e)kei/nou.]]
-
-[Side-note: The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to
-have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is.]
-
-Here then the Eleate professes to have found what Non-Ens is: that
-it is a real substantive Form, numerable among the other Forms,
-and having a separate constant nature of its own, like _not
-beautiful_, _not great_:[73] that it is real and existent, just as
-much as _Ens_, _beautiful_, _great_, &c. Disregarding the
-prohibition of Parmenides, we have shown (says he) not only that
-Non-Ens exists, but also what it is. Many Forms or Genera enter
-into partnership or communion with each other; and Non-Ens is the
-partnership between Ens and Diversum. Diversum, in partnership
-with Ens, _is_ (exists), in consequence of such partnership:--yet
-_it is not_ that with which it is in partnership, but different
-therefrom--and being thus different from Ens, it is clearly and
-necessarily Non-Ens: while Ens also, by virtue of its partnership
-with Diversum, is different from all the other Forms, or _is not_
-any one of them, and to this extent therefore Ens is Non-Ens. We
-drop altogether the idea of contrariety, without enquiring whether
-it be reasonably justifiable or not: we attach ourselves entirely
-to the Form--_Different_.[74]
-
-[Footnote 73: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B-C. [Greek: to\ me\ o)\n
-bebai/os e)sti\ te\n au)tou= phu/sin e)/chon . . . e)na/rithmon
-to=n pollo=n o)/nto=n ei)=dos e(/n.]]
-
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E--259 A. [Greek: e(mei=s
-ga\r peri\ me\n e)nanti/ou tino\s au)to=| chai/rein pa/lai
-le/gomen, ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te me\ lo/gon e)/chon e)\ kai\
-panta/pasin a)/logon], &c.
-
-[Greek: to\ me\n e(/teron metascho\n tou= o)/ntos _e)/sti_ me\n
-dia\ tau/ten te\n me/thexin, ou) me\n e)kei=no ge ou)= me/teschen,
-a)ll' e(/teron, e(/teron de\ tou= o)/ntos o)/n e)sti saphe/stata
-e)x a)na/gkes ei)=nai me\ o)/n], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which
-justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate
-different from the subject.]
-
-Let those refute this explanation, who can do so (continues the
-Eleate), or let them propose a better of their own, if they can:
-if not, let them allow the foregoing as possible.[75] Let them not
-content themselves with multiplying apparent contradictions, by
-saying that the same may be in some particular respect different,
-and that the different may be in some particular respect the same,
-through this or the other accidental attribute.[76] All these
-sophisms lead but to make us believe--That no one thing can be
-predicated of any other--That there is no intercommunion of the
-distinct Forms one with another, no right to predicate of any
-subject a second name and the possession of a new attribute--That
-therefore there can be no dialectic debate or philosophy, which is
-all founded upon such intercommunion of Forms.[77] We have shown
-that Forms do really come into conjunction, so as to enable us to
-conjoin, truly and properly, predicate with subject, and to
-constitute proposition and judgment as taking place among the true
-Forms or Genera. Among these true Forms or Genera, Non-Ens is
-included as one.[78]
-
-[Footnote 75: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 A-C. [Greek: o(\ de\ nu=n
-ei)re/kamen ei)=nai to\ me\ o)/n, e)\ peisa/to tis o(s ou) kalo=s
-le/gomen e)le/gxas, e)\ me/chri per a)\n a)dunate=|, lekte/on kai\
-e)kei=no| katha/per e(mei=s le/gomen . . . to\ tau=ta _e)a/santa
-o(s dunata/_. . . .]
-
-The language of the Eleate here is altogether at variance with the
-spirit of Plato in his negative or Searching Dialogues. To say, as
-he does, "Either accept the explanation which I give, or propose a
-better of your own"--is a dilemma which the Sokrates of the
-Theaetetus, and other dialogues, would have declined altogether.
-The complaint here made by the Eleate, against disputants who did
-nothing but propound difficulties--is the same as that which the
-hearers of Sokrates made against _him_ (see Plato, Philebus, p. 20
-A, where the remark is put into the mouth, not of an opponent, but
-of a respectful young listener); and many a reader of the Platonic
-Parmenides has indulged in the complaint.]
-
-[Footnote 76: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 D. [Greek: e)kei/ne| kai\
-kat' e)kei=no o(/ phesi tou/ton peponthe/nai po/teron.]]
-
-[Footnote 77: Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B, E. [Greek: dia\ ga\r te\n
-a)lle/lon to=n ei)do=n sumploke\n o( lo/gos ge/gonen e(mi=n.] 252
-B: [Greek: oi( mede\n e)o=ntes koinoni/a| pathe/matos e(te/rou
-tha/teron prosagoreu/ein.]]
-
-[Footnote 78: Plato, Sophist. p. 260 A. [Greek: pro\s to\ to\n
-lo/gon e(mi=n to=n o)/nton e(/n ti geno=n ei)=nai.] 258 B: [Greek:
-to\ me\ o)\n bebai/os e)sti\ te\n au(tou= phu/sin e)/chon.]]
-
-[Side-note: Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into
-intercommunion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment.]
-
-The Eleate next proceeds to consider, whether these two Genera or
-Forms--Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, on the one hand, and
-Non-Ens on the other--are among those which may or do enter into
-partnership and conjunction with each other. For we have admitted
-that there are some Forms which cannot come into partnership; and
-the Sophist against whom we are reasoning, though we have driven
-him to concede that Non-Ens is a real Form, may still contend that
-it is one of those which cannot come into partnership with
-Proposition, Judgment, Opinion--and he may allege that we can
-neither embody in language, nor in mental judgment, that which _is
-not_.[79]
-
-[Footnote 79: Plato, Sophist. p. 260 C-D-E.]
-
-[Side-note: Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have
-a noun and a verb--it must be proposition of _Something_. False
-propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the
-particular subject.]
-
-Let us look attentively what Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, are.
-As we said about Forms and letters, so about words: it is not
-every combination of words which is possible, so as to make up a
-significant proposition. A string of nouns alone will not make
-one, nor a string of verbs alone. To compose the simplest
-proposition, you must put together at least one noun and one verb,
-in order to signify something respecting things existing, or
-events past, present, and future.[80] Now every proposition must
-be a proposition about something, or belonging to a certain
-subject: every proposition must also be of a certain quality.[81]
-_Theaetetus is sitting down_--_Theaetetus is flying._ Here are two
-propositions, both belonging to the same subject, but with
-opposite qualities: the former true, the latter false. The true
-proposition affirms respecting Theaetetus real things as they are;
-the false proposition affirms respecting him things different from
-real, or non-real, as being real. The attribute of _flying_ is
-just as real in itself as the attribute of _sitting_: but as
-respects Theaetetus, or as predicated concerning him, it is
-different from the reality, or non-real.[82] But still Theaetetus
-is the subject of the proposition, though the predicate _flying_
-does not really belong to him: for there is no other subject than
-he, and without a subject the proposition would be no proposition
-at all. When therefore different things are affirmed as the same,
-or non-realities as realities, respecting you or any given
-subject, the proposition so affirming is false.[83]
-
-[Footnote 80: Plato, Sophist. pp. 261-262.]
-
-[Footnote 81: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 E. [Greek: lo/gon
-a)nagkai=on, o(/tan per e)=|, tino\s ei)=nai lo/gon; me\ de/ tinos
-a)du/naton . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ _poi=o/n tina_ au)to\n ei)=nai
-dei=?]]
-
-[Footnote 82: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B [Greek: O)/nton de/ ge
-o)/nta e(/tera peri\ sou=.]
-
-That is, [Greek: e(/tera to=n o)/nton],--being the explanation
-given by Plato of [Greek: ta\ me\ o)/nta].]
-
-[Footnote 83: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition,
-and may be also false, by coming into partnership with the Form
-Non-Ens.]
-
-As propositions may be true or false, so also opinion or judgment
-or conception, may be true or false: for opinion or judgment is
-only the concluding result of deliberation or reflection--and
-reflection is the silent dialogue of the mind with itself: while
-conception or phantasy is the coalescence or conjunction of
-opinion with present perception.[84] Both opinion and conception
-are akin to proposition. It has thus been shown that false
-propositions, and false opinions or judgments, are perfectly real,
-and involve no contradiction: and that the Form or
-Genus--Proposition, Judgment, Opinion--comes properly and naturally
-into partnership with the Form Non-Ens.
-
-[Footnote 84: Plato, Sophist. pp. 263-264. 264 A-B: [Greek:
-Ou)kou=n e)/peiper lo/gos a)lethe\s e)=n kai\ pseude/s, tou/ton d'
-e)pha/ne dia/noia me\n au)te=s pro\s e(aute\n psuche=s dia/logos,
-do/xa de\ dianoi/as a)poteleu/tesis, phai/netai de\ o(\ le/gomen
-(phantasi/a) su/mmixis ai)sthe/seos kai\ do/xes, a)na/gke de\ kai\
-tou/ton to=| lo/go| xuggeno=n o)/nton pseude= te au)to=n e)/nia
-kai\ e)ni/ote ei)=nai?]]
-
-This was the point which Plato's Eleate undertook to prove against
-Parmenides, and against the plea of the Sophist founded on the
-Parmenidean doctrine.
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-[Side-note: It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is
-theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like
-that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it.]
-
-Here Plato closes his general philosophical discussion, and
-reverts to the process of logical division from which he had
-deviated. In descending the predicamental steps, to find the
-logical place of the Sophist, Plato had reached a point where he
-assumed Non-Ens, together with false propositions and judgments
-affirming Non-Ens. To which the Sophist is conceived as replying,
-that Non-Ens was contradictory and impossible, and that no
-proposition could be false. On these points Plato has produced an
-elaborate argument intended to refute him, and to show that there
-was such a thing as falsehood imitating truth, or passing itself
-off as truth: accordingly, that there might be an art or
-profession engaged in producing such falsehood.
-
-[Side-note: Logical distribution of Imitators--those who imitate
-what they know, or what they do not know--of these last, some
-sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that
-they do not know, and designedly impose upon others.]
-
-Now the imitative profession may be distributed into those who
-know what they imitate--and those who imitate without knowing.[85]
-The man who mimics your figure or voice, knows what he imitates:
-those who imitate the figure of justice and virtue often pass
-themselves off as knowing it, yet do not really know it, having
-nothing better than fancy or opinion concerning it. Of these
-latter again--(_i.e._ the imitators with mere opinion, but no
-knowledge, respecting that which sincerely they imitate)--there
-are two classes: one, those who sincerely mistake their own mere
-opinions for knowledge, and are falsely persuaded that they really
-know: the other class, those who by their perpetual occupation in
-talking, lead us to suspect and apprehend that they are conscious
-of not knowing things, which nevertheless they discuss before
-others as if they did know.[86]
-
-[Footnote 85: Plato, Sophist. p. 267 A-D.]
-
-[Footnote 86: Plato, Sophist. p. 268 A. [Greek: to\ de\ thate/rou
-sche=ma, dia\ te\n e)n toi=s lo/gois kuli/ndesin, e)/chei polle\n
-u(popsi/an kai\ pho/bon o(s a)gnoei= tau=ta a(\ pro\s tou\s
-a)/llous o(s ei)do\s e)schema/tistai.]]
-
-[Side-note: Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous
-auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select
-auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent
-contradict himself--the Sophist.]
-
-Of this latter class, again, we may recognise two sections: those
-who impose upon a numerous audience by long discourses on public
-matters: and those who in private, by short question and answer,
-compel the person conversing with them to contradict himself.[87]
-The man of long discourse is not the true statesman, but the
-popular orator: the man of short discourse, but without any real
-knowledge, is not the truly wise man, since he has no real
-knowledge--but the imitator of the wise man, or Sophist.
-
-[Footnote 87: Plato, Sophist. p. 268 B. [Greek: to\n me\n
-demosi/a| te kai\ makroi=s lo/gois pro\s ple/the dunato\n
-_ei)roneu/esthai_ kathoro=; to\n de\ i)di/a| te kai\ brache/si
-lo/gois a)nagka/zonta to\n prosdialego/menon e)nantiologei=n
-au)to\n au)to=|.]]
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-[Side-note: Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics
-ascribed to a Sophist.]
-
-We have here the conclusion of this abstruse and complicated
-dialogue, called Sophistes. It ends by setting forth, as the
-leading characteristics of the Sophist--that he deals in short
-question and answer so as to make the respondent contradict
-himself: That he talks with small circles of listeners, upon a
-large variety of subjects, on which he possesses no real
-knowledge: That he mystifies or imposes upon his auditors; not
-giving his own sincere convictions, but talking for the production
-of a special effect. He is [Greek: e)nantiopoiologiko\s] and
-[Greek: ei)/ron], to employ the two original Platonic words,
-neither of which is easy to translate.
-
-[Side-note: These characteristics may have belonged to other
-persons, but they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates
-himself.]
-
-I dare say that there were some acute and subtle disputants in
-Athens to whom these characteristics belonged, though we do not
-know them by name. But we know one to whom they certainly
-belonged: and that was, Sokrates himself. They stand manifest and
-prominent both in the Platonic and in the Xenophontic dialogues.
-The attribute which Xenophon directly predicates about him, that
-"in conversation he dealt with his interlocutors just as he
-pleased,"[88] is amply exemplified by Plato in the Protagoras,
-Gorgias, Euthyphron, Laches, Charmides, Lysias, Alkibiades I. and
-II., Hippias I. and II., &c. That he cross-examined and puzzled
-every one else without knowing the subjects on which he talked,
-better than they did--is his own declaration in the Apology. That
-the Athenians regarded him as a clever man mystifying
-them--talking without sincere persuasion, or in a manner so strange
-that you could not tell whether he was in jest or in
-earnest--overthrowing men's established convictions by subtleties which
-led to no positive truth--is also attested both by what he himself
-says in the Apology, and by other passages of Plato and
-Xenophon.[89]
-
-[Footnote 88: Xen. Memor. i. 2, 14, [Greek: toi=s de\
-dialegome/nois au)to=| pa=si chro/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/pos
-bou/loito.]
-
-Compare, to the same purpose, i. 4, 1, where we are told that
-Sokrates employed his colloquial Elenchus as a means of chastising
-([Greek: kolasteri/ou e(/neka]) those who thought that they knew
-every thing: and the conversation of Sokrates with the youthful
-Euthydemus, especially what is said by Xenophon at the close of it
-(iv. 4, 39-40).
-
-The power of Sokrates to vanquish in dialogue the persons called
-Sophists, and to make them contradict themselves in answering--is
-clearly brought out, and doubtless intentionally brought out, in
-some of Plato's most consummate dialogues. Alkibiades says, in the
-Platonic Protagoras (p. 336), "Sokrates confesses himself no match
-for Protagoras in long speaking. If Protagoras on his side
-confesses himself inferior to Sokrates in dialogue, Sokrates is
-satisfied."]
-
-[Footnote 89: Plato, Apolog. p. 37 E. [Greek: e)a/n te ga\r le/go,
-o(/ti to=| theo=| a)peithei=n tou=t' e)/stin, kai\ dia\ tou=t'
-a)du/naton e(suchi/an a)/gein, ou) pei/sesthe/ moi o(s
-ei)roneuome/no|.]
-
-Xen. Memor. iv. 4, 9. [Greek: a)rkei= ga\r] (says Hippias to
-Sokrates), [Greek: o(/ti to=n a)/llon katagela=|s, e)roto=n kai\
-e)le/gchon pa/ntas, au)to\s de\ ou)deni\ the/lon u(pe/chein
-lo/gon, ou)de\ gno/men a)pophai/nesthai peri\ ou)deno/s.] See also
-Memorab. iii. 5, 24.
-
-Compare a striking passage in Plato's Menon, p. 80 A; also
-Theaetet. p. 149; and Plutarch, Quaest. Platonic. p. 1000.
-
-The attribute [Greek: ei)ronei/a], which Plato here declares as
-one of the main characteristics of the Sophists, is applied to
-Sokrates in a very special manner, not merely in the Platonic
-dialogues, but also by Timon in the fragments of his Silli
-remaining--[Greek: Au)te\ e)kei/ne e( eiothui=a _ei)ronei/a
-Sokra/tous_] (Plato, Repub. i. p. 337 A); and again--[Greek:
-prou)/legon o(/ti su\ a)pokri/nasthai me\n ou)k e)thelesois,
-_ei)roneu/soio_ de\ kai\ pa/nta ma=llon poie/sois e)\
-a)pokri/noio, ei)/ tis ti/ se e)rota=|.] So also in the Symposion,
-p. 216 E, Alkibiades says about Sokrates [Greek: _ei)roneuo/menos_
-de\ kai\ pai/zon pa/nta to\n bi/on pro\s tou\s a)nthro/pous
-diatelei=.] And Gorgias, p. 489 E. In another part of the Gorgias
-(p. 481 B), Kallikles says, "Tell me, Chaerephon, does Sokrates
-mean seriously what he says, or is he bantering?" [Greek:
-spouda/zei tau=ta Sokra/tes e)\ pai/zei?] Protagoras, Prodikus,
-Hippias, &c., do not seem to have been [Greek: ei)/rones] at all,
-as far as our scanty knowledge goes.
-
-The words [Greek: ei)/ron, ei)roniko/s, ei)ronei/a] seem to
-include more than is implied in our words _irony_, _ironical_.
-Schleiermacher translates the words [Greek: a(plou=n mime/ten,
-ei)roniko\n mime/ten], at the end of the Sophistes, by "den
-ehrlichen, den Schlauen, Nachahmer"; which seems to me near the
-truth,--meaning one who either speaks what he does not think, or
-evades speaking what he does think, in order to serve some special
-purpose.]
-
-[Side-note: The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the
-taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person.]
-
-Moreover, if we examine not merely the special features assigned
-to the Sophist in the conclusion of the dialogue, but also those
-indicated in the earlier part of it, we shall find that many of
-them fit Sokrates as well as they could have fitted any one else.
-If the Sophists hunted after rich young men,[90] Sokrates did the
-same; seeking opportunities for conversation with them by
-assiduous frequentation of the palaestrae, as well as in other ways.
-We see this amply attested by Plato and Xenophon:[91] we see
-farther that Sokrates announces it as a propensity natural to him,
-and meritorious rather than otherwise. Again, the argumentative
-dialogue--disputation or eristic reduced to an art, and debating
-on the general theses of just and unjust, which Plato notes as
-characterising the Sophists[92]--belonged in still higher
-perfection to Sokrates. It not only formed the business of his
-life, but is extolled by Plato elsewhere,[93] as the true walk of
-virtuous philosophy. But there was undoubtedly this difference
-between Sokrates and the Sophists, that he conversed and argued
-gratuitously, delighting in the process itself: while they both
-asked and received money for it. Upon this point, brought forward
-by Plato both directly and with his remarkable fertility in
-multiplying indirect allusions, the peculiarity of the Sophist is
-made mainly to turn. To ask or receive a fee for communicating
-knowledge, virtue, aptitude in debate, was in the view of Sokrates
-and Plato a grave enormity: a kind of simoniacal practice.[94]
-
-[Footnote 90: Plato, Sophist. p. 223. [Greek: ne/on plousi/on kai\
-e)ndo/xon the/ra].]
-
-[Footnote 91: In the opening words of the Platonic Protagoras, we
-read as a question from the friend or companion of Sokrates,
-[Greek: Po/then, o)= So/krates, phai/nei? e)\ _a)po\ kunegesi/ou
-tou=_ peri\ te\n A)lkibia/dou o(/ran?]
-
-See also the opening of the Charmides, Lysis, Alkibiades I., and
-the speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion.
-
-Compare also Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2, 1-2-6, with the
-commencement of the Platonic Protagoras; in which the youth
-Hippokrates, far from being run after by the Sophist Protagoras,
-is described as an enthusiastic admirer of that Sophist from
-reputation alone, and as eagerly soliciting Sokrates to present
-him to Protagoras (Protag. pp. 310-311).]
-
-[Footnote 92: Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C. [Greek: To\ de/ ge
-e)/ntechnon kai\ peri\ dikai/on au)ton kai\ a)di/kon kai\ peri\
-to=n a)/llon o(/los a)mphisbetou=n.]
-
-Spengel says truly--in his [Greek: Sunagoge\ Techno=n]
-p. 40--"Quod si sermo et locus hic esset de Sophistarum doctrina et
-philosophia, odium quod nunc vulgo in eos vertunt, majore ex parte
-sine causa et ratione esse conceptum, eosque laude magis quam
-vituperatione dignos esse censendos--haud multa cum opera exponi
-posset. Sic, quo proscinduntur convicio, juvenes non nisi magno
-pretio eruditos esse, levissimum est: immo hoc sophistas suae
-ipsorum scientiae satis confisos esse neque eam despexisse, docet:
-et vitium, si modo vitium dicendum, commune est vel potius ortum
-optimis lyricae poeseos asseclis, Simonide, Pindaro, aliis."]
-
-[Footnote 93: Plato, Theaetet. p. 175 C.]
-
-[Footnote 94: It is to be remembered, however, that Plato, though
-doubtless exacting no fee, received presents from rich admirers
-like Dion and Dionysius: and there were various teachers who found
-presents more lucrative than fees. "M. Antonius Guipho, fuisse
-dicitur ingenii magni, memoriae singularis, nec minus Graice, quam
-Latino, doctus: praeterea comi fucilique natura, _nec unquam de
-mercedibus pactus--eoque plura ex liberalitate discentium
-consecutus._" (Sueton. De Illustr. Grammat. 7.)]
-
-[Side-note: The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble
-Sophistical Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The
-Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not
-Sophists in this sense.]
-
-We have seen also that Plato assigns to what he terms "the
-thoroughbred and noble Sophistic Art" ([Greek: e( ge/nei gennai/a
-sophistike\]), the employment of the Elenchus, for the purpose of
-destroying, in the minds of others, that false persuasion of
-existing knowledge which was the radical impediment to their
-imbibing acquisitions of real knowledge from the teacher.[95] Here
-Plato draws a portrait not only strikingly resembling Sokrates,
-but resembling no one else. As far as we can make out, Sokrates
-stood alone in this original conception of the purpose of the
-Elenchus, and in his no less original manner of working it out. To
-prove to others that they knew nothing, is what he himself
-represents to be his mission from the Delphian oracle. Sokrates is
-a Sophist of the most genuine and noble stamp: others are
-Sophists, but of a more degenerate variety. Plato admits the
-analogy with reluctance, and seeks to attenuate it.[96] We may
-remark, however, that according to the characteristic of the true
-Sophist here given by Plato, Protagoras and Prodikus were less of
-Sophists than Sokrates. For though we know little of the two
-former, yet there is good reason to believe, That the method which
-they generally employed was, that of continuous and eloquent
-discourse, lecture, exhortation: that disputation by short
-question and answer was less usual with them, and was not their
-strong point: and that the Elenchus, in the Sokratic meaning, can
-hardly be said to have been used by them at all. Now Plato, in
-this dialogue, tells us that the true and genuine Sophist
-renounces the method of exhortation as unprofitable; or at least
-employs it only subject to the condition of having previously
-administered the Elenchus with success, as his own patent
-medicine.[97] Upon this definition, Sokrates is more truly a
-Sophist than either Protagoras or Prodikus: neither of whom, so
-far as we know, made it their business to drive the respondent to
-contradictions.
-
-[Footnote 95: Plato, Sophist. p. 230 D. [Greek: pri\n a)\n
-e)le/gchon tis to\n e)legcho/menon ei)s ai)schu/nen kataste/sas,
-ta\s toi=s mathe/masin e)mpodi/ous do/xas e)xelo/n, katharo\n
-a)pophe/ne| kai\ tau=ta e(gou/menon, a(/per oi)=den ei)de/nai
-mo/na, plei/o de\ me/.]]
-
-[Footnote 96: Plato, Sophist. p. 231 C.]
-
-[Footnote 97: Plato, Sophist. p. 230 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Universal knowledge--was professed at that time by all
-Philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, &c.]
-
-Again, Plato tells us that the Sophist is a person who disputes
-about all matters, and pretends to know all matters: respecting
-the invisible Gods, respecting the visible Gods, Sun, Moon, Stars,
-Earth, &c., respecting transcendental philosophy, generation and
-essence--and respecting all civil, social, and political
-questions--and respecting special arts. On all these miscellaneous
-topics, according to Plato, the Sophists pretended to be
-themselves instructed, and to qualify their disciples for arguing
-on all of them.
-
-Now it is possible that the Sophists of that day may have
-pretended to this species of universal knowledge; but most
-certainly Plato and Aristotle did the same. The dialogues of Plato
-embrace all that wide range of topics which he tells us that the
-Sophists argued about, and pretended to teach. In an age when the
-amount of positive knowledge was so slender, it was natural for a
-clever talker or writer to fancy that he knew every thing. In
-reference to every subject then discussed, an ingenious mind could
-readily supply deductions from both hypotheses--generalities
-ratiocinative or imaginative--strung together into an apparent
-order sufficient for the exigencies of hearers. There was no large
-range of books to be studied; no stock of facts or experience to
-be mastered. Every philosopher wove his own tissue of theory for
-himself, without any restraint upon his intellectual impulse, in
-regard to all the problems then afloat. What the theories of the
-Sophists were, we do not know: but Plato, author of the Timaeus,
-Republic, Leges, Kratylus, Menon--who affirmed the pre-existence
-as well as post-existence of the mind, and the eternal
-self-existence of Ideas--has no fair ground for reproaching them with
-blamable rashness in the extent and diversity of topics which they
-presumed to discuss. They obtained indeed (he says justly) no
-truth or knowledge, but merely a fanciful semblance of knowledge--an
-equivocal show or imitation of reality.[98] But Plato himself
-obtains nothing more in the Timaeus: and we shall find Aristotle
-pronouncing the like condemnation on the Platonic self-existent
-Ideas. If the Sophists professed to be encyclopedists, this was an
-error natural to the age; and was the character of Grecian
-philosophy generally, even in its most illustrious manifestations.
-
-[Footnote 98: Plato, Sophistes, p. 233 C. [Greek: doxastike\n
-a)/ra tina\ peri\ pa/nton e)piste/men o( sophiste\s e(mi=n, a)ll'
-ou)k a)lethei/an e)/chon a)nape/phantai.] 234 B: [Greek: mime/mata
-kai\ o(mo/numa to=n o)/nton.]
-
-When the Eleate here says about the Sophists (p. 233 B), [Greek:
-dokou=si pro\s tau=ta e)pistemo/nos e)/chein au)toi\ pro\s a(/per
-a)ntile/gousin], this is exactly what Sokrates, in the Platonic
-Apology, tells us about the impression made by his own dialectics
-or refutative conversation, Plato, Apolog. p. 23 A.
-
-[Greek: e)k tau/tesi de\ te=s e)xeta/seos pollai\ me\n
-a)pe/chtheiai/ moi gego/nasi kai\ oi(=ai chalepo/tatai kai\
-baru/tatai, o(/ste polla\s diabola\s a)p' au)to=n gegone/nai,
-o)/noma/ te tou=to le/gesthai, sopho\s ei)=nai; oi)=ontai ga/r me
-e(ka/stoth' oi( paro/ntes tau=t' ei)=nai sopho\n a(\ a)\n a)/llon
-e)xele/gxo.]]
-
-[Side-note: Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistes. He
-says that the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every
-one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one
-who maintains false propositions to be impossible.]
-
-Having traced the Sophist down to the character of a man of
-delusion and imposture, passing off appearance as if it were
-reality, and falsehood as if it were truth--Plato (as we have
-seen) suddenly turns round upon himself, and asks how such a
-character is possible. He represents the Sophist as maintaining
-that no man could speak falsely[99]--that a false proposition was
-self-contradictory, inasmuch as Non-Ens was inconceivable and
-unutterable. I do not see how the argument which Plato here
-ascribes to the Sophist, can be reconciled with the character
-which he had before given of the Sophist--as a man who passed his
-life in disputation and controversy; which involves the perpetual
-arraigning of other men's opinions as false. A professed disputant
-may perhaps be accused of admitting nothing to be true: but he
-cannot well be charged with maintaining that nothing is false.
-
-[Footnote 99: Plato, Sophist. pp. 240-241. Compare 260 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens--No predications
-except identical.]
-
-To pass over this inconsistency, however--the reasoning of Plato
-himself on the subject of Non-Ens is an interesting relic of
-ancient speculation. He has made for himself an opportunity of
-canvassing, not only the doctrine of Parmenides, who emphatically
-denied Non-Ens--but also the opposite doctrine of other schools.
-He farther comments upon a different opinion, advanced by other
-philosophers--That no proposition can be admitted, in which the
-predicate is different from the subject: That no proposition is
-true or valid, except an identical proposition. You cannot say,
-Man is good: you can only say, Man is Man, or Good is good. You
-cannot say--Sokrates is good, brave, old, stout, flat-nosed, &c.,
-because you thereby multiply the one Sokrates into many. One thing
-cannot be many, nor many things one.[100]
-
-[Footnote 100: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B-C. Compare Plato, Philebus,
-p. 14 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Misconception of the function of the copula in
-predication.]
-
-This last opinion is said to have been held by Antisthenes, one of
-the disciples of Sokrates. We do not know how he explained or
-defended it, nor what reserves he may have admitted to qualify it.
-Plato takes no pains to inform us on this point. He treats the
-opinion with derision, as an absurdity. We may conceive it as one
-of the many errors arising from a misconception of the purpose and
-function of the copula in predication. Antisthenes probably
-considered that the copula implied identity between the predicate
-and the subject. Now the explanation or definition of _man_ is
-different from the explanation or definition of _good_:
-accordingly, if you say, Man is good, you predicate identity
-between two different things: as if you were to say Two is Three,
-or Three is Four. And if the predicates were multiplied, the
-contradiction became aggravated, because then you predicated
-identity not merely between one thing and another different thing,
-but between one thing and many different things. The opinion of
-Antisthenes depends upon two assumptions--That each separate word,
-whether used as subject or as predicate, denotes a Something
-separate and existent by itself: That the copula implies identity.
-Now the first of these two assumptions is not unfrequently
-admitted, even in the reasonings of Plato, Aristotle, and many
-others: while the latter is not more remarkable than various other
-erroneous conceptions which have been entertained, as to the
-function of the copula.
-
-[Side-note: No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No
-analysis or classification of propositions before the works of
-Aristotle.]
-
-What is most important to observe is--That at the time which we
-are here discussing, there existed no such sciences either grammar
-or formal logic. There was a copious and flexible language--a
-large body of literature, chiefly poetical--and great facility as
-well as felicity in the use of speech for the purposes of
-communication and persuasion. But no attempt had yet been made to
-analyse or theorise on speech: to distinguish between the
-different functions of words, and to throw them into suitable
-classes: to generalise the conditions of good or bad use of speech
-for proving a conclusion: or to draw up rules for grammar, syntax,
-and logic. Both Protagoras and Prodikus appear to have contributed
-something towards this object, and Plato gives various scattered
-remarks going still farther. But there was no regular body either
-of grammar or of formal logic: no established rules or principles
-to appeal to, no recognised teaching, on either topic. It was
-Aristotle who rendered the important service of filling up this
-gap. I shall touch hereafter upon the manner in which he
-proceeded: but the necessity of laying down a good theory of
-predication, and precepts respecting the employment of
-propositions in reasoning, is best shown by such misconceptions as
-this of Antisthenes; which naturally arise among argumentative men
-yet untrained in the generalities of grammar and logic.
-
-[Side-note: Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistes--To confute
-the various schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the
-Materialists, &c.]
-
-Plato announces his intention, in this portion of the Sophistes,
-to confute all these different schools of thinkers, to whom he has
-made allusion.[101] His first purpose, in reasoning against those
-who maintained Non-Ens to be an incogitable absurdity, is, to show
-that there are equal difficulties respecting Ens: that the
-Existent is just as equivocal and unintelligible as the
-Non-Existent. Those who recognise two co-ordinate and elementary
-principles (such as Hot and Cold) maintain that both are really
-existent, and call them both, Entia. Here (argues Plato) they
-contradict themselves: they call their two elementary principles
-_one_. What do they mean by existence, if this be not so?
-
-[Footnote 101: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 C-D. [Greek: I(/na toi/nun
-pro\s a(/pantas e(mi=n o( lo/gos e)=| tou\s po/pote peri\ ou)si/as
-kai\ o(tiou=n dialechthe/ntas, e)/sto kai\ pro\s tou/tous kai\
-pro\s tou\s a)/llous, o(/sois e)/mprosthen dieile/gmetha, ta\ nu=n
-o(s e)n e)rote/sei lechtheso/mena.]]
-
-Then again, Parmenides--and those who affirm that Ens Totum was
-essentially Unum, denying all plurality--had difficulties on their
-side to surmount. Ens could not be identical with Unum, nor was
-the name _Ens_, identical with the thing named Ens. Moreover,
-though Ens Unum was _Totum_, yet Totum was not identical with Ens
-or with Unum. _Totum_ necessarily implied _partes_: but the _Unum
-per se_ was indivisible or implied absence of parts. Though it was
-true therefore that Ens was both Unum and Totum, these two were
-both of them essentially different from Ens, and belonged to it
-only by way of adjunct accident. Parmenides was therefore wrong in
-saying that Unum alone existed.
-
-[Side-note: Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of
-Antisthenes.]
-
-The reasoning here given from Plato throws some light upon the
-doctrine just now cited from Antisthenes. You cannot say (argues
-Plato against the advocates of duality) that _two_ elements (Hot
-and Cold) are both of them Entia or Existent, because by so doing
-you call them _one_. You cannot say (argues Antisthenes) that
-Sokrates is good, brave, old, &c., because by such speech you call
-one thing three. Again, in controverting the doctrine of
-Parmenides, Plato urges, That Ens cannot _be_ Unum, because it is
-Totum (Unum having no parts, while Totum has parts): but it may
-carry with it the accident Unum, or may have Unum applied to it as
-a predicate by accident. Here again, we have difficulties similar
-to those which perplexed Antisthenes. For the same reason that
-Plato will not admit, That Ens _is_ Unum--Antisthenes will not
-admit, That Man _is_ good. It appeared to him to imply essential
-identity between the predicate and the subject.
-
-All these difficulties and others to which we shall come
-presently, noway peculiar to Antisthenes--attest the incomplete
-formal logic of the time: the want of a good theory respecting
-predication and the function of the copula.
-
-[Side-note: Plato's argument against the Materialists.]
-
-Pursuing the purpose of establishing his conclusion (_viz._ That
-Ens involved as many perplexities as Non-Ens), Plato comes to the
-two opposite sects:--1. Those (the Materialists) who recognised
-bodies and nothing else, as the real Entia or Existences. 2. Those
-(the Friends of Forms, the Idealists) who maintained that
-incorporeal and intelligible Forms or Species were the only real
-existences; and that bodies had no existence, but were in
-perpetual generation and destruction.[102]
-
-[Footnote 102: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 B.]
-
-Respecting the first, Plato says that they must after all be
-ashamed not to admit, that justice, intelligence, &c., are
-something real, which may be present or absent in different
-individual men, and therefore must exist apart from all
-individuals. Yet justice and intelligence are not bodies.
-Existence therefore is something common to body and not-body. The
-characteristic mark of existence is, power or potentiality.
-Whatever has power to act upon any thing else, or to be acted on
-by any thing else, is a real Ens or existent something.[103]
-
-[Footnote 103: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. [Greek: le/go de\ to\
-kai\ o(poianou=n kekteme/non _du/namin_, ei)/t' ei)s to\ poiei=n
-e(/teron o(tiou=n pephuko\s ei)/t' ei)s to\ pathei=n** kai\
-smikro/taton u(po\ tou= phaulota/tou, ka)\n ei) mo/non ei)sa/pax,
-pa=n tou=to o)/ntos ei)=nai; ti/themai ga\r o(/ron o(ri/zein ta\
-o)/nta, o(s e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti ple\n _du/namis_.]]
-
-[Side-note: Reply open to the Materialists.]
-
-Unfortunately we never know any thing about the opponents of
-Plato, nor how they would have answered his objection--except so
-much as he chooses to tell us. But it appears to me that the
-opponents whom he is here confuting would have accepted his
-definition, and employed it for the support of their own opinion.
-"We recognise (they would say) just men, or hard bodies, as
-existent, because they conform to your definition: they have power
-to act and be acted upon. But justice, apart from just
-men--hardness, apart from hard bodies--has no such power: they neither
-act upon any thing, nor are acted on by any thing: therefore we do
-not recognise them as existent." According to their view, objects
-of perception acted on the mind, and therefore were to be
-recognised as existent: objects of mere conception did not act on
-the mind, and therefore had not the same claim to be ranked as
-existent: or at any rate they acted on the mind in a different
-way, which constitutes the difference between the real and unreal.
-Of this difference Plato's definition takes no account.[104]
-
-[Footnote 104: Plato, Sophist. p. 247 E. [Greek: to\ kai\
-o(poianou=n kekteme/non du/namin], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of
-Forms. Their point of view against him.]
-
-Plato now presents this same definition to the opposite class of
-philosophers: to the Idealists, or partisans of the incorporeal--or
-of self-existent and separate Forms. These thinkers drew a
-marked distinction between the Existent and the Generated--between
-Ens and Fiens--[Greek: to\ o)\n] and [Greek: to\ gigno/menon]. Ens
-or the Existent was eternal and unchangeable: Fiens or the
-Generated was always in change or transit, coming or going. We
-hold communion (they said) with the generated or transitory,
-through our bodies and sensible perceptions: we hold communion
-with unchangeable Ens through our mind and by intellection. They
-did not admit the definition of existence just given by Plato.
-They contended that that definition applied only to Fiens or to
-the sensible world--not to Ens or the intelligible world.[105]
-Fiens had power to act and be acted upon, and existed only under
-the condition of being so: that is, its existence was only
-temporary, conditional, relative: it had no permanent or absolute
-existence at all. Ens was the real existent, absolute and
-independent--neither acting upon any thing nor being acted upon.
-They considered that Plato's definition was not a definition of
-Existence, or the Absolute: but rather of Non-Existence, or the
-Relative.
-
-[Footnote 105: Plato, Sophist. p. 248 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato argues--That to know, and be known, is action and
-passion, a mode of relativity.]
-
-But (asks Plato in reply) what do you mean by "the mind holding
-communion" with the intelligible world? You mean that the mind
-knows, comprehends, conceives, the intelligible world: or in other
-words, that the intelligible world (Ens) is known, is
-comprehended, is conceived, by the mind. To be known or conceived,
-is to be acted on by the mind.[106] Ens, or the intelligible
-world, is thus acted upon by the mind, and has a power to be so
-acted upon: which power is, in Plato's definition here given, the
-characteristic mark of existence. Plato thus makes good his
-definition as applying to Ens, the world of intelligible Forms--not
-less than to Fiens, the world of sensible phenomena.
-
-[Footnote 106: Plato, Sophist. p. 248 D. [Greek: ei)
-prosomologou=si te\n me\n psuche\n gino/skein, te\n d' ou)si/an
-gigno/skesthai . . . Ti/ de/? to\ gino/skein e)\ gigno/skesthai
-phate\ poi/ema e)\ pa/thos e)\ a)mpho/teron?]]
-
-The definition of _existence_, here given by Plato, and the way in
-which he employs it against the two different sects of
-philosophers--Materialists and Idealists--deserves some remark.
-
-[Side-note: Plato's reasoning--compared with the points of view of
-both.]
-
-According to the Idealists or Immaterialists, Plato's definition
-of existence would be supposed to establish the case of their
-opponents the Materialists, who recognised nothing as existing
-except the sensible world: for Plato's definition (as the
-Idealists thought) fitted the sensible world, but fitted nothing
-else. Now these Idealists did not recognise the sensible world as
-existent at all. They considered it merely as Fiens, ever
-appearing and vanishing. The only Existent, in their view, was the
-intelligible world--Form or Forms, absolute, eternal,
-unchangeable, but neither visible nor perceivable by any of the
-other senses. This is the opinion against which Plato _here_
-reasons, though in various other dialogues he gives it as his own
-opinion, or at least, as the opinion of his representative
-spokesman.
-
-In this portion of the present dialogue (Sophistes) the point
-which he makes is, to show to the Idealists, or Absolutists, that
-their Forms are not really absolute, or independent of the mind:
-that the existence of these forms is relative, just as much as
-that of the sensible world. The sensible world exists relatively
-to our senses, really or potentially exercised: the intelligible
-world exists relatively to our intelligence, really or potentially
-exercised. In both cases alike, we hold communion with the two
-worlds: the communion cannot be left out of sight, either in the
-one case or in the other. The communion is the entire and
-fundamental fact, of which the Subject conceiving and the Object
-conceived, form the two opposite but inseparable faces--the
-concave and convex, to employ a favourite illustration of
-Aristotle. Subject conceiving, in communion with Object conceived,
-are one and the same indivisible fact, looked at on different
-sides. This is, in substance, what Plato urges against those
-philosophers who asserted the absolute and independent existence
-of intelligible Forms. Such forms (he says) exist only in
-communion with, or relatively to, an intelligent mind: they are
-not absolute, not independent: they are Objects of intelligence to
-an intelligent Subject, but they are nothing without the Subject,
-just as the Subject is nothing without them or some other Object.
-Object of intelligence implies an intelligent Subject: Object of
-sense implies a sentient Subject. Thus Objects of intelligence, and
-Objects of sense, exist alike relatively to a Subject--not
-absolutely or independently.
-
-[Side-note: The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the
-Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative.]
-
-This argument, then, of Plato against the Idealists is an argument
-against the Absolute--showing that there can be no Object of
-intelligence or conception without its obverse side, the
-intelligent or concipient Subject. The Idealists held, that by
-soaring above the sensible world into the intelligible world, they
-got out of the region of the Relative into that of the Absolute.
-But Plato reminds them that this is not the fact. Their
-intelligible world is relative, not less than the sensible; that
-is, it exists only in communion with a mind or Subject, but with a
-Cogitant or intelligent Subject, not a percipient Subject.
-
-[Side-note: Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of
-Protagoras in the Theaetetus.]
-
-The argument here urged by Plato coincides in its drift and result
-with the dictum of Protagoras--Man is the measure of all things.
-In my remarks on the Theaetetus,[107] I endeavoured to make it
-appear that the Protagorean dictum was really a negation of the
-Absolute, of the Thing in itself, of the Object without a
-Subject:--and an affirmation of the Relative, of the Thing in
-communion with a percipient or concipient mind, of Object
-implicated with Subject--as two aspects or sides of one and the
-same conception or cognition. Though Plato in the Theaetetus argued
-at length against Protagoras, yet his reasoning here in the
-Sophistes establishes by implication the conclusion of Protagoras.
-Here Plato impugns the doctrine of those who (like Sokrates in his
-own Theaetetus) held that the sensible world alone was relative,
-but that the intelligible world or Forms were absolute. He shows
-that the latter were no less relative to a mind than the former;
-and that mind, either percipient or cogitant, could never be
-eliminated from "communion" with them.
-
-[Footnote 107: See my notice of the Theaetetus, in the chapter
-immediately preceding, where I have adverted to Plato's reasoning
-in the Sophistes.]
-
-[Side-note: The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were
-entirely unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and
-maintains that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable.]
-
-These same Idealist philosophers also maintained--That Forms, or
-the intelligible world, were eternally the same and unchangeable.
-Plato here affirms that this ideas or opinion is not true: he
-contends that the intelligible world includes both change and
-unchangeableness, motion and rest, difference and sameness, life,
-mind, intelligence, &c. He argues that the intelligible world,
-whether assumed as consisting of one Form or of many Forms, could
-not be regarded either as wholly changeable or wholly
-unchangeable: it must comprise both constituents alike. If all
-were changeable, or if all were unchangeable, there could be no
-Object of knowledge; and, by consequence, no knowledge.[108] But
-the fact that there _is_ knowledge (cognition, conception), is the
-fundamental fact from which we must reason; and any conclusion
-which contradicts this must be untrue. Therefore the intelligible
-world is not all homogeneous, but contains different and even
-opposite Forms--change and unchangeableness--motion and
-rest--different and same.[109]
-
-[Footnote 108: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. [Greek: xumbai/nei d'
-ou)=n a)kine/ton te o)/nton nou=n medeni\ peri\ medeno\s ei)=nai
-medamou=.]]
-
-[Footnote 109: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's reasoning against the Materialists.]
-
-Let us now look at Plato's argument, and his definition of
-existence, as they bear upon the doctrine of the opposing
-Materialist philosophers, whom he states to have held that bodies
-alone existed, and that the Incorporeal did not exist:--in other
-words that all real existence was concrete and particular: that
-the abstract (universals, forms, attributes) had no real
-existence, certainly no separate existence. As I before remarked,
-it is not quite clear what or how much these philosophers denied.
-But as far as we can gather from Plato's language, what they
-denied was, the existence of attributes _apart from_ a substance.
-They did not deny the existence of just and wise men, but the
-existence of justice and wisdom, apart from men real or
-supposable.
-
-[Side-note: Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made
-conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to
-Ens--comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of
-Conception besides.]
-
-In the time of Plato, distinction between the two classes of
-words, Concrete and Abstract, had not become so clearly matter of
-reflection as to be noted by two appropriate terms: in fact,
-logical terminology was yet in its first rudiments. It is
-therefore the less matter of wonder that Plato should not here
-advert to the relation between the two, or to the different sense
-in which existence might properly be predicable of both. He agrees
-with the materialists or friends of the Concrete, in affirming
-that sensible objects, Man, Horse, Tree, exist (which the
-Idealists or friends of the Abstract denied): but he differs from
-them by saying that other Objects, super-sensible and merely
-intelligible, exist also--namely, Justice, Virtue, Whiteness,
-Hardness, and other Forms or Attributes. He admits that these
-last-mentioned objects do not make themselves manifest to the
-senses; but they do make themselves manifest to the intelligence
-or the conception: and that is sufficient, in his opinion, to
-authenticate them as existent. The word _existent_, according to
-his definition (as given in this dialogue), includes not only all
-that is or may be perceived, but also all that is or may be known
-by the mind; _i.e._, understood, conceived, imagined, talked or
-reasoned about. Existent, or Ens, is thus made purely relative:
-having its root in a Subject, but ramifying by its branches in
-every direction. It bears the widest possible sense, co-extensive
-with _Object_ universally, either of perception or conception. It
-includes all fictions, as well as all (commonly called) realities.
-The conceivable and the existent become equivalent.
-
-[Side-note: Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens--they
-included only Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to
-Plato.]
-
-Now the friends of the Concrete, against whom Plato reasons, used
-the word _existent_ in a narrower sense, as comprising only the
-concretes of the sensible world. They probably admitted the
-existence of the abstract, along with and particularised in the
-concrete: but they certainly denied the _separate_ existence of
-the Abstract--_i.e._, of Forms, Attributes, or classes, apart from
-particulars. They would not deny that many things were
-conceivable, more or less dissimilar from the realities of the
-sensible world: but they did not admit that all those conceivable
-things ought to be termed existent or realities, and put upon the
-same footing as the sensible world. They used the word _existent_
-to distinguish between Men, Horses, Trees, on the one hand--and
-Cyclopes, Centaurs, [Greek: Trage/laphoi], &c., on the other. A
-Centaur is just as intelligible and conceivable as either a man or
-a horse; and according to this definition of Plato, would be as
-much entitled to be called really existent. The attributes of
-_man_ and _horse_ are real, because the objects themselves are
-real and perceivable: the class _man_ and the class _horse_ is
-real, for the same reason: but the attributes of a Centaur, and
-the class Centaurs, are not real, because no individuals
-possessing the attributes, or belonging to the class, have ever
-been perceived, or authenticated by induction. Plato's Materialist
-opponents would here have urged, that if he used the word
-_existent_ or Ens in so wide a sense, comprehending all that is
-conceivable or nameable, fiction as well as reality--they would
-require some other words to distinguish fiction from
-reality--Centaur from Man: which is what most men mean when they speak
-of one thing as non-existent, another thing as existent. At any rate,
-here is an equivocal sense of the word Ens--a wider and a narrower
-sense--which, we shall find frequently perplexing us in the
-ancient metaphysics; and which, when sifted, will often prove,
-that what appears to be a difference of doctrine, is in reality
-little more than a difference of phraseology.[110]
-
-[Footnote 110: Plato here aspires to deliver one definition of
-Ens, applying to all cases. The contrast between him and Aristotle
-is shown in the more cautious procedure of the latter, who
-entirely renounces the possibility of giving any one definition
-fitting all cases. Aristotle declares Ens to be an equivocal word
-([Greek: o(mo/numon]), and discriminates several different
-significations which it bears: all these significations having
-nevertheless an analogical affinity, more or less remote, with
-each other. See Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. 1017, a. 7, seq.;
-vi. 1028, a. 10.
-
-It is declared by Aristotle to be the question first and most
-disputed in Philosophia Prima, Quid est Ens? [Greek: kai\ de\ kai\
-to\ pa/lai te kai\ nu=n kai\ a)ei\ zetou/menon kai\ a)ei\
-a)porou/menon, tou=to e)sti, ti/s e( ou)si/a] (p. 1028, b. 2).
-Compare, B. 1001, a. 6, 31.
-
-This subject is well treated by Brentano, in his Dissertation
-Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden im Aristoteles. See pp. 49-50
-seq., of that work.
-
-Aristotle observes truly, that these most general terms are the
-most convenient hiding-places for equivocal meaning (Anal. Post.
-ii. 97, b. 29).
-
-The analogical varieties of Ens or Essence are graduated,
-according to Aristotle: Complete, Proper, typical, [Greek:
-ou)si/a], stands at the head: there are then other varieties more
-or less approaching to this proper type: some of them which
-[Greek: mikro\n e)\ ou)the\n e)/chei tou= o)/ntos.] (Metaphys. vi.
-1029, b. 9.)]
-
-[Side-note: Different definitions of Ens--by Plato--the
-Materialists, the Idealists.]
-
-This enquiry respecting Ens is left by Plato professedly
-unsettled; according to his very frequent practice. He pretends
-only to have brought it to this point: that Ens or the Existent is
-shown to present as many difficulties and perplexities as Non-Ens
-or the non-existent.[111] I do not think that he has shown thus
-much; for, according to his definition, Non-Ens is an
-impossibility: the term is absolutely unmeaning: it is equivalent
-to the Unknowable or Inconceivable--as Parmenides affirmed it to
-be. But he has undoubtedly shown that Ens is in itself perplexing:
-which, instead of lightening the difficulties about Non-Ens,
-aggravates them: for all the difficulties about Ens must be
-solved, before you can pretend to understand Non-Ens. Plato has
-shown that Ens is used in three different meanings:--
-
-1. According to the Materialists, it means only the concrete and
-particular, including all the attributes thereof, essential and
-accidental.
-
-2. According to the Idealists or friends of Forms, it means only
-Universals, Forms, and Attributes.
-
-3. According to Plato's own definition here given, it means both
-the one and the other: whatever the mind can either perceive or
-conceive: whatever can act upon the mind in any way, or for any
-time however short. It is therefore wholly relative to the mind:
-yet not exclusively to the _perceiving_ mind (as the Materialists
-said), nor exclusively to the _conceiving_ mind (as the friends of
-Forms said): but to both alike.
-
-[Footnote 111: Plato, Sophist. p. 250 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's views about Non-Ens examined.]
-
-Here is much confusion, partly real but principally verbal, about
-Ens. Plato proceeds to affirm, that the difficulty about Non-Ens
-is no greater, and that it admits of being elucidated. The higher
-Genera or Forms (he says) are such that some of them will combine
-or enter into communion with each other, wholly or partially,
-others will not, but are reciprocally exclusive. Motion and Rest
-will not enter into communion, but mutually exclude each other:
-neither of them can be predicated of the other. But each or both
-of them will enter into communion with Existence, which latter may
-be predicated of both. Here are three Genera or Forms: motion,
-rest, and existence. Each of them is the _same_ with itself, and
-_different_ from the other two. Thus we have two new distinct
-Forms or Genera--_Same_ and _Different_--which enter into
-communion with the preceding three, but are in themselves distinct
-from them.[112] Accordingly you may say, motion _partakes_ of (or
-enters into communion with) Diversum, because motion differs from
-rest: also you may say, motion _partakes_ of Idem, as being
-identical with itself: but you cannot say, motion _is_ different,
-motion _is_ the same; because the subject and the predicate are
-essentially distinct and not identical.[113]
-
-[Footnote 112: In the Timaeus (pp. 35-36-37), Plato declares these
-three elements--[Greek: Tau)to/n, Tha/teron, Ou)si/a]--to be the
-three constituent elements of the cosmical soul, and of the human
-rational soul.]
-
-[Footnote 113: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B.
-
-[Greek: Mete/cheton me\n a)/mpho (ki/nesis kai\ sta/sis) tau)tou=
-kai\ thate/rou. . . .]
-
-[Greek: Me\ toi/nun le/gomen ki/nesin g' _ei)=nai_ tau)to\n e)\
-tha/teron, med' au)= sta/sin.] He had before said--[Greek: A)ll'
-ou)/ ti me\n ki/nesi/s ge kai\ sta/sis ou)th' e(/teron ou)/te
-tau)to/n _e)stin_] (p. 255 A).
-
-Plato here says, It is true that [Greek: ki/nesis _mete/chei_
-tau)tou=], but it is not true that [Greek: ki/nesi/s e)sti
-tau)to/n]. Again, p. 259 A. [Greek: to\ me\n e(/teron metascho\n
-tou= o)/ntos _e)/sti_ me\n dia\ tau/ten te\n me/thexin, ou) me\n
-e)kei=no/ ge ou)= mete/schen a)ll' e(/teron.] He understands,
-therefore, that [Greek: e)sti], when used as copula, implies
-identity between the predicate and the subject.
-
-This is the same point of view from which Antisthenes looked, when
-he denied the propriety of saying [Greek: A)/nthropo/s _e)stin_
-a)gatho/s--A)/nthropo/s _e)sti_ kako/s]: and when he admitted only
-identical propositions, such as [Greek: A)/nthropo/s _e)stin_
-a)/nthropos--A)/gatho/s _e)stin_ a)gatho/s.] He assumed that
-[Greek: e)sti], when intervening between the subject and the
-predicate, implies identity between them; and the same assumption
-is made by Plato in the passage now before us. Whether Antisthenes
-would have allowed the proposition--[Greek: A)/nthropos
-_mete/chei_ kaki/as], or other propositions in which [Greek:
-e)sti] does not appear as copula, we do not know enough of his
-opinions to say.
-
-Compare Aristotel. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 27, with the Scholia of
-Simplikius, p. 330, a. 331, b. 18-28, ed. Brandis.]
-
-Some things are always named or spoken of _per se_, others with
-reference to something else. Thus, Diversum is always different
-from something else: it is relative, implying a correlate.[114] In
-this, as well as in other points, Diversum (or Different) is a
-distinct Form, Genus, or Idea, which runs through all other things
-whatever. Each thing is different from every other thing: but it
-differs from them, not through any thing in its own nature, but
-because it partakes of the Form or Idea of Diversum or the
-Different.[115] So, in like manner, the Form or Idea of Idem (or
-Same) runs through all other things: since each thing is both
-different from all others, and is also the same with itself.
-
-[Footnote 114: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 C-D. [Greek: to=n o)/nton
-ta\ me\n au)ta\ kath' au(ta/, ta/ de\ pro\s a)/llela a)ei\
-_le/gesthai_ . . . To\ d' e(/teron a)ei\ pro\s e(/teron . . . Nu=n
-de\ a)techno=s e(mi=n o(/, ti per a)\n e(/teron e)=|, sumbe/beken
-e)x a)na/gkes _e(te/rou tou=to o(/per e)sti\n ei)=nai_.] These
-last words partly anticipate Aristotle's explanation of [Greek:
-ta\ pro/s ti] (Categor. p. 6, a. 38).
-
-Here we have, for the first time so far as I know (certainly
-anterior to Aristotle), names _relative_ and _non-relative_,
-distinguished as classes, and contrasted with each other. It is to
-be observed that Plato here uses [Greek: le/gesthai] and [Greek:
-ei)=nai] as equivalent; which is not very consistent with the
-sense which he assigns to [Greek: e)stin] in predication: see the
-note immediately preceding.]
-
-[Footnote 115: Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. [Greek: pe/mpton de\ te\n
-thate/rou phu/sin lekte/on e)n toi=s ei)/desin ou)=san, e)n oi(=s
-proairou/metha . . . kai\ dia\ pa/nton ge au)te\n au)to=n
-phe/somen ei)=nai dieleluthui=an; e(\n e(/kaston ga\r e(/teron
-ei)=nai to=n a)/llon ou) dia\ te\n au(tou= phu/sin, a)lla\ dia\
-to\ _mete/chein te=s i)de/as te=s thate/rou_.]]
-
-[Side-note: His review of the select Five Forms.]
-
-Now motion is altogether different from rest Motion therefore _is
-not_ rest. Yet still motion _is_, because it partakes of existence
-or Ens. Accordingly, motion both _is_ and _is not_.
-
-Again, motion is different from Idem or the Same. It is therefore
-_not the same_. Yet still motion _is the same_; because every
-thing partakes of identity, or is the same with itself. Motion
-therefore both _is_ the same and _is not_ the same. We must not
-scruple to advance both these propositions. Each of them stands on
-its own separate ground.[116] So also motion is different from
-Diversum or The Different; in other words, it _is not_ different,
-yet still it _is_ different. And, lastly, motion is different from
-Ens, in other words, _it is not Ens_, or is non-Ens: yet still _it
-is Ens_, because it partakes of existence. Hence motion is both
-Ens, and Non-Ens.
-
-[Footnote 116: Plato, Sophist. pp. 255-256.]
-
-Here we arrive at Plato's explanation of Non-Ens, [Greek: to\ me\
-o)\n]: the main problem which he is now setting to himself.
-Non-Ens is equivalent to, _different from Ens_. It is the Form or Idea
-of Diversum, considered in reference to Ens. Every thing is Ens,
-or partakes of entity, or existence. Every thing also is different
-from Ens, or partakes of difference in relation to Ens: it is thus
-Non-Ens. Every thing therefore is at the same time both Ens, and
-Non-Ens. Nay, Ens itself, inasmuch as it is different from all
-other things, is Non-Ens in reference to them. It is Ens only as
-one, in reference to itself: but it is Non-Ens an infinite number
-of times, in reference to all other things.[117]
-
-[Footnote 117: Plato, Sophist. pp. 256-257.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's doctrine--That Non-Ens is nothing more than
-different from Ens.]
-
-When we say Non-Ens, therefore (continues Plato), we do not mean
-any thing _contrary_ to Ens, but merely something _different from_
-Ens. When we say _Not-great_, we nothing do not mean any thing
-contrary to Great, but only something different from great. The
-negative generally, when annexed to any name, does not designate
-any thing contrary to what is meant by that name, but something
-different from it. The general nature or Form of difference is
-disseminated into a multitude of different parts or varieties
-according to the number of different things with which it is
-brought into communion: _Not-great_, _Not-just_, &c., are specific
-varieties of this general nature, and are just as much realities
-as _great_, _just_. And thus Non-Ens is just as much a reality as
-Ens being not contrary, but only that variety of the general
-nature of difference which corresponds to Ens. _Non-Ens_,
-_Not-great_, _Not-just_, &c., are each of them permanent Forms,
-among the many other Forms or Entia, having each a true and
-distinct nature of its own.[118]
-
-[Footnote 118: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 C. [Greek: o(/ti to\ me\
-o)\n bebai/os e)sti\ te\n au)tou= phu/sin e)/chon . . . ou(/to de\
-kai\ to\ me\ o)\n kata\ tau)to\n e)=n te kai\ e)/stin me\ o)/n,
-e)na/rithmon to=n pollo=n o)/nton ei)=dos e(/n.]]
-
-I say nothing about contrariety (concludes Plato), or about any
-thing contrary to Ens; nor will I determine whether Non-Ens in
-this sense be rationally possible or not. What I mean by Non-Ens
-is a particular case under the general doctrine of the communion
-or combination of Forms: the combination of Ens with Diversum,
-composing that which is different from Ens, and which is therefore
-Non-Ens. Thus Ens itself, being different from all other Forms, is
-Non-Ens in reference to them all, or an indefinite number of
-times[119] (_i.e._ an indefinite number of negative predications
-may be made concerning it).
-
-[Footnote 119: Plato, Sophist. pp. 258 E-259 A. [Greek: e(mei=s
-ga\r peri\ me\n e)nanti/ou tino\s au)to=| (to=| o)/nti) chai/rein
-pa/lai le/gomen, ei)/t' e)/stin ei)/te me\ lo/gon e)/chon e)\ kai\
-panta/pasin a)/logon; o(\ de\ nu=n ei)re/kamen ei)=nai to\ me\
-o)/n], &c.]
-
-Non-Ens being thus shown to be one among the many other Forms,
-disseminated among all the others, and entering into communion
-with Ens among the rest--we have next to enquire whether it enters
-into communion with the Form of Opinion and Discourse. It is the
-communion of the two which constitutes false opinion and false
-proposition: if therefore such communion be possible, false
-opinion and false proposition are possible, which is the point
-that Plato is trying to prove.[120]
-
-[Footnote 120: Plato, Sophist. p. 260 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Communion of Non-Ens with proposition--possible and
-explicable.]
-
-Now it has been already stated (continues Plato) that some Forms
-or Genera admit of communion with each other, others do not. In
-like manner some words admit of communion with each other--not
-others. Those alone admit of communion, which, when put together,
-make up a proposition significant or giving information respecting
-Essence or Existence. The smallest proposition must have a noun
-and a verb put together: the noun indicating the agent, the verb
-indicating the act. Every proposition must be a proposition
-concerning something, or must have a logical subject: every
-proposition must also be of a certain quality. Let us take (he
-proceeds) two simple propositions: _Theaetetus is sitting
-down_--_Theaetetus is flying._[121] Of both these two, the subject is
-the same: but the first is true, the second is false. The first gives
-things existing as they are, respecting the subject: the second
-gives respecting the subject, things different from those
-existing, or in other words things non-existent, as if they did
-exist.[122] A false proposition is that which gives things
-different as if they were the same, and things non-existent as if
-they were existent, respecting the subject.[123]
-
-[Footnote 121: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 A. [Greek: Theai/tetos
-ka/thetai . . . Theai/tetos pe/tetai.]]
-
-[Footnote 122: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B. [Greek: le/gei de\
-au)to=n] ([Greek: to=n lo/gon] of the two propositions) [Greek: o(
-me\n a)lethe\s ta\ o)/nta, o(s e)sti peri\ sou= . . . O( de\ de\
-pseude\s e(/tera to=n o)/nton . . . Ta\ me\ o)/nt' a)/ra o(s
-o)/nta le/gei . . . O)/nton de/ ge o)/nta e(/tera peri\ sou=.
-Polla\ me\n ga\r e)/phamen o)/nta peri\ e(/kaston ei)=nai/ pou,
-polla\ de\ ou)k o)/nta.]]
-
-[Footnote 123: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D. [Greek: Peri\ de\ sou=
-lego/mena me/ntoi tha/tera o(s ta\ au)ta/, kai\ me\ o)/nta o(s
-o)/nta, panta/pasin, o(s e)/oiken, e( toiau/te su/nthesis e)/k te
-r(ema/ton gignome/ne kai\ o)noma/ton o)/ntos te kai\ a)letho=s
-gi/gnesthai lo/gos pseude/s.]
-
-It is plain that this explanation takes no account of negative
-propositions: it applies only to affirmative propositions.]
-
-[Side-note: Imperfect analysis of a proposition--Plato does not
-recognise the predicate.]
-
-The foregoing is Plato's explanation of Non-Ens. Before we remark
-upon it, let us examine his mode of analysing a proposition. He
-conceives the proposition as consisting of a noun and a verb. The
-noun marks the logical _subject_, but he has no technical word
-equivalent to _subject_: his phrase is, that a proposition must be
-_of something_ or _concerning something_. Then again, he not only
-has no word to designate the predicate, but he does not even seem
-to conceive the predicate as distinct and separable: it stands
-along with the copula embodied in the verb. The two essentials of
-a proposition, as he states them, are--That it should have a
-certain subject--That it should be of a certain quality, true or
-false.[124] This conception is just, as far as it goes: but it
-does not state all which ought to be known about proposition, and
-it marks an undeveloped logical analysis. It indicates moreover
-that Plato, not yet conceiving the predicate as a distinct
-constituent, had not yet conceived the copula as such: and
-therefore that the substantive verb [Greek: e)/stin] had not yet
-been understood by him in its function of pure and simple copula.
-The idea that the substantive verb when used in a proposition must
-mark _existence_ or _essence_, is sufficiently apparent in several
-of his reasonings.
-
-[Footnote 124: Since the time of Aristotle, the _quality_ of a
-proposition has been understood to designate its being either
-affirmative or negative: that being _formal_, or belonging to its
-form only. Whether affirmative or negative, it may be true or
-false: and this is doubtless a _quality_, but belonging to its
-matter, not to its form. Plato seems to have taken no account of
-the formal distinction, _negative_ or _affirmative_.]
-
-I shall now say a few words on Plato's explanation of Non-Ens. It
-is given at considerable length, and was, in the judgment of
-Schleiermacher, eminently satisfactory to Plato himself. Some of
-Plato's expressions[125] lead me to suspect that his satisfaction
-was not thus unqualified: but whether he was himself satisfied or
-not, I cannot think that the explanation ought to satisfy others.
-
-[Footnote 125: Plato, Sophistes, p. 259 A-B. Schleiermacher,
-Einleitung zum Sophistes, vol. iv. p. 134, of his translation of
-Plato.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not
-satisfactory--Objections to it.]
-
-Plato here lays down the position--That the word _Not_ signifies
-nothing more than difference, with respect to that other word to
-which it is attached. It does not signify (he says) what is
-contrary; but simply what is different. _Not-great_,
-_Not-beautiful_--mean what is different from great or beautiful:
-Non-Ens means, not what is contrary to Ens, but simply what is
-different from Ens.
-
-First, then, even if we admit that Non-Ens has this latter meaning
-and nothing beyond--yet when we turn to Plato's own definition of
-Ens, we shall find it so all-comprehensive, that there can be
-absolutely nothing different from Ens:--these last words can have
-no place and no meaning. Plato defines Ens so as to include all
-that is knowable, conceivable, thinkable.[126] One portion of this
-total differs from another: but there can be nothing which differs
-from it all. The Form or nature of Diversum (to use Plato's
-phrase) as it is among the knowable or conceivable, is already
-included in the total of Ens, and comes into communion (according
-to the Platonic phraseology) with one portion of that total as
-against another portion. But with Ens as a whole, it cannot come
-into communion, for there is nothing apart from Ens. Whenever we
-try to think of any thing apart from Ens, we do by the act of
-thought include it in Ens, as defined by Plato. _Different from
-great_--_different from white_ (_i.e._ not great, not white, sensu
-Platonico) is very intelligible: but _Different from Ens_, is not
-intelligible: there is nothing except the inconceivable and
-incomprehensible: the words professing to describe it, are mere
-unmeaning sound. Now this is just[127] what Parmenides said about
-Non-Ens. Plato's definition of Ens appears to me to make out the
-case of Parmenides about Non-Ens; and to render the Platonic
-explanation--_different from Ens_--open to quite as many
-difficulties, as those which attach to Non-Ens in the ordinary
-sense.
-
-[Footnote 126: Plato, Sophist. pp. 247-248.]
-
-[Footnote 127: Compare Kratylus, 430 A.]
-
-Secondly, there is an objection still graver against Plato's
-explanation. When he resolves negation into an affirmation of
-something different from what is denied, he effaces or puts out of
-sight one of the capital distinctions of logic. What he says is
-indeed perfectly true: _Not-great_, _Not-beautiful_, _Non-Ens_,
-are respectively different from _great_, _beautiful_, _Ens_. But
-this, though true, is only a part of the truth; leaving unsaid
-another portion of the truth which, while equally essential, is at
-the same time special and characteristic. The negative not only
-differs from the affirmative, but has such peculiar meaning of its
-own, as to exclude the affirmative: both cannot be true together.
-_Not-great_ is certainly different from _great_: so also, _white_,
-_hard_, _rough_, _just_, _valiant_, &c, are all different from
-_great_. But there is nothing in these latter epithets to exclude
-the co-existence of great. _Theaetetus is great_--_Theaetetus is
-white_; in the second of these two propositions I affirm something
-respecting Theaetetus quite different from what I affirm in the
-first, yet nevertheless noway excluding what is affirmed in the
-first.[128] The two propositions may both be true. But when I
-say--_Theaetetus is dead_--_Theaetetus is not dead_: here are two
-propositions which cannot both be true, from the very form of the
-words. To explain _not-great_, as Plato does, by saying that it
-means _only_ something different from great,[129] is to suppress
-this peculiar meaning and virtue of the negative, whereby it
-simply excludes the affirmative, without affirming any thing in
-its place. Plato is right in saying that _not-great_ does not
-affirm the _contrary_ of great, by which he means _little_.[130]
-The negative does not affirm any thing: it simply denies. Plato
-seems to consider the negative as a species of affirmative:[131]
-only affirming something different from what is affirmed by the
-term which it accompanies. Not-Great, Not-Beautiful, Not-Just--he
-declares to be Forms just as real and distinct as Great,
-Beautiful, Just: only different from these latter. This, in my
-opinion, is a conception logically erroneous. Negative stands
-opposed to affirmative, as one of the modes of distributing both
-terms and propositions. A purely negative term cannot stand alone
-in the subject of a proposition: _Non-Entis nulla sunt
-praedicata_--was the scholastic maxim. The apparent exceptions to
-this rule arise only from the fact, that many terms negative in
-their form have taken on an affirmative signification.
-
-[Footnote 128: Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenides (p.
-281, p. 785, Stallbaum), says, with reference to the doctrine laid
-down by Plato in the Sophistes, [Greek: o(/los ga\r ai(
-a)potha/seis e)ggonoi/ ei)si te=s e(tero/tetos te=s noera=s; dia\
-tou=to ga\r _ou)ch i(/ppos_, o(/ti e(/teron--kai\ dia\ tou=to
-_ou)k a)/nthropos_, o(/ti a)/llo.]
-
-Proklus here adopts and repeats Plato's erroneous idea of the
-negative proposition and its function. When I deny that Caius is
-just, wise, &c., my denial does not intimate simply that I know
-him to be something _different_ from just, wise; for he may have
-fifty _different_ attributes, co-existent and consistent with
-justice and wisdom.
-
-To employ the language of Aristotle (see a pertinent example,
-Physic. i. 8, 191, b. 15, where he distinguishes [Greek: to\ me\
-o)\n kath' au(to\] from [Greek: to\ me\ o)\n kata\ sumbebeko/s]),
-we may say that it is not of the essence of the Different to deny
-or exclude that from which it is different: the Different may deny
-or exclude, but that is only by _accident_--[Greek: kata\
-sumbebeko/s]. Plato includes, in the essence of the Different,
-that which belongs to it only by accident.
-
-Aristotle in more than one place distinguishes [Greek: diaphora\]
-from [Greek: e)nanti/osis]--not always in the same language. In
-Metaphysic. I. p. 1055 a. 33, he considers that the root of all
-[Greek: e)nanti/osis] is [Greek: e(/xis] and [Greek: ste/resis],
-understood in the widest sense, _i.e._ affirmative and negative.
-See Bonitz, not. ad loc., and Waitz, ad Categor. p. 12, a. 26. The
-last portion of the treatise [Greek: Peri\ E(rmenei/as] was
-interpreted by Syrianus with a view to uphold Plato's opinion here
-given in the Sophistes (Schol. ad Aristot. p. 136, a. 15
-Brandis).]
-
-[Footnote 129: Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. [Greek: ou)k e)nanti/on
-e)kei/no| semai/nousa, a)lla\ _tosou=ton mo/non_, e(/teron
-e)kei/nou.]
-
-If we look to the Euthydemus we shall see that this confusion
-between what is different from A, and what is incompatible with or
-exclusive of A, is one of the fallacies which Plato puts into the
-mouth of the two Sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, whom he
-exhibits and exposes in that dialogue. [Greek: A)/llo ti ou)=n
-e(/teros, e)= d' o(/s] (Dionysodorus), [Greek: o)\n li/thou, ou)
-li/thos ei)=? kai\ e(/teros o)\n chrusou=, ou) chruso\s ei)=?
-E)/sti tau=ta. Ou)kou=n kai\ o( Chaire/demos, e)/phe, e(/teros
-o)\n patro/s, ou)k a)\n pate\r ei)/e?] (Plat. Euthydem. p. 298
-A).]
-
-[Footnote 130: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B.]
-
-[Footnote 131: Plato, Sophist. pp. 257 E, 258 A.
-
-[Greek: O)/ntos de\ pro\s o)\n a)nti/thesis, o(s e)/oik', ei)=nai
-xumbai/nei to\ _me\ kalo/n_. . . .
-
-O(moi/os a)/ra to\ me\ me/ga, kai\ to\ me/ga au)to\ _ei)=nai_
-lekte/on.]
-
-Plato distinctly recognises here Forms or Ideas [Greek: to=n
-a)popha/seon], which the Platonists professed not to do, according
-to Aristotle, Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13--see the instructive Scholia
-of Alexander, p. 565, a. Brandis.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical
-maxim of contradiction.]
-
-The view which Plato here takes of the negative deserves the
-greater notice, because, if it were adopted, what is called the
-maxim of contradiction would be divested of its universality.
-Given a significant proposition with the same subject and the same
-predicate, each taken in one and the same signification--its
-affirmative and its negative cannot both be true. But if by the
-negative, you mean to make a new affirmation, different from that
-contained in the affirmative--the maxim just stated cannot be
-broadly maintained as of universal application: it may or may not
-be valid, as the case happens to stand. The second affirmation may
-be, as a matter of fact, incompatible with the first: but this is
-not to be presumed, from the mere fact that it is different from
-the first: proof must be given of such incompatibility.
-
-[Side-note: Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by
-Plato--How do we know that one is true, the other false?]
-
-We may illustrate this remark by looking at the two propositions
-which Plato gives as examples of true and false. _Theaetetus is
-sitting down_--_Theaetetus is flying_. Both the examples are of
-affirmative propositions: and it seems clear that Plato, in all
-this reasoning, took no account of negative propositions: those
-which simply deny, affirming nothing. The second of these
-propositions (says Plato) affirms _what is not_, as if it were,
-respecting the subject But how do we know this to be so? In the
-form of the second proposition there is nothing to show it: there
-is no negation of any thing, but simply affirmation of a different
-positive attribute. Although it happens, in this particular case,
-that the two attributes are incompatible, and that the affirmation
-of the one includes the negation of the other--yet there is
-nothing in the form of either proposition to deny the other:--no
-formal incompatibility between them. Both are alike affirmative,
-with the same subject, but different predicates. These two
-propositions therefore do not serve to illustrate the real nature
-of the negative, which consists precisely in this formal
-incompatibility. The proper negative belonging to the
-proposition--_Theaetetus is sitting down_--would be, _Theaetetus
-is not sitting down_. Plato ought to maintain, if he followed out
-his previous argument, that Not-Sitting down is as good a Form as
-Sitting-down, and that it meant merely--Different from Sitting down.
