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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44200 ***
+
+THE REALITY OF WAR
+
+
+
+
+  THE
+  REALITY OF WAR
+
+  A COMPANION
+  TO CLAUSEWITZ
+
+  BY
+  MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY
+  LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS
+
+  POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY
+  A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE
+
+  LONDON
+  HODDER AND STOUGHTON
+  WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.
+
+  HUGH REES, LTD.
+  5 REGENT STREET, S.W.
+
+
+  _Reprinted in 1914_
+
+
+
+
+EDITOR'S PREFACE
+
+
+Great books, the masterpieces of the special branch of knowledge with
+which they deal, are often very big books; and busy men, who have not
+unlimited time for reading, find it helpful to have some one who will
+give them a general summary of a famous writer's teaching, and point
+out the most important passages in which the author himself embodies
+the very essence of his argument.
+
+This is what Major Murray has done for the most important work on war
+that was ever written. He does not give a mere dry summary of its
+contents. He sets forth, in language so plain that even the civilian
+reader or the youngest soldier can read it with interest, the essence
+of the teaching of Clausewitz, and he embodies in his book the most
+striking passages of the original work. He adds to each section of his
+subject some useful criticisms, and at the end of the book he sums up
+the effect of recent changes on the practice of war.
+
+The book is a popular manual of the realities of war, which should be
+read not only by soldiers, but by every one who takes an intelligent
+interest in the great events of our time.
+
+As to the practical value of the writings of Clausewitz, it may be
+well to quote here the words of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, the Professor
+of Military History at Oxford, from his introduction to the original
+edition of Major Murray's work:
+
+"Clausewitz was a Prussian officer who first saw fighting as a boy in
+1793, and whose experience of war lasted until 1815, when the great
+war ended. He was then thirty-five and spent the next fifteen years in
+trying to clear his mind on the subject of war, which he did by writing
+a number of military histories and a systematic treatise 'On War.' At
+the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts into a parcel, hoping to work
+at them again on the conclusion of the duties for which he was ordered
+from home. A little more than a year later he died at Breslau of
+cholera, and the papers, to which he had never put the finishing touch,
+were afterwards published by his widow.
+
+"Part of the value of his work is due to the exceptional opportunities
+which he enjoyed. When the war of 1806 began he had long been the
+personal adjutant of one of the Prussian princes, and an intimate
+friend of Scharnhorst, who was probably the greatest of Napoleon's
+contemporaries. In the period of reorganization which followed
+the Peace of Tilsit he made the acquaintance of Gneisenau, and of
+almost all the officers who made their mark in the subsequent wars
+of liberation. During the years of preparation he was Scharnhorst's
+assistant, first in the Ministry of War and then on the General Staff.
+During the campaign of 1812 he served with the Russian army as a
+staff officer. Thus his experience during the four years of the Wars
+of Liberation was that of one who was continually behind the scenes,
+always in touch with the Governments and Generals, and therefore better
+able than any one not so favourably placed to see everything in its
+proper perspective, and to follow and appreciate the considerations
+which directed the decisions both of statesmen and of the commanders
+of armies. His personal character was of the finest mould, and his
+writings have the sincerity, the absence of which makes it so difficult
+to rely upon those of Napoleon.
+
+"The ultimate test of the value of books is time. When Clausewitz
+died, the two books on war which were thought the best were those of
+the Archduke Charles of Austria and General Jomini. To-day the book
+of Clausewitz, 'On War,' easily holds the first place. It is the
+least technical of all the great books on war; from beginning to end
+it is nothing but common sense applied to the subject, but for that
+reason it is the hardest to digest, because common sense or a man's
+natural instinctive judgment on any subject is exceedingly hard to
+analyse and put into words. An exceptionally gifted man can go through
+this process, but few can follow it for any length of time without a
+distinct effort.
+
+"Almost every good institution has arisen out of the effort to provide
+a remedy for some evil, but in the imperfection of human nature nearly
+every institution brings with it fresh evils, which in their turn have
+to be counteracted. The modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism
+and its belief in knowledge, has grafted the examination system upon
+every form of education from the lowest to the highest. The British
+army shares in the benefits and in the disadvantages of the system,
+of which, in the case of an officer, the danger to be guarded against
+is that it tends to accustom a man to rely rather on his memory than
+his intelligence, and to lean more on other people's thinking than on
+his own. Clausewitz aimed at producing the very opposite result. He
+does not offer specific solutions of the various problems of war lest
+officers, in moments when their business is to decide and to act,
+should be trying to recall his precepts instead of using their eyes and
+their wits. His purpose rather is to enable them to understand what war
+is. He believed that if a man had accustomed himself to think of war as
+it really is, had got to know the different elements which go to make
+it up, and to distinguish those that are important from those that are
+comparative trifles, he would be more likely to know of himself what
+to do in a given situation, and would be much less likely to confuse
+himself by trying to remember what some general, long since dead, did
+on some occasion in which after all the position was by no means the
+same as that in which he finds himself."
+
+What is said here of the soldier actually engaged in war, is true also
+even of the onlooker who takes a patriotic interest in the progress of
+a war in which his country is involved. Unless he has a clear idea of
+the real character of modern war, and the principles on which success
+or failure depend, he will be utterly unable to grasp the significance
+of the events of which he reads each day. And it is of real importance
+that in time of war every citizen should judge soundly the course of
+events, for opinion influences action, and public opinion is made up of
+the ideas of the units who compose the public. In this connection it is
+well to bear in mind a point that is often overlooked, a point on which
+Clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing passage--namely, the fact
+that one of the main objects of a nation waging war is to force the
+enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. This
+fact is sufficient proof of the importance of public opinion being
+well informed not only as to the course of events, but also as to the
+principles that give to these events their real significance.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+  CHAPTER I
+
+                                           PAGE
+  THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ                      3
+
+
+  CHAPTER II
+
+  THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN
+    POLICY AND WAR                           11
+
+
+  CHAPTER III
+
+  THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ                 23
+
+
+  CHAPTER IV
+
+  THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR         33
+
+
+  CHAPTER V
+
+  THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED
+    IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR                 47
+
+
+  CHAPTER VI
+
+  PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR                      65
+
+
+  CHAPTER VII
+
+  THE NATURE OF WAR                          79
+
+
+  CHAPTER VIII
+
+  WAR AS POLICY                             119
+
+
+  CHAPTER IX
+
+  STRATEGY                                  137
+
+
+  CHAPTER X
+
+  THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY                 161
+
+
+  CHAPTER XI
+
+  TACTICS                                   177
+
+
+  CHAPTER XII
+
+  CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ      213
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ
+
+
+In an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the British public in
+even the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that
+he was not a mere theorist or bookworm. The wide and varied experience
+which the British officer gradually gains in so many different parts
+of the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces
+a certain distrust of them. Also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly
+one of our national characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal to the
+British officer or civilian, a writer must be a practical soldier.
+
+Such was General Clausewitz: a practical soldier of very great
+experience in the long series of wars 1793 to 1815, and one present
+throughout that most awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian
+campaign in 1812.
+
+"General Karl von Clausewitz was born near Magdeburg in 1780, and
+entered the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in 1792. He served in the
+campaigns of 1793-1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he entered the military
+school at Berlin as an officer, and remained there till 1803. He here
+attracted the notice of Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served
+as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, was present at the
+battle of Jena, and saw that awful retreat which ended a fortnight
+later in the surrender at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured, he
+was sent into France as a prisoner till the end of the war." "On his
+return (in November, 1807) he was placed on General Scharnhorst's
+staff, and employed on the work then going on for the reorganization
+of the Prussian army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the Russian service,
+was employed on the general staff, and was thus able to gain much
+experience in the most gigantic of all the struggles of his time." "In
+the spring campaign of 1813 (battles of Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as
+a Russian officer, was attached to Blucher's staff; during the winter
+campaign he found employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count Walmoden,
+who fought against Davoust on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid action
+of the Goerde was entirely the result of his able dispositions. In 1815
+he again entered the Prussian service, and was chief-of-the-staff to
+the III. Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny formed the left of the
+line of battle, and at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's army." "In
+addition to this, we may say, considerable practical training (note,
+enormous and varied indeed compared to any obtainable in the present
+day), he also possessed a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of
+military history, and also an uncommonly clear perception of general
+history" (Von Caemmerer). After the Peace he was employed in a command
+on the Rhine. In 1818 he became major-general, and was made Director of
+the Military School at Berlin. Here he remained for some years. This
+was the chief period of his writings. As General von Caemmerer, in his
+"Development of Strategical Science," puts it: "This practical and
+experienced, and at the same time highly cultured soldier, feels now,
+in peaceful repose, as he himself confesses, the urgent need to develop
+and systematize the whole world of thought which occupies him, yet also
+resolves to keep secret till his death the fruit of his researches, in
+order that his soul, which is thirsting for _Truth_, may be safely and
+finally spared all temptations from subordinate considerations."
+
+In 1830 he was appointed Director of Artillery at Breslau, and, having
+no more time for writing, sealed up and put away his papers, unfinished
+as they were. In the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff to
+Field-Marshal Gneisenau's army. In the winter of that year war with
+France was considered imminent, and Clausewitz had prospects of acting
+as chief of the general staff of the Commander-in-Chief Gneisenau. He
+then drew up two plans for war with France, which bear the stamp of
+that practical knowledge of war and adaptation of means to ends which
+distinguish his writings.
+
+In the same year the war scare passed away, the army of Gneisenau was
+disbanded, and Clausewitz returned to Breslau, where after a few days
+he was seized with cholera, and died in November, 1831, aged only 51.
+
+His works were published after his death by his widow.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN POLICY AND WAR
+
+
+From the day of their publication until now the influence of the
+writings of Clausewitz has been steadily growing, till to-day it is
+impossible to over-estimate the extent of that influence upon modern
+military and political thought, especially in Germany. As General von
+Caemmerer, in his "Development of Strategical Science," says: "Karl
+von Clausewitz, the pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and the confidant
+of Gneisenau, is in Germany generally recognized as the most prominent
+theorist on war, as the real philosopher on war, to whom our famous
+victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training."
+
+Field-Marshal Moltke was "his most distinguished pupil," and adapted
+the teaching of Clausewitz to the conditions of to-day.
+
+General von der Goltz, in the introduction to his great work, "The
+Nation in Arms," thus describes the veneration which he inspires: "A
+military writer who, after Clausewitz, writes upon the subject of war,
+runs the risk of being likened to a poet who, after Goethe, attempts a
+_Faust_, or, after Shakespeare, a _Hamlet_. Everything important that
+can be told about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the
+works which that great military genius has left behind him. Although
+Clausewitz has himself described his book as being something as yet
+incomplete, this remark of his must be taken to mean that he, too,
+was subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits, and was forced to
+feel that all he attained lay far beneath his ideal. For us, who knew
+not what that ideal was, his labours are a complete work. I have,
+accordingly, not attempted to write anything new, or of universal
+applicability about the science of warfare, but have limited myself to
+turning my attention to the military operations of our own day." One
+can hardly imagine a stronger tribute of admiration.
+
+And, as Moltke was Clausewitz's most distinguished pupil, so also
+are all those trained in the school of Moltke pupils of Clausewitz,
+including the most eminent of modern German military writers, such as
+General von Blume, in his "Strategy"; Von der Goltz, in his "Nation in
+Arms" and "The Conduct of War," who trained the Turkish General Staff
+for the campaign of 1897 against Greece and the battle of Pharsalia,
+etc.; General von Boguslawski; General von Verdy du Vernois, the
+father of the study of Applied Tactics; General von Schlichting, in his
+"Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present"; General Meckel,
+who trained the Japanese Staff, etc., etc.
+
+We all remember the telegram sent to General Meckel by Marshal Oyama
+after the battle of Liao-yang: "We hope you are proud of your pupils."
+
+Some time ago, when asked to give a lecture at Aldershot to the
+officers of the 2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me that it would
+be very interesting, anxious as we all were then to know the causes
+of the wonderful Japanese efficiency and success, if I could obtain a
+pronouncement from General Meckel how far he had been influenced in his
+teaching by Clausewitz. My friend Herr von Donat did me the favour to
+write to General von Caemmerer and ask him if he could procure me such
+a pronouncement which I might publish. General Meckel, whose death both
+Japan and Germany have since had to mourn, most kindly consented, and
+I esteem it a great honour to be allowed to quote part of his letter.
+He said: "I, like every other German officer, have, consciously or
+unconsciously, instructed in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz is
+the _founder_ of that theory of war which resulted from the Napoleonic.
+I maintain that _every one_ who nowadays either makes or teaches war
+in a modern sense, bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if he is not
+conscious of it." This opinion of General Meckel, to whose training of
+the Japanese General Staff the success of the Japanese armies must be
+largely attributed, is most interesting. It is not possible to give a
+stronger or more up-to-date example of the magnitude of the influence
+of Clausewitz.
+
+In this connection I should like to make a short quotation from "The
+War in the Far East," by the _Times_ military correspondent. In his
+short but suggestive chapter on "Clausewitz in Manchuria" he says: "But
+as all save one of the great battles in Manchuria have been waged by
+the Japanese in close accordance with the spirit and almost the letter
+of Clausewitz's doctrine, and as the same battles have been fought by
+the Russians in absolute disregard of them (though his works had been
+translated into Russian by General Dragomiroff long before the war),
+it is certainly worth showing how reading and reflection may profit
+one army, and how the neglect of this respectable practice may ruin
+another." "Clausewitz in Manchuria"! That brings us up to date. It is a
+far cry for his influence to have reached, and triumphed.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers.
+We may be sure, therefore, that the influence of Clausewitz on the
+Continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than
+the realm of war. From this thought arise many reflections. It will be
+sufficient here to suggest one. I would suggest that we should regard
+every foreign statesman, especially in Germany, as, consciously or
+unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. That is to say, we should
+regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the
+most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable
+part of policy. He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse
+of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as
+commercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument
+of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied
+accordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches,
+but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his
+State. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation
+shall impose its will upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait
+and wait, to make "every imaginable preparation," and finally to let
+loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out
+with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a
+whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and
+compel submission to its will by force.
+
+To talk to such a man of "the evils of war," or of "the burden of
+armaments"; or to propose to him "disarmament" or "reduction of
+armed forces," and so forth can only appear to him as the result of
+"imperfect knowledge." He will not say so, but he will think so, and
+act accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man
+one can only say, "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he
+fall."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ
+
+
+The writings of Clausewitz are contained in nine volumes, published
+after his death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly on his three
+volumes "On War," which have been translated by Colonel J. J. Graham
+(the last edition edited by Colonel F. N. Maude, and published by
+Messrs. Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls them "a collection of
+materials," "a mass of conceptions not brought into form," and states
+that he intended to revise, and throw the whole into more complete
+shape.
+
+We must lament that he did not live to complete his revision. But,
+on the other hand, it is perhaps possible that this unfinished
+state is really an advantage, for it leaves us free to apply his
+great maxims and principles and mode of thought to the ever-varying
+conditions of the present and future, unhampered by too complete a
+crystallization of his ideas written before more modern conditions of
+railways, telegraphs, and rapid long-ranging arms of precision, etc.,
+arose. It is perhaps this unfinished state which renders Clausewitz
+so essentially in touch with, and a part of, the onward movement and
+evolution of military thought. For his great aim was "the truth, the
+whole truth, and nothing but the truth," without preconception or
+favour, as far as he could go--essentially "a realist" of war--and what
+better aim can we set before ourselves?
+
+As Sir Arthur Helps has so well put it in his "Friends in Council,"
+every man needs a sort of central stem for his reading and culture. I
+wish here to say why I think that Clausewitz is admirably adapted to
+form such a main stem in the military culture of British officers.
+
+In the first place there is a lofty sort of tone about his writings
+which one gradually realizes as one reads them, and which I will not
+attempt to describe further than by saying that they stamp themselves
+as the writings of a gentleman of fine character.
+
+In the second place it is a book which "any fellow" can read, for
+there is nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse or mathematical or
+formal, no formulæ or lines and angles and technical terms, such as in
+other writers, Jomini, Hamley, etc. Clausewitz is free from all such
+pedantries, which for my part, and I dare say for the part of many
+others, often "put one off" a book, and made one instinctively feel
+that there was something wrong, something unpractical about it, which
+rendered it hardly worth the sacrifice of time involved in its study.
+There is in Clausewitz nothing of that kind at all. All those lines and
+angles and formulæ he dismisses in a few pages as of little practical
+importance.
+
+In the third place Clausewitz only goes in for experience and the
+practical facts of war. As he somewhat poetically puts it, "The
+flowers of Speculation require to be cut down low near the ground of
+Experience, their proper soil."[1] He is the great apostle of human
+nature and character as being everything in war. "All war supposes
+human weakness, and against that it is directed."[2] I believe that the
+British officer will find himself in sympathy with the great thinker
+on war, who asserts that "_Of_ _all military virtues Energy in the
+conduct of Operations has always conduced most to glory and success of
+arms_."[3]
+
+In the fourth place, to the practical mind will appeal his denunciation
+of all elaborate plans, because _Time_ is required for all elaborate
+combinations, and Time is just the one thing that an active enemy
+will not give us,--and his consequent deduction that all plans must
+be of the simplest possible form. His famous sentence, "_In war all
+things are simple, but the simple are difficult_,"[4] gives the key
+to his writings, for to _overcome those simple yet great difficulties
+he regards as the art of war_, which can only be done by the military
+virtues of perseverance, energy, and boldness.
+
+In the fifth place he does not want men to be bookworms, for he says:
+
+"_Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations
+in which we can be placed in war_."[5] And we can all reflect, without
+reading too many books. Also he says: "Much reading of history is
+not required for the above object. The knowledge of a few separate
+battles, _in their details_, is more useful than a general knowledge of
+several campaigns. On this account it is more useful to read detailed
+narratives and journals than regular works of history."[6] He wants
+history in detail, not a general smattering and a loose application
+thereof, which fault he strongly denounces. And he expressly states
+that the history of the very latest war is the most useful. All of
+which is very practical, and in accord with what we feel to be true.
+
+As he pictures war, "_the struggle between the spiritual and moral
+forces_ on _both_ sides is the centre of all,"[7] and to this aspect
+of the subject he gives much more attention than Jomini and most of
+Jomini's disciples. He has freed us once for all from all formalism.
+The formation of character, careful, practical, detailed study, and
+thorough preparation in peace, the simplest plans carried out with the
+utmost perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness in war--these are
+the practical fruits of his teaching.
+
+Therefore, I say again, that I do not think that the British officer
+could possibly find a more interesting or a better guide for the main
+stem of his reading than Clausewitz, nor any one that will appeal
+to his practical instincts of what is _True_ half so well. I do not
+believe that he could possibly do better than with Clausewitz as
+main stem, and a detailed study of the latest campaigns and modern
+technicalities as the up-to-date addition required to transform
+knowledge into action. I trust that every reader of Clausewitz will
+agree with me in this.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR
+
+
+"Moltke, the most gifted pupil of Clausewitz," "Moltke, who knew
+Clausewitz's book well, and often liked to describe him as the
+theoretical instructor." As Chaucer would say, "What needeth wordes
+more?"
+
+Clausewitz has treated practically every chief branch of strategy
+and tactics (except, of course, the present-day developments of
+railways, telegraphs, quick-firing guns, smokeless powder, universal
+service armies, etc.). The whole of his bulky work "On War" is full
+of interesting and sometimes eloquent and almost poetical passages,
+of concentrated, pregnant, and far-reaching thoughts on every
+subject. Through all these it is, of course, impossible to follow
+him in any introduction. One can really do no more than urge all to
+read Clausewitz for themselves, to go to the fountain-head, to the
+master-work itself. In the short space to which I have restricted
+myself, I propose, therefore, to concentrate on a few of his leading
+ideas, reluctantly leaving out many others which are really almost just
+as good.
+
+
+THEORY AND PRACTICE
+
+One of the things for which we are most deeply indebted to Clausewitz
+is that he has shown us clearly the proper place of theory in relation
+to practice. "It should educate the mind of the future leader in
+war, or, rather, guide him in his _self-instruction_, but _not_
+accompany him on to the battlefield; just as a sensible tutor forms
+and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without therefore keeping
+him in leading-strings all his life."[8] Again, "In real action most
+men are guided by the tact of judgment, which hits the object more or
+less accurately, according as they possess more or less genius. This
+is the way in which all great generals have acted, and therein partly
+lay their greatness and their genius, in that they always hit upon what
+was right by this tact. Thus also it will always be in _action_, and
+so far this tact is amply sufficient. But when it is a question not of
+acting one's self, but of convincing others _in consultation_, then
+all depends upon clear conceptions and demonstrations and the inherent
+relations; and so little progress has been made in this respect that
+most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no
+firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion,
+or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle
+course really without any value. Clear ideas on these matters are not,
+therefore, wholly useless."[9]
+
+How true this is any one will admit who reflects for a moment upon
+the great diversity of opinions on almost every subject held in our
+army, just because of this want of a central theory common to all. In
+the domain of tactics it is evident that this holds good even as in
+strategy, for a common central theory of war will produce a more or
+less common way of looking at things, from which results more or less
+common action towards the attainment of the common object.
+
+
+REJECTION OF SET AND GEOMETRICAL THEORIES
+
+"It should educate the mind of the future leader in war" is what
+Clausewitz demands from a useful theory; but he most expressly and
+unreservedly rejects every attempt at a method "by which definite
+plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if
+from a machine."[10] He mocks at Bülow's including at first in the
+one term "base" all sorts of things, like the supply of the army, its
+reinforcements and equipments, the security of its communications with
+the home country, and lastly the security of its line of retreat, and
+then fixing the extent of the base, and finally fixing an angle for the
+extent of that base: "And all this was done merely to obtain a pure
+geometrical result utterly useless" (Von Caemmerer).
+
+For the same reason Jomini's principle of the Inner Line does not
+satisfy him, owing to its mere geometrical nature, although he right
+willingly acknowledges "that it rests on a sound foundation, on
+the truth that the combat is the only effectual means in war" (Von
+Caemmerer). All such attempts at theory seem to him therefore perfectly
+useless, "because they strive to work with fixed quantities, while in
+war everything is _uncertain_, and all considerations must reckon with
+all kinds of variable quantities; because they only consider _material_
+objects, while every action in war is saturated with _moral_ forces and
+effects; lastly, because they deal only with the action of _one_ party,
+while war is a constant reciprocal effect of _both_ parties" (Von
+Caemmerer).
+
+"Pity the warrior," says Clausewitz, "who is contented to crawl about
+in this beggardom of rules." "Pity the theory which sets itself in
+opposition to the mind"[11] (note, the moral forces).
+
+
+A THEORY TO BE PRACTICALLY USEFUL
+
+Clausewitz insists that a useful theory cannot be more than a thorough
+knowledge of military history and "reflection upon all the situations
+in which we can be placed in war." "What genius does must be just the
+best of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to show just how
+and why it is so." "It is an analytical investigation of the subject
+which leads to exact knowledge: and if brought to bear on the results
+of experience, which in our case would be military history, to a
+_thorough_ familiarity with it. If theory investigates the subjects
+which constitute war; if it separates more distinctly that which at
+first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the properties of
+the means; if it shows their probable effects; if it makes evident the
+nature of objects; _if it brings to bear all over the field of war the
+light of essentially critical investigation_,--then it has fulfilled
+the chief duties of its province. It becomes then a guide to him who
+wishes to make himself acquainted with war from books; it lights up the
+whole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his judgment,
+and shields him from error."[12]
+
+
+KNOWLEDGE MUST BE THOROUGH
+
+This Clausewitz considers most important. He says that "Knowledge of
+the conduct of war ... _must pass completely into the mind_, and almost
+cease to be something objective." For in war "The moral reaction, the
+ever-changing form of things makes it necessary for the chief actor
+to carry _in himself_ the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, in
+order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving
+the requisite decision _from himself_. Knowledge must, by this complete
+assimilation with his own mind and life, be converted into real power."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+So much for Clausewitz, therefore, as the greatest yet the simplest and
+least theoretical of theorists on war. Mark well his comforting dictum
+that "Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations
+in which we can be placed in war." That is a task which we have all
+more or less attempted. Therefore we are all more or less theorists.
+The only question is that of comparative "thoroughness" in our
+reflections. And it is essentially this "thoroughness" in investigation
+and reflection towards which Clausewitz helps us. Like every other
+habit, the _habit_ of military reflection gradually grows with use;
+till, fortified and strengthened by detailed knowledge, it gradually
+becomes Power.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+The theory of war is simple, and there is no reason why any man who
+chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or
+two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a
+fair knowledge thereof. He may with reasonable trouble attain to such
+knowledge of the theory of war as will enable him to follow with
+intelligent appreciation the discussions of experienced soldier or
+soldiers. Such knowledge as will prevent his misunderstanding the
+experienced soldier's argument from pure ignorance, and such knowledge
+as will enable him to understand the military reasons put forward and
+the military object proposed. To the opinion of such a man all respect
+will be due. Thus, and thus only.
+
+It is indeed the plain duty of all who aspire to rule either thus to
+qualify themselves to understand, or else to abstain from interference
+with, the military interests of the State.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR
+
+
+This point is here illustrated with more detail from Clausewitz than
+may seem necessary to some, because it is precisely the point regarding
+modern war which is least understood in this country.
+
+"The complete overthrow of the enemy is the natural end of the art of
+war." "As this idea must apply to both the belligerent parties, it
+must follow, that there can be no suspension in the military act, and
+peace cannot take place until one or other of the parties concerned is
+completely overthrown." This is what Clausewitz means by Absolute War,
+that is war carried to its absolute and logical conclusion with the
+utmost force, the utmost effort and the utmost energy. He then proceeds
+to show that war, owing "to all the natural inertia and friction of its
+parts, the whole of the inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation (or
+timidity) of the human mind," usually takes a weaker or less absolute
+form according to circumstances. "All this, theory must admit, but it
+is its duty to give the foremost place to the absolute form of war, and
+to use that form as a general point of direction." He then proceeds to
+show that war finally took its absolute form under Napoleon. To-day we
+may say that war takes its absolute form in the modern great national
+war, which is waged by each belligerent with the whole concentrated
+physical and mental power of the nation-in-arms.
+
+This requires to be gone into a little more in detail, for it is a
+most important point.
+
+Clausewitz in Book VIII. approaches this part of his subject by an
+historical survey of war from the time of the Roman Empire to that
+of Napoleon. He shows how as the feudal system gradually merged into
+the later monarchical States of Europe, armies gradually became less
+and less national, more and more mercenary. Omitting this, we arrive
+at the seventeenth century. He says: "The end of the seventeenth
+century, the time of Louis XIV., is to be regarded as the point in
+history at which the standing military power, such as it existed in the
+eighteenth century, reached its zenith. That military force was based
+on enlistment and money. States had organized themselves into complete
+unities; and the governments, by commuting the personal services of
+their subjects into money payments, had concentrated their whole power
+in their treasuries. Through the rapid strides in social improvements,
+and a more enlightened system of government, this power had become very
+great in comparison with what it had been. France appeared in the field
+with a standing army of a couple of hundred thousand men, and the other
+Powers in proportion."
+
+Armies were supported out of the Treasury, which the sovereign regarded
+partly as his privy purse, at least as a resource belonging to the
+Government, and not to the people. Relations with other States, except
+with respect to a few commercial subjects, mostly concerned only the
+interests of the Treasury or of the Government, not those of the
+people; at least ideas tended everywhere in that way. The Cabinets
+therefore looked upon themselves as the owners and administrators
+of large estates, which they were continually seeking to increase,
+without the tenants on those estates being particularly interested in
+this improvement.
+
+The people, therefore, who in the Tartar invasions were everything in
+war, who in the old republics and in the Middle Ages were of great
+consequence, were in the eighteenth century absolutely nothing directly.
+
+In this manner, in proportion as the Government separated itself more
+from the people, and regarded itself as the State, war became more and
+more exclusively a business of the Government, which it carried on
+by means of the money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds it could
+pick up in its own and neighbouring countries. The army was a State
+property, very expensive, and not to be lightly risked in battle.
+"In its signification war was only diplomacy somewhat intensified, a
+more vigorous way of negotiating, in which battles and sieges were
+substituted for diplomatic notes."
+
+"Plundering and devastating the enemy's country were no longer in
+accordance with the spirit of the age." "They were justly looked upon
+as unnecessary barbarity." "War, therefore, confined itself more and
+more, both as regards means and ends, to the army itself. The army,
+with its fortresses and some prepared positions, constituted a State in
+a State, within which the element of war slowly consumed itself. All
+Europe rejoiced at its taking this direction, and held it to be the
+necessary consequence of the spirit of progress."
+
+So think many in this country to-day. They are only a hundred years
+behind the times.
+
+"The plan of a war on the part of the State assuming the offensive in
+those times consisted generally in the conquest of one or other of the
+enemy's provinces; the plan of the defender was to prevent this. The
+plan of campaign was to take one or other of the enemy's fortresses, or
+to prevent one of our own being taken; it was only when a battle became
+unavoidable for this purpose that it was sought for and fought. Whoever
+fought a battle without this unavoidable necessity, from mere innate
+desire of gaining a victory, was reckoned a general with too much
+daring." For armies were too precious to be lightly risked. "Winter
+quarters, in which the mutual relations of the two parties almost
+entirely ceased, formed a distinct limit to the activity which was
+considered to belong to one campaign." "As long as war was universally
+conducted in this manner, all was considered to be in the most regular
+order." "Thus there was eminence and perfection of every kind, and
+even Field-Marshal Daun, to whom it was chiefly owing that Frederick
+the Great completely attained his object, and Maria Theresa completely
+failed in hers, notwithstanding that could still pass for a great
+general."
+
+Beyond this stage of military thought, many in this country have not
+yet advanced.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+"Thus matters stood when the French Revolution broke out; Austria
+and Prussia tried their diplomatic art of war; this very soon proved
+insufficient. Whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things,
+all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in 1793, such
+a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. War had
+suddenly become again an affair of the people, and that of a people
+numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself as a
+citizen of the State." "_By this participation of the people in the
+war_, instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural
+weight came into the scale. Henceforth the means available--the efforts
+which might be called forth--had no longer any definite limits; the
+energy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer any
+counterpoise, and consequently the danger to the adversary had risen to
+the extreme."
+
+If only our politicians could learn this old lesson of the French
+Revolution! For many, too many, of them appear to derive their ideas of
+war to-day from some dim reminiscent recollections of school histories
+of the wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
+
+To continue: "After all this was perfected by the hand of Bonaparte,
+this military power based on the strength of the whole nation, marched
+over Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly,
+that where it only encountered the old-fashioned armies the result was
+not doubtful for a moment.
+
+"A reaction, however, awoke in due time. In Spain the war became of
+itself an affair of the people." In Austria. In Russia. "In Germany
+Prussia rose up the first, made the war a national cause, and without
+either money or credit, and with a population reduced one-half, took
+the field with an army twice as strong as in 1806. The rest of Germany
+followed the example of Prussia sooner or later." "Thus it was that
+Germany and Russia, in the years 1813 and 1814, appeared against France
+with about a million of men."
+
+"Under these circumstances the energy thrown into the conduct of war
+was quite different." "In eight months the theatre of war was removed
+from the Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had to bow its head for the
+first time; and the redoubtable Bonaparte lay fettered on the ground."
+
+"Therefore, since the time of Bonaparte, war, through being, first on
+one side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has
+assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer
+to its real nature, to its absolute perfection. The means then called
+forth had no visible limit, the limit losing itself in the energy
+and enthusiasm of the Government and its subjects. By the extent of
+the means, and the wide field of possible results, as well as by
+the powerful excitement of feeling which prevailed, energy in the
+conduct of war was immensely increased; the object of its action was
+the downfall of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerless on
+the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop, or to come to any
+understanding with regard to the mutual objects of the contest.
+
+"Thus, therefore the element of war, freed from all conventional
+restrictions, broke loose with all its natural force. The cause was the
+participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this
+participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on
+the internal affairs of other countries, partly from the threatening
+attitude of the French towards all nations.
+
+"Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars
+hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the
+States, and, consequently, _will only take place on account of great
+interests closely affecting the people_, would be a difficult point to
+settle. But every one will agree with us that, at least, _Whenever
+great interests are in dispute_, mutual hostility will discharge itself
+in the same manner as it has done in our times."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+This is so true, that every war since the days of Clausewitz has made
+its truth more apparent. Since he wrote, the participation of the
+people in war has become, not a revolutionary fact, but an organized
+fact, an ordinary fact in the everyday life of nations. To-day every
+State except Great Britain, securely based on the system of the
+universal training of its sons to arms, stands ready to defend its
+interests with the whole concentrated power, physical, intellectual,
+and material, of its whole manhood. Consequently, European war,
+as Clausewitz foresaw, "will only take place on account of great
+interests closely affecting the people." The character of such war
+will be absolute, the object of its action will be the downfall of the
+foe, and not till the foe (be it Great Britain or not) lies powerless
+on the ground will it be supposed possible to stop. In the prosecution
+of such a national war the means available, the energy and the effort
+called forth, will be without limits. Such must be the conflicts of
+nations-in-arms.
+
+Yet, even now, so many years after Clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he
+himself stated, "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists
+and statesmen," the great transformation in the character of modern
+war, due to the participation of the people therein, has not yet been
+adequately realized by many men in this country _who ought to know_.
+It is earnestly to be hoped that they will endeavour to adjust their
+minds, as regards war, to the fact that we are living, not in the
+eighteenth century, but in the twentieth, and that they will consider
+that war has once for all become an affair of the people, that our
+opponents will be a people-in-arms, using the uttermost means of their
+whole manhood to crush us, and that disaster can only be prevented by a
+like utmost effort on our part, by an effort regardless of everything
+except self-preservation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR
+
+
+"War belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the
+province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is
+settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from
+others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to
+liken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and
+activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on
+its part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale.
+Besides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which
+its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of
+living creatures in their germs."[13]
+
+These conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of
+feeling that "even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate
+hatred of each other." It is an unpleasant fact for the philosopher,
+for the social reformer, to contemplate, but history repeats and
+repeats the lesson. Still more, "It is quite possible for such a state
+of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political
+motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact, a
+perfect explosion."
+
+"War is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its
+elements--hatred and animosity--which may be looked upon as blind
+instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free
+activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political
+instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.
+
+"The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second,
+more the general and his army; the third more the Government. _The
+passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence
+in the peoples._
+
+"These three tendencies are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject.
+A theory which would leave any one of them out of account would
+immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality,
+that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone."[14]
+
+Clausewitz is the great thinker, the great realist, the great
+philosopher of war. His aim was, free from all bias, to get at _the
+truth of things_. His view of war as a social act, as part of the
+intercourse of nations, so that occasional warlike struggles can no
+more be avoided than occasional commercial struggles, is a view which
+requires to be most carefully pondered over by every statesman. It
+is based upon the essential fundamental characteristics of human
+nature, which do not alter. It is not to be lightly set aside by
+declamation about the blessings of peace, the evils of war, the burden
+of armaments, and such-like sophistries. To submit without a struggle
+to injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in
+passionate human nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile
+people. It is indeed to be most sincerely hoped that _arbitration_
+will be resorted to more and more as a means of peacefully settling
+all non-vital causes of dispute. But arbitration has its limits. For
+_no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that
+it regards as absolutely vital_. The view of war, therefore, as a
+social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, with all that it
+implies, appears to be the only one which a statesman, however much he
+may regret the fact, can take. It has, therefore, been brought forward
+here at once, as it underlies the whole subject and is essential to all
+clear thought thereon.
+
+So much for the influence of Public Opinion in producing war. Now for
+its influence in and during war.
+
+"There are three principal objects in carrying on war," says Clausewitz.
+
+  "(_a_) To conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force.
+
+  "(_b_) To get possession of the material elements of aggression,
+  and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army.
+
+  "(_c_) _To gain Public Opinion._[15]
+
+"To attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be
+directed against the enemy's principal army, for it must be beaten
+before we can follow up the other two objects with success.
+
+"In order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against
+those points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated:
+principal towns, magazines, great fortresses. On the road to these the
+enemy's principal force, or a considerable part of his army, will be
+encountered.
+
+"Public Opinion is ultimately gained by great victories, and by the
+possession of the enemy's capital."[16]
+
+This almost prophetic (as it was in his day) recognition by Clausewitz
+of the vast importance of gaining Public Opinion _as one of the
+three great aims in war_, is fundamental. It is just one of those
+instances of his rare insight into the principles and development of
+modern national war which make his book of such great and enduring
+value to us. For since his day Europe has become organized into great
+industrial nations, democracy and popular passion have become more
+and more a force to be reckoned with, and the gaining and preserving
+of Public Opinion in war has become more and more important. It has,
+in fact, become the statesman's chief business during a great modern
+national war. It has become necessary for him to study intently war in
+its relation to industry, and to the industrial millions over whom he
+presides, or over whom he may preside.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in Britain were a nation of
+18,000,000, practically self-supporting, and governed by an
+aristocracy. To-day we are a crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent
+upon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw
+materials, for our trade, for our staying power, _and_ we are governed
+by a democracy. In a modern democratic State it will only be possible
+to carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships
+brought on the democracy by the war do not become intolerable. To
+prevent these hardships from thus becoming intolerable to the people,
+to Public Opinion, will be the task of the modern statesman during war,
+and this can only be done by wise prevision and timely preparation. _It
+requires the internal organization of the Industrial State for war._
+
+It appears to the _writer_ that internal organization can be subdivided
+as follows:--
+
+I. An adequate gold reserve.
+
+II. The protection of our ships carrying raw material, food, and
+exports during their passage on the high seas from the places of
+origin to the consumers: (A) by the few available cruisers which could
+be spared from the fighting fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well
+thought out and prepared scheme of national indemnity (_vide_ Blue Book
+thereon); (B) by insuring the distribution to the consumers of food
+and raw material, after it has arrived in the country, by preparing a
+thorough organization which would deal with the blocking of any of the
+principal ports of arrival, and by guarding the vulnerable points of
+our internal lines of communications to and from the shipping centres.
+
+III. Organization of Poor Law system to bring immediate relief by
+selling at peace price food to those unable to pay war prices owing to
+(A) normal poverty (7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works,
+due to effect of war on trade.
+
+Work and wages the State _must_ guarantee during modern war, and
+before the State _can_ guarantee these, it is absolutely necessary
+that it should satisfy itself that the above preparations are actually
+_in being_. This pre-supposes a more earnest study of the industrial
+effects of a great national war than has yet been given to the subject
+by our political leaders. For in the warfare of the present and future
+the importance of gaining and preserving Public Opinion, as pointed
+out by Clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. It is as fundamentally
+important _to safeguard our own Public Opinion as it is to attack,
+weaken, and gain over that of the enemy_. This has not yet passed
+the stage of thought. But good thoughts are no better than good dreams
+unless they be put into action. We are waiting for the statesman to DO
+it. There is no great difficulty.
+
+(2) In arousing the national spirit to the requisite height of
+patriotic self-denial and self-sacrifice, in elevating, preserving, and
+safe-guarding Public Opinion during a great national struggle, much
+may be hoped for from the patriotism of our Press. Only in fairness to
+those whose patriotism is self-originating and spontaneous, it must
+be made compulsory upon ALL, so that no journal may suffer loss of
+circulation or pecuniary injury thereby.
+
+(3) There lies a practical task immediately to the hand of our
+statesmen if they will seriously set themselves to the task of
+improving the _moral_ of our nation by reforming our education
+_curriculum_, on the leading principle that the moral is to the
+physical as three to one in life, and that therefore character-building
+must be its chief aim. Then they will do much towards strengthening
+us for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's idea of the gaining and
+preserving of our Public Opinion in War.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE NATURE OF WAR
+
+
+"It is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the
+whole, because it is particularly necessary that, in the consideration
+of any of the parts, the whole should be kept constantly in view. We
+shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by
+Publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a
+duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would
+conceive as a unit the countless numbers of duels which make up a
+war, we shall do so best by supposing two wrestlers. Each strives
+by physical force to throw his adversary, and thus to render him
+incapable of further resistance.
+
+"Violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and science in
+order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost
+imperceptible, and _hardly worth mentioning_, termed _usages of
+International Law_, accompany it without essentially impairing its
+power.
+
+"Violence, that is to say physical force, is therefore _the Means_;
+the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate
+_object_. In order to attain this object fully the enemy must first be
+disarmed: and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities
+in theory."[17]
+
+Now, "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful
+method of disarming and overcoming an adversary without causing great
+bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war.
+However plausible this may appear, _still it is an error which must
+be extirpated_, for in such dangerous things as war _the errors which
+proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_. As the
+use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the
+co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that _he who uses force
+unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed_, MUST
+_obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise_." "To
+introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation
+would be an absurdity." "We therefore repeat our proposition, that _War
+is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds_."
+
+
+THE POLITICAL NATURE OF WAR
+
+In endeavouring briefly to describe Clausewitz's method of looking at
+war, one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting
+a few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant
+passages. However, a selection must be made.
+
+I assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy,
+because that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical
+way of looking at things. This point of view is as necessary for
+the strategist as for the statesman, indeed for every man who would
+understand the nature of war. For otherwise it is impossible to
+understand the military conduct of many campaigns and battles, in which
+the political outweighed the military influence, and led to action
+incomprehensible almost from a purely military point of view. History
+is full of such examples.
+
+Clausewitz clearly lays down: "_War is only a continuation of State
+policy by other means._ This point of view being adhered to will
+introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and
+things will be more easily disentangled from each other."[18] "It
+is only thus that we can obtain a clear conception of war, for the
+political view is the _object_, war is the _means_, and the means
+must always include the object in our conception." "Each (nation or
+government) strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to
+its will."[19]
+
+Owing to the great importance of this point of view, so little
+understood in this country, I have devoted the next chapter to it
+alone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's view more in detail. We can,
+therefore, pass on for the present.
+
+
+THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY
+
+Secondly, I select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory,
+because that is essential in order to understand his division of all
+wars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be
+able to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating
+point, where reaction may set in.[20]
+
+"The conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his
+adversary completely. Often, in fact almost _universally, there is a
+culminating point of victory_. Experience shows this sufficiently."[21]
+As the attack or invasion progresses it becomes weaker even from its
+successes, from sieges or corps left to observe fortified places, from
+the troops required to guard the territory gained, and the lengthening
+line of communications, from the fact that we are removing further
+from our resource while the enemy is falling back upon and drawing
+nearer to his, from the danger of other States joining in to prevent
+the utter destruction of the defeated nation, from the rousing of
+the whole nation in extremity to save themselves by a people's war,
+from the slackening of effort in the victorious army itself, etc.,
+etc. Leoben, Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances of such a
+culminating point, and probably in the late Russo-Japanese war Harbin
+would have proved so, too, if peace had not intervened.
+
+Clausewitz continues: "It is necessary to know how far it (our
+preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and,
+instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster." He defines it as "_The
+point at which the offensive changes into the defensive_," and says,
+"to overstep this point is more than simply a useless expenditure of
+power yielding no further results, it is a _destructive_ step which
+causes reaction, and the reaction is, according to all experience,
+productive of most disproportionate effects."[22] The reader will find
+it an interesting exercise to search for this culminating point of
+victory in historical campaigns, and mark the result where it has been
+overstepped and where it has not been overstepped.
+
+
+THE TWO CLASSES OF WARS
+
+From this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the
+two classes into which Clausewitz divides all wars.
+
+"The two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the
+complete _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be that we aim at his
+destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to
+conclude peace on our terms; and, _next_, those in which our aim is
+merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either
+for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to
+account as matters for exchange in the settlement of Peace."[23]
+
+All wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the
+enemy, _i.e._ "unlimited object," or wars with a "limited object."
+In the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in
+accordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with
+the enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point
+of victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or
+beyond it. If the former--then the plan should be one with a "limited
+object," such as the Crimea, Manchuria, etc.; if the latter--then the
+plan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of
+Napoleon's campaigns, or the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as 1866,
+or 1870. As Clausewitz says: "_Now, the first, the grandest, and most
+decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is
+rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages_,
+not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which,
+by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. _This,
+therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical
+questions._"[24]
+
+In Clausewitz's two plans for war with France in 1831,[25] this
+difference is plain. In the first plan, he considered Prussia, Austria,
+the German Confederation, and Great Britain united as allies against
+France,--and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack
+by two armies, each of 300,000 men, one marching on Paris from Belgium,
+one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine. In the second plan the political
+conditions had meanwhile changed; Austria and Great Britain were
+doubtful, and Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if Prussia and
+the German Confederation alone could appear before Paris in sufficient
+strength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it
+would be permissible to venture even beyond Paris. So he proposed to
+limit the object to the conquest of Belgium, and to attack the French
+vigorously the moment they entered that country.
+
+Which strict limitation of the object within the means available to
+attain it is characteristic of Clausewitz's practical way of looking
+at things. In each plan, however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a
+decisive victory was to be adopted.
+
+
+PREPARATION FOR WAR
+
+The third place, in respect to its present-day importance, I assign to
+Clausewitz's clear statement that--
+
+"If we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then
+the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal
+classes, into such as are only _preparations for war_ and into _the war
+itself_. This distinction must also be made in theory."
+
+Nothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater
+honour peace preparations. Like his doctrine of the importance of
+gaining public opinion in war, it is one of those almost prophetic
+utterances which make Clausewitz the germ of modern military evolution.
+
+Clausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not, foresaw to a certain extent
+(probably owing to his employment in organizing the new Prussian
+short-service army after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the present day.
+And, since his time, the greater the forces which have to be prepared,
+the greater has become the value of preparation for war. It has been
+continually growing, till to-day it has obtained such overwhelming
+importance that one may almost say that a modern war is practically (or
+nearly so) decided _before_ war breaks out, according to which nation
+has made the greatest and most thorough peace preparations.
+
+Clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every imaginable preparation." We may
+nowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that
+that nation which is beaten in preparation is already beaten BEFORE
+the war breaks out.
+
+A failure to understand this fact is a fundamental error at the root
+of the idea of war as held by civilians, for many of them think that
+speeches are a substitute for preparations.
+
+It is plain that these three ideas of Clausewitz regarding the nature
+of war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an
+unlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace-time,
+are as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier, and require
+study and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part
+of the latter.
+
+
+FRICTION IN WAR
+
+I place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual
+war, of war in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war
+on paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the
+part of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway
+between the two.
+
+Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. He
+always looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction
+and the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be
+the chief characteristic of real war as distinguished from theoretical
+war or war on paper, it is chiefly this habit or mode of thought which
+makes his writings of such great and permanent value. It is also a
+habit which we ought sedulously to cultivate in ourselves.
+
+"_In war everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is
+difficult_,"[26] runs his famous saying. Why is the simplest thing
+difficult? Because of the friction of war. And how can that friction
+be minimized? Only by force of character, and the military virtues of
+discipline, perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. Hence the
+great emphasis which he always and everywhere lays upon character and
+these military virtues as the deciding factors in war.
+
+"_Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to
+that which distinguishes real war from war on paper_," he says. Each
+individual of the army "keeps up his own friction in all directions."
+"The danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it
+requires, augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the
+greatest causes of it."[27] "_This enormous friction is everywhere
+brought into contact with chance_, and thus facts take place
+upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being
+chance. As an instance of one such chance take the weather. Here the
+fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time,--a battery from
+firing, or a report from reaching the general. The rain (mud) prevents
+a battalion from arriving,--or the cavalry from charging effectively,
+because it had stuck fast in the heavy ground." And so on. Consider
+for examples the foggy mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau, the
+Katzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz, Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud
+of Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest, the mud of Manchuria.
+
+"_Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium._" "_The knowledge
+of friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in
+war_, which is required in a good general." "It is therefore this
+friction which makes that which appears easy in war so difficult in
+reality."[28] In considering any situation in war we must therefore
+always add to the known circumstances--friction.
+
+
+WAR ITSELF
+
+In Clausewitz's way of looking at war itself I assign at once the first
+place to his doctrine, "_The destruction of the enemy's military force
+is the leading principle of war_, and for the whole chapter of positive
+action _the direct way to the aim_."[29] This dictum, repeated in
+many different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. All the
+old theoretical ideas about threatening by manoeuvring, conquering by
+manoeuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manoeuvring, and so forth,
+in which his predecessors entangled strategy, and from which even the
+Archduke Charles and Jomini had not completely freed themselves, he
+brushes aside by "our assertion is that ONLY great tactical results can
+lead to great strategical results."[30] Thus he leads and concentrates
+our thoughts in strategy on the central idea of victory in battle,
+and frees us once for all from the obscuring veil of lines and angles
+and geometrical forms by which other writers have hidden that truth.
+"Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of
+overcoming and disarming an adversary without causing great bloodshed,
+and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However
+plausible this may appear, _it is an error which must be extirpated_,
+for, in such dangerous things as war, _the errors which spring from a
+spirit of benevolence are just the worst_."[31] For "he who uses force
+unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, _must_
+obtain the superiority if his adversary does not act likewise." And the
+"worst of all errors in wars" is still the idea of war too commonly
+held by civilians in this country, as witness the outcries which
+greeted every loss during the South African war, which shows how much
+Clausewitz is needed as a tonic to brace their minds to the reality.
+
+"War is an act of violence which in its application knows NO bounds."
+"Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed; if a bloody
+slaughter be a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more
+respect to war (for avoiding unnecessary war), but not for making the
+sword we wear blunt and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity,
+till some one steps in with a sword that is sharp, and lops off the
+arm from our body."
+
+
+SIMPLE PLANS
+
+The second place I assign to his doctrine of _the simplest plans_,
+because time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions,
+but "a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have _time_
+for wide-reaching skilful combination."[32] "By this it appears to us
+that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are
+complicated is conclusively shown."
+
+"We must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike," or the
+opponent will get his thrust in first.
+
+"Whenever this is the case, we must ourselves choose the shorter."
+"Therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by
+complicated plans, _we must always rather endeavour to be beforehand
+with him by the simplest and shortest_."
+
+
+STRATEGIC LINES
+
+The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between
+the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation,
+and lines of manoeuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in Jomini and his
+predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing
+a part,--for these Clausewitz has little respect. In his chapter on
+"The Geometrical Element,"[33] he says, "We therefore do not hesitate
+to regard it as an established truth that _in strategy more depends
+upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the
+form of the great lines by which they are connected_."[34] Of course
+he does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above
+sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. He
+therefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to
+the heart of things.
+
+
+FRICTION
+
+has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about
+its components.
+
+
+DANGER
+
+"An ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger.
+"Danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is
+necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under
+notice here."[35]
+
+
+BODILY EXERTION
+
+Clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on
+the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul."
+"Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction."[36]
+
+To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen the retreat from Moscow, the
+awful passage of the Beresina, and the battle of the nations round
+Leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. Had he not seen
+bodily exertion and hardship break up the Grand Army into a small horde
+of stragglers, and destroy the army of Kutusoff in almost an equal
+measure, in 1812, as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely
+break up the great army of Napoleon in 1813?
+
+As for the effects of bodily exertion on the mind, purpose, and
+resolution of the general, compare Benningsen at Eylau after thirty-six
+hours in the saddle, or Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost all the
+results of his victory.
+
+
+INFORMATION IN WAR
+
+"_The foundation of all our ideas and actions_," but "in a few words,
+_most reports are false_." "When in the thick of war itself one
+report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if
+these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of
+probability." In another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual
+uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he
+compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and
+groping uncertainly for one another.
+
+"These things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war
+and make it a _resistant medium for every activity_, we have designated
+danger, bodily exertion, information, and friction."[37] He never loses
+sight of this; it pervades everything he writes.
+
+
+THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL
+
+"And therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in
+this book are composed _half of physical, half of moral causes and
+effects_, and we might say that the physical are almost no more than
+the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real
+bright polished weapon."[38] Pages might be filled with extracts
+showing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader
+is already convinced of that. Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral
+is to the physical as three to one." Clausewitz regards all military
+questions from this point. His psychological attitude is what chiefly
+characterizes Clausewitz from all writers who came before him, and
+which makes his deductions so realistic, so interesting and so valuable
+for all who come after him.
+
+
+TENSION AND REST IN WAR
+
+In order not to weary the reader I will bring this chapter to a
+conclusion with one or two extracts relating to "tension and rest;
+the suspension of the act in warfare." This is explanatory of those
+frequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first
+sight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. These halts are
+due to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty,
+irresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc.
+
+In this connection one must remember that war is "a chain of battles
+all strung together, one of which always brings on another." But they
+seldom follow each other immediately; there is usually a certain
+pause between. As soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new
+combinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the
+next. Whilst these new combinations are being developed, or perhaps
+considered, there may be a greater or less suspension of the act, a
+longer or shorter halt in the forward movement. Then another spring
+forward. Clausewitz has a great many interesting things to say on this
+subject.[39]
+
+"If there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither
+party for the moment wills anything positive, there is _rest_, and for
+the moment equilibrium.... As soon as ever one of the parties proposes
+to himself a new positive object, and commences active steps towards
+it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy
+opposes this, there is _tension_ of the powers; this lasts until the
+decision takes place.... This decision, the foundation of which lies
+always in the battle-combinations which are made on each side, ... is
+followed by a movement in one or other direction."
+
+"It may so happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not only
+feel themselves too weak to attack, but are so in reality."
+
+"Wild as is the nature of war it still wears the claims of human
+weakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates
+dangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one."
+
+"If we cast a glance at military history in general, there we find
+so much the opposite of an incessant advance towards the aim, that
+_standing still_ and _doing nothing_ is quite plainly the _normal
+condition_ of an army in the midst of war, _acting_ the _exception_.
+This must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception.
+But if military history has this effect by the great body of its
+events, so also the latest series of wars redeem the view. The war of
+the French Revolution shows only too plainly its reality, and only
+proves too plainly its necessity. In that war, and especially in the
+campaigns of Bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited
+degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the
+element. This degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then
+it is necessary."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So that is how Clausewitz regards
+International Law, Clausewitz to whom in Germany "our most famous
+victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training,"
+and on whom "everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war
+bases himself, even if he is not conscious of it." And we must regard
+nearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a
+disciple of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time that we should
+cease to pin our faith on International Law, or think that it can in
+any way protect us, if we neglect strongly to protect ourselves. Power
+and expediency are the only rules that the practical politicians of
+foreign countries recognize, and the only question they ask themselves
+is, "Have we got sufficient power to do this," and if so, "Is it
+expedient to do it?"
+
+(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length
+of time? None whatever. For treaties are only considered binding as
+long as the interests of _both_ contracting parties remain the same.
+Directly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most
+solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia tore up the Treaty of Paris, or
+as Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history is full of torn-up
+treaties. And as it has been so it will be. The European waste-paper
+basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way,
+and a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste-paper basket
+is, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. Only
+in ourselves can we trust. Therefore no treaties at present existing
+should be allowed in any way to alter or lessen our preparations to
+enable us to fight _alone_ when necessary.
+
+(3) It cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted on, that the
+success or failure of a State policy is dependent upon the amount of
+armed force behind it. For upon the amount of armed force behind a
+policy depends the greater or less amount of resistance, of friction,
+which that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. The
+prestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength.
+The less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its
+rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have
+been prevented if its prestige, or armed force, had been greater. On
+the other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more
+reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. So
+that the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is, the
+more likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful
+compromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace.
+
+Therefore, under this consideration, those who would reduce our
+national forces are deeply mistaken, for such action would imperil our
+prestige, imperil our negotiations, imperil our peace, and perhaps lead
+eventually to a war that we might otherwise have avoided. Therefore
+no such deeply mistaken economy for us. A few hundred thousand pounds
+saved would be dear economy indeed if it led, as well it might, to the
+payment before many years of a War Indemnity of £800,000,000 or so.
+Better the evils we know than the far greater evils we know not of.
+
+(4) Surprise in war is what we have to fear. There are two sorts of
+national surprise that we must consider. These are (A) the _surprise
+by actual hostilities_ taking place before the actual declaration of
+war, such as the Japanese surprise and practical destruction of the
+fighting force of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; (B) the _surprise
+by superior preparation_, silently carried out till all is ready for a
+decisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defence,
+and then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly
+ready, as the surprise in this sense of France by Germany in 1870.
+
+(A) Every successful example is always copied, and usually on a larger
+scale. We may be quite certain that our rivals have taken to heart
+the lesson of Port Arthur. It is possible that our next war will open
+with a similar night attack on our fleet, either just before, or
+simultaneously with the declaration of war. If it is successful, or
+even partially successful, it may produce the most grave results, as in
+the Russo-Japanese War. It _may_ render possible a naval action with
+almost equal forces, in which our opponents _might_ be victorious. The
+invasion of this country on a gigantic scale by 300,000 men or more
+would then follow as a certainty. This is not a probability, but a
+possibility which requires to be kept in our view.
+
+(B) _The surprise by superior preparation_, as I term it, for want
+of a better name, is a danger to which we are peculiarly liable. As
+Lord Salisbury said, "The British constitution is a bad fighting
+machine," and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by
+the lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all
+that appertains to war. Hence they are always liable to oppose, as
+excessive, preparations which are in reality the minimum consistent
+with national safety. Consequently our preparations for war, controlled
+as they are by those who have no special knowledge of war, are always
+apt to be insufficient, as were those of France in 1870. In former
+days this did not perhaps so very much matter, although it resulted
+in the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of British lives and
+hundreds of millions of British treasure. But still we were able, at
+this somewhat excessive price, to "muddle through," owing to the heroic
+efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make bricks without straw and
+retrieve the mistakes of our policy. For our opponents then conducted
+war in such a slow way as to give us time to repair _after_ the
+outbreak of war our lack of preparation _before_ it. But opposed to a
+modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen and led by generals brought
+up in the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Moltke--all will be
+different. In such a war the national forces brought into play are so
+immense that it is only possible to do so efficaciously if everything
+has been most carefully prepared and organized beforehand. It is not
+_possible_ to improvise such organization of national force _after_
+the war has begun, for there cannot be sufficient time. If our rival
+makes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that
+war the _whole_ of its national force, material, moral, and physical,
+while we only prepare to bring to bear a _small portion_ thereof, then
+there will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. The
+war will be conducted with the utmost energy, and the aim will be to
+utilize to the utmost the superiority obtained by superior preparation,
+so as to make the decision as rapid as possible before we have time to
+recover from the effects of our surprise. That is the danger we have to
+fear, and to keep ever in mind.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+WAR AS POLICY
+
+
+"War," says Clausewitz, "is only a continuation of State policy by
+other means." The first question that at once arises in the mind is
+what is meant by Policy. We may safely lay down that State policy is
+the defence and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole
+amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards
+acquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. There
+can, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength
+or weakness, of success or failure, in the policy of a State.
+
+Clausewitz expressly stated that he hoped "to iron out many creases
+in the heads of strategists and statesmen," such, for instance, as
+the idea that it is possible to consider either policy or war as
+independent of the other.
+
+It is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy if we
+regard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes peace
+negotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to
+attain the political object.
+
+War is only a part of policy, a continuance of the previous
+negotiations; but the instrument is now the sword and not the pen. As
+Clausewitz says, "_In one word, the art of war, in its highest point
+of view, is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead
+of writing notes._" War is merely a means whereby a nation attempts
+to impose its will upon another nation in order to attain a political
+object. This object is settled by policy, which also orders the war,
+determines what sort of war it is to be, with what means and resources
+and expenditure it is to be waged, when its object has been attained,
+and when it is to cease. In fact, policy prepares, leads up to, orders,
+supports, guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz said, "_All the
+leading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet--that
+is, by a political, not a military functionary._"
+
+Unity of thought is only to be obtained by "the conception that
+war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means
+an independent thing in itself." "And how can we conceive it to be
+otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political
+relations between different nations and governments? Is not war
+merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts?"
+"Accordingly war can never be separated from political intercourse;
+and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way,
+all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent,
+broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object."
+
+"If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from
+policy. If the policy is grand and powerful, so will also be the war,
+and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its
+absolute form." "Only through this kind of view war recovers unity;
+only by it can we see _all_ wars of _one_ kind, and it is only through
+it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of
+view from which _great plans_ may be traced out and determined upon."
+
+"There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find
+out the _right_ point of view from which things should be looked at and
+judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend
+the mass of events in their unity from _one_ standpoint; and it is only
+the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency."
+"We can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests
+generally of the whole community," and "_wars are in reality only the
+expressions or manifestations of policy itself_."
+
+To the student of history this unity of conception is equally
+necessary, for it supplies the key to many a military puzzle. Without
+it we can never understand, for instance, Napoleon's conduct in
+1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can we see the compelling reason of
+many battles, apparently fought against military judgment, such, for
+instance, as Borodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have to remember that
+these and many other battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were fought
+from a political, not a military, motive. It is a well-known fact that
+the strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to
+suit overmastering political necessity. Yet many people have failed to
+draw therefrom the generalization of Clausewitz that "war is only a
+continuation of State policy by other means." But having got it now,
+let us hold fast to it, with all its consequences.
+
+
+SOME KNOWLEDGE OF WAR NECESSARY FOR STATESMEN
+
+"From this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things
+a necessary conflict between the political and military interests,
+and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as _imperfect
+knowledge_ only. That policy makes demands upon the war which it
+cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that _it knows
+the instrument it is going to use_, therefore contrary to a natural and
+_indispensable supposition_."
+
+"_None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made
+without an insight into the political relations_; and in reality when
+people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy
+on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different
+to what they intend. It is not this influence, but the policy itself
+which should be found fault with. If policy is right, if it succeeds
+in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war also with
+advantage; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the
+object, the cause is to be looked for in a mistaken policy.
+
+"It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain
+military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it
+can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes.
+Just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant
+sometimes says what he does not intend, _so policy, when intending
+right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views_.
+
+"_This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain
+knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of
+political intercourse._"
+
+
+THE WAR MINISTER
+
+"Before going further we must guard ourselves against a false
+interpretation of which this is very susceptible. We do not mean to
+say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the _principal_
+qualification for a war minister. Elevation, superiority of mind,
+strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he
+must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another."
+
+
+POLICY AND THE MEANS TO CARRY OUT THAT POLICY MUST HARMONIZE
+
+"_If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy
+to accommodate itself to the means available for war_, there is only
+one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are
+not combined in one person (note, as William of Orange, Frederick
+the Great, or Napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an
+_ex-officio_ member of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its
+councils and decisions on important occasions."
+
+"The influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the
+Cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous
+action."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+We shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding
+dicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree.
+
+Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to
+policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much
+as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy.
+
+Secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may
+be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of
+his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering,
+guiding, and controlling of war. As Clausewitz says, "it is an
+_indispensable supposition_ that policy knows the instrument it is
+going to use." It is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations
+between two States cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the
+political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued
+in another form--in the form of war. The statesman still retains
+control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his
+object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well
+as of the peaceful, policy of the nation.
+
+Thirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is
+theoretically allowable during the course of actual operations, _i.e._
+after the war has actually begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy
+should only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should
+keep clear during the actual operations. Clausewitz, however, holds
+that the two are so intimately related that the political influence
+cannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. Between two
+such authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and
+must seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly, in history policy often
+has really affected the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813, 1814,
+1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan, or Bismarck's interference to hurry
+on the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith in the Boer War, and in
+many other cases. That, we must admit. We must also admit that its
+interference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations.
+Clausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is
+wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle way rule appears to be this,
+that policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but
+during actual operations the statesman should exercise the greatest
+possible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded by
+_overwhelming political necessity_.
+
+Fourthly, a politician is bound to study war. He is bound to study war
+as well as diplomacy, his two instruments. If he only studies how to
+use one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed.
+It is plain that he MUST study war, so that he may not try to use an
+instrument of which he knows nothing. It is not meant, of course,
+that a politician should study all the details of naval and military
+matters, but only that he should study the general principles of war,
+and the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political
+object of war, through the submission of the enemy.
+
+Fifthly, in order that the object and the means of policy may
+harmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests
+are entrusted should study the principles of war, so that _he may keep
+his policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it_. That is to say,
+he must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely
+to be strongly opposed by another Power, unless he has from careful
+study and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at
+his disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his
+policy and declares war. He should not even consider a policy without
+_at the same time_ considering with his military and naval advisers the
+nation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. He must
+not think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do
+so, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give a
+reasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. Otherwise,
+
+Sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war
+will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall
+of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be Great Britain or not)
+lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as
+we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy,
+the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,--these points deserve the
+most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the
+destinies of the Anglo-Saxon Race.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+STRATEGY
+
+
+Clausewitz defines strategy as "_the use of the battle to gain the
+object of the war_." War is "a chain of battles all strung together,
+one of which always brings on another."[40] The great thing in strategy
+is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits.
+"_The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally;
+secondly, at the decisive point._"[41]
+
+"In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the
+most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be
+sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating
+circumstances. The direct result of all this is that the _greatest
+possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive
+point_.[42] Whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not,
+we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is
+_the first great principle of strategy_, as well suited for Greeks or
+Persians, or for Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French or Germans."
+
+It sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. How
+many generals have been ruined in consequence!
+
+
+SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR STRATEGIC CERTAINTY
+
+Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we may search modern military
+history in vain for a battle (except Leuthen or Rosbach) in which an
+army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no
+means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of
+modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception,
+that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in
+numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and
+when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon,
+Waterloo, he was beaten."[43] "From this we may infer, in the present
+state of Europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented
+general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now, if
+we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even
+the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small
+as well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but
+which need not be over _two to one_, will be sufficient to _ensure the
+victory_, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be."[44]
+
+The double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore,
+the ideal of strategy. "_The superiority of numbers is, therefore, to
+be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before
+all_, and as far as possible." If strategy has done this, then it has
+done its utmost duty. It is then for the tactician to make the most
+of this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory.
+Strategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to
+the altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the
+hostile armed force is destroyed.
+
+This _superiority of numbers_ in battle as the _first principle of
+strategy_ we require, on all occasions in season and out of season, to
+repeat and repeat. At present we have not the numbers we shall want. We
+must get them. Otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and
+"the best strategy" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for
+us. This rests with our statesmen.
+
+
+THE DECISIVE POINT
+
+If the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the
+decisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point?
+
+Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz. Jomini, even after Napoleon,
+confuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre
+of war, but Clausewitz clears the air by asserting only _one_.
+
+"But whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against
+which we are to direct our ultimate operations, _still the conquest and
+destruction of his army is the surest commencement_ and, _in all cases,
+the most essential_."[45]
+
+Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force is THERE
+is the decisive point, against which we must concentrate ALL our forces.
+
+"There are," said Napoleon, "many good generals in Europe, but they
+see too many things at one time. _As for me, I see only one thing, the
+enemy's chief army, and I concentrate all my efforts to destroy it._"
+
+
+THE SIMULTANEOUS USE OF ALL THE FORCES
+
+"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which we have been endeavouring to set
+forth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and
+destined for a strategic object should be _simultaneously_ applied
+to it. And this application will be all the more complete the more
+everything is compressed into one act and one moment."[46] This he
+calls "_the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in
+strategy_."[47] "In strategy we can never employ too many forces."[48]
+"What can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of force must be
+regarded in strategy as a means of giving expansion to success."
