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diff --git a/43719-0.txt b/43719-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8645a9c --- /dev/null +++ b/43719-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12943 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 43719 *** + + LIFE'S BASIS AND LIFE'S IDEAL + + + + + BY THE SAME AUTHOR + + THE MEANING AND VALUE OF LIFE + + Translated by W. R. BOYCE GIBSON + Crown 8vo, cloth, price 3s. 6d. net. + + * * * * * + + And by W. R. BOYCE GIBSON + + RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE + + Second Edition, crown 8vo, cloth, price 3s. 6d. net. + + * * * * * + + A. AND C. BLACK, 4 SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W. + + + + + AGENTS: + + + AMERICA THE MACMILLAN COMPANY + 64 & 66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK + + AUSTRALASIA OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS + 205 FLINDERS LANE, MELBOURNE + + CANADA THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LTD. + ST. MARTIN'S HOUSE, 70 BOND STREET, TORONTO + + INDIA MACMILLAN & COMPANY, LTD. + MACMILLAN BUILDING, BOMBAY + 309 BOW BAZAAR STREET, CALCUTTA + + + + + LIFE'S BASIS AND LIFE'S IDEAL + + THE FUNDAMENTALS OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE + + BY + + RUDOLF EUCKEN + PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA + + TRANSLATED, WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTE + + BY + + ALBAN G. WIDGERY + FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF ST. CATHARINE'S COLLEGE, AND BURNEY STUDENT, + CAMBRIDGE, AND MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA + + [Illustration] + + LONDON + ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK + 1912 + + + _First published December 1911_ + _Second and Revised Edition, February 1912_ + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE + TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE vii + + AUTHOR'S PREFACE xxi + + I. INTRODUCTORY: THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE IN THE PRESENT DAY 1 + + PRELIMINARY REMARKS 3 + + I. STATEMENT AND CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS OF LIFE 6 + (a) The Older Systems 6 + 1. The Religious System 6 + 2. The System of Immanent Idealism 15 + (b) The Newer Systems 22 + 1. The Naturalistic System 24 + 2. The Socialistic System 41 + 3. The System of Æsthetic Individualism 61 + + II. Consideration of the Situation as a Whole, and + Preliminaries for Further Investigation 81 + (a) The Nature of the New as a Whole and its Relation to + the Old 81 + (b) The Condition of the Present 86 + (c) The Form of the Problem 92 + + II. THE OUTLINE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 99 + INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND CONSIDERATIONS 101 + + I. THE MAIN THESIS 110 + (a) The Ascent to the Main Thesis 110 + 1. Man as a Being of Nature 110 + 2. The Growth of Man beyond Nature 113 + 3. The Inner Contradiction of the New Life 134 + (b) The Development of the Main Thesis 144 + 1. The Main Thesis and the Possibility of a New + System of Life 144 + (a) _The Development of the Spiritual Life to + Independence_ 144 + (b) _The Demands of a New System of Life_ 150 + (c) _The Spiritual Basis of the System of Life_ 152 + (d) _Human Existence_ 161 + (e) _Results and Prospects_ 166 + 2. The Transformation and the Elevation of Human + Life 168 + (a) _Aims and Ways_ 168 + (b) _The Nature of Freedom_ 174 + (c) _The Beginnings of the Independent Spiritual + Life_ 183 + (d) _The Transcending of Division_ 187 + i. _The Spiritual Conception of History_ 188 + ii. _The Spiritual Conception of Society_ 196 + (e) _The Elevation of Life above Division_ 201 + + II. THE MORE DETAILED FORM OF OUR SPIRITUAL LIFE 216 + (a) The Problem of Truth and Reality 216 + (b) Man and the World 226 + (c) The Movement of the Spiritual Life in Man 233 + (d) The Emergence of a New Type of Life 240 + 1. _Life's Attainment of Greatness_ 240 + 2. _The Increase of Movement_ 247 + 3. _The Gain of Stability_ 251 + (e) Activism, a Profession of Faith 255 + + III. THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN MAN IN CONFLICT AND IN VICTORY 262 + (a) Doubt and Prostration 262 + (b) Consideration and Demand 267 + (c) The Victory 273 + + III. APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT: CONSEQUENCES AND REQUIREMENTS 287 + + _Introductory Considerations_ 289 + I. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FORM OF LIFE AS A WHOLE 298 + (a) The Character of Culture 298 + (b) The Organisation of the Work of Culture 315 + + II. THE FORM OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS 322 + _Preliminary Remarks_ 322 + (a) Religion, Morality, Education 324 + 1. Religion 324 + 2. Morality 335 + 3. Education and Instruction 343 + (b) Science and Philosophy 345 + (c) Art and Literature 354 + (d) Social and Political Life 358 + (e) The Life of the Individual 369 + + CONCLUSION 373 + + INDEX 375 + + + + +TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE + + +With the consent of the author the title "Life's Basis and Life's Ideal" +has been adopted for this translation of "Die Grundlinien einer neuen +Lebensanschauung," with the hope that thereby the purpose of the work +will be more directly indicated than by a literal translation of the +German title. It is hoped, further, that the title adopted will make an +appeal to the general reading public. To make such an appeal is not the +desire of every writer on philosophical subjects: but in the present +instance it is the case. The author feels that he has a message for the +present time, and one that is vital to the true interests of all. It has +been remarked, and the present writer would be among the first to +acknowledge the truth of the statement, that the voice is that of a +prophet in the sense of an ethical teacher, rather than that of a +philosopher in the more technical sense. Nevertheless, the use of a +philosophical terminology, and the constant implicit reference to the +results of philosophical endeavour in the past and present, combined +with the peculiarities of the author's own views, make it difficult to +understand his message. To non-philosophical readers who are not already +acquainted with the more popular works which have been translated under +the titles of "Christianity and the New Idealism," "The Life of the +Spirit," and "The Meaning and Value of Life," the present work will +appear of considerable difficulty. Difficulty in such a work is, +however, by no means necessarily an evil, for it may compel more careful +reading and thought. The present work is the latest and best general +statement, by the author, of his philosophical position. By some +reference here to certain ideas, principles, and aims of the +philosophy, the attention of the reader may be drawn to those aspects +which, in personal contact with the author, one comes to feel are +regarded by him as of most importance. It is not invariably so, but in +this case to know the man is to gain immensely in the power to +understand and appreciate the message. He inspires us with his +confidence and enthusiasm, even when we have doubts as to the adequacy +of his philosophical creed. His philosophy is, indeed, the outcome of an +attitude of life. To know the man is to understand more fully than from +all his written works what he means when he speaks of the development of +_personality_ and _spiritual individuality_. Whatever may be the value +of what is written about Professor Eucken's position, no substitute can +be found for reading his own words in as many of his different +expositions as possible. + +Should anyone seek in this work for a systematic discussion of +philosophical problems on the lines of traditional Rationalism, which, +though often assumed to be dead, still asserts a strong influence upon +us, he will not only look in vain but will also lose much that is of +value in that which is offered. The aim of the philosophy is not to +discuss the basis and ideal of thought, but to probe to the depth of +life in all its complexity, and to advance to an all-inclusive ideal. +The starting-point for us all is life as we experience it, not an +apparent ultimate, such as the _cogito ergo sum_ of Descartes, the _I +ought_ of Kant, or the _pure being_ of Hegel. At the outset, therefore, +it is necessary to note the nature of the relation between philosophy +and life. Philosophy arises within life as an expression of its nature +and general import. Life may assume various forms, may be, that is, of +different types; with different individuals and societies it is +organised in divers ways. Life so organised, having certain definite +tendencies, is called by Professor Eucken a _system of life_. In the +philosophies of life which arise in these types or systems of life, life +becomes more explicitly conscious of its own nature. Further, a +philosophy of life is also a means of justification and defence of one +system of life in opposition to other systems. Life as experienced, as +organised in some way, is prior to any definite intellectual or +conceptual expression of it. On the other hand a type of life may be +influenced and modified by changes in the accepted philosophy of life, +or by the adoption of a new philosophy. A philosophy, therefore, is to +be judged by the system of life it represents and by its spiritual +fruitfulness. As the roots of the differences between philosophies are +in the systems of life from which the philosophies arise, the conflict +is primarily not between theories, but between systems of life. The +ground of the author's general appeal thus becomes apparent. The problem +is a vital one; in one form or another, at one time or another, everyone +is faced with it: how shall I mould my life? And it is here that we must +insist upon the importance of Professor Eucken's contention that we have +to make our decision for one system of life as a whole, and thus for one +philosophy of life as a whole, as against other systems and other +philosophies taken as wholes. + +Life as experienced is a process, a growth; and in this growth it +oversteps the bounds of the philosophy in which at an earlier stage it +expressed itself, and according to which it strove to fashion itself. +The need for a new philosophy is then felt. Generally, the need is for a +philosophy more comprehensive and more clearly defined than any of the +previous philosophies. Now, Professor Eucken contends that none of the +philosophies of life which are common among us in the present time are +adequate to represent and guide our life at this stage of its +development. He calls us to turn for a few moments from the rush and +turmoil of modern life to "come and reason together" as to life's basis +and ideal. In justification of his view, and in accordance with his own +principle that we must start with life as we experience it, he considers +in the first place the common philosophies of life of the present time +in relation to the systems of life from which they spring. Few will +disagree with his negative view that Religion--at least as +ecclesiastically presented--Immanent Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism, +and Individualism involve limitations, and sometimes unjustifiable +tendencies and claims, and are inadequate to satisfy the age. His next +and chief endeavour is to indicate the direction in which a new +philosophy is to be sought, and also tentatively to sketch the outlines +of such a philosophy. In the nature of the case--as life is a +process--no such philosophy can be regarded as complete. It can and +should strive to take up into itself all that is of value in the +discarded philosophies. Any attempt to outline a "new" philosophy will +be judged by how far, with the incompleteness on all hands, it takes the +different threads of life, and blending them into a unity aids their +growth individually and as a whole. + +Brief reference maybe made here to an attitude, common in the present +time especially among English-speaking peoples, which the author does +not explicitly mention. I mean the attitude of Agnosticism. This, he +would contend and it would seem rightly, is in the main theoretical and +does not, as such, correspond to or represent a system of life. The +agnostic's system of life is formed of aspects of the systems discussed, +with a strong tendency to Naturalism. The case of Huxley, who coined the +term _Agnosticism_, is an excellent example: notwithstanding his +frequently insisting with considerable force upon truths essentially +idealistic, no one can doubt the predominant naturalistic tendency of +his thought. As a rule the adoption of the attitude of Agnosticism is an +attempt, as Dr. Ward has so clearly and forcibly argued in his +"Naturalism and Agnosticism,"[1] to escape from the difficulties of +Naturalism, which in the end it betrays. Agnosticism is, in fact, only +an assumed absence of a theory of life. Professor Eucken would insist +that the instability of the position is intolerable in actual life. +Life's demand for unification, for consciousness of a meaning and a +value, drives us beyond it. "Mere research," he writes, p. 272, "can +tolerate a state of hesitation between affirmation and negation; it must +often refrain from a decision in the case of special problems. Life, +however, cannot endure any such intermediary position; for life, such +hesitation in arriving at a decision must result in complete stagnation, +and this would help the mere negation to victory." + +The great objection to all the systems of life mentioned is that they +are too narrow, and in some aspects superficial. The new system must +unite comprehensiveness with depth. The insufficiency of intellectualism +is now generally recognised: the desire of the age is to do justice to +the content of experience. Though the new system of life is to include +all that is of value of earlier systems, it is by no means an +eclecticism, for it has its integrating principle. This we shall best +see by considering the method and the result of the philosophy. Life as +experienced has already been referred to as the starting-point. To +whatever extent we may seem, on the surface of experience, to be under +the antithesis of subject and object, when we probe deeper we recognise +that both are within life: they are a duality in unity. Here again +reference may be made to the above-mentioned work[2] of Dr. Ward, in +which probably the best exposition in English of this same truth is to +be found. Life as experienced is not simply the empirical states of +consciousness: its basis lies deeper. The method of the philosophy is in +consequence described as _noölogical_ in distinction from the +_psychological_ method, which treats of man out of relation to a world, +and ends with the examination of psychical states; and from the +_cosmological_ method, which treats the world out of relation to man and +aims chiefly at comprehension in universals of thought. Expressed in +another way, life is fundamentally spiritual. Self-consciousness is the +unifying principle: it is only by relation to life as self-conscious +that we can predicate meaning or value. All that is regarded as true and +valuable in all the above-mentioned systems presupposes this relation. +The self-conscious life is not to be confused with the subjective life +of the "mere" individual. In fact, there is no "mere" individual, for in +all there are tendencies which transcend the limits of individual +experience. For example, life includes the relation of man and world; +and the life of society is more than a mere sum of the lives of the +individuals. Perhaps a more correct way to state the author's position +is to say that the individual shares the self-conscious, or, otherwise +expressed, the spiritual life which transcends nature, the individual, +and society. This world-pervading and world-transcending self-conscious +life--_the Independent Spiritual Life_--may be regarded as an absolute +or universal life. The pursuit of the ideals of truth, goodness, and +beauty carries us far beyond considerations of the welfare of the +individual, or the society, or even humanity as a whole. In our +activities we often attain something quite different from and far better +than that at which we aim. Nevertheless, unless truth, goodness, beauty, +and all tendencies leading to them are self-consciously experienced they +have neither meaning nor value: viewed universally, they presuppose the +Independent Spiritual Life. The highest development of the spiritual +life known to us is personality, our "being-for-self," which is not to +be identified with subjective individuality. We are not personalities to +begin with, but have the potentiality to become such through our own +effort. Personality is our highest ideal: in it, as self-conscious +experience all other values for us are included. The author calls us, +therefore, from that excessive occupation with the environment in which +we forget ourselves, to spiritual concentration and the pursuit of +spiritual ideals. The spirit of his message may be expressed in words +familiar to all: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world +and lose his own soul." Remembering that life is fundamentally +self-conscious or spiritual, it may be said that life's basis and life's +ideal is life itself--life completely self-conscious and following out +its own necessities. The basis of man's life is the Independent +Spiritual Life which is appropriated but not created by him in his +striving for a comprehensive and harmonious personality. The ideal of +man's life is such a personality. The more man "loses his life" in the +pursuit of the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty, the more surely +will he "save it," the more comprehensive, harmonious, and spiritual in +nature will he become. Then he will realise himself as a personality, +and become conscious of his unity with the Independent Spiritual Life. +The dominant Idealism of this philosophy of life is evident: but the +meanings of truth, goodness, and beauty are different from what they +appear to be in many of the older presentations of Idealism. Truth, +goodness and beauty are not abstract ideals but concrete experiences. +The present writer has long been of the opinion that much of +contemporary idealistic philosophy, including that of Professor Eucken, +might be better termed _Spiritualism_ than _Idealism_. + +If life as experienced is a process, it is not difficult to understand +that importance should be attributed to history. In the author's +exposition not only is constant reference made to historical +development, but the nature of history is made a definite subject of +discussion. I would call attention to this aspect of the author's work: +it appears a means of doing more justice to the content of experience +than is done in most forms of Idealism. On the one hand a Rationalism +which tends to shut out the historical as transient and merely +appearance is avoided, and on the other a Historical Relativism which +denies all stability and permanence is strenuously opposed. While the +absolute and eternal--the Independent Spiritual Life--is the +presupposition of the temporal manifestation of the spiritual life in +man, for man the historical is real. The form of our spiritual life is +due to our own acts and decisions. It is in this connection that the +fundamental nature of our spiritual effort may best be seen. The +author's voice is that of a prophet in so far as his whole exposition is +presented as an endeavour to arouse men from their apathy and from the +pursuit of what they themselves know to be unsatisfying ideals. The +importance attached to spiritual effort in his philosophy leads +Professor Eucken to adopt the term "_Activism_" as a definite +philosophical badge. The activistic note is evident throughout, much +more so perhaps in the present volume than in those which have preceded +it. The significance of this emphasis is most clear in its bearing upon +our relation to the past and the present. The present is neither to be +dominated by the past nor sacrificed to the future, but the past is to +be appropriated by our activity in the present, and the present, while +possessing reality and value in itself, looks forward to the future. +Historical content, spiritual endeavour in past, present, and future, +must be unified by a common task. The past is ours only so far as we +appropriate it. Spiritual inheritance is not the same as natural +inheritance. We may by our spiritual effort adopt or reject ideas or a +system of life which have come to us from the past. The character which +the past will have for us will depend on our present spiritual +condition. All spiritual progress involves a break with the past. In the +same way we may take up an attitude of antagonism to the confusions +which exist in modern life, and we may follow a new course. All this is +not to deny the value of history in itself and for our present efforts: +the reverse of such a denial is nearer the truth. For if we realise the +depths and independence of our own life we are not only in a position to +understand and appreciate the movement of history, but, by the nature of +life, we are then driven beyond the mere present. The past relives with +a new spiritual meaning in the consciousness that makes it its own. +History is more than a succession of facts; it must be revalued as a +present experience. Life is not subjectively individual, and to realise +it we must find our place in universal tendencies which are working +themselves out in history. The content of history cannot be pressed into +the narrow scheme of moral effort and attainment, as that is usually +conceived, but in it all spheres of life assert their independent right. +History is not an evolution of categories, but a conflict of concrete +realities, of systems of life, of personalities. Though the great man +cannot be understood out of relation to his time, he is not simply a +product of the social environment. The great man strives to raise the +time to his own level. It may be said that in order adequately to +appreciate the author's position in regard to history the book +translated into English under the title of "The Problem of Human Life +as viewed by the Great Thinkers from Plato to the Present Time" should +be read in the light of the general principles of his philosophy. The +reality of evil and of antitheses in life are fully acknowledged; but by +the spiritual life being thereby called to assert its independence and +to strive to overcome them they may be a factor leading to good. Evil, +so regarded, is not explained away, but the solution is essentially a +practical one. The theoretical problem of evil remains an enigma to us. +The author's message is positive, not negative: it is a call to pursue +definite positive aims rather than to eradicate painful experiences. +"Not suffering, but spiritual destitution is man's worst enemy" (p. +314). + +It has been said with, it would seem, a large amount of truth, that the +philosophy of Hegel has been most fruitfully studied on English soil. +There is reason to believe that it will be somewhat the same in the case +of Professor Eucken's philosophy. His debts to Kant and Hegel are +obvious, but it is interesting to notice that the points in which he +more especially diverges from Hegelianism are largely the same as have +been emphasised in England. The importance he attaches to personality +and ethical activity, his insistence upon human endeavour as a +determining factor in reality, and his emphasis on the dialectic as +being not one of categories but of concrete realities, are in accord +with much of the best of recent English philosophical thought. In the +present work there is much of value for those who--while dissenting from +such perversions as Pragmatism--hold what is commonly termed a "Personal +Idealism." The position of our author is not the same as that of English +Personal Idealism, nevertheless his work aids it in many ways, and +especially in its insistence upon the distinction between personality +and subjective individuality. A comparison of some of the views of the +three philosophical writers who have been most discussed in our +time--the late Professor James, M. Bergson, and our author--would be of +interest. To enter upon a systematic and exhaustive comparison here is +far from my intention, but a few points may be suggested. The modes of +exposition, which in a greater or less degree indicate the respective +methods, manifest striking contrasts: in many respects the positions of +M. Bergson and Professor Eucken appear totally dissimilar. The +acquaintance with natural science, and the constant reference to its +data, that we find in the works of M. Bergson, are not found in those of +our author. Their place is taken, however, by what some will regard as +more interesting, and even more important, an acquaintance with the +present condition of human life, and also a constant reference to +history. Common to these writers is a reaction against formalism and +intellectualism, and in one form or another there is in their writings a +strong element of empiricism. Freedom in some sense is insisted upon by +all; though so far as we may judge from their published expositions +there seem to be considerable differences of view in this matter. +Together with this assertion of the reality of Freedom, both M. Bergson +and our author definitely acknowledge the reality of Necessity and +recognise the importance of struggle in development. Neither writer +claims that we can gain more than the knowledge of a direction in which +the solution of the problem may be sought. Our author himself might +quite well have said, though with application in the main to different +classes of facts, what M. Bergson has said: "It seems to me that in a +great number of different fields there is a great number of collections +of facts, each of which, considered apart, gives us a direction in which +the answer to the problem may be sought--a direction only. But it is a +great thing to have even a direction, and still more to have several +directions, for at the precise point where these directions converge +might be found the solution we are seeking. What we possess meanwhile +are lines of facts.[3]..." "But what is this new reality," writes +Professor Eucken (p. 135), "and this whole to which the course of the +movement trends? The more we reflect over the question the more strongly +we feel that it is a direction rather than a conclusion that is offered +to us in this matter...." There is another passage from M. Bergson the +quotation of which in the present context is justified by its harmony +with so much that Professor Eucken himself says with regard to man's +ideal of life: "If, then, in every province, the triumph of life is +expressed by creation, ought we not to think that the ultimate reason of +human life is a creation which, in distinction from that of the artist +or the man of science, can be pursued at every moment and by all men +alike; I mean the creation of self by self, the continual enrichment of +personality by elements which it does not draw from outside, but causes +to spring forth from itself?"[4] Whether in the works of the late +Professor James there is evidence of a lurking desire for an Absolute +may be left undiscussed. M. Bergson certainly gives more than a hint of +something like an Absolute. Of the absolutist (not rationalistic) +tendency in the philosophy of our author there can be no doubt. +Notwithstanding the antagonism to intellectualism shown in this +philosophy, the influence of Hegel seems evident in its absolutist +tendency. Dr. Ward has justly said that, "with Hegel, the Absolute seems +at one time to be a perfect Self with no hint of aught beside or beyond +its own completed self-consciousness, and at another not to be a self at +all, but only the absolutely spiritual--art, religion, and +philosophy--the over-individual ends, as they are sometimes called, +which become realised in subjective spirits: not self-conscious Spirit, +but simply the impersonal Spirit in all spirits."[5] How far a +corresponding criticism is applicable to the ideas of the Independent +Spiritual Life, and the spiritual life in humanity and the world, in the +present philosophy, its readers must be left to decide. + +The relation of philosophy to life as Professor Eucken conceives it may +justify him in treating primarily of what may be called in a special +sense the problems of life. The difficulty of the problems of the theory +of knowledge no one will deny, though many are impatient of +considerations of them. In any general appeal such as we have to do with +in this work it is almost impossible to deal seriously with them. Still +the problems of the theory of knowledge force themselves upon us, and +will not be thrust on one side. The late Professor James did his best to +leave us in no doubt as to his position in this matter: we have more +than a glimpse of the attitudes of M. Bergson and Professor Eucken. We +await, however, as likely to aid us in a fuller understanding and +estimate of the philosophy, the volume the author has promised us on the +theory of knowledge. Whatever the points of similarity may be in the +views of those mentioned, we cannot fail to note the differences--to +some of these in the case of Pragmatism the author has himself called +our attention; further, we cannot mistake the dominant Idealism of the +philosophy of life here presented to us. One word must be said as to the +author's attitude towards Mysticism; an attitude that has not always +been understood. The Mysticism he opposes is of the type that is +virtually the negation of the Activism which is to him fundamental. But +when that is recognised, the careful reader cannot fail to see that, +ultimately, the philosophy is essentially mystical. + +As I understand it, the suggestion that our author's philosophy would +form a rallying-point for Idealists of various kinds is a tribute to its +unity and comprehensiveness, of which there can be no doubt. Roughly, we +may take up one of two attitudes to the work of a philosopher. We may +accept his general point of view, his main principles, in a word his +"system," however tentative, and modify it in detail. On the other hand +we may reject his main position, and yet find much to accept in his +working out of various aspects of detail, and we may incorporate this in +some other general system. It is not for me to state here the attitude I +take towards, or the difficulties I feel in, the philosophy; I think +that there will be few who will not gain much from the inspiration and +originality which are shown by the author. For his own philosophy of +life he seeks no other treatment than that which he has meted to others: +a sincere endeavour to understand its basis and its ideal. His hope is +that however much its limitations may be pointed out, the truth in it +may be acknowledged and appropriated, if possible in a higher view. The +acquisition of a higher view would cause no one more real joy than +Professor Eucken. + +I have to thank the author for his personal kindness in the discussion +of some difficult points and in the revision of a portion of the proof +sheets. At his suggestion or with his consent a number of small +alterations, as, for example, in the titles of sections, have been made +from the present German text. Owing to an accident, the time for the +preparation of this translation was unfortunately curtailed: I should be +indebted for any suggestions for its improvement. I am indebted to the +Rev. Felix Holt, B.A., for reading through the whole in manuscript and +making many valuable suggestions. For all defect and error I alone am +responsible. + + ALBAN G. WIDGERY + + CAMBRIDGE, _October 1911_ + + +FOOTNOTES: + + [1] "Naturalism and Agnosticism." 3rd Edition, 1906. Vols. I. and II. + A. & C. Black. + + [2] _Ibid._ Vol. II. Lects. xiv.-xx. + + [3] _Hibbert Journal_, October 1911: p. 26. + + [4] _Ibid._ p. 42. + + [5] "The Realm of Ends; or, Pluralism and Theism" (1911), p. 46. + + +NOTE TO SECOND EDITION + +I have taken the opportunity given by reprinting to revise the whole. I +have made a number of alterations rendering the author's meaning more +clear. My thanks are again due to Mr. Holt for his help. + + ALBAN G. WIDGERY + + CAVERSWALL, STOKE-ON-TRENT, + _January 1912_ + + + + +AUTHOR'S PREFACE + + +We may hope for a friendly reception of our investigation only by those +who acknowledge that that which occupies us here is a real problem. It +is hardly open to dispute that life in the present time displays a +serious incongruity between an incalculably rich and fruitful activity +with regard to the material, and complete uncertainty and destitution in +respect of the spiritual, side of life. Attempt after attempt is made to +deliver us from this state of perplexity, and to give more soul and +unity to a culture which outwardly is so imposing. But in the main these +attempts are far too irresolute in their advance from superficiality to +depth, and from individual appearances to the whole: in their innermost +nature they are under the influence of the temporary conditions beyond +which they wish to lead us. In truth, we cannot make an advance in +relation to our life as a whole unless we win a new basis for it. This, +however, we cannot do without raising the problem of our relation to +reality, and, if it is in any way possible, moulding this relationship +in a new way: further, we can be of service in the satisfaction of the +needs of the time only when we gain an independence of it and a +superiority to it. + +Here, therefore, so far as the realm of conviction is concerned, we have +a task for philosophy. The confusion that reigns, however, makes the way +difficult for philosophy also; and sets insuperable limits to its power. +We do not meet in immediate experience with facts upon which a new type +of life might be based: much toil and trouble are necessary to arrive at +that, which, when it is once attained, may seem to be simple and easy. +He who finds the problem too complex, and shirks to expend the necessary +effort, can do nothing else than resign himself submissively to the +prevailing confusion. To-day we are unable at first to sketch more than +the outlines and to indicate fundamentals: we must be quite sure of the +basis and the main tendency of life if we would undertake the +construction of systems; and yet it is just these things which are +to-day the subject of agitation and conflict. Not for a moment do we +doubt the imperfection of our own attempt; we can but hope that others +will take up and pursue the matter further. + +Notwithstanding these limitations and this trouble, an urgent inner +necessity compels us to recognise that there can be no enduring life of +genuine culture unless humanity is inwardly united by common aims. More +and more clearly this main question is seen to be involved in all the +particular questions of the time; more and more does it become evident +to us that our achievement in individual matters can be but +insignificant, if life as a whole is in a state of stagnation and +exhaustion. Though some who may already have taken up a definite course, +or who in their attention to work in some special sphere have lost all +sense for the whole, may refuse to consider the matter, yet wherever +life is still flowing, and where fresh impulse resists the tendency to +division which deprives it of all soul, to deal with the problem will be +felt to be a necessity. Above all, therefore, we trust in the young, +who, among all cultured nations, are striving for a deeper and nobler +life. The more successful this striving, the sooner shall we advance +from a state of confusion to one of order and clearness, from a realm of +illusions to the kingdom of truth, and in face of the chaotic whirl of +appearances we shall attain stability within ourselves. + + RUDOLF EUCKEN + + JENA, _Christmas 1906_ + + + + +I + +INTRODUCTORY + +THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE IN THE PRESENT DAY + +PRELIMINARY REMARKS + + +He who strives after a new philosophy of life confesses himself thereby +to be of the conviction that the philosophies of the present no longer +satisfy mankind; and so we must begin by giving reasons for sharing this +conviction. In doing this we hope to be able to take a positive survey +of the present situation as a whole, and also to gain a firm +starting-point for the course in which the new is to be sought, and not +simply to remain fixed in a mere negative attitude. A precise statement +of the question is the first condition for a correct answer; to satisfy +this requirement is the chief concern of the first part of our treatise. + +Philosophies of life, representations of human life as a whole, surround +us to-day in abundance and court our adherence. The fusion of rich +historical development with active reflection gives occasion to the most +diverse combinations and makes it easy for the individual to project a +representation corresponding to his circumstances and his mood. Thus, +to-day, the philosophies of life of individuals whirl together in +chaotic confusion, gain and lose the passing favour, displace one +another, and themselves change kaleidoscopically. It is not the concern +of philosophy to occupy itself more closely with opinions so accidental +and so fleeting. + +There are, however, philosophies of life of another kind, conceptions of +life, which unite and dominate large numbers of people, hold up a common +ideal for their activity, and constitute a power in the life of +universal history. These philosophies of life are rooted in particular +concrete forms of life, in actual combinations of working and striving, +which with dominating power surround the individual and point out his +course. With such ascendancy they may seem to him to be unassailable and +a matter of natural necessity; in reality they are a product of the +industry of universal history, and from this point of view appear merely +as attempts to comprehend the boundless stream of life and to win a +character for our otherwise indefinite existence. For at first we stand +defenceless and helpless in face of the wealth of impressions and +suggestions which throng upon us and draw us in opposite directions. +Only in one way are we able to prevail: life must concentrate and +acquire a controlling centre within itself, and from that begin a +process of counteraction. We lack distinction of centre and environment; +we need an inner aspiration, an aspiration which seeks to draw the whole +of existence to itself and to mould it in its own particular way. This, +however, is impossible, unless at the same time a philosophy of life, a +profession of faith as to the nature of the whole, a justification of +our undertaking, is evolved. A philosophy of life established in this +manner will be incomparably more powerful, and fuller in content, than +the mere foam on the surface of time. + +Nevertheless, with all its advantages, such a philosophy of life, like +the corresponding system of life itself, is not ultimate truth: it +remains an attempt, a problem which, ever anew, divides men into +opposing camps. For the experience of history teaches us that the effort +after concentration and an inner synthesis of life does not follow one +clear, direct course throughout, but that different possibilities offer +themselves and, in course of time, struggle upwards to reality. +Different systems thus advance by the side of and in opposition to one +another, each making the claim to undivided supremacy, to a superiority +over all others. Philosophies of life now become means and instruments +to justify and to establish such claims. They must enter into the +severest conflict one with another, and the strife keeps up a powerful +tension and pressure because here, by means of the ideas, tendencies of +life compete with one another; because not mere representations of +reality but realities themselves struggle together. It is manifest from +the existence of these last problems that we do not grow up in a +finished world, but have first to form and build up our world. We are +concerned not merely with interpreting a given reality, but first of all +with winning the true, primary, and all-comprehensive reality. By this +our life is made uncertain and laborious, but it is raised at the same +time to an inner freedom and a more genuine independence. + +And now for the first time we see in its true light the fact that its +own views of life can become inadequate to an age. For the fact that an +age lacks an inner unity, that cogent reasons drive it beyond the extant +syntheses, is now a sign that it is not clear and certain as to its own +life. To open up a way for a new synthesis, to organise life more +adequately, becomes the most pressing of all demands, the question of +questions. Even the most cautious and most subtle reflection will not +lead us far in this matter; all hope of success depends upon our life +containing greater depths, which hitherto have not been fully grasped, +and more especially upon a transcendent unity present in it, which +hitherto has not come to complete recognition. All thought and +reflection is thus called to direct itself to the comprehension of such +depths and of such a unity. Everything here depends on facts; on facts, +however, which do not come to us opportunely from without, but which +reveal themselves only to the eye of the spirit and to aspiration. + + + + +I. STATEMENT AND CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS OF LIFE + + +It must be admitted that the first glance at the present conditions of +life shows a chaotic confusion. A more careful examination, however, +soon discloses a limited number of schemes of life, which, although they +are often combined by individuals, are in their nature distinct and +remain differentiated. We recognise five such systems of life: those of +Religion and of Immanent Idealism on the one hand, and those of +Naturalism, Socialism, and Individualism on the other hand. For, two +main groups may be clearly distinguished: one, older, which gives to +life an invisible world for its chief province; and one, newer, which +places man entirely in the realm of sense experience; within these +groups, the ways again lead in diverse directions. Let us see what each +of these organisations makes out of life; on what each supports itself; +and what each accomplishes. Let us see also where each meets with +opposition and in what it finds its limits; and this not according to +our individual opinion, but according to the experiences of the age. + + +(a) THE OLDER SYSTEMS + +1. THE RELIGIOUS SYSTEM + +The religious organisation of life has influenced us in the past with +especial power. This has worked in the form of Christianity, which, as +an ethical religion of redemption, occupies a thoroughly unique position +among religions. As a religion it unites life to a supernatural world, +and subjects our existence to its supremacy; as a religion of redemption +it heightens the contrast between the two worlds to such a degree of +harshness that a complete revolution becomes a necessity; as an ethical +religion it regards the spiritual life as a power of positive creation +and self-determination, and insists upon a complete change of the heart. +Arising in an age of decay, an age weary of life, it confidently took up +the conflict against this faintness; it did not carry on this conflict, +however, by a further development of the natural world and of culture, +but through the revelation of a supernatural order, of a new community +of life, which, through the building up of an invisible Kingdom of +God--which wins a visible expression in the Church--becomes to man in +faith and hope the most certain presence. Christianity ratified an +affirmation of life; still, it did not accomplish this immediately, but +by the most fundamental and definite negation; and thus to a cursory +consideration it might appear to be a flight from the world. In reality, +it unites the negation and the affirmation, flight from, and renewal of, +the world; the deepest feeling of, and the happiest deliverance from, +guilt and suffering, and thereby gives to life a greater breadth as well +as a ceaseless activity in search of its true self. Religion does not +mean a special domain by the side of others; its intention is rather to +be the innermost soul and the supreme power of the whole life. Through +its ideals and its standards it lends to the whole sphere of life a +distinctive character; it leads to a definite organisation of mankind +and offers powerful opposition to all dissipation, all merely individual +caprice. It comes to the individual as a supreme power which brings to +him salvation and truth, shapes him for the highest ends, and connects +his thought and feeling with an invisible world. + +With such an undertaking Christianity has exercised most deep-reaching +influences on the course of history; in the first place it implanted a +new vitality in an exhausted humanity; then in the Middle Ages it worked +to the education of a new race; and now that it has become mature it +has not ceased to exercise strong, though quieter, influences: +considering all the facts, it appears to be the most powerful force in +history. + +But all the greatness of past achievement could not prevent a strong +movement from arising in the Modern Age against Christianity; a movement +which still continues to increase in power and which undermines the +position of Christianity, where outwardly it still appears quite secure. +It is true that there never was a period when it was not opposed by +individuals, but through the lack of any spiritual import these isolated +oppositions had never combined so as to produce a united effect. An +effect of this kind was first produced with the emergence of new systems +of thought and new streams of life since the beginning of the +seventeenth century; as long, however, as this movement was limited to +the cultured classes and left the masses untouched, that which existed +in it as a menace did not produce its full effect. It was the conviction +of Bayle, that the spirit of the Enlightenment would never permeate the +masses. In the nineteenth century this "unexpected" happened, and the +nature of spiritual endeavour and the disposition of men join together +in an assault upon Christianity; an assault which no one with insight +will call anything but dangerous. + +The thing most evident and most talked of is the subversion of the old +conception of the world; a conception which is usually associated with +Christianity. This conception is less and less able to assert itself in +face of the triumphant onward march of modern science. The +representation of nature, like that of human history, has been broadened +immeasurably and at the same time has acquired inner unity, law, and +order; a direct intervention of a supernatural power is felt more and +more to be an intolerable derangement. The earth, hitherto the centre of +the whole and the chief platform upon which the destiny of the universe +was decided, sinks to a position of more correct proportion, and man is +much more closely linked to nature and fitted into a common order. How +then can that which takes place in him decide what shall be the destiny +of the whole? + +If we would withdraw from this shattered conception of the world, as +from a mere external matter, to the substance of Christianity, this +substance must be much more clearly and much more forcibly present to us +than it really is. For, in this change we are concerned not simply with +individual phrases, but with the whole mode of thought. We have learnt +to think far more causally and critically; we perceive the peculiarity +of the historical circumstances in which Christianity arose, and, along +with this, become aware of a wide disparity from the circumstances of +the present. We question all historical tradition as to its grounds, and +so overthrow the weight of authority; our thought has become throughout +less naïve and we strive to transcend the form of the immediate +impression. From this point of view it comes about quite easily that the +religious mode of thought appears to be a mere anthropomorphism, a +childlike, imaginative interpretation of the world, which, to an +intelligence equipped with the clearness of objective consideration, can +pass only for a stage in evolution, which has once for all been +overcome. Such is the teaching of Positivism, and it is just in this +reference to religion that its influence extends far beyond the limits +of the positivistic school. + +The change of thought would not be so far-reaching and so dangerous if +it did not give expression to a change of life as a whole; but this is +what it really does: the Modern Age through the whole course of its +development sets a universal--a system--over against the religious +system of life. That all departments of life should subordinate +themselves to Religion, that every activity has value only so far as it +either directly or indirectly furthers Religion, appears to the Modern +Age a much too narrow conception, and one which is a mischievous denial +of the truth that these departments of life contain. So the different +branches of the spiritual life--for example, science and art, politics +and economics--liberate themselves radically from the supremacy of +Religion, and this is felt to be an incalculable gain in freedom and +breadth. Since, unimpeded, the new life increases in comprehensiveness, +and draws the whole content of reality into itself, it seems to rest +firmly and securely in itself and to need no completion of any kind +whatever. + +Religion, however, must first seek a place in this new life. It finds +this place with greater difficulty, in that modern life, as it works out +its own peculiar characteristics, ever more directly and ever more +harshly opposes Christianity. The initial assumptions of the two are +fundamentally different. Early Christianity spoke to a generation which +had become perplexed concerning the rationality of the universe and +concerning its own capacity; a generation which could attain to an +affirmation of life only through the building up of a new world in +contrast to that of sense impression. The world, then disdained, has +acquired in the Modern Age an ever-increasing power of attraction. New +peoples and epochs have grown up, which have a feeling of power and wish +to exert the force of their youth in work upon the surrounding world; +this world meets such a desire since it shows itself to be still in the +midst of change and full of problems. If formerly the world surrounded +man as an unchangeable fate, it now proves to be capable of change and +of upward development; man can work and strive to transform it into a +kingdom of reason. The more that power and object unite in this, the +more victorious is the advance of work; the nearer the world is brought +to man's inner life, the more does it become to him his true and only +home. The idea of immanence comes to have a magical sound; everything +which oversteps the boundary marked out by the work of the world soon +comes to be regarded as a flight into a realm of shadows, into an +"other" world. Satisfaction is obtained in life in grappling with +realities; in the display of masculine strength: while the religious +attitude to life, with its waiting and hope, and its expectation of +supernatural aid, seems lifeless, feeble, and altogether lacking in +spirit. + +At the same time, all capacity for understanding the world in which +Christianity set the soul of man disappears. That world was one of pure +inwardness, a world in which the fundamental relation of life was that +of the spiritual life to its own ideal conception, to absolute spirit; a +world in which the questions of character and of the determination of +the will were the chief problems. To earlier Christianity that world was +anything but a mere "other" world; rather it constituted that which was +nearest and most certain; the chief basis of life, from which the world +of sense first received its truth and its value. But the more +significant the world of sense becomes to man, and the more powerfully +it draws his affections to itself, the more does the relation to this +world become the fundamental relation of life; the more does that pure +inner world fade, and the more it appears to be something artificial, +shadowy, something added as an afterthought; and the turning to it comes +to be regarded as a flight into an "other" world. Christianity must +necessarily be alien and unintelligible to anyone who feels the world +which was to Christianity the chief world to be a mere "other" world; +for him all the contentions of Christianity are inevitably distorted, +and every element of joyful affirmation and heroic victory which it +contains obscured; the whole must present a miserable and morbid +picture. Now that the centre of life has changed its position in +relation to the world, is it possible to avoid the consequences of a +growing tendency to displace and dissolve Christianity? + +The inner world was to Christianity essentially a realm of conviction +and decision, a relation of will to will, of personality to personality: +free action, in power and love, in guilt and reconciliation, formed the +essence of all events and gave to the world a soul. Only as ethical, +personal power did the spiritual life appear to find its own depth and +to be able to govern the world. + +Here again the Modern Age takes a directly antagonistic course. Its work +is considered most of all to lead beyond the subjectivity of man to the +content and under the objective necessity of things. For we seem first +to attain genuine truth when we place ourselves in the world of fact, +reveal its relations, and take part in its movements; we have to follow +the objective and immanent necessities of things; to interpret every +particular case from the standpoint of these necessities and to +harmonise our own conduct with them. Life seems to acquire greatness and +universal significance only insomuch as the process comes before the +effect, the law before freedom, fixed relations before the resolution +into individual occurrences. To the Modern Age, not only has nature been +transformed into a continuous causal chain, but in its spiritual +activity also the age forms great complexes, which, through the force of +logical necessity, are placed beyond the influence of all caprice, and +of all the interests of the narrowly human. From the point of view of +such an evolution the realm of ethical life appears to be a mere +subjective sphere; a tissue of human opinion and striving; something +which falls outside of genuine reality and which can never be forced +into its structure. To continue in the position of early Christianity is +looked upon as a remaining at a lower level of life; conceptions such as +freedom of the will and moral judgment are regarded as childish +delusions which are the more decidedly rejected the more the new life +displays its fundamental character. Again, with a transvaluation of all +values, that which to Christianity was the highest in life and dominated +the whole is regarded as a mere accompanying appearance; indeed, a +danger to the energy and truth of life. + +Hence a mode of life has arisen which not only regards the answers of +Christianity with indifference, but does not even recognise its +problems; and this mode of life is attracting to itself more and more +the convictions and energies of mankind. Even now the antithesis which +the centuries have prepared is being forced with unmistakable clearness +into prominence. It was possible for us to deceive ourselves with regard +to its implacability so long as a rationalistic and pantheistic way of +thinking presented Christianity in the most general way, and tried to +comprehend its nature as something universal, and at the same time +placed nature and the universe in the transfiguring light of +speculative consideration. But, in the course of further experience, +that mode of thought has been severely shaken and appears more and more +to be a mere aggregate of phrases; and so the antitheses face one +another unreconciled and a decision is not to be evaded. In this matter +mankind is under the influence of a strong reaction against the +religious, and especially the Christian, mode of life. Throughout many +centuries Christianity has given life a unity and has thrown light upon +reality from its standpoint: further, it has presented its way as the +only possible one; one to which everything which in any way strives +spiritually upward has to adapt itself. If the truth of the whole now +falls into doubt, everything which was intended to give to life +stability and character is soon felt to be heavily oppressive and +intolerably narrow; and everything which in that mode of life was +accidental, temporal, and human advances into the foreground. We clearly +perceive that much passed current as true only because we had become +unaccustomed to ask questions concerning it, and also that many things +owed their acceptance not to their inner necessity, but only to social +sanction. With such feelings it may come to be considered a great +deliverance to shake off the whole, and a necessary step towards +truthfulness of life to eliminate every aspect of that mode of life +which through custom or authority continues to exist. + +These tendencies are tendencies of reaction with all their +one-sidedness. But can we deny that a great change of life has been +accomplished, a change which reaches far beyond these tendencies, and +which is still working itself out? That which previously was most +proximate to us is now made to recede; what held currency as absolutely +certain must now be laboriously proved, and, through continual +reflection, loses all freshness and power to convince; immediate +experience, axiomatic certainty, immovable conviction are lacking. The +self-evident certainties in the light of which earlier ages lived and +worked are wanting, and we are compelled to acknowledge that some things +become uncertain, even impossible, when they cease to be self-evident. +Again, it cannot fail to be recognised that we are tired of a merely +religious way of life; we feel its limitations; new needs are awakened +and seek new forms of life and expression; even the traditional +terminology displeases us; even the acutest dialectic cannot lend to the +old the power of youth. + +Of course the matter is not finally settled by these judgments of the +age. For, a later age is not the infallible judge of an earlier; much +which to us moderns seems certain may soon become problematic; much +which satisfies us may soon be shown to be inadequate. It may be that +the old is capable of asserting the ultimate depth of life in contrast +to the new; that the world of inner spiritual experience which it +discloses may finally show itself superior to every assault. But, in any +case, the new contains a wealth of fact not only in individual results +but in the whole of its being; through its emergence it has transformed +the whole condition of things; it is impossible to decry it as a mere +apostasy and to appeal to the consciences of individuals. It may be that +spiritual power here stands against spiritual power in a titanic +struggle for the soul of man: victory must fall to the power which +penetrates to the primary depths of life and is capable of taking +possession of what is true in the others. But if in this the older view +of life is inwardly superior, it can develop such superiority only by +its own complete renewal and energetic inward elevation, through the +most fundamental settlement with everything antagonistic in an +all-comprehensive whole of life. Yet how deeply the age is still +involved in its search! How far it is from the conclusion! For the +present, as far as the life of culture is concerned, Religion has fallen +into complete uncertainty; its chief support and realm lie not within +but outside of that life. It is this which makes all affirmation of +Religion weak and all negation strong; it is this which threatens to +stamp, as something subjective and false, every conception of a +"supernatural." Religion has become uncertain to us not merely in single +doctrines and tendencies, but in the whole of its being, in its +fundamental contention as to the nature of life; and what it offers in +the traditional form in which it has come to us no longer satisfies a +life which has been aroused to greater breadth and freedom. + + +2. THE SYSTEM OF IMMANENT IDEALISM + +By the side of the religious system of life, for thousands of years, now +as supplementary, now as contradictory, there has been another which may +be designated as Immanent Idealism. The latter system is not so fixed +and overawing a structure as the former, but with a quieter force it +penetrates the whole of life. It is not of a simple nature, but is found +in many different forms; still, there exists so much in common in these +that they clearly exhibit and emphasise one common tendency. Like the +religious system, this Idealism also places life primarily in a world of +thought, from which it organises sense experience; it is distinguished +from the former system, however, in that it never separates the two +worlds one from the other, but conceives them as related elements or +aspects of a single whole. They are related to one another as appearance +and reality, as cause and effect, as animating and animated nature +(_natura naturans_ and _naturata_). The divine is not so much a power +transcending the world as one permeating it and living in it; not +something specific outside of things, but their connection in a living +unity; it does not make demands and present us with problems so much as +give to the world its truth and depth. Thus, reality appears as an +inwardly co-ordinated whole: the individual finds his genuine being only +as a part of this whole. And so, here, the fundamental relation of life +is that to the invisible whole of reality; with the development of this +relation, that which seems lifeless becomes animated; the elements which +seem isolated are brought together; and the world discloses an infinite +content and gives it to man for a joyous possession. + +But it would be impossible for man to accomplish the transition from +appearance to reality, if he were not rooted in the fundamental +permanencies and if, in the comprehending of the world, he did not find +his own being. If this is the case, however, and if, through courageous +turning from the superficiality to which he in the first place belongs, +he is able to set himself in the depth of reality, then a magnificent +life with the widest prospects opens out before him. For, now, he may +win the whole of infinity for his own and set himself free from the +triviality of the merely human without losing himself in an alien world; +he may direct the movement of life to a positive gain, since he guides +it from within and from the whole. This life will find its centre in the +activities which bring man into relation with the whole and broaden him +from within to the whole; thus, in science and art spiritual creation +becomes the chief concern; its forceful development allows us to hope +for an ennobling of the whole of existence. With this creative activity +as centre, the rest is regarded as its environment, its means, its +presupposition; but there remain a clear distinction and gradation +between that which a creative life evolves immediately, and that which +forms a mere condition for this and may never become an aim in itself. +Thus, the beautiful is separated sharply from the merely useful; the +inner life from all preservation of physical existence; a genuine +spiritual culture, as the revelation of the depth of things, from all +perfecting of natural and social conditions, from mere civilisation. +Here life finds an aim and a task in itself; they are not presented to +it from a transcendent world; but it can evolve a morality in the sense +of taking up the whole into one's own volition, the subjection of +caprice to the necessity of things. + +A life thus full of content and joyous activity arose when Greek culture +was at its height, and exercised its influence through the course of the +centuries; Christianity also soon laid aside its original suspicion +against this life and joined it to itself. This life, however, first +attained complete independence and self-consciousness in modern culture +so far as this culture followed the way of Idealism. It is felt to be +superior to Religion and hopes to be able to shape the world of man more +satisfactorily than Religion can. In this system formulated conceptions +and perplexing doctrines of the divine are not necessary, as they are in +Religion, because the divine is present immediately in the process of +life and surrounds man on all sides. Man's powers are not drawn in a +particular direction and nothing is discarded, but everything is to be +uniformly developed and unified in an all-inclusive harmony; natural +instincts are restrained and ennobled through their relations in a +larger whole. A power of organisation is displayed which reaches the +finest vein of the soul, throws the genuinely human into relief in +contrast with environment and tradition, and makes it the matter of +chief concern: with all this it deepens life in itself and finds +incalculable treasure in such depth. Everywhere there is powerful effort +and creative activity on the part of man, but at the same time the +consciousness of an invisible order; a joyful affirmation of life, but +at the same time a deliverance from unrestrained curiosity and coarse +enjoyment; a breadth and a freedom of life, and with this a clear +consciousness of the greatness but also of the limitations of man. Such +was the state of conviction in the classical period of German +literature. + +This form of life has, with remarkable quickness, been relegated into +the distance; with all its external proximity it has become inwardly +more alien to us than the world of Religion. All this has come to pass, +however, not so much through direct conflict, which its free and +comprehensive nature could scarcely provoke, as through inner changes of +conditions and strivings, which have now thrust other facts into +prominence and driven men to other tasks. The transformation could +hardly have been effected so quickly and so fundamentally if this mode +of life did not involve fixed limits and problematic presuppositions +which we have now become fully conscious of for the first time. + +It is the aristocratic nature of this Immanent Idealism which first +awakens suspicion and opposition. Spiritual creation, from which it +expects complete salvation, can take possession of and satisfy the whole +soul only where it breaks forth spontaneously with great and powerful +effect, where, with overwhelming power, it raises man above himself. An +incontrovertible experience shows us that this takes place only in rare +and exceptional cases; there must be a union of many forces before man +can rise to such a height and be swayed by the compulsion of this +creation. Now, it is true that the gain of such red-letter days carries +its effect into ordinary days and that from the heights light pours down +upon lower levels. But in such transmission there is a serious and +inevitable loss in power and purity; indeed, in veracity: that which +fills the life of those producing it and arouses it to its highest +passion easily becomes to the receiver a subsidiary matter, a pleasant +accompanying experience. Thus we see epochs of organisation follow upon +times of creation, but we see that such organisation sinks more and more +into a reflective and passive reproduction. Such organisation tends to +become mere imagination; the man imbued with the spirit of such +organisation easily seems to himself more than he is; with a false +self-consciousness talks and feels as though he were at a supreme +height; lives less his own life than an alien one. Sooner or later +opposition must necessarily arise against such a half-life, such a life +of pretence, and this opposition will become especially strong if it is +animated by the desire that all who bear human features should +participate in the chief goods of our existence and freely co-operate in +the highest tasks. It must be observed that this longing is one which, +at the present time, is found to be irresistible. And so the +aristocratic character of Immanent Idealism produces a type of life +rigidly exclusive, harsh and intolerable. + +But not only does this type of life lack complete power and truthfulness +in regard to mankind as a whole; it is subject to similar limitations in +relation to the world and to things. All success in our relation to the +world and to things depends on the spiritual constituting the thing's +own depth, on things finding their genuine being in it, and where this +depth is reached, on the visible world uniting with it willingly, indeed +joyfully, and moulding itself solely and completely for spiritual +expression. Spirit and world must strive together in mutual trust and +each must finally be completely involved one in the other; reality must +build itself up, if not at one stroke, at any rate in ceaseless advance +as a kingdom of reason. A solution at once so simple and so easy bluntly +contradicts the experiences of the last century. Both without and within +the soul of man an infinite concreteness makes itself evident, which +withstands all derivation from general principles, all insertion into a +comprehensive scheme, obstinately asserts its particularity, forms its +own complexes, and follows its own course. The realistic mode of thought +of the Modern Age has brought this aspect of reality to full +recognition. If the spiritual life cannot take complete possession of +things, if a realm of facts continues to exist over against it, it may +be doubted whether the spiritual is of the ultimate being of the world +and reveals the reality of things, or whether it merely comes to them +from without and only touches their surface. In the latter case external +limitation becomes the cause of an inward convulsion. This is a fact +which we find corroborated when we come to reflect that Immanent +Idealism treats the spiritual life in man much too hastily and boldly as +absolute spiritual life; that it attributes to human capacity, without +further consideration, that which belongs to spiritual life in general. +The experiences of modern life place the particularity and insignificant +of man more and more before our eyes; they enable us to see with what +difficulty and how slowly any kind of spiritual life whatever has +emerged in the human sphere, and with what toil it maintains itself +there; they insist that, if the spiritual life is not to sink down to a +mere appearance to man, a sharp distinction must be made between the +substance of the spiritual life and the form of its existence in man; in +every sphere modern life puts questions which lead beyond the position +of Immanent Idealism. Immanent Idealism seems to treat the problem of +life much too summarily and not to penetrate sufficiently to ultimate +depths. + +The conflict between Immanent Idealism and modern life is still more +keen in regard to the problem whether reality is rational. It is +essential to this Idealism to affirm this rationality; it need not +conceive it as present in a complete state, but it must be sure of an +advance to it; the movement of reality, with its antitheses and +conflicts, must pass in elements of reason. Immanent Idealism tolerates +no inner division of the spiritual life; wherever spiritual movement +emerges, there can be no doubt concerning the aim; the development of +power must bring the right disposition with it; every limitation can +come only from weakness or misunderstanding; there can be no radical +evil. With an optimism of this kind the leading minds of German +classical literature are imbued; but how much, in the midst of all the +progress of civilisation, in the nineteenth century the appearance of +the world has been darkened! We see now with complete clearness the +indifference of the forces of nature towards the aims of the spirit; we +see the incessant crossing of the work of reason by blind necessity; we +see the spiritual life divided against itself, eminent spiritual powers +drawn into the service of lower interests, and carried away by +unrestrained passion. In a time of extraordinary increase of technical +and social culture, we see the spiritual life win scarcely anything, in +fact, seriously recede; we see it become perplexed concerning its main +direction, and oscillate in uncertainty between different possibilities. +We experience in every sphere a violent convulsion of the spirit. How +can Immanent Idealism satisfy us under such circumstances; how can it +assure to our life a firm basis? + +Indeed, we may now doubt whether Immanent Idealism signifies a type of +life at all; whether it is not simply a compromise between a religious +shaping of life and a life turned towards sense experience; a _via +media_, which as merely transitional is only able to maintain itself for +a time. The historical experience of the Modern Age seems to show that +the latter hypothesis is the true one. At the beginning of the epoch +Religion stood in secure supremacy and the divine acted on man from a +sovereignty that was supreme over the world. Then the divine came ever +closer to the world that it might spread itself over it and permeate it, +till finally there was no longer any separation, and God and world +blended together in a single whole. At first this seemed a pure and a +great gain: the divine put off all rigid sovereignty and spoke to us +immediately out of the whole extent of life; the world was related, +through the power of the divine, to an inner whole and, illuminated by +it, received a transfigured appearance. And yet this solution was only +apparent; it contained an inner contradiction, which ultimately was +bound to break forth with a power of destruction. The divine had +developed its power and its depth in opposition to the world; will it +retain that power and that depth if the opposition ceases; will not the +renunciation of supremacy, the fusion with things, rob it of all +distinctive content? As a matter of fact, with this increase in +proximity and extension, the divine fades and dissolves more and more; +ever less power proceeds from it: and so the world is ever less +transformed and elevated by it; its transfiguring light is dissipated +and its inner relations are broken. From being a life-penetrating power +Pantheism becomes more and more a vague disposition; indeed, an empty +phrase. The living whole, which in the beginning raised things to +itself, has finally become a mere abstraction which cannot hold its +ground before vigorous thought. Thus, with an immanent dialectic, such +as historical life often enough shows, the movement, since it strove for +breadth, has been destroyed in its life-giving root; it has abandoned +the basis from which it derived its truth and power. Immanent Idealism +shows itself to be one great contradiction; a fascinating illusion, +which, instead of reality, presents us with mere appearance. + +Of course, Immanent Idealism is not finally refuted by such doubts and +difficulties; it puts forward demands which need to be satisfied in +some way; it contains truths which in some manner must be acknowledged. +What would become of human life if it should abandon its striving +forwards to the whole; its spiritual penetration of the world; its +advance in greatness and breadth; its joyous and vigorous nature; the +excellence of its disposition? But the indispensable truth that is +involved in Immanent Idealism must be brought into wider relations, and +thus made clear and modified, so that it may be more secure and more +fruitful in its effect. Meanwhile, we see that here also we are in +complete uncertainty; that which was intended to give a firm support, +and to point out a clear course to our life, has itself become a +difficult problem. + + +(b) THE NEWER SYSTEMS + +No attack from without and no relaxation from within could have brought +the older systems of life into the state of chaos which we actually find +them to be in, if the experience of sense had not become far more to man +and had not given him far more to do than in earlier times. Hitherto +genuine spiritual life seemed to be able to unfold itself only in +energetic detachment from the world of sense; it reduced this world to a +subordinate sphere which received its position and value only from a +transcendent order; thus, all tarrying with the things of sense seemed +to be a sign of a lower disposition, a falling from the heights of human +life. + +This view has been radically altered by the course of the Modern Age. +When the invisible world became uncertain to man and the life directed +towards it shadowy, an intense thirst for reality, for a life out of the +abundance and truth of things, arose, and only the visible world seemed +to promise satisfaction. This world had been seen previously in a +particular light which is now felt to be artificial and distorting; if +this light fails and the world can unfold itself unaffected, it shows a +far richer content, far firmer relations, far greater tasks. All this is +more especially because the world no longer appears to be something +finished, but as still in process and as capable of a thorough-going +elevation; because great possibilities which human power is able to +awaken still lie dormant in it. In diverse directions sense experience +advances far beyond the older form; Natural Science analyses the visible +world into its single components and makes it penetrable to our thought, +and at the same time technical skill wins power over its forces. In the +political and social sphere men find new tasks not only in regard to +isolated questions, but throughout the whole of its organisation, and +great hopes of an essential elevation of life are raised. The individual +also appears more powerful and richer, in that the decay of traditional +ties gives him complete freedom for his development. Even if, in the +struggle for the control of life, these movements in many ways fall into +contradiction one with another, still, in the first place they unite in +advancing the world of sense in man's estimation, in fixing his love and +his work there, and in also making men more and more disinclined to +consider the life-systems rooted in the invisible. Sense experience +presents itself ever more decidedly as something which can tolerate +neither partner nor rival; the life directed towards it loses more and +more the nature of being an opponent, which it hitherto had, and it +undertakes to shape our whole existence characteristically in positive +achievement and also to satisfy the spiritual needs of man completely. +All this signifies an entire reversal of the order of life; for, since +the world which formerly had seemed secondary now becomes predominant, +indeed exclusive, all standards and values are changed, and the old +possession appears also as a new gain. It is true that the new mode of +thought misses the advantages which a long tradition gave to the old: +but in place of this, it has the charm of searching and finding for +itself, the joy of first discovery and successful exertion; here an +infinite horizon is disclosed; before the research and effort of man +lies an open way. Endeavour derives particular power and confidence +from the conviction that the new is nothing else than the old and +genuine, but hitherto misunderstood, nature: it is a return of life to +itself, to its plain and pure truth, which permits us to expect a new +world epoch. And so mankind, exalted in mind and with cheerful courage, +enters upon the course which promises so much. + + +1. THE NATURALISTIC SYSTEM + +The movement towards giving sole attention to the world of sense cannot +make sure progress without a more definite decision concerning the main +agents and the main direction of work. Different possibilities here +offer themselves; three, however, in particular. In reality, these have +all evolved, sometimes blending together and strengthening one another, +at other times crossing and hindering one another. + +None of these movements has displayed more energy and exercised more +power than that which makes the sense experience of surrounding nature +its basis, and strives to include man's entire being within this +experience. This is Naturalism, which, starting out from the mechanical +conception of nature, which has been developed in the Modern Age, +applies the ideas thus obtained to everything, and subordinates even the +life of the soul to them. The movement originated at the dawn of the +seventeenth century, when an independence and autonomy of nature began +to be acknowledged. Nature had been covered with a veil of explanation, +mainly æsthetic or religious in character, which gave it a colour +corresponding to the prevailing disposition, but at the same time +excluded the possibility of a scientific comprehension. A comprehension +of this kind could only be attained by getting rid of all subjective +addition which had been made by man, and by investigating nature purely +by itself. Since Descartes and Galileo that has been accomplished, and +nature now appears as an immense web of single threads, as a complex of +fundamentally mobile, but soulless, elements, whose movements take +simple basal forms, while the combination of these elements produces all +constructions, even the most complicated. This mighty machinery never +points beyond, and as it runs its course solely within itself, so it +requires to be understood solely from itself. Everything spiritual is +thus eliminated; this realm of fact has no implication of aims, or of a +meaning of events. + +This new scientific conception of nature had first, with much toil and +difficulty, to wrestle with the traditional, naïvely human, +representation; this was chiefly a matter of reducing first appearances +to their simple elements, and of constructing the world anew from these. +By this process, nature at the same time became accessible to the +operation of man. For, the technical control of nature presupposes the +analytic character of research; only such a research, with its discovery +of the single elements and tendencies, places man in a relation of +activity towards nature; while in earlier times only an attitude of +contemplation had been granted to him. Natural Science thus created a +new type of life, a life energetic, masculine, pressing forward +unceasingly. + +This life, like science itself, in the first place forms a special part +of a wider whole. As the expulsion of the soul from nature at first +brought about a strengthening of the soul in itself, nature was the less +immediately able to govern the whole. The individual of modern times +strengthened and asserted himself against nature, and insisted upon a +realm of independent inwardness. The contest was a severe one; yet the +more nature was seen to extend, on the one hand, to the infinitely +great, and, on the other, to the infinitely small, the more fixed +relations it showed, so much the more overwhelmingly did it draw man to +itself, the more did its conception tend to include the inner aspects of +the soul also. The final blow in the struggle was given by the modern +theory of descent, since this theory asserts man to be the product +solely of natural forces, and maintains that everything which man +ascribes to himself as characteristic and distinctive is derived from a +gradual development of natural factors. And so nature is exalted as an +all-comprehensive world--nature, that is, as represented in the modern +mechanistic theory, which is thus transformed into a final theory of the +world, a naturalistic metaphysic. The human and spiritual world, which +hitherto had been felt to be an independent realm in contrast with +nature, appears henceforth as its mere continuation, as something which +fits completely into a wider conception of nature. + +A conviction of this kind must fundamentally alter the position of the +spiritual life, as well as its magnitudes and values: and this +conviction is no mere theory, but desires and strives to take possession +of the whole of existence and to change its form completely. Indeed, a +particular naturalistic type of life arises and wins a powerful +influence over the thought and activity of the time. + +Naturalism denies all independence of the spiritual life, which it +regards as nothing more than an adjunct to the realm of nature, and one +that can only exist along with sense existence, as a part of or as a +supplement to it. Spirituality has, therefore, to subordinate itself and +conform entirely to the life of nature; it can never produce and guide a +movement from itself, never evolve a basal and comprehensive activity, +never withdraw itself into its own sphere as into an independent realm. +All self-existent spirituality fades to a world of mere shadows; +whatever makes itself felt in us can only become a complete reality by +winning flesh and blood through the appropriation of physical forces. +Life, thus understood, possesses nothing in itself; it receives +everything from its relations to the environment with which it is bound +up: thought brings forth no new ideas; all ideas are merely +abbreviations of sense impressions. Effort can never realise purely +spiritual values; the essence of all happiness is sensuous enjoyment, +however refined that may in some cases be. The naturalistic system of +life receives a more definite delineation from the representation of +nature, which the mechanical theory, together with a theory of descent +adapted to it, sketches and impressively holds up to the present age. By +this theory nature is completely resolved into a co-existence of +individual forces, which, within the narrow bounds of existence, must +clash violently together, and assert themselves one against the other in +ceaseless conflict. This conflict, however, is a source of progressive +movement, in that it brings together, establishes, and employs +everything useful for self-preservation; it keeps life in a state of +youthful freshness, in that new conditions continually arise and demand +new accommodations with respect to the biologico-economic environment. A +biologico-economic mode of thought is evolved which revolutionises all +previous estimations of values. Everything intrinsically valuable +disappears from the world; its expulsion seems a deliverance from a +confused, indeed a meaningless, conception of things; the useful, that +which promotes the interests of living beings, each after its kind, in +the struggle for existence, becomes the all-dominating value. No +mysterious being of things is apprehended in the True; but those +presentations and systems of thought are called true which ensure that +the best accommodation to the conditions of life shall be attained, and +which just in this way hold the individuals together. No longer does a +Good speak to man with austere demand from a transcendent sovereignty; +but that is good which, within our experience, is of service to the +preservation of life. The Beautiful, also, is subordinated to the +useful, and it is solely by its value in relation to this that it +asserts itself. In everything, it is only one's own welfare, the +interest of individual preservation, that directly inspires conduct; but +real life shows man in so many relations, so closely implicated with his +environment, that he can strive for nothing for himself without also +striving for others. This extension of interests has no limits; there is +nothing in the whole of infinity which could not in this way become to +man, indirectly, a means of self-preservation and thus an object of +desire. + +The naturalistic type of life extends from the most general of impulses +to every branch of activity, and forms every department of life in a +distinctive fashion. Knowledge depends entirely upon experience; every +speculative element must be excluded as a subjective delusion; in all +its branches knowledge is nothing else than a broadened Natural Science. +Art may not pursue imaginary ideals; it finds its single task in the +faithful and simple reproduction of the natural environment. Social life +and endeavour will develop, above all, natural powers, and will seek to +adapt itself to the conditions given by nature, and, rejecting all aims +based upon mere imagination, it will care chiefly for the physical +welfare of the whole, as the source of all power and of all success. + +It is not difficult to understand how this form of life was able to win +and carry away the minds of its contemporaries. In the first place it +has the character of simplicity and immediacy, which, in contrast with +the complexity and the remoteness of the traditional position, appears a +great advantage. For, in this scheme, life, with all its multiplicity, +is dominated and unified by the idea of natural self-preservation; and +the things which immediately affect us, which lie physically and +psychically near to us, come most directly into relation to this aim. It +is a further tendency of this scheme of life to bring the whole of +existence into a state of activity and restless advance. For the state +of conflict which prevails under the naturalistic system allows nothing +to persist merely because of its present existence or through the weight +of tradition, but everything must always be reasserting its right to +existence; it must stretch and extend itself in order to be useful in +the life of the present. That which cannot satisfy this test is +unmercifully thrown over as a dead weight. It is also of great +importance to the theory in question that nature and the world are +involved in ceaseless change, and that, along with the conditions of +life, the requirements also alter: the matter is one of continually +accommodating oneself anew; and so life is placed entirely in the +present, and the fixity of an absolute conception and treatment of +change yields to the instability of a relative one. Last of all, and +most especially, life according to its own conviction bears the +character of truth. For human striving appears to attain the firm basis +of reality, and to become truthful in itself only when it is definitely +related to the surrounding world; while, so long as it trusted to the +capacity of the subject--which fondly imagined itself independent--it +fell into unspeakable error. Only when delivered from subjectivity, only +when fixed within the web of the whole of nature, does life seem to +awaken out of a dream, and to become fully real, a genuine, securely +grounded life. + +The energy of negation which this theory employs and with which it +drives out everything which has become old adds strength to the elements +of assertion and positive achievement in these changes. In this theory +there is nothing indefinite which could soften the opposition, nothing +mediatory which could overcome it, but, distinctly and harshly, +affirmation and negation stand face to face and call for a plain +decision between them. Whatever remains in doubt and under suspicion is +forced into the background, indeed eliminated altogether, through the +victorious onward march of modern Natural Science and the increasing +triumphs of technical skill, which seem to demonstrate, immediately, the +truth of the naturalistic type of life. Thus, this movement spreads in a +mighty flood through humanity, and seizes with a particular power the +classes which are struggling upward, and which meet science and culture +with a faith yet undisturbed. In matters temporal there is hardly +anything which seems able to withstand such an attack. + +Nevertheless, that which gains the support of many contemporaries is not +thereby proved to be the supreme power and the final truth. In that +movement there may be far more, and something far more important than it +itself admits. It may be that it achieves that which it does achieve +only with the help of elements of another kind; perhaps, indeed, it is +able to maintain its truth only in so far as it enters into broader +relations in a wider whole and thereby changes its meaning essentially. +Whether such is the case can be ascertained not by reference to +subjective opinion, but by an examination of the life of humanity. + +Now, the first movement of opposition is produced in just that sphere +which seemed Naturalism's strongest bulwark, that is, Natural Science, +the Natural Science based on mathematics and physics. Only the most +fleeting survey can lead to the confusion of Natural Science with +Naturalism; in reality, the naturalistic thinker cannot with justice +acknowledge any exact Natural Science, and a natural scientist cannot be +naturalistic in thought in consequence of his science, but only in spite +of it. For, Natural Science is anything but a mere copy of the sense +impressions which we experience; its origin and progress are due to the +fact that thought fundamentally acts upon and transforms those +impressions. If our intellect were no more than Naturalism can logically +make it out to be, it could, at most, only refine the animal +presentations a little; it never could have advanced beyond the single +presentations to a representative conception of the world as a whole. +Such an advance can be achieved only by thought raising itself above the +stream of appearances and placing itself over against it; but how could +a mere bundle of perceptions, to which Naturalism reduces the intellect, +achieve this? Incomparably more unity of being and freedom of operation +are necessary for this achievement than such a bundle could produce. + +In earlier times, no doubt, man went very much astray in the +interpretation of his environment; he transferred his immediate feelings +into it; he coloured the whole world in human colours, and associated +with its realities as with beings of the same nature as himself. But +even the error shows a seeking and an interpretation; the simple putting +of the question proclaims a being becoming superior to mere nature. The +most important thing, however, is that man has not regarded the matter +as finally settled with this anthropomorphism; he has come to regard it +as inadequate and has pressed forward to a new way of thinking. What +could drive him to that change but a desire for truth, and how is such a +conception as _truth_ attainable from nature? And if thought has +succeeded in breaking through the misty veil of anthropomorphism and +seeks things in their own relations; if an objective consciousness of +the world has emerged, a consciousness which is as different from the +immediacy of sense impressions as the sky is distant from the earth, has +not man also grown in himself beyond mere sense impression; is it not a +work of thought which supports and governs the whole construction, and +differentiates genuine nature from appearance? How much power of +comprehension and of relating together is exhibited even by Natural +Science, in that it analyses the sense presentation of the environment +into its single elements, ascertains the laws of these, and traces the +movement from the simplest beginnings right up to its present stage of +development. All activity of thought is thus subject to a certain +reproach in that it must continually bring itself into relation to +perception: nevertheless it will interweave all that is imparted to it +by perception into a framework of thought--transform it, in fact, into a +realm of thought. Spirituality is bound; but how dull an individual must +be to confuse such a bound spirituality with mere sensuousness! + +The error of Naturalism is obvious; concerned solely with the object and +its form, it entirely leaves out of account the psychical activity which +is involved in the perception of an object; it overlooks the +life-process within which alone we can have knowledge of an object and +occupy ourselves with it. As soon, however, as we regard the object from +this point of view, it will be transformed and will assume far more +spiritual traits. Reality will then burst asunder the framework into +which Naturalism desires to press it. + +The type of life which Naturalism gives rise to also contains more than +Naturalism is able to explain. At first sight it seems as though man is +taken up completely into a wider conception of nature; as though his +life obeys its forces and impulses exclusively; as though all his +asserted superiority to nature is simply imaginary. As a matter of fact, +in this turning to nature, man, with his spiritual activity, stands not +within, but above, nature. For he does not appear as a mere piece of +nature, but experiences it and thinks over it: its kingdom, its +organisation, its stability become to him a joyful possession and a +widening of his being. The spiritual life has developed in relation to +nature; nature has not welded it together. The same may be said of the +idea of the increase of power, which constitutes the main gain of life +in the naturalistic system. For, in the naturalistic type of life power +is not directed towards externals, as in nature, but is experienced and +enjoyed, and only thus does it constitute a source of happiness; yet how +could it be that, without an organisation of life in an inner unity +which transcends individual occurrences? Thus, the intellectual and the +technical control of nature which the Modern Age has acquired attracts +men and prevails over them chiefly as a growth of life, as an increase +of self-reliance. Even material goods, wealth and property, do not +determine the endeavour of the man of culture so much through sensuous +enjoyment, the limit of which is soon reached, as through their +possibilities as means to activity and creation, to the advancement of +human capacity. It is this in particular which has filled the material +civilisation of the present with the spirit of restlessness and +extravagance, and gives it its demoniacal power over men. It is this +relation alone which explains and justifies the present estimate of +material goods, so much higher as that is in modern culture than it was +in the older systems of thought, which branded as unworthy all endeavour +directed to the acquirement of such things. + +In short, even Naturalism in no way eliminates the subject with its +inwardness; rather in its own development it everywhere presupposes the +subject. It does not shape life out of mere and pure nature, but out of +a close union of a transcendent spiritual life with nature, and out of +an energetic insistence upon elements of nature within the soul. +However, man experiences not so much the things themselves as himself +in the things; the relating together, the surveying, the experiencing of +the whole is always a spiritual performance. This performance makes +something different out of nature, just as the naturalistic culture that +is striven for is different from the state of nature that is found at +the beginning. The misconception of the relation of nature to the mind; +the postulation of nature without mind, in place of nature with mind, +makes Naturalism self-contradictory and untenable. Naturalism therefore +struggles vainly against the following dilemma: if it is really in +earnest in the elimination of spiritual realities, it must inevitably +destroy its own fundamental basis and, as a system of life, must break +down; while if it in any way acknowledges a transcendence of nature, and +a transcendence just in that which is fundamental to it, then it is +necessarily driven beyond itself. + +But such contradiction in the basal position must be present through the +whole development of Naturalism and must make all its factors variating +in colour and double in meaning, since at one and the same time they +involve the spiritual element and reject it, eliminate it and bring it +into the foreground, the former openly and explicitly, the latter +concealedly and implicitly. Such is the case, in particular, with the +fundamental conception of the _struggle for existence_. In the context +of Naturalism, this conception can signify nothing else than the +preservation of natural existence, of mere life; such a conception, +however, is as incapable of comprehending the whole wealth of the work +of civilisation and culture as it is of developing within itself. If the +preservation of existence in this sense were really the highest aim, +then, all the work of humanity, incalculable and great as it is, all the +toil and creative activity of history, would be without result; in no +way would it lead beyond the starting-point; we should, of course, have +life, but nothing along with and in life. Indeed, the movement would be +a continual retrogression, for the experience of the present shows us +clearly enough that the conflict of life becomes ever more difficult, +toilsome, and embittered. If all this toil does not yield more than was +possessed in the original condition, that is, physical existence, then +this implies that we have to make an ever greater detour to establish +that which formerly devolved upon us immediately. In such a case our +life would be a continual sinking, a toil continually increasing in +difficulty, in order that we might simply be something, without being +anything in particular. Or, will anyone assert that there is no +retrogression when the achievement of the same aim costs ever more +effort, ever more labour and turmoil of spirit? + +The fact is that Naturalism also gives to life, which is seen to be thus +immersed in conflict, some kind of content, which it conceives as +increasing continually in the course of the movement, and as attaining +for us through the conflict an ever richer and more comprehensive +existence. But how