-But instead of doing this Plato gives us a new affirmative proposition,
-which, besides what it affirms, conceals an implied negation of the
-first proposition. This does not serve to illustrate the purpose
-of his reasoning--which was to set up the formal negative as a new
-substantive attribute, different from its corresponding
-affirmative. As between the two, the maxim of contradiction
-applies: both cannot be true. But as between the two propositions
-given in Plato, that maxim has no application: they are two
-propositions with the same subject, but different predicates;
-which happen in this case to be, the one true, the other false--but
-which are not formally incompatible. The second is not false
-because it differs from the first; it has no essential connection
-with the first, and would be equally false, even if the first were
-false also.
-
-The function of the negative is to deny. Now denial is not a
-species of affirmation, but the reversal or antithesis of
-affirmation: it nullifies a belief previously entertained, or
-excludes one which might otherwise be entertained,--but it affirms
-nothing. In particular cases, indeed, the denial of one thing may
-be tantamount to the affirmation of another: for a man may know
-that there are only two suppositions possible, and that to shut
-out the one is to admit the other. But this is an inference drawn
-in virtue of previous knowledge possessed and contributed by
-himself: another man without such knowledge would not draw the
-same inference, nor could he learn it from the negative
-proposition _per se_. Such then is the genuine meaning of the
-negative; from which Plato departs, when he tells us that the
-negative is a kind of affirmation, only affirming something
-different--and when he illustrates it by producing two affirmative
-propositions respecting the same subject, affirming different
-attributes, the one as matter of fact incompatible with the other.
-
-[Side-note: Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense.]
-
-But how do we know that the first proposition--_Theaetetus is
-sitting down_--affirms what is:--and that the second
-proposition--_Theaetetus is flying_--affirms what is not? If present,
-our senses testify to us the truth of the first, and the falsehood
-of the second: if absent, we have the testimony of a witness, combined
-with our own past experience attesting the frequency of facts
-analogous to the one, and the non-occurrence of facts analogous to
-the other. When we make the distinction, then,--we assume that
-what is attested by sense or by comparisons and inductions from
-the facts of sense, is real, or _is_: and that what is merely
-conceived or imagined, without the attestation of sense (either
-directly or by way of induction), is not real, or _is not_. Upon
-this assumption Plato himself must proceed, when he takes it for
-granted, as a matter of course, that the first proposition is
-true, and the second false. But he forgets that this assumption
-contradicts the definition which, in this same dialogue,[132] he
-had himself given of Ens--of the real or _the thing that is_. His
-definition was so comprehensive, as to include not only all that
-could be seen or felt, but also all that had capacity to be known
-or conceived by the mind: and he speaks very harshly of those who
-admit the reality of things perceived, but refuse to admit equal
-reality to things only conceived. Proceeding then upon this
-definition, we can allow no distinction as to truth or falsehood
-between the two propositions--_Theaetetus is sitting
-down_--_Theaetetus is flying_: the predicate of the second affirms
-what is, just as much as the predicate of the first: for it affirms
-something which, though neither perceived nor perceivable by
-sense, is distinctly conceivable and conceived by the mind. When
-Plato takes for granted the distinction between the two, that the
-first affirms _what is_, and the second _what is not_--he
-unconsciously slides into that very recognition of the testimony
-of sense (in other words, of fact and experience), as the
-certificate of reality, which he had so severely denounced in the
-opposing materialist philosophers: and upon the ground of which he
-thought himself entitled, not merely to correct them as mistaken,
-but to reprove them as wicked and impudent.[133]
-
-[Footnote 132: Plato, Sophist. pp. 247 D-E, 248 D-E.]
-
-[Footnote 133: Plato, Sophist. p. 246 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Errors of Antisthenes--depended partly on the imperfect
-formal logic of that day.]
-
-I have thus reviewed a long discussion--terminating in a
-conclusion which appears to me unsatisfactory--of the meaning and
-function of the negative. I hardly think that Plato would have
-given such an explanation of it, if he had had the opportunity of
-studying the Organon of Aristotle. Prior to Aristotle, the
-principles and distinctions of formal logic were hardly at
-all developed; nor can we wonder that others at that time fell
-into various errors which Plato scornfully derides, but very
-imperfectly rectifies. For example, Antisthenes did not admit the
-propriety of any predication, except identical, or at most
-essential, predication: the word [Greek: e)/stin] appeared to him
-incompatible with any other. But we perceive in this dialogue,
-that Plato also did not conceive the substantive verb as
-performing the simple function of copula in predication: on the
-contrary he distinguishes [Greek: e)/stin], as marking identity
-between subject and predicate--from [Greek: mete/chei], as marking
-accidental communion between the two. Again, there were men in
-Plato's day who maintained that Non-Ens ([Greek: to\ me\ o)\n])
-was inconceivable and impossible. Plato, in refuting these
-philosophers, gives a definition of Ens ([Greek: to\ o)\n]), which
-puts them in the right--fails in stating what the true negative
-is--and substitutes, in place of simple denial, a second
-affirmation to overlay and supplant the first.
-
-[Side-note: Doctrine of the Sophistes--contradicts that of other
-Platonic dialogues.]
-
-To complete the examination of this doctrine of the Sophistes,
-respecting Non-Ens, we must compare it with the doctrine on the
-same subject laid down in other Platonic dialogues. It will be
-found to contradict, very distinctly, the opinion assigned by
-Plato to Sokrates both in the Theaetetus and in the fifth Book of
-the Republic:[134] where Sokrates deals with Non-Ens in its usual
-sense as the negation of Ens: laying down the position that
-Non-Ens can be neither the object of the cognizing Mind, nor the
-object of the opining ([Greek: doxa/zon]) or cogitant Mind: that
-it is uncognizable and incogitable, correlating only with
-Non-Cognition or Ignorance. Now we find that this doctrine (of
-Sokrates, in Theaetetus and Republic) is the very same as that
-which is affirmed, in the Sophistes, to be taken up by the
-delusive Sophist: the same as that which the Eleate spends much
-ingenuity in trying to refute, by proving that Non-Ens is not the
-negation of Ens, but only that which differs from Ens, being
-itself a particular variety of Ens. It is also the same doctrine
-as is declared, both by the Eleate in the Sophistes and by
-Sokrates in the Theaetetus, to imply as an undeniable consequence,
-that the falsehood of any proposition is impossible. "A false
-proposition is that which speaks the thing that is not ([Greek:
-to\ me\ o)/n]). But this is an impossibility. You can neither
-know, nor think, nor speak, the thing that is not. You cannot know
-without knowing something: you cannot speak without speaking
-something (_i. e._ something that is)." Of this consequence--which
-is expressly announced as included in the doctrine, both by the
-Eleate in the Sophistes and by the Platonic Sokrates in the
-Theaetetus--no notice is taken in the Republic.[135]
-
-[Footnote 134: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 477-478. Theaetet. pp.
-188-189. Parmenides, pp. 160 C, 163 C. Euthydemus, p. 284 B-C.
-
-Aristotle (De Interpretat. p. 21, a. 22) briefly expresses his
-dissent from an opinion, the same as what is given in the Platonic
-Sophistes--that [Greek: to\ me\ o)/n] is [Greek: o)/n ti]. He
-makes no mention of Plato, but Ammonius in the Scholia alludes to
-Plato (p. 129, b. 20, Schol. Bekk.).
-
-We must note that the Eleate in the Sophistes states both opinions
-respecting [Greek: to\ me\ o)/n]: first that which he
-refutes--next that which he advances. The Scholiast may, therefore,
-refer to both opinions, as _stated_ in the Sophistes, though one of
-them is stated only for the purpose of being refuted.
-
-We may contrast with these views of Plato (in the Sophistes)
-respecting [Greek: to\ me\ o)/n], as not being a negation [Greek:
-tou= o)/ntos], but simply a something [Greek: e(/teron tou=
-o)/ntos], the different views of Aristotle about [Greek: to\ me\
-o)/n], set forth in the instructive Commentary of M. Ravaisson,
-Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, p. 360.
-
-"Le non-etre s'oppose a l'etre, comme sa negation: ce n'est donc
-pas, non plus que l'etre, une chose simple; et autant il y a de
-genres de l'etre, autant il faut que le non-etre ait de genres.
-Cependant l'opposition de l'etre et du non-etre, differente, en
-realite, dans chacune des categories, est la meme dans toutes par
-sa forme. Dans cette forme, le second terme n'exprime pas autre
-chose que l'absence du premier. Le rapport de l'etre et du
-non-etre consiste donc dans une pure contradiction: derniere forme
-a laquelle toute opposition doit se ramener."
-
-Aristotle seems to allude to the Sophistes, though not mentioning
-it by its title, in three passages of the Metaphysica--E. 1026, b.
-14; K. 1064, b. 29; N. 1089, a. 5 (see the note of Bonitz on the
-latter passage)--perhaps also elsewhere (see Ueberweg, pp.
-153-154). Plato replied in one way, Leukippus and Demokritus in
-another, to the doctrine of Parmenides, who banished Non-Ens as
-incogitable. Leukippus maintained that Non-Ens equivalent to
-[Greek: to\ keno/n], and that the two elements of things were
-[Greek: to\ ple=res] and [Greek: to\ keno/n], for which he used
-the expressions [Greek: de\n] and [Greek: ou)de/n]. Plato replied
-as we read in the Sophistes: thus both he and Leukippus tried in
-different ways to demonstrate a positive nature and existence for
-Non-Ens. See Aristot. Metaph. A. 985, b. 4, with the Scholia, p.
-538, Brandis. The Scholiast cites Plato [Greek: e)n te=|
-Politei/a|], which seems a mistake for [Greek: e)n to=|
-Sophi/ste|].]
-
-[Footnote 135: Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 264-265) is
-upon this point more satisfactory than the other Platonic
-commentators. He points out--not only without disguise, but even
-with emphasis--the discrepancies and contradictions between the
-doctrines ascribed to the Eleate in the Sophistes, and those
-ascribed to Sokrates in the Republic, Phaedon, and other Platonic
-dialogues. These are the main premisses upon which Socher rests
-his inference, that the Sophistes is not the composition of Plato.
-I do not admit his inference: but the premisses, as matters of
-fact, appear to me undeniable. Stallbaum, in his Proleg. to the
-Sophistes, p. 40 seq., attempts to explain away these
-discrepancies--in my opinion his remarks are obscure and
-unsatisfactory. Various other commentators, also holding the
-Sophistes to be a genuine work of Plato, overlook or extenuate
-these premisses, which they consider unfavourable to that
-conclusion. Thus Alkinous, in his [Greek: Ei)sagoge/], sets down
-the explanation of [Greek: to\ me\ o)\n] which is given in the
-Sophistes, as if it were the true and Platonic explanation, not
-adverting to what is said in the Republic and elsewhere (Alkin. c.
-35, p. 189 in the Appendix Platonica annexed to the edition of
-Plato by K. F. Hermann). The like appears in the [Greek:
-Prolego/mena te=s Pla/tonos philosophi/as]: c. 21, p. 215 of the
-same edition. Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenides, speaks
-in much the same manner about [Greek: to\ me\ o)\n]--considering
-the doctrine advanced and defended by the Eleate in the Sophistes,
-to represent the opinion of Plato (p. 785 ed. Stallbaum; see also
-the Commentary of Proklus on the Timaeus, b. iii. p. 188 E, 448 ed.
-Schneid.). So likewise Simplikius and the commentators on
-Aristotle, appear to consider it--see Schol. ad Aristotel.
-Physica, p. 332, a. 8, p. 333, b., 334, a., 343, a. 5. It is plain
-from these Scholia that the commentators were much embarrassed in
-explaining [Greek: to\ me\ o)/n]. They take the Sophistes as if it
-delivered Plato's decisive opinion upon that point (Porphyry
-compares what Plato says in the Timaeus, but not what he says in
-the Republic or in Theaetetus, p. 333, b. 25); and I think that
-they accommodate Plato to Aristotle, in such manner as to obscure
-the real antithesis which Plato insists upon in the Sophistes--I
-mean the antithesis according to which Plato excludes what is
-[Greek: e)nanti/on tou= o)/ntos] and admits only what is [Greek:
-e(/teron tou= o)/ntos].
-
-Ritter gives an account (Gesch. der Philos. part ii. pp. 288-289)
-of Plato's doctrine in the Sophistes respecting Non-Ens; but by no
-means an adequate account. K. F. Hermann also omits (Geschichte
-und System der Platonischen Philos. pp. 504-505-507) to notice the
-discrepancy between the doctrine of the Sophistes, and the
-doctrine of the Republic, and Theaetetus, respecting [Greek: to\
-me\ o)/n]--though he pronounces elsewhere that the Republic is
-among the most indisputably positive of all Plato's compositions
-(p. 536).]
-
-Again, the doctrine maintained by the Eleate in the Sophistes
-respecting Ens, as well as respecting Ideas or Forms, is in other
-ways inconsistent with what is laid down in other Platonic
-dialogues. The Eleate in the Sophistes undertakes to refute two
-different classes of opponents; first, the Materialists, of whom
-he speaks with derision and antipathy--secondly, others of very
-opposite doctrines, whom he denominates the Friends of Ideas or
-Forms, speaking of them in terms of great respect. Now by these
-Friends of Forms or Ideas, Schleiermacher conjectures that Plato
-intends to denote the Megaric philosophers. M. Cousin, and most
-other critics (except Ritter), have taken up this opinion. But to
-me it seems that Socher is right in declaring the doctrine,
-ascribed to these Friends of Ideas, to be the very same as that
-which is laid down by Plato himself in other important
-dialogues--Republic, Timaeus, Phaedon, Phaedrus, Kratylus, &c.--and
-which is generally understood as that of the Platonic Ideas.[136]
-In all these dialogues, the capital contrast and antithesis is that
-between Ens or Entia on one side, and Fientia (the transient, ever
-generated and ever perishing), on the other: between the eternal,
-unchangeable, archetypal Forms or Ideas--and the ever-changing
-flux of particulars, wherein approximative likeness of these
-archetypes is imperfectly manifested. Now it is exactly this
-antithesis which the Friends of Forms in the Sophistes are
-represented as upholding, and which the Eleate undertakes to
-refute.[137] We shall find Aristotle, over and over again,
-impugning the total separation or demarcation between Ens and
-Fientia ([Greek: ei)/de--ge/nesis--chorista/]), both as the
-characteristic dogma, and the untenable dogma, of the Platonic
-philosophy: it is exactly the same issue which the Eleate in the
-Sophistes takes with the Friends of Forms. He proves that Ens is
-just as full of perplexity, and just as difficult to understand,
-as Non-Ens:[138] whereas, in the other Platonic dialogues, Ens is
-constantly spoken of as if it were plain and intelligible. In
-fact, he breaks down the barrier between Ens and Fientia, by
-including motion, change, the moving or variable, among the world
-of Entia.[139] Motion or Change belongs to Fieri; and if it be
-held to belong to Esse also (by recognising a Form or Idea of
-Motion or Change, as in the Sophistes), the antithesis between the
-two, which is so distinctly declared in other Platonic dialogues,
-disappears.[140]
-
-[Footnote 136: Socher, p. 266; Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum
-Sophistes, p. 134; Cousin, Oeuvres de Platon, vol. xi. 517,
-notes.
-
-Schleiermacher gives this as little more than a conjecture; and
-distinctly admits that any man may easily suppose the doctrine
-ascribed to these Friends of Forms to be Plato's own
-doctrine--"Nicht zu verwundern waere es, wenn Mancher auf den Gedanken
-kaeme, Platon meinte hier sich selbst und seine eigene Lehre," &c.
-
-But most of the subsequent critics have taken up Schleiermacher's
-conjecture (that the Megarici are intended), as if it were
-something proved and indubitable.
-
-It is curious that while Schleiermacher thinks that the opinions
-of the Megaric philosophers are impugned and refuted in the
-Sophistes, Socher fancies that the dialogue was composed by a
-Megaric philosopher, not by Plato. Ueberweg (Aechtheit der Platon.
-Schr. pp. 275-277) points out as explicitly as Socher, the
-discrepancy between the Sophistes and several other Platonic
-dialogues, in respect to what is said about Forms or Ideas. But he
-draws a different inference: he infers from it a great change in
-Plato's own opinion, and he considers that the Sophistes is later
-in its date of composition than those other dialogues which it
-contradicts. I think this opinion about the late composition of
-the Sophistes, is not improbable; but the premisses are not
-sufficient to prove it.
-
-My view of the Platonic Sophistes differs from the elaborate
-criticism on it given by Steinhart (Einleitung zum Soph. p. 417
-seq.) Moreover, there is one assertion in that Einleitung which I
-read with great surprise. Steinhart not only holds it for certain
-that the Sophistes was composed after the Parmenides, but also
-affirms that it solves the difficulties propounded in the
-Parmenides--discusses the points of difficulty "in the best
-possible way" ("in der wuenschenwerthesten Weise" (pp. 470-471).
-
-I confess I cannot find that the difficulties started in the
-Parmenides are even noticed, much less solved, in the Sophistes.
-And Steinhart himself tells that the Parmenides places us in a
-circle both of persons and doctrines entirely different from those
-of the Sophistes (p. 472). It is plain also that the other
-Platonic commentators do not agree with Steinhart in finding the
-Sophistes a key to the Parmenides: for most of them (Ast, Hermann,
-Zeller, Stallbaum, Brandis, &c.) consider the Parmenides to have
-been composed at a later date than the Sophistes (as Steinhart
-himself intimates; compare his Einleitung zum Parmenides, p. 312
-seq.). Ueberweg, the most recent enquirer (posterior to
-Steinhart), regards the Parmenides as the latest of all Plato's
-compositions--if indeed it be genuine, of which he rather doubts.
-(Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift. pp. 182-183.)
-
-M. Mallet (Histoire de l'Ecole de Megare, Introd. pp. xl.-lviii.,
-Paris, 1845) differs from all the three opinions of
-Schleiermacher, Ritter, and Socher. He thinks that the
-philosophers, designated as Friends of Forms, are intended for the
-Pythagoreans. His reasons do not satisfy me.]
-
-[Footnote 137: Plato, Sophist. pp. 246 B, 248 B. The same opinion
-is advanced by Sokrates in the Republic, v. p. 479 B-C. Phaedon,
-pp. 78-79. Compare Sophist, p. 248 C with Symposion, p. 211 B. In
-the former passage, [Greek: to\ pa/schein] is affirmed of the
-Ideas: in the latter passage, [Greek: to\ pa/schein mede/n].]
-
-[Footnote 138: Plato, Sophist p. 245 E. Yet he afterwards talks of
-[Greek: to\ lampro\n tou= o)/ntos a)ei\] as contrasted with
-[Greek: to\ skoteino\n tou= me\ o)/ntos], p. 254 A, which seems
-not consistent.]
-
-[Footnote 139: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. "Ipsae ideae per se
-simplices sunt et immutabiles: sunt aeternae, ac semper fuerunt ab
-omni liberae mutatione," says Stallbaum ad Platon. Republ. v. p.
-476; see also his Prolegg. to the Parmenides, pp. 39-40. This is
-the way in which the Platonic Ideas are presented in the Timaeus,
-Republic, Phaedon, &c., and the way in which they are conceived by
-the [Greek: ei)do=n phi/loi] in the Sophistes, whom the Eleate
-seeks to confute.
-
-Zeller's chapter on Plato seems to me to represent not so much
-what we read in the separate dialogues, as the attempt of an able
-and ingenious man to bring out something like a consistent and
-intelligible doctrine which will do credit to Plato, and to soften
-down all the inconsistencies (see Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. pp.
-394-415-429 ed. 2nd).]
-
-[Footnote 140: See a striking passage about the unchangeableness
-of Forms or Ideas in the Kratylus, p. 439 D-E; also Philebus, p.
-15.
-
-In the Parmenides (p. 132 D) the supposition [Greek: ta\ ei)/de
-e)sta/nai e)n te=| phu/sei] is one of those set up by Sokrates and
-impugned by Parmenides. Nevertheless in an earlier passage of that
-dialogue Sokrates is made to include [Greek: ki/nesis] and [Greek:
-sta/sis] among the [Greek: ei)/de] (p. 129 E). It will be found,
-however, that when Parmenides comes to question Sokrates, What
-[Greek: ei)/de] do you recognise? attributes and subjects only
-(the latter with hesitation) are included: no such thing as
-actions, processes, events--[Greek: to\ poiei=n kai\ pa/schein]
-(p. 130). In Republic vii. 529 D, we find mention made of [Greek:
-to\ o)\n ta/chos] and [Greek: e( ou)=sa bradu/tes], which implies
-[Greek: ki/nesis] as among the [Greek: ei)/de]. In Theaetet. pp.
-152 D, 156 A, [Greek: ki/nesis] is noted as the constituent and
-characteristic of Fieri--[Greek: to\ gigno/menon]--which belongs
-to the domain of sensible perception, as distinguished from
-permanent and unchangeable Ens.]
-
-[Side-note: The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms
-are those who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in
-Phaedon, Republic, &c.]
-
-If we examine the reasoning of the Eleate, in the Sophistes,
-against the persons whom he calls the Friends of Forms, we shall
-see that these latter are not Parmenideans only, but also Plato
-himself in the Phaedon, Republic, and elsewhere. We shall also see
-that the ground, taken up by the Eleate, is much the same as that
-which was afterwards taken up by Aristotle against the Platonic
-Ideas. Plato, in most of his dialogues, declares Ideas, Forms,
-Entia, to be eternal substances distinct and apart from the flux
-and movement of particulars: yet he also declares, nevertheless,
-that particulars have a certain communion or participation with
-the Ideas, and are discriminated and denominated according to such
-participation. Aristotle controverts both these doctrines: first,
-the essential separation of the two, which he declares to be
-untrue: next, the participation or coming together of the two
-separate elements--which he declares to be an unmeaning fiction or
-poetical metaphor, introduced in order to elude the consequences
-of the original fallacy.[141] He maintains that the two (Entia and
-Fientia--Universals and Particulars) have no reality except in
-conjunction and implication together; though they are separable by
-reason ([Greek: lo/go| chorista\--to=| ei)nai, chorista/]) or
-abstraction, and though we may reason about them apart, and must
-often reason about them apart.[142] Now it is this implication and
-conjunction of the Universal with its particulars, which is the
-doctrine of the Sophistes, and which distinguishes it from other
-Platonic dialogues, wherein the Universal is
-transcendentalized--lodged in a separate world from particulars. No
-science or intelligence is possible (says the Eleate in the Sophistes)
-either upon the theory of those who pronounce all Ens to be constant
-and unchangeable, or upon that of those who declare all Ens to be
-fluent and variable. We must recognise both together, the constant
-and the variable, as equally real and as making up the totality of
-Ens.[143] This result, though not stated in the language which
-Aristotle would have employed, coincides very nearly with the
-Aristotelian doctrine, in one of the main points on which
-Aristotle distinguishes his own teaching from that of his master.
-
-[Footnote 141: Aristot. Metaphys. A. 991-992.]
-
-[Footnote 142: Aristot. Metaph. vi. 1038, a-b. The Scholion of
-Alexander here (p. 763, b. 36, Brandis) is clearer than Aristotle
-himself. [Greek: To\ prokei/meno/n e)sti dei=xai o(s ou)de\n to=n
-katho/lou ou)si/a e)/stin; ou)/te ga\r o( katho/lou a)/nthropos
-e)\ o( katho/lou i(/ppos, ou)/te a)/llo ou)de/n; a)ll' e(/kaston
-au)ton _dianoi/as a)po/maxi/s_ e)stin _a)po\ to=n kath' e(/kasta_
-kai\ pro/tos kai\ ma/lista legome/non ou)sio=n kai\ o(moi/oma.]]
-
-[Footnote 143: Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C-D. [Greek: To=| de\
-philoso/pho| kai\ tau=ta ma/lista timo=nti pa=sa a)na/gke dia\
-tau=ta me/te to=n e(\n e)\ kai\ ta\ polla\ ei)/de lego/nton to\
-pa=n e(steko\s a)pode/chesthai, to=n te au)= pantache=| to\ o)\n
-kinou=nton mede\ to\ para/pan a)kou/ein; a)lla\ kata\ te\n to=n
-pai/don eu)che/n, o(/sa a)ki/neta/ te kai\ kekineme/na, to\ o)/n
-te kai\ to\ pa=n, xunampho/tera le/gein.]
-
-Ritter states the result of this portion of the Sophistes
-correctly. "Es bleibt uns als Ergebniss aller dieser
-Untersuchungen ueber das Seyn, dass die Wahrheit sowohl des
-Werdens, als auch des beharrlichen Seyns, anerkannt werden muesse"
-(Geschichte der Philos. ii. p. 281).]
-
-[Side-note: The Sophistes recedes from the Platonic point of view,
-and approaches the Aristotelian.]
-
-That the Eleate in the Sophistes recedes from the Platonic point
-of view and approaches towards the Aristotelian, will be seen also
-if we look at the lesson of logic which he gives to Theaetetus. In
-his analysis of a proposition--and in discriminating such
-conjunctions of words as are significant, from such as are
-insignificant--he places himself on the same ground as that which
-is travelled over by Aristotle in the Categories and the treatise
-De Interpretatione. That the handling of the topic by Aristotle is
-much superior, is what we might naturally expect from the fact
-that he is posterior in time. But there is another difference
-between the two which is important to notice. Aristotle deals with
-this topic, as he does with every other, in the way of methodical
-and systematic exposition. To expound it as a whole, to distribute
-it into convenient portions each illustrating the others, to
-furnish suitable examples for the general principles laid down--are
-announced as his distinct purposes. Now Plato's manner is quite
-different. Systematic exposition is not his primary purpose: he
-employs it up to a certain point, but as means towards another and
-an independent purpose--towards the solution of a particular
-difficulty, which has presented itself in the course of the
-dialogue.--"_Nosti morem dialogorum._" Aristotle is demonstrative:
-Plato is dialectical. In our present dialogue (the Sophistes), the
-Eleate has been giving a long explanation of Non-Ens; an
-explanation intended to prove that Non-Ens was a particular sort
-of Ens, and that there was therefore no absurdity (though
-Parmenides had said that this was absurdity) in assuming it as a
-passable object of Cognition, Opination, Affirmation. He now goes
-a step further, and seeks to show that it is, actually and in
-fact, an object of Opination and Affirmation.[144] It is for this
-purpose, and for this purpose only, that he analyses a
-proposition, specifies the constituent elements requisite to form
-it, and distinguishes one proposition from another.
-
-[Footnote 144: Plato, Sophist. p. 261 D.]
-
-Accordingly, the Eleate,--after pointing out that neither a string
-of nouns repeated one after the other, nor a string of verbs so
-repeated, would form a significant proposition,--declares that the
-conjunction of a noun with a verb is required to form one; and
-that opination is nothing but that internal mental process which
-the words of the proposition express. The smallest proposition
-must combine a noun with a verb:--the former signifying the agent,
-the latter, the action or thing done.[145] Moreover, the
-proposition must be a proposition _of something_; and it must be
-of a certain quality. By a proposition _of something_, Plato
-means, that what is called technically the subject of the
-proposition (in his time there were no technical terms of logic)
-must be something positive, and cannot be negative: by the quality
-of the proposition, he means that it must be either true or
-false.[146]
-
-[Footnote 145: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 C.]
-
-[Footnote 146: Plato, Sophist. p. 262 E. [Greek: Lo/gon
-a)nagkai=on, o(/tan per e)=|, tino\s ei)=nai lo/gon, _me\ de/
-tinos_, a)du/naton . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ poio/n tina au)to\n ei)=nai
-dei=?] Compare p. 237 E.
-
-In the words here cited Plato unconsciously slides back into the
-ordinary acceptation of [Greek: me/ ti]: that is, to [Greek: me\]
-in the sense of negation. If we adopt that peculiar sense of
-[Greek: me/], which the Eleate has taken so much pains to prove
-just before in the case of [Greek: to\ me\ o)\n] (that is, if we
-take [Greek: me\] as signifying not negation but simply
-difference), the above argument will not hold. If [Greek: ti/s]
-signifies one subject (A), and [Greek: me/ tis] signifies simply
-another subject (B) different from A ([Greek: e(/teron]), the
-predicate [Greek: a)du/naton] cannot be affirmed. But if we take
-[Greek: me/ tis] in its proper sense of negation, the [Greek:
-a)du/naton] will be so far true that [Greek: ou)k a)/nthropos, ou)
-Theai/tetos], cannot be the subject of a proposition. Aristotle
-says the same in the beginning of the Treatise De Interpretatione
-(p. 16, a. 30).]
-
-[Side-note: Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some
-propositions true, others false.]
-
-This early example of rudimentary grammatical or logical analysis,
-recognising only the two main and principal parts of speech, is
-interesting as occurring prior to Aristotle; by whom it is
-repeated in a manner more enlarged, systematic,[147] and
-instructive. But Aristotle assumes, without proof and without
-supposing that any one will dispute the assumption--that there are
-some propositions true, other propositions false: that a name or
-noun, taken separately, is neither true nor false:[148] that
-propositions (enunciations) only can be true or false.
-
-[Footnote 147: Aristotel. De Interpr. init. with Scholia of
-Ammonius, p. 98, Bekk.]
-
-[Footnote 148: In the Kratylus of Plato Sokrates maintains that
-names may be true or false as well as propositions, pp. 385 D, 431
-B.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato in the Sophistes has undertaken an impossible
-task--He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary,
-that there _are_ false propositions.]
-
-The proceeding of Plato in the Sophistes is different. He supposes
-a Sophist who maintains that no proposition either is false or can
-be false, and undertakes to prove against him that there are false
-propositions: he farther supposes this antagonist to reject the
-evidence of sense and visible analogies, and to acknowledge no
-proof except what is furnished by reason and philosophical
-deduction.[149] Attempting, under these restrictions, to prove his
-point, Plato's Eleatic disputant rests entirely upon the peculiar
-meaning which he professes to have shown to attach to Non-Ens. He
-applies this to prove that Non-Ens may be predicated as well as
-Ens: assuming that such predication of Non-Ens constitutes a false
-proposition. But the proof fails. It serves only to show that the
-peculiar meaning ascribed by the Eleate to Non-Ens is
-inadmissible. The Eleate compares two distinct
-propositions--_Theaetetus is sitting down_--_Theaetetus is flying_. The
-first is true: the second is false. Why? Because (says the Eleate)
-the first predicates Ens, the second predicates Non-Ens, or (to
-substitute his definition of Non-Ens) another Ens different from
-the Ens predicated in the first.[150] But here the reason
-assigned, why the second proposition is false, is not the real
-reason. Many propositions may be assigned, which predicate
-attributes different from the first, but which are nevertheless
-quite as much true as the first. I have already observed, that the
-reason why the second proposition is false is, because it
-contradicts the direct testimony of sense, if the persons debating
-are spectators: if they are not spectators, then because it
-contradicts the sum total of their previous sensible experience,
-remembered, compared, and generalised, which has established in
-them the conviction that no man does or can fly. If you discard
-the testimony of sense as unworthy of credit (which Plato assumes
-the Sophist to do), you cannot prove that the second proposition
-is false--nor indeed that the first proposition is true. Plato has
-therefore failed in giving that dialectic proof which he promised.
-The Eleate is forced to rely (without formally confessing it), on
-the testimony of sense, which he had forbidden Theaetetus to
-invoke, twenty pages before.[151] The long intervening piece of
-dialectic about Ens and Non-Ens is inconclusive for his purpose,
-and might have been omitted. The proposition--_Theaetetus is
-flying_--does undoubtedly predicate attributes _which are not_ as
-if they were,[152] and is thus false. But then we must consult and
-trust the evidence of our perception: we must farther accept _are
-not_ in the ordinary sense of the words, and not in the sense
-given to them by the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistes. His attempt
-to banish the specific meaning of the negative particle, and to
-treat it as signifying nothing more than difference, appears to me
-fallacious.[153]
-
-[Footnote 149: Plato, Sophist. p. 240 A. It deserves note that
-here Plato presents to us the Sophist as rejecting the evidence of
-sense: in the Theaetetus he presents to us the Sophist as holding
-the doctrine [Greek: e)piste/me = ai)/sthesis]. How these
-propositions can both be true respecting the Sophists as a class I
-do not understand. The first may be true respecting some of them;
-the second may be true respecting others; respecting a third class
-of them, neither may be true. About the Sophists in a body there
-is hardly a single proposition which can be safely affirmed.]
-
-[Footnote 150: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 C.]
-
-[Footnote 151: Theaetetus makes this attempt and is checked by the
-Eleate, pp. 239-240. It is in p. 261 A that the Eleate begins his
-proof in refutation of the supposed Sophist--that [Greek: do/xa]
-and [Greek: lo/gos] may be false. The long interval between the
-two is occupied with the reasoning about Ens and Non-Ens.]
-
-[Footnote 152: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 E. [Greek: ta\ me\ o)/nta
-o(s o)/nta lego/mena], &c.
-
-The distinction between these two propositions, the first as true,
-the second as false (Theaetetus is sitting down, Theaetetus is
-flying), is in noway connected with the distinction which Plato
-had so much insisted upon before respecting the intercommunion of
-Forms, Ideas, General Notions, &c., that some Forms will come into
-communion with each other, while others will not (pp. 252-253).
-
-There is here no question of repugnancy or intercommunion of
-Forms: the question turns upon the evidence of vision, which
-informs us that Theaetetus is sitting down and not standing up or
-flying. If any predicate be affirmed of a subject, contrary to
-what is included in the definition of that subject, then indeed
-repugnancy of Forms might be urged.]
-
-[Footnote 153: Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B.]
-
-[Side-note: What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion.]
-
-In all reasoning, nay in all communication by speech, you must
-assume that your hearer understands the meaning of what is spoken:
-that he has the feelings of belief and disbelief, and is familiar
-with those forms of the language whereby such feelings are
-expressed: that there are certain propositions which he believes--in
-other words, which he regards as true: that there are certain
-other propositions which he disbelieves, or regards as false: that
-he has had experience of the transition from belief to disbelief,
-and _vice versa_--in other words, of having fallen into error and
-afterwards come to perceive that it was error. These are the
-mental facts realised in each man and assumed by him to be also
-realised in his neighbours, when communication takes place by
-speech. If a man could be supposed to believe nothing, and to
-disbelieve nothing;--if he had no forms of speech to express his
-belief, disbelief, affirmation, and denial--no information could
-be given, no discussion would be possible. Every child has to
-learn this lesson in infancy; and a tedious lesson it undoubtedly
-is.[154] Antisthenes (who composed several dialogues) and the
-other disputants of whom we are now speaking, must have learnt the
-lesson as other men have: but they find or make some general
-theory which forbids them to trust the lesson when learnt. It was
-in obedience to some such theory that Antisthenes discarded all
-predication except essential predication, and discarded also the
-form suited for expressing disbelief--the negative proposition:
-maintaining, That to contradict was impossible. I know no mode of
-refuting him, except by showing that his fundamental theory is
-erroneous.
-
-[Footnote 154: Aristotel. Metaphys. vii. 1043, b. 25. [Greek:
-o(/ste e( a)pori/a e(\n oi( A)ntisthe/neioi kai\ oi( ou(/tos
-_a)pai/deutoi_ e)po/roun, e)/chei tina\ kairo/n], &c.
-
-Compare respecting this paradox or [Greek: the/sis] of
-Antisthenes, the scholia of Alexander on the passage of
-Aristotle's Topica above cited, p. 259, b. 15, in Schol. Bekk.
-
-If Antisthenes admitted only identical predications, of course
-[Greek: to\ a)ntilo/gein] became impossible. I have endeavoured to
-show, in a previous note on this dialogue, that a misconception
-(occasionally shared even by Plato) of the function of the copula,
-lay at the bottom of the Antisthenean theory respecting identical
-predication. Compare Aristotel. Physic. i. p. 185, b. 28, together
-with the Scholia of Simplikius, pp. 329-330, ed. Bekk., and
-Plato, Sophistes, p. 245.]
-
-[Side-note: Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and
-disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply
-predication, which Antisthenes discarded.]
-
-Discussion and theorising can only begin when these processes,
-partly intellectual, partly emotional, have become established and
-reproducible portions of the train of mental association. As
-processes, they are common to all men. But though two persons
-agree in having expressed the feeling of belief, and in expressing
-that feeling by one form of proposition--also in having the
-feeling of disbelief, and in expressing it by another form of
-proposition--yet it does not follow that the propositions which
-these two believe or disbelieve are the same. How far such is the
-case must be ascertained by comparison--by appeal to sense,
-memory, inference from analogy, induction, feeling, consciousness,
-&c. The ground is now prepared for fruitful debate: for analysing
-the meaning, often confused and complicated, of propositions: for
-discriminating the causes, intellectual and emotional, of belief
-and disbelief, and for determining how far they harmonise in one
-mind and another: for setting out general rules as to sequence, or
-inconsistency, or independence, of one belief as compared with
-another. To a certain extent, the grounds of belief and disbelief
-in all men, and the grounds of consistency or inconsistency
-between some beliefs and others, will be found to harmonise: they
-can be embodied in methodical forms of language, and general rules
-can be laid down preventing in many cases inadvertence or
-erroneous combination. It is at this point that Aristotle takes up
-rational grammar and logic, with most profitable effect. But he is
-obliged to postulate (what Antisthenes professed to discard)
-predication, not merely identical, but also accidental as well as
-essential--together with names and propositions both negative and
-affirmative.[155] He cannot avoid postulating thus much: though he
-likewise postulates a great deal more, which ought not to be
-granted.
-
-[Footnote 155: See the remarks in Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: G].
-1005, b. 2, 1006, a. 6. He calls it [Greek: a)paideusi/a--a)paideusi/a
-to=n a)nalutiko=n]--not to be able to distinguish
-those matters which can be proved and require to be proved, from
-those matters which are true, but require no proof and are
-incapable of being proved. But this distinction has been one of
-the grand subjects of controversy from his day down to the
-present day; and between different schools of philosophers, none
-of whom would allow themselves to deserve the epithet of [Greek:
-a)pai/deutoi].
-
-Aristotle calls Antisthenes and his followers [Greek:
-a)pai/deutoi], in the passage cited in the preceding note.]
-
-[Side-note: Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated
-in the Sophistes.]
-
-The long and varied predicamental series, given in the Sophistes,
-illustrates the process of logical partition, as Plato conceived
-it, and the definition of a class-name founded thereupon. You take
-a logical whole, and you subtract from it part after part until
-you find the _quaesitum_ isolated from every thing else.[156] But
-you must always divide into two parts (he says) wherever it can be
-done: dichotomy or bipartition is the true logical partition:
-should this be impracticable, trichotomy, or division into the
-smallest attainable number of parts, must be sought for.[157]
-Moreover, the bipartition must be made according to Forms (Ideas,
-Kinds): the parts which you recognise must be not merely parts,
-but Forms: every form is a part, but every part is not a
-form.[158] Next, you must draw the line of division as nearly as
-you can through the middle of the _dividendum_, so that the parts
-on both sides may be nearly equal: it is in this way that your
-partition is most likely to coincide with forms on both sides of
-the line.[159] This is the longest way of proceeding, but the
-safest. It is a logical mistake to divide into two parts very
-unequal: you may find a form on one side of the line, but you
-obtain none on the other side. Thus, it is bad classification to
-distribute the human race into Hellenes + Barbari: the _Barbari_
-are of infinite number and diversity, having no one common form to
-which the name can apply. It is also improper to distribute Number
-into the myriad on side, and all other numbers on the other--for a
-similar reason. You ought to distribute the human race into the
-two forms, Male--Female: and number into the two, Odd--Even.[160]
-So also, you must not divide gregarious creatures into human
-beings on one side, and animals on the other; because this last
-term would comprise numerous particulars utterly disparate. Such a
-classification is suggested only by the personal feeling of man,
-who prides himself upon his intelligence. But if the
-classification were framed by any other intelligent species, such
-as Cranes,[161] they would distinguish Cranes on the one side from
-animals on the other, including Man as one among many disparate
-particulars under _animal_.
-
-[Footnote 156: Plato, Politikus, p. 268 D. [Greek: me/ros a)ei\
-me/rous a)phairoume/nous e)p' a)/kron e)phiknei=sthai to\
-zetou/menon.]
-
-Ueberweg thinks that Aristotle, when he talks of [Greek: ai(
-gegramme/nai diaire/seis] alludes to these logical distributions
-in the Sophistes and Politikus (Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp.
-153-154).]
-
-[Footnote 157: Politik. p. 287 C.]
-
-[Footnote 158: Politik. p. 263 C.]
-
-[Footnote 159: Politik. pp. 262 B, 265 A. [Greek: dei= mesotomei=n
-o(s ma/lista], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 160: Politikus, p. 262 D-E.]
-
-[Footnote 161: Politikus, p. 262 D. [Greek: semnu=non au(to\
-e(auto/], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Recommendation of logical bipartition.]
-
-The above-mentioned principle--dichotomy or bipartition into two
-equal or nearly equal halves, each resting upon a characteristic
-form--is to be applied as far as it will go. Many different
-schemes of partition upon this principle may be found, each
-including forms subordinated one to the other, descending from the
-more comprehensive to the less comprehensive. It is only when you
-can find no more parts which are forms, that you must be content
-to divide into parts which are not forms. Thus after all the
-characteristic forms, for dividing the human race, have been gone
-through, they may at last be partitioned into Hellenes and
-Barbari, Lydians and non-Lydians, Phrygians and non-Phrygians: in
-which divisions there is no guiding form at all, but only a
-capricious distribution into fractions with separate
-names[162]--meaning by _capricious_, a distribution founded on some
-feeling or circumstance peculiar to the distributor, or shared by him
-only with a few others; such as the fact, that he is himself a Lydian
-or a Phrygian, &c.
-
-[Footnote 162: Politikus, p. 262 E. [Greek: Ludou\s de\ e)\
-Phru/gas e)/ tinas e(te/rous pro\s a(/pantas ta/tton a)po/schizoi
-to/te, e(ni/ka a)poroi= ge/nos a)/ma kai\ me/ros eu(ri/skein
-e(ka/teron to=n schisthe/nton.]]
-
-[Side-note: Precepts illustrated by the Philebus.]
-
-These precepts in the Sophistes and Politikus, respecting the
-process of classification, are illustrated by an important passage
-of the Philebus:[163] wherein Plato tells us that the constitution
-of things includes the Determinate and the Indeterminate
-implicated with each other, and requiring study to disengage them.
-Between the highest One, Form, or Genus--and the lowest array of
-indefinite particulars--there exist a certain number of
-intermediate Ones or Forms, each including more or fewer of these
-particulars. The process of study or acquired cognition is brought
-to bear upon these intermediate Forms: to learn how many there
-are, and to discriminate them in themselves as well as in their
-position relative to each other. But many persons do not recognise
-this: they apprehend only the Highest One, and the Infinite Many,
-not looking for any thing between: they take up hastily with some
-extreme and vague generality, below which they know nothing but
-particulars. With knowledge thus imperfect, you do not get beyond
-contentious debate. Real, instructive, dialectic requires an
-understanding of all the intermediate forms. But in descending
-from the Highest Form downwards, you must proceed as much as
-possible in the way of bipartition, or if not, then of
-tripartition, &c.: looking for the smallest number of forms which
-can be found to cover the whole field. When no more forms can be
-found, then and not till then, you must be content with nothing
-better than the countless indeterminate particulars.
-
-[Footnote 163: Plato, Philebus, pp. 16-17.
-
-The notes of Dr. Badham upon this passage in his edition of the
-Philebus, p. 11, should be consulted as a just correction of
-Stallbaum in regard to [Greek: pe/ras] and [Greek: to=n e(\n
-e)kei/non].]
-
-This instructive passage of the Philebus--while it brings to view
-a widespread tendency of the human mind, to pass from the largest
-and vaguest generalities at once into the region of particulars,
-and to omit the distinctive sub-classes which lie
-between--illustrates usefully the drift of the Sophistes and Politikus.
-In these two last dialogues it is the method itself of good logical
-distribution which Plato wishes to impress upon his readers: the
-formal part of the process.[164] With this view, he not only makes
-the process intentionally circuitous and diversified, but also
-selects by preference matters of common sensible experience,
-though in themselves indifferent, such as the art of weaving,[165]
-&c.
-
-[Footnote 164: He states this expressly, Politik. p. 286 D.]
-
-[Footnote 165: Plato, Politik. p. 285 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Importance of founding logical Partition on
-resemblances perceived by sense.]
-
-The reasons given for this preference deserve attention. In these
-common matters (he tells us) the resemblances upon which Forms are
-founded are perceived by sense, and can be exhibited to every one,
-so that the form is readily understood and easily discriminated.
-The general terms can there be explained by reference to sense.
-But in regard to incorporeal matters, the higher and grander
-topics of discussion, there is no corresponding sensible
-illustration to consult. These objects can be apprehended only by
-reason, and described only by general terms. By means of these
-general terms, we must learn to give and receive rational
-explanations, and to follow by process of reasoning from one form
-to another. But this is more difficult, and requires a higher
-order of mind, where there are no resemblances or illustrations
-exposed to sense. Accordingly, we select the common sensible
-objects as an easier preparatory mode of a process substantially
-the same in both.[166]
-
-[Footnote 166: Plato, Politik. pp. 285 E--286 A. [Greek: tou\s
-plei/stous le/lethen o(/ti toi=s me\n to=n o)/nton r(a|di/os
-katamathei=n ai)sthetai/ tines o(moio/tetes pephu/kasin, a(\s
-ou)de\n chalepo\n delou=n, o(/tan au)to=n tis boule/the| to=|
-lo/gon ai)tou=nti peri\ tou, me\ meta\ pragma/ton a)lla\ chori\s
-lo/gou r(a|di/os e)ndei/xasthai; toi=s d' au)= megi/stois ou)=si
-kai\ timiota/tois ou)k e)/stin ei)/dolon ou)de\n pro\s tou\s
-a)nthro/pous ei)rgasme/non e)nargo=s, ou(= deichthe/ntos], &c.
-
-About the [Greek: ei)/dolon ei)rgasme/non e)nargo=s], which is
-affirmed in one of these two cases and denied in the other,
-compare a striking analogy in the Phaedrus, p. 250 A-E.]
-
-[Side-note: Province of sensible perception--is not so much
-narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theaetetus.]
-
-This explanation given by Plato, in itself just, deserves to be
-compared with his view of sensible objects as knowable, and of
-sense as a source of knowledge. I noticed in a preceding chapter
-the position which Sokrates is made to lay down in the
-Theaetetus,[167]--That ([Greek: ai)/sthesis]) sensible perception
-reaches only to the separate impressions of sense, and does not
-apprehend the likeness and other relations between them. I have
-also noticed the contrast which he establishes elsewhere between
-Esse and Fieri: _i.e._, between Ens which alone (according to him)
-is knowable, and the perpetual flux of Fientia which is not
-knowable at all, but is only matter of opinion or guess-work. Now
-in the dialogue before us, the Politikus, there is no such marked
-antithesis between opinion and knowledge. Nor is the province of
-[Greek: ai)/sthesis] so strictly confined: on the contrary, Plato
-here considers sensible perception as dealing with Entia, and as
-appreciating resemblances and other relations between them. It is
-by an attentive study and comparison of these facts of sense that
-Forms are detected. "When a man (he says) has first perceived by
-sense the points of communion between the Many, he must not desist
-from attentive observation until he has discerned in that
-communion all the differences which reside in Forms: and when he
-has looked at the multifarious differences which are visible among
-these Many, he must not rest contented until he has confined all
-such as are really cognate within one resemblance, tied together
-by the essence of one common Form."[168]
-
-[Footnote 167: Plato, Theaet. pp. 185-186. See above p. 161.]
-
-[Footnote 168: Plato, Politikus, p. 285 B. [Greek: de/on, o(/tan
-me\n te\n to=n pollo=n tis pro/teron ai)/sthetai koinoni/an, me\
-proaphi/stasthai pri\n a)\n e)n au)te=| ta\s diaphora\s i)/de|
-pa/sas o(po/sai per e)n ei)/desi kei=ntai; ta\s de\ au)=
-pantodapa\s a)nomoio/tetas, o(/tan e)n ple/thesin o)phtho=si, me\
-dunato\n ei)=nai dusopou/menon pau/esthai, pri\n a)\n xu/mpanta
-ta\ oi)kei=a e)nto\s mia=s o(moio/tetos e(/rxas ge/nous tino\s
-ou)si/a| periba/letai.]]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of the Sophistes with the Phaedrus.]
-
-These passages may be compared with others of similar import in
-the Phaedrus.[169] Plato here considers the Form, not as an Entity
-_per se_ separate from and independent of the particulars, but as
-implicated in and with the particulars: as a result reached by the
-mind through the attentive observation and comparison of
-particulars: as corresponding to what is termed in modern language
-abstraction and generalisation. The self-existent Platonic Ideas
-do not appear in the Politikus:[170] which approximates rather to
-the Aristotelian doctrine:--that is, the doctrine of the
-universal, logically distinguishable from its particulars, but
-having no reality apart from them ([Greek: chorista\ lo/go|
-mo/non]). But in other dialogues of Plato, the separation between
-the two is made as complete as possible, especially in the
-striking passages of the Republic: wherein we read that the facts
-of sense are a delusive juggle--that we must turn our back upon
-them and cease to study them--and that we must face about, away
-from the sensible world, to contemplate Ideas, the separate and
-unchangeable furniture of the intelligible world--and that the
-whole process of acquiring true Cognition, consists in passing
-from the higher to the lower Forms or Ideas, without any
-misleading illustrations of sense.[171] Here, in the Sophistes and
-Politikus, instead of having the Universal behind our backs when
-the particulars are before our faces, we see it _in and amidst_
-particulars: the illustrations of sense, instead of deluding us,
-being declared to conduce, wherever they can be had, to the
-clearness and facility of the process.[172] Here, as well as in
-the Phaedrus, we find the process of Dialectic emphatically
-recommended, but described as consisting mainly in logical
-classification of particulars, ascending and descending divisions
-and conjunctions, as Plato calls them[173]--analysis and
-synthesis. We are enjoined to divide and analyse the larger genera
-into their component species until we come to the lowest species
-which can no longer be divided: also, conversely, to conjoin
-synthetically the subordinate species until the highest genus is
-attained, but taking care not to omit any of the intermediate
-species, in their successive gradations.[174] Throughout all this
-process, as described both in the Phaedrus and in the Politikus,
-the eye is kept fixed upon the constituent individuals. The Form
-is studied in and among the particulars which it comprehends: the
-particulars are looked at in groups put together suitably to each
-comprehending Form. And in both dialogues, marked stress is laid
-upon the necessity of making the division dichotomous; as well as
-according to Forms, and not according to fractions which are not
-legitimate Forms.[175] Any other method, we are told, would be
-like the wandering of a blind man.
-
-[Footnote 169: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 249 C, 265 D-E.]
-
-[Footnote 170: This remark is made by Stallbaum in his Prolegg. ad
-Politicum, p. 81; and it is just, though I do not at all concur in
-his general view of the Politikus, wherein he represents the
-dialogue as intended to deride the Megaric philosophers.]
-
-[Footnote 171: See the Republic, v. pp. 476-479, vi. pp.
-508-510-511, and especially the memorable simile about the cave
-and the shadows within it, in Book vii. pp. 518-519, together with
-the [Greek: periagoge\] which he there prescribes--[Greek: a)po\ tou=
-gignome/nou ei)s to\ o)/n]--and the remarks respecting
-observations in astronomy and acoustics, p. 529.]
-
-[Footnote 172: Compare the passage of the Phaedrus (p. 263 A-C)
-where Plato distinguishes the sensible particulars on which men
-mostly agree, from the abstractions (Just and Unjust, &c.,
-corresponding with the [Greek: a)so/mata, ka/llista, me/gista,
-timio/tata], Politikus, p. 286 A) on which they are perpetually
-dissenting.]
-
-[Footnote 173: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 266 B. [Greek: tou/ton de\
-e)/goge au)to/s te e)raste\s to=n diaire/seon kai\ sunagogo=n
-. . . tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n . . . kalo= dialektikou/s.]
-The reason which Sokrates gives in the Phaedrus for his attachment
-to dialectics, that he may become competent in discourse and in
-wisdom ([Greek: i(/n' oi(=o/s te o)= le/gein kai\ phronei=n]), is
-the same as that which the Eleate assigns in recommendation of the
-logical exercises in the Politikus.]
-
-[Footnote 174: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 271 D, 277 B. [Greek:
-o(risa/meno/s te pa/lin kat' ei)/de me/chri tou= a)tme/tou
-te/mnein e)piste/the|.]]
-
-[Footnote 175: Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 265 E, 270 E. [Greek: e)oi/koi
-a)\n o(/sper tuphlou= porei/a|.]]
-
-What distinguishes the Sophistes and Politikus from most other
-dialogues of Plato, is, that the method of logical classification
-is illustrated by setting the classifier to work upon one or a few
-given subjects, some in themselves trivial, some important. Though
-the principles of the method are enunciated in general terms, yet
-their application to the special example is kept constantly before
-us; so that we are never permitted, much less required, to divorce
-the Universal from its Particulars.
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenides.]
-
-As a dialogue illustrative of this method, the Politikus (as I
-have already pointed out) may be compared to the Phaedrus: in
-another point of view, we shall find instruction in comparing it
-to the Parmenides. This last too is a dialogue illustrative of
-method, but of a different variety of method.
-
-[Side-note: Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of
-Plato.]
-
-What the Sophistes and Politikus are for the enforcement of
-logical classification, the Parmenides is for another part of the
-philosophising process--laborious evolution of all the
-consequences deducible from the affirmative as well as from the
-negative of every hypothesis bearing upon the problem. And we note
-the fact, that both in the Politikus and Parmenides, Plato
-manifests the consciousness that readers will complain of him as
-prolix, tiresome, and wasting ingenuity upon unprofitable
-matters.[176] In the Parmenides, he even goes the length of saying
-that the method ought only to be applied before a small and select
-audience; to most people it would be repulsive, since they cannot
-be made to comprehend the necessity for such circuitous
-preparation in order to reach truth.[177]
-
-[Footnote 176: Plato, Politikus, p. 283 B. [Greek: pro\s de\ to\
-no/sema to\ toiou=ton], and the long series of questions and
-answers which follows to show that the prolixity is unavoidable,
-pp. 285 C, 286 B-E.]
-
-[Footnote 177: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 D-E.]
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XXX.
-
-POLITIKUS.
-
-
-[Side-note: The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistes.]
-
-I have examined in the preceding sections both that which the
-Sophistes and Politikus present in common--(_viz._ a lesson, as
-well as a partial theory, of the logical processes called
-Definition and Division)--and that which Sophistes presents apart
-from the Politikus. I now advert to two matters which we find in
-the Politikus, but not in the Sophistes. Both of them will be
-found to illustrate the Platonic mode of philosophising.
-
-[Side-note: Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against
-each other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art,
-the purpose to be attained is the standard.]
-
-I. Plato assumes, that there will be critics who blame the two
-dialogues as too long and circuitous; excessive in respect of
-prolixity. In replying to those objectors,[1] he enquires, What is
-meant by long or short--excessive or deficient--great or little?
-Such expressions denote mensuration or comparison. But there are
-two varieties of mensuration. We may measure two objects one
-against the other: the first will be called great or greater, in
-relation to the second--the second will be called little or less
-in relation to the first. But we may also proceed in a different
-way. We may assume some third object as a standard, and then
-measure both the two against it: declaring the first to be great,
-greater, excessive, &c., because it exceeds the standard--and the
-second to be little, less, deficient, &c., because it falls short
-of the standard. Here then are two judgments or estimations
-altogether different from each other, and yet both denoted by the
-same words _great_ and _little_: two distinct _essences_ (in
-Platonic phrase) of great and little, or of greatness and
-littleness.[2] The art of mensuration has thus two varieties. One
-includes arithmetic and geometry, where we simply compare numbers
-and magnitudes with each other, determining the proportions
-between them: the other assumes some independent standard; above
-which is excess, and below which is deficiency. This standard
-passes by different names according to circumstances: the
-Moderate, Becoming, Seasonable, Proper, Obligatory, &c.[3] Such a
-standard is assumed in every art--in every artistic or scientific
-course of procedure. Every art has an end to be attained, a result
-to be produced; which serves as the standard whereby each
-preparatory step of the artist is measured, and pronounced to be
-either excessive or deficient, as the case may be.[4] Unless such
-a standard be assumed, you cannot have regular art or science of
-any kind; neither in grave matters, nor in vulgar matters--neither
-in the government of society, nor in the weaving of cloth.[5]
-
-[Footnote 1: The treatment of this subject begins, Politik. p. 283
-C, where Plato intimates that the coming remarks are of wide
-application.]
-
-[Footnote 2: Plato, Politik. p. 283 E. [Greek: _di/ttas_ a)/ra
-_tau/tas ou)si/as_ kai\ kri/seis tou= mega/lou kai\ tou= smikrou=
-thete/on.]]
-
-[Footnote 3: Plato, Politik. p. 284 E. [Greek: to\ me/trion, to\
-pre/pon, to\n kairo/n, to\ de/on], &c.
-
-The reader will find these two varieties of mensuration, here
-distinguished by Plato, illustrated in the "two distinct modes of
-appreciating weight" (the Absolute and the Relative), described
-and explained by Professor Alexander Bain in his work on The
-Senses and The Intellect, 3rd edition, p. 93. This explanation
-forms an item in the copious enumeration given by Mr. Bain of the
-fundamental sensations of our nature.]
-
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Politik. p. 283 D. [Greek: kata\ te\n te=s
-gene/seos a)nagkai/an ou)si/an].--284 A-C. [Greek: pro\s te\n tou=
-metri/ou ge/nesin].]
-
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Politik. p. 284 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Purpose in the Sophistes and Politikus is--To attain
-dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to
-judge whether the means employed are suitable.]
-
-Now what is the end to be attained, by this our enquiry into the
-definition of a Statesman? It is not so much to solve the
-particular question started, as to create in ourselves dialectic
-talent and aptitude, applicable to every thing. This is the
-standard with reference to which our enquiry must be criticised--not
-by regard to the easy solution of the particular problem, or
-to the immediate pleasure of the hearer. And if an objector
-complains, that our exposition is too long or our subject-matters
-too vulgar--we shall require him to show that the proposed end
-might have been attained with fewer words and with more solemn
-illustrations. If he cannot show this, we shall disregard his
-censure as inapplicable.[6]
-
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Politik. pp. 286 D, 287 A. Compare Plato,
-Philebus, p. 36 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's defence of the Politikus against critics.
-Necessity that the critic shall declare explicitly what his
-standard of comparison is.]
-
-The above-mentioned distinction between the two varieties of
-mensuration or comparison, is here given by Plato, simply to serve
-as a defence against critics who censured the peculiarities of the
-Politikus. It is not pursued into farther applications. But it
-deserves notice, not merely as being in itself just and useful,
-but as illustrating one of the many phases of Plato's philosophy.
-It is an exhibition of the relative side of Plato's character, as
-contra-distinguished from the absolute or dogmatical: for both the
-two, opposed as they are to each other, co-exist in him and
-manifest themselves alternately. It conveys a valuable lesson as
-to the apportionment of praise and blame. "When you blame me" (he
-says to his critics), "you must have in your mind some standard of
-comparison upon which the blame turns. Declare what that standard
-is:--what you mean by the Proper, Becoming, Moderate, &c. There is
-such a standard, and a different one, in every different Art. What
-is it here? You must choose this standard, explain what it is, and
-adhere to it when you undertake to praise or blame." Such an
-enunciation (thoroughly Sokratic[7]) of the principle of
-relativity, brings before critics the fact--which is very apt to
-be forgotten--that there must exist in the mind of each some
-standard of comparison, varying or unvarying, well or ill
-understood: while at the same time it enforces upon them the
-necessity of determining clearly for themselves, and announcing
-explicitly to others, what that standard is. Otherwise the
-propositions, affirming comparison, can have no uniform meaning
-with any two debaters, nor even with the same man at different
-times.
-
-[Footnote 7: Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 7, iii. 10, 12.]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phaedon,
-Philebus, &c.]
-
-To this relative side of Plato's mind belong his frequent
-commendations of measurement, numbering, computation, comparison,
-&c. In the Protagoras,[8] he describes the art of measurement as
-the main guide and protector of human life: it is there treated as
-applicable to the correct estimation of pleasures and pains. In
-the Phaedon,[9] it is again extolled: though the elements to be
-calculated are there specified differently. In the Philebus, the
-antithesis of [Greek: Pe/ras] and [Greek: A)/peiron] (the
-Determinant or Limit, and the Indeterminate or Infinite) is one of
-the leading points of the dialogue. We read in it moreover a
-bipartite division of Mensuration or Arithmetic,[10] which is
-quite different from the bipartite division just cited out of the
-Politikus. Plato divides it there (in the Philebus) into
-arithmetic for theorists, and arithmetic for practical life:
-besides which, he distinguishes the various practical arts as
-being more or less accurate, according as they have more or less
-of measurement and sensible comparison in them. Thus the art of
-the carpenter, who employs measuring instruments such as the line
-and rule--is more accurate than that of the physician, general,
-pilot, husbandman, &c., who have no similar means of measuring.
-This is a classification quite different from what we find in the
-Politikus; yet tending in like manner to illustrate the relative
-point of view, and its frequent manifestation in Plato. In the
-Politikus, he seeks to refer praise and blame to a standard of
-measurement, instead of suffering them to be mere outbursts of
-sentiment unsystematic and unanalysed.
-
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Protagor. p. 357 B.]
-
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Phaedon, p. 69 B.]
-
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Philebus, pp. 25 C, 27 D, 57. [Greek: du/o
-a)rithmetikai\ kai\ du/o metretikai/ . . . te\n didumo/teta
-e)/chousai tau/ten, o)no/matos de\ e(no\s kekoinome/nai.]
-
-This same bipartition, however, is noticed in another passage of
-the Politikus, p. 258 D-E.]
-
-[Side-note: Definition of the statesman, or Governor. Scientific
-competence. Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in
-subdividing.]
-
-II. The second peculiarity to which I call attention in the
-Politikus, is the definition or description there furnished of the
-character so-called: that is, the Statesman, the King, Governor,
-Director, or Manager, of human society. At the outset of the
-dialogue, this person is declared to belong to the Genus--Men of
-Science or of Art (the two words are faintly distinguished in
-Plato). It is possession of the proper amount of scientific
-competence which constitutes a man a Governor: and which entitles
-him to be so named, whether he actually governs any society or
-not.[11] (This point of departure is purely Sokratic: for in the
-Memorabilia of Xenophon,[12] Sokrates makes the same express
-declaration.) The King knows, but does not act: yet he is not a
-simple critic or spectator--he gives orders: and those orders are
-not suggested to him by any one else (as in the case of the
-Herald, the Keleustes, and others),[13] but spring from his own
-bosom and his own knowledge. From thence Plato carries us through
-a series of descending logical subdivisions, until we come to
-define the King as the shepherd and feeder of the flock of human
-beings.[14] But many other persons, besides the King, are
-concerned in feeding the human flock, and will therefore be
-included in this definition: which is thus proved to be too
-large, and to require farther qualification and restriction.[15]
-Moreover the feeding of the human flock belongs to others rather
-than to the King. He tends and takes care of the flock, but does
-not feed it: hence the definition is, in this way also,
-unsuitable.[16]
-
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Politikus, pp. 258 B, 259 B.]
-
-[Footnote 12: Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 9, 10.]
-
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Politik. p. 260 C-E. [Greek: to\ me\n to=n
-basile/on ge/nos ei)s te\n au)tepitaktike\n the/ntes], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Politik. pp. 267 B, 268 C.]
-
-[Footnote 15: Plato, Politik. p. 268.]
-
-[Footnote 16: Plato, Politik. p. 275 D-E.]
-
-[Side-note: King during the Saturnian period, was of a breed
-superior to the people--not so any longer.]
-
-Our mistake (says Plato) was of this kind. In describing the King
-or Governor, we have unconsciously fallen upon the description of
-the King, such as he was in the Saturnian period or under the
-presidency of Kronus; and not such as he is in the present period.
-Under the presidency of Kronus, each human flock was tended and
-governed by a divine King or God, who managed every thing for it,
-keeping it happy and comfortable by his own unassisted agency: the
-entire Kosmos too, with its revolutions, was at that time under
-the immediate guidance of a divine mover. But in the present
-period this divine superintendance is withdrawn: both the entire
-Kosmos, and each separate portion of it, is left to its own
-movement, full of imperfection and irregularity. Each human flock
-is now tended not by a divine King, as it was then; but by a human
-King, much less perfect, less effective, less exalted above the
-constituent members. Now the definition which we fell upon (says
-Plato) suited the King of the Saturnian period; but does not suit
-the King of the present or human period.[17] At the first
-commencement of the present period, the human flock, left to
-themselves without superintendance from the Gods, suffered great
-misery: but various presents from some Gods (fire from Prometheus,
-arts from Hephaestus and Athene, plants and seeds from Demeter)
-rendered their condition more endurable, though still full of
-difficulty and hardship.[18]
-
-[Footnote 17: Plato, Politik. pp. 274-275 B.]
-
-[Footnote 18: Plato, Politik. p. 274 C.
-
-Plato embodies these last-mentioned comparisons in an elaborate
-and remarkable mythe--theological, cosmical, zoological,
-social--which occupies six pages of the Politikus (268 D--274 E).
-Meiners and Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 273-275) point out
-that the theology of Plato in this fable differs much from what we
-read in the Phaedon, Republic, &c.: and Socher insists upon such
-discrepancy as one of his arguments against the genuineness of the
-Politikus. I have already observed that I do not concur in his
-inference. I do not expect uniformity of doctrine in the various
-Platonic dialogues: more especially on a subject so much beyond
-experience, and so completely open to the conjectures of a rich
-imagination, as theology and cosmogony. In the Sophistes, pp.
-242-243, Plato had talked in a sort of contemptuous tone about those
-who dealt with philosophical doctrine in the way of mythe, as a
-proceeding fit only for boys: (not unlike the manner of Aristotle,
-when he speaks of [Greek: oi( muthiko=s sophizo/menoi--ta\ u(pe\r
-e(ma=s], Metaphys. B. 1000, a. 15-18, [Greek: L]. 1071, b. 27): while
-here, in the Politikus, he dilates upon what he admits to be a
-boyish mythe, partly because a certain portion of it may be made
-available in illustration of his philosophical purpose, partly
-because he wishes to enliven the monotony of a long-continued
-classification. Again, in the Phaedrus (**p. 229 C), the Platonic
-Sokrates is made to censure as futile any attempt to find rational
-explanations for the popular legends ([Greek: sophi/zesthai]): but
-here, in the Politikus, the Eleate expressly adapts his theory
-about the backward and forward rotation of the Kosmos to the
-explanation of the popular legends--about earthborn men, and about
-Helios turning back his chariot, in order to escape the shocking
-spectacle of the Thyestean banquet: which legends, when so
-explained, Plato declares that people would be wrong to disbelieve
-([Greek: oi( nu=n u(po\ pollo=n ou)k o)rtho=s a)pistou=ntai], pp.
-271 B, 268 A, B, C).
-
-The differences of doctrine and handling, between the various
-Platonic dialogues, are facts not less worthy to be noted than the
-similarities. Here, in the mythe of the Politikus, we find a
-peculiar theological view, and a very remarkable cosmical
-doctrine--the rotation and counter-rotation of the Kosmos. The
-Kosmos is here declared (as in the Timaeus) to be a living and
-intelligent Subject; having received these mental gifts from its
-Demiurgus. But the Kosmos is also Body as well as Mind; so that it
-is incapable of that constant sameness or uniformity which belongs
-to the Divine: Body having in itself an incurable principle of
-disorder (p. 269 D). The Kosmos is perpetually in movement; but
-its movement is only rotatory or circular in the same place: which
-is the nearest approximation to uniformity of movement. It does
-not always revolve by itself; nor is it always made to revolve by
-the Divine Steersman ([Greek: kuberne/tes], p. 272 E), but
-alternately the one and the other. This Divine Steersman presides
-over its rotation for a certain time, and along with him many
-subordinate Deities or Daemons; until an epoch fixed by some
-unassigned destiny has been reached (p. 272 E). Then the Steersman
-withdraws from the process to his own watch-tower ([Greek: ei)s
-te\n au)tou= periope\n]), and the other Deities along with him.
-The Kosmos, being left to itself, ceases to revolve in the same
-direction, and begins its counter rotation; revolving by itself
-backwards, or in the contrary direction. By such violent revulsion
-many of the living inhabitants of the Kosmos are destroyed. The
-past phenomena are successively reproduced, but in an inverse
-direction--the old men go back to maturity, boyhood, infancy,
-death: the dead are born again, and pass through their lives
-backwards from age to infancy. Yet the counter-rotation brings
-about not simply an inverted reproduction of past phenomena, but
-new phenomena also: for we are told that the Kosmos, when left to
-itself, did tolerably well as long as it remembered the
-Steersman's direction, but after a certain interval became
-forgetful and went wrong, generating mischief and evil: so that
-the Steersman was at last forced to put his hand again to the
-work, and to impart to it a fresh rotation in his own direction
-(p. 273 B-D). The Kosmos never goes satisfactorily, except when
-the hand of the Steersman is upon it. But we are informed that
-there are varieties of this divine administration: one named the
-period of Kronus or Saturn; another that of Zeus, &c. The
-_present_ is the period of Zeus (p. 272 B). The period of Kronus
-was one of spontaneous and universal abundance, under the
-immediate superintendence of the Deity. This Divine Ruler was
-infinitely superior to the subjects whom he ruled, and left
-nothing to be desired. But _now_, in the present period of Zeus,
-men are under human rule, and not divine: there is no such marked
-superiority of the Ruler to his subjects. The human race has been
-on the point of becoming extinct; and has only been saved by
-beneficent presents from various Gods--fire from Prometheus,
-handicraft from Hephaestus and Athene (pp. 272 C, 274 C).
-
-All this prodigious bulk of mythical invention ([Greek:
-thaumasto\s o)/gkos], p. 277 B) seems to be introduced here for
-the purpose of illustrating the comparative ratio between the
-Ruler and his subjects; and the material difference in this
-respect between King and Shepherd--between the government of
-mankind by kings, and that of flocks and herds by the herdsman. In
-attempting to define the True and Genuine Ruler (he lays it down),
-we can expect nothing better than a man among other men; but
-distinguished above his fellows, so far as wisdom, dialectic, and
-artistic accomplishment, can confer superiority.
-
-There is much in this copious mythe which I cannot clearly
-understand or put together: nor do I derive much profit from the
-long exposition of it given by Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Polit. pp.
-100-128). We cannot fairly demand either harmonious consistency or
-profound meaning in the different features of an ingenious
-fiction. The hypothesis of a counter-rotation of the Kosmos
-(spinning like a top, [Greek: e)pi\ smikrota/tou bai=non podo\s
-i)e/nai], p. 270 A), with an inverted reproduction of past
-phenomena, appears to me one of the most singular fancies in the
-Greek mythology. I cannot tell how far it may have been suggested
-by any such statement as that of the Egyptian priests (Herodot.
-ii. 142). I can only repeat the observation made by Phaedrus to the
-Platonic Sokrates, in the dialogue Phaedrus (p. 275 A): "You,
-Sokrates, construct easily enough Egyptian tales, or any other
-tales that you please".]
-
-[Side-note: Distinction of causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary.
-The King is the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend
-to be principal also.]
-
-The human King, whom we shall now attempt to define, tends the
-human flock; but there are other persons also who assist in doing
-so, and without whose concurrent agency he could not attain his
-purpose. We may illustrate this by comparing with him the weaver
-of woollen garments: who requires many subsidiary and preparatory
-processes, performed by agents different from himself (such as the
-carder of wool, the spinner, and the manufacturer of the
-instruments for working the loom) to enable him to finish his
-work. In all matters, important as well as vulgar, two separate
-processes or arts, or contributory persons, are to be
-distinguished: Causes and Co-Causes, _i.e._, Principal Causes, and
-Concurrent, Auxiliary, Co-efficient, Subordinate, Causes.[19] The
-King, like the Weaver, is distinguishable, from other agents
-helping towards the same end, as a Principal Cause from Auxiliary
-Causes.[20] The Causes auxiliary to the King, in so far as they
-are inanimate, may be distributed roughly under seven heads
-(bipartition being here impracticable)--Implements, Vessels,
-Vehicles, Protections surrounding the Body, Recreative Objects,
-Raw Material of every variety, Nutritive Substances, &c.[21] Other
-auxiliary Causes are, the domestic cattle, bought slaves, and all
-descriptions of serving persons; being often freemen who
-undertake, for hire, servile occupations and low trades. There are
-moreover ministerial officers of a higher grade: heralds, scribes,
-interpreters, prophets, priests, Sophists, rhetors; and a great
-diversity of other functionaries, military, judicial, forensic,
-dramatic, &c., who manage different departments of public affairs,
-often changing from one post to another.[22] But these higher
-ministerial functionaries differ from the lower in this--That they
-pretend to be themselves the directors and managers of the
-government, not recognising the genuine King: whereas the truth
-is, that they are only ministerial and subordinate to him:--they
-are Concurrent Causes, while he is the only real or principal
-Cause.[23]
-
-[Footnote 19: Plato, Politik. p. 281 D-E.]
-
-[Footnote 20: Plato, Politik. p. 287 D.]
-
-[Footnote 21: Plato, Politik. pp. 288-289.]
-
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Politik. pp. 290-291 B. Plato describes these
-men by comparing them to lions, centaurs, satyrs, wild beasts,
-feeble and crafty. This is not very intelligible, but I presume
-that it alludes to the variety of functions, and the frequent
-alternation of functions. I cannot think that such an obscure jest
-deserves Stallbaum's compliment:--"Ceterum lepidissima haec est
-istorum hominum irrisio, qui cum leonibus, Centauris, Satyris,
-aliisque monstris comparantur". Plato repeats it p. 303 C.]
-
-[Footnote 23: Plato, Politik. p. 291 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato does not admit the received classification of
-government. It does not touch the point upon which all true
-distinction ought to be founded--Scientific or Unscientific.]