+"_No troops should be kept back as a strategic reserve_," but every
+available man hurried up to the first battlefield, fresh levies being
+meanwhile formed in rear. As an instance of what not to do, Prussia, in
+1806, kept back 45,000 men in Brandenburg and East Prussia; they might,
+if present at Jena, have turned defeat into victory, but they were
+useless afterwards.[49] A fault so often made may be made again.
+
+
+CONCENTRATION
+
+"It is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point," said
+Napoleon. To concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive
+point so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the
+enemy will be making a similar attempt. "The calculation of time and
+space appears the most essential thing to this end. But the calculation
+of time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of
+strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither
+the most difficult nor the most decisive one." "Much more frequently
+the relative superiority, that is the skilful assemblage of superior
+forces at the decisive point, has its foundation in the right
+appreciation of those points, in the judicious distribution which by
+that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in
+_the resolution to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the
+important_. In this respect Frederick the Great and Bonaparte are
+especially characteristic."[50]
+
+"There is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy than _to
+keep all the forces concentrated. No portion to be separated from the
+main body unless called away by some urgent necessity._ On this maxim
+we stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be depended upon."[51]
+
+"_The concentration of the whole force_ (_i.e._ within supporting
+distance) _should be the rule_, and _every separation or division is an
+exception which must be justified_."[52] Of course, this does not
+mean that all the troops are to be kept concentrated in one mass upon
+one road, but within supporting distance, for he expressly states, "_It
+is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of
+the action._"[53] This doctrine, qualified by the last sentence, makes
+Clausewitz the germ of modern military thought, for the last sentence
+leaves room for all the modern developments of new roads, railways,
+telegraphs, wire and wireless, and so forth.
+
+Therefore in war, according to Clausewitz, concentration,
+concentration, concentration, and _every division or detachment is an
+evil which can only be justified by urgent necessity_. Here again we
+find a simple truth, which, however, the history of all wars shows us
+to be very difficult to carry out. Hence the value of keeping such an
+imperative maxim always in our minds.
+
+
+THE FIRST PITCHED BATTLE
+
+"The more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as
+well as of every other contest, that he must and _will_ conquer, the
+more will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first
+battle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. Napoleon hardly
+ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at
+once in the first battle."[54]
+
+"_At the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the
+first battle_, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage
+to which no one would willingly expose himself, and also because the
+first decision, though not the only one, still will have the more
+influence on subsequent events the greater it is in itself."[1]
+
+"The law of the simultaneous use of the forces in strategy lets the
+principal result (which need not be the final one) take place almost
+always at the commencement of the great act."[55] A great victory thus
+won at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow
+us to carry out our own. The first pitched battle is, therefore, the
+crisis of the rival strategies, and towards its favourable decision
+all our preparations, all our forces, and all our energies should be
+directed. This is a point that civilians seem to find hard to grasp.
+Witness all our history, with inadequate forces at the beginning of
+every war, as even in the latest of our wars--that in South Africa. It
+is a point which our statesmen should very seriously consider.
+
+The difficulty of concentrating superior numbers for the first battle
+is that the enemy will be, or should be, of the same opinion, and will
+be making equal efforts to win the first battle. So, then, the crisis
+will be all the more acute, the battle greater, and the result greater.
+
+"_We would not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the
+crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's main force, is
+the first-born son of war._"[56]
+
+Till this is done, the first great victory gained, strategy should
+think of nothing else.
+
+Then, and only then, a further combination in accordance with the
+altered circumstances to win the next.
+
+"For we maintain that, with few exceptions, _the victory at the
+decisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor
+points_"[57] over the whole theatre of war. Therefore nothing else
+matters for long, and to victory in the first great battle "everything
+else must be sacrificed." For concentration can only be obtained by
+sacrifice.
+
+
+PURSUIT
+
+"Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about
+rest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only
+of pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the
+enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever
+else appears as a rallying point for the enemy."[58]
+
+Clausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel
+his exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requires GREAT
+force of WILL on the part of the equally exhausted commander. We need
+only remember that Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis of his fate,
+being physically tired, failed to pursue the allies after his victory
+at Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the fruits of his victory, and
+indeed his last chance of ultimate success.
+
+
+SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
+
+Leaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical
+thoughts, I hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at
+Clausewitz's admirable summary[59] of strategic principles:--
+
+"_The first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves
+is to employ_ ALL _the forces which we can make available with the_
+UTMOST ENERGY. Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it
+is extremely unwise not to make it _perfectly certain_.
+
+"_The second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible
+at the point where the_ DECISIVE _blow is to be struck. The success at
+that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points._
+
+"_The third principle is not to lose time. Rapidity and surprise are
+the most powerful elements of victory._
+
+"_Lastly, the fourth principle is to_ FOLLOW UP THE SUCCESS _we gain
+with the_ UTMOST ENERGY. _The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the
+only means of gathering up the fruits of victory._
+
+"The first of these principles is the foundation of all the others. _If
+we have followed the first principle, we can venture any length with
+regard to the three others without risking our all._ It gives the means
+of _continually creating new forces behind us_, and with new forces
+every disaster may be repaired. _In this, and not in going forward
+with timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise._"
+
+These great principles are everything in war, and "due regard being
+paid to these principles, the form (_i.e._ the geometrical element)
+in which the operations are carried on is in the end of little
+consequence."
+
+"Therefore I am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his
+powers to appear _incessantly with new masses_, whoever adopts _every
+imaginable means of preparation_, whoever _concentrates his force at
+the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with
+resolution and energy_, has done all that can be done in a general
+way for the strategical conduct of the war, and that, unless he is
+altogether unfortunate in battle, will undoubtedly be victorious in the
+same measure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and
+energy."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+When we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy
+firmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of
+our knowledge. For principles are no use unless we apply them. On
+consideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all
+apply these principles with advantage.
+
+I. It will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise
+to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about,
+to search for indications of their application in the strategy of each
+belligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to
+carry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded
+or failed, and the results of doing or not doing so. Also to search
+for the interaction of the political motive of the war on the military
+operations, and to see how far the belligerent statesmen gained or
+failed to gain their political object, according to the comparative
+degree of preparation they had made for it, and the magnitude of
+effort which they made or did not make to support it with the whole
+means of the nation, material, moral and physical. Also to see how
+far the national spirit was aroused or not, and the causes thereof,
+and to note the greater or less energy, resolution and boldness which
+was consequently infused into the war. Also to note how the thorough
+application of these great simple principles of strategy shortens the
+war and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to 1870), and how the neglect of
+them by statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards, lengthens a war
+and adds to its cost enormously (South Africa, etc.). Used thus, these
+principles give us a theoretically correct ground for criticism.
+
+II. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for
+anticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will
+be, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will
+direct those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness
+with which they will use them against us. It is an axiom always to
+assume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare
+accordingly.
+
+III. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for
+our own counter-preparations. We require to take the most dangerous war
+which is probable or possible, and make every imaginable preparation to
+carry out these principles therein.
+
+In such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals
+to win, and thus save the nation from the irreparable consequences
+and the huge war indemnity of £800,000,000 or so, which would follow
+defeat? How are we going to do it? How are we going to render it
+possible for our generals to employ the best strategy? The ideal of
+strategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers.
+How are we going to give our generals that? If we cannot do that,
+how are we going to give them even any superiority _at all_, so that
+they may be able to carry out the first principle of strategy? How?
+Or are we going to make NO _adequate preparations_ for these three
+eventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to
+save us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the
+impossible? It is in this way that a statesman should use these few
+great simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political
+object and safeguard the interests of the nation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY
+
+
+Now, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory of war is easy enough to
+understand. There is no reason--one might almost say no excuse--why
+every one, soldier or statesman, should not know it fairly well. The
+great leading principles of strategy are few and simple. There is no
+reason why every one, soldier and statesman, should not understand
+and know these few simple principles thoroughly, and have them at his
+finger ends ready to apply them to the consideration of any military
+question, past, present, or future. So far all is easy. But when it
+is a question of carrying out in actual war this easy theory, these
+simple strategical principles, then it is QUITE a different matter,
+then it is a matter of the very greatest difficulty. This is a
+difference which the mind always finds very hard to grasp, as witness
+the denunciations with which any failure in execution by a general, no
+matter how great the real difficulties with which he had to contend,
+is nearly always greeted. Observers rarely make allowances for these
+difficulties, very largely probably because they do not understand
+them. The present chapter is devoted to these difficulties of execution
+in war.
+
+
+THE GENIUS FOR WAR
+
+In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the genius for war"[60] he sets forth
+the difficulties which confront a general, the character and genius,
+the driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of
+war. It is impossible to abstract it adequately; I can only advise all
+to read it for themselves. But I will endeavour to give an idea of it.
+
+After discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general,
+physical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength
+of body and mind, the personal pride, the patriotism, the enthusiasm,
+etc., he comes to the unexpected.
+
+"_War_," he says, "_is the province of uncertainty. Three-fourths of
+those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden
+more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty._ Here, then, above
+all other, a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the
+truth by the tact of its judgment." Mark this point, that three-fourths
+of the things that we as critics AFTER the event know, when all
+information of the situation has been collected and published, were
+unknown to the general who had to decide, or only dimly guessed at from
+a number of contradictory reports.
+
+"From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, _this
+continual interposition of chance_." "Now, if he is to get safely
+through _this perpetual conflict with the unexpected_, two qualities
+are indispensable; in the first place _an understanding which, even
+in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces
+of inner light_, which _lead to the truth_, and then _the courage to
+follow this faint light_. The first is expressed by the French phrase
+_coup d'oeil_; the second is resolution."
+
+"Resolution is an _act of courage in face of responsibility_." "The
+forerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making plain the
+necessity of venturing and thus influencing the will. This quite
+peculiar direction of the mind, which conquers every other fear in man
+by the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes up resolution in
+strong minds."
+
+The vital importance of firmness and resolution, so strongly urged
+by Clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the
+strongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation
+in war. Compare, for instance, York _v._ Wartenburg's masterly
+exposition of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation in 1813 at
+Dresden.
+
+Also there is required "_the power of listening to reason in the midst
+of the most intense excitement_, in the storm of the most violent
+passions."
+
+"But to keep to the result of by-gone reflections in opposition to the
+stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it, is
+just THE difficulty." "Here nothing else can help us but an imperative
+maxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that maxim
+is, _in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to
+give it up till a clear conviction forces us to do so_."
+
+"But as soon as difficulties arise, and that must always happen
+when great results are at stake, then the machine, the army itself,
+begins to offer a sort of passive resistance, and to overcome this
+the commander must have great force of will." Driving power, such as
+Napoleon's. And also "the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice,
+which the commander has to contend with in himself."
+
+"These are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of
+the commander have to contend with and OVERCOME, if he is to make his
+name illustrious." If he is to prevent the downfall of his country.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+(1) In connection with these difficulties I would like to put forward a
+suggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though
+not exactly Clausewitz's, is a corollary from Clausewitz. It is this.
+In reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history
+nearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of
+one or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in
+the previous chapter. But we must assume that the defeated general was
+_familiar_ with that principle, and that his _will_ was to carry it
+out. What, then, were the difficulties, the friction, which, on any
+particular day or days, overcame his will and made him sacrifice the
+principle? This is where most critics fail us. Here seems the matter
+to search for. And could a stronger resolution have enabled him to
+overcome those difficulties, that friction? And if so, how and by what
+means? But we must first discover the difficulties and uncertainties
+of the particular day when his will gave way. Take the Manchurian
+campaign as an instance. If we could only have a military history of
+the campaign of 1870 or that of Manchuria, written in the form of a
+series of "appreciations of the situation," so that we know nothing but
+what the general knew at the time as we read, and if the true state of
+affairs could be withheld from us till the end, this, I think, would
+be very instructive and helpful. It would be a more difficult way of
+writing a military history, but I think that the extra trouble would be
+repaid by the extra value. So at least it appears.
+
+(2) If we reflect upon the enormous difficulties, so strikingly
+brought out by Clausewitz, which _our_ generals have to contend with
+and _overcome_ in actual war, it should surely teach us to curb our
+criticism. It should surely also make us resolve in future to try to
+aid them as far as is in our power at home, and not thoughtlessly to
+increase their already stupendous burdens. In the past we at home have
+much to accuse ourselves of, much to regret. In the past often have
+we added to the difficulties of our generals, often have we greatly
+weakened their chances, and increased those of their opponents, often
+have we, unintentionally, through ignorance cast a weight into the
+scale against our country.
+
+(3) The ignorance of the public regarding the conduct of war
+constitutes for us a very serious national danger. If this ignorance
+were less pronounced, if our statesmen understood the vast importance
+of information to the enemy, and the equal importance to our generals
+that this information the enemy should NOT obtain, then the public
+craving for information regarding every detail of what occurs in
+the field, and the demand for the wide publication thereof, would
+certainly be repressed. Nothing occurs in any of our campaigns which
+is not immediately made known; reports of actions with the fullest
+details as to the troops engaged, and the casualties that have befallen
+them, appear in the columns of the Press within a few hours of their
+occurrence. _Any efforts, therefore, of our generals_ in the field
+to maintain _secrecy as to strength, intentions, and movements are
+deliberately_, though probably unintentionally, _counteracted by
+their own countrymen_. This is due to pure ignorance of war, no doubt,
+but the effect of this ignorance is as bad as if it were due to evil
+intention. In fairness, however, we must admit that, in the past, the
+immense value of reticence has not been fully appreciated by some of
+our soldiers themselves, and it were well if, in the future, more
+attention were directed to the importance of secrecy.
+
+The results of such almost criminal stupidity may not be apparent
+when we are fighting with a savage foe, but if we ever have, as we
+undoubtedly some day shall have, the misfortune to find ourselves
+engaged with a civilized Power, we may be certain that not only will
+the operations be indefinitely prolonged, _and their cost enormously
+increased_, but their successful issue will be for us highly
+problematical.
+
+In this connection it must be remembered that every Great Power has
+secret agents in every country, including Great Britain, and that it
+will be easy for such a secret agent to telegraph in cypher or in
+some agreed code to an agent in a neutral State all war information
+published here, who will telegraph it on at once to the hostile
+general, who will thus get, within a very short time of its publication
+in London, perhaps just exactly the information he requires to clear up
+the strategical or tactical situation for him, and enable him to defeat
+the combinations of our generals. As a case in point, take Macmahon's
+march on Sedan to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy was absolutely
+necessary for success, but which became known to the Germans by the
+English newspapers.--Result, Sedan.
+
+That this cannot be allowed is plain. It is believed that the
+patriotism of our Press will welcome any necessary measure to this end
+if it is made compulsory upon ALL.[61]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+TACTICS
+
+
+Some will probably feel inclined to ask what Clausewitz, who wrote more
+than eighty years ago, can possibly have to say about tactics which can
+be valuable in the twentieth century.
+
+It was said by Napoleon that tactics change every ten years, according,
+of course, to the progress of technicalities, etc. Weapons indeed
+change, but there is one thing that never changes, and that is human
+nature. The most important thing in tactics, the man behind the gun,
+never alters; in his heart and feelings, his strength and weakness, he
+is always much the same.
+
+Therefore, Clausewitz's tactical deductions, founded on the immense
+and varied data supplied by the desperate and long-continued fighting
+of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, permeated as they are by his
+all-pervading psychological or moral view, can never lose their value
+to us.
+
+It is true, no doubt, that our rifles of to-day can be used with
+effect at a distance ten times as great as the old smooth bores of
+Clausewitz's day, our shrapnel five times as far as his cannon, and
+that cover and ground play a far more important part now than then, and
+so on. All these things, of course, considerably modify the tactics of
+Clausewitz. Not so much, however, as some text-books would lead us to
+suppose, which always seem to assume clear ground and clear weather.
+For, after all, how many combats are fought on ground where there is
+a very restricted field of fire (_vide_ Herbert's "Defence of Plevna,"
+etc.), or at night? How many battles are fought during rain, or snow,
+or mist, or fog, which destroys all long range? Compare the tremendous
+fighting with "bullets, bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and even
+fists," of Nogi's attempt to cut the Russian line of retreat at Mukden,
+with the hand-to-hand fighting of Eylau, Friedland, Borodino, or with
+the desperate efforts of the French in 1812 to open their line of
+retreat through Maro-Jaroslawitz, where all day the masses of troops
+fought hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town was taken and retaken
+seven times, and the rival nations fought with the bayonet in the midst
+of the burning houses" (Alison).
+
+When it comes to push of pike, as in all great decisions between
+equally resolute adversaries it is bound to do, the difference between
+the fighting of Clausewitz's day and ours is but small. The most recent
+instances of all, the hand-to-hand fighting in Manchuria, take us back
+to the Napoleonic struggles.
+
+Therefore, despite the eighty years that have intervened, the writings
+of Clausewitz are still valuable from a tactical point of view, always
+considering of course the difference in weapons, because of the human
+heart in battle.
+
+His ideas on tactics have largely filtered through his German pupils
+into our textbooks, minus the psychological or moral note, so that it
+is not necessary to go at length into the subject, or give a number of
+extracts. It would be wearisome. I will, however, give a few passages
+at haphazard as illustrations.
+
+
+FLANK ATTACKS
+
+The endeavour to gain the enemy's line of retreat, and protect our own,
+on which so much learned erudition has been spent by various writers,
+he regards as a NATURAL instinct, which will ALWAYS produce itself both
+in generals and subalterns.
+
+"From this arises, in the whole conduct of war, and especially in great
+and small combats, a PERFECT INSTINCT, which is the security of our
+own line of retreat and the seizure of the enemy's; this follows from
+the conception of victory, which, as we have seen, is something beyond
+mere slaughter. In this effort we see, therefore, the FIRST immediate
+purpose in the combat, and one which is quite universal. No combat
+is _imaginable_ in which this effort, either in its double or single
+form, is not to go hand in hand with the plain and simple stroke of
+force. Even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon the enemy
+without thinking of its line of retreat, and in most cases it will have
+an eye upon that of the enemy."[62] "This is a great _natural law_ of
+the combat," "and so becomes the pivot upon which ALL strategical and
+tactical manoeuvres turn."
+
+
+RESERVES--DESTRUCTIVE AND DECISIVE ACT
+
+The combat he regards as settled by whoever has the preponderance of
+moral force at the end; that is, in fresh or only partly used up troops.
+
+The combat itself he divides into a destructive and a decisive act.
+During the long destructive act, or period of fire preparation, the
+troops engaged gradually wear each other out, and gradually almost
+cease to count as factors in the decision. "After a fire combat of
+some hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe
+losses--for instance, a quarter or one-third of its numbers--the
+_débris_ may for the time be looked upon as a heap of cinders. For the
+men are physically exhausted; they have spent their ammunition; many
+have left the field with the wounded, though not themselves wounded
+(compare, for instance, Eylau and the 1870 battles); the rest think
+they have done their part for the day, and if they get beyond the
+sphere of danger, do not willingly return to it. The feeling of courage
+with which they originally started has had the edge taken off, the
+longing for the fight is satisfied, the original organization is partly
+destroyed, and the formations broken up."
+
+"So that the amount of moral force lost may be estimated by the amount
+of the Reserves used up, almost as with a foot rule."[63]
+
+This goes on till, "In all probability, only the untouched reserve and
+some troops which, though they have been in action, have suffered very
+little, are in reality to be regarded as serviceable, and the remainder
+(perhaps four-sixths) may be looked upon for the present as a "caput
+mortuum."
+
+Therefore the art of the commander he regards as "economy of force"
+during the destructive period; that is, to employ as few troops as
+possible, by taking advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to use a smaller
+number of men in the combat with firearms than the enemy employs," so
+that a smaller proportionate number of his own are reduced to a "heap
+of cinders" and more are left, more moral force, for the decision.
+
+"Hundreds of times," he says, "a line of fire has maintained its own
+against one twice its strength" (_e.g._ the Boers).
+
+To do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect demands very skilful
+handling of the troops, both on the part of the chief and subordinate
+leaders.
+
+With the preponderance thus obtained the commander at last starts the
+decision. "Towards the close of a battle the line of retreat is always
+regarded with increased jealousy, therefore a threat against that
+line is always a potent means of bringing on the decision (Liao-yang,
+Mukden). On that account, when circumstances permit, the plan of battle
+will be aimed at that point from the very first." Or, "If this wear and
+tear and exhaustion of the forces has reached a certain pitch, then a
+rapid advance in concentrated masses on one side against the line of
+battle of the other" (_i.e._ the Napoleonic breaking the centre, of
+recent years thought almost hopeless, but revived in Manchuria with
+success, in the case of Nodzu breaking the centre at Mukden).
+
+From what precedes it is evident that, as in the preparatory acts, the
+utmost economy of forces must prevail, so in the decisive act to win
+the mastery through _numbers_ must be the ruling idea.
+
+Just as in the preparatory acts endurance, firmness and coolness are
+the first qualities, so in the decisive act boldness and fiery spirit
+must predominate.
+
+"The difference between these two acts will never be completely lost as
+respects the whole."
+
+"This is the way in which our view is to be understood; then, on the
+one hand, it will not come short of the reality, and on the other
+it will direct the attention of the leader of a combat (be it great
+or small, partial or general) to giving each of the two acts of
+activity its due share, so that there may be neither precipitation nor
+negligence.
+
+"_Precipitation_ there will be if space and time are not allowed
+for the destructive act. _Negligence_ in general there will be if
+a complete decision does not take place, either from want of moral
+courage or from a wrong view of the situation."[64]
+
+
+DURATION OF THE COMBAT
+
+"Even the resistance of an ordinary division of 8,000 or 10,000 men
+of all arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably superior in
+numbers, will last several hours, if the advantages of country are not
+too preponderating. And if the enemy is only a little or not at all
+superior in numbers, the combat will last half a day. A corps of three
+or four divisions will prolong it to double that time; an army of
+80,000 or 100,000 men to three or four times." "These calculations are
+the result of experience."[65]
+
+As General von Caemmerer points out, if these calculations were adhered
+to in present-day German manoeuvres, as they are now in all war games,
+tactical exercises, and staff rides, the dangerous dualism of their
+training, the difference between theory and manoeuvre practice, would
+cease.
+
+
+ATTACK AND DEFENCE
+
+I have left to the last the consideration of three or four disputed
+points in Clausewitz. In considering these I shall quote a good deal
+from General von Caemmerer's "Development of Strategical Science,"
+as in such matters it is best to quote the most recent authors of
+established reputation.
+
+The most important of these, and the most disputed, is Clausewitz's
+famous dictum that "the defensive is the stronger form of making war."
+"The defence is the stronger form of war with a negative object; the
+attack is the weaker form with a positive object."[66]
+
+General von Caemmerer says, "It is strange, we Germans look upon
+Clausewitz as indisputably the deepest and acutest thinker upon the
+subject of war; the beneficial effect of his intellectual labours is
+universally recognized and highly appreciated; but the more or less
+keen opposition against this sentence never ceases. And yet that
+sentence can as little be cut out of his work 'On War' as the heart out
+of a man. Our most distinguished and prominent military writers are
+here at variance with Clausewitz.
+
+"Now, of course, I do not here propose to go into such a controversy.
+I only wish to point out that Clausewitz, in saying this, only meant
+the defensive-offensive, the form in which he always regards it, both
+strategically and technically, in oft-repeated explanations all through
+his works. For instance--
+
+"It is a FIRST maxim NEVER to remain perfectly passive, but to fall
+upon the enemy in front and flank, even when he is in the act of making
+an attack upon us."[67]
+
+And again--
+
+"_A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword
+of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive._ He who
+does not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who
+does not from the first include this transition in his idea of the
+defensive, will never understand its superiority as a form of war."[68]
+Von Caemmerer comments thus: "And this conception of the defence
+by Clausewitz has become part and parcel of our army--everywhere,
+strategically and tactically, he who has been forced into a defensive
+attitude at once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack. I am thus
+unable to see how the way in which Clausewitz has contrasted Attack
+and Defence could in any way paralyse the spirit of enterprise." Von
+Caemmerer also justly remarks that, as Clausewitz always insisted
+both in strategy and tactics, neither Attack nor Defence is pure, but
+oscillates between the two forms; and as the Attack is frequently
+temporarily reduced to defend itself, and also as no nation can be sure
+of never being invaded by a superior coalition, it is most desirable
+to encourage a belief in the strength of the Defence, if properly used.
+In this I think that Wellington would probably have agreed. Certainly
+Austerlitz and Waterloo were examples of battles such as Clausewitz
+preferred.
+
+Still, one must admit that Clausewitz's chapter on "The Relations
+of the Offensive and Defensive to each other in Tactics," Book VII.
+Chapter 2, is the least convincing chapter of his work.
+
+Strategically, the argument is stronger. It always seems to me that we
+must remember that Clausewitz had taken part in the defensive-offensive
+in its strongest, most absolute and unlimited form, on the greatest
+possible scale--the Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated before
+a single flake of snow fell) of the Grand Army. If he had lived to
+complete the revision of his works, it always seems to me that he
+would have made his theory undeniable by stating that the defensive is
+the strongest form of war, _if unlimited by space_. What, for instance,
+would have happened if the Japanese had tried to march through Siberia
+on to St. Petersburg?
+
+But, after all, which of the two is absolutely the stronger form of
+war, attack or defence, is merely a theoretical abstraction, for,
+practically, the choice is always settled for us by the pressing
+necessity of circumstances. And, in this connection, let us always bear
+in mind Clausewitz's dictum: "A swift and vigorous assumption of the
+offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point
+in the defensive."
+
+
+THE INNER LINE
+
+A second disputed point is Clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule,
+for the Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary to remember that
+that was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and
+telegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting
+on concentric lines. And he is not in any way wedded to the Inner Line,
+like Jomini, but _only_ when circumstances are favourable. He has many
+sentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and
+telegraph days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most distinguished
+pupil, would have aimed at envelopment as a rule. For to bring up
+troops rapidly by several railways necessitates a broad strategic
+front, and Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity as his second great
+principle, and says--
+
+"If the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss
+of time, and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too
+great, then the same may be justifiable on these grounds; for _to
+effect an unnecessary concentration of the forces_ would be contrary
+to the second principle we have laid down (_i.e._ 'to act as swiftly
+as possible')."[69] Also: "Such separation into several columns as is
+absolutely necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the
+tactical attack in the enveloping form, _for that form is natural to
+the attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason_."[70]
+Also: "_It is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during
+the action._" So that while the conditions of his time led Clausewitz
+to prefer close concentration and the Inner Line, like Napoleon,
+yet his reflections led him to propound the germ of the strategy of
+Moltke. Substitute for Clausewitz's close concentration this: "As
+close concentration, the combined movements regulated by telegraph,
+as is compatible with the utmost use of the railways and the greatest
+rapidity" (as he would certainly have said), and we arrive at Moltke's
+strategy.
+
+
+FRONTAL ATTACKS
+
+A third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical
+efficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic method
+of breaking the enemy's line in the centre. Breaking the line by a
+frontal attack was, of course, much easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic
+day than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only
+natural that Clausewitz in his writings should give it the full
+tactical importance which it then deserved. His book would not be true
+to the tactical conditions of his day had he not done so, with Rivoli,
+Austerlitz, Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before his mind. But it seems
+hardly correct to accuse him of over-partiality to frontal attacks, for
+he has examined both frontal and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving
+to each their relative advantages and disadvantages, and concluding:
+"The envelopment may lead directly to the _destruction_ of the enemy's
+army, if it is made with very superior numbers and succeeds. If it
+leads to victory the early results are _in every case_ greater than
+by breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the enemy's line can only lead
+indirectly to the destruction of the enemy's army, and its effects
+are hardly shown so much on the first day, but rather strategically
+afterwards,"[71] by forcing apart on different lines of retreat the
+separated fragments of the beaten army.
+
+"The breaking through the hostile army by massing our principal force
+against one point, _supposes an excessive length of front on the part
+of the enemy_; for in this form of attack the difficulty of occupying
+the remainder of the enemy's force with few troops is greater, because
+the enemy's forces nearer to the principal point of attack can easily
+join in opposing it. Now in an attack upon the centre there are such
+forces on both sides of the attack; in an attack upon a flank, only
+on one side. The consequence of this is that such a central attack
+may easily end in a very disadvantageous form of combat, _through a
+convergent counter-attack_." Which is exactly our modern difficulty.
+"The choice between these two forms of attack must therefore be made
+according to the existing conditions of the moment. Length of front,
+the nature and direction of the line of retreat, the military qualities
+of the enemy's troops, and the characteristics of their general,
+lastly the ground must determine the choice."
+
+Speaking generally he regards the _concentric_ enveloping form of
+tactical attack aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as the most
+efficacious and natural. "On the field of battle itself ... the
+enveloping form must always be considered the most effectual."[72] And
+the _eccentric_ or frontal counter-attack at the extended enveloping
+attack as the most efficacious and natural form of the defence, such as
+Napoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz or Dresden, or Wellington's
+at Salamanca. "And we think that one means is at least as good as the
+other."[73]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Now I think that these extracts sufficiently defend Clausewitz from the
+imputation of too great a belief in frontal attacks, and considering
+the frequent success of such Napoleonic attacks in his day, he gives
+a very fair summing up of the relative advantages and disadvantages
+thereof, and indeed such as might be written in the present day.
+Indeed the quite abnormal conditions of the Boer war produced such a
+feeling against frontal attacks, and so much loose talk of their being
+extinct, that it is very useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder
+that breaking the centre, whenever the condition he postulates, namely
+_over-extension of front_ on the enemy's part, is present, will
+always remain one of the two great forms of decisive attack open to a
+commander.
+
+And as in our day the forces are so enormous that to reach the hostile
+flank becomes more difficult, and the extension of front becomes so
+gigantic (a front of several armies on a line of forty to seventy miles
+perhaps), it is well to consider whether breaking the enemy's centre
+will not again offer the most advantageous form for the final decisive
+act, coupled of course, as Clausewitz says it ALWAYS MUST be, with a
+strong flank attack. And in these gigantic battles of the future, such
+as Liao-yang and Mukden, which we must consider typical of the future,
+battles which must take several days, during which the troops in the
+first line become utterly exhausted and used up,--a decisive attack
+on the centre can well be imagined after the hostile reserves have
+been decoyed away over a day's march by a strong flank attack. As, for
+example, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden followed by Nodzu's decisive
+breaking the centre and capture of Mukden itself.
+
+So that far from thinking Clausewitz's remarks about frontal attacks
+and breaking the line to be obsolete, it rather appears from the great
+Russo-Japanese battles that they are worthy of close study in view of
+the future.
+
+
+TACTICAL VERSUS STRATEGICAL ENVELOPMENT
+
+A fourth disputed point is the preference of Clausewitz, owing to his
+insistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard
+for the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or
+near the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged
+beforehand. In this matter I will again quote General v. Caemmerer,
+who disagrees with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims the oblique
+front as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to
+say, when the whole army with one united front falls upon the strategic
+_flank_ of the enemy, and, if victorious, cuts him from his line of
+retreat. But where such a situation cannot be brought about, where our
+advance has brought us before the strategic _front_ of the enemy, then
+he sees in the tactical envelopment, in the formation of an offensive
+flank, the proper means of effectively preparing to push the enemy
+from his line of retreat, and he distinctly explains that tactical
+envelopment need not at all be the _consequence_ of strategical
+envelopment, and need not at all be prepared long beforehand by a
+corresponding advance of divided forces."
+
+Clausewitz says, "The consequence of this is that battles fought with
+enveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which should properly
+result from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication,
+are commonly the result of a moral and physical preponderance."[74]
+Also "he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width
+of front as will admit of their all coming into action together."
+"Such separation into several columns should be made use of for the
+disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form" (_i.e._ by
+troops within a day's march of each other). "But it must be only of a
+tactical nature, for a strategic envelopment, when a great blow is to
+be struck, is a complete waste of power."
+
+General v. Caemmerer comments: "He is thus of opinion that the lateral
+movement of part of the army against the flank of the enemy could
+without any difficulty still be carried out as initiated by the plan of
+battle; and in order to understand this idea we must again bear in mind
+the difference between the fire-effect of then and now. In those days a
+comparatively short movement made it still possible for a considerable
+portion of the army to gain the defenders' flank; to-day a lengthy
+and troublesome operation would be necessary for the same object, and
+its successful execution would only be counted upon if the defender
+remained entirely passive, and would neither think of a counter-stroke
+nor of a corresponding movement of his forces to the threatened flank."
+
+Without going into this controversy I will, however, quote the
+excellent reason given by Clausewitz for his preference for tactical as
+opposed to strategical envelopment: "One peculiarity of the offensive
+battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position (note, and
+strength) of the enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things
+that are unknown (Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena, Katzbach).
+The more this is the case the more concentration of forces becomes
+paramount, and turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding."[75]
+
+It is also well to recollect how many famous generals had been ruined
+in Clausewitz's experience through over-extension or dispersion of
+their forces. The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals in the winter
+of 1813, Macdonald at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren, Ney at
+Dennewitz, which neutralized Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and
+began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to this cause.
+
+And the weather may, again, have as great influence in shortening
+resistance and allowing troops to be overwhelmed before the too-distant
+reinforcements arrive, as it had in those battles. If the weather then
+prevented the old muskets going off, and enabled the attack to rush
+the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or snow, by restricting the
+field of view and fire, may produce the same results. When one thinks
+of the number of great battles fought in such weather, as they may
+well be again, one sees an additional reason for carefully considering
+Clausewitz's warning. Far from relegating his preference for the
+tactical as opposed to the strategical envelopment to the region of
+the obsolete, because of our improved armament, it seems right to give
+it full weight as a corrective to a perceivable tendency to elevate
+strategical envelopment (after Königgrätz) into a formula for victory.
+If in the past many great generals have been ruined by over-extension,
+so may they be again. Against this tendency Clausewitz will for ever
+lift his voice.
+
+Also it remains to be considered, with the huge armies of to-day and
+the future, such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden, such armies as
+may possibly one day join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical
+envelopment will be practicable, or whether tactical envelopment,
+such as General Kuroki's tactical enveloping movement on Yentai, and
+the Russian line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General Nogi's tactical
+enveloping dash northward on Hsinminting and the railway at Mukden,
+will not be preferable.
+
+Perhaps, as a compromise, one might call such a movement
+strategical-tactical, and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of words.
+
+I have not attempted to do more than roughly indicate that the solution
+of these four disputed tactical questions in Clausewitz is to be sought
+in a study of the latest campaign, as he would have said himself; that
+is, the campaign in Manchuria. For, as the _Times_ correspondent in the
+XLVth Chapter, "Clausewitz in Manchuria," of his book "The War in the
+Far East," observes, "It will be abundantly clear to any one who has
+followed the great battles in Manchuria that the spirit of Clausewitz
+has presided over Japanese victories and wept over Russian defeats."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ
+
+
+In reading Clausewitz it is, first, the great principles of the nature
+of war founded on human nature, which alter not; and, secondly, it
+is his spirit and practical way of looking at things that we want to
+assimilate and apply to THE PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY, to which end it is
+necessary to read him always with the changed conditions of to-day in
+our minds, and think what he would have said under the circumstances.
+These changes are chiefly:--
+
+    (1) The improved net-work of roads.
+    (2) Railways.
+    (3) Telegraphs, wire and wireless.
+    (4) Improved arms.
+    (5) Aviation
+    (6) Universal service armies.
+
+
+THE IMPROVED NET-WORK OF ROADS
+
+The improved net-work of roads in Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria,
+or in Afghanistan where we have to consider our future strategy, but in
+Europe), as General v. Caemmerer puts it, "now offers to the movements
+of armies everywhere a whole series of useful roads where formerly one
+or two only were available," easier gradients, good bridges instead of
+unreliable ones, etc. So that the march-discipline of that day when
+concentrated for battle, artillery and train _on_ the roads, infantry
+and cavalry _by the side_ of the roads, has disappeared. Such close
+concentration is therefore now not possible, as we move all arms _on_
+the road, and an army corps with train, or two without, is the most
+that we can now calculate on bringing into action in one day on one
+road.
+
+
+RAILWAYS
+
+"Railways have, above all, completely altered the term 'base,'" remarks
+V. Caemmerer. "Railways carry in a few days men, horses, vehicles,
+and materials of all kinds from the remotest district to any desired
+point of our country, and nobody would any longer think of accumulating
+enormous supplies of all kinds at certain fortified points on his
+own frontier with the object of basing himself on those points. One
+does not base one's self any longer on a distinct district which is
+specially prepared for that object, but upon the whole country, which
+has become one single magazine, with separate store-rooms. So the term
+'base' has now to be considered in this light."
+
+It is only when operating in savage or semi-savage countries, where
+there are no railways, that the old idea of a base applies.
+
+As we penetrate deeper and further from our own country into the
+enemy's, and as a small raiding party can demolish the railway line so
+as to stop all traffic for days or weeks, it becomes far more necessary
+than it ever was in Clausewitz's day to guard our communications.
+And armies become more and more sensitive to any attack upon their
+communications.
+
+Also "such a line cannot easily be changed, and consequently those
+celebrated changes of the line of communication in an enemy's country
+which Napoleon himself, on some occasion, declared to be the ablest
+manoeuvre in the art of war, could scarcely be carried out any more"
+(V. Caemmerer).
+
+Also concentration by means of several railways demands a broad
+strategic front, which produces that separation of corps or armies
+which prepares the way for strategical envelopment, and so on.
+
+General von der Goltz, in his "Conduct of War," says: "The more recent
+treatises on the conduct of war on a large scale are principally taken
+up with the mobilization and strategical concentration of armies, a
+department of strategy which only began to play an important part in
+modern times. It is the result of a dense net-work of railways in
+Western Europe which has rendered it possible to mass large bodies
+of troops in a surprisingly brief time. Each Power tries to outdo
+its neighbours in this respect, ... which gives an opportunity to
+the strategical specialist to show off his brilliant qualities....
+Consequently it is now frequently assumed that the whole conduct of
+war is comprised in this one section of it." This over-estimate is of
+course an error, which, however, requires to be pointed out.
+
+
+TELEGRAPHS
+
+The telegraph has very greatly reduced the danger of separation.
+The great advantage of the inner line in the day of Napoleon and of
+Clausewitz was that separated forces could only communicate by mounted
+messengers, so if the enemy got between them they could not communicate
+at all, nor act in concert. This the telegraph has completely altered,
+for as the field telegraph can now be laid as quickly as an army can
+advance, the most widely separated bodies of troops can every day
+arrange combined operations by telegraph through, if necessary,
+a point one hundred or four hundred miles in rear. So that to-day
+the chief advantage of the inner line has gone, while its chief
+disadvantage, the possibility of being surrounded, remains.
+
+
+MAPS
+
+We now possess complete detailed Ordnance maps of every country in
+Europe, kept up to date by the latest alterations, whereas in the days
+of Clausewitz maps were of the very roughest character, and quite
+unreliable in comparison.
+
+
+IMPROVED ARMS
+
+Smokeless powder, quick-firing and long-ranging artillery and rifles,
+the infantry field of effective fire being ten times, the artillery
+five times what it was in Clausewitz's time, have all to be borne in
+mind when reading the tactical part of his writings. In consequence,
+also, cover and the tactical use of ground are of far greater
+importance now than then, etc., etc., etc.
+
+
+AVIATION
+
+The recent wonderful developments in aviation will obviously almost
+revolutionize "Information in War." To what extent, it is as yet
+impossible to say. Each year will teach us more.
+
+
+THE NATION-IN-ARMS
+
+The nation-in-arms as the common foundation of all armies (except our
+own), brought up by railways, vastly increases the numbers in a modern
+battle from what they were in Clausewitz's day. Compare Austerlitz,
+Dresden, Leipzig and Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden. It should be
+so with us also, for as General von der Goltz says in "The Conduct of
+War": "The BEST military organization is that which renders available
+ALL the intellectual and material resources of the country in event of
+war. _A State is not justified in trying to defend itself with only a
+portion of its strength, when the existence of the whole is at stake._"
+
+In Great Britain the difference which the introduction of this
+nation-in-arms principle has made in our military strength compared
+with that of our future opponents, a difference relatively FAR GREATER
+AGAINST US than it was in Napoleon's and Clausewitz's day, is as yet
+hardly realized by the people, or by our statesmen. People forget the
+wastage of war, and the necessity for a constant flow of troops to
+repair that wastage. As Von der Goltz puts it: "It is characteristic
+of the strategical offensive that the foremost body of troops of
+an army, the portion which fights the battles, amounts to only a
+comparatively small fraction, frequently only _a quarter or even
+one-eighth_, of the total fighting strength employed, whilst the fate
+of the whole army throughout depends upon the success or failure of
+this fraction. _Attacking armies melt away like snow in the spring._"
+To condense his remarks: "In spite of the most admirable discipline,
+the Prussian Guard Corps lost 5000 to 6000 men in the marches between
+the attack on St. Privat and the battle of Sedan." "Napoleon crossed
+the Niemen in 1812 with 442,000 men, but reached Moscow only three
+months later with only 95,000." In the spring of 1810, the French
+crossed the Pyrenees with 400,000 men, but still Marshal Massena in
+the end only brought 45,000 men up to the lines of Torres Vedras,
+near Lisbon, where the decision lay. Again, in 1829, the Russians
+put 160,000 men in the field, but had barely 20,000 left when, at
+Adrianople, a skilfully concluded peace saved them before their
+weakness became apparent and a reaction set in. In 1878 the Russians
+led 460,000 across the Danube, but they only brought 100,000 men--of
+whom only 43,000 were effective, the rest being sick--to the gates of
+Constantinople. In 1870 the Germans crossed the French frontier with
+372,000 men, but after only a six weeks' campaign brought but 171,000
+men to Paris. And so on. The result of it all is simple--that a people
+which is not based on the modern principle of the nation-in-arms cannot
+for long rival or contend with one that is, for it can neither put
+an equal (still less a superior) army into the field at the outset
+(_vide_ Clausewitz's first principle), nor even maintain in the field
+the _inferior_ army it does place there, because it cannot send the
+ever-required fresh supplies of trained troops. Sooner or later this
+must tell. Sooner or later a situation must arise in which the nation
+based on the obsolete voluntary system _must_ go down before a nation
+based on the nation-in-arms principle. Circumstances change with time,
+and, as wise Lord Bacon said long ago, "He that will not adopt new
+remedies must expect new evils." May we adopt the remedy before we
+experience the evil!
+
+
+THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL FORCES IN WAR
+
+But though these changed conditions must, of course, _modify_
+Clausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete
+our circle and leave off where we started) I repeat that, as human
+nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three
+to one in war, Clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical
+philosopher on the actual nature of war, as _the chief exponent of the
+moral and spiritual forces in war_, will ever remain invaluable in the
+study of war.
+
+Consider what unsurpassed opportunities he had for observing and
+reflecting on the influence of enthusiasm and passion, of resolution
+and boldness, of vacillation and weakness, of coolness and caution, of
+endurance and hardship, of patriotism and freedom, of ambition and of
+glory--on war, either by his own experience or by conversation with
+other equally experienced soldiers, during that long period of almost
+endless wars between 1793 and 1815.
+
+The fervour and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the Revolution,
+which drove the French forward, smashing everything before them, at
+the beginning; the ambition, military glory, plunder and greed, which
+animated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion,
+and stern endurance, which nerved the Russian hosts then as now; that
+awful Moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and
+sank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance and selfish
+callousness were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the
+spirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in Germany,
+which gave to the Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same driving
+force that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the French;
+the passing, therefore, in 1813 of the moral superiority, the greater
+driving force, from the French to the allies. Clausewitz saw all this;
+he conversed intimately with such men as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,
+who saw and guided it, too. All his friends had seen it also. No
+wonder, then, that such an unexampled series of warlike phenomena
+deeply impressed his reflective mind with the supreme importance of the
+moral and spiritual factors in war.
+
+His opportunities for long-continued observation of warlike phenomena
+were far greater than those of any writer since his day, and it is to
+be hoped they will remain so. For we have no desire to see another
+series of wars such as the Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that
+there was then such a man as Clausewitz to sum up for us so simply and
+so clearly the accumulated experiences of those long, long years of
+carnage and devastation.
+
+
+_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] Book IV. Chap. 10.
+
+[2] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[3] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[4] Book I. Chap. 8.
+
+[5] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[6] Summary of Instruction, p. 120.
+
+[7] Book II. Chap. 6.
+
+[8] Book II. Chap. 2.
+
+[9] Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz.
+
+[10] Book II. Chap. 4.
+
+[11] Book II. Chap. 2.
+
+[12] Book II. Chap. 2.
+
+[13] Book II. Chap. 3.
+
+[14] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[15] By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force the enemy's
+population into a state of mind favourable to submission.
+
+[16] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[17] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[18] Author's "Introduction."
+
+[19] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[20] Book VII. Chap. 5.
+
+[21] Book VII. Chap. 21.
+
+[22] Book VII. Chap. 21.
+
+[23] Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.
+
+[24] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[25] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[26] Book I. Chap. 7.
+
+[27] Book I. Chap. 8.
+
+[28] Book I. Chap. 8.
+
+[29] Book IV. Chap. 1.
+
+[30] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[31] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[32] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[33] Book III. Chap. 15.
+
+[34] Book VII. Chap. 13.
+
+[35] Book I. Chap. 4.
+
+[36] Book I. Chap. 5.
+
+[37] Book I. Chap. 7.
+
+[38] Book III. Chap. 3.
+
+[39] Book III. Chaps. 16-18.
+
+[40] Book II. Chap. 1.
+
+[41] Book III. Chap. 11.
+
+[42] Book III. Chap. 8.
+
+[43] Book V. Chap. 3.
+
+[44] Book III. Chap. 8.
+
+[45] Book VIII. Chap. 4.
+
+[46] Book III. Chap. 12.
+
+[47] Book III. Chap. 13.
+
+[48] Book III. Chap. 12.
+
+[49] Book III. Chap. 13.
+
+[50] Book III. Chap. 8.
+
+[51] Book III. Chap. 11.
+
+[52] Book VI. Chap. 28.
+
+[53] Book V. Chap. 10.
+
+[54] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[55] Book III. Chap. 13.
+
+[56] Book I. Chap. 3.
+
+[57] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[58] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[59] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[60] Book I. Chap. 3.
+
+[61] This warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be
+published freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five
+years ago. In the present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and
+its loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the enemy of
+any helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been
+learned.--Editor's Note.
+
+[62] Book IV. Chap. 4.
+
+[63] Book IV. Chap. 4.
+
+[64] "Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136-146.
+
+[65] Book IV. Chap. 4.
+
+[66] Book VI. Chap. 1.
+
+[67] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[68] Book VI. Chap. 5.
+
+[69] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[70] Book VII. Chap. 15.
+
+[71] Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500.
+
+[72] Book VI. Chap. 9.
+
+[73] Book VII. Chap. 9.
+
+[74] Book VII. Chap. 7.
+
+[75] Book VII. Chap. 7.
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's Notes:
+
+
+Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
+preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.
+
+Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
+
+Page 133: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Reality of War, by Stewart L. Murray
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44200 ***
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+<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44200 ***</div>
+
+<div class="hidepub">
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 264px;">
+<img src="images/coversmall.jpg" width="264" height="400" alt="cover" />
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h1>THE REALITY OF WAR</h1>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p class="newpage p4 center vspace larger">
+<span class="small">THE</span><br />
+<span class="larger">REALITY OF WAR</span></p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">A COMPANION<br />
+TO CLAUSEWITZ</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center vspace"><span class="small">BY</span><br />
+<span class="large">MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY</span><br />
+<span class="small">LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS</span></p>
+
+<p class="p2 center vspace"><span class="smaller">POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY</span><br />
+<span class="larger">A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE</span></p>
+
+<p class="p4 center">LONDON<br />
+<span class="large">HODDER AND STOUGHTON</span><br />
+WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.</p>
+
+<p class="phalf center"><span class="larger">HUGH REES, LTD.</span><br />
+5 REGENT STREET, S.W.</p>
+
+<p class="p4 center smaller"><i>Reprinted in 1914</i></p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">v</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="EDITORS_PREFACE" id="EDITORS_PREFACE">EDITOR'S PREFACE</a></h2>
+
+<p>Great books, the masterpieces of the
+special branch of knowledge with which
+they deal, are often very big books;
+and busy men, who have not unlimited
+time for reading, find it helpful to have
+some one who will give them a general
+summary of a famous writer's teaching,
+and point out the most important passages
+in which the author himself embodies
+the very essence of his argument.</p>
+
+<p>This is what Major Murray has done
+for the most important work on war
+that was ever written. He does not give
+a mere dry summary of its contents.
+
+He sets forth, in language so plain that
+even the civilian reader or the youngest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">vi</a></span>
+soldier can read it with interest, the
+essence of the teaching of Clausewitz,
+and he embodies in his book the most
+striking passages of the original work.
+He adds to each section of his subject
+some useful criticisms, and at the end of
+the book he sums up the effect of recent
+changes on the practice of war.</p>
+
+<p>The book is a popular manual of the
+realities of war, which should be read not
+only by soldiers, but by every one who
+takes an intelligent interest in the great
+events of our time.</p>
+
+<p>As to the practical value of the writings
+of Clausewitz, it may be well to quote
+here the words of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson,
+the Professor of Military History at
+Oxford, from his introduction to the
+original edition of Major Murray's
+work:</p>
+
+<p>"Clausewitz was a Prussian officer
+who first saw fighting as a boy in 1793,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">vii</a></span>
+and whose experience of war lasted until
+1815, when the great war ended. He
+was then thirty-five and spent the next
+fifteen years in trying to clear his mind
+on the subject of war, which he did by
+writing a number of military histories
+and a systematic treatise 'On War.'
+At the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts
+into a parcel, hoping to work at them
+again on the conclusion of the duties
+for which he was ordered from home. A
+little more than a year later he died at
+Breslau of cholera, and the papers, to
+which he had never put the finishing
+touch, were afterwards published by his
+widow.</p>
+
+<p>"Part of the value of his work is due
+to the exceptional opportunities which he
+enjoyed. When the war of 1806 began
+he had long been the personal adjutant
+of one of the Prussian princes, and an
+intimate friend of Scharnhorst, who was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">viii</a></span>
+probably the greatest of Napoleon's contemporaries.
+In the period of reorganization
+which followed the Peace of Tilsit he
+made the acquaintance of Gneisenau,
+and of almost all the officers who made
+their mark in the subsequent wars of
+liberation. During the years of preparation
+he was Scharnhorst's assistant, first
+in the Ministry of War and then on the
+General Staff. During the campaign of
+1812 he served with the Russian army
+as a staff officer. Thus his experience
+during the four years of the Wars of
+Liberation was that of one who was continually
+behind the scenes, always in
+touch with the Governments and Generals,
+and therefore better able than any one
+not so favourably placed to see everything
+in its proper perspective, and to follow
+and appreciate the considerations which
+directed the decisions both of statesmen
+and of the commanders of armies. His<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">ix</a></span>
+personal character was of the finest
+mould, and his writings have the sincerity,
+the absence of which makes it so
+difficult to rely upon those of Napoleon.</p>
+
+<p>"The ultimate test of the value of books
+is time. When Clausewitz died, the two
+books on war which were thought the
+best were those of the Archduke Charles
+of Austria and General Jomini. To-day
+the book of Clausewitz, 'On War,' easily
+holds the first place. It is the least
+technical of all the great books on war;
+from beginning to end it is nothing but
+common sense applied to the subject,
+but for that reason it is the hardest to
+digest, because common sense or a man's
+natural instinctive judgment on any subject
+is exceedingly hard to analyse and
+put into words. An exceptionally gifted
+man can go through this process, but
+few can follow it for any length of time
+without a distinct effort.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">x</a></span>
+"Almost every good institution has
+arisen out of the effort to provide a remedy
+for some evil, but in the imperfection of
+human nature nearly every institution
+brings with it fresh evils, which in their
+turn have to be counteracted. The
+modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism
+and its belief in knowledge, has grafted
+the examination system upon every form
+of education from the lowest to the
+highest. The British army shares in the
+benefits and in the disadvantages of the
+system, of which, in the case of an
+officer, the danger to be guarded against
+is that it tends to accustom a man to
+rely rather on his memory than his
+intelligence, and to lean more on other
+people's thinking than on his own. Clausewitz
+aimed at producing the very opposite
+result. He does not offer specific solutions
+of the various problems of war lest
+officers, in moments when their business<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">xi</a></span>
+is to decide and to act, should be trying
+to recall his precepts instead of using
+their eyes and their wits. His purpose
+rather is to enable them to understand
+what war is. He believed that if a man
+had accustomed himself to think of war
+as it really is, had got to know the
+different elements which go to make it
+up, and to distinguish those that are
+important from those that are comparative
+trifles, he would be more likely to
+know of himself what to do in a given
+situation, and would be much less likely
+to confuse himself by trying to remember
+what some general, long since
+dead, did on some occasion in which
+after all the position was by no means
+the same as that in which he finds
+himself."</p>
+
+<p>What is said here of the soldier actually
+engaged in war, is true also even of the
+onlooker who takes a patriotic interest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">xii</a></span>
+in the progress of a war in which his
+country is involved. Unless he has a
+clear idea of the real character of modern
+war, and the principles on which success
+or failure depend, he will be utterly
+unable to grasp the significance of the
+events of which he reads each day.
+And it is of real importance that in time
+of war every citizen should judge soundly
+the course of events, for opinion influences
+action, and public opinion is
+made up of the ideas of the units who
+compose the public. In this connection
+it is well to bear in mind a point that
+is often overlooked, a point on which
+Clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing
+passage&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;namely, the fact that
+one of the main objects of a nation
+waging war is to force the enemy's
+population into a state of mind favourable
+to submission. This fact is sufficient
+proof of the importance of public opinion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">xiii</a></span>
+being well informed not only as to the
+course of events, but also as to the
+principles that give to these events their
+real significance.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">xv</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></h2>
+
+<table summary="Contents">
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a></td></tr>
+  <tr class="smaller">
+    <td>&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="tdr">PAGE</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ</td>
+    <td class="tdr">3</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN POLICY AND WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">11</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ</td>
+    <td class="tdr">23</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">33</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">47</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">xvi</a></span></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">65</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE NATURE OF WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">79</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">WAR AS POLICY</td>
+    <td class="tdr">119</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">STRATEGY</td>
+    <td class="tdr">137</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY</td>
+    <td class="tdr">161</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">TACTICS</td>
+    <td class="tdr">177</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ</td>
+    <td class="tdr">213</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ</span></h2>
+
+<p>In an endeavour, such as the present, to
+interest the British public in even the
+greatest military writer, the first necessity
+is to show that he was not a mere theorist
+or bookworm. The wide and varied
+experience which the British officer gradually
+gains in so many different parts
+of the world shows up the weak points
+of most theories, and produces a certain
+distrust of them. Also a distrust of
+theory is undoubtedly one of our national
+characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal
+to the British officer or civilian, a writer
+must be a practical soldier.</p>
+
+<p>Such was General Clausewitz: a practical
+soldier of very great experience in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span>
+the long series of wars 1793 to 1815,
+and one present throughout that most
+awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian
+campaign in 1812.</p>
+
+<p>"General Karl von Clausewitz was
+born near Magdeburg in 1780, and entered
+the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in
+1792. He served in the campaigns of
+1793&ndash;1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he
+entered the military school at Berlin as
+an officer, and remained there till 1803.
+He here attracted the notice of Scharnhorst.
+In the campaign of 1806 he
+served as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus
+of Prussia, was present at the battle of
+Jena, and saw that awful retreat which
+ended a fortnight later in the surrender
+at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured,
+he was sent into France as a
+prisoner till the end of the war." "On
+his return (in November, 1807) he was
+placed on General Scharnhorst's staff,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span>
+and employed on the work then going
+on for the reorganization of the Prussian
+army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the
+Russian service, was employed on the
+general staff, and was thus able to gain
+much experience in the most gigantic of
+all the struggles of his time." "In the
+spring campaign of 1813 (battles of
+Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as a Russian
+officer, was attached to Blucher's staff;
+during the winter campaign he found
+employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count
+Walmoden, who fought against Davoust
+on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid
+action of the Goerde was entirely the
+result of his able dispositions. In 1815
+he again entered the Prussian service,
+and was chief-of-the-staff to the III.
+Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny
+formed the left of the line of battle, and
+at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's
+army." "In addition to this, we may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span>
+say, considerable practical training (note,
+enormous and varied indeed compared
+to any obtainable in the present day),
+he also possessed a comprehensive and
+thorough knowledge of military history,
+and also an uncommonly clear perception
+of general history" (Von Caemmerer).
+After the Peace he was employed in a
+command on the Rhine. In 1818 he
+became major-general, and was made
+Director of the Military School at Berlin.
+Here he remained for some years. This
+was the chief period of his writings. As
+General von Caemmerer, in his "Development
+of Strategical Science," puts it:
+"This practical and experienced, and at
+the same time highly cultured soldier,
+feels now, in peaceful repose, as he himself
+confesses, the urgent need to develop
+and systematize the whole world of
+thought which occupies him, yet also
+resolves to keep secret till his death the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span>
+fruit of his researches, in order that his
+soul, which is thirsting for <em>Truth</em>, may
+be safely and finally spared all temptations
+from subordinate considerations."</p>
+
+<p>In 1830 he was appointed Director of
+Artillery at Breslau, and, having no more
+time for writing, sealed up and put away
+his papers, unfinished as they were. In
+the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff
+to Field-Marshal Gneisenau's
+army. In the winter of that year war
+with France was considered imminent,
+and Clausewitz had prospects of acting
+as chief of the general staff of the Commander-in-Chief
+Gneisenau. He then
+drew up two plans for war with France,
+which bear the stamp of that practical
+knowledge of war and adaptation of
+means to ends which distinguish his
+writings.</p>
+
+<p>In the same year the war scare passed
+away, the army of Gneisenau was disbanded,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span>
+and Clausewitz returned to Breslau,
+where after a few days he was seized
+with cholera, and died in November, 1831,
+aged only 51.</p>
+
+<p>His works were published after his
+death by his widow.</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN
+POLICY AND WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>From the day of their publication until
+now the influence of the writings of
+Clausewitz has been steadily growing,
+till to-day it is impossible to over-estimate
+the extent of that influence upon modern
+military and political thought, especially
+in Germany. As General von Caemmerer,
+in his "Development of Strategical
+Science," says: "Karl von Clausewitz,
+the pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and
+the confidant of Gneisenau, is in Germany
+generally recognized as the most prominent
+theorist on war, as the real
+philosopher on war, to whom our famous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span>
+victors on the more modern battlefields
+owe their spiritual training."</p>
+
+<p>Field-Marshal Moltke was "his most
+distinguished pupil," and adapted the
+teaching of Clausewitz to the conditions
+of to-day.</p>
+
+<p>General von der Goltz, in the introduction
+to his great work, "The Nation
+in Arms," thus describes the veneration
+which he inspires: "A military writer
+who, after Clausewitz, writes upon the
+subject of war, runs the risk of being
+likened to a poet who, after Goethe,
+attempts a <em>Faust</em>, or, after Shakespeare,
+a <em>Hamlet</em>. Everything important that
+can be told about the nature of war can
+be found stereotyped in the works which
+that great military genius has left behind
+him. Although Clausewitz has himself
+described his book as being something as
+yet incomplete, this remark of his must
+be taken to mean that he, too, was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span>
+subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits,
+and was forced to feel that all he attained
+lay far beneath his ideal. For us, who
+knew not what that ideal was, his labours
+are a complete work. I have, accordingly,
+not attempted to write anything new, or
+of universal applicability about the science
+of warfare, but have limited myself to
+turning my attention to the military operations
+of our own day." One can hardly
+imagine a stronger tribute of admiration.</p>
+
+<p>And, as Moltke was Clausewitz's most
+distinguished pupil, so also are all those
+trained in the school of Moltke pupils of
+Clausewitz, including the most eminent
+of modern German military writers, such
+as General von Blume, in his "Strategy";
+Von der Goltz, in his "Nation in Arms"
+and "The Conduct of War," who trained
+the Turkish General Staff for the campaign
+of 1897 against Greece and the
+battle of Pharsalia, etc.; General von<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span>
+Boguslawski; General von Verdy du
+Vernois, the father of the study of
+Applied Tactics; General von Schlichting,
+in his "Tactical and Strategical Principles
+of the Present"; General Meckel, who
+trained the Japanese Staff, etc., etc.</p>
+
+<p>We all remember the telegram sent to
+General Meckel by Marshal Oyama after
+the battle of Liao-yang: "We hope you
+are proud of your pupils."</p>
+
+<p>Some time ago, when asked to give a
+lecture at Aldershot to the officers of the
+2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me
+that it would be very interesting, anxious
+as we all were then to know the causes
+of the wonderful Japanese efficiency and
+success, if I could obtain a pronouncement
+from General Meckel how far he had
+been influenced in his teaching by Clausewitz.
+My friend Herr von Donat did me
+the favour to write to General von Caemmerer
+and ask him if he could procure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span>
+me such a pronouncement which I might
+publish. General Meckel, whose death
+both Japan and Germany have since had
+to mourn, most kindly consented, and I
+esteem it a great honour to be allowed to
+quote part of his letter. He said: "I,
+like every other German officer, have,
+consciously or unconsciously, instructed
+in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz
+is the <em>founder</em> of that theory of war which
+resulted from the Napoleonic. I maintain
+that <em>every one</em> who nowadays either
+makes or teaches war in a modern sense,
+bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if
+he is not conscious of it." This opinion
+of General Meckel, to whose training of
+the Japanese General Staff the success of
+the Japanese armies must be largely
+attributed, is most interesting. It is not
+possible to give a stronger or more up-to-date
+example of the magnitude of the
+influence of Clausewitz.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span>
+In this connection I should like to
+make a short quotation from "The War
+in the Far East," by the <i>Times</i> military
+correspondent. In his short but suggestive
+chapter on "Clausewitz in Manchuria"
+he says: "But as all save
+one of the great battles in Manchuria
+have been waged by the Japanese in
+close accordance with the spirit and
+almost the letter of Clausewitz's doctrine,
+and as the same battles have been fought
+by the Russians in absolute disregard of
+them (though his works had been translated
+into Russian by General Dragomiroff
+long before the war), it is certainly worth
+showing how reading and reflection may
+profit one army, and how the neglect of
+this respectable practice may ruin another."
+"Clausewitz in Manchuria"!
+That brings us up to date. It is a far cry
+for his influence to have reached, and
+triumphed.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for
+statesmen as well as soldiers. We may
+be sure, therefore, that the influence of
+Clausewitz on the Continent has penetrated
+the realm of policy little less widely than
+the realm of war. From this thought
+arise many reflections. It will be sufficient
+here to suggest one. I would
+suggest that we should regard every
+foreign statesman, especially in Germany,
+as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple
+of Clausewitz. That is to say, we
+should regard him as a man who, underneath
+everything else, underneath the
+most pacific assurances for the present,
+considers war an unalterable part of
+policy. He will regard war as part of
+the ordinary intercourse of nations, and
+occasional warlike struggles as inevitable
+as commercial struggles. He will consider<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span>
+war also as an instrument of policy,
+which he himself may have to use, and
+to be studied accordingly. He will consider
+it not as a thing merely for speeches,
+but for practical use in furthering or
+defending the interests of his State. He
+will regard war as the means by which
+some day his nation shall impose its will
+upon another nation. He will be prepared
+to wait and wait, to make "every
+imaginable preparation," and finally to
+let loose war in its most absolute and
+ruthless character, war carried out with
+the utmost means, the utmost energy,
+and the utmost effort of a whole nation-in-arms,
+determined to achieve its political
+object and compel submission to
+its will by force.</p>
+
+<p>To talk to such a man of "the evils of
+war," or of "the burden of armaments";
+or to propose to him "disarmament" or
+"reduction of armed forces," and so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</a></span>
+forth can only appear to him as the
+result of "imperfect knowledge." He
+will not say so, but he will think so, and
+act accordingly. To the partially instructed
+opponent of such a man one can
+only say, "Let him that thinketh he
+standeth take heed lest he fall."</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ</span></h2>
+
+<p>The writings of Clausewitz are contained
+in nine volumes, published after his
+death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly
+on his three volumes "On War," which
+have been translated by Colonel J.&nbsp;J.
+Graham (the last edition edited by Colonel
+F.&nbsp;N. Maude, and published by Messrs.
+Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls
+them "a collection of materials," "a
+mass of conceptions not brought into
+form," and states that he intended to
+revise, and throw the whole into more
+complete shape.</p>
+
+<p>We must lament that he did not live
+to complete his revision. But, on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span>
+other hand, it is perhaps possible that
+this unfinished state is really an advantage,
+for it leaves us free to apply his great
+maxims and principles and mode of
+thought to the ever-varying conditions
+of the present and future, unhampered
+by too complete a crystallization of his
+ideas written before more modern conditions
+of railways, telegraphs, and rapid
+long-ranging arms of precision, etc.,
+arose. It is perhaps this unfinished state
+which renders Clausewitz so essentially
+in touch with, and a part of, the onward
+movement and evolution of military
+thought. For his great aim was "the
+truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
+the truth," without preconception or
+favour, as far as he could go&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;essentially
+"a realist" of war&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;and what better aim
+can we set before ourselves?</p>
+
+<p>As Sir Arthur Helps has so well put it
+in his "Friends in Council," every man<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span>
+needs a sort of central stem for his
+reading and culture. I wish here to say
+why I think that Clausewitz is admirably
+adapted to form such a main stem in
+the military culture of British officers.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place there is a lofty sort
+of tone about his writings which one
+gradually realizes as one reads them, and
+which I will not attempt to describe
+further than by saying that they stamp
+themselves as the writings of a gentleman
+of fine character.</p>
+
+<p>In the second place it is a book which
+"any fellow" can read, for there is
+nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse
+or mathematical or formal, no formulæ
+or lines and angles and technical terms,
+such as in other writers, Jomini, Hamley,
+etc. Clausewitz is free from all such
+pedantries, which for my part, and I
+dare say for the part of many others,
+often "put one off" a book, and made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span>
+one instinctively feel that there was
+something wrong, something unpractical
+about it, which rendered it hardly worth
+the sacrifice of time involved in its study.
+There is in Clausewitz nothing of that
+kind at all. All those lines and angles
+and formulæ he dismisses in a few pages
+as of little practical importance.</p>
+
+<p>In the third place Clausewitz only
+goes in for experience and the practical
+facts of war. As he somewhat poetically
+puts it, "The flowers of Speculation
+require to be cut down low near the
+ground of Experience, their proper soil."<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a>
+He is the great apostle of human nature
+and character as being everything in
+war. "All war supposes human weakness,
+and against that it is <span class="locked">directed."<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a></span>
+I believe that the British officer will find
+himself in sympathy with the great
+thinker on war, who asserts that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span> "<em>Of
+all military virtues Energy in the conduct
+of Operations has always conduced most
+to glory and success of arms</em>."<a name="FNanchor_3" id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a></p>
+
+<p>In the fourth place, to the practical
+mind will appeal his denunciation of all
+elaborate plans, because <em>Time</em> is required
+for all elaborate combinations, and Time
+is just the one thing that an active
+enemy will not give us,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;and his consequent
+deduction that all plans must be
+of the simplest possible form. His famous
+sentence, "<em>In war all things are simple,
+but the simple are difficult</em>,"<a name="FNanchor_4" id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> gives the
+key to his writings, for to <em>overcome
+those simple yet great difficulties he regards
+as the art of war</em>, which can only be
+done by the military virtues of perseverance,
+energy, and boldness.</p>
+
+<p>In the fifth place he does not want
+men to be bookworms, for he says:</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Theory is nothing but rational reflection</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span>
+<i>upon all the situations in which we can
+be placed in war</i>."<a name="FNanchor_5" id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> And we can all
+reflect, without reading too many books.