can a conception such as that of the _content of +life_ originate in mere nature? How can it be even conceived unless life +possesses some consciousness of itself, unless there is a transformation +of what is external into something internal--a thing which nature can +never accomplish? + +With the conception of the _struggle for existence_, the useful becomes +the preponderant power of life; it attempts a transvaluation of all +values, since it lays stress rather on the relation of things to us than +on their own nature. The conception won acceptance from and power over +the minds of men because it was a complete change from the generally +accepted explanation, and at the same time seemed to simplify matters +greatly. Unfortunately, on further consideration this transformation +proves to be a complete reversal of the general scheme of life, indeed a +destruction of it. Man, it is true, does not preserve his physical +existence without toil; he must continually win it anew, and nothing can +occupy him which does not acquire some relation to this necessity and +make itself consistent with it. But the further question arises, whether +anxiety for the useful is also able to crush out that which is +distinctive and characteristic in the world of humanity. If we +recognise the limits of the endeavour after the useful, we shall soon +become doubtful concerning its claim to be the sole aim of conduct. That +endeavour is spent solely on the welfare of the individual; it can never +free itself from reference to the individual, and never, beyond that +perceived, can it take up anything as an aim in itself. Interest is +centred solely upon the external products of the activity of men and of +the process of nature, and not at all upon what men and nature are in +themselves. We find here nothing but isolated spheres of existence which +are devoid alike of inner relation to themselves and to one another. + +Now, Naturalism can appeal in its own defence to the fact that real life +shows its individual departments to have thousands of inter-relationships, +so that the welfare of the individual is inseparably bound up with that of +his environment, his family, his home, his state; and that therefore, in +order to prosper himself, his endeavour must be for the good of these +also. It may even serve his own interest to give up a direct advantage in +favour of a greater indirect one. Further, Naturalism is able to assert +that, however little the inner disposition of others may affect us +directly, this disposition can acquire a value for us in so far as its +persistence alone assures to us a continuance of achievement. As +considerations of this kind may be extended without limit, there is +nothing in the whole breadth of existence which the utilitarian view of +life need reject. + +But, in the midst of all this extension in breadth, this development of +life retains a fixed limitation in its inner nature, which cannot be +transcended: we can never strive for the alien, the other, the whole, +for its own sake, but only as a means for our own welfare; everything +inward becomes a matter of indifference if, sooner or later, it is not +transformed into an external result. Human life, however, through its +own development has grown beyond this limitation; if not in the breadth +of existence, yet in its inner nature and at its highest, it manifests +something significantly more. Man is capable of a love which values +another, not because it hopes for this or that which is useful from +him, but because with the whole of his existence he is valuable to it. +Man is capable of a love which can lead him to the willing +subordination, indeed the joyful sacrifice, of his own existence; of a +love in which the first self dies and a new self is born. "Love is the +greatest of all contradictions, and one which the understanding cannot +solve, since there is nothing more impenetrable than this individuality +of self-consciousness, which is negated, and which yet I should retain +as positive" (Hegel). Into what a state of poverty humanity would fall +if a genuine love of this kind were struck out of the number of its +possessions! But can Naturalism in any way understand and estimate such +an inner expansion of the heart, such a _Stirbe und Werde_ [a dying to +live], to use the words of Goethe? + +A deliverance of life from the mere _ego_ is effected in another +direction in work. Of course, work also stands in close relation to the +preservation of life; it must demonstrate itself to be in some way +useful. But work would never fill the soul and attain to anything great +if it did not also become an aim in itself; if it were not carried on in +complete submission to the object and according to its requirements. How +low all educational endeavour, personal guardianship, all work for +humanity would sink; how humanity would lack all self-forgetting +devotion to it, all bold pressing forward; and how unintelligible the +joy in a life's vocation would be, if the idea of utility solely and +entirely determined conduct, if the chief concern were always how the +work paid! Should we not sink, in such a case, into a slavery which +would enthral man far more oppressively than any command which a tyrant +could be capable of? + +It is true that on the average level of existence much is turned to the +service of the merely useful which was produced from love and work, and +this reversal of spiritual goods may be the first thing which comes +definitely under our notice. In order, however, even to be so applied +and reversed, they must originally have been generated in some manner, +and this original generation can never proceed from the useful, but only +out of the inner force and compulsion of the object, as, for example, in +the case of the great transitions of thought, of artistic creation, and +of religious conviction. And, as these have proceeded from inner +movements, so they have also brought about powerful inner changes. They +have not altered this or that in a given world in order to make it more +comfortable to man, but with an energetic revolution have transformed +our world from its very foundations, and have constructed a new world in +contrast to that which immediately surrounds us. How much or how little +individual men, or indeed even mankind as a whole, have appropriated of +this; how far man has corresponded and still corresponds to the +necessities of his own nature, is a matter and a question in itself: in +the spiritual life of humanity the new magnitudes are extant, and they +operate here as norms for testing all achievement. At the same time, +they show that our life and our nature are of a kind different from what +Naturalism represents them to be. However much Naturalism may boast that +it is possible for even the highest to be drawn into the service of the +merely human, with all its boasting it has not explained the origin of +the highest: can a thing proceed from its own shadow? The naturalistic +attempt to trace everything back to the useful really reverses the +condition of affairs and results in inner destruction wherever +disposition stands first. For conduct changes its character completely +according as it is regarded as a mere means, or as an end in itself; +according as its aim is striven for directly or only indirectly. Do such +things as love, fidelity, honour deserve these names if the thought of +selfish advantage is their motive power? It lies in the nature of +certain things that they must be treated as ends in themselves and as +matters of primary concern: to degrade them to a subsidiary position is +in their case only a finer kind of destruction; to be opposed to utility +is an attribute inseparable from their very being. Where disposition is +valued only as a pre-condition of achievement, as in Naturalism, at the +highest only a tolerable appearance, a substitute for a genuine +disposition, can be reached in the whole moral sphere. Naturalism +affords us an example of such a substitution when it sets up an +altruistic action, that is, an action which produces something useful to +another, in place of an inner expansion of life, which takes the other +up inwardly into our own volition and being, and which alone leads +beyond egoism. Naturalism is able to overlook all this; is able to make +what is the secondary view of things the primary one; the derived, the +original; is able to put the relation to human perception in place of +the thing itself, only because its interest is so completely occupied +with external relations that it does not independently evaluate the +inner; and again, because a reflection that appeals to the understanding +hinders all immediate relation and spontaneous appropriation. Otherwise, +it also would feel how deep, how intolerable, a degradation of man +ensues if his innermost experience, his striving after truth, his +wrestling for unity within himself, his love, and his suffering are made +a mere means to physical self-preservation, and are thus regarded from +the point of view of utility. + +If we glance over the life of universal history, we see that a history +of a distinctively human character extricates itself from the machinery +of nature only through man's acquiring an independence over against his +environment, evolving a life conscious of itself and from it exerting a +transforming power upon all presented to it. Only thus does a +civilisation grow up in contrast with the mere state of nature. In +civilisation and culture man enters into conflict with the infinity of +the external world, but he cannot carry on this conflict victoriously +without setting an inner infinity in opposition to that external one. In +the struggle between these two worlds the life of man is transformed no +less than the appearance of reality. More and more the visible world +becomes an expression of an invisible one; more and more life draws the +world into itself and finds the chief problems in its own sphere. Thus +life becomes raised above simple physical preservation; that which +serves in this preservation is regarded as a condition only and as +something preliminary. + +Among the peoples situated nearest to us, this tendency has taken +different forms; but the separation of creative spiritual activity from +all mere utility is common to all. Thus, Greek culture gave birth to a +life resting in its own movement, a life satisfied in itself. In the +sharpest manner it marked off the beautiful, that which could produce +pleasure immediately and of itself, from the merely useful, everything +which served something else. It lauded the life filled with the +perception and appreciation of the beautiful as the only free life, and +pronounced every other way of life to be servile. Further, if in +Christianity, in the comprehensiveness of its relations, the care for +the welfare of the narrowly human takes up a great amount of attention, +and a utilitarianism of a religious kind is evolved, the height of its +creation and disposition is not affected: in it the winning of a new +life superior to all selfishness, the becoming one with the divine, is +the one end in itself. If Clement of Alexandria could say that, if it +was a matter of choosing between the knowledge of God and eternal bliss, +he would have, without hesitation, to renounce the latter, or if Thomas +à Kempis said, "I would rather be poor for Thy sake than rich without +Thee. I choose rather to be a pilgrim with Thee on the earth, than +without Thee to possess heaven. For where Thou art, there is heaven; but +where Thou art not, there is death and hell"--then these are not merely +the lofty sayings of individuals, but a faithful expression of that +which gave to the whole system its world-penetrating and world-reviving +power. + +The Modern Age, too, which has conceded so much to utilitarian striving, +is in the innermost essence of its effort far removed from the spirit of +mere utility. For, from the two poles of its life, from the subject as +from the object, it breaks through all that is simply "given" and forms +a new, self-existent world. In modern times the subject frees itself +from the environment, places itself proudly over against it, and finds +its securest experience in the self-certainty of its own life. At the +same time it in no way renounces the surrounding world; but through the +activity of thought it reconstructs that world, and in this +conceptualises and idealises all its magnitudes. The more the subject +becomes assured of seeing all things spiritually and scientifically by +means of its own organisation, the more true is it that all sense +experience is sustained and modified by spiritual power. Natural +self-preservation cannot possibly satisfy the striving of the subject. +For this striving can never be reduced to a mere means, but finds its +power, as its joy, in becoming a world in itself; in the proud +maintenance and establishment of its own nature in face of every +opposition; in the impression of its particularity upon the infinity of +things. On the other hand, over against the circumstantiality of man, +great systems of thought are formed; evolve a characteristic content and +independent powers; and, as forces in the life of universal history, +press forward their consequences with inevitable necessity. These +systems seek to bring reality under their sway, and do not manifest the +least concern with regard to the continuance and the interests of man. +Science and art and the political and economical aspects of life afford +examples of what we mean. Accordingly, in the modern world and in the +modern man, two movements towards infinity clash together, and from +these there arise great commotion and violent unrest. Whatever may +remain enigmatical in this, the fact of the transformation of the first, +the sense experience of things, is beyond doubt. It is also beyond doubt +that man, regarded spiritually, does not find himself a member of a +given world, but must first seek and make clear his fundamental +relations to the world. From this position Naturalism, with its naïve +assertion of the finality and permanence of the sense impression, +appears to be an intolerable dogmatism. + +Naturalism is seen to be far below the highest point of universal +historical development; it cannot appropriate the experiences and +results of that development; it consists of a confusion of naïve and +scientific modes of thought, which win the adherence of many +individuals, but which, through their contradictions, can never +guarantee to life genuine stability and a clear course. Only because it +evolves in the atmosphere of a world of another kind, and thereby +imperceptibly enhances its own conceptions, does it appear at all +plausible. Nevertheless, even so, it is a mischievous confusion of +thought which must act detrimentally upon conduct. Those especially will +be opposed to it who recognise in human life great tasks and severe +perplexities, and desire that the highest powers and clearest thought +shall be called forth for the accomplishment of those tasks and the +solution of those perplexities. But Naturalism, obscuring, as it does, +the inner problems of life; with its backwardness in the movement of +universal history; and with its attempt to take from human life all +proud and free self-consciousness, indeed all soul, can tend only to +reduce the energy of life. + +The rejection of Naturalism by no means signifies failure to appreciate +the increased attention to nature, out of the wrong interpretation of +which Naturalism has proceeded. Not only has visible nature become more +to our knowledge; it has also become incomparably more to our life. The +fact that we feel ourselves conditioned by it, and have become more +closely associated with it, can be fully appreciated and must force us +to a radical revision of the traditional form of life. Such a revision, +however, can be successful in achieving its aim only if the new +experiences are systematised to form a consistent whole with the +remaining facts in a comprehensive, universal life; spiritual endeavour +is solely and alone capable of offering this universality and of +accomplishing this task. + + +2. THE SOCIALISTIC SYSTEM + +The socialistic system of life is often closely bound up with the +naturalistic, and blends with it so well as almost to form a single +whole; indeed, there is so much affinity in their fundamental +principles that the one may appear to be the completion of the other. +But when we come to details, we find that a different character and a +different emotional life are yielded according as the relation to nature +or to human society governs life; especially as we are parts in an +infinite nature, or as we place our own province in the foreground and +seek a new form for it. On the one hand knowledge takes the lead, on the +other activity. While the former, according to its nature, is more +concerned with reaching a consistent whole, the latter feels the +contradictions of experience most intensely. With the one progress +appears to be a gradual accumulation, with the other it does not seem +possible to dispense with a radical change; while the former is broader +in its outlook, the latter has more warmth of enthusiasm. Through the +domination of thought and life by the problems of society, a distinctive +form of culture may therefore be expected. + +In modern life different motives have led to a closer unity of men on +the basis of experience. Religion no longer accords to the individual +firm support as in earlier times, and with every advance of scientific +research nature is removed inwardly further from us; ceaseless criticism +and reflection tend to prevent us more and more from comprehending the +whole as a unity. Man, thus isolated in the whole, seems to himself to +be lost, unless he succeeds in discovering relations between himself and +others of the same nature as himself, and unless in co-operation with +them he helps to build up an independent realm of their own, which may +lend support and value to the life of the individual. + +In the Modern Age social life has tended to this end under the influence +of fresh impressions and new prospects. Hitherto that life was under the +influence of an invisible world of thought, especially of one of a +religious kind. The union of men had particular presuppositions and was +realised in a particular manner; here, the more closely a certain group +held together, the more sharply was it separated from others; the +calling forth of power in one particular direction meant diverting it +from other tasks. A changed mode of thought was also able to take +exception to the view that the ties which bind men together came from a +transcendent order, which is now felt as an "other" world and is the +subject of doubt. At first, therefore, we are apt to think it a pure +gain if modern society no longer concerns itself with these invisible +bonds, and regards the union as arising solely and entirely out of the +immediate experience of life. For then there is nothing to hinder the +balanced development of all the relationships of men among themselves; +the social life serves no other end, but finds its task and happiness in +itself, and in its actuality is disturbed by no kind of doubt. + +With this deliverance from all external constraint, a positive advance +of the life of society on the basis of the Modern Age is associated. A +life more free in conduct, and which through progress in the arts +ceaselessly expands, brings men nearer to one another, and forces them +into closer union; action and reaction accelerate each other. The +opinions and strivings of the masses are determined more easily and +exercise more influence; the whole and its influence upon the individual +become incomparably stronger. At the same time, the energetic attention +that men bestow upon the surrounding reality throws into bold relief +relations which have existed from the earliest times, but which hitherto +have not been prominent, and enables them to acquire a greater value for +life. Since the old appears in a new light, and the new arises, diverse +streams of social life are formed, and through their diversity operate +to the strengthening of the main tendency. + +Modern Sociology shows the individual to be far more dependent upon the +social environment, upon general conditions, than we are wont to assume +from the first impression, which usually throws differences into relief +and overlooks common traits, generally fails to pay sufficient attention +to the growth of the individuals, and is too apt to take the positions +which they possess as essentially the result of their own work. In +contrast to this, the one thing which now has power to impress us is +the fact that the dependence reaches back to the earliest beginnings; +that the individual has become what he has become through the +overpowering influences of heredity, education, and environment. +Further, the conviction that the differences lie within ascertainable +limits, and that there is a certain average level throughout all the +multiplicity of life, is gaining a firmer hold. To ascertain these +average levels now becomes the chief problem of knowledge, and to +realise them the chief task of practical political provision. Inner +changes are also brought about. The fact that, with these changes, +responsibility, guilt, and desert are transferred more and more from the +individual to the society tends to call forth more humane sympathy and +more mildness of judgment, and tends to discredit the excessive +self-esteem of a self-righteous Pharisaism. At the same time it +constitutes a powerful motive to work for the whole; to strive to raise +the whole, morally and physically; to develop a social morality and a +strong feeling of solidarity. + +To the modern man, therefore, the life of the State advances through +changes in content and form. The State, which in the Middle Ages had to +leave all problems of inner training to the Church, in its new function +of culture State now assumes all tasks, influences the whole life of the +individual, and is confident in its power to transform our existence +more and more into a realm of reason. Along with this there is a strong +tendency to place the State increasingly on the power and insight of +individuals; all through the nineteenth century this tendency won an +ever more overwhelming power. The more activity we bestow upon a +particular sphere of work, the more valuable does it become to us, the +nearer does it stand to our inner nature. Thus, the ancient mode of +thought, that the individual is a mere member of the political organism, +and that he receives his tasks and obtains his power from it, was able +to be revived. + +With this the stronger emphasis laid upon national peculiarities, and +the more definite self-assertion and more vigorous development of +nations are associated. Formerly national character had been veiled +and, as far as the spiritual ideals of humanity are concerned, as though +lost. Now nations appear as points where the spiritual life manifests +itself and concentrates distinctively. To work out their peculiarities +clearly, and manfully to assert them in the competition of peoples, +promises great gain for the organisation and energising of life; for the +first time, the divine seems to pass into daily toil on earth. + +Most of all, the modern organisation of labour, with its enhancing of +technique and its advance beyond the capacity of production of the mere +individual, heightens the power of impression of the picture as a whole. +Work brings about a deliverance from the passivity of the subject; it +organises itself into independent complexes, which develop into a state +entirely foreign to our nature. It produces its own motive powers and +necessities, and requires from the individual the strictest obedience. +The performance of the individual attains a value only in definitely +ordered co-operation with others; it loses all worth if he attempts to +ignore this relation. This is shown with particular clearness in the +evolution of the factory with its production by machinery. It is shown +further in every specifically modern work in administrative government, +in military organisation, in knowledge and education. Everywhere we find +great organisations; an enormous growth in the capacity of the whole, +but a sinking of the individual to a mere link of the great chain, a +proscribing of all individual will. If all thus depends upon the whole, +the success of endeavour and the happiness of life will be decided +chiefly by the organisation of the whole. It is not to be wondered at, +then, if the antitheses which arise in reference to this organisation +agitate people in the strongest degree; if a faith in the omnipotence of +political and social forms grows up, and if over these the keenest fight +rages. + +In this connection there is no problem which gives rise to greater +complications and severer conflicts than that in regard to the +preservation and raising of the standard of material existence. If, in +general, we attribute incomparably more value to the material in life +than was done formerly, so here also the problems of modern labour reach +their climax. The organisation and concentration of labour have made by +far their greatest progress in this matter; a gigantic accumulation of +capital on the one side and of labour power on the other has intensified +to the uttermost the opposition between man and man. In this conflict +more than in any other the whole being of man comes into play; here, +therefore, the most powerful passions flame up. No wonder that, if the +thought of a fundamental re-organisation rises to the surface, it wins +an influence amounting to fascination, arouses the hope of an essential +advancement of the whole of human existence, and impels men to vigorous +activity. + +Thus, then, this sphere, in which fact is regarded as principle, and in +which the problem of the development of society is elevated to a +position of importance above all others, and seeks to impress its stamp +upon the whole of life, is first and foremost. From this point of view +the organisation of society is the central problem of all culture, and a +distinctive social culture, a social system of life, is evolved. But +that which emerges at this point with especial power and clearness would +not have been able to win men so quickly and influence them so strongly +if it did not constitute a high-water mark of a wider movement, of a +general tendency of the modern man to regard the social relation as +being of the essence of life, and to shape life anew from this. Viewed +historically, this tendency arose as a reaction against the practice of +placing the individual in the foreground, a practice which since the +beginning of the Modern Age had been resorted to in the most diverse +departments of life. What was felt to be unconditionally right in +opposition to the bondage of the Middle Ages has, in the course of time, +shown a reverse side. Many painful experiences have led us to favour a +movement in the direction of the whole again; and so it comes about that +all hope of amelioration is able to be regarded as inevitably bound up +with the complete victory of this movement. + +A distinctive social type of life can be formed and can strive for +supremacy only if great problems arise within society and if its +position in the whole of our life is capable of and in need of change. +It will soon be seen that the case is so in respect of both these +things; and also that two movements, one more general in kind, and +another more precise but also more uncertain as to its goal, are +connected. + +The point at which the new development of life institutes a new demand +is the relation of the individual to the means of existence and the +goods of culture. Formerly an aristocratic order preponderated, which +allowed only a few to share in the abundance of these goods, while it +was only afterwards that the many were able to partake of the poor +remains. In material, as in spiritual, things man was concerned less +with the equitable distribution of the possessions of humanity than with +increasing them. The matter of chief importance, and this with regard to +questions of inward culture also, appeared to be in some way to +incorporate the contents and goods within the sphere of human existence, +and to fix them there; the extension of these goods among men was a +matter of secondary consideration, and often one that was only very +lightly thought of. The limitation to a small chosen class, indeed, +seemed to be quite indispensable for a secure and worthy organisation of +life. Thus, this culture acquired its character at the highest levels of +society, and from there descended in diminishing degrees to lower +levels: it was regarded as inevitable that in this descent much should +be lost, and that the less privileged classes must perforce be satisfied +with very little. + +A movement in opposition to this state of things arose in the first +place among the individuals who were placed in the background by such an +organisation, and who, not convinced of the validity of the doctrine of +the immutability of their fate, began to make comparisons and to ask +questions. Their desire was not merely for more happiness, but for +spiritual advance also. In humanity there is an energetic striving and +advance, and in this a far greater spirituality and a far keener thirst +for truth are often shown in the classes of the people who are +struggling upward and pressing forward than in those classes which from +early times have had possession of power and wealth and which are +hampered by a feeling of self-satisfaction. + +That which at first is striven for by merely a part of mankind acquires, +through its inner necessities, a power over others also, and becomes a +requirement of the whole. We experience here what earlier was called the +power of ideas in history, that is, the fact that in certain periods +certain thoughts and demands acquire an overwhelming power of +penetration and impel men to a line of conduct which is even opposed to +their special interests. We may so far speak of the supremacy of the +social idea in the present, as not only in the disposition of +individuals but also through organisation and legislation there is an +endeavour to bring help to the poor and the weak, to raise those who are +struggling upward, and to convey as directly as possible both material +and spiritual goods to all who bear human features. It is not only that +this appears a matter of justice; a rejuvenation and an energising of +the whole of culture are also hoped for. Without a radical rejection of +all that which in the traditional position has decayed, become alien, or +is now artificial; without a deep-reaching simplification and a greater +proximity to the soul, how could all partake of culture, and how could +it become a concern of all? The old demand of leading educationalists, +of Comenius and Rousseau, of Pestalozzi and Froebel, the desire for a +rejuvenation of our culture antiquated as it is in many respects, seems +to be approaching its fulfilment now that the matter is a concern of the +whole of mankind. + +However, this striving, which in itself cannot be rejected, enters upon +a narrow course and at the same time upon much that is problematical, in +that it unites with the positivistic tendencies of the age in the +rejection of all invisible connections and in the restriction of life to +the experience of sense. Instead of the whole, we now have the average +and the masses, and instead of a creation from the whole, a building up +from below; the needs of the masses are the main motive power of life. +But as with the masses the chief questions are those of the physical +preservation of life, and of economic existence, it seems as if, with +their solution, with the deliverance from oppressing cares and necessity +through a radical revolution, a complete state of happiness and a +ceaseless spiritual advance of humanity are assured. Material welfare, +which in earlier organisations of life was so depreciated, in the new +system becomes the matter of chief concern; it is regarded as that which +more than anything else leads to the development of every power and +makes culture the truth for the whole of humanity. + +The life of society is thus seen to be full of problems. Nevertheless, +the position of society in our life as a whole has been changed and +raised. We have become far more uncertain concerning our relation to +ultimate and universal reality; we doubt the possibility and the +validity of first winning, through religion or speculation, a world +beyond human experience, of the conveying it to that experience, and +from the point of view of such a world giving the human its light and +setting it its task. In short, the centre of life has changed from the +object to the subject; we know that we cannot abstract from our own +nature our spiritual organisation, but that we carry it into every +aspect of the whole; that we see and form the world through man. With +such a transition, the movement from man to world becomes the chief +movement of life; and the conception of man will decide the nature of +the conceptions of life and of reality. Henceforth greatness may be +attributed to these only if human nature is capable of an advance beyond +what it appears to be in the first impression. That, however, will +scarcely be possible unless humanity is conceived as a whole and, with +such a unity, has more power and depth than it has as it exists +immediately before us. This also will operate to the strengthening of +the social order, in which sense experience controls thought. + +Thus, many different factors unite to make the condition of mankind as +it is, that is, the state of society on the basis of experience, the +starting-point and final aim of all endeavour, and the relation of man +to surrounding men the fundamental relation of his life. But, as in the +case of culture as a whole, the individual departments of life must also +win a distinctive character if the welfare of the social whole, the +achievement for man and the influence on man, becomes the +all-controlling task which sets the aim and points out the way for all +activity. + +In this context science does not reveal hidden depths of things, but +aids man in winning power over appearances; it leads him to a more +zealous and a more active life. Art does not lift him into an ideal +world; but, within experience, softens the pressure of existence and +fills life with pure joys. Morality does not subject our conduct to an +invisible order, but directs man beyond himself to men around him; it +develops the feeling of solidarity and raises the standard of the inner +relationships of society. For religion as the revelation of an "other" +world there is no room; this world shows in humanity an object worthy of +reverence; so understood, religion also must work to the inner elevation +of society. + +In everything that which distinguishes the individual is thrust into the +background to make way for that which is common; work has in the first +place to concern itself with that which is common to all. In that here +science makes man the chief study of man, it considers him especially as +a social being and finds its chief theme in the knowledge of social +conditions. Similarly, the chief subject of art is not, as was formerly +the case, the doings and experience of individuals, but the forceful +representation of these social conditions. The raising of the general +level becomes the chief care of all practical activity, as also of +education. According to this scheme the individual is of consequence and +of worth only through those elements of the common life which he brings +to expression, and through the way in which he reacts upon that life. +The industry of universal history is understood, therefore, not from +that which relates primarily to individuals, but from that relating to +the movements and destinies of society. + +Such an estimate of the whole involves a conviction which seldom finds +expression, but which silently exerts its influence everywhere: the +belief in a summation of reason by the organisation of individuals into +a whole. Only a belief of this kind is able to establish the supremacy +of the mass over against the individuals, also in spiritual things; only +such a belief is able to justify the hope of a victory of the good in +the sphere of humanity. + +The net result of all these ideas and tendencies is a co-ordinated +system of thought, a distinctive type of life. In this system man is +first and foremost a member of society; he originates in it; he remains +in it; and his activity carries implications far beyond his own life. +Not community of labour only joins him with his fellows, but also the +general tone of thought and feeling. This type of life is not one +without sacrifice; for it has to give up many things which in earlier +times seemed a secure possession and were a source of joy. Yet these +things were only illusions which vanished, and mankind seems to find a +compensation, more than equivalent for all that has been lost, in that +it is more closely united and through this wins new powers; and +henceforth out of its own capacity can venture to take up the struggle +against every irrationality of existence, and to advance its own +well-being without constraint. A life is therefore evolved, conscious of +its limits, but at the same time active and courageous. + +In this manner, then, transcending all subjective opinions and wishes, a +distinctive social culture has arisen, and its growth and results are +clearly evident to us. Through combination of forces and through +diligent activity on behalf of one another, and this with the aid of a +highly evolved technique, we have brought about a magnificent elevation +of our being; necessity and disease have been successfully fought +against; the standard of education and the amount and kind of joy in +life have been raised in many ways; in life and suffering men have been +drawn together inwardly and associated together with a greater degree of +solidarity. If one accepts the creed of the socialistic movement in the +narrower sense: that human society can be placed on a new basis and at +the same time raised essentially in its achievement, one can conceive +that social culture may grow to the comprehensiveness of culture in +general, and arouse the hope of a kingdom of reason among men. + + * * * * * + +But here also there is a limit set to things, not from without, but from +within; not from a rationalising criticism, but through the actual facts +of the life of humanity. This limit appears with especial clearness when +we consider the relation of the individual, together with his work, to +the society in which he stands. If social culture should be regarded as +absolute culture, the individual must spend himself solely and entirely +in relation to his environment; all his activity and endeavour must be +exerted in achievement for this culture--must, indeed, be regarded as a +mere part of a common work. In such a system man could never attain an +independent position and a superior right in opposition to society. Let +us examine whether the experience of history establishes the truth of +this system or whether it does not much rather show the opposite to be +more correct. + +It was only in the earliest state of culture, and under very simple +conditions of life, that the individual was solely and entirely bound up +with the social organism, simply a member of family, of tribe, and such +like; entirely swayed by custom, authority, and tradition. All further +evolution was a differentiation and led to the greater independence of +the individual. There came a time, however, when, in contrast with his +mere membership of the society, the individual felt himself to have +arrived at a state of maturity; when he questioned the right of the +traditional order, and ultimately found himself coming into opposition +with the whole of society; his own thought thus became the chief basis +of his life and the measure of all things. At first that may have +appeared an impious break and a destructive negation; in reality, the +positive results which have been thus effected could never have been +produced out of a mere revolt. For, a deepening of life in all its +branches went hand in hand with the individual's attainment of +independence; now, for the first time, Religion developed a personal +religious experience, and Art filled man's whole soul; now only did +Science set a distinctive world of thought in opposition to the +traditional presentation; and so the whole of life gained enormously in +independence, mobility, and depth. How could this point have been +reached if an immediate relation to reality had not emerged in the soul +of man; if an inner world had not been formed from this reality, as the +representative of which the individual might feel superior to the +society and, from inner necessities, criticise the prevailing condition +of things? The fact is that all deepening of culture, all awakening of +life to self-consciousness, is a rising above the life of society, a +summoning of the individual to creative activity. Never have real +advances in Religion, Science, and Art, or great transformations of +life, originated out of a combination of the activities of the majority. +Only in isolated cases has an incomparable individuality, supreme in the +entire range of creative activity, been reached, and spiritual tasks +been treated as ends in themselves, without which there is nothing +great. Only out of the necessity of spiritual self-preservation, only as +an overcoming of intolerable contradictions within our own being, could +creative activity find a sure direction and a lofty self-confidence in +order to lead the whole of humanity along new paths. The individuals in +whom this was accomplished were, to be sure, under many influences from +historico-social life; but, to overlook the essential elevation above +the entire domain of merely human interests into a realm of +self-conscious truth, which was accomplished by these individuals, one +must confuse the conditions with spiritual activity itself. + +As this spiritual life has transcended social life from the beginning, +in the same way its effects are by no means exhausted in that life. It +has, it is true, exerted its activity upon the social environment, and, +after the initial opposition has been overcome, has often been +superabundantly honoured; but even so, it has been accepted in isolated +and external relations rather than in the whole of its being, and in its +appropriation through society it is apt to lose what is best in it. Ever +anew, even after centuries and centuries, it has attracted aspiring +souls to itself, and has always been able to offer something new to +them; in fact, in its essence it stands not in time but above it. The +more such genuine creative activity and production in all its spheres +become unified, the more a kingdom of truth spreads like an arch over +the whole machinery of human history, and, measured by the standards of +that truth, human standards are seen to be extremely low, like the size +of the earth when contrasted with the region of the fixed stars. This +realm of eternal truth, however, reveals itself immediately only to the +soul of the individual, who must convey it to society. + +Such an estimate of spiritual depth in the individual is quite +compatible with the fact that in the course of history the individual +has often fallen into utter uncertainty; has felt destitute and lonely, +and has passionately sought a support in society. For the individual may +cut himself adrift from the invisible connections in which his greatness +is rooted; he may base himself on his own isolated power and groping +intellect. When he has indeed done this, he has soon perceived and +experienced his insufficiency; after such experience he has longed for +the building up of a new society by spiritual activity, and when this +has been attained he has fled to it as to a sure haven. Men strove for +such a society in the later period of Antiquity; one such was founded by +Early Christianity, by which the centre of life was transferred from the +individual to the society. But in this transition the individual did not +again become simply a member of society. For the new union that was +sought could not come to men from without, but could proceed only as a +result of spiritual endeavour; for its origin and in the early stages +of its life it required great creative personalities of the kind of +Augustine; for its preservation it needed appropriation by individuals, +who unless they made an independent decision could not come to a +complete knowledge of the truth. Wherever such individual activity +languished, the inwardness of life at once became weak; the whole +threatened to lose its spiritual nature and to be transformed into mere +mechanism. But after, in the course of history, the individual has +developed so far as experience shows him to have done; after that, as +microcosm, he has found an immediate relation to reality and to himself, +his transcendence may for a time be obscured, but he can never be +deprived of it. As the individual has grown strong only as the +representative and champion of a culture that is spiritual, as opposed +to one that is merely human, so at the same time that spiritual culture +asserts itself and criticises all which limits man to his own sphere. +After having attained a greater comprehensiveness, a pure +self-existence, and other standards toilsomely enough, a narrowly social +culture must be absolutely intolerable to us. + +This assertion is valid especially in regard to the social culture of +the present. That culture, as we saw, makes significant and justifiable +demands which have arisen from historical conditions; but its right +gives place to error, if these demands are made the central point of +life as a whole, and everything else subordinated to them. The +unsatisfactoriness of this system of culture and the impossibility of +achieving its aims would be still more manifest if it did not constantly +supplement its own results out of the other organisations of life, and +did not boldly and unjustifiably idealise the man of experience. + +This social culture may be shortly described in some of its tendencies: +(1) Work for society was the compelling motive in the shaping of this +life of social utility. Some such social principle may suffice for the +distribution of goods; it never suffices for their original production. +We saw how spiritual experience can arise only from the compulsion of an +inner self-preservation, in which man does not think in the least of +the effects on others, but of himself and the object. Only that effort +which has sprung up without regard to its mere utility has been able to +achieve great things. If, therefore, merely social culture rigidly binds +up vital energy with the direction of all thoughts on the effect, in the +long run it must seriously degrade life. Can we deny that in the chief +departments of the spiritual life the present already clearly shows +tendencies to such a degradation? And can this be otherwise when we only +more widely diffuse the inherited possession, but are unable to increase +it through our own activity? + +(2) Social culture makes the judgment of the society the test of all +truth and requires from the individual a complete subordination. It can +do this, as we saw, only under the assumption that reason is summed in a +judgment by the people as a whole; but, in face of the experiences of +history and the impressions of the present time, can this assumption be +ratified? Upon its emergence, truth has nearly always been championed by +a minority so small as to be hardly discernible; and what in its case is +called victory is usually nothing else than the transforming of the +struggle from an external into an internal one. He who continues firm in +his faith in the victory of truth does so because he trusts, not so much +in the wisdom of the majority as in a reason transcending all that is +empirically human, and which begets a truth with power to constrain. The +present gives us the opportunity of testing this assertion by an +example. We see movements of the masses in plenty, but where do we see +great spiritual creations arise from the resulting chaos? Even Socialism +in the narrower sense has to thank but a few men for its vital power and +character, as, for example, Marx; the masses are indeed a condition and +an environment, but never as such the bearers of creative activity. + +(3) Where man, as he is, governs all thought, his well-being, his +complacency, an existence as free from care as possible, and as rich as +possible in pleasure, will become the highest of all aims. But would not +one find an inner emptiness, a monotony, even more intolerable than any +suffering if this aim were reached and life were freed from all pain +and necessity? Intelligible as it is that, to the classes whose life is +spent in hard struggle against necessity and care, the deliverance from +these appears the highest good and an assurance of complete happiness, +it is just as unintelligible that anyone who is conscious of the work of +universal history and the inner movement of humanity can share such a +belief. For that movement has given rise to difficult problems and +severe conflicts within the soul of man; a wrestling for a truth and a +content of life, where we now drift hither and thither on the surface of +appearance; a longing for infinity and eternity, where now a finitude +and a past fascinate and charm us; a clashing together of freedom and +destiny, of nature and spirit. The tendencies and tasks which this +movement produces may for a time be thrust into the background, but they +continually reappear and claim their right. It is a foolish undertaking +to try to make man happy by directing him to give up what is distinctive +in him, and to give his striving a less worthy character. + +(4) From a radical improvement of the conditions of life, the +socialistic way of thinking expects a continuous advance of culture and +an increasing ennoblement of man. To some extent this expectation would +be justified if a strong spiritual impulse and a sure tendency towards +the good were found everywhere; if it were only a matter of opening the +door to an inner striving that was everywhere operative; only a matter +of removing restrictions. The actual picture of human conditions +corresponds but little to such an optimism. How small a place spiritual +impulse has in human conduct and effort! How wearisome to the +indifferent and reluctant average man any thought of spiritual goods +becomes, and what severe restrictions moral development meets with in +selfishness, avarice, and jealousy! The impressions which reality gives +speak too plainly in regard to this for even the believers in +socialistic culture to be able to hide the facts from themselves; but it +is noteworthy enough that not that which they see with their eyes and +grasp with their hands determines their judgment, but that which, +unconsciously, they add to it: an invisible humanity, a greatness and a +dignity of human nature, a nobility in the depths of the soul; +conceptions for which, in this context, there is not the least +justification. + +All these considerations show clearly enough the limits of simply +socialistic culture, and the sharp contradictions of its adherents. This +culture only throws man back increasingly upon the merely human, and +unmercifully holds him firmly fixed in it. It chains him to his own +appearance and suppresses all tendencies towards depth. It knows nothing +of life's consciousness of itself; it knows no inner problems, no +infinite development of the soul; it cannot acknowledge a common life of +an inner kind, but must derive all from external relations. At the same +time it excludes all understanding of the movement of universal history; +for the chief content of this movement constitutes just those problems +which Socialism regards as foolish delusions. To be sure, the striving +after an inner independence of life has brought much error with it, and +it may involve much that is problematical. But that a longing after such +independence should arise at all and prove itself able to call forth so +much endeavour sufficiently demonstrates that man is more than a mere +being of society; more than a member of a social organism. + +Ultimately, socialistic culture presupposes, in its own development, a +greater depth of life than it is itself able to produce. It can make so +much out of its data only because it assumes in them a more +comprehensive and a deeper world of thought. Like Naturalism, Socialism +reaches a tolerable conclusion only by much plagiarism from the old +Idealism, before the principal conceptions of which it crosses itself as +before something atrocious. + +This inner inconsistency of socialistic culture, its remaining bound up +with something which inwardly it contradicts, is most plainly shown by +the historical experience of the Modern Age. Men were at first led to +take up the movements towards the strengthening of society chiefly by +the expectation that the invisible forces in human existence would be +invigorated, and by the hope that the inner life of men would be raised. +The more they have cut themselves adrift from these invisible +connections and have placed themselves simply on the basis of experience +the more have they lost in spiritual content. + +The movement towards the modern free State arose in association with +religious strivings; the desire for political independence attached +itself to and inwardly grew from the longing for more complete equality +before God. The more this relation to Religion and, further, to an +invisible realm receded into the background, the more difficult did it +become to guard the striving for freedom from being diverted in the +interests of individuals, classes, and parties; the more did the +movement inwardly lose by external expansion. We saw that the idea of +nationality acquired power from the conviction that there results in an +independent people an individualisation of the spiritual and divine +which is the first thing to ensure to existence a definite character and +a firm support. So long as this conviction predominated, each people had +a great inner task in reaching the highest point of development of its +nature, and, what is more important, did not need to direct its energies +upon externals. With the obscuring or the complete surrender of this +spiritual foundation, a blind adoration of one's own country, an +increase of unfruitful pride of race, a passionate struggle for external +expansion and power, inevitably accompanied by the surrender of humanity +and justice, threatens us. + +When in the nineteenth century the modern idea of the State again came +into currency, the State came to be regarded--as, for example, in the +system of Hegel--as the realisation of an absolute reason, and desired +to be honoured as something "earthly divine." Its leading +administrators, however, men of the kind of Altenstein, were imbued with +the philosophic spirit; were men who could be regarded as philosophers +in Plato's sense. To-day we still hear of such spiritual bases of the +State, in syllabuses of courses of study; but we count so little on a +philosophical training that when anyone gives any sign of such a +training he is regarded with astonishment as a rare exception. Even the +socialistic movement in the narrower sense, the longing for an economic +revolution, at first stood in close connection with philosophical +endeavours, and the hope of an inner ennobling of humanity, the hope of +raising the whole of culture, worked in it as a powerful motive force. +More and more, out of this a mere desire for power and enjoyment has +developed, a passionate struggle of class against class, of interest +against interest, and how this might lead to an inner elevation of +humanity is not apparent. The more socialistic culture, in its pressing +forward, has cut itself loose from a richer and more inward culture and +has trusted solely to its own resources, the more distinct have its +limitations become, the more has its incapacity to include the whole of +human existence been made evident. + +To assert this does not mean to depreciate the significance of the facts +which the social tendency has made us conscious of and the tasks which +it has imposed upon us. Not only do the advance into prominence of the +economic side of life, and the desire for a more energetic realisation +of a social organisation in this direction, remain unimpeached, but +there are demands of an imperative kind which extend beyond the scope of +this narrow conception. The increasing isolation and separation of +individuals make us feel the desire for reunion more and more strongly. +Man, with that which is near him and in him, acquires an ever greater +significance for the shaping of our life and our world; from no other +point of departure than from him can we attempt to reach the depths of +reality and from these to build up a realm of reason. + +Socialistic culture, however, treats these problems, to which it gives +rise, far too externally and too meanly to hold out any hope that its +method can lead to their solution; and so, as we see it immediately +before us, it brings truth and error into a melancholy mixture. Only a +broader conception of life could bring about a differentiation and give +to each factor its right. In this case also the promised solution of the +problem is seen to be itself a problem. + + +3. THE SYSTEM OF ÆSTHETIC INDIVIDUALISM + +The naturalistic and socialistic tendencies unite in the modern life of +culture for action in common. How near they stand to each other, +notwithstanding all their differences, our accounts of them will have +shown. Not only do both make the world of sense the sole world of man, +but both also find life entirely in the relation to the environment, be +it nature or society. Again, both maintain that all happiness arises +from work upon this environment, whether the work be in the main +scientific and technical, or practical and political. Thus the culture +of both systems bears throughout the character of a culture of work; in +one as in the other great complexes of work arise, and draw the +individual to themselves; all trouble and effort are for the sake of the +result; in both a restless progressive movement surrounds us and directs +all reflection and thought to a better future. With such a tendency we +have grown closer to the environment and we have ascribed more value to +the world and to life. With an ever-increasing activity, a proud +self-consciousness has developed in humanity. + +But the limitations and defects of such a culture, centred as it is upon +results, could not remain concealed. The age, alert and fond of +reflecting upon its own nature, has been compelled more and more to +perceive the negation that accompanied the assertion made in that +system. The striving for results alone made care for the soul +impossible; the being fitted into a complex whole impaired the +development to complete individuality. The more industrial and social +activities have become specialised, the less significant has that part +of human existence become which is embodied in the individual as such, +the more have all aspects of his nature other than those involved in +his work degenerated. The continual thought of the future, the impetuous +movement ever onward and onward, also threatens to destroy all +appreciation of the present, all self-consciousness and independence of +life. If we exist merely in order to serve as means and instruments to a +soulless process of culture, does not the whole enormous movement +finally amount to nothing, if it is not experienced and appropriated? + +Once such questions arise and make man concerned about the meaning and +the happiness of his life, a sudden change must soon take place. Man may +at all times fall into error concerning the aims of the culture of work; +indeed, concerning work itself. It may appear to him as something which, +originally his own creation, has broken loose from him, placed itself in +opposition to him, enslaved him, and finally, like a gigantic spider, +threatens to suck his life's blood. From this point of view it may be +regarded as the most important of all tasks again to become master of +work, and to preserve a life inwardly conscious of itself, in contrast +with the tendency of work to occupy itself solely with externals; to +realise a true present in contrast with the restless hurry onward and +onward; a quietness and a depth of the soul in contrast with work's +bustle and agitation. To those with such a conviction the culture of +work must seem sordid, secular, profane, and in contrast a longing for +more inspiration, more soul, more permanent splendour of life will +arise. + +Many movements of this kind make themselves apparent in the present; the +longing for a return of life to itself, for more joy and more depth in +life, grows ever stronger and stronger. Of all these movements, however, +one stands out with definite achievement--one which, upon the basis of +the present and with the means of sense experience, seeks a remedy +which, while in these two aspects it shares the general initial +assumption of the culture of work, within the limits of this assumption +is entirely opposed to this culture of work. We mean the system of +Subjectivism and Individualism. In that this system is blended with a +kind of art of its own, and gains strength from this, it boldly +undertakes to govern and shape our whole existence. + +He who wishes to rise above the culture of work without transcending the +region of experience will scarcely discover any other basis than the +individual with his self-consciousness, his "being-for-self." For, +however far work with its influences may penetrate into the innermost +recesses of the soul, there always remains something which is able to +resist it. Something original seems to spring up here, which fits into +no scheme and bows down to no external power. + +If, therefore, a newly aroused longing for greater immediacy and +happiness in life drives man once more to the subjective and to the +individual, he can emphasise this factor conceptually in order to +depreciate the other systems of life. For, whether the individual +belongs to an invisible world of thought or to a visible structure, his +task and his worth is then assigned to him by the whole; his activity +will have a definite direction determined by the whole, and his power +will be called into play only so far as it fitted into the framework of +the whole organisation. If all such relation to the whole is discarded, +and the individual becomes bold enough to place himself simply upon his +own capacity, and to acknowledge no other standard than his own +decision, an infinite course seems to open up before him. What lies in +him is now able to develop with complete freedom, and he need take +neither a visible nor an invisible order into anxious consideration. The +individual, raised to such sovereignty, will make far more out of +himself, and will mean far more than the narrow and often over-awed +individual of earlier ages. True, even in earlier times opposition from +the individual was not lacking, but the circumstances of the Modern Age +are especially conducive to his development and recognition. We know how +the modern man extricated himself from the ties which bound him, and how +he boldly placed himself in opposition to the world. We know how much +more freely thought rules in modern life; how much more deeply an +over-subtle reflection penetrates everywhere and takes all stability +from things. We know, too, how the external form of civilisation, with +its acceleration of intercourse, and its development in a thousand +directions, sets the individual more free. Is it to be wondered at if +the modern individual regards himself as the centre and undertakes to +shape the whole of life from himself? + +The individual can attain complete independence only when he liberates +his soul from all external connections, from every objective relation, +and, as a free subject, simply lives his own states of consciousness. +This is achieved above all in the disposition--transcending all form and +shape and bound to no particular object--which has obtained an +independent position chiefly as a result of the Romantic movement. In +this a complete detachment of life, an inward infinity, and a complete +independence seem attained; every individual has his own course and his +own truth; no limit is set to life, no command given, but he can with +the utmost freedom develop every impulse and exhaust its possibilities +according to its nature. Thus a life arises, profuse and extremely +active: a life fine and delicate in nature; a life which is in no way +directed beyond itself. + +But all agitation, profuseness, and refinement could hardly have +prevented this emotional life from becoming hollow, if, when it turned +to the individual, it had not united to itself another movement, which +is flowing with a powerful current through the age. We mean the movement +towards art, and beyond that towards an æsthetic conception of life. +From ancient times there has always been an antithesis of an ethical and +an æsthetical fashioning of life: of a preponderance on the one hand of +the active, on the other hand of the contemplative relation to reality. +Emphasis on the activity of man has led to the formation in modern +systems of life of a culture of work and utility. An æsthetical, +contemplative mode of thought can with good reason feel itself superior +to that culture. In contrast to utility, it promises beauty; over +against the heaviness and weariness of the way of life of a culture of +work, it promises a joy and a lightness; in opposition to effort, +hurriedly and continually striving further and further, it promises an +independent self-consciousness, and an inward calm. But, as this +movement towards art blends with that towards the subject it lapses into +a narrow course and assumes a distinctive character. Here, art has less +to comprehend the object than to stimulate and please the subject; it +will strive less after content and a further construction than with +lyrical cadences, to give expression to changing moods. It has a +difficult task given to it which can only approximately be solved--the +task of expressing something fundamentally inexpressible and resisting +all attempts to give it form. But in that art undertakes such an +impossibility, and exerts its power to the uttermost, it brings about a +refinement of the soul as well as an enrichment of expression. It +enables much to be grasped and comprehended which, without it, passes +like a fleeting shadow. It permits the observation of the most delicate +vibrations of the soul, and throws light into depths which would +otherwise be inaccessible. + +A distinctive type of life is thus formed from the side of literature +and art, and this feels securely supreme over all the embarrassments of +the culture of work and of the masses. The centre of life is transferred +into the inner tissue of self-consciousness. With the development of +this self-consciousness, life appears to be placed entirely on its own +resources and directed simply towards itself. Through all change of +circumstances and conditions it remains undisturbed; in all the infinity +of that which happens to it, it feels that it is supreme. All external +manifestation is valuable to it as an unfolding of its own being; it +never experiences things, but only itself--that is, its own passive +states of consciousness--in the things. + +A life of such a kind gives rise, in different directions, to +distinctive tendencies, which, through their antithesis to the +traditional forms, are sharply accentuated. This system thinks +especially to turn the whole of human existence into something +positive, to limit it on none of its sides, to raise it everywhere to +activity, joy, and pleasure. In the older systems of life, especially in +the religious, it finds far too much feeble renunciation, far too much +sad negation: such a depreciation of life is henceforth to give way to a +complete and joyful affirmation. But an affirmation appears to be +possible because in this system, through that reference to and +excitement of subjectivity, all that in any way affects man is +transformed in activity and advance; because before all else the subject +feels its own life in every experience and takes pleasure in this. It +must be added that the self-refinement of life, its mobility and +delicacy, free it from all the heaviness of existence, and that the free +play of forces which exist here transforms the whole of existence into +something lightly poised. We find this to be especially the case when we +turn to art, which joins beauty to power, or, rather, strengthens life +in itself through its embodiment in the beautiful. + +This free, joyous, and as it would seem purely self-conscious life is +throughout of an aristocratic and individual character. In that it is +adapted to the old experience, that to only a few is given the power and +the disposition for independent creation and independent life, it +addresses itself to these few and summons them to the greatest possible +development of the individuality of their nature, to the most decisive +detachment from the characterless average of the masses. For, without a +completely developed consciousness of individuality, without an +energetic differentiation and isolation, life does not seem to attain +its greatest height. Thus the matter is one of making all the relations +and all the externals of life as individual as possible. Everything +which places the development of life under universal standards, and, +through these, limits that development, is rejected as an unwarrantable +limitation and an intolerable restriction. This individualising of our +existence extends also to the matter of our relation to time. One moment +may not be sacrificed to another; the present may not be degraded to the +status of being a mere preparation for the future, but every moment +should be an end in itself, and, with this, life is considered as being +solely in the present. And so life is a ceaseless change, a perpetual +self-renewal, a continuous transition; but it is just this which +preserves to life its youthful freshness and gives to it the capacity to +attract through every new charm. Hence this system presents the most +definite contrast to the interminable chain and the gigantic +construction which the culture of work makes out of the activities of +the individuals. + +Æsthetic Individualism appears most distinctive in the way it represents +the relation between the spiritual and the sensuous. It cannot take its +attention from the external world, in order to centre it upon human +perception, without strengthening the psychical. But, as its own system +is based upon sense experience, it is impossible for it to acknowledge +an independent spirituality and to contrast it with the sensuous; the +spirituality which it recognises always remains bound and blended with +the sensuous. For it an entirely mutual interpenetration is the highest +ideal, a spiritualising of the sensuous, and a sensualising of the +spiritual to an exactly equivalent degree. This high estimate of the +sensuous, and the endeavour to harmonise the spiritual with it, put this +new system of life in the sharpest opposition to the older systems, +especially to religious Idealism, in which the supremacy of the +spiritual is essential. + +From such a basal character this system evolves a distinctive relation +to the individual values and spheres of life. Artistic literary creation +becomes the soul of life; the source of the influences for the +fashioning of a new man. The social, political, sphere is reduced to the +level of a mere outside world, which urges less to activity on our own +part than provokes a sceptical and critical attitude. The lack of +attention to all that which fits man into a common order, be it into the +State with its laws, or the civic community with its customs and +arrangements, permits the free relation of individual to individual in +social contact, friendship and love, to develop so much more +forcefully. In particular, it is the inter-relationship of the sexes, +with its many-sidedness and its inseparable interweaving of spirituality +with sensuousness, which occupies thought and dominates literary +production. Strike out the erotic element from specifically modern +literature, and how insignificant the remainder would appear! It is also +in the relation of the sexes that this scheme of life insists on the +fullest freedom. There is a marked tendency to regard an acknowledgment +of fixed standards and of traditional morals in this connection as a +sign of weakness and of a narrow-minded way of thinking. + +Since this scheme seeks to realise an æsthetic conception of life and an +artistic culture in opposition to all the restraint of tradition and +environment, it will come into particularly severe conflict with +traditional religion and morality. It must reject religion, or at least +what hitherto has been called religion, because, with its blending +together of the spiritual and the sensuous in a single world, it can by +no means acknowledge a world of independent spirituality; its thought is +much too "monistic" for that. It must reject religion also for the +reason that, with its immediate affirmation of life, it cannot in the +least understand the starting-point of religion, the experience and +perception of harsh inner contradictions in our existence. Religion, +with all the heroism that it truly shows, is here regarded as a mere +lowering of vital energy; a chimera which pleases the weak. + +In relation to morality the matter is not much different. A foundation +of morality in the necessity of its own nature is lacking in this +system. What motive could move a man who whole-heartedly accepted +Æsthetic Individualism to acknowledge something external to the subject +as a standard, and in accordance with this standard to put a check upon +his natural impulses? Indeed, with the denial of spiritual activity and +the division of the world into for and against, the entire antithesis of +good and evil loses its meaning and its justification. Reality appears +from the point of view of this system to be rent in twain in an +unwarrantable manner at the command of a human authority. What is +usually called morality is considered to be only a statute of the +community, a means by which it seeks to rob the individual of his +independence and to subordinate him to itself. + +All this reasoning presents itself as an offspring of our own time, and +wishes to establish the correctness of its claims on its own ground +through its results. Yet it by no means lacks historical relations: +often in the course of the centuries the subject has shaken off every +constraint and sought a solution to life's problems in its own realm. +This happened, first among the Sophists; then in a form less marked and +with more direct attention to happiness in Epicureanism; later, in proud +exaltation and in a titanic struggle with the world, in the Renaissance; +and again in a more delicate and more contemplative manner in the +Romantic period. Tendencies from all these operate in the Æsthetic +Individualism of the present time and enrich it in many ways, though +their contributions are not always free from contradiction. But, even +with these historical elements, Æsthetic Individualism is essentially a +modern product; and it cannot be denied that it has won a great power in +the present; a movement of culture in this direction is unmistakeable. +It is the very nature of this scheme of life not to hasten to a definite +form, and for this reason it does not manifest itself with very definite +features; but, with invisible power, it is everywhere present and +creates a spiritual atmosphere from which it is difficult to withdraw +ourselves. Notwithstanding all the attacks it is subjected to and the +doubts as to its validity, it draws power continually from both the main +tendencies which it unites; from the evolution of the subject and from +the growth of art. Thus, here again we are concerned not with mere +subjective willing and wishing, but with an actual movement in universal +history. + +Whether this movement be the primary and the all-dominant remains to be +examined by consideration of the total possessions of humanity. Such an +examination is in this case peculiarly difficult, because in +Individualism and Subjectivism diverse forms mingle together and give to +the movement very different levels. There is, therefore, an obvious +danger that, viewing these forms from the position of an average level, +at which we may attempt to arrive, we may judge one too severely and +another too leniently. And yet we cannot dispense with the assumption of +such an average level; only, it must not be applied mechanically to the +individual forms which are so numerous. + +In forming our judgment in this matter, it is necessary in the first +place to distinguish the aims and the methods of the scheme of life. +There can hardly be any doubt or dispute concerning the aims. For, if we +are called to give to life an independence, a content and a value; to +raise it to complete power; to press forward from anxious negation to +joyful affirmation; to reduce the monotony of existence; to organise the +whole realm of individuality so that it shall be fully clear; and if, at +the same time, the fact of the degeneration of the inner life through a +culture of work lends to such demands the impressiveness and the voice +of a present need, it is difficult to see how this system is to be +effectively opposed. Æsthetic Individualism here appears as the champion +of truths which may be obscured for a time, but which, nevertheless, +continually gain in significance in human evolution as a whole. A +further question is whether its aims, which cannot be rejected, are +attainable along the ways which Individualism follows and beyond which +it is not able to go; whether the means suffice for the attainment of +the end. If this should not be the case, we are in presence of a great +difficulty, in that something, in itself of the highest necessity, is +desired, but is desired in a way which not only is inadequate to the +aim, but directly contradicts it. + +And yet that is how the matter really stands. It is essential to +Individualism--with this it stands or falls--that it lead to an +independent life, to a self-consciousness; that it transform our whole +condition into something of positive value on the basis of sense +experience. That the actual condition of human reality, the nature of +human experience, inexorably resists such a transformation, and that on +this account the individualistic scheme of life is contradictory, we +intend to indicate more in detail. + +Man desires a self-conscious life, a deliverance from all external ties, +a removal of all oppressions. This desire is a lofty one, but one which, +as things are, is very difficult of attainment. For not only in what +happens to us, but also in the innermost depths of the soul--in our +spiritual constitution--we are bound up with an overwhelming and +impenetrable world. The mechanism of nature as well as the organisation +of society surrounds and visibly and invisibly coerces us. At first +sight we are no more than parts of an immense whole, and appear to be +completely determined by that which happens in this whole; we come from +it and sink back into it, and every moment we are dependent upon that +which takes place around us. What is Individualism able to do against +such forces, and what does it succeed in achieving towards life's +attainment of independence? The means it employs are the arousing of an +unrestrained mood, and the withdrawal of life to the greatest possible +concentration in its own passive states of consciousness. Because by +these means man is in some measure relieved from the oppression of +things, he imagines himself to be fully free. But is he free simply +because he appears to himself to be so; free, to take the example of +Spinoza, in the way in which the stone thrown up into the air might +during its motion suppose itself to be free? As a matter of fact, as +everyday experience shows us, it is just in his moods that man is least +stable and least lord of his own soul, and that the most diverse +circumstances, physical and psychical, visible and invisible, great and +small, influence and compel him. The transitoriness of appearances, +which form the matter of fact as far as moods are concerned, is lacking +in all firm relation, all inner construction of life; for nothing is +more mobile, nothing more subject to sudden changes, than mood--nothing +except the surface of the rolling sea, or a reed shaking in the wind. +The life of mood is, in reality, a purely superficial life; a projection +of the psychical nature on to the surface of the immediate passive +states of consciousness. Life in this case attains no depth, content, or +independence, but only subjective opinion, the mere semblance of +independence. We shall see that Individualism so persistently offers the +semblance instead of the real thing that it has come to believe that +with the production of the semblance it has acquired the reality. Life +can only attain a real independence when it has been widened to a realm +in itself, when inner relations, antitheses, problems thus become +evident; and when, through the exercise of activity upon these, an inner +world is raised up, which confidently places itself in opposition to the +endlessness of the soulless world and is able to take up the struggle +with it. We must show unrelenting hostility to any attempt to identify +mood with inner spirituality, with the soul's self-consciousness; for, +really, there is no greater contrast than that between simple +disposition and spiritual depth, between the man of mere sentiment, with +his dependence and vacillation, and the personality rooted in an inner +infinity. + +And so the independence and the predominance of the individual over the +social environment, which Individualism asserts, are nothing more than +an appearance. For what is offered in this system is far less a +self-conscious life and an undisturbed pursuance of our own course than +the inclination to say and do the opposite of that which is said and +done by the majority of those who surround us. It is easy to see that +life, as a matter of fact, always remains related to its environment and +to the standard of that environment; and that what is represented here +as independence is nothing but a different kind of dependence, an +indirect dependence. To the endeavour of Individualism to provide a free +course for the individual with his particularity it is scarcely possible +to offer any opposition. Unfortunately, however, intention and +realisation are different things, and Individualism is apt to assume as +something simple and self-evident that which of all things is the most +difficult, that is, individuality itself. Just as Socialism promises a +sure advance of life as a result of the removal of external hindrances, +so Individualism expects a magnificent advance of an inexhaustible +individualistic culture, if only the statutes by which the community +oppresses and limits the individual are annulled. What, then, is the +real state of the matter? Are men so full of spiritual impulse that it +is only necessary to open up a course for it? And further, does that +which is peculiar in a man signify, as a matter of course, that he is an +individuality with some sort of value?--and is it at once capable of +forming a centre of life? How indefinite and how lacking in consistency +the psychical nature of man usually is! How much that is lofty and how +much that is mean, how much that is noble and how much that is vulgar, +is found here! Shall this chaos display itself and be extolled as an +individuality? In truth, an inner unity appertains to a genuine +individuality, and the ascertaining and realisation of this are not +simply a gift from nature, but a result of spiritual endeavour. To +attain to a genuine individuality requires an energetic concentration of +life; an overcoming of the spirit of indifference; a unifying of the +multiplicity of experience; often, also, a transcending of sharp +contradictions. How difficult it has been for even the most prominent +individualities--men such as Luther, Kant, Goethe--to find their true +selves, that is, the essence of their being, the aspect in which their +strength lay! How great a problem, and what an object of the keenest +conflict, their genuine individuality formed to them! How could a task +of such difficulty find fulfilment, and life a unification and +elevation, in superficial and fleeting mood? If in order to make men +independent individuals it sufficed to declare them so, we should indeed +be much further advanced than unfortunately is the case. + +The new life ought not to be simply autonomous, independent and +individual, it should also be powerful and great. Is the mere evolution +and cultivation of sentiment able to give such power and greatness to an +unrestrained passivity? Of course, in its own estimation unrestrained +mood can raise itself high above the whole world, and so magnify the +supposed independence as to give rise to a feeling of supreme power; but +again, it is only a representation of power, a semblance of power, and +not a real power, that is reached. Mere mood and genuine power +constitute an irreconcilable antithesis. Attention to and cultivation of +sentiment may refine life; it will at the same time weaken and dissipate +it. Power develops and grows only in grappling with resistances, whether +they be outside or within one's own soul. Life will acquire a powerful +character only where an active spirituality is acknowledged, which, +drawing from its own nature, holds up standards and aims to the actual +condition of reality, especially to its own soul, and undertakes to +change this condition in accordance with the requirements set by these +standards and aims. Æsthetic Individualism, however, as we saw, +conceives of the spiritual life as chiefly receptive and contemplative; +as an appropriation, a mirroring and an enjoyment of an existent +reality. Thus for it the spiritual life might be closely connected with +this existent reality, indeed might be one with it; but at the same time +the view robs that life of the power of arousing and elevating, of +independent construction and secure advance. + +An aristocratic character, the separation of an exoteric and an esoteric +sphere, has been distinctive of an æsthetic conception of life from +ancient times even until now. The fact appealed to in justification of +its assumption of this character is beyond doubt: it is that, not only +in art but in all spiritual creation, only few among those creating or +reproducing stand high; that genuine creation always comes about in +opposition to the mediocre; that if it identified itself with the +interests and conditions of the majority it would be deeply degraded, +indeed inwardly destroyed. But this is a contrast between spiritual +creation and human circumstances, not a division of humanity according +to two sets of circumstances; in truth, fewer of the really great than +of those great in their own estimation have boasted of greatness. For +the genuinely great have been occupied far too much by the demands of +their task, and been too deeply conscious of the inadequacy of human +capacity, to have been able to indulge in a reflection upon and a vain +enjoyment of themselves. The infinity of the task by which, rather than +by other men, they measured themselves made even the highest result +appear inadequate to them. It is necessary to Individualism to represent +the unmistakeable distinction between a culture that is genuinely +spiritual and one that is merely human, as a difference between two +classes of men; and it is only because it knows no objective restraint, +no inner necessities, and can measure men only with men, that it is able +to believe itself justified in looking down upon other men from its +standpoint--as though the mere profession of faith in its programme at +once effected an elevation of nature. + +The undertaking to transform life completely into something of positive +value, suddenly and directly to advance to complete affirmation of life, +is associated with the desire for power. So far as this is simply a +desire to abandon an irresolute and narrow mode of thought, false +humiliation and self-belittlement, and mere accommodation to +circumstances in tasks where the beginning is difficult and calls for +great effort, we may frankly admit its justification. But the matter is +not so simple as it is represented in this train of thought. Ultimately +no spiritual movement which would win mankind can give up its claim to a +final affirmation of life. Even the most completely pessimistic systems, +systems of absolute negation--as, for example, the original +Buddhism--could not conquer wider areas without making that negative +milder and transforming it into an affirmative. But the question is +whether, after all that humanity has experienced and suffered, a quick +and immediate affirmation is possible; whether the way to a final +affirmation does not lead rather through an energetic negation. So long +as the restriction which life felt seemed to come from outside only, +and not to reach the inner recesses of the soul, as the prevailing mode +of thought in Antiquity represented the case to be, the decisive +rejection of all suffering, the proud armouring of the soul against all +pain, could be accepted as the crown of all virtues. In face, however, +of actual experience, Antiquity could not continue to hold such a +conviction. For good or for evil, it was compelled to regard suffering +as something more important and to occupy itself more with it, and, +until Christianity opened up new paths, it fell into the danger of +losing all vital energy. Whatever position one may take up with regard +to the dogma and the tendencies of Christianity, the fact cannot be +struck out of history that it has laid bare infinite perplexities in the +soul of man in regard to his relation to the world, and at the same time +has taken up suffering into the centre of life, not to perpetuate it, +but to rise above it by the revealing of a world of spirit and of love. +This has not made life easier, but more difficult; yet at the same time +it has made it greater, deeper, and more inwardly determined. Every +scheme of life which light-heartedly professes to be able to lead us +quickly over suffering and to cast it off proves itself to be +intolerably superficial, if not frivolous. Superficiality easily +triumphs over men and becomes their first opinion; men seem to welcome +first every way of thinking which makes life comfortable and presents no +demands of any sort. But the problems of our existence, and the longing +for genuine and not merely illusory happiness, remain, and in face of +the seriousness of these problems it soon proves to be fleeting and vain +to try to find satisfaction in that which is simply comfortable. + +The case is no different in regard to Individualism and the problem of +morality. The value of an energetic opposition to laws of convention and +external etiquette is beyond question; but it should not be forgotten +that such a conflict has been carried on within the sphere of morality +and religion from ancient times; that in every age that which was +spiritually highest has forcibly withstood the efforts of men +illegitimately to claim absolute validity for their statutes and +tendencies. But Individualism commits the error of asserting that the +mean morality which is reached at the average level of humanity +constitutes the essence of morality, and in so doing excludes from +itself the feeling for everything great and deep which lies within +morality. With all its talk of greatness and breadth, Individualism +makes life narrow, since it leads man solely to the cultivation and +unfolding of his own passive states of consciousness, and permits the +pleasure-seeking _ego_ to draw everything to itself and hold it fast +there. Everything, however, which exists beyond his sphere it interprets +as a mere "other" world, and thus declares all submission to the object +for its own sake, all forgetfulness of self, all becoming more +comprehensive, and all renewal through genuine love, to be only +delusory. Further, in this system, in which natural impulse governs +everything, the conceptions of responsibility and guilt, and with this +the antithesis of good and evil, must be held to be the result of a +narrowly human way of thinking, as something which, though serving no +real purpose, still alarms men and overawes life. Yet through the +development of a spiritual activity which places it in a more inward and +free relation to reality, humanity has really advanced beyond the +position in which man acted as a part of mere nature. In this, too, +Christianity also marks a great advance; we have only to picture to +ourselves the life-work of Augustine in order to have a clear example of +the separation of a genuine morality, as the expression of a new world +based upon freedom, from the attention to and cultivation of natural +instincts. The greatest thinker of the Modern Age, Kant, has only +established this distinction in a newer form. In this connection +responsibility and guilt, as transcending nature, also become a witness +of greatness; they give expression to the fact that man is an +independent co-operator in the universe, and regards the world as in +some sense his own; to the fact that life does not simply happen to him, +but also through him. For, along with freedom and its world, the old +world of given existence remains and holds us fast, not merely +externally but inwardly also; life is a severe conflict between higher +and lower, between freedom and destiny. With so much that is complicated +and perplex, life must be regarded as in the highest degree unfinished. +But just because of this it involves an incalculable tension, and even +in its constraints and pains it leaves the self-preservation and the +welfare of the mere subject at a level far beneath itself. When, +therefore, Individualism, neglecting the movement of universal history, +wishes to limit us to this mere subject, and, effacing all dividing +lines, calls upon us to submit to every force which plays upon us, and +to enter into the glad enjoyment of life, there is really no difference +between this and advising a man, who has gone through the many and +difficult experiences of life, to throw to the winds all he has thus +gained, and to please himself again with the games of childhood. + +The position is similar with regard to the relation of the spiritual and +the sensuous, as Individualism represents it. It is rightly opposed to +both a monkish asceticism and a conventional, feigned, low estimate of +the sensuous; it is indeed with good reason that Æsthetic Individualism +defends the right of the sensuous. But to give the sensuous its right +does not mean to permit it to be joined together in an undifferentiated +unity with the spiritual, as though it were of equal value. Naïve ages +were able to strive for a perfect balance of spiritual and sensuous; +but, with the increasing depth of the life of the soul, a division has +resulted which no toil and no art can simply remove again. Now, +therefore, either the spiritual will be dominant over the sensuous or +the sensuous over the spiritual. In Individualism, with its amalgamation +of the spiritual and the sensuous, by which all claim to spiritual +activity, and therefore to all independence of spiritual life, is given +up, the sensuous will inevitably dominate over the spiritual. The result +is simply a degeneration of the spiritual, a refined sensuousness; and +it is defenceless against an intrusion of vulgar pleasure. Will any one +seriously assert that we find ourselves to-day in a naïve position in +relation to sense? + +In this respect, as in all others, the strength of Individualism lies +chiefly in criticism; its refined perception makes it especially capable +of apprehending clearly the errors of the traditional conceptions of +life. Its influence, however, suffers from the contradiction which it +involves, in that it purposes to solve the problems, to which only an +independent and self-determining spiritual life is equal, with the means +of sense experience. Such a spiritual life is to be attained only by +transcending this sense experience. Owing to the fact that Individualism +places its sole attention upon the surface of sense experience, its +aims, in themselves of the highest necessity, must be distorted and +grossly misrepresented. Independence, greatness, and certainty--ever +hovering before life--cannot be attained by Individualism in reality, +but only in picture and semblance. And it can lend to this appearance a +moderate power of conviction only because, just in the same way as the +other modern organisations of life, it enriches itself imperceptibly +from the same traditional modes of thought and of culture, in opposition +to which it stands, and of which the impelling motives are to it a +sealed book. + +Thus, in truth, it does not offer mere and pure subjectivity, but +subjectivity on the basis of a rich life of culture, which it is itself +unable to produce, but without which it would lapse at once into +complete emptiness. The æsthetic-individualistic scheme of life proves +to be a phenomenon, accompanying a ripe, indeed an over-ripe, culture. +An independent culture, with its labour and its sacrifice, it is unable +to produce. + +To reject Æsthetic Individualism means to attack modern art and its +service to life just as little as to reject Naturalism and Socialism is +to estimate meanly modern natural science and present social endeavour. +On the contrary, it may be said that, as Naturalism has no keener +antagonist than modern natural science, so modern art, with the energy +which is bestowed upon it and with its many-sided expansion of the soul, +stands not in agreement with but in opposition to Æsthetic +Individualism. For, indeed, a creative artist of the first rank has +never subscribed to a merely æsthetic conception of life. Still, however +much artistic endeavour and a merely æsthetic conception of the world +may be associated by the individual, in their nature they remain +differentiated, and no appreciation of art is able to justify the +æsthetic conception of life, which subjects all life to a contradiction; +works against life in striving to attain its own ends; neglects the +development through the centuries; and, instead of the substance hoped +for, offers only opinion and appearance. How can life find a support in +this? + + + + +II. CONSIDERATION OF THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE AND PRELIMINARIES FOR +FURTHER INVESTIGATION + +(a) THE NATURE OF THE NEW AS A WHOLE AND ITS RELATION TO THE OLD + + +From the description that has been given of the modern systems of life, +we have seen that the Modern Age is by no means homogeneous, and that +the conception "modern" has more than one meaning. Culture, in +particular, has a character fundamentally different according as life +finds its basis on the one hand in something external to itself, in +nature, or in society, or on the other hand in the subjective states of +consciousness. But that a common striving is present in spite of every +difference, indeed of every antithesis, is proved by the energy with +which all deny and reject the older form of culture and its +transcendence of sense experience; by the vigour of the struggle against +that which is regarded by the more modern systems as mere phantasy and +deception, but which nevertheless continues to dominate social life. The +kinship of these systems extends, beyond a common acquiescence in a +negation, to a common affirmation. On all sides a thirst after a more +forceful reality, and a more imposing immediacy of life, is to be found. +Sense experience manifests itself throughout as fuller in content and +more plastic; and so the chief point of support is found within it, and, +though in different ways, the whole of life is organised from it. Still, +granted that this could be effected only in opposition to the +traditional conduct of life, the new is by no means desirous of +remaining in a state of mere opposition. It seeks rather to unite the +opposing elements to itself, to adapt them to itself, and to satisfy to +the fullest extent the ideal demands of human nature. It is an attempt +entirely to renew and completely to revolutionise life--a vast +undertaking! Whether it has succeeded, or whether it is still engaged in +bringing the attempt to a successful issue, is the problem that we had +to investigate. + +As far as our chief question is concerned, our result was a decided +negative. True, much that is great and much that may not be lost again +has been achieved. The new systems of life have indeed appropriated +whole groups of facts; have invigorated whole groups with new powers; +have revealed new tasks of the most fruitful kind, not only in the +individual but also for the whole; and have given to life dominating +impulses and a powerful impetus. But all this becomes a doubtful gain, +indeed it threatens to become a loss, if particular experience and +achievement desire to govern the whole of life, and to impress upon it +their own peculiar stamp. Not only does life become intolerably +one-sided in such a case, but its wealth of experience is cut down