-
-Our main object now (says the Eleate) is to distinguish this Real
-Cause from the subordinate Causes which are mistaken for its
-partners and equals:--the genuine and intelligent Governor, from
-those who pretend falsely to be governors, and are supposed often
-to be such.[24] We cannot admit the lines of distinction, which
-are commonly drawn between different governments, as truly
-logical: at least they are only subordinate to ours. Most men
-distinguish the government of one, or a few, or the many:
-government of the poor or of the rich: government according to
-law, or without law:--by consent, or by force. The different names
-current, monarchy or despotism, aristocracy, or oligarchy, &c.,
-correspond to these definitions. But we hold that these
-definitions do not touch the true characteristic: which is to be
-found in Science, Knowledge, Intelligence, Art or scientific
-procedure, &c., and in nothing else. The true government of
-mankind is, the scientific or artistic: whether it be carried on
-by one, or a few, or many--whether by poor or rich, by force or
-consent--whether according to law, or without law.[25] This is the
-right and essential characteristic of genuine government:--it is
-government conducted according to science or art. All governments
-not conforming to this type are only spurious counterfeits and
-approaches to it, more or less defective or objectionable.[26]
-
-[Footnote 24: Plato, Politik. p. 292 D.]
-
-[Footnote 25: Plato, Politik. pp. 292 C, 293 B.]
-
-[Footnote 26: Plato, Politik. p. 293 E. [Greek: tau/ten to/te kai\
-kata\ tou\s toiou/tous o(/rous e(mi=n mo/nen o)rthe\n politei/an
-ei)=nai r(ete/on, o(/sas de\ a)/llas le/gomen, ou) gnesi/as ou)d'
-o)/ntos ou)/sas lekte/on.]]
-
-[Side-note: Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government
-by any numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one
-scientific man is the true government.]
-
-Looking to the characteristic here suggested, the Eleate
-pronounces that all numerous and popular governments must be
-counterfeits. There can be no genuine government except by One
-man, or by a very small number at most. True science or art is not
-attainable by many persons, whether rich or poor: scarcely even by
-a few, and probably by One alone; since the science or art of
-governing men is more difficult than any other science or art.[27]
-But the government of this One is the only true and right
-government, whether he proclaims laws or governs without law,
-whether he employs severity or mildness--provided only he adheres
-to his art, and achieves its purpose, the good and improvement of
-the governed.[28] He is like the true physician, who cuts and
-burns patients, when his art commands, for the purpose of curing
-them. He will not be disposed to fetter himself by fixed general
-laws: for the variety of situations and the fluctuation of
-circumstances, is so perpetual, that no law can possibly fit all
-cases. He will recognise no other law but his art.[29] If he lays
-down any general formula or law, it will only be from necessity,
-because he cannot be always at hand to watch and direct each
-individual case: but he will not hesitate to depart from his own
-formula whenever Art enjoins it.[30] That alone is base, evil,
-unjust, which he with his political Science or Art declares to be
-so. If in any particular case he departs from his own declaration,
-and orders such a thing to be done--the public have no right to
-complain that he does injustice. No patient can complain of his
-physician, if the latter, acting upon the counsels of his art,
-disregards a therapeutic formula.[31] All the acts of the true
-Governor are right, whether according or contrary to law, so long
-as he conducts himself with Art and Intelligence--aiming
-exclusively to preserve the people, and to render them better
-instead of worse.[32]
-
-[Footnote 27: Plato, Politik. pp. 292 D-E, 297 B, 300 E.]
-
-[Footnote 28: Plato, Politik. p. 293 B-E.]
-
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Politik. p. 297 A. [Greek: ou) gra/mmata
-tithei\s a)lla\ te\n te/chnen no/mon parecho/menos.]]
-
-[Footnote 30: Plato, Politik. pp. 300 C, 295 B-C.]
-
-[Footnote 31: Plato, Politik. p. 296 C-D.]
-
-[Footnote 32: Plato, Politik. p. 297 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Fixed laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are
-mischievous, as they would be for the physician and the steersman.
-Absurdity of determining medical practice by laws, and presuming
-every one to know it.]
-
-How mischievous would it be (continues the Eleate) if we
-prescribed by fixed laws how the physician or the steersman should
-practise their respective arts: if we held them bound to
-peremptory rules, punishing them whenever they departed from those
-rules, and making them accountable before the Dikastery, when any
-one accused them of doing so: if we consecrated these rules and
-dogmas, forbidding all criticism or censure upon them, and putting
-to death the free enquirer as a dreaming, prosy, Sophist,
-corrupting the youth and inciting lawless discontent![33] How
-absurd, if we pretended that every citizen did know, or might or
-ought to know, these two arts; because the matters concerning them
-were enrolled in the laws, and because no one ought to be wiser
-than the laws?[34] Who would think of imposing any such fetters on
-other arts, such as those of the general, the painter, the
-husbandman, the carpenter, the prophet, the cattle-dealer? To
-impose them would be to render life, hard as it is even now,
-altogether intolerable. Yet these are the trammels under which in
-actual cities the political Art is exercised.[35]
-
-[Footnote 33: Plato, Politik. pp. 298-299. 299 B: [Greek: Kai\
-toi/nun e)/ti dee/sei the/sthai no/mon e)pi\ pa=si tou/tois, a)/n
-tis kubernetike\n kai\ to\ nautiko\n e)\ to\ u(gieino\n kai\
-i)atrike=s a)lethei/an . . . zeto=n phai/netai para\ ta\ gra/mmata
-kai\ sophizo/menos o(tiou=n peri\ ta\ toiau=ta, pro=ton me\n me/te
-i)atriko\n au)to\n me/te kubernetiko\n o)noma/zein, a)lla\
-meteoro/logon a)dole/schen tina\ sophiste\n ei)=th' o(s
-diaphthei/ronta a)/llous neote/rous kai\ a)napei/thonta
-e)piti/thesthai kubernetike=|], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 34: Plato, Polit. p. 299 C. [Greek: a)\n de\ para\ tou\s
-no/mous kai\ ta\ gegramme/na do/xe| pei/thein ei)/te ne/ous ei)/te
-presbu/tas, kola/zein toi=s e)scha/tois. Ou)de\n ga\r dei=n to=n
-no/mon, ei)=nai sopho/teron; ou)de/na ga\r a)gnoei=n to/ te
-i)atriko\n kai\ to\ u(gieino\n ou)de\ to\ kubernetiko\n kai\
-nautiko/n; e)xei=nai ga\r to=| boulome/no| mantha/nein gegramme/na
-kai\ pa/tria e)/the kei/mena.]]
-
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Polit. p. 299 D-E. [Greek: o(/ste o( bi/os,
-o(n kai\ nu=n chalepo/s, ei)s to\n chro/non e)kei=non a)bi/otos
-gi/gnoit' a)\n to\ para/pan.]]
-
-[Side-note: Government by fixed laws is better than lawless
-government by unscientific men, but worse than lawless government
-by scientific men. It is a second-best.]
-
-Such are the mischiefs inseparable, in greater or less degree,
-from fixed and peremptory laws. Yet grave as these mischiefs are,
-there are others yet graver, which such laws tend to obviate. If
-the magistrate appointed to guard and enforce the laws, ventures
-to break or contravene them, simulating, but not really
-possessing, the Art or Science of the genuine Ruler--he will make
-matters far worse. The laws at any rate are such as the citizens
-have been accustomed to, and such as give a certain measure of
-satisfaction. But the arbitrary rule of this violent and
-unscientific Governor is a tyranny:[36] which is greatly worse
-than the laws. Fixed laws are thus a second-best:[37] assuming
-that you cannot obtain a true scientific, artistic, Governor. If
-such a man could be obtained, men would be delighted to live under
-him. But they despair of ever seeing such a character, and they
-therefore cling to fixed laws, in spite of the numerous
-concomitant mischiefs.[38] These mischiefs are indeed so serious,
-that when we look at actual cities, we are astonished how they get
-on under such a system; and we cannot but feel how firm and deeply
-rooted a city naturally is.[39]
-
-[Footnote 36: Plato, Politik. p. 300 A-B, 301 B-C.]
-
-[Footnote 37: Plato, Politik. p. 300 C. [Greek: deu/teros
-plou=s].]
-
-[Footnote 38: Plato, Politik. p. 301 D.]
-
-[Footnote 39: Plato, Polit. p. 302 A. [Greek: e)\ e)kei=no e(mi=n
-thaumaste/on ma=llon, o(s i)schuro/n ti po/lis e)sti\ phu/sei?]]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of unscientific governments. The one despot
-is the worse. Democracy is the least bad, because it is least of a
-government.]
-
-We see therefore (the Eleate goes on) that there is no true
-polity--nothing which deserves the name of a genuine political
-society--except the government of one chief, scientific or
-artistic. With him laws are superfluous and even inconvenient. All
-other polities are counterfeits: factions and cabals, rather than
-governments:[40] delusions carried on by tricksters and conjurers.
-But among these other polities or sham polities, there is a
-material difference as to greater or less badness: and the
-difference turns upon the presence or absence of good laws. Thus,
-the single-headed government, called monarchy (assuming the Prince
-not to be a man of science or art) is the best of all the
-sham-polities, if the Prince rules along with and in observance of
-known good laws: but it is the worst of them all, if he rules
-without such laws, as a despot or tyrant. Oligarchy, or the
-government of a few--if under good laws, is less good than that of
-the Prince under the same circumstances--if without such laws, is
-less bad than that of the despot. Lastly, the government of the
-many is less good under the one supposition--and less bad under
-the other. It is less effective, either for good or for evil. It
-is in fact less of a government: the administrative force being
-lost by dissipation among many hands for short intervals; and more
-free play being thus left to individuals. Accordingly, assuming
-the absence of laws, democracy is the least bad or most tolerable
-of the six varieties of sham-polity. Assuming the presence of
-laws, it is the worst of them.[41]
-
-[Footnote 40: Plato, Polit. pp. 302-303 B-C. [Greek: tou\s
-koinonou\s tou/ton to=n politeio=n paso=n, ple\n te=s
-e)piste/monos, a)phairete/on o(s ou)k o)/ntas politikou\s a)lla\
-stasiastikou/s, kai\ ei)do/lon megi/ston prosta/tas o)/ntas kai\
-au)tou\s ei)=nai toiou/tous, megi/stous de\ o)/ntas mimeta\s kai\
-go/etas megi/stous gi/gnesthai to=n sophisto=n sophista/s.]]
-
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Polit. p. 302 B. [Greek: ti/s de\ to=n ou)k
-o)rtho=n politeio=n tou/ton e(/kista chalepe\ suze=n, paso=n
-chalepo=n ou)so=n, kai\ ti/s baruta/te?] Also p. 303 A-B.]
-
-[Side-note: The true governor distinguished from the General, the
-Rhetor, &c. They are all properly his subordinates and
-auxiliaries.]
-
-We have thus severed the genuine scientific Governor from the
-unworthy counterfeits by whom his agency is mimicked in actual
-society. But we have still to sever him from other worthier
-functionaries, analogous and cognate, with whom he co-operates;
-and to show by what characteristic he is distinguished from
-persons such as the General, the Judge, the Rhetor or Persuader to
-good and just objects. The distinction is, that all these
-functions, however honourable functions, are still nevertheless
-essentially subordinate and ministerial, assuming a sovereign
-guidance from some other quarter to direct them. Thus the General
-may, by his strategic art, carry on war effectively; but he must
-be directed when, and against whom, war is to be carried on. The
-Judge may decide quarrels without fear, antipathy, or favour: but
-the general rules for deciding them must be prescribed to him by a
-higher authority. So too the Rhetor may apply his art well, to
-persuade people, or to work upon their emotions, without teaching
-them: but he must be told by some one else, when and on what
-occasions persuasion is suitable, and when force must be employed
-instead of it.[42] Each of these functionaries must learn, what
-his own art will not teach him, the proper seasons, persons, and
-limitations, among and under which his art is to be applied. To
-furnish such guidance is the characteristic privilege and duty of
-the scientific chief, for which he alone is competent. He does not
-act himself, but he originates, directs, and controls, all the
-real agents and agencies. Without him, none of them are available
-or beneficial towards their special ends. He alone can judge of
-their comparative value, and of the proper reasons for invoking or
-restraining their interference.[43]
-
-[Footnote 42: Plato, Polit. pp. 304-305.]
-
-[Footnote 43: Plato, Polit. p. 305 D. [Greek: te\n ga\r o)/ntos
-ou)=san basilike\n ou)k au)te\n dei= pra/ttein, a)ll' a)/rchein
-to=n duname/non pra/ttein, gigno/skousan te\n a)rche/n te kai\
-o(rme\n to=n megi/ston e)n tai=s po/lesin e)gkairi/as te pe/ri
-kai\ a)kairi/as, ta\s d' a)/llas ta\ prostachthe/nta dra=|n.]]
-
-[Side-note: What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at
-the formation of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the
-energetic virtues with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence
-between them.]
-
-The great scientific Governor being thus defined, and logically
-distinguished from all others liable to be confounded with him,
-Plato concludes by a brief statement what his principal functions
-are. He will aim at ensuring among his citizens the most virtuous
-characters and the best ethical combinations. Like the weaver (to
-whom he has been already assimilated) he will put together the
-great political web or tissue of improved citizenship,
-intertwining the strong and energetic virtues (the warp) with the
-yielding and gentler virtues (the woof).[44] Both these
-dispositions are parts or branches of virtue; but there is a
-natural variance or repulsion between them.[45] Each of them is
-good, in proper measure and season: each of them is bad, out of
-measure and season. The combination of both, in due proportion, is
-indispensable to form the virtuous citizen: and that combination
-it is the business of the scientific Governor to form and uphold.
-It is with a view to this end that he must set at work all the
-agents of teaching and education, and must even interfere to
-arrange the intermarriages of the citizens; not allowing the
-strong and courageous families to form alliance with each other,
-lest the breed should in time become too violent--nor the gentle
-and quiet families to do the like, lest the offspring should
-degenerate into stupidity.[46]
-
-[Footnote 44: Plato, Polit. pp. 306-307. [Greek: te\n basilike\n
-sumploke/n].]
-
-[Footnote 45: Plato, Polit. pp. 306 A-B, 307 C, 308 B.]
-
-[Footnote 46: Plato, Polit. pp. 308-309-310.]
-
-[Side-note: If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is
-to be killed or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a
-slave. The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an
-unanimous standard of ethical orthodoxy.]
-
-All persons, who, unable to take on this conjunction, sin by an
-excess of the strong element, manifesting injustice or
-irreligion--must be banished or put to death:[47] all who sin by
-excess of the feebler element, exhibiting stupidity and meanness,
-must be degraded into slavery. Above all things, the scientific
-Governor must himself dictate, and must implant and maintain,
-in the minds of all his citizens, an authoritative standard of
-orthodox sentiment respecting what is just, honourable, good--and the
-contrary.[48] If this be ensured, and if the virtues naturally
-discordant be attempered with proper care, he will make sure of a
-friendly and harmonious community, enjoying as much happiness as
-human affairs admit.[49]
-
-[Footnote 47: Plato, Polit. p. 309 A.]
-
-[Footnote 48: Plato, Polit. pp. 309 C, 310 E.]
-
-[Footnote 49: Plato, Polit. p. 311 B-C.]
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-[Side-note: Remarks--Sokratic Ideal--Title to govern mankind
-derived exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual
-person.]
-
-I have thus given a brief abridgment of the main purpose of the
-Politikus, and of the definition which Plato gives of the True
-Governor and his function. I proceed to make a few remarks upon
-it.
-
-Plato's theory of government is founded upon the supposition of
-perfect knowledge--scientific or artistic intelligence--in the
-person of the Governor: a partial approach, through teaching and
-acquired knowledge, to that immense superiority of the Governor
-over the Governed, which existed in the Saturnian period. It is
-this, and this alone, which constitutes, in his estimation, the
-title to govern mankind. The Governor does not himself act: he
-directs the agency of others: and the directions are dictated by
-his knowledge. I have already observed that Sokrates had himself
-enunciated the doctrine--Superior scientific competence (the
-special privilege of a professor or an artist) is the only
-legitimate title to govern.
-
-[Side-note: Different ways in which this ideal is worked out by
-Plato and Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action.]
-
-From Sokrates the idea passed both to Plato and to Xenophon: and
-the contrast between the two is shown forcibly by the different
-way in which they deal with it. Xenophon has worked it out on a
-large scale, in the Cyropaedia--on a small scale, in the
-OEconomicus. Cyrus in the former, Ischomachus in the latter,
-knows better than any one else what is to be done, and gives
-orders accordingly. But both the one and the other are also
-foremost in action, setting example as well as giving orders to
-others. Now Plato, while developing the same idea, draws a marked
-line of distinction between Science and Practice:--between
-direction and execution.[50] His scientific Governor does not act
-at all, but he gives orders to all the different men of action,
-and he is the only person who knows on what occasions and within
-what limits each agent should put forth his own special aptitude.
-Herein we discern one of the distinctions between these two _viri
-Socratici_: Xenophon, the soldier and man of action--Plato, the
-speculative philosopher. Xenophon conceives the conditions of the
-True Governor in a larger way than Plato, for he includes among
-them the forward and energetic qualities requisite for acting on
-the feelings of the subject Many, and for disposing them to follow
-orders with cheerfulness and zeal:[51] whereas Plato makes
-abstraction of this part of the conditions, and postulates
-obedience on the part of the many as an item in his fundamental
-hypothesis. Indeed he perpetually presents us with the comparison
-of the physician, who cuts and burns for the purpose of ultimate
-cure. Plato either neglects, or assumes as a matter of course, the
-sentiments of the persons commanded, or the conditions of willing
-obedience; while Xenophon dwells upon the maintenance of such
-sentiments as one of the capital difficulties in the problem of
-government. And we perceive a marked contrast between the
-unskilful proceedings of Plato, when he visited Dionysius II. at
-Syracuse, illustrating his (Plato's) inaptitude for dealing with a
-real situation--and the judicious management of Xenophon, when
-acting as one of the leaders of the Cyreian army under
-circumstances alike unexpected and perilous.
-
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Polit. pp. 259 C-D, 305 D.]
-
-[Footnote 51: See the preface to Xenophon's Cyropaedia; also
-Cyropaed. i. 6, 20; and his Oecon. c. 21, and c. 13, 4, where we
-see the difference between the Xenophontic idea, and the Platonic
-idea, of [Greek: o( a)rchiko\s a)nthro/pon, oi( thei=oi kai\
-a)gathoi\ kai\ e)piste/mones a)/rchontes].]
-
-[Side-note: The theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to
-that theory which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras.]
-
-Plato here sets forth the business of governing as a special art,
-analogous to the special art of the weaver, the steersman, the
-physician. Now in each special art, the requisite knowledge and
-competence is possessed only by the one or few artists who
-practise them. The knowledge possessed by such one or few,
-suffices for all the remaining community; who benefit by it, but
-are altogether ignorant on the matter, and follow orders
-blindfold. As this one Artist is the only competent person for the
-task, so he is assumed _qua_ Artist, to be infallible in the
-performance of the task--never to go wrong, nor to abuse his
-power, nor to aim at any collateral end.[52] Such is Plato's
-theory of government in the Politikus. But if we turn to the
-Protagoras, we shall find this very theory of government
-explicitly denied, and a counter-theory affirmed, in the discourse
-put into the mouth of Protagoras. That Sophist is made to
-distinguish the political or social art, upon which the
-possibility of constituting or keeping up human society depends,
-from all other arts (manual, useful, linguistic), by this express
-characteristic: All other arts were distributed among mankind in
-such manner, that knowledge and skill were confined to an
-exclusive few, whose knowledge, each in his own special
-department, sufficed for the service of all the rest, not favoured
-with the like knowledge--but the political or social art was
-distributed (by order of Zeus to Hermes) on a principle quite
-opposite. It was imparted to every member of society without
-exception. If it had been granted only to a few, and not to all,
-society could not have held together. Justice and the sense of
-shame (Temperance or Moderation), which are the bonds of the city
-and the fruits of the political art, must be instilled into every
-man. Whoever cannot take on and appropriate them (Zeus proclaims
-it as his law), must be slain as a nuisance or distemper of the
-city.[53]
-
-[Footnote 52: Compare Plato, Republic, i. pp. 340-341.]
-
-[Footnote 53: Plato, Protag. pp. 322, 325 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Points of the Protagorean theory--rests upon common
-sentiment.]
-
-Such we have seen to be the theory enunciated by the Platonic
-Protagoras (in the dialogue so-called) respecting the political or
-social art. It pervades all the members of society, as a common
-and universal attribute, though each man has his own specialty
-besides. It was thus distributed at the outset by Zeus. It stands
-embodied in the laws and in the unwritten customs, so that one man
-may know it as well as another. Every man makes open profession of
-knowing and possessing it:--which he cannot do with any special
-art. Fathers enforce it on their children by rewards and
-punishments, schoolmasters and musicians impart it by extracts
-from the poets: the old teach it to the young: nay every man, far
-from desiring to monopolise it for himself, is forward in teaching
-it to others: for it is the interest of every one that his
-neighbour should learn it. Since every one thus teaches it, there
-are no professed or special teachers: yet there are still some few
-who can teach it a little better than others--and among those few
-I (says Protagoras) am one.[54]
-
-[Footnote 54: Plato, Protag. pp. 327-328.]
-
-[Side-note: Counter-Theory in the Politikus. The exigencies of the
-Eleate in the Politikus go much farther than those of Protagoras.]
-
-Whoever compares the doctrine of the Politikus[55] with the
-portion of the Protagoras[56] to which I have just referred, will
-see that they stand to each other as theory and counter-theory.
-The theory in the Politikus sets aside (intentionally or not) that
-in the Protagoras. The Platonic Protagoras, spokesman of King
-Nomos, represents common sense, sentiment, sympathies and
-antipathies, written laws, and traditional customs known to all as
-well as reverenced by the majority: the Platonic Politikus
-repudiates all these, as preposterous fetters to the single
-Governor who monopolises all political science and art. Let us add
-too, that the Platonic Protagoras (whom many commentators teach us
-to regard as a person of exorbitant arrogance and pretensions) is
-a very modest man compared to the Eleate in the Platonic
-Politikus. For the former accepts all the written laws and
-respected customs around him,--admits that most others know them,
-in the main, as well as he,--and only professes to have acquired a
-certain amount of superior skill in impressing them upon others:
-whereas the latter sets them all aside, claims for himself an
-uncontradicted monopoly of social science and art, and postulates
-an extent of blind submission from society such as has never yet
-been yielded in history.
-
-[Footnote 55: Plato, Politik. p. 301 E.
-
-The portion of this dialogue, from p. 296 to p. 302, enunciates
-the doctrine of which I have given a brief abstract in the text.]
-
-[Footnote 56: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-328.]
-
-[Side-note: The Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory
-no adverse criticism is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned
-to silence or punished.]
-
-The Eleate here complains of it as a hardship, that amidst a
-community actually established and existing, directed by written
-laws, traditional customs and common sentiment (the Protagorean
-model),--he, the political artist, is interdicted from adverse
-criticism and outspoken censure of the legal and consecrated
-doctrines. If he talks as one wiser than the laws, or impugns them
-as he thinks that they deserve, or theorises in his own way
-respecting the doctrines which they sanction--he is either laughed
-to scorn as a visionary, prosing, Sophist--or hated, and perhaps
-punished, as a corrupter of youth; as a person who brings the
-institutions of society into contempt, and encourages violators of
-the law.[57]
-
-[Footnote 57: Plato, Politik. p. 299 B. [Greek: a)\n tis . . .
-zeto=n phai/netai para\ ta\ gra/mmata kai\ sophizo/menos o(tiou=n
-peri\ ta\ toiau=ta.]
-
-In the seventh book of Republic (p. 520 B), Plato describes the
-position of the philosopher in an established society, springing
-up by his own internal force, against the opposition of all the
-social influences--[Greek: au)to/matoi ga\r e)mphu/ontai a)kou/ses
-te=s e)n e(ka/ste| (po/lei) politei/as], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato
-complains of the assumption of infallibility in existing
-societies, but exacts it severely in that which he himself
-constructs.]
-
-The reproach implied in these phrases of Plato is doubtless
-intended as an allusion to the condemnation of Sokrates. It is a
-reproach well-founded against that proceeding of the government of
-Athens:--and would have been still better founded against other
-contemporary governments. That the Athenians were intolerant, is
-not to be denied: but they were less intolerant than any of their
-contemporaries. Nowhere else except at Athens could Sokrates have
-gone on until seventy years of age talking freely in the
-market-place against the received political and religious orthodoxy.
-There was more free speech ([Greek: par)r(esi/a])[58] at Athens
-than in any part of the contemporary world. Plato, Xenophon, and
-the other companions of Sokrates, proclaimed by lectures and
-writings that they thought themselves wiser than the laws of
-Athens: yet though the Gorgias was intended as well as adapted to
-bring into hatred and contempt both those laws and the persons who
-administered them, the Athenian Rhetors never indicted Plato for
-libel. Upon this point, we can only speak comparatively: for
-perfect liberty of proclaiming opinions neither does now exist,
-nor ever has existed, any where. Most men have no genuine respect
-for the right of another to form and express an opinion
-dissentient from theirs: if they happen to hate the opinion, they
-account it a virtue to employ as much ill-usage or menace as will
-frighten the holder thereof into silence. Plato here points out in
-emphatic language,[59] the deplorable consequences of assuming
-infallibility and perfection for the legal and customary orthodoxy
-of the country, and prohibiting free censure by dissentient
-individuals. But this is on the supposition that the laws and
-customs are founded only on common sense and traditional
-reverence:--and that the scientific Governor is among the
-dissenters. Plato's judgment is radically different when he
-supposes the case reversed:--when King Nomos is superseded by the
-scientific Professor of whom Plato dreams, or by a lawgiver who
-represents him. We shall observe this when we come to the Treatise
-de Legibus, in which Plato constitutes an orthodoxy of his own,
-prohibiting free dissent by restrictions and penalties stricter
-than any which were known to antiquity. He cannot recognise an
-infallible common sense: but he has no scruple in postulating an
-infallible scientific dictator, and in enthroning himself as such.
-Though well aware that reasoned truth presents itself to different
-philosophers in different versions, he does not hesitate to
-condemn those philosophers who differ from him, to silence or to
-something worse.
-
-[Footnote 58: See Euripides, Ion, 671.
-
- [Greek: e)k to=n A)theno=n m' e( tekou=s' ei)/e gune/,
-o(/s moi ge/noito metro/then par)r(esi/a.]
-
-Also Euripid. Hippolyt. 424, and Plato, Gorgias, p. 461 E, where
-Sokrates says to Polus--[Greek: deina\ me/nt' a)\n pa/thois, ei)
-A)the/naze a)phiko/menos, ou)= te=s E(lla/dos, plei/ste e)sti\n
-e)xousi/a tou= le/gein, e)/peita su\ e)ntau=tha tou/tou mo/nos
-a)tuche/sais], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 59: Plato, Polit. p. 299 E.]
-
-[Side-note: Theory of the Politikus--distinguished three gradations
-of polity. Gigantic individual force the worst.]
-
-It will appear then that the Platonic Politikus distinguishes
-three varieties and gradations of social constitution.
-
-1. _Science or Art. Systematic Construction from the beginning,
-based upon Theory._--That which is directed by the constant
-supervision of a scientific or artistic Ruler. This is the only
-true or legitimate polity. Represented by Plato in Republic.
-Illustrated by the systematic scheme of weights, measures,
-apportionment of years, months, and days, in calendar--put
-together on scientific principles by the French Convention in
-1793--as contrasted with the various local, incoherent, growths,
-which had obtained recognition through custom or arbitrary
-preference of unscientific superiors.
-
-2. _Common Sense. Unsystematic Aggregate of Customs, accepted in
-an Actual Society._--That which is directed by written laws and
-fixed traditional customs, known to every one, approved by the
-common sense of the community, and communicated as well as upheld
-by the spontaneous teaching of the majority. King Nomos.
-
-This stands for the second best scheme: the least objectionable
-form of degeneracy--yet still a degeneracy. It is the scheme set
-forth by the Platonic Protagoras, in the dialogue so called.
-Represented with improvements by Plato in Treatise De Legibus.
-
-3. _Gigantic Individual Force._--That in which some violent
-individual--not being really scientific or artistic, but perhaps
-falsely pretending to be so--violates and tramples under foot the
-established laws and customs, under the stimulus of his own
-exorbitant ambition and unmeasured desires.
-
-This is put forward as the worst scheme of all: as the greatest
-depravation of society, and the greatest forfeiture of public as
-well as private happiness. We have here the proposition which
-Polus and Kallikles are introduced as defending in the Gorgias,
-and Thrasymachus in the Republic. In both dialogues, Sokrates
-undertakes to expose it. The great benefit conferred by King
-Nomos, is, that he protects society against the maximum of evil.
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points
-of analogy and difference.]
-
-Another interesting comparison may be made: that between the
-Politikus and the Republic. We must remember that the Politikus is
-announced by Plato as having two purposes. 1. To give a lesson in
-the method of definition and division. 2. To define the
-characteristic of the person bearing the name of Politikus,
-distinguishing him from all others, analogous or disparate.--The
-method is here more prominent than the doctrine.
-
-But in the Republic, no lesson of method is attempted; the
-doctrine stands alone and independent of it. We shall find however
-that the doctrine is essentially the same. That which the
-Politikus lays down in brief outline, is in the Republic amplified
-and enlarged; presented with many variations and under different
-points of view, yet, still at the bottom, the same doctrine, both
-as to affirmation and negation. The Republic affirms (as the
-Politikus does) the exclusive legitimacy of science, art,
-intelligence, &c., as the initiatory and omnipotent authority over
-all the constituent members of society: and farther, that such
-intelligence can have no place except in one or a few privileged
-persons. The Republic (like the Politikus) presents to us the
-march of society with its Principal Cause--its concurrent or
-Auxiliary Causes--and its inferior governable mass or matter, the
-human flock, indispensable and co-essential as a part of the whole
-scheme. In the Republic, the Cause is represented by the small
-council of philosophical Elders: the concurrent causes, by the
-Guardians or trained soldiers: the inferior matter, by the
-remaining society, which is distributed among various trades,
-providing for the subsistence and wants of all. The explanation of
-Justice (which is the ostensible purpose of the Republic) is made
-to consist in the fact--That each one of these several parts does
-its own special work--nothing more--nothing less. Throughout all
-the Republic, a constant parallelism is carried on (often indeed
-overstrained) between the community and the individual man. In the
-one as well as in the other, Plato recognises the three
-constituent elements, all essential as co-operators, but each with
-its own special function: in the individual, he recognises three
-souls (encephalic, thoracic, and abdominal) as corresponding to
-Elders, Guardians, and Producers, in the community. Here are the
-same features as those given in outline in the Politikus: but the
-two higher features of the three appear greatly expanded in the
-Republic: the training and conditions proper for the philosophic
-Artist or Governor, and for his auxiliaries the Guardians, being
-described and vindicated at great length. Moreover, in the
-Republic, Plato not only repeats the doctrine[60] that the right
-of command belongs to every art in its own province and over its
-own subject-matter (which is the cardinal point in the
-Politikus)--but he farther proclaims that each individual neither can
-exercise, nor ought to exercise, more than one art. He allows no
-double men or triple men[61]--"Quam quisque novit artem, in ea se
-exerceat". He would not have respected the Xenophontic Cyrus or
-Ischomachus. He carries the principle of specialization to its
-extreme point. His Republic is an aggregate of special artists and
-professional aptitudes: among whom the Governor is only one,
-though the first and rarest. He sets aside the common basis of
-social endowments essential to every man: upon which each man's
-specialty is superinduced in the theory of the Platonic
-Protagoras. The only common quality which Plato admits is,--That
-each man, and each of the three souls composing each man, shall do
-his own business and his own business only: this is his definition
-of Justice, in the Republic.[62]
-
-[Footnote 60: Plato, Republ. i. p. 342 C. [Greek: A)lla\ me\n
-a)/rchousi ge ai( te/chnai kai\ kratou=sin e)kei/nou ou)= per
-ei)si\ te/chnai.]]
-
-[Footnote 61: Plato, Republ. ii. pp. 370 B, 374 B--395-397 E.
-[Greek: ou)k e)/sti diplou=s a)ne\r par' e(mi=n ou)de\
-pollaplou=s, e)peide\ e(/kastos e(\n pra/ttei] (p. 397 E).]
-
-[Footnote 62: Plato, Republ. iv. p. 433.]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of the Politikus with the Kratylus.
-Dictatorial, constructive, science or art, common to both: applied
-in the former to social administration--in the latter to the
-formation and modification of names.]
-
-Lastly, I will illustrate the Politikus by comparison with the
-Kratylus, which will be treated in the next chapter. The
-conception of dictatorial science or art, which I have stated as
-the principal point in the Politikus, appears again in the
-Kratylus applied to a different subject--naming, or the imposition
-of names. Right and legitimate name-giving is declared to be an
-affair of science or art, like right and legitimate polity: it can
-only be performed by the competent scientific or artistic
-name-giver, or by the lawgiver considered in that special capacity.
-The second title of the dialogue Kratylus is [Greek: Peri\ O)noma/ton
-O)rtho/tetos]--On the Rectitude or legitimacy of names. What
-constitutes right and legitimate Name-giving? In like manner, we
-might provide a second title for the Politikus--[Greek: Peri\
-Politei/as O)rtho/tetos]--On the rectitude or legitimacy of polity
-or sociality. What constitutes right or legitimate sociality?[63]
-Plato answers--It is the constant dictation and supervision of art
-or science--or of the scientific, artistic, dictator, who alone
-knows both the End and the means. This alone is right and true
-sociality--or sociality as it ought to be. So, if we read the
-Kratylus, we find Plato defining in the same way right
-Name-giving--or name-giving as it ought to be. It is when each name
-is given by an artistic name-constructor, who discerns the Form of
-the name naturally suitable in each particular case, and can
-embody it in appropriate letters and syllables.[64] A true or
-right name signifies by likeness to the thing signified.[65] The
-good lawgiver discerns this likeness: but all lawgivers are not
-good: the bad lawgiver fancies that he discerns it, but is often
-mistaken.[66] It would be the ideal perfection of language, if
-every name could be made to signify by likeness to the thing
-named. But this cannot be realised: sufficient likenesses cannot
-be found to furnish an adequate stock of names. In the absence of
-such best standard, we are driven to eke out language by appealing
-to a _second-best_, an inferior and vulgar principle approximating
-more or less, to rectitude--that is, custom and convention.[67]
-
-[Footnote 63: The exact expression occurs in Politikus, pp. 293 E,
-294 A. [Greek: nu=n de\ e)/de phanero\n o(/ti tou=to
-bouleso/metha, to\ peri\ te=s to=n a)/neu no/mon a)rcho/nton
-o)rtho/tetos dielthei=n e(ma=s.]
-
-The [Greek: o)rthe/, a)lethine/, gnesi/a, politei/a] are phrases
-employed several times--pp. 292 A-C, 293 B-E, 296 E, 297 B-D. 300
-D-E: [Greek: o( a)lethino/s, o( e)/ntechnos]. 300 E: [Greek: te\n
-a)lethine\n e)kei/nen, te\n tou= e(no\s meta\ te/chnes a)/rchontos
-politei/an]. 302 A-E.
-
-Plato sometimes speaks as if a bad [Greek: politei/a] were no
-[Greek: politei/a] at all--as if a bad [Greek: no/mos] were no
-[Greek: no/mos] at all. See above, vol. ii. ch. xiv. pp. 88, where
-I have touched on this point in reviewing the Minos. This is a
-frequent and perplexing confusion, but purely verbal. Compare
-Aristotel. Polit. iii. 2. p. 1276, a. 1, where he deals with the
-like confusion--[Greek: a)=r' ei) me\ dikai/os poli/tes, ou)
-poli/tes?]]
-
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Kratylus, p. 388 E. [Greek: Ou)/k a)/ra
-panto\s a)ndro\s o)/noma the/sthai e)/stin, a)lla/ tinos
-o)nomatourgou/; ou(=tos d' e)/stin, o(s e)/oiken, o( nomothe/tes,
-o(\s de\ to=n demiourgo=n spanio/tatos e)n a)nthro/pois
-gi/gnetai.] Compare Politik. p. 292 D.]
-
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 430, 431 D, 430 C.]
-
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 431 E, 436 B.]
-
-[Footnote 67: Plato, Kratyl. p. 435 B-C.
-
-So in the Protagoras (p. 328 A) we find the Platonic Protagoras
-comparing the self-originated and self-sustaining traditional
-ethics, to the traditional language--[Greek: ti/s dida/skalo/s
-e)sti tou= E(lleni/zein?]]
-
-We see thus that in the Kratylus also, as well as in the
-Politikus, the systematic dictation of the Man of Science or Art
-is pronounced to be the only basis of complete rectitude. Below
-this, and far short of it, yet still indispensable as a supplement
-in real life--is, the authority of unsystematic custom or
-convention; not emanating from any systematic constructive Artist,
-but actually established (often, no one knows how) among the
-community, and resting upon their common sentiment, memory, and
-tradition.
-
-[Side-note: Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No
-notice taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Laches and
-Charmides.]
-
-This is the true Platonic point of view, considering human affairs
-in every department, the highest as well as the lowest, as
-subjects of Art and Science: specialization of attributes and
-subdivision of function, so that the business of governing falls
-to the lot of one or a few highly qualified Governors: while the
-social edifice is assumed to have been constructed from the
-beginning by one of these Governors, with a view to consistent,
-systematic, predetermined ends--instead of that incoherent
-aggregate[68] which is consecrated under the empire of law and
-custom. Here in the Politikus, we read that the great purpose of
-the philosophical Governor is to train all the citizens into
-virtuous characters: by a proper combination of Courage and
-Temperance, two endowments naturally discordant, yet each alike
-essential in its proper season and measure. The interweaving of
-these two forms the true Regal Web of social life.[69]
-
-[Footnote 68:The want of coherence, or of reference to any common
-and distinct End, among the bundle of established [Greek: No/mima]
-is noted by Aristotle, Polit. vii. 2, 1324, b. 5: [Greek: dio\ kai\
-to=n plei/ston nomi/mon chu/den, o(s ei)pei=n _keime/non_ para\
-toi=s plei/stois, o(/mos, ei)/ pou/ ti pro\s e(\n oi( no/moi
-ble/pousi, tou= kratei=n stocha/zontai Kre/te| pro\s tou\s
-pole/mous sunte/taktai schedo\n e)\ te paidei/a kai\ to\ to=n
-no/mon ple=thos.]
-
-Custom and education surround all prohibitions with the like
-sanctity--both those most essential to the common security, and
-those which emanate from capricious or local antipathy--in the
-minds of docile citizens.
-
-[Greek: I)=so/n toi kua/mous te phagei=n, kephala/s te toke/on.]
-
-Aristotle dissents from Plato on the point of always vesting the
-governing functions in the same hands. He considers such a
-provision dangerous and intolerable to the governed.
-
-Aristot. Polit. ii. 5, 1264, b. 6.]
-
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Polit. p. 306 A. [Greek: basilike\
-sumploke/], &c.
-
-Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the Politikus (pp. 254-256)
-treats this [Greek: basilike\ sumploke\] as a poor and
-insignificant function, for the political Artist determined and
-installed by so elaborate a method and classification. But the
-dialogue was already so long that Plato could not well lengthen it
-by going into fuller details. Socher points out (Ueber Platon's
-Schrift. p. 274) discrepancies between the Politikus on one side,
-and Protagoras and Gorgias on the other--which I think are really
-discoverable, though I do not admit the inference which he draws
-from them.]
-
-Such is the concluding declaration of the accomplished Eleatic
-expositor, to Sokrates and the other auditors. But this suggests
-to us another question, when we revert to some of the Platonic
-dialogues handled in the preceding pages. What _are_ Virtue,
-Courage, Temperance? In the Menon, the Platonic Sokrates had
-proclaimed, that he did not himself know what virtue was: that he
-had never seen any one else who did know: that it was impossible
-to say how virtue could be communicated, until you knew what
-virtue was--and impossible to determine any one of the parts of
-virtue, until virtue had been determined as a whole. In the
-Charmides, Sokrates had affirmed that he did not know what
-Temperance was; he then tested several explanations thereof,
-propounded by Charmides and Kritias: but ending only in universal
-puzzle and confessed ignorance. In the Laches, he had done the
-same with Courage: not without various expressions of regret for
-his own ignorance, and of surprise at those who talked freely
-about generalities which they had never probed to the bottom.
-Perplexed by these doubts and difficulties--which perplexed yet
-more all his previous hearers, the modest beauty of Charmides and
-the mature dignity of Nikias and Laches--Sokrates now finds
-himself in presence of the Eleate, who talks about Virtue,
-Temperance, Courage, &c., as matters determinate and familiar.
-Here then would have been the opportunity for Sokrates to
-reproduce all his unsolved perplexities, and to get them cleared
-up by the divine Stranger who is travelling on a mission of
-philosophy. The third dialogue, to be called the Philosophus,
-which Plato promises as sequel to the Sophistes and Politikus,
-would have been well employed in such a work of elucidation.
-
-[Side-note: Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of
-Search--To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition
-does not give solutions.]
-
-This, I say, is what we might have expected, if Plato had
-corresponded to the picture drawn by admiring commentators: if he
-had merely tied knots in one dialogue, in order to untie them in
-another. But we find nothing of the kind, nor is such a picture of
-Plato correct. The dialogue Philosophus does not exist, and
-probably was never written. Respecting the embarrassments of the
-Menon, Laches, Charmides, Alkibiades I., Protagoras,
-Euthyphron--Sokrates says not a word--[Greek: ou)de\ gru/]--to urge
-them upon the attention of the Eleate: who even alludes with
-displeasure to contentious disputants as unfair enemies. For the
-right understanding of these mysterious but familiar words--Virtue,
-Courage, Temperance--we are thrown back upon the common passive,
-unscientific, unreasoning, consciousness: or upon such measure and
-variety of it as each of us may have chanced to imbibe from the
-local atmosphere, unassisted by any special revelation from
-philosophy. At any rate, the Eleate furnishes no interpretative
-aid. He employs the words, as if the hearers understood them of
-course, without the slightest intimation that any difficulty
-attaches to them. Plato himself ignores all the difficulties, when
-he is putting positive exposition into the mouth of the Eleate.
-Puzzles and perplexities belong to the Dialogues of Search; in
-which they serve their purpose, if they provoke the intellect of
-the hearer to active meditation and effort, for the purpose of
-obtaining a solution.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XXXI.
-
-KRATYLUS.
-
-
-The dialogue entitled Kratylus presents numerous difficulties to
-the commentators: who differ greatly in their manner of
-explaining, First, What is its main or leading purpose? Next, How
-much of it is intended as serious reasoning, how much as mere
-caricature or parody, for the purpose of exposing and reducing to
-absurdity the doctrines of opponents? Lastly, who, if any, are the
-opponents thus intended to be ridiculed?
-
-[Side-note: Persons and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus--Sokrates
-has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others.]
-
-The subject proposed for discussion is, the rectitude or inherent
-propriety of names. How far is there any natural adaptation, or
-special fitness, of each name to the thing named? Two disputants
-are introduced who invoke Sokrates as umpire. Hermogenes asserts
-the negative of the question; contending that each name is
-destitute of natural significance, and acquires its meaning only
-from the mutual agreement and habitual usage of society.[1]
-Kratylus on the contrary maintains the doctrine that each name has
-a natural rectitude or fitness for its own significant
-function:--that there is an inherent bond of connection, a fundamental
-analogy or resemblance between each name and the thing signified.
-Sokrates carries on the first part of the dialogue with
-Hermogenes, the last part with Kratylus.[2] He declares more than
-once, that the subject is one on which he is ignorant, and has
-formed no conclusion: he professes only to prosecute the search
-for a good conclusion, conjointly with his two companions.[3]
-
-[Footnote 1: In the arguments put into the mouth of Hermogenes, he
-is made to maintain two opinions which are not identical, but
-opposed. 1. That names are significant by habit and convention, and
-not by nature. 2. That each man may and can give any name which he
-pleases to any object (pp. 384-385).
-
-The first of these two opinions is that which is really discussed
-here: impugned in the first half of the dialogue, conceded in the
-second. It is implied that names are to serve the purpose of
-mutual communication and information among persons living in
-society; which purpose they would not serve if each individual
-gave a different name to the same object. The second opinion is
-therefore not a consequence of the first, but an implied
-contradiction of the first.
-
-He who says that the names Horse and Dog are significant by
-convention, will admit that at the outset they might have been
-inverted in point of signification; but he will not say that any
-individual may invert them at pleasure, now that they are
-established. The purposes of naming would no longer be answered,
-if this were done.]
-
-[Footnote 2: The question between Hermogenes and Kratylus was much
-debated among the philosophers and literary men throughout
-antiquity (Aul. Gell. x. 4). Origen says (contra Celsum, i. c.
-24)--[Greek: lo/gos bathu\s kai\ a)po/r)r(etos o( peri\ phu/seos
-o)noma/ton, po/teron, o(s oi)/etai A)ristote/les, the/sei ei)=nai
-ta\ o)no/mata, e)\, o(s nomi/zousin oi( a)po\ te=s Stoa=s,
-phu/sei.]
-
-Aristotle assumes the question in favour of [Greek: the/sei], in
-his treatise De Interpretatione, without any reasoning, against
-the Platonic Kratylus; but his commentators, Ammonius and
-Boethius, note the controversy as one upon which eminent men in
-antiquity were much divided.
-
-Plato connects his opinion, that names have a natural rectitude of
-signification, with his general doctrine of self-existent,
-archetypal, Forms or Ideas. The Stoics, and others who defended
-the same opinion afterwards, seem to have disconnected it from
-this latter doctrine.]
-
-[Footnote 3: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 C, 391 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes--all
-proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed
-laws--speaking and naming among the rest.]
-
-Sokrates, refuting Hermogenes, lays down the following
-doctrines.[4] If propositions are either true or false, names,
-which are parts of propositions, must be true or false also.[5]
-Every thing has its own fixed and determinate essence, not
-relative to us nor varying according to our fancy or pleasure, but
-existing _per se_ as nature has arranged.[6] All agencies either
-by one thing upon other things, or by other things upon it, are in
-like manner determined by nature, independent of our will and
-choice. If we intend to cut or burn any substance, we must go to
-work, not according to our own pleasure, but in the manner that
-nature prescribes: by attempting to do it contrary to nature, we
-shall do it badly or fail altogether.[7] Now _speaking_ is one of
-these agencies, and _naming_ is a branch of _speaking_: what is
-true of other agencies is true of these also--we must name things,
-not according to our own will and pleasure, but in the way that
-nature prescribes that they shall be named.[8] Farther, each
-agency must be performed by its appropriate instrument: cutting by
-the axe, boring by the gimlet, weaving by the bodkin. The name is
-the instrument of naming, whereby we communicate information and
-distinguish things from each other. It is a didactic instrument:
-to be employed well, it must be in the hands of a properly
-qualified person for the purpose of teaching.[9] Not every man,
-but only the professional craftsman, is competent to fabricate the
-instruments of cutting and weaving. In like manner, not every man
-is competent to make a name: no one is competent except the
-lawgiver or the gifted name-maker, the rarest of all existing
-artists.[10]
-
-[Footnote 4: Aristot. De Interpretat. ii. 1-2: [Greek: O)/noma
-me\n ou)=n e)sti\ phone\ semantike\ kata\ sunthe/ken a)/neu
-chro/nou . . . to\ de\ kata\ sunthe/ken, o(/ti phu/sei to=n
-o)noma/ton ou)de/n e)stin], &c.
-
-This is the same doctrine which Plato puts into the mouth of
-Hermogenes (Kratylus, p. 384 E), and which Sokrates himself, in
-the latter half of the dialogue, admits as true to a large extent:
-that is, he admits that names are significant [Greek: kata\
-sunthe/ken], though he does not deny that they are or may be
-significant [Greek: phu/sei].
-
-[Greek: To\ a)po\ tau)toma/tou] (p. 397 A) is another phrase for
-expressing the opinion opposed to [Greek: o)noma/ton o)rtho/tes].]
-
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Kratyl. p. 385.
-
-Here too, Aristotle affirms the contrary: he says (with far more
-exactness than Plato) that propositions alone are true or false;
-and that a name taken by itself is neither. (De Interpret. i. 2.)
-
-The mistake of Plato in affirming Names to be true or false, is
-analogous to that which we read in the Philebus, where Pleasures
-are distinguished as true and false.]
-
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Kratyl. p. 386 D. [Greek: de=lon de\ o(/ti
-au)ta\ au(to=n ou)si/an e)/chonta/ tina be/baio/n e)sti ta\
-pra/gmata, ou) pro\s e(ma=s ou)de\ u(ph' e(mo=n, e)lko/mena a)/no
-kai\ ka/to to=| e(mete/ro| phanta/smati, a)lla\ kath' au(ta\ pro\s
-te\n au(ton ou)si/an e)/chonta e(=|per pe/phuken.]]
-
-[Footnote 7: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 A.]
-
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ to\
-o)noma/zein pra=xis ti/s e)stin, ei)/per kai\ to\ le/gein pra=xis
-tis e)=n peri\ ta\ pra/gmata? . . . Ai( de\ pra/xeis e)pha/nesan
-e(mi=n ou) pro\s e(ma=s ou)=sai, a)ll' au(to=n tina i)di/an
-phu/sin e)/chousai? . . . Ou)kou=n kai\ o)nomaste/on e(=| pe/phuke
-ta\ pra/gmata o)noma/zein te kai\ o)noma/zesthai, kai\ o(=|, a)ll'
-ou)ch e(=| a)\n e(mei=s bouletho=men, ei)/per ti toi=s
-e)/mprosthen me/llei o(mologou/menon ei)=nai? kai\ ou(/to me\n
-a)\n ple/on ti poioi=men kai\ o)noma/zoimen, a)/llos de\ ou)/?]
-
-Speaking and naming are regarded by Plato as acts whereby the
-thing (spoken of or) named is acted upon or suffers. So in the
-Sophistes (p. 248) he considers Knowing as an act performed,
-whereby the thing known suffers. Deuschle (Die Platonische
-Sprach-philosophie, p. 59, Marpurg. 1859) treats this comparison
-made by Plato between naming and material agencies, as if it were
-mere banter--and even indifferent banter. Schleiermacher in his note
-thinks it seriously meant and Platonic; and I fully agree with him
-(Schl. p. 456).]
-
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Kratyl. p. 388 C. [Greek: O)/noma a)/ra
-didaskaliko/n ti/ e)stin o)/rganon, kai\ diakritiko\n te=s
-ou)si/as, o(/sper kerki\s u(pha/smatos.] See Boethius ap. Schol.
-ad Aristot. Interp. p. 108, a. 40. Aristotle (De Interpr. iv. 3)
-says: [Greek: e)/sti de\ lo/gos a(/pas me\n semantiko/s, ou)ch o(s
-o)/rganon de/, a)lla\ kata\ sunthe/ken.] Several even of the
-Platonic critics consider Plato's choice of the metaphor [Greek:
-o)/rganon] as inappropriate: but modern writers on logic and
-psychology often speak of names as "_instruments_ of thought".]
-
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 A. [Greek: o( nomothe/tes,
-o(\s de\ to=n demiourgo=n spanio/tatos e)n a)nthro=pois
-gi/gnetai.]]
-
-[Side-note: The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the
-law-giver upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as
-appreciated, by the philosopher.]
-
-To what does the lawgiver look when he frames a name? Compare the
-analogy of other instruments. The artisan who constructs a bodkin
-or shuttle for weaving, has present to his mind as a model, the
-Idea or Form of the bodkin--the self-existent bodkin of Nature
-herself. If a broken shuttle is to be replaced, it is this Idea or
-type, not the actual broken instrument, which he seeks to copy.
-Whatever may be the variety of web for which the shuttle is
-destined, he modifies the new instrument accordingly: but all of
-them must embody the Form or Idea of the shuttle. He cannot choose
-another type according to his own pleasure: he must embody the
-type, prescribed by nature, in the iron, wood, or other material
-of which the instrument is made.[11]
-
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 B-C. [Greek: au)to\ o( e)/sti
-kerki/s . . . pa/sas me\n dei= to\ te=s kerki/dos e)/chein ei)=dos
-. . . ou)ch oi(=on a)\n au)to\s boule/the, a)ll' oi(=on
-e)pephu/kei.]]
-
-So about names: the lawgiver, in distributing names, must look to
-the Idea, Form, or type--the self-existent name of Nature--and
-must embody this type, as it stands for each different thing, in
-appropriate syllables. The syllables indeed may admit of great
-variety, just as the material of which the shuttle is made may be
-diversified: but each aggregate of syllables, whether Hellenic or
-barbaric, must embody the essential Name-Idea or Type.[12] The
-lawgiver[13] ought to know, enumerate, and classify all the sorts
-of things on the one hand, and all the varieties of letters or
-elements of language on the other; distinguishing the special
-significative power belonging to each letter. He ought then to
-construct his words, and adapt each to signify that with which it
-is naturally connected. Who is to judge whether this process has
-been well or ill performed? Upon that point, the judge is, the
-professional man who uses the instrument. It is for the working
-weaver to decide whether the shuttle given to him is well or ill
-made. To have a good ship and rudder, it must be made by a
-professional builder, and appreciated by a professional pilot or
-steersman. In like manner, the names constructed by the lawgiver
-must be appreciated by the man who is qualified by training or
-study to use names skilfully: that is, by the dialectician or
-philosopher, competent to ask and answer questions.[14]
-
-[Footnote 12: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 389 D, 390 A. [Greek: to\
-e(ka/sto| phu/sei pephuko\s o)/noma to\n nomothe/ten e)kei=non
-ei)s tou\s phtho/ggous kai\ ta\s sullaba\s dei= e)pi/stasthai
-tithe/nai, kai\ ble/ponta _pro\s au)to\ e)kei=no o(\ e)/stin
-o)/noma_, pa/nta ta\ o)no/mata poiei=n te kai\ ti/thesthai, _ei)
-me/llei ku/rios ei)=nai o)noma/ton the/tes_. . . .
-
-Ou(/tos a)xio/seis kai\ to\n nomothe/ten to/n te e)ntha/de kai\
-to\n e)n toi=s barba/rois, e(/os a)\n to\ _tou= o)no/matos
-ei)=dos_ a)podido=| _to\ prose=kon e(ka/sto| e)n o(poiaisou=n
-sullabai=s_, ou)de\n chei/ro nomothe/ten ei)=nai to\n e)ntha/de
-e)\ to\n o(pouou=n a)/llothi?]]
-
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Kratyl. p. 424 D-E.]
-
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one
-thing and not another.]
-
-It is the fact then, though many persons may think it ridiculous,
-that names--or the elementary constituents and letters, of which
-names are composed--have each an intrinsic and distinctive
-aptitude, fitting them to signify particular things.[15] Names
-have thus a standard with reference to which they are correct or
-incorrect. If they are to be correct, they cannot be given either
-by the freewill of an ordinary individual, or even by the
-convention of all society. They can be affixed only by the skilled
-lawgiver, and appreciated only by the skilled dialectician.
-
-[Footnote 15: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 425-426.]
-
-[Side-note: Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things
-nameable--essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its
-Nominatum.]
-
-Such is the theory here laid down by Sokrates respecting Names. It
-is curious as illustrating the Platonic vein of speculation. It
-enlarges to an extreme point Plato's region of the absolute and
-objective. Not merely each thing named, but each name also, is in
-his view an Ens absolutum; not dependent upon human choice--not
-even relative (so he alleges) to human apprehension. Each name has
-its own self-existent Idea, Form, or Type, the reproduction or
-copy of which is imperative. The Platonic intelligible world
-included Ideas of things, and of names correlative to them: just
-as it included Ideas of master and slave correlative to each
-other. It contained Noumena of names, as well as Noumena of
-things.[16] The essence of the name was, to be significant of the
-essence of the thing named: though such significance admitted of
-diversity, multiplication, or curtailment, in the letters or
-syllables wherein it was embodied.[17] The name became
-significant, by imitation or resemblance: that name was right, the
-essence of which imitated the essence of the thing named.[18] The
-vocal mimic imitates sounds, the painter imitates the colours: the
-name-giver imitates in letters or syllables, the essence of
-colours, sounds, and every thing else which is nameable.
-
-[Footnote 16: Plato, Parmenid. p. 133 E.]
-
-[Footnote 17: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 393 D, 432.]
-
-[Footnote 18: Plato, Kratyl. p. 422 D. [Greek: to=n o)noma/ton e(
-o)rtho/tes toiau/te tis e)bou/leto ei)=nai, oi(=a delou=n oi(=on
-e(/kasto/n e)sti to=n o)/nton.]--423 D: [Greek: ou) kai\ _ou)si/a
-dokei=_ soi ei)=nai e(ka/sto|, o(/sper kai\ chro=ma kai\ a(\ nu=n
-de\ e)le/gomen? pro=ton au)to=| to=| chro/mati kai\ te=| phone=|
-ou)k e)/stin ou)si/a tis e(kate/ro| au)to=n kai\ toi=s a)/llois
-pa=sin, _o(/sa exi/otai tau/tes te=s prosre/seos tou= ei)=nai?_
-. . . Ti/ ou)=n?** ei)/ tis au)to\ tou=to mimei=sthai du/naito,
-e(ka/stou** te\n ou)si/an, gra/mmasi/ te kai\ sullabai=s, a)=r' ou)k
-a)\n deloi= e(/kaston o(\ e)/stin?] Compare p. 433.
-
-The story given by Herodotus (ii. 2) about the experiment made by
-the Egyptian king Psammetichus, is curious. He wished to find out
-whether the Egyptians or the Phrygians were the oldest or first of
-mankind: he accordingly caused two children to be brought up
-without having a word spoken to them, with a view to ascertain
-what language they would come to by nature. At the age of two
-years they uttered the Phrygian word signifying _bread_.
-Psammetichus was then satisfied that the Phrygians were the first
-of mankind.
-
-This story undoubtedly proceeds upon the assumption that there is
-one name which naturally suggests itself for each object. But when
-M. Renan says that the assumption is the same "as Plato has
-developed with so much subtlety in the Kratylus," I do not agree
-with him. The Absolute Name-Form or Essence, discernible only by
-the technical Lawgiver, is something very different. See M. Renan,
-De l'Origine du Langage, ch. vi. p. 146, 2nd ed.]
-
-Another point here is peculiar to Plato. The Name-Giver must
-provide names such as can be used with effect by the dialectician
-or philosopher: who is the sole competent judge whether the names
-have genuine rectitude or not.[19] We see from hence that the
-aspirations of Plato went towards a philosophical language fit for
-those who conversed with forms or essences: something like (to use
-modern illustrations) a technical nomenclature systematically
-constructed for the expositions of men of science: such as that of
-Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, &c. Assuredly no language actually
-spoken among men, has ever been found suitable for this purpose
-without much artificial help.[20]
-
-[Footnote 19: Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 D. Respecting the person
-called [Greek: o( dialektiko/s], whom Plato describes as grasping
-Ideas, or Forms, Essences, and employing nothing else in his
-reasoning--[Greek: lo/gon didou\s kai\ lamba/non te=s
-ou)si/as]--see Republic, vi. p. 511 B, vii. pp. 533-534-537 C.]
-
-[Footnote 20: Plato, Kratyl. p. 426 A. [Greek: o( peri\ o)noma/ton
-techniko/s], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to
-discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly.]
-
-As this theory of naming is a deduction from Plato's main doctrine
-of absolute or self-existing Ideas, so it also illustrates (to
-repeat what was said in the last chapter) his recognition of
-professional skill and of competence vested exclusively in a
-gifted One or Few: which he ranks as the sole producing cause of
-Good or the Best, setting it in contrast with those two causes
-which he considers as productive of Evil, or at any rate of the
-Inferior or Second-Best: 1. The One or Few, who are ungifted and
-unphilosophical: perhaps ambitious pretenders. 2. The spontaneous,
-unbespoken inspirations, conventions, customs, or habits, which
-grow up without formal mandate among the community. To find the
-right name of each thing, is no light matter, nor within the
-competence of any one or many ordinary men. It can only be done by
-one of the few privileged lawgivers. Plato even glances at the
-necessity of a superhuman name-giver: though he deprecates the
-supposition generally, as a mere evasion or subterfuge, introduced
-to escape the confession of real ignorance.[21]
-
-[Footnote 21: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 397, 425, 438.]
-
-[Side-note: Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and
-impugns--the Protagorean doctrine--Homo Mensura.]
-
-In laying down the basis of his theory respecting names, Plato
-states another doctrine as opposed to it: _viz._, the Protagorean
-doctrine--Man is the Measure of all things. I have already said
-something about this doctrine, in reviewing the Theaetetus, where
-Plato impugns it: but as he here impugns it again, by arguments in
-part different--a few words more will not be misplaced.
-
-The doctrine of Protagoras maintains that all things are relative
-to the percipient, cogitant, concipient, mind: that all Object is
-implicated with a Subject: that as things appear to me, so they
-are to me--as they appear to you, so they are to you. Plato denies
-this, and says: "All things have a fixed essence of their own,
-absolutely and in themselves, not relative to any percipient or
-cogitant--nor dependent upon any one's appreciative understanding,
-or emotional susceptibility, or will. Things are so and so,
-without reference to us as sentient or cogitant beings: and not
-only the things are thus independent and absolute, but all their
-agencies are so likewise--agencies either by them or upon them.
-Cutting, burning, speaking, naming, &c., must be performed in a
-certain determinate way, whether we prefer it or not. A certain
-Name belongs, by Nature or absolutely, to a certain thing, whether
-we choose it or not: it is not relative to any adoption by us,
-either individually or collectively."
-
-This Protagorean theory is here set forth by the Platonic Sokrates
-as the antithesis or counter-theory, to that which he is himself
-advancing, _viz._--That Names are significant by nature and not by
-agreement of men:--That each Nomen is tied to its Nominatum by a
-natural and indissoluble bond. His remarks imply, that those who
-do not accept this last-mentioned theory must agree with
-Protagoras. But such an antithesis is noway necessary: since (not
-to speak of Hermogenes himself in this very dialogue) we find also
-that Aristotle--who maintains that Names are significant by
-convention and not by nature--dissents also from the theory of
-Protagoras: and would have rested his dissent from it on very
-different grounds.
-
-[Side-note: Objection by Sokrates--That Protagoras puts all men on
-a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance.]
-
-This will show us--what I have already remarked in commenting on
-the Theaetetus--that Plato has not been very careful in
-appreciating the real bearing of the Protagorean doctrine. He
-impugns it here by the same argument which we also read in the
-Theaetetus. "Everyone admits" (he says) "that there are some men
-wise and good--others foolish and wicked. Now if you admit this,
-you disallow the Protagorean doctrine. If I contend that as things
-appear to me, so they truly are to me--as things appear to you or
-to him, so they truly are to you or to him--I cannot consistently
-allow that any one man is wiser than any other. Upon such a
-theory, all men are put upon the same level of knowledge or
-ignorance."
-
-But the premisses of Plato here do not sustain his inference.
-
-[Side-note: Objection unfounded--What the Protagorean theory really
-affirms--Belief always relative to the believer's mind.]
-
-The Protagorean doctrine is, when stated in its most general
-terms,--That every man is and must be his own measure of truth or
-falsehood--That what appears to him true, _is true to him_,
-however it may appear to others--That he cannot by any effort step
-out of or beyond his own individual belief conviction,
-knowledge--That all his Cognita, Credita, Percepta, Cogitata, &c.,
-imply himself as Cognoscens, Credens, Percipiens, Cogitans, inseparably
-and indivisibly--That in affirming an object, he himself is
-necessarily present as affirming subject, and that Object and
-Subject are only two sides of the same indivisible fact[22]--That
-though there are some matters which all men agree in believing,
-there is no criterion at once infallible and universally
-recognised, in matters where they dissent: moreover, the matters
-believed are just as much relative where all agree, as where some
-disagree.
-
-[Footnote 22: M. Destutt Tracy observes, Logique, ch. ix. p. 347,
-ed. 1825:
-
-
-"En effet, on ne saurait trop le redire, chacun de nous, et meme
-tout etre anime quelconque, est pour lui-meme le centre de tout.
-Il ne percoit par un sentiment direct et une conscience intime,
-que ce qui affecte et emeut sa sensibilite. Il ne concoit et ne
-connait son existence que par ce qu'il sent, et celle des autres
-etres que parce qu'ils lui font sentir. Il n'y a de reel pour lui
-que ses perceptions, ses affections, ses idees: et tout ce qu'il
-peut jamais savoir, n'est toujours que des consequences et des
-combinaisons de ces premieres perceptions ou idees."
-
-The doctrine of the Sceptical philosophers, is explicitly
-announced by Sextus Empiricus as his personal belief: that which
-appears true to him, as far as his enquiry had reached. The
-passage deserves to be cited.
-
-Sextus Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i. Sect. 197-199.
-
-[Greek: O(/tan ou)=n ei)/pe| o( skeptiko\s "_ou)de\n o(ri/zo_"
-. . . tou=to/ phesi le/gon to\ _e(auto=| phaino/menon peri\
-to=n prokeime/non_, ou)k a)paggeltiko=s, meta\ pepoithe/seos
-a)pophaino/menos, a)ll' o(\ pa/schei, diegou/menos. . . . Kai\
-o(/sper o(le/gon "_peripato=_," ou(/tos o( le/gon "_pa/nta
-e)sti\n a)o/rista_" sussemai/nei kath' e(ma=s to\ o(s _pro\s e)me
-e)\ o(s e)moi\ phai/netai_; o(s ei)=nai to\ lego/menon toiou=ton
-"o(/sa e)pelthon to=n dogmatiko=s zetoume/non, toiau=ta/ moi
-phai/netai_, o(s mede\n au)to=n tou= machome/nou prou)/chein moi\
-dokei=n kata\ pi/stin e)\ a)pisti/an".]]
-
-[Side-note: Each man believes others to be wiser on various points
-than himself--Belief on authority--not inconsistent with the
-affirmation of Protagoras.]
-
-This doctrine is not refuted by the fact, that every man believes
-others to be wiser than himself on various points. A man is just
-as much a measure to himself when he acts upon the advice of
-others, or believes a fact upon the affirmation of others, as when
-he judges upon his own unassisted sense or reasoning. He is a
-measure to himself when he agrees with others, as much as when he
-disagrees with them. Opinions of others, or facts attested by
-others, may count as materials determining his judgment; but the
-judgment is and must be his own. The larger portion of every man's
-knowledge rests upon the testimony of others; nevertheless the
-facts thus reported become portions of _his_ knowledge, generating
-conclusions _in him_ and relatively _to him_. I believe the
-narrative of travellers, respecting parts of the globe which I
-have never seen: I adopt the opinion of A a lawyer, and of B a
-physician, on matters which I have not studied: I understand facts
-which I did not witness, from the description of those who did
-witness them. In all these cases the act of adoption is my own,
-and the grounds of belief are relative to my state of mind.
-Another man may mistrust completely the authorities which I
-follow: just as I mistrust the authority of Mahomet or Confucius,
-or various others, regarded as infallible by a large portion of
-mankind. The grounds of belief are to a certain extent similar, to
-a certain extent dissimilar, in different men's minds. Authority
-is doubtless a frequent ground of belief; but it is essentially
-variable and essentially relative to the believer. Plato himself,
-in many passages, insists emphatically upon the dissensions in
-mankind respecting the question--"_Who are_ the good and wise
-men?" He tells us that the true philosopher is accounted by the
-bulk of mankind foolish and worthless.
-
-[Side-note: Analogy of physical processes (cutting and burning)
-appealed to by Sokrates--does not sustain his inference against
-Protagoras.]
-
-In the Kratylus, Sokrates says (and I agree with him) that there
-are laws of nature respecting the processes of cutting and
-burning: and that any one who attempts to cut or burn in a way
-unconformable to those laws, will fail in his purpose. This is
-true, but it proves nothing against Protagoras. It is an appeal to
-a generalization from physical facts, resting upon experience and
-induction--upon sensation and inference which we and others,
-Protagoras as well as Plato, have had, and which we believe to be
-common to all. We know this fact, or have a full and certain
-conviction of it; but we are not brought at all nearer to the
-Absolute (_i.e._, to the Object without Subject) which Plato's
-argument requires. The analogy rather carries us away from the
-Absolute: for cutting and burning, with their antecedent
-conditions, are facts of sense: and Plato himself admits, to a
-great extent, that the facts of sense are relative. All experience
-and induction, and all belief founded thereupon, are essentially
-relative. The experience may be one common to all mankind, and
-upon which all are unanimous:[23] but it is not the less relative
-to each individual of the multitude. What is relative to all,
-continues to be relative to each: the fact that all sentient
-individuals are in this respect alike, does not make it cease to
-be relative, and become absolute. What I see and hear in the
-theatre is relative to me, though it may at the same time be
-relative to ten thousand other spectators, who are experiencing
-like sensations. Where all men think or believe alike, it may not
-be necessary for common purposes to distinguish the multiplicity
-of individual thinking subjects: yet the subjects are nevertheless
-multiple, and the belief, knowledge, or fact, is relative to each
-of them, whether all agree, or whether beliefs are many and
-divergent. We cannot suppress ourselves as sentient or cogitant
-subjects, nor find any _locus standi_ for Object pure and simple,
-apart from the ground of relativity. And the Protagorean dictum
-brings to view these subjective conditions, as being essential, no
-less than the objective, to belief and disbelief.
-
-[Footnote 23: Proklus, in his Scholia on the Kratylus, p. 32, ed.
-Boisson, cites the argument used by Aristotle against Plato on
-this very subject of names--[Greek: _ta\ me\n phu/sei, para\ pa=si
-ta\ au)ta/_; ta\ de\ o)no/mata ou) para\ pa=si ta\ au)ta/; o/ste
-ta\ phu/sei o)/nta ou)/k e)stin o)no/mata, kai\ ta\ o)no/mata ou)k
-ei)si phu/sei.] Ammonius ad Aristot. De Interpretat. p. 100, a.
-28, Schol. Bekk. Sextus Empiricus adv. Mathemat. i. 145-147, p.
-247, Fab.
-
-Plato had assimilated naming to cutting and burning. Aristotle
-denies the analogy: he says that cutting and burning are the same
-to all, or _are by nature_: naming is not the same to all, and is
-therefore not by nature.
-
-We find here the test pointed out to distinguish what _is by
-nature_ (that which Plato calls the [Greek: ou)si/an be/baion to=n
-pragma/ton]--p. 386 E),--_viz._ That it is the same to all or
-among all. What it is to one individual, it is to another also.
-There are a multitude of different judging subjects, but no
-dissentient subjects: myself, and in my belief all other subjects,
-are affected alike. This is the true and real Objective: a
-particular fact of sense, where Subject is not eliminated
-altogether, but becomes a constant quantity, and therefore escapes
-separate notice. An Objective _absolute_ (_i.e._, without Subject
-altogether) is an impossibility.
-
-In the Aristotelian sense of [Greek: phu/sei], it would be correct
-to say that Language, or Naming _in genere_, is natural to man. No
-human society has yet been found without some language--some
-names--some speech employed and understood by each individual
-member. But many different varieties of speech will serve the
-purpose, not indeed with equal perfection, yet tolerably: enough
-to enable a society to get on. The uniformity ([Greek: to\
-phu/sei]) here ceases. To a certain extent, the objects and
-agencies which are named, are the same in all societies: to a
-certain extent different. If we were acquainted with all the past
-facts respecting the different languages which have existed or do
-exist on the globe, we should be able to assign the reason which
-brought each particular _Nomen_ into association with its
-_Nominatum_. But this past history is lost.]
-
-[Side-note: Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections.]
-
-Protagoras would have agreed with Plato as to combustion--that
-there were certain antecedent conditions under which he fully
-expected it, and certain other conditions under which he expected
-with confidence that it would not occur. Only he would have
-declared this (assuming him to speak conformably to his own
-theory) to be his own full belief and conviction, derived from
-certain facts and comparisons of sense, which he also _knew_ to be
-shared by most other persons. He would have pronounced farther,
-that those who held opposite opinions were in his judgment wrong:
-but he would have recognised that their opinion was true to
-themselves, and that their belief must be relative to causes
-operating upon _their_ minds. Farthermore, he would have pointed
-out, that combustion itself, with its antecedents, were facts of
-sense, relative to individual sentients and observers, remembering
-and comparing what they had observed. This would have been the
-testimony of Protagoras (always assuming him to speak in
-conformity with his own theory), but it would not have satisfied
-Plato: who would have required a peremptory, absolute affirmation,
-discarding all relation to observers or observed facts, and
-leaving no scope for error or fallibility.
-
-[Side-note: Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief, common to all
-men--Grounds of belief and disbelief, different with different men
-and different ages.]
-
-Those who agree with Plato on this question, impugn the doctrine
-of Protagoras as effacing all real, intrinsic, distinction between
-truth and falsehood. Such objectors make it a charge against
-Protagoras, that he does not erect his own mind into a peremptory
-and infallible measure for all other minds.[24] He expressly
-recognises the distinction, so far as his own mind is concerned:
-he admits that other men recognise it also, each for himself.
-Nevertheless, to say that all men recognise one and the same
-objective distinction between truth and falsehood, would be to
-contradict palpable facts. Each man has a standard, an ideal of
-truth in his own mind: but different men have different standards.
-The grounds of belief, though in part similar with all men, are to
-a great extent dissimilar also: they are dissimilar even with the
-same man, at different periods of his life and circumstances. What
-all men have in common is the feeling of belief and the feeling of
-disbelief: the matters believed or disbelieved, as well as the
-ideal standard to which any new matter presented for belief or
-disbelief is referred, differ considerably. By rational
-discussion--by facts and reasonings set forth on both sides, as in
-the Platonic dialogues--opinions may be overthrown or modified:
-dissentients may be brought into agreement, or at least each may
-be rendered more fully master of the case on both sides. But this
-dialectic, the Platonic question and answer, is itself an appeal
-to the free action of the individual mind. The questioner starts
-from premisses conceded by the respondent. He depends upon the
-acquiescence of the respondent for every step taken in advance.
-Such a proceeding is relative, not absolute: coinciding with the
-Protagorean formula rather than with the Platonic negation of
-it.[25] No man ever claimed the right of individual judgment more
-emphatically than Sokrates: no man was ever more special in
-adapting his persuasions to the individual persons with whom he
-conversed.
-
-[Footnote 24: To illustrate the impossibility of obtaining any
-standard absolute and purely objective, without reference to any
-judging Subject, I had transcribed a passage from Steinthal's work
-on the Classification of Human languages; but I find it too long
-for a note.
-
-Steinthal, Charakteristik der Hauptsaechlichen Typen des
-Sprachbaues, 2nd ed. Berlin, 1860, pp. 313-314-315.]