+Also he says: "Much reading of history
+is not required for the above object.
+The knowledge of a few separate battles,
+<em>in their details</em>, is more useful than a
+general knowledge of several campaigns.
+On this account it is more useful to read
+detailed narratives and journals than
+regular works of <span class="locked">history."<a name="FNanchor_6" id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a></span> He wants
+history in detail, not a general smattering
+and a loose application thereof, which
+fault he strongly denounces. And he
+expressly states that the history of the
+very latest war is the most useful. All
+of which is very practical, and in accord
+with what we feel to be true.</p>
+
+<p>As he pictures war, "<i>the struggle
+between the spiritual and moral forces</i> on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span>
+<em>both</em> sides is the centre of <span class="locked">all,"<a name="FNanchor_7" id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a></span> and to
+this aspect of the subject he gives much
+more attention than Jomini and most of
+Jomini's disciples. He has freed us once
+for all from all formalism. The formation
+of character, careful, practical, detailed
+study, and thorough preparation in peace,
+the simplest plans carried out with the
+utmost perseverance, resolution, energy,
+and boldness in war&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;these are the
+practical fruits of his teaching.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore, I say again, that I do not
+think that the British officer could possibly
+find a more interesting or a better
+guide for the main stem of his reading
+than Clausewitz, nor any one that will
+appeal to his practical instincts of what
+is <em>True</em> half so well. I do not believe
+that he could possibly do better than
+with Clausewitz as main stem, and a
+detailed study of the latest campaigns<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span>
+and modern technicalities as the up-to-date
+addition required to transform knowledge
+into action. I trust that every
+reader of Clausewitz will agree with me
+in this.</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>"Moltke, the most gifted pupil of Clausewitz,"
+"Moltke, who knew Clausewitz's
+book well, and often liked to describe
+him as the theoretical instructor." As
+Chaucer would say, "What needeth
+wordes more?"</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz has treated practically every
+chief branch of strategy and tactics
+(except, of course, the present-day developments
+of railways, telegraphs, quick-firing
+guns, smokeless powder, universal
+service armies, etc.). The whole of his
+bulky work "On War" is full of interesting
+and sometimes eloquent and almost
+poetical passages, of concentrated, pregnant,
+and far-reaching thoughts on every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span>
+subject. Through all these it is, of
+course, impossible to follow him in any
+introduction. One can really do no more
+than urge all to read Clausewitz for
+themselves, to go to the fountain-head,
+to the master-work itself. In the short
+space to which I have restricted myself,
+I propose, therefore, to concentrate on
+a few of his leading ideas, reluctantly
+leaving out many others which are really
+almost just as good.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Theory and Practice</span></h3>
+
+<p>One of the things for which we are
+most deeply indebted to Clausewitz is
+that he has shown us clearly the proper
+place of theory in relation to practice.
+"It should educate the mind of the
+future leader in war, or, rather, guide
+him in his <em>self-instruction</em>, but <em>not</em> accompany
+him on to the battlefield; just as
+a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span>
+opening mind of a youth without therefore
+keeping him in leading-strings all
+his <span class="locked">life."<a name="FNanchor_8" id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a></span> Again, "In real action most
+men are guided by the tact of judgment,
+which hits the object more or less accurately,
+according as they possess more
+or less genius. This is the way in which
+all great generals have acted, and therein
+partly lay their greatness and their genius,
+in that they always hit upon what was
+right by this tact. Thus also it will
+always be in <em>action</em>, and so far this tact
+is amply sufficient. But when it is a
+question not of acting one's self, but of
+convincing others <em>in consultation</em>, then
+all depends upon clear conceptions and
+demonstrations and the inherent relations;
+and so little progress has been
+made in this respect that most deliberations
+are merely a contention of words,
+resting on no firm basis, and ending<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span>
+either in every one retaining his own
+opinion, or in a compromise from mutual
+considerations of respect, a middle course
+really without any value. Clear ideas
+on these matters are not, therefore,
+wholly <span class="locked">useless."<a name="FNanchor_9" id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></span></p>
+
+<p>How true this is any one will admit
+who reflects for a moment upon the great
+diversity of opinions on almost every
+subject held in our army, just because
+of this want of a central theory common
+to all. In the domain of tactics it is
+evident that this holds good even as in
+strategy, for a common central theory
+of war will produce a more or less common
+way of looking at things, from which
+results more or less common action
+towards the attainment of the common
+object.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Rejection of Set and Geometrical Theories</span></h3>
+
+<p>"It should educate the mind of the
+future leader in war" is what Clausewitz
+demands from a useful theory; but he
+most expressly and unreservedly rejects
+every attempt at a method "by which
+definite plans for wars or campaigns are
+to be given out all ready made as if from
+a <span class="locked">machine."<a name="FNanchor_10" id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a></span> He mocks at Bülow's
+including at first in the one term "base"
+all sorts of things, like the supply of
+the army, its reinforcements and equipments,
+the security of its communications
+with the home country, and lastly the
+security of its line of retreat, and then
+fixing the extent of the base, and finally
+fixing an angle for the extent of that
+base: "And all this was done merely
+to obtain a pure geometrical result utterly
+useless" (Von Caemmerer).</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span>
+For the same reason Jomini's principle
+of the Inner Line does not satisfy him,
+owing to its mere geometrical nature,
+although he right willingly acknowledges
+"that it rests on a sound foundation,
+on the truth that the combat is the only
+effectual means in war" (Von Caemmerer).
+All such attempts at theory
+seem to him therefore perfectly useless,
+"because they strive to work with fixed
+quantities, while in war everything is
+<em>uncertain</em>, and all considerations must
+reckon with all kinds of variable quantities;
+because they only consider <em>material</em>
+objects, while every action in war is
+saturated with <em>moral</em> forces and effects;
+lastly, because they deal only with the
+action of <em>one</em> party, while war is a constant
+reciprocal effect of <em>both</em> parties" (Von
+Caemmerer).</p>
+
+<p>"Pity the warrior," says Clausewitz,
+"who is contented to crawl about in this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span>
+beggardom of rules." "Pity the theory
+which sets itself in opposition to the
+<span class="locked">mind"<a name="FNanchor_11" id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a></span> (note, the moral forces).</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">A Theory to be Practically Useful</span></h3>
+
+<p>Clausewitz insists that a useful theory
+cannot be more than a thorough knowledge
+of military history and "reflection
+upon all the situations in which we can
+be placed in war." "What genius does
+must be just the best of all rules, and
+theory cannot do better than to show
+just how and why it is so." "It is an
+analytical investigation of the subject
+which leads to exact knowledge: and if
+brought to bear on the results of experience,
+which in our case would be
+military history, to a <em>thorough</em> familiarity
+with it. If theory investigates the subjects
+which constitute war; if it separates<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span>
+more distinctly that which at first sight
+seems amalgamated; if it explains fully
+the properties of the means; if it shows
+their probable effects; if it makes evident
+the nature of objects; <em>if it brings
+to bear all over the field of war the light
+of essentially critical investigation</em>,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;then
+it has fulfilled the chief duties of its
+province. It becomes then a guide to
+him who wishes to make himself acquainted
+with war from books; it lights
+up the whole road for him, facilitates
+his progress, educates his judgment, and
+shields him from <span class="locked">error."<a name="FNanchor_12" id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Knowledge must be Thorough</span></h3>
+
+<p>This Clausewitz considers most important.
+He says that "Knowledge of the
+conduct of war ... <em>must pass completely
+into the mind</em>, and almost cease to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span>
+something objective." For in war "The
+moral reaction, the ever-changing form
+of things makes it necessary for the chief
+actor to carry <em>in himself</em> the whole
+mental apparatus of his knowledge, in
+order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat
+he may be capable of giving the
+requisite decision <em>from himself</em>. Knowledge
+must, by this complete assimilation
+with his own mind and life, be converted
+into real power."</p>
+
+<div class="tb">*<span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span></div>
+
+<p>So much for Clausewitz, therefore, as
+the greatest yet the simplest and least
+theoretical of theorists on war. Mark
+well his comforting dictum that "Theory
+is nothing but rational reflection upon
+all the situations in which we can be
+placed in war." That is a task which we
+have all more or less attempted. Therefore
+we are all more or less theorists.
+The only question is that of comparative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span>
+"thoroughness" in our reflections. And
+it is essentially this "thoroughness" in
+investigation and reflection towards which
+Clausewitz helps us. Like every other
+habit, the <em>habit</em> of military reflection
+gradually grows with use; till, fortified
+and strengthened by detailed knowledge,
+it gradually becomes Power.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>The theory of war is simple, and there
+is no reason why any man who chooses
+to take the trouble to read and reflect
+carefully on one or two of the acknowledged
+best books thereon, should not
+attain to a fair knowledge thereof. He
+may with reasonable trouble attain to
+such knowledge of the theory of war as
+will enable him to follow with intelligent
+appreciation the discussions of experienced
+soldier or soldiers. Such knowledge as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span>
+will prevent his misunderstanding the
+experienced soldier's argument from pure
+ignorance, and such knowledge as will
+enable him to understand the military
+reasons put forward and the military
+object proposed. To the opinion of such
+a man all respect will be due. Thus, and
+thus only.</p>
+
+<p>It is indeed the plain duty of all who
+aspire to rule either thus to qualify themselves
+to understand, or else to abstain
+from interference with, the military interests
+of the State.</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A
+MODERN NATIONAL WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>This point is here illustrated with more
+detail from Clausewitz than may seem
+necessary to some, because it is precisely
+the point regarding modern war which is
+least understood in this country.</p>
+
+<p>"The complete overthrow of the enemy
+is the natural end of the art of war."
+"As this idea must apply to both the
+belligerent parties, it must follow, that
+there can be no suspension in the military
+act, and peace cannot take place until
+one or other of the parties concerned is
+completely overthrown." This is what
+Clausewitz means by Absolute War, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</a></span>
+is war carried to its absolute and logical
+conclusion with the utmost force, the
+utmost effort and the utmost energy.
+He then proceeds to show that war,
+owing "to all the natural inertia and
+friction of its parts, the whole of the
+inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation
+(or timidity) of the human mind,"
+usually takes a weaker or less absolute
+form according to circumstances. "All
+this, theory must admit, but it is its duty
+to give the foremost place to the absolute
+form of war, and to use that form as a
+general point of direction." He then
+proceeds to show that war finally took
+its absolute form under Napoleon. To-day
+we may say that war takes its absolute
+form in the modern great national war,
+which is waged by each belligerent with
+the whole concentrated physical and
+mental power of the nation-in-arms.</p>
+
+<p>This requires to be gone into a little<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span>
+more in detail, for it is a most important
+point.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz in Book VIII. approaches
+this part of his subject by an historical
+survey of war from the time of the
+Roman Empire to that of Napoleon. He
+shows how as the feudal system gradually
+merged into the later monarchical States
+of Europe, armies gradually became less
+and less national, more and more mercenary.
+Omitting this, we arrive at the
+seventeenth century. He says: "The
+end of the seventeenth century, the time
+of Louis XIV., is to be regarded as the
+point in history at which the standing
+military power, such as it existed in the
+eighteenth century, reached its zenith.
+That military force was based on enlistment
+and money. States had organized
+themselves into complete unities; and
+the governments, by commuting the personal
+services of their subjects into money<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span>
+payments, had concentrated their whole
+power in their treasuries. Through the
+rapid strides in social improvements, and a
+more enlightened system of government,
+this power had become very great in
+comparison with what it had been. France
+appeared in the field with a standing army
+of a couple of hundred thousand men,
+and the other Powers in proportion."</p>
+
+<p>Armies were supported out of the
+Treasury, which the sovereign regarded
+partly as his privy purse, at least as a
+resource belonging to the Government,
+and not to the people. Relations with
+other States, except with respect to a few
+commercial subjects, mostly concerned
+only the interests of the Treasury or of
+the Government, not those of the people;
+at least ideas tended everywhere in that
+way. The Cabinets therefore looked upon
+themselves as the owners and administrators
+of large estates, which they were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span>
+continually seeking to increase, without
+the tenants on those estates being particularly
+interested in this improvement.</p>
+
+<p>The people, therefore, who in the
+Tartar invasions were everything in war,
+who in the old republics and in the
+Middle Ages were of great consequence,
+were in the eighteenth century absolutely
+nothing directly.</p>
+
+<p>In this manner, in proportion as the
+Government separated itself more from
+the people, and regarded itself as the
+State, war became more and more exclusively
+a business of the Government,
+which it carried on by means of the
+money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds
+it could pick up in its own and
+neighbouring countries. The army was
+a State property, very expensive, and not
+to be lightly risked in battle. "In its
+signification war was only diplomacy
+somewhat intensified, a more vigorous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span>
+way of negotiating, in which battles and
+sieges were substituted for diplomatic
+notes."</p>
+
+<p>"Plundering and devastating the
+enemy's country were no longer in accordance
+with the spirit of the age."
+"They were justly looked upon as unnecessary
+barbarity." "War, therefore,
+confined itself more and more, both as
+regards means and ends, to the army
+itself. The army, with its fortresses and
+some prepared positions, constituted a
+State in a State, within which the element
+of war slowly consumed itself. All Europe
+rejoiced at its taking this direction, and
+held it to be the necessary consequence of
+the spirit of progress."</p>
+
+<p>So think many in this country to-day.
+They are only a hundred years behind
+the times.</p>
+
+<p>"The plan of a war on the part of the
+State assuming the offensive in those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">53</a></span>
+times consisted generally in the conquest
+of one or other of the enemy's provinces;
+the plan of the defender was to prevent
+this. The plan of campaign was to take
+one or other of the enemy's fortresses,
+or to prevent one of our own being taken;
+it was only when a battle became unavoidable
+for this purpose that it was sought
+for and fought. Whoever fought a battle
+without this unavoidable necessity, from
+mere innate desire of gaining a victory,
+was reckoned a general with too much
+daring." For armies were too precious
+to be lightly risked. "Winter quarters,
+in which the mutual relations of the two
+parties almost entirely ceased, formed a
+distinct limit to the activity which was
+considered to belong to one campaign."
+"As long as war was universally conducted
+in this manner, all was considered
+to be in the most regular order." "Thus
+there was eminence and perfection of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">54</a></span>
+every kind, and even Field-Marshal Daun,
+to whom it was chiefly owing that
+Frederick the Great completely attained
+his object, and Maria Theresa completely
+failed in hers, notwithstanding that could
+still pass for a great general."</p>
+
+<p>Beyond this stage of military thought,
+many in this country have not yet
+advanced.</p>
+
+<div class="tb">*<span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span></div>
+
+<p>"Thus matters stood when the French
+Revolution broke out; Austria and
+Prussia tried their diplomatic art of war;
+this very soon proved insufficient. Whilst,
+according to the usual way of seeing
+things, all hopes were placed on a very
+limited military force in 1793, such a
+force as no one had any conception of
+made its appearance. War had suddenly
+become again an affair of the people,
+and that of a people numbering thirty
+millions, every one of whom regarded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">55</a></span>
+himself as a citizen of the State." "<em>By
+this participation of the people in the
+war</em>, instead of a cabinet and an army,
+a whole nation with its natural weight
+came into the scale. Henceforth the
+means available&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the efforts which might
+be called forth&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;had no longer any
+definite limits; the energy with which
+the war itself might be conducted had
+no longer any counterpoise, and consequently
+the danger to the adversary had
+risen to the extreme."</p>
+
+<p>If only our politicians could learn this
+old lesson of the French Revolution!
+For many, too many, of them appear
+to derive their ideas of war to-day from
+some dim reminiscent recollections of
+school histories of the wars in the seventeenth
+and eighteenth centuries.</p>
+
+<p>To continue: "After all this was
+perfected by the hand of Bonaparte, this
+military power based on the strength of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">56</a></span>
+the whole nation, marched over Europe,
+smashing everything in pieces so surely
+and certainly, that where it only encountered
+the old-fashioned armies the
+result was not doubtful for a moment.</p>
+
+<p>"A reaction, however, awoke in due
+time. In Spain the war became of itself
+an affair of the people." In Austria.
+In Russia. "In Germany Prussia rose
+up the first, made the war a national
+cause, and without either money or
+credit, and with a population reduced
+one-half, took the field with an army
+twice as strong as in 1806. The rest of
+Germany followed the example of Prussia
+sooner or later." "Thus it was that
+Germany and Russia, in the years 1813
+and 1814, appeared against France with
+about a million of men."</p>
+
+<p>"Under these circumstances the energy
+thrown into the conduct of war was
+quite different." "In eight months the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">57</a></span>
+theatre of war was removed from the
+Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had to
+bow its head for the first time; and the
+redoubtable Bonaparte lay fettered on
+the ground."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, since the time of Bonaparte,
+war, through being, first on one
+side, then again on the other, an affair
+of the whole nation, has assumed quite
+a new nature, or rather it has approached
+much nearer to its real nature, to its
+absolute perfection. The means then
+called forth had no visible limit, the limit
+losing itself in the energy and enthusiasm
+of the Government and its subjects. By
+the extent of the means, and the wide
+field of possible results, as well as by the
+powerful excitement of feeling which
+prevailed, energy in the conduct of war
+was immensely increased; the object
+of its action was the downfall of the foe;
+and not until the enemy lay powerless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">58</a></span>
+on the ground was it supposed to be
+possible to stop, or to come to any understanding
+with regard to the mutual
+objects of the contest.</p>
+
+<p>"Thus, therefore the element of war,
+freed from all conventional restrictions,
+broke loose with all its natural force.
+The cause was the participation of the
+people in this great affair of State, and
+this participation arose partly from the
+effects of the French Revolution on the
+internal affairs of other countries, partly
+from the threatening attitude of the
+French towards all nations.</p>
+
+<p>"Now, whether this will be the case
+always in future, whether all wars hereafter
+in Europe will be carried on with
+the whole power of the States, and,
+consequently, <em>will only take place on
+account of great interests closely affecting
+the people</em>, would be a difficult point to
+settle. But every one will agree with us<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">59</a></span>
+that, at least, <em>Whenever great interests
+are in dispute</em>, mutual hostility will discharge
+itself in the same manner as it
+has done in our times."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>This is so true, that every war since
+the days of Clausewitz has made its
+truth more apparent. Since he wrote,
+the participation of the people in war
+has become, not a revolutionary fact,
+but an organized fact, an ordinary fact
+in the everyday life of nations. To-day
+every State except Great Britain, securely
+based on the system of the universal
+training of its sons to arms, stands ready
+to defend its interests with the whole
+concentrated power, physical, intellectual,
+and material, of its whole manhood.
+Consequently, European war, as Clausewitz
+foresaw, "will only take place on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">60</a></span>
+account of great interests closely affecting
+the people." The character of such war
+will be absolute, the object of its action
+will be the downfall of the foe, and not
+till the foe (be it Great Britain or not)
+lies powerless on the ground will it be
+supposed possible to stop. In the prosecution
+of such a national war the means
+available, the energy and the effort
+called forth, will be without limits. Such
+must be the conflicts of nations-in-arms.</p>
+
+<p>Yet, even now, so many years after
+Clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he
+himself stated, "to iron out many creases
+in the heads of strategists and statesmen,"
+the great transformation in the character
+of modern war, due to the participation of
+the people therein, has not yet been
+adequately realized by many men in this
+country <em>who ought to know</em>. It is earnestly
+to be hoped that they will endeavour to
+adjust their minds, as regards war, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">61</a></span>
+the fact that we are living, not in the
+eighteenth century, but in the twentieth,
+and that they will consider that war
+has once for all become an affair of the
+people, that our opponents will be a
+people-in-arms, using the uttermost means
+of their whole manhood to crush us, and
+that disaster can only be prevented by a
+like utmost effort on our part, by an
+effort regardless of everything except
+self-preservation.</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">65</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>"War belongs, not to the province of
+arts and sciences, but to the province
+of social life. It is a conflict of great
+interests which is settled by bloodshed,
+and only in that respect is it different
+from others. It would be better, instead
+of comparing it with any art, to liken
+it to trade, which is also a conflict of
+human interests and activities; and it is
+still more like state policy, which again,
+on its part, may be looked upon as a
+kind of trade on a great scale. Besides,
+state policy is the womb in which war is
+developed, in which its outlines lie hidden<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">66</a></span>
+in a rudimentary state, like the qualities
+of living creatures in their <span class="locked">germs."<a name="FNanchor_13" id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a></span></p>
+
+<p>These conflicts of interest can bring
+about gradually such a state of feeling
+that "even the most civilized nations
+may burn with passionate hatred of each
+other." It is an unpleasant fact for
+the philosopher, for the social reformer,
+to contemplate, but history repeats and
+repeats the lesson. Still more, "It is
+quite possible for such a state of feeling
+to exist between two States that a very
+trifling political motive for war may
+produce an effect quite disproportionate&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;in
+fact, a perfect explosion."</p>
+
+<p>"War is a wonderful trinity, composed
+of the original violence of its elements&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;hatred
+and animosity&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;which may be
+looked upon as blind instinct; of the
+play of probabilities and chance, which
+make it a free activity of the soul; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">67</a></span>
+of the subordinate nature of a political
+instrument, by which it belongs purely
+to the reason.</p>
+
+<p>"The first of these three phases concerns
+more the people; the second, more
+the general and his army; the third
+more the Government. <em>The passions
+which break forth in war must already
+have a latent existence in the peoples.</em></p>
+
+<p>"These three tendencies are deeply
+rooted in the nature of the subject. A
+theory which would leave any one of
+them out of account would immediately
+become involved in such a contradiction
+with the reality, that it might be regarded
+as destroyed at once by that <span class="locked">alone."<a name="FNanchor_14" id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz is the great thinker, the
+great realist, the great philosopher of
+war. His aim was, free from all bias,
+to get at <em>the truth of things</em>. His view
+of war as a social act, as part of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">68</a></span>
+intercourse of nations, so that occasional
+warlike struggles can no more be avoided
+than occasional commercial struggles, is
+a view which requires to be most carefully
+pondered over by every statesman.
+It is based upon the essential fundamental
+characteristics of human nature, which
+do not alter. It is not to be lightly set
+aside by declamation about the blessings
+of peace, the evils of war, the burden of
+armaments, and such-like sophistries. To
+submit without a struggle to injustice
+or to the destruction of one's vital
+interests is not in passionate human
+nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature
+of a virile people. It is indeed to be
+most sincerely hoped that <em>arbitration</em> will
+be resorted to more and more as a means
+of peacefully settling all non-vital causes
+of dispute. But arbitration has its limits.
+For <em>no great nation will ever submit to
+arbitration any interest that it regards as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">69</a></span>
+absolutely vital</em>. The view of war, therefore,
+as a social act, as part of the intercourse
+of nations, with all that it implies,
+appears to be the only one which a statesman,
+however much he may regret the
+fact, can take. It has, therefore, been
+brought forward here at once, as it
+underlies the whole subject and is essential
+to all clear thought thereon.</p>
+
+<p>So much for the influence of Public
+Opinion in producing war. Now for its
+influence in and during war.</p>
+
+<p>"There are three principal objects in
+carrying on war," says Clausewitz.</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p class="hang">"(<i>a</i>)&nbsp;<span class="in1">To conquer and destroy the
+enemy's armed force.</span></p>
+
+<p class="hang">"(<i>b</i>)&nbsp;<span class="in1">To get possession of the material
+elements of aggression, and of the
+other sources of existence of the
+hostile army.</span></p>
+
+<p class="hang">"(<i>c</i>)&nbsp;<span class="in1"><em>To gain Public Opinion.</em></span><a name="FNanchor_15" id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">70</a></span>
+"To attain the first of these objects,
+the chief operation must be directed
+against the enemy's principal army, for
+it must be beaten before we can follow
+up the other two objects with success.</p>
+
+<p>"In order to seize the material forces,
+operations are directed against those
+points at which those resources are chiefly
+concentrated: principal towns, magazines,
+great fortresses. On the road to
+these the enemy's principal force, or a
+considerable part of his army, will be
+encountered.</p>
+
+<p>"Public Opinion is ultimately gained
+by great victories, and by the possession
+of the enemy's <span class="locked">capital."<a name="FNanchor_16" id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a></span></p>
+
+<p>This almost prophetic (as it was in his
+day) recognition by Clausewitz of the
+vast importance of gaining Public Opinion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">71</a></span>
+<em>as one of the three great aims in war</em>, is
+fundamental. It is just one of those
+instances of his rare insight into the
+principles and development of modern
+national war which make his book of
+such great and enduring value to us.
+For since his day Europe has become
+organized into great industrial nations,
+democracy and popular passion have become
+more and more a force to be reckoned
+with, and the gaining and preserving of
+Public Opinion in war has become more
+and more important. It has, in fact,
+become the statesman's chief business
+during a great modern national war. It
+has become necessary for him to study
+intently war in its relation to industry,
+and to the industrial millions over whom
+he presides, or over whom he may
+preside.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">72</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in
+Britain were a nation of 18,000,000,
+practically self-supporting, and governed
+by an aristocracy. To-day we are a
+crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent
+upon over-sea sources for three-fourths
+of our food, for our raw materials, for
+our trade, for our staying power, <em>and</em> we
+are governed by a democracy. In a
+modern democratic State it will only be
+possible to carry on the most just and
+unavoidable war so long as the hardships
+brought on the democracy by the war
+do not become intolerable. To prevent
+these hardships from thus becoming intolerable
+to the people, to Public Opinion,
+will be the task of the modern statesman
+during war, and this can only be done by
+wise prevision and timely preparation.
+<em>It requires the internal organization of
+the Industrial State for war.</em></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">73</a></span>
+It appears to the <em>writer</em> that internal
+organization can be subdivided as
+<span class="locked">follows:&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>I. An adequate gold reserve.</p>
+
+<p>II. The protection of our ships carrying
+raw material, food, and exports
+during their passage on the high seas
+from the places of origin to the consumers:
+(A) by the few available cruisers
+which could be spared from the fighting
+fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well
+thought out and prepared scheme of
+national indemnity (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vide</i> Blue Book thereon);
+(B) by insuring the distribution to
+the consumers of food and raw material,
+after it has arrived in the country, by
+preparing a thorough organization which
+would deal with the blocking of any of
+the principal ports of arrival, and by
+guarding the vulnerable points of our
+internal lines of communications to and
+from the shipping centres.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">74</a></span>
+III. Organization of Poor Law system
+to bring immediate relief by selling at
+peace price food to those unable to pay
+war prices owing to (A) normal poverty
+(7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works,
+due to effect of war on trade.</p>
+
+<p>Work and wages the State <em>must</em> guarantee
+during modern war, and before the
+State <em>can</em> guarantee these, it is absolutely
+necessary that it should satisfy itself
+that the above preparations are actually
+<em>in being</em>. This pre-supposes a more
+earnest study of the industrial effects of
+a great national war than has yet been
+given to the subject by our political
+leaders. For in the warfare of the
+present and future the importance of
+gaining and preserving Public Opinion,
+as pointed out by Clausewitz, cannot be
+over-estimated. It is as fundamentally
+important <em>to safeguard our own Public
+Opinion as it is to attack, weaken, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">75</a></span>
+gain over that of the enemy</em>. This has
+not yet passed the stage of thought.
+But good thoughts are no better than
+good dreams unless they be put into
+action. We are waiting for the statesman
+to DO it. There is no great difficulty.</p>
+
+<p>(2) In arousing the national spirit to
+the requisite height of patriotic self-denial
+and self-sacrifice, in elevating,
+preserving, and safe-guarding Public
+Opinion during a great national struggle,
+much may be hoped for from the patriotism
+of our Press. Only in fairness to
+those whose patriotism is self-originating
+and spontaneous, it must be made compulsory
+upon <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span>, so that no journal
+may suffer loss of circulation or pecuniary
+injury thereby.</p>
+
+<p>(3) There lies a practical task immediately
+to the hand of our statesmen
+if they will seriously set themselves to
+the task of improving the <em>moral</em> of our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">76</a></span>
+nation by reforming our education <em>curriculum</em>,
+on the leading principle that the
+moral is to the physical as three to one
+in life, and that therefore character-building
+must be its chief aim. Then
+they will do much towards strengthening
+us for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's
+idea of the gaining and preserving
+of our Public Opinion in War.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">79</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE NATURE OF WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>"It is necessary for us to commence
+with a glance at the nature of the whole,
+because it is particularly necessary that,
+in the consideration of any of the parts,
+the whole should be kept constantly in
+view. We shall not enter into any of
+the abstruse definitions of war used by
+Publicists. We shall keep to the element
+of the thing itself, to a duel. War is
+nothing but a duel on an extensive scale.
+If we would conceive as a unit the
+countless numbers of duels which make
+up a war, we shall do so best by supposing
+two wrestlers. Each strives by physical
+force to throw his adversary, and thus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">80</a></span>
+to render him incapable of further resistance.</p>
+
+<p>"Violence arms itself with the inventions
+of arts and science in order to
+contend against violence. Self-imposed
+restrictions, almost imperceptible, and
+<em>hardly worth mentioning</em>, termed <i>usages
+of International Law</i>, accompany it without
+essentially impairing its power.</p>
+
+<p>"Violence, that is to say physical
+force, is therefore <em>the Means</em>; the compulsory
+submission of the enemy to our
+will is the ultimate <em>object</em>. In order to
+attain this object fully the enemy must
+first be disarmed: and this is, correctly
+speaking, the real aim of hostilities in
+<span class="locked">theory."<a name="FNanchor_17" id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Now, "philanthropists may easily imagine
+that there is a skilful method of disarming
+and overcoming an adversary without
+causing great bloodshed, and that this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">81</a></span>
+is the proper tendency of the art of war.
+However plausible this may appear, <em>still
+it is an error which must be extirpated</em>,
+for in such dangerous things as war <em>the
+errors which proceed from a spirit of
+benevolence are just the worst</em>. As the
+use of physical power to the utmost
+extent by no means excludes the co-operation
+of the intelligence, it follows
+that <em>he who uses force unsparingly without
+reference to the quantity of bloodshed</em>,
+<span class="smcap smaller">MUST</span> <em>obtain a superiority if his adversary
+does not act likewise</em>." "To introduce
+into the philosophy of war itself a principle
+of moderation would be an absurdity."
+"We therefore repeat our proposition,
+that <em>War is an act of violence which in
+its application knows no bounds</em>."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Political Nature of War</span></h3>
+
+<p>In endeavouring briefly to describe
+Clausewitz's method of looking at war,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">82</a></span>
+one is continually confronted by the
+difficulty of selecting a few leading ideas
+out of so many profound thoughts and
+pregnant passages. However, a selection
+must be made.</p>
+
+<p>I assign the first place to his conception
+of war as a part of policy, because that
+is fundamentally necessary to understand
+his practical way of looking at
+things. This point of view is as necessary
+for the strategist as for the statesman,
+indeed for every man who would understand
+the nature of war. For otherwise
+it is impossible to understand the military
+conduct of many campaigns and battles,
+in which the political outweighed the
+military influence, and led to action
+incomprehensible almost from a purely
+military point of view. History is full
+of such examples.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz clearly lays down: "<em>War
+is only a continuation of State policy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">83</a></span>
+by other means.</em> This point of view being
+adhered to will introduce much more
+unity into the consideration of the subject,
+and things will be more easily
+disentangled from each <span class="locked">other."<a name="FNanchor_18" id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a></span> "It is
+only thus that we can obtain a clear
+conception of war, for the political view
+is the <em>object</em>, war is the <em>means</em>, and the
+means must always include the object
+in our conception." "Each (nation or
+government) strives by physical force to
+compel the other to submit to its <span class="locked">will."<a name="FNanchor_19" id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Owing to the great importance of this
+point of view, so little understood in this
+country, I have devoted the next chapter
+to it alone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's
+view more in detail. We can, therefore,
+pass on for the present.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">84</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Culminating Point of Victory</span></h3>
+
+<p>Secondly, I select his doctrine of the
+culminating point of victory, because
+that is essential in order to understand
+his division of all wars into two classes,
+according to how far the attack is likely
+to be able to extend into the hostile
+country before reaching its culminating
+point, where reaction may set <span class="locked">in.<a name="FNanchor_20" id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"The conqueror in a war is not always
+in a condition to subdue his adversary
+completely. Often, in fact almost <em>universally,
+there is a culminating point of
+victory</em>. Experience shows this <span class="locked">sufficiently."<a name="FNanchor_21" id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a></span>
+As the attack or invasion
+progresses it becomes weaker even from
+its successes, from sieges or corps left
+to observe fortified places, from the
+troops required to guard the territory
+gained, and the lengthening line of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">85</a></span>
+communications, from the fact that we
+are removing further from our resource
+while the enemy is falling back upon and
+drawing nearer to his, from the danger
+of other States joining in to prevent the
+utter destruction of the defeated nation,
+from the rousing of the whole nation in
+extremity to save themselves by a people's
+war, from the slackening of effort in the
+victorious army itself, etc., etc. Leoben,
+Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances
+of such a culminating point, and
+probably in the late Russo-Japanese war
+Harbin would have proved so, too, if
+peace had not intervened.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz continues: "It is necessary
+to know how far it (our preponderance)
+will reach, in order not to go
+beyond that point and, instead of fresh
+advantage, reap disaster." He defines
+it as "<em>The point at which the offensive
+changes into the defensive</em>," and says, "to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">86</a></span>
+overstep this point is more than simply
+a useless expenditure of power yielding
+no further results, it is a <em>destructive</em> step
+which causes reaction, and the reaction
+is, according to all experience, productive
+of most disproportionate <span class="locked">effects."<a name="FNanchor_22" id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a></span> The
+reader will find it an interesting exercise
+to search for this culminating point of
+victory in historical campaigns, and mark
+the result where it has been overstepped
+and where it has not been overstepped.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Two Classes of Wars</span></h3>
+
+<p>From this consideration of the culminating
+point of victory follow the two
+classes into which Clausewitz divides all
+wars.</p>
+
+<p>"The two kinds of war are, first, those
+in which the object is the complete <em>overthrow
+of the enemy</em>, whether it be that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">87</a></span>
+we aim at his destruction politically, or
+merely at disarming him and forcing
+him to conclude peace on our terms; and,
+<em>next</em>, those in which our aim is merely
+to make some conquests on the frontiers
+of his country, either for the purpose
+of retaining them permanently, or of
+turning them to account as matters for
+exchange in the settlement of <span class="locked">Peace."<a name="FNanchor_23" id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a></span></p>
+
+<p>All wars, therefore, are wars for the
+complete destruction of the enemy, <abbr>i.e.</abbr>
+"unlimited object," or wars with a
+"limited object." In the plan of a war
+it is necessary to settle which it is to be
+in accordance with our powers and
+resources of attack compared with the
+enemy's resources for defence, and where
+our culminating point of victory is likely
+to be, on this side of the enemy's capital
+or beyond it. If the former&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;then the
+plan should be one with a "limited<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">88</a></span>
+object," such as the Crimea, Manchuria,
+etc.; if the latter&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;then the plan should
+aim at the enemy's total destruction,
+such as most of Napoleon's campaigns, or
+the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as
+1866, or 1870. As Clausewitz says:
+"<em>Now, the first, the grandest, and most
+decisive act of judgment which the statesman
+and general exercises, is rightly to
+understand in this respect the war in
+which he engages</em>, not to take it for something
+or to wish to make of it something
+which, by the nature of its relations, it
+is impossible for it to be. <em>This, therefore,
+is the first and most comprehensive of all
+strategical questions.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_24" id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a></p>
+
+<p>In Clausewitz's two plans for war
+with France in <span class="locked">1831,<a name="FNanchor_25" id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a></span> this difference is
+plain. In the first plan, he considered
+Prussia, Austria, the German Confederation,
+and Great Britain united as allies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">89</a></span>
+against France,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;and with this great
+superiority of numbers he plans an attack
+by two armies, each of 300,000 men,
+one marching on Paris from Belgium,
+one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine.
+In the second plan the political conditions
+had meanwhile changed; Austria
+and Great Britain were doubtful, and
+Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious
+if Prussia and the German Confederation
+alone could appear before Paris in sufficient
+strength to guarantee victory in a
+decisive battle, and with which it would
+be permissible to venture even beyond
+Paris. So he proposed to limit the object
+to the conquest of Belgium, and to
+attack the French vigorously the moment
+they entered that country.</p>
+
+<p>Which strict limitation of the object
+within the means available to attain it is
+characteristic of Clausewitz's practical
+way of looking at things. In each plan,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">90</a></span>
+however, a vigorous offensive aiming at
+a decisive victory was to be adopted.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Preparation for War</span></h3>
+
+<p>The third place, in respect to its present-day
+importance, I assign to Clausewitz's
+clear statement <span class="locked">that&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"If we have clearly understood the
+result of our reflections, then the activities
+belonging to war divide themselves into
+two principal classes, into such as are
+only <em>preparations for war</em> and into <em>the
+war itself</em>. This distinction must also be
+made in theory."</p>
+
+<p>Nothing could be more clearly stated
+than this, or place in greater honour
+peace preparations. Like his doctrine
+of the importance of gaining public
+opinion in war, it is one of those almost
+prophetic utterances which make Clausewitz<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">91</a></span>
+the germ of modern military evolution.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not,
+foresaw to a certain extent (probably
+owing to his employment in organizing
+the new Prussian short-service army
+after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the
+present day. And, since his time, the
+greater the forces which have to be prepared,
+the greater has become the value
+of preparation for war. It has been
+continually growing, till to-day it has
+obtained such overwhelming importance
+that one may almost say that a modern
+war is practically (or nearly so) decided
+<em>before</em> war breaks out, according to which
+nation has made the greatest and most
+thorough peace preparations.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every
+imaginable preparation." We may nowadays
+almost go so far as to say that
+preparation is war, and that that nation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">92</a></span>
+which is beaten in preparation is already
+beaten <span class="smcap smaller">BEFORE</span> the war breaks out.</p>
+
+<p>A failure to understand this fact is a
+fundamental error at the root of the idea
+of war as held by civilians, for many of
+them think that speeches are a substitute
+for preparations.</p>
+
+<p>It is plain that these three ideas of
+Clausewitz regarding the nature of war,
+its political nature, the distinction between
+wars with an unlimited object
+and a limited object, and preparations in
+peace-time, are as much matters for the
+statesman as for the soldier, and require
+study and reflection on the part of the
+former as much as on the part of the
+latter.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Friction in War</span></h3>
+
+<p>I place friction here before the more
+detailed consideration of actual war, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">93</a></span>
+war in itself, because it is that which
+distinguishes war on paper from real
+war, the statesman's and soldier's part
+from the part of the soldier only, and is
+therefore to be fitly treated midway
+between the two.</p>
+
+<p>Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's
+most characteristic ideas. He always
+looks at everything from that point of
+view, and as friction and the fog of war,
+and their influence on human nature
+will always be the chief characteristic
+of real war as distinguished from theoretical
+war or war on paper, it is chiefly
+this habit or mode of thought which
+makes his writings of such great and
+permanent value. It is also a habit
+which we ought sedulously to cultivate
+in ourselves.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>In war everything is very simple, but
+the simplest thing is difficult</em>,"<a name="FNanchor_26" id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> runs his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">94</a></span>
+famous saying. Why is the simplest
+thing difficult? Because of the friction
+of war. And how can that friction be
+minimized? Only by force of character,
+and the military virtues of discipline,
+perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness.
+Hence the great emphasis which
+he always and everywhere lays upon
+character and these military virtues as
+the deciding factors in war.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>Friction is the only conception which
+in a general way corresponds to that which
+distinguishes real war from war on paper</em>,"
+he says. Each individual of the army
+"keeps up his own friction in all directions."
+"The danger which war brings
+with it, the bodily exertions which it
+requires, augment this evil so much
+that they may be regarded as the greatest
+causes of <span class="locked">it."<a name="FNanchor_27" id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a></span> "<em>This enormous friction
+is everywhere brought into contact with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">95</a></span>
+chance</em>, and thus facts take place upon
+which it was impossible to calculate, their
+chief origin being chance. As an instance
+of one such chance take the weather.
+Here the fog prevents the enemy from
+being discovered in time,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;a battery from
+firing, or a report from reaching the
+general. The rain (mud) prevents a
+battalion from arriving,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;or the cavalry
+from charging effectively, because it had
+stuck fast in the heavy ground." And
+so on. Consider for examples the foggy
+mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau,
+the Katzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz,
+Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud
+of Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest,
+the mud of Manchuria.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>Activity in war is movement in a
+resistant medium.</em>" "<em>The knowledge of
+friction is a chief part of that so often
+talked of experience in war</em>, which is
+required in a good general." "It is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">96</a></span>
+therefore this friction which makes that
+which appears easy in war so difficult in
+<span class="locked">reality."<a name="FNanchor_28" id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a></span> In considering any situation
+in war we must therefore always add to
+the known circumstances&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;friction.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">War Itself</span></h3>
+
+<p>In Clausewitz's way of looking at war
+itself I assign at once the first place to
+his doctrine, "<em>The destruction of the
+enemy's military force is the leading
+principle of war</em>, and for the whole chapter
+of positive action <em>the direct way to the
+aim</em>."<a name="FNanchor_29" id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> This dictum, repeated in many
+different forms, underlies his whole conception
+of war. All the old theoretical
+ideas about threatening by man&oelig;uvring,
+conquering by man&oelig;uvring, forcing the
+enemy to retreat by man&oelig;uvring, and
+so forth, in which his predecessors entangled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">97</a></span>
+strategy, and from which even the
+Archduke Charles and Jomini had not
+completely freed themselves, he brushes
+aside by "our assertion is that <span class="smcap smaller">ONLY</span>
+great tactical results can lead to great
+strategical <span class="locked">results."<a name="FNanchor_30" id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a></span> Thus he leads and
+concentrates our thoughts in strategy on
+the central idea of victory in battle, and
+frees us once for all from the obscuring
+veil of lines and angles and geometrical
+forms by which other writers have hidden
+that truth. "Philanthropists may easily
+imagine that there is a skilful method of
+overcoming and disarming an adversary
+without causing great bloodshed, and
+that this is the proper tendency of the
+art of war. However plausible this may
+appear, <em>it is an error which must be
+extirpated</em>, for, in such dangerous things
+as war, <em>the errors which spring from a
+spirit of benevolence are just the worst</em>."<a name="FNanchor_31" id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">98</a></span>
+For "he who uses force unsparingly
+without reference to the quantity of
+bloodshed, <em>must</em> obtain the superiority if
+his adversary does not act likewise."
+And the "worst of all errors in wars" is
+still the idea of war too commonly held
+by civilians in this country, as witness
+the outcries which greeted every loss
+during the South African war, which
+shows how much Clausewitz is needed as
+a tonic to brace their minds to the
+reality.</p>
+
+<p>"War is an act of violence which in its
+application knows <span class="smcap smaller">NO</span> bounds." "Let
+us not hear of generals who conquer
+without bloodshed; if a bloody slaughter
+be a horrible sight, then that is a ground
+for paying more respect to war (for avoiding
+unnecessary war), but not for making
+the sword we wear blunt and blunter by
+degrees from feelings of humanity, till
+some one steps in with a sword that is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">99</a></span>
+sharp, and lops off the arm from our
+body."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Simple Plans</span></h3>
+
+<p>The second place I assign to his doctrine
+of <em>the simplest plans</em>, because time is
+required for the completion of complicated
+evolutions, but "a bold, courageous,
+resolute enemy will not let us have <em>time</em>
+for wide-reaching skilful <span class="locked">combination."<a name="FNanchor_32" id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a></span>
+"By this it appears to us that the advantage
+of simple and direct results over
+those that are complicated is conclusively
+shown."</p>
+
+<p>"We must not lift the arm too far for
+the room given to strike," or the opponent
+will get his thrust in first.</p>
+
+<p>"Whenever this is the case, we must
+ourselves choose the shorter." "Therefore,
+far from making it our aim to gain
+upon the enemy by complicated plans,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">100</a></span>
+<em>we must always rather endeavour to be
+beforehand with him by the simplest and
+shortest</em>."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Strategic Lines</span></h3>
+
+<p>The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the
+subtle distinctions between the numerous
+kinds of strategic lines, and lines of
+operation, and lines of man&oelig;uvre, etc.,
+etc., etc., which in Jomini and his predecessors
+and followers play so great, so
+pedantic, and so confusing a part,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;for
+these Clausewitz has little respect. In
+his chapter on "The Geometrical <span class="locked">Element,"<a name="FNanchor_33" id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a></span>
+he says, "We therefore do not
+hesitate to regard it as an established
+truth that <em>in strategy more depends upon
+the number and magnitude of the victorious
+battles than on the form of the great lines
+by which they are connected</em>."<a name="FNanchor_34" id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> Of course<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">101</a></span>
+he does not altogether leave out such
+considerations, but the above sentence
+shows how he regards them as only of
+minor importance. He therefore frees
+us from a great deal of pedantry, and
+takes us back to the heart of things.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Friction</span></h3>
+
+<p class="in0">has been already dealt with, so no more
+need be said here, except about its
+components.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Danger</span></h3>
+
+<p>"An ordinary character never attains
+to complete coolness" in danger. "Danger
+in war belongs to its friction, and a
+correct idea of it is necessary for truth
+of perception, and therefore it is brought
+under notice <span class="locked">here."<a name="FNanchor_35" id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a></span></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">102</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Bodily Exertion</span></h3>
+
+<p>Clausewitz says that bodily exertion
+and fatigue in war "put fetters on the
+action of the mind, and wear out in
+secret the powers of the soul." "Like
+danger, they belong to the fundamental
+causes of <span class="locked">friction."<a name="FNanchor_36" id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a></span></p>
+
+<p>To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen
+the retreat from Moscow, the awful
+passage of the Beresina, and the battle
+of the nations round Leipzig, bodily
+exertion could not be overlooked. Had
+he not seen bodily exertion and hardship
+break up the Grand Army into a small
+horde of stragglers, and destroy the army
+of Kutusoff in almost an equal measure,
+in 1812, as well as practically ruin the
+spirit, and largely break up the great
+army of Napoleon in 1813?</p>
+
+<p>As for the effects of bodily exertion on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">103</a></span>
+the mind, purpose, and resolution of the
+general, compare Benningsen at Eylau
+after thirty-six hours in the saddle, or
+Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost
+all the results of his victory.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Information in War</span></h3>
+
+<p>"<em>The foundation of all our ideas and
+actions</em>," but "in a few words, <em>most
+reports are false</em>." "When in the thick
+of war itself one report follows hard upon
+the heels of another, it is fortunate if
+these reports in contradicting each other
+show a certain balance of probability."
+In another passage, in order to illustrate
+this perpetual uncertainty under which
+all decisions in war have to be made, he
+compares two opposing commanders to
+two men fighting in a dark room and
+groping uncertainly for one another.</p>
+
+<p>"These things which as elements meet<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">104</a></span>
+together in the atmosphere of war and
+make it a <em>resistant medium for every
+activity</em>, we have designated danger, bodily
+exertion, information, and <span class="locked">friction."<a name="FNanchor_37" id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a></span> He
+never loses sight of this; it pervades
+everything he writes.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Moral and Physical</span></h3>
+
+<p>"And therefore the most of the subjects
+which we shall go through in this book
+are composed <em>half of physical, half of
+moral causes and effects</em>, and we might
+say that the physical are almost no more
+than the wooden handle, whilst the
+moral are the noble metal, the real bright
+polished <span class="locked">weapon."<a name="FNanchor_38" id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a></span> Pages might be
+filled with extracts showing his opinion
+that the moral is everything in war, but
+the reader is already convinced of that.
+Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">105</a></span>
+is to the physical as three to one."
+Clausewitz regards all military questions
+from this point. His psychological attitude
+is what chiefly characterizes Clausewitz
+from all writers who came before
+him, and which makes his deductions so
+realistic, so interesting and so valuable
+for all who come after him.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Tension and Rest in War</span></h3>
+
+<p>In order not to weary the reader I will
+bring this chapter to a conclusion with
+one or two extracts relating to "tension
+and rest; the suspension of the act in
+warfare." This is explanatory of those
+frequent halts which take place in a
+campaign, which appear at first sight
+contradictory to the absolute theory of
+war. These halts are due to many
+causes, such as preparations, exhaustion,
+uncertainty, irresolution, friction, waiting
+for reinforcements, etc.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">106</a></span>
+In this connection one must remember
+that war is "a chain of battles all strung
+together, one of which always brings on
+another." But they seldom follow each
+other immediately; there is usually a
+certain pause between. As soon as one
+battle is gained, strategy makes new
+combinations in accordance with the
+altered circumstances to win the next.
+Whilst these new combinations are being
+developed, or perhaps considered, there
+may be a greater or less suspension of the
+act, a longer or shorter halt in the forward
+movement. Then another spring forward.
+Clausewitz has a great many
+interesting things to say on this <span class="locked">subject.<a name="FNanchor_39" id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"If there is a suspension of the act
+in war, that is to say, if neither party
+for the moment wills anything positive,
+there is <em>rest</em>, and for the moment equilibrium....
+As soon as ever one of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">107</a></span>
+parties proposes to himself a new positive
+object, and commences active steps towards
+it, even if it is only by preparations,
+and as soon as the enemy opposes this,
+there is <em>tension</em> of the powers; this lasts
+until the decision takes place.... This
+decision, the foundation of which lies
+always in the battle-combinations which
+are made on each side, ... is followed by
+a movement in one or other direction."</p>
+
+<p>"It may so happen that both parties,
+at one and the same time, not only feel
+themselves too weak to attack, but are so
+in reality."</p>
+
+<p>"Wild as is the nature of war it still
+wears the claims of human weakness, and
+the contradiction we see here, that man
+seeks and creates dangers which he fears
+at the same time, will astonish no one."</p>
+
+<p>"If we cast a glance at military history
+in general, there we find so much the
+opposite of an incessant advance towards<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">108</a></span>
+the aim, that <em>standing still</em> and <em>doing
+nothing</em> is quite plainly the <em>normal condition</em>
+of an army in the midst of war,
+<em>acting</em> the <em>exception</em>. This must almost
+raise a doubt as to the correctness of our
+conception. But if military history has
+this effect by the great body of its events,
+so also the latest series of wars redeem
+the view. The war of the French Revolution
+shows only too plainly its reality,
+and only proves too plainly its necessity.
+In that war, and especially in the campaigns
+of Bonaparte, the conduct of war
+attained to that unlimited degree of
+energy which we have represented as the
+natural law of the element. This degree
+is therefore possible, and if it is possible
+then it is necessary."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So
+that is how Clausewitz regards International<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">109</a></span>
+Law, Clausewitz to whom in
+Germany "our most famous victors on
+the more modern battlefields owe their
+spiritual training," and on whom "everybody
+who to-day either makes or teaches
+modern war bases himself, even if he is
+not conscious of it." And we must
+regard nearly every foreign statesman as,
+consciously or unconsciously, a disciple
+of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time
+that we should cease to pin our faith on
+International Law, or think that it can
+in any way protect us, if we neglect
+strongly to protect ourselves. Power and
+expediency are the only rules that the
+practical politicians of foreign countries
+recognize, and the only question they ask
+themselves is, "Have we got sufficient
+power to do this," and if so, "Is it
+expedient to do it?"</p>
+
+<p>(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we
+place upon them for any length of time?<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">110</a></span>
+None whatever. For treaties are only
+considered binding as long as the interests
+of <em>both</em> contracting parties remain the
+same. Directly circumstances change,
+and they change constantly, the most
+solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia
+tore up the Treaty of Paris, or as Austria
+tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history
+is full of torn-up treaties. And as it has
+been so it will be. The European waste-paper
+basket is the place to which all
+treaties eventually find their way, and a
+thing which can any day be thrown into
+a waste-paper basket is, indeed, a poor
+thing on which to hang our national
+safety. Only in ourselves can we trust.
+Therefore no treaties at present existing
+should be allowed in any way to alter
+or lessen our preparations to enable us
+to fight <em>alone</em> when necessary.</p>
+
+<p>(3) It cannot be too often repeated,
+or too much insisted on, that the success<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">111</a></span>
+or failure of a State policy is dependent
+upon the amount of armed force behind
+it. For upon the amount of armed force
+behind a policy depends the greater or
+less amount of resistance, of friction,
+which that policy will meet with on the
+part of other nations. The prestige of a
+nation depends upon the general belief in
+its strength. The less its prestige, the
+more it will be checked and foiled by its
+rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded
+into a war which would have been prevented
+if its prestige, or armed force, had
+been greater. On the other hand, the
+greater its prestige, its armed force, the
+more reasonable and inclined to a fair
+compromise are its rivals found. So that
+the greater the prestige, the armed force,
+of our nation is, the more likely is it
+that all our negotiations will be settled
+by peaceful compromise, and the longer
+we shall enjoy peace.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">112</a></span>
+Therefore, under this consideration,
+those who would reduce our national
+forces are deeply mistaken, for such
+action would imperil our prestige, imperil
+our negotiations, imperil our peace, and
+perhaps lead eventually to a war that we
+might otherwise have avoided. Therefore
+no such deeply mistaken economy
+for us. A few hundred thousand pounds
+saved would be dear economy indeed if
+it led, as well it might, to the payment
+before many years of a War Indemnity
+of £800,000,000 or so. Better the evils
+we know than the far greater evils we
+know not of.</p>
+
+<p>(4) Surprise in war is what we have
+to fear. There are two sorts of national
+surprise that we must consider. These
+are (A) the <em>surprise by actual hostilities</em>
+taking place before the actual declaration
+of war, such as the Japanese surprise and
+practical destruction of the fighting force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">113</a></span>
+of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur;
+(B) the <em>surprise by superior preparation</em>,
+silently carried out till all is ready for a
+decisive blow, whilst we are not ready
+for equally efficient defence, and then a
+declaration of war before we have time
+to get properly ready, as the surprise in
+this sense of France by Germany in
+1870.</p>
+
+<p>(A) Every successful example is always
+copied, and usually on a larger scale.
+We may be quite certain that our rivals
+have taken to heart the lesson of Port
+Arthur. It is possible that our next war
+will open with a similar night attack on
+our fleet, either just before, or simultaneously
+with the declaration of war.
+If it is successful, or even partially successful,
+it may produce the most grave
+results, as in the Russo-Japanese War.
+It <em>may</em> render possible a naval action with
+almost equal forces, in which our opponents<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">114</a></span>
+<em>might</em> be victorious. The invasion
+of this country on a gigantic scale by
+300,000 men or more would then follow
+as a certainty. This is not a probability,
+but a possibility which requires to be
+kept in our view.</p>
+
+<p>(B) <em>The surprise by superior preparation</em>,
+as I term it, for want of a better
+name, is a danger to which we are
+peculiarly liable. As Lord Salisbury said,
+"The British constitution is a bad fighting
+machine," and it is made an infinitely
+worse fighting machine by the lack of
+interest which our politicians appear to
+take in all that appertains to war. Hence
+they are always liable to oppose, as
+excessive, preparations which are in
+reality the minimum consistent with
+national safety. Consequently our preparations
+for war, controlled as they are
+by those who have no special knowledge
+of war, are always apt to be insufficient,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">115</a></span>
+as were those of France in 1870. In
+former days this did not perhaps so very
+much matter, although it resulted in the
+unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands
+of British lives and hundreds of millions
+of British treasure. But still we were
+able, at this somewhat excessive price, to
+"muddle through," owing to the heroic
+efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make
+bricks without straw and retrieve the
+mistakes of our policy. For our opponents
+then conducted war in such a
+slow way as to give us time to repair
+<em>after</em> the outbreak of war our lack of
+preparation <em>before</em> it. But opposed to a
+modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen
+and led by generals brought up in
+the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and
+Moltke&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;all will be different. In such a
+war the national forces brought into play
+are so immense that it is only possible
+to do so efficaciously if everything has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">116</a></span>
+been most carefully prepared and organized
+beforehand. It is not <em>possible</em> to
+improvise such organization of national
+force <em>after</em> the war has begun, for there
+cannot be sufficient time. If our rival
+makes adequate preparation before the
+war to bring to bear in that war the <em>whole</em>
+of its national force, material, moral, and
+physical, while we only prepare to bring
+to bear a <em>small portion</em> thereof, then
+there will be no time afterwards for us
+to repair our negligence. The war will
+be conducted with the utmost energy,
+and the aim will be to utilize to the
+utmost the superiority obtained by superior
+preparation, so as to make the decision
+as rapid as possible before we have time
+to recover from the effects of our surprise.
+That is the danger we have to fear, and
+to keep ever in mind.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">119</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">WAR AS POLICY</span></h2>
+
+<p>"War," says Clausewitz, "is only a
+continuation of State policy by other
+means." The first question that at once
+arises in the mind is what is meant by
+Policy. We may safely lay down that
+State policy is the defence and furtherance
+of the interests of the nation as a whole
+amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies
+towards rest and towards acquisition,
+and that its instruments are the
+pen and the sword. There can, of course,
+be any degree of consistency or fickleness,
+of strength or weakness, of success or
+failure, in the policy of a State.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz expressly stated that he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">120</a></span>
+hoped "to iron out many creases in the
+heads of strategists and statesmen," such,
+for instance, as the idea that it is possible
+to consider either policy or war as
+independent of the other.</p>
+
+<p>It is only possible to obtain a proper
+conception of policy if we regard it as
+continuous both in peace and war, using
+sometimes peace negotiations, sometimes
+war negotiations, as circumstances require,
+to attain the political object.</p>
+
+<p>War is only a part of policy, a continuance
+of the previous negotiations;
+but the instrument is now the sword
+and not the pen. As Clausewitz says,
+"<em>In one word, the art of war, in its
+highest point of view, is policy; but no
+doubt a policy which fights battles instead
+of writing notes.</em>" War is merely a
+means whereby a nation attempts to
+impose its will upon another nation in
+order to attain a political object. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">121</a></span>
+object is settled by policy, which also
+orders the war, determines what sort of
+war it is to be, with what means and
+resources and expenditure it is to be
+waged, when its object has been attained,
+and when it is to cease. In fact, policy
+prepares, leads up to, orders, supports,
+guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz
+said, "<em>All the leading outlines of a war
+are always determined by the Cabinet&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;that
+is, by a political, not a military
+functionary.</em>"</p>
+
+<p>Unity of thought is only to be obtained
+by "the conception that war is only a
+part of political intercourse, therefore by
+no means an independent thing in itself."
+"And how can we conceive it to be
+otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic
+notes stop the political relations
+between different nations and governments?
+Is not war merely another kind
+of writing and language for political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">122</a></span>
+thoughts?" "Accordingly war can
+never be separated from political intercourse;
+and if, in the consideration
+of the matter, this is done in any way,
+all the threads of the different relations
+are, to a certain extent, broken, and we
+have before us a senseless thing without
+an object."</p>
+
+<p>"If war belongs to policy, it will
+naturally take its character from policy.
+If the policy is grand and powerful, so
+will also be the war, and this may be
+carried to the point at which war attains
+to its absolute form." "Only through
+this kind of view war recovers unity;
+only by it can we see <em>all</em> wars of <em>one</em>
+kind, and it is only through it that the
+judgment can obtain the true and perfect
+basis and point of view from which <em>great
+plans</em> may be traced out and determined
+upon."</p>
+
+<p>"There is upon the whole nothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">123</a></span>
+more important in life than to find out
+the <em>right</em> point of view from which things
+should be looked at and judged of, and
+then to keep to that point; for we can
+only apprehend the mass of events in
+their unity from <em>one</em> standpoint; and
+it is only the keeping to one point of
+view that guards us from inconsistency."
+"We can only look at policy here as the
+representative of the interests generally
+of the whole community," and "<em>wars
+are in reality only the expressions or
+manifestations of policy itself</em>."</p>
+
+<p>To the student of history this unity of
+conception is equally necessary, for it
+supplies the key to many a military
+puzzle. Without it we can never understand,
+for instance, Napoleon's conduct
+in 1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can
+we see the compelling reason of many
+battles, apparently fought against military
+judgment, such, for instance, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">124</a></span>
+Borodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have
+to remember that these and many other
+battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were
+fought from a political, not a military,
+motive. It is a well-known fact that
+the strategist frequently has to alter and
+adapt his plans so as to suit overmastering
+political necessity. Yet many people have
+failed to draw therefrom the generalization
+of Clausewitz that "war is only a
+continuation of State policy by other
+means." But having got it now, let us
+hold fast to it, with all its consequences.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Some Knowledge of War necessary for
+Statesmen</span></h3>
+
+<p>"From this point of view there is no
+longer in the nature of things a necessary
+conflict between the political and military
+interests, and where it appears it is therefore
+to be regarded as <em>imperfect knowledge</em><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">125</a></span>
+only. That policy makes demands upon
+the war which it cannot respond to,
+would be contrary to the supposition that
+<em>it knows the instrument it is going to use</em>,
+therefore contrary to a natural and
+<em>indispensable supposition</em>."</p>
+
+<p>"<em>None of the principal plans which
+are required for a war can be made without
+an insight into the political relations</em>;
+and in reality when people speak, as
+they often do, of the prejudicial influence
+of policy on the conduct of a war, they
+say in reality something very different
+to what they intend. It is not this
+influence, but the policy itself which
+should be found fault with. If policy is
+right, if it succeeds in hitting the object,
+then it can only act on the war also with
+advantage; and if this influence of
+policy causes a divergence from the
+object, the cause is to be looked for in
+a mistaken policy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">126</a></span>
+"It is only when policy promises itself
+a wrong effect from certain military
+means and measures, an effect opposed
+to their nature, that it can exercise a
+prejudicial effect on war by the course
+it prescribes. Just as a person in a
+language with which he is not conversant
+sometimes says what he does not intend,
+<em>so policy, when intending right, may
+often order things which do not tally with
+its own views</em>.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>This has happened times without
+end, and it shows that a certain knowledge
+of the nature of war is essential to the
+management of political intercourse.</em>"</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The War Minister</span></h3>
+
+<p>"Before going further we must guard
+ourselves against a false interpretation
+of which this is very susceptible. We do
+not mean to say that this acquaintance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">127</a></span>
+with the nature of war is the <em>principal</em>
+qualification for a war minister. Elevation,
+superiority of mind, strength of
+character, these are the principal qualifications
+which he must possess; a knowledge
+of war may be supplied in one way
+or another."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Policy and the means to carry out that
+Policy must Harmonize</span></h3>
+
+<p>"<em>If war is to harmonize entirely with
+the political views, and policy to accommodate
+itself to the means available for
+war</em>, there is only one alternative to be
+recommended when the statesman and
+soldier are not combined in one person
+(note, as William of Orange, Frederick
+the Great, or Napoleon), which is to
+make the chief commander an <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ex-officio</i>
+member of the Cabinet, that he may
+take part in its councils and decisions on
+important occasions."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">128</a></span>
+"The influence of any military man
+except the general-in-chief in the Cabinet
+is extremely dangerous; it very seldom
+leads to able, vigorous action."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>We shall conclude this chapter with a
+few reflections on the preceding dicta
+of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped
+that the reader will agree.</p>
+
+<p>Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that
+war is subordinate to policy, is an instrument
+of policy, is a part of policy, just
+as much as diplomatic negotiations are a
+part of policy.</p>
+
+<p>Secondly, a statesman, however good
+at peaceful administration he may be,
+who is ignorant of war is, therefore,
+ignorant of one part of his profession;
+that part which deals with the preparing,
+ordering, guiding, and controlling of war.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">129</a></span>
+As Clausewitz says, "it is an <em>indispensable
+supposition</em> that policy knows the instrument
+it is going to use." It is a mistake
+to suppose, when diplomatic relations
+between two States cease, and war breaks
+out, that therefore the political negotiations
+cease, for they do not, but are
+merely continued in another form&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;in
+the form of war. The statesman still
+retains control, and uses the military
+events as they occur to attain his object.
+He is still responsible for the success
+of the warlike, as well as of the peaceful,
+policy of the nation.</p>
+
+<p>Thirdly, it is a disputed point how
+far the influence of policy is theoretically
+allowable during the course of actual
+operations, <abbr>i.e.</abbr> after the war has actually
+begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy
+should only act at the beginning and at
+the end of a war, and should keep clear
+during the actual operations. Clausewitz,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">130</a></span>
+however, holds that the two are so
+intimately related that the political influence
+cannot be lost sight of even
+during actual operations. Between two
+such authorities we may well hesitate
+to give a definite opinion, and must
+seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly,
+in history policy often has really affected
+the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813,
+1814, 1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan,
+or Bismarck's interference to hurry on
+the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith
+in the Boer War, and in many other
+cases. That, we must admit. We must
+also admit that its interference frequently
+produces a weakening effect on the
+operations. Clausewitz says that that
+only occurs when the policy itself is
+wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle
+way rule appears to be this, that policy
+should be dominant at the beginning
+and end of a war, but during actual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">131</a></span>
+operations the statesman should exercise
+the greatest possible restraint, and
+avoid all interference, except when
+demanded by <em>overwhelming political
+necessity</em>.</p>
+
+<p>Fourthly, a politician is bound to study
+war. He is bound to study war as well
+as diplomacy, his two instruments. If
+he only studies how to use one of his
+two instruments, he will be a poor statesman
+indeed. It is plain that he <span class="smcap smaller">MUST</span>
+study war, so that he may not try to
+use an instrument of which he knows
+nothing. It is not meant, of course,
+that a politician should study all the
+details of naval and military matters,
+but only that he should study the general
+principles of war, and the means, resources,
+and forces required to attain
+the political object of war, through the
+submission of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Fifthly, in order that the object and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">132</a></span>
+the means of policy may harmonize, it
+is necessary that the one to whom the
+national interests are entrusted should
+study the principles of war, so that <em>he may
+keep his policy proportionate to the means
+of enforcing it</em>. That is to say, he must
+not propose or commit the nation to a
+policy which is likely to be strongly
+opposed by another Power, unless he has
+from careful study and enquiry made
+certain that he has sufficient armed
+force at his disposal, in case the opposing
+nation suddenly challenges his policy
+and declares war. He should not even
+consider a policy without <em>at the same
+time</em> considering with his military and
+naval advisers the nation's means of
+enforcing that policy if challenged to do
+so. He must not think of embarking
+upon a war, or of provoking another
+nation to do so, till he has carefully provided
+sufficient armed force to give a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">133</a></span>
+reasonable prospect, if not a certainty,
+of success. Otherwise,</p>
+
+<p>Sixthly, as our next contest will be
+with a nation-in-arms, as the war will
+be in its character absolute, as its object
+will be the downfall of the foe, as not
+until the foe (whether it be Great Britain
+or not) lies powerless upon the ground
+will it be supposed possible to stop, as
+we shall have to contend against the
+utmost means, the utmost energy, the
+utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;these
+points deserve the most serious
+consideration of every politician who
+aspires to guide the destinies of the
+Anglo-Saxon Race.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">137</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">STRATEGY</span></h2>
+
+<p>Clausewitz defines strategy as "<em>the use
+of the battle to gain the object of the war</em>."
