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diff --git a/old/42208.txt b/old/42208.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 0a514af..0000000 --- a/old/42208.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3290 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of German philosophy and politics, by John Dewey - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: German philosophy and politics - -Author: John Dewey - -Release Date: February 26, 2013 [EBook #42208] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GERMAN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS *** - - - - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Lisa Reigel, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - - - - - - - - - GERMAN PHILOSOPHY - AND POLITICS - - - BY - JOHN DEWEY - Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University - - - NEW YORK - HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY - 1915 - - - - - COPYRIGHT, 1915, - BY - HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY - - - THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS - RAHWAY, N. J. - - - - -PREFACE - - -The will of John Calvin McNair established a Foundation at the -University of North Carolina upon which public lectures are to be given -from time to time to the members of the University. This book contains -three lectures which were given in February of this year upon this -Foundation. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the many courtesies enjoyed -during my brief stay at Chapel Hill, the seat of the University. - - J. D. - - Columbia University, - New York City, April, 1915. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - I GERMAN PHILOSOPHY: THE TWO WORLDS 3 - - II GERMAN MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 47 - - III THE GERMANIC PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 91 - - INDEX 133 - - - - -GERMAN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS - - - - -I - -GERMAN PHILOSOPHY: THE TWO WORLDS - - -The nature of the influence of general ideas upon practical affairs is a -troubled question. Mind dislikes to find itself a pilgrim in an alien -world. A discovery that the belief in the influence of thought upon -action is an illusion would leave men profoundly saddened with -themselves and with the world. Were it not that the doctrine forbids any -discovery influencing affairs--since the discovery would be an idea--we -should say that the discovery of the wholly _ex post facto_ and idle -character of ideas would profoundly influence subsequent affairs. The -strange thing is that when men had least control over nature and their -own affairs, they were most sure of the efficacy of thought. The -doctrine that nature does nothing in vain, that it is directed by -purpose, was not engrafted by scholasticism upon science; it formulates -an instinctive tendency. And if the doctrine be fallacious, its pathos -has a noble quality. It testifies to the longing of human thought for a -world of its own texture. Yet just in the degree in which men, by means -of inventions and political arrangements, have found ways of making -their thoughts effective, they have come to question whether any -thinking is efficacious. Our notions in physical science tend to reduce -mind to a bare spectator of a machine-like nature grinding its -unrelenting way. The vogue of evolutionary ideas has led many to regard -intelligence as a deposit from history, not as a force in its making. We -look backward rather than forward; and when we look forward we seem to -see but a further unrolling of a panorama long ago rolled up on a cosmic -reel. Even Bergson, who, to a casual reader, appears to reveal vast -unexplored vistas of genuinely novel possibilities, turns out, upon -careful study, to regard _intellect_ (everything which in the past has -gone by the name of observation and reflection) as but an evolutionary -deposit whose importance is confined to the conservation of a life -already achieved, and bids us trust to instinct, or something akin to -instinct, for the future:--as if there were hope and consolation in -bidding us trust to that which, in any case, we cannot intelligently -direct or control. - -I do not see that the school of history which finds Bergson mystic and -romantic, which prides itself upon its hard-headed and scientific -character, comes out at a different place. I refer to the doctrine of -the economic interpretation of history in its extreme form--which, so -its adherents tell us, is its only logical form. It is easy to follow -them when they tell us that past historians have ignored the great part -played by economic forces, and that descriptions and explanations have -been correspondingly superficial. When one reflects that the great -problems of the present day are those attending economic reorganization, -one might even take the doctrine as a half-hearted confession that -historians are really engaged in construing the past in terms of the -problems and interests of an impending future, instead of reporting a -past in order to discover some mathematical curve which future events -are bound to describe. But no; our strictly scientific economic -interpreters will have it that economic forces present an inevitable -evolution, of which state and church, art and literature, science and -philosophy are by-products. It is useless to suggest that while modern -industry has given an immense stimulus to scientific inquiry, yet -nevertheless the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century comes -after the scientific revolution of the seventeenth. The dogma forbids -any connection. - -But when we note that Marx gave it away that his materialistic -interpretation of history was but the Hegelian idealistic dialectic -turned upside down, we may grow wary. Is it, after all, history we are -dealing with or another philosophy of history? And when we discover that -the great importance of the doctrine is urged upon us, when we find that -we are told that the general recognition of its truth helps us out of -our present troubles and indicates a path for future effort, we -positively take heart. These writers do not seem to mean just what they -say. Like the rest of us, they are human, and infected with a belief -that ideas, even highly abstract theories, are of efficacy in the -conduct of human affairs influencing the history which is yet to be. - - * * * * * - -I have, however, no intention of entering upon this controversy, much -less of trying to settle it. These remarks are but preliminary to a -consideration of some of the practical affiliations of portions of the -modern history of philosophical thought with practical social affairs. -And if I set forth my own position in the controversy in question, the -statement is frankly a personal one, intended to make known the -prepossessions with which I approach the discussion of the political -bearings of one phase of modern philosophy. I do not believe, then, that -_pure_ ideas, or pure thought, ever exercised any influence upon human -action. I believe that very much of what has been presented as -philosophic reflection is in effect simply an idealization, for the sake -of emotional satisfaction, of the brutely given state of affairs, and is -not a genuine discovery of the practical influence of ideas. In other -words, I believe it to be esthetic in type even when sadly lacking in -esthetic form. And I believe it is easy to exaggerate the practical -influence of even the more vital and genuine ideas of which I am about -to speak. - -But I also believe that there are no such things as _pure_ ideas or -_pure_ reason. Every living thought represents a gesture made toward -the world, an attitude taken to some practical situation in which we -are implicated. Most of these gestures are ephemeral; they reveal the -state of him who makes them rather than effect a significant alteration -of conditions. But at some times they are congenial to a situation in -which men in masses are acting and suffering. They supply a model for -the attitudes of others; they condense into a dramatic type of action. -They then form what we call the "great" systems of thought. Not all -ideas perish with the momentary response. They are voiced and others -hear; they are written and others read. Education, formal and informal, -embodies them not so much in other men's minds as in their permanent -dispositions of action. They are in the blood, and afford sustenance to -conduct; they are in the muscles and men strike or retire. Even -emotional and esthetic systems may breed a disposition toward the world -and take overt effect. The reactions thus engendered are, indeed, -superficial as compared with those in which more primitive instincts are -embodied. The business of eating and drinking, buying and selling, -marrying and being given in marriage, making war and peace, gets somehow -carried on along with any and every system of ideas which the world has -known. But how, and when and where and for what men do even these things -is tremendously affected by the abstract ideas which get into -circulation. - - * * * * * - -I take it that I may seem to be engaged in an emphatic urging of the -obvious. However it may be with a few specialized schools of men, almost -everybody takes it as a matter of course that ideas influence action and -help determine the subsequent course of events. Yet there is a purpose -in this insistence. Most persons draw the line at a certain kind of -general ideas. They are especially prone to regard the ideas which -constitute philosophic theories as practically innocuous--as more or -less amiable speculations significant at the most for moments of -leisure, in moments of relief from preoccupation with affairs. Above -all, men take the particular general ideas which happen to affect their -own conduct of life as normal and inevitable. Pray what other ideas -would any sensible man have? They forget the extent to which these ideas -originated as parts of a remote and technical theoretical system, which -by multitudes of non-reflective channels has infiltrated into their -habits of imagination and behavior. An expert intellectual anatomist, -my friends, might dissect you and find Platonic and Aristotelian -tissues, organs from St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, Locke and -Descartes, in the make-up of the ideas by which you are habitually -swayed, and find, indeed, that they and other thinkers of whose names -you have never heard constitute a larger part of your mental structure -than does the Calvin or Kant, Darwin or Spencer, Hegel or Emerson, -Bergson or Browning to whom you yield conscious allegiance. - -Philosophers themselves are naturally chiefly responsible for the -ordinary estimate of their own influence, or lack of influence. They -have been taken mostly at their own word as to what they were doing, and -what for the most part they have pretended to do is radically different -from what they have actually done. They are quite negligible as seers -and reporters of ultimate reality, or the essential natures of things. -And it is in this aspect that they have mostly fancied seeing -themselves. Their actual office has been quite other. They have told -about nature and life and society in terms of collective human desire -and aspiration as these were determined by contemporary difficulties -and struggles. - -I have spoken thus far as if the influence of general ideas upon action -were likely to be beneficial. It goes against the grain to attribute -evil to the workings of intelligence. But we might as well face the -dilemma. What is called pure thought, thought freed from the empirical -contingencies of life, would, even if it existed, be irrelevant to the -guidance of action. For the latter always operates amid the circumstance -of contingencies. And thinking which is colored by time and place must -always be of a mixed quality. In part, it will detect and hold fast to -more permanent tendencies and arrangements; in part, it will take the -limitations of its own period as necessary and universal--even as -intrinsically desirable. - -The traits which give thinking effectiveness for the good give it also -potency for harm. A physical catastrophe, an earthquake or -conflagration, acts only where it happens. While its effects endure, it -passes away. But it is of the nature of ideas to be abstract: that is to -say, severed from the circumstances of their origin, and through -embodiment in language capable of operating in remote climes and alien -situations. Time heals physical ravages, but it may only accentuate the -evils of an intellectual catastrophe--for by no lesser name can we call -a systematic intellectual error. To one who is professionally -preoccupied with philosophy there is much in its history which is -profoundly depressing. He sees ideas which were not only natural but -useful in their native time and place, figuring in foreign contexts so -as to formulate defects as virtues and to give rational sanction to -brute facts, and to oppose alleged eternal truths to progress. He sees -movements which might have passed away with change of circumstance as -casually as they arose, acquire persistence and dignity because thought -has taken cognizance of them and given them intellectual names. The -witness of history is that to think in general and abstract terms is -dangerous; it elevates ideas beyond the situations in which they were -born and charges them with we know not what menace for the future. And -in the past the danger has been the greater because philosophers have so -largely purported to be concerned not with contemporary problems of -living, but with essential Truth and Reality viewed under the form of -eternity. - -In bringing these general considerations to a close, I face an -embarrassment. I must choose some particular period of intellectual -history for more concrete illustration of the mutual relationship of -philosophy and practical social affairs--which latter, for the sake of -brevity, I term Politics. One is tempted to choose Plato. For in spite -of the mystic and transcendental coloring of his thought, it was he who -defined philosophy as the science of the State, or the most complete and -organized whole known to man; it is no accident that his chief work is -termed the "Republic." In modern times, we are struck by the fact that -English philosophy from Bacon to John Stuart Mill has been cultivated by -men of affairs rather than by professors, and with a direct outlook upon -social interests. In France, the great period of philosophy, the period -of _les philosophes_, was the time in which were forged the ideas which -connect in particular with the French Revolution and in general with the -conceptions which spread so rapidly through the civilized world, of the -indefinite perfectibility of humanity, the rights of man, and the -promotion of a society as wide as humanity, based upon allegiance to -reason. - -Somewhat arbitrarily I have, however, selected some aspects of classic -German thought for my illustrative material. Partly, I suppose, because -one is piqued by the apparent challenge which its highly technical, -professorial and predominantly _a priori_ character offers to the -proposition that there is close connection between abstract thought and -the tendencies of collective life. More to the point, probably, is the -fact that the heroic age of German thought lies almost within the last -century, while the creative period of continental thought lies largely -in the eighteenth century, and that of British thought still earlier. It -was Taine, the Frenchman, who said that all the leading ideas of the -present day were produced in Germany between 1780 and 1830. Above all, -the Germans, as we say, have philosophy in their blood. Such phrases -generally mean something not about hereditary qualities, but about the -social conditions under which ideas propagate and circulate. - -Now Germany is the modern state which provides the greatest facilities -for general ideas to take effect through social inculcation. Its system -of education is adapted to that end. Higher schools and universities in -Germany are really, not just nominally, under the control of the state -and part of the state life. In spite of freedom of academic instruction -when once a teacher is installed in office, the political authorities -have always taken a hand, at critical junctures, in determining the -selection of teachers in subjects that had a direct bearing upon -political policies. Moreover, one of the chief functions of the -universities is the preparation of future state officials. Legislative -activity is distinctly subordinate to that of administration conducted -by a trained civil service, or, if you please, bureaucracy. Membership -in this bureaucracy is dependent upon university training. Philosophy, -both directly and indirectly, plays an unusually large role in the -training. The faculty of law does not chiefly aim at the preparation of -practicing lawyers. Philosophies of jurisprudence are essential parts of -the law teaching; and every one of the classic philosophers took a hand -in writing a philosophy of Law and of the State. Moreover, in the -theological faculties, which are also organic parts of state-controlled -institutions, the theology and higher criticism of Protestant Germany -have been developed, and developed also in close connection with -philosophical systems--like those of Kant, Schleiermacher and Hegel. In -short, the educational and administrative agencies of Germany provide -ready-made channels through which philosophic ideas may flow on their -way to practical affairs. - -Political public opinion hardly exists in Germany in the sense in which -it obtains in France, Great Britain or this country. So far as it -exists, the universities may be said to be its chief organs. They, -rather than the newspapers, crystallize it and give it articulate -expression. Instead of expressing surprise at the characteristic -utterances of university men with reference to the great war, we should -then rather turn to the past history in which the ideas now uttered were -generated. - -In an account of German intellectual history sufficiently extensive we -should have to go back at least to Luther. Fortunately, for our -purposes, what he actually did and taught is not so important as the -more recent tradition concerning his peculiarly Germanic status and -office. All peoples are proud of all their great men. Germany is proud -of Luther as its greatest national hero. But while most nations are -proud of their great men, Germany is proud of itself rather for -producing Luther. It finds him as a Germanic product quite natural--nay, -inevitable. A belief in the universal character of his genius thus -naturally is converted into a belief of the essentially universal -quality of the people who produced him. - -Heine was not disposed by birth or temperament to overestimate the -significance of Luther. But here is what he said: - - "Luther is not only the greatest but the most _German_ man in - our history. . . . He possessed qualities that we seldom see - associated--nay, that we usually find in the most hostile - antagonism. He was at once a dreamy mystic and a practical man - of action. . . . He was both a cold scholastic word-sifter and - an inspired God-drunk prophet. . . . He was full of the awful - reverence of God, full of self-sacrificing devotion to - the Holy Spirit, he could lose himself entirely in pure - spirituality. Yet he was fully acquainted with the glories of - this earth; he knew how estimable they are; it was his lips - that uttered the famous maxim-- - - "'Who loves not woman, wine and song, - Remains a fool his whole life long.' - - He was a complete man, I might say an absolute man, in whom - there was no discord between matter and spirit. To call - him a spiritualist would be as erroneous as to call him a - sensualist. . . . Eternal praise to the man whom we have to - thank for the deliverance of our most precious possessions." - -And again speaking of Luther's work: - - "Thus was established in Germany spiritual freedom, or as it - is called, freedom of thought. Thought became a right and the - decisions of reason legitimate." - -The specific correctness of the above is of slight importance as -compared with the universality of the tradition which made these ideas -peculiarly Germanic, and Luther, therefore, a genuine national hero and -type. - -It is, however, with Kant that I commence. In