in +order to fit it into the given framework. We also saw that a serious +inner inconsistency originates. For a long period this inconsistency may +be concealed, but where any great energy is present in life, it must +break forth with a disturbing force and become intolerable. Since the +modern systems regard the whole of life as arising from relation, +whether it be to the environment or to the subjective states of +consciousness, they must reduce everything inward and universal to the +level of a derived and secondary product; they must repudiate and oppose +an original and independent spirituality, a self-conscious inner world. +Such an inner spiritual experience has evolved through the whole of +history, and transcends all forms of life-organisation: it is impossible +to explain it away. The modern systems must themselves experience this. +For they could not possibly transform the abundance of diverse +appearances into an organised whole; they could not pass from universal +to universal, without presupposing and employing the same transcendent +and encompassing inner world, which directly they attack. At the same +time, however, they give to every factor of life a position and a depth +wholly inconsistent with what they are justified in doing with their own +mode of thought. They cannot perform their own tasks without drawing +incessantly upon another kind of reality, one richer and more +substantial. In truth, they are something other, and something far more +than they believe themselves to be. Does this not show, beyond +possibility of refutation, that they do not fill the whole of life? + +The contradiction immanent in the modern systems of life is especially +apparent in the fact that they are unable to banish supersensual powers +and to limit life to sense experience, without attributing to sense +experience more content and more value than that which experience itself +justifies, and which, to be consistent, they should not overstep. The +naturalistic thinker ascribes unperceived to nature, which to him can be +only a co-existence of soulless elements, an inner connection and a +living soul. Only thus can he revere it as a higher power, as a kind of +divinity; only thus can he pass from the fact of dependence to a +devotional surrender of his feelings. The socialist bases human society, +with its motives mixed with triviality and passion, on an invisible +community, an ideal humanity, which he clothes with the splendour of a +power and dignity that transfigures the immediate appearance of society. +It is only in this way that he is able to direct his whole effort upon +the welfare of mankind, and to expect a pure victory of reason within +its sphere. The individualist in his conception exalts the individual to +a height far more lofty than is justified by the individual as he is +found in experience; for his thought, the individual is far more +powerful and far more prominent and noble than immediate impressions +indicate. Only thus is he able, from the freedom and the development of +the individual, to hope for the beginning of a new epoch. + +In these newer systems of life the conception of reality as a whole is +also subjected to the same groundless and, likewise, false idealisation. +As in these systems nothing may be acknowledged which transcends sense +experience, there can be no universal which pervades and holds together +the manifold. This being the case, reality must be a co-existence of +single pieces; but no one will readily confess himself of this opinion. +A pantheism, vague to the highest degree, is therefore seized upon as a +cure-all, that man may have something which permeates and connects; but +of this something, however, all more detailed description is lacking, +and is carefully avoided. A conception so vague allows us at the same +time to think and not to think something; at the same time to affirm and +to deny. It seems to accomplish so much and to demand so little; it +makes the impossible possible; and offers the most convenient asylum to +all indefiniteness and confusion. It is a pity that in all this it is +not a reality that surrounds us, but a mere _fata morgana_ which +deceives. And a conception so vague is to displace religion and accord +support to the new life! Truly, this requires a stronger faith than that +with which the older religions were satisfied. + +The modern systems of life desire a more forceful reality; in this they +set work an aim which cannot be rejected. The course they have entered +upon, however, does not bring them nearer to this aim, but rather +removes them further from it. Neither the self-evidence of the senses +nor the oscillation of mood can ever represent genuine reality to a +being who, for good or for evil, has once learned to think. Many and +varied impressions may come and go in sense experience; but their +abundance cannot prevent the chief conceptions, by which they are here +accompanied, from receiving a character abstract and vague in the +highest degree. We hear continually of the whole, of reason, of power, +of evolution; but all these conceptions have no stability and little +content; they are like shadows and phantoms which vanish as soon as we +wish to take hold of them. So, by an irony of fate, just those modes of +thought whose chief impulse was the desire for more reality dissipate, +dissolve reality. We see that the spiritual life may be denied by the +individual, but not driven from the work of culture. It is true that +immediate experience, outer and inner, has become much more to the +present age than it was to earlier ages; but it has become so only +through spiritual endeavour. If, therefore, the Modern Age now turns +definitely against this spiritual activity, to rob it of all +independence, it destroys that which first gave it its own power. + +The modern systems of life have raised the standard of human existence +enormously in regard to power and content; but they have done this at +the cost of its spiritual concreteness. They have suppressed the life of +inner spiritual experience and denied the problems of man's inner +nature. They know of no grappling of man either with the infinite or +with his own nature; they recognise no conflict between freedom and +fate, and no inner development of the soul. And all this because their +view of life as a whole takes away all depth, and transforms existence +into a mere series of appearances. Thus, for anyone who regards such +depth as the basis of life, and who, therefore, will not reject the +experience and the result of the work of universal history, it becomes a +necessity to reject and oppose the modern systems as guides of life. The +more explicitly and exclusively they are presented, the more decided +must his opposition be. For, what shall all the gain on the +circumference of life profit man if through attention to that the centre +of his life becomes empty and weak, if there emerges no content and no +meaning in life itself? What is the value of all the advancing and +refining of human existence if it does not bring with it a genuine +spiritual culture and an inward elevation of mankind? + +The increasing experience and perception of such limitations in the new +may lead men to give more attention again to the old. The striving to +transcend mere sense experience can no longer appear as a mere flight +into an "other" world of dreams, or as due to a feeble and cowardly +disposition; it may now be admitted rather as a deeply rooted endeavour +to reach greater depths of life. Yet such a relaxation of the opposition +to the old, and such an inclination to estimate it more highly, by no +means justifies us in simply taking it up again in the form in which it +lies before us. For to this not merely the modern system of life, but +the whole development of life and work, is opposed. The contradictions +and doubts which have grown up in the course of this development are not +in the least overcome by the failure of the modern systems of life. For +we do not find ourselves confronted here with an "either--or," in which +the invalidity of the one alternative immediately establishes the +validity of the other; but both may be inadequate. So we remain +surrounded by the old and the new, under powerful influences from both, +but not in a position to accept either the one or the other exclusively. + + +(b) THE CONDITION OF THE PRESENT + +This situation, with its juxtaposition of the new and the old, is so +full of confusion and perplexity that only a feeble disposition is +capable of acquiescing in it. In the old we respect or surmise a depth; +but this depth does not know how to give itself a form suitable to the +present, or to influence us with the means available in our own time. +The new directs all our attention to the immediate present and fills us +with its intuitions; but this present becomes superficial to us, and +with increasing power a desire for more substance and soul in life rises +up in opposition to it. The old lifted us to the proud height of a new +world, but this height showed signs of becoming severed from the rest of +existence, and lapsed therefore into a state of painful insecurity. The +new builds up from the experience of sense, but it finds no conclusion +without going beyond this experience and thus contradicting itself. The +old regarded the spiritual life of man, if not man himself, as occupying +the centre of all and thereby fell into the danger of a hastened +conclusion and of an anthropomorphic conception of reality. The new +takes from man every position by which he is especially distinguished, +and ignores all connection with ultimate depths, but in so doing it +overthrows more than it intends; it undermines nothing less than the +possibility of all spiritual work, all science, all culture. + +And so we find ourselves in the midst of contradictions, drawn first in +one direction, then in another: that we are at a crisis in life as a +whole and in culture, that we are in state of spiritual need, cannot +fail to be recognised. This crisis is made all the more acute through +the peculiarity of the historical circumstances which have led up to it +and the social conditions which surround us. Historically, we are under +the influences of two cultures: one older, which up to the seventeenth +century was in undisputed supremacy and which has asserted its authority +up to the present day, especially in regard to the arrangements of +social life; and one newer, which, after the influence of many varied +preliminary tendencies, has arisen since that time with the energy of +youth, and which, in the minds of individuals, has easily become the +dominant power. The two cultures had different starting-points and +followed different main courses. The old culture carried within itself +the experiences of Greek life, the inner progress of which may be seen +especially in the development of its philosophy. In the old culture +endeavour was driven more and more beyond the world of sense to a world +of thought, in which it went on from a universal to an ethical and +ultimately to a religious conviction. To the thought of Greece, as she +grew old, the world of sense experience sank more and more in reality +and value, and life found its basis and chief realm of experience in a +region transcending sense. Christianity definitely established this view +of life, and made the invisible Kingdom of God the true home of man, the +most immediate and the most secure that this life knows. + +New peoples then grew up in this way of thinking; peoples who still had +their work before them; to these, the break with the world of sense came +more as the imposition of an overpowering authority than as due to +their own experience. This fact constituted a point of weakness in every +way; but no serious complication arose so long as these peoples were not +yet ripe for spiritual independence. As soon, however, as this was the +case, it was inevitable that contradictions should manifest themselves, +and that a newly awakened impulse should urge the movement into an +entirely opposite direction. + +That is what really happened; the main tendency of life is now directed +just as much upon the world as earlier it went beyond it; it has been +transferred from the invisible to the visible, from the supernatural to +the natural. We see this most clearly in the case of religion, which, as +though with immanent necessity, runs through the sequence of a +predominant transcendent Theism, a Panentheism, a Pantheism--gradually +becoming colourless--an Agnosticism, and a Positivism. Everything +supernatural disappears from thought, and life is concerned solely with +sense experience. Thus, finally, we appear to have arrived at the same +point as that from which the Greeks started out: the Monism of the most +modern coining, for example, is hardly to be distinguished from the +Hylozoism of the ancient Ionian thinkers. But is the whole result of the +movement of universal history really only a deception? Has it simply +brought us back again, from the false paths that we have tried, without +according us any kind of positive profit whatever? We have become men of +another kind; we think and feel differently; we have built up a rich +culture, have transformed the world, have created a spiritual +atmosphere; and we are capable of striving after infinite life and +ultimate truth. Could all of this spring out of mere error? If that were +so, should we not be compelled to reject the whole of this as phantasy +and deception? But if the error was a means and an instrument in the +attainment of truth, and if mankind in its going out from itself and in +its return to itself is inwardly developed, where does the boundary +between truth and error lie, and what is the meaning of the whole? So +here again we lapse into uncertainty; history, to other ages a secure +support, leads us into still greater doubt. + +Finally, we must add to this crisis of culture the onward march of the +social movement, which continually increases in power; the passionate +longing of ever-growing groups of men for immediate participation in +culture and the joys of life. Such movements may accomplish themselves +within a fixed and acknowledged sphere of culture and of life; what +changes they then bring lie within this sphere; they do not place the +whole in question. Thus, the democratic movements of the fifteenth and +sixteenth centuries left certain principles of religious conviction +untouched; they left the conception of the world entirely unchanged. But +the matter is quite otherwise when a movement of this kind comes in +contact with a culture which is inwardly unstable and which is growing +uncertain concerning its final aims. We cannot fail to recognise what a +great danger of degeneration there is under such circumstances. The +masses, thus struggling upward, then seek their own way of life, and in +so doing they naturally concentrate their attention upon that which lies +immediately before their eyes and affects their immediate well-being. +From this position they will advance all the more quickly to a certain +conclusion, in that they are unconcerned with the experiences and +perplexities of the work of universal history, and therefore, with +unclouded enthusiasm, expect complete truth and pure happiness from +freer exercise of their powers and the rejection of all authority. If we +wish to ignore the dangers to culture which thus grow up, we must either +estimate man as he is too highly, or spiritual tasks too meanly. Until +the present, an independent spiritual life, making man more +comprehensive in being, raising and freeing him, has manifested itself +only at individual points; in the first place in chosen individuals, +from whom it has been conveyed to the common life. The spiritual world +made its appearance as a power superior to the interests and the +opinions of individuals and of the masses. Only in such transcendence of +the merely human did it develop any characteristic content, find an +inner unity, arouse respect, and lead man beyond mere nature. If all +this should now become different, if man in the mass should come to feel +himself to be the measure of all things, and should relate all to his +perception as the centre of infinity, would not a severe contradiction +arise between human enterprise and spiritual necessity, and would not +the full development of this opposition threaten the whole state of +culture with a violent convulsion? Ultimately the inner necessities of +our being would certainly win the day against all errors of +superficiality, but what severe conflicts and losses the division must +cost! + +The consideration of all these facts reveals us under the power of +different, indeed antagonistic, movements, and most especially in the +midst of the great struggle for supremacy between the visible and +invisible world, as the conflict between Positivism and Idealism gives +expression to it. Life for us contains two movements, one of which +starts from the centre and the other from the circumference; the former +cannot embrace the fullness of reality, and its basis is also insecure; +the latter gives no inner unity to life and lowers the standard of the +whole. As each of these main tendencies again divides, movements the +most varied surround us, tear us asunder, and crush our souls under +their oppositions. God and reason have become uncertain to us, and the +substitutes that are offered--nature, society, the individual--fail to +satisfy us. The unrest and uncertainty that arise from this are not +limited to a single sphere, they extend to the ultimate basal principles +of life. The new mode of thought declares the chief world of the +ancients to be a delusion; but we saw its own world dissolved in shadows +and schemes by spiritual activity. Since the one dissolves the reality +of the other, we are threatened with the loss of all definite results; +our own being becomes a dark problem to us; we know neither what we are +nor what we are not. + +The impression that we get of the condition of the present as a whole +may also be represented in the following manner: the historical +movement of humanity unfolds an incalculable wealth of life; this life, +however, cannot reach its own highest point and cannot win a character +of a spiritual kind unless it organises itself into a whole, unless it +attains an inner synthesis transcending all isolated states. Such +syntheses have been realised, and have led to distinctive organisations +of life; but these organisations have all proved to be too insignificant +and too narrow, and none has been able to overcome the rest and to +embrace the whole wealth of life. So life as a whole has broken them +down; and since it has thus lost all inner structure, it must inevitably +fall into a state of rapid degeneration, and must threaten to lose all +content and meaning. + +The evil effects on the development of life that are caused by this +convulsion and division, and by the lack of a dominant tendency; how +this condition leads to the destruction of everything simple and +self-evident, and lends to an unrestrained reflection an unwarrantable +power; how it robs endeavour of all its main tendencies, and permits +true and untrue, good and evil, to run confusedly together, all this and +much else is to-day so much and so widely discussed, and presents itself +with such overpowering clearness to our vision, that its description +need not detain us even for a moment. + +Ought we to submit to this disintegration and degradation of life as to +an inevitable destiny, or is it possible to work against it and to +strive after a unity transcending the division? The fact that the +division makes so strong an impression on us and that we feel it to be +so intolerable is at once in favour of the latter alternative. How could +this experience be possible if all multiplicity did not fall within a +comprehensive whole of life--if our nature were not superior to the +oppositions and did not drive us compulsorily to seek a unity? The life +which, in distinct contrast to decaying Antiquity, flows through our age +in a powerful, ceaselessly swelling flood; the unwearied activity of +this age; the excellence of its work; its passionate longing for more +happiness and fullness of life, all forbids a hasty and light +renunciation. It is true that there are hard contradictions, and that +spiritual power is at present not equal to cope with them; but this +power is not a given and fixed magnitude: it is capable of an +incalculable increase. Thus we ought not to be too ready to assert that +the limitations of the age are identical with the bounds of humanity, +and we ought not faint-heartedly to discontinue the struggle for a unity +and a meaning in life. + +This problem cannot be acknowledged without at the same time being +admitted as the most important and the most urgent of all problems. For, +on the decision concerning the whole, that concerning the spiritual +character of life depends, and, as this character extends through the +whole of life, every single matter will be differently decided according +to the decision concerning the whole. Only purely technical and merely +formal matters of work may remain unaffected by the problem, but +wherever a content comes into question it will at once arise and +manifest its urgency. This problem, therefore, will not suffer itself to +be thrust into the background; we can neither dally with it nor turn +aside from it. The individual, indeed, in his sphere of free decision +and of independent action can withdraw himself from the question, but he +can do so only at the price of the debasement of the quality of his +life, only in that, from an independent co-operator in the building up +of the ages, he becomes a dependent under-worker. + + +(c) THE FORM OF THE PROBLEM + +Only a few words are now necessary to come to a more definite +understanding concerning the form of the problem, which, with compelling +force, rises into prominence out of all this complexity. Where the +convulsion is such a fundamental and universal one as it shows itself to +us to be, it is of the first importance to rise above the existing +chaos, and to avoid all that which, even indirectly, would lead us back +to it. Many of the aids which would-be healers of the time's evils +recommend with vigour therefore need not be considered. + +Every attempt to make a direct compromise between the different forms of +life, to appropriate eclectically this aspect from one and that aspect +from another, is inadequate. The view that none of the systems of life +could have won so much power over mankind without containing some kind +of truth, which may not be lost, has, to be sure, a good deal of truth +in it. It is first necessary, however, to attain a position from which +this truth in each case may be ascertained and rightly appreciated; and +we can only reach such a position in opposition to the confusion which +surrounds us. + +A recourse to history and an adherence to a high achievement of the past +promise just as little help. One thing is certain: history cannot be +eliminated from our life; its highest achievements invite us to consider +them again and again. But what is to be accepted by us as "high," +indeed, what as "spiritual" history, is not at all definite without +further consideration. It is what is esteemed in our own conviction as +true and great which decides in this matter. We look at history from the +position of the present and with the spirit of the present. If, +therefore, as we saw, the present has fallen inwardly into a state of +complete uncertainty and doubt, our consideration of history must be +affected in the same way; and, of course, not its external data, but its +inner spiritual content and meaning must be made uncertain. At the same +time, we cannot fail to recognise that in reference to the central +problem with which we are concerned, the present situation is quite +peculiar, and lacks historical parallel. Sharp contrasts have always +been found in human experience; and in transitional periods in history +they have been felt with painful acuteness. But never did they so extend +over the whole of life and so deeply affect fundamentals; never was +there so much uncertainty with regard to what should be the main +direction of endeavour, and the meaning of all human existence and man's +relation to the universe, as in the present. Everything which to earlier +ages appeared an inviolable possession has become to us a problem. What +gain, therefore, in respect of the chief matter could a return to the +past bring? In his investigation of the far-off ages the scholar may for +a time forget the present: the attitude of mind which may result in +bringing him fame for his work would be dangerous and destructive as a +disposition of the whole of mankind. For we cannot treat that which is +foreign to our nature as something of our own, without losing our +distinctive character and degrading our own life to one of mere +imitation. + +Further, it has become impossible to strive for the ideal by selecting +from the realm of experience a single point and treating it as an +archimedean point, as absolutely fixed, and shaping our life from it. +Descartes attempted to do this with his "I think," and Kant with his "I +ought." But it is very doubtful whether there is an archimedean point in +man; whether to make such an assumption is not to over-estimate man. The +experience of history shows further that that which some have taken as +absolutely primary and axiomatic has been regarded by others as +derivative, and has been explained in an entirely different manner. The +presentationalist does not deny the actuality of thought, or the +naturalistic thinker conscience; but he understands it as a subsidiary +phenomenon, and therefore can find no support in it. How then can that +overcome all doubt which itself calls forth serious doubt? + +A whole sphere can be withdrawn from the confusion and used to overcome +it just as little as can a single leading point. For the uncertainty +with regard to the whole extends far into every individual sphere; and +such a sphere may appear, to one in one way, and to another in another. + +Science is not infrequently treated as though it were enthroned on high, +supreme above all the struggles and the doubts of existence, and as +though, from its sovereign capacity, it were able to give a secure +content of truth to life. It is true that science has much in its forms +and in its work which is not the subject of dispute; but that with which +we are here concerned--its intrinsic value, its spiritual character, and +its place in life as a whole--is by no means a matter beyond dispute. As +a matter of fact, every system of life has its own assertion in +reference to this problem: to each to know signifies something different +and is capable of something different. Whoever decides for one of these +assertions concerning the nature of knowing has at the same time made a +decision concerning the systems of life. He stands not outside, but in +the midst, of the struggle. The same thing holds good with regard to +morality, which is often welcomed as a secure refuge from the doubts of +science. For, however certain it may be that in this sphere also there +is no difference of opinion in respect of many things, as, for example, +concerning the goodness or badness of certain types of conduct, still, +the more we come to be concerned with principles the more do problems +arise. In the immediate present the fact is most unmistakably clear that +in this field also the fight does not rage around the interpretation of +a given and acknowledged fact, but around the fact itself. What a +different purport and meaning morality has in the systems of Religion, +Immanent Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism, and Individualism +respectively! + +Finally, the attempt to give to life stability and peace by turning to +the subject, to personality, as to a point removed from all perplexity, +also fails. We should be the last to place a low estimate upon +personality, but the conception receives its meaning and value only in +its spiritual connections, and without these it soon becomes nothing +more than a mere term, which blurs and blunts the great antithesis of +existence. If that which is called personality exists as a merely +individual point by the side of things, then we can never discover how +occupation with things is capable of transforming life as a whole. If, +however, in this activity we should win an inward relation to infinity +and a spontaneity of life, then this admission involves a confession +concerning reality as a whole which can never be justified by a theory +which regards the mere individual as the starting-point. That the idea +of personality implies a problem rather than a fact is indicated by the +different conceptions of it which we meet in the different systems of +life. In considering personality, Religion thinks of the immediate +relation of the soul to God; Immanent Idealism, of the presence of the +infinite at the individual point; Individualism, of the supremacy of the +free subject over against the social environment. It is only by reason +of the common terminology that we fail to recognise how great the +differences are in the thought on the matter; how that which one regards +as of value in personality is severely attacked by another. + +All these attempts therefore prove to be inadequate because they lead +back to the state of uncertainty they were meant to overcome. To reject +them, however, involves us in a certain assertion, which to some extent +points out the main direction which further investigation must follow. +No external compromise can help us, but only the winning of a +transcendent position which is capable of giving to each factor its +right without reduction; no flight into history can lead us to the +truth, but only an activity of the present, not, however, of the present +of the mere moment, but which embraces the work of universal history; no +placing a single point or sphere into a supreme and all-dominant +position can help us to overcome division, but only a conflict for a new +whole; no mere turning to personality is of value before a sure basis is +given to it from the whole! All leads us to this conclusion: we must +strive for a new system of life. And to achieve this is not impossible, +for, as we saw, a system of life is not imposed upon us by fate, but +must arise from our own activity. If the systems which have previously +been formed no longer satisfy, why cannot mankind evolve others? Or is +it proved that the existent forms exhaust all possibilities? A too +narrow conception of life was seen to be a common defect of all these +systems; its richness broke through the attempted unifications, and with +this they fell into irreconcilable contradiction. Should not a synthesis +be possible which would do more justice to the whole extent of life; +which need not deny and exclude so much; and which might also unite what +at first seems absolutely contradictory? Doubtless such a synthesis +would not be achieved all at once; it is inevitable that growing life +should involve many discords and movements within itself. Yet this +synthesis would present itself at least in a manner similar to that of +the extant systems; and, since it strives after something human, it must +always be mindful of its limits. + +Should such a universal synthesis be at all possible, it must certainly +be something which is to be found and disclosed rather than something +which simply is to be produced from ourselves. How could we hope to +advance to it if it were not somehow involved in the depth of our being, +and in our fundamental relation to the world, and if it did not already +exist here in some way? It is a matter, therefore, of arousing to fuller +independence and at the same time of raising inwardly something which +exists within us; of recognising something new and even astonishing in +the old and the supposedly self-evident, so that the truth of the +universe may become our truth and give power to our life. + +A task of this kind is a matter of the whole soul and not merely of the +understanding; it is a concern of humanity, not of the individual alone. +Of that which the single individual may contribute towards the +attainment of the aim it is hardly possible to think humbly enough. And +yet each has to use his power to the best of his ability; if in cases of +great necessity and of ill-fortune in matters of an external kind the +individual considers it only right to hasten to help, how could he +withdraw himself where the task is the satisfying of a spiritual need +of mankind? Still less than in the former case is he able to disregard +the matter as something alien and indifferent to himself. For, in the +struggle for the whole, he fights at the same time for the unity of his +own being, for a meaning for his own life. + + + + +II + +THE OUTLINE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE + +INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND CONSIDERATIONS + + +Our inquiry ended in a definite negation; it showed the present +condition of things to be marked by severe internal conflict and in +danger of dissolution from within. Many movements of thought and life +cross, disturb, limit, and oppose one another. Since what to one seems a +wholesome truth seems to another pernicious error, all inner community +of life disappears, and with it all firmness of conviction and joy of +creative activity. The more these conflicting tendencies develop the +more do they crush and destroy all the traditional elements of our life; +the more are the spiritual contents and goods, which the necessities of +life compel us to adhere to, deprived of their basis in the depths of +the soul. The confusion which prevails in the present time, with its +continual change, its rapid alteration of circumstances, its power to +convey the most diverse impressions, its production of ever new +combinations, might even attract and entertain us if it were no more +than a drama. But if the confusion is more than this, if it includes our +destiny and is meant to signify the whole of our life, then, by reason +of its detrimental effects upon the whole of life and upon man's +inwardness, and by reason of its lack of content and soul, it must +completely fail to satisfy us, and must provoke an energetic resistance. +True, a condition of things so full of contradictions has also its +advantages; it accords to the activity of the individual the greatest +liberty and gives him a feeling of supremacy; its dissolution of +everything previously regarded as fixed enables uncontrolled feeling and +unstable mood to acquire power, and at one time to flatter man +pleasantly, and at another to carry him away impetuously. The +individual's attainment of freedom, however, gives as yet no content to +life; and the feeling of supremacy is as yet not a real supremacy. These +feelings and tendencies, which, within a wider whole of life, certainly +serve to add to its animation, inevitably lead to a state of vagueness +and emptiness when they put themselves forward as the whole. The +supposed aids which are offered us are no more than mere pretences; and +they become dangerous and harmful so far as they deceive us concerning +the seriousness and tension of the situation. + +The feeling of tension was increased through the historical treatment +which accompanied our inquiry. For, from the point of view of history, +the present confusion shows itself to be not a temporary obscuring of an +indisputable truth, or a tendency on the part of man to become feeble +and weary in the appropriation of such a truth, but to involve in doubt +the basal nature of truth itself: the meaning of our life as a whole was +seen to have fallen into uncertainty. The systems of thought, in the +light of which we have hitherto regarded reality and steered the +oncoming flood of appearances, have broken up and dissolved. We have +become defenceless in face of the impressions of the environment which +affect us with increasing force, and impel us now in one direction, now +in another. It is not simply this or that aspect in human existence, but +the whole of man's nature which has become problematical in this +dissolution. Formerly, the chief result of the effort of universal +history had seemed to be that man rises more and more above nature and +builds for himself a realm with new contents and new values. Now, the +desire to be something higher than nature appears to be a bold +presumption; the idea that man has a special position is ably contested, +and every distinctive task is denied him. Man appears to be far too +insignificant and to possess far too little freedom to be able to take +up arms against the world and to obtain the mastery of it. Doubts such +as these are all the more painful because they are the result of our own +work; in that we toiled, investigated, and pressed forward, we +undermined the foundations of our own life; our work has turned with +destroying power against ourselves. With the increase of external +results, life as a whole has become increasingly hollow; it has no +longer an organising and governing centre. Is it to be wondered at if +the finer spirits of our age are weary, disheartened, and repelled by +the feeling of the disharmony of the whole of present culture, which +calls for so much effort from man and yields him so little genuine +happiness; speaks of truth and lives from semblance and pretence; +assumes an imposing mien and utterly fails to satisfy when confronted +with ultimate problems? Is not the power of attraction, which the figure +of St. Francis of Assisi was recently able to acquire, an eloquent +witness to the reality of the longing for more plainness and simplicity +in life? And yet we cannot take up again the position occupied by an +earlier age; we cannot take up a past phase unchanged. No return to the +conditions of the past can bring satisfaction to the spiritual needs of +the present, for a device of this kind always leads by a detour back +again to the starting-point. Ultimately, it is from ourselves alone that +help can come; and we can have recourse to no means other than those of +the living present. + +First of all, our state of necessity must be admitted to the full, and +the danger of a further degeneration of life in respect of its spiritual +nature adequately estimated. It is always a gain to obtain a clear idea +of the condition of the matter in question and to grasp the problem as a +whole. For, through this, we are saved not only from illusions leading +to error, but also from the authority of the mere present and from a +feeling of anxiety and fear in the presence of contemporary opinion. If +this age is in a state of such uncertainty; if it achieves so little for +that which concerns the foundations of our spiritual existence, then +neither its agreement can impress us, nor its opposition appal us; but +the endeavour to make life firm again can seek confidently what is +needful for it, and, with care in regard to what it shall affirm and +deny, can follow the way which its own necessities point out. + +One fact in particular must tend to increase our confidence in this +endeavour: the fact, namely, that a negative result, which proceeds from +our own work, cannot be a mere negation, but must contain an affirmative +element within it. From what reason could the traditional systems of +life have become inadequate to man other than that they do not satisfy a +demand that we ourselves make upon them, and must make upon them? It is +plain that we need and seek more than we possess, and this seeking +betrays that our being is wider or deeper than was assumed in those +systems. Why did each of the different systems become inadequate, unless +it was that life itself rejected as too narrow the standard involved in +them? Why was it impossible to regard the different systems as having a +certain validity, to allow them to continue side by side, and divide our +existence amongst them, if not because we cannot possibly give up all +claim to an inner unity? If, then, the present confusion is rooted in a +wrong relation between our desire and our achievement, we need not +faint-heartedly surrender ourselves to it. It is plain that there is +something higher in us, which we have to arouse to life and realise to +its fullest extent. We may be confident that the necessity of our being, +which gave rise to the desire, will also reveal some way by which it may +be satisfied. + +A closer consideration of the results of our inquiry leaves no doubt +with regard to the direction which research has to take to accomplish +its task. Diverse, fundamentally different systems passed in review +before us; each came forward as the unadorned and true expression of a +reality that seemed common to them all; their struggle appeared to be a +conflict concerning the interpretation of this reality. It became +evident, however, that the conflict is, on the contrary, in regard not +to the interpretation but the fundamental nature of reality; different +realities arise which are irreconcilably opposed. The systems do not +originate in a common and secure basis: the basis itself is sought, and +may assume various forms. The conflict therefore is much more over +ultimate problems than is usually supposed; it arises primarily out of +the nature of life itself, out of the inner movement which advances +against the illimitable world around us, and seeks to gain the mastery +over it. Our life and our world acquire a definite character only by our +taking up such a movement of counteraction, the particular nature of +which decides over all further moulding of life. We have seen that when +we ourselves became active we took up and emphasised one of the +possibilities which lie within the range of our life, and held it as +supreme over all the rest; we took as the fundamental relation one of +the relations of which our life is capable, as, for example, the +relation to God, to the immanent reason of the universe, to nature, to +society, to one's own individuality. A particular sphere of life was +thus marked out; a scheme of life was yielded which appeared capable of +taking up all experience into itself: according to the starting-point +adopted, we sketched a distinctive outline and sought to include the +whole content of human industry, man's universe of work--as we might +call it--in order to lead to our own perfection. This scheme, assumed to +be true, then had to show what it was capable of; a powerful effort was +brought forth to overcome the resistance of a world which, even when it +was grasped from within, still remained alien to our nature; and, +ultimately, to form the whole into a unity. We were not, as it were, an +empty vessel into which a content flows from outside, but we generated +from within a movement which went onward and onward, and desired to take +up everything in itself; it was a matter of radically transforming the +external into an inner life. We could succeed in this only in that life +self-consciously pressed forward to win new powers; formed connections, +branches, and graduations; accomplished an inner construction; and with +progressive self-elevation became an all-inclusive whole, which did not +possess a reality by the side of itself, but itself became complete +reality. Thus, life took possession of the world only in that it widened +itself from within to the world, and, in the appropriation of +everything alien to it, advanced from the original outline to full +concreteness. + +According to the results of our inquiry, the chief decision in the +struggle with regard to the nature of the world also depends upon our +type of life. We convinced ourselves that there was no conception of +life common to the different systems, but that from its starting-point, +throughout its whole development, each of them shaped life differently +from the others; and we saw that the differences even went as far as +complete opposition. Each system of life had its own kind of experience; +each formed its own instruments for the appropriation of the world; each +saw of the infinite that in particular which corresponded to the main +direction of its own movement. A consideration of all the facts makes it +quite clear that a decision depends neither upon externals nor upon the +individual, but upon the inner life and the whole; and further, that +cognition does not give a solution to the problems of life, but that +life itself has to reach a solution through its own organisation and +construction, its own advance and creative activity. + +However, that which was the compelling and deciding power in the systems +of the present day--the struggle for life itself--has not attained to +complete recognition in them. Rather, they were too quick to begin to +occupy themselves with objects, and sought to show themselves superior +in this respect to their rivals; the attention to results prevented the +correct appreciation and estimation of experience itself. The +impossibility of coming to an agreement concerning the object then +forced us back to the life-process; and we were led to the view that the +object appeared different because we ourselves placed something +different into it, and that we saw less the object itself than ourselves +and our life in the object. Thus we were induced to place our attention +chiefly on the subject; but then there was a strong tendency to leave +the world outside as a special realm; and the division of work between +subject and object drove us still further into uncertainty. In the +midst of such confusion, we did not come to the point of making a +decision; we did not attain the position from which alone an agreement +is possible; at one time one system, at another time another carried us +away. We failed to recognise that, however much we come into contact +externally, we live spiritually in separate worlds; that, while using +the same expressions, we speak different languages, and therefore cannot +possibly understand one another. + +The gain is by no means an insignificant one, and a distinctive +treatment arises, if we become clearly conscious of the fact that the +shaping of the process of life itself is the chief object of conflict; +that the movement is not one between world and life, but lies entirely +within life; and that the essential matter is the perfecting of life +itself. The recognition of this fact leads us to an immanent mode of +treatment that has many advantages. The facts involved are now seen to +lie deeper. The source of experiences is not so much the relation to the +environment as the movement and expansion of life itself. Striving and +conduct may now involve a certain concreteness; indeed, the actual +experiencing of limitations and negations may lead to an elevation above +them. The type of life does not seek to justify itself, to show its +truth, through harmony with an external world; it is justified by its +own advance, its increase in strength, and its upward growth. It is only +a justification of this kind, a justification within its own realm, that +can acquire a power to convince and to restore again to life that +concreteness of which, in opposition to the excess of unrestrained +reflection and vague feeling, it is to-day in the direst need. If we +desire to arise above this state of division, and to attain a greater +unity, we can achieve our aim only by the power of an inner unification +of our life. + +Instead, therefore, of considering the internal from the point of view +of the external, we must consider the external from the point of view of +the internal; our knowledge must be essentially a knowledge of self, our +experience an experience of self, if we would come any nearer to the +attainment of the aim. Our inner nature is not given to us as something +complete; it has first to be aroused to life and developed; we need to +attain to a state of self-determining activity if we would reach the +highest that we are capable of. From the recognition of the necessity of +greater activity, and of seeking the roots of the problem at greater +depths, we become aware of a new relation of thought to life. Although +thought may involve certain fundamental forms, and may adhere to them in +all its activity, it is life in its totality, as we understand it, which +first gives to thought its more detailed form, a characteristic nature, +clear aims and sure tendencies. Thought, therefore, is inseparable from +the movement and the advance of life; all hope of progress rests on the +hope of a further deepening of life; a revealing of new relations, and a +development of new powers. It is not from mere knowledge, but only from +the movement of life as a whole that we can make any advance; but the +life here referred to is one that includes knowledge, and not one that +takes up a position independent of knowledge, and, in opposition to it, +bases itself on supposed practical needs. + +A treatment such as the one we have indicated has to be followed in the +investigation upon which we are about to enter. The chief aim of this +investigation is to reveal and to call forth life; it is not its chief +aim to interpret life in conceptual terms. It is from this position, +therefore, that we ask the question--which the conflict of the different +systems of life forced upon us--whether a unity transcending the +oppositions exists in us and can be aroused to life through our +self-determining activity. It is from this position also that we ask the +further question--which springs out of the struggle between the older +and the newer modes of thought--whether ultimately man must give up the +superior position which from early times he has adjudged himself, or +whether an inner elevation is possible which gives him the power to cope +with new tasks and new conditions. Whether such a treatment leads to a +positive result is a question of fact; and what the answer to this is +cannot be decided by a preliminary consideration, but only by the actual +investigation. + + + + +I. THE MAIN THESIS + +(a) THE ASCENT TO THE MAIN THESIS + + +The most expeditious way of arriving at a comprehensive conception of +human life is to begin with the impression which we get of it as a +whole; ascertain what problems arise from this, and seek to make what +headway we can in solving them until we reach a stage where the +necessity of a particular assertion becomes apparent. From the outset, +however, the attention will be centred chiefly upon that which +differentiates human life from other forms of life existing within our +knowledge; it is from a consideration of this that we shall most readily +see the whole in its proper light. + + +1. MAN AS A BEING OF NATURE + +No one doubts that human life forms the highest point of development +that comes within our experience; that it is in some way more than mere +animal life. But what it is that is characteristic in human life as +distinct from animal life, and how it is to be interpreted, is a matter +of dispute. From the earliest times there has been a great diversity of +opinion and conviction concerning this matter, and absolutely +contradictory views have been maintained. Some thinkers have believed it +possible to regard human life, in spite of its uniqueness, as +essentially the same as that of the animal, and to trace back all +difference to a difference in the quantity of the fundamental nature +which they all possess; these thinkers did not concern themselves with +presenting the higher as developed from the lower by a gradual growth. +Others, on the contrary, regarded human life as something essentially +new and in its very nature distinct--the beginning of another kind of +world--and denied to the uttermost a derivation from lower forms; these +held it to be impossible to avoid the recognition of a break between +animal and human life. According to which of these positions was +accepted, life obtained a fundamentally different prospect and a +fundamentally different task; activity necessarily had different aims +and sought different paths; the conflict around this problem affected +the whole sphere of existence. + +As a result of the movements and experiences of the nineteenth century, +this conflict has entered upon a new stage. In earlier times the +decision had generally been made as a result of the immediate impression +of the civilised man who was conscious of his superiority; it did not +seem possible for him to lift himself far enough above his environment; +the life of his soul, through its distinctive spiritual character, +seemed to be as distinct from every impulse which nature exhibited as +the sky is distant from the earth. Science and art, morality and +religion were accepted as an original possession of man and as the power +which had dominated his life from the beginning. He appeared to be a +higher being; and to direct all thought and endeavour towards the +strengthening of the distinctively human was regarded as the chief +requirement of life. + +The movements which have arisen in the Modern Age have led to a radical +change in our treatment of this question: this change is chiefly due to +science. Modern science breaks down the authority of the immediate +impression, and, in contrast with it, projects a new representation of +the world. Man is no longer looked upon as occupying a position of +lonely elevation, but is seen to be in the closest concatenation with +nature around him, and is regarded, finally, as a mere part of its +machinery. Many movements of thought tend toward this conclusion and +support one another. The physical relationship which exists between man +and the animals could not have been so clearly perceived, and traced +with such exactitude of detail by modern science had not the fixed +boundaries, which in our representation had hitherto divided the life of +the human soul from that of the animals, been abolished. The new view +was further supported by the results of a keener investigation into the +nature of psychical life, since in this investigation the traditional +conception was analysed into its individual constituents, and it was +sought to explain from their combinations even the highest spiritual +achievements. The result of this modification of ideas was that the +inner life of man was assimilated much more closely to nature than +before; the juxtaposition and the succession of occurrences gained in +significance; it was recognised that relations did not hold from the +beginning but are developed gradually. The forces and impulses which +were operative in this development seemed to have arisen from an actual +process of nature, without any co-operation of human caprice. Our +psychical life appeared to be nothing more than a continuation of +nature. The great divergence between the heights attained in experience, +and the theories that were formulated to account for them, caused no +misgivings because the idea of a gradual evolution during an indefinite +period of time was sufficient to bridge the widest gulf. At the same +time the conception of society allied itself with that of history and +lent its support to the general tendency. Every higher aspect of life +that was accepted formerly as a proof of a supernatural order now became +a witness to historico-social relationship and, with its new +interpretation, lost its old mysteriousness. All this was, of course, +only on the assumption that human life brings nothing essentially new +with it. Not the least doubt as to the validity of this assumption came +to those who entered upon this train of thought. + +Thought was able to follow this course with the greater confidence +because it went hand in hand with a change in practical life. By reason +of the development of modern life, man's relations to the environment +have become increasingly significant to man. Modern industry and +physical science have led him from a preponderatingly contemplative +relation to his environment to an active one; infinite prospects have +been disclosed; the forces of nature have been pressed more and more +into the service of mankind. But even in the service which they render +man these forces have won a power over him, since with a determining +power they keep his activity and his thought bent upon themselves. The +material side of life has escaped from the mean estimation in which it +had previously been held, if not in the conduct of individuals, yet at +the height of spiritual culture: to the present age it has become the +indispensable basis of all development. The social movement, with its +summoning of the masses to complete participation in happiness and +culture, supports the tendency to estimate material goods more highly. +With the cessation of oppression and necessity, and with the increase of +material well-being, a general advance and an inner development of life +seem assured. The whole tendency which we have considered exhibits man +as solely and entirely a part of nature, even though nature may be +conceived of more broadly than it was formerly; and the life of the +society and of the individual as being determined by natural forces and +subject to natural laws. How, along with this tendency, the traditional +conception of the world has been completely transformed; how biology, in +the sense of natural science, has been taken as the leading point of +view for the explanation of life, it is unnecessary to follow further, +since our consideration of the naturalistic system of life has already +given us an insight into this matter. + + +2. THE GROWTH OF MAN BEYOND NATURE + +But even after we had seen an older type of life disappear and a new one +with the power of youth rise up, gain mastery over souls, and transform +conditions, despite all its triumphs the new movement manifested +limitations--limitations which did not arouse the criticism of the +thinker, but with the compulsion of an actual power the opposition of +the developing life of mankind. That which we became aware of in this +connection will become even more clear to us, and impel us to seek for +new aims, if we now concentrate our attention upon the process of life +and follow it throughout its experiences. + +There cannot be the least doubt that we belong to nature: no one can +fail to recognise that it penetrates deep into the life of the soul, and +to a marked extent impresses its own form upon that life: the boundary +therefore is not between man and nature, but within the soul of man +itself. But whether nature is able to claim the whole life of the soul, +or whether at some point there does not arise an insuperable opposition +to such a claim, is another question. Even the most zealous champion of +the claims of nature cannot deny that man achieves something +distinctive: we not only belong to nature, we also have knowledge of the +fact; and this knowledge is in itself sufficient to show that we are +more than nature. For in knowledge, be it in the first place however +meanly conceived, however much concerned with the simple representation +of external occurrences, there is a kind of life other than that which +is shown in the simultaneity and succession of events at the level of +nature. For it is a characteristic of knowledge that in it we hold the +single points present together and connect them into a chain; but how +could we do that without in some way rising above the mere succession +and surveying it from a transcendent point? In this survey we pass from +earlier to later, from later to earlier; and at the same time we are +able to hold the multiplicity together: there must be a unity of some +kind ruling within us; but the mechanism of nature can never produce +such a unity. A transcendence of nature therefore is already +accomplished in the process of thought, even when it only represents +nature, only displays it to our consciousness. Intellectual achievement, +however, is by no means exhausted in the representation of nature. The +development of a new scientific conception of nature sufficiently +demonstrates, as we saw reason to believe, that thought has far more +independence than such representation implies; that in arranging and +transforming phenomena it opposes itself to the environment. For the +scientific conception of nature is not offered to us immediately as +something complete; it has to be won from the naïve view with toil and +difficulty. In order to arrive at this scientific conception, thought +must have a position antecedent to the impressions, must become +conscious of itself, realise its own strength, and in its activity lead +from universal to universal. The work of thought is not simply +transitional: without its continuance that which has been gained would +be quickly lost. Mere existence gives to nature no present reality for +our thought and life. To follow the pathway to reality involves the +overthrow of manifold delusions; and this necessitates such a longing +for truth, and a power to gain truth, as only a thought, which +transcends the sense impression, can produce. Not only is transcendence +of nature demonstrated through the fact of the existence of thought with +such independence, thought also carries within its being unique demands, +measures the life of nature by their standard, and in that life +recognises limitations not simply on this side and that, but also in the +inner being of the whole. Thought cannot possibly be satisfied with the +state of things as they are presented; it desires to illuminate, +penetrate, and comprehend it; it asks "Whence?" and "Why?"--it insists +that events must have a meaning and be rational. And from this point of +view it feels the mere actuality of nature--which excites no opposition +within its own sphere--to be a painful limitation and constraint, +something dark and meaningless. To thought, a life which is swayed by +blind natural impulse must be inadequate, indeed intolerable. Similar +conflicts arise in other directions. Thought embraces a whole and +demands a whole; it cannot refrain from passing a judgment upon the +whole. If this treatment is applied by thought to nature, the +predominant concentration of life in the single individuals and their +juxtaposition will appear to be a serious defect; all the passionate +strivings of the individual beings cannot deceive us concerning the +inner emptiness of the whole. For in nature there is nothing that +experiences the whole of this movement as a whole; makes the experience +self-conscious and something of value in itself. In the movement of +nature everything individual is sacrificed; and there seems to be +nothing to which this sacrifice brings results which are experienced as +a good. The same holds good of a culture that resolves human social +relationship into a simple co-existence of individuals, regards them as +battling together in the struggle for existence, and believes all +progress of the whole to be dependent upon their ceaseless and pitiless +conflict. Even if such a conflict leads to further external results, +there is no spiritual product: the results are experienced by no one as +an inner gain. The indescribable meanness of this whole culture, swayed +as it is solely by the spirit of egoism; the slavish dependence to which +this culture condemns man; the rigour of the individualism that rules in +it, cannot possibly escape from the criticism of thought. Thought, in +transforming this condition of things into an experience--that is, in +making us conscious of it--at the same time makes it impossible for man +to accept it as final. Since it makes us more conscious of the +limitations of this state of life, thought demonstrates--and that +through this very consciousness of its limitations itself--that our +whole existence is not exhausted by that individualisation and +detachment, but that there is a tendency of some sort within us which +strives towards the unity of the whole. + +Problems no less complex arise in relation to time. Looked at from the +point of view of nature, no inconsistency is felt in the fact that only +a short span of time is granted to the life of individuals; that they +come and go in most rapid succession. For here the individuals do not +rise to the consideration of anything beyond their own time; their +presentation and desire are exhausted in the present; they feel no +longing for a continuation of life. The position is radically changed +with the entrance of thought. Thought does not drift along with time: as +certainly as it strives to attain truth, it must rise above time and its +treatment must be timeless: a timeless validity appertains to truth, a +comprehension of things "under the form of eternity" (_sub specie +aeternitatis_). To a being who, in his thought, rises to comprehension +of experience from the point of view of the eternal, all temporal +limitation, and especially the short duration of human life, is a source +of surprise and a contradiction. The rapid sequence of generations, the +perpetual decay of all that impels us so forcibly to desire life and +holds us so firmly to it, seem to deprive our endeavour of all its +value, and give to the whole of existence a shadowy, phantom-like +character. Feelings of this kind have been aroused anew in our own time. +The restlessness of the activities of our civilisation and the lack of +real meaning in this civilisation, which to the present age seems to +constitute the whole of life, need only to be clearly and forcibly +comprehended by thought, and all its bustle and all its passion cannot +prevent the emergence of an acute feeling of its dream-like nature. + +The feeling of the lack of reality and depth in the life of nature will +become the keener in proportion to the degree of independence thought +evolves. For the more thought finds its own basis in itself, the more +will it treat nature as an appearance, the more clearly will it +recognise that sense, with all its obviousness and palpability, does not +guarantee the possession of truth; for truth comes to us only through +thought. In thought, therefore, the world of nature loses its immediacy +and becomes a realm of appearances and phantoms. + +A consideration of all the facts leads us to the result that a life +consisting solely of nature and intelligence involves an intolerable +inconsistency: form and content are sharply separated from each other; +thought is strong enough to disturb the sense of satisfaction with +nature, but is too weak to construct a new world in opposition to it. +Life is in a state of painful uncertainty, and man is a "Prometheus +bound" in that he must needs experience all the constraint and +meaninglessness of the life of nature, and must suffer therefrom an +increasing pain without being able to change this state in any way. + +The experience of our time confirms this conclusion in no indefinite +manner. Since, with regard to the material and the technical, we have +attained heights never before reached, the bonds between us and our +environment have increased a thousandfold, and our work has united us +more closely with the world, we seem now for the first time to attain a +sure hold of reality. At the same time, however, the activity of +thought, and with it unrestrained reflection, have also increased +immeasurably in modern life. This reflection forbids all naïve +submission to the immediacy of nature; destroys all feeling of security; +and comes between us and our own soul, our own volition. We are thrown +back once more on to the world of sense, that we may seek in it a +support and a scope for our life and effort; and from the point of view +of this world the work of thought appears to be a formation of clouds. +But this formation persists; draws us back again to itself and, with all +its insubstantiality, proves strong enough to make us regard the +physical as appearance. Our life is divided into two parts which cannot +and will not coalesce. The emergence of a new life, which can do nothing +but comprehend the other in thought, and which, while it is indeed +capable of depreciating the other, cannot itself advance further, is +seen to involve a monstrous inconsistency. + +If the union of nature and intelligence produces so much confusion, we +are inevitably led to ask whether man does not possess in himself more +than thought; whether thought is not rooted in a deeper and a more +comprehensive life, from which it derives its power. It is not necessary +that such a life should be manifest to us in all its completeness; we +shall also be compelled to acknowledge it as a fact even if in the first +place it has to struggle up in face of opposition; however, in its +development it must show distinctive contents and powers which could not +be the work of a subjective reflection. If there is a life and a +development of this kind, it will be necessary for us to comprehend it +in its various aspects and tendencies, and only when we have +accomplished this may we endeavour to obtain a representation of the +whole. + +Now, developments of life which defy limitation by the mechanism of +nature and set a new kind of being in opposition to it do, in truth, +appear. We recognise such developments in the processes by which life +liberates itself from bondage to an individualism and its subjectivity, +and afterwards attains a self-conscious inwardness. We may consider both +these developments somewhat more in detail. So far as man belongs to +nature, his conduct is determined solely by the impulse to +self-preservation; every movement must either directly or indirectly +tend to the welfare of the individual; everything may be traced back to +what happens to the individuals. This by no means indicates a distinct +separation of man from his environment. For even the mechanism of nature +closely unites that which happens to the individual with that which +happens around him; the individual can progress only in so far as he is +united with others: he cannot advance his own well-being without +advancing that of others. Even in a "state of nature" man takes his +family, his nation, and the whole of humanity indeed, up into his +interests; and as this tendency is not bounded from without, but may be +immeasurably refined and extended in an indefinite number of directions, +it easily comes to appear that this involves an inner deliverance from +self, and that another is of value to us for his own sake. But it is no +more than an appearance; for with all the external agreement the inward +separation is far greater, and amounts to opposition. Within the limits +of nature we can certainly concern ourselves with something which is +only indirectly useful to us; but we can never be concerned with +anything which is devoid of all use to ourselves; we cannot take such a +direct interest in the welfare of others as will tend to our own +disadvantage. If experience gives evidence of such an activity and such +an interest, in so doing it demonstrates a transcendence of nature. Now, +experience does give such evidence, and indeed with irresistible +clearness. A witness to this is seen in the zeal with which man +habitually attempts to give to his struggles for mere self-preservation +a better appearance, a semblance of conduct performed out of genuine +regard for the interests of others. To what purpose all this trouble to +acquire such an appearance; for what reason this hypocrisy which +permeates the whole of human life; and whence this appearance itself if +we belong solely and entirely to nature? Further, whatever elements of +semblance there may be in the general state of human life, the +development of that life is by no means nothing but semblance. The +social life of man is not explicable as a simple collection of +individuals related to one another in different ways; but in the family, +in the state, in humanity as a whole there is evolved an inner unity, a +sphere of life with distinctive values and contents. And as it is of the +nature of these to transcend the ends and aims of the individuals, to +arouse other feelings and stimulate to other efforts, so their demands +may be directly opposed to those of individual self-preservation. Man +sees himself compelled to decide whether he will pursue his own welfare +or that of the whole: from the necessity of a decision it is impossible +to escape. However much in the majority of cases self-interest may +preponderate, we cannot dispute the possibility of his acting in direct +and conscious opposition to his own interest; of his subordinating and +sacrificing himself; and of his doing this "not grudgingly nor of +necessity," but willingly and gladly; of his feeling this subordination +to be not a negation and a limitation, but an affirmation and an +expansion of his life. All who strive for some essential renewal and +elevation of human life base their hope and trust upon such a +disposition. A renewal and an elevation of life involve far too much +toil, conflict, and danger; they demand a renunciation and a sacrifice +far too great for them to be commended to us by consideration of our own +welfare, or for them to dispense with the necessity of counting upon an +unselfish submission, a sincere sympathy, a genuine love. That which was +produced with glowing passion in heroic beginnings must with a quieter +warmth pervade all progress also. An inner community of minds is +indispensable if the whole of culture is not to become a soulless +mechanism and inwardly alien to us. It is true that the external way of +regarding the facts of life often fuses together as one, lower and +higher, a continuation of nature and the beginning of a new life. +Language also supports this tendency, since it indicates fundamentally +different psychical states with the same terms. Yet the love in which +the union with others is sought only in order to advance one's own +interests, and the love which finds in this union a release from the +limitations of the natural _ego_, and gains a new life, remain distinct. +The sympathy which feels the sufferings of others to be unpleasant +because one's own complacency is disturbed by them, and which in +consequence fades away and disappears as soon as the sight of the +suffering comes to an end, is absolutely separated from a sympathy which +extends to the soul of the other, and possessing which, in order to +contribute to the relieving of the other's need, one willingly +sacrifices one's own complacency: a sympathy, therefore, which extends +its interest and help without limit beyond all that simply has to do +with the relation to the environment. How much real love and genuine +sympathy the experience of humanity shows is a question in itself. Even +as possibilities of our being, as matters of thought which occupy our +attention, and as tasks and problems, they give evidence of a +development of our life beyond the limits of nature. + +This forgetfulness of self is a kind of deliverance of life from the +limitations and the interests of the individual: a new relation of man +to man, of person to person, thus arises and brings about an essential +change, indeed a complete transformation of aims and feelings. The +deliverance is effected in another direction with the emergence of a +new relation to things, to the object. In the realm of nature everything +that is external has a value for man only as a means and an instrument +to the advancement of his own welfare; from the point of view of nature, +it is impossible to understand how a thing could attract us on account +of a content and a value of its own. As a matter of fact, the object +does attract us and acquire a power over us in this manner, and this not +merely here and there but over a wide area in movements which affect and +transform the whole of life. Nothing else differentiates work--viewed +spiritually--from other activity, and nothing else elevates work above +other activity than this: that in work the object is inwardly present; +and that man may make its moulding and extension a motive, and find this +a source of joy. This seems to be something self-evident, only because +it happens daily to us and around us; and we do not recognise a new type +of life in it, simply because in human life it is usual to find that +work only gradually attains complete independence. For it is the +pressing necessity of life, the impulse to self-preservation, that first +arouses us from our natural inactivity and compels us to occupy +ourselves with things; and in this change from inactivity to activity it +is our own advantage that we first seek. But that which to us, to +commence with, was simply a means; that which was perhaps most +unwillingly done, begins to attract and hold us more and more for its +own sake; becomes an end in itself, and is able so to charm us that it +forces the idea of utility completely into the background. It is +possible for work to become so attractive, and of such a value in our +estimation, that to ensure its success we can make sacrifices, and can +pursue it in direct opposition to our own welfare. Only when the object +is regarded and treated in this manner can it win an inner proximity to +us; reveal to us its relations; develop characteristic laws; make +demands upon us and call forth our power to meet them. In this way it +constrains us, but the constraint is not exerted upon us from without, +but proceeds from our own decision and activity. We do not feel the +relation to be an oppression, but rather as a witness to our freedom; in +the subordination to the object we feel that we are caught up into a +life more comprehensive, clearer and richer than any we can develop from +the subjective. We reach a stability and a calm in ourselves, and have +within our own being a support against all vacillation and error. Work, +therefore, produces relations which on the one hand unify the endeavour +of the individual and fashion his life as a definite whole; and on the +other, bind humanity into a creative community. In the former case we +have vocation, with its demands and its limitations, it is true, but +with them also its strengthening and its elevation of life; in the +latter complexes of work develop in whole departments of life, in which +the individuals find themselves side by side and are ultimately united +into the community of an all-inclusive whole of culture. From this +something is evolved which is independent not only of the choice but +also of the interests of mere man: a kingdom of truth, a world of +thought transcending all human subjectivity is formed. Thus we see +something grow up within the human sphere which leads man beyond +himself, and which is valid not simply for him but even in opposition to +him. The whole matter bristles with problems: from the point of view of +the life of nature this new life must appear to be an insoluble riddle; +and yet it has far too much value and certitude to be banished as +imaginary. + +Along with this detachment of life from the mere individual and the mere +subjectivity of man, there is a liberation from external ties, and the +development of a self-conscious spirituality. As at the level of nature +life is spent in the development of relations with the environment, in +action and reaction, so the form of life in man remains bound, since the +life of the soul cannot dissociate itself from the experience of sense. +The apparent inwardness that is evolved at this level is simply an +after-effect of sensuous feelings and desires. So far as the life of +nature extends, the forces and laws of the life of the soul will only +refine what the external world exhibits in coarser features. The +mechanism of nature also extends into human life; natural impulses of +conduct, as well as association of ideas, reveal the fact that the life +of the soul is in complete dependence upon natural conditions. From this +point of view it seems impossible that inwardness should ever become +independent. The actual experience of human life, however, shows that +what is thus regarded as impossible is indisputably real. The detachment +from the mere subjectivity of the _ego_ and the development of universal +values, which exist over against us, can be effected only if the basis +of life lies deeper than the contact with the environment. It was a work +of thought which brought about the transition and gave birth to the new +life; only with the help of thought did it ever become possible to form +relations of a new kind and to rouse man's interest in them. The +realities which arose were not of sense but conceptual, ideal. The more +this movement increased in extent, the more human existence was +transformed into realities of thought. Is not such a transformation +evident when in ourselves we see before all else, not the sensuous being +of nature, but a personality or an individuality; when in relationship +with one another we form the idea of the state, and feel that we are +ourselves members of the state; when we regard and value the cognate +beings around us from the conception of humanity? As a matter of fact, a +strong tendency in this direction runs through the whole history of +humanity: sense does not disappear, but is taken up more and more into +something conceptual; the world of thought gives us increasingly the +point of view from which we fashion our lives. We find a progressive +spiritualisation of religion, of morality, of law, of the whole life of +culture. In everything life seeks a deeper basis; an inwardness wins an +independence of the environment, and exercises on the environment a +transforming power. The relations and the order of the realities of +thought manifest a law different from that of sense presentations with +their mere juxtaposition. For in the former case an inner unity, an +objective relation is evolved, and the significance of the individual +member is estimated according to its position in the whole. The +distinctive attributes in a conception form no mere collection, and the +statement of a syllogism no mere sequence; rather, in both, a +comprehending act of thought grasps the manifold and arranges the +separate elements according to their relationship within the whole. The +course of presentation with its mere succession is by no means simply +suppressed through this development of thought; it persists and governs +consciousness on the surface. But the surface is not the totality of the +intellectual life; through it and transcending it an activity of thought +manifests itself, forms new connections, and maintains itself against +all opposition. + +Accordingly, the power that thought exercises is fundamentally different +from the physical power of association, or even of custom. In the case +of thought there is an insistence upon a consistent and related whole +which, even though externally insignificant, produces most powerful +effects. If contradictions exist in our world of thought and condition +of life, they may become intolerable, and the desire to remove them lead +to the emergence of impetuous movements. If, on the other hand, we +recognise that certain things which formerly seemed to be unrelated, +even though they existed side by side, are really inwardly related; or +if, again, an assertion involves a consequence that has not hitherto +been deduced, then the demand, that these things shall be unified and +this consequence developed, is capable of breaking down even the +strongest opposition. In this matter an invisible is capable of more +than a visible power. Of course, thought in isolation has not such a +power; it acquires it only through its relation to a wider life and in +championing the cause of that life. For thought is wont to defend the +life of the individual, of a people, a historical situation of humanity, +on the one hand from an abundance of inconsistencies, and on the other +from dissolution and incompleteness, without any conflict growing out of +it. Life as we experience it immediately is anything but a regular +logic of the schools. In itself simple perception of the fact that an +inconsistency exists, or that ideas which have been regarded as valid +require further development, need not arouse the feeling of man and lead +him to assert his activity; he can acquiesce, and leave the condition of +things unaltered; he can voluntarily resign himself to the +inconsistencies and incompleteness. But, nevertheless, there is a point +at which this condition of inconsistency can be endured no longer, at +which to transcend it becomes the dominant task of life. This point is +reached when the confusion is no longer something external to us which +we contemplate, but enters into the substance of our life, so that the +inconsistency becomes a division, and an attitude of inconsequence +towards it a limitation of our own being. The solving of the problem +then becomes an essential part of our spiritual preservation. And in +that it commands the whole energy and passion of such preservation it +can do that of which thought, with its necessity, is not in itself +capable, it can rouse our whole life to activity and break down even the +strongest opposition. It is from the inner presence of a determining and +moulding process of life that thought itself first obtains a +characteristic form, and is able to impress it upon things, and so +subject them to itself. A spiritual self-preservation of this kind is +fundamentally different from all physical self-preservation: for the +former, it is not a matter of the self asserting its place in the +co-existence of things, but of becoming an independent inward nature, +and of establishing a distinctive whole of life. The exact significance +of spiritual self-preservation is for the present obscure enough; but +whatever it may be, it derives its power from within and not from +contact with the environment. + +How deeply these inner movements are rooted in human life the so-called +historical ideas show with particular clearness. Certain thought +complexes, or rather certain tendencies of life, arise, and win an +overwhelming power in opposition to all narrowly human concerns. They +force the activity of mankind into particular channels; they follow out +their consequences with pitiless rigour; they speak to us in a tone of +command, and require absolute obedience. Neither the interests of +individuals nor those of whole classes prevail against them; every +consideration of utility vanishes before their inner necessity. The +history of religions, for example, has often shown such an astonishing +consistency in the following of characteristic tendencies that their +adherents could see in it the working of a divine spirit. Similarly, the +Enlightenment, in its time with overpowering might seized minds and +penetrated deeply into every department of life; to-day we have a +similar experience in the case of the social movement. On all sides +something is acknowledged as an imperative requirement, as indispensable +for the spiritual persistence of man--something which cannot be brought +in from outside, and which may indeed be entirely inconsistent with +external conditions. Has not the conflict of inner necessities with the +external circumstances that were opposed to them been a leading motive +power in history, and is not all genuine progress achieved through such +an opposition? + +Again, the great force that has been exerted in the movement of history +in the detection and the elimination of contradictions can be explained +only in this context. Logic, as we saw, played an unassuming rôle in +this matter, and the indolence of man always inclined to easy +accommodation and compromise. It was the increased vital energy, the +adoption of a particular issue as the main issue, that made movements, +which had long existed in a state of harmony and peace, irreconcilable +enemies, and drove them to a life-and-death struggle. With a lower level +of spiritual activity the Middle Ages unsuspiciously united a religion +of ecclesiastical organisation with a religion of personal feeling and +disposition; and it did not feel that there was an inconsistency in +their union so much as that one was the completion of the other. As soon +and so far, however, as in the Modern Age spirituality won more +independence and more self-consciousness, and felt itself to be the +centre of the whole, it was inevitable that a dependence upon an +external order should be experienced only as an intolerable oppression; +and the division of life between the one and the other became an +impossibility. It was necessary only that a powerful and passionate +personality, like that of Luther, should take up the problem, and make +it the sole object of his effort, and the hour of revolution had come. +How meanly they think of the controlling forces of history who would +trace back such changes to the selfishness or the vanity of individuals! +Looked at from our point of view, the inner changes within the life of +universal history often appear to be simplifications--cases of energetic +concentration on the essential, and of fundamental separation of the +subsidiary. The truly great carry on a ceaseless conflict against the +chaotic confusion which the life of the majority is wont to produce ever +anew--a condition in which matters of the first importance are confused +with those that are subsidiary; all inner gradation is lacking; and the +great is treated as something insignificant, and the insignificant as +something great. There is a struggle to secure a clear differentiation +and gradation; to establish a centre, and to transform life into a +genuinely self-conscious life. Have not all the principal revivals of +religion, of morality, of education, been simplifications? + +These movements show life in a particular form; something emerges in it +which, unconcerned with the weal and the woe of man, follows its own +course and makes absolute demands; and, more than anything else, +disturbs and destroys his calmness and complacency. How heavily Germany +has had to pay for the movement of the Reformation by being thrown back +politically, nationally, and economically! It is inevitable that all +movements of an ideal kind, the social movement of the present included, +should appear from the point of view of natural well-being, troublesome +and pernicious disturbances. They can be regarded as something higher +only when we acknowledge that life does not consist entirely in external +relations, or in the endeavour to attain harmony with the environment, +but that an inner task grows out of life itself, and first gives to +human existence a value and a dignity. + +In the development of a self-consciousness and of a movement of life +itself, we rise above the motive of utility, by which nature is swayed. +It is a moral element in the widest sense; it is the consciousness of +something objectively necessary, unconditionally transcending the ends +of the narrowly human, that first gives to convictions axiomatic +certainty and to conduct the right energy. This moral element attains to +a more independent display in the moral self-judgment of man that is +called "conscience." True, this conception has been the subject of much +error and has been much over-estimated. Not only has the moral judgment +less power over man than is frequently assumed, but that which is called +conscience is often--generally, in fact--nothing more than a by-product +of custom and of accommodation in human social life. In this case the +inner life has still attained no independence, but remains dependent +upon the environment; and the disposition thus produced is nothing more +than a feeling of aversion to the results of conduct, nothing more nor +less than concealed fear of punishment--a state of the soul which the +most prominent thinkers have, with good reason, stigmatised as a +manifestation of weakness and cowardice. But, however much that is +foreign to it and of an inferior order may have been associated with +conscience, nevertheless, judging conduct, as it does, according to the +inward disposition and not according to consequences, conscience is a +unique, original phenomenon. To whatever extent conscience, as we know +it, may have had its source in something external, and in however great +a degree it may depend upon changing circumstances, it is nevertheless +impossible to explain the fundamental fact by reference to the +environment. For, if our life depended solely and entirely upon the +environment and no movement arose from within, all influence from +without could do nothing but subdue us by sheer force; there could never +be an independent recognition and acceptance of the command addressed +to us; never the feeling of an inner responsibility for conduct; never +an independent extension of the original precept; and yet all these +phenomena are in fact found in human experience. True, we are affected +very greatly by external forces; but that they may achieve what they do +a movement from within must meet them, take them up, and carry them +further. The enormous amount of pretence which flourishes amongst us +with regard to matters of morality, and which so easily obscures our +vision for the chief matter, would be unintelligible if the spiritual +did not manifest some kind of independence in the moral judgment. Unless +there is such a development towards independence, the moral judgment +must also, as far as its content is concerned, be determined by the +condition of the social environment: it could never follow a course of +its own; never give rise to anything new; never enter into inner +conflict with the environment. Yet, as a matter of fact, we find these +tendencies in abundance. The individual is able, in the light of his own +moral conviction, to approve and value something which all around him +reject; and conversely, to condemn and reject something which all around +him esteem and respect; and this he is able to do under the compulsion +of inner necessity, and not simply out of a love of vain paradox. This +opposition of individuals to the condition of things in the social +environment has been the main source of all inner progress in matters of +morality. For it is in matters of morality, in particular, that that +which hitherto had given no offence has become intolerable to +individuals; and that new and imperative demands such as had never been +made before have emerged with constraining power. Or did the idea of +humanity, the abolition of slavery, and the commandment to love one's +enemies, for example, arise in some other way? If in respect of such +matters as these that which on its first appearance was paradoxical +quickly came to be regarded as self-evident, what else was operative in +bringing about this result than an inner necessity, from which, when +once we become conscious of it, we can never again escape? Suitable +conditions in the social environment were, of course, also necessary for +the fulfilment and the extension of those moral requirements; but they +could never have originated from the environment, or have derived from +it their unconditional nature, their certainty of victory, and their +indifference to all external consequences: qualities without which they +could not have effected what they have. + +In the life of the individual the moral judgment manifests its power in +affirmation as well as in negation. If it approves one's disposition and +conduct, it gives to life a greater stability and joyfulness; if it +condemns, then existence is paralysed by division. In this experience it +is implicitly assumed that the distinction of good and evil has its +source neither in the preferences of the human individual nor in those +of the human society; but that in this antithesis a new order that is +present only to the inner nature is revealed. + +We see, therefore, that in contrast with its attachment to the external, +life attains an independent inwardness which we are compelled to +acknowledge, however mysterious the inward may at present be to us, and +however little we may be able to define its nature more closely. Earlier +in our investigation we were led to recognise a movement of life from +the narrowness of the individual to the comprehensiveness of the whole. +It is obvious that our two results are closely connected with each other +and refer to each other. For we attain a unity, as contrasted with the +juxtaposition of the elements of the visible world, only through a +powerful activity from within; but this activity cannot emerge unless +life forms a whole in contrast with its dissipation into disconnected +points. + +These two developments are obviously sides of the same life--a life +which bears a totally different character from that of the psychical +life which forms a mere continuation of nature. Within the soul itself +there is a distinction between two levels, of which that other than +nature may in agreement with established usage be called "spiritual," +however little may be implied by this expression; however mysterious, +indeed, the conception may for the present be. In contrast with the old, +this new level is unmistakably at a disadvantage. The old seems to +include the whole range of human existence; the new, on the other hand, +must toilsomely struggle for a place of some kind. Nevertheless, in +spite of its external insignificance, the spiritual gives birth to a +movement of no mean character; in face of all opposition it seeks to +form a centre of life of its own, and to make this the chief basis of +effort; it is to be found thus in the life of mankind as revealed in +history, and also in that of the individual. Within the conception of +culture we comprehend all achievements distinctive of man. But what is +culture if it does not assure to man a position independent of nature; +if it does not set up ideals which can arise only out of a new life? +Ultimately the chief motive-power of culture is the longing of mankind +for a new kind of being in contrast to that of nature. Culture +necessarily becomes superficial and empty when it directs human striving +to external objects and does not lead through all occupation with +externals to its own development and to the advance of its own being. +The work of culture is genuine and powerful only when man seeks in it +his own true and ultimate self. + +How every development of the spiritual advances towards the attainment +of a new unity of life may be more clearly seen in the case of the +individual, in relation to whom we meet with the conceptions of +personality and of spiritual individuality. However much confusion there +may be in the ordinary use of these conceptions, the conception of +personality merits the estimation in which it is held only if it is +regarded as the bearer of a new life in contrast to that of nature, and +not simply as something added to nature. The development is more evident +with the conception of spiritual individuality. For such an +individuality is by no means something given to a man in the natural +characteristics which he brings with him into life. Within this +particular nature, as a rule, many things, significant and +insignificant--things which are original in himself and things which are +due to external influence--are chaotically confused; and, as it lacks an +inner unity and an adjustment of the different aspects, one aspect may +directly contradict another. If the individual is no more than these +natural characteristics, he can become active as a whole only through a +summation of the multiplicity, and not through a dominating and +organising unity. With the transition to the new kind of life a desire +for such a unity awakens and gives rise to a definitely characteristic +movement. A unity must be found within us in some manner; it must be +included in the range of possibilities open to us. But in order to +obtain supremacy it must be grasped, be appropriated and strengthened by +our self-activity. We ourselves therefore become a task in the treatment +of which it is possible to fall into serious error. Looked at from this +point of view our spiritual nature is seen to be the product of our own +activity. We cannot fail to recognise a peculiar interweaving of freedom +and fate in our existence. + +The inner history of all creative minds shows how great may be the +inspiration and the tension which arise in this striving to realise a +spiritual nature; an inspiration and a tension which are evident even +when the main direction for the realisation of this nature has been +easily found and only the more detailed form has to be sought: they are +still more apparent when the main direction itself is in question. How +toilsome it has often been for a man to come to that in which his +strength lay, and with the aid of reflection to attain a state of secure +creative activity; to unite all forces to a common achievement; and to +make a distinct advance beyond the traditional position of the spiritual +life! Life was by no means a completed gift and something to be easily +enjoyed, even in the case of natures lavishly equipped by destiny--as, +for example, Goethe: it was in a struggle for itself that it won a +complete independence and a proud superiority over everything external. +This struggle was being fought in all his cares, in all thought for +natural and social well-being, all utilitarian considerations in regard +to the externals of life. It gave to the man amid all his doubts and +agitations the certainty of being something unique, something +indispensable; at the same time it lifted him into an invisible world, +and enabled him to understand his own life as an end complete in itself. +How different this is from the struggle for existence, for the +preservation of physical life; and how clearly a new life, another kind +of reality, arises in these movements! The new life does not by any +means appear only at the heights of spiritual creation; rather it would +be true to say that the life which is present in the whole of human +existence becomes most easily discernible at these heights. The movement +towards a spiritual individuality may be begun in the most simple +conditions; and it is not to be estimated according to the degree of its +achievement. For, where