+War is "a chain of battles all strung
+together, one of which always brings on
+<span class="locked">another."<a name="FNanchor_40" id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a></span> The great thing in strategy
+is to win these battles one after the
+other till the enemy submits. "<em>The best
+strategy is always to be very strong, first,
+generally; secondly, at the decisive point.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_41" id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a></p>
+
+<p>"In such an aspect we grant that the
+superiority of numbers is the most important
+factor in the result of a battle,
+only it must be sufficiently great to be a
+counterpoise to all the other co-operating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">138</a></span>
+circumstances. The direct result of all
+this is that the <em>greatest possible number
+of troops should be brought into action at
+the decisive point</em>.<a name="FNanchor_42" id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Whether the troops
+thus brought up are sufficient or not,
+we have then done in this respect all
+that our means allowed. This is <em>the
+first great principle of strategy</em>, as well
+suited for Greeks or Persians, or for
+Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French
+or Germans."</p>
+
+<p>It sounds so simple, and yet how many
+times has it not been done. How many
+generals have been ruined in consequence!</p>
+
+<h3 class="vspace"><span class="smcap">Superiority in Numbers<br />
+What is Required for Strategic Certainty</span></h3>
+
+<p>Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we
+may search modern military history in
+vain for a battle (except Leuthen or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">139</a></span>
+Rosbach) in which an army has beaten
+another double its own strength, an
+occurrence by no means uncommon in
+former times. Bonaparte, the greatest
+general of modern days, in all his great
+victorious battles, with one exception,
+that of Dresden 1813, had managed to
+assemble an army superior in numbers,
+or at least very little inferior, to that of
+his opponent, and when it was impossible
+for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne,
+Laon, Waterloo, he was <span class="locked">beaten."<a name="FNanchor_43" id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a></span> "From
+this we may infer, in the present state of
+Europe, that it is very difficult for the
+most talented general to gain a victory
+over an enemy double his strength.
+Now, if we see that double numbers are
+such a weight in the scale against even
+the greatest generals, we may be sure
+that in ordinary cases, in small as well
+as in great combats, an important superiority<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">140</a></span>
+of numbers, but which need not
+be over <em>two to one</em>, will be sufficient to
+<em>ensure the victory</em>, however disadvantageous
+other circumstances may <span class="locked">be."<a name="FNanchor_44" id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">44</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The double superiority of numbers at
+the decisive point is, therefore, the ideal
+of strategy. "<em>The superiority of numbers
+is, therefore, to be regarded as the
+fundamental idea, always to be aimed at,
+before all</em>, and as far as possible." If
+strategy has done this, then it has done
+its utmost duty. It is then for the
+tactician to make the most of this
+superiority thus provided by strategy,
+and win the victory. Strategy then repeats
+the operation with new combinations
+suited to the altered circumstances
+to win the next battle, and so on, till the
+hostile armed force is destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>This <em>superiority of numbers</em> in battle as
+the <em>first principle of strategy</em> we require,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">141</a></span>
+on all occasions in season and out of
+season, to repeat and repeat. At present
+we have not the numbers we shall want.
+We must get them. Otherwise we are
+bound to be inferior in numbers, and
+"the best strategy" will be possible for
+our enemies and impossible for us. This
+rests with our statesmen.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Decisive Point</span></h3>
+
+<p>If the double superiority, or as near
+the double as possible, at the decisive
+point is the ideal of strategy ... what
+is the decisive point?</p>
+
+<p>Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz.
+Jomini, even after Napoleon, confuses
+us with three different sorts of
+decisive points in a theatre of war, but
+Clausewitz clears the air by asserting
+only <em>one</em>.</p>
+
+<p>"But whatever may be the central<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">142</a></span>
+point of the enemy's power against
+which we are to direct our ultimate
+operations, <em>still the conquest and destruction
+of his army is the surest commencement</em>
+and, <em>in all cases, the most essential</em>."<a name="FNanchor_45" id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a></p>
+
+<p>Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever
+the enemy's main force is <span class="smcap smaller">THERE</span> is the
+decisive point, against which we must
+concentrate <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> our forces.</p>
+
+<p>"There are," said Napoleon, "many
+good generals in Europe, but they see
+too many things at one time. <em>As for
+me, I see only one thing, the enemy's
+chief army, and I concentrate all my
+efforts to destroy it.</em>"</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Simultaneous Use of all the Forces</span></h3>
+
+<p>"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which
+we have been endeavouring to set forth
+is, therefore, that all the forces which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">143</a></span>
+are available and destined for a strategic
+object should be <em>simultaneously</em> applied
+to it. And this application will be all
+the more complete the more everything
+is compressed into one act and one
+<span class="locked">moment."<a name="FNanchor_46" id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a></span> This he calls "<em>the law of
+the simultaneous employment of the forces
+in strategy</em>."<a name="FNanchor_47" id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> "In strategy we can
+never employ too many <span class="locked">forces."<a name="FNanchor_48" id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a></span> "What
+can be looked upon in tactics as an
+excess of force must be regarded in
+strategy as a means of giving expansion
+to success." "<em>No troops should be kept
+back as a strategic reserve</em>," but every
+available man hurried up to the first
+battlefield, fresh levies being meanwhile
+formed in rear. As an instance of what
+not to do, Prussia, in 1806, kept back
+45,000 men in Brandenburg and East
+Prussia; they might, if present at Jena,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">144</a></span>
+have turned defeat into victory, but they
+were useless <span class="locked">afterwards.<a name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a></span> A fault so
+often made may be made again.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Concentration</span></h3>
+
+<p>"It is impossible to be too strong at
+the decisive point," said Napoleon. To
+concentrate every available man and
+gun at the decisive point so as to attain
+superiority there, is not an easy thing,
+for the enemy will be making a similar
+attempt. "The calculation of time and
+space appears the most essential thing
+to this end. But the calculation of time
+and space, though it lies universally at
+the foundation of strategy, and is to a
+certain extent its daily bread, is still
+neither the most difficult nor the most
+decisive one." "Much more frequently
+the relative superiority, that is the skilful
+assemblage of superior forces at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">145</a></span>
+decisive point, has its foundation in the
+right appreciation of those points, in
+the judicious distribution which by that
+means has been given to the forces from
+the very first, and in <em>the resolution to
+sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage
+of the important</em>. In this respect Frederick
+the Great and Bonaparte are especially
+<span class="locked">characteristic."<a name="FNanchor_50" id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"There is no simpler and more imperative
+rule for strategy than <em>to keep all the
+forces concentrated</em>. <em>No portion to be
+separated from the main body unless
+called away by some urgent necessity.</em> On
+this maxim we stand firm, and look
+upon it as a fact to be depended
+<span class="locked">upon."<a name="FNanchor_51" id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"<em>The concentration of the whole force</em>
+(<abbr>i.e.</abbr> within supporting distance) <em>should
+be the rule</em>, and <em>every separation or
+division is an exception which must be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">146</a></span>
+justified</em>."<a name="FNanchor_52" id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Of course, this does not
+mean that all the troops are to be kept
+concentrated in one mass upon one
+road, but within supporting distance, for
+he expressly states, "<em>It is sufficient
+now if the concentration takes place during
+the course of the action.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_53" id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> This doctrine,
+qualified by the last sentence, makes
+Clausewitz the germ of modern military
+thought, for the last sentence leaves
+room for all the modern developments of
+new roads, railways, telegraphs, wire
+and wireless, and so forth.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore in war, according to Clausewitz,
+concentration, concentration, concentration,
+and <em>every division or detachment
+is an evil which can only be justified
+by urgent necessity</em>. Here again we find
+a simple truth, which, however, the
+history of all wars shows us to be very
+difficult to carry out. Hence the value<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">147</a></span>
+of keeping such an imperative maxim
+always in our minds.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The First Pitched Battle</span></h3>
+
+<p>"The more a general takes the field
+in the true spirit of war, as well as of
+every other contest, that he must and
+<em>will</em> conquer, the more will he strive to
+throw every weight into the scale in the
+first battle, and hope and strive to win
+everything by it. Napoleon hardly ever
+entered upon a war without thinking of
+conquering his enemy at once in the
+first <span class="locked">battle."<a name="FNanchor_54" id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"<em>At the very outset of war we must
+direct all our efforts to gain the first battle</em>,
+because an unfavourable issue is always
+a disadvantage to which no one would
+willingly expose himself, and also because
+the first decision, though not the only
+one, still will have the more influence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">148</a></span>
+on subsequent events the greater it is
+in <span class="locked">itself."<a href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"The law of the simultaneous use of
+the forces in strategy lets the principal
+result (which need not be the final one)
+take place almost always at the commencement
+of the great <span class="locked">act."<a name="FNanchor_55" id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a></span> A great
+victory thus won at the outset will upset
+all the enemy's plan of campaign and
+allow us to carry out our own. The first
+pitched battle is, therefore, the crisis of
+the rival strategies, and towards its
+favourable decision all our preparations,
+all our forces, and all our energies should
+be directed. This is a point that civilians
+seem to find hard to grasp. Witness all
+our history, with inadequate forces at
+the beginning of every war, as even in
+the latest of our wars&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;that in South
+Africa. It is a point which our statesmen
+should very seriously consider.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">149</a></span>
+The difficulty of concentrating superior
+numbers for the first battle is that the
+enemy will be, or should be, of the same
+opinion, and will be making equal efforts
+to win the first battle. So, then, the
+crisis will be all the more acute, the
+battle greater, and the result greater.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>We would not avoid showing at once
+that the bloody solution of the crisis, the
+effort for the destruction of the enemy's
+main force, is the first-born son of war.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_56" id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a></p>
+
+<p>Till this is done, the first great victory
+gained, strategy should think of nothing
+else.</p>
+
+<p>Then, and only then, a further combination
+in accordance with the altered
+circumstances to win the next.</p>
+
+<p>"For we maintain that, with few
+exceptions, <em>the victory at the decisive
+point will carry with it the decision on
+all minor points</em>"<a name="FNanchor_57" id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> over the whole theatre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">150</a></span>
+of war. Therefore nothing else matters
+for long, and to victory in the first great
+battle "everything else must be sacrificed."
+For concentration can only be
+obtained by sacrifice.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Pursuit</span></h3>
+
+<p>"Once the great victory is gained, the
+next question is not about rest, not about
+taking breath, not about re-organizing,
+etc., but only of pursuit, of fresh blows
+wherever necessary, of the capture of
+the enemy's capital, of the attack of the
+armies of his allies, or whatever else
+appears as a rallying point for the
+<span class="locked">enemy."<a name="FNanchor_58" id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz points out that this is very
+difficult, and that to compel his exhausted
+troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall
+requires <span class="smcap smaller">GREAT</span> force of <span class="smcap smaller">WILL</span> on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">151</a></span>
+part of the equally exhausted commander.
+We need only remember that
+Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis
+of his fate, being physically tired, failed
+to pursue the allies after his victory at
+Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the
+fruits of his victory, and indeed his last
+chance of ultimate success.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Summary of Strategic Principles</span></h3>
+
+<p>Leaving out, for the sake of shortness,
+the rest of his strategical thoughts, I hasten
+to conclude this sketch with a glance at
+Clausewitz's admirable <span class="locked">summary<a name="FNanchor_59" id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a></span> of strategic
+<span class="locked">principles:&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"<em>The first and most important maxim
+which we can set before ourselves is to
+employ</em> <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> <em>the forces which we can make
+available with the</em> <span class="smcap smaller">UTMOST ENERGY</span>. Even
+if the result is tolerably certain in itself,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">152</a></span>
+it is extremely unwise not to make it
+<em>perfectly certain</em>.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>The second principle is to concentrate
+our forces as much as possible at the point
+where the</em> <span class="smcap smaller">DECISIVE</span> <em>blow is to be struck.
+The success at that point will compensate
+for all defeats at secondary points.</em></p>
+
+<p>"<em>The third principle is not to lose
+time. Rapidity and surprise are the most
+powerful elements of victory.</em></p>
+
+<p>"<em>Lastly, the fourth principle is to</em>
+<span class="smcap smaller">FOLLOW UP THE SUCCESS</span> <em>we gain with
+the</em> <span class="smcap smaller">UTMOST ENERGY</span>. <em>The pursuit of
+the enemy when defeated is the only means
+of gathering up the fruits of victory.</em></p>
+
+<p>"The first of these principles is the
+foundation of all the others. <em>If we have
+followed the first principle, we can venture
+any length with regard to the three others
+without risking our all.</em> It gives the
+means of <em>continually creating new forces
+behind us</em>, and with new forces every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">153</a></span>
+disaster may be repaired. <em>In this, and
+not in going forward with timid steps,
+lies that prudence which may be called
+wise.</em>"</p>
+
+<p>These great principles are everything
+in war, and "due regard being paid to
+these principles, the form (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> the geometrical
+element) in which the operations
+are carried on is in the end of little consequence."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore I am perfectly convinced
+that whoever calls forth all his powers
+to appear <em>incessantly with new masses</em>,
+whoever adopts <em>every imaginable means of
+preparation</em>, whoever <em>concentrates his force
+at the decisive point, whoever thus armed
+pursues a great object with resolution and
+energy</em>, has done all that can be done
+in a general way for the strategical conduct
+of the war, and that, unless he is
+altogether unfortunate in battle, will
+undoubtedly be victorious in the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">154</a></span>
+measure that his adversary has fallen
+short of this exertion and energy."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>When we have got these great simple
+leading principles of strategy firmly into
+our heads, the next question is how to
+make use of our knowledge. For principles
+are no use unless we apply them.
+On consideration it appears that there
+are three ways in which we can all apply
+these principles with advantage.</p>
+
+<p>I. It will prove a very interesting and
+strengthening mental exercise to apply
+these few leading principles to every
+campaign we read about, to search for
+indications of their application in the
+strategy of each belligerent, how far each
+commander succeeded, and how far failed
+to carry them out in their entirety, and
+where, when, and why he succeeded or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">155</a></span>
+failed, and the results of doing or not
+doing so. Also to search for the interaction
+of the political motive of the war
+on the military operations, and to see
+how far the belligerent statesmen gained
+or failed to gain their political object,
+according to the comparative degree of
+preparation they had made for it, and the
+magnitude of effort which they made
+or did not make to support it with the
+whole means of the nation, material,
+moral and physical. Also to see how far
+the national spirit was aroused or not,
+and the causes thereof, and to note the
+greater or less energy, resolution and
+boldness which was consequently infused
+into the war. Also to note how the
+thorough application of these great simple
+principles of strategy shortens the war
+and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to
+1870), and how the neglect of them by
+statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">156</a></span>
+lengthens a war and adds to its
+cost enormously (South Africa, etc.).
+Used thus, these principles give us a
+theoretically correct ground for criticism.</p>
+
+<p>II. These principles also give us a
+theoretically correct ground for anticipating
+what the action of our opponents in
+any future war will be, the measure of
+the forces they will bring to bear, how
+they will direct those forces, and the
+amount of energy, resolution, and boldness
+with which they will use them against
+us. It is an axiom always to assume that
+the enemy will do the best and wisest
+thing, and to prepare accordingly.</p>
+
+<p>III. These principles also give us a
+theoretically correct ground for our own
+counter-preparations. We require to take
+the most dangerous war which is probable
+or possible, and make every imaginable
+preparation to carry out these principles
+therein.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">157</a></span>
+In such a case how are we going to
+render it possible for our generals to win,
+and thus save the nation from the irreparable
+consequences and the huge war
+indemnity of £800,000,000 or so, which
+would follow defeat? How are we going
+to do it? How are we going to render
+it possible for our generals to employ
+the best strategy? The ideal of strategy,
+always to be aimed at, is the double
+superiority of numbers. How are we
+going to give our generals that? If we
+cannot do that, how are we going to give
+them even any superiority <em>at all</em>, so that
+they may be able to carry out the first
+principle of strategy? How? Or are
+we going to make <span class="smcap smaller">NO</span> <em>adequate preparations</em>
+for these three eventualities, and
+when one of them suddenly comes ask
+our generals to save us from the fate we
+have brought upon ourselves, by performing
+the impossible? It is in this way<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">158</a></span>
+that a statesman should use these few
+great simple principles of strategy in
+order to attain his political object and
+safeguard the interests of the nation.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">161</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY</span></h2>
+
+<p>Now, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory
+of war is easy enough to understand.
+There is no reason&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;one might almost
+say no excuse&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;why every one, soldier
+or statesman, should not know it fairly
+well. The great leading principles of
+strategy are few and simple. There is
+no reason why every one, soldier and
+statesman, should not understand and
+know these few simple principles thoroughly,
+and have them at his finger ends
+ready to apply them to the consideration
+of any military question, past, present,
+or future. So far all is easy. But when
+it is a question of carrying out in actual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">162</a></span>
+war this easy theory, these simple strategical
+principles, then it is <span class="smcap smaller">QUITE</span> a different
+matter, then it is a matter of the very
+greatest difficulty. This is a difference
+which the mind always finds very hard
+to grasp, as witness the denunciations
+with which any failure in execution by
+a general, no matter how great the real
+difficulties with which he had to contend,
+is nearly always greeted. Observers rarely
+make allowances for these difficulties,
+very largely probably because they do
+not understand them. The present chapter
+is devoted to these difficulties of
+execution in war.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Genius for War</span></h3>
+
+<p>In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the
+genius for <span class="locked">war"<a name="FNanchor_60" id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a></span> he sets forth the
+difficulties which confront a general, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">163</a></span>
+character and genius, the driving and
+animating force, required to overcome
+the friction of war. It is impossible to
+abstract it adequately; I can only advise
+all to read it for themselves. But I will
+endeavour to give an idea of it.</p>
+
+<p>After discussing the various sorts of
+courage required by a general, physical
+before danger and moral before responsibility,
+the strength of body and mind,
+the personal pride, the patriotism, the
+enthusiasm, etc., he comes to the unexpected.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>War</em>," he says, "<em>is the province of
+uncertainty. Three-fourths of those things
+upon which action in war must be calculated
+are hidden more or less in the
+clouds of great uncertainty.</em> Here, then,
+above all other, a fine and penetrating
+mind is called for, to grope out the
+truth by the tact of its judgment."
+Mark this point, that three-fourths of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">164</a></span>
+the things that we as critics <span class="smcap smaller">AFTER</span> the
+event know, when all information of the
+situation has been collected and published,
+were unknown to the general
+who had to decide, or only dimly guessed
+at from a number of contradictory reports.</p>
+
+<p>"From this uncertainty of all intelligence
+and suppositions, <em>this continual
+interposition of chance</em>." "Now, if he
+is to get safely through <em>this perpetual
+conflict with the unexpected</em>, two qualities
+are indispensable; in the first place <em>an
+understanding which, even in the midst
+of this intense obscurity, is not without
+some traces of inner light</em>, which <em>lead to
+the truth</em>, and then <em>the courage to follow
+this faint light</em>. The first is expressed by
+the French phrase <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">coup d'&oelig;il</i>; the second
+is resolution."</p>
+
+<p>"Resolution is an <em>act of courage in
+face of responsibility</em>." "The forerunner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">165</a></span>
+of resolution is an act of the mind making
+plain the necessity of venturing and thus
+influencing the will. This quite peculiar
+direction of the mind, which conquers
+every other fear in man by the fear of
+wavering or doubting, is what makes up
+resolution in strong minds."</p>
+
+<p>The vital importance of firmness and
+resolution, so strongly urged by Clausewitz,
+will be apparent to all if we reflect
+how even the strongest characters have
+been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation
+in war. Compare, for instance,
+York <abbr>v.</abbr> Wartenburg's masterly exposition
+of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation
+in 1813 at Dresden.</p>
+
+<p>Also there is required "<em>the power of
+listening to reason in the midst of the
+most intense excitement</em>, in the storm of
+the most violent passions."</p>
+
+<p>"But to keep to the result of by-gone
+reflections in opposition to the stream<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">166</a></span>
+of opinions and phenomena which the
+present brings with it, is just <span class="smcap smaller">THE</span> difficulty."
+"Here nothing else can help
+us but an imperative maxim which,
+independent of reflection, at once controls
+it: that maxim is, <em>in all doubtful cases
+to adhere to the first opinion and not to
+give it up till a clear conviction forces us
+to do so</em>."</p>
+
+<p>"But as soon as difficulties arise, and
+that must always happen when great
+results are at stake, then the machine,
+the army itself, begins to offer a sort
+of passive resistance, and to overcome
+this the commander must have great
+force of will." Driving power, such as
+Napoleon's. And also "the heart-rending
+sight of the bloody sacrifice, which the
+commander has to contend with in himself."</p>
+
+<p>"These are the weights which the
+courage and intelligent faculties of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">167</a></span>
+commander have to contend with and
+<span class="smcap smaller">OVERCOME</span>, if he is to make his name
+illustrious." If he is to prevent the
+downfall of his country.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>(1) In connection with these difficulties
+I would like to put forward a suggestion
+as to criticism of a general's action in
+war, which though not exactly Clausewitz's,
+is a corollary from Clausewitz.
+It is this. In reading a war with the
+clearness and after-knowledge of history
+nearly all defeats are easily seen to be
+due to the non-observance of one or
+other of the few leading principles of
+strategy referred to in the previous
+chapter. But we must assume that the
+defeated general was <em>familiar</em> with that
+principle, and that his <em>will</em> was to carry
+it out. What, then, were the difficulties,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">168</a></span>
+the friction, which, on any particular
+day or days, overcame his will and
+made him sacrifice the principle? This
+is where most critics fail us. Here seems
+the matter to search for. And could a
+stronger resolution have enabled him to
+overcome those difficulties, that friction?
+And if so, how and by what means?
+But we must first discover the difficulties
+and uncertainties of the particular day
+when his will gave way. Take the
+Manchurian campaign as an instance.
+If we could only have a military history
+of the campaign of 1870 or that of
+Manchuria, written in the form of a
+series of "appreciations of the situation,"
+so that we know nothing but what the
+general knew at the time as we read, and
+if the true state of affairs could be withheld
+from us till the end, this, I think,
+would be very instructive and helpful.
+It would be a more difficult way of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">169</a></span>
+writing a military history, but I think
+that the extra trouble would be repaid
+by the extra value. So at least it appears.</p>
+
+<p>(2) If we reflect upon the enormous
+difficulties, so strikingly brought out by
+Clausewitz, which <em>our</em> generals have to
+contend with and <em>overcome</em> in actual war,
+it should surely teach us to curb our
+criticism. It should surely also make us
+resolve in future to try to aid them as
+far as is in our power at home, and not
+thoughtlessly to increase their already
+stupendous burdens. In the past we at
+home have much to accuse ourselves of,
+much to regret. In the past often
+have we added to the difficulties of our
+generals, often have we greatly weakened
+their chances, and increased those of their
+opponents, often have we, unintentionally,
+through ignorance cast a weight
+into the scale against our country.</p>
+
+<p>(3) The ignorance of the public regarding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">170</a></span>
+the conduct of war constitutes
+for us a very serious national danger.
+If this ignorance were less pronounced,
+if our statesmen understood the vast
+importance of information to the enemy,
+and the equal importance to our generals
+that this information the enemy should
+<span class="smcap smaller">NOT</span> obtain, then the public craving for
+information regarding every detail of
+what occurs in the field, and the demand
+for the wide publication thereof, would
+certainly be repressed. Nothing occurs
+in any of our campaigns which is not
+immediately made known; reports of
+actions with the fullest details as to the
+troops engaged, and the casualties that
+have befallen them, appear in the columns
+of the Press within a few hours of their
+occurrence. <em>Any efforts, therefore, of our
+generals</em> in the field to maintain <em>secrecy
+as to strength, intentions, and movements
+are deliberately</em>, though probably unintentionally,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">171</a></span>
+<em>counteracted by their own
+countrymen</em>. This is due to pure ignorance
+of war, no doubt, but the effect
+of this ignorance is as bad as if it were
+due to evil intention. In fairness, however,
+we must admit that, in the past,
+the immense value of reticence has not
+been fully appreciated by some of our
+soldiers themselves, and it were well if,
+in the future, more attention were directed
+to the importance of secrecy.</p>
+
+<p>The results of such almost criminal
+stupidity may not be apparent when we
+are fighting with a savage foe, but if
+we ever have, as we undoubtedly some
+day shall have, the misfortune to find
+ourselves engaged with a civilized Power,
+we may be certain that not only will the
+operations be indefinitely prolonged, <em>and
+their cost enormously increased</em>, but their
+successful issue will be for us highly
+problematical.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">172</a></span>
+In this connection it must be remembered
+that every Great Power has secret
+agents in every country, including Great
+Britain, and that it will be easy for such a
+secret agent to telegraph in cypher or
+in some agreed code to an agent in a
+neutral State all war information published
+here, who will telegraph it on at
+once to the hostile general, who will
+thus get, within a very short time of its
+publication in London, perhaps just exactly
+the information he requires to clear up
+the strategical or tactical situation for
+him, and enable him to defeat the combinations
+of our generals. As a case in
+point, take Macmahon's march on Sedan
+to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy
+was absolutely necessary for success, but
+which became known to the Germans
+by the English newspapers.&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;Result,
+Sedan.</p>
+
+<p>That this cannot be allowed is plain.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">173</a></span>
+It is believed that the patriotism of our
+Press will welcome any necessary measure
+to this end if it is made compulsory upon
+<span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span>.<a name="FNanchor_61" id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a></p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">177</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">TACTICS</span></h2>
+
+<p>Some will probably feel inclined to ask
+what Clausewitz, who wrote more than
+eighty years ago, can possibly have to
+say about tactics which can be valuable
+in the twentieth century.</p>
+
+<p>It was said by Napoleon that tactics
+change every ten years, according, of
+course, to the progress of technicalities,
+etc. Weapons indeed change, but there
+is one thing that never changes, and
+that is human nature. The most important
+thing in tactics, the man behind
+the gun, never alters; in his heart and
+feelings, his strength and weakness, he is
+always much the same.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">178</a></span>
+Therefore, Clausewitz's tactical deductions,
+founded on the immense and varied
+data supplied by the desperate and long-continued
+fighting of the Revolutionary
+and Napoleonic wars, permeated as they
+are by his all-pervading psychological or
+moral view, can never lose their value
+to us.</p>
+
+<p>It is true, no doubt, that our rifles of
+to-day can be used with effect at a
+distance ten times as great as the old
+smooth bores of Clausewitz's day, our
+shrapnel five times as far as his cannon,
+and that cover and ground play a far
+more important part now than then, and
+so on. All these things, of course, considerably
+modify the tactics of Clausewitz.
+Not so much, however, as some text-books
+would lead us to suppose, which always
+seem to assume clear ground and clear
+weather. For, after all, how many combats
+are fought on ground where there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">179</a></span>
+is a very restricted field of fire (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vide</i>
+Herbert's "Defence of Plevna," etc.), or
+at night? How many battles are fought
+during rain, or snow, or mist, or fog,
+which destroys all long range? Compare
+the tremendous fighting with "bullets,
+bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and
+even fists," of Nogi's attempt to cut the
+Russian line of retreat at Mukden, with
+the hand-to-hand fighting of Eylau, Friedland,
+Borodino, or with the desperate
+efforts of the French in 1812 to open their
+line of retreat through Maro-Jaroslawitz,
+where all day the masses of troops fought
+hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town
+was taken and retaken seven times, and
+the rival nations fought with the bayonet
+in the midst of the burning houses"
+(Alison).</p>
+
+<p>When it comes to push of pike, as in
+all great decisions between equally resolute
+adversaries it is bound to do, the difference<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">180</a></span>
+between the fighting of Clausewitz's
+day and ours is but small. The most
+recent instances of all, the hand-to-hand
+fighting in Manchuria, take us back to
+the Napoleonic struggles.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore, despite the eighty years
+that have intervened, the writings of
+Clausewitz are still valuable from a
+tactical point of view, always considering
+of course the difference in weapons,
+because of the human heart in battle.</p>
+
+<p>His ideas on tactics have largely filtered
+through his German pupils into our textbooks,
+minus the psychological or moral
+note, so that it is not necessary to go at
+length into the subject, or give a number
+of extracts. It would be wearisome. I
+will, however, give a few passages at haphazard
+as illustrations.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">181</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Flank Attacks</span></h3>
+
+<p>The endeavour to gain the enemy's line
+of retreat, and protect our own, on
+which so much learned erudition has
+been spent by various writers, he regards
+as a <span class="smcap smaller">NATURAL</span> instinct, which will <span class="smcap smaller">ALWAYS</span>
+produce itself both in generals and subalterns.</p>
+
+<p>"From this arises, in the whole conduct
+of war, and especially in great and small
+combats, a <span class="smcap smaller">PERFECT INSTINCT</span>, which is
+the security of our own line of retreat
+and the seizure of the enemy's; this
+follows from the conception of victory,
+which, as we have seen, is something
+beyond mere slaughter. In this effort
+we see, therefore, the <span class="smcap smaller">FIRST</span> immediate
+purpose in the combat, and one which
+is quite universal. No combat is <em>imaginable</em>
+in which this effort, either in its
+double or single form, is not to go hand<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">182</a></span>
+in hand with the plain and simple stroke
+of force. Even the smallest troop will
+not throw itself upon the enemy without
+thinking of its line of retreat, and in
+most cases it will have an eye upon that
+of the <span class="locked">enemy."<a name="FNanchor_62" id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a></span> "This is a great
+<em>natural law</em> of the combat," "and so
+becomes the pivot upon which <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> strategical
+and tactical man&oelig;uvres turn."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reserves&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;Destructive and Decisive Act</span></h3>
+
+<p>The combat he regards as settled by
+whoever has the preponderance of moral
+force at the end; that is, in fresh or only
+partly used up troops.</p>
+
+<p>The combat itself he divides into a
+destructive and a decisive act. During
+the long destructive act, or period of fire
+preparation, the troops engaged gradually
+wear each other out, and gradually<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">183</a></span>
+almost cease to count as factors in the
+decision. "After a fire combat of some
+hours' duration, in which a body of
+troops has suffered severe losses&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;for
+instance, a quarter or one-third of its
+numbers&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">débris</i> may for the time
+be looked upon as a heap of cinders.
+For the men are physically exhausted;
+they have spent their ammunition; many
+have left the field with the wounded,
+though not themselves wounded (compare,
+for instance, Eylau and the 1870 battles);
+the rest think they have done their part
+for the day, and if they get beyond the
+sphere of danger, do not willingly return
+to it. The feeling of courage with which
+they originally started has had the edge
+taken off, the longing for the fight is
+satisfied, the original organization is partly
+destroyed, and the formations broken up."</p>
+
+<p>"So that the amount of moral force
+lost may be estimated by the amount of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">184</a></span>
+the Reserves used up, almost as with a
+foot <span class="locked">rule."<a name="FNanchor_63" id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">63</a></span></p>
+
+<p>This goes on till, "In all probability,
+only the untouched reserve and some
+troops which, though they have been in
+action, have suffered very little, are in
+reality to be regarded as serviceable, and
+the remainder (perhaps four-sixths) may
+be looked upon for the present as a
+"caput mortuum."</p>
+
+<p>Therefore the art of the commander
+he regards as "economy of force" during
+the destructive period; that is, to employ
+as few troops as possible, by taking
+advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to
+use a smaller number of men in the
+combat with firearms than the enemy
+employs," so that a smaller proportionate
+number of his own are reduced to a
+"heap of cinders" and more are left,
+more moral force, for the decision.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">185</a></span>
+"Hundreds of times," he says, "a line
+of fire has maintained its own against
+one twice its strength" (<abbr>e.g.</abbr> the Boers).</p>
+
+<p>To do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect
+demands very skilful handling of
+the troops, both on the part of the chief
+and subordinate leaders.</p>
+
+<p>With the preponderance thus obtained
+the commander at last starts the decision.
+"Towards the close of a battle the line
+of retreat is always regarded with increased
+jealousy, therefore a threat against that
+line is always a potent means of bringing
+on the decision (Liao-yang, Mukden).
+On that account, when circumstances
+permit, the plan of battle will be aimed
+at that point from the very first." Or,
+"If this wear and tear and exhaustion
+of the forces has reached a certain pitch,
+then a rapid advance in concentrated
+masses on one side against the line of
+battle of the other" (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> the Napoleonic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">186</a></span>
+breaking the centre, of recent years
+thought almost hopeless, but revived in
+Manchuria with success, in the case of
+Nodzu breaking the centre at Mukden).</p>
+
+<p>From what precedes it is evident that,
+as in the preparatory acts, the utmost
+economy of forces must prevail, so in
+the decisive act to win the mastery
+through <em>numbers</em> must be the ruling idea.</p>
+
+<p>Just as in the preparatory acts endurance,
+firmness and coolness are the first
+qualities, so in the decisive act boldness
+and fiery spirit must predominate.</p>
+
+<p>"The difference between these two
+acts will never be completely lost as
+respects the whole."</p>
+
+<p>"This is the way in which our view
+is to be understood; then, on the one
+hand, it will not come short of the
+reality, and on the other it will direct
+the attention of the leader of a combat
+(be it great or small, partial or general)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">187</a></span>
+to giving each of the two acts of activity
+its due share, so that there may be
+neither precipitation nor negligence.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>Precipitation</em> there will be if space
+and time are not allowed for the destructive
+act. <em>Negligence</em> in general there will
+be if a complete decision does not take
+place, either from want of moral courage
+or from a wrong view of the <span class="locked">situation."<a name="FNanchor_64" id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">64</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Duration of the Combat</span></h3>
+
+<p>"Even the resistance of an ordinary
+division of 8,000 or 10,000 men of all
+arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably
+superior in numbers, will last
+several hours, if the advantages of country
+are not too preponderating. And if the
+enemy is only a little or not at all superior
+in numbers, the combat will last half a
+day. A corps of three or four divisions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">188</a></span>
+will prolong it to double that time; an
+army of 80,000 or 100,000 men to three
+or four times." "These calculations are
+the result of <span class="locked">experience."<a name="FNanchor_65" id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">65</a></span></p>
+
+<p>As General von Caemmerer points out,
+if these calculations were adhered to in
+present-day German man&oelig;uvres, as they
+are now in all war games, tactical exercises,
+and staff rides, the dangerous
+dualism of their training, the difference
+between theory and man&oelig;uvre practice,
+would cease.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Attack and Defence</span></h3>
+
+<p>I have left to the last the consideration
+of three or four disputed points in Clausewitz.
+In considering these I shall quote
+a good deal from General von Caemmerer's
+"Development of Strategical
+Science," as in such matters it is best to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">189</a></span>
+quote the most recent authors of established
+reputation.</p>
+
+<p>The most important of these, and the
+most disputed, is Clausewitz's famous
+dictum that "the defensive is the stronger
+form of making war." "The defence is
+the stronger form of war with a negative
+object; the attack is the weaker form
+with a positive <span class="locked">object."<a name="FNanchor_66" id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">66</a></span></p>
+
+<p>General von Caemmerer says, "It is
+strange, we Germans look upon Clausewitz
+as indisputably the deepest and
+acutest thinker upon the subject of war;
+the beneficial effect of his intellectual
+labours is universally recognized and
+highly appreciated; but the more or
+less keen opposition against this sentence
+never ceases. And yet that sentence
+can as little be cut out of his work 'On
+War' as the heart out of a man. Our
+most distinguished and prominent military<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">190</a></span>
+writers are here at variance with
+Clausewitz.</p>
+
+<p>"Now, of course, I do not here propose
+to go into such a controversy. I only
+wish to point out that Clausewitz, in
+saying this, only meant the defensive-offensive,
+the form in which he always
+regards it, both strategically and technically,
+in oft-repeated explanations all
+through his works. For <span class="locked">instance&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"It is a <span class="smcap smaller">FIRST</span> maxim <span class="smcap smaller">NEVER</span> to remain
+perfectly passive, but to fall upon the
+enemy in front and flank, even when he
+is in the act of making an attack upon <span class="locked">us."<a name="FNanchor_67" id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">67</a></span></p>
+
+<p>And <span class="locked">again&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"<em>A swift and vigorous assumption of
+the offensive&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the flashing sword of vengeance&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;is
+the most brilliant point in the
+defensive.</em> He who does not at once
+think of it at the right moment, or rather
+he who does not from the first include<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">191</a></span>
+this transition in his idea of the defensive,
+will never understand its superiority as a
+form of <span class="locked">war."<a name="FNanchor_68" id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">68</a></span> Von Caemmerer comments
+thus: "And this conception of
+the defence by Clausewitz has become
+part and parcel of our army&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;everywhere,
+strategically and tactically, he who has
+been forced into a defensive attitude at
+once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack.
+I am thus unable to see how
+the way in which Clausewitz has contrasted
+Attack and Defence could in any
+way paralyse the spirit of enterprise."
+Von Caemmerer also justly remarks that,
+as Clausewitz always insisted both in
+strategy and tactics, neither Attack nor
+Defence is pure, but oscillates between
+the two forms; and as the Attack is
+frequently temporarily reduced to defend
+itself, and also as no nation can be sure
+of never being invaded by a superior<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">192</a></span>
+coalition, it is most desirable to encourage
+a belief in the strength of the Defence,
+if properly used. In this I think that
+Wellington would probably have agreed.
+Certainly Austerlitz and Waterloo were
+examples of battles such as Clausewitz
+preferred.</p>
+
+<p>Still, one must admit that Clausewitz's
+chapter on "The Relations of the Offensive
+and Defensive to each other in
+Tactics," Book VII. Chapter 2, is the
+least convincing chapter of his work.</p>
+
+<p>Strategically, the argument is stronger.
+It always seems to me that we must
+remember that Clausewitz had taken
+part in the defensive-offensive in its
+strongest, most absolute and unlimited
+form, on the greatest possible scale&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the
+Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated
+before a single flake of snow fell)
+of the Grand Army. If he had lived to
+complete the revision of his works, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">193</a></span>
+always seems to me that he would have
+made his theory undeniable by stating
+that the defensive is the strongest form
+of war, <em>if unlimited by space</em>. What, for
+instance, would have happened if the
+Japanese had tried to march through
+Siberia on to St. Petersburg?</p>
+
+<p>But, after all, which of the two is
+absolutely the stronger form of war,
+attack or defence, is merely a theoretical
+abstraction, for, practically, the choice
+is always settled for us by the pressing
+necessity of circumstances. And, in this
+connection, let us always bear in mind
+Clausewitz's dictum: "A swift and
+vigorous assumption of the offensive&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the
+flashing sword of vengeance&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;is the
+most brilliant point in the defensive."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Inner Line</span></h3>
+
+<p>A second disputed point is Clausewitz's
+alleged preference, as a rule, for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">194</a></span>
+Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary
+to remember that that was only
+due to the conditions of his time, before
+railways and telegraphs, when it was
+difficult to communicate between columns
+acting on concentric lines. And he is
+not in any way wedded to the Inner
+Line, like Jomini, but <em>only</em> when circumstances
+are favourable. He has many
+sentences from which we may infer that,
+had he lived in railway and telegraph
+days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most
+distinguished pupil, would have aimed
+at envelopment as a rule. For to bring
+up troops rapidly by several railways
+necessitates a broad strategic front, and
+Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity
+as his second great principle, and <span class="locked">says&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"If the concentration of the forces
+would occasion detours and loss of time,
+and the danger of advancing by separate
+lines is not too great, then the same may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">195</a></span>
+be justifiable on these grounds; for <em>to
+effect an unnecessary concentration of the
+forces</em> would be contrary to the second
+principle we have laid down (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> 'to act
+as swiftly as possible')."<a name="FNanchor_69" id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> Also: "Such
+separation into several columns as is
+absolutely necessary must be made use
+of for the disposition of the tactical attack
+in the enveloping form, <em>for that form is
+natural to the attack, and must not be
+disregarded without good reason</em>."<a name="FNanchor_70" id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> Also:
+"<em>It is sufficient now if the concentration
+takes place during the action.</em>" So that
+while the conditions of his time led
+Clausewitz to prefer close concentration
+and the Inner Line, like Napoleon, yet his
+reflections led him to propound the
+germ of the strategy of Moltke. Substitute
+for Clausewitz's close concentration
+this: "As close concentration, the combined
+movements regulated by telegraph,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">196</a></span>
+as is compatible with the utmost use of
+the railways and the greatest rapidity"
+(as he would certainly have said), and
+we arrive at Moltke's strategy.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Frontal Attacks</span></h3>
+
+<p>A third disputed point is his belief in
+the superior tactical efficiency, under
+favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic
+method of breaking the enemy's
+line in the centre. Breaking the line by
+a frontal attack was, of course, much
+easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic day
+than it is with the long-ranging arms of
+our day, and it is only natural that
+Clausewitz in his writings should give it
+the full tactical importance which it then
+deserved. His book would not be true
+to the tactical conditions of his day had
+he not done so, with Rivoli, Austerlitz,
+Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">197</a></span>
+mind. But it seems hardly correct to
+accuse him of over-partiality to frontal
+attacks, for he has examined both frontal
+and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving
+to each their relative advantages and
+disadvantages, and concluding: "The
+envelopment may lead directly to the
+<em>destruction</em> of the enemy's army, if it is
+made with very superior numbers and
+succeeds. If it leads to victory the early
+results are <em>in every case</em> greater than by
+breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the
+enemy's line can only lead indirectly to
+the destruction of the enemy's army, and
+its effects are hardly shown so much on
+the first day, but rather strategically
+<span class="locked">afterwards,"<a name="FNanchor_71" id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">71</a></span> by forcing apart on different
+lines of retreat the separated fragments
+of the beaten army.</p>
+
+<p>"The breaking through the hostile
+army by massing our principal force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">198</a></span>
+against one point, <em>supposes an excessive
+length of front on the part of the enemy</em>;
+for in this form of attack the difficulty
+of occupying the remainder of the enemy's
+force with few troops is greater, because
+the enemy's forces nearer to the principal
+point of attack can easily join in opposing
+it. Now in an attack upon the centre
+there are such forces on both sides of
+the attack; in an attack upon a flank,
+only on one side. The consequence of
+this is that such a central attack may
+easily end in a very disadvantageous form
+of combat, <em>through a convergent counter-attack</em>."
+Which is exactly our modern
+difficulty. "The choice between these two
+forms of attack must therefore be made
+according to the existing conditions of
+the moment. Length of front, the nature
+and direction of the line of retreat, the
+military qualities of the enemy's troops,
+and the characteristics of their general,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">199</a></span>
+lastly the ground must determine the
+choice."</p>
+
+<p>Speaking generally he regards the <em>concentric</em>
+enveloping form of tactical attack
+aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as
+the most efficacious and natural. "On
+the field of battle itself ... the enveloping
+form must always be considered the
+most <span class="locked">effectual."<a name="FNanchor_72" id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">72</a></span> And the <em>eccentric</em> or
+frontal counter-attack at the extended
+enveloping attack as the most efficacious
+and natural form of the defence, such as
+Napoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz
+or Dresden, or Wellington's at Salamanca.
+"And we think that one means is at
+least as good as the <span class="locked">other."<a name="FNanchor_73" id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">73</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="tb">*<span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span></div>
+
+<p>Now I think that these extracts sufficiently
+defend Clausewitz from the imputation
+of too great a belief in frontal
+attacks, and considering the frequent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">200</a></span>
+success of such Napoleonic attacks in his
+day, he gives a very fair summing up of
+the relative advantages and disadvantages
+thereof, and indeed such as might be
+written in the present day. Indeed the
+quite abnormal conditions of the Boer
+war produced such a feeling against
+frontal attacks, and so much loose talk
+of their being extinct, that it is very
+useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder
+that breaking the centre, whenever
+the condition he postulates, namely <em>over-extension
+of front</em> on the enemy's part, is
+present, will always remain one of the
+two great forms of decisive attack open
+to a commander.</p>
+
+<p>And as in our day the forces are so
+enormous that to reach the hostile flank
+becomes more difficult, and the extension
+of front becomes so gigantic (a front of
+several armies on a line of forty to seventy
+miles perhaps), it is well to consider<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">201</a></span>
+whether breaking the enemy's centre will
+not again offer the most advantageous
+form for the final decisive act, coupled
+of course, as Clausewitz says it <span class="smcap smaller">ALWAYS
+MUST</span> be, with a strong flank attack.
+And in these gigantic battles of the
+future, such as Liao-yang and Mukden,
+which we must consider typical of the
+future, battles which must take several
+days, during which the troops in the first
+line become utterly exhausted and used
+up,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;a decisive attack on the centre can
+well be imagined after the hostile reserves
+have been decoyed away over a day's
+march by a strong flank attack. As, for
+example, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden
+followed by Nodzu's decisive breaking
+the centre and capture of Mukden
+itself.</p>
+
+<p>So that far from thinking Clausewitz's
+remarks about frontal attacks and breaking
+the line to be obsolete, it rather<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">202</a></span>
+appears from the great Russo-Japanese
+battles that they are worthy of close
+study in view of the future.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Tactical versus Strategical
+Envelopment</span></h3>
+
+<p>A fourth disputed point is the preference
+of Clausewitz, owing to his insistence
+on the greatest concentration possible
+with proper regard for the circumstances,
+for the tactical envelopment arranged
+on or near the field to strategical envelopment
+with divided forces arranged beforehand.
+In this matter I will again quote
+General v. Caemmerer, who disagrees
+with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims
+the oblique front as the most
+effective strategic form of attack, ... that
+is to say, when the whole army with
+one united front falls upon the strategic
+<em>flank</em> of the enemy, and, if victorious,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">203</a></span>
+cuts him from his line of retreat. But
+where such a situation cannot be brought
+about, where our advance has brought
+us before the strategic <em>front</em> of the enemy,
+then he sees in the tactical envelopment,
+in the formation of an offensive flank,
+the proper means of effectively preparing
+to push the enemy from his line of retreat,
+and he distinctly explains that tactical
+envelopment need not at all be the
+<em>consequence</em> of strategical envelopment,
+and need not at all be prepared long
+beforehand by a corresponding advance
+of divided forces."</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz says, "The consequence of
+this is that battles fought with enveloping
+lines, or even with an oblique front,
+which should properly result from an
+advantageous relation of the lines of
+communication, are commonly the result
+of a moral and physical <span class="locked">preponderance."<a name="FNanchor_74" id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">74</a></span><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">204</a></span>
+Also "he should therefore only advance
+with his columns on such a width of
+front as will admit of their all coming
+into action together." "Such separation
+into several columns should be made use
+of for the disposition of the tactical attack
+in the enveloping form" (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> by troops
+within a day's march of each other).
+"But it must be only of a tactical nature,
+for a strategic envelopment, when a great
+blow is to be struck, is a complete waste
+of power."</p>
+
+<p>General v. Caemmerer comments: "He
+is thus of opinion that the lateral movement
+of part of the army against the
+flank of the enemy could without any
+difficulty still be carried out as initiated
+by the plan of battle; and in order to
+understand this idea we must again bear
+in mind the difference between the fire-effect
+of then and now. In those days a
+comparatively short movement made it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">205</a></span>
+still possible for a considerable portion
+of the army to gain the defenders' flank;
+to-day a lengthy and troublesome operation
+would be necessary for the same
+object, and its successful execution would
+only be counted upon if the defender
+remained entirely passive, and would
+neither think of a counter-stroke nor
+of a corresponding movement of his
+forces to the threatened flank."</p>
+
+<p>Without going into this controversy I
+will, however, quote the excellent reason
+given by Clausewitz for his preference for
+tactical as opposed to strategical envelopment:
+"One peculiarity of the offensive
+battle is the uncertainty, in most cases,
+as to the position (note, and strength)
+of the enemy; it is a complete groping
+about amongst things that are unknown
+(Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena,
+Katzbach). The more this is the case
+the more concentration of forces becomes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">206</a></span>
+paramount, and turning a flank to be
+preferred to <span class="locked">surrounding."<a name="FNanchor_75" id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It is also well to recollect how many
+famous generals had been ruined in
+Clausewitz's experience through over-extension
+or dispersion of their forces.
+The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals
+in the winter of 1813, Macdonald
+at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren,
+Ney at Dennewitz, which neutralized
+Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and
+began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to
+this cause.</p>
+
+<p>And the weather may, again, have as
+great influence in shortening resistance
+and allowing troops to be overwhelmed
+before the too-distant reinforcements
+arrive, as it had in those battles. If the
+weather then prevented the old muskets
+going off, and enabled the attack to rush
+the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">207</a></span>
+snow, by restricting the field of view
+and fire, may produce the same results.
+When one thinks of the number of great
+battles fought in such weather, as they
+may well be again, one sees an additional
+reason for carefully considering Clausewitz's
+warning. Far from relegating his
+preference for the tactical as opposed to
+the strategical envelopment to the region
+of the obsolete, because of our improved
+armament, it seems right to give it full
+weight as a corrective to a perceivable
+tendency to elevate strategical envelopment
+(after Königgrätz) into a formula
+for victory. If in the past many great
+generals have been ruined by over-extension,
+so may they be again. Against
+this tendency Clausewitz will for ever
+lift his voice.</p>
+
+<p>Also it remains to be considered, with
+the huge armies of to-day and the future,
+such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">208</a></span>
+such armies as may possibly one day
+join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical
+envelopment will be practicable, or
+whether tactical envelopment, such as
+General Kuroki's tactical enveloping
+movement on Yentai, and the Russian
+line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General
+Nogi's tactical enveloping dash northward
+on Hsinminting and the railway
+at Mukden, will not be preferable.</p>
+
+<p>Perhaps, as a compromise, one might
+call such a movement strategical-tactical,
+and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of
+words.</p>
+
+<p>I have not attempted to do more than
+roughly indicate that the solution of
+these four disputed tactical questions in
+Clausewitz is to be sought in a study of
+the latest campaign, as he would have
+said himself; that is, the campaign in
+Manchuria. For, as the <i>Times</i> correspondent
+in the XLVth Chapter, "Clausewitz<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">209</a></span>
+in Manchuria," of his book "The
+War in the Far East," observes, "It will
+be abundantly clear to any one who
+has followed the great battles in Manchuria
+that the spirit of Clausewitz has
+presided over Japanese victories and wept
+over Russian defeats."</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">213</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ</span></h2>
+
+<p>In reading Clausewitz it is, first, the
+great principles of the nature of war
+founded on human nature, which alter
+not; and, secondly, it is his spirit and
+practical way of looking at things that
+we want to assimilate and apply to <span class="smcap smaller">THE
+PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY</span>, to which end it
+is necessary to read him always with
+the changed conditions of to-day in our
+minds, and think what he would have
+said under the circumstances. These
+changes are <span class="locked">chiefly:&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<ul>
+<li>(1) &nbsp; The improved net-work of roads.</li>
+<li>(2) &nbsp; Railways.</li>
+<li>(3) &nbsp; Telegraphs, wire and wireless.</li>
+<li>(4) &nbsp; Improved arms.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">214</a></span></li>
+<li>(5) &nbsp; Aviation</li>
+<li>(6) &nbsp; Universal service armies.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Improved Net-work of Roads</span></h3>
+
+<p>The improved net-work of roads in
+Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria, or
+in Afghanistan where we have to consider
+our future strategy, but in Europe),
+as General v. Caemmerer puts it, "now
+offers to the movements of armies everywhere
+a whole series of useful roads
+where formerly one or two only were
+available," easier gradients, good bridges
+instead of unreliable ones, etc. So that
+the march-discipline of that day when
+concentrated for battle, artillery and train
+<em>on</em> the roads, infantry and cavalry <em>by the
+side</em> of the roads, has disappeared. Such
+close concentration is therefore now not
+possible, as we move all arms <em>on</em> the road,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">215</a></span>
+and an army corps with train, or two
+without, is the most that we can now
+calculate on bringing into action in one
+day on one road.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Railways</span></h3>
+
+<p>"Railways have, above all, completely
+altered the term 'base,'" remarks V.
+Caemmerer. "Railways carry in a few
+days men, horses, vehicles, and materials
+of all kinds from the remotest district
+to any desired point of our country, and
+nobody would any longer think of accumulating
+enormous supplies of all kinds
+at certain fortified points on his own
+frontier with the object of basing himself
+on those points. One does not base one's
+self any longer on a distinct district
+which is specially prepared for that
+object, but upon the whole country,
+which has become one single magazine,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">216</a></span>
+with separate store-rooms. So the term
+'base' has now to be considered in this
+light."</p>
+
+<p>It is only when operating in savage
+or semi-savage countries, where there
+are no railways, that the old idea of a
+base applies.</p>
+
+<p>As we penetrate deeper and further
+from our own country into the enemy's,
+and as a small raiding party can demolish
+the railway line so as to stop all traffic
+for days or weeks, it becomes far more
+necessary than it ever was in Clausewitz's
+day to guard our communications. And
+armies become more and more sensitive
+to any attack upon their communications.</p>
+
+<p>Also "such a line cannot easily be
+changed, and consequently those celebrated
+changes of the line of communication
+in an enemy's country which
+Napoleon himself, on some occasion,
+declared to be the ablest man&oelig;uvre in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">217</a></span>
+the art of war, could scarcely be carried
+out any more" (V. Caemmerer).</p>
+
+<p>Also concentration by means of several
+railways demands a broad strategic front,
+which produces that separation of corps
+or armies which prepares the way for
+strategical envelopment, and so on.</p>
+
+<p>General von der Goltz, in his "Conduct
+of War," says: "The more recent
+treatises on the conduct of war on a
+large scale are principally taken up with
+the mobilization and strategical concentration
+of armies, a department of
+strategy which only began to play an
+important part in modern times. It is
+the result of a dense net-work of railways
+in Western Europe which has rendered
+it possible to mass large bodies of troops
+in a surprisingly brief time. Each Power
+tries to outdo its neighbours in this
+respect, ... which gives an opportunity
+to the strategical specialist to show off<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">218</a></span>
+his brilliant qualities.... Consequently
+it is now frequently assumed that the
+whole conduct of war is comprised in
+this one section of it." This over-estimate
+is of course an error, which, however,
+requires to be pointed out.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Telegraphs</span></h3>
+
+<p>The telegraph has very greatly reduced
+the danger of separation. The great
+advantage of the inner line in the day
+of Napoleon and of Clausewitz was that
+separated forces could only communicate
+by mounted messengers, so if the enemy
+got between them they could not communicate
+at all, nor act in concert.
+This the telegraph has completely altered,
+for as the field telegraph can now be laid
+as quickly as an army can advance, the
+most widely separated bodies of troops
+can every day arrange combined operations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">219</a></span>
+by telegraph through, if necessary,
+a point one hundred or four hundred
+miles in rear. So that to-day the chief
+advantage of the inner line has gone,
+while its chief disadvantage, the possibility
+of being surrounded, remains.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Maps</span></h3>
+
+<p>We now possess complete detailed Ordnance
+maps of every country in Europe,
+kept up to date by the latest alterations,
+whereas in the days of Clausewitz maps
+were of the very roughest character, and
+quite unreliable in comparison.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Improved Arms</span></h3>
+
+<p>Smokeless powder, quick-firing and
+long-ranging artillery and rifles, the infantry
+field of effective fire being ten
+times, the artillery five times what it
+was in Clausewitz's time, have all to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">220</a></span>
+borne in mind when reading the tactical
+part of his writings. In consequence,
+also, cover and the tactical use of ground
+are of far greater importance now than
+then, etc., etc., etc.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Aviation</span></h3>
+
+<p>The recent wonderful developments in
+aviation will obviously almost revolutionize
+"Information in War." To what
+extent, it is as yet impossible to say.
+Each year will teach us more.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Nation-in-Arms</span></h3>
+
+<p>The nation-in-arms as the common
+foundation of all armies (except our
+own), brought up by railways, vastly
+increases the numbers in a modern battle
+from what they were in Clausewitz's day.
+Compare Austerlitz, Dresden, Leipzig and
+Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">221</a></span>
+It should be so with us also, for as
+General von der Goltz says in "The
+Conduct of War": "The <span class="smcap smaller">BEST</span> military
+organization is that which renders available
+<span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> the intellectual and material
+resources of the country in event of war.
+<em>A State is not justified in trying to defend
+itself with only a portion of its strength,
+when the existence of the whole is at
+stake.</em>"</p>
+
+<p>In Great Britain the difference which
+the introduction of this nation-in-arms
+principle has made in our military strength
+compared with that of our future opponents,
+a difference relatively <span class="smcap smaller">FAR GREATER
+AGAINST US</span> than it was in Napoleon's
+and Clausewitz's day, is as yet hardly
+realized by the people, or by our statesmen.
+People forget the wastage of war,
+and the necessity for a constant flow of
+troops to repair that wastage. As Von
+der Goltz puts it: "It is characteristic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">222</a></span>
+of the strategical offensive that the foremost
+body of troops of an army, the
+portion which fights the battles, amounts
+to only a comparatively small fraction,
+frequently only <em>a quarter or even one-eighth</em>,
+of the total fighting strength
+employed, whilst the fate of the whole
+army throughout depends upon the success
+or failure of this fraction. <em>Attacking
+armies melt away like snow in the spring.</em>"
+To condense his remarks: "In spite of
+the most admirable discipline, the Prussian
+Guard Corps lost 5000 to 6000 men in
+the marches between the attack on St.
+Privat and the battle of Sedan." "Napoleon
+crossed the Niemen in 1812 with
+442,000 men, but reached Moscow only
+three months later with only 95,000."
+In the spring of 1810, the French crossed
+the Pyrenees with 400,000 men, but
+still Marshal Massena in the end only
+brought 45,000 men up to the lines of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">223</a></span>
+Torres Vedras, near Lisbon, where the
+decision lay. Again, in 1829, the Russians
+put 160,000 men in the field, but
+had barely 20,000 left when, at Adrianople,
+a skilfully concluded peace saved
+them before their weakness became apparent
+and a reaction set in. In 1878 the
+Russians led 460,000 across the Danube,
+but they only brought 100,000 men&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;of
+whom only 43,000 were effective, the
+rest being sick&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;to the gates of Constantinople.
+In 1870 the Germans crossed
+the French frontier with 372,000 men,
+but after only a six weeks' campaign
+brought but 171,000 men to Paris. And
+so on. The result of it all is simple&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;that
+a people which is not based on the
+modern principle of the nation-in-arms
+cannot for long rival or contend with
+one that is, for it can neither put an equal
+(still less a superior) army into the field
+at the outset (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vide</i> Clausewitz's first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">224</a></span>
+principle), nor even maintain in the field
+the <em>inferior</em> army it does place there,
+because it cannot send the ever-required
+fresh supplies of trained troops. Sooner
+or later this must tell. Sooner or later a
+situation must arise in which the nation
+based on the obsolete voluntary system
+<em>must</em> go down before a nation based on
+the nation-in-arms principle. Circumstances
+change with time, and, as wise
+Lord Bacon said long ago, "He that will
+not adopt new remedies must expect new
+evils." May we adopt the remedy before
+we experience the evil!</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Moral and Spiritual Forces in War</span></h3>
+
+<p>But though these changed conditions
+must, of course, <em>modify</em> Clausewitz's
+details in many important particulars,
+still (to complete our circle and leave off
+where we started) I repeat that, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">225</a></span>
+human nature never changes, and as
+the moral is to the physical as three to
+one in war, Clausewitz, as the great
+realistic and practical philosopher on the
+actual nature of war, as <em>the chief exponent
+of the moral and spiritual forces in war</em>,
+will ever remain invaluable in the study
+of war.</p>
+
+<p>Consider what unsurpassed opportunities
+he had for observing and reflecting
+on the influence of enthusiasm and
+passion, of resolution and boldness, of
+vacillation and weakness, of coolness and
+caution, of endurance and hardship, of
+patriotism and freedom, of ambition and
+of glory&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;on war, either by his own
+experience or by conversation with other
+equally experienced soldiers, during that
+long period of almost endless wars between
+1793 and 1815.</p>
+
+<p>The fervour and enthusiasm and boundless
+energy of the Revolution, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">226</a></span>
+drove the French forward, smashing
+everything before them, at the beginning;
+the ambition, military glory, plunder
+and greed, which animated them later
+on; the patriotism, religious and loyal
+devotion, and stern endurance, which
+nerved the Russian hosts then as now;
+that awful Moscow winter campaign,
+when human nature rose to its highest
+and sank to its lowest, when the extremes
+of heroic endurance and selfish callousness
+were visible side by side; the
+magnificent uprising of the spirit of
+liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression
+in Germany, which gave to the
+Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same
+driving force that revolutionary enthusiasm
+had formerly given to the French;
+the passing, therefore, in 1813 of the
+moral superiority, the greater driving
+force, from the French to the allies.
+Clausewitz saw all this; he conversed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">227</a></span>
+intimately with such men as Scharnhorst
+and Gneisenau, who saw and guided it,
+too. All his friends had seen it also.
+No wonder, then, that such an unexampled
+series of warlike phenomena
+deeply impressed his reflective mind with
+the supreme importance of the moral
+and spiritual factors in war.</p>
+
+<p>His opportunities for long-continued
+observation of warlike phenomena were
+far greater than those of any writer
+since his day, and it is to be hoped they
+will remain so. For we have no desire
+to see another series of wars such as the
+Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that
+there was then such a man as Clausewitz
+to sum up for us so simply and so clearly
+the accumulated experiences of those
+long, long years of carnage and devastation.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center smaller"><i>Printed by Hazell, Watson &amp; Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.</i></p>
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+<h2><a name="FOOTNOTES" id="FOOTNOTES">FOOTNOTES</a></h2>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> Book IV. Chap. 10.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_3" id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_4" id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> Book I. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_5" id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_6" id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> Summary of Instruction, p. 120.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_7" id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> Book II. Chap. 6.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_8" id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> Book II. Chap. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_9" id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_10" id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Book II. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_11" id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> Book II. Chap. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_12" id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> Book II. Chap. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_13" id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> Book II. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_14" id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_15" id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force
+the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable
+to submission.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_16" id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_17" id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_18" id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> Author's "Introduction."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_19" id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_20" id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> Book VII. Chap. 5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_21" id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> Book VII. Chap. 21.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_22" id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> Book VII. Chap. 21.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_23" id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_24" id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_25" id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_26" id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> Book I. Chap. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_27" id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> Book I. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_28" id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> Book I. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_29" id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> Book IV. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_30" id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_31" id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_32" id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_33" id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> Book III. Chap. 15.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_34" id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> Book VII. Chap. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_35" id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> Book I. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_36" id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> Book I. Chap. 5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_37" id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> Book I. Chap. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_38" id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> Book III. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_39" id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> Book III. Chaps. 16&ndash;18.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_40" id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> Book II. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_41" id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> Book III. Chap. 11.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_42" id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Book III. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_43" id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> Book V. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_44" id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> Book III. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_45" id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> Book VIII. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_46" id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> Book III. Chap. 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_47" id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> Book III. Chap. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_48" id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> Book III. Chap. 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_49" id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> Book III. Chap. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_50" id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> Book III. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_51" id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> Book III. Chap. 11.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_52" id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Book VI. Chap. 28.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_53" id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> Book V. Chap. 10.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_54" id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_55" id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> Book III. Chap. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_56" id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> Book I. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_57" id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_58" id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_59" id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_60" id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> Book I. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_61" id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> This warning as to the consequences of allowing
+information to be published freely which would be helpful
+to an enemy was written five years ago. In the
+present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and its
+loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the
+enemy of any helpful information, show that the lesson
+here insisted on has been learned.&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;Editor's Note.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_62" id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> Book IV. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_63" id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> Book IV. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_64" id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> "Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136&ndash;146.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_65" id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="fnanchor">65</a> Book IV. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_66" id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> Book VI. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_67" id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_68" id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> Book VI. Chap. 5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_69" id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_70" id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> Book VII. Chap. 15.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_71" id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_72" id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="fnanchor">72</a> Book VI. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_73" id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> Book VII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_74" id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> Book VII. Chap. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_75" id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="fnanchor">75</a> Book VII. Chap. 7.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="transnote">
+<h2><a name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber's Notes</a></h2>
+
+<p>Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
+preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p>
+
+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.</p>
+
+<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_133">133</a>: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44200 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #44200 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44200)
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Reality of War, by Stewart L. Murray
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Reality of War
+       A Companion to Clausewitz
+
+Author: Stewart L. Murray
+
+Editor: A. Hilliard Atteridge
+
+Release Date: November 17, 2013 [EBook #44200]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE REALITY OF WAR ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Charlie Howard and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE REALITY OF WAR
+
+
+
+
+  THE
+  REALITY OF WAR
+
+  A COMPANION
+  TO CLAUSEWITZ
+
+  BY
+  MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY
+  LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS
+
+  POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY
+  A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE
+
+  LONDON
+  HODDER AND STOUGHTON
+  WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.
+
+  HUGH REES, LTD.
+  5 REGENT STREET, S.W.
+
+
+  _Reprinted in 1914_
+
+
+
+
+EDITOR'S PREFACE
+
+
+Great books, the masterpieces of the special branch of knowledge with
+which they deal, are often very big books; and busy men, who have not
+unlimited time for reading, find it helpful to have some one who will
+give them a general summary of a famous writer's teaching, and point
+out the most important passages in which the author himself embodies
+the very essence of his argument.
+
+This is what Major Murray has done for the most important work on war
+that was ever written. He does not give a mere dry summary of its
+contents. He sets forth, in language so plain that even the civilian
+reader or the youngest soldier can read it with interest, the essence
+of the teaching of Clausewitz, and he embodies in his book the most
+striking passages of the original work. He adds to each section of his
+subject some useful criticisms, and at the end of the book he sums up
+the effect of recent changes on the practice of war.
+
+The book is a popular manual of the realities of war, which should be
+read not only by soldiers, but by every one who takes an intelligent
+interest in the great events of our time.
+
+As to the practical value of the writings of Clausewitz, it may be
+well to quote here the words of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, the Professor
+of Military History at Oxford, from his introduction to the original
+edition of Major Murray's work:
+
+"Clausewitz was a Prussian officer who first saw fighting as a boy in
+1793, and whose experience of war lasted until 1815, when the great
+war ended. He was then thirty-five and spent the next fifteen years in
+trying to clear his mind on the subject of war, which he did by writing
+a number of military histories and a systematic treatise 'On War.' At
+the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts into a parcel, hoping to work
+at them again on the conclusion of the duties for which he was ordered
+from home. A little more than a year later he died at Breslau of
+cholera, and the papers, to which he had never put the finishing touch,
+were afterwards published by his widow.
+
+"Part of the value of his work is due to the exceptional opportunities
+which he enjoyed. When the war of 1806 began he had long been the
+personal adjutant of one of the Prussian princes, and an intimate
+friend of Scharnhorst, who was probably the greatest of Napoleon's
+contemporaries. In the period of reorganization which followed
+the Peace of Tilsit he made the acquaintance of Gneisenau, and of
+almost all the officers who made their mark in the subsequent wars
+of liberation. During the years of preparation he was Scharnhorst's
+assistant, first in the Ministry of War and then on the General Staff.
+During the campaign of 1812 he served with the Russian army as a
+staff officer. Thus his experience during the four years of the Wars
+of Liberation was that of one who was continually behind the scenes,
+always in touch with the Governments and Generals, and therefore better
+able than any one not so favourably placed to see everything in its
+proper perspective, and to follow and appreciate the considerations
+which directed the decisions both of statesmen and of the commanders
+of armies. His personal character was of the finest mould, and his
+writings have the sincerity, the absence of which makes it so difficult
+to rely upon those of Napoleon.
+
+"The ultimate test of the value of books is time. When Clausewitz
+died, the two books on war which were thought the best were those of
+the Archduke Charles of Austria and General Jomini. To-day the book
+of Clausewitz, 'On War,' easily holds the first place. It is the
+least technical of all the great books on war; from beginning to end
+it is nothing but common sense applied to the subject, but for that
+reason it is the hardest to digest, because common sense or a man's
+natural instinctive judgment on any subject is exceedingly hard to
+analyse and put into words. An exceptionally gifted man can go through
+this process, but few can follow it for any length of time without a
+distinct effort.