Protestant Germany his -name is almost always associated with that of Luther. That he brought to -consciousness the true meaning of the Lutheran reformation is a -commonplace of the German historian. One can hardly convey a sense of -the unique position he occupies in the German thought of the last two -generations. It is not that every philosopher is a Kantian, or that the -professed Kantians stick literally to his text. Far from it. But Kant -must always be reckoned with. No position unlike his should be taken up -till Kant has been reverently disposed of, and the new position -evaluated in his terms. To scoff at him is fair sacrilege. In a genuine -sense, he marks the end of the older age. He _is_ the transition to -distinctively modern thought. - -One shrinks at the attempt to compress even his leading ideas into an -hour. Fortunately for me, few who read my attempt will have sufficient -acquaintance with the tomes of Kantian interpretation and exposition to -appreciate the full enormity of my offense. For I cannot avoid the -effort to seize from out his highly technical writings a single idea and -to label that his germinal idea. For only in this way can we get a clew -to those general ideas with which Germany characteristically prefers to -connect the aspirations and convictions that animate its deeds. - -Adventuring without further preface into this field, I find that Kant's -decisive contribution is the idea of a dual legislation of reason by -which are marked off two distinct realms--that of science and that of -morals. Each of these two realms has its own final and authoritative -constitution: On one hand, there is the world of sense, the world of -phenomena in space and time in which science is at home; on the other -hand, is the supersensible, the noumenal world, the world of moral duty -and moral freedom. - -Every cultivated man is familiar with the conflict of science and -religion, brute fact and ideal purpose, what is and what ought to be, -necessity and freedom. In the domain of science causal dependence is -sovereign; while freedom is lord of moral action. It is the proud boast -of those who are Kantian in spirit that Kant discovered laws deep in the -very nature of things and of human experience whose recognition puts an -end forever to all possibility of conflict. - -In principle, the discovery is as simple as its application is -far-reaching. Both science and moral obligation exist. Analysis shows -that each is based upon laws supplied by one and the same reason (of -which, as he is fond of saying, reason is the legislator); but laws of -such a nature that their respective jurisdictions can never compete. The -material for the legislation of reason in the natural world is sense. In -this sensible world of space and time, causal necessity reigns: such is -the decree of reason itself. Every attempt to find freedom, to locate -ideals, to draw support for man's moral aspirations in nature, is -predoomed to failure. The effort of reason to do these things is -contrary to the very nature of reason itself: it is self-contradictory, -suicidal. - -When one considers the extent in which religion has been bound up with -belief in miracles, or departures from the order of nature; when one -notes how support for morals has been sought in natural law; how morals -have been tied up with man's natural tendencies to seek happiness and -with consequences in the way of reward of virtue and punishment of vice; -how history has been explained as a play of moral forces--in short, the -extent to which both the grounds and the sanctions for morality have -been sought within the time and space world, one realizes the scope of -the revolution wrought by Kant, provided his philosophy be true. Add to -this the fact that men in the past have not taken seriously the idea -that every existence in space, every event in time, is connected by -bonds of causal necessity with other existences and events, and -consequently have had no motive for the systematic pursuit of science. -How is the late appearance of science in human history to be accounted -for? How are we to understand the comparatively slight influence which -science still has upon the conduct of life? Men, when they have not -consciously looked upon nature as a scene of caprice, have failed to -bring home to themselves that nature is a scene of the legislative -activity of reason in the material of sense. This fact the Kantian -philosophy brings home to man once for all; it brings it home not as a -pious wish, nor as a precarious hope confirmed empirically here and -there by victories won by a Galileo or a Newton, but as an indubitable -fact necessary to the existence of any cognitive experience at all. The -reign of law in nature is the work of the same reason which proceeds -empirically and haltingly to the discovery of law here and there. Thus -the acceptance of the Kantian philosophy not only frees man at a single -stroke from superstition, sentimentalism and moral and theological -romanticism, but gives at the same stroke authorization and stimulation -to the detailed efforts of man to wrest from nature her secrets of -causal law. What sparse groups of men of natural science had been doing -for the three preceding centuries, Kant proclaimed to be the -manifestation of the essential constitution of man as a knowing being. -For those who accept the Kantian philosophy, it is accordingly the -_magna charta_ of scientific work: the adequate formulation of the -constitution which directs and justifies their scientific inquiries. It -is a truism to say that among the Germans as nowhere else has developed -a positive reverence for science. In what other land does one find in -the organic law mention of Science, and read in its constitution an -express provision that "Science and its teaching are free"? - -But this expresses only half of Kant's work. Reason is itself -supersensible. Giving law to the material of sense and so constituting -nature, it is in itself above sense and nature, as a sovereign is above -his subjects. The supersensible world is thus a more congenial field for -its legislative activity than the physical world of space and time. But -is any such field open to human experience? Has not Kant himself closed -and locked the gates in his assertion that the entire operation of man's -knowing powers is confined to the realm of sense in which causal -necessity dominates? Yes, as far as knowledge is concerned. No, as far -as moral obligation is concerned. The fact of duty, the existence of a -categorical command to act thus and so, no matter what the pressure of -physical surroundings or the incitation of animal inclinations, is as -much a fact as the existence of knowledge of the physical world. Such a -command cannot proceed from nature. What is cannot introduce man to what -ought to be, and thus impose its own opposite upon him. Nature only -enmeshes men in its relentless machine-like movement. The very existence -of a command in man to act for the sake of what ought to be--no matter -what actually is--is thus of itself final proof of the operation of -supersensible reason within human experience: not, indeed, within -theoretical or cognitive experience, but within moral experience. - -The moral law, the law of obligation, thus proceeds from a source in man -above reason. It is token of his membership as a moral being in a -kingdom of absolute ends above nature. But it is also directed to -something in man which is equally above nature: it appeals to and -demands freedom. Reason is incapable of anything so irrational, so -self-contradictory, as imposing a law of action to which no faculty of -action corresponds. The freedom of the moral will is the answer to the -unqualified demand of duty. It is not open to man to accept or reject -this truth as he may see fit. It is a principle of reason which is -involved in every exercise of reason. In denying it in name, man none -the less acknowledges it in fact. Only men already sophisticated by vice -who are seeking an excuse for their viciousness ever try to deny, even -in words, the response which freedom makes to the voice of duty. Since, -however, freedom is an absolute stranger to the natural and sensible -world, man's possession of moral freedom is the final sign and seal of -his membership in a supersensible world. The existence of an ideal or -spiritual realm with its own laws is thus certified to by the fact of -man's own citizenship within it. But, once more, this citizenship and -this certification are solely moral. Scientific or intellectual warrant -for it is impossible or self-contradictory, for science works by the -law of causal necessity with respect to what is, ignorant of any law of -freedom referring to what should be. - -With the doors to the supersensible world now open, it is but a short -step to religion. Of the negative traits of true religion we may be sure -in advance. It will not be based upon intellectual grounds. Proofs of -the existence of God, of the creation of nature, of the existence of an -immaterial soul from the standpoint of knowledge are all of them -impossible. They transgress the limits of knowledge, since that is -confined to the sensible world of time and space. Neither will true -religion be based upon historic facts such as those of Jewish history or -the life of Jesus or the authority of a historic institution like a -church. For all historic facts as such fall within the realm of time -which is sensibly conditioned. From the points of view of natural -theology and historic religions Kant was greeted by his contemporaries -as the "all-shattering." Quite otherwise is it, however, as to moral -proofs of religious ideas and ideals. In Kant's own words: "I have found -it necessary to deny knowledge of God, freedom and immortality in order -to find a place for faith"--faith being a moral act. - -Then he proceeds to reinterpret in terms of the sensuous natural -principle and the ideal rational principle the main doctrines of -Lutheran Protestantism. The doctrines of incarnation, original sin, -atonement, justification by faith and sanctification, while baseless -literally and historically, are symbols of the dual nature of man, as -phenomenal and noumenal. And while Kant scourges ecclesiastical -religions so far as they have relied upon ceremonies and external -authority, upon external rewards and punishments, yet he ascribes -transitional value to them in that they have symbolized ultimate moral -truths. Although dogmas are but the external vesture of inner truths, -yet it may be good for us "to continue to pay reverence to the outward -vesture since that has served to bring to general acceptance a doctrine -which really rests upon an authority within the soul of man, and which, -therefore, needs no miracle to commend it." - -It is a precarious undertaking to single out some one thing in German -philosophy as of typical importance in understanding German national -life. Yet I am committed to the venture. My conviction is that we have -its root idea in the doctrine of Kant concerning the two realms, one -outer, physical and necessary, the other inner, ideal and free. To this -we must add that, in spite of their separateness and independence, the -primacy always lies with the inner. As compared with this, the -philosophy of a Nietzsche, to which so many resort at the present time -for explanation of what seems to them otherwise inexplicable, is but a -superficial and transitory wave of opinion. Surely the chief mark of -distinctively German civilization is its combination of self-conscious -idealism with unsurpassed technical efficiency and organization in the -varied fields of action. If this is not a realization in fact of what is -found in Kant, I am totally at loss for a name by which to characterize -it. I do not mean that conscious adherence to the philosophy of Kant has -been the cause of the marvelous advances made in Germany in the natural -sciences and in the systematic application of the fruits of intelligence -to industry, trade, commerce, military affairs, education, civic -administration and industrial organization. Such a claim would be -absurd. But I do mean, primarily, that Kant detected and formulated the -direction in which the German genius was moving, so that his philosophy -is of immense prophetic significance; and, secondarily, that his -formulation has furnished a banner and a conscious creed which in solid -and definite fashion has intensified and deepened the work actually -undertaken. - -In bringing to an imaginative synthesis what might have remained an -immense diversity of enterprises, Kantianism has helped formulate a -sense of a national mission and destiny. Over and above this, his -formulation and its influence aids us to understand why the German -consciousness has never been swamped by its technical efficiency and -devotion, but has remained self-consciously, not to say -self-righteously, idealistic. Such a work as Germany has undertaken -might well seem calculated to generate attachment to a positivistic or -even materialistic philosophy and to a utilitarian ethics. But no; the -teaching of Kant had put mechanism forever in its subordinate place at -the very time it inculcated devotion to mechanism in its place. Above -and beyond as an end, for the sake of which all technical achievements, -all promotion of health, wealth and happiness, exist, lies the realm of -inner freedom, of the ideal and the supersensible. The more the Germans -accomplish in the way of material conquest, the more they are conscious -of fulfilling an ideal mission; every external conquest affords the -greater warrant for dwelling in an inner region where mechanism does not -intrude. Thus it turns out that while the Germans have been, to employ a -catchword of recent thought, the most technically pragmatic of all -peoples in their actual conduct of affairs, there is no people so -hostile to the spirit of a pragmatic philosophy. - -The combination of devotion to mechanism and organization in outward -affairs and of loyalty to freedom and consciousness in the inner realm -has its obvious attractions. Realized in the common temper of a people -it might well seem invincible. Ended is the paralysis of action arising -from the split between science and useful achievements on one side and -spiritual and ideal aspirations on the other. Each feeds and reinforces -the other. Freedom of soul and subordination of action dwell in harmony. -Obedience, definite subjection and control, detailed organization is the -lesson enforced by the rule of causal necessity in the outer world of -space and time in which action takes place. Unlimited freedom, the -heightening of consciousness for its own sake, sheer reveling in noble -ideals, the law of the inner world. What more can mortal man ask? - -It would not be difficult, I imagine, to fill the three hours devoted to -these lectures with quotations from representative German authors to the -effect that supreme regard for the inner meaning of things, reverence -for inner truth in disregard of external consequences of advantage or -disadvantage, is the distinguishing mark of the German spirit as -against, say, the externality of the Latin spirit or the utilitarianism -of Anglo-Saxondom. I content myself with one quotation, a quotation -which also indicates the same inclination to treat historic facts as -symbolic of great truths which is found in Kant's treatment of church -dogmas. Speaking of the Germanic languages, an historian of German -civilization says: - - "While all other Indo-European languages allow a wide liberty - in placing the accent and make external considerations, - such as the quantity of the syllables and euphony, of - deciding influence, the Germanic tribes show a remarkable - and intentional transition to an internal principle of - accentuation. . . . Of all related peoples the Germanic alone - puts the accent on the root syllable of the word, that is, on - the part that gives it its meaning. There is hardly an - ethnological fact extant which gives so much food for thought - as this. What leads these people to give up a habit which must - have been so old that it had become instinctive, and to evolve - out of their own minds a principle which indicates a power of - discrimination far in advance of anything we are used to - attribute to the lower stages of civilization? Circumstances - of which we are not now aware must have compelled them to - distinguish the inner essence of things from their external - form, and must have taught them to appreciate the former as of - higher, indeed as of sole, importance. It is this accentuation - of the real substance of things, the ever-powerful desire to - discover this real substance, and the ever-present impulse to - give expression to this inner reality which has become the - controlling trait of the Germanic soul. Hence the conviction - gained by countless unfruitful efforts, that reason alone will - never get at the true foundation of things; hence the - thoroughness of German science; hence a great many of the - qualities that explain Germanic successes and failures; hence, - perhaps, a certain stubbornness and obstinacy, the - unwillingness to give up a conviction once formed; hence the - tendency to mysticism; hence that continuous struggle which - marks the history of German art,--the struggle to give to the - contents powerful and adequate expression, and to satisfy at - the same time the requirements of esthetic elegance and - beauty, a struggle in which the victory is ever on the side of - truth, though it be homely, over beauty of form whenever it - appears deceitful; hence the part played by music as the only - expression of those imponderable vibrations of the soul for - which language seems to have no words; hence the faith of the - German in his mission among the nations as a bringer of truth, - as a recognizer of the real value of things as against the - hollow shell of beautiful form, as the doer of right deeds for - their own sake and not for any reward beyond the natural - outcome of the deed itself." - -The division established between the outer realm, in which of course -acts fall, and the inner realm of consciousness explains what is -otherwise so paradoxical to a foreigner in German writings: The constant -assertion that Germany brought to the world the conscious recognition of -the principle of freedom coupled with the assertion of the relative -incompetency of the German folk _en masse_ for political self-direction. -To one saturated by the English tradition which identifies freedom with -power to act upon one's ideas, to make one's purposes effective in -regulation of public affairs, the combination seems self-contradictory. -To the German it is natural. Readers who have been led by newspaper -quotations to regard Bernhardi as preaching simply a gospel of superior -force will find in his writings a continual assertion that _the_ German -spirit is the spirit of freedom, of complete intellectual -self-determination; that the Germans have "always been the standard -bearers of free thought." We find him supporting his teachings not by -appeal to Nietzsche, but by the Kantian distinction between the -"empirical and rational ego." - -It is Bernhardi who says: - - "Two great movements were born from the German intellectual - life, on which, henceforth, _all the intellectual and moral - progress of mankind must rest_:--The Reformation and the - critical philosophy. The Reformation that broke the - intellectual yoke imposed by the Church, which checked all - free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason which put a - stop to the caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for - the human mind the limitations of its capacities for - knowledge, and at the same time pointed out the way in which - knowledge is really possible. On this substructure was - developed the intellectual life of our time, whose deepest - significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result - of free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and - thus to lay a foundation for the harmonious organization of - mankind. . . . The German nation not only laid the foundations - of this great struggle for a harmonious development of humanity - but took the lead in it. We are thus incurring an obligation - for the future from which we cannot shrink. We must be - prepared to be the leader in this campaign which is being - fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human - efforts. . . . To no nation except the German has it been given - to enjoy in its inner self 'that which is given to mankind as - a whole.' . . . It is this quality which especially fits us for - leadership in the intellectual domain and _imposes upon us the - obligation to maintain that position_."