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diff --git a/42438-8.txt b/42438-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index aacd06f..0000000 --- a/42438-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17241 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, -1833-1914, by Edwin A. Pratt - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914 - -Author: Edwin A. Pratt - -Release Date: March 30, 2013 [EBook #42438] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER *** - - - - -Produced by Moti Ben-Ari and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net. (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive.) - - - - - - - - - - THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER - IN WAR AND CONQUEST - 1833-1914 - - - - - THE - RISE OF RAIL-POWER - IN WAR AND CONQUEST - 1833-1914 - - WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY - - BY - EDWIN A. PRATT - Author of "A History of Inland Transport," - "Railways and their Rates," etc. - - LONDON - P. S. KING & SON, LTD. - ORCHARD HOUSE - WESTMINSTER - 1915 - - - - -CONTENTS. - - - CHAP. PAGE - - I A NEW FACTOR 1 - II RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR 14 - III RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR 26 - IV CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR 40 - V PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR 54 - VI TROOPS AND SUPPLIES 62 - VII ARMOURED TRAINS 67 - VIII RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT 81 - IX PREPARATION IN PEACE FOR WAR 98 - X ORGANISATION IN GERMANY 103 - XI RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY 122 - XII FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71 138 - XIII ORGANISATION IN FRANCE 149 - XIV ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND 175 - XV MILITARY RAILWAYS 205 - XVI RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR 232 - XVII THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 260 - XVIII STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY 277 - XIX A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE 296 - XX DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY 331 - XXI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 345 - - APPENDIX - INDIAN FRONTIER RAILWAYS 357 - THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA 368 - - BIBLIOGRAPHY 376 - INDEX 398 - - - - -PREFATORY NOTE. - - -The extent to which railways are being used in the present War of the -Nations has taken quite by surprise a world whose military historians, -in their accounts of what armies have done or have failed to do on the -battle-field in the past, have too often disregarded such matters of -detail as to how the armies got there and the possible effect of good or -defective transport conditions, including the maintenance of supplies -and communications, on the whole course of a campaign. - -In the gigantic struggle now proceeding, these matters of detail are -found to be of transcendant importance. The part which railways are -playing in the struggle has, indeed--in keeping with the magnitude of -the struggle itself--assumed proportions unexampled in history. Whilst -this is so it is, nevertheless, a remarkable fact that although much has -been said as to the conditions of military unpreparedness in which the -outbreak of hostilities in August, 1914, found the Allies, there has, so -far as I am aware, been no suggestion of any inability on the part of -the railways to meet, at once, from the very moment war was declared, -all the requirements of military transport. In this respect, indeed, the -organisation, the preparedness, and the efficiency throughout alike of -the British and of the French railways have been fully equal to those of -the German railways themselves. - -As regards British conditions, especially, much interest attaches to -some remarks made by Sir Charles Owens, formerly General Manager of -the London and South Western Railway Company, in the course of an -address delivered by him to students of the London School of Economics -on October 12, 1914. He told how, some five or six years ago, he had -met at a social function the Secretary of State for War, who, after -dinner, took him aside and asked, "Do you think in any emergency which -might arise in this country the railways would be able to cope with it -adequately?" To this question Sir Charles replied, "I will stake my -reputation as a railway man that the country could not concentrate men -and materials half so fast as the railways could deal with them; but the -management of the railways must be left in the hands of railway men." -We have here an affirmation and a proviso. That the affirmation was -warranted has been abundantly proved by what the British railways have -accomplished in the emergency that has arisen. The special significance -of the proviso will be understood in the light of what I record in the -present work concerning the control of railways in war. - -Taking the railways of all the countries, whether friends or foes, -concerned in the present World-War, and assuming, for the sake of -argument, that all, without exception, have accomplished marvels in the -way of military transport, one must, nevertheless, bear in mind two -important considerations:-- - -(1) That, apart from the huge proportions of the scale upon which, -in the aggregate, the railways are being required to serve military -purposes, the present conflict, in spite of its magnitude, has thus far -produced no absolutely new factor in the employment of railways for war -except as regards the use of air-craft for their destruction. - -(2) That when hostilities were declared in August, 1914, the subject -of the employment of railways for the purposes of war had already been -under the consideration of railway and military experts in different -countries for no fewer than eighty years, during which period, and -as the result of vast study, much experience, and many blunders in -or between wars in various parts of the world, there had been slowly -evolved certain fixed principles and, also, subject to constant -amendments, a recognised and comprehensive organisation which, accepted -more or less completely by the leading nations, with modifications to -suit their national circumstances and conditions, was designed to meet -all contingencies, to provide, as far as human foresight could suggest, -for all possible difficulties, and be capable of application instantly -the need for it might arise. - -The time has not yet come for telling all that the railways have thus -far done during the war which has still to be fought out. That story, in -the words of a railway man concerned therein, is at present "a sealed -book." Meanwhile, however, it is desirable that the position as defined -in the second of the two considerations given above should be fully -realised, in order that what the railways and, so far as they have -been aided by them, the combatants, have accomplished or are likely to -accomplish may be better understood when the sealed book becomes an open -one. - -If, as suggested at the outset, the world has already been taken by -surprise even by what the railways are known to have done, it may be -still more surprised to learn (as the present work will show) that -the construction of railways for strategical purposes was advocated -in Germany as early as 1833; that in 1842 a scheme was elaborated for -covering Germany with a network of strategical railways which, while -serving the entire country, would more especially allow of war being -conducted on two fronts--France and Russia--at the same time; and that -in the same year (1842) attention was already being called in the French -Chamber to the "aggressive lines" which Germany was building in the -direction of France, while predictions were also being made that any new -invasion of France by Germany would be between Metz and Strasburg. - -If, again, it is found that a good deal of space is devoted in the -present work to the War of Secession, criticism may, perhaps, be -disarmed by the explanation that the American Civil War was practically -the beginning of things as regards the scientific use of railways for -war, and that many of the problems connected therewith were either -started in the United States or were actually worked out there, -precedents being established and examples being set which the rest of -the world had simply to follow, adapt or perfect. The possibility of -carrying on warfare at a great distance from the base of supplies by -means of even a single line of single-track railway; the creation of -an organised corps for the restoration, operation or destruction of -railways; the control of railways in war by the railway or the military -interests independently or jointly; the question as to when the railway -could be used to advantage and when it would be better for the troops -to march; the use of armoured trains; the evolution of the ambulance or -the hospital train--all these, and many other matters besides, are to -be traced back to the American Civil War of 1861-65, and are dealt with -herein at what, it is hoped, will be found not undue length. - -As for the building up of the subsequent organisation in -Europe--Germany, France and England being the countries selected -for special treatment in relation thereto--this, also, has had to -be described with some regard for detail; and, incidentally, it is -shown (1) that the alleged perfection of Germany's arrangements when -she went to war with France in 1870-71 is merely one of the fictions -of history, so far as her military rail-transport was concerned; (2) -that France learned the bitter lesson taught her by the deplorable and -undeniable imperfections of her own transport system--or no-system--on -that occasion, and at once set about the creation of what was to become -an organisation of the most complete and comprehensive character; and -(3) that the "beginning of things" in England, in the way of employing -railways for the purposes of war, was the direct outcome of the -conditions of semi-panic created here in 1859 by what was regarded as -the prospect of an early invasion of this country by France, coupled -with the then recognised deficiencies of our means of national defence. - -Military railways, as employed in the Crimean War, the Abyssinian -Campaign, the Franco-German War, the Russo-Turkish War and the Sudan -are described; a detailed account is given of the use of railways in -the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War; and this is followed by a -description of the strategical railways constructed in Germany for the -purpose of facilitating war on the possessions of her neighbours. - -Chapters XIX and XX deal with the building of railways which, -whether avowedly strategical or what I have described as -"economic-political-strategical," are intended to effect the purposes -of conquest, with or without the accompaniment of war. The former of -these two chapters, which shows how, with the help of railways, Germany -proposed to transform the African continent into an African Empire of -her own, should be found deserving of notice, and especially so in view -of the statements quoted (p. 311) as having been made by German officers -in what was then German South-West Africa, to the effect that the main -objective of Germany in going to war would be the conquest of Africa, -"the smashing up of France and Great Britain" being regarded only as -"incidents" which, followed by seizure of the possessions of the smaller -Powers, would make Germany the supreme Power in Africa, and lead to the -whole African continent becoming a German possession. - -From Chapter XX the reader will learn how Germany proposed to employ -railways for the furthering of her aims against, not only Asiatic -Turkey, but Egypt and India, as well. - -The subsidiary articles on "Indian Frontier Railways" and "The Defence -of Australia" have no direct bearing on that _evolution_ of rail-power -in warfare with which it is the special purpose of the present volume -to deal; but in the belief that they are of interest and importance in -themselves, from the point of view of the general question, they have -been given in an Appendix. The difficulties and other conditions under -which the Sind-Pishin State Railway, designed to serve strategical -purposes, was built to the frontiers of Afghanistan are unexampled in -the history either of railways or of war. As regards Australia, the -gravity of the position there was well indicated by Lord Kitchener when -he wrote of the lines running inland that they were "of little use for -defence, although possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would -have temporary command of the sea." - -At the end of the volume there is a Bibliography of books, pamphlets -and review or other articles relating to the use of railways for the -purposes of war. In the first instance this compilation was based on -a "List of References" prepared by the American Bureau of Railway -Economics; but, while many items on that list have here been omitted, a -considerable number of others have been inserted from other sources. The -Bibliography is not offered as being in any way complete, but it may, -nevertheless, be of advantage to students desirous of making further -researches into the matters of history here specially treated. - -The assistance rendered in other ways by the American Bureau of Railway -Economics in the preparation of the present work has been most helpful. -In the writing of the chapters concerning German designs on Africa, Asia -Minor, etc., the resources of the well-arranged and admirably-indexed -library of the Royal Colonial Institute have been of great service. I -have, also, to express cordial acknowledgments to the General Managers -and other officers of various leading railway companies for information -given respecting the organisation of railways in this country for -military purposes. - - EDWIN A. PRATT. - _November, 1915._ - - - - -The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest - - - - -CHAPTER I - -A NEW FACTOR - - -While the original purpose of railways was to promote the arts of -peace, the wide scope of their possibilities in the direction, also, of -furthering the arts of war began to be realised at a very early date -after their success in the former capacity had been assured in Great -Britain. - -Already the canal system had introduced an innovation which greatly -impressed the British public. In December, 1806, a considerable body of -troops went by barge on the Paddington Canal from London to Liverpool, -_en route_ for Dublin, relays of fresh horses for the canal boats being -provided at all the stages in order to facilitate the transport; and in -referring to this event _The Times_ of December 19, 1806, remarked:--"By -this mode of conveyance the men will be only seven days in reaching -Liverpool, and with comparatively little fatigue, as it would take them -above fourteen days to march that distance." - -But when, on the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, in -1830, a British regiment was conveyed thereon, in two hours, a journey -of thirty-four miles, which they would have required two days to -accomplish on foot, far-seeing men became still more impressed, and -began to realise that there had, indeed, been introduced a new factor -destined to exercise a powerful influence on the future conduct of war. - -The geographical position of the United Kingdom led, in those early -days, to greater importance being attached to the conveniences of -railways as a means of transport than to their actual strategical and -tactical advantages; and the issue by the War Office, in 1846, of a -"Regulation Relative to the Conveyance of Her Majesty's Forces, their -Baggage and Stores, by Rail," may have appeared to meet the requirements -of the immediate situation, so far as this country was concerned. - -On the Continent of Europe, however, the rivalry of nations divided from -one another only by a more or less uncertain or varying frontier, and -still powerfully influenced by the recollection of recent conflicts, -resulted in much greater attention being paid to the possibilities of -the new development. - -The first definite proposals for the use of railways for strategical -purposes were advanced, as early as 1833, by Friedrich Wilhelm Harkort, -a Westphalian worthy who came to be better known in his native land -as "Der alte Harkort." A participant in the Napoleonic wars, he had -subsequently shown great energy and enterprise in the development of -steam engines, hydraulic presses, iron-making, and other important -industries in Germany; he had been the first writer in that country to -give an account--as he did in 1825--of the progress England was making -in respect to railways and steamships; and he had, in 1826, placed a -working model of a railway in the garden of the Elberfeld Museum. These -various efforts he followed up, in 1833, by bringing forward in the -Westphalian Landtag a scheme for the building of a railway to connect -the Weser and the Lippe. Later in the same year he published "Die -Eisenbahn von Minden nach Köln," in which he laid special stress on the -value to Germany of the proposed line from a military point of view. -With the help of such a railway, he argued, it would be possible to -concentrate large bodies of troops at a given point much more speedily -than if they marched by road; he made calculations as to what the actual -saving in time, as well as in physical strain, would be in transporting -Prussian troops from various specified centres to others; and he -proceeded:-- - - Let us suppose that we had a railway and a telegraph line - on the right bank of the Rhine, from Mainz to Wesel. Any - crossing of the Rhine by the French would then scarcely be - possible, since we should be able to bring a strong defensive - force on the spot before the attempt could be developed. - - These things may appear very strange to-day; yet in the womb - of the future there slumbers the seed of great developments in - railways, the results of which it is, as yet, quite beyond our - powers to foresee. - -Harkort's proposals gave rise to much vigorous controversy in Germany. -The official classes condemned as "nonsensical fancies" his ideas, not -only as to the usefulness of railways for the conveyance of troops, but, -also, as to the utility of railways for any practical purposes whatever; -and contemporary newspapers and periodicals, in turn, made him the butt -of their ridicule. - -The pros and cons of the use of railways for military purposes were, -none the less, actively discussed in numerous pamphlets and treatises. -Just as, in France, General Rumigny, adjutant to Louis-Philippe, had -already foreshadowed the possibility of a sudden invasion by a German -army reaching the frontier by rail, so, also, in Germany, in the words -of one writer at this period, "anxious spirits shudder at the thought -that, some fine spring morning, a hundred thousand Frenchmen, thirsting -for war, will suddenly invade our peaceful valleys at bird-like speed, -thanks to the new means of locomotion, and begin their old game (_das -alte Spiel_) over again." On the other hand there were military -sceptics--such as the author of a pamphlet "Uber die Militärische -Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Berlin, 1836)--who, basing their -calculations on locomotive performances up to that date, asserted that, -although the railway might be of service in the conveyance of supplies, -guns and ammunition, it would be of no advantage in the transport of -troops. These, they declared, would get to their destination sooner if -they marched.[1] - -The most noticeable of the various publications issued in Germany at -this period was a book by Carl Eduard Pönitz ("Pz."), which appeared -at Adorf, Saxony, in 1842, under the title of "Die Eisenbahnen -als militärische Operationslinien betrachtet, und durch Beispiele -erlaütert." The writer of this remarkable book (of which a second -edition was issued in 1853) gave a comprehensive survey of the whole -situation in regard to railways and war, so far as the subject could -be dealt with in the light of railway developments and of actual -experiences of troop movements by rail down to that time; and he argued -strongly in favour of the advantages to be derived from the employment -of railways for military purposes. He even suggested that, in the event -of an inadequate supply of locomotives, or of operations having to be -conducted in a mountainous country where locomotives could not be used -for heavy traffic, the troops might still use their own horses to draw -the coaches and wagons along the railway lines, so that the men would -arrive fresh and fit for immediate fighting at the end of their journey. - -Describing railways as the most powerful vehicle for the advancement of -"Kultur" since the invention of printing, Pönitz showed how Belgium and -Saxony were the two countries which had taken the initiative in railway -construction on the Continent of Europe; and his references to the -former country are especially deserving of being recalled, in view of -recent events. He pointed to the good example which had been set by the -"far-sighted and energetic" King of the Belgians, and continued:-- - - Although, in a land torn asunder by revolutionary factions, - many wounds were still bleeding; and although the newly-created - kingdom was threatened by foes within and without and could - organise means of resistance only with great difficulty, there - was, nevertheless, taken in hand a scheme for the construction - of a network of railways designed to extend over the entire - country, while at the present moment the greater part of - that scheme has, in fact, been carried out. In this way King - Leopold has raised up for himself a memorial the full value - and significance of which may, perhaps, be appreciated only by - generations yet to come. - -While Belgium was thus shown to have been setting a good example, the -only railways which Prussia then had in actual operation (apart from -the Berlin-Stettin and the Berlin-Breslau lines, which had been begun, -and others which had been projected) were the Berlin-Potsdam and the -Berlin-Magdeburg-Leipzig lines; though Saxony had the Leipzig-Dresden -line, and Bavaria the Nüremberg-Fürth and the Munich-Augsburg lines. -Pönitz, however, excused the backwardness of Prussia on the ground -that if her Government had refused, for a long time, to sanction -various projected railways, or had imposed heavy obligations in -regard to them, such action was due, not to prejudice, but to "a wise -foresight"--meaning, presumably, that Prussia was waiting to profit by -the experience that other countries were gaining at their own cost. - -Having dealt with all the arguments he could advance in favour of the -general principle of employing railways for military purposes, Pönitz -proceeded to elaborate a scheme for the construction of a network of -strategical lines serving the whole of Germany, though intended, more -especially, to protect her frontiers against attack by either France -or Russia. Without, he said, being in the secrets of international -politics, he thought he might safely presume that Germany's only fear of -attack was from one of these two directions; and, although the relations -of the Great Powers of Europe were then peaceful, a continuance of those -conditions could not, of course, be guaranteed. So, he proceeded-- - - We have to look to these two fronts; and, if we want - to avoid the risk of heavy losses at the outset, we needs - must--also at the outset--be prepared to meet the enemy there - with an overwhelming force. Every one knows that the strength of - an army is multiplied by movements which are rapid in themselves - and allow of the troops arriving at the end of their journey - without fatigue. - -In a powerful appeal--based on motives alike of patriotism, of national -defence and of economic advantage--that his fellow-countrymen should -support the scheme he thus put forward, Pönitz once more pointed to -Belgium, saying:-- - - The youngest of all the European States has given us an - example of what can be done by intelligence and good will. - The network of Belgian railways will be of as much advantage - in advancing the industries of that country as it will be in - facilitating the defence of the land against attack by France. - It will increase alike Belgium's prosperity and Belgium's - security. And we Germans, who place so high a value on our - intelligence, and are scarcely yet inclined to recognise the - political independence of the Belgian people, shall we remain so - blind as not to see what is needed for our own safety? - -Pönitz could not, of course, anticipate in 1842 that the time would -come when his country, acting to the full on the advice he was then -giving, would have her strategic railways, not only to the French and -the Russian, but, also, to the Belgian frontier, and would use those in -the last-mentioned direction to crush remorselessly the little nation -concerning which he himself was using words of such generous sympathy -and approbation. - -The ideas and proposals put forward by Pönitz (of whose work a French -translation, under the title of "Essai sur les Chemins de Fer, -considérés commes lignes d'opérations militaires," was published by L. -A. Unger in Paris, in 1844) did much to stimulate the discussion of the -general question, while the military authorities of Germany were moved -to make investigations into it on their own account, there being issued -in Berlin, about 1848 or 1850, a "Survey of the Traffic and Equipment of -German and of neighbouring foreign Railways for military purposes, based -on information collected by the Great General Staff."[2] - -In France, also, there were those who, quite early in the days of the -new means of transport, predicted the important service it was likely to -render for the purposes of war no less than for those of peace. - -General Lamarque declared in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1832, or -1833, that the strategical use of railways would lead to "a revolution -in military science as great as that which had been brought about by the -use of gunpowder." - -At the sitting of the Chamber on May 25, 1833, M. de Bérigny, in urging -the "incontestable" importance of railways, said:-- - - From the point of view of national defence, what advantages - do they not present! An army, with all its material, could, in a - few days, be transported from the north to the south, from the - east to the west, of France. If a country could thus speedily - carry considerable masses of troops to any given point on its - frontiers, would it not become invincible, and would it not, - also, be in a position to effect great economies in its military - expenditure? - -In a further debate on June 8, 1837, M. Dufaure declared that railways -had a greater mission to fulfil than that of offering facilities to -industry or than that of conferring benefits on private interests. Was -it a matter of no account, he asked, that they should be able in one -night to send troops to all the frontiers of France, from Paris to -the banks of the Rhine, from Lyons to the foot of the Alps, with an -assurance of their arriving fresh and ready for combat? - -Then, in 1842, M. Marschall, advocating the construction of a line from -Paris to Strasburg, predicted that any new invasion of France by Germany -would most probably be attempted between Metz and Strasburg. He further -said:-- - - It is there that the German Confederation is converging - a formidable system of railways from Cologne, Mayence and - Mannheim.... Twenty-four hours will suffice for our neighbours - to concentrate on the Rhine the forces of Prussia, Austria and - the Confederation, and on the morrow an army of 400,000 men - could invade our territory by that breach of forty leagues - between Thionville and Lauterburg, which are the outposts of - Strasburg and Metz. Three months later, the reserve system - organised in Prussia and in some of the other German States - would allow of a second Army being sent of equal force to the - other. The title of "aggressive lines" given by our neighbours - to these railways leave us with no room for doubt as to their - intentions. Studies for an expedition against Paris by way of - Lorraine and Champagne can hardly be regarded as indicative of a - sentiment of fraternity. - -France, however, had no inclination at that time to build railways -designed to serve military purposes, whether from the point of view of -aggression or even from that of national defence; so that in a letter to -his brother Ludwig, written April 13, 1844, von Moltke, then a member -of the General Staff of the Fourth Army Corps of the Prussian Army, -declared that whilst Germany was building railways, the French Chamber -was only discussing them. This was so far the case that when, later on, -Germany had nearly 3,300 miles of railway France was operating only a -little over 1,000 miles. - -Apart from the experiences, on quite a small scale, which had been -obtained on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, the earliest example -of what railways could do in the transport of large bodies of troops -was afforded in 1846, when Prussia's Sixth Army Corps--consisting -of over 12,000 men, together with horses, guns, road vehicles and -ammunition--was moved by rail, upon two lines, to Cracow. In 1849 a -Russian corps of 30,000 men, with all its equipment, was taken by rail -from its cantonments in Poland to Göding, Moravia, whence it effected a -junction with the Austrian army. There was, also, a certain movement of -German troops by rail to Schleswig-Holstein in the troubles of 1848-50; -but of greater importance than these other instances was the transport -of an Austrian army of 75,000 men, 8,000 horses and 1,000 vehicles from -Vienna and Hungary to the Silesian frontier in the early winter of 1850. - -It is true that, owing to the combined disadvantages of single-line -railways, inadequate staff and rolling stock, unfavourable weather, lack -of previous preparations and of transport regulations, and delays from -various unforeseen causes, no fewer than twenty-six days were occupied -in the transport, although the journey was one of only about 150 miles. -It was, also, admitted that the troops could have marched the distance -in the same time. All the same, as told by Regierungsrat Wernekke,[3] -the movement of so large a body of troops by rail at all was regarded -as especially instructive. It was the cause of greater attention being -paid to the use of railways for military purposes, while it further led -(1) to the drawing up, in May, 1851, of a scheme for the construction -throughout the Austrian monarchy of railways from the special point -of view of strategical requirements; and (2) to a reorganisation of -the methods hitherto adopted for the transport of troops by rail, the -result being that the next considerable movement in Austria--in the year -1853--was conducted with "unprecedented regularity and efficiency," and -this, also, without any cessation of the ordinary traffic of the lines -concerned. - -In 1851 a further striking object lesson of the usefulness of railways -was afforded by the moving of a division of 14,500 men, with nearly -2,000 horses, 48 guns and 464 vehicles, from Cracow to Hradish, -a distance of 187 miles, in two days. Reckoning that a large column -of troops, with all its impedimenta, would march twelve miles per -day, and allowing for one day's rest in seven, the movement would, in -this instance, have occupied fifteen days by road instead of two days -by rail. - -It was in the _Italian campaign of 1859_ that railways first played a -conspicuous part in actual warfare, both strategically and tactically. -"In this campaign," said Major Millar, R.A., V.C., of the Topographical -Staff, in two lectures delivered by him at the Royal United Service -Institution in 1861[4]-- - - Railways assisted the ordinary means of locomotion hitherto - employed by armies. By them thousands of men were carried - daily through France to Toulon, Marseilles, or the foot of - Mont Cenis; by them troops were hastened up to the very fields - of battle; and by them injured men were brought swiftly back - to the hospitals, still groaning in the first agony of their - wounds. Moreover, the railway cuttings, embankments and bridges - presented features of importance equal or superior to the - ordinary accidents of the ground, and the possession of which - was hotly contested. If you go to Magenta you will see, close - to the railway platform on which you alight, an excavation full - of rough mounds and simple black crosses, erected to mark the - resting-places of many hundred men who fell in the great fight. - This first employment of railways in close connection with vast - military operations would alone be enough to give a distinction - to this campaign in military history. - -The French railways, especially, attained a remarkable degree of -success. In eighty-six days--from April 19 to July 15--they transported -an aggregate of 604,000 men and over 129,000 horses, including nearly -228,000 men and 37,000 horses sent to Culox, Marseilles, Toulon, -Grenoble and Aix by lines in the south-east. The greatest movements -took place during the ten days from April 20 to April 30, when the -Paris-Lyons Company, without interrupting the ordinary traffic, conveyed -an average per day of 8,421 men and 512 horses. On April 25, a maximum -of 12,138 men and 655 horses was attained. During the eighty-six days -there were run on the lines of the same company a total of 2,636 trains, -including 253 military specials. It was estimated that the 75,966 men -and 4,469 horses transported by rail from Paris to the Mediterranean -or to the frontiers of the Kingdom of Sardinia between April 20 and -April 30 would have taken sixty days to make the journey by road. In -effect, the rate of transit by rail was six times greater than the rate -of progress by marching would have been, and this, again, was about -double as fast as the best achievement recorded up to that time on the -German railways. The Chasseurs de Vincennes are described as leaving -the station at Turin full of vigour and activity, and with none of the -fatigue or the reduction in numbers which would have occurred had they -made the journey by road. - -As against, however, the advantage thus gained by the quicker transport -of the French troops to the seat of war, due to the successful manner -in which the railways were operated, there had to be set some serious -defects in administrative organisation. When the men got to the end -of their rail journey there was a more or less prolonged waiting for -the food and other necessaries which were to follow. There were grave -deficiencies, also, in the dispatch of the subsequent supplies. On June -25, the day after the defeat of the Austrians, the French troops had -no provisions at all for twenty-four hours, except some biscuits which -were so mouldy that no one could eat them. Their horses, also, were -without fodder. In these circumstances it was impossible to follow up -the Austrians in their retreat beyond the Mincio. - -Thus the efficiency of the French railways was to a large extent -negatived by the inefficiency of the military administration; and in -these respects France had a foretaste, in 1859, of experiences to be -repeated on a much graver scale in the Franco-German War of 1870-71. - -As regards the Austrians, they improved but little on their admittedly -poor performance in 1850, in spite of the lessons they appeared to -have learned as the result of their experiences on that occasion. -Government and railways were alike unprepared. Little or no real attempt -at organisation in time of peace had been made, and, in the result, -trains were delayed or blocked, and stations got choked with masses -of supplies which could not be forwarded. At Vienna there was such a -deficiency of rolling stock--accelerated by great delays in the return -of empties--that many of the troop trains for the South could not be -made up until the last moment. Even then the average number of men they -conveyed did not exceed about 360. At Laibach there was much congestion -because troops had to wait there for instructions as to their actual -destination. Other delays occurred because, owing to the heavy gradients -of the Semmering Pass, each train had to be divided into three sections -before it could proceed. Between, again, Innsbruck and Bozen the railway -was still incomplete, and the First Corps (about 40,000 men and 10,000 -horses) had to march between these two points on their journey from -Prague to Verona. Notwithstanding this fact, it was estimated that they -covered in fourteen days a journey which would have taken sixty-four -days if they had marched all the way. From Vienna to Lombardy the Third -Army Corps (20,000 men, 5,500 horses, with guns, ammunition and 300 -wagons) was carried by rail in fourteen days, the rate of progress -attained being four and a half times greater than by road marching, -though still inferior by one and a half times to what the French -troop-trains had accomplished. - -On both sides important reinforcements were brought up at critical -periods during the progress of the war. Referring to the attacks by -the allies on Casteggio and Montebello, Count Gyulai, the Austrian -General, wrote:--"The enemy soon displayed a superior force, which was -continually increased by arrivals from the railway"; and the special -correspondent of _The Times_, writing from Pavia on May 21, 1859, said:-- - - From the heights of Montebello the Austrians beheld a - novelty in the art of war. Train after train arrived by railway - from Voghera, each train disgorging its hundreds of armed men - and immediately hastening back for more. In vain Count Stadion - endeavoured to crush the force behind him before it could be - increased enough to overpower him. - -Then, also, the good use made of the railways by the allies in carrying -out their important flanking movement against the Austrians at Vercelli -gave further evidence of the fact that rail-power was a new force which -could be employed, not alone for the earlier concentration of troops at -the seat of war, but, also, in support of strategic developments on the -battle-field itself. Commenting on this fact the _Spectateur Militaire_ -said, in its issue for September, 1869:-- - - Les chemins de fer ont joué un rôle immense dans cette - concentration. C'est la première fois que, dans l'histoire - militaire, ils servent d'une manière aussi merveilleuse et - entrent dans les combinaisons stratégiques. - -While these observations were fully warranted by the results -accomplished in regard to concentration, reinforcements and tactical -movements by rail, the campaign also brought out more clearly than -ever before the need, if railways were to fulfil their greatest -possible measure of utility in time of war, of working out in advance -all important details likely to arise in connection with the movement -of troops, instead--as in the case of the Austrians, at least--of -neglecting any serious attempt at organisation until the need arose for -immediate action. - -From all these various points of view the Italian campaign of 1859 -marked a further important stage in the early development of that new -factor which the employment of railways for the purposes of warfare -represented; though far greater results in the same direction were to -be brought about, shortly afterwards, by the American Civil War of -1861-65. Not only does the real development of rail-power as a new arm -in war date therefrom, but the War of Secession was to establish in a -pre-eminent degree (1) the possibility, through the use of railways, -of carrying on operations at a considerable distance from the base -of supplies; (2) the need of a special organisation to deal alike -with restoration of railway lines destroyed by the enemy and with the -interruption, in turn, of the enemy's own communications; and (3) the -difficulties that may arise as between the military element and the -technical (railway) element in regard to the control and operation of -railways during war. To each of these subjects it is proposed to devote -a separate chapter. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] In 1847 one of the leading military writers in Germany published a -pamphlet in which he sought to prove that the best-organised railway -could not carry 10,000 Infantry a distance equal to sixty English miles -in twenty-four hours. As for the conveyance of Cavalry and Artillery by -train, he declared that this would be a sheer impossibility. - -[2] "Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel auf den inländischen -und den benachbarten ausländischen Eisenbahnen für militärischen Zwecke; -nach dem beim grossen Generalstabe vorhanden Materialen zusammen -gestellt." - -[3] "Die Mitwirkung der Eisenbahn an den Kriegen in Mitteleuropa." -"Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen," Juli und August, 1912. - -[4] "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," vol. v, pp. -269-308. London, 1861. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR - - -Such were the conditions under which the War of Secession in the United -States was fought that without the help of railways it could hardly have -been fought at all. - -The area of the military operations, from first to last, was equal in -extent almost to the whole of Europe. The line of separation between the -rival forces of North and South was fully 2,000 miles. Large portions -of this region were then unexplored. Everywhere, except in the towns, -it was but thinly populated. Civilisation had not yet progressed so far -that an advancing army could always depend on being able to "live on the -country." There were occasions when local supplies of food and forage -were so difficult of attainment that an army might be wholly dependent -on a base hundreds of miles distant from the scene of its operations. - -Of roads and tracks throughout this vast area there were but few, and -these were mostly either indifferent or bad, even if they did not become -positively execrable in wet weather or after a considerable force of -troops had passed along them. In the low-lying districts, especially, -the alluvial undrained soil was speedily converted by the winter floods -into swamps and lakes. Further difficulties in the movement of troops -were offered by pathless forests as large as an English county; and -still others by the broad rivers or the mountain ranges it might be -necessary to cross. - -Apart from the deficient and defective roads and tracks, the transport -facilities available for the combatants were those afforded by coastal -services, navigable rivers, canals and railways. Of these it was the -railways that played the most important rôle. - -The American railway lines of those days had, generally speaking, -been constructed as cheaply as possible by the private enterprise -which--though with liberal grants of land and other advantages--alone -undertook their provision, the main idea being to supply a railway of -some sort to satisfy immediate wants and to improve it later on, when -population and traffic increased and more funds were available. The -lines themselves were mostly single track; the ballasting was too often -imperfect; iron rails of inadequate weight soon wore down and got out -of shape; sleepers (otherwise "ties"), which consisted of logs of wood -brought straight from the forests, speedily became rotten, especially in -low-lying districts; while, in the early 'Sixties lumber, used either in -the rough or smoothed on two sides, was still the customary material for -the building of bridges and viaducts carrying the railways across narrow -streams, broad rivers or widespread valleys. - -All the same, these railways, while awaiting their later betterment, -extended for long distances, served as a connecting link of inestimable -advantage between the various centres of population and production, and -offered in many instances the only practicable means by which troops -and supplies could be moved. They fulfilled, in fact, purposes of such -vital importance from a strategical point of view that many battles -were fought primarily for the control of particular railways, for the -safeguarding of lines of communication, or for the possession, more -especially, of important junctions, some of which themselves became the -base for more or less distant operations. - -The North, bent not simply on invasion but on reconquest of the States -which had seceded, necessarily took the offensive; the South stood -mostly on the defensive. Yet while the population in the North was far -in excess of that in the South, the initial advantages from a transport -point of view were in favour of the South, which found its principal -ally in the railways. Generals in the North are, indeed, said to have -been exceedingly chary, at first, in getting far away from the magazines -they depended on for their supplies; though this uneasiness wore off in -proportion as organised effort showed how successfully the lines of -rail communication could be defended. - -In these and other circumstances, and especially in view of the -paramount importance the railway system was to assume in the conduct of -the war, the Federal Government took possession of the Philadelphia, -Wilmington and Baltimore Railway on March 31, 1861. This preliminary -measure was followed by the passing, in January, 1862, by the United -States House of Representatives, of "An Act to authorise the President -of the United States in certain cases to take possession of railroad and -telegraph lines, and for other purposes." - -The President, "when in his judgment the public safety may require it," -was "to take possession of any or all the telegraph lines in the United -States; ... to take possession of any or all the railroad lines in the -United States, their rolling stock, their offices, shops, buildings -and all their appendages and appurtenances; to prescribe rules and -regulations for the holding, using, and maintaining of the aforesaid -telegraph and railroad lines, and to extend, repair and complete the -same in the manner most conducive to the safety and interest of the -Government; to place under military control all the officers, agents -and employés belonging to the telegraph and railroad lines thus taken -possession of by the President, so that they shall be considered as a -post road and a part of the military establishment of the United States, -subject to all the restrictions imposed by the Rules and Articles of -War." Commissioners were to be appointed to assess and determine the -damages suffered, or the compensation to which any railroad or telegraph -company might be entitled by reason of such seizure of their property; -and it was further enacted "that the transportation of troops, munitions -of war, equipments, military property and stores, throughout the United -States, should be under the immediate control and supervision of the -Secretary of War and such agents as he might appoint." - -Thus the Act in question established a precedent for a Government -taking formal possession of, and exercising complete authority and -control over, the whole of such railways as it might require to employ -for the purposes of war; although, in point of fact, only such lines, -or portions of lines, were so taken over by the War Department as were -actually required. In each instance, also, the line or portion of line -in question was given back to the owning company as soon as it was no -longer required for military purposes; while at the conclusion of the -war all the lines taken possession of by the Government were formally -restored to their original owners by an Executive Order dated August 8, -1865. - -Under the authority of the Act of January 31, 1862, the following -order was sent to Mr. Daniel Craig McCallum, a native of Johnstone, -Renfrewshire, Scotland, who had been taken to America by his parents -when a youth, had joined the railway service, had held for many years -the position of general superintendent of the Erie Railroad, and was -one of the ablest and most experienced railway men then in the United -States:-- - - WAR DEPARTMENT. - Washington City, D.C., - _February 11, 1862_. - - _Ordered_, That D. C. McCallum be, and he is hereby, - appointed Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in - the United States, with authority to enter upon, take possession - of, hold and use all railroads, engines, cars, locomotives, - equipments, appendages and appurtenances that may be required - for the transport of troops, arms, ammunition and military - supplies of the United States, and to do and perform all acts - and things that may be necessary and proper to be done for the - safe and speedy transport aforesaid. - - By order of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army - and Navy of the United States. - - EDWIN M. STANTON, - Secretary of War. - -McCallum commenced his duties with the staff rank of Colonel, afterwards -attaining to that of Brev.-Brig.-General. The scope of the authority -conferred on him, under the War Department order of February 11, 1862, -was widened a year later, when he was further appointed general manager -of all railways in possession of the Federal Government, or that might -from time to time be taken possession of by military authority, in the -departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and of Arkansas, -forming the "Military Division of the Mississippi." - -The total mileage of the lines taken over by the Federal Government -during the course of the war was 2,105, namely, in Virginia, 611 -miles; in the military division of the Mississippi, 1,201; and in -North Carolina, 293. Much more was involved, however, for the Federal -Government than a mere transfer to themselves of the ownership and -operation of these lines for the duration of the war. - -One of the greatest disadvantages of the American railways at the -time of the Civil War lay in their differences of gauge. The various -companies had built their lines with gauges chosen either to suit local -conditions or according to the views of their own engineers, with little -or no consideration for the running of through traffic on or from other -lines. There were, in fact, at that time gauges of 6 ft., 5 ft. 6 in., -5 ft., 4 ft. 10 in., 4 ft. 9 in., 4 ft. 8½ in. (the standard English -gauge), and various narrower gauges besides. These conditions prevailed -until 1866, when the companies adopted a uniform gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in. - -During the Civil War the lack of uniformity was in full force, and -military transport by rail was greatly complicated in consequence. More -than one-half of the lines taken over and operated had a gauge of 5 ft., -and the remainder had a gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in., except in the case of -one short line, which was 5 ft. 6 in. As locomotives and rolling stock -adapted to one gauge were unsuited to any other, the obligations falling -upon the Director and General Manager of the Federal Military Railways -included that of taking up the lines of certain companies which had -adopted the 5 ft. gauge, and relaying them with the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge, -so that the same rolling stock could be used as on lines connecting with -them. - -Incidentally, therefore, the Civil War in America taught the lesson that -the actual value of rail-power as influencing warfare in one and the -same country, or on one and the same continent, may vary materially -according to whether there is uniformity or diversity of railway gauge. - -In certain instances the lines taken possession of were in so -defective a condition that it was imperatively necessary to relay -them, apart altogether from any question of gauge. When McCallum was -appointed General Manager of Military Railways for the Division of -the Mississippi, the main army was at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and its -supplies were being received from Nashville, 151 miles distant, over -the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. This was necessarily the main -line of supply during the subsequent campaigns from Chattanooga towards -Atlanta, and from Knoxville towards South-western Virginia; yet McCallum -says of it, in the Final Report he presented to the Secretary of War in -1866:-- - - The track was laid originally in a very imperfect manner, - with a light U-rail on wooden stringers which were badly decayed - and caused almost daily accidents by spreading apart and letting - the engines and cars drop through them. - -In still other instances, lines which, though begun, were not finished, -had to be completed; in others new lines had to be constructed -throughout, or extensive sidings provided; so that once more we see -that it was not then simply a question of the Federal Government taking -possession of and operating an existing complete and efficient system of -railways. - -Whatever, again, the condition of the lines when taken over, the -railways of both combatants were subjected to constant attack by the -other side with a view to the interruption of communications, the -destruction of railway track, railway bridges, rolling stock and other -railway property being enormous. - -Reviewing the general situation at this time, McCallum says in his -report:-- - - In the beginning of the war military railroads were an - experiment; and though some light as to their management had - been gleaned by the operations of 1862 and 1863, yet so little - progress had been made that the attempt to supply the army of - General Sherman in the field, construct and reconstruct the - railroad in its rear, and keep pace with its march, was regarded - by those who had the largest experience, and who had become - most familiar with the subject, as the greatest experiment of - all. The attempt to furnish an army of 100,000 men and 60,000 - animals with supplies from a base 360 miles distant by one line - of single-track railroad, located almost the entire distance - through the country of an active and vindictive enemy, is - without precedent in the history of warfare; and to make it - successful required an enormous outlay for labour and a vast - consumption of material, together with all the forethought, - energy, patience and watchfulness of which men are capable. - -To meet the various conditions which had thus arisen, McCallum -was authorised by the Federal Government to create two distinct -departments, destined to bring about a still further development in the -application of rail-power to war by establishing precedents which the -leading countries of the world were afterwards to follow more or less -completely, according to their own circumstances and requirements. - -The departments were known respectively as the "Transportation -Department," embracing the operation and maintenance of all the lines -brought under use by the army of the North; and the "Construction -Corps," which was to repair the damage done by wrecking parties of the -enemy, maintain lines of communication, and reconstruct, when necessary, -railways captured from the enemy as the Federals advanced. - -Concerning the Construction Corps, and the great work accomplished by it -in keeping the lines open, details will be given in the chapter which -follows. - -In regard to the Transportation Department, it may be of interest -to state that this was placed by McCallum in charge of a General -Superintendent of Transportation on United States Railroads in the -Military Division of the Mississippi. For each of the principal lines -there was appointed a Superintendent of Transportation who, acting under -the control of the General Superintendent, was held responsible for the -movement of all trains and locomotives; and these superintendents, in -turn, had under their direction one or more Masters of Transportation, -whose business it was to be constantly moving about over the sections of -line placed under their charge, and see that the railway employés were -attending properly to their duties. - -At each of the principal stations there was an Engine Dispatcher who -was required to see that the locomotives were kept in good order and -ready for immediate use whenever required, to exercise control over the -drivers and firemen, and to assign the requisite "crew" to each engine -sent out. - -Maintenance of road and structures for each line (as distinct from -the reconstruction work left to the Construction Department) was in -charge of a Superintendent of Repairs, assisted by such supervisors, -road-masters and foremen as he needed to control and direct his working -staff; and maintenance of rolling stock was delegated to (1) a Master -Machinist, responsible for repairs to locomotives, and (2) a Master of -Car Repairs. - -These various officers were independent of each other, and all of -them reported direct to the General Superintendent. The maximum force -employed at any one time in the Transportation Department of the -Military Division of the Mississippi (as distinct from the military -lines in Virginia and elsewhere) was about 12,000 men. - -A sufficient staff of competent railwaymen for the operation of the -Military Railways was difficult to get, partly because of the inadequate -supply of such men in the United States at that period, and partly -because those still at work on railways not taken over for military -purposes were unwilling to give up what they found to be exceptionally -good posts; but of the men whose services he was able to secure McCallum -speaks in terms of the highest commendation. - -Having got his Department and Construction Corps into working order, -McCallum had next to turn his attention to ensuring an adequate supply -of locomotives and cars, with the necessary shops, tools and materials -for keeping them in working order. Here the Secretary of War again -came to his help, issuing, on March 23, 1864, an Order addressed to -locomotive manufacturers in which he stated that Colonel McCallum had -been authorised by the War Department to procure locomotives without -delay for the railways under his charge, and proceeded:-- - - In order to meet the wants of the Military Department of - the Government, you will deliver to his order such engines as - he may direct, whether building under orders for other parties - or otherwise, the Government being accountable to you for the - same. The urgent necessity of the Government for the immediate - supply of our armies operating in Tennessee renders the engines - indispensable for the equipment of the lines of communication, - and it is hoped that this necessity will be recognised by you as - a military necessity, paramount to all other considerations.--By - order of the President. - -In January, 1864, McCallum had estimated that he would require 200 -locomotives and 3,000 cars for the lines to be operated from Nashville, -and towards this number he then had only 47 locomotives and 437 cars -available. There was thus a substantial shortage which had to be -made good; but the manufacturers, inspired by "a spirit of zealous -patriotism," responded heartily to the appeal made to them, putting -their full force on to the completion of further supplies. These were -furnished with a speed that surpassed all previous records. - -Then, to maintain the locomotives and cars in good condition--more -especially in view of the constant attempts made by the enemy to destroy -them--extensive machine and car shops were built at Nashville and -Chattanooga. Those at Nashville--the terminal station for 500 miles -of railway running south, east or west--had, at times, as many as 100 -engines and 1,000 cars awaiting repair. - -Next to that insufficiency of engines and rolling stock which hampered -the movements of both combatants came the difficulty in the way of -obtaining further supplies of rails, whether for new lines or to take -the place of those which had either worn out or been so bent and twisted -by the enemy that they could not be used again without re-rolling. -For the Confederates, cut off by the advance of General Grant to the -south and west from their sources of supply, the want of iron for new -rails was declared to be a worse evil than was the lack of gold for the -Federals. - -One expedient resorted to by the Federal Government, on finding they -could not procure from the manufacturers all the rails they wanted, was -to pull up the railway lines that were not wanted for military purposes -and use their rails for relaying those that were. Altogether the rails -on over 156 miles of track in Virginia and the Military Division of the -Mississippi were thus taken up and utilised elsewhere. Later on the -Federal Construction Corps erected at Chattanooga some "very superior" -rolling mills, equipped with all the latest improvements in the way of -machinery and mechanical appliances; though these mills did not actually -get to work until April 1, 1865. Their production of new rails during -the course of six months from that date was 3,818 tons, this supply -being in addition to nearly 22,000 tons which the Federal Government -obtained by purchase. - -These details may convey some idea of all that was involved in the -utilisation of rail-power in the American Civil War under such -development of railway construction as had then been brought about. -Great, however, as was the outlay, the forethought, the energy, the -patience and the watchfulness spoken of by McCallum, the results were no -less valuable from the point of view of the Federals, who could hardly -have hoped to achieve the aim they set before themselves--that of saving -the Union--but for the material advantages they derived from the use of -the railways for the purposes of the campaign. - -Some of the achievements accomplished in the movement of troops from -one part of the theatre of war to another would have been creditable -even in the most favourable of circumstances; but they were especially -so in view alike of the physical conditions of many of the lines, the -inadequate supply of rolling stock, and the risks and difficulties to be -met or overcome. - -One of these achievements, carried out in September, 1863, is thus -narrated in an article on "Recollections of Secretary Stanton," -published in the _Century Magazine_ for March, 1887:-- - - The defeat of Rosecrans, at Chickamauga, was believed at - Washington to imperil East Tennessee, and the Secretary [of War] - was urged to send a strong reinforcement there from the Army - of the Potomac. General Halleck (General-in-Chief of the Army - of the United States) contended that it was impossible to get - an effective reinforcement there in time; and the President, - after hearing both sides, accepted the judgment of Halleck. Mr. - Stanton put off the decision till evening, when he and Halleck - were to be ready with details to support their conclusions. - The Secretary then sent for Colonel McCallum, who was neither - a lawyer nor a strategist, but a master of railway science. He - showed McCallum how many officers, men, horses, and pieces of - artillery, and how much baggage, it was proposed to move from - the Rapidan to the Tennessee, and asked him to name the shortest - time he would undertake to do it in if his life depended on - it. McCallum made some rapid calculations, jotted down some - projects connected with the move, and named a time within that - which Halleck had admitted would be soon enough if it were - only possible; this time being conditioned on his being able - to control everything that he could reach. The Secretary was - delighted, told him that he would make him a Brigadier-General - the day that the last train was safely unloaded; put him on his - mettle by telling him of Halleck's assertion that the thing - was beyond human power; told him to go and work out final - calculations and projects and to begin preliminary measures, - using his name and authority everywhere; and finally instructed - him what to do and say when he should send for him by and - by to come over to the department. When the conference was - resumed and McCallum was introduced, his apparently spontaneous - demonstration of how easily and surely the impossible thing - could be done convinced the two sceptics, and the movement was - ordered, and made, and figures now in military science as a - grand piece of strategy. - -The feat thus accomplished was that of conveying by rail 23,000 men, -together with artillery, road vehicles, etc., a distance of about 1,200 -miles in seven days. It was estimated that if the troops had had to -march this distance, with all their impedimenta, along such roads as -were then available, the journey would have taken them three months. By -doing it in one week they saved the situation in East Tennessee, and -they gave an especially convincing proof of the success with which "a -grand piece of strategy" could be carried out through the employment of -rail transport. - -In December, 1864, General Schofield's corps of 15,000 men, after -fighting at Nashville in the midst of ice and snow, was, on the -conclusion of the campaign in the west, transferred from the valley of -the Tennessee to the banks of the Potomac, moving by river and rail down -the Tennessee, up the Ohio and across the snow-covered Alleghanies, -a distance of 1,400 miles, accomplished in the short space of eleven -days. In 1865 the moving of the Fourth Army Corps of the Federals from -Carter's Station, East Tennessee, to Nashville, a distance of 373 miles, -involved the employment of 1,498 cars. - -What, in effect, the Civil War in America did in furthering the -development of the rail-power principle in warfare was to show that, -by the use of railways, (1) the fighting power of armies is increased; -(2) strategical advantages unattainable but for the early arrival of -reinforcements at threatened points may be assured; and (3) expeditions -may be undertaken at distances from the base of supplies which would -be prohibitive but for the control of lines of railway communication; -though as against these advantages were to be put those considerations -which also arose as to destruction and restoration, and as to the -control of railways in their operation for military purposes. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR - - -One of the earliest and most obvious criticisms advanced against the -use of railways in war was based on the vulnerability of the iron -road. The destruction of a bridge, the tearing up of a few rails or -the blocking of a tunnel would, it was argued, suffice to cause an -interruption in the transport of troops or supplies which might be of -serious consequence to the combatants prejudiced thereby, though of -corresponding advantage to the other side. By means of such interruption -the concentration of troops on the frontier might be delayed; an army -might be divided into two or more parts, and exposed to the risk of -defeat in detail; the arrival of reinforcements urgently wanted to -meet a critical situation might be prevented until it was too late for -them to afford the desired relief; a force advancing into an enemy's -country might have its rail connection severed and be left to starve -or to surrender at discretion; invaders would find that the force they -were driving before them had taken the precaution to destroy their -own railways as they retreated; or, alternatively, lines of railway -constructed to the frontier, and depended upon to facilitate invasion of -neighbouring territory, might--unless destroyed--be of material service -to the enemy, should the latter become the invaders instead of the -invaded. - -While these and other possibilities--foreshadowed more especially in -the controversies which the whole subject aroused in Germany in the -'Forties--were frankly admitted, it was argued that, however vulnerable -railways might be as a line of communication, it should be quite -possible either to defend them successfully or to carry out on them -such speedy repairs or reconstruction as would, generally speaking, -permit of an early resumption of traffic; though experience was to show -that these safeguards could only be assured through a well-planned and -thoroughly efficient organisation prepared to meet, with the utmost -dispatch and the highest degree of efficiency, all the requirements in -the way of railway repairs or railway rebuilding that were likely to -arise. - -The earliest instance of an attempt to delay the advance of an enemy -by interrupting his rail communications was recorded in 1848, when the -Venetians, threatened with bombardment by the Austrians, destroyed -some of the arches in the railway viaduct connecting their island city -with the mainland. Then in the _Italian campaign of 1859_ the allies -and the Austrians both resorted to the expedient of destroying railway -bridges or tearing up the railway lines; although the allies were able, -in various instances, to repair so speedily the damage done by the -Austrians that the lines were ready for use again by the time they were -wanted. - -It was the _American Civil War_ that was to elevate railway destruction -and restoration into a science and to see the establishment, in the -interests of such science, of an organisation which was to become a -model for European countries and influence the whole subsequent course -of modern warfare. - -The destruction of railways likely to be used by the North for its -projected invasion of the Confederate States was, from the first, -a leading feature in the strategy of the South. Expeditions were -undertaken and raids were made with no other object than that of -burning down bridges, tearing up and bending rails, making bonfires of -sleepers, wrecking stations, rendering engines, trucks and carriages -unserviceable, cutting off the water supply for locomotives, or in -various other ways seeking to check the advance of the Northerners. -Later on the Federals, in turn, became no less energetic in resorting to -similar tactics in order either to prevent pursuit by the Confederates -or to interrupt their communications. - -For the carrying out of these destructive tactics use was generally made -either of cavalry, accompanied by civilians, or of bodies of civilians -only; but in some instances, when it was considered desirable to destroy -lengths of track extending to twenty or thirty miles, or more, the -Confederates put the whole of their available forces on to the work. - -At the outset the methods of destruction were somewhat primitive; but -they were improved upon as the result of practice and experiment. - -Thus, in the first instance, timber bridges or viaducts were destroyed -by collecting brushwood, placing this around the arches, pouring tar or -petroleum upon the pile, and then setting fire to the whole. Afterwards -the Federals made use of a "torpedo," eight inches long, and charged -with gunpowder, which was inserted in a hole bored in the main timbers -of the bridge and exploded with a fuse. It was claimed that with two or -three men working at each span the largest timber bridge could be thrown -down in a few minutes. - -Then the method generally adopted at first for destroying a railway -track was to tear up sleepers and rails, place the sleepers in a heap, -put the rails cross-ways over them, set fire to the sleepers, and heat -the rails until they either fell out of shape or could be twisted around -a tree with the help of chains and horses. But this process was found -to require too much time and labour, while the results were not always -satisfactory, since rails only slightly bent could be restored to -their original shape, and made ready for use again, in much less time -than it had taken for the fire to heat and bend them. A Federal expert -accordingly invented an ingenious contrivance, in the form of iron -U-shaped "claws," which, being turned up and over at each extremity, -were inserted underneath each end of a rail, on opposite sides, and -operated, with the help of a long wooden lever and rope, by half a dozen -men. In this way a rail could be torn from the sleepers and not only -bent but given such a spiral or corkscrew twist, while still in the cold -state, that it could not be used again until it had gone through the -rolling mills. By the adoption of this method, 440 men could destroy -one mile of track in an hour, or 2,200 men could, in the same time, -destroy five miles. - -The most effective method for rendering a locomotive unfit for service -was found to be the firing of a cannon ball through the boiler. -Carriages and wagons which might otherwise be used by the enemy, and -could not be conveniently carried off, were easily destroyed by fire. -In one period of six months the Federals disposed of 400 in this way. -Stations, water-tanks, sleepers, fuel and telegraph poles were also -destroyed or rendered useless by fire or otherwise. - -In the first year of the war--1861--the Confederates gave the Federals a -foretaste of much that was to come by destroying forty-eight locomotives -on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and making a complete wreck of 100 -miles of the North Missouri Railroad track and everything thereon. - -Much more serious than this, however, from a strategical point of -view, was the wholesale destruction carried out by the Confederates, -in April, 1862, on the Fredericksburg Railway, connecting Richmond -and Washington, the immediate result of the mischief done being to -prevent an impending combination between the Federal armies of the -Potomac and the Rappahannock, neither of which could act without the -other, while neither could join the other unless it could make use -of rail communication. There was much that required to be done, for -the Confederates had carried out their work in a most thorough-going -fashion. Several indispensable railway bridges had been destroyed; three -miles of track had been torn up, the rails being carried south and the -sleepers burned; and wharves and buildings had been burned or wrecked. -The whole transportation service, in fact, had been reduced to a state -of chaos. - -At the urgent request of the Secretary of War, the work of restoration -was undertaken by Mr. Herman Haupt, a railway engineer who had already -distinguished himself more especially as a builder of bridges, and was -now to establish a further record as the pioneer of those Construction -Corps of which so much was to be heard later on in connection with -railways and war. - -In carrying out the necessary repairs the only help which Haupt could -obtain, at first, was that of soldiers detailed from the Federal ranks. -Many of these men were entirely unaccustomed to physical labour; others -were sickly, inefficient, or unwilling to undertake what they did not -regard as a soldier's duties, while the Army officers sent in a fresh -lot daily until Haupt's remonstrances led to their allotting certain -men to form a "Construction Corps." Other difficulties which presented -themselves included an insufficient supply of tools, occasional scarcity -of food, and several days of wet weather; yet the work advanced so -rapidly that the Akakeek bridge, a single span of 120 ft., at an -elevation of 30 ft., was rebuilt in about fifteen working hours; the -Potomac Creek bridge, 414 ft. long with an elevation of 82 ft. above -the water, and requiring the use of as much roughly-hewn timber as -would have extended a total length of six and a half miles, if put end -to end, was completed in nine days;[5] and the three miles of track -were relaid in three days, included in the work done in that time being -the preparation of more than 3,000 sleepers from lumber cut down for -the purpose in woods a mile and a half distant from the track. General -McDowell subsequently said, concerning the Potomac bridge:-- - - When it is considered that in the campaigns of Napoleon - trestle bridges of more than one story, even of moderate - height, were regarded as impracticable, and that, too, for - common military roads, it is not difficult to understand why - distinguished Europeans should express surprise at so bold a - specimen of American military engineering. It is a structure - which ignores all rules and precedents of military science as - laid down in the books. It is constructed chiefly of round - sticks cut from the woods, and not even divested of bark; the - legs of the trestles are braced with round poles. It is in four - stories--three of trestle and one of crib work. - -While constructed in so apparently primitive a fashion, the bridge was, -General McDowell further said, carrying every day from ten to twenty -heavy railway trains in both directions, and had withstood several -severe freshets and storms without injury. - -Thus early, therefore, in the more active phases of the Civil War, -evidence was being afforded that, although the railways on which so -much depended might be readily destroyed, they could, also, be rapidly -restored; and subsequent experience was to offer proofs still more -remarkable in support of this fact. - -On May 28, 1862, Haupt was appointed Chief of Construction and -Transportation in the Department of the Rappahannock, with the rank of -Colonel. He was raised to the rank of Brigadier-General in the following -year, and did much excellent construction and other work for the -Government, though mainly in Virginia, down to September, 1863. In his -"Reminiscences" he relates that the supplies of repair or reconstruction -materials, as kept on hand by the Federals, included the interchangeable -parts of bridge trusses, in spans of 60 ft., and so prepared that, taken -on flat cars, by ox-teams or otherwise, to the place where they were -wanted, and hoisted into position by machinery arranged for the purpose, -they could, without previous fitting, be put together with such rapidity -that one of his foremen claimed to be able to build a bridge "about as -fast as a dog could trot." When the Massaponix bridge, six miles from -Fredericksburg, was burned down one Monday morning, a new one was put -up in its place in half a day--a feat which, he says, led some of the -onlookers to exclaim, "The Yankees can build bridges quicker than the -Rebs can burn them down." In May, 1862, five bridges over Goose Creek -which the "Rebs" had destroyed were reconstructed in a day and a half. -In the following month five other bridges, each with a span of from 60 -ft. to 120 ft., were renewed in one day. At the Battle of Gettysburg -Lee's troops destroyed nineteen bridges on the Northern Central Railroad -and did much havoc on the branch lines leading to Gettysburg; but the -Construction Corps was hard at work on the repairs whilst the battle -was still being waged, and rail communication with both Washington and -Baltimore had been re-established by noon of the day after Lee's retreat. - -In some instances railway bridges underwent repeated destruction and -reconstruction. By June, 1863, the bridge over Bull Run, for instance, -had been burned down and built up again no fewer than seven times. Many -of the bridges, also, were swept away by floods, and this even for a -second or a third time after they had been rebuilt. Precautions thus -had to be taken against the destructive forces of Nature no less than -against those of man. - -Haupt's pioneer Construction Corps in Virginia was succeeded by the -one set up on much broader lines by McCallum when, in February, 1864, -he became General Manager of railways in the Military Division of the -Mississippi. This corps eventually reached a total of 10,000 men. - -"The design of the corps," wrote McCallum, in his final report, "was -to combine a body of skilled workmen in each department of railroad -construction and repairs, under competent engineers, supplied with -abundant materials, tools and mechanical appliances." The corps was -formed into divisions the number of which varied from time to time, in -different districts, according to requirements. In the military division -of the Mississippi the corps comprised six divisions, under the general -charge of the chief engineer of the United States military railroads -for that military division, and consisted at its maximum strength of -nearly 5,000 men. In order to give the corps entire mobility, and to -enable it to move independently and undertake work at widely different -points, each of the six divisions was made a complete unit, under -the command of a divisional engineer, and was, in turn, divided into -sub-divisions or sections, with a supervisor in charge of each. The -two largest and most important sub-divisions in any one division were -those of the track-layers and the bridge-builders. A sub-division was, -again, composed of gangs, each with a foreman, while the gangs were -divided into squads, each with a sub-foreman.[6] Under this method of -organisation it was possible to move either the entire division or any -section thereof, with its tools, camp requirements and field transport, -in any direction, wherever and whenever needed, and by any mode of -conveyance--rail, road, with teams and wagons, or on foot. - -To facilitate the operations of the corps, supplies of materials were -kept at points along or within a short distance of the railway lines, -where they would be comparatively safe and speedily procurable in -case of necessity. At places where there was special need for taking -precautionary measures, detachments of the corps were stationed in -readiness for immediate action, while on important lines of railway -Federals and Confederates alike had, at each end thereof, construction -trains loaded with every possible requisite, the locomotives attached -to them keeping their steam up in order that the trains could be -started off instantly on the receipt of a telegram announcing a further -interruption of traffic. - -At Nashville and Chattanooga the Federals built extensive storehouses -where they kept on hand supplies of materials for the prompt carrying -out of railway repairs of every kind to any extent and in whatever -direction. - -On the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway itself the Construction Corps, -from February, 1864, to the close of the war, relaid 115 miles of -track, put in nineteen miles of new sidings, eight miles apart and each -capable of holding from five to eight long freight trains, and erected -forty-five new water tanks. - -The reconstruction of this particular line was more especially needed -in connection with General Sherman's campaign in Georgia and the -Carolinas--a campaign which afforded the greatest and most direct -evidence up to that time alike of the possibilities of rail-power -in warfare, of the risks by which its use was attended, and of the -success with which those risks could be overcome by means of efficient -organisation. - -In that struggle for Atlanta which preceded his still more famous march -to the sea, Sherman had with him a force of 100,000 men, together with -23,000 animals. His base of supplies, when he approached Atlanta, was -360 miles distant, and the continuance of his communications with that -base, not only for the procuring of food, clothing, fodder, ammunition -and every other requisite, but for the transport to the rear of sick -and wounded, refugees, freedmen and prisoners, depended on what he -afterwards described as "a poorly-constructed single-track railroad" -passing for 120 miles of its length through the country of an extremely -active enemy. Yet Sherman is said to have made his advance in perfect -confidence that, although subject to interruptions, the railway in his -rear would be "all right"; and this confidence was fully warranted by -the results accomplished. - -Early in September, 1864, the Confederate General, Wheeler, destroyed -seven miles of road between Nashville and Murfreesboro', on the -Nashville and Chattanooga Railway, and in the following December Hood -destroyed eight miles of track and 530 ft. of bridges between the same -stations; yet the arrangements of the Federal Construction Corps allowed -of the repairs being carried out with such promptness that in each -instance the trains were running again in a few days. - -The Confederate attacks on the Western and Atlantic Railway, running -from Chattanooga at Atlanta, a distance of 136 miles, were more -continuous and more severe than on any other line of railway during -the war; but, thanks again to the speed with which the repair and -reconstruction work was done, the delays occasioned were, as a rule, of -only a few hours, or, at the most, a few days' duration. One especially -remarkable feat accomplished on this line was the rebuilding, in four -and a half days, of the Chattahochee bridge, near Atlanta--a structure -780 ft. long, and 92 ft. high. Hood, the Confederate General, thought -still further to check Sherman's communications by passing round the -Federal army and falling upon the railway in its rear. He succeeded -in tearing up two lengths of track, one of ten miles, and another of -twenty-five miles, in extent, and destroying 250 ft. of bridges; but -once more the work of restoration was speedily carried out, McCallum -saying in reference to it:-- - - Fortunately the detachments of the Construction Corps which - escaped were so distributed that even before Hood had left the - road two strong working parties were at work, one at each end of - the break at Big Shanty, and this gap of ten miles was closed, - and the force ready to move to the great break of twenty-five - miles in length, north of Resaca, as soon as the enemy had left - it. The destruction by Hood's army of our depôts of supplies - compelled us to cut nearly all the cross-ties required to relay - this track and to send a distance for rails. The cross-ties were - cut near the line of the road and many of them carried by hand - to the track, as the teams to be furnished for hauling them did - not get to the work until it was nearly complete. The rails used - on the southern end of the break had to be taken up and brought - from the railroads south of Atlanta, and those for the northern - end were mostly brought from Nashville, nearly 200 miles distant. - - Notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which the labour - was performed, this twenty-five miles of track was laid, and the - trains were running over it in seven and a half days from the - time the work was commenced. - -Concluding, however, that it would be unwise to depend on the railway -during his further march to the sea, Sherman collected at Atlanta, by -means of the restored lines, the supplies he wanted for 600,000 men, -sent to the rear all the men and material no longer required, and -then, before starting for Savannah, destroyed sixty miles of track -behind him in so effectual a manner that it would be impossible for the -Confederates--especially in view of their own great lack, at this time, -of rails, locomotives and rolling stock--to repair and utilise the -lines again in any attempted pursuit. It was, in fact, as much to his -advantage now to destroy the railways in his rear as it had previously -been to repair and rebuild them. - -All through Georgia, for the 300 miles from Atlanta to Savannah (where -he was able to establish communications with the Federal fleet), Sherman -continued the same tactics of railway destruction; and he resumed them -when his army, now divided into three columns, turned northward to -effect a junction with Grant at Richmond. - -On this northward march, also, there was no need for Sherman to make a -direct attack on Charleston. By destroying about sixty miles of track -in and around Branchville--a village on the South Carolina Railroad -which formed a junction where the line from Charleston branched off in -the directions of Columbia and Augusta respectively--one of Sherman's -columns severed Charleston from all its sources of supply in the -interior, and left the garrison with no alternative but to surrender. -Commenting on this event, Vigo-Rouissillon remarks, in his "Puissance -Militaire des États-Unis d'Amérique":-- - - Ainsi il avait suffi de la destruction ou de la possession - de quelques kilomètres de chemin de fer pour amener la chute de - ce boulevard de l'insurrection, qui avait si longtemps résisté - aux plus puissantes flottes du Nord. Exemple frappant du rôle - reservé dans nos guerres modernes à ce precieux et fragile moyen - de communication. - -In the aggregate, Sherman's troops destroyed hundreds of miles of -railway track in their progress through what had previously been -regarded as a veritable stronghold of the enemy's country; though -meanwhile the Construction Corps had repaired and reopened nearly 300 -miles of railway in North Carolina and had built a wharf, covering an -area of 54,000 square feet, at the ocean terminus of the Atlantic and -North Carolina Railroad in order both to facilitate Sherman's progress -northwards, by the time of his reaching the lines in question, and to -enable him to obtain supplies from the fleet. The railways, in fact, -contributed greatly to the brilliant success of Sherman's campaign, and -hence, also, to the final triumph of the Federal cause. - -The total length of track laid or relaid by the Federal Construction -Corps during the continuance of the war was 641 miles, and the lineal -feet of bridges built or rebuilt was equal to twenty-six miles. The -net expenditure, in respect alike to construction and transportation, -incurred by the department in charge of the railways during their -control by the Government for military purposes was close on $30,000,000. - -From this time the interruption of railway communication became a -recognised phase of warfare all the world over; and, not only have -numerous treatises been written on the subject in various languages, but -the creation of special forces to deal alike with the destruction and -the restoration of railways has become an important and indispensable -feature of military organisation. These matters will be dealt with more -fully in subsequent chapters; but it may be of interest if reference -is made here to the experiences of _Mexico_, as further illustrating -the universality of practices with which, in her case, at least, no -effective measures had been taken to deal. - -"How Mexican Rebels Destroy Railways and Bridges" was told by Mr. G. -E. Weekes in the _Scientific American_ for September 13, 1913, and the -subject was further dealt with by Major Charles Hine in a paper on "War -Time Railroading in Mexico," read by him before the St. Louis Railway -Club, on October 10, 1913. The term "rebels" applies, of course, in -Mexico to the party that is against the particular President who is in -office for the time being; and in the revolutionary period lasting from -1910 to 1913 the "rebels" of the moment found plenty to do in the way -of destroying railways not only, as in other countries, in order to -retard the advance of their pursuers, but, also, to spite the national -Government, who control about two-thirds of the stock in the railways of -the Republic. - -Altogether, the mischief done by one party or the other during the -period in question included the destruction of many hundreds of miles of -track; the burning or the dynamiting of hundreds of bridges, according -as these had been built of timber or of steel; and the wrecking of many -stations and over 50 per cent. of the rolling stock on the national -lines. - -Concerning the methods adopted in the carrying out of this work, Mr. -Weekes, who had the opportunity of seeing track and bridge destruction -in full progress, says:-- - - Up to the past six months track destruction had been - accompanied either by the use of a wrecking crane, which lifted - sections of rails and ties (sleepers) bodily and piled them up - ready for burning, or by the slower process of the claw-bar, - wrench and pick. But a Constitutionalist expert devised a new - system. - - A trench is dug between two ties, through which a heavy - chain is passed around two opposite rails and made fast in the - centre of the track. To this one end of a heavy steel cable is - hooked, the other end being made fast to the coupling on the - engine pilot. At the signal the engineman starts his locomotive - slowly backward, and as they are huge 220-ton "consolidations," - with 22-inch by 30-inch cylinders, one can easily imagine that - something has to give. And it does! The rails are torn loose - from the spikes that hold them to the ties and are dragged - closely together in the centre of the road bed. The ties are - loosened from the ballast and dragged into piles, while in many - cases the rails are badly bent and twisted by the force applied. - A gang of men follows the engine, piling ties on top of the line - and leaving others beneath them. These are then saturated with - oil and a match applied. In a short time the ties are consumed - and the rails left lying on the ground twisted and contorted - into all sorts of shapes and of no further use until after they - have been re-rolled. - -As for the bridges, those of timber were saturated with oil and burned, -while in the case of steel bridges rows of holes were bored horizontally -in the lower part of the piers and charged with dynamite, which was then -exploded by means of fuses connected with batteries of the type used in -Mexican coal mines. - -Another favourite method adopted for interfering with transportation -by rail was that of attacking a train, compelling it to stop, taking -possession of the locomotive, and burning the cars. - -There is no suggestion by either of the authorities mentioned above -of any well-organised Construction Corps in Mexico repairing damage -done on the railway almost as quickly as it could be effected by the -destroyers. Mr. Weekes believed, rather, that it would take years to -restore the roads to the condition they were in before the rebellion -against President Diaz, and he further declared that it would cost -the national lines of Mexico many millions of dollars to replace the -destroyed rolling stock, bridges, stations, etc. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[5] In May, 1864, when this bridge had been again destroyed, it was -rebuilt, ready for trains to pass over, in forty working hours. - -[6] A division, completely organised, consisted of 777 officers and -men, as follows:--Division engineer, assistant engineer, rodman, -clerk, and 2 messengers (6). Sub-division I: Supervisor of bridges and -carpenters' work, clerk and time-keeper, commissionary (taking charge -of transport and issue of rations), quartermaster (in charge of tools, -camp equipment, etc.), surgeon, hospital steward, 6 foremen (1 for -each 50 men), 30 sub-foremen (1 for each 10 men), 300 mechanics and -labourers, blacksmith and helper, and 12 cooks (356). Sub-division II: -Supervisor of track, and remainder of staff as in Sub-division I (356). -Sub-division III: Supervisor of water stations, foreman, 12 mechanics -and labourers, and cook (15). Sub-division IV: Supervisor of masonry, -foreman, 10 masons and helpers, and cook (13). Sub-division V: Foreman -of ox-brigade, 18 ox-drivers, and cook (20). Train crew: 2 conductors, 4 -brakesmen, 2 locomotive engineers, 2 firemen, and cook (11). - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR - - -Curtailment of the efficiency of railways during war may be due to -friend no less than to foe; and there have been occasions when, of the -two, it is the friend who has caused the greater degree of trouble, -hindrance and interruption. - -These conditions have arisen mainly from three causes--(1) questions of -control; (2) irregularities in the employment of railway material; and -(3) absence or inadequacy of organisation for military rail-transport -purposes. - -When the use of railways becomes an essential factor in the conduct of -war, it may appear only natural that the military authority charged with -the duty of furthering or defending national interests should, through -the Government concerned, have power to command the transport facilities -of all railway lines the use of which may be necessary for the movement -of troops or other military purposes. - -Yet, while the soundness of the principle here involved is beyond -dispute, there is much to be said as to the circumstances and conditions -under which a military control of railways should be exercised. - -It is, in the first place, especially necessary to bear in mind that the -railway, as a means of transport, must needs be regarded from a point of -view wholly different from that which would apply to ordinary roads. On -the latter any sort of vehicle can be used, and there are, generally, -alternative roads along which traffic can pass, in case of need. -Railroads are not only available exclusively for vehicles constructed -to run upon them, but the degree of their usefulness is limited by -such considerations as the number of separate routes to a given -destination; the important matters of detail as to whether the lines are -single track or double track and whether they are on the level or have -heavy gradients; the number of locomotives and the amount of rolling -stock available; the extent of the station and siding accommodation; -the provision or non-provision of adequate facilities for loading and -unloading; and, in war time, the damage or destruction of a particular -line or lines by the enemy. The amount of traffic it is possible to -convey between certain points in a given time may thus be wholly -controlled by the physical conditions of the railway concerned, and such -conditions may be incapable of modification by the railway staffs, in -case of a sudden emergency, however great their desire to do everything -that is in their power. - -In the next place, all these physical conditions may vary on different -railway systems, and even on different sections of the same system. -It does not, therefore, necessarily follow that military requirements -which can be complied with on one line or in one district can be -responded to as readily, if at all, under another and totally different -set of conditions elsewhere; though it is conceivable that a military -commander or officer who fails to realise this fact may, if he is -left to deal direct with the railway people, become very angry indeed -at non-compliance with his demands, and resent protests that what he -asks for cannot be done at one place although it may have been done at -another. - -Then a railway must be regarded as a delicate piece of transportation -machinery which can easily be thrown out of order, and is capable -of being worked only by railwaymen as skilled in the knowledge of -its mechanism, and as experienced in the details of its complicated -operation, as military officers themselves are assumed to be in the -technicalities of their own particular duties. The Chief Goods Manager -of a leading line of railway who offered to take the place of a General -at the seat of war would arouse much mirth in the Army at his own -expense. It is, nevertheless, quite conceivable that the General would -himself not be a complete success as a Chief Goods Manager. In the -earliest days of railways it was assumed that the men best qualified -both to manage them and to control the large staffs to be employed would -be retired Army officers. This policy was, in fact, adopted for a time, -though it was abandoned, after a fair trial, in favour of appointing -as responsible railway officers men who had undergone training in -the railway service, and were practically acquainted alike with its -fundamental principles and its technical details. - -In the operation of this delicate and complicated piece of machinery -dislocation of traffic may result from a variety of causes, even -when such operation is conducted by men of the greatest experience -in railway working; but the risk, alike of blocks and interruptions -and of accidents involving loss of life or destruction of valuable -property must needs be materially increased if military commanders, or -officers, themselves having no practical knowledge of railway working, -and influenced only by an otherwise praiseworthy zeal for the interests -of their own service, should have power either to force a responsible -railwayman to do something which he, with his greater technical -knowledge, knows to be impracticable, or to hamper and interfere with -the working of the line at a time of exceptional strain on its resources. - -Under, again, a misapprehension of the exact bearing of the principle -of military control of railways for military operations in time of -war, there was developed in various campaigns a tendency on the part -of commanders and subordinate officers (1) to look upon railways and -railwaymen as subject to their personal command, if not, even, to their -own will, pleasure and convenience, so long as the war lasted; (2) -to consider that every order they themselves gave should be at once -carried out, regardless either of orders from other directions or of -any question as to the possibility of complying therewith; and (3) to -indulge in merciless denunciations, even if not in measures still more -vigorous, when their orders have not been obeyed. - -Apart from other considerations, all these things have a direct bearing -on the efficiency of the railway itself as an instrument in the -carrying on of warfare; and it is, therefore, a matter of essential -importance to our present study to see how the difficulties in question -had their rise, the development they have undergone, and the steps that -have been taken to overcome or to guard against them. - -It was once more in the _American Civil War_ that the control problem -first arose in a really acute degree. - -The fundamental principle adopted for the operation of the railways -taken possession of by the Federal Government for military purposes -was that they should be conducted under orders issued by the Secretary -of War or by Army commanders in or out of the field. It was for the -Quartermaster's department to load all material upon the cars, to direct -where such material should be taken, and to arrange for unloading and -delivery; but _because_ the Government had taken possession of the -railways; _because_ the Quartermaster's department was to discharge the -duties mentioned; and _because_ the railways were to be used during the -war for the transport of troops and of Army supplies, therefore certain -of the officers came to the conclusion that the whole operation of the -particular lines in which they were concerned should be left either to -themselves individually or to the Quartermaster's department. - -Among those holding this view was General Pope, who, on taking over the -command of the Rappahannock Division, on June 26, 1862, disregarded -the position held by Herman Haupt as "Chief of Construction and -Transportation" in that Division, gave him no instructions, and left him -to conclude that the Army could get on very well without his assistance -as a mere railwayman. Thereupon Haupt went home. Ten days afterwards -he received from the Assistant-Secretary of War a telegram which -said:--"Come back immediately. Cannot get on without you. Not a wheel -moving." Haupt went back, and he found that, what with mismanagement of -the lines and the attacks made on them by Confederates, not a wheel was, -indeed, moving in the Division. His own position strengthened by his now -being put in "exclusive charge of all the railways within the limits -of the Army of Virginia," he was soon able to set the wheels running -again; and from that time General Pope exercised a wise discretion in -leaving the details of railway transportation to men who understood them. - -Then there was a General Sturgis who, when Haupt called on him one -day, received him with the intimation, "I have just sent a guard to -your office to put you under arrest for disobedience of my orders in -failing to transport my command." It was quite true. Haupt had failed -to obey his orders. Sturgis wanted some special trains to convey 10,000 -men, with horses and baggage, the short distance of eighteen miles. -The railway was a single-track line; it had only a limited equipment -of engines and cars; there was the prospect of further immediate -requirements in other directions, and Haupt took the liberty of thinking -that he had better keep his transportation for more pressing needs than -a journey to a prospective battle-field only eighteen miles away--the -more so as if the men were attacked whilst they were in the train they -would be comparatively helpless, whereas if they were attacked when on -the road--doing what amounted to no more than a single day's march--they -would be ready for immediate defence. These considerations suggest that, -of the two, the railwayman was a better strategist than the General. - -Sturgis followed up his intimation to Haupt by taking military -possession of the railway and issuing some orders which any one -possessing the most elementary knowledge of railway operation would have -known to be impracticable. Meanwhile Haupt appealed by telegraph to the -Commander-in-Chief, who replied:--"No military officer has any authority -to interfere with your control over railroad. Show this to General -Sturgis, and, if he attempts to interfere, I will arrest him." Told what -the Commander-in-Chief said in his message, Sturgis exclaimed, "He does, -does he? Well, then, take your damned railroad!" - -Haupt found it possible to put at the disposal of Sturgis, early the -following morning, the transportation asked for; but at two o'clock -in the afternoon the cars were still unoccupied. On the attention of -Sturgis being called to this fact he replied that he had given his -orders but they had been disobeyed. Thereupon the cars were withdrawn -for service elsewhere--the more so since no other traffic could pass -until they had been cleared out of the way. The net results of the -General's interference was that traffic on the lines was deranged for -twenty-four hours, and 10,000 men were prevented from taking part in an -engagement, as they might have done had they gone by road. - -Of the varied and almost unending irregularities which occurred in the -working of the lines as military railways during the progress of the -same war a few other examples may be given. - -One prolific source of trouble was the detention or appropriation -of trains by officers who did not think it necessary to communicate -first with the Superintendent of the Line. A certain General who did -inform the Superintendent when he wanted a train was, nevertheless, in -the habit of keeping it waiting for several hours before he made his -appearance, traffic being meanwhile suspended, in consequence. - -Special consideration was even claimed for officers' wives, as well as -for the officers themselves. On one occasion Haupt was much disturbed by -the non-arrival of a train bringing supplies which were urgently wanted -for a body of troops starting on a march, and he went along the line to -see what had happened. Coming at last to the train, which had pulled -up, he made inquiries of the engine-driver, who told him that he had -received instructions to stop at a certain point so that an officer's -wife, who was coming in the train to see her husband on the eve of an -engagement, could go to a neighbouring town to look out for rooms for -herself. At that moment the lady put in an appearance. She took her seat -again and the train then proceeded; but her side-trip in search of rooms -meant a delay of three hours alike for this one train and for three -others following behind. - -The impression seems to have prevailed, also, that officers were at -liberty to make any use of the trains they pleased for the conveyance -of their own belongings. To check the abuses thus developed, Haupt was -compelled to issue, on June 25, 1862, the following notice:-- - - Assistant Quartermasters and Commissaries are positively - forbidden to load on to cars on any of the Military Railroads of - the Department of the Rappahannock any freights which are not - strictly and properly included in Quarter and Commissary stores. - They shall not load or permit to be loaded any articles for the - private use of officers, or other persons, whatever their rank - or position. - -Officers, again, there were who, regardless of all traffic -considerations, would order a train to pull up at any point they thought -fit along the main line in order that they could examine the passes and -permits of the passengers, instead of doing this at a terminal or other -station. In still another instance a paymaster adopted as his office a -box car standing on a main line. He placed in it a table, some chairs, a -money-chest and his papers--finding it either more comfortable or more -convenient than a house alongside--and proceeded with the transaction -of all his Army business in the car. Invited to withdraw, on the -ground that he was holding up the traffic, he refused to leave, and -he persisted in his refusal until troops were called up to remove his -things for him. - -Defective arrangements in regard to the forwarding of supplies were -another cause of traffic disorganisation. The railwayman made from time -to time the most strenuous efforts in getting to the extreme front large -consignments of articles either in excess of requirements or not wanted -there at all. After blocking the line for some days, the still-loaded -cars might be sent back again, no fewer than 142 of such cars being -returned on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the course of a single -day. If the excessive supplies so sent were unloaded at the front, they -might have to be loaded into the cars again when the Army moved; or, as -was frequently the case in exposed positions, they might be seized or -destroyed by the enemy. Under a well-organised system an adequate stock -of supplies would, of course, have been kept in stores or on sidings at -some point in the rear, only such quantities being forwarded to the -advanced front as were really needed. - -At the railway stations there were frequent disputes between the -responsible officers as to which should have the first use of such -troop trains as were available, and Haupt found it necessary to ask the -Commander-in-Chief to delegate some one who would decide in what order -the troops should be forwarded. - -Much trouble arose because, in their anxiety to send off as many wounded -as they could, medical officers detained their trains for such periods -as dislocated the service, instead of despatching at schedule time the -men they had ready, and then asking for an extra train for the remainder. - -In other respects, also, the arrangements for the transport of the -sick and wounded were defective. Telegraphing on this subject to the -Assistant Secretary of War on August 22, 1862, Haupt said:-- - - I fear that I may be compelled to-night to do what may - appear inhuman--turn out the sick in the street. Doctors will - persist in sending sick, often without papers, to get them - off their hands, and we cannot send forward the troops if we - must run our trains to Washington with sick to stand for hours - unloaded. My first care is to send forward troops, next forage - and subsistence. - -Still more serious were the irregularities due to delays in the -unloading of trucks and the return of empties. The amount of rolling -stock available was already inadequate to meet requirements; but the -effect of the shortage was rendered still worse by reason of these -delays, due, in part, to the too frequent insufficiency of the force -available for unloading a train of supplies with the expedition that -should have been shown, and in part to the retention of the cars for -weeks together as storehouses; though the main cause, perhaps, was -the inability of military men, inexperienced in railway working, to -appreciate, as railwaymen would do, the need of getting the greatest -possible use out of rolling stock in times of emergency, and not -allowing it to stand idle longer than absolutely necessary. - -How such delays interfered with the efficiency of the railways was -indicated in one of Haupt's oft-repeated protests, in which he wrote:-- - - If all cars on their arrival at a depôt are immediately - loaded or unloaded and returned, and trains are run to schedule, - a single-track road, in good order and properly equipped, may - supply an army of 200,000 men when, if these conditions are not - complied with, the same road will not supply 30,000. - -On July 9, 1863, he telegraphed to General M. C. Meigs:-- - - I am on my way to Gettysburg again. Find things in great - confusion. Road blocked; cars not unloaded; stores ordered - to Gettysburg--where they stand for a long time, completely - preventing all movement there--ordered back without unloading; - wounded lying for hours without ability to carry them off. All - because the simple rule of promptly unloading and returning cars - is violated. - -As for the effect of all these conditions on the military situation as -a whole, this is well shown in the following "Notice," which, replying -to complaints that railwaymen had not treated the military officers with -proper respect, Haupt addressed "To agents and other employés of the -United States Military Railroad Department":-- - - While conscious of no disposition to shield the employés or - agents of the Military Railroads from any censure or punishment - that is really merited, justice to them requires me to state - that, so far, examination has shown that complaints against them - have been generally without proper foundation, and, when demands - were not promptly complied with, the cause has been inability, - arising from want of proper notice, and not indisposition. - - Officers at posts entrusted with the performance of certain - local duties, and anxious, as they generally are, to discharge - them efficiently, are not always able, or disposed, to look - beyond their own particular spheres. They expect demands on - railway agents to be promptly complied with, without considering - that similar demands, at the same time, in addition to the - regular train service and routine duties, may come from - Quartermasters, Commissaries, medical directors, surgeons, - ordnance officers, the Commanding General, the War Department - and from other sources. The Military Railroads have utterly - failed to furnish transportation to even one-fifth of their - capacity when managed without a strict conformity to schedule - and established rules. Punctuality and discipline are even more - important to the operation of a railroad than to the movement of - an army; and they are vital in both. - -It is doubtful if even the Confederate raiders and wreckers had, by -their destructive tactics, diminished the efficiency of the Union -railways to the extent of the four-fifths here attributed to the -irregularities and shortcomings of the Federals themselves. The clearest -proof was thus afforded that, if the new arm in warfare which rail-power -represented was to accomplish all it was capable of doing, it would have -to be saved from friends quite as much as from foes. - -Haupt, as we have seen, suffered much from officers during the time -he was connected with the Military Railroads in Virginia. He had the -sympathetic support of the Commander-in-Chief, who telegraphed to him -on one occasion (August 23, 1862), "No military officer will give any -orders to your subordinates except through you, nor will any of them -attempt to interfere with the running of trains"; and, also, of the -Assistant Secretary of War, who sought to soothe him in a message which -said:--"Be patient as possible with the Generals. Some of them will -trouble you more than they will the enemy." But the abuses which arose -were so serious that, in the interest of the military position itself, -they called for a drastic remedy; and this was provided for by the issue -of the following Order:-- - - War Department, - Adjutant-General's Office, - Washington, - _November 10, 1862_. - - SPECIAL ORDER. - - Commanding officers of troops along the United States - Military Railroads will give all facilities to the officers - of the road and the Quartermasters for loading and unloading - cars so as to prevent any delay. On arrival at depôts, whether - in the day or night, the cars will be instantly unloaded, and - working parties will always be in readiness for that duty, and - sufficient to unload the whole train at once. - - Commanding officers will be charged with guarding the track, - sidings, wood, water tanks, etc., within their several commands, - and will be held responsible for the result. - - Any military officer who shall neglect his duty in this - respect will be reported by the Quartermasters and - officers of the railroad, and his name will be stricken from the - rolls of the Army. - - Depôts will be established at suitable points under the - direction of the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac, - and properly guarded. - - No officer, whatever may be his rank, will interfere with - the running of the cars, as directed by the superintendent of - the road. Any one who so interferes will be dismissed from the - service for disobedience of orders. - - By order of the Secretary of War. - J. C. KELTON. - -Commenting on this Order, General McCallum says in his report that -it was issued "in consequence of several attempts having been made -to operate railroads by Army or departmental commanders which had, -without exception, proved signal failures, disorganising in tendency and -destructive of all discipline"; and he proceeds:-- - - Having had a somewhat extensive railroad experience, both - before and since the rebellion, I consider this Order of the - Secretary of War to have been the very foundation of success; - without it the whole railroad system, which had proved an - important element in conducting military movements, would have - been, not only a costly but ludicrous failure. The fact should - be understood that the management of railroads is just as much a - distinct profession as is that of the art of war, and should be - so regarded. - -In _Europe_, Germany and Austria-Hungary were the first countries to -attempt to solve problems that seemed to go to the very foundations of -the practical usefulness of rail-transport in war. Various exhaustive -studies thereon were written by railway or military authorities, and -it may be of interest here to refer, more especially, to the views -expressed by an eminent German authority, Baron M. M. von Weber, in "Die -Schulung der Eisenbahnen," published in 1870.