+
+"Almost every good institution has arisen out of the effort to provide
+a remedy for some evil, but in the imperfection of human nature nearly
+every institution brings with it fresh evils, which in their turn have
+to be counteracted. The modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism
+and its belief in knowledge, has grafted the examination system upon
+every form of education from the lowest to the highest. The British
+army shares in the benefits and in the disadvantages of the system,
+of which, in the case of an officer, the danger to be guarded against
+is that it tends to accustom a man to rely rather on his memory than
+his intelligence, and to lean more on other people's thinking than on
+his own. Clausewitz aimed at producing the very opposite result. He
+does not offer specific solutions of the various problems of war lest
+officers, in moments when their business is to decide and to act,
+should be trying to recall his precepts instead of using their eyes and
+their wits. His purpose rather is to enable them to understand what war
+is. He believed that if a man had accustomed himself to think of war as
+it really is, had got to know the different elements which go to make
+it up, and to distinguish those that are important from those that are
+comparative trifles, he would be more likely to know of himself what
+to do in a given situation, and would be much less likely to confuse
+himself by trying to remember what some general, long since dead, did
+on some occasion in which after all the position was by no means the
+same as that in which he finds himself."
+
+What is said here of the soldier actually engaged in war, is true also
+even of the onlooker who takes a patriotic interest in the progress of
+a war in which his country is involved. Unless he has a clear idea of
+the real character of modern war, and the principles on which success
+or failure depend, he will be utterly unable to grasp the significance
+of the events of which he reads each day. And it is of real importance
+that in time of war every citizen should judge soundly the course of
+events, for opinion influences action, and public opinion is made up of
+the ideas of the units who compose the public. In this connection it is
+well to bear in mind a point that is often overlooked, a point on which
+Clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing passage--namely, the fact
+that one of the main objects of a nation waging war is to force the
+enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. This
+fact is sufficient proof of the importance of public opinion being
+well informed not only as to the course of events, but also as to the
+principles that give to these events their real significance.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+  CHAPTER I
+
+                                           PAGE
+  THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ                      3
+
+
+  CHAPTER II
+
+  THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN
+    POLICY AND WAR                           11
+
+
+  CHAPTER III
+
+  THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ                 23
+
+
+  CHAPTER IV
+
+  THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR         33
+
+
+  CHAPTER V
+
+  THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED
+    IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR                 47
+
+
+  CHAPTER VI
+
+  PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR                      65
+
+
+  CHAPTER VII
+
+  THE NATURE OF WAR                          79
+
+
+  CHAPTER VIII
+
+  WAR AS POLICY                             119
+
+
+  CHAPTER IX
+
+  STRATEGY                                  137
+
+
+  CHAPTER X
+
+  THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY                 161
+
+
+  CHAPTER XI
+
+  TACTICS                                   177
+
+
+  CHAPTER XII
+
+  CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ      213
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ
+
+
+In an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the British public in
+even the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that
+he was not a mere theorist or bookworm. The wide and varied experience
+which the British officer gradually gains in so many different parts
+of the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces
+a certain distrust of them. Also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly
+one of our national characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal to the
+British officer or civilian, a writer must be a practical soldier.
+
+Such was General Clausewitz: a practical soldier of very great
+experience in the long series of wars 1793 to 1815, and one present
+throughout that most awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian
+campaign in 1812.
+
+"General Karl von Clausewitz was born near Magdeburg in 1780, and
+entered the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in 1792. He served in the
+campaigns of 1793-1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he entered the military
+school at Berlin as an officer, and remained there till 1803. He here
+attracted the notice of Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served
+as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, was present at the
+battle of Jena, and saw that awful retreat which ended a fortnight
+later in the surrender at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured, he
+was sent into France as a prisoner till the end of the war." "On his
+return (in November, 1807) he was placed on General Scharnhorst's
+staff, and employed on the work then going on for the reorganization
+of the Prussian army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the Russian service,
+was employed on the general staff, and was thus able to gain much
+experience in the most gigantic of all the struggles of his time." "In
+the spring campaign of 1813 (battles of Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as
+a Russian officer, was attached to Blucher's staff; during the winter
+campaign he found employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count Walmoden,
+who fought against Davoust on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid action
+of the Goerde was entirely the result of his able dispositions. In 1815
+he again entered the Prussian service, and was chief-of-the-staff to
+the III. Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny formed the left of the
+line of battle, and at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's army." "In
+addition to this, we may say, considerable practical training (note,
+enormous and varied indeed compared to any obtainable in the present
+day), he also possessed a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of
+military history, and also an uncommonly clear perception of general
+history" (Von Caemmerer). After the Peace he was employed in a command
+on the Rhine. In 1818 he became major-general, and was made Director of
+the Military School at Berlin. Here he remained for some years. This
+was the chief period of his writings. As General von Caemmerer, in his
+"Development of Strategical Science," puts it: "This practical and
+experienced, and at the same time highly cultured soldier, feels now,
+in peaceful repose, as he himself confesses, the urgent need to develop
+and systematize the whole world of thought which occupies him, yet also
+resolves to keep secret till his death the fruit of his researches, in
+order that his soul, which is thirsting for _Truth_, may be safely and
+finally spared all temptations from subordinate considerations."
+
+In 1830 he was appointed Director of Artillery at Breslau, and, having
+no more time for writing, sealed up and put away his papers, unfinished
+as they were. In the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff to
+Field-Marshal Gneisenau's army. In the winter of that year war with
+France was considered imminent, and Clausewitz had prospects of acting
+as chief of the general staff of the Commander-in-Chief Gneisenau. He
+then drew up two plans for war with France, which bear the stamp of
+that practical knowledge of war and adaptation of means to ends which
+distinguish his writings.
+
+In the same year the war scare passed away, the army of Gneisenau was
+disbanded, and Clausewitz returned to Breslau, where after a few days
+he was seized with cholera, and died in November, 1831, aged only 51.
+
+His works were published after his death by his widow.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN POLICY AND WAR
+
+
+From the day of their publication until now the influence of the
+writings of Clausewitz has been steadily growing, till to-day it is
+impossible to over-estimate the extent of that influence upon modern
+military and political thought, especially in Germany. As General von
+Caemmerer, in his "Development of Strategical Science," says: "Karl
+von Clausewitz, the pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and the confidant
+of Gneisenau, is in Germany generally recognized as the most prominent
+theorist on war, as the real philosopher on war, to whom our famous
+victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training."
+
+Field-Marshal Moltke was "his most distinguished pupil," and adapted
+the teaching of Clausewitz to the conditions of to-day.
+
+General von der Goltz, in the introduction to his great work, "The
+Nation in Arms," thus describes the veneration which he inspires: "A
+military writer who, after Clausewitz, writes upon the subject of war,
+runs the risk of being likened to a poet who, after Goethe, attempts a
+_Faust_, or, after Shakespeare, a _Hamlet_. Everything important that
+can be told about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the
+works which that great military genius has left behind him. Although
+Clausewitz has himself described his book as being something as yet
+incomplete, this remark of his must be taken to mean that he, too,
+was subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits, and was forced to
+feel that all he attained lay far beneath his ideal. For us, who knew
+not what that ideal was, his labours are a complete work. I have,
+accordingly, not attempted to write anything new, or of universal
+applicability about the science of warfare, but have limited myself to
+turning my attention to the military operations of our own day." One
+can hardly imagine a stronger tribute of admiration.
+
+And, as Moltke was Clausewitz's most distinguished pupil, so also
+are all those trained in the school of Moltke pupils of Clausewitz,
+including the most eminent of modern German military writers, such as
+General von Blume, in his "Strategy"; Von der Goltz, in his "Nation in
+Arms" and "The Conduct of War," who trained the Turkish General Staff
+for the campaign of 1897 against Greece and the battle of Pharsalia,
+etc.; General von Boguslawski; General von Verdy du Vernois, the
+father of the study of Applied Tactics; General von Schlichting, in his
+"Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present"; General Meckel,
+who trained the Japanese Staff, etc., etc.
+
+We all remember the telegram sent to General Meckel by Marshal Oyama
+after the battle of Liao-yang: "We hope you are proud of your pupils."
+
+Some time ago, when asked to give a lecture at Aldershot to the
+officers of the 2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me that it would
+be very interesting, anxious as we all were then to know the causes
+of the wonderful Japanese efficiency and success, if I could obtain a
+pronouncement from General Meckel how far he had been influenced in his
+teaching by Clausewitz. My friend Herr von Donat did me the favour to
+write to General von Caemmerer and ask him if he could procure me such
+a pronouncement which I might publish. General Meckel, whose death both
+Japan and Germany have since had to mourn, most kindly consented, and
+I esteem it a great honour to be allowed to quote part of his letter.
+He said: "I, like every other German officer, have, consciously or
+unconsciously, instructed in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz is
+the _founder_ of that theory of war which resulted from the Napoleonic.
+I maintain that _every one_ who nowadays either makes or teaches war
+in a modern sense, bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if he is not
+conscious of it." This opinion of General Meckel, to whose training of
+the Japanese General Staff the success of the Japanese armies must be
+largely attributed, is most interesting. It is not possible to give a
+stronger or more up-to-date example of the magnitude of the influence
+of Clausewitz.
+
+In this connection I should like to make a short quotation from "The
+War in the Far East," by the _Times_ military correspondent. In his
+short but suggestive chapter on "Clausewitz in Manchuria" he says: "But
+as all save one of the great battles in Manchuria have been waged by
+the Japanese in close accordance with the spirit and almost the letter
+of Clausewitz's doctrine, and as the same battles have been fought by
+the Russians in absolute disregard of them (though his works had been
+translated into Russian by General Dragomiroff long before the war),
+it is certainly worth showing how reading and reflection may profit
+one army, and how the neglect of this respectable practice may ruin
+another." "Clausewitz in Manchuria"! That brings us up to date. It is a
+far cry for his influence to have reached, and triumphed.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers.
+We may be sure, therefore, that the influence of Clausewitz on the
+Continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than
+the realm of war. From this thought arise many reflections. It will be
+sufficient here to suggest one. I would suggest that we should regard
+every foreign statesman, especially in Germany, as, consciously or
+unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. That is to say, we should
+regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the
+most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable
+part of policy. He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse
+of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as
+commercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument
+of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied
+accordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches,
+but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his
+State. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation
+shall impose its will upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait
+and wait, to make "every imaginable preparation," and finally to let
+loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out
+with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a
+whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and
+compel submission to its will by force.
+
+To talk to such a man of "the evils of war," or of "the burden of
+armaments"; or to propose to him "disarmament" or "reduction of
+armed forces," and so forth can only appear to him as the result of
+"imperfect knowledge." He will not say so, but he will think so, and
+act accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man
+one can only say, "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he
+fall."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ
+
+
+The writings of Clausewitz are contained in nine volumes, published
+after his death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly on his three
+volumes "On War," which have been translated by Colonel J. J. Graham
+(the last edition edited by Colonel F. N. Maude, and published by
+Messrs. Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls them "a collection of
+materials," "a mass of conceptions not brought into form," and states
+that he intended to revise, and throw the whole into more complete
+shape.
+
+We must lament that he did not live to complete his revision. But,
+on the other hand, it is perhaps possible that this unfinished
+state is really an advantage, for it leaves us free to apply his
+great maxims and principles and mode of thought to the ever-varying
+conditions of the present and future, unhampered by too complete a
+crystallization of his ideas written before more modern conditions of
+railways, telegraphs, and rapid long-ranging arms of precision, etc.,
+arose. It is perhaps this unfinished state which renders Clausewitz
+so essentially in touch with, and a part of, the onward movement and
+evolution of military thought. For his great aim was "the truth, the
+whole truth, and nothing but the truth," without preconception or
+favour, as far as he could go--essentially "a realist" of war--and what
+better aim can we set before ourselves?
+
+As Sir Arthur Helps has so well put it in his "Friends in Council,"
+every man needs a sort of central stem for his reading and culture. I
+wish here to say why I think that Clausewitz is admirably adapted to
+form such a main stem in the military culture of British officers.
+
+In the first place there is a lofty sort of tone about his writings
+which one gradually realizes as one reads them, and which I will not
+attempt to describe further than by saying that they stamp themselves
+as the writings of a gentleman of fine character.
+
+In the second place it is a book which "any fellow" can read, for
+there is nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse or mathematical or
+formal, no formulæ or lines and angles and technical terms, such as in
+other writers, Jomini, Hamley, etc. Clausewitz is free from all such
+pedantries, which for my part, and I dare say for the part of many
+others, often "put one off" a book, and made one instinctively feel
+that there was something wrong, something unpractical about it, which
+rendered it hardly worth the sacrifice of time involved in its study.
+There is in Clausewitz nothing of that kind at all. All those lines and
+angles and formulæ he dismisses in a few pages as of little practical
+importance.
+
+In the third place Clausewitz only goes in for experience and the
+practical facts of war. As he somewhat poetically puts it, "The
+flowers of Speculation require to be cut down low near the ground of
+Experience, their proper soil."[1] He is the great apostle of human
+nature and character as being everything in war. "All war supposes
+human weakness, and against that it is directed."[2] I believe that the
+British officer will find himself in sympathy with the great thinker
+on war, who asserts that "_Of_ _all military virtues Energy in the
+conduct of Operations has always conduced most to glory and success of
+arms_."[3]
+
+In the fourth place, to the practical mind will appeal his denunciation
+of all elaborate plans, because _Time_ is required for all elaborate
+combinations, and Time is just the one thing that an active enemy
+will not give us,--and his consequent deduction that all plans must
+be of the simplest possible form. His famous sentence, "_In war all
+things are simple, but the simple are difficult_,"[4] gives the key
+to his writings, for to _overcome those simple yet great difficulties
+he regards as the art of war_, which can only be done by the military
+virtues of perseverance, energy, and boldness.
+
+In the fifth place he does not want men to be bookworms, for he says:
+
+"_Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations
+in which we can be placed in war_."[5] And we can all reflect, without
+reading too many books. Also he says: "Much reading of history is
+not required for the above object. The knowledge of a few separate
+battles, _in their details_, is more useful than a general knowledge of
+several campaigns. On this account it is more useful to read detailed
+narratives and journals than regular works of history."[6] He wants
+history in detail, not a general smattering and a loose application
+thereof, which fault he strongly denounces. And he expressly states
+that the history of the very latest war is the most useful. All of
+which is very practical, and in accord with what we feel to be true.
+
+As he pictures war, "_the struggle between the spiritual and moral
+forces_ on _both_ sides is the centre of all,"[7] and to this aspect
+of the subject he gives much more attention than Jomini and most of
+Jomini's disciples. He has freed us once for all from all formalism.
+The formation of character, careful, practical, detailed study, and
+thorough preparation in peace, the simplest plans carried out with the
+utmost perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness in war--these are
+the practical fruits of his teaching.
+
+Therefore, I say again, that I do not think that the British officer
+could possibly find a more interesting or a better guide for the main
+stem of his reading than Clausewitz, nor any one that will appeal
+to his practical instincts of what is _True_ half so well. I do not
+believe that he could possibly do better than with Clausewitz as
+main stem, and a detailed study of the latest campaigns and modern
+technicalities as the up-to-date addition required to transform
+knowledge into action. I trust that every reader of Clausewitz will
+agree with me in this.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR
+
+
+"Moltke, the most gifted pupil of Clausewitz," "Moltke, who knew
+Clausewitz's book well, and often liked to describe him as the
+theoretical instructor." As Chaucer would say, "What needeth wordes
+more?"
+
+Clausewitz has treated practically every chief branch of strategy
+and tactics (except, of course, the present-day developments of
+railways, telegraphs, quick-firing guns, smokeless powder, universal
+service armies, etc.). The whole of his bulky work "On War" is full
+of interesting and sometimes eloquent and almost poetical passages,
+of concentrated, pregnant, and far-reaching thoughts on every
+subject. Through all these it is, of course, impossible to follow
+him in any introduction. One can really do no more than urge all to
+read Clausewitz for themselves, to go to the fountain-head, to the
+master-work itself. In the short space to which I have restricted
+myself, I propose, therefore, to concentrate on a few of his leading
+ideas, reluctantly leaving out many others which are really almost just
+as good.
+
+
+THEORY AND PRACTICE
+
+One of the things for which we are most deeply indebted to Clausewitz
+is that he has shown us clearly the proper place of theory in relation
+to practice. "It should educate the mind of the future leader in
+war, or, rather, guide him in his _self-instruction_, but _not_
+accompany him on to the battlefield; just as a sensible tutor forms
+and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without therefore keeping
+him in leading-strings all his life."[8] Again, "In real action most
+men are guided by the tact of judgment, which hits the object more or
+less accurately, according as they possess more or less genius. This
+is the way in which all great generals have acted, and therein partly
+lay their greatness and their genius, in that they always hit upon what
+was right by this tact. Thus also it will always be in _action_, and
+so far this tact is amply sufficient. But when it is a question not of
+acting one's self, but of convincing others _in consultation_, then
+all depends upon clear conceptions and demonstrations and the inherent
+relations; and so little progress has been made in this respect that
+most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no
+firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion,
+or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle
+course really without any value. Clear ideas on these matters are not,
+therefore, wholly useless."[9]
+
+How true this is any one will admit who reflects for a moment upon
+the great diversity of opinions on almost every subject held in our
+army, just because of this want of a central theory common to all. In
+the domain of tactics it is evident that this holds good even as in
+strategy, for a common central theory of war will produce a more or
+less common way of looking at things, from which results more or less
+common action towards the attainment of the common object.
+
+
+REJECTION OF SET AND GEOMETRICAL THEORIES
+
+"It should educate the mind of the future leader in war" is what
+Clausewitz demands from a useful theory; but he most expressly and
+unreservedly rejects every attempt at a method "by which definite
+plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if
+from a machine."[10] He mocks at Bülow's including at first in the
+one term "base" all sorts of things, like the supply of the army, its
+reinforcements and equipments, the security of its communications with
+the home country, and lastly the security of its line of retreat, and
+then fixing the extent of the base, and finally fixing an angle for the
+extent of that base: "And all this was done merely to obtain a pure
+geometrical result utterly useless" (Von Caemmerer).
+
+For the same reason Jomini's principle of the Inner Line does not
+satisfy him, owing to its mere geometrical nature, although he right
+willingly acknowledges "that it rests on a sound foundation, on
+the truth that the combat is the only effectual means in war" (Von
+Caemmerer). All such attempts at theory seem to him therefore perfectly
+useless, "because they strive to work with fixed quantities, while in
+war everything is _uncertain_, and all considerations must reckon with
+all kinds of variable quantities; because they only consider _material_
+objects, while every action in war is saturated with _moral_ forces and
+effects; lastly, because they deal only with the action of _one_ party,
+while war is a constant reciprocal effect of _both_ parties" (Von
+Caemmerer).
+
+"Pity the warrior," says Clausewitz, "who is contented to crawl about
+in this beggardom of rules." "Pity the theory which sets itself in
+opposition to the mind"[11] (note, the moral forces).
+
+
+A THEORY TO BE PRACTICALLY USEFUL
+
+Clausewitz insists that a useful theory cannot be more than a thorough
+knowledge of military history and "reflection upon all the situations
+in which we can be placed in war." "What genius does must be just the
+best of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to show just how
+and why it is so." "It is an analytical investigation of the subject
+which leads to exact knowledge: and if brought to bear on the results
+of experience, which in our case would be military history, to a
+_thorough_ familiarity with it. If theory investigates the subjects
+which constitute war; if it separates more distinctly that which at
+first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the properties of
+the means; if it shows their probable effects; if it makes evident the
+nature of objects; _if it brings to bear all over the field of war the
+light of essentially critical investigation_,--then it has fulfilled
+the chief duties of its province. It becomes then a guide to him who
+wishes to make himself acquainted with war from books; it lights up the
+whole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his judgment,
+and shields him from error."[12]
+
+
+KNOWLEDGE MUST BE THOROUGH
+
+This Clausewitz considers most important. He says that "Knowledge of
+the conduct of war ... _must pass completely into the mind_, and almost
+cease to be something objective." For in war "The moral reaction, the
+ever-changing form of things makes it necessary for the chief actor
+to carry _in himself_ the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, in
+order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving
+the requisite decision _from himself_. Knowledge must, by this complete
+assimilation with his own mind and life, be converted into real power."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+So much for Clausewitz, therefore, as the greatest yet the simplest and
+least theoretical of theorists on war. Mark well his comforting dictum
+that "Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations
+in which we can be placed in war." That is a task which we have all
+more or less attempted. Therefore we are all more or less theorists.
+The only question is that of comparative "thoroughness" in our
+reflections. And it is essentially this "thoroughness" in investigation
+and reflection towards which Clausewitz helps us. Like every other
+habit, the _habit_ of military reflection gradually grows with use;
+till, fortified and strengthened by detailed knowledge, it gradually
+becomes Power.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+The theory of war is simple, and there is no reason why any man who
+chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or
+two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a
+fair knowledge thereof. He may with reasonable trouble attain to such
+knowledge of the theory of war as will enable him to follow with
+intelligent appreciation the discussions of experienced soldier or
+soldiers. Such knowledge as will prevent his misunderstanding the
+experienced soldier's argument from pure ignorance, and such knowledge
+as will enable him to understand the military reasons put forward and
+the military object proposed. To the opinion of such a man all respect
+will be due. Thus, and thus only.
+
+It is indeed the plain duty of all who aspire to rule either thus to
+qualify themselves to understand, or else to abstain from interference
+with, the military interests of the State.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR
+
+
+This point is here illustrated with more detail from Clausewitz than
+may seem necessary to some, because it is precisely the point regarding
+modern war which is least understood in this country.
+
+"The complete overthrow of the enemy is the natural end of the art of
+war." "As this idea must apply to both the belligerent parties, it
+must follow, that there can be no suspension in the military act, and
+peace cannot take place until one or other of the parties concerned is
+completely overthrown." This is what Clausewitz means by Absolute War,
+that is war carried to its absolute and logical conclusion with the
+utmost force, the utmost effort and the utmost energy. He then proceeds
+to show that war, owing "to all the natural inertia and friction of its
+parts, the whole of the inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation (or
+timidity) of the human mind," usually takes a weaker or less absolute
+form according to circumstances. "All this, theory must admit, but it
+is its duty to give the foremost place to the absolute form of war, and
+to use that form as a general point of direction." He then proceeds to
+show that war finally took its absolute form under Napoleon. To-day we
+may say that war takes its absolute form in the modern great national
+war, which is waged by each belligerent with the whole concentrated
+physical and mental power of the nation-in-arms.
+
+This requires to be gone into a little more in detail, for it is a
+most important point.
+
+Clausewitz in Book VIII. approaches this part of his subject by an
+historical survey of war from the time of the Roman Empire to that
+of Napoleon. He shows how as the feudal system gradually merged into
+the later monarchical States of Europe, armies gradually became less
+and less national, more and more mercenary. Omitting this, we arrive
+at the seventeenth century. He says: "The end of the seventeenth
+century, the time of Louis XIV., is to be regarded as the point in
+history at which the standing military power, such as it existed in the
+eighteenth century, reached its zenith. That military force was based
+on enlistment and money. States had organized themselves into complete
+unities; and the governments, by commuting the personal services of
+their subjects into money payments, had concentrated their whole power
+in their treasuries. Through the rapid strides in social improvements,
+and a more enlightened system of government, this power had become very
+great in comparison with what it had been. France appeared in the field
+with a standing army of a couple of hundred thousand men, and the other
+Powers in proportion."
+
+Armies were supported out of the Treasury, which the sovereign regarded
+partly as his privy purse, at least as a resource belonging to the
+Government, and not to the people. Relations with other States, except
+with respect to a few commercial subjects, mostly concerned only the
+interests of the Treasury or of the Government, not those of the
+people; at least ideas tended everywhere in that way. The Cabinets
+therefore looked upon themselves as the owners and administrators
+of large estates, which they were continually seeking to increase,
+without the tenants on those estates being particularly interested in
+this improvement.
+
+The people, therefore, who in the Tartar invasions were everything in
+war, who in the old republics and in the Middle Ages were of great
+consequence, were in the eighteenth century absolutely nothing directly.
+
+In this manner, in proportion as the Government separated itself more
+from the people, and regarded itself as the State, war became more and
+more exclusively a business of the Government, which it carried on
+by means of the money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds it could
+pick up in its own and neighbouring countries. The army was a State
+property, very expensive, and not to be lightly risked in battle.
+"In its signification war was only diplomacy somewhat intensified, a
+more vigorous way of negotiating, in which battles and sieges were
+substituted for diplomatic notes."
+
+"Plundering and devastating the enemy's country were no longer in
+accordance with the spirit of the age." "They were justly looked upon
+as unnecessary barbarity." "War, therefore, confined itself more and
+more, both as regards means and ends, to the army itself. The army,
+with its fortresses and some prepared positions, constituted a State in
+a State, within which the element of war slowly consumed itself. All
+Europe rejoiced at its taking this direction, and held it to be the
+necessary consequence of the spirit of progress."
+
+So think many in this country to-day. They are only a hundred years
+behind the times.
+
+"The plan of a war on the part of the State assuming the offensive in
+those times consisted generally in the conquest of one or other of the
+enemy's provinces; the plan of the defender was to prevent this. The
+plan of campaign was to take one or other of the enemy's fortresses, or
+to prevent one of our own being taken; it was only when a battle became
+unavoidable for this purpose that it was sought for and fought. Whoever
+fought a battle without this unavoidable necessity, from mere innate
+desire of gaining a victory, was reckoned a general with too much
+daring." For armies were too precious to be lightly risked. "Winter
+quarters, in which the mutual relations of the two parties almost
+entirely ceased, formed a distinct limit to the activity which was
+considered to belong to one campaign." "As long as war was universally
+conducted in this manner, all was considered to be in the most regular
+order." "Thus there was eminence and perfection of every kind, and
+even Field-Marshal Daun, to whom it was chiefly owing that Frederick
+the Great completely attained his object, and Maria Theresa completely
+failed in hers, notwithstanding that could still pass for a great
+general."
+
+Beyond this stage of military thought, many in this country have not
+yet advanced.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+"Thus matters stood when the French Revolution broke out; Austria
+and Prussia tried their diplomatic art of war; this very soon proved
+insufficient. Whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things,
+all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in 1793, such
+a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. War had
+suddenly become again an affair of the people, and that of a people
+numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself as a
+citizen of the State." "_By this participation of the people in the
+war_, instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural
+weight came into the scale. Henceforth the means available--the efforts
+which might be called forth--had no longer any definite limits; the
+energy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer any
+counterpoise, and consequently the danger to the adversary had risen to
+the extreme."
+
+If only our politicians could learn this old lesson of the French
+Revolution! For many, too many, of them appear to derive their ideas of
+war to-day from some dim reminiscent recollections of school histories
+of the wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
+
+To continue: "After all this was perfected by the hand of Bonaparte,
+this military power based on the strength of the whole nation, marched
+over Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly,
+that where it only encountered the old-fashioned armies the result was
+not doubtful for a moment.
+
+"A reaction, however, awoke in due time. In Spain the war became of
+itself an affair of the people." In Austria. In Russia. "In Germany
+Prussia rose up the first, made the war a national cause, and without
+either money or credit, and with a population reduced one-half, took
+the field with an army twice as strong as in 1806. The rest of Germany
+followed the example of Prussia sooner or later." "Thus it was that
+Germany and Russia, in the years 1813 and 1814, appeared against France
+with about a million of men."
+
+"Under these circumstances the energy thrown into the conduct of war
+was quite different." "In eight months the theatre of war was removed
+from the Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had to bow its head for the
+first time; and the redoubtable Bonaparte lay fettered on the ground."
+
+"Therefore, since the time of Bonaparte, war, through being, first on
+one side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has
+assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer
+to its real nature, to its absolute perfection. The means then called
+forth had no visible limit, the limit losing itself in the energy
+and enthusiasm of the Government and its subjects. By the extent of
+the means, and the wide field of possible results, as well as by
+the powerful excitement of feeling which prevailed, energy in the
+conduct of war was immensely increased; the object of its action was
+the downfall of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerless on
+the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop, or to come to any
+understanding with regard to the mutual objects of the contest.
+
+"Thus, therefore the element of war, freed from all conventional
+restrictions, broke loose with all its natural force. The cause was the
+participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this
+participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on
+the internal affairs of other countries, partly from the threatening
+attitude of the French towards all nations.
+
+"Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars
+hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the
+States, and, consequently, _will only take place on account of great
+interests closely affecting the people_, would be a difficult point to
+settle. But every one will agree with us that, at least, _Whenever
+great interests are in dispute_, mutual hostility will discharge itself
+in the same manner as it has done in our times."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+This is so true, that every war since the days of Clausewitz has made
+its truth more apparent. Since he wrote, the participation of the
+people in war has become, not a revolutionary fact, but an organized
+fact, an ordinary fact in the everyday life of nations. To-day every
+State except Great Britain, securely based on the system of the
+universal training of its sons to arms, stands ready to defend its
+interests with the whole concentrated power, physical, intellectual,
+and material, of its whole manhood. Consequently, European war,
+as Clausewitz foresaw, "will only take place on account of great
+interests closely affecting the people." The character of such war
+will be absolute, the object of its action will be the downfall of the
+foe, and not till the foe (be it Great Britain or not) lies powerless
+on the ground will it be supposed possible to stop. In the prosecution
+of such a national war the means available, the energy and the effort
+called forth, will be without limits. Such must be the conflicts of
+nations-in-arms.
+
+Yet, even now, so many years after Clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he
+himself stated, "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists
+and statesmen," the great transformation in the character of modern
+war, due to the participation of the people therein, has not yet been
+adequately realized by many men in this country _who ought to know_.
+It is earnestly to be hoped that they will endeavour to adjust their
+minds, as regards war, to the fact that we are living, not in the
+eighteenth century, but in the twentieth, and that they will consider
+that war has once for all become an affair of the people, that our
+opponents will be a people-in-arms, using the uttermost means of their
+whole manhood to crush us, and that disaster can only be prevented by a
+like utmost effort on our part, by an effort regardless of everything
+except self-preservation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR
+
+
+"War belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the
+province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is
+settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from
+others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to
+liken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and
+activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on
+its part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale.
+Besides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which
+its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of
+living creatures in their germs."[13]
+
+These conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of
+feeling that "even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate
+hatred of each other." It is an unpleasant fact for the philosopher,
+for the social reformer, to contemplate, but history repeats and
+repeats the lesson. Still more, "It is quite possible for such a state
+of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political
+motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact, a
+perfect explosion."
+
+"War is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its
+elements--hatred and animosity--which may be looked upon as blind
+instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free
+activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political
+instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.
+
+"The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second,
+more the general and his army; the third more the Government. _The
+passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence
+in the peoples._
+
+"These three tendencies are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject.
+A theory which would leave any one of them out of account would
+immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality,
+that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone."[14]
+
+Clausewitz is the great thinker, the great realist, the great
+philosopher of war. His aim was, free from all bias, to get at _the
+truth of things_. His view of war as a social act, as part of the
+intercourse of nations, so that occasional warlike struggles can no
+more be avoided than occasional commercial struggles, is a view which
+requires to be most carefully pondered over by every statesman. It
+is based upon the essential fundamental characteristics of human
+nature, which do not alter. It is not to be lightly set aside by
+declamation about the blessings of peace, the evils of war, the burden
+of armaments, and such-like sophistries. To submit without a struggle
+to injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in
+passionate human nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile
+people. It is indeed to be most sincerely hoped that _arbitration_
+will be resorted to more and more as a means of peacefully settling
+all non-vital causes of dispute. But arbitration has its limits. For
+_no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that
+it regards as absolutely vital_. The view of war, therefore, as a
+social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, with all that it
+implies, appears to be the only one which a statesman, however much he
+may regret the fact, can take. It has, therefore, been brought forward
+here at once, as it underlies the whole subject and is essential to all
+clear thought thereon.
+
+So much for the influence of Public Opinion in producing war. Now for
+its influence in and during war.
+
+"There are three principal objects in carrying on war," says Clausewitz.
+
+  "(_a_) To conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force.
+
+  "(_b_) To get possession of the material elements of aggression,
+  and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army.
+
+  "(_c_) _To gain Public Opinion._[15]
+
+"To attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be
+directed against the enemy's principal army, for it must be beaten
+before we can follow up the other two objects with success.
+
+"In order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against
+those points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated:
+principal towns, magazines, great fortresses. On the road to these the
+enemy's principal force, or a considerable part of his army, will be
+encountered.
+
+"Public Opinion is ultimately gained by great victories, and by the
+possession of the enemy's capital."[16]
+
+This almost prophetic (as it was in his day) recognition by Clausewitz
+of the vast importance of gaining Public Opinion _as one of the
+three great aims in war_, is fundamental. It is just one of those
+instances of his rare insight into the principles and development of
+modern national war which make his book of such great and enduring
+value to us. For since his day Europe has become organized into great
+industrial nations, democracy and popular passion have become more
+and more a force to be reckoned with, and the gaining and preserving
+of Public Opinion in war has become more and more important. It has,
+in fact, become the statesman's chief business during a great modern
+national war. It has become necessary for him to study intently war in
+its relation to industry, and to the industrial millions over whom he
+presides, or over whom he may preside.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in Britain were a nation of
+18,000,000, practically self-supporting, and governed by an
+aristocracy. To-day we are a crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent
+upon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw
+materials, for our trade, for our staying power, _and_ we are governed
+by a democracy. In a modern democratic State it will only be possible
+to carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships
+brought on the democracy by the war do not become intolerable. To
+prevent these hardships from thus becoming intolerable to the people,
+to Public Opinion, will be the task of the modern statesman during war,
+and this can only be done by wise prevision and timely preparation. _It
+requires the internal organization of the Industrial State for war._
+
+It appears to the _writer_ that internal organization can be subdivided
+as follows:--
+
+I. An adequate gold reserve.
+
+II. The protection of our ships carrying raw material, food, and
+exports during their passage on the high seas from the places of
+origin to the consumers: (A) by the few available cruisers which could
+be spared from the fighting fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well
+thought out and prepared scheme of national indemnity (_vide_ Blue Book
+thereon); (B) by insuring the distribution to the consumers of food
+and raw material, after it has arrived in the country, by preparing a
+thorough organization which would deal with the blocking of any of the
+principal ports of arrival, and by guarding the vulnerable points of
+our internal lines of communications to and from the shipping centres.
+
+III. Organization of Poor Law system to bring immediate relief by
+selling at peace price food to those unable to pay war prices owing to
+(A) normal poverty (7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works,
+due to effect of war on trade.
+
+Work and wages the State _must_ guarantee during modern war, and
+before the State _can_ guarantee these, it is absolutely necessary
+that it should satisfy itself that the above preparations are actually
+_in being_. This pre-supposes a more earnest study of the industrial
+effects of a great national war than has yet been given to the subject
+by our political leaders. For in the warfare of the present and future
+the importance of gaining and preserving Public Opinion, as pointed
+out by Clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. It is as fundamentally
+important _to safeguard our own Public Opinion as it is to attack,
+weaken, and gain over that of the enemy_. This has not yet passed
+the stage of thought. But good thoughts are no better than good dreams
+unless they be put into action. We are waiting for the statesman to DO
+it. There is no great difficulty.
+
+(2) In arousing the national spirit to the requisite height of
+patriotic self-denial and self-sacrifice, in elevating, preserving, and
+safe-guarding Public Opinion during a great national struggle, much
+may be hoped for from the patriotism of our Press. Only in fairness to
+those whose patriotism is self-originating and spontaneous, it must
+be made compulsory upon ALL, so that no journal may suffer loss of
+circulation or pecuniary injury thereby.
+
+(3) There lies a practical task immediately to the hand of our
+statesmen if they will seriously set themselves to the task of
+improving the _moral_ of our nation by reforming our education
+_curriculum_, on the leading principle that the moral is to the
+physical as three to one in life, and that therefore character-building
+must be its chief aim. Then they will do much towards strengthening
+us for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's idea of the gaining and
+preserving of our Public Opinion in War.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE NATURE OF WAR
+
+
+"It is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the
+whole, because it is particularly necessary that, in the consideration
+of any of the parts, the whole should be kept constantly in view. We
+shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by
+Publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a
+duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would
+conceive as a unit the countless numbers of duels which make up a
+war, we shall do so best by supposing two wrestlers. Each strives
+by physical force to throw his adversary, and thus to render him
+incapable of further resistance.
+
+"Violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and science in
+order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost
+imperceptible, and _hardly worth mentioning_, termed _usages of
+International Law_, accompany it without essentially impairing its
+power.
+
+"Violence, that is to say physical force, is therefore _the Means_;
+the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate
+_object_. In order to attain this object fully the enemy must first be
+disarmed: and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities
+in theory."[17]
+
+Now, "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful
+method of disarming and overcoming an adversary without causing great
+bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war.
+However plausible this may appear, _still it is an error which must
+be extirpated_, for in such dangerous things as war _the errors which
+proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_. As the
+use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the
+co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that _he who uses force
+unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed_, MUST
+_obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise_." "To
+introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation
+would be an absurdity." "We therefore repeat our proposition, that _War
+is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds_."
+
+
+THE POLITICAL NATURE OF WAR
+
+In endeavouring briefly to describe Clausewitz's method of looking at
+war, one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting
+a few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant
+passages. However, a selection must be made.
+
+I assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy,
+because that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical
+way of looking at things. This point of view is as necessary for
+the strategist as for the statesman, indeed for every man who would
+understand the nature of war. For otherwise it is impossible to
+understand the military conduct of many campaigns and battles, in which
+the political outweighed the military influence, and led to action
+incomprehensible almost from a purely military point of view. History
+is full of such examples.
+
+Clausewitz clearly lays down: "_War is only a continuation of State
+policy by other means._ This point of view being adhered to will
+introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and
+things will be more easily disentangled from each other."[18] "It
+is only thus that we can obtain a clear conception of war, for the
+political view is the _object_, war is the _means_, and the means
+must always include the object in our conception." "Each (nation or
+government) strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to
+its will."[19]
+
+Owing to the great importance of this point of view, so little
+understood in this country, I have devoted the next chapter to it
+alone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's view more in detail. We can,
+therefore, pass on for the present.
+
+
+THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY
+
+Secondly, I select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory,
+because that is essential in order to understand his division of all
+wars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be
+able to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating
+point, where reaction may set in.[20]
+
+"The conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his
+adversary completely. Often, in fact almost _universally, there is a
+culminating point of victory_. Experience shows this sufficiently."[21]
+As the attack or invasion progresses it becomes weaker even from its
+successes, from sieges or corps left to observe fortified places, from
+the troops required to guard the territory gained, and the lengthening
+line of communications, from the fact that we are removing further
+from our resource while the enemy is falling back upon and drawing
+nearer to his, from the danger of other States joining in to prevent
+the utter destruction of the defeated nation, from the rousing of
+the whole nation in extremity to save themselves by a people's war,
+from the slackening of effort in the victorious army itself, etc.,
+etc. Leoben, Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances of such a
+culminating point, and probably in the late Russo-Japanese war Harbin
+would have proved so, too, if peace had not intervened.
+
+Clausewitz continues: "It is necessary to know how far it (our
+preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and,
+instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster." He defines it as "_The
+point at which the offensive changes into the defensive_," and says,
+"to overstep this point is more than simply a useless expenditure of
+power yielding no further results, it is a _destructive_ step which
+causes reaction, and the reaction is, according to all experience,
+productive of most disproportionate effects."[22] The reader will find
+it an interesting exercise to search for this culminating point of
+victory in historical campaigns, and mark the result where it has been
+overstepped and where it has not been overstepped.
+
+
+THE TWO CLASSES OF WARS
+
+From this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the
+two classes into which Clausewitz divides all wars.
+
+"The two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the
+complete _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be that we aim at his
+destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to
+conclude peace on our terms; and, _next_, those in which our aim is
+merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either
+for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to
+account as matters for exchange in the settlement of Peace."[23]
+
+All wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the
+enemy, _i.e._ "unlimited object," or wars with a "limited object."
+In the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in
+accordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with
+the enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point
+of victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or
+beyond it. If the former--then the plan should be one with a "limited
+object," such as the Crimea, Manchuria, etc.; if the latter--then the
+plan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of
+Napoleon's campaigns, or the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as 1866,
+or 1870. As Clausewitz says: "_Now, the first, the grandest, and most
+decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is
+rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages_,
+not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which,
+by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. _This,
+therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical
+questions._"[24]
+
+In Clausewitz's two plans for war with France in 1831,[25] this
+difference is plain. In the first plan, he considered Prussia, Austria,
+the German Confederation, and Great Britain united as allies against
+France,--and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack
+by two armies, each of 300,000 men, one marching on Paris from Belgium,
+one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine. In the second plan the political
+conditions had meanwhile changed; Austria and Great Britain were
+doubtful, and Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if Prussia and
+the German Confederation alone could appear before Paris in sufficient
+strength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it
+would be permissible to venture even beyond Paris. So he proposed to
+limit the object to the conquest of Belgium, and to attack the French
+vigorously the moment they entered that country.
+
+Which strict limitation of the object within the means available to
+attain it is characteristic of Clausewitz's practical way of looking
+at things. In each plan, however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a
+decisive victory was to be adopted.
+
+
+PREPARATION FOR WAR
+
+The third place, in respect to its present-day importance, I assign to
+Clausewitz's clear statement that--
+
+"If we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then
+the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal
+classes, into such as are only _preparations for war_ and into _the war
+itself_. This distinction must also be made in theory."
+
+Nothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater
+honour peace preparations. Like his doctrine of the importance of
+gaining public opinion in war, it is one of those almost prophetic
+utterances which make Clausewitz the germ of modern military evolution.
+
+Clausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not, foresaw to a certain extent
+(probably owing to his employment in organizing the new Prussian
+short-service army after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the present day.
+And, since his time, the greater the forces which have to be prepared,
+the greater has become the value of preparation for war. It has been
+continually growing, till to-day it has obtained such overwhelming
+importance that one may almost say that a modern war is practically (or
+nearly so) decided _before_ war breaks out, according to which nation
+has made the greatest and most thorough peace preparations.
+
+Clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every imaginable preparation." We may
+nowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that
+that nation which is beaten in preparation is already beaten BEFORE
+the war breaks out.
+
+A failure to understand this fact is a fundamental error at the root
+of the idea of war as held by civilians, for many of them think that
+speeches are a substitute for preparations.
+
+It is plain that these three ideas of Clausewitz regarding the nature
+of war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an
+unlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace-time,
+are as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier, and require
+study and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part
+of the latter.
+
+
+FRICTION IN WAR
+
+I place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual
+war, of war in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war
+on paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the
+part of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway
+between the two.
+
+Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. He
+always looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction
+and the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be
+the chief characteristic of real war as distinguished from theoretical
+war or war on paper, it is chiefly this habit or mode of thought which
+makes his writings of such great and permanent value. It is also a
+habit which we ought sedulously to cultivate in ourselves.
+
+"_In war everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is
+difficult_,"[26] runs his famous saying. Why is the simplest thing
+difficult? Because of the friction of war. And how can that friction
+be minimized? Only by force of character, and the military virtues of
+discipline, perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. Hence the
+great emphasis which he always and everywhere lays upon character and
+these military virtues as the deciding factors in war.
+
+"_Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to
+that which distinguishes real war from war on paper_," he says. Each
+individual of the army "keeps up his own friction in all directions."
+"The danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it
+requires, augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the
+greatest causes of it."[27] "_This enormous friction is everywhere
+brought into contact with chance_, and thus facts take place
+upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being
+chance. As an instance of one such chance take the weather. Here the
+fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time,--a battery from
+firing, or a report from reaching the general. The rain (mud) prevents
+a battalion from arriving,--or the cavalry from charging effectively,
+because it had stuck fast in the heavy ground." And so on. Consider
+for examples the foggy mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau, the
+Katzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz, Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud
+of Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest, the mud of Manchuria.
+
+"_Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium._" "_The knowledge
+of friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in
+war_, which is required in a good general." "It is therefore this
+friction which makes that which appears easy in war so difficult in
+reality."[28] In considering any situation in war we must therefore
+always add to the known circumstances--friction.
+
+
+WAR ITSELF
+
+In Clausewitz's way of looking at war itself I assign at once the first
+place to his doctrine, "_The destruction of the enemy's military force
+is the leading principle of war_, and for the whole chapter of positive
+action _the direct way to the aim_."[29] This dictum, repeated in
+many different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. All the
+old theoretical ideas about threatening by manoeuvring, conquering by
+manoeuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manoeuvring, and so forth,
+in which his predecessors entangled strategy, and from which even the
+Archduke Charles and Jomini had not completely freed themselves, he
+brushes aside by "our assertion is that ONLY great tactical results can
+lead to great strategical results."[30] Thus he leads and concentrates
+our thoughts in strategy on the central idea of victory in battle,
+and frees us once for all from the obscuring veil of lines and angles
+and geometrical forms by which other writers have hidden that truth.
+"Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of
+overcoming and disarming an adversary without causing great bloodshed,
+and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However
+plausible this may appear, _it is an error which must be extirpated_,
+for, in such dangerous things as war, _the errors which spring from a
+spirit of benevolence are just the worst_."[31] For "he who uses force
+unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, _must_
+obtain the superiority if his adversary does not act likewise." And the
+"worst of all errors in wars" is still the idea of war too commonly
+held by civilians in this country, as witness the outcries which
+greeted every loss during the South African war, which shows how much
+Clausewitz is needed as a tonic to brace their minds to the reality.
+
+"War is an act of violence which in its application knows NO bounds."
+"Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed; if a bloody
+slaughter be a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more
+respect to war (for avoiding unnecessary war), but not for making the
+sword we wear blunt and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity,
+till some one steps in with a sword that is sharp, and lops off the
+arm from our body."
+
+
+SIMPLE PLANS
+
+The second place I assign to his doctrine of _the simplest plans_,
+because time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions,
+but "a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have _time_
+for wide-reaching skilful combination."[32] "By this it appears to us
+that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are
+complicated is conclusively shown."
+
+"We must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike," or the
+opponent will get his thrust in first.
+
+"Whenever this is the case, we must ourselves choose the shorter."
+"Therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by
+complicated plans, _we must always rather endeavour to be beforehand
+with him by the simplest and shortest_."
+
+
+STRATEGIC LINES
+
+The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between
+the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation,
+and lines of manoeuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in Jomini and his
+predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing
+a part,--for these Clausewitz has little respect. In his chapter on
+"The Geometrical Element,"[33] he says, "We therefore do not hesitate
+to regard it as an established truth that _in strategy more depends
+upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the
+form of the great lines by which they are connected_."[34] Of course
+he does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above
+sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. He
+therefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to
+the heart of things.
+
+
+FRICTION
+
+has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about
+its components.
+
+
+DANGER
+
+"An ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger.
+"Danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is
+necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under
+notice here."[35]
+
+
+BODILY EXERTION
+
+Clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on
+the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul."
+"Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction."[36]
+
+To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen the retreat from Moscow, the
+awful passage of the Beresina, and the battle of the nations round
+Leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. Had he not seen
+bodily exertion and hardship break up the Grand Army into a small horde
+of stragglers, and destroy the army of Kutusoff in almost an equal
+measure, in 1812, as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely
+break up the great army of Napoleon in 1813?
+
+As for the effects of bodily exertion on the mind, purpose, and
+resolution of the general, compare Benningsen at Eylau after thirty-six
+hours in the saddle, or Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost all the
+results of his victory.
+
+
+INFORMATION IN WAR
+
+"_The foundation of all our ideas and actions_," but "in a few words,
+_most reports are false_." "When in the thick of war itself one
+report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if
+these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of
+probability." In another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual
+uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he
+compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and
+groping uncertainly for one another.
+
+"These things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war
+and make it a _resistant medium for every activity_, we have designated
+danger, bodily exertion, information, and friction."[37] He never loses
+sight of this; it pervades everything he writes.
+
+
+THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL
+
+"And therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in
+this book are composed _half of physical, half of moral causes and
+effects_, and we might say that the physical are almost no more than
+the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real
+bright polished weapon."[38] Pages might be filled with extracts
+showing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader
+is already convinced of that. Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral
+is to the physical as three to one." Clausewitz regards all military
+questions from this point. His psychological attitude is what chiefly
+characterizes Clausewitz from all writers who came before him, and
+which makes his deductions so realistic, so interesting and so valuable
+for all who come after him.
+
+
+TENSION AND REST IN WAR
+
+In order not to weary the reader I will bring this chapter to a
+conclusion with one or two extracts relating to "tension and rest;
+the suspension of the act in warfare." This is explanatory of those
+frequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first
+sight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. These halts are
+due to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty,
+irresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc.
+
+In this connection one must remember that war is "a chain of battles
+all strung together, one of which always brings on another." But they
+seldom follow each other immediately; there is usually a certain
+pause between. As soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new
+combinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the
+next. Whilst these new combinations are being developed, or perhaps
+considered, there may be a greater or less suspension of the act, a
+longer or shorter halt in the forward movement. Then another spring
+forward. Clausewitz has a great many interesting things to say on this
+subject.[39]
+
+"If there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither
+party for the moment wills anything positive, there is _rest_, and for
+the moment equilibrium.... As soon as ever one of the parties proposes
+to himself a new positive object, and commences active steps towards
+it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy
+opposes this, there is _tension_ of the powers; this lasts until the
+decision takes place.... This decision, the foundation of which lies
+always in the battle-combinations which are made on each side, ... is
+followed by a movement in one or other direction."
+
+"It may so happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not only
+feel themselves too weak to attack, but are so in reality."
+
+"Wild as is the nature of war it still wears the claims of human
+weakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates
+dangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one."
+
+"If we cast a glance at military history in general, there we find
+so much the opposite of an incessant advance towards the aim, that
+_standing still_ and _doing nothing_ is quite plainly the _normal
+condition_ of an army in the midst of war, _acting_ the _exception_.
+This must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception.
+But if military history has this effect by the great body of its
+events, so also the latest series of wars redeem the view. The war of
+the French Revolution shows only too plainly its reality, and only
+proves too plainly its necessity. In that war, and especially in the
+campaigns of Bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited
+degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the
+element. This degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then
+it is necessary."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So that is how Clausewitz regards
+International Law, Clausewitz to whom in Germany "our most famous
+victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training,"
+and on whom "everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war
+bases himself, even if he is not conscious of it." And we must regard
+nearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a
+disciple of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time that we should
+cease to pin our faith on International Law, or think that it can in
+any way protect us, if we neglect strongly to protect ourselves. Power
+and expediency are the only rules that the practical politicians of
+foreign countries recognize, and the only question they ask themselves
+is, "Have we got sufficient power to do this," and if so, "Is it
+expedient to do it?"
+
+(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length
+of time? None whatever. For treaties are only considered binding as
+long as the interests of _both_ contracting parties remain the same.
+Directly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most
+solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia tore up the Treaty of Paris, or
+as Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history is full of torn-up
+treaties. And as it has been so it will be. The European waste-paper
+basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way,
+and a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste-paper basket
+is, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. Only
+in ourselves can we trust. Therefore no treaties at present existing
+should be allowed in any way to alter or lessen our preparations to
+enable us to fight _alone_ when necessary.
+
+(3) It cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted on, that the
+success or failure of a State policy is dependent upon the amount of
+armed force behind it. For upon the amount of armed force behind a
+policy depends the greater or less amount of resistance, of friction,
+which that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. The
+prestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength.
+The less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its
+rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have
+been prevented if its prestige, or armed force, had been greater. On
+the other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more
+reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. So
+that the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is, the
+more likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful
+compromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace.
+
+Therefore, under this consideration, those who would reduce our
+national forces are deeply mistaken, for such action would imperil our
+prestige, imperil our negotiations, imperil our peace, and perhaps lead
+eventually to a war that we might otherwise have avoided. Therefore
+no such deeply mistaken economy for us. A few hundred thousand pounds
+saved would be dear economy indeed if it led, as well it might, to the
+payment before many years of a War Indemnity of £800,000,000 or so.
+Better the evils we know than the far greater evils we know not of.
+
+(4) Surprise in war is what we have to fear. There are two sorts of
+national surprise that we must consider. These are (A) the _surprise
+by actual hostilities_ taking place before the actual declaration of
+war, such as the Japanese surprise and practical destruction of the
+fighting force of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; (B) the _surprise
+by superior preparation_, silently carried out till all is ready for a
+decisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defence,
+and then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly
+ready, as the surprise in this sense of France by Germany in 1870.
+
+(A) Every successful example is always copied, and usually on a larger
+scale. We may be quite certain that our rivals have taken to heart
+the lesson of Port Arthur. It is possible that our next war will open
+with a similar night attack on our fleet, either just before, or
+simultaneously with the declaration of war. If it is successful, or
+even partially successful, it may produce the most grave results, as in
+the Russo-Japanese War. It _may_ render possible a naval action with
+almost equal forces, in which our opponents _might_ be victorious. The
+invasion of this country on a gigantic scale by 300,000 men or more
+would then follow as a certainty. This is not a probability, but a
+possibility which requires to be kept in our view.
+
+(B) _The surprise by superior preparation_, as I term it, for want
+of a better name, is a danger to which we are peculiarly liable. As
+Lord Salisbury said, "The British constitution is a bad fighting
+machine," and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by
+the lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all
+that appertains to war. Hence they are always liable to oppose, as
+excessive, preparations which are in reality the minimum consistent
+with national safety. Consequently our preparations for war, controlled
+as they are by those who have no special knowledge of war, are always
+apt to be insufficient, as were those of France in 1870. In former
+days this did not perhaps so very much matter, although it resulted
+in the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of British lives and
+hundreds of millions of British treasure. But still we were able, at
+this somewhat excessive price, to "muddle through," owing to the heroic
+efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make bricks without straw and
+retrieve the mistakes of our policy. For our opponents then conducted
+war in such a slow way as to give us time to repair _after_ the
+outbreak of war our lack of preparation _before_ it. But opposed to a
+modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen and led by generals brought
+up in the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Moltke--all will be
+different. In such a war the national forces brought into play are so
+immense that it is only possible to do so efficaciously if everything
+has been most carefully prepared and organized beforehand. It is not
+_possible_ to improvise such organization of national force _after_
+the war has begun, for there cannot be sufficient time. If our rival
+makes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that
+war the _whole_ of its national force, material, moral, and physical,
+while we only prepare to bring to bear a _small portion_ thereof, then
+there will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. The
+war will be conducted with the utmost energy, and the aim will be to
+utilize to the utmost the superiority obtained by superior preparation,
+so as to make the decision as rapid as possible before we have time to
+recover from the effects of our surprise. That is the danger we have to
+fear, and to keep ever in mind.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+WAR AS POLICY
+
+
+"War," says Clausewitz, "is only a continuation of State policy by
+other means." The first question that at once arises in the mind is
+what is meant by Policy. We may safely lay down that State policy is
+the defence and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole
+amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards
+acquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. There
+can, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength
+or weakness, of success or failure, in the policy of a State.
+
+Clausewitz expressly stated that he hoped "to iron out many creases
+in the heads of strategists and statesmen," such, for instance, as
+the idea that it is possible to consider either policy or war as
+independent of the other.
+
+It is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy if we
+regard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes peace
+negotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to
+attain the political object.
+
+War is only a part of policy, a continuance of the previous
+negotiations; but the instrument is now the sword and not the pen. As
+Clausewitz says, "_In one word, the art of war, in its highest point
+of view, is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead
+of writing notes._" War is merely a means whereby a nation attempts
+to impose its will upon another nation in order to attain a political
+object. This object is settled by policy, which also orders the war,
+determines what sort of war it is to be, with what means and resources
+and expenditure it is to be waged, when its object has been attained,
+and when it is to cease. In fact, policy prepares, leads up to, orders,
+supports, guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz said, "_All the
+leading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet--that
+is, by a political, not a military functionary._"
+
+Unity of thought is only to be obtained by "the conception that
+war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means
+an independent thing in itself." "And how can we conceive it to be
+otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political
+relations between different nations and governments? Is not war
+merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts?"
+"Accordingly war can never be separated from political intercourse;
+and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way,
+all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent,
+broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object."
+
+"If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from
+policy. If the policy is grand and powerful, so will also be the war,
+and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its
+absolute form." "Only through this kind of view war recovers unity;
+only by it can we see _all_ wars of _one_ kind, and it is only through
+it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of
+view from which _great plans_ may be traced out and determined upon."
+
+"There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find
+out the _right_ point of view from which things should be looked at and
+judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend
+the mass of events in their unity from _one_ standpoint; and it is only
+the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency."
+"We can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests
+generally of the whole community," and "_wars are in reality only the
+expressions or manifestations of policy itself_."
+
+To the student of history this unity of conception is equally
+necessary, for it supplies the key to many a military puzzle. Without
+it we can never understand, for instance, Napoleon's conduct in
+1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can we see the compelling reason of
+many battles, apparently fought against military judgment, such, for
+instance, as Borodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have to remember that
+these and many other battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were fought
+from a political, not a military, motive. It is a well-known fact that
+the strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to
+suit overmastering political necessity. Yet many people have failed to
+draw therefrom the generalization of Clausewitz that "war is only a
+continuation of State policy by other means." But having got it now,
+let us hold fast to it, with all its consequences.
+
+
+SOME KNOWLEDGE OF WAR NECESSARY FOR STATESMEN
+
+"From this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things
+a necessary conflict between the political and military interests,
+and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as _imperfect
+knowledge_ only. That policy makes demands upon the war which it
+cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that _it knows
+the instrument it is going to use_, therefore contrary to a natural and
+_indispensable supposition_."
+
+"_None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made
+without an insight into the political relations_; and in reality when
+people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy
+on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different
+to what they intend. It is not this influence, but the policy itself
+which should be found fault with. If policy is right, if it succeeds
+in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war also with
+advantage; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the
+object, the cause is to be looked for in a mistaken policy.
+
+"It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain
+military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it
+can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes.
+Just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant
+sometimes says what he does not intend, _so policy, when intending
+right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views_.
+
+"_This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain
+knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of
+political intercourse._"
+
+
+THE WAR MINISTER
+
+"Before going further we must guard ourselves against a false
+interpretation of which this is very susceptible. We do not mean to
+say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the _principal_
+qualification for a war minister. Elevation, superiority of mind,
+strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he
+must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another."
+
+
+POLICY AND THE MEANS TO CARRY OUT THAT POLICY MUST HARMONIZE
+
+"_If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy
+to accommodate itself to the means available for war_, there is only
+one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are
+not combined in one person (note, as William of Orange, Frederick
+the Great, or Napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an
+_ex-officio_ member of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its
+councils and decisions on important occasions."
+
+"The influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the
+Cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous
+action."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+We shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding
+dicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree.
+
+Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to
+policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much
+as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy.
+
+Secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may
+be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of
+his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering,
+guiding, and controlling of war. As Clausewitz says, "it is an
+_indispensable supposition_ that policy knows the instrument it is
+going to use." It is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations
+between two States cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the
+political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued
+in another form--in the form of war. The statesman still retains
+control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his
+object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well
+as of the peaceful, policy of the nation.
+
+Thirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is
+theoretically allowable during the course of actual operations, _i.e._
+after the war has actually begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy
+should only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should
+keep clear during the actual operations. Clausewitz, however, holds
+that the two are so intimately related that the political influence
+cannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. Between two
+such authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and
+must seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly, in history policy often
+has really affected the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813, 1814,
+1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan, or Bismarck's interference to hurry
+on the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith in the Boer War, and in
+many other cases. That, we must admit. We must also admit that its
+interference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations.
+Clausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is
+wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle way rule appears to be this,
+that policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but
+during actual operations the statesman should exercise the greatest
+possible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded by
+_overwhelming political necessity_.
+
+Fourthly, a politician is bound to study war. He is bound to study war
+as well as diplomacy, his two instruments. If he only studies how to
+use one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed.
+It is plain that he MUST study war, so that he may not try to use an
+instrument of which he knows nothing. It is not meant, of course,
+that a politician should study all the details of naval and military
+matters, but only that he should study the general principles of war,
+and the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political
+object of war, through the submission of the enemy.
+
+Fifthly, in order that the object and the means of policy may
+harmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests
+are entrusted should study the principles of war, so that _he may keep
+his policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it_. That is to say,
+he must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely
+to be strongly opposed by another Power, unless he has from careful
+study and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at
+his disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his
+policy and declares war. He should not even consider a policy without
+_at the same time_ considering with his military and naval advisers the
+nation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. He must
+not think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do
+so, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give a
+reasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. Otherwise,
+
+Sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war
+will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall
+of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be Great Britain or not)
+lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as
+we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy,
+the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,--these points deserve the
+most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the
+destinies of the Anglo-Saxon Race.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+STRATEGY
+
+
+Clausewitz defines strategy as "_the use of the battle to gain the
+object of the war_." War is "a chain of battles all strung together,
+one of which always brings on another."[40] The great thing in strategy
+is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits.
+"_The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally;
+secondly, at the decisive point._"[41]
+
+"In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the
+most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be
+sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating
+circumstances. The direct result of all this is that the _greatest
+possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive
+point_.[42] Whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not,
+we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is
+_the first great principle of strategy_, as well suited for Greeks or
+Persians, or for Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French or Germans."
+
+It sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. How
+many generals have been ruined in consequence!
+
+
+SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR STRATEGIC CERTAINTY
+
+Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we may search modern military
+history in vain for a battle (except Leuthen or Rosbach) in which an
+army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no
+means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of
+modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception,
+that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in
+numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and
+when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon,
+Waterloo, he was beaten."[43] "From this we may infer, in the present
+state of Europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented
+general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now, if
+we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even
+the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small
+as well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but
+which need not be over _two to one_, will be sufficient to _ensure the
+victory_, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be."[44]
+
+The double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore,
+the ideal of strategy. "_The superiority of numbers is, therefore, to
+be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before
+all_, and as far as possible." If strategy has done this, then it has
+done its utmost duty. It is then for the tactician to make the most
+of this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory.
+Strategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to
+the altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the
+hostile armed force is destroyed.
+
+This _superiority of numbers_ in battle as the _first principle of
+strategy_ we require, on all occasions in season and out of season, to
+repeat and repeat. At present we have not the numbers we shall want. We
+must get them. Otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and
+"the best strategy" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for
+us. This rests with our statesmen.
+
+
+THE DECISIVE POINT
+
+If the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the
+decisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point?
+
+Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz. Jomini, even after Napoleon,
+confuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre
+of war, but Clausewitz clears the air by asserting only _one_.
+
+"But whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against
+which we are to direct our ultimate operations, _still the conquest and
+destruction of his army is the surest commencement_ and, _in all cases,
+the most essential_."[45]
+
+Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force is THERE
+is the decisive point, against which we must concentrate ALL our forces.
+
+"There are," said Napoleon, "many good generals in Europe, but they
+see too many things at one time. _As for me, I see only one thing, the
+enemy's chief army, and I concentrate all my efforts to destroy it._"
+
+
+THE SIMULTANEOUS USE OF ALL THE FORCES
+
+"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which we have been endeavouring to set
+forth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and
+destined for a strategic object should be _simultaneously_ applied
+to it. And this application will be all the more complete the more
+everything is compressed into one act and one moment."[46] This he
+calls "_the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in
+strategy_."[47] "In strategy we can never employ too many forces."[48]
+"What can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of force must be
+regarded in strategy as a means of giving expansion to success."
+"_No troops should be kept back as a strategic reserve_," but every
+available man hurried up to the first battlefield, fresh levies being
+meanwhile formed in rear. As an instance of what not to do, Prussia, in
+1806, kept back 45,000 men in Brandenburg and East Prussia; they might,
+if present at Jena, have turned defeat into victory, but they were
+useless afterwards.[49] A fault so often made may be made again.
+
+
+CONCENTRATION
+
+"It is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point," said
+Napoleon. To concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive
+point so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the
+enemy will be making a similar attempt. "The calculation of time and
+space appears the most essential thing to this end. But the calculation
+of time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of
+strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither
+the most difficult nor the most decisive one." "Much more frequently
+the relative superiority, that is the skilful assemblage of superior
+forces at the decisive point, has its foundation in the right
+appreciation of those points, in the judicious distribution which by
+that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in
+_the resolution to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the
+important_. In this respect Frederick the Great and Bonaparte are
+especially characteristic."[50]
+
+"There is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy than _to
+keep all the forces concentrated. No portion to be separated from the
+main body unless called away by some urgent necessity._ On this maxim
+we stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be depended upon."[51]
+
+"_The concentration of the whole force_ (_i.e._ within supporting
+distance) _should be the rule_, and _every separation or division is an
+exception which must be justified_."[52] Of course, this does not
+mean that all the troops are to be kept concentrated in one mass upon
+one road, but within supporting distance, for he expressly states, "_It
+is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of
+the action._"[53] This doctrine, qualified by the last sentence, makes
+Clausewitz the germ of modern military thought, for the last sentence
+leaves room for all the modern developments of new roads, railways,
+telegraphs, wire and wireless, and so forth.
+
+Therefore in war, according to Clausewitz, concentration,
+concentration, concentration, and _every division or detachment is an
+evil which can only be justified by urgent necessity_. Here again we
+find a simple truth, which, however, the history of all wars shows us
+to be very difficult to carry out. Hence the value of keeping such an
+imperative maxim always in our minds.
+
+
+THE FIRST PITCHED BATTLE
+
+"The more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as
+well as of every other contest, that he must and _will_ conquer, the
+more will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first
+battle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. Napoleon hardly
+ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at
+once in the first battle."[54]
+
+"_At the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the
+first battle_, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage
+to which no one would willingly expose himself, and also because the
+first decision, though not the only one, still will have the more
+influence on subsequent events the greater it is in itself."[1]
+
+"The law of the simultaneous use of the forces in strategy lets the
+principal result (which need not be the final one) take place almost
+always at the commencement of the great act."[55] A great victory thus
+won at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow
+us to carry out our own. The first pitched battle is, therefore, the
+crisis of the rival strategies, and towards its favourable decision
+all our preparations, all our forces, and all our energies should be
+directed. This is a point that civilians seem to find hard to grasp.
+Witness all our history, with inadequate forces at the beginning of
+every war, as even in the latest of our wars--that in South Africa. It
+is a point which our statesmen should very seriously consider.
+
+The difficulty of concentrating superior numbers for the first battle
+is that the enemy will be, or should be, of the same opinion, and will
+be making equal efforts to win the first battle. So, then, the crisis
+will be all the more acute, the battle greater, and the result greater.
+
+"_We would not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the
+crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's main force, is
+the first-born son of war._"[56]
+
+Till this is done, the first great victory gained, strategy should
+think of nothing else.
+
+Then, and only then, a further combination in accordance with the
+altered circumstances to win the next.
+
+"For we maintain that, with few exceptions, _the victory at the
+decisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor
+points_"[57] over the whole theatre of war. Therefore nothing else
+matters for long, and to victory in the first great battle "everything
+else must be sacrificed." For concentration can only be obtained by
+sacrifice.
+
+
+PURSUIT
+
+"Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about
+rest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only
+of pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the
+enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever
+else appears as a rallying point for the enemy."[58]
+
+Clausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel
+his exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requires GREAT
+force of WILL on the part of the equally exhausted commander. We need
+only remember that Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis of his fate,
+being physically tired, failed to pursue the allies after his victory
+at Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the fruits of his victory, and
+indeed his last chance of ultimate success.