[35:A] - - [35:A] Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," pp. - 73-74. Italics not in the original text. - -More significant than the words themselves are their occasion and the -occupation of the one who utters them. Outside of Germany, cavalry -generals who employ philosophy to bring home practical lessons are, I -think, rare. Outside of Germany, it would be hard to find an audience -where an appeal for military preparedness would be reinforced by -allusions to the Critique of Pure Reason. - -Yet only by taking such statements seriously can one understand the -temper in which opinion in Germany meets a national crisis. When the -philosopher Eucken (who received a Nobel prize for contributing to the -idealistic literature of the world) justifies the part taken by Germany -in a world war because the Germans alone do not represent a -particularistic and nationalistic spirit, but embody the "universalism" -of humanity itself, he utters a conviction bred in German thought by the -ruling interpretation of German philosophic idealism. By the side of -this _motif_ the glorification of war as a biologic necessity, forced by -increase of population, is a secondary detail, giving a totally false -impression when isolated from its context. The main thing is that -Germany, more than any other nation, in a sense alone of all nations, -embodies the essential principle of humanity: freedom of spirit, -combined with thorough and detailed work in the outer sphere where -reigns causal law, where obedience, discipline and subordination are -the necessities of successful organization. It is perhaps worth while to -recall that Kant lived, taught and died in Koenigsberg; and that -Koenigsberg was the chief city of east Prussia, an island still cut off -in his early years from western Prussia, a titular capital for the -Prussian kings where they went for their coronations. His lifework in -philosophy coincides essentially with the political work of Frederick -the Great, the king who combined a regime of freedom of thought and -complete religious toleration with the most extraordinary display known -in history of administrative and military efficiency. Fortunately for -our present purposes, Kant, in one of his minor essays, has touched upon -this combination and stated its philosophy in terms of his own thought. - -The essay in question is that entitled "What is the Enlightenment?" His -reply in substance is that it is the coming of age on the part of -humanity: the transition from a state of minority or infancy wherein man -does not dare to think freely to that period of majority or maturity in -which mankind dares to use its own power of understanding. The growth of -this power of free use of reason is the sole hope of progress in human -affairs. External revolutions which are not the natural expression of an -inner or intellectual revolution are of little significance. Genuine -growth is found in the slow growth of science and philosophy and in the -gradual diffusion throughout the mass of the discoveries and conclusions -of those who are superior in intelligence. True freedom is inner -freedom, freedom of thought together with the liberty consequent upon it -of teaching and publication. To check this rational freedom "is a sin -against the very nature of man, the primary law of which consists in -just the advance in rational enlightenment." - -In contrast with this realm of inner freedom stands that of civil and -political action, the principle of which is obedience or subordination -to constituted authority. Kant illustrates the nature of the two by the -position of a military subordinate who is given an order to execute -which his reason tells him is unwise. His sole duty in the realm of -practice is to obey--to do his duty. But as a member not of the State -but of the kingdom of science, he has the right of free inquiry and -publication. Later he might write upon the campaign in which this event -took place and point out, upon intellectual grounds, the mistake -involved in the order. No wonder that Kant proclaims that the age of the -enlightenment is the age of Frederick the Great. Yet we should do -injustice to Kant if we inferred that he expected this dualism of -spheres of action, with its twofold moral law of freedom and obedience, -to endure forever. By the exercise of freedom of thought, and by its -publication and the education which should make its results permeate the -whole state, the habits of a nation will finally become elevated to -rationality, and the spread of reason will make it possible for the -government to treat men, not as cogs in a machine, but in accord with -the dignity of rational creatures. - -Before leaving this theme, I must point out one aspect of the work of -reason thus far passed over. Nature, the sensible world of space and -time, is, as a knowable object, constituted by the legislative work of -reason, although constituted out of a non-rational sensible stuff. This -determining work of reason forms not merely the Idealism of the Kantian -philosophy but determines its emphasis upon the _a priori_. The -functions of reason through which nature is rendered a knowable object -cannot be derived from experience, for they are necessary to the -existence of experience. The details of this _a priori_ apparatus lie -far outside our present concern. Suffice it to say that as compared with -some of his successors, Kant was an economical soul and got along with -only two _a priori_ forms and twelve _a priori_ categories. The mental -habitudes generated by attachment to _a priori_ categories cannot -however be entirely neglected in even such a cursory discussion as the -present. - -If one were to follow the suggestion involved in the lately quoted -passage as to the significant symbolism of the place of the accent in -German speech, one might discourse upon the deep meaning of the -Capitalization of Nouns in the written form of the German language, -together with the richness of the language in abstract nouns. One might -fancy that the dignity of the common noun substantive, expressing as it -does the universal or generic, has bred an intellectual deference. One -may fancy a whole nation of readers reverently bowing their heads at -each successively capitalized word. In such fashion one might arrive at -a picture, not without its truth, of what it means to be devoted to _a -priori_ rational principles. - -A number of times during the course of the world war I have heard -someone remark that he would not so much mind what the Germans did if it -were not for the reasons assigned in its justification. But to -rationalize such a tangled skein as human experience is a difficult -task. If one is in possession of antecedent rational concepts which are -legislative for experience, the task is much simplified. It only remains -to subsume each empirical event under its proper category. If the -outsider does not see the applicability of the concept to the event, it -may be argued that his blindness shows his ineptness for truly universal -thinking. He is probably a crass empiric who thinks in terms of material -consequences instead of upon the basis of antecedent informing -principles of reason. - -Thus it has come about that no moral, social or political question is -adequately discussed in Germany until the matter in hand has been -properly deduced from an exhaustive determination of its fundamental -_Begriff_ or _Wesen_. Or if the material is too obviously empirical to -allow of such deduction, it must at least be placed under its -appropriate rational form. What a convenience, what a resource, nay, -what a weapon is the Kantian distinction of _a priori_ rational form and -_a posteriori_ empirical matter. Let the latter be as brutely -diversified, as chaotic as you please. There always exists a form of -unity under which it may be brought. If the empirical facts are -recalcitrant, so much the worse for them. It only shows how empirical -they are. To put them under a rational form is but to subdue their -irrational opposition to reason, or to invade their lukewarm neutrality. -Any violence done them is more than indemnified by the favor of bringing -them under the sway of _a priori_ reason, the incarnation of the -Absolute on earth. - -Yet there are certain disadvantages attached to _a priori_ categories. -They have a certain rigidity, appalling to those who have not learned to -identify stiffness with force. Empirical matters are subject to -revision. The strongest belief that claims the support of experience is -subject to modification when experience testifies against it. But an _a -priori_ conception is not open to adverse evidence. There is no court -having jurisdiction. If, then, an unfortunate mortal should happen to -be imposed upon so that he was led to regard a prejudice or predilection -as an _a priori_ truth, contrary experience would have a tendency to -make him the more obstinate in his belief. History proves what a -dangerous thing it has been for men, when they try to impose their will -upon other men, to think of themselves as special instruments and organs -of Deity. The danger is equally great when an _a priori_ Reason is -substituted for a Divine Providence. Empirically grounded truths do not -have a wide scope; they do not inspire such violent loyalty to -themselves as ideas supposed to proceed directly from reason itself. But -they are discussable; they have a humane and social quality, while -truths of pure reason have a paradoxical way, in the end, of escaping -from the arbitrament of reasoning. They evade the logic of experience, -only to become, in the phrase of a recent writer, the spoil of a "logic -of fanaticism." Weapons forged in the smithy of the Absolute become -brutal and cruel when confronted by merely human resistance. - -The stiffly constrained character of an _a priori_ Reason manifests -itself in another way. A category of pure reason is suspiciously like a -pigeonhole. An American writer, speaking before the present war, -remarked with witty exaggeration that "Germany is a monstrous set of -pigeonholes, and every mother's son of a German is pigeoned in his -respective hole--tagged, labeled and ticketed. Germany is a huge human -check-room, and the government carries the checks in its pocket." John -Locke's deepest objection to the older form of the _a priori_ -philosophy, the doctrine of innate ideas, was the readiness with which -such ideas become strongholds behind which authority shelters itself -from questioning. And John Morley pointed out long ago the undoubted -historic fact that the whole modern liberal social and political -movement has allied itself with philosophic empiricism. It is hard here, -as everywhere, to disentangle cause and effect. But one can at least say -with considerable assurance that a hierarchically ordered and subordered -State will feel an affinity for a philosophy of fixed categories, while -a flexible democratic society will, in its crude empiricism, exhibit -loose ends. - -There is a story to the effect that the good townspeople of Koenigsberg -were accustomed to their watches by the time at which Kant passed upon -his walks--so uniform was he. Yielding to the Teutonic temptation to -find an inner meaning in the outer event, one may wonder whether German -thought has not since Kant's time set its intellectual and spiritual -clocks by the Kantian standard: the separation of the inner and the -outer, with its lesson of freedom and idealism in one realm, and of -mechanism, efficiency and organization in the other. A German professor -of philosophy has said that while the Latins live in the present moment, -the Germans live in the infinite and ineffable. His accusation (though I -am not sure he meant it as such) is not completely justified. But it -does seem to be true that the Germans, more readily than other peoples, -can withdraw themselves from the exigencies and contingencies of life -into a region of _Innerlichkeit_ which at least _seems_ boundless; and -which can rarely be successfully uttered save through music, and a frail -and tender poetry, sometimes domestic, sometimes lyric, but always full -of mysterious charm. But technical ideas, ideas about means and -instruments, can readily be externalized because the outer world is in -truth their abiding home. - - - - -II - -GERMAN MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY - - -It is difficult to select sentences from Kant which are intelligible to -those not trained in his vocabulary, unless the selection is accompanied -by an almost word-by-word commentary. His writings have proved an -admirable _terrain_ for the display of German _Gruendlichkeit_. But I -venture upon the quotation of one sentence which may serve the purpose -of at once recalling the main lesson of the previous lecture and -furnishing a transition to the theme of the present hour. - - "Even if an immeasurable gulf is fixed between the sensible - realm of the concept of nature and the supersensible realm of - the concept of freedom, so that it is not possible to go from - the first to the second (at least by means of the theoretical - use of reason) any more than if they were two separate worlds - of which the first could have no influence upon the - second,--yet the second is _meant_ to have an influence upon - the first. The concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the - world of sense the purpose proposed by its laws." . . . - -That is, the relation between the world of space and time where physical -causality reigns and the moral world of freedom and duty is not a -symmetrical one. The former cannot intrude into the latter. But it is -the very nature of moral legislation that it is meant to influence the -world of sense; its object is to realize the purposes of free rational -action within the sense world. This fact fixes the chief features of -Kant's philosophy of Morals and of the State. - -It is a claim of the admirers of Kant that he first brought to -recognition the true and infinite nature of the principle of -Personality. On one side, the individual is _homo phenomenon_--a part of -the scheme of nature, governed by its laws as much as any stone or -plant. But in virtue of his citizenship in the kingdom of supersensible -Laws and Ends, he is elevated to true universality. He is no longer a -mere occurrence. He is a Person--one in whom the purpose of Humanity is -incarnate. In English and American writings the terms subjective and -subjectivism usually carry with them a disparaging color. Quite -otherwise is it in German literature. This sets the age of subjectivism, -whose commencement, roughly speaking, coincides with the influence of -Kantian thought, in sharp opposition to the age of individualism, as -well as to a prior period of subordination to external authority. -Individualism means isolation; it means external relations of human -beings with one another and with the world; it looks at things -quantitatively, in terms of wholes and parts. Subjectivism means -recognition of the principle of free personality: the self as creative, -occupied not with an external world which limits it from without, but, -through its own self-consciousness, finding a world within itself; and -having found the universal within itself, setting to work to recreate -itself in what had been the external world, and by its own creative -expansion in industry, art and politics to transform what had been mere -limiting material into a work of its own. Free as was Kant from the -sentimental, the mystic and the romantic phases of this Subjectivism, we -shall do well to bear it in mind in thinking of his ethical theory. -Personality means that man as a rational being does not receive the end -which forms the law of his action from without, whether from Nature, the -State or from God, but from his own self. Morality is autonomous; man, -humanity, is an end in itself. Obedience to the self-imposed law will -transform the sensible world (within which falls all social ties so far -as they spring from natural instinct desire) into a form appropriate to -universal reason. Thus we may paraphrase the sentence quoted from Kant. - -The gospel of duty has an invigorating ring. It is easy to present it as -the most noble and sublime of all moral doctrines. What is more worthy -of humanity, what better marks the separation of man from brute, than -the will to subordinate selfish desire and individual inclination to the -commands of stern and lofty duty? And if the idea of command (which -inevitably goes with the notion of duty) carries a sinister suggestion -of legal authority, pains and penalties and of subservience to an -external authority who issues the commands, Kant seems to have provided -a final corrective in insisting that duty is self-imposed. Moral -commands are imposed by the higher, supranatural self upon the lower -empirical self, by the rational self upon the self of passions and -inclinations. German philosophy is attached to antitheses and their -reconciliation in a higher synthesis. The Kantian principle of Duty is a -striking case of the reconciliation of the seemingly conflicting ideas -of freedom and authority. - -Unfortunately, however, the balance cannot be maintained in practice. -Kant's faithful logic compels him to insist that the concept of duty is -empty and formal. It tells men that to do their duty is their supreme -law of action, but is silent as to what men's duties specifically are. -Kant, moreover, insists, as he is in logic bound to do, that the motive -which measures duty is wholly inner; it is purely a matter of inner -consciousness. To admit that consequences can be taken into account in -deciding what duty is in a particular case would be to make concessions -to the empirical and sensible world which are fatal to the scheme. The -combination of these two features of pure internality and pure formalism -leads, in a world where men's _acts_ take place wholly in the external -and empirical region, to serious consequences. - -The dangerous character of these consequences may perhaps be best -gathered indirectly by means of a quotation. - - "While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual - and secular despotism had broken their chains and proclaimed - their _rights_, another quite different revolution was working - in Prussia--the revolution of _duty_. The assertion of the - rights of the individual leads ultimately to individual - irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State. Immanuel - Kant, the founder of the critical philosophy, taught, in - opposition to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and - Scharnhorst grasped the idea of universal military service. By - calling upon which individual to sacrifice property and life - for the good of the community, he gave the clearest expression - to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis on which - the claims to individual rights might rest."