[7] - -Railway irregularities peculiar to war service were stated by this -writer to be mainly of three kinds:--(i) Delays from unsatisfactory -arrangements of the service and from the misemployment of rolling -stock; (ii) temporary interruption of traffic owing to the crowding of -transport masses at the stations or sidings; (iii) unsuitableness of the -stations and conveyances for the required military services. The special -reasons for the first of these causes he defined as (_a_) the absence -of sufficient mutual comprehension between the military and the railway -officials; (_b_) the strict limitation of the efficiency of individual -railway authorities to their own lines only; (_c_) the ignorance of -the entire staff of each line with regard to the details and service -regulations of the neighbouring lines; and (_d_) the impracticability -of employing certain modes of carrying on business beyond the circuit -to which they belong. It should, however, be borne in mind that these -criticisms of authorities and their staffs relate to the conditions of -the German railway system in 1870, at which time, as told by H. Budde, -in "Die französischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege 1870-71," there were in -Germany fifteen separate Directions for State railways; five Directions -of private railways operated by the State; and thirty-one Directions of -private railways operated by companies--a total of fifty-one controlling -bodies which, on an average, operated only 210 miles of line each. - -On the general question von Weber observed:-- - - The value in practice of mutual intelligence between - military and railway officials has hitherto been far too - slightly regarded. - - Demands for services from military authorities, - impracticable from the very nature of railways in general or - the nature of the existing lines in particular, have occasioned - confusion and ill-will on the part of the railway authorities - and conductors. On the other hand the latter have frequently - declared services to be impracticable which were really not so. - - All this has arisen because the two parties in the - transaction have too little insight into the nature and - mechanism of their respective callings, and regard their powers - more as contradictory than co-operative, so that they do not, - and cannot, work together. - - If, on the contrary, the nature of the railway service, - with its modifications due to differences in the nature of - the ground, the locality, and the organisation of transport - requirements, is apparent to the military officer, even in a - general way; if he appreciates the fact that the same amount of - transport must be differently performed when he passes from a - level line to a mountain line, from a double line to a single - line, from one where the signal and telegraph system are in use - to one in which these organs of safety and intelligence are - destroyed; if he can judge of the capability of stations, the - length of track, and arrangements for the loading, ordering - and passing of trains, etc., he will, with this knowledge, - and his orders being framed in accordance with it, come much - sooner and with greater facility to an understanding with the - railway executives than if his commands had to be rectified by - contradiction and assertion, frequently carried on under the - influence of excited passions, or attempted to be enforced by - violence. - - The railway official, also, who has some acquaintance with - military science, who understands from practical experience and - inspection, not confined to his own line, the capabilities of - lines and stations in a military point of view, will, at his - first transaction with the military authorities, enter sooner - into an understanding with them than if he were deficient - in this knowledge, and will find himself in a position to - co-operate, and not be coerced. - -Here the suggestion seems to be that the individual Army officer and the -individual railway executive, or railway official, should each become -sufficiently acquainted with the technicalities of the other's business -to be able to conduct their relations with mutual understanding. It -would, however, be too much to expect that this plan could be carried -out as regards either the military element in general or the railway -element in general. - -The real need of the situation was, rather, for some intermediary -organisation which, including both elements, would provide the machinery -for close co-operation between the Army on the one side and the railway -on the other, guiding the Army as to the possibilities and limitations -of the railway, and constituting the recognised and sole medium -through which orders from the Army would be conveyed to the railway, -no individual commander or officer having the right to give any direct -order to the railway executives or staffs on his own responsibility, or -to interfere in any way with the working of the railways, except in some -such case of extreme emergency as an attack by the enemy on a railway -station. - -All these problems were to form the subject of much more controversy, -together with much further practical experience, in various other -countries--and notably in France during the war of 1870-71--before, -as will be told in due course, they were solved by the adoption of -elaborate systems of organisation designed to provide, as far as -possible, for all contingencies. - - -FOOTNOTE: - -[7] See Bibliography. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR - - -The liability of railway lines to interruption or destruction--whether -by bodies of cavalry sent across the frontier for that purpose, and -aiming at damage on a large scale; by smaller raiding parties operating -in the rear of an advancing army; or by individuals acting on their own -account in a hostile country--rendered necessary from an early date -in the railway era the adoption of protective measures of a type and -character varying according to circumstances; while these, in turn, -introduced some further new features into modern warfare. - -Under the orders given by General McDowell for the guarding of railways -in the Department of the Rappahannock, in the _American Civil War_, -twelve sentinels were posted along each mile of track; block-houses were -constructed at each bridge, at cross-roads, and at intervals along the -track; pickets were thrown forward at various points; bushes and trees -were cleared away from alongside the line, and the men at each post had -flags and lanterns for signalling. General Sherman took similar measures -to guard his rail communications between Nashville and Atlanta. - -Precautions such as these were directed mainly against the enemy in the -field; but an early example was to be afforded of how a civil population -may either concern themselves or be concerned against their will in the -maintenance of rail communication for military purposes. This position -is well shown in the following proclamation, issued July 30, 1863, by -Major-General G. G. Meade from the head-quarters of the Army of the -Potomac at a time when attempts to throw troop trains off the railway -lines were a matter of daily occurrence:-- - - The numerous depredations committed by citizens or rebel - soldiers in disguise, harboured and concealed by citizens, along - the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and within our lines, call - for prompt and exemplary punishment. Under the instructions of - the Government, therefore, every citizen against whom there is - sufficient evidence of his having engaged in these practices - will be arrested and confined for punishment, or put beyond the - lines. - - The people within ten miles of the railroad are notified - that they will be held responsible, in their persons and - property, for any injury done to the road, trains, depôts or - stations by citizens, guerillas or persons in disguise; and - in case of such injury they will be impressed as labourers to - repair all damages. - - If these measures should not stop such depredations, it will - become the unpleasant duty of the undersigned, in the execution - of his instructions, to direct that the entire inhabitants of - the district of country along the railroad be put across the - lines, and their property taken for Government uses. - -On the Manassas Gap Railway General Auger further sought to protect -Federal army trains against guerilla attacks by placing in a conspicuous -position in each of such trains some of the leading Confederates -residing within Union lines, so that, should any accident happen to the -train, they would run the risk of being among the victims. - -In the _Austro-Prussian War of 1866_ the principle of punishing -the civil population for attacks on the railway lines underwent a -further development. Captain Webber says in reference to the line -through Turnau, Prague and Pardubitz to Brünn[8]: "The Prussians -were fortunate in being able to preserve the line intact from injury -by the inhabitants, partly by the number and strength of the guards -posted along it, and partly from the terror of reprisals which they -had inspired." Captain Webber suggests that, in the face of an active -enemy, and in a country where the population was hostile, it would -have been impossible to depend on the railway as a principal line of -communication; but the significance of his expression, "the terror of -reprisals," as denoting the policy adopted by Prussia so far back as -1866, will not be lost on those who are only too well acquainted with -more recent developments of the same policy by the same country. - -The number of men per mile required for guarding a line of rail -communication is declared by Captain John Bigelow, in his "Principles of -Strategy" (Philadelphia, 1894), to be exceedingly variable, depending -as it does upon the tactical features of the country and the temper of -the inhabitants. According, he says, to the estimate of the Germans for -the conditions of European warfare, the number will average about 1,000 -men for every stretch of fifteen miles. At this rate an army sixty miles -from its base requires about 4,000 men for the protection of each line -of communication. - -With the help of figures such as these one may, perhaps, understand -the more readily how it is that a Commander-in-Chief, of merciless -disposition, and wanting to retain the active services of every soldier -he possibly can in the interests of an early and successful advance -will, by spreading a feeling of "terror" among the civil population, -seek to reduce to as low a figure as circumstances will permit -the number of men he must leave behind to guard his lines of rail -communication. - -These considerations will be found to apply with the greater force -when it is remembered that in the _Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71_ the -Prussians had to adopt an especially elaborate system for safeguarding -their lines of communication with Germany during the time they occupied -French territory. At each railway station they placed a guard formed of -detachments of the Landwehr, while small detachments were stationed in -towns and villages in the neighbourhood. In each signal-box a detachment -of troops was stationed, and the whole line of railway was patrolled -from posts established along it at distances of every three or four -miles. Altogether, the Germans are said to have employed, on over 2,000 -miles of French railway lines controlled by them, as many as 100,000 -troops for protective purposes only; and even then the _franc-tireurs_ -were able to cause many interruptions. - -Under a Prussian regulation dated May 2, 1867, it was laid down that -after the restoration of any lines taken possession of in an enemy's -territory, notice should be given that in the event of any further -damage being done to the railway, the locality would be subject to a -fine of at least 500 thalers, the belongings of the inhabitants would be -liable to seizure, and the local authorities might be arrested. - -As a further precautionary measure in the war of 1870-71, the Germans -took a hint from the example of the Union Generals in the American Civil -War by compelling a leading citizen of the district passed through to -ride on the engine of each train run by them on French soil. In defence -of this practice, the German General Staff say in their handbook on "The -Usages of War"[9]:-- - - Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were, without any - fault on their part, thereby exposed to grave danger, every - writer outside Germany has stigmatised this measure as contrary - to the law of nations and as unjustified towards the inhabitants - of the country. As against this unfavourable criticism it must - be pointed out that this measure, which was also recognised on - the German side as harsh and cruel, was only resorted to after - declarations and instructions of the occupying authorities had - proved ineffective, and that in the particular circumstances - it was the only method which promised to be effective against - the doubtless unauthorised, indeed the criminal, behaviour of - a fanatical population. Herein lies its justification under - the laws of war, but still more in the fact that it proved - completely successful, and that wherever citizens were thus - carried on the trains ... the security of traffic was assured. - -Writing under date December 16, 1870, Busch offered the following -justification for the course adopted:-- - - They were taken, not to serve as a hindrance to French - heroism, but as a precaution against treacherous crime. The - railway does not carry merely soldiers, ammunition and other - war material against which it may be allowable to use violent - measures; it also conveys a great number of wounded, doctors, - hospital attendants, and other perfectly harmless persons. Is a - peasant or _franc-tireur_ to be allowed to endanger hundreds of - those lives by removing a rail or laying a stone upon the line? - Let the French see that the security of the railway trains is no - longer threatened and the journeys made by those hostages will - be merely outings, or our people may even be able to forgo such - precautionary measures. - -In the _South African War_, Field-Marshal Earl Roberts issued at -Pretoria, on June 19, 1900, a proclamation one section of which -authorised the placing of leading men among the Boers on the locomotives -of the trains run by the British on the occupied territory; but this -particular section was withdrawn eight days afterwards. - -The English view of the practice in question is thus defined in the -official "Manual of Military Law" (Chap. XIV, "The Laws and Usages of -War," par. 463):-- - - Such measures expose the lives of inhabitants, not only - to the illegitimate acts of train wrecking by private enemy - individuals, but also to the lawful operations of raiding - parties of the armed forces of the belligerent, and cannot, - therefore, be considered a commendable practice. - -To guard against the attacks made on the railway lines in the Orange -Free State and the Transvaal during the British occupation, entrenched -posts were placed at every bridge exceeding a 30-feet span; constant -patrolling was maintained between these posts; and the block-houses -introduced (in 1901) by Lord Kitchener were erected along all the -railway lines, at distances of about 2,000 yards. Each block-house, -also, was garrisoned by about ten men, and each was surrounded by wire -entanglements which, together with various kinds of alarm fences, were -also placed between the block-houses themselves in order both to impede -the approach of the enemy and to warn the garrison thereof. - -_Block-houses_ are to-day regarded as one of the chief means of -protecting railways against attacks. Their construction and equipment -are dealt with by Major W. D. Connor, of the Corps of Engineers, U.S.A., -in "Military Railways" (Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of Engineers, -U.S. Army, Washington, 1910). - -Supplementary to the adoption of this block-house system, in time of -war, is the practice followed in various Continental countries, in -time of peace, of building _permanent fortresses_, in solid masonry, -alongside railway bridges crossing important rivers. In some instances -the fortress is so constructed that the railway lines pass through the -centre of it. Not only, as a rule, are these fortresses extremely solid -and substantial, but they may be provided with bomb-proof covers and -be stocked with a sufficient supply of provisions to be able to stand, -if necessary, a fairly prolonged siege. One can assume, also, that the -garrison would have under its control facilities arranged in advance for -the destruction of the bridge, as a last resort, in case of need. - -The theory is that such fortresses and their garrisons should be of -especial advantage, on the outbreak of war, in checking any sudden -invasion and allowing time for the completion of defensive measures. -Their construction in connection with all the principal railway bridges -crossing the Rhine was especially favoured in Prussia after the war of -1870-1. - -Similar fortresses, or "interrupting forts," as the Germans call them, -are also built for the protection of important tunnels, junctions, -locomotive and carriage works, etc. - -Another method adopted for the safeguarding of railway lines in war is -the use of _armoured trains_; though in practice these are also employed -for the purposes of independent attacks on the enemy, apart altogether -from any question of ensuring the safety of rail communication.[10] - -For the _protection of locomotives and rolling stock_, and to prevent -not only their capture but their use by the enemy, the most efficacious -method to adopt is, of course, that of removing them to some locality -where the enemy is not likely to come. - -When, in 1866, Austria saw that she could not hold back the Prussian -invader, she took off into Hungary no fewer than 1,000 locomotives and -16,000 wagons from the railways in Bohemia and Saxony. Similar tactics -were adopted by the Boers as against ourselves in the war in South -Africa. On the British troops crossing into the Orange Free State, -from Cape Colony, they found that the retreating enemy had withdrawn -all their rolling stock, as well as all their staffs from the railway -stations, leaving behind only a more or less damaged line of railway. -Subsequently, when the forces occupied Pretoria, they certainly did find -there sixteen locomotives and 400 trucks; but the station books showed -that in the previous forty-eight hours no fewer than seventy trains, -many of them drawn by two engines, had been sent east in the direction -of Delagoa Bay. - -When it is not practicable to withdraw locomotives and rolling stock -which it is desired the enemy shall not be able to use, the obvious -alternative is that measures should be taken either to remove vital -parts or to ensure their destruction. Certain of the methods adopted -during the Civil War in America were especially efficacious in attaining -the latter result. In some instances trains were started running and -then--driver and fireman leaping off the engine--were left to go into -a river, or to fall through a broken viaduct. In other instances two -trains, after having had a good supply of explosives put in them, would -be allowed to dash into one another at full speed. Many locomotives -had their boilers burst, and wagons were set on fire after having been -filled up with combustibles. - -Still another method which has been adopted with a view to preventing -an enemy from using the railways he might succeed in capturing is that -of constructing them with a _different gauge_. The standard gauge of -the main-line railways in France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, -Austria-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Roumania and Turkey (like that, -also, of railways in Great Britain, Canada and the United States), is -4ft. 8½in., allowing trains to pass readily from one country to the -other with the same rolling stock; but the gauge of the Russian railways -is 5ft., necessitating a transshipment from one train to another when -the frontier is reached. Similar conditions are found in Spain and -Portugal, where the standard gauge is 5ft. 6in.[11] - -Russia adopted her broader gauge so that, in case of invasion, the -invader should not be able to run his rolling-stock over her lines, as -Germany, for instance, would be able to do in the case of the railways -of Belgium and France. Thus far, therefore, Russia strengthened her -position from the point of view of defence; but she weakened it as -regards attack, since if she should herself want, either to become the -invader or to send troop trains over neighbouring territory to some -point beyond, she would be at a disadvantage. In the Russo-Turkish War -of 1877-78, when the Russian forces passed through Roumania on their way -to Turkey, the difference in gauge between the Russian and the Roumanian -railways caused great delay and inconvenience by reason of the necessary -transfer of troops, stores, guns, ammunition, torpedo boats, etc., at -the frontier. - -It should, also, be remembered that the reduction of a broad gauge to a -narrow one is a much simpler matter, from an engineering point of view, -than the widening of a narrower gauge into a broad one. In the former -case the existing sleepers, bridges, tunnels, platforms, etc., would -still serve their purpose. In the latter case fresh sleepers might have -to be laid, bridges and tunnels widened or enlarged, and platforms and -stations altered, use of the broader-gauge rolling stock thus involving -an almost complete reconstruction of the railway lines. To this extent, -therefore, the balance of advantage would seem to be against the country -having the broader gauge. The conclusion may, at least, be formed that -such a country is far more bent on protecting her own territory than on -invading that of her neighbours. - -The course adopted by Germany for overcoming the difficulty which, in -the event of her seeking to invade Russia, the difference of railway -gauge in that country would present, will be told in Chapter XVIII. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[8] "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866." By Capt. Webber, R.E. -Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., vol. xvi. Woolwich, 1868. - -[9] "The German War Book. Being the Usages of War on Land"; issued by -the Great General Staff of the German Army. London, 1915. - -[10] The subject of armoured trains will be dealt with more fully in -Chapters VII and XVI. - -[11] See "Field Service Pocket Book, 1914," pp. 151-2. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -TROOPS AND SUPPLIES - - -In the earlier controversies as to the use of railways in war, attention -was almost entirely concentrated on questions relating to the movement -of large masses of troops, the saving of time to be effected, and the -strategic advantages to be gained. These considerations quickly passed -from the theoretical to the practical, and when the results attained -were put against such facts as, for instance, the one that in 1805 -Napoleon's Grand Army of 200,000 men took forty-two days to march the -700 kilometres (435 miles) between Ulm on the Danube and the French camp -at Boulogne, there was no longer any possibility of doubt as to the -services that railways might render from these particular points of view. - -_Quicker transport_ was, however, only one consideration. There was the -further important detail that the movement of troops by rail would bring -them to their point of concentration, not only sooner, but in _more -complete numbers_, than if they had to endure the fatigues of prolonged -marches by road. - -According to German authorities, the falling-out of infantry and cavalry -when marching along good roads under conditions of well-maintained -discipline and adequate food supplies averages three per cent. in cool -and dry weather, and six per cent. in hot or wet weather; while in -unfavourable conditions as regards roads, weather and supplies, the -diminution may be enormous. When, in the autumn of 1799, Suvóroff made -his famous march over the St. Gothard, he lost, in eleven days, no -fewer than 10,000 men owing to the hardships of the journey. In his -invasion of Russia, in 1812, Napoleon's losses in men who succumbed to -the fatigues and trials they experienced on the road were out of all -proportion to the casualties due to actual fighting. It was, too, a -saying of Blücher's that "he feared night marches worse than the enemy." - -An English authority, Lieut.-Col. R. Home, C.B., R.E., wrote in a -paper on "The Organisation of the Communications, including Railways," -published in Vol XIX. of the Journal of the Royal United Service -Institution (1875):-- - - If an army of moderate size, say 50,000 men, simply marches - one hundred miles without firing one shot or seeing an enemy the - number of sick to be got rid of is very great. - - Experience has shown that in a good climate, with abundant - food, easy marches, and fair weather, the waste from ordinary - causes in a ten days' march of such a force would be between - 2,000 and 2,500 men, while the number of galled, footsore - or worn-out horses would also be very large. A few wet days - or a sharp engagement would raise the number of both very - considerably. An inefficient man or horse at the front is a - positive disadvantage. - -Another equally important detail relates to the _provision of supplies_ -for the troops and animals thus transported by rail both more quickly -and with less fatigue. - -In all ages the feeding of his troops in an enemy's country has been -one of the gravest problems a military commander has had to solve; -and though, in some instances, vast armies have succeeded in drawing -sufficient support from the land they have invaded, there have been -others in which an army intending to "live upon the country" has failed -to get the food it needed, and has had its numbers depleted to the -extent of thousands as the result of sheer starvation. This was the -experience of Darius, King of Persia, who, in 513 B.C., crossed the -Bosporus, on a bridge of boats, with an army of 700,000, followed the -retreating Scythians, and lost 80,000 of his men in wild steppes where -no means existed for feeding them. When, also, Alexander the Great was -withdrawing from India, in 325 B.C., two-thirds of his force died on -the desert plains of Beluchistan from thirst or hunger. Lack of the -supplies from which he found himself entirely cut off was, again, a main -cause of the disaster that overtook Napoleon in his Russian campaign. -Even fertile or comparatively fertile lands, satisfying the needs of -their inhabitants in time of peace, may fail to afford provisions for -an invading army, either because of the great number of the latter or -because the retreating population have destroyed the food supplies -they could not take with them into the interior whether for their own -sustenance or with a view to starving the invaders. - -Should the invading army succeed in "living on the country," the effect -of leaving the troops to their own resources, in the way of collecting -food, may still be not only subversive of discipline but of strategic -disadvantage through their being scattered on marauding expeditions at a -time when, possibly, it would be preferable to keep them concentrated. - -General Friron, chief of the staff of Marshal Masséna, wrote concerning -Napoleon's campaign in Portugal:-- - - The day the soldier became convinced that, for the future, - he would have to depend on himself, discipline disappeared - from the ranks of the army. The officer became powerless in - the presence of want; he was no longer disposed to reprimand - the soldier who brought him the nourishment essential to his - existence, and who shared with him, in brotherly goodwill, a - prey which may have cost him incalculable dangers and fatigues. - -The extent to which a combination of physical fatigue and shortness of -supplies in an inhospitable country may interfere with the efficiency of -an army is well shown by Thiers ("Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire") -in regard to the conditions at the very outset of Napoleon's Russian -campaign. The French troops arriving on the Niemen--at which point they -were merely on the frontiers of Russia--were already overcome by the -long marches they had made. They had no bread, no salt, and no spirits; -their craving for food could no longer be satisfied by meat without salt -and meal mixed with water. The horses, too, were out of condition for -want of proper food. Behind the army a great number of soldiers dropped -out of the ranks and had lost their way, while the few people they met -in a scantily-populated district could speak nothing but Polish, which -the wearied and famished men were unable to understand. Yet, under the -conditions of former days, it was by troops thus exhausted by marches of -hundreds of miles, done on, possibly, a starvation diet, that battles -involving the severest strain on human energy were fought. - -When "living on the country" is no longer practicable, the only -alternative for an army is, of course, that of sending supplies after it -for the feeding of the troops; but when, or where, this has had to be -done by means of ordinary road services, it has involved--together with -the transport of artillery, ammunition and stores--(1) the employment -of an enormous number of vehicles and animals, greatly complicating -the movements of the army; and (2) a limitation of the distance within -which a campaign can be waged by an army depending entirely on its own -resources. - -The latter of these conditions was the direct consequence of the former; -and the reason for this was shown by General W. T. Sherman in an article -contributed by him to the _Century Magazine_ for February, 1888 (pp. -595-6), in the course of which he says:-- - - According to the Duke of Wellington, an army moves upon its - belly, not upon its legs; and no army dependent on wagons can - operate more than a hundred miles from its base because the - teams going and returning consume the contents of their wagons, - leaving little or nothing for the maintenance of men and animals - at the front who are fully employed in fighting. - -There was, again, the risk when food supplies followed the army by road -either of perishables going bad _en route_, owing to the time taken in -their transport by wagon, or of their suffering deterioration as the -result of exposure to weather, the consequence in either case being a -diminution in the amount of provisions available for feeding the army. - -All these various conditions have been changed by the railway, the use -of which for the purposes of war has, in regard to the forwarding of -supplies, introduced innovations which are quite as important as those -relating to the movement of troops--if, indeed, the former advantages -are not of even greater importance than the latter. - -Thanks to the railway, an army can now draw its supplies from the -whole of the interior of the home country--provided that the lines of -communication can be kept open; and, with the help not only of regular -rail services but of stores and magazines _en route_ those supplies can -be forwarded to railhead in just such quantities as they may be wanted. -Under these conditions the feeding of an army in the field should -be assured regardless alike of the possible scanty resources of the -country in which it is engaged and of its own distance from the base of -supplies. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -ARMOURED TRAINS - - -In the issue of the now defunct London periodical, _Once a Week_, for -August 13, 1859, there was published an article on "English Railway -Artillery: A Cheap Defence against Invasion," in which it was said, -among other things:-- - - We have hitherto regarded the rail merely as a vehicle - of transport, to carry materials which are not to be set in - work till off the rails. If we look at the rail as part of an - instrument of warfare, we shall be startled at the enormous - means we have at hand, instantly available, from mercantile - purposes, to convert to engines of war. - -The writer was William Bridges Adams (1797-1872), an authority on -railways who had grown up with them, had introduced into their operation -many inventions and improvements (including the fish-joint still used -for connecting rails), and was the author of various books and papers on -railways, transport, and other subjects. His new idea, as set forth in -the article in question, was specially directed to the utilisation of -railways for defending the shores of Great Britain against an invader; -and in developing this idea he was, also, as far as can be traced, the -first to suggest the employment of armoured trains. - -The immediate reason alike for the writing of the article and for the -making of the suggestion was that in 1859 Great Britain appeared to be -faced by the prospect of invasion by France,--a prospect which, in view -of the then admittedly defective condition of the national defences, -led to the creation of the Volunteer Corps, to the appointment of a -Royal Commission to inquire into the question of coast defence, and -to suggestions being put forward by many different authorities as to -what should be done. Among those suggestions was one by the writer in -question for supplementing any system of coast defence that might be -adopted by the mounting of guns on railway trucks protected by armour, -such trucks being moved from point to point along the coast railways to -meet, as far as possible, the needs of the military situation. - -Heavy artillery, wrote Adams, though the most formidable implement of -modern warfare, had the disadvantage of requiring many horses to draw -it. So the problem arose as to how the horses could be dispensed with. -This could best be done, he thought, by putting artillery on "our true -line of defence,--our rails," and having it drawn, or propelled, by a -locomotive. "Mount," he said, "a gun of twenty tons weight on a railway -truck, with a circular traversing platform, and capable of throwing -a shot or shell weighing one hundred to one and a half a distance of -five miles. A truck on eight wheels would carry this very easily, and -there would be no recoil." Such a battery would be "practically a -moving fortress," and, used on the coast railways, which he regarded as -constituting lines of defence, would be "the cheapest of all possible -fortresses--absolutely a continuous fortress along the whole coast." -Communication with coast railways at all strategical points should, -however, be facilitated by the placing of rails along the ordinary -highways. After giving some technical details as to the construction -alike of coast railways and road tramways, he proceeded:-- - - With these roads communicating with the railroads, the whole - railway system becomes applicable to military purposes. - - The railway system is so especially adapted for defence, and - so little adapted to invaders, that it should become at once a - matter of experiment how best to adapt Armstrong or other guns - to its uses. The process of fitting the engines with shot-proof - walls to protect the drivers against riflemen would be very - easy.... Nothing but artillery could damage the engines or - moving batteries, and artillery could not get near them if it - were desirable to keep out of the way. - - One gun transportable would do the work of ten which are - fixtures in forts, and there would be no men to take prisoners, - for no forts would be captured. - - The more this system is thought of the more the conviction - will grow that it is the simplest mode of rendering the country - impenetrable to invaders at a comparatively trifling cost. - -It will be seen that the scheme here proposed included three separate -propositions--(1) the use of railways, as "engines of war," for coast -defence; (2) the mounting of Armstrong or other guns on railway trucks -from which they could be discharged for the purposes of such defence; -and (3) the providing of the engines with "shot-proof walls" for the -protection of the drivers. A similar protection for the men operating -the guns on the trucks was not then, apparently, considered necessary; -but we have here what was clearly the germ of the "armoured train." - -Among the other suggestions advanced on the same occasion were some for -the employment of railways in general for strategical purposes, and more -especially for the defence of London; and here, again, the employment of -armoured trains was advocated. - -"A Staff Officer," writing in _The Times_ of July 16, 1860, declared -that the most efficacious and the most economical line of defence which -London could have would be a circular railway forming a complete cordon -around the Metropolis at a distance of fifteen miles from the centre, -and having for its interior lines of operation the numerous railways -already existing within that radius. On this circular railway there -should be "Armstrong and Whitworth ordnance mounted on large iron-plated -trucks" fitted with traversing platforms in the way already recommended -by W. Bridges Adams, the trucks themselves, however, and not only the -locomotives, being protected by "shot-proof shields." The circular -railway was to be constructed primarily for strategical purposes; but -during peace the line would be available for ordinary traffic, and in -this way it could be made to yield at least some return on the capital -expenditure. - -The writer of this letter, Lieut. Arthur Walker, then an officer of the -79th Highlanders and the holder of a staff appointment at the School -of Musketry, Fleetwood, followed up the subject by reading a paper -on "Coast Railways and Railway Artillery" at a meeting of the Royal -United Service Institution on January 30, 1865.[12] On this occasion -he specially advocated the use of "moveable batteries" for coast -defence in conjunction with railways constructed more or less within -a short parallel distance of the entire coast line. Field artillery, -he recommended, should be mounted on a truck the sides of which would -be "encased in a cuirass of sufficient thickness," while the engine -and tender would also be "protected by an iron cuirass, and placed -between two cupolas for further protection." He considered that "to -attempt to land in face of such an engine of war as this would be simply -impossible." Moving batteries of this kind would be "the cheapest of -all possible fortresses.... We have nothing to do but to improvise -well-adapted gun-carriages for our rails." At the same meeting Mr. T. -Wright, C.E., gave details of a proposed railway train battery for -coast, frontier and inland defence which was designed to carry ten, -twenty or forty guns or mortars. - -Another early advocate of the use of railways as an actual instrument -of warfare was Colonel E. R. Wethered, who, in 1872, wrote to the War -Office suggesting that heavy ordnance should be mounted on wheeled -carriages so constructed that they could be moved along any of the -railways, from point to point. In this way the three-fold advantage -would be gained of (1) utilising the railway system for purposes of -national defence; (2) rendering possible a concentration of artillery -with overwhelming force at any given spot, and, (3) by the use of these -moveable carriages for the conveyance of the guns, exposing the men to -less risk. - -Colonel Wethered further communicated to _The Times_ of May 25, 1877, -a letter on "Portable Batteries" in which he declared that if, before -an enemy could effect a landing, we were to provide the means of -concentrating, with unerring certainty, on any given points of the -coast, a crushing force of artillery, with guns of heavier calibre than -even the warships of the invader could command, it would be impossible -for the vessels of an invading force to approach near enough to effect -the landing of their men. He continued:-- - - My proposal is to take the full advantage which our railway - system, in connection with our insular position, affords, and - provide powerful moveable batteries which can be sent fully - equipped in fighting order direct by railway to any required - point; and the recent experimental trials of the 81-ton gun - have proved that the heaviest ordnance can be moved and fought - on railway metals with considerable advantage.... In connection - with our present main lines of railway, which probably would - require strengthening at certain points, I would construct - branch lines or sidings leading to every strategical point - of our coast and into every fort, as far as possible, with - requisite platforms.... These branch lines during peace would, - doubtless, be of some small commercial value.... I would mount - as many of our heaviest guns as practicable on railway gun - carriages so that they could be moved by rail from one face of a - front to another, and from one place to another. - -He also recommended that guns thus mounted, fully equipped, and ready -for use, should be kept at three large central depôts which might be -utilised for the defence of London. At each of them he would station (1) -Militia and Volunteer Artillery able not only to work the guns but to -construct, repair or destroy railway lines, and (2) a locomotive corps -specially trained in the working of traffic under war conditions. - -By reading a paper at the Royal United Service Institution on April -24, 1891, on "The Use of Railways for Coast and Harbour Defence,"[13] -Lieut. E. P. Girouard, R.E. (now Major-General Sir E. Percy C. Girouard, -K.C.M.G.), made what was, at that time, an important contribution to a -subject on which there was then still much to be learned. Sketching a -detailed scheme comprising the employment of all the coastal railways -for the purposes of national defence, he emphasised the value of -Britain's "enormous railway power" as the strong point of her defensive -position, whether regarded from the point of view of (1) railway mileage -open as compared with the square mile of coastal area to be defended, -or (2) the length of coast line compared with the railway mileage at or -near that coast line, and, therefore, locally available for its defence. -"Why," he asked, "should we not turn to account the enormous advantage -which our great railway power gives us to concentrate every available -gun at a threatened point in the right and the proper time, which the -proper utilisation of our railways can and will do, thereby practically -doubling or quadrupling our available gun power?" - -Whilst the subject had thus been under discussion in the United Kingdom, -America, in her _Civil War of 1861-65_, had set the rest of the world an -example by actually introducing armoured-protected gun-carrying trucks -into modern warfare. - -Writing from Washington, under date August 29, 1862, to Colonel Herman -Haupt, then Chief of Construction and Transportation in the Department -of Rappahannock, Mr. P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, -said:--"An armour-clad car, bullet proof, and mounting a cannon, has -arrived here and will be sent down to Alexandria." A later message, on -the same date added:--"After you see the bullet-proof car, let me know -what you think of it. I think you ought at once to have a locomotive -protected by armour. Can you have the work done expeditiously and well -at Alexandria, or shall I get it done at Philadelphia or Wilmington?" -The car was duly received; but Haupt's comments in respect to it, as -recorded in his "Reminiscences," show that he was not greatly impressed -by the innovation. "P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, sent me," -he says, "an armour-clad, bullet-proof car, mounting a cannon. The -kindness was appreciated, but the present was an elephant. I could not -use it, and, being in the way, it was finally side-tracked on an old -siding in Alexandria." - -It would seem, however, that other armour-clad cars were brought into -actual use during the course of the Civil War. - -In the _Railway Age Gazette_ (Chicago) for January 22, 1915, Mr. -Frederick Hobart, associated editor of the New York _Engineer and Mining -Journal_, writes, from personal knowledge, of two armoured cars which -were in use in the Civil War. One of these, formed by heavy timbers -built up on a flat car, was put together in the shops of the Atlantic -and North Carolina Railroad Company at Newberne, N.C., in 1862, about -two months after the city had been captured by the Burnside expedition. -The armour consisted of old rails spiked on the outside of the planking -composing the sides and front of the car. Along the sides there were -slits for musketry fire, and at the front end there was a port hole -covered with a shutter behind which a gun from one of the field -batteries was mounted. The second car was similarly constructed, but was -armed with a naval howitzer. The cars were run ahead of the engine, and -were used in reconnoitring along the railroad line west of Newberne. Mr. -Hobart adds that he was quite familiar with the cars, having assisted in -the design and construction of both. - -In the _Century Magazine_ for September, 1887 (page 774), there is given -an illustration ("from a photograph") of an armour-clad car described as -"the Union Railroad Battery" which was, apparently, used in connection -with the springing of the mine in front of Petersburg on July 30, 1864. -The car is shown to have consisted of a low truck with, at one end, a -sloping armour plate coming down almost to the rails, and having a hole -through which the gun placed behind it on the truck could be fired. The -sides of the truck were protected from the top of the sloping armour -downwards, but the back was open. The car was, of course, designed to be -pushed in front of the locomotive. - -Mr. L. Lodian, also, contributed to the issue of the American -periodical, _Railway and Locomotive Engineering_, for May, 1915, a -communication, under the title of "The Origin of Armoured Railroad -Cars Unquestionably the Product of the American Civil War," in which, -claiming that "our own Civil War" originated those cars, he said:-- - - Attached is a picture of one in use on the old - Philadelphia-Baltimore Railroad. The illustration appeared in - Frank Leslie's illustrated periodical on May 18, 1864. No better - proof could be furnished of the authenticity of the fact that - such a car was in use at that time.... There appears to be no - great variation even to-day in armoured car design from the - initial effort of half a century ago. Pictures are appearing - in numerous periodicals, at the period of writing, of those in - use by the European belligerents, and in general appearance - and outline they are about the same as the original, the chief - variation in their use being that the war-going locomotive is - also sheathed in armour, whereas that in use in the sixties was - entirely unprotected, except in front, and then only by reason - of the mailclad car being placed in front to do the fighting. - -As against this suggestion, there is the undoubted fact that in the -American Civil War the plan was adopted of having the locomotives -of ordinary troop or supply trains protected by armour-plating as a -precaution against attack when there was no armoured car in front of -them. Writing to the Director of Military Railroads on October 8, 1862, -Haupt said:-- - - I have been thinking over the subject of locomotives. It - is one which, at the present time, and in view of the future - requirements of the service, demands especial attention. - Experience has shown that on engines men are targets for - the enemy; the cabs where they are usually seated have been - riddled by bullets, and they have only escaped by lying on the - footboard. It will be necessary to inspire confidence in our men - by placing iron cabins (bullet proof) upon all or nearly all our - engines, and the necessity will increase as we penetrate further - into the enemy's country. - - Again, it is desirable that the smaller and more delicate - portions of the apparatus should be better protected than at - present, and I would be pleased if you would give to the plans, - of which I spoke to you recently, a careful consideration. It - seems to me that they are peculiarly well adapted to military - service. - -Haupt adds that "protected locomotives and bullet-proof cabs were soon -after provided, as recommended"; and elsewhere in his "Reminiscences" he -says, on the same subject:-- - - The bullet-proof cabs on locomotives were very useful--in - fact, indispensable. I had a number of them made and put on - engines, and they afforded protection to engineers and firemen - against the fire from guerillas from the bushes that lined the - road. - -In the _Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71_ guns mounted on four -armour-plated trucks, fitted up in the workshops of the Orléans Company, -under the supervision of M. Dupuy de Lorme, Engineer-in-Chief for Naval -Construction, were taken into action on four occasions during the siege -of Paris, namely, at Choisy-le-Roi, for the sortie preceding the one -from Champigny; near Brie-sur-Marne, to support the Champigny sortie; -at Le Bourget, for one of the attempts to recapture that position; and -at La Malmaison, to support the Montretout sortie. The wagons were -protected by a covering which consisted of five plates of wrought -iron, each two-fifths of an inch thick, and giving, therefore, a total -thickness of two inches. The two engines used were also protected by -armour-plating. One or two of the wagons were struck by field-gun shells -without, however, sustaining further damage than the denting of their -plates. The engines escaped damage altogether. On going into action the -armoured wagons were followed by another bullet-proof engine conveying a -party of men with tools and materials to repair any interruption of the -lines that might interfere with the return of the trains; but the only -damage done was so slight that it was remedied in about a quarter of an -hour.[14] - -Further use was made of armoured trains in the _Egyptian Campaign of -1882_. One that was put together to assist in the defensive works at -Alexandria is declared in the official history of the campaign[15] to -have "proved most serviceable." Two of the trucks, fitted with iron -plating and sand bags as a protecting cover, carried one Nordenfelt and -two Gatling guns. A 9-pr. was also placed on one of the trucks, together -with a crane by means of which it could be lowered out immediately. -Other trucks, rendered bullet proof by sand bags and boiler-plating, -and carrying a force of 200 bluejackets, with small arms, completed the -fighting force. On July 28, the train took part in a reconnaissance sent -out to ascertain the extent of the damage which had been done to the -railway lines near Arabi's outpost. Shots were fired at the train by the -enemy, but without effect. The reconnaissance was a complete success -inasmuch as it enabled such repairs to be done to the railway as gave -the use of a second line between Ramleh and Alexandria. - -So useful had the train been found that it was now further improved -by adding to it a 40-pr. on a truck protected by an iron mantlet. The -locomotive was put in the middle of the train and was itself protected -by sand bags and railway iron. Thus strengthened, the train went into -action in the reconnaissance in force carried out from Alexandria -on August 5, and "the most interesting incident of the engagement," -according to the official account, "was the good service done by the -40-pr. from the armoured train." - -Early in the morning of September 13 the train, consisting of five -wagons, and having, on this occasion, one Krupp gun and one Gatling in -addition to the 40-pr., was sent to support the attack on Tel el-Kebir. -It was followed by another train having 350 yards of permanent-way -materials, with all the necessary tools and appliances for the prompt -carrying out of any repairs that might be necessary. Owing, however, to -the hazy and uncertain light and to the ever-increasing clouds of smoke -that hung over the battle-field, it was impossible to fire the 40-pr. - -In the futile attempt made in 1885 to construct a railway from Suakin -to Berber, in support of the _Nile Expedition of 1884-85_, resort was -had to an armoured train for the purpose of protecting the line from -the constant attacks to which it was subjected by the enemy. The train -carried a 20-pr. B.L., which could be fired only either in prolongation -of the line or at a slight angle from it. - -At the Camp of Exercise in _Delhi_ in January, 1886, some important -experiments were carried out with a view to testing the practicability -of firing guns at right angles to an ordinary line of railway, the -result being to establish the fact that a 40-pr. R.B.L. could be fired -with perfect safety broadside from (_a_) small empty wagons mounted -on four wheels; (_b_) small empty wagons weighted up to four tons; -and (_c_) empty eight-wheel bogies. These experiments were especially -successful when account is taken of the fact that no attempt was made to -reduce in any way the energy of recoil. - -Other experiments, begun in 1885, were successfully conducted during a -succession of years both by the French Government and by private firms -in _France_ in the transport and the firing of guns from railway trucks -with a view to obtaining definite data on the subject, more especially -in relation to firing at right angles to the line. - -In _Italy_ a distinguished officer raised the question in the Italian -Parliament, in 1891, as to whether Sicily should not be defended by -means of a coast railway and armoured trains. - -Some experiments carried out at _Newhaven, Sussex_, in 1894, were the -more interesting because the results attained were due to the combined -efforts of Artillery Volunteers and of the London, Brighton and South -Coast Railway Company. - -Under the Volunteer mobilization scheme of 1891 there were some 300 -members of the 1st Sussex Artillery Volunteers to whom no special -duties had been allotted, and there happened to be, at Shoreham, a -40-pr. Armstrong B.L. gun which was then serving no particular purpose. -Inspired by these two facts, the Secretary of the Committee for National -Defence suggested, in November, 1891, that negotiations should be opened -with the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company with a view -to their mounting the 40-pr. on a specially prepared truck, designed -to form part of an armoured train, experiments in firing the gun from -the truck--in order to test the efficiency of this expedient for the -purposes of coast defence--being afterwards carried out by the Artillery -Volunteers whose services were available for the purpose. - -On being approached, the directors of the railway company readily -consented to the fitting up of the truck being carried out at their -engineering and carriage works; they contributed towards the expenses, -and members of their staff entered with great cordiality into the -scheme, Mr. R. J. Billington, the locomotive superintendent, being the -first to suggest the mounting of the gun on a turntable to be fixed on -the truck,--a "bold departure," as it was regarded at the time, and one -expected to produce excellent results. The railway staff were the more -interested, also, in the proposed experiments because a large proportion -of the members of the 1st Sussex Artillery Volunteers consisted of men -employed at the Brighton Company's works. - -In commenting upon these facts, Col. Charles Gervaise Boxall, the -commanding officer, said in a paper on "The Armoured Train for Coast -Defence," read by him at a meeting of officers and N.C.O.'s of the -Brigade, held at Newhaven Fort, Sussex, on May 14, 1894:-- - - When one considers that a railway company is neither - a philanthropic institution nor a patriotic society, the - generous support given to this experiment by so powerful a - body as the directors of the London, Brighton and South Coast - Railway Company is in itself some considerable evidence of - the importance they themselves ascribe to this effort in the - direction of the maintenance of coast defence and protection - from invasion. - -Preliminary experiments with the gun were conducted on May 5, 1894, -and they conclusively showed, Col. Boxall said, "that the gun will -require no traversing to correct variation caused by the recoil, while -the muzzle of the gun can be directed to any part of its circumference -by handspike traversing within half a minute." He was evidently proud -of the results even of these preliminary trials. They were the first -occasion on which a heavy gun had been fired broadside on the permanent -way of an English railway, and the truck was the first armour-plated one -on which a turntable, a recoil cylinder, and other inventions introduced -had been employed. So, he further declared:-- - - We do confidently submit that, having proved that such a - gun as this can be mounted so as to be transportable to any - part of our railway system at a moment's notice, brought into - action, and fired with accuracy either end on, broadside, or in - any other direction, without danger of capsizing, and without - injury to the permanent way, we have become pioneers of a new - departure in artillery which must lead to results of the highest - importance. - -This was written prior to the full trials, which took place at Newhaven -on May 19, 1894, in the presence of a distinguished company of military -men and others. An account of the event will be found in _The Times_ -of May 21, 1894. The gun and its carriage are described as standing on -a turntable platform pivoted on the centre of the truck, and revolving -on a central "racer." The gun detachments were protected by a plating -six feet high round three sides of the turntable, and the gun was fired -through an aperture in the plating. Drawn by an ordinary locomotive, -the truck on which the gun was mounted was accompanied by two carriages -conveying the Volunteer Artillerymen who were to serve the gun. Several -rounds were fired at a target some 2,500 yards distant, and "the -armoured train passed through the searching and severe ordeal most -successfully, the jar caused being so slight that a stone placed on the -rails remained unmoved by the firing." The truck, it is further stated, -had been provided with some cross girders which could be run out and -supported on blocks in order to secure a broad base when the gun was -fired at right angles to the line, and there was a further arrangement -for connecting the truck to the rails by strong clips; but the truck -remained sufficiently steady without any need for making use of these -appliances. - -Finally, as will be told more fully in Chapter XVI, the _South African -Campaign of 1899-1902_ definitely established the usefulness of armoured -trains as an "instrument of war," and led both to the creation of an -efficient organisation for their employment on the most scientific and -most practical lines and to the establishment of certain principles -in regard to such important matters of detail as uses and purposes, -administration, staff, armament, tactics, etc. Published in the -"Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War" which was -issued by the Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, in 1905, these -principles were adopted in the _United States_ with modifications to -suit American conditions, and, so modified, are reproduced in Major -William D. Connor's handbook on "Military Railways," forming No. 32 -of the Professional Papers of the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. An -excellent treatment of the subject, from a technical point of view, -will be found in a paper, by Capt. H. O. Nance, on "Armoured Trains," -published, with photographs and drawings, in "Papers of the Corps of -Royal Engineers," Fourth Series, Vol. I., Paper 4 (Chatham, 1906). - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[12] _See_ the "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution" Vol. -IX., pp. 221-31, 1865. - -[13] "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," Vol. XXXV., 1891. - -[14] For detailed description, with diagrams, of the trains here in -question, _see_ "Armour-plated Railway Wagons used during the late -Sieges of Paris," by Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the Corps of Royal -Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX, 1872. - -[15] "Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt." Prepared by -the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition. London, 1908. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT - - -According to statistics which have been compiled in relation to wars -alike in ancient and in modern times, for every ten men among the -armies in the field who have died from wounds received in battle there -have been from thirty-five to forty who died from sickness or disease. -Writing in the _Journal des Sciences Militaires_, Dr. Morache, a surgeon -in the French Army, has said that while the total number of deaths among -combatants taking part in the Crimean War was 95,000, no fewer than -70,000 were due to typhus, scurvy, cholera or other diseases. In the -Italian campaign of 1859 the French lost 5,498 men, of whom 2,500 died -from sickness. On the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War the Russians -had 51,000 of their troops sick, the ravages of typhus having been -especially severe. - -These conditions have been materially aggravated by the gathering -together of great numbers of sick and wounded into overcrowded hospitals -situate on or near to the theatre of war and destined inevitably to -become hot-beds of disease and pestilence far more dangerous to human -life, under these conditions, than even the most deadly weapons which -the art of war had invented for use on the battle-field itself. - -Nor was it the armies alone that suffered. Returning troops spread the -seeds of disease among the civil population, causing epidemics that -lingered, in some instances, for several years and carried off many -thousands of non-combatants, in addition to the great number of victims -among the combatants themselves. In a volume of 866 pages, published by -Dr. E. Gurlt, under the title of "Zur Geschichte der Internationellen -und Freiwilligen Krankenpflege im Kriege" (Leipzig, 1873), will be found -many terrible details concerning the ravages in France, Germany and -Austria of the typhus which Napoleon's troops brought back with them on -the occasion of their disastrous retreat from Russia. - -The most practicable means of mitigating, if not of avoiding, these -various evils is to be found in the prompt removal of the sick and -wounded from the theatre of war, and their distribution in smaller -units, not simply among a group of neighbouring towns, but over an -area extending to considerable distances inland. The adoption of this -remedy only became possible, however, with a provision of adequate rail -facilities, and even then many years were to elapse before an efficient -system of railway ambulance transport was finally evolved. - -The objects which the use of the railway in these directions was to -attain were alike humanitarian and strategical. - -To the sick and wounded among the troops, prompt removal and widespread -distribution among hospitals in the interior meant (1) that they avoided -the risks to which they would have been subjected in the aforesaid -overcrowded and pestilential hospitals near the fighting line, where -slight injuries might readily develop dangerous symptoms, and contagious -disease complete the conditions leading to a fatal issue; (2) that, -apart from these considerations, it would be possible to give them a -greater degree of individual attention if they were distributed among a -large number of hospitals away from the scene of the fighting; (3) that -more conservative methods of surgery became practicable when operations -of a kind not to be attempted either on the battle-field or in temporary -hospitals (from which the inmates might have to be suddenly removed, -owing to some change in the strategical position) could be delayed until -the sufferer's arrival at some hospital in the interior, where better -appliances and better facilities would be available, and where, after -the operation, the patient would be able to remain undisturbed until -he was cured; (4) that these improved conditions might more especially -permit of the avoidance of amputations otherwise imperatively necessary; -and (5) that, on the whole, the wounded soldier was afforded a better -chance of effecting a speedy recovery and of saving both life and limb -than would be possible if railways were not available. - -To the army in the field the innovation meant that with the speedy -removal of the sick and wounded it would be relieved of the great -source of embarrassment caused by the presence and dependence upon it -of so many inefficients;[16] depôt and intermediate hospitals could -be reduced to the smallest proportions, and would thus occasion less -inconvenience if, owing to a retreat or a change in the strategical -position, they were brought within the sphere of military operations; -with the delegation of so many of the sick and wounded to the care of -civil practitioners in the interior, fewer of the divisional, brigade -and regimental medical officers would require to be detached from the -marching column; a smaller supplementary medical staff would suffice; -a considerable reduction could be effected in the stocks of ambulance -supplies kept on hand at the front; while important strategical -advantages would be gained through (1) the greater freedom of movement -which the army would secure; (2) the decreased risk of the number of -efficients being reduced through the outbreak of epidemics; and (3) the -prospect of a large proportion of the sick and wounded being enabled to -rejoin the fighting force on their making a speedy recovery from their -illness or their wounds. - -The earliest occasion on which the railway was made use of for the -conveyance of sick and wounded from a scene of actual hostilities to the -rear was on the occasion of the _Crimean War_, when the little military -line between Balaklava and the camp before Sebastopol, of which an -account will be given in Chapter XV, was so employed. The facilities -afforded were, however, of the most primitive character. Only the -wagons used for the transport of supplies to the front--wagons, that is -to say, little better than those known as "contractors' trucks"--were -available, and there were no means of adapting them to the conveyance -of sufferers who could not be moved otherwise than in a recumbent -position. Sitting-up cases could, therefore, alone be carried; but what -was to develop into a revolution in the conditions of warfare was thus -introduced, all the same. - -In the _Italian war of 1859_ both the French and the Austrians made use -of the railways for the withdrawal of their sick and wounded, and, in -his "Souvenir de Solferino," Jean Henri Dumant, the "Father" of the Red -Cross Movement, speaks of the transportation of wounded from Brescia to -Milan by train to the extent of about 1,000 a night. No arrangements for -their comfort on the journey had been made in advance, and the changes -in the military situation were so rapid, when hostilities broke out, -that no special facilities could be provided then. All that was done -was to lay down straw on the floor of the goods or cattle trucks used -for the conveyance of some of the more serious cases. The remainder -travelled in ordinary third-class carriages, and their sufferings on the -journey, before they reached the long and narrow sheds put up along the -railway lines at Milan or elsewhere to serve as temporary hospitals, -must often have been very great. They may, nevertheless, have escaped -the fate of those who died, not from their wounds, but from the fevers -quickly generated in the overcrowded hospitals at the front, where there -was, besides, a general deficiency of ambulance requirements of all -kinds. The good resulting from the removal by train is, indeed, said to -have been "immense." - -These experiences in the campaign of 1859 led to a recommendation -being made in the following year by a _German_ medical authority, Dr. -E. Gurlt,[17] that railway vehicles should be specially prepared for -the conveyance of the sick and wounded in time of war. The plan which -he himself suggested for adoption was the placing of the sufferers in -hammocks suspended from hooks driven into the roof of the goods van or -carriage employed, mattresses being first put on the hammocks, when -necessary. By this means, he suggested, the sufferers would travel much -more comfortably than when seated in the ordinary passenger carriages, -or when lying on straw in the goods wagons or cattle trucks. - -Dr. Gurlt's pamphlet served the good purpose of drawing much attention -to the subject, and his proposals were duly subjected to the test of -experiment. They failed, however, on two grounds,--(1) because the roofs -of the goods vans, designed for shelter only, were not sufficiently -strong to bear the weight of a number of men carried in the way -suggested; and (2) because the motion of the train caused the hammocks -to come into frequent contact with the sides of the wagon, to the -serious discomfort of the occupants. - -In November of the same year (1860) the Prussian War Minister, von Roon, -appointed a Commission to enquire into the whole subject of the care -of the sick and wounded in time of war, and the question of transport -by rail was among the various matters considered. As a result of these -investigations, the Minister issued, on July 1, 1861, an order to the -effect that in future the less seriously wounded should travel in -ordinary first, second or third-class carriages, according to the degree -of comfort they required, care being taken to let them have corner -seats; while for those who were seriously ill, or badly wounded, there -were to be provided sacks of straw having three canvas loops on each -side for the insertion of poles by means of which the sacks and the -sufferers lying upon them could be readily lifted in or out of the goods -wagons set apart for their conveyance. In these wagons they were to be -placed on the floor in such a way that each wagon would accommodate -either seven or eight. In the event of a deficiency of sacks, loose -straw was to be used instead. The door on one side of the truck was to -be left open for ventilation. A doctor and attendants were to accompany -each train, and they were to have a supply of bandages, medicines and -appliances. Of the last-mentioned a list of five articles was appended -as obligatory. The medical officer was to visit the wagons during the -stoppages, and the attendants on duty in the wagons were to carry flags -so that, when necessary, they could signal both for the train to pull -up and for the doctor to come to the sufferers. - -This was as far as Prussia had got by 1861, when the arrangements stated -were regarded as quite sufficient to meet the requirements of the -situation. Real progress was to come, rather, from the other side of the -Atlantic. - -In the early days of the _War of Secession_ (1861-65) the arrangements -for the conveyance by rail of the sick and wounded from the -battle-fields of the Eastern States to the hospitals in the large -cities were still distinctly primitive. Those who could sit up in the -ordinary cars were conveyed in them. Those who could not sit up, or -would be injured by so doing, were carried to the railway, by hand, on -the mattresses or stretchers they had occupied in the hospitals to which -they had first been taken. At the station the mattresses were placed on -thick layers of straw or hay strewn over the floors of the freight cars -in which supplies had been brought to the front. Large window spaces -were cut in the sides or ends of the cars to provide for ventilation. -On some occasions, when hay or straw was not available, pine boughs or -leaves were used instead. As only the floor space was occupied no more -than about ten patients could be carried comfortably in each car, though -as many as twenty were occasionally crowded in. The wide doors of the -box cars readily permitted of the beds being lifted in or out. Medical -officers, with supplies, accompanied each train. On arrival at New -York, Washington, Philadelphia, Harrisburg, or other destination, the -sufferers were taken out and carried, still on the same mattresses or -stretchers, to the hospitals there. - -Large numbers of sick or wounded were conveyed by rail under one or -other of these conditions, and the work was done with great expedition. -Between the morning of June 12 and the evening of June 14, 1863, over -9,000 wounded, victims of the Federal disaster at Chancellorsville, -were taken by the single-track Aquia Creek railroad from Aquia Creek to -Washington. Many even of the severely wounded declared they had suffered -no inconvenience from the journey. After the battle of Gettysburg, July -1-3, 1863, more than 15,000 wounded had been sent by rail from the -field hospitals to Baltimore, New York, Harrisburg or Philadelphia by -July 22. An even more rapid distribution was effected after the battles -of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania when, with a few exceptions, the -transfer to the hospitals in the cities mentioned was effected in the -course of a few days. Following on the battle of Olustree (February 20, -1864), the serious cases were removed on the Mobile Railway by freight -cars bedded with pine boughs, palmetto leaves and a small quantity of -straw, each patient having a blanket, in addition. - -As an improvement on these methods of transport, the plan was adopted -of fixing rows of upright wooden posts, connecting floor and ceiling, -on each side of a car as supports for two or three tiers of rough -wooden bunks, a central gangway through the car being left. In this -way the available space in the car was much better utilised than -with the straw-on-floor system. Next, in place of the bunks, came an -arrangement by which the stretchers whereon the patients lay could be -securely lashed to the uprights; while this was followed, in turn, by -the insertion of wooden pegs into the uprights and the placing on them -of large and strong india-rubber rings into which the handles of the -stretchers could readily be slipped, and so suspended. The first car so -arranged came into use in March, 1863. - -Meanwhile the Philadelphia Railroad Company had, at the end of 1862, -fitted up an ambulance car on the principle of a sleeping car, but so -planned that the stretchers on which the sufferers lay could be made to -slide in or out of the wooden supports. This particular car was capable -of accommodating fifty-one patients, in addition to a seat at each end -for an attendant. Other innovations introduced on the car were (1) a -stove at which soups could be warmed or tea made; (2) a water tank, and -(3) a locker. - -What the introducers of these improvements mainly prided themselves -upon was the fact that the patient could remain, throughout the entire -journey from field hospital to destination, on the stretcher he had been -placed on at the start. The adoption of this principle necessitated, -however, uniformity in the dimensions of the stretchers in order that -these could always be accommodated on the ambulance-car fittings. - -The next important development was reached when the ambulance _car_, -run in connection with ordinary trains, and used for exceptionally -severe cases, was succeeded by the ambulance _train_. Here came further -innovations, the nine or ten "ward-cars," of which such a train mainly -consisted in the Eastern States, being supplemented by others fitted -up as dispensary and store-room, kitchen, and quarters for surgeon, -attendants, and staff of train, besides carrying all necessary -appliances and provisions for the journey. - -What was now specially aimed at was to make the train as close an -approach to an actual hospital on wheels as circumstances would -permit. "At present," wrote the Medical Director of the Department of -Washington, "the sick and wounded are transferred in cars ill-adapted -for the purpose and with difficulty spared from the other pressing -demands; and lives are lost on the route not infrequently which, in all -probability, might be saved by a more comfortable and easy method of -transportation." The train he caused to be constructed consisted of ten -ward-cars, one car for the surgeon and attendants, one as a dispensary -and store-room, and one as a kitchen, etc. The ward-cars, arranged on -an improved principle, each accommodated thirty recumbent and twenty or -thirty seated patients. The train was to run regularly on the Orange and -Alexandria Railroad between the theatre of war and the base hospitals at -Alexandria and Washington. It was either to supplement or to supersede -the freight cars with their bedding of straw, hay or leaves. If only -from the point of view of the inadequate supply of rolling stock, a car -fitted up to accommodate fifty or sixty patients offered an obvious -advantage, in the speedy removal and distribution of sick and wounded, -over a car, without fittings, in which the floor space alone could be -utilised. - -Several complete trains of the type stated were soon running on the -Orange and Alexandria Railroad, within the Union lines, and the -hospital train thus became an established institution in modern warfare. - -It was, however, in connection with the chief army in the West, the Army -of the Cumberland, operating under General George H. Thomas, that the -useful purposes which could be served by hospital trains became most -conspicuous. - -The need for them in the West was even greater than in the East, -because the distances to be covered were greater and lay, also, to a -considerable extent, in enemy country. - -In the fall of 1863 and the winter of 1864, as narrated in the "Medical -and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion," the chief army of the -West was concentrated principally along the line of railroads leading -from Nashville, Tennessee, to the South-west, viâ Chattanooga, Tenn., -and onwards towards Atlanta, Georgia. At the outset the sick and wounded -who could travel in ordinary passenger cars to points in the North were -so taken. Severe cases had to remain in the nearest available hospital -depôt. In addition to the discomfort suffered by the former in having -to travel in cars not suited to invalids, they were liable to frequent -and prolonged delays on the single-track lines by reason of the constant -passing of supply trains proceeding to the front; and not unfrequently -the detentions were at points where nothing could be obtained for -feeding the sufferers or making them comfortable, while even if rations -could be drawn the train afforded no means of cooking them. So it was -resolved to have a train which would be the equivalent of an ambulating, -self-contained hospital, capable of carrying both recumbent and -sitting-up patients and supplying all their wants on the journey. - -On August 11, 1863, instructions were sent from the -Assistant-Surgeon-General's Office to the Medical Officer of the Army -of the Cumberland directing him "to take immediate measures to fit up a -special train for hospital purposes, with every possible comfort," to -run between Nashville, Ten., and Louisville, Ken. General Thomas, in -turn, accorded the fullest authority to the Medical Officer to select -for the purpose the best locomotives and the best cars to be found among -the railway rolling stock, and to have new cars fitted up whenever -necessary. He further directed that the most experienced drivers, -conductors and other necessary railway employés should be selected for -the conduct of the hospital-train service. - -Three of these trains were ready by the spring of 1864, and they ran -regularly--each taking a section of the journey--between Atlanta and -Louisville, a distance of 472 miles. They consisted, apparently, in -part of specially-built and in part of adapted rolling stock, the -large open American passenger cars, with their greater freedom from -internal fittings than ordinary European railway carriages, lending -themselves specially to the purpose. In the converted passenger cars -the carrying of the stretchers through the end doors was avoided by -removing two windows and the panelling underneath them from the side of -the car, and making an opening 6 ft. in width which could be closed by -a sliding door. Each train provided five ward-cars (converted passenger -cars) for lying-down patients; a surgeon's car (a passenger car from -which the seats had been removed, with partitions and fittings for the -accommodation of the doctor and his helpers); a dispensary car (in which -an ample supply of medicines, instruments and appliances was carried); -an ordinary passenger car for sitting-up patients or convalescents; a -kitchen car (divided into kitchen, dining-room and store-room); and -a conductor's car. The kitchen car was supplied with a small cooking -range, boilers, and other requisites for the feeding of from 175 to -200 patients. The cars were warmed and lighted in winter, and special -attention was paid to ventilation, so that Dr. F. L. Town, of the -United States Army, was able to report of them:--"In visiting these -hospital trains, the air is found sweet and pure, the wards are neat -and inviting; and it may unhesitatingly be said that men on hospital -trains are often as comfortable and better fed and attended than in many -permanent hospitals." The trains had distinguishing signals which were -recognised by the Confederates, and none of them were ever fired on or -molested in any way. - -One, at least, of the trains was despatched daily from the vicinity of -the field hospitals. The services rendered by them during the last -eighteen months of the war were of the greatest value. It has been said, -indeed, that the combined effect of all the provision made for the care -of the sick and wounded and their speedy recovery--including therein, as -one of the most important items, their prompt removal and distribution -by rail--was to ensure for the Federals the retention of a force equal -in itself to an army of 100,000 men. No single fact could show more -conclusively the _strategical_ as well as the humanitarian value of -railway ambulance transport. - -These details as to what was accomplished in the American Civil War are -the more deserving of record because they show that the evolution of the -"hospital on wheels," from the initial conditions of a bedding of straw -on the floor of a railway goods wagon, was really carried out, step by -step, in all its essential details, in the United States. The hospital -train was thus _not_ an English invention, as is widely assumed to be -the case; though much was to be done here to improve its construction, -equipment and organisation. - -Whilst America had been gaining all this very practical experience, the -_Danish War of 1864_ had given Prussia the opportunity of testing the -system approved by her in 1861 for the conveyance of the less severely -wounded in ordinary passenger carriages and of the seriously wounded on -sacks of straw laid on the floor of goods wagons. The results were found -so unsatisfactory that on the conclusion of hostilities a fresh series -of investigations and experiments was begun, and matters were still at -this stage when war broke out between Prussia and Austria. - -The conditions in regard to the care of the sick and wounded in the -_campaign of 1866_ were deplorably defective. Not only, according to -Dr. T. W. Evans[18]--an American medical man, settled in Paris, who -visited the battle-field and assisted in the work of relief--was there -no advance on what had been done in the United States, but the American -example was in no way followed, the combatants having made no attempt -whatever to profit from her experience. - -After the battle of Sadowa, thousands of wounded were left on the -battle-field, and many remained there three days and three nights before -they could be removed in the carts and wagons which were alone available -for the purpose. Within five days every village in a radius of four -leagues was crowded with wounded. Those taken to Dresden and Prague in -ordinary passenger carriages or goods vans were detained for days on -the journey owing to the congestion of traffic on the lines. Some of -them, also, were in the trains for two days before their wounds were -dressed. Then the use of straw, depended on by the Austrians, was found -to be unsatisfactory. It failed to afford the sufferers a sufficient -protection against the jolting of the wagons, especially when they -worked through it to the bare boards; and even then there was not always -sufficient straw available to meet requirements. Altogether, it is -declared, the wounded suffered "unheard-of tortures." - -Shortly after the conclusion of the war there was appointed in _Prussia_ -a further Commission of medical and military authorities to renew the -investigation into the care and transport of sick and wounded. The -Commission sat from March 18 to May 5, 1867. In the result it still -favoured the use of sacks of straw, with canvas loops, as the simplest -and most comfortable method to adopt for the rail transport of recumbent -sufferers, though it recommended that the sacks should be made with -side pieces, giving them the form of paillasses, as this would afford a -greater degree of support to those lying on them. The American system of -suspending stretchers in tiers by means of india-rubber rings depending -from pegs let into wooden uprights was disapproved of, partly because -of the continuous swinging of the stretchers so carried, and partly -because of the assumed discomfort to one set of patients of having -others just above them. The report also recommended the adoption of -the following principles:--(1) Through communication between all the -carriages employed in one and the same train for the conveyance of sick -and wounded; (2) provision, for the severely wounded, either of beds -with springs or of litters suspended from the roof or the sides of the -carriages; and (3) extra carriages for the accommodation of doctor, -nurses, surgical appliances, medical stores, cooking utensils, etc. - -These principles were subjected to various tests, and it was found that -in Germany the existing carriages which could best be adapted to the -desired purpose were those belonging to the fourth-class, inasmuch as -they had no internal divisions or fittings, travellers by them being -expected either to stand during the journey or to sit on their luggage. -The only structural alteration necessary was the placing of the doors at -the end of the carriages instead of at the sides, so that, on opening -these end doors, and letting down a small bridge to be provided for the -purpose, access could readily be obtained from one carriage to another. -Instructions were accordingly given that all fourth-class carriages -on the Prussian railways should thenceforward have end doors--an -arrangement which had, in fact, already been adopted in South Germany. -Steps were also taken in Prussia to adapt goods vans and horse boxes -for the conveyance of sick and wounded in the event of the number of -fourth-class carriages not being sufficient to meet requirements. - -The widespread interest which was being attracted throughout Europe to -the subject of the care of the sick and wounded in war led to a series -of experimental trials being carried out at the _Paris International -Exhibition of 1867_, when, with the help of a short line of railway laid -down in the exhibition grounds and of a goods wagon supplied by the -Western of France Railway Company, a number of different systems were -tested. On this occasion, also, a model of an American car fitted up -with india-rubber rings for the handles of stretchers was shown. - -At this time, and for many years afterwards, the ideal arrangement was -considered, on the Continent of Europe, to be one under which railway -vehicles sent to the front with troops, supplies or munitions could be -readily adapted for bringing back the sick and wounded on the return -journey; and alike in Germany, Russia, France, Austria and Italy the -respective merits of a great variety of internal fittings designed to -adapt existing rolling stock, whether passenger coaches, luggage vans, -Post Office vans or goods wagons, to the serving of these dual purposes -formed the subject of much experiment and controversy. Rope cables -across the roof of a goods wagon, with dependent loops of rope for -the reception of the stretcher handles (as in the Zavodovski method); -stretchers laid on springs on the floor, suspended from the roof either -by strong springs or by rope, resting on brackets attached to the -sides, or partly resting and partly suspended; and collapsible frames -of various kinds, each had their respective advocates.[19] The use and -equipment of ambulance or hospital trains constituted, also, a regular -subject of discussion at all the international congresses of Red Cross -Societies which have been held since 1869. - -The experimental trials at the Paris Exhibition of 1867 were followed -by the appointment in _Prussia_ of still another Commission of inquiry, -and, acting on the recommendations of this body, the Prussian Government -adopted the "Grund" system, under which the stretchers whereon the -recumbent sufferers lay in the goods wagons or fourth-class carriages -were placed on poles resting in slots over the convexity of laminated -springs having one end screwed into the floor while the other, and -free, end was provided with a roller designed to respond to the varying -conditions of weight by sliding to and fro. This was the system mainly -used in the "sanitary trains" of the Germans in the _Franco-Prussian -War of 1870-71_. It was criticised on the ground (1) that the sick -and wounded were still subject to the same jolts and concussions as -ordinary seated passengers; (2) that the number who could be carried per -carriage or wagon was very small, since it was still the case that only -the floor space was utilised; and (3) that it was inconvenient for the -doctor and the attendants to have to kneel down in order to attend to -the patients.[20] Apart from these disadvantages, the ambulance service -of the Germans was well organised during the war. Of ambulance trains, -fitted up more or less as complete travelling hospitals, twenty-one were -run, and the total number of sufferers removed by rail is said to have -been over 89,000. - -Owing to traffic congestions, the transport to Berlin of wounded from -the army engaged in the investment of Paris occupied no less a period -than six days; but these journeys were made in the special ambulance -trains which, provided in the later stages of the war, ensured full -provision for the feeding, nursing and general comfort of the sufferers. -The fact that such journeys could be undertaken at all showed the great -advance which had been made since the battle of Sadowa, when most of the -wounded could be conveyed no further than to cottages and farm-houses in -neighbouring villages. - -In the _South-African War of 1899-1902_ the system favoured was that -of having hospital trains either expressly built for the purpose or -adapted from ordinary rolling stock and devoted exclusively, for the -duration of the war, to the conveyance of the sick and wounded. The -"Princess Christian" hospital train, specially constructed for the -British Central Red Cross Committee by the Birmingham Railway Carriage -and Wagon Company Ltd., according to the plans of Sir John Furley and -Mr. W. J. Fieldhouse, and sent out to South Africa early in 1900, -consisted of seven carriages, each about 36 ft. in length, and 8 ft. -in width, for running on the Cape standard gauge of 3ft. 6in. The -carriages were arranged as follows:--I., divided into three compartments -for (_a_) linen and other stores, (_b_) two nurses and (_c_) two invalid -officers; II., also divided into three compartments, for (_a_) two -medical officers; (_b_) dining-room and (_c_) dispensary; III., IV., -V., and VI., ward-cars for invalids, carried on beds arranged in three -tiers; VII., kitchen, pantry, and a compartment for the guard. The train -carried everything that was necessary for patients and staff even though -they might be cut off from other sources of supply for a period of two -or three weeks. - -Seven other hospital trains, all adapted from existing rolling stock -in Cape Colony or Natal, were made available for the transport of sick -and wounded in the same war. One of these, No. 4, was arranged and -equipped at the cost of the British Central Red Cross Committee, under -the direction of Sir John Furley, then acting as the Society's Chief -Commissioner in South Africa. The arrangement of the other converted -trains was carried out by the Army Medical Service in South Africa, -with the co-operation of the Government Railway officials in Cape Town -and Natal. A number of specially-fitted carriages, placed at convenient -distances on the railways occupied by the British, were made use of to -pick up small parties of sick from the various posts along the lines, -such carriages being attached to passing trains for the conveyance -of the sufferers to the nearest hospital. Many of them had a regular -service up and down a particular stretch of railway. Some were provided -with iron frames for the support of service stretchers, and others were -fitted up similarly to the ward-carriages of the converted hospital -trains. Convalescents and "sitting-up" patients for whom no special -accommodation was necessary travelled in such ordinary trains as might -be available. - -In effect, there are four classes of trains by which, under the -conditions of to-day, the sick and wounded may be despatched from the -seat of war:--(1) Permanent hospital trains, specially constructed for -the purpose; (2) temporary hospital trains, made up either entirely -of converted ordinary vehicles or partly of converted and partly of -specially-constructed rolling stock, their use for this purpose -continuing for the duration of the war; (3) ambulance trains improvised -at railhead out of rolling stock bringing troops, supplies and stores to -the front, the internal fittings for "lying-down" cases being of such -a kind that they can be readily fixed or dismantled; and (4) ordinary -passenger carriages for slightly wounded or convalescents. - -The advantages conferred on armies from a strategical point of view, -under all these improved conditions, are no less beyond dispute than -the benefits conferred on the individual soldiers, and if railways had -done no more in regard to the conduct of warfare than ensure these dual -results, they would still have rendered a service of incalculable value. -While, also, their provision of an efficient ambulance transport system, -with its speedy removal of non-effectives, has served the purposes -of war, it has, in addition, by its regard for the sick and wounded -themselves, further served to relieve warfare of some, at least, of its -horrors. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[16] A saying attributed to Napoleon is that he preferred a dead soldier -to a wounded one. - -[17] "Ueber den Transport Schwerverwundeter und Kranker im Kriege, nebst -Vorschlägen über die Benutzung der Eisenbahnen dabei." 33 pp. Berlin, -1860. - -[18] "Les Institutions Sanitaires pendant le Conflit -Austro-Prussien-Italien." Par Thomas W. Evans. Paris, 1867. - -[19] For "A short consideration and comparison of the regulations for -the transport of sick and wounded by rail, as laid down in four of the -leading Continental armies (the German, French, Austrian and Italian)," -see a paper on "Continental Regulations for the Transport of Sick and -Wounded by Rail," by Surg.-Capt. C. H. Melville, A.M.S., _Royal United -Service Institution Journal_, vol. 42 (1898), pp. 560-594. - -[20] In an article on "Military Hospital Trains; their Origin and -Progress," in _The Railway Gazette_ of December 4, 1914, it is said: -"The comparatively small loss of the Germans by death from wounds in -1870 was due solely to the fact that they entered upon the war with what -were then considered wonderfully elaborate arrangements for removing the -wounded.... The trains were composed partly of first-class carriages, -for the less badly wounded, and partly of covered goods wagons.... In -these covered vans were placed beds formed of boards laid on springs. -Each van would hold four or five men, and a sister rode in the van." One -would not, however, consider to-day that there was anything wonderfully -elaborate in an arrangement under which no more than four or five -sufferers were accommodated in each goods van. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -PREPARATION IN PEACE FOR WAR - - -The greater the experience gained of the application of rail-power -in practice, and the closer the study devoted to its possibilities, -in theory, the more obvious it became that the fullest degree of -advantage to be derived therefrom could only be assured as the result -of preparation and organisation in peace; and this conclusion appeared -specially to apply to countries whose geographical and political -conditions led them to regard it as expedient that they should always -be ready to meet some great national emergency. The Federal Government -of the United States certainly did succeed, in the early sixties, -in creating an excellent military rail-transport organisation after -hostilities had broken out; but the conditions of warfare to-day make -it essentially necessary that arrangements for the use of railways for -military purposes should, as far as possible, be planned, perfected or -provided for long in advance of any possible outbreak of hostilities. - -Among other considerations which strengthen this view are the -following:-- - -I. The increasing dependence of armies on rail transport owing to -(_a_) the vastly greater number of troops employed now than in former -days; (_b_) the supreme importance of time as a factor in enabling -a Commander-in-Chief to effect, possibly, an earlier concentration -than the enemy, and so obtain the power of initiative; and (_c_) the -magnitude of the supplies, munitions and other necessaries wanted to -meet the daily wants of the prodigious forces in the field, and only -to be assured by the employment of rail transport from a more or less -distant base. - -II. The complications, confusion and possible chaos which may result -if, without prior preparation, railway lines designed to serve ordinary -transport purposes are suddenly required to meet military demands taxing -their resources to the utmost extreme. - -III. The further troubles that will assuredly arise if, in the -absence of efficient control by properly-constituted and responsible -intermediaries, railwaymen unfamiliar with military technicalities -are left to deal with the possibly conflicting and impracticable -orders of individual military officers themselves unfamiliar with the -technicalities and limitations of railway working. - -IV. The imperative necessity of having an organised and well-regulated -system of forwarding military supplies, etc., in order both to avoid -congestion of stations and lines and to ensure the punctual arrival of -those supplies in the right quantities, at the right spot, and at the -right time. - -V. The need, in view of the vital importance of the part that railways -may play in war, of having organised forces of railway troops and -railway workers available, together with stores of materials and -appliances, to carry out, speedily and thoroughly, all the work that -may be necessary for the repair, construction or destruction of railway -lines. - -In making the necessary preparations, in time of peace, to ensure the -successful realisation of these and other purposes, there is a vast -amount of work that requires to be done. - -In readiness for the excessive strain that will be thrown on the -railways as soon as they pass from a peace footing to a war footing, on -the order being given for mobilisation, the military authorities and -the railway authorities must needs have at their command the fullest -information as to the physical conditions, the resources and the -transport capabilities of every line of railway in the country which, -directly or indirectly, may be able to render useful service. Details as -to double or single track; gradients; number of locomotives, carriages, -wagons, horse-boxes and other vehicles available; and facilities -afforded by stations in important centres as regards number and length -of platforms and sidings, water supply, loading, unloading or storage -accommodation, etc., are all carefully compiled and kept up to date. -As regards rolling stock, lines not likely to be called upon to carry -any military transports at all may still be able to contribute to the -supply of carriages and wagons wanted to meet the heavy demands on other -railways. By including all lines of railway in the collected data, it -will be known exactly where additional rolling stock may be obtained -if wanted. The carrying capacity of the different types of carriages, -trucks, etc., is also noted. If necessary, arrangements will be made for -the reduction of gradients, the improvement of curves, the construction -of connecting links between different main lines, the lengthening of -station platforms, or the provision of increased loading or unloading -facilities. - -On the basis of the information collected elaborate calculations are -made in regard to such matters as (1) the number of vehicles required -for a given number of men, with horses, guns, munitions, stores, road -vehicles, etc., so that rolling stock can be used to the best advantage -and according as to whether the troops carried belong to the Infantry, -Cavalry or the Artillery; (2) the number of vehicles that can be made -up into a train going by any one route; (3) the length of time likely -to be taken for the entraining and detraining respectively of a given -unit; (4) the time intervals at which a succession of troop trains can -follow one another on the same line; (5) the speed of troop trains; and -(6) the further intervals to be allowed in the arrival at one and the -same station, or centre, of a number of trains starting from different -points, so as to avoid the risk of congestion and of consequent delays. - -Military time-tables, corresponding to those in everyday use, have -next to be prepared, showing exactly what trains must run from given -stations, at fixed hours, by clearly defined routes, to specified -destinations as soon as the occasion arises. The great aim kept in view -in the compilation of these time-tables is, not alone preparation in -advance, but the most complete utilisation possible of the available -transport facilities of the country as a whole. - -A selection must also be made in advance of the stations at which troops -on long journeys can obtain food, as well as of the stations to be used -as depôts for stores and supplies, all the necessary arrangements being -provided for. - -After the initial great strain on the railway resources involved in -mobilisation and concentration, there will still be an enormous amount -of transport to be done during the campaign. In the one direction there -will be a constant despatch of reinforcements, provisions, clothing, -munitions and supplies or stores to the front; in the other direction -there will be a steady flow of sick and wounded, of prisoners of war, -and of materiel not wanted at the front, followed by the final return -home of the troops at the end of the campaign. - -At each important point along the lines of communication where special -services in connection with the rail transport, in either direction, are -to be rendered, there must be organisation of such kind as will ensure -that whatever is necessary shall be done promptly and efficiently under -the control of persons of recognised authority and responsibility, and -without any of the friction that would, inevitably, lead to delays, -traffic blocks and other complications. - -Nor can the same system of organisation apply to the whole line of -communication, from the base to the limit of the rail service at the -front. A point will be reached therein where the control, if not the -actual operation, of the railway lines must needs be transferred from -the civil to the military authorities, rendering necessary a scheme of -supervision and working different from that which can be followed on the -sections not within the actual theatre of war. - -Then, if the army should be compelled to retreat before the enemy, -there should be available a sufficiency of forces skilled in the art of -rapidly and effectively destroying lines, bridges, viaducts, tunnels, or -other railway property, with a view to retarding the enemy's movements -until, it may be, reinforcements can be brought up in sufficient number -to check his further progress. If, alternatively, the army should -advance into the enemy's country, there must again be a provision of -Railway Troops fully qualified by previous training and experience both -to repair quickly the demolitions or the damage which the enemy will -have carried out on his own lines and to construct hastily such new -lines--light railways or otherwise--as the circumstances of the moment -require. These things done, and still further advance being made into -the invaded territory, the need will also arise for a staff capable of -operating, under war conditions, the lines of which possession has been -taken, in order that communications with the advanced front and the -forwarding of reinforcements and supplies can still be maintained. - -All these and many other things, besides, must needs be thought out and -prepared for in time of peace, long in advance of any probable or even -any possible war. They are, in fact, made the subject of exhaustive and -continuous study alike by military officers specially entrusted with -the task and by railway managers commanding all the technical knowledge -requisite for making arrangements calculated to ensure the prompt and -efficient satisfaction of all such demands for military rail-transport -as may, with whatever urgency, and under whatever conditions, some day -be put forward. - -Still more practical do the preparations in peace for war become when -they include the construction of a network of strategical railways -expressly designed to facilitate the mobilisation of troops, their -speedy concentration on the frontier, or their movement from one point -of attack to another at the theatre of war. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -ORGANISATION IN GERMANY - - -In no country in the world was the desirability of preparing in time of -peace for military rail-transport in time of war recognised earlier than -in Germany. In none has the practice of such preparation in peace been -followed up with greater study and persistence. - -As shown in Chapter I, the military use of railways led to the proposal -and discussion in Germany of definite schemes for such use as early as -1833; and it is not too much to say that, from that date down to the -outbreak of the World-War in 1914, the whole subject had received there -an ever-increasing degree of attention from the military authorities, -and, also, from a large body of writers as a question of the day in its -relation more especially to German expansion. - -One great mistake, however, made alike by historians, by writers in the -Press, and by popular tradition, has been the attributing to Germany of -a far higher degree of credit in regard to the alleged perfection of -her preparations for the _Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71_ than she was -really entitled to claim. Nor, indeed, has the fact been sufficiently -recognised that the organisation eventually elaborated by Germany for -the efficient conduct of her rail-transport in war had been evolved -from studies, investigations, trials, experiments and tests (in actual -warfare or otherwise) extending over a period of half a century or more, -during which time, also, there was issued a bewildering mass of laws, -rules and regulations, each more or less modifying those that had gone -before and adding still further to the elaborate, if not the extremely -complicated, machinery laboriously built up as the result of the -universally recognised genius of the German people for organisation. - -The final great test of all this machinery was to be applied in 1914. -Here, however, it must suffice, for present purposes, to show how the -machinery itself was created and the form it finally assumed. - -Down to 1861 Prussia had done no more, in the way of organising military -transport by rail, than issue a series of Ordinances dealing with the -movement of large bodies of troops, such Ordinances being akin to those -which all the leading countries of Europe had either compiled or were -engaged in compiling. Directly influenced by the developments of the -Civil War in America, Prussia took the further step, in 1864, of forming -a Railway Section of her General Staff. This new body was actively -employed in the furtherance of Prussia's interests in the Danish War of -the same year, when confirmatory evidence was given of the advantages -to be derived from the use of rail transport for military movements, -journeys that would have taken the troops sixteen days by road being -done within six days by rail. - -The organisation thus applied on a comparatively small scale in 1864 was -further developed by Prussia in the _campaign of 1866_. - -On that occasion mobilisation and concentration of the Prussian troops -were both carried out mainly by rail, under the direction of an -Executive Commission consisting of an officer of the General Staff and -a representative of the Ministry of Commerce. This Executive Commission -sat in Berlin, and was assisted by Line Commissions operating on the -different railways utilised for military purposes. Movements of troops -by rail were certainly effected in one-third of the time they would have -taken by road, while the Prussians, gaining a great advantage, by the -rapidity of such movements, over Austria, routed her combined forces -within seven days of crossing the frontier, and dictated terms of peace -to her within a month. - -Some serious faults were nevertheless developed, even in the course of -this very short campaign, in Prussia's rail-transport arrangements, -such being especially the case in regard to the forwarding of supplies. -These were rushed to the front in excess of immediate requirements, the -only concern of contractors or of officers at the base being to get them -away, while the railway companies--bound to accept goods for transport -and delivery as ordered--dispatched them without regard for any possible -deficiency in the unloading and storage arrangements at the other -end. The supplies, forwarded in bulk, followed as close up behind the -troops as they could be taken; but the provision made for unloading was -inadequate, the railway staffs disclaimed responsibility for the work, -and, before long, stations and sidings at the front were hopelessly -blocked, although elsewhere the shortage of wagons was so great that -everything was at a standstill. Even when wagons had been unloaded, they -were too often left on the lines, in long trains of empties, instead of -being sent where they were most needed. Each railway company disposed -of its own rolling stock independently of the other companies, adopting -the view that it had no concern with what was happening elsewhere. In -some instances special trains were dispatched for the conveyance of a -few hundred men or a few hundredweights of stores. Orders which should -have gone direct from one responsible person to another went through -a variety of channels with the result that serious delays and no less -serious blunders occurred. One East Prussian Battalion, for instance, -was sent off by train in a direction exactly opposite to that which it -should have taken. - -All these and other troubles experienced were directly due to the -absence of a central controlling body formed on such a basis that -it could (1) govern the rail-transport arrangements as a whole; -(2) supervise the forwarding of supplies; (3) provide for a proper -distribution, and better utilisation, of rolling stock; (4) secure -the prompt unloading and return of wagons, and (5) form a direct link -between the military authorities and the railway managements and staffs. - -Immediately on the close of the war a mixed committee of Staff officers -and railway authorities was appointed, under the supervision of von -Moltke, to inquire what steps should be taken to organise the Prussian -military transport services on such a basis as would avoid a repetition -of the faults already experienced, and give a greater guarantee of -efficiency on the occasion of the next war in which Prussia might be -engaged. The desirability of making such preparations in time of peace -doubtless appeared the greater in proportion as it became more and more -evident that the trial of strength between Prussia and Austria would -inevitably be followed by one between Prussia and France. - -The scheme elaborated by the committee in question took the form of a -_Route Service Regulation_ which was approved by the King on May 2, -1867, and was, also, adopted by most of the other German States, but was -kept secret until the time came for applying it in practice, as was done -in the war of 1870-71. - -The basis of the scheme was the creation of a system of _Route -Inspection_ ("Etappen Inspektion") constituting a department of the -General Staff, and designed-- - -I. To watch over the replenishing of the operating army with men, -horses, provisions, ammunition, and other military stores. - -II. To see to the removal into the interior of the country of the sick -and wounded, prisoners and trophies of war. - -III. With the assistance of the troops appointed for the purpose and -the Railway Field Corps, to maintain the line of communication, viz., -railway, roads, bridges, telegraphs, and postal arrangements; to -undertake the government of the hostile conquered provinces, and other -duties. - -The preparation of the necessary plans for the attainment of these -objects was entrusted to a _Central Commission_ composed, partly of -officers connected with the General Staff and the Ministry of War, and -partly of prominent functionaries on the staffs of the Ministry of -Commerce, Industry and Public Works (then in supreme control over the -railways), and of the Minister of the Interior. Two of its members--a -Staff Officer and a railway expert from the Ministry of Commerce--formed -an _Executive Commission_ and exercised a general supervision over the -arrangements for military transports; though on the removal of the -Great Head-quarters from Berlin, the Executive Commission was to be -succeeded by an _Auxiliary Executive Commission_, which would supervise -the railways in the interior to be made use of for supplying the needs -of the army. - -In time of war the Central Commission was to be supplemented by _Line -Commissions_ formed by military officers and railway officers in -combination, and operating each in a leading centre of railway traffic. -Their function it would be--with the assistance of _District Line -Commissions_--not only to communicate to the line or lines of railway in -their district such orders as might be necessary for the transport of -troops, guns, ammunition, horses, and supplies, but, also, to draw up -or make the final arrangements in connection with the time-tables for -the running of military trains; to fix the direction in which the trains -would go; to decide at what stations the troops should stop for their -meals or for their coffee; and, in fact, to arrange everything connected -with the said transport down to--as it appeared at the time--the -smallest details. - -In the forwarding of supplies, each Army Corps was to have its own line -of communication, separate and distinct from that of the other Army -Corps, the object aimed at being that of avoiding the confusion and -disorder which might result from the fact of several Army Corps using -the same railway. - -Each of such lines of communication would start from some large railway -station forming a _Point of Concentration_ ("Etappenanfangsort") for the -collection and the dispatch therefrom of supplies for the Army Corps it -would serve, or for the receipt and further distribution in the interior -of persons or commodities coming back from the seat of war. - -Along the line of railway, at distances of about 100 or 125 miles, -stations were to be selected which would serve as halting-places for the -feeding of troops, for the watering of horses, for the reception of sick -and wounded unable to continue their journey, for the repair of rolling -stock, or for other such purposes. The furthest point to be reached by -rail from day to day would constitute _Railhead_ ("Etappenhauptort"), -whence communication with the fighting line would be carried on by road, -being further facilitated by _Halting Places_ ("Etappenörter") _en -route_. - -The whole of this elaborate organisation--and here we come to the -weakest point in the system--was to be under the supreme direction -and control of an _Inspector-General of Communications_--a sort of -Universal Provider of every requirement the Army could possibly need, -and responsible for the fulfilment of a long and exceedingly varied list -of obligations among which the conduct of military rail-transport became -simply one of many items. The special merit of his position was assumed -to be that of a superior authority who, having the rank of Commandant of -a Division, and being in constant touch both with the Commander-in-Chief -of the Army and with the War Minister, would be able to establish -harmony in the operations of the different services and corps. The -principle itself was sound; but, in practice, such a multiplicity of -duties fell upon him, or, through him, on his department, that the -break-down which actually occurred in the campaign of 1870-71 should -have been foreseen in advance. - -On the declaration of war the Inspector-General was to organise the -stations for the feeding of the troops and horses proceeding to the -front, and was then himself to go to some station one or two marches -from the fighting-line, and fix, each day, the Railhead Station for the -time being, moving his own head-quarters as occasion might require. -From these head-quarters he was to exercise control and direction over -a staff among whose duties--apart from those relating to railways -or rail-transport--were the following:--A centralisation of all the -services through a Chief of the Staff giving a common impulse to them -according to the instructions of the Inspector-General; the forwarding -of all troops to the front, special precautions having to be taken -that none were left behind; distribution of the troops on arrival at -their destination; the forwarding of all supplies; decision of all -personal questions that might arise in connection with the troops; -the keeping of journals and registers, the drawing up of reports, -and the carrying on of correspondence with the War Minister and the -Chiefs of the army; everything concerned with horses for the troops, -transport and distribution of prisoners of war, and maintenance of good -order among the troops; assurance of an ample supply of ammunition -for the artillery; construction or provision of barracks, huts, or -temporary hospitals; maintenance of roads and telegraphs; control -of telegraphs and postal services at the seat of war; supervision -of road communications; responsibility for the safe and regular -delivery to the troops of all supplies and necessaries ordered to meet -their requirements, and establishment of hospitals, infirmaries and -convalescent homes, with the arrangements for the removal thereto of the -sick and wounded. - -In regard to railway matters, the Inspector-General was assisted by a -_Director of Field Railways_ who, in turn, had many duties to perform. -Acting in the name and with the authority of the Inspector-General, -he gave directions to the Line Commissions concerning the succession -in which supplies were to be forwarded, and, in conjunction with -the military and railway authorities, drew up the time-tables for -military transports, submitting them, however, for the approval of -his chief before they were put into operation. The actual transport -of troops and material--on the basis of principles the details of -which would have been worked out in advance--was also to be conducted -under the supervision of the Director of Railways. In the event of -any of the lines being destroyed by the enemy, he was to undertake -their reconstruction, obtaining through the Inspector-General such -helpers--whether soldiers or civilians--as he might require to -supplement his own working staff in the accomplishment of the necessary -work. On the lines being restored, the Director was further to take -control of their operation by means of troops and, also, of railway -employés to be furnished by the Minister of Commerce on the requisition -of the Inspector-General of Communications. - -Such was the elaborate machinery which, constructed alike in peace and -in secret by the Great General Staff, under the direct supervision of -von Moltke himself, was to be tested in the inevitable war with France -for which it had been designed. - -According to popular belief, Germany's preparations for that war were -so complete that she had only, as it were, to press a button, or pull -a lever, in order to ensure the immediate and perfect working of all -the plans she had made in advance. Whether or not this was really so -in regard to her transport arrangements, at least, is a point to which -attention may now be directed. - -At the beginning of the war a _Route Inspection_, organised on the basis -already detailed, and having its own Inspector-General of Communications -in charge of, and responsible for, the efficient working of the entire -network of duties and obligations, was called into being for each of the -three German armies. Subsequently a fourth, under the Crown Prince of -Saxony, was added. - -So far as the mobilisation of the German troops and their concentration -on the frontier were concerned the plans worked, on the whole, -remarkably well; though even in this respect complete success was not -attained. There were, in 1870, nine lines of concentration available, -namely, six for the Northern and three for the Southern Army; and -between July 24 and August 3, there were dispatched by these different -routes 1,200 trains, conveying 350,000 men, 87,000 horses, and 8,400 -guns or road vehicles. Yet the delays which occurred to some of these -trains were alone sufficient to show that the machinery which had been -elaborated was not working with perfect smoothness. On, for example, the -route known as line "C," the troops sent to Giessen were--as told by -Balck, in his "Taktik"--eleven hours late in their arrival. They then -had their first warm food after a journey which had lasted twenty-one -hours. For the transport to Homburg-in-der-Pfalz and Neunkirchen forty -hours had been allowed. The first train did the journey in the time, but -the next one took ninety hours. - -It was, however, in the forwarding of supplies and in the provisioning -of the troops that the greatest difficulties were experienced; and here -there certainly appeared to be little real advance on the shortcomings -of the campaign of 1866, notwithstanding all the preparations which had -been made in the meantime. - -Comprehensive as it undoubtedly was, the scheme prepared in time of -peace included no adequate organisation for regulating the transport of -supplies to the front and for ensuring alike their dispatch and their -arrival in just such quantities, and under just such conditions, as -would provide for the needs of the troops from day to day. Magazines -had certainly been set up, but not in sufficient number or always in -the right place. The system, too, of operating them was defective. -Just as in 1866, so in 1870, army officers, contractors and railway -companies, all inspired by zeal for the welfare of the troops, rushed -off train-load after train-load of supplies to stations provided -with an inadequate supply alike of sidings where the wagons could be -accommodated and of labour for the work of unloading. Stores were handed -to the railway staffs under the same conditions as in peace time, the -idea being, apparently, that if they were only dispatched as soon as -possible they would be sure to get to the troops in want of them. - -As for the conditions at the other end, it not unfrequently happened -that even though the supply-trains might go to stations where the -facilities for unloading them were ample, the Commissariat or other -officers in charge would follow the example already being set in France -by regarding loaded railway trucks as convenient movable magazines -which should not be unloaded until their contents were really wanted. -This was done regardless of the fact alike that the trucks thus kept -standing on the lines impeded the traffic and that they were urgently -wanted to meet the shortage of trucks elsewhere. But for the stringent -action taken to check it, the evil due to this use of railway trucks for -storage purposes would have assumed even graver proportions than was -actually the case. Defective, also, as the German arrangements in this -respect undoubtedly were, they still did not attain to the same degree -of inefficiency as was the case in France. - -All the same, the general result of these various conditions was that -serious difficulties were experienced on the German no less than on the -French railways. No sooner had the concentration of the Prussian troops -been completed than provisions and stores were sent after them in such -volume that a hopeless block, extending to Cologne in one direction and -Frankfort in the other, was speedily produced on the lines along the -left bank of the Rhine, while the feeding of the troops was brought to -a temporary standstill. The combined efforts of the Prussian Executive -Commission, of the Minister of Commerce and of the Line Commissions -failed for a time to overcome the conditions of chaos and confusion thus -brought about, and on August 11, 1870, instructions had to be given that -thenceforward supplies were to be forwarded only on the express order of -the Intendant-General or of an Inspector-General of Communications. Yet -on September 5 there were standing, on five different lines, a total of -no fewer than 2,322 loaded wagons, containing 16,830 tons of provisions -for the Second Army, or sufficient to keep it supplied for a period of -twenty-six days. Such blocks on the German lines--though not always on -so great a scale--were of frequent occurrence throughout the war. - -Trouble arose, also, in getting provisions from the railway to the -troops by reason either of the inadequate number of road vehicles or -because of the use of these for the conveyance of ammunition or for -other purposes, instead. Thus the Inspector-General of the First Army -started with 2,000 road vehicles; but on October 17 the total number -still at his disposal was only twenty. The position became still worse -as the retreating French destroyed the lines behind them, increasing the -difficulties of the invaders in maintaining their communications with -the Fatherland. - -While the food supplies for the German troops were thus blocking the -railway lines--or, alternatively, were going bad on account either -of the heated conditions of the closed wagons or of exposure to the -weather after unloading--many of the German troops were suffering severe -privations from lack of adequate nourishment; and they would have -suffered still more but for the provision-trains or stores of supplies -seized from the French at Metz, Forbach, Verdun, Dôle, Le Hans, and -elsewhere. If, indeed, the French had only refrained from rushing their -own supplies to the extreme front in excessive quantities, or if they -had destroyed those they could not remove in time, the invaders would, -on various occasions, have found themselves in a condition bordering on -starvation. Even as it was, they were often reduced to the necessity of -dependence on their "iron" rations. - -Difficulty was especially experienced in feeding the army of occupation -during the investment of Paris. The supplies received by train from -Germany were equal to scarcely one half of the actual requirements; -a resort to "requisitions" on the French territory occupied yielded -inadequate results; and the making of a regular daily money-allowance -to officers and men, so that they could purchase their own supplies in -the open market or otherwise, was, at first, far from satisfactory. It -was, in fact, only owing to the most strenuous effort on the part of the -responsible officers, both during the investment of Paris and in earlier -phases of the war, that the German troops were often saved from actual -want.[21] - -The main reasons for the defects and shortcomings thus developed in a -scheme on which so much care and preparation had been bestowed were -(1) that, while based on fundamentally sound principles, the scheme in -its actual application threw too great a strain on the department of -the Inspector-General of Communications, which, as we have seen, was -expected to look after, not only rail transport, but route marching, -telegraphs, postal arrangements, and a great variety of other things -besides; (2) that, owing to the larger number of Army Corps, it was no -longer possible, as had been done in 1866, to place a separate line of -railway at the disposal of each, so as to allow the said department to -superintend the traffic on the basis of its own organisation; and (3) -the absence of a central administration specially designed (_a_) to -act as an intermediary and to ensure co-operation and mutual working -between the various Line Commissions and, also, between the individuals -and administrations, both military and civil, engaged in the conduct of -rail-transport; and (_b_) to control the traffic as a whole, avoiding -difficulties, blocks and delays assuring a prompt and efficient -distribution of supplies, and guaranteeing the utilisation of rolling -stock to the best advantage. - -With a view to overcoming, as far as possible, the trouble due to the -wide extent and the great variety of duties falling on the department -of the Inspector-General of Communications, it was arranged, during -the latter part of the war, to relieve that department of all -responsibility for the railway services and to transfer the control and -direction of these to the Executive Commission established at the Royal -Head-quarters. In this way it was hoped to utilise the rail-transport -facilities to greater advantage, to decrease the risk of collisions -and delays, and, through a central organisation, to distribute the -transport demands more equally among the various railways concerned. -By means of these provisional modifications in the original scheme a -better system of operation was obtained during the remainder of the -war. But the complete reorganisation that was really necessary was then -impracticable, and much friction in the working of the railway services -was still experienced, partly because this needful reorganisation could -not be carried out, and partly because of the conflicting orders coming -from different authorities, each of whom, under the conditions then -existing, was perfectly within his right in giving them.[22] - -The difficulties due to the attempts to rush supplies in excessive -quantities direct to the fighting-line, or as near thereto as possible, -were also met, to a certain extent, during the course of the war, by -the setting up of additional railway magazines or depôts where the -forwarding of necessaries could be better controlled; but it was not -until the end of 1870 that any approach to regularity in supplying the -wants of the German forces was finally secured. - -No sooner had the war come to an end than the work of remedying the -defects which had been developed was taken in hand by the Minister of -War and the Great General Staff. Following the creation, on October -1, 1871, of a Railway Battalion on a permanent basis came, on July -20, 1872, a new Regulation cancelling the one of May 2, 1867, which -had been in operation during the war, and substituting a new basis of -organisation in its place. - -While retaining the principle of a Central Commission in Berlin, the -scheme of 1872 relieved the route authorities of all responsibility -for rail transport as well as for railway restoration and operation -at the theatre of war, transferring to a new military department all -the duties falling under these heads, with the further advantage -that such department would be able to control the railways in time -of war independently of the civil authorities, and without the -disadvantages hitherto resulting from the need to deal, in regard to -railway questions, with nine separate Ministries of Commerce and about -fifty different railway companies. At the same time the principle -of co-ordination was to be maintained by the appointment of an -_Inspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communication_ who, in each -of these departments, would control a far more efficient organisation -than had previously existed, and, also, as director-in-chief, would -constitute a central authority and an intermediary between the services -concerned and the head of the Great General Staff, under whose direction -he would himself act. - -Another important feature of the new Regulation was that a distinction -was now drawn between (1) railways on or near to the theatre of war -which could not be worked by their ordinary staffs, and must needs pass -under military operation, with a paramount military control; and (2) -"home" or other railways, in the rear of the fighting, which might -carry ordinary traffic--except so far as the lines were wanted for -military purposes--and might still be worked by their own staffs, but in -the operation of which there should be a military element in time of war -in order to facilitate the transport of troops and military necessaries. - -Various other Regulations, and notably a series in 1878 and 1888, -followed that of 1872, and eventually the whole scheme of organisation, -with its additions and modifications, seeking to provide for every -possible contingency, became extremely complicated. Of the multifarious -instructions, provisions and orders which had been compiled, some -applied to peace only, some to war only, and some to both peace and war; -some to "home" railways and some to railways at the seat of war; some -to military men and some to railway men, and so on. As an elaborate -piece of machinery the organisation was more comprehensive and more -complete than ever; but the fear arose that there had again been a -failure to take the human element sufficiently into account. Of those in -the military and the railway service who should have applied themselves -in time of peace to a study of the elaborate and extremely involved -provisions which would apply in time of war, comparatively few, it was -found, were disposed to devote themselves to so uninviting a task. - -So there was issued, on January 18, 1899, still another new Regulation -which repealed some of the earlier ones and aimed at amplifying, -condensing, rearranging and facilitating reference to the provisions -remaining in force, in order that the whole scheme should be made -clearer, simpler and easier to grasp. These results were fully attained, -and, though still subject to the final test of a great war, such as that -which broke out in 1914, the German Regulation of 1899 might certainly -be considered a masterpiece of organisation as prepared in time of -peace. One especially useful purpose it served was that of defining -clearly the duties, responsibilities, and spheres of action of all the -authorities, civil or military, concerned in the control and operation -of railways for military purposes. - -The various Regulations here in question have been supplemented from -time to time by _Field Service Regulations_, the first series of which, -issued under date May 23, 1887, was designed to take the place of the -Ordinances of 1861 relating to the movement by rail of great bodies of -troops. These Field Service Regulations of 1887 constituted an epoch -in the military history of Germany. They were regarded at the time as -offering a resumé of the most advanced ideas of Moltke, if not, also, -as the crowning glory of military organisation in the reign of William -I; and they certainly exercised a powerful influence on German military -literature. They were, further, the starting-point of a prolonged -series of similar Regulations, all amending, modifying, adding to, or -abbreviating their predecessors. These changes led to the issue, on -January 1, 1900, of a new edition, based on the exhaustive studies of a -Commission of fourteen members; and still later revisions resulted in -the publication of a further series on March 22, 1908.[23] - -Here, then, we get still further evidence of the keenness with which -Germany has followed up, in times of peace, her preparations for war, -while the Field Service Regulations, no less than the other Regulations -already detailed, show the important place that military rail-transport -holds in the view of those responsible in Germany for the making of -these arrangements. "Railways," it is declared in the Regulations of -1908, "exercise a decisive influence on the whole conduct of a war. They -are of the greatest importance for mobilising and concentrating the -army, and for maintaining it in a state of efficiency, and they enable -portions of it to be transported from one place to another during the -operations." What the Field Service Regulations do is to present in -concentrated and compact form the working details, in respect to field -service requirements, of those other and fuller Regulations which cover -the whole ground of military transport in general. - -Taking these various sources of information, the nature of the -organisation that Germany has thus effected as the result of so many -years of study and experience may be summarised as follows:-- - -In time of peace the authorities entrusted with the task of ensuring, -by their preparations in advance, the success of the whole system of -military rail-transport include (1) the Minister of War; the Prussian -Chief of the General Staff of the Army; the members of the Railway -Section of the Great General Staff, the Line Commissions and the -Station Commissions; authorities concerned in the forwarding, transport -and receiving of supplies, and representatives of the Commissariat -department; and (2) the Imperial Chancellor, the Imperial Railway -Bureau, the Imperial Administration of Posts and Telegraphs, and the -various railway administrations. - -The _Prussian Minister of War_ is the chief representative of the -interests of the Army in all questions relating to the military use of -the railways. - -The _Prussian Chief of the General Staff_ of the Army has under his -orders, in time of peace, the military authorities concerned in -rail-transport, and gives them the necessary instructions. He keeps -in close relations with the Imperial Railway Bureau, and serves as -intermediary between that Bureau and the Prussian Minister of War. It is -he who gives the directions according to which the use of the railways -in war-time is regulated, and he prescribes all the preparations -that are to be made in advance for the facilitating of such use. On -mobilisation, he discharges all the duties appertaining to the office -of the Inspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communication until -that officer has himself taken them in hand. From that time he issues -instructions according to circumstances. - -The _Railway Section of the Great General Staff_ is required, among -other duties, to collect, and have always available, the fullest and -most complete information as to the powers and facilities of the -railways for the transport of troops, etc. To this end it keeps in -constant communication with the railway administrations, and, also, -with the Imperial Railway Bureau (which centralises all questions -affecting railway administration), completing, if necessary, through -investigations made by its own officers, the information furnished -annually by the Bureau. The Railway Section further takes charge -of a wide range of details and preparations concerning military -rail-transport in war-time. - -On the outbreak of hostilities there is appointed for each theatre of -war an _Inspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communication_ who, -receiving his orders from the Chief of the General Staff, co-ordinates -the two groups of services, and ensures harmony in their joint -working. For the operation of the railways, as applied to military -purposes, there is a _Director of Field Railways_ who, acting under the -Inspector-General, controls the whole railway service. Through the Line -Commissions or Commandants subordinate to him he conveys to the railway -authorities the necessary demands or instructions in respect to military -transport, and, in concert with his superior officers, he fixes the -boundary between the lines to be operated on a peace footing and those -that are to be subject to military working. In the discharge of these -and other duties he is assisted by a staff composed partly of military -men and partly of railwaymen. Each officer concerned in the transport -arrangements has a recognised deputy who can act for him in case of need. - -Of _Line Commissions_, placed in charge, for military purposes, -over the lines of railway in certain districts, and becoming _Line -Commandants_ on the outbreak of war, there were twenty under the revised -Regulation of 1899, the number being increased in 1904 to twenty-one. -The headquarters of these Commissions are at such centres of traffic as -Berlin, Hanover, Erfurt, Dresden, Cologne, Altona, Breslau, etc. They -serve as intermediaries between the higher military authorities and -the railway administrations with which they are associated. Each Line -Commission consists, normally, of a staff officer of the active army and -a prominent railway functionary, the former having a non-commissioned -officer, and the latter a railway official, as secretary, with such -further assistance as may be needed. - -Subordinate, in turn, to the Line Commissions are the _Station -Commissions_, which, receiving instructions from the former, see to the -carrying out of the necessary transport requirements either at their -particular station or on the section of line of which they are placed in -charge. - -While full provision is thus made for the representation of the military -element in the conduct of rail-transport in time of war, with a view -to ensuring its efficiency, precautions are no less taken to avoid -repetitions of earlier troubles due to questions of responsibility and -control, and, more especially, to the interference of military officers -in the technical operation of the railway lines. On this subject the -Field Service Regulations of 1900 stated (paragraph 496):-- - - Railways can only fully accomplish their important and - difficult task during war if no serious hindrances to their - management are created by the conduct of the troops. - -In the later Regulations of 1908 it was said (paragraph 527):-- - - The important rôle which railways have to fulfil renders it - incumbent on every commander to do all in his power to prevent - any interference with the traffic due to delay, etc., on the - part of the troops. The railway staff and conducting officers - are bound by the transport arrangements made by the railway - authorities. - - The conducting officer is responsible for the administration - of the detachment of troops or consignment of stores under his - charge. It is his duty, as regards himself and his charge, to - obey the instructions of the railway officials. - - Any interference with the service of the railways is - forbidden. - - At important stations Railway Staff Officers are appointed - who act as intermediaries between the conducting officers and - the railway officials. - -Concerning _Lines of Communication_ the Field Service Regulations of -1908 say:-- - - A railway station, to serve as a Home Base - ("Etappenanfangsort") will be assigned to every Army Corps. From - these home bases supplies are sent forward to Collecting Depôts - ("Sammelstationen"), which will be established at not too great - a distance from the theatre of war. - - In the theatre of war a base will be assigned to each Army, - the situation of which will change according to the progress - of the operations. The Army Corps are connected with the Field - Base by lines of communication roads ("Etappenstrassen"), and on - these roads posts are formed about 13½ miles apart. - -As for the mass of working details also included in the various -Regulations, these may well appear to provide in advance for every -possible requirement in regard to military transport by rail, from -the movement of entire armies down to the supply of drinking water at -stations and the taking of carrier pigeons in the troop trains. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[21] In "Der Kriegs-Train des deutschen Heeres," by E. Schäffer, -(Berlin, 1883), the author, dealing with the subject of transport -in the war of 1870-71, and its effect on the feeding of the German -Army, says of the situation in August-September, 1870: "Immerhin -wurden den Truppen damals nicht unerhebliche Entbehrungen auferlegt"; -while concerning the position of the army of occupation in France he -writes: "Immerhin erforderte es umfassender Massregeln seitens der -Intendantur, die Truppen vor wirklichem Mangel zu schützen, namentlich -da die Requisitionen wenig ergiebig ausfielen, und anfänglich auch der -freihändige Ankauf keinen rechten Erfolg hatte." - -[22] "Revue militaire de l'Étranger," 27 Novembre, 1872. - -[23] "Field Service Regulations (Felddienst Ordnung, 1908) of the German -Army." Translated by the General Staff, War Office. London, 1908. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY - - -The innovation introduced into modern warfare by the Federal Government -of the United States, in the organisation on a comprehensive scale of a -Construction Corps for the combined purposes of repairing, destroying -and operating the railways on which so much might depend in the conduct -of war, attracted great attention in Europe, and more especially so in -Germany, which was the first country on this side of the Atlantic to -follow the American precedent, since adopted more or less completely by -all nations possessed alike of railways and a standing army. - -Down to the time of the War of Secession the need for such a corps -had not been realised in Europe; but the advantages which might be -gained therefrom had been shown in so unmistakable a form that when, -in 1866, there was the certainty of an early conflict between Prussia -and Austria, one of the first steps taken by the former country was to -provide, under a decree of May 6, 1866, for a _Field Railway Section_, -("Feldeisenbahnabteilung,") to be formed, and designed to operate, -on a basis closely approximating to that which had applied to the -corresponding American corps. The special purposes to be served were -defined as those of rapidly repairing lines of railway destroyed by -the enemy and of destroying railways it might be thought expedient to -prevent the enemy from using. The section was to be under the orders -of the General Staff either of the Army or of an Army Corps. It was, -however, not to come into being until its services were really required, -and it was then to act for the duration of the war only. - -On the outbreak of hostilities three divisions of the corps were -mobilised, under Cabinet Orders of May 25 and June 1, one division -being allotted to each of the three Prussian armies operating in -different parts of the theatre of war. The composition of the corps was -partly military and partly civil. The military element was supplied by -officers of the Engineers (one of whom acted as chief), non-commissioned -officers, and a detachment of Pioneers, the last-mentioned being either -carpenters or smiths. The civil element comprised railway engineers, -thoroughly acquainted with the construction and repair of permanent -way, bridges, etc.; assistant railway engineers, performing the duties -of clerks of the works; head platelayers, foremen, locomotive drivers, -machinists (for the repair of engines, rolling-stock, water pumps -and water tanks), and others. The members of the civil section were -chosen from the staff of the Prussian State railways by the Minister of -Commerce, their services being placed by him at the disposal of the War -Minister. Each of the three divisions constituted a complete unit. - -On the side of the Austrians there was at that time no similar force -available. Three years before there had been published in Vienna -a book, by Oberst. von Panz, entitled "Das Eisenbahnwesen, vom -militärischen Standpuncte," in which the author expressed the view that -details on the following points, among others, concerning railways -should be collected in time of peace and classified for reference -in case of need:--Permanent way: system and construction; gauge and -number of lines; whether lines single or double. Stations: size and -construction; which of them best fitted to serve as depôts. Bridges: -underground works, etc.; which of these could be the most easily -destroyed, or soonest repaired if destroyed, and if prepared beforehand -for destruction. Embankments: size; how made; slope; if provided -with culverts and size of these. Cuttings: length and depth; slopes; -nature of ground; whether much or little water, and whether danger of -landslips. Tunnels: dimensions and construction; if lined or cut in -rock; nature of cuttings at end and whether they can be blocked. Large -bridges and viaducts: system of construction; span of arches; whether or -not the piers are mined.[24] Where men, tools, stores and materials can -be obtained, and to what extent. - -These recommendations attracted much attention at the time. They -were quoted by H. L. Westphalen in his book on "Die Kriegführung -unter Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Leipzig, 1868), of which a French -translation was published under the title of "De l'Emploi des Chemins -de Fer en Temps de Guerre" (Paris, 1869); yet when, just before the -outbreak of war with Prussia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian -Northern Army recommended that a Construction Corps should be formed, -the Minister of War replied that "the repair of railways was work which -should be done by the railway companies concerned." - -All the same, the retarding of the Prussian advance by interrupting -the rail communications became an important phase of Austrian tactics -and was followed up with great activity. Bridges and viaducts were -destroyed, rails torn up, sleepers burned, points and turntables carried -away, tunnels obstructed and water cranes and pumps rendered useless. -At one place (between Libenau and Sichrau), where the railway passed -through a deep cutting, the explosion of mines along the top of each -bank detached great masses of rock which, falling on the lines, filled -up the cutting to a height of six or eight feet for a distance of about -250 ft., and could not be removed until, by means of blasting, they had -been broken up into pieces sufficiently small to be carried away in -ballast trucks. - -The arrangements made by the Prussians were, however, so complete as to -permit, in most instances, of a speedy restoration. Even in the instance -just mentioned, fifty Pioneers, aided by twenty labourers, had the line -clear for traffic again before midnight of the day the destruction was -caused. - -Each division of the Construction Corps had at its disposal two -locomotives and thirty closed wagons or open trucks, provision thus -being made for the transport of, among other things, six light covered -carts (for use on the roads in the country to be invaded, horses being -requisitioned therein as necessary); tools; supplies of blasting powder -or gun-cotton; and rails, sleepers, bolts, etc., for 250 yards of -railway, reserve materials for a further quarter of a mile of track -being left at intermediate depôts, supplemented by an unlimited supply -at the base of operations. The construction trains also carried timber, -ropes, nails, scaffolding, clamps, etc., for the prompt repair of -small bridges. Materials for larger bridges or viaducts were stored at -convenient centres. - -How the reconnaissance of a line which might have been subjected to the -enemy's destructive tactics was carried out is thus told by Captain C. -E. Webber, R.E., in his "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866":-- - - The reconnaissance starts with, and, until interrupted, - keeps up with, the advance guard, the movement being covered by - cavalry scouts on each side of the line. - - The greater portion of the train in charge of the - department, with one engine in front and another behind, - advances slowly, preceded at a distance of about 500 paces by a - trolley carrying one of the officers, four men to work it, and - a bugler. On arriving at any obstruction the trolley signals - to the train by bugle and extra caution is used in advancing - towards it. If in presence of the enemy, the scouts give warning - to the officer in the trolley, who returns to the train and the - whole retires. The second engine can be detached from the rear - to send messages or bring up fresh supplies. - -But for the successes already gained in the same direction by the -Federals in the United States, the speed with which repairs were -carried out by the Prussian Construction Corps--then so recently -organised--would have been regarded as remarkable. In various instances -communication was restored within from one and a half to three days -after the destruction even of important bridges. - -As it happened, however, whilst the Austrians had shown an excess of -zeal in some directions by destroying bridges when the tearing up -of the rails would have answered the same purpose, the hesitation -of the responsible Austrian officer to fire the mines which had -already been laid to the bridge over the Elbe at Lobkowitz was of -great advantage to the Prussians, leaving them the use of the line -from Turnau to Prague, Pardubitz and Brünn between July 18 and July -27, on which latter date the bridge was at last destroyed by order -of the governor of Theresienstadt. This particular bridge was one of -exceptional strategical importance, and, according to Captain Webber, -the construction even of a temporary substitute--had the Austrians blown -up the bridge before the Prussians could cross it--would have taken no -less than six weeks. The omission, also, of the Austrians to remove or -to destroy the railway rolling stock they left behind at Prague, on -their retirement from that city, conferred a further benefit on the -Prussians. These examples would seem to show that promptness in carrying -out destruction at a critical moment may be no less important on the one -side than efficient organisation on the other for accomplishing the work -of restoration in the shortest possible time. - -While the Construction Corps had thus fully justified its existence, -the sudden creation of such a corps for the purposes of a particular -war, and for the period of the war only, was considered inadequate for -a country where a large standing Army had to be maintained in readiness -for action at any moment, in case of need. Hence it was thought -desirable that Prussia should have a Field Railway Section established -on a permanent and well-organised footing. There was the further -reason for adopting this course because the Pioneers, composed almost -exclusively of reservists, had received no special training in railway -work, while the railway men themselves, accustomed to building lines in -a solid way for public use, were at a disadvantage when called on to -carry out, with great rapidity, and in a rough and ready manner, work -that was wanted only to serve the temporary purposes of the Army with -which they were associated. - -It was found, also, that the corps, comprising so large a civil element, -had escaped the supervision and control of the Executive Commission -at Berlin which had for its function the regulation of all matters -concerning military rail-transport. Nor did the Construction _and_ -Destruction Corps constitute, as well, an Operation Corps, providing -for the working of railways at the theatre of war, and especially of -railways taken from the enemy. The Prussians had, indeed, been able to -command the services of Austrian railwaymen in working the railways -seized in that country; but there was no certainty that the adoption of -a like expedient would be possible in any future war. - -By this time the whole subject of the destruction and restoration of -railway lines as an important element in modern warfare was attracting -attention among military authorities and writers in Germany. A -translation of McCallum's report was published, and the issue was begun -of what was to develop into a long series of technical papers, pamphlets -or books--such as, for example, Wilhelm Basson's "Die Eisenbahnen -im Kriege, nach den Erfahrungen des letzten Feldzuges" (Ratibor, -1867)--dealing with the art of rapidly destroying and restoring railways -in time of war and the most effective measures to be adopted in the -attainment of either end. - -These various considerations and developments were, no doubt, the reason -for the issuing, on August 10, 1869, of a Prussian Royal Decree which -created a permanent cadre of _Railway Troops_ to be constituted of -Pioneers who were to undergo regular instruction in everything relating -to the construction, destruction and operation of railways. A new -Battalion of Pioneers was to be raised for the purpose, and the whole -scheme was to be carried into effect in the course of 1871. - -When, in 1870, the war with France broke out, the preparations for -the creation of this permanent corps were still proceeding; but the -Prussians were, nevertheless, able to enter on the campaign with four -sections of Railway Troops, subsequently increased to six, including one -Bavarian section. Each section comprised Engineers, Pioneers, railwaymen -and auxiliary helpers, all of whom wore a uniform having the letter "E" -("Eisenbahntruppen") on the shoulder, and carried rifles. Prussia, in -fact, once more started, as in 1866, with such advantage over her enemy -as might result from her control of a Railway Construction Corps. At the -outset France had no similar body, and though, during the progress of -the war, she hurriedly set about the creation of a Construction Corps -of her own, that corps did not do very much beyond collecting at Metz -and Strasburg a great store of railway materials which was afterwards -to fall into the hands of the Prussians, and assist them in their own -operations. - -Notwithstanding the advantage thus gained, the practical benefits -secured by the Germans, although important in their effect on the -final issue, were far from being as great as the Army leaders may have -anticipated or desired. The destruction work carried out by the French -on their own railways, on their retirement, was much more serious -than anything experienced in the Prussian campaign in Austria. Thus -the works for the re-establishment of the Paris-Strasburg line (of -primary importance to the Germans for the siege of Paris) extended -from September 17 to November 22. The French had blocked the tunnel -of Nanteuil by the explosion therein of six mines which brought down -the walls and filled the western end of the tunnel with about 4,000 -square yards of sand. Attempts to clear away the obstruction were a -failure, owing to the occurrence of fresh slips due to the wet weather, -and eventually the Construction Corps built a loop line which avoided -the tunnel, and so restored communication. The defence of some of the -principal lines by fortresses also contributed to the difficulties of -the invaders; though, on the other hand, these difficulties would have -been greater still if the French had always adopted the best and most -scientific methods of interrupting rail communications, as, presumably, -they would have done if they had had the advantage of a well-organised -corps prepared in advance for the work that required to be done. - -At Fontenoy-sur-Moselle, between Nancy and Toul, there was, for example, -a bridge of seven arches, effective destruction of which would have made -a very serious check in the communications along the principal line -between Germany and Paris; but, instead of blowing up the bridge in the -middle, the men entrusted with the work (in January, 1871) brought down -two arches at the side of the bridge, causing a break which the Germans -were able to fill in with stones and earth, restoring communication -in about seventeen days. Then, although several of the tunnels in the -Vosges mountains were mined, the mines had not been charged, and before -instructions to blow up the tunnels had been received by those awaiting -them, the Germans were on the spot and took possession. - -On the other hand the absence on the side of the French of an organised -corps for destruction as well as construction did not prevent the -carrying out of some very bold and highly successful work by parties of -_franc tireurs_, who showed alike their appreciation of the importance -of rail communications and their skill in impeding them. - -One especially striking feat in this direction was accomplished by a -company known as the "Franc Tireurs of the Meuse." - -Learning that a Prussian troop train was to pass through Lanois (on -the line between Reims and Mons) on October 26, 1870, they resolved to -effect its destruction. How they operated is told by Lieutenant Fraser, -R. E.,[25] who arrived on the spot shortly afterwards, and heard the -story from some of the men engaged on the work. - -Any obstruction placed on the line would have been seen. Hence a -different course had to be adopted. Selecting a spot where the line ran -along a 12-ft. high embankment, to which a well-wooded slope came down -on one side, the _franc tireurs_ took up a pair of rails, removed the -sleepers, cut a deep trench across the line, laid some pieces of iron -at the bottom of the trench, placed on the iron a box containing thirty -kilos (2 qrs. 10 lbs.) of powder, and fixed into the lid of the box a -French field shell in such a way that, when the rail was replaced over -the box, the head of the fuse would be just below the lower flange of -the rail. In restoring the line again in order that there should be -nothing to attract attention, the _franc tireurs_ omitted one sleeper so -that the weight of the locomotive should in passing press the rail down -on to the head of the fuse. The party--some seventy-five strong--then -withdrew to the shelter of the woods to await developments. - -In due time the train of forty coaches approached at the ordinary speed, -the driver not suspecting any danger. When the engine reached the spot -where the "torpedo" had been placed, an explosion occurred which tore -up a mass of earth, rails and sleepers, threw the engine and several -carriages down the embankment, and wrecked the train. Those of the -Prussian troops who got clear from the wreckage were shot down by the -_franc tireurs_ under the protection of their cover. The number of the -enemy thus disposed of was said to be about 400. - -Altogether the French, in their efforts to impede the rail movements of -the invader, destroyed many miles of line, together with no fewer than -seventy-eight large bridges and tunnels, apart from minor interruptions. -The repairs and reconstruction thus rendered necessary threw a great -amount of labour on the Prussian Railway Troops, and much trouble arose -from time to time on account, not only of the inadequate supply of -materials even for temporary constructions, but, also, by reason of the -shortcomings of the workers themselves. The sections of Railway Troops -had been so recently formed that the men were still without adequate -training. In 1870-71, as in 1866, military members and civilian members -of the Construction Corps were alike unfamiliar with the special class -of work called for in the repair or the rebuilding of railways under the -emergency conditions of actual warfare. This instruction had, in fact, -to be completed at the theatre of war at a time when the Corps should -have been prepared to show the greatest efficiency. - -Difficulties arose, also, on the side of the Germans in operating the -2,500 miles of French railway lines of which they took possession. - -There was, in the first place, a deficiency both of locomotives and of -rolling stock. So far as circumstances would permit, the French, as -they retreated, either took their railway rolling stock with them or -destroyed it, in order that it should not be used by the enemy. Attempts -were made to meet the difficulty by obtaining constant reinforcements -of engines and wagons from Germany; but even then the organisation for -controlling the use of rolling stock, among other transport details, was -still so defective that commanders who wanted to ensure the movement of -their own troops by rail did not hesitate to take possession of engines -and carriages set aside for the regular services of the line. There -were, in fact, occasions when, for this reason, the regular services had -to be stopped altogether. - -In the next place troubles with the _personnel_ were no less acute -than those with the _matériel_. In proportion as the Germans advanced -towards Paris the bulk of the French population retired, while threats -and offers of liberal pay alike failed to secure from those who remained -assistance either in repairing or in operating the lines of which the -invaders had taken possession. In these circumstances not only engines, -carriages and wagons, but no fewer than 3,500 railwaymen--in addition -to the German Railway Troops already in France--had to be brought -from Germany. Yet even the resort to this expedient started a fresh -lot of troubles. The railwaymen so imported had been in the service -of different German railway companies whose equipment and methods of -operation varied considerably; so that when the men were required to -work together--and that, also, on the lines of a foreign country, with -the accompaniment of much laxity in discipline as well as of much mutual -misunderstanding--a vast amount of friction arose. - -All these experiences emphasised and strengthened the conclusion arrived -at even before the campaign of 1870-71--that the real efficiency of -Railway Troops can only be obtained by organising them in time of -peace in readiness for times of war. Such conclusion being now beyond -all possible dispute, action was taken by Prussia with characteristic -promptness. - -In accordance with a Royal Order of May 19, 1871, there was added to the -Prussian Army, on October 1 of the same year, a _Railway Battalion_ -("Eisenbahnbataillon"), the special purposes of which were (1) to afford -to those constituting it the means of obtaining, in time of peace, -such technical training as would enable them to construct any railway -works necessary in time of war, to repair promptly any damage done to -railways, and to undertake the entire railway traffic along lines of -communication; (2) to procure, or prepare, in time of peace, all plant, -materials, tools, etc., likely to be required in time of war; and (3) -to constitute the nucleus of all necessary railway formations in war. -The Battalion was formed of non-commissioned officers and men of the now -disbanded sections of Railway Troops who were still liable to military -service, supplemented by three-year volunteers and recruits from all -parts of the territory subject to the Prussian Minister of War, only -those being accepted, however, whose previous occupations fitted them -for one or other of the various grades of railway work. The officers -were obtained mainly, though not exclusively, from the Engineers. -Members of that corps, together with others who were mechanical -engineers by profession, were accepted as one-year volunteers. - -On a peace footing the Battalion was composed of a Staff and four -Companies, each of 100 or 125 men, with a depôt, and provided with its -own means of transport. One of the Companies consisted exclusively -of platelayers and watchmen. On mobilisation each Company was to be -enlarged into two Construction Companies and one Traffic Company, giving -a total, on a war footing, of eight Construction and four Traffic -Companies. The Corps also had a reserve division consisting of a Staff, -two Companies and a section of railway employés. All officers having -railway experience who had served in the war of 1870-71 were included in -the reserve. - -The training of the Battalion was under the direction of the -Inspector-General of the Engineers Corps. It comprised (1) theoretical -and scientific instruction of the officers in all branches of railway -construction, repair and destruction, coupled with the study of every -branch of railway science likely to be of advantage in military -transport, while special importance was attached to a close and -constant intercourse with the staffs of the various railways, and -(2) practical experience of railway construction and operation. This -experience was afforded (_a_) on the Battalion's practice grounds, where -instruction was more especially given in the art of rapidly destroying -railway track; (_b_) through the employment of the men--subject to -the continued maintenance among them of the principle of a military -organisation--on many of the private as well as on the State railways -in Germany, such employment including the repair of bridges, the -laying of track, the enlargement of stations, etc., and (_c_) by the -construction, operation and management of a short line of railway which, -on completion, was devoted to the public service. The period of training -was for either one or three years and the Battalion was kept up to a -normal standard of about 500 men by a succession of recruits. These -recruits were generally men of a good type, admission to the Battalion -being regarded with the greater favour inasmuch as the experience gained -was found to be of advantage to the men in obtaining railway employment -on their return to civil life. - -In the giving of this practical instruction the purpose specially -kept in view was that of anticipating as far as possible actual war -conditions, and providing for them accordingly. Thus in the laying of -rails for any new line built by the Railway Troops great importance was -attached to the speed with which the work could be done, the records of -the time taken being very closely watched. - -To one group of officers was allocated the duty of studying all -developments in railway science and operation at home or abroad and -conveying information thereon to those under instruction. A further -important feature of the scheme included the publication of a series of -textbooks on railway subjects regarded from a military standpoint. A -beginning was also made with the collection of large supplies of rails, -bridge materials, etc., for use as required. - -In December, 1872, Bavaria created a similar Battalion, comprising a -single Company attached to the 1st Bavarian Corps. The constitution -and the operations of this Battalion followed closely the precedents -established by Prussia. - -Such was the importance attached by the highest military authorities in -Germany to the formation of these Railway Troops that the Chief of the -Great General Staff was their Inspector-General from the time of the -first Prussian Battalion being created down to the year 1899. - -In December 30, 1875, came the conversion of the Railway Battalion into -a _Railway Regiment_. It was felt that the cadres of the former did -not respond sufficiently to the needs of the military rail-transport -situation, and they were accordingly enlarged into a Regiment of two -Battalions, with a regimental Staff of forty-eight, and 502 men in -each Battalion. In 1887 the Prussian Regiment was increased from two -Battalions to four, and the Bavarian Battalion expanded to the extent -of two companies in place of one. In 1890 the Prussian Regiment further -became a _Brigade_ of two Regiments, each of two Battalions, the number -of units thus remaining the same as before; though in 1893 the Prussian -Brigade was augmented by two more Battalions, increasing its force to -three Regiments, each of two Battalions with four Companies in each -Battalion, or a total of twenty-four Companies, of which one was a -Würtemberg Company and two were Saxon Companies, while the Bavarian -Battalion acquired three Companies in the place of two. - -In 1899 Prussia took a further new departure by grouping together, as -_Communication Troops_ ("Verkerstrüppen"), all the technical units -concerned in the railway, the telegraphic and the air-craft services. -This new arm was put under the control of an officer holding the rank -of a General of Division and receiving his orders direct from the -Emperor. A change was also effected in regard to the Berlin-Juterbog -railway--a single-track line, 70 km. (44 miles) in length, which, -originally constructed mainly by the Railway Troops, was operated by -them as a means of acquiring experience in railway working. Prior to -the passing of the law of March 25, 1899, troops for the working staff -were supplied by the Brigade, and the frequent changes were a cause of -some inconvenience. Under the new law a section constituted of three -Prussian Companies and a Saxon detachment, with a Lieutenant-Colonel as -director, was specially created for the operation of the line. - -Altogether the Railway Troops comprised a total of thirty-one Companies, -having 180 officers and 4,500 non-commissioned officers and men; but -these figures were irrespective of carefully-compiled lists (subjected -to frequent revision) of all reservists possessing railway experience -and still liable for military service. Brigade, Battalions and Companies -thus formed only the cadres of a small army of men considered qualified -to undertake railway work of one kind or another in time of war. - -Even in Germany itself the need for having so large a body of Railway -Troops was called into question some years ago, on the ground, partly, -that it was desirable to keep to the lowest practicable minimum the -number of non-combatants closely associated with the Army; and, -partly, because of the view--favoured by Von der Goltz, in his -"Kriegführung"--that much of the construction work which the Railway -Troops would carry out might be left to contractors, without hampering -the Army with further bodies of new troops for special purposes. - -To these suggestions it was replied, in effect, (1) that in any future -war the movement of large bodies of troops would be directly associated -with the provision and the maintenance of adequate railway facilities; -(2) that Railway Troops, constituted in time of peace, would alone -be capable of ensuring the rapid renovation of damaged lines, or the -construction of new ones, in time of war; (3) that works of this kind, -done under great pressure, and serving temporary purposes only, would -differ essentially from railway works undertaken in peace by ordinary -contractors; and (4) that Germany required a large body of Railway -Troops on account of her geographical position, inasmuch as she might -have to face an enemy on either, or both, of two fronts--France and -Russia; while if, in the event of a war with Russia, she should want to -send her forces into that country by rail, she would require to have -a large body of Railway Troops available either for the conversion of -the Russian 5 ft. gauge into the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the German lines -(in order that the engines and rolling stock of the latter could be -utilised on Russian territory), or for the construction of special -military railways as substitutes for the Russian lines. - -Whatever the merits of these respective arguments, the fact remains -that the Railway Troops of Germany, created under the circumstances and -conditions here detailed, have been maintained in steadily increasing -numbers, and, also, in constantly expanding efficiency thanks to what -is, in effect, their School of Railway Instruction and to the great -amount of practical work they have been called upon to do, whether in -the building of strategical lines or in other departments of railway -construction, destruction or working in which they could gain experience -likely to be of advantage in time of war. - -There was, also, according to M. Paul Lanoir, as related by him in his -book on "The German Spy System," a still further purpose that these Army -railwaymen might be called on to serve. He tells how in 1880, the chief -of the system, the notorious Stieber, conceived the idea of securing the -appointment in every portion of the national railway system of France -(and more especially at important junctions or strategical centres) of -German spies who, competent to act as railway workers, would, in the -event of any future war between Germany and France, and on receiving -the necessary instructions, destroy or block the railway lines at those -points in such a manner--as planned, of course, in advance--that great -delay would occur in the mobilisation of the French troops owing to -the traffic being paralysed for the time being; the Germans, in the -meantime, rushing their own forces to the frontier. "The extremely -important rôle which would devolve on our railwaymen," adds M. Lanoir, -"at the moment of the declaration of war, in fulfilling their functions -as indispensable auxiliaries to the combatant army, was already -thoroughly appreciated at this period." - -Submitted to Prince Bismarck, Stieber's scheme was approved by him, -and, so far as the obtaining of appointments on the French railways -by Stieber's agents was concerned, the plan had been quietly carried -into effect by the end of 1883; but a casual incident then led to the -discovery of the conspiracy by M. Lanoir himself. Within a week, as the -result of his communications with General Campenau, Minister of War, -the railway companies received a confidential circular requiring that -they should call upon every foreigner employed by them in any capacity -whatever to become naturalised without delay. Those who would not adopt -this course were to be immediately dismissed. The number of foreigners -then in the employ of the railway companies was 1,641, and, although -1,459 of them agreed to become naturalised, there were 182 Germans who -refused so to do. These 182 were at once discharged--the assumption -being that they were the spies, qualified to act as railway workers, by -whom the dislocation of traffic was to have been ensured whenever they -might receive word to that effect. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[24] Captain A. de Formanoir states in his book, "Des Chemins de Fer en -Temps de Guerre" (Conférences militaires belges. Bruxelles, 1870), that -in France and Austria all the railway bridges have mine-chambers so that -they can be readily destroyed when the occasion arises. - -[25] "Account of a Torpedo used for the Destruction of a Railway Train -on the 26th of October, 1870." By Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the -Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Woolwich, 1872. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71 - - -When France went to war with Germany in 1870-71, her military -rail-transport was still governed by regulations which, adopted as far -back as 1851 and 1855, related only to such matters of detail as the -financial arrangements between the Army and the railway companies, -the length of troop trains, etc., without making any provision for an -organisation controlling the transport of large bodies of men in time -of war. It certainly had been under these regulations that the French -troops were conveyed to Italy when they took part in the campaign of -1859; but the defects then developed, coupled with the further lessons -taught by the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, had shown the need for -bringing these early French regulations into harmony with the conditions -and requirements of modern warfare. - -Impressed by these considerations, and realising the disadvantages and -dangers of the position into which his country had drifted, the French -Minister of War, Marshal Niel, appointed in March, 1869, a "Commission -Centrale des Chemins de Fer," composed of representatives of the Army, -the Ministry of Public Works, and the principal railway companies, -for the purpose not only of revising the existing regulations on -military transports but of preparing a new one to take their place. The -Commission held twenty-nine sittings and it drew up a provisional scheme -on lines closely following those already adopted in Germany and Austria -and based, especially, on the same principle of a co-ordination of the -military with the railway technical element. This provisional scheme -was subjected to various tests and trials with a view to perfecting -it before it was placed on a permanent basis. But Marshal Niel died; -no new regulation was adopted; the projected scheme was more or less -forgotten; time was against the early completion of the proposed -experiments, while political and military developments succeeded one -another with such rapidity that, on the outbreak of war in 1870, it was -no longer possible to carry out the proposed plans. So the studies of -the Commission came to naught, and France embarked on her tremendous -conflict with no organisation for military transport apart from the -out-of-date and wholly defective regulations under which her troops had -already suffered in the Italian war of 1859. - -There was an impression that the talent of the French soldier would -enable him to "se débrouiller"--to "pull," if not (in the English sense) -to "muddle," through. But the conditions were hopeless, and the results -speedily brought about were little short of chaos. - -So far as the actual conveyance of troops was concerned, the railway -companies themselves did marvels. "The numerical superiority of -Germany," as Von der Goltz says in his "Nation in Arms," "was known in -Paris, and it was thought to neutralise this superiority by boldness -and rapidity. The idea was a good one ... but ... it was needful that -the Germans should be outdone in the rapidity with which the armies -were massed." That the railway managements and staffs did their best to -secure this result is beyond any possibility of doubt. - -On July 15, 1870, the Minister of Public Works directed the Est, Nord -and Paris-Lyon Companies to place all their means of transport at the -disposal of the War Minister, suspending as far as necessary their -ordinary passenger and goods services; and the Ouest and Orléans -Companies were asked to put their rolling stock at the disposal of the -three other companies. The Est, to which the heaviest part in the work -involved was to fall, had already taken various measures in anticipation -of an outbreak of war; and such was the energy shown by the companies, -as a whole, that the first troop train was started from Paris at 5.45 -p.m. on July 16, within, that is to say, twenty-four hours of the -receipt of the notice from the Minister of Public Works. Between July 16 -and July 26 there were despatched 594 troop trains, conveying 186,620 -men, 32,410 horses, 3,162 guns and road vehicles, and 995 wagon-loads of -ammunition and supplies. In the nineteen days of the whole concentration -period (July 16-August 4) the companies carried 300,000 men, 64,700 -horses, 6,600 guns and road vehicles, and 4,400 wagon-loads of -ammunition and supplies. - -All this activity on the part of the railway companies was, however, -neutralised more or less by the absence of any adequate organisation for -regulating and otherwise dealing with the traffic, so far as concerned -the military authorities themselves. - -The first regiment to leave Paris, on July 16, arrived at the station -at 2 p.m. for the train due to start at 5.45 p.m. The men had been -accompanied through the streets by an immense crowd shouting "À Berlin!" -and, with so much time to spare, they either blocked up the station or -were taken off by their friends to the neighbouring taverns, where the -consumption of liquor was such that, by the time the train started, most -of the men were excessively drunk. In addition to this, many had been -relieved of their ammunition--taken from them, perhaps, as "souvenirs" -of an historic occasion, though destined to reappear and to be put to -bad use in the days of the Commune, later on. - -If, however, at the beginning, the troops got to the station three hours -before there was any need, other occasions were to arise when they kept -trains waiting three or four hours before they themselves were ready to -start. - -Then, in Germany the concentration of the troops at some safe point -in the interior, and their transport thence by rail to the frontier -in complete units, took place as separate and distinct operations. In -France the two movements were conducted simultaneously; and this, in -itself, was a prolific source of confusion and disorganisation on the -railways. The troops came to the stations on a peace footing and in -various strengths. One regiment might have only one-third the strength -of another despatched earlier the same day or on the previous day, -although the railway company would have provided the same number of -vehicles for both. There was thus a choice of evils as between removing -two-thirds of the carriages (a procedure which time or the station -arrangements did not always permit); sending the train away only -partially loaded; or filling up the available space either with men -belonging to other corps or with such supplies as might be available -at the moment. Some trains did leave nearly empty, but it was the -last mentioned of the three courses that was generally adopted. Men -of different arms--Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery; mobilised troops, -reservists, and individuals, separated, it might be, from their own -officers and not willing to show themselves amenable to the discipline -of other officers--were thus transported at the same time as, possibly, -a miscellaneous collection of horses, material and commissariat -supplies. Other trains, again, went away so overcrowded that they could -not accommodate all the men who should have gone by them, many being -left behind in consequence. - -Confusion and delays at the railway stations during the entraining -of the troops were rendered the more complete because the railway -staffs failed to get an adequate degree of support from the military -authorities. According to one of the articles in those regulations of -1855 which were still in force, "officers were responsible for the -prescribed movements in connection with the entraining, and should -personally co-operate in ensuring observance of the regulations -referring thereto"; but, according to Baron Ernouf, ("Histoire des -Chemins de Fer Français pendant la Guerre Franco-Prussienne,") there -were officers who refused absolutely to concern themselves with the -entraining of their men at the Est station in Paris, declaring that this -was a matter to be looked after by the railway officials with the help -of subordinate officers, if they wanted it. - -Under such conditions as these, officers in charge of troops got -hopelessly separated from their men, who themselves might have been -sent off with no knowledge of their proper destination. One General -telegraphed to Paris on July 21:--"Have arrived at Belfort. Not found -my Brigade. Not found General of Division. What should I do? Don't know -where my Regiments are." As for the men, it was not many days before -the stations _en route_ to the front were occupied by a floating mass -of "lost" soldiers, who pretended to be looking for their corps but too -often found it much pleasanter to remain in the station buffets, and -there enjoy the hospitality of local patriots. Such proportions did this -evil assume that in August, 1870, the railway station at Reims had to be -protected against a mob of from 4,000 to 5,000 "lost" ones, who wanted -to plunder the wagons containing supplies for the front. - -Confusion, again, was made still worse confounded by the multiplicity -of orders--too often contradictory or impossible to carry out--which -bombarded the railway officials, and must have driven them at times -almost to distraction. Orders came direct from anybody and everybody -possessed of the slightest degree of military authority. They came from -the Ministry of War, the General Staff, and the Administrative Staff; -from the Quartermaster-General's Department and the Commissariat; from -officers and non-commissioned officers of Infantry, Artillery and -Engineers; while each individual invariably gave his orders based on -the range of his own particular sphere, or the convenience of his own -particular troops, without any regard for the situation as a whole, -for what might be wanted in other spheres, or for whether or not it -was physically possible for the railway staffs to do at all what was -asked of them, even if they were not being overwhelmed with those other -orders, besides. Commanding officers of different corps especially -distinguished themselves by presenting to the railway managements claims -for priority in the despatch of Infantry, Artillery or supplies, as the -case might be, threatening them with grave consequences if, in each -instance, they did not yield such priority at once, though leaving them -to meet an obviously impracticable position as best they could. Then it -might happen that when all the necessary arrangements--involving much -interference with other traffic--had been made, another order would come -countermanding the first one, or postponing the execution of it until a -later occasion. - -As though, again, the orders from all these independent military -authorities were not sufficient, the railways were further worried by -local authorities who wanted special trains for some such service as the -conveyance of detachments of garde mobile a distance of ten or twelve -miles to an instruction camp so that the men would not have to march by -road. There were even demands from certain of the local authorities that -they should be allowed to use railway wagons as barracks for troops. - -M. Jacqmin, general manager of the Chemin de Fer de l'Est, relates in -his book, "Les Chemins de Fer Pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," that at -the moment when the Compagnie de l'Est was providing for the transport -of Bourbacki's forces, and preparing for the revictualling of Paris, -the préfet of the Rhone demanded the use of railway wagons in which to -house the garde nationale mobilised on the plain of Vénissieux, on the -left bank of the Rhone, there having been a delay in the delivery of -the material for barracks. The company refused the request, and they -had with the departmental authorities a lively controversy which was -only settled by the decision of the Bordeaux Government that those -authorities were in the wrong. - -Typical of the general conditions, as they prevailed not only in -Paris but elsewhere in France, were the circumstances under which the -Nineteenth Army Corps, of 32,000 men, 3,000 horses and 300 guns, was -sent from Cherbourg to Alençon. The troops were late in arriving at the -station; the officers neglected to look after the men; the men refused -to travel in goods trucks; orders and counter-orders succeeded one -another in rapid succession; two or three hours were required for the -despatch of each train, and delays occurred which must have disorganised -the traffic all along the line. - -Great as the confusion undoubtedly was at the points of despatch, it -was far surpassed by that which prevailed at stations to which trains -were sent regardless of any consideration as to whether or not they -could be unloaded there with such despatch as to avoid congestion. -No transfer stations--constituting the points beyond which only the -supplies wanted for immediate or early use at the extreme front should -be taken, the remainder being forwarded as wanted--had been arranged, -and the consignors, military or civil, had assumed that all supplies -should be sent in bulk to places as near to the troops as possible. -There were, consequently, many stations close to the frontier where the -rails leading to them were occupied for miles together by loaded wagons, -the number of which was being constantly added to by fresh arrivals. -Many of these wagons were, in fact, used as magazines or storehouses on -wheels. The same was, also, being done to a certain extent on the German -lines, though with this difference--that whereas in Germany there were -at the railway stations route commandants whose duty it was to enforce -the prompt unloading of wagons, in France there was no corresponding -authority. It suited the officers or the military department concerned -to keep the supplies in the wagons until they were wanted; and this -arrangement may have appeared an especially desirable one from their -point of view because if the army moved forward--or backward--the -supplies could be more readily moved with it if they were still in the -wagons. - -For these various reasons, there were officers who gave the most -stringent orders that the wagons were not to be unloaded until their -contents were actually required. It was evidently a matter of no concern -to them that the wagons they were detaining might be wanted elsewhere, -and that, for lack of them, other troops might be experiencing a -shortage in their own supplies. - -When the wagons were not deliberately kept loaded, it might still be -impossible for the unloading to be done because of there being no -military in attendance to do the work. As for the picking out, from -among the large number in waiting, of some one wagon the contents of -which were specially wanted, the trouble involved in this operation must -often have been far greater than if the wagon had been unloaded and the -supplies stored in the first instance. - -Even the stations themselves got congested, under like conditions. The -Commissariat wanted to convert them into depôts, and the Artillery -sought to change them into arsenals. There were stations at which no -platform was any longer available and troops arriving by any further -train had to descend some distance away, several days elapsing before -their train could be moved from the place where it had pulled up. At -stations not thus blocked trains might be hours late in arriving, or -they might bring a squadron of cavalry when arrangements had been made -for receiving a battalion of infantry. - -In one instance a General refused to allow his men to detrain on arrival -at their destination at night, saying they would be more comfortable -in the carriages than in the snow. This was, indeed, the case; but so -long as the train remained where it was standing no other traffic could -pass. Sometimes it was necessary for troop trains to wait on the lines -for hours because no camp had been assigned to the men, and there was at -least one occasion when a Colonel had to ask the stationmaster where it -was his troops were to go. - -Most of the traffic had been directed to Metz and Strasburg, and the -state of chaos speedily developed at the former station has become -historic. - -The station at Metz was a large one; it had eight good depôts and four -miles of sidings, and it was equal to the unloading of 930 wagons in -twenty-four hours under well-organised conditions. But when the first -infantry trains arrived the men were kept at the station four or five -hours owing to the absence of orders as to their further destination. -The men detrained, and the wagons containing road vehicles, officers' -luggage, etc., were left unloaded and sent into the sidings. Other -trains followed in rapid succession, bringing troops and supplies, and -the block began to assume serious proportions. - -The railway officials appealed to the local Commissariat force to unload -the wagons so that they could be got out of the way. They were told -that this could not be done because no orders had been received. The -Commissariat force for the division also declined to unload the wagons, -saying it was uncertain whether the troops for whom the supplies were -intended would remain at Metz or go further on. - -Any unloading at all for several days was next rendered impossible by -the higher military authorities. They asked the railway officers to -prepare for the transport of an army corps of 30,000 men. This was done, -and forty trains were located at various points along the line. An order -was then given that the trains should be brought to Metz, to allow of -the troops leaving at once. Within four hours every train was ready, and -its locomotive was standing with the steam up; but no troops appeared. -The order was countermanded. Then it was repeated, and then it was -countermanded over again. - -All this time fresh train-loads of supplies and ammunition had been -arriving at Metz, adding to the collection of unloaded wagons which, -having filled up all the sidings began to overflow and block up, first -the lines leading to the locomotive sheds and next the main lines -themselves. Everything was in inextricable confusion. Nobody knew where -any particular commodity was to be found or, if they did, how to get -the truck containing it from the consolidated mass of some thousands of -vehicles. "In Metz," telegraphed the Commissary-General to Paris, "there -is neither coffee, nor sugar; no rice, no brandy, no salt, only a little -bacon and biscuit. Send me at least a million rations to Thionville." -Yet it was quite possible that the articles specified were already in -some or other of the trucks on hand, had the Commissary-General only -known where they were and how to get them. - -The railway people did what they could. They unloaded some of the -consignments and removed them a considerable distance by road--only to -have them sent back again to Metz station for re-loading and conveyance -elsewhere. Hay unloaded at the station was sent into Metz to some -magazines which, in turn, and at the same time, were sending hay to -the railway for another destination. Finally, as a last resource, -and in order both to reduce the block and to get further use out of -the wagons, the railway officials began to unload them and put their -contents on the ground alongside. A big capture alike of wagons and of -supplies was made by the enemy on his occupation of Metz. - -Analogous conditions prevailed in many other places. At Dôle (Dep. Jura) -an accumulated stock of loaded wagons not only filled up all the sidings -but blocked up a large portion of the main line. When the evacuation -was decided on a great waste of time occurred in selecting the wagons -to be moved. Orders given one hour were countermanded the next; trains -which had been made up were moved forward and backward, instead of being -got out of the way at once; and, eventually, a considerable quantity of -rolling stock, which might and should have been removed, had to be left -behind. - -On the Paris-Lyon railway a collection of 7,500 loaded trucks had -accumulated at a time when a great truck shortage began to be felt, -and the whole of these, together with the provisions and the materials -they contained, fell into the hands of the Germans, whose total haul -of wagons, including those captured at Metz and other places, numbered -no fewer than 16,000. The wagons thus taken were first used by them -for their own military transport during the remainder of the war; -were then utilised for ordinary traffic on lines in Germany, and were -eventually returned to France. Not only, therefore, had the French -failed to get from these 16,000 railway wagons the benefit they should -have derived from their use but, in blocking their lines with them -under such conditions that it was impossible to save them from capture, -they conferred a material advantage on the enemy, providing him with -supplies, and increasing his own means both of transport and of attack -on themselves. - -The proportions of the German haul of wagons would, probably, have been -larger still had not some of the French railway companies, on seeing the -advance the enemy was making, assumed the responsibility of stopping -traffic on certain of their lines and sending off their rolling stock -to a place of safety. In taking this action they adopted a course -based alike on precedent and prudence, and one fully warranted by the -principle of keeping railway rolling stock designed for purposes of -defence from being utilised by the enemy for his own purposes of attack. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -ORGANISATION IN FRANCE - - -While, on the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, Germany began, -as we have seen in Chapter X., to improve her own system of military -rail-transport, with a view to remedying the faults developed -therein, France applied herself with equal, if not with even greater, -determination and perseverance to the task of creating for herself a -system which, in her case, had been entirely lacking. - -Recognising alike her own shortcomings, the imperative need to prepare -for future contingencies, and the still more important part that -railways would inevitably play in the next great war in which she might -be engaged, France resolved to create, in time of peace, and as an -indispensable factor in her scheme of national defence, a system of -military transport comprehensive in its scope, complete in its working -details, and leaving nothing to chance. Everything was to be foreseen, -provided for, and, as far as circumstances would permit, tested in -advance. - -The Prussian organisation of 1870-71 was, admittedly, and as recommended -by Jacqmin, taken as a starting point for what was to be done. From -that time, also, every new regulation adopted by Prussia in regard to -military transport, and every important alteration made in the Prussian -system, was promptly recorded and commended or criticised in the -ably-conducted French military papers; though in the actual creation -of her own system there was no mere following by France of Prussian -examples. What was considered worth adopting certainly was adopted; -but the organisation eventually built up, as the result of many years -of pertinacious efforts, was, in reality, based on French conditions, -French requirements, and the most progressive ideas of French military -science. The French were, also, to show that, when they applied -themselves to the task, they had a genius for organisation in no way -inferior to that of the Germans themselves. - -In his review of the events of 1870-71, Jacqmin declared that, while -the education of France in the use of railways in time of war had still -to be completed, the basis for such education had already been laid -down by Marshal Niel's "Commission Centrale" of 1869. The two essential -conditions were (1) unification of control in the use of railways for -military purposes, whether for the transport of men or of supplies; and -(2) association of the military element and the technical element,--an -association which should be permanent in its nature and apply to every -phase of the railway service, so that before any order was given there -should be a guarantee that it was one possible of achievement, and this, -also, without prejudice to other transport orders already given or -likely to become necessary. - -It was these essential conditions that formed the basis of the -organisation which France created. - -As early as November, 1872, there was called into existence a -_Commission Militaire Superieure des Chemins de Fer_ consisting of -twelve members, who represented the Ministry of Public Works, the Army, -the Navy, and the great railway companies. Attached to the Ministry of -War, and charged with the task of studying all questions relating to -the use of railways by the Army, the Commission had for its first duty -a revision of the proposals made by Marshal Niel's Commission of 1869. -Following on this came a succession of laws, decrees and instructions -dealing with various aspects of the situation in regard to military -transport and the military organization of the railways, the number -issued between 1872 and 1883 being no fewer than seventeen. These, -however, represented more or less tentative or sectional efforts made in -combination with the railway companies, who gave to the Chambers and to -the administrative authorities their most earnest support and the full -benefit of all their technical knowledge and experience in regard to -the many problems which had to be solved. - -In 1884 there were issued two decrees (July 7 and October 29) which -codified, modified or further developed the various legislative -or administrative measures already taken, and laid down both the -fundamental principles and the leading details of a comprehensive -scheme which, after additional modifications or amendments, based on -later experiences, was to develop into the system of organised military -rail-transport as it exists in France to-day. - -These later modifications were more especially effected by three -decrees which, based on the law of December 28, 1888, dealt with (1) -the composition and powers of the Commission Militaire Superieure des -Chemins de Fer; (2) the creation of Field Railway Sections and Railway -Troops; and (3) the organisation of the military service of railways. - -Since its original formation in 1872, the _Superior Military Commission_ -had already undergone reconstruction in 1886, and still further changes, -in addition to those made by the decree of February 5, 1889, were to -follow. In its final form the Commission still retains the principle of -representation thereon alike of the military and the technical (railway) -element. Presided over by the Chief of the General Staff--who, with -the help of a special department of that Staff, exercises the supreme -direction of the military transport services, subject to the authority -of the War Minister--the Commission is composed of six Generals or other -military officers of high rank, three representatives of the Ministry of -Public Works, and the members of the Line Commission appointed for each -of the great railway systems and, also, for the Chemin de Fer d'État. - -All the members of the Commission are nominated by the Minister of -War. The function they discharge is a purely consultative one. Their -business it is to give to the Minister their views on all such questions -as he may submit to them for consideration in regard to the use of the -railways by the Army, and more especially in regard to-- - -1. Preparations for military transports. - -2. Examination of all projects for new lines or junctions and -alterations of existing lines, as well as all projects which concern -railway facilities (stations, platforms, water supply, locomotive sheds, -etc.) - -3. The fixing of the conditions to be fulfilled by railway rolling stock -in view of military requirements, and the alterations which may be -necessary to adapt it thereto. - -4. Special instructions to be given to troops of all arms as to their -travelling by rail. - -5. Agreements to be made between railway companies and the War -Department in respect to transport of troops, provisions, etc. - -6. Organisation, instruction and employment of special corps of -railwaymen (for repairs, etc.). - -7. Measures to be taken for ensuring the supervision and protection of -railways and their approaches. - -8. The means of destroying and of rapidly repairing lines of railway. - -Heads of the different services at the Ministry of War can attend -meetings of the Commission, in a consultative capacity, in respect to -matters coming within their jurisdiction, and the Commission can, in -turn, apply to the Minister for the attendance of any person it may -desire to hear. - -As far as possible, all plans and arrangements concerning the transport -of troops and supplies in time of war, from the moment of mobilisation -onward, are thus prepared, examined or provided for in advance. In -article 8 of the Regulation of December 8, 1913, on Military Transports -by Railway ("Réglement sur les transports stratégiques par chemin de -fer") it is, in fact, stated that-- - - All the arrangements relating to the organisation and - carrying out of transport for mobilisation, concentration, - revictualling and evacuation are studied and prepared in time - of peace. The Minister gives, to this effect, all the necessary - instructions to the General Staff, to the commanders of Army - Corps, and to the different services. A like course is adopted, - in time of peace, with regard to the study of the conditions - under which the railways will be operated on the lines of - communication. - -The creation, under the law of March 13, 1875, of Field Railway Sections -and Railway Troops was the outcome of the obvious need of having an -organised force able to take up the duties of constructing, repairing, -destroying or operating railways at the theatre of war, such force being -established in time of peace and assured all the experience needed to -qualify them for the discharge of those various duties. France, in fact, -was now, in this respect, to follow the example of Germany, just as -Germany had already been inspired by the example of the United States. - -Under a decree of February 5, 1889, _Field Railway Sections_ ("Sections -de chemins de fer de campagne") were defined as permanent military corps -charged, in time of war, and concurrently with the Railway Troops, -with the construction, renovation and operation of those railways of -which the working could not be assured by the national companies. Their -personnel was to be recruited from among the engineers, officials -and men employed by the railway companies and by the State Railways -Administration, such recruiting being carried out either voluntarily -or by reason of liability to render military service; and they were to -form a distinct corps, having its own governing body with, as its head, -a commandant exercising the functions of a Chef de Corps. In time of -peace there were to be nine sections, each designated by a distinctive -number according to the particular railway system or systems from which -it was formed; though authority was given to the Minister of War to call -further sections into being in case of war. The number in peace was -increased, in 1906, by the formation of a tenth section from among the -staffs of railways in the "secondary" group, including local lines and -tramways, in order to assure, or to assist in, the operation of these -railways or tramways for military transport in time of war. - -In time of peace the sections were to be subject to inspections, -musters, reviews and assemblies, as ordered by the Minister of War. A -further provision in the decree of 1889 says:--"All the arrangements -relative to the mobilisation of each section shall be studied and -planned in time of peace. Each section should always be ready, in the -most complete manner, to render its services to the Minister of War." - -Subsequent decrees or instructions constituted each of the sections a -complete unit on the following basis: (1) A central body; (2) three -distinct divisions, namely, (_a_) "movement," (_b_) "voie," and (_c_) -"traction"; (3) a central depôt common to the three divisions and the -central body; and (4) complementary territorial subdivisions in the same -three classes, and attached to the central depôt of the section. The -territorial subdivisions are designed to provide a reserve force of men -who can complete or strengthen the existing sections, or, alternatively, -be constituted into additional sections, if so desired by the Minister -of War. The total strength of each section (including 141 allotted to -the central depôt) was fixed as 1,466. - -The administration of a section rests with an Administrative Council -formed by the president and the heads of the several departments, and -meeting at least once in every three months in time of peace, and once -a week in time of war. Authority is exercised over the sections by the -Field Railway Commissions to which they are attached.