world stands against world, everything depends +upon the decision with regard to the fundamental principle, and this may +be made at any point. The mere possibility of making such a decision +testifies here irrefutably to a reality: the reality of a new order of +things. + + +3. THE INNER CONTRADICTION OF THE NEW LIFE + +The conclusion we are led to is that a new life distinct from that of +nature arises in our soul. With a great diversity of manifestations, it +surrounds us with an indisputable actuality; no one can fail to +recognise that something of importance, something distinctive comes to +pass in us. But as soon as we try to comprehend these manifestations as +a whole, and to ascertain the meaning of the whole, a difficult problem +arises. It is comparatively easy, however, to come to an understanding +as to the negative aspect of the matter. It is obvious that the new life +is not an embellishment or a continuation of nature; it would bring with +it something essentially new. Again, it is obvious that it is not a +product of a single psychical function, such as thought or feeling; it +would form a whole transcending the psychical functions, and from this +whole determine the form of each function distinctively. But what is +this new reality and this whole to which the course of the movement +trends? The more we reflect over the question the more strongly we feel +that it is a direction rather than a conclusion that is offered to us in +this matter; something higher, something inward and so on is to evolve, +but what is embedded in the inward and in what this supremacy is based +is at present not apparent. Further, every attempt at a more definite +orientation at once reveals to us a wide gulf, indeed a harsh +contradiction, between the content of that which is sought and the form +of existence from which it is sought. The chief impulse of the spiritual +life is that it wills to liberate us from the merely human; to give us a +share in the life of the whole; to remove us from a happening between +things to their fundamental happening. Seen from within, the history of +humanity is primarily an increasing deliverance of life from bondage to +the narrowly human, an emergence of something more than human, and an +attempt to shape our life from the point of view of this: it is an +increasing conflict of man with himself. At the same time, however, it +is a taking up of the whole into himself; since man in all his planning +and striving is related to the whole, it seems to him that his own +nature must remain alien to himself if the whole does not disclose +itself to him and allow him to participate in a life which has its +source in ultimate depths; if in the life of the whole he does not find +a purer and a more genuine self. The idea of truth impels us beyond all +the limitations to which a particular being is subject, beyond all +communication of things from without. There must be nothing between us +and reality; the inner life of reality must become ours, and thus our +life will emerge for the first time from a shadowy existence to full +reality, from the narrowness of the mere individual to the +comprehensiveness of infinity. The idea of the good makes similar +demands. To the spiritual movement, the advancement of merely human +well-being is far too mean an aim. This movement makes us clearly +conscious of the triviality of mere happiness; of the oppressive and +destructive effect of a continual reference to our own subjectivity; and +of the unworthiness of treating love and justice as only means to our +welfare. It becomes at the same time an urgent duty to break through the +narrow limitations of the natural ego, and to conduct our life from the +point of view of objective truth and comprehensiveness, and so for the +first time to become capable of genuine love and justice. + +It is true that these aims are lofty, and, we feel we have the right to +say, aims that may not be rejected. But it is not at all evident how +they are to be reached from the position of man; it is not at all clear +how man shall press forward from mere existence to the creative basis, +from the part to the whole: for his particularity and his mere existence +hold him fixed. But in his existence nature preponderates by far: +individual tendencies of a new order do appear; but how could they in +their state of isolation and weakness bring about a revolution and place +life on a new foundation? As a matter of fact, we usually find these +impulses to a new life drawn into the service of natural and social +self-preservation, and, over against the passionate struggle for +existence, condemned to complete impotence and shadowiness. + +The whole life of culture makes us clearly conscious of this perplexity. +The essence of that life consists in this, and by this alone can it be +held as true--that it wills to build up a new, spiritual reality within +the sphere of humanity. But to what extent is such a reality +recognisable on the basis of experience? In and with all civilisation +man continues obstinately bent upon the attainment of his own ends: the +struggle for material goods exerts an immense influence upon and +controls men; an indescribable amount of pretence and hypocrisy +accompanies and surrounds the spiritual movement. Between that which man +really strives for, and that which he asserts that he is striving for, +and which perhaps it is his intention to strive for, there is great +divergence. Falsehood like this is not limited to individuals; our whole +culture is one monstrous deception in so far as it promises to develop +humanity to something new and higher, while in reality the new is +occupied mostly with polishing up the old, the life of nature, to give +it a glittering appearance. It is on this account that in times of +criticism and introspection so much opposition has been offered to +culture; that such passionate scorn has been aroused against the +hypocrisy and pretence which pervades its whole life. But although we +are fully aware of its deplorable state, we do not break its power over +us. It is perhaps the most bitter of all our experiences that we are +held fast under the spell of a condition of things concerning the vanity +and futility of which no one with any insight has the slightest doubt. + +However, in moralising over this state of things we ought to guard +ourselves from becoming too passionate. For it is a question whether it +could be otherwise; whether the fault is in any way in our will, and is +not solely and entirely in the nature of our being itself. For it is +certainly a contradiction throughout that man, who is an individual +being existing by the side of others, and whose life belongs to the +domain of experience, should set himself in a universal life +transcending all particularity and live from the bases of reality. How +can that which is primarily a part of a given world build up a new +world? Ideas like those of the true and the good are, from this point of +view, simply delusions, manifest impossibilities; man may trouble and +weary himself with them, but all his endeavour only leads him into a +state of greater confusion. These ideas are to him for ever an "other" +world; he may expand himself and develop, but he does not come a step +nearer by doing so. + +It is true that in striving for truth, man advances beyond sense +presentation to the activity of thought; but the thoughts always remain +his--thoughts of mere man. However much he may widen his own sphere as a +consequence of his reflection upon them, he does not go beyond it. In +history also the striving for a scientific comprehension of truth +appears to be a vain struggle; the passing through different phases has +not brought it nearer its aim so much as, with ever-increasing +clearness, it has manifested the impossibility of attaining what is +sought. + +The ancient conception of truth, with its belief in a relationship of +the being of man with the whole; with it assumption of an easy +transference of life from one to the other; with its view of truth as an +agreement of thought with an external reality, has through the course of +life become untenable; it has been rejected through the influence of the +tendency of our being to become more inward. For this tendency +necessarily led to a detachment from the environment of the world, and +to a separation of the two sides of our experience. We became clearly +conscious of this separation at the beginning of the Modern Age. We saw +that, if we were not to give up all claim to truth, only one course +remained possible: to make a division within the human domain, a +division between a merely human and something else which might be +regarded as the presence of universal and genuine life in man. And so +Spinoza distinguished an objective thought from the springs of the +emotions; Kant distinguished practical reason from the theoretical which +is bound up with the limitations of human nature; and Hegel elevated the +thought-process, which manifests itself in the work of universal +history, far above the opinions and the wishes of individuals. Each of +these championed a distinctive conception of truth and a characteristic +form of the spiritual life; but with regard to all attempts we come to +doubt whether even that proclaimed as more than human is not still +within the domain of man; whether in every case we do not wrongly +declare the last point which we reach to be the deepest basis of +reality. + +The position is somewhat similar with regard to the idea of the good. In +the attempts to which we have referred, it passed current as a +deliverance from all selfish happiness, which was felt to be intolerably +narrow. A new, purer, and more comprehensive life is to proceed from +the winning of a new position. Now, there are many different conceptions +of happiness, and higher levels are distinguished plainly from lower. +But the highest level does not transcend human desire; man must bring +all into relation with his own well-being. He cannot in opposition to +his own well-being adopt something alien as an end in itself; his +activity can be aroused for nothing which has not some value for +himself. In this case also, therefore, the bounds of his life hold him +fast, and, unless these bounds are transcended, the good cannot be +distinguished from the useful. Of this a clear confirmation is furnished +by the experiences of religions. In their origin they wished to free man +from himself and to set him in a new life--whether they promised +tranquillity in a surrender to the infinite whole or won a positive +content by the revelation of a kingdom of divine love. How soon the +succession of events has led back to a quest of happiness! How soon has +it become evident that the religions have far less revealed a new world +to the majority of mankind than chained them more firmly to the old; and +that they easily arouse to greater power the raw instinct of life, which +they desired to overcome! + +We seem to be shut in on all sides: it seems a monstrous inconsistency +to wish to build up from man a world transcending man; to remove him +into a world other than that of a man. A world of this kind is, however, +essential to the spiritual life; with its abandonment that life is only +a delusion; and the less intelligent people who reject as a meaningless +folly all striving for the true and the good seem to be right. + + * * * * * + +Why do we refuse to adopt this view, and to discontinue an endeavour the +aims of which appear to be unattainable? In the first place, because the +movement cannot be given up so easily as those critics imagine who adopt +this view; for it does not consist simply of explanations and theories +that might be completely refuted by rigorous argument, but a certain +reality has been evolved, desires aroused, forces called into life, and +movements inaugurated. Even if they halt in their course they were +something; they do not disappear therefore before the attacks of +Scepticism; further, however mean their results may be, they prove to be +strong enough to indicate the limitations in the life of nature, and to +make it inadequate for us. The matter is the more mysterious in that the +striving is anything but a product of the natural desire for happiness. +For the movement disturbs all our complacency; it leads man to be +discontented with that which hitherto had fully satisfied him; it +surrounds him with fixed organisations; desires from him much labour and +sacrifice, and makes existence, not easier, but more difficult for him. +Delusions are wont to deceive us by pleasing pictures; to attract us +with the promise of pleasure and enjoyment. How does a delusion, that +imposes so much toil and trouble upon us, win so much power over us? +There is another matter to be considered in this connection. A complete +renunciation can appear possible only because it is not clearly +perceived how much which we cannot give up and which ultimately we have +no desire to give up is involved in it. Only a want of clearness of +thought, and still more a weakness of character, could wish to retain in +the particular case what was given up as a whole; could affirm as effect +what it denied as cause. As soon as this course is recognised to be +impossible, it becomes evident that with the rejection of the spiritual +life everything is abandoned which gives to our life dignity, greatness, +and inner unity, and joins us to others with an inward bond. Realities +such as love and honour, truth and right, must be regarded as empty +forms; and even science must come to an end, because there is no longer +any inner unity of work, no objective necessity. + +Such considerations again show us that a complete negation is +impossible; and it seems that we must remain for ever in painful +suspense between an unattainable affirmation and an impossible negation. +We might be able to endure this condition of affairs if it concerned a +problem which arose in reference to something of little importance to +our life, something that we could relegate to the background, and simply +permit to lie there, without compromising our life. But our problem lies +at the centre of life; is, in fact, itself the centre. To be left in +suspense here means to condemn life as a whole to a state of paralysis, +to surrender it to complete dissolution. Against this everyone who has +any vital energy in him will contend; with his whole might he will seek +to escape from a condition so intolerable; he will not hold back from +making a bold venture, mindful of the words of Goethe, "Necessity is the +best counsellor." + +In seeking a way out of the contradiction, it is essentially necessary +not to forget the source of the contradiction. We saw that source to be +in the fact that the spiritual life would set up a new world, and at the +same time remains bound up with the merely human and presents itself as +an endeavour of mere man. To the spiritual life a universal character is +indispensable; of this claim nothing can be abated. There must therefore +be a change as regards man; it must be that more comes to pass in him +than the first impression makes evident. It must be that the spiritual +within him, which seems at first to be his own product, is a +participation in wider connections; the spiritual must be operative in +man, but not originate out of the merely human. It is true that this +makes a reversal of the traditional position necessary, and not merely +of its representations; and such a reversal provokes serious doubt. +Modern science, however, has taught us sufficiently often that the first +appearance of anything need not be the ultimate one; that there may be +cogent reasons for regarding something that at first seems based in +itself as the proof of something existing beyond. Thus, modern natural +science has transformed the world of sense into a world present only to +the eyes of research. Certainly, science accomplishes these changes +within the bounds of experience: on the contrary, in regard to our +problem, in which the fundamental form of reality is in question, it is +indispensable that we should transcend these bounds; without a change in +respect of the whole, and hence without a resort to metaphysics, it is +not possible to accomplish our purpose. It is quite clear that the +tendency of our time is opposed to appeals to metaphysics: yet it is a +question how far this attitude is justified. So far as metaphysics +assumes the same form as in the past--that of conceptual speculation of +a thought hovering unrestrained over the existing world--then it is +rightly opposed. But the attitude is unjustifiable which assumes that +with the overthrow of the older metaphysics all metaphysics may be +ignored. For a metaphysic can proceed also from the whole life, and need +not be a product of mere thought. The implication therefore is this, +that the centre of life itself must be changed, and thus a revolution of +the previous condition accomplished; that an actuality already operative +in life is to be given its rightful place and brought to its full +effect. The business of metaphysics, therefore, is not to add something +in thought to a reality which lies before us, or to weave such a reality +into a texture of conceptions; but to seek to grasp reality in itself, +and to rouse it to life in its entire depth for ourselves. Every change +of thought then rests on a change of life. Such a metaphysic may appeal +to the saying of Hebbel, "Only fools will banish metaphysic from the +drama; it makes a great difference, however, whether life evolves out of +metaphysic or metaphysic out of life." + +Even if our age rejects a metaphysic of this kind also, if it surrenders +itself without resistance to the inconsistencies of the world of sense, +this would be the last thing which could deter us from an appeal to +metaphysic. For the inner cleavages and the superficiality of the life +of our time--and we saw reason to believe that these are facts--stand in +the closest relation to the rejection of metaphysics: this rejection has +made the age inwardly insignificant. If an indirect proof of the +necessity of a revolutionary transformation of life, and at the same +time of a metaphysic may be offered, our age furnishes one quite +sufficient in its own experiences; its opposition can be only a +recommendation of an appeal to metaphysic. + +The one main thesis which it is essentially necessary to establish is +analysed in sufficient detail throughout the whole course of our +investigation; it simply sums up that which has already been advanced +point by point. The intolerable contradiction arises, as we saw, from +this, that the spiritual life with its new world should be a product of +mere man, and that that life should remain within man and at the same +time lead in its essence beyond him. This contradiction cannot be +overcome otherwise than by our recognising and acknowledging in the +spiritual life a universal life, which transcends man, is shared by him, +and raises him to itself. That this transition brings with it a change +in the appearance of life and of the world as a whole, and that as a +result our striving is brought under entirely different conditions, +needs more detailed presentation. + + + + +(b) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAIN THESIS + +1. The Main Thesis and the Possibility of a New System of Life + +(a) _The Development of the Spiritual Life to Independence_ + + +Our investigation reached its highest point in the demand that the +spiritual life should become independent of man. Man cannot produce a +spiritual life of his own capacity: a spiritual world must impart itself +to him and raise him to itself. It must be shown that this does not by +any means signify only a change of name, a new labelling of an old +possession, but implies far-reaching changes, and indeed involves a +complete reversal of the first condition. At the same time the course of +the investigation must establish that this transition to the spiritual +life is not something subsequently inferred or offered simply for the +explanation of an otherwise unintelligible fact, but that it would +overcome a false appearance, and help a misunderstood truth to its +right. The fact that is affirmed should become an immediate experience +of one's own and should advance life rather than knowledge. Only the +whole investigation and not an introductory consideration can furnish a +proof of our contention. + +There are within our own soul distinctive movements tending in +directions different from those of nature. We recognised that there is a +life which proceeds from some kind of comprehensive whole; a life which +transcends the opposition of subject and object, and evolves a +self-consciousness in contrast with the relation to externals. All these +features present a quite different appearance, form a more coherent +whole, and will occupy a more definite position in the representation +of reality, if in them an independent life superior to mere man is +recognised and acknowledged. The principal reason for this is that it is +only by means of that deliverance from the simply human that the new +life is able to express its own nature clearly and to realise as part of +its own nature what otherwise seemed to have its source in something +external. The individual traits that we become aware of are the +revelation of a universal life, if they are no longer regarded as +limited by the idiosyncrasies of the human. With this acknowledgment +they can gain ascendancy over man and prove their power upon him. + +We saw that it is characteristic of the spiritual life that it is lived +from the whole; the elements are fashioned by a comprehensive unity; the +different complexes and tendencies which arise in this life strive +ultimately towards a single aim. We saw also that it was absolutely +impossible that the tendency to universality should be originated by +man, whose chief movement is towards differentiation and division; and, +further, that it should be realised by him in face of the opposition of +nature, which extends to the immeasurable in matters great and small. +The unity that is necessary for this cannot arise out of the many as an +ultimate result; it must be original and be operative from the +beginning. We may postulate such a unity only if the spiritual life is +itself a universal life transcending that of the isolated individuals; +if it bears in itself a unity which takes the multiplicity up into +itself. And so the whole from an abstract conception is for the first +time raised to a living reality; and only on thus becoming a reality can +it exercise a distinctive power upon individuals and in contrast to +individuals; and inwardly unite and essentially raise them. Only in this +way is it conceivable that another kind of activity having its source +within the soul may exert itself in opposition to the mechanism of +nature and transcend it; and that selfishness and spiritual weakness may +in some way be overcome. Man, so far as he shares in the spiritual life, +is more than a mere individual; a universal life becomes his own and +works within him as a power of his life. + +Further, the taking up of the object into the life-process, the +transcendence of the antithesis of subject and object, is characteristic +of the spiritual life. But this remained an inner contradiction, a +complete impossibility so long as the spiritual life was regarded as an +occurrence in a being who, with a closed nature, stands over against +things as though they were alien; and who can take up nothing into +himself without accommodating it to his own particular nature. The +contradiction is removed only when the spiritual becomes independent; +for then both sides of the antithesis come to belong to each other and +are related to each other in a single life; and a life transcending the +division may develop, a life that produces the antithesis from within, +lives in the different sides and seeks in them its own perfection. The +life-process is now seen to be a movement that is neither from object to +subject, nor from subject to object; neither the subject's attainment of +content from the object, nor the object's becoming controlled by the +subject, but an advance of a self-conscious life in and through the +antithesis. Life, by this movement, ceases to be a single, thin thread; +it wins breadth; it expands to an inner universality. At the same time a +depth is manifested in that a persistent and comprehensive activity +emerges which lives in the antithesis. In this manner life first becomes +a life in a spiritual sense, a self-conscious and self-determining life, +a self-consciousness. + +That this change is possible and brings with it a new type of life is +shown with complete clearness by experience in the separate departments +of the spiritual life. Thus, artistic creation at its highest is neither +the production of the truest possible copy of an external object, the +artist painfully abstaining from all subjective addition; nor a +presentation of subjective situations and moods, the artist endeavouring +to the utmost to avoid everything objective; but a transcendence of the +opposition of soulless objectivity and empty subjectivity by an art that +is sovereign, autonomous, and with a character of its own; the creative +activity belonging to which gives life from the soul to the object, and +moulds the soul by means of the object. This kind of artistic creation +is directed primarily towards an inner truth, not towards a truth that +is produced by the object, but one that arises only in the contact of +the object with the soul. It is manifest that creation is effected here +not as an interaction between subject and object, but above and through +this antithesis; it is only by transcending the antithesis that the +artist can give himself in his work, lend to it a soul, place an +infinity within it. In this respect conduct manifests a character +similar to that of creation. Conduct would never attain an inner +stability and enter upon an independent course, if it could not raise +itself above the opposition of a submission to orders that are forced +upon it from without, and a mere play of subjective inclination; if it +were not able to become the self-assertion and self-development of a +life transcending that opposition. At this point also the acknowledgment +of an independent spiritual life teaches us to comprehend as a whole +that which, in a many-sided development, the different departments of +life show to be real. + +The obscurity in which the conception of inwardness was hitherto +involved begins to disappear when the spiritual life is no longer +regarded as supplementary but as an independent life. It cannot be +denied that, within humanity, there is an endeavour to develop the life +of the soul to a state of self-determining activity and, at the same +time, to free that life from the bondage to sense in which it remains at +the level of nature. Yet, definite affirmation that shall correspond to +the negation of sense has been lacking; it has not been clear how +inwardness might find content and characteristic forms; there has been +no advance from the subjective to the substantial. But since a universal +activity is operative within the multiplicity and through the division, +and since it sets itself in the division and from this returns to +itself, a self-conscious inwardness becomes conceivable which has a life +of its own with new experiences. Since within this life "to receive" +presupposes the comprehending power and the self-determining activity of +a vital whole, something other than sense is able to evolve and through +all the persistence of sense to become the chief matter. The spiritual +life is not directed to a reality adjacent to it, but evolves a reality +out of itself; or rather, it evolves as a reality, a kingdom, a world; +and so it advances from vague outline to more complete development; it +struggles for itself, for its own perfection, not for anything external. + +It is directly implied in the above conception that the spiritual life +is something different from single psychical functions, such as +cognition, volition, and the like; and that man, so far as he shares in +it, is more than one such function or a sum of such functions. For these +functions come under the antithesis of subject and object, while the +spiritual life transcends it. It is also clear that the spiritual life +does not change this or that in a life which already exists, or add this +or that to it, but that it introduces a new kind of life--a life by +which man is distinguished clearly from everything inferior to him. + +If the spiritual life is an evolution of a reality in the life-process, +then the question arises as to how this reality is related to the world +that immediate experience shows us to be surrounded by. As surely as man +in his subjective reflection is able to free himself from the world and +to place himself in opposition to it, so there can be no doubt that the +spiritual life belongs to the permanent reality of the world and, as we +see it, grows up out of its movement. The transition to an independent +inwardness is not something which happens externally to the world but +within it: no special sphere, separate from all the rest, is originated; +but reality itself evolves an inner life: it is the world itself that +reveals a spiritual depth, or, as we might say, a soul. We are not +justified in doubting and attacking this view simply because the +spiritual life meets us only in man, and thus, in contrast with the +infinity of nature, is in its external manifestation so insignificant. +For something essentially new appears in it, something that involves +another order of things: the fact that little falls within our range of +vision is in this connection not at all relevant. If anyone is disturbed +and driven to denial by the external insignificance of the +manifestations of the spiritual life, he shows only that he +misunderstands what is distinctive and revolutionising in that life. The +spiritual life is not to be thought of merely in reference to the +experiences of the individual, but also to the work of humanity, to +history, to the advance of culture. All these show us a development of +life that presents the world from a new side; and this must be an +important factor in the estimation of the world, especially if the +spiritual is recognised as having a life independent of man. + +The inward must necessarily present itself as the fundamental and the +comprehensive; as that which in its invisibility sustains, dominates, +and unifies the visible world. Nature, which there was a tendency to +regard as the whole, is now of the essence of a wider reality and a +stage in its development; and it is impossible for the conception formed +from it to be regulative of the whole. Ultimately, therefore, reality +cannot be regarded as something dead, detached, and given: it signifies +to us something living, something experienced in itself, something +sustained by incessant activity. At the same time, the lateness of the +appearance of the spiritual life within our realm and the many ways in +which this appearance is conditioned force us to acknowledge that the +life of the world as a whole has a history. The conception of history +that we have become familiar with in its application to nature and to +the spiritual life throughout is now extended to the relation between +the two. However many mysteries it yet involves, definite progress in +our conception of the world must be admitted. + +Most of all it is man with his life and endeavour that appears in a new +light. Two worlds meet together in him, and, indeed, not merely in such +a manner that he provides the place in which they meet and enter into +conflict, but so that he acquires an independent participation in the +new world, and through his own decision co-operates in its development. +For spiritual life, with its self-determining activity, can never become +itself as a mere effect; to become this it must be apprehended and +roused to activity as cause. But it is cause and animating power only in +its being as a whole; so, as a whole it must be present to man and +become his own life. Thus, in contrast to the particularity of his +natural existence, a life having its source in the infinite grows up +within him: in the former a mere part of a world; in the latter he +becomes a world in himself: in the one, bound up with the particular +nature of man; in the other, he is elevated above all particularity to +something more than human, to something cosmic. + +To such changes in the content of life there must be corresponding +changes in its form. Empirical consciousness with its discreteness and +succession of presentations and states cannot possibly comprehend the +new life; to do that the soul must acquire a greater depth. It must be +capable of an activity which, with single phases, extends into this +consciousness, but which as a whole and in its creative work must +transcend it. With the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life +in man two questions giving rise to different methods of treatment +necessarily become distinguished: the one as to the nature and extent of +the spiritual that is revealed in him; and the other, how, under the +specific conditions of his nature, it emerges and establishes itself. It +will become evident how important it is to distinguish these +sufficiently, and yet on the other hand to associate them closely. + + +(b) _The Demands of a New System of Life_ + +If the acknowledgment of an independent spirituality thus alters the +view of reality as a whole, and in particular of man, we are faced with +the question whether we may not attain a new synthesis through this +spirituality, and whether it does not begin a characteristic formation +of our world. Our treatment of the philosophies of life of the present +day makes it possible for us to approach this question with definite +demands. We saw life branch off in different movements, each of which +took up into itself a wealth of fact; but we found none of them strong +enough to absorb the others into itself, or even able to estimate them. +If life is not finally to fall into dissolution, it needs, in contrast +to these movements, one more universal in character, and this can be +more than a weak compromise only when there is a still more fundamental +relation of life than that which the developments that we have +considered proffered. In that case the more original basal relation +ought to be able to manifest itself as a presupposition of those +developments; it should make intelligible how divisions can originate in +the condition of man; in particular it should illuminate the opposition +between the idealistic and the naturalistic systems of life--an +opposition which, like a deep gulf, divides the life of the present. In +short, it should depend upon whether the change that results with the +acknowledgment of the independence of the spiritual life makes it +possible for us permanently to transcend those oppositions and to work +towards their reconciliation. But we ought then to see that, with its +universality, the system of life striven for does not fall into a state +vague and lacking in character. Through its whole being, in affirmation +and in negation, the system of life must definitely express itself; it +must synthesise and differentiate, elevate and exclude. But it will be +able to do this only if it produces a new kind of life-process and a new +web of life: only thus can essentially new evaluations and tasks, new +experiences and genuine developments, originate; only thus can life as a +whole be definitely raised. Of course, this new cannot signify something +that has just been discovered and that has arisen suddenly. How could it +be a truth which gives to us security, and how could it dominate our +life, if it is not rooted in our being, and if it had not exerted an +influence at all times? But it makes a great difference whether the new +has been concealed, obscure and against the tendency of our own +activity; or whether it is taken up fully in our own self-determining +activity and thereby essentially advanced. If, on the one hand, the new +must be something old, on the other hand the old must become something +new if it is to liberate, strengthen, and elevate our life where its +needs are so urgent. + + +(c) _The Spiritual Basis of the System of Life_ + +There can be no doubt that the acknowledgment of the independence of the +spiritual life involves the recognition of a new fundamental relation of +our life. This relation is no other than that of man to the spiritual +world, which is immanent in him and at the same time transcends him. It +is more original than the relations implied in the systems of the +present day; for these, even though contrary to their own knowledge and +intention, all presuppose this fundamental relation to the spiritual +life. Religion could not be so violently attacked and so zealously +denied by so many, if the relation of life to God were the absolute +relation and were present before all others. The value of religion +depends essentially upon the content of the spiritual life which it +serves. With the mere relation of life to a supernatural power, the +nature of which is not more closely defined--with mere blind +devotion--nothing of value is attained. An honest religious attitude of +a formal kind can go together, on the one hand, with spiritual poverty +and blindness, and, on the other, with hatred and passion. How sad the +condition of things in general has often been even when religion has +shown a strong development of power! How often the help of divine power +has been invoked even in the commission of crime! If, however, the value +of religion and its effect on the substance of life are measured +according to its spiritual content, then this content necessarily +becomes the chief object of attention and conduct. We can assure +ourselves of the relation to a supernatural power only from the +experiences of the spiritual life, and not previously to this life and +independently of it. The relation of life to the spiritual life must +therefore necessarily precede its relation to God; life must be certain +of a universal spiritual character before it can assume a truly +religious one. + +We find the case to be no different as regards the system of Immanent +Idealism. It is open to considerable doubt whether the world as it lies +before us can be looked upon as a pure unfolding of the spiritual life, +as this Idealism asserts. In any case, for the spiritual life to +comprehend the world within itself it must itself be established as a +universal power, and clearly distinguished from mere man. Otherwise the +way of Immanent Idealism leads to an anthropomorphism of a more refined +kind; and there is a danger that the whole world which this system +champions may be criticised hostilely and rejected as simply human. +Immanent Idealism, therefore, also points to the problem of substantial +spiritual life. + +The naturalistic systems do the same thing in a different way, and this, +indeed, in contradiction to their main contention. For, when they +attempted to produce a system from themselves, they could achieve their +object only in that they were implicitly based upon the spiritual life, +and introduced again indirectly that which they had previously rejected. +They are developments of the spiritual life in particular directions and +under particular circumstances: they think that they are able to +accomplish out of their own resources something which they accomplish +only with the help of a fundamental spiritual life; and so the more +consistent they are in their denial of an independent spirituality the +more inevitably they lose all internal coherence. + +Thus from whatever point we start we come to the question of an +independent spirituality; an answer to this question is involved in +every system of life. But as its implications are not distinctly +recognised, it does not receive its proper due. If we consider the +question adequately, it will be found that a universal life must precede +all differentiation and division; and that from this life each movement +must receive a new elucidation. A multiplicity within the whole is quite +intelligible, because it is a development of the spiritual life, not +absolutely, that is in question, but in relation to the position of man +and under the conditions to which he is subject. The desire to give +greater stability to our life in opposition to the never-ceasing flow of +appearances that constitutes our immediate existence, also compels us +strongly to emphasise the importance of the relation to the spiritual +life, which is acknowledged as independent. Without an elevation above +this constant change all spiritual work must inevitably become +disintegrated, and no truth of any kind would be possible to us. In the +Modern Age especially there is a keen desire for a firm basis, as a +secure support of life as a whole. But it is useless to seek this basis +in life as we immediately experience it, whether in thought, in +activity, or in anything else; for in the whole life of immediate +experience there is nothing that is free from change. To seek this basis +in a particular point is also to no purpose, even if one could be raised +to a position above change; for it could not operate beyond itself in +such a way as to support the rest of life. If, therefore, we would not +submit to a dissolution of life, we must seek a basis for it beyond its +immediate state and in a whole of life. Such a whole of life is offered +only by the spiritual life, which, transcending man, is also immanent in +him. Of course this cannot be taken possession of immediately at the +beginning of the journey of life; but it is held up to us as an aim, and +we can only gradually approach it. But how could it operate within us +thus, if our life had not some kind of participation in it from the +beginning; if our life were not in some way based in the spiritual life, +and in progressive activity only developed the spiritual that is in it? +For unless we are based in the spiritual life we should drift helplessly +to and fro in uncertainty, and our endeavour would never be +intelligible. From this point of view also, our relation to the +spiritual life is seen to be the fundamental problem that must precede +all others. + +If there can be no doubt that the problem of life is comprehended most +universally when we view it in relation to the spiritual life, there may +be all the more uncertainty whether all characteristic form and, with +it, all deep-reaching effect are not lost by reason of this +universality. If the conception of the spiritual life involved its usual +vagueness, this would in reality be the case, for recourse to it would +not effect any fundamental transformation of the immediate condition of +life; and we should not rise above the mere combination of its various +movements. The case is quite otherwise if the spiritual life is +distinguished clearly from the human and is acknowledged to be an +independent world. So understood, it must show a particular content, a +new structure of life, and must give a distinct form to everything that +it takes up into itself. It is necessary to consider, also, its relation +to the world of sense, and we may expect to be faced in this matter with +complications and problems that will agitate our life in its whole +extent, and set it in a new light. + +In the spiritual life we recognised a new world, a realm of inwardness, +which has become independent. Within this realm life cannot be directed +to something alien, but can be occupied only with itself, with its own +development. Its experiences cannot be related to externals; they must +lie in itself. Now, have we any knowledge of a movement that reaches +back in this manner to the elements of life? We perceive a movement of +this kind clearly enough. In the first place, all development of the +spiritual life shows, even within the individual, the attribute that a +universal mode of thought, conviction, disposition, sets itself in the +single function and continues present within it. The tendencies and +manifestations of the spiritual are not all at the same level of +development, but since a universal activity, a comprehensive and +persistent deed, is present in the particular manifestation, the process +acquires a depth, and a single act is able to give expression to a +tendency of the whole as well as to react upon it. + +But this movement extends beyond the immediate state of the soul of the +individual to spiritual work, and gives it a particular form. Life as a +whole, as reality's consciousness of itself, may be regarded as +throughout capable of a multiplicity, as containing within itself +different sides and possibilities. Since its evolution produces this +multiplicity, life as a whole can express itself in the individual +aspects and tendencies; expand them till they become different +departments; experience itself in particular ways in these departments, +and in so doing achieve a development of its own; it is able also to +bring these departments and their developments into their relation to +one another. Since thus, within the world as a whole, life concentrates +in different ways, and the particular tendencies which thus arise meet +and enter into conflict with one another, and since their conflict is in +particular a contest to determine the form of the whole, there is +revealed the prospect of a wealth of experiences which come not from +without but out of the movement of life itself, and spring from its +occupation with itself. The conflict between the different movements of +life must bring the whole into a state of tension and lead it to further +development. In the progressive formation of itself, in the development +of a reality conscious of itself, life through its movement finds itself +and develops a content. This movement will summon all the psychical +powers of man to activity; it cannot possibly proceed from them. If we +are to take part in the building up of that inner world, a spiritual +creative activity from the basis of our being must be operative through +these psychical functions, uniting them, and applying them as means and +instruments. + +If, for us men, life becomes conscious of its content only through +movement and conflict, nevertheless this content may not be regarded as +ultimately proceeding from them. If, as a whole, life did not transcend +movement and conflict, if the latter were not included within a +self-conscious and self-determining life, then they could yield no +inner result, and could not lead to the further development of the +whole. The attempts to derive this self-conscious and self-determining +life from ontological conceptions such as "being," "whole," "movement," +and so on, as the older metaphysics often undertook to do; or the +tendency to treat it only as a supplement to them, are to be dismissed +most decisively. The fundamental qualities that the spiritual life +evolves always presuppose a self-conscious life and become intelligible +only in relation to it. Without it, the conceptions of the true and the +good remain in complete obscurity, as will be shown later in more +detail. + +If our human reflection often advances from the indefinite to the +definite, from the abstract to the concrete, this does not involve that +the latter is originated from the former: the advance could not be +achieved unless that which comes at the end was operative from the +beginning as its basis and presupposition. + +If a self-conscious life unfolds itself with an increasing content +through all departments and activities of life, then these departments +will have their meaning and their value primarily in that which they +accomplish for the further development of that life, and in the +particular tendencies that they add to it: this yields a treatment and a +standard of value different from those which we are led to if we make +the psychical states of the individual our starting-point. The treatment +of religion, for example, as a mere occurrence of an unrestrained +psychical life may understand by religion a particular agitation of this +or that psychical function; but with this we do not obtain a spiritual +content. Again, it is not evident how a world of thought formed from +such an individual psychical life could acquire an independence of man, +and lift him above the position in which it finds him. The problem of +religion attains quite a different basis if the spiritual movements and +contents which emerge with it are emphasised; with this it develops and +discloses the reality of the spiritual life more deeply. Then through it +we may discover and win something that alters the condition of life, +transcends the immediate life of the soul, and is able to exert an +elevating influence upon man. The value and the truth of a particular +religion will be judged in the first place by the nature of the +spiritual substance that it offers, and the degree in which, in its +advance, it is able to join itself to the movement of life as a whole +and to guide it further. A great divergence is possible between this +spiritual substance and the movement and passion that call forth a +religion on the basis of humanity: the real is, in human relations, by +no means without further consideration to be regarded as rational. + +The case of the other departments of life is the same as that of +religion: the character and the value of all achievement depend entirely +upon the range and the kind of substantial spirituality that they +evolve. The same is valid of whole epochs and cultures, of peoples and +individuals. The exertion of the greatest energy upon externals and the +most revolutionary transformation of human conditions cannot protect us +from becoming inwardly destitute, or lead us beyond mere appearance to +genuine reality. On the contrary, the experience of history shows often +enough that spiritual revivals have been accompanied in their origin and +growth by manifestations externally insignificant; and that something +which struggles against the broad stream of human life fundamentally +changes the standards and values of our existence. + +Our whole spiritual life, therefore, constitutes a problem; it is an +indefatigable seeking and pressing forward. In self-consciousness the +framework is given which has to be filled; in it we have acquired only +the basis upon which the superstructure has to be raised. We have to +find experiences in life itself, to reveal something new, to develop +life, to increase its range and its depth. The endeavour to advance in +spirituality, to win itself through struggle, is the soul of the life of +the individual and of the work of universal history: where there is no +endeavour of this kind, there is no true life and no genuine history; +our activity in relation to the world as a whole assumes a different +form, and the world is represented differently and presents to us +different problems according to that which is attained here in the basal +structure of life. Life's struggle for itself, for its own content, its +own truth, is the greatest and most intense of all struggles. + +The passion which animates all the endeavour after a revelation of life +and to win life itself is no other than the desire for a genuine +reality: for a being within the activity, for a full as opposed to an +empty life. If the formation of reality from within once begins, and the +desire for a substantial inwardness gains the day over the merely +subjective, then the intolerable inadequacy of all that is usually +called life is bound to be strongly felt. The growth of intelligence has +led man beyond the life of nature and its blind actuality. In +intelligence, the inner life already proves far too independent to be +satisfied with being a mere appearance accompanying nature. With this +evolution the psychical powers win a greater freedom, and man is able to +face his environment more boldly: indeed, in his thought he can grasp an +infinity; and in arousing and using all his powers he may hope from his +own position, in the interaction of subject and environment, to give to +life a content, and thus to make it a genuine life. But here the +limitation of man and the contradictory character of life as it is +immediately experienced soon come to be felt. All the rousing of forces, +all the passing backwards and forwards between subject and object that +we experience in the immediate condition of life, does not lead beyond +interaction, and yields no content: it does not raise life to a +self-conscious and self-determining life; so that, in spite of all its +activity, our life in this condition remains inwardly alien. There is +thus an enormous disparity between the means that are offered and the +aims that are reached; an inward unrest; an incessant conflict, without +any prospect of victory, against the ever-recurring tendency to become +spiritually destitute; a state of dissatisfaction in the midst of all +results of an external kind. Only the revelation of a self-conscious +life, a life which itself evolves as a reality, can be the source of +progress, and lead from appearances and shadows to a genuine life. + +It is apparent that with such an aim a task is presented that dominates +and comprehends the whole extent of our existence. We have to take up +everything into that self-conscious and self-determining life and to +transform the condition of life as it lies immediately before us. A +demand of this kind is not limited to a change of this or that; it +implies a complete transformation and renewal. It not only involves the +whole multiplicity of life, but it must also itself tend to bring about +an increase in the multiplicity; indeed, this task first gives the +multiplicity a firm foundation and an inner value. For the development +and the formation of self-conscious life, it is essential, as we saw, +that life concentrate in particular tendencies and departments; that the +whole place itself in them, and return to itself from them; and that by +this they develop a life of their own and give rise to their own +experiences. To act thus, to advance the whole in its own development, +the individual concentrations of life must possess an inner spiritual +unity which comprehends and dominates all multiplicity. This is seen in +the case of individuals, peoples, epochs, and whole civilisations: only +by overcoming the state of confusion and division in which they at first +find themselves do they come to wrestle with the spiritual life as a +whole and win a spiritual character. These unities of life, however, +will enter into the most diverse relations with the whole and with one +another; and since in so doing they further self-conscious and +self-determining life, they develop reality without limit. From all the +facts we have considered we see that, with the attainment of +independence by the spiritual life, there emerges a distinctive kind of +being which everywhere exerts its activity, holds up a new aim, and +desires a transformation: life is for the first time placed on a firm +foundation, and taken possession of in the deepest source of its +movement. + + +(d) _Human Existence_ + +For the construction of a new system of life, this independent nature of +the spiritual life is primary and most essential. Such construction is +dependent in the second place upon the relation in which the development +of the self-conscious and self-determining life of reality stands to the +position and to the activity of man; in particular whether it wins this +position and activity for itself with ease or meets with definite +opposition. Now, there cannot be any doubt that the recognition of the +fact of the development of the spiritual life to independence of man, as +we traced it, must make us feel that the state of things at the usual +level of human life is most unsatisfactory. It is not that one or +another aspect is inadequate, but that as a whole it is definitely +opposed to the requirements of an independent spiritual life. For the +spirituality that is evolved here is treated for the most part as a mere +means in the pursuit of human welfare. Civilisation, at the level at +which we are most accustomed to it, lifts man above mere nature, but at +the same time it forces him into rivalry and conflict with his equals, +and leads him to expect happiness from victory. This is the case not +only among individuals but also among nations. Since the desire and the +conflict for more generate an indescribable amount of excitement and +passion, life seems to be full, whereas in reality it is entirely +lacking in content, and behind the tumult is felt to be empty. But man +has no intention of giving up all claim to a share in genuine +spirituality: and so he gives a better outward appearance to his +endeavour and his conduct, and practises deceit upon himself as well as +upon others. Genuine spiritual life cannot possibly proceed from +circumstances so contradictory and so confused. Neither can such +circumstances produce the concentration of life that is necessary for +the strengthening and advancement of the spiritual life. It is not the +abuse of some one thing that provokes attack: it is not a particular +failing, but the ordinary daily course which, unresistingly, man is +accustomed to accept as his world, that shows in its successes no less +than in its failures the greatest divergence from genuine spirituality. +It is just at the point where man becomes proud of his own doings and +makes much ostentatious display that he can least of all conceal the +spiritual poverty and the foolishness of his way of thinking. + +Attempts to attribute the responsibility of all limitation to man and +his will, to find the root of all evil in the moral failings of +humanity, have not been wanting. Universal religions have given these +attempts an embodiment. It has seemed as though the harmony of reality +is only disturbed by man, and as though his moral restoration were the +only thing necessary to lead to all good. To be sure, such a way of +thinking manifests a disposition of great seriousness, and it may appeal +to the fact that the perplexity of our existence is nowhere more real +than in reference to the ethical problem. Still, there is no possibility +of doubt for the man of the Modern Age that this conception is too +narrow; that it not only contradicts indisputable impressions and +experiences, but also takes the question much too subjectively and too +anthropomorphically, and thus falls into the danger of doing harm to the +cause that it wishes to serve. It is not simply our disposition, it is +our being as a whole and the circumstances that we are in, which +obstinately oppose the emergence and the development of an independent +spiritual world. It is the most elementary forms of life themselves that +prevent the elevation of our existence to the level of a genuine +spiritual life. We cannot blind ourselves to the fact that the greater +part of our life is bound up with a form of existence in which it is not +able to embrace the spiritual life. Any kind of appropriation of the +spiritual--if it is at all possible--can be effected therefore only in +opposition to that form of existence. In genuine spiritual life all +movement should proceed from the whole and should be sustained by the +whole, even when it is concentrated in the individual departments and +tendencies. Human existence presents the spectacle of individuals ranged +side by side; and if a movement to overcome the original inertia is to +begin at all, their impulses, their desire for happiness, and their +conflicts are necessary. The spiritual life knows no limits; it works +and creates from the infinite whole: the individual is narrowly limited, +and with all his activity and work constitutes but a tiny point in the +infinite whole. The spiritual life presents its content as transcending +time; even if for us it is only gradually revealed, time is in this a +mere means to the presentation of an eternal and immutable truth: man, +however, drifts with time; is dependent upon the momentary situation, +and experiences himself in an incessant change: how can he comprehend +the eternal? Spiritual creation is effected in the transcending of the +antithesis of subject and object: human endeavour is conditioned by this +antithesis. The former with its self-determining activity overcomes from +within the attachment to sense: man even in the highest flight of his +endeavour cannot withdraw himself from it. From the altitudes occupied +by the spiritual life submission to the impulses and the goods of sense +seems to be something mean and base: and yet without these man cannot +possibly preserve his life; he has not conferred sensuous needs and +desires upon himself by an act of will, but finds himself endowed with +them from the beginning. Spiritual life with its formation from within +banishes from itself all mechanism; all compulsion of blind actuality: +without a mechanism in thought and in conduct, without habits and +methods determined by custom, human life cannot attain to an enduring +stability either in the case of the individual or in that of society. +Thus, through the ever-present necessity of self-preservation and +self-renewal, human life is compulsorily related to something, bound to +something, that not only is not adequate to fulfil the tasks of an +independent spiritual life, but is directly opposed to them. There is +something in our life which we cannot dispense with, yet which, from the +spiritual point of view, it is an imperative duty to shake off. + +We see clearly enough that it is not merely our will that is in play, +but that two worlds conflict within us, and that the world to which we +primarily belong, according to the testimony of experience, holds us +fixed with superior power, and draws back to itself all movement which +strives upward. If, in particular, the dimness and the weakness of the +spiritual life in man; its severance from its source; its disintegration +into isolated powers; and, finally, the moral perversity which human +existence exhibits, and the debasement of spiritual power to a mere +means for natural or social self-preservation, become clear to us, then +it is evident that a compromise between such a pitiable and shallow +confusion and a genuine spiritual life is absolutely impossible. The +acknowledgment of an independent spiritual world tends only to increase +the contradiction and make us more clearly conscious of it. + +A clear consciousness of the inadequacy of the human is especially +important and necessary in contrast to the utter confusion which reigns +with regard to the spiritual life and vitiates the whole of the +endeavour of the present. The increasing transference of life to the +world of sense has led the present age to abandon all inner bonds of +mankind. The endeavour of Antiquity to lift our life above the +insignificantly human by giving it a share in the greatness and +magnificence of the whole, and the attempt of Christianity to give a new +nature to life from the relation to God, appear to the present age to be +Utopian. Since the faith of modern Idealism in the immanent universal +reason has become more and more dim, man is thrown back more and more +exclusively upon himself, upon man as he is, upon empirical society. +There has grown up a strong belief that this empirical existence is +quite sufficient in itself, and is able to satisfy our spiritual needs +from itself. The ennobling of man, the improvement of his condition +within this existence, becomes the aim of aims. Now, this presupposes +that within the province of man, the good, even if it does not entirely +preponderate, is still confident of a triumphant advance. It +presupposes, further, that the establishment of a certain state of life +will bring complete happiness with it. At the same time, all that is +disagreeable in human experience--the power of selfishness and pride; +the weakness of love; the feebleness of all spiritual impulse; the +incessant increase of the struggle for existence, with the consequent +degeneration of the inwardness of the whole--appears with dazzling +clearness to the more refined perception of the modern man. After even a +little consideration he cannot doubt that, if, in spite of all +limitations, an unclouded state of human well-being could be +established; if all pain could be banished from our life, life would +fall into the power of the other and worse enemy--emptiness and +monotony. As a refuge from such perplexities there is a tendency to flee +to society and history. From the point of view of humanity as a whole +and with the thought of a better future, all defects and losses of +individuals seem to vanish; the hope of an unceasing progressive +development rises above the feeling of the unsatisfactoriness of the +condition of the moment. But what are these relations of empirical +humanity other than those of a mere collection of individuals who never +become an inner community, and what is empirical history other than a +mere succession which never produces an inner unity of movement? In the +appeal to the former, as in that to the latter, it is only +surreptitiously that something essential can appear to be acquired. In +reality, conceptions are here made use of which in other relations have +a meaning, but which here signify nothing more than empty abstractions, +simply subjective constructions of thought. However, notwithstanding all +the glossing over, the real state of things must ultimately assert +itself: pessimism must then be the last word, and the belief in a +rationality in human existence must finally be given up. The faith in +the greatness of the empirical man is, indeed, of all faiths the +boldest. For, if the other faiths proclaim a new reality in contrast +with the world of sense, they have the possibility of one in an +invisible world. In the case that we are considering, however, +experience itself must offer more than mere experience; we must not only +be certain of a thing that we do not see, but that which we do not see +must coincide with that which exists immediately before us. Such a +position is no longer a faith, but a gross contradiction, a complete +absurdity. + + +(e) _Results and Prospects_ + +The immediate experience of man may by no means be rejected as a whole +on this account; if it were, spiritual work itself would degenerate and +lack content. However, we only need to take up into a whole the +impressions and experiences which each in his sphere acknowledges to be +indisputable, and it will be clear that a movement toward spiritual +independence can never proceed from such a pitiable state of confusion +as that which is thereby seen to exist. It is essential that the +movement toward spiritual independence have an independent starting +point, and proceed on its own course. Only then is it able to select and +appropriate the spirituality that exists in those confused experiences, +and at the same time purify and strengthen it. We may most decisively +reject all presumption to sovereignty on the part of the human realm; +nevertheless, for the construction of a spiritual world that realm +cannot be dispensed with. For this construction is not peacefully and +securely accomplished through the self-development of a spiritual power +placed in us, as was supposed by those who attempted to represent +reality as a whole as a cosmic process of thought. If through the +joyfulness of its faith and the definiteness of its undertaking this +attempt captivated the minds of men for a time, at last it was +frustrated by the fact that we men do not find ourselves immediately in +the atmosphere of reason, but have first through toil to raise ourselves +into it; that we have to do not with absolute spiritual life, but with +spiritual life under the conditions and limitations of human existence. +Thus, in the first place an independent spiritual life, a universal +self-consciousness, must work in us and be changed in our activity; and +this can be accomplished only by a revolutionary transformation of life +as we immediately experience it; only by the attainment of a new point +of view. But if at this point of view certain fundamentals of a new +world become evident, they are as yet only fundamentals, and, without +the help of a world of immediate existence, without recourse to the +movements and experiences of human life, they cannot be completely +developed and embodied. The complete development of a self-conscious +reality is by no means made possible by combining an original spiritual +movement with the world of sense brought to meet it. For the spiritual +life can be furthered by coming into contact with that world only so far +as the spiritual life takes it up and transforms it; the situation is +rather that the spiritual movement wrests a content from sense +experience and at the same time is raised in itself; it is a realisation +of self through the other. The further the movement advances the more +one may win one's own in what is apparently alien; the more that which +is really alien may be separated and opposed. Thus we have a +characteristic picture of the spiritual life in man; only the more +detailed treatment can confirm it. + +The matter of greatest importance to the whole, and the one upon which +all hope of success rests, is that the movement towards an independent +spirituality, to the building up of a new world, should, in spite of the +opposition of immediate circumstances, become manifest also in the human +sphere in characteristic operation, and that it should establish stable +bases in this sphere and rise upon them to the highest by means of work. +We have now to investigate more closely, to demonstrate more exactly, +and as far as possible to show that at all the chief points of life such +movements begin; that one such movement advances another; and that all +are associated in a community of striving, and that from here the +spiritual movement that we see in history is lit up, strengthened, and +for the first time rendered practicable. + + +2. The Transformation and the Elevation of Human Life + +(a) _Aims and Ways_ + +The question before us is whether any kind of transcendence of the gulf +between the spiritual world and man is effected; whether that world, in +spite of its antithesis to the world of sense, manifests itself also +with a characteristic effect in our sphere, and thereby inaugurates a +movement which takes possession of our whole life and advances it. Only +on the result of such an inquiry can we judge whether man is able again +to establish his position, which has been so shaken in the course of +modern culture; and to save the courage and faith of life from violent +changes and convulsions. At the same time we must ascertain whether the +representation of the spiritual life that we have sketched is true in +reference to things as they are found in the human sphere. + +To be sure, proof or verification through experience is, in the case of +this problem, in the highest degree peculiar. No definite reality +spreads itself before us by which we must test the validity of our +representations of thought. Representation and object cannot be simply +brought into coincidence, but as life, which we wish to comprehend, is +found in movement, and as, further, in immediate experience genuine fact +and the form assumed by it in the idea of man are confused, so the +revelation of the spiritual life does not come to us immediately, but +has first to be extricated and wrested from the most diverse errors and +half-truths. Every attempt to obtain proof from experience rests on the +conviction that a movement of the kind, the recognition of which is +being fought for by us, is already in some way in process everywhere +where human life goes beyond mere nature; and that only the clear +comprehension of the aim and the taking it up with complete +self-conscious and self-determining activity are lacking. If now the aim +which is presented is the right one, that is, that which is implied in +the spiritual movement of life itself, then its acknowledgment and +appropriation must tend to the elucidation, the unification, and the +strengthening of all endeavour tending in the direction of this +movement; it must lead to a development and an elevation of life above +the condition in which it is immediately experienced. In the first +place, it must be shown that the connections, preparations, directions +in life in its general condition, tend towards the new according to its +chief demands; and, further, it must be shown that the existing +condition is raised essentially through becoming comprehended by the +revealed universal movement, and is led to its own perfection. Again, it +has to be shown that thus life wins a more precise content and a greater +power in its every aspect: that which is present in all human endeavour +as a necessary requirement must now become more intelligible, and at the +same time from something impossible of fulfilment to something possible, +and reveal new aspects and new tasks. Further, those elements which at +first sight exist unconnected side by side and tend to limit one another +must unite, and must strengthen one another. On the other hand, +divisions must arise: it is as necessary energetically to reject that +which follows wrong aims as to come to a peaceful settlement with that +which errs only in the means. The antitheses which the work of humanity +contains must also become intelligible, and at the same time a way must +be prepared by which these antitheses may be overcome, not one by which +merely a compromise between them may be arrived at. The breaking forth +of the new must tend always toward the self-elevation of life; with +arousing and strengthening power, it must take up the whole of life into +its movement: it must demonstrate a transcendence of all the reflection +and subjectivity of man, and this can be accomplished only through the +disclosure of new forms and contents of life. Accordingly attention must +in the first place be centred upon the pointing out of such new forms +and contents. + +The union of the spiritual life with man, its being firmly rooted in +him, is seen to be at the same time something old and something +new--something old in so far as it must have been existent and in some +way effective from the beginning, something new in so far as its +distinct emergence and its transition to a state of self-determining +activity must alter the condition of things essentially; in fact, must +turn life as a whole into a problem. Where the reality of man is +reduced, as by Hegel, solely to an unfolding of thought and cognition, +the present may find its most important task in the complete +clarification and appropriation of the past; life comes to complete +satisfaction in the drawing of historical achievement to itself. Where +it is a question of the building up of a reality based on self-conscious +and self-determining activity, when we ourselves share in such activity, +we must find ourselves in an essentially different relation to things; +and with all the connection with the past, life will press forward, +changing and elevating in contrast with the whole past. + + * * * * * + +A contact, indeed a union, must therefore be established between the +independent spiritual world--which in some way must be operative in +us--and the activity of our own which struggles upward; and, through the +gain of such a contact, that world must be led to more complete +organisation, and that which strives upward made secure, unified, and +advanced. In this it is essential that the movements and the demands +which the fundamental idea of the spiritual life contains be present to +our minds. The spiritual life appears, so we saw reason to believe, in +the first place, to be something essentially new in contrast to the life +of nature. The spiritual life is not the product of a gradual +development from the life of nature, but has an independent origin, and +evolves new powers and standards: new beginnings must, therefore, be +recognisable in us if the spiritual life is to become our life. The new, +however, manifested a development of the inner life to independence in +opposition to its state of subjection at the level of nature, and so +thus in man also the inner life must in some way come to itself and +attain to freedom. We saw, further, that this development to +independence cannot be brought about through new achievements in a given +world, but that it needs the building up of a new world--a new basis for +life: it extends even to the final basal forms; not any kind of activity +could suffice, but a being within the activity, or, rather, a division +of activity into something sustaining and comprehending on the one hand, +and something demonstrating and producing on the other, is necessary. It +is only thus that life becomes turned toward itself and elevated to a +self-conscious life; activity to self-determining activity; experience +to self-conscious experience. Man could not participate in such a +self-conscious and self-determining life, if in him also a new life, a +spiritual self, had not begun to be in some way. It is impossible for +this self to be merely individual in nature: it can change the form of +things and convey a new world only if it encompasses the multiplicity +and experiences it as its own. An infinite self-conscious and +self-determining life must not only include man within itself; it must +become his own life, his true self. + +To realise this life, this self, in more detail and to pass from mere +impulse to fruitful work, such as the building up of a new reality +necessitates, man must in some way transcend in his own sphere the mere +juxtaposition of individual powers. Connections must be formed within +the realm of man that somehow deal with that task and advance towards +its accomplishment in a way that is beyond the capacity of individuals. +A transcendence of the antithesis of subject and object, that dominates +the greater part of life, is also essential to the new life; an +energetic revolution must raise life to a state of resting upon itself, +to autonomy: and so in man also movements must appear in opposition to +this antithesis--condensations and concentrations, in which life from +being a movement hither and thither becomes a forming of reality from +within. In these connections only out of a self-development of life has +a reality arisen at all; and its content was not there complete at the +outset, but was yielded only through the continuance of that +self-development: it must be shown, therefore, that in man also life +begins to turn toward itself, and that this makes it possible to attempt +tasks which to our capacity are otherwise inaccessible. + +It is necessary to acknowledge that in all the spiritual movement which +appears in the domain of man, there is a revelation of the spiritual +world: as merely human power cannot lead the whole to new heights, in +all development of the spiritual life the communication of the new world +must precede the activity of man. At the same time, where we are +concerned with a life that is independent, and of which the activity is +conscious and self-determined, the change cannot possibly simply _happen +to_ man: it must be taken up by his own activity; it needs his own +decision and acceptance. + +We shall consider the question of the possibility of this almost +immediately: so much, however, is certain--that this necessity of a +decision by man himself makes the matter far more complex and of far +greater risk. The establishment of an independent spiritual life in man +finds its chief enemy not in nature, but in the limitation and +perversion of spiritual impulse through man's subordinating it to his +own ends. The chief conflict is not between spirit and nature, but +between real and false spirituality. Thus thought emerges in man, seeks +a representation of the world and would in this attain to truth; but +when this striving first appears, man is wont to treat himself as the +central point of the whole, to measure the whole of infinity according +to what it achieves in relation to him, and to see reflections of +himself throughout its whole extent. And so we have the anthropomorphic +way of thinking, the nature of which we have become aware of only +through toil during the progress of the work of culture; a way of +thinking from which it has needed even more toil to protect ourselves, +and which, in forms often hardly noticeable, is ever ready to appear +again and to draw the spiritual movement into its paths. With the +emergence of the spiritual life, man becomes more free in relation to +his environment; more free also in relation to the necessities of mere +nature: his activity can exert itself more independently, concern itself +with lofty aims, strive towards the infinite. But all this capacity +becomes drawn into the service of the human; the wishes and the desires +of the individual grow to an enormous extent. Since out of the struggle +for existence, with its natural limitation, an interminable struggle for +more existence arises, naïve self-preservation becomes transformed into +an unrestricted egoism. That the more-than-human which appears in the +domain of man should be employed to the advancement of the merely human +is a danger that is present even at the highest stages of development: +at one time man would prove his own power in the more-than-human; at +another, and this more especially, he treats it as a means to attain his +material welfare. Religion, for example, would reveal to man a new depth +of reality, and so create a new life for him; and yet, how often even +this new reality is degraded to a means for the preservation of his +insignificant personality, and regarded as something which on his behalf +guides the whole world aright! + +The development of the spiritual life in the human sphere can thus be +seen to be anything but a sure and steady progress; every step forward +brings new dangers; unutterable confusion arises through the use and the +perversion of the new in the interests of man. But, if the development +of the spiritual life within man is thus an unceasing conflict against +human error, this conflict, despite its exhibition of the littleness of +man, is at the same time a witness to his greatness. For it shows not +only that the spiritual movement needs the active co-operation of man, +but also that there is a conflict within humanity itself against the +perversion of the spiritual; that there must be more within man and +operative in him than the narrowly human. Indeed, in nothing does man +seem greater than in this development of a more-than-human within the +domain of man, in this severe and untiring conflict with himself. How +could this conflict arise and become the soul of universal history if +man did not possess a life and being transcending his particularity, and +if he did not realise more in himself than we at the first glance see in +him? The error of Positivism is that, although it shows most clearly how +this spiritual movement dissolves the forms of life as it is immediately +experienced, it does not perceive and value the fact that, at the same +time, a new life, an inner life emerges; that, indeed, the negation +itself is possible only through a more comprehensive spiritual +revelation. To consider the negative and the positive in their relation +to each other, and to weigh them one against the other, is the +indispensable condition for the adequate understanding of human life. + + +(b) _The Nature of Freedom_ + +The arousing of a new world to life within man is a problem and a task: +it cannot be effected unless the spontaneity and self-determining +activity that are distinctive of this world also manifest themselves +within him. Further, it cannot be effected unless within man, who with +the greater part of his being belongs primarily to nature, a deliverance +from nature is accomplished and the centre of life is removed to its +spiritual side; and this cannot happen without the co-operation of man. +We need freedom, therefore, in two senses: as the presence of an +independent inner life, and as man's capacity to change--and we cannot +fail to recognise that these are closely related. + +Now, the impressions and experiences of modern life are opposed to +freedom in both of these senses; indeed, with apparently insuperable +force they oppose freedom in every sense. Modern science most clearly +shows that man belongs to a great world-whole and world-movement; his +life and work seem to be completely determined through his relations in +this whole; his whole life is subject to an irresistible destiny, and in +all his undertakings and conduct he can only follow the course directed +by it. This destiny assumes for us the most diverse forms; and through +this diversity surrounds us on all sides. Through the power of heredity +we enter life with a definite nature: in the family, the state, and the +society a particular kind of environment surrounds us and gives to our +nature its more detailed colouring: the age meets us with particular +tendencies, takes us up into itself with a supreme power, and just as +decidedly directs us towards certain ends as it diverts us from others. + +Even in earlier times all this was not ignored, so far as the individual +aspects are concerned; but the Modern Age was the first to conceive the +problem as a whole, and with this it has pursued the idea of +determination even into the inner structure of the life of the soul, +with the demonstration that here also nothing is spontaneous, nothing +unmeditated, but that even down to the most primary impulse everything +depends upon something else, and proceeds from definite relations. From +this point of view the idea of freedom, and in particular that of a +freedom of choice, appears to be only a remnant of an unscientific way +of thinking. The fact that man feels--as an immediate impression--free +in cases of hesitation between different possibilities has lost its +power to convince the individual of the Modern Age. For the new mode of +thought has evolved point for point along with an increasing divergence +from the naïve manner of representation, and it has won its greatest +victories in opposition to this manner of representation. The revolution +that Copernicus accomplished in the representation of the world has +become typical of the whole of modern work; and as regards our problem +also, dissent from ordinary opinion is less a cause for doubt than a +recommendation. + +However, our attitude in regard to this problem has, indeed, been +essentially changed by modern thought. There can be no further talk of a +vague freedom of the will, of a capacity to act in one manner or +another unaffected by anything that preceded and by the whole +environment; the fact of the subjection of man to a destiny, both +external and internal, is forced upon us with overwhelming power. +Whether the idea of freedom in every sense is shown to be invalid is +another question; perhaps the problem is not so much solved as put on +one side. In any case, if a fundamental problem--one that has been +discussed from the earliest times--is suddenly declared to be finally +solved, the suspicion must soon arise that the solution appears to be +self-evident only because certain presuppositions which are in no way +self-evident are implicitly assumed in it. + +The surrender of every kind of freedom meets in the first place with the +suspicion that thereby far more is lost than we think or intend; that +much is lost to which it is impossible to surrender all claim. Great +trouble is taken to prove that the denial of freedom by no means does +away with the possibility of an ethical moulding of life. Yet it might +be shown without difficulty that, in attempts of this kind, either the +freedom, rejected in its ordinary sense, finds entrance again altered +and deepened--as, for example, in the philosophy of Spinoza--or the +ethic that remains after freedom has been denied retains only the name, +and in itself signifies something merely mechanical. But why do we +insist upon the ethical; why does so much depend upon its continuance? +For this reason: that upon it depends whether life merely _happens to_ +us or also _from_ us; whether we are simply parts of a rigid +world-mechanism or self-determining co-operators in the building up of +reality. If the former hypothesis is true, we are no more than the +platform upon which events become connected; and we can possess no other +unity than a summation of the multiplicity. A unity of this kind could +not possibly attain to independence and transcendence; could not make an +inner judgment upon events; could not take up a conflict in opposition +to the condition of life as it is immediately experienced. The +conception of conduct would inevitably be degraded to that of mere +occurrence. We should cease to have inner unity and be comprehensive +selves; we should not be able to speak of disposition and conviction: +for it is of the essence of all these things that they cannot be +imparted, but must arise newly and spontaneously just in the individual, +and for this a concentration of life, an elevation to self-conscious and +self-determining activity, is necessary. + +Where inner unity and such an activity are lacking, a true present does +not exist. For if, through the all-dominant relation of cause and +effect, that which comes later proceeds in certain sequence from that +which came earlier, our whole existence is only a stream of occurrences, +and that which is called present is nothing more than the point of +transition from the past to the future. Now, a real present can be +reached from such an apparent present only if an independent task +originates at this point, and a decision has to be made: the more our +whole life and being here become a problem again, the more securely +might we trust to the possibility of advancing beyond all previous +achievement, and of a spontaneous breaking forth of new powers, the more +will our life be transformed into a genuine present. A genuine present +does not exist within the sequence, but above it; it cannot come to us +opportunely, but must be attained through our own activity: it is our +own work. It is, therefore, not a common and equal possession, but is +differently constituted according to the individual. The present is the +more real and comprehensive for us the more spiritual power we evolve +and the more spiritual content we give to life. Thus the present is not +a mere point in the succession of times, a mere ripple in the stream of +appearances, but involves a counteraction to this flow; its formation is +to be accomplished only by the placing of life in the region of the +spontaneous, the independent, the time-transcendent. + +All the losses in individual matters are, however, only appearances and +parts of a universal loss that the surrender of freedom involves. This +loss is no other than that of an independent nature-transcending +spiritual life in general. Spontaneity is no subsidiary quality, the +disappearance of which might only involve a modification; with it, the +spiritual life as a whole stands or falls. The experience of history +also shows clearly enough that that which has in any way reached a +spiritual height never persists by simply existing, but that, if it is +not to degenerate rapidly, it must proceed ever anew from spontaneous +creative activity. The law of nature, that everything remains in its +existent state of rest or motion until it is acted upon from without, is +not true of the spiritual: of it nothing abides that is not continually +brought forth anew. + +The surrender of freedom, therefore, means no less than the inner +destruction of the spiritual life. And before we submit to this we shall +feel compelled to make a more careful inquiry, to see whether the +arguments against freedom are really so cogent as they are represented. +They do exert a compelling force, but only so long as their +presuppositions are admitted and held to be unassailable. That they are +not unassailable will become evident as soon as we clearly recognise +their nature and implications. + +If the world forms a closed and "given" system, in which every +particular is determined completely by its position in the whole, there +is no place for spontaneity. The question of freedom has no meaning for +man if he belongs solely and entirely to such a world, and within it has +only to weigh aims one against another. But in accordance with the +results of our investigation we contest these two presuppositions most +decidedly. To an investigation that begins with the life-process as the +basis of its treatment, it is certain that a "given" world never can be +primary, but only secondary. That it may attain to an inner present it +needs a life that is not itself "given," but with its activity +encompasses a multiplicity, unifies, and makes it definite; for anything +to be experienced as "given" a self-conscious and self-determining +activity is necessary. If this self-determining activity can struggle +upwards to complete power and consciousness only slowly, still it is +the first and the sustaining world; and at the same time it can never be +asserted that the forms of its life are only ideas and appearances. Life +is not formed from existing individual points, and does not pass between +such points, but all multiplicity is sustained by an active whole, and +from this whole animated ever anew. This active whole may not be +conceived as dependent upon another, and it is quite capable of advance. +We have endeavoured to show that the matter is not one of subtleties of +thought, but of different natures of the world and of activity; and that +with the attainment of independence a new world emerges. We have also +shown that in us the new world must first wrestle with another, to which +we primarily belong; that inner changes must take place in us; and that, +if all our toil is not to be in vain, the relation of the two worlds +must be changed. + +Man, therefore, has a special significance in that the two worlds meet +together within him, and in that there can be no change in their +relation to each other at this point without his co-operation. The +problem of his life concerns more than his conduct, it extends to his +being; the question is, how far the different worlds may become his own +world, his life. The matter is one of shifting the centre of life from +the position in which it is in immediate experience. Thus, the tension +and the conflict involve the ultimate elements: each of the worlds has +its own tasks and evaluations; things do not affect man with a given and +fixed value, but they receive their value first from their relation to +the main course upon which his life enters; and so all conflict +concerning particular matters implies a decision concerning the whole. +Of course, such a decision is not being made from moment to moment; and +more especially, it is not made simply by reflection, but it is involved +in the whole of life. Only that which in him, in endeavour and work, +participates in such decision is true life; individual acts of external +conduct only bring to expression that which has happened and still +continues to happen inwardly and in the whole. + +In all this the possibility of an inner elevation is presupposed. +Everyone who strives for an inner development of man; everyone who, with +clear insight into the meanness of the general condition of human +affairs, unswervingly continues to strive for the advancement of +humanity, relies on this possibility: without it there is no hope of a +development and a growth of one's own life, of an elevation of it above +the condition in which it is first experienced. And so without this +possibility endeavour loses all its true tension, and all that we are +able to accomplish in ourselves and in others is no more than a +dexterous use of existent forces. But is this condition of the matter, +spiritually discerned, more than a mere discipline? + +It is true that the possibility of an elevation has its fixed +conditions; it necessitates particular convictions with regard to the +world and to man. We must view the world as being still in a state of +flux and regard man as not being simply a closed and limited individual. +The infinite spiritual life must be present as a whole to him, and +arouse a new world to life in him; his conduct must be rooted in the +power and content of the infinite life: only thus can we understand that +in man also a movement begins and a change is brought about. And so it +remains ever an inderivable, original phenomenon, which we must +acknowledge as a fact, that a spontaneous life breaks forth in man, a +new and relatively independent life-centre originates. We always come +back in the long run to original phenomena; the origin of living being +in general is also an original phenomenon. May we deny the fact of such +original phenomena, because they make our representation of the world +less uniform and simple? To do so would be nothing else than to make our +previously formed conceptions the measure of reality; it would be a new, +specifically modern anthropomorphism. + +This freedom, with its requirement of a world of inner life that +introduces new contents, and also that we belong in some way to this +world, is by no means a capacity to make a decision capriciously at any +moment; it is not a denial of the power of necessity. Of course, it +implies that there may be some kind of counteraction to this necessity; +and that if this counteraction can attain success only as a result of +the activity of life as a whole, even the individual moment need not be +a matter of indifference. For, as the spiritual life has always to win +its own height anew, so the present in its relations is not a mere +consequence of the past: times of temptation can come repeatedly when +all that which has been achieved becomes doubtful again; but times of +elevation also come when an advance is made beyond that previously +achieved. It is not possible for us simply to reject the present +existence and all the conditions which constrain us, and to choose for +ourselves a new kind of existence, instead of the one we have; from that +it is impossible to free ourselves: in all further endeavour we have to +take it into account, to make our peace with it. Nevertheless, life can +attain to a transcendent point of view, from which the world of sense +becomes the object of judgment and of adaptation; from which, to be +regarded as completely ours, it needs acknowledgment and appropriation +by us; and from which it is seen not to constitute our whole life, as +that which is ultimate. Indeed, the tendencies within us which are +concerned with nature, first reach their highest through such +acknowledgment and appropriation by us: placed on a spiritual basis they +lose their rigid exclusiveness and become unified; our particular nature +no longer constitutes our whole being, but becomes the central point of +a more comprehensive life, which extends further and further to +infinity. + +Our life, therefore, is a conflict between fate and freedom, between +being "given" and spontaneity; and this conflict may be followed through +all life's divisions. The conflict appears primarily in the individual +in the development towards personality and spiritual individuality. For, +as personality, unless life has a spontaneous source, is an empty word, +so also spiritual individuality does not come to anyone, but has first +to be won by the work of life essentially elevating that which destiny +brings: so far, it is our own work; but it is not entirely our own work, +because that which comes to us from nature, and the condition of life +gives us fixed points of support and points out a certain course. +Similarly, peoples have in their nature, environment, and history +definite conditions of their being, from which they cannot withdraw. But +spiritual creation and inward greatness do not grow simply out of these +conditions, however favourable they may be, but out of a spontaneous +activity which takes up that which has been presented to it, gives it a +central point, and from this develops it. The deciding question is +always whether and how far individuals and peoples attain to and +preserve such a self-determining activity. This activity alone makes it +possible for life to be unified inwardly; for its elements to be +distinguished and separated, and for some to be brought into prominence +and others relegated to the background; for life to be made secure and +elevated, and as the result of all for a spiritual individuality to be +formed. The same thing holds good of the condition of a particular time, +and man's relation to it. At first man appears to be a child of his age, +a slave of his age. But by the spiritual life he is able to win an +independence of the age, and to make himself its lord. Again, he cannot +free himself from the problems of the age; he cannot alter them just as +he likes, cannot divert into an opposite direction the power which they +exert upon him. But there is always an "either--or," either submission +to the succession of experience, or the beginning of an opposition from +spiritual self-determining activity: in this, also, the possibility of +calling new powers to life presents itself. From this spiritual point of +view activity centred upon the concerns of the particular age is no +longer regarded as the whole life; the particular age with its work is +comprehended in an infinite life. As through all its different stages +and constituents, so ultimately humanity as a whole also carries on a +struggle for a spiritual being, an advance to a new level. Humanity may +not be regarded as something finished; it must evolve to a nature other +than its present one, bring about a transformation of its life, and win +a spiritual individuality: the life of humanity is in a state of motion +and it must become self-determined. + +The idea of freedom thus reveals far-reaching prospects and the greatest +tasks; it manifests its truth and power in taking possession of common +experiences and illuminating them, and in the arousing and +re-organisation of our life. With the acknowledgment and the adequate +appreciation of freedom, with the revelation of its universal relations, +man is elevated in the most essential manner, for it manifests the new +world as active in the midst of his life and capable of appropriation by +him: it calls him to independent co-operation in the conflict of the +worlds; it gives to the simply human and the apparently commonplace an +incomparable greatness. However powerful destiny may be, it does not +determine man entirely; for, even in beginning opposition to it there is +a liberation from it. However mean man's activity, it carries in it a +decision between worlds; however vanishing the moment, it is not +entirely lost. True, the idea of freedom involves definite +presuppositions: it involves, indeed, a profession of faith concerning +life and reality as a whole, a profession of faith that contradicts +every form of Naturalism and Intellectualism, and, in opposition to +their representations of the world, champions another. But this +profession of faith does not concern this problem only; it is involved +in our work as a whole, and so the whole may support and confirm it. + + +(c) _The Beginnings of the Independent Spiritual Life_ + +As the problem of freedom gains in clearness and depth in the relations +which have been discussed, so also the beginnings of independent +spiritual life which are manifested in the domain of man become much +clearer in them. Without such beginnings, which represent a new order +in contrast to nature, and which oppose the degeneration of life to the +narrowly human, a movement towards independent spirituality could never +emerge in us. They are really intelligible and acquire power only when +they are unified and acknowledged as the activity of a new life and +being. + +These beginnings appear in an elevation of life accessible to every +individual, an elevation above the forms as well as the content of mere +nature. We perceive this in the norms with which the research of the +present is busily occupied. Our life does not consist entirely of simple +matters of fact, but in certain directions qualities and forms are +presented to it which are able to contradict the immediate state of +things and to exercise a certain power over it. Thus the norms of +thought, the norms of conduct and of artistic creation are evolved, each +making particular demands, and being different in the manner of its +operation. However, we are concerned here not with the aspects of +difference, but with that which is common to all; and this consists in +the working of an actuality in us that is something other than natural +occurrence, an actuality that needs our acknowledgment, and through this +acknowledgment first wins power over us. The demands which these norms +make upon us are in no way convenient to us; they limit our caprice; +they often cost hard toil and heavy sacrifice; our desire for natural +happiness does not commend them to us. How is it then that we do not +simply reject them? what is it that gives to them a constraining power +over us? If they remained isolated and impenetrable experiences, if they +adhered to us as something alien in nature, were foreign elements in our +being, their power would be unintelligible. It is to be explained only +upon the hypothesis that they are unfoldings of our own life, which by +these unfoldings is proved to be something other than a life of nature. +Unless they are rooted in our own life, these norms are like misty forms +in the air. They obtain complete reality and motive power first as +movements of our self, which then is no mere point by the side of other +points, but an independent manifestation of life of the spiritual +world. + +This is in particular clearly the case in the idea of duty, the +elucidation of the inner meaning of which is Kant's greatest and most +enduring service. A duty is always a command; it presents itself as +independent of all caprice. At the same time, however, it can never be +forced upon us by an external power; it needs our own assent and +acknowledgment. Our own volition and being must operate in it, and, in +this, being must present itself otherwise than it appears to be at the +first glance. We must bear and maintain within us a new world; in +submission to its orders we must assert and develop ourselves. In this +manner alone can we explain the joyfulness which accompanies all genuine +performance of duty, and without which duty is no more than a task +forced upon us. How much power duty, and the norms in general, may +acquire in the greater part of human life is a question in itself; but +they could not exist for us even as ideas and possibilities if they were +not in some way based in our own being. However, as they show this being +in a new light, it follows that they must themselves gain in clearness +and in power and become more closely unified if they are understood and +treated as developments and modes of self-preservation of our own life. + +It is with regard to content as well as to form that beginnings of a new +life appear. At the level of nature only that which serves the +self-preservation and the advancement of the life of the individual +being is estimated as a good; all that is involved in this may be +comprehended under the conception of utility. But notwithstanding its +great power over man the consideration of utility does not form the only +motive of his life. For a detailed treatment of this matter we may refer +to what was said in the discussion of "The Growth of Man beyond Nature." +At present we are concerned especially with the view that the new that +appears in us should be acknowledged to be the manifestation of a new +world and the expression of our real being. In the growing of man beyond +nature negation usually preponderates; he must limit the impulses of +his natural _ego_, acknowledge and respect the rights of others, be +ready to subordinate and sacrifice himself. It is for the most part not +evident what can commend such a negation to him and give it power over +him; and an impulse aroused to clear consciousness and strong desire +may, therefore, feel this entire connection with a new world to be an +unwarrantable limitation, and reject it as a violent intimidation and a +degradation of life. The matter is seen in its right light only when +negation is regarded as the reverse side of affirmation, and even then +only if the winning of a new life and being is acknowledged in this +affirmation. The positive impulse of self-preservation is indispensable +to complete vital-energy, but mere self-assertion on the part of an +individual in opposition to others does not constitute a genuine self; a +genuine self is constituted only by the coming to life of the infinite +spiritual world in an independent concentration in the individual. Only +thus does life, which otherwise were empty, acquire a content. Then the +individual is no longer compelled to develop his powers in conflict with +other individuals, but in directing his life towards this infinite +spiritual world, in its complete appropriation and organisation. Hence, +only that which raises the spiritual content of life can be regarded as +good, and goods will be compared in value in accordance with this +standard. The more they lead beyond mere results to the development of a +new being and self, the more essential they are to spiritual +self-preservation; everything else becomes a means or a preliminary +condition. Negation, also, has greater significance and importance from +this point of view. The new affirmation can acquire no complete truth +and no real power in man without a fundamental deliverance of life from +mere nature and its particularity. Without earnestness of renunciation +the new life sinks back to the old or both are combined in an +undifferentiated unity, with the consequence that the new life loses its +power to stimulate to new endeavour. As human beings are, this negation +must always be a sharp one. + +In this connection, it may be said that life needs the stage of law +which restricts natural impulse, and constrains to the acknowledgment of +superior organisations of life; but from the stage of law there must be +progress to the stage of love, which for the first time reveals an inner +relation to reality and reacts upon the stage of law, giving it a soul. +On the other hand, a love that would be genuine comes not to destroy the +law, but to fulfil, to take it up into itself. As love and law are +indisputable powers in the life of humanity, so they also proclaim the +emergence of a new world and the development of a new being within the +domain of humanity. + + +(d) _The Transcending of Division_ + +A particularly severe conflict with regard to the problem of the unity +of life arises between the natural condition of man and the requirements +of an independent spiritual life. The spiritual life demands an enduring +whole which includes all multiplicity within itself and of which the +movement originates within: human existence is primarily a juxtaposition +of individuals and a succession of moments; no union seems to be more +than that which is constituted by a mere collection of the individuals. +If the division were not in some way transcended no spiritual life could +grow up within humanity, and man have no share in the building up of a +spiritual world. The nineteenth century gave a confident answer to the +problem: it contended that history and society of their own capacity +bind the elements of life into stable forms which take up all +multiplicity into themselves and raise our existence to spirituality. We +most emphatically deny the validity of this contention, and hope to show +that history and society themselves involve difficult problems; further, +that only when we conceive them in a particular way are they able to +help in the unification of life and then only in a limited manner; and +lastly, that they do not so much produce a spiritual life as presuppose +it, as essential to their own existence. Naturalism and Intellectualism +have also confused the outlook; if we free it from this confusion, +history and society will take a secondary place in our estimation; they +will themselves be seen to be deeper and more comprehensive and to +involve movements which extend further than appears in immediate +experience; and they will become witnesses to the living presence of the +spiritual life within humanity. + + +(i.) _The Spiritual Conception of History_ + +The nineteenth century transmitted to us a conception of history that is +far more peculiar in nature and far more open to attack than is usually +recognised: history is represented as a great stream which takes up all +individual achievements into itself, unites them, and, regardless of all +human error and caprice, leads surely to its end. No genuine achievement +is lost, and all gain seems to be permanent; beyond all the trouble and +uncertainty of the moment appeal is made to the power which, directing +and elevating, permeates the movement, clarifies and refines it. In this +conception the necessity of a process that has the power of determining +its own activity and making its own decision is primary. The fact that +the matter is not so simple as this conception of history represents is +shown by the experience of the age itself, which directly contradicts +it. For according to this conception the whole past should discharge +itself into the present and so impart its whole result immediately to +us, and the direction that our activity ought to take should be pointed +out to us with complete certainty by history. But we are distinctly +aware of the extent to which this direction is a matter of question and +doubt, and of the uncertainty into which we have fallen with regard to +the relation of the present to the past: in the process of our +investigation we saw this in particular in the division and conflict +between the different systems of life. History is seen to be a difficult +problem far more than a secure fact; and we are compelled to take up a +new consideration of the question. + +In this consideration a distinct delimitation of the achievements +characteristic of man is primarily necessary. Modern science already +recognises a history of nature, and much that was formerly regarded as +complete is now seen to be in a state of flux and movement. Since every +event leaves effects behind, in the course of ages the results +accumulate, develop, and act upon one another, that which comes later is +conditioned by the influence of the earlier and is intelligible only in +relation to it, a distinctive historical method gains currency. Geology +presents to us with particular clearness a history of this type. In so +far as man belongs to nature and the spiritual life has not yet +developed to any degree of independence in him, he is also the subject +of such a history. That which happens within him leaves behind effects +that become the conditions of later occurrence. This conception of +history, as determined solely by mechanical causes, is still maintained +in some quarters in spite of further developments of thought. But it is +not apparent from this point of view how, even with the greatest +accumulation of effects, history could yield anything of gain to an +inner unity, to a life from the whole: for that, man must bring with him +something essentially new; and as a matter of fact this is what he does. + +Not only do events happen to us and change our condition, but with our +own activity we are able to hold fast to these events, to give to them +an inner permanence, to bring them ever anew from the dim distance into +the living present. We do not drift onward with the stream of time, but +withstand it; seek to wrest something fixed from "becoming" and change, +and salvation in the eternal. We cannot do this without altering the +whole view of things and manifesting a new spiritual capacity. + +The retention in mind of individual events by means of annals, monuments +and similar methods is the beginning of a history of a higher kind: even +so much shows a greater activity, since it involves a judgment of the +significance of events, and on the basis of this judgment begins to +wage war against the destroying power of "cormorant devouring time." The +achievement is incomparably higher, if certain spiritual unities and +tendencies are adhered to and are given permanent currency: thus +religion in particular gave a stability to life and delivered men from +the tyranny of the mere moment. The matter remains simple so long as the +movement is within a single people or a definite sphere of culture. But +in its progress it goes far beyond these limits. New peoples arise; the +state of culture undergoes great changes, indeed revolutions; life is +taken up from new starting points, from which everything of importance +to earlier ages loses its value. But it is lost only for a time; a +desire to return to it and to bring it into complete harmony with the +new is soon felt. The circle of vision is thus increasingly widened, and +all multiplicity is finally united into a whole. This retention of the +past is primarily a matter of knowledge and of intellectual +appropriation. But it is not limited to this; it would operate not only +in the extension of knowledge but beyond this in the development of +life. Whatever has been won by human power is to be preserved, unified, +and used to advance the present. Thus, there arises a historical +culture; an education on a historical basis; religion and philosophy, +art and law derive power and content from the work of universal history, +and life as a whole seems to win a greater comprehensiveness and +stability. And so it has come to appear as though the past imparts its +whole result to the present without any effort on the part of man and +without incurring him in any risk. + +In reality the case is entirely different. The stream of the ages +becomes spiritually significant to us only in so far as we develop an +independence of it. The stream does not itself, automatically and +independently of us, select the elements of value which it contains or +unite the ages to a harmonious result: we ourselves must achieve this. +Spiritually regarded, we do not from the beginning stand upon a sure +foundation, on which we might peacefully build; we must first acquire +such a foundation through endeavour, and in this matter we see doubt and +violent change continually make that uncertain which is apparently most +secure, and make it necessary to seek greater depths. + +For this treatment of history, involving, as it does, self-determining +activity, an elevation above time is essential. Without in some way +transcending time we could not survey individual events and unite them +in one representation. But we would do far more than that; we would +select and take up into our own life that which is valuable in the +earlier, in order thereby to enrich and strengthen our life, and to lead +it as far as possible from the present of the mere moment to a present +encompassing the ages. How could this come to pass unless we were able +to secure an independent vantage ground transcending the stream of the +ages; a vantage ground from which we may survey and judge the ages, +appropriate some elements from them and reject others? Experience shows +clearly enough that the tendency and the content of life with which we +meet the past, decide what shall be its spiritual representation, and +how we shall stand in relation to it. For experience shows that each +main tendency of life has its own view of history and its own treatment +of history; it shows further that every change in life which is in any +way far-reaching involves an alteration in our relation to the past; +gives prominence to the new, and relegates the old to the background. +There arises therefore a history of history; a history, for example, of +that which in the life of Antiquity has seemed essential and valuable to +the different later ages. For us, therefore, history, in regard to its +spiritual nature, is involved in constant change. The past does not +decide concerning the present so much as the present concerning the +past; the past is not something dead and fixed behind us; ever anew it +becomes the object of passionate conflict. + +But does not this dependence of the past upon the present deprive +history of all independence and of all value? Does it not surrender life +completely to the contingency of the changing moments? Does it not +destroy all inner unity of the ages? This would, in fact, be the case +if the matter remained on a simply human basis; if a spiritual life +transcending time were not manifested through all the changes of the +ages; if a spiritual history could not be distinguished from a narrowly +human one. Spiritual history is concerned with that which through all +human activity and endeavour reveals a self-conscious inner life and +which, as such a revelation, is valid not only for a particular age but +through all ages and independently of all ages. Spiritual history would +be impossible unless there is active within us from the beginning an +independent spiritual life which first realises its content through the +historical process. + +Such a transcendent nature is most evident at those highest points of +human development which we call "classical," not because they should +dominate and bind all ages, but because in them the spiritual life +attained to a complete independence over against man, lifted him above +himself into the fire and flood of creative activity, and made it +possible for him to produce characteristic contents. These classical +achievements are especially important for the development of life if +they not only bring something new in individual departments and in +particular directions, but also shape and present the whole to us in a +distinctive manner, and seek to appropriate to themselves, and in the +appropriation to elevate, the spiritual impulse that exists in man; if a +new being, in contrast to nature and society, emerges and would become +lord of the whole. Life as a whole is thus transformed into a problem +and a conflict. The question is whether this movement is able to take up +everything into itself and to lead life to its highest level, or whether +it meets with an insuperable resistance. In this matter life tests +itself by itself, by its own development--a thing which is possible only +if its experiences arise out of its being as a whole. If in a particular +case it proves that essential requirements remain unsatisfied, that the +movement is not able to include the spiritual life within itself, a +severe convulsion is inevitable, the spiritual life as a whole comes to +a standstill, and there can be no advance until life concentrates anew +and the new concentration gains ground. It is to be expected that a new +concentration will bring forward and develop that, in particular, which +formerly did not find complete satisfaction. In the first place, +therefore, there is an abrupt break and the emergence of an apparently +irreconcilable opposition: the old is relegated to the background; +tested by the new, the old soon comes to be regarded as a complete +mistake. In reality it is not so. For, as certainly as spontaneous +creative activity was operative in the old and produced characteristic +contents, it involves something which, superior to all the change of +time, will survive convulsion and doubt, and assert itself in some way +in a more comprehensive life. But the old will not survive and re-assert +itself unless the timeless reality within it separates itself from all +human and temporary addition; unless it manifests what lies behind the +historical form. + +The same thing happens in the case of the new movement that arises. With +all its greatness of achievement, limitations become manifest in it; +then, more comprehensive forms arise; and so in the historical movement +as a whole the spiritual life is revealed in forms continually +increasing in content. In opposition to the tendency for one age to be +separated from another, however, a desire for unity, for a life which in +some way embraces the multiplicity of movements and concentrations of +life, and binds them into a whole, makes itself felt. A unity can hardly +be achieved by simply regarding the different concentrations and +tendencies as on the same level and making a compromise between them; +rather it is necessary that the different concentrations and different +movements contend with one another; it is just their conflict which may +elevate and deepen life. The movement to secure this unity and to retain +elements from the past is not an accumulation of elements and tendencies +in time, but an increasing deliverance from time, the establishment of a +timeless truth independent of the change of things. Experiences, of +which the external manifestations no longer exist, are again called to +life, and preserved for all time by spiritual power; indeed, that which +is lost in immediacy by the absence of the external manifestation is +more than compensated for by an advance to the source of the power: +things which in their temporal form are a mere co-existence are +transformed into an organised whole. Movements, which in history have +often been engaged in passionate conflict, may enter into a relation of +interaction, and may be regarded as a sequence of stages, in which the +earlier prepares for the later, and the later presupposes the earlier; +in which all give life to and further one another. A universal life thus +progressively arises within the domain of man; the individual +achievements unite more and more to the building up of a new, enduring +world; the whole realises itself in the individual occurrence, and +through the development of a time-inclusive present transcends the mere +moment. + +This movement of life in history involves more unrest, conflict and +doubt, than the nineteenth-century doctrine of evolution implied. For +this doctrine saw in the historical movement the unfolding of a +spiritual life, sure as regards its foundation and its main direction; +the antitheses within that movement seemed to be involved in a single +process, which determined the limits of each tendency in relation to the +others; a transcendent necessity was regarded as leading to the +development of all in their relation to one another. As a fact, the +conflict is also concerning the substance and the main direction of the +whole; the spiritual life must first realise itself within the region of +mankind, and it is realised through the toil and work of man himself. It +is just the fact that the problem is an ultimate one, that even the +fundamental forms of life develop only in conflict and experience, and +that we are concerned not with winning simply this or that in life, but +genuine life itself, that makes history significant. At the same time, +this brings man into a more inward relation to the spiritual life, and +this life is made more his own life and being than if he were +surrounded by the power of physical or intellectual processes. Nothing +makes humanity as a whole more significant than that in its province and +through its work the new world begins to develop. + +With such a conception of history, the philosophical treatment of it +must direct its attention chiefly to the independent spirituality which +in the course of the centuries, and especially in great changes, is +evolved in contrast with the narrowly human; and to the main direction +which is given to life by this spirituality. The philosophical treatment +of history ought first of all to trace the liberation of life from the +simply human; the inner elevation of our being to a more-than-human. +Antiquity at the height of its spiritual development began to desire a +universal truth independent of man; a moulding of life in accordance +with an inner right; and an order of things beyond the power of human +caprice, as was shown by the giving symmetry and harmony precedence in +art, and justice in conduct. Christianity brought about a liberation of +the innermost disposition, the root of endeavour and of love, from +purely natural impulse, however ennobled; and in this way brought men +into new relationships and set them before new tasks. The Modern Age on +the part of science began a relentless conflict against the +anthropomorphism of the mode of life as immediately experienced; thus it +has made the spiritual life even in its form independent of man, in that +it has created spiritual complexes and has recognised in them movements +and inner necessities of their own. Through the whole of this movement +of universal history life frees itself more and more from its dependence +upon mere man, and from the bondage to "given" presuppositions and +"given" natural impulses, and from a "given" world in general. Life is +based more and more upon its own independent nature, and from its +position of independence develops a new kind of being. It is this gain +of a new world through struggle that alone gives to history a meaning +and an inner unity. + +If history thus accomplishes the formation of great spiritual complexes, +and if there is an endeavour to fit these with all their antitheses into +an all-comprehensive whole, if it unites all ages and all powers with +the bond of a universal task, it is a clear witness to the living +presence of the spiritual life within the human sphere. Apart from this +presence all these achievements would be impossible, and the whole +movement must vanish into thin air. The estimate of history here given +is valid only when a spiritual history is clearly distinguished from +merely human history. Only when history as a whole gains a soul and a +support from this spiritual history are the non-spiritual factors able +to attain to any rational significance; only then can history have a +meaning and transcend the relativity from which otherwise it cannot +escape. On the one hand, history demands for its own existence the +presence of a spiritual world within humanity; on the other, it +testifies to this presence by that which is characteristic in its own +content; by that which can be understood only as a progressive +disclosure of such a world. + + +(ii.) _The Spiritual Conception of Society_ + +The problem of society is closely akin to that of history. In the life +around us a certain union is attained in that men dwell together, but +this immediate union does not simply of itself produce a spiritual +unity, a spiritual whole: if society manifests such a unity, then in it, +also, a distinctive revelation of the spiritual must be acknowledged. + +Modern science shows clearly and distinctly that the individual is not +an isolated atom, but exists in relation with a social environment; and +that, even to the innermost recesses of his being, he is determined by +the constitution of this environment. But science falls into serious +error if it goes beyond the truth of this contention and attempts to +represent spiritual creation as the result of the mere inter-relation +and accumulation of individual powers. For between spiritual creation +and this inter-relation and accumulation of individual powers, in spite +of all their external proximity, there is the widest divergence. +Spiritual creation requires to be treated as an end complete in itself, +and must follow the laws of its own being; it claims an inalienable +supremacy above all trivial human interests, which yet for a time +dominate the common life. Further, it cannot succeed without the +development of an inner unity which maintains and characteristically +forms a whole of life. The existence of men side by side gives rise to a +variety of opinions, strivings, dispositions, which mingle confusedly +together; the usual condition of things that arises from this confusion +has anything but a definite character. The condition of our own time +must convince everyone who is unprejudiced, how little this pitiable +confusion can of itself produce anything spiritual and associate men +together in an inner unity. For in the epoch of railways, telegraphs and +newspapers, of large towns and of factories, movements of the masses are +certainly not lacking; they surround the individual and influence him +more strongly than ever before. But where, out of all the fluctuation of +public opinion, out of the confusion and bustle of life, does creative +spiritual activity arise, give to life an inner content, and unite +humanity in an inner community? Rather, we see humanity continually +split up into opposing factions; we see the strife tend more and more to +affect the foundation of our existence. + +However, in spite of the spiritual impotency of the movements of the +masses, creative spiritual activity has emerged in humanity, has +overcome the separation of the individuals and inwardly unified the +forces of life. It must not only be possible to effect, but we must +actually effect a unity which transcends the individuals, a union which +has its source in the spiritual life itself. + +In reality the experience of humanity shows such a union. Of primary +importance in this connection is the fact of the power of so-called +"ideas" in history--the fact that certain aims transcending natural +welfare win power over the whole domain of culture, bind men together +and lift them above their selfish interests. To be sure, in the +movements which arise to carry out these ideas much that is +insignificantly human is introduced; and the interests of individuals +and of classes often largely preponderate, but the origin and the +progress of these movements cannot be accounted for by the merely human; +they are only to be explained as due to man feeling directly within +himself the necessity of spiritual tasks. If he feels this necessity +only under particular conditions, and if it is only for a short time +that it asserts itself at its highest, still it extends its influence +over life as a whole, and is everywhere a unique phenomenon, even when +limited and confused by much that is alien to it. + +Further, the fact that whole peoples have developed distinctive national +characters is of importance in this connection. Such a character is +distinguished essentially from all mere participation of common +conditions, not only physical but also psychical, that social life +brings with it. For the development of such a character life must rise +to energetic activity and become unified; there must be an advance +towards a common goal; an active relation must be taken up not only +towards the environment but also towards itself. A national character is +not "given," but is attained through the work of history; it develops +only through common experiences, sufferings, and triumphs: in its origin +and its continuance it involves an elevation above the aims of physical +and social preservation, a development of pure inwardness. + +Finally, no inner relation of humanity proceeds from the physical +association of men, from their meeting in a common world. If a vital +whole, a common truth, did not exist within us, all our relations would +be external: we could not follow common aims in life and endeavour or +have common experiences; we could not think and live for one another, or +develop spiritual contents in different departments, such as those of +law and religion, science and art, and give to them a cognate spiritual +character. It is always the presence of a self-conscious reality that +binds humanity together inwardly. We can be as certain in our +acknowledgment of this presence as we can that our experience shows such +an inner unity in important achievements and in the formation of whole +departments of work and other complexes. + +With its acknowledgment we avoid the severe contradiction that is shown +in the contemporary estimate and conception of humanity. To our more +dispassionate consideration of things the disagreeable aspect of the +social machinery, the growing sharpness of the conflict, the passionate +eagerness of the desire for more, the inconsistency between the enormous +amount of subjective excitement and the spiritual poverty, are clear. +Logically, this confused and self-contradictory state of affairs ought +to lead to a rejection of the whole, and to a pronounced pessimism. Yet +humanity is regarded as noble and worthy of respect; it is made the +value of all values; the object of our faith and our hope; all our +efforts are directed towards its well-being. And this is done without it +being perceived that thus the basis of experience is forsaken and that +the impression of humanity obtained from experience is bluntly +contradicted: the introduction of an abstract conception seems to alter +everything and to lead to its being regarded as good. In the shattering +of beliefs at least this one has remained: belief in the power of +abstractions. He who would abandon this belief and at the same time hold +fast to the high estimate of humanity must admit that a spiritual world +is active in man, and in so doing acknowledge that man is more than he +appears in immediate experience. Such a one will feel increasingly the +necessity of actively comprehending and definitely distinguishing from +the medley of trivial social concerns every manifestation of a spiritual +world in man. It is not out of society but in conflict with it that +everything great has grown. And yet that which is great is rooted in a +whole of life. Spiritual work must have its basis in this invisible +whole, not in mere society; and from this position it must protest +against the presumptuous claim of society to evolve the spiritual life +of its own power. The community that proceeds from a spiritual union +will be primarily an invisible one; but whether this invisible unity +could not realise itself better and be effective also in the visible +world is a serious and difficult question that continually becomes more +urgent. + +If the conviction that we have here given an account of definitely +contradicts the historico-social view of life which was so potent in the +nineteenth century, and which deeply degraded the spiritual life and its +self-conscious and self-determining activity, it by no means fails to +recognise the significance of history and society; and has no intention +of taking up again the mode of thought common in the period of the +Enlightenment. History and society are indispensable means for the +development of the spiritual life in humanity: from mere individuals and +from individual moments it could attain neither content nor power. But +to declare for this reason that history and society are the generating +basis of the spiritual life was a definite error; though in the +historical movement of the problem it certainly finds an explanation and +an excuse. The higher estimate of history and society has grown up on +the basis of Idealism; to Idealism the spiritual life seemed to live and +first to attain to its complete truth in history and society. Later on, +attention and activity were diverted from a world of thought chiefly to +the world of sense; and with this change history and society lost their +spiritual foundation and their animating soul. Nevertheless, their claim +to produce the spiritual life remained; they were expected to achieve of +their own power more than was possible even with the greatest exertion. +In truth they can bring forth spiritual contents, and serve the +development of the spiritual life within man, only under the +presupposition of the presence of a transcendent spiritual life. At the +same time their achievement in the combination of forces and in the +production of spiritual results is a witness to the reality of the +spiritual life. + + +(e) _The Elevation of Life above Division_ + +We saw that the spiritual life attains an independence only if it does +not simply bring about an effect upon a world independent of it, but +produces a reality from itself; concentrates so as to become a reality +itself. At the first glance man seems by no means to satisfy this +demand. For his life, after, in its progress, rising above its initial +stages, in which it was undifferentiated from the environment, is +subject to the antithesis of man and world, of subject and object, and +the divergence seems to increase continually in the course of his +development. The more power the life of the soul wins, the more it +produces a characteristic content, the freer and more active reflection +becomes, the more does the world recede before man, the more definitely +is immediate contact with the world prevented. The gulf is not bridged +by the epistemological consideration that that over against which we +place ourselves must also, fundamentally, belong to our own life, be in +some way included within it: this treatment signifies a removal of the +antithesis to another region rather than an inner transcendence of it. A +genuine transcendence cannot be effected without an expansion and +development of life, evolving new connections which transcend the +division, and lifting us into a sphere above mere subjectivity. + +Connections such as these are, as a fact, brought about by an expansion +and development of life; but these connections which in their individual +appearances are evident to all are seldom adequately estimated as a +whole, and in respect of the problems to which they give rise. These +connections are effected in work, in work as a spiritual occurrence. We +have already seen how in work the object loses its alien nature and is +taken up into our own life; we must now follow more closely the process +by which work is extended and deepened; produces a characteristic sphere +of life and establishes a spiritual reality in the domain of man. + +At first we are occupied in work with an abundance of individual tasks +that have no inner relation to one another. But the more work advances +from an external contact with objects to an inner change of them, the +more necessary is it that these tasks should be unified so as to form a +whole; and that each task should have its position in this whole, and +represent in itself a particular aspect of the whole. The proof of +greatness in a "work" is just that the nature of the individual aspects +is determined fundamentally by their relation within the whole; that +what is characteristic in the work as a whole is manifested even in its +simplest elements; thus, for example, every independent thinker has +particular views with regard to the nature of the fundamental forms of +logical thought such as the concept and the judgment; in the same way +every independent artist creates his own language of forms. Work not +only leads to a unity of life in the case of individuals; but, further, +without a union of individual forces for a common end, without an +organisation of all human work, we should stand defenceless in face of +the infinity of the world, and we could never advance to a state of +culture. In such community of work man creates a new sphere of existence +for himself; he forms his world of work and sets it in contrast to +everything which does not come within it. This world of work transcends +the individual; and yet it is our world; it is sustained by human power +and, directing and forming, reacts upon man. For, the more unity this +world of work acquires and the more control it wins over the object, the +more definite departments and relations it evolves in itself, the more +does it manifest characteristic laws and methods which, with superior +power, prescribe to human activity its nature and direction, but which +can originate nowhere else than in the domain of man. And so within the +domain of man we rise above all caprice and subjectivity: since the law +of the object determines man's work, his life is raised above the +antithesis between soul and object. Work is not something that man, +essentially perfect, undertakes incidentally and as something +supplementary, but it is that through which he first develops a +spiritual life; through which he acquires a spiritual existence; and the +character of the work determines at the same time the nature of this +existence. As the individual departments of work evolve characteristic +modes of thought and conviction, so out of work as a whole a particular +spiritual nature arises which does not exist in relation to a world +external to it, but contains within itself a world formed by its own +activity. All this, in conformity with our fundamental conviction, +involves the implication that man is not a spiritual being from the +beginning, but only has the potency to become one. + +Such a raising of the aim which is set to work involves an increase in +the amount of toil that it necessitates, and the dangers which are +incurred: the object and the encompassing life are subject to these +dangers. For the complete success of work and the formation of a genuine +self, it is as necessary that the object be taken up entirely into the +process of work as that there should not be another vital unity more +ultimate than the self which grows up in the work, but that the self +should form the final conclusion: whatever is not taken up into the +process of work lessens its content, weakens its power, endangers its +truth, and prevents just that from being achieved which is here in +question. If, however, we consider the opposition that arises at +different points, genuine work is seen to be a high ideal, an infinite +task which even in favourable cases is only approximately fulfilled. At +the same time it is a witness to the sway of elevating and modifying +powers within the domain of man. + +The object is concealed from man chiefly by his own inclination to treat +himself as the centre of reality; to transform the environment into a +reflection of his own being; and to measure the infinite by the standard +of his own well-being. Along with this humanising of the environment, +man develops the most diverse forms of occupation with it, but however +far such occupation may be extended, it does not lead man beyond his own +domain; it does not aid him in his spiritual progress. It is possible +for occupation upon the environment to aid spiritual progress only when +things attain an independence, and from this firmly resist the tendency +of man to represent them in accordance with his subjective wishes. Only +such independence of the objective makes it possible for it to arouse +new powers in man and for his life to be based on something deeper than +immediate feeling and desire, and to begin an inner transformation. But +this movement has various levels which differ distinctly from one +another; and from the position of a higher level it is difficult to +regard the achievement at a lower one as genuine and complete work. The +Modern Age with its exact research often cannot regard the work of early +natural science as work of high value. A similar gradation is evident in +the striving for happiness; for the raising of human well-being. So long +as endeavour is directed to attaining and preserving mere subjective +states of feeling, and so long as a movement beyond this subjectivity is +not acknowledged to exist within man himself, and the requirements of +this movement are not satisfied--as is the case with Epicureanism and +Utilitarianism--endeavour, earnest as it may be, does not acquire the +character of spiritual work; it does not essentially advance life, and +therefore in the long run does not satisfy human needs. Epicureanism and +Utilitarianism with all their results inevitably become insipid and +empty to him. + +If there are powerful hindrances to this endeavour for something more +than the subjective, there is at the same time a wealth of movement +which bids defiance to them, and the course of history shows continuous +expansion and development of this movement; it shows that man is able to +take up a conflict against the trivially human, and, in the building up +of a new world, to raise himself essentially above his original +condition. Exact science breaks away from the object of perception, +removes it to a distance, analyses it there, ascertains its laws, and +then restores it in changed form to men: in this it also advances human +life in itself, in that thought rises more freely above perception, and +a system of pure thought sustains the whole world of sense. A further +divergence between the struggle for physical existence and the building +up of a new world appears in history in the endeavour for happiness and +a significant content of life. In the experience of humanity, morality +and religion, looked at inwardly, assume two fundamentally different +forms. On the one hand they are looked upon as a mere means to support +man in a given world; to bring him into congenial relation with the +world; and so to organise this world that it may achieve as much as +possible for human well-being. This form governs human experience at its +general level, and easily comes to be regarded as the only form. At +higher levels of creative activity, however, a totally different form +made its appearance: there was a break with the whole world of sense and +well-being as though with something intolerably narrow, and in a +self-conscious life a new world arose and brought forth characteristic +contents; the appropriation of this world raised life above all mere +particularity and subjectivity; at the same time this appropriation +became an infinite task and work for man and for humanity as a whole. If +this form of religion and morality has been manifested with complete +clearness only at high levels of life in history, from these heights +this form has also exerted an influence upon the rest of life, animating +and raising it; indeed, it is only this genuine conception of religion +and morality which first gives to them an independence and a value in +themselves. Thus, notwithstanding the inadequacy of human achievement we +cannot but recognise that life transcends mere subjectivity and the +separation that it involves. + +In another direction complexities arise in that something objective is +evolved and established which, however, is not brought sufficiently into +relation with life as a whole and united with it. Then, work may +progress within its own province constantly and vigorously, but it loses +touch with our soul; we do not realise or develop ourselves in it. With +all the feverish tension of individual powers work is then inwardly +alien to us, and its power over us may become a heavy oppression. +Through such a detachment from life as a whole work loses soul and is +nothing more than mechanical; in short, we have all those results of +division between work and soul which we may feel with particular +acuteness in the contemporary state of culture. Experiences rising from +this division lead us to demand that work shall be so organised as to be +capable of taking up life as a whole into itself, and with this of +becoming our true self. Again, life as a whole cannot enter upon work as +complete, for then it would force something alien upon work, and by this +pervert it; life as a whole can be evolved only from the unification and +elevation of work itself. We do not begin and carry on work as a fixed +individuality, but we form individuality first through work by the +continual overcoming of the opposition of subjective disposition and +object. Spiritual contents are not produced by a communication of +something that is in itself complete to something else that is in itself +complete, an interaction of disposition and object; rather must we say +that genuine work sets both sides in motion and with elevating power +unites them in a single life. So understood, every movement which tends +to the development of spirituality in individuals, peoples, ages, and +finally of humanity as a whole, is a witness to the possibility of a +transcendence of this opposition, of the emergence of a reality within +the life-process. + +We cannot give work a spiritual nature in this way, and make it the +instrument of a new reality, without being compelled to acknowledge that +there is much less genuine work among men than we are accustomed to +assume. On the other hand, we must also recognise that the little that +there is signifies much more, and indicates much greater advances of +life than it is usual to admit. Nothing differentiates individuals and +ages more from one another than the extent to which they take part in +genuine work; the degree to which they transform their life in such +work. Mere reflection and good will can accomplish very little in this +matter; without an energetic nature, a strong inner disposition with a +definite tendency, as well as the favour of destiny, not much can be +achieved. What is usually called "life" is only a will to live, a +straining after life; it yields but an outward appearance and a shadow +of life: genuine life is first brought forth by that transformation. + +But the less human existence in general immediately includes genuine +work, the more indispensable is it that there should be firmly rooted +tendencies to such work in the basis of our being, and that these +tendencies should be developed to greater clearness of form and to +greater effect in the work of universal history. So that our work may +not be split up and destroyed, we need definite syntheses that establish +a structure of life. On the one hand we must accomplish an analysis into +individual tendencies and departments of life which, operating +independently, generate life; and on the other hand we must find a unity +of endeavour among these tendencies and departments; a movement from one +to another; a common activity directed towards the building up of a new +world. These syntheses must be an immediate experience at each point; +they must be involved in all division of work; everywhere set +distinctive tasks; produce characteristic achievements; and in energetic +organisation of existence elevate it to the level of a characteristic +system of life, full of power, which presses forward to further +development. Only thus could a movement originate which might expand to +a real whole and be capable of establishing this whole against the world +as it is for immediate experience; only thus could humanity defend +itself against the power of the environment and of destiny. + +Experience alone can decide whether our life contains such syntheses, +and whether by means of them it forms a whole: the movement of universal +history shows that there are such syntheses. The natures of these +syntheses give to the chief epochs of culture their distinctive +characters, by which the natures of their elements and of the relations +between them are determined; and man acquires a definite relation to +the world and can make a judgment upon it. Such a synthesis, with its +life-penetrating and life-forming power, certainly contains some truth; +it is not a product of narrowly human reflection and imagination. The +course of time and the changes of history, therefore, cannot simply +break it down completely; rather with the truth that it contains such a +synthesis elevates life above time into the eternal. But it has not been +demonstrated that life is capable of only one synthesis, or that it may +not produce a variety of such: life does not necessarily realise its +unity in simply establishing a single synthesis; it can seek unity in +the supremacy of a chief synthesis above others. That experience in our +own sphere of culture shows the latter to be the case we intend to +indicate in a few lines. + +A characteristic synthesis first made its appearance at the height of +classical Antiquity. It was art, chiefly plastic art, that determined +the nature of this synthesis. Form as a unifying and systematising power +is at the centre of life, takes possession of matter and organises it, +transforms chaos into a cosmos; and in this exercise of power it +realises itself, even though its fundamental nature is regarded as +transcending all change and variation. Spiritual work is formative and +selective; it is the triumphant realisation of form; it is necessary +that life in all its stages of development should be permeated by this +formative spiritual activity. There are numerous independent centres of +life, but the tendencies from each are towards the realisation of the +whole, and find their perfection in it alone. + +Thought, independent of the world, must extract from the medley of first +impressions permanent forms, and unite these into a consistent +representation of the whole; it finds the acme of its achievement in +bringing this representation clearly to consciousness in a form that is +complete and free from subjective addition. In conduct, an organisation +and a unifying of the elements so as to produce a harmonious effect is +the chief thing. From the chaotic mass of individuals, the state by +constitution and law forms a living work of art, a differentiated +organism. For the individual the chief matter in conduct is to bring the +diverse forces in the soul into the right relation of order and +gradation, to reach the highest of all harmonies, the harmonious life. + +All this involves particular estimates of value, a characteristic +solution of the problems and a harmonising of the oppositions of our +existence. It is a matter of general knowledge how this synthesis has +elevated and ennobled life, and is still increasingly felt as an +influence tending to further development and harmony. But it is equally +well known how the progress of life has rebuffed the claim of this +system of life to be the only valid one. We have become aware of +contradictions which do not find sufficient acknowledgment in this +system: a gulf deeper than it is able to transcend has made its +appearance between man and his environment: in particular, the supremacy +of form, which constitutes the basis of the system, has been shaken. +Antiquity, at its highest development, had, without much consideration, +given to form a living soul; its later course dissolved this union, the +soul degenerated more and more into an inwardness of feeling, and gave +up all claim, if not to the world, yet to its organisation and +formation: form, deprived of soul, threatened to become superficial, and +to change life into play and enjoyment. It was at this point that +Christianity intervened with a powerful effect, but it has not, in the +sense with which we are here concerned, produced an organised system of +life. + +Such a system was first produced in the Modern Age, and more +particularly in the period of the Enlightenment. This system makes force +the centre of life; to increase force without limit is the task of +tasks. The elements of reality are centres of force; but these elements +are not isolated, because force is called forth only by force, and the +amount of life depends on the degree to which relations are developed. +Since in this way one tends towards another, they become interweaved and +joined, and the many are united. For this system the world does not +appear as a work of art which rests in itself, but as a process that +ceaselessly increases in volume: the main achievement of spiritual work +is, with complete consciousness and self-determining activity, to take +possession of this process, which actually surrounds us; to change its +infinite life as much as possible into our own life, and to co-operate +to the best of our capacity for its advancement. Since here spiritual +work never tolerates a state of inactive peace, never accepts the world +as a rigid destiny, but is concerned to develop the world, to analyse +the world as it first appears into its elements in order to reach the +forces that move it, life acquires a more active relation to the +environment than it does in the earlier, more contemplative system, and +feels itself to be more in the workshop of reality. + +The relation of knowledge and life is changed from its traditional +character. Research cannot transform the world from the apparent calm +and completeness of the immediate impression into movement and +development, without analysing the representation offered into its +ultimate elements; ascertaining their laws, and finally, with the help +of the idea of unlimited time, reconstructing from the beginning the +world, which it had first of all destroyed. With such destruction and +reconstruction modern research brings the world much nearer to us, and +gives us more power over it than does the earlier type. Corresponding to +the understanding of reality from its evolution, man finds his own life +in a progressive movement. Human society is regarded less as a +well-arranged work of art than as a complex of forces, which come to +full development and make sure progress only in their relation. The +chief demand is for the greatest amount of freedom of movement; the +greatest number of relations between individuals, and a ceaseless +increase of the stream of life, that should take up into itself all that +bear human features. The individual also must realise his existence as +one of "becoming" and motion; he is not bound by a closed standard of +nature. Through the power of his spiritual nature he is able to +assimilate ever new capacity, and to grow without limit: nothing gives +more proud courage and joyous force to his life than this consciousness +of an inner infinitude. A characteristic ideal of culture and education +is formed: all individual departments of spiritual work are now regarded +primarily as means to the increase of human power, and must assume a +form corresponding to this. And so life everywhere becomes more active +and more powerful: it finds its aim within itself, in its own elevation, +and has therefore no need to seek it in something external; the whole +existence of man becomes more his own work. As work comes more deeply +into touch with the nature of things the development of power becomes at +the same time a controlling of the world. It was not to be wondered at, +therefore, when the modern man, with the development of this system of +life, believed that for the first time he had left a childlike condition +of constraint and limitation, and entered a state of freedom and +maturity. + +But the further development of life shows clearly enough that this +system, which makes force and movement its leading principles, is not +the final stage of human endeavour: the leading idea of our whole +investigation is that human endeavour is more than this. We have seen +that a system of mere force and movement gives no soul to work and does +not lead life to self-consciousness and self-determination. A rushing +stream seizes us and carries us along with it, but we reach no position +independent of it; and so we cannot unify the multiplicity, nor gain a +content from its immeasurable achievement; indeed, the increasing +extension of life divides us more and more into single forces, and +deprives us of a self that transcends the movement. At first this was +not fully perceived, since the soul was implicitly assumed to be force +and the extension of movement was regarded as a pure gain to the life of +the soul. But the further development and the keener emphasis on the new +state attained could not but clearly indicate the contradiction here +involved; could not but lead to a separation between soul and work, and +force them into conflict. Hence there is a danger of work becoming +mechanical, and of the life of the soul, which, with this separation, is +thrown back entirely upon the subjective, being lost in indefiniteness. + +These experiences of mechanical work and indefinite subjectivity give +birth to a new situation, in which the problem of the soul, a problem +which in the earlier systems remained in the background, is forced into +prominence. The task of life is seen to be a more fundamental one; it is +a matter not so much of altering a given reality in one way or another +as of first discovering a genuine reality, of advancing beyond all mere +activity to a being which exists within the activity. + +It has become evident to us in many ways that from the recognition of +this a characteristic form of life proceeds. The only question is +whether the change is capable of bringing about a thorough organisation +of life, whether it can produce independent centres of life and unite +them into a community of life, and thus lead to the development of a +system of life. We ourselves most resolutely maintain the view that this +is really possible; that life is in process of forming itself into a new +whole, and that with the clearer establishment of this, problems which +have existed from early times receive full explanation, and a definite +advance is made in their solution. + +We saw that, in its highest stages of development, life concentrates at +particular points, and that a characteristic sphere of life is in this +way brought forth, as, for example, in spiritual individualities, +national character, and so on. As soon as these developments are +acknowledged to be spiritual and are sufficiently distinguished from +simply natural existence, as soon as the manifestation of a new world is +recognised in them, they become a great problem. Then they cannot be +regarded as a mere product of a particular part of nature, but must be +accepted as primarily a creation from the spiritual life as a whole, a +creation which at the same time must maintain itself and transform in +its own activity that which it receives. The relation to the spiritual +world as a whole is the fundamental relation of life, and yet the +further development of life does not follow immediately from the +relation to the whole, but from the relation to the innumerable other +centres of life; the infinitude that the individual being acquires from +the relation to the whole receives that which is particular in its +organisation and its content only from the experience of the relation to +others. The relation to others, however, is not produced by nature, but +as spiritual, only from the spiritual world as a whole and must be +continually sustained by the whole. The relations of individual to +individual will therefore be included within the whole, and through the +presence of the whole will be essentially advanced beyond the capacity +of mere nature. The love that arises here is fundamentally different +from all the love which arises from natural impulse; and, understood in +this manner, notwithstanding all that may be doubtful in respect of its +fulfilment in individual matters, there is much point in the demand of +Augustine, that, in the relation of man to man, not man but God should +be set in the first place, and that man is to be loved only through God. + +However, it is not an increase of activity alone that is sought in the +multiplicity of relations, but a growth of being--a being not beyond all +activity, but existent within it. It is necessary not only that the +life-process achieve more, but also that it grow in itself, change that +which is alien to it into its own, and display more reality within +itself; life must experience every single activity as the manifestation +of the activity of the whole, and thus, along with unlimited extension, +preserve self-consciousness. + +The demand for a self-conscious life, the demand for an elevation of +activity to the organisation and development of being, by no means +excludes other forms of activity, if only for the reason that this +demand presents a high ideal to which man can only very slowly +approximate. But this ideal constitutes an aim and a standard for all +other activity; the giving of form and the increasing of force must aid +in the development towards this aim if they are not to become devoid of +real worth. The more necessary it is to insist upon an animation of +reality through the development of self-conscious life, the more must we +guard against the danger of anthropomorphism, which, when we are hasty +and impatient, inevitably finds an entrance to and corrupts the whole of +our thought and life. Only with much toil and with continual +self-criticism can life be brought to the point where the transition to +self-consciousness is possible; and even then the whole cannot, under +human circumstances, be attained at one stroke; but at first life must +endeavour to concentrate, to form a nucleus so that in this way it may +acquire a firm basis, and from this take up a struggle for its further +spiritualisation. + +The same thing is to be seen in the differentiation and the gradation of +life: everywhere a movement towards self-consciousness begins, but the +emergence of this movement forces an antithesis into prominence, and +life is completely transformed into work and conflict. Thought cannot be +satisfied with representing the world as a work of art or as a process; +thought must seek self-consciousness in the world. This it finds in the +emergence of an independent spiritual life and in reality's +coming-to-itself; at the same time the difference between spirit and +nature becomes more pronounced, and all the divergences in life +increase. Men can find their highest unity neither in joining together +so as to form a whole as a work of art, nor in a system of progressive +increase of force. Neither alone could prevent society from becoming +spiritually destitute, nor could both together. Society also needs a +self-consciousness and acquires it only through the development of a +spiritual content and spiritual character; but this must be won by +continual struggle from the medley which constitutes the general +condition of social life. Again, the individual does not attain a +content for his life through an immediate combination of his powers so +as to form a harmonious whole, or through increasing them without +limit; the individual also must by activity concentrate his life and so +gain the basis of a new world: never is he in his life, as a whole, +personality and spiritual individuality. True, there lies within him the +potentiality to become such a spiritual individuality, and this +potentiality may be transformed in his own activity; and the existence +thus acquired can affect the rest of life, arousing and elevating it. + +Thus the ideal is set completely in the distance; it is seen that we do +not live our life from a given basis, but that, on the contrary, we have +first to acquire the basis and to preserve it by continuous work; it is +not a particular direction of life, but a genuine life itself and with +this a spiritual being that is in question. We appear, therefore, more +imperfect than ever before. But in this connection the imperfection +itself is a witness that important tasks are set before us, and that +superior forces rule in us. In the midst of all that is obscure it +cannot fail to be recognised that there is a movement towards the +development of a new self-conscious reality above the capacity and the +interests of mere man. This movement has been manifested in great +historical achievements, in the formation of fruitful systems of life +which at the same time were developments of the life of the individual. +It has brought forth ever new creations; now it sets before us the task +of developing a new system of life which does complete justice to +self-consciousness, and in accordance with its main idea must also +transform all individual aspects and departments. Where we recognise so +much to do, we are certainly far removed from opinion and pretence. + + + + +II. THE MORE DETAILED FORM OF OUR SPIRITUAL LIFE + +(a) THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND REALITY + + +Whatever there is peculiar in our conception of the spiritual life must +be manifested and proved in reference to the problem of truth and +reality. In the first place our conception decidedly rejects the widely +held view of truth as a correspondence of our thought with an external +reality. For the attainment of independence by the inner life makes it +impossible for something externally existing to be taken up into life +without undergoing an essential change. It is also inconceivable from +this point of view how something beyond us could in any way attract and +arouse us. The problem of truth can do this only if it originates within +our own life: it can become a compelling power only if the attainment of +truth aids us to transcend a division within ourselves which has become +intolerable. The representation of life, that we have given, makes it +quite evident that such a division does spring up within us. Within our +own life a certain activity begins, which becomes wider and wider, and +which would signify our whole being. But this activity finds limits and +contradiction within ourselves: much takes place in our experience +independent of this activity and apparently without our co-operation; a +certain condition of things exists, and asserts a rigid actuality; and, +so far as this condition extends, we are bound; we bear something +impenetrable within us. So long as these two sides of our being remain +separated life is not complete and genuine: activity lacks a foundation, +a content, and a direction that is sure of its aim; and all the bustle +of free movements, all effort of reflection cannot conceal the state of +spiritual poverty. On the other hand, the fact that we bear so much +within us that only half belongs to us and that presses upon us like a +fate must cramp and oppress us. And so life does not experience itself +as a unity; it lacks an inner truth, since activity presents itself as a +whole and yet is not one. Life itself is therefore a problem. The +problem must be felt to be the more serious the stronger the desire for +a self-consciousness becomes. However, self-consciousness cannot +possibly be reached without a transcendence of the division between +activity and the given condition of things. Life has first to seek +itself, its unity, its perfection; and it is just this that is the +problem of truth: and in this problem life is turned not towards +externals, but towards itself. We understand now how the desire for +truth can exert such an enormous power, for, in this struggle for truth, +we fight not for something alien, but for our own being. + +This conception of truth determines also the nature of the effort to +attain truth. The task cannot be to subordinate one side of life to the +other, and to derive one side as far as possible from the other; that +is, to transform the given condition of life as far as possible into +free activity, or to adapt activity to the given condition in such a way +that activity is merged into it; but the task is one of pressing forward +to a transcendent active whole which unites the two sides, and develops +them both; and in mutual relation gives to activity a content and to the +given condition a soul. We have seen how a movement to attain such a +unity runs through history and extends into the soul of the individual. +That life is in general able to unify and raise itself is the +presupposition of all striving after truth: the proof of this, however, +is to be found in the actual furtherance of life, in the new contents +which are thus obtained. + +Such a way of regarding truth, that is, as an upward endeavour of life +to its own unity, a unity not forced upon it but immanent, exhibits its +unique nature especially in its opposition to the intellectualistic +conception of truth, which, notwithstanding that it has been rejected +and attacked so often, still continues to assert a mighty power. +According to the intellectualist, cognition should treat the problem and +solve it of its own capacity; it seems that the synthesis that is sought +must be found in the first place in the realm of thought, and thence +imparted to the rest of life. As a fact, however, knowledge itself is +affected with particular severity by the division of free activity and +fixed given condition; and from its own capacity thought cannot attain +to a state of full creative activity which alone is able to overcome the +division, but for the attainment of this is referred to an advance of +life as a whole which alone can reach an essentially new position. To be +sure, cognition has particular fundamental logical principles which +regulate all its work. But to regulate and to produce are two different +things. The most scrupulous adherence to these principles does not lead +beyond reflection to an inner relation to the object, to an inner +transcendence, a penetration, and an appropriation of the object; it +leaves us still in the position of simply attempting to know, in a state +of mere reflection and search. All real knowledge involves a spiritual +creation, an advance, and a self-formation of life as a whole. The chief +epochs of culture have therefore given a distinctly unique character to +the inner nature and the fundamental texture of knowledge; the character +given to it by one epoch being entirely different from that given to it +by another. Modern knowledge does not differ from earlier knowledge only +in a quantitative way: as soon as its connection with the chief +synthesis characteristic of modern life is revealed, it can no longer be +regarded as absolute knowledge, but only as a particular kind of +knowledge beyond which there are possibilities of further developments. + +From life as a whole the conflict will extend into all its individual +departments, and give to the activity in them a greater intensity. +Religion, art, and human society all have first to overcome the +opposition of subjective power and alien given condition, and thereby to +win a truth. In no case does truth mean a taking up of things which are +presented to the activity of life--it means rather an advance of life to +its own perfection. + +In accordance with this conception of truth, that which claims to be +true will not be able to prove its right otherwise than through its +power, that is, through its capacity to embrace life as a whole and to +raise it above opposition into the state of complete activity. Every +such attempt must prove its power and its right in opposition to rivals +by being able to wrest from them the truth contained by them, and in new +relationships to lead beyond the state they reach, and to change life +more into a self-consciousness than they are able. + +Hence the endeavour after truth here shows more movement, more freedom, +more multiplicity: different starting points and different ways may be +chosen, and the correctness of the one need not involve the +incorrectness of the other. The only indispensable thing is that the +movement pass beyond the state of division and reflection to one of +complete activity; only in that way can the content of life gain through +the movement of life. And so we see the great significance of progress +in work, in spiritual work; according as it succeeds, genuine life is +distinguished from the mere will to live. To be sure, each piece of work +that is here undertaken is a venture; it is far easier and far more +secure to continue in the state of mere reflection and reasoning. But +the latter does not lead us to an experience and a decision in a matter +concerning the development of life, and therefore does not bring us a +step further in this chief matter. Work with its failures is better than +all subtle contemplation which leads to no activity; for failure can +lead us beyond itself to truth, while feebleness and inactivity keep us +in the old position. + +In our conception of it truth is anything but a system of universal +propositions out of which, by deduction, all detail might be derived. +Rather the organisation of life into an inner unity, upon which in this +view of truth everything depends, will exclude all that is only general +and turn towards the differentiation of the whole. The more life +progresses in this direction the less is it a mere application of +general principles; the less does it find its consummation after the +manner of a conclusion from given premises; the more does it become a +progressive activity, a new formation and an elevation. + +In this conception, there is also room for a truth peculiar to the +single individuals. As the comprehensive life-synthesis can permeate +every individual detail of existence, so it is necessary for every +individual life-centre to realise its own particular synthesis, and that +every individual should fight for his inner unity and thus, also, for a +truth of his own; he must, however, realise this unity and truth in +every particular activity. A truth which is not my truth is, for me, not +a complete truth. Only it is necessary that such individualisation be +effected within the whole, not independent of it; it must result from +the inner necessity of creative activity, not out of a vain wish to +excel. In any case, it follows here that, as the immanent and universal +form of truth requires more activity and power, it is also able to grant +more free movement and multiplicity. Truth and freedom have been thought +opposed to one another in the course of history; if the former seemed to +require unconditional submission, the latter had a strong tendency to +shake off every tie as an oppressive yoke. If we see that truth of life +can be reached only through freedom, and also that freedom acquires a +content and a spiritual character only through its relation to truth, +the opposition by no means entirely disappears, but a basis is won upon +which we may strive to attain an agreement and a fruitful interaction +between the two. + + * * * * * + +So understood, the problem of truth has the closest connection with that +of reality: with regard to the one as to the other we are concerned in +a conflict against the external conception common to a naïve state of +life, which, though far surpassed by the inner movement of the work of +history, obstinately asserts itself through the evidence of the senses +in single individuals and hardly ceases to impress men with its apparent +self-evidence. The naïve way of thinking understands reality as a space +which encompasses men and things; reality seems to be presented, +"given," to man through the senses; only that which is exhibited to man +in these sense-relations passes current as real. In this Ptolemaic form +of life, dominated by sense impression, everything other than sense +fades to a mere illusion, and this includes the spiritual life itself, +although in it alone is reality known. Now, however, as science has with +no mean power led beyond this Ptolemaic representation of nature, so the +development of life has led beyond the Ptolemaic reality. Life could not +emancipate itself from its attachment to the environment and develop an +inwardness without effecting a revolution in this problem. The inward +becomes the first and surest experience, with which all that is to pass +current as real must show itself to be in consistent relation: +everything external loses its proximity and becomes a problem; it can be +established as real only through that which it achieves for the inner +nature and in accordance with the standards of that nature. The power to +convince possessed by sense impression is now based, not on its +obviousness, but on the spiritual activity that it arouses. Here also, +only the experiences of the spiritual life itself can lead to the +experience of something less than spiritual. + +As such a revolution brings clearly to consciousness the spiritual +achievement in the formation of reality, so at the same time it gives +the object more movement and transforms it in spiritual endeavour. Two +things are necessary to the conception of reality: an independence of +man, and a realisation of the many as a unity. Now, since that which +lies wholly beyond experience must for that reason be inaccessible to +us, this assertion of independence can have no other meaning than that, +within life itself, something becomes detached from the stream of +consciousness and fixes and asserts itself as independent of it. The +power thus to transcend the time-process is a characteristic mark of all +spiritual activity; this activity evolves within us something in +opposition to us, and in so doing accomplishes a marvellous expansion. +This is most clearly seen within the sphere of thought. For all the +functions peculiar to thought receive their differentiating +characteristic only through such a detachment from the flow of +sense-presentation and by establishing themselves as independent of it: +the concept presents its content as something fixed in contrast to the +stream of presentations; the judgment proclaims its connection of +concepts to be something that does not pass away with the act of +connecting them but persists in face of all the changes of the psychical +life. Life accomplishes a gradation within itself and lifts itself above +the mere stream of change. Only because life establishes within itself a +fixed nucleus, and in this manner wins an independence of its own +momentary condition, can it oppose a world to itself, and set itself the +task of appropriating this world--that, further, that independent +nucleus should remain no mere collection, but should be inwardly unified +is again a requirement and an achievement of the spiritual life. How far +that requirement will be fulfilled depends upon the nature and the +degree of the development of the spiritual life. + +Reality, therefore, is to be found chiefly in the self-consciousness of +the spiritual life; from this self-consciousness we build up our +reality. Since spiritual requirement is from this point of view the +measure of human undertaking, our activity is judged by the degree to +which the state of the world is changed in it and has thus become our +reality. How far our capacity reaches in this matter cannot be decided +by preliminary consideration, but only by the progress of life itself: +in particular it is not permissible to assume things-in-themselves +independent of us and thus to reduce our world to a realm of mere +appearances. For, so far as that independence reached, things could +never enter our life, and never be inwardly appropriated; at most they +could concern us only in their effects. As far as the conception of +nature as a mechanism is concerned, which regards all occurrence as a +texture of related individual points which exist, inaccessible, behind +it, there is much to be said for the view that things are only known in +their effects; but this view is an intolerable limitation--dogmatic in +the highest degree--if it is meant to represent our fundamental relation +to reality and to ourselves. For then we should be related to ourselves +as to something alien; all the self-consciousness of life would be +destroyed; there could be no development of being in contrast to single +acts, but we must be completely resolved in the stream of appearances; +there would be no advance in the striving after reality. As a matter of +fact, we are concerned primarily with the content that life is able to +give to itself; how far it presses forward to reality. Our world is to +be measured more especially by the degree in which life becomes +deepened. But from the beginning man, so far as he shares in the +spiritual life, is not a being adjacent to reality, but within it. He +would never be able to attain to a reality if he did not bear it within +himself and needed only to develop it. Thus ultimately he does not look +inwards from outside, but outwards from within; and his limitation is +not the chief thing, but the secondary. + +The inner structure of our life corresponds with this conviction. It is +characteristic of all spiritual life that it does not pass hither and +thither between individual points, but includes and develops a +multiplicity within a transcendent unity; by this the spiritual life +grows within itself, and more and more acquires a self-consciousness. +And it is just in this way that it evolves to a reality. Reality, +therefore, here is not a fixed and completed magnitude, but is of +different degrees. In the first place there is a difference in the +energy which maintains a union of the manifold and a transcendence of +the division: according to the nature of this energy the self appears, +sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker; its power of changing, at one +time greater, at another smaller. Again, the force of the resistance +that the given condition to be appropriated offers, differs according to +the amount of its positive power; and the clash of the given condition +and free activity will be harder or more gentle according to this power. +One man finds intolerable contradictions where to another all is plain +and smooth; one believes that things are transformed in their own being +where another holds that only their surface is affected: and so, that +which one regards as reality may seem to another only a realm of +shadows. + +Mere energy, however, is too subjective to be able to obtain a genuine +reality from life: for that, a transformation of life in work, an +elevation to full activity, is necessary; but the preceding paragraph +has shown that this transformation and elevation is of different kinds +and of different degrees. The system of the formation of being promises +to give to life the most fundamental organisation and the most forceful +reality. For into the single elements embraced by the movement of life +it is able to breathe a life of their own, to confer upon them an +incomparably greater independence than in those systems in which they +are regarded as lifeless objects which are acted upon, and which only +set isolated forces in motion. When within a comprehensive life +different centres of life meet, and in their interaction the activity of +the whole wins an ever richer content and a more stable nature, genuine +reality must increasingly unfold itself. + +Looked at from this position, reality is not a fact but a problem and an +ideal; it does not lie at the beginning but at the end of the course: it +is different with different individuals, peoples, and times; each in its +particular nature and work has its own reality. Thus we cannot +comprehend the problem of reality from experience without conceiving +reality as existing in flux: the assertion of an independent spiritual +life, transcendent over all human undertaking, is a sufficient safeguard +against a destructive relativism. It is one of the most troublesome +appearances in the conflicts of minds that they fail to recognise the +many-sidedness and fluidity of our conceptions of reality; that each +takes his conception as the self-evident one and urges it upon the +others. In this way originate the many unfruitful disputes concerning +this world and the next, immanence and transcendence, in which the most +external and superficial conception is usually presented as +self-evident; while yet, according to the fundamental relation and the +chief basis of life, very different conceptions arise, and as a fact, +systems of thought nowhere come into more severe conflict than with +regard to their conceptions of reality. Only to a mode of thought which, +without further consideration, accepts the world of sense as the genuine +and only reality, can philosophy and religion, for example, appear to be +occupied with things implying an "other" world, and which, therefore, +are incomprehensible. On the contrary, Augustine thought to attain to +genuine reality and at the same time a true life only by elevation to a +realm above sense, so that to him the world of sense was secondary and +derivative. + +To-day we are again deeply concerned with the problem of reality. +Notwithstanding all the passionate agitation of forces in the +incalculable extension of and the breathless haste in work, a genuine +reality fails us; our life lacks the proper character of being real; and +so, in the midst of all the external results of our work, our life, +spiritually discerned, threatens to become destitute and unreal. An +eager desire for reality exists in our time; it is often thought +possible to satisfy it by the closest possible connection with sense +impression and impulse, and by expelling as far as possible all elements +of thought. But thought is there, and cannot be expelled; with its power +to analyse, it steps continually between us and things, takes away from +them the proximity they have for us, and dissolves them into mere +pictures and shadows. As a fact, the problem of reality lies primarily +within the spiritual life; and it cannot be solved otherwise than in +that the spiritual life advances within itself from division to unity, +from the movement of forces to self-determining activity, from all mere +activity to a formation of being. If thus our life becomes transformed +into a self-preservation, if in it we unfold and assert a spiritual +being, we become certain of a reality and feel a satisfaction. Never, +however, can reality come to us from without. + + +(b) MAN AND THE WORLD + +Through our whole investigation we have expressed the conviction that +man acquires a secure relation to the world only through his belonging +to a spiritual life acknowledged as independent; otherwise, all entrance +to the world is shut off. The growing independence of the inner life has +broken down the immediate connection which dominates the naïve way of +thinking: if, however, man once finds himself set in a position of +independence of the world, he can hardly draw it back to himself simply +of his own capacity. All appeal to subtlety and reflection seems only to +widen the gulf still more. Only the acknowledgment of an independent +spiritual life offers a way out of such a desperate situation: if in the +spiritual life the world attains to a self-consciousness, and if, on the +other hand, the spiritual life is present and active within man, there +is a possibility that man and the world are united; and that, at the +same time, human life also becomes cosmic. But it is a question how far +the possibility comes to be realised; how far the union that exists in +the innermost basis can be developed and transformed within us in the +work of life. Only the actual experience of life can answer this +question. We must ascertain whether there are any particular +developments of life which are not productions of the human, but which +manifest the operation of a transcendent world; and, further, whether +these developments are able to find a more detailed formation in their +contact with the world around us, and to adapt themselves to the +multiplicity of this world. Such a turning to the individual thing would +be impossible if a complete life-form ruled within us and impressed +itself on things only from the outside. For in this case this form must +inevitably be uniformly effective in its whole extent; in appropriating +the multiplicity it could not itself advance to greater concreteness. If +such an advance is effected, there is a contact within life between the +one and the other; and so the world acquires an inner connection with +our activity, and the spiritual movement can take possession of the +breadth of our life and with its differentiation gain a greater +intuitiveness. + +An immediate union of man and world is indeed opposed to the fact that +the spiritual life which should unite them always exists, for us, in its +particular form in human existence and that this form cannot be +projected beyond man into the whole. The form of human existence +constitutes an insuperable boundary; if it governed our life as a whole, +then man could never overstep his narrow, particular sphere. But it is a +conviction that is fundamental to our investigation that our whole life +does not come under this form, but that there are tendencies in life +which are operative beyond this form of existence, and attain to an +independence of it. So far as these life-tendencies may be detached and +developed, man may confidently take up the problem of the world, and +feel related to the world around him; he can try to transform its life +into his own. The particularity of his manner of presentation and +perception then simply sets the limitation, that that which may be +admitted to be certain and true in its fundamental content can be +presented only through the medium of human peculiarity; the more +detailed amplification of the representation is always only of a +symbolic character. We see from this fact that there is a contradiction +ever present within our life that prevents it from ever gaining an +ultimate conclusion; however, it does not take from us the possibility +of an inner union and a community with the whole. Indeed, the +contradiction itself, and the powerful movement that it calls forth, are +to the train of thought here indicated a witness to a fundamental +expansion of our life. + +An attempt to unite our life with the whole appears in the first place +in thought, in its work of obtaining knowledge. This emergence of +thought involves a transformation of life that could never be occasioned +by mere man, but can be understood only as the revelation of a new stage +of universal life. In thought, the intellect, otherwise bound to the +mechanism of the sequence of presentations, attains an independence. It +places itself in a position independent of the world, and seeks to +comprehend it as a whole, to appropriate it as a whole. The primary +connection with things is dissolved, to become established anew upon a +higher level and with an important transformation of its nature; through +the deviation a real appropriation is achieved. All this is incomparably +more than a merely becoming conscious of a given world, which is an +experience that could arise in some way at isolated points; thought +contains a development of the world which ultimately can proceed only +from the power of the world itself. How can the individual matter be +elucidated if the whole remain obscure? How can the desire for +enlightenment obtain such a power over man, and assert itself in him in +opposition to the interests of his physical self-preservation, if a +universal movement were not operative in him? Man does not elucidate the +world, but the world elucidates itself within him. What is thus reached +is valid not for him alone, but universally; the development of this +universal movement of thought enables him to win a closer relation to +the world, a life embracing the world. + +Our thought cannot advance in the definite work of building up science +without producing and employing a definite logical structure with fixed +principles: these principles are immanent in the work of thought; they +are above all the caprice and all the differences of the individuals. +This logical structure cannot be carried over and applied to the world +around us, as all scientific research carries it over and applies it, +without implicitly presupposing an objective logic of things, a +conceivability of experience: in this, man does not simply project +externally and apply mechanically forms already existing in a complete +and final state within him. For the multiplicity of things not only +gives to those principles a particular form, in the production of which +they must themselves participate, but through the relation to the world +the fundamental forms are also further developed in their nature as a +whole; it is only with the co-operation of both sides that the +thought-structure achieves what is ultimately reached. The chief thing +is that thought actually transcends the state of contemplative +reflection, and advances to fully active work; that out of the movement +of our thought proceed further developments, which extend to the object +also; that, moreover, we come under the compulsion of inner necessities, +and, possessing the highest freedom, are raised securely above all +caprice. This creative thought in us, which is at the same time our own +thought, constitutes a witness to a meeting of our thought with a +thought that has its basis in things and in the whole. Inability to +imagine such a thought should never lead to the denial of an absolute +logic, with which all scientific research stands or falls. The +disclosure of this relation, however, gives to our thought, in the midst +of all doubt, a firm foundation, a joyful certainty, an infinite task. + +Artistic creation and appreciation brings another characteristic +unfolding of life; and this also demonstrates an inner relation of man +to the world, and can be developed only when this relation is +acknowledged. In the first place, for this creation and appreciation a +deliverance of life from the turmoil of ends and interests, which at +first sway our existence, is essential; artistic creation and +appreciation involves a resting and a tarrying in itself. If the world +were no more than this turmoil, if it did not in some way attain to +self-consciousness, how could such a deliverance be brought about? If a +self-conscious life were not present in man, how could a longing for an +artistic moulding of life arise in him? But an arousing of an inner +life in things, the revelation of a soul, is accomplished not through +imparting something from without, but through a meeting together of +things and human endeavour. On the other hand, the spiritual expresses +itself in a visible form and in doing so moulds itself. The chief thing +in this connection is not mere beauty, a preparation for idle enjoyment, +but a truth, a revelation of contents, a further development of life +through and above the antithesis. How could something invisible and +something visible, to express the matter briefly, find a common ground +and combine together in a common action if nature were not more than the +mere web of relations into which the mechanistic conception of it +transforms it; if spiritual life were not more than the subjective form +of life that it is supposed to be, according to general opinion; if from +that form of life an inner life did not arise, and beyond all +subjectivity attain to a full activity, and thus to the building up of a +reality within its own province? That we do not simply become aware of a +movement within ourselves, and then read it into nature, but only take +up and lead to its own truth that which strives upward in nature, is +again testified by the inner advance of this striving through its +contact with the world, and by the infinite abundance of particular +contents which are revealed to us in the world and which continually aid +in our development. Again, our life experiences the most important +elevation in that it takes up and carries further a movement of the +whole, and is liberated from the narrowness of the particular sphere, +without merging into a vague infinity. To realise clearly that we belong +to the world, and energetically to amplify this relation, is of the +greatest significance for artistic creation and appreciation. For it is +only by becoming firmly established in these relations that artistic +endeavour is able to resist the tendency to degenerate into play and +pleasure--a tendency which threatens it with inner destruction; as in a +similar manner the work of thought must guard itself from degenerating +into mere reflection. In the realms of thought and art there remains +much that is alien, ever surmise and symbol; but even symbol is not to +be disdained, if it serves an important truth. + +A universal character is shown most clearly by the movements that +co-operate towards the ethical moulding of life. Without freedom there +is no such moulding; but we saw above that freedom requires a world of +spontaneous life and its presence within man. However, when freedom is +thought of in these relations, it is elevated above the usual conception +of it and also above the usual criticism. All moral life is pretence and +delusion without the arousing and fundamental idea of duty. But where is +the truth more clearly expressed than in duty, that what man does by no +means concerns himself alone; and