-
-[Footnote 25: See the striking passages in the Gorgias, pp. 472 B,
-474 B, 482 B; Theaetetus, p. 171 D.
-
-Also in proclaiming the necessity of specialty of adaptation to
-individual minds--Plat. Phaedr. pp. 271-272, 277 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon
-the will or inclination of each individual but that it was
-relative to the circumstances of each individual mind.]
-
-The grounds of belief, according to Protagoras, relative to the
-individual, are not the same with all men at all times. But it
-does not follow (nor does Protagoras appear to have asserted) that
-they vary according to the _will_ or _inclination_ of the
-individual. Plato, in impugning this doctrine, reasons as if these
-two things were one and the same--as if, according to Protagoras,
-a man believed whatever he chose.[26] This, however, is not an
-exact representation of the doctrine "Homo Mensura": which does
-not assert the voluntary or the arbitrary, but simply the relative
-as against the absolute. What a man believes does not depend upon
-his own will or choice: it depends upon an aggregate of
-circumstances, partly peculiar to himself, partly common to him
-with other persons more or fewer in number:[27] upon his age,
-organisation, and temperament--his experience, education,
-historical and social position--his intellectual powers and
-acquirements--his passions and sentiments of every kind, &c. These
-and other ingredients--analogous, yet neither the same nor
-combined in the same manner, even in different individuals of the
-same time and country, much less in those of different times and
-countries--compose the aggregate determining grounds of belief or
-disbelief in every one. Each man has in his mind an ideal standard
-of truth and falsehood: but that ideal standard, never exactly the
-same in any two men, nor in the same man at all times, often
-varies in different men to a prodigious extent. Now it is to this
-standard in the man's own mind that those reasoners refer who
-maintain that belief is relative. They do not maintain, that it is
-relative simply to his wishes, or that he believes and disbelieves
-what he chooses.
-
-[Footnote 26: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 387-389, where [Greek: pro\s
-e(ma=s] is considered as equivalent to [Greek: o(s a)\n e(mei=s
-boulo/metha--e(=| a)\n e(mei=s boule/thomen]--both of them being
-opposed to [Greek: oi(=on e)pephu/kei--to\ kata\ phu/sin--i)di/an
-au)to=n phu/sin e)/chousai.]
-
-The error here noted is enumerated by by Mr. John Stuart Mill,
-among the specimens of Fallacies of Confusion, in his System of
-Logic, Book v. ch. vii. Sec. 1: "The following is an argument of
-Descartes to prove, in his _a priori_ manner, the being of a God.
-The conception, says he, of an infinite Being proves the real
-existence of such a Being. For if there is not really any such
-Being, _I_ must have made the conception: but if I could make it,
-I can also unmake it--which evidently is not true: therefore there
-must be, externally to myself, an archetype from which the
-conception was derived. In this argument (which, it may be
-observed, would equally prove the real existence of ghosts and of
-witches) the ambiguity is in the pronoun _I_; by which, in one
-place, is to be understood _my will_--in another, the _laws of my
-nature_. If the conception, existing as it does in my mind, had no
-original without, the conclusion would unquestionably follow that
-_I_ made it--that is, the laws of my nature must have somehow
-evolved it: but that _my will_ made it, would not follow. Now when
-Descartes afterwards adds that I cannot unmake the conception, he
-means that I cannot get rid of it by an act of my will--which is
-true, but is not the proposition required. I can as much unmake
-this conception as I can any other: no conception which I have
-once had, can I ever dismiss by mere volition: but what some of
-the laws of my nature have produced, other laws, or those same
-laws in other circumstances, may, and often do, subsequently
-efface."]
-
-[Footnote 27: To show how constantly this Protagorean dictum is
-misconceived, as if Protagoras had said that things were to each
-individual what he was pleased or chose to represent them as
-being, I transcribe the following passage from Lassalle's
-elaborate work on Herakleitus (vol. ii. p. 381):--"Des Protagoras
-Prinzip ist es, dass ueberhaupt Nichts Objektives ist; dass
-vielmehr alles Beliebige was Einem scheint, auch fuer ihn sei. Dies
-Selbstsetzen des Subjekts ist die einzige Wahrheit der Dinge,
-welche an sich selbst Nichts Objektives haben, sondern zur
-gleichgueltigen Flaeche geworden sind, auf die das Subjekt
-willkuehrlich und beliebig seine Charaktere schreibt."
-
-Protagoras does not (as is here asserted) deny the Objective: he
-only insists on looking at it in conjunction with, or measured by,
-some Subject; and that Subject, not simply as desiring or
-preferring, but clothed in all its attributes.]
-
-[Side-note: Facts of sense--some are the same to all sentient
-subjects, others are different to different subjects. Grounds of
-unanimity.]
-
-When Plato says that combustibility and secability of objects are
-properties fixed and determinate,[28] this is perfectly true, as
-meaning that a certain proportion of the facts of sense affect in
-the same way the sentient and appreciative powers of each
-individual, determining the like belief in every man who has ever
-experienced them. Measuring and weighing are sensible facts of
-this character: seen alike by all, and conclusive proofs to all.
-But this implies, to a certain point, fundamental uniformity in
-the individual sentients and judges. Where such condition is
-wanting--where there is a fundamental difference in the sensible
-apprehension manifested by different individuals--the unanimity is
-wanting also. Such is the case in regard to colours and other
-sensations: witness the peculiar vision of Dalton and many others.
-The unanimity in the first case, the discrepancy in the second, is
-alike an aggregate of judgments, each individual, distinct, and
-relative. You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you
-cannot support your opinion by evidence or authority which
-satisfies _his_ senses or _his_ reason, he remains unconvinced.
-Your individual opinion stands good _to you_; his opinion stands
-good _to him_. You think that he ought to believe as you do, and
-in certain cases you feel persuaded that he will be brought to
-that result by future experience, which of course must be relative
-to him and to his appreciative powers. He entertains the like
-persuasion in regard to you.
-
-[Footnote 28: When Plato asserts not only that Objects are
-absolute and not relative to any Subject--but that the agencies or
-properties of Objects are also absolute--he carries the doctrine
-farther than modern defenders of the absolute. M. Cousin, in the
-eighth and ninth Lectures of his Cours d'Hist. de la Philosophie
-Morale au 18me Siecle, lays down the contrary, maintaining that
-objects and essences alone are absolute, though unknowable; but
-that their agencies are relative and knowable.
-
-"Nous savons qu'il exists quelque chose hors de nous, parceque
-nous ne pouvons expliquer nos perceptions sans les rattacher a des
-causes distinctes de nous memes: nous savons de plus que ces
-causes, dont nous ne connaissons pas d'ailleurs l'essence,
-_produisent les effets les plus variables, les plus divers, et
-meme les plus contraires, selon qu'elles rencontrent telle nature
-ou telle disposition du sujet._ Mais savons-nous quelque chose de
-plus? et meme, vu le caractere indetermine des causes que nous
-concevons dans les corps, y-a-t-il quelque chose de plus a savoir?
-Y-a-t-il lieu de nous enquerir si nous percevons _les choses
-telles qu'elles sont? Non, evidemment. . . Je ne dis pas que le
-probleme est insoluble: je dis qu'il est absurde, et renferme une
-contradiction._ Nous ne savons pas ce que ces causes sont en
-elles-memes, et la raison nous defend de chercher a les connaitre:
-mais il est bien evident _a priori_ qu'elles ne sont pas en
-elles-memes ce qu'elles sont par rapport a nous, _puisque la presence
-du sujet modifie necessairement leur action_. Supprimez tout sujet
-sentant, il est certain que ces causes agiraient encore,
-puisqu'elles continueraient d'exister: mais elles agiraient
-autrement; elles seraient encore des qualites et des proprietes,
-mais qui ne ressembleraient a rien de ce que nous connaissons. Le
-feu ne manifesterait plus aucune des proprietes que nous lui
-connaissons: que serait-il? C'est ce que nous ne saurons jamais.
-C'est d'ailleurs peut-etre un probleme qui ne repugne pas
-seulement a la nature de notre esprit mais a l'essence meme des
-choses. Quand meme en effet on supprimerait par la pensee tous les
-sujets sentants, il faudrait encore admettre que nul corps ne
-manifesterait ses proprietes autrement qu'en relation avec un
-sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas _ses proprietes ne seraient
-encore que relatives_: en sorte qu'il me parait fort raisonnable
-d'admettre que les proprietes determinees des corps _n'existent
-pas independamment d'un sujet quelconque_." (2de Partie, 8me
-Lecon, pp. 216-218, ed. Danton et Vacherot, Bruxelles, 1841.)]
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or
-the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many
-existing names. His etymological transitions.]
-
-It is thus that Sokrates, in the first half of the Kratylus, lays
-down his general theory that names have a natural and inherent
-propriety: and that naming is a process which cannot be performed
-except in one way. He at the same time announces that his theory
-rests upon a principle opposed to the "Homo Mensura" of
-Protagoras. He then proceeds to illustrate his doctrine by
-exemplification of many particular names, which are alleged to
-manifest a propriety of signification in reference to the persons
-or matters to which they are applied. Many of these are proper
-names, but some are common names or appellatives. Plato regards
-the proper names as illustrating, even better than the common, the
-doctrine of inherent rectitude in naming: especially the names of
-the Gods, with respect to the use of which Plato was himself
-timidly scrupulous--and the names reported by Homer as employed by
-the Gods themselves. We must remember that nearly all Grecian
-proper names had some meaning: being compounds or derivatives from
-appellative nouns.
-
-The proper names are mostly names of Gods or Heroes: then follow
-the names of the celestial bodies (conceived as Gods), of the
-elements, of virtues and vices, &c. All of them, however, both the
-proper and the common names, are declared to be compound, or
-derivative; presupposing other simple and primitive names from
-which they are formed.[29] Sokrates declares the fundamental
-theory on which the primitive roots rest; and indicates the
-transforming processes, whereby many of the names are deduced or
-combined from their roots. But these processes, though sometimes
-reasonable enough, are in a far greater number of instances
-forced, arbitrary, and fanciful. The transitions of meaning
-imagined, and the structural transformations of words, are alike
-strange and violent.[30]
-
-[Footnote 29: See the Introduction to Pape's Woerterbuch der
-Griechischen Eigennamen.
-
-Thus Proklus observes:--"The recklessness about proper names, is
-shown in the case of the man who gave to his son the name of
-Athanasius" (Proklus, Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 5, ed. Boiss.) Proklus
-adopts the distinction between divine and human names, citing the
-authority of Plato in Kratylus. The words of Proklus are
-remarkable, ad Timaeum, ii. p. 197. Schneid. [Greek: Oi)kei=a ga/r
-e)stin o)no/mata pa/se| ta/xei to=n pragma/ton, thei=a me\n toi=s
-thei/ois, dianoeta\ de\ toi=s dianoetoi=s, doxasta\ de\ toi=s
-doxastoi=s.] See Timaeus, p. 29 B. Compare also Kratylus, p. 400 E,
-and Philebus, p. 12 C.
-
-When Plato (Kratylus, pp. 391-392; compare Phaedrus, p. 252 A)
-cites the lines of Homer mentioning appellations bestowed by the
-Gods, I do not understand him, as Graefenhahn and others do, to
-speak in mockery, but _bona fide_. The affirmation of Clemens
-Alexandrinus (Stromat. i. 104) gives a probable account of Plato's
-belief:--[Greek: O( Pla/ton kai\ toi=s theoi=s dialekto\n
-a)pone/mei tina/, ma/lista me\n a)po\ to=n o)neira/ton
-tekmairo/menos kai\ to=n chresmo=n.] See Graefenhahn, Gesch. der
-Klassischen Philologie, vol. i. p. 176.
-
-When we read the views of some learned modern philologists, such
-as Godfrey Hermann, we cannot be surprised that many Greeks in the
-Platonic age should believe in an [Greek: o)rtho/tes o)noma/ton]
-applicable to their Gods and Heroes:--"Unde intelligitur, ex
-nominibus naturam et munia esse cognoscenda Deorum: Nec Deorum
-tantum, sed etiam heroum, omninoque rerum omnium, nominibus quae
-propria vocantur appellatarum" (De Mythologia Graecorum
-Antiquissima--in Opuscula, vol. ii. p. 167).
-
-"Bei euch, Ihr Herrn, kann man das Wesen
-Gewoehnlich aus dem Namen lesen," &c.
-_Goethe_, Faust.
-
-See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, adv. Koloten, c. 22, p. 1119
-E, respecting the essential rectitude and indispensable employment
-of the surnames and appellations of the Gods.
-
-The supposition of a mysterious inherent relation, between Names
-and the things named, has found acceptance among expositors of
-many different countries.
-
-M. Jacob Salvador (Histoire des Institutions de Moise, Liv. x.,
-ch. ii.; vol. iii. p. 136) says respecting the Jewish
-Cabbala:--"Que dirai-je de leur _Cabale_? mot signifiant aussi
-_tradition_. Elle se composait originairement de tous les principes
-abstraits qui ne se repandent pas chez le vulgaire: elle tomba bientot
-dans la folie. Cacher quelques idees metaphysiques sous les figures
-les plus bizarres, et prendre ensuite une peine infinie pour retrouver
-ces idees premieres: s'imaginer qu'il existe entre les noms et les
-choses une correlation inevitable, et que la contexture litterale
-des livres sacres par exemple, doit eclairer sur l'essence meme et
-sur tous les secrets du Dieu qui les a dictes: tourmenter des-lors
-chaque phrase, chaque mot, chaque lettre, avec la meme ardeur
-qu'on en met de nos jours a decomposer et a recomposer tous les
-corps de la nature: enfin, apres avoir etabli la correlation entre
-les mots et les choses, croire qu'en changeant, disposant,
-combinant, ces mots, on traverse de pretendus _canaux_ d'influence
-qui les unissent a ces choses, et qu'on agit sur elles: voila, ce
-me semble, les principales pretentions de cette espece de science
-occulte, echappee de l'Egypte, qui a devore beaucoup de bons
-esprits, et qui, d'une part, donne la main a la theologie, d'autre
-part, a l'astrologie et aux combinaisons magiques."]
-
-[Footnote 30: I cite various specimens of the etymologies given by
-Plato:--
-
-1. [Greek: A)game/mnon--o( a)gasto\s kata\ te\n e)pimone/n]--in
-consequence of his patience in remaining ([Greek: mone\]) with his
-army before Troy (p. 395 A).
-
-2. [Greek: A)treu\s--kata\ to\ a)teire/s, kai\ kata\ to\
-a)/treston, kai\ kata\ to\ a)tero/n] (p. 395 C).
-
-3. [Greek: Pe/lops--o( to\ e)ggu\s (pe/las) mo/non o(ro=n kai\ to\
-parachre=ma] (p. 395 D).
-
-4. [Greek: Ta/ntalos--tala/ntatos] (p. 395 E).
-
-5. [Greek: Zeu\s--Di/a--Ze=na--di' o(\n _ze=n_ a)ei\ pa=si toi=s
-zo=sin u(pa/rchei]--ut proprie unum debuerit esse vocabulum
-[Greek: Diaze=na]. Stallbaum, ad. p. 396 A. Proklus admired these
-etymologies (ad Timaeum, ii. p. 226, ed. Schneid.).
-
-6. [Greek: Oi( theoi\]--Sun, Moon, Earth, Stars, Uranus--[Greek:
-a(/te au)ta\ o(rontes pa/nta a)ei\ i)o/nta dro/mo| kai\ the/onta,
-a)po\ tau/tes te=s phu/seos te=s tou= thei=n _theou\s_ au)tou\s
-e)ponoma/sai] (p. 397 D).
-
-7. [Greek: Dai/mones--o(/ti phro/nimoi kai\ dae/mones e)=san,
-dai/monas au)tou\s ono/masen] (Hesiod) (p. 398 B).
-
-8. [Greek: E)/ros]--either from [Greek: e)/ros], as one sprung
-from the union of Gods with human females: or from [Greek:
-e)rota=|n] or [Greek: ei)/rein],--from oral or rhetorical
-attributes, as being [Greek: r(e/tores kai\ e)rotetikoi/] (p. 398
-D).
-
-9. [Greek: Di/philos--Dii+\ phi/los] (p. 399 B).
-
-10. [Greek: A)/nthropos--o( a)nathro=n a(\ o)/popen] (p. 399 C).
-
-11. [Greek: Psuche\]--a double derivation is proposed: first,
-[Greek: to\ a)na/psuchon], next, a second, _i.e._ [Greek: psuche\
-= phuse/che, e)\ phu/sin o)chei= kai\ e)/chei], which second is
-declared to be [Greek: techniko/teron], and the former to be
-ridiculous (pp. 399 E, 400 A-B).
-
-12. [Greek: So=ma = to\ se=ma te=s phuche=s], because the soul is
-buried in the body. Or [Greek: so=ma], that is, preserved or
-guarded, by the body as by an exterior wall, in order that it may
-expiate wrongs of a preceding life (p. 400 C).
-
-13. The first imposer of names was a philosopher who followed the
-theory of Herakleitus--perpetual flux of everything. Pursuant to
-this theory he gave to various Gods the names Kronos, Rhea,
-Tethys, &c., all signifying flux (p. 402 A-D).
-
-14. Various derivations of the names Poseidon, Hades or Pluto,
-Persephone or Pherrephatta, &c., are given (pp. 404-405); also of
-Apollo, so as to fit on to the four functions of the last-named
-God, [Greek: mousike/, mantike/, i)atrike/, toxike/] (p. 405).
-
-15. [Greek: Mou=sa--mousike\], from [Greek: mo=sthai] (recognised
-in Liddell and Scott from [Greek: ma/o] p. 406 A). [Greek:
-A)phrodi/te] from [Greek: a)phrou= ge/nesin], the Hesiodic
-derivation (p. 406 B-D).
-
-16. [Greek: A)e\r--o(/ti ai)/rei ta\ a)po\ te=s ge=s--e)\ o(/ti
-a)ei\ r(ei=--e)\ o(/ti pneu=ma e)x au)tou= gi/gnetai
-r(e/ontos]--quasi [Greek: a)eto/r)r(oun. Ai)the\r--o(/ti a)ei\
-thei= peri\ to\n a)e/ra r(e/on] (p. 410 B).
-
-17. [Greek: Phro/nesis--phora=s kai\ r(ou= no/esis u(polabei=n
-phora=s]. This and the following are put as derivatives from the
-Herakleitean theory (p. 411 D-E). [Greek: No/esis = tou= ne/ou
-e)/sis. Sophrosu/ne--soteri/a phrone/seos]. This is recognised by
-Aristotle in the Nikom. Ethica, vi. 5.
-
-18. [Greek: E)piste/me = e)pisteme/ne--o(s pherome/nois toi=s
-pra/gmasin e(pome/nes te=s psuche=s] (p. 412 A).
-
-19. [Greek: Dikaiosu/ne--e)pi\ te=| tou= dikai/ou sune/sei] (p.
-412 C).
-
-20. [Greek: Kaki/a = to\ kako=s i)o/n. Deili/a--te=s psuche=s
-desmo\s i)schuro/s--o(\ dei= li/an. A)rete\ = a)eirei/te]--that
-which has an easy and constant flux, or perhaps [Greek: ai(rete/]
-(p. 415 B-D). [Greek: Ai)schro\n = to\ a)eischorou=n--to\ a)ei\
-i)/schon to\n r(ou=n] (p. 416 B). [Greek: Su/mphero\n = te\ a(/ma
-phora\n te=s psuche=s meta\ to=n pragma/ton] (p. 417 A). [Greek:
-Lusite/loun = to\ te=s phora=s lu/on to\ te/los] (p. 417 C-E).
-[Greek: Blabero\n = to\ bla/pton to\n r(ou=n].
-
-The names of favourable import are such as designate facility of
-the universal flux, according to the Herakleitean theory. The
-names of unfavourable import designate obstruction of the flux.
-
-21. [Greek: Zugo\n = duogo/n] (p. 418 D).
-
-22. [Greek: Eu)phrosu/ne--a)po\ tou= eu)= pra/gmasi te\n psuche\n
-xumphe/resthai = eu)pherosu/ne] (p. 419 D).
-
-23. [Greek: Thumo\s--a)po\ te=s thu/seos kai\ ze/seos te=s
-psuche=s. E)pithumi/a--e( e)pi\ to\n thumo\n i)ou=sa du/namis] (p.
-419 E).
-
-24. [Greek: To\ o)/n = to\ ou)= tugcha/nei ze/tema, to\ o)/noma.
-O)nomasto\n = o)/n, ou)= ma/sma e)sti/n. (Ma/sma = ze/tema:
-mai/esthai = zetei=n)] (p. 421 A).
-
-25. [Greek: A)lethei/a--thei/a a)/le], or [Greek: e( thei/a tou=
-o)/ntos phora/. Pseu=dos] from [Greek: eu(/dein], with [Greek:
-psi=] prefixed, as being the opposite of movement and flux (p. 421
-B-C).
-
-26. Several derivations of names are given by Sokrates, as founded
-upon the theory opposed to Herakleitus--_i.e._, the theory that
-things were not in perpetual flux, but stationary:--
-
-[Greek: E)piste/me--o(/ti i(/stesin e(mo=n e)pi\ toi=s pra/gmasi
-te\n psuche/n.
-
-I(stori/a--o(/ti i(/stesi to\n r(ou=n.
-
-Pisto\n--i(sta=|n panta/pasi semai/nei.
-
-Mne/me--mone\ e)n te=| psuche=|] (437 A-C).
-
-27. We found before that some names of _good_ attributes were
-founded on the Herakleitean theory. But there are also names of
-_bad_ attributes founded on it.
-
-[Greek: A)mathi/a = e( tou= a(/ma theo=| i)o/ntos porei/a.
-
-A)kolasi/a = e( a)kolouthi/a toi=s pra/gmasin] (p. 437 C).
-
-Sokrates contrasts the two theories of [Greek: sta/sis] and
-[Greek: ki/nesis], and says that he believes the first Name-Givers
-to have apportioned names in conformity to the theory of [Greek:
-ki/nesis], but that he thinks they were mistaken in adopting that
-theory (p. 439 C).]
-
-[Side-note: These transitions appear violent to a modern reader.
-They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century.
-Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride
-the Sophists.]
-
-Such is the light in which these Platonic etymologies appear to a
-modern critic. But such was not the light in which they appeared
-either to the ancient Platonists, or to critics earlier than the
-last century. The Platonists even thought them full of mysterious
-and recondite wisdom. Dionysius of Halikarnassus highly commends
-Plato for his speculations on etymology, especially in the
-Kratylus.[31] Plutarch cites some of the most singular etymologies
-in the Kratylus as serious and instructive. The modesty of the
-Protagorean formula becomes here especially applicable: for so
-complete has been the revolution of opinion, that the Platonic
-etymologies are _now_ treated by _most_ critics as too absurd to
-have been seriously intended by Plato, even as conjectures. It is
-called "a valuable discovery of modern times" (so
-Schleiermacher[32] terms it) that Plato meant all or most of them
-as mere parody and caricature. We are now told that it was not
-Plato who misconceived the analogies, conditions, and limits, of
-etymological transition, but others; whom Plato has here set
-himself to expose and ridicule, by mock etymologies intended to
-parody those which they had proposed as serious. If we ask who the
-persons thus ridiculed were, we learn that they were the Sophists,
-Protagoras, or Prodikus, with others; according to Schleiermacher,
-Antisthenes among them.[33]
-
-[Footnote 31: Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verb. a. 16, p. 196, Schaefer.
-[Greek: ta\ kra/tista de\ ne/mo, o(s pro/to| to\n u(pe\r
-e)tumologi/as ei)sa/gonti lo/gon, Pla/toni to=| Sokratiko=|,
-pollache=| me\n kai\ a)/llothi, ma/lista de\ e)n to=| Kratu/lo|.]
-
-About Plato's etymologies, as seriously intended, see Plutarch, De
-Iside et Osiride, p. 375 C-D-E, with the note of Wyttenbach.
-Harris, in his Hermes (pp. 369-370-407), alludes to the
-etymologies of Plato in the Kratylus as being ingenious, though
-disputable, but not at all as being derisory caricatures. Indeed
-the etymology of _Scientia_, which he cites from Scaliger, p. 370,
-is quite as singular as any in the Kratylus. Sydenham (Notes to
-the translation of Plato's Philebus, p. 35) calls the Kratylus "a
-dialogue, in which is taught the nature of things, as well the
-permanent as the transient, from a supposed etymology of names and
-words.
-
-I find, in the very instructive comments of Bishop Colenso on the
-Pentateuch (Part iv. ch. 24, p. 250), a citation from St.
-Augustine, illustrating the view which I believe Plato to have
-taken of these etymologies: "Quo loco prorsus non arbitror
-praetereundum, quod pater Valerius animadvertit admirans, in
-quorundam rusticanorum (_i.e._, Africans, near Carthage)
-collocutione. Cum enim alter alteri dixisset _Salus_--quaesivit ab
-eo, qui et Latine nosset et Punice, quid esset _Salus_: responsum
-est, _Tria_. Tum ille agnoscens cum gaudio, salutem nostram esse
-Trinitatem, convenientiam linguarum non fortuitu sic sonuisse
-arbitratus est, sed occultissima dispensatione divinae
-providentiae--ut cum Latine nominatur _Salus_, a Punicis intelligantur
-_Tria_--et cum Punici lingua sua _Tria_ nominant, Latine intelligatur
-_Salus_ . . . Sed _haec verborum consonantia_, sive provenerit sive
-provisa sit, _non pugnaciter agendum est ut ei quisque consentiat,
-sed quantum interpretantis elegantiam hilaritas audientis
-admittit._"
-
-So in the etymologies of the Kratylus: Plato follows out threads
-of analogy, which, with indulgent hearers, he reckons will be
-sufficient for proof: and which, even when not accepted as proof,
-will be pleasing to the fancy of unbelieving hearers, as they are
-to his own. There is no intention to caricature: no obvious
-absurdities piled up with a view to caricature.]
-
-[Footnote 32: Schleiermacher, Introduction to Kratylus, vol. iv.
-p. 6: "Dagegen ist viel gewonnen durch die Entdeckung neuerer
-Zeiten," &c. To the same purpose, Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., part
-ii. p. 402, edit. 2nd, and Brandis, Gesch. Gr. Roem. Phil., part
-ii. sect. cvii. p. 285.
-
-Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Cratylum, p. 4, says: "Quod mirum
-est non esse ab iis animadversum, qui Platonem putaverunt de
-linguae et vocabulorum origine hoc libro suam sententiam explicare
-voluisse. Isti enim adeo nihil senserunt irrisionis, ut omnia
-atque singula pro philosophi decretis venditarint, ideoque ei
-absurdissima quaeque commenta affinxerint. Ita Menagius. . . . Nec
-Tiedemannus Argum, Dial. Plat. multo rectius judicat. Irrisionem
-primi senserunt Garnierius et Tennemann." &c. Stallbaum, moreover,
-is perpetually complaining in his notes, that the Etymological
-Lexicons adopt Plato's derivations as genuine. Menage (ad Diogen.
-Laert. iii. 25) declares most of the etymologies of Plato in the
-Kratylus to be [Greek: pseude/tuma], but never hints at the
-supposition that they are intended as caricatures. During the
-centuries between Plato and Menage, men had become more critical
-on the subject of etymology: in the century after Menage, they had
-become more critical still, as we may see by the remarks of Turgot
-on the etymologies of Menage himself.
-
-The following are the remarks of Turgot, in the article
-'Etymologie' (Encycl. Franc. in Turgot's collected works, vol.
-iii. p. 33): "Menage est un exemple frappant des absurdites dans
-lesquelles on tombe, en adoptant sans choix ce que suggere la
-malheureuse facilite de supposer tout ce qui est possible: car il
-est tres vrai qu'il ne fait aucune supposition dont la possibilite
-ne soit justifiee par des exemples. Mais nous avons prouve qu'en
-multipliant a volonte les alterations intermediaires, soit dans le
-son, soit dans la signification, il est aise de deriver un mot
-quelconque de tout autre mot donne: c'est le moyen _d'expliquer
-tout, et des-lors de ne rien expliquer_; c'est le moyen aussi de
-justifier tous les mepris de l'ignorance."
-
-Steinhart (Einleitung zum Kratylus, pp. 551-552) agrees with
-Stallbaum to a certain extent, that Plato in the Kratylus intended
-to mock and caricature the bad etymologists of his own day; yet
-also that parts of the Kratylus are seriously intended. And he
-declares it almost impossible to draw a line between the serious
-matter and the caricature.
-
-It appears to me that the Platonic critics here exculpate Plato
-from the charge of being a bad etymologist, only by fastening upon
-him another intellectual defect quite as serious.
-
-Dittrich, in his Dissertation De Cratylo Platonis, Leipsic, 1841,
-adopts the opinion of Schleiermacher and the other critics, that
-the etymological examples given in this dialogue, though Sokrates
-announces them as proving and illustrating his own theory
-seriously laid down, are really bitter jests and mockery, intended
-to destroy it--"hanc sententiam facetissimis et irrisione plenis
-exemplis, dum comprobare videtur, revera infringit" (p. 12).
-Dittrich admits that Kratylus, who holds the theory derided,
-understands nothing of this _acerbissima irrisio_ (p. 18). He
-thinks that Protagoras, not Prodikus nor Antisthenes, is the
-person principally caricatured (pp. 32-34-38).]
-
-[Footnote 33: Schleiermacher, Introd. to Kratyl. pp. 8-16;
-Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Krat. p. 17. Winckelmann suspects that
-Hermogenes in the Kratylus is intended to represent Antisthenes
-(Antisth. Fragment. p. 49).
-
-Lobeck (Aglaophamus, p. 866) says that the Pythagoreans were among
-the earliest etymologising philosophers, proposing such
-etymologies as now appear very absurd.]
-
-[Side-note: Dissent from this theory--No proof that the Sophists
-ever proposed etymologies.]
-
-To me this modern discovery or hypothesis appears inadmissible. It
-rests upon assumptions at best gratuitous, and in part incorrect:
-it introduces difficulties greater than those which it removes. We
-find no proof that the Sophists ever proposed such etymologies as
-those which are here supposed to be ridiculed--or that they
-devoted themselves to etymology at all. If they etymologised, they
-would doubtless do so in the manner (to our judgment loose and
-fantastic) of their own time and of times long after them. But
-what ground have we for presuming that Plato's views on the
-subject were more correct? and that etymologies which to them
-appeared admissible, would be regarded by him as absurd and
-ridiculous?
-
-Now if the persons concerned were other than the Sophists,
-scarcely any critic would have thought himself entitled to fasten
-upon them a discreditable imputation without some evidence. Of
-Prodikus we know (and that too chiefly from some sarcasms of
-Plato) that he took pains to distinguish words apparently, but not
-really, equivalent: and that such accurate distinction was what he
-meant by "rectitude of names" (Plato, Euthydem. 277 E.) Of
-Protagoras we know that he taught, by precept or example, correct
-speaking or writing: but we have no information that either of
-them pursued etymological researches, successfully or
-unsuccessfully.[34] Moreover this very dialogue (Kratylus)
-contains strong presumptive evidence that the Platonic etymologies
-could never have been intended to ridicule Protagoras. For these
-etymologies are announced by Sokrates as exemplifying and
-illustrating a theory of his own respecting names: which theory
-(Sokrates himself expressly tells us) is founded upon the direct
-negation of the cardinal doctrine of Protagoras.[35] That Sophist,
-therefore, could not have been ridiculed by any applications,
-however extravagant, of a theory directly opposed to him.[36]
-
-[Footnote 34: See a good passage of Winckelmann, Prolegg. ad
-Platon. Euthydemum, p. xlvii., respecting Protagoras and Prodikus,
-as writers and critics on language.
-
-Stallbaum says, Proleg. ad Krat. p. 11:--"Quibus verbis _haud
-dubie_ notantur Sophistae; qui, neglectis linguae elementis,
-derivatorum et compositorum verborum originationem temere ad suum
-arbitrium tractabant". Ibid. p. 4:--"In Cratylo ineptae etymologiae
-specimina exhibentur, ita quidem ut _haudquaquam dubitari liceat_,
-quin ista omnia ad mentem sophistarum maximeque Protagoreorum
-_joculari imitatione_ explicata sint".
-
-In spite of these confident assertions,--first, that the Sophists
-are the persons _intended_ to be ridiculed, next, that they
-_deserved_ to be so ridiculed--Stallbaum has another passage, p.
-15, wherein he says, "Jam vero quinam fuerint philosophi isti
-atque etymologi, qui in Cratylo ridentur et exploduntur, _vulgo
-parum exploratum habetur_". He goes on to say that neither
-Prodikus nor Antisthenes is meant, but Protagoras and the
-Protagoreans. To prove this he infers, from a passage in this
-dialogue (c. 11, p. 391 C), that Protagoras had written a book
-[Greek: peri\ o)rtho/tetos to=n o)noma/ton] (Heindorf and
-Schleiermacher, with better reason, infer from the passage nothing
-more than the circumstance that Protagoras taught [Greek:
-o)rthoepei/an] or correct speaking and writing). The passage does
-not prove this; but if it did, what did Protagoras teach in the
-book? Stallbaum tells us (p. 16):--"Jam si quaeras, quid tandem
-Protagoras ipse de nominum ortu censuerit, _fateor una conjectura
-nitendum esse, ut de hac re aliquid eruatur_". He then proceeds to
-_conjecture_, from the little which we know respecting Protagoras,
-what that Sophist must have laid down upon the origin of names;
-and he finishes by assuming the very point which he ought to have
-proved (p. 17):--"_ex ipso Cratylo intelligimus et cognoscimus_,
-mox inter Protagorae amicos exstitisse qui inepte haec studia
-persequentes, non e verbis et nominibus mentis humanae notiones
-elicere et illustrare, sed in verba et nomina sua ipsi decreta
-transferre et sic ea probare et confirmare niterentur. Quid quidem
-homines a Platone hoc libro _facetissima irrisione_ exagitantur,"
-&c. I repeat, that in spite of Stallbaum's confident assertions,
-he fails in giving the smallest proof that Protagoras or the
-Sophists proposed etymologies such as to make them a suitable butt
-for Plato on this occasion. Ast also talks with equal confidence
-and equal absence of proof about the silly and arbitrary
-etymological proceedings of the Sophists, which (he says) this
-dialogue is intended throughout to ridicule (Ast, Platon's Leben
-und Schriften, pp. 253-254-264, &c.).]
-
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Kratylus, c. 4-5, pp. 386-387.]
-
-[Footnote 36: Lassalle (Herakleitos, vol. ii. pp. 379-384) asserts
-and shows very truly that Protagoras cannot be the person intended
-to be represented by Plato under the name of Kratylus, or as
-holding the opinion of Kratylus about names. Lassalle affirms that
-Plato intends Kratylus in the dialogue to represent Herakleitus
-himself (p. 385); moreover he greatly extols the sagacity of
-Herakleitos for having laid down the principle, that "Names are
-the essence of things," in which principle Lassalle (so far as I
-understand him) himself concurs.
-
-Assuming this to be the case, we should naturally suppose that if
-Plato intends to ridicule any one, by presenting caricatured
-etymologies as flowing from this principle, the person intended as
-butt must be Herakleitus himself. Not so Lassalle. He asserts as
-broadly as Stallbaum that it was Protagoras and the other Sophists
-who grossly abused the doctrine of Herakleitus, for the purpose of
-confusing and perverting truth by arbitrary etymologies. His
-language is even more monstrous and extravagant than that of
-Stallbaum; yet he does not produce (any more than Stallbaum) the
-least fragment of proof that the Sophists or Protagoras did what
-he imputes to them (pp. 400-401-403-422).
-
-M. Lenormant, in his recent edition of the Kratylus (Comm. p.
-7-9), maintains also that neither the Sophists nor the Rhetors
-pretended to etymologise, nor are here ridiculed. But he ascribes
-to Plato in the Kratylus a mystical and theological purpose which
-I find it difficult to follow.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to
-deride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither
-Hermogenes nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature.]
-
-Suppose it then ascertained that Plato intended to ridicule and
-humiliate some rash etymologists, there would still be no
-propriety in singling out the Sophists as his victims--except that
-they are obnoxious names, against whom every unattested accusation
-is readily believed. But it is neither ascertained, nor (in my
-judgment) probable, that Plato here intended to ridicule or
-humiliate any one. The ridicule, if any was intended, would tell
-against himself more than against others. For he first begins by
-laying down a general theory respecting names: a theory
-unquestionably propounded as serious, and understood to be so by
-the critics:[37] moreover, involving some of his favourite and
-peculiar doctrines. It is this theory that his particular
-etymologies are announced as intended to carry out, in the way of
-illustration or exemplification. Moreover, he undertakes to prove
-this theory against Hermogenes, who declares himself strongly
-opposed to it: and he proves it by a string of arguments which
-(whether valid or not) are obviously given with a serious and
-sincere purpose of establishing the conclusion. Immediately after
-having established that there was a real rectitude of names, and
-after announcing that he would proceed to enquire wherein such
-rectitude consisted,[38] what sense or consistency would there be
-in his inventing a string of intentional caricatures announced as
-real etymologies? By doing this, he would be only discrediting and
-degrading the very theory which he had taken so much pains to
-inculcate upon Hermogenes. Instead of ridiculing Protagoras, he
-would ridicule himself and his own theory for the benefit of
-opponents generally, one among them being Protagoras: who (if we
-imagine his life prolonged) would have had the satisfaction of
-seeing a theory, framed in direct opposition to his doctrine,
-discredited and parodied by his own advocate. Hermogenes, too
-(himself an opponent of the theory, though not concurring with
-Protagoras), if these etymologies were intended as caricatures,
-ought to be made to receive them as such, and to join in the joke
-at the expense of the persons derided. But Hermogenes is not made
-to manifest any sense of their being so intended: he accepts them
-all as serious, though some as novel and surprising, in the same
-passive way which is usual with the interlocutors of Sokrates in
-other dialogues. Farther, there are some among these etymologies
-plain and plausible enough, accepted as serious by all the
-critics.[39] Yet these are presented in the series, without being
-parted off by any definite line, along with those which we are
-called upon to regard as deliberate specimens of mock-etymology.
-Again, there are also some, which, looking at their etymological
-character, are as strange and surprising as any in the whole
-dialogue: but which yet, from the place which they occupy in the
-argument, and from the plain language in which they are presented,
-almost exclude the supposition that they can be intended as jest
-or caricature.[40] Lastly, Kratylus, whose theory all these
-etymologies are supposed to be intended to caricature, is so far
-from being aware of this, that he cordially approves every thing
-which Sokrates had said.[41]
-
-[Footnote 37: Schleiermacher, Introd. to Krat. pp. 7-10; Lassalle,
-Herakleit. ii. p. 387.]
-
-[Footnote 38: Plato, Kratylus, p. 391 B.]
-
-[Footnote 39: See, as an example, his derivation of [Greek:
-_Di/philos_] from [Greek: Dii+/ phi/los], p. 399: [Greek:
-_Mou=sa_], p. 406: [Greek: dai/mon] from [Greek: dae/mon], p. 398:
-for [Greek: _A)phrodi/te_] he takes the Hesiodic etymology, p.
-406. [Greek: _A)/res_] and [Greek: _a)/r)r(en_] (p. 407). His
-derivation of [Greek: _ai)the/r_--a)po\ tou= a)ei\ the/ein] (p.
-410) is given twice by Aristotle (De Coelo, i. 3, p. 270, b. 22;
-Meteorol. i. 3, p. 339, b. 25) as well as in the Pseudo-Aristotle,
-De Mundo, p. 392, a. 8. None of the Platonic etymologies is more
-strange than that of [Greek: psuche/], quasi [Greek: phuse/che,
-a)po\ tou= te\n phu/sin o)chei=n kai\ e)/chein] (Kratyl. p. 400).
-Yet Proklus cites this as serious, Scholia in Kratylum, p. 4, ed.
-Boissonnade. Plato, in the Treatise De Legibus, derives [Greek:
-cho/ros] from [Greek: chara/] and [Greek: no/mos] from [Greek:
-nou=s] or [Greek: no/os] (ii. 1, p. 654 A, xii. 8, p. 957 D).]
-
-[Footnote 40: See Plato, Kratyl. p. 437 A-B.
-
-This occurs in the latter portion of the dialogue carried on by
-Sokrates with Kratylus, and is admitted by Lassalle to be
-seriously meant by Plato: though Lassalle maintains that the
-etymologies in the first part of the dialogue (between Sokrates
-and Hermogenes) are mere mockery and parody. (Lassalle,
-Herakleitos der Dunkle, vol. ii., pp. 402-403).
-
-I venture to say that none of those Platonic etymologies, which
-Lassalle regards as caricatures, are more absurd than those which
-he here accepts as serious. Liddell and Scott in their Lexicon say
-about [Greek: thumo/s], "probably rightly derived from [Greek:
-thu/o] by Plat. Crat. 419 E, [Greek: a)po\ te=s thu/seos kai\
-ze/seos te=s psuche=s.]" The manner in which Schleiermacher and
-Steinhart also (Einleit. zum Kratylos, pp. 552-554), analysing
-this dialogue, represent Plato as passing backwards and forwards
-from mockery to earnest and from earnest to mockery, appears to me
-very singular: as well as the principle which Schleiermacher lays
-down (Introduct. p. 10), that Plato intended the general doctrines
-to be seriously understood, and the particular etymological
-applications to be mere mockery and extravagance (um wer weiss
-welche Komoedie aufzufuehren). What other philosopher has ever
-propounded serious doctrines, and then followed them up by
-illustrations knowingly and intentionally caricatured so as to
-disparage the doctrines instead of recommending them?
-
-It** is surely less difficult to believe that Plato conceived as
-plausible and admissible those etymologies which appear to us
-absurd.
-
-As a specimen of the view entertained by able men of the
-seventeenth century respecting the Platonic and Aristotelian
-etymologies, see the Institutiones Logicae of Burgersdicius, Lib.
-i. c. 25, not. 1. Lehrsch (Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten, Part
-i. p. 34-35) agrees with the other commentators, that the Platonic
-etymologies in the Kratylus are caricatured to deride the boastful
-and arbitrary etymologies of the Sophists about language. But he
-too produces no evidence of such etymologies on the part of the
-Sophists; nay, what is remarkable, he supposes that _both_
-Protagoras and Prodikus agreed in the Platonic doctrine that names
-were [Greek: phu/sei] (see pp. 17-19).]
-
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Kratylus, p. 429 C. Steinhart (Einleit. zum
-Krat. pp. 549-550) observes that both Kratylus and Hermogenes are
-represented as understanding seriously these etymologies which are
-now affirmed to be meant as caricatures.
-
-As specimens of Plato's view respecting admissible etymologies, we
-find him in Timaeus, p. 43 C, deriving [Greek: ai)/sthesis] from
-[Greek: a)i+/sso]: again in the same dialogue, p. 62 A, [Greek:
-thermo\s] from [Greek: kermati/zein]. In Legg. iv. 714, we have
-[Greek: te\n tou= nou= dianome\n e)ponoma/zontas no/mon]. In
-Phaedrus, p. 238 C, we find [Greek: e)/ros] derived from [Greek:
-e)r)r(ome/nos r(osthei=sa].
-
-Aristotle derives [Greek: o)/sphus] from [Greek: i)sophue/s],
-Histor. Animal. i. 13, p. 493, a. 22: also [Greek: di/kaion] from
-[Greek: di/cha], Ethic. Nikom. v. 7, 1132, a. 31; [Greek:
-methu/ein--meta\ to\ thu/ein], Athenaeus, ii. 40. The
-Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise [Greek: Peri\ Ko/smou] (p. 401, a. 15)
-adopts the Platonic etymology of [Greek: Di/a-Ze=na] as [Greek:
-di' o(\n zo=men]
-
-Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, c. 9, p. 948, derives [Greek: kne/phas]
-from [Greek: keno\n pha/ous].
-
-The Emperor Marcus Antoninus derives [Greek: a)kti/s], the ray of
-the Sun, [Greek: a)po\ tou= e)ktei/nesthai], Meditat. viii. 57.
-
-The Stoics, who were fond of etymologising, borrowed many
-etymologies from the Platonic Kratylus (Villoison, de Theologia
-Physica Stoicorum, in Osann's edition of Cornutus De Natura
-Deorum, p. 512). Specimens of the Stoic etymologies are given by
-the Stoic Balbus in Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, ii. 25-29 (64-73).
-
-Daehne (in his Darstellung der Judisch-Alexandrinischen
-Religions-Philosophie, i. p. 73 seq.) remarks on the numerous
-etymologies not merely propounded, but assumed as grounds of
-reasoning by Philo Judaeus in commenting upon the Pentateuch,
-etymologies totally inadmissible and often ridiculous.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato intended his theory as serious, but his
-exemplifications as admissible guesses. He does not cite
-particular cases as proofs of a theory, but only as illustrating
-what he means.]
-
-I cannot therefore accept as well-founded this "discovery of
-modern times," which represents the Platonic etymologies in the
-Kratylus as intentionally extravagant and knowingly caricatured,
-for the purpose of ridiculing the Sophists or others. In my
-judgment, Plato did not put them forward as extravagant, nor for
-the purpose of ridiculing any one, but as genuine illustrations of
-a theory of his own respecting names. It cannot be said indeed
-that he advanced them as proof of his theory: for Plato seldom
-appeals to particulars, except when he has a theory to attack.
-When he has a theory to lay down, he does not generally recognise
-the necessity of either proving or verifying it by application to
-particular cases. His proof is usually deductive or derived from
-some more general principle asserted _a priori_--some internal
-sentiment enunciated as a self-justifying maxim. Particular
-examples serve to illustrate what the principle is, but are not
-required to establish its validity.[42] But I believe that he
-intended his particular etymologies as _bona fide_ guesses, more
-or less probable (like the developments in the Timaeus, which
-he[43] repeatedly designates as [Greek: ei)ko/ta], and nothing
-beyond): some certain, some doubtful, some merely novel and
-ingenious: such as would naturally spring from the originating
-_afflatus_ of diviners (like Euthyphron, to whom he alludes more
-than once[44]) who stepped beyond the ordinary regions of human
-affirmation. Occasionally he proposes alternative and distinct
-etymologies: feeling assured that there was some way of making out
-the conclusion--but not feeling equally certain about his own way
-of making it out. The sentiment of belief attaches itself in
-Plato's mind to general views and theorems: when he gives
-particular consequences as flowing from them, his belief graduates
-down through all the stages between full certainty and the lowest
-probability, until in some cases it becomes little more than a
-fanciful illustration--like the mythes which he so often invents
-to expand and enliven these same general views.[45]
-
-[Footnote 42: See some passages in this very dialogue, Krat. pp.
-436 E, 437 C, 438 C.
-
-Lassalle remarks that neither Herakleitus nor Plato were disposed
-to rest the proof of a general principle upon an induction of
-particulars (Herakleitos, p. 406).]
-
-[Footnote 43: Spengel justly remarks (Art. Scr. p. 52) respecting
-the hypotheses of the Platonic commentators:--"Platonem quidem
-liberare gestiunt, falsa, ironia, non ex animi sententia omnia in
-Cratylo prolata esse dicentes. Sed praeter alia multa et hoc
-neglexerunt viri docti, easdem verborum originationes, quas in
-Cratylo, in caeteris quoque dialogis, ubi nullus est facetiis
-locus, et seria omnia aguntur, recurrere."
-
-This passage is cited by K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. d.
-Platon. Phil. Not. 474, p. 656. Hermann's own remarks on the
-dialogue (pp. 494-497) are very indistinct, but he seems to agree
-with Schleiermacher in singling out Antisthenes as the object of
-attack.
-
-The third portion of Lehrsch's work, _Ueber die Sprachphilosophie
-der Alten_, cites numerous examples of the etymologies attempted
-by the ancients, from Homer downwards, many of them collected from
-the Etymologicon Magnum. When we read the etymologies propounded
-seriously by Greek and Latin philosophers (especially the Stoic
-Chrysippus), literary men, jurists, and poets, we shall not be
-astonished at those found in the Platonic Kratylus. The etymology
-of [Greek: Theo\s a)po\ tou= thei=n], given in the Kratylus (p.
-397 D), as well as in the Pythagorean Philolaus (see Boeckh,
-Philolaus, pp. 168-175), and repeated by Clemens Alexandrinus, is
-not more absurd than that of [Greek: theo\s a)po\ tou= thei=nai],
-given by Herodot. ii. 52, and also repeated by Clemens, see
-Wesseling's note. None of the etymologies of the Kratylus is more
-strange than that of [Greek: Zeu\s-Di/a-Ze=na] (p. 396 B). Yet
-this is reproduced in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise, [Greek:
-Peri\ Ko/smou] (p. 401, a. 15), as well as by the Stoic Zeno
-(Diogen. Laert. vii. 147). The treatise of Cornutus, De Nat. Deor.
-with Osann's Commentary, is instructive in enabling us to
-appreciate the taste of ancient times as to what was probable or
-admissible in etymology. There are few of the etymologies in the
-Kratylus more singular than that of [Greek: a)/nthropos] from
-[Greek: a)nathro=n a)\ o(/popen]. Yet this is cited by Ammonius as
-a perfectly good derivation, ad Aristot. De Interpret. p. 103, b.
-8, Schol. Bekk., and also in the Etymologicon Magnum.]
-
-[Footnote 44: Compare Plato, Euthyphron, p. 6 D. Origination and
-invention often pass in Plato as the workings of an ordinary mind
-(sometimes even a feeble mind) worked upon from without by divine
-inspiration, quite distinct from the internal force, reasoning,
-judging, testing, which belongs to a powerful mind. See Phaedrus,
-pp. 235 C, 238 D, 244 A; Timaeus, p. 72 A; Menon, p. 81 A.]
-
-[Footnote 45: I have made some remarks to this effect upon the
-Platonic mythes in my notice of the Phaedon, see ch. xxv. p. 415,
-ad Phaedon, p. 114.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other
-etymologists of ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as
-those of Plato.]
-
-We must remember that Sokrates in the Kratylus explicitly
-announces himself as having no formed opinion on the subject, and
-as competent only to the prosecution of the enquiry, jointly with
-the others. What he says must therefore be received as conjectures
-proposed for discussion. I see no ground for believing that he
-regarded any of them, even those which appear to us the strangest,
-as being absurd or extravagant--or that he proposed any of them in
-mockery and caricature, for the purpose of deriding other
-Etymologists. Because these etymologies, or many of them at least,
-appear to us obviously absurd, we are not warranted in believing
-that they must have appeared so to Plato. They did not appear so
-(as I have already observed) to Dionysius of Halikarnassus--nor to
-Diogenes, nor to the Platonists of antiquity nor to any critics
-earlier than the seventeenth century.[46] By many of these critics
-they were deemed not merely serious, but valuable. Nor are they
-more absurd than many of the etymologies proposed by Aristotle, by
-the Stoics, by the Alexandrine critics, by Varro, and by the
-_grammatici_ or literary men of antiquity generally; moreover,
-even by Plato himself in other dialogues occasionally.[47] In
-determining what etymologies would appear to Plato reasonable or
-admissible, Dionysius, Plutarch, Proklus, and Alkinous, are more
-likely to judge rightly than we: partly because they had a larger
-knowledge of the etymologies proposed by Greek philosophers and
-_grammatici_ than we possess--partly because they had no
-acquaintance with the enlarged views of modern
-etymologists--which, on the point here in question, are misleading
-rather than otherwise. Plato held the general theory that names,
-in so far as they were framed with perfect rectitude, held embodied
-in words and syllables a likeness or imitation of the essence of things.
-And if he tried to follow out such a theory into detail, without
-any knowledge of grammatical systems, without any large and
-well-chosen collection of analogies within his own language, or any
-comparison of different languages with each other--he could
-scarcely fail to lose himself in wonderful and violent
-transmutations of letters and syllables.[48]
-
-[Footnote 46: Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. c. 16, p. 96, Reiske;
-Plutarch, De Isid. et Osir. c. 60, p. 375.
-
-Proklus advises that those who wish to become dialecticians should
-begin with the study of the Kratylus (Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 3, ed.
-Boiss.).
-
-We read in the Phaedrus of Plato (p. 244 B) in the second speech
-ascribed to Sokrates, two etymologies:--1. [Greek: mantike\]
-derived from [Greek: manike\] by the insertion of [Greek: t],
-which Sokrates declares to be done in bad taste, [Greek: oi( de\
-nu=n a)peiroka/los to\ _tau=_ e)pemba/llontes mantike\n
-e)ka/lasan.] 2. [Greek: oi)onistike\], quasi [Greek:
-oi)onoi+stike\], from [Greek: oi)/esis, nou=s, i(stori/a]. Compare
-the etymology of [Greek: E)/ros], p. 238 C. That these are real
-word-changes, which Plato believes to have taken place, is the
-natural and reasonable interpretation of the passage. Cicero
-(Divinat. i. 1) alludes to the first of the two as Plato's real
-opinion; and Heindorf as well as Schleiermacher accept it in the
-same sense, while expressing their surprise at the want of
-etymological perspicacity in Plato. Ast and Stallbaum, on the
-contrary, declare that these two etymologies are mere irony and
-mockery, spoken by Plato, _ex mente Sophistarum_, and intended as
-a sneer at the perverse and silly Sophists. No reason is produced
-by Ast and Stallbaum to justify this hypothesis, except that you
-cannot imagine "_Platonem tam caecum fuisse_," &c. To me this
-reason is utterly insufficient; and I contend, moreover, that
-sneers at the Sophists would be quite out of place in a speech,
-such as the palinode of Sokrates about Eros.]
-
-[Footnote 47: See what Aristotle says about [Greek: Pa/nte] in the
-first chapter of the treatise De Coelo; also about [Greek:
-au)to/maton] from [Greek: au)to\ ma/ten], Physic. ii. 5, p. 197,
-b. 30.
-
-Stallbaum, after having complimented Plato for his talent in
-caricaturing the etymologies of others, expresses his surprise to
-find Aristotle reproducing some of these very caricatures as
-serious, see Stallbaum's note on Kratyl. p. 411 E.
-
-Respecting the etymologies proposed by learned and able Romans in
-and before the Ciceronian and Augustan age, AElius Stilo, Varro,
-Labeo, Nigidius, &c., see Aulus Gellius, xiii. 10; Quintilian,
-Inst. Or. i. 5; Varro, de Lingua Latina.
-
-Even to Quintilian, the etymologies of Varro appeared
-preposterous; and he observes, in reference to those proposed by
-AElius Stilo and by others afterwards, "Cui non post Varronem sit
-venia?" (i. 6, 37). This critical remark, alike good tempered and
-reasonable, might be applied with still greater pertinence to the
-Kratylus of Plato. In regard to etymology, more might have been
-expected from Varro than from Plato; for in the days of Plato,
-etymological guesses were almost a novelty; while during the three
-centuries which elapsed between him and Varro, many such
-conjectures had been hazarded by various scholars, and more or
-less of improvement might be hoped from the conflict of opposite
-opinions and thinkers.
-
-M. Gaston Boissier (in his interesting Etude sur la vie et les
-Ouvrages de M. Terentius Varron, p. 152, Paris, 1861) observes
-respecting Varro, what is still more applicable to
-Plato:--"Gardons nous bien d'ailleurs de demander a Varron ce qu'exige
-la science moderne: pour n'etre pas trop severes, remettons-le dans
-son epoque et jugeons-le avec l'esprit de son temps.** Il ne semble
-pas qu'alors on reclamat, de ceux qui recherchaient les
-etymologies, beaucoup d'exactitude et de severite. _On se piquait
-moins d'arriver a l'origine reelle du mot, que de le decomposer
-d'une maniere ingenieuse et qui en gravat le sens dans la
-memoire._ Les jurisconsultes eux-memes, malgre la gravite de leur
-profession et l'importance pratique de leurs recherches, ne
-suivaient pas une autre methode. Trebatius trouvait dans
-_sacellum_ les deux mots _sacra cella_: et Labeon faisait venir
-_soror_ de _seorsum_, parce que la jeune fille se separe de le
-maison paternelle pours suivre son epoux: tout comme Nigidius
-trouvoit dans _frater fere alter_--c'est a dire, un autre
-soi-meme," &c.
-
-Lobeck has similar remarks in his Aglaophamus (pp. 867-869):--"Sane
-ita J. Capellus veteres juris consultos excusat, _mutuum_
-interpretantes _quod ex meo tuum fiat, testamentum_ autem
-_testationem mentis_, non quod eam verborum originem esse
-putarent, sed ut significationem eorum altius in legentium animis
-defigerent. Similiterque ecclesiastici quidam auctores, quum nomen
-Pascha a graeco verbo [Greek: pa/schein] repetunt, non per
-ignorantiam lapsi, sed allusionis quandam gratiam aucupati
-videntur."]
-
-[Footnote 48: Graefenhahn (Gesch. d. classichen Philologie, vol. i.
-sect. 36, pp. 151-164) points out how common was the hypothesis of
-fanciful derivation of names or supposed etymologies among the
-Greek poets, and how it passed from them to the prose writers. He
-declares that the etymologies in Plato not only in the Kratylus
-but in other dialogues are "etymologische monstra," but he
-professes inability to distinguish which of them are serious (pp.
-163-164).
-
-Lobeck remarks that the playing and quibbling with words, widely
-diffused among the ancient literati generally, was especially
-likely to belong to those who held the Platonic theory about
-language:--"Is intelligat necesse est, hoc universum genus ab
-antiquitatis** ingenio non alienum, ei vero, qui imagines rerum in
-vocabulis sic ut in cera expressas putaret, convenientissimum
-fuisse" (Aglaophamus, p. 870).]
-
-[Side-note: Continuance of the dialogue--Sokrates endeavours to
-explain how it is that the Names originally right have become so
-disguised and spoiled.]
-
-Having expressed my opinion that the etymologies propounded by
-Sokrates in the Kratylus are not intended as caricatures, but as
-_bona fide_ specimens of admissible etymological conjecture, or,
-at the least, of discoverable analogy--I resume the thread of the
-dialogue.
-
-These etymologies are the hypothetical links whereby Sokrates
-reconciles his first theory of the essential rectitude of Names
-(that is, of Naming, as a process which can only be performed in
-one way, and by an Artist who discerns and uses the Name-Form),
-with the names actually received and current. The contrast between
-the sameness and perfection postulated in the theory, and the
-confusion of actual practice, is not less manifest than the
-contrast between the benevolent purposes ascribed to the Demiurgus
-(in the Timaeus) and the realities of man and society:--requiring
-intermediate assumptions, more or less ingenious, to explain or
-attenuate the glaring inconsistencies. Respecting the Name-Form,
-Sokrates intimates that it may often be so disguised by difference
-of letters and syllables, as not to be discernible by an ordinary
-man, or by any one except an artist or philosopher. Two names, if
-compound, may have the same Name-Form, though few or none of the
-letters in them be the same. A physician may so disguise his
-complex mixtures, by apparent differences of colour or smell, that
-they shall be supposed by others to be different, though
-essentially the same. _Beta_ is the name of the letter B: you may
-substitute, in place of the three last letters, any others which
-you prefer, and the name will still be appropriate to designate
-the letter B.[49]
-
-[Footnote 49: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 393-394.]
-
-[Side-note: Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with
-their essential properties, each must be adapted to each.]
-
-To explain the foundations of the onomastic (name-giving or
-speaking) art,[50] we must analyse words into their primordial
-constituent letters. The name-giving Artists have begun from this
-point, and we must follow in their synthetical track. We must
-distinguish letters with their essential forms--we must also
-distinguish things with their essential forms--we must then assign
-to each essence of things that essence of letters which has a
-natural aptitude to signify it, either one letter singly or
-several conjoined. The rectitude of the compound names will depend
-upon that of the simple and primordial.[51] This is the only way
-in which we can track out the rectitude of names: for it is no
-account of the matter to say that the Gods bestowed them, and that
-therefore they are right: such recourse to a _Deus ex machina_ is
-only one among the pretexts for evading the necessity of
-explanation.[52]
-
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Kratyl. p. 425 A. [Greek: te=| o)nomastike=|,
-e)\ r(etorike=|, e)\ e(/tis e)sti\n e( te/chne.]]
-
-[Footnote 51: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 424 B-E, 426 A, 434 A.]
-
-[Footnote 52: Plato, Kratyl. p. 425 E.]
-
-This extreme postulate of analysis and adaptation may be compared
-with that which Sokrates lays down, in the Phaedrus, in regard to
-the art of Rhetoric. You must first distinguish all the different
-forms of mind--then all the different forms of speech; you must
-assign the sort of speech which is apt for persuading each
-particular sort of mind. Phaedrus, pp. 271-272.]
-
-[Side-note: Essential significant aptitude consists in
-resemblance.]
-
-Essential aptitude for signification consists in resemblance
-between the essence of the letter and that of the thing signified.
-Thus the letter _Rho_, according to Sokrates, is naturally apt for
-the signification of rush or vehement motion, because in
-pronouncing it the tongue is briskly agitated and rolled about.
-Several words are cited, illustrating this position.[53] _Iota_
-naturally designates thin and subtle things, which insinuate
-themselves everywhere. _Phi_, _Chi_, _Psi_, _Sigma_, the
-sibilants, imitate blowing. _Delta_ and _Tau_, from the
-compression of the tongue, imitate stoppage of motion, or
-stationary condition. _Lambda_ imitates smooth and slippery
-things. _Nu_ serves, as confining the voice in the mouth, to form
-the words signifying in-doors and interior. _Alpha_ and _Eta_ are
-both of them large letters: the first is assigned to signify size,
-the last to signify length. _Omicron_ is suited to what is round
-or circular.[54]
-
-[Footnote 53: Plato, Kratyl. p. 426 D-E. [Greek: krou/ein,
-thrau/ein, e(rei/kein], &c. Leibnitz (Nouveaux Essais sur
-l'Entendement Humain, Book iii. ch. 2, p. 300 Erdm.); and Jacob
-Grimm (in his Dissertation Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache,
-Berlin, 1858, ed. 4) give views very similar to those of Plato,
-respecting the primordial growth of language, and the original
-significant or symbolising power supposed to be inherent in each
-letter (Kein Buchstabe, "urspruenglich steht bedeutungslos oder
-ueberfluessig," pp. 39-40). Leibnitz and Grimm say (as Plato here
-also affirms) that Rho designates the Rough--Lambda, the Smooth:
-see also what he says about Alpha, Iota, Hypsilon. Compare,
-besides, M. Renan, Orig. du Langage, vi. p. 137.
-
-The comparison of the Platonic speculations on the primordial
-powers of letters, with those of a modern linguistic scholar so
-illustrious as Grimm (the earliest speculations with the latest)
-are exceedingly curious--and honourable to Plato. They serve as
-farther reasons for believing that this dialogue was not intended
-to caricature Protagoras.]
-
-[Footnote 54: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 426-427.]
-
-It is from these fundamental aptitudes, and some others analogous,
-that the name-giving Artist, or Lawgiver, first put together
-letters to compound and construct his names. Herein consists their
-rectitude, according to Sokrates. Though in laying down the
-position Sokrates gives it only as the best which _he_ could
-discover, and intimates that some persons may turn it into
-derision--yet he evidently means to be understood seriously.[55]
-
-[Footnote 55: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 426 B, 427 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a
-believer in the Herakleitean theory.]
-
-In applying this theory--about the fundamental significant
-aptitudes of the letters of the alphabet--to show the rectitude of
-the existing words compounded from them--Sokrates assumes that the
-name-giving Artists were believers in the Herakleitean theory:
-that is, in the perpetual process of flux, movement, and
-transition into contraries. He cites a large variety of names,
-showing by their composition that they were adapted to denote this
-all-pervading fact, as constituting the essence of things.[56] The
-names given by these theorists to that which is good, virtuous,
-agreeable, &c., were compounded in such a manner as to denote what
-facilitates, or falls in with, the law of universal movement: the
-names of things bad or hurtful, denote what obstructs or retards
-movement.[57]
-
-[Footnote 56: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 401 C--402 B. 436 E: [Greek: o(s
-tou= panto\s i)o/ntos te kai\ pherome/non kai\ r(e/ontos phame\n
-semai/nein e(mi=n te\n ou)si/an ta\ o)no/mata.] Also p. 439 B.]
-
-[Footnote 57: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 415-416-417, &c.]
-
-[Side-note: But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent--the
-rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge.]
-
-Many names (pursues Sokrates), having been given by artistic
-lawgivers who believed in the Herakleitean theory, will possess
-intrinsic rectitude, if we assume that theory to be true. But how
-if the theory be not true? and if the name-givers were mistaken on
-this fundamental point? The names will then not be right. Now we
-must not assume the theory to be true, although the Name-givers
-believed it to be so. Perhaps they themselves (Sokrates intimates)
-having become giddy by often turning round to survey the nature of
-things, mistook this _vertige_ of their own for a perpetual
-revolution and movement of the things which they saw, and gave
-names accordingly.[58] A Name-Giver who is real and artistic is
-rare and hard to find: there are more among them incompetent than
-competent: and the name originally bestowed represents only the
-opinion or conviction of him by whom it is bestowed.[59] Yet the
-names bestowed will be consistent with themselves, founded on the
-same theory.
-
-[Footnote 58: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 409**-411 C. [Greek:
-Ai)tio=ntai de\ ou) to\ e)/ndon to\ para\ sphi/si pa/thos ai)/tion
-ei)=nai tau/tes te=s do/xes, a)ll' au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata ou(/to
-pephuke/nai], &c.
-
-"He that is giddy thinks the world turns round," &c.]
-
-[Footnote 59: Plato, Kratyl. p. 418 C. [Greek: Oi)=stha ou)=n o(/ti
-mo/non tou=to deloi= to\ a)rchai=on o)/noma te\n dia/noian tou=
-theme/nou?] Also p. 419 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Changes and transpositions introduced in the name--hard
-to follow.]
-
-Again, the names originally bestowed differ much from those in use
-now. Many of them have undergone serious changes: there have been
-numerous omissions, additions, interpolations, and transpositions
-of letters, from regard to euphony or other fancies: insomuch that
-the primitive root becomes hardly traceable, except by great
-penetration and sagacity.[60] Then there are some names which have
-never been issued at all from the mint of the name-giver, but have
-either been borrowed from foreigners, or perhaps have been
-suggested by super-human powers.[61]
-
-[Footnote 60: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 394 B, 399 B, 414 C, 418 A.]
-
-[Footnote 61: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 397 B, 409 B.]
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis.]
-
-To this point Sokrates brings the question during his conversation
-with Hermogenes: against whom he maintains--That there is a
-natural intrinsic rectitude in Names, or a true Name-Form--that
-naming is a process which must be performed in the natural way,
-and by an Artist who knows that way. But when, after laying down
-this general theory, he has gone a certain length in applying it
-to actual names, he proceeds to introduce qualifications which
-attenuate and explain it away. Existing names were bestowed by
-artistic law-givers, but under a belief in the Herakleitean
-theory--which theory is at best doubtful: moreover the original
-names have, in course of time, undergone such multiplied changes,
-that the original point of significant resemblance can hardly be
-now recognised except by very penetrating intellects.
-
-[Side-note: Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus: who upholds
-that original thesis without any qualification.]
-
-It is here that Sokrates comes into conversation with Kratylus:
-who appears as the unreserved advocate of the same general theory
-which Sokrates had enforced upon Hermogenes. He admits all the
-consequences of the theory, taking no account of qualifications.
-Moreover he announces himself as having already bestowed
-reflection on the subject, and as espousing the doctrine of
-Herakleitus.[62]
-
-[Footnote 62: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 428 B, 440 E.
-
-It appears that on this point the opinion of Herakleitus coincided
-with that of the Pythagoreans, who held that names were [Greek:
-phu/sei kai\ ou) the/sei] and maintained as a corollary that there
-could be only one name for each thing and only one thing signified
-by each name (Simplikius ad Aristot. Categ. p. 43, b. 32, Schol.
-Bekk.).
-
-In general Herakleitus differed from Pythagoras, and is described
-as speaking of him with bitter antipathy.]
-
-If names are significant by natural rectitude, or by partaking of
-the Name-Form, it follows that all names must be right or true,
-one as well as another. If a name be not right, it cannot be
-significant: that is, it is no name at all: it is a mere unmeaning
-sound. A name, in order to be significant, must imitate the
-essence of the thing named. If you add any thing to a number, or
-subtract any thing from it, it becomes thereby a new number: it is
-not the same number badly rendered. So with a letter: so too with
-a name. There is no such thing as a bad name. Every name must be
-either significant, and therefore, right--or else it is not a
-name. So also there is no such thing as a false proposition: you
-cannot say the thing that is not: your words in that case have no
-meaning; they are only an empty sound. The hypothesis that the
-law-giver may have distributed names erroneously is therefore not
-admissible.[63] Moreover, you see that he must have known well,
-for otherwise he would not have given names so consistent with
-each other, and with the general Herakleitean theory.[64] And
-since the name is by necessity a representation or copy of the
-thing, whoever knows the name, must also know the thing named.
-There is in fact no other way of knowing or seeking or finding out
-things, except through their names.[65]
-
-[Footnote 63: Plato, Kratyl. p. 429 B-C.
-
-_Sokr._ [Greek: Pa/nta a)/ra ta\ o)no/mata o)rthos kei=tai?]
-
-_Krat._ [Greek: O(/sa ge o)no/mata e)/sti.]
-
-_Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? E(rmoge/nei to=|de po/teron mede\
-o)/noma tou=to kei=sthai pho=men, ei) me/ ti au)to=| E(rmou=
-gene/seos prose/kei, e)\ kei=sthai me/n, ou) me/ntoi o)rtho=s ge?]
-
-_Krat._ [Greek: Ou)de\ kei=sthai e)/moige dokei=, _a)lla\ dokei=n
-kei=sthai_. ei)=nai de\ e(te/rou tou=to tou)/noma, ou(=per kai\ e(
-phu/sis e( to\ o)/noma delou=sa.]
-
-The critics say that these last words ought to be read [Greek:
-e)\n to\ o)/noma deloi=], as Ficinus has translated, and
-Schleiermacher after him. They are probably in the right; at the
-same time, reasoning upon the theory of Kratylus, we say without
-impropriety, that "the thing indicates the name".
-
-That which is erroneously called a bad name is no name at all (so
-Kratylus argues), but only seems to be a name to ignorant persons.
-Thus also in the Platonic Minos (c. 9, p. 317): a bad law is no
-law in reality, but only seems to be a law to ignorant men, see
-above, ch. xiv. p. 88.**
-
-Compare the like argument about [Greek: no/mos] in Xenoph.
-Memorab. i. 2, 42-47, and Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 392.]
-
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Krat. p. 436 C. [Greek: A)lla\ me ou)ch
-ou(/tos e)/che|, a)ll' a)nagkai=on e)=|, ei)do/ta ti/thesthai to\n
-tithe/menon ta\ o)no/mata; ei) de\ me/, o(/per pa/lai e)go\
-e)/legon, ou)d' a)\n o)no/mata ei)/e. Me/giston de/ soi e)/sto
-tekme/rion o(/ti ou)k e)/sphaltai te=s a)lethei/as o( tithe/menos;
-ou) ga\r a)\n pote ou(/to xu/mphona e)=n au)to=| a(/panta. e)\
-_ou)k e)neno/eis au)to\s le/gon o(s pa/nta kat' au)to\ kai\ e)pi\
-tau)to\n e)gi/gneto ta\ o)no/mata?_]
-
-These last words allude to the various particular etymologies
-which had been enumerated by Sokrates as illustrations of the
-Herakleitean theory. They confirm the opinion above expressed,
-that Plato intended his etymologies seriously, not as mockery or
-caricature. That Plato should have intended them as caricatures of
-Protagoras and Prodikus, and yet that he should introduce Kratylus
-as welcoming them in support of _his_ argument, is a much greater
-absurdity than the supposition that Plato mistook them for
-admissible guesses.]
-
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Krat. c. 111, pp. 435-436.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it,]
-
-These consequences are fairly deduced by Kratylus from the
-hypothesis, of the natural rectitude of names, as laid down in the
-beginning of the dialogue, by Sokrates: who had expressly affirmed
-(in his anti-Protagorean opening of the dialogue) that unless the
-process of naming was performed according to the peremptory
-dictates of nature and by one of the few privileged name-givers,
-it would be a failure and would accomplish nothing;[66] in other
-words, that a non-natural name would be no name at all.
-Accordingly, in replying to Kratylus, Sokrates goes yet farther in
-retracting his own previous reasoning at the beginning of the
-dialogue--though still without openly professing to do so. He
-proposes a compromise.[67] He withdraws the pretensions of his
-theory, as peremptory or exclusive; he acknowledges the theory of
-Hermogenes as true, and valid in conjunction with it. He admits
-that non-natural names also, significant only by convention, are
-available as a make-shift--and that such names are in frequent
-use. Still however he contends, that natural names, significant by
-likeness, are the best, so far as they can be obtained: but
-inasmuch as that principle will not afford sufficiently extensive
-holding-ground, recourse must be had by way of supplement to the
-less perfect rectitude (of names) presented by customary or
-conventional significance.[68]
-
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. [Greek: e)a\n de\ me/,
-e)xamarte/setai/ te kai\ ou)de\n poie/sei.] Compare p. 389 A.]
-
-[Footnote 67: Plato, Kratyl. p. 430 A. [Greek: phe/re de/, e)a/n
-pe| diallachtho=men, o= Kra/tule], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 68: Plato, Krat. p. 435 C. [Greek: e)moi\ me\n ou)=n
-kai\ au)to=| a)re/skei me\n kata\ to\ dunato\n o(/moia ei)=nai ta\
-o)no/mata toi=s pra/gmasin; a)lla\ me\ o(s a)letho=s glischra\
-e)=| e( o)lke\ au)te\ te=s o(moio/tetos, a)nagkai=on de\ e)=| kai\
-to=| phortiko=| tou/to| proschre=sthai, te=| xunthe/ke|, ei)s
-o)noma/ton o)rtho/teta; e)pei\ i)/sos kata/ ge to\ dunato\n
-ka/llist' a)\n le/goito, o(/tan e)\ pa=sin e)\ o(s plei/stois
-o(moi/ois le/getai, tou=to d' e)sti\ prosekousin, ai)/schista de\
-tou)nanti/on.]]
-
-[Side-note: There are names better--more like, or less like to the
-things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always
-be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior
-way.]
-
-You say (reasons Sokrates with Kratylus) that names must be
-significant by way of likeness. But there are degrees of
-likeness. A portrait is more or less like its original, but it is
-never exactly like: it is never a duplicate, nor does it need to
-be so. Or a portrait, which really belongs to and resembles one
-person, may be erroneously assigned to another. The same thing
-happens with names. There are names more or less like the thing
-named--good or bad: there are names good with reference to their
-own object, but erroneously fitted on to objects not their own.