[26] - -Men in the active divisions of the sections who are liable to military -service are excused from taking part in the ordinary military exercises, -but may be assembled for inspections, etc., or to undergo courses of -instruction in railway work. Men in the territorial subdivisions can be -summoned by the Minister of War for "a period of exercises" in railway -work in time of peace; and the fact may be recalled that advantage of -this power was taken during the French railway troubles of 1910, when -the strikers were required to assume the rôle of soldiers doing railway -work under military authority and control. - -The _Railway Troops_ ("Troupes de chemin de fer") now constitute a -Railway Regiment ("5e régiment du génie") organised under the decree -of July 11, 1899, and comprising on a peace footing, three Battalions, -each of four Companies. - -Recruits for the Railway Regiment come from one or other of the -following classes: (1) Young soldiers who were in the railway service -before they joined the Army; (2) an annual contingent of railway -employés selected by the Minister of War from lists supplied for this -purpose by the administrations of the five great railway companies -and of the State railways, the number so selected not to exceed 240, -distributed as follows: Compagnie du Nord, 42; Est, 18; P. L. M., 54; -Orléans, 42; Midi, 15; État, 69; and (3) soldiers belonging to Infantry -Regiments who, after one year of training therein, are sent to the -Railway Regiment, those chosen for this purpose being, by preference, -men whose previous occupation in life has adapted them for railway work. - -The railway administrations are also required to provide from among -their officials a certain number of officers and non-commissioned -officers to form a reserve for the Regiment. - -A most complete and systematic course of instruction is arranged.[27] It -is divided into (1) military instruction and (2) technical instruction, -the purpose of the latter being defined as that of qualifying the -Railway Troops to undertake at the theatre of war, subject to the -authority of the Director-General of Railways and Communications, -works of repair or destruction of railway lines, or, in case of need, -the provisional working of the railways. In time of peace it is the -duty of the Superior Military Commission for Railways to advise on all -questions concerning the organisation, instruction and employment of the -special troops for railway work. To enable it to discharge this function -the Commission receives, through the Chief of the General Staff, all -programmes, proposals or reports that may be issued in regard to the -technical instruction of the troops, giving its views thereon, and -making such recommendations as it may consider desirable. - -Such technical instruction comprises (_a_) that which is given to the -whole of the troops; (_b_) instruction in particular branches of railway -work given to a limited number of individuals; (_c_) instruction to -groups of men operating in companies or otherwise, and (_d_) instruction -obtained on the ordinary railways. It is further divided into (i) -theoretical and (ii) practical. - -Among the measures adopted for ensuring the success of the general -scheme, mention might be made of the issuing of special series of -textbooks; the regular working by the Regiment of about forty miles of -railway--including an important junction--between Chartres and Orléans, -on the State Railway system; and arrangements made with the railway -administrations under which (1) a certain number of Companies belonging -to the Regiment are attached to the ordinary railway systems every -year, for periods of two or three months; and (2) power is given to the -railway administrations to engage the services of the Railway Troops -in carrying out repairs or construction works on their lines, a mutual -advantage thus being obtained. - -Finally there is a Railway School ("École de chemins de fer") which -has charge of all the materials, tools, etc., used in the technical -instruction of the troops; draws up, under the orders of the Colonel, -programmes of practical work and instruction; and provides (1) a library -which is supplied with books and periodicals dealing with military, -railway, scientific and historical subjects, together with maps, -plans, decrees, regulations, etc., relating to the military operation -of railways; (2) a collection of tools, instruments and models; (3) -photographic and lithographic departments; (4) stores of railway -construction material for instruction purposes; (5) other stores of like -material for use in case of war; (6) workshops for practical instruction -in railway repairs, etc.; and (7) practice grounds reserved exclusively -for the Railway Troops. - -The fact of these two bodies of Field Railway Sections and Railway -Troops being organised on so practical and comprehensive a basis -secured to France the control of forces certain to be of the greatest -service to her in the next war in which she might be engaged. It would, -also, even suffice by itself to prove the earnestness, the vigour and -the thoroughness with which, after 1870-71, France entered upon the -improvement of her system of military rail-transport for national -defence. There was, however, much more to be done, besides, before that -system could be considered complete; and here, again, a vast amount of -study, foresight and energy was shown. - -Following, indeed, the laws, decrees, regulations, orders, and -instructions issued down to 1889 came so many others--dealing, in some -instances, with even the minutest detail concerning some particular -phase of the organisation in course of being perfected--that a collected -series of those still in force in 1902 formed a volume of over 700 -pages.[28] Since the issue of this somewhat formidable collection, still -further changes have been introduced, the general conditions being -finally modified by decrees passed on December 8, 1913. - -Without attempting to indicate all the successive stages in this -prolonged series of legislative and administrative efforts, it may -suffice to offer a general sketch of the French organisation of military -rail-transport on the basis of the laws, regulations and practices in -operation on the outbreak of war in 1914. - -Connected with each of the great railway systems there is a permanent -_Line Commission_ ("Commission de réseau") which consists of (1) a -technical member who, in practice, is the general manager of the line; -and (2) a military member, who is a member of the General Staff of the -Army. The former is chosen by the railway administration, subject to -the approval of the War Minister, and the latter by the War Minister -himself. Each Line Commission controls the services of a combined -technical and military staff, and each Commissioner has a deputy who -can take his place and exercise his powers in case of need. While the -Military Commissioner is specially responsible for measures adopted -from a military point of view, the Railway Commissioner is specially -responsible for putting at the command of the Army, as far as may be -necessary or practicable, all the resources of the particular railway -system he represents. - -The authority of a Line Commission on any one of the great railway -systems extends to the smaller, or secondary, lines situate within the -same territory; but the smaller companies may themselves claim to be -represented on the Commission by a duly credited agent. - -Among the duties to be discharged by a Line Commission in time of peace -are the following:-- - -1. Investigation of all matters to which military transport on the line -or the system can give rise. - -2. Study of all the available resources of the system, in material and -men, from the point of view of military requirements. - -3. Preparation of plans, estimates, and other data in connection with -the movement of troops, etc. - -4. Verification of reports concerning extent of lines, rolling stock, -and station or traffic facilities. - -5. Special instruction of the railway staff. - -6. Inspection of lines, bridges, etc. - -7. The carrying out of experiments of all kinds with a view to -ameliorating or accelerating the facilities offered by the system in -respect to military transports. - -Should several Line Commissions be interested in some particular -question concerning military movements by rail, the Chief of the -General Staff can summon them to a joint conference as often as may be -necessary. The fact, also, that the members of the Line Commissions are -members of the Superior Commission assures co-ordination in the studies -carried on as regards the railways in general, and provides a ready -means by which the central body can obtain the information it desires -concerning any one system or group of systems. - -As their district executives, the Line Commissions have such number of -_Sub-Line Commissions_ as may be found necessary. Each of these is, -in turn, composed of a military member, nominated by the Minister, -and a technical member, chosen by the Line Commission. Then, also, to -discharge the function of local executive, there is at every important -centre of traffic a _Station Commission_ ("Commission de gare") which -consists of a military officer and the stationmaster. It receives from -the Line or Sub-Line Commission all orders or instructions concerning -military transport to, from, or passing through, such station, and is -the recognised intermediary for carrying them into effect and seeing -that efficiency is ensured and good order maintained. - -A staff, formed of military men and railwaymen acting in combination, -is allotted to each Line, Sub-Line or Station Commission. Concerning -the representation of these two elements, military and civil, on the -one body, article 10 of the decree of December 8, 1913, on Military -Transports says:-- - - The special function of each of the agents, military or - technical, on the Commissions or Sub-Commissions must, in the - operation of the service, be maintained in the most absolute - manner. At the same time these agents should not lose from their - view the fact that their association is designed to effect - harmony between the exigencies alike of military requirements - and of rail transport, subordinating those of the one to those - of the other, according to circumstances. - -From the time that mobilisation begins--or even earlier, on the order -of the War Minister--the members of the Superior Commission take up -their posts _en permanence_ at the War Office, and those of the Line, -Sub-Line and Station Commissions locate themselves at the stations -which will have been allotted to them in time of peace. Thenceforward -each Station Commission is in constant communication by telegraph with -the Line or Sub-Line Commission under which it acts, supplementing -such communication by daily written reports. Among the duties to be -discharged by the Station Commissions are those of superintending the -entrainment or detrainment of troops and the loading or unloading -of material; seeing that the trains required for transport purposes -are provided; preventing congestion of the lines or of the station -approaches; and ensuring the security of the station and of the lines -within a certain radius thereof. - -On the outbreak of war the railway companies must place at the service -of the State either the whole or such of their lines, rolling stock, and -other means of transport as may be needed for the conveyance of troops, -stores, etc., to any points served by them. Thenceforward the lines so -required for "strategic transports"--including therein mobilisation, -concentration, reinforcements, supplies and evacuations from the theatre -of war--can be used for ordinary passengers and goods only to such -extent as the Minister may approve. - -Following on the order for mobilisation the Minister, after consultation -with the Commander-in-Chief, divides the railways of the country into -two zones--the "Zone of the Interior," and the "Zone of the Armies." Of -these the former passes under the supreme control of the War Minister, -and the latter under that of the Commander-in-Chief. The location of -the _Stations of Transition_, dividing the one zone from the other, -can be varied from time to time by the Minister, in consultation with -the Commander-in-Chief, according to the developments of the military -situation. - -The _Zone of the Interior_ is that part of the railway system which, -though not situated at the theatre of war, is subject to military -control by reason of the services required of it in the forwarding of -troops, supplies, guns, ammunition and other necessaries. Operation -by the ordinary staffs of the railway systems is continued, but the -transports ordered by the War Minister are regulated by the Chief of the -General Staff. The execution of the orders given is entrusted from the -day of mobilisation to the Line Commissions, each of which, acting under -the authority of the War Minister, takes charge over the whole of the -services on the lines comprised in its particular territory. - -The _Zone of the Armies_ is, in turn, divided into two sections (1) -the "Zone de l'avant," in which military operation of the railways is -necessary on account of their nearness to the fighting-line; and (2) -the "Zone de l'Arrière," in which the railways can still be operated by -the ordinary railway staffs, under the direction of Line and Station -Commissions, as in the adjoining Zone of the Interior. - -Orders given by the Commander-in-Chief in respect to transport in the -Zone of the Armies are carried out under the supreme control of an -officer now known as the _Directeur de l'Arrière_. The history of this -important functionary affords an excellent example of the way in which -the whole scheme of operations has been evolved. - -The "Règlement général" of July 1, 1874,--one of the earliest attempts -to meet the difficulties which had arisen in 1870-71 in respect to -military rail-transport--was found to be defective inasmuch as it -did not apply, also, to those road and rear services ("Services de -l'Arrière") which are necessarily associated with the rail services -and themselves constitute so important a phase of military transport -as a whole. In 1878 an attempt was made to meet this defect by the -inauguration of a system of "Services des Étapes"; but here, again, -the existence of separate organisations for rail service and road -service, without any connecting and controlling link, was found to be -unsatisfactory. In 1883 a Commission, presided over by General Fay, -was appointed to consider what would be the best course to adopt, and, -in the result, there was issued, on July 7, 1884, a Decree creating -a "Directeur Général des Chemins de Fer et des Étapes," whose duties -were more clearly defined under a Decree of February 21, 1900. In -1908 the title of this officer was changed to that of "Directeur de -l'Arrière," and, after further revisions, the scope of his authority and -responsibility was eventually fixed by the Regulation of December 8, -1913. - -Taking up his position at the head-quarters of the Commander-in-Chief, -and keeping in close touch, also, with the Minister of War through the -Chief of the General Staff, the Directeur de l'Arrière has for his -special function that of securing complete co-ordination alike between -rail services and road services and between the services in the Zone of -the Interior and those in the Zone of the Armies. Both from the Minister -and from the Commander-in-Chief he receives information as to operations -projected or in progress, and as to the needs of the armies in -_personnel_ and _matériel_. His business it is to see that these needs, -according to their order of urgency--as further communicated to him--are -supplied under conditions which shall provide for all contingencies -and guard against all possible confusion or delays. He fixes, among -other things, the lines of communication; he keeps in close touch with -the road services, and--having, within the limit of his instructions, -complete control over the railways in the Zone of the Armies--he decides -on the conditions to be adopted in respect to all transport alike -from the interior to the armies and from the armies to the interior. -As between, also, the Minister of War and the Commander-in-Chief, he -maintains a constant exchange of information concerning time-tables for -military trains and other such matters. - -In the discharge of these duties the Directeur de l'Arrière is aided by -a staff which comprises both the technical and the military elements; -but he is not himself responsible for the actual working of either the -rail or the road services. - -Railway services in the Zone of the Armies are--subject to the supreme -authority of the Directeur de l'Arrière--under the control of a -_Director of Railways_ who is assisted by (1) a combined military and -technical staff; (2) a Line Commission for that section of the zone -where the railways can still be worked by their ordinary staffs; and (3) -one or more _Field Line Commissions_ ("Commissions de chemins de fer de -campagne"), together with Railway Troops, for the section where military -operation is necessary. - -In the interests of that co-ordination to which so much importance is -rightly attached, the Director of Railways refers to the Directeur -de l'Arrière all demands for transport that concern the railways of -both the Zone of the Interior and the Zone of the Armies or involve -conveyance by road as well as by rail. He also passes on to the -Commissions in charge of either section of the railways included in the -Zone of the Armies the orders he himself receives from the Directeur de -l'Arrière in respect to such transport requirements as may concern them. -Time-tables drawn up, and other arrangements made, by these Commissions -are subject to his approval. He further decides as to the distribution, -within the Zone of the Armies, of the rolling stock and the railway -personnel placed at his disposal by the Commander-in-Chief. - -The _Field Line Commissions_ are the executive agents of the Director -of Railways in the discharge of the various duties assigned to him. The -number of these Commissions is decided by the Directeur de l'Arrière, -and the date of their entering on their functions is fixed by the -Director of Railways. Each Commission consists of a staff officer and -a railway engineer. Of these the former is military president of the -Commission and has the controlling voice. When he considers it necessary -that he should accept, in addition to his own responsibility, that of -the technical commissioner, the latter must defer to his views and -to the orders he gives. The president has an assistant--also a staff -officer--who can replace him when necessary, while the Commission has -a staff of secretaries and orderlies as approved by the Minister of -War. The personnel of the Commissions includes Railway Troops ("Sapeurs -de chemins de fer" and "Sections de chemins de fer de campagne"); a -telegraphy staff; Station Commissions; and "gendarmerie" to undertake -police duties in the stations and on the trains. - -In addition to making traffic arrangements and undertaking the operation -of those lines at the theatre of war that may pass under full military -control, the Field Line Commissions are required to carry out such -construction, repair, maintenance or destruction work on the railways as -should be found necessary. - -On the _Lines of Communication_ passing through the two zones and -ensuring direct communication between the interior and such accessible -points on the railway as may, from time to time, be nearest to the -armies in the field, the leading stations _en route_ are required to -serve a variety of military purposes; though in each and every such -instance the system of organisation is such that the duties to be -discharged or the responsibilities to be fulfilled are undertaken by, -or are under the control of, a Commission formed on the now established -basis of representation thereon of both the military and the technical -elements. - -For the conveyance of troops, there are, in the first place, -_Mobilisation Stations_ and _Junction Stations_, whence the men -within a certain district are sent to the _Embarkation Stations_, at -which complete units for the front are made up. These are followed by -_Stations for Meals_ ("Stations haltes-repas"), for men and horses; -though in this case the "stations" may really be goods or locomotive -sheds, able to accommodate a large number of men. At the end of the -railway line, so far as it is available for troops, come the _Detraining -Stations_. - -In regard to supplies and stores, the first link in the chain of -organisation is constituted by the _Base Supply Stations_ ("gares de -rassemblement"). Here the supplies going from a certain district outside -the theatre of operations to any one Army Corps must be delivered; and -here they are checked, made up into full train loads, or otherwise dealt -with in such a way as to simplify and facilitate their further transport. - -In certain cases full train-loads arriving at these assembling stations -pass through to destination, after being checked; but the general -practice is for the consignments forwarded from base supply stations to -go to the _Supply Depôts_ ("Stations-magasins"), serving the purposes -of storehouses from which supplies, whether received from the base or -collected locally, can be despatched in just such quantities, and at -just such intervals, as circumstances may require. These depôts are -organised on a different basis according to the particular service or -purpose for which they are designed,--Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery, -Medical, Telegraph Corps; provisions, live stock, clothing, camp -equipment, etc. Their number, character, and location are decided by -the Minister of War in time of peace. On the outbreak of war those in -the Zone of the Armies pass under the control of the Commander-in-Chief -together with the railway lines within that zone. The situation of -the depôts may be changed, or additional depôts may be opened, by the -Directeur de l'Arrière, with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief. - -Each station depôt is under the charge of the military member of the -Station Commission. His special function it is to supply therefrom the -wants of the Army in accordance with the demands he receives. These -demands he distributes among the different departments of the depôt, -giving instructions as to the time by which the railway wagons must -be loaded. He also takes, with the stationmaster, all the necessary -measures for ensuring the making up, the loading, and the departure of -the trains; but he must not interfere with the internal administration -of the station or with the technical direction and execution of the -railway services. - -Provision is also made for the immediate unloading of trains bringing -supplies to the station depôts for storage there, the military -commissioner being expressly instructed to guard against any block on -the lines in or near to the station. Wagons need not be unloaded if -they are to be sent on after only a brief detention, or if they contain -ammunition forming part of the current needs of the Army. - -From the supply depôts the supplies and stores pass on to the -_Regulating Station_ ("gare régulatrice"). This is located at such point -on each line of communication as, while allowing of a final regulation -of supplies going to the front, does not--owing to its nearness to the -fighting line--permit of any guarantee of a fixed train service beyond -that point. The locality of the regulating station is changed from day -to day, or from time to time, according to developments in the military -situation. - -The regulating station is in charge of a _Regulating Commission_ -("Commission régulatrice"), constituted on the same basis as a Sub-Line -Commission. Receiving orders or instructions as to the nature and -quantities of the supplies and stores required by the troops at the -front, and drawing these from the supply depôts, the Commission must -always have on hand a sufficiency to meet requirements. It is, also, -left to the Commission to arrange for the further despatch of the -supplies from the regulating station by means of such trains as, in the -circumstances of the moment, may be found practicable. - -As a matter of daily routine, and without further instructions, the -supply depôts send one train of provisions each day to the regulating -station, and the latter sends on one train daily to the front, always, -however, keeping a further day's supply on hand, at or near the -regulating station, to meet further possible requirements. Additional -trains, whether from the supply depôts or from the regulating station -(where rolling stock is kept available) are made up as needed. - -Supplementing these arrangements, the Regulating Commission may, at -the request of the Director of Road Services, further keep permanently -within its zone of action a certain number of wagons of provisions in -readiness to meet contingencies, the wagons so utilised as _Stores -on wheels_ being known as "en-cas mobiles." Should the Directeur de -l'Arrière so desire, railway wagons with ammunition can, in the same -way, be kept loaded at any station within the Zone of the Armies, or, -by arrangement with the Minister of War, in the Zone of the Interior. -It is, however, stipulated that the number of these wagons should -be reduced to a minimum, in order to avoid congestion either of the -stations or of the railway lines. - -Beyond the regulating station comes _Railhead_, which constitutes the -furthest limit of possible rail-transport for the time being, and -the final point of connection between rail and road services, the -latter being left with the responsibility of continuing the line of -communication thence to the armies on the field of battle. - -It is the duty of the Regulating Commission, as soon as it enters on the -discharge of its functions and as often afterwards as may be necessary, -to advise both the General in command of the Army served by the line -of communication and the Director of Road Services as to the station -which can be used as railhead and the facilities offered there for the -accommodation, unloading, and loading of wagons. On the basis of the -information so given the General-in-Command decides each day, or as the -occasion requires, on the particular station which shall be regarded -as railhead for the purposes of transport. He advises the Regulating -Commission and the Director of Road Services accordingly, and he -further notifies to them his wishes in regard to the forwarding of -supplies to the point thus fixed. - -These elaborate arrangements for ensuring a maintenance of efficiency -along the whole line of communication from the interior to the front -equally apply to transport of all kinds from the theatre of war to the -interior. In principle, evacuations from the army of sick and wounded, -prisoners, surplus stores, and so on, are effected from railhead by -means of the daily supply-trains returning thence to the regulating -station, where the Regulating Commission takes them in charge, and -passes them on by the trains going back to the Depôt Stations, or -beyond. Should special trains be necessary for the removal of a -large number of wounded, or otherwise, the Director of Road Services -communicates with the Regulating Commission, which either makes up the -desired specials from the rolling stock it has on hand or, if it cannot -do this, itself applies, in turn, to the Director of Railways. - -For dealing with the sick and wounded, every possible provision is made -under the authority of the Minister of War and the Director-General, -the arrangements in advance, as detailed in the decrees relating to -this branch of the subject, being on the most comprehensive scale. -Among other measures provided for is the setting up of _Evacuation -Hospitals_ ("hôpitaux d'évacuation") in the immediate neighbourhood of -the Regulating Stations, if not, also, at railhead. Elsewhere along -the line certain stations become _Infirmary Stations_, ("infirmaries -de gare") where, in urgent cases, and under conditions laid down by -the War Minister, the sick and wounded _en route_ to the interior can -receive prompt medical attention in case of need. From the _Distribution -Stations_ ("gares de répartition"), the sick and wounded are sent to the -hospitals in the interior to which they may be assigned. - -It will be seen that this comprehensive scheme of organisation aims at -preventing the recurrence of any of those defects or deficiencies which -characterised the military rail-transport movements of France in the war -of 1870-71. - -The presence, at every important link in the chain of rail -communication, of a Commission designed to secure regularity and -efficiency in the traffic arrangements should avoid confusion, -congestion and delay. - -The association, on each of these Commissions, of the military and -technical elements, with a strict definition of their respective powers, -duties and responsibilities, should ensure the best use of the available -transport facilities under conditions in themselves practicable, and -without the risk either of friction between the representatives of the -two interests or, alternatively, of any interference with the railway -services owing to contradictory or impossible orders being given by -individual officers acting on their own responsibility. - -The setting up of the supply depôts and regulating stations along the -line of communication should prevent (i) the rushing through of supplies -in excessive quantities to the extreme front; (ii) the congestion of -railway lines and stations; (iii) the undue accumulation of provisions -at one point, with a corresponding deficiency elsewhere, and (iv) the -possibility of large stocks being eventually seized by the enemy and -made use of by him to his own advantage. - -The measures adopted both to prevent any excessive employment of railway -wagons as storehouses on wheels and to secure their prompt unloading -should afford a greater guarantee of the best utilisation of rolling -stock under conditions of, possibly, extreme urgency. - -Finally, the unification of control, the co-ordination of the many -different services involved, and the harmony of working established -between all the various sections on the line of communication linking up -the interior of the country with the troops in the fighting line should -assure, not only the nearest possible approach to complete efficiency in -the transport conditions, but the conferring of great advantages on the -armies concerned, with a proportionate increase of their strength in the -field. - -The effect of all these things on the military position of France must -needs be great. Had France controlled a rail-transport organisation such -as this--instead of none at all--in 1870-71; and had Germany controlled -a system no better than what we have seen to be the admittedly imperfect -one she put into operation on that occasion, the results of the -Franco-German war and the subsequent course of events in Europe might -alike have been wholly different. - -_Tests_ of what were being planned or projected in France as -precautionary measures, for application in war, could not, of course, -be carried out exhaustively in peace; but many parts of the machinery -designed came into daily use as a matter of ordinary routine. Full -advantage was taken, also, of whatever opportunities did present -themselves--in the form of exercises in partial mobilisation, reviews, -and other occasions involving the movement by rail of large bodies -of troops--to effect such trials as were possible of regulations and -instructions already based on exhaustive studies by the military and -railway authorities. In 1892 the results attained were so satisfactory -that a German authority, Lieutenant Becker, writing in his book on "Der -nächste Krieg und die deutschen Bahnverwaltungen," (Hanover, 1893,) -concerning the trials in France, in that year, of the new conditions -introduced by the law of December 28, 1888, was not only greatly -impressed thereby but even appeared disposed to think that the French -were becoming superior to the Germans in that very organisation which -the latter had regarded as their own particular province. The following -passages from his book may be worth recalling:-- - - Towards the middle of September, 1892, from a military - railway station improvised for the occasion, there were sent off - in less than eight hours forty-two trains conveying a complete - Army Corps of 25,000 men. - - In their famous mobilisation test of 1887 the French - despatched from the Toulouse station 150 military trains without - interrupting the ordinary traffic, and without any accident. - - Such figures speak a significant language. They show what - enormous masses of troops the railway can carry in the course of - a few hours to a given point.... - - If I have referred to the results obtained by our neighbours - on their railway systems, it is not because I have the least - fear as to the final issue of the next war. Quite the contrary; - but the fact does not prevent me from asking why the German - Army cannot base on the railways of that country the same hopes - which neighbouring countries are able to entertain in regard to - theirs. - -The favourable impression thus given, even to a German critic, by the -progress France was making in her creation, not so much _de novo_ as _ab -ovo_, of a system of organised military rail-transport, were confirmed -by many subsequent trials, experiments and experiences, all, in turn, -leading to further improvements in matters of detail; but it was, -indeed, the "nächste Krieg" concerning which Lieutenant Becker wrote -that was to be the real test of the organisation which, during more than -forty years of peace, France followed up with a zeal, a pertinacity and -a thoroughness fully equal to those of Germany herself. - -In any case it would seem that France, though having to make up for -the headway gained by Germany, finally created a system of military -rail-transport which would be able to stand the fullest comparison with -even the now greatly-improved system of her traditional foe; while the -organisation she thus elaborated, not for the purposes of aggression -but as an arm of her national defence, illustrates in a striking degree -the ever-increasing importance of the problem of rail-power, and the -comprehensive nature of the measures for its effective exercise which a -great Continental nation regards as indispensable under the conditions -of modern warfare. - - -DEFENSIVE RAILWAYS - -The measures adopted included, also, the improvement of the French -railway system, since this was no less in need of amendment and -additions in order to adapt it to the needs of the military situation. - -Whilst, as we have seen in Chapter I, the important part that railways -were likely to play in war was recognised in France as early as 1833, -and whilst, in 1842, attention was called in that country to the -"aggressive lines" which Germany was then already building in the -direction of the French frontiers, the French railway system itself -was, prior to the war of 1870-71, developed on principles which -practically ignored strategical considerations, were based mainly on -economic, political and local interests, and not only refrained from -becoming "aggressive" in turn, but even failed to provide adequately, as -they should have done, for the legitimate purposes of national defence. - -Apart from the absence of any designs on the part of France against -her neighbours' territory, during this period of her history, one of -the main reasons for the conditions just mentioned is to be found in -the predominant position of Paris as the capital and centre-point of -French life and French movement. Germany at this time consisted of a -collection of States each of which had its own chief city and built its -railways to serve its own particular interests, without much regard -for the interests of its sister States, even if it escaped the risk -of cherishing more or less jealousy towards them. In France there was -but one State and one capital, and Paris was regarded as the common -centre from which the main lines were to radiate in all directions. -Communication was thus established as between the capital and the -principal inland towns or important points on the frontiers or on the -coasts of France; but the inadequate number of lateral or transverse -lines linking up and connecting these main lines placed great difficulty -in the way of communication between the provincial centres themselves -otherwise than viâ Paris. - -Some of these disadvantages were to have been overcome under a law -passed in 1868 which approved the construction of seventeen new lines -having a total length of 1,840 km. (1,143 miles). When, however, war -broke out in 1870, comparatively little had been done towards the -achievement of this programme, and France entered upon the conflict with -a railway system which had been even less developed towards her eastern -frontiers than towards the north, the west and the south, while for the -purposes of concentrating her troops in the first-mentioned direction -she had available only three lines, and of these three one alone was -provided with double-track throughout. Such were the inadequacies of the -system at this time that the important line between Verdun and Metz had -not yet been completed. - -No sooner had the war come to an end than the French Government started -on the improvement of the railway system in order to adapt it to the -possible if not prospective military requirements of the future, so that -they should never again be taken at a disadvantage; and in carrying on -this work--in addition to the reorganisation of their military-transport -system in general--they showed an unexampled energy and thoroughness. -Within five years of the restoration of peace the French railway system -had already undergone an extension which, according to Captain A. -Pernot, as told in his "Aperçu historique sur le service des transports -militaires," would have been possible in but few countries in so short -a period; while of the situation at the time he wrote (1894) the same -authority declared:--"One can say that everything is ready in a vast -organisation which only awaits the word of command in order to prove the -strength of its capacity." - -Without attempting to give exhaustive details of all that was done, it -may suffice to indicate generally the principles adopted. - -One of the most important of these related to an improvement of the -conditions in and around Paris. - -Here the purposes specially aimed at were (1) to establish further -connecting links between the various trunk lines radiating from the -capital, and (2) to obviate the necessity for traffic from, for example, -the south or the west having to pass through Paris _en route_ to the -east or the north. - -These aims it was sought to effect by means of a series of circular -railways, or "rings" of railways, joining up the existing lines, and -allowing of the transfer of military transport from one to the other -without coming into Paris at all. An "inner" circular railway ("Chemin -de Fer de Petite Ceinture") had already been constructed within the -fortifications prior to 1870, and this was followed in 1879 by an -"outer" line, ("Chemin de Fer de Grande Ceinture"), which provided a -wider circle at an average distance of about 20 km. (12½ miles) and -established direct rail connection, not only between a large number of -the more remote suburbs, together with the different trunk lines at a -greater distance from the city, but, also, between the various forts -constructed for the defence of Paris. - -These circular railways were, in turn, succeeded by a series of -connecting links which ensured the provision of a complete ring of -rail communication at a still greater distance around Paris, the towns -comprised therein including Rouen, Amiens, La Fère, Laon, Reims, -Chalons-sur-Marne, Troyes, Sens, Montargis, Orléans, Dreux, and so on -back to Rouen. Within, again, this outermost ring there was provided -a further series of lines which, by linking up Orléans, Malesherbes, -Montereau, Nogent, Epernay, Soissons, Beauvais and Dreux, established -additional connections between all the lines from Paris to the north and -the east of France, and gave increased facilities for the distribution -in those directions of troops arriving at Orléans from the south-west, -this being once more done without any need for their entering Paris or -even approaching it at a closer distance than about forty miles. - -Orléans itself was recognised as a point of great strategical importance -in regard to the movement of troops, and it was, accordingly, provided -with a number of new lines radiating therefrom, and establishing better -connections with other lines. Tours and other centres of military -significance, from the same point of view, were strengthened in a like -manner. At important junctions, and notably so in the case of Troyes -(Champagne), loop lines were built in order that troop trains could be -transferred direct from one line to another without stopping, and with -no need for shunting or for changing the position of the engine. - -In the direction of the eastern frontier the line from Verdun to Metz -was completed, and by 1899 the three routes which could alone be made -use of in 1870-71 had been increased to ten. Most of them were provided -with double-track throughout, and all of them were independent of one -another, though having intercommunication by means of cross lines. - -Other new railways established connection with or between the forts on -both the eastern and the northern frontiers. Others, again, provided -direct communication between different harbours or between each of -them and strategical points in the interior, thus contributing to the -possibilities of their defence in case of attack from the sea. Still -others were designed for the defence of the French Alps. - -Apart from the provision of all these new lines, much was done in -the doubling or even the quadrupling of existing track wherever the -question of military transport came into consideration at all. Then at -railway stations near to arsenals, and at important strategical centres, -specially long platforms were provided to allow of the rapid entraining -of men or material in case of need. - -While, also, so much was being done for the improvement of the French -railway system from an avowedly strategical point of view, there were -many additional lines constructed or improvements made which, although -designed to further the interests of trade and travel, also added to the -sum total of available facilities for military transport. - -The advantages specially aimed at were (1) the ensuring of a more -rapid mobilisation of troops through the betterment of cross-country -connections; (2) the avoidance of congestion of traffic in Paris; (3) -the securing of a more rapid concentration on the frontiers, especially -when each Army Corps could be assured the independent use of a -double-track line of rails for its own use; and (4) the more effective -defence of all vital points. - -National defence, rather than the building of strategical lines -designed to serve "aggressive" purposes, was the fundamental principle -on which the policy thus followed since 1870-71 was based; and if, -as Captain Pernot wrote in 1894, everything was even then ready for -all emergencies, the continuous additions and improvements made since -that time, bringing the railway system of the country more and more -into harmony with the "perfectionnement" aimed at by France in the -organisation of her military transport, must have made the conditions of -preparedness still more complete by 1914. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[26] For details concerning the functions and duties of the various -divisions, subdivisions, etc., see "Mouvements et Transports. Sections -de chemins de fer de campagne. Volume arrêté à la date du 1er septembre, -1914." Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle. - -[27] "Bulletin Officiel du Ministère de la Guerre. Génie. Troupes de -chemins de fer. Volume arrêté à la date du 1er décembre, 1912." - -[28] "Transports militaires par chemin de fer. (Guerre et Marine.) -Édition mise à jour des textes en vigueur jusqu'en octobre, 1902." -For later publications, dealing, in separate issues, with particular -departments of the military rail-transport organisation, see -Bibliography. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND - - -The difference between the geographical conditions of the British Isles -and those of the principal countries on the Continent of Europe led to -the systematic organisation of rail transport for military purposes -being taken in hand at a later date in the United Kingdom than was, -more especially, the case in Germany. Here there was no question of -building lines of invasion or lines to facilitate the massing of troops -on a neighbour's frontiers. The questions that alone seemed to arise -in England were--(1) the relations between the State and the companies -in regard to the use of the railways for the transport of troops and -military necessaries under conditions either of peace or of war; (2) -the employment of railways both for resisting invasion and for the -conveyance of expeditionary forces to the port of embarkation; (3) -the adoption of such means as would ensure the efficient working of -the railways under war conditions; and (4) the creation of an Army -engineering force providing for the construction, repair, operation -or destruction of railways either at home, in case of invasion, or to -facilitate operations in overseas expeditions through the building and -working of military railways. - -With these various considerations it may be convenient to deal in the -order as here given. - - -THE STATE AND THE RAILWAYS - -In the Railway Regulation Act, 1842, (5 and 6 Vict., c. 55,) entitled -"An Act for the better Regulation of Railways and for the Conveyance of -Troops," it was provided, by section 20:-- - - Whenever it shall be necessary to move any of the officers - or soldiers of her Majesty's forces of the line ... by any - railway, the directors shall permit them, with baggage, stores, - arms, ammunition and other necessaries and things, to be - conveyed, at the usual hours of starting, at such prices or upon - such conditions as may be contracted for between the Secretary - at War and such railway companies on the production of a route - or order signed by the proper authorities. - -This was the first provision made in the United Kingdom in respect to -the conveyance of troops by rail. It was succeeded in 1844 by another -Act (7 and 8 Vict., c. 85,) by which (sec. 12) railway companies were -required to provide conveyances for the transport of troops at fares -not exceeding a scale given in the Act, and maximum fares were also -prescribed in regard to public baggage, stores, ammunition, (with -certain exceptions, applying to gunpowder and explosives,) and other -military necessaries. In 1867 these provisions were extended to the Army -Reserve. Further revision of the fares and charges took place under -the Cheap Trains Act, 1883, (46 and 47 Vict., c. 34,) entitled "An Act -to amend the Law Relating to Railway Passenger Duty and to amend and -consolidate the law relating to the conveyance of the Queen's forces by -railway." - -State control of the railways in case of war was provided for under the -Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, (34 and 35 Vict., c. 86,) "An Act -for the Regulation of the Regular and Auxiliary Forces of the Crown, and -for other purposes relating thereto." Section 16 laid down that-- - - When her Majesty, by Order in Council, declares that an - emergency has arisen in which it is expedient for the public - service that her Majesty's Government should have control - over the railroads of the United Kingdom, or any of them, the - Secretary of State may, by warrant under his hand, empower any - person or persons named in such warrant to take possession in - the name or on behalf of her Majesty of any railroad in the - United Kingdom, and of the plant belonging thereto, or of any - part thereof, and may take possession of any plant without - taking possession of the railroad itself, and to use the same - for her Majesty's service at such times and in such manner as - the Secretary of State may direct; and the directors, officers - and servants of any such railroad shall obey the directions of - the Secretary of State as to the user of such railroad or plant - as aforesaid for her Majesty's service. - - Any warrant granted by the said Secretary of State in - pursuance of this section shall remain in force for one week - only, but may be renewed from week to week so long as, in the - opinion of the said Secretary of State, the emergency continues. - -Provision was also made for the payment of "full compensation" to the -interests concerned. - -The powers of control thus acquired by the Government followed, in -effect, closely upon the precedent already established in the United -States, (see p. 16,) even although they were not defined with the same -elaborate detail. On the other hand greater emphasis is laid in the -English Act on the provision that the Government "may take possession -of any plant without taking possession of the railroad itself." This -gives them the right to take over the locomotives and rolling stock of -any railway in any part of the United Kingdom, even though the lines -in question may not themselves be wanted for the purposes of military -transport. - -Under the provisions of the National Defence Act, 1888, (51 and 52 -Vict., c. 31,) traffic for naval and military purposes is to have -precedence over other traffic on the railways of the United Kingdom -whenever an Order for the embodiment of the Militia is in force. - -It was by virtue of the above section of the Act of 1871 that the -Government took control over the railways of Great Britain on the -outbreak of war in 1914. - -As regards the earlier Acts of 1842 and 1844, these were mainly domestic -measures relating to the conveyance of troops in time of peace rather -than war. The beginnings of organisation of military rail-transport -for the purposes of war followed, rather, on a realisation both of the -possibilities of invasion and of the weakness of the position in which -England at one time stood from the point of view of national defence. - - -INVASION PROSPECTS AND HOME DEFENCE - -In 1847 the Duke of Wellington, (then Commander-in-Chief,) addressed -to Sir John Burgoyne a letter in which he said he had endeavoured to -awaken the attention of different Administrations to the defenceless -state of the country. We had, he declared, no defence, or hope of chance -of defence, except in our Fleet, and he was especially sensible both of -the certainty of failure if we did not, at an early moment, attend to -the measures necessary to be taken for our defence and of "the disgrace, -the indelible disgrace," of such failure. Then, in words that greatly -impressed the country, he added:-- - - I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age, passed in - honour; I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being the - witness of the tragedy which I cannot persuade my contemporaries - to take measures to avert. - -As the result alike of this pathetic warning; of a "Letter on the -Defence of England by Volunteer Corps and Militia" issued in pamphlet -form by Sir Charles Napier in 1852; and of the Indian Mutiny in 1857, -which event called attention to the defenceless condition of the Empire -as a whole, continuous efforts were made to secure the creation of -Volunteer Corps for the purposes of defence. For a period of twelve -years these efforts met with persistent discouragement, the Government -refusing official recognition to certain corps of riflemen tentatively -formed; but in 1859 the prospect of an early invasion of this country by -France aroused public feeling to such an extent that on May 12 the then -Secretary of State for War, General Peel, addressed a circular to the -Lord-Lieutenants of counties in Great Britain announcing that Volunteer -Corps might be formed under an Act passed in 1804, when a like course -had been adopted as a precautionary measure against the threatened -invasion of England by Napoleon. - -The formation of Volunteer Corps was thereupon taken up with the -greatest zeal, and by the end of 1860 the number of Volunteers enrolled -throughout Great Britain was no fewer than 120,000. Other results of the -national awakening in 1859 were the public discussion of the questions -of coast defence and armoured trains, (of which mention has been made in -Chapter VII,) and the appropriation, in 1860, of a loan of seven and a -half millions for the improvement of our coast defences and notably the -fortifications of Portsmouth and Plymouth. - - -ENGINEER AND RAILWAY STAFF CORPS - -Already in December, 1859, the necessity for some definite engineering -instruction for Volunteers was being pointed out, and in January, 1860, -the first corps of Volunteer Engineers was created, under the title -of the 1st Middlesex Volunteer Engineers. Similar corps were formed -in various parts of the country, and by 1867 the number of Volunteer -Engineers enrolled was 6,580. - -At the beginning of 1860 a further proposal was made for the formation -of a body which, composed of eminent civil engineers, the general -managers of leading lines of railway, and the principal railway -contractors or other employers of labour, would undertake a variety of -duties considered no less essential in the interests of national defence. - -There was, in the first place, the question of the transport by rail -alike of Volunteers and of the regular forces, either on the occasion of -reviews or for the protection of our coasts against an invader. While -it was evident that the railways could be efficiently worked only by -their own officers, it was no less obvious that plans for the movement -of large bodies of men, and especially of troops, with horses, guns, -ammunition and stores, should be well considered and prepared long -beforehand, and not left for the occasion or the emergency when the need -for them would arise. - -In the next place it was suggested that the engineering talent of the -country should be made available for the purpose of supplementing the -services of the Royal Engineers in carrying out various defensive -works, such as the destruction of railway lines, bridges and roads, the -throwing up of earthworks, or the flooding of the lowland districts, -with a view to resisting the advance of a possible invader. - -Finally the great contractors were to be brought into the combination -so that they could provide the labour necessary for the execution of -these defensive works under the direction of the civil engineers, who -themselves would act under the direction of the military commanders. - -Each of the three groups was to discharge the function for which it -was specially adapted, while the co-ordination of the three, for the -purpose of strengthening the country's powers of resisting invasion, was -expected to add greatly to the value of the proposed organisation. - -The author of this scheme was Mr. Charles Manby, F.R.S., (1804-1884,) a -distinguished civil engineer who for nearly half a century was secretary -of the Institution of Civil Engineers and was closely associated with -the leading civil engineers, contractors and railway interests of the -country. He submitted his ideas to several members of the Council -of his Institution, and though, at first, the scheme was not well -received, he was subsequently so far encouraged that in August, 1860, -he laid his plan before Mr. Sidney Herbert, then Minister at War in -Lord Palmerston's second administration. Mr. Herbert expressed cordial -approval of the project, giving the assurance, on behalf of the War -Office, that an organisation on the basis suggested could not fail to be -of public benefit; but Mr. Manby still met with difficulties alike from -several members of the Council, who either offered direct opposition -to the scheme or else gave unwilling consent to join, and, also, from -the railway companies, who thought that arrangements for rail-transport -might very well be left to themselves, and that there was no necessity -for the suggested system so far as they, at least, were concerned. - -In these circumstances Mr. Manby made, at first, very little progress; -but he was unremitting in his efforts to demonstrate alike to civil -engineers and to the railway companies the practical benefits from -the point of view of public interests that would result from the -organisation he advocated, and in 1864 he felt sufficiently encouraged -to lay his views once more before the War Office. Earl de Grey, then in -charge of that Department, thereupon instructed the Inspector-General -of Volunteers, Colonel McMurdo, (afterwards General Sir W. M. McMurdo, -C.B.,) to inquire into and report to him on the subject. - -In the result there was created, in January, 1865, a body known as the -Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, constituted, according to -its rules, "for the purpose of directing the application of skilled -labour and of railway transport to the purposes of national defence, -and for preparing, in time of peace, a system on which such duties -should be conducted." The Corps was to consist of officers only, and its -members were to be civil engineers and contractors, officers of railway -and dock companies, and, under special circumstances, Board of Trade -Inspectors of Railways. Civil engineers of standing and experience who -had directed the construction of the chief railways and other important -works, general managers of railways and commercial docks, and Board -of Trade Inspectors of Railways, were alone eligible for the rank of -Lieutenant-Colonel. Other civil engineers and contractors connected -chiefly with railway works, and, also, railway officers other than -general managers, take the rank of Major. Col. McMurdo was appointed -Honorary Colonel of the Corps on February 9, 1865.[29] As ultimately -constituted, the corps consisted of an Honorary Colonel (now Maj.-Gen. -D. A. Scott, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.C.), thirty Lieutenant-Colonels including -a Commandant, (now Lieut.-Col. Sir William Forbes, general manager of -the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway) and twenty Majors.[30] - - -FUNCTIONS AND PURPOSES - -That the Corps thus created was the direct outcome, first, of the -Volunteer movement, and, through that movement, of the state of -semi-panic into which the country had drifted in 1859, as the result -both of the anticipations of invasion and the admitted weakness, at -that time, of our national defences, has thus been clearly established. -Writing in 1869, Major-General McMurdo, who had been raised to that -rank in 1868, said in a pamphlet he issued under the title of "Rifle -Volunteers for Field Service" that the Corps was "prepared to work, -not for Volunteers alone, but for the entire defensive forces of the -country." - -In this same publication Major-General McMurdo gave an account of the -functions and purposes the Corps had been designed to serve. Alluding -first to the Volunteer movement, he showed how the railway carriage must -both carry and shelter the Volunteer when moving from one part of the -country to another; and he proceeded:-- - - I will ask you to look attentively for a moment at a - Bradshaw's railway map, and you will see that throughout the - network of rails that overspreads the land none of the meshes, - so to speak, in any vital parts of the country, exceed fifteen - miles across, from rail to rail; but as the eye approaches the - Metropolis, or any of the commercial centres, these meshes are - diminished to about one-half the area of the others. - -He then dealt with the operations which the movement of troops along -these lines of railway would involve, and continued:-- - - The railway schemes for the accomplishment of such delicate - operations would emanate from the Council of the Engineer and - Railway Staff Corps.... - - During peace the railway branch of this body is employed in - working out hypothetical plans of campaign, in the development - of which they manipulate in theory the entire rolling-stock - and railway resources of the country, elaborated by special - time-tables and technical reports. - - The share taken by the civil engineers is not confined to - providing merely for the class of railway works contingent on - war, whether of construction, demolition, or of reconstruction, - but in supplying the military engineers with information, advice - and labour. No one, for example, can be more familiar with the - features and character of a district than the engineer who has - constructed a line of railway through it. No one is so well able - to point out the results of _letting in_ that which he had been - so often employed in _keeping out_, viz., the inundations of the - sea. None better acquainted with the existing distribution of - labour power throughout the country, and of the means by which - it could be concentrated upon given points, for the construction - of works of defence. All these elements, in short, by which - the gigantic resources of our country may be safely wielded - for her defence, are now being silently considered and woven - into strategical schemes of operations by these eminent and - patriotic men, the value of whose voluntary services will not be - fully comprehended or appreciated till the day comes when the - discomfiture of the invader shall be accomplished through their - instrumentality. - -The same distinguished authority wrote concerning the Engineer and -Railway Volunteer Staff Corps in an article on "Volunteers" which he -contributed to the "Encyclopædia Britannica" (ninth edition):-- - - The ready labour power of this useful Corps is estimated - at from 12,000 to 20,000 navvies, with tools, barrows and - commissariat complete. It has already performed important - service in tabulating, and printing at great private cost, - complete time-tables and special reports for six general - concentrations against possible invasion. A special return - was also prepared by the Corps (the first of its kind) of the - entire rolling stock of all the railways in Great Britain. - This important work--which is corrected and republished - annually--shows where the requisite number of carriages of every - description can be obtained for the composition of troop trains. - -In the official catalogue of books in the War Office Library there is an -item which reads:--"Time Tables for Special Troop Trains, etc. Compiled -by the Railway Companies. 311 pp. 8vo. London, 1866." This, presumably, -refers to the first of the complete time tables mentioned in the -"Encyclopædia Britannica" article as having been compiled by the Corps. -It is evident, from the date given, that the Corps must have got quickly -to work after its formation in 1865. - -At one time there was an expectation that the Engineer and Railway -Volunteer Staff Corps would develop into a body exercising still wider -and more responsible duties than those already mentioned. On this point -we have the testimony of the late Sir George Findlay, formerly general -manager of the London and North-Western Railway Company, and himself a -Lieutenant-Colonel in the Corps. - -Col. J. S. Rothwell had written some articles[31] in which, while -admitting their practically unlimited resources, he questioned the -ability of the British railways, at a few hours notice, to transport to -any part of our coasts which might be the scene of a hostile invasion a -sufficient body of troops to dispute the advance of an army upon London, -and he further suggested that the whole question was one which had not -yet received the mature consideration it deserved. Col. Rothwell said, -in the course of what he wrote:-- - - Though the actual working of our railways must be left in - the hands of the proper railway officials, it does not follow - that the planning of the arrangements for the military traffic - should also be entrusted to them exclusively. This, however, - appears to be contemplated, as, under existing circumstances, - such arrangements would rest with the members of a body called - the "Volunteer Engineer and Railway Staff Corps."... Though the - efficiency of these gentlemen in their own sphere is undeniable, - it appears open to question whether they are likely to have - sufficient leisure personally to work out the details of a - large concentration of troops by rail, and whether the special - requirements of military transport will be fully appreciated by - them, or by the subordinates whom they presumably will employ. - -Much, he argued, required to be done before the country could be -considered ready to meet a possible invader; and he concluded:-- - - If the invasion of England is to be regarded as an event - which is within the bounds of possibility, it is surely not - unreasonable to ask that those precautionary measures which - require time for their elaboration shall be thoroughly worked - out before there is any risk of our wanting to employ them. The - organisation for the conveyance of our troops by railway is such - a measure. - -To these criticisms Sir George Findlay replied in an article "On the -Use of Railways in the United Kingdom for the Conveyance of Troops," -published in the _United Service Magazine_ for April, 1892. The complete -network of railways covering these islands, admirably equipped and -efficiently worked as they were, would, he declared, be found equal -to any part they might be called upon to play in a scheme of national -defence. As regarded the attention already paid to the question he -said:-- - - The War Office, so far from having in any way neglected - the subject, have devoted considerable attention to it, and a - complete scheme for the working of our railways for transport - purposes in time of war has been elaborated, and would at once - be put in operation, if ever the emergency arose. - -Passing on to describe the composition and duties of the Engineer and -Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, he spoke of its members as meeting in -council at their headquarters to discuss from time to time details of -railway organisation and other matters delegated to their consideration, -afterwards reporting their conclusions to the War Office; and he went on -to say that for the operation of the railways, under State control, on -any occasion of national energy or danger-- - - A draft scheme has been prepared, has been worked out in - detail, and would, in all probability, be adopted and put in - operation if, unhappily, the necessity should ever arise. - - This scheme in its main features provides that, at such - time as we are contemplating, the principal railway officials - in Great Britain and Ireland would at once become, for the - time being, the officers of the State, and in addition to the - general managers of the leading railways, who are officers of - the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, military rank - of some kind would be conferred upon the engineers, locomotive - superintendents, chief passenger superintendents and goods - managers of the principal railway companies, as well as on the - managers of the principal Irish railways. - - The railways of the country would be divided into sections, - and for each section there would be a committee composed - of the general managers of the railways included in the - section, together with the principal engineers, locomotive - superintendents and other chief officers. The railways would - be worked and controlled for military purposes by these - committees of sections, each committee having as its president a - Lieutenant-Colonel of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff - Corps, who would be directly responsible for providing transport - for troops and stores over the section of which his committee - had charge, while if the operation to be carried out required - the co-operation of one or more sections of the railways, the - committees of those sections would act in unison. In such a - case the Quartermaster-General's requisition for the service to - be performed would be made upon the president of the section - embracing the point of departure, that officer and his committee - taking the initiative and arranging with the other committees - for the performance of the service. - - For each section, or group, of railways, a military officer - of rank would be appointed, with full power to arrange for - food, forage and water for the troops and horses _en route_, - and having at his disposal a sufficient number of soldiers or - labourers to assist in loading and unloading baggage, stores, - etc., at the points of entrainment and detrainment within his - section. He would also be able to command the services of the - Royal or Volunteer Engineers to assist in the erection of - temporary platforms or landings, or the laying down of temporary - rails, and would be instructed to co-operate with, and assist - in every way, the committee of section having charge of his - district, but not in any way to attempt to interfere with the - working of the line or the movement of the trains or traffic. - -The number of sections into which the railways were to be divided for -the purposes of this scheme was nine. After defining the various areas, -Sir George continued:-- - - It is contemplated that during any such period of crisis as - we are now discussing, the Council of the Engineer and Railway - Volunteer Staff Corps would be sitting _en permanence_ at its - headquarters, and, with a full knowledge of the nature and - extent of the operations to be carried out, would have power to - regulate the supply and distribution of rolling stock throughout - the area affected, all the vehicles in the country being, for - the time being, treated as a common stock. - - This is a mere outline of the scheme, with the further - details of which it is not necessary to trouble the reader, - though probably enough has been said to show that the subject, - far from having been neglected, as Colonel Rothwell appears to - assume, has been carefully studied and thought out. - -Had the scheme in question been matured and adopted on the lines here -stated, a still greater degree of importance would have been attached -to the position and proceedings of a Corps then--and still--almost -unknown to the world at large, since its chief function was to carry out -investigations at the request of the authorities, and prepare reports, -statements and statistics which have invariably got no further than the -War Office and the Horse Guards, where, alone, the value of the services -rendered has been fully understood and appreciated. The scheme was, -however, allowed to drop, the policy eventually adopted being based, -preferably, (1) on the railways of Great Britain being operated in war -time as one group instead of in a series of groups or sections; and (2) -on such operation being entrusted to a body specially created for the -purpose; though prior to the adoption of the latter course there was to -be a fresh development in another direction. - - -THE WAR RAILWAY COUNCIL - -While the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps remained, down to -1896, the only organised body which (apart from the individual railway -companies) Government departments could consult as to the technical -working and traffic facilities of the railways, from the point of view -of military transport, it was thought desirable, in the year mentioned, -to supplement that Corps by a smaller body known at first as the "Army -Railway Council" and afterwards as the "War Railway Council." - -Designed to act in a purely advisory capacity, without assuming any -administrative or executive functions, this Council was eventually -constituted as follows:--The Deputy Quartermaster-General (president); -six railway managers, who represented the British railway companies -and might or might not already be members of the Engineer and Railway -Staff Corps; one Board of Trade Inspector of Railways; two members -(not being railway managers) of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps; -the Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General; one mobilisation officer; -two Naval officers; and one officer of the Royal Engineers, with a -representative of the Quartermaster-General's Department as secretary. - -The Council approximated closely to the "Commission Militaire Superieure -des Chemins de Fer" in France, of which an account has been given in -Chapter IX. It also undertook many of the duties which in the case of -the German Army would be performed by a special section of the General -Staff; though some of these duties it took over from the Engineer and -Railway Staff Corps, reducing the functions and the importance of that -body proportionately. - -In time of peace the Council was (1) generally to advise the Secretary -of State for War on matters relating to military rail-transport; (2) to -draw up, in conjunction with the different railway companies concerned, -and on the basis of data to be supplied to them by the War Office, a -detailed scheme for the movement of troops on mobilisation; (3) to -arrange in advance as to the composition of the trains which would be -required for any such movement; (4) to determine the nature of the -data to be asked for from the railway companies,[32] and to prepare -the necessary regulations and instructions in regard to the said troop -movements; (5) to draw up rules for the organisation of a body of -Railway Staff Officers who, located at railway stations to be selected -by the Council, would act there as intermediaries between the railway -officials and the troops; and (6) to confer with the different railway -companies as to the provision of such extra sidings, loading platforms, -ramps, barriers, etc., as might be necessary to facilitate military -transport, and to decide on the best means by which the provision -thereof could be arranged. Information on these subjects was to be -carefully compiled, elaborated, and, with explanatory maps, placed on -record for use as required. - -In the event of mobilisation, or of some national emergency, the Council -was, also, to advise the Secretary of State for War in regard to matters -relating to the movement of troops by rail; to act as a medium of -communication between the War Office and the railway companies, and to -make all the necessary arrangements in connection with such movements. - -Other questions likely to arise, and requiring consideration in time -of peace, included the guarding of the railways against possible -attack; the prompt repair of any damage that might be done to them; the -equipment of armoured trains, and the provision of ambulance trains on -lines where they might be required. - -All these and various other matters were dealt with at the periodical -meetings held by the Council, which, within the range of its limitations -as an advisory body, rendered good service to the War Office; though -that Department was still left to deal with the individual railway -companies in regard to all arrangements and matters of detail directly -concerning them. - - -RAILWAY TRANSPORT OFFICERS - -In the foregoing statement as to the functions to be discharged by the -War Railway Council it is mentioned that these were to include the -drawing up of rules for the organisation of a body of Railway Staff -Officers who were to act as intermediaries between the troops and the -railway station staffs in the conduct of military rail-transport. - -We touch here upon those questions of control and organisation of -military traffic which had been a fruitful source of trouble in earlier -wars, and more especially so on the French railways in the war of -1870-71. There was, indeed, much wisdom in the attempt now being made, -as a precautionary measure, to provide well in advance against the risk -of similar experiences in regard to movements of British troops by rail, -while the course adopted led to the creation of a system which was to -ensure excellent results later on. - -In the first instance the officers appointed under the system here in -question were known as "Railway Control Officers," (R.C.O.'s,) their -chief as the "Director of Railways," (D.R.,) and the organisation itself -as the "Railway Control Establishment"; but the titles of Railway -Transport Officers (R.T.O.'s), Director of Railway Transport (D.R.T.) -and Transport Establishments were afterwards substituted. - -The functions of the Director of Railway Transport are thus defined in -Field Service Regulations, Part II, section 23 (1913):-- - - Provision of railway transport and administration of - railway transport personnel. Control, construction, working and - maintenance of all railways. Provision of telegraph operators - for railway circuits. Control and working of telephones and - telegraphs allotted to the railway service. For the erection - and maintenance of all telegraph circuits on railways which are - worked by the troops, a representative of the Director of Army - Signals will be attached to his headquarters and the necessary - signal troops allotted to him as may be ordered by the I.G.C. - (Inspector-General of Communications). - -As regards the Railway Transport Establishments, the Regulations say -(section 62):-- - - In railway matters, the authority of each member of a - railway transport establishment will be paramount on that - portion of a railway system where he is posted for duty. - - Railway technical officials will always receive the demands - of the troops for railway transport through the railway - transport establishment. - - Except when fighting is imminent or in progress, a member of - the railway transport establishment will receive orders from the - Director of Railway Transport only, or his representative. - - An officer, or officers, of the railway transport - establishment, recognized by a badge worn on the left arm marked - R.T.O., will be posted for duty at each place where troops are - constantly entraining, detraining, or halting _en route_. Their - chief duties will be:-- - - 1. To facilitate the transport of troops, animals and - material. - - 2. To act as a channel of communication between the military - authorities and the technical railway personnel. - - 3. To advise the local military authorities as to the - capacity and possibilities of the railway. - - 4. To bring to the notice of the Director of Railway - Transport any means by which the carrying power of the railway - may, for military purposes, be increased. - -All details as to the entraining and detraining of troops and the -loading and unloading of stores will be arranged in conjunction with the -technical officials by the railway transport establishment, who will -meet all troops arriving to entrain, inform commanders of the times -and places of entrainment, and allot trucks and carriages to units in -bulk. They will see that the necessary rolling stock is provided by -the railway officials, that only the prescribed amount of baggage is -loaded, and that no unauthorised person travels by rail. They will meet -all troop trains, and see that troops and stores are detrained with the -utmost despatch. - -It will be observed from these regulations that, whatever his own rank -may be, the R.T.O., subject to the instructions he has received from his -superior Transport Officer, exercises at the railway station to which he -is delegated an authority that not even a General may question or seek -to set aside by giving orders direct to the station staff. The R.T.O. -alone is the "channel of communication" between the military and the -railway elements. He it is who, acting in conjunction with the railway -people, must see that all the details in connection with entraining and -detraining are properly arranged and efficiently carried out, while the -operations of the station staff are, in turn, greatly facilitated alike -by his co-operation and by the fact that there is now only one military -authority to be dealt with at a station instead, possibly, of several -acting more or less independently of one another. - - -VOLUNTEER REVIEWS - -While all these developments had been proceeding, the railway companies -had, since the formation of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff -Corps, given repeated evidence of their capacity to move large bodies -of Volunteers with complete efficiency. They specially distinguished -themselves in this respect on the occasion of the great Volunteer -reviews held from time to time. In a book entitled "England's Naval -and Military Weakness," (London, 1882,) Major James Walter, of the 4th -Lancashire Artillery Volunteers, was highly eulogistic of what was done -by the railways on the occasion of the reviews in Edinburgh and Windsor -in 1881. In regard to the Windsor review he wrote:-- - - The broad result has been, so far as the railway part of - the business goes, to prove that it is perfectly feasible to - concentrate fifty thousand men from all parts of the kingdom - in twenty-four hours.... The two lines most concerned in the - Windsor review--the Great Western and the South Western--carried - out this great experiment with ... the regularity and dispatch - of the Scotch mail. - -Major Walter seems to have had the idea, rightly or wrongly, that the -success of this performance was mainly due to the Engineer and Railway -Volunteer Staff Corps. He says concerning that body:-- - - Not the least valued result of the Windsor and Edinburgh - reviews of 1881 is the having introduced with becoming - prominence to public knowledge the necessary and indispensable - services of the "Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps." - Until these reviews bore testimony to the national importance of - this Corps, few knew anything of its duties, or even existence, - beyond a list of officers recorded in the Army List.... Since - the embodiment of the Volunteers the Engineer and Railway - Transport Corps has done much service, invariably thorough and - without a hitch.... These several officers of the Railway Staff - Corps set about their transport work of the 1881 reviews in a - manner worthy of their vocation. They proved to the country that - their Corps was a reality and necessity. - -In 1893 the authors of the "Army Book for the British Empire" wrote (p. -531):-- - - There is every reason to believe that, in case of the - military forces in the United Kingdom being mobilised for the - purposes of home defence, and being concentrated in any part - or parts of the country for the purpose of guarding against or - confronting an invasion, the railway arrangements would work - satisfactorily. The remarkable success which has attended the - concentration of large bodies of Volunteers gathered from all - quarters of the Kingdom for military functions and reviews, on - more than one occasion, has shown the extraordinary capabilities - of the British railway system for military transport on a great - scale. Rolling stock is abundant. The more important lines in - England have a double line of rails; some have four or more - rails. Gradients, moreover, as a rule are easy, an important - point, since troop trains are very heavy. - - -THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR - -While no one was likely to dispute these conclusions, it had to be -remembered that the transport by rail even of exceptionally large bodies -of Volunteers, carrying their rifles only, was a very different matter -from the conveyance, under conditions of great pressure, of large forces -of troops accompanied by horses, guns, ammunition, road wagons, stores -and other necessaries for prospective actual warfare. So the accepted -capacity of the British railways had still to stand the test of actual -war conditions, with or without the accompaniment of invasion; and this -test was applied, to a certain extent, by the South African War. - -The bulk of the military traffic on that occasion passed over the lines -of the London and South Western Railway Company, troops from all parts -of the country being conveyed by different routes and different lines of -railway to Southampton, whence they and their stores, etc., were shipped -to the Cape. Such was the magnitude of this traffic that between the -outbreak of the war, in 1899, and the end of 1900 there were carried on -the London and South Western, and despatched from Southampton, 6,160 -officers; 229,097 men; 29,500 horses; and 1,085 wheeled vehicles. The -conveyance of this traffic involved the running of 1,154 special trains, -in addition to a large number of others carrying baggage, stores, -etc. At times the pressure was very great. On October 20, 1899, five -transports sailed from Southampton with 167 officers and 4,756 men, -besides guns horses and wagons. Yet the whole of the operations were -conducted with perfect smoothness, there being no overtaxing either of -the railway facilities or of the dock accommodation.[33] - -Much of this smoothness of working was due to the fact that the War -Office had, in accordance with the principle adopted on the appointment -of the War Railway Council, stationed at Southampton a Railway Transport -Officer who was to act as a connecting link, or intermediary, between -the railway, the docks, the military and the Admiralty authorities, -co-ordinating their requirements, superintending the arrivals by train, -arranging for and directing the embarkation of the troops and their -equipment in the transports allotted to them, and preventing any of -that confusion which otherwise might well have arisen. Similar officers -had also been stationed by the War Office at leading railway stations -throughout the country to ensure co-operation between the military and -the railway staffs and, while avoiding the possibility of friction or -complications, facilitate the handling of the military traffic. - -In the account to be given in Chapter XVI. of "Railways in the Boer -War," it will be shown that a like course was pursued in South Africa -for the duration of the campaign. - - -ARMY MANOEUVRES OF 1912 - -Further evidence as to what the British railways were capable of -accomplishing was afforded by the Army Manoeuvres in East Anglia -in 1912. This event also constituted a much more severe test than -the Volunteer reviews of former days, since it meant not only the -assembling, in the manoeuvre area, of four divisions of the Army and -some thousands of Territorials, but the transport, at short notice, and -within a limited period, of many horses, guns, transport wagons, etc., -together with considerable quantities of stores. Certain sections of -the traffic were dealt with by the Great Northern and the London and -North-Western Companies; but the bulk of it was handled by the Great -Eastern and was carried in nearly 200 troop trains, consisting in all -of about 4,000 vehicles. Of these trains 50 per cent. started before -or exactly to time, while the others were only a few minutes late in -leaving the station. Such was the regularity and general efficiency with -which the work of transportation was carried out that in the course of -an address to the Generals, at Cambridge, his Majesty the King referred -to the rapid concentration of troops by rail, without dislocating -the ordinary civilian traffic, as one of the special features of the -manoeuvres. The dispersal of the forces on the conclusion of the -manoeuvres was effected in a little over two days, and constituted -another smart piece of work.[34] - - -A RAILWAYS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE - -In view of all such testimony and of all such actual achievements, -there was no reason to doubt that the railway companies, with their -great resources in material and personnel, and with the excellence of -their own organisation, would themselves be able to respond promptly -and effectively to such demands as might be made upon them in a time of -national emergency. - -There still remained, however, the singular fact that although, so -far back as 1871, the Government had acquired power of control over -the railways, in the event of an emergency arising, a period of forty -years had elapsed without any action being taken to create, even as -a precautionary measure, the administrative machinery by which that -control would be exercised by the State. Such machinery had been -perfected in Germany, France, and other countries, but in England it -had still to be provided. Not only had section 16 of the Act of 1871 -remained practically a dead letter, but even the fact that it existed -did not seem to be known to so prominent a railway manager as Sir George -Findlay when he wrote "Working and Management of an English Railway" -and the article he contributed to the _United Service Magazine_ of -April, 1892, his assumption that the State would control the railways -in time of war being based, not on the Act of 1871--which he failed to -mention--but on the Act of 1888, which simply gives a right of priority -to military traffic, under certain conditions. - -Notwithstanding, too, the draft scheme spoken of by Sir George Findlay, -under which the operation of the railways was to be entrusted, in case -of emergency, to the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, that body and, -also, the War Railway Council, continued to occupy a purely advisory -position. - -So it was clearly desirable to supplement the recognized efficiency of -the railways themselves by the creation of a central executive body -which, whenever the State assumed control of the railways, under the Act -of 1871, would (1) secure the necessary co-operation between Government -departments and the railway managements; (2) ensure the working of the -various railway systems on a national basis; and (3) co-ordinate such -various needs as naval and military movements to or from all parts of -the Kingdom; coal supply for the Fleet; transport of munitions; the -requirements of the civil population, etc. - -The necessity for this machinery--which could not possibly be created at -a moment's notice--became still more apparent in the autumn of 1911, and -steps were taken to provide what was so obviously a missing link in the -existing organisation. - -Thus it was that in 1912 the War Railway Council was succeeded by a -Railways Executive Committee which, constituted of the general managers -of leading railway companies, was to prepare plans "with a view to -facilitate the working" of the provisions of the Act of 1871, and would, -also, in the event of the Government assuming control over the railways -of Great Britain, under the provisions of that Act, constitute the -executive body for working them on behalf of the State, becoming the -recognised intermediary (1) for receiving the instructions of Government -departments in respect to military and naval requirements; and (2) for -taking the necessary measures in order to give effect to them through -the individual companies, each of which, subject to the instructions -it received from the Committee, would retain the management of its own -line. - -In accordance with the principle thus adopted, it was through the -Railways Executive Committee that the Government, subject to certain -financial arrangements which need not be dealt with here, established -their control over the railways of Great Britain on the outbreak of war -in 1914, the announcement to this effect issued from the War Office, -under date August 4, stating:-- - - An Order in Council has been made under Section 16 of - the Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, declaring that it is - expedient that the Government should have control over the - railroads in Great Britain. This control will be exercised - through an Executive Committee composed of general managers of - railways which has been formed for some time, and has prepared - plans with a view to facilitating the working of this Act. - -In a notification issued by the Executive Committee, of which the -official chairman was the President of the Board of Trade and the acting -chairman was Mr. (now Sir Herbert A.) Walker, general manager of the -London and South Western Railway, it was further stated:-- - - The control of the railways has been taken over by the - Government for the purpose of ensuring that the railways, - locomotives, rolling stock and staff shall be used as one - complete unit in the best interests of the State for the - movement of troops, stores and food supplies.... The staff on - each railway will remain under the same control as heretofore, - and will receive their instructions through the same channels as - in the past. - -As eventually constituted, the Committee consisted of the following -general managers:--Mr. D. A. Matheson, Caledonian Railway; Sir Sam -Fay, Great Central Railway; Mr. C. H. Dent, Great Northern Railway; -Mr. F. Potter, Great Western Railway; Mr. Guy Calthrop, London and -North Western Railway; Mr. J. A. F. Aspinall, Lancashire and Yorkshire -Railway; Sir Herbert A. Walker, London and South Western Railway; Sir -William Forbes, London, Brighton and South Coast Railway; Sir Guy -Granet, Midland Railway; Sir A. K. Butterworth, North Eastern Railway, -and Mr. F. H. Dent, South Eastern and Chatham Railway, with Mr. Gilbert -S. Szlumper as secretary. - - -1860 AND 1914 - -Such, then, was the final outcome of a movement which, started in 1860, -by individual effort, as the result of an expected invasion of England -by France, was, in 1914, and after undergoing gradual though continuous -development, to play an important part on behalf of the nation in -helping France herself, now England's cherished Ally, to resist the -invader of her own fair territory. - -With what smoothness the transport of our troops was conducted cannot -yet be told in detail; but the facts here narrated will show that the -success attained was mainly due to three all-important factors,--(1) -the efficiency of the railway organisation; (2) the willingness of the -Government, on assuming control of the railways under the Act of 1871, -to leave their management in the hands of railway men; and (3) the ready -adoption, alike by the railway interests and by State departments, -of the fundamental principle enforced by a succession of wars from -the American Civil War of 1861-65 downwards,--that in the conduct of -military rail transport there should be, in each of its various stages, -intermediaries between the military and the railway technical elements, -co-ordinating their mutual requirements, constituting the recognised -and only channel for orders and instructions, and ensuring, as far as -prudence, foresight and human skill can devise, the perfect working of -so delicate and complicated an instrument as the railway machine. - - -RAILWAY TROOPS - -While Germany, inspired by the American example, had begun the creation -of special bodies of Railway Troops in 1866, it was not until 1882 that -a like course was adopted in England. Prior to the last-mentioned year -it was, possibly, thought that the labour branch of the Engineer and -Railway Volunteer Staff Corps would suffice to meet requirements in -regard to the destruction or the re-establishment of railways at home in -the event of invasion; but the arrangements of the Corps did not provide -for the supply of men to take up railway construction and operation on -the occasion of military expeditions to other countries. - -It was this particular need that led, in the summer of 1882, to -the conversion of the 8th Company of Royal Engineers into the 8th -(Railway) Company, R.E., the occasion therefore being the dispatch of -an expeditionary force under Sir Garnet (afterwards Lord) Wolseley to -Egypt, where the necessity for railway work of various kinds was likely -to arise. This pioneer corps of British Railway Troops was formed of -seven officers, one warrant officer, two buglers, and ninety-seven -N.C.O.'s and sappers. So constituted, it was thought better adapted -for railway work under conditions of active service than a body of -civilian railwaymen would be. There certainly was the disadvantage that -those constituting the 8th were not then proficient in railway matters; -but, before they left, both officers and men were given the run of the -London, Chatham and Dover Railway lines, and were there enabled to pick -up what they could of railway working in the locomotive and traffic -departments, while on the London and South Western and the South Eastern -Railways they were initiated, as far as could be done in the time, into -the art of platelaying. The Corps took out to Egypt four small tank -locomotives; two first-class, two second-class and six third-class -carriages; forty cattle trucks; four brake vans; two travelling cranes; -two breakdown vans, and five miles of permanent way, complete, with -accessories, tools, etc. Excellent work was done in carrying on regular -train services, repairing damaged track, etc., running an armoured -train, constructing supplementary short lines, and conveying troops, -sick and wounded, and stores, the practical utility of such an addition -to the engineering forces of the Army being thus fully assured. - -In January, 1885, the 10th Company, Royal Engineers, was converted -into the 10th (Railway) Company, and sent to Egypt to assist in the -construction of the then contemplated Suakin-Berber line, to which -further reference will be made in Chapter XV. Both companies also -rendered good service in the South African War. - -According to the "Manual of Military Railways," issued with Army Orders -dated March 1st, 1889, the duties likely to be required from the Royal -Engineers with regard to railways are as follows:-- (1) Laying, working, -and maintaining a military line of railway between two places; (2) -restoring an existing line which has been damaged or destroyed by an -enemy; (3) destroying an existing line as much as possible with a given -number of men and in a specified time, and (4) working and maintaining -an existing line. The "Manual" itself gave much technical information as -to the construction, maintenance, destruction and working of railways. -It was re-issued by the War Office in 1898 as Part VI of "Instruction -in Military Engineering," and was stated to embody a portion of the -course of instruction in railways at the school of Military Engineering, -Chatham. In the "Manual of Military Engineering," issued by the General -Staff of the War Office in 1905, instructions are given (Chap. XVII, -pars. 238-244) on the "hasty demolition, without explosives," of -railways, stations, buildings, rolling stock, permanent way, water -supply, etc.; and in Chapter XXIII, "Railways and Telegraphs," the -statement is made that-- - - The duties likely to be required of troops in the field with - regard to railways (apart from large railway schemes, for which - special arrangements would be necessary,) may be considered as - either temporary repairs or the laying of short lengths of line - to join up breaks, the construction of additional works, such - as platforms, etc., to adapt the line for military use, or the - demolition of an existing line. - -Detailed information is given, for the benefit of R.E. officers, -concerning railway construction, repair and reconstruction, and the -main principles on which such work should be carried out for military -purposes are explained. The best system to adopt for the effecting of -rapid repairs is said to be that of establishing construction trains. -"The reconstruction staff live in these trains, which rapidly advance -along the line as it is being repaired, conveying, also, the necessary -material." - -The peace training[35] of the Companies includes: reconnaissance, survey -and final location of a railway; laying out station yards; laying out -deviations; rapid laying of narrow-gauge "military" lines; construction -of all kinds of railway bridges; signal installation; water supply; -repairs to telegraphs and telephones necessary for working construction -lines; working of electric block instruments; fitting up armoured -trains; construction of temporary platforms, and working and maintenance -of construction trains. - -Instruction in reconnaissance and survey work is given to officers -while at head-quarters, and a certain number of N.C.O.'s and men are -also instructed in railway survey work. Parties, each commanded by an -officer, are sent to carry out a reconnaissance and final location of -a railway between two points about forty miles apart on the assumption -that it is an unmapped country, and complete maps and sections are -prepared. The Companies have also undertaken the construction and -maintenance of the Woolmer Instructional Military Railway,--a 4 ft. 8½ -in. gauge military line, about six miles in length, connecting Bordon -(London and South Western Railway) with Longmore Camp. All the plant -necessary for railway work and workshops for the repair of rolling stock -are provided at Longmore. - -In time of war the chief duties of a Railway Company, R.E., would be to -survey, construct, repair and demolish railways and to work construction -and armoured trains. - -In the South African campaign, when the military had to operate the -railways of which they took possession in the enemy's country, some -difficulty was experienced in obtaining from the ranks of the Army a -sufficient number of men capable of working the lines. As the result -of these conditions, it was arranged, in 1903, between the War Office -and certain of the British railway companies that the latter should -afford facilities in their locomotive departments and workshops for the -training of a number of non-commissioned officers and men as drivers, -firemen and mechanics, (capable of carrying out repairs,) in order to -qualify them better for railway work in the field, in case of need. This -arrangement was carried out down to the outbreak of war in 1914. The -period of training lasted either six or nine months. In order to avoid -the raising of any "labour" difficulties, no wages were given during -this period to Army men who were already receiving Army pay as soldiers, -but a bonus was granted to them by the railway companies, when they -left, on their obtaining from the head of the department to which they -had been attached a certificate of their efficiency. - - -STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS - -The subject of strategical railways will be dealt with, both generally -and in special reference to their construction in Germany, in Chapter -XVIII. In regard to Great Britain it may be said that the position as -explained by Sir George Findlay in his article in the _United Service -Magazine_ for April, 1892, is that whilst Continental countries have -been spending large sums of money on the building of strategical -lines for the defence of their frontiers, (or, he might have added, -for the invasion, in some instances, of their neighbours' territory,) -Great Britain, more fortunate, possesses already a system of railways -which, though constructed entirely by private enterprise, could not, -even if they had been laid out with a view to national defence, "have -been better adapted for the purpose, since there are duplicated lines -directed from the great centres of population and of military activity -upon every point of the coast, while there are lines skirting the coast -in every direction, north, east, south and west." - -Some years ago there were certain critics who recommended the building -of lines, for strategical purposes, along sections of our coast which -the ordinary railways did not directly serve; but the real necessity for -such lines was questioned, the more so because the transport of troops -by rail on such short-distance journeys as those that would have been -here in question might, with the marching to and from the railway and -the time occupied in entraining and detraining, take longer than if the -troops either marched all the way, or (in the event of there being only -a small force) if they went by motor vehicles to the coast. - -One point that was, indeed, likely to arise in connection with the -movement of troops was the provision of facilities for their ready -transfer from one railway system to another, without change of carriage, -when making cross-country journeys or travelling, for instance, from the -North or the Midlands to ports in the South. - -We have seen that in France many such links were established, subsequent -to the war of 1870-71, expressly for strategical reasons; but in -Great Britain a like result has been attained, apart from military -considerations, from the fact that some years ago the different railway -companies established physical connections between their different -systems with a view to the ready transfer of ordinary traffic. When, -therefore, the necessity arose for a speedy mobilisation, or for the -transport of troops from any part of Great Britain to any particular -port for an overseas destination, the necessary facilities for through -journeys by rail, in the shortest possible time, already existed. - -In effect, the nearest approach to purely strategical lines in Great -Britain is to be found, perhaps, in those which connect military camps -with the ordinary railways; yet, while these particular lines may -have been built to serve a military purpose, they approximate less to -strategical railways proper, as understood in Germany, than to branch -lines and sidings constructed to meet the special needs of some large -industrial concern. - -Generally speaking, the attitude of Parliament and of British -authorities in general has not been sympathetic to suggestions of -strategical railways, even when proposals put forward have had the -support of the War Office itself. - -This tendency was well shown in connection with the Northern Junction -Railway scheme which was inquired into by a Select Committee of the -House of Commons in 1913. Under the scheme in question, a railway was -to be constructed from Brentford, on the west of London, to Wood Green, -on the north, passing through Acton, Ealing, Wembley Park, Hampstead -and Finchley, and establishing connections with and between several of -the existing main-line systems. In this respect it compared with those -"outer circle" railway systems which, as a further result of the war of -1870-71, were expressly designed by the French Government for the better -defence of Paris. - -The Northern Junction scheme was introduced to the Select Committee -as one which, among other considerations, "would be important from a -military point of view for moving troops from one point to another -without taking them through London." Lieut.