[52:A] - - [52:A] Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," pp. - 63-64. - -The sudden jump, by means of only a comma, from the gospel of moral duty -to universal military service is much more logical than the shock which -it gives to an American reader would indicate. I do not mean, of course, -that Kant's teaching was the cause of Prussia's adoption of universal -military service and of the thoroughgoing subordination of individual -happiness and liberty of action to that capitalized entity, the State. -But I do mean that when the practical political situation called for -universal military service in order to support and expand the existing -state, the gospel of a Duty devoid of content naturally lent itself to -the consecration and idealization of such specific duties as the -existing national order might prescribe. The sense of duty must get its -subject-matter somewhere, and unless subjectivism was to revert to -anarchic or romantic individualism (which is hardly in the spirit of -obedience to authoritative law) its appropriate subject-matter lies in -the commands of a superior. Concretely what the State commands is the -congenial outer filling of a purely inner sense of duty. That the -despotism of Frederick the Great and of the Hohenzollerns who remained -true to his policy was at least that hitherto unknown thing, an -enlightened despotism, made the identification easier. Individuals have -at all times, in epochs of stress, offered their supreme sacrifice to -their country's good. In Germany this sacrifice in times of peace as -well as of war has been systematically reinforced by an inner mystic -sense of a Duty elevating men to the plane of the universal and -eternal. - -In short, the sublime gospel of duty has its defects. Outside of the -theological and the Kantian moral traditions, men have generally agreed -that duties are relative to ends. Not the obligation, but some purpose, -some good, which the fulfillment of duty realizes, is the principle of -morals. The business of reason is to see that the end, the good, for -which one acts is a reasonable one--that is to say, as wide and as -equitable in its working out as the situation permits. Morals which are -based upon consideration of good and evil consequences not only allow, -but imperiously demand the exercise of a discriminating intelligence. A -gospel of duty separated from empirical purposes and results tends to -gag intelligence. It substitutes for the work of reason displayed in a -wide and distributed survey of consequences in order to determine where -duty lies an inner consciousness, empty of content, which clothes with -the form of rationality the demands of existing social authorities. A -consciousness which is not based upon and checked by consideration of -actual results upon human welfare is none the less socially -irresponsible because labeled Reason. - -Professor Eucken represents a type of idealistic philosophy which is -hardly acceptable to strict Kantians. Yet only where the fundamental -Kantian ideas were current would such ethical ideas as the following -flourish: - - "When justice is considered as a mere means of securing man's - welfare, and is treated accordingly--whether it be the welfare - of individuals or of society as a whole makes no essential - difference--it loses all its characteristic features. No - longer can it compel us to see life from its own standpoint; - no longer can it change the existing condition of things; no - longer can it sway our hearts with the force of a primitive - passion, and oppose to all consideration of consequences an - irresistible spiritual compulsion. It degenerates rather into - the complaisant servant of utility; it adopts herself to her - demands, and in so doing suffers inward annihilation. It can - maintain itself only when it comes as a unique revelation of - the Spiritual Life within our human world, as a lofty Presence - transcending all considerations of expediency."[55:A] - - [55:A] Eucken, "The Meaning and Value of Life," - translated by Gibson, p. 104. - -Such writing is capable of arousing emotional reverberations in the -breasts of many persons. But they are emotions which, if given headway, -smother intelligence, and undermine its responsibility for promoting the -actual goods of life. If justice loses all its characteristic features -when regarded as a means (the word "mere" inserted before "means" speaks -volumes) of the welfare of society as a whole, then there is no -objective and responsible criterion for justice at all. A justice which, -irrespective of the determination of social well-being, proclaims itself -as an irresistible spiritual impulsion possessed of the force of a -primitive passion, is nothing but a primitive passion clothed with a -spiritual title so that it is protected from having to render an account -of itself. During an ordinary course of things, it passes for but an -emotional indulgence; in a time of stress and strain, it exhibits itself -as surrender of intelligence to passion. - -The passage (from Bernhardi) quoted earlier puts the German principle of -duty in opposition to the French principle of rights--a favorite -contrast in German thought. Men like Jeremy Bentham also found the -Revolutionary Rights of Man doctrinaire and conducing to tyranny rather -than to freedom. These Rights were _a priori_, like Duty, being derived -from the supposed nature or essence of man, instead of being adopted as -empirical expedients to further progress and happiness. But the -conception of duty is one-sided, expressing command on one side and -obedience on the other, while rights are at least reciprocal. Rights are -social and sociable in accord with the spirit of French philosophy. Put -in a less abstract form than the revolutionary theory stated them, they -are things to be discussed and measured. They admit of more and less, of -compromise and adjustment. So also does the characteristic moral -contribution of English thought--intelligent self-interest. This is -hardly an ultimate idea. But at least it evokes a picture of merchants -bargaining, while the categorical imperative calls up the drill -sergeant. Trafficking ethics, in which each gives up something which he -wants to get something which he wants more, is not the noblest kind of -morals, but at least it is socially responsible as far as it goes. "Give -so that it may be given to you in return" has at least some tendency to -bring men together; it promotes agreement. It requires deliberation and -discussion. This is just what the authoritative voice of a superior will -not tolerate; it is the one unforgiveable sin. - -The morals of bargaining, exchange, the mutual satisfaction of wants may -be outlived in some remote future, but up to the present they play an -important part in life. To me there is something uncanny in the scorn -which German ethics, in behalf of an unsullied moral idealism, pours -upon a theory which takes cognizance of practical motives. In a highly -esthetic people one might understand the display of contempt. But when -an aggressive and commercial nation carries on commerce and war simply -from the motive of obedience to duty, there is awakened an unpleasant -suspicion of a suppressed "psychic complex." When Nietzsche says, "Man -does not desire happiness; only the Englishman does that," we laugh at -the fair hit. But persons who profess no regard for happiness as a test -of action have an unfortunate way of living up to their principle by -making others _un_happy. I should entertain some suspicion of the -complete sincerity of those who profess disregard for their own -happiness, but I should be quite certain of their sincerity when it -comes to a question of _my_ happiness. - -Within the Kantian philosophy of morals there is an idea which conducts -necessarily to a philosophy of society and the State. Leibniz was the -great German source of the philosophy of the enlightenment. Harmony was -the dominant thought of this philosophy; the harmony of nature with -itself and with intelligence; the harmony of nature with the moral ends -of humanity. Although Kant was a true son of the enlightenment, his -doctrine of the radically dual nature of the legislation of Reason put -an end to its complacent optimism. According to Kant, morality is in no -way a work of nature. It is the achievement of the self-conscious reason -of man through conquest of nature. The ideal of a final harmony remains, -but it is an ideal to be won through a battle with the natural forces of -man. His breach with the enlightenment is nowhere as marked as in his -denial that man is by nature good. On the contrary, man is by nature -evil--that is, his philosophical rendering of the doctrine of original -sin. Not that the passions, appetites and senses are of themselves evil, -but they tend to usurp the sovereignty of duty as the _motivating_ -force of human action. Hence morality is a ceaseless battle to transform -all the natural desires of man into willing servants of the law and -purpose of reason. - -Even the kindly and sociable instincts of man, in which so many have -sought the basis of both morality and organized society, fall under -Kant's condemnation. As natural desires, they aspire to an illegitimate -control in man's motives. They are parts of human self-love: the -unlawful tendency to make happiness the controlling purpose of action. -The natural relations of man to man are those of an unsocial -sociableness. On the one hand, men are forced together by natural ties. -Only in social relations can individuals develop their capacities. But -no sooner do they come together than disintegrating tendencies set in. -Union with his fellows give a stimulus to vanity, avarice and gaining -power over others--traits which cannot show in themselves in individuals -when they are isolated. This mutual antagonism is, however, more of a -force in evolving man from savagery to civilization than are the kindly -and sociable instincts. - - "Without these unlovely qualities which set man over against - man in strife, individuals would have lived on in perfect - harmony, contentment and mutual love, with all their - distinctive abilities latent and undeveloped." - -In short, they would have remained in Rousseau's paradise of a state of -nature, and - - "perhaps Rousseau was right when he preferred the savage state - to the state of civilization provided we leave out of account - the last stage to which our species is yet destined to rise." - -But since the condition of civilization is but an intermediary between -the natural state and the truly or rational moral condition to which man -is to rise, Rousseau was wrong. - - "Thanks then be to nature for the unsociableness, the spiteful - competition of vanity, the insatiate desires for power and - gain." - -These quotations, selected from Kant's little essay on an "Idea for a -Universal History," are precious for understanding two of the most -characteristic traits of subsequent German thought, the distinctions -made between Society and the State and between Civilization and -Culture. Much of the trouble which has been experienced in respect to -the recent use of _Kultur_ might have been allayed by a knowledge that -_Kultur_ has little in common with the English word "culture" save a -likeness in sound. _Kultur_ is sharply antithetical to civilization in -its meaning. Civilization is a natural and largely unconscious or -involuntary growth. It is, so to speak, a by-product of the needs -engendered when people live close together. It is external, in short. -Culture, on the other, is deliberate and conscious. It is a fruit not of -men's natural motives, but of natural motives which have been -transformed by the inner spirit. Kant made the distinction when he said -that Rousseau was not so far wrong in preferring savagery to -civilization, since civilization meant simply social decencies and -elegancies and outward proprieties, while morality, that is, the rule of -the end of Reason, is necessary to culture. And the real significance of -the term "culture" becomes more obvious when he adds that it involves -the slow toil of education of the Inner Life, and that the attainment of -culture on the part of an individual depends upon long effort by the -community to which he belongs. It is not primarily an individual trait -or possession, but a conquest of the community won through devotion to -"duty." - -In recent German literature, Culture has been given even a more sharply -technical distinction from Civilization and one which emphasizes even -more its collective and nationalistic character. Civilization as -external and uncontrolled by self-conscious purpose includes such things -as language in its more spontaneous colloquial expression, trade, -conventional manners or etiquette, and the police activities of -government. _Kultur_ comprises language used for purposes of higher -literature; commerce pursued not as means of enriching individuals but -as a condition of the development of national life; art, philosophy -(especially in that untranslatable thing, the "Welt-Anschauung"); -science, religion, and the activities of the state in the nurture and -expansion of the other forms of national genius, that is, its activities -in education and the army. The legislation of Bismarck with reference to -certain Roman Catholic orders is nicknamed _Kultur-kampf_, for it was -conceived as embodying a struggle between two radically different -philosophies of life, the Roman, or Italian, and the true Germanic, not -simply as a measure of political expediency. Thus it is that a trading -and military post like Kiao-Chou is officially spoken of as a "monument -of Teutonic _Kultur_." The war now raging is conceived of as an outer -manifestation of a great spiritual struggle, in which what is really at -stake is the supreme value of the Germanic attitude in philosophy, -science and social questions generally, the "specifically German habits -of feeling and thinking." - -Very similar motives are at work in the distinction between society and -the State, which is almost a commonplace of German thought. In English -and American writings the State is almost always used to denote society -in its more organized aspects, or it may be identified with government -as a special agency operating for the collective interests of men in -association. But in German literature society is a technical term and -means something empirical and, so to speak, external; while the State, -if not avowedly something mystic and transcendental, is at least a moral -entity, the creation of self-conscious reason operating in behalf of the -spiritual and ideal interests of its members. Its function is cultural, -educative. Even when it intervenes in material interests, as it does in -regulating lawsuits, poor laws, protective tariffs, etc., etc., its -action has ultimately an ethical significance: its purpose is the -furthering of an ideal community. The same thing is to be said of wars -when they are really national wars, and not merely dynastic or -accidental. - -Society is an expression of man's egoistic nature; his natural seeking -for personal advantage and profit. Its typical manifestation is in -competitive economic struggle and in the struggle for honor and -recognized social status. These have their proper place; but with -respect even to them it is the duty of the State to intervene so that -the struggle may contribute to ideal ends which alone are universal. -Hence the significance of the force or power of the State. Unlike other -forms of force, it has a sort of sacred import, for it represents force -consecrated to the assertion and expansion of final goods which are -spiritual, moral, rational. These absolute ends can be maintained only -in struggle against man's individualistic ends. Conquest through -conflict is the law of morals everywhere. - -In Kant we find only the beginnings of this political philosophy. He is -still held back by the individualism of the eighteenth century. -Everything legal and political is conceived by him as external and hence -outside the strictly moral realm of inner motivation. Yet he is not -content to leave the State and its law as a wholly unmoral matter. The -_natural_ motives of man are, according to Kant (evidently following -Hobbes), love of power, love of gain, love of glory. These motives are -egoistic; they issue in strife--in the war of all against all. While -such a state of affairs does not and cannot invade the inner realm of -duty, the realm of the moral motive, it evidently presents a regime in -which the conquest of the world of sense by the law of reason cannot be -effected. Man in his rational or universal capacity must, therefore, -will an outward order of harmony in which it is at least possible for -acts dictated by rational freedom to get a footing. Such an outer order -is the State. Its province is not to promote moral freedom -directly--only the moral will can do that. But its business is to hinder -the hindrances to freedom: to establish a social condition of outward -order in which truly moral acts may gradually evolve a kingdom of -humanity. Thus while the State does not have a directly moral scope of -action (since the coercion of motive is a moral absurdity), it does have -a moral basis and an ultimate moral function. - -It is the law of reason, "holy and inviolable," which impels man to the -institution of the State, not natural sociability, much less -considerations of expediency. And so necessary is the State to -humanity's realization of its moral purpose that there can be no right -of revolution. The overthrow and execution of the sovereign (Kant -evidently had the French Revolution and Louis XVI in mind) is "an -immortal and inexpiable sin like the sin against the Holy Ghost spoken -of by theologians, which can never be forgiven in this world or in the -next." - -Kant was enough of a child of the eighteenth century to be cosmopolitan, -not nationalistic, in his feeling. Since humanity as a whole, in its -universality, alone truly corresponds to the universality of reason, he -upheld the ideal of an ultimate republican federation of states; he was -one of the first to proclaim the possibility of enduring peace among -nations on the basis of such a federated union of mankind. - -The threatened domination of Europe by Napoleon following on the wars -waged by republican France put an end, however, to cosmopolitanism. -Since Germany was the greatest sufferer from these wars, and since it -was obvious that the lack of national unity, the division of Germany -into a multitude of petty states, was the great source of her weakness; -since it was equally obvious that Prussia, the one strong and -centralized power among the German states, was the only thing which -saved them all from national extinction, subsequent political philosophy -in Germany rescued the idea of the State from the somewhat ambiguous -moral position in which Kant had left it. Since a state which is an -absolute moral necessity and whose actions are nevertheless lacking in -inherent moral quality is an anomaly, the doctrine almost calls for a -theory which shall make the State the supreme moral entity. - -Fichte marks the beginning of the transformation; and, in his writings, -it is easy to detect a marked difference of attitude toward the -nationalistic state before and after 1806, when in the battle of Jena -Germany went down to inglorious defeat. From the time of Fichte, the -German philosophy of the State blends with its philosophy of history, so -that my reservation of the latter topic for the next section is somewhat -arbitrary, and I shall not try rigidly to maintain the division of -themes. - -I have already mentioned the fact that Kant relaxes the separation of -the moral realm of freedom from the sensuous realm of nature -sufficiently to assert that the former is _meant_ to influence the -latter and finally to subjugate it. By means of the little crack thus -introduced into nature, Fichte rewrites the Kantian philosophy. The -world of sense must be regarded from the very start as material which -the free, rational, moral Ego has created in order to have material for -its own adequate realization of will. Fichte had a longing for an -absolute unity which did not afflict Kant, to whom, save for the -concession just referred to, a complete separation of the two operations -of legislative reason sufficed. Fichte was also an ardently _active_ -soul, whose very temperament assured him of the subordination of -theoretical knowledge to moral action. - -It would be as difficult to give, in short space, an adequate sketch of -Fichte's philosophy as of Kant's. To him, however, reason was the -expression of the will, not (as with Kant) the will an application of -reason to action. "_Im Anfang war die That_" is good Fichteanism. While -Kant continued the usual significance of the term Reason (with only such -modifications as the rationalism of his century had made current), -Fichte began the transformation which consummated in later German -idealism. If the world of nature and of human relations is an expression -of reason, then reason must be the sort of thing, and have the sort of -attributes by means of which the world may be construed, no matter how -far away this conception of reason takes us from the usual meaning of -the term. To Fichte the formula which best described such aspects of the -world and of life as he was interested in was effort at self-realization -through struggle with difficulties and overcoming opposition. Hence his -formula for reason was a Will which, having "posited" itself, then -"posited" its antithesis in order, through further action subjugating -this opposite, to conquer its own freedom. - -The doctrine of the primacy of the Deed, and of the Duty to achieve -freedom through moral self-assertion