-The name does not cease to be a name, so long as the type or form
-of the thing named is preserved in it: but it is worse or better,
-according as the accompanying features are more or less in harmony
-with the form.[69] If names are like things, the letters which are
-put together to form names, must have a natural resemblance to
-things--as we remarked above respecting the letters Rho, Lambda,
-&c. But the natural, inherent, powers of resemblance and
-significance, which we pronounced to belong to these letters, are
-not found to pervade all the actual names, in which they are
-employed. There are words containing the letters _Rho_ and
-_Lambda_, in a sense opposite to that which is natural to them--yet
-nevertheless at the same time significant; as is evident from
-the fact, that you and I and others understand them alike. Here
-then are words significant, without resembling: significant
-altogether through habit and convention. We must admit the
-principle of convention as an inferior ground and manner of
-significance. Resemblance, though the best ground as far as it can
-be had, is not the only one.[70]
-
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 432-434.]
-
-[Footnote 70: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 434-435.]
-
-[Side-note: All names are not consistent with the theory of
-Herakleitus: some are opposed to it.]
-
-All names are not like the things named: some names are bad,
-others good: the law-giver sometimes gave names under an erroneous
-belief. Hence you are not warranted in saying that things must be
-known and investigated through names, and that whoever knows the
-name, knows also the thing named. You say that the names given are
-all coherent and grounded upon the Herakleitean theory of
-perpetual flux. You take this as a proof that that theory is true
-in itself, and that the law-giver adopted and proceeded upon it as
-true. I agree with you that the law-giver or name-giver believed
-in the Herakleitean theory, and adapted many of his names to it:
-but you cannot infer from hence that the theory is true--for he
-may have been mistaken.[71] Moreover, though many of the existing
-names consist with, and are based upon, that theory, the same
-cannot be said of all names. Many names can be enumerated which
-are based on the opposite principle of permanence and stand-still.
-It is unsafe to strike a balance of mere numbers between the two:
-besides which, even among the various names founded on the
-Herakleitean theory, you will find jumbled together the names of
-virtues and vices, benefits and misfortunes. That theory lends
-itself to good and evil alike; it cannot therefore be received as
-true--whether the name-giver believed in it or not.[72]
-
-[Footnote 71: Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 B-C. [Greek: E)/ti toi/nun
-to/de skepsometha, o(/pos me\ e(ma=s ta\ polla\ tau=ta o)no/mata
-e)s tauto\n tei/nonta e)xapata=|, kai\ to=| o)/nti me\n oi(
-the/menoi au(ta\ _dianoethe/ntes te e)/thento_ o(s i)o/nton
-a)pa/nton a)ei\ kai\ r(eo/nton--_phai/nontai ga\r e)/moige kai\
-au)toi\ ou)/to dianoethe=nai_--to\ d', ei) e)/tuchen, ou)ch
-ou)/tos e)/chei], &c.
-
-These words appear to me to imply that Sokrates is perfectly
-serious, and not ironical, in delivering his opinion, that the
-original imposers of names were believers in the Herakleitean
-theory.]
-
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Krat. pp. 437-438 C.
-
-Sokrates here enumerates the particular names illustrating his
-judgment. However strange the verbal transitions and
-approximations may appear to us, I think it clear that he intends
-to be understood seriously.]
-
-[Side-note: It is not true to say, That Things can only be known
-through their names.]
-
-Lastly, even if we granted that things may be known and studied
-through their names, it is certain that there must be some other
-way of knowing them; since the first name-givers (as you yourself
-affirm) knew things, at a time when no names existed.[73] Things
-may be known and ought to be studied, not through names, but by
-themselves and through their own affinities.[74]
-
-[Footnote 73: Plato, Krat. p. 438 A-B. Kratylus here suggests that
-the first names may perhaps have been imposed by a super-human
-power. But Sokrates replies, that upon that supposition all the
-names must have been imposed upon the same theory: there could not
-have been any contradiction between one name and another.]
-
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Krat. pp. 438-439. 438 E:--[Greek: di'
-a)lle/lon ge, ei)/ pe| xuggene= e)sti/, kai\ au)ta\ di' au(to=n.]]
-
-[Side-note: Unchangeable Platonic Forms--opposed to the
-Herakleitean flux, which is true only respecting sensible
-particulars.]
-
-Sokrates then concludes the dialogue by opposing the Platonic
-ideas to the Herakleitean theory. I often dream or imagine the
-Beautiful _per se_, the Good _per se_, and such like existences or
-Entia.[75] Are not such existences real? Are they not eternal,
-unchangeable and stationary? Particular beautiful
-things--particular good things--are in perpetual change or flux: but
-The Beautiful, The Good--The Ideas or Forms of these and such
-like--remain always what they are, always the same.
-
-[Footnote 75: Plato, Krat. p. 439 C-D. [Greek: ske/psai o( e)/goge
-polla/kis o)neiro/tto, po/teron pho=me/n ti ei)=nai au)to\ kalo\n
-kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ e(\n e(/kaston to=n o)/nton ou(/tos, e)\ me/?
-. . .
-
-me\ ei) pro/sopo/n ti/ e)sti kalo\n e)/ ti to=n toiou=ton, kai\
-dokei= tau=ta pa/nta r(ei=n; a)ll' au)to\ to\ kalo\n ou) toiou=ton
-a)ei/ e)stin oi(=o/n e)stin?]]
-
-The Herakleitean theory of constant and universal flux is true
-respecting particular things, but not true respecting these Ideas
-or Forms. It is the latter alone which know or are known: it is
-they alone which admit of being rightly named. For that which is
-in perpetual flux and change can neither know, nor be known, nor
-be rightly named.[76] Being an ever-changing subject, it is never
-in any determinate condition: and nothing can be known which is
-not in a determinate condition. The Form of the knowing subject,
-as well as the Form of the known object, must both remain fixed
-and eternal, otherwise there can be no knowledge at all.
-
-[Footnote 76: Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 D--440 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n
-oi(=o/n te _proseipei=n au)to\ o)rthos_, ei) a)ei\ u(pexe/rchetai,
-pro=ton me\n o(/ti, e)keino/ e)stin, e)/peita o(/ti toiou=ton? e)\
-a)na/gke a)/ma e(mo=n lego/nton a)/llo au)to\ eu)thu\s gi/gnesthai
-kai\ u(pexie/nai, kai\ meke/ti ou(/tos e)/chein? . . .
-
-A)lla\ me\n ou)d' a)\n gnosthei/e ge u(p' ou)deno/s. . . .
-
-A)ll' ou)de\ gnosin ei)=nai pha/nai ei)ko/s, ei) metapi/ptei
-pa/nta chre/mata kai\ mede\n me/nei.]]
-
-[Side-note: Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We
-must not put implicit faith in names.]
-
-To admit these permanent and unchangeable Forms is to deny the
-Herakleitean theory, which proclaims constant and universal flux.
-This is a debate still open and not easy to decide. But while it
-is yet undecided, no wise man ought to put such implicit faith in
-names and in the bestowers of names, as to feel himself warranted
-in asserting confidently the certainty of the Herakleitean
-theory.[77] Perhaps that theory is true, perhaps not. Consider the
-point strenuously, Kratylus. Be not too easy in acquiescence--for
-you are still young, and have time enough before you. If you find
-it out, give to me also the benefit of your solution.[78]
-
-[Footnote 77: Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 C. [Greek: Tau=t' ou)=n
-po/tero/n pote ou(/tos e)/chei, e)\ e)kei/nos o(s oi( peri\
-E(ra/kleito/n te le/gousi kai\ a)/lloi polloi/, me\ ou) r(a=|dion
-e)=| e)piske/psasthai, ou)de\ pa/nu nou=n e)/chontos _a)nthro/pou
-e)pitre/psanta o)no/masin au(to\n kai\ te\ au(tou= psuche\n
-therapeu/ein_, pepisteuko/ta e)kei/nois kai\ toi=s theme/nois
-_au)ta/_, dii+schuri/zesthai o(s ti ei)do/ta, kai\ au)tou= te kai\
-to=n o)/nton katagigno/skein, o(s ou)de\n u(gie\s ou)deno/s,
-a(lla\ pa/nta o/sper kera/mia r(ei=], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 78: Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 D.]
-
-Kratylus replies that he will follow the advice given, but that he
-has already meditated on the matter, and still adheres to
-Herakleitus. Such is the close of the dialogue.
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-[Side-note: Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of
-Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and
-other Sophists.]
-
-One of the most learned among the modern Platonic commentators
-informs us that the purpose of Plato in this dialogue was, "to rub
-over Protagoras and other Sophists with the bitterest salt of
-sarcasm".[79] I have already expressed my dissent from this
-theory, which is opposed to all the ancient views of the dialogue,
-and which has arisen, in my judgment, only from the anxiety of the
-moderns to exonerate Plato from the reproach of having suggested
-as admissible, etymologies which now appear to us fantastic. I see
-no derision of the Sophists, except one or two sneers against
-Protagoras and Prodikus, upon the ever-recurring theme that they
-took money for their lectures.[80] The argument against Protagoras
-at the opening of the dialogue--whether conclusive or not--is
-serious and not derisory. The discourse of Sokrates is neither
-that of an anti-sophistical caricaturist, on the one hand--nor
-that of a confirmed dogmatist who has studied the subject and made
-up his mind on the other (this is the part which he ascribes to
-Kratylus)[81]--but the tentative march of an enquirer groping
-after truth, who follows the suggestive promptings of his own
-invention, without knowing whither it will conduct him: who,
-having in his mind different and even opposite points of view,
-unfolds first arguments on behalf of one, and next those on behalf
-of the other, without pledging himself either to the one or to the
-other, or to any definite scheme of compromise between them.[82]
-Those who take no interest in such circuitous gropings and guesses
-of an inquisitive and yet unsatisfied mind--those who ask for
-nothing but a conclusion clearly enunciated along with one or two
-affirmative reasons--may find the dialogue tiresome. However this
-may be--it is a manner found in many Platonic dialogues.
-
-[Footnote 79: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Kratyl. p. 18--"quos Plato
-hoc libro acerbissimo sale perfricandos statuit." Schleiermacher
-also tells us (Einleitung, pp. 17-21) that "Plato had much delight
-in heaping a full measure of ridicule upon his enemy Antisthenes;
-and that he at last became tired with the exuberance of his own
-philological jests". Lassalle shows, with much force, that the
-persons ridiculed (even if we grant the derisory purpose to be
-established) cannot be Protagoras and the Protagoreans
-(Herakleitos, vol. ii. pp. 376-384).]
-
-[Footnote 80: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 B, 391 B.]
-
-[Footnote 81: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 428 A, 440 D.]
-
-[Footnote 82: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 C. 391 A. [Greek: suzetei=n
-e(/toimo/s ei)mi kai\ soi\ kai\ Kratu/lo| koine=| . . . o(/ti ou)k
-ei)dei/en a)lla\ skepsoi/men meta\ sou=.]]
-
-[Side-note: Theory laid down by Sokrates _a priori_, in the first
-part--Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into
-harmony with facts.]
-
-Sokrates opens his case by declaring the thesis of the Absolute
-(Object _sine_ Subject), against the Protagorean thesis of the
-Relative (Object _cum_ Subject). Things have an absolute essence:
-names have an absolute essence:[83] each name belongs to its own
-thing, and to no other: this is its rectitude: none but that rare
-person, the artistic name-giver, can detect the essence of each
-thing, and the essence of each name, so as to apply the name
-rightly. Here we have a theory truly Platonic: impressed upon
-Plato's mind by a sentiment _a priori_, and not from any survey or
-comparison of particulars. Accordingly when Sokrates is called
-upon to apply his theory to existing current words, and to make
-out how any such rectitude can be shown to belong to them--he
-finds the greatest divergence and incongruity between the two. His
-ingenuity is hardly tasked to reconcile them: and he is obliged to
-have recourse to bold and multiplied hypotheses. That the first
-Name-Givers were artists proceeding upon system, but incompetent
-artists proceeding on a bad system--they were Herakleiteans who
-believed in the universality of movement, and gave names having
-reference to movement:[84] That the various letters of the
-alphabet, or rather the different actions of the vocal organism by
-which they are pronounced, have each an inherent, essential,
-adaptation, or analogy to the phenomena of movement or arrest of
-movement:[85] That the names originally bestowed have become
-disguised by a variety of metamorphoses, but may be brought back
-to their original by probable suppositions, and shown to possess
-the rectitude sought. All these hypotheses are only violent
-efforts to reconcile the Platonic _a priori_ theory, in some way
-or other, with existing facts of language. To regard them as
-intentional caricatures, would be to suppose that Plato is seeking
-intentionally to discredit and deride his own theory of the
-Absolute: for the discredit could fall nowhere else. We see that
-Plato considered many of his own guesses as strange and novel,
-some even as laying him open to ridicule.[86] But they were
-indispensable to bring his theory into something like coherence,
-however inadequate, with real language.
-
-[Footnote 83: One cannot but notice how Plato, shortly after
-having declared war against the Relativity affirmed by Protagoras,
-falls himself into that very track of Relativity when he comes to
-speak about actual language, telling us that names are imposed on
-grounds dependant on or relative to the knowledge or belief of the
-Name-givers. Kratylus, pp. 397 B, 399 A, 401 A-B, 411 B, 436 B.
-
-The like doctrine is affirmed in the Republic, vi. p. 515 B.
-[Greek: de=lon o(/ti o( the/menos pro=tos ta\ o)no/mata, oi(=a
-e(gei=to ei)=nai ta\ pra/gmata, toiau=ta e)ti/theto kai\ ta\
-o)no/mata.]
-
-Leibnitz conceived an idea of a "Lingua Characterica Universalis,
-quae simul sit ars inveniendi et judicandi" (see Leibnitz Opp.
-Erdmann, pp. 162-163), and he alludes to a conception of Jacob
-Boehme, that there once existed a Lingua Adamica or Natur-Sprache,
-through which the essences of things might be contemplated and
-understood. "Lingua Adamica vel certe vis ejus, quam quidam se
-nosse, et in nominibus ab Adamo impositis essentias rerum intueri
-posse contendunt--nobis certe ignota est" (Opp. p. 93). Leibnitz
-seems to have thought that it was possible to construct a
-philosophical language, based upon an Alphabetum Cogitationum
-Humanarum, through which problems on all subjects might be
-resolved, by a _calculus_ like that which is employed for the
-solution of arithmetical or geometrical problems (Opp. p. 83;
-compare also p. 356).
-
-This is very analogous to the affirmations of Sokrates, in the
-first part of the Kratylus, about the essentiality of Names
-discovered and declared by the [Greek: nomothe/tes techniko/s]]
-
-[Footnote 84: Plato, Kratyl. p. 436 D.]
-
-[Footnote 85: Plato, Krat. pp. 424-425. Schleiermacher declares
-this to be among the greatest and most profound truths which have
-ever been enunciated about language (Introduction to Kratylus, p.
-11). Stallbaum, on the contrary, regards it as not even seriously
-meant, but mere derision of others (Prolegg. ad Krat. p. 12).
-Another commentator on Plato calls it "eine Lehre der
-Sophistischen Sprachforscher" (August Arnold, Einleitung in die
-Philosophie--durch die Lehre Platons vermittelt--p. 178, Berlin,
-1841).
-
-Proklus, in his Commentary, says that the scope of this dialogue
-is to exhibit the imitative or generative faculty which
-essentially belongs to the mind, and whereby the mind (aided by
-the vocal or pronunciative imagination--[Greek: lektike\
-phantasi/a]) constructs names which are natural transcripts of the
-essences of things (Proklus, Schol. ad Kratyl. pp. 1-21 ed.
-Boissonnade; Alkinous, Introd. ad Platon. c. 6).
-
-Ficinus, too, in his argument to the Kratylus (p. 768), speaks
-much about the mystic sanctity of names, recognised not merely by
-Pythagoras and Plato, but also by the Jews and Orientals. He
-treats the etymologies in the Kratylus as seriously intended. He
-says not a word about any intention on the part of Plato to deride
-the Sophists or any other Etymologists.
-
-So also Sydenham, in his translation of Plato's Philebus (p. 33),
-designates the Kratylus as "a dialogue in which is taught the
-nature of things, as well the permanent as the transient, by a
-supposed etymology of Names and Words".]
-
-[Footnote 86: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 425 D, 426 B. Because Sokrates
-says that these etymologies may appear ridiculous, we are not to
-infer that he proposed them as caricatures; see what Plato says in
-the Republic, v. p. 452, about his own propositions respecting the
-training of women, which others (he says) will think ludicrous,
-but which he proposes with the most thorough and serious
-conviction.]
-
-[Side-note: Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the
-dialogue--he disconnects his theory of Naming from the
-Herakleitean doctrine.]
-
-In the second part of the dialogue, where Kratylus is introduced
-as uncompromising champion of this same theory, Sokrates changes
-his line of argument, and impugns the peremptory or exclusive
-pretensions of the theory: first denying some legitimate
-corollaries from it--next establishing by the side of it the
-counter-theory of Hermogenes, as being an inferior though
-indispensable auxiliary--yet still continuing to uphold it as an
-ideal of what is Best. He concludes by disconnecting the theory
-pointedly from the doctrine of Herakleitus, with which Kratylus
-connected it, and by maintaining that there can be no right
-naming, and no sound knowledge, if that doctrine be admitted.[87]
-The Platonic Ideas, eternal and unchangeable, are finally opposed
-to Kratylus as the only objects truly knowable and nameable--and
-therefore as the only conditions under which right naming can be
-realised. The Name-givers of actual society have failed in their
-task by proceeding on a wrong doctrine: neither they nor the names
-which they have given can be trusted.[88] The doctrine of
-perpetual change or movement is true respecting the sensible world
-and particulars, but it is false respecting the intelligible world
-or universals--Ideas and Forms. These latter are the only things
-knowable: but we cannot know them through names: we must study
-them by themselves and by their own affinities.
-
-[Footnote 87: Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n oi(=on
-te proseipei=n au)to\ o)rthos, ei) a)ei\ u(pexe/chetai?]]
-
-[Footnote 88: Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 C. Compare pp. 436 D, 439 B.
-
-Lassalle contends that Herakleitus and his followers considered
-the knowledge of names to be not only indispensable to the
-knowledge of things, but equivalent to and essentially embodying
-that knowledge. (Herakleitos, vol. ii. pp. 363-368-387.) See also
-a passage of Proklus, in his Commentary on the Platonic
-Parmenides, p. 476, ed. Stallbaum.
-
-The remarkable passage in the first book of Aristotle's
-Metaphysica, wherein he speaks of Plato and Plato's early
-familiarity with Kratylus and the Herakleitean opinions, coincides
-very much with the course of the Platonic dialogue Kratylus, from
-its beginning to its end (Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 987 a-b).]
-
-How this is to be done, Sokrates professes himself unable to say.
-We may presume him to mean, that a true Artistic Name-giver must
-set the example, knowing these Forms or essences beforehand, and
-providing for each its appropriate Name, or Name-Form, significant
-by essential analogy.
-
-[Side-note: Ideal of the best system of naming--the Name-Giver
-ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and
-apportion his names according to resemblances among them.]
-
-Herein, so far as I can understand, consists the amount of
-positive inference which Plato enables us to draw from the
-Kratylus. Sokrates began by saying that names having natural
-rectitude were the only materials out of which a language could be
-formed: he ends by affirming merely that this is the best and most
-perfect mode of formation: he admits that names may become
-significant, though loosely and imperfectly, by convention
-alone--yet the best scheme would be, that in which they are
-significant by inherent resemblance to the thing named. But this
-cannot be done until the Name-giver, instead of proceeding upon
-the false theory of Herakleitus, starts from the true theory
-recognising the reality of eternal, unchangeable, Ideas or Forms.
-He will distinguish, and embody in appropriate syllables, those
-Forms of Names which truly resemble, and have natural connection
-with, the Forms of Things.
-
-Such is the ideal of perfect or philosophical Naming, as Plato
-conceives it--disengaged from those divinations of the origin and
-metamorphoses of existing names, which occupy so much of the
-dialogue.[89] He does not indeed attempt to construct a body of
-true names _a priori_, but he sets forth the real nameable
-permanent essences, to which these names might be assimilated: the
-principles upon which the construction ought to be founded, by the
-philosophic lawgiver following out a good theory:[90] and he
-contrasts this process with two rival processes, each defective in
-its own way. This same contrast, pervading Plato's views on other
-subjects, deserves a few words of illustration.
-
-[Footnote 89: Deuschle (Die Platonische Sprachphilosophie, p. 57)
-tells us that in this dialogue "Plato _intentionally_ presented
-many of his thoughts in a covert or contradictory and
-unintelligible manner". (Vieles absichtlich verhuellt oder
-widersprechend und missverstaendlich dargestellt wird.)
-
-I see no probability in such an hypothesis.
-
-Respecting the origin and primordial signification of language, a
-great variety of different opinions have been started.
-
-William von Humboldt (Werke, vi. 80) assumes that there must have
-been some primitive and natural bond between each sound and its
-meaning (_i.e._ that names were originally significant [Greek:
-phu/sei]), though there are very few particular cases in which
-such connexion can be brought to evidence or even divined. (Here
-we see that the larger knowledge of etymology possessed at present
-deters the modern philologer from that which Plato undertakes in
-the Kratylus.) He distinguishes a threefold relation between the
-name and the thing signified. 1. Directly imitative. 2. Indirectly
-imitative or symbolical. 3. Imitative by one remove, or
-analogical: where a name becomes transferred from one object to
-another, by virtue of likeness between the two objects. (Ueber die
-Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss
-auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechtes, p. 78,
-Berlin, 1880.)
-
-Mr. Hensleigh Wedgwood, in his Etymology of the English Language
-(see Prelim. Disc. p. 10 seq.), recognises the same imitative
-origin, and tries to apply the principle to particular English
-words. Mr. F. W. Farrar, in his recent interesting work (Chapters
-on Language) has explained and enforced copiously the like
-thesis--onomatopoeic origin for language generally. He has combated
-the objections of Professor Max Mueller, who considers the principle to
-be of little applicability or avail. But M. Renan assigns to it
-not less importance than Mr. Wedgwood and Mr. Farrar. (See sixth
-chapter of his ingenious dissertation De l'Origine du Langage, pp.
-135-146-148.)
-
-"L'imitation, ou l'onomatopee, parait avoir ete le procede
-ordinaire d'apres lequel les premiers nomenclateurs formerent les
-appellations. . . D'ailleurs, comme le choix de l'appellation
-n'est point arbitraire, et que jamais l'homme ne se decide a
-assembler des sons au hasard pour en faire les signes de la
-pensee, on peut affirmer que de tous les mots actuellement usites,
-il n'en est pas un seul qui _n'ait eu sa raison suffisante_, et ne
-se rattache, a travers mille transformations, a _une election
-primitive_. Or, le motif determinant pour le choix des mots a du
-etre, dans la plupart des cas, le desir d'imiter l'objet qu'on
-voulait exprimer. L'instinct de certains animaux suffit pour les
-porter a ce genre d'imitation, qui, faute de principes rationnels,
-reste chez eux infecond. . .
-
-"En resume, _le caprice_ n'a eu aucune part dans la formation du
-langage. Sans doute, on ne peut admettre qu'il y ait une relation
-intrinseque entre le nom et la chose. Le systeme que Platon a si
-subtilement developpe dans le Cratyle--cette these qu'il y a des
-denominations naturelles, et que la propriete des mots se
-reconnailt a l'imitation plus ou moins exacte de
-l'objet,--pourrait tout au plus s'appliquer aux noms formes par
-onomatopee, et pour ceux-ci memes, la loi dont nous parlous n'etablit
-qu'une convenance. _Les appellations n'ont pas uniquement leur cause
-dans l'objet appele_ (sans quoi, elles seraient les memes dans toutes
-les langues), _mais dans l'objet appele, vu a travers les
-dispositions personnelles du sujet appelant_. . . La raison qui a
-determine le choix des premiers hommes peut nous echapper; mais
-elle a existe. La liaison du sens et du mot n'est jamais
-_necessaire_, jamais _arbitraire_; toujours elle est motivee."
-
-When M. Renan maintains the Protagorean doctrine, that it is not
-the Object which is cause of the denomination given, but the
-Object seen through the personal dispositions of the denominating
-Subject--he contradicts the reasoning of the Platonic Sokrates in
-the conversation with Hermogenes (pp. 386-387; compare 424 A). But
-he adopts the reasoning of the same in the subsequent conversation
-with Kratylus; wherein the relative point of view is introduced
-for the first time (pp. 429 A-B, 431 E), and brought more and more
-into the foreground (pp. 436 B-D--437 C--439 C).
-
-The distinction drawn by M. Renan between _l'arbitraire_ and _le
-motive_ appears to me unfounded: at least, it requires a peculiar
-explanation of the two words--for if by _le caprice_ and
-_l'arbitraire_ be meant the exclusion of _all_ motive, such a
-state of mind could not be a preliminary to any proceeding at all.
-M. Renan can only mean that the motive which led to the original
-choice of the name, was peculiar to the occasion, and has since
-been forgotten. And this is what he himself says in a note to his
-Preface (pp. 18-19), replying to M. Littre: "L'Arien primitif a eu
-un motif pour appeler le frere _bhratr_ ou _fratr_, et le Semite
-pour l'appeler _ah_: peut on dire que cette difference resulte ou
-des aptitudes differentes de leur esprit, ou du spectacle
-exterieur? Chaque objet, les circonstances restant les memes, a
-ete susceptible d'une foule de denominations: le choix qui a ete
-fait de l'une d'elles tient a des causes impossibles a saisir."]
-
-[Footnote 90: Plato (in Timaeus, p. 29 B) recognises an essential
-affinity between the eternal Forms and the words or propositions
-in which they become subjects of discourse.]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of Plato's views about naming with those
-upon social institutions. Artistic, systematic
-construction--contrasted with unpremeditated unsystematic growth.]
-
-Respecting social institutions and government, there is one
-well-known theory to which Sir James Mackintosh gave expression in the
-phrase--"Governments are not made, but grow". The like phrase has
-been applied by an eminent modern author on Logic, to
-language--"Languages are not made, but grow".[91] One might suppose,
-in reading the second and third books of the Republic of Plato, that
-Plato also had adopted this theory: for the growth of a society,
-without any initiative or predetermined construction by a special
-individual, is there strikingly depicted.[92] But in truth it is
-this theory which stands in most of the Platonic works, as the
-antithesis depreciated and discredited by Plato. The view most
-satisfactory to him contemplates the analogy of a human artist or
-professional man; which he enlarges into the idea of an
-originating, intelligent, artistic, Constructor, as the source of
-all good. This view is exhibited to us in the Timaeus, where we
-find the Demiurgus, building up by his own fiat all that is good
-in the Kosmos: in the Politikus, where we find the individual
-dictator producing by his uncontrolled ordinance all that is
-really good in the social system;--lastly, here also in the
-Kratylus, where we have the scientific or artistic Name-giver, and
-him alone, set forth as competent to construct an assemblage of
-names, each possessing full and perfect rectitude. To this theory
-there is presented a counter-theory, which Plato disapproves--a
-Kosmos which grows by itself and keeps up its own agencies,
-without any extra-kosmic constructor or superintendent: in like
-manner, an aggregate of social customs, and an aggregate of names,
-which have grown up no one knows how; and which sustain and
-perpetuate themselves by traditional force--by movement already
-acquired in a given direction. The idea of growth, by regular
-assignable steps and by regularising tendencies instinctive and
-inherent in Nature, belongs rather to Aristotle; Plato conceives
-Nature as herself irregular, and as persuaded or constrained into
-some sort of regularity by a supernatural or extranatural
-artist.[93]
-
-[Footnote 91: See Mr. John Stuart Mill's Logic, Book i. ch. viii.]
-
-[Footnote 92: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 seq., where the [Greek:
-ge/nesis] of a social community, out of common necessity and
-desire acting upon all and each of the individual citizens, is
-depicted in a striking way. The [Greek: a)rche] of the City (p.
-369 B) as Plato there presents it, is Aristotelian rather than
-Platonic.]
-
-[Footnote 93: M. Destutt de Tracy insists upon the emotional
-initiative force, as deeper and more efficacious than the
-intellectual, in the first formation of language.
-
-"Dans l'origine du langage d'action, un seul geste dit--je veux
-cela, ou je vous montre cela, ou je vous demande secours; un seul
-cri dit, je vous appelle, ou je souffre, ou je suis content, &c.;
-mais sans distinguer aucune des idees qui composent ses
-propositions. Ce n'est point par le detail, mais par les masses,
-que, commencent toutes nos expressions, ainsi que toutes nos
-connaissances. Si quelques langages possedent des signes propres a
-exprimer des idees isolees, ce n'est donc que par l'effet de la
-decomposition qui s'est operee dans ces langages; et ces signes,
-ou noms propres d'idees, ne sont, pour ainsi dire, que des debris,
-des fragmens, ou du moins des emanations de ceux qui d'abord
-exprimaient, bien ou mal, les propositions tout entieres."
-(Destutt de Tracy, Grammaire, ch. i. p. 23, ed. 1825; see also the
-Ideologie of the same author, ch. xvi. p. 215.)
-
-M. Renan enunciates in the most explicit terms this comparison of
-the formation of language to the growth and development of a
-germ:--"Les langues doivent etres comparees, non au cristal qui se
-forme par agglomeration autour d'un noyau, mais au germe qui se
-developpe par sa force intime, et par l'appel necessaire de ses
-parties". (De l'Origine du Langage, ch. iii. p. 101; also ch. iv.
-pp. 115-117.)
-
-The theory of M. Renan, in this ingenious treatise, is, that
-language is the product of "la raison spontanee, la raison
-populaire," without reflexion. "La reflexion n'y peut rien: les
-langues sont sorties toutes faites du moule meme de l'esprit
-humain, comme Minerve du cerveau de Jupiter." "Maintenant que la
-raison reflechie a remplace l'instinct createur, a peine le genie
-suffit-il pour analyser ce que les l'esprit des premiers hommes
-enfanta de toutes pieces, et sans y songer" (pp. 98-99). This
-theory appears to me very doubtful; as much as there is proved in
-it, is stated in a good passage cited by M. Renan from Will. von
-Humboldt (pp. 106-107). But there are two remarks to be made, in
-comparing it with the Kratylus of Plato. 1. That the hypothesis of
-a philosopher "qui compose un langage de sang-froid," which
-appears absurd to Turgot and M. Renan (p. 92), did not appear
-absurd to Plato, but on the contrary as the only sure source of
-what is good and right in language. 2. That Plato, in the
-Kratylus, takes account only of _naming_, and not of the
-grammatical structure of language, which M. Renan considers the
-essential part (p. 106: compare also pp. 208-209). Grammar, with
-its established analogies, does not seem to have been present to
-Plato's mind as an object of reflexion; there existed none in his
-day.]
-
-[Side-note: Politikus compared with Kratylus.]
-
-Looking back to the Politikus (reviewed in the last chapter), we
-find Plato declaring to us wherein consists the rectitude of a
-social Form: it resides in the presiding and uncontrolled
-authority of a scientific or artistic Ruler, always present and
-directing every one: or of a few such Rulers, if there be a
-few--though this is more than can be hoped. But such rectitude is
-seldom or never realised. Existing social systems are bad copies
-of this type, degenerating more or less widely from its
-perfection. One or a Few persons arrogate to themselves
-uncontrolled power, without possessing that science or art which
-justifies the exercise of it in the Right Ruler. These are, or may
-become, extreme depravations. The least bad, among all the
-imperfect systems, is an aggregate of fixed laws and magistrates
-with known functions, agreed to by convention of all and
-faithfully obeyed by all. But such a system of fixed laws, though
-second-best, falls greatly short of rectitude. It is much inferior
-in every way to the uncontrolled authority of the scientific
-Ruler.[94]
-
-[Footnote 94: See Plato, Politik. pp. 300-301.]
-
-That which Plato does for social systems in the Politikus, he does
-for names in the Kratylus. The full rectitude of names is when
-they are bestowed by the scientific Ruler, considered in the
-capacity of Name-giver. He it is who discerns, and embodies in
-syllables, the true Name-Form in each particular case. But such an
-artist is seldom realised: and there are others who, attempting to
-do his work without his knowledge, perform it ignorantly or under
-false theories.[95] The names thus given are imperfect names:
-moreover, after being given, they become corrupted and transformed
-in passing from man to man. Lastly, the mere fact of convention
-among the individuals composing the society, without any
-deliberate authorship or origination from any Ruler, bad or
-good--suffices to impart to Names a sort of significance, vulgar and
-imperfect, yet adequate to a certain extent.[96] The Name-giving
-Artist or Lawgiver is here superseded by King Nomos.
-
-[Footnote 95: Plato, Kratyl. p. 432 E.]
-
-[Footnote 96: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 434 E, 435 A-B.
-
-This unsystematic, spontaneous, origin and growth of language is
-set forth by Lucretius, who declares himself opposed to the theory
-of an originating Name-giver (v. pp. 1021-1060). Jacob Grimm and
-M. Renan espouse a theory, in the main, similar.]
-
-[Side-note: Ideal of Plato--Postulate of the One Wise Man--Badness
-of all reality.]
-
-It will be seen that in both these cases the Platonic point of
-view comes out--deliberate authorship from the scientific or
-artistic individual mind, as the only source of rectitude and
-perfection. But when Plato looks at the reality of life, either in
-social system or in names, he finds no such perfection anywhere:
-he discovers a divine agency originating what is good; but there
-is an independent agency necessary in the way of co-operation,
-though it sometimes counteracts and always debases the good.[97]
-We find either an incompetent dictator who badly imitates the true
-Artist--or else we have fixed, peremptory, laws; depending on the
-unsystematic, unauthorised, convention among individuals, which
-has grown up no one knows how--which is transmitted by tradition,
-being taught by every one and learnt by every one without any
-privileged caste of teachers--and which in the Platonic Protagoras
-is illustrated in the mythe and discourse ascribed to that
-Sophist;[98] being in truth, common sense, as contrasted with
-professional specialty. In regard to social systems, Plato
-pronounces fixed laws to be the second-best--enjoining strict
-obedience to them, wherever the first-best cannot be obtained. In
-the Republic he enumerates what are the conditions of rectitude in
-a city: but he admits at the same time that this Right Civic
-Constitution is an ideal, nowhere to be found existing: and he
-points out the successive stages of corruption by which it
-degenerates more and more into conformity with the realities of
-human society. As with Right Civic Constitution, so with Right
-Naming: Plato shows what constitutes rectitude of Names, but he
-admits that this is an ideal seen nowhere, and he notes the
-various causes which deprave the Right Names into that imperfect
-and semi-significant condition, which is the best that existing
-languages present.[99]
-
-[Footnote 97: Plato, Timaeus, p. 68 E.]
-
-[Footnote 98: See my remarks on the Politikus, in the last
-chapter: also Protagoras, p. 320 seq.
-
-Compare Plato, Kriton, p. 48 A. [Greek: o( e)pai+/on peri\ to
-dikai/on, o( ei(=s.]
-
-In the Menon also the same question is broached as in the
-Protagoras, whether virtue is teachable or not? and how any virtue
-can exist, when there are no special teachers, and no special
-learners of virtue? Here we have, though differently handled, the
-same antithesis between the ethical sentiment which grows and
-propagates itself unconsciously, without special initiative--and
-that which is deliberately prescribed and imparted by the wise
-individual: common sense versus professional specialty.]
-
-[Footnote 99: See the conditions of the [Greek: o)rthe\
-politei/a], and its gradual depravation and degeneracy into the
-state of actual governments, in Republic, v. init. p. 449 B, vii.
-544 A-B.]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of Kratylus, Theaetetus, and Sophistes, in
-treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility
-of false propositions.]
-
-One more remark, in reference to the general spirit and reciprocal
-bearing of Plato's dialogues. In three comparison distinct
-dialogues--Kratylus, Theaetetus, Sophistes--one and the same
-question is introduced into the discussion: a question keenly
-debated among the contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle. How is a
-false proposition possible? Many held that a false proposition and
-a false name were impossible: that you could not speak the thing
-that _is not_, or Non-Ens ([Greek: to\ me\ o)/n]): that such a
-proposition would be an empty sound, without meaning or
-signification: that speech may be significant or insignificant,
-but could not be false, except in the sense of being
-unmeaning.[100]
-
-[Footnote 100: Plato, Kratyl. p. 429.
-
-Ammonius, Scholia [Greek: ei)s ta\s Kategori/as] of Aristotle
-(Schol. Brandis, p. 60, a. 10).
-
-[Greek: Tine/s phasi mede\n ei)=nai to=n pro/s ti phu/sei, a)lla\
-a)na/plasma ei)=nai tau=ta te=s e(mete/ras dianoi/as, le/gontes
-o(/ti ou(/tos ou)k e)sti\ phu/sei ta\ pro/s ti a)lla\ the/sei
-. . . Tine\s de/, e)k diame/trou tou/tois e)/chontes, pa/nta ta\
-o)/nta pro/s ti e)/legon. O(=n ei)=s e)=n Protago/ras o(
-sophiste/s; . . . dio\ kai\ e)/legen o(/ti ou)k e)/sti tina\
-pseude= le/gein; e(/kastos ga\r kata\ to\ phaino/menon au)to=|
-kai\ dokou=n a)pophai/netai peri\ to=n pragma/ton, ou)k e)cho/nton
-o(risme/nen phu/sin a)ll' e)n te=| pro\s e(ma=s sche/sei to\
-ei)=nai e)cho/nton.]]
-
-Now this doctrine is dealt with in the Theaetetus, Sophistes, and
-Kratylus. In the Theaetetus,[101] Sokrates examines it at great
-length, and proposes several different hypotheses to explain how a
-false proposition might be possible: but ends in pronouncing them
-all inadmissible. He declares himself incompetent, and passes on
-to something else. Again, in the Sophistes, the same point is
-taken up, and discussed there also very copiously.[102] The Eleate
-in that dialogue ends by finding a solution which satisfies him
-(_viz._: that [Greek: to\ me o)\n = to\ e(/teron o)/ntos]). But
-what is remarkable is, that the solution does not meet any of the
-difficulties propounded in the Theaetetus; nor are those
-difficulties at all adverted to in the Sophistes. Finally, in the
-Kratylus, we have the very same doctrine, that false affirmations
-are impossible--which both in the Theaetetus and in the Sophistes
-is enunciated, not as the decided opinion of the speaker, but as a
-problem which embarrasses him--we have this same doctrine averred
-unequivocally by Kratylus as his own full conviction. And Sokrates
-finds that a very short argument, and a very simple comparison,
-suffice to refute him.[103] The supposed "aggressive
-cross-examiner," who presses Sokrates so hard in the Theaetetus, is
-not allowed to put his puzzling questions in the Kratylus.[104]
-
-[Footnote 101: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 187 D to 201 D. The discussion
-of the point is continued through thirteen pages of Stephan.
-Edit.]
-
-[Footnote 102: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 237 A, 264 B, through
-twenty-seven pages of Steph. edit.--though there are some digressions
-included herein.]
-
-[Footnote 103: Plato, Kratyl. pp. 430-431 A-B.]
-
-[Footnote 104: Plato, Theaetet. p. 200 A. [Greek: o( ga\r
-e)legktiko\s e)kei=nos gela/sas phe/sei.]]
-
-[Side-note: Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his
-manner of handling the same subject.]
-
-How are we to explain these three different modes of handling the
-same question by the same philosopher? If the question about
-Non-Ens can be disposed of in the summary way which we read in the
-Kratylus, what is gained by the string of unsolved puzzles in the
-Theaetetus--or by the long discursive argument in the Sophistes,
-ushering in a new solution noway satisfactory? If, on the
-contrary, the difficulties which are unsolved in the Theaetetus,
-and imperfectly solved in the Sophistes, are real and
-pertinent--how are we to explain the proceeding of Plato in the
-Kratylus, when he puts into the mouth of Kratylus a distinct averment
-of the opinion, about Non-Ens, yet without allowing him, when it is
-impugned by Sokrates, to urge any of these pertinent arguments in
-defence of it? If the peculiar solution given in the Sophistes be
-the really genuine and triumphant solution, why is it left
-unnoticed both in the Kratylus and the Theaetetus, and why is it
-contradicted in other dialogues? Which of the three dialogues
-represents Plato's real opinion on the question?
-
-[Side-note: No common didactic purpose pervading the
-Dialogues--each is a distinct composition, working out its own
-peculiar argument.]
-
-To these questions, and to many others of like bearing, connected
-with the Platonic writings, I see no satisfactory reply, if we are
-to consider Plato as a positive philosopher, with a scheme and
-edifice of methodised opinions in his mind: and as composing all
-his dialogues with a set purpose, either of inculcating these
-opinions on the reader, or of refuting the opinions opposed to
-them. This supposition is what most Platonic critics have in their
-minds, even when professedly modifying it. Their admiration for
-Plato is not satisfied unless they conceive him in the
-professorial chair as a teacher, surrounded by a crowd of
-learners, all under the obligation (incumbent on learners
-generally) to believe what they hear. Reasoning upon such a basis,
-the Platonic dialogues present themselves to me as a mystery. They
-exhibit neither identity of the teacher, nor identity of the
-matter taught: the composer (to use various Platonic comparisons)
-is Many, and not One--he is more complex than Typhos.[105]
-
-[Footnote 105: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 230 A.]
-
-If we are to find any common purpose pervading and binding
-together all the dialogues, it must not be a didactic purpose, in
-the sense above defined. The value of them consists, not in the
-result, but in the discussion--not in the conclusion, but in the
-premisses for and against it. In this sense all the dialogues have
-value, and all the same sort of value--though not all equal in
-amount. In different dialogues, the same subject is set before you
-in different ways: with remarks and illustrations sometimes
-tending towards one theory, sometimes towards another. It is for
-you to compare and balance them, and to elicit such result as your
-reason approves. The Platonic dialogues require, in order to
-produce their effect, a supplementary responsive force, and a
-strong effective reaction, from the individual reason of the
-reader: they require moreover that he shall have a genuine
-interest in the process of dialectic scrutiny ([Greek: to\
-philomathe/s, philo/logon])[106] which will enable him to perceive
-beauties in what would appear tiresome to others.
-
-[Footnote 106: 	Plato, Republic, v. p. 475; compare Phaedon,
-pp. 89-90. Phaedrus, p. 230 E.]
-
-Such manner of proceeding may be judicious or not, according to
-the sentiment of the critic. But it is at any rate Platonic. And
-we have to recall this point of view when dismissing the Kratylus,
-which presents much interest in the premisses and conflicting
-theories, with little or no result. It embodies the oldest
-speculations known to us respecting the origin, the mode of
-signification, and the functions of words as an instrument: and
-not the least interesting part of it, in my judgment, consists in
-its etymological conjectures, affording evidence of a rude
-etymological sense which has now passed away.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XXXII
-
-PHILEBUS.
-
-
-The Philebus, which we are now about to examine, is not merely a
-Dialogue of Search, but a Dialogue of Exposition, accompanied with
-more or less of search made subservient to the exposition. It
-represents Sokrates from the first as advancing an affirmative
-opinion--maintaining it against Philebus and Protarchus--and
-closing with a result assumed to be positively established.[1]
-
-[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher says, about the Philebus (Einleit. p.
-136)--"Das Ganze liegt fertig in dem Haupte des Sokrates, und
-tritt mit der ganzen Persoenlichkeit und Willkuehr einer
-zusammenhaengenden Rede heraus," &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philebus.]
-
-The question is, Wherein consists the Good--The Supreme
-Good--Summum Bonum. Three persons stand before us: the youthful
-Philebus: Protarchus, somewhat older, yet still a young man: and
-Sokrates. Philebus declares that The Good consists in pleasure or
-enjoyment; and Protarchus his friend advocates the same thesis,
-though in a less peremptory manner. On the contrary, Sokrates
-begins by proclaiming that it consists in wisdom or intelligence.
-He presently however recedes from this doctrine, so far as to
-admit that wisdom, alone and _per se_, is not sufficient to
-constitute the Supreme Good: and that a certain combination of
-pleasure along with it is required. Though the compound total thus
-formed is superior both to wisdom and to pleasure taken
-separately, yet comparing the two elements of which it is
-compounded, wisdom (Sokrates contends) is the most important of
-the two, and pleasure the least important. Neither wisdom nor
-pleasure can pretend to claim the first prize; but wisdom is fully
-entitled to the second, as being far more cognate than pleasure
-is, with the nature of Good.
-
-[Side-note: Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely
-negative procedure.]
-
-Such is the general purpose of the dialogue. As to the method of
-enquiry, Plato not only assigns to Sokrates a distinct affirmative
-opinion from the beginning, instead of that profession of
-ignorance which is his more usual characteristic--but he also
-places in the mouth of Protarchus an explicit protest against the
-negative cross-examination and Elenchus. "We shall not let you
-off" (says Protarchus to Sokrates) "until the two sides of this
-question shall have been so discriminated as to elicit a
-sufficient conclusion. In meeting us on the present question, pray
-desist from that ordinary manner of yours--desist from throwing us
-into embarrassment, and putting interrogations to which we cannot
-at the moment give suitable answers. We must not be content to
-close the discussion by finding ourselves in one common puzzle and
-confusion. If _we_ cannot solve the difficulty, you must solve it
-for us."[2]
-
-[Footnote 2: Plato, Philebus, pp. 19 E--20 A. [Greek: pau=sai de\
-to\n tro/pon e(mi=n a)panto=n tou=ton e)pi\ ta\ nu=n lego/mena
-. . . ei)s a)pori/an e)mba/llon kai\ a)neroto=n o(=n me\
-dunai/meth' a)\n i(kane\n a)po/krisin e)n to=| paro/nti dido/nai
-soi. me\ ga\r oi)o/metha te/los e(mi=n ei)=nai to=n nu=n te\n
-pa/nton e(mo=n a)pori/an, a)ll' ei) dra=|n tou=th' e(mei=s
-a)dunatou=men, soi\ draste/on.]
-
-There is a remarkable contrast between the method here proclaimed
-and that followed in the Theaetetus, though some eminent
-commentators have represented the Philebus as a sequel of the
-Theaetetus.]
-
-[Side-note: Enquiry--What mental condition will ensure to all men a
-happy life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive.
-Philebus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence.]
-
-Conformably to this requisition, Sokrates, while applying his
-cross-examining negative test to the doctrine of Philebus, sets
-against it a counter-doctrine of his own, and prescribes, farther,
-a positive method of enquiry. "You and I" (he says) "will each try
-to assign what permanent habit of mind, and what particular mental
-condition, is calculated to ensure to all men a happy life."[3]
-Good and Happiness are used in this dialogue as correlative and
-co-extensive terms. Happiness is that which a man feels when he
-possesses Good: Good is that which a man must possess in order to
-feel Happiness. The same fact or condition, looked at objectively,
-is denominated Good: looked at subjectively, is denominated
-Happiness.
-
-[Footnote 3: Plato, Philebus, p. 11 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Good--object of universal choice and attachment by men,
-animals, and plants--all-sufficient--satisfies all desires.]
-
-Is Good identical with pleasure, or with intelligence, or is it a
-Tertium Quid, distinct from both? Good, or The Good must be
-perfect and all-sufficient in itself: the object of desire,
-aspiration, choice, and attachment, by all men, and even by all
-animals and plants, who are capable of attaining it. Every man who
-has it, is satisfied, desiring nothing else. If he neglects it,
-and chooses any thing else, this is contrary to nature: he does so
-involuntarily, either from ignorance or some other untoward
-constraint.[4] Thus, the characteristic mark of Good or Happiness
-is, That it is desired, loved, and sought by all, and that, if
-attained, it satisfies all the wishes and aspirations of human
-nature.
-
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Philebus, p. 11 C. 20 C-D: [Greek: Te\n
-ta)gathou= moi=ran po/teron a)na/gke te/leon e)\ me\ te/leon
-ei)=nai? Pa/nton de/pou teleo/taton. Ti/ de/; i(kano\n ta)gatho/n?
-Po=s ga\r ou)/? kai\ pa/nton ge ei)s tou=to diaphe/rein to=n
-o)/nto=n. To/de ge me\n, o(s oi)=mai, peri\ au)tou=
-a)nagkaio/taton ei)=nai le/gein, o(s pa=n to\ gigno=skon au)to\
-thereu/ei kai\ e)phi/etai boulo/menon e(lei=n kai\ peri\ au(to\
-kte/sasthai, kai\ to=n a)/llon ou)de\n phronti/zei ple\n to=n
-a)poteloume/non a)/ma a)gathoi=s.]
-
-22 B: [Greek: i(kano\s kai\ te/leos kai\ pa=si phutoi=s kai\
-zo/ois ai(reto/s, oi(=sper dunato\n e)=n ou(/tos a)ei\ dia\ bi/ou
-ze=n; ei) de/ tis a)/lla e(|rei=th' e(mo=n, para\ phu/sin a)\n
-te\n tou= a)lethou=s ai(retou= e)la/mbanen a)/kon e)x a)gnoi/as
-e)/ tinos a)na/gkes ou)k eu)dai/monos.]
-
-60 C, 61 A. 61 E: [Greek: to\n a)gapeto/taton bi/on]. 64 C:
-[Greek: tou= pa=si gegone/nai prosphile= te\n toiau/ten
-dia/thesin.] 67 A.
-
-"Omnibus naturae humanae desideriis prorsus satisfacere" (Stallbaum
-ad Phileb. p. 18 D-E, page 139).]
-
-[Side-note: Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite
-cognitions are so likewise.]
-
-Sokrates then remarks that pleasure is very multifarious and
-diverse: and that under that same word, different forms and
-varieties are signified, very unlike to each other, and sometimes
-even opposite to each other. Thus the intemperate man has his
-pleasures, while the temperate man enjoys his pleasures also,
-attached to his own mode of life: so too the simpleton has
-pleasure in his foolish dreams and hopes, the intelligent man in
-the exercise of intellectual force. These and many others are
-varieties of pleasure not resembling, but highly dissimilar, even
-opposite.--Protarchus replies--That they proceed from dissimilar
-and opposite circumstances, but that in themselves they are not
-dissimilar or opposite. Pleasure must be completely similar to
-pleasure--itself to itself.--So too (rejoins Sokrates) colour is
-like to colour: in that respect there is no difference between
-them. But black colour is different from, and even opposite to,
-white colour.[5] You will go wrong if you make things altogether
-opposite, into one. You may call all pleasures by the name
-_pleasures_: but you must not affirm between them any other point
-of resemblance, nor call them all _good_. I maintain that some are
-bad, others good. What common property in all of them, is it, that
-you signify by the name _good_? As different pleasures are unlike
-to each other, so also different cognitions (or modes of
-intelligence) are unlike to each other; though all of them agree
-in being _cognitions_. To this Protarchus accedes.[6]--We must
-enter upon our enquiry after The Good with this mutual concession:
-That Pleasure, which you affirm to be The Good--and Intelligence,
-which I declare to be so--is at once both Unum, and Multa et
-Diversa.[7]
-
-[Footnote 5: Plat. Phileb. p. 12 D-E.]
-
-[Footnote 6: Plat. Phileb. pp. 13 D-E, 14 A.]
-
-[Footnote 7: Plat. Phileb. p. 14 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this
-description? Appeal to individual choice.]
-
-In determining between the two competing doctrines--pleasure on
-one side and intelligence on the other--Sokrates makes appeal to
-individual choice. "Would _you_ be satisfied (he asks Protarchus)
-to live your life through in the enjoyment of the greatest
-pleasures? Would _any one of us_ be satisfied to live, possessing
-the fullest measure and variety of intelligence, reason,
-knowledge, and memory--but having no sense, great or small, either
-of pleasure or pain?" And Protarchus replies, in reference to the
-joint life of intelligence and pleasure combined, "Every man will
-choose this joint life in preference to either of them separately.
-It is not one man who will choose it, and another who will reject
-it: but every man will choose it alike."[8]
-
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Philebus, p. 21 A. [Greek: de/xai' a)\n su/,
-Pro/tarche, ze=n to\n bi/on a(/panta e(do/menos e(dona\s ta\s
-megi/stas?] 21 D-E: [Greek: ei)/ tis de/xait' a)\n au)= ze=n
-e(mo=n], &c. 22 A: [Greek: Pa=s de/pou tou=to/n ge ai(re/setai
-pro/teron e)\ e)kei/non o(poteronou=n, kai\ pro\s tou/tois ge
-ou)ch o( me/n, o( d' ou)/.] 60 D: [Greek: ei)/ tis a)/neu tou/ton
-de/xait' a)/n], &c.
-
-Here again in appealing to the individual choice and judgment, the
-Platonic Sokrates indirectly recognises what, in the Theaetetus and
-other dialogues, we have seen him formally rejecting and
-endeavouring to confute--the Protagorean canon or measure.
-Protarchus is the measure of truth or falsehood, of belief or
-disbelief, to Protarchus himself: every other man is so _to
-himself_. Sokrates may be a wiser man, in the estimation of the
-public, than Protarchus; and if Protarchus believes him to be
-such, that very belief may amount to an authority, determining
-Protarchus to accept or reject various opinions propounded by
-Sokrates: but the ultimate verdict must emanate from the bosom of
-the acceptor or rejector. I have already observed elsewhere, that
-a large part of the conversation which the Platonic dialogues put
-into the mouth of Sokrates, is addressed to individualities and
-specialties of the other interlocutors: that this very power of
-discriminating between one mind and another, forms the great
-superiority of dialectic colloquy as compared with written
-treatise or rhetorical discourse--both of which address the same
-terms to a multitude of hearers or readers differing among
-themselves, without possibility of separate adaptation to each.
-(See above, ch. xxvi. pp. 50-54, on Phaedrus.)]
-
-[Side-note: First Question submitted to Protarchus--Intense
-Pleasure, without any intelligence--He declines to accept it.]
-
-The point, which Sokrates submits to the individual judgment of
-Protarchus, is--"Would _you_ be satisfied to pass your life in the
-enjoyment of the most intense pleasures, and would you desire
-nothing farther?" The reply is in the affirmative. "But recollect
-(adds Sokrates) that you are to have nothing else. The question
-assumes that you are to be without thought, intelligence, reason,
-sight, and memory: you are neither to have opinion of present
-enjoyment, nor remembrance of past, nor anticipation of future:
-you are to live the life of an oyster, with great present
-pleasure?" The question being put with these additions, Protarchus
-alters his view, and replies in the negative: at the same time
-expressing his surprise at the strangeness of the hypothesis.[9]
-
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Philebus, p. 21.
-
-Such an hypothesis does indeed depart so totally from the
-conditions of human life, that it cannot be considered as a fair
-test of any doctrine. A perpetuity of delicious sensations cannot
-be enjoyed, consistent with the conditions of animal organization.
-A man cannot realise to himself that which the hypothesis
-promises; much less can he realise it without those accompaniments
-which it assumes him to renounce. The loss stands out far more
-palpably than the gain. It is no refutation of the theory of
-Philebus; who, announcing pleasure as the Summum Bonum, is
-entitled to call for pleasure in all its varieties, and for
-exemption from all pains. Sokrates himself had previously insisted
-on the great variety as well as on the great dissimilarity of the
-modes of pleasure and pain. To each variety of pleasure there
-corresponds a desire: to each variety of pain, an aversion.
-
-If the Summum Bonum is to fulfil the conditions postulated--that
-is, if it be such as to satisfy all human desires, it ought to
-comprise all these varieties of pleasure. It ought, _e.g._, to
-comprise the pleasures of self-esteem, and conscious
-self-protecting power, affording security for the future; it ought
-to comprise exemption from the pains of self-reproach, self-contempt,
-and conscious helplessness. These are among the greatest pleasures
-and pains of the mature man, though they are aggregates formed by
-association. Now the alternative tendered by Sokrates neither
-includes these pleasures nor eliminates these pains. It includes
-only the pleasures of sense; and it is tendered to one who has
-rooted in his mind desires for other pleasures, and aversions for
-other pains, besides those of sense. It does not therefore come up
-to the requirements fairly implied in the theory of Philebus.]
-
-[Side-note: Second Question--Whether he will accept a life of
-Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer--_No_.]
-
-Sokrates now proceeds to ask Protarchus, whether he will accept a
-life of full and all-comprehensive intelligence purely and simply,
-without any taste either of pleasure or pain. To which Protarchus
-answers, that neither he nor any one else would accept such a
-life.[10] Both of them agree that the Summum Bonum ought to be
-sought neither in pleasure singly, nor in intelligence singly, but
-in both combined.
-
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Philebus, pp. 21-22.
-
-It is to be remarked, however, that there was more than one
-Grecian philosopher who described the Summum Bonum as consisting
-in absence of pain ([Greek: a)lupi/a]); even without the large
-measure of intelligence which Sokrates here promises, and without
-any positive pleasure. These men would of course have accepted the
-second alternative put by Sokrates, which Protarchus here refuses.
-They took their standard of comparison from the actualities of
-human life around them, which exhibited pain and suffering
-universal, frequent, and unavoidable. They conceived that if
-painlessness could be obtained, it was as much as could reasonably
-be demanded, and that pleasure might be dispensed with. In laying
-down any theory about the Summum Bonum, the preliminary question
-ought always to be settled--What are the conditions of human life
-which are to be assumed as peremptory and unalterable? What
-circumstances are we at liberty to suppose to be suppressed,
-modified, or reversed? According as these fundamental postulates
-are given in a larger or narrower sense, the ideal Summum Bonum
-will be shaped differently. This preliminary requisite to the
-investigation was little considered by the ancient philosophers.]
-
-[Side-note: It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a
-Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence
-is more cognate with it than Pleasure.]
-
-[Side-note: Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be
-Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about
-Generic Unity--how it is distributed among species and
-individuals.]
-
-Sokrates then undertakes to show, that of these two elements,
-intelligence is the most efficacious and the most contributory to
-the Summum Bonum--pleasure the least so. But as a preparation for
-this enquiry, he adverts to that which has just been agreed
-between them respecting both Pleasure and Intelligence--That each
-of them is Unum, and each of them at the same time Multa et
-Diversa. Here (argues Sokrates) we find opened before us the
-embarrassing question respecting the One and the Many. Enquirers
-often ask--"How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? How
-can the same thing be both One and Many?" They find it difficult
-to understand how you, Protarchus, being One person, are called by
-different names--tall, heavy, white, just, &c.: or how you are
-affirmed to consist of many different parts and members. To this
-difficulty, however (says Sokrates), the reply is easy. You, and
-other particular men, belong to the generated and the perishable.
-You partake of many different Ideas or Essences, and your
-partaking of one among them does not exclude you from partaking
-also of another distinct and even opposite. You partake of the
-Idea or Essence of Unity--also of Multitude--of tallness,
-heaviness, whiteness, humanity, greatness, littleness, &c. You are
-both great and little, heavy and light, &c. In regard to generated
-and perishable things, we may understand this. But in regard to
-the ungenerated, imperishable, absolute Essences, the difficulty
-is more serious. The Self-existent or Universal Man, Bull,
-Animal--the Self-existent Beautiful, Good--in regard to these Unities
-or Monads there is room for great controversy. First, Do such unities
-or monads really and truly exist? Next, assuming that they do
-exist, how do they come into communion with generated and
-perishable particulars, infinite in number? Is each of them
-dispersed and parcelled out among countless individuals? or is it
-found, whole and entire, in each individual, maintaining itself as
-one and the same, and yet being parted from itself? Is the
-Universal Man distributed among all individual men, or is he one
-and entire in each of them? How is the Universal Beautiful (The
-Self-Beautiful--Beauty) in all and each beautiful thing? How does
-this one monad, unchangeable and imperishable, become embodied in
-a multitude of transitory individuals, each successively generated
-and perishing? How does this One become Many, or how do these Many
-become One?[11]
-
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Philebus, p. 15 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Active disputes upon this question at the time.]
-
-These (says Sokrates) are the really grave difficulties respecting
-the identity of the One and the Many: difficulties which have
-occasioned numerous controversies, and are likely to occasion many
-more. Youthful speculators, especially, are fond of trying their
-first efforts of dialectical ingenuity in arguing upon this
-paradox--How the One can be Many, and the Many One.[12]
-
-[Footnote 12: Plato, Philebus, pp. 15-16.
-
-In reading the difficulties thus started by Sokrates, we perceive
-them to be the same as those which we have seen set forth in the
-dialogue called Parmenides, where they are put into the mouth of
-the philosopher so-called; as objections requiring to be removed
-by Sokrates, before the Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas,
-universal, eternal and unchangeable, can be admitted. We might
-expect that Plato having so emphatically and repeatedly announced
-his own sense of the difficulty, would proceed to suggest some
-mode of replying to it. But this he never does. In the Parmenides,
-he does not even promise any explanation; in the Philebus, he
-seems to promise one, but all the explanation which he gives
-ignores or jumps over the difficulty, enjoining us to proceed as
-if no such difficulty existed.]
-
-[Side-note: Order of Nature--Coalescence of the Finite with the
-Infinite. The One--The Finite Many--The Infinite Many.]
-
-It is a primaeval inspiration (he says) granted by the Gods to man
-along with the fire of Prometheus, and handed down to us as a
-tradition from that heroic race who were in nearer kindred with
-the Gods--That all things said to exist are composed of Unity and
-Multitude, and include in them a natural coalescence of Finiteness
-and Infinity.[13] This is the fundamental order of Nature, which
-we must assume and proceed upon in our investigations. We shall
-find everywhere the Form of Unity conjoined with the Form of
-Infinity. But we must not be satisfied simply to find these two
-forms. We must look farther for those intermediate Forms which lie
-between the two. Having found the Form of One, we must next search
-for the Form of Two, Three, Four, or some definite number: and we
-must not permit ourselves to acquiesce in the Form of Infinite,
-until no farther definite number can be detected. In other words,
-we must not be satisfied with knowing only one comprehensive
-Genus, and individuals comprised under it. We must distribute the
-Genus into two, three, or more Species: and each of those Species
-again into two or more sub-species, each characterised by some
-specific mark: until no more characteristic marks can be
-discovered upon which to found the establishment of a distinct
-species. When we reach this limit, and when we have determined the
-number of subordinate species which the case presents, nothing
-remains except the indefinite mass and variety of individuals.[14]
-The whole scheme will thus comprise--The One, the Summum Genus, or
-Highest Form: The Many, a definite number of Species or
-sub-Species or subordinate Forms: The Infinite, a countless heap of
-Individuals.
-
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Philebus, p. 16 C. [Greek: o(s e)x e(no\s
-me\n kai\ e)k pollo=n o)/nton to=n a)ei\ legome/non ei)=nai,
-pe/ras de\ kai\ a)peiri/an e(n au(toi=s xu/mphuton e)cho/nton.]]
-
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Philebus, p. 16 D. [Greek: dei=n ou)=n e(ma=s
-_tou/ton ou(/to diakerosmeme/non_, a)ei\ _mi/an i)de/an_ peri\
-panto\s e(ka/stote _theme/nous zetei=n; eu(re/sein ga\r
-e)nou=san_; e)a\n ou)=n metala/bomen, meta\ mi/an du/o, ei)/ pos
-ei)si/, skopei=n, ei) de\ me/, trei=s e)/ tina a)/llon a)rithmo/n,
-kai\ to\ e(\n e)kei/non e(/kaston pa/lin o(sau/tos, me/chri per
-a)\n to\ kat' a)rcha\s e(\n me\ o(/ti e(\n kai\ polla\ kai\
-a)/peira/ e)sti mo/non i)/de| tis a)lla\ kai\ o(/posa; _te\n de\
-tou= a)pei/rou i)de/an_ pro\s to\ ple=thos me\ prosphe/rein, pri\n
-a)/n tis to\n a)rithmo\n au)tou= pa/nta kati/de| to\n metaxu\ tou=
-a)pei/rou te kai\ tou= e(no/s; to/te d' e)/de to\ e(\n e(/kaston
-to=n pa/nton ei)s to\ a)/peiron methe/nta chai/rein e)a=|n.]
-
-Plato here recognises a Form of the Infinite, [Greek: a)pei/rou
-i)de/an]; again, p. 18 A, [Greek: a)pei/rou phu/sin].]
-
-[Side-note: Mistake commonly made--To look only for the One, and
-the Infinite Many, without looking for the intermediate
-subdivisions.]
-
-The mistake commonly made (continues Sokrates) by clever men of
-the present day, is, that they look for nothing beyond the One and
-the Infinite Many: one comprehensive class, and countless
-individuals included in it. They take up carelessly any class
-which strikes them,[15] and are satisfied to have got an
-indefinite number of individuals under one name. But they never
-seek for intermediate sub-divisions between the two, so as to be
-able to discriminate one portion of the class from other by some
-definite mark, and thus to constitute a sub-class. They do not
-feel the want of such intermediate sub-divisions, nor the
-necessity of distinguishing one portion of this immense group of
-individuals from another. Yet it is exactly upon these
-discriminating marks that the difference turns, between genuine
-dialectical argument and controversy without result.[16]
-
-[Footnote 15: Plato, Philebus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi( de\ nu=n to=n
-a)nthro/pon sophoi\ _e(\n me/n, o(/pos a)\n tu/chosi_, kai\ polla\
-tha=tton kai\ bradu/teron poiou=si tou= de/ontos, _meta\ de\ to\
-e(\n a)/peira eu)thu/s_, ta\ de\ me/sa au)tou\s e)kpheu/gei], &c.
-
-Stallbaum conjectures that the words [Greek: kai\ polla\] after
-[Greek: tu/chosi] ought not to be in the text. He proposes to
-expunge them. The meaning of the passage certainly seems clearer
-without them.]
-
-[Footnote 16: Plato, Philebus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi(=s
-diakecho/ristai to/ te dialektiko=s pa/lin kai\ to\ e)ristiko=s
-e(ma=s poiei=sthai pro\s a)lle/lous tou\s lo/gous.]]
-
-[Side-note: Illustration from Speech and Music.]
-
-This general doctrine is illustrated by two particular
-cases--Speech and Music. The voice (or Vocal Utterance) is One--the
-voice is also Infinite: to know only thus much is to know very little.
-Even when you know, in addition to this, the general distinction
-of sounds into acute and grave, you are still far short of the
-knowledge of music. You must learn farthermore to distinguish all
-the intermediate gradations, and specific varieties of sound, into
-which the infinity of separate sounds admits of being distributed:
-what and how many these gradations are? what are the numerical
-ratios upon which they depend--the rhythmical and harmonic
-systems? When you have learnt to know the One Genus, the infinite
-diversity of individual sounds, and the number of subordinate
-specific varieties by which these two extremes are connected with
-each other--then you know the science of music. So too, in speech:
-when you can distinguish the infinite diversity of articulate
-utterance into vowels, semi-vowels, and consonants, each in
-definite number and with known properties--you are master of
-grammatical science. You must neither descend at once from the One
-to the Infinite Multitude, nor ascend at once from the Infinite
-Multitude to the One: you must pass through the intermediate
-stages of subordinate Forms, in determinate number. All three
-together make up scientific knowledge. You cannot know one portion
-separately, without knowing the remainder: all of them being
-connected into one by the common bond of the highest Genus.[17]
-
-[Footnote 17: Plato, Philebus, p. 18 C-D. [Greek: kathoro=n de\
-o(s ou)dei\s e(mo=n ou)d' a)\n e(\n au)to\ kath' au(to\ a)/neu
-pa/nton au)to=n ma/thoi, tou=ton to\n desmo\n au)= logisa/menos
-o(s o)/nta e(/na kai\ pa/nta tau=ta e(\n pos poiou=nta, mi/an e)p'
-au)toi=s o(s ou)=san grammatike\n te/chnen e)pephthe/gxato
-proseipo/n.]]
-
-[Side-note: Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties
-which he had himself recognised as existing.]
-
-Such is the explanation which Plato gives as to the identity of
-One and Many. Considered as a reply to his own previous doubts and
-difficulties, it is altogether insufficient. It leaves all those
-doubts unsolved. The first point of enquiry which he had started,
-was, Whether any Universal or Generic Monads really existed: the
-second point was, assuming that they did exist, how each of them,
-being essentially eternal and unchangeable, could so multiply
-itself or divide itself as to be at the same time in an infinite
-variety of particulars.[18] Both points are left untouched by the
-explanation. No proof is furnished that Universal Monads
-exist--still less that they multiply or divide their one and unchangeable
-essence among infinite particulars--least of all is it shown, how
-such multiplication or division can take place, consistently with
-the fundamental and eternal sameness of the Universal Monad. The
-explanation assumes these difficulties to be eliminated, but does
-not suggest the means of eliminating them. The Philebus, like the
-Parmenides, recognises the difficulties as existing, but leaves
-them unsolved, though the dogmas to which they attach are the
-cardinal and peculiar tenets of Platonic speculation. Plato shows
-that he is aware of the embarrassments: yet he is content to
-theorize as if they did not exist. In a remarkable passage of this
-very dialogue, he intimates pretty clearly that he considered the
-difficulty of these questions to be insuperable, and never likely
-to be set at rest. This identification of the One with the Many,
-in verbal propositions (he says) has begun with the beginning of
-dialectic debate, and will continue to the end of it, as a
-stimulating puzzle which especially captivates the imagination of
-youth.[19]
-
-[Footnote 18: Plato, Philebus, p. 15 B-C.]
-
-[Footnote 19: Plato, Philebus, p. 15 D. [Greek: phame/n pou
-tau)to\n e(\n kai\ polla\ u(po\ lo/gon gigno/mena peritre/chein
-pa/nte| kath' e(/kaston to=n legome/non a)ei\ kai\ pa/lai kai\
-nu=n. kai\ tou=to ou)/te me\ pau/setai/ pote ou)/te e)/rxato nu=n,
-a)ll' e)/sti to\ toiou=ton, o(s e)moi\ phai/netai, to=n lo/gon
-au)to=n a)tha/nato/n ti kai\ a)ge/ron pa/thos e)n e(mi=n.]
-
-The sequel (too long to transcribe) of this passage (setting forth
-the manner in which this apparent paradox worked upon the
-imagination of youthful students) is very interesting to read, and
-shows (in my opinion) that Stallbaum's interpretation of it in his
-note is not the right one. Plato is here talking (in my judgment)
-about the puzzle and paradox itself: Stallbaum represents Plato as
-talking about his pretended solution of it, which has not as yet
-been at all alluded to.
-
-Plato seems to give his own explanation without full certainty or
-confidence: see p. 16 B. And when we turn to pp. 18-19, we shall
-see that he forgets the original difficulty which had been
-proposed (compare p. 15 B), introducing in place of it another
-totally distinct difficulty, as if _that_ had been in
-contemplation.]
-
-[Side-note: It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical
-division and classification.]
-
-But though the difficulties started by Plato remain unexplained,
-still his manner of stating them is in itself valuable and
-instructive. It proclaims--1. The necessity of a systematic
-classification, or subordinate scale of species and sub-species,
-between the highest Genus and the group of individuals beneath. 2.
-That each of these subordinate grades in the scale must be founded
-upon some characteristic mark. 3. That the number of sub-divisions
-is definite and assignable, there being a limit beyond which it
-cannot be carried. 4. That full knowledge is not attainable until
-we know all three--The highest Genus--The intermediate species and
-sub-species; both what they are, how many there are, and how each
-is characterised--The infinite group of individuals. These three
-elements must all be known in conjunction: we are not to pass
-either from the first to the third, or from the third to the
-first, except through the second.
-
-[Side-note: At that time little thought had been bestowed upon
-classification as a logical process.]
-
-The general necessity of systematic classification--of
-generalisation and specification, or subordination of species and
-sub-species, as a condition of knowing any extensive group of
-individuals--requires no advocate at the present day. But it was
-otherwise in the time of Plato. There existed then no body of
-knowledge, distributed and classified, to which he could appeal as
-an example. The illustrations to which he himself refers here, of
-language and music as systematic arrangements of vocal sounds,
-were both of them the product of empirical analogy and unconscious
-growth, involving little of predetermined principle or theory. All
-the classification then employed was merely that which is included
-in the structure of language: in the framing of general names,
-each designating a multitude of individuals. All that men knew of
-classification was, that which is involved in calling many
-individuals by the same common name. This is the defect pointed
-out by Plato, when he remarks that the clever men of his time took
-no heed except of the One and the Infinite (Genus and
-Individuals): neglecting all the intermediate distinctions. Upon
-the knowledge of these _media_ (he says) rests the difference
-between true dialectic debate, and mere polemic.[20] That is--when
-you have only an infinite multitude of individuals, called by the
-same generic name, it is not even certain that they have a single
-property in common: and even if they have, it is not safe to
-reason from one to another as to the possession of any other
-property beyond the one generic property--so that the debate ends
-in mere perplexity. All pleasures agree in being pleasures
-(Sokrates had before observed to Protarchus), and all cognitions
-agree in being cognitions. But you cannot from hence infer that
-there is any other property belonging in common to all.[21] That
-is a point which you cannot determine without farther observation
-of individuals, and discrimination of the great multitude into
-appropriate subdivisions. You will thus bring the whole under that
-triple point of view which Plato requires:--the highest
-Genus,--the definite number of species and sub-species,--the
-undefined number of individuals.
-
-[Footnote 20: Plato, Philebus, p. 17 A. [Greek: oi( de\ nu=n to=n
-a)nthro/pon sophoi\ e(\n me/n, o(/pos a)\n tu/chosi, kai\ polla\
-tha=tton kai\ bradu/teron poiou=si tou= de/ontos, meta\ de\ to\
-e(\n a)/peira eu)thu/s, ta\ de\ me/sa au)tou\s e)kpheu/gei, oi(=s
-diakechoristai to/ te dialektiko=s pa/lon kai\ to\ e)ristiko=s
-e(ma=s poiei=sthai pro\s a)lle/lous tou\s lo/gous.]]
-
-[Footnote 21: Plato, Philebus, pp. 13 B, 14 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Classification--unconscious and conscious.]
-
-Here we have set before us one important branch of logical
-method--the necessity of classification, not simply arising as an
-incidental and unconscious effect of the transitive employment of
-a common name, but undertaken consciously and intentionally as a
-deliberate process, and framed upon principles predetermined as
-essential to the accomplishment of a scientific end. This was a
-conception new in the Sokratic age. Plato seized upon it with
-ardour. He has not only emphatically insisted upon it in the
-Philebus and elsewhere, but he has also given (in the Sophistes
-and Politikus) elaborate examples of systematic logical
-subdivision applied to given subjects.
-
-[Side-note: Plato's doctrine about classification is not
-necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas.]