-General Sir J. S. Cowans, -Quartermaster-General, a member of the Army Council responsible for -the movement of troops, and deputed by the Secretary for War to give -evidence, said: - - The proposed line would be a great advantage in time of - emergency if it was constructed in its entirety. The Army - Council felt that it would provide important routes between - the South of England and East Anglia and the North. At present - trains had to come from Aldershot to Clapham Junction by the - South-Western line, and be there broken up and sent over - congested City lines on to the Great Northern. By the proposed - line military trains could be handled without dividing them and - be transferred to the Great Northern or Great Eastern without - being sent over the congested City lines. - -Strong opposition was offered, however, on the ground that the -construction of the line would do "irreparable damage" to the amenities -of the Hampstead Garden Suburb; and, after a sitting which extended -over several days, the Committee threw out the Bill, the Chairman -subsequently admitting that "they had been influenced very largely by -the objection of the Hampstead Garden Suburb." - -In 1914 the scheme was introduced afresh into the House of Commons, with -certain modifications, the proposed line of route no longer passing -through the Hampstead Garden Suburb, though near to it. One member -of the House said he had collaborated in promoting the Bill because -"he most earnestly believed this railway was of vital import to the -mobilisation of our troops in time of emergency"; but another declared -that the alleged military necessity for the railway was "all fudge," -while much was now said as to the pernicious effect the line would have -on the highly-desirable residential district of Finchley. In the result -strategical considerations were again set aside, and the House rejected -the Bill by a majority of seventy-seven. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[29] Colonel McMurdo had special qualifications for the post. -Becoming a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army in October, 1853, he was -Assistant-Adjutant-General at Dublin from May, 1854, to January, -1855. On February 2, 1855, he was entrusted with the duties of -Director-General of the new Land-Transport Corps, and was sent out to -the Crimea, with the local rank of Colonel, to reorganize the transport -service, then in a deplorably defective condition. He is said to have -accomplished this task with great energy and success. Before the close -of the campaign his corps numbered 17,000 men, with 28,000 horses, -mules, etc. He also took over the working of the pioneer military -railway in the Crimea. In 1857 the Land-Transport Corps was converted -into the Military Train, with Colonel McMurdo as Colonel-Commandant. -Early in 1860, when the Volunteer movement was assuming a permanent -character, Colonel McMurdo was appointed Inspector of Volunteers, -and in June of the same year he became Inspector-General, a post he -retained until January, 1865. He was chosen as Colonel of the Inns of -Court Volunteers on January 23, 1865, and his further appointment to -the post of Colonel of the newly-formed Engineer and Railway Volunteer -Staff Corps followed, as stated above, in February, 1865. He was created -K.C.B. in 1881 and G.C.B. in 1893. He died in 1894. - -[30] The names of present members of the Corps will be found in "Hart's -Army List." Under the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907 -the Corps became part of the Territorial Force, and the designation -"Volunteer" was dropped from its title, which since that date has been -"The Engineer and Railway Staff Corps." - -[31] "The Conveyance of Troops by Railway." By Col. J. S. Rothwell, -R.A., Professor of Military Administration, Staff College, _United -Service Magazine_, Dec., 1891, and Jan., 1892. - -[32] Detailed information as to the capacity of British rolling stock; -composition of trains required for units at war strength; truck space -taken up by Army vehicles; standard forms of reports on existing -railways, and other matters, is published in the official publication -known as "Railway Manual (War)." - -[33] _The Railway Magazine_, May, 1901. - -[34] For details as to the nature of the organisation by which these -results were effected, see an article on "The Great Eastern Railway -and the Army Manoeuvres in East Anglia--1912," by H. J. Prytherch, -in the _Great Eastern Railway Magazine_ for November, 1912. In the -_Great Western Railway Magazine_ for November, 1909, there are given, -under the heading, "The Transport of an Army," some details concerning -the military transport on the Great Western system during the Army -manoeuvres of that year. The traffic conveyed was, approximately, 514 -officers, 14,552 men, 208 officers' horses, 2,474 troop horses, 25 guns, -34 limbers, and 581 wagons and carts. "The military authorities and the -Army contractors," it is said, "expressed their pleasure at the manner -in which the work was performed by the Company's staff." - -[35] "General Principles, Organisation and Equipment of Royal -Engineers," _Royal Engineers Journal_, February, 1910. - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -MILITARY RAILWAYS - - -By the expression "military railways" is meant lines of railways which, -as distinct from commercial lines serving public purposes, have been -designed expressly for military use. The fact that any line forming -part of the ordinary railway system of the country is employed for the -conveyance of troops either direct to the theatre of war or to some port -for embarkation therefrom does not constitute that line a "military" -railway, in the strict sense of the term, whatever the extent of its -use for military transport for the time being. Such line remains a -commercial railway, all the same, and the application to it of the -designation "military" is erroneous. - -Military railways proper fall mainly into two groups--(1) "field" -or "siege" railways, constructed on the theatre of war for moving -heavy guns, platform materials, etc., to their position; conveying -ammunition and supplies to siege batteries, magazines, advanced -trenches or bombproofs; bringing up reinforcements rapidly in case of -a sortie; conveying working-parties to and from their work; removing -sick and wounded to the rear, and other kindred purposes, the loads -being generally hauled by animals, by gasoline motor or by men; and -(2) "supply" railways, specially constructed to convey troops, stores, -etc., from the base to the front, in time of war, or from an ordinary -main-line railway to a military camp or depôt in time of peace, where -local lines of railway are not available for the purpose. - -These two main groups include various types of railways coming under -one or the other designation, and ranging from a very light portable -tramway, put down at express speed to serve an emergency, and worked -by small engines, mules or horses, to substantially built lines, of -standard gauge, designed both to be worked by locomotives and to carry -the largest possible number of troops or amount of freight. - -In any case, the details of construction, equipment and operation of -a military railway vary from those of a commercial railway since the -one would be intended to serve only a specific and possibly temporary -purpose, in the attainment of which the question of speed would be a -secondary consideration, whereas the other would require to assume -a permanent form, be capable of higher speeds, and afford adequate -guarantee of safety for the public, by whom it would be used. The -building, also, of a military railway may be, and generally is, carried -out by a corps of Railway Troops to which are specially delegated -the duties of laying, working, maintaining, repairing, restoring or -destroying railways; and, provided the desired lines were built with -sufficient dispatch, and answered the desired purpose, the military -commanders who would alone be concerned might well be satisfied. - -In many different ways the resort to military railways, whatever -their particular type, has greatly extended the range of advantages -to be gained from the application of rail-power to war. A full record -of all that has been accomplished in this direction could hardly be -attempted here; but a few typical examples of what has been done in this -direction--though not always with conspicuous success--may be offered. - - -THE CRIMEAN WAR - -The earliest instance of a purely military railway being constructed -to serve the purpose of a campaign occurred in the Crimean War; and, -although the line then made would to-day be regarded as little more than -an especially inefficient apology for a railway, it was looked upon at -the time as a remarkable innovation in warfare. It further established a -precedent destined to be widely followed in later years. - -Between the camp of the allies at Sebastopol and their base of supplies -at Balaklava the distance was only seven or eight miles; yet in the -winter of 1854-55 the fatigue parties sent for rations, clothing, fuel, -huts, ammunition and other necessaries were frequently no less than -twelve hours in doing the return journey. The reason was that during -the greater part of that time they were floundering in a sea of mud. -The soil of the Crimea is clay impregnated with salt, and, under the -combined influence of climatic conditions and heavy traffic, the route -between camp and base had been converted into a perfect quagmire. -Horses, mules and carts were, at first, alone available for transport -purposes; but, although plenty of animals were to be obtained in the -surrounding country, only a limited number could be employed by reason -of the lack of forage, a totally inadequate supply having been sent -out from England. As for the animals that were used, their sufferings, -as the result of those terrible journeys, their own shortage of food, -and the effect of the intense cold on their half-starved bodies, were -terrible. "In the rear of each Division," says General Sir Edward -Hamley, in "The War in the Crimea," "a scanty group of miserable ponies -and mules, whose backs never knew what it was to be quit of the saddle, -shivered, and starved, and daily died." They died, also, on every -journey to or from the base. The toil of going through the quagmire -even for their own forage, or of bringing it back when they had got it, -was too great for them, and the whole line of route was marked by their -remains. - -As for the troops, they experienced great hardships owing to the -inadequate supplies of provisions and fuel at the camp, although there -might be plenty of both at the base. Apart from the physical conditions -of the roads, or apologies for roads, between the two points, the -campaign was begun without transport arrangements of any kind whatever. -A transport corps formed for the British Army in 1799, under the title -of the Royal Wagon Train, had been disbanded in 1833, and, whether from -motives of economy or because the need for war preparations in time -of peace was not sufficiently appreciated, no other corps had been -created to take its place. Hence the troops sent to the Crimea were -required, at the outset, to look after the transport themselves, and in -many instances they even had to do the work of mules and horses. It was -not until January 24, 1855, that a Land Transport Corps, composed of -volunteers from various arms of the service, was raised by Royal Warrant -and began to provide for a defect in the military organisation which -had, in the meantime, involved the allies, and especially the British, -in severe privations owing to the frequent shortage of supplies. -The original intention to establish a depôt at head-quarters before -Sebastopol had had to be abandoned because of the hopelessness of any -attempt to get a sufficient surplus of provisions to form a store. - -Such were the conditions that the pioneer military railway was designed -to remedy. Built, at a very slow rate, by English contractors, who -arrived at the Crimea with their men and material during the month -of January, 1855, the line was a single-track one, with a 4 feet 8½ -inch gauge. For the first two miles from Balaklava it was worked by a -locomotive. Then the trucks were drawn up an incline, eight at a time, -by a stationary engine. Six horses next drew two trucks at a time up -another incline. After this came a fairly level piece of road, followed -by two gullies where each wagon was detached in succession and made to -run down one side of the gully and up the other by its own momentum. -Then horses were again attached to the trucks and so drew them, finally, -to the end of the line on the Upland. - -Five locomotives, of from 12 to 18 tons weight, were provided, and -there were about forty ordinary side-tip ballast wagons--all entirely -unsuitable for use on a military railway. - -At first the men belonging to the contractors' staff--navvies and -others--were entrusted with the working of the line. The question had -been raised as to whether their services should not be made use of in -other directions, as well. On their being sent out from England the -idea was entertained that they might construct trenches and batteries, -in addition to building the railway, and there was a suggestion that -they should, also, join the siege parties in the attack on Sebastopol. -In order to test the question (as recorded by Major-General Whitworth -Porter, in his "History of the Corps of Royal Engineers"), Sir John -Burgoyne wrote to Mr. Beattie, principal engineer of the Railway -Department, asking if he would approve of an invitation being given to -the men to undergo such training as would qualify them to defend any -position in which they might happen to be. In his answer Mr. Beattie -wrote:-- - - The subject of your letter was very fully and anxiously - discussed in London before I left, and it was determined _not_ - to arm the men. They were considered too valuable to be used as - soldiers, and were distinctly told that they would not be called - upon to fight. - -Their value, however, did not stand the test it underwent when they -were called on to work the railway they had built. They were found to -be lacking in any sense of discipline; they repeatedly struck work when -their services were most urgently needed, and they had to be got rid of -accordingly. They were replaced by men from the Army Works Corps and the -Land Transport Corps, then in operation in the Crimea, and the members -of the new staff--constituting a disciplined force--worked admirably. -Major Powell, who became traffic manager of the line in March, 1855, -and chief superintendent in the following July, has said concerning -them[36]:-- - - Many lost their lives in the execution of their duty. When - I required them to work night and day to throw forward supplies - for the great struggle--the capture of Sebastopol--several of - them remained seventy-two hours continuously at work. - -The quantities of ammunition and stores which could be carried were -below the requirements of the troops engaged in the siege operations; -but during the last bombardment of Sebastopol--when the line was worked -continuously, night and day, by a staff increased to about 1,000 men, of -whom 400 were Turks--the transport effected rose from 200 tons a day, -the limit attained under operation by the undisciplined navvies, to -700 tons. The line also did excellent work on the re-embarkment of the -troops at the end of the campaign. - - -AMERICAN CIVIL WAR - -In the American War of Succession, the existing lines of railway -were supplemented in various instances by "surface railroads," which -consisted of rails and sleepers laid on the ordinary ground without -any preparation of a proper road bed, yet serving a useful purpose, -notwithstanding the rough and ready way in which they were put together. - - -THE ABYSSINIAN CAMPAIGN - -How a railway specially constructed for the purpose may assist a -military expedition in the prosecution of a "little war" in an -uncivilised country, practically devoid of roads, and offering great -physical difficulties, was shown on the occasion of the British Campaign -in Abyssinia in 1867-68; though the circumstances under which the -line in question was built were not in themselves creditable to the -authorities concerned. - -Sent to effect the release of the British prisoners whom King Theodore -was keeping in captivity at Magdala, the expedition under Sir Robert -Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala) entered upon what was to be -quite as much an engineering as a military exploit. Not only was Magdala -300 miles from Annesley Bay, the base of operations on the Red Sea, but -it stood, as a hill fortress, on a plateau more than 9,000 feet above -the sea-level. To reach it meant the construction of roads in three -sections. The first, which, in parts, had to be cut in the mountain -side, rose to a height of 7,400 feet in 63 miles; the second allowed -of no more than a cart road, and the third and final stage was a mere -mountain track where the only transport possible was that of mules or -elephants. - -When, in October, 1867, the advance Brigade landed at Zoulla, the port -in Annesley Bay from which the advance inland was to be made, they took -with them the materials for some tramway lines intended to connect -two landing piers with the depôts it was proposed to establish a mile -inland. In November these plans were altered in favour of a line of -railway, twelve miles in length, from the landing-place to Koomayleh, at -the entrance of the Soroo Pass, the route to be taken by the expedition -on its journey to the Abyssinian highlands. All the necessary plant -was to be supplied by the Government of Bombay, who also undertook to -provide the labour; but it was the middle of January, 1868, before a -real start could be made with the work. - -Even then, as told by Lieut. Willans, R.E.,[37] who took part in the -expedition, the progress made was extremely slow. The rails obtained -from different railway companies in India were of five different -patterns, of odd lengths, and varying in weight from 30 lb. to 65 lb. -a yard. Some of them had been in use many years on the harbour works -at Karachi, had been taken up and laid down several times, and had, -also, been bent to fit sharp curves or cut to suit the original line. -Some single-flanged rails had been fitted in the Government workshops -at Bombay with fish-plates and bolts; but the holes in the plates and -rails were not at uniform distances, and the bolts fitted the holes so -tightly as to allow of no play. Then, when the rails arrived, no spikes -came with them, and without spikes they could not be laid. When the -spikes followed, it was found that the augurs for boring holes in the -sleepers had been left at Bombay, to come on by another ship; though -this particular difficulty was met by the artisans of the 23rd Punjab -Pioneer Regiment making augurs for themselves. - -If the rails gave much trouble--and even when they had been laid it was -no unusual thing for them to break between two sleepers and throw the -engine off the line--the locomotives and rolling stock caused still -more. - -Six locomotives were shipped from Bombay; but, owing to the great -difficulty in landing and the labour involved in putting them together, -only four were used. Of these, one was a tank engine which, although -just turned out from the railway workshops at Bombay, required new -driving wheels after it had been running a fortnight. Another came with -worn-out boiler tubes, and these had to be replaced at Zoulla. The -two others, tank engines with only four wheels each, had previously -seen many years' service at Karachi. All the engines were very light, -weighing with coal and water from 16 to 20 tons each. The best of them -could do no more than draw fifteen small loaded trucks up an incline of -one in sixty. - -The sixty wagons sent were ordinary trolleys having no springs, no -spring buffers and no grease boxes. Their axle-boxes were of cast iron, -and wore out within a fortnight, owing to the driving sand. As the -railway came into use, every truck was loaded to its fullest capacity, -and the combination of this weight with the jarring and oscillation on a -very rough line led either to the breaking of the coupling chains or to -the coupling bars being pulled from the wagons at starting. When fresh -coupling chains were asked for it was found that the boxes containing -them had either been left behind at Bombay or were buried beneath -several hundred tons of other supplies on board ship. At least forty per -cent. of the trucks were either constantly under repair or had to be put -aside as unfit for use. In May a number of open wagons with springs and -spring buffers arrived from Bombay. Some of these were converted into -passenger carriages. - -Difficulties arose in other directions, besides. - -The plant forwarded was adapted to the Indian standard gauge of 5 feet -6 inches, and was heavy and difficult to handle, especially under the -troublesome conditions of landing. To-day, of course, a narrow-gauge -railway, easily dealt with, would be employed in circumstances such as -those of the Abyssinian expedition. - -The Indian natives who had been sent in the first instance to construct -the line were found unsuitable, and had to be replaced by gangs of -Chinese picked up in Bombay. The latter worked well and gave no trouble. - -The country through which the line was laid was timberless, if not, -also, practically waterless. Wells had to be sunk for the water wanted -for the locomotives and the working-parties. - -The heat was excessive. The temperature at times was 180 degrees Fahr. -in the sun. English navvies could not have made the line at all. - -The two piers where the incoming vessels could alone be unloaded got -so congested with traffic that it was only with the greatest trouble -railway material could be landed. - -Use began to be made of the line as soon as any of it was ready, and the -traffic at the shore end at once became so heavy that it was difficult -to get materials and supplies through to the construction parties at -the other end. Officers, also, who should have been superintending the -construction had to devote a good deal of time, instead, to details of -operation, or to looking after the repairs of rolling stock. - -In all these circumstances one cannot be surprised at the slow rate of -progress made. One may, rather, wonder that the line got built at all. -As it was, four months were spent on eleven miles of railway, or a total -of twelve miles including sidings. There remained still another mile or -so to be built when, at the end of April, news arrived that the object -of the expedition had been attained, and that Magdala had fallen. It was -then decided not to complete the line, but to devote all energies to -preparing for the heavy traffic to be dealt with in the conveyance of -troops, baggage and stores on the return journey. - -From the middle of May to the middle of June the resources of the line -were severely taxed; but a great improvement had been made in the -working arrangements, and a railway which had involved so much trouble -in the making was eventually found to be of great practical service. -Lieutenant Willans says of it:-- - - The Abyssinian railway was a great success, if one may gauge - it by the amount of assistance it gave to the expedition, by - the celerity and dispatch with which, by its aid, stores were - landed and brought up to the store sheds, and by the rapidity - and ease with which the troops and their baggage were brought - back and re-embarked at once.... - - As an auxiliary to the expedition, and as an additional - means of transport, no one who had anything to do in connection - with it can have doubted its extreme utility. - -Faulty, therefore, as had been the conditions under which the line -was constructed, the results nevertheless established definitely the -principle that, in such campaigns as the one in Abyssinia, military -railways might serve an extremely useful purpose in facilitating the -transport of troops and supplies. - -The Abyssinian experiences did, however, further show the desirability -of any country likely to find itself in a position requiring the -construction of military railways--as an aid to wars small or -great--creating in advance an organisation designed to enable it, as far -as possible, to meet promptly whatever emergency might arise, without -the risk of having to deal with defective material, unsatisfactory -labour, and administrative mismanagement. - -The same lesson was to be enforced by other expeditions in which -England has taken part, and, down to the period when improvements in -our system--or lack of system--began to be effected, there was much -scope for criticism as to the way in which military railways, designed -to facilitate operations undertaken in countries having a lack of -communications, had been either constructed or worked. Writing, in -1882, in the "Professional Papers" of the Royal Engineers (Chatham) on -"Railways for Military Communication in the Field," Col. J. P. Maquay, -R.E., observed in regard to what had been the experiences to that date:-- - - In most of the wars that England has undertaken during - the past thirty years, attempts have been made to construct - railways for the transport of stores and materials from the base - of operations. This base must necessarily be on the sea coast - for a country situated as England is. These railways have not - been successful chiefly because, when war had broken out, such - material was hastily got together as seemed most suitable to - the occasion; and, further, the construction of these lines was - not carried out on any system. It is not surprising, therefore, - that our military railways were never completed in time to be - of much use to the troops they were intended to serve. - - -FRANCO-GERMAN WAR - -In the Franco-German War of 1870-71 the Germans constructed two military -railways--(1) a line, twenty-two miles in length, connecting Remilly, on -the Saarbrück Railway, with Pont à Mousson, on the Metz-Frouard line; -and (2) a loop line, three miles long, passing round the tunnel at -Nanteuil, blown up by the French. - -Special interest attached to these two lines inasmuch as they were the -result of construction work done, not in anticipation of a war, or even -immediately preceding hostilities, but during the course of an active -campaign. In addition to this, they afforded an opportunity for showing -what Prussia could do, under pressure, with the Construction Corps she -had formed in order, among other things, to meet just such contingencies -as those that now arose. - -At the beginning of the war the Prussian General Staff had (according to -Rüstow) assumed that Metz would offer a prolonged resistance, and that -the defenders would be certain to make an attempt to interrupt the rail -communication between Germany and her troops in the field. To meet the -position which might thus be created, it was decided to build from Pont -à Mousson to Remilly a field railway which, avoiding Metz, would link up -at Remilly with the line proceeding thence to Saarbrück, and so ensure -the maintenance of direct rail communication to and from Germany. On -August 14, 1870, the day of the rearguard action at Borny, the survey -and the levelling of the ground were begun, and three days later a start -was made with the construction. Altogether some 4,200 men were employed -on the work, namely, 400 belonging to two Field Railway Companies; 800 -forming four Fortress Pioneer Companies, and about 3,000 miners from the -colliery districts of Saarbrück who had been thrown out of work owing to -the war and accepted employment on the railway. The building corps had -at their disposal a park of 330 wagons and other vehicles, and patrol -and requisition duties were performed for them by a squadron of Cavalry. - -Notwithstanding that so considerable a force was available for the -purpose, the work of building the twenty-two miles of railway took -forty-eight days, the line not being ready for operation until October -4. This was in no way a great achievement, and it did not compare -favourably with much that was done by the Federal Construction Corps -employed in the American War of Secession. It is true that the -irregularities of the ground were such as to render necessary numerous -cuttings and embankments, and that two bridges and two viaducts had -to be provided; but the cuttings were only about 3 feet deep, and the -embankments were only 5 feet high, except near one of the viaducts, -where they were 10 feet high. The viaducts and bridges were of timber, -with spans of about 16 feet. The building of the line was, therefore, in -no way a formidable undertaking, from an engineering point of view. - -Not only, however, did it take over 4,000 men nearly fifty days to make -twenty-two miles of line, but the work had been done in such a way that -when the autumn rains came on the track settled in many places; traffic -on the lines became very dangerous; one of the bridges was washed away -by the floods, and almost as many men had to be put on to do repairs as -had previously been employed for the construction. Traffic of a very -moderate description--each locomotive drawing only four wagons at a -time--was carried on for just twenty-six days, and then, happily for the -engineers concerned, the developments in and around Metz rendered the -line no longer necessary. - -How the restoration of the traffic interrupted through the explosion of -French mines in the tunnel at Nanteuil occupied from September 17 to -November 22 has already been told on page 128. - - -RUSSO-TURKISH WAR - -In the opinion of one English military critic, what short lines were -made in the Franco-German War "were neither so speedily constructed -nor so successful in result as to encourage the idea that lines of any -length could be made during a campaign"; but a different impression -is to be derived from the story of what was accomplished in the same -direction in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. - -Russia planned her campaign against Turkey in the hope and expectation -that it would be short, sharp and decisive. She started her mobilisation -in good time, that is to say, in November, 1876, although she did -not declare war until April 24, 1877. Making the mistake, however, -of despising her foe, she anticipated no serious opposition from the -Turks, but expected, rather, to paralyse them by a rapid advance, have a -triumphal march to Constantinople, secure the desired safeguards for the -Christians in Turkey, and see the war over before the end of the summer. - -One reason why Russia specially desired to bring the campaign to so -early a conclusion lay in the deficient and precarious nature of the -rail communication. Under a convention which had been agreed to with -Rumania on April 16, 1877, Russia was to have a free passage for her -troops through that country. She was, also, to have the use of the -Rumanian railways and of all their transport facilities. But the only -line then running through Rumania was one that went from Galatz, on the -Russo-Rumanian frontier, to Bucharest, and thence (with a branch to -Slatina) to Giurgevo, on the Danube, where it connected with a Bulgarian -line from Rustchuk, on the south of the river, to Varna, the Turkish -base of supplies on the Black Sea. Not only was the Rumanian railway -system thus limited in extent, but the lines had been indifferently -constructed, they were badly maintained, and they had an inadequate -personnel together with an insufficiency both of rolling stock and of -terminal facilities. Still further, the fact that the Russian railways -had a broader gauge than the railways of Rumania (among other European -countries) caused great delay in the transfer, at the frontier, from the -one system to the other, not alone of 200,000 men, but of the 850 field -and 400 siege guns, of the ammunition, and of much other material the -troops required to take with them. The alternative to dependence on the -railway was a resort to roads impassable in wet weather. - -What really caused the Russian plans to miscarry, however, was the -obstinate defence of Plevna by Osman Pasha, who took up his position -there on July 19, subjected the Russians to successive repulses, and did -not capitulate until December 10, the siege costing the Russians 55,000 -men and the Rumanians 10,000. - -When it was realised that the check at Plevna rendered certain a -prolongation of the campaign, Russia set about the construction of -a series of new lines of railway during the course of the war. The -principal lines thus taken in hand were:-- - -1. A line in Russia, from Bender, on the Dniester, to Galatz, -establishing direct communication between the Odessa railways and the -Rumanian frontier, and affording improved facilities for the sending of -reinforcements to the seat of war. - -2. A line from Fratesti, on the Bucharest-Giurgevo Railway, to Simnitza, -the point on the north bank of the Danube where, on the night of June -26-7, the Russians built the bridge which enabled them to cross the -river. - -3. A line from Sistova, on the south side of the Danube, to Tirnova -(Bulgaria), situate about thirty miles south-east of Plevna, and about -twenty-five north of the Shipka Pass. - -Of these three lines the construction of the first, 189 miles in -length, was begun at the end of July, 1877. The original intention -was to build a railway to serve the purposes of the war only; but the -conclusion that ulterior strategical and commercial purposes would -alike be served by linking up Odessa with the Rumanian frontier led -to the building of a railway likely to be of permanent usefulness. -The line was a single-track one, with a sufficient number of stations -and passing places to allow of the running of seven trains in each -direction in the twenty-four hours. The construction, carried out by -contract, involved the building of a number of timber bridges and the -provision of several embankments, one of which was over three miles in -length. Great difficulties were experienced in regard to labour, and -especially by reason of the refusal of the men to work either on Sundays -or on their numerous saints' days. Trains were, nevertheless, running -on the line within 100 days of the construction being started, and this -notwithstanding the fact that the number of actual working days had been -only fifty-eight. Whereas, therefore, the Germans had, in 1870, with the -help of a Construction Corps over 4,000 strong, taken forty-eight days -to build twenty-two miles of railway between Pont à Mousson and Remilly, -the Russians in 1877 built, by contract, 189 miles of railway in just -over double the same period. - -A railway from Fratesti to Simnitza had become indispensable inasmuch -as the main line of communication for the Russian Army could not be -continued for an indefinite period along the forty miles of defective -roads--speedily worn out by the heavy traffic--which separated the -Bucharest-Giurgevo line from the bridge built across the Danube. The -only important earthwork necessary was an embankment a mile and a half -long and fourteen feet high. The bridges to be provided included one -of 420 feet and two of 210 feet each. In this instance the troubles -experienced were due to the difficulty in getting the necessary -materials for the work of construction owing partly to the existing -Rumanian lines being blocked with military traffic, and partly to the -state of the roads and to the use of all available draught horses for -Army transport purposes. There could thus be no great celerity shown in -construction, and the forty miles of railway, begun in the middle of -September, were, in fact, not ready for working until the beginning of -December. - -Like difficulties were experienced, though to a still more acute degree, -in regard to the Sistova-Tirnova line, the length of which was to be -seventy-five miles; and here only the earthworks could be finished -before the end of the campaign. - -What, however, had been accomplished during the time the war was in -progress was (1) the completion of 229 miles of new railway, and the -making of the road-bed for another seventy-five miles, together with the -carrying out of a number of minor railway works; (2) the acquisition, -by purchase in different countries, of 120 locomotives and 2,150 wagons -and trucks, all new, and (3) the provision of a steam railway ferry -across the Danube.[38] - -So the development of the rail-power principle in warfare was -carried still further by this construction, during the course of the -Russo-Turkish conflict, of a greater length of railways, designed for -military use, than had ever been built under like conditions before. -The world gained a fresh lesson as to the importance of the rôle played -by railways in war, and it was offered, also, a striking example of -what could be done in the way of rapidly providing them in a time of -emergency. - -On the other hand it had to be remembered that, of the three railways in -question, the one which included 189 miles out of the total 229 miles -built was constructed on Russian territory where there was no danger of -interruption by the enemy, while the delays which occurred with the two -other lines, owing to the congestion of traffic, under war conditions, -on existing railways depended upon for the supply of materials, seemed -to point (1) to the risk that might, from this cause, be run if the -building of lines necessary or desirable in the interests of some -prospective campaign were left until the outbreak of hostilities, and -(2) to the wisdom of constructing all such lines, as far as necessary -and practicable, in time of peace. - - -THE SUDAN - -If we turn now to the Sudan, we gain examples of military railways -which, designed for the purposes of war, and constructed, in part, -during the progress of active hostilities, first rendered great services -in facilitating the conquest of a vast area, and then developed into a -system of Government railways operated, in turn, for the purposes of -peace, and accomplishing results as conspicuously successful in the -latter direction as they had previously done in the former. - -During the time that Saïd Pasha was Viceroy of Egypt (1854-63) there -was brought forward a scheme for the linking up of Egypt and the Sudan -by means of a single line of railway from Cairo to Khartoum, with a -branch to Massowa, on the Red Sea. It was an ambitious proposal, and, -if it could have been carried into effect, the opening up of the Sudan -to civilisation, by means of an iron road, might have altered the -whole subsequent history of that much-suffering land. But the cost was -regarded as prohibitive, and the scheme was abandoned for a time, to -be revived, however, in a modified form in 1871, when Ismail Pasha was -Khedive. It was then proposed that the line should start at Wady Halfa -and be continued to Matemmeh (Shendy), situate about 100 miles north of -Khartoum--a total distance of 558 miles. In 1875 a beginning was made -with the building of this railway, which was to consist of a single -line, with a gauge of 3 feet 6 inches, and was to be made with 50-lb. -rails and 7-ft. sleepers; but when, in 1877, after an expenditure of -about £400,000, the railway had been carried no farther than Sarras, -thirty-three and a half miles from the starting-point, it was stopped -for lack of funds. - -In the autumn of 1884 the British expedition to Khartoum, where General -Gordon was endeavouring to maintain his position against the Mahdi's -followers, was resolved upon, and it was then decided to extend the -Sudan Railway beyond the point already reached, at Sarras, in order to -facilitate still further the journey of the troops along the valley of -the Nile, which had been selected as the route of the expedition. - -Platelaying for the extension was begun in September by a party of -English and Egyptian infantry and native labourers, afterwards joined -by the 4th Battalion Egyptian Army and the 8th (Railway) Company of the -Royal Engineers. While, however, materials previously stored at Sarras -were found to be still available, the trucks containing rails, etc., -for the extension work had to be pushed by hand from Sarras to railhead -owing to the absence of engines; sleepers were carried on the backs of -camels, of which 300 were employed for the purpose, and the coolie work -was entrusted to 700 native labourers, mainly old men and boys, most -of whom had deserted by the end of October, when further platelaying -was discontinued. By that time the extension works had reached the -thirty-ninth mile, and the line from Sarras to this point was opened on -December 4. - -Following on the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon in January, -1885, came the decision to extend the line to Firket (103 miles), in -view of a then projected further campaign in the autumn of that year. -The extension was sanctioned towards the end of February; fifty-two -miles of permanent way were ordered from England; 300 platelayers -and railway mechanics were obtained from India, to supplement the -construction forces already available; and on August 7 the extension was -completed as far as Akasha (87 miles). - -Meanwhile, however, there had been a change of policy which affected -the whole situation. On the return of the expeditionary force to -Korti (situate at the southern extremity of the great Nile bend), the -whole of the country to the south thereof passed under the control of -the Dervishes; and the British Government, reluctant at that time to -enter on the formidable task of reconquest, decided that no further -military operations should be taken in hand, and that the Sudan must be -definitely abandoned. Orders were accordingly given by Lord Wolseley in -May, 1885, for the withdrawal of the troops from all stations south of -Dongola, which itself was abandoned on June 15, the retreat continuing -as far as Akasha. Beyond this point, therefore, platelaying for the -proposed railway extension was not carried, although the formation -levels had been completed to Firket. - -Subsequently the British retreat was continued to Wady Halfa, which then -became the southern frontier of Egypt, the railway extension thence to -Akasha, together with all posts to the south of Wady Halfa, being also -abandoned. - -Excellent service had, nevertheless, been rendered by the railway, as -far as it was carried. - -Operation of the line had been taken over by the 8th (Railway) Company, -R.E., who, at the outset, had at their disposal only five more or less -decrepit locomotives, fifty open trucks, five covered goods vans, and -six brake vans. The troops were conveyed in the open trucks, and by the -end of 1884 all the stores for the opening of the campaign had been -passed up. During the course of 1885 additional locomotives and rolling -stock were obtained from the Cape. - -Summing up the work done on the Sudan Military Railway for the Nile -Expedition of 1884-5, Lieut. M. Nathan, R.E.,[39] says that it included -(1) the repair and maintenance of thirty-three and a half miles of -existing railway; (2) the construction of fifty-three and a half -miles of new line through a nearly waterless desert, with no means of -distributing material except the line itself; (3) the transport, for -the most part with limited and indifferent stock, of about 9,000 troops -round the worst part of the second cataract when going up the river, and -round nearly the whole of it when coming down; and (4) the carriage of -40,000 tons for an average distance of thirty-six and a half miles. - -As against what had thus been achieved in the Nile Valley must be set a -failure on the Red Sea. - -When, on the fall of Khartoum in January, 1885, the British Government -first decided on an extension of the Nile Valley Railway, they further -resolved on the building of a military railway from Suakin to Berber, -on the Nile, in order to have a second line of communication available -for Lord Wolseley's Army; and an Anglo-Indian force was sent to Suakin, -under the command of General Sir Gerald Graham, in order, first, to -defeat the Dervishes in the Eastern Sudan, and then to protect the -construction of the proposed railway. Such a line would obviously have -been of great strategical value to a Nile expeditionary force; but -the attempt to build it broke down owing, in part, to the defective -nature of the organisation resorted to, though still more to the active -opposition of the enemy. - -Sir Andrew Clarke, Inspector-General of Fortifications, had from the -first advocated that the line should be supplied and laid by the -military engineering strength then available; but he was over-ruled, and -the work was given to an English firm of contractors in the expectation, -as Major-General Whitworth Porter tells, in volume two of the "History -of the Corps of Royal Engineers," "that the necessary material would be -supplied more readily, and in shorter time, through civilian agency." -It was, however, decided to send the 10th (Railway) Company of Royal -Engineers both to carry out some local works in the neighbourhood of -Suakin and to assist the contractors in the longer undertaking; and -this military element was strengthened, not only by a force of Indian -coolies, but, also, by the addition of thirty-nine members of Engineer -Volunteer Corps in England who had enlisted for the campaign, all having -had experience in trades qualifying them for railway work.[40] There was -thus practically a dual system, workable, in the opinion of Sir Andrew -Clarke, "only by a species of compromise which was both unscientific and -uneconomical." - -As for interruptions by the Dervishes, these took the form of constant -attacks both on the line under construction and on the workers. Several -actions were fought, and at Tofrik, near Suakin, the British sustained a -serious loss of life. Posts were erected as the work slowly progressed, -and the bullet-proof train mentioned on page 76 was used for patrolling -the line at night; but in face of all the difficulties experienced the -work was definitely abandoned when only twenty miles of the intended -railway had been completed. The troops were recalled in June, 1885, -the railway material not used was brought back to England, and a line -linking up Suakin (and Port Sudan) with Berber, via Atbara Junction, was -not finally opened until 1906. - -Reverting to the Nile Valley Railway, it is gratifying to be able to -say that the success already spoken of as having been attained in this -direction was but a prelude to still more important developments that -were to follow. - -To prevent the carrying out of schemes which the Dervishes were known to -be preparing for an invasion of Egypt, the British Government decided, -early in 1896, to allow Egypt to resume occupation of the country along -the Nile Valley abandoned at the time of the withdrawal in 1885, and -on March 12, 1896, Sir Herbert (now Earl) Kitchener, who had succeeded -to the command of the Egyptian army in 1892, received instructions -to advance to the south from Wady Halfa. Akasha, the point to which -the Nile Valley Railway had been built, was occupied on March 20, the -Dervishes retreating to Firket. - -As a means towards realising the objects of the expedition, Sir Herbert -Kitchener resolved to continue the railway along the Nile Valley to -Kerma; but this meant the construction of practically a new railway, -since the Dervishes had torn up over fifty of the eighty-seven miles of -the original line between Wady Halfa and Akasha, burning the sleepers -and twisting the rails, while the remainder of the line was in such -a condition that it required relaying. The work of construction was -entrusted to a staff of Royal Engineers operating under Lieut. (now -Major-General Sir E. Percy C.) Girouard, and it was pushed forward with -great energy, the line being urgently required for the forwarding of -stores to the front, and especially so on account of the impediments to -navigation along the Nile due to the cataracts. - -With the help of the railway, so far as it had then been restored, Sir -Herbert Kitchener concentrated a force of 9,000 men at Akasha, and -early in June he made a successful advance on Firket. The Dervishes -retired to Dongola; but it was thought prudent, before following them -up, to await a further extension of the railway. This was completed as -far as Kosha, 116 miles from Wady Halfa, by August 4, 1896. Three weeks -later some heavy rains, lasting three days, were the cause of floods -which, in a few hours, destroyed twelve miles of the newly-constructed -line. The repairs were completed in about a week, but in the same month -there was an outbreak of cholera which carried off a large number of the -working staff. - -Utilising the railway as far as Kosha, Sir Herbert Kitchener -concentrated the whole of his force at Fereig, on the north of the -Kaibar cataract, and from thence a further advance was made to Dongola, -which place the Dervishes made no attempt to defend. - -The immediate purpose of the expedition had thus been attained; but, in -the meantime, a further campaign had been resolved upon for the purpose -of breaking down the power of the Khalifa and effecting the conquest -of Khartoum. To this end the railway was continued another hundred -miles, from Kosha to Kerma, which point was reached in May, 1897. Some -216 miles of railway had thus been completed in about thirteen months, -notwithstanding interruptions which had led to very little progress -being made during five months of this period, and notwithstanding, also, -the fact that construction work had to be carried on simultaneously with -the transport of troops and stores so far as the line had been completed. - -Before, however, Kerma was reached, Sir Herbert Kitchener instructed -the staff of the Royal Engineers to make a survey of the Nubian Desert -with a view to seeing whether or not it would be practicable to build -an alternative line of railway across it from Wady Halfa direct to Abu -Hamed (a distance of 232 miles), thus giving a direct route to Khartoum. - -A survey carried out at the end of 1896 showed that the work was not -likely to present any unsurmountable engineering difficulties, and that -the absence of water could be overcome by the sinking of wells. The -only doubtful point was whether construction could be carried through -without interruption by a still active enemy. - -It was seen that the proposed desert line was likely to be of far -greater importance, both strategically and politically, than a -continuation of the Wady Halfa-Kerma line round the remainder of the -Nile bend. The cutting off of this bend altogether would confer a great -advantage on the Expeditionary Force. It was thus resolved to build the -line, to run the risk of attacks by the enemy, and to push construction -forward with the greatest energy. - -A start was made with the work on May 15, 1897, the staff which had -been engaged on the Nile Valley line to Kerma returning to Wady Halfa -in order to take the desert line in hand. By the end of July, 115 of -the 232 miles of line had been completed, and Sir Herbert Kitchener, -utilising the railway which had already been constructed to Kerma, then -sent a force along the Nile Valley to effect the capture of Abu Hamed. -This was accomplished on August 7, and the constructors of the desert -line were thus enabled to resume their work with greater security and -even accelerated speed. Abu Hamed was reached on October 31, 1897, -the two extreme points of the great Nile bend being thus brought into -communication by a direct line of railway. The construction of the -232 miles of track had been accomplished in five and a half months, -notwithstanding the fact that the work was carried on during the hottest -time of the year. An average length of a mile and a quarter of line -was laid per day, while on one day in October a maximum of three and a -quarter miles was attained. So well, too, had the work been done that -trains carrying 200 tons of stores, drawn by engines weighing, without -tender, fifty tons, were taken safely across the desert at a speed of -twenty-five miles per hour. - -From Abu Hamed the line was at once pushed on in the direction of -Berber, and its value from a military point of view was speedily to -be proved. Receiving information, towards the end of 1897, that the -Dervishes were planning an attack on Berber, Sir Herbert Kitchener sent -to Cairo for a Brigade of British troops to join with the Egyptian -forces then at Berber in opposing this advance, and the Brigade arrived -in January, 1898, having travelled by the desert railway not only to Abu -Hamed, but to a point twenty miles farther south, which then constituted -railhead. Early in March the Anglo-Egyptian Army was concentrated -between Berber and the Atbara river, and the battle of Atbara, fought in -the following month, led to the complete annihilation of the forces sent -by the Khalifa to drive the Egyptians out of Berber. - -There was known to be still an army of 50,000 men in Omdurman, at the -command of the Khalifa; but it was considered desirable, before any -further advance was made by the Anglo-Egyptian forces, to await not -only the completion of the railway to the Atbara but the rise, also, of -the Nile, so that the river would be available for the bringing up of -steamers and gunboats to take part in the attack on Omdurman. - -Once more, therefore, Lieut. Girouard and his staff had to make the most -strenuous efforts, and these were again so successful that the line was -carried to the Atbara early in July. It was of the greatest service in -facilitating the concentration of an Anglo-Egyptian Army, 22,000 strong, -at Wad Hamed, and the victory of Omdurman, on September 2, 1898--when -20,000 of the enemy were killed or wounded--followed by the occupation -of Khartoum, meant the overthrow of the Mahdi, the final reconquest of -the Sudan, and the gaining of a further great triumph in the cause of -civilisation. - -In the account of these events which he gives in volume three of the -"History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers," Colonel Sir Charles M. -Watson says concerning this ultimate outcome of a rebellion which had -lasted, altogether, for a period of eighteen years:-- - - Lord Kitchener, of course, by the skill and determination - with which he conducted the operations to a successful - termination, deserves the principal credit for the happy - conclusion of the campaign. But it must not be forgotten that - a large part of the work was carried out by the officers of - the Royal Engineers, especially those who had charge of the - construction and maintenance of that railway without which, it - is fair to say, the campaign could not have been conducted at - all. - -The final triumph was the more gratifying because, although the desert -railway had contributed so materially thereto, dependence upon it had -not been without an element of serious risk which cannot be told better -than in the words of Lord Cromer, in his book on "Modern Egypt":-- - - The interval which elapsed between the occupation of Abu - Hamed and the final advance on Khartoum was a period of much - anxiety. Sir Herbert Kitchener's force depended entirely on - the desert railway for its supplies. I was rather haunted with - the idea that some European adventurer, of the type familiar - in India a century and more ago, might turn up at Khartoum and - advise the Dervishes to make frequent raids across the Nile - below Abu Hamed with a view to cutting the communication of the - Anglo-Egyptian force with Wady Halfa. This was unquestionably - the right military operation to have undertaken; neither, I - think, would it have been very difficult of accomplishment. - Fortunately the Dervishes ... failed to take advantage of the - opportunity presented to them. To myself it was a great relief - when the period of suspense was over. I do not think that the - somewhat perilous position in which Sir Herbert Kitchener's army - was undoubtedly placed for some time was at all realised by the - public in general. - -Within about two months of the battle of Omdurman the plans were made -for a further extension of the railway from Atbara to Khartoum, and -Khartoum North was reached on the last day of 1899. The construction -of a bridge over the Blue Nile subsequently allowed of trains running -direct into Khartoum. - -To-day this same railway has been carried a distance of 430 miles south -of Khartoum. It continues along the Blue Nile to Sennah, where it turns -to the westward, crosses the White Nile at Kosti, and has its terminus -at El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan Province. What this means is that -an enormous expanse of territory has been opened up both to civilisation -and to commercial development. - -Apart from the important gum trade of which El Obeid is the centre, the -Sudan is pre-eminently a pastoral country. The number of its cattle, -sheep and goats is estimated at "several millions"; it has thousands of -square miles available for cotton-growing, already carried on there for -centuries, and it has wide possibilities in other directions, besides; -though stock-raising and cotton cultivation should alone suffice to -ensure for the Sudan a future of great wealth and commercial importance. - -Beyond the districts immediately served by the extension there are -others which are to be brought into touch with the railway, either -direct or via the Nile, by means of a "roads system" linking up towns -and villages with a number of highways extending to all the frontiers of -the Sudan. On these roads and highways motor traction will, it is hoped, -be gradually substituted for transport animals, the troubles caused by -the tsetse fly and other pests being thus avoided. - -The scheme here in question is certainly an ambitious one, considering -that the Sudan covers an area of 1,000,000 square miles, and is equal -in extent to the whole of British India; but already the outlook is -most promising. For twelve years before its rescue from heathenism by -the British and Egyptian forces in 1898, Khartoum, which formerly had -a population of 50,000, was represented by the mass of ruins to which -it had been reduced by order of the Khalifa. To-day it is a large, -beautiful, and well-built city, possessed of a Governor-General's -palace, cathedrals, a mosque, schools, hospitals, hotels, broad streets, -public gardens, boulevards, imposing business premises, a good water -supply, electric light, tramways, ferries, and other essentials of a -capital city of the most progressive type. Khartoum itself has now about -30,000 inhabitants; in Khartoum North, on the other side of the Blue -Nile, there are 20,000, and in Omdurman 70,000, a total of 120,000 for -the three sister cities. Not only, also, have the natives, once living -under the terror of their oppressors, settled down to peaceful pursuits, -but many thousands of immigrants have come into the Sudan from West -Africa (a striking testimony of the confidence felt by native tribes -in the justice and security of British rule), while great expansion -has taken place in the commercial interests of the Sudan and more -especially in the export of cattle and sheep. - -In the bringing about of these developments, affecting the peace and -prosperity of so huge a country and of so many millions of people, -the Sudan Military Railways have played a leading part. They rendered -possible, in the first instance, the conquest of the Sudan, and then -(save for the now abandoned line from Wady Halfa to Kerma) they became, -with their extensions and improvements, the system of "Sudan Government -Railways," having their branches to-day both from Atbara to Port Sudan -and Suakin, on the Red Sea, and from Abu Hamed to Kareima, on the south -side of the great Nile bend, whence there is free communication by water -to the third cataract at Kerma. Concurrently, also, with the carrying -out of the railway extension schemes, and in order to make greater -provision for the prospective increase of traffic, 460 miles of the line -north of Khartoum were relaid with 75-lb. rails, in place of the 50-lb. -rails originally used, and the whole of the track from Khartoum to El -Obeid was also laid with the heavier rails. - -So we are enabled to regard military railways from still another point -of view--that, namely, in which they may develop into lines of permanent -communication and promote the blessings of peace and security no less -than afford unquestionable advantages in the prosecution of war. Other -examples of a similar kind might be offered from the history of British -rule in Africa; but the record of what has been accomplished in the -Sudan may suffice to establish the further claim here presented as to -the varied purposes that military railways may serve. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[36] See lecture by Capt. C. E. Luard, R.E., on "Field Railways and -their general application in war." Journal of the Royal United Service -Institution, vol. xvii, 1873. - -[37] "The Abyssinian Railway." By Lieut. Willans, R.E. Papers on -Subjects Connected with the Duties of the Corps of Royal Engineers. New -Series. Vol. xviii. 1870. - -[38] "The Construction of Military Railways during the Russo-Turkish -War of 1877-8." By Captain M. T. Sale, R.E. Journal of the Royal United -Service Institution, vol. xxiv, 1881. "De la Construction des Chemins de -Fer en temps de guerre. Lignes construites par l'armée russe pendant la -campagne 1877-78." Par M. P. Lessar, Ingénieur du Gouvernement russe. -Traduit du russe par M. L. Avril. Paris, 1879. - -[39] "The Sudan Military Railway." By Lieut. M. Nathan, R.E. -"Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Occasional -Papers," vol. xi, 1885. - -[40] In his dispatch of May 30, 1885, Sir Gerald Graham said concerning -these Volunteers: "Their services would have been of great value had -the campaign lasted longer. As it was the Volunteers worked well with -their comrades of the Royal Engineers.... It may be considered the first -experiment in associating the Volunteer force with a combatant branch of -the Regular Army on active service." - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR - - -The South African campaign of 1899-1902 afforded to Great Britain and -to British Imperial interests their greatest, most instructive, and, -also, their most anxious experiences, down to that time, not only of -the services railways can render in the conduct of war, but of the -difficulties and complications which may result from their employment, -and especially from dependence on them for the purposes of military -transport; though, in the result, the services so rendered were a -material factor in the success by which the military operations carried -out by the British forces were crowned. - -When the Boers declared war in October, 1899, the various railway -systems, working in direct communication with one another, in South -Africa, had a total length of 4,268 miles, namely, British South Africa, -3,267; the Transvaal, 918; the Orange Free State, 388; and in Portuguese -territory, 55. These railways consisted of single-track, narrow-gauge -lines (3 feet 6 inches), never designed for such heavy traffic as the -transport of an army and all its impedimenta would involve; but it was -obvious from the first that they must needs play a part of paramount -importance in the campaign. Independently of all that was involved in -the conveyance of troops, munitions, supplies, etc., from England to the -Cape, there was the consideration that from Cape Town, the principal -base of our forces, to Pretoria, their eventual objective, the distance -was 1,040 miles. From Port Elizabeth it was 740 miles, and from Durban -511 miles. Journeys such as these could be made only by rail, and -there was seen to be an imperative need, not only for the railways -themselves, but for an organisation which would, among other things, -superintend military rail-transport in order to ensure efficiency in -the movement of troops, stores, etc., and, also, provide for the speedy -repair or rebuilding of damaged lines as well as for the operation of -lines taken possession of in the captured territory. - -In view of the uncertainty of events in the Transvaal, and as a -precautionary measure, the 8th (Railway) Company, Royal Engineers, was -sent out to the Cape in July, 1899; and when, subsequently, the dispatch -of an Army Corps was being arranged by the British Government, it was -decided to create a _Department of Military Railways_, of which Major -Girouard, R.E. (now Major-General Sir E. Percy C. Girouard, K.C.M.G.), -who had rendered such valuable services in connection with military -railways in the Sudan, and was then President of the Egyptian Railway -Administration, was put in charge as "Director of Railways for the South -African Field Force." A number of other Royal Engineer officers who had -had experience of railway work in India and other parts of the British -Empire were selected to serve as Assistant Directors or staff officers -in various capacities, and the 10th (Railway) Company, Royal Engineers, -with the 6th, 20th, 31st and 42nd Fortress Companies, were sent to join -the 8th (Railway) Company in the carrying out of railway work. - - -ORGANISATION AND CONTROL - -The creation of this Department of Military Railways for South Africa -carried still further the development of those questions of organisation -and control which, as we have seen, had already raised important issues -in the United States, in Germany, and in France. - -According to the official "History of the War in South Africa, -1899-1902," the Director and his staff were (1) to be the intermediaries -between the Army and the technical working administration of the -railway; (2) to see that the ordinary working of the railway was carried -on in such a manner as to ensure the greatest military efficiency; -and (3) to satisfy the demands of the Army on the railway without -disorganising the working of the railway system as a whole. - -"In war," the official "History" further declares, "these services are -essential, for the officers of a civil railway administration cannot -discriminate between the demands of the various branches and departments -of the Army, or class them in the order of urgency." This is perfectly -true of the civil railway administration, and it is only what could be -expected of railwaymen who, while competent to discharge their ordinary -railway duties, might not be well versed in military matters, and ought -not to be left with the responsibility of deciding between the possibly -conflicting orders of different military commanders. - -All the same, there was another side to the question; and this is dealt -with by Sir Percy Girouard in his "History of the Railways during the -War in South Africa," wherein he says, in regard to rail transport -conditions in time of war:-- - - Military commanders who have not previously studied the - working of a railway attempt to seize and work the portion of - line nearest to them, regardless of the remainder of the system. - They often look upon trucks as another form of commissariat - wagon which may be kept loaded for an indefinite period. They - expect trains to stop and off-load, or load, on the main line. - They like to have a number of trains ready, either loaded or - unloaded, in case they should be required. They are apt to - give orders for large entrainments and detrainments to be - carried out at any part of the line, regardless of the railway - facilities at that point, although perhaps a suitable place is - within reasonable distance. Frequently they have been known - to countermand their orders for entrainments, heedless of the - fact that, once arrangements have been made to concentrate - rolling stock on a certain place, it takes time to alter these - arrangements, and is sure to cause confusion. Many of them - expect railway accommodation for troops to be on a liberal - scale, and consider that there is no necessity, when close to a - railway, to make any effort to cut down baggage and stores.... - - Commandants of posts on the line, which are very often - placed at railway stations, are inclined to think that, because - they are called "station commandants," it means that they are - in charge of the railway station, and can give orders to railway - officials as to traffic and other matters.... - - Civil railway officials have been heard to say that attacks - by the enemy are not nearly so disturbing to traffic as the - arrival of a friendly General with his force. - -It was under these circumstances that Sir Percy Girouard saw from the -first the necessity for having in South Africa, for the duration of -the war, a staff of officers whose business it would be, as he himself -defines their duties, (_a_) to keep the military commanders fully -informed of the capacity and possibilities of the railway, and to convey -their orders and requests to the civil railway staff; and (_b_) to -protect the civil railway administration from interference by military -commanders and commandants of posts; in fact, to act as intermediaries -between the army and the civil railway officials. - -In arriving at this conclusion Sir Percy was especially impressed by -the rail transport experiences of France in her war with Prussia in -1870-1; and in his Report he gives a digest of Jacqmin's facts and -recommendations by way of further justifying the step that he himself -took. He thought it absolutely necessary that the staff of the Director -of Railways should be paramount on the railway, and that no officer -should be able to give any orders to railway staff officers or other -railway officials unless fighting was actually proceeding at that spot. -"This," he adds, "was the system adopted with great success by the -Germans, the want of which caused such chaos on the French railways, and -the correctness of which has been entirely established by the experience -of this war. It is not too much to say that, unless it had been adopted -in South Africa, the chaos would have been past belief." - -The _Military Railway Controlling-Staff_ created, in accordance with -these principles and policy, to co-operate with the technical working -staff under the Director of Railways, was constituted as follows:-- - -I. An _Assistant-Director of Railways_ for Cape Colony, who was on -the staff both of the Director of Railways and on that of the General -Officer Commanding Lines of Communication, Cape Colony. His business -it was to co-operate with the General Traffic Manager of the Cape -Government Railway, in whose office he was given accommodation. In -this dual capacity it was his duty to inform both the General Officer -Commanding and the Director as to the traffic capacities of the -railways; to take the orders of the G.O.C. while advising him as to the -best method of carrying them out; to inform the railway officials what -was required, and, Sir Percy adds, in giving these details, "to protect -them from interference by unauthorised military officers." It was the -duty, also, of the Assistant-Director to see that proper regulations -were issued to the Army for (_a_) the efficient conduct of entrainments -and detrainments; (_b_) the forwarding of stores, and (_c_) the keeping -of financial accounts in respect to the use made of the lines for -military purposes. As between the General Officer Commanding and the -Chief Traffic Manager, the Assistant-Director of Railways was the sole -channel of communication. - -II. Four _Deputy-Assistant-Directors_, undertaking similar duties over -particular sections of the railway system. - -III. _Railway Staff Officers_, located at leading stations to -superintend all important movements, and constituting the only means of -communication between the Army and the stationmasters. The latter were -to take orders in respect to military requirements from no one else, -and were, in turn, to be protected by the railway staff officers from -interference with by other officers having no authority to give them -direct orders. - -The defective step in the scheme, as originally planned, was in respect -to the railway staff officers, who, of all those constituting the -Military Railway Controlling Staff, were, under Army Regulations, on -the staff of officers commanding lines of communication and thus not -controlled by the Director of Railways. The officers in question, though -charged with the duty of looking after entrainments, detrainments, etc., -were in no way to interfere with the railway staff in the shunting -or marshalling of trains or in regard to the traffic arrangements -generally. For this reason the framers of the Army Regulations had -assumed that there was no need for the railway staff officers to have -any knowledge of railway operation, or to be under the control of others -who did possess such knowledge. - -After the annexation of the Orange Free State railways, the Chief -of the Staff agreed that the railway staff officers in that State -should be under the orders of the Director of Railways through his -Deputy-Assistant-Directors; and a like course was adopted shortly -afterwards in respect to the railway staff officers in Cape Colony. In -this way an undivided chain of responsibility was secured, affording -a much greater guarantee of efficiency alike in control and in actual -operation. - -Concerning the Deputy-Assistant-Directors, Sir Percy Girouard says -they were found to be of great benefit to the railway officials, who -appreciated their work and laboured in hearty co-operation with them; -though they experienced difficulty in establishing their position with -the Generals and Staff officers, to whom the arrangement was an entire -novelty, and one they did not at first understand. - -In the first instance the principle of military control applied -specially to the lines in Cape Colony, those in Natal being still -operated by the Natal Government Railway Department, with certain -assistance in the matter of repairs; though after eighteen months of -war, the military transport system first established in Cape Colony -became uniform throughout British South Africa. - - -TRANSPORT CONDITIONS - -The need for the elaborate organisation thus brought into existence was -all the greater because of the difficulties by which those responsible -for the conduct of military transport were faced. - -In November, 1899, considerable portions of the lines both in Cape -Colony and in Natal were in the possession of the Boers, so that, beyond -a certain distance, the British would have to fight for every mile -of railway before they could make use of it. After, also, regaining -possession of the lines on British territory controlled by the Boers, -they would require first to capture and then to operate those on the -enemy's territory; and in each case they would have to be prepared to -repair the damage the enemy would be certain to do to the lines in order -to prevent their use by the advancing forces. Meanwhile the traffic -must be kept open, as far as possible, for the conveyance of troops and -stores to the theatre of war and for the carrying out of such strategic -movements as the requirements of the military situation might render -necessary, adequate protection of the lines being meanwhile assured. -There were, in fact, occasions when the whole issue of the campaign -seemed to turn upon the question as to whether or not the British could -either secure possession of the railways or, alternatively, repair them -as fast, more or less, as the enemy could demolish them. - -Although, again, so elaborate a system of organisation had been -arranged, there was much that required to be done to adapt it to the -conditions of African warfare. Initial mistakes had to be remedied; -old evils reappeared in new forms; regulations had to be made or -modified according to experiences gained; and, while there was at no -time any general failure of transport, there certainly were partial -failures. Not only was there an inadequate supply of trucks, partly -because of the considerable number in the Boer States at the time of -the declaration of war and partly because of the number locked up in -Kimberley and Mafeking, but trucks were kept loaded when they should -have been promptly unloaded and released for service elsewhere; lines -were seriously blocked at critical moments by these loaded trucks, while -chaos in certain large troop movements was only avoided owing to the -control of Cape Town facilities by the Director's staff and to the fact -that the Deputy-Assistant-Directors of Railways were enabled to have -special officers at all important points. - - -HOW THE SYSTEM WORKED - -As regards the _operation of the railways_ during the war Sir Percy -Girouard says:-- - - Although not, perhaps, so much a matter of railway as of - general staff administration, a word should be said as to the - methods whereby the very limited resources of the single line of - railway communication were allotted to ensure an equal attention - to the requirements of the Army as a whole. - - The allocation of railway facilities was reserved strictly - to the Chief of Staff, without whose order, in each case, - nothing could pass by rail towards the front. The number of - trains, or, more accurately, the number of trucks which could - be hauled daily in the "up" direction, being communicated by - the railway authorities to Lord Kitchener, he placed a number, - liable to vary from day to day, at the disposal of the supply - and remount departments, either generally for the maintenance of - their depôts or for specific traffic. - - The number reserved for hospital, ordnance, engineer and - special stores was even more closely calculated, and the demands - of these departments had to be submitted for approval in the - utmost detail. All authorisations were passed to the railway - representatives at Headquarters, whose business it was to - notify when the total of such orders outstanding for dispatch - from the advanced base was exceeding the accommodation which - could be provided within a reasonable time under the scheme of - proportion in force for the time being. In such case the issue - of permits fell temporarily into abeyance, or the outstanding - list was revised to accord with the necessities of the moment. - No truck could be loaded and no troops dispatched by rail - without such authority, with the single exception of details - and small parties, who were invariably made to travel upon - the loaded supply trucks. Proposed troop movements by rail - requiring separate accommodation had to be carefully considered - in view of the supply traffic they would displace, and, when - time permitted, were generally made by road. It was this system - alone which co-ordinated the railway requirements of the various - departments and did so much to falsify previously accepted - figures as to the limits of the fighting force which could be - maintained by a single line of railway. - - -THE IMPERIAL MILITARY RAILWAYS - -Following the questions which arose as to the working of railways on -British territory within the sphere of the military operations came -those concerning the _railways taken from the enemy_ in the Boer States, -and converted into a system of Imperial Military Railways for which the -Department also became responsible. - -The occupation of Bloemfontein led to that place becoming the base of -supplies for an army of 35,000 men, likely to increase to 100,000, while -eventually the Imperial Military Railways included 1,130 miles of line. -Efficient operation thus became a matter of grave importance, and the -task to be accomplished was one of considerable magnitude, especially -considering that a staff for the working of the system had to be -created. In the traffic and locomotive departments alone no fewer than -3,000 white workers were needed. - -Many of the employés of the Netherlands Railway Company were kept on, -even at the risk of their showing hostility to the British; but the -number who thus made themselves available was quite inadequate, even -if they could all have been trusted. The Cape Government Railways were -drawn on to the fullest possible extent for workers; the Railway and -the Fortress Companies of the Royal Engineers in South Africa were -employed in operating the lines; railwaymen in the Special Railway -Reserve in England were sent for, and, of the remaining posts, from -800 to 1,000 were filled--the approval of the Commander-in-Chief being -first obtained--by inviting soldiers and reservists serving in the Army -who had had experience of railway work in civil life to join the staff -of the Imperial Military Railways, pay at Royal Engineer rates being -guaranteed to them. Positions of the least importance were filled by -men who had had no previous railway experience at all. Railway staff -officers were also obtained mainly from among the troops; though many -even of these, being unfamiliar with the details of railway operation, -had to be taught their special duties before they could attempt to -discharge them. - -On September 30, 1900, the staff employed on the Imperial Military -Railways comprised close on 18,000 officers and men. From the time these -railways were brought under the control of the British forces to August -31, 1900, they carried 177,000 passengers, 86,000 animals, and 520,000 -tons of goods. - -As the moral to be drawn from his experiences in having to create, under -circumstances of exceptional difficulty, a staff for the operation of -railways captured from the enemy, Sir Percy Girouard says:-- - - The South African campaign has fully shown the necessity of - having a number of traffic employés registered in peace time, - who are paid a small retaining fee which will render them liable - to be called out in case of war at home or abroad. The want of - this system forced the Director of Railways in South Africa to - employ a large number of men who had been employed by the enemy, - and who could not be relied on, and also to withdraw from the - fighting-line a large number of soldiers with railway experience - prior to enlistment; and he was compelled to work the railways - with this heterogeneous mass of individuals whose qualifications - were unknown. The amount of correspondence entailed over - conditions of service, pay, transfer, etc., of all these men, - coming from different parts of South Africa and from different - units, was tremendous. The registration system would also - arrange for the men on the railways being subject to Military - Law, the necessity for which has been clearly proved. - - -REPAIR OF RAILWAYS - -Whilst all these arrangements in regard to operation and transport -were thus being perfected, the need had arisen for an equally complete -organisation in another direction, that, namely, of providing for the -_repair or restoration of railway lines_ damaged or destroyed by the -enemy. - -Since the American Civil War the art of railway demolition had -made considerable advance by reason of the use for this purpose of -dynamite--an agency which was now to be employed very freely by the -Boers. With dynamite they easily blew up the bridges, or material -portions thereof; they destroyed the track for considerable distances -by the simple process of exploding dynamite cartridges under alternate -rail-joints; they wrecked culverts, pumps and water tanks, and they -effectively damaged locomotives which they had not time or opportunity -to remove. Then, among other things, they derailed engines and trucks -by means of mines; they caused obstructions by throwing down into the -railway cuttings boulders of up to two or three tons in weight; they cut -telegraph lines; they removed or smashed up instruments and batteries at -railway stations; they wrecked the stations; they burned many railway -trucks, or otherwise rendered them useless; they set fire to stacks of -fuel, and, when dynamite cartridges were not available, they deprived -the locomotives of their vital parts and tore up considerable lengths of -rails. - -By December, 1899, it had become evident that the Railway Companies -and the Fortress Companies of the Royal Engineers, sent out to the -Cape and brought up to their fullest strength, would be unequal to the -requirements of the prospective situation. The Railway Corps thus formed -was, accordingly, augmented by a Railway Pioneer Regiment, composed of -miners, artisans and labourers who had been employed at Cape Town or -Johannesburg, volunteers from the ranks of the Army (preference being -given to those already possessed of experience in railway work), and -employés of the Orange Free State Railway. Some Field Railway Sections, -created to form the nucleus of a staff to take over the working of -railways in the enemy's country became construction parties, doing -repairs only, and having no control of traffic except at railhead. In -addition to all these, a large number of natives were engaged through -Native Labour Depôts opened at De Aar, Bloemfontein and Johannesburg, -the number so employed at any one time attaining a maximum of about -20,000. - -It was in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal that the Boers -displayed their greatest activity in the way of railway destruction. -At Norval's Pont and Bethulie they broke down the bridges crossing the -Orange River, which divided Cape Colony from the Orange Free State. -Before leaving Bloemfontein (occupied by the British March 13, 1900), -they destroyed all the bridges and all the culverts on the railway in -their rear; they blew up miles of the permanent way, and they left the -railway itself an almost complete wreck. North of Bloemfontein they -pursued similar tactics along 180 miles of track, on which they wrecked -more or less completely no fewer than fifty bridges, including the one -over the Vaal River--a high structure with seven spans each of 130 feet. -No sooner, too, had the line been reopened as far as Johannesburg than -Commandant De Wet made a raid on it and undid all that the repairing -parties had done over a length of thirty miles. Speedily following the -re-establishing of rail communication with Pretoria, the Boers began -a fresh series of guerilla attacks on the lines both in the Transvaal -and in the Orange Free State; and they continued these attacks for -months--until, in fact, their power for doing further mischief had been -finally checked. - -In carrying out repairs and reconstruction work of such vital importance -to the advance and security of the British forces, the policy adopted -by the Director of Railways was that of employing Royal Engineers to do -rapid temporary repairs--with a view to having a line of some sort made -available with the least possible delay--and leaving permanent or even -semi-permanent repairs to the Railway Pioneer Regiment. At convenient -sidings on the railways throughout the theatre of war _construction -trains_ were stationed in charge of permanent-way inspectors and -sections of Royal Engineers who had at their disposal, at each of such -sidings, a gang of men--whites and natives--varying in number from 300 -to 1,000, according to circumstances. Infantry working-parties were also -obtained wherever possible. - -Gangers began a patrol of the lines at dawn. Information as to any -break or alarm was communicated to the nearest military post and -telegraphed to the Deputy-Superintendent of Works, who thereupon ordered -the dispatch of a construction train to the scene of any reported or -prospective break without waiting for confirmation of the news received -or of the suspicions aroused. - -This well-organised system operated to great advantage. At 2.30 -a.m. on January 1, 1901, for instance, information reached the -Deputy-Superintendent of Works at Bloemfontein that a break of the line -had occurred at Wolvehoek, sixty-three miles distant. The construction -train was instantly dispatched, and the repairs were completed by 8 -a.m. Rail communication with Johannesburg, notwithstanding the great -amount of destruction done by the Boers, was restored within eleven -days of the arrival of Lord Roberts at that place. It was restored to -Pretoria within sixteen days of the occupation thereof by our troops. On -the western side, where the enemy had been no less active than in the -Orange Free State, rail communication was reopened within thirteen days -of the relief of Mafeking. - -In the official report on Field Transport in the South African War, it -is said in regard to the Railways Department:-- - - All temporary repairs in the Cape Colony, Transvaal, and - Orange River Colony were carried out, with a few exceptions, - by the military railway staff. Up to 31 October, 1900, these - temporary repairs included the restoration of seventy-five - bridges, ninety-four culverts, and 37 miles of line. A detail - of the general advance from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg, a - distance of 265 miles, will give some idea of the expedition - with which repairs were affected. The period during which the - advance was being made was from 3 May to 11 June, 1900, in which - space of time the following temporary repairs were executed: - Twenty-seven bridges, forty-one culverts, 10 miles of line, - including seven deviations, varying in length from 200 yards to - 2 miles. - - From 6 June to 15 November, 1900, the Imperial Military - Railways were more or less seriously damaged by the enemy on 115 - occasions, but all such damages were promptly repaired, and did - not materially affect the working of the railways, except that - the running of trains after dark had to be suspended. During the - same period fully 60 per cent. of damaged bridges and culverts - were permanently or semi-permanently repaired. - -Of _bridges_, over 200, with spans ranging from nine feet to 130 feet, -were destroyed wholly or in part during the progress of the war; but -even here the speedy restoration of traffic did not, as a rule, present -any very grave difficulty. The course generally adopted, as one suited -to South African conditions, was, not to start at once on the repair -of the damaged bridge, but, in order to meet the exigencies of the -moment, to construct a diversion or deviation line alongside, with small -low-level bridges on piers, built of sleepers and rails.[41] These -deviation lines offered great disadvantages by reason of their sharp -curves, their steep approaches and their liability to be washed away in -wet weather. The building even of temporary bridges across deep rivers -having a considerable volume of water also caused inevitable delays. -But the lines in question served their purpose until the reconstruction -of the damaged bridges--taken in hand as speedily as possible--could -be effected. Anticipating the needs for this more permanent work, the -Director of Railways had arranged before leaving England for a supply -of girders, similar to those in use in South Africa, to be sent out, -together with sufficient timber, of useful dimensions, to rebuild the -whole of the railway bridges in the Orange Free State, should it become -necessary so to do--as, in point of fact, it did. Of new rails he had -available, at one time, a total length of 300 miles. - -By October, 1900, the makeshift repairs completed on all the lines -taken from the enemy were being gradually converted into permanent or -semi-permanent reconstruction by the Works Department of the Imperial -Military Railways; but the continuous guerilla raids of the enemy still -made it impossible to run trains by night. These conditions led to a -resort to the system of _blockhouses_ which, first constructed for the -defence of railway bridges in Natal during the advance for the relief -of Ladysmith, and used extensively when Lord Roberts marched from -Bloemfontein into the Transvaal, leaving a long track of railway lines -behind him, were subsequently so far extended that the whole of the -railway lines in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony were provided -with them.[42] So well did they answer the purpose that by April, 1901, -the worst of the trouble involved in maintaining railway communications -was over, although another year was to elapse before peace was restored. - - -MILITARY TRAFFIC - -An especially remarkable achievement with which, under the various -conditions here narrated, the Department of Military Railways is to be -credited was in connection with the concentration of the force with -which Lord Roberts marched from the Modder River to Bloemfontein. The -movement began on January 21, 1900, by which time the repairs of the -lines had been completed, and within three weeks no fewer than 20,000 -men, 13,590 horses and over 24,000 tons of stores had been conveyed over -a single line of railway. - -Taking the sum total of the military traffic carried on the Cape -Government and the Natal Government Railways respectively during the war -period, we get the following substantial figures:-- - -Cape Government Railways, from October 1, 1899, to March 31, -1901:--Officers, men, and other passengers, 1,247,000; supplies, etc., -1,058,000 tons; horses and other live stock, 540,321, besides many -wagons and guns. - -Natal Government Railways:--Officers, men, prisoners of war, sick and -wounded, women and children (including Boer refugees), natives and -Indians, 522,186; baggage and stores, supplies, hay, forage, etc., -861,000 tons; ammunition, 9,784 boxes; guns, 454; vehicles, 6,430; -pontoons, 48; traction engines, 84; horses and other live stock, 399,000. - - -MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES - -The figures here given as to the military traffic carried do not -represent the full extent of the work that was done by the South African -railways during the course of the war. One must also take into account -the wide variety of subsidiary services rendered, and these are the -more deserving of attention because they show, more than had, perhaps, -been the case in any previous war, that railways can afford valuable -aid in the conduct of a campaign apart from the achievement of their -fundamental purpose in the transport of men and matériel. - -If we look atthe list of services rendered by the Natal Government -Railways we find that the Railway Department--in addition to the -transport work represented by the above figures--adapted six armoured -trains; prepared special carriages for the 6 in. and 4·7 in. guns; -adapted and equipped three hospital trains, withdrawing for this -purpose fully a quarter of the most serviceable carriage stock from -the ordinary traffic; wired and lamped the hospitals at four different -centres, supplying them, also, with electric current; mounted the -electric search-light apparatus with engine, dynamo, etc.; supplied -30,000 troops at Colenso with water; found the plant and fuel at -Ladysmith for condensing water from the Klip River for 20,000 persons -during the four months' siege; allotted and arranged a portion of the -goods-shed as the Base Medical Stores at Durban, and fitted up vans to -follow the army with reserve medical supplies. - -The Department's Engineering Staff speedily restored, or temporarily -provided--either on the Natal system or along 100 miles of the Transvaal -railways, when these passed under control of the British forces--72 -bridges and culverts, varying in length from 10 to 600 feet; 32 -different portions of permanent way; and many water tanks, etc. The -Engineering Staff also effected in seven days a clearance through the -Lang's Nek Tunnel, blown in by the Boers, and constructed several miles -of new lines, sidings and deviations. - -The Natal Railway Pioneer Staff advanced with General Buller and worked -the Netherlands Railway as far as Greylingstad, 100 miles beyond -Charlestown (the point of traffic exchange with the Transvaal system), -until the line was taken over by the Imperial authorities on August 15, -1900. - -"For nearly six months, up to the relief of Ladysmith," says Mr. C. W. -Francis Harrison, from whose official work on "Natal"[43] these details -are mainly taken, "the Natal lines were robbed of about 40 per cent. of -their total mileage and a quantity of their stock. On the clearance of -the enemy from Natal and the south-eastern portion of the Transvaal, -large supply depôts were formed at Newcastle, Volksrust, Standerton and -intermediate points; and on the joining of the two main portions of the -British army at Heidelberg, the greater portion of the stores for the -forces was conveyed via Natal; and this continued unceasingly until the -termination of hostilities." - - -ARMOURED TRAINS - -It was, again, in the South African war that armoured trains underwent -their greatest development--down to that time--for the purposes alike -of line protection and of attack on the enemy, although their real -usefulness and the conditions necessary to their efficient operation -were not established until after certain early experiences which had -tended to throw doubts upon their efficiency, and had even led to their -being regarded as of little or no account for the purposes of war. - -In view of prospective requirements, five armoured trains had been -constructed in advance in the locomotive shops at Cape Town and another -at Natal. Others were put together shortly afterwards; but one of the -Cape trains was wrecked by the Boers the first night of the war, and -two of the Natal trains were locked up in Ladysmith. The remainder -were employed on scouting expeditions during the earlier phases of the -war. Their use not being then rightly understood, they were often sent -considerable distances without any support, with the result that one of -the Natal trains was destroyed by the Boers at Chieveley, on November -15, 1899, and the Cape trains had several narrow escapes of sharing the -same fate. - -On the occupation of Bloemfontein by the British, more armoured trains -were constructed at the railway workshops there, and eventually the -number available was increased to a fleet of twenty. Under an improved -system of control and operation, and converted, by the addition of guns, -into what were virtually batteries on wheels, the trains came to be -regarded as offering possibilities of much practical usefulness. - -In a lecture on "Railways in War," delivered by him at the Royal -Engineers' Institute, Chatham, and reported in the "Royal Engineers -Journal" for July, 1905, Sir Percy Girouard, said:-- - - The South African War at one time threatened to produce - a siege, that of Pretoria, where fairly modern forts with - modern armaments were known to exist. At the same time the - enemy at Modder River were giving us some trouble with their - heavy artillery. The Navy came to our rescue with heavy B.L. - guns mounted on wheels. With a view to trying the use of the - railway itself, it was pointed out that the railway department - had both the shops and the goodwill to mount heavy guns, if - required. This offer was approved, and in a few weeks the two - heaviest siege guns ever seen in the field were made ready. - The carriages, designed by the combined wit of the machinery - officers and the Chief Locomotive Superintendent of the Cape - Government Railway, were most creditable achievements, old - engine and tender frames being used as a foundation. The guns - mounted were a 6-inch B.L., and no less a monster than a 9·2 - inch B.L. The 6-inch went into action at Modder River. It - was deemed unsafe to fix it at an angle of more than sixteen - degrees to either side of the centre line of the railway; but - by placing it on a so-called firing curve a wider field of fire - was secured. The gun behaved exceedingly well in every way; and - later on it was fired at right angles to the railway, without - any damage either to itself or to the line. - -The 9·2-inch gun gave good results in its trials, but, although it was -run up to Pretoria on its truck, there was no opportunity of firing it -on the enemy. - -Sir Percy says in his "History" that-- - - The experiments demonstrated the possibility of big guns - being used in siege operations without any difficulty, the only - limit to the size of the gun being the weight which the railway - bridges will stand. - -Apart from the powers of usefulness offered by these batteries on -wheels, there arose, in the early days of the war, the further question -whether the usefulness of armoured trains proper might not be marred as -the result of a defective system of control. - -At the outset the trains were placed entirely under the orders of -officers commanding sections of the line; but the arrangement was found -unsatisfactory as the trains were constantly being rushed out regardless -of Traffic Department regulations, and sometimes without even a "line -clear" message. Having, also, the trains at their disposal, as they -considered officers commanding sections of the line often made use of -them to inspect posts between stations, other traffic being stopped -while the inspections were being made. On one occasion, when a large mob -of cattle was being sent to Pretoria and there were no mounted troops -available to convoy them, the expedient was resorted to of employing an -armoured train for the purpose. The train had to adapt its speed to the -rate of progress of the cattle alongside, and such was the interference -with other traffic that the entire length of railway on the Delagoa -main line was blocked until the cattle had reached their destination. -In fact, instead of assisting traffic by preventing the enemy from -interrupting it, the armoured trains caused, Sir Percy Girouard -declares, "more interruptions than the enemy themselves." - -With a view both to meet these particular difficulties and to ensure -a better use of the trains, there was appointed an Assistant-Director -of Armoured Trains who was placed on the staff both of the -Commander-in-Chief and of the Director of Railways and had under his -control all the armoured trains in South Africa. Captain H. C. Nanton, -R.E., the officer so appointed, had practical acquaintance alike with -railway requirements and regulations and with armoured trains. In touch -with Headquarters, and kept informed as to which portions of the line -were most threatened by the enemy, it became his duty to order where -the trains should be sent. Once despatched to a particular section of -the line, an armoured train was to be under the control of the General -or other officer commanding that section. The Assistant-Director -had power to remove it, however, if he thought it was more urgently -required elsewhere. It was his duty, also, to work in harmony with -the officers in question; but they, in turn, were not to use as a -private conveyance the train sent to them, and they were not to alter -its garrison or equipment, or to give orders to the officer in charge -which were contrary to the spirit of the general instructions. The -Assistant-Director was himself required to instruct officers in command -of the trains as to the proper tactics to adopt, the best methods -of patrolling, etc., and to see that they "worked in harmony with -the railway officials, and were an assistance and not a hindrance to -traffic." - -These improved conditions led to a recognised system for the employment -of armoured trains, the purposes and duties of which were eventually -defined as follows[44]:-- - -1. In conjunction with columns in the field, to intercept the enemy whom -the columns were driving on to the line. - -2. To act on the flank of a column or line of columns, the train being -well advanced so as to prevent the enemy breaking to that flank. - -3. To reinforce stations and camps on the railway which were threatened -by the enemy. - -4. To escort ordinary traffic trains. - -5. To reconnoitre. - -6. To patrol by day and night. - -7. To protect traffic routes generally. - -The garrison of an armoured train consisted of an Infantry escort and -Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer detachments. The R.E. detachment -consisted of one N.C.O. and six sappers skilled in railway repairing -work and in re-setting derailed engines and trucks; two telegraph -linesmen; one telegraph clerk; two engine-drivers and two firemen. -When the train was engaged, all counted as effective rifles with the -exception of the driver and firemen on the footplate, and even they -carried rifles in their engine cab for use against an enemy endeavouring -to gain possession of the engine. - -Responsibility for the efficiency of the garrisons was placed upon the -Assistant-Director of Armoured Trains. Whenever, also, a concentration -of the trains had been decided upon, he was to attach himself to one of -them, and take charge of the concerted action of the whole. - -In reference to the operation of the trains Captain M. H. Grant -writes[45]:-- - - It was important that the officer commanding the train - should be a man of judgment and strong nerve. He was often - called upon to act on his own responsibility. His strong - armament and defences enabled him to attack superior forces. - Yet his vulnerable points were many. He had ever to be alert - that the enemy did not cut the line behind him. In addition - to his visible foes and the constant risks of traffic in war - time, he had to contend with skilfully-used automatic and - observation mines, and had to keep his head even amid the roar - which followed the passage of his leading truck over a charge - of dynamite, and then to deal with the attack which almost - certainly ensued. Officers, therefore, had to be chosen from - men of no common stamp. The danger from contact mines was to - a certain extent obviated by a standing order that each train - should propel a heavily-loaded bogie truck. Such trucks had - low sides and ends; they in no way obstructed the view, or - fire, from the trains; and they performed the double purpose of - exploding contact mines and carrying the railway and telegraph - materials. The necessity for this propelled unoccupied bogie was - exemplified on several occasions. - -As regards their protection of the railway lines, the armoured trains -rendered an invaluable service, and this was especially the case when -the blockhouse system had been fully developed, and when, concurrently -therewith, the enemy's artillery became scarce. In recording this -opinion, Sir Percy Girouard further observes:--"There is no doubt, also, -that the enemy disliked them intensely, and the presence of an armoured -train had a great moral effect." - -In addition to the organisation and running of these armoured trains, -there was included in every ordinary train, as far as possible, a -special gun-truck on which was a pedestal-mounted Q. F. gun, under the -charge of an escort. The trains also carried a machine gun at each end, -arranged with a lateral sweep, to allow the fires to cross on either -side of the train at a distance of from fifty to eighty yards. In -addition to this, armour plates were hung on each side of the driver's -cab, and the first train run each morning had two or three trucks in -front of the engine as a precaution against any mine that might have -been laid over-night. - - -AMBULANCE AND HOSPITAL TRAINS - -Supplementing the references already made on pp. 95-6 to the employment -of ambulance and hospital trains in the South African War, it may here -be stated that three out of the seven adapted from rolling stock already -in use on the Cape or the Natal Government lines had been prepared in -advance of the outbreak of hostilities, namely, two at the Cape and one -in Natal, and these three were, consequently, available for immediate -use. - -"In Cape Colony," as stated in "_The Times_ History of the War in South -Africa," "the two hospital trains that had been prepared in September -were manned by a complete _personnel_ from England, and were kept in -constant touch with Lord Methuen's advance. In most cases they were -run up almost into the firing line, and during the actions at Belmont, -Graspan, Modder River and Magersfontein, they relieved the force of its -sick and wounded in an incredibly short time, conveying some to De Aar -and Orange River, and others to the general hospitals at Cape Town." The -services thus rendered by the hospital trains were greatly facilitated -by the fact that during the first three months of the war the fighting -was almost entirely on or alongside the railways. It was, therefore, -possible to arrange for a speedy evacuation of wounded from the field -hospitals. - -The same two trains, after working along the line of communication in -Cape Colony, reached Bloemfontein early in April, 1900; and here they -were of great use in helping to remove the sufferers from the enteric -fever which was filling up, not only all the hospitals, but every other -available building, as well, and finally attained, by the end of May, a -maximum of 4,000 cases. Unable to meet all requirements arising under -these exceptional conditions, the two hospital trains were supplemented -by a number of locally-prepared or ordinary trains, made available for -the transport either of sick or of convalescents. - -In regard to Natal, "_The Times_ History" says that of all the medical -arrangements made in connection with the war, "those during Sir Redvers -Buller's operations in Natal presented the most satisfactory features." - -The line of communication with the base was short, and it was amply -supplied with hospital trains. In addition to the one that had been -formed before the outbreak of hostilities, a second and similar -train was prepared in November, 1889. The hospital train, "Princess -Christian," constructed in England at a cost of £14,000, mainly raised -by Her Royal Highness--with a handsome contribution from the town of -Windsor--reached Cape Town early in February, 1900. It was sent on in -sections to Durban, where it was put together in the Natal Government -Railway workshops. Under the charge of Sir John Furley, who had also -supervised its reconstruction, the train was the first to cross the -temporary trestle bridge provided to take the place of the one across -the Tugela, at Colenso, which had been destroyed by the Boers, and it -was, also, the first train to enter Ladysmith (March 18, 1900) after the -siege. Between this time and September 5, 1901, it made 108 journeys, -mainly on the Natal side and on the Pretoria-Koomati Poort line; it ran -a total of 42,000 miles, and it carried (in addition to the medical and -nursing staff) 321 officers and 7,208 non-commissioned officers and men, -a total of 7,529 sick and wounded, of whom only three died _en route_. -In June, 1901, the train was formally presented by the Central Red Cross -Committee to the Secretary of State for War as a complete hospital -train unit for the use of the military forces in South Africa; but, on -the assumption, apparently, that no further use for its services as a -hospital train was likely to arise, it was subsequently dismantled. - -As showing the extent of the work done by the other hospital trains -during the course of the war, it may be added that No. 2 ran 114,539 -miles, in 226 trips, between November 22, 1898, and the end of August, -1902, conveying 471 officers and 10,325 non-commissioned officers and -men, a total of 10,796, of whom only seven died _en route_. - - -TRANSVAAL RAILWAYS AND THE WAR - -To the foregoing account of the British use of railways for military -purposes during the course of the South African War it may be of -interest to add a few notes giving the experiences of the Boers, as -detailed in a statement on "The Netherlands South African Railway -Company and the Transvaal War," drawn up at Pretoria, in April, 1900, by -the Secretary of the Company, Mr. Th. Steinnetz, and published in _De -Ingenieur_ of July 14 and 21, 1900.