against obstacles (which, after -all, are there only to further this self-assertion) was one which could, -with more or less plausibility, be derived from Kant. More to our -present point, it was a doctrine which could be preached with noble -moral fervor in connection with the difficulties and needs of a divided -and conquered Germany. Fichte saw himself as the continuator of the work -of Luther and Kant. His final "science of knowledge" brought the German -people alone of the peoples of the world into the possession of the idea -and ideal of absolute freedom. Hence the peculiar destiny of the German -scholar and the German State. It was the duty and mission of German -science and philosophy to contribute to the cause of the spiritual -emancipation of humanity. Kant had already taught that the acts of men -were to become gradually permeated by a spirit of rationality till there -should be an equation of inner freedom of mind and outer freedom of -action. Fichte's doctrine demanded an acceleration of the process. Men -who have attained to a consciousness of the absolute freedom and -self-activity must necessarily desire to see around them similar free -beings. The scholar who is truly a scholar not merely knows, but he -knows the nature of knowledge--its place and function as a manifestation -of the Absolute. Hence he is, in a peculiar sense, the direct -manifestation of God in the world--the true priest. And his priestly -function consists in bringing other men to recognize moral freedom in -its creative operation. Such is the dignity of education as conducted by -those who have attained true philosophic insight. - -Fichte made a specific application of this idea to his own country and -time. The humiliating condition of contemporary Germany was due to the -prevalence of egoism, selfishness and particularism: to the fact that -men had lowered themselves to the plane of sensuous life. The fall was -the worse because the Germans, more than any other people, were by -nature and history conscious of the ideal and spiritual principle, the -principle of freedom, lying at the very basis of all things. The key to -the political regeneration of Germany was to be found in a moral and -spiritual regeneration effected by means of education. The key, amid -political division, to political unity was to be sought in devotion to -moral unity. In this spirit Fichte preached his "Addresses to the -German Nation." In this spirit he collaborated in the foundation of the -University of Berlin, and zealously promoted all the educational reforms -introduced by Stein and Humboldt into Prussian life. - -The conception of the State as an essential moral Being charged with an -indispensable moral function lay close to these ideas. Education is -_the_ means of the advancement of humanity toward realization of its -divine perfection. Education is the work of the State. The syllogism -completes itself. But in order that the State may carry on its -educational or moral mission it must not only possess organization and -commensurate power, but it must also control the conditions which secure -the possibility offered to the individuals composing it. To adopt -Aristotle's phrase, men must live before they can live nobly. The -primary condition of a secure life is that everyone be able to live by -his own labor. Without this, moral self-determination is a mockery. The -business of the State, outside of its educational mission, is concerned -with property, and this business means insuring property to everyone as -well as protecting him in what he already possesses. Moreover, property -is not mere physical possession. It has a profound moral significance, -for it means the subjugation of physical things to will. It is a -necessary part of the realization of moral personality: the conquest of -the non-ego by the ego. Since property does not mean mere appropriation, -but is a right recognized and validated by society itself, property has -a social basis and aim. It is an expression not of individual egotism -but of the universal will. Hence it is essential to the very idea of -property and of the State that all the members of society have an equal -opportunity for property. Hence it is the duty of the State to secure to -its every member the right to work and the reward of his work. - -The outcome, as expressed in his essay on "The Closed Industrial State," -is State Socialism, based on moral and idealistic grounds, not on -economic considerations. In order that men may have a real opportunity -to develop their moral personalities, their right to labor and to -adequate living, in return for their labor must be assured. This cannot -happen in a competitive society. Industry must be completely regulated -by the State if these indispensable rights to labor and resulting -comfort and security of life as means to moral volition are to be -achieved. But a state engaged in unrestricted foreign trade will leave -its workingmen at the mercy of foreign conditions. It must therefore -regulate or even eliminate foreign commerce so far as is necessary to -secure its own citizens. The ultimate goal is a universal state as wide -as humanity, and a state in which each individual will act freely, -without state-secured rights and state-imposed obligations. But before -this cosmopolitan and philosophically anarchic condition can be reached, -we must pass through a period of the nationalistic closed state. Thus at -the end a wide gulf separates Fichte from Kant. The moral individualism -of the latter has become an ethical socialism. Only in and by means of a -circle of egos or personalities does a human being attain the moral -reason and freedom which Kant bestowed upon him as his birthright. Only -through the educational activities of the State and its complete -regulation of the industrial activities of its members does the -potential moral freedom of individuals become an established reality. - -If I have devoted so much space to Fichte it is not because of his -direct influence upon affairs or even upon thought. He did not found a -school. His system was at once too personal and too formal. -Nevertheless, he expressed ideas which, removed from their special -context in his system, were taken up into the thought of cultivated -Germany. Heine, speaking of the vogue of systems of thought, says with -profound truth that "nations have an instinctive presentiment of what -they require to fulfill their mission." - -And Fichte's thought infiltrated through many crevices. Rodbertus and -Lasalle, the socialists, were, for example, profoundly affected by him. -When the latter was prosecuted in a criminal suit for his "Programme of -Workingmen," his reply was that his programme was a distinctively -philosophic utterance, and hence protected by the constitutional -provision for freedom of science and its teaching. And this is his -philosophy of the State: - - "The State is the unity and cooperation of individuals in a - moral whole. . . . The ultimate and intrinsic end of the State - is, therefore, to further the positive unfolding, the - progressive development of human life. Its function is to work - out the true end of man; that is to say, the full degree of - culture of which human nature is capable." - -And he quotes with approval the words: - - "The concept of the State must be broadened so as to make the - State the contrivance whereby all human virtue is to be - realized to the full." - -And if he differs from Fichte, it is but in the assertion that since the -laboring class is the one to whom the need most directly appeals, it is -workingmen who must take the lead in the development of the true -functions of the State. - -Pantheism is a philosophic nickname which should be sparingly employed; -so also should the term Monism. To call Fichte's system an ethical -pantheism and monism is not to say much that is enlightening. But with -free interpretation the designation may be highly significant in -reference to the spiritual temper of the Germany of the first part of -the nineteenth century. For it gives a key to the presentiment of what -Germany needed to fulfill its mission. - -It is a commonplace of German historians that its unity and expansion to -a great state powerful externally, prosperous internally, was wrought, -unlike that of any other people, from within outward. In Lange's words, -"our national development started from the most ideal and approximated -more and more to the real." Hegel and Heine agree that in Germany the -French Revolution and the Napoleonic career were paralleled by a -philosophic revolution and an intellectual empire. You recall the bitter -word that, when Napoleon was finally conquered and Europe partitioned, -to Germany was assigned the kingdom of the clouds. But this aerial and -tenuous kingdom became a mighty power, working with and in the statesmen -of Prussia and the scholars of Germany to found a kingdom on the solid -earth. Spiritual and ideal Germany made common cause with realistic and -practical Prussia. As says Von Sybel, the historian of the "Founding of -the German Empire": - - "Germany had been ruined through its own disintegration and - had dragged Prussia with it into the abyss. It was well known - that the wild fancies of the Conqueror hovered about the utter - annihilation of Prussia; if this should take place, then east - as well as west of the Elbe, not only political independence, - but every trace of a German spirit, the German language and - customs, German art and learning--everything would be wiped - out by the foreigners. But this fatal danger was perceived - just at the time when everybody had been looking up to Kant - and Schiller, had been admiring Faust, the world-embracing - masterpiece of Goethe's, and had recognized that Alexander von - Humboldt's cosmological studies and Niebuhr's "Roman History" - had created a new era in European science and learning. In - such intellectual attainments the Germans felt that they were - far superior to the vanquisher of the world and his great - nation; and so the political interests of Prussia and the - salvation of the German nationality exactly coincided. - Schleiermacher's patriotic sermons, Fichte's stirring - addresses to the German people, Humboldt's glorious founding - of the Berlin University, served to augment the resisting - power of Prussia, while Scharnhorst's recruits and militia - were devoted to the defense of German honor and German - customs. Everyone felt that German nationality was lost if - Prussia did not come to its rescue, and that, too, there was - no safety possible for Prussia unless all Germany was free. - - "What a remarkable providence it was that brought together, as - in the Middle Ages, on this ancient colonial ground, a throng - of the most energetic men from all districts of Germany. For - neither Stein nor his follower, Hardenberg, nor the generals - Scharnhorst, Bluecher and Gneisenau, nor the authors, Niebuhr, - Fichte and K. F. Eichorn, nor many others who might be - mentioned, were born in Prussia; yet because their thoughts - centered in Germany, they had become loyal Prussians. The name - Germany had been blotted from the political map of Europe, but - never had so many hearts thrilled at the thought of being - German. - - "Thus on the most eastern frontier of German life, in the - midst of troubles which seemed hopeless, the idea of German - unity, which had lain dormant for centuries, now sprang up in - a new birth. At first this idea was held exclusively by the - great men of the times and remained the invaluable possession - of the cultivated classes; but once started it spread far and - wide among the younger generation. . . . But it was easier to - defeat the mighty Napoleon than to bend the German sentiments - of dualism and individualism to the spirit of national unity." - -What I have called the ethical pantheism and monistic idealism of Fichte -(a type of philosophy reigning almost unchallenged in Germany till -almost the middle of the century) was an effective weapon in fighting -and winning this more difficult battle. In his volume on the "Romantic -School in Germany," Brandes quotes from the diary of Hoffman a passage -written in 1809. - - "Seized by a strange fancy at the ball on the 6th, I imagine - myself looking at my own Ego through a kaleidoscope. All the - forms moving around me are Egos and annoy me by what they do - and leave undone." - -It is a temptation to find in this passage a symbol both of German -philosophy and of the temper of Germany at the time. Its outer defeats, -its weakness in the world of action, had developed an exasperated -introspection. This outer weakness, coinciding, as Von Sybel points out, -with the bloom of Germany in art, philosophy, history, philology and -philosophy, made the Ego of Germany the noblest contemporary object of -contemplation, yet one surrounded with other national Egos who offended -by what they did and what they did not do. Patriotism, national feeling, -national consciousness are common enough facts. But nowhere save in -Germany, in the earlier nineteenth century, have these sentiments and -impulses been transformed by deliberate nurture into a mystic cult. This -was the time when the idea of the _Volks-seele_, the _Volks-geist_, was -born; and the idea lost no time in becoming a fact. Not merely poetry -was affected by it, but philology, history and jurisprudence. The -so-called historic school is its offspring. The science of social -psychology derives from it at one remove. The soul, however, needed a -body, and (quite in accord with German idealism) it formed a body for -itself--the German State as a unified Empire. - -While the idealistic period came first, it is important to bear in mind -the kind of idealism it was. At this point the pantheistic allusion -becomes significant. The idealism in question was not an idealism of -another world but of _this_ world, and especially of the State. The -embodiment of the divine and absolute will and ideal is the existing -world of nature and of men. Especially is the human ego the authorized -and creative agent of absolute purpose. The significance of German -philosophy was precisely to make men aware of their nature and destiny -as the direct and active representatives of absolute and creative -purpose. - -If I again quote Heine, it is because, with his contempt for technical -philosophy, he had an intimate sense of its human meaning. Of German -pantheistic idealism, he wrote in 1833 while it was still in its prime: - - "God is identical with the world. . . . But he manifests - himself most gloriously in man, who feels and thinks at - the same time, who is capable of distinguishing his own - individuality from objective nature, whose intellect - already bears within itself the ideas that present themselves - to him in the phenomenal world. In man Deity reaches - self-consciousness, and this self-consciousness God again - reveals through man. But this revelation does not take place - in and through individual man, but in and through collective - humanity . . . which comprehends and represents in idea and in - reality the whole God-universe. . . . It is an error to suppose - that this religion leads men to indifference. On the contrary, - the consciousness of his divinity will inspire man with - enthusiasm for its manifestation, and from this moment the - really noble achievements of true heroism glorify the earth." - -In one respect, Heine was a false prophet. He thought that this -philosophy would in the end accrue to the profit of the radical, the -republican and revolutionary party in Germany. The history of German -liberalism is a complicated matter. Suffice it in general to say that -the honey the libertarians hived was appropriated in the end by the -party of authority. In Heine's assurance that these ideas would in due -time issue in action he was profoundly right. His essay closes with -burning words, from which I extract the following: - - "It seems to me that a methodical people, such as we, must - begin with the reformation, must then occupy ourselves with - systems of philosophy, and only after their completion pass to - the political revolution. . . . Then will appear Kantians, as - little tolerant of piety in the world of deeds as in the world - of ideas, who will mercilessly upturn with sword and axe the - soil of our European life to extirpate the last remnants of - the past. Then will come upon the scene armed Fichteans, whose - fanaticism of will is to be restrained neither by fear nor - self-interest, for they live in the spirit. . . . Most of all - to be feared would be the philosophers of nature,[84:A] were - they actively to mingle. . . . For if the hand of the Kantian - strikes with strong unerring blow; if the Fichtean courageously - defies every danger, since for him danger has in reality no - existence;--the Philosopher of Nature will be terrible in that - he has allied himself with the primitive powers of nature, in - that he can conjure up the demoniac forces of old German - pantheism; and having done so, aroused in him that ancient - Germanic eagerness which combats for the joy of the combat - itself. . . . Smile not at my counsel as at the counsel of a - dreamer. . . . The thought precedes the deed as the lightning - the thunder. . . . The hour will come. As on the steps of an - amphitheater, the nations will group themselves around Germany - to witness the terrible combat." - - [84:A] He refers to the followers of Schelling, who - as matter of fact had little vogue. But his words - may not unjustly be transferred to the naturalistic - schools, which have since affected German thought. - -In my preoccupation with Heine, I seem to have wandered somewhat from -our immediate topic: the connection of the idealistic philosophy with -the development and organization of the national state of Germany. But -the necessity of the organized State to care for the moral interests of -mankind was an inherent part of Fichte's thought. At first, _what_ state -was a matter of indifference. In fact his sympathies were largely French -and republican. Before Jena, he writes: - - "What is the nation for a truly civilized Christian European? - In a general way, Europe itself. More particularly at any time - the State which is at the head of civilization. . . . With this - cosmopolitan sense, we can be tranquil before the vicissitudes - and catastrophes of history." - -In 1807 he writes: - - "The distinction between Prussia and the rest of Germany is - external, arbitrary and fortuitous. The distinction between - Germany and the rest of Europe is founded in nature." - -The seeming gulf between the two ideas is easily bridged. The "Addresses -on the Fundamental Features of the Present Age" had taught that the end -of humanity on earth is the establishment of a kingdom in which all -relations of humanity are determined with freedom or according to -Reason--according to Reason as conceived by the Fichtean formula. In his -"Addresses to the German Nation," in 1807-08, the unique mission of -Germany in the establishment of this kingdom is urged as a motive for -securing national unity and the overthrow of the conqueror. The Germans -are the sole people who recognize the principles of spiritual freedom, -of freedom won by action in accord with reason. Faithfulness to this -mission will "elevate the German name to that of the most glorious among -all the peoples, making this Nation the regenerator and restorer of the -world." He personifies their ancestors speaking to them, and saying: "We -in our time saved Germany from the Roman World Empire." But "yours is -the greater fortune. You may establish once for all the Kingdom of the -Spirit and of Reason, bringing to naught corporeal might as the ruling -thing in the world." And this antithesis of the Germanic and the Roman -principles has become a commonplace in the German imagination. Moreover, -for Germany to win is no selfish gain. It is an advantage to all -nations. "The great promise of a kingdom of right reason and truth on -earth must not become a vain and empty phantom; the present iron age is -but a transition to a better estate." Hence the concluding words: "There -is no middle road: If you sink, so sinks humanity entire with you, -without hope of future restoration." - -The premises of the historic syllogism are plain. First, the German -Luther who saved for mankind the principle of spiritual freedom against -Latin externalism; then Kant and Fichte, who wrought out the principle -into a final philosophy