-
-We may here remark that Plato's views as to the necessity of
-systematic classification, or of connecting the Summum Genus with
-individuals by intermediate stages of gradually decreasing
-generality--are not necessarily connected with his peculiar theory
-of Ideas as Self-existent objects, eternal and unchangeable. The
-two are indeed blended together in his own mind and language: but
-the one is quite separable from the other; and his remarks on
-classification are more perspicuous without his theory of Ideas
-than with it. Classification does not depend upon his
-hypothesis--That Ideas are not simply Concepts of the Reason, but
-absolute existences apart from the Reason (Entia Rationis apart from
-the Ratio)--and that these Ideas correspond to the words _Unum_,
-_Multa definite_, _Multa indefinite_, which are put together to
-compose the totality of what we see and feel in the Kosmos.
-
-Applying this general doctrine (about the necessity of
-establishing subordinate classes as intermediate between the Genus
-and Individuals) to the particular subject debated between
-Sokrates and Protarchus--the next step in the procedure would
-naturally be, to distinguish the subordinate classes comprised
-first under the Genus Pleasure--next, under the Genus Intelligence
-(or Cognition). And so indeed the dialogue seems to promise[22] in
-tolerably explicit terms.
-
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Philebus, p. 19 B, p. 20 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite.
-2. The Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or
-Agency.]
-
-But such promise is not realised. The dialogue takes a different
-turn, and recurs to the general distinction already brought to
-view between the Finient (Determinans) and the Infinite
-(Indeterminatum). We have it laid down that all existences in the
-universe are divided into four Genera: 1. The Infinite or
-Indeterminate. 2. The Finient or the Determinans. 3. The product
-of these two, mixed or compounded together Determinatum. 4. The
-Cause or Agency whereby they become mixed together.--Of these
-four, the first is a Genus, or is both One and Many, having
-numerous varieties, all agreeing in the possession of a perpetual
-More and Less (without any limit or positive quantity): that which
-is perpetually increasing or diminishing, more or less hot, cold,
-moist, great, &c., than any given positive standard. The second,
-or the Determinans, is also a Genus, or One and Many: including
-equal, double, triple, and all fixed ratios.[23]
-
-[Footnote 23: Plato, Philebus, pp. 24-25.]
-
-The third Genus is laid down by Plato as generated by a mixture or
-combination of these two first--the Infinite and the Determinans.
-The varieties of this third or compound Genus comprise all that is
-good and desirable in nature--health, strength, beauty, virtue,
-fine weather, good temperature:[24] all agreeing, each in its
-respective sphere, in presenting a right measure or proportion as
-opposed to excess or deficiency.
-
-[Footnote 24: Plato, Philebus, p. 26 A-B.]
-
-Fourthly, Plato assumes a distinct element of causal agency which
-operates such mixture of the Determinans with the Infinite, or
-banishment and supersession of the latter by the former.
-
-[Side-note: Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four
-Classes--Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth.]
-
-We now approach the application of these generalities to the
-question in hand--the comparative estimate of pleasure and
-intelligence in reference to Good. It has been granted that
-neither of them separately is sufficient, and that both must be
-combined to compose the result Good: but the question remains,
-which of the two elements is the most important in the compound?
-To which of the four above-mentioned Genera (says Sokrates) does
-Pleasure belong? It belongs to the Infinite or Indeterminate: so
-also does Pain. To which of the four does Intelligence or
-Cognition belong? It belongs to the fourth, or to the nature of
-Cause, the productive agency whereby definite combinations are
-brought about.[25]
-
-[Footnote 25: Plato, Philebus, pp. 27-28, p. 31 A.]
-
-[Side-note: In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence
-with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two
-constituents.]
-
-Hence we see (Sokrates argues) that pleasure is a less important
-element than Intelligence, in the compound called Good. For
-pleasure belongs to the Infinite: but pain belongs to the Infinite
-also: the Infinite therefore, being common to both, cannot be the
-circumstance which imparts to pleasures their affinity with Good:
-they must derive that affinity from some one of the other
-elements.[26] It is Intelligence which imparts to pleasures their
-affinity with Good: for Intelligence belongs to the more
-efficacious Genus called Cause. In the combination of Intelligence
-with Pleasure, indispensable to constitute Good, Intelligence is
-the primary element, Pleasure only the secondary element.
-Intelligence or Reason is the ruling cause which pervades and
-directs both the smaller body called Man, and the greater body
-called the Kosmos. The body of man consists of a combination of
-the four elements, Earth, Water, Air, and Fire: deriving its
-supply of all these elements from the vast stock of them which
-constitutes the Kosmos. So too the mind of man, with its limited
-reason and intelligence, is derived from the vast stock of mind,
-reason, and intelligence, diffused throughout the Kosmos, and
-governing its great elemental body. The Kosmos is animated and
-intelligent, having body and mind like man, but in far higher
-measure and perfection. It is from this source alone that man can
-derive his supply of mind and intelligence.[27]
-
-[Footnote 26: Plato, Philebus, pp. 27-28.
-
-The argument of Plato is here very obscure and difficult to
-follow. Stallbaum in his note even intimates that Plato uses the
-word [Greek: a)/peiron] in a sense different from that in which he
-had used it before: which I think doubtful.]
-
-[Footnote 27: Plato, Philebus, p. 29 C. 30 A: [Greek: To\ par'
-e(mi=n so=ma a)=r' ou) psuche\n phe/somen e)/chein? . . . Po/then
-labo/n, ei)/per me\ to/ ge tou= panto\s so=ma e)/mpsuchon o)\n
-e)tu/gchane, tau)ta/ ge e)/chon tou/to| kai\ e)/ti pa/nte
-kalli/ona?]]
-
-[Side-note: Intelligence is the regulating principle--Pleasure is
-the Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated.]
-
-Sokrates thus arrives at the conclusion, that in the combination
-constituting Good, Reason or Intelligence is the regulating
-principle: and that Pleasure is the Infinite or Indeterminate
-which requires regulation from without, having no fixed measure or
-regulating power in itself.[28] He now proceeds to investigate
-pleasure and intelligence as phenomena: to enquire in what each of
-them resides, and through what affection they are generated.[29]
-
-[Footnote 28: Plato, Philebus, p. 31 A.]
-
-[Footnote 29: Plato, Philebus, p. 31 B. [Greek: dei= de\ to\ meta\
-tou=to, e)n o(=| te/ e)stin e(ka/teron au)toi=n kai\ dia\ ti/
-pa/thos gi/gnesthon, o(po/tan gi/gnesthon, i)dei=n e(ma=s.]]
-
-[Side-note: Pleasure and Pain must be explained together--Pain
-arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the
-system--Pleasure from the restoration.]
-
-We cannot investigate pleasure (Sokrates continues) apart from
-pain: both must be studied together. Both pleasure and pain reside
-in the third out of the four above-mentioned Genera:[30] that is,
-in the compound Genus formed out of that union (of the Infinite
-with the Determinans or Finient) which includes all animated
-bodies. Health and Harmony reside in these animated bodies: and
-pleasure as well as pain proceed from modifications of such
-fundamental harmony. When the fundamental harmony is disturbed or
-dissolved, pain is the consequence: when the disturbance is
-rectified and the harmony restored, pleasure ensues.[31] Thus
-hunger, thirst, extreme heat and cold, are painful, because they
-break up the fundamental harmony of animal nature: while eating,
-drinking, cooling under extreme heat, or warming under extreme
-cold, are pleasurable, because they restore the disturbed harmony.
-
-[Footnote 30: Plato, Philebus, p. 31 C. [Greek: _e)n to=| koino=|
-moi ge/nei_ a(/ma phai/nesthon lu/pe te kai\ e(done\ _gi/gnesthai_
-kata\ phu/sin . . . koino\n toi/nun u(pakou/omen o(\ de\ to=n
-tetta/ron tri/ton e)le/gomen.] Compare p. 32 A-B: [Greek: to\ e)k
-tou= a)pei/rou kai\ pe/ratos kata\ phu/sin e)/mpsuchon gegono\s
-ei)=dos.]
-
-Plato had before said that [Greek: e(done\] belonged to the
-Infinite (compare p. 41 D), or to the _first_ of the four
-above-mentioned genera, not to the third.]
-
-[Footnote 31: Plato, Philebus, p. 31 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Pleasure presupposes Pain.]
-
-This is the primary conception, or original class, of pleasures
-and pains, embracing body and mind in one and the same fact.
-Pleasure cannot be had without antecedent pain: it is in fact a
-mere reaction against pain, or a restoration from pain.
-
-[Side-note: Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation
-belonging to mind alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain.]
-
-But there is another class of pleasures, secondary and derivative
-from these, and belonging to the mind alone without the body. The
-expectation of future pleasures is itself pleasurable,[32] the
-expectation of future pains is itself painful. In this secondary
-class we find pleasure without pain, and pain without pleasure: so
-that we shall be better able to study pleasure by itself, and to
-decide whether the whole class, in all its varieties, be good,
-welcome and desirable,--or whether pleasure and pain be not, like
-heat and cold, desirable or undesirable according to
-circumstances--_i.e._ not good in their own nature, but sometimes
-good and sometimes not.[33]
-
-[Footnote 32: Plato, Philebus, p. 32 C. [Greek: e(done=s kai\
-lu/pes e(/teron ei)=dos, to\ chori\s tou= so/matos au)te=s te=s
-psuche=s dia\ prosdoki/as gigno/menon.]]
-
-[Footnote 33: Plato, Philebus, p. 32 D.]
-
-[Side-note: A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without
-pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is
-second-best.]
-
-In the definition above given of the conditions of pleasure, as a
-re-action from antecedent pain, it is implied that if there be no
-pain, there can be no pleasure: and that a state of life is
-therefore conceivable which shall be without both--without pain
-and without pleasure. The man who embraces wisdom may prefer this
-third mode of life. It would be the most divine and the most akin
-to the nature of the Gods, who cannot be supposed without
-indecency to feel either joy or sorrow.[34] At any rate, if not
-the best life of all, it will be the second-best.
-
-[Footnote 34: Plato, Philebus, p. 33 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei)ko/s
-ge ou)/te chai/rein theou\s ou)/te to\ e)nanti/on? Pa/nu me\n
-ou)=n ou)k ei)ko/s; a)/schemon gou=n au)ton e(ka/teron
-gigno/meno/n e)stin.]]
-
-[Side-note: Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily
-want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The
-mind and body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein.]
-
-Those pleasures, which reside in the mind alone without the body,
-arise through memory and by means of reminiscence. When the body
-receives a shock which does not go through to the mind, we call
-the fact insensibility. In sensation, the body and mind are both
-affected:[35] such sensation is treasured up in the memory, and
-the mental part of it is recalled (without the bodily part) by
-reminiscence.[36] Memory and reminiscence are the foundations of
-desire or appetite. When the body suffers the pain of hunger or
-thirst, the mind recollects previous moments of satisfaction,
-desires a repetition of that satisfaction by means of food or
-drink. Here the body and the mind are not moved in the same way,
-but in two opposite ways: the desire belongs to the mind alone,
-and is turned towards something directly opposed to the affection
-of the body. That which the body feels is emptiness: that which
-the mind feels is desire of replenishment, or of the condition
-opposed to emptiness. But it is only after experience of
-replenishment that the mind will feel such desire. On the first
-occasion of emptiness, it will not desire replenishment, because
-it will have nothing, neither sensation nor memory, through which
-to touch replenishment: it can only do so after replenishment has
-been previously enjoyed, and through the memory. Desire therefore
-is a state of the mind apart from the body, resting upon
-memory.[37] Here then the man is in a double state: the pain of
-emptiness, which affects the mind through the body, and the memory
-of past replenishment, or expectation of future replenishment,
-which resides in the mind. Such expectation, if certain and
-immediate, will be a state of pleasure: if doubtful and distant,
-it will be a state of pain. The state of emptiness and consequent
-appetite must be, at the very best, a state of mixed pain and
-pleasure: and it may perhaps be a state of pain only, under two
-distinct forms.[38] Life composed of a succession of these states
-can afford no true or pure pleasure.
-
-[Footnote 35: Plato, Philebus, pp. 33 E--34 A. [Greek:
-a)naisthesi/an e)pono/mason . . . to\ de\ e)n e(ni\ pa/thei te\n
-psuche\n kai\ to\ so=ma koine=| gigno/menon koine=| kai\
-kinei=sthai, tau/ten d' au)= te\n ki/nesin o)noma/zon
-_ai)/sthesin_ ou)k a)po\ tro/pou phthe/ggoi' a)/n.]]
-
-[Footnote 36: Plato, Philebus, p. 34 A-B. [Greek: soteri/an
-ai)sthe/seos te\n mne/men.]
-
-[Greek: Mne/me] and [Greek: a)na/mnesis] are pronounced to be
-different.]
-
-[Footnote 37: Plato, Philebus, p. 35 C. [Greek: te\n psuche\n
-a)/ra te=s plero/seos e)pha/ptesthai loipo/n, te=| mne/me| de=lon
-o(/ti; to=| ga\r a)\n e)/t' a)/llo| e)pha/psaito?]
-
-35 D. [Greek: te\n a)/r' e)pa/gousan e)pi\ ta\ e)pithumou/mena
-a)podei/xas mne/men, o( lo/gos psuche=s xu/mpasan te/n te o(rme\n
-kai\ e)pithumi/an kai\ te\n a)rche\n tou= zo/ou panto\s
-a)pe/phe|nen.]
-
-[Footnote 38: Plato, Philebus, p. 36 A-B.
-
-This analysis of desire is in the main just: antecedent to all
-gratification, it is simple uneasiness: gratification having been
-supplied, the memory thereof remains, and goes along with the
-uneasiness to form the complex mental state called _desire_.
-
-But there is another case of desire. While tasting a pleasure, we
-desire the continuance of it: and if the expectation of its
-continuance be assured, this is an additional pleasure: two
-sources of pleasure instead of one. In this last case, there is no
-such conjunction of opposite states, pain and pleasure, as Plato
-pointed out in the former case.]
-
-[Side-note: Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that
-they are so.]
-
-What do you mean (asks Protarchus) by true pleasures or pains? How
-can pleasures or pains be either true or false? Opinions and
-expectations may be true or false; but not pleasures, nor pains.
-
-That is an important question (replies Sokrates), which we must
-carefully examine. If opinions may be false or true, surely
-pleasures may be so likewise. When a man holds an opinion, there
-is always some Object of his opinion, whether he thinks truly or
-falsely: so also when a man takes delight, there must always be
-some Object in which he takes delight, truly or falsely. Pleasure
-and pain, as well as opinion, are susceptible of various
-attributes; vehement or moderate, right or wrong, bad or good.
-Delight sometimes comes to us along with a false opinion,
-sometimes along with a true one.
-
-Yes (replies Protarchus), but we then call _the opinion_ true or
-false--not _the pleasure_.[39]
-
-[Footnote 39: Plato, Philebus, p. 37.]
-
-[Side-note: Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true
-opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the
-Gods, and will have true visions sent to him.]
-
-You will not deny (says Sokrates) that there is a difference
-between the pleasure accompanying a true opinion, and that which
-accompanies a false opinion. Wherein does the difference consist?
-Our opinions, and our comparisons of opinion, arise from sensation
-and memory:[40] which write words and impress images upon our mind
-(as upon a book or canvas), sometimes truly, sometimes
-falsely,[41] not only respecting the past and present, but also
-respecting the future. To these opinions respecting the future are
-attached the pleasures and pains of expectation, which we have
-already recognised as belonging to the mind alone,--anticipations
-of bodily pleasures or pains to come--hopes and fears. As our
-opinions respecting the future are sometimes true, sometimes
-false, so also are our hopes and fears: but throughout our lives
-we are always full of hopes and fears.[42] Now the just and good
-man, being a favourite of the Gods, will have these visions or
-anticipations of the future presented to him truly and accurately:
-the bad man on the contrary will have them presented to him
-falsely. The pleasures of anticipation will be true to the former,
-and false to the latter:[43] his false pleasures will be a
-ludicrous parody on the true ones.[44] Good or bad opinions are
-identical with true or false opinions: so also are good or bad
-pleasures, identical with true or false pleasures: there is no
-other ground for their being good or bad.
-
-[Footnote 40: Plato, Philebus, p. 38 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n e)k
-mne/mes te kai\ ai)sthe/seos do/xa e(mi=n kai\ to\ diadoxa/zein
-e)gcheirei=n gi/gneth' e(ka/stote?]]
-
-[Footnote 41: Plato, Philebus, pp. 38 E, 39. [Greek: dokei= moi
-to/te e(mo=n e( psuche\ bibli/o| tini\ proseoike/nai . . . e(
-mne/me tai=s ai)sthe/sesi xumpi/ptousa ei)s tau)to/n, ka)kei=na
-a)\ peri\ tau=ta/ e)sti ta\ pathe/mata, phai/nontai/ moi schedo\n
-oi(=on gra/phein e(mo=n e)n tai=s psuchai=s to/te lo/gous. . .
-
-A)pode/chou de\ kai\ e(/teron demiourgo\n e(mo=n e)n tai=s
-psuchai=s e)n to=| to/te chro/no| gigno/menon . . . Zogra/phon,
-o(\s meta\ to\n grammatiste\n to=n legome/non ei)ko/nas e)n te=|
-psuche=| tou/ton gra/phei.]
-
-It seems odd that Plato here puts the painter _after_ the scribe,
-and not _before_ him. The images or phantasm of sense must be
-painted on the mind before any words are written upon it if we are
-to adopt both these metaphors).
-
-The comparison of the mind to a sheet of paper or a book begins
-with the poets (AEschyl. Prometh. 790), and passes into philosophy
-with Plato.]
-
-[Footnote 42: Plato, Philebus, p. 39 E. [Greek: e(mei=s d' au)=
-dia\ panto\s tou= bi/ou a)ei\ ge/momen e)lpi/don.] 40 E. [Greek:
-ou)kou=n o( au)to\s lo/gos a)\n ei)/e peri\ pho/bon** te kai\
-thumo=n], &c. Also 40 D.]
-
-[Footnote 43: Plato, Philebus, p. 40 A-B.
-
-Prophets and prophecies, inspired by the Gods, were phenomena
-received as frequently occurring in the days of Plato.]
-
-[Footnote 44: Plato, Philebus, p. 40 C. [Greek: memimeme/nai
-me/ntoi ta\s a)lethei=s e)pi\ ta\ geloio/tera.]]
-
-[Side-note: Protarchus disputes this--He thinks that there are some
-pleasures bad, but none false--Sokrates does not admit this, but
-reserves the question.]
-
-I admit this identity (remarks Protarchus) in regard to opinions,
-but not in regard to pleasures. I think there are other grounds,
-and stronger grounds, for pronouncing pleasures to be
-bad--independently of their being false. We will reserve that question
-(says Sokrates) for the present--whether there are or are not
-pleasures bad on other grounds.[45] I am now endeavouring to show
-that there are some pleasures which are _false_: and I proceed to
-another way of viewing the subject.
-
-[Footnote 45: Plato, Philebus, pp. 40 E-41 A. _Sokr._ [Greek:
-Ou)d' e(dona/s g', oi)=mai, katanoou=men o(s a)/llon tina\ tro/pon
-ei)si\ ponerai\ ple\n to=| pseudei=s ei)=nai.] _Protarch._ [Greek:
-Pa/nu me\n ou)=n tou)nanti/on ei)/rekas], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains--False
-estimate habitual--These are the false pleasures.]
-
-We agreed before that the state, called Appetite or Desire, was a
-mixed state comprehending body and mind: the state of body
-affecting the mind with a pain of emptiness,--the state of mind
-apart from body being either a pleasure of expected replenishment,
-or a pain arising from our regarding replenishment as distant or
-unattainable. Appetite or Desire, therefore, is sometimes mixed
-pleasure and pain; both, of the genus Infinite, Indeterminate. We
-desire to compare these pleasures and pains, and to value their
-magnitude in relation to each other, but we have no means of
-performing the process. We not only cannot perform it well, but we
-are sure to perform it wrongly. For future pleasure or pain counts
-for more or less in our comparison, according to its proximity or
-distance. Here then is a constant source of false computation:
-pleasures and pains counted as greater or less than they really
-are: in other words, false pleasures and pains. We thus see that
-pleasures may be true or false, no less than opinions.[46]
-
-[Footnote 46: Plato, Philebus, pp. 41-42.]
-
-[Side-note: Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and
-gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as
-pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure.]
-
-We have also other ways of proving the point that much of what is
-called pleasure is false and unreal[47]--either no pleasure at
-all, or pleasure mingled and alloyed with pain and relief from
-pain. According to our previous definition of pain and
-pleasure--that pain arises from derangement of the harmony of our nature,
-and pleasure from the correction of such derangement, or from the
-re-establishment of harmony--there may be and are states which are
-neither painful nor pleasurable. Doubtless the body never remains
-the same: it is always undergoing change: but the gentle and
-gradual changes (such as growth, &c.) escape our consciousness,
-producing neither pain nor pleasure: none but the marked, sudden
-changes force themselves upon our consciousness, thus producing
-pain and pleasure.[48] A life of gentle changes would be a life
-without pain as well as without pleasure. There are thus three
-states of life[49]--painful--pleasurable--neither painful nor
-pleasurable. But _no pain_ (absence of pain) is not identical with
-pleasure: it is a third and distinct state.[50]
-
-[Footnote 47: Plato, Philebus, p. 42 C. [Greek: Tou/ton toi/nun
-e(xe=s o)pso/metha, e)a\n te=|de a)panto=men e(dona\s kai\ lu/pas
-pseudei=s e(/ti ma=llon e)\ tau/tas phainome/nas te kai\ ou)/sas
-e)n toi=s zo/ois.]
-
-This argument is continued, though in a manner desultory and
-difficult to follow, down to p. 51 A: [Greek: pro\s to\ tina\s
-e(dona\s ei)=nai dokou/sas, ou)sas d' ou)damo=s; kai\ mega/las
-e(te/ras tina\s a)/ma kai\ polla\s phantasthei/sas, ei)=nai d'
-au)ta\s sumpephurme/nas o(mou= lu/pais te kai\ a)napau/sesin
-o)duno=n to=n megi/ston peri/ te so/matos kai\ psuche=s
-a)pori/as.]]
-
-[Footnote 48: Plato, Philebus, pp. 42-43.]
-
-[Footnote 49: Plato, Philebus, p. 43 D. [Greek: trittou\s bi/ous,
-e(/na me\n e(du/n, to\n d' au)= lupero/n, to\n d' e(/na
-mede/tera.]]
-
-[Footnote 50: Plato, Philebus, p. 43 D. [Greek: ou)k a)\n ei)/e
-to\ me\ lupei=sthai/ pote tau)to\n to=| chai/rein.]]
-
-[Side-note: Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers--That
-pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle--no reality except pain,
-and the relief from pain.]
-
-Now there are some philosophers who confound this distinction:[51]
-Philosophers respectable, but stern, who hate the very name of
-pleasure, deny its existence as a separate state _per se_, and
-maintain it to be nothing more than relief from pain: implying
-therefore, perpetually and inevitably, the conjunction or
-antecedence of pain. They consider the seduction of pleasure in
-prospect to be a mere juggle--a promise never realised. Often the
-expected moment brings no pleasure at all: and even when it does,
-there are constant accompaniments of pain, which always greatly
-impair, often countervail, sometimes far more than countervail,
-its effect. Pain is regarded by them as the evil--removal or
-mitigation of pain as the good--of human life.
-
-[Footnote 51: Plato, Philebus, p. 44 B-C. [Greek: kai\ ma/la
-deinou\s legome/nous ta\ peri\ phu/sin, oi( to\ para/pan e(dona\s
-ou)/ phasin ei)=nai . . . lupo=n tau/tas ei)=nai pa/sas
-a)pothuga/s, a(\s nu=n oi( peri\ Phi/lebon e(dona\s
-e)ponoma/zousin.]]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly.]
-
-These philosophers (continues Sokrates) are like prophets who
-speak truth from the stimulus of internal temperament, without any
-rational comprehension of it. Their theory is partially true, but
-not universally.[52] It is true of a large portion of what are
-called pleasures, but it is not true of all pleasures. Most
-pleasures (indeed all the more vehement and coveted pleasures),
-correspond to the description given in the theory. The moment when
-the supposed intense pleasure arrives, is a disappointment of the
-antecedent hopes, either by not bringing the pleasure promised, or
-by bringing it along with a preponderant dose of pain. But there
-are some pleasures of which this cannot be said--which are really
-true and unmixed with pain. Which these are (continues Sokrates),
-I will presently explain: but I shall first state the case of the
-pleasure-hating philosophers, so far as I go along with it.
-
-[Footnote 52: Plato, Philebus, p. 44 C. [Greek: o(/sper ma/ntesi
-proschre=sthai/ tisi, manteuome/nois ou) te/chne|, a)lla/ tini
-duscherei/a phu/seos ou)k a)gennou=s], &c. Also p. 51 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Theory of the pleasure-haters--We must learn what
-pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures--These are
-connected with distempered body and mind.]
-
-When we are studying any property (they say), we ought to examine
-especially those cases in which it appears most fully and
-prominently developed: thus, if we are enquiring into hardness, we
-must take for our first objects of investigation the hardest
-things, in preference to those which are less hard or scarcely
-hard at all.[53] So in enquiring into pleasure generally, we must
-investigate first the pleasures of extreme intensity and
-vehemence. Now the most intense pleasures are enjoyed not in a
-healthy state of body, but on the contrary under circumstances of
-distemper and disorder: because they are then preceded by the most
-violent wants and desires. The sick man under fever suffers
-greater thirst and cold than when he is in health, but in the
-satisfaction of those wants, his pleasure is proportionally more
-intense. Again when he suffers from the itch or an inflamed state
-of body, the pleasure of rubbing or scratching is more intense
-than if he had no such disorder.[54] The most vehement bodily
-pleasures can only be enjoyed under condition of being preceded or
-attended by pains greater or less as the case may be. The
-condition is not one of pure pleasure, but mixed between pain and
-pleasure. Sometimes the pain preponderates, sometimes the
-pleasure: if the latter, then most men, forgetting the
-accompanying pain, look upon these transient moments as the summit
-of happiness.[55] In like manner the violent and insane man, under
-the stimulus of furious passions and desires, experiences more
-intense gratifications than persons of sober disposition: his
-condition is a mixed one, of great pains and great pleasures. The
-like is true of all the vehement passions--love, hatred, revenge,
-anger, jealousy, envy, fear, sorrow, &c.: all of them embody
-pleasures mixed with pain, and the magnitude of the pleasure is
-proportioned to that of the accompanying pain.[56]
-
-[Footnote 53: Plato, Philebus, p. 44 E. [Greek: o(s ei)
-boule/theimen o(touou=n ei)=dous te\n phu/sin i)dei=n, oi(=on te\n
-tou= sklerou=, po/teron ei)s ta\ sklero/tta a)poble/pontes ou(/tos
-a)\n ma=llon sunnoe/saimen e)\ pro\s ta\ pollosta\ sklero/teti?]
-Answer: [Greek: pro\s ta\ pro=ta mege/thei.]]
-
-[Footnote 54: Plato, Philebus, pp. 45-46.]
-
-[Footnote 55: Plato, Philebus, p. 47 A.]
-
-[Footnote 56: Plato, Philebus, pp. 49-50 D. Plato here introduces,
-at some length, an analysis of the mixed sentiment of pleasure and
-pain with which we regard scenic representations, tragedy and
-comedy--especially the latter. The explanation which he gives of
-the sentiment of the ludicrous is curious, and is intended to
-elucidate an obscure psychological phenomenon ([Greek: o(/so|
-skoteino/tero/n e)sti], p. 48 B). But his explanation is not
-clear, and the sense which he gives to the word [Greek: phtho/nos]
-is a forced one. He states truly that the natural object (at least
-one among the objects) which a man laughs at, is the intellectual
-and moral infirmities of persons with whom he is in friendly
-intercourse, when such persons are not placed in a situation of
-power, so as to make their defects or displeasure pregnant with
-dangerous consequences. The laugher is amused with exaggerated
-self-estimation or foolish vanity displayed by friends, [Greek:
-doxosophi/a, doxokali/a] &c. (49 E). But how the laugher can be
-said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here, or how he
-can be said to feel [Greek: phtho/nos], I do not clearly see. At
-least [Greek: phtho/nos] is here used in the very unusual sense
-(to use Stallbaum's words, note p. 48 B, page 278) of "injusta
-laetitia de malis eorum, quibus bene cupere debemus": a sense
-altogether contrary to that which the word bears in Xen. Memor.
-iii. 9, 8; which Stallbaum himself cites, as if the definition of
-[Greek: phtho/nos] were the same in both.]
-
-[Side-note: The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness;
-but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of
-health.]
-
-Recollect (observes Sokrates) that the question here is not
-whether _more pleasure_ is enjoyed, _on the whole_, in a state of
-health than in a state of sickness--by violent rather than by
-sober men. The question is, about the intense modes of pleasure.
-Respecting these, I have endeavoured to show that they belong to a
-distempered, rather than to a healthy, state both of state of body
-and mind:--and that they cannot be enjoyed pure, without a
-countervailing or preponderant accompaniment of pain.[57] This is
-equally true, whether they be pleasures of body alone, of mind
-alone, or of body and mind together. They are false and delusive
-pleasures: in fact, they are pleasures only in seeming, but not in
-truth and reality. To-morrow I will give you fuller proofs on the
-subject.[58]
-
-[Footnote 57: Plato, Philebus, p. 45 C-E. [Greek: me/ me e(ge=|
-dianoou/menon e)rota=|n se, ei) _plei/o chai/rousin_ oi( spho/dra
-nosou=ntes to=n u(giaino/nton, a)ll' oi)/ou _me/getho/s_ me
-zetei=n e(done=s, kai\ _to\ spho/dra_ peri\ tou= toiou/tou pou=
-pote\ gi/gnetai e(ka/stote], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 58: Plato, Philebus, p. 50 E. [Greek: tou/ton ga\r
-a(pa/nton au(/rion e)thele/so soi lo/gon dou=nai], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true.
-Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c.
-Pleasures of acquiring knowledge.]
-
-Thus far (continues Sokrates) I have set forth the case on behalf
-of the pleasure-haters. Though I deny their full doctrine,--that
-there is no pleasure except cessation from pain--I nevertheless
-agree with them and cite them as witnesses on my behalf, to the
-extent of affirming that a large proportion of our so-called
-pleasures, and those precisely the most intense, are false and
-unreal: being poisoned and drenched in accompaniments of pain.[59]
-But there are some pleasures, true, genuine, and untainted. Such
-are those produced by beautiful colours and figures--by many
-odours--by various sounds: none of which are preceded by any
-painful want requiring to be satisfied. The sensation when it
-comes is therefore one of pure and unmixed pleasure. The figures
-here meant are the perfect triangle, cube, circle, &c.: the
-colours and sounds are such as are clear and simple. All these are
-beautiful and pleasurable absolutely and in themselves--not simply
-in relation to (or relatively to) some special antecedent
-condition. Smells too, though less divine than the others, are in
-common with them unalloyed by accompanying pain.[60] To these must
-be added the pleasure of acquiring knowledge, which supposes
-neither any painful want before it, nor any subsequent pain even
-if the knowledge acquired be lost. This too is one of the unmixed
-or pure pleasures; though it is not attainable by most men, but
-only by a select few.[61]
-
-[Footnote 59: Plato, Philebus, p. 51 A.]
-
-[Footnote 60: Plato, Philebus, p. 51 E. [Greek: to\ de\ peri\ ta\s
-o)sma\s e(=tton me\n tou/ton thei=on ge/nos e(dono=n; to\ de\ me\
-summemi/chthai e)n au)tai=s a)nagkai/ous lu/pas], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 61: Plato, Philebus, p. 52 B. [Greek: tau/tas toi/nun
-ta\s to=n mathema/ton e(dona\s a)mi/ktous te ei)=nai lu/pais
-r(ete/on, kai\ ou)damo=s to=n spho/dra o)li/gon.]]
-
-[Side-note: Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and
-proportion.]
-
-Having thus distinguished the pure and moderate class of
-pleasures, from the mixed and vehement--we may remark that the
-former class admit of measure and proportion, while the latter
-belong to the immeasurable and the infinite. Moreover, look where
-we will, we shall find truth on the side of the select, small,
-unmixed specimens--rather than among the large and mixed masses. A
-small patch of white colour, free from all trace of any other
-colour, is truer, purer, and more beautiful, than a large mass of
-clouded and troubled white. In like manner, gentle pleasure, free
-from all pain, is more pleasurable, truer, and more beautiful,
-than intense pleasure coupled with pain.[62]
-
-[Footnote 62: Plato, Philebus, p. 53 B-C.]
-
-[Side-note: Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it
-cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means
-towards substance--Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good.]
-
-There are yet other arguments remaining (continues Sokrates) which
-show that pleasure cannot be the Summum Bonum. If it be so, it
-must be an End, not a Means: it must be something for the sake of
-which other things exist or are done--not something which itself
-exists or is done for the sake of something else. But pleasure is
-not an End: it is essentially a means, as we may infer from the
-reasonings of its own advocates. They themselves tell us that it
-is generation, not substance:--essentially a process of transition
-or change, never attaining essence or permanence.[63] But
-generation or transition is always for the sake of the thing to be
-generated, or for Substance--not substance for the sake of
-generation: the transitory serves as a road to the permanent, not
-_vice versa_. Pleasure is thus a means, not an End. It cannot
-therefore partake of the essential nature and dignity of Good: it
-belongs to a subordinate and imperfect category.[64]
-
-[Footnote 63: Plato, Philebus, p. 53 C. [Greek: a)=ra peri\
-e(done=s ou)k a)keko/amen o(s a)ei\ ge/nesi/s e)stin, ou)si/a de\
-ou)k e)/sti to\ para/pan e(dona=s; kompsoi\ ga\r de/ tines au)=
-tou=ton to\n lo/gon e)picheirou=si menu/ein e(mi=n, oi(=s dei=
-cha/rin e)/chein. . . .]
-
-53 D: [Greek: e)sto\n de/ tine du/o, to\ me\n au)to\ kath' au(to/,
-to\ de\ a)ei\ e)phie/menon a)/llou . . . to\ me\n semno/taton
-a)ei\ pephuko/s, to\ de\ e)llipe\s e)kei/nou.]]
-
-[Footnote 64: Plato, Philebus, p. 54 D. [Greek: e(done\ ei)/per
-ge/nesi/s e)stin, ei)s a)/llen e)\ te\n tou= a)gathou= moi=ran
-au)te\n tithe/ntes o)rtho=s the/somen.]]
-
-[Side-note: Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good.]
-
-Indeed we cannot reasonably admit that there is no Good in bodies
-and in the universe generally, nor anywhere except in the
-mind:--nor that, within the mind, pleasure alone is good, while courage,
-temperance, &c., are not good:--nor that a man is good only while
-he is enjoying pleasure, and bad while suffering pain, whatever
-may be his character and merits.[65]
-
-[Footnote 65: Plato, Philebus, p. 55 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Distinction and classification of the varieties of
-Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than
-others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and
-computation.]
-
-Having thus (continues Sokrates) gone through the analysis of
-pleasures, distinguishing such as are true and pure, from such as
-are false and troubled--we must apply the like distinctive
-analysis to the various modes of knowledge and intelligence. Which
-varieties of knowledge, science, or art, are the purest from
-heterogeneous elements, and bear most closely upon truth? Some
-sciences and arts (we know) are intended for special professional
-practice: others are taught as subjects for improving the
-intellect of youth. As specimens of the former variety, we may
-notice music, medicine, husbandry, navigation, generalship,
-joinery, ship-building, &c. Now in all these, the guiding and
-directing elements are computation, mensuration, and statics--the
-sciences or arts of computing, measuring, weighing. Take away
-these three--and little would be left worth having, in any of the
-sciences or arts before named. There would be no exact assignable
-rules, no definite proportions: everything would be left to vague
-conjecture, depending upon each artisan's knack and practice which
-some erroneously call Art. In proportion as each of these
-professional occupations has in it more or less of computation and
-mensuration, in the same proportion is it exact and true. There is
-little of computation or mensuration in music, medicine,
-husbandry, &c.: there is more of them in joinery and
-ship-building, which employ the line, plummet, and other instruments:
-accordingly these latter are more true and exact, less dependent
-upon knack and conjecture, than the three former.[66] They
-approach nearer to the purity of science, and include less of the
-non-scientific, variable, conjectural, elements.
-
-[Footnote 66: Plato, Philebus, pp. 55-56.]
-
-[Side-note: Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the
-philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan.]
-
-But a farther distinction must here be taken (Sokrates goes on).
-Even in such practical arts as ship-building, which include most
-of computation and mensuration--these two latter do not appear
-pure, but diversified and embodied in a multitude of variable
-particulars. Arithmetic and geometry, as applied by the
-ship-builder and other practical men, are very different from
-arithmetic and geometry as studied and taught by the
-philosopher.[67] Though called by the same name, they are very
-different; and the latter alone are pure and true. The philosopher
-assumes in his arithmetic the exact equality of all units, and in
-his geometry the exact ratios of lines and spaces: the practical
-man adds together units very unlike each other--two armies, two
-bulls, things little or great as the case may be: his measurement
-too, always falls short of accuracy.[68] There are in short two
-arithmetics and two geometries[69]--very different from each
-other, though bearing a common name.
-
-[Footnote 67: Plato, Philebus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: A)rithmetike\n
-pro=ton a)=r' ou)k a)/llen me/n tina te\n to=n pollo=n phate/on,
-a)/llen d' au)= te\n to=n philosophou/nton? . . .
-
-logistike\ kai\ metretike\ e( kata\ tektonike\n kai\ kat'
-e)mporike\n te=s kata\ philosophi/an geometri/as te kai\ logismo=n
-katameletome/non--po/teron o(s mi/a e(kate/ra lekte/on, e)\ du/o
-titho=men?]
-
-Compare Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7, p. 1098, a. 30.]
-
-[Footnote 68: Plato, Philebus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: oi( me\n ga/r
-pou mona/das a)ni/sous katarithmou=ntai to=n peri\ a)rithmo/n,
-oi(=on strato/peda du/o kai\ bou=s du/o kai\ du/o ta\ smikro/tata
-e)\ kai\ ta\ pa/nton me/gista; oi( d' ou)k a)/n pote au)toi=s
-sunakolouthe/seian, ei) me\ mona/da mona/dos e(ka/stes to=n
-muri/on medemi/an a)/llen a)/lles diaphe/rousa/n tis the/sei.]]
-
-[Footnote 69: Plato, Philebus, p. 57 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions.
-Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are
-gradations of truth and purity.]
-
-We thus make out (continues Sokrates) that there is a difference
-between one variety and another variety of science or knowledge,
-analogous to that which we have traced between the varieties of
-pleasure. One pleasure is true and pure; another is not so, or is
-inseparably connected with pain and non-pleasurable
-elements--there being in each case a difference in degree. So too one
-variety of science, cognition, or art, is more true and pure than
-another: that is, it is less intermingled with fluctuating
-particulars and indefinite accompaniments. A science, bearing one
-and the same name, is different according as it is handled by the
-practical man or by the philosopher. Only as handled by the
-philosopher, does science attain purity: dealing with eternal and
-invariable essences. Among all sciences, Dialectic is the truest
-and purest, because it takes comprehensive cognizance of the
-eternal and invariable--_Ens semper Idem_--presiding over those
-subordinate sciences which bear upon the like matter in partial
-and separate departments.[70]
-
-[Footnote 70: Plato, Philebus, pp. 57-58.]
-
-[Side-note: Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for
-Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness
-and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as
-satisfying the lover of truth.]
-
-Your opinion (remarks Protarchus) does not agree with that of
-Gorgias. He affirms, that the power of persuasion (Rhetoric) is
-the greatest and best of all arts: inasmuch as it enables us to
-carry all our points, not by force, but with the free will and
-consent of others. I should be glad to avoid contradicting either
-him or you.
-
-There is no real contradiction between us (replies Sokrates). You
-may concede to Gorgias that his art or cognition is the greatest
-and best of all--the most in repute, as well as the most useful to
-mankind. I do not claim any superiority of _that_ kind, on behalf
-of my cognition.[71] I claim for it superiority in truth and
-purity. I remarked before, that a small patch of unmixed white
-colour was superior in truth and purity to a large mass of white
-tarnished with other colours--a gentle and unmixed pleasure, in
-like manner, to one that is more intense but alloyed with pains.
-It is this superiority that I assert for Dialectic and the other
-sister cognitions. They are of little positive advantage to
-mankind: yet they, and only they, will satisfy both the demands of
-intelligence, and the impulse within us, in so far as we have an
-impulse to love and strain after truth.[72]
-
-[Footnote 71: Plato, Philebus, p. 58 B. [Greek: Ou) tou=t' e)/goge
-e)ze/toun po, ti/s te/chne e)\ ti/s e)piste/me paso=n diaphe/rei
-to=| megi/ste kai\ a)ri/ste kai\ plei=sta o)phelou=sa e(ma=s.
-a)lla\ ti/s pote to\ saphe\s kai\ ta)kribe\s kai\ to\
-a)lethe/staton e)piskopei=, ka)\n e)=| smikra\ kai\ smikra\
-o)ni/nasa. Tou=t' e)sti\n o(\ nu=n de\ zetou=men.]]
-
-[Footnote 72: Plato, Philebus, p. 58 D. [Greek: a)ll' ei)/ tis
-pe/phuke te=s psuche=s e(mo=n du/namis e)ra=|n te tou= a)lethou=s
-kai\ pa/nta e(/neka tou/tou pra/ttein, tau/ten ei)/pomen], &c.]
-
-As far as straining after truth is concerned (says Protarchus),
-Dialectic and the kindred sciences have an incontestable
-superiority.
-
-[Side-note: Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal
-manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable
-essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained.]
-
-You must see (rejoins Sokrates) that Rhetoric, and most other arts
-or sciences, employ all their study, and seek all their standard,
-in opinions alone: while of those who study Nature, the greater
-number confine their investigations to this Kosmos, to its
-generation and its phenomenal operations--its manifestations past,
-present, and future.[73] Now all these manifestations are in
-perpetual flux, admitting of no true or certain cognition. Pure
-truth, corresponding to those highest mental endowments, Reason
-and Intelligence--can be found only in essences, eternal and
-unchangeable, or in matters most akin to them.[74]
-
-[Footnote 73: Plato, Philebus, p. 59. [Greek: ei) de\ kai\ peri\
-phu/seos e(gei=tai/ tis zetei=n, oi)=sth' o(/ti ta\ peri\ to\n
-ko/smon to/nde, o(/pe| te ge/gone kai\ o(/pe| pa/schei ti kai\
-o(/pe| poiei=, tau=ta zetei= dia\ bi/ou?]]
-
-[Footnote 74: Plato, Philebus, p. 59.]
-
-[Side-note: Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure
-separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two--Intelligence
-being the most important. How are they to be mixed?]
-
-We have now (continues Sokrates) examined pleasure separately and
-intelligence separately. We have agreed that neither of them,
-apart and by itself, comes up to the conception of Good; the
-attribute of which is, to be all sufficient, and to give plenary
-satisfaction, so that any animal possessing it desires nothing
-besides.[75] We must therefore seek Good in a certain mixture or
-combination of the two--Pleasure and Intelligence: and we must
-determine, what sort of combination of these two contains the Good
-we seek. Now, to mix all pleasures, with all cognitions, at once
-and indiscriminately, will hardly be safe. We will first mix the
-truest and purest pleasures (those which include pleasure in its
-purest form), with the truest or purest cognitions (those which
-deal altogether with eternal and unchangeable essence, not with
-fluctuating particulars). Will such a combination suffice to
-constitute Good, or an all-sufficient and all-satisfactory
-existence? Or do we want anything more besides?[76] Suppose a man
-cognizant of the Form or Idea of Justice, and of all other
-essential Ideas: and able to render account of his cognition, in
-proper words: Will this be sufficient?[77] Suppose him to be
-cognizant of the divine Ideas of Circle, Sphere, and other
-figures; and to employ them in architecture, not knowing anything
-of human circles and figures as they exist in practical life?[78]
-
-[Footnote 75: Plato, Philebus, p. 60 C. [Greek: te\n ta)gathou=
-diaphe/rein phu/sin to=|de to=n a)/llon . . . o(=| parei/e tou=t'
-a)ei\ to=n zo/on dia\ te/lous pa/ntos kai\ pa/nte|, medeno\s
-e(te/rou pote\ e)/ti prosdei=sthai, to\ de\ i(kano\n teleo/taton
-e)/chein.]]
-
-[Footnote 76: Plato, Philebus, p. 61 E.]
-
-[Footnote 77: Plato, Philebus, p. 62 A. [Greek: E)/sto de/ tis
-e(mi=n phrono=n a)/nthropos au)te=s peri\ dikaiosu/nes, o(/, ti
-e)/sti, kai\ lo/gon e)/chon e(po/menon to=| noei=n, kai\ de\ kai\
-peri\ to=n a)/llon a(pa/nton to=n o)/nton o(sau/tos
-dianoou/menos?]]
-
-[Footnote 78: Plato, Philebus, p. 62 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n
-ou(=tos i(kano=s e)piste/mes e(/xei ku/klou me\n kai\ sphai/ras
-au)te=s te=s thei/as to\n lo/gon e)/chon, te\n de\ a)nthropi/nen
-tau/ten sphai=ran kai\ tou\s ku/klous tou/tous a)gnoo=n], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: We must include all Cognitions, not merely the truest,
-but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both.]
-
-That would be a ludicrous position indeed (remarks Protarchus), to
-have his mind full of the divine Ideas or cognitions only.
-
-What! (replies Sokrates) must he have cognition not only of the
-true line and circle, but also of the false, the variable, the
-uncertain?
-
-Certainly (says Protarchus), we all must have this farther
-cognition, if we are to find our way from hence to our own
-homes.[79]
-
-[Footnote 79: Plato, Philebus, p. 62 B. [Greek: A)nagkai=on ga/r,
-ei) me/llei tis e(mo=n kai\ te\n o(do\n e(ka/stote e)xeure/sein
-oi)/kade.]]
-
-Must we then admit (says Sokrates) those cognitions also in music,
-which we declared to be full of conjecture and imitation, without
-any pure truth or certainty?
-
-We must admit them (says Protarchus), if life is to be worth
-anything at all. No harm can come from admitting all the other
-cognitions, provided a man possesses the first and most perfect.
-
-[Side-note: But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure,
-and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or
-Intelligence--especially the intense sexual pleasures.]
-
-Well then (continues Sokrates), we will admit them all. We have
-now to consider whether we can in like manner admit all pleasures
-without distinction. The true and pure must first be let in: next,
-such as are necessary and indispensable: and all the rest also, if
-any one can show that there is advantage without mischief in our
-enjoying every variety of pleasure.[80] We must put the question
-first to pleasures, next to cognitions--whether they can consent
-respectively to live in company with each other. Now pleasures
-will readily consent to the companionship of cognitions: but
-cognitions (or Reason, upon whom they depend) will not tolerate
-the companionship of all pleasures indiscriminately. Reason will
-welcome the true and pure pleasures: she will also accept such as
-are indispensable, and such as consist with health, and with a
-sober and virtuous disposition. But Reason will not tolerate those
-most intense, violent, insane, pleasures, which extinguish correct
-memory, disturb sound reflection, and consist only with folly and
-bad conduct. Excluding these violent pleasures, but retaining the
-others in company with Reason and Truth--we shall secure that
-perfect and harmonious mixture which makes the nearest
-approximation to Good.[81]
-
-[Footnote 80: Plato, Philebus, p. 63 A. [Greek: ei)/per pa/sas
-e(dona\s e(/desthai dia\ bi/ou sumphe/ron te e(mi=n e)sti\ kai\
-a)blabe\s a(/pasi, pa/sas xugkrate/on.]]
-
-[Footnote 81: Plato, Philebus, pp. 63-64.]
-
-[Side-note: What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is
-Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than
-Pleasure.]
-
-This mixture as Good (continues Sokrates) will be acceptable to
-all.[82] But what is the cause that it is so? and is that cause
-more akin to Reason or to Pleasure? The answer is, that this
-mixture and combination, like every other that is excellent,
-derives its excellence from Measure and Proportion. Thus the Good
-becomes merged in the Beautiful: for measure and proportion
-(Moderation and Symmetry) constitute in every case beauty and
-excellence.[83] In this case, Truth has been recognised as a third
-element of the mixture: the three together coalesce into Good,
-forming a Quasi-Unum, which serves instead of a Real Unum or Idea
-of Good.[84] We must examine these three elements
-separately--Truth--Moderation--Symmetry (Measure--Proportion) to find
-whether each of them is most akin to Reason or to Pleasure. There can
-be no doubt that to all the three, Reason is more akin than Pleasure:
-and that the intense pleasures are in strong repugnance and
-antipathy to all the three.[85]
-
-[Footnote 82: Plato, Philebus, p. 64 C. [Greek: Ti/ de=ta e)n te=|
-xummi/xei timio/taton a(/ma kai\ ma/list' ai)/tion ei)=nai
-do/xeien a)\n e(mi=n, _tou= pa=si gegone/nai prosphile=_ te\n
-toiau/ten dia/thesin?]]
-
-[Footnote 83: Plato, Philebus, p. 64 E. [Greek: nu=n de\
-katape/pheugen e(mi=n e( ta)gathou= du/namis ei)s te\n tou= kalou=
-phu/sin; metrio/tes ga\r kai\ xummetri/a ka/llos de/pou kai\
-a)rete\ pantachou= xumbai/nei gi/gnesthai.]]
-
-[Footnote 84: Plato, Philebus, p. 64 E-65 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei)
-me\ mia=| duna/metha i)de/a| to\ a)gatho\n thereu=sai, su\n trisi\
-labo/ntes, ka/llei kai\ xummetri/a| kai\ a)lethei/a|, le/gomen o(s
-tou=to oi(=on e(\n o)rtho/tat' a)\n ai)tiasai/meth' a)\n to=n e)n
-te=| xummi/xei, kai\ dia\ tou=to o(s a)gatho\n o)\n toiau/ten
-au)te\n gegone/nai.]]
-
-[Footnote 85: Plato, Philebus, p. 65 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1.
-Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right
-Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures.]
-
-We thus see (says Sokrates in conclusion), in reference to the
-debate with Philebus, that Pleasure stands neither first nor
-second in the scale of approximation to Good. First comes
-Measure--the Moderate--the Seasonable--and all those eternal Forms
-and Ideas which are analogous to these.[86] Secondly, come the
-Symmetrical--the Beautiful--the Perfect--the Sufficient--and other
-such like Forms and Ideas.[87] Thirdly, come Reason and
-Intelligence. Fourthly, the various sciences, cognitions, arts,
-and right opinions--acquirements embodied in the mind itself.
-Fifthly, those pleasures which we have discriminated as pure
-pleasures without admixture of pain; belonging to the mind itself
-but consequent on the sensations of sight, hearing, smell.[88]
-
-[Footnote 86: Plato, Philebus, p. 66 A. [Greek: o(s e(done\ kte=ma
-ou)k e)/sti pro=ton ou)d' au)= deu/teron, a)lla\ pro=ton me/n pe|
-peri\ me/tron kai\ to\ me/trion kai\ kai/rion kai\ pa/nta o(po/sa
-chre\ toiau=ta nomi/zein te\n a)i+/dion e(|re=sthai phu/sin.]]
-
-[Footnote 87: Plato, Philebus, p. 66 B. [Greek: deu/teron me\n
-peri\ to\ su/mmetron kai\ kalo\n kai\ to\ te/leon kai\ i(kano\n,
-kai\ pa/nth' o(po/sa te=s genea=s au)= tau/tes e)sti/n.]]
-
-[Footnote 88: Plato, Philebus, p. 66 C.]
-
-It is not necessary to trace the descending scale farther. It has
-been shown, against Philebus--That though neither Intelligence
-separately, nor Pleasure separately, is an adequate embodiment of
-Good, which requires both of them conjointly--yet Intelligence is
-more akin to Good, and stands nearer to it in nature, than
-Pleasure.
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-Dionysius of Halikarnassus, while blaming the highflown metaphor
-and poetry of the Phaedrus and other Platonic dialogues, speaks
-with great admiration of Plato in his appropriate walk of the
-Sokratic dialogues; and selects specially the Philebus, as his
-example of these latter. I confess that this selection surprises
-me: for the Philebus, while it explicitly renounces the peculiar
-Sokratic vein, and becomes didactic--cannot be said to possess
-high merit as a didactic composition. It is neither clear, nor
-orderly, nor comparable in animation to the expository books of
-the Republic.[89] Every commentator of Plato, from Galen
-downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the Philebus.
-
-[Footnote 89: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. ap. Demosth. p. 1025.
-
-Schleiermacher (Einleit. p. 136) admits the comparatively tiresome
-character and negligent execution of the Philebus.
-
-Galen had composed a special treatise, [Greek: Peri\ to=n e)n
-Phile/bo| metaba/seon], now lost (Galen, De Libris Propriis, 13,
-vol. xix. 46, ed. Kuehn).
-
-We have the advantage of two recent editions of the Philebus by
-excellent English scholars, Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste; both are
-valuable, and that of Dr. Badham is distinguished by sagacious
-critical remarks and conjectures, but the obscurity of the
-original remains incorrigible.]
-
-[Side-note: Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of
-an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy.]
-
-Sokrates concludes his task, in the debate with Protarchus, by
-describing Bonum or the Supreme Good as a complex aggregate of
-five distinct elements, in a graduated scale of affinity to it and
-contributing to its composition in a greater or less degree
-according to the order in which they are placed. Plato does not
-intimate that these five complete the catalogue; but that after
-the fifth degree, the affinity becomes too feeble to deserve
-notice.[90] According to this view, no Idea of Good, in the strict
-Platonic sense, is affirmed. Good has not the complete unity of an
-Idea, but only the quasi-unity of analogy between its diverse
-elements; which are attached by different threads to the same
-root, with an order of priority and posteriority.[91]
-
-[Footnote 90: Plato, Philebus, p. 66 C.]
-
-[Footnote 91: Plato, Philebus, p. 65 A. The passage is cited in
-note 5, p. 363.
-
-About the difference, recognised partly by Plato but still more
-insisted on by Aristotle, between [Greek: ta\ lego/mena kath' e(\n
-(kata\ mi/an i)de/an)] and [Greek: ta\ lego/mena pro\s e(\n (pro\s
-mi/an tina\ phu/sin)], see my note towards the close of the Lysis,
-vol. ii. ch. xx.
-
-Aristotle says about Plato (Eth. Nikom. i. 6): [Greek: Oi( de\
-komi/santes te\n do/xan tau/ten, ou)k e)poi/oun i)de/as e)n oi(=s
-to\ pro/teron kai\ to\ u(/steron e)/legon], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute
-view, maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic
-Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic
-doctrine.]
-
-In the discussions about Bonum, there existed among the
-contemporaries of Plato a great divergence of opinions. Eukleides
-of Megara represents the extreme absolute, ontological, or
-objective view: Sokrates (I mean the historical Sokrates, as
-reported by Xenophon) enunciated very distinctly the relative or
-subjective view. "Good (said Eukleides) is the One: the only real,
-eternal, omnipresent Ens--always the same or like itself--called
-sometimes Good, sometimes Intelligence, and by various other
-names: the opposite of Good has no real existence, but only a
-temporary, phenomenal, relative, existence." On the other hand,
-the Xenophontic Sokrates affirmed--"The Good and The Beautiful
-have no objective unity at all; they include a variety of items
-altogether dissimilar to each other, yet each having reference to
-some human want or desire: sometimes relieving or preventing pain,
-sometimes conferring pleasure. That which neither contributes to
-relieve any pain or want, nor to confer pleasure, is not Good at
-all."[92] In the Philebus, Plato borrows in part from both of
-these points of view, though inclining much more to the first than
-to the last. He produces a new eclectic doctrine, comprising
-something from both, and intended to harmonise both; announced as
-applying at once to Man, to Animals, to Plants, and to the
-Universe.[93]
-
-[Footnote 92: Diogen. Laert. ii. 106; Cicero, Academic. ii. 42;
-Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 3-5.]
-
-[Footnote 93: Plato, Philebus, p. 64 A. [Greek: e)n tau/te|
-mathei=n peira=sthai, ti/ _pote e(\n te a)nthro/po| kai\ to=|
-panti\ pe/phuken a)gatho/n_, kai\ ti/na i)de/an au)te\n ei)=nai/
-pote manteute/on.]
-
-Schleiermacher observes about the Philebus:--"Dieses also lag ihm
-(Plato) am Herzen, das Gute zu bestimmen nicht nur fuer das Leben
-des Menschen, sondern auch zumal fuer das ganze Gebiet des
-gewordenen Seins," &c.
-
-The partial affinity between the Kosmos and the human soul is set
-forth in the Timaeus, pp. 37-43-44.]
-
-[Side-note: Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with
-Ethics.]
-
-Unfortunately, the result has not corresponded to his intentions.
-If we turn to the close of the dialogue, we find that the
-principal elements which he assigns as explanatory of Good, and
-the relation in which they stand to each other, stand as much in
-need of explanation as Good itself. If we follow the course of the
-dialogue, we are frequently embarrassed by the language, because
-he is seeking for phrases applicable at once to the Kosmos and to
-Man: or because he passes from one to the other, under the
-assumption of real analogy between them. The extreme generalities
-of Logic or Ontology, upon which Sokrates here dwells--the
-Determinant and Indeterminate, the Cause, &c.--do not conduct us
-to the attainment of Good as he himself defines it--That which is
-desired by, and will give full satisfaction to, all men, animals,
-and plants. The fault appears to me to lie in the very scheme of
-the dialogue. Attempts to discuss Ontology and Ethics in one and
-the same piece of reasoning, instead of elucidating both, only
-serve to darken both. Aristotle has already made a similar remark:
-and it is after reading the Philebus that we feel most distinctly
-the value of his comments on Plato in the first book of the
-Nikomachean Ethics. Aristotle has discussed Ontology in the
-Metaphysica and in other treatises: but he proclaims explicitly
-the necessity of discussing Ethics upon their own principles:
-looking at what is good for man, and what is attainable by
-man.[94] We find in the Philebus many just reflections upon
-pleasure and its varieties: but these might have been better and
-more clearly established, without any appeal to the cosmical
-dogmas. The parallelism between Man and the Kosmos is overstrained
-and inconclusive, like the parallelism in the Republic between the
-collective commonwealth and the individual citizen.
-
-[Footnote 94: See especially Ethic. Nikom. i. 4, 1096-1097.
-Aristotle reasons there directly against the Platonic [Greek:
-i)de/a a)gathou=], but his arguments have full application to the
-exposition in the Philebus. He distinguishes pointedly the ethical
-from the physical point of view. In his discussion of friendship,
-after touching upon various comparisons of the physiological
-poets, and of Plato himself repeating them, he says:--[Greek: ta\
-me\n ou)=n phusika\ to=n a)porema/ton paraphei/stho; ou) ga\r
-oi)kei=a te=s parou/ses ske/pseos; o(/sa d' e)sti\n a)nthropika/
-kai\ a)ne/kei ei)s ta\ e)/the kai\ ta\ pa/the, tau=t'
-e)piskepso/metha], Ethic. Nikom. viii. 1, 1155, b. 10.
-
-The like contrast is brought out (though less clearly) in the
-Eudemian Ethics, viii. 1. 1235, a. 30.
-
-He animadverts upon Plato on the same ground in the Ethica Magna,
-i. 1, 1182, a. 23-30. [Greek: u(pe\r ga\r to=n o)/nton kai\
-a)lethei/as le/gonta, ou)k e)/dei u(pe\r a)rete=s phra/zein;
-ou)de\n ga\r tou/to| ka)kei/no| koino/n.]]
-
-[Side-note: Comparison of Man to the Kosmos, which has reason, but
-no emotion, is unnecessary and confusing.]
-
-Moreover, when Plato, to prove the conclusion that Intelligence
-and Reason are the governing attributes of man's mind, enunciates
-as his premiss that Intelligence and Reason are the governing
-attributes in the Kosmos[95]--the premiss introduced is more
-debateable than the conclusion; and would (as he himself
-intimates) be contested by those against whose opposition he was
-arguing. In fact, the same proposition (That Reason and
-Intelligence are the dominant and controlling attributes of man,
-Passion and Appetite the subordinate) is assumed without any proof
-by Sokrates, both in the Protagoras and in the Republic. The
-Kosmos (in Plato's view) has reason and intelligence, but
-experiences no emotion either painful or pleasurable: the rational
-nature of man is thus common to him with the Kosmos, his emotional
-nature is not so. That the mind of each individual man was an
-emanation from the all-pervading mind of the Kosmos or universe,
-and his body a fragmentary portion of the four elements composing
-the cosmical body--these are propositions which had been laid down
-by Sokrates, as well as by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans
-(perhaps by Pythagoras himself) before the time of Plato.[96] Not
-only that doctrine, but also the analysis of the Kosmos into
-certain abstract constituent _principia_--(the Finient or
-Determinant--and the Infinite or Indeterminate)--this too seems to
-have been borrowed by Plato from Philolaus.[97]
-
-[Footnote 95: Plato, Philebus, pp. 20-30.]
-
-[Footnote 96: Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 11, 27: De Senectute, 21,
-78; Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 7-8; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 6, 18;
-Plato, Timaeus, pp. 37-38, &c.
-
-In the Xenophontic dialogue here referred to, Sokrates inverts the
-premiss and the conclusion: he infers that Mind and Reason govern
-the Kosmos, because the mind and reason of man govern the body of
-man.]
-
-[Footnote 97: See Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Phileb. pp. 41-42.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their
-doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic
-classification.]
-
-But here in the Philebus, that analysis appears expanded into a
-larger scheme going beyond Philolaus or the Pythagoreans: _viz._
-the recognition of a graduated scale of limits, or a definite
-number of species and sub-species--intermediate between the One or
-Highest Genus, and the Infinite Many or Individuals--and
-descending by successive stages of limitation from the Highest to
-the Lowest. What is thus described, is the general framework of
-systematic logical classification, deliberately contrived, and
-founded upon known attributes, common as well as differential. It
-is prescribed as essential to all real cognition; if we conceive
-only the highest Genus or generic name as comprehending an
-infinity of diverse particulars, we have no real cognition, until
-we can assign the intermediate stages of specification by which we
-descend from one to the other.[98] The step here made by Plato,
-under the stimulus of the Sokratic dialectic, from the Pythagorean
-doctrine of Finient and Infinite to the idea of gradual,
-systematic, logical division and subdivision, is one very
-important in the history of science. He lays as much stress upon
-the searching out of the intermediate species, as Bacon does upon
-the Axiomata Media of scientific enquiry.[99]
-
-[Footnote 98: Ueberweg (AEchtheit und Zeitf. Platon. Schriften, pp.
-204-207) considers the Philebus, as well as the Sophistes and
-Timaeus, to be compositions of Plato's very late age--partly on the
-ground of their didactic and expository style, the dialogue
-serving only as form to the exponent Sokrates--partly because he
-thinks that the nearest approach is made in them to that manner of
-conceiving the doctrine of Ideas which Aristotle ascribes to Plato
-in his old age--that is, the two [Greek: stoichei=a] or factors of
-the Ideas. 1. [Greek: To\ e(\n]. 2. [Greek: To\ me/ga kai\
-mikro/n]. This last argument seems to me far-fetched. I see no
-real and sensible approach in the Philebus to this Platonic
-doctrine of the [Greek: stoichei=a] of the Ideas: at least, the
-approach is so vague, that one can hardly make it a basis of
-reasoning. But the didactic tone is undoubtedly a characteristic
-of the Philebus, and seems to indicate that the dialogue was
-composed after Plato had been so long established in his school,
-as to have acquired a pedagogic ostentation.]
-
-[Footnote 99: Bacon, Augment. Scient. v. 2. Nov. Organ. Aph. 105.
-"At Plato non semel innuit particularia infinita esse maxime:
-rursus generalia minus certa documenta exhibere. Medullam igitur
-scientiarum, qua artifex ab imperito distinguitur, in mediis
-propositionibus consistere, quas per singulas scientias tradidit
-et docuit experientia."]
-
-[Side-note: Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly
-recommended--yet feebly applied--in this dialogue.]
-
-Though there are several other passages of the Platonic dialogues
-in which the method of logical division is inculcated, there is
-none (I think) in which it is prescribed so formally, or
-enunciated with such comprehensive generality, as this before us
-in the Philebus. Yet the method, after being emphatically
-announced, is but feebly and partially applied, in the distinction
-of different species, both of pleasure and of cognition.[100] The
-announcement would come more suitably, as a preface to the
-Sophistes and Politikus: wherein the process is applied to given
-subjects in great detail, and at a length which some critics
-consider excessive: and wherein moreover the particular enquiry is
-expressly proclaimed as intended to teach as well as to exemplify
-the general method.[101]
-
-[Footnote 100: The purpose of discriminating the different sorts
-of pleasure is intimated, yet seemingly not considered as
-indispensable, by Sokrates; and it is executed certainly in a very
-unsystematic and perfunctory manner, compared with what we read in
-the Sophistes and Politikus. (Philebus, pp. 19 B, 20 C, 32 B-C.)
-
-Mr. Poste, in his note on p. 55 A, expresses surprise at this
-point; and notices it as one among other grounds for suspecting
-that the Philebus is a composition of two distinct fragments,
-rather carelessly soldered together:--"Again after Division and
-Generalization have been propounded as the only satisfactory
-method, it is somewhat strange that both the original problems are
-solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to
-classification. All this becomes intelligible if we assume the
-Philebus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two
-originally separate dialogues."
-
-Acknowledging the want of coherence in the dialogue, I have
-difficulty in conceiving what the two fragments could have been,
-out of which it was compounded. Schleiermacher (Einleit. pp.
-136-137) also points out the negligent execution and heavy march of
-the dialogue.]
-
-[Footnote 101: See Politikus, pp. 285-286; Phaedrus, p. 265;
-Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 12.
-
-I have already observed that Socher (Ueber Platon. pp. 260-270)
-and Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Politik. pp. 52-54-65-67, &c.) agree in
-condemning the extreme minuteness, the tiresome monotony, the
-useless and petty comparisons, which Plato brings together in the
-multiplied bifurcate divisions of the Sophistes and Politikus.
-Socher adduces this as one among his reasons for rejecting the
-dialogue as spurious.]
-
-[Side-note: What is the Good? Discussed both in Philebus and in
-Republic. Comparison.]
-
-The same question as that which is here discussed in the Philebus,
-is also started in the sixth book of the Republic. It is worth
-while to compare the different handling, here and there. "Whatever
-else we possess (says Sokrates in the Republic), and whatever else
-we may know is of no value, unless we also possess and know Good.
-In the opinion of most persons, Pleasure is The Good: in the
-opinion of accomplished and philosophical men, intelligence
-([Greek: phro/nesis]) is the Good. But when we ask Intelligence,
-_of what_? these philosophers cannot inform us: they end by
-telling us, ridiculously enough, Intelligence of _The Good_. Thus,
-while blaming us for not knowing what The Good is, they make an
-answer which implies that we do already know it: in saying,
-Intelligence of the Good, they of course presume that we know what
-they mean by the word. Then again, those who pronounce Pleasure to
-be the Good, are not less involved in error; since they are forced
-to admit that some Pleasures are Evil; thus making Good and Evil
-to be the same. It is plain therefore that there are many and
-grave disputes what The Good is."[102]
-
-[Footnote 102: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 B-C. [Greek: oi( tou=to
-e(gu/menoi ou)k e)/chousi dei=xai e(/ _tis phro/nesis, a)ll'_
-a)nagka/zontai teleuto=ntes te\n tou= a)gathou= pha/nai . . .
-o)neidi/zonte/s ge o(/ti ou)k i)/smen to\ a)gatho/n, le/gousi
-pa/lin o(s ei)do/si; phro/nesin ga\r au)to/ phasin ei)=nai
-a)gathou=, o(s au)= sunie/nton e(mo=n o(/, ti le/gousin, e)peida\n
-to\ tou= a)gathou= phthe/gxontai o)/noma.]
-
-In the Symposion, there is a like tenor of questions about Eros or
-Love. Love must be Love of something: the term is relative. You
-confound Love with the object loved. See Plato, Symposion, pp. 199
-C, 204 C.
-
-When we read the objection here advanced by Plato (in the above
-passage of the Republic) as conclusive against the appeal to
-[Greek: phro/nesis] absolutely (without specifying [Greek:
-phro/nesis] _of what_), we are surprised to see that it is not
-even mentioned in the Philebus.]
-
-[Side-note: Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it
-were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself
-wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes
-professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently.]
-
-In this passage of the Republic Plato points out that Intelligence
-cannot be understood, except as determined by or referring to some
-Object or End: and that those who tendered Intelligence _per se_
-for an explanation of The Good (as Sokrates does in the Philebus),
-assumed as known the very point in dispute which they professed to
-explain. This is an important remark in regard to ethical
-discussions: and it were to be wished that Plato had himself
-avoided the mistake which he here blames in others. The Platonic
-Sokrates frequently tells us that he does not know what Good is.
-In the sixth Book of the Republic, having come to a point where
-his argument required him to furnish a positive explanation of it,
-he expressly declines the obligation and makes his escape amidst
-the clouds of metaphor.[103] In the Protagoras, he pronounces Good
-to be identical with pleasure and avoidance of pain, in the
-largest sense and under the supervision of calculating
-Intelligence.[104] In the second Book of the Republic, we find
-what is substantially the same explanation as that of the
-Protagoras, given (though in a more enlarged and analytical
-manner) by Glaukon and assented to by Sokrates; to the effect that
-Good is tripartite,[105] _viz._: 1. That which we desire for
-itself, without any reference to consequences--_e. g._, enjoyment
-and the innocuous pleasures. 2. That which we desire on a double
-account, both for itself and by reason of its consequences--_e.
-g._, good health, eyesight, intelligence, &c. 3. That which we do
-not desire, perhaps even shun, for itself: but which we desire, or
-at least accept, by reason of its consequences--such as
-gymnastics, medical treatment, discipline, &c. Again, in the
-Gorgias and elsewhere, Plato seems to confine the definition of
-Good to the two last of these three heads, rejecting the first:
-for he distinguishes pointedly the Good from the Pleasurable. Yet
-while thus wavering in his conception of the term, Plato often
-admits it into the discussions as if it were not merely familiar,
-but clear and well-understood by every one.
-
-[Footnote 103: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 E.
-
-Compare also Republic, vii. p. 533 C. [Greek: o)=| ga\r a)rche\
-me\n o(\ me\ oi)=de, teleute\ de\ kai\ ta\ metaxu\ e)x ou)= me\
-oi)=de sumpe/plektai, ti/s mechane\ te\n toiau=ten o(mologi/an
-pote\ e)piste/men gi/gnesthai?]]
-
-[Footnote 104: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 356-7.]
-
-[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined:
-but the answer in the Philebus does not satisfy those tests.]
-
-In the present dialogue, Plato lays down certain characteristic
-marks whereby The Supreme Good may be known. These marks are
-subjective--relative to the feelings and appreciation of sentient
-beings--to all mankind, and even to animals and plants. Good is
-explicitly defined by the property of conferring happiness. The
-Good is declared to be "that habit and disposition of mind which
-has power to confer on all men a happy life":[106] it is perfect
-and all sufficient: every creature that knows Good, desires and
-hunts after it, demanding nothing farther when it is attained, and
-caring for nothing else except what is attained along with
-it:[107] it is the object of choice for all plants and animals,
-and if any one prefers any thing else, he only does so through
-ignorance or from some untoward necessity:[108] it is most
-delightful and agreeable to all.[109] This is what Plato tells us
-as to the characteristic attributes of Good. And the test which
-Sokrates applies, to determine whether Pleasure does or does not
-correspond with these attributes, is an appeal to individual
-choice or judgment. "Would you choose? Would _any one_ be
-satisfied?" Though this appeal ought by the conditions of the
-problem to be made to mankind generally, and is actually made to
-Protarchus as one specimen of them--yet Sokrates says at the end
-of the dialogue that all except philosophers choose wrong, being
-too ignorant or misguided to choose aright. Now it is certain that
-what these philosophers choose, will not satisfy the aspirations
-of all other persons besides. It may be Good, in reference to the
-philosophers themselves: but it will fail to answer those larger
-conditions which Plato has just laid down.
-
-[Footnote 106: Plato, Philebus, p. 11 E.]
-
-[Footnote 107: Plato, Philebus, pp. 20 D-E, 61 C, 67 A. [Greek:
-au)tarkei/a], &c.
-
-Sydenham, Translation of Philebus, note, p. 48, observes--"Whether
-Happiness be to be found in Speculative Wisdom or in Pleasure, or
-in some other possession or enjoyment, it can be seated nowhere
-but in the soul. For Happiness has no existence anywhere but where
-it is felt and known. Now, it is no less certain, that only the
-soul is sensible of pain and pleasure, than it is, that only the
-soul is capable of knowledge, and of thinking either foolishly or
-wisely."]
-
-[Footnote 108: Plato, Philebus, pp. 22 B, 61 A.]
-
-[Footnote 109: Plato, Philebus, pp. 61 E, 64 C. [Greek: to\n
-a)gapeto/taton bi/on pa=si prosphile=].
-
-Aristotle, Ethic. Nikomach. i. init. [Greek: ta)gatho/n, ou)=
-pa/nta e)phi/etai].
-
-Seneca, Epistol. 118. "Bonum est quod ad se impetum animi secundum
-naturam movet."]
-
-[Side-note: Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the
-question--The alternative which he tenders has no fair
-application.]
-
-In submitting the question to individual choice, Plato does not
-keep clear either of confusion or of contradiction. If this Summum
-Bonum be understood as the End comprising the full satisfaction of
-human wishes and imaginations, without limitation by certain given
-actualities--and if the option be tendered to a man already
-furnished with his share of the various desires generated in
-actual life--such a man will naturally demand entire absence of
-all pains, with pleasures such as to satisfy all his various
-desires: not merely the most intense pleasures (which Plato
-intends to prove, not to be pleasures at all), but other pleasures
-also. He will wish (if you thus suppose him master of Fortunatus's
-wishing-cap) to include in his enjoyments pleasures which do not
-usually go together, and which may even, in the real conditions of
-life, exclude one another: no boundary being prescribed to his
-wishing power. He will wish for the pleasures of knowledge or
-intelligence, of self-esteem, esteem from others, sympathy, &c.,
-as well as for those of sense. He will put in his claim for
-pleasures, without any of those antecedent means and conditions
-which, in real life, are necessary to procure them. Such being the
-state of the question, the alternative tendered by
-Plato--Pleasure, versus Intelligence or Knowledge--has no fair
-application. Plato himself expressly states that pleasure, though
-generically One, is specifically multiform, and has many varieties
-different from, even opposite to, each other: among which
-varieties one is, the pleasure of knowledge or intelligence
-itself.[110] The person to whom the question is submitted, has a
-right to claim these pleasures of knowledge among the rest, as
-portions of his Summum Bonum. And when Plato proceeds to ask--Will
-you be satisfied to possess pleasure only, without the least spark
-of intelligence, without memory, without eyesight?--he departs
-from the import of his previous question, and withdraws from the
-sum total of pleasure many of its most important items: since we
-must of course understand that the pleasures of intelligence will
-disappear along with intelligence itself,[111] and that the pains
-of conscious want of intelligence will be felt instead of them.