+
+
+SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
+
+Leaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical
+thoughts, I hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at
+Clausewitz's admirable summary[59] of strategic principles:--
+
+"_The first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves
+is to employ_ ALL _the forces which we can make available with the_
+UTMOST ENERGY. Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it
+is extremely unwise not to make it _perfectly certain_.
+
+"_The second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible
+at the point where the_ DECISIVE _blow is to be struck. The success at
+that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points._
+
+"_The third principle is not to lose time. Rapidity and surprise are
+the most powerful elements of victory._
+
+"_Lastly, the fourth principle is to_ FOLLOW UP THE SUCCESS _we gain
+with the_ UTMOST ENERGY. _The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the
+only means of gathering up the fruits of victory._
+
+"The first of these principles is the foundation of all the others. _If
+we have followed the first principle, we can venture any length with
+regard to the three others without risking our all._ It gives the means
+of _continually creating new forces behind us_, and with new forces
+every disaster may be repaired. _In this, and not in going forward
+with timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise._"
+
+These great principles are everything in war, and "due regard being
+paid to these principles, the form (_i.e._ the geometrical element)
+in which the operations are carried on is in the end of little
+consequence."
+
+"Therefore I am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his
+powers to appear _incessantly with new masses_, whoever adopts _every
+imaginable means of preparation_, whoever _concentrates his force at
+the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with
+resolution and energy_, has done all that can be done in a general
+way for the strategical conduct of the war, and that, unless he is
+altogether unfortunate in battle, will undoubtedly be victorious in the
+same measure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and
+energy."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+When we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy
+firmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of
+our knowledge. For principles are no use unless we apply them. On
+consideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all
+apply these principles with advantage.
+
+I. It will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise
+to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about,
+to search for indications of their application in the strategy of each
+belligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to
+carry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded
+or failed, and the results of doing or not doing so. Also to search
+for the interaction of the political motive of the war on the military
+operations, and to see how far the belligerent statesmen gained or
+failed to gain their political object, according to the comparative
+degree of preparation they had made for it, and the magnitude of
+effort which they made or did not make to support it with the whole
+means of the nation, material, moral and physical. Also to see how
+far the national spirit was aroused or not, and the causes thereof,
+and to note the greater or less energy, resolution and boldness which
+was consequently infused into the war. Also to note how the thorough
+application of these great simple principles of strategy shortens the
+war and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to 1870), and how the neglect of
+them by statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards, lengthens a war
+and adds to its cost enormously (South Africa, etc.). Used thus, these
+principles give us a theoretically correct ground for criticism.
+
+II. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for
+anticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will
+be, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will
+direct those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness
+with which they will use them against us. It is an axiom always to
+assume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare
+accordingly.
+
+III. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for
+our own counter-preparations. We require to take the most dangerous war
+which is probable or possible, and make every imaginable preparation to
+carry out these principles therein.
+
+In such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals
+to win, and thus save the nation from the irreparable consequences
+and the huge war indemnity of £800,000,000 or so, which would follow
+defeat? How are we going to do it? How are we going to render it
+possible for our generals to employ the best strategy? The ideal of
+strategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers.
+How are we going to give our generals that? If we cannot do that,
+how are we going to give them even any superiority _at all_, so that
+they may be able to carry out the first principle of strategy? How?
+Or are we going to make NO _adequate preparations_ for these three
+eventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to
+save us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the
+impossible? It is in this way that a statesman should use these few
+great simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political
+object and safeguard the interests of the nation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY
+
+
+Now, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory of war is easy enough to
+understand. There is no reason--one might almost say no excuse--why
+every one, soldier or statesman, should not know it fairly well. The
+great leading principles of strategy are few and simple. There is no
+reason why every one, soldier and statesman, should not understand
+and know these few simple principles thoroughly, and have them at his
+finger ends ready to apply them to the consideration of any military
+question, past, present, or future. So far all is easy. But when it
+is a question of carrying out in actual war this easy theory, these
+simple strategical principles, then it is QUITE a different matter,
+then it is a matter of the very greatest difficulty. This is a
+difference which the mind always finds very hard to grasp, as witness
+the denunciations with which any failure in execution by a general, no
+matter how great the real difficulties with which he had to contend,
+is nearly always greeted. Observers rarely make allowances for these
+difficulties, very largely probably because they do not understand
+them. The present chapter is devoted to these difficulties of execution
+in war.
+
+
+THE GENIUS FOR WAR
+
+In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the genius for war"[60] he sets forth
+the difficulties which confront a general, the character and genius,
+the driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of
+war. It is impossible to abstract it adequately; I can only advise all
+to read it for themselves. But I will endeavour to give an idea of it.
+
+After discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general,
+physical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength
+of body and mind, the personal pride, the patriotism, the enthusiasm,
+etc., he comes to the unexpected.
+
+"_War_," he says, "_is the province of uncertainty. Three-fourths of
+those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden
+more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty._ Here, then, above
+all other, a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the
+truth by the tact of its judgment." Mark this point, that three-fourths
+of the things that we as critics AFTER the event know, when all
+information of the situation has been collected and published, were
+unknown to the general who had to decide, or only dimly guessed at from
+a number of contradictory reports.
+
+"From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, _this
+continual interposition of chance_." "Now, if he is to get safely
+through _this perpetual conflict with the unexpected_, two qualities
+are indispensable; in the first place _an understanding which, even
+in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces
+of inner light_, which _lead to the truth_, and then _the courage to
+follow this faint light_. The first is expressed by the French phrase
+_coup d'oeil_; the second is resolution."
+
+"Resolution is an _act of courage in face of responsibility_." "The
+forerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making plain the
+necessity of venturing and thus influencing the will. This quite
+peculiar direction of the mind, which conquers every other fear in man
+by the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes up resolution in
+strong minds."
+
+The vital importance of firmness and resolution, so strongly urged
+by Clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the
+strongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation
+in war. Compare, for instance, York _v._ Wartenburg's masterly
+exposition of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation in 1813 at
+Dresden.
+
+Also there is required "_the power of listening to reason in the midst
+of the most intense excitement_, in the storm of the most violent
+passions."
+
+"But to keep to the result of by-gone reflections in opposition to the
+stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it, is
+just THE difficulty." "Here nothing else can help us but an imperative
+maxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that maxim
+is, _in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to
+give it up till a clear conviction forces us to do so_."
+
+"But as soon as difficulties arise, and that must always happen
+when great results are at stake, then the machine, the army itself,
+begins to offer a sort of passive resistance, and to overcome this
+the commander must have great force of will." Driving power, such as
+Napoleon's. And also "the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice,
+which the commander has to contend with in himself."
+
+"These are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of
+the commander have to contend with and OVERCOME, if he is to make his
+name illustrious." If he is to prevent the downfall of his country.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+(1) In connection with these difficulties I would like to put forward a
+suggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though
+not exactly Clausewitz's, is a corollary from Clausewitz. It is this.
+In reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history
+nearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of
+one or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in
+the previous chapter. But we must assume that the defeated general was
+_familiar_ with that principle, and that his _will_ was to carry it
+out. What, then, were the difficulties, the friction, which, on any
+particular day or days, overcame his will and made him sacrifice the
+principle? This is where most critics fail us. Here seems the matter
+to search for. And could a stronger resolution have enabled him to
+overcome those difficulties, that friction? And if so, how and by what
+means? But we must first discover the difficulties and uncertainties
+of the particular day when his will gave way. Take the Manchurian
+campaign as an instance. If we could only have a military history of
+the campaign of 1870 or that of Manchuria, written in the form of a
+series of "appreciations of the situation," so that we know nothing but
+what the general knew at the time as we read, and if the true state of
+affairs could be withheld from us till the end, this, I think, would
+be very instructive and helpful. It would be a more difficult way of
+writing a military history, but I think that the extra trouble would be
+repaid by the extra value. So at least it appears.
+
+(2) If we reflect upon the enormous difficulties, so strikingly
+brought out by Clausewitz, which _our_ generals have to contend with
+and _overcome_ in actual war, it should surely teach us to curb our
+criticism. It should surely also make us resolve in future to try to
+aid them as far as is in our power at home, and not thoughtlessly to
+increase their already stupendous burdens. In the past we at home have
+much to accuse ourselves of, much to regret. In the past often have
+we added to the difficulties of our generals, often have we greatly
+weakened their chances, and increased those of their opponents, often
+have we, unintentionally, through ignorance cast a weight into the
+scale against our country.
+
+(3) The ignorance of the public regarding the conduct of war
+constitutes for us a very serious national danger. If this ignorance
+were less pronounced, if our statesmen understood the vast importance
+of information to the enemy, and the equal importance to our generals
+that this information the enemy should NOT obtain, then the public
+craving for information regarding every detail of what occurs in
+the field, and the demand for the wide publication thereof, would
+certainly be repressed. Nothing occurs in any of our campaigns which
+is not immediately made known; reports of actions with the fullest
+details as to the troops engaged, and the casualties that have befallen
+them, appear in the columns of the Press within a few hours of their
+occurrence. _Any efforts, therefore, of our generals_ in the field
+to maintain _secrecy as to strength, intentions, and movements are
+deliberately_, though probably unintentionally, _counteracted by
+their own countrymen_. This is due to pure ignorance of war, no doubt,
+but the effect of this ignorance is as bad as if it were due to evil
+intention. In fairness, however, we must admit that, in the past, the
+immense value of reticence has not been fully appreciated by some of
+our soldiers themselves, and it were well if, in the future, more
+attention were directed to the importance of secrecy.
+
+The results of such almost criminal stupidity may not be apparent
+when we are fighting with a savage foe, but if we ever have, as we
+undoubtedly some day shall have, the misfortune to find ourselves
+engaged with a civilized Power, we may be certain that not only will
+the operations be indefinitely prolonged, _and their cost enormously
+increased_, but their successful issue will be for us highly
+problematical.
+
+In this connection it must be remembered that every Great Power has
+secret agents in every country, including Great Britain, and that it
+will be easy for such a secret agent to telegraph in cypher or in
+some agreed code to an agent in a neutral State all war information
+published here, who will telegraph it on at once to the hostile
+general, who will thus get, within a very short time of its publication
+in London, perhaps just exactly the information he requires to clear up
+the strategical or tactical situation for him, and enable him to defeat
+the combinations of our generals. As a case in point, take Macmahon's
+march on Sedan to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy was absolutely
+necessary for success, but which became known to the Germans by the
+English newspapers.--Result, Sedan.
+
+That this cannot be allowed is plain. It is believed that the
+patriotism of our Press will welcome any necessary measure to this end
+if it is made compulsory upon ALL.[61]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+TACTICS
+
+
+Some will probably feel inclined to ask what Clausewitz, who wrote more
+than eighty years ago, can possibly have to say about tactics which can
+be valuable in the twentieth century.
+
+It was said by Napoleon that tactics change every ten years, according,
+of course, to the progress of technicalities, etc. Weapons indeed
+change, but there is one thing that never changes, and that is human
+nature. The most important thing in tactics, the man behind the gun,
+never alters; in his heart and feelings, his strength and weakness, he
+is always much the same.
+
+Therefore, Clausewitz's tactical deductions, founded on the immense
+and varied data supplied by the desperate and long-continued fighting
+of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, permeated as they are by his
+all-pervading psychological or moral view, can never lose their value
+to us.
+
+It is true, no doubt, that our rifles of to-day can be used with
+effect at a distance ten times as great as the old smooth bores of
+Clausewitz's day, our shrapnel five times as far as his cannon, and
+that cover and ground play a far more important part now than then, and
+so on. All these things, of course, considerably modify the tactics of
+Clausewitz. Not so much, however, as some text-books would lead us to
+suppose, which always seem to assume clear ground and clear weather.
+For, after all, how many combats are fought on ground where there is
+a very restricted field of fire (_vide_ Herbert's "Defence of Plevna,"
+etc.), or at night? How many battles are fought during rain, or snow,
+or mist, or fog, which destroys all long range? Compare the tremendous
+fighting with "bullets, bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and even
+fists," of Nogi's attempt to cut the Russian line of retreat at Mukden,
+with the hand-to-hand fighting of Eylau, Friedland, Borodino, or with
+the desperate efforts of the French in 1812 to open their line of
+retreat through Maro-Jaroslawitz, where all day the masses of troops
+fought hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town was taken and retaken
+seven times, and the rival nations fought with the bayonet in the midst
+of the burning houses" (Alison).
+
+When it comes to push of pike, as in all great decisions between
+equally resolute adversaries it is bound to do, the difference between
+the fighting of Clausewitz's day and ours is but small. The most recent
+instances of all, the hand-to-hand fighting in Manchuria, take us back
+to the Napoleonic struggles.
+
+Therefore, despite the eighty years that have intervened, the writings
+of Clausewitz are still valuable from a tactical point of view, always
+considering of course the difference in weapons, because of the human
+heart in battle.
+
+His ideas on tactics have largely filtered through his German pupils
+into our textbooks, minus the psychological or moral note, so that it
+is not necessary to go at length into the subject, or give a number of
+extracts. It would be wearisome. I will, however, give a few passages
+at haphazard as illustrations.
+
+
+FLANK ATTACKS
+
+The endeavour to gain the enemy's line of retreat, and protect our own,
+on which so much learned erudition has been spent by various writers,
+he regards as a NATURAL instinct, which will ALWAYS produce itself both
+in generals and subalterns.
+
+"From this arises, in the whole conduct of war, and especially in great
+and small combats, a PERFECT INSTINCT, which is the security of our
+own line of retreat and the seizure of the enemy's; this follows from
+the conception of victory, which, as we have seen, is something beyond
+mere slaughter. In this effort we see, therefore, the FIRST immediate
+purpose in the combat, and one which is quite universal. No combat
+is _imaginable_ in which this effort, either in its double or single
+form, is not to go hand in hand with the plain and simple stroke of
+force. Even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon the enemy
+without thinking of its line of retreat, and in most cases it will have
+an eye upon that of the enemy."[62] "This is a great _natural law_ of
+the combat," "and so becomes the pivot upon which ALL strategical and
+tactical manoeuvres turn."
+
+
+RESERVES--DESTRUCTIVE AND DECISIVE ACT
+
+The combat he regards as settled by whoever has the preponderance of
+moral force at the end; that is, in fresh or only partly used up troops.
+
+The combat itself he divides into a destructive and a decisive act.
+During the long destructive act, or period of fire preparation, the
+troops engaged gradually wear each other out, and gradually almost
+cease to count as factors in the decision. "After a fire combat of
+some hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe
+losses--for instance, a quarter or one-third of its numbers--the
+_débris_ may for the time be looked upon as a heap of cinders. For the
+men are physically exhausted; they have spent their ammunition; many
+have left the field with the wounded, though not themselves wounded
+(compare, for instance, Eylau and the 1870 battles); the rest think
+they have done their part for the day, and if they get beyond the
+sphere of danger, do not willingly return to it. The feeling of courage
+with which they originally started has had the edge taken off, the
+longing for the fight is satisfied, the original organization is partly
+destroyed, and the formations broken up."
+
+"So that the amount of moral force lost may be estimated by the amount
+of the Reserves used up, almost as with a foot rule."[63]
+
+This goes on till, "In all probability, only the untouched reserve and
+some troops which, though they have been in action, have suffered very
+little, are in reality to be regarded as serviceable, and the remainder
+(perhaps four-sixths) may be looked upon for the present as a "caput
+mortuum."
+
+Therefore the art of the commander he regards as "economy of force"
+during the destructive period; that is, to employ as few troops as
+possible, by taking advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to use a smaller
+number of men in the combat with firearms than the enemy employs," so
+that a smaller proportionate number of his own are reduced to a "heap
+of cinders" and more are left, more moral force, for the decision.
+
+"Hundreds of times," he says, "a line of fire has maintained its own
+against one twice its strength" (_e.g._ the Boers).
+
+To do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect demands very skilful
+handling of the troops, both on the part of the chief and subordinate
+leaders.
+
+With the preponderance thus obtained the commander at last starts the
+decision. "Towards the close of a battle the line of retreat is always
+regarded with increased jealousy, therefore a threat against that
+line is always a potent means of bringing on the decision (Liao-yang,
+Mukden). On that account, when circumstances permit, the plan of battle
+will be aimed at that point from the very first." Or, "If this wear and
+tear and exhaustion of the forces has reached a certain pitch, then a
+rapid advance in concentrated masses on one side against the line of
+battle of the other" (_i.e._ the Napoleonic breaking the centre, of
+recent years thought almost hopeless, but revived in Manchuria with
+success, in the case of Nodzu breaking the centre at Mukden).
+
+From what precedes it is evident that, as in the preparatory acts, the
+utmost economy of forces must prevail, so in the decisive act to win
+the mastery through _numbers_ must be the ruling idea.
+
+Just as in the preparatory acts endurance, firmness and coolness are
+the first qualities, so in the decisive act boldness and fiery spirit
+must predominate.
+
+"The difference between these two acts will never be completely lost as
+respects the whole."
+
+"This is the way in which our view is to be understood; then, on the
+one hand, it will not come short of the reality, and on the other
+it will direct the attention of the leader of a combat (be it great
+or small, partial or general) to giving each of the two acts of
+activity its due share, so that there may be neither precipitation nor
+negligence.
+
+"_Precipitation_ there will be if space and time are not allowed
+for the destructive act. _Negligence_ in general there will be if
+a complete decision does not take place, either from want of moral
+courage or from a wrong view of the situation."[64]
+
+
+DURATION OF THE COMBAT
+
+"Even the resistance of an ordinary division of 8,000 or 10,000 men
+of all arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably superior in
+numbers, will last several hours, if the advantages of country are not
+too preponderating. And if the enemy is only a little or not at all
+superior in numbers, the combat will last half a day. A corps of three
+or four divisions will prolong it to double that time; an army of
+80,000 or 100,000 men to three or four times." "These calculations are
+the result of experience."[65]
+
+As General von Caemmerer points out, if these calculations were adhered
+to in present-day German manoeuvres, as they are now in all war games,
+tactical exercises, and staff rides, the dangerous dualism of their
+training, the difference between theory and manoeuvre practice, would
+cease.
+
+
+ATTACK AND DEFENCE
+
+I have left to the last the consideration of three or four disputed
+points in Clausewitz. In considering these I shall quote a good deal
+from General von Caemmerer's "Development of Strategical Science,"
+as in such matters it is best to quote the most recent authors of
+established reputation.
+
+The most important of these, and the most disputed, is Clausewitz's
+famous dictum that "the defensive is the stronger form of making war."
+"The defence is the stronger form of war with a negative object; the
+attack is the weaker form with a positive object."[66]
+
+General von Caemmerer says, "It is strange, we Germans look upon
+Clausewitz as indisputably the deepest and acutest thinker upon the
+subject of war; the beneficial effect of his intellectual labours is
+universally recognized and highly appreciated; but the more or less
+keen opposition against this sentence never ceases. And yet that
+sentence can as little be cut out of his work 'On War' as the heart out
+of a man. Our most distinguished and prominent military writers are
+here at variance with Clausewitz.
+
+"Now, of course, I do not here propose to go into such a controversy.
+I only wish to point out that Clausewitz, in saying this, only meant
+the defensive-offensive, the form in which he always regards it, both
+strategically and technically, in oft-repeated explanations all through
+his works. For instance--
+
+"It is a FIRST maxim NEVER to remain perfectly passive, but to fall
+upon the enemy in front and flank, even when he is in the act of making
+an attack upon us."[67]
+
+And again--
+
+"_A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword
+of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive._ He who
+does not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who
+does not from the first include this transition in his idea of the
+defensive, will never understand its superiority as a form of war."[68]
+Von Caemmerer comments thus: "And this conception of the defence
+by Clausewitz has become part and parcel of our army--everywhere,
+strategically and tactically, he who has been forced into a defensive
+attitude at once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack. I am thus
+unable to see how the way in which Clausewitz has contrasted Attack
+and Defence could in any way paralyse the spirit of enterprise." Von
+Caemmerer also justly remarks that, as Clausewitz always insisted
+both in strategy and tactics, neither Attack nor Defence is pure, but
+oscillates between the two forms; and as the Attack is frequently
+temporarily reduced to defend itself, and also as no nation can be sure
+of never being invaded by a superior coalition, it is most desirable
+to encourage a belief in the strength of the Defence, if properly used.
+In this I think that Wellington would probably have agreed. Certainly
+Austerlitz and Waterloo were examples of battles such as Clausewitz
+preferred.
+
+Still, one must admit that Clausewitz's chapter on "The Relations
+of the Offensive and Defensive to each other in Tactics," Book VII.
+Chapter 2, is the least convincing chapter of his work.
+
+Strategically, the argument is stronger. It always seems to me that we
+must remember that Clausewitz had taken part in the defensive-offensive
+in its strongest, most absolute and unlimited form, on the greatest
+possible scale--the Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated before
+a single flake of snow fell) of the Grand Army. If he had lived to
+complete the revision of his works, it always seems to me that he
+would have made his theory undeniable by stating that the defensive is
+the strongest form of war, _if unlimited by space_. What, for instance,
+would have happened if the Japanese had tried to march through Siberia
+on to St. Petersburg?
+
+But, after all, which of the two is absolutely the stronger form of
+war, attack or defence, is merely a theoretical abstraction, for,
+practically, the choice is always settled for us by the pressing
+necessity of circumstances. And, in this connection, let us always bear
+in mind Clausewitz's dictum: "A swift and vigorous assumption of the
+offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point
+in the defensive."
+
+
+THE INNER LINE
+
+A second disputed point is Clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule,
+for the Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary to remember that
+that was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and
+telegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting
+on concentric lines. And he is not in any way wedded to the Inner Line,
+like Jomini, but _only_ when circumstances are favourable. He has many
+sentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and
+telegraph days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most distinguished
+pupil, would have aimed at envelopment as a rule. For to bring up
+troops rapidly by several railways necessitates a broad strategic
+front, and Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity as his second great
+principle, and says--
+
+"If the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss
+of time, and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too
+great, then the same may be justifiable on these grounds; for _to
+effect an unnecessary concentration of the forces_ would be contrary
+to the second principle we have laid down (_i.e._ 'to act as swiftly
+as possible')."[69] Also: "Such separation into several columns as is
+absolutely necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the
+tactical attack in the enveloping form, _for that form is natural to
+the attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason_."[70]
+Also: "_It is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during
+the action._" So that while the conditions of his time led Clausewitz
+to prefer close concentration and the Inner Line, like Napoleon,
+yet his reflections led him to propound the germ of the strategy of
+Moltke. Substitute for Clausewitz's close concentration this: "As
+close concentration, the combined movements regulated by telegraph,
+as is compatible with the utmost use of the railways and the greatest
+rapidity" (as he would certainly have said), and we arrive at Moltke's
+strategy.
+
+
+FRONTAL ATTACKS
+
+A third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical
+efficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic method
+of breaking the enemy's line in the centre. Breaking the line by a
+frontal attack was, of course, much easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic
+day than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only
+natural that Clausewitz in his writings should give it the full
+tactical importance which it then deserved. His book would not be true
+to the tactical conditions of his day had he not done so, with Rivoli,
+Austerlitz, Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before his mind. But it seems
+hardly correct to accuse him of over-partiality to frontal attacks, for
+he has examined both frontal and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving
+to each their relative advantages and disadvantages, and concluding:
+"The envelopment may lead directly to the _destruction_ of the enemy's
+army, if it is made with very superior numbers and succeeds. If it
+leads to victory the early results are _in every case_ greater than
+by breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the enemy's line can only lead
+indirectly to the destruction of the enemy's army, and its effects
+are hardly shown so much on the first day, but rather strategically
+afterwards,"[71] by forcing apart on different lines of retreat the
+separated fragments of the beaten army.
+
+"The breaking through the hostile army by massing our principal force
+against one point, _supposes an excessive length of front on the part
+of the enemy_; for in this form of attack the difficulty of occupying
+the remainder of the enemy's force with few troops is greater, because
+the enemy's forces nearer to the principal point of attack can easily
+join in opposing it. Now in an attack upon the centre there are such
+forces on both sides of the attack; in an attack upon a flank, only
+on one side. The consequence of this is that such a central attack
+may easily end in a very disadvantageous form of combat, _through a
+convergent counter-attack_." Which is exactly our modern difficulty.
+"The choice between these two forms of attack must therefore be made
+according to the existing conditions of the moment. Length of front,
+the nature and direction of the line of retreat, the military qualities
+of the enemy's troops, and the characteristics of their general,
+lastly the ground must determine the choice."
+
+Speaking generally he regards the _concentric_ enveloping form of
+tactical attack aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as the most
+efficacious and natural. "On the field of battle itself ... the
+enveloping form must always be considered the most effectual."[72] And
+the _eccentric_ or frontal counter-attack at the extended enveloping
+attack as the most efficacious and natural form of the defence, such as
+Napoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz or Dresden, or Wellington's
+at Salamanca. "And we think that one means is at least as good as the
+other."[73]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Now I think that these extracts sufficiently defend Clausewitz from the
+imputation of too great a belief in frontal attacks, and considering
+the frequent success of such Napoleonic attacks in his day, he gives
+a very fair summing up of the relative advantages and disadvantages
+thereof, and indeed such as might be written in the present day.
+Indeed the quite abnormal conditions of the Boer war produced such a
+feeling against frontal attacks, and so much loose talk of their being
+extinct, that it is very useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder
+that breaking the centre, whenever the condition he postulates, namely
+_over-extension of front_ on the enemy's part, is present, will
+always remain one of the two great forms of decisive attack open to a
+commander.
+
+And as in our day the forces are so enormous that to reach the hostile
+flank becomes more difficult, and the extension of front becomes so
+gigantic (a front of several armies on a line of forty to seventy miles
+perhaps), it is well to consider whether breaking the enemy's centre
+will not again offer the most advantageous form for the final decisive
+act, coupled of course, as Clausewitz says it ALWAYS MUST be, with a
+strong flank attack. And in these gigantic battles of the future, such
+as Liao-yang and Mukden, which we must consider typical of the future,
+battles which must take several days, during which the troops in the
+first line become utterly exhausted and used up,--a decisive attack
+on the centre can well be imagined after the hostile reserves have
+been decoyed away over a day's march by a strong flank attack. As, for
+example, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden followed by Nodzu's decisive
+breaking the centre and capture of Mukden itself.
+
+So that far from thinking Clausewitz's remarks about frontal attacks
+and breaking the line to be obsolete, it rather appears from the great
+Russo-Japanese battles that they are worthy of close study in view of
+the future.
+
+
+TACTICAL VERSUS STRATEGICAL ENVELOPMENT
+
+A fourth disputed point is the preference of Clausewitz, owing to his
+insistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard
+for the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or
+near the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged
+beforehand. In this matter I will again quote General v. Caemmerer,
+who disagrees with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims the oblique
+front as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to
+say, when the whole army with one united front falls upon the strategic
+_flank_ of the enemy, and, if victorious, cuts him from his line of
+retreat. But where such a situation cannot be brought about, where our
+advance has brought us before the strategic _front_ of the enemy, then
+he sees in the tactical envelopment, in the formation of an offensive
+flank, the proper means of effectively preparing to push the enemy
+from his line of retreat, and he distinctly explains that tactical
+envelopment need not at all be the _consequence_ of strategical
+envelopment, and need not at all be prepared long beforehand by a
+corresponding advance of divided forces."
+
+Clausewitz says, "The consequence of this is that battles fought with
+enveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which should properly
+result from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication,
+are commonly the result of a moral and physical preponderance."[74]
+Also "he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width
+of front as will admit of their all coming into action together."
+"Such separation into several columns should be made use of for the
+disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form" (_i.e._ by
+troops within a day's march of each other). "But it must be only of a
+tactical nature, for a strategic envelopment, when a great blow is to
+be struck, is a complete waste of power."
+
+General v. Caemmerer comments: "He is thus of opinion that the lateral
+movement of part of the army against the flank of the enemy could
+without any difficulty still be carried out as initiated by the plan of
+battle; and in order to understand this idea we must again bear in mind
+the difference between the fire-effect of then and now. In those days a
+comparatively short movement made it still possible for a considerable
+portion of the army to gain the defenders' flank; to-day a lengthy
+and troublesome operation would be necessary for the same object, and
+its successful execution would only be counted upon if the defender
+remained entirely passive, and would neither think of a counter-stroke
+nor of a corresponding movement of his forces to the threatened flank."
+
+Without going into this controversy I will, however, quote the
+excellent reason given by Clausewitz for his preference for tactical as
+opposed to strategical envelopment: "One peculiarity of the offensive
+battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position (note, and
+strength) of the enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things
+that are unknown (Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena, Katzbach).
+The more this is the case the more concentration of forces becomes
+paramount, and turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding."[75]
+
+It is also well to recollect how many famous generals had been ruined
+in Clausewitz's experience through over-extension or dispersion of
+their forces. The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals in the winter
+of 1813, Macdonald at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren, Ney at
+Dennewitz, which neutralized Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and
+began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to this cause.
+
+And the weather may, again, have as great influence in shortening
+resistance and allowing troops to be overwhelmed before the too-distant
+reinforcements arrive, as it had in those battles. If the weather then
+prevented the old muskets going off, and enabled the attack to rush
+the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or snow, by restricting the
+field of view and fire, may produce the same results. When one thinks
+of the number of great battles fought in such weather, as they may
+well be again, one sees an additional reason for carefully considering
+Clausewitz's warning. Far from relegating his preference for the
+tactical as opposed to the strategical envelopment to the region of
+the obsolete, because of our improved armament, it seems right to give
+it full weight as a corrective to a perceivable tendency to elevate
+strategical envelopment (after Königgrätz) into a formula for victory.
+If in the past many great generals have been ruined by over-extension,
+so may they be again. Against this tendency Clausewitz will for ever
+lift his voice.
+
+Also it remains to be considered, with the huge armies of to-day and
+the future, such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden, such armies as
+may possibly one day join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical
+envelopment will be practicable, or whether tactical envelopment,
+such as General Kuroki's tactical enveloping movement on Yentai, and
+the Russian line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General Nogi's tactical
+enveloping dash northward on Hsinminting and the railway at Mukden,
+will not be preferable.
+
+Perhaps, as a compromise, one might call such a movement
+strategical-tactical, and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of words.
+
+I have not attempted to do more than roughly indicate that the solution
+of these four disputed tactical questions in Clausewitz is to be sought
+in a study of the latest campaign, as he would have said himself; that
+is, the campaign in Manchuria. For, as the _Times_ correspondent in the
+XLVth Chapter, "Clausewitz in Manchuria," of his book "The War in the
+Far East," observes, "It will be abundantly clear to any one who has
+followed the great battles in Manchuria that the spirit of Clausewitz
+has presided over Japanese victories and wept over Russian defeats."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ
+
+
+In reading Clausewitz it is, first, the great principles of the nature
+of war founded on human nature, which alter not; and, secondly, it
+is his spirit and practical way of looking at things that we want to
+assimilate and apply to THE PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY, to which end it is
+necessary to read him always with the changed conditions of to-day in
+our minds, and think what he would have said under the circumstances.
+These changes are chiefly:--
+
+    (1) The improved net-work of roads.
+    (2) Railways.
+    (3) Telegraphs, wire and wireless.
+    (4) Improved arms.
+    (5) Aviation
+    (6) Universal service armies.
+
+
+THE IMPROVED NET-WORK OF ROADS
+
+The improved net-work of roads in Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria,
+or in Afghanistan where we have to consider our future strategy, but in
+Europe), as General v. Caemmerer puts it, "now offers to the movements
+of armies everywhere a whole series of useful roads where formerly one
+or two only were available," easier gradients, good bridges instead of
+unreliable ones, etc. So that the march-discipline of that day when
+concentrated for battle, artillery and train _on_ the roads, infantry
+and cavalry _by the side_ of the roads, has disappeared. Such close
+concentration is therefore now not possible, as we move all arms _on_
+the road, and an army corps with train, or two without, is the most
+that we can now calculate on bringing into action in one day on one
+road.
+
+
+RAILWAYS
+
+"Railways have, above all, completely altered the term 'base,'" remarks
+V. Caemmerer. "Railways carry in a few days men, horses, vehicles,
+and materials of all kinds from the remotest district to any desired
+point of our country, and nobody would any longer think of accumulating
+enormous supplies of all kinds at certain fortified points on his
+own frontier with the object of basing himself on those points. One
+does not base one's self any longer on a distinct district which is
+specially prepared for that object, but upon the whole country, which
+has become one single magazine, with separate store-rooms. So the term
+'base' has now to be considered in this light."
+
+It is only when operating in savage or semi-savage countries, where
+there are no railways, that the old idea of a base applies.
+
+As we penetrate deeper and further from our own country into the
+enemy's, and as a small raiding party can demolish the railway line so
+as to stop all traffic for days or weeks, it becomes far more necessary
+than it ever was in Clausewitz's day to guard our communications.
+And armies become more and more sensitive to any attack upon their
+communications.
+
+Also "such a line cannot easily be changed, and consequently those
+celebrated changes of the line of communication in an enemy's country
+which Napoleon himself, on some occasion, declared to be the ablest
+manoeuvre in the art of war, could scarcely be carried out any more"
+(V. Caemmerer).
+
+Also concentration by means of several railways demands a broad
+strategic front, which produces that separation of corps or armies
+which prepares the way for strategical envelopment, and so on.
+
+General von der Goltz, in his "Conduct of War," says: "The more recent
+treatises on the conduct of war on a large scale are principally taken
+up with the mobilization and strategical concentration of armies, a
+department of strategy which only began to play an important part in
+modern times. It is the result of a dense net-work of railways in
+Western Europe which has rendered it possible to mass large bodies
+of troops in a surprisingly brief time. Each Power tries to outdo
+its neighbours in this respect, ... which gives an opportunity to
+the strategical specialist to show off his brilliant qualities....
+Consequently it is now frequently assumed that the whole conduct of
+war is comprised in this one section of it." This over-estimate is of
+course an error, which, however, requires to be pointed out.
+
+
+TELEGRAPHS
+
+The telegraph has very greatly reduced the danger of separation.
+The great advantage of the inner line in the day of Napoleon and of
+Clausewitz was that separated forces could only communicate by mounted
+messengers, so if the enemy got between them they could not communicate
+at all, nor act in concert. This the telegraph has completely altered,
+for as the field telegraph can now be laid as quickly as an army can
+advance, the most widely separated bodies of troops can every day
+arrange combined operations by telegraph through, if necessary,
+a point one hundred or four hundred miles in rear. So that to-day
+the chief advantage of the inner line has gone, while its chief
+disadvantage, the possibility of being surrounded, remains.
+
+
+MAPS
+
+We now possess complete detailed Ordnance maps of every country in
+Europe, kept up to date by the latest alterations, whereas in the days
+of Clausewitz maps were of the very roughest character, and quite
+unreliable in comparison.
+
+
+IMPROVED ARMS
+
+Smokeless powder, quick-firing and long-ranging artillery and rifles,
+the infantry field of effective fire being ten times, the artillery
+five times what it was in Clausewitz's time, have all to be borne in
+mind when reading the tactical part of his writings. In consequence,
+also, cover and the tactical use of ground are of far greater
+importance now than then, etc., etc., etc.
+
+
+AVIATION
+
+The recent wonderful developments in aviation will obviously almost
+revolutionize "Information in War." To what extent, it is as yet
+impossible to say. Each year will teach us more.
+
+
+THE NATION-IN-ARMS
+
+The nation-in-arms as the common foundation of all armies (except our
+own), brought up by railways, vastly increases the numbers in a modern
+battle from what they were in Clausewitz's day. Compare Austerlitz,
+Dresden, Leipzig and Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden. It should be
+so with us also, for as General von der Goltz says in "The Conduct of
+War": "The BEST military organization is that which renders available
+ALL the intellectual and material resources of the country in event of
+war. _A State is not justified in trying to defend itself with only a
+portion of its strength, when the existence of the whole is at stake._"
+
+In Great Britain the difference which the introduction of this
+nation-in-arms principle has made in our military strength compared
+with that of our future opponents, a difference relatively FAR GREATER
+AGAINST US than it was in Napoleon's and Clausewitz's day, is as yet
+hardly realized by the people, or by our statesmen. People forget the
+wastage of war, and the necessity for a constant flow of troops to
+repair that wastage. As Von der Goltz puts it: "It is characteristic
+of the strategical offensive that the foremost body of troops of
+an army, the portion which fights the battles, amounts to only a
+comparatively small fraction, frequently only _a quarter or even
+one-eighth_, of the total fighting strength employed, whilst the fate
+of the whole army throughout depends upon the success or failure of
+this fraction. _Attacking armies melt away like snow in the spring._"
+To condense his remarks: "In spite of the most admirable discipline,
+the Prussian Guard Corps lost 5000 to 6000 men in the marches between
+the attack on St. Privat and the battle of Sedan." "Napoleon crossed
+the Niemen in 1812 with 442,000 men, but reached Moscow only three
+months later with only 95,000." In the spring of 1810, the French
+crossed the Pyrenees with 400,000 men, but still Marshal Massena in
+the end only brought 45,000 men up to the lines of Torres Vedras,
+near Lisbon, where the decision lay. Again, in 1829, the Russians
+put 160,000 men in the field, but had barely 20,000 left when, at
+Adrianople, a skilfully concluded peace saved them before their
+weakness became apparent and a reaction set in. In 1878 the Russians
+led 460,000 across the Danube, but they only brought 100,000 men--of
+whom only 43,000 were effective, the rest being sick--to the gates of
+Constantinople. In 1870 the Germans crossed the French frontier with
+372,000 men, but after only a six weeks' campaign brought but 171,000
+men to Paris. And so on. The result of it all is simple--that a people
+which is not based on the modern principle of the nation-in-arms cannot
+for long rival or contend with one that is, for it can neither put
+an equal (still less a superior) army into the field at the outset
+(_vide_ Clausewitz's first principle), nor even maintain in the field
+the _inferior_ army it does place there, because it cannot send the
+ever-required fresh supplies of trained troops. Sooner or later this
+must tell. Sooner or later a situation must arise in which the nation
+based on the obsolete voluntary system _must_ go down before a nation
+based on the nation-in-arms principle. Circumstances change with time,
+and, as wise Lord Bacon said long ago, "He that will not adopt new
+remedies must expect new evils." May we adopt the remedy before we
+experience the evil!
+
+
+THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL FORCES IN WAR
+
+But though these changed conditions must, of course, _modify_
+Clausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete
+our circle and leave off where we started) I repeat that, as human
+nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three
+to one in war, Clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical
+philosopher on the actual nature of war, as _the chief exponent of the
+moral and spiritual forces in war_, will ever remain invaluable in the
+study of war.
+
+Consider what unsurpassed opportunities he had for observing and
+reflecting on the influence of enthusiasm and passion, of resolution
+and boldness, of vacillation and weakness, of coolness and caution, of
+endurance and hardship, of patriotism and freedom, of ambition and of
+glory--on war, either by his own experience or by conversation with
+other equally experienced soldiers, during that long period of almost
+endless wars between 1793 and 1815.
+
+The fervour and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the Revolution,
+which drove the French forward, smashing everything before them, at
+the beginning; the ambition, military glory, plunder and greed, which
+animated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion,
+and stern endurance, which nerved the Russian hosts then as now; that
+awful Moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and
+sank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance and selfish
+callousness were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the
+spirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in Germany,
+which gave to the Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same driving
+force that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the French;
+the passing, therefore, in 1813 of the moral superiority, the greater
+driving force, from the French to the allies. Clausewitz saw all this;
+he conversed intimately with such men as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,
+who saw and guided it, too. All his friends had seen it also. No
+wonder, then, that such an unexampled series of warlike phenomena
+deeply impressed his reflective mind with the supreme importance of the
+moral and spiritual factors in war.
+
+His opportunities for long-continued observation of warlike phenomena
+were far greater than those of any writer since his day, and it is to
+be hoped they will remain so. For we have no desire to see another
+series of wars such as the Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that
+there was then such a man as Clausewitz to sum up for us so simply and
+so clearly the accumulated experiences of those long, long years of
+carnage and devastation.
+
+
+_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] Book IV. Chap. 10.
+
+[2] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[3] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[4] Book I. Chap. 8.
+
+[5] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[6] Summary of Instruction, p. 120.
+
+[7] Book II. Chap. 6.
+
+[8] Book II. Chap. 2.
+
+[9] Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz.
+
+[10] Book II. Chap. 4.
+
+[11] Book II. Chap. 2.
+
+[12] Book II. Chap. 2.
+
+[13] Book II. Chap. 3.
+
+[14] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[15] By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force the enemy's
+population into a state of mind favourable to submission.
+
+[16] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[17] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[18] Author's "Introduction."
+
+[19] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[20] Book VII. Chap. 5.
+
+[21] Book VII. Chap. 21.
+
+[22] Book VII. Chap. 21.
+
+[23] Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.
+
+[24] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[25] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[26] Book I. Chap. 7.
+
+[27] Book I. Chap. 8.
+
+[28] Book I. Chap. 8.
+
+[29] Book IV. Chap. 1.
+
+[30] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[31] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[32] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[33] Book III. Chap. 15.
+
+[34] Book VII. Chap. 13.
+
+[35] Book I. Chap. 4.
+
+[36] Book I. Chap. 5.
+
+[37] Book I. Chap. 7.
+
+[38] Book III. Chap. 3.
+
+[39] Book III. Chaps. 16-18.
+
+[40] Book II. Chap. 1.
+
+[41] Book III. Chap. 11.
+
+[42] Book III. Chap. 8.
+
+[43] Book V. Chap. 3.
+
+[44] Book III. Chap. 8.
+
+[45] Book VIII. Chap. 4.
+
+[46] Book III. Chap. 12.
+
+[47] Book III. Chap. 13.
+
+[48] Book III. Chap. 12.
+
+[49] Book III. Chap. 13.
+
+[50] Book III. Chap. 8.
+
+[51] Book III. Chap. 11.
+
+[52] Book VI. Chap. 28.
+
+[53] Book V. Chap. 10.
+
+[54] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[55] Book III. Chap. 13.
+
+[56] Book I. Chap. 3.
+
+[57] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[58] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[59] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[60] Book I. Chap. 3.
+
+[61] This warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be
+published freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five
+years ago. In the present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and
+its loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the enemy of
+any helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been
+learned.--Editor's Note.
+
+[62] Book IV. Chap. 4.
+
+[63] Book IV. Chap. 4.
+
+[64] "Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136-146.
+
+[65] Book IV. Chap. 4.
+
+[66] Book VI. Chap. 1.
+
+[67] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[68] Book VI. Chap. 5.
+
+[69] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[70] Book VII. Chap. 15.
+
+[71] Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500.
+
+[72] Book VI. Chap. 9.
+
+[73] Book VII. Chap. 9.
+
+[74] Book VII. Chap. 7.
+
+[75] Book VII. Chap. 7.
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's Notes:
+
+
+Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
+preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.
+
+Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
+
+Page 133: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Reality of War, by Stewart L. Murray
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+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Reality of War, by Stewart L. Murray
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Reality of War
+       A Companion to Clausewitz
+
+Author: Stewart L. Murray
+
+Editor: A. Hilliard Atteridge
+
+Release Date: November 17, 2013 [EBook #44200]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE REALITY OF WAR ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Charlie Howard and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+<div class="hidepub">
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 264px;">
+<img src="images/coversmall.jpg" width="264" height="400" alt="cover" />
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<h1>THE REALITY OF WAR</h1>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p class="newpage p4 center vspace larger">
+<span class="small">THE</span><br />
+<span class="larger">REALITY OF WAR</span></p>
+
+<p class="p1 center">A COMPANION<br />
+TO CLAUSEWITZ</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center vspace"><span class="small">BY</span><br />
+<span class="large">MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY</span><br />
+<span class="small">LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS</span></p>
+
+<p class="p2 center vspace"><span class="smaller">POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY</span><br />
+<span class="larger">A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE</span></p>
+
+<p class="p4 center">LONDON<br />
+<span class="large">HODDER AND STOUGHTON</span><br />
+WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.</p>
+
+<p class="phalf center"><span class="larger">HUGH REES, LTD.</span><br />
+5 REGENT STREET, S.W.</p>
+
+<p class="p4 center smaller"><i>Reprinted in 1914</i></p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">v</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="EDITORS_PREFACE" id="EDITORS_PREFACE">EDITOR'S PREFACE</a></h2>
+
+<p>Great books, the masterpieces of the
+special branch of knowledge with which
+they deal, are often very big books;
+and busy men, who have not unlimited
+time for reading, find it helpful to have
+some one who will give them a general
+summary of a famous writer's teaching,
+and point out the most important passages
+in which the author himself embodies
+the very essence of his argument.</p>
+
+<p>This is what Major Murray has done
+for the most important work on war
+that was ever written. He does not give
+a mere dry summary of its contents.
+
+He sets forth, in language so plain that
+even the civilian reader or the youngest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">vi</a></span>
+soldier can read it with interest, the
+essence of the teaching of Clausewitz,
+and he embodies in his book the most
+striking passages of the original work.
+He adds to each section of his subject
+some useful criticisms, and at the end of
+the book he sums up the effect of recent
+changes on the practice of war.</p>
+
+<p>The book is a popular manual of the
+realities of war, which should be read not
+only by soldiers, but by every one who
+takes an intelligent interest in the great
+events of our time.</p>
+
+<p>As to the practical value of the writings
+of Clausewitz, it may be well to quote
+here the words of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson,
+the Professor of Military History at
+Oxford, from his introduction to the
+original edition of Major Murray's
+work:</p>
+
+<p>"Clausewitz was a Prussian officer
+who first saw fighting as a boy in 1793,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">vii</a></span>
+and whose experience of war lasted until
+1815, when the great war ended. He
+was then thirty-five and spent the next
+fifteen years in trying to clear his mind
+on the subject of war, which he did by
+writing a number of military histories
+and a systematic treatise 'On War.'
+At the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts
+into a parcel, hoping to work at them
+again on the conclusion of the duties
+for which he was ordered from home. A
+little more than a year later he died at
+Breslau of cholera, and the papers, to
+which he had never put the finishing
+touch, were afterwards published by his
+widow.</p>
+
+<p>"Part of the value of his work is due
+to the exceptional opportunities which he
+enjoyed. When the war of 1806 began
+he had long been the personal adjutant
+of one of the Prussian princes, and an
+intimate friend of Scharnhorst, who was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">viii</a></span>
+probably the greatest of Napoleon's contemporaries.
+In the period of reorganization
+which followed the Peace of Tilsit he
+made the acquaintance of Gneisenau,
+and of almost all the officers who made
+their mark in the subsequent wars of
+liberation. During the years of preparation
+he was Scharnhorst's assistant, first
+in the Ministry of War and then on the
+General Staff. During the campaign of
+1812 he served with the Russian army
+as a staff officer. Thus his experience
+during the four years of the Wars of
+Liberation was that of one who was continually
+behind the scenes, always in
+touch with the Governments and Generals,
+and therefore better able than any one
+not so favourably placed to see everything
+in its proper perspective, and to follow
+and appreciate the considerations which
+directed the decisions both of statesmen
+and of the commanders of armies. His<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">ix</a></span>
+personal character was of the finest
+mould, and his writings have the sincerity,
+the absence of which makes it so
+difficult to rely upon those of Napoleon.</p>
+
+<p>"The ultimate test of the value of books
+is time. When Clausewitz died, the two
+books on war which were thought the
+best were those of the Archduke Charles
+of Austria and General Jomini. To-day
+the book of Clausewitz, 'On War,' easily
+holds the first place. It is the least
+technical of all the great books on war;
+from beginning to end it is nothing but
+common sense applied to the subject,
+but for that reason it is the hardest to
+digest, because common sense or a man's
+natural instinctive judgment on any subject
+is exceedingly hard to analyse and
+put into words. An exceptionally gifted
+man can go through this process, but
+few can follow it for any length of time
+without a distinct effort.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">x</a></span>
+"Almost every good institution has
+arisen out of the effort to provide a remedy
+for some evil, but in the imperfection of
+human nature nearly every institution
+brings with it fresh evils, which in their
+turn have to be counteracted. The
+modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism
+and its belief in knowledge, has grafted
+the examination system upon every form
+of education from the lowest to the
+highest. The British army shares in the
+benefits and in the disadvantages of the
+system, of which, in the case of an
+officer, the danger to be guarded against
+is that it tends to accustom a man to
+rely rather on his memory than his
+intelligence, and to lean more on other
+people's thinking than on his own. Clausewitz
+aimed at producing the very opposite
+result. He does not offer specific solutions
+of the various problems of war lest
+officers, in moments when their business<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">xi</a></span>
+is to decide and to act, should be trying
+to recall his precepts instead of using
+their eyes and their wits. His purpose
+rather is to enable them to understand
+what war is. He believed that if a man
+had accustomed himself to think of war
+as it really is, had got to know the
+different elements which go to make it
+up, and to distinguish those that are
+important from those that are comparative
+trifles, he would be more likely to
+know of himself what to do in a given
+situation, and would be much less likely
+to confuse himself by trying to remember
+what some general, long since
+dead, did on some occasion in which
+after all the position was by no means
+the same as that in which he finds
+himself."</p>
+
+<p>What is said here of the soldier actually
+engaged in war, is true also even of the
+onlooker who takes a patriotic interest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">xii</a></span>
+in the progress of a war in which his
+country is involved. Unless he has a
+clear idea of the real character of modern
+war, and the principles on which success
+or failure depend, he will be utterly
+unable to grasp the significance of the
+events of which he reads each day.
+And it is of real importance that in time
+of war every citizen should judge soundly
+the course of events, for opinion influences
+action, and public opinion is
+made up of the ideas of the units who
+compose the public. In this connection
+it is well to bear in mind a point that
+is often overlooked, a point on which
+Clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing
+passage&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;namely, the fact that
+one of the main objects of a nation
+waging war is to force the enemy's
+population into a state of mind favourable
+to submission. This fact is sufficient
+proof of the importance of public opinion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">xiii</a></span>
+being well informed not only as to the
+course of events, but also as to the
+principles that give to these events their
+real significance.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">xv</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></h2>
+
+<table summary="Contents">
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a></td></tr>
+  <tr class="smaller">
+    <td>&nbsp;</td>
+    <td class="tdr">PAGE</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ</td>
+    <td class="tdr">3</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN POLICY AND WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">11</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ</td>
+    <td class="tdr">23</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">33</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">47</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">xvi</a></span></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">65</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE NATURE OF WAR</td>
+    <td class="tdr">79</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">WAR AS POLICY</td>
+    <td class="tdr">119</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">STRATEGY</td>
+    <td class="tdr">137</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY</td>
+    <td class="tdr">161</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">TACTICS</td>
+    <td class="tdr">177</td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a></td></tr>
+  <tr>
+    <td class="tdl">CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ</td>
+    <td class="tdr">213</td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ</span></h2>
+
+<p>In an endeavour, such as the present, to
+interest the British public in even the
+greatest military writer, the first necessity
+is to show that he was not a mere theorist
+or bookworm. The wide and varied
+experience which the British officer gradually
+gains in so many different parts
+of the world shows up the weak points
+of most theories, and produces a certain
+distrust of them. Also a distrust of
+theory is undoubtedly one of our national
+characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal
+to the British officer or civilian, a writer
+must be a practical soldier.</p>
+
+<p>Such was General Clausewitz: a practical
+soldier of very great experience in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span>
+the long series of wars 1793 to 1815,
+and one present throughout that most
+awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian
+campaign in 1812.</p>
+
+<p>"General Karl von Clausewitz was
+born near Magdeburg in 1780, and entered
+the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in
+1792. He served in the campaigns of
+1793&ndash;1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he
+entered the military school at Berlin as
+an officer, and remained there till 1803.
+He here attracted the notice of Scharnhorst.
+In the campaign of 1806 he
+served as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus
+of Prussia, was present at the battle of
+Jena, and saw that awful retreat which
+ended a fortnight later in the surrender
+at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured,
+he was sent into France as a
+prisoner till the end of the war." "On
+his return (in November, 1807) he was
+placed on General Scharnhorst's staff,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span>
+and employed on the work then going
+on for the reorganization of the Prussian
+army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the
+Russian service, was employed on the
+general staff, and was thus able to gain
+much experience in the most gigantic of
+all the struggles of his time." "In the
+spring campaign of 1813 (battles of
+Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as a Russian
+officer, was attached to Blucher's staff;
+during the winter campaign he found
+employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count
+Walmoden, who fought against Davoust
+on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid
+action of the Goerde was entirely the
+result of his able dispositions. In 1815
+he again entered the Prussian service,
+and was chief-of-the-staff to the III.
+Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny
+formed the left of the line of battle, and
+at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's
+army." "In addition to this, we may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span>
+say, considerable practical training (note,
+enormous and varied indeed compared
+to any obtainable in the present day),
+he also possessed a comprehensive and
+thorough knowledge of military history,
+and also an uncommonly clear perception
+of general history" (Von Caemmerer).
+After the Peace he was employed in a
+command on the Rhine. In 1818 he
+became major-general, and was made
+Director of the Military School at Berlin.
+Here he remained for some years. This
+was the chief period of his writings. As
+General von Caemmerer, in his "Development
+of Strategical Science," puts it:
+"This practical and experienced, and at
+the same time highly cultured soldier,
+feels now, in peaceful repose, as he himself
+confesses, the urgent need to develop
+and systematize the whole world of
+thought which occupies him, yet also
+resolves to keep secret till his death the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span>
+fruit of his researches, in order that his
+soul, which is thirsting for <em>Truth</em>, may
+be safely and finally spared all temptations
+from subordinate considerations."</p>
+
+<p>In 1830 he was appointed Director of
+Artillery at Breslau, and, having no more
+time for writing, sealed up and put away
+his papers, unfinished as they were. In
+the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff
+to Field-Marshal Gneisenau's
+army. In the winter of that year war
+with France was considered imminent,
+and Clausewitz had prospects of acting
+as chief of the general staff of the Commander-in-Chief
+Gneisenau. He then
+drew up two plans for war with France,
+which bear the stamp of that practical
+knowledge of war and adaptation of
+means to ends which distinguish his
+writings.</p>
+
+<p>In the same year the war scare passed
+away, the army of Gneisenau was disbanded,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span>
+and Clausewitz returned to Breslau,
+where after a few days he was seized
+with cholera, and died in November, 1831,
+aged only 51.</p>
+
+<p>His works were published after his
+death by his widow.</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN
+POLICY AND WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>From the day of their publication until
+now the influence of the writings of
+Clausewitz has been steadily growing,
+till to-day it is impossible to over-estimate
+the extent of that influence upon modern
+military and political thought, especially
+in Germany. As General von Caemmerer,
+in his "Development of Strategical
+Science," says: "Karl von Clausewitz,
+the pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and
+the confidant of Gneisenau, is in Germany
+generally recognized as the most prominent
+theorist on war, as the real
+philosopher on war, to whom our famous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span>
+victors on the more modern battlefields
+owe their spiritual training."</p>
+
+<p>Field-Marshal Moltke was "his most
+distinguished pupil," and adapted the
+teaching of Clausewitz to the conditions
+of to-day.</p>
+
+<p>General von der Goltz, in the introduction
+to his great work, "The Nation
+in Arms," thus describes the veneration
+which he inspires: "A military writer
+who, after Clausewitz, writes upon the
+subject of war, runs the risk of being
+likened to a poet who, after Goethe,
+attempts a <em>Faust</em>, or, after Shakespeare,
+a <em>Hamlet</em>. Everything important that
+can be told about the nature of war can
+be found stereotyped in the works which
+that great military genius has left behind
+him. Although Clausewitz has himself
+described his book as being something as
+yet incomplete, this remark of his must
+be taken to mean that he, too, was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span>
+subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits,
+and was forced to feel that all he attained
+lay far beneath his ideal. For us, who
+knew not what that ideal was, his labours
+are a complete work. I have, accordingly,
+not attempted to write anything new, or
+of universal applicability about the science
+of warfare, but have limited myself to
+turning my attention to the military operations
+of our own day." One can hardly
+imagine a stronger tribute of admiration.</p>
+
+<p>And, as Moltke was Clausewitz's most
+distinguished pupil, so also are all those
+trained in the school of Moltke pupils of
+Clausewitz, including the most eminent
+of modern German military writers, such
+as General von Blume, in his "Strategy";
+Von der Goltz, in his "Nation in Arms"
+and "The Conduct of War," who trained
+the Turkish General Staff for the campaign
+of 1897 against Greece and the
+battle of Pharsalia, etc.; General von<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span>
+Boguslawski; General von Verdy du
+Vernois, the father of the study of
+Applied Tactics; General von Schlichting,
+in his "Tactical and Strategical Principles
+of the Present"; General Meckel, who
+trained the Japanese Staff, etc., etc.</p>
+
+<p>We all remember the telegram sent to
+General Meckel by Marshal Oyama after
+the battle of Liao-yang: "We hope you
+are proud of your pupils."</p>
+
+<p>Some time ago, when asked to give a
+lecture at Aldershot to the officers of the
+2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me
+that it would be very interesting, anxious
+as we all were then to know the causes
+of the wonderful Japanese efficiency and
+success, if I could obtain a pronouncement
+from General Meckel how far he had
+been influenced in his teaching by Clausewitz.
+My friend Herr von Donat did me
+the favour to write to General von Caemmerer
+and ask him if he could procure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span>
+me such a pronouncement which I might
+publish. General Meckel, whose death
+both Japan and Germany have since had
+to mourn, most kindly consented, and I
+esteem it a great honour to be allowed to
+quote part of his letter. He said: "I,
+like every other German officer, have,
+consciously or unconsciously, instructed
+in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz
+is the <em>founder</em> of that theory of war which
+resulted from the Napoleonic. I maintain
+that <em>every one</em> who nowadays either
+makes or teaches war in a modern sense,
+bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if
+he is not conscious of it." This opinion
+of General Meckel, to whose training of
+the Japanese General Staff the success of
+the Japanese armies must be largely
+attributed, is most interesting. It is not
+possible to give a stronger or more up-to-date
+example of the magnitude of the
+influence of Clausewitz.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span>
+In this connection I should like to
+make a short quotation from "The War
+in the Far East," by the <i>Times</i> military
+correspondent. In his short but suggestive
+chapter on "Clausewitz in Manchuria"
+he says: "But as all save
+one of the great battles in Manchuria
+have been waged by the Japanese in
+close accordance with the spirit and
+almost the letter of Clausewitz's doctrine,
+and as the same battles have been fought
+by the Russians in absolute disregard of
+them (though his works had been translated
+into Russian by General Dragomiroff
+long before the war), it is certainly worth
+showing how reading and reflection may
+profit one army, and how the neglect of
+this respectable practice may ruin another."
+"Clausewitz in Manchuria"!
+That brings us up to date. It is a far cry
+for his influence to have reached, and
+triumphed.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for
+statesmen as well as soldiers. We may
+be sure, therefore, that the influence of
+Clausewitz on the Continent has penetrated
+the realm of policy little less widely than
+the realm of war. From this thought
+arise many reflections. It will be sufficient
+here to suggest one. I would
+suggest that we should regard every
+foreign statesman, especially in Germany,
+as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple
+of Clausewitz. That is to say, we
+should regard him as a man who, underneath
+everything else, underneath the
+most pacific assurances for the present,
+considers war an unalterable part of
+policy. He will regard war as part of
+the ordinary intercourse of nations, and
+occasional warlike struggles as inevitable
+as commercial struggles. He will consider<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span>
+war also as an instrument of policy,
+which he himself may have to use, and
+to be studied accordingly. He will consider
+it not as a thing merely for speeches,
+but for practical use in furthering or
+defending the interests of his State. He
+will regard war as the means by which
+some day his nation shall impose its will
+upon another nation. He will be prepared
+to wait and wait, to make "every
+imaginable preparation," and finally to
+let loose war in its most absolute and
+ruthless character, war carried out with
+the utmost means, the utmost energy,
+and the utmost effort of a whole nation-in-arms,
+determined to achieve its political
+object and compel submission to
+its will by force.</p>
+
+<p>To talk to such a man of "the evils of
+war," or of "the burden of armaments";
+or to propose to him "disarmament" or
+"reduction of armed forces," and so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</a></span>
+forth can only appear to him as the
+result of "imperfect knowledge." He
+will not say so, but he will think so, and
+act accordingly. To the partially instructed
+opponent of such a man one can
+only say, "Let him that thinketh he
+standeth take heed lest he fall."</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ</span></h2>
+
+<p>The writings of Clausewitz are contained
+in nine volumes, published after his
+death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly
+on his three volumes "On War," which
+have been translated by Colonel J.&nbsp;J.
+Graham (the last edition edited by Colonel
+F.&nbsp;N. Maude, and published by Messrs.
+Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls
+them "a collection of materials," "a
+mass of conceptions not brought into
+form," and states that he intended to
+revise, and throw the whole into more
+complete shape.</p>
+
+<p>We must lament that he did not live
+to complete his revision. But, on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span>
+other hand, it is perhaps possible that
+this unfinished state is really an advantage,
+for it leaves us free to apply his great
+maxims and principles and mode of
+thought to the ever-varying conditions
+of the present and future, unhampered
+by too complete a crystallization of his
+ideas written before more modern conditions
+of railways, telegraphs, and rapid
+long-ranging arms of precision, etc.,
+arose. It is perhaps this unfinished state
+which renders Clausewitz so essentially
+in touch with, and a part of, the onward
+movement and evolution of military
+thought. For his great aim was "the
+truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
+the truth," without preconception or
+favour, as far as he could go&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;essentially
+"a realist" of war&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;and what better aim
+can we set before ourselves?</p>
+
+<p>As Sir Arthur Helps has so well put it
+in his "Friends in Council," every man<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span>
+needs a sort of central stem for his
+reading and culture. I wish here to say
+why I think that Clausewitz is admirably
+adapted to form such a main stem in
+the military culture of British officers.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place there is a lofty sort
+of tone about his writings which one
+gradually realizes as one reads them, and
+which I will not attempt to describe
+further than by saying that they stamp
+themselves as the writings of a gentleman
+of fine character.</p>
+
+<p>In the second place it is a book which
+"any fellow" can read, for there is
+nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse
+or mathematical or formal, no formulæ
+or lines and angles and technical terms,
+such as in other writers, Jomini, Hamley,
+etc. Clausewitz is free from all such
+pedantries, which for my part, and I
+dare say for the part of many others,
+often "put one off" a book, and made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span>
+one instinctively feel that there was
+something wrong, something unpractical
+about it, which rendered it hardly worth
+the sacrifice of time involved in its study.
+There is in Clausewitz nothing of that
+kind at all. All those lines and angles
+and formulæ he dismisses in a few pages
+as of little practical importance.</p>
+
+<p>In the third place Clausewitz only
+goes in for experience and the practical
+facts of war. As he somewhat poetically
+puts it, "The flowers of Speculation
+require to be cut down low near the
+ground of Experience, their proper soil."<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a>
+He is the great apostle of human nature
+and character as being everything in
+war. "All war supposes human weakness,
+and against that it is <span class="locked">directed."<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a></span>
+I believe that the British officer will find
+himself in sympathy with the great
+thinker on war, who asserts that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span> "<em>Of
+all military virtues Energy in the conduct
+of Operations has always conduced most
+to glory and success of arms</em>."<a name="FNanchor_3" id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a></p>
+
+<p>In the fourth place, to the practical
+mind will appeal his denunciation of all
+elaborate plans, because <em>Time</em> is required
+for all elaborate combinations, and Time
+is just the one thing that an active
+enemy will not give us,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;and his consequent
+deduction that all plans must be
+of the simplest possible form. His famous
+sentence, "<em>In war all things are simple,
+but the simple are difficult</em>,"<a name="FNanchor_4" id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> gives the
+key to his writings, for to <em>overcome
+those simple yet great difficulties he regards
+as the art of war</em>, which can only be
+done by the military virtues of perseverance,
+energy, and boldness.</p>
+
+<p>In the fifth place he does not want
+men to be bookworms, for he says:</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Theory is nothing but rational reflection</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span>
+<i>upon all the situations in which we can
+be placed in war</i>."<a name="FNanchor_5" id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> And we can all
+reflect, without reading too many books.
+Also he says: "Much reading of history
+is not required for the above object.
+The knowledge of a few separate battles,
+<em>in their details</em>, is more useful than a
+general knowledge of several campaigns.
+On this account it is more useful to read
+detailed narratives and journals than
+regular works of <span class="locked">history."<a name="FNanchor_6" id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a></span> He wants
+history in detail, not a general smattering
+and a loose application thereof, which
+fault he strongly denounces. And he
+expressly states that the history of the
+very latest war is the most useful. All
+of which is very practical, and in accord
+with what we feel to be true.</p>
+
+<p>As he pictures war, "<i>the struggle
+between the spiritual and moral forces</i> on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span>
+<em>both</em> sides is the centre of <span class="locked">all,"<a name="FNanchor_7" id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a></span> and to
+this aspect of the subject he gives much
+more attention than Jomini and most of
+Jomini's disciples. He has freed us once
+for all from all formalism. The formation
+of character, careful, practical, detailed
+study, and thorough preparation in peace,
+the simplest plans carried out with the
+utmost perseverance, resolution, energy,
+and boldness in war&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;these are the
+practical fruits of his teaching.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore, I say again, that I do not
+think that the British officer could possibly
+find a more interesting or a better
+guide for the main stem of his reading
+than Clausewitz, nor any one that will
+appeal to his practical instincts of what
+is <em>True</em> half so well. I do not believe
+that he could possibly do better than
+with Clausewitz as main stem, and a
+detailed study of the latest campaigns<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span>
+and modern technicalities as the up-to-date
+addition required to transform knowledge
+into action. I trust that every
+reader of Clausewitz will agree with me
+in this.</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>"Moltke, the most gifted pupil of Clausewitz,"
+"Moltke, who knew Clausewitz's
+book well, and often liked to describe
+him as the theoretical instructor." As
+Chaucer would say, "What needeth
+wordes more?"</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz has treated practically every
+chief branch of strategy and tactics
+(except, of course, the present-day developments
+of railways, telegraphs, quick-firing
+guns, smokeless powder, universal
+service armies, etc.). The whole of his
+bulky work "On War" is full of interesting
+and sometimes eloquent and almost
+poetical passages, of concentrated, pregnant,
+and far-reaching thoughts on every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span>
+subject. Through all these it is, of
+course, impossible to follow him in any
+introduction. One can really do no more
+than urge all to read Clausewitz for
+themselves, to go to the fountain-head,
+to the master-work itself. In the short
+space to which I have restricted myself,
+I propose, therefore, to concentrate on
+a few of his leading ideas, reluctantly
+leaving out many others which are really
+almost just as good.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Theory and Practice</span></h3>
+
+<p>One of the things for which we are
+most deeply indebted to Clausewitz is
+that he has shown us clearly the proper
+place of theory in relation to practice.