that nothing can constrain him but +what he acknowledges as his own will, his own being? As duty is +concerned ultimately not with something isolated but with a whole, not +with a performance within the old order but with the creation of a new +order, so in the moral life a whole new world appears to be taken up +into man's own will and being. Duty exhibits the new world particularly +in relation and in opposition to the old; the new world appears in +itself to be pre-eminently a kingdom of love. Love is primarily not a +subjective emotion, but an expansion and a deepening of life, through +life setting itself in the other, taking the other up into itself; and +in this movement life itself becomes greater, more comprehensive and +noble. Love is not a mere relation of given individuals, but a +development and a growing in communion, an elevation and an animation of +the original condition. And this movement of love has no limits; it has +all infinity for its development; it extends beyond the relation to +persons to the relation to things; for things also reveal their +innermost being only to a disposition of love. Again, the striving after +truth in science and art cannot succeed without love and an animation +that proceeds from it, without inwardly becoming one with the object. +How could this unity and activity in the whole be possible, how could +it even become an object of desire, if the whole itself did not strive? +And how could such a wealth of cultures proceed out of this movement if +that which was striven towards at one time was not taken up and carried +further by other times; how could the single movements tend together +without the unifying and elevating power of a universal life? As a +phenomenon to the individual, the movement involves a definite +contradiction: wherever it has been further and more freely developed it +has been directed to a kingdom of love; and this has necessarily been +thought of as the soul of reality, and a severe conflict has been taken +up against the world of self-assertion. Thus in the realm of morality +also we find ourselves in world-movements, we create out of the whole, +work towards the whole, and are borne on the flood of infinite life. + +Accordingly, life-developments of various and related kinds arise: with +their manifold experiences they strive to attain to a harmony and a +union with one another. They can seek these only on the basis of a +self-consciousness of reality; find them only through their unification +in a universal life, to which each individual tendency leads. +Representations of the whole are attempted at the highest points of +creative activity by philosophy, religion, and art; these +representations accompany, indeed govern, the work in these spheres of +life through history. But the limitations of our capacity, through which +we are unable to give a suitable form to necessary contents, and through +which we attribute and must attribute human traits to that which should +lead us beyond the human, are of particular force in this matter of +forming a representation of the whole; and, indeed, this is the more so +the further we remove ourselves from that which may be immediately +transformed in work. These representations of the whole are, therefore, +inadequate; their content of truth is clothed in a wrapping of myth, and +humanity lies under the danger of taking the myth for the chief thing +and thus of obscuring the truth, and this must produce an incalculable +amount of error and strife. Still, it is impossible to give up all claim +to these representations of the whole; for they alone make the fact of +our belonging to the whole and of the presence of the whole in our life +quite clear and enable it to exert a far-reaching influence. Only with +their help can the degeneration of life to the intolerable +insignificance of the narrowly human be resisted; only with their help +can a movement from whole to whole begin. + +Thus it is a matter not so much of abandoning these representations of +the whole as of referring them continually to their essence; to those +unfoldings of life which are experienced by us; to test them by these +and to renew them from these. It was the error of the earlier +position--much too indulgent to Intellectualism-that it did not +sufficiently maintain the relation with these living sources, and so +fell into the danger of having no definite tendency, or even of failing +to recognise the relativity of the myth. If a more energetic direction +of life upon its own content and experiences teaches us to preserve +these connections better and to develop them more forcefully, a new type +of representation of the whole is yielded in contrast to the old, and +far more different from it than may appear at the first glance. We may +hope that with its development the truth will be seen more clearly +through the myth, and that the striving, which we cannot give up, to win +a universal life may not lead us astray into a world of dreams. + + +(c) THE MOVEMENT OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN MAN + +The question as to in which direction the spiritual life moves in man is +implied through our whole investigation, and in it receives an answer. +Nevertheless, it requires to be definitely stated and treated by itself, +so that the distinctive character of the movement and its influence in +the moulding of life may be fully acknowledged. It has become clearly +evident to us that an independent and, therefore, genuine spiritual +life cannot arise out of life in its usual condition, but only in +opposition to this condition. For, however little this condition of life +may lack spiritual elements, they are mixed and bound up with other +elements far too much to be able to bind themselves immediately into a +whole, and to display an independent power. That the spiritual life must +and can gain a basis independent of this condition of life is the +indispensable, fundamental idea of Idealism. But such attainment of +independence of the usual condition would help little if the spiritual +life which is based upon itself had not a particular nature of its own, +and if from this it did not oppose everything alien and partly alien to +itself. The doctrines of innate ideas, of an _a priori_, and so on, +which have occupied humanity for thousands of years did not intend +anything different from this. The details of the conception of these +were indeed often open to criticism: it was sought to exhibit individual +conceptions and propositions as existing complete at the beginning, +where rather movements or tendencies are in question, which can find +their realisation only within the work of life. Again, the _a priori_ +was limited to the intellectual sphere, whereas it is indispensable to +all spiritual activity; for example, how can morality, rising above +merely natural preservation and rejecting all mere utility, as it does, +be conceived without such an _a priori_? To deny to spiritual life an +original nature and power--an _a priori_ in this more comprehensive +sense--means nothing else than to eliminate that life as an independent +factor, and to reduce it to the position of a secondary product. For +without an original nature the spiritual life would be like soft wax +that may be shaped in one form or another to suit our own pleasure: then +the spiritual life could not possibly follow its own aims, could not +possibly attain to an independence in the inner life, in which we +recognised the characteristic nature of the inner life. As certain as it +is that there is a spiritual life at all, so certainly does it bring +certain fundamental tendencies and movements with it; as surely as it +develops in particular directions--and that it does this we have +seen--so surely is this _a priori_ also differentiated. To trace this +fundamental state of spiritual activity in all its relations and +multiplicity is an especially important task of philosophic research. + +The revelation of such an original fundamental activity of the spirit +must induce us to undertake to form our whole world from this activity, +and to produce from it or to transform into it that which exists over +against activity as an independent realm of experience. This has been +attempted for thousands of years with the summoning of an enormous amount +of spiritual power and the arousing of a proud self-consciousness. But +failure was inevitable because it was not recognised that the development +of the spiritual life in man is conditioned. However certain it may be +that original spiritual movements must be active within us, they are not +so with organised content and overwhelming power from the beginning, but +they acquire content and power only through the process of life itself, +only in grappling with the oppositions of experience and in the +appropriation of the tasks and stimuli which experience brings to them. +The incompleteness and the mutability of what was accepted earlier as a +fixed and unchangeable racial possession of the spiritual life is to-day +quite clearly perceived. What great changes morality, for example, has +undergone in the course of the ages; how toilsomely has much been won +which later ages have considered self-evident! To be sure, morality +remains, even through all such changes, an original spiritual phenomenon, +which can never be derived from an external source, but which could +emerge and establish itself only as an inner necessity of the spiritual +life in opposition to the realm of mere utility. But the actuality of +this original phenomenon gives rise to a difficult problem, for the +solution of which a closer contact with the environment, a fundamental +arrangement with experience, is necessary. And so the problem is traced +to a more ultimate source, and, though this makes the matter less +simple, it gives a higher significance to our work and to the movement +of history. + +Even the fundamental forms of thought which are often accepted as of +everything the most fixed share in this gradual amplification. Man, so +far as he participates in spiritual impulse, thinks, of course, in +conceptions; he gives to appearances fixed points of support by the +establishing of things, and relates events causally. But all this is +full of problems and is comprehended only in its upward endeavour; it +raises more problems than it solves; and around the solution of these +the whole work of science moves. What different things the "idea" meant +to Plato and to Kant, and to ancient and to modern thought generally: +how every thinker of moment has given a particular conception of +substance and of causality; how whole epochs have exhibited their +particular nature in the treatment of these problems! + +For the sake of its own perfection, therefore, the spiritual life must +continually turn back to the realm of experience, from which, at first, +it tore itself free. Attempts to evolve the whole life from that _a +priori_ have always given as a result something of a bloodless nature, +abstract in the highest degree, a mere web of formulæ, in so far as +experience, which had been relegated to the background, has not +indirectly asserted its right again, and infused the formulæ with life. +Accordingly, our life does not spend itself in one direction, but bears +within it the counter-tendencies of a tearing oneself free from the +world of sense and a returning back to it, of a detachment from it and +an appropriation of it to oneself. But, in this, independent life and +bound life do not become combined; how could that be the case without +the loss of all inner unity? A basis is necessary; and it is furnished +only by self-determining activity. Experience acquires a spiritual +content and value only so far as it is based upon this activity, and is +taken up into a spiritual movement. Experience does not share something +with the spiritual life, but, through stimulation and opposition, it +forces that life to further development within itself. The state in +which the world of sense is first found undergoes an inner elevation in +that appropriation: sense presentation, for example, is to scientific +work something quite different from what it is to naïve perception; even +if it obstinately withstands a complete resolution into magnitudes of +pure thought, it takes up more and more thought elements; it enters into +conceptual relations; it answers questions which the work of thought +sets. To the whole sphere of sense science gives the background of a +world of thought, and transforms mere sense into a spatially bound +spirituality. + +The same thing is valid with regard to the things of value in life; in +these, also, sense and spirit are not simply combined; but something of +sense becomes a spiritual good only so far as it serves the spiritual +life in some way; it cannot do this, however, without itself undergoing +a transformation. This is to be seen nowhere more clearly than in +economics. Money and estate had at all times a value for +self-preservation and enjoyment, but in the doctrine of economics and +political economy they could obtain acknowledgment only after a power to +advance the spiritual life had been recognised in them. As culture in +the ancient world had not yet reached this point of view, it branded all +endeavour after material wealth as inferior, and as far as possible +checked such endeavour. Only since the Modern Age has recognised in +money and estate an indispensable means of gaining control over the +surrounding world and of increasing human power have they secured a +place within the spiritual life, and as a result of this have become +more highly estimated. At the same time, however, they have been changed +inwardly in the process, since that which they achieve, not towards +ostentatious display and enjoyment, but towards the increase of human +power over things has become the chief matter. + +As in this way the content and the value of that which is offered by the +world of sense shows its dependence upon the condition of the spiritual +life, so in science also a similar relation between experience and the +spiritual life is found. Science appeals to experience with particular +zeal, more especially after it has first accomplished far-reaching +changes in its own thought constructions; only then does experience give +anything new to knowledge and exhibit a greater depth. Experience can +answer only in the measure in which it is questioned; the question, +however, varies according to the stage of development of the spiritual +life. + +Such a view fully appreciates the significance of life-work, and must +strive energetically to gain its acknowledgment. This work is not a +carrying out of a complete scheme in a given condition of things, an +application of firmly rooted principles to particular cases, but a +self-realisation and self-perfecting of the spiritual life which builds +up a self-conscious reality. In this our life is not divided between two +different realms, but, in a comprehensive spiritual world, different +stages of reality meet together, which must be brought into relation and +developed. To be sure, the world of sense retains a certain +independence; it resists a complete transformation into spiritual +magnitudes, and our life, therefore, retains a certain restriction and +impenetrability. But the self-consciousness of the spirit becomes more +and more the chief basis and sphere of life: this self-consciousness +continually takes up more into itself; it makes the world that was to us +at first primary, indeed the only world, more and more secondary and +subordinate. + +This increasing spiritualisation of human life never becomes a sure +possession that calls for no toil; ever anew it demands our attention +and activity; it has continually to be won anew as a whole. As soon as +the tension slackens, the world of experience with its appeal to sense +preponderates, and it soon appears to be man's sole world, one which +cannot tolerate anything beyond itself. For the spiritualisation of +human life, a longing rooted in the whole being is primarily necessary; +for with the keen feeling of the vanity of the world of sense +experience, this leads to the removal of the centre of life into the +invisible world of self-determining activity. Further, a clear +presentation of this invisible world is needed; and in this the help of +the visible is not to be dispensed with. For its own establishment the +realm of the invisible must borrow means of expression from the visible, +which now governs human presentation; must transform and refine them for +its aims; prepare out of them an impressive presentation of the whole. +Along with the energy of turning to the spiritual life a creative +imagination is required, through which the invisible may become equal to +holding its own against the visible. + +The help of such imagination is indispensable for religion, in order +that the supernatural world advocated by it may gain an effective +presence in the province of humanity. And so with bold upward flights of +imagination the heroes of religion have projected a new condition of +reality as a whole, a kingdom of justice or of love, and have judged +human existence by the standard of this new condition. Similarly, +philosophy did not become an independent world of thought without the +help of imagination; and of how indispensable it is to art we need not +speak at all. Again, work in political, social, educational matters, at +least as far as radical renewals are concerned, has really been taken up +and carried on, and has won a triumphant power, only where the state +striven for has been presented as something visible and clearly present; +this alone has united the multiplicity, and has led with compelling +force beyond the extant situation as though that were something +intolerable. Humanity as a whole must be present in an ideal condition +to our minds for us to be aroused sufficiently from our indolence. + +Our life, therefore, contains movements which tend in opposite +directions: there are a pressing forward and a turning backward, a +detachment from experience and a taking up again of experience; and so +we may well speak of an action and reaction within its movement. But +the antitheses that arise aid in advancement only so long as they are +encompassed by a whole of activity. In that the course of history +increases far more than it diminishes the antitheses, the dangers grow +more and more, the possibilities and the tasks of human existence, +however, also grow. + + +(d) THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TYPE OF LIFE + +The conception of the spiritual life here developed gives rise to a +particular type of life which can bring about a transformation and +elevation of man from two main positions: the union of man with the +spiritual life is much closer, and the spiritual life in itself is +incomparably more, than is represented by the customary conception of +that life. For in our conception man does not merely enter into some +kind of relation with the spiritual life, but finds his own being in it, +and becomes so completely united with it that it is able to determine +him immediately as his own self. The spiritual life is not a particular +function among others, not a part or an aspect of a more comprehensive +world, but is itself a world, and, indeed, a world in which life first +attains to self-consciousness and becomes a complete reality. If this +world becomes the immediate possession of man himself, his life must +experience a deep-reaching change, indeed a revolution of its usual +condition: to trace the main tendencies of this revolution is our +immediate task. + + +(1) _Life's Attainment of Greatness_ + +The placing of man in the spiritual life, becoming aware of its own +independence, must make the forms of this life his own, and in this way +bring about a reversal of the commonplace of every day. Life is +transposed from the narrowness of its merely particular nature to +infinity; what was hitherto alien and hostile to man is changed into his +own possession, and is able to arouse an animating and elevating love. +At the same time a deliverance from subjectivity and its web of +interests and ideas is effected, to the advantage of a life-process that +takes up the object into itself, and thus advances to independence and +sovereign creation; a life is attained that is not spent in movement to +and fro between antitheses, but unfolds a content through them. As this +life attains to complete independence only because it produces a +universal activity in contrast to individual activities, so +participation in this life must lead man beyond division to a +comprehensive unity. It is this that is sought in the idea of +personality--an idea which is often quite obscure and superficial, but +which can in this context be elucidated, manifest its complete +significance, and prove its power of development. + +As the spiritual life is a self-consciousness, so man also wins from it +a life that is not exhausted by activity directed upon anything external +to this life, and that does not expect its content from outside like an +empty vessel, but would be itself and realise the possibilities lying +within itself. So far as such a life extends man does not stand on the +border of things but in the centre, in the formation and creation of the +whole; he experiences the world not as something external but from +within. The question of the limits of this life is no longer primary but +secondary, and the answer to this question is to be expected from the +experience of life, not from preliminary reflections. Since, in this, +life has a content in itself and develops this content through its +movement, it distinctly grows above all the play of forces with which it +is often confused; if such a play of forces suffices for a lower stage +it cannot suffice for further development. For the feeling of joyous +excitement which accompanies the exertion of power is not sufficient in +opposition to the serious perplexities that accompany all spiritual +work; indeed, not even against the cares and needs that are involved in +the mere preservation of existence in an advancing culture. Life then +easily comes to be regarded as full of trouble and of work, and becomes +a burden from which one wishes to be delivered. Life is not from the +beginning a good, but it must prove itself to be such by its more +detailed development. In the spiritual life this comes to pass, since it +produces a reality out of itself; it does not become valuable first in +its relation to the external world, but it carries a value in itself, as +is clearly shown by the joy that permeates all experience of the true, +the good, and the beautiful. This joy must be further increased if all +the multiplicity of this experience is regarded as the unfolding of a +comprehensive and persistent fundamental life. + +A life of this kind is no indefinite impulse; it cannot become an +independent reality without penetrating into every aspect and making the +ordinary state of things everywhere inadequate, indeed intolerable. +Since the independent spirituality and spiritual character that is +acquired, and that which the particular thing and activity signifies in +the spiritual life as a whole, everywhere constitutes the most important +question, the problem of truth will be raised at each point; and in this +way a sharp division will be made between the genuine and the spurious; +everything that strives within us in the direction of the spirit will +unite and acquire a more stable basis; everything that would satisfy man +in other ways will be seen to be empty and vain. Life now acquires a +deeper reality, but this must first be reached and brought to complete +effect. New forms, in contrast to the ordinary representations, must +also make their appearance if life is to be equal to the task of +developing content and character. + +Life in the individual must have roots deeper than the immediate +psychical life; for psychical life cannot itself produce and make clear +that which occurs in it, for this reason at least, that it involves the +antithesis of individual and environment, of subject and object, beyond +which spiritual creation results. The spiritual impulse that the +immediate life of the soul manifests can be based only upon deeper +realities and more comprehensive relations. And so a _noölogical_ +treatment is to be distinguished from the psychological, not in order to +displace or limit the latter, but rather to complete it; and it is a +problem to show the point of transition in the immediate life of the +soul. The significance of the individual life, as far as content is +concerned, will depend upon whether an independent spirituality arises +within it, and constitutes it a distinctive life-centre. According to +the new standards a free spiritual activity does not suffice, however +extended it may be, and however sustained by subjective emotion. For all +such activity may be without spiritual substance, and in spite of all +external results the life that is nothing but this activity may remain +spiritually destitute: how shallow many individuals are whose +achievements deserve and obtain the highest appreciation! The inwardness +that the spiritual life requires is not simply a reflex of work in the +soul--from that little is gained--but the forming of a characteristic +spiritual self-consciousness that lifts us above all mere achievement, +and also by giving to activity a soul first makes it complete. + +We have often seen how the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual +life forces us to make a sharper distinction between human history and +human society and all merely natural history and merely natural +co-existence of men. At the same time, in that which is called history +and society, a distinction between an esoteric and an exoteric kind is +also required. The value of individual epochs and of history as a whole +depends upon the spiritual substance that grows up in them; everything +else, to whatever extent it may, with commotion and external result, +assume the air of being the chief thing, is only environment or +supplement. Similarly, in the case of society, the spiritual content, if +it has one at all, and human fortune and conduct must become more +distinctly separated. There is far less genuine history and society than +is usually assumed; but this little signifies incomparably more than +both would imply without the spiritual life. + +Similarly, with the acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life in +us, a new light is shed upon the individual departments of life, and new +tasks are set them. They have now, primarily, not to further human +well-being, to be of service in the attainment of narrowly human aims, +but they are characteristic unfoldings of the spiritual life. The +particular nature of these departments has its basis in that life, and +they must prove their capacity by advancing it. They are concerned with +man only so far as he participates in the spiritual life; and so they +will not so much strengthen him in his human nature as elevate him +spiritually, and remould him more and more to the form of the spiritual +life. A deliverance from the confusion of that which is narrowly human +with the spiritual is also necessary, and, along with this, life as a +whole must be more energetically based upon the spiritual life, and the +spiritual life itself must be given a more distinct form. From the +position of this life, that which has been handed down to us must be +evaluated and new paths must be opened up for the future. Religion could +obtain no content, and all change in it would be only an advance from a +more crude to a more refined anthropomorphism, if it were based solely +upon human needs and aided man to attain a supposed happiness. Religion +rises above such a condition of doubt only if it exhibits its roots in +an independent spiritual life and is able to show its actuality and its +power by aiding the development of the spiritual life. At its highest +religion has always been concerned with winning a new world and a new +humanity, not with the achievement of something within the old world and +for the old humanity. And as we need a religion of the spiritual life, +we also need a morality, an art, and, finally, an all-comprehensive +spiritual culture, through which something really new may be produced +and man be elevated in this being, and not simply circle round and round +continually in the old paths. Everywhere the matter is one of advance +and revelation; from this point of view the complexes of every day must +also be seen in a new light, and in what is apparently simple and +self-evident great achievements and tasks become manifest. We now, for +the first time and in another sense, win again that which we thought we +already possessed; indeed, by the revolution to the spiritual life, life +as a whole is transformed into a task. Every individual has such a +life-embracing task in the cultivation of a genuine personality and a +spiritual individuality. Humanity as a whole has such a task in the +building up of a kingdom of reason within its domain, in the furtherance +of the movement which comes to it from the whole and summons it to +co-operation. + +Human life by participation in the spiritual life finds its basis in the +inward and spontaneous, in the infinite and eternal. The development and +the experiences of the spiritual life and its conflict with a world, +which is only being won, are here the chief content of human life and +unite individuals inwardly; the destinies of individuals receive their +particular nature from such a common life. As this life of independent +spirituality is possible only by detachment from the chaotic condition +of life as we find it at its general level, the development of the +spiritual life must make us clearly conscious of the spiritual +destitution of the majority; and especially must it oppose the attempt +on the part of such a life as that of the majority to present itself as +the whole, and to make itself the standard of human endeavour. In such +an attempt the trivially human inevitably preponderates, and this now, +at its highest points, invests itself with ostentatious pomp and a +feeling of power; now, almost as a whole, relies on the reason of the +masses, which loudly and noisily proclaims that those things which +according to human opinion are valuable are of all things the highest; +confidently makes its judgment and its task the standard of truth; and, +with arrogant presumption, demands a reverence towards itself that is +due solely to the spiritual world. From of old there have been many +indictments of this, but as long as a new life, based in the spiritual +world in contrast with merely human life, was not attained to, these +indictments did not lead to a deliverance. Under the guidance of +religion humanity has evolved such a life and for thousands of years has +found support in it. However, humanity has lost this life and this +support, in its old form, and the loss was inevitable. If humanity will +strive after a new form and at the same time transcend mere appearance, +it can attain to this only on the basis of the spiritual life, that is +acknowledged to be independent. Only on this basis can it enter into the +conflict on the side of gods against idols, for truth against appearance +and emptiness. + +The new life cannot develop without elevating the individual in his +spiritual nature above all environment. For, as surely as the +construction of a spiritual reality within humanity needs a union of all +powers, there is a spontaneous springing up of the independent spiritual +life only within the soul of the individual. All social and all +historical life that does not unceasingly draw from this source falls +irrecoverably into a state of stagnation and desolation. The individual +can never be reduced to the position of a mere member of society; of a +church, of a state; notwithstanding all external subordination he must +assert an inner superiority; each spiritual individual is more than the +whole external world. But as the individual does not derive this +superiority from himself, not from a natural particularity and +peculiarity in distinction from others, but only from the presence of a +spiritual world, so he is securely guarded from all vain self-assurance +and the arrogance of the idea of the Superman, which grotesquely +distorts the great fact of the revelation of a universal life at +individual points. + +The desire for the presence of the infinite at the individual point may +be characterised as an approximation to mysticism. Indeed, we need both +a metaphysic and a mysticism; but we want both in a new form, not in the +old. It seems to us preposterous to declare that necessary demands of +the spiritual life are finally disposed of, because the older solution +has become inadequate. If man does not in some way succeed in +appropriating the spiritual life, if it is not actively present as a +whole within him and animating him, then his relation to the spiritual +life remains for ever an external one; and this life cannot acquire a +complete spontaneity in him, can never become a genuine life of his own. +But the older mysticism was the offspring of a worn-out age, which +primarily reflected upon quietness and peace, and was under the +influence of a philosophy that sought the truth in striving towards the +most comprehensive universal, and saw in all particularity a defect +(_omnis determinatio negatio_). And so, to be completely merged in the +formless infinite could be regarded as the culmination of life. As the +spiritual life is to us, on the contrary, an increasing activity and +creation, a world of self-determining activity, so its being called to +life at individual points is a rousing of life to its highest energy; in +this also, a continual appropriation is necessary. Further, the movement +of the spiritual life does not appear to us as an advance from +particular to universal, but as one from differentiation to the living +whole; from the indefiniteness of the beginnings to complete +organisation and distinctive form. The inwardness that we advocate is +not a feeble echo and a yearning for dissolution, but is of an active +and masculine nature, and rests on ceaseless self-determining activity. +One may or may not call this mysticism; in any case mysticism of such a +kind cannot be charged with that which now appears to us to be defect or +error in the older form. + + +(2) _The Increase of Movement_ + +As certainly as a universal life must surround us and, with efficient +power, in some way be implanted within us, yet only our own activity can +appropriate and amplify that life for us. As the transition to the +independent spiritual life changes the problem so that no achievement +in a given world will satisfy it, but only the winning of a new world, +our existence must become much more active; our life must be made not +only much more comprehensive but also inwardly transformed and deepened. + +Naïve opinion is accustomed to presuppose a fixed sphere for our +activity; it is possible for it to do this only because it confuses the +spiritual and that which is less than the spiritual and leaves them +undifferentiated. Since the attainment of independence by the spiritual +life makes this confusion impossible, it may at the same time be +recognised that the fixed relations in which we seem to be are also in +reality due to our own activity. From this fact a method of treatment is +justified, the introduction of which constitutes one of the greatest +services of Kant. This method in his own terminology is the +transcendental method. Unlike ordinary opinion, it does not regard the +relation of the departments of life and all its activities as being +self-evident, but it enquires into the inner possibility of this +relation, that is, it indicates the conditions without which the union +of the manifold could not be accomplished; it reveals the spiritual +activity that exists in the whole. It reveals a far finer texture of +life; it shows syntheses from the whole to the elements; it indicates +clearer limits and makes us more definitely recognise what +differentiates the individual departments. This is what Kant did in the +case of scientific knowledge, of morality, and of the realm of the +beautiful. The transcendental method itself is first indisputably +justified and given a secure foundation with the acknowledgment that a +world of independent spirituality emerges in man, and this through his +own activity, not by a mere favour and gift of destiny. For, when this +independent spiritual world is acknowledged it first becomes a matter +beyond doubt that the basis, and the bonds which unite the whole, could +not be given, but must proceed from our own activity. The transcendental +method must therefore be applied not only to the individual branches but +also to the whole, and the possibility of a spiritual life in man in +general made a problem. Then from the whole the method must also be +extended to the departments that are not brought into prominence by +Kant; it must discuss, for example, the possibility of history in a +characteristically human sense. Since our reality is thus dependent in +the first place upon our own activity, life and movement acquire a wider +scope and a greater value. + +The movement of life also tends to be increased by the fact that in our +conviction the more detailed form of the spiritual life itself must +first be won by our activity, and that this detail can be acquired only +little by little through attempts, experiences, convulsions; that for +man the spiritual life with its actuality forms a difficult problem. +What more particularly separates us from the Enlightenment is that while +for it the ultimately valid form of the spiritual life appeared to be +immediately present and to need only an energetic working out, we extend +the historical treatment not only to the representation, but also to the +nature, of the spiritual life; and so the ultimately valid form of the +spiritual life appears to be a high ideal, to which man can only +gradually approximate. The fact that endeavour is centred not upon +externals but primarily upon our own being must make our activity far +more significant and more intense; and this leads to a higher estimate +of history as well as of a historical treatment. As hence epochs are no +longer distinguished simply by their achievements, but by the nature of +their spiritual life, so the life of the present must also be given its +place in the moving stream, and so our innermost nature also depends on +spiritual work. + +If with such an increase of movement much is mutable that otherwise +seemed to be as firm as a rock; and if, in particular, the foundations +of life themselves also suffer change, life seems to lose all support +and to fall into an unlimited relativism. Indeed, life must thus lose +all stability if in the spiritual sphere movement does not involve +something in opposition to change: and this as a fact it does involve. +As the spiritual life cannot develop a content without presenting it as +timeless, there is no great achievement in history that does not include +some kind of timeless truth, and the movement of the spiritual life is +not merely a flowing onward with time but also an elevation above time. +In spiritual work, therefore, the achievements of the ages can be +surveyed and examined; indeed, in distinguishing between past and not +past the sequence of times can be transformed into a timeless present. +Of course this is valid only with the presupposition of an absolute +spiritual life, which is present in all the uncertainty and change of +human undertaking, and does not allow it to become fixed in error. +Unless an immanence of the absolute spiritual life is acknowledged, an +essential characteristic of the spiritual work of the Modern Age remains +absolutely unintelligible, namely, its critical character. Modern work +is not completely objective, and occupation with the object does not +completely exhaust that work; but activity realises its independence of +the object, investigates its relation to the object, surveys that which +has been achieved, and tests it by transcendent standards. Such a +critique belongs especially to the fundamental nature of the +Enlightenment, to the proud self-confidence of which a conscientious +self-examination forms a necessary antithesis. The critical method +reached its highest point in Kant, and we can never go back again upon +the transformation of life that has been effected by it. But how could +the critique be justified and exercise such far-reaching influence as it +has done, if it were not more than a product of a subjective reflection +that accompanies the object, and that has to do with the object +externally? The critique could effect an inner transformation and +elevation of work only because it set new forces in motion. And it did +this in that it measured all human achievement by the demands of a +transcendent spiritual life and out of it developed inner necessities, +to which all achievement had to correspond. So the movement was not lost +through the lack of an aim; and life did not flow onward with the stream +of presentations, but found a support in itself; it was able to exert a +powerful counteraction; it did not need to acknowledge anything that +had not proved its validity before the judgment-seat of immanent reason. +This emergence of the question of validity in contrast to that of +actuality must inwardly raise and ennoble the movement of life; it +reveals to man an active relation not only to the environment but +primarily to himself; it leads to a ceaseless differentiation and +examination of the quality of life. + +It is true that the Enlightenment, which acknowledged that alone to be +true which was clearly and distinctly cognised, exercised this critique +in a too narrow manner; yet notwithstanding all that may be +problematical in its application to details, the right and the necessity +of the fundamental idea are not thereby overthrown: the question +remains; it can be fully justified only in the relations that we have +indicated; but at the same time it must be transferred from the merely +intellectual to the spiritual as a whole, and form in relation to the +whole that which in the state of culture contains and develops an +independent spirituality and a self-conscious life; but by this it gains +a content of truth. This self-consciousness alone can be regarded as +essence and genuine reality, while everything else is reduced to mere +environment and becomes matter of secondary importance, if not of mere +appearance. Task after task is revealed, more especially for the +present; we see how, with the attainment of independence by the +spiritual life, the movement is not only extended, but also grows +inwardly and tends towards the elevation of life. + + +(3) _The Gain of Stability_ + +The movement of the spiritual life as not only directed towards the +outside but also turned inwards towards itself gained for us a greater +independence. But even that which emerges from within exists only in the +process of formation, and in this that which satisfies us to-day may +to-morrow be uncertain; and so we cannot dismiss the question whether +the spiritual life lacks the necessary stability; whether, in the midst +of all becoming and change, caprice and subjectivity are not without the +necessary opposition. In any case, the question of fixation must have a +different appearance within a system of life based upon activity from +that it would have within a system which proceeded from a given world: +in the former, that which is fixed cannot be introduced from outside, +but must exist within the movement itself; it can manifest itself only +through a movement of a kind and form which transcend the utmost +capacity of the mere subject. + +Our investigation as a whole contends that the fixity is of this kind; +and at this point only a short revision and a summing up are required. +All spiritual activity is, as we saw, a transcendence of the antithesis +of subject and object; it is progressive and formative universal +activity. But this activity cannot be produced and formed according to +desire or fancy; we must be elevated into it; and, as a result of this, +we feel that we are under the compulsion of an inner necessity, which +distinctly counteracts the caprice of the mere subject. We saw, further, +that within the life-process spiritual contents are raised out of the +stream of events, and that they unite so as to form a world in contrast +with that stream, a world greater and more comprehensive, which +nevertheless continues within our life. This applies to all the branches +of our work; everywhere the deciding step to joyful advance is when +activity proceeds from mere search and contemplation under the necessity +of the object. No resolution, however, or even the most sincere +volition, can of itself force us to this decisive step. Man must be +taken possession of by a spiritual activity and power, and elevated +above the state of groping and doubt. This is shown in all scientific +work and artistic creation; everywhere success does not appear to be the +work of the human, but a gift and a grace from higher forces; everywhere +those who have created have felt guided and sustained by such forces. +Beyond individuals humanity as a whole develops complexes in science, in +law, and so on, which evolve inner necessities and require their +recognition and fulfilment by man, and follow courses of their own +regardless of the weal or the woe of individuals; so far as life follows +these tendencies, it is elevated above doubt to a state of stability and +joyfulness. + +Such movements appear at first as a multiplicity, and are most directly +effective through that which is distinctive in the particular +departments of life. But through all multiplicity and above it, there is +a striving towards a comprehensive unity; every advance towards this +unity is an immediate gain in stability and certainty. Nothing helps the +individual to become inwardly firm more than the unification of his life +in a whole of activity, more than becoming certain of an inward +all-comprehensive task in the development of a spiritual individuality. +The development of a spiritual individuality is a task that comes to him +from within, and which, while it is more than anything else his own, is +yet above all caprice. This task may tend little to promote that which +is usually called happiness; the striving to fulfil it may transform the +whole of existence into a state of toil and trouble, of conflict and +care; and yet it alone gives to life a meaning and a value, a sure +direction and a secure self-consciousness, and by assuring man of a +spiritual existence of his own makes him certain of the spiritual life +as a whole. Such a unification of the manifold activities so as to form +a life-work, an incomparable kind of spiritual being, is something +entirely axiomatic, which is in no way derived from outside. Again, this +unification does not depend upon particular representations of the +world; only the fanaticism of party can bind it to definite doctrines of +the human and the divine. It itself, however, is a secure starting-point +for the development of convictions; its acknowledgment involves the +acknowledgment of a spiritual world independent of and operative within +us, and summoning us to co-operation, even though this implication is +often concealed from consciousness. Where our own life lacks such a +fountain-head the conviction of a spiritual life never attains to +axiomatic certainty, but depends on the thin threads of reasons and +proofs, and therefore is most easy to overthrow. And so, for the +overcoming of doubt and faintheartedness everything depends upon +attaining to a unity of activity and creation which inwardly embraces +life as a whole, and with this, upon being something, not simply doing +something. + +What is valid of individuals is valid also of peoples and epochs, of +humanity as a whole. Whether a people feels certain of a spiritual life, +and is thereby elevated to a state of inward joyfulness, depends +primarily upon whether it recognises and acknowledges in itself a common +spiritual task: if this is not the case, the acutest apologetic cannot +prevent the increase of doubt and faintness of heart. Similarly, the +disposition and life-feeling of epochs is decided primarily by whether +their endeavour unites them inwardly or whether it is divided, and at +the same time becomes inconsistent. The endeavour of our own time does +suffer from such division and inconsistency; it is this in particular +that gives the negative tendency so much power over us and in the midst +of all greatness of achievement in external matters makes us inwardly +despondent. Humanity as a whole can attain to a stable spiritual life +which is more than that of the particular times and peoples only by the +revelation and appropriation of an all-comprehensive task which governs +it with inner necessities. Such a task alone makes life a preservation +of spiritual character; and gives conviction an unshakable firmness, and +a joyous confidence of victory. And so everywhere only the formation of +life itself is able to guarantee to it inner stability; the movement +itself by its elevation above all caprice and its inner unity is alone +able to overcome the dangers which the transformation of life into +activity brings with it. + + +(e) ACTIVISM: A PROFESSION OF FAITH + +The system of life here developed receives its distinctive colour and +tone chiefly because it brings into prominence the fact that we do not +belong to a world of reason, which from the beginning had only to be +perceived and enjoyed, but that we have first to advance to such a +world; and for this we require a revolution of the first condition of +things. The basis of true life must continually be won anew; and even +the individual achievement always contains a decision between one and +another type of life. Only through ceaseless activity can life remain at +the height to which it has attained; that which life experiences and +receives is judged according to the more precise form of activity. Since +it gives this precedence to activity, to such activity, this system may +be called "Activism." Activism, however, demonstrates its unique +character and develops its capacity only if it is definitely +distinguished from all other apparently related tendencies. Neither a +sudden resolution nor even a mere incitement of power brings us at once +into the condition of activity. For at first we are surrounded and +embraced by a world of inflexible nature and of feeble spirituality, +which is at the same time mixed with human pretence: this world binds us +so strongly, and suppresses all independence with such force, that the +mere individual remains entirely powerless in opposition to it, and +could soar to no higher wisdom than that of an involuntary submission to +it. Activity without release from the given world is an absurdity; but +such release is attainable only through the living presence of a world +of self-determining activity; the power of such a world alone is able to +arouse the individual to self-determining activity. But how could man +appropriate this world to himself without changing its life into his +own; without acknowledging its content as valid for himself also; +without making its laws norms of his conduct? + +Activity in this way acquires an ethical character; it is this which +draws the boundary line between spiritual activity and merely natural +impulse, and distinguishes genuine from imaginary self-determining +activity. Ethical relation does not mean a submission to alien and +unsympathetic regulations, but a taking up of the infinite spiritual +world into our own volition and being: this relation brings things close +to us and reveals them, so that they are able to impart their life to +us, and we are able to grow with their growth. So understood, ethical +relation is primarily not regulative but productive; it is not merely +being prepared to fulfil certain demands, when they are made upon us, to +live in accordance with strict regulations, but it involves the motive +of aiding in the development of the world, of advancing everything good +and true: it requires an untiring forward endeavour and advance to the +building up of a kingdom of reason and love. If in this way conduct is +lifted above the pursuit of that which pleases and interests the mere +subject, this is not on behalf of something alien, but for the elevation +of our own being, for the sake of this genuine being, for the sake of +our spiritual self. + +It is this inner elevation and this demand for a new world that +distinguishes Activism from all mere Voluntarism and Pragmatism, to +which it appears to approximate, and with which, in its negative aspect, +it is, indeed, associated. For it shares with them the rejection of an +intellectualistic view of life, in which cognition is regarded as +finding truth of its own power and as conveying it to the rest of life. +Further, Activism desires, as do Voluntarism and Pragmatism also, the +basing of truth upon a more spontaneous and essential activity. But the +flight to the will is more a reaction against Intellectualism than an +overcoming of the difficulty. As such the will does not yield a new +world and a transcendent power; it may, therefore, be that mere volition +is implicitly transformed into a self-determining activity encompassing +the whole extent of life. Pragmatism, also, which has recently made so +much headway among English-speaking peoples and beyond them, is more +inclined to shape the world and life in accordance with human condition +and needs than to invest spiritual activity with an independence in +relation to these, and apply its standards to the testing and sifting of +the whole content of human life. But after the experiences of history +the claim to this latter can scarcely be given up. After man has been +seen to be particular and limited in nature, as things first present +themselves, he no longer suffices for the starting-point of the +endeavour for truth, but to attain to this starting-point an elevation +above the human into a universal spiritual life is necessary. And that +is the intention of Activism. + +The unique character of Activism becomes clearer especially in +comparison with organisations of life, of which one indeed makes +activity the chief thing, but gives to it the character of a mere +process; while another thinks of the fundamental relation of man to +reality in general not under the ideas of conduct and progress but under +those of contemplation and enjoyment. The idea that life constitutes a +process transcending all human endeavour and decision has shown a strong +power of attraction in the Modern Age; and, in the system of Hegel +especially, has found an imposing embodiment. This idea is asserted most +definitely in the evolutionary conception of history, since it regards +the motive power of history as striving to its aim, certain of +accomplishing it, and unaffected by human opinion and preference. By +this deliverance from the insignificance of human motives and the +variations of human conditions the object seemed to gain incomparably in +greatness; but it was considered that this deliverance from man involved +an elevation above the ethical conception, which then appeared to be +something subjectively human. But not only does this conception of a +process that ceaselessly advances with compelling necessity contradict +the actual state of things as they are found in history, which shows so +much stagnation and retrogression, and so many different spheres of +culture existing side by side indifferent to one another, but the +transformation of life into a mere process, if consistently carried out, +must also destroy or seriously debase its spiritual character. If life +were a mere process it would be nothing other than a soulless +mechanism; only in the case of such a mechanism can one phase proceed +immediately from the others without at the same time a whole of life +becoming active and exercising an animating power within the whole +process. As a fact, the process is usually supplemented in thought by a +universal life unifying, sustaining, and controlling the individual +phases; however, so far as such a life does not simply come to us, but +needs our own activity, the deed comes before the process; and a new +world reveals itself to us. The disregard of the ethical element by the +systems which make mere process their fundamental idea is explained by +the fact that they understand the ethical only as a decision and turning +of man, accompanying the spiritual life, not as the motive and +progressive power of the spiritual life itself. They know only a human +ethic, not an ethic of the spiritual life--as a self-assertion and a +self-elevation, through which it first attains its complete freedom and +independence. Still, to trace this further is the less necessary since +this mode of thought lives rather from earlier achievements than works +from fresh impulse springing up in the present. + +The relation of Activism to the æsthetic mode of thought requires closer +consideration; we indicated at the beginning of our investigation that +Æstheticism forms one of the chief streams of the life of the present +day; at this point, only its relation to Activism need be examined. This +Æstheticism has its definite conditions. Where the contemplation and +enjoyment of the world and its beauty are to constitute the essence of +life, we must be assured that the world is a kingdom of reason and +beauty, so that the condition in which it is incites us to no +far-reaching change. Further, there must be no perplexities in our soul, +and no deep conflicts within our being, so that this contemplation may +occupy us completely, and be a source of happiness. Lastly, we must be +closely and surely united with the world so that a change of life may be +accomplished easily and smoothly. If one of these requirements is not +satisfied; if, instead of this harmony, the world manifests severe +conflicts and harsh contradictions; if such exist also within our soul; +if, lastly, there appears to be a deep gulf between us and the whole, +then the æsthetic solution of the problem of life is an impossibility. +If in spite of these contradictions we attempt to entertain this +solution, our life will become insincere, and will lose all spiritual +productivity, and, as a whole, our life will be spent in subjective +mood, empty enjoyment, and become feeble. Now, however, the Modern Age +develops in a direction which is directly opposed to the requirements of +the æsthetic form of life. The great world appears to us to be a +meaningless machine; and in the struggle for existence the earlier +harmony is forgotten. We perceive in man far too much that is +insignificant and far too much selfishness, emptiness, and mere show for +us to be able to regard him as being inwardly complete. Lastly, the +modern strengthening of the subject and the ceaseless growth of +reflection have so fundamentally overthrown the immediate relation of +man to the world that only a far-reaching transformation of life can +prepare for a reunion. If our life is so full of problems and tasks; if +we do not find ourselves in a completed world of reason; but if we must, +with all our powers, work toward such a world, we shall turn to Activism +as the only help possible. But we shall resolutely reject Æstheticism as +a veiling of the real condition of things and a too facile solution of +the great problems of life. + +Activism does not imply that immediately and at one stroke our life may +be transformed into spiritual activity and may quickly establish a +positive relation to reality: that would be to fail to recognise the +conditions under which man exists, and the necessity of undergoing +experiences and changes. Such an attitude might easily lead to the +formation of syntheses of life that would be much too hasty and far too +narrow; and the necessary breaking up of these would arouse a keen +distrust of the whole undertaking. The power which the Romantic movement +from time to time wins over minds is based on the fact that it warns us +against an over-estimation of our activity; that it demands that the +soul should be open to the influences of the world; that its +impressions should be appropriated without restriction and permitted to +fade away completely; that in opposition to all the limitation and +organisation of life, it still longs for the infinite; and that it also +to some extent satisfies by turning to unrestrained feeling. At the same +time, the Romantic movement makes us clearly conscious of the power of +destiny, the transcendence of external and internal necessities above +all human intention and utilitarian conduct. In this way life acquires a +much greater comprehensiveness and freshness; it seems to return to its +source, to retain far more immediacy. But it is one thing to acknowledge +the importance of this, another to make it the essence of life. When +such precedence is given to this Romantic tendency life threatens to +become delicate, feeble, effeminate; it knows no energetic opposition to +the flow of presentations; instead of a definite union it offers +aphoristic thoughts and stimuli; through the lack of logical acuteness +it falls into the direst contradictions; it sacrifices all distinct form +and organisation to a revelling in vague moods. As in such a state of +weakness the spiritual life does not succeed in gaining complete +independence in face of the natural conditions of our existence, so it +does not attain the necessary ascendancy over sense. Sense, in its own +province entirely incontestable, raises doubts in us in that it flows +together with the spiritual, is undifferentiated from it, brings it +under itself, and turns it from its course. And, in this, sense does not +possess the naïve freshness and the natural limitation of its original +state, but it is over-refined and too full of excitement. + +To recognise all this clearly is at the same time to acknowledge the +superiority of Activism over all mere Romanticism. However much may +still be lacking in Activism, through the fact that man often regards +the difficult and complicated task as easy and simple, and thus sets too +low an estimate upon the distance between himself and the spiritual +world, there is still the objective necessity of the requirement to +transform our life as far as possible into a state of independence, to +achieve independence in opposition to a world confused and only half +rational. Such a self-determining activity is by no means simply a +matter of subjective disposition; it requires a particular form of life. +In opposition to the desultoriness and change of the life of sense it +needs a powerful unification and organisation. It advances to methods +and laws of the object in contrast to playful caprice; to a logic of the +object in opposition to a persistence in contradiction; to a further +construction of the first impression in contrast to comfortable +complacency; to a courageous continuation and building up of life in +opposition to a complacent acceptance of destiny. It gives to life a +dramatic character in contrast to a lyrical, sentimental one, and along +with this it can acknowledge fully that a genuine drama usually contains +much that is lyrical. + +It is detrimental to Activism itself if it takes the problem of life +lightly. It is vital that it should not forget or underestimate the fact +that the effort to solve the problems of life meets with great +difficulties, that the solution costs incalculable trouble and work, and +that even when the best is achieved it is only approximate. When +Activism recognises this fact it may acknowledge a certain validity in +the positions of its opponents and may learn from them. But there is a +harsh contradiction that extends to the innermost basis of life, an +implacable "either--or," whether man simply receives the world and +accompanies it with his own mood, or whether he finds courage and power +to take up a conflict against confusion and irrationality, to co-operate +in the building up of a kingdom of reason. For the latter, the +affirmation of reason in the innermost basis of reality as a whole and +of his own being is necessary. Whether men and times find a way to such +an inner establishment, to such transcendence of all external and +internal limitation, is that which decides the main tendency of their +life. + + + + +III. THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN MAN IN CONFLICT AND IN VICTORY + + +We intend to make the following section as short as possible, as we have +treated this subject so much in detail in "The Truth of Religion" and +also in "The Struggle for a Concrete Spiritual Experience." We must +refer those who wish for a closer consideration of the subject to those +works: the subject will be treated of here only so far as is necessary +for a representation of life as a whole; a concise statement may have +distinct advantages. + + +(a) DOUBT AND PROSTRATION + +It is a leading idea of our whole investigation, and one which has held +good in every branch of it, that for us men spiritual life is evolved +only in opposition to a world other than spiritual; that reality does +not surround us from the beginning, but forms a high ideal in contrast +to the customary want of purpose and energy in life. The existence of a +world lower than the spiritual, and the late appearance of that which +arises from within as the primary and the all-dominant reality, must +give birth to many questions and much doubt; from early times these +facts have occupied and much disturbed reflective thought. Man might +place the problem on one side without incurring any risk, if the +spiritual life when it comes to the fore assumes the guidance of life +and manifests itself as world-transcendent power--externally, in that it +subordinates to itself and takes up into itself everything else; +internally, in that with certain progress it presses forward in the +human province, wins the whole soul of man, and becomes more and more +his only world. In particular, where the spiritual life is regarded, as +we regard it, as the self-consciousness of reality; where, therefore, +that which apparently stands in opposition to the spiritual life must +ultimately have its basis within it, the demands of the spiritual life +have a coercive power. And so when experiences a thousandfold, new and +old, present a picture which contradicts these demands we must feel the +state of things to be a particularly painful one. + +That, however, is what really happens: it is the case in the relation of +the spiritual life to nature, as well as in its relation to humanity; it +happens, therefore, in our whole experience. If the spiritual life +constitutes the fundamental nature of reality; if, in it, reality first +attains to self-consciousness, it is to be expected that when the +spiritual life appeared it would create for itself an independent form +of existence in contrast to that of nature, and would exercise a +superior power in this form of existence, to which nature must +accommodate itself. But, as a fact, this is so far from being the case +that even the attempt to imagine the spiritual in any way leads +immediately to the quixotic. In the experience of humanity the spiritual +life is related in its entirety to a natural basis; in no way does it +seem able to free itself from this, but in all its activity it remains +dependent upon nature. If nature simply follows its own tendencies; if, +indifferent to value and lack of value, without aim and ideal, nature +lives its life of soulless movement, union with an order so alien and +impenetrable must most seriously affect the spiritual life. The world +goes on its course unconcerned with the weal or the woe, the persistence +or the disappearance of spiritual being, of spiritual relations, indeed +of spiritual life in general. Not only do great catastrophes, as in +earthquakes, storms, and floods, show how indifferent the existence or +the non-existence of spiritual life is to the forces of nature, but the +commonplaces of everyday experience and of individual destiny also show +the same indifference. In nature we find no difference of treatment in +accordance with any distinction of good and evil, great and mean, noble +and vulgar. Even the most eminent personality, who may be almost +indispensable to our spiritual welfare, is subject to the same +contingency, the same fate as all others. Regarded from the point of +view of the world of sense, all spiritual life is a chaotic confusion of +fleeting appearances, all of which are dependent; it is not an +independent world, but a subsidiary addition to a world which is other +than spiritual. + +Experience of the impotence of the spiritual life in relation to nature +has been the cause of mental disquiet from early times. But this +experience was not necessarily oppressive so long as mankind was called +upon to transform nature into a realm of reason, and so long as there +was hope of accomplishing this. For the contrast with the cold and rigid +external world has deepened the inwardness of human relationship and +made us conscious of the dignity and greatness of spiritual creation. In +culture, humanity has formed a characteristic sphere of life, and in +doing this has aided the spiritual life to attain a certain reality. In +culture, spiritual factors and values win power; and a new order of life +in contrast to that of nature is evolved. It cannot be doubted that a +new reality makes its appearance; but it is an open question whether +this new reality fulfils the hopes which have been placed upon it; and, +further, whether perplexities and confusions, which make it doubtful +whether anything has been gained, do not arise out of its further +development. This question is certainly not answered lightly in the +affirmative by the conviction that regards the spiritual life as a +turning of reality towards its own truth, which therefore in its +development must insist primarily on complete spontaneity and +independence. For, if in culture the spiritual life attains an +independence over against nature, it is at the same time drawn so deeply +into the particularity and limitation of human life, and is associated +so much with the merely human, that culture as a whole is anything but +the unfolding of a realm of pure, or even of only preponderating, +spirituality. + +In the first place, the spiritual life does not introduce a definite and +fixed content into our experience, and it does not follow paths +independent of human striving and error; but arises through hard toil +and only slowly finds any unity: in its further endeavour it by no means +follows the same tendency, but effects great changes, indeed +revolutions, into states the exact opposite of its previous states. When +it is so uncertain as to its own aim the spiritual life becomes +seriously involved in the seeking and vacillation, in the needs and +passions, of man: instead of giving to man an immovable support and +pointing out a definite aim for his activity, it seems itself unable to +pass beyond a state of uncertain groping and error. + +Corresponding to this uncertainty as to its content, there is a want of +power on the part of the spiritual life within man. Instead of +controlling the conduct of man directly, the spiritual life generally +determines it through that which it contributes towards the attainment +of his aims. If this is so in the case of the individual, it is even +more so in the case of social life, for in it spiritual activity is +regarded chiefly as a means to obtain advantages over others, and to +advance socially. And so that of which it is the nature to be an end +complete in itself is treated as a means to other ends; it is not itself +active, and its own power is not a motive force; but even for its own +maintenance it needs the help and support of things alien to itself: the +artificial mechanism of social organisation must bring forth toilsomely +that which, unless it flows immediately from its source, cannot be fresh +or genuine. Such a state of human affairs remains far below the aims of +the spiritual life; it produces insincerity, a luxuriant growth of +hypocrisy and pretence. For all striving for the true and the good +involves the assertion that the object is desired for its own sake: if +the object really serves the aims of mere man, there inevitably +originates a wide divergence between what is willed and what is alleged +to be willed. In respect of this, one cannot, with the moralists, lay +the blame simply on the will. For, in man, spiritual impulse in general +is insignificant; without the compulsion of the social environment it +would hardly prevail at all against nature. This social compulsion, +therefore, notwithstanding its defects, cannot be dispensed with; +however clearly we may see its inadequacy, we cannot renounce it +altogether. Society cannot exert such coercive power without presenting +itself as the champion of pure reason; without desiring an infallibility +for its decisions. This attitude naturally arouses the opposition of +individuals and a keen struggle ensues, but as one side may be right the +condition of the spiritual life is not much improved by the struggle. + +The state of life, uncertain of its aims and inadequate in its means, is +rather a paltry substitute for a realm of reason than such a realm +itself. A noisy and self-conscious agitation, much unrest and +excitement, but little substance and soul; a ceaseless anxiety +concerning the means of life and hurried pursuit of them, and in the +occupation with the means forgetfulness and neglect of life itself; much +self-glorification and ostentation, and little reverence for the +spiritual life--such is social life in general. Where the vanity, +emptiness, and falsehood of the social machinery have come to be clearly +perceived, man has become absolutely wearied and satiated, and has often +fled from society to nature, to seek therein simple truth and enduring +peace. But he could believe it possible to find such in nature only +because he read this truth and peace into it from himself; as, +nevertheless, he must ultimately return to those of the same nature as +himself: thus he remains in a state of vacillation between nature, which +is indifferent to the spiritual life, and humanity, which corrupts the +spiritual life by drawing it down to the level of the narrowly human. If +the spiritual life nowhere attains to pure unfolding and certain effect +within our experience, how can the spiritual life be accepted by us in +this experience as the essence of reality? In the midst of such doubt, +the original suspicions, which may have receded before the hope of the +emergence of a new world, also become felt again--the insignificance of +the external manifestation of the spiritual life in contrast with the +immeasurableness of nature; the late appearance of the spiritual life in +the world-process, and its probable disappearance as a result of the +expected changes in the conditions of nature. Does not everything tend +to give us the impression that the spiritual life signifies no more than +an episode in the world-process; an episode which passes fleetingly, and +does not affect the fundamental nature of reality at all? The necessity +of such a conclusion remains concealed so long as man, in an undeveloped +state of life, is able to fill the world with forms similar to himself, +and to understand the control of nature on an analogy with human +conduct. But the progress of culture and especially the growth of +scientific knowledge have, with irresistible power, taken us beyond that +state; have led us from dream and illusion to a state of complete +alertness. Has not all independence of the spiritual life become +doubtful with this progress of culture and scientific knowledge, and +must we not give up all claim to subject our existence to its +sovereignty, and to determine our life and effort spiritually? For there +cannot be any doubt that, with the spiritual life, the characteristic +organisation of our existence also falls. It may be that we have thought +superficially and confusedly enough to declare something to be in itself +falsehood and deceit, and at the same time to give to it the guidance of +our life. + + +(b) CONSIDERATION AND DEMAND + +The previous train of thought may appear to be a plain and +straightforward negation, a complete renunciation of the spiritual life +as the most adequate solution of our problem. But that train of thought +is itself the result of a superficial treatment; every deeper +consideration inevitably contradicts such a summary procedure. A +contradiction of that train of thought is found especially in the fact +which governs the whole course of our investigation, that with the +transition to the spiritual life there appear essentially new magnitudes +and values, new forms and contents of life, which advance beyond not +only the nature but also the capacity of mere man. Whence all these, if +spiritual life is only delusion? The new in us may be never so +powerless; still, the fact that it emerges in our world of thought and +hovers before us as a possibility proves that it has a certain reality +also within us. + +Further, is the spiritual life, ultimately, in every sense so powerless +as it at first appears? That it does not pass by as a phantom among our +presentations is shown by the fact that we do not simply receive the +existing condition of things, and its degrading oppression of the +spiritual life, but we feel it to be a cause of harm and of pain to us. +Could we experience this if we belonged entirely to that condition of +things; and is not Hegel right when he says that he who feels a +limitation is already in some way above it? We feel the insufficiency, +the feebleness, the threadbareness of all human morality; could we feel +this if we did not experience a longing for a more genuine morality? And +whence arises this longing in opposition to an entirely different world, +if not from a spirituality implanted within our own being? We perceive +the limitations in our knowledge; a growing insight into all its +conditions and oppositions may lead us in this matter almost to complete +scepticism: but whence came the desire for an inner elucidation of +reality; and how did even the idea of it originate, if we belong +entirely to the darkness of a nature that is less than spiritual, and if +there is no fight at all within us? We feel that the rapid flow of time, +its change and course, its sudden revolutions sometimes even into the +complete opposite of the previous state, is a defect, a source of +serious danger to truth: could we feel this to be so if our whole being +were centred in the passing moment; if we did not survey and compare the +different times; if our being did not participate in something +super-temporal? And lastly, if the feeling that culture is inadequate +and indeed nothing but a pretence is so strong and so painful, then here +again we set ourselves in a position independent of the condition of +things, and judge that condition by a transcendent standard which only +our own being can supply. If all these aims were only invented by man +and applied to life in an external manner, failure to realise them could +not agitate us as it does. + +Besides, the matter is not by any means at an end with the feeling of +the inadequacy of our position; a movement in opposition to this +condition is also not lacking. For, as has been seen throughout our +whole treatment, spiritual operation, creative activity is to be found +within human experience. It meets us with especial clearness at the +heights of the work of history; but these also belong to humanity as a +whole, and the light kindled there is not entirely lost in the mist of +the commonplace circumstances of every day. In relation with these +heights of endeavour there is, in humanity as a whole, a movement in +opposition to the tendency of mediocre culture to fill life entirely; a +longing for a more spontaneous, a purer, and a more genuine life. Our +own power of creation may be dormant; only the advent of a strong +suggestion, or a serious convulsion, is necessary and it breaks forth +forcefully, and shows distinctly that there is more spirituality in man +than the circumstances of every day allow us to perceive. The spiritual +movement manifests itself also in private life and in the relation of +individual to individual. He who does not measure spiritual greatness by +physical standards will often find more genuine greatness in the +simplicity of these relations than in the famous deeds of history; and +at the same time he will find that through these relations an effective +presence of the spiritual life within human experience is strengthened. + +If in its opposition to human perversion of it genuine spiritual life +does not always reach a definite positive result, the operation of that +life as the law and the judge of human things is all the more distinct. +Man may try to withdraw himself from the spiritual life; he may reject +and mock at that which the age presents to him as an aim; he may seek to +fill his life completely with human interests and inclinations: but he +cannot do this without degenerating into a state of destitution, which +even he himself soon finds to be intolerable, and without being forced, +with the compulsion of necessity, to surrender much which it is +impossible for him to surrender. The catastrophes of history in which +that which has been found insignificant sinks, and that which carries a +spiritual necessity within it rises, careless, as it seems, of the weal +or the woe of man, show in letters of brass that the spiritual life may +not be modified by man at his pleasure, in this way or that, in +accordance with his circumstances and his mood. + +When we consider all the facts together, we do not get the impression +that the spiritual life is simply a fleeting illusion that may easily be +banished; but rather, that there are serious complications, out of which +we cannot find our way; and that something occurs within us, something +is begun within us, that is unaffected by mood and caprice, and that +shows us to be in relations much more comprehensive, though obscure in +the highest degree. In particular, for a treatment that starts out from +the life-process, and sees the spiritual movement chiefly in strivings, +collisions, and even in failures, there can be no doubt concerning the +actuality of this movement, the emergence of a new life, and thus of a +new stage of reality in man. + +When we recognise the actuality of the spiritual movement the relation +of the spiritual life to nature and to the world is also to be regarded +differently from the manner in which the negative mode of thought +represents it. It is now impossible, as it often happens, more +particularly among philosophising natural scientists, to consider the +representation of nature as a complete representation of reality, and to +leave the spiritual life out of attention as something supplementary and +subsidiary. The spiritual life is now itself acknowledged to be a +reality, and must help to determine the representation of reality as a +whole. Nature must be more than a soulless machine if its evolution is +to lead, as it does, to the point where a self-conscious life emerges. +Within our own experience points of transition are not lacking where +nature produces something that becomes elevated to the spiritual, and +furthers the spiritual life. The difference of the sexes, for example, +is primarily a matter of natural organisation, and what a rich source of +spiritual animation it is! Nothing manifests the union between nature +and the spiritual life more convincingly than the beautiful, when, in +accordance with the result of our investigation, it is regarded as a +characteristic unfolding of the spiritual life, and not as something +which merely fascinates man and is a source of pleasure to him. For how +could the external receive a characteristic soul by being taken up into +the inner life; how could the inward need an external form for its +perfection if the two realms were not united, if a comprehensive reality +did not transcend the antithesis? + +Lastly, it should not be forgotten that it is modern science, especially +in its latest phases, with its destruction of the supposed self-evidence +of the sense impression of nature, that has placed the relation of +nature to the spiritual life in a more favourable light than it was +placed by the dogmatic mechanistic theory, which in earlier times seemed +to be the ultimate solution of the problem of their relation. Nature has +again become far more of a problem to us, and we recognise that our +conception of it is a work of the spirit. The old facts of the +connection and interaction of phenomena, of the conformity to law on the +part of occurrences, of the developments of form, and of a progress to +even more artistic complexes and ever finer organisation, once more make +us feel, and far more keenly than before, that they involve difficult +problems. It is more clearly evident to us than it was formerly that +every attempt to make these facts intelligible is made by the spiritual +life and by analogy with the spiritual life. If in such analogy we do +not go beyond symbols, yet the symbols themselves betray a depth and a +secret of reality. At the present time when scientific work is at its +highest stage of development, the shallowness and the rashness of a +radical negation are distinctly recognised. + +It is true that for the particular life-problem that we are considering +we have not yet gained much from this recognition; to perceive the +impossibility of an absolute negation does not in itself imply the +victory of a joyful affirmation. For all the perplexities that +previously occupied us still remain, as do the limitation and the +curtailment of the spiritual life which proceeded from these +perplexities; the whole movement also remains in its state of +stagnation. As certainly as on the one hand there is too much of the +spiritual life presented to us to allow of negation, so on the other it +is by no means sufficient for the removal of all doubt. + +Mere research can tolerate a state of hesitation between affirmation and +negation; it must often refrain from a decision in the case of special +problems. Life, however, cannot endure any such intermediary position; +for life, such hesitation in arriving at a decision must result in +complete stagnation, and this would help the negation to victory. If +life is faced with an "either--or" the affirmation has a prospect of +victory only if the situation previously described may be in some way +transformed in its favour. This cannot come to pass unless the spiritual +movement can transcend the limitations which appear in human life, and +unless a further development can proceed out of the limitations +themselves. Only such an advance can help the endangered affirmation to +victory. But whether the spiritual movement does transcend these +limitations, not a logical consideration of concepts but only the +experience of life will decide; let us enquire therefore whether life +offers what we seek. + + +(c) THE VICTORY + +The questions that are given rise to in the consideration of human life +as it is are answered in the affirmative with joyful certainty by the +religions. The religions do this in that they announce to man the help +of a transcendent order; an appearance of divine power and goodness in +the domain of man. But after the far-reaching changes of life and of +conviction that we have experienced, can this confidence still be +justified? And have we a place for this assertion of help from a +transcendent order when we acknowledge the reality of the independent +spiritual life? + +Everything of a religious character and even that which is related to it +meets, at least upon the surface, in the present the keenest opposition. +This opposition is aroused in the first place by anthropomorphism--the +indulgence in merely human representations and desires--which is often +found associated with religion. If the essence of religion were +inseparable from such anthropomorphism, the dissolution and submergence +of religion could hardly be prevented. But according to the witness of +history, an energetic conflict against all such mere anthropomorphism +has been carried on within religion itself and, in its highest stages of +development, religion has demanded a complete surrender of everything +narrowly human: anthropomorphism and religion are, therefore, not +absolutely identical. Our investigation, emphasising as it does the +radical distinction between the substance of the spiritual life and its +appropriation by man, counselled us to be cautious in reference to this +matter, and warned us against a hasty rejection of religion. + +The essence of religion is still less affected by the charge that modern +natural science in conceiving of the spatial world as infinite leaves no +room for a visible heaven. For, to take such a criticism seriously, we +must not only think of religion as at a primitive stage which, in the +development of its spiritual content, it has overstepped, but we must +also completely ignore the fundamental revolution that modern philosophy +and the whole tendency of modern thought have accomplished in the +representation of the visible world. Modern thought has destroyed the +self-evidence that the naïve man attributed to that representation, by +the experience and the proof that the visible world around us does not +come to us completely as we represent it, but that we form the +representation from our point of view, and under the conditions of our +spiritual nature. Our own activity is embodied in the representation; +and it will depend upon the value of this activity how far the +representation may be accepted as reality as a whole and the ultimate +and absolute world. Now, as in the visible world the spiritual life is +always bound up with something alien and which cannot be completely +transformed by the activity of that life, so every assertion of an +independent spiritual life is a protest against the view that the world +of sense is the only world. But in that, unless the spiritual life is +independent, there is neither science nor culture, the priority of a +world other than that of sense cannot be in any way a matter of doubt to +philosophy. + +But a world other than the world of sense is by no means the +transcendent world of religion; such a world as the latter could be +reached only by a continuation of the life-process beyond the position +yet attained; the course of our investigation, however, has left no +uncertainty concerning the direction in which such a world is to be +sought. We saw that the spiritual life could not acquire an independence +without becoming a universal life: only the immediate presence of this +universal life at the individual point arouses and preserves a spiritual +life in it. In spite of this immediate presence of the whole, the life +of man receives its more detailed organisation and development from his +relation to the environment and in the building up of a world; the unity +that exists in the whole reveals itself at first only in relation to the +multiplicity. There is, therefore, still the possibility that a new and +characteristic life should evolve out of an exclusive relation to the +whole; such a life, in contrast to that building up of a world, would +bear a world-transcendent character. This possibility constitutes the +only way of advancing beyond the position hitherto reached. + +Now, however much work in the world forms the main part of our life and +asserts itself to be such, yet, as a fact, our life is not taken up +entirely by such work. In the striving of humanity and in the soul of +the individual there is a movement towards a world-transcendent life, a +life that first attains to a complete inwardness when it becomes +world-transcendent. Only such an inwardness offers a firm support, a +spirituality unperverted by the perplexities of the world; but this is +not possible otherwise than by man's gaining participation in a +world-transcendent spiritual life which is purely and absolutely +self-conscious: this life must become man's own life, and spirituality +in this way self-consciously advance towards divinity. This makes it for +the first time intelligible how life, even when it suffers complete +failure in its work in the world, even when the activity exerted upon +the world is completely frustrated, by no means degenerates into a state +of destitution and ruin. For a new task is now revealed to man in his +own attitude to the spiritual life as a whole, a relation which may in +different cases be very different in character, and he may find in the +solution of the task incalculable difficulties. Here activity also +changes its character, since without any external manifestation it can +become complete and purely inward: character can free itself of +everything passive and become fully active; from being a mere +accompaniment it can become an active whole. All this, however, is +possible only if life is directed toward a world-transcendent +spirituality and only by the power of such a spirituality. + +As this new kind of life does not make its appearance suddenly, but is +prepared by the whole evolution of spiritual life, which we have +previously considered, so its main individual tendencies are also +related to this evolution. Essential qualities of the spiritual life are +manifested in work in the world, but in this they do not come to pure +formation and victorious establishment: only the elevation to the +world-transcendent self-consciousness makes possible that with which the +spiritual life as a whole cannot well dispense, indeed in which it has +its essential nature. The striving itself, and its arousing and motive +power, could not be explained if the end were not operative within our +life: "Thou wouldst not seek me, if thou hadst not already found me" +(Pascal). + +The spiritual life in man could have no hope of acquiring truth if it +were not rooted in a life which transcends all error and which in some +way imparts to us this transcendence. If the spiritual life in man did +not know of certain truth sustained at one innermost point, a truth that +exerts a directing power on all human undertaking, and prevents it from +becoming fixed in error, man would lose all confidence in truth in face +of the obscurities and errors of life as they are shown by the work of +culture. Further, for the maintenance of the spiritual life, the +preservation of spontaneity, a possibility of overcoming all restriction +by nature and of defying destiny is absolutely necessary. But in work in +the world this spontaneity is subject to the most severe limitations; +the power of fate surrounds man on all sides: in the natural course of +things even his own work becomes a rigid destiny to him, and chains him +with inexorable necessity. As in the case of the individual, so also in +that of humanity as a whole, life is a gradual narrowing, an ever +further exclusion of original possibilities; and this tendency is +continually felt as an increasing oppression in its opposition to the +freedom of the will and an independent present. How may the spiritual +life be prevented from growing feeble and senile, if new pure beginnings +cannot be produced from a fundamental relation transcending the relation +with the world, if from this fundamental relation a spontaneous life +cannot spring up ever anew? The fact that humanity is able not only to +transform the nature of culture in its particular aspects, but also to +fall into error concerning culture as a whole, without surrendering +itself, is an indication that the life of humanity is not exhausted in +work in the world. The spiritual life must unite in an inner community +all who participate in it; and this is impossible unless the spiritual +life leads man to a point where all walls of partition and all +differences fall away. But spiritual work increases rather than +diminishes these differences; with culture the differentiation of men +also grows. We must sink ever deeper in such differentiation; lose more +and more the possibility of a mutual understanding, of a life and +feeling with one another and for one another, if this movement toward +differentiation does not come into contact with a transcendent power +that counteracts it, if some power does not unite us inwardly. What +other power could this be than the spiritual life itself, and how could +it effect this result otherwise than in the revelation of a +world-transcendent self-conscious life which thus presents itself as an +Absolute? For, then a removal of differences in negative and in positive +matters becomes possible: in negative matters so far as all achievements +in the human sphere, however distant they may be from one another, +appear equally inadequate when they are judged by the standard of an +absolute life: in positive matters so far as the absolute life produces +something at each point transcending all complexity, by which the +movement is freed from its restrictions and resumes its flow, and by the +imparting of which to man in the innermost depth of his being, reveals a +new life in which all may in like manner participate. The possibility of +a finally valid affirmation of life is first attained when this +world-transcendent self-conscious life is acknowledged. Without turning +to the absolute life, life could not withdraw from its perplexities; +suffering and guilt would crush man. With this turning, however, he +acquires, not in his merely human nature, but so far as he is taken up +into the absolute life, part in the perfection, infinity, and eternity +of that life: in the midst of all change and becoming something +immovable is disclosed to him; in the midst of all dependence upon the +world, a sure world-transcendence; in the midst of all darkness and +suffering, a state of incalculable bliss. From the ultimate depths the +Yes triumphs over the No, which, at the first glance, seems so easily +its superior. + +This transition derives a power to convince primarily from the union of +the individual tendencies so as to form a vital whole of +world-transcendent inwardness. Such a whole, thoroughly characteristic +in its nature, is never a work of mere man, a product of critical +reflection; it can proceed only from the spiritual life itself. Looked +at from the point of view of that life this whole cannot be regarded as +something later and as something supplementary; but it will be seen that +that which for us first attains complete clearness through suffering and +convulsion must be effective from the beginning, and already exist in +the work upon the world. If, however, it becomes our possession only +when it takes precedence, then the whole prospect of reality must be +altered and deepened, and for us life will be divided into the stages of +the establishing, struggling, triumphing of spirituality. + +It is this fact of transcendent spirituality that the religions take up +and develop, and seek to bring near to humanity. The doctrines they +contain are ultimately only the framework or the outward manifestation +of that world-transcendent inwardness; they desire to realise its power +of deliverance and elevation completely. They themselves have their +support and justification in this transcendent spiritual life, and the +precedence of one to the others will be judged by the degree to which in +affirmation and negation they develop this spiritual life in its +world-transcending sovereignty and in its world-penetrating power. From +the point of view of that life, religion as a whole must maintain its +truth and its indispensable nature: where that life is lacking, religion +is simply a delusion, a folly the absurdity of which is hardly +conceivable; but where it is developed religion must pass current as +that which, of all things, is the most certain, as the fundamental axiom +of the whole spiritual life. Between this "either--or" there is no +middle course; historical experience shows that religion has been to +men and ages either the most certain of all things or the one about +which there has been most dispute. + +We can now return to the question that led us to this discussion, to the +question of the rationality of our reality. To be sure, even after the +further revelation of the spiritual life, the answer is not so easy as +the adherents of religion often think. For they often believe that with +the acknowledgment of a world-transcendent spirituality, its triumphant +manifestation within our world is immediately assured; and with this +conviction they attempt to present this world as a kingdom of justice, +even if not of love. But all endeavour, however energetic, and all +recourse to subtlety of thought, yield no satisfactory conclusion: at +most, the possibility is reached that that which seems irrational may +acquire some rationality in more comprehensive relations; but even if +that is so, we are not free from irrationality; and those mere +possibilities are far from being equal to counteracting the strong +impression of the reality of evil. Even religion, which would bring +about a transition to the better, is itself deeply involved in this +irrationality; a painful martyrdom has often been imposed upon its +heroes, and its form has continually degenerated in the course of +history through the influence of human error and passion. Since in the +latter the restriction is presented as an opposition to the divine, the +view of the world as it immediately appears is darkened rather than +illuminated. + +Nevertheless, through the revelation that the world has a