-
-[Footnote 110: Plato, Philebus, p. 12 D.]
-
-[Footnote 111: Plato, Philebus, p. 21 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly
-compared--Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be
-compared with Pleasure, except some other End.]
-
-That the antithesis here enunciated by Plato is not legitimate or
-logical, we may see on other grounds also. Pleasure and
-Intelligence cannot be placed in competition with each other for
-recognition as Summum Bonum: which, as described by Plato himself,
-is of the nature of an End, while Intelligence is of the nature of
-a means or agency--indispensable indeed, yet of no value unless it
-be exercised, and rightly exercised towards its appropriate end,
-which end must be separately declared.[112] Intelligence is a
-durable acquisition stored up, like the good health, moral
-character, or established habits, of each individual person: it is
-a capital engaged in the production of interest, and its value is
-measured by the interest produced. You cannot with propriety put
-the means--the Capital--in one scale, and the End--the Interest--in
-the other, so as to ascertain which of the two weighs most. A
-prudent man will refrain from any present enjoyment which trenches
-on his capital: but this is because the maintenance of the capital
-is essential to all future acquisitions and even future
-maintenance. So too, Intelligence is essential as a means or
-condition to the attainment of pleasure in its largest sense--that
-is, including avoidance or alleviation of pain or suffering: if
-therefore you choose to understand pleasure in a narrower sense,
-not including therein avoidance of pain (as Plato understands it
-in this portion of the Philebus), the comprehensive end to which
-Intelligence corresponds may be compared with Pleasure and
-declared more valuable--but Intelligence itself cannot with
-propriety be so compared. Such a comparison can only be properly
-instituted when you consider the exercise of Intelligence as
-involving (which it undoubtedly does[113]) pleasures of its own;
-which pleasures form part of the End, and may fairly be measured
-against other pleasures and pains. But nothing can be properly
-compared with Pleasure, except some other supposed End: and those
-theorists who reject Pleasure must specify some other _Terminus ad
-quem_--otherwise intelligence has no clear meaning.
-
-[Footnote 112: Compare Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 D (referred to
-in a previous note); also Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 3, 1095, b.
-30; i. 8, 1099, a. 1.
-
-Respecting the value of Intelligence or Cognition, when the end
-towards which it is to be exercised is undetermined, see the
-dialogue between Sokrates and Kleinias--Plato, Euthydem. pp.
-289-292 B-E.
-
-Aristotle, in the Nikomach. Ethic. (i. 4, 1096, b. 10), makes a
-distinction between--1. [Greek: ta\ kath' au(ta\ dioko/mena kai\
-a)gapo/mena]--2. [Greek: ta\ poietika\ tou/ton e)\ phulaktika\ e)\
-to=n e)nanti/on kolutika/]: and Plato himself makes the same
-distinction at the beginning of the second book of the Republic.
-But though it is convenient to draw attention to this distinction,
-for the clear understanding of the subject, you cannot ask with
-propriety which of the two lots is most valuable. The value of the
-two is equal: the one cannot be had without the other.]
-
-[Footnote 113: Plato, Phileb. p. 12 D.]
-
-[Side-note: The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of
-pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the
-governing agency.]
-
-Now the Hedonists in Plato's age, when they declared Pleasure to
-be the supreme Good, understood Pleasure in its widest sense, as
-including not merely all varieties of pleasure, mental and bodily
-alike, but also avoidance of pain (in fact Epikurus dwelt
-especially upon this last point). Moreover, they did not intend to
-depreciate Intelligence, but on the contrary postulated it as a
-governing agency, indispensable to right choice and comparative
-estimation between different pleasures and pains. That
-Eudoxus,[114] the geometer and astronomer, did this, we may be
-sure: but besides, this is the way in which the Hedonistic
-doctrine is expounded by Plato himself. In his Protagoras,
-Sokrates advocates that doctrine, against the Sophist who is
-unwilling to admit it. In the exposition there given by Sokrates,
-Pleasure is announced as The Good to be sought, Pain as The Evil
-to be avoided or reduced to a minimum. But precisely because the
-End, to be pursued through constant diversity of complicated
-situations, is thus defined--for that very reason he declares that
-the dominant or sovereign element in man must be, the measuring
-and calculating Intelligence; since such is the sole condition
-under which the End can be attained or approached. In the theory
-of the Hedonists, there was no antithesis, but indispensable
-conjunction and implication, between Pleasure and
-Intelligence.[115] And if it be said, that by declaring Pleasure
-(and avoidance of Pain) to be the End, Intelligence the
-means,--they lowered the dignity of the latter as compared with the
-former:--we may reply that the dignity of Intelligence is exalted
-to the maximum when it is enthroned as the ruling and controuling
-agent over the human mind.
-
-[Footnote 114: Eudoxus is cited by Aristotle (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2)
-as the great champion of the Hedonistic theory. He is
-characterised by Aristotle as [Greek: diaphero/ntos so/phron].]
-
-[Footnote 115: The implication of the intelligent and emotional is
-well stated by Aristotle (Eth. Nikom. x. 8, 1178, a. 16). [Greek:
-sune/zeuktai de\ kai\ e( phro/nesis te=| tou= e)/thous a)rete=|,
-kai\ au)/te te=| phrone/sei, ei)/per ai( me\n te=s phrone/seos
-a)rchai\ kata\ ta\s e)thika/s ei)sin a)reta/s, to\ d' o)rtho\n
-to=n e=thiko=n kata\ te\n phro/nesin. sunerteme/nai d' au)=tai
-kai\ toi=s pa/thesi peri\ to\ su/ntheton a)\n ei)=en; ai( de\ tou=
-sunthe/tou a)retai\ a)nthropikai/. kai\ o( bi/os de\ o( kat'
-au)ta\s kai\ e( eu)daimoni/a. e( de\ tou= nou= kechorisme/ne], &c.
-Compare also the first two or three sentences of the tenth Book of
-Eth. Nik.]
-
-[Side-note: Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are
-compared by Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of
-more value. This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis.]
-
-In a scheme of mental philosophy, Emotion and Intellect are
-properly treated as distinct phenomena requiring to be explained
-separately, though perpetually co-existent and interfering with
-each other. But in an ethical discourse about Summum Bonum, the
-antithesis between Pleasure and Intelligence, on which the
-Philebus turns, is from the outset illogical. What gives to it an
-apparent plausibility, is, That the exercise of Intelligence has
-pleasures and pains of its own, and includes therefore in itself a
-part of the End, besides being the constant and indispensable
-directing force or Means. Now, though pleasure _in genere_ cannot
-be weighed in the scale against Intelligence, yet the pleasures
-and pains of Intelligence may be fairly and instructively compared
-with other pleasures and pains. You may contend that the pleasures
-of Intelligence are superior in quality, as well as less alloyed
-by accompanying pains. This comparison is really instituted by
-Plato in other dialogues;[116] and we find the two questions
-apparently running together in his mind as if they were one and
-the same. Yet the fact is, that those who affirm the pleasures
-attending the exercise of Intelligence to be better and greater,
-and the pains less, than those which attend other occupations, are
-really arguing upon the Hedonistic basis.[117] Far from
-establishing any antithesis between Pleasure and Intelligence,
-they bring the two into closer conjunction than was done by
-Epikurus himself.
-
-[Footnote 116: See Republic, ix. pp. 581-582, where he compares
-the pleasures of the three different lives. 1. [Greek: O(
-philo/sophos] or [Greek: philomathe/s]. 2. [Greek: O(
-philu/timos]. 3. [Greek: O( philokerde/s].
-
-Again in the Phaedon, he tells us that we are not to weigh
-pleasures against pleasures, or pains against pains, but all of
-them against [Greek: phro/nesis] or Intelligence (p. 69 A-B). This
-appears distinctly to contradict what Sokrates affirms in the
-Protagoras. But when we turn to another passage of the Phaedon (p.
-114 E), we find Sokrates recognising a class of pleasures attached
-to the exercise of Intelligence, and declaring them to be more
-valuable than the pleasures of sense, or any others. This is a
-very different proposition: but in both passages Plato had
-probably the same comparison in his mind.
-
-Sydenham, in a note to his translation of the Philebus (pp.
-42-43), observes--"if Protarchus, when he took on himself to be an
-advocate for pleasure, had included, in his meaning of the word,
-all such pleasures as are purely mental, his opinion, fairly and
-rightly understood, could not have been different in the main,
-from what Sokrates here professes--That in every particular case,
-to discern what is best in action, and to perceive what is true in
-speculation, is the chief good of man; unless, indeed, it should
-afterwards come into question which of the two kinds of pleasure,
-the sensual or the mental, was to be preferred. For if it should
-appear that in this point they were both of the same mind, the
-controversy between them would be found a mere logomachy, or
-contention about words (as between Epicureans and Stoics), of the
-same kind as that would be between two persons, one of whom
-asserted that to a musical ear the proper and true good was
-Harmony, while the other contended that the good lay not in the
-Harmony itself, but in the pleasure which the musical ear felt
-from hearing it: or like a controversy among three persons, one of
-whom having asserted that to all animals living under the northern
-frigid zone, the Sun in Cancer was the greatest blessing; and
-another having asserted that not the Sun was that chief blessing
-to those northern animals, but the warmth which he afforded them;
-the third should imagine that he corrected or amended the two
-former by saying--That those animals were thus highly blest
-neither by the Sun, nor by the warmth which his rays afforded
-them, but by the joy or pleasure which they felt from the return
-of the Sun and warmth."]
-
-[Footnote 117: Plato, in Philebus, p. 63 C-D, denounces and
-discards the vehement pleasures because they disturb the right
-exercise of Reason and Intelligence. Aristotle, after alluding to
-this doctrine, presents the same fact under a different point of
-view, as one case of a general law. Each variety of pleasure
-belongs to, and is consequent on, a certain [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] of
-the system. Each variety of pleasure promotes and consummates its
-own [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], but impedes or arrests other different
-[Greek: e)nergei/as]. Thus the pleasures of hunting, of gymnastic
-contest, of hearing or playing music--cause each of these [Greek:
-e)nergei=ai], upon which each pleasure respectively depends, to be
-more completely developed; but are unfavourable to different
-[Greek: e)nergei=ai], such as learning by heart, or solving a
-geometrical problem. The pleasure belonging to these latter,
-again, is unfavourable to the performance of the former [Greek:
-e)nergei=ai]. Study often hurts health or good management of
-property; but if a man has pleasure in study, he will perform that
-work with better fruit and result.
-
-This is a juster view of [Greek: e(done\] than what we read in the
-Philebus. The illogical antithesis of Pleasure _in genere_,
-against Intelligence, finds no countenance from Aristotle.
-
-See Ethic. Nikom. vii. 13, 1153, a. 20; x. 5, p. 1175; also Ethic.
-Magna, ii. p. 1206, a. 3.]
-
-[Side-note: Marked antithesis in the Philebus between pleasure and
-avoidance of pain.]
-
-Another remark may be made on the way in which Plato argues the
-question in the Philebus against the Hedonists. He draws a marked
-line of separation between Pleasure--and avoidance, relief, or
-mitigation, of Pain. He does not merely distinguish the two, but
-sets them in opposing antithesis. Wherever there is pain to be
-relieved, he will not allow the title of _pleasurable_ to be
-bestowed on the situation. That is not _true_ pleasure: in other
-words, it is no pleasure at all. He does not go quite so far as
-some contemporary theorists, the Fastidious Pleasure-Haters, who
-repudiated all pleasures without exception.[118] He allows a few
-rare exceptions; the sensual pleasures of sight, hearing, and
-smell--and the pleasures of exercising Intelligence, which (these
-latter most erroneously) he affirms to be not disentitled by any
-accompanying pains. His catalogue of pleasures is thus reduced to
-a chosen few, and these too enjoyable only by a chosen few among
-mankind.
-
-[Footnote 118: Plato, Philebus, p. 44 B.]
-
-[Side-note: The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction--They
-included both in their acknowledged End.]
-
-Now this very restricted sense of the word Pleasure is peculiar to
-Plato, and peculiar even to some of the Platonic dialogues. Those
-who affirmed Pleasure to be the Good, did not understand the word
-in the same restricted sense. When Sokrates in the Protagoras
-affirms, and when Sokrates in the Philebus denies, that Pleasure
-is identical with Good,--the affirmation and the denial do not
-bear upon the same substantial meaning.[119]
-
-[Footnote 119: Among the arguments employed by Sokrates in the
-Philebus to disprove the identity between [Greek: e(done\] and
-[Greek: a)gatho/n], one is, that [Greek: e(done\] is a [Greek:
-ge/nesis], and is therefore essentially a process of imperfection
-or transition into some ulterior [Greek: ou)si/a], for the sake of
-which alone it existed (Philebus, pp. 53-55); whereas Good is
-essentially an [Greek: ou)si/a]--perfect, complete,
-all-sufficient--and must not be confounded with the process whereby it
-is brought about. He illustrates this by telling us that the
-species of [Greek: ge/nesis] called ship-building exists only for
-the sake of the ship--the [Greek: ou)si/a] in which it terminates;
-but that the fabricating process, and the result in which it ends,
-are not to be confounded together.
-
-The doctrine that pleasure is a [Greek: ge/nesis], Plato cites as
-laid down by others: certain [Greek: kompsoi/], whom he does not
-name, but whom the critics suppose to be Aristippus and the
-Kyrenaici. Aristotle (in the seventh and tenth books of Ethic.
-Nik.) also criticises and impugns the doctrine that pleasure is a
-[Greek: ge/nesis]: but he too omits to name the persons by whom it
-was propounded.
-
-Possibly Aristippus may have been the author of it: but we can
-hardly tell what he meant, or how he defended it. Plato derides
-him for his inconsistency in calling pleasure a [Greek: ge/nesis],
-while he at the same time maintained it to be the Good: but the
-derision is founded upon an assumption which Aristippus would have
-denied. Aristippus would not have admitted that all [Greek:
-ge/nesis] existed only for the sake of [Greek: ou)si/a]: and he
-would have replied to Plato's argument, illustrated by the example
-of ship-building, by saying that the [Greek: ou)si/a] called a
-_ship_ existed only for the sake of the services which it was
-destined to render in transporting persons and goods: that if
-[Greek: ge/nesis] existed for the sake of [Greek: ou)si/a], it was
-no less true that [Greek: ou)si/a] existed for the sake of [Greek:
-ge/nesis]. Plato therefore had no good foundation for the sarcasm
-which he throws out against Aristippus.
-
-The reasoning of Aristotle (E. N. x. 3-4; compare Eth. Magn. ii.
-1204-1205) against the doctrine, that pleasure is [Greek:
-ge/nesis] or [Greek: ki/nesis], is drawn from a different point of
-view, and is quite as unfavourable to the opinions of Plato as to
-those of Aristippus. His language however in the Rhetoric is
-somewhat different (i. p. 1370, b. 33).
-
-Aristippus is said to have defined pleasure as [Greek: lei/a
-ki/nesis], and pain as [Greek: trachei=a ki/nesis] (Diog. L. ii.
-86-89). The word [Greek: ki/nesis] is so vague, that one can
-hardly say what it means, without some words of context: but I
-doubt whether he meant anything more than "_a marked change of
-consciousness_". The word [Greek: ge/nesis] is also very obscure:
-and we are not sure that Aristippus employed it.]
-
-[Side-note: Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures--The
-Hedonists enforced the same reasonable view.]
-
-Again, in the arguments of Sokrates against pleasure _in genere_,
-we find him also singling out as examples the intense pleasures,
-which he takes much pains to discredit. The remarks which he makes
-here upon the intense pleasures, considered as elements of
-happiness, have much truth taken generally. Though he exaggerates
-the matter when he says that many persons would rejoice to have
-itch and irritation, in order that they might have the pleasure of
-scratching[120]--and that persons in a fever have greater pleasure
-as well as greater pain than persons in health--yet he is correct
-to this extent, that the disposition to hanker after intense
-pleasures, to forget their painful sequel in many cases, and to
-pay for them a greater price than they are worth, is widely
-disseminated among mankind. But this is no valid objection against
-the Hedonistic theory, as it was enunciated and defended by its
-principal advocates--by the Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras),
-by Aristippus, Eudoxus,[121] Epikurus. All of them took account of
-this frequent wrong tendency, and arranged their warnings
-accordingly. All of them discouraged, not less than Plato, such
-intense enjoyments as produced greater mischief in the way of
-future pain and disappointment, or as obstructed the exercise of
-calm reason.[122] All of them, when they talked of pleasure as the
-Supreme Good, understood thereby a rational estimate and
-comparison of pleasures and pains, present and future, so as to
-ensure the maximum of the former and the minimum of the latter.
-All of them postulated a calculating and governing Reason.
-Epikurus undoubtedly, and I believe the other two also,
-recommended a life of moderation, tranquillity, and meditative
-reason: they deprecated the violent emotions, whether sensual,
-ambitious, or money-getting.[123] The objections therefore here
-stated by Sokrates, in so far as they are derived from the
-mischievous consequences of indulgence in the intense pleasures,
-do not avail against the Hedonistic theory, as explained either by
-Plato himself (Protagoras) or by any theorists of the Platonic
-century.
-
-[Footnote 120: Plato, Philebus, p. 47 B.]
-
-[Footnote 121: I have already remarked that Eudoxus is
-characterised by Aristotle as being [Greek: diaphero/ntos
-so/phron] (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2). The strong interest which he felt
-in scientific pursuits is marked by a story in Plutarch (Non Posse
-Suaviter Vivi; see Epicur. p. 1094 A).]
-
-[Footnote 122: The equivocal sense of the word Pleasure is the
-same as that which Plato notes in the Symposion to attach to Eros
-or Love (p. 205). When employed in philosophical discussion, it
-sometimes _is_ used (and always _ought_ to be used) in its full
-extent of generic comprehension: sometimes in a narrower sense, so
-as to include only a few of the more intense pleasures, chiefly
-the physical, and especially the sexual; sometimes in a sense
-still more peculiar, partly as opposed to _duty_, partly as
-opposed to _business_, _work_, _utility_, &c. Opponents of the
-Hedonists took advantage of the unfavourable associations attached
-to the word in these narrower and special senses, to make
-objections tell against the theory which employed the word in its
-widest generic sense.]
-
-[Footnote 123: See the beautiful lines of Lucretius, Book ii.
-init. When we read the three acrimonious treatises in which
-Plutarch attacks the Epikureans (Non Posse Suaviter Vivi, adv.
-Koloten, De Latenter Vivendo), we find him complaining, not that
-Epikurus thought too much about pleasures, or that he thought too
-much about the intense pleasures, but quite the reverse. Epikurus
-(he says) made out too poor a catalogue of pleasures: he was too
-easily satisfied with a small amount and variety of pleasures: he
-dwelt too much upon the absence of pain, as being, when combined
-with a very little pleasure, as much as man ought to look for: he
-renounced all the most vehement and delicious pleasures, those of
-political activity and contemplative study, which constitute the
-great charms of life (1097 F-1098 E-1092 E-1093-1094). Plutarch
-attacks Epikurus upon grounds really Hedonistic.]
-
-[Side-note: Different points of view worked out by Plato in
-different dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, Philebus--True and False
-Pleasures.]
-
-We find Plato in his various dialogues working out different
-points of view, partly harmonious, partly conflicting, upon
-ethical theory. Thus in the Gorgias, Sokrates insists eloquently
-upon the antithesis between the Immediate and Transient on the one
-hand, which he calls Pleasure or Pain--and the Distant and
-Permanent on the other, which he calls Good or Profit, Hurt or
-Evil. In the Protagoras, Sokrates acknowledges the same
-antithesis: but he points out that the Good or Profit, Hurt or
-Evil, resolve themselves into elements generically the same as
-those of the Immediate and Transient--Pleasure and Pain: so that
-all which we require is, a calculating Intelligence to assess and
-balance correctly the pleasures and pains in every given case. In
-the Philebus, Sokrates takes a third line, distinct from both the
-other two dialogues: he insists upon a new antithesis, between
-True Pleasures--and False Pleasures. If a Pleasure be associated
-with any proportion, however small, of Pain or Uneasiness--or with
-any false belief or impression--he denounces it as false and
-impostrous, and strikes it out of the list of pleasures. The small
-residue which is left after such deduction, consists of pleasures
-recommended altogether by what Plato calls their truth, and
-addressing themselves to the love of truth in a few chosen minds.
-The attainment of Good--the object of the practical aspirations--is
-presented as a secondary appendage of the attainment of Truth--the
-object of the speculative or intellectual energies.
-
-[Side-note: Opposition between the Gorgias and Philebus, about
-Gorgias and Rhetoric.]
-
-How much the Philebus differs in its point of view from the
-Gorgias,[124] is indicated by Plato himself in a remarkable
-passage. "I have often heard Gorgias affirm" (says Protarchus)
-"that among all arts, the art of persuasion stands greatly
-pre-eminent: since, it ensures subservience from all, not by force,
-but with their own free consent." To which Sokrates replies--"I
-was not then enquiring what art or science stands pre-eminent as
-the greatest, or as the best, or as conferring most benefit upon
-us--but what art or science investigates clear, exact, and full
-truth, though it be in itself small, and may afford small benefit.
-You need not quarrel with Gorgias, for you may admit to him the
-superiority of his art in respect of usefulness to mankind, while
-my art (dialectic philosophy) is superior in respect of accuracy.
-I observed just now, that a small piece of white colour which is
-pure, surpasses in truth a large area which is not pure. We must
-not look to the comparative profitable consequences or good repute
-of the various sciences or arts, but to any natural aspiration
-which may exist in our minds to love truth, and to do every thing
-for the sake of truth. It will then appear that no other science
-or art strives after truth so earnestly as Dialectic."[125]
-
-[Footnote 124: Sokrates in the Gorgias insists upon the constant
-intermixture of pleasure with pain, as an argument to prove that
-pleasure cannot be identical with good: pleasure and pain (he
-says) go together but good and evil cannot go together: therefore
-pleasure cannot be good, pain cannot be evil (Gorgias, pp.
-496-497). But he distinguishes pleasures into the good and the bad;
-not into the true and the false, as they are distinguished in the
-Philebus and the Republic (ix. pp. 583-585).]
-
-[Footnote 125: Plato, Philebus, p. 58 B-D-E. [Greek: Ou) tou=to
-e(/goge e)ze/toun po, ti/s te/chne e)\ ti/s e)piste/me paso=n
-diaphe/rei to=| megi/ste kai\ a)ri/ste kai\ plei=sta o)phelou=sa
-e(ma=s, a)lla\ ti/s pote to\ saphe\s kai\ ta)kribe\s kai\ to\
-a)lethe/staton e)piskopei=, ka)\n ei) smikra\ kai\ smikra\
-o)ni/nasa . . . A)ll' o(/ra; ou)de\ ga\r a)pechthe/sei Gorgi/a|,
-te=| me\n e)kei/nou u(pere/chein te/chne| didou\s pro\s chrei/an
-toi=s a)nthro/pois, pro\s a)kribei/an de\ e)=| ei)=pon e)go\ nu=n
-pragmatei/a| . . . me/t' ei)/s tinas o)phelei/as e)pistemo=n
-ble/psantes me/te tina\s eu)dokimi/as, a)ll' ei)/ tis pe/phuke
-te=s psuche=s e(mo=n du/namis e)ra=|n te tou= a)lethou=s kai\
-pa/nta e(/neka tou/tou pra/ttein.]
-
-Here, as elsewhere, I translate the substance of the passage,
-adopting the amendments of Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste (see Mr.
-Poste's note), which appear to me valuable improvements of a
-confused text.
-
-It seems probable enough that what is here said, conceding so
-large a measure of credit to Gorgias and his art, may be intended
-expressly as a mitigation of the bitter polemic assigned to
-Sokrates in the Gorgias. This is, however, altogether conjecture.]
-
-If we turn to the Gorgias, we find the very same claim advanced by
-Gorgias on behalf of his own art, as that which Protarchus here
-advances: but while Sokrates here admits it, in the Gorgias he
-repudiates it with emphasis, and even with contumely: ranking
-rhetoric among those employments which minister only to present
-pleasure, but which are neither intended to yield, nor ever do
-yield, any profitable result. Here in the Philebus, the antithesis
-between immediate pleasure and distant profit is scarcely noticed.
-Sokrates resigns to Gorgias and to others of the like stamp, a
-superiority not merely in the art of flattering and tricking the
-immediate sensibilities of mankind, but in that of contributing to
-their permanent profit and advantage. It is in a spirit contrary
-to the Gorgias, and contrary also to the Republic (in which latter
-we read the memorable declaration--That the miseries of society
-will have no respite until government is in the hands of
-philosophers[126]), that Sokrates here abnegates on behalf of
-philosophy all efficacious pretension of conferring profit or
-happiness on mankind generally, and claims for it only the pure
-delight of satisfying the truth-seeking aspirations. Now these
-aspirations have little force except in a few chosen minds; in the
-bulk of mankind the love of truth is feeble, and the active search
-for truth almost unknown. We thus see that in the Philebus it is
-the speculative few who are present to the imagination of Plato,
-more than the ordinary working, suffering, enjoying Many.
-
-[Footnote 126: Plato, Republ. v. 473 D.]
-
-[Side-note: Peculiarity of the Philebus--Plato applies the same
-principle of classification--true and false--to Cognitions and
-Pleasures.]
-
-Aristotle, in the commencement of his Metaphysica, recommends
-Metaphysics or First Philosophy to the reader, by affirming that,
-though other studies are more useful or more necessary to man,
-none is equal to it in respect of truth and exactness,[127]
-because it teaches us to understand First Causes and Principles.
-The like pretension is put forward by Plato in the Philebus[128]
-on behalf of dialectic; which he designates as the science of all
-real, permanent, unchangeable, Entia. Taking Dialectic as the
-maximum or Verissimum, Plato classifies other sciences or
-cognitions according as they approach closer to it in truth or
-exactness--according as they contain more of precise measurement
-and less of conjecture. Sciences or cognitions are thus classified
-according as they are more or less true and pure. But because this
-principle of classification is fairly applicable to cognitions,
-Plato conceives that it may be made applicable to Pleasures also.
-One characteristic feature of the Philebus is the attempt to apply
-the predicates, _true_ or _false_, to pleasures and pains, as they
-are applicable to cognitions or opinions: an attempt against which
-Protarchus is made to protest, and which Sokrates altogether fails
-in justifying,[129] though he employs a train of argument both
-long and diversified.
-
-[Footnote 127: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. p. 983, a. 25, b. 10.]
-
-[Footnote 128: Plato, Phileb. pp. 57-58. Compare Republic, vii.
-pp. 531-532.]
-
-[Footnote 129: Plato, Philebus, pp. 36 C. 38 A.
-
-The various arguments, intended to prove this conclusion, are
-continued from p. 36 to p. 51. The same doctrine is advocated by
-Sokrates in the Republic, ix. pp. 583-584.
-
-The doctrine is briefly stated by the Platonist Nemesius, De
-Natur. Hominis, p. 223. [Greek: kai\ ga\r kata\ Pla/tona to=n
-e(dono=n ai( me/n ei)si pseudei=s, ai( de\ a)lethei=s. Pseudei=s
-me/n, o(/sai met' ai)sthe/seos gi/gnontai kai\ do/xes ou)k
-a)lethou=s, kai\ lu/pas e)/chousi sumpeplegme/nas; a)lethei=s de/,
-o(/sai te=s psuche=s ei)si mo/nes au)te=s kath' e(aute\n met'
-e)piste/mes kai\ nou= kai\ phrone/seos, katharai\ kai\
-a)nepi/miktoi lu/pes, ai)=s ou)demi/a meta/noia parakolouthei=
-pote/.]
-
-A brief but clear abstract of the argument will be found in Dr.
-Badham's Preface to the Philebus (pp. viii.-xi.). Compare also
-Stallbaum's Prolegg. ch. v. p. 50, seq.]
-
-[Side-note: Distinction of true and false--not applicable to
-pleasures.]
-
-In this train of argument we find a good deal of just and
-instructive psychological remark: but nothing at all which proves
-the conclusion that there are or can be _false pleasures_ or
-_false pains_. We have (as Sokrates shows) false remembrances of
-past pleasures and pains--false expectations, hopes, and fears of
-future: we have pleasures alloyed by accompanying pains, and pains
-qualified by accompanying pleasures: we have pleasures and pains
-dependent upon false beliefs: but false pleasures we neither have
-nor can have. The predicate is altogether inapplicable to the
-subject. It is applicable to the intellectual side of our nature,
-not to the emotional. A pleasure (or a pain) is what it seems,
-neither more nor less; its essence consists in being felt.[130]
-There are false beliefs, disbeliefs, judgments, opinions--but not
-false pleasures or pains. The pleasure of the dreamer or madman is
-not false, though it may be founded on illusory belief: the joy of
-a man informed that he has just been appointed to a lucrative and
-honourable post, the grief of a father on hearing that his son has
-been killed in battle, are neither of them false, though the news
-which both persons are made to believe may be totally false, and
-though the feelings will thus be of short duration. Plato observes
-that the state which he calls neutrality or indifference appears
-pleasurable when it follows pain, and painful when it results from
-an interruption of pleasure: here is a state which appears
-alternately to be both, though it is in reality neither: the
-pleasure or pain, therefore, whichever it be, he infers to be
-_false_[131] But there is no falsehood in the case: the state
-described is what it appears to be--pleasurable or painful: Plato
-describes it erroneously when he calls it the same state, or one
-of neutrality. Pleasure and Pain are both of them phenomena of
-present consciousness. They are what they seem: none of them can
-be properly called (as Plato calls them) "apparent pleasures which
-have no reality".[132]
-
-[Footnote 130: This is what Aristotle means when he says:--[Greek:
-te=s e(done=s d' e)n o(to|ou=n chro/no| te/leion to\ ei)=dos . . .
-to=n o(/lon ti kai\ telei/on e( e(done/] (Eth. Nik. x. 3, 1174, b.
-4).]
-
-[Footnote 131: Plato, Philebus, pp. 43-44; Republic, ix. p. 583.
-
-I copy the following passage from Professor Bain's work on "The
-Emotions and the Will," the fullest and most philosophical account
-of the emotions that I know (pp. 615-616; 3rd ed., pp. 550
-seq.):--
-
-"It is a general law of the mental constitution, more or less
-recognised by inquirers into the human mind, that change of
-impression is essential to consciousness in every form. . . There
-are notable examples to show, that one unvarying action upon the
-senses fails to give any perception whatever. Take the motion of
-the earth about its axis and through space, whereby we are whirled
-with immense velocity, but at a uniform pace, being utterly
-insensible of the circumstance. . . It is the change from rest to
-motion that wakens our sensibility, and, conversely, from motion
-to rest. A uniform condition, as respects either state, is devoid
-of any quickening influence on the mind. . . . We have repeatedly
-seen pleasures depending for their existence on previous pains,
-and pains on pleasures experienced or conceived. Such are the
-contrasting states of Liberty and Restraint, Power and Impotence.
-Many pleasures owe their effect as such to mere cessation. For
-example, the pleasures of exercise do not need to be preceded by
-pain: it is enough that there has been a certain intermission,
-coupled with the nourishment of the exhausted parts. These are of
-course our best pleasures. By means of this class, we might have a
-life of enjoyment without pain: although, in fact, the other is
-more or less mixed up in every one's experience. Exercise, Repose,
-the pleasures of the different Senses and Emotions, might be made
-to alternate, so as to give a constant succession of pleasure:
-each being sufficiently dormant during the exercise of the others,
-to reanimate the consciousness when its turn comes. It also
-happens that some of those modes of delight are increased, by
-being preceded by a certain amount of a painful opposite. Thus,
-confinement adds to the pleasure of exercise, and protracted
-exertion to that of repose. Fasting increases the enjoyment of
-meals; and being much chilled prepares us for a higher zest in the
-accession of warmth. It is not necessary, however, in those cases,
-that the privation should amount to positive pain, in order to the
-existence of the pleasure. The enjoyment of food may be
-experienced, although the previous hunger may not be in any way
-painful: at all events, with no more pain than the certainty of
-the coming meal can effectually appease. There is still another
-class of our delights depending entirely upon previous suffering,
-as in the sudden cessation of acute pains, or the sudden relief
-from great depression. Here the rebound from one nervous condition
-to another is a stimulant of positive pleasure: constituting a
-small, but altogether inadequate, compensation for the prior
-misery. The pleasurable sensation of good health presupposes the
-opposite experience in a still larger measure. Uninterrupted
-health, though an instrumentality for working out many enjoyments,
-of itself gives no sensation."
-
-It appears to me that this passage of Mr. Bain's work
-discriminates and sets out what there is of truth in Plato's
-doctrine about the pure and painless pleasures. In his first
-volume (The Senses and the Intellect) Mr. Bain has laid down and
-explained the great fundamental fact of the system, that it
-includes spontaneous sources of activity; which, after repose and
-nourishment, require to be exerted, and afford a certain pleasure
-in the course of being exerted. There is no antecedent pain to be
-relieved: but privation (which is only a grade and variety of
-pain, and sometimes considerable pain) is felt if the exertion be
-hindered. This doctrine of spontaneous activity, employed by Mr.
-Bain successfully to explain a large variety of mental phenomena,
-is an important and valuable extension of that which Aristotle
-lays down in the Ethics, that pleasure is an accessory or adjunct
-of [Greek: e)ne/rgeia a)nempo/distos (e)ne/rgeia te=s kata\
-phu/sin e(/xeos] Eth. N. vii. 13, 1153, a. 15), without any view
-to obtain any separate extraneous pleasure or to relieve any
-separate extraneous pain ([Greek: kath' au(ta\s d' ei)si\n
-ai(retai/, a)ph' o)=n mede\n e)pizetei=tai para\ te\n
-e)ne/rgeian], E. N. x. 6, 1176, b. 6).]
-
-[Footnote 132: Plato, Philebus, p. 51 A. [Greek: pro\s to\ tina\s
-e(dona\s ei)=nai dokou/sas, ou)/sas d' ou)damo=s], &c. [Greek: to\
-phaino/menon a)ll' ou)k o)/n], p. 42 C, which last sentence is
-better explained (I think) in the note of Dr. Badham than in that
-of Mr. Poste.
-
-Mr. Poste observes justly, in his note on p. 40 C:--"The falsely
-anticipated pleasure in mistaken Hope may be called, as it is here
-called, False Pleasure. This is, however, an inaccurate
-expression. It is not the Pleasure, but the Imagination of it
-(_i.e._ the Imagination or Opinion) that is false. Sokrates
-therefore does not dwell upon this point, though Protarchus allows
-the expression to pass." The last phrase of the passage which I
-have thus transcribed ("Sokrates _therefore_ does not dwell upon
-this point") is less accurate than that which precedes: for it
-seems to imply that the Sokrates of Philebus _admits_ the
-inaccuracy of the expression, which seems to me not borne out by
-the text of the dialogue. Both here and elsewhere in the dialogue,
-the doctrine, that many pleasures are false, is maintained by
-Sokrates distinctly--[Greek: to\ e(/desthai] is put upon the same
-footing as [Greek: to\ doxa/zein], which may be either [Greek:
-a)letho=s] or [Greek: pseudo=s].
-
-When Sokrates (p. 37 B) puts the question, "You admit that [Greek:
-do/xa] may be either [Greek: a)lethe\s] or [Greek: pseude/s]: how
-then can you argue that [Greek: e(done/] must be always [Greek:
-a)lethe/s]?" the answer is, that pleasure is not, if we speak
-correctly, either true or false: neither one predicate nor the
-other is properly applicable to it: we can only so apply them by a
-metaphor, altogether misleading in philosophical reasoning. When
-Sokrates further argues (37 D), "You admit that some qualifying
-predicates may be applied to pleasures and pain, great or small,
-durable or transient, &c. You admit that an opinion may be correct
-or mistaken in its object, and when it is the latter you call it
-_false_: why is not the pleasure which accompanies a false opinion
-to be called false also?" Protarchus refuses distinctly to admit
-this, saying, "I have already affirmed that on that supposition
-the _opinion_ is false: but no man will call the _pleasure_ false"
-(p. 38 A).]
-
-[Side-note: Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the
-Absolute--Pleasures which he admits to be true--and why.]
-
-What seems present to the mind of Plato in this doctrine is the
-antithesis between the absolute and the relative. He will allow
-reality only to the absolute: the relative he considers (herein
-agreeing with the Eleates) to be all seeming and illusion. Thus
-when he comes to describe the character of those few pleasures
-which he admits to be true, we find him dwelling upon their
-absolute nature. 1. The pleasures derived from perfect geometrical
-figures: the exact straight line, square, cube, circle, &c.: which
-figures are always beautiful _per se_, not by comparison or in
-relation with any thing else:[133] and "which have pleasures of
-their own, noway analogous to those of scratching" (_i. e._, not
-requiring to be preceded by the discomfort of an itching surface).
-2. The pleasures derived from certain colours beautiful in
-themselves: which are beautiful always, not merely when seen in
-contrast with some other colours. 3. The pleasures of hearing
-simple sounds, beautiful in and by themselves, with whatever other
-sounds they may be connected. 4. The pleasures of sweet smells,
-which are pleasurable though not preceded by uneasiness. 5. The
-pleasures of mathematical studies: these studies do not derive
-their pleasurable character from satisfying any previous uneasy
-appetite, nor do they leave behind them any pain if they happen to
-be forgotten.[134]
-
-[Footnote 133: Plato, Philebus, p. 51 C. [Greek: tau=ta ga\r ou)k
-ei)=nai pro/s ti kala\ le/go, katha/per a)/lla, a)ll' a)ei\ kala\
-kath' au(ta\ pephuke/nai, kai/ tinas e(dona\s oi)kei/as e)/chein,
-ou)de\n tai=s to=n kne/seon prospherei=s.]
-
-51 D: [Greek: ta\s to=n phono=n ta\s lei/as kai\ lampra/s, ta\s
-e(/n ti katharo\n i(ei/sas me/los, ou) pro\s e(/teron kala\s a)ll'
-au)ta\s kath' au(ta\s ei)=nai, kai\ tou/ton xumphu/tous e(dona\s
-e(pome/nas.]]
-
-[Footnote 134: Plato, Philebus, p. 62 B.
-
-We may illustrate the doctrine of the Philebus about pleasures and
-pains, by reference to a dictum of Sokrates quoted in the
-Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 13).
-
-Some person complained to Sokrates that he had lost his
-appetite--that he no longer ate with any pleasure ([Greek: o(/ti
-a)edo=s e)/sthioi])--"The physician Akumenus (so replied Sokrates) teaches
-us a good remedy in such a case. Leave off eating: after you have
-left off, you will come back into a more pleasurable, easy, and
-healthful condition."
-
-Now let us suppose the like complaint to be addressed to the
-Platonic Sokrates. What would have been _his_ answer?
-
-The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have regarded the complainant
-as suffering under a misfortune, and would have tried to suggest
-some remedy: either the prescription of Akumenus, or any other
-more promising that he could think of. The Sokrates of the Phaedon,
-on the contrary, would have congratulated him on the improvement
-in his condition, inasmuch as the misguiding and degrading
-ascendancy, exercised by his body over his mind, was suppressed in
-one of its most influential channels: just as Kephalus, in the
-Republic (i. 329), is made to announce it as one of the blessings
-of old age, that the sexual appetite has left him. The Sokrates of
-the Philebus, also, would have treated the case as one for
-congratulation, but he would have assigned a different reason. He
-would have replied: "The pleasures of eating are altogether false.
-You never really had any pleasure in eating. If you believed
-yourself to have any, you were under an illusion. You have reason
-to rejoice that this illusion has now passed away: and to rejoice
-the more, because you have come a step nearer to the most divine
-scheme of life."
-
-Speusippus (the nephew and successor of Plato), if he had been
-present, would have re-assured the complainant in a manner equally
-decided. He would have said nothing, however, about the difference
-between true and false pleasures: he would have acknowledged them
-all as true, and denounced them all as mischievous. He would have
-said (see Aul. Gell. ix. 5): "The condition which you describe is
-one which I greatly envy. Pleasure and Pain are both, alike and
-equally, forms of Evil. I eat, to relieve the pain of hunger: but
-unfortunately, I cannot do so without experiencing some pleasure;
-and I thus incur evil in the other and opposite form. I am ashamed
-of this, because I am still kept far off from Good, or the point
-of neutrality: but I cannot help myself. _You_ are more fortunate:
-you avert one evil, _pain_, without the least alloy of the other
-evil, _pleasure_: what you attain is thus pure Good. I hope your
-condition may long continue, and I should be glad to come into it
-myself."
-
-Not only the sincere pleasure-haters, but also other theorists
-indicated by Aristotle, would have warmly applauded this pure
-ethical doctrine of Speusippus; not from real agreement with it,
-but in order to edify the audience. They would say to one another
-aside: "This is not true; but we must do all we can to make people
-believe it. Since every one is too fond of pleasures, and suffers
-himself to be enslaved by them, we must pull in the contrary
-direction, in order that we may thereby bring people into the
-middle line." (Aristot. Eth. Nikom. x. 1, 1172, a. 30.)
-
-It deserves to be remarked that Aristotle, in alluding to these
-last theorists, disapproves their scheme of Ethical Fictions, or
-of falsifying theory in order to work upon men's minds by edifying
-imposture; while Plato approves and employs this scheme in the
-Republic. Aristotle even recognises it as a fault in various
-persons, that they take too little delight in bodily
-pleasures--that a man is [Greek: toiou=tos oi(=os e(=tton e)\ dei=
-toi=s somatikoi=s chai/ron] (Ethic. Nikom. vii. 11, 1151, b. 24).]
-
-These few are all the varieties of pleasure which Plato admits as
-true: they are alleged as cases of the absolutely pleasurable
-([Greek: Au)to-e(du/])--that which is pleasurable _per se_, and
-always, without relation to any thing else, without dependence on
-occasion or circumstance, and without any antecedent or
-concomitant pain. All other pleasures are pleasurable relatively
-to some antecedent pain, or to some contrasting condition, with
-which they are compared: accordingly Plato considers them as
-false, unreal, illusory: pleasures and not pleasures at once, and
-not more one than the other.[135] Herein he conforms to the
-Eleatic or Parmenidean view, according to which the relative is
-altogether falsehood and illusion: an intermediate stage between
-Ens and Non-Ens, belonging as much to the first as to the last.
-
-[Footnote 135: Compare, respecting this Platonic view, Republic,
-v. pp. 478-479, and pp. 583-585, where Plato contrasts the [Greek:
-panalethe\s] or [Greek: gnesi/a e(done/], which arises from the
-acquisition of knowledge (when the mind nourishes itself with real
-essence), with the [Greek: no/the] (p. 587 B) or [Greek:
-e)skiagrapheme/ne e(done/, ei)/dolon te=s a)lethou=s e(done=s],
-arising from the pursuits of wealth, power, and other objects of
-desire.
-
-The comic poet Alexis adverts to this Platonic doctrine of the
-absolutely pleasurable, here, there, and everywhere,--[Greek: to\
-d' e(du\ pa/ntos e(du/, ka)kei= ka)ntha/de], Athenae. viii. 354;
-Meineke, Com. Frag. p. 453.
-
-In the Phaedrus (258 E), we find this same class of pleasures,
-those which cannot be enjoyed unless preceded by some pain,
-asserted to be called _for that reason slavish_ ([Greek:
-a)ndrapodo/deis]), and depreciated as worthless. Nearly all the
-pleasures connected with the body are said to belong to this
-class; but those of rhetoric and dialectic are exempted from it,
-and declared to be of superior order.
-
-The pleasure of gaining a victory in the stadium at Olympia was
-ranked by Greeks generally as the maximum of pleasure: and we find
-the Platonic Sokrates (Republ. v. 465 D) speaks in concurrence
-with this opinion. But this pleasure ought in Plato's view to pass
-for a false pleasure; since it was invariably preceded by the most
-painful, long-continued training.
-
-The reasoning of Sokrates in the Philebus (see especially pp.
-46-47) against the intense and extatic pleasures, as being never
-pure, but always adulterated by accompanying pain, misfortune,
-disappointment, &c., is much the same as that of Epikurus and his
-followers afterwards. The case is nowhere more forcibly put than
-in the fourth book of Lucretius (1074 seq.): where that poet
-deprecates passionate love, and points out that pure or unmixed
-pleasure belongs only to the man of sound and healthy reason.]
-
-[Side-note: Plato could not have defended this small list of
-Pleasures, upon his own admission, against his opponents--the
-Pleasure-haters, who disallowed pleasures altogether.]
-
-The catalogue of pleasures recognised by Plato being so narrow
-(and much of them attainable only by a few persons), the amount of
-difference is really very small between him and his
-pleasure-hating opponents, who disallowed pleasure altogether.
-But small as the catalogue is, he could not consistently have defended
-it against them, upon his own principles. His opponents could have
-shown him that a considerable portion of it must be discarded, if
-we are to disallow all pleasures which are preceded by or
-intermingled with pain--or which are sometimes stronger, sometimes
-feebler, according to the relations of contrast or similarity with
-other concomitant sensations. Mathematical study certainly, far
-from being all pleasure and no pain, demands an irksome
-preparatory training (which is numbered among the miseries of life
-in the Axiochus[136]), succeeded by long laborious application,
-together with a fair share of vexatious puzzle and disappointment.
-The love of knowledge grows up by association (like the thirst for
-money or power), and includes an uncomfortable consciousness of
-ignorance: nay, it is precisely this painful consciousness which
-the Sokratic method was expressly intended to plant forcibly in
-the student's mind, as an indispensable antecedent condition.
-Requital doubtless comes in time; but the outlay is not the less
-real, and is quite sufficient to disentitle the study from being
-counted as a true pleasure, in the Platonic sense. Nor could
-Plato, upon his own principles, defend the pleasures of sight,
-sound, and smell. For though he might justly contend that there
-were some objects originally agreeable to these senses, yet all
-these objects will appear more or less agreeable, according to the
-accompanying contrasts under which they are presented, while, in
-particular states of the organ, they will not appear agreeable at
-all. Now such variability of estimate is among the grounds alleged
-by Plato for declaring pleasures to be false.[137]
-
-[Footnote 136: See the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Axiochus, pp.
-366-367. Compare Republic, vii. 526 C, vi. 504 C.
-
-The Sokratic method, in creating consciousness of ignorance, is
-exhibited not less in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (iv. 2, 40) than
-in various Platonic dialogues, Alkibiades I., Theaetetus, &c. We
-read it formally proclaimed by Sokrates in the Platonic Apology.
-
-Aristotle repeats the assertion contained in the Philebus about
-the list of painless pleasures--[Greek: a)/lupoi ga/r ei)sin ai(/
-te mathematikai\], &c. (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2, 1173, b. 16; 7, 1177,
-a. 25.) He himself says in another place (vii. 13, 1153, a. 20)
-that [Greek: to\ theorei=n] sometimes hurts the health, and if he
-had examined the lives of mathematicians, especially that of
-Kepler, he would hardly have imagined that mathematical
-investigations have no pains attached to them. He probably means
-that they are not preceded by painful appetites such as hunger and
-thirst. But they are preceded by acquired impulses or desires,
-which in reference to the present question are upon same footing
-as the natural appetites. A healthy and temperate man, leading a
-regular life and in easy circumstances, knows little of hunger and
-thirst as pains: he knows them only as appetites which give relish
-to his periodical meals. It is only when this periodical
-satisfaction is withheld that his appetite grows to a painful and
-distressing height. So too the [Greek: philomathe/s]; his appetite
-for study, when regularly gratified to an extent consistent with
-health and other considerations, is not painful; but it will rise
-to the height of a most distressing privation if he be debarred
-from gratifying it, excluded from books and papers, disturbed by
-noises and intrusions. Kepler, if interdicted from pursuing his
-calculations, would have been miserable. Jason of Pherae was heard
-to say that he felt hungry so long as he was not in possession of
-supreme power--[Greek: peine=|n, o(/te me\ turannoi=], Aristot.
-Politic. iii. 4, 1277, a. 24; thus intimating that the acquired
-appetite of ambition had in his mind reached the same intensity as
-the natural appetite of hunger.]
-
-[Footnote 137: Plato, Philebus, pp. 41-42. In the Phaedon (p. 60 B)
-Sokrates makes a striking remark on the inseparable conjunction of
-pleasure with pain generally.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these
-Pleasure-haters.]
-
-How little the Sokrates of this dialogue differs, at the bottom,
-from the fastidious pleasure-haters, may be seen by the passage in
-which he proclaims that the life of intelligence alone, without
-the smallest intermixture of pleasure or pain, is the really
-perfect life: that the Gods and the divine Kosmos have no
-enjoyment and no suffering.[138] The emotional department of human
-nature is here regarded as a degenerate and obstructive appendage:
-so that it was an inauspicious act of the sons of the Demiurgus
-(in the Timaeus[139]) when they attached the spherical head (the
-miniature parallel of the Kosmos, with the rotatory movements of
-the immortal soul in the brain within) at the summit of a bodily
-trunk and limbs, containing the thoracic and abdominal cavities:
-the thoracic cavity embodying a second and inferior soul with the
-energetic emotions and passions--the abdominal region serving as
-lodgment to a third yet baser soul with the appetites. From this
-conjunction sprang the corrupting influence of emotional impulse,
-depriving man of his close parallelism with the Kosmos, and
-poisoning the life of pure exclusive Intelligence--regular,
-unfeeling, undisturbed. The Pleasure-haters, together with
-Speusippus and others, declared that pleasure and pain were both
-alike enemies to be repelled, and that neutrality was the
-condition to be aimed at.[140] And such appears to me to be the
-drift of Plato's reasonings in the Philebus: though he relaxes
-somewhat the severity of his requirements in favour of a few
-pleasures, towards which he feels the same indulgence as towards
-Homer in the Republic.[141] When Ethics are discussed, not upon
-principles of their own ([Greek: oi)kei=ai a)rchai\]), but upon
-principles of Kosmology or Ontology, no emotion of any kind can
-find consistent place.
-
-[Footnote 138: Plato, Philebus, p. 33 B.]
-
-[Footnote 139: Plato, Timaeus, pp. 43 A, 44 D, 69 D, 70-71. The
-same fundamental idea though embodied in a different illustration,
-appears also in the Phaedon; where Sokrates depicts life as a
-period of imprisonment, to which the immortal rational soul is
-condemned, in a corrupt and defective body, with perpetual stream
-of disturbing sensations and emotions (Phaedon, pp. 64-65).
-
-Aristotle observes, De Anima, i. p. 407, b. 2:--[Greek: e)pi/ponon
-de\ kai\ to\ memi/chthai to=| so/mati me\ duna/menon
-a)poluthe=nai, kai\ prose/ti pheukto/n, ei)/per be/ltion to=| no=|
-me\ meta\ so/matos ei)=nai, katha/per ei)/othe/ te le/gesthai kai\
-polloi=s sundokei=.]
-
-We find in one of the Fragments of Cicero, quoted by Augustin from
-the lost work Hortensius (p. 485, ed. Orelli):--"An vero, inquit,
-voluptates corporis expetendae, quae vere et graviter dictae sunt a
-Platone illecebrae et escae malorum? Quis autem bona mente praeditus,
-non mallet nullas omnino nobis a natura voluptates esse datas?"
-This is the same doctrine as what is ascribed to Speusippus.]
-
-[Footnote 140: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. vii. 14, p. 1153, b. 5; x.
-2, p. 1173, a. 8; Aulus Gellius, ix. 5. "Speusippus vetusque omnis
-Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter
-se: bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret."
-
-Compare Plato, Philebus, pp. 43 D-E, 33 B.
-
-To whom does Plato here make allusion, under the general title of
-the Fastidious ([Greek: oi( duscherei=s]) Pleasure-haters?
-Schleiermacher (note to his translation, p. 487), Stallbaum, and
-most critics down to Dr. Badham inclusive, are of opinion, that he
-alludes to Antisthenes--among whose _dicta_ we certainly read
-declarations expressing positive aversion to pleasure--[Greek:
-manei/en ma=llon e)\ e(sthei/en] Diog. L. vi. 3; compare ix. 101,
-and Winckelmann, Frag. Antisthen. xii. Mr. Poste, on the contrary,
-thinks it improbable that Antisthenes is alluded to (see p. 80 of
-his Philebus). I confess that I think so too. Mr. Poste points out
-that these [Greek: duscherei=s] are characterised by Plato (p. 44
-B), as [Greek: ma/la deinou\s legome/nous peri\ phu/sin]:--whereas
-we are informed that speculations on [Greek: phu/sis] were
-neglected by Antisthenes, who confined his attention to [Greek:
-ta\ e)thika/]. This is a strong reason for believing that
-Antisthenes cannot be here meant; and there are some other reasons
-also.
-
-First, in describing the [Greek: duscherei=s], Plato notes it as
-one among their attributes, that they _hold in thorough
-detestation the indecorous pleasures_ ([Greek: ta\s to=n
-a)schemo/non e(dona/s, a(\s ou(\s ei)/pomen duscherei=s misou=si
-pantelo=s], p. 46 A). Now this is surely not likely to have been
-affirmed about Antisthenes. It was the conspicuous characteristic
-of the Cynic sect, begun by Antisthenes, and carried still farther
-by his pupil Diogenes, that they reduced to its minimum the
-distinction between the decorous and the indecorous.
-
-Next, we may observe that these [Greek: duscherei=s], whoever they
-were, are spoken of with much respect by Plato, even while he
-combats their doctrine (p. 44 C). I think it not likely that he
-would have spoken thus of Antisthenes. We are told that there
-prevailed between the two a great and reciprocal acrimony. And
-this sentiment is manifested in the Sophistes (p. 251 B), where
-the opponents whom Plato is refuting are described with the most
-contemptuous bitterness--and where Schleiermacher, and the critics
-generally, declare that he alludes to Antisthenes. The passage in
-the Sophistes represents, in my judgment, the probable sentiment
-of Plato towards Antisthenes: the passage in the Philebus is at
-variance with it.
-
-I imagine that the [Greek: duscherei=s] to whom Plato makes
-allusion in the Philebus, are the persons from whom his nephew and
-successor Speusippus derived the doctrine declared in the first
-portion of this note. The "vetus omnia Academia" of Aulus Gellius
-is an exaggerated phrase; but many of the old Academy, or
-companions of Plato, probably held the theory that pleasure was
-only one form of evil,--especially the pythagorising _Platonici_,
-adopting the tendencies of Plato himself in his old age. That
-Speusippus was among the borrowers from the Pythagoreans, we know
-from Aristotle (Eth. Nikom. i. 4, 1096, b. 8).
-
-Now the Pythagorean canon of life, like the Orphic (both of them
-supposed by Herodotus to be derived in great part from Egypt--ii.
-81), was distinguished by a multiplicity of abstinences, disgusts,
-antipathies, in respect to alimentation and other physical
-circumstances of life--which were held to be of the most
-imperative force and necessity; so that offences against them were
-of all others the most intolerable. A remarkable fragment of the
-[Greek: Kre=tes] of Euripides (ed. Dind., vol. ii. p. 912)
-describes a variety of this _purism_ analogous to the Orphic
-and Pythagorean:--[Greek: Pa/lleuka d' e)/chon ei)/mata, pheu/go
-ge/nesi/n te bro/ton, kai\ nekrothe/kes ou) chrimpto/menos; te\n
-t' e)mpsu/chon bro=sin e)desto=n pephu/lagmai.] Compare Eurip.
-Hippol. 957; Alexis Comicus, ap. Athenae, iv. p. 161. See the work
-of M. Alfred Maury, Histoire des Religions de la Grece Antique,
-vol. iii. pp. 368-384.
-
-It appears to me that the [Greek: duscherei=s], to whom Plato
-alludes in the Philebus, were most probably pythagorising friends
-of his own; who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour,
-distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies
-towards [Greek: ta\s e(dona\s ta\s to=n a)schemo/non]. Plato
-speaks of them with respect; partly because ethical theorists, who
-denounce _pleasure_, are usually characterised in reverential
-terms, as persons of exalted principle, even by those who think
-their reasonings inconclusive; partly because these men only
-pushed the consequences of Plato's own reasonings, rather farther
-than Plato himself did. In fact they were more consistent than
-Plato was: for the principles laid down in the Philebus, if
-carried out strictly, would go to the exclusion of all
-pleasures--not less of the few which he tolerates, than of the many
-which he banishes.
-
-These pythagorising _Platonici_ might well be termed [Greek:
-deinoi\ peri\ phu/sin]. They paid much attention to the
-interpretation of nature, though they did so according to a
-numerical and geometrical symbolism.]
-
-[Footnote 141: Plato, Republic, x. p. 607.]
-
-[Side-note: Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics--defect of
-the Philebus.]
-
-In my judgment, this is one main defect pervading the Platonic
-Philebus--the forced conjunction between Kosmology and Ethics--the
-violent pressure employed to force Pleasures and Pains into the
-same classifying framework as cognitive Beliefs--the true and the
-false. In respect to the various pleasures, the dialogue contains
-many excellent remarks, the value of which is diminished by the
-purpose to which they are turned.[142] One of Plato's main
-batteries is directed against the intense, extatic, momentary
-enjoyments, which he sets in contrast against the gentle, serene,
-often renewable.[143] That the former are often purchasable only
-at the cost of a distempered condition of body and mind, which
-ought to render them objects shunned rather than desired by a
-reasonable man--this is a doctrine important to inculcate: but
-nothing is gained by applying the metaphorical predicate _false_,
-either to them, or to the other classes of mixed pleasures, &c.,
-which Plato discountenances under the same epithet. By thus
-condemning pleasures in wholesale and in large groups, we not only
-set aside the innocuous as well as others, but we also leave
-unapplied, or only half applied, that principle of Measure or
-Calculation which Plato so often extols as the main item in Summum
-Bonum.
-
-[Footnote 142: We read in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (Book
-i. ch. 7, pp. 168-170) some very good remarks on the erroneous and
-equivocal assertions which identify Truth and Good--a thesis on
-which various Platonists have expended much eloquence. Dr.
-Campbell maintains the just distinction between the Emotions and
-Will on one side, and the Understanding on the other.
-
-"Passion" (he says) "is the mover to action, Reason is the guide.
-Good is the object of the Will; Truth the object of the
-Understanding."]
-
-[Footnote 143: Plato, Philebus, p. 45 D. [Greek: e)n u(/brei
-mei/zous e(dona/s, ou) plei/ous le/go], &c.
-
-So in the Republic, also, [Greek: e(done\ u(perba/llousa] is
-declared to be inconsistent with [Greek: sophrosu/ne] (iii. 402
-E).]
-
-[Side-note: Directive sovereignty of Measure--how explained and
-applied in the Protagoras.]
-
-In this dialogue as well as others, Measure is thus exalted, and
-exalted with emphasis, at the final conclusion: but it is far less
-clearly and systematically applied, as far as human beings are
-concerned, than in the Protagoras. The Sokrates of the Protagoras
-does not recognise any pleasures as false--nor any class of
-pleasures as absolutely unmixed with pain: he does not set
-pleasure in pointed opposition to the avoidance of pain, nor the
-intense momentary pleasures to the gentle and more durable. He
-considers that the whole course of life is a perpetual
-intermixture of pleasures and pains, in proportions variable and
-to a certain extent modifiable: that each item in both lists has
-its proper value, commensurable with the others; that the purpose
-of a well-ordered life consists, in rendering the total sum of
-pleasure as great, and the total sum of pain as small, as each
-man's case admits: that avoidance of pain and attainment of
-pleasure are co-ordinate branches of this one comprehensive End.
-He farther declares that men are constantly liable to err by false
-remembrances, estimates, and comparisons, of pleasures and pains
-past--by false expectations of pleasures and pains to come: that
-the whole security of life lies in keeping clear of such error--in
-right comparison of these items and right choice between them:
-that therefore the full sovereign controul of each man's life must
-be vested in the Measuring Science or Calculating
-Intelligence.[144] Not only all comprehensive sovereignty, but
-also ever-active guidance, is postulated for this Measuring
-Science: while at the same time its special function, and the
-items to which it applies, are more clearly defined than in any
-other Platonic dialogue. If a man be so absorbed by the idea of an
-intense momentary pleasure or pain, as to forget or disregard
-accompaniments or consequences of an opposite nature, greatly
-overbalancing it--this is an error committed from default of the
-Measuring Science: but it is only one among many errors arising
-from the like deficiency. Nothing is required but the Measuring
-Science or Intelligence, to enable a man to make the best of those
-circumstances in which he may be placed: this is true of all men,
-under every variety of place and circumstances. Measure is not the
-Good, but the one condition which is constant as well as
-indispensable to any tolerable approach towards Good.
-
-[Footnote 144: This argument is carried on by Sokrates from p. 351
-until the close of the Protagoras, p. 357 A. [Greek: e)peide\ de\
-e(done=s te kai\ lu/pes e)n o)rthe=| _te=| ai(re/sei e)pha/ne
-e(mi=n e( soteri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa_, tou= te ple/onos kai\
-e)la/ttonos kai\ mei/zonos kai\ smikroterou= kai\ por)r(ote/ro
-kai\ e)ggute/ro, a)=ra pro=ton me\n _ou) metretike\ phai/netai_,
-u(perbole=s te kai\ e)ndei/as ou)=sa kai\ i)so/tetos pro\s
-a)lle/las ske/psis? . . . E)pei\ de\ metretike/, a)na/gke| de/pou
-te/chne kai\ e)piste/me.]
-
-Yet Plato in the Philebus, imputing to the Hedonistic theory that
-it sets aside all idea of measure, regulation, limit, advances as
-an argument in the case, that Pleasure and Pain in their own
-nature have no limit (Philebus, pp. 25-26 B, 27 E. Compare Dr.
-Badham's note, p. 30 of his edition).
-
-The imputation is unfounded, and the argument without application,
-in regard to the same theory as expounded by Sokrates in the
-Protagoras.
-
-At the end of the Philebus (p. 67 B) Plato makes Sokrates exclaim,
-"We cannot put Pleasure first among the items of Good, even though
-all oxen, horses, and other beasts affirm it". This rhetorical
-flourish is altogether misplaced in the Philebus: for Plato had
-already specified it as one of the conditions of the Good, That it
-must be acceptable and must give satisfaction to all animals, and
-even to all plants (pp. 22 B, 60 C), as well as to men.]
-
-[Side-note: How explained in Philebus--no statement to what items
-it is applied.]
-
-In the Philebus, too, Measure--The Exact Quantum--The Exact
-Moment--are proclaimed as the chief item in the complex
-called--The Good.[145] But to what Items does Sokrates intend the
-measure to be applied? Not certainly to pleasures: the comparison of
-quantity between one pleasure and another is discarded as useless
-or misleading, and the comparison of quality alone is
-admitted--_i. e._, true and false: the large majority of human pleasures
-being repudiated in the lump as false, and a small remnant only
-being tolerated, on the allegation that they are true. Nor, again,
-is the measure applied to pains: for though Plato affirms that a
-life altogether without pains (as without pleasures) would be the
-truly divine Ideal, yet he never tells us that the Measuring
-Intelligence is to be made available in the comparison and choice
-of pains, and in avoidance of the greater by submitting to the
-less. Lastly, when we look at the concession made in this dialogue
-to Gorgias and his art, we find that Plato no longer claims for
-his Good or Measure any directive function, or any paramount
-influence, as to utility, profit, reputation, or the greater ends
-which men usually pursue in life:[146] he claims for it only the
-privilege of satisfying the aspiration for truth, in minds wherein
-such aspiration is preponderant over all others.
-
-[Footnote 145: Plato, Philebus, p. 66 A. [Greek: me/tron--to\
-me/trion--to\ kai/rion].]
-
-[Footnote 146: Plato, Philebus, p. 58 B-D.]
-
-Comparing the Philebus with the Protagoras, therefore, we see that
-though, in both, Measuring Science or Intelligence is proclaimed
-as supreme, the province assigned to it in the Philebus is
-comparatively narrow. Moreover the practical side or activities of
-life (which are prominent in the Protagoras) appear in the
-Philebus thrust into a corner; where scanty room is found for them
-on ground nearly covered by the speculative, or theorising,
-truth-seeking, pursuits. Practical reason is forced into the same
-categories as theoretical.
-
-The classification of _true_ and _false_ is (as I have already
-remarked) unsuitable for pleasures and pains. We have now to see
-how Plato applies it to cognitions, to which it really belongs.
-
-[Side-note: Classification of true and false--how Plato applies it
-to Cognitions.]
-
-The highest of these Cognitions is set apart as Dialectic or
-Ontology: the Object of which is, Ens or Entia, eternal, ever the
-same and unchangeable, ever unmixed with each other: while the
-corresponding Subject is, Reason, Intelligence, Wisdom, by which
-it is apprehended and felt. In this Science alone reside perfect
-Truth and Purity. Where the Objects are shifting, variable, mixed
-or confounded together, there Reason cannot apply herself; no pure
-or exact truth can be attained.[147] These unchangeable Entities
-are what in other dialogues Plato terms Ideas or Forms--a term
-scarcely used in the Philebus.
-
-[Footnote 147: Plato, Philebus, p. 59 C. [Greek: o(s e)\ peri\
-e)kei=na e)/sth' e(mi=n to/ te be/baion kai\ to\ katharo\n kai\
-to\ a)lethe\s kai\ o(\ de\ le/gomen ei)likrine/s, peri\ ta\ a)ei\
-kata\ ta\ au)ta\ o(sau/tos a)mikto/tata e)/chonta--e)\ deute/ros
-e)kei/non o(/ ti ma/lista/ e)sti xuggene/s; ta\ d' a)/lla pa/nta
-deu/tera/ te kai\ u(/stera lekte/on.] 62 A: [Greek: phrono=n
-a)/nthropos _au(te=s peri\ dikaiosu/nes_, o(/, ti e)/sti, kai\
-lo/gon e)/chon e(po/menon to=| noei=n . . . ku/klou me\n kai\
-sphai/ras au)te=s te=s thei/as to\n lo/gon e)/chon.]]
-
-Though pure truth belongs exclusively to Dialectic and to the
-Objects thereof, there are other Sciences which, having more or
-less of affinity to Dialectic, may thus be classified according to
-the degree of such affinity. Mathematics approach most nearly to
-Dialectic. Under Mathematics are included the Sciences or Arts of
-numbering, measuring, weighing--Arithmetic, Metretic,
-Static--which are applied to various subordinate arts, and impart to
-these latter all the scientific guidance and certainty which is found
-in them. Without Arithmetic, the subordinate arts would be little
-better than vague guesswork or knack. But Plato distinguishes two
-varieties of Arithmetic and Metretic: one purely theoretical,
-prosecuted by philosophers, and adapted to satisfy the love of
-abstract truth--the other applied to some department of practice,
-and employed by the artist as a guide to the execution of his
-work. Theoretical Arithmetic is characterised by this feature,
-that it assumes each unit to be equal, like, and interchangeable
-with every other unit: while practical Arithmetic adds together
-concrete realities, whether like and equal to each other or
-not.[148]
-
-[Footnote 148: Plato, Philebus, p. 56 E.]
-
-It is thus that the theoretical geometer and arithmetician, though
-not coming up to the full and pure truth of Dialectic, is
-nevertheless nearer to it than the carpenter or the ship-builder,
-who apply the measure to material objects. But the carpenter,
-ship-builder, architect, &c., do really apply measure, line, rule,
-&c.: they are therefore nearer to truth than other artists, who
-apply no measure at all. To this last category belong the musical
-composer, the physician, the husbandman, the pilot, the military
-commander, neither of whom can apply to their processes either
-numeration or measurement: all of them are forced to be contented
-with vague estimate, conjecture, a practised eye and ear.[149]
-
-[Footnote 149: Plato, Philebus, p. 56 A-B.]
-
-[Side-note: Valuable principles of this classification--difference
-with other dialogues.]
-
-The foregoing classification of Sciences and Arts is among the
-most interesting points in the Philebus. It coincides to a great
-degree with that which we read in the sixth and seventh books of
-the Republic, though it is also partially different: it differs
-too in some respects from doctrines advanced in other dialogues.
-Thus we find here (in the Philebus) that the science or art of the
-physician, the pilot, the general, &c., is treated as destitute of
-measure and as an aggregate of unscientific guesses: whereas in
-the Gorgias[150] and elsewhere, these are extolled as genuine
-arts, and are employed to discredit Rhetoric by contrast. Again,
-all these arts are here placed lower in the scientific scale than
-the occupations of the carpenter or the ship-builder, who possess
-and use some material measures. But these latter, in the
-Republic,[151] are dismissed with the disparaging epithet of
-snobbish ([Greek: ba/nausoi]) and deemed unworthy of
-consideration.
-
-[Footnote 150: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 501 A, 518 A. Compare Republic,
-i. pp. 341-342.]
-
-[Footnote 151: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 522 B.]
-
-Dialectic appears here exalted to the same pre-eminence which is
-assigned to it in the Republic--as the energy of the pure
-Intellect, dealing with those permanent real Essences which are
-the objects of Intellect alone, intelligible only and not visible.
-The distinction here drawn by Plato between the theoretical and
-practical arithmetic and geometry, compared with numeration or
-mensuration of actual objects of sense--is also remarkable in two
-ways: first, as it marks his departure from the historical
-Sokrates, who recognised the difference between the two, but
-discountenanced the theoretical as worthless:[152] next as it
-brings clearly to view, the fundamental assumption or hypothesis
-upon which abstract arithmetic proceeds--the concept of units all
-perfectly like and equal. That this _is_ an assumption (always
-departing more or less from the facts of sense)--and that upon its
-being conceded depends the peculiar certainty and accuracy of
-arithmetical calculation--was an observation probably then made
-for the first time; and not unnecessary to be made even now, since
-it is apt to escape attention. It is enunciated clearly both here
-and in the Republic.[153]
-
-[Footnote 152: Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7, 2-8. The contrast drawn
-in this chapter of the Memorabilia appears to me to coincide
-pretty exactly with that which is taken in the Philebus, though
-the preference is reversed. Dr. Badham (p. 78) and Mr. Poste (pp.
-106-113) consider Plato as pointing to a contrast between pure and
-applied Mathematics: which I do not understand to be his meaning.
-The distinction taken by Aristotle in the passage cited by Mr.
-Poste is different, and does really designate Pure and Applied
-Mathematics. Mr. Poste would have found a better comparison in
-Ethic. Nikom. i. 7, 1098, a. 29.]
-
-[Footnote 153: Plato, Philebus, p. 56 E. [Greek: oi( d' ou)k a)/n
-pote au)toi=s sunakolouthe/seian, ei) me\ mona/da mona/dos
-e(ka/stes to=n muri/on medemi/an a)/llen a)/lles diaphe/rousa/n
-tis the/sei]--where it is formally proclaimed as an assumption or
-postulate. See Republic, vii. pp. 525-526, vi. p. 510 C.
-
-Mr. John Stuart Mill thus calls attention to the same remark in
-his instructive chapters on Demonstration and Necessary Truth
-(System of Logic, Book ii. ch. vi. sect. 3).
-
-"The inductions of Arithmetic are of two sorts: first, those that
-we have just expounded, such as One and One are Two, Two and One
-are Three, &c., which may be called the definitions of the various
-numbers, in the improper or geometrical sense of the word
-Definition; and, secondly, the two following Axioms. The sums of
-Equals are equal, the differences of Equals are equal.
-
-"These axioms, and likewise the so-called Definitions, are (as
-already shown) results of induction: true of all objects
-whatsoever, and as it may seem, exactly true, without the
-hypothetical assumption of unqualified truth where an
-approximation to it is all that exists. On more accurate
-investigation, however, it will be found that even in this case,
-there is one hypothetical element in the ratiocination. In all
-propositions concerning numbers a condition is implied without
-which none of them would be true, and that condition is an
-assumption which may be false. The condition is that 1 = 1: that
-all the numbers are numbers of the same or of equal units. Let
-this be doubtful, and not one of the propositions in arithmetic
-will hold true. How can we know that one pound and one pound make
-two pounds, if one of the pounds may be troy and the other
-avoirdupois? They may not make two pounds of either or of any
-weight. How can we know that a forty-horse power is always equal
-to itself, unless we assume that all horses are of equal strength?
-One actual pound weight is not exactly equal to another, nor one
-mile's length to another; a nicer balance or more exact measuring
-instruments would always detect some difference."]
-
-The long preliminary discussion of the Philebus thus brings us to
-the conclusion--That a descending scale of value, relatively to
-truth and falsehood, must be recognised in cognitions as well as
-in pleasures: many cognitions are not entirely true, but tainted
-in different degrees by error and falsehood: most pleasures also,
-instead of being true and pure, are alloyed by concomitant pains
-or delusions or both: moreover, all the intense pleasures are
-incompatible with Measure, or a fixed standard,[154] and must
-therefore be excluded from the category of Good.
-
-[Footnote 154: Plato, Philebus, pp. 52 D--57 B.]
-
-[Side-note: Close of the Philebus--Graduated elements of Good.]
-
-In arranging the quintuple scale of elements or conditions of the
-Good, Plato adopts the following descending order: I report them
-as well as I can, for I confess that I understand them very
-imperfectly.
-
-1. Measure; that which conforms to Measure and to proper season:
-with everything else analogous, which we can believe to be of
-eternal nature.--These seem to be unchangeable Forms or Ideas,
-which are here considered objectively, apart from any percipient
-Subject affected by them.[155]
-
-2. The Symmetrical, Beautiful, Perfect, Sufficient, &c.--These
-words seem to denote the successive manifestations of the same
-afore-mentioned attributes; but considered both objectively and
-subjectively, as affecting and appreciated by some percipient.
-
-3. Intelligent or Rational Mind--Here the Subject is brought in by
-itself.
-
-4. Sciences, Cognitions, Arts, Right Opinions, &c.--Here we have
-the intellectual manifestations of the Subject, but of a character
-inferior to No. 3, descending in the scale of value relatively to
-truth.
-
-5. Lastly come the small list of true and painless
-pleasures.--These, being not intellectual at all, but merely emotional
-(some as accompaniments of intellectual, others of sensible, processes),
-are farther removed from Good and Measure than even No. 4--the
-opining or uncertain phases of the intellect.[156]
-
-The four first elements belong to the Kosmos as well as to man:
-for the Kosmos has an intelligent soul. The fifth marks the
-emotional nature of man.
-
-[Footnote 155: Plato, Philebus, p. 66 A.