+"It should educate the mind of the
+future leader in war, or, rather, guide
+him in his <em>self-instruction</em>, but <em>not</em> accompany
+him on to the battlefield; just as
+a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span>
+opening mind of a youth without therefore
+keeping him in leading-strings all
+his <span class="locked">life."<a name="FNanchor_8" id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a></span> Again, "In real action most
+men are guided by the tact of judgment,
+which hits the object more or less accurately,
+according as they possess more
+or less genius. This is the way in which
+all great generals have acted, and therein
+partly lay their greatness and their genius,
+in that they always hit upon what was
+right by this tact. Thus also it will
+always be in <em>action</em>, and so far this tact
+is amply sufficient. But when it is a
+question not of acting one's self, but of
+convincing others <em>in consultation</em>, then
+all depends upon clear conceptions and
+demonstrations and the inherent relations;
+and so little progress has been
+made in this respect that most deliberations
+are merely a contention of words,
+resting on no firm basis, and ending<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span>
+either in every one retaining his own
+opinion, or in a compromise from mutual
+considerations of respect, a middle course
+really without any value. Clear ideas
+on these matters are not, therefore,
+wholly <span class="locked">useless."<a name="FNanchor_9" id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></span></p>
+
+<p>How true this is any one will admit
+who reflects for a moment upon the great
+diversity of opinions on almost every
+subject held in our army, just because
+of this want of a central theory common
+to all. In the domain of tactics it is
+evident that this holds good even as in
+strategy, for a common central theory
+of war will produce a more or less common
+way of looking at things, from which
+results more or less common action
+towards the attainment of the common
+object.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Rejection of Set and Geometrical Theories</span></h3>
+
+<p>"It should educate the mind of the
+future leader in war" is what Clausewitz
+demands from a useful theory; but he
+most expressly and unreservedly rejects
+every attempt at a method "by which
+definite plans for wars or campaigns are
+to be given out all ready made as if from
+a <span class="locked">machine."<a name="FNanchor_10" id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a></span> He mocks at Bülow's
+including at first in the one term "base"
+all sorts of things, like the supply of
+the army, its reinforcements and equipments,
+the security of its communications
+with the home country, and lastly the
+security of its line of retreat, and then
+fixing the extent of the base, and finally
+fixing an angle for the extent of that
+base: "And all this was done merely
+to obtain a pure geometrical result utterly
+useless" (Von Caemmerer).</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span>
+For the same reason Jomini's principle
+of the Inner Line does not satisfy him,
+owing to its mere geometrical nature,
+although he right willingly acknowledges
+"that it rests on a sound foundation,
+on the truth that the combat is the only
+effectual means in war" (Von Caemmerer).
+All such attempts at theory
+seem to him therefore perfectly useless,
+"because they strive to work with fixed
+quantities, while in war everything is
+<em>uncertain</em>, and all considerations must
+reckon with all kinds of variable quantities;
+because they only consider <em>material</em>
+objects, while every action in war is
+saturated with <em>moral</em> forces and effects;
+lastly, because they deal only with the
+action of <em>one</em> party, while war is a constant
+reciprocal effect of <em>both</em> parties" (Von
+Caemmerer).</p>
+
+<p>"Pity the warrior," says Clausewitz,
+"who is contented to crawl about in this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span>
+beggardom of rules." "Pity the theory
+which sets itself in opposition to the
+<span class="locked">mind"<a name="FNanchor_11" id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a></span> (note, the moral forces).</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">A Theory to be Practically Useful</span></h3>
+
+<p>Clausewitz insists that a useful theory
+cannot be more than a thorough knowledge
+of military history and "reflection
+upon all the situations in which we can
+be placed in war." "What genius does
+must be just the best of all rules, and
+theory cannot do better than to show
+just how and why it is so." "It is an
+analytical investigation of the subject
+which leads to exact knowledge: and if
+brought to bear on the results of experience,
+which in our case would be
+military history, to a <em>thorough</em> familiarity
+with it. If theory investigates the subjects
+which constitute war; if it separates<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span>
+more distinctly that which at first sight
+seems amalgamated; if it explains fully
+the properties of the means; if it shows
+their probable effects; if it makes evident
+the nature of objects; <em>if it brings
+to bear all over the field of war the light
+of essentially critical investigation</em>,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;then
+it has fulfilled the chief duties of its
+province. It becomes then a guide to
+him who wishes to make himself acquainted
+with war from books; it lights
+up the whole road for him, facilitates
+his progress, educates his judgment, and
+shields him from <span class="locked">error."<a name="FNanchor_12" id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Knowledge must be Thorough</span></h3>
+
+<p>This Clausewitz considers most important.
+He says that "Knowledge of the
+conduct of war ... <em>must pass completely
+into the mind</em>, and almost cease to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span>
+something objective." For in war "The
+moral reaction, the ever-changing form
+of things makes it necessary for the chief
+actor to carry <em>in himself</em> the whole
+mental apparatus of his knowledge, in
+order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat
+he may be capable of giving the
+requisite decision <em>from himself</em>. Knowledge
+must, by this complete assimilation
+with his own mind and life, be converted
+into real power."</p>
+
+<div class="tb">*<span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span></div>
+
+<p>So much for Clausewitz, therefore, as
+the greatest yet the simplest and least
+theoretical of theorists on war. Mark
+well his comforting dictum that "Theory
+is nothing but rational reflection upon
+all the situations in which we can be
+placed in war." That is a task which we
+have all more or less attempted. Therefore
+we are all more or less theorists.
+The only question is that of comparative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span>
+"thoroughness" in our reflections. And
+it is essentially this "thoroughness" in
+investigation and reflection towards which
+Clausewitz helps us. Like every other
+habit, the <em>habit</em> of military reflection
+gradually grows with use; till, fortified
+and strengthened by detailed knowledge,
+it gradually becomes Power.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>The theory of war is simple, and there
+is no reason why any man who chooses
+to take the trouble to read and reflect
+carefully on one or two of the acknowledged
+best books thereon, should not
+attain to a fair knowledge thereof. He
+may with reasonable trouble attain to
+such knowledge of the theory of war as
+will enable him to follow with intelligent
+appreciation the discussions of experienced
+soldier or soldiers. Such knowledge as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span>
+will prevent his misunderstanding the
+experienced soldier's argument from pure
+ignorance, and such knowledge as will
+enable him to understand the military
+reasons put forward and the military
+object proposed. To the opinion of such
+a man all respect will be due. Thus, and
+thus only.</p>
+
+<p>It is indeed the plain duty of all who
+aspire to rule either thus to qualify themselves
+to understand, or else to abstain
+from interference with, the military interests
+of the State.</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A
+MODERN NATIONAL WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>This point is here illustrated with more
+detail from Clausewitz than may seem
+necessary to some, because it is precisely
+the point regarding modern war which is
+least understood in this country.</p>
+
+<p>"The complete overthrow of the enemy
+is the natural end of the art of war."
+"As this idea must apply to both the
+belligerent parties, it must follow, that
+there can be no suspension in the military
+act, and peace cannot take place until
+one or other of the parties concerned is
+completely overthrown." This is what
+Clausewitz means by Absolute War, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</a></span>
+is war carried to its absolute and logical
+conclusion with the utmost force, the
+utmost effort and the utmost energy.
+He then proceeds to show that war,
+owing "to all the natural inertia and
+friction of its parts, the whole of the
+inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation
+(or timidity) of the human mind,"
+usually takes a weaker or less absolute
+form according to circumstances. "All
+this, theory must admit, but it is its duty
+to give the foremost place to the absolute
+form of war, and to use that form as a
+general point of direction." He then
+proceeds to show that war finally took
+its absolute form under Napoleon. To-day
+we may say that war takes its absolute
+form in the modern great national war,
+which is waged by each belligerent with
+the whole concentrated physical and
+mental power of the nation-in-arms.</p>
+
+<p>This requires to be gone into a little<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span>
+more in detail, for it is a most important
+point.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz in Book VIII. approaches
+this part of his subject by an historical
+survey of war from the time of the
+Roman Empire to that of Napoleon. He
+shows how as the feudal system gradually
+merged into the later monarchical States
+of Europe, armies gradually became less
+and less national, more and more mercenary.
+Omitting this, we arrive at the
+seventeenth century. He says: "The
+end of the seventeenth century, the time
+of Louis XIV., is to be regarded as the
+point in history at which the standing
+military power, such as it existed in the
+eighteenth century, reached its zenith.
+That military force was based on enlistment
+and money. States had organized
+themselves into complete unities; and
+the governments, by commuting the personal
+services of their subjects into money<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span>
+payments, had concentrated their whole
+power in their treasuries. Through the
+rapid strides in social improvements, and a
+more enlightened system of government,
+this power had become very great in
+comparison with what it had been. France
+appeared in the field with a standing army
+of a couple of hundred thousand men,
+and the other Powers in proportion."</p>
+
+<p>Armies were supported out of the
+Treasury, which the sovereign regarded
+partly as his privy purse, at least as a
+resource belonging to the Government,
+and not to the people. Relations with
+other States, except with respect to a few
+commercial subjects, mostly concerned
+only the interests of the Treasury or of
+the Government, not those of the people;
+at least ideas tended everywhere in that
+way. The Cabinets therefore looked upon
+themselves as the owners and administrators
+of large estates, which they were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span>
+continually seeking to increase, without
+the tenants on those estates being particularly
+interested in this improvement.</p>
+
+<p>The people, therefore, who in the
+Tartar invasions were everything in war,
+who in the old republics and in the
+Middle Ages were of great consequence,
+were in the eighteenth century absolutely
+nothing directly.</p>
+
+<p>In this manner, in proportion as the
+Government separated itself more from
+the people, and regarded itself as the
+State, war became more and more exclusively
+a business of the Government,
+which it carried on by means of the
+money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds
+it could pick up in its own and
+neighbouring countries. The army was
+a State property, very expensive, and not
+to be lightly risked in battle. "In its
+signification war was only diplomacy
+somewhat intensified, a more vigorous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span>
+way of negotiating, in which battles and
+sieges were substituted for diplomatic
+notes."</p>
+
+<p>"Plundering and devastating the
+enemy's country were no longer in accordance
+with the spirit of the age."
+"They were justly looked upon as unnecessary
+barbarity." "War, therefore,
+confined itself more and more, both as
+regards means and ends, to the army
+itself. The army, with its fortresses and
+some prepared positions, constituted a
+State in a State, within which the element
+of war slowly consumed itself. All Europe
+rejoiced at its taking this direction, and
+held it to be the necessary consequence of
+the spirit of progress."</p>
+
+<p>So think many in this country to-day.
+They are only a hundred years behind
+the times.</p>
+
+<p>"The plan of a war on the part of the
+State assuming the offensive in those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">53</a></span>
+times consisted generally in the conquest
+of one or other of the enemy's provinces;
+the plan of the defender was to prevent
+this. The plan of campaign was to take
+one or other of the enemy's fortresses,
+or to prevent one of our own being taken;
+it was only when a battle became unavoidable
+for this purpose that it was sought
+for and fought. Whoever fought a battle
+without this unavoidable necessity, from
+mere innate desire of gaining a victory,
+was reckoned a general with too much
+daring." For armies were too precious
+to be lightly risked. "Winter quarters,
+in which the mutual relations of the two
+parties almost entirely ceased, formed a
+distinct limit to the activity which was
+considered to belong to one campaign."
+"As long as war was universally conducted
+in this manner, all was considered
+to be in the most regular order." "Thus
+there was eminence and perfection of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">54</a></span>
+every kind, and even Field-Marshal Daun,
+to whom it was chiefly owing that
+Frederick the Great completely attained
+his object, and Maria Theresa completely
+failed in hers, notwithstanding that could
+still pass for a great general."</p>
+
+<p>Beyond this stage of military thought,
+many in this country have not yet
+advanced.</p>
+
+<div class="tb">*<span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span></div>
+
+<p>"Thus matters stood when the French
+Revolution broke out; Austria and
+Prussia tried their diplomatic art of war;
+this very soon proved insufficient. Whilst,
+according to the usual way of seeing
+things, all hopes were placed on a very
+limited military force in 1793, such a
+force as no one had any conception of
+made its appearance. War had suddenly
+become again an affair of the people,
+and that of a people numbering thirty
+millions, every one of whom regarded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">55</a></span>
+himself as a citizen of the State." "<em>By
+this participation of the people in the
+war</em>, instead of a cabinet and an army,
+a whole nation with its natural weight
+came into the scale. Henceforth the
+means available&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the efforts which might
+be called forth&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;had no longer any
+definite limits; the energy with which
+the war itself might be conducted had
+no longer any counterpoise, and consequently
+the danger to the adversary had
+risen to the extreme."</p>
+
+<p>If only our politicians could learn this
+old lesson of the French Revolution!
+For many, too many, of them appear
+to derive their ideas of war to-day from
+some dim reminiscent recollections of
+school histories of the wars in the seventeenth
+and eighteenth centuries.</p>
+
+<p>To continue: "After all this was
+perfected by the hand of Bonaparte, this
+military power based on the strength of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">56</a></span>
+the whole nation, marched over Europe,
+smashing everything in pieces so surely
+and certainly, that where it only encountered
+the old-fashioned armies the
+result was not doubtful for a moment.</p>
+
+<p>"A reaction, however, awoke in due
+time. In Spain the war became of itself
+an affair of the people." In Austria.
+In Russia. "In Germany Prussia rose
+up the first, made the war a national
+cause, and without either money or
+credit, and with a population reduced
+one-half, took the field with an army
+twice as strong as in 1806. The rest of
+Germany followed the example of Prussia
+sooner or later." "Thus it was that
+Germany and Russia, in the years 1813
+and 1814, appeared against France with
+about a million of men."</p>
+
+<p>"Under these circumstances the energy
+thrown into the conduct of war was
+quite different." "In eight months the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">57</a></span>
+theatre of war was removed from the
+Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had to
+bow its head for the first time; and the
+redoubtable Bonaparte lay fettered on
+the ground."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore, since the time of Bonaparte,
+war, through being, first on one
+side, then again on the other, an affair
+of the whole nation, has assumed quite
+a new nature, or rather it has approached
+much nearer to its real nature, to its
+absolute perfection. The means then
+called forth had no visible limit, the limit
+losing itself in the energy and enthusiasm
+of the Government and its subjects. By
+the extent of the means, and the wide
+field of possible results, as well as by the
+powerful excitement of feeling which
+prevailed, energy in the conduct of war
+was immensely increased; the object
+of its action was the downfall of the foe;
+and not until the enemy lay powerless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">58</a></span>
+on the ground was it supposed to be
+possible to stop, or to come to any understanding
+with regard to the mutual
+objects of the contest.</p>
+
+<p>"Thus, therefore the element of war,
+freed from all conventional restrictions,
+broke loose with all its natural force.
+The cause was the participation of the
+people in this great affair of State, and
+this participation arose partly from the
+effects of the French Revolution on the
+internal affairs of other countries, partly
+from the threatening attitude of the
+French towards all nations.</p>
+
+<p>"Now, whether this will be the case
+always in future, whether all wars hereafter
+in Europe will be carried on with
+the whole power of the States, and,
+consequently, <em>will only take place on
+account of great interests closely affecting
+the people</em>, would be a difficult point to
+settle. But every one will agree with us<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">59</a></span>
+that, at least, <em>Whenever great interests
+are in dispute</em>, mutual hostility will discharge
+itself in the same manner as it
+has done in our times."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>This is so true, that every war since
+the days of Clausewitz has made its
+truth more apparent. Since he wrote,
+the participation of the people in war
+has become, not a revolutionary fact,
+but an organized fact, an ordinary fact
+in the everyday life of nations. To-day
+every State except Great Britain, securely
+based on the system of the universal
+training of its sons to arms, stands ready
+to defend its interests with the whole
+concentrated power, physical, intellectual,
+and material, of its whole manhood.
+Consequently, European war, as Clausewitz
+foresaw, "will only take place on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">60</a></span>
+account of great interests closely affecting
+the people." The character of such war
+will be absolute, the object of its action
+will be the downfall of the foe, and not
+till the foe (be it Great Britain or not)
+lies powerless on the ground will it be
+supposed possible to stop. In the prosecution
+of such a national war the means
+available, the energy and the effort
+called forth, will be without limits. Such
+must be the conflicts of nations-in-arms.</p>
+
+<p>Yet, even now, so many years after
+Clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he
+himself stated, "to iron out many creases
+in the heads of strategists and statesmen,"
+the great transformation in the character
+of modern war, due to the participation of
+the people therein, has not yet been
+adequately realized by many men in this
+country <em>who ought to know</em>. It is earnestly
+to be hoped that they will endeavour to
+adjust their minds, as regards war, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">61</a></span>
+the fact that we are living, not in the
+eighteenth century, but in the twentieth,
+and that they will consider that war
+has once for all become an affair of the
+people, that our opponents will be a
+people-in-arms, using the uttermost means
+of their whole manhood to crush us, and
+that disaster can only be prevented by a
+like utmost effort on our part, by an
+effort regardless of everything except
+self-preservation.</p>
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">65</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>"War belongs, not to the province of
+arts and sciences, but to the province
+of social life. It is a conflict of great
+interests which is settled by bloodshed,
+and only in that respect is it different
+from others. It would be better, instead
+of comparing it with any art, to liken
+it to trade, which is also a conflict of
+human interests and activities; and it is
+still more like state policy, which again,
+on its part, may be looked upon as a
+kind of trade on a great scale. Besides,
+state policy is the womb in which war is
+developed, in which its outlines lie hidden<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">66</a></span>
+in a rudimentary state, like the qualities
+of living creatures in their <span class="locked">germs."<a name="FNanchor_13" id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a></span></p>
+
+<p>These conflicts of interest can bring
+about gradually such a state of feeling
+that "even the most civilized nations
+may burn with passionate hatred of each
+other." It is an unpleasant fact for
+the philosopher, for the social reformer,
+to contemplate, but history repeats and
+repeats the lesson. Still more, "It is
+quite possible for such a state of feeling
+to exist between two States that a very
+trifling political motive for war may
+produce an effect quite disproportionate&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;in
+fact, a perfect explosion."</p>
+
+<p>"War is a wonderful trinity, composed
+of the original violence of its elements&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;hatred
+and animosity&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;which may be
+looked upon as blind instinct; of the
+play of probabilities and chance, which
+make it a free activity of the soul; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">67</a></span>
+of the subordinate nature of a political
+instrument, by which it belongs purely
+to the reason.</p>
+
+<p>"The first of these three phases concerns
+more the people; the second, more
+the general and his army; the third
+more the Government. <em>The passions
+which break forth in war must already
+have a latent existence in the peoples.</em></p>
+
+<p>"These three tendencies are deeply
+rooted in the nature of the subject. A
+theory which would leave any one of
+them out of account would immediately
+become involved in such a contradiction
+with the reality, that it might be regarded
+as destroyed at once by that <span class="locked">alone."<a name="FNanchor_14" id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz is the great thinker, the
+great realist, the great philosopher of
+war. His aim was, free from all bias,
+to get at <em>the truth of things</em>. His view
+of war as a social act, as part of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">68</a></span>
+intercourse of nations, so that occasional
+warlike struggles can no more be avoided
+than occasional commercial struggles, is
+a view which requires to be most carefully
+pondered over by every statesman.
+It is based upon the essential fundamental
+characteristics of human nature, which
+do not alter. It is not to be lightly set
+aside by declamation about the blessings
+of peace, the evils of war, the burden of
+armaments, and such-like sophistries. To
+submit without a struggle to injustice
+or to the destruction of one's vital
+interests is not in passionate human
+nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature
+of a virile people. It is indeed to be
+most sincerely hoped that <em>arbitration</em> will
+be resorted to more and more as a means
+of peacefully settling all non-vital causes
+of dispute. But arbitration has its limits.
+For <em>no great nation will ever submit to
+arbitration any interest that it regards as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">69</a></span>
+absolutely vital</em>. The view of war, therefore,
+as a social act, as part of the intercourse
+of nations, with all that it implies,
+appears to be the only one which a statesman,
+however much he may regret the
+fact, can take. It has, therefore, been
+brought forward here at once, as it
+underlies the whole subject and is essential
+to all clear thought thereon.</p>
+
+<p>So much for the influence of Public
+Opinion in producing war. Now for its
+influence in and during war.</p>
+
+<p>"There are three principal objects in
+carrying on war," says Clausewitz.</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p class="hang">"(<i>a</i>)&nbsp;<span class="in1">To conquer and destroy the
+enemy's armed force.</span></p>
+
+<p class="hang">"(<i>b</i>)&nbsp;<span class="in1">To get possession of the material
+elements of aggression, and of the
+other sources of existence of the
+hostile army.</span></p>
+
+<p class="hang">"(<i>c</i>)&nbsp;<span class="in1"><em>To gain Public Opinion.</em></span><a name="FNanchor_15" id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">70</a></span>
+"To attain the first of these objects,
+the chief operation must be directed
+against the enemy's principal army, for
+it must be beaten before we can follow
+up the other two objects with success.</p>
+
+<p>"In order to seize the material forces,
+operations are directed against those
+points at which those resources are chiefly
+concentrated: principal towns, magazines,
+great fortresses. On the road to
+these the enemy's principal force, or a
+considerable part of his army, will be
+encountered.</p>
+
+<p>"Public Opinion is ultimately gained
+by great victories, and by the possession
+of the enemy's <span class="locked">capital."<a name="FNanchor_16" id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a></span></p>
+
+<p>This almost prophetic (as it was in his
+day) recognition by Clausewitz of the
+vast importance of gaining Public Opinion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">71</a></span>
+<em>as one of the three great aims in war</em>, is
+fundamental. It is just one of those
+instances of his rare insight into the
+principles and development of modern
+national war which make his book of
+such great and enduring value to us.
+For since his day Europe has become
+organized into great industrial nations,
+democracy and popular passion have become
+more and more a force to be reckoned
+with, and the gaining and preserving of
+Public Opinion in war has become more
+and more important. It has, in fact,
+become the statesman's chief business
+during a great modern national war. It
+has become necessary for him to study
+intently war in its relation to industry,
+and to the industrial millions over whom
+he presides, or over whom he may
+preside.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">72</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in
+Britain were a nation of 18,000,000,
+practically self-supporting, and governed
+by an aristocracy. To-day we are a
+crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent
+upon over-sea sources for three-fourths
+of our food, for our raw materials, for
+our trade, for our staying power, <em>and</em> we
+are governed by a democracy. In a
+modern democratic State it will only be
+possible to carry on the most just and
+unavoidable war so long as the hardships
+brought on the democracy by the war
+do not become intolerable. To prevent
+these hardships from thus becoming intolerable
+to the people, to Public Opinion,
+will be the task of the modern statesman
+during war, and this can only be done by
+wise prevision and timely preparation.
+<em>It requires the internal organization of
+the Industrial State for war.</em></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">73</a></span>
+It appears to the <em>writer</em> that internal
+organization can be subdivided as
+<span class="locked">follows:&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>I. An adequate gold reserve.</p>
+
+<p>II. The protection of our ships carrying
+raw material, food, and exports
+during their passage on the high seas
+from the places of origin to the consumers:
+(A) by the few available cruisers
+which could be spared from the fighting
+fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well
+thought out and prepared scheme of
+national indemnity (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vide</i> Blue Book thereon);
+(B) by insuring the distribution to
+the consumers of food and raw material,
+after it has arrived in the country, by
+preparing a thorough organization which
+would deal with the blocking of any of
+the principal ports of arrival, and by
+guarding the vulnerable points of our
+internal lines of communications to and
+from the shipping centres.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">74</a></span>
+III. Organization of Poor Law system
+to bring immediate relief by selling at
+peace price food to those unable to pay
+war prices owing to (A) normal poverty
+(7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works,
+due to effect of war on trade.</p>
+
+<p>Work and wages the State <em>must</em> guarantee
+during modern war, and before the
+State <em>can</em> guarantee these, it is absolutely
+necessary that it should satisfy itself
+that the above preparations are actually
+<em>in being</em>. This pre-supposes a more
+earnest study of the industrial effects of
+a great national war than has yet been
+given to the subject by our political
+leaders. For in the warfare of the
+present and future the importance of
+gaining and preserving Public Opinion,
+as pointed out by Clausewitz, cannot be
+over-estimated. It is as fundamentally
+important <em>to safeguard our own Public
+Opinion as it is to attack, weaken, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">75</a></span>
+gain over that of the enemy</em>. This has
+not yet passed the stage of thought.
+But good thoughts are no better than
+good dreams unless they be put into
+action. We are waiting for the statesman
+to DO it. There is no great difficulty.</p>
+
+<p>(2) In arousing the national spirit to
+the requisite height of patriotic self-denial
+and self-sacrifice, in elevating,
+preserving, and safe-guarding Public
+Opinion during a great national struggle,
+much may be hoped for from the patriotism
+of our Press. Only in fairness to
+those whose patriotism is self-originating
+and spontaneous, it must be made compulsory
+upon <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span>, so that no journal
+may suffer loss of circulation or pecuniary
+injury thereby.</p>
+
+<p>(3) There lies a practical task immediately
+to the hand of our statesmen
+if they will seriously set themselves to
+the task of improving the <em>moral</em> of our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">76</a></span>
+nation by reforming our education <em>curriculum</em>,
+on the leading principle that the
+moral is to the physical as three to one
+in life, and that therefore character-building
+must be its chief aim. Then
+they will do much towards strengthening
+us for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's
+idea of the gaining and preserving
+of our Public Opinion in War.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">79</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE NATURE OF WAR</span></h2>
+
+<p>"It is necessary for us to commence
+with a glance at the nature of the whole,
+because it is particularly necessary that,
+in the consideration of any of the parts,
+the whole should be kept constantly in
+view. We shall not enter into any of
+the abstruse definitions of war used by
+Publicists. We shall keep to the element
+of the thing itself, to a duel. War is
+nothing but a duel on an extensive scale.
+If we would conceive as a unit the
+countless numbers of duels which make
+up a war, we shall do so best by supposing
+two wrestlers. Each strives by physical
+force to throw his adversary, and thus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">80</a></span>
+to render him incapable of further resistance.</p>
+
+<p>"Violence arms itself with the inventions
+of arts and science in order to
+contend against violence. Self-imposed
+restrictions, almost imperceptible, and
+<em>hardly worth mentioning</em>, termed <i>usages
+of International Law</i>, accompany it without
+essentially impairing its power.</p>
+
+<p>"Violence, that is to say physical
+force, is therefore <em>the Means</em>; the compulsory
+submission of the enemy to our
+will is the ultimate <em>object</em>. In order to
+attain this object fully the enemy must
+first be disarmed: and this is, correctly
+speaking, the real aim of hostilities in
+<span class="locked">theory."<a name="FNanchor_17" id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Now, "philanthropists may easily imagine
+that there is a skilful method of disarming
+and overcoming an adversary without
+causing great bloodshed, and that this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">81</a></span>
+is the proper tendency of the art of war.
+However plausible this may appear, <em>still
+it is an error which must be extirpated</em>,
+for in such dangerous things as war <em>the
+errors which proceed from a spirit of
+benevolence are just the worst</em>. As the
+use of physical power to the utmost
+extent by no means excludes the co-operation
+of the intelligence, it follows
+that <em>he who uses force unsparingly without
+reference to the quantity of bloodshed</em>,
+<span class="smcap smaller">MUST</span> <em>obtain a superiority if his adversary
+does not act likewise</em>." "To introduce
+into the philosophy of war itself a principle
+of moderation would be an absurdity."
+"We therefore repeat our proposition,
+that <em>War is an act of violence which in
+its application knows no bounds</em>."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Political Nature of War</span></h3>
+
+<p>In endeavouring briefly to describe
+Clausewitz's method of looking at war,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">82</a></span>
+one is continually confronted by the
+difficulty of selecting a few leading ideas
+out of so many profound thoughts and
+pregnant passages. However, a selection
+must be made.</p>
+
+<p>I assign the first place to his conception
+of war as a part of policy, because that
+is fundamentally necessary to understand
+his practical way of looking at
+things. This point of view is as necessary
+for the strategist as for the statesman,
+indeed for every man who would understand
+the nature of war. For otherwise
+it is impossible to understand the military
+conduct of many campaigns and battles,
+in which the political outweighed the
+military influence, and led to action
+incomprehensible almost from a purely
+military point of view. History is full
+of such examples.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz clearly lays down: "<em>War
+is only a continuation of State policy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">83</a></span>
+by other means.</em> This point of view being
+adhered to will introduce much more
+unity into the consideration of the subject,
+and things will be more easily
+disentangled from each <span class="locked">other."<a name="FNanchor_18" id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a></span> "It is
+only thus that we can obtain a clear
+conception of war, for the political view
+is the <em>object</em>, war is the <em>means</em>, and the
+means must always include the object
+in our conception." "Each (nation or
+government) strives by physical force to
+compel the other to submit to its <span class="locked">will."<a name="FNanchor_19" id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Owing to the great importance of this
+point of view, so little understood in this
+country, I have devoted the next chapter
+to it alone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's
+view more in detail. We can, therefore,
+pass on for the present.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">84</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Culminating Point of Victory</span></h3>
+
+<p>Secondly, I select his doctrine of the
+culminating point of victory, because
+that is essential in order to understand
+his division of all wars into two classes,
+according to how far the attack is likely
+to be able to extend into the hostile
+country before reaching its culminating
+point, where reaction may set <span class="locked">in.<a name="FNanchor_20" id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"The conqueror in a war is not always
+in a condition to subdue his adversary
+completely. Often, in fact almost <em>universally,
+there is a culminating point of
+victory</em>. Experience shows this <span class="locked">sufficiently."<a name="FNanchor_21" id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a></span>
+As the attack or invasion
+progresses it becomes weaker even from
+its successes, from sieges or corps left
+to observe fortified places, from the
+troops required to guard the territory
+gained, and the lengthening line of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">85</a></span>
+communications, from the fact that we
+are removing further from our resource
+while the enemy is falling back upon and
+drawing nearer to his, from the danger
+of other States joining in to prevent the
+utter destruction of the defeated nation,
+from the rousing of the whole nation in
+extremity to save themselves by a people's
+war, from the slackening of effort in the
+victorious army itself, etc., etc. Leoben,
+Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances
+of such a culminating point, and
+probably in the late Russo-Japanese war
+Harbin would have proved so, too, if
+peace had not intervened.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz continues: "It is necessary
+to know how far it (our preponderance)
+will reach, in order not to go
+beyond that point and, instead of fresh
+advantage, reap disaster." He defines
+it as "<em>The point at which the offensive
+changes into the defensive</em>," and says, "to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">86</a></span>
+overstep this point is more than simply
+a useless expenditure of power yielding
+no further results, it is a <em>destructive</em> step
+which causes reaction, and the reaction
+is, according to all experience, productive
+of most disproportionate <span class="locked">effects."<a name="FNanchor_22" id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a></span> The
+reader will find it an interesting exercise
+to search for this culminating point of
+victory in historical campaigns, and mark
+the result where it has been overstepped
+and where it has not been overstepped.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Two Classes of Wars</span></h3>
+
+<p>From this consideration of the culminating
+point of victory follow the two
+classes into which Clausewitz divides all
+wars.</p>
+
+<p>"The two kinds of war are, first, those
+in which the object is the complete <em>overthrow
+of the enemy</em>, whether it be that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">87</a></span>
+we aim at his destruction politically, or
+merely at disarming him and forcing
+him to conclude peace on our terms; and,
+<em>next</em>, those in which our aim is merely
+to make some conquests on the frontiers
+of his country, either for the purpose
+of retaining them permanently, or of
+turning them to account as matters for
+exchange in the settlement of <span class="locked">Peace."<a name="FNanchor_23" id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a></span></p>
+
+<p>All wars, therefore, are wars for the
+complete destruction of the enemy, <abbr>i.e.</abbr>
+"unlimited object," or wars with a
+"limited object." In the plan of a war
+it is necessary to settle which it is to be
+in accordance with our powers and
+resources of attack compared with the
+enemy's resources for defence, and where
+our culminating point of victory is likely
+to be, on this side of the enemy's capital
+or beyond it. If the former&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;then the
+plan should be one with a "limited<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">88</a></span>
+object," such as the Crimea, Manchuria,
+etc.; if the latter&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;then the plan should
+aim at the enemy's total destruction,
+such as most of Napoleon's campaigns, or
+the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as
+1866, or 1870. As Clausewitz says:
+"<em>Now, the first, the grandest, and most
+decisive act of judgment which the statesman
+and general exercises, is rightly to
+understand in this respect the war in
+which he engages</em>, not to take it for something
+or to wish to make of it something
+which, by the nature of its relations, it
+is impossible for it to be. <em>This, therefore,
+is the first and most comprehensive of all
+strategical questions.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_24" id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a></p>
+
+<p>In Clausewitz's two plans for war
+with France in <span class="locked">1831,<a name="FNanchor_25" id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a></span> this difference is
+plain. In the first plan, he considered
+Prussia, Austria, the German Confederation,
+and Great Britain united as allies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">89</a></span>
+against France,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;and with this great
+superiority of numbers he plans an attack
+by two armies, each of 300,000 men,
+one marching on Paris from Belgium,
+one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine.
+In the second plan the political conditions
+had meanwhile changed; Austria
+and Great Britain were doubtful, and
+Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious
+if Prussia and the German Confederation
+alone could appear before Paris in sufficient
+strength to guarantee victory in a
+decisive battle, and with which it would
+be permissible to venture even beyond
+Paris. So he proposed to limit the object
+to the conquest of Belgium, and to
+attack the French vigorously the moment
+they entered that country.</p>
+
+<p>Which strict limitation of the object
+within the means available to attain it is
+characteristic of Clausewitz's practical
+way of looking at things. In each plan,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">90</a></span>
+however, a vigorous offensive aiming at
+a decisive victory was to be adopted.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Preparation for War</span></h3>
+
+<p>The third place, in respect to its present-day
+importance, I assign to Clausewitz's
+clear statement <span class="locked">that&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"If we have clearly understood the
+result of our reflections, then the activities
+belonging to war divide themselves into
+two principal classes, into such as are
+only <em>preparations for war</em> and into <em>the
+war itself</em>. This distinction must also be
+made in theory."</p>
+
+<p>Nothing could be more clearly stated
+than this, or place in greater honour
+peace preparations. Like his doctrine
+of the importance of gaining public
+opinion in war, it is one of those almost
+prophetic utterances which make Clausewitz<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">91</a></span>
+the germ of modern military evolution.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not,
+foresaw to a certain extent (probably
+owing to his employment in organizing
+the new Prussian short-service army
+after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the
+present day. And, since his time, the
+greater the forces which have to be prepared,
+the greater has become the value
+of preparation for war. It has been
+continually growing, till to-day it has
+obtained such overwhelming importance
+that one may almost say that a modern
+war is practically (or nearly so) decided
+<em>before</em> war breaks out, according to which
+nation has made the greatest and most
+thorough peace preparations.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every
+imaginable preparation." We may nowadays
+almost go so far as to say that
+preparation is war, and that that nation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">92</a></span>
+which is beaten in preparation is already
+beaten <span class="smcap smaller">BEFORE</span> the war breaks out.</p>
+
+<p>A failure to understand this fact is a
+fundamental error at the root of the idea
+of war as held by civilians, for many of
+them think that speeches are a substitute
+for preparations.</p>
+
+<p>It is plain that these three ideas of
+Clausewitz regarding the nature of war,
+its political nature, the distinction between
+wars with an unlimited object
+and a limited object, and preparations in
+peace-time, are as much matters for the
+statesman as for the soldier, and require
+study and reflection on the part of the
+former as much as on the part of the
+latter.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Friction in War</span></h3>
+
+<p>I place friction here before the more
+detailed consideration of actual war, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">93</a></span>
+war in itself, because it is that which
+distinguishes war on paper from real
+war, the statesman's and soldier's part
+from the part of the soldier only, and is
+therefore to be fitly treated midway
+between the two.</p>
+
+<p>Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's
+most characteristic ideas. He always
+looks at everything from that point of
+view, and as friction and the fog of war,
+and their influence on human nature
+will always be the chief characteristic
+of real war as distinguished from theoretical
+war or war on paper, it is chiefly
+this habit or mode of thought which
+makes his writings of such great and
+permanent value. It is also a habit
+which we ought sedulously to cultivate
+in ourselves.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>In war everything is very simple, but
+the simplest thing is difficult</em>,"<a name="FNanchor_26" id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> runs his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">94</a></span>
+famous saying. Why is the simplest
+thing difficult? Because of the friction
+of war. And how can that friction be
+minimized? Only by force of character,
+and the military virtues of discipline,
+perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness.
+Hence the great emphasis which
+he always and everywhere lays upon
+character and these military virtues as
+the deciding factors in war.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>Friction is the only conception which
+in a general way corresponds to that which
+distinguishes real war from war on paper</em>,"
+he says. Each individual of the army
+"keeps up his own friction in all directions."
+"The danger which war brings
+with it, the bodily exertions which it
+requires, augment this evil so much
+that they may be regarded as the greatest
+causes of <span class="locked">it."<a name="FNanchor_27" id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a></span> "<em>This enormous friction
+is everywhere brought into contact with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">95</a></span>
+chance</em>, and thus facts take place upon
+which it was impossible to calculate, their
+chief origin being chance. As an instance
+of one such chance take the weather.
+Here the fog prevents the enemy from
+being discovered in time,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;a battery from
+firing, or a report from reaching the
+general. The rain (mud) prevents a
+battalion from arriving,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;or the cavalry
+from charging effectively, because it had
+stuck fast in the heavy ground." And
+so on. Consider for examples the foggy
+mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau,
+the Katzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz,
+Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud
+of Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest,
+the mud of Manchuria.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>Activity in war is movement in a
+resistant medium.</em>" "<em>The knowledge of
+friction is a chief part of that so often
+talked of experience in war</em>, which is
+required in a good general." "It is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">96</a></span>
+therefore this friction which makes that
+which appears easy in war so difficult in
+<span class="locked">reality."<a name="FNanchor_28" id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a></span> In considering any situation
+in war we must therefore always add to
+the known circumstances&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;friction.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">War Itself</span></h3>
+
+<p>In Clausewitz's way of looking at war
+itself I assign at once the first place to
+his doctrine, "<em>The destruction of the
+enemy's military force is the leading
+principle of war</em>, and for the whole chapter
+of positive action <em>the direct way to the
+aim</em>."<a name="FNanchor_29" id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> This dictum, repeated in many
+different forms, underlies his whole conception
+of war. All the old theoretical
+ideas about threatening by man&oelig;uvring,
+conquering by man&oelig;uvring, forcing the
+enemy to retreat by man&oelig;uvring, and
+so forth, in which his predecessors entangled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">97</a></span>
+strategy, and from which even the
+Archduke Charles and Jomini had not
+completely freed themselves, he brushes
+aside by "our assertion is that <span class="smcap smaller">ONLY</span>
+great tactical results can lead to great
+strategical <span class="locked">results."<a name="FNanchor_30" id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a></span> Thus he leads and
+concentrates our thoughts in strategy on
+the central idea of victory in battle, and
+frees us once for all from the obscuring
+veil of lines and angles and geometrical
+forms by which other writers have hidden
+that truth. "Philanthropists may easily
+imagine that there is a skilful method of
+overcoming and disarming an adversary
+without causing great bloodshed, and
+that this is the proper tendency of the
+art of war. However plausible this may
+appear, <em>it is an error which must be
+extirpated</em>, for, in such dangerous things
+as war, <em>the errors which spring from a
+spirit of benevolence are just the worst</em>."<a name="FNanchor_31" id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">98</a></span>
+For "he who uses force unsparingly
+without reference to the quantity of
+bloodshed, <em>must</em> obtain the superiority if
+his adversary does not act likewise."
+And the "worst of all errors in wars" is
+still the idea of war too commonly held
+by civilians in this country, as witness
+the outcries which greeted every loss
+during the South African war, which
+shows how much Clausewitz is needed as
+a tonic to brace their minds to the
+reality.</p>
+
+<p>"War is an act of violence which in its
+application knows <span class="smcap smaller">NO</span> bounds." "Let
+us not hear of generals who conquer
+without bloodshed; if a bloody slaughter
+be a horrible sight, then that is a ground
+for paying more respect to war (for avoiding
+unnecessary war), but not for making
+the sword we wear blunt and blunter by
+degrees from feelings of humanity, till
+some one steps in with a sword that is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">99</a></span>
+sharp, and lops off the arm from our
+body."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Simple Plans</span></h3>
+
+<p>The second place I assign to his doctrine
+of <em>the simplest plans</em>, because time is
+required for the completion of complicated
+evolutions, but "a bold, courageous,
+resolute enemy will not let us have <em>time</em>
+for wide-reaching skilful <span class="locked">combination."<a name="FNanchor_32" id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a></span>
+"By this it appears to us that the advantage
+of simple and direct results over
+those that are complicated is conclusively
+shown."</p>
+
+<p>"We must not lift the arm too far for
+the room given to strike," or the opponent
+will get his thrust in first.</p>
+
+<p>"Whenever this is the case, we must
+ourselves choose the shorter." "Therefore,
+far from making it our aim to gain
+upon the enemy by complicated plans,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">100</a></span>
+<em>we must always rather endeavour to be
+beforehand with him by the simplest and
+shortest</em>."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Strategic Lines</span></h3>
+
+<p>The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the
+subtle distinctions between the numerous
+kinds of strategic lines, and lines of
+operation, and lines of man&oelig;uvre, etc.,
+etc., etc., which in Jomini and his predecessors
+and followers play so great, so
+pedantic, and so confusing a part,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;for
+these Clausewitz has little respect. In
+his chapter on "The Geometrical <span class="locked">Element,"<a name="FNanchor_33" id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a></span>
+he says, "We therefore do not
+hesitate to regard it as an established
+truth that <em>in strategy more depends upon
+the number and magnitude of the victorious
+battles than on the form of the great lines
+by which they are connected</em>."<a name="FNanchor_34" id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> Of course<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">101</a></span>
+he does not altogether leave out such
+considerations, but the above sentence
+shows how he regards them as only of
+minor importance. He therefore frees
+us from a great deal of pedantry, and
+takes us back to the heart of things.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Friction</span></h3>
+
+<p class="in0">has been already dealt with, so no more
+need be said here, except about its
+components.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Danger</span></h3>
+
+<p>"An ordinary character never attains
+to complete coolness" in danger. "Danger
+in war belongs to its friction, and a
+correct idea of it is necessary for truth
+of perception, and therefore it is brought
+under notice <span class="locked">here."<a name="FNanchor_35" id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a></span></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">102</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Bodily Exertion</span></h3>
+
+<p>Clausewitz says that bodily exertion
+and fatigue in war "put fetters on the
+action of the mind, and wear out in
+secret the powers of the soul." "Like
+danger, they belong to the fundamental
+causes of <span class="locked">friction."<a name="FNanchor_36" id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a></span></p>
+
+<p>To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen
+the retreat from Moscow, the awful
+passage of the Beresina, and the battle
+of the nations round Leipzig, bodily
+exertion could not be overlooked. Had
+he not seen bodily exertion and hardship
+break up the Grand Army into a small
+horde of stragglers, and destroy the army
+of Kutusoff in almost an equal measure,
+in 1812, as well as practically ruin the
+spirit, and largely break up the great
+army of Napoleon in 1813?</p>
+
+<p>As for the effects of bodily exertion on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">103</a></span>
+the mind, purpose, and resolution of the
+general, compare Benningsen at Eylau
+after thirty-six hours in the saddle, or
+Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost
+all the results of his victory.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Information in War</span></h3>
+
+<p>"<em>The foundation of all our ideas and
+actions</em>," but "in a few words, <em>most
+reports are false</em>." "When in the thick
+of war itself one report follows hard upon
+the heels of another, it is fortunate if
+these reports in contradicting each other
+show a certain balance of probability."
+In another passage, in order to illustrate
+this perpetual uncertainty under which
+all decisions in war have to be made, he
+compares two opposing commanders to
+two men fighting in a dark room and
+groping uncertainly for one another.</p>
+
+<p>"These things which as elements meet<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">104</a></span>
+together in the atmosphere of war and
+make it a <em>resistant medium for every
+activity</em>, we have designated danger, bodily
+exertion, information, and <span class="locked">friction."<a name="FNanchor_37" id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a></span> He
+never loses sight of this; it pervades
+everything he writes.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Moral and Physical</span></h3>
+
+<p>"And therefore the most of the subjects
+which we shall go through in this book
+are composed <em>half of physical, half of
+moral causes and effects</em>, and we might
+say that the physical are almost no more
+than the wooden handle, whilst the
+moral are the noble metal, the real bright
+polished <span class="locked">weapon."<a name="FNanchor_38" id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a></span> Pages might be
+filled with extracts showing his opinion
+that the moral is everything in war, but
+the reader is already convinced of that.
+Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">105</a></span>
+is to the physical as three to one."
+Clausewitz regards all military questions
+from this point. His psychological attitude
+is what chiefly characterizes Clausewitz
+from all writers who came before
+him, and which makes his deductions so
+realistic, so interesting and so valuable
+for all who come after him.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Tension and Rest in War</span></h3>
+
+<p>In order not to weary the reader I will
+bring this chapter to a conclusion with
+one or two extracts relating to "tension
+and rest; the suspension of the act in
+warfare." This is explanatory of those
+frequent halts which take place in a
+campaign, which appear at first sight
+contradictory to the absolute theory of
+war. These halts are due to many
+causes, such as preparations, exhaustion,
+uncertainty, irresolution, friction, waiting
+for reinforcements, etc.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">106</a></span>
+In this connection one must remember
+that war is "a chain of battles all strung
+together, one of which always brings on
+another." But they seldom follow each
+other immediately; there is usually a
+certain pause between. As soon as one
+battle is gained, strategy makes new
+combinations in accordance with the
+altered circumstances to win the next.
+Whilst these new combinations are being
+developed, or perhaps considered, there
+may be a greater or less suspension of the
+act, a longer or shorter halt in the forward
+movement. Then another spring forward.
+Clausewitz has a great many
+interesting things to say on this <span class="locked">subject.<a name="FNanchor_39" id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"If there is a suspension of the act
+in war, that is to say, if neither party
+for the moment wills anything positive,
+there is <em>rest</em>, and for the moment equilibrium....
+As soon as ever one of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">107</a></span>
+parties proposes to himself a new positive
+object, and commences active steps towards
+it, even if it is only by preparations,
+and as soon as the enemy opposes this,
+there is <em>tension</em> of the powers; this lasts
+until the decision takes place.... This
+decision, the foundation of which lies
+always in the battle-combinations which
+are made on each side, ... is followed by
+a movement in one or other direction."</p>
+
+<p>"It may so happen that both parties,
+at one and the same time, not only feel
+themselves too weak to attack, but are so
+in reality."</p>
+
+<p>"Wild as is the nature of war it still
+wears the claims of human weakness, and
+the contradiction we see here, that man
+seeks and creates dangers which he fears
+at the same time, will astonish no one."</p>
+
+<p>"If we cast a glance at military history
+in general, there we find so much the
+opposite of an incessant advance towards<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">108</a></span>
+the aim, that <em>standing still</em> and <em>doing
+nothing</em> is quite plainly the <em>normal condition</em>
+of an army in the midst of war,
+<em>acting</em> the <em>exception</em>. This must almost
+raise a doubt as to the correctness of our
+conception. But if military history has
+this effect by the great body of its events,
+so also the latest series of wars redeem
+the view. The war of the French Revolution
+shows only too plainly its reality,
+and only proves too plainly its necessity.
+In that war, and especially in the campaigns
+of Bonaparte, the conduct of war
+attained to that unlimited degree of
+energy which we have represented as the
+natural law of the element. This degree
+is therefore possible, and if it is possible
+then it is necessary."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So
+that is how Clausewitz regards International<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">109</a></span>
+Law, Clausewitz to whom in
+Germany "our most famous victors on
+the more modern battlefields owe their
+spiritual training," and on whom "everybody
+who to-day either makes or teaches
+modern war bases himself, even if he is
+not conscious of it." And we must
+regard nearly every foreign statesman as,
+consciously or unconsciously, a disciple
+of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time
+that we should cease to pin our faith on
+International Law, or think that it can
+in any way protect us, if we neglect
+strongly to protect ourselves. Power and
+expediency are the only rules that the
+practical politicians of foreign countries
+recognize, and the only question they ask
+themselves is, "Have we got sufficient
+power to do this," and if so, "Is it
+expedient to do it?"</p>
+
+<p>(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we
+place upon them for any length of time?<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">110</a></span>
+None whatever. For treaties are only
+considered binding as long as the interests
+of <em>both</em> contracting parties remain the
+same. Directly circumstances change,
+and they change constantly, the most
+solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia
+tore up the Treaty of Paris, or as Austria
+tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history
+is full of torn-up treaties. And as it has
+been so it will be. The European waste-paper
+basket is the place to which all
+treaties eventually find their way, and a
+thing which can any day be thrown into
+a waste-paper basket is, indeed, a poor
+thing on which to hang our national
+safety. Only in ourselves can we trust.
+Therefore no treaties at present existing
+should be allowed in any way to alter
+or lessen our preparations to enable us
+to fight <em>alone</em> when necessary.</p>
+
+<p>(3) It cannot be too often repeated,
+or too much insisted on, that the success<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">111</a></span>
+or failure of a State policy is dependent
+upon the amount of armed force behind
+it. For upon the amount of armed force
+behind a policy depends the greater or
+less amount of resistance, of friction,
+which that policy will meet with on the
+part of other nations. The prestige of a
+nation depends upon the general belief in
+its strength. The less its prestige, the
+more it will be checked and foiled by its
+rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded
+into a war which would have been prevented
+if its prestige, or armed force, had
+been greater. On the other hand, the
+greater its prestige, its armed force, the
+more reasonable and inclined to a fair
+compromise are its rivals found. So that
+the greater the prestige, the armed force,
+of our nation is, the more likely is it
+that all our negotiations will be settled
+by peaceful compromise, and the longer
+we shall enjoy peace.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">112</a></span>
+Therefore, under this consideration,
+those who would reduce our national
+forces are deeply mistaken, for such
+action would imperil our prestige, imperil
+our negotiations, imperil our peace, and
+perhaps lead eventually to a war that we
+might otherwise have avoided. Therefore
+no such deeply mistaken economy
+for us. A few hundred thousand pounds
+saved would be dear economy indeed if
+it led, as well it might, to the payment
+before many years of a War Indemnity
+of £800,000,000 or so. Better the evils
+we know than the far greater evils we
+know not of.</p>
+
+<p>(4) Surprise in war is what we have
+to fear. There are two sorts of national
+surprise that we must consider. These
+are (A) the <em>surprise by actual hostilities</em>
+taking place before the actual declaration
+of war, such as the Japanese surprise and
+practical destruction of the fighting force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">113</a></span>
+of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur;
+(B) the <em>surprise by superior preparation</em>,
+silently carried out till all is ready for a
+decisive blow, whilst we are not ready
+for equally efficient defence, and then a
+declaration of war before we have time
+to get properly ready, as the surprise in
+this sense of France by Germany in
+1870.</p>
+
+<p>(A) Every successful example is always
+copied, and usually on a larger scale.
+We may be quite certain that our rivals
+have taken to heart the lesson of Port
+Arthur. It is possible that our next war
+will open with a similar night attack on
+our fleet, either just before, or simultaneously
+with the declaration of war.
+If it is successful, or even partially successful,
+it may produce the most grave
+results, as in the Russo-Japanese War.
+It <em>may</em> render possible a naval action with
+almost equal forces, in which our opponents<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">114</a></span>
+<em>might</em> be victorious. The invasion
+of this country on a gigantic scale by
+300,000 men or more would then follow
+as a certainty. This is not a probability,
+but a possibility which requires to be
+kept in our view.</p>
+
+<p>(B) <em>The surprise by superior preparation</em>,
+as I term it, for want of a better
+name, is a danger to which we are
+peculiarly liable. As Lord Salisbury said,
+"The British constitution is a bad fighting
+machine," and it is made an infinitely
+worse fighting machine by the lack of
+interest which our politicians appear to
+take in all that appertains to war. Hence
+they are always liable to oppose, as
+excessive, preparations which are in
+reality the minimum consistent with
+national safety. Consequently our preparations
+for war, controlled as they are
+by those who have no special knowledge
+of war, are always apt to be insufficient,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">115</a></span>
+as were those of France in 1870. In
+former days this did not perhaps so very
+much matter, although it resulted in the
+unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands
+of British lives and hundreds of millions
+of British treasure. But still we were
+able, at this somewhat excessive price, to
+"muddle through," owing to the heroic
+efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make
+bricks without straw and retrieve the
+mistakes of our policy. For our opponents
+then conducted war in such a
+slow way as to give us time to repair
+<em>after</em> the outbreak of war our lack of
+preparation <em>before</em> it. But opposed to a
+modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen
+and led by generals brought up in
+the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and
+Moltke&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;all will be different. In such a
+war the national forces brought into play
+are so immense that it is only possible
+to do so efficaciously if everything has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">116</a></span>
+been most carefully prepared and organized
+beforehand. It is not <em>possible</em> to
+improvise such organization of national
+force <em>after</em> the war has begun, for there
+cannot be sufficient time. If our rival
+makes adequate preparation before the
+war to bring to bear in that war the <em>whole</em>
+of its national force, material, moral, and
+physical, while we only prepare to bring
+to bear a <em>small portion</em> thereof, then
+there will be no time afterwards for us
+to repair our negligence. The war will
+be conducted with the utmost energy,
+and the aim will be to utilize to the
+utmost the superiority obtained by superior
+preparation, so as to make the decision
+as rapid as possible before we have time
+to recover from the effects of our surprise.
+That is the danger we have to fear, and
+to keep ever in mind.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">119</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">WAR AS POLICY</span></h2>
+
+<p>"War," says Clausewitz, "is only a
+continuation of State policy by other
+means." The first question that at once
+arises in the mind is what is meant by
+Policy. We may safely lay down that
+State policy is the defence and furtherance
+of the interests of the nation as a whole
+amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies
+towards rest and towards acquisition,
+and that its instruments are the
+pen and the sword. There can, of course,
+be any degree of consistency or fickleness,
+of strength or weakness, of success or
+failure, in the policy of a State.</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz expressly stated that he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">120</a></span>
+hoped "to iron out many creases in the
+heads of strategists and statesmen," such,
+for instance, as the idea that it is possible
+to consider either policy or war as
+independent of the other.</p>
+
+<p>It is only possible to obtain a proper
+conception of policy if we regard it as
+continuous both in peace and war, using
+sometimes peace negotiations, sometimes
+war negotiations, as circumstances require,
+to attain the political object.</p>
+
+<p>War is only a part of policy, a continuance
+of the previous negotiations;
+but the instrument is now the sword
+and not the pen. As Clausewitz says,
+"<em>In one word, the art of war, in its
+highest point of view, is policy; but no
+doubt a policy which fights battles instead
+of writing notes.</em>" War is merely a
+means whereby a nation attempts to
+impose its will upon another nation in
+order to attain a political object. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">121</a></span>
+object is settled by policy, which also
+orders the war, determines what sort of
+war it is to be, with what means and
+resources and expenditure it is to be
+waged, when its object has been attained,
+and when it is to cease. In fact, policy
+prepares, leads up to, orders, supports,
+guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz
+said, "<em>All the leading outlines of a war
+are always determined by the Cabinet&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;that
+is, by a political, not a military
+functionary.</em>"</p>
+
+<p>Unity of thought is only to be obtained
+by "the conception that war is only a
+part of political intercourse, therefore by
+no means an independent thing in itself."
+"And how can we conceive it to be
+otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic
+notes stop the political relations
+between different nations and governments?
+Is not war merely another kind
+of writing and language for political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">122</a></span>
+thoughts?" "Accordingly war can
+never be separated from political intercourse;
+and if, in the consideration
+of the matter, this is done in any way,
+all the threads of the different relations
+are, to a certain extent, broken, and we
+have before us a senseless thing without
+an object."</p>
+
+<p>"If war belongs to policy, it will
+naturally take its character from policy.
+If the policy is grand and powerful, so
+will also be the war, and this may be
+carried to the point at which war attains
+to its absolute form." "Only through
+this kind of view war recovers unity;
+only by it can we see <em>all</em> wars of <em>one</em>
+kind, and it is only through it that the
+judgment can obtain the true and perfect
+basis and point of view from which <em>great
+plans</em> may be traced out and determined
+upon."</p>
+
+<p>"There is upon the whole nothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">123</a></span>
+more important in life than to find out
+the <em>right</em> point of view from which things
+should be looked at and judged of, and
+then to keep to that point; for we can
+only apprehend the mass of events in
+their unity from <em>one</em> standpoint; and
+it is only the keeping to one point of
+view that guards us from inconsistency."
+"We can only look at policy here as the
+representative of the interests generally
+of the whole community," and "<em>wars
+are in reality only the expressions or
+manifestations of policy itself</em>."</p>
+
+<p>To the student of history this unity of
+conception is equally necessary, for it
+supplies the key to many a military
+puzzle. Without it we can never understand,
+for instance, Napoleon's conduct
+in 1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can
+we see the compelling reason of many
+battles, apparently fought against military
+judgment, such, for instance, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">124</a></span>
+Borodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have
+to remember that these and many other
+battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were
+fought from a political, not a military,
+motive. It is a well-known fact that
+the strategist frequently has to alter and
+adapt his plans so as to suit overmastering
+political necessity. Yet many people have
+failed to draw therefrom the generalization
+of Clausewitz that "war is only a
+continuation of State policy by other
+means." But having got it now, let us
+hold fast to it, with all its consequences.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Some Knowledge of War necessary for
+Statesmen</span></h3>
+
+<p>"From this point of view there is no
+longer in the nature of things a necessary
+conflict between the political and military
+interests, and where it appears it is therefore
+to be regarded as <em>imperfect knowledge</em><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">125</a></span>
+only. That policy makes demands upon
+the war which it cannot respond to,
+would be contrary to the supposition that
+<em>it knows the instrument it is going to use</em>,
+therefore contrary to a natural and
+<em>indispensable supposition</em>."</p>
+
+<p>"<em>None of the principal plans which
+are required for a war can be made without
+an insight into the political relations</em>;
+and in reality when people speak, as
+they often do, of the prejudicial influence
+of policy on the conduct of a war, they
+say in reality something very different
+to what they intend. It is not this
+influence, but the policy itself which
+should be found fault with. If policy is
+right, if it succeeds in hitting the object,
+then it can only act on the war also with
+advantage; and if this influence of
+policy causes a divergence from the
+object, the cause is to be looked for in
+a mistaken policy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">126</a></span>
+"It is only when policy promises itself
+a wrong effect from certain military
+means and measures, an effect opposed
+to their nature, that it can exercise a
+prejudicial effect on war by the course
+it prescribes. Just as a person in a
+language with which he is not conversant
+sometimes says what he does not intend,
+<em>so policy, when intending right, may
+often order things which do not tally with
+its own views</em>.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>This has happened times without
+end, and it shows that a certain knowledge
+of the nature of war is essential to the
+management of political intercourse.</em>"</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The War Minister</span></h3>
+
+<p>"Before going further we must guard
+ourselves against a false interpretation
+of which this is very susceptible. We do
+not mean to say that this acquaintance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">127</a></span>
+with the nature of war is the <em>principal</em>
+qualification for a war minister. Elevation,
+superiority of mind, strength of
+character, these are the principal qualifications
+which he must possess; a knowledge
+of war may be supplied in one way
+or another."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Policy and the means to carry out that
+Policy must Harmonize</span></h3>
+
+<p>"<em>If war is to harmonize entirely with
+the political views, and policy to accommodate
+itself to the means available for
+war</em>, there is only one alternative to be
+recommended when the statesman and
+soldier are not combined in one person
+(note, as William of Orange, Frederick
+the Great, or Napoleon), which is to
+make the chief commander an <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ex-officio</i>
+member of the Cabinet, that he may
+take part in its councils and decisions on
+important occasions."</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">128</a></span>
+"The influence of any military man
+except the general-in-chief in the Cabinet
+is extremely dangerous; it very seldom
+leads to able, vigorous action."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>We shall conclude this chapter with a
+few reflections on the preceding dicta
+of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped
+that the reader will agree.</p>
+
+<p>Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that
+war is subordinate to policy, is an instrument
+of policy, is a part of policy, just
+as much as diplomatic negotiations are a
+part of policy.</p>
+
+<p>Secondly, a statesman, however good
+at peaceful administration he may be,
+who is ignorant of war is, therefore,
+ignorant of one part of his profession;
+that part which deals with the preparing,
+ordering, guiding, and controlling of war.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">129</a></span>
+As Clausewitz says, "it is an <em>indispensable
+supposition</em> that policy knows the instrument
+it is going to use." It is a mistake
+to suppose, when diplomatic relations
+between two States cease, and war breaks
+out, that therefore the political negotiations
+cease, for they do not, but are
+merely continued in another form&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;in
+the form of war. The statesman still
+retains control, and uses the military
+events as they occur to attain his object.
+He is still responsible for the success
+of the warlike, as well as of the peaceful,
+policy of the nation.</p>
+
+<p>Thirdly, it is a disputed point how
+far the influence of policy is theoretically
+allowable during the course of actual
+operations, <abbr>i.e.</abbr> after the war has actually
+begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy
+should only act at the beginning and at
+the end of a war, and should keep clear
+during the actual operations. Clausewitz,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">130</a></span>
+however, holds that the two are so
+intimately related that the political influence
+cannot be lost sight of even
+during actual operations. Between two
+such authorities we may well hesitate
+to give a definite opinion, and must
+seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly,
+in history policy often has really affected
+the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813,
+1814, 1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan,
+or Bismarck's interference to hurry on
+the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith
+in the Boer War, and in many other
+cases. That, we must admit. We must
+also admit that its interference frequently
+produces a weakening effect on the
+operations. Clausewitz says that that
+only occurs when the policy itself is
+wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle
+way rule appears to be this, that policy
+should be dominant at the beginning
+and end of a war, but during actual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">131</a></span>
+operations the statesman should exercise
+the greatest possible restraint, and
+avoid all interference, except when
+demanded by <em>overwhelming political
+necessity</em>.</p>
+
+<p>Fourthly, a politician is bound to study
+war. He is bound to study war as well
+as diplomacy, his two instruments. If
+he only studies how to use one of his
+two instruments, he will be a poor statesman
+indeed. It is plain that he <span class="smcap smaller">MUST</span>
+study war, so that he may not try to
+use an instrument of which he knows
+nothing. It is not meant, of course,
+that a politician should study all the
+details of naval and military matters,
+but only that he should study the general
+principles of war, and the means, resources,
+and forces required to attain
+the political object of war, through the
+submission of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Fifthly, in order that the object and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">132</a></span>
+the means of policy may harmonize, it
+is necessary that the one to whom the
+national interests are entrusted should
+study the principles of war, so that <em>he may
+keep his policy proportionate to the means
+of enforcing it</em>. That is to say, he must
+not propose or commit the nation to a
+policy which is likely to be strongly
+opposed by another Power, unless he has
+from careful study and enquiry made
+certain that he has sufficient armed
+force at his disposal, in case the opposing
+nation suddenly challenges his policy
+and declares war. He should not even
+consider a policy without <em>at the same
+time</em> considering with his military and
+naval advisers the nation's means of
+enforcing that policy if challenged to do
+so. He must not think of embarking
+upon a war, or of provoking another
+nation to do so, till he has carefully provided
+sufficient armed force to give a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">133</a></span>
+reasonable prospect, if not a certainty,
+of success. Otherwise,</p>
+
+<p>Sixthly, as our next contest will be
+with a nation-in-arms, as the war will
+be in its character absolute, as its object
+will be the downfall of the foe, as not
+until the foe (whether it be Great Britain
+or not) lies powerless upon the ground
+will it be supposed possible to stop, as
+we shall have to contend against the
+utmost means, the utmost energy, the
+utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;these
+points deserve the most serious
+consideration of every politician who
+aspires to guide the destinies of the
+Anglo-Saxon Race.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">137</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">STRATEGY</span></h2>
+
+<p>Clausewitz defines strategy as "<em>the use
+of the battle to gain the object of the war</em>."
+War is "a chain of battles all strung
+together, one of which always brings on
+<span class="locked">another."<a name="FNanchor_40" id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a></span> The great thing in strategy
+is to win these battles one after the
+other till the enemy submits. "<em>The best
+strategy is always to be very strong, first,
+generally; secondly, at the decisive point.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_41" id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a></p>
+
+<p>"In such an aspect we grant that the
+superiority of numbers is the most important
+factor in the result of a battle,
+only it must be sufficiently great to be a
+counterpoise to all the other co-operating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">138</a></span>
+circumstances. The direct result of all
+this is that the <em>greatest possible number
+of troops should be brought into action at
+the decisive point</em>.<a name="FNanchor_42" id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Whether the troops
+thus brought up are sufficient or not,
+we have then done in this respect all
+that our means allowed. This is <em>the
+first great principle of strategy</em>, as well
+suited for Greeks or Persians, or for
+Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French
+or Germans."</p>
+
+<p>It sounds so simple, and yet how many
+times has it not been done. How many
+generals have been ruined in consequence!</p>
+
+<h3 class="vspace"><span class="smcap">Superiority in Numbers<br />
+What is Required for Strategic Certainty</span></h3>
+
+<p>Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we
+may search modern military history in
+vain for a battle (except Leuthen or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">139</a></span>
+Rosbach) in which an army has beaten
+another double its own strength, an
+occurrence by no means uncommon in
+former times. Bonaparte, the greatest
+general of modern days, in all his great
+victorious battles, with one exception,
+that of Dresden 1813, had managed to
+assemble an army superior in numbers,
+or at least very little inferior, to that of
+his opponent, and when it was impossible
+for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne,
+Laon, Waterloo, he was <span class="locked">beaten."<a name="FNanchor_43" id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a></span> "From
+this we may infer, in the present state of
+Europe, that it is very difficult for the
+most talented general to gain a victory
+over an enemy double his strength.
+Now, if we see that double numbers are
+such a weight in the scale against even
+the greatest generals, we may be sure
+that in ordinary cases, in small as well
+as in great combats, an important superiority<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">140</a></span>
+of numbers, but which need not
+be over <em>two to one</em>, will be sufficient to
+<em>ensure the victory</em>, however disadvantageous
+other circumstances may <span class="locked">be."<a name="FNanchor_44" id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">44</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The double superiority of numbers at
+the decisive point is, therefore, the ideal
+of strategy. "<em>The superiority of numbers
+is, therefore, to be regarded as the
+fundamental idea, always to be aimed at,
+before all</em>, and as far as possible." If
+strategy has done this, then it has done
+its utmost duty. It is then for the
+tactician to make the most of this
+superiority thus provided by strategy,
+and win the victory. Strategy then repeats
+the operation with new combinations
+suited to the altered circumstances
+to win the next battle, and so on, till the
+hostile armed force is destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>This <em>superiority of numbers</em> in battle as
+the <em>first principle of strategy</em> we require,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">141</a></span>
+on all occasions in season and out of
+season, to repeat and repeat. At present
+we have not the numbers we shall want.
+We must get them. Otherwise we are
+bound to be inferior in numbers, and
+"the best strategy" will be possible for
+our enemies and impossible for us. This
+rests with our statesmen.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Decisive Point</span></h3>
+
+<p>If the double superiority, or as near
+the double as possible, at the decisive
+point is the ideal of strategy ... what
+is the decisive point?</p>
+
+<p>Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz.