[46] - -Under the terms of the concession granted to the Netherlands South -African Railway Company (otherwise the Nederland Zuid Afrikaansche -Spoorweg Maatschappij) by the Government of the Transvaal Republic, -the latter were, in the event either of war or of danger of war, to -have complete control alike over the railway and over everything--and -everybody--necessary for its use, subject to certain undertakings -as to the payment of compensation to concessionaires. By virtue of -these powers the Executive Raad issued a decree on September 13, -1899, establishing Government control over the lines, and stating -further:--"With the view of ensuring that proper use can be made of -the railway, the whole of the _personnel_ of the company are ... -commandeered to do duty on the railways in the functions they now -occupy, and they are placed under the orders of the Commandant-General -and the war officers indicated by him, or of other officials." The -Government, in effect, took possession of all the lines, rolling stock, -workshops and other properties of the railway company for the purposes -of military transport, and they assumed control over the staff in order -to ensure the working, not only of the company's own lines, but, also, -of the lines in such portions of British territory as might be occupied -by the forces of the Republic. - -Against the possibility of an immediate invasion of the -Transvaal--"about which," says the statement, "there was much anxiety -on account of the armoured trains, which the English advertised so -loudly"--precautions were taken by preparing for demolition some of the -bridges on the south-eastern section of the company's lines. Guards -were, also, stationed at bridges and other important points throughout -the Transvaal in order to protect them against attack or interference by -"the great number of Anglophiles" assumed to be still in the Republic; -but the statement seems to suggest that, as shown by the small number -of attempts made in this direction, the British rather neglected their -opportunities. - -In regard to the transport of Transvaal troops, difficulties arose at -the outset owing to the absence of data, even of the vaguest character, -as to the numbers of burghers, horses and wagons it would be necessary -to convey by train. Consequently, no military time-tables could be -drawn up, and the traffic demands were met as best they could be when -they were made. No more, however, than eleven trains a day, in each -direction, could be run on the south-eastern branch--a single-track -line, with stations and crossing places about one hour's journey apart. -Concerning the amount of traffic carried, Mr. Steinnetz says:-- - - The total military traffic to the frontier was not so great - as one would expect, in spite of only a portion of the burghers - having taken up arms. From various districts the commandos - marched mounted, with ox-wagons, to the place of assembly, as - had been the custom in the past, although the use of the railway - would have saved time and trouble to both horses and men. Yet - it was not the first time that the Transvaalers had had the - opportunity of learning the use of railways in warfare. At the - time of the Jameson Raid and the Magato Campaign full use had - been made of them. - -Among the railway bridges which the Boers had prepared for destruction, -in case of need, was an iron one of 116 ft. span, the blowing up of -which would have checked the anticipated British invasion of the -Transvaal via Lang's Nek; but the concentration of the British forces -at Dundee and Ladysmith allowed the Boers to enter Natal without -resistance; and they took over, in sections, the working of the Natal -railway in proportion as they advanced. At various stations in northern -Natal long platforms had been specially constructed by the British, -and other arrangements made, to permit of large movements of troops -and especially the detraining of cavalry. These improvements, says Mr. -Steinnetz, came in very handy for the Federal Army. The _personnel_ -of the lines had "retired in a great hurry," without attempting any -demolitions or doing any damage to the lines beyond what could be easily -repaired. The Lang's Nek tunnel was "wholly untouched." Mr. Steinnetz -continues:-- - - The Boers themselves, however, through fear of being - surprised by armoured trains, and for other reasons, gave - the breakdown gangs more work to do. The telegraph line was - destroyed by them for long distances, the track was broken up - and two bridges were damaged. In order to obstruct the retreat - of General Yule from Dundee a bridge of two 30-foot spans on - the Dundee branch line was blown up by the Irish Brigade with - a dynamite charge in the central pier. The damage done was not - very great and was easily repaired. The same ineffective measure - was applied with greater success to a similar bridge over a - small spruit near Waschbank. But even here the repair was not - difficult. - -These admissions as to the ease with which the work of destruction -could, as a rule, readily be put right again are in full accord with -Sir Percy Girouard's report, in dealing with the same subject. It is -only fair to accept, in turn, the assertion made by Mr. Steinnetz that -the damage which the British did to certain of the railway bridges was -"speedily repaired." - -Some of the later destruction work carried out by the Boers was of -a more serious character. The blowing up of the Tugela bridge at -Colenso--a structure consisting of five iron lattice girder spans of -100 ft. each on masonry piles--was entrusted by the Boer military -authorities to an inspector of the railway company who had served in the -Dutch engineers. It was accomplished by the simultaneous detonation of -forty dynamite charges all connected by leads to a Siemens and Halske -"exploder," the bridge being "thoroughly demolished." In the destruction -of the three-span bridge over the Orange River at Norval's Pont the -charge employed consisted of about three and a half chests of dynamite, -or 198 lbs. Concerning the general destruction of bridges by which the -Boers sought to check pursuit after their abandonment of the siege of -Ladysmith, Mr. Steinnitz says:--"There was no lack of explosives, and no -need to spare them." - -The central workshops of the Netherlands Company were made use of by the -Government for the repair of guns, rifles, wagons, etc., and for the -manufacture of war material. Four complete ambulance trains were also -fitted up there for the use of wounded burghers. - -All the traffic on the lines was done on Government orders, and all -expenses were charged to them. No private traffic at all was carried. -There were, consequently, no railway receipts, and the railway company -had no responsibility. - - -DEVELOPMENT OF RAIL POWER - -In one way or another the South African War of 1899-1902 was concerned -in many of the most complicated of the problems that arise in connection -with the use of railways for military purposes.[47] - -In various ways, also, it advanced to a still further stage the whole -question of the nature and possibilities of rail-power in war. - -It confirmed under especially remarkable conditions a fact which -the American War of Secession had already established, namely, that -even single lines of railway, passing through country occupied by or -belonging to the enemy, may allow of campaigns being conducted at -such distances from the base of supplies as, but for this means of -communication, would render war impracticable. - -It offered further evidence as to the possibility, in favourable -circumstances, of employing railways for the carrying out of important -tactical movements. - -It re-established the essential need of organisation for the attainment -of efficiency in military transport and especially in so far as such -organisation deals with questions of control and co-ordination of the -military and the technical elements. - -It placed on a recognised and clearly defined basis the uses of armoured -trains and the best methods to be adopted for their construction and -operation. - -It showed still more clearly, perhaps, than any previous war had done, -the useful and beneficent purposes served by ambulance and hospital -trains, whether constructed for the purpose or adapted from existing -railway stock. - -It proved that, however apparently insecure a line of rail communication -may be, and however active and destructive the attacks made on it by -a pertinacious enemy, yet, with a strong and well-organised force of -Railway Troops following close on the advancing army, and supplemented -by an efficient system of line-protection, repairs and reconstruction -can be carried out with such speed that comparatively little material -delay will be caused, the final result of the campaign will not -necessarily be affected, and the value of rail-power as an instrument of -war will suffer no actual reduction. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[41] In Vol. II of the "Detailed History of the Railways in the South -African War" (Chatham: Royal Engineers Institute, 1904), there is -a series of 45 full-page photographs of damaged bridges and of the -low-level deviations constructed to take their place. - -[42] For a description of these blockhouses, see vol. iii, pp. 125-6, of -the "History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers," by Col. Sir Chas. M. -Watson. Royal Engineers Institute, Chatham, 1915. - -[43] "Natal: An Illustrated Official Railway Guide and Handbook." -Compiled and edited by C. W. Francis Harrison. Published by Authority. -London, 1903. - -[44] "History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Compiled by -Direction of His Majesty's Government." Vol. IV, Appendix 10: "Notes on -the Military Railway System in South Africa." London, 1910. - -[45] Official "History," Vol. IV, Appendix 10. - -[46] For English translation, see "Journal of the Royal United Service -Institution," January, 1902. - -[47] In the preface of his standard work on "Military Railways," Major -W. D. Connor, of the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, says: -"On the military side I refer to the reports of Colonel Sir E. P. C. -Girouard, K.C.M.G., R.E., of the British Army, whose work in Egypt and -South Africa has set a high standard for any engineer who in future may -be required to meet and solve railway problems in the theatre of war. -These reports give the solution of many points as worked out in the -field, and confirm the main lessons to be learned from the history of -the military railways in our Civil War." (See "Bibliography.") - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR - - -The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 was a test not so much of the military -strength of the two combatants as of their respective means of -communication and concentration. - -From Moscow to Port Arthur the distance is 5,300 miles, and, save for -the sea journey via the Baltic, the North Sea, the Atlantic and the -Indian Ocean, the Russians were dependent for the transport of their -troops and stores to Manchuria on such very inadequate railways as they -then controlled. Japan, on the other hand, was able to rely on her fleet -and her considerably developed mercantile marine; and, as soon as she -had paralysed the Russian fleet and established her own command of the -sea--as she did within two days of the outbreak of hostilities--she -could land her forces whenever she chose at almost any convenient point -on the sea-board of the theatre of war. - -The situation recalled, somewhat, the still worse position in which -Russia had found herself at the time of the Crimean War when, in the -absence of any rail facilities at all, her troops had to march, and -their supplies and munitions had to be conveyed, hundreds of miles over -dreary steppes--"huge columns that had quitted the far north and east of -the interior dwindling to a few broken-down Battalions before they came -in sight of Sebastopol"--whereas the allies could send their troops all -the way to the Crimea by sea. - -While there are many other causes which, rightly or wrongly, have been -regarded as contributing to the defeat of Russia by Japan--included -therein being personal shortcomings of the Russian officers; mistakes -made by them in strategy and tactics; defects in the Russian military -system, and the half-hearted interest of the Russian nation in the -struggle--the really decisive factors in the situation were the -transport deficiencies of the Siberian and Manchurian railways. - -The construction of a _Trans-Siberian Railway_ as a great strategic -line stretching across Asia, facilitating the development of a vast -territory, and, above all, calculated to foster the realisation of -Russia's aims in the Far East, first came under discussion about the -year 1860. It was made the subject of an exhaustive study by a Committee -of Ministers in 1875, but it was not until 1891 that the first sod was -turned. - -Military and political considerations being paramount, such energy was -shown in the work of construction that by 1896 the western section -had been carried through Irkutsk to Lake Baikal and from the eastern -shores thereof to Strietensk, while the eastern section--known as the -Usuri Railway--had been made through Russia's Maritime Province from -Vladivostok to Khabarovsk. The original design was that the line should -be constructed on Russian territory all the way to Vladivostok; but -this meant that from Strietensk it would have to follow the great bend -made to the north by the Amur, the southern boundary of Russia, and the -Russian Government thought it desirable to secure a more direct route. - -Towards the end of 1896, in return for the great services which she -considered she had rendered to China in the war between that country and -Japan, Russia obtained the concession for a railway which, starting from -Chita, Trans-Baikalia, about 200 miles west of Strietensk, would pass -through Manchuria to Vladivostok, avoiding the great bend of the Amur, -though still offering the disadvantage that one important section of the -through route would not be on Russian territory. Under a contract made -between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, a _Chinese -Eastern Railway Company_ was formed to build and operate the line thus -conceded; but the arrangements made were carried out through the Russian -Minister of Finance, and the line was directly dependent on the Russian -State. - -Russia's occupation of Port Arthur in March, 1898, led, in the spring -of the following year, to the further construction being begun of a -southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Harbin, a station on -the Chita-Vladivostok line, to the extremity of the Liao-tung peninsula. - -It was these two railways, the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern, -terminating at Vladivostok in the one direction and at Port Arthur in -the other, which came into special consideration in the war of 1904-5. -It was on the Trans-Siberian line, more especially, that Russia was -mainly dependent (as the German official report on the war points out) -not only for the concentration and maintenance of her army but even for -the raising and organisation of most of its units. - -When the Trans-Siberian was first built, the desire to avoid undue -expenditure on a line which must necessarily involve a huge expenditure, -with little or no prospect of yielding a return sufficient for the -payment of interest thereon, led to the adoption of an economy which was -to hamper very materially the transport capacity of the railway. Only a -single line of rails was allowed for; a limit was placed on the breadth -of the embankments; the curves were greater than considerations of speed -and safety should have permitted; the gradients were either dangerously -varied or so excessive that divisions of the trains were necessary; -the rails used were of no greater weight than from 42 lbs. to 47 lbs. -per yard, and they were badly laid, even then; the bridges across the -smaller streams were made of wood only; the crossing-places and the -railway stations were few and far between, while all the secondary -constructions were provided on what was almost the cheapest possible -scale. - -These conditions necessitated the limitation of the traffic, when the -line was first opened, to the running of three trains a day in each -direction. The length of the trains was restricted to sixty axles. It -was thus impossible to meet the demands even of the ordinary traffic -in peace time, apart altogether from any question as to military -requirements in time of war. No sooner, therefore, were the main -portions of the line ready, in 1898, than there was set aside, for -a railway which was already to cost over £350,000,000, a further sum -of £9,130,000 for relaying those portions of the line with a better -quality of rails and sleepers, the reconstruction of sections dangerous -to traffic, the provision of more stations and more rolling stock, and -other improvements. It was expected that this additional work would be -completed by 1904, by which time the line was to be equal to the running -of thirteen pairs of trains daily. - -Reporting on the condition of the Russian railways in 1900 (at which -date the Eastern Chinese line was still unfinished), General Kuropatkin, -then War Minister, afterwards Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria, did not -hesitate to declare that it was still impossible for them to cope with -heavy traffic. - -Relations between Russia and Japan became strained towards the end of -1903, though the Government of the former country were desirous that any -outbreak of hostilities should be avoided until they were better able -to undertake them. In his account of "The Russian Army and the Japanese -War" General Kuropatkin says concerning the position at this period:-- - - Our unreadiness was only too plain, and it seemed at that - time that we should be able, with two or three years' steady - work, so to strengthen our position in the Far East, and improve - the railway, the fleet, the land forces, and the fortresses of - Port Arthur and Vladivostok that Japan would have small chance - of success against us. - -Regarding war as inevitable, and disinclined to give Russia an -opportunity of first strengthening her position in the directions here -suggested, Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia on February -6, 1904, this being the immediate prelude to the hostilities that -followed. - -In anticipation of a possible rupture, Russia had already despatched -reinforcements and stores to the Far East by sea; but the rupture, -when it did come, found her quite unprepared to send further large -reinforcements by land, while her forces in the Far East were scattered -over the vast area extending from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, and from -Port Arthur to Nikolaievsk. No orders for mobilisation had been issued; -the army was in the midst of rearmament and reorganisation, and the -unreadiness of the railways had prevented the drawing up of time-tables -for the concentration of the troops. Ten days after the outbreak of war -the Russian Government issued a statement in which they said:-- - - The distance of the territory now attacked and the desire of - the Tsar to maintain peace were the causes of the impossibility - of preparations for war being made a long time in advance. - -Not only, too, was the seat of war 5,000 miles away, and not only was -a single-track ill-equipped line of railway the only practicable means -of sending troops and war material there by land, but an exceptionally -great obstacle to traffic had to be met owing to the interruption of -rail communication by Lake Baikal. - -Having a length of 380 miles, a breadth ranging from eighteen miles to -fifty-six miles, a mean depth of 850 feet (with a maximum, in parts, of -no less than 4,500 ft.), and a total area of over 13,000 square miles, -_Lake Baikal_ ranks, next to the great lakes of the United States and -Central Africa, as the largest fresh-water lake in the world; though it -should, in reality, be regarded less as a lake than as a great inland -sea. As it happened, also, this vast expanse of water stood in the -direct line of route of the Trans-Siberian railway, and the crossing of -it by the Russian reinforcements going to the Far East constituted a -seriously defective link in the chain of communication. - -At an elevation of 1,360 feet above sea level, the lake is subject -alike to severe gales, to heavy fogs, and to frosts so intense that in -mid-winter the water may be frozen to a depth of ten feet. From the end -of April to the end of December troops and travellers arriving by rail -at one side of the lake crossed to the other by passenger steamers. -Goods wagons were taken over by ferry-boats which, also, acted as -ice-breakers early and late in the winter season, so long as the passage -could be kept open. When, in the winter, the ice was strong enough -to bear, traffic was conducted by transport sledges; but when there -was sufficient ice to stop the ferry-boats, though not sufficient to -permit of the sledges being used--conditions which generally prevailed -for about six weeks in the year--the traffic had to be discontinued -altogether. - -The question will naturally be asked,--Why had not the constructors of -the line avoided these disadvantages by carrying it round the lake? The -reply is that this had not been done, prior to the outbreak of war, -owing to the formidable nature of the work involved from an engineering -point of view. - -Lake Baikal is bordered, on the south--the route a Circum-Baikal line -would have to take--by mountains which rise sheer up from the water's -edge to a height of, in places, no less than 4,600 ft. Across the -mountains, along the rocky shores, and over the intervening valleys the -railway would require to be carried for a distance of 160 miles in order -to link up the two sections then divided by the lake. The difficulties -of the work were likely to be as great as the cost would certainly be -enormous, compared with that of the remainder of the Trans-Siberian -railway. So it was that when the war broke out there were still 112 -miles of the Circum-Baikal line to be constructed. - -So it was, also, that, pending the completion of this line round the -lake, Russia's reinforcements from Europe for the Far East had to -cross the lake itself; and the outbreak of hostilities in the month of -February placed Russia at an especially great disadvantage in regard to -transport. - -The combined ferry-steamers and ice-breakers had made their final -journey for the winter on January 27, and at first the only way in -which the troops could cross the ice was by marching or by sledge. -After a day's rest at Irkutsk, they were brought by train to Baikal -station, at the lake side, arriving there at about four o'clock in -the morning in order that they could complete the journey to Tanchoi -station, on the other side of the lake--a distance of about twenty-five -miles--in the day. The track was marked out by posts, supplemented by -lanterns at night, and it was kept in order by gangs of labourers. -Small bridges were placed over cracks in the ice. Shelters, in -telephonic communication with one another, were provided at four-mile -distances alike for the purpose of rest and for the distribution of food -prepared by regimental field kitchens; but the principal meal of the -day was taken at a more substantial half-way house, where the cooking -arrangements were on a more elaborate scale and better accommodation -was provided. Around the half-way house at night petroleum flares were -burned, so that it could be seen a long way off. In foggy weather, or -during snow storms, bells were rung at all the shelters. Inasmuch as the -temperature fell, at times, to 22 deg., Fahr., below zero, the provision -of these rest-houses must have been greatly appreciated. Baggage was -taken across in sledges, the normal supply of which had been increased -by an additional 3,000. Some of the troops also made the journey by this -form of conveyance, four men being seated in each sledge. The batteries -crossed with their own horses. - -As soon as the ice attained a thickness of about 4½ ft., the expedient -was adopted of laying a pair of rails along it in order, more -especially, that the additional engines and railway wagons urgently -needed on the lines east of the lake could be taken across. The -rails were laid on sleepers of exceptional length, the weight being -thus distributed over a greater surface of ice; but, even with this -precaution, it was no easy matter to keep the line in working order -owing to the extreme cold, to storms, to the occasional ice movements -and cracks, or to the effect of earthquake shocks in destroying lengths -of line, sections of which sometimes required to be relaid almost as -soon as they had been put down. The line was begun on February 10 and -completed by the 29th of the same month. Between March 1 and March 26 -there were taken across the lake, by this means, sixty-five dismantled -locomotives (rebuilt on arrival on the eastern side), twenty-five -railway carriages, and 2,313 goods wagons. Transport was provided by -horses, the number so used being about 1,000. - -Constructed to serve an exclusively military purpose, this -twenty-five-mile line across Lake Baikal may certainly be regarded as -a "military railway," while as a military ice-railway it holds a unique -position in the history of warfare. - -When, owing to the advancing season, the ice on the lake could no longer -be trusted to bear either railway trucks or sledges, and when navigation -was again open, dependence had to be placed on the ferry services. There -were, however, only two vessels available for the transfer of railway -trucks across the lake, and each of these, accommodating twenty-seven -trucks at a time, could make no more than three return crossings in the -twenty-four hours. - -Only in one way could an improvement be effected in these obviously -inadequate facilities for getting an army to Manchuria, and that was in -carrying the railway round the southern end of the lake, thus avoiding -the delay caused by the hitherto unavoidable transshipment and crossing, -and ensuring a continuous rail journey. The need for this _Circum-Baikal -link_ had, in fact, become urgent, and the work was pushed on with the -greatest vigour. - -Mention has already been made of the engineering difficulties which the -construction of the line involved. These will be better understood if -it is added that the 160-mile link passes through thirty-four tunnels, -having an aggregate length of over six miles; that it is carried across -valleys, or open spaces, on two hundred bridges, and that numerous -cuttings and many large culverts had also to be provided. The total -cost worked out at no less than £52,000 per mile--probably the largest -sum per mile ever spent on a railway designed, in the first instance, -to serve a distinctly military purpose, and exceeding by £35,000 the -average cost per mile, down to that date, of the entire system of -Russian railways. Delays occurred, also, through strikes and other -causes, and, in the result, it was not until September 25, 1904--more -than seven months after the outbreak of war--that the line was ready for -use, and that an interruption of the rail journey by the crossing of -Lake Baikal became no longer necessary. - -Meanwhile, an inadequate supply of engines and rolling stock had been -a serious hindrance to traffic alike on the Trans-Baikal section of -the Siberian line and on the Eastern Chinese lines. The locomotives and -wagons taken across Lake Baikal either on the ice-railway or on the -ferry boats had served a useful purpose, but six months elapsed before -the Eastern Chinese lines could be worked to their full efficiency. - -There were other directions, as well, in which _traffic hindrances_ -arose. The freezing, down to the very bottom, of the rivers between -the eastern side of Lake Baikal and Harbin (Manchuria) was a cause of -serious difficulty in the early part of the year in getting water even -for such locomotives as were available. In the western Siberian section -the supply of water was impaired by the great percentage of salt in the -streams. In Manchuria the fuel reserve was inadequate; soldiers were -the only reliable portion of the subordinate railway staff; the railway -workshops were poorly equipped; there were not nearly enough engine -depôts; large supplies of rails, fish-plates, sleepers and ballast were -needed, and much work had to be done in the construction of additional -sidings, etc. All these shortcomings required to be made good whilst -the war was in actual progress, though for the transport of most of the -necessary materials and appliances there was only a single-track line of -railway already overtaxed for the conveyance of troops, munitions and -supplies. - -The _number of trains_ that could be run was extremely limited. The -capacity of the line of communication as a whole was fixed by that -of the Eastern Chinese Railway between Chita and Harbin; and after -three months of war it was still possible to run from west to east in -each twenty-four hours no more than three military trains (conveying -troops, supplies, stores and remounts), one light mail train, and, when -necessary, one ambulance train; though these conditions were improved -later on. - -The _speed_ at which the trains ran--allowing for necessary stops in -stations or at crossing places on the line--ranged from five to eleven -miles an hour, with seven miles an hour as a good average. For the -journey from Warsaw to Mukden the military trains took forty days, -including one day's rest for the troops at the end of every 600 or 700 -miles. In April and May the journey from Wirballen, on the frontier -of Russia and Germany, to Liao-yang, situate between Mukden and Port -Arthur, took fifty days--an average speed of five and a quarter miles -per hour. - -What with the transport and other difficulties that arose, it was not -for three months after the outbreak of hostilities that the Russian -troops in the Ear East received reinforcements. It was not until after -seven months of war that the three Army Corps sent from European Russia -to join the field army were all concentrated in Manchuria. - -Under these conditions the Japanese, free to send their own armies by -sea to the theatre of war, and able to concentrate them with far greater -speed, had all the initial advantage. The Russian reinforcements arrived -in driblets, and they were either cut off as they came or, as regards, -at least, the fighting from May 14 to October 14, provided only 21,000 -men to replace 100,000 killed, wounded or sick; whereas the Japanese -were able to maintain a continuous flow of reinforcements to make good -their own casualties. - -General Kuropatkin is of opinion that if the Russians had been able -to command better transport from the outset the whole course of the -campaign would have been changed. He thinks that even a single extra -through troop train per day would have made a material difference, while -the running, from the start, of six trains a day would, he believes, -have secured for Russia alike the initiative and the victory. Referring -to the Siberian and Eastern Chinese Railways he says:-- - - If these lines had been more efficient, we could have - brought up our troops more rapidly, and, as things turned out, - 150,000 men concentrated at first would have been of far more - value to us than the 300,000 who were gradually assembled during - nine months, only to be sacrificed in detail.... If we had had a - better railway and had been able to mass at Liao-yang the number - specified, we should undoubtedly have won the day in spite of - our mistakes. - -Kuropatkin himself certainly did all he could to improve the transport -conditions. In a statement he submitted to the Tsar on March 7, 1904, -he declared that of all urgently pressing questions that of bettering -the railway communication between Russia and Siberia was the most -important; and he added:--"It must, therefore, be taken up at once, in -spite of the enormous cost. The money expended will not be wasted; it -will, on the contrary, be in the highest sense productive inasmuch as it -will shorten the duration of the war." - -On the Trans-Baikal section six new stations were added, and additional -crossing places to facilitate the passing of trains were provided -elsewhere, so that by May some additional trains per day could be -run. In June orders were given by the Government for the execution of -extensive works designed to increase the capacity of the Siberian and -Eastern Chinese main lines to seven trains per day in each direction, -and that of the southern branch to twelve per day. The cost of these -improvements was estimated at £4,400,000. - -In November, 1904, Kuropatkin submitted to the Tsar a recommendation -that the lines should be at once doubled throughout their whole length. -The reinforcements, he declared, were even then still coming in -driblets. "Supplies despatched in the spring are still on the Siberian -side. Waterproofs sent for the summer will arrive when we want fur -coats; fur coats will come to hand when waterproofs are wanted." - -There was need, also, to provide stores of provisions for the troops. So -long as the army was a comparatively small one it could depend mainly on -local resources. In proportion as it increased in size it became more -and more dependent on supplies from European Russia; but the collection -of a sufficiency for a single month meant the running of five extra -trains a day for a like period. Even when ample supplies were available -at one point, weakness and inefficiency in the transport arrangements -might lead to the troops elsewhere suffering privations which should be -avoided. - -Whether for financial or other reasons, the Russian Government did not -adopt the idea of converting the single track of the railway system -into double track; but the improvements made in the traffic facilities -(including the provision of sixty-nine additional places for the passing -of trains) were such that by the time peace was concluded, on September -5, 1905, the Russians had ten, or even twelve pairs of full-length -trains running in the twenty-four hours, as compared with the two per -day which could alone be run six months before the outbreak of war and -the three per day which were running nine months later. The capacity of -the lines had been increased practically fourfold; though the general -situation remained such as to evoke the following comment from the -writer of the official German account of the war[48]:-- - - In spite of the efforts made to improve the line, the - connection of the Russian forces in East Asia with their home - country was, and remained, an unreliable and uncertain factor - in the calculations of Army Headquarters. No measures, were - they ever so energetic, could be designed to remove this - uncertainty, and it was only gradually, as the Manchurian Army - itself increased and concentrated, and as the railway works - advanced, that greater freedom of action was assured to the - Commander-in-Chief; but even then the army as a whole, with all - its wants and supplies, remained dependent on the Siberian and - Eastern Chinese Railways. - -What the railways did was to enable the Russians to collect at the -theatre of war, by the time the war itself came to an end, an army of -1,000,000 men--of whom two-thirds had not yet been under fire--together -with machine-guns, howitzers, shells, small-arm ammunition, field -railways, wireless telegraphy, supplies, and technical stores of all -kinds. Kuropatkin says of this achievement:-- - - The War Department had, with the co-operation of other - departments, successfully accomplished a most colossal task. - What single authority would have admitted a few years ago the - possibility of concentrating an army of a million men 5,400 - miles away from its base of supply and equipment by means of a - poorly-constructed single-line railway? Wonders were effected; - but it was too late. Affairs in the interior of Russia for which - the War Department could not be held responsible were the cause - of the war being brought to an end at a time when decisive - military operations should really have only just been beginning. - - -Russia, in fact, agreed to make peace at a time when the prospect of her -being able to secure a victory was greater than it had been at any time -during the earlier phases of the war; but the Japanese failed to attain -all they had hoped for, the primary causes of such failure, in spite -of their repeated victories, being, as told in the British "Official -History" of the war, that "Port Arthur held out longer than had been -expected, and the Trans-Siberian Railway enabled Russia to place more -men in the field than had been thought possible."[49] - -Thus, in respect to rail-power, at least, Russia still achieved a -remarkable feat in her transport of an army so great a distance by a -single-track line of railway. Such an achievement was unexampled, while, -although Fate was against the ultimate success of her efforts, Russia -provided the world with a fresh object lesson as to what might have -been done, in a campaign waged more than 5,000 miles from the base of -supplies, if only the line of rail communication had been equal from the -first to the demands it was called upon to meet. - -Apart from this main consideration, there were some other phases of the -Russo-Japanese War which are of interest from the point of view of the -present study. - -The _Field railways_, mentioned on the previous page, constituted a -network of, altogether, 250 miles of narrow-gauge railways built and -operated by the Russian troops--either alone or with the help of Chinese -labourers--and designed to act as subsidiary arteries of the broad-gauge -Eastern Chinese Railway by (1) providing for the transport therefrom of -troops and supplies to the front; (2) conveying guns and munitions to -the siege batteries, and (3) bringing back the sick and wounded. Horses, -ponies and mules were employed for traction purposes. Each of the three -Russian armies in the field had its own group of narrow-gauge lines, -and the lines themselves served a most useful purpose in a country of -primitive roads and inadequate local means of transport. - -In one instance a broad-gauge branch line was built inland, during the -course of the war, from the Eastern Chinese Railway for a distance of -twenty-five miles. A depôt was set up at its terminus, and thence the -supplies were conveyed to the troops by a series of narrow-gauge lines -extending to every part of that particular section of the theatre of war. - -Construction of the narrow-gauge line serving the Second Army, and -extending nineteen miles from a point on the Eastern Chinese Railway -near to Port Arthur, necessitated the provision of six bridges and three -embankments. Three lines, the building of which was begun in January, -1905, were siege lines specially designed to serve the positions taken -up at Liao-yang; but all three were abandoned on the evacuation of -Mukden, early in March. It was, however, subsequent to the retreat from -Mukden that the greatest degree of energy in constructing narrow-gauge -lines was shown by the Russians. In addition to the 250 miles brought -into use, there was still another 100 miles completed; but these could -not be operated owing to the inadequate supply of wagons--a supply -reduced still further through seizures made by the Japanese. - -During the course of the war the traffic carried on these military -narrow-gauge lines included over 58,000 tons of provisions, stores, -etc., 75,132 sick and wounded, and 24,786 other troops.[50] - -For the carrying out of all this construction work, and, also, for the -operation of the Manchurian and Ussuri railways, Russia had twenty-four -companies of _Railway Troops_, the total force of which was estimated -at 11,431. In the first part of the war she relied upon her six East -Siberian Railway Battalions. As the work increased other Battalions were -brought from European Russia. - -The Japanese were not well provided with Railway Troops; but they were -none the less active in endeavouring to destroy the Russian lines of -communication, on which so much depended. For instance, the railway -to Port Arthur was cut by them near Wa-fang-tien at 11 p.m. on May 6. -The Russians repaired the line, and by May 10 a further train-load of -ammunition was sent over it into Port Arthur. Three days later the -Japanese cut the line at another point, and from that time Port Arthur -was isolated. - -As regards the _operation_ of the Siberian and Eastern Chinese Railways, -Colonel W. H. H. Waters says:--[51] - - Taking the railway as a whole, from Chelyabinsk, which is - the western terminus of the Siberian portion, to Mukden, a - distance of close upon 4,000 miles, it has worked better than I - expected; but the one great fault connected with it has been, - and is, the incapacity of Russian railwaymen, civil or military, - to handle heavy station traffic properly. If Russia were to pay - a British or American goods-yard foreman, say from Nine Elms - station, a salary, no matter how high, and let him import his - own staff of assistants, the improvement of the Asiatic lines in - question would be remarkable. - -Then, again, Captain C. E. Vickers, R.E., writing on "The Siberian -Railway in War," in the issue of "The Royal Engineers Journal" (Chatham) -for August, 1905, points to the need which was developed for the -_control_ of the railway during war by a separate staff, as distinct -from the staffs concerned in arranging operations, distributing supplies -and munitions, and other military duties. - -Whether due to the personal incapacity spoken of by the one authority -here quoted, or to the lack of a separate organisation alluded to by the -other, the fact remains that the operation of the Siberian and Eastern -Chinese lines did give rise to a degree of confusion that must have -greatly increased the difficulties of the position in which the Russians -were placed. - -When, for example, in September, 1904, reservists were urgently -wanted at Mukden after the retreat from Liao-yang, the traffic was so -mismanaged that it took the troops seven days to do the 337 miles from -Harbin--an average speed of two miles per hour. On December 5, Harbin -Junction was so blocked in all directions by trains which could neither -move in nor go out that traffic had to be suspended for twelve hours -until the entanglement was set right. Still further, after the fall of -Port Arthur, on January 2, 1905, and the augmentation of the Japanese -forces by Nogi's army, the arrival of reinforcements then so greatly -needed by the Russians was delayed for over one month to allow of the -forwarding of a quantity of stores which had accumulated on the line. - -Some, at least, of the difficulties and delays experienced in operation -were undoubtedly due to developments of that _interference by individual -officers_ with the working of the railways of which we have already had -striking examples in the case of the American War of Secession and the -Franco-German War of 1870-71. Colonel Waters writes on this subject:-- - - It is interesting to note how the working of the line was - interfered with by those who should have been the first to see - that no extraneous calls were made upon it when the organisation - of the army and the strengthening of Port Arthur were of vital - importance. - - The chief of the Viceroy's Staff was the intermediary - between Admiral Alexeiev and General Kuropatkin, the former - being at Mukden and the latter at Liao-yang, thirty-seven miles - distant. Frequent conferences took place between Kuropatkin - and this officer, who always used to come in a special train - to Liao-yang. This necessitated the line being kept clear for - indefinite periods of time and dislocated all the other traffic - arrangements, as the then chief of the railways himself declared. - - In the first days of May, 1904, the Viceroy and the Grand - Duke Boris were at Port Arthur, and wished to leave it before - they should be cut off. I heard that they actually took three - special trains to quit Port Arthur, namely, one for each of - them, and one for their baggage and stores. This entirely upset - the troop train, supply and ammunition services, at a time, - too, when the scarcity of heavy gun munition in the fortress was - such that, within a week, Kuropatkin called for volunteers to - run a train-load through, which was done a few hours only before - the place was definitely invested. - - There were, throughout 1904, plenty of other instances - of special trains being run for, and siding accommodation - occupied by, various individuals, so that the organisation and - maintenance of the army was considerably hampered thereby. - -These experiences simply confirm the wisdom of the action which other -countries had already taken (1) to ensure the efficient operation of -railways in time of war by staffs comprising the military and the -technical elements in combination, and (2) to prevent the interference -of the former in the details of the actual working by the latter. - -Russia was, in fact, distinctly behind Western nations in these respects -in 1904-5, and the need for placing her military transport system on a -sounder basis was among the many lessons she learnt--and acted upon--as -the result of her experiences in the war with Japan. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[48] "The Russo-Japanese War. The Ya-Lu. Prepared in the Historical -Section of the German General Staff." Authorized Translation by Karl von -Donat. London, 1908. - -[49] "Official History of the Russo-Japanese War." Prepared by the -Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. London, 1910. - -[50] "Construction et exploitation des chemins de fer à traction animale -sur le théâtre de la guerre de 1904-5 en Mandchourie." _Revue du Genie -Militaire_, Avril, Mai, Juin, 1909. Paris. - -[51] "The Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers attached to -the Japanese and Russians Forces in the Field." Vol. III. General Report -[dated March, 1905] by Col. W. H. H. Waters. London, 1908. - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII - -STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY - - -Between "strategical" and "military" railways there are certain -fundamental differences, just as there are, also, between both of them -and ordinary commercial railways. - -While designed partly, mainly, or, it may be, exclusively, to serve -military purposes, strategical railways, unlike military railways -proper, form part of the ordinary railway system of the country in which -they are built. They approximate to commercial lines in construction, -equipment and operation, and they are worked in connection with them -for the ordinary purposes of trade and travel; though in their case any -considerations as to whether the traffic they carry is remunerative -does not arise, provided only that they are capable of fulfilling -their real purpose--that, namely, of ensuring such military transports -as may, sooner or later, be required of them. It is possible that in -times of peace the amount of actual traffic passing over them will -be comparatively small, if not even practically _nil_, and that many -years may elapse before the special facilities they must necessarily -offer,--such as extensive siding accommodation and long platforms for -the loading and unloading of troop trains--are likely to be employed to -the fullest extent; but they nevertheless form an integral part both -of the railway system and of the military system of the country, and, -having been constructed, they are, at least, available for military -purposes whenever wanted. - -One must, however, again bear in mind that a railway built to meet -the ordinary requirements of trade and travel does not become a -"strategical" any more than a "military" railway simply because, in -time of war, it is used, to whatever extent, for the conveyance of -troops, supplies or war material. The essential factor in each instance -is, not the use that is made of the line, but the particular, or, at -least, the main object it has been built to serve. Just, also, as a -commercial line remains a commercial line notwithstanding its use for -military traffic, so, in turn, a strategical line remains a strategical -line whatever the amount of civilian traffic it may carry in time of -peace. - -Yet while the distinction thus drawn between general railways and -strategical railways is abundantly warranted, the increase of the former -may still have an important bearing on the operation of the latter -because of the improvement of transport facilities in the interior, -and because of the greater amount of rolling stock which will be made -available for war purposes. "From a military point of view," said von -Moltke in the Prussian Herrenhaus on March 26, 1876, "every railway is -welcome, and two are still more welcome than one"; and he developed -this idea in a further speech on December 17, 1879, when, in declaring -that the ownership and operation of the leading Prussian railways was -desirable from a military standpoint, he said:--[52] - - Railways have become, in our time, one of the most essential - instruments for the conduct of war. The transport of large - bodies of troops to a given point is an extremely complicated - and comprehensive piece of work, to which continuous attention - must be paid. Every fresh railway junction makes a difference, - while, although we may not want to make use of every railway - line that has been constructed, we may still want to make use of - the whole of the rolling stock that is available. - -Another important distinction between military and strategical railways -is that whereas the building of the former will be governed primarily -by military requirements, that of the latter may be fundamentally due -to considerations of State policy. Strategical railways are wanted -to serve the purposes of national defence or, alternatively, of -national expansion. They are especially provided to ensure the speedy -concentration of troops on the frontier, whether to resist invasion by -a neighbouring country or to facilitate the invasion either of that -country or, it may be, of territory on the other side thereof. The fact -that they have been built may, in some cases, even further the interests -of peace, should the increased means they offer for military transports -render the country concerned a more formidable antagonist than it -might otherwise be, and influence the policy of other States or lands -accordingly. - -In tropical dependencies the building of railways as a practical proof -of "effective occupation" is often regarded as preferable to military -conquest, being likely, in most cases, to answer the same purpose while -offering many other advantages, besides. In West Africa there are not -only railways of this class but others that have, in addition, been -designed as a precautionary measure against a not impossible invasion, -at some future date, by Mohammedan tribes from North Central Africa. All -such lines as these belong to the strategical type, though they may, -also, serve an important part in furthering the economic development of -the territories concerned. - -Strategical railways, whether designed for defensive or aggressive -purposes, may, in turn, be divided into two main groups, (1) those that -constitute a network of lines; and (2) single or individual lines for -short or long distances. - -A network of strategical railways is generally found in direct -association with frontiers. Single or individual strategical lines fall -into various groups including (1) short lines or branches running out -to some point on or near to a frontier; (2) single lines carried for -long distances, and, possibly, crossing entire continents; (3) circular -or short lines, connecting different railway systems with one another, -in order to facilitate the movement of troops during mobilisation or -concentration or for defensive purposes in the event of invasion; (4) -lines passing round cities or large towns in order to avoid delay of -troop trains; and (5) lines for coast defence. - -The ideal conditions for a network of strategical railways was already -a subject of discussion in Germany in 1842, when Pönitz brought -forward his proposal that that country should provide herself with -such a system. There were, he said, theorists who designed, on paper, -strategical railways which, starting from a common centre, radiated in -straight lines to different points on the frontier and were connected -with one another by parallel or intersecting lines of railway on the -principle of a geometrical design, or, he might have added, of a -spider's web. Pönitz admitted the excellence of the idea, suggesting -that if there were, indeed, a group of lines to the frontier connected -by cross lines allowing of a complete interchange of traffic, the enemy -would never know at what point a sudden advance in force might not be -made, while the linking up of the entire system would greatly facilitate -working. - -In practice, however, as he proceeded to point out, this ideal system -could not be fully adopted, partly because the planning of railways is -influenced by the configuration of the country, which may not permit -of geometrical designs for iron roads; and partly because the trunk -lines of national systems of rail communication had already been laid -by private enterprise on the principle of catering for the social and -economic needs of the community and of returning interest on capital -expenditure, rather than of serving military or political purposes. - -In the proposals which Pönitz himself advanced for providing Germany -with a complete network of strategical lines he sought to combine, as -far as possible, the commercial and the military principle; though the -subsequent predominance, in most countries, of the economic element in -regard to railways in general strengthened the force of his contention -that an ideal system was not necessarily a practicable one. The -suggested geometrical design was, nevertheless, not lost sight of, -and it continued to be regarded as the plan that should, at least, be -followed in respect to strategical railways, as far as circumstances -would permit. - -Dealing with this particular subject in his "Geschichte und System -der Eisenbahnbenutzung im Kriege" (Leipzig, 1896), Dr. Josef Joesten -included the following among the conditions which, theoretically -and practically, should enable a railway system to respond to the -necessities of war:-- - -1. To each of the strategical fronts of the national territory there -should be the largest possible number of railway lines, all independent -the one of the other. - -2. The converging lines terminating at the bases of concentration, and -more especially those leading to the coast or to great navigable rivers, -should be crossed by numerous transverse lines in order to allow of the -rapid passing of troops from any one of the lines of concentration to -any other. - -3. Positions or localities having a recognised strategical value should -be selected as the places where the two types of lines should cross, and -these intersection points, when they are near to the frontier, should -themselves be protected by fortifications serving as _points d'appui_ -for movements of advance or retirement. - -It is possible that, if the building of railways in Germany had been -left entirely to the State from the outset, these principles would have -been generally followed there; but in Prussia the private lines taken -over as the result of the policy of nationalisation adopted by that -country--the total length of those acquired since 1872 being now nearly -10,000 miles--had been originally constructed to serve, not strategic, -but economic purposes, and, more especially, the industrial interests -of Westphalia and the Rhineland, the Government having been left by -private enterprise to provide, not alone the strategical lines, but, -also, the lines that were wanted to serve the less promising economic -requirements, of Eastern Prussia. To say, therefore, as some writers -have done, that the Prussian--if not the German--railways as a whole -have been designed to serve military purposes is erroneous. It is none -the less true that the adoption of the principle of State ownership -conferred alike on Prussia and on other German States a great advantage -in enabling them both to build strategical lines as, ostensibly, part -of the ordinary railway system and to adapt existing lines to military -purposes so far as conditions allowed and occasion might require. - -In these circumstances any close adherence to ideal systems has, indeed, -not been practicable; yet the activity shown in Germany in providing -either new or adapted strategical lines of railway has been beyond all -question. - -Such activity has been especially manifest since the Franco-German war -of 1870-1. It is, indeed, the case that during the last twenty-five -years there have been constant representations by Prussian trading -interests that the railways in Westphalia and Rhineland, numerous -as they might appear to be, were unequal to the industrial needs -of those districts. The reasons for these conditions were that the -Administration, eager to secure railway "profits," had neglected to -provide adequately for improvements, widenings and extensions of -line, and for additions to rolling stock. No one, however, is likely -to suggest that Prussia has shown any lack of enterprise in the -construction of strategical lines which would enable her to concentrate -great masses of troops on her frontiers with the utmost dispatch. "The -rivalry between neighbouring States," writes von der Goltz in "The -Conduct of War," "has had the effect of causing perfectly new lines -to be constructed solely for military reasons. Strategical railways -constitute a special feature of our time"; and in no country has this -fact been recognised more clearly, and acted upon more thoroughly, than -in Germany. - -It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to attempt to form a reliable -estimate of the situation, from a strategical point of view, on the -basis of the ordinary German railway maps, and certain reproductions -thereof recently offered in the English Press have been wholly -misleading. Not only may these maps be hopelessly out of date--one, for -instance, that was published in a military journal in the autumn of 1914 -contained none of the strategical lines built by Prussia since 1900 -for troop movements in the direction of Belgium--but they invariably -draw no distinction between State-owned lines which do come into -consideration in regard to military transports and agricultural or other -lines--including many narrow-gauge ones--which serve local purposes -only and are still owned by private companies, the State not having -thought it necessary in the general interest to take them over. - -A more accurate idea of the real bearings of German railways on the -military and strategical situation can be gathered from the large map -("Kartenbeilage I") which accompanies the "Bericht" presented to the -Kaiser, in 1911, by the Prussian Minister of Public Works under the -title of "Die Verwaltung der öffentlichen Arbeiten in Preussen, 1900 bis -1910." On this map a clear distinction is drawn between State-owned and -company-owned lines, while difference in colouring shows the additions -made to the State system during the decade either by construction of new -lines or by State acquisition of existing lines. - -One especially noticeable feature brought out by this map is the fact -that, in addition to the innumerable railway lines built either to the -frontiers or establishing intercommunication and exchange of traffic -between those lines themselves, there is an almost unbroken series -running parallel to the coasts of _Pomerania_ and _East Prussia_, and -thence southward all along and close to the frontiers of Russia and -Russian Poland. In this way troops can be moved, not only by different -routes _to_ many points along the Baltic coast or the Russian frontier, -but, also, _from_ one of these coastal or frontier points direct to -another, as may be desired. - -The strategical significance of this arrangement is sufficiently -obvious; but any possible doubt as to the purpose aimed at is removed -by some observations thereon made by Joesten, who further says in his -"Geschichte und System der Eisenbahnbenutzung im Kriege":-- - - If it is true that, generally speaking, the best - railways for general purposes constitute excellent lines of - communication for armies, it is no less true that good, or - very good, strategical lines cannot, and ought not to, in all - cases constitute good commercial lines. In support of this - assertion one can refer to the immense extent of railway lines - on the coasts of Pomerania. These lines, which are of the - first importance from a strategical point of view, have only - a moderate value from a commercial standpoint, considering - that they do not connect the interior of the country with any - district providing goods or passenger traffic on a material - scale, and only provide means of communication between - localities having identical needs. - -What is thus admitted in regard to the coastal railways of Pomerania -applies no less to many, if not to most, of the frontier lines in East -Prussia, West Prussia and Silesia. - -Not only, again, is the number of German lines going to the frontiers, -and no farther, out of all proportion to the number of those providing -for international communication, but the map on which these observations -are based shows that between 1900 and 1910 there were added to the -Prussian State system many lines which (1) established additional -transverse links between those already going to the Russian frontier, -(2) provided alternative routes thereto, or (3) supplemented the -lines which skirt the frontier, a few miles inland, by branches going -therefrom to strategic points actually on the frontier itself. - -As against this construction of an elaborate network of strategical -lines towards and along _the Russian frontier_, there must be put the -fact that although, by this means, Germany acquired the power to effect -a great and speedy concentration of troops on the frontier itself, her -locomotives and rolling stock would not be able to cross into Russia and -run on the railways there because of _the difference in gauge_. On the -eastern frontier the question as to how an invasion in large force could -be effected was, consequently, quite different from that which would -present itself on the western frontiers, where the railway gauges of -Belgium, Luxemburg and France were the same as those of Germany. - -It was certain that whenever, in the event of war, German troops were -able to enter Russian territory, Russia would withdraw into the interior -or else destroy such of her locomotives and rolling stock as the enemy -might otherwise utilise for his own purpose. If, therefore, the Germans -wanted to use the existing Russian lines, they would either have to -build, in advance, locomotives and rolling stock capable of running -thereon, or they would have to convert the Russian gauge of 5 feet to -the German gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches, so that German trains could run -on the other side of the frontier. As already remarked on page 61, the -reduction of the broader gauge into a narrower one would involve fewer -engineering difficulties than an expansion of the German gauge into the -Russian gauge; yet even the former procedure, if carried out over any -considerable length of line, would take up a good deal of time, and -this would be still more the case if the Russians, when they retreated, -destroyed the railway track and bridges behind them, as they might -confidently be expected to do. - -Dependence, again, on the existing lines across the frontier would, -apart from questions of conversion and reconstruction, still give -Germany only a very small number of railway routes into Russia, and -these, also, at points where the opposition offered might be especially -active. - -What, in these circumstances, Germany evidently planned to do as soon -as her troops crossed the frontier, in the event of a war with Russia, -was to supplement the strategical lines on her own side of that frontier -by military light railways which, laid on the ordinary roads, or on -clearances to be effected, on Russian territory, would render her -independent of the ordinary railways there, while offering the further -advantage (1) that the laying of these narrow-gauge military lines--in -rough and ready fashion, yet in a way that would answer the purposes of -the moment--could be effected in shorter time than the gauge-conversion -and the reconstruction of the Russian trunk lines would take; and (2) -that these military railways could be built from any points along -the frontier which were capable of being reached direct from the -German strategical lines, and offered either an existing road or the -opportunity of making one for the purpose. - -In the light of this assumption, one can understand more clearly the -reason for those short lines which, branching out from the German -strategical railways that run parallel to the Russian frontier though -some miles from it, are carried to the frontier and there suddenly stop. -It was, presumably, from such terminal points as these that the laying -of the military railways on Russian territory would begin. - -As regards the type of railways to be employed and the preparations made -in advance for supplying and constructing them, we have the testimony of -Mr. Roy Norton, an American writer, who says in "The Man of Peace"--one -of the "Oxford Pamphlets, 1914-15," published by the Oxford University -Press:-- - - On February 14 of this year (1914) I was in Cologne, and - blundered, where I had no business, into what I learned was - a military-stores yard. Among other curious things were tiny - locomotives loaded on flats which could be run off those cars - by an ingenious contrivance of metals, or, as we call them in - America, rails. Also there were other flats loaded with sections - of tracks fastened on cup ties (sleepers that can be laid on the - surface of the earth) and sections of miniature bridges on other - flats. I saw how it was possible to lay a line of temporary - railway, including bridges, almost anywhere in an incredibly - short space of time, if one had the men.... Before I could - conclude my examination I discovered that I was on _verboten_ - ground; but the official who directed me out told me that what I - had seen were construction outfits. - -Mr. Norton further quotes the following from a letter he had just -received from a Hollander who was a refugee in Germany at the outbreak -of the war, and reached home on August 30, 1914:-- - - Never, I believe, did a country so thoroughly get ready - for war. I saw the oddest spectacle, the building of a railway - behind a battle-field. They had diminutive little engines and - rails in sections, so that they could be bolted together, and - even bridges that could be put across ravines in a twinkling. - Flat cars that could be carried by hand and dropped on the - rails, great strings of them. Up to the nearest point of battle - came, on the regular railway, this small one.... It seemed to - me that hundreds of men had been trained for this task, for in - but a few minutes that small portable train was buzzing backward - and forward on its own small portable rails, distributing food - and supplies.... I've an idea that in time of battle it would - be possible for those sturdy little trains to shift troops to - critical or endangered points at the rate of perhaps twenty - miles an hour.... A portable railway for a battle-field struck - me as coming about as close to making war by machinery as - anything I have ever heard of. - -One may thus reasonably conclude, in regard to the Russo-German -frontier, (1) that the broader gauge of the Russian railways would -itself offer no real obstacle to the German troops whenever the time -came for their invading Russian territory; (2) that in this eventuality -the Germans would be able, by reason of the preparations made by them in -advance, to lay down along the ordinary Russian roads lines of military -light railways already put together in complete sections of combined -rails and sleepers, which sections would only require to be fastened -the one to the other to be at once ready for use; and (3) that these -portable military railways, to be built on Russian territory, were -designed both to supplement and to render still more efficient Germany's -network of strategical railways along her eastern frontier. - -In _southern Silesia_ many improvements in the rail communication with -Austria were made in 1900-10. New connections were established with the -frontier railways, offering alternative routes from interior points, -while various lines which stopped short of the frontier were extended to -it and linked up with Austrian lines on the other side. - -In her relations with _France_, Germany's efforts to improve still -further her rail communications to the eastern and north-eastern -frontiers of that country have been continuous since the war of 1870-1, -on which campaign she started with a great advantage over the French -since she was able to concentrate her troops on those frontiers by -nine different routes, namely, six in North Germany, and three in -South Germany, whereas France herself had then only three available. -The course adopted by Germany has been (1) to secure a larger number -of routes to the French frontier, South Germany's three lines, for -instance, being increased to six; (2) to provide double track, or to -substitute double for single track, for lines leading to the frontier -and having a strategical importance; (3) to construct lines which -cross transversely those proceeding direct to the French frontiers, -thus allowing of intercommunication and transfer of traffic from one -to another; and (4) improvement of the interior network of lines, -with a view to facilitating military transport services in time of -war. "Altogether," says Joesten, "we have nineteen points at which -our railways cross the Rhine, and sixteen double-track lines for the -transport of our troops from east to west, as against the nine which -were alone available for concentration in 1870." - -While showing all this activity on the immediate frontiers of France, -Germany was no less zealous in providing alternative routes for a fresh -invasion of French territory, the adoption of this further policy being -obviously inspired by the energy that France was herself showing in the -strengthening of her north-east frontier against invasion. - -One such alternative route was represented by _Luxemburg_. Not only -did Germany have lines of her own on the north, south, and east of -Luxemburg, but the lines within the Grand Duchy itself had passed under -German control; and if Germany thought fit to disregard her treaty -obligations, and use the lines for strategical purposes, Luxemburg was -powerless to prevent her from so doing. - -Another alternative route was by way of _Belgium_; and the various -developments of Germany's railway policy on the Belgian frontier since -1908 point in an unmistakable manner to deliberate preparation on her -part for an invasion of that country, whether for the purpose of passing -through it, as a means of reaching a more vulnerable part of French -territory than the strongly fortified north-east corner, or in pursuance -of designs against Belgium itself. - -The full story of Germany's activity in this direction will be found in -a series of articles from the _Fortnightly Review_ reproduced by the -author, Mr. Demetrius C. Boulger, in "England's Arch-Enemy: A Collection -of Essays forming an Indictment of German Policy during the last sixteen -years" (London, 1914).[53] - -The story opens with the establishment by Germany, about the year 1896, -of a camp at Elsenborn, ten miles north-east of Malmédy, a town situate -close to the Belgian frontier and four miles from the Belgian town of -Stavelot. The camp was begun on a small scale, and at the outset the -establishment of it on the site in question was declared by the Prussian -authorities to have no strategical significance. It steadily developed, -however, in size and importance, and its position, character and -surroundings all suggested that it was designed for aggressive rather -than defensive purposes. - -At first the camp was reached from Hellenthal, a station, fourteen miles -away, on a light railway connected with the lines in the Eifel district, -between Cologne and Treves (Trier), on the Moselle; but in 1896 a light -railway was constructed from Aix-la-Chapelle parallel with the Belgian -frontier as far as St. Vith, a distance of fifty miles, the main purpose -of this line being stated to be the securing of a better connection, -from Sourbrodt, for the camp at Elsenborn. The line was, nevertheless, -extended to Trois Vièrges (Ger. Uflingen), where it connected both -with the railway system of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and with the -main lines of the Belgian System from Pepinster, via Spa, Stavelot, -Trois Ponts and Gouvy, to Trois Vièrges. From Trois Ponts there is a -direct route to Liége, while Gouvy, situate only a few miles from Trois -Vièrges, is the junction both for Libramont, on the main line from -Brussels to Metz and Alsace, and for the further junction of Beatrix, -the central point of a Belgian line running parallel with the French -frontier from Dinant to Luxemburg. - -The single-track line from Aix-la-Chapelle along the Belgian frontier, -supplemented by a light-railway branch from Weismes to Malmédy, met all -the traffic requirements of a scantily-populated and primitive district, -devoid alike of industries and of local resources, and offering very -little traffic; but in 1908 the Prussian Government suddenly decided -to double the line, first as far as Weismes, and then to St. Vith, -notwithstanding that there was no apparent justification for such a -procedure. The widening involved, also, the reconstruction of a high -embankment originally designed for one set of metals, a fact which -showed that only a few years previously--since when the local traffic -had not materially increased--there was no idea that a double-track -line would ever be wanted. Still more significant was the fact that, in -addition to the second set of metals, sidings were provided on such a -scale at the stations _en route_, in localities possessing only a dozen -or so of cottages, that, in the aggregate, trains containing a complete -Army Corps could have been accommodated on them. At one station three -sidings, each about 500 yards long, were supplied, and at another a -perfect network of sidings was constructed, including two which were at -least half a mile long and were, also, equipped with turntables.[54] - -The provision, more especially, of sidings such as these at local -stations where the trains were few and far between and the ordinary -merchandise was represented by some occasional coal trucks, could have -but one purpose. They were obviously designed--in conjunction with -the substitution of double for single track--to permit of a large -body of troops, whether from Aix-la-Chapelle (an important point of -concentration for the Prussian Army, on mobilisation), or elsewhere, -being assembled in the immediate neighbourhood of Weismes, the junction -of the branch line to Malmédy, for an invasion of Belgium. The doubling -of the rails as far as Weismes was completed by May, 1909. It was -afterwards continued to St. Vith, and so on to Trois Vièrges. - -We have thus far, however, got only the first chapter of the story. The -second opens with the further attempt of the Prussian Government to -secure an extension of the Weismes-Malmédy line as a "light railway" -across the frontier to Stavelot, three miles east of Trois Ponts, thus -giving a shorter route from Aix-la-Chapelle and the camp at Elsenborn -to Liége, Namur, Louvain and Brussels, and a second route to Gouvy for -Libramont, Bertrix and the north of France. - -As the result of the influence they were able to bring to bear on them, -the Germans succeeded in persuading the Belgian Government, not only to -agree to the Weismes-Malmédy branch being continued to Stavelot, but -themselves to build the greater part of this connecting link, and even -to cut, on the north of Stavelot, a tunnel without which that town would -have remained inaccessible by rail. - -Once more there could be no suggestion that this connecting link, opened -in October, 1913, was wanted in the interests of the ordinary traffic, -the needs of which were adequately met by the diligence running twice -a day between Malmédy and Stavelot. What was really aimed at was a -rail connection with the Belgian system by means of which the troops -concentrated in those extensive sidings on the Aix-la-Chapelle-St. -Vith line could be poured into Belgium in a continuous stream for the -achievement of designs on Belgium or--operating from either the Belgian -or the Luxemburg frontier--on France. - -In helping to provide this connection, Belgium, as subsequent events -were to show, was in a position akin to that of a man forced to dig -the grave in which he is to be buried after being shot; but Belgium, -we are told, "yielded in this and other matters because she could not -resist without support, and no support was forthcoming." There certainly -was an attempt to lull possible suspicions by the designation of the -Malmédy-Stavelot link as a "light railway." It was, also, evident that -the physical conditions of the Weismes-Malmédy branch, with which it -was to connect, would not permit of any heavy traffic along it. But -the so-called "light railway" was built with the same gauge as the -main-line systems on each side of the frontier; the powers obtained in -respect to it allowed of trains being run at a speed of forty miles an -hour, as against the recognised speed of sixteen miles an hour on light -railways proper; while no sooner had the link been established than -Germany discarded the defective Weismes-Malmédy branch for the purposes -of military transport, and built a new line from Malmédy to Weywertz, -a station to the north or north-east of Weismes. This Malmédy-Weywertz -branch would, it was understood, be used exclusively for military -traffic, and the station at Weywertz was, in due course, provided with -its own extensive platforms and network of sidings for the accommodation -of troop trains. - -We now come to the third chapter of the story; and here we learn that -what was happening in the immediate proximity of the German-Belgian -frontier was but part of a much wider scheme, though one still designed -to serve the same purpose--that, namely, of ensuring the invasion of -Belgium by German troops with the greatest facility and in the least -possible time. - -From Weywertz, the new junction for Stavelot and the Belgian railways -in general, the Germans built a line to Jünkerath, a station north of -Gerolstein, on the line from Cologne to Treves. Then from Blankenheim, -immediately north of Jünkerath, and from Lissendorf, on the south -of the same station, there were opened for traffic, in July, 1912, -new double-track lines which, meeting at Dümpelfeld, on the existing -Remagen-Adenau line, gave a through route for troops from the Rhine, -across the Eifel district to Weywertz, and so on to Stavelot for -destinations (in war-time) throughout Belgium, Luxemburg, or along the -northern frontier of France. - -This direct route to Belgium offered the further advantage that it -avoided any necessity for troops from the Rhine to pass through -Cologne, where much congestion might otherwise occur. It also left -the Aix-la-Chapelle-Weywertz route free for troops from Cologne and -Westphalia, while a further improvement of the facilities for crossing -the Rhine made Remagen still more accessible for troops from all parts -of Central Germany destined for Belgium--and beyond. - -Reference to the Prussian State Railways official map shows, also, (1) -a new line from Coblenz which joins, at Mayen, the existing railway -from Andernach, on the Rhine, to Gerolstein, in the Eifel, whence the -Belgian border can be reached either via Jünkerath and Weywertz or -via Lammersweiler and the Luxemburg station of Trois-Vièrges; (2) the -extension to Daun, also on the Andernach-Gerolstein route, of a short -branch on the Coblenz-Treves Railway which previously terminated at -Wittlich; and (3) several other small lines in the Eifel district, -offering additional facilities for the concentration of troops on the -Belgian frontier. - -So the Malmédy-Stavelot "light railway"--especially in view of this -series of new German lines all leading thereto--had become a railway -of the greatest strategical importance; and the fourth chapter of the -story (though one upon which it is not proposed to enter here) would -show how this network of strategical lines, developed with so much -energy and thoroughness, was brought into operation in 1914 immediately -on the outbreak of war, and, from that time, constituted one of the -main arteries for the passage of German troops to and from Belgium and -Northern France. - -In regard to _Holland_, one finds a new line of railway from Jülich--a -station reached from Düren, on the main line between Cologne and -Aix-la-Chapelle--to Dalheim, the German frontier station on the direct -line from Cologne via Rheydt to Roermond, a Dutch station on the right -bank of the Meuse (which is here crossed by two bridges), and thence -through the Belgian stations of Moll and Herenthals and across the flat -expanse of the Campine to Antwerp. - -This line obviously offers an alternative route for the transport of -troops from Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle to Dalheim; but of still greater -significance is the information given by the writer of the _Fortnightly -Review_ articles as to the changes carried out at Dalheim itself, -transforming that place from "an unimportant halting-place" into "a -point of concentration of great strategical importance" on the frontiers -of Holland. - -Inasmuch as the line from Dalheim to Roermond and on to Antwerp was -already a double one, the alterations made at Dalheim were confined -to a liberal provision of railway sidings in order that, as we have -seen was done on the Belgian frontier, a large body of troops could -be concentrated for a possible invasion, in this instance, either of -Holland itself, or of Belgium by the alternative route across the -south-eastern corner of Dutch territory. - -One of the Dalheim sidings, about a quarter of a mile in length, -situate on a high embankment; and, in order that it could be reached -without interfering with other traffic, a bridge over which the main -line runs east of Dalheim station was widened to allow of the laying -across it of a third pair of rails. Other sidings adjoining Dalheim -station have no fewer than ten pairs of parallel rails, and there -are still others on the west of the same station, towards the Dutch -frontier. At Wegberg and Rheydt, east of Dalheim, further sidings were -provided which, like those at Dalheim, would not possibly be required -for other than military reasons. - -Summing up the situation in regard alike to the Belgian and the Dutch -frontiers, Mr. Boulger remarks, in his article of February, 1914:-- - - Thus on an arc extending from Treves to Nijmegen (excluding - from our purview what is called the main concentration on the - Saar, behind Metz), the German War Department has arranged for a - simultaneous advance by fourteen separate routes across Holland, - Belgium and the Grand Duchy. - -In view of all these facts, there is no possible room for doubt as to -the prolonged and extensive nature of the preparations made by Germany -for the war she instigated in 1914; but the particular consideration -with which we are here concerned is that of seeing to what extent those -preparations related either to the construction of strategical lines of -railway or to the adaptation of existing lines to strategical purposes. - -Leaving Belgium and Holland, and looking at the Prussian State lines in -_Schleswig-Holstein_, one finds on the official map the indication of -a new line (partly built and partly under construction in 1910) which, -starting from Holtenau, at the mouth of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal in the -Baltic, continues the short distance to Kiel, then turns to the west, -connects with the Neumünster-Vandrup main line to Denmark, crosses the -canal, and so on to Husum, a junction on the Altona-Esbjerg west-coast -route. This new line would evidently be of strategical advantage in -moving troops from Kiel either for the defence of the Kaiser Wilhelm -Canal or to resist invasion by sea on the north of the waterway. Then -the existing line from Kiel through Eckernförde to Flensburg, on the -Neumünster-Vandrup route to Denmark, and giving through connection from -Kiel to Tondern and Hoyer on the west coast--has been "nationalised," -and so added to the Prussian State system; while from two stations just -to the north of Flensburg there are short new lines which, meeting at -Torsbüll, continue to the Alsener Sund, on the west of the Little Belt, -and may--or may not--be of value in improving Prussia's strategical -position in this corner of the Baltic, and in immediate proximity to the -Danish island of Fünen. - -Finally a large number of additions have been made in recent years to -the State Railway systems in the interior of Germany; and, although a -good proportion of these may have been provided to meet the increased -economic and social needs of the German people, many of them must -be regarded as strategical lines designed to facilitate (1) the -mobilisation of troops on the outbreak of war; (2) their concentration, -by routes covering all parts of the Empire, as arranged long in advance; -and (3) their speedy transfer across country from one frontier to -another, should several campaigns be fought at the same time. - -The resort by Germany to strategical railways in Africa and elsewhere, -as a means of furthering her Weltpolitik, will be dealt with in the two -chapters that follow. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[52] "Gesammelte Schriften." Berlin, 1891, etc. - -[53] The articles which here specially come into question are--"The -Menace of Elsenborn" (published in the _Fortnightly_, July, 1908); "An -Object Lesson in German Plans" (February, 1910); and "A Further Object -Lesson in German Plans" (February, 1914). - -[54] They were "hydraulic turntables," according to Major -Stuart-Stephens. See _The English Review_ for June, 1915. - - - - -CHAPTER XIX - -A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE - - -Strategical railways in South-West Africa were built by Germany as -a means towards the achievement of her designs on British South -Africa; but these, in turn, were only part of a still greater plan -having for its purpose the transformation of Africa as a whole into a -German-African Empire which should compare in value, if not in glory, -with that of the Indian Empire itself. - -Colonisation societies began to be formed in Germany as early as 1849; -though in the first instance the aims of their promoters were directed -mainly to such parts of the world as Brazil, Texas, the Mosquito Shore, -Chili and Morocco. All such places as these, however, offered the -disadvantage that Germans going there could only become foreign settlers -under the more or less civilised Powers already in possession.[55] -In the 60's and 70's of the nineteenth century attention in Germany -began to be diverted, rather, to Africa as a land where vast expanses, -possessing great prospects and possibilities, and not yet controlled by -any civilised Power, were still available not only for colonisation but -for acquisition. So it was that successive German travellers explored -many different parts of Africa and published accounts of their journeys -designed, not merely as contributions to geographical science, but, -also, to impress a then somewhat apathetic German public with the -importance of their acquiring a "footing" on the African continent. -In 1873 a German Society for the Exploration of Equatorial Africa was -founded. This was followed in 1876 by the German African Society, and -subsequently these two bodies were combined under the name of the Berlin -African Society. - -Not long after this, evidence was forthcoming that something far more -than the settling of German colonists in Africa and the securing of a -"footing" on African soil by Germany was really being kept in view. - -In 1880 Sir Bartle Frere, at that time Governor of the Cape and High -Commissioner for South Africa, forwarded to Lord Kimberley a translation -of an article which had just been contributed to the _Geographische -Nachrichten_ by Ernst von Weber; and, in doing so he informed the -Colonial Secretary that the article contained "a clear and well-argued -statement in favour of the plan for a German colony in South Africa -which was much discussed in German commercial and political circles -even before the Franco-German War, and is said to have been one of the -immediate motives of the German mission of scientific inquiry which -visited southern and eastern Africa in 1870-71." - -Von Weber's proposals[56] pointed, however, to the creation, not simply -of "a German colony" in South Africa, but of a German Empire in Africa. -"A new Empire," he wrote, "possibly more valuable and more brilliant -than even the Indian Empire, awaits in the newly-discovered Central -Africa that Power which shall possess sufficient courage, strength and -intelligence to acquire it"; and he proceeded to show (1) why Germany -should be this Power, and (2) the means by which she might eventually -secure control of the whole country. - -The establishment of trading settlements was to ensure for the Germans -a footing in the districts north of the Transvaal, and this was to -be followed by the flooding of South Africa generally with German -immigrants. The Boers spread throughout South Africa were already allied -to the Germans by speech and habits, and they would, he thought, be -sure to emigrate to the north and place themselves under the protection -of the German colonies there, rather than remain subject to the hated -British. In any case, "a constant mass-immigration of Germans would -gradually bring about a decided numerical preponderance of Germans over -the Dutch population, and of itself would effect the Germanisation of -the country in a peaceful manner. It was," he continued, "this free, -unlimited room for annexation in the north, this open access to the -heart of Africa, which principally inspired me with the idea, now more -than four years ago, that Germany should try, by the acquisition of -Delagoa Bay and the subsequent continued influx of German immigrants -into the Transvaal, to secure future dominion over the country, and -so pave the way for the foundation of a German-African Empire of the -future." - -The procedure to be followed was (1) the acquiring of territory in -Africa by Germany wherever she could get it, whether in the central or -in the coastal districts; (2) co-operation with the Boers as a step -towards bringing them and their Republics under German suzerainty; and -(3) the overthrow of British influence, with the substitution for it of -German supremacy. - -These ideas gained wide acceptance in Germany; they became a leading -factor in the colonial policy of the Imperial Government, and they -reconciled the German people, more or less, to the heavy burdens which -the developments of that policy were to involve. - - -GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA - -The first steps towards the attainment of the aspirations entertained -were taken by Herr Adolf Lüderitz, a Bremen merchant who, acting under -the auspices of the German Colonial Society, and having received from -the Imperial Foreign Office assurances of its protection, established -a trading settlement, in April, 1883, in the bay of Angra Pequeña, -situate between Namaqualand and Damaraland on the west coast of Africa, -and about 150 miles north of Orange River, the northern boundary of -Cape Colony. Acquiring from a Hottentot chief a stretch of territory -215 miles in extent in the Hinterland of Angra Pequeña, Lüderitz -raised the German flag in the settlement, which thus became Germany's -first colony. Further concessions of territory were obtained, and in -September, 1884, Germany announced that the west coast of Africa, from -26 degrees S. latitude to Cape Frio, excepting Walfisch Bay (declared -British in 1878), had been placed under the protection of the German -Emperor. A treaty made between England and Germany in 1890 defined the -limits of the German South-West African Protectorate as bounded on the -south by the Orange River and Cape Colony, on the north by Portuguese -Angola, on the west by the Atlantic, and on the east by British -Bechuanaland, with the so-called "Caprivi Strip," giving Germany access -from the north-east corner of her Protectorate to a point on the Zambezi -River north of Victoria Falls.[57] The total area comprised within these -boundaries was about 322,200 square miles. - -At the outset, the new Protectorate aroused little enthusiasm in Germany -as a colony where her surplus population could hope to settle and -prosper under the German flag instead of going to foreign countries, -as so many thousands of Germans were then doing. On a coast-line of -900 miles there was no good natural harbour except the one at Walfisch -Bay, owned by the British. Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht, on which the -German colonists would have to rely, were then little better than open -roadsteads. Considerable expanses of the territory itself consist of -drought-stricken desert. The rainfall in Damaraland and Namaqualand -averages only about three inches a year. In certain districts a period -of five or six years has been known to pass without any rain at all. -A record of rainfall on some parts of the coast has shown a total of -one-fifth of an inch in the course of twelve months. At Walfisch Bay the -British settlement imports its fresh water from Capetown. On the higher -of the series of plateaux rising gradually to the Kalahari desert the -climatic conditions are more favourable, and the better rainfall in the -north-east allows of good crops being grown, while various sections are -favourable for stock-raising. In later years, also, various deposits -of copper were found in the district of Otavi, some 400 miles from -Swakopmund, and diamond fields, which yielded nearly £1,000,000 worth of -stones in the first year, were discovered east of Lüderitzbucht in 1908. -But in Germany the Protectorate was regarded as a desirable acquisition -mainly, if not exclusively, because of the advantages it was expected to -afford as a base for the eventual creation of a German-African Empire. - - -THE HERERO RISING - -The attainment of this higher purpose seemed likely to be furthered as -the result of the steps taken to suppress the risings of the Hereros -and the Hottentots between the years 1903 and 1907. Not only did the -reinforcements sent out from Germany assume such proportions that at one -time the Germans are said to have had no fewer than 19,000 men under -arms in the Protectorate, but the troops took with them a plentiful -supply of pom-poms, mountain guns, field guns and Maxims of various -kinds, the _Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères_ being led to remark -thereon that "the German columns had an unusually large proportion of -artillery, roughly two batteries to three companies of mounted infantry; -and it is difficult to believe that so many guns were necessary, -especially as the Hereros had no artillery at all.[58] Probably," -the _Revue_ continued, "the artillery could have been dispensed with -altogether; and had this been done, the columns would have been rendered -more mobile." - -The military measures taken appeared to be in excess of requirements -even when allowance was made for the fact that the campaign was fought -in difficult country and that the Germans themselves lost about 5,000 -men; but the real significance of the policy adopted lay in the keeping -of a considerable proportion of the German expeditionary force in the -colony after the rising had, with German thoroughness, been effectively -crushed. - -This procedure attracted attention and adverse comment even in Germany, -where doubts were already being entertained as to whether good value was -being received for the £30,000,000 which the suppression of the troubles -had cost. It was, however, made clear that the still considerable -body of German troops left in the colony was being kept on hand there -in case of the opportunity arising for its employment in another -direction--that, namely, of achieving Germany's aspirations in regard -to the conquest of British South Africa, and the final elimination of -British influence from Africa in general. - -Evidence both as to the nature of these continued aspirations and as to -the further purpose it was hoped the troops on the spot might effect was -forthcoming in various directions. - -In a book of 416 pages, published in 1905, under the title of "Das -neue Südafrika," Dr. Paul Samassa emphasised the part which the German -people had taken in the settlement of South Africa; pointed to the -close relationship and affinity of feeling between Germans and Boers; -encouraged the idea of their mutually looking forward to the opening up -of South Africa as "a land of settlement for the German race," and said, -further:-- - - German South-West Africa is, to-day, a strong tramp card in - our hands, from the point of view of Weltpolitik. In England - much has been said of late as to what a good thing it would - be for that country if our fleet were annihilated before it - became dangerous.... On our side we might cool these hot-heads, - and strengthen the peace party in England, if we reminded them - that, whatever the loss to ourselves of a war with that country, - England would run a greater risk--that of losing South Africa. - We have in German South-West Africa to-day about 12,000 troops, - of whom one-half will remain there for a considerable time. In - the event of a war between Germany and England the South African - coast would naturally be blockaded by England; and there would - then be nothing left for our troops to do but to go on to Cape - Colony--for their food supplies. - -In so doing they could, he argued, count upon the support of the Boers, -of whom there were 14,000 opposed to the English at the end of the -South African war. As against this possible concentration of German -troops and Boers there was the fact that the English garrison in South -Africa did not exceed 20,000. So, he added, the people in England could -consider "what an incalculable adventure a war with Germany might be, -notwithstanding the superiority of the English fleet." - -Speaking in the Reichstag in February, 1906, Herr Ledebour called -attention to the fact that Major von François, who at one time was -in command of German South-West Africa, had declared, in his book, -"Nama und Damara," issued three months previously, that fewer than one -thousand troops would suffice to maintain order in the colony; and Herr -Ledebour added:--"For two years imaginative Pan-German politicians -have been disseminating the idea that a large force must be maintained -in South-West Africa for the purpose of exercising in the sphere of -Weltpolitik pressure upon England, with the eventual object of invading -Cape Colony." - -There is the testimony, also, of "An Anglo-German," who, in the course -of an article on "German Clerks in British Offices," published in _The -London Magazine_ for November, 1910, tells the following story:-- - - During a recent stay in Germany I was introduced by a man - I know to be one of the chief functionaries of the Commerce - Defence League[59] to a friend of his who had just returned - from German South-West Africa. On a subsequent meeting I entered - into conversation with this gentleman, and made inquiries about - German progress in that part of the world. He answered my - questions without reserve. Little headway was being made, and - little was looked for. Men and money were being freely expended, - without present return. The only good harbour (Walfisch Bay) is - a British possession, as likewise are all the islands of any - value which are dotted along the coast. - - "Why then," was my inevitable query, "do the Germans persist - in their occupation of the country?" - - He smiled craftily. - - "We Germans look far ahead, my friend," he replied. "We - foresee a British débácle in South Africa, and we are on the - spot. Thanks to the pioneers of our excellent League, our - plans are all matured. The League finances the scheme and the - Imperial Government supplies the military forces. By cession--or - otherwise--Walfisch Bay will before long be German territory; - but in the meantime British Free Trade opposes no obstacle to - us, and we can pursue our purpose unmolested." - - "But what is that purpose?" I asked, with the object of - leading him on. - - "Surely you are not so blind as to need enlightenment!" was - his reply. "Germany has long regarded South Africa as a future - possession of her own. When the inevitable happens, and Great - Britain finds her hands full elsewhere, we are ready to strike - the moment the signal is given, and Cape Colony, Bechuanaland, - Rhodesia--all frontier States--will fall like ripe apples into - our grasp." - -In order, however, that Germany might be prepared thus to take action -at a moment's notice, two things were essential, in addition to having -troops on the spot, namely, (1) that the colony should possess railways -within striking distance alike of the Cape, of Bechuanaland and of -Rhodesia; and (2) that the military preparations as a whole should be so -complete as to be ready for any emergency. - - -RAILWAYS IN G.S.W. AFRICA - -Railways were indispensable on account, not only of the considerable -distances to be covered, but, also, of the sand-belts and stretches of -desert across which the transport of troops and stores would be a matter -of great difficulty without the help of railways. They were, in fact, a -vital part of the whole scheme. - -Following on Germany's annexation of Damaraland and Great Namaqualand, -and her conversion of them into the Protectorate of German South-West -Africa, a party of German engineers and surveyors landed at Swakopmund -with the design of planning a line of railway to be constructed from -that point to Windhoek, and thence across the Kalahari desert to the -Transvaal. About the same time, also, Germans and Boers were alike -working to secure as much of Bechuanaland as they could, without -attracting too much attention to their proceedings. A realisation -of these further aims might have been of great value to Germany in -facilitating the attainment of her full programme in respect to -Africa; but the scheme was frustrated by Great Britain's annexation of -Bechuanaland in September, 1885, the result of the step thus taken being -to drive a wedge of British territory between German South-West Africa -and the Boer Republics. - -So the railway in question got no further east than Windhoek, the -capital of the colony, a distance inland of 237 miles. - -Having failed in one direction, Germany tried another. Under a -concession granted to them in 1887 by the Government of the Transvaal -Republic, a group of Dutch, German and other capitalists, constituting -the Netherlands South African Railway Company, built a railway from -Delagoa Bay to Pretoria; and the new aim of Germany was, apparently, -to make use of this line, and so get access to the Transvaal--and -beyond--from the east coast instead of from the west. - -Confirmation of this fact is to be found in "A Brief History of the -Transvaal Secret Service System, from its Inception to the Present -Time," written by Mr. A. E. Heyer, and published at Cape Town in 1899. -The writer had held a position in the Transvaal which enabled him to -learn many interesting facts concerning the working of the system in -question. Among other things he tells how, at Lisbon, every effort -was made to obtain a port in Delagoa Bay, and how, "aided by Germany, -Dr. Leyds approached Lisbon over and over again with a view to get -Delagoa Bay ceded to the Transvaal"; though the Doctor got no more -from the Portuguese authorities than a reminder that, under the London -Convention of 1884, the South African Republic could conclude no treaty -or engagement with any foreign State or nation (except the Orange Free -State) until such treaty or engagement had been submitted to the Queen -of England for her approval. - -That Germany, in giving her "aid" in these matters to the Transvaal -Republic, was inspired by a regard for the furthering of her own -particular schemes is beyond all reasonable doubt; but Mr. Heyer shows, -also, that when the negotiations with Portugal were unsuccessful, there -was elaborated a scheme under which Germany and the Transvaal were to -get what they wanted by means of a _coup de main_. Mr. Heyer says on -this subject:-- - - I have before me a copy of a document, dated Pretoria, - August 24, 1892 (the original of which is still in a certain - Government office in Pretoria), wherein a Pretoria-Berlin - scheme is detailed, namely, "How a few regiments of Prussian - Infantry could be landed at Delagoa Bay and force their way into - Transvaal territory, and, 'once in,' defy British suzerainty, - and for all time 'hang the annoying question of her paramountcy - on the nail.'" The name of Herr von Herff, then German Consul - at Pretoria, appears on the document. Any one reading this - cleverly-planned "Descent on Delagoa" would be readily convinced - as to how very easily a German raid on Delagoa territory could - be successfully accomplished. - -This project, also, proved abortive, and, in default of Delagoa Bay, -Germany had still to regard her South-West African Protectorate, with -its railways and its armed forces, as the base from which British -interests were to be wiped out--sooner or later--from the Cape to Cairo. - -At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914, the principal railways in -German South-West Africa--apart from some minor lines which do not come -into consideration--were as follows:-- - - -----------------+---------------+------------------- - | 2 ft. GAUGE. | 3 ft. 6 in. GAUGE. - RAILWAY. | Miles. | Miles. - -----------------+---------------+------------------- - Northern | 121 | 119½ - Otavi | 425 | -- - Southern | -- | 340½ - North-to-South | -- | 317 - -----------------+---------------+------------------- - Total | 546 | 777 - -----------------+---------------+------------------- - -Granting that the Northern Railway was needed to afford a means of -communication between Swakopmund and the capital of the colony, and that -the original purpose of the Otavi line was to provide an outlet for the -copper obtained from the mines in that district, it is, nevertheless, -the fact that the Southern and the North-to-South lines were designed to -serve what were mainly or exclusively strategical purposes. - -When the building of the first section of the Southern line--from -Lüderitzbucht to Aus--was under consideration in the Reichstag, one -of the members of that body, Herr Lattmann, recommended that the vote -should be passed without being referred to a committee; and in support -of his recommendation he said:-- - - This way of passing the vote would be of particular - importance for the whole nation, since the railway would not - then have to be regarded from the point of view of provisioning - our troops, or with regard to the financially remunerative - character of the colony, but because a much more serious - question lies behind it, namely, what significance has the - railway in the event of complications between Germany and other - nations? Yes, this railway can be employed for other purposes - than for transport from the coast to the interior; our troops - can be easily conveyed by it from the interior to the coast and - thence to other places. If, for example, a war had broken out - with England we could send them into Cape Colony. - -From Aus the line was extended in 1908 to Keetmanshoop, a distance -inland of 230 miles from Lüderitzbucht. Situate in the _Bezirk_ -(district) of South-West Africa nearest to Cape Province, Keetmanshoop, -with the railway as a source of supply from the chief harbour of the -colony, developed into the leading military station of German South-West -Africa. - -At Keetmanshoop all the chief military authorities were stationed. It -became the headquarters of the Medical Corps, the Ordnance Department, -the Engineer and Railway Corps, and the Intelligence Corps of the -Southern Command. It was the point of mobilisation for all the troops -in that Command. It had a considerable garrison, and it had, also, an -arsenal which a correspondent of the _Transvaal Chronicle_, who visited -the town about two years before the outbreak of war in 1914 and gathered -much information concerning the military preparations which had then -already been made,[60] described as four times as large, and, in regard -to its contents, four times as important, as the arsenal at Windhoek. -Those contents included--47 gun carriages; fourteen 16-pounders; -eighteen ambulances; 82 covered convoy vehicles; 3,287 wheels, mostly -for trek ox-wagons; three large transportable marquees used as magazines -and containing 28,000 military rifles; huge quantities of bandoliers, -kits, etc.; three further magazines for ammunition, and large stores -of fodder; while further military supplies were constantly arriving -by train from Lüderitzbucht, whither they were brought from Germany -by German ships. In the arsenal workshops was a staff of men actively -engaged on the making of, among other military requirements, 1,000 -saddles and water bags for the Camel Corps kept available for crossing -the desert between the furthest limit of the railway and the Cape -Province border. - -It was, also, in this south-eastern district, and in immediate -proximity, therefore, to Cape Province and Bechuanaland, that the -military forces kept in the colony had all their principal manoeuvres. - -Of still greater importance, from a strategical standpoint, was the -branch of this Southern Railway which, starting from Seeheim, forty -miles west of Keetmanshoop, continued in a south-easterly direction -to Kalkfontein, eighty miles north of Raman's Drift, on the Orange -River, and less than ninety miles from Ukamas, where the Germans had -established a military post within five miles of Nakob, situate on the -Bechuanaland border, only forty miles from Upington, in Cape Province. -From Kalkfontein the branch was to be continued another thirty miles to -Warmbad, and so on to Raman's Drift--a convenient point for the passage -of the Orange River into Cape Province territory by an attacking force. -At Seeheim, the junction of this branch line, a Service Corps was -stationed; Kalkfontein was the headquarters of the Camel Corps of 500 -men and animals; and at Warmbad there was a military post and a military -hospital. - -The North-to-South line allowed of an easy movement of troops between -the military headquarters at Keetmanshoop and Windhoek, or vice versâ. -According to the original estimates this line was not to be completed -before 1913. Special reasons for urgency--as to the nature of which it -would be easy to speculate--led, however, to the line being opened for -traffic on March 8, 1912. From Windhoek, also, troops were supplied to -Gobabis, situate 100 miles east of the capital and about forty miles -west of the Bechuanaland frontier. Gobabis became a German military -station in 1895. Provided with a well-equipped fort, it became the chief -strategical position on the eastern border of German South-West Africa. -A railway connecting Gobabis with Windhoek was to have been commenced in -1915. - -From Windhoek, as already told, there is rail communication with -Swakopmund. - -Grootfontein, the terminus, on the east, of the Swakopmund-Otavi line, -had been a military station since 1899. Its special significance lay -in the fact that it was the nearest point of approach by rail to the -"Caprivi Strip," along which the German troops, conveyed as far as -Grootfontein by rail, were to make their invasion of the adjoining -British territory of Rhodesia. Troop movements in this direction would -have been further facilitated by a link at Karibib connecting the -Swakopmund-Otavi-Grootfontein line with the one to Windhoek and thence -to the military headquarters at Keetmanshoop. Karibib was itself a -military base, in addition to having large railway offices and workshops. - -With, therefore, the minor exceptions, the system of railways in German -South-West Africa had been designed or developed in accordance with -plans which had for their basis an eventual attack on British territory -in three separate directions--(1) Cape Province, (2) Bechuanaland and -(3) Rhodesia. The Southern and the North-to-South lines had, also, been -built exclusively with the standard Cape gauge of 3 ft. 6 in., so that, -when "der Tag" arrived, and German succeeded British supremacy in South -Africa, these particular lines could be continued in order to link up -with those which the Germans would then expect to take over from Cape -Province. Keetmanshoop was eventually to be converted from a terminus to -a stopping-place on a through line of German railway from Lüderitzbucht -to Kimberley, the effect of which, it was pointed out, would be to -shorten the distance from Europe to Bulawayo by 1,300 miles as compared -with the journey via the Cape. Surveys had been made for extensions (1) -from Keetmanshoop, via Hasuur, to the Union frontier near Rietfontein, -and (2) from Kalkfontein, on the southern branch, to Ukamas, also on the -frontier and in the direction of Upington, in Union territory. Each of -these additions would have carried the original scheme a stage further, -though it was not, apparently, thought wise to make them before "der -Tag" actually arrived. - -On these various railways the Government of German South-West Africa -had expended, so far as the available figures show, a total of, -approximately, £8,400,000, defrayed in part from Imperial funds and -in part from the revenue of the Protectorate. This total includes the -amount paid by the Government to the South-West Africa Company for -their line from Swakopmund to the Company's mines at Otavi and Tsumeb, -but it does not include the cost of the original narrow-gauge Government -line from Swakopmund to Windhoek, of which the section between -Swakopmund and Karibib was abandoned when the Swakopmund-Otavi line, via -Karibib, was taken over, the remaining section from Karibib to Windhoek -being then converted into the Cape 3 ft. 6 in. gauge. On most of the -open lines no more than two or three trains a week were run, and on some -of the branches there was only one train in the week.