-
-The Appendix B, subjoined by Mr. Poste to his edition of the
-Philebus (pp. 149-165), is a very valuable Dissertation, comparing
-and explaining the abstract theories of Plato and Aristotle. He
-remarks, justly contrasting the Philebus with the Timaeus, as to
-the doctrine of Limit: "In the Philebus the limit is always
-quantitative. Quality, including all the elementary forces, is the
-substratum that has to receive the quantitative determination.
-Just, however, as Quality underlies quantity, we can conceive a
-substratum underlying quality. This Plato in the Timaeus calls the
-Vehicle or Receptacle ([Greek: to\ dektiko/n]), and Aristotle in
-his writings the primary Matter ([Greek: pro/te u(/le]). The
-Philebus, however, does not carry the analysis so far. It regards
-quality as the ultimate matter, the substratum to be moulded and
-measured out in due quantity by the quantitative limit" (p. 160).
-
-I doubt whether the Platonic idea of [Greek: to\ me/trion] is
-rightly expressed by Mr. Poste's translation--a _mean_ (p. 158).
-It rather implies, even in Politikus, p. 306, to which he refers,
-something adjusted according to a positive standard or conformable
-to an assumed measure or perfection: there being undoubtedly error
-in excess above it and error in defect below it--but the standard
-being not necessarily mid-way between the two. The Pythagoreans
-used [Greek: kairo\s] in a very large sense, describing it as the
-First Cause of Good. Proklus ad Plat. Alkib. i. p. 270-272,
-Cousin.]
-
-[Footnote 156: Neither the Introduction of Schleiermacher (p. 134
-seq.), nor the elucidation of Trendelenburg (De Philebi Consilio,
-pp. 16-23), nor the Prolegomena of Stallbaum (pp. 76-77 seq.),
-succeed in making this obscure close of the Philebus clearly
-intelligible. Stallbaum, after indicating many commentators who
-have preceded him, observes respecting the explanations which they
-have given: "Ea sunt adeo varia atque inter se diversa, ut
-tanquam adversa fronte inter ipsa pugnare dicenda sint" (p. 72).]
-
-I see no sufficient ground for the hypothesis of Stallbaum and
-some other critics, who, considering the last result abrupt and
-unsatisfactory, suspect that Plato either intended to add more, or
-did add more which has not come down to us.[157] Certainly the
-result (as in many other Platonic dialogues) is inconsiderable,
-and the instruction derivable from the dialogue must be picked out
-by the reader himself from the long train of antecedent reasoning.
-The special point emphatically brought out at the end is the
-discredit thrown upon the intense pleasures, and the exclusion of
-them from the list of constituents of Good. If among Plato's
-contemporaries who advocated the Hedonistic doctrine, there were
-any who laid their main stress upon these intense pleasures, he
-may be considered to have replied to them under the name of
-Philebus. But certainly this result might have been attained with
-a smaller array of preliminaries.
-
-[Footnote 157: Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 10.]
-
-[Side-note: Contrast between the Philebus and the Phaedrus, and
-Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions
-generally.]
-
-Moreover, in regard to these same intense emotions we have to
-remark that Plato in other dialogues holds a very different
-opinion respecting them--or at least respecting some of them. We
-have seen that at the close of the Philebus he connects Bonum and
-Pulchrum principally, and almost exclusively, with the Reason; but
-we find him, in the Phaedrus and Symposion, taking a different,
-indeed an opposite, view of the matter; and presenting Bonum and
-Pulchrum as objects, not of the unimpassioned and calculating
-Reason, but of ardent aspiration and even of extatic love. Reason
-is pronounced to be insufficient for attaining them, and a
-peculiar vein of inspiration a species of madness, _eo nomine_--is
-postulated in its place. The life of the philosophical aspirant is
-compared to that of the passionate lover, beginning at first with
-attachment to some beautiful youth, and rising by a gradual
-process of association, so as to transfer the same fervent
-attachment to his mental companionship, as a stimulus for
-generating intellectual sympathies and recollections of the world
-of Ideas. He is represented as experiencing in the fullest measure
-those intense excitements and disturbances which Eros alone can
-provoke.[158] It is true that Plato here repudiates sensual
-excitements. In this respect the Phaedrus and Symposion agree with
-the Philebus. But as between Reason and Emotion, they disagree
-with it altogether: for they dwell upon ideal excitements of the
-most vehement character. They describe the highest perfection of
-human nature as growing out of the better variety of madness--out
-of the glowing inspirations of Eros: a state replete with the most
-intense alternating emotions of pain and pleasure. How opposite is
-the tone of Sokrates in the Philebus, where he denounces all the
-intense pleasures as belonging to a distempered condition--as
-adulterated with pain, and as impeding the tranquil process of
-Reason--and where he tolerates only such gentle pleasures as are
-at once unmixed with pain and easily controuled by Reason! In the
-Phaedrus and Symposion, we are told that Bonum and Pulchrum are
-attainable only under the stimulus of Eros, through a process of
-emotion, feverish and extatic, with mingled pleasure and pain: and
-that they crown such aspirations, if successfully prosecuted, with
-an emotional recompense, or with pleasure so intense as to surpass
-all other pleasures. In the Philebus, Bonum and Pulchrum come
-before us as measure, proportion, seasonableness: as approachable
-only through tranquil Reason--addressing their ultimate recompense
-to Reason alone--excluding both vehement agitations and intense
-pleasures--and leaving only a corner of the mind for gentle and
-unmixed pleasures.[159]
-
-[Footnote 158: See in the Symposion the doctrines of the
-prophetess Diotima, as recited by Sokrates, pp. 204-212: also the
-Phaedrus, the second [Greek: e)gko/mion] delivered by Sokrates upon
-Eros, pp. 36-60, repeated briefly and confirmed by Sokrates, pp.
-77-78.
-
-Compare these with the latter portion of the Philebus; the
-difference of spirit and doctrine will appear very manifest.
-
-To illustrate the contrast between the Phaedrus and the Philebus,
-we may observe that the former compares the excitement and
-irritation of the inspired soul when its wings are growing to
-ascend to Bonum and Pulchrum, with the [Greek: kne=sis] or
-irritation of the gums when a child is cutting teeth--[Greek: zei=
-ou)=n e)n tou/to| o(/le kai\ a)nakeki/ei, kai\ o(/per to\ to=n
-o)dontophuou/nton pa/thos peri\ tou\s o)do/ntas gi/gnetai o(/tan
-a)/rti phuo=si kne=si/s te kai\ a)gana/ktesis peri\ ta\ ou)=la,
-tau)to\n de\ pe/ponthen e( tou= pterophuei=n a)rchome/nou psuche/;
-zei= te kai\ a)ganaktei= kai\ gargali/zetai phu/ousa ta\ ptera/]
-(Phaedrus, p. 251). These are specimens of the strong metaphors
-used by Plato to describe the emotional condition of the mind
-during its fervour of aspiration towards Bonum and Pulchrum. On
-the other hand, in the Philebus, [Greek: kne=sis] and [Greek:
-gargalismo\s] are noted as manifestations of that distempered
-condition which produces indeed moments of intense pleasure, but
-is quite inconsistent with Reason and the attainment of Good. See
-Philebus, pp. 46 E, 51 D, and Gorgias, p. 494.]
-
-[Footnote 159: Plato, Philebus, p. 66.]
-
-The comparison, here made, of the Philebus with the Phaedrus and
-Symposion, is one among many proofs of the different points of
-view with which Plato, in his different dialogues,[160] handled
-the same topics of ethical and psychological discussion. And upon
-this point of dissent, Eudoxus and Epikurus, would have agreed
-with the Sokrates of the Philebus, in deprecating that extatic
-vein of emotion which is so greatly extolled in the Phaedrus and
-Symposion.
-
-[Footnote 160: Maximus Tyrius remarks this difference (between the
-erotic dialogues of Plato and many of the others) in one of his
-discourses about the [Greek: e)rotike\] of Sokrates. [Greek:
-Ou)de\n ga\r au)to\s au(to=| o(/moios o( Sokra/tes e)ro=n to=|
-sophronou=nti, kai\ o( e)kpletto/menos tou\s kalou\s to=|
-e)le/gchonti tou\s a)/phronas], &c. (Diss. xxiv. 5, p. 466 ed.
-Reiske).]
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XXXIII.
-
-MENEXENUS.
-
-
-[Side-note: Persons and situation of the dialogue.]
-
-In this dialogue the only personages are, Sokrates as an elderly
-man, and Menexenus, a young Athenian of noble family, whom we have
-already seen as the intimate friend of Lysis, in the dialogue
-known under the name of Lysis.
-
-[Side-note: Funeral harangue at Athens--Choice of a public
-orator--Sokrates declares the task of the public orator to be
-easy--Comic exaggeration of the effects of the harangue.]
-
-_Sokr._--What have you been doing at the Senate-house, Menexenus?
-You probably think that your course of education and philosophy is
-finished, and that you are qualified for high political functions.
-Young as you are, you aim at exercising command over us elders, as
-your family have always done before you.[1] _Menex._--I shall do
-so, if you advise and allow me, Sokrates: but not otherwise. Now,
-however, I came to learn who was the person chosen by the Senate
-to deliver the customary oration at the approaching public funeral
-of the citizens who have fallen in battle. The Senate, however,
-have adjourned the election until to-morrow: but I think either
-Archinus or Dion will be chosen. _Sokr._--To die in battle is a
-fine thing in many ways.[2] He who dies thus may be poor, but he
-receives a splendid funeral: he may be of little worth, yet he is
-still praised in prepared speeches by able orators, who decorate
-his name with brilliant encomiums, whether deserved or not,
-fascinating all the hearers: extolling us all--not merely the
-slain warrior, but the city collectively, our ancestors, and us
-the living--so admirably that I stand bewitched when I hear them,
-and fancy myself a greater, nobler, and finer man than I was
-before. I am usually accompanied by some strangers, who admire as
-much as I do, and who conceive a lofty estimation both of me and
-of the city. The voice of the orator resounds in my ear, and the
-feeling of pride dwells in my mind, for more than three days;
-during which interval I fancy myself almost in the islands of the
-blest. I hardly come to myself or recollect where I am, until the
-fourth or fifth day. Such is the force of these orators.
-
-[Footnote 1: Plat. Menex. p. 234 B-C.]
-
-[Footnote 2: Plat. Menex. p. 235 A-B.]
-
-[Side-note: Sokrates professes to have learnt a funeral harangue
-from Aspasia, and to be competent to recite it himself. Menexenus
-entreats him to do so.]
-
-_Menex._--You are always deriding the orators, Sokrates.[3]
-However, on this occasion I think the orator chosen will have
-little chance of success: he will have no time for preparation,
-and will be obliged to speak _impromptu_. _Sokr._--Never fear:
-each of these orators has harangues ready prepared. Besides, there
-is no difficulty here in speaking _impromptu_. If indeed the
-purpose were to praise the Athenians in Peloponnesus, or the
-Peloponnesians at Athens, an excellent orator would be required to
-persuade or to give satisfaction. But when he exhibits before the
-very hearers whom he praises, there is no great difficulty in
-appearing to be a good speaker.[4] _Menex._--Indeed! What! do you
-think you would be competent to deliver the harangue yourself, if
-the Senate were to elect you? _Sokr._--Certainly: and it is no
-wonder that I should be competent to speak, because I have learnt
-rhetoric from Aspasia (an excellent mistress, who has taught many
-eminent speakers, and among them Perikles, the most illustrious of
-all), and the harp from Konnus. But any one else, even less
-well-trained than me--instructed in music by Lamprus, and in rhetoric
-by Antiphon--would still be fully competent to succeed in praising
-Athenians among Athenians. _Menex._--What would you have to say,
-if the duty were imposed upon you?[5] _Sokr._--Probably little or
-nothing of my own. But it was only yesterday that I heard Aspasia
-going through a funeral harangue for this very occasion: partly
-suggestions of the present moment, partly recollections of past
-matters which had occurred to her when she composed the funeral
-harangue delivered by Perikles. _Menex._--Could you recollect what
-Aspasia said? _Sokr._--I should be much to blame if I could not. I
-learnt it from herself, and was near being beaten because I partly
-forgot it. _Menex._--Why do you not proceed with it then?
-_Sokr._--I fear that my instructress would be displeased, if I were to
-publish her discourse. _Menex._--Do not fear that, but proceed to
-speak. You will confer the greatest pleasure upon me, whether what
-you say comes from Aspasia or from any one else. Only proceed.
-_Sokr._--But perhaps you will laugh me to scorn, if I, an elderly
-man, continue still such work of pastime.[6] _Menex._--Not at all:
-I beseech you to speak. _Sokr._--Well, I cannot refuse you.
-Indeed, I could hardly refuse, if you requested me to strip naked
-and dance--since we are here alone.[7]
-
-[Footnote 3: Plat. Menex. p. 235 C. [Greek: A)ei\ su\
-prospai/zeis, o)= So/krates, tou\s r(e/toras.]]
-
-[Footnote 4: Plat. Menex. p. 235 D.
-
-Aristotle refers twice to this dictum as being a true remark made
-by [Greek: Sokra/tes e)n to=| E)pitaphi/o|], Rhetoric, i. 9, p.
-1367, b. 8, iii. 14, p. 1415, b. 30.]
-
-[Footnote 5: Plat. Menex. p. 236 A.]
-
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Menex. p. 236 C. [Greek: A)ll' i)/sos mou
-katagela/sei, a)/n soi do/xo presbu/tes o)\n e)/ti pai/zein.]]
-
-[Footnote 7: Plat. Menex. pp. 234 C, 236 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Harangue recited by Sokrates.]
-
-Sokrates then proceeds to recite a funeral harangue of some length
-which continues almost to the end.[8] When he concludes--repeating
-his declaration that the harangue comes from Aspasia--Menexenus
-observes, By Zeus, Sokrates, Aspasia is truly enviable, if she, a
-woman, is competent to compose such discourses as that.
-
-[Footnote 8: Plat. Menex. pp. 236 C, 249 C.]
-
-[Side-note: Compliments of Menexenus after Sokrates has finished,
-both to the harangue itself and to Aspasia.]
-_Sokr._--If you do not believe me, come along with me, and you
-will hear it from her own lips. _Menex._--I have often been in
-company with Aspasia, and I know what sort of person she is.
-_Sokr._--Well then, don't you admire her? and are you not grateful
-to her for the harangue? _Menex._--I am truly grateful for the
-harangue, to her, or to him, whoever it was that prompted you: and
-most of all, I am grateful to you for having recited it.
-_Sokr._--Very good. Take care then that you do not betray me. I may
-perhaps be able, on future occasions, to recite to you many other fine
-political harangues from her. _Menex._--Be assured that I will not
-betray you. Only let me hear them. _Sokr._--I certainly will.
-
-[Side-note: Supposed period--shortly after the peace of
-Antalkidas.]
-
-The interval between these two fragments of dialogue is filled up
-by the recitation of Sokrates: a long funeral harangue in honour
-of deceased warriors, whom the city directs to be thus
-commemorated. The period is supposed to be not long after the
-peace concluded by Antalkidas in 387 B.C. That peace was imposed
-upon Sparta, Athens, and the other Grecian cities, by the
-imperative rescript of the Persian king: the condition of it being
-an enforcement of universal autonomy, or free separate government
-to each city, small as well as great.[9]
-
-[Footnote 9: See respecting the character of the peace of
-Antalkidas, and the manner in which its conditions were executed,
-my History of Greece, chap. 76.]
-
-[Side-note: Custom of Athens about funeral harangues. Many such
-harangues existed at Athens, composed by distinguished orators or
-logographers--Established type of the harangue.]
-
-It had been long the received practice among the Athenians to
-honour their fallen warriors from time to time by this sort of
-public funeral, celebrated with every demonstration of mournful
-respect: and to appoint one of the ablest and most dignified
-citizens as public orator on the occasion.[10] The discourse
-delivered by Perikles, as appointed orator, at the end of the
-first Peloponnesian war, has been immortalised by Thucydides, and
-stands as one of the most impressive remnants of Hellenic
-antiquity. Since the occasion recurred pretty often, and since the
-orator chosen was always a man already conspicuous,[11] we may be
-sure that there existed in the time of Plato many funeral
-harangues which are now lost: indeed he himself says in this
-dialogue, that distinguished politicians prepared such harangues
-beforehand, in case the choice of the citizens should fall upon
-them. And we may farther be sure, amidst the active cultivation of
-rhetoric at Athens--that the rhetorical teachers as well as their
-pupils, and the logographers or paid composers of speeches, were
-practised in this variety of oratorical compositions not less than
-in others. We have one of them among the remaining discourses of
-the logographer Lysias: who could not actually have delivered it
-himself (since he was not even a citizen)--nor could ever probably
-have been called upon to prepare one for delivery (since the
-citizens chosen were always eminent speakers and politicians
-themselves, not requiring the aid of a logographer)--but who
-composed it as a rhetorical exercise to extend his own celebrity.
-In like manner we find one among the discourses of Demosthenes,
-though of very doubtful authenticity. The funeral discourse had
-thus come to acquire an established type. Rhetorical teachers had
-collected and generalised, out of the published harangues before
-them, certain _loci communes_, religious, patriotic, social,
-historical or pseudo-historical, &c., suitable to be employed by
-any new orator.[12] All such _loci_ were of course framed upon the
-actual sentiments prevalent among the majority of Athenians;
-furnishing eloquent expression for sympathies and antipathies
-deeply lodged in every one's bosom.
-
-[Footnote 10: Thucyd. ii. 34.]
-
-[Footnote 11: Thucyd. ii. 34. [Greek: o(\s a)\n gno/me| te doke=|
-me\ a)xu/netos ei)=nai, kai\ a)xio/mati proe/ke|.]]
-
-[Footnote 12: Aristotel. Rhetoric. i. 5, p. 1360, b. 31, i. 9, p.
-1367. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetoric. c. 6, pp. 260-267.
-
-"Nec enim artibus inventis factum est, ut argumenta inveniremus;
-sed dicta sunt omnia, antequam praeciperentur: mox ea scriptores
-observata et collecta ediderunt" (Quintilian, Inst. Or. v. 10).]
-
-[Side-note: Plato in this harangue conforms to the established
-type--Topics on which he insists.]
-
-The funeral discourse which we read in the Menexenus is framed
-upon this classical model. It dwells, with emphasis and elegance,
-upon the patriotic common-places which formed the theme of rhetors
-generally. Plato begins by extolling the indigenous character of
-the Athenian population; not immigrants from abroad (like the
-Peloponnesians), but born from the very soil of Attica:[13] which,
-at a time when other parts of the earth produced nothing but
-strange animals and plants, gave birth to an admirable breed of
-men, as well as to wheat and barley for their nourishment, and to
-the olive for assisting their bodily exercises.[14] Attica was
-from the beginning favoured by the Gods; and the acropolis had
-been an object of competition between Athene and Poseidon.[15] She
-was the common and equal mother of all the citizens, who, from
-such community of birth and purity of Hellenic origin, had derived
-the attributes which they had ever since manifested--attachment to
-equal laws among themselves, Panhellenic patriotism, and hatred of
-barbarians.[16] The free and equal political constitution of
-Athens--called an aristocracy, or presidency of the best men,
-under the choice and approval of the multitude--as it was and as
-it always had been, is here extolled by Plato, as a result of the
-common origin.
-
-[Footnote 13: Plat. Menex. pp. 237-245. 245 D: [Greek: ou) ga/r
-Pe/lopes ou)de\ Ka/dmoi ou)de\ Ai)/guptoi/ te kai\ Danaoi\ ou)de\
-a)/lloi polloi/, phu/sei me\n ba/rbaroi o)/ntes, no/mo| de\
-E(/llenes, sunoikou=sin e(mi=n, a)ll' au)toi\ E(/llenes, ou)
-mixoba/rbaroi oi)kou=men], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 14: Plat. Menex. pp. 237 D, 238 A.]
-
-[Footnote 15: Plat. Menex. p. 237 C.]
-
-[Footnote 16: Plat. Menex. pp. 238 D, 239 A, 245 C-D. 239 A:
-[Greek: e( i)sogoni/a e(ma=s e( kata\ phu/sin i)sonomi/an
-a)nagka/zei zetei=n kata\ no/mon, kai\ medeni\ a)/llo| u(pei/kein
-a)lle/lois e)\ a)rete=s do/xe| kai\ phrone/seos.] 245 D: [Greek:
-o(/then katharo\n to\ mi=sos e)nte/teke te=| po/lei te=s
-a)llotri/as phu/seos] (_i.e._ of the [Greek: ba/rbaroi]).]
-
-Alluding briefly to the victories over Eumolpus and the Amazons,
-the orator passes on to the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and
-Plataea, which he celebrates with the warmth of an Hellenic
-patriot.[17] He eulogizes the generous behaviour of Athens towards
-the Greeks, during the interval between the Persian and the
-Peloponnesian wars, contrasting it with the unworthy requital
-which she received from Sparta and others. He then glances at the
-events of the Peloponnesian wars, though colouring them in a
-manner so fanciful and delusive, that any one familiar with
-Thucydides can scarcely recognise their identity--especially in
-regard to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse.[18] He
-protests against the faithlessness of Sparta, towards the close of
-the Peloponnesian war, in allying herself with the common
-anti-Hellenic enemy--the Great King--against Athens: and he ascribes
-mainly to this unholy alliance the conquest of Athens at the end
-of the war.[19] The moderation of political parties in Athens,
-when the Thirty were put down and the democracy restored, receives
-its due meed of praise: but the peculiar merit claimed for Athens,
-in reference to the public events between 403 B.C. and 387 B.C.,
-is--That she stood alone among Greeks in refusing to fraternise
-with the Persian King, or to betray to him the Asiatic Greeks.
-Athens had always been prompted by generous feeling, even in spite
-of political interests, to compassionate and befriend the
-weak.[20] The orator dwells with satisfaction on the years
-preceding the peace concluded by Antalkidas; during which years
-Athens had recovered her walls and her ships--had put down the
-Spartan superiority at sea--and had rescued even the Great King
-from Spartan force.[21] He laments the disasters of Athenian
-soldiers at Corinth, through difficulties of the ground--and at
-Lechaeum, through treachery. These are the latest political events
-to which he alludes.[22]
-
-[Footnote 17: Plat. Menex. pp. 240-241.]
-
-[Footnote 18: Plat. Menex. pp. 242-243.]
-
-[Footnote 19: Plat. Menex. pp. 243-244.]
-
-[Footnote 20: Plat. Menex. pp. 244-245. 244 E: [Greek: ei)/ tis
-bou/loito te=s po/leos kategore=sai dikai/os, tou=t' a)\n mo/non
-le/gon o)rtho=s a)\n kategoroi/e, o(s a)ei\ li/an philoikti/rmon
-e)sti/, kai\ tou= e(/ttonos therapi/s.] Isokrates also, in the
-Oratio Panegyrica (Or. iv.), dwells upon this point, as well as on
-the pronounced hatred towards [Greek: ba/rbaroi], as standing
-features in the Athenian character (sect. 59-184). The points
-touched upon in reference to Athens by Isokrates are in the main
-the same as those brought out by Plato in the Menexenus, only that
-Isokrates makes them subservient to a special purpose, that of
-bringing about an expedition against Persia under the joint
-headship of Sparta and Athens.]
-
-[Footnote 21: Plat. Menex. p. 245.]
-
-[Footnote 22: Plat. Menex. pp. 245 E, 246 A.]
-
-[Side-note: Consolation and exhortation to surviving relatives.]
-
-Having thus touched upon the political history of Athens, he turns
-to the surviving relatives--fathers, mothers, children, &c.--of
-the fallen warriors: addressing to them words of mingled
-consolation and exhortation. He adopts the fiction of supposing
-these exhortations to have been suggested to him by the warriors
-themselves, immediately before entering upon their last
-battle.[23] This is the most eloquent and impressive portion of
-the harangue. The orator concludes by a few words from himself,
-inculcating on the elders the duty of resignation, and on the
-youth that of forward and devoted patriotism.[24]
-
-[Footnote 23: Plat. Menex. pp. 247-248.]
-
-[Footnote 24: Plat. Menex. p. 249 A-C.]
-
-[Side-note: Admiration felt for this harangue, both at the time and
-afterwards.]
-
-That this oration was much admired, not merely during the lifetime
-of Plato, but also long after his death, we know from the
-testimony of Cicero; who informs us that it was publicly recited
-every year on the day when the annual funeral rites were
-celebrated, in honour of those citizens collectively who had been
-slain in the service of their country.[25] The rhetor
-Dionysius[26] recognises the fact of such warm admiration, and
-concurs generally therein, yet not without reserves. He points out
-what he considers defects of thought and expression--ostentatious
-contrasts and balancing of antithetical clauses, after the manner
-of Gorgias. Yet we may easily believe that the harangue found much
-favour, and greatly extended the reputation of its author. It
-would please many readers who took little interest in the Sokratic
-dialectics.
-
-[Footnote 25: Cicero, Orator. c. 44, 151. "At non Thucydides: ne
-ille quidem, haud paullo major scriptor, Plato: nec solum in his
-sermonibus, qui dialogi dicuntur, ubi etiam de industria id
-faciendum fuit, sed in populari oratione, qua est Athenis laudari
-in concione eos, qui sint in praeliis interfecti: quae sic probata
-est, ut eam quotannis, ut scis, illo die recitari necesse sit."
-
-See Plato, Menex. p. 249 B, about these yearly funereal rites, and
-Lysias, Epitaph. s. 80.]
-
-[Footnote 26: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosth. p. 1027,
-compared with Ars Rhetoric. c. 6, pp. 260-267.]
-
-[Side-note: Probable motives of Plato in composing it, shortly
-after he established himself at Athens as a teacher--His
-competition with Lysias--Desire for celebrity both as rhetor and
-as dialectician.]
-
-When Plato first established himself at Athens as a lecturer
-(about 386 B.C., shortly after the peace made by Antalkidas), he
-was probably known only by Sokratic dialogues, properly so called:
-which Dionysius specifies both as his earliest works and as his
-proper department, wherein he stood unrivalled.[27] In these, his
-opposition to the Rhetors and Sophists was proclaimed: and if, as
-is probable, the Gorgias had been published before that time, he
-had already declared war, openly as well as bitterly, against the
-whole art of Rhetoric. But it would be a double triumph for his
-genius, if, after standing forward as the representative of
-Dialectic, and in that character heaping scornful derision on the
-rival art of Rhetoric, as being nothing better than a mere knack
-of juggling and flattery[28]--he were able to show that this did
-not proceed from want of rhetorical competence, but that he could
-rival or surpass the Rhetors in their own department. Herein lies
-the purpose of the Menexenus. I agree with Schleiermacher,
-Stallbaum, and some other critics,[29] in thinking that it was
-probably composed not long after the peace of Antalkidas, in
-competition with the harangue of Lysias now remaining on the same
-subject. Though the name of Lysias is not mentioned in the
-Menexenus, yet the rivalry between him and Plato is clearly
-proclaimed in the Platonic Phaedrus: and the two funeral harangues
-go so completely over the same ground, that intentional
-competition on the part of the latest, is the most natural of all
-hypotheses.
-
-[Footnote 27: Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pomp. De Platon. p. 762. [Greek:
-traphei\s me\n e)n toi=s Sokratikoi=s dialo/gois i)schnota/tois
-ou)=si kai\ a)kribesta/tois, ou) mei/nas d' e)n au)toi=s, a)lla\
-te=s Gorgi/ou kai\ Thoukudi/dou kataskeue=s e)rasthei/s.] Compare
-p. 761, the passage immediately preceding, and De Adm. Vi Dicendi
-in Demosthene, pp. 1025-1031.
-
-To many critics Plato appeared successful in the figurative and
-metaphorical style--[Greek: deino\s peri\ to\ tropiko/n]. But
-Dionysius thinks him very inferior to Demosthenes even on this
-point, though it was not the strongest point of Demosthenes, whose
-main purpose was [Greek: o( a)lethino\s a)go/n] (Dionys. ibid. p.
-1057).]
-
-[Footnote 28: Isokrates, in his last composition (Panathen. Or.
-xii.) written in very old age, shows how keenly he felt the
-aspersions of jealous rivals--Sophists less successful than
-himself--who publicly complained that he despised the lessons of
-the poets, and thought no teaching worth having except his
-own--[Greek: a)podexame/non de\ to=n periesto/ton te\n diatribe\n
-au)to=n, e(/na to\n tolmero/teron e)picheire=sai e)me\
-diaba/llein, le/gonth' o(s e)go\ pa/nton kataphrono= o=n
-toiou/ton, kai\ ta/s te philosophi/as ta\s to=n a)/llon kai\ ta\s
-paidei/as a(pa/sas a)nairo=, kai\ phemi\ pa/ntas lerei=n ple\n
-tou\s metescheko/tas te=s e)me=s diatribe=s] (sect. 22). That
-which Isokrates complains of these teachers for saying in their
-talk with each other, the rhetorical teachers would vehemently
-complain of in Plato, when he expressed forcibly his contempt for
-rhetoric in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus. One way of expressing
-their resentment would be to affirm that Plato could not compose a
-regular rhetorical discourse; which affirmation Plato would best
-contradict by composing one in the received manner.]
-
-[Footnote 29: See the Einleitung of Schleiermacher to his
-translation of the Menexenus; also Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Menex. p.
-10, and Westermann, Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit, sect. 66, p. 134.]
-
-[Side-note: Menexenus compared with the view of rhetoric presented
-in the Gorgias--Necessity for an orator to conform to established
-sentiments.]
-
-Here then we have Plato exchanging philosophy for "the knack of
-flattery"--to use the phrase of the Gorgias. Stallbaum is so
-unwilling to admit this as possible, that he represents the
-Platonic harangue as a mere caricature, intended to make the
-rhetorical process ridiculous. I dissent from this supposition; as
-I have already dissented from the like supposition of the same
-critic, in regard to the etymologies of the Kratylus. That Plato
-might in one dialogue scornfully denounce Rhetoric--and in
-another, compose an elaborate discourse upon the received
-rhetorical type--is noway inconsistent with the general theory
-which I frame to myself, about the intellectual character and
-distinct occasional manifestations of Plato.[30] The funeral
-harangue in the Menexenus proves that, whatever he thought about
-Rhetoric generally, he was anxious to establish his title as a
-competent rhetorical composer: it proves farther that he was equal
-to Lysias in the epideiktic department, though inferior to
-Perikles. It affords a valuable illustration of that general
-doctrine which the Platonic Sokrates lays down in the
-Gorgias--That no man can succeed as a rhetor, unless he is in full
-harmony of spirit and cast of mind with his auditors; or unless he
-dwells upon and enforces sympathies, antipathies, and convictions,
-already established in their minds.[31] A first-rate orator like
-Perikles, touching the chords of cherished national sentiment,
-might hope, by such a discourse as that which we read in
-Thucydides, "adjecisse aliquid receptae religioni".[32] No public
-orator ever appointed by the Senate to pronounce the funeral
-harangue, could have expatiated more warmly than Plato has here
-done, upon the excellence of the Athenian constitution, and upon
-the admirable spirit which had animated Athenian politics, both
-foreign and domestic. Plato falls far short, indeed, of the weight
-and grandeur, the impressive distinctness of specification, the
-large sympathies, intellectual as well as popular--with which
-these topics are handled by Perikles in Thucydides: but his eulogy
-is quite as highflown and unreserved.
-
-[Footnote 30: Compare also the majestic picture which Plato
-presents of the ancient character and exploits of the early
-Athenians, in the mythe commenced in the Timaeus (pp. 23-24),
-prosecuted in the Kritias (pp. 113-114 seq.), but left by the
-author incomplete.]
-
-[Footnote 31: Plato, Gorgias, p. 510 C; see above, ch. xxiv. p.
-359.**
-
-This appears to me the real truth, subject to very rare
-exceptions. But I do not think it true to say, as the Platonic
-Sokrates is made to declare in the Menexenus, that it is an easy
-matter to obtain admiration when you praise Athens among
-Athenians--though Aristotle commends the observation. Assuredly
-Perikles did not think so (Thucyd. ii. 35). You have a popular
-theme, but unless you have oratorical talent to do justice to it
-you are likely to disappoint and offend, especially among auditors
-like the Athenians, accustomed to good speaking. Compare Plat.
-Kritias, p. 107 E.]
-
-[Footnote 32: To employ the striking expression of Quintilian
-(xii. 10) respecting the great statue of Zeus at Olympia by
-Pheidias.]
-
-[Side-note: Colloquial portion of the Menexenus is probably
-intended as ridicule and sneer at Rhetoric--The harangue itself is
-serious, and intended as an evidence of Plato's ability.]
-
-In understanding fully the Menexenus, however, we have to take
-account, not merely of the harangue which forms the bulk of it,
-but also of the conversation whereby it is commenced and
-concluded. Plato, speaking always through the mouth of Sokrates,
-has to invent some fiction excusing the employment of his master
-in the unprecedented capacity of public orator. What Stallbaum
-says (in my judgment, erroneously) about the harangue--appears to
-me perfectly true about the conversation before and after it. The
-introductory observations, interchanged between Sokrates and
-Menexenus, certainly tend to caricature (as Aristophanes[33] does
-in the Acharneis and the Equites) the strong effects produced by
-this panegyrical oratory on the feelings of hearers; and to
-depreciate the task of the orator as nothing better than an easy
-and amusing pastime. To praise Athens among Athenian auditors (we
-are told) is a matter in which few speakers can fail to succeed,
-however poor their abilities. Moreover, the great funeral harangue
-of Perikles is represented as having been composed for him by
-Aspasia[34]--a female, though remarkable among her sex--who is
-extolled as holding the highest place among rhetorical teachers,
-and is introduced here, as Aristophanes introduces her in the
-Acharneis, when he is putting a construction of discreditable
-ridicule on the origin of the Peloponnesian war.[35] To make a
-good funeral harangue (Sokrates says) requires little or no
-preliminary preparation: besides, the Rhetors have harangues ready
-prepared at home. All this _persiflage_, in harmony with the
-polemics of the Gorgias, derides and degrades the Rhetors
-collectively. But when Plato takes the field against them as a
-competitor, in his own rhetorical discourse, he drops the ironical
-vein, and takes pains to deliver one really good and excellent in
-its kind. His triumph is thus doubled. He tells the Rhetors that
-their business is a trifling and despicable one: at the same time
-showing them that, despicable as it is, he can surpass them in it,
-as he professes to surpass Lysias in the Phaedrus.[36]
-
-[Footnote 33: Aristoph. Acharn. 615, Equit. 640-887.
-
-The comic exaggeration of Sokrates, in the colloquial portion of
-the Menexenus (235 B-C) goes as far as that of Aristophanes.]
-
-[Footnote 34: By the language of Plato here, he seems plainly to
-bring his own harangue into competition not merely with that of
-Lysias but also with that of Perikles. But we must not suppose for
-that reason, that he necessarily has in view the Periklean
-harangue which we now read in Thucydides, ii. 35-43: which is the
-real speech, reported and drest up by Thucydides in his own
-language and manner. Probably the Periklean harangue was preserved
-separately and in other reports, so that Plato may have known it
-without knowing the history of Thucydides. When I see the extreme
-liberty which Plato takes throughout his harangue in regard to the
-history of the past, I can hardly believe that he ever read
-Thucydides; if he ever read the history, he certainly disregarded
-it altogether, and threw himself [Greek: e)pi\ to\ prosagogo/teron
-te=| a)kroa/sei e)\ a)lethe/steron]: like the [Greek:
-logogra/phoi] of whom Thucydides speaks, i. 21, Lysias among them,
-though in a less degree than Plato. AEschines Sokraticus had
-composed among his dialogues one entitled [Greek: A)spasi/a]. See
-Xenophon, Oeconom. i. 14; Cicero de Inventione, i. 31: Plutarch,
-Perikles, c. 24-32: also Bergk, De Reliquiis Comoed. Attic.
-Antiq. p. 237.]
-
-[Footnote 35: Aristoph. Acharn. 501.]
-
-[Footnote 36: The remarks of Dionysius of Halikarnassus (in the
-Epistle to Cn. Pompey about Plato, pp. 754-758) are well deserving
-of attention: especially as he had before him many writers now
-lost, either contemporary with Plato or of the succeeding
-generation. He notices not only Plato's asperity in ridiculing
-most of his distinguished contemporaries, but also his marked
-rivalry against Lysias.
-
-[Greek: e)=n ga/r, e)=n me\n te=| Pla/tonos phu/sei polla\s
-a)reta\s e)chou/se| to\ philo/timon], &c. (p. 756).
-
-See this subject well handled in an instructive Dissertation by M.
-Lebeau (Stuttgart, 1863, Lysias' Epitaphios als aecht erwiesen, pp.
-42-46 seq.).]
-
-[Side-note: Anachronism of the Menexenus--Plato careless on this
-point.]
-
-Such I conceive to be the scope of the dialogue, looked at from
-Plato's point of view. In order to find a person suitable in point
-of age to be described as the teacher of Sokrates, he is forced to
-go back to the past generation--that of Perikles and Aspasia. But
-though he avoids anachronism on this point, he cannot avoid the
-anachronism of making Sokrates allude to events long posterior to
-his own death. This anachronism is real, though it has been
-magnified by some critics into a graver defect than it is in
-truth. Plato was resolved not to speak in his own person, but
-through that of Sokrates. But he is not always careful to keep
-within the limits which consistent adherence to such a plan
-imposes.[37]
-
-[Footnote 37: Groen van Prinsterer (Prosopographia Platonica, p.
-211 seq.) adverts to the carelessness of Plato about exact
-chronology.
-
-Most of the Platonic critics recognise the Menexenus as a genuine
-Platonic dialogue. Ast, however, includes it among the numerous
-dialogues which he disallows as spurious; and Suckow, Steinhart,
-and Ueberweg, are also inclined to disallow it. See Ueberweg, Die
-Aechtheit der Platonischen Schriften, pp. 143-148. These critics
-make light of the allusion of Aristotle in the Rhetoric--[Greek:
-Sokra/tes e)n to=| E)pitaphi/o|]--which appears to me, I confess,
-of more weight than all the grounds of suspicion adduced by them
-to prove the dialogue spurious. The presumption in favour of the
-catalogue of Thrasyllus counts with them, here as elsewhere, for
-nothing.]
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XXXIV.
-
-KLEITOPHON.
-
-
-[Side-note: Persons and circumstances of Kleitophon.]
-
-The Kleitophon is an unfinished fragment, beginning with a short
-introductory conversation between Sokrates and Kleitophon, and
-finishing with a discourse of some length, a sort of remonstrance
-or appeal, addressed by Kleitophon to Sokrates; who makes no
-reply.
-
-Some one was lately telling me (says Sokrates) that Kleitophon, in
-conversation with Lysias, depreciated the conversation of
-Sokrates, and extolled prodigiously that of Thrasymachus.
-
-[Side-note: Conversation of Sokrates with Kleitophon alone: he
-alludes to observations of an unfavourable character recently made
-by Kleitophon, who asks permission to explain.]
-
-Whoever told you so (replies Kleitophon), did not report
-accurately what I said. On some points, indeed, I did not praise
-you; but on other points I did praise you. Since, however, you are
-evidently displeased with me, though you affect indifference--and
-since we are here alone--I should be glad to repeat the same
-observations to yourself, in order that you may not believe me to
-think meanly of you. These incorrect reports seem to have made you
-displeased with me, more than is reasonable. I am anxious to speak
-to you with full freedom, if you will allow it.[1]
-
-[Footnote 1: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 406.]
-
-It would be a shame indeed (rejoined Sokrates), if, when you were
-anxious to do me good, I could not endure to receive it. When I
-have learnt which are my worst and which are my best points, I
-shall evidently be in a condition to cultivate and pursue the
-latter and resolutely to avoid the former.
-
-Hear me then (says Kleitophon).
-
-[Side-note: Explanation given. Kleitophon expresses gratitude and
-admiration for the benefit which he has derived from long
-companionship with Sokrates.]
-
-As your frequent companion, Sokrates, I have often listened to you
-with profound admiration. I thought you superior to all other
-speakers when you proclaimed your usual strain of reproof, like
-the God from a dramatic machine, against mankind.[2] You asked
-them, "Whither are you drifting, my friends? You do not seem aware
-that you are doing wrong when you place all your affections on the
-gain of money, and neglect to teach your sons and heirs the right
-use of money. You do not provide for them teachers of justice, if
-justice be teachable; nor trainers of it, if it be acquirable by
-training and habit; nor indeed have you studied the acquisition of
-it, even for yourselves. Since the fact is obvious that, while
-you, as well as your sons, have learnt what passes for a finished
-education in virtue (letters, music, gymnastic), you nevertheless
-yield to the corruptions of gain--how comes it that you do not
-despise your actual education, and look out for teachers to
-correct such disorder? It is this disorder, not the want of
-accomplishment in the use of the lyre, which occasions such
-terrible discord, and such calamitous war, between brother and
-brother--between city and city.[3] You affirm that men do wrong
-wilfully, not from ignorance or want of training: yet nevertheless
-you are bold enough to say, that wrong-doing is dishonourable and
-offensive to the Gods. How can any one, then, choose such an evil
-willingly? You tell us it is because he is overcome by pleasures:
-well then, that again comes to unwillingness--if victory be the
-thing which every man wishes: so that, whichever way you turn it,
-reason shows you that wrong-doing is taken up unwillingly, and
-that greater precautions ought to be taken upon the subject, both
-by individuals and by cities."[4]
-
-[Footnote 2: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 A. [Greek: e)go\ ga/r, o)=
-So/krates, soi\ suggigno/menos, polla/kis e)xepletto/men a)kou/on;
-kai/ moi e)do/keis para\ tou\s a)/llous a)nthro/pous ka/llista
-le/gein, o(po/te e)pitimo=n toi=s a)nthro/pois, o(/sper e)pi\
-mechane=s tragike=s theo/s, u(mei=s, le/gon, poi= pheresthe,
-a)/nthropoi?] &c.]
-
-[Footnote 3: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 B-C.]
-
-[Footnote 4: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 D-E. [Greek: o(/ste e)k
-panto\s tro/pou to/ ge a)dikei=n a)kou/sion o( lo/gos ai(rei=,
-kai\ dei=n e)pime/leian te=s nu=n plei/o poiei=sthai pa/nt'
-a)/ndra i)di/a| th' a(/ma kai\ demosi/a| xumpa/sas ta\s po/leis.]]
-
-[Side-note: The observations made by Sokrates have been most
-salutary and stimulating in awakening ardour for virtue. Arguments
-and analogies commonly used by Sokrates.]
-
-Such, Sokrates (continues Kleitophon), is the language which I
-often hear from you; and which I always hear with the strongest
-and most respectful admiration. You follow it up by observing,
-that those who train their bodies and neglect their minds, commit
-the mistake of busying themselves about the subordinate and
-neglecting the superior. You farther remark, that if a man does
-not know how to use any object rightly, he had better abstain from
-using it altogether: if he does not know how to use his eyes, his
-ears, or his body--it will be better for him neither to see, nor
-to hear, nor to use his body at all: the like with any instrument
-or article of property--for whoever cannot use his own lyre well,
-cannot use his neighbour's lyre better. Out of these premisses you
-bring out forcibly the conclusion--That if a man does not know how
-to use his mind rightly, it is better for him to make no use of
-it:--better for him not to live, than to live under his own
-direction. If he must live, he had better live as a slave than a
-freeman, surrendering the guidance of his understanding to some
-one else who knows the art of piloting men: which art you,
-Sokrates, denominate often the political art, sometimes the
-judicial art or justice.[5]
-
-[Footnote 5: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 B. [Greek: e)=n de\ su\
-politike/n, o)= So/krates, o)noma/zeis polla/kis, te\n au)te\n de\
-tau/ten dikastike/n te kai\ dikaiosu/nen o(s e)/sti le/gon.]]
-
-[Side-note: But Sokrates does not explain what virtue is, nor how
-it is to be attained. Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and
-now wants information how he is to act.]
-
-These discourses of yours, alike numerous and admirable--showing
-that virtue is teachable, and that a man should attend to himself
-before he attends to other objects--I never have contradicted, and
-never shall contradict. I account them most profitable and
-stimulating, calculated to wake men as it were out of sleep. I
-expected anxiously what was to come afterwards. I began by
-copying your style and asking, not yourself, but those among your
-companions whom you esteemed the most[6]--How are we now to
-understand this stimulus imparted by Sokrates towards virtue? Is
-this to be all? Cannot we make advance towards virtue and get full
-possession of it? Are we to pass our whole lives in stimulating
-those who have not yet been stimulated, in order that they in
-their turn may stimulate others? Is it not rather incumbent upon
-us, now that we have agreed thus far, to entreat both from
-Sokrates and from each other, an answer to the ulterior question,
-What next? How are we to set to work in regard to the learning of
-justice?[7] If any trainer, seeing us careless of our bodily
-condition, should exhort us strenuously to take care of it, and
-convince us that we ought to do so--we should next ask him, which
-were the arts prescribing how we should proceed? He would
-reply--The gymnastic and medical arts. How will Sokrates or his
-friends answer the corresponding question in their case?
-
-[Footnote 6: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 C. [Greek: tou/ton ga\r tou/s
-ti ma/lista ei)=nai doxazome/nous u(po\ sou= pro/tous
-e)panero/ton, punthano/menos ti/s o( meta\ tau=t' ei)/e lo/gos,
-_kai\ kata\ se\ tro/pon tina\ u(potei/non au)toi=s_], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 7: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 408 D-E. [Greek: e)\ dei= to\n
-Sokra/ten kai\ a)lle/lous e(ma=s to\ meta\ tou=t' e)panerota=|n,
-o(mologe/santas tou=t' au)to\ a)nthro/po| prakte/on ei)=nai. _Ti/
-tou)nteu=then_? po=s a)/rchesthai dei=n phame\n dikaiosu/nes peri\
-mathe/seos?]]
-
-[Side-note: Questions addressed by Kleitophon with this view, both
-to the companions of Sokrates and to Sokrates himself.]
-
-The ablest of your companions answered me (continues Kleitophon),
-that the art to which you were wont to allude was no other than
-Justice itself. I told him in reply--Do not give me the mere name,
-but tell me what Justice is.[8] In the medical art there are two
-distinct results contemplated and achieved: one, that of keeping
-up the succession of competent physicians--another that of
-conferring or preserving health: this last, _Health_, is not the
-art itself, but the work accomplished by the art. Just so, the
-builder's art, has for its object the _house_, which is its
-work--and the keeping up the continuity of builders, which is its
-teaching. Tell me in the same manner respecting the art called
-Justice. Its teaching province is plain enough--to maintain the
-succession of just men: but what is its working province? what is
-the work which the just man does for us?
-
-[Footnote 8: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 A. [Greek: ei)po/ntos de\
-mou=, Me/ moi to\ o)/noma mo/non ei)pe=|s, a)lla\ o)=de--I)atrike/
-pou/ tis le/getai te/chne], &c,]
-
-[Side-note: Replies made by the friends of Sokrates
-unsatisfactory.]
-To this question your friend replied (explaining Justice)--it is
-The Advantageous. Another man near him said, The Proper: a third
-said, The Profitable: a fourth, The Gainful.[9] I pursued the
-inquiry by observing, that these were general names equally
-applicable in other arts, and to something different in each.
-Every art aims at what is proper, advantageous, profitable,
-gainful, in its own separate department: but each can farther
-describe to you what that department is. Thus the art of the
-carpenter is, to perform well, properly, advantageously,
-profitably, &c., in the construction of wooden implements, &c.
-That is the special work of the carpenter's art: now tell me, what
-is the special work, corresponding thereunto, of the art called
-Justice?
-
-[Footnote 9: Plato, Kleitoph. 409 B. [Greek: to\ d' e(/teron, o(\
-du/natai poiei=n e(mi=n e)/rgon o( di/kaios, ti/ tou=to/ phamen?
-ei)=pe. Ou(=tos me/n, o(s oi)=mai, _to\ sumphe/ron_ a)pekri/nato;
-a)/llos de/, _to\ de/on_; e(/teros de/, to\ _o)phe/limon_; o( de/,
-to\ _lusitelou=n_. e)pane/|ein de\ e)go\ le/gon o(/ti ka)kei=na/
-ge o)no/mata tau=t' e)sti\n e)n e(ka/ste| to=n techno=n, o)rtho=s
-pra/ttein, lusitelou=nta, o)phe/lima, kai\ ta)/lla ta\ toiau=ta;
-a)lla\ pro\s o(/, ti tau=ta pa/nta tei/nei, e)rei= to\ i)/dion
-e(ka/ste| te/chne|], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: None of them could explain what the special work of
-justice or virtue was.]
-
-At length one of your most accomplished companions, Sokrates,
-answered me--That the special work peculiar to Justice was, to
-bring about friendship in the community.[10] Being farther
-interrogated, he said--That friendship was always a good, never an
-evil: That the so-called friendships between children, and between
-animals, mischievous rather than otherwise, were not real
-friendships, and ought not to bear the name: That the only genuine
-friendship was, sameness of reason and intelligence: not sameness
-of opinion, which was often hurtful--but knowledge and reason
-agreeing, in different persons.[11]
-
-[Footnote 10: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 D. [Greek: Teleuto=n
-a)pekri/nato/ tis, o)= So/krates, moi\ to=n so=n e(tai/ron, o(\s
-de\ kompso/tata e)/doxen ei)pei=n, o(/ti tou=t' ei)/e to\ te=s
-dikaiosu/nes i)/dion e)/rgon, o(\ to=n a)/llon ou)demia=s,
-phili/an e)n tai=s po/lesi poiei=n.]]
-
-[Footnote 11: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 409 E.]
-
-At this stage of our conversation the hearers themselves felt
-perplexed, and interfered to remonstrate with him; observing, that
-the debate had come round to the same point again. They declared
-that the medical art also was harmony of reason and intelligence:
-that the like was true besides of every other art: that each of
-them could define the special end to which it tended: but that as
-to that art, or that harmony of reason and intelligence, which had
-been called Justice, no one could see to what purpose it tended,
-nor what was its special work.[12]
-
-[Footnote 12: Plato, Kleitoph. p. 410 A. [Greek: kai\ e)/legon]
-(_i.e._ the hearers said) [Greek: o(/ti kai\ e( i)atrike\
-o(mo/noia/ ti/s e)sti, kai\ a(/pasai ai( te/chnai, kai\ peri\
-o(/tou ei)si/n, e)/chousi le/gein; te\n de\ u(po\ sou= legome/nen
-dikaiosu/nen e)\ o(mo/noian, o(/poi tei/nousa/ e)sti,
-diape/pheuge, kai\ a)/delon au)te=s o(/, ti po/t e)sti\ to\
-e)/rgon.]]
-
-[Side-note: Kleitophon at length asked the question from Sokrates
-himself. But Sokrates did not answer clearly. Kleitophon believes
-that Sokrates knows, but will not tell.]
-
-After all this debate (continues Kleitophon) I addressed the same
-question to yourself, Sokrates--What is Justice? You answered--To
-do good to friends, hurt to enemies. But presently it appeared,
-that the just man would never, on any occasion, do hurt to any
-one:--that he would act towards every one with a view to good. It
-is not once, nor twice, but often and often, that I have endured
-these perplexities, and have importuned you to clear them up.[13]
-At last I am wearied out, and have come to the conviction that you
-are doubtless a consummate proficient in the art of stimulating
-men to seek virtue; but that as to the ulterior question, how they
-are to find it--you either do not know, or you will not tell. In
-regard to any art (such as steersmanship or others), there may be
-persons who can extol and recommend the art to esteem, but cannot
-direct the hearers how to acquire it: and in like manner a man
-might remark about you, that you do not know any better what
-Justice is, because you are a proficient in commending it. For my
-part, such is not my opinion. I think that you know, but have
-declined to tell me. I am resolved, in my present embarrassment,
-to go to Thrasymachus, or any one else that I can find to help me;
-unless you will consent to give me something more than these
-merely stimulating discourses.[14] Consider me as one upon whom
-your stimulus has already told. If the question were about
-gymnastic, as soon as I had become fully stimulated to attend to
-my bodily condition, you would have given me, as a sequel to your
-stimulating discourse, some positive direction, what my body was
-by nature, and what treatment it required. Deal in like manner
-with the case before us: reckon Kleitophon as one fully agreeing
-with you, that it is contemptible to spend so much energy upon
-other objects, and to neglect our minds, with a view to which all
-other objects are treasured up. Put me down as having already
-given my adhesion to all these views of yours.
-
-[Footnote 13: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 B. [Greek: Tau=ta de\
-ou)ch a(/pax ou)de\ di\s a)lla\ polu\n de\ u(pomei/nas chro/non
-kai\ liparo=n a)pei/reka], &c.]
-
-[Footnote 14: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 C. [Greek: dia\ tau=ta de\
-kai\ pro\s Thrasu/machon, oi)=mai, poreu/somai, kai\ a)/llose
-o(/poi du/namai, a)poro=n--e)pei\ ei)/ g' e)the/lois su\ tou/ton
-me\n e)/de pau/sasthai pro\s e)me\ to=n lo/gon to=n
-protreptiko=n], &c.]
-
-[Side-note: Kleitophon is on the point of leaving Sokrates and
-going to Thrasymachus. But before leaving he addresses one last
-entreaty, that Sokrates will speak out clearly and explicitly.]
-
-Proceed, Sokrates--I supplicate you--to deal with me as I have
-described; in order that I may never more have occasion, when I
-talk with Lysias, to blame you on some points while praising you
-on others. I will repeat, that to one who has not yet received the
-necessary stimulus, your conversation is of inestimable value: but
-to one who has already been stimulated, it is rather a hindrance
-than a help, to his realising the full acquisition of virtue, and
-thus becoming happy.[15]
-
-[Footnote 15: Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 E. [Greek: me\ me\n ga\r
-protetramme/no| se\ a)nthro/po|, o)= So/krates, a)/xion ei)=nai
-tou= panto\s phe/so, protetramme/no| de/, schedo\n kai\ e)mpo/dion
-tou= pro\s te/los a)rete=s e)ltho/nta eu)dai/mona gene/sthai.]]
-
-*  *  *  *  *
-
-[Side-note: Remarks on the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in
-the eighth Tetralogy immediately before the Republic, and along
-with Kritias, the other fragment.]
-
-The fragment called Kleitophon (of which I have given an abstract
-comparatively long), is in several ways remarkable. The
-Thrasyllean catalogue places it first in the eighth Tetralogy; the
-three other members of the same Tetralogy being, Republic, Timaeus,
-Kritias.[16] Though it is both short, and abrupt in its close, we
-know that it was so likewise in antiquity: the ancient Platonic
-commentators observing, that Sokrates disdained to make any reply
-to the appeal of Kleitophon.[17] There were therefore in this
-Tetralogy two fragments, unfinished works from the
-beginning--Kleitophon and Kritias.
-
-[Footnote 16: Diog. L. iii. 59. The Kleitophon also was one of the
-dialogues selected by some students of Plato as proper to be
-studied first of all (Diog. L. iii. 61).]
-
-[Footnote 17: M. Boeckh observes (ad Platonis Minoem, p. 11):--"Nec
-minus falsum est, quod _spurium_ Clitophontem plerique omnes
-mutilatum putant; quem ex auctoris manibus truncum excidisse inde
-intelligitur, quod ne vetusti quidem Platonici philosophi, quibus
-antiquissima exemplaria ad manum erant, habuerunt integriorem.
-Proclus in Timae, i. p. 7. [Greek: Ptolemai=os de\ o( Platoniko\s
-Kleitopho=nta au)to\n oi)/etai ei)=nai. tou=ton ga\r e)n to=|
-o(monu/mo| dialo/go| med' a)pokri/seos e)xio=sthai para\
-Sokra/tous.] Plane ut in Critia, quem ab ipso Platone non
-absolutum docet Plutarchus in Solone."
-
-M. Boeckh here characterises the Kleitophon as _spurious_, in
-which opinion I do not concur.
-
-Yxem, in his Dissertation, Ueber Platon's Kleitophon, Berlin,
-1846, has vindicated the genuineness of this dialogue, though many
-of his arguments are such as I cannot subscribe to.
-
-He shows farther, that the first idea of distrusting the
-genuineness of the Kleitophon arose from the fact that the
-dialogue was printed in the Aldine edition of 1513, along with the
-spurious dialogues; although in that very Aldine edition the
-editors expressly announce that this was a mistake, and that the
-dialogue ought to have been printed as first of the eighth
-tetralogy. See Yxem, pp. 32-33. Subsequent editors followed the
-Aldine in printing the dialogue among the spurious, though still
-declaring that they did not consider it spurious.]
-
-We may explain why Thrasyllus placed the Kleitophon in immediate
-antecedence to the Republic: because 1. It complains bitterly of
-the want of a good explanation of Justice, which Sokrates in the
-latter books of the Republic professes to furnish. 2. It brings
-before us Kleitophon, who announces an inclination to consult
-Thrasymachus: now both these personages appear in the first book
-of the Republic, in which too Thrasymachus is introduced as
-disputing in a brutal and insulting way, and as humiliated by
-Sokrates: so that the Republic might be considered both as an
-answer to the challenge of the Kleitophon, and as a reproof to
-Kleitophon himself for having threatened to quit Sokrates and go
-to Thrasymachus.
-
-[Side-note: Kleitophon is genuine, and perfectly in harmony with a
-just theory of Plato.]
-
-Like so many other pieces in the Thrasyllean catalogue, the
-Kleitophon has been declared to be spurious by Schleiermacher and
-other critics of the present century. I see no ground for this
-opinion, and I believe the dialogue to be genuine. If it be asked,
-how can we imagine Plato to have composed a polemic argument, both
-powerful and unanswered, against Sokrates,--I reply, that this is
-not so surprising as the Parmenides: in which Plato has introduced
-the veteran so named as the successful assailant not only of
-Sokrates, but of the Platonic theory of Ideas defended by
-Sokrates.
-
-I have already declared, that the character of Plato is, in my
-judgment, essentially many-sided. It comprehends the whole process
-of searching for truth, and testing all that is propounded as
-such: it does not shrink from broaching and developing speculative
-views not merely various and distinct, but sometimes even
-opposite.
-
-[Side-note: It could not have been published until after Plato's
-death.]
-
-Yet though the Kleitophon is Plato's work, it is a sketch or
-fragment never worked out. In its present condition, it can hardly
-have been published (any more than the Kritias) either by his
-direction or during his life. I conceive it to have remained among
-his papers, to have been made known by his school after his death,
-and to have passed from thence among the other Platonic
-manuscripts into the Alexandrian library at its first foundation.
-Possibly it may have been originally intended as a preparation for
-the solution of that problem, which Sokrates afterwards undertakes
-in the Republic: for it is a challenge to Sokrates to explain what
-he means by Justice. It may have been intended as such, but never
-prosecuted:--the preparation for that solution being provided in
-another way, such as we now read in the first and second books of
-the Republic. That the great works of Plato--Republic, Protagoras,
-Symposion, &c.--could not have been completed without preliminary
-sketches and tentatives--we may regard as certain. That some of
-these sketches, though never worked up, and never published by
-Plato himself, should have been good enough to be preserved by him
-and published by those who succeeded him--is at the very least
-highly probable. One such is the Kleitophon.
-
-[Side-note: Reasons why the Kleitophon was never finished. It
-points out the defects of Sokrates, just as he himself confesses
-them in the Apology.]
-
-When I read the Kleitophon, I am not at all surprised that Plato
-never brought it to a conclusion, nor ever provided Sokrates with
-an answer to the respectful, yet emphatic, requisition of
-Kleitophon. The case against Sokrates has been made so strong,
-that I doubt whether Plato himself could have answered it to his
-own satisfaction. It resembles the objections which he advances in
-the Parmenides against the theory of Ideas: objections which he
-has nowhere answered, and which I do not believe that he could
-answer. The characteristic attribute of which Kleitophon complains
-in Sokrates is, that of a one-sided and incomplete
-efficiency--([Greek: phu/sis mono/kolos])--"You are perpetually stirring
-us up and instigating us: you do this most admirably: but when we have
-become full of fervour, you do not teach us how we are to act, nor
-point out the goal towards which we are to move".[18] Now this is
-precisely the description which Sokrates gives of his own
-efficiency, in the Platonic Apology addressed to the Dikasts. He
-lays especial stress on the mission imposed upon him by the Gods,
-to apply his Elenchus in testing and convicting the false
-persuasion of knowledge universally prevalent:--to make sure by
-repeated cross-examination, whether the citizens pursued money and
-worldly advancement more energetically than virtue:--and to worry
-the Athenians with perpetual stimulus, like the gadfly exciting a
-high-bred but lethargic horse. Sokrates describes this not only as
-the mission of his life, but as a signal benefit and privilege
-conferred upon Athens by the Gods.[19] But here his services end.
-He declares explicitly that he shares in the universal ignorance,
-and that he is no wiser than any one else, except in being aware
-of his own ignorance. He disclaims all power of teaching:[20] and
-he deprecates the supposition,--that he himself knew what he
-convicted others of not knowing,--as a mistake which had brought
-upon him alike unmerited reputation and great unpopularity.[21] We
-find thus that the description given by Sokrates of himself in the
-Apology, and the reproach addressed to Sokrates by Kleitophon,
-fully coincide. "My mission from the Gods" (says Sokrates), "is to
-dispel the false persuasion of knowledge, to cross-examine men
-into a painful conviction of their own ignorance, and to create in
-them a lively impulse towards knowledge and virtue: but I am no
-wiser than they: I can teach them nothing, nor can I direct them
-what to do."--That is exactly what I complain of (remarks
-Kleitophon): I have gone through your course,--have been
-electrified by your Elenchus,--and am full of the impulse which
-you so admirably communicate. In this condition, what I require
-is, to find out how, or in which direction I am to employ that
-impulse. If you cannot tell me, I must ask Thrasymachus or some
-one else.
-
-[Footnote 18: I have in an earlier chapter (ch. viii. vol. i. p.
-406) cited the passage--"Philosophiam multis locis inchoasti: ad
-impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum". This is the language
-addressed by Cicero to Varro, and coinciding substantially with
-that of Kleitophon here.]
-
-[Footnote 19: Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 28 E, 29 D-E, 30 A-E. 30 E:
-[Greek: proskei/menon te=| po/lei u(po\ tou= theou= o(/sper
-i(/ppo| mega/lo| me\n kai\ gennai/o|, u(po\ mege/thous de\
-notheste/ro| kai\ deome/no| e)gei/resthai u(po\ mu/opo/s tinos;
-oi(=on de/ moi dokei= o( theo\s e)me\ te=| po/lei prostetheike/nai
-toiou=to/n tina, o(\s u(ma=s e)gei/ron kai\ pei/thon kai\
-o)neidi/zon e(/na e(/kaston ou)de\n pau/omai te\n e(me/ran o(/len
-pantachou= proskathi/zon.] Also pp. 36 D, 41 E.]
-
-[Footnote 20: Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 21 D-22 D, 33 A: [Greek: e)go\
-de\ dida/skalos ou)deno\s po/pot' e)geno/men.]]
-
-[Footnote 21: Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 23 A, 28 A.]
-
-[Side-note: The same defects also confessed in many of the Platonic
-and Xenophontic dialogues.]
-
-Moreover, it is not merely in the declarations of Sokrates himself
-before the Athenian Dikasts, but also in the Platonic Sokrates as
-exhibited by Plato in very many of his dialogues, that the same
-efficiency, and the same deficiency, stand conspicuous. The hearer
-is convicted of ignorance, on some familiar subject which he
-believed himself to know: the protreptic stimulus is powerful,
-stinging his mind into uneasiness which he cannot appease except
-by finding some tenable result: but the didactic supplement is not
-forthcoming. Sokrates ends by creating a painful feeling of
-perplexity in the hearers, but he himself shares the feeling along
-with them.--It is this which the youth Protarchus deprecates, at
-the beginning of the Platonic Philebus;[22] and with which Hippias
-taunts Sokrates, in one of the Xenophontic
-conversations[23]--insomuch that Sokrates replies to the taunt by
-giving a definition of the Just ([Greek: to\ di/kaion]), upon which
-Hippias comments. But if the observations ascribed by Xenophon to
-Hippias are a report of what that Sophist really said, we only see
-how inferior he was to Sokrates in the art of cross-questioning: for
-the definition given by Sokrates would have been found altogether
-untenable, if there had been any second Sokrates to apply the
-Elenchus to it.[24] Lastly, Xenophon expressly tells us, that
-there were others also, who, both in speech and writing, imputed
-to Sokrates the same deficiency on the affirmative side.[25]
-
-[Footnote 22: Plato, Philebus, p. 20 A.]
-
-[Footnote 23: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 9-11.]
-
-[Footnote 24: We need only compare the observations made by
-Hippias in that dialogue, to the objections raised by Sokrates
-himself in his conversation with Euthydemus, Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2,
-and to the dialogue of the youthful Alkibiades (evidently borrowed
-from Sokrates) with Perikles, ib. i. 2, 40-47.]
-
-[Footnote 25: Xenoph. Memor. i. 4, 1. [Greek: ei) de/ tines
-Sokra/ten nomi/zousin, o(s e(/nioi gra/phousi/ te kai\ le/gousi
-peri\ au)tou= tekmairo/menoi, protre/psasthai me\n a)nthro/pous
-e)p' a)rete\n kra/tiston gegone/nai, proagagei=n de\ e)p' au)te\n
-ou)ch i(kano/n--skepsa/menoi me\ mo/non], &c.
-
-See also Cicero, De Oratore, i. 47, 204, in which Sokrates is
-represented as saying that _concitatio_ ([Greek: protrope\]) was
-all that people required: they did not need guidance: they would
-find out the way for themselves: and Yxem, Ueber Platon's
-Kleitophon, pp. 5-12.]
-
-[Side-note: Forcible, yet respectful, manner in which these defects
-are set forth in the Kleitophon. Impossible to answer them in such
-a way as to hold out against the negative Elenchus of a Sokratic
-pupil.]
-
-The Platonic Kleitophon corresponds, in a great degree, to these
-complaints of Protarchus and others, as well as to the taunt of
-Hippias. The case is put, however, with much greater force and
-emphasis: as looked at, not by an opponent and outsider, like
-Hippias--nor by a mere novice, unarmed though eager, like
-Protarchus--but by a companion of long standing, who has gone
-through the full course of negative gymnastic, is grateful for the
-benefit derived, and feels that it is time to pass from the lesser
-mysteries to the greater. He is sick of perpetual negation and
-stimulus: he demands doctrines and explanations, which will hold
-good against the negative Elenchus of Sokrates himself. But this
-is exactly what Sokrates cannot give. His mission from the
-Delphian God finishes with the negative: inspiration fails him
-when he deals with the affirmative. He is like the gadfly (his own
-simile) in stimulating the horse--and also in furnishing no
-direction how the stimulus is to be expended. His affirmative
-dicta,--as given in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, are for the most
-part plain, home-bred, good sense,--in which all the philosophical
-questions are slurred over, and the undefined words, Justice,
-Temperance, Holiness, Courage, Law, &c., are assumed to have a
-settled meaning agreed to by every one: while as given by Plato,
-in the Republic and elsewhere, they are more speculative,
-highflown, and poetical,[26] but not the less exposed to certain
-demolition, if the batteries of the Sokratic Elenchus were brought
-to bear upon them. The challenge of Kleitophon is thus
-unanswerable. It brings out in the most forcible, yet respectful,
-manner the contrast between the two attributes of the Sokratic
-mind: in the negative, irresistible force and originality: in the
-affirmative, confessed barrenness alternating with honest, acute,
-practical sense, but not philosophy. Instead of this, Plato gives
-us transcendental hypotheses, and a religious and poetical ideal;
-impressive indeed to the feelings, but equally inadmissible to a
-mind trained in the use of the Sokratic tests.
-
-[Footnote 26: The explanation of Justice given by Plato in the
-Republic deserves to be described much in the same words as
-Sokrates employs (Repub. i. p. 332 C) in characterising the
-definition of Justice furnished by (or ascribed to) the poet
-Simonides:--
-
-[Greek: e)|ni/xato, o(s e)/oiken, o( Simoni/des poietiko=s to\
-di/kaion o(\ ei)/e.]]
-
-[Side-note: The Kleitophon represents a point of view which many
-objectors must have insisted on against Sokrates and Plato.]
-
-We may thus see sufficient reason why Plato, after having drawn up
-the Kleitophon as preparatory basis for a dialogue, became
-unwilling to work it out, and left it as an unfinished sketch. He
-had, probably without intending it, made out too strong a case
-against Sokrates and against himself. If he continued it, he would
-have been obliged to put some sufficient reason into the mouth of
-Sokrates, why Kleitophon should abandon his intention of
-frequenting some other teacher: and this was a hard task. He would
-have been obliged to lay before Kleitophon, a pupil thoroughly
-inoculated with his own negative _oestrus_, affirmative
-solutions proof against such subtle cross-examination: and this,
-we may fairly assume, was not merely a hard task, but impossible.
-Hence it is that we possess the Kleitophon only as a fragment.
-
-[Side-note: The Kleitophon was originally intended as a first book
-of the Republic, but was found too hard to answer. Reasons why the
-existing first book was substituted.]
-
-Yet I think it a very ingenious and instructive fragment: setting
-forth powerfully, in respect to the negative philosophy of
-Sokrates and Plato, a point of view which must have been held by
-many intelligent contemporaries. Among all the objections urged
-against Sokrates and Plato, probably none was more frequent than
-this protest against the continued negative procedure. This same
-point of view--that Sokrates puzzled every one, but taught no one
-any thing--is reproduced by Thrasymachus against Sokrates in the
-first book of the Republic:[27] in which first book there are
-various other marks of analogy with the Kleitophon.[28] It might
-seem as if Plato had in the first instance projected a dialogue in
-which Sokrates was to discuss the subject of justice, and had
-drawn up the Kleitophon as the sketch of a sort of forcing process
-to be applied to Sokrates: then, finding that he placed Sokrates
-under too severe pressure, had abandoned the project, and taken up
-the same subject anew, in the manner which we now read in the
-Republic. The task which he assigns to Sokrates, in this
-last-mentioned dialogue, is far easier. Instead of the appeal made
-to Sokrates by Kleitophon, with truly Sokratic point--we have an
-assault made upon him by Thrasymachus, alike angry, impudent and
-feeble; which just elicits the peculiar aptitude of Sokrates for
-humbling the boastful affirmer. Again in the second book, Glaukon
-and Adeimantus are introduced as stating the difficulties which
-they feel in respect to the theory of Justice: but in a manner
-totally different from Kleitophon, and without any reference to
-previous Sokratic requirements. Each of them delivers an eloquent
-and forcible pleading, in the manner of an Aristotelian or
-Ciceronian dialogue: and to this Sokrates makes his reply. In that
-reply, Sokrates explains what he means by Justice: and though his
-exposition is given in the form of short questions, each followed
-by an answer of acquiescence, yet no real or serious objections
-are made to him throughout the whole. The case must have been very
-different if Plato had continued the dialogue Kleitophon; so as to
-make Sokrates explain the theory of Justice, in the face of all
-the objections raised by a Sokratic cross-examiner.[29]
-
-[Footnote 27: Plat. Repub. pp. 336 D, 337 A, 338 A.]
-
-[Footnote 28: For example, That it is not the province of the just
-man to hurt any one, either friend or foe, Repub. p. 335 D.
-
-Thrasymachus derides any such definitions of [Greek: to\ di/kaion]
-as the following--[Greek: to\ de/on--to\ o)phe/limon--to\
-lusitelou=n--to\ xumphe/ron--to\ kerda/leon], Repub. i. p. 336,
-C-D.
-
-These are exactly the unsatisfactory definitions which Kleitophon
-describes himself (p. 409 C) as having received from the partisans
-of Sokrates.]
-
-[Footnote 29: Schleiermacher (Einleitung, v. pp. 453-455)
-considers the Kleitophon not to be the work of Plato. But this
-only shows that he, like many other critics, attaches scarcely the
-smallest importance to the presumption arising from the Canon of
-Thrasyllus. For the grounds by which he justifies his disallowance
-of the dialogue are to the last degree trivial.
-
-I note with surprise one of his assertions: "How" (he asks) "or
-from what motive can Plato have introduced an attack upon
-Sokrates, which is thoroughly repelled, both seriously and
-ironically, in almost all the Platonic dialogues?"
-
-As I read Plato, on the contrary: the Truth is, That it is
-repelled in none, confirmed in many, and thoroughly ratified by
-Sokrates himself in the Platonic Apology.
-
-Schleiermacher thinks that the Kleitophon is an attack upon
-Sokrates and the Sokratic men, Plato included, made by some
-opponent out of the best rhetorical schools. He calls it "a parody
-and caricature" of the Sokratic manner. To me it seems no
-caricature at all. It is a very fair application of the Sokratic
-or Platonic manner. Nor is it conceived by any means in the spirit
-of an enemy, but in that of an established companion, respectful
-and grateful, yet dissatisfied at finding that he makes no
-progress.]
-
-
-
-
-END OF VOL. III.
-
-
-
-
-*************************************
-Transcriber's Note
-
-The text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive.
-
-For the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used:
-) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute
-accent; \ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript.
-ch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta;
-e for eta and o for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases.
-
-Corrections to the text, indicated in text with **:
-
-Location             Text of scan of 3rd edition   Correction
-ToC, Ch. 31          admissable                    admissible
-Ch. 26 fn. 30        phi/le=|                      phi/le|
-Ch. 26 fn. 33        to/de\                        to/de
-Ch. 26 after fn. 125 fourth                        eighth
-Ch. 28 fn. 47        aussitot                      aussitot
-Ch. 28 fn. 78        ajourd'hui                    aujourd'hui
-Ch. 28 fn. 92        It we compare                 If we compare
-Ch. 28 fn. 97        Theaetet. p. 186 C.            Theaetet. p. 186 D.
-Ch. 28 fn. 99        tuphra/                       tuphla/
-Ch. 28 after fn. 143 Chapter VI                    Chapter VIII
-Ch. 29 fn. 23        p. 130 D                      p. 130 E
-Ch. 29 fn. 102       paphei=n                      pathei=n
-Ch. 30 fn. 18        Phaedrus p. 229 C),            Phaedrus (p. 229 C),
-Ch. 31 fn. 18        e(u)=n                        ou)=n
-Ch. 31 fn. 18        oka/stou                      e(ka/stou
-Ch. 31 fn. 40        Is is                         It is
-Ch. 31 fn. 47        tems                          temps
-Ch. 31 fn. 48        ab-antiquitatis               ab antiquitatis
-Ch. 31 fn. 58        429-411 C.                    409-411 C.
-Ch. 31 fn. 63        p. .                          p. 88
-Ch. 32 fn. 42        pho/bpn                       pho/bon
-Ch. 33 fn. 31        p. 373                        p. 359
-
-
-
-
-
-End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plato and the Other Companions of
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