+Jomini, even after Napoleon, confuses
+us with three different sorts of
+decisive points in a theatre of war, but
+Clausewitz clears the air by asserting
+only <em>one</em>.</p>
+
+<p>"But whatever may be the central<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">142</a></span>
+point of the enemy's power against
+which we are to direct our ultimate
+operations, <em>still the conquest and destruction
+of his army is the surest commencement</em>
+and, <em>in all cases, the most essential</em>."<a name="FNanchor_45" id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a></p>
+
+<p>Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever
+the enemy's main force is <span class="smcap smaller">THERE</span> is the
+decisive point, against which we must
+concentrate <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> our forces.</p>
+
+<p>"There are," said Napoleon, "many
+good generals in Europe, but they see
+too many things at one time. <em>As for
+me, I see only one thing, the enemy's
+chief army, and I concentrate all my
+efforts to destroy it.</em>"</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Simultaneous Use of all the Forces</span></h3>
+
+<p>"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which
+we have been endeavouring to set forth
+is, therefore, that all the forces which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">143</a></span>
+are available and destined for a strategic
+object should be <em>simultaneously</em> applied
+to it. And this application will be all
+the more complete the more everything
+is compressed into one act and one
+<span class="locked">moment."<a name="FNanchor_46" id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a></span> This he calls "<em>the law of
+the simultaneous employment of the forces
+in strategy</em>."<a name="FNanchor_47" id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> "In strategy we can
+never employ too many <span class="locked">forces."<a name="FNanchor_48" id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a></span> "What
+can be looked upon in tactics as an
+excess of force must be regarded in
+strategy as a means of giving expansion
+to success." "<em>No troops should be kept
+back as a strategic reserve</em>," but every
+available man hurried up to the first
+battlefield, fresh levies being meanwhile
+formed in rear. As an instance of what
+not to do, Prussia, in 1806, kept back
+45,000 men in Brandenburg and East
+Prussia; they might, if present at Jena,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">144</a></span>
+have turned defeat into victory, but they
+were useless <span class="locked">afterwards.<a name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a></span> A fault so
+often made may be made again.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Concentration</span></h3>
+
+<p>"It is impossible to be too strong at
+the decisive point," said Napoleon. To
+concentrate every available man and
+gun at the decisive point so as to attain
+superiority there, is not an easy thing,
+for the enemy will be making a similar
+attempt. "The calculation of time and
+space appears the most essential thing
+to this end. But the calculation of time
+and space, though it lies universally at
+the foundation of strategy, and is to a
+certain extent its daily bread, is still
+neither the most difficult nor the most
+decisive one." "Much more frequently
+the relative superiority, that is the skilful
+assemblage of superior forces at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">145</a></span>
+decisive point, has its foundation in the
+right appreciation of those points, in
+the judicious distribution which by that
+means has been given to the forces from
+the very first, and in <em>the resolution to
+sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage
+of the important</em>. In this respect Frederick
+the Great and Bonaparte are especially
+<span class="locked">characteristic."<a name="FNanchor_50" id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"There is no simpler and more imperative
+rule for strategy than <em>to keep all the
+forces concentrated</em>. <em>No portion to be
+separated from the main body unless
+called away by some urgent necessity.</em> On
+this maxim we stand firm, and look
+upon it as a fact to be depended
+<span class="locked">upon."<a name="FNanchor_51" id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"<em>The concentration of the whole force</em>
+(<abbr>i.e.</abbr> within supporting distance) <em>should
+be the rule</em>, and <em>every separation or
+division is an exception which must be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">146</a></span>
+justified</em>."<a name="FNanchor_52" id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Of course, this does not
+mean that all the troops are to be kept
+concentrated in one mass upon one
+road, but within supporting distance, for
+he expressly states, "<em>It is sufficient
+now if the concentration takes place during
+the course of the action.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_53" id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> This doctrine,
+qualified by the last sentence, makes
+Clausewitz the germ of modern military
+thought, for the last sentence leaves
+room for all the modern developments of
+new roads, railways, telegraphs, wire
+and wireless, and so forth.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore in war, according to Clausewitz,
+concentration, concentration, concentration,
+and <em>every division or detachment
+is an evil which can only be justified
+by urgent necessity</em>. Here again we find
+a simple truth, which, however, the
+history of all wars shows us to be very
+difficult to carry out. Hence the value<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">147</a></span>
+of keeping such an imperative maxim
+always in our minds.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The First Pitched Battle</span></h3>
+
+<p>"The more a general takes the field
+in the true spirit of war, as well as of
+every other contest, that he must and
+<em>will</em> conquer, the more will he strive to
+throw every weight into the scale in the
+first battle, and hope and strive to win
+everything by it. Napoleon hardly ever
+entered upon a war without thinking of
+conquering his enemy at once in the
+first <span class="locked">battle."<a name="FNanchor_54" id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"<em>At the very outset of war we must
+direct all our efforts to gain the first battle</em>,
+because an unfavourable issue is always
+a disadvantage to which no one would
+willingly expose himself, and also because
+the first decision, though not the only
+one, still will have the more influence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">148</a></span>
+on subsequent events the greater it is
+in <span class="locked">itself."<a href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"The law of the simultaneous use of
+the forces in strategy lets the principal
+result (which need not be the final one)
+take place almost always at the commencement
+of the great <span class="locked">act."<a name="FNanchor_55" id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a></span> A great
+victory thus won at the outset will upset
+all the enemy's plan of campaign and
+allow us to carry out our own. The first
+pitched battle is, therefore, the crisis of
+the rival strategies, and towards its
+favourable decision all our preparations,
+all our forces, and all our energies should
+be directed. This is a point that civilians
+seem to find hard to grasp. Witness all
+our history, with inadequate forces at
+the beginning of every war, as even in
+the latest of our wars&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;that in South
+Africa. It is a point which our statesmen
+should very seriously consider.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">149</a></span>
+The difficulty of concentrating superior
+numbers for the first battle is that the
+enemy will be, or should be, of the same
+opinion, and will be making equal efforts
+to win the first battle. So, then, the
+crisis will be all the more acute, the
+battle greater, and the result greater.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>We would not avoid showing at once
+that the bloody solution of the crisis, the
+effort for the destruction of the enemy's
+main force, is the first-born son of war.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_56" id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a></p>
+
+<p>Till this is done, the first great victory
+gained, strategy should think of nothing
+else.</p>
+
+<p>Then, and only then, a further combination
+in accordance with the altered
+circumstances to win the next.</p>
+
+<p>"For we maintain that, with few
+exceptions, <em>the victory at the decisive
+point will carry with it the decision on
+all minor points</em>"<a name="FNanchor_57" id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> over the whole theatre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">150</a></span>
+of war. Therefore nothing else matters
+for long, and to victory in the first great
+battle "everything else must be sacrificed."
+For concentration can only be
+obtained by sacrifice.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Pursuit</span></h3>
+
+<p>"Once the great victory is gained, the
+next question is not about rest, not about
+taking breath, not about re-organizing,
+etc., but only of pursuit, of fresh blows
+wherever necessary, of the capture of
+the enemy's capital, of the attack of the
+armies of his allies, or whatever else
+appears as a rallying point for the
+<span class="locked">enemy."<a name="FNanchor_58" id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz points out that this is very
+difficult, and that to compel his exhausted
+troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall
+requires <span class="smcap smaller">GREAT</span> force of <span class="smcap smaller">WILL</span> on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">151</a></span>
+part of the equally exhausted commander.
+We need only remember that
+Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis
+of his fate, being physically tired, failed
+to pursue the allies after his victory at
+Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the
+fruits of his victory, and indeed his last
+chance of ultimate success.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Summary of Strategic Principles</span></h3>
+
+<p>Leaving out, for the sake of shortness,
+the rest of his strategical thoughts, I hasten
+to conclude this sketch with a glance at
+Clausewitz's admirable <span class="locked">summary<a name="FNanchor_59" id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a></span> of strategic
+<span class="locked">principles:&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"<em>The first and most important maxim
+which we can set before ourselves is to
+employ</em> <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> <em>the forces which we can make
+available with the</em> <span class="smcap smaller">UTMOST ENERGY</span>. Even
+if the result is tolerably certain in itself,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">152</a></span>
+it is extremely unwise not to make it
+<em>perfectly certain</em>.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>The second principle is to concentrate
+our forces as much as possible at the point
+where the</em> <span class="smcap smaller">DECISIVE</span> <em>blow is to be struck.
+The success at that point will compensate
+for all defeats at secondary points.</em></p>
+
+<p>"<em>The third principle is not to lose
+time. Rapidity and surprise are the most
+powerful elements of victory.</em></p>
+
+<p>"<em>Lastly, the fourth principle is to</em>
+<span class="smcap smaller">FOLLOW UP THE SUCCESS</span> <em>we gain with
+the</em> <span class="smcap smaller">UTMOST ENERGY</span>. <em>The pursuit of
+the enemy when defeated is the only means
+of gathering up the fruits of victory.</em></p>
+
+<p>"The first of these principles is the
+foundation of all the others. <em>If we have
+followed the first principle, we can venture
+any length with regard to the three others
+without risking our all.</em> It gives the
+means of <em>continually creating new forces
+behind us</em>, and with new forces every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">153</a></span>
+disaster may be repaired. <em>In this, and
+not in going forward with timid steps,
+lies that prudence which may be called
+wise.</em>"</p>
+
+<p>These great principles are everything
+in war, and "due regard being paid to
+these principles, the form (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> the geometrical
+element) in which the operations
+are carried on is in the end of little consequence."</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore I am perfectly convinced
+that whoever calls forth all his powers
+to appear <em>incessantly with new masses</em>,
+whoever adopts <em>every imaginable means of
+preparation</em>, whoever <em>concentrates his force
+at the decisive point, whoever thus armed
+pursues a great object with resolution and
+energy</em>, has done all that can be done
+in a general way for the strategical conduct
+of the war, and that, unless he is
+altogether unfortunate in battle, will
+undoubtedly be victorious in the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">154</a></span>
+measure that his adversary has fallen
+short of this exertion and energy."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>When we have got these great simple
+leading principles of strategy firmly into
+our heads, the next question is how to
+make use of our knowledge. For principles
+are no use unless we apply them.
+On consideration it appears that there
+are three ways in which we can all apply
+these principles with advantage.</p>
+
+<p>I. It will prove a very interesting and
+strengthening mental exercise to apply
+these few leading principles to every
+campaign we read about, to search for
+indications of their application in the
+strategy of each belligerent, how far each
+commander succeeded, and how far failed
+to carry them out in their entirety, and
+where, when, and why he succeeded or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">155</a></span>
+failed, and the results of doing or not
+doing so. Also to search for the interaction
+of the political motive of the war
+on the military operations, and to see
+how far the belligerent statesmen gained
+or failed to gain their political object,
+according to the comparative degree of
+preparation they had made for it, and the
+magnitude of effort which they made
+or did not make to support it with the
+whole means of the nation, material,
+moral and physical. Also to see how far
+the national spirit was aroused or not,
+and the causes thereof, and to note the
+greater or less energy, resolution and
+boldness which was consequently infused
+into the war. Also to note how the
+thorough application of these great simple
+principles of strategy shortens the war
+and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to
+1870), and how the neglect of them by
+statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">156</a></span>
+lengthens a war and adds to its
+cost enormously (South Africa, etc.).
+Used thus, these principles give us a
+theoretically correct ground for criticism.</p>
+
+<p>II. These principles also give us a
+theoretically correct ground for anticipating
+what the action of our opponents in
+any future war will be, the measure of
+the forces they will bring to bear, how
+they will direct those forces, and the
+amount of energy, resolution, and boldness
+with which they will use them against
+us. It is an axiom always to assume that
+the enemy will do the best and wisest
+thing, and to prepare accordingly.</p>
+
+<p>III. These principles also give us a
+theoretically correct ground for our own
+counter-preparations. We require to take
+the most dangerous war which is probable
+or possible, and make every imaginable
+preparation to carry out these principles
+therein.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">157</a></span>
+In such a case how are we going to
+render it possible for our generals to win,
+and thus save the nation from the irreparable
+consequences and the huge war
+indemnity of £800,000,000 or so, which
+would follow defeat? How are we going
+to do it? How are we going to render
+it possible for our generals to employ
+the best strategy? The ideal of strategy,
+always to be aimed at, is the double
+superiority of numbers. How are we
+going to give our generals that? If we
+cannot do that, how are we going to give
+them even any superiority <em>at all</em>, so that
+they may be able to carry out the first
+principle of strategy? How? Or are
+we going to make <span class="smcap smaller">NO</span> <em>adequate preparations</em>
+for these three eventualities, and
+when one of them suddenly comes ask
+our generals to save us from the fate we
+have brought upon ourselves, by performing
+the impossible? It is in this way<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">158</a></span>
+that a statesman should use these few
+great simple principles of strategy in
+order to attain his political object and
+safeguard the interests of the nation.</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">161</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY</span></h2>
+
+<p>Now, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory
+of war is easy enough to understand.
+There is no reason&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;one might almost
+say no excuse&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;why every one, soldier
+or statesman, should not know it fairly
+well. The great leading principles of
+strategy are few and simple. There is
+no reason why every one, soldier and
+statesman, should not understand and
+know these few simple principles thoroughly,
+and have them at his finger ends
+ready to apply them to the consideration
+of any military question, past, present,
+or future. So far all is easy. But when
+it is a question of carrying out in actual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">162</a></span>
+war this easy theory, these simple strategical
+principles, then it is <span class="smcap smaller">QUITE</span> a different
+matter, then it is a matter of the very
+greatest difficulty. This is a difference
+which the mind always finds very hard
+to grasp, as witness the denunciations
+with which any failure in execution by
+a general, no matter how great the real
+difficulties with which he had to contend,
+is nearly always greeted. Observers rarely
+make allowances for these difficulties,
+very largely probably because they do
+not understand them. The present chapter
+is devoted to these difficulties of
+execution in war.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Genius for War</span></h3>
+
+<p>In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the
+genius for <span class="locked">war"<a name="FNanchor_60" id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a></span> he sets forth the
+difficulties which confront a general, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">163</a></span>
+character and genius, the driving and
+animating force, required to overcome
+the friction of war. It is impossible to
+abstract it adequately; I can only advise
+all to read it for themselves. But I will
+endeavour to give an idea of it.</p>
+
+<p>After discussing the various sorts of
+courage required by a general, physical
+before danger and moral before responsibility,
+the strength of body and mind,
+the personal pride, the patriotism, the
+enthusiasm, etc., he comes to the unexpected.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>War</em>," he says, "<em>is the province of
+uncertainty. Three-fourths of those things
+upon which action in war must be calculated
+are hidden more or less in the
+clouds of great uncertainty.</em> Here, then,
+above all other, a fine and penetrating
+mind is called for, to grope out the
+truth by the tact of its judgment."
+Mark this point, that three-fourths of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">164</a></span>
+the things that we as critics <span class="smcap smaller">AFTER</span> the
+event know, when all information of the
+situation has been collected and published,
+were unknown to the general
+who had to decide, or only dimly guessed
+at from a number of contradictory reports.</p>
+
+<p>"From this uncertainty of all intelligence
+and suppositions, <em>this continual
+interposition of chance</em>." "Now, if he
+is to get safely through <em>this perpetual
+conflict with the unexpected</em>, two qualities
+are indispensable; in the first place <em>an
+understanding which, even in the midst
+of this intense obscurity, is not without
+some traces of inner light</em>, which <em>lead to
+the truth</em>, and then <em>the courage to follow
+this faint light</em>. The first is expressed by
+the French phrase <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">coup d'&oelig;il</i>; the second
+is resolution."</p>
+
+<p>"Resolution is an <em>act of courage in
+face of responsibility</em>." "The forerunner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">165</a></span>
+of resolution is an act of the mind making
+plain the necessity of venturing and thus
+influencing the will. This quite peculiar
+direction of the mind, which conquers
+every other fear in man by the fear of
+wavering or doubting, is what makes up
+resolution in strong minds."</p>
+
+<p>The vital importance of firmness and
+resolution, so strongly urged by Clausewitz,
+will be apparent to all if we reflect
+how even the strongest characters have
+been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation
+in war. Compare, for instance,
+York <abbr>v.</abbr> Wartenburg's masterly exposition
+of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation
+in 1813 at Dresden.</p>
+
+<p>Also there is required "<em>the power of
+listening to reason in the midst of the
+most intense excitement</em>, in the storm of
+the most violent passions."</p>
+
+<p>"But to keep to the result of by-gone
+reflections in opposition to the stream<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">166</a></span>
+of opinions and phenomena which the
+present brings with it, is just <span class="smcap smaller">THE</span> difficulty."
+"Here nothing else can help
+us but an imperative maxim which,
+independent of reflection, at once controls
+it: that maxim is, <em>in all doubtful cases
+to adhere to the first opinion and not to
+give it up till a clear conviction forces us
+to do so</em>."</p>
+
+<p>"But as soon as difficulties arise, and
+that must always happen when great
+results are at stake, then the machine,
+the army itself, begins to offer a sort
+of passive resistance, and to overcome
+this the commander must have great
+force of will." Driving power, such as
+Napoleon's. And also "the heart-rending
+sight of the bloody sacrifice, which the
+commander has to contend with in himself."</p>
+
+<p>"These are the weights which the
+courage and intelligent faculties of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">167</a></span>
+commander have to contend with and
+<span class="smcap smaller">OVERCOME</span>, if he is to make his name
+illustrious." If he is to prevent the
+downfall of his country.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3>
+
+<p>(1) In connection with these difficulties
+I would like to put forward a suggestion
+as to criticism of a general's action in
+war, which though not exactly Clausewitz's,
+is a corollary from Clausewitz.
+It is this. In reading a war with the
+clearness and after-knowledge of history
+nearly all defeats are easily seen to be
+due to the non-observance of one or
+other of the few leading principles of
+strategy referred to in the previous
+chapter. But we must assume that the
+defeated general was <em>familiar</em> with that
+principle, and that his <em>will</em> was to carry
+it out. What, then, were the difficulties,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">168</a></span>
+the friction, which, on any particular
+day or days, overcame his will and
+made him sacrifice the principle? This
+is where most critics fail us. Here seems
+the matter to search for. And could a
+stronger resolution have enabled him to
+overcome those difficulties, that friction?
+And if so, how and by what means?
+But we must first discover the difficulties
+and uncertainties of the particular day
+when his will gave way. Take the
+Manchurian campaign as an instance.
+If we could only have a military history
+of the campaign of 1870 or that of
+Manchuria, written in the form of a
+series of "appreciations of the situation,"
+so that we know nothing but what the
+general knew at the time as we read, and
+if the true state of affairs could be withheld
+from us till the end, this, I think,
+would be very instructive and helpful.
+It would be a more difficult way of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">169</a></span>
+writing a military history, but I think
+that the extra trouble would be repaid
+by the extra value. So at least it appears.</p>
+
+<p>(2) If we reflect upon the enormous
+difficulties, so strikingly brought out by
+Clausewitz, which <em>our</em> generals have to
+contend with and <em>overcome</em> in actual war,
+it should surely teach us to curb our
+criticism. It should surely also make us
+resolve in future to try to aid them as
+far as is in our power at home, and not
+thoughtlessly to increase their already
+stupendous burdens. In the past we at
+home have much to accuse ourselves of,
+much to regret. In the past often
+have we added to the difficulties of our
+generals, often have we greatly weakened
+their chances, and increased those of their
+opponents, often have we, unintentionally,
+through ignorance cast a weight
+into the scale against our country.</p>
+
+<p>(3) The ignorance of the public regarding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">170</a></span>
+the conduct of war constitutes
+for us a very serious national danger.
+If this ignorance were less pronounced,
+if our statesmen understood the vast
+importance of information to the enemy,
+and the equal importance to our generals
+that this information the enemy should
+<span class="smcap smaller">NOT</span> obtain, then the public craving for
+information regarding every detail of
+what occurs in the field, and the demand
+for the wide publication thereof, would
+certainly be repressed. Nothing occurs
+in any of our campaigns which is not
+immediately made known; reports of
+actions with the fullest details as to the
+troops engaged, and the casualties that
+have befallen them, appear in the columns
+of the Press within a few hours of their
+occurrence. <em>Any efforts, therefore, of our
+generals</em> in the field to maintain <em>secrecy
+as to strength, intentions, and movements
+are deliberately</em>, though probably unintentionally,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">171</a></span>
+<em>counteracted by their own
+countrymen</em>. This is due to pure ignorance
+of war, no doubt, but the effect
+of this ignorance is as bad as if it were
+due to evil intention. In fairness, however,
+we must admit that, in the past,
+the immense value of reticence has not
+been fully appreciated by some of our
+soldiers themselves, and it were well if,
+in the future, more attention were directed
+to the importance of secrecy.</p>
+
+<p>The results of such almost criminal
+stupidity may not be apparent when we
+are fighting with a savage foe, but if
+we ever have, as we undoubtedly some
+day shall have, the misfortune to find
+ourselves engaged with a civilized Power,
+we may be certain that not only will the
+operations be indefinitely prolonged, <em>and
+their cost enormously increased</em>, but their
+successful issue will be for us highly
+problematical.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">172</a></span>
+In this connection it must be remembered
+that every Great Power has secret
+agents in every country, including Great
+Britain, and that it will be easy for such a
+secret agent to telegraph in cypher or
+in some agreed code to an agent in a
+neutral State all war information published
+here, who will telegraph it on at
+once to the hostile general, who will
+thus get, within a very short time of its
+publication in London, perhaps just exactly
+the information he requires to clear up
+the strategical or tactical situation for
+him, and enable him to defeat the combinations
+of our generals. As a case in
+point, take Macmahon's march on Sedan
+to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy
+was absolutely necessary for success, but
+which became known to the Germans
+by the English newspapers.&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;Result,
+Sedan.</p>
+
+<p>That this cannot be allowed is plain.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">173</a></span>
+It is believed that the patriotism of our
+Press will welcome any necessary measure
+to this end if it is made compulsory upon
+<span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span>.<a name="FNanchor_61" id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a></p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">177</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">TACTICS</span></h2>
+
+<p>Some will probably feel inclined to ask
+what Clausewitz, who wrote more than
+eighty years ago, can possibly have to
+say about tactics which can be valuable
+in the twentieth century.</p>
+
+<p>It was said by Napoleon that tactics
+change every ten years, according, of
+course, to the progress of technicalities,
+etc. Weapons indeed change, but there
+is one thing that never changes, and
+that is human nature. The most important
+thing in tactics, the man behind
+the gun, never alters; in his heart and
+feelings, his strength and weakness, he is
+always much the same.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">178</a></span>
+Therefore, Clausewitz's tactical deductions,
+founded on the immense and varied
+data supplied by the desperate and long-continued
+fighting of the Revolutionary
+and Napoleonic wars, permeated as they
+are by his all-pervading psychological or
+moral view, can never lose their value
+to us.</p>
+
+<p>It is true, no doubt, that our rifles of
+to-day can be used with effect at a
+distance ten times as great as the old
+smooth bores of Clausewitz's day, our
+shrapnel five times as far as his cannon,
+and that cover and ground play a far
+more important part now than then, and
+so on. All these things, of course, considerably
+modify the tactics of Clausewitz.
+Not so much, however, as some text-books
+would lead us to suppose, which always
+seem to assume clear ground and clear
+weather. For, after all, how many combats
+are fought on ground where there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">179</a></span>
+is a very restricted field of fire (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vide</i>
+Herbert's "Defence of Plevna," etc.), or
+at night? How many battles are fought
+during rain, or snow, or mist, or fog,
+which destroys all long range? Compare
+the tremendous fighting with "bullets,
+bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and
+even fists," of Nogi's attempt to cut the
+Russian line of retreat at Mukden, with
+the hand-to-hand fighting of Eylau, Friedland,
+Borodino, or with the desperate
+efforts of the French in 1812 to open their
+line of retreat through Maro-Jaroslawitz,
+where all day the masses of troops fought
+hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town
+was taken and retaken seven times, and
+the rival nations fought with the bayonet
+in the midst of the burning houses"
+(Alison).</p>
+
+<p>When it comes to push of pike, as in
+all great decisions between equally resolute
+adversaries it is bound to do, the difference<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">180</a></span>
+between the fighting of Clausewitz's
+day and ours is but small. The most
+recent instances of all, the hand-to-hand
+fighting in Manchuria, take us back to
+the Napoleonic struggles.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore, despite the eighty years
+that have intervened, the writings of
+Clausewitz are still valuable from a
+tactical point of view, always considering
+of course the difference in weapons,
+because of the human heart in battle.</p>
+
+<p>His ideas on tactics have largely filtered
+through his German pupils into our textbooks,
+minus the psychological or moral
+note, so that it is not necessary to go at
+length into the subject, or give a number
+of extracts. It would be wearisome. I
+will, however, give a few passages at haphazard
+as illustrations.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">181</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Flank Attacks</span></h3>
+
+<p>The endeavour to gain the enemy's line
+of retreat, and protect our own, on
+which so much learned erudition has
+been spent by various writers, he regards
+as a <span class="smcap smaller">NATURAL</span> instinct, which will <span class="smcap smaller">ALWAYS</span>
+produce itself both in generals and subalterns.</p>
+
+<p>"From this arises, in the whole conduct
+of war, and especially in great and small
+combats, a <span class="smcap smaller">PERFECT INSTINCT</span>, which is
+the security of our own line of retreat
+and the seizure of the enemy's; this
+follows from the conception of victory,
+which, as we have seen, is something
+beyond mere slaughter. In this effort
+we see, therefore, the <span class="smcap smaller">FIRST</span> immediate
+purpose in the combat, and one which
+is quite universal. No combat is <em>imaginable</em>
+in which this effort, either in its
+double or single form, is not to go hand<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">182</a></span>
+in hand with the plain and simple stroke
+of force. Even the smallest troop will
+not throw itself upon the enemy without
+thinking of its line of retreat, and in
+most cases it will have an eye upon that
+of the <span class="locked">enemy."<a name="FNanchor_62" id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a></span> "This is a great
+<em>natural law</em> of the combat," "and so
+becomes the pivot upon which <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> strategical
+and tactical man&oelig;uvres turn."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Reserves&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;Destructive and Decisive Act</span></h3>
+
+<p>The combat he regards as settled by
+whoever has the preponderance of moral
+force at the end; that is, in fresh or only
+partly used up troops.</p>
+
+<p>The combat itself he divides into a
+destructive and a decisive act. During
+the long destructive act, or period of fire
+preparation, the troops engaged gradually
+wear each other out, and gradually<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">183</a></span>
+almost cease to count as factors in the
+decision. "After a fire combat of some
+hours' duration, in which a body of
+troops has suffered severe losses&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;for
+instance, a quarter or one-third of its
+numbers&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">débris</i> may for the time
+be looked upon as a heap of cinders.
+For the men are physically exhausted;
+they have spent their ammunition; many
+have left the field with the wounded,
+though not themselves wounded (compare,
+for instance, Eylau and the 1870 battles);
+the rest think they have done their part
+for the day, and if they get beyond the
+sphere of danger, do not willingly return
+to it. The feeling of courage with which
+they originally started has had the edge
+taken off, the longing for the fight is
+satisfied, the original organization is partly
+destroyed, and the formations broken up."</p>
+
+<p>"So that the amount of moral force
+lost may be estimated by the amount of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">184</a></span>
+the Reserves used up, almost as with a
+foot <span class="locked">rule."<a name="FNanchor_63" id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">63</a></span></p>
+
+<p>This goes on till, "In all probability,
+only the untouched reserve and some
+troops which, though they have been in
+action, have suffered very little, are in
+reality to be regarded as serviceable, and
+the remainder (perhaps four-sixths) may
+be looked upon for the present as a
+"caput mortuum."</p>
+
+<p>Therefore the art of the commander
+he regards as "economy of force" during
+the destructive period; that is, to employ
+as few troops as possible, by taking
+advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to
+use a smaller number of men in the
+combat with firearms than the enemy
+employs," so that a smaller proportionate
+number of his own are reduced to a
+"heap of cinders" and more are left,
+more moral force, for the decision.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">185</a></span>
+"Hundreds of times," he says, "a line
+of fire has maintained its own against
+one twice its strength" (<abbr>e.g.</abbr> the Boers).</p>
+
+<p>To do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect
+demands very skilful handling of
+the troops, both on the part of the chief
+and subordinate leaders.</p>
+
+<p>With the preponderance thus obtained
+the commander at last starts the decision.
+"Towards the close of a battle the line
+of retreat is always regarded with increased
+jealousy, therefore a threat against that
+line is always a potent means of bringing
+on the decision (Liao-yang, Mukden).
+On that account, when circumstances
+permit, the plan of battle will be aimed
+at that point from the very first." Or,
+"If this wear and tear and exhaustion
+of the forces has reached a certain pitch,
+then a rapid advance in concentrated
+masses on one side against the line of
+battle of the other" (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> the Napoleonic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">186</a></span>
+breaking the centre, of recent years
+thought almost hopeless, but revived in
+Manchuria with success, in the case of
+Nodzu breaking the centre at Mukden).</p>
+
+<p>From what precedes it is evident that,
+as in the preparatory acts, the utmost
+economy of forces must prevail, so in
+the decisive act to win the mastery
+through <em>numbers</em> must be the ruling idea.</p>
+
+<p>Just as in the preparatory acts endurance,
+firmness and coolness are the first
+qualities, so in the decisive act boldness
+and fiery spirit must predominate.</p>
+
+<p>"The difference between these two
+acts will never be completely lost as
+respects the whole."</p>
+
+<p>"This is the way in which our view
+is to be understood; then, on the one
+hand, it will not come short of the
+reality, and on the other it will direct
+the attention of the leader of a combat
+(be it great or small, partial or general)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">187</a></span>
+to giving each of the two acts of activity
+its due share, so that there may be
+neither precipitation nor negligence.</p>
+
+<p>"<em>Precipitation</em> there will be if space
+and time are not allowed for the destructive
+act. <em>Negligence</em> in general there will
+be if a complete decision does not take
+place, either from want of moral courage
+or from a wrong view of the <span class="locked">situation."<a name="FNanchor_64" id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">64</a></span></p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Duration of the Combat</span></h3>
+
+<p>"Even the resistance of an ordinary
+division of 8,000 or 10,000 men of all
+arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably
+superior in numbers, will last
+several hours, if the advantages of country
+are not too preponderating. And if the
+enemy is only a little or not at all superior
+in numbers, the combat will last half a
+day. A corps of three or four divisions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">188</a></span>
+will prolong it to double that time; an
+army of 80,000 or 100,000 men to three
+or four times." "These calculations are
+the result of <span class="locked">experience."<a name="FNanchor_65" id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">65</a></span></p>
+
+<p>As General von Caemmerer points out,
+if these calculations were adhered to in
+present-day German man&oelig;uvres, as they
+are now in all war games, tactical exercises,
+and staff rides, the dangerous
+dualism of their training, the difference
+between theory and man&oelig;uvre practice,
+would cease.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Attack and Defence</span></h3>
+
+<p>I have left to the last the consideration
+of three or four disputed points in Clausewitz.
+In considering these I shall quote
+a good deal from General von Caemmerer's
+"Development of Strategical
+Science," as in such matters it is best to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">189</a></span>
+quote the most recent authors of established
+reputation.</p>
+
+<p>The most important of these, and the
+most disputed, is Clausewitz's famous
+dictum that "the defensive is the stronger
+form of making war." "The defence is
+the stronger form of war with a negative
+object; the attack is the weaker form
+with a positive <span class="locked">object."<a name="FNanchor_66" id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">66</a></span></p>
+
+<p>General von Caemmerer says, "It is
+strange, we Germans look upon Clausewitz
+as indisputably the deepest and
+acutest thinker upon the subject of war;
+the beneficial effect of his intellectual
+labours is universally recognized and
+highly appreciated; but the more or
+less keen opposition against this sentence
+never ceases. And yet that sentence
+can as little be cut out of his work 'On
+War' as the heart out of a man. Our
+most distinguished and prominent military<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">190</a></span>
+writers are here at variance with
+Clausewitz.</p>
+
+<p>"Now, of course, I do not here propose
+to go into such a controversy. I only
+wish to point out that Clausewitz, in
+saying this, only meant the defensive-offensive,
+the form in which he always
+regards it, both strategically and technically,
+in oft-repeated explanations all
+through his works. For <span class="locked">instance&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"It is a <span class="smcap smaller">FIRST</span> maxim <span class="smcap smaller">NEVER</span> to remain
+perfectly passive, but to fall upon the
+enemy in front and flank, even when he
+is in the act of making an attack upon <span class="locked">us."<a name="FNanchor_67" id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">67</a></span></p>
+
+<p>And <span class="locked">again&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"<em>A swift and vigorous assumption of
+the offensive&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the flashing sword of vengeance&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;is
+the most brilliant point in the
+defensive.</em> He who does not at once
+think of it at the right moment, or rather
+he who does not from the first include<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">191</a></span>
+this transition in his idea of the defensive,
+will never understand its superiority as a
+form of <span class="locked">war."<a name="FNanchor_68" id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">68</a></span> Von Caemmerer comments
+thus: "And this conception of
+the defence by Clausewitz has become
+part and parcel of our army&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;everywhere,
+strategically and tactically, he who has
+been forced into a defensive attitude at
+once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack.
+I am thus unable to see how
+the way in which Clausewitz has contrasted
+Attack and Defence could in any
+way paralyse the spirit of enterprise."
+Von Caemmerer also justly remarks that,
+as Clausewitz always insisted both in
+strategy and tactics, neither Attack nor
+Defence is pure, but oscillates between
+the two forms; and as the Attack is
+frequently temporarily reduced to defend
+itself, and also as no nation can be sure
+of never being invaded by a superior<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">192</a></span>
+coalition, it is most desirable to encourage
+a belief in the strength of the Defence,
+if properly used. In this I think that
+Wellington would probably have agreed.
+Certainly Austerlitz and Waterloo were
+examples of battles such as Clausewitz
+preferred.</p>
+
+<p>Still, one must admit that Clausewitz's
+chapter on "The Relations of the Offensive
+and Defensive to each other in
+Tactics," Book VII. Chapter 2, is the
+least convincing chapter of his work.</p>
+
+<p>Strategically, the argument is stronger.
+It always seems to me that we must
+remember that Clausewitz had taken
+part in the defensive-offensive in its
+strongest, most absolute and unlimited
+form, on the greatest possible scale&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the
+Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated
+before a single flake of snow fell)
+of the Grand Army. If he had lived to
+complete the revision of his works, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">193</a></span>
+always seems to me that he would have
+made his theory undeniable by stating
+that the defensive is the strongest form
+of war, <em>if unlimited by space</em>. What, for
+instance, would have happened if the
+Japanese had tried to march through
+Siberia on to St. Petersburg?</p>
+
+<p>But, after all, which of the two is
+absolutely the stronger form of war,
+attack or defence, is merely a theoretical
+abstraction, for, practically, the choice
+is always settled for us by the pressing
+necessity of circumstances. And, in this
+connection, let us always bear in mind
+Clausewitz's dictum: "A swift and
+vigorous assumption of the offensive&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;the
+flashing sword of vengeance&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;is the
+most brilliant point in the defensive."</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Inner Line</span></h3>
+
+<p>A second disputed point is Clausewitz's
+alleged preference, as a rule, for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">194</a></span>
+Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary
+to remember that that was only
+due to the conditions of his time, before
+railways and telegraphs, when it was
+difficult to communicate between columns
+acting on concentric lines. And he is
+not in any way wedded to the Inner
+Line, like Jomini, but <em>only</em> when circumstances
+are favourable. He has many
+sentences from which we may infer that,
+had he lived in railway and telegraph
+days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most
+distinguished pupil, would have aimed
+at envelopment as a rule. For to bring
+up troops rapidly by several railways
+necessitates a broad strategic front, and
+Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity
+as his second great principle, and <span class="locked">says&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<p>"If the concentration of the forces
+would occasion detours and loss of time,
+and the danger of advancing by separate
+lines is not too great, then the same may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">195</a></span>
+be justifiable on these grounds; for <em>to
+effect an unnecessary concentration of the
+forces</em> would be contrary to the second
+principle we have laid down (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> 'to act
+as swiftly as possible')."<a name="FNanchor_69" id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> Also: "Such
+separation into several columns as is
+absolutely necessary must be made use
+of for the disposition of the tactical attack
+in the enveloping form, <em>for that form is
+natural to the attack, and must not be
+disregarded without good reason</em>."<a name="FNanchor_70" id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> Also:
+"<em>It is sufficient now if the concentration
+takes place during the action.</em>" So that
+while the conditions of his time led
+Clausewitz to prefer close concentration
+and the Inner Line, like Napoleon, yet his
+reflections led him to propound the
+germ of the strategy of Moltke. Substitute
+for Clausewitz's close concentration
+this: "As close concentration, the combined
+movements regulated by telegraph,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">196</a></span>
+as is compatible with the utmost use of
+the railways and the greatest rapidity"
+(as he would certainly have said), and
+we arrive at Moltke's strategy.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Frontal Attacks</span></h3>
+
+<p>A third disputed point is his belief in
+the superior tactical efficiency, under
+favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic
+method of breaking the enemy's
+line in the centre. Breaking the line by
+a frontal attack was, of course, much
+easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic day
+than it is with the long-ranging arms of
+our day, and it is only natural that
+Clausewitz in his writings should give it
+the full tactical importance which it then
+deserved. His book would not be true
+to the tactical conditions of his day had
+he not done so, with Rivoli, Austerlitz,
+Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">197</a></span>
+mind. But it seems hardly correct to
+accuse him of over-partiality to frontal
+attacks, for he has examined both frontal
+and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving
+to each their relative advantages and
+disadvantages, and concluding: "The
+envelopment may lead directly to the
+<em>destruction</em> of the enemy's army, if it is
+made with very superior numbers and
+succeeds. If it leads to victory the early
+results are <em>in every case</em> greater than by
+breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the
+enemy's line can only lead indirectly to
+the destruction of the enemy's army, and
+its effects are hardly shown so much on
+the first day, but rather strategically
+<span class="locked">afterwards,"<a name="FNanchor_71" id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">71</a></span> by forcing apart on different
+lines of retreat the separated fragments
+of the beaten army.</p>
+
+<p>"The breaking through the hostile
+army by massing our principal force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">198</a></span>
+against one point, <em>supposes an excessive
+length of front on the part of the enemy</em>;
+for in this form of attack the difficulty
+of occupying the remainder of the enemy's
+force with few troops is greater, because
+the enemy's forces nearer to the principal
+point of attack can easily join in opposing
+it. Now in an attack upon the centre
+there are such forces on both sides of
+the attack; in an attack upon a flank,
+only on one side. The consequence of
+this is that such a central attack may
+easily end in a very disadvantageous form
+of combat, <em>through a convergent counter-attack</em>."
+Which is exactly our modern
+difficulty. "The choice between these two
+forms of attack must therefore be made
+according to the existing conditions of
+the moment. Length of front, the nature
+and direction of the line of retreat, the
+military qualities of the enemy's troops,
+and the characteristics of their general,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">199</a></span>
+lastly the ground must determine the
+choice."</p>
+
+<p>Speaking generally he regards the <em>concentric</em>
+enveloping form of tactical attack
+aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as
+the most efficacious and natural. "On
+the field of battle itself ... the enveloping
+form must always be considered the
+most <span class="locked">effectual."<a name="FNanchor_72" id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">72</a></span> And the <em>eccentric</em> or
+frontal counter-attack at the extended
+enveloping attack as the most efficacious
+and natural form of the defence, such as
+Napoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz
+or Dresden, or Wellington's at Salamanca.
+"And we think that one means is at
+least as good as the <span class="locked">other."<a name="FNanchor_73" id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">73</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="tb">*<span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span></div>
+
+<p>Now I think that these extracts sufficiently
+defend Clausewitz from the imputation
+of too great a belief in frontal
+attacks, and considering the frequent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">200</a></span>
+success of such Napoleonic attacks in his
+day, he gives a very fair summing up of
+the relative advantages and disadvantages
+thereof, and indeed such as might be
+written in the present day. Indeed the
+quite abnormal conditions of the Boer
+war produced such a feeling against
+frontal attacks, and so much loose talk
+of their being extinct, that it is very
+useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder
+that breaking the centre, whenever
+the condition he postulates, namely <em>over-extension
+of front</em> on the enemy's part, is
+present, will always remain one of the
+two great forms of decisive attack open
+to a commander.</p>
+
+<p>And as in our day the forces are so
+enormous that to reach the hostile flank
+becomes more difficult, and the extension
+of front becomes so gigantic (a front of
+several armies on a line of forty to seventy
+miles perhaps), it is well to consider<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">201</a></span>
+whether breaking the enemy's centre will
+not again offer the most advantageous
+form for the final decisive act, coupled
+of course, as Clausewitz says it <span class="smcap smaller">ALWAYS
+MUST</span> be, with a strong flank attack.
+And in these gigantic battles of the
+future, such as Liao-yang and Mukden,
+which we must consider typical of the
+future, battles which must take several
+days, during which the troops in the first
+line become utterly exhausted and used
+up,&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;a decisive attack on the centre can
+well be imagined after the hostile reserves
+have been decoyed away over a day's
+march by a strong flank attack. As, for
+example, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden
+followed by Nodzu's decisive breaking
+the centre and capture of Mukden
+itself.</p>
+
+<p>So that far from thinking Clausewitz's
+remarks about frontal attacks and breaking
+the line to be obsolete, it rather<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">202</a></span>
+appears from the great Russo-Japanese
+battles that they are worthy of close
+study in view of the future.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Tactical versus Strategical
+Envelopment</span></h3>
+
+<p>A fourth disputed point is the preference
+of Clausewitz, owing to his insistence
+on the greatest concentration possible
+with proper regard for the circumstances,
+for the tactical envelopment arranged
+on or near the field to strategical envelopment
+with divided forces arranged beforehand.
+In this matter I will again quote
+General v. Caemmerer, who disagrees
+with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims
+the oblique front as the most
+effective strategic form of attack, ... that
+is to say, when the whole army with
+one united front falls upon the strategic
+<em>flank</em> of the enemy, and, if victorious,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">203</a></span>
+cuts him from his line of retreat. But
+where such a situation cannot be brought
+about, where our advance has brought
+us before the strategic <em>front</em> of the enemy,
+then he sees in the tactical envelopment,
+in the formation of an offensive flank,
+the proper means of effectively preparing
+to push the enemy from his line of retreat,
+and he distinctly explains that tactical
+envelopment need not at all be the
+<em>consequence</em> of strategical envelopment,
+and need not at all be prepared long
+beforehand by a corresponding advance
+of divided forces."</p>
+
+<p>Clausewitz says, "The consequence of
+this is that battles fought with enveloping
+lines, or even with an oblique front,
+which should properly result from an
+advantageous relation of the lines of
+communication, are commonly the result
+of a moral and physical <span class="locked">preponderance."<a name="FNanchor_74" id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">74</a></span><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">204</a></span>
+Also "he should therefore only advance
+with his columns on such a width of
+front as will admit of their all coming
+into action together." "Such separation
+into several columns should be made use
+of for the disposition of the tactical attack
+in the enveloping form" (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> by troops
+within a day's march of each other).
+"But it must be only of a tactical nature,
+for a strategic envelopment, when a great
+blow is to be struck, is a complete waste
+of power."</p>
+
+<p>General v. Caemmerer comments: "He
+is thus of opinion that the lateral movement
+of part of the army against the
+flank of the enemy could without any
+difficulty still be carried out as initiated
+by the plan of battle; and in order to
+understand this idea we must again bear
+in mind the difference between the fire-effect
+of then and now. In those days a
+comparatively short movement made it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">205</a></span>
+still possible for a considerable portion
+of the army to gain the defenders' flank;
+to-day a lengthy and troublesome operation
+would be necessary for the same
+object, and its successful execution would
+only be counted upon if the defender
+remained entirely passive, and would
+neither think of a counter-stroke nor
+of a corresponding movement of his
+forces to the threatened flank."</p>
+
+<p>Without going into this controversy I
+will, however, quote the excellent reason
+given by Clausewitz for his preference for
+tactical as opposed to strategical envelopment:
+"One peculiarity of the offensive
+battle is the uncertainty, in most cases,
+as to the position (note, and strength)
+of the enemy; it is a complete groping
+about amongst things that are unknown
+(Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena,
+Katzbach). The more this is the case
+the more concentration of forces becomes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">206</a></span>
+paramount, and turning a flank to be
+preferred to <span class="locked">surrounding."<a name="FNanchor_75" id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It is also well to recollect how many
+famous generals had been ruined in
+Clausewitz's experience through over-extension
+or dispersion of their forces.
+The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals
+in the winter of 1813, Macdonald
+at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren,
+Ney at Dennewitz, which neutralized
+Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and
+began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to
+this cause.</p>
+
+<p>And the weather may, again, have as
+great influence in shortening resistance
+and allowing troops to be overwhelmed
+before the too-distant reinforcements
+arrive, as it had in those battles. If the
+weather then prevented the old muskets
+going off, and enabled the attack to rush
+the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">207</a></span>
+snow, by restricting the field of view
+and fire, may produce the same results.
+When one thinks of the number of great
+battles fought in such weather, as they
+may well be again, one sees an additional
+reason for carefully considering Clausewitz's
+warning. Far from relegating his
+preference for the tactical as opposed to
+the strategical envelopment to the region
+of the obsolete, because of our improved
+armament, it seems right to give it full
+weight as a corrective to a perceivable
+tendency to elevate strategical envelopment
+(after Königgrätz) into a formula
+for victory. If in the past many great
+generals have been ruined by over-extension,
+so may they be again. Against
+this tendency Clausewitz will for ever
+lift his voice.</p>
+
+<p>Also it remains to be considered, with
+the huge armies of to-day and the future,
+such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">208</a></span>
+such armies as may possibly one day
+join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical
+envelopment will be practicable, or
+whether tactical envelopment, such as
+General Kuroki's tactical enveloping
+movement on Yentai, and the Russian
+line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General
+Nogi's tactical enveloping dash northward
+on Hsinminting and the railway
+at Mukden, will not be preferable.</p>
+
+<p>Perhaps, as a compromise, one might
+call such a movement strategical-tactical,
+and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of
+words.</p>
+
+<p>I have not attempted to do more than
+roughly indicate that the solution of
+these four disputed tactical questions in
+Clausewitz is to be sought in a study of
+the latest campaign, as he would have
+said himself; that is, the campaign in
+Manchuria. For, as the <i>Times</i> correspondent
+in the XLVth Chapter, "Clausewitz<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">209</a></span>
+in Manchuria," of his book "The
+War in the Far East," observes, "It will
+be abundantly clear to any one who
+has followed the great battles in Manchuria
+that the spirit of Clausewitz has
+presided over Japanese victories and wept
+over Russian defeats."</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">213</a></span></p>
+
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a><br />
+
+<span class="subhead">CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ</span></h2>
+
+<p>In reading Clausewitz it is, first, the
+great principles of the nature of war
+founded on human nature, which alter
+not; and, secondly, it is his spirit and
+practical way of looking at things that
+we want to assimilate and apply to <span class="smcap smaller">THE
+PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY</span>, to which end it
+is necessary to read him always with
+the changed conditions of to-day in our
+minds, and think what he would have
+said under the circumstances. These
+changes are <span class="locked">chiefly:&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;</span></p>
+
+<ul>
+<li>(1) &nbsp; The improved net-work of roads.</li>
+<li>(2) &nbsp; Railways.</li>
+<li>(3) &nbsp; Telegraphs, wire and wireless.</li>
+<li>(4) &nbsp; Improved arms.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">214</a></span></li>
+<li>(5) &nbsp; Aviation</li>
+<li>(6) &nbsp; Universal service armies.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Improved Net-work of Roads</span></h3>
+
+<p>The improved net-work of roads in
+Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria, or
+in Afghanistan where we have to consider
+our future strategy, but in Europe),
+as General v. Caemmerer puts it, "now
+offers to the movements of armies everywhere
+a whole series of useful roads
+where formerly one or two only were
+available," easier gradients, good bridges
+instead of unreliable ones, etc. So that
+the march-discipline of that day when
+concentrated for battle, artillery and train
+<em>on</em> the roads, infantry and cavalry <em>by the
+side</em> of the roads, has disappeared. Such
+close concentration is therefore now not
+possible, as we move all arms <em>on</em> the road,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">215</a></span>
+and an army corps with train, or two
+without, is the most that we can now
+calculate on bringing into action in one
+day on one road.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Railways</span></h3>
+
+<p>"Railways have, above all, completely
+altered the term 'base,'" remarks V.
+Caemmerer. "Railways carry in a few
+days men, horses, vehicles, and materials
+of all kinds from the remotest district
+to any desired point of our country, and
+nobody would any longer think of accumulating
+enormous supplies of all kinds
+at certain fortified points on his own
+frontier with the object of basing himself
+on those points. One does not base one's
+self any longer on a distinct district
+which is specially prepared for that
+object, but upon the whole country,
+which has become one single magazine,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">216</a></span>
+with separate store-rooms. So the term
+'base' has now to be considered in this
+light."</p>
+
+<p>It is only when operating in savage
+or semi-savage countries, where there
+are no railways, that the old idea of a
+base applies.</p>
+
+<p>As we penetrate deeper and further
+from our own country into the enemy's,
+and as a small raiding party can demolish
+the railway line so as to stop all traffic
+for days or weeks, it becomes far more
+necessary than it ever was in Clausewitz's
+day to guard our communications. And
+armies become more and more sensitive
+to any attack upon their communications.</p>
+
+<p>Also "such a line cannot easily be
+changed, and consequently those celebrated
+changes of the line of communication
+in an enemy's country which
+Napoleon himself, on some occasion,
+declared to be the ablest man&oelig;uvre in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">217</a></span>
+the art of war, could scarcely be carried
+out any more" (V. Caemmerer).</p>
+
+<p>Also concentration by means of several
+railways demands a broad strategic front,
+which produces that separation of corps
+or armies which prepares the way for
+strategical envelopment, and so on.</p>
+
+<p>General von der Goltz, in his "Conduct
+of War," says: "The more recent
+treatises on the conduct of war on a
+large scale are principally taken up with
+the mobilization and strategical concentration
+of armies, a department of
+strategy which only began to play an
+important part in modern times. It is
+the result of a dense net-work of railways
+in Western Europe which has rendered
+it possible to mass large bodies of troops
+in a surprisingly brief time. Each Power
+tries to outdo its neighbours in this
+respect, ... which gives an opportunity
+to the strategical specialist to show off<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">218</a></span>
+his brilliant qualities.... Consequently
+it is now frequently assumed that the
+whole conduct of war is comprised in
+this one section of it." This over-estimate
+is of course an error, which, however,
+requires to be pointed out.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Telegraphs</span></h3>
+
+<p>The telegraph has very greatly reduced
+the danger of separation. The great
+advantage of the inner line in the day
+of Napoleon and of Clausewitz was that
+separated forces could only communicate
+by mounted messengers, so if the enemy
+got between them they could not communicate
+at all, nor act in concert.
+This the telegraph has completely altered,
+for as the field telegraph can now be laid
+as quickly as an army can advance, the
+most widely separated bodies of troops
+can every day arrange combined operations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">219</a></span>
+by telegraph through, if necessary,
+a point one hundred or four hundred
+miles in rear. So that to-day the chief
+advantage of the inner line has gone,
+while its chief disadvantage, the possibility
+of being surrounded, remains.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Maps</span></h3>
+
+<p>We now possess complete detailed Ordnance
+maps of every country in Europe,
+kept up to date by the latest alterations,
+whereas in the days of Clausewitz maps
+were of the very roughest character, and
+quite unreliable in comparison.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Improved Arms</span></h3>
+
+<p>Smokeless powder, quick-firing and
+long-ranging artillery and rifles, the infantry
+field of effective fire being ten
+times, the artillery five times what it
+was in Clausewitz's time, have all to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">220</a></span>
+borne in mind when reading the tactical
+part of his writings. In consequence,
+also, cover and the tactical use of ground
+are of far greater importance now than
+then, etc., etc., etc.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Aviation</span></h3>
+
+<p>The recent wonderful developments in
+aviation will obviously almost revolutionize
+"Information in War." To what
+extent, it is as yet impossible to say.
+Each year will teach us more.</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Nation-in-Arms</span></h3>
+
+<p>The nation-in-arms as the common
+foundation of all armies (except our
+own), brought up by railways, vastly
+increases the numbers in a modern battle
+from what they were in Clausewitz's day.
+Compare Austerlitz, Dresden, Leipzig and
+Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">221</a></span>
+It should be so with us also, for as
+General von der Goltz says in "The
+Conduct of War": "The <span class="smcap smaller">BEST</span> military
+organization is that which renders available
+<span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> the intellectual and material
+resources of the country in event of war.
+<em>A State is not justified in trying to defend
+itself with only a portion of its strength,
+when the existence of the whole is at
+stake.</em>"</p>
+
+<p>In Great Britain the difference which
+the introduction of this nation-in-arms
+principle has made in our military strength
+compared with that of our future opponents,
+a difference relatively <span class="smcap smaller">FAR GREATER
+AGAINST US</span> than it was in Napoleon's
+and Clausewitz's day, is as yet hardly
+realized by the people, or by our statesmen.
+People forget the wastage of war,
+and the necessity for a constant flow of
+troops to repair that wastage. As Von
+der Goltz puts it: "It is characteristic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">222</a></span>
+of the strategical offensive that the foremost
+body of troops of an army, the
+portion which fights the battles, amounts
+to only a comparatively small fraction,
+frequently only <em>a quarter or even one-eighth</em>,
+of the total fighting strength
+employed, whilst the fate of the whole
+army throughout depends upon the success
+or failure of this fraction. <em>Attacking
+armies melt away like snow in the spring.</em>"
+To condense his remarks: "In spite of
+the most admirable discipline, the Prussian
+Guard Corps lost 5000 to 6000 men in
+the marches between the attack on St.
+Privat and the battle of Sedan." "Napoleon
+crossed the Niemen in 1812 with
+442,000 men, but reached Moscow only
+three months later with only 95,000."
+In the spring of 1810, the French crossed
+the Pyrenees with 400,000 men, but
+still Marshal Massena in the end only
+brought 45,000 men up to the lines of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">223</a></span>
+Torres Vedras, near Lisbon, where the
+decision lay. Again, in 1829, the Russians
+put 160,000 men in the field, but
+had barely 20,000 left when, at Adrianople,
+a skilfully concluded peace saved
+them before their weakness became apparent
+and a reaction set in. In 1878 the
+Russians led 460,000 across the Danube,
+but they only brought 100,000 men&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;of
+whom only 43,000 were effective, the
+rest being sick&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;to the gates of Constantinople.
+In 1870 the Germans crossed
+the French frontier with 372,000 men,
+but after only a six weeks' campaign
+brought but 171,000 men to Paris. And
+so on. The result of it all is simple&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;that
+a people which is not based on the
+modern principle of the nation-in-arms
+cannot for long rival or contend with
+one that is, for it can neither put an equal
+(still less a superior) army into the field
+at the outset (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vide</i> Clausewitz's first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">224</a></span>
+principle), nor even maintain in the field
+the <em>inferior</em> army it does place there,
+because it cannot send the ever-required
+fresh supplies of trained troops. Sooner
+or later this must tell. Sooner or later a
+situation must arise in which the nation
+based on the obsolete voluntary system
+<em>must</em> go down before a nation based on
+the nation-in-arms principle. Circumstances
+change with time, and, as wise
+Lord Bacon said long ago, "He that will
+not adopt new remedies must expect new
+evils." May we adopt the remedy before
+we experience the evil!</p>
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">The Moral and Spiritual Forces in War</span></h3>
+
+<p>But though these changed conditions
+must, of course, <em>modify</em> Clausewitz's
+details in many important particulars,
+still (to complete our circle and leave off
+where we started) I repeat that, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">225</a></span>
+human nature never changes, and as
+the moral is to the physical as three to
+one in war, Clausewitz, as the great
+realistic and practical philosopher on the
+actual nature of war, as <em>the chief exponent
+of the moral and spiritual forces in war</em>,
+will ever remain invaluable in the study
+of war.</p>
+
+<p>Consider what unsurpassed opportunities
+he had for observing and reflecting
+on the influence of enthusiasm and
+passion, of resolution and boldness, of
+vacillation and weakness, of coolness and
+caution, of endurance and hardship, of
+patriotism and freedom, of ambition and
+of glory&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;on war, either by his own
+experience or by conversation with other
+equally experienced soldiers, during that
+long period of almost endless wars between
+1793 and 1815.</p>
+
+<p>The fervour and enthusiasm and boundless
+energy of the Revolution, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">226</a></span>
+drove the French forward, smashing
+everything before them, at the beginning;
+the ambition, military glory, plunder
+and greed, which animated them later
+on; the patriotism, religious and loyal
+devotion, and stern endurance, which
+nerved the Russian hosts then as now;
+that awful Moscow winter campaign,
+when human nature rose to its highest
+and sank to its lowest, when the extremes
+of heroic endurance and selfish callousness
+were visible side by side; the
+magnificent uprising of the spirit of
+liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression
+in Germany, which gave to the
+Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same
+driving force that revolutionary enthusiasm
+had formerly given to the French;
+the passing, therefore, in 1813 of the
+moral superiority, the greater driving
+force, from the French to the allies.
+Clausewitz saw all this; he conversed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">227</a></span>
+intimately with such men as Scharnhorst
+and Gneisenau, who saw and guided it,
+too. All his friends had seen it also.
+No wonder, then, that such an unexampled
+series of warlike phenomena
+deeply impressed his reflective mind with
+the supreme importance of the moral
+and spiritual factors in war.</p>
+
+<p>His opportunities for long-continued
+observation of warlike phenomena were
+far greater than those of any writer
+since his day, and it is to be hoped they
+will remain so. For we have no desire
+to see another series of wars such as the
+Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that
+there was then such a man as Clausewitz
+to sum up for us so simply and so clearly
+the accumulated experiences of those
+long, long years of carnage and devastation.</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center smaller"><i>Printed by Hazell, Watson &amp; Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.</i></p>
+
+<div class="footnotes">
+<h2><a name="FOOTNOTES" id="FOOTNOTES">FOOTNOTES</a></h2>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> Book IV. Chap. 10.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_3" id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_4" id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> Book I. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_5" id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_6" id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> Summary of Instruction, p. 120.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_7" id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> Book II. Chap. 6.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_8" id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> Book II. Chap. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_9" id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_10" id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Book II. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_11" id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> Book II. Chap. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_12" id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> Book II. Chap. 2.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_13" id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> Book II. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_14" id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_15" id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force
+the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable
+to submission.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_16" id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_17" id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_18" id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> Author's "Introduction."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_19" id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_20" id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> Book VII. Chap. 5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_21" id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> Book VII. Chap. 21.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_22" id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> Book VII. Chap. 21.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_23" id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_24" id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_25" id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_26" id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> Book I. Chap. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_27" id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> Book I. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_28" id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> Book I. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_29" id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> Book IV. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_30" id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_31" id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_32" id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_33" id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> Book III. Chap. 15.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_34" id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> Book VII. Chap. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_35" id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> Book I. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_36" id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> Book I. Chap. 5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_37" id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> Book I. Chap. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_38" id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> Book III. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_39" id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> Book III. Chaps. 16&ndash;18.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_40" id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> Book II. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_41" id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> Book III. Chap. 11.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_42" id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Book III. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_43" id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> Book V. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_44" id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> Book III. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_45" id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> Book VIII. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_46" id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> Book III. Chap. 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_47" id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> Book III. Chap. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_48" id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> Book III. Chap. 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_49" id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> Book III. Chap. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_50" id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> Book III. Chap. 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_51" id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> Book III. Chap. 11.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_52" id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Book VI. Chap. 28.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_53" id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> Book V. Chap. 10.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_54" id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_55" id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> Book III. Chap. 13.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_56" id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> Book I. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_57" id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_58" id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_59" id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_60" id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> Book I. Chap. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_61" id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> This warning as to the consequences of allowing
+information to be published freely which would be helpful
+to an enemy was written five years ago. In the
+present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and its
+loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the
+enemy of any helpful information, show that the lesson
+here insisted on has been learned.&#8203;&mdash;&#8203;Editor's Note.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_62" id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> Book IV. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_63" id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> Book IV. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_64" id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> "Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136&ndash;146.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_65" id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="fnanchor">65</a> Book IV. Chap. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_66" id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> Book VI. Chap. 1.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_67" id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_68" id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> Book VI. Chap. 5.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_69" id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_70" id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> Book VII. Chap. 15.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_71" id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_72" id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="fnanchor">72</a> Book VI. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_73" id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> Book VII. Chap. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_74" id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> Book VII. Chap. 7.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a name="Footnote_75" id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="fnanchor">75</a> Book VII. Chap. 7.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="transnote">
+<h2><a name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber's Notes</a></h2>
+
+<p>Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
+preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p>
+
+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.</p>
+
+<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_133">133</a>: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period.</p>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Reality of War, by Stewart L. Murray
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+</body>
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Reality of War, by Stewart L. Murray
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Reality of War
+       A Companion to Clausewitz
+
+Author: Stewart L. Murray
+
+Editor: A. Hilliard Atteridge
+
+Release Date: November 17, 2013 [EBook #44200]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE REALITY OF WAR ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Charlie Howard and the Online Distributed
+Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was
+produced from images generously made available by The
+Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE REALITY OF WAR
+
+
+
+
+  THE
+  REALITY OF WAR
+
+  A COMPANION
+  TO CLAUSEWITZ
+
+  BY
+  MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY
+  LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS
+
+  POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY
+  A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE
+
+  LONDON
+  HODDER AND STOUGHTON
+  WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.
+
+  HUGH REES, LTD.
+  5 REGENT STREET, S.W.
+
+
+  _Reprinted in 1914_
+
+
+
+
+EDITOR'S PREFACE
+
+
+Great books, the masterpieces of the special branch of knowledge with
+which they deal, are often very big books; and busy men, who have not
+unlimited time for reading, find it helpful to have some one who will
+give them a general summary of a famous writer's teaching, and point
+out the most important passages in which the author himself embodies
+the very essence of his argument.
+
+This is what Major Murray has done for the most important work on war
+that was ever written. He does not give a mere dry summary of its
+contents. He sets forth, in language so plain that even the civilian
+reader or the youngest soldier can read it with interest, the essence
+of the teaching of Clausewitz, and he embodies in his book the most
+striking passages of the original work. He adds to each section of his
+subject some useful criticisms, and at the end of the book he sums up
+the effect of recent changes on the practice of war.
+
+The book is a popular manual of the realities of war, which should be
+read not only by soldiers, but by every one who takes an intelligent
+interest in the great events of our time.
+
+As to the practical value of the writings of Clausewitz, it may be
+well to quote here the words of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, the Professor
+of Military History at Oxford, from his introduction to the original
+edition of Major Murray's work:
+
+"Clausewitz was a Prussian officer who first saw fighting as a boy in
+1793, and whose experience of war lasted until 1815, when the great
+war ended. He was then thirty-five and spent the next fifteen years in
+trying to clear his mind on the subject of war, which he did by writing
+a number of military histories and a systematic treatise 'On War.' At
+the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts into a parcel, hoping to work
+at them again on the conclusion of the duties for which he was ordered
+from home. A little more than a year later he died at Breslau of
+cholera, and the papers, to which he had never put the finishing touch,
+were afterwards published by his widow.
+
+"Part of the value of his work is due to the exceptional opportunities
+which he enjoyed. When the war of 1806 began he had long been the
+personal adjutant of one of the Prussian princes, and an intimate
+friend of Scharnhorst, who was probably the greatest of Napoleon's
+contemporaries. In the period of reorganization which followed
+the Peace of Tilsit he made the acquaintance of Gneisenau, and of
+almost all the officers who made their mark in the subsequent wars
+of liberation. During the years of preparation he was Scharnhorst's
+assistant, first in the Ministry of War and then on the General Staff.
+During the campaign of 1812 he served with the Russian army as a
+staff officer. Thus his experience during the four years of the Wars
+of Liberation was that of one who was continually behind the scenes,
+always in touch with the Governments and Generals, and therefore better
+able than any one not so favourably placed to see everything in its
+proper perspective, and to follow and appreciate the considerations
+which directed the decisions both of statesmen and of the commanders
+of armies. His personal character was of the finest mould, and his
+writings have the sincerity, the absence of which makes it so difficult
+to rely upon those of Napoleon.
+
+"The ultimate test of the value of books is time. When Clausewitz
+died, the two books on war which were thought the best were those of
+the Archduke Charles of Austria and General Jomini. To-day the book
+of Clausewitz, 'On War,' easily holds the first place. It is the
+least technical of all the great books on war; from beginning to end
+it is nothing but common sense applied to the subject, but for that
+reason it is the hardest to digest, because common sense or a man's
+natural instinctive judgment on any subject is exceedingly hard to
+analyse and put into words. An exceptionally gifted man can go through
+this process, but few can follow it for any length of time without a
+distinct effort.
+
+"Almost every good institution has arisen out of the effort to provide
+a remedy for some evil, but in the imperfection of human nature nearly
+every institution brings with it fresh evils, which in their turn have
+to be counteracted. The modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism
+and its belief in knowledge, has grafted the examination system upon
+every form of education from the lowest to the highest. The British
+army shares in the benefits and in the disadvantages of the system,
+of which, in the case of an officer, the danger to be guarded against
+is that it tends to accustom a man to rely rather on his memory than
+his intelligence, and to lean more on other people's thinking than on
+his own. Clausewitz aimed at producing the very opposite result. He
+does not offer specific solutions of the various problems of war lest
+officers, in moments when their business is to decide and to act,
+should be trying to recall his precepts instead of using their eyes and
+their wits. His purpose rather is to enable them to understand what war
+is. He believed that if a man had accustomed himself to think of war as
+it really is, had got to know the different elements which go to make
+it up, and to distinguish those that are important from those that are
+comparative trifles, he would be more likely to know of himself what
+to do in a given situation, and would be much less likely to confuse
+himself by trying to remember what some general, long since dead, did
+on some occasion in which after all the position was by no means the
+same as that in which he finds himself."
+
+What is said here of the soldier actually engaged in war, is true also
+even of the onlooker who takes a patriotic interest in the progress of
+a war in which his country is involved. Unless he has a clear idea of
+the real character of modern war, and the principles on which success
+or failure depend, he will be utterly unable to grasp the significance
+of the events of which he reads each day. And it is of real importance
+that in time of war every citizen should judge soundly the course of
+events, for opinion influences action, and public opinion is made up of
+the ideas of the units who compose the public. In this connection it is
+well to bear in mind a point that is often overlooked, a point on which
+Clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing passage--namely, the fact
+that one of the main objects of a nation waging war is to force the
+enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. This
+fact is sufficient proof of the importance of public opinion being
+well informed not only as to the course of events, but also as to the
+principles that give to these events their real significance.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+  CHAPTER I
+
+                                           PAGE
+  THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ                      3
+
+
+  CHAPTER II
+
+  THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN
+    POLICY AND WAR                           11
+
+
+  CHAPTER III
+
+  THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ                 23
+
+
+  CHAPTER IV
+
+  THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR         33
+
+
+  CHAPTER V
+
+  THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED
+    IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR                 47
+
+
+  CHAPTER VI
+
+  PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR                      65
+
+
+  CHAPTER VII
+
+  THE NATURE OF WAR                          79
+
+
+  CHAPTER VIII
+
+  WAR AS POLICY                             119
+
+
+  CHAPTER IX
+
+  STRATEGY                                  137
+
+
+  CHAPTER X
+
+  THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY                 161
+
+
+  CHAPTER XI
+
+  TACTICS                                   177
+
+
+  CHAPTER XII
+
+  CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ      213
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ
+
+
+In an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the British public in
+even the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that
+he was not a mere theorist or bookworm. The wide and varied experience
+which the British officer gradually gains in so many different parts
+of the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces
+a certain distrust of them. Also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly
+one of our national characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal to the
+British officer or civilian, a writer must be a practical soldier.
+
+Such was General Clausewitz: a practical soldier of very great
+experience in the long series of wars 1793 to 1815, and one present
+throughout that most awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian
+campaign in 1812.
+
+"General Karl von Clausewitz was born near Magdeburg in 1780, and
+entered the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in 