of science, morals and the State; as conclusion, -the German nation organized in order to win the world to recognition of -the principle, and thereby to establish the rule of freedom and science -in humanity as a whole. The Germans are patient; they have a long -memory. Ideas produced when Germany was divided and broken were retained -and cherished after it became a unified State of supreme military power, -and one yielding to no other people in industrial and commercial -prosperity. In the grosser sense of the words, Germany has not held that -might makes right. But it has been instructed by a long line of -philosophers that it is the business of ideal right to gather might to -itself in order that it may cease to be merely ideal. The State -represents exactly this incarnation of ideal law and right in effective -might. The military arm is part of this moral embodiment. Let -sentimentalists sing the praises of an ideal to which no actual force -corresponds. Prussian faith in the reality and enforcement among men of -the ideal is of a more solid character. As past history is the record -of the gradual realization in the Germanic State of the divine idea, -future history must uphold and expand what has been accomplished. -Diplomacy is the veiled display of law clothed with force in behalf of -this realization, and war is its overt manifestation. That war demands -self-sacrifice is but the more convincing proof of its profound -morality. It is the final seal of devotion to the extension of the -kingdom of the Absolute on earth. - -For the philosophy stands or falls with the conception of an Absolute. -Whether a philosophy of absolutes is theoretically sound or unsound is -none of my present concern. But that philosophical absolutism may be -practically as dangerous as matter of fact political absolutism history -testifies. The situation puts in relief what finally is at issue between -a theory which is pinned to a belief in an Absolute beyond history and -behind experience, and one which is frankly experimental. For any -philosophy which is not consistently experimental will always traffic in -absolutes no matter in how disguised a form. In German political -philosophy, the traffic is without mask. - - - - -III - -THE GERMANIC PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY - - -The unity of the German people longed for and dreamed of after 1807 -became an established fact through the war of 1870 with France. It is -easy to assign symbolic significance to this fact. Ever since the time -of the French Revolution--if not before--German thought has taken shape -in conflict with ideas that were characteristically French and in sharp -and conscious antithesis to them. Rousseau's deification of Nature was -the occasion for the development of the conception of Culture. His -condemnation of science and art as socially corrupting and socially -divisive worked across the Rhine to produce the notion that science and -art are the forces which moralize and unify humanity. The -cosmopolitanism of the French Enlightenment was transformed by German -thinkers into a self-conscious assertion of nationalism. The abstract -Rights of Man of the French Revolution were set in antithesis to the -principle of the rights of the citizen secured to him solely by the -power of the politically organized nation. The deliberate breach of the -revolutionary philosophy with the past, the attempt (foreshadowed in the -philosophy of Descartes) to make a _tabula rasa_ of the fortuitous -assemblage of traditions and institutions which history offers, in order -to substitute a social structure built upon Reason, was envisaged as the -_fons et origo_ of all evil. That history is itself incarnate reason; -that history is infinitely more rational than the formal abstracting and -generalizing reason of individuals; that individual mind becomes -rational only through the absorption and assimilation of the universal -reason embodied in historic institutions and historic development, -became the articles of faith of the German intellectual creed. It is -hardly an exaggeration to say that for almost a century the -characteristic philosophy of Germany has been a philosophy of history -even when not such in apparent form. - -Yet the meaning of this appeal to history is lost unless we bear in mind -that the Enlightenment after all transmitted to Germany, from medieval -thought, its foundation principle. The appeal was not from reason to -experience, but from analytic thought (henceforth condemned to be merely -"Understanding"--"_Verstand_") to an absolute and universal Reason -(_Vernunft_) partially revealed in nature and more adequately manifested -in human history as an organic process. Recourse to history was required -because not of any empirical lessons it has to teach, nor yet because -history bequeathes to us stubborn institutions which must be reckoned -with, but because history is the dynamic and evolving realization of -immanent reason. The contrast of the German attitude with that of Edmund -Burke is instructive. The latter had the same profound hostility to -cutting loose from the past. But his objection was not that the past is -an embodiment of transcendent reason, but that its institutions are an -"inheritance" bequeathed to us from the "collected wisdom" of our -forefathers. The continuity of political life centers not about an inner -evolving Idea, but about "our hearths, our sepulchers and our altars." -He has the same suspicion of abstract rights of man. But his appeal is -to experience and to practical consequences. Since "circumstances give -in reality to every principle its distinguishing color and -discriminating effect," there is no soundness in any principle when "it -stands stripped of every relation in all the nakedness and solitude of -metaphysical abstraction." - -According to the German view, the English protested because of -interference with empirically established rights and privileges; the -Germans, because they perceived in the Revolution a radical error as to -the nature and work of reason. In point of fact, the Germans never made -that break with tradition, political or religious, of which the French -Revolution is an emphatic symbol. I have already referred to Kant's -disposition to regard church dogmas (of which, as dogmas, he -disapproved) as vehicles of eternal spiritual truths--husks to preserve -an inner grain. All of the great German idealists gave further -expression to this disposition. To Hegel, for example, the substance of -the doctrines of Protestant Christianity is identical with the truths of -absolute philosophy, except that in religion they are expressed in a -form not adequate to their meaning, the form, namely, of imaginative -thought in which most men live. The disposition to philosophize -Christianity is too widely shown in Germany to be dismissed as a -cowardly desire at accommodation with things established. It shows -rather an intellectual piety among a people where freedom of thought and -conscience had been achieved without a violent political upheaval. Hegel -finds that the characteristic weakness of Romance thought was an inner -split, an inability to reconcile the spiritual and absolute essence of -reality with which religion deals with the detailed work of intelligence -in science and politics. The Germans, on the contrary, "were predestined -to be the bearers of the Christian principle and to carry out the Idea -as the absolutely Rational end." They accomplished this, not by a flight -away from the secular world, but by realizing that the Christian -principle is in itself that of the unity of the subjective and the -objective, the spiritual and the worldly. The "spirit finds the goal of -its struggle, its harmony, in that very sphere which it made the object -of its resistance,--it finds that secular pursuits are a spiritual -occupation";--a discovery, surely, which unites simplicity with -comprehensiveness and one which does not lead to criticism of the -secular pursuits carried on. Whatever is to be said of this as -philosophy, it expresses, in a way, the quality of German life and -thought. More than other countries, Germany has had the fortune to -preserve as food for its imaginative life and as emotional sanction the -great ideas of the past. It has carried over their reinforcement into -the pursuit of science and into politics--into the very things which in -other countries, notably in the Latin countries, have been used as -weapons of attack upon tradition. - -Political development tells a somewhat similar tale. The painful -transition from feudalism to the modern era was, for the most part, -accomplished recently in Germany, and accomplished under the guidance of -established political authorities instead of by revolt against them. -Under their supervision, and mainly at their initiative, Germany has -passed in less than a century to the regime of modern capitalistic -competitive enterprise, moderated by the State, out of the dominion of -those local and guild restrictions which so long held economic activity -in corporate bonds. The governing powers themselves secured to members -of the State what seems, at least to Germans, to be a satisfying degree -of political freedom. Along with this absence of internal disturbance -and revolution, we must put the fact that every step in the development -of Germany as a unified political power has been effected by war with -some of the neighbors by which it is hemmed in. There stands the -unfolding sequence: 1815 (not to go back to Frederick the Great), 1864, -1866, 1870. And the significant thing about these wars is not that -external territory was annexed as their consequence, but the rebound of -external struggle upon the achieving of internal unity. No wonder the -German imagination has been impressed with the idea of an organic -evolution from within, which takes the form of a unity achieved through -conflict and the conquest of an opposing principle. - -Such scattering comments as these prove nothing. But they suggest why -German thought has been peculiarly sensitive to the idea of historic -continuity; why it has been prone to seek for an original implicit -essence which has progressively unfolded itself in a single development. -It would take much more than an hour to give even a superficial account -of the growth of the historical sciences and historic methods of Germany -during the first half of the eighteenth century. It would involve an -account of the creation of philology, and the philological methods which -go by the name of higher criticism; of their extension to archeology; of -the historic schools of jurisprudence and political economy, as well as -of the ways in which such men as Niebuhr, Mommsen and Ranke remade the -methods of studying the past. I can only say here that Germany developed -such an effective historical technique that even mediocre men achieved -respectable results; and, much more significantly, that when Taine made -the remark (quoted earlier) that we owe to the Germany of the half -century before 1830 all our distinctively modern ideas, his remarks -apply above all to the disciplines concerned with the historical -development of mankind. - -The bases of this philosophy are already before us. Even in Kant we find -the idea of a single continuous development of humanity, as a progress -from a reign of natural instinct to a final freedom won through -adherence to the law of reason. Fichte sketched the stages already -traversed on this road and located the point at which mankind now -stands. In his later writings, the significance of history as the -realization of the absolute purpose is increasingly emphasized. History -is the continuous life of a divine Ego by which it realizes in fact what -it is in idea or destiny. Its phases are successive stages in the -founding of the Kingdom of God on earth. It and it only is the -revelation of the Absolute. Along with this growing deification of -history is the increased significance attached to nationalism in general -and the German nation in particular. The State is the concrete -individual interposed between generic humanity and particular beings. In -his words, the national folk is the channel of divine life as it pours -into particular finite human beings. He says: - - "While cosmopolitanism is the dominant will that the purpose - of the existence of humanity be actually realized in humanity, - patriotism is the will that this end be first realized in the - particular nation to which we ourselves belong, and that this - achievement _thence_ spread over the entire race." - -Since the State is an organ of divinity, patriotism is religion. As the -Germans are the only truly religious people, they alone are truly -capable of patriotism. Other peoples are products of external causes; -they have no self-formed Self, but only an acquired self due to general -convention. In Germany there is a self which is self-wrought and -self-owned. The very fact that Germany for centuries has had no external -unity proves that its selfhood is metaphysical, not a gift of -circumstance. This conception of the German mission has been combined -with a kind of anthropological metaphysics which has become the rage in -Germany. The Germans alone of all existing European nations are a pure -race. They alone have preserved unalloyed the original divine deposit. -Language is the expression of the national soul, and only the Germans -have kept their native speech in its purity. In like vein, Hegel -attributes the inner disharmony characteristic of Romance peoples to the -fact that they are of mixed Germanic and Latin blood. A purely -artificial cult of race has so flourished in Germany that many social -movements--like anti-Semitism--and some of Germany's political ambitions -cannot be understood apart from the mystic identification of Race, -Culture and the State. In the light of actual science, this is so -mythological that the remark of an American periodical that race means a -number of people reading the same newspapers is sober scientific fact -compared with it.[101:A] - - [101:A] Chamberlain, for example, holds that Jesus must have - been of Teutonic birth--a perfect logical conclusion from the - received philosophy of the State and religion. Quite aware - that there is much Slav blood in northern Germany and Romance - blood in southern Germany, he explains that while with other - peoples crossing produces a mongrel race, the potency of the - German blood is such that cross-breeding strengthens it. While - at one time he explains the historic strength of the Jew on - the ground that he has kept his race pure, another place he - allows his indignation at the Jews to lead him to include them - among the most mongrel of all peoples. To one thing he remains - consistent: By the very essence of race, the Semites represent - a metaphysical principle inherently hostile to the grand - Germanic principle. It perhaps seems absurd to dignify the - vagaries of this garrulous writer, but according to all report - the volumes in which such expressions occur, "The Foundations - of the Nineteenth Century," has had august approval and much - vogue. - -At the beginning of history Fichte placed an "_Urvolk_." His account of -it seems an attempt to rationalize at one stroke the legends of the -Golden Age, the Biblical account of man before the Fall and Rousseau's -primitive "state of nature." The _Urvolk_ lived in a paradise of -innocence, a paradise without knowledge, labor or art. The philosophy -which demands such a Folk is comparatively simple. Except as a -manifestation of Absolute Reason, humanity could not exist at all. Yet -in the first stage of the manifestation, Reason could not have been -appropriated by the self-conscious effort of man. It existed without -consciousness of itself, for it was given, not, like all true -self-consciousness, won by morally creative struggle. Rational in -substance, in form it was but feeling or instinct. In a sense, all -subsequent history is but a return to this primitive condition. But -"humanity must make the journey on its own feet; by its own strength it -must bring itself back to that state in which it was once without its -own cooperating labor. . . . If humanity does not recreate its own true -being, it has no real life." While philosophy compels us to assume a -Normal People who, by "the mere fact of their existence, without science -and art, found themselves in a state of perfectly developed reason," -there is no ground for not admitting the existence at the same time of -"timid and rude earth-born savages." Thus the original state of humanity -would have been one of the greatest possible inequality, being divided -between the Normal Folk existing as a manifestation of Reason and the -wild and savage races of barbarism. - -In his later period of inflamed patriotism this innocuous speculation -grew a sting. He had determined that the present age--the Europe of the -Enlightenment and the French Revolution--is the age of liberation from -the external authority in which Reason had presented itself in the -second age. Hence it is inherently negative: "an age of absolute -indifference toward the Truth, an age of entire and unrestrained -licentiousness." But the further evolution of the Divine Idea demands a -Folk which has retained the primitive principle of Reason, which may -redeem, therefore, the corrupt and rebellious modes of humanity -elsewhere existing. Since the Germans are this saving remnant, they are -the _Urvolk_, the Normal Nation, of the modern period. From this point -on, idealization of past Germanic history and appeal to the nation to -realize its unique calling by victory over Napoleon blend. - -The Fichtean scaffolding tumbled, but these ideas persisted. I doubt if -it is possible to exaggerate the extent to which German history has -been systematically idealized for the last hundred years. Technically -speaking, the Romantic movement may have passed away and an age of -scientific history dawned. Actually the detailed facts have been -depicted by use of the palette of Romanticism. Space permits but one -illustration which would be but a literary curiosity were it not fairly -typical. Tacitus called his account of the northern barbarians -Germania--an unfortunate title in view of later developments. The -characteristics assigned by him to the German tribes are such as any -anthropologist could duplicate from any warlike barbaric tribe. Yet over -and over again these traits (which Tacitus idealized as Cooper, say, -idealized the North American Indian traits) are made the basis of the -philosophic history of the German people. The Germans, for example, had -that psychological experience now known as mana, manitou, tabu, etc. -They identified their gods, in Tacitus' phrase, with "that mystery which -they perceive by experiencing sacred fear." This turns out to be the -germinal deposit of spiritual-mindedness which later showed itself in -Luther and in the peculiar genius of the Germans for religious -experience. - -The following words are from no less an authority than Pfleiderer: - - "Cannot we recognize in this point that truly German - characteristic of _Innerlichkeit_ which scorns to fix for - sensuous perception the divine something which makes itself - felt in the depths of the sensitive soul, which scorns to drag - down the sublime mystery of the unknowable to the vulgar - distinctness of earthly things? The fact that the Germans - attached but little importance to religious ceremonies accords - with this view." - -To others, this sense of mystery is a prophetic anticipation of the -Kantian thing-in-itself. - -A similar treatment has been accorded to the personal and voluntary bond -by which individuals attached themselves to a chieftain. Thus early was -marked out the fidelity or loyalty, _Treue_, which is uniquely -Germanic--although some warlike tribes among our Indians carried the -system still further. I can allow myself but one more example of the way -in which the philosophic sophistication of history has worked. No -historian can be unconscious of the extent to which European culture has -been genuinely European--the extent to which it derives itself from a -common heritage of the ancient world and the extent to which -intermixtures and borrowings of culture have gone on ever since. As to -Germany, however, these obvious facts have to be accommodated to the -doctrine of an original racial deposit steadily evolving from within. - -The method is simple. As respects Germany, these