[61] - - -MILITARY PREPARATIONS - -Further details as to the elaborate nature of the preparations made for -the realisation of Germany's dreams of conquest in Africa are supplied -by Mr. J. K. O'Connor in a pamphlet published at Capetown, towards the -end of 1914, under the title of "The Hun in our Hinterland; or the -Menace of G.S.W.A." Mr. O'Connor made a tour through German South-West -Africa a few months before the outbreak of the war, assuming the rôle -of a journalist in search of data concerning the agricultural resources -of the territory. He obtained much information which had other than an -agricultural interest. - -He ascertained, for instance, that the German troops then in the -territory consisted of Mounted Infantry, Field Artillery, Machine Gun -Divisions, Intelligence Divisions, an Engineer and Railway Corps, Field -Railway Divisions, an Etappen-Formation, a Camel Corps, a Police Force -and a Reserve, representing altogether--apart from natives--a trained -European force of approximately 10,000 men, whose duties and location in -the event of war had all been assigned to them in advance. - -He found that the railways had been supplemented by a strong transport -service of natives, who had an abundant supply of oxen and mules for -their wagons. - -He tells how (in addition to the military stations already mentioned) -the Germans had established throughout the territory a network of -block-houses, strengthened by forts at intervals and supplemented by -magazines and storehouses at central points; while 1,600 miles of -telegraph and telephone wires, together with the "Funken-telegraph," -placed all these stations and outposts in touch with one another as well -as with the military headquarters and the various towns.[62] - -He says concerning Keetmanshoop that its conversion into the chief -military station in the territory was "the first move in the German -game." - -He points to the fact that "Das Koloniale Jahrbuch," published by -authority, laid it down that the Boers in British South Africa must be -constantly reminded of their Low-German origin; that German ideas must -be spread among them by means of German schools and German churches, and -he declares:--"For thirty years Teuton ideas have been foisted upon the -Boer population of British South Africa. For thirty years, under the -guise of friendship, Germany has plotted and planned for the elimination -of the Anglo-Saxon element from South Africa." - -Mr. O'Connor further writes:-- - - From what I was able to gather it was evident that the - military plans of the Germans were completed for an invasion of - the Union territory, and that they were only awaiting the day - when Peace would spread her wings and soar from the embassies of - Europe. It was not anticipated, however, that that would be in - August, 1914. - - They were confident of success, and from the conversations - that took place between officers and myself it was evident that - the possession of the African continent was the greatest desire - of the Teutons. - - The smashing up of France and Great Britain were only - incidents that would lead to the whole continent of Africa - becoming a German possession; and it was considered that as - Germany would accomplish this, despite her late entrance upon - the stage as a Colonial Power, she would have more to show for - her thirty years as such a Power than could either England or - France, who had started colonising centuries before her. - - The great aim became to break France and England, for the - purpose of acquiring their African possessions; and, having - broken these Powers, Germany would have turned her attention to - the African possessions of smaller Powers who, having neither - England nor France to rely upon, would have been compelled to - relinquish their possessions, and, by so doing, would have made - Germany the supreme Power in Africa. - -Summing up the conclusions at which he arrived, as the result of all -that he saw for himself and all that he had heard from responsible -German officers during the course of his tour, Mr. O'Connor says:-- - - From the day the Germans set their feet upon South-West - African soil they have prepared themselves for a raid into - British territory. For years the Reichstag has voted two million - pounds per annum for the purpose. Had these millions been spent - on the development of South-West Africa it would, to-day, be a - colony of which any country might be proud. But what can they - show for this expenditure? Nothing but a military camp. - - It is evident, then, that this territory has not been - regarded by the Berliners as a colony, but as a jumping-off - ground for an invasion of British South Africa. - -Here we have simply an amplification of ideas which, as we have seen, -had long been entertained in Germany; though they were ideas it was now -being sought to reduce to practice by a resort, in advance, to every -step that could possibly be taken for ensuring their realisation. Any -suggestion that the system of strategical railways which had been built, -and the elaborate military preparations which had been effected, were -merely precautions against a further possible rising of the natives -would have been absurd. - - -RAIL CONNECTION WITH ANGOLA - -What Mr. O'Connor says in regard to Germany's attitude towards the -African possessions of the smaller Powers gives additional significance -to a report published in the _Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten_ of May 31, -1914, concerning a project for building a line of railway along the -coast of German South-West Africa to connect with Portuguese Angola. -This was to be the first of a series of lines which "after lengthy -discussions with the Imperial Government," were to be carried out in -German South-West Africa by a syndicate of prominent shipping and -banking houses in Germany, controlling an initial capital of 50,000,000 -marks (£2,500,000). It was further reported that in the early part of -1914 the Governor of German South-West Africa made a tour through the -northern part of the Protectorate, going as far as Tiger Bay, in Angola, -"in connection with possible railway construction in the near future." - -Angola was certainly an item on the German list of desirable -acquisitions in Africa. It has been in the occupation of Portugal since -the middle of the fifteenth century; but the point of view from which it -was regarded by advocates of German expansion may be judged from some -remarks made in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ by a traveller who returned to -Germany from Angola in June, 1914:-- - - The game is worth the candle. An enormous market for - industrial products, rich and virgin mineral treasures, a - fruitful and healthy country equally suitable for agriculture, - cattle-breeding and immigration, and the finest harbours on the - west coast--that is the prize that awaits us. - -A territory offering these advantages, having an area estimated at -484,000 square miles, and extending inland for a distance of 1,500 -miles, might be coveted for its own sake; but its possession would -have been of still greater value to Germany (1) as a continuation, -northwards, of German South-West Africa, and (2) as the starting point -for a chain of communications, under German control, extending right -across the African continent, from west to east. - -The coast-railway spoken of by the _Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten_ was -to link up German South-West Africa with Angola, in which country, -also, the Germans hoped to obtain extensive mining and agricultural -concessions, thus forwarding their established policy of peaceful -penetration by means of commerce and railways, and establishing economic -interests which might be expected to lead to political developments in -due course, and so prepare the way for an eventual seizure of "the prize -that awaits us." - -The Germans had also sought to finance the completion eastwards of the -Lobito Bay or Benguela Railway, to which reference will be made later -on in connection with the development of the Katanga district of the -Belgian Congo; but the condition they advanced, namely that the control -of the line should be left in their hands, coupled with their adoption -of suspicious lines of policy in other directions,[63] led to their -railway proposals being declined by the Portuguese, with thanks. - - -GERMAN EAST AFRICA - -Then, in order to understand the full scope of the aspirations Germany -was cherishing towards the African Continent, one must take into account -her railways on the east coast no less than those on the west coast, -since these, also, formed an essential part of the general scheme. - -The line which stretches right across German East Africa, from -Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of the Protectorate, to Kigoma, on Lake -Tanganyika, and north of Ujiji, has a total length of 1,439 miles; -and if the economic development of a territory estimated as having a -total area of 384,000 square miles had been the sole aim in view, the -Tanganyikabahn would have well deserved to rank as a notable enterprise -in German colonial expansion, and one calling for commendation rather -than criticism. The question arises, however, whether, in addition to -the development of German East Africa itself, the railway in question -was not intended, also, to facilitate the realisation of Germany's -designs against Central Africa as part of her aforesaid scheme for the -eventual conquest of the African continent. - -The feverish haste with which the second and third sections of the -railway were built sufficed, in itself, to give rise to suspicions of -ulterior designs. The first section, from Dar-es-Salaam to Morogo (136½ -miles), was constructed by a syndicate of German bankers acting under a -State guarantee of interest, and the work, begun in February, 1905, was -completed in September, 1907. The second section, from Morogo to Tabora -(526½ miles), was to have been completed by July 1, 1914; but in 1910, -the Reichstag voted a special credit both for the earlier completion of -this second section--which was thus finished by February 26, 1912--and -for surveys for the third section, from Tabora to Kigoma (776 miles). -Such, again, was the celerity with which the work on this third section -was pushed forward that, although the date fixed for the completion of -the line was April 1, 1915, through rail communication from the Indian -Ocean to Lake Tanganyika was established by February 1, 1914--that is to -say, one year and two months in advance of time. - -We here come to the two-fold question (1) Why was the railway extended -at all for the 776 miles from Tabora to Lake Tanganyika, considering -that this portion of the German Protectorate offered, in itself, the -prospect of no traffic at all for the line[64]; and (2) why was it -necessary that such haste should be shown in the completion of the -undertaking? - - -"THE OTHER SIDE OF TANGANYIKA" - -To the first of these questions the reply is (1) that the traffic on -which the western section of the Tanganyikabahn was mainly to rely for -its receipts was traffic originating in or destined for the Belgian -Congo; (2) that the control it was hoped to secure over Belgian trade -was, in combination with the strategical advantages offered by the -railway, to be the preliminary to an eventual annexation by Germany of -the Belgian Congo itself; and (3) that like conditions were to lead, if -possible, to the final realisation of von Weber's dream of 1880. - -"That we are directing our gaze to the other side of Tanganyika," said -the _Kolonial Zeitung_ of April 4, 1914, in referring to the completion -of the railway to Kigoma--an event which occasioned a great outburst of -enthusiasm in Germany--"goes, of course, without saying." - -There certainly is much on "the other side of Tanganyika" to which -Germany might look with feelings of envy. In regard to mineral wealth, -alone, the resources of the South-eastern section of the Belgian Congo -could not fail to make a strong appeal to her. - -The great copper belt in the Katanga district,[65] commences about 100 -miles north-west of the British South African post, Ndola (situate -twelve miles south of the Congo border), and extends thence, in a -north-westerly direction, for a distance of 180 miles, with an average -breadth of twenty-five miles. "In the not far distant future, when the -many problems of development are solved, the Katanga copper belt," -says Mr. J. B. Thornhill,[66] "will be one of the controlling factors -in the copper supply of the world." In the report of the British South -Africa Company for the year ending March 31, 1914, it was stated that -the copper-mining industry in Katanga had attained to considerable -dimensions; that furnaces with a capacity of 1,000 tons of copper per -month were at work, and that further large additions to the plant were -being made. - -Katanga has, also, a tin belt, and coal, gold, iron and other minerals -are found there, besides. - -In the German territory on the eastern side of Lake Tanganyika there -are, indeed, minerals; but they are found in no such abundance as in the -Belgian territory on the western side of the lake. German East Africa -can, however, produce in great abundance the wheat, the rice and the -other food supplies necessary for the workers in Katanga mines, and -the German view has been that the eastern and the western sides of the -lake should be regarded as complementary the one to the other, and that -the Tanganyikabahn should convey these food supplies to the lake, for -transfer to the other side by steamer, and bring back the products of -the mines for distribution, via the German east coast route and the -Indian Ocean, among the markets of the world. In the same way it was -hoped that all goods and necessaries likely to be imported into the -Katanga and Mweru districts from Europe would reach their destination -via this German East Africa Central Railway; and German business houses -were strongly advised to establish branches in those districts,[67] so -that, apparently, Germany would eventually control the trade as well as -the transport of "the other side of Tanganyika." - -The development of the south-western section of Germany's east-coast -Protectorate had, in itself, become a matter of vital importance ("eine -Lebensfrage"[68]); but the Belgian Congo was the only quarter to which -that section could look for markets for its produce. The possibility -of securing sufficient traffic for the Central Railway to ensure its -financial success may have been a secondary consideration; but the -railway itself was to serve a most important purpose, economically, by -helping Germany to capture the Tanganyika and trans-Tanganyika trade, -and by making her East Africa colony more prosperous; politically, by -strengthening her hold on the Belgian Congo through the increase of her -commercial interests there; and strategically, by affording her the -means of effecting a speedy concentration of troops in Central Africa, -should the occasion for so doing arise. - -This last-mentioned purpose was to be further attained by the projected -construction of what would have been a purely strategical line from -Tabora, on the Tanganyikabahn, to Mwanza, on the southern shores of the -Victoria Nyanza, whence German troops would--in case of need--be in a -position to make a rear attack on British East Africa. - - -CENTRAL AFRICA - -Germany's hopes of thus strengthening her position in Central Africa -by means of the Tanganyikabahn received, however, a serious set-back -through the activity and enterprise of Belgian and British interests in -providing, opening up or projecting alternative transport routes which -threatened (1) to divert a large proportion of the traffic she had -expected to secure for the East Africa Central line; (2) to diminish -greatly the prospect of her achieving the commercial and political aims -she cherished in regard to the Belgian Congo; (3) to make it still -more difficult for German East Africa to emerge from a position of -comparative isolation, and (4) to impede greatly the realisation of -Germany's aspirations in regard alike to Central Africa and the African -Continent. - -It is the more necessary that the bearing of all these facts on the -general situation should be understood because they tend to indicate -the critical nature of the position into which the said aspirations had -drifted, and the imperative necessity by which Germany may, by 1914, -have considered she was faced for adopting some bold course of action if -she were still to look forward to the possibility of those aspirations -being realised. - -The principle originally adopted by King Leopold in his efforts to -develop the Congo State was that of supplementing navigation on the -Congo by railways wherever these were necessary either to overcome the -difficulties presented by rapids or to supply missing links in the chain -of communication to or from the west coast. The same policy was followed -by the Belgian Government when they assumed control, and the last of -these links--the line, 165 miles long, from Kabalo to Albertville, -connecting the Congo with the Tanganyika--was opened in March, 1915. -One reason, in fact, given in Germany for the express speed at which -the Tanganyikabahn was completed to Kigoma was an alleged fear that -the Belgians might capture the trade and transport of the territory in -question by getting to the lake first. - -This combined river and rail transport still left it necessary for -traffic from the Congo basin to the west coast to follow the winding -course of that river, with a number of transhipments; and if the route -in question had been the only competitor of the Tanganyikabahn, Germany -would have had less cause for uneasiness. Meanwhile, however, the -Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo had built a line--forming a -continuation of the Rhodesian Railways--from the boundary of Northern -Rhodesia, at Elizabethville, to Kambove (Katanga); and a continuation of -this line to Bukama, on the Lualaba, a navigable tributary of the Congo, -was (1) to give shorter and better access to the Congo for products -from Katanga, and (2) to establish combined rail and water transport -between the entire railway system of South Africa and the mouth of the -Congo. Already the minerals from Katanga were finding their outlet to -the sea on the east coast via the Rhodesian Railways and the Portuguese -port of Beira, instead of via the Tanganyikabahn and the German port of -Dar-es-Salaam. The former had, indeed, become the recognised route for -this important traffic in preference to the latter. The line between -Kambove and Bukama had not been completed when war broke out in 1914; -but the provision of this through route, and the various facilities -it would offer, rendered still more uncertain the prospect of Germany -getting control of the trans-Tanganyika traffic for her own lines. - -There were other important railway schemes, besides. - -From Bukama rail communication is to be continued right across Central -Africa to Matadi, to which point the Congo is navigable for large -vessels from its mouth, less than a hundred miles distant. This line, -in addition to avoiding the great bend of the Congo, will open up and -develop the vast and promising territory in the northern districts of -the Belgian Congo, south of that river. - -Another scheme which is to be carried out is a line from Kambove, in the -Southern Katanga, to the south-western boundary of the Belgian Congo, -and thence across Portuguese territory to the present eastern terminus -of the Lobito Bay Railway. This will give to the mining interests of -Katanga direct rail communication, by the shortest possible route, with -a port on the west coast, while the connection at Kambove with the -Rhodesian and South African systems will make the line a still more -important addition to the railways of Africa for the purposes alike of -development in the central districts and as a shorter route to and from -Europe. German financiers were at one time desirous of undertaking the -extension eastward of the Lobito Bay Railway--mainly, as it seemed, with -a view to furthering German interests in Portuguese territory (see page -314); but the Kambove-Lobito Bay line is now to be constructed with -British capital. - -Finally there is the Cape-to-Cairo Railway which, passing through the -Katanga mining districts, is likely to divert still more of the traffic -Germany had counted upon alike for her Tanganyikabahn and as a means -towards the attainment of her political aspirations in Central Africa. - -Whilst these various developments were proceeding, there were still -others, in the Cameroons, to which attention may now be directed. - - -THE CAMEROONS, LAKE CHAD AND THE SUDAN - -Anticipations of the great results for Germany which would follow from -the building of railways in the Cameroons began to be entertained about -the year 1897. The main objective of the schemes brought forward seems -to have been, however, not simply the internal economic development of -an already vast area, but the carrying of lines of communication to the -furthest limits of that area in order, apparently, to extend German -interests and influence to territories beyond. - -One of these schemes was for the building of a line of railway from -Duala, the chief port of the Cameroons, to Lake Chad (otherwise Tsâd), a -sheet of water some 7,000 square miles in extent which, situate on the -western borders of the Sudan, constitutes the extreme northern limits -of German territory in this direction, while the shores of the lake are -occupied jointly by Germany, England and France. - -The proposed line was to have an estimated total length of about 1,000 -kilometres (621 miles). In September, 1902, the German Imperial -Government granted to a Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Syndikat a concession for -building the line; an expedition sent out by the syndicate made a survey -of the route in 1902-3; and a Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, with a -capital of 17,000,000 marks (£850,000), was formed by a group of bankers -and others in Germany to build the first section. - -In December, 1903, the German Emperor, at his reception of the President -of the Reichstag, gave his blessing to all such enterprises by declaring -that an essential condition ("eine Lebensbedingung") for the welfare of -Germany's colonies in Africa was that the building of railways should -be taken earnestly in hand. In 1905 the prospects of the proposed line -seemed so hopeful that the early commencement of construction was -announced as probable; but various difficulties arose, including much -trouble in regard to labour, and the line did not get beyond the end of -its first stage, a distance of only 160 km. (100 miles) from the coast. - -Although the scheme was thus not fully carried out, there was no doubt -as to the nature of the purposes it had been designed to serve. In his -official and detailed account of the proposed undertaking[69]--a book -of exceptional merit from the point of view of the clearness and of the -exhaustive data with which "the case for the line" is presented--the -director of the syndicate says:-- - - My opinion is that only a great railway--one that unites - the Sudan with the Atlantic, and that extends from Lake Chad to - the west coast of Africa--will be in a position both to develop - fully the economic interests of the Cameroons and to assure to - Germany a means of access to the richest territory that Central - Africa possesses. - -Had the line been completed as far as Lake Chad, it would have been a -powerful competitor of British railways via the Nile or the Red Sea for -the traffic of the Sudan, with its vast commercial possibilities; and, -had it been found the better route, it might have established German -commercial supremacy in this part of Central Africa, with the inevitable -political developments to follow. "The German Tsâdsee-Eisenbahn," the -director of the syndicate further wrote, "will, especially when it has -been completed, be for the whole of Central Africa a _Kulturwerk_ of the -first importance." - -The Germanisation of Lake Chad, combined with an eventual acquiring -by Germany of French interests in the Sahara and North Africa, would -further have permitted the continuation of the Tsâdsee-Eisenbahn from -that lake to Algeria along the route already projected in France for a -Trans-African line linking up the Mediterranean alike with the Congo -and with the Rhodesian and other British railways in South Africa, via -Lake Chad--a line which, it is said, would offer no great technical -difficulty in construction.[70] - - -THE CAMEROONS AND THE CONGO - -Another ambitious scheme was for the building of a Mittellandbahn which, -crossing the Njong, would eventually link up the chief port of the -Cameroons with a navigable tributary of the Congo. Here, again, the line -as actually constructed has not been carried a greater distance than -about 300 km. (186 miles). At one time, in fact, the original project -seemed to have been abandoned; but quite recently it has been brought -forward again under conditions which have a distinct bearing on what has -already been said concerning Germany and Central Africa. - -From the views expressed by Emil Zimmermann in his "Neu-Kamerun,"[71] -one gathers that in 1913 Germany was regarding with some degree of -concern alike the outlook for her Tanganyikabahn, on which over -£7,000,000 had been spent, and the prospective set-back to her -aspirations in regard to the Belgian Congo; and Herr Zimmermann, in -giving an account of the additions made to her Cameroons possessions -at the expense of France, under the agreement of November 4, 1911, -following on the Agadir crisis, makes certain overtures to Belgium, -and follows them up with a distinct threat, should she refrain from -responding to them. - -Belgium and Germany, he says, in effect, are the two dominant Powers -in Central Africa; and he is of opinion that it will be to their mutual -interest to co-operate in the development of that great territory. -Belgium, however, he finds to be faced by the need for a great outlay -of money (1) on account of necessary improvements of her Congo rail and -river communication, to meet expanding traffic requirements, and (2) in -order to develop her Katanga territory. She cannot herself command the -necessary capital, but Germany could assist her to raise it, and would -do so--provided Belgium undertook that traffic from her Tanganyika and -Mweru districts, and, also, from points east of the Middle Congo, should -reach the sea by "its natural outlet," that is to say, by the German -East African Central Railway. - -Should Belgium refuse to agree to these proposals, and should she, by -her high tariffs, continue to impede the flow of traffic to German -territory, then it would be open to Germany to construct lines of -railway from the west coast either to navigable tributaries of the Congo -or to the Congo itself, and so divert the traffic from the Belgian -Congo at certain important points, to the serious prejudice of Belgian -interests. - -Apart from what might be done in the way of extending the Duala-Njong -line to the said navigable tributaries of the Congo, as originally -projected, Herr Zimmermann says that, under the treaty of November 4, -1911, Germany has the right to continue her Cameroons railways across -French territory (France having reciprocal rights as regards German -territory); and he points out how she could exercise this power, to the -detriment of Belgium, should that country not accept her proposals in -regard to the Congo basin and Central Africa. He specially mentions the -fact that when the boundaries of the 100,000 square miles of territory -added, at the expense of France, to the German Cameroons (then already -191,000 square miles in extent), were fixed by virtue of the treaty of -1911, the wedge-like strip on the south of Spanish Muni was so defined -as to leave at the eastern point thereof a gap between the Spanish -territory and the French Cameroons wide enough for either a road or a -railway; and he emphasises the fact that, by taking advantage of the -facilities thus open to her, Germany could, under the treaty of 1911, -construct a railway 1,000 km. (621 miles) long from Muni Bay through -the said gap and cross French territory to the junction of the Sangha -with the Congo. Alternatively, and by arrangement with France, the -line could start from Libreville. "What such a railway, tapping the -Congo-Sangha-Ubangi traffic at its most favourable point, would mean, -can," Herr Zimmermann remarks, "be left to the Belgians themselves to -say." - -He does not suggest that such schemes as these would in themselves be -of great value to Germany; but he thinks they might have a powerful -influence, both politically and economically, on the solution of the -Tanganyika problem in Germany's favour. In fact, he considers that since -the 1911 treaty Germany has practically controlled the situation in -Central Africa; and from all he says it is a reasonable assumption that -the Agadir crisis, the concession of territory exacted from France, and -the undertaking as to the carrying of German Cameroon railways across -French territory, had far more to do with German designs on the Belgian -Congo and Central Africa than is generally supposed. - -In another work, published a year later,[72] the same writer, adopting -now a distinctly different tone, endeavoured to appease an "Anti-Central -Africa agitation" which, he tells us, had developed in Germany and -was protesting alike against the "danger" of acquiring any more -"Congo-swamps" and against the "boundless German plans" in Africa. -He further sought to soothe the suspicions which, he found, had been -excited in Belgium and elsewhere as to the nature of Germany's plans in -Africa. Germany, he declared, had no annexation projects in view. Her -aspirations were purely economic. Kamerun, thanks to the German-French -treaty of 1911 (which, he reiterated, had changed the whole situation), -could now take a considerable share in the development of Central -Africa, and was the more entitled so to do since she had, in Duala, "one -of the best harbours on the west coast of Africa." - - -OFFICIAL ADMISSIONS - -As against, however, affirmations such as these, there is the -undisputable evidence of no less an authority than the German Foreign -Minister himself as to the real nature of Germany's designs on the -Belgian Congo. - -In the second Belgian Grey Book, published in August, 1915, under the -title of "Correspondance Diplomatique relative à la Guerre de 1914-15," -there is given (pp. 2-3) a letter from the Belgian Minister in Berlin, -Baron Beyens, to his Government, recording, under date April 2, 1914, -a conversation which the French Ambassador in Berlin informed him he -had had quite recently (and, therefore, only about four months before -the outbreak of war) with the German Foreign Minister. Herr von Jagow -suggested to him that Germany, France and England should arrive at an -agreement on the construction and linking up of railways in Africa. M. -Gambon replied that in this case Belgium ought to be invited to confer -with them, as she was constructing some new railways on the Congo. He -also expressed the view that any conference held on the subject should -meet at Brussels. To this Herr von Jagow responded, "Oh no; for it is -at the expense of Belgium that our agreement should be made. Do you -not think," he added, "that King Leopold placed too heavy a burden on -the shoulders of Belgium? Belgium is not rich enough to develop that -vast possession. It is an enterprise beyond her financial resources and -her means of expansion." The French Ambassador dissented, but Herr von -Jagow went on to affirm that the great Powers were alone in a position -to colonise, and that the small Powers were destined to disappear or -to gravitate towards the orbit of the large ones. In the words of the -Belgian Minister:-- - - Il développa l'opinion que seules les grandes Puissances - sont en situation de coloniser. Il dévoila même le fond de sa - pensée en soutenant que les petits États ne pourraient plus - mener, dans la transformation qui s'opérait en Europe au profit - des nationalités les plus fortes, par suite du développement des - forces économiques et des moyens de communication, l'existence - indépendante dont ils avaient joui jusqu'à présent. Ils étaient - destinés à disparaître ou à graviter dans l'orbite des grandes - Puissances. - - -"DER TAG" AND ITS PROGRAMME - -The story here presented of Germany's aims in Africa has taken us over -almost the entire African Continent. It now only remains to be seen how -those aims were to be realised, not merely as the outcome of Pan-German -dreams and advocacy, but as the result of many years of scheming, -plotting and actual preparation, all directed to the wiping out of the -influence in Africa of other Powers, great as well as small, and the -final realisation of Germany's long-cherished purpose. - -According to conversations Mr. O'Connor had with military officers in -German South-West Africa just before the outbreak of war in 1914, the -programme under which Germany hoped to become "the supreme power in -Africa" when "der Tag" so long looked forward to should arrive was, in -effect, as follows:-- - -Belgium was to be disposed of "at one gulp." This would make it an easy -matter for Germany to take over the Belgian Congo. - -France would be paralysed; and, being paralysed, she would not be able -to prevent Germany from succeeding to the whole of her possessions in -Africa. - -The Dervishes would stir up a rebellion in Egypt,[73] and other -rebellions were anticipated in Ireland and India. - -While England was fully occupied in these directions the Afrikanders -were to rise _en masse_ and declare British South Africa an Afrikander -Republic. - -The forces in German East Africa would make a sudden raid into British -East Africa. Having annexed that territory and got possession of the -railway, they would next invade Rhodesia from the east, in co-operation -with troops from German South-West Africa advancing to the Zambezi, via -the Caprivi Strip, from the railway terminus at Grootfontein. - -Meanwhile German columns would have moved (1) from the military station -at Gobabis into Bechuanaland, crossing the desert of Kalahari, to effect -the capture of Vryburg; and (2) from Keetmanshoop, and other points -served by the Seeheim branch, into northern Cape Province, via Raman's -Drift, Schuit Drift and the south-east corner of the territory. - -Rhodesia having been seized, more troops would be available to proceed -to the assistance of the Afrikander forces operating in the Cape -Province, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State--a "rising" on the -part of the Afrikanders as soon as they saw a good opportunity for one -being taken for granted. In return for the services thus rendered by her -to the Afrikanders in establishing their Republic, Germany would take a -portion of the Transvaal, as well as part of the Zululand coast. - -With Belgium and France effectively crushed, and the power of Great -Britain in South Africa broken down, those countries would no longer -be in a position to prevent Germany from annexing Portuguese Angola; -and this she was to do next. She would "allow" the Afrikander Republic -to take Delagoa Bay; but the Republic itself was to come under the -"guardianship" of Germany. The word "suzerainty," Mr. O'Connor says, was -not mentioned, "guardianship" being preferred; but, with the exception -of Italian Somaliland--about which nothing was said--practically the -whole of Africa was either to belong to Germany or to be brought -directly or indirectly under her control. - - -THE OBJECTIVE OF THE WORLD-WAR - -Since the outbreak of the World-War in 1914 there has been much -speculation as to the real objective and purpose of Germany in bringing -it about. - -Do the facts stated in the present chapter afford any help towards a -solution of this problem? - -We have seen the nature of the aims cherished by Germany towards Africa, -the practical and persistent efforts she made during a long series of -years for their attainment, and the substantial expenditure she incurred -in the hope of at last securing the prize she considered was awaiting -her. - -We have seen how the purpose of Germany in Africa was less to develop -colonies for their own sake than to regard them as points from which to -absorb or to control neighbouring territories. - -We have seen how the development of rival railways in Central Africa had -recently threatened the supremacy Germany hoped to gain and may, indeed, -have suggested to her the need for early vigorous effort, if she wished -still to secure the realisation of her aims. - -We have seen what, in the view of the German Foreign Minister, should be -the fate of small Powers which stand in the way of the aggrandisement of -great ones. - -We have seen, also, how, in the opinion of officers serving in -German South-West Africa, the real purpose of the war to which they -were looking forward, and for which they were preparing, was the -German annexation of Africa, and how the "smashing up" of France and -Great Britain, the overthrow of Belgium, the seizure of Portuguese -possessions, and the virtual absorption of the proposed new Boer -Republics were to be the preliminaries to a final transformation of -the whole African Continent into a German possession--the "new Empire" -which, in the words of von Weber, was to be "possibly more valuable and -more brilliant than even the Indian Empire." - -May one not conclude, in face of these and of all the other facts which -have here been narrated, that one, at least, of the main objectives -of Germany (apart from minor ones) in provoking the Great War was no -less a prize than the African Continent;[74] and that when she invaded -Belgium and France she did so less with the object of annexing the -former country, and of creating another Alsace-Lorraine in the latter -than of having "something in her hand" with which to "bargain"--in the -interests of her projects in Africa--when the time came for discussing -the terms of peace, assuming that she had not already attained her -purpose at the outset by the sheer force of what she thought would be -her irresistible strength? - -If this conclusion should seem to be warranted, on the basis of what -has already been told, it may certainly be regarded as confirmed by the -fact that, down to the moment when these lines are being written, any -suggestions coming from German sources as to possible terms of peace -have invariably included proposals for the concession to Germany of -territory in Africa as "compensation" for the surrender of territory she -has herself occupied in Belgium and France. - -Thus, in a despatch published in _The Times_ of September 4, 1915, a -statement was reproduced from the Chicago _Tribune_ giving, on the -authority of "a writer in close touch with the German Embassy," the -terms on which Germany would be prepared to agree to peace. These terms -included the following:-- - - The cession of the Belgian Congo to Germany, as compensation - for the evacuation of Belgium. - - The cession of African colonial territory to Germany by - France, as compensation for the evacuation of Northern France. - -Then, also, on October 24, 1915, the _New York American_ published a -long interview with Professor Hans Delbrück on the terms of peace which -Germany hoped to secure if "President Wilson and the Pope" would consent -to act as mediators. The interview (which had been approved by the -German censor) included the following passage:-- - - It is quite possible that peace could be secured by ceding - to Germany such colonies as Uganda by England and the French - and Belgian Congos as a ransom for the evacuation by Germany of - Northern France and Belgium. - -Such concessions, if one can conceive the possibility of their being -made--would still leave Germany far from the attainment of her full -African programme; but the fact of these proposals being put forward at -all as "terms of peace" is quite in keeping with the whole course of -Germany's policy in Africa, and points clearly to what may, in fact, -have been her chief objective in the war itself. - -Any moral reflections either on the said policy or on the "programme" by -means of which it was to have been carried out would be beyond the scope -of the present work. - -What we are here concerned in is the fact that Germany's dreams of -an African Empire, given expression to by von Weber in 1880, and the -subject of such continuous effort ever since, were, in the possibilities -of their realisation, based primarily on the extension and utilisation -of such facilities for rail-transport as she might be able either to -create or to acquire. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[55] See Vol. III. of "The Story of Africa," by Robert Brown. London, -1894. - -[56] "The Germans and Africa," by Evans Lewin, Librarian of the Royal -Colonial Institute. London, 1915. - -[57] Under the terms of the treaty of July 1, 1900, Germany was to have -"free access" from her South-West Africa Protectorate to the Zambezi -River "by a strip which shall at no point be less than twenty English -miles in width." - -[58] The Hereros (Damaras) are not a warlike people, and although, -at the time of the rising, many of them were armed with Mausers and -Lee-Enfields, it has been said of them that they were not of much -account with the rifle, their "natural weapon" being the assegai. A -German White Book on the rebellion stated that the cause of the outbreak -was the spirit of independence which characterised the Hereros, "to -whom the increasing domination of the Germans had become insupportable, -and who believed themselves stronger than the whites." According to Mr. -H. A. Bryden ("The Conquest of German South-West Africa," _Fortnightly -Review_, July, 1915) the real causes were the abuses of the white -trader, the brutal methods of certain officials, and the seizure and -occupation of tribal lands. The war developed into one of practical -extermination for the natives concerned. Of the Hereros between 20,000 -and 30,000 were either killed outright or driven into the Kalahari -desert to die of starvation. The Hottentots also lost heavily. - -[59] The Commerce Defence League, as explained by the writer of the -article, is an organisation of German traders which gives subsidies to -German clerks so that they can take up appointments at nominal salaries -in foreign countries, on the understanding that they are to report to -the League as to the business methods, etc., of those countries and on -openings for German trade or industry therein, the League acting on such -information and dividing among its subscribers the profits derived from -the agencies opened or the competitive businesses started. - -[60] See _South Africa_, November 14, 1914. - -[61] "Memorandum on the Country known as German South-West Africa. -Compiled from such information as is at present available to the -Government of the Union of South Africa." Pretoria, 1915. - -[62] The colony was also in wireless-telegraphic communication, via -Togoland, with Berlin. - -[63] For details of so-called "invasions" of Portuguese territory by -German political agents, posing as engineers and prospectors, see an -article on "The Invasion of Angola," by Mr. George Bailey, in the issue -of "United Empire: The Royal Colonial Institute Journal," for October, -1915. - -[64] "Le Chemin de Fer du Tanganyika et les progrès de l'Afrique -orientale allemande." Par Camille Martin. Renseignements coloniaux, No. -3. Supplément de _l'Afrique française_, Mars, 1914. Paris. - -[65] A region on the Belgian Congo about 115,000 square miles in extent -and one of the best watered districts in Africa, lying nearly in the -centre of the African continent, and equidistant, therefore, from the -Atlantic and Indian Oceans. - -[66] "Adventures in Africa under the British, Belgian and Portuguese -Flags." London, 1915. - -[67] "Welches Interesse hat Deutschland an der Erschliessung des Congo?" -Von Emil Zimmermann. _Koloniale Rundschau_, Mai, 1911. Berlin. - -[68] "Die Eroberung des Tanganyika-Verkehrs." Von Emil Zimmermann. -_Koloniale Rundschau_, Jan., 1911. Berlin. - -[69] "Kamerun und die Deutsche Tsâdsee-Eisenbahn." Von Carl René, -Director des Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Syndikats. 251 pp. Mit 37 Textbildern -und 22 Tafeln nach Original-Aufnahmen der Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Expediton, -1902-3. Berlin, 1905. - -[70] "Bulletin de la Société de Geographie et d'Etudes coloniales de -Marseilles." Tome XXXVI, No. 1. Ie Trimestre, 1912. - -[71] "Neu-Kamerun; Reiseerlebnisse und wirtschaftspolitische -Untersuchungen." Von Emil Zimmermann. 135 pp. Map. Berlin, 1913. - -[72] "Was ist uns Zentralafrika?" Von Emil Zimmermann. 57 pp. Berlin, -1914. - -[73] How Egypt was to be invaded and captured by the Germans and Turks, -in combination, with the help of the railways in Asia Minor, will be -told in the following Chapter. - -[74] Should there still be any doubt on this point, it will be removed -by the frank admission of _Die Neue Zeit_, even whilst the Great War -is still in progress, that Germany undertook the war with "the main -object of extending her colonial possessions." As quoted in the _Daily -Express_ of October 8, 1915, _Die Neue Zeit_ further said:--"Herr Paul -Rohrbach favours the acquisition of the whole of Central Africa, but -opines that this territory, vast as it is, will not be adequate to -furnish Germany with all the elbow room she may require within the next -half-century. Professor Delbrück, while agreeing with Herr Rohrbach, -as to the importance of Central Africa, as well as of Angola and the -whole of British East Africa, further emphasises the necessity for the -acquisition of the Sudan and the southern part of the Sahara, now in -the possession of France. We are quite in agreement with these eminent -leaders that we must found an "India" of our own, and that the greater -part of the African continent must furnish the requisite territory. -Once well established in this new empire, we shall link ourselves with -Asiatic Turkey, and also with China, reconstructing the political and -economic foundations of both on a scientific German basis." - - - - -CHAPTER XX - -DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY - - -Just as avowedly strategical lines in Africa were to lead the way to the -creation of a German African Empire, so, in turn, was that system of -economic-political-strategical lines comprised within the scheme of what -is known as the "Baghdad Railway" designed to ensure the establishment -of a German Middle-Asian Empire, bringing under German control the -entire region from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and providing -convenient stepping-off places from which an advance might be made on -Egypt in the one direction and India in the other. - -The conception of this further programme was spread over (1) the period -during which Germany's aspirations were limited to the inheritance of -Turkey's possessions in Asia; and (2) the period when such inheritance -began to be regarded as a means to the realisation of still greater aims -in the domain of Weltpolitik. - -For more than half a century Asiatic Turkey has been looked upon as -Germany's Land of Promise. Anatolia was thought a most desirable -territory for her surplus population. The development, under German -influence, of that territory as a whole--especially with a revival -of the Babylonian system of irrigation--was considered to offer vast -possibilities of commercial prosperity. Wheat, cotton and tobacco, -especially, might be raised in prodigious quantities, and there was the -prospect, also, of a petroleum industry rivalling that of Baku itself. -Turkey was a decadent nation, and as soon as "the Sick Man" succumbed -to his apparently inevitable fate--or even before, should circumstances -permit--Germany was ready to step into his shoes. - -That these aspirations had, indeed, long been cherished is a fact -capable of ready proof. - -In 1848 Wilhelm Roscher, the leading expounder of the historical school -of political economy in Germany, selected Asia Minor as Germany's share -in the Turkish spoils, whenever the division thereof should take place; -and Johann Karl Robertus (1805-1875), the founder of the so-called -scientific socialism in Germany, expressed the hope that he would live -long enough to see Turkey fall into the hands of Germany, and, also, to -see German soldiers on the shores of the Bosporus. - -Coming to a more recent period, we find that Dr. Aloys Sprenger, the -German orientalist, published, in 1886, a pamphlet on "Babylonia, the -richest land in the past, and the most promising field for colonisation -in the present,"[75] in which, after dealing with the history, physical -conditions and resources of Babylonia, he predicted that, before the end -of the century, not only Babylonia but Assyria, which was inseparable -from it, would, if not formally annexed, at least come under the control -of some European Power. Assyria and Syria, he declared, were even better -adapted for colonisation than Babylonia. He continued:-- - - The Orient is the only territory on earth which has not yet - been taken possession of by some aspiring nation. It offers the - finest opportunities for colonisation, and if Germany, taking - care not to let the opportunity slip, should act before the - Cossacks come along, she would, in the division of the world, - get the best share.... The German Kaiser, as soon as a few - hundred thousand armed German colonists bring these promising - fields into cultivation, will have in his hand the fate of Asia - Minor, and he can--and will--then become the Protector of Peace - for the whole of Asia. - -Dr. Karl Kaerger, traveller and economist, lamented, in his "Kleinasien; -ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld" (Berlin, 1892), the enormous loss -sustained by Germany in the migration of so many of her people and of so -much capital to Anglo-Saxon lands; but there were, he affirmed, only two -countries to which German settlers could go with any hope of retaining -alike their nationality and their commercial relations with the -_Mutterland_. Those countries were--Africa and Asia Minor. He had been -especially impressed, during the course of his travels, by the prospects -and possibilities of Anatolia, and he recommended the establishment -there of large German companies which would organise schemes of -colonisation and land cultivation on a large scale. The colonies so -established should be self-governing, free from all taxation for ten -years, have the right of duty-free importation of necessaries, and enjoy -various other privileges, while Turkey, in return for the concessions -she thus made to the settlers, would be assured "the protection of -Germany against attack." Not only hundreds of thousands, but millions, -of colonists could find a second home on those wide expanses. Germany -herself would gain a dual advantage--an economical one, and a political -one. Concerning the latter, Dr. Kaerger observed:-- - - If the German Empire, while maintaining her friendship with - Austria and Italy--which, under all circumstances, the political - situation in Europe undoubtedly requires--can direct the stream - of her emigration to the fertile territories of Turkey, and if - she can conclude with that country a closer customs convention, - then the entire economic, and with it, also, the political - future of Germany will rest on a broader and a firmer basis - than if the present streams of hundreds of thousands of her - people, and millions of capital, continue to pass in increasing - proportions, year by year, to countries which are economically - hostile to us. - -Dr. Kaerger was especially concerned lest Germany might be anticipated -by Russia or England in the realisation of her own designs on Asia -Minor. Should, he declared, either of those countries acquire any -further territory from Turkey, or increase in any way Turkey's -dependence upon them, the result would be the most serious disturbance -of the prevailing situation in Europe that had occurred since 1870. - -The development of all these ideas went so far that in 1895 the -_Alldeutscher Blätter_ recommended that Germany should establish a -Protectorate over the Turkish possessions in Asia Minor; and in the -following year the _Alldeutscher_ _Verband_ published a manifesto on -"German claims to the Inheritance of Turkey" ("Deutschlands Anspruch an -das türkische Erbe"), making a formal statement of Germany's alleged -rights to the Turkish succession. - -Germany had by this time already secured a footing on the soil of -Asiatic Turkey by virtue of the _Anatolian Railway_. The first -section--a length of about seventy miles, extending from Haidar Pacha -(situate on the north-eastern coast of the Sea of Marmara, and opposite -Constantinople) to Ismidt--was built in 1875 by German engineers to -the order of the Turkish Government. It was transferred in 1888 to a -German syndicate, nominees of the Deutsche Bank. Under the powers then -conferred upon them, the syndicate opened an extension, on the east, to -Angora, in 1892, and another, on the south, to Konia, in 1896, the total -length of line being thus increased to 633 miles. - -As the result of the visit of the German Emperor to Constantinople in -1898, followed by negotiations between the Porte and the director of -the Deutsche Bank, authority was given to a new German Company--the -Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company--under conventions of 1889, -1902 and 1903, to continue the existing Anatolian Railway from Konia to -the Persian Gulf, via Adana, Nisibin, Mosul and Baghdad. This extension -was to constitute the main line of the _Baghdad Railway_ proper; but the -Company also acquired control over most of the branch railways already -in operation. One of these was the French Smyrna--Afium Karahissar line, -which constitutes the direct trade route between Smyrna and places -served by the Anatolian railway, and has, also, a branch to Panderma, on -the southern shores of the Sea of Marmara. Another was the short line -from Adana to Mersina, giving access to the Mediterranean. This meant -the substitution of German for French interests, while the course taken -by the Anatolia-Baghdad Railway from the Bosporus to Adana shut off the -possibility of an extension of the British line from Smyrna via Aidin to -Egerdir (west of Konia) into the interior. - -Then in 1911 the Company acquired the right to build a _new port at -Alexandretta_, with quays, docks, bonded warehouses, etc., and to -construct thence a short line of railway connecting with the Baghdad -main line at Osmanieh, east of Adana. By these means the Germans -acquired the control over, if not an actual monopoly of, the traffic -between one of the most important ports on the eastern sea-board of the -Mediterranean--a port where a trade valued at three and a half million -sterling is already being done--and the vast extent of territory in Asia -Minor designed to be served by the Baghdad Railway. - -From Muslimiyeh, a little town on the north of Aleppo, there is a short -branch connecting the Baghdad Railway with the _Hedjaz line_ from -Damascus to Medina, which is eventually to be carried on to Mecca; -while from Rayak, north of Damascus, a branch built in a south-westerly -direction was to be carried to within a short distance of the Egyptian -frontier. - -From the junction for the Aleppo branch, the main line was to continue -across the Mesopotamian plain to Baghdad (whence a branch to Khanikin, -on the Persian frontier was projected) and so on to Basra, for the -Persian Gulf. - -Thus the scheme for what passes under the title of the Baghdad Railway -embraces three separate and distinct regions of Asiatic Turkey--(1) -Anatolia, (2) Syria and (3) Mesopotamia. In other words, whereas in -their first phase, German aspirations for Turkish territory were based -on the economic advantages of settlement in Anatolia--a region in -itself large enough to accommodate all the Germans who were likely -to want to settle there--in the second phase those aspirations were -based on an extension of the Baghdad Railway towards Egypt in the -one direction and the Persian Gulf in the other. This dual extension -became the more noticeable, also, inasmuch as for the passage of the -Taurus range of mountains a total of nearly 100 miles of blasting and -tunnelling would have to be carried out, the cost of construction on -certain sections of the line rising to between £35,000 and £40,000 a -mile. The extension, therefore, was likely to be a costly business, the -total length of the Baghdad Railway proper, apart from the Anatolian -system, being, as projected, about 1,350 miles, of which, however, -only about 600 miles were, in June, 1915, available for traffic.[76] -Admitting the desirability of opening up Mesopotamia to commercial and -agricultural development, it may, nevertheless, be asked, were there -other motives--and motives to which still greater weight might have been -attached--for this expansion of the earlier designs? - -Abdul Hamid's reason for granting the concession is said to have been -that the extension of the line to the Persian Gulf would greatly -strengthen the military position of Turkey, since it would enable her to -effect a speedy transfer of troops between the Bosporus and the Gulf, or -intermediate places, as against the many months that might be occupied -by marching on foot across plains and mountains. - -Germany's reasons for seeking to construct the Baghdad Railway, its -branches and connections, to the full extent of the programme laid -down, were, not simply the development of new trade routes, as certain -inspired representations have sought to make the world believe, and not -simply the gain of various other economic advantages, but (1) a desire -to increase German influence over Turkey; to strengthen her military -and other resources with a view to employing them eventually in the -advancement of Germany's own interests; and to ensure the realisation -of that eventual Protectorate over Turkey which would convert the -country into practically a German province; and (2) the furthering -of Germany's aims against Great Britain in the belief that she, too, -was a decadent country whose possessions, when we could no longer -defend them effectively, Germany would be the more likely to secure -for herself if, with a concentration of Turkish forces to assist her, -she were established within striking distance of some of the most -vulnerable points of the British Empire, ready to take instant advantage -of any favourable opportunity that might present itself, whether in a -prospective break-up of that Empire or otherwise. - -Of evidence concerning Germany's efforts to obtain increasing influence -over Turkey there is no lack. - -We have, in the first place, the fact that in 1882 a German military -mission, of which General the Baron Colmar von der Goltz was the -principal member, undertook the training of the Turkish Army according -to the principles of German military science, with the result that the -Turkish Army became a more efficient instrument for the attainment, not -only of her own aims or purposes, but those, also, of Germany herself. - -The Kaiser, although the supreme head of the Lutheran Church, and -although having no Mohammedan subjects of his own, sought to pose as the -champion of Mohammedans in general and the Defender of _their_ Faith. -During his visit to Damascus in November, 1898, he declared--"May the -Sultan, may the three hundred million Mohammedans living who, scattered -throughout the earth, honour in his person their Caliph, rest assured -that at all times the German Kaiser will be their friend."[77] - -Whenever political trouble threatened to fall upon Turkey, as the result -of such occurrences as the Armenian and Macedonian atrocities or the -insurrection in Crete, it was Germany who became her champion as against -the other Powers of Europe. - -Everything possible was done to push German trade in Turkey and to -establish closer commercial relations with her. There came a time when -every city of importance in the Turkish Empire was declared to be -"overrun with German bankers, German clerks and German bagmen." - -Not only, too, were German engineers active in seeking to get -concessions for new railways, and not only were German financiers -equally active in endeavouring to control existing ones, but, as Dr. -Charles Sarolea points out, in his book on "The Anglo-German Problem," -there are, in the agreements between the Baghdad Railway Company and the -Porte, financial clauses which must ultimately place Turkey entirely at -the mercy of her professed champion. "In Turkey Germany alone would rule -supreme"; and the aspirations for a German Protectorate over Turkey, -with the Sultan as a vassal of Germany, would then be realised. - -Writing on the position as he found it in 1903, M. André Chéradame said -in "La Question d'Orient":-- - - More and more the Germans seem to regard the land of - the Turks as their personal property. All the recent German - literature relating to Turkey affords proof of the tendency. An - ordinary book of travels is entitled, "In Asia Minor, by German - Railways." In his "Pan-Germanic Atlas" Paul Langhams gives a - map of "German Railways in Asia Minor." So it is, indeed, a - matter of the organised conquest of Turkey. Everywhere and in - everything, Turkey is being encircled by the tentacles of the - German octopus. - -Coming, next, to the nature of _Germany's aims against England_ and the -part which the Baghdad Railway was to play in their attainment, we have -the frank confessions of Dr. Paul Rohrbach, an authority on the subject -of Germany's Weltpolitik, and a traveller who has paid four visits to -Asia Minor. In "Die Baghdadbahn" (2nd. edition, 1911) he tells us that -Ludwig Ross, a professor at Halle who was well acquainted with Anatolia, -was the first to point to Asia Minor as a desirable place for German -settlement. At the outset economic considerations were alone concerned, -and in Bismarck's day Germany's relations to England played only a minor -rôle in her foreign politics; but in proportion as Germany's interests -were developed and her soil no longer provided sufficient food for her -people or sufficient raw products for her manufactures, she had to look -abroad for the supply of her surplus needs. In so doing, however, her -interests abroad might be endangered by the British Fleet. Hence the -necessity for a German Fleet; and, although the German sea-power might -not be strong enough, by itself, to attack and conquer England, it -could bring certain considerations home to English policy. Dr. Rohrbach -continues:-- - - If it came to a matter of war with England, it would be for - Germany simply a question of life and death. The possibility - of a successful issue for Germany depends exclusively on one - consideration, namely, on whether or not we can succeed in - bringing England herself into a dangerous position. That end - can in no way be obtained by means of a direct attack across - the North Sea; any idea of a German invasion of England being - possible is a mere phantasy. One must seek, therefore, another - combination in order to assail England at some vulnerable spot; - and here we come to the point where the relations of Germany to - Turkey, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, are found to - be of decisive importance for German foreign policy. There is, - in fact, only one means possible by which Germany can resist a - war of aggression by England, and that is the strengthening of - Turkey. - - England can, from Europe, be attacked by land and mortally - wounded only in one place--Egypt. If England were to lose Egypt - she would lose, not only her control over the Suez Canal and her - connexions with India and the Far East, but, presumably, also, - her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of - Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, such as Turkey, might, in addition, - have a dangerous effect on her 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in - India, besides being to her prejudice in Afghanistan and Persia. - - Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until - she controls a fully-developed railway system in Asia Minor - and Syria; until, by the extension of the Anatolian Railway to - Baghdad, she can resist an attack by England on Mesopotamia; - until her army has been increased and improved; and until - progress has been made in her general economic and financial - conditions.... The stronger Turkey becomes, the greater will be - the danger for England if, in a German-English conflict, Turkey - should be on the side of Germany; and, with Egypt for a prize, - it certainly would be worth the while of Turkey to run the risk - of fighting with Germany against England. On the other hand the - mere fact that Turkey had increased in military strength, had - improved her economic position, and had an adequate railway - system, would make England hesitate to attack Germany; and this - is the point at which Germany must aim. The policy of supporting - Turkey which is now being followed by Germany has no other - purpose than that of effecting a strong measure against the - danger of war with England. - -From other directions, besides, similar testimony was forthcoming. - -The Socialist _Liepziger Volkszeitung_ declared in March, 1911, that -"the new situation shortly to be created in Asia Minor would hasten the -break-up of the British Empire, which was already beginning to totter -(schwanken)." - -In _Die Neue Zeit_ for June 2, 1911, Herr Karl Radek said:-- - - The strengthening of German Imperialism, the first success - of which, attained with so much effort, is the Baghdad Railway; - the victory of the revolutionary party in Turkey; the prospect - of a modern revolutionary movement in India, which, of course, - must be regarded as a very different thing from the earlier - scattered risings of individual tribes; the movement towards - nationalisation in Egypt; the beginning of reform in Egypt--all - this has raised to an extraordinary degree the political - significance of the Baghdad Railway question. - - The Baghdad Railway being a blow at the interests of English - Imperialism, Turkey could only entrust its construction to the - German Company because she knew that Germany's army and navy - stood behind her, which fact makes it appear to England and - Russia inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon Turkey. - -In the _Akademische Blätter_ of June 1, 1911, Professor R. Mangelsdorf, -another recognised authority on German policy and politics, wrote:-- - - The political and military power an organised railway - system will confer upon Turkey is altogether in the interest - of Germany, which can only obtain a share in actual economic - developments if Turkey is independent; and, besides, any attempt - to increase the power and ambition of England, in any case - oppressively great, is thereby effectively thwarted. To some - extent, indeed, Turkey's construction of a railway system is - a threat to England, for it means that an attack on the most - vulnerable part of the body of England's world-empire, namely - Egypt, comes well within the bounds of possibility. - -These declarations and admissions render perfectly clear the reasons for -Germany's professions of friendship for Turkey and for her desire that -that country should become stronger and more powerful. They also leave -no doubt as to the real purpose the south-western branch of the Baghdad -Railway was designed to effect. The _conquest of Egypt_ by a combined -German and Turkish force was the first object to be accomplished -with the help of the railway extension to the Egyptian frontier in -one direction and to Mecca in another; but Dr. Rohrbach's suggestion -that the loss of Egypt by England would entail the loss, also, of her -possessions in Central and East Africa has a further bearing on what has -been told in the previous chapter concerning Germany's designs on Africa -as a whole. The strategical railways in German South-West Africa; the -projected extensions thereof--when circumstances permitted; the German -East African lines, _and_ the south-western branch of the Baghdad -Railway in the direction of Egypt were all to play their part in the -eventual creation of a Cape-to-Cairo German-African Empire. - -If we now direct our attention to the south-eastern branch of the -Baghdad Railway, we are met by the repeated protests made by Germany -that in desiring the construction of a railway to the _Persian Gulf_ -she was influenced solely by commercial considerations. Against these -protests, however, there are to be put various material facts which -leave no room for doubt that Germany's aims in this direction were -otherwise than exclusively economic, while even the economic purposes -which the Baghdad Railway would, undoubtedly, have served must have -eventually led to a strengthening of Germany's political position, this, -in turn, helping her military and strategical purposes. - -As originally planned, the port of Basra (the commercial centre of -trade in Mesopotamia, situate, sixty miles from the sea, on the -Shat-el-Arab--the great river formed by the junction of the Tigris and -the Euphrates--and open to the shipping of the world) was to have been -the terminus of the Baghdad Railway; and if commercial considerations -had, indeed, been exclusively aimed at, this terminus would have -answered all requirements. - -No objection was, or could be, raised by the British Government to the -construction of the Baghdad Railway, on Turkish territory, as far as -Basra. In the later developments of the scheme, however, Germany and her -Turkish partner sought to ensure the continuation of the line from its -natural commercial terminus, at Basra, to a political and strategical -terminus, at Koweit, on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The _Abendpost_ -(Berlin) voiced the German view when it spoke of Koweit as "the only -possible outlet to the Baghdad Railway." - -But the extension of an avowedly German line of railway to Koweit would -have been a direct challenge to the paramountcy which Great Britain -claimed over the Persian Gulf. It would have come into collision with -British policy, interests and prestige in the East. It would have -given the German and Turkish allies an excuse for creating at Koweit a -harbour, with wharves, docks, warehouses, etc., which might be converted -into a naval and military base capable of serving far different purposes -than those of trade and commerce--those, namely, of a new line of -advance on _India_. It would, in combination with the control already -exercised by the Deutsche Bank over the railways in European Turkey, -have assured to Germany the means of sending her Naval forces or her -troops, together with supplies and ammunition, direct to the Persian -Gulf, either to strengthen her fleet or to carry out any further designs -she might cherish in the domain of Weltpolitik as affecting the Far -East. It would have meant that, as far as the head of the Persian Gulf, -at least, rail-power would have rendered her less dependent on the -exercise of sea-power, on her own account, and would have enabled her to -neutralise, also, as far as the said Gulf, the sea-power of England. - -What so fundamental a change in the strategical position might imply was -well expressed by so eminent and impartial an authority as A. T. Mahan, -when he said, in his "Retrospect and Prospect" (1902):-- - - The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of - considerable naval potentiality, a "fleet in being" there, based - upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of - Cadiz, Gibraltar and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank - all the routes to the Farther East, to India and to Australia, - the last two actually internal to the Empire, regarded as - a political system; and, although at present Great Britain - unquestionably could check such a fleet, it might well require a - detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength - of her naval position.... Concession in the Persian Gulf, - whether by positive formal arrangement, or by simple neglect - of the local commercial interests which now underlie political - and military control, will imperil Great Britain's naval - situation in the Farther East, her political position in India, - her commercial interests in both, and the Imperial tie between - herself and Australia. - -One is thus led to the conclusion that Koweit, as the terminus of -the south-eastern branch of the Baghdad Railway, and within four days -of Bombay, would have been as vital a point for British interests as -the terminus of the south-western branch within about twelve hours of -Egypt; while the possession of this further advantage by Germany would -have been in full accord with the proposition laid down by Rohrbach -and others as to the line of policy Germany should adopt for "bringing -England herself into a dangerous position." - -With a view to safeguarding British interests from any possible -drifting into this position, as regards the Persian Gulf, the claim -was raised, some years ago, that England should have entire control -of the railway from Baghdad to Koweit. Germany did not see her way -to assent to this proposal; but in 1911 she announced that she would -forgo her right to construct the section from Baghdad to Basra on the -understanding that this final section would be completed by Turkey. -By way of compensation for the concession thus made by her to British -views, she secured certain financial advantages and the right both to -build the Alexandretta extension and to convert Alexandretta itself into -practically a German port on the shores of the Mediterranean. - -The precise value of the "concession" thus made by Germany was, however, -open to considerable doubt. If she could succeed in her long-cherished -aim of establishing a virtual protectorate over Turkey, then the fact -that the final section of the Baghdad Railway had been built by Turkey, -and not by Germany, would have become a matter of detail not likely to -affect the reality of Germany's control. The line to Basra might have -been nominally Turkish but the directing policy would have been German; -and like conditions would have arisen had Great Britain agreed to allow -Turkey--though not Germany--to continue the railway from Basra to Koweit. - -In the wide scope of their aggressive purpose, the Baghdad Railway -and its associated lines can best be compared with those roads which -the Romans, in the days of their pride--the pride that came before -their fall--built for the better achievement of their own aims as -world-conquerors. Apart from the fact that the roads now in question are -iron roads, and that the locomotive has superseded the chariot, the main -difference between Roman and German is to be found in the fact that the -world which the former sought to conquer was far smaller than the one -coveted by the latter. - -The programme of Weltpolitik comprised in the German schemes embraced -not only countries but continents. In addition to the aspirations -cherished as regards Europe, that programme aimed at the eventual -annexation to the German Empire of three other Empires--the Turkish, -the Indian, and a new one to be known as the German-African. It was -further to secure the means of sending troops direct from Germany via -Constantinople and the Baghdad Railway to the frontiers of Persia -for possible operations against that country in combination with the -Turkish military forces, these having first been brought under German -control. The Baghdad Railway itself was, in the same way, and with like -support, to afford to Germany the means of threatening Russian interests -both in Persia and in Trans-Caucasia. It was to nullify England's sea -power in the Mediterranean, if not, to a certain extent--through the -establishment of a new Power at the gate of India--in the Far East, as -well. It would, as Mahan showed, have flanked our communications with -Australia, giving Germany an advantage in this direction, also, had Asia -and Africa failed to satisfy her aspirations. - -Regarded from the point of view of its designed effect on the destinies -of nations, on the balance of political power, and on the reconstruction -of the world's forces--all for the aggrandisement of a single -people--the full programme must be looked upon as the most ambitious and -the most unscrupulous project of world-conquest that has yet been placed -on record in the history of mankind. - -For its attainment, however, it clearly depended no less upon -rail-transport than upon force of arms; and in this respect it -represented Germany's greatest attempt to apply, in practice, that -principle of rail-power to which she had devoted eight decades of -inquiry, trial and organisation. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[75] "Babylonien, das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das lohnendste -Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart." 128 pp. Heidelberg, 1886. - -[76] Important extensions have been carried out since. - -[77] Dr. Dillon, in _The Contemporary Review_, April, 1906. - - - - -CHAPTER XXI - -SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS - - -As will have been gathered from the preceding chapters, a prolonged -period of consideration, preparation and application in many different -countries throughout the world, prior to the outbreak of the Great -War in 1914, had established certain definite facts and fundamental -principles in regard to the relations of railways to warfare in -general. These may now be brought together and summarised in four -groups or divisions, namely, (A) Advantages; (B) Conditions Essential -to Efficiency; (C) Limitations in Usefulness; and (D) Drawbacks and -Disadvantages. - - -A.--ADVANTAGES - -Assuming (1) the provision, in advance, of a system or systems of -railways capable of meeting all the requirements of the military -situation on the outbreak of war, or (2) the possibility of constructing -military railways during the progress of hostilities, such railways -should permit of-- - -A mobilisation of troops and their concentration at the frontier, or -at the seat of war, with a speed that was impossible under earlier -conditions. - -Simultaneous use of different routes across the national territory -for concentration either on the frontier or at a point some distance -therefrom where the concentration can be completed without fear of -interruption by the enemy. - -Sudden invasion of neighbouring territory by troops sent in a succession -of rapidly-following trains direct from various points in the interior -of the country where they might have been concentrated without the -knowledge of the enemy, this procedure being adopted in preference to -collecting at the frontier in advance a force on such a scale as would -disclose prematurely the intentions entertained. - -The possibility of using promptly, for these purposes, the full strength -of the country's available resources--the railway lines in the interior -having already been adapted thereto, as well as those on or directly -connecting with the frontier--with a proportionate increase of the -offensive and defensive power of the State. - -The supplementing of increased mobility and celerity by decreased -strain on the physical powers of the troops and the avoidance of such -inevitable reduction in their numbers as would result from the trials -and fatigues of prolonged marches by road (in combination with the -carrying of kits, etc.), should railway lines not be available. - -A further consequent increase in the fighting strength of the army. - -The possible attainment of the power of initiative through an early -concentration of large forces at points of strategic importance either -on national or on enemy's territory.[78] - -The carrying out of strategical combinations on a scale or of a -character which would formerly have been impracticable. - -Employment of railways for tactical purposes during the progress of -a war, including therein (_a_) movement of troops from one part of -the theatre of war to another, whether with a view to effecting big -changes of front or otherwise; (_b_) employment of the same Army Corps -on different fronts in succession, their transfer being effected in -the briefest possible interval of time; (_c_) the rapid bringing up -of reinforcements at a critical moment to some position exposed to -overpowering attack which might otherwise be lost; (_d_) surprise -attacks on the enemy; (_e_) the throwing of great masses of troops on -distant points; (_f_) strengthening weak places in the fighting line; -(_g_) strengthening threatened forts by means of troops, guns, munitions -or supplies; (_h_) relief of invested fortresses, and (_i_) retirement -by rail--when circumstances permit--of troops after defeat. - -Control of a line of rail communication between the base and the -strategic centre of operations, facilitating the enormous amount of -transport in both directions which must be kept up in the rear of the -army, and for which the elements of speed, safety and regularity may be -of vital importance. - -The possibility, thanks to railways, of regarding the whole interior of -the national territory as a base for the supply of requirements at the -front, dependence having no longer to be placed on a base established in -one particular district with its restricted range of possible supplies -and its collection of magazines, stores, workshops, transport parks, -etc., protected by fortresses, entrenched camps, or other means of -defence. - -The establishment of supplementary, sectional or advanced bases along -the line of communication, with railway services so arranged that -supplies can be dispatched daily in such regulated quantities, and to -such points, as will serve the immediate needs of the army in the field, -without risk either of shortage or of excess. - -Avoidance, under these conditions, of congestion of the railway lines -in the immediate rear of the army by trains or loaded wagons containing -a redundancy of supplies which (_a_) cannot be unloaded, (_b_) restrict -the use of the lines for other purposes, and (_c_) might have to be -abandoned to the enemy in the event of a sudden retreat. - -Material benefits from the substitution of rail for road transport of -food, etc., by reason of (_a_) greater speed and regularity; (_b_) -less risk of deterioration from exposure to weather, and other causes; -(_c_) decreased cost of transport as compared with earlier conditions -involving the employment of a greater number of drivers, escort, -guards, horses and road vehicles; and (_d_) the arrival at destination -of the full quantities dispatched, the need for the consumption of an -appreciable proportion _en route_ by men and animals in a convoying -wagon train, carrying supplies for long distances by road, being -non-existent. - -Reduction in the need for field ovens and other paraphernalia of the -army cook, since much of the food required--bread, for example--can -be prepared in cities or elsewhere at a distant base and forwarded -regularly by rail. - -Freedom, more or less complete, from the once prevalent obligation on -the part of an advancing army that it should "live upon the country"--a -condition which the enormous increase in the size of armies to-day would -render impossible of fulfilment, even assuming that the people of the -country invaded had not withdrawn live stock, vehicles and food supplies -on their retirement before the invader. - -In addition to this provision for the wants of an army in its advance -into hostile country, the safeguarding of the troops against the risk -of their becoming a band of demoralized marauders, wandering over a -wide area to seek and appropriate food whenever they can find it--as -was the case, for instance, in the Napoleonic wars--the maintenance of -discipline and the continued usefulness of the troops as a concentrated -body for the military purposes in view being further assured when both -men and leaders are relieved of anxiety as to the continuance of their -supplies. - -The conduct of war at a great distance from the base by reason of the -facilities offered for the forwarding alike of troops, reinforcements, -supplies and military materials, the value of even a single line of -railway in the achievement of this purpose having been incontestably -established. - -Defence of frontiers by strategical railways which may, also, become -available for general use. - -Investment of cities or fortresses in occupied territory when, owing to -the lack or the deficiency of food supplies in the surrounding country, -the troops engaged are mainly if not entirely dependent on those brought -to them by rail from their own base.[79] - -Victualling of cities before, and their revictualling after, -investment.[80] - -Extension of lines of communication by means of quickly-constructed -narrow-gauge siege railways to be operated by motor traction, animal -power, or otherwise, including therein trench tramways for (_a_) removal -of wounded men from the trenches; (_b_) transport of siege guns to -trenches; and (_c_) supplying ammunition to battery. - -Transport of heavy siege guns, mortars, ammunition and other materials -of a size or weight that would render impracticable their conveyance, -whether singly or in the aggregate, along ordinary roads, the railway -offering, in this respect, facilities for ponderous transport comparable -to those of the steamship, with the further advantage of being able, in -most instances, to take the guns, etc., to the spot or to the locality -where they are wanted. - -Material aid given to expeditions to countries otherwise devoid of means -of communication, by the construction of military railways. - -Employment of armoured trains which, apart from their usefulness in -defending railways against attack, may, as movable fortresses, render -important service in the operations against the enemy. - -Removal of sick and wounded from the theatre of war, and the ensuring -of their distribution among hospitals in the rear or throughout the -interior, thus (_a_) avoiding alike the embarrassment to the army and -the many dangers and evils that would result from their remaining in -overcrowded hospitals on or near the battle-field; (_b_) giving the men -a better chance of effecting a speedy recovery and returning soon to -the ranks; and (_c_) adding to the fighting strength of the army by the -combination of these two advantages. - -Facilities for giving a short leave to officers and men who, though -neither sick nor wounded, have been so far affected by their strenuous -exertions that they stand in need of a rest, or change, for which they -will fight all the better subsequently. - -Dispatch of prisoners of war into the interior by trains which have -brought reinforcements or supplies, the army thus being speedily -relieved of what might otherwise be a hindrance to its operations. - -Return of material no longer wanted at the front and constituting -impedimenta of which it is desirable to get rid as soon as possible. - -Conveyance into the interior of "trophies of war"--including -plunder--taken from captured towns or cities. - -Retirement of troops from occupied territory on the declaration of peace. - - -B.--CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EFFICIENCY - -In the matter of railway construction there should be-- - -i. Uniformity of gauge, together with physical connections between the -different systems or sections, in order (_a_) that the locomotives and -rolling stock on any one line can be used for military transport on -any other; (_b_) that mobilisation, concentration and the forwarding -of supplies and military material can be facilitated by the running of -through trains from any probable or possible point of dispatch; and -(_c_) that troops can readily be transferred from one front, or from one -part of the coast, to another for the purpose either of attack or of -defence. - -ii. Lines linking up the interior of the country with the frontier, with -the coast, or with principal ports by different routes, transverse lines -connecting them, in turn, one with another. - -iii. Double track for all lines leading direct to the frontier. - -iv. In the case of single-track lines crossing continents or otherwise, -a liberal provision of passing places each capable of accommodating the -longest troop train likely to be run. - -v. On all lines, and at all important stations, a sufficiency of -sidings, with provision of, or the possibility of providing speedily, -all such facilities as may be needed for the prompt and efficient -handling of military transports whenever the occasion should arise. - -Preparations in advance should include-- - -i. The carrying out of a scheme of organisation based on recognition -of the following principles:--(_a_) That, while the railway is an -instrument capable of rendering great and even incalculable services in -the conduct of war, the working of it is a highly-skilled business only -to be entrusted to those possessed of the necessary experience; (_b_) -that interference with such working on the part of military officers -not possessing the requisite technical knowledge of the details and -limitations of railway operation may result in chaos and disaster; (_c_) -that railwaymen, in turn, are not likely to be fully acquainted with the -technicalities of military conditions and requirements, and should not, -in any case, be left with the responsibility of having to decide between -the possibly conflicting demands of various military authorities; -(_d_) that, for these reasons, there should be co-ordination of the -military and the technical railway elements, operating throughout -the whole scheme of organisation in its manifold details, avoiding -conflict of authority, ensuring harmony of working, and offering the -fullest guarantee that all military requirements will be met so far as -the capacity of the railway, together with a due regard for safe and -efficient operation, will allow; and (_e_) that effect can best be given -to these various conditions by the appointment of intermediary bodies -which, representing the dual elements, shall alone have power to give -directions, or to make demands, in respect to military rail-transport -during the continuance of war. - -ii. Collection of data concerning the physical character, resources and -transport capabilities of the railways both in the national territory -and in any other country to which the war operations may extend. - -iii. Study of all movements of troops, etc., likely to be necessary -on the outbreak of war; the preparation of special time-tables for the -running of troop trains, etc., and the working out of all essential -details respecting military transport in general. - -iv. Creation and training of bodies of Railway Troops qualified to -undertake the construction, destruction, repair and operation of -railways in time of war. - - -C.--LIMITATIONS IN USEFULNESS - -The usefulness of railways in war is limited by the following -considerations, among others:-- - -Railways are "inferior to ships in power of simultaneously transporting -heavy loads" (Von der Goltz). For this reason an overland route to -India could never compete, in respect to military transport, with -the sea route via the Suez Canal. Such overland route, also, passing -through foreign countries, would be especially liable to attack and -interruption. Where, however, the overland route goes entirely through -national territory (as in the case of the Trans-Siberian Railway), and -when the questions of time and safety, in regard to an alternative sea -route, suggest possible disadvantages, railways will be preferred to -ships in spite of the said inferiority. - -Railways are inferior to roads in so far as, like rivers and canals, -they are on fixed spots. Troops depending on them are thus able to -move only in the direction in which lines have been or can quickly be -laid, whereas if they went by road they might have a greater choice of -alternative routes. - -For these reasons the choice of the zone of concentration or of the -"decisive points" may depend less to-day on political, military or -geographical reasons (as in the Napoleonic wars) than on the direction, -extent and capacity of the available railways. - -Great masses of troops can be entrained only at stations where -facilities for their so doing have been prepared in advance. The -provision of these facilities is even more necessary in the case of -Cavalry or Artillery than in that of Infantry. Hence the movement of -considerable bodies of troops may be restricted to certain lines, and -their entrainment or detrainment even to certain large stations. In the -case of road marching these restrictions would not apply. - -Vehicles specially constructed for the purpose can alone be used on -railways. Any deficiency in their supply must needs cause delay. - -During the time the troops are travelling by railway their power of -resisting attack is much more restricted than it would be if they were -marching by road, they can do little or nothing to protect the railway -lines, while if the enemy can only get to the railway he may be in a -position to prevent the train from continuing its journey, and take the -troops in it at a disadvantage. - -For these reasons, among others, troop movements by rail at the theatre -of war, and especially in the enemy's country, are attended by a degree -of risk which may render it desirable to abandon the use of the railway -for the time being. - -Railways are especially liable to destruction by the enemy, and, -although the arrangements made in advance may permit of speedy repairs -or reconstruction, the interruption of traffic for even a day or half a -day may be a matter of grave importance during the concentration of the -army or at some critical moment. - -Destructions of line carried out by a retreating force, in order to -delay pursuit by the enemy, will be to the disadvantage of that force -when, after having driven back the enemy, it would itself make use of -the line it had rendered unserviceable. - -Dependence on the railway for the transport of considerable bodies -of troops on short journeys--say for twenty, twenty-five or thirty -miles--is rendered inexpedient by the fact that, when allowance is made -for the time likely to be taken, not only on the journey, but in the -assembling at the station, in the entraining and detraining (perhaps at -some place devoid of adequate platform or siding accommodation), and in -the march from the arrival station to destination, it may well be found -that the troops could cover the distance in less time by road, apart -from the consideration, suggested above, as to their being in a better -position, when marching, to resist attack. Experts in all countries -have studied this question with a view to deciding, on the basis of -their national conditions, within what limit it would be better for -troops to march by road in preference to going by rail. - -For reasons akin to those here stated, supplemented by the recent great -expansion of motor transport, less has been heard of late concerning the -proposed construction in this country of strategical railways along a -coast-line remarkable for its sinuosities, and presenting, therefore, an -exceptional position from the point of view of coast railways for purely -defensive purposes. - -As regards long-distance journeys, whilst armies marching by road have -often been materially reduced in proportions by the number of men -falling out owing to lameness, exhaustion, or other causes, those who -reached the theatre of war, representing "the survival of the fittest," -were better able to endure the trials and fatigues of the subsequent -campaign than if they could have made the journey by rail under -conditions involving no strain, but affording them no such exercise and -strengthening of their physical powers.[81] - -Experience has further shown that exceptionally long railway journeys -may have a prejudicial effect upon troops from the point of view, also, -of maintenance of discipline.[82] - -The services rendered by railways in war relate much more to strategy -than to tactics. Great masses of troops and munitions, brought from -all parts of the interior, may be conveyed readily and safely by rail -to particular points in the theatre of war; but the possibility of -effecting their transport by rail from one point to another on the -battle-field when the opposing forces are in actual contact is subject -to many restrictions and constitutes a much more difficult undertaking. - -The imperative need for guarding a long line of railway communications, -more especially in occupied territory, may lead to the withdrawal of a -considerable number of men from the main army, weakening the strength of -the available fighting force proportionately. - - -D.--DRAWBACKS AND DISADVANTAGES - -While, notwithstanding the conditions to be observed and the limitations -to be experienced, the balance of advantage conferred by railways on the -conduct of war may appear so pronounced, from a military and a political -point of view, there is a darker side to the story, as regards the world -at large, which must also be taken into account. - -If railways have increased the power of defending a country against -invasion they have, also, increased enormously the power of aggression -at the command of an invader. - -They offer vastly greater facilities to military Powers for the making -of sudden attacks on neighbouring countries--themselves, it may be, in a -state of more or less unpreparedness. - -They afford the opportunity for overwhelming weaker Powers by means -of armies mobilised and concentrated in the interior and poured on to -or across the frontier in an endless succession of trains following -one another with such rapidity that the initial movement may, in some -instances, be carried out within the short space of twenty-four hours. - -They permit of the prosecution of war at distances which, but for -the means offered for military transport by rail, would render war -impracticable. - -They allow of war being carried on between a number of nations at one -and the same time, thus spreading the area over which the conflicts of -to-day may extend. - -They encourage the cherishing of designs of world-power and dreams of -universal conquest. - -They have added to the horrors of war by facilitating the transport and -the employment of the most terrible engines of war. - -They have rendered possible the carrying off of plunder from an occupied -territory to an extent which would be impossible if the invaders had to -depend on ordinary road vehicles for their means of transport. - -They have brought fresh risks and dangers upon civil populations, -the maintenance of lines of rail communication being a matter of -such paramount importance to an invader that the severest measures -may be adopted by him towards the community in general as a means of -terrorising them and ensuring the security of the railway lines. - -What, in effect, count as "advantages" in one direction may be the -gravest of disadvantages in another. - - * * * * * - -Such, for attack or for defence, for good or for evil, is the nature, -and such are the possibilities, of that rail-power in warfare which, -after eighty years of continuous evolution, was, in the War of the -Nations imposed on mankind in 1914, to undergo a development and an -application on a wider, more impressive, and more terrible scale than -the world had ever seen before. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[78] Von Moltke is reported to have said on one occasion in the -Reichstag: "Our Great General Staff is so much persuaded of the -advantages to be derived from obtaining the initiative at the outset -of a war that it prefers to construct railways rather than forts. An -additional railway, crossing the whole country, makes a difference of -two days in the assembling of the army, and advances the operations -proportionately." "In the concentration of armies," says von der Goltz -in "The Conduct of War," "we reckon almost by hours." - -[79] "Without railroads, it is said, the siege of Paris would have been -impossible" (Bigelow's "Principles of Strategy"). "During the siege -of Paris one railway for some time fed the [German] army of, in round -numbers, 200,000 men, brought up the siege materials and reinforcements -averaging 2,000 to 3,000 men a day, and even, at one time, fed Prince -Frederick Charles' army, as well, with very slight assistance from the -exhausted theatre of war" (Hamley's "Operations of War"). - -[80] During the thirty-five days preceding the investment, Paris -received by the Western Railway, alone, 72,442 tons of provisions and -67,716 head of cattle. But for these supplies she could not have endured -so long a siege. In the revictualling of Paris, after the siege, the -railways, though much restricted by the Germans, brought into the city, -in the course of twenty days, 155,955 tons of provisions and 42,580 head -of cattle. - -[81] "The railways spare the troops fatigue," remarks Lieut.-Col. -Tovey, R.E., in "The Elements of Strategy"; "but it may be that when -they have to use their legs afterwards there will be more falling out -and lagging behind, in consequence." Balck, in his "Taktik," says: "It -is only in respect to the important consideration as to speed that the -rail-transport of troops is to be preferred to road-marching. The real -advantages of marching on foot--which was formerly the rule, and had -the effect of 'separating the chaff from the wheat' and of preparing -the men for the toils of fighting--are not counterbalanced by the fact -that the troops arrive at the theatre of war in their full numbers. -When time permits, marching on foot is preferable because it accustoms -the men both to their new equipment and to marching in large bodies. -After a long railway journey--on which the feet will have swollen and -the new boots will have been especially troublesome--marching becomes -particularly irksome, and the falling out of footsore men is very -considerable. It is, nevertheless, the almost invariable rule that the -troops shall begin their marching immediately they get to the end of -the rail journey, since it may be a matter of great importance that -the station at which they detrain should be cleared again as soon as -possible." - -[82] In alluding to the conditions under which Russian reinforcements -were sent to Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, General Kuropatkin -writes ("The Russian Army and the Japanese War"): "In former days troops -had to make long marches in full service order before they reached the -battle-field. If properly conducted these marches hardened the men, and -enabled units to settle down; all superfluous luggage was discarded; -the weaker men were left behind; the officers and men got to know one -another. But, nowadays, with railway transport, the results are very -different. Going to the Far East, our men were crowded in railway -carriages for as long as forty days at a time, out of the control of -their officers, who were in different compartments. In the old and -well-disciplined units in particular no harm was done; but in the case -of newly-formed units ... it was most harmful." - - - - -Appendix - - -INDIAN FRONTIER RAILWAYS - -On the north-west frontier of India the plains of the Punjab are -separated from the great central valley of Afghanistan, from the deserts -of Baluchistan, and from the Russian Empire on the north thereof, by -ranges of mountains, otherwise "a gridiron of stupendous ridges and -furrows," intersected by passes which have always been regarded as the -most vulnerable points of the Indian Empire. Through these passes from -the earliest days of recorded history there has come a long succession -of invasions instigated by that incalculable wealth of India which may -well have inspired the envy of dwellers in less favoured lands.[83] - -These considerations would alone suffice to establish the need for an -effective control of the more important of the said passes by the Power -which exercises supremacy in India; but the obligation thus devolving -upon the British people as the present holders of that supremacy has -been increased in recent times by two further factors--(1) troubles -with frontier tribes; and (2) the development of that Central Asian -Question which, though now no longer acute, was, not so many years -ago, a source of great anxiety in England and India. Frontier troubles -gave rise to a number of expeditions to Afghanistan from time to time, -while the gravity of the general situation was increased by the once -steady advance of Russia towards India--whether for the purposes of -actual conquest thereof or, alternatively, for the attainment of the aim -cherished by Russia during three centuries for an outlet to a southern -sea, such outlet being sought via the Persian Gulf on her disappointment -in regard to the Dardanelles; though British interests were concerned in -either case. - -This combination of circumstances, with the possibility, at one -time, that Afghanistan might become the theatre of war in a conflict -between two great European Powers, invested with special interest and -importance the provision on the north-west frontier of India of railway -lines which, whether constructed to the more important passes or going -actually through them, would form a ready means of concentrating -Anglo-Indian troops at such places on the frontier, or beyond, as -occasion might require. - -From this point of view the Bolan and Khyber passes--the former leading -to Quetta and Kandahar and the latter to Kabul--have more especially had -importance attached to them as "the two gates of India." - -Proposals for constructing railways through them were advanced as early -as 1857, when Mr. (afterwards Sir) W. P. Andrew, chairman of the Sind, -Punjab and Delhi Railway, acted as spokesman of a deputation which -waited on Lord Palmerston in order to urge the construction of (1) a -railway down the valley of the Euphrates, improving our communications -with India by connecting the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf; -and (2) railways through the Bolan and Khyber passes, not only, as -he urged, facilitating the movement of troops to the frontier, but -offering alternative routes by means of which the flank or the rear -of an enemy operating beyond or between the limits of the two lines -might be threatened. Mr. Andrew followed up with great earnestness and -perseverance for many years his advocacy of these views, publishing a -succession of books and pamphlets, and writing many letters to the Press -on the subject. - -Such advocacy had, however, no practical issue, and, though the -arguments originally advanced in favour of the Euphrates railway lost -most of their force on the opening of the Suez Canal, the consequences -of the neglect to provide better means of communication with the -north-west frontier were well manifested in the troubles of 1878-79-80. - -The refusal of the Ameer of Afghanistan--who had already accorded an -ostentatious welcome to a Russian Embassy at Kabul--to receive a British -mission led, in 1878, to an order being given for the advance of three -columns of British forces upon Afghan territory, the routes selected for -this purpose being (1) the Khyber Pass, (2) the Kuram Pass, and (3) the -Bolan Pass. At this time, however, the system of frontier railways which -had been advocated so long scarcely existed except on paper. The nearest -point of railway communication with Afghanistan was then at Sukkur, on -the Indus. An extension across the Sind desert to the entrance to the -Bolan Pass had been surveyed, and a very short section had been laid; -but in their advance on Kandahar Sir Donald Stewart and his force had to -march all the way from the Indus, experiencing great trials in crossing -the intervening desert, where many of the men lost their lives. The -work of constructing this desert railway--which presented no engineering -difficulty--was now taken actively in hand, and the line was available -for the troops on their return. - -Success attended the expedition of 1878 so far as it led to the flight -of Shere Ali, the occupation of Kandahar by Sir Donald Stewart, the -control by the British of the three main highways between India and -Afghanistan, and the signing of the treaty of Gandamak; but the murder -of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his staff at Kabul, in September, 1879, -rendered necessary the sending of a further expedition, General Sir -Frederick (afterwards Lord) Roberts being directed to proceed with a -British force by the Kuram route to Kabul. - -Thereupon the whole question of transport facilities was revived afresh, -and, although the expedition itself was a conspicuous success, delays -and commissariat difficulties arose which might have been avoided had -better railway facilities been available.[84] The terminus, at that -time, of the Punjab State Railway was at Jhelum, seventy miles from -Rawal Pindi, 180 from Peshawar, and 260 from Thal, the frontier post of -the Kuram pass; and in spite of the vigorous efforts made, between 1878 -and 1880, to extend the line, Jhelum remained the actual railway base -throughout, no material assistance being gained from the twenty miles of -extension which, owing to the great engineering difficulties presented -by innumerable ravines, could alone be carried out during that period. -Commenting on the "painfully slow" progress being made by the Khyber -column, _The Times_ of October 13, 1879, remarked:-- - - It is now upwards of a quarter of a century since the - chairman of the Sind railway commenced to broach the idea - of connecting the Khyber and Bolan passes with the railway - system of India. For more than a quarter of a century he - has unsparingly advocated these views.... Had the views so - persistently advocated by Mr. Andrew, and so repeatedly brought - forward by us, been adopted at the commencement of the struggle - last October, as we then ventured to insist upon, vast sums - would have been spared in the hire of transport, and we should - have been spared the ignominy of feeling that a British army, - nominally on active service, has occupied five weeks in covering - less than seventy miles. - -Rawal Pindi--one of the most important strategical points in India--was -not reached by the railway until October, 1880, by which time the Afghan -War of 1878-80 had been brought to a close; and the further extension of -the Indian railway system to Peshawar,--another position of the utmost -strategic importance, situate ten miles from the entrance to the Khyber -Pass, and 190 from Kabul--was effected by May, 1883. - -From a military point of view, however, still greater importance was -attached, at that time, to the securing of rail communication through -the Bolan Pass to Quetta and Pishin in the direction of Kandahar, this -being the route by which, it was thought, the Russians would be certain -to attempt their invasion of India,--if they should undertake one at all. - -Surveys for an extension of the Sukkur-Sibi desert line to Pishin were -made whilst that line was under construction, and early in 1880 the -Government gave directions that the extension was to be proceeded with; -though they decided that the route to be taken from Sibi should be -through the Hurnai Pass in preference to the Bolan route, the former -being regarded as preferable for the broad-gauge line (5 ft. 6 in.) with -which the "Kandahar State Railway," as it was to be called, would be -provided. - -Arrangements were at once made for collecting the necessary materials -and for carrying through the work with the least possible delay; but -further progress was checked, in July, 1880, by the disaster at Maiwand. -In the following October the Gladstone Government, who had succeeded -the Beaconsfield Administration and had, apparently, resolved upon a -complete reversal of the Indian policy of their predecessors, followed -up an earlier announcement of their intention to withdraw from Kandahar -by giving orders for the cessation of the work on the Sind-Pishin -railway. Maiwand having been avenged, and some refractory tribes -subdued, Afghanistan was completely evacuated by the British at the end -of April, 1881, and the construction of frontier railways in India was -dropped, for the time being. - -In the middle of 1883 came a reconsideration of the position. Russia -was then showing increased activity in the direction of Merv, and -the British Government concluded, apparently, that they had been too -hasty in ordering the abandonment of the Kandahar State Railway scheme -nearly three years before. So they gave orders that the work should be -resumed; though, in order to render this _volte face_ on their part less -conspicuous, they directed that the undertaking should now be known only -as the "Hurnai Road Improvement Scheme"; that it should be proceeded -with quietly, in order that it might not attract too much attention, -and that the suggestion of a "road improvement scheme," instead of -a railway, should be kept up by the engineers not being allowed to -have even a temporary line of rails for conveying stores, materials -for bridges, etc., from the base to the passes. This last-mentioned -stipulation meant that the stores and materials had to be either -transported on the backs of camels or dragged on wheels up stream; and -it was estimated that, in addition to the great loss of time, a sum -of not less than £1,000,000 was wasted in this way before the order -prohibiting the use of temporary rails was rescinded. - -A start was made with the work in October, 1883, and the fact that -the Russians were then actually approaching Merv, and that a sudden -advance by them in force was regarded as probable, led to the laying of -great emphasis on the need for construction being pushed on with the -utmost vigour. When, in February, 1884, the Russians did occupy Merv, -the pressure brought to bear on the Engineer-in-chief became still -more acute. Then, in May, the British Government formally announced -that, owing to the encroachments of Russia, the line _would_ be built. -The fiction of a "Hurnai Road Improvement Scheme" was now abandoned. -Henceforth the line under construction was to be known as "The -Sind-Pishin State Railway." - -From the very outset, however, the difficulties which crowded upon -Colonel (afterwards Sir James) Browne, R.E., an officer well experienced -in railway and engineering work who was entrusted with the carrying -out of the scheme, were unfavourable to the prospects of speed in -construction. The surveys which had already been made were found not -only worthless but misleading. The first members of his staff were -unacquainted with railway work and had to be succeeded by men brought -from England. The plant and materials previously collected, but disposed -of at scrap-iron prices when the line was abandoned in 1880, had now to -be replaced at an almost fabulous cost, owing to the urgency of the need -for them. - -All these were, nevertheless, minor troubles as compared with the -physical conditions to be overcome. - -Starting from an elevation, at Sibi, of 300 ft., the line was to rise -6,200 ft. in the 120 miles between Sibi and the summit level at Kach. - -Then, for the greater part of the 224 miles to which the line was to -extend, the country was a wilderness of rocks and stones--a land of -barrenness and desolation, where there was no timber, no fuel, scarcely -a blade of grass, and, in places, for stretches of several miles, no -water. It was a land, too, almost devoid of inhabitants, while those -who did dwell there were described as "a savage and blood-thirsty race -of robbers," continually engaged in plunder and inter-tribal warfare, -and not growing sufficient food even for their own consumption. Almost -everything that was wanted--including supplies for from 15,000 to 30,000 -workers and materials for the line--had to be imported from a distance. - -Still less inviting was this inhospitable region by reason of its range -of climatic conditions. The lowlands have the reputation of being one of -the hottest corners of the earth's surface. A temperature of 124 deg. -Fahr. has been registered in the Nari valley. The highlands, in turn, -offer the alternative of Arctic cold, the temperature there falling in -winter to 18 deg. below zero. Between the lowlands and the highlands -there is a temperate zone; but here the constant pestilence was dreaded -no less than the extremes of heat and cold elsewhere. - -As the result of these conditions, the work of construction could be -carried on in certain districts for part of the year only, and the -workers had to be transferred from one section of the line to another -according to the season. Such a movement of front involved the transport -of everything,--stores, tools, offices and some thousands of men. "The -management of this vast exodus," says Captain Scott-Moncrieff, R.E., -in his paper on "The Frontier Railways of India,"[85] "was a work of -considerable anxiety and difficulty. A sudden influx of people, such -as this, into a desolate and barren land naturally caused a famine. -Everything was eaten up, and for some days the question of supplies was -the burning question of the hour.... Nine hundred camel loads of food -were consumed daily on the works." The customary load for a camel was -400 lbs., but some of the camels carried loads of 800 lbs. up the pass. - -The engineering difficulties fell into four principal groups,--(1) the -Nari Gorge; (2) the Gundakin Defile; (3) the Chuppur Rift, and (4) the -Mud Gorge.[86] - -The Nari Gorge, about fourteen miles in length, beginning just beyond -Sibi, has been described as "one of the most weird tracks through which -a railway has ever been carried. The hills, absolutely bare, rise above -the valley for many thousands of feet in fantastic pinnacles and cliffs. -It is a scene of the wildest desolation." The Nari river, running -through the gorge, is formed by a combination of three streams having -but little water on ordinary occasions, but becoming, in time of flood, -a raging torrent which fills up the whole gorge for miles, attains a -depth of ten feet, and has a velocity of five feet per second. Over -this river the railway had to be carried in five different places. Not -alone bridges, but heavy embankments, cuttings and tunnels were needed. -At one point there was an especially dangerous tunnel in which so many -accidents occurred, owing to roof or sides falling in, that at last no -workmen would enter it except at a wage five-fold that of the high rate -already being paid. The whole work was liable to be stopped for months -together, owing to the washing away of half-completed embankments or -bridges; though until this portion of the line had been completed no -materials could be sent to the sections beyond. - -In the Gundakin Defile, eight miles long, two tunnels had to be made -through some most treacherous material, and four bridges had to be -provided. - -The Chuppur Rift is a chasm three miles long in the spurs of a rocky -mountain forming an apparently insuperable barrier. In time of floods -the river attains a height of from 30 to 40 ft. The running of the -railway on a ledge along the side of the mountain being impracticable, -owing to the nature of the rock, the engineers cut a line of continuous -tunnels partly on one side of the rift and partly on the other, -connecting the two series by an iron girder bridge; but, instead of -constructing the tunnels in the usual way, from each end--a procedure -which would have taken much time--they adopted the expedient of driving -openings (adits) into the side of the cliff at various points, and then -cutting the tunnel right and left of each of these openings until the -various sections met. The only way in which the openings could be made -was by lowering men down by ropes several hundred feet from the top of -the cliff until they reached the point where the work for an opening was -to be started. They then drove crowbars into the perpendicular sides of -the cliff in order to gain the necessary support for a platform from -which the blasting operations could be carried on. Six of these openings -were made on one side of the cliff and six on the other. As a separate -gang of men could operate at each it was possible to complete the whole -work in the course of a few months. Altogether there is a collective -length of 6,400 ft. of tunnels in the rift, in addition to a viaduct -75 ft. high, with seven spans of 40 ft. each, and a bridge having an -elevation over the river of 250 ft., and consisting of a central span of -150 ft. and eight spans of 40 ft. - -On the summit level, twenty-five miles in length, came the five-mile -long Mud Gorge,--a narrow valley, between precipitous mountains, filled -with a soil little better than dried mud, and of such a character that -several bad slips of road-bed, carrying away the whole of the line, -occurred. - -One would think that with all these difficulties--physical, climatic and -engineering--to face, the constructors of the railway might have been -excused any more; but there were others besides. - -In August and September, 1884, the troops and native labourers employed -on the work on the lower part of the line were visited by an outbreak -of fever and scurvy of a virulence almost unprecedented in Indian -experience. Large numbers of the men died. In one gang of 200 the -average number of deaths was ten a day. Of those who survived the -majority were so prostrated as to be scarcely capable of doing anything. -Sixty per cent. of the Sappers were in hospital. - -Fresh troops, to the extent of three Battalions of Pioneers, were -brought on to the work; but they had scarcely arrived before--in -November--there was a severe outbreak of cholera. The Afghans thereupon -"bolted to a man"; and they were followed by many skilled artisans who -had been collected from various parts of India. Additional labour had to -be obtained from the Eastern Punjab, but much time was lost. - -Whilst the engineers were struggling to overcome these manifold -difficulties, the political situation was steadily becoming still more -acute. The climax seemed to be reached by the Penj-deh incident of -March 30, 1885, when a Russian force under General Komaroff seized this -important strategical position, situate near the junction of the Khushk -and Murghab rivers. On April 27, 1885, Mr. Gladstone proposed in the -House of Commons a vote of £11,000,000 for the purposes of what then -seemed to be an inevitable war with Russia. The money was voted the same -night. - -So the urgency for completing the line which would now, probably, have -been available for use had it not been stopped in 1880, was greater -than ever. Orders were sent to India that the work must be continued -along all parts of the line regardless of seasons. Within a week or two, -however, of the war vote at Westminster, cholera broke out afresh among -the construction party in India. By the end of May it was spreading -among them "like a raging fire"; while to the cholera itself there was -added a heat so intense that even the most willing of workers found it -almost unendurable. - -Under this combination of cholera and excessive heat, work on the lower -sections of the line was stopped altogether for a time--Government -orders and Russians notwithstanding. All possible measures were taken to -mitigate the severity of the epidemic; but the death-rate increased with -frightful rapidity. Some of the best workers, European and Asiatic--men -who could least be spared, on account of the responsible positions they -held--were carried off. During the month of June no fewer than 2,000 -died out of 10,000. Of the remainder large numbers sought safety in -flight. Many of the minor Government officials, such as telegraph and -Post Office clerks, went off in a body. - -Whilst sickness and disease had thus been afflicting the camps, fresh -troubles had arisen in another direction. Early in 1885 the district -was visited by a succession of floods exceeding in severity anything -known there for sixty years. In the course of three months the rainfall -amounted to 19.27 inches,--a total six times in excess of the average. -Several bridges and many miles of temporary roads were washed away; -numerous accidents were caused; camping grounds were destroyed; -communications were interrupted; food supplies became scarcely -obtainable, and great delay resulted in the prosecution of a work for -which urgency was being so persistently demanded. The floods did not -finally subside until the end of May. - -Nature having done so much to impede the progress of the undertaking, -it only remained for politicians and officials to do what they could to -follow her example. - -Mention has already been made of the initial prohibition of temporary -lines of rails for the conveyance of stores and materials, and the -loss of time and waste of money involved in the use of camels instead; -but to this one fact may be added another, namely, that after the -Engineer-in-Chief had made his arrangements to obtain sleepers from the -juniper forests on the north of the line--this being the only timber -available in the whole district--the Government vetoed the arrangement -on the ground that it might, possibly, lead to quarrels among the Afghan -tribes. The timber had to be procured from India, instead. Hence more -delay. - -Then the original arrangement with the Engineer-in-Chief, that the -work was to be carried out under the Military Department of the Indian -Government, and that, in the interests of urgency, he should have a -free hand, was changed into one which required that the work should -be controlled by a new member of the Public Works Department, who, it -is alleged, interfered with many of the working details which should -have been left to an Engineer-in-Chief, and, by his "unskilled and -unqualified control," caused still further delay, together with much -expense and confusion. A good deal of time was lost, for instance, -before Col. Browne could get even some indispensable instruments and -survey appliances. Especially persistent, also, was Col. Browne's -immediate superior in demanding from him "detailed estimates" which, -on account of the uncertainties of the engineering work and of the -other factors in the situation, it was impossible to prepare whilst the -construction of the line was in progress. - -Such, however, was the energy which had been shown, in spite of all -these difficulties and drawbacks, that the work was completed within the -two years and a half fixed by the Engineer-in-Chief at the start as the -period in which--"with money freely granted"--it could be done. On March -27, 1887, an engine ran over the line all the way from Sibi to Quetta, -and the Hurnai Railway was formally declared open for traffic. - -In the meantime the apparent certainty of war with Russia, following, -especially, on her seizure of Penj-deh, had led, in April, 1885, to -an order being given for the construction of a light railway from -Sibi through the Bolan Pass to Quetta, as an alternative, more direct -and more quickly constructed route, of which use could be made for -a movement of troops to the frontier on the anticipated partial -mobilisation of the Indian Army. - -The laying of this light railway constituted another notable engineering -achievement. - -Running through the heart of what has been described as "some of the -boldest mountain scenery in India," the Bolan Pass has a length of about -sixty miles and a breadth ranging from one mile to a space, in places, -of only about twenty yards between the rugged mountain walls which here -convert the pass into a mere defile. The pass is, in fact, practically -the bed of the Bolan River, and is dry for the greater part of the -year, but liable to floods. The temporary narrow-gauge line was to be -laid along the river bed without interfering with the military road -constructed in 1882-84 as far as Quetta. - -For the first forty miles there was a fairly good gradient; but beyond -that came a very heavy rise to the top of the pass; and here, at least, -anything more than a metre-gauge line would have been impracticable. -The possibility of constructing a line of railway through the pass at -all had long been the despair of engineers, and this was the reason why -the Hurnai route had been decided on in preference to the Bolan for the -broad-gauge line to Quetta. Unfortunately, too, the climatic were even -greater than the engineering difficulties. The heat in the lower parts -of the pass was "beyond all description," and cholera or other diseases -carried off thousands of the workers. - -With these two lines at their disposal, the Government were, in the -spring of 1887, quite prepared for a concentration of British and -Indian forces in Afghanistan, had the political condition rendered such -a course necessary; but the situation had by then greatly improved, -thanks to the negotiations which had been proceeding with Russia for -the demarcation of frontiers. In April, 1877, the British and Russian -commissioners met at St. Petersburg, and, as the result of still further -negotiations, the questions at issue were settled without the appeal to -arms which had at one time appeared inevitable. - -In 1892 some fifty miles of the Bolan light railway were abandoned in -favour of another route which, avoiding the first part of the pass, -allowed of a broad-gauge line being laid from Sibi through Quetta -to Bostan Junction, where it connects with what is now known as the -Hurnai-Pishin Loop. A branch ninety miles in length, from Quetta to -Mushki, on the Seistan trade route, was opened in 1905. - -To-day the Sind-Pishin railway, with its two sections, via the Bolan -and the Hurnai respectively, has its terminus at New Chaman, on the -actual frontier of Afghanistan, and within seventy miles of Kandahar. -A broad-gauge line throughout, it forms part of the railway system of -India, linking up at Ruk junction with the line running thence along the -north bank of the Indus to Karachi, and, by means of a bridge across the -Indus, with a line on the south of the river which, in one direction -provides an alternative route to Karachi, and in the other connects with -Calcutta and other leading cities. The Sind-Pishin line affords, in -fact, a most valuable means for concentrating on the Afghan frontier, -within a short distance of Kandahar, and in the shortest possible time a -considerable body of troops collected from all parts of India, together -with reinforcements from Europe, landed at Karachi. As a strategical -line, therefore, the railway is of exceptional importance to India and -to British interests in general; though there can be no suggestion that -it would be used otherwise than for purely defensive purposes. - -Then, in what, since 1901, has constituted the North-West Frontier -Province of India, there has been a considerable extension of frontier -railways in recent years,--all serving important strategical purposes. -From Peshawar--1,520 miles from Calcutta--there is a broad-gauge -extension, twelve miles in length, to Fort Jamrud, at the mouth of the -Khyber Pass; from Naushahra, a cantonment twenty-seven miles due east -of Peshawar, there is a narrow-gauge line to Dargai, at the foot of -the Malakand Pass; while among other lines is one to Thal, a military -outpost on the extreme limit of British territory which serves also as a -depôt for the trade with Northern Afghanistan passing through the Kurram -valley; and one to Banu, a garrison town, seventy-nine miles south of -Kohat, built on a site chosen for political reasons by Sir Herbert -Edwards in 1848. - -A number of other railways on the north-west frontiers of India have -been proposed. Whatever may or may not be ultimately done in regard to -these further schemes, it is obvious that those already constructed have -made an enormous difference in our strategical position in regard to -Afghanistan and the lands beyond as compared with the military transport -conditions of 1878. - - -THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA - -With a total area of 2,948,000 square miles, a population of less than -four and a half million, and a coast line of 11,300 miles, the continent -of Australia is peculiarly open to attack, and the possibilities of -invasion, or of attempts at invasion, have not only been much discussed -there of late years, but they have given rise to schemes of land defence -in which the building of strategical railways and the adapting of -existing lines to strategical purposes form important factors. - -Under present conditions Western Australia and the Northern Territory -are isolated from the remaining States of the Commonwealth so far as -regards rail communication, and are at the mercy of any invader who -might be able to land a force there unchallenged by the British Fleet. - -Since the autumn of 1912, however, there has been under construction a -railway which, starting from Kalgoorlie, the eastern terminus of the -Western Australian system, will proceed in a direct line for 1,063 miles -to Port Augusta, on the South Australian system, thus establishing -through rail connection between Perth (Western Australia) and the -farthest limit of the Queensland railway system, a total distance, that -is, of about 4,000 miles. When this, the first of Australia's proposed -trans-continental lines, is completed, it will be possible to send -troops from the Central or the Eastern States to Western Australia, not -only by rail, but by a railway laid so far inland that they will be safe -from attack from the sea. There would thus be a reasonable certainty -of the troops arriving at their destination; whereas if they had to -go by water there might be the risk of the vessels in which they were -making the journey being captured by the enemy. While, therefore, the -Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line is expected to serve other than purely -strategical purposes, it is, in effect, the latter which claim first -consideration. - -Referring to the Northern Territory, in an article contributed by him to -_The Empire Review_ for May, 1910, Mr. F. A. W. Gisborne, an authority -on Australian questions, wrote:-- - - This vast region embraces 523,620 square miles of land, - and lies close to Asia, the most populous of the continents. - At present it contains, exclusive of the aborigines, barely - one thousand white people and about twice as many Chinese. It - lacks railway communication with the settled parts of Australia, - and is completely isolated from them. Its magnificent harbour, - accessible to the largest vessels afloat, and constituting - the natural gateway to tropical Australia, lies, save for - the British Fleet, absolutely defenceless. Behind it extend - millions of acres of fertile plains never yet tilled, and - never likely to be cultivated by white hands. Practically no - industry flourishes in a region which could support myriads of - agriculturists and operatives. - -That some of the peoples of crowded Asia may, sooner or later, seek -a settlement for their surplus millions on what, for them, would be -so desirable a land as the Northern Territory, with its magnificent -opportunities for those capable of working in a tropical climate, is a -contingency that has been fully realised in Australia, and the questions -have arisen (1) as to whether the presence of a thousand whites in a -region half a million square miles in extent constitutes such "effective -occupation" thereof as gives them a right to its exclusive possession; -and (2) whether it would be possible either to prevent Asiatics from -invading the Northern Territory, if they sought so to do, or to eject -them therefrom if they did. - -The latter question raises in an especially interesting form the -problem as to the respective merits and possibilities of sea-power and -rail-power. - -Sea-power would, assuredly, have to be relied upon for safeguarding -the Northern Territory against invasion, since it would be impossible -for the Commonwealth Government to station troops at every prospective -landing point along 1,200 miles of a tropical coast-line in sufficient -force to keep off any invader who might appear there at some unexpected -moment. For the checking, therefore, of such invasion, dependence would -have to be placed on the power of the British Fleet (1) to stop the -invader, (2) to cut off his connections if he should effect a landing, -or (3) to carry war into the invader's own country. - -Nor, if any large Asiatic settlement--as distinct from an "invasion" in -the ordinary acceptation of that term--did take place in the Northern -Territory under conditions that might not call for the intervention of -the British Fleet, is it certain that the ejection of the settlers could -be ensured with the help even of a trans-continental line of railway. -Here the question is not that of the carrying power of a single line -of railway. The examples offered by the War of Secession, the South -African War and the Russo-Japanese War have well established the great -advantages that even single lines, extending for great distances, can -confer in the effecting of military transport. The considerations that -would arise in Australia are, rather, (1) the fact that troops arriving -at Pine Creek or Port Darwin from the south might have to make some -very long and very trying marches across the 523,000 square miles -comprising the Northern Territory before they reached the settlement -of the Asiatics whom they were to eject, while they would be dependent -for their supplies on a far-distant railway base; and (2) the doubt as -to whether Australia could spare a sufficiently large body of troops to -undertake such an expedition, having regard to the defence requirements -of her south-eastern States, the integrity of which would count as of -more vital importance than an Asiatic settlement in her Far North. So -there are those who think that if such a settlement were eventually -effected in the Northern Territory, under conditions not constituting a -_casus belli_, Australia would simply have to accept the situation, and -reconcile herself to it as best she could. - -All these things may seem to reflect on the precise value, from the -rail-power point of view, of that direct communication which, more -especially for strategical reasons, Australia has hoped eventually to -obtain between north and south as well as between west and east. It -is, nevertheless, desirable to see what has already been done in this -direction. - -The construction of a north-to-south trans-continental line, passing -through the very centre of the Australian mainland, and linking up -the Northern Territory with the southern and eastern States, has -been under discussion for a period of about forty years. Progress -seemed to be assured by the Acceptance Act of 1910, under which the -Government of the Commonwealth, in taking over the Northern Territory -from South Australia, agreed to build a trans-continental line -connecting Oodnadatta, the northern terminus of the South Australian -railway system, and 688 miles from Adelaide, with Pine Creek, the -southern terminus of the Northern Territory system, and 145 miles -distant from Port Darwin. This connecting link would have a length -of 1,063 miles,--the same, by a singular coincidence, as that of the -Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line. - -Since this "bargain" between the South Australia and the Commonwealth -Governments was made, there have been many advocates of an alternative, -or, otherwise, a supplementary route which, instead of going direct from -South Australia to the Northern Territory, (passing through the central -Australian desert,) would link up--on their west--with the railway -systems of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, connections with -the new line being made by these States where necessary. This "eastern -deviation route" would, it is argued, offer a greater strategical -advantage, as compared with the other route, because if troops had to -be despatched to the north, they could more readily be supplied from -Melbourne and Sydney--which, between them, contain over one-fourth of -the entire population of Australia--than from Adelaide; while to send -troops from Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria to South Australia -in order that they might start on their journey to the Northern -Territory from Oodnadatta, would involve a material delay under, -possibly, urgent conditions. Thus it is estimated that if the eastern -route were adopted, troops and travellers from Brisbane to Port Darwin -would only travel about 2,234 miles as against 3,691 miles via Sydney, -Melbourne, Adelaide and the central Australian route from Oodnadatta. - -How these rival claims and contentions will be eventually settled -remains to be seen; but there has now been added to them a project for -the building of other avowedly strategical lines, establishing a more -direct connection between the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta trans-continental -line, when it is finished, and the capitals of Victoria, New South Wales -and Queensland respectively, facilitating the mutual defence of the -eastern, southern and western States in a time of crisis. This further -scheme is, however, designed only to supplement the trans-continental -lines already mentioned. - -As regards the eastern States and the "central" State of South -Australia, the question of an Asiatic invasion may be assumed not to -arise. It has, however, long been regarded as possible that if Great -Britain were at war with some non-Asiatic Power able to challenge her -supremacy on the seas, the enemy might make an attack, not on the -admittedly vulnerable Northern Territory--which he would not want -either as a colony for Europeans or as a "jumping-off" place from which -to conquer the remainder of Australia--but on some point along the -coast-line of nearly 2,000 miles which, stretching from Rockhampton, -in Queensland, to Adelaide, in South Australia, comprises (with a -Hinterland of some 200 miles) the most populous, the most wealthy and -(for non-Asiatics) the most desirable section of the whole Australian -continent. - -It is true that Germany--the Power which claims first attention from -this point of view--has shown far greater desire to convert Africa into -a German Empire than she has to effect the annexation of Australia. Yet -that she has recognized the weakness of the Australian situation is -suggested by the fact that, in dealing with the defensive power of the -Commonwealth, Dr. Rohrbach, one of the exponents of German World-Policy, -and author of "Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern," among other works, -has declared that Australia could not resist if her four chief towns, -all of them near the coast, were occupied by an invader.[87] - -Which of these four towns, or which particular point along the said -2,000 miles of coast-line, an invader would select for his main -attack--apart from feints elsewhere--must needs be uncertain; but this -very fact only adds to the imperative importance of those responsible -for the defence of Australia being able to move troops freely, and -within the shortest possible period, either from one State to another or -from any place to another within one and the same State, as the defence -conditions might require. - -When we thus pass on to consider the question as to the use of existing -lines of railway in Australia for strategical purposes, we find that -the most noteworthy expression of opinion on this branch of the subject -is contained in the following extract from the "Memorandum" which Lord -Kitchener wrote in 1910, as the result of an investigation made by him, -at the request of the Commonwealth Government, into the "Defence of -Australia":-- - - Railway construction has, while developing the country, - resulted in lines that would appear to be more favourable to an - enemy invading Australia than to the defence of the country. - Different gauges in most of the States isolate each system, and - the want of systematic interior connection makes the present - lines running inland of little use for defence, although - possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would have - temporary command of the sea. - -The "different gauges" undoubtedly constitute one of the most serious -shortcomings of the existing railways in Australia in regard to those -military movements with which we are here alone concerned. - -Strategical considerations as applied to rail transport require, not -only that troops shall be readily conveyed, when necessary, from one -part of a country or one part of a continent to another, but that a -mobilisation of the forces shall be followed by a mobilisation of -railway rolling stock. Locomotives, carriages and trucks on lines which -are not themselves likely to be wanted for military transport should be -available for use on the lines that will be so wanted, in order that all -the rolling stock of all the railways in all parts of the country or of -the States concerned can, at a time of possibly the gravest emergency, -be concentrated or employed on whatever lines, or in whatever direction, -additional transport facilities may be needed. - -The importance of this principle was first recognised by von Moltke; -but when the railways of Australia were originally planned, each State -took a more or less parochial view of its own requirements, its own -geographical conditions, or its own resources, and adopted the gauge -which accorded best therewith, regardless of any future need for a -co-ordinated system of rail-transport serving the requirements of the -Australian continent as a whole. - -So we find that the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge has been adopted in Queensland, -South Australia (with a further 600 miles of 5 ft. 3 in. gauge), Western -Australia, and the Northern Territory; the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge (the -standard gauge in Great Britain and, also, of over 65 per cent. of -the world's railway mileage,) in New South Wales; and the 5 ft. 3 in. -gauge in Victoria. This means, in most cases, that when the frontier of -a State is reached, passengers, mails, baggage and merchandise must -change or be transferred from the trains on the one system to those of -the other. - -Assuming that the west-to-east trans-continental railway (which is -being built with the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge) were now available for use, a -traveller by it from Perth, Western Australia, through South Australia, -Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland would require, on account -of the differences in gauge, to change trains at least five times. -This may be regarded as an extreme case; but the evils of the existing -conditions are presented to us in a concrete form by an estimate which -the Defence Department of the Commonwealth recently made as to the time -it would take to move a force of 30,000 mounted troops from Melbourne -to Brisbane. It was shown that, with the present break of gauge, this -operation would occupy no less a time than sixty-three days; whereas -if there were no break of gauge twenty-three days would suffice. Thus -the differences of gauge would mean a loss of forty days in effecting -transfers at the frontier. In this time much might happen if the enemy -had obtained temporary control of the sea. Under these conditions, in -fact, he would be able to move his own forces by sea for the still -longer distance from Adelaide to Brisbane in five days. Brisbane might -thus be captured by the enemy while the reinforcements it wanted were -still changing trains at the State boundaries. - -It may be of interest here to recall the fact that at one time there -were still greater differences of gauge on the railways in the -United States; that in 1885 the American railway companies resolved -upon establishing uniformity as a means of overcoming the great -inconveniences due to these conditions; and that in 1886, after adequate -preparation, the conversion of practically the entire system of railways -in the United States to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge was effected in two -days. Strategically, therefore, the United States Federal Government -could now, not only send troops by rail from any one part of their vast -territory to another, but utilise almost the whole of the available -rolling stock for military purposes.[88] - -Unification of gauge forms, however, a serious proposition for Australia -on account of the prodigious outlay which, owing to the short-sighted -policy of the past, it would now involve.[89] - -The estimated cost of converting all the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge in New South -Wales and all the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge in Queensland, South Australia, -Western Australia and the Northern Territory to the 5 ft. 3 in. gauge of -Victoria is no less than £51,659,000. To convert all the 3 ft. 6 in. and -5 ft. 3 in. railways to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the New South Wales -lines would cost £37,164,000. To convert to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge all -the trunk lines connecting the capitals--and this without shortening the -present circuitous routes or modifying the heavy grades--would alone -cost about £12,000,000. - -In addition to this still undecided "battle of the gauges" there -are in Australia other disadvantages, from a strategical standpoint, -in the existing railway system, included therein being (1) an undue -preponderance of single over double track, so that any exceptional -amount of traffic causes a congestion which is likely only to be -aggravated by new lines constructed, or extensions made, before the -carrying capacity of the trunk lines has been increased; and (2) the -building of lines which either lead nowhere or have been expressly -stopped short of the boundaries of a State in order to retain, for the -railways of that State, traffic from outlying districts which would -pass, by a much shorter journey, to the port of a neighbouring State if, -by means of through railway connexion, the residents in the districts -concerned were free to avail themselves of their geographical advantage -in respect to their nearness to such port. - -In addition to the efforts she has already made, or is proposing to -make, to effect such improvement both in her railway system and in -her military transport facilities as may be practicable, Australia -has sought to provide for that effective organisation without which, -as experience elsewhere has fully shown, great and even disastrous -confusion may arise at a critical moment owing to conflicts of authority -and other troubles or difficulties in the working of such railways as -may be utilised for military movements. - -The action taken in this direction is based on a further recommendation -made by Lord Kitchener, who, in the course of his Memorandum to the -Commonwealth Government in 1910 said (paragraph 85):-- - - Preparation for mobilisation is primarily the work of - the General Staff, who recommend the lines to be followed - and advise where, and in what quantities, the munitions of - war of the various units should be stored. Concentration can - only be satisfactorily effected when the railway and military - authorities are in the closest touch, and work in absolute - harmony. To secure this co-operation, I advise that a War - Railway Council be formed, as is the case in the United Kingdom, - composed of the Chief Railway Commissioner from each State, - under the presidency of the Quartermaster-General of the Citizen - Forces, and with an officer of the Headquarters Staff as - secretary. - -A War Railway Council for the Commonwealth was duly constituted in -1911. The Council, which forms an adjunct of the Commonwealth Defence -Department, consists of the Quartermaster-General, (president,) the -senior officer of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps also created -for the railway system alike of the Commonwealth and of each State -(such senior officer being the Chief or the Deputy Commissioner of -Railways); the Consulting Military Engineer of the Commonwealth, -and two representatives of the naval and military forces, with a -military officer as secretary. The duties of the Council in time of -peace are, generally, to furnish advice to the Minister of Defence on -railway matters, and, particularly (_a_) to determine the method of -supplying information to, and obtaining it from, the different railway -departments; (_b_) to suggest regulations and instructions for carrying -out movement of troops; (_c_) to suggest the method of organising -railway staff officers in time of war to act as intermediaries between -the various railway authorities and the troops; (_d_) to consider the -question of extra sidings, loading platforms, etc.; and proposals for -unification of gauges; and (_e_) to suggest the organisation and system -of training of railway troops. In time of war the Council further -advises the Minister of defence on questions of mobilisation. The -organisation for military rail-transport in the several States follows -on the lines of the system already adopted in the United Kingdom, as -laid down in the Field Service Regulations. - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[83] Altogether there have been twenty-six invasions of India, dating -back to about 2,000 years B.C., and of this number no fewer than -twenty-one have ended in conquest. - -[84] It has been stated that the number of camels employed during the -expeditions of 1878-80 for transport purposes, in default of better -rail communication, was so great as almost to exhaust the supply of -the frontier provinces of Sind and Punjab, while from 30,000 to 40,000 -of them died owing to the excessive toils and trials of the work they -were required to perform, the financial loss resulting therefrom to the -Treasury being estimated at £200,000. - -[85] "Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers," Vol xi, 1885. - -[86] "Life and Times of General Sir James Browne, R.E., K.C.B., -K.C.S.I." by General J. J. McLeod Innes, London, 1905. - -[87] See "The Origins of the War"; by J. Holland Rose, Litt.D. -Cambridge, 1914. - -[88] In the _New York Sun_ of June 18, 1911, there was published an -article which had for its heading, "If Troops had to be Rushed, the -Railroads in this Country could move 250,000 Men a Day." - -[89] The mileage of lines open, under construction, or authorised, in -the three gauges, is as follows:--5 ft. 3 in. gauge, 4,979 miles; 4 ft. -8½ in. gauge, 6,160 miles; 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, 11,727 miles. - - - - -BIBLIOGRAPHY - - -The following list of books, pamphlets and articles bearing on the -evolution and the development of rail-power down to the outbreak of -the Great War in 1914--this alone being the purpose and the scope of -the present work--was originally based on selections from a "List of -References on the Use of Railroads in War" prepared by the Bureau of -Railway Economics, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., and including items from -all the leading libraries of the United States (Library of Congress; -the libraries of the principal Universities, Colleges and learned -or technical societies; State libraries, public libraries, private -railway-libraries, and the library of the Bureau itself), together with -various foreign libraries, such as those of the Minister of Public Works -in Berlin, the International Railway Congress at Berne, and others -besides. - -Much valuable help has been derived from the American list; but a large -number of its references, and especially those relating to the World-War -itself, have not here been reproduced, while so many additions have -been gathered in from other sources among which might be mentioned the -published catalogue of the War Office Library; the libraries of the -British Museum, the Royal Colonial Institute, and the Patent Office; the -_Journal_ of the Royal United Service Institution, the publications of -the Royal Engineers' Institute, and official or other publications in -Great Britain, France, etc., that the Bibliography here presented may, -perhaps, be regarded as practically a new compilation, supplementing -the excellent purpose which the list of the American Bureau of Railway -Economics will undoubtedly serve. - - -EARLIEST REFERENCES (1833-50). - - HARKORT, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. Die Eisenbahn von Minden nach - Köln. Hagen, 1833. - - [The earliest published work in which the importance and - the possibilities of railways from a military standpoint were - advocated.] - - Ueber die militärische Benutzung der Eisenbahnen. Berlin, - 1836. - - Darlegung der technischen und Verkehrs-Verhältnisse der - Eisenbahnen, nebst darauf gegründeter Erörterung über die - militärische Benutzung derselben. Berlin, 1841. - - "Pz." (CARL EDUARD POENITZ). Die Eisenbahn als militärische - Operationslinien betrachtet und durch Beispiele erläutet. Nebst - Entwurf zu einem militärischen Eisenbahnsystem für Deutschland. - Adorf [Saxony], 1842. - - ---- II. Aufl. Adorf, 1853. - - Essai sur les Chemins de Fer, considérés comme lignes - d'opérations militaires. Traduit de l'allemand par L. A. Unger. - Paris, 1844. - - [A French translation of the above-mentioned work by - Poenitz, with an introduction by the translator and a map of - Germany and Austria showing railways existing in 1842 and the - "system" projected by the German writer.] - - Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel auf den - inländischen und den benachbarten ausländischen Eisenbahnen - für militärische Zwecke; nach den beim grossen Generalstabe - vorhandenen Materialen zusammengestellt. Berlin, 1848-50. - - HOFFMANN, C. Amtlich erlassene Vorschriften über Anlage und - Betrieb der Eisenbahnen in Preussen. Berlin, 1849. - - -WARS AND EXPEDITIONS - - -CRIMEAN WAR (1854-55) - - HAMLEY, GEN. SIR EDWARD. The War in the Crimea. London, 1891. - - LUARD, R.E., CAPT. C. E. Field Railways and their general - application in war. _Journal of the Royal United Service - Institution_, Vol. XVII, 1873. - - [Refers to military railway built for use in the Crimea.] - - -ITALIAN WAR (1859) - - BARTHOLONY, F. Notice sur les Transports par les Chemins - de Fer français vers le théâtre de la guerre d'Italie. 71 pp. - Paris, 1859. - - MILLAR, R.A., MAJOR, Topographical Staff. The Italian - Campaign of 1859. _Journal of the Royal United Service - Institution_, Vol. V, pp. 269-308. London, 1861. - - [Introductory reference to use of railways.] - - -AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861-65) - - Abhandlung über die Thätigkeit der amerikanischen - Feldeisenbahn-Abtheilungen der Nordstaaten; bei den Directionen - der Staatseisenbahnen. Durch das Königl. Ministerium in - Circulation gesetzt. Berlin. - - BACON, E. L. How railroads helped save the Union. - _Railroadman's Magazine_, July, 1909. - - HAUPT, HERMAN. Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, Chief - of the Bureau of United States Military Railroads in the Civil - War. 321 pp. Illustrations. Milwaukee, Wis., 1901. - - HENDERSON, LIEUT.-COL. G. F. R. Stonewall Jackson and the - American Civil War. Second edition. Two vols. London, 1899. - - PORTER, W. E. Keeping the Baltimore and Ohio in Repair in - War Time was a Task for Hercules. _Book of the Royal Blue_, - June, 1907. - - United States Military Railroads. Report of Brev.-Brig.-Gen. - D. C. McCallum, Director and General Manager, from 1861 to 1866. - Executive Documents, 39th Congress, 1st Session. House. Serial - number, 1251. Washington, 1866. - - VIGO-ROUISSILLON, F. P. Puissance Militaire des États-Unis - d'Amérique, d'après la Guerre de la Sécession, 1861-65. IIIe - Partie; chap. viii, Transports généraux. Paris, 1866. - - -AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (1866) - - COOKE, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. A. C. C. Short Sketch of the - Campaign in Austria of 1866. 70 pp. Map. London, 1867. - - WEBBER, R.E., CAPT. Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in - 1886. Papers of the Corps of the Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. - XVI. Woolwich, 1868. - - -ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION (1867-68) - - WILLANS, R.E., LIEUT. The Abyssinian Railway. Papers on - Subjects Connected with the Duties of the Corps of Royal - Engineers. N.S. Vol. XVIII. Woolwich, 1870. - - -FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR (1870-71) - - BUDDE, LIEUT. H. Die Französischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege - 1870-71 und ihre seitherige Entwicklung in militärischer - Hinsicht. Mit zwei Karten und zehn Skizzen im Texte. 99 pp. - Berlin, 1877. - - [Gives maps of the French railway system in 1870 and 1877 - respectively.] - - ---- Die französischen Eisenbahnen im deutschen - Kriegsbetriebe, 1870-71. 487 pp. Berlin, 1904. - - ERNOUF, LE BARON. Histoire des Chemins de Fer français - pendant la Guerre Franco-Prussienne. Paris, 1874. - - JACQMIN, F., Ingénieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussées. Les - Chemins de Fer pendant la Guerre de 1870-71. 351 pp. Paris, 1872. - - ---- 2e edition. 363 pp. 1874. - - MÜLLER-BRESLAU, F. Die Tätigkeit unserer - Feldeisenbahn-Abteilung im Kriege 1870-71. Berlin, 1896. - - Railway Organisation in the late War. _Edinburgh Review_, - January, 1872. - - -RUSSO-TURKISH WAR (1877-78) - - LESSAR, P. De la construction des Chemins de Fer en temps de - guerre. Lignes construites par l'armée russe pendant la campagne - 1877-78. Traduit du russe par L. Avril. 142 pp. 10 Planches. - Paris, 1879. - - SALE, R.E., CAPT. M. T. The Construction of Military - Railways during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. _Journal of - the Royal United Service Institution_, Vol. XXIV. 1880. - - -EGYPT AND THE SUDAN (1882-99) - - History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers. Vol. II. By - Maj.-Gen. Whitworth Porter, R.E. The War in Egypt, 1882-85, pp. - 64-87. London, 1889. - - ---- Vol. III. By Col. Sir Chas. M. Watson. The Sudan - Campaigns, 1885-99, pp. 53-76. Royal Engineers' Institute, - Chatham, 1915. - - Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt. Prepared - in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition. - London, 1908. - - NATHAN, R.E., LIEUT. M. The Sudan Military Railway. - Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. Occasional - Papers, Vol. XI. 1885. - - WALLACE, R.E., MAJ. W. A. J. Railway Operations in Egypt - during August and September, 1882. Professional Papers of the - Corps of Royal Engineers, Chatham. Occasional Papers, Vol. IX. - - -PHILIPPINE WAR (1898) - - COLSON, L. W. Railroading in the Philippine War. _Baltimore - and Ohio Employés' Magazine_, Feb., 1913. - - Soldiers Running a Railroad. _Railroad Telegrapher_, Sept., - 1899. - - [Tells how the 20th Kansas Regiment ran four miles of the - Manila and Dagupan Railroad during the Philippine insurrection.] - - -SOUTH AFRICAN WAR (1899-1902) - - Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War, - 1899-1902. Two vols. Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, 1905. - - Vol. I.--Organisation, Military Control, Working and Repair - of Cape and Natal Government Railways; Management, Engineering - and other Departments of Imperial Military Railways; Railway - Pioneer Regiment; Organisation, Equipment and Use of Armoured - Trains; Army Labour Depôts. - - Vol. II.--61 Photographs and 93 Drawings. - - GIROUARD, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. E. P. C., Director of Railways, - South African Field Force. History of the Railways during the - War in South Africa, 1899-1902. 149 pp. Maps. London, 1903. - - HARRISON, C. W. FRANCIS. Natal: an Illustrated Official - Railway Guide and Handbook. Published by Authority. London, 1903. - - [Gives a statement, on pp. 287-290, as to services rendered - by Natal Government Railways during South African War.] - - History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Compiled by - the Direction of His Majesty's Government. Vol. IV, Appendix 10, - Notes on the Military Railway System in South Africa. London, - 1910. - - Netherlands South African Railway Company and the - Transvaal War. Account by the Secretary, Th. Steinnetz, dated - Pretoria, April, 1900. _De Ingenieur_, July 14 and 21, 1900. - English translation in _Journal of the Royal United Service - Institution_, Jan., 1902. - - _The Times_. History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. - Vol. VI, Part II, chap. iii, The Railway Work in the War, pp. - 297-331. London, 1909. - - WATSON, COL. SIR CHAS. M. History of the Corps of the Royal - Engineers. Vol. III, chap. iv, The South African War, 1899-1902. - Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, 1915. - - Working of Railways: Duties of Staff Officers. Pamphlet. - Published by authority. Pretoria, 1900. - - -RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904-5) - - KUROPATKIN, GENERAL A. N. The Russian Army and the Japanese - War. Translated by Captain A. B. Lindsay. Two vols. Maps, - Illustrations. London, 1909. - - MÉTIN, ALBERT. Le Transsibérien et la Guerre. _Revue - Économique Internationale_, Oct., 1904. - - Official History of the Russo-Japanese War. Prepared by the - Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. London, - 1910. - - "P., A." Construction et Exploitation de Chemins de Fer - à Traction animale sur le Théâtre de la Guerre de 1904-5 en - Mandchourie. _Revue du Génie Militaire_, Avril, Mai, Juin, 1909. - Paris. - - Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers attached - to the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field. Vol. III. - General Report (dated March, 1905) by Col. W. H. H. Waters: - Section XXXVIII, "Railways," pp. 184-9. London, 1908. - - Russo-Japanese War. The Ya-Lu. Prepared in the Historical - Section of the German General Staff. Authorised Translation by - Karl von Donat. Chaps. ii and iii. London, 1908. - - VICKERS, R.E., CAPT. C. E. The Siberian Railway in War. - _Royal Engineers' Journal_, Aug., 1905. Chatham. - - -MEXICAN WAR (1910-13) - - HINE, MAJ. CHARLES. War Time Railroading in Mexico. Paper - read before the St. Louis Railway Club, Oct. 10, 1913. The - Railway Library, 1913. Chicago. - - WEEKS, G. E. How Mexican Rebels Destroy Railways and - Bridges. _Scientific American_, Sept. 13, 1913. - - -COUNTRIES - - -AUSTRALIA - - ELLISON, H. K. Australia's Trans-Continental Railway. - _Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, June, 1912. - - KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT. Memorandum - on the Defence of Australia. Government of the Commonwealth of - Australia, 1910. - - Proceedings of the War Railway Council. (1) First and - Second Meetings, Feb. 14-16, 1911, and May 19, 1911. (2) Fifth - Meeting, Nov. 18 and 19, 1914. Government of the Commonwealth of - Australia. - - -AUSTRIA-HUNGARY - - Geschichte der Eisenbahnen der österreichisch-ungarischen - Monarchie. Unsere Eisenbahnen im Kriege. Eisenbahnbureau des K. - u. K. General-Stabes. Wien, 1898-1908. - - HARE, R.E., CAPT. W. A. Organisation of the Austrian Railway - and Telegraph Corps. _Journal of the Royal United Service - Institution._ Vol. XXIX, pp. 257-79. London, 1885-6. - - JESSEP, R.E., LIEUT. H. L. Railway Works in Connection - with an Army in the Field; forming the Second Division of - the Austrian Guide to Railways. Vienna, 1872 (Translation). - Professional Papers of the Royal Engineers. Chatham. Vol. O.II. - - JOESTEN, JOSEF. Studien über die heutigen Eisenbahnen im - Kriegsfalle. Wien, 1892. - - Leitfaden des Eisenbahnwesens, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf - den Dienst der Feldeisenbahn-Abteilungen. 2 Bände. Wien, 1872. - - NOSINICH, MAJ. Das österreichisch-ungarische Eisenbahn- und - übrige Communications-System. Politisch-militärisch beleuchtet. - 77 pp. Wien, 1871. - - OBAUER, H., UND E. R. VON GUTTENBERG. Das - Train-Communications und Verpflegungswesen, vom operativen - Standpunkte. Wien, 1871. - - PANZ, OBERST V. V. 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Section - VI, Conveyance of War Department Stores. 1--Rail. Appendix III, - Acts of Parliament relating to Transport Services. 1911. - - Field Service Pocket Book. Section 30, Transport by Rail. - General Staff, War Office. 1914. - - Field Service Regulations. Part I, Operations. 1909. - (Reprinted, with amendments, 1914.) Chap. iii, Movements by - Rail, pp. 62-6. Part II, Organisation and Administration. - 1909. (Reprinted, with amendments, 1913.) Chap. viii, Railway - Transport, pp. 91-96. General Staff, War Office. - - Instruction in Military Engineering. Part VI, Military - Railways. War Office, 1898. - - [Embodies a portion of the course of instruction in railways - at the School of Military Engineering, Chatham. Was first issued - with Army Orders, dated March 1, 1889, as a Manual of Military - Railways, 95 pp.] - - Manual of Military Engineering. Chap. xvii: Hasty Demolition - of Railways ... without Explosives. Chap. xxiii: Railways. - (Technical details concerning construction, repairs and - reconstruction.) 144 pp. General Staff, War Office, 1905. - - Manual of Military Law. War Office, 1914. - - [Includes a brief account of the relations of the State to - the railways in regard to the conveyance of troops (see pp. - 184-5), and gives text of various Parliamentary enactments - relating thereto.] - - Notes on Reconnaissance and Survey of Military Railways - for Officers of R.E. Railway Companies. Compiled in the - Quartermaster-General's Department of the War Office. 1910. - - Railway Manual (War). 64 pp. 1911. Reprinted, with - Amendments, 1914. - - Regulations for the Transport of Troops by Railway - Quartermaster-General's Office, Horse Guards, Feb. 28, 1867. - - -HOLLAND - - WIJNPERSSE, KAPT. W. J. M. V. D. De voorbereiding van het - militair gebruik der spoorwegen in oorlogstijd. 76 pp. Plans and - plates. s'Gravenhage, 1905. - - -INDIA - - ANDREW, W. P. Our Scientific Frontier. London, 1880. - - INNES, R.E., GEN. J. J. MCLEOD. Life and Times of Gen. Sir - James Browne, R.E., K.C.B., K.C.S.I. 371 pp. London, 1905. - - [Gives an account of the construction of the Sind-Pishin - Railway, of which Sir J. Browne was Chief Engineer.] - - LYONS, CAPT. GERVAIS. Afghanistan, the Buffer State. Great - Britain and Russia in Central Asia. 232 pp. Maps. Madras and - London, 1910. - - [Gives, in summarised form, much information concerning - British Indian frontier and Russian Central Asian Railways.] - - Military Railways in India. Précis of Report of the Railway - Transport Committee, India, 1876. Professional Papers of the - Corps of Royal Engineers. Occasional Papers, Vol. II. Chatham, - 1878. - - ROSS, C.I.E., DAVID. Military Transport by Indian Railways. - 109 pp. Maps and plates. Lahore, 1883. - - ---- Transport by Rail of Troops, Horses, Guns, and War - Material in India. A lecture. 24 pp. London, 1879. - - SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, R.E., CAPT. G. K. The Frontier Railways - of India. Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. - Occasional Papers, Vol. XI, 1885. Chatham. - - -ITALY - - ALLIX, G. La Mobilisation des Chemins de Fer Italiens. - _Journal des Transports_, 3 Juillet, 1915. Paris. - - AYMONINO, C. Considérations Militaires et Stratégiques - sur les chemins de fer italiens. Traduit de l'Italien par G. - Malifaud. 3e. éd. 68 pp. Paris, 1889. - - Le Ferrovie dello Stato e le grandi manovre del - 1911._Rivista Tecnica della Ferrovie Italiane_, Nov., 1912. - - ZANOTTI, MAG. B. Impiego dei ferrovieri in guerra. 67 pp. - 1902. - - -RUSSIA - - FENDRIKH, COL. A. VON. The Organisation of a Staff for - Military Railway Work and of a Central Management for the - Control of Rolling Stock in War Time. Translated from _The - Russian Military Magazine_, by Capt. J. Wolfe Murray, R.A., - D.A.A.G. _Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, Vol. - XXXII, 1889. - - IGEL, GEN. VON. Russlands Eisenbahnbau an der Westgrenze. - _Deutsche Revue_, Dec., 1902. Stuttgart. - - K., H. Das russische Eisenbahn-Netz zur deutschen Grenze in - seiner Bedeutung für einen Krieg Russlands mit Deutschland. 29 - pp. Map. Hannover, 1885. - - NIENSTÄDT, OBERSTLT. Das russische Eisenbahnnetz zur - deutschen-österreichischen Grenze in seiner Bedeutung für einen - Krieg. 43 pp. Map. Leipzig, 1895. - - Strategical Railways. Translated from the Voïénnyi Sbórnik. - _Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, Oct., 1899. - - - -SPAIN - - TAYLOR, TEN. T. L. Los ferrocarriles en la guerra. 288 pp. - Plates. Barcelona, 1885. - - -SWITZERLAND - - BLASER, HAUPT. E. Die Zerstörungs- und - Wiederherstellungs-Arbeiten von Eisenbahnen. 22 pp. Plates. - Basel, 1871. - - HOFFMANN-MERIAN, T. Die Eisenbahnen zum Truppen-Transport - und für den Krieg im Hinblick auf die Schweiz. 2e. Ausg. Basel, - 1871. - - NOWACKI, KARL. Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege. 160 pp. Zurich, - 1906. - - -UNITED STATES - - Are Railroads Neutralising Sea Power? _American Review of - Reviews_, June, 1913. - - BIGELOW, JOHN, Captain 10th Cavalry, U.S. Army. The - Principles of Strategy, illustrated mainly from American - Campaigns. 2nd edition. Philadelphia, 1894. - - Commerce of the Ohio and Western Rivers. Importance of - Railroads in a Military point of view. _DeBow's Commercial - Review_, June, 1857. - - CONNOR, MAJ. W. D. Military Railways. 192 pp. Illustrations. - Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. - Washington, 1910. - - ---- Operation and Maintenance of the Railroad in a Theatre - of War. _Journal of the Military Service Institute._ New York, - 1905. - - DERR, W. L. The working of railways in Military Operations. - _Engineering Magazine_, Oct., 1898. - - Great Railroad Feats during War and Flood. _Washington, - D.C., Post_, April 25, 1913. - - GRIMSHAW, ROBERT. War Capacity of United States Railways. - _Scientific American_, May 1, 1915. - - HAINES, CHARLES O. Our Railroads and National Defence. _The - North American Review_, Sept., 1915. - - HAUPT, HERMAN. Military Bridges ... including designs for - trestle and truss bridges for military railroads, adapted - specially to the wants of the service in the United States. 310 - pp. 69 plates. New York, 1864. - - Use of Railroads in War. _Journal of the Military Service - Institution._ Vol. XXI. New York, 1897. - - PALMER, CAPT. JOHN MCAULEY. Railroad Building as a Mode of - Warfare. _North American Review_, Dec., 1902. - - Railroads, and not Bullets, will feature the next War. - _Washington, D.C., Star_, Feb. 11, 1912. - - WILSON, W. B. History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. - Two vols. The Railroad in War Times, Vol. I, pp. 411-18. - Philadelphia, 1899. - - -AMBULANCE AND HOSPITAL TRAINS - - FURSE, LIEUT.-COL. G. A. Military Transport. Chap. - vii, Railway Ambulance Trains, pp. 185-99. Diagrams and - illustrations. London, 1882. - - GURLT, DR. E. Ueber den Transport Schwerverwundeter und - Kranker im Kriege, nebst Vorschlägen über die Benutzung der - Eisenbahnen dabei. 33 pp. Berlin, 1860. - - [Contains, so far as can be traced, the earliest - recommendations as to the special fitting up of railway rolling - stock for the transport of the sick and wounded in war.] - - LOEFFLER, DR. F. Das Preussische Militär-Sanitätswesen und - seine Reform nach der Kriegserfahrung von 1866. Two parts. - Berlin, 1869. - - [In the appendix of Part II of this work will be found - an "Anleitung zur Ausführung der Beförderung verwundeter und - kranker Militairs auf Eisenbahnen," issued July 1, 1861.] - - LONGMORE, SURG.-GEN. SIR T. A Manual of Ambulance Transport. - 2nd edition. Edited by Surg.-Capt. W. A. Morris. Chap. vi, Class - V, Railway Ambulance Transport, pp. 347-89. Illustrations. - London, 1893. - - [The 1st edition was published in 1869 under the title of A - Treatise on the Transport of Sick and Wounded Troops.] - - Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion. - Part III, Vol. II, Surgical History. Railway Transportation, pp. - 957-71. Diagrams and illustrations of hospital cars, fittings, - etc. U.S.A. Dept. of War. Surgeon-General's Office. Washington, - 1883. - - [Gives a detailed account of the evolution, in the Civil - War, of the hospital train in vogue to-day. A copy of the work - will be found in the British Museum Library. Pressmark: 7686 i. - 4.] - - MELVILLE, A.M.S., SURG.-CAPT. Continental Regulations for - the Transport of Sick and Wounded by Rail. _Journal of the Royal - United Service Institution._ Vol. XLII, pp. 560-92. London, 1898. - - Military Hospital Trains: Their Origin and Progress. _The - Railway Gazette_, Dec. 4, 1914. London. - - NIEDEN, J. Der Eisenbahn-Transport verwundeter und - erkrankter Krieger. 2 Aufl. 271 pp. Berlin, 1883. - - OTIS, GEORGE A. A Report on a Plan for Transporting Wounded - Soldiers by Railway in Time of War. Surgeon-General's Office, - War Department, Washington, 1875. - - [The material parts of this work are reproduced in the - "Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion."] - - Report by the Central British Red Cross Committee on - Voluntary Organisations in aid of the Sick and Wounded during - the South African War. Part VII, Hospital Trains, pp. 32-5. - London, 1902. - - Report on the Medical Arrangements in the South African War. - By Surg.-Gen. Sir W. D. Wilson, K.C.M.G., late Principal Medical - Officer, South African Field Force. Part IX, Hospital Trains, - pp. 213-9. London, 1904. - - RIDDELL, J. SCOTT. A Manual of Ambulance. Section on Railway - Ambulance Wagons and Ambulance Trains, pp. 168-76. 6th edition. - London, 1913. - - -ARMOURED TRAINS - - ADAMS, W. BRIDGES. English Railway Artillery: A Cheap - Defence against Invasion. _Once a Week_, Aug. 13, 1859. London. - - Armoured Truck ("Union Railroad Battery," Petersburg) used - in the American Civil War, 1861-65. See illustration, _Century - Magazine_, Sept., 1887, p. 774. - - BOXALL, CHARLES GERVAISE, Col. Commanding 1st Sussex - Artillery Volunteers. Armoured Train for Coast Defence in Great - Britain, The. Paper read at a meeting of Officers and N.C.O.'s - of the Brigade at Newhaven Fort, Sussex, May 14, 1894. 11 pp. - - ---- Railway Batteries and Armoured Trains. _Fortnightly - Review_, Aug., 1895. - - CONNOR, MAJ. W. D. Military Railways. Section on Armoured - Trains, pp. 141-50. Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of - Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, 1910. - - Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War, - 1899-1902. Vol. I, Section on Organisation, Equipment and Use of - Armoured Trains. Chatham, 1905. - - Field Service Regulations. Part I, Operations. 1909. - (Reprinted, with amendments, 1914.) Section 40, Defence of - Railways. General Staff, War Office, London. - - FITZGERALD, W. C. The Armoured Train. _The Four-track News_, - March, 1906. New York. - - FORBIN, V. Les trains blindés. _Nature_, Dec. 12, 1914. - Paris. - - FRASER, R.E., LIEUT. T. Armour-plated Railway Wagons used - during the late Sieges of Paris in 1870-71. Papers of the Corps - of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Woolwich, 1872. - - GIROUARD, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. E. P. C. History of the Railways - during the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Section V, The - Organisation and Use of Armoured Trains. London, 1903. - - HOBART, FREDERICK. The first Armoured Train. _Railway Age - Gazette_, Jan. 22, 1915. Chicago, U.S.A. - - LODIAN, L. The Origin of Armoured Railroad Cars - unquestionably the Product of the American Civil War. _Railroad - and Locomotive Engineering_, May, 1915. New York. - - [Reproduces from _Leslie's Weekly_ for May 18, 1864, an - illustration of a "Railroad Battery on the Philadelphia and - Baltimore Railway," showing a "box" car completely covered with - armour plating, with loop-holes at end and side for guns, and - placed on the line in front of the locomotive, itself otherwise - unprotected.] - - Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt. Prepared - in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition. - London, 1908. - - [References to use of armoured train.] - - NANCE, CAPT. H. O. Armoured Trains. Lecture delivered at the - Royal Engineers' Institute. 52 pp. Photographs and drawings. - Professional Papers, fourth series, Vol. I, Paper 4. Chatham, - 1906. - - [The subject is dealt with in three sections: (1) Uses of - Armoured Trains; (2) Construction, equipment and garrison; (3) - Organisation and administration.] - - Railway Manual (War). Chapter VI, Section 15, Armoured - Trains. London, 1911. - - WALKER, LIEUT. ARTHUR. Coast Railways and Railway Artillery. - _Journal of the Royal United Service Institution_, Vol. IX, pp. - 221-23. Plates. London, 1866. - - - - -INDEX - - - ABYSSINIAN CAMPAIGN: - Construction and working of military railway, 210-14. - - ADAMS, WILLIAM BRIDGES: 67-9. - - ADVANTAGES FROM USE OF RAILWAYS: 345-50. - - AFRICA, GERMAN DESIGNS ON: - Proposals of von Weber, 297; - German South-West Africa, 298-300; - the Herero rising, 300-1; - railways, 304-10; - military preparations, 307, 310-12; - rail connection with Angola, 312-14; - German East Africa Central Railway, 314-7; - Katanga district, 316; - Central Africa, 318; - rival railway schemes, 319-20; - railway schemes in the Cameroons, 320-5; - official admissions, 325-6; - "der Tag" and its programme, 326-30. - - AGADIR CRISIS, THE: 324. - - AGGRESSION, USE OF RAILWAYS FOR: 355-6. - - ALEXANDER THE GREAT: 63. - - ALEXANDRETTA, GERMANY AND: 334, 343. - - ALEXEIEV, ADMIRAL: 275. - - AMBULANCE TRAINS: _see_ RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. - - AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: - What it established, 13; - railway lines, 15; - Federal Government and railways, 16; - mileage taken over, 18; - gauge of lines, 18; - condition of lines, 19; - Transportation Department, 20-1; - locomotives, 21-2; - rolling mills, 23; - movement of troops, 23-5; - destruction of railways, 27-8; - Construction Corps, 29-37; - control of railways, 43-50; - protection of, 54-5; - armoured cars, 72-4; - removal of sick and wounded, 86-91; - American precedents followed in Europe, 104, 122, 153, 177; - "surface railroads," 210; - the Civil War and the South African campaign, 258 (_n._). - - ANATOLIA: 331, 335. - - ANATOLIAN RAILWAY, THE: 334. - - ANGOLA: 299, 312-4, 320. - - ARMOURED TRAINS: - Protection of railway lines, 59; - first suggested, 67-9; - proposals of Lieut. A. Walker, 69-70; - of Col. Wethered, 70-71; - of Lieut. E. P. C. Girouard, 71-2; - Civil War, 72-4; - Franco-Prussian War, 75; - Egyptian Campaign, 75-6, 224; - Delhi, 76; - experiments in France, 77; - at Newhaven, Sussex, 77-9; - South African War, 79, 248-52. - - ASIA MINOR: - Germany's "share" in the Turkish spoils, 332; - Germany's colonisation field, 332-3; - proposed German protectorate, 333. - - ASPINALL, MR. J. A. F.: 197. - - ATLANTIC AND NORTH CAROLINA RAILROAD: 36, 73. - - AUSTRALIA AND THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY: 342, 344. - - AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: - Early troop movements by rail, 8-9; - scheme for strategical railways, 9; - Italian campaign of 1859, 11-12; - Railway Troops, 123; - German rail communications, 287. - - AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN CAMPAIGN: - Protection of railways, 55, 59; - removal of sick and wounded, 91-2; - Prussian mobilisation, 104; - defective transport arrangements, 104-5; - destruction and restoration of railway lines, 124-6. - - - BABYLONIA, GERMANY AND: 332. - - BAGHDAD RAILWAY, THE: - Concession, 334; - branches, 334-5; - Germany's aims, 336; - the conquest of Egypt, 338-40; - the Persian Gulf, 341; - India, 342; - Capt. Mahan's views, 342; - the desired extension to Koweit, 343; - what the railway was to accomplish, 344. - - BALCK: 110. - - BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD: 29. - - BASSON, WILHELM: 127. - - BECKER, LIEUT.: 169-70. - - BELGIUM: - Early Railways in, 4-5; - German strategical lines on Belgian frontier, 288-294; - German designs, 323-4, 325-6, 327, 329. - - BÉRIGNY, M. DE: 7. - - BEYENS, BARON: 325. - - BIGELOW, CAPT. J.: 56, 348 (_n._). - - BILLINGTON, MR. R. J.: 78. - - BISMARCK, PRINCE: 136, 338. - - BLOCKHOUSES FOR PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS: 54, 58, 245. - - BOULGER, MR. D. C.: 288, 294. - - BOXALL, COL. C. G.: 78. - - BRITISH CENTRAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE: 95, 254. - - BRITISH EAST AFRICA: 317, 327. - - BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA: - German designs on, 301, 302, 303, 308, 312, 327. - - BRYDEN, MR. H. A.: 300 (_n._). - - BUDDE, H.: 51. - - BULLER, SIR REDVERS: 254. - - BURGOYNE, SIR JOHN: 178, 209. - - BUTTERWORTH, SIR A. K.: 197. - - - CALEDONIAN RLY.: 197. - - CALTHROP, MR. GUY: 197. - - CAMEROONS, THE: 320-5. - - CAMPENAU, GEN.: 137. - - CANALS AND TROOPS: 1. - - CAPE GOVERNMENT RAILWAYS: 237, 240, 246, 253. - - CAPE-TO-CAIRO RAILWAY: 320. - - CENTRAL AFRICA: 318-20. - - CHÉRADAME, M. ANDRÉ: 338. - - CHRISTIAN, PRINCESS: 254. - - CLARKE, SIR ANDREW: 224. - - COAST DEFENCE: 67, 179. - - COMMERCE DEFENCE LEAGUE, THE GERMAN: 303 (_n._). - - CONGO, THE BELGIAN: 315-320, 322-6. - - CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EFFICIENCY: 350-2. - - CONNOR, MAJ. W. D.: 58, 80, 258 (_n._). - - CONSTRUCTION CORPS: - U.S.A., 20, 21, 23, 29-37; - Prussia, 122-3, 124-8, 132-6, 215-6, 219; - Austria, 123-4; - Bavaria, 127-133; - France, 128, 152-4; - England, 198-202; - South African War, 242-5; - Russo-Japanese War, 273-4. - - CONSTRUCTION OF RAILWAYS: - Military requirements, 350-1. - - CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR: - Conditions of operation, 40-3; - American Civil War, 43-50; - views of Baron M. M. von Weber, 50-2; - need for intermediaries, 52; - organisation in peace, 99; - Austro-Prussian War, 104-5; - German system in 1870-71, 106-115; - new regulations, 115-7; - present system, 118-121; - inefficient military control in France in 1870-71, 139-147; - creation of new organisation, 149-170; - State control in England, 176-7; - draft scheme for State operation, 185-7; - Railway Transport Officers, 189-191; - South African War, 233-7, 238-9, 249-52; - Russo-Japanese War, 274-5; - general, 351. - - COWANS, LIEUT.-GEN. SIR J. S.: 204. - - CRIMEAN WAR: - Deaths from sickness and disease, 81; - removal of sick and wounded by railway, 83; - transport conditions, 207-8; - construction of military railway, 208; - operation, 208-10; - recalled by Russo-Japanese War, 260. - - CROMER, LORD: 229. - - - DANISH WAR (1864): 91, 104. - - DELAGOA BAY: 304-5, 327. - - DELBRÜCK, PROF. HANS: 330. - - DENT, MR. C. H.: 197. - - DENT, MR. F. H.: 197. - - DESTRUCTION OF RAILWAYS: - Vulnerability, 26-7; - early instances, 27; - American Civil War, 27-37; - Mexican War, 37-9; - Austro-Prussian War, 124, 125-6; - Franco-German War, 128-30; - South African War, 241-5, 256-8; - Russo-Japanese War, 274. - - DISADVANTAGES OF RAILWAYS: 355-6. - - DUFAURE, M.: 7. - - DUMANT, JEAN HENRI: 84. - - - EAST PRUSSIA, STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS IN: 283. - - EGYPT: - German anticipations of rebellion, 326; - aims against Egypt, 338-9; - conquest to be facilitated by railways, 340. - - EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS: - Armoured cars, 75-6; - Railway Companies, Royal Engineers, 199. - - EIFEL DISTRICT: - German strategical railways, 289-292. - - ELSENBORN, GERMAN CAMP AT: 288-9. - - ENGINEER AND RAILWAY STAFF CORPS: - Formation, 179-182; - constitution, 181-2; - functions and work done, 182-7, 192; - supplemented by War Railway Council, 187. - - ENGLAND, ORGANISATION IN: - Early regulation for troop movements, 2; - legislative enactments, 175-7; - invasion prospects and formation of Volunteer Corps, 178; - Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, 179-187; - attitude of War Office, 180; - War Office and defence scheme, 185-7; - War Railway Council, 187-9; - Railway Transport Officers, 189-191; - Railways Executive Committee, 195-7; - Railway Companies, Royal Engineers, 200-2. - - ERNOUF, BARON: 141. - - EVANS, DR. T. W.: 91. - - - FAY, SIR SAM: 197. - - FIELDHOUSE, MR. W. J.: 95. - - FINDLAY, SIR GEORGE: 184-7, 195, 196, 202. - - FORBES, SIR WILLIAM: 182, 197. - - FORMANOIR, CAPTAIN A. DE: 124 (_n._). - - FORTRESSES FOR PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS: 59. - - FRANCE: - Early references in French Chamber, 6-7; - complaints in 1842 of German aggressive lines, 7; - early railways, 7; - railways and the Italian campaign of 1859, 9-11; - early regulations, 138; - Marshal Niel's Commission, 138-9; - experiences in Franco-German War, 139-148; - German railway lines on French frontiers, 287-8; - Germany's alternative routes, via Luxemburg, 288; - via Belgium, 288-93; - French possessions in Africa to be seized by Germany, 326; - to be demanded as "ransom," 329. - - FRANCE, ORGANISATION IN: - Early regulations, 138; - action taken after the Franco-German War, 149-50; - Superior Military Commission, 150, 151-2; - Field Railway Sections, 153-4; - Railway Troops, 154-6; - existing organisation, 157-168; - tests, 169; - views of German authority, 169; - defensive railways, 170-4. - - FRANCO-GERMAN WAR: FRANCE: - Armoured wagons, 75; - rail-transport regulations, 138; - the Niel Commission, 138-9; - despatches by rail, 139-40; - absence of military organisation, 140; - confusion and chaos, 140-2; - conflicting orders, 142; - local authorities, 143; - unloading, 143-4; - congestion at stations, 145-7; - seizure of rolling stock by enemy, 147. - - FRANCO-GERMAN WAR: GERMANY: - Safeguarding of railway lines, 56-8; - removal of sick and wounded, 94-5; - rail transport conditions, 106-115; - Railway Troops, 127-8; - destruction of lines, etc., 128-30; - operation of French lines by Germans, 130-1; - construction of military lines, 215-6. - - FRANC-TIREURS AND RAILWAYS: 57, 129-30. - - FRASER, R. E., LIEUT.: 129. - - FREDERICKSBURG RAILROAD: 29. - - FRENCH TRANS-AFRICAN RAILWAY SCHEME: 322. - - FRERE, SIR BARTLE: 297. - - FRIRON, GEN.: 64. - - FURLEY, SIR JOHN: 95, 96, 254. - - - GAMBON, M.: 325. - - GAUGE, RAILWAY: - Various countries, 60; - Russian policy in respect to, 61; - experiences in Russo-Turkish War, 61, 217; - Germany and Russian lines, 284-6. - - GERMAN EAST AFRICA: 314-5, 316-7. - - GERMAN EMPEROR, THE: - African railways, 321; - visit to Constantinople, 334; - to Damascus, 337. - - GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: 298-312. - - GERMANY AND EGYPT: 338-40. - - GERMANY: - Early proposals for strategical railways, 2-3; - early railways constructed, 5; - possible attacks on two fronts, 5; - "aggressive" lines, 7; - early troop transports, 8; - control of railways in war, 50-52; - railway ambulance transport, 84-6, 91-3, 94; - _see_ also GERMANY, ORGANISATION IN. - - GERMANY, ORGANISATION IN: - Influence of American Civil War, 104, 122; - Railway Section of General Staff formed, 104; - Danish War (1864), 104; - Austro-Prussian War, 104-6; - Route Service Regulation, 106-9; - Franco-Prussian War, 110-15; - further Regulations, 115-6; - Field Service Regulations, 117; - present basis of organisation, 118-121; - Railway Troops, 122-37. - - GIROUARD, SIR E. PERCY C.: 71, 225, 228, 233-7, 238-9, 240-1, - 248-9, 252, 257, 258 (_n._). - - GOLTZ, VON DER: 135, 139, 282, 346 (_n._), 352. - - GORDON, GEN.: 221, 222. - - GRAHAM, GEN. SIR G.: 223, 224 (_n._). - - GRANET, SIR GUY: 197. - - GRANT, CAPT. M. H.: 251. - - GRANT, GEN.: 22. - - GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY, 197. - - GREAT EASTERN RLY.: 194, 204. - - GREAT NORTHERN RLY.: 194, 197, 204. - - GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY: 192, 195 (_n._), 197. - - GREY, EARL DE: 180. - - GRUND SYSTEM OF RAILWAY FITTINGS: 94. - - GURLT, DR. E.: 81, 84, 85. - - GYULIA, COUNT: 12. - - - HALLECK, GEN.: 23-4. - - HAMLEY, GEN. SIR E.: 207, 349 (_n._). - - HARKORT, F. W.: 2-3. - - HARRISON, MR. C. W. F.: 247. - - HAUPT, HERMAN: - Pioneer of Construction Corps, U.S.A., 29-30; - rebuilding of bridges, 31-2; - control questions, 43-9; - armoured car, 72. - - HEDJAZ RAILWAY: 335. - - HERBERT, MR. SIDNEY: 180. - - HERFF, HERR VON: 305. - - HEYER, MR. A. E.: 305. - - HINE, MAJ. CHARLES: 37. - - HOBART, MR. F.: 73. - - HOLLAND: - German strategical lines on Dutch frontier, 293-4. - - HOME, R.E., LIEUT.-COL. R.: 63. - - HOOD, GEN.: 35. - - HOSPITAL TRAINS; _see_ RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. - - - INDIA: - German anticipations of rebellion, 326; - the Baghdad railway and India, 342, 344. - - INVASION OF ENGLAND: - Fears of, 67, 177-8, 182. - - ITALIAN CAMPAIGN (1859): - Conveyance of troops by rail, 9-13; - destruction of railway lines, 27; - removal of sick and wounded by rail, 84. - - - JACQMIN, M.: 143, 148, 235. - - JAGOW, HERR VON: 325-6. - - JOESTEN, DR. JOSEF: 281, 283. - - - KAERGER, DR. KARL: 332-3. - - KATANGA DISTRICT (Central Africa): 316-20. - - KELTON, J. C.: 50. - - KITCHENER, LORD: 58, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 239. - - KUROPATKIN, GEN.: 263, 269-70, 271, 275, 355 (_n._). - - - LAMARQUE, GEN.: 6. - - LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RLY.: 197. - - LAND TRANSPORT CORPS (Crimea): 181 (_n._), 208, 209. - - LANGHAMS, PAUL: 338. - - LANOIR, M. PAUL: 136-7. - - LATTMANN, HERR: 306. - - LEDEBOUR, HERR: 302. - - LEOPOLD, KING: 318, 325. - - LIMITATIONS IN USEFULNESS OF RAILWAYS: 352-5. - - LIVERPOOL AND MANCHESTER RLY.: 1, 8. - - LOBITO BAY RLY.: 314, 319-20. - - LODIAN, MR. L.: 73. - - LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RLY.: 194, 197. - - LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN RLY.: 192, 193, 197, 199, 201. - - LONDON, BRIGHTON AND SOUTH COAST RLY.: 77-8, 197. - - LONDON, CHATHAM AND DOVER RLY.: 199. - - LONDON, DEFENCE OF: 71. - - LORME, M. DUPUY DE: 75. - - LUARD, R. E., CAPT. C. E.: 209. - - LÜDERITZ, ADOLF: 298. - - LUXEMBURG RAILWAYS: 288, 289, 292. - - - MCCALLUM, D. G.: - Appointed Military Director, etc., U. S. railroads, 17-18; - views on situation, 19; - creation of Transportation Department and Construction Corps, - 20, 32-37; - movement of troops, 23-4; - question of control, 50; - German translation of report, 127. - - MCDOWELL, GEN.: 30, 54. - - MCMURDO, GEN. SIR W. M.: 180, 181, 182-3. - - MAHAN, CAPT. A. T.: 342, 344. - - MANASSAS GAP RAILWAY: 55. - - MANBY, F.R.S., MR. C.: 180. - - MANGELSDORF, PROF. R.: 340. - - MAQUAY, R. E., COL. J. P.: 214. - - MARSCHALL, M., 7. - - MASSÉNA, MARSHAL: 64. - - MATHESON, MR. D. A.: 197. - - MEADE, MAJ.-GEN. G. G.: 54. - - MEIGS, GEN.: 48. - - MEXICO, RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN: 37-9. - - MIDLAND RAILWAY: 197. - - MILITARY OPERATION OF RAILWAYS: - Civil War, 20-1; - Franco-German War, 130-1; - British organisation, 175; - South African War, 239-41; - Russo-Japanese War, 374. - - MILITARY RAILWAYS: - Description of, 205-6; - pioneer military line in Crimean War, 206-10; - American Civil War, 210; - Abyssinian Campaign, 210-14; - Franco-German War, 215-6; - Russo-Turkish War, 216-20; - the Sudan, 220-231; - Russo-Japanese War, 272-3; - general, 349. - - MILLAR, R. A., MAJ.: 9. - - MOLTKE, VON: 8, 106, 109, 278, 346 (_n._). - - MORACHE, DR.: 81. - - MUNI (Spanish): 324. - - - NANCE, CAPT. H. O.: 80. - - NANTON, R. E., CAPT. H. C.: 250. - - NAPIER OF MAGDALA, LORD: 210. - - NAPIER, SIR CHARLES: 178. - - NAPOLEON: 62, 63, 64. - - NASHVILLE AND CHATTANOOGA RLY.: 33, 34. - - NATAL GOVERNMENT RAILWAYS: 237, 246-8, 253. - - NATAL RAILWAY PIONEER STAFF: 247. - - NATHAN, R. E., LIEUT. M.: 223. - - NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT, 1888: 177, 195. - - NETHERLANDS SOUTH AFRICAN RLY.: 240, 254-8. - - NIEL, MARSHAL: 138, 139. - - NORTON, Mr. ROY: 286. - - NORTH EASTERN RLY.: 197. - - NORTH MISSOURI RAILROAD: 29. - - - O'CONNOR, MR. J. K.: 310-12, 326-7. - - ORANGE AND ALEXANDRIA RAILROAD: 46, 55, 88. - - OSMAN PASHA: 218. - - - PANZ, OBERST. VON: 123. - - PEEL, GEN.: 176. - - PERNOT, CAPT. A.: 172, 174. - - PHILADELPHIA-BALTIMORE RAILROAD: 73. - - PHILADELPHIA RAILROAD: 87. - - POMERANIA, STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS IN: 283. - - PÖNITZ, C. E.: 4-6, 280. - - POPE, GEN.: 43. - - PORTER, MAJ.-GEN. WHITWORTH: 209, 224. - - POTTER, MR. F.: 197. - - POWELL, MAJ.: 209. - - PREPARATIONS IN PEACE: Need for, 98-102; 106, 123, 138, 149, - 178-180, 184, 351-2. - - PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR: - American Civil War, 54-5; - blockhouses, 54, 58; - placing of civilians on engines or trains, 55, 57-8; - Austro-Prussian War, 55-6; - Franco-Prussian War, 56-8; - South African War, 58; - permanent fortresses, 59; - use of armoured trains, 59; - removal of rolling stock, 59; - destruction of, 60; - different gauge, 60-1; - terrorising of civil population, 356. - - PRUSSIAN RAILWAY TROOPS: - Formation of Field Railway Section, 122; - operations in Austro-Prussian campaign, 123, 124-6; - permanent cadre, 127; - Franco-Prussian War, 127-8, 130-1; - Railway Battalion, 132-4; - Railway Regiment, 134; - Communication Troops, 134; - need for Railway Troops, 135-6; - railwaymen as spies, 136-7; - construction of military lines, 215-6. - - - RADEK, HERR KARL: 339-40. - - RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT: - Deaths from disease and sickness, 81; - importance of prompt removal of sick and wounded, 82-3; - Crimean War, 83; - Italian War, 84; - recommendations by Dr. Gurlt, 84-5; - first Prussian Commission, 85; - American Civil War, 86-91; - Danish War, 91; - Austro-Prussian War, 91-2; - second Prussian Commission, 92-3; - Paris International Exhibition (1867), 93; - third Prussian Commission, 94; - Franco-Prussian War, 94-5; - South African War, 95-6, 253-4; - methods now in vogue, 96-7. - - RAILWAY COMPANIES, ROYAL ENGINEERS: - Formation, 199; - services in Egypt, 199; - duties, 200; - training, 200-2; - services in the Sudan, 221-9; - South African War, 233, 240, 242, 243, 251. - - RAILWAY PIONEER REGIMENT: 242, 243. - - RAILWAYS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: 195-6. - - RAILWAY TRANSPORT OFFICERS: 189-191, 193-4. - - RAILWAY WAGONS, UNLOADING OF: - American Civil War, 46, 47-8; - Austro-Prussian War, 105; - Franco-German War, 111-2, 144, 145; - South African War, 234, 238, 239. - - REGULATION OF THE FORCES ACT, 1871: 176, 177, 195, 196, 197. - - RENÉ, CARL: 321-2. - - REPRISALS, PRUSSIA AND: 55-6. - - RHODESIA: 320, 322, 327. - - ROBERTS, LORD: 58, 245. - - ROBERTUS, J. K.: 332. - - ROHRBACH, DR. PAUL: 338-9, 340. - - ROON, VON: 85. - - ROSCHER, WILHELM: 332. - - ROSS, PROF. LUDWIG: 338. - - ROTHWELL, R. A., COL. J. S.: 184. - - RUMIGNY, GEN.: 3 - - RUSSIA: - Early troop movements by rail, 8; - policy in respect to railway gauge, 61, 135-6, 217; - military lines built in campaign against Turkey, 216-220; - German strategical lines on Russian frontier, 284-7. - _See_ also RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. - - RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: - Distances from theatre of war, 260; - the Trans-Siberian Railway, 261, 262-3; - Chinese Eastern Railway, 261, 262; - unreadiness of Russia, 263; - Lake Baikal, 263, 264-7; - ice railway across the lake, 266-7; - circum-Baikal line, 267; - traffic hindrances, 268; - number of trains, 268; - speed, 268; - Russian reinforcements in driblets, 269; - rail improvements, 270-1; - dependence on railway, 271; - results accomplished, 271-2; - field railways, 272-3; - Railway Troops, 273-4; - operation, 274; - control, 274-6, 355 (_n._). - - RUSSO-TURKISH WAR: - Railway gauge, 61; - construction of military railways, 216-20. - - - SAÏD PASHA: 221. - - SAMASSA, DR. PAUL: 301-2. - - SAROLEA, DR. CHARLES: 337. - - SCHÄFFER, E.: 113 (_n._). - - SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN: - German strategical lines, 294. - - SCHOFIELD, GEN.: 24. - - SCOTT, MAJ.-GEN. D. A.: 181. - - SHERMAN, GEN. W. T.: 19, 34-6, 54, 65. - - SICK AND WOUNDED IN WAR: - Evacuation hospitals, 167; - infirmary stations, 167; - distribution stations, 167; - general, 349-50. - _See_ also, RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. - - SOUTH AFRICAN WAR: - Removal of locomotives and rolling stock, 59-60; - hospital trains, 95-6, 253-4; - transport of troops for embarkation, 193; - South African railways, 232-3; - creation of Department of Military Railways, 233; - control questions, 233-5; - basis of organisation, 235-7; - transport conditions, 237-8; - how the system worked, 238-9; - Imperial Military Railways, 239-40; - need for operating staff organised in time of peace, 240-1; - destruction and repair of lines, etc., 241-5; - Railway Pioneer Regiment, 242; - blockhouses, 245; - military traffic, 245-6; - miscellaneous services, 246-8; - armoured trains, 248-52; - operation of Netherlands South African Railway by Boers, 254-9; - the war and rail-power, 258-9. - - SOUTH CAROLINA RAILROAD: 36. - - SOUTH EASTERN AND CHATHAM RLY.: 197. - - SOUTH EASTERN RLY.: 199. - - SPRENGER, DR. A.: 332. - - STANTON, MR.: 23, 29. - - STAVELOT-MALMÉDY LINE: 288-292. - - STEINNETZ, MR. T.: 255-8. - - STRATEGICAL MOVEMENTS BY RAIL: 12, 25, 245-6, 346. - - STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: - Early proposals in Germany, 2, 5-6, 7; - France, 7; - Austria, 9; - defensive lines in France, 170-4; - position in Great Britain, 202; - connecting links, 203; - attitude of Parliament, 203; - Northern Junction line, 203-4; - nature of strategical railways, 277-80; - ideal conditions, 279-81; - position in Germany, 281-4; - Pomerania and East Prussia, 283-4; - Russian frontier, 284-7; - southern Silesia, 287; - French frontier, 287-8; - Belgian frontier, 288-93; - Dutch frontier, 293-4; - Schleswig-Holstein, 294; - German South-West Africa, 304-9; - Angola, 312-4; - German East Africa, 314-5; - Cameroons, 320-4; - Baghdad Railway, 334-344. - - STUART-STEPHENS, MAJ.: 290 (_n._). - - STURGIS, GEN.: 44. - - SUAKIN-BERBER LINE: 199, 223-5. - - SUPPLIES FOR TROOPS: - War of Secession, 15-16, 46; - "living on the country," 63, 64, 65; - conditions in pre-railway days, 63-4; - discipline, 64; - road transport, 65; - advantages of rail transport, 65-6; - defective organisation, Austro-Prussian War, 105; - new system for Germany, 107; - Franco-German War, 110-113, 143-6; - present French system, 164-6; - general, 347-8. - - SURFACE RAILROADS IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: 210. - - SUDAN, THE: - Early railway schemes, 221; - Wady Halfa-Sarras line, 221; - extension for expedition of 1884, 221-2; - abandonment, 222; - results attained, 223; - Suakin-Berber line, 223-5; - Nile Valley line, reconstructed and extended, 225-6; - Nubian Desert line, 226-7; - extension to Atbara, 228; - Khartoum, 229; - El Obeid, 229; - military results, 228; - services to civilisation, 230-1; - Germany and the Sudan, 321-2. - - SUVÓROFF: 62. - - SZLUMPER, MR. G. S.: 197. - - - TACTICAL MOVEMENTS BY RAIL: 346. - - THIERS, M.: 64. - - THORNHILL, MR. J. B.: 316. - - THOMAS, GEN. G. H.: 89. - - TOVEY, R. E., LIEUT.-COL.: 354 (_n._). - - TOWN, DR. F. L.: 90. - - TRANS-SIBERIAN RLY. _See_ RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. - - TRANSVAAL, GERMANY AND THE: 304, 305, 311, 327. - - TROOP MOVEMENTS BY RAIL: - Early, 8; - Italian campaign of 1859, 9-12; - Civil War, 23-5; - quicker transport, 62; - more complete numbers, 62-3; - Danish War of 1864, 104; - Austro-Prussian War, 104; - Franco-Prussian War, 110, 139-140; - Volunteer reviews and army manoeuvres, 192, 194; - South African War, 193, 245-6; - Russo-Japanese War, 269, 271; - general, 345-6, 352-4. - - TURKEY, ASIATIC: Germany's Land of Promise, 331. - - TURKEY: Germany's designs against, 331, 336-40. - - - UNGER, L. A.: 6. - - - VICKERS, R.E., CAPT. C. E.: 274. - - VIGO-ROUISSILLON, M.: 36. - - VOLUNTEER CORPS IN GREAT BRITAIN: 67, 178-9, 182, 191-2. - - - WALKER, LIEUT. ARTHUR: 69. - - WALKER, SIR HERBERT A.: 197. - - WALTER, MAJ. J.: 191-2. - - WAR RAILWAY COUNCIL, THE: 187-9, 193, 196. - - WATERS, COL. W. H. H.: 274, 275. - - WATSON, COL. SIR CHARLES: 228. - - WATSON, MR. P. H.: 72. - - WEBBER, R.E., CAPT. C. E.: 55, 125, 126. - - WEBER, BARON, M. M. VON: 50-2. - - WEBER, ERNST VON: 297, 330. - - WEEKS, G. E.: 37-8. - - WELLINGTON, DUKE OF: 65, 177. - - WELTPOLITIK: 331, 342, 344, 356. - - WERNEKKE, REGIERUNGSRAT: 8. - - WESTERN AND ATLANTIC RLY.: 34. - - WESTPHALEN, H. L.: 124. - - WETHERED, COL. E. R.: 70. - - WHEELER, GEN.: 34. - - WILLANS, R.E., LIEUT.: 211, 213. - - WILSON, PRESIDENT: 330. - - WOLSELEY, LORD: 199, 222, 223. - - WRIGHT, C.E., Mr. T.: 70. - - - ZAVODOVSKI SYSTEM OF RAILWAY FITTINGS: 94. - - ZIMMERMANN, EMIL: 322-5. - - -P. S. KING & SON, LTD., Orchard House, Westminster, London, S.W. - - - - -_WORKS BY EDWIN A. PRATT._ - -A HISTORY OF INLAND TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION IN ENGLAND. - -CONTENTS. - - CHAP. - - I INTRODUCTORY - II BRITAIN'S EARLIEST ROADS - III ROADS AND THE CHURCH - IV EARLY TRADING CONDITIONS - V EARLY ROAD LEGISLATION - VI EARLY CARRIAGES - VII LOADS, WHEELS AND ROADS - VIII THE COACHING ERA - IX THE AGE OF BAD ROADS - X THE TURNPIKE SYSTEM - XI TRADE AND TRANSPORT IN THE TURNPIKE ERA - XII SCIENTIFIC ROAD-MAKING - XIII RIVERS AND RIVER TRANSPORT - XIV RIVER IMPROVEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION - XV DISADVANTAGES OF RIVER NAVIGATION - XVI THE CANAL ERA - XVII THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION - XVIII EVOLUTION OF THE RAILWAY - XIX THE RAILWAY ERA - XX RAILWAY EXPANSION - XXI RAILWAYS AND THE STATE - XXII DECLINE OF CANALS - XXIII DECLINE OF TURNPIKES - XXIV END OF THE COACHING ERA - XXV RAILWAY RATES AND CHARGES - XXVI THE RAILWAY SYSTEM TO-DAY - XXVII WHAT THE RAILWAYS HAVE DONE - XXVIII RAILWAYS A NATIONAL INDUSTRY - XXIX TRAMWAYS, MOTOR-BUSES AND RAIL-LESS ELECTRIC TRACTION - XXX CYCLES, MOTOR-VEHICLES AND TUBES - XXXI THE OUTLOOK - AUTHORITIES - INDEX - -xii. + 532 pp. 6_s._ net. 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KING & SON, Ltd., Orchard House, Westminster, -London, S.W._ - - - - -Transcriber's Notes - -Obvious errors of punctuation and diacritics repaired. - -Note: "Liége" was the correct spelling at that time for what is now -written "Liège". - -Hyphen removed: "break-down" (p. 108), "earth-work" (p. 219), -"inter-communication" (p. 173), "plate-laying" (pp. 221, 222), -"rail-head" (pp. 66, 97, 108), "re-built" (p. 266), "re-organisation" -(p. 264), "South-African" (p. 402), "station-master" (p. 145), -"store-houses" (pp. 144, 164), "text-books" (p. 133), "turn-tables" (p. -124), "wide-spread" (pp. 15, 82). - -The following variants appear frequently and have not been changed: -block-house / blockhouse, head-quarter(s) / headquarter(s), -sub-division(s) / subdivision(s). - -P. 5: "Leipsig" changed to "Leibzig" (Leipzig-Dresden line). - -P. 15: "seceeded" changed to "seceded" (the States which had seceded). - -P. 17: "Ctiy" changed to "City" (Washington City, D.C.). - -P. 31: "Goose Greek" changed to "Goose Creek". - -P. 105: "(3)" changed to "(4)" ((4) secure the prompt unloading). - -P. 185: "Mazagine" changed to "Magazine" (United Service Magazine). - -P. 195: "Raliway" changed to "Railway" (Great Western Railway Magazine). - -P. 218: "dependance" changed to "dependence" (to dependence on the -railway). - -P. 246: "in." added (4·7 in. guns). - -P. 273: "de" changed to "des" (des chemins de fer). - -P. 273: "Juni" changed to "Juin". - -P. 284: "½" added (4 feet 8½ inches). - -P. 290: "moblisation" changed to "mobilisation" (on mobilisation, or -elsewhere). - -P. 290: "pursuading" changed to "persuading" (persuading the Belgian -Government). - -P. 296: "promotor" changed to "promotors" (the aims of their promoters). - -P. 303: "enlightment" changed to "enlightenment" (not so blind as to -need enlightenment). - -P. 306: "between" changed to "between" (communication between Swakopmund -and the capital). - -P. 315: "Renseignments" changed to "Renseignements" (Renseignements -coloniaux). - -P. 321: "Expediton" changed to "Expedition" -(Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Expedition). - -P. 328: "possesssion" changed to "possession" (into a German possession). - -P. 350: "tranverse" changed to "transverse" (transverse lines connecting -them). - -P. 355: "diciplined" changed to "disciplined" (old and well-disciplined -units). - -P. 355, footnote 82: added "no" (no harm was done). - -P. 373: Railway gauges changed to be consistently 3 ft. 6 in., 5 ft. 3 -in., 4 ft. 8-1/2 in. - -P. 377: "Eröterung" changed to "Erörterung" (gegründeter Erörterung über -die militärische Benutzung). - -P. 377: "militärischen" changed to "militärische" (Eisenbahnen für -militärische Zwecke). - -P. 378: "militärische" changed to "militärischer" (in militärische -Hinsicht). - -P. 387: "Heidelburg" changed to "Heidelberg". - -P. 388: "Fielddienst" changed to "Felddienst" (Felddienst Ordnung). - -P. 389: "Lehrer" changed to "Lehre" (Kurze Lehre ihrer wichtigsten -Grundsätze). - -P. 393: "Revista Technica" changed to "Rivista Tecnica". - -P. 401: Index entry for "Germany, Organisation in, present basis of -organisation" changed from 188-121 to 118-121. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Rise of Rail-Power in War and -Conquest, 1833-1914, by Edwin A. 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