deeper basis, +the perplexity concerning life and reality is essentially changed. Evil +is not removed; the external view of things is not altered; the good is +perhaps strengthened, and, indeed, life in its innermost depth withdrawn +from all power of perplexity and led to a new stage. So far, the +irrationality may appear in another light from this point of view, as +hence the conflicts and the convulsions may themselves be factors which +help life to realise its own ideal and to establish it in the new world. +In history, suffering has been regarded as absolutely irrational, and +has been unconditionally rejected only where man has been regarded as +essentially complete. But if an immense problem is recognised in +suffering, then suffering also, by rousing us to activity and by making +us less inflexible, may acquire a positive value and be of service in +the development of being. This, however, does not give us a theodicy; it +justifies neither philosophy nor religion in trying to act as advocate +for the Deity. To us evil is an insoluble riddle: no formula can make it +intelligible why a powerful and clear reason is implanted in our world +and that at the same time the lower most obstinately asserts itself in +opposition, treats it as a matter of indifference, offers an +insurmountable resistance to it. + +Thus we can hardly reach a decision in regard to our last conviction by +way of intellectual consideration; rather, in the decision concerning +the "either--or" which is the question here, our whole being is +involved. On the one side there is the external impression of the world, +the weakness of the good, its perversion into evil, the apparent +indifference of the world-process towards the aims of the spirit, the +apparent futility of all that would advance beyond nature. Can anything +that is aroused within our inner being, and with so much toil finds any +form, arise in opposition to this immeasurable world? This will be +possible only when a movement of the world itself, and not a mere +product of man, is recognised in that which is aroused within man: for +only then will its extension be a matter of complete indifference, and, +however mean an extension it shows in the human sphere, a turning of the +whole would be proved, a revolution of the whole accomplished. Then that +which for us emerges on the edge of our life must nevertheless be +regarded as the sustaining basis and the controlling power of reality as +a whole. Our whole investigation has championed the view that the +turning to the spiritual life implies a movement of the world: wherever +the independence of the spiritual life is acknowledged the supremacy of +reason cannot be doubted. + +But it is one thing to acknowledge such a thesis to be necessary, +another to give it the power to convince and impress, without which it +does not leave the realm of phantoms, and does not become a living +power. This is possible only where the spiritual life is taken up as our +own life, and developed as our own life; where, therefore, its +vindication attains to the overwhelming power and the axiomatic +certainty of self-preservation. The centre of reality will be changed +for us only if we change the centre of our own life, and find true +immediacy no longer in sense impression, but in self-determining +activity. + +The acknowledgment of a self-conscious inwardness, of a +world-transcendent spirituality, together with the recognition of +another kind of world, full of oppositions, must give a characteristic +form to our conception of our reality. Here, a rational solution of the +world-problem is for ever excluded, and the world present to man must be +accepted as a particular kind of reality, which cannot be regarded as +the only and ultimate one. From this point of view the whole life of +humanity must appear to be a mere link in a great chain; an act of a +drama, the course of which we are unable to survey; the fundamental idea +of which, however, glimmers through sufficiently clearly to point out a +direction to our life. + +Through the emergence of a world-transcendent inwardness there appear +characteristic tasks and complications, also for the more detailed +development of our life. Unqualified esteem for that inwardness has +often led religions to demand that life should be placed solely and +entirely in that transcendent sphere, in the realm of faith and of +disposition, and to free life as far as possible from the work of the +world; the former life seemed to excel the latter as the divine the +human. But this comparison does not hold good; for the divine is to us +not only a world-transcendent sovereignty but also a world-pervading +power: to honour the former preponderatingly may be the only salvation +for times and individuals in a state of prostration and collapse, and in +this way life would be given a preponderatingly religious character; but +this form of life can never be accepted as the normal one and the one +alone worth striving for. For one thing, that transcendent world, as far +as its contents and tasks are concerned, is presented to us only in +outline; all its more detailed nature must result from the world of our +activity, and must retain a symbolic character. If the connection of the +spiritual world with the empirical world is broken it falls into the +danger of becoming destitute; so that religion may come to be simply a +revelling in feeling; or a devotion, indifferent to all content and +which, therefore, judged by spiritual standards, is worthless. It is by +hard work alone, in relation to men and things, that our life acquires a +spiritual character. Religion does, indeed, elevate life above work, and +give to life its full depth. Still, movement and differentiation must be +included within a vital whole; and the relation to activity which is the +chief factor in life cannot be given up even at its greatest depth. The +high estimate of spirituality may not rightly lead to a mean estimate of +nature, to a conflict with nature such as has been the case in the realm +of religion in the tendency to asceticism. For as certainly as our +acknowledgment of an independent spirituality involves a subordination +of nature, this subordination does not imply a mean estimate, still less +a rejection. Asceticism which appears to be the attainment of a high +level of spiritual life soon leads to an inward degeneration. For in +asceticism the chief task is not the powerful development and courageous +advance of spirituality, but simply a negation and suppression of sense. +Reflection and thought will thus be centred upon just those things +beyond which the spiritual movement wishes to lead. Particular temporary +circumstances may make the tendency to asceticism comprehensible; such +times were over-refined and diseased, and the diseased may not rightly +give to life its rule. + +But if, in this way, we oppose a specifically religious or ascetic form +of life we are not prevented from acknowledging the strong and fruitful +influence of a world of transcendent inwardness upon life as a whole. +For its perfect health and breadth, our life needs two tendencies which, +though they directly contradict each other, must, nevertheless, within +us be complementary to each other: it needs an energetic conflict +against all that is irrational, and at the same time to be elevated into +a sphere in which everything is rational, into a realm of peace and +perfection. Within the spiritual life itself, tasks are given their form +and are estimated on the one hand from the human point of view, and on +the other from an ultimate, one might say an absolute, view of things. +The significance of this distinction is to be seen most clearly in +history, and, perhaps, in the contrast between the Greek and the +Christian character. The former places man in the midst of the world, +and requires him energetically to take up the struggle for the cause of +rationality and decisively to reject the irrational. Suffering and pain +were to be avoided; man was never to submit to them. Courage appeared to +be the chief quality of this form of life, and in relation to others +justice was its determining idea. But if this idea demands that each +should receive according to his achievement, then the higher and the +lower, the noble and the common, must be distinctly separated and never +allowed to be confused. That the noble form a small minority, and that +history hardly promises any change in this matter, is a fact that has +not escaped perception; and the permanence of the antithesis of an +esoteric and an exoteric form, therefore, appears to be inevitable. The +difference that exists is regarded as due primarily to nature, not to +free decision. To make nature completely active, and to unify that which +it offers in a scattered and an unsystematic manner, appears to be our +whole life-work. + +The result, therefore, is a powerful, active, self-conscious life, which +not only affects us by its results but to which we must assign a +permanent significance. But as the only and exclusive form of life, it +involves great restrictions and rigour; its limitations may remain +hidden in days of joyful creative activity and in the highest circles of +society, but they must be keenly felt if life falls into a condition of +stagnation, and man, as man, asks questions with regard to the +happiness of life. This destiny may then become an intolerable +compulsion; mere courage, an over-exertion of human power; mere justice, +severity and unmercifulness; the sharp distinction between men, an +actual separation, which tends on the one side to proud haughtiness and +on the other to doubt and depression. A keen perception of such +limitations and dangers must necessarily force life into new paths. + +The counter movement has won the victory in Christianity, which makes +not work in the world but the relation to a world-transcendent spiritual +life the chief thing. Man does not in the first place trust a nature +that safely leads him but at the same time limits him; but his nature +seems full of problems, and to need a complete transformation, which +only a miracle of grace can accomplish. Men are not regarded as being +separated by fixed differences, but in comparison with the divine +perfection all differences vanish, and from the relation to God the +feeling of equality and brotherhood is evolved. Thought of in relation +to the requirement of a pure inwardness of the whole being, differences +in achievement are totally insignificant: justice gives place to an +infinite love that dispels all harshness, makes all differences +consistent and harmonious, and tolerates no feeling of hostility. + +The antithesis of a nature which is operative within the world and which +elevates above the world must permeate life as a whole and must give +rise to opposite tendencies in every part of life. On the one hand, +there is a distinct formation in finite relations, an insistence upon +plastic organisation and complete consciousness of life; on the other, +an aspiration towards the infinite, a more submissive faith, a more +unrestrained disposition, a higher estimate of the naïve and the +childlike. In the former, man, full of confidence in his own power, +himself produces a rationality of reality, and disdains all aids alien +to himself; in the latter, life is sustained by a trust in an infinite +good and power which, in a way transcending the capacity of man, guides +to the attainment of the best; in short, as a whole and in its +individual aspects each is a fundamentally different type of life from +the other. + +The type of life advocated by Christianity has resulted in a great +deepening of life; it cannot possibly be given up again in favour of an +earlier type. But this Christian type also does not suffice for the +moulding of life as a whole. Most severe complications would ensue if +the position of Christianity were taken up as an ultimate conclusion and +an absolute evaluation in the conditions which at present exist, and its +principles without further consideration were applied to our life as a +whole. The annulling of all differences, even of spiritual capacity; the +displacement of justice through pity; the cessation of the conflict +against evil; the low estimate of man's own power, would all endanger +most severely the rational character of life; an adoption of this type +of life in its entirety would lead to the discontinuance of the work of +culture; in particular, it is inconsistent with any kind of political +organisation. Finite conditions are not to be judged by infinite +standards; and we men are, after all, in the finite and remain so. + +And so, from the earliest times since Christianity, from being merely +one of opposing systems, became the dominant power, compromises have +been sought. The system of the development of power and of justice has +nevertheless asserted its influence, and though Christianity has had an +external supremacy, this system has forced characteristically Christian +life to be regarded as a matter of mere subjective disposition and of +private life. But as such compromises do not fully and truly express +spiritual necessity, they easily lead to falsity. To rise above this +tendency to make such compromises, the acknowledgment of the right and +of the limits of each type, the acknowledgment of the necessity of both +within a comprehensive whole, is necessary. Such a whole and along with +it a common ground, upon which the movements meet together, and can +strive to understand one another, is given to us by the spiritual life, +acknowledged in its independence. It is not for us to force our life +into a finished scheme, but to develop fully and to acknowledge the +movements and oppositions which exist in our life. True, life will ever +remain unfinished, but can we wish to make it more complete than it can +be, and can the incompleteness cause us anxiety, when we are sure of its +main direction? + + + + +III + +APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT + +CONSEQUENCES AND REQUIREMENTS + +_Introductory Considerations_ + + +With a consideration of the present we set out: to the present we now +return. The convictions at which we have arrived, and which have led us +to a characteristic philosophy of life, must now be considered in +relation to the needs of the present; we must see whether this +philosophy proves to be true in this connection, and this by its own +development, as well as by the simplification of the condition of a +time, which, as it is immediately experienced, is confused in the +highest degree. + +But, at the outset of our treatment of this problem, we perceive how +difficult it is for the acknowledgment of an independent spirituality to +determine our relation to the temporal environment; we see how this +acknowledgment transforms that relation into a problem. The conception +of the "present" is by no means simple and certain, even as far as its +external boundary is concerned. The mere to-day is obviously too short a +period to constitute the present; but how much is to be added and where +must it cease in order that we may have a genuine present? True, the +present must involve a characteristic content that associates the +moments and unites them so as to produce a common effect; but does our +time give us such a content? The first glance at the state of life in +our time reveals a chaotic confusion, which includes the most diverse +endeavours, now in passionate union, now in complete indifference to one +another, and yet again in harsh hostility; further, there is a constant +displacement of the individual elements by a process of elevation and of +degradation. Even if something common and permanent is operative in the +present, its close amalgamation with this change and movement prevents +it from being purely developed: the truth contained in the present state +of life is inseparably mixed with human error and passion. + +And yet this is not an experience simply of the present, but one common +to all ages. For fundamental spiritual creation has always been effected +in the direst contradiction to the social environment. What harsh +judgments, and judgments that set its value at nil, have been passed +upon society with regard to its capacity not only in religion but also +in philosophy and art! How severe a conflict has been carried on in all +departments of life against the presumption of society! The present, +especially, is troubled by these problems, because, as has become +evident to us from the beginning of our investigation, it carries within +it movements of a diverse and contradictory nature, so that it can +hardly produce a consistent impression of the whole, still less attain +to a definite character. Human interests and parties seek with all their +energy to impress upon the time their own character; they call that +modern which is useful to and in harmony with themselves. The most +diverse tendencies cross one another; experiences in particular +departments of life determine the conception of the whole; the different +classes of society follow different courses in accordance with their +different interests; much that is accidental is regarded as vital and is +allowed to influence us: the extreme has the advantage of being able to +make an impression upon us; and the superficial and the negative creep +into favour through the easiness of the conclusion presented by them: in +short, in this state of the time, that which arises in human opinion is +incapable of offering to spiritual endeavour a secure support and an +orientation concerning its aims. + +This uncertainty cannot be removed by turning our attention to history, +by taking an interest in past ages. For, with whatever clearness a +highly developed science of history may present the whole course of the +ages to us, to believe that our own life is enriched and made more +stable by this, we must confuse knowledge and life, the mere present +representation of earlier times and the appropriation of them by our own +activity--a danger into which the purely academic mode of thought easily +falls. The power and the tendency of life in the present determine the +nature of our appropriation of the past and of its transformation in +self-determining activity. If this life stagnates, then we are helpless +in face of the stream of earlier systems of thought. Even if these +systems attract us to themselves, and carry us with them for a time, +finally they will manifest their antitheses and throw us back again upon +ourselves: we cannot escape from ourselves; we can never find a +substitute from outside for want of conviction and power of our own. It +is a fundamental error, not, indeed, of historical research but of a +feeble historical relativism, to expect us to form a conviction of our +own by concerning ourselves with the past; and to think that the later +stage in history proceeds from the earlier as a self-evident final +result. By taking such an attitude to the past we should only fall into +the half-will and half-life common to an age of decadence. If the +present is thus uncertain in the heart of its spiritual nature, and it +is not possible to escape from this uncertainty by resorting to the +past, it may appear to be essential that we should be completely +delivered from the tyranny of time, and that we should take up an +attitude of entire unconcern of its affirmation and its negation of +spiritual endeavour. + +But a rejection of the immediate relation to time by no means settles +the matter. If spiritual work were completely dissociated from the +temporal environment and the historical movement, it would be dependent +solely upon the capacity of the mere individual and upon the passing +moment; all relation, all community of work, would thus be given up, and +the performance of others could not be anything to us, nor our +achievement anything to others; there would be no inner building up of +life, and no hope of reaching greater depths. Not only is it impossible +to abandon such aims, but our experience of spiritual work itself +contradicts the disintegration of life into nothing but isolated +points. If all spiritual creation is effected in contradiction to time, +what is denied in this contradiction is rather that which lies upon the +surface of time than that which is deeper; rather human accommodation to +than the spiritual content of time. All who believe that distinctive +human history is sustained by the activity of a spiritual life will +attribute to time such a spiritual content. + +Every age, therefore, in virtue of the presence of this spiritual life, +will contain characteristic spiritual motives, movements, and demands, +and will be especially qualified to convey certain contents to man, to +open up certain experiences to him, and to point out certain directions. +All these must be appropriated by anyone who wishes to transcend the +original state of emptiness, and to advance to spiritual creation and to +a spiritual fashioning of life. In consequence of this a more friendly +attitude may be taken up towards time; and we shall be far more grateful +to it--though perhaps not with explicit consciousness, perhaps even in +contradiction to definite purpose--than we could ever be with regard to +the experiences on the surface of time. However low, for example, the +estimate Plato may have formed of "the many" around him; and though with +the whole passion of his soul he may have insisted upon a transformation +of the immediate condition of life, what he offered of his own and the +new that he required, with all its originality and uniqueness, +contradicts neither the natural spirit of the Greek nor the contemporary +Greek culture: Plato can be regarded only as a Greek of a particular +time. His conflict with the time is not the conflict of an incomparable +individuality with his environment, but a selection and a unification of +the possibilities existing in time; it is an arousing to life of the +deeper realities of time against its superficialities, of spiritual +necessities in opposition to the conduct and interests of men. In this +manner the great man also is a child of his age, and is unintelligible +out of relation to it. Could one think of Goethe as living in the Middle +Ages, or of Augustine as living in the age of the Enlightenment? +Indeed, we may carry our contention further, and say that the great has +been just that which has had the closest relation with the time; and +that it has reached a permanent significance, just because it expressed +the unique nature and the inner longing of the time, that which was +incomparable and inderivable in it. That which has been able to work +permanently beyond the time in which it made its appearance was born not +from a timeless consideration of things, but from the deepest feeling of +the needs of the time; only thus can we escape from the feeling of +unreality which otherwise accompanies the striving after spirituality. +This consideration must commend to spiritual work the closest possible +relation with the time, and the spiritual life may hope for an essential +advance of its own striving as a result of this relation. + +Still, the matter is not so simple as it is often thought to be. The +spiritual content of the ages is not a complete fact that permeates life +with a sure and definite effect, so that it could be taken up by +activity. Rather, that which is great and characteristic in the ages is +found only in creative spiritual activity, abstracted from which it is +no more than a possibility; a suggestion that is inevitably lost, if an +advancing spiritual activity is lacking. Spiritual creation is not a +mere copy, an employment of an existent time-character. Rather, time +first attains a spiritual character through spiritual activity, and by +spiritual creation possibility first becomes complete reality. This +spiritual creation is not simply a summation but a potentialisation, an +essential elevation of that which exists in time. Without this activity +the spiritual elements in time remain merely coexistent, and have no +living unity; they realise no life of the whole, no being within the +activity, nothing that means to us development of being. Temporal life +then remains only a half-life, a life of pretence; it lacks complete +self-consciousness and true stability and joy, and at the same time it +lacks a genuine present. To attain such a present thus appears to be a +difficult task, the performance of which is not so much presupposed by +the different branches of spiritual life as is an object of their work. +Art, for example, is rightly required to express the feeling of the life +of the time; yet it does not find such a feeling of life already +existent, but it must first wrest it from the chaos of the general +condition of life. Art is great in giving to the time that which it did +not already possess, but which is, nevertheless, necessary to the +complete reality of its life. Spiritual work, therefore, is not +something just added in time, but that which first gives to time a +genuine life and a genuine present. This task may be achieved with quite +different degrees of success; it is not all times that reach this +elevation and attain to a genuine present; those that do so we call +great and "classical" times. The general state of our life--which, +however, does not imply time as a whole--appears from this point of view +to be especially afflicted with the defect and fault of insincerity; our +age does not so much live a life of its own as a strange life; and yet +this life is represented as being a life of our own. And it is +especially so in our own time, when along with a state of division in +our own purposes we are inundated by systems of thought alien to us. We +are thus in danger of becoming half-hearted and living a life of +pretence: in religion we assert the profession of faith and the feelings +of times long gone by to be our own conviction and feelings; we build +our cathedrals in styles that correspond to another spiritual condition +and another tendency of life; in philosophy we hang upon systems and +problems of other times; in everything we lack sincerity. But why is +this so, and why do we renounce all claim to a life in accordance with +our own nature? Certainly not because our time lacks problems and tasks +of its own, or because it is deficient in spiritual possibilities and +necessities; for, of these there is an abundance; in this matter our +time is not behind any other. But there predominates a wrong relation +between these tasks and the central power of the spiritual life, which +is equal to cope with them and out of the possibilities create a +reality. + +In any case spiritual work has a great deal to do with the time; and in +regard to this it finds itself in no simple situation. Spiritual work +must acknowledge a given condition, which it cannot alter to suit its +own preferences; but it can make something else out of this condition +and also see something else in it than immediately meets the eye. The +possibilities of a time are revealed only in spiritual work, and through +it alone are they separated from the human additions that usually +overgrow them. These possibilities cannot become clearly evident, unless +a close relation to history is won: they are not suggestions simply of +the moment, for they have been prepared by the whole work of history. +History acquires quite a different--a far more positive--meaning when +the spiritual life is acknowledged to be independent, and when it is +admitted that spiritual life is not just the embellishment of a reality +other than spiritual, but the formation of the only genuine and +substantial reality, the transition to a self-consciousness of life. +For, as such a formation of reality, this creative activity extends +beyond the particular time in which it originates, and becomes part of a +time-transcending present. True, this activity always appears in a +garment that seems simply temporary; but this garment does not +constitute its being: the imperishable in it, its fundamental life, +remains inwardly near and present even after great changes of temporal +condition; and within the sphere of spiritual work is always capable of +new effect. + +Christianity, for example, in spite of the attacks that are and have +been made upon it, still asserts itself as a living power. Yet there +cannot be the slightest doubt that in everything that lies on the +surface of our life we are as far as possible removed from the centuries +of its formation; that not only the view of the world but also the tasks +of life and the nature of feeling and disposition have become radically +different. But life is not exhausted in these activities on the surface, +which must be regarded as external manifestations that proceed from an +inner unity. That which these centuries have performed for the essence +of life: the realisation of a freedom of spiritual inwardness, the +acknowledgment of an independent spiritual world with great aims and +tasks, may, indeed, become obscured for the consciousness of individuals +and of whole periods; it remains, however, an essential part, a +presupposition of all further spiritual life. + +As in this manner in the case of Christianity, spiritual reality has +also been evolved otherwise in some creative epochs; and in the movement +of history they have all together produced a certain condition of +spiritual evolution which constitutes the invisible basis of our own +activity, and from which it is first possible to elucidate the spiritual +nature of a particular time. This universal, historical state of +spiritual evolution indicates a level, to which must correspond all +work, which desires not simply to attain the aim of the moment but also +to serve in the building up of a spiritual reality within the domain of +humanity. This historical condition of the spiritual life is not +conferred upon us by history; rather history only mediates an incentive +that must first be transformed by our own activity and conviction. Only +a mode of thought which transcends the movement of history can recognise +a spiritual content in history and in our own time, and use this content +for our own striving. + +Spiritual work, therefore, and philosophy as part of it, has a twofold +relation to time, a negative and a positive: it must possess an +independence of time, and it must seek an intimate relation with it. The +"modern," according to the sense in which it is taken, will arouse us at +one time to energetic opposition, at another to the closest intimacy; +the former when it desires to subject us to the contemporary conditions +with all their contingency, the latter when it champions the spiritual +possibilities of the time and the state of spiritual evolution in +contrast with the human. We are concerned in a conflict for genuine +against false time; we are to distinguish clearly between the merely +human and the spiritual present; the spiritual life must first give a +genuine reality to time, and in doing this must advance in itself. + +Every particular philosophic conviction must justify itself in its +treatment of this problem; it must be in a position to wrest the truth +from the error in time; to understand and to estimate the endeavour of +the time without yielding to it; to comprehend as a whole the manifold +elements of truth in the life of the present, and to elucidate them from +a transcendent unity. Without doubt great problems and fruitful +possibilities exist in the time, but we often feel the most painful +contrast between their demands and the achievements of man. To diminish +this divergence; for the time to attain more to its own perfection and +become a genuine present, is an urgent task in the performance of which +philosophy also must co-operate; and by this endeavour philosophy can +also gain much for itself. + + + + +I. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FORM OF LIFE AS A WHOLE + +(a) THE CHARACTER OF CULTURE + + +The term "culture" received its present meaning in the latter half of +the eighteenth century; culture itself reaches back to the beginning of +the Modern Age. The whole evolution of the Modern Age is a striving +beyond the religious form of life which prevailed in the Middle Ages, +and which began to be felt to be narrow and one-sided. In opposition to +this type of life a new type arose, increased in strength, and finally +we became fully conscious of it in the idea of culture. The new type has +been felt to be far superior to the old in many ways; it is not limited +to one side of human nature, but desires to take it, and to develop it +as a whole; it does not refer man to any kind of external aid, but makes +his life depend as much as possible upon his own power, and finds an aim +fully sufficient in the limitless extension of this power; it directs +man's perception and endeavour not so much beyond the world as to it, +and hopes by this means to give a stability to his striving, and a close +relation with the abundance of things. The movement has brought about a +far-reaching transformation of life: that which was lying dormant has +been aroused; the rigid made plastic; the manifold woven into a whole of +life; the whole range of life has acquired more spontaneous freshness +and inner movement. The result of the work of history now becomes for +the first time a complete possession, since above everything contingent +and accidental it elevates an essential, and above everything tending to +separation and hostility, a common humanity. + +The animating and ennobling influence of modern culture is nowhere more +manifest than in the life-work of Goethe. For we recognise the greatness +of his nature primarily in that, with the acutest vision and the +greatest freedom, he entered into the multiplicity of experience and +events; with placid yet powerful dominance stripped off all that was +mere semblance and pretence, all that was simply conventional and +partial, and fully realised the genuine, the freshness of life, and the +purely human. (_V._ "The Problem of Human Life.") His treatment of +Biblical narratives is a good example of this: that a king reigned in +Egypt who knew not Joseph suggests to him how quickly even the most +magnificent human achievements are forgotten; that Saul went forth to +find his father's she-asses, and found a kingdom, symbolises to him the +truth that we men often reach something totally different from, and also +much better than, that for which we strove and hoped; the miracle of the +walking on the water is to him a parable of unflinching faith--the +holding fast to apparent impossibilities--without which there can be no +great creation. + +If, with this achievement, modern culture may have the feeling of being +the fulfilment of the strivings of the ages, yet its own course has +produced oppositions, and engendered perplexities that culminate in a +dangerous crisis. Culture, as it was represented at the height of German +spiritual life, was directed chiefly towards the inner development of +man; it was called with especial satisfaction "spiritual culture." Its +adherents were concerned not so much with finding a better relation to +the environment as with growing in the realm of their own soul, and with +employing whatever the experience of life brought in the development of +a self-conscious personality, of pure inwardness. Only in this way did +they seem to advance from the previous state of limitation to the +complete breadth of existence, and the exercise of all their powers. A +joy in life, a firm confidence in the rationality of reality gave this +inner culture a soul; and a bold flight bore it far above the narrowness +and heaviness of daily life; æsthetic literary creation became the +chief sphere of its work, and the chief means for the development and +self-perfecting of personality. + +Inner culture has by no means vanished from our life; effects of many +kinds are felt from it in the present. But it has been forced to resign +its supremacy in favour of a realistic culture, which makes the relation +to the environment the chief matter, and removes the centre of life to +the intellectual and practical control of this environment. In realistic +culture the inner development of work, of work in the direction of +natural science and technical art, as well as in politics and social +endeavour, is less occupied with the acquiring of a powerful +individuality than with the establishment of an agreeable condition of +society as a whole. Since activity is related more and more closely with +things, and receives laws and directions from them, culture is freed +from dependence upon man and his subjectivity. Culture is an impersonal +power in contrast with man; it does not lead ultimately to a good to him +so much as make him simply a means and an instrument of its progressive +movement. An immeasurable structure of life, a ceaseless self-assertion +and self-advancement, an arousing and an exertion of all powers that can +bring man into relation with the environment, are manifest in this +culture: but at the same time there is an increasing transformation of +our life into a mere life of relation and mediation, a deprivation and a +vanishing of self-consciousness. In the midst of the magnificent +triumphs in external matters there is an increasingly perceptible +contrast between an astonishing development of the technical, and a +pitiful neglect of the personal side of life: in regard to the former we +surpass all other times, as much as we fall below most in regard to the +latter. Along with a ceaseless increase of technical capacity, there is +a rapid degeneration of personal life, a pauperising of the soul. Where +the matter is one of a technical nature there is a magnificent +condition, definite progress in all departments, work conscious of its +aim; but there is a painful groping and helpless hesitation, a +stagnation of production, an emptiness that is only just hidden by a +veneer of academic education, where powerful personalities and +impressive individualities are required. + +For a time we were carried away entirely by the tendency to place our +attention solely upon the environment, and we seemed to be satisfied +absolutely by it. But the inner life that has been evolved within human +experience by the work of thousands of years, and through severe +convulsions, prevents this condition being accepted as a conclusion; +that which has once become an independent centre cannot possibly permit +itself to be degraded to the position of a mere means and an instrument. +It is impossible to give up all claim to self-conscious and +self-determining life and a satisfaction of this life. Our spiritual +nature compels us to ask questions and to make claims; if they are not +satisfied, then, notwithstanding all the wealth of experiences, the +feeling of poverty spreads and we seek for aids, and, first, we turn +back to that inner culture from which we had turned away. But we find +the ways shut off; a direct return is impossible. This culture had +characteristic principles and presuppositions; and the course of modern +life itself has, if not overthrown them, involved them in serious doubt. +We have become clearly conscious of the limitations which this inner +culture had without itself feeling them; movements which it united have +now separated, and have become hostile. Inner culture rested on a firm +faith in the power of reason in reality, and this faith begot a joyful +confidence. For it the world was sustained and determined by inner +forces: we feel the rigid actuality of occurrences, the indifference of +the machinery of the world towards the aims of the spirit, and the +contradictions of existence. In the former case the greatness of man was +the predominant faith; and this greatness was sought in his freedom: we, +however, feel much more our bondage to obscure powers and at the same +time our insignificance. In the former again, it aroused no opposition +to call only a chosen part of humanity, the creative, to full and +complete life, and to assign a most meagre portion to the majority: we +cannot possibly renounce the concern for all mankind and for the +welfare of every individual. In the former, morality and art were +harmoniously united in the ideal of life; in our time they have +separated and are at deadly enmity with one another. Everywhere life has +given rise to more problems, more inconsistencies, more obscurities; +thus, with all its external proximity, the joyfully secure ideal of life +of our classical writers is inwardly removed far from us; without +insincerity we cannot proclaim it to be our profession of faith. In +particular the resort to Goethe, as to one with a secure standard of +life, is in general no more than an expression of perplexity, no more +than a flight from a clear decision of our own: the universality and the +flexibility of his spirit permit a point of contact with him to be found +by those whose views directly contradict those of one another, and +allows each to abstract, and make a profession of faith of that which is +preferable and pleasing to himself. + +Thus to-day we are in a state of uncertainty and indefiniteness in +reference to the problem of culture. Since the new does not suffice, and +the old cannot be taken up again, we are in doubt with regard to the +whole conception of culture; we know neither what we have of it nor what +it demands from us. We cannot give up our claim to being something more +than nature, without sinking again to the level of the mere animal; but +in what this "more" consists and how it is at all possible to surpass +nature is to us completely obscure. A developed historical consciousness +and the free unfolding of the powers of the present permit many things +to rush in upon us; and we are involved in much inconsistency. We have +seen diverse systems of life arise and attract man to themselves; their +conflict relegates to the background all that is common to them, +produces the greatest uncertainty, and gives rise to the inclination, in +order to avoid all perplexities, to regard life as being made up +entirely of that which occurs within sense experience; and to acquire +aims from this experience, as well as to derive powers from it. But in +this we fall into the danger of idealising sense experience falsely, +and of expecting achievements from movements within it which are +possible only if these movements flow from deeper sources. We flee to +morality to become free from all religion and metaphysics; as though +morality, elevating man, as it does, above simply physical preservation +and the compulsion of mere instinct, is not itself a metaphysic, and as +though it does not of necessity require the existence of an order +superior to nature. Then we flee to the subject with its unrestrained +inwardness and contrast this inwardness with all the restricting +relations of life; as though the subject had any content and any value +without an independent inner world, the recognition of which involves a +complete revolution of the representation of reality; as then according +to the witness of history also humanity has reached such an inner world +only through wearisome toil and forceful resolutions. The whole course +of Antiquity had been leading up to this inner world, but the collision +of Antiquity at the time of its decay, with Christianity which was then +arising, first developed it clearly. Such an inner world must ever be +justified anew; and for this our own activity and conviction are +necessary. If we surrender its basis, it becomes dead capital which, +little by little, is inevitably spent, and then the appeal to the +subject that has lost its spiritual content is but a mere semblance of +help, which deceives us concerning the seriousness of the situation with +sweet-sounding words like "personality," "individuality," and so forth. +If the spiritual life is not strengthened and does not energetically +counteract this tendency, then, notwithstanding all external progress, +we must inwardly sink lower and lower. + +It is obvious that there is already such a counteraction in existence; +otherwise, how could spiritual destitution and the insignificance of the +merely human be so keenly felt in the present; how could so ardent a +desire for an inner elevation spread amongst men as we experience it +around us? There is no lack of attempts and endeavours after new aims +and new ways. But much is still lacking for these attempts to be equal +to satisfy the requirements of the matter. We place far too much hope +in external reforms, instead of primarily strengthening the inner basis +of life; we fix our attention far too much upon individual tasks instead +of seizing the whole; we have far too much faith that we can rise to a +new life out of this chaotic condition, instead of insisting upon an +attainment of independence in relation to this condition. + +How could independence be attained except by an energetic reflection of +man upon himself, upon his fundamental relation to reality, upon the +life dwelling in him, in short, except by self-consciousness? It is not +the first time that, in the course of the ages, to satisfy such a demand +has become the most urgent of all tasks. The work of history has not +unshakable foundations from the beginning; but the spiritual nature of +epochs always involves the activity and the decisions of man; it +involves, therefore, presuppositions that for a long period may be +accepted as established truths, and which, yet, finally become +problematic. At the beginning of the Modern Age, especially in the +transition to the Enlightenment, apparently established truths became +problematic in this way: the present is in a similar situation. The +threads that we have hitherto followed break; all external help is +rejected, as is also the authority of history; nothing else remains to +us than our own capacity, and the hope to find in it a new support and +the basis for a new construction. Only by our own power, and after a +break with the immediate present, shall we be able to strive after a new +idea of culture which corresponds to the historical position of +spiritual evolution, and which can take up into itself the experiences +of humanity. Such times of error, of vacillation, of searching, of +necessary renewal, are disagreeable and severe, but it depends only on +the summoning of spiritual power whether they become great and fruitful. +For, with regard to these central questions the times do not make men, +but men make the times, not, of course, in accordance with their own +preferences, but by seizing and realising the necessities that exist in +the spiritual condition of the time. + +Now, as scarcely anything else in life is more called upon to co-operate +in the renewing of culture than philosophy, so the system here concisely +presented is placed in the service of this task; it attempts a +construction chiefly by the union of three demands and points of attack: +it requires a more energetic development and a complete unification of +the life-process; it requires the acknowledgment and development of a +spiritual life of independent nature present to us; and lastly, it +requires that this life shall be understood and treated as the world's +consciousness of itself and thus as the only reality. All these demands +must tend towards an essential alteration of the existent state of +culture; they make much inadequate that previously sufficed; but they +also reveal an abundance of new prospects and the possibility of a +thorough inner elevation. + +It is a leading idea of our whole investigation that only from the +life-process itself are we able to orientate ourselves in relation to +ourselves and the world; and this idea is in agreement with the present +mode of thought in science. But to apply to our own time that which is +already acknowledged in general ideas is by no means simple. To give the +life-process such a position in our thought and to estimate it so highly +is possible only when life is distinctly distinguished from the states +of the mere subject, from the mere reflex of the environment in the +individual. This detachment cannot be accomplished unless we comprehend +as a whole that which exists in individual manifestations of life; +distinguish different levels in life, indicate relations and movements +within them, and thus advance to new experiences of life; reveal a union +of fact, a distinctive synthesis in life, which from a transcendent +unity shapes the multiplicity that it contains. But if in general it is +difficult to free ourselves so much from the condition of life in which +we find ourselves, to be able to illuminate this condition in this way, +and to throw its inner framework into relief; for us there is also to be +added the immeasurable expansion that directs the interests and the +vision to the outside, and is accustomed to treat, as a mere supplement, +a mere means and instrument, the life that in reality sustains all +infinity. A culture that has made the attainment of results the chief +thing has been detrimental to the spiritual, which no longer trusts +itself to encompass these achievements and to change them in a +development of life, to take up the conflict for dominion over reality. +It willingly flees to the passivity of the subject, where sooner or +later it expires in complete destitution. + +If inwardness is so feeble and external relations so overwhelm us, life +necessarily receives its content from outside, and seems to be +determined essentially by that which happens around us. It is this that +lends so much power to-day to a superficial enlightenment that centres +in natural science, and expects life to be advanced without limit, and +man to be revived and ennobled, simply by reaching a more valid +representation of the environment. We do not ask here how far the +representations proposed overcome the difficulties of the older +representations, or whether new and more difficult problems do not arise +from the solutions offered; but we do ask whether life can obtain its +aim and content from outside, and whether it can be treated simply as an +addition to nature without degenerating inwardly, and losing all inner +motive. We ask what the theories based chiefly on externals make of man, +and what they achieve for his soul. We summon him to an examination, to +see whether the picture that is held up to him by these theories agrees +with what he longs for, and, by a compelling necessity of his being, +must long for. + +To-day it will also be evident that the final decision does not rest +with the intellect, but with life as a whole. For, little as +intellectual achievement is absent from truth, the masses--and to the +masses belong those at the average level of all classes, higher as well +as lower--will always hold fast to the external impression. The advance +beyond this impression and the appreciation of the inner conditions of +knowledge will always remain a concern of the minority. There is, +however, a point where the problem becomes real to each individual, and +where each can offer his opinion: this is in reference to the question +of the happiness and the content of life. The more this question is +felt, the greater will be the thirst for a substantial truth in contrast +with the shadows of the Enlightenment; the more will the question +concerning the nature of life as a whole receive its due consideration, +and the perception of things externally will give place to a +comprehension of their inner reality. Only with such a revolution can +our life and we ourselves be transformed from a state of spiritual +destitution to one of independent energy; only thus can we discover the +wealth that is within us; only thus can culture, from being an +occupation with things, become a preservation and an unfolding of our +own selves; only thus can we strive for more simplicity in contrast to +the complexity that would otherwise be our condition; and only thus can +we wrest from what would otherwise be chaos, fundamentals and +tendencies. Our demand, therefore, that the starting-point should be the +life-process itself is in harmony with the innermost longing of the +time--even if this longing is often indefinite--after a deepening of +life and an attainment of its independence. + +If the turning to the life-process puts the question, the assertion of +an independent spiritual life gives the answer to it: however strange +this assertion may seem in relation to superficial temporal experience, +it meets a deep longing. For we are completely satiated with narrowly +human culture; the movements and experiences of the Modern Age, and in +particular of the present, make us so clearly conscious of all that is +trivial, simply apparent, disagreeable, feeble, shallow, empty, and +futile in human conduct, that all hope of finding satisfaction in this +conduct, and of advancing life essentially by its means and powers, must +be abandoned. We have, therefore, to face the following alternative: +either absolute doubt and the cessation of all effort, or the +acknowledgment of a "more" in man; there is no third possibility. But in +the context of our investigation no discussion is required to show that +this "more" cannot consist in an individual's elevation of himself above +others; that it cannot consist in a so-called Superman--a view that +only involves us more in the narrowly human. Either the "more" sought +for is only imaginary, a covering of tinsel with which we conceal our +nakedness, or a world transcending the merely human, a new stage of +reality, reveals itself to man, which can become his own life. As it is +this transcendent world alone that engenders a universal life within us +and opposes the insignificantly human; so also from this alone, and as +its manifestation, can culture become independent in relation to man. +Only when it is understood in this way can culture include aims and +tasks that do not strengthen man in his narrowness, but free him from +it, and make him spiritually greater. + +Not only the conception but the whole nature of that which is called +culture is an unstable hybrid. It should elevate man above nature, and +give to his life a characteristic spiritual content; but at the same +time we have a dread of a detachment from the experience of sense and of +the construction of an independent world, because these must lead to +that which, of all things, is the cause of most alarm, to a change of a +metaphysical character, to a transformation of existence. In truth, in +the work of humanity two tendencies are usually undistinguished, which, +if life is to continue to advance, need to be distinctly separated: a +spiritual culture and a merely human culture. The former reveals new +contents and aims; with it a new world emerges within man, and +transforms his life from its basis: the latter uses that which a higher +organisation has given us, solely as a means for the advancement of our +natural and social existence. Merely human culture turns the spiritual +into a mere means to increase narrowly human happiness, whereas the +spiritual by its very nature makes us feel the whole of this happiness +to be too insignificant, indeed intolerable. The difference of a merely +human and a spiritual culture extends from the fundamental disposition +to all the separate departments of life. Religion, for example, is to +the former a means by which the individual may make himself as +comfortable and as secure as possible in an existent world, and conduct +his own insignificant _ego_ through all dangers; to the latter, it +signifies a radical break with that world and the gain of a new life, in +which care for that _ego_, or even the state of society, is relegated +completely into the background. To the one, morality is simply a means +in the organisation of human social life, in the accommodation of the +individual to his environment; to the other, it discloses a new +fundamental relation to reality, and in the transformation of existence +in self-determining activity allows life to win an inner union with the +infinite and its self-consciousness. On the one hand, art, science, the +life of the state, education, and so forth are the idols of utility, of +expediency, the adornments of a given existence; on the other, they are +the gods of truth, of inner independence, of world-renewing spontaneity. +That there should be an end to the confusion of the worship of idols and +of gods; that spiritual culture should be distinguished from merely +human culture; that the spiritual content of the individual departments +of life should be energetically developed, and the spiritual poverty of +merely human culture made clear--all this is the urgent demand of the +present, without the fulfilment of which its state of confusion cannot +be overcome. Yet spiritual culture can never become independent unless +the spiritual world is independent. Only the presence of this spiritual +world makes it possible for culture, at the level at which it is +generally found, to be tested by a transcendent standard to see how much +spiritual substance, how much content and value, it contains. This test +will prove that we possess far less spirituality than we think; and that +the most of what is called culture is no more than the semblance of +culture, no more than imagination and presumption. But at the same time +we recognise and gain in the little spirituality that remains to us +incomparably more; we win the presence of a new world, and by this, +depth of life and the possibility of an inner renewal. Our life would be +indescribably shallow if it were to pass on one level and were to be +exhausted in the experiences at that level. The acknowledgment of an +independent spiritual life saves us from this shallowness, in that it +shows an inner gradation within our own province and sets life as a +whole a task. + +If the acknowledgment of a spiritual world, inwardly present to us, +gives to culture a distinctive character, this character receives a +further modification from the particular manner in which the spiritual +life makes its appearance and becomes established within our existence; +at the same time, from this position there is also the possibility of +different sides and tasks within an all-comprehensive work of culture. +Of special significance in reference to this modification is the +circumstance that the spiritual life does not possess man as a natural +fact, does not operate within him with complete power and sure direction +from the beginning, but is present to him at first only as a +possibility, and as a transcendence of the general condition of things. +In accordance with this, although the spiritual belongs to our nature, +it is not so much "given" to us as set as a task; for its realisation it +needs our own attention and appropriation; all development of the +spiritual life within us, therefore, involves our own activity and so +receives an ethical character. The spiritual life also has such an +ethical character because, transcending our original condition, it must +be conveyed to us, and must be maintained by an imparting and an +activity. In the spiritual life we find ourselves in a sphere of +activity and of freedom in contrast with that of nature; in this way our +life becomes our work, our own life in a much more real sense. We see +this in the case of the fundamental form of the spiritual life that is +called "personality." We men are by no means personalities from the +beginning; but we bear within us simply the potentiality of becoming a +personality. Whether we shall realise our personality is decided by our +own work; it depends primarily upon the extent to which we succeed in +striving beyond the given existence to a state of self-determining +activity. The fact that we thus take part in the formation of our own +being proves that we are citizens of a new world--a world other than +nature--and shows that we are incomparably more than we could become +simply as parts of nature. Neither philosophy nor religion will convince +one who, at this point, does not recognise an elevation to a higher +power, indeed a transformation of existence. But one who recognises this +will desire such a transformation and such an elevation of culture also; +he will not come to an easy compromise with the given condition of +things and draw the greatest possible amount of pleasure from this +condition; but he will set culture an objective ideal; arouse it from +the prevailing state of indolence; fully acknowledge the antitheses of +experience, and will be provoked rather to make further exertions than +disposed to abandon himself to these antitheses. Life finds its main +problem in itself, solely in the development of an ethical character, +and attains to complete independence and a transcendence of nature only +when the spiritual takes precedence. Every culture that does not treat +the ethical task, in the widest sense, as the most important of tasks +and the one that decides all, sinks inevitably to a semblance of +culture, a half-culture, indeed a comedy. The æsthetic system, with its +transformation of life into play and pleasure, with its beautiful +language and its spiritual poverty, is such a life. To-day, therefore, +we can revive and strengthen culture only by establishing such an +ethical conviction. Only a culture of an ethical character can develop +an independent and positive spirituality; only such a culture can free +the impulse of life from being directed simply to natural +self-preservation, and in doing this not make the impulse weaker, but +stronger. In nothing have minds been more divided and in nothing will +they become more divided than with regard to the question whether, after +the perception of the inadequacy of mere nature and society, a new world +reveals itself to them, or whether this negation is the ultimate +conclusion; the former will be possible only through that which we call +ethical. + +The conception that we have here presented of the spiritual life and of +its relation to man also makes it for the first time possible to +understand and acknowledge the manifold and opposing elements in our +time without falling into a shallow eclecticism. Realism advances in +power, and Idealism seems to be endangered in respect not only of its +form but also of its innermost nature. Idealism is indeed in danger so +long as the spiritual life has not attained to independence in relation +to man; for, so long as the spiritual life is regarded as a production +of man the knowledge of man's relation to nature and his animal origin +must lead to a serious prostration, to a complete dissolution of +Idealism. If, on the other hand, it is established that with the +spiritual life a new order transcending the power of man makes its +appearance within him, then the recognition of human incapacity becomes +a direct witness to the independence of the spiritual life. We must, +therefore, cease to treat spiritual developments, such as religion, art, +morality, as the natural attributes of all called men. Man's natural +character simply offers tendencies and relations which can find a +spiritual character only by the revelation of a spiritual world. The +decisive point of transition is not between man and animal, but between +nature and spirit. But even where culture is supposed to be at its +highest, human existence is for the most part at the level of +nature--and is only embellished in some degree. + +In Idealism a religious shaping of life is to be distinguished from an +immanent shaping of life by spiritual creation, especially in art and +science. The demand for a universal spiritual system involves the +rejection of the specific religious system as being in many ways too +narrow and open to hostile criticism; this universal system, however, as +it is presented when the spiritual life is acknowledged to be +independent, is closely related to religion. Not only is all +spirituality within us dependent upon a universal spiritual life, but +this spiritual life within us always presents itself as something +transcendent and is not coincident with our life. This religious +character must be the more clearly emphasised the greater the toil with +which the spiritual life must defend itself from a world apparently +alien and hostile. Immanent Idealism, filling life as it does through +art and science, cannot possibly be the whole and conclusive--for this +reason at least, that it has too little with which to counteract the +perplexities of spiritual and of material life, and because it +concentrates life too little within itself. But a scientific character +is indispensable to a universal spiritual culture, in order that life +may not pass in subjective feeling and presentation, and that life may +have an objective character, and be led to the clearness of a universal +consciousness. An æsthetic form and creative activity pertain also to +this life; for, otherwise, no representation of reality as a whole could +be obtained from the confused impressions of immediate experience; the +spiritual could attain to no clear present, and could not permeate +reality with ennobling power, and change all that is deformed and +indifferent to it in the original condition of things. + +From the point of view of spiritual culture the movements in the +direction of Realism also may be regarded as of value, if only they do +not desire to dominate life and to impress their form directly upon it. +The tendency to place a low estimate upon the natural and material +conditions of life and of human social relationship has everywhere +revenged itself upon the spiritual life, since it has allowed that life +to fall into a state of weakness and effeminacy, and prevented it from +realising its full power and strength. + +The acknowledgment of the multiplicity of tasks that are involved in all +the departments must be a source of great danger to life, if every +department of human experience does not serve the development of an +independent spiritual life. The more power the spiritual life acquires, +the more securely will it tend to prevent division. Nevertheless, +everything is in a state of movement; man must first win a coherent +character for his life. But it is already a great gain that we are not +defenceless in face of the antitheses within the human sphere, that the +presence of an independent spiritual life elevates us inwardly above +them and only allows an inner unity to take up a conflict. + +We may also briefly consider how the conception of the spiritual life as +a coming of reality to itself, as a formation and development of being, +must tend to deepen and strengthen the work of culture. How much more +this work must become to us, how much more indispensable must it be, if +it is not simply a matter of giving an existent material a new form, of +arousing dormant powers, but if in it we first advance from a life that +is only a half-life and a life of pretence to a real and genuine life; +if we struggle not for one thing or another within existence, but for +our being as a whole! If once life is awakened to reflect upon itself, +and if at the same time it makes a claim to self-consciousness and a +content, it cannot doubt the poverty of the life of mere nature and just +as little that of the life of mere society; in the former, as in the +latter, there are only suggestions of a genuine life, only +possibilities, most of which do not come to be realised. Not suffering, +but spiritual destitution is man's worst enemy. From this position the +outlook of the life of the majority can be only a cloudy one, its value +only mean. If we abstract from the experience of man that which is due +to the necessity of self-preservation and to social training, how much +inner movement, how much life of his own, how much that is spiritual +remains in him! How many dead souls there are in all classes of society; +how many who, allowing their powers to lie dormant, drift about +aimlessly! Nevertheless other possibilities exist in man, and even if +they are not positively developed, still they prevent him from feeling +satisfied in that state of spiritual poverty, and always keep him in an +insecure state of suspension. + +The less we think of the immediate welfare and capacity of man, the more +will the spiritual life transcend us and the more urgent will the task +of the spiritual life become--to preserve to human existence in the +midst of all externality and pretence some kind of substance and some +kind of soul. However, we have already occupied ourselves with the +question of the nature and significance of truth and reality in the +spiritual life. + + +(b) THE ORGANISATION OF THE WORK OF CULTURE + +A problem from which no system of life can escape is that of the +organisation of culture, the question how the work of culture can be +divided into different departments and at the same time preserve a +unity. To-day we are in a state of great perplexity in this matter; an +old solution has become untenable, and a new one has not yet been found. + +The Middle Ages handed down to us a system of culture that may be +described as a hierarchy, in the widest sense of that term. The +multiplicity of life was united into a whole; but this whole was +dominated by distinctive religious and philosophic convictions, which +assigned to each individual department its place in the whole and set it +its task; these departments attained to a complete independence as +little as that system had an independence for individual forms. The +Modern Age has evolved and has realised a system of freedom in +increasing opposition to the earlier system. How this everywhere effects +an emancipation is demonstrated by our problem of the increasing +development to independence by the individual departments of life. The +state and society, science and art, find their tasks more and more +within themselves, in their own development; they engender distinctive +laws and methods of their own; they seem to be able to reach their aims +of their own capacity. Effort is directed more and more into individual +departments, and there is a feeling of complete satisfaction in this +tendency. Our life has gained immensely in comprehensiveness and breadth +by the transition to this modern system: it comes more closely into +touch with the realm of fact; it produces a greater diversity of +movement, since the different departments have their own +starting-points, enter upon distinctive paths, and direct their powers +into these paths. The attainment of independence by the individual +departments of life constitutes one of the chief gains of modern +culture, and it cannot again be given up. + +But the attainment of independence by the individual departments brings +great perplexities with it, which make a definite counter-movement +necessary. At first the tendencies characteristic of the individual +departments directly contradict one another; indeed, this is inevitable, +if they are not systematised in some way. For, particular experiences of +human life are present in each department: one feels our greatness more, +another our weakness; one is moved more by the harmony of existence, +another more by the antitheses; one tends rather to exert power upon the +environment, the other to concentration in itself; from these +experiences there must originate different modes of life and different +representations of the world. In this condition of life it is impossible +for the different tendencies not to cross one another and to clash +together; and this threatens to divide our life, and to rob it of all +its inner unity. A glance at the condition of life in the present is +sufficient to convince us that such dangers are more than fancies. + +To the difficulty in respect of the relations of the different +departments among themselves, we must add another, if anything greater, +in respect of the relation of each department to life as a whole. To be +well organised each department needs a co-operation of form and content, +of the technical and the personal; the former gives the department its +particular nature; for the latter a relation with life as a whole is +necessary. The work of science, for example, follows certain forms of +thought, which it evolves from itself, and which are equally valid for +all times and parties. But even the most conscientious following of +these laws does not give to science a content and a character; science +can acquire these only in relation with a movement of life as a whole, +which, in its striving from whole to whole, takes up the experiences of +humanity and unites them into a whole. Only in this way does science, +from being simply an arrangement and accumulation, become knowledge, an +inner appropriation of things. If in accordance with this the individual +departments are detached more and more from life as a whole, and are +made dependent solely upon their own capacity, it can hardly be +otherwise than that in the midst of all perfection in execution they +lose more and more all spiritual content and all definite character. At +the same time, it may soon follow that the effect upon humanity as a +whole will become subsidiary and a matter of indifference; the +individual departments will become exclusively a matter of a circle of +specialists, and strive for an effect within this circle only. In this +way an art arises which, in the artist, forgets the man, and which does +not so much convey new content to human life, or help the time to attain +to a characteristic feeling of life, and elevate it above the +meaninglessness and the confusion of commonplace everyday experience, +but which is for the most part mindful of refinement in execution, and +so, easily degenerates into the complicated and the virtuoso. In the +case of science we find the same thing. It may, through exaggerating the +independence necessary to it, assume an air of proud self-satisfaction, +and, by detachment from the movement of life as a whole, that which is +its main concern, namely, knowledge, may suffer. For it soon tends to +become mere erudition, which treats problems as something half-alien, +gains no inner relation to things, does not understand how to animate +reality, indeed even rejects, as unscientific, all striving after such +animation. This tendency produces, to use an expression of Hegel's, +excellent "counter-servers," who do not look after business of their +own, but only that of others. + +No people are more threatened by the danger of this tendency than we +Germans; more especially because the tendency is closely related with a +most advantageous quality of our nature--willing subordination to the +object, fidelity to and conscientiousness in our work. But since we +follow this one tendency, aspects and tendencies which are absolutely +necessary to a complete life stagnate and decay. We do not sufficiently +develop a personal life independent of the object; we do not encompass +and transform it from its very base by a transcendent life-process; and +so we are occupied too much with the material, and do not completely +spiritualise it; we do not bring into relief simple lines in the +infinite abundance, which we require and must maintain complete. How +many excellent scholars our time possesses, who are equipped with an +astonishing capacity for work, who are masters of even the most +complicated technical matters, and yet how few spiritual types there are +among them; how few who have anything to say to humanity, and who will +exert their influence in this way beyond the present! The history of +German formative art also indicates a painful divergence between the +amount of untiring work and the carefulness of execution, and the +creation of simple and pure forms that would increase the spiritual +possessions of humanity, and be permanent factors in its movement. +However, the trait is rooted far too deeply in our being for even the +most determined resolution to be able directly to achieve much to +counteract it. Nevertheless, it is not a matter of indifference whether +we give ourselves complacently up to this one-sidedness, and fortify +ourselves proudly in it; or whether we oppose it to the best of our +ability. + +We find ourselves therefore in the present in a difficult situation with +regard to the organisation of culture. To give up the independence of +the individual departments, or even only to limit it in any way, would +be an enormous and impossible retrogression; on the other hand, some +kind of inner unity of life must be obtained. A transcendence of the +antithesis must, therefore, be sought; and this needs a distinctive +structure of life. The spiritual life offers such a structure in so far +as it constitutes the development of being. For we saw how independent +centres and characteristic movements arise in an all-comprehensive life. +Between these movements there may be manifold relations and antitheses, +but they are within a vital whole and with their experiences can aid its +further development. Viewing the departments of life from this position, +it will be necessary to show that each individual department has a root +in life as a whole and a significance for this life; only thus can the +power of this whole life be exerted in the individual departments, and +penetrate them. But the department does not receive its form simply from +the whole by way of derivation; but it can take up and treat the problem +independently, and with its own means; that which exists in the whole as +an affirmation may be only a question and a suggestion in the individual +department. Yet this is in no way without value: for, nevertheless, it +leads us beyond the indefiniteness of the original condition, and guides +effort in circumscribed paths. What gives work in the individual +departments special significance and intensity is the fact that they +take up the problem of the whole in a particular sphere, and can treat +that problem in a characteristic manner; that they are not mere aids and +assistants, but independent co-operators. In this connection it is of +especial importance that the spiritual life is not conferred upon man in +a finished form; but that within him it must first be worked towards +with great toil and through doubt and error, from indefinite outlines to +more detailed development. It is obvious that the form of the whole will +ever be questionable; and that the individual departments must +co-operate in the examination and justification of the forms proposed. +Indeed, it is just the mark of great achievements in the individual +departments that, while they transform their own sphere, they at the +same time develop the whole. It is this that distinguishes Leibniz from +Wolff, and Kant from Herbart. + +Such an organisation gives to life a movement in two directions: it must +be conducted from whole to part, and from part to whole. The individual +departments must be developed far enough to reveal their particularity +and to produce a characteristic tendency of their own; but they must +remain within a whole, to receive from it and to lead back to it. The +relations between the individual departments will be distinctive in such +a system; the influence of one upon another will be without suspicion, +and advantageous, only when it is exerted through the mediation of the +whole; while disturbances are inevitable, when one conveys immediate +experiences to another and imposes its nature upon another. It was +necessary, for example, to reject the earlier encroachments of religion +upon other departments of life; art, too, often found it necessary to +resist the tendency to subordinate it to morality; and to-day there is a +strong inclination to shape every department of life in accordance with +the instructions of natural science. Yet although such encroachments +must be rejected, and the independence of each in relation to the others +preserved, the changes that are effected in one department are by no +means indifferent and lost to the other departments. For, if through +these changes life as a whole is developed, then the effect of the +change must extend to the other departments. In this manner of mediation +religion has exercised a strong influence upon the other departments of +life; and in this sense, to-day, an influence of natural science upon +the whole circle of existence will be readily acknowledged. But this +does not involve a limitation or an enslaving of other departments, +because the change in life as a whole must now be ascertained first; +and, besides, each individual department must test by its own +experiences the suggestion coming from the whole. + +When we take all these facts into consideration we see that the +organisation of culture is a difficult problem and that our organisation +is unstable. In culture, different tendencies will cross one another; +antitheses cannot be avoided, and collisions will not be lacking. But +that which life loses in completeness and exclusiveness, it gains in +wealth and movement; and division need not be a cause of anxiety so long +as a powerful spiritual life embraces and unifies the multiplicity. +Without such a counteraction by the spiritual life we must drift +towards ever greater specialisation; and, with this, we should not only +see life become more and more disintegrated, but we should also become +less and less spiritual, and be transformed into a soulless mechanism. + + + + +II. THE FORM OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS + +_Preliminary Considerations_ + + +Before we proceed to discuss the individual departments of life we may +briefly consider the common task that is imposed upon them all by the +distinctive condition of the time: they must become independent in +relation to the earlier as well as to the more modern conceptions of +them, and, if necessary, take up a conflict against both. The course of +our investigation can have left no doubt with regard to the state of +prostration of the older forms of life: the uncertainty affects the +whole and the fundamental principles much more than it has ever done +before. Formerly the struggle was concerned rather with individual +departments or individual tendencies of life; it was carried on more in +reference to the conception and meaning of fundamental truths than with +regard to the validity of those truths themselves. The passionate +struggles of the period of the Reformation left the fundamentals of +Christianity untouched; in a similar manner the later attacks upon +ecclesiastical religion usually had a basis of firm faith in morality, +and derived their power more especially from it. To-day the authority of +morality is just as seriously shaken as that of religion; and the +conception of truth is itself in the same condition of uncertainty. + +In this condition of things an appeal to history cannot be employed as +proof of any position; a patchwork of our own and of something alien +gives us still less a position above perplexity: there is no other way +than to take up the problem with the means of the present itself. For +this the acknowledgment of the independence of the spiritual life forms +a fit foundation. The spiritual life is not dependent upon and fixed to +particular temporal conditions; ever anew it can break forth +spontaneously, and from the particularity of the time advance to eternal +truths. It is to us a source of joy that a time has come again when we +need not follow other paths, but must go our own; when nothing can bind +us but that which has been approved by our own being and our own +conviction. It is not necessary for a time such as this to take up an +attitude of hostility towards the whole past; rather--and especially +when it thinks worthily of itself--it will seek a friendly relationship +with history. But this is possible only when the present has attained +complete independence, and only from this independent position; only +when an eternal content is revealed in that which history conveys to us. +In opposition to submission to authority such a time makes a demand for +unlimited freedom and complete spontaneity; such freedom and spontaneity +are essential if life is again to find the truthfulness and the inner +power that we so painfully miss. + +Such a requirement of life and thought arising out of the immediate +present may easily lead us to separate from those to whom the crisis +does not seem so serious, and who believe that it is possible to +transform the old in a quiet and inhostile manner into the new. The +conflict will be far more acute with those who, with us, make the demand +for an independent present; but who, by the conceptions of an +independent present, freedom and spontaneity, understand something +totally different from that which we ourselves understand by them from +the point of view of an independent spiritual life. In all times of +spiritual revival the freedom and immediacy which the spiritual life +needs for itself have been usurped by mere man as though they were a +right pertaining to him: and then it appears that only the complete +emancipation of individuals, a severance of all connections, +unconditional submission to the passing moment, are necessary in order +to lead life to truth and greatness, and man to a glorious state of +happiness. Such a movement cannot spread without making the antitheses +of life appear less acute, concealing its problems and its depths, and +falsely idealising man with all the contingency of his experience: with +all the bustle of its preparation and all its agitation the movement +must terminate in a state of spiritual destitution; it threatens life +with inner destruction. With a modernity of this kind we have nothing in +common. + +We must, therefore, with all our power, wage war against the narrowly +human and imaginary freedom on behalf of one that is genuine and +spiritual: this conflict is exceptionally complicated and difficult, +because real life does not make such a clear distinction between the +genuine and the false as the conceptions do, but rather allows them to +be confused. For this reason the conflict will be carried on not only on +the right hand and on the left, but also against the confusion that +obscures the great "either--or," without the distinct presence of which +a spontaneous life does not acquire power and consciousness. A way must +be found by which, notwithstanding manifold dangers and complications, +we may advance to a life that combines depth with freedom, stability +with movement: this is an inner necessity of the age, and once it is +recognised and taken up as such, it will in some way be realised. + + +(a) RELIGION, MORALITY, EDUCATION + +1. RELIGION + +In no sphere of life is there more inner division and uncertainty at the +present time than in that of religion. To one, the rejection of all +religion seems to be indispensable to the sincerity of life and to the +attainment of healthy conditions, because, as a pernicious legacy from +past ages, it oppresses our life, confuses our thought, paralyses our +power of activity, and provokes men to the greatest hatred of one +another. To another, on the contrary, religion seems to be the only +firm support in face of the needs and confusions of the age--the only +thing that inwardly unites men and elevates each individual above +himself, the only thing that reveals a depth in life and allows life to +share in the infinite and the eternal. The adherents to each of these +views show the greatest earnestness and zeal; we cannot treat the +negation lightly and dispose of it with the convenient catchword +"unbelief," if only for the reason that on the part of many this +negative attitude is due to a sincere anxiety for the truthfulness of +life. To rise above this conflict in regard to religion we must, in the +first place, estimate the points at issue impartially; and nothing else +is more called upon to do this than philosophy. + +Philosophy will not make light of the prostration of religion; for a +survey of history shows that the state of life has undergone a complete +change since the epoch when religion exercised an undisputed supremacy. +At that time the world and human life received all meaning and value +from their relation to an invisible and supernatural order. The course +of the Modern Age has made the world that surrounds us ever more +significant, and since man has directed his activity upon this world, +the world of faith has been allowed to recede more and more. The +movement that led to our present position attained increasing power and +consciousness through three stages: at the height of the Renaissance the +divine was revered less in its world-transcendent sovereignty than in +its world-pervading operation; then, the Pantheism of a speculative and +æsthetic culture associated the world and God together in one reality; +finally, in the investigation of inimitable nature and the formation of +political and social relations the world of sense gives man so much to +do, fetters his power so much, and gives him at the same time such a +proud consciousness of this power, that the conception of a transcendent +world fades entirely; and an Agnosticism that rejects as superfluous and +unfruitful all reflection upon and care concerning such a world gains +ground. + +This change in the direction and in the disposition of life must itself +have forced religion more or less out of the field of our attention. But +it is fraught with far more dangers to religion that the work of the +Modern Age in all its main tendencies is directed against the principles +of the life upon which the development of religion rests. Modern natural +science has dispossessed man of the central position that he formerly +attributed to himself, and has deprived nature of its soul. The modern +science of history, with its demonstration of ceaseless change in all +that is human, has undermined the faith in an absolute truth. At the +same time, with regard to the beginnings of Christianity, there is a +wide divergence between the traditional conception of faith and the new +conception obtained by historical research. The tendency of modern +culture has been to make the increasing of power, in work upon things +and in their control, the highest ideal; from the point of view of this +ideal of impersonal power, the world of pure inwardness, the home of +Christianity, has been able to appear to be simply a subjective and +subsidiary accompaniment of the life-process. He who estimates rightly +the fact that all these tendencies of modern life work together and +strengthen one another cannot fail to recognise that they force religion +from the centre of life to its circumference, and transform it from an +impregnable fact into a difficult problem; they destroy that +self-evidence of religion which previously made life secure and calm. +If, however, religion no longer springs up in the consciousness of +contemporaries from a necessity of their own life, it is not difficult +to understand that the complications of the problem are too great for +many of them; that the burden of obsolete forms over-balances the power +of their own impulse, and thus, by a sudden revolution, to reject it +seems the only way to save truth. Then religion seems to be only a +delusion that arose in a past age--a delusion similar to astrology and +alchemy; one which, in face of growing enlightenment, must ultimately be +completely dispelled. + +But if the philosophic treatment understands the negation rightly, it +can only warn us against being hasty in our acceptance of it. To be +sure, quite apart from all the caprice and purpose of man, the condition +of life has become very much changed; but it was less the state of +affairs itself that permitted the changes to clash so irreconcilably +with religion than the interpretation which it received and the +exclusiveness which was attributed to it. The decision in this matter +has depended in particular upon what is called the spirit of the age, +which is often nothing more than the inclination and disposition of man; +such inclination, as history shows, may change into the direct opposite; +it does not form a sure touchstone of truth. + +These considerations, indeed, do not make much headway in opposition to +the storm and stress of the movements of the age: that which operates far +more strongly in favour of religion is the experience and the feeling +that the attempted negation of religion by no means easily and directly +solves the problem of life; and, further, that along with religion much +becomes untenable to which even the modern man cannot lightly renounce +all claim. Whatever there may be in religion, it has brought man into +union with the deepest basis of reality, and at the same time revealed to +him a life of pure inwardness: it has set a task for life as a whole and +has given to life a meaning and a value; it has counteracted the lower +impulses and the egoism of mere self-preservation; and has organised +humanity spiritually. These aims have hardly become superfluous and +worthless: even without religion, and after abandoning its principles, it +would be necessary to accomplish these aims in other ways. It is in the +attempts at reconstruction that the futility of the negation of religion +becomes painfully evident. Phrases concerning the greatness and +noble-mindedness of all that bear human features; a blind faith in the +elevating power of intellectual enlightenment or even of external +organisation; a confusion of thought which, unobserved, rejects and +elevates its own principles, and so maintains in the conclusion that +which it rejected in the premises; all these things can deceive him alone +concerning the spiritual poverty and the complete powerlessness of what +is offered in them, whose zeal in his antagonism to religion has deprived +him of balance of feeling and impartiality of judgment. If it is inquired +what content and value human life still retains after the surrender of +all relation to the whole and of all inner relation, it will be +recognised that the complete negation of religion consistently carried +out must lead to an appalling convulsion of human existence as a whole. + +But if such considerations counsel us to be cautious in regard to the +negation of religion, they do not justify an adherence to its +traditional form. The far-reaching changes of life that we are aware of +cannot possibly be explained away or their significance lessened; they +must be estimated, and brought into relation with religion. The boundary +between the eternal and the temporal, the substance and the outward form +in religion, has been made uncertain by these changes; in particular +they forbid philosophy to treat the religious problem from the point of +view of a dogmatic confession. The antithesis between Catholicism and +Protestantism is the offspring of an age that preceded the development +of modern culture, with all its deep-reaching revolutions. The main +problem of religion at the time when the antithesis made its appearance +was differently stated from the way in which we now state it. For then +it was a question whether Christianity was to be formed from society or +from personality; while to-day Christianity fights for its existence as +a whole, and must defend its fundamental truths against a time in which +activity is directed into other paths. The present antithesis cannot +possibly be regarded as ultimately identical with the former one; and it +is for this reason impossible to take up the present conflict concerning +religion under the banner of a particular dogmatic confession. Such an +ante-dating of the conflict also has the disadvantage that it prevents +the great antitheses which are involved to-day both in Catholicism and +Protestantism from being clearly displayed. Two different streams have +been present in Catholicism from its beginning: to the one, the power of +the ecclesiastical system is the main thing; while to the other, on the +contrary, the religious disposition is of supreme importance. The +influences of modern culture have increased this difference, both +directly and indirectly, and, chiefly outside of Germany, there are +signs of the beginning of a stronger movement towards a more inward +Catholicism. Protestantism carries within it an antithesis of the old +ecclesiastical form of religion, which adheres as much as possible to +the state of things in the sixteenth century, and a form transformed by +the Idealism in modern culture more into the universal, the free, the +purely human, but also not infrequently into vagueness and superficial +optimism. But so long as the bitterness of sectarian prejudice diverts +the attention of men from the chief thing, these antitheses are not +clearly expressed and energetically developed. There are serious +contradictions involved in these views of religion, and they cannot be +developed without giving rise to parties. Philosophy must strive with +all its energy to bring it about that these parties shall be formed in +relation to the present situation, and not from the point of view of a +past age; and that the conflict shall be raised to a higher level, to +truth and greatness, by bringing itself into relation with the needs of +the age. + +The task of philosophy is not limited to estimating as impartially as +possible the state of things as we immediately experience it; that task +also includes a positive treatment of the religious problem. That which +is characteristic in the philosophy of life advocated in this treatise, +Noëtism, as it might be called, must also find a definite expression and +show what capacity it has, in the fulfilment of this task. In accordance +with its fundamental relation to history, which has been much discussed, +Noëtism cannot make history most important, even in religion, and cannot +read into history as much as possible of what the present demands; it +must regard any such procedure as a weakness and a half-truth. Noëtism +must insist upon religion's justifying itself and establishing its +reality before the tribunal of the spiritual life: only then can the +truth that exists in history and that which, through progressive +differentiation, promotes the cause of transcendent truth and brings it +nearer to humanity as a whole, be elucidated. We have not for a moment +lost sight of the fact that it is essential to religion to be related +not to single individuals but to all; and that religion can evolve no +power without compelling men to some kind of unity. + +Now, for the treatment of the religious problem, Noëtism offers first a +position from which demands are made compatible which are otherwise +directly opposed to one another. Religion is concerned with experiences +which at one and the same time must possess a universal character, +belong to our own life, and be immediately accessible to each. The +attempt of speculative philosophy to establish religion by deduction +from the nature of the whole has the required universal character; but +it introduces religion to the soul from outside, and remains a mere +intellectual gain. The contrary attempt to base religion in the +individual soul developed an inwardness; but this attempt shows that the +soul does not know how to build up a world and to contrast it with the +subject, to present this world as something transcendent; it makes no +sure progress beyond the fluctuation and undulation of feeling. Only an +independent spiritual life, inwardly present to us, elevates us above +this division of subjective feeling and a transcendent world, and +inaugurates universal experiences in our own domain. How with the +spiritual life new realities are manifested; how a world-whole which +transcends human existence becomes evident, has already been discussed, +and it is not necessary to make any repetition here. Every +acknowledgment of an independent spiritual life is favourable to +religion in so far as this acknowledgment makes us clearly perceive the +inadequacy, the illusoriness, and the vanity of all narrowly human +conduct and occupation, its futility in matters both small and great. So +long as attention is fixed on individual matters, and so long as we may +expect some improvement in these in the present or in the future, we +may not be aware of the futility of this conduct; but as soon as the +situation is grasped as a whole and estimated as a whole, such human +conduct is found to be entirely inadequate, these external aids are +found wanting, and there remains only the inexorable "either--or": +either the power of a new world is operative in man, and makes him +strong outwardly and inwardly, or the whole life of man is spiritually +lost--one great delusion, one great error. + +If from the point of view of the spiritual life the contour of a new +world is acquired, we may turn back to history, and ask how far it +indicates a movement which tends in the direction of such a world. The +spiritual life itself brings a distinctive standard for this inquiry: +the fundamental fact is not a single factor within life, but the +existence of a self-conscious whole of life, of a spiritual process +itself. From the point of view of the spiritual life, the chief thing in +religions will be the kind of life they reveal; what they make of the +life-process; how through the relation to an absolute life they evolve +the life-process to a higher stage. Only so far as they express this +life-process, and not in themselves, are the doctrines and practices of +religion of value. + +If we apply this test to the individual religions, Christianity +distinctly shows itself to be far superior to the others. More than any +of the other religions, Christianity fulfils the demands which are made +by the nature of the spiritual life and its relation to the world; and +so far as Christianity satisfies these demands, but not in its +historical form as a whole, it may assert itself to be absolute. + +If Christianity as a religion of redemption requires that we should tear +ourselves from the old world and aspire to a new one, this demand +receives a distinctive significance by the more detailed conception +which Christianity forms of it. As evil and that which is to be overcome +is regarded not, as among the Hindus, as mere appearance, but as moral +guilt, which disorganises the world, it is not the fundamental reality +of the world but a particular conception of it that is rejected; and so +there remains the possibility of life being given a positive character; +and in this the main thing is not intellectual enlightenment, but +radical moral renewal, an elevation into a world of love, grace, and +reverence. This view of the world makes it impossible to base life +simply upon affirmation or negation; but affirmation and negation must +be present within it, and thus life is given an inner comprehensiveness +and an inner movement which it would not otherwise possess. Christianity +included the innermost basis of human life in this movement and +transformation, since it not only regarded the divine as influencing the +human by individual manifestations of its power, but proclaimed a +complete union of both, and maintained this through its whole +development. A wearied and exhausted age may have formulated this +fundamental truth in the most unfortunate manner in the doctrine of the +divine humanity of Christ; nevertheless, the effectiveness of the truth +involved was not prevented by this. Only from the power of a conception +of a union of the divine and the human can religion acquire the +character of pure and complete inwardness, of a spiritual +self-consciousness: otherwise the relation of the divine and the human +remains a more or less external one. But this is not the place to trace +how the Christian type of life has been visibly embodied in the course +of history in the personality and the life of its founder, and in the +common labours of centuries, in which the Semitic and Germanic natures +have been harmonised, and great peoples and personalities have given +their best to the world: here we may only remark further that the whole +is not a work completed at one particular point in time, but a +continuous task of all ages; and that, in the fundamental life +transcending all mere time, a fixed standard is offered by which to test +the achievement of all particular ages, and to differentiate the results +of the work of history as far as they correspond with the fundamental +character of religion. Religion must maintain the fundamental character +of the life that it advocates, in face of all change in the state of +culture, just as decidedly as for its development in detail it remains +dependent upon the help of the work of culture. + +Religion in the present, therefore, has great and difficult tasks. For +one thing, religion must energetically maintain the supremacy, in +opposition to modern culture, of the type of life that it advocates. The +fact that there are points of direct antagonism between the religious +type of life and modern culture ought neither to be denied nor in any +way obscured. On the one hand, we have an ideal of a life of the pure +inwardness of ethical disposition; on the other, the ideal of spiritual +power: in the former the tendency is to personal, in the latter to +impersonal life: in the one case there is a positive development only by +a complete transformation; in the other the immediate impulse of life is +the ruling motive power of the whole. It shows only superficiality and +confusion to seek an agreeable compromise between these antitheses; for, +in truth, either the one or the other must assume the guidance of the +whole. The whole course of our investigation permits of no doubt as to +our own attitude in this matter. + +But it is impossible to defend the supremacy of the type of life +advocated by Christianity without recognising the necessity that this +type of life must be in a form which appropriates to itself the long +experience of humanity and corresponds to the present stage of spiritual +evolution. The changes necessitated by this evolution are far too great +for the traditional form of Christianity to be able to express them; in +order to develop their own power, and to establish themselves +triumphantly in opposition to a hostile world, they must acquire an +independent form for themselves. + +There are three kinds of changes that are especially necessary to the +form of Christianity in the present. (1) The representation of the world +found in the older form of Christianity has become absolutely untenable: +in this matter we must not seek weak compromises between the old and the +new, but without fear we must fully acknowledge the elements of fact +that exist in the new. We cannot do this unless we make deep changes in +the way we regard religion; we must find the courage and the power for +such a renewal. (2) The whole movement of modern life has made us feel +that the realities with which traditional religion has to do are far too +insignificant and too narrow; a rigid insistence upon them threatens to +involve us in a degeneration to the narrowly human and subjective. The +conceptions of "inwardness," "personality," and "morality," in +particular, need to be interpreted more comprehensively and deeply; the +soul's "being for self" must be based upon a self-consciousness of the +spiritual life. Religion must take up the conflict with the world +spiritually, and through this grow in greatness in its whole effect and +government. (3) The older form of Christianity was the product of an +exhausted and faint-spirited age; hence its fundamental attitude is +predominantly passive and negative. It shows a strong tendency to +depreciate human nature, and to leave the salvation of man entirely to +God's mercy: in emphasising man's redemption from evil it is apt to +forget the elevation of his nature toward the good. The joyousness of +the Christian life is insufficiently dwelt upon; and the raising of men +from their prostration and perplexities falls short of a restoration to +a free and self-determining activity. What is needed is a thorough-going +reconstruction which shall emphasise the importance of action and +joyousness in Christian morality, without in any way weakening the +opposition to all systems of natural morality based on the rights of +force. + +In a word, with all respect to Christianity, we demand its expression in +a new form. We require that Christianity shall identify itself more +definitely with a religion of the spiritual life as opposed to a +religion which merely ministers to human frailty, and that it shall show +greater decision in casting off the antiquated accessories that hamper +its movement. We ask that it shall make prominent those simple and +fundamental features of its system which have value for all time, and in +this way restore sincerity and settled confidence to life. We can +hardly expect that the reunion of man on a religious basis will take +place all at once, but it would be a great gain if we could only clearly +realise what the oppositions are which still keep us apart. Such insight +would help to check that insincerity in religious matters which must +first be got rid of, if there is to be any source of spiritual health in +us. + + +2. MORALITY. + +From the perplexities of religion many flee to morality as to something +secure and untouched by dissension. The position of morality is, indeed, +different from that of religion. Of atheists there are many; but there +are few, if any, who deny the validity of all moral values: that +fidelity is better than deceit, love better than hate, concerning this +there is no dispute. But it is a question how far this agreement extends +and how much we may gain from it. Within the same sphere of culture at +least it is with very little difficulty that we come to agreement in +respect of individual matters of morality; if ethical societies limited +themselves to practical morality, and did not at the same time wish to +settle questions of principle, they would find scarcely any opposition. +But, as soon as we comprehend the individual matters as a whole and ask +for a foundation for the whole, problem after problem makes its +appearance, and it soon becomes clear that we can neither establish nor +distinctively form morality without a conviction concerning life as a +whole and our fundamental relation to reality. If, therefore, there is +so much uncertainty in the present concerning life as a whole and our +fundamental relation to reality, we must inevitably become doubtful and +unclear with regard to morality. In fact, the position may be described +in this way: we lack a morality which has a secure basis and a definite +character; in morality, also, after-effects of the past mingle with the +impulses of the present; and we are accustomed to conceal the poverty +of our own possessions by historical knowledge and mere learning--so +much is this the case that we are able even in a state of disgraceful +poverty to think ourselves rich. There are no less than five types of +morality which seek our adherence and the guidance of our soul: we may +suppose that in each of these there is some truth, but no single one is +able to win our acceptance entirely; each leads to a certain point, and +then we recognise a limit. We have a religious morality, in which our +volition is related to and our destiny is determined by a divine power; +but this endangers the spiritual independence of man, and has a strong +tendency to make his life too passive; besides, in this case, the +prostration of religion also weakens the power of morality and its power +to direct life. We have a morality of culture, which directs all power +towards increasing the progress of humanity, and subordinates all +subjective preference to the requirements of an objective operation and +creation; but the ceaselessly increasing differentiation of work makes +this form of morality a danger to the soul as a whole; man is in danger +of being made a mere means and instrument of a soulless process of +culture. We have a social morality, which makes the welfare of society +the chief thing, and which, by strengthening the feeling of solidarity, +produces humane efforts in abundance, but is unable to include life as a +whole; in this form of morality there is a great danger of +overestimating external conditions of life, and of levelling and +weakening life. Certain great thinkers have advocated a morality of pure +reason, which elevates man above the sphere of the useful and the +pleasant; and gives to him an inner independence; but with all its +greatness this morality is too formal and too abstract for us; and, +besides, we lack to-day the certainty of an invisible world, which alone +can give a secure foundation to this type of morality. Lastly, we have +an individualistic morality, a morality of beautiful souls, which +regards the complete development of one's own particular nature, the +harmonious cultivation of the whole range of one's powers, as the aim +of conduct, but which not only necessitates individuals who are far +greater and far more characteristic in nature than we find in experience +in general, but also has little power to arouse us to effort, and, if +accepted exclusively, soon tends to degenerate into a refined +self-enjoyment and vain self-reflection. + +The presence of all these tendencies and motives in morality subjects us +to-day to an abundance of ethical stimuli; but it does not give us an +ethic. At the most it conceals the fact that the multiplicity of +activities do not form for us a universal task, which could counteract +the separation into individuals, parties, particular departments, and +give us the consciousness of serving in our work aims that transcend the +well-being and preference of mere man. We are in need of a morality that +proceeds from our own life; and in this we need much more than we are +conscious of needing. For we have no universal aim that we might take up +in our disposition, and by which we might test all individual +activities; and so life must become disunified and inwardly alien; we +lose all spiritual relation to the world. The world surrounds us in the +first place as a dark and immovable fate; we do not make ourselves +masters of this fate, just because we give ourselves too much to do with +things. Rather, to accomplish this, we must transform reality from its +very foundation by our own activity and decision; we must wage war +against obscurity and irrationality, and this conflict must tend to +divide our whole existence into friend and enemy, good and evil, but +along with this first give to life complete activity, and lead it to +world-embracing greatness. Only in this way does man, from being simply +a spectator, become a co-operator in the building up of the world; only +thus does that which occurs within him become in the fullest sense his +own. Everything which obscures the ethical character of human life +involves, therefore, a loss in greatness and dignity; a degeneration to +a state of servitude, to being a mere part of an alien whole. Particular +parties may be in agreement with and find satisfaction in this +condition; humanity as a whole will not rest content with it. As +certainly as humanity confidently maintains that its life has meaning +and value, so certainly will it take up the problem of morality ever +anew against all attempted intimidation. + +If to-day we are again to take up this problem, then in the first place +the conditions and the requirements of the problem must be quite clear. +We can never acquire a morality from the troubled confusion of social +life; on the contrary, morality involves a transcendence of this; it +necessitates distinctive convictions concerning the world as a whole and +our position in it. There is no independent morality, no morality in +itself; morality involves a fundamental whole of life, which is +appropriated in it and by this appropriation first attains to +perfection. In contrast to the existing condition of things a new +condition must first be raised in ideas that precede conduct. The new +condition acquires a moral character only through requiring on the one +hand moral freedom as opposed to the mechanism of natural impulse, on +the other a transcendent ideal in opposition to mere self-preservation. +These two together reveal a new order of things distinct from nature; +they must seem impossible from the point of view of the world of sense, +not only freedom with its apparent annulling of all connections, but +also the freeing of conduct from bondage to mere nature. For how would +one conceive an activity that did not tend ultimately to the good of the +agent, and so aid in his self-preservation? Does it not involve a +contradiction for him to exert his power for something alien to himself? + +If in the present we feel such problems in the fullness of their force, +and if we must fight for morality as a whole, we must go back to the +foundations of our existence, and seek primarily for a secure position +in contrast with the instability of temporal experiences. In accordance +with the whole course of our investigation, we can find such a position, +and by further development a distinctive morality also, only in an +independent spiritual life, which first conducts the world to +self-consciousness and so to genuine reality. The two requirements +discussed above cause no difficulty from the point of view of an +independent spiritual life. We convinced ourselves in a previous section +of the reality of freedom in the spiritual life; in morality also +conduct can free itself from the natural _ego_ without degenerating into +a state of emptiness, because the spiritual life reveals a new and the +alone genuine self. Thus here activity is not spent upon something alien +to us, something presented to it from outside, but is within our own +being, which here, indeed, includes the whole infinity within it. +Activity in the spiritual life serves true self-preservation, which has +only the name in common with natural self-preservation. + +Wherever it is acknowledged that the spiritual life involves a turning +of reality to complete independence and spontaneity, morality must take +a significant, indeed the central, position. For it is clear that only +the taking up in our own activity and conviction, only complete +appropriation, can bring life to the highest degree of perfection. +Morality does not find in existence a life-content which it must convey +to the individual subject, but is itself within the life-process; a +complete self-consciousness of the spiritual life is attained first in +morality, and morality must develop the content of that life. It is not +that man in morality turns toward the spiritual life, but that the +spiritual life elevates itself in the whole of its nature; all human +morality must have its basis in a morality of the spiritual life. + +With such a basis in the innermost nature, morality must concern the +whole multiplicity of life; it can include and estimate the most diverse +relations and experiences of our existence. But whatever is thus brought +under the sway of the morality of the spiritual life must undergo an +essential change, and must be elevated above the nature of that which is +not taken up in this manner. By an ethical formation and development of +art and science we do not mean that the individual should be loyal and +straightforward in their pursuit, and should follow honest aims; this +conception would be much too narrow. But it is that we should take +possession of and treat as our own life and being that which otherwise +remains outside as something half alien to us; that the work should +acquire the power and fervour of self-preservation; and that in this +unification the necessity of the object becomes a definite demand of our +life, and the gain of the object an advance of our life. Only such a +life which transcends the antithesis of subject and object gives to the +object a soul, and freedom a content. + +The experience of history also makes it clearly evident to us that the +spiritual life first acquires a secure position and an indisputable +supremacy over nature by its acknowledgment and appropriation in +self-determining activity. For history shows that wherever morality is +not central, the spiritual life, even in the midst of the most +magnificent results in external matters, languishes inwardly and loses +its hold. With individuals also the final decision concerning the +problems of the world and of life always depends upon whether they do or +do not recognise that man has an inner moral task in his nature as a +whole. If this is acknowledged, then--and this just in oppositions and +conflicts--a realm of inwardness is assured us which all apparently +contrary experiences of the external world cannot expel from its central +position; but if there is no such acknowledgment, the triumph of these +experiences and the collapse of the spiritual life cannot be avoided. + +The morality of the spiritual life, as we advocate it, will have +distinctive features in comparison with other conceptions of morality; +of these we can mention but a few here. The acknowledgment of an +independent spiritual life makes life as a whole a task, since it +requires that as a whole it should be changed into a state of +self-determining activity; that everything must be aroused and set in +motion. Thus the morality of the spiritual life is constructive and +progressive, and not simply regulative in character; it is not its +purpose simply to place life under regulations and to let activity wait +until there is an opportunity to fulfil them; but, calling forth all +our powers, morality must work and create, arouse and prepare the +opportunities, so that in everything the realm of the spirit may be +increased within the province of humanity. Like the spiritual life +itself, the morality proceeding from it must be of a transcendent +nature. To-day or to-morrow may not be considered beyond good and evil; +morality may not sink to being a mere means of realising the wishes of +the time. If, however, morality transcends time, and is able to separate +the transitory and the eternal in time, then, within its task, it may +very well acknowledge distinctive situations and problems, and present +different sides; indeed, only by a close relation with the time and by +penetrating deeply into the experiences of the time will morality +acquire the necessary proximity and impressiveness. To this extent, +therefore, we also insist upon a modern morality, however decidedly we +reject that which to-day is called "modern" morality, and which for the +most part is no more than a surrender of morality to the wishes and +moods of the individual. + +If in these features the morality of the spiritual life already +manifests a distinctive character, this distinctiveness is further +increased by the particular nature of the actual relation of man to the +moral task, as it appears here. The highering of the ideal will +necessarily increase its divergence from man, as he is. It will become +quite evident that morality is not a continuation of nature, a natural +attribute of man, or a product of social relationship, but the most +pronounced expression of a great change in the direction of life, the +institution of a new order of things. If at the same time life is to be +fashioned morally, a conflict is inevitable; and the general outlook of +life and of conduct will depend upon where we find the centre of +opposition and what is the main direction of the conflict. In the first +place, morality must take up a definite attitude towards the +sense-nature of man; that nature must be subordinated to the aims of the +spirit. But we have already seen that there is a danger that the ethical +task will lose its depth, and that life as a whole will be perverted, +if the rights of nature are misunderstood and there arises the desire to +suppress it completely, and if, in a tendency to asceticism, this +suppression is made the chief concern. The chief moral task is the +development and establishment of a genuine and real spiritual life, as +opposed to a false and merely apparent one, which is found in human +conditions, not only in the state of society but also in the soul of the +individual: thus a mere transition from society to the individual can +never give any aid. The condition in which life is generally found +evolves no independent spiritual life; but it uses the spiritual impulse +that is present within it simply as a means to other ends, and thus the +result is an inner perversion; at the same time man is generally +zealously occupied with giving himself the appearance of intending to +follow the spiritual for its own sake, and of sacrificing everything to +it. In opposition to such radical insincerity, to acquire a sincere and +genuine life is the chief task and the chief desire of morality; for the +establishment of sincerity and truth in face of an opposing world the +soul needs before all else loyalty and courage. + +And so morality involves life in a great division: it cannot possibly +take up a friendly attitude towards everything and readily admit +everything: its chief task must be to arouse life from its confusion and +apathy. But this does not prevent a morality of the spiritual life +striving for universality in its inner nature. The morality of the +spiritual life must, therefore, establish a definite relationship on the +basis of the present with the prevailing types of morality which were +previously mentioned. If the morality of the spiritual life is certain +of its own nature, it is quite possible for it to recognise a certain +validity in every other kind of morality without degenerating into a +feeble eclecticism. The relation that we recognised between the +spiritual life and religion also makes religion valuable to morality: +the moral significance of culture may be especially acknowledged where a +universal character is desired for the spiritual life; the relation of +man to man may also become inwardly important where it is necessary to +the inner construction of the life of society. Again the morality of the +spiritual life fully agrees with the demand for an independence of +morality and for an elevation above narrowly human aims, in the manner +that the morality of reason advocates; finally, individuality also can +obtain its due in the spiritual life. All this, however, is valid only +with the presupposition that we acquire a position above the antitheses +of experience and not between them, and an inner independence in +relation to the chaos of time. Only from this position and this +independence can we advance in any way, even within time. + + +3. EDUCATION AND INSTRUCTION + +Education and instruction are especially affected by the difficulties +that are engendered by the lack of a main tendency in life and of a +transcendence of the superficiality of time. For the lively interest +which its questions provoke, the incalculable amount of work and +activity that is called forth in this department, do not produce their +full result, because we do not possess enough life of our own of a +definite character to be able to test and sort, to clarify and deepen, +that which is presented to us. And so in conflict with one another we +use up much power without making much progress in the most important +matter. + +Educational reform is the catchword, but we have no philosophy of +education that is based upon a securely established conviction +concerning life as a whole, and we trouble ourselves very little to +obtain one. We wish to improve education, and yet we have not come to an +understanding with regard to its ideals, its possibility, and its +conditions. Education must be fundamentally different in character, +according as man is regarded as a particular and exclusively individual +being, or as a being in whom a new and universal life seems to emerge; +according as he is only an elevated being of nature or in the highest +degree possible a spiritual being; according as the higher proceeds from +the lower gradually and surely after the manner of organic growth, or we +must find a new starting-point and accomplish a revolution. Further, an +individualistic training, as it dominated the classical systems of +pedagogy, is no longer sufficient; the relation to society must also be +fully appreciated, and be effective. But attention to this requirement +involves us in the danger of treating the problem of education too +externally, and of bringing all more or less to the same level; and this +danger must be overcome. Yet how can it be overcome, unless we possess +securely a depth, unless we acknowledge the presence of the infinite +within the human being, as it is comprehended in our conviction of the +spiritual life? + +The form of instruction suffers from the ceaseless onflow of new +material, the constant increase in the number of claims. In itself each +single demand may be quite justifiable; but whether it is better than +the others can be decided only from an idea which governs the whole. If +no such idea exists, a gain in the individual departments may be a loss +to the whole; and an enrichment in one department may lead to a decline +of the whole. In face of that which has been handed down from the past +and that which arises in the present, it is difficult to come to a +balanced judgment; the parties may be right in their attacks one upon +another, but this does not imply that they are right in their own +assertions. The immediate impression tends to give the balance in favour +of the requirements of the present; from the point of view of the +immediate impression, all occupation with the past may appear to be a +flight from the living to the dead. The advocate of the claims of +history may reply to this that man as a spiritual being is not a child +of the mere moment, and that we concern ourselves with the past not on +account of what is transitory in it, but for its eternal content. But he +who thinks thus must throw the eternal content into relief and separate +it sharply from that which is simply temporal; he must establish a +relation between this content and his own life, and make that which is +externally alien his inward possession. This does indeed come to pass in +a few cases; but can we say that it comes to pass generally or +predominantly? We Germans in particular have far too strong a tendency +to substitute scholarly occupation for inner animation, and instead of +spiritual substance to offer academically correct knowledge. It is +therefore not without good reason if Classical Antiquity does not so +much inspire as weary our youth; yet the blame for this does not rest +upon Antiquity, but on ourselves, and upon the manner in which we treat +it with calm scholarship, without transforming it into our own +possession. For how could that influence the whole man which does not +come from the whole man? Everything points again and again to the same +thing--we lack spiritual independence, inner transcendence of history +and environment, we lack a characteristic life as a whole. The contact +with the incalculable abundance of impressions that we experience must +therefore remain an external one; and with all our increasing wealth of +knowledge we threaten to become spiritually poorer. + + +(b) SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY + +Science, with its innumerable branches and its powerful penetration of +life, is indisputably a strong feature of the age. Its effect is not +exhausted in the abundance of particular achievements; by the +objectivity of its work it has brought the world much nearer to us, has +led our life to greater clearness, has made us more alert, and given us +a secure dominion over things. Science, therefore, must also be a factor +in the determination of a philosophy of life, and must raise the whole +position of man. Of course, as soon as we survey and estimate its work +from the life-process we find that there is no lack of difficult +problems in science. Since the magnificent results of the natural +sciences often give rise to the tendency to force their particular bent +and methods on the human sciences, to which our conception of the +spiritual life gives a characteristic sphere of their own, there is a +danger that the balanced development of the individual sciences and the +complete organisation of what is distinctive in them will be prevented. +However, we do not lack energetic resistance of this danger; and +ultimately it is less science itself than the movement to popularise it +that falls into this danger. Further, the results of science with regard +to the object easily tend to obscure the subjective element, the +spiritual activity, the characteristic synthesis, which forms an +organised collection of pieces of knowledge into the unity of a science. +It is apt to appear as though science needs only to construct further on +a given basis and in a given direction; while both of these are open to +much dispute: different possibilities, prospects, types may be revealed; +the work of history has run through different stages, and has certainly +not already exhausted its possibilities. Nevertheless, the subjective +element with its freedom, mobility, and many-sidedness is becoming more +adequately appreciated, and there is no reason to fear that science will +become dogmatically pursued in paths that have become fixed. Finally, +the problem of the relation of thought to life is the source of much +perplexity: we Germans, for example, have a strong tendency to take mere +knowledge for inner appropriation of the object, and instead of +spiritual substance to offer an abundance of scholarship. This, however, +is not a defect in science itself, but an error on the part of man, who +has no life of his own with which to meet the onflow of impressions from +the environment; and so our estimate of science and our acknowledgment +of its magnificent achievement cannot be affected by this charge. + +Philosophy is in quite a different position: its present state cannot +satisfy anyone who seeks rather for a universal science than for an +academic discipline. For our philosophical efforts lack a common aim and +close relation with the innermost need of the time; they do not even +show any definite and energetic attempt to overcome the confusion from +which our world of thought suffers. A great stream of philosophic effort +came to an end with the speculative philosophy of the first decade of +the nineteenth century. After a temporary ebb of this philosophic +effort, we now wish to take up the work again with fresh power, but we +have not yet acquired inner independence; and therefore, in sifting and +collecting, we are unable to direct the age to definite aims, or +radically expel the inconsistencies into which an indefinite relation to +the past has led the present. + +There are three main streams of thought which come to us from the past, +and we can neither completely take them up nor withdraw ourselves from +them: the Enlightenment, with its philosophic summit in Descartes; the +critical philosophy of Kant; and speculative philosophy, with its +consummation in Hegel. It has been thought that the Enlightenment, with +its starting out from the subject, its unadorned intellectualism, its +formal ratiocination, its rejection of everything that is not +comprehended in clear and distinct ideas, was transcended at the height +of German classical literature, because at that time a life rich in +content was set in contrast with it. But, as a fact, no adequate +settlement with the Enlightenment has been arrived at; the supposed +transcendence is not final, because the elements of truth in the +Enlightenment, especially its turning from history to the immediacy and +independence of spiritual life, were not properly acknowledged. But +to-day it is less the elements of truth of the Enlightenment that are a +force than that which is trivial and narrowly human in it--the +ratiocination of the subject which, the more empty it is, the more it +feels itself to be the measure of all things, and, rejoicing in +negation, applies the results of the natural sciences in an attempt to +bring about the greatest possible suppression of all spiritual +relations. In this form the Enlightenment gains acceptance by the +masses, which formerly had seemed inaccessible to it; and thus it +becomes an instrument by which life is dissipated and made shallow. +From its position of research, philosophy looks down upon this tendency +with contempt; but it produces no movement that is able to take up the +struggle with this tendency to shallowness, and pass through the +struggle victoriously. Kant is often lauded as the spiritual guide of +our time; and it is overlooked how much that was certain for him has +become doubtful; how many new facts, new problems, new prospects, which +cannot be lost to the world of thought we have received from the +nineteenth century with its historico-social culture and its +overwhelming widening of the horizon. Kant's critique of the reason is +based on a conception of science; on a faith in the possibility of a +knowledge of truth; on a conviction of a spiritual organisation of man, +which are rather in contradiction than in harmony with the main +tendencies of the present. His absolute ethic, the pillar of his +constructive thought, is incompatible with the empirical and social +treatment of morality to which the present does homage. But at the same +time we cannot free ourselves from the influence of Kant. For we cannot +refute his critique of the reason, breaking up, as it does, the old +representation and conception of truth; and, without his ethic, our +ethic would lose the appearance of truth and greatness. In the judgment +of the present, Hegel experiences a treatment that is just the opposite +of that which Kant receives: if in reference to the latter we do not +notice what divides us, so in reference to the former we fail to +recognise what joins us. For if Hegel's exaggeration of the power of the +human spirit and his identification of spirit and thought appear alien +to us, yet his idea of evolution, which embraces all multiplicity, and +represents all realities and conceptions as in a state of flux; his +elevation of spiritual factors to the form of independent powers which +develop and establish their own necessities undeterred by the preference +of man; his emphasis on the fact of the power of contradiction and +opposition in history--all this, often in spite of our own conceptions, +exerts an enormous influence over us; and we cannot shake it off +without surrendering a considerable portion of our spiritual possession. + +These tendencies all whirl confusedly together and draw us now in one +direction, now in another; we can get beyond the state of decadence only +when we have succeeded in giving to the world of thought an independent +character, which corresponds with the spiritual condition of the +present, and which can do justice to the old as well as the new +experiences. After the whole course of our investigation, only a brief +account is necessary to indicate the directions the system of life here +advocated points out to reach this; a fuller treatment would make a +particular theory of knowledge necessary. We must bring into prominence +three of the chief points. + +(1) Only the life-process can be the starting-point of philosophy, not +some kind of being more ultimate than this process, whether we conceive +of such being as an external world or as a subject existing independent +of the world: the ideas of "world" and "subject," as also that of +"being," can be evolved and made clear only within the life-process; at +the same time, they remain in a state of flux, and never are so directly +opposed to one another as modern thought has represented them as being. +Philosophy, with this starting-point, would, however, attain an +independence in relation to the special sciences only if it were +possible within the life-process to form a unity and a distinctive +synthesis, which should deepen our view of reality and set it as a whole +in a new light. (2) Such a synthesis must transcend the state of change +of all the relations and caprice of men; this is possible only by the +revelation and appropriation of an independent spiritual life withdrawn +from the life of sense. Without such a spiritual life there is no +release from the chaos of subjective experiences and opinions; only from +the position of the spiritual life is it possible for a spiritual +occurrence to be revealed in the province of man, so that we do not need +to infer from man to the world, but that within him a universal life can +be immediately experienced. (3) As, on the one hand, the spiritual life +is an indispensable presupposition, so on the other it is an infinite +task; the former as far as the fundamental fact is concerned, the latter +in reference to its detailed content. This content can be acquired only +through the movement of history as a whole; thus a constructive +philosophy--and not merely a critical one--could arise only where the +spiritual life as a whole had acquired a characteristic form. In this +case, philosophy was not simply an offspring of life, not merely +something for life to occupy itself with. By its demand for a thorough +clarification of our ideas and life, and by its raising the question of +absolute truth, philosophy has exercised no little influence upon the +progress of life. But that which it achieved of a fruitful nature, it +achieved not in detachment from, but only in relation to, life, and by +interaction with it, however much this relation may be concealed at the +first glance. + +Such a connection of philosophy with life as a whole is by no means new; +it has existed in all times. Never has the world of thought acquired a +distinctive character except in close relation with life as a whole: it +is only from life as a whole that thought has received its problems, the +nature of its procedure, and the demarcation of its work. A survey of +the history of philosophy makes it evident that the leading thinkers +differ mostly, and differ from the beginning, in that which they regard +as the essence of life. In what they regard as the essence of life they +have found the firm point of support for their work; from that the +direction of their research has been determined; and from that the +questions arose to which they required an answer from the universe. And +we all know that in these matters the question often implies more than +the answer, that it often carries the answer within itself. + +If, therefore, this connection of philosophy with the life-process +signifies an old and indisputable truth, this truth is not sufficiently +acknowledged. Its adequate acknowledgment gives rise to a new situation; +indeed, it tends to the development of a new type of philosophy. With +the critical tendency of the Modern Age, this type shares the desire not +to surrender thought to a state of defencelessness in face of the stream +of appearances, but would primarily concentrate it in itself, and in an +inner independence find a standard for all further undertaking. But this +attainment of independence in thought is not accomplished by turning to +the mere subject, but to a central occurrence, transcending the +antithesis of subject and object. If thought cannot begin from such an +occurrence, and understand the movement of life as an unfolding and +perfecting of this comprehensive occurrence, then there is no truth for +man. Truth, as a relation of two series absolutely alien to each other, +is an absolutely nonsensical conception: truth must be immanent, in the +sense that one life embraces both subject and object, and that in the +movement of life there is as much a coming together of subject and +object as a coming together of activity from the centre and from the +circumference. + +That in this we have to do with a peculiar formation of knowledge and +not with a merely formal modification is shown by the following +considerations. If thought, in the manner previously supposed, takes its +starting-point in a world existing independently of the subject, then in +order to subordinate reality spiritually thought will comprehend it in +the most general conceptions. Ultimately, the being of things will be +sought in formal ontological magnitudes, as, for example, in "pure +being." If the whole abundance of reality appears to be derived simply +from these general conceptions, it is in danger of being transformed +into nothing but schemes and shadows, and of losing all genuine life. +If, as opposed to this, the subject alone is taken as the +starting-point, then more life and more movement is indeed assured, and +a more varied prospect will be acquired, but there is no possibility of +distinguishing between that which is only contingent to the individual +and that which forms a common inner world; there is no possibility of a +rejection of the narrowly human, or even of extricating a realm of ideas +from the abundance of impressions: if in the former case knowledge lost +all content, in the present case it threatens to be completely +dissolved. If, further, on the one hand abstract universal conceptions, +and on the other the subjective states of individuals, form the stem of +knowledge, then neither in one nor in the other does the fullness of +spiritual reality attain its due--the reality that exists in the +building up of a genuine spiritual culture. But in the type of +philosophy advocated by us this is the chief thing; since in contrast to +the psychological and the cosmological treatment this philosophy +develops a noölogical treatment, and sees the central domain of +philosophical research in the elucidation and unification of facts +which, in the construction of a spiritual world in the province of man, +appear in the whole and in every branch. In this connection the +conception of fact is something more ultimate and universal in its +relations; but it is just that which makes it more valuable for the +conviction as a whole. + +This conception of its task will bring philosophy into a closer relation +with personal life, as well as with the work of history, without making +it the mere instrument either of the one or the other. Otherwise it +would seem irrational, and a tendency from which one must free oneself +as much as possible, that in philosophy, personality, not only in +creative activity but also in appropriation, signifies so much. The +object, on the contrary, acquires a positive value, if we are certain +that the standard of life is ultimately also the standard of knowledge; +if with this the degree of the development of life at a particular point +necessarily decides the nature of the work of thought there achieved. +The near relation of the thinker to the proximate and the more distant +culture environment is explained from this position in a manner no less +satisfactory: the relation can then remain close, even if in the first +place it appears to be one of conflict and opposition. Similarly, the +whole movement of history acquires a greater significance for knowledge; +far-reaching changes of life transform the temporal situation, since +they permit us to experience, see, and seek something else; all these +changes, however, demand from thought an attention to and an +appreciation of the whole. Nothing other than this is involved in the +requirement that thought must correspond with the historical state of +spiritual evolution. + +This acknowledgment of personal and of historical life by philosophy +makes it intelligible why philosophy manifests so much diversity and +opposition, and why on the surface it shows so little unity. Where the +conviction of an independent spiritual life rules, the faith in a unity +of truth can be shaken by this fact just as little as the courage to +creative activity can be paralysed. The basing of thought upon the +spiritual life also has the advantage that the main types of thought can +be derived from the different positions which may be taken up towards +the spiritual life, and thus a limit may be set to the otherwise +indefinite abundance. From this point of view there are for us five +chief types of thought and world-conception. Minds first divide on the +question whether we can unify life at all, and at the same time whether +we may venture to make an assertion concerning reality as a whole. He +who rejects this as impossible and readily surrenders himself to the +conflict of immediate impressions might be called an indifferentist. If, +however, a striving towards unity is admitted, then the question whether +a spiritual life with a reality and values of its own in contrast with +nature may be acknowledged or not becomes the point of decision, and the +basis of division into opposing camps. He who gives a negative answer to +the question, and regards nature as the whole of reality, becomes an +advocate of Naturalism. He, however, who answers in the affirmative, and +may be called an idealist, is immediately confronted with a new problem. +He cannot acknowledge the spiritual life without at the same time giving +it the supremacy; but now the doubt arises whether this supremacy may be +easily and peacefully established, or whether it meets with strong +opposition. When the existence of these oppositions is denied, or they +are regarded as being easy to overcome, there grows up an optimistic, +contemplative form of Idealism, which to the holders of other forms +inevitably seems abstract and shallow. If, on the contrary, the +oppositions are fully acknowledged, the final division originates with +the question whether finally we are to submit to the state of stagnation +brought about by these oppositions, or whether by some kind of +reinforcement of the counteraction to this state of stagnation life may +once more be set in progress: the former gives rise to Scepticism and +Pessimism, the latter to Activism, as it has been discussed by us in an +earlier section. It is easy to see what distinctive lines of conflict +and what kinds of conflict must arise between the indifferentist, the +naturalistic thinker, the optimist, the sceptic, and the activist. +However, we cannot allow this to detain us; it must, nevertheless, be +pointed out here, that in philosophy the possibilities are not yet +exhausted, and that to avail ourselves of these possibilities nothing is +more necessary than a close relation of its work with the life-process, +and a firmer grounding in the independent spiritual life. + + +(c) ART AND LITERATURE + +Nowhere does modern life throb more violently and more strongly than in +art and literature. That which in this department has a claim to +permanence acquires especial power from the fact that this department +had to establish itself anew in opposition to an attempt to curtail it. +For who could deny that a culture of work and of utility had a tendency +to reduce artistic literary creation to the position of an accompaniment +and a fringe of another kind of life, to a diversion for idle hours? The +more we feel the limitations of the life of work and utility the more do +art and literature become independent tasks. From art and literature we +expect more lightness, more agility, and more joy in life; they should +conduct life from too great an attention to externals to +self-consciousness, and in this way give life a soul. They should +strengthen individuality in opposition to the levelling tendency of the +culture of the masses, wrest simple fundamentals from chaotic confusion +of life, and aid the time in reaching a comprehensive vital-feeling and +a synthesis transcending its inconsistencies. In opposition to that +which oppresses us and degrades us to instruments of a meaningless +machinery, we desire some kind of province where life rests in itself +and purposes nothing else but itself; where it springs up with complete +spontaneity; and where it can express itself with complete freedom, and +in this expression find its highest joy. + +From such a longing a new art that permeates our life has arisen. Art +must seek new means of expression for the new situation; it cannot serve +the development of a new life-content without bringing about liberation +from all conventional statutes; it cannot prevent a threatened tendency +of life to become stagnant without desiring a fully free place for the +subject, and for the development of his individuality. He who sees +chiefly the dangers in everything forgets that nothing new and great can +arise without bringing dangers with it. + +From the point of view of the system that we champion, we can quite well +understand the significance of the æsthetic movement of the present, +acknowledge the deliverance of life which it has accomplished, and in +general we can go a good distance with it. But there comes a point where +the courses diverge; not because we think less of the capacity of art, +but we believe that we think more highly of its task. This deliverance +from the culture of work, this turning to individuality, promises an +essential elevation of life only if a new kind of being, a new world, is +able to break forth in the soul that depends upon itself; if the +individual in his conflicts aids the development of the infinite life; +if, through all transformations and prostrations, man wins an inner +relation to the whole and to things, and by this grows beyond the +narrowly human. + +If this does not come to pass, the movement remains on the surface of +sense experience and related to the activity and occupation of mere man; +and so it cannot make anything higher or essentially new of us; it +remains subject to the oppositions of the age instead of becoming +superior to them. We are, indeed, enriched by the most diverse forms of +expression: even the most concealed circumstances, the most delicate +pulsations of the soul, cannot withdraw themselves from being +represented. None the less, the description of the world-environment +acquires the most striking clearness and penetration, and in the +incalculable wealth of individual forms of art virtuosi are not lacking +at whose capacity of execution we are astonished. But all this gives to +art no spiritual content and no real greatness. It can, indeed, bring an +inexhaustible abundance of stimuli to bear upon individuals and spread a +shiny gloss over existence and life, but it cannot raise life +essentially. The care of the mere individual, with his changing +circumstances, prevents art from taking up sufficiently the problems of +the present situation as a whole; of the spiritual condition of humanity +as a whole. + +And so art in this form is not able to grasp the epoch with its +spiritual movement as a whole, and to further humanity in the struggle +for spiritual existence, in which to-day all individual problems are +included. Humanity is in a serious crisis; the old foundations of life +are about to give way, and the new are not yet secured. The world has +rejected the standards which man had imposed upon it; it turns against +him, and leaves him nothing more in particular. To be assured of a +distinctive significance man needs a strengthening, and at the same time +an aroused reflection forbids him all help from outside. The fact that +that which is hostile and threatens to degrade and to annihilate man +takes possession of his own province of life and penetrates into it +gives a particular acuteness to these problems. We are not only +surrounded externally by a dark fate, but our soul also degenerates in +it, and becomes more and more a soulless mechanism. Indeed, our own +activity becomes the most dangerous opponent of the soul, since in +forming and taking part in complexes of work which ever become greater +it turns against us and takes the soul from the soul. + +An art which has its basis in the individual and which does not advance +to spiritual substance cannot possibly prevent the threatened +dissolution of life. Even the most wonderful expression of disposition, +even the most delicate and most fluid representations of conditions, do +not free us from the chaos of the time: they might easily bind us still +more strongly to it, since they weaken the power, indeed the tendency to +energetic concentration, and increase the tendency to degenerate into a +state of weakness and decay; while to overcome these dangers it is +necessary primarily to increase our activity, to win again an active +relation to reality. Art cannot free itself from that condition of +feebleness without entering into a close relation with the central task +of life and acknowledging a spirituality transcending the subjective +circumstances and interests of mere man. If these requirements are not +satisfied, no talent can prevent a decline of art into a more refined +Epicureanism. + +But where such a spiritual life is acknowledged, and at the same time +there arises the task of winning for man a new life, a new spiritual +reality, art inevitably acquires a great significance, and becomes +absolutely indispensable. Without the liberation which it brings, and +its presentation of things in a harmony, how could a whole with definite +character be raised? How could the new that hovers before us acquire +form and exert a penetrating power without the help of a constructive +imagination which precedes its realisation? How could the soul's +innermost experience permeate life as a whole, and ennoble its whole +structure without the help of art? The higher we place the ideal of +life, the more does the spiritual content which immediate existence +manifests become a mere sense form, the more is æsthetic activity +necessary to prevent disunion of life, in the midst of all oppositions +to give it some kind of unity, and in the midst of the passion of +conflict some rest within itself. But, to achieve this, art may not +purpose to form an oasis in a wilderness of life, but, hand-in-hand with +other activities, must fight for spiritual experience and a genuine +meaning of life as a whole. + + +(d) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE + +To treat of the complicated problems of the political and social life of +the present does not come within our purpose; we can consider them only +so far as the task of the construction of an independent spiritual world +is affected either for good or evil by the nature of their solution. + +In contrast to the epoch of the Enlightenment, the nineteenth century +brought about a transition from the individual to society: social life +has developed in numerous branches, has disclosed a superabundance of +new facts, and has set us new tasks. But this development has also +brought much perplexity with it. It becomes evident in this development +also, that each spiritual movement that attains power experiences in its +further course limitations, and is degraded by its contact with human +conditions. Along with the social movement there has been the +often-discussed change by which life from being centred in an invisible +world becomes occupied with the visible one, and by which all +departments of life are given a naturalistic, realistic character and +tendency. There has been no lack of opposition to the movement to make +society the first consideration; the opposition has gone even so far as +to dispute the right of the whole. Further, the earlier and the later +conception of society, the idealistic and the realistic, are often +confused; and from this confusion contradictions arise that not only +confuse our ideas but also degrade our life. There is a danger that a +zealous and excited occupation with nothing but individual tasks may +take our attention from the whole, and that the problems which the inner +condition of man involves may not obtain due consideration. + +This turning to society is most manifest in the powerful advance of the +state. In this, an inner longing for a more social life, as Hegel +especially philosophically advocated it; and actual changes of +conditions operated together, and strengthened one another. The more +definite manifestation of individuality on the part of nations and the +sharper division between them; the active interest of wider circles in +political problems; the mechanical organisation of work, with its more +exact differentiation and its more rigid organisation of forces; but +primarily the longing, which grows out of the ceaselessly increasing +economical and social perplexities, for a power superior to the parties +in dispute and acting as arbitrator--all these have immeasurably +increased the power of the state in different degrees among different +peoples, but in general through the whole civilised world. + +The freedom of the individual, therefore, cannot but suffer from +manifold limitations; there arises a danger that the individual may +gradually lose all initiative, and expect all stimulation from the +state. The spontaneity and the wealth of life suffer from the tendency +to increase the power of the state, and a bureaucracy which delights in +correct forms, but which spiritually is entirely unproductive, indeed +even indifferent, appropriates more and more to itself. The substance of +the spiritual life is also threatened by the fact that the omnipotent +state is inclined to treat that life, with all its branches, as a mere +means in the attainment of its own particular aims; to look upon science +and art, and chiefly religion and education, especially with regard to +that which they achieve for the aims of the state, and to shape them as +much as possible in accordance with these aims. There is also a strong +tendency to follow the same course to accomplish the ends of the +contemporary form of government. An independent and genuine spiritual +life can hardly offer too great an opposition to such a perversion, +with its deification of human forms. But the matter is by no means +simple; for not the will of single individuals and parties, but the +whole tendency of modern life has given this power to the state; indeed, +on the economic side the state will soon experience a further increase +of power. The more the guidance on this side belongs to the state, the +more necessary is a free movement of spiritual culture in opposition to +it; the more urgent is the demand that the amalgamation of church and +state should be discontinued--an amalgamation which, by the growing +disputes that arise from it, forces religion into an undignified +position; the more definitely is a greater independence to be desired +for school organisation in all its branches. The Germans especially have +much to do in this matter; and there is much at stake. For, with the +limitations of our spatial extension, we can be a permanent determining +factor in world-culture only by giving our culture the greatest +intensity; but this requires a calling forth of the complete power and +of the spontaneity of individuals. Ultimately, in this matter also, the +chief thing proves to be the taking up again of central problems and the +realisation of human being in its innermost depths as an unconditional +end in itself and the bearer of an infinite life. No conception can +guard us from sinking to the position of puppets of the soulless +mechanism of the state, if we do not find the power to give soul to our +life and to maintain it against all attempted limitation. + +The longing for more freedom and independence has therefore an +indisputable validity. But this acknowledgment may easily lead to new +complications by freedom and independence being conceived in a manner +much too external, and also by a really questionable association of +these ideas with the problem of equality. The conviction of the modern +man concerning the world on the one hand, and the demands of life on the +other, are often in direct contradiction with regard to the conception +of equality. We become aware of our limitation on all sides: we are +represented simply as a product of heredity and environment: all +possibility of making a decision for ourselves is rejected as a +delusion. If thus we are deprived of all independence and all +spontaneity of life, then even in social life we shall become mere +bearers of a _rôle_ imposed upon us by a dark fate. One does not see how +freedom could retain a value, arouse enthusiasm, and lead to sacrifice +in such a case. If the whole is a soulless mechanism, in which only the +excess of existent power is the cause of decisions, then we ourselves +cannot be exceptions. + +Other complications have their origin in the democratic tendency which +permeates not only our political endeavour but also our whole life of +culture. How far-reaching a change, indeed how complete a revolution, +has been accomplished by this tendency in opposition to a condition of +things which has stood for hundreds or rather thousands of years, is but +seldom fully appreciated. In the earlier form of social life spiritual +work was the chief matter only of a limited and exclusive circle; to the +people as a whole it was only secondary, and the benefit that they +received from it was often of the most meagre character. Even the +Reformation left this aristocratic form of life as it was; for as +certainly as it made the care for every individual member of the church +more urgent, that care was bestowed from above in an authoritative +manner. The earlier Enlightenment, as it was represented, for example, +by Bayle, was of the conviction that the deliverance from delusion and +superstition would always be limited to a small circle of those standing +spiritually high, and would never reach the masses. We know how this has +changed; how the masses are determined to form a mere dependent body of +the so-called higher classes no longer, but to take the problem of life +independently into their own hands, and how they obtain their +representation of the world and the task of their life from that which +is more immediately present to them and directly concerns their welfare; +and how in this way they are inclined to look upon themselves as the +whole of humanity. We have already referred to the danger that culture +as a whole will thus be made shallow--a danger that arises from the fact +that here the decision is made by those who scarcely participate in the +work of history, and who depend almost entirely upon the immediate +impression. Further, we have already contended that only a +simplification and rejuvenation of culture are able to cope with this +danger. The fact is important that this democratic movement appeals to +the equality of all who bear human features. Here again there appears to +be a direct contradiction between theoretical conviction and actual +conditions. Experience everywhere shows a pronounced inequality among +men; it shows this not only in the traditional social relationships but +also in the organisation of modern industry. More, however, than all +social arrangements, nature shows the greatest inequality amongst men; +and the actual relation of individuals in work and idleness, in love and +hate, in independent thinking and blind subordination shows it none the +less. From the point of view of experience the idea of equality seems to +be an empty phrase. If it is more than this, if we recognise in it a +truth that we cannot afford to lose, then it implies the conviction that +humanity has spiritual relations; that each has a significance in a +spiritual nature, and that there is a universal life present everywhere +which opposes the guilt and folly of the individual and even in spite of +himself gives him a value. Thus we have seen that in history, religion +and ideal culture were the first to bring the idea of equality into good +repute. But to-day the champions of equality turn with particular +keenness against religion and ideal culture, and are not aware that in +so doing they are destroying the foundations of their own belief. + +These inconsistencies are not felt, chiefly because of the power which +abstractions usually exercise over men in the present day. A faith in +abstractions reigns amongst us which is capable of far greater things +than faith in religion or faith in reason. We are surrounded by the +bustle of a fierce and ceaselessly increasing struggle for existence: +ideas are overgrown by interests; the motives of people in general are +trivial, and all spiritual aspiration is feeble, and along with this +there is an unutterable amount of pretence which permeates and distorts +all conduct. Yet the disagreeable aspect of this condition seems to +vanish as soon as the mere word "humanity" is mentioned. But what is +humanity from the point of view of Naturalism other than a collection of +beings of nature? How can a power to elevate and to strengthen proceed +from this conception, which in the naturalistic context signifies no +more than the subjective unification of the individuals? Or, again, the +idea of a ceaseless progress of humanity is placed in opposition to the +confusions which exist in the present. But how can this idea be +established if a compelling reason is not active within man? How could +the present be so incomplete and so full of perplexity as it seems, +especially to the advocates of the idea of progress, if century after +century had made progress upon progress? Rather, if man has such a noble +nature as he is assumed to have, life should be full of reason and +bliss. The old faith saved man by resorting to an invisible world; it +required a firm confidence in that which one did not see. The new faith, +which denies an invisible world, desires more: it desires that we should +be convinced of the direct opposite of that which we see and comprehend. +These considerations in no way signify a depreciation on our part of the +effort to attain freedom and equality--an effort that has an +indisputable validity. But this validity must be based upon a whole of +life and be more definitely determined, otherwise the effort is stifled +by the inconsistencies in which the conceptions of freedom and equality +are involved in the minds of their advocates. + +The independence of the individual and the spontaneity of the spiritual +life are endangered not only by the mechanism of a bureaucracy +indifferent to spiritual values but also none the less by the movements +of the masses, which in modern life in particular surround and browbeat +the individual. The man of the present day often believes that he has +gained freedom when in reality he has only changed the nature of his +dependence. What makes the movements of the masses, with their so-called +public opinion, so irksome is the falsehood that is generally contained +in this opinion, which is presented as proceeding from the experience +and decision of a great majority, and therefore as having a definite +presupposition of truth. The fact, as a rule, is that a few venture an +assertion and urge it upon the others with unobserved compulsion, since +they proclaim as already existent the agreement that they are only +seeking. Of course sometimes there is much more in public opinion; it +may be the expression of a spiritual necessity which subjects to itself +the dispositions of men. Whether public opinion is to be an interpreter +of truth or a mere product of man remains to be decided; and this +decision can rest only with the individual. He will be equal to making +this decision if he possesses a spiritual experience, and has in this a +touchstone by which to distinguish the genuine from the false. + +Philosophy can maintain the rights of the individual only so far as he +is rooted in spiritual relationships and derives power from them; it +must absolutely oppose all glorification of the natural, spiritually +destitute individual. We find such a glorification to-day more +especially in that which, with particular emphasis, is called "modern" +morality, but which in fact threatens rather to be a complete negation +of morality; even though this negation is against the intentions of its +advocates, mostly women, who display great enthusiasm for this "modern" +morality. It seems as though life is limited and degraded because +society, particularly in the matter of the sexual life, prescribes rigid +statutes which, if they were not irrational at the beginning, have +nevertheless become irrational, and tend to brand the right as wrong and +the wrong as right. The shaking off of these restrictions and of the +pressure of society in general seems to promise a form of life +incomparably more powerful, sincere, and individual: this life is also +to offer more beauty, for to-day generally the idea of beauty is +emphasised with great partiality where life has no clear ideas and no +significant content. + +This criticism of the statutes of society is not entirely without +reason. Such statutes do not in themselves constitute a morality, as it +is easy to imagine they do; but they only advocate a morality; as life +undergoes such far-reaching changes, these statutes must continually be +examined anew as to their validity and value. But this relativity does +not make them worthless, and does not justify their complete rejection +in favour of an absolute freedom on the part of individuals. We could +expect an elevation of life by such an effort for freedom only if we +might assume that the individuals are thoroughly noble, energetic, and +spiritually rich, and if in the relations between the sexes a state of +paradisiacal innocence reigned which only the evil arrangements of +society had disturbed. But this is a way of thinking which does more +honour to the hearts than to the heads of its advocates. He who takes +men as they really are and does not paint them in romantic colours, and +who at the same time recognises the dangers of a highly developed, +pleasure-seeking, and over-refined state of culture, will not despise +those social arrangements, notwithstanding their relativity, but value +them as an indispensable safeguard against the selfishness, the greed +for pleasure, and the instability of the mere individual--a safeguard +not only against the tyranny of externals but also for the individual +against himself. It is unfortunate enough that such safeguards are +necessary; but, as they are necessary, it is better to preserve and +improve them as much as possible than to reject them, and to expose +humanity to dangers that might throw it back into the condition of the +animals. Man is not better because he is painted more beautifully; +rather Pascal is right when he says: "L'homme n'est ni ange ni bête, et +le malheur veut, que qui veut faire l'ange fait la bête." + +The tendency to think that man may be transformed inwardly and the whole +condition of life raised by changes in external organisation is most +definitely felt in the social movements of the age. In this there is a +clearly marked opposition to the earlier mode of thought, which, placing +a low estimate upon everything external, and finding greatness too +easily in disposition, overlooked how much the organisation of the +conditions of life means for men in whom the spiritual is only in +process of development; and, further, failed to notice that there is +also a strong movement from external to internal. Nevertheless, the fact +cannot be denied, notwithstanding all this, that the problems of the +whole and of man's inner nature require to be treated as of chief +importance. Otherwise, as Aristotle suggested, notwithstanding all the +alteration of conditions, the old problems will continually make their +appearance anew, and the substance of life might easily suffer from that +which was intended to improve its condition. + +In conclusion, we may briefly consider the problems that have been +raised in the nineteenth century by the increased emphasis on the idea +of nationality. Influences of an idealistic nature first raised the +cultivation and establishment of a particular national character to the +position of a matter of the greatest importance. This character appeared +to be an extremely valuable form of individualisation of the spiritual +life, a form in which that life attains to concreteness and greater +definiteness and penetration. The co-existence of these individual +nationalities gave promise of an incomparably richer formation of the +life of humanity as a whole: the inner development of their peculiar +natures, and their lofty rivalry, also promised to bring a wealth of +arousing and elevating motives. The nineteenth century has, indeed, won +an incalculable amount through this movement; to take up an abstract +cosmopolitanism again would be decidedly retrograde. + +But the more the idea of nationality has been brought from its high +place in the realm of thought to the domain of human circumstance, the +more has it been debased and the more dangers has it produced. If +previously the cultivation of an ideal type of life was most prominent, +and if the nations could thus permit one another to follow their own +courses peacefully, this has become less and less the case in face of +the desire and effort for power and expansion in the visible world; and +owing to the narrowness of physical space occupied by the nations, the +different strivings have clashed together more and more severely. If +this tendency continues without the counteraction of an inner task +common to humanity as a whole, and of unifying and elevating ideas, it +is hardly possible to avoid mutual hostility, a degeneration into +obstinacy and injustice. The idea of nationality may therefore become a +danger to the ethical character of life. This is the case if, by milder +or by severer means, one nation tries to force its own character and +speech upon another. The mode of thought based on the old _cujus regio +ejus natio_ is in no way better than that based on the old _cujus regio +ejus religio_, which we are now accustomed to regard with contempt as a +piece of barbarism. The desire for external power at the same time tends +to lessen the attention to the inner development and unification of +nationality, without which ultimately little progress can be made in the +development of power. It is through a common national character, with +its unification of the feelings and efforts of the individuals, that a +people is first elevated into a genuine nation; it is a character such +as this that gives to a people a power of influencing humanity as a +whole; it is a character such as this that gives to the individuals the +consciousness of being "members one of another," and with this a +stability and a joy in life and activity. Such a national character +necessitates certain natural conditions, that are like the veins in +marble which prescribe a certain direction to the work of the artist. +But these conditions must first be organised and by the complete +elevation of their nature spiritually unified; and this cannot be +achieved otherwise than through our own work, which through common +events and experiences follows its ideal. So far, therefore, national +character is not a gift of nature but a task which presents itself +distinctively to each people according to its nature and conditions. In +this matter a people must always in the first place realise a unity in +its own nature. + +In the fulfilment of this task hardly any other people has had to +contend with keener opposition, both external and internal, than the +Germans. Our physical environment does not direct us so definitely into +distinctive paths as is the case with other peoples. But our inner +nature contains, before all else, harsh antitheses. Our strength lies +chiefly in arousing to life depths of the soul otherwise undreamt of. +Thus in music and in poetry we have been able to surpass all other +peoples; again, we have been able to give to religion a wonderful +inwardness, and in education to evolve the leading ideas. At the same +time, however, we are driven to the physical world to take possession of +and to shape things; we are not the Hindus of Europe, as other people +indeed previously called us. We came into history by achievements in +war, and the desire for conflict and victory has been maintained through +all the phases of our varied history. By the continued diligence of our +citizens in work we have subordinated the world around us to our aims; +our capacity for organisation has been most marked, as the present state +of industry and trade shows. However, not only have these movements +towards inwardness, and towards the world, a strong tendency to oppose +one another, but also, in contrast with these magnificent gifts, there +are many defects and tendencies that make the development of a powerful +and unified life exceedingly difficult. We show a want of form and +taste, a heaviness and formality, a tendency to occupation with detail +and, in general, with what is petty in life, and, as a result of this, +an uncultured "Philistinism" in all spheres of society, and along with +this the inclination on the part of individuals to insist on the +correctness of their positions, and thus to cause division; finally--and +this is the worst of all--much envy and jealousy. None of these features +can be denied. There is an infinite amount which must be altered and +overcome amongst us if we are to become what we are capable of becoming, +and if we are to reach the highest in our nature. The limitations that +have been brought about by our history, which on the whole has not been +a happy one, constitute an important determining factor in this matter. +The more problems we bear within us, the more possibilities of genuine +creation that exist within us, and the more we may be to humanity in the +future, the more painful is it if attention and activity are diverted +from the chief task, and if an externalising of the idea of nationality +allows us to consider ourselves great rather than lead us to strive for +true greatness. The people that has produced Luther and Bach, Kant and +Goethe, cannot be devoid of true greatness, if it only remains faithful +to its own nature, and if it concentrates its power and treats the chief +thing really as such. + + +(e) THE LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL + +The problems and antitheses that are to be found in the life of the +present penetrate deeply into the life of the individual, and often make +their appearance within him with a particular power. The antithesis that +exists between the conceptions of the world and the demands of life is +especially harsh. The tendency of the age is to form a conception of the +world which reduces the status of the individual in the greatest degree: +from the point of view of nature and of society, he seems to be no more +than a fleeting appearance, a matter of indifference, and to show no +independence, and never to be able to take part with spontaneous +activity in the course of events. On the other hand, the contemporary +form of life demands the greatest independence and freedom of the +individual. We see in him the chief bearer of life, and we expect +salvation from the severe perplexities of the time, primarily from his +strengthening. This state of inconsistency cannot be tolerated for long; +either the degradation of the individual, that is found in the +conceptions of the world, must be applied to life, and lead it to a +resigned submission to an impenetrable world-process, or the positive +estimate of the individual which governs conduct must be acknowledged in +the conviction concerning reality as a whole: only a weakness of +disposition and a feebleness of thought can divide our existence between +the one conviction and the other. + +The course which our investigation has taken cannot leave any possible +doubt as to the direction which our conviction points out to us in this +matter: however much we also demand an energetic development of the +individual, that the stagnation of the age may be overcome, at the same +time we insist upon a necessary condition of this, on his inner +strengthening by an inner world present to him, on his elevation by a +spirituality transcending nature. Only if he thus acquires an inner +relation to infinity, and becomes an independent centre of life, can he +satisfy the demands that are generally made upon him, and, remarkably +enough, especially by those who theoretically deny the inner world as a +whole, and hail a most shallow Naturalism as a deliverance. + +Of course that inner elevation of the individual by no means lifts him +gently and simply out of all the confusion that the experience of our +existence shows; at the first glance it may even seem to make the +confusion greater. For, if each individual can become a co-operator in +the building up of a new world, and if his activity thereby acquires a +value for the whole, then the complete indifference with which, +according to our human impression, the individual is treated by the +course of the physical world, the inflexibility and injustice that he +often experiences in this world, the defect of love and justice in this +world, in which the bad so often obtain the victory and the good are led +to destruction, are all the greater mystery. The more the development of +the spiritual life widens the field of vision; the more it leads us +beyond a lifeless resignation to the question of the rationality of +events and compels us to compare the destiny of one man with that of +another, the deeper must that feeling of mystery become. All attempts +at a theodicy founder on this difficulty; we must inevitably submit to +the view that with regard to this problem all is obscure to the eyes of +man. There is, however, no need on this account to doubt and to regard +our life as hopeless; our investigation also has shown this. For, in +contrast with the obscurity of the world around us, we are able to set +the fact of the emergence of a new world within us. Great things take +place within us; not only does a new world appear, but we are called by +an inner necessity of our own being to co-operate in its development, +and this co-operation is not limited to individual activities, but +involves our being as a whole. For it was just in this that we were able +to recognise the development of being as the essence of the spiritual +life--that the chief movement of our life is to win a genuine being, and +that in the development of personality and spiritual individuality such +a being is in question. We saw clearly enough that we are not +personalities and individuals from the beginning; but that nature gives +us only the possibility of becoming this. To realise this possibility +our own activity is necessary; and this activity is not a sudden +resolution, but requires a revolution of our being and the development +of a new nature; and this can only be achieved by a faithful and zealous +life-work, and even then only approximately. Thus life as a whole is a +task which includes all multiplicity within it, the task of winning our +own being completely, and just in this way to increase the kingdom of +the spirit at our point. + +This task cannot be completely recognised and adopted without making a +great divergence from the aim, harsh oppositions and difficult +conflicts, manifest in the inner recesses of the soul. If our life, +therefore, appears to be in the highest degree incomplete, a mere +beginning, then this increase of the task demonstrates more than +anything else that, in this matter, we are concerned not with phantoms +and imaginations, but with realities: so here, notwithstanding all our +incompleteness, we can obtain the certainty of a spiritual existence, +and even become strengthened by the direct resistance of the external +world, because that world is henceforth reduced to the secondary +position. Thus, as we saw, the question upon which minds separate into +irreconcilable opposition is whether they acknowledge in the inwardness +of being itself not merely individual problems but a universal task; if +this is the case, the seriousness of the task will give to them an +unshakable stability of possession and a security superior to all +attacks; if it is not the case, the spiritual world is an unintelligible +paradox, because the want of an independent inner life means that there +is no basis for the development of an organ for the comprehension of a +world of inwardness. In this matter there is no possibility of a direct +agreement; only the proof of the spirit and of power can decide. + +But where the life of the individual acquires a genuine being and a +connection with the realm of self-consciousness, then, notwithstanding +all that is fleeting and insubstantial, the individual cannot regard +himself as a transitory appearance in the whole, even in the ultimate +basis of his being. Where, in contrast with all the meaninglessness of +mere nature and all the pretence of mere society, a movement towards +inner unity and substantial being emerges, the individual will be +elevated into a time-transcendent order, and must necessarily acquire +some position within it. The whole movement towards spirituality in the +human sphere would be vain, and all distinctively human life would be a +meaningless contradiction, if the individuals in whom alone the +spiritual life breaks forth spontaneously were included solely and +entirely in the stream of the process of nature. If the spiritual life +has once revealed itself to us, so far as to begin an independent and +distinctive being within us, then this being will assert itself in some +way. This does not imply agreement with the usual belief in immortality, +which would preserve man just as he is through all eternity, and thus +condemn him to the torture of rigid continuance in the same form; a +state that would, indeed, be as unbearable as the pain of the +traditional hell. As the world as a whole is in the highest degree +mysterious to us, so our future is veiled in the deepest obscurity. But, +if with the essence of our being we are elevated into a universal +spiritual life, and if in the innermost basis of our life we participate +in an eternal order, then the time-transcendence of this life assures to +us also some kind of time-transcendence in our being. + + _So löst sich jene grosse Frage + Nach unserm zweiten Vaterland, + Denn das Beständige der ird'schen Tage + Verbürgt uns ewigen Bestand._ + + GOETHE + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +In conclusion a few words will suffice. The last section showed that the +present sets great problems and reveals possibilities in every +department of life; but that we men are very far from being equal to +cope with these problems. We are limited especially by the fact that we +are incapable of elevating ourselves inwardly above the present; that we +do not take possession of it sufficiently as a whole, and find an inner +independence in relation to it; and that therefore we do not enter with +the necessary vigour into the conflict against the trivial and the +poor-spirited, the decadent and the sceptical that the present contains. +To point out the way to attain such independence appeared to us to be +the chief task of philosophy in the present. In the service of this +task, which cannot be achieved without the manifestation of a new +actuality, without a fundamental deepening of our reality, we have made +our investigation, which contains a distinctive conception of the +spiritual life. In that everywhere we have pressed back from the results +to the experience, and from the wealth of achievement to the generating +basis, we have seen nature, history, culture, and human nature as a +whole in a new light. We have hoped, by widening and strengthening life +itself from within, to supply a substitute for the external supports +that life has lost. How far we have succeeded in our endeavour is +another question; we shall be satisfied even if our work only +contributes to bring the present to a clearer consciousness of the state +of spiritual crisis in which it exists and concerning the seriousness of +which it deceives itself in a thousand ways. There is an enormous amount +of vigorous activity and efficient work, of honest endeavour and serious +disposition, in our time, and the tendency to make life more spiritual +is also evident. But the movement is still far from attaining the depth +which is necessary to the chief question of our spiritual existence; +thus the conflict, instead of being between whole and whole, is divided; +that which is significant and valuable in the endeavour of the time is +in danger of becoming problematic, and of producing the opposite of what +it purposes, because it does not fit itself into a universal life, and +in this realise its limitations and at the same time its right. A more +energetic concentration of life in itself is therefore the first +condition of transcending the chaos of the life of the present and of +preventing spiritual degeneration in the midst of too intense an +occupation with externals. As for the rest, we may say with Plotinus: +"The doctrine serves to point the way and guide the traveller; the +vision, however, is for him who will see it." + + + + +INDEX + + + Abstractions; their power in modern life, 362 ff. + + Activism; profession of faith in, 255 ff.; + how it differs from a system of mere force, 255 ff.; + its ethical character, 256; + how it differs from Voluntarism and Pragmatism, 256 ff. + + Æsthetic Individualism, 61 ff. + + Æstheticism; its antithesis to Activism, 258 ff. + + Antiquity; its distinctive synthesis of life, 208 ff. + + _A priori_; its validity and its limitations, 234 + + Archimedean point in the spiritual life; its impossibility, 94 ff., 154 + + Art and literature, condition and tasks in the present, 354 ff. + + Ascetic organisation of life; rejected, 281 ff. + + + Being, development of; as a system of life, 212 ff., 314 + + + Catholicism; different tendencies in, 328 ff. + + Christianity; its unique character, 6; + the opposition to, 7 ff.; + its permanent truth, 331 ff.; + changes necessary to it, 332 ff.; + Christian and Greek forms of life, 283 ff. + + "Classical," the; its significance, 192 + + Concentration of life (within the whole), 156 ff., 160 + + Conscience; its significance, 129 ff. + + Critical character of modern work; its presuppositions, 250 ff. + + Culture, 110 ff.; + genuine and apparent, 269 ff.; + requirements of a new type, 298 ff.; + organisation of, 315 ff. + + + Democratic tendency of modern culture, 361 ff. + + Departments of life; their relation to life as a whole, 316 ff. + + Dogmatic sectarian point of view; rejected, 328 + + Duty; significance of the idea, 184 ff., 231 + + + Education; problems in the present state of, 343 ff. + + Enlightenment, the; its synthesis of life, 209 ff.; + how far problematic, 249; + relation of the present to it, 347 ff. + + Equality; problems of the present conception of, 362 + + Eternity; how far implied in the life of the individual, 372 + + Ethical character of life; how to be understood, 256, 258; + of spiritual culture, 309 ff.; + its necessity, 337 ff. + + Ethics (morality); different types in the present time, 336 ff.; + conditions of a morality, 338 ff.; + requirements of morality in a spiritual culture, 339 ff. + + Evil; the problem of, 263 ff.; + the way in which it is solved, 279 ff. + + Evolution, doctrine of; spiritual, its limitations, 194 ff., 257 ff. + + Experience; its significance for the spiritual life in man, 235 ff. + + + Freedom; its nature, 174 ff.; + its conflict with destiny, 181 ff.; + genuine and false, 323 ff.; + inconsistency in contemporary treatment of the problem, 360 ff. + + + German character; its greatness and its dangers, 317 ff., 368 ff. + + Goethe; characteristic influence, 299 + + Good, the (idea of the good); how it differs from the Useful, 119 ff.; + apparent inconsistency, 138 ff.; + more detailed determination, 185 ff. + + Great man, the; his relation to his time, 292 + + Greek and Christian forms of life, 283 ff. + + + Hegel; relation of the present to him indefinite, 348 + + Historical and social organisation of life; its limitations, 200 + + Historical Relativism; rejected, 290 ff., 323 ff. + + History; the spiritual conception of, its conditions, 188 ff.; + esoteric and exoteric history, 243 ff. + + Human life; how far it is from the spiritual life, 161 ff. + + + Idealisation, false; of immediate existence, 83 ff., 362 ff. + + Idealism and Realism; their unification in a spiritual culture, 312 ff. + + Ideas in history; their unique character, 126 ff., 188 ff. + + Imagination; indispensable in all departments of life, 239 + + Immanent Idealism, its rise and fall, 15 ff. + + Immanental treatment (from the life-process), 107 ff. + + Individual, the, and the Society; problems of their relation, 364 ff. + + Individual, the; his significance in the new relations, 246, 369 ff. + + Individual, life of the; its form in the new system, 369 ff. + + Individuality (spiritual); as a problem, 132 ff., 181 ff., 370 + + Instruction; problems in the present time with reference to, 343 ff. + + Inwardness; its attainment of independence in man, 123 ff., 146 ff.; + as the inner life of reality, 148 ff.; + inwardness and the inner world, 303 + + Irrationality, of existence; in what manner overcome, 279 + + + Kant; inconsistency in the relation to him in the present time, 348 + + Knowledge; its form in the new system, 351 + + + Life; its detachment from the mere individual, 119 ff.; + the two movements in it, 282 ff. + + Life-process; as the fundamental principle of investigation, 104 ff., + 305 ff., 349 ff. + + Life's attainment of greatness, 240 ff. + + Life-work; its significance in acquiring stability, 253 + + Love; as a witness to the union with the whole, 231 + + + Man; as a being of nature, 110 ff.; + growing beyond nature, 113 ff.; + his union with the whole, 226 ff. + + Masses, the culture of the; its problems, 89 ff. + + Mass-movements; their dangers and limitations, 363 ff. + + Metaphysic; in what sense necessary, 141 ff. + + "Modern," the; double meaning, 296 + + Modern Age, the (in a broad sense); the characteristic in its nature, + 9 ff. + + "Modern" Morality; discussed and rejected, 364 ff. + + Movement, of the spiritual life in man; its uniqueness, 233 ff.; + its increase in the new system of life, 247 ff. + + Mysticism; in what sense justifiable, 246 + + + National Character, 198, 367 ff. + + Nationality, the idea of; its problems, 366 ff. + + Naturalism; its significance and its limitations, 24 ff. + + Nature and Spirit, 270 ff. + + Negation; impossibility of an absolute, 267 ff. + + Newer Systems of Life; what they have in common, 22 ff., 81 ff. + + Noölogical Method; distinguished from the psychological and the + cosmological, 243, 352 + + Norms; their significance, 184 + + + Pantheism; vague character of the general conception of it, 84 + + Past; impossibility of flight to the, 93 ff. + + People and nation, 366 ff. + + Personal conviction, concerning reality as a whole; where the decision + is made, 253, 281, 311 ff., 340, 372 + + Personality; the difficulty of the conception, 95 ff.; + no mere gift of nature, 311, 370 + + Philosophy; its present position, 346 ff.; + its three main tendencies in the present time, 347 ff.; + chief demands, 349 ff. + + Philosophy of life; the conception of a, 3 ff. + + Political and social life; condition and tasks in the present time, 358 + ff. + + Present, the; difficulties of determining its extent, 289 ff. + + Protestantism; the different tendencies in it, 329 + + Public opinion; manner of its formation, 364 + + + Reality; difficulty of the conception, 84 ff.; + longing for, 159 ff.; + new conception of, 220 ff. + + Relation (fundamental), of man to reality; new, from the point of view + of the spiritual life, 152 ff. + + Religion; the system of life of, 6 ff.; + its form and its justification, 273 ff.; + its necessity in a spiritual culture, 312 ff.; + its present condition, 324; + its requirements in a spiritual culture, 330 ff.; + specific religious system of life rejected, 281 ff. + + Romanticism; its significance and its limitations, 258 ff. + + + Science; its present greatness and problems, 345 ff. + + Self-preservation, spiritual; distinguished from natural + self-preservation, 126 + + Sense; its estimate, 260 + + Simplification (in revivals), 128 + + Socialistic system; its significance and its limitations, 41 ff. + + Society; the spiritual conception of, 196 ff.; + emphasis upon society in the nineteenth century, 358 ff. + + Spiritual culture, and human culture, 308 ff. + + Spiritual life; its independence a necessity, 141 ff.; + as the fundamental principle of a new organisation of the individual + departments of life, 157 ff., 244 ff. + + Spiritual work; its relation to time, 290 ff. + + Stability in life; how won, 251 ff. + + State, the; the greater emphasis upon it in the nineteenth century, 359 + ff. + + Suffering and spiritual destitution, 314 + + Syntheses of life; in history, 207 ff. + + + Theodicy; rejected, 279 ff., 371 + + Thought; its relation to life, 108, 126 ff., 141 ff., 349 ff.; + its unique operation (in distinction from association), 125 ff. + + Time; fundamental relation of man to, 116 ff. + + Transcendent Spirituality; as the fundamental principle of religion, + 278 ff. + + Transcendental method; in what sense justifiable, 248 + + Truth, conception of; its history, 138; + new conception, 216 ff. + + + Work; its distinctive character, 122; + its power to develop, 201 ff.; + the world of work, 201 ff. + + World, conceptions of the; chief types, 353 ff. + + + + + Printed by + BALLANTYNE & COMPANY LTD + Tavistock Street Covent Garden + London + + + + + BY RUDOLF EUCKEN + + THE MEANING AND VALUE OF LIFE + + TRANSLATED BY + + LUCY JUDGE GIBSON & W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A. + + SECOND EDITION + + Crown 8vo, By Post + Cloth Price 3s. 6d. net 3s. 9d. + + +FROM THE TRANSLATORS' PREFACE + +Eucken's influence as a thinker has for long been felt far beyond the +borders of his native land. Translations of his books have appeared in +many foreign languages, including French, Italian, Swedish, Finnish and +Russian. In our own country such articles on Eucken's works as have +appeared quite recently in the _Times_, the _Guardian_, and the +_Inquirer_ are significantly sympathetic and appreciative. 'It seems +likely,' writes the reviewer in the _Guardian_, 'that for the next +decade Eucken will be the leading guide for the pilgrims of thought who +walk on the Idealist Road.' + + _PRESS OPINION_ + + "There are scores of passages throughout the volume one would like to + quote--the thinking of a man of clearest vision and loftiest outlook + on the fabric of life as men are fashioning it to-day. It is a volume + for Churchmen and politicians of all shades and parties, for the + student and for the man of business, for the workshop as well--a + volume for every one who is seriously interested in the great business + of life."--_Aberdeen Journal._ + + + PUBLISHED BY + ADAM & CHARLES BLACK. 4 SOHO SQUARE. LONDON, W. + + + + + RUDOLF EUCKEN'S + + PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE + + By W. R. BOYCE GIBSON + + LECTURER IN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL + + THIRD EDITION + + With Frontispiece Portrait of Rudolf Eucken + + Crown 8vo, By Post + Cloth Price 3s. 6d. net 3s. 9d. + + +SUMMARY OF CONTENTS + + The New Idealism: Eucken's Philosophy a Rallying-point for Idealistic + Effort + His Theory of Knowledge + His Philosophy of History + The Meaning of a Historical Fact + The Break with Aristotelianism and Aquinism + Eucken's Criticism of the Naturalistic Syntagma + The Great Alternative: Individuality or Personality + The Category of Action + Eucken's View of Revelation + The Problem of the Union of Human and Divine + The New Spiritual Immediacy + The Spiritual Life as Eucken conceives it: its Intrinsically + Oppositional Character + Eucken's Philosophy as a Philosophy of Freedom + The New Idealism as a Religious Idealism + + "No reader should fail to find pleasure in a book so full of fresh and + stimulating thought, expressed with great felicity of language." + + _The Scottish Review_ + + "It is done with just the proper combination of sympathy and + criticism."--_The British Weekly_ + + + PUBLISHED BY + ADAM & CHARLES BLACK. 4 SOHO SQUARE. LONDON, W. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, by Rudolf Eucken + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 43719 *** |