cultural borrowings and -crosses represent the intrinsic universality of its genius. Through this -universality, the German spirit finds itself at home everywhere. -Consequently, it consciously appropriates and assimilates what other -peoples have produced by a kind of blind unconscious instinct. Thus it -was German thought which revealed the truth of Hellenic culture, and -rescued essential Christianity from its Romanized petrifaction. The -principle of Reason which French enlightenment laid hold of only in its -negative and destructive aspect, the German spirit grasped in its -positive and constructive form. Shakespeare happened to be born in -England, but only the Germans have apprehended him in his spiritual -universality so that he is now more his own than he is England's--and so -on. But with respect to other peoples, similar borrowings reveal only -their lack of inner and essential selfhood. While Luther is universal -because he is German, Shakespeare is universal because he is not -English. - -I have intimated that Fichte's actual influence was limited. But his -basic ideas of the State and of history were absorbed in the philosophy -of Hegel, and Hegel for a considerable period absolutely dominated -German thinking. To set forth the ground principles of his "absolute -idealism" would be only to repeat what has already been said. Its chief -difference, aside from Hegel's encyclopedic knowledge, his greater -concrete historic interest and his more conservative temperament, is his -bottomless scorn for an Idea, an Absolute, which merely ought to be and -which is only going to be realized after a period of time. "The Actual -is the Rational and the Rational _is_ the Actual"--and the actual means -the actuating force and movement of things. It is customary to call him -an Idealist. In one sense of much abused terms, he is the greatest -realist known to philosophy. He might be called a Brutalist. In the -inquiry Bourdon carried on in Germany a few years ago (published under -the title of the "German Enigma"), he records a conversation with a -German who deplores the tendency of the Germans to forsake the solid -bone of things in behalf of a romantic shadow. As against this he -appeals to the realistic sense of Hegel, who, "in opposition to the -idealism which had lifted Germany on wings, arrayed and marshaled the -maxims of an unflinching realism. He had formulae for the justification -of facts whatever they might be. That which _is_, he would say, is -reason realized. And what did he teach? That the hour has sounded for -the third act in the drama of humanity, and that the German opportunity -is not far off. . . . I could show you throughout the nineteenth century -the torrent of political and social ideas which had their source here." - -I have said that the essential points of the Fichtean philosophy of -history were taken up into the Hegelian system. This assimilation -involved, however, a rectification of an inconsistency between the -earlier and the later moral theories of Fichte. In his earlier ethical -writings, emphasis fell upon conscious moral personality--upon the -deliberate identification by the individual will of its career and -destiny with the purpose of the Absolute. In his later patriotic -philosophy, he asserts that the organized nation is the channel by -which a finite ego acquires moral personality, since the nation alone -transmits to individuals the generic principle of God working in -humanity. At the same time he appeals to the resolute will and -consciously chosen self-sacrifice of individuals to overthrow the enemy -and re-establish the Prussian state. When Hegel writes that victory has -been obtained, the war of Independence has been successfully waged. The -necessity of emphasizing individual self-assertion had given way to the -need of subordinating the individual to the established state in order -to check the disintegrating tendencies of liberalism. - -Haym has said that Hegel's "Philosophy of Law" had for its task the -exhibition as the perfect work of Absolute Reason up to date of the -"practical and political condition existing in Prussia in 1821." This -was meant as a hostile attack. But Hegel himself should have been the -last to object. With his scorn for an Ideal so impotent that its -realization must depend upon the effort of private selves, an Absolute -so inconsequential that it must wait upon the accidents of future time -for manifestation, he sticks in politics more than elsewhere to the -conviction that the actual _is_ the rational. "The task of philosophy is -to comprehend that which is, for that which is, is Reason." Alleged -philosophies which try to tell what the State should be or even what a -state ought in the future to come to be, are idle fantasies. Such -attempts come too late. Human wisdom is like "the bird of Minerva which -takes its flight only at the close of day."[110:A] It comes, after the -issue, to acknowledge what has happened. "The State is the rational in -itself and for itself. Its substantial unity is an absolute end in -itself. To it belongs supreme right in respect to individuals whose -first duty is--just to be members of the State." . . . The State "is the -absolute reality and the individual himself has objective existence, -truth and morality only in his capacity as a member of the State." It is -a commonplace of idealistic theism that nature is a manifestation of -God. But Hegel says that nature is only an externalized, unconscious and -so incomplete expression. The State has more, not less, objective -reality than physical nature, for it is a realization of Absolute -spirit in the realm of consciousness. The doctrine presents an extreme -form of the idea, not of the divine right of kings, but of the divine -right of States. "The march of God in history is the cause of the -existence of states; their foundation is the power of reason realizing -itself as will. Every state, whatever it be, participates in the divine -essence. The State is not the work of human art; only Reason could -produce it." The State is God on earth. - - [110:A] Marx said of the historic schools of politics, law and - economics that to them, as Jehovah to Moses on Mt. Sinai, the - divine showed but its posterior side. - -His depreciation of the individual as an individual appears in every -theme of his Philosophy of Right and History. At first sight, his theory -of great world heroes seems inconsistent with his disregard of -individuals. While the morality of most men consists simply in -assimilating into their own habits the customs already found in the -institutions about them, great men initiate new historic epochs. They -derive "their purposes and their calling not from the calm regular -course of things sanctioned by the existing order, but from a concealed -fount, from that inner spirit hidden beneath the surface, which, -striking the outer world as a shell, bursts it to pieces." The heroes -are thus the exception which proves the rule. They are world characters; -while they seem to be seeking personal interests they are really acting -as organs of a universal will, of God in his further march. In his -identification with the Absolute, the world-hero can have but one aim to -which "he is devoted regardless of all else. Such men may even treat -other great and sacred interests inconsiderately. . . . But so mighty a -form must trample down many an innocent flower--crush to pieces many an -object in its path." We are not surprised to see that Alexander, Caesar -and Napoleon are the characters he prefers to cite. One can only regret -that he died before his contemplative piety could behold Bismarck. - -A large part of the intellectual machinery by which Hegel overcame the -remnants of individualism found in prior philosophy came from the idea -of organic development which had been active in German thought since the -time of Herder. In his chief work ("Ideas for a Philosophy of the -History of Humanity"), written in the closing decades of the eighteenth -century, Herder holds that history is a progressive education of -humanity. This idea, had from Lessing, is combined with the idea of -Leibniz that change is evolution, by means of an internal force, of -powers originally implicit in existence, and with the idea of Spinoza of -an all-comprehensive substance. This idea of organic growth was then -applied to language, literature and institutions. It soon obtained -reinforcement from the rising science of biology. Long before the days -of Darwin or Spencer, the idea of evolution had been a commonplace of -German thought with respect to everything concerning the history of -humanity. The notion was set in sharp antithesis to the conception of -"making" or manufacturing institutions and constitutions, which was -treated as one of the fallacies of the French philosophy of the -Enlightenment. A combination of this notion of universal organic growth -with the technique of prior idealism may fairly be said to have -determined Hegel's whole philosophy. While Leibniz and Herder had -emphasized the notion of harmony as an essential factor of the working -of organic forces, Hegel took from Fichte the notion of a unity or -synthesis arrived at by "positing," and overcoming an opposite. Struggle -for existence (or realization) was thus an "organic" part of German -thinking long before the teaching of Darwin, who, in fact, is usually -treated by German writers as giving a rather superficial empirical -expression to an idea which they had already grasped in its universal -speculative form. It is characteristic of the extent in which Hegel -thought in terms of struggle and overcoming that after stating why it -was as yet impossible to include the Americas in his philosophy of -history, and after saying that in the future the burden of world history -will reveal itself there, he surmises that it may take the form of a -"contest" between North and South America. No philosopher has ever -thought so consistently and so wholly in terms of strife and overcoming -as Hegel. When he says the "world history is the world judgment" he -means judgment in the sense of assize, and judgment as victory of one -and defeat of another--victory being the final proof that the world -spirit has now passed from one nation to take up its residence in -another. To be defeated in a way which causes the nation to take a -secondary position among nations is a sign that divine judgment has been -passed upon it. When a recent German writer argues that for Germany to -surrender any territory which it has conquered during the present war -would be sacrilegious, since it would be to refuse to acknowledge the -workings of God in human history, he speaks quite in the Hegelian vein. - -Although the phenomenon of nationalism was very recent when Hegel wrote, -indeed practically contemporary with his own day, he writes in -nationalistic terms the entire history of humanity. The State is the -Individual of history: it is to history what a given man is to -biography. History gives us the progressive realization or evolution of -the Absolute, moving from one National Individual to another. It is law, -the universal, which makes the State a State, for law is reason, not as -mere subjective reflection, but in its manifestation as supreme over and -in particulars. On this account, Hegel's statement that the fundamental -principle of history is the progressive realization of freedom does not -mean what an uninstructed English reader would naturally take it to -mean. Freedom is always understood in terms of Reason. Its expression in -history means that Thought has progressively become conscious of itself; -that is, has made itself its own object. Freedom is the _consciousness_ -of freedom. Liberty of action has little to do with it. Obviously it is -only in the German idealistic system--particularly in the system of -Hegel himself--that this has fully taken place. Meantime, when citizens -of a state (especially of the state in which this philosophic insight -has been achieved) take the laws of their state as their own ends and -motives of action, they attain the best possible substitute for a reason -which is its own object. They appropriate as their own personal reason -the objective and absolute Reason embodied perforce in law and custom. - -After this detour, we are led back to the fact that the Germans possess -the greatest freedom yet attained by humanity, for the Prussian -political organization most fully exemplifies Law, or the Universal, -organizing under and within itself all particular arrangements of social -and personal life. Some other peoples--particularly the Latin--have -thought they could _make_ constitutions, or at least that the form of -their constitution was a matter of choice. But this is merely setting up -the private conceit of individuals against the work of Absolute Reason, -and thus marks the disintegration of a state rather than its existence. -Other peoples have tried to found the government on the consent of the -governed, unwitting of the fact that it is the government, the -_specific_ realization of Reason, which makes a state out of what is -otherwise an anarchic mass of individuals. Other peoples have made a -parliament or representative body the essential thing in government; in -philosophic reality this is only a consultative body, having as its main -function communication between classes (which are indispensable to an -"organic" state) and the real government. The chief function of -parliament is to give the opinion of the social classes an opportunity -to feel it is being considered and to enable the real government to take -advantage of whatever wisdom may chance to be expressed. Hegel seems -quite prophetic when he says: "By virtue of this participation -subjective liberty and conceit, with their general opinion, can show -themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling -themselves to count for something." Finally, the State becomes wholly -and completely an organized Individual only in its external relations, -its relations to other states. As his philosophy of history ignores the -past in seizing upon the national state as the unit and focus of -history, so it ignores all future possibility of a genuinely -international federation to which isolated nationalism shall be -subordinated. Bernhardi writes wholly in the Hegelian sense when he says -that to expand the idea of the State into the idea of humanity is a -Utopian error, for it would exclude the essential principle of life, -struggle. - -Philosophical justification of war follows inevitably from a philosophy -of history composed in nationalistic terms. History is the movement, the -march of God on earth through time. Only one nation at a time can be the -latest and hence the fullest realization of God. The movement of God in -history is thus particularly manifest in those changes by which unique -place passes from one nation to another. War is the signally visible -occurrence of such a flight of the divine spirit in its onward movement. -The idea that friendly intercourse among all the peoples of the earth is -a legitimate aim of human effort is in basic contradiction of such a -philosophy. War is explicit realization of "dialectic," of the negation -by which a higher synthesis of reason is assured. It effectively -displays the "irony of the divine Idea." It is to national life what the -winds are to the sea, "preserving mankind from the corruption -engendered by immobility." War is the most effective preacher of the -vanity of all merely finite interests; it puts an end to that selfish -egoism of the individual by which he would claim his life and his -property as his own or as his family's. International law is not -properly law; it expresses simply certain usages which are accepted so -long as they do not come into conflict with the purpose of a state--a -purpose which always gives the supreme law of national life. -Particularly against the absolute right of the "present bearer of the -world spirit, the spirits of the other nations are absolutely without -right. The latter, just like the nations whose epochs have passed, count -no longer in universal history." Since they are already passed over from -the standpoint of the divine idea, war can do no more than exhibit the -fact that their day has come and gone. World history is the world's -judgment seat. - -For a period Hegelian thought was almost supreme in Germany. Then its -rule passed away almost as rapidly as it had been achieved. After -various shiftings, the trend of philosophic thought was definitely "Back -to Kant." Kant's greater sobriety, the sharp distinction he drew -between the realm of phenomena and science and the ideal noumenal world, -commended him after the unbridled pretensions of Hegelian absolutism. -For more than a generation Hegel was spoken of with almost universal -contempt. Nevertheless his ideas, loosed from the technical apparatus -with which he surrounded them, persisted. Upon the historical -disciplines his influence was peculiarly deep and abiding. He fixed the -ideas of Fichte and fastened them together with the pin of evolution. -Since his day, histories of philosophy, or religion, or institutions -have all been treated as developments through necessary stages of an -inner implicit idea or purpose according to an indwelling law. And the -idea of a peculiar mission and destiny of German history has lost -nothing in the operation. Expressions which a bewildered world has -sought since the beginning of the war to explain through the influence -of a Darwinian struggle for existence and survival of the fittest, or -through the influence of a Nietzschean philosophy of power, have their -roots in the classic idealistic philosophy culminating in Hegel. - -Kant still remains the philosopher of Germany. The division of life -between the world of sense and of mechanism and the world of the -supersensible and purpose, the world of necessity and the world of -freedom, is more congenial than a complete monism. The attempts of his -successors to bridge the gap and set up a wholly unified philosophy -failed, historically speaking. But, nevertheless, they contributed an -indispensable ingredient to the contemporary German spirit; they helped -people the Kantian void of the supersensible with the substantial -figures of the State and its Historical Evolution and Mission. Kant -bequeathed to the world an intellect devoted to the congenial task of -discovering causal law in external nature, and an inner intuition which, -in spite of its sublimity, had nothing to look at except the bare form -of an empty law of duty. Kant was kept busy in proving the existence of -this supernal but empty region. Consequently he was not troubled by -being obliged to engage in the unremunerative task of spending his time -gazing into a blank void. His successors were not so fortunate. The -existence of this ideal realm in which reason, purpose and freedom are -one was axiomatic to them; they could no longer busy themselves with -proving its existence. Some of them, called the Romanticists, filled it -with visions, more or less poetic, which frankly drew their substance -from an imagination inflamed by emotional aspiration in revolt at the -limitations of outward action. Others, called the idealistic -philosophers, filled in the void, dark because of excess of light, with -less ghostly forms of Law and the unfolding in History of Absolute Value -and Purpose. The two worlds of Kant were too far away from each other. -The later idealistic world constructions crumbled; but their debris -supplied material with which to fill in the middle regions between the -Kantian worlds of sense and of reason. This, I repeat, is their lasting -contribution to present German culture. Where Kantianism has not -received a filling in from the philosophy of history and the State, it -has remained in Germany, as elsewhere, a critique of the methodology of -science; its importance has been professional rather than human. - - * * * * * - -In the first lecture we set out with the suggestion of an inquiry into -the influence of general ideas upon practical affairs, upon those -larger practical affairs called politics. We appear to have concluded -with a conviction that (in the instance before us at least) politics has -rather been the controlling factor in the formation of philosophic ideas -and in deciding their vogue. Yet we are well within limits when we say -that ideas which were evoked in correspondence with concrete social -conditions served to articulate and consolidate the latter. Even if we -went so far as to say that reigning philosophies simply reflect as in a -mirror contemporary social struggles, we should have to add that seeing -one's self in a mirror is a definite practical aid in carrying on one's -undertaking to its completion. - -When what a people sees in its intellectual looking glass is its own -organization and its own historic evolution as an organic instrument of -the accomplishment of an Absolute Will and Law, the articulating and -consolidating efficacy of the reflection is immensely intensified. -Outside of Germany, the career of the German idealistic philosophy has -been mainly professional and literary. It has exercised considerable -influence upon the teaching of philosophy in France, England and this -country. Beyond professorial circles, its influence has been -considerable in theological directions. Without doubt, it has modulated -for many persons the transition from a supernatural to a spiritual -religion; it has enabled them to give up historical and miraculous -elements as indifferent accretions and to retain the moral substance and -emotional values of Christianity. But the Germans are quite right in -feeling that only in Germany is this form of idealistic thinking both -indigenous and widely applied. - -A crisis like the present forces upon thoughtful persons a consideration -of the value for the general aims of civilization of a philosophy of the -_a priori_, the Absolute, and of their immanent evolution through the -medium of an experience which as just experience is only a superficial -and negligible vehicle of transcendent Laws and Ends. It forces a -consideration of what type of general ideas is available for the -articulation and guidance of our own life in case we find ourselves -looking upon the present world scene as an _a priori_ and an -absolutistic philosophy gone into bankruptcy. - -In Europe, speaking generally, "Americanism" is a synonym for crude -empiricism and a materialistic utilitarianism. It is no part of my -present task to try to show how largely this accusation is due to -misunderstanding. It is simpler to inquire how far the charge points to -the problem which American life, and therefore philosophy in America, -must meet. It is difficult to see how any _a priori_ philosophy, or any -systematic absolutism, is to get a footing among us, at least beyond -narrow and professorial circles. Psychologists talk about learning by -the method of trial and error or success. Our social organization -commits us to this philosophy of life. Our working principle is to try: -to find out by trying, and to measure the worth of the ideas and -theories tried by the success with which they meet the test of -application in practice. Concrete consequences rather than _a priori_ -rules supply our guiding principles. Hegel found it "superficial and -absurd to regard as objects of choice" social constitutions; to him -"they were necessary structures in the path of development." To us they -are the cumulative result of a multitude of daily and ever-renewed -choices. - -That such an experimental philosophy of life means a dangerous -experiment goes without saying. It permits, sooner or later it may -require, every alleged sacrosanct principle to submit to ordeal by -fire--to trial by service rendered. From the standpoint of _a priorism_, -it is hopelessly anarchic; it is doomed, _a priori_, to failure. From -its own standpoint, it is itself a theory to be tested by experience. -Now experiments are of all kinds, varying from those generated by blind -impulse and appetite to those guided by intelligently formed ideas. They -are as diverse as the attempt of a savage to get rain by sprinkling -water and scattering thistledown, and that control of electricity in the -laboratory from which issue wireless telegraphy and rapid traction. Is -it not likely that in this distinction we have the key to the failure or -success of the experimental method generalized into a philosophy of -life, that is to say, of social matters--the only application which -procures complete generalization? - -An experimental philosophy differs from empirical philosophy as -empiricism has been previously formulated. Historical empiricisms have -been stated in terms of precedents; their generalizations have been -summaries of what has previously happened. The truth and falsity of -these generalizations depended then upon the accuracy with which they -catalogued, under appropriate heads, a multiplicity of past occurrences. -They were perforce lacking in directive power except so far as the -future might be a routine repetition of the past. In an experimental -philosophy of life, the question of the past, of precedents, of origins, -is quite subordinate to prevision, to guidance and control amid future -possibilities. Consequences rather than antecedents measure the worth of -theories. Any scheme or project may have a fair hearing provided it -promise amelioration in the future; and no theory or standard is so -sacred that it may be accepted simply on the basis of past performance. - -But this difference between a radically experimental philosophy and an -empiristic philosophy only emphasizes the demand for careful and -comprehensive reflection with respect to the ideas which are to be -tested in practice. If an _a priori_ philosophy has worked at all in -Germany it is because it has been based on an _a priori_ social -constitution--that is to say, on a state whose organization is such as -to determine in advance the main activities of classes of individuals, -and to utilize their particular activities by linking them up with one -another in definite ways. It is a commonplace to say that Germany is a -monument to what can be done by means of conscious method and -organization. An experimental philosophy of life in order to succeed -must not set less store upon methodic and organized intelligence, but -more. We must learn from Germany what methodic and organized work means. -But instead of confining intelligence to the technical means of -realizing ends which are predetermined by the State (or by something -called the historic Evolution of the Idea), intelligence must, with us, -devote itself as well to construction of the ends to be acted upon. - -The method of trial and error or success is likely, if not directed by a -trained and informed imagination, to score an undue proportion of -failures. There is no possibility of disguising the fact that an -experimental philosophy of life means a hit-and-miss philosophy in the -end. But it means missing rather than hitting, if the aiming is done in -a happy-go-lucky way instead of by bringing to bear all the resources of -inquiry upon locating the target, constructing propulsive machinery and -figuring out the curve of trajectory. That this work is, after all, but -hypothetical and tentative till it issue from thought into action does -not mean that it might as well be random guesswork; it means that we can -do still better next time if we are sufficiently attentive to the causes -of success and failure this time. - -America is too new to afford a foundation for an _a priori_ philosophy; -we have not the requisite background of law, institutions and achieved -social organization. America is too new to render congenial to our -imagination an evolutionary philosophy of the German type. For our -history is too obviously future. Our country is too big and too -unformed, however, to enable us to trust to an empirical philosophy of -muddling along, patching up here and there some old piece of machinery -which has broken down by reason of its antiquity. We must have system, -constructive method, springing from a widely inventive imagination, a -method checked up at each turn by results achieved. We have said long -enough that America means opportunity; we must now begin to ask: -Opportunity for what, and how shall the opportunity be achieved? I can -but think that the present European situation forces home upon us the -need for constructive planning. I can but think that while it gives no -reason for supposing that creative power attaches _ex officio_ to -general ideas, it does encourage us to believe that a philosophy which -should articulate and consolidate the ideas to which our social practice -commits us would clarify and guide our future endeavor. - -Time permits of but one illustration. The present situation presents the -spectacle of the breakdown of the whole philosophy of Nationalism, -political, racial and cultural. It is by the accident of position rather -than any virtue of our own that we are not sharers in the present -demonstration of failure. We have borrowed the older philosophy of -isolated national sovereignty and have lived upon it in a more or less -half-hearted way. In our internal constitution we are actually -interracial and international. It remains to see whether we have the -courage to face this fact and the wisdom to think out the plan of action -which it indicates. Arbitration treaties, international judicial -councils, schemes of international disarmament, peace funds and peace -movements, are all well in their way. But the situation calls for more -radical thinking than that which terminates in such proposals. We have -to recognize that furtherance of the depth and width of human -intercourse is the measure of civilization; and we have to apply this -fact without as well as within our national life. We must make the -accident of our internal composition into an idea, an idea upon which we -may conduct our foreign as well as our domestic policy. An international -judicial tribunal will break in the end upon the principle of national -sovereignty. - -We have no right to cast stones at any warring nation till we have asked -ourselves whether we are willing to forego this principle and to submit -affairs which limited imagination and sense have led us to consider -strictly national to an international legislature. In and of itself, the -idea of peace is a negative idea; it is a police idea. There _are_ -things more important than keeping one's body whole and one's property -intact. Disturbing the peace is bad, not because peace is disturbed, but -because the fruitful processes of cooperation in the great experiment of -living together are disturbed. It is futile to work for the negative end -of peace unless we are committed to the positive ideal which it cloaks: -Promoting the efficacy of human intercourse irrespective of class, -racial, geographical and national limits. Any philosophy which should -penetrate and particulate our present social practice would find at work -the forces which unify human intercourse. An intelligent and courageous -philosophy of practice would devise means by which the operation of -these forces would be extended and assured in the future. An American -philosophy of history must perforce be a philosophy for its future, a -future in which freedom and fullness of human companionship is the aim, -and intelligent cooperative experimentation the method. - - -THE END - - - - -INDEX - - - Absolutism, 89, 112, 115, 124 - - America, philosophy in, 123-132 - - "Americanism," 124 - - Anti-Semitism, 100-101. - - _A priori_, 39-44, 126, 129 - - Authority, 52-54 - - - Bentham, 56 - - Bergson, 4 - - Bernhardi, 34-35, 52, 118 - - Bourdon, 107-108 - - Burke, 93-94 - - - Chamberlain, 101 n. - - Cosmopolitanism, 67, 75, 85, 99 - - Culture, 91 - - - Descartes, 92 - - Despotism enlightened, 53 - - Dialectic, 70, 118 - - Duty, 24, 50-57 - - - Education, 14, 72, 73 - - Empiricism, 41, 43, 126-129 - - Enlightenment, the, 37-39, 59, 92, 103 - - Eucken, 36, 55 - - Evolution, 112 - - - Fichte, 68-80, 85-87 - - Formalism, 51 - - Freedom, 18, 25, 30, 33-35, 47, 51, 71, 115. - - French Revolution, 57, 94, 103 - - French thought, 52, 91-94, 95, 100 - - - Germania, 104 - - Germany, 14-16, 28, 29-31, 32-33, 36, 71, 78-81, 84-85, 88, 91-93, - 94-98, 106-107 - - - Haym, 107 - - Hegel, 94-95, 107-120, 125 - - Heine, 17, 18, 76, 83, 84-85 - - Herder, 112 - - History, 5-6, 59-67, 98-102, 107-119, 121 - - Hoffman, 81 - - - Idealism, 28, 39, 70, 82, 107, 123, 130 - - Ideas and action, 3-15, 123-132 - - Individualism, 49, 72 - - Intelligence, 54-56, 126-128 - - - Jena, 68 - - - Kant, 19-40, 47-58, 59-67, 119-121 - - Kultur, 62-64 - - - Lange, 78 - - Lasalle, 77 - - Law, 20-25, 116 - - Leibniz, 59, 112 - - Luther, 16, 27, 71, 87 - - - Marx, 6, 110 n. - - Militarism, 52 - - - Napoleon, 67, 78-79 - - Nationalism, 67, 81, 86, 87, 115 - - Nietzsche, 28, 34, 58 - - - Pantheism, 77, 82 - - Parliaments, 117 - - Personality, 48 - - Pfleiderer, 105 - - Philosophy, 7-18, 123-132 - - Property, 74 - - Psychology, Social, 82 - - - Race, 100-101 - - Religion, 20-21, 26-27, 95 - - Rights, 52, 57 - - Romanticism, 81, 104, 122 - - Rousseau, 61, 91 - - - Schelling, 82 n. - - Scholar, 72 - - Science, 21-23, 28 - - Socialism, 74-75 - - Social motives, 60-61 - - Society, 64-65 - - State, 64-65, 66-67, 73-77, 110-118 - - Subjectivism, 49, 81 - - Supersensible, 23-25 - - v. Sybel, 78-80 - - - Tacitus, 104 - - Taine, 14 - - - Universalism of Germany, 36, 106-107 - - _Urvolk_, 101-102 - - Utilitarianism, 57-58 - - - _Volks-seele_, 82 - - - War, 35-36, 89, 97, 118-120 - - World-heroes, 112 - - - - -DEWEY AND TUFTS'S ETHICS - - By JOHN DEWEY, Professor in Columbia University, and JAMES H. - TUFTS, Professor in the University of Chicago. (_American - Science Series._) 618 pp. 8vo. $2.00. - - -G. H. PALMER, _Professor in Harvard University_: It is a scholarly and -stimulating production, the best, I think, for college use that has yet -appeared. Indeed, from no other book would a general reader obtain in so -brief a compass so wide a view of the moral work of to-day, set forth in -so positive, lucid and interesting a fashion. Twenty years ago the book -could not have been written, for into it have gone the spoils of all the -ethical battles of our time. While I often find myself in dissent from -its opinions, I see that whoever wishes to comprehend the deeper social -tendencies of recent years will do well to study this book, and that he -will carry away from his reading as much enjoyment as instruction. - -PROFESSOR NORMAN WILDE of the _University of Minnesota_ in _Journal of -Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_: If this is not the ideal -text-book in ethics for which we have been waiting so many years, it is, -at least, a very good substitute for it. Certainly no more valuable -fruit of the recent ethical revival has been produced than this, nor one -which will itself produce more future good, for it is bound to be but -the first of a new type of texts. It marks the end of the abstract, -speculative treatises and the beginning of the positive studies of -established human values. The moral life is presented as a reality about -which there can be no more question than about the reality of the -physical life, and, indeed, as that in which the latter finds its -completion and explanation. Theories and systems are strictly -subordinated to the facts and are not presented until the facts are -clearly given. No student can rise from the study of this book feeling -that he has been engaged with questions of purely academic interest. On -the contrary, he can not but realize that it is the origin and solution -of the problems of his own life with which he is here concerned. Reality -is the dominant note of the book. - -THE OUTLOOK: In several respects this work, among the many of its kind -appearing in recent years, is eminently valuable, especially for the -ample treatment given to ethics in the world of action in civil society, -admidst the relations of political, economic, and family life. To trace -the growth of morality, and to discover its laws and principles, with a -view to their application to present social conditions and problems for -progressive moral development, is the proper aim of ethical science as -here unfolded. . . . The many ethical questions raised by present -economic conditions are treated with admirable fulness and perspicacity. - - - HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY - NEW YORK - - - - -BERGSON'S CREATIVE EVOLUTION - -_Translated from the French by Dr. Arthur Mitchell_ - -$3.00 net, by mail $3.17 - - -"Bergson's resources in the way of erudition are remarkable, and in the -way of expression they are simply phenomenal. . . . If anything can make -hard things easy to follow it is a style like Bergson's. It is a miracle -and he a real magician. Open Bergson and new horizons open on every page -you read. It tells of reality itself instead of reiterating what -dusty-minded professors have written about what other previous -professors have thought. Nothing in Bergson is shopworn or at -second-hand."--_William James._ - -"A distinctive and trenchant piece of dialectic. . . . Than its entrance -upon the field as a well-armed and militant philosophy there have been -not many more memorable occurences in the history of ideas."--_Nation._ - -"To bring out in an adequate manner the effect which Bergson's philsophy -has on those who are attracted by it let us try to imagine what it would -have been like to have lived when Kant produced his 'Critique of Pure -Reason.'"--_Hibbert Journal._ - -"_Creative Evolution_ is destined, I believe, to mark an epoch in the -history of modern thought. The work has its root in modern physical -science, but it blooms and bears fruit in the spirit to a degree quite -unprecedented. . . . Bergson is a new star in the intellectual firmament -of our day. He is a philosopher upon whom the spirits of both literature -and science have descended. In his great work he touches the materialism -of science to finer issues. Probably no other writer of our time has -possessed in the same measure the three gifts, the literary, the -scientific, and the philosophical. Bergson is a kind of chastened and -spiritualized Herbert Spencer."--_John Burroughs in the Atlantic -Monthly._ - - - HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY - PUBLISHERS NEW YORK - - - - -BY WALTER LIPPMANN - - -DRIFT AND MASTERY - -_2nd Printing, $1.50 Net_ - -THEODORE ROOSEVELT _in The Outlook_: - -"No man who wishes seriously to study our present social, industrial and -political life can afford not to read it through and through and to -ponder and digest it." - -WILLIAM MARION REEDY _in The St. Louis Mirror_: - -"When 'A Preface to Politics' was published, I ventured the opinion that -it was the best book on politics since Walter Bagehot's 'Physics and -Politics.' Now he has followed it with 'Drift and Mastery,' an even more -brilliant performance." - - -A PREFACE TO POLITICS - -_3rd Printing, $1.50 Net_ - -_The Boston Transcript_: - -"'A Preface to Politics' is its own complete and sufficient -justification. In many respects it is the ablest brief book of its kind -published during the last ten years. It has the supreme virtue of -clearness aided by a style that is incisive and compelling." - - -THE STAKES OF DIPLOMACY - -_4th Printing, cloth, $1.35 Net; paper, 60 cts. Net_ - -J. B. KERFOOT _in Life_: - -"It is a real joy to find it of the same order as 'A Preface to -Politics.' It deals with human nature involved in international human -relations impersonally, yet brings significances personally home to us. -A book that widens horizons and quickens consciousness." - - - HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY - PUBLISHERS NEW YORK - - - - - -TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES - - -Ellipses match the original. A row of asterisks represents a thought break. -Words in italics in the original are surrounded with _underscores_. - -The following corrections have been made to the text: - - Page 53: duty must get[original has gets] its subject-matter - somewhere - - Page 110: wisdom is like "[quotation mark missing in the - original]the bird of Minerva - - Page 134: _Volks-seele_[original has _Volk-seele_], 82 - -Typographical errors in the book reviews have been retained as printed. - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's German philosophy and politics, by John Dewey - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GERMAN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS *** - -***** This file should be named 42208.txt or 42208.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/2/2/0/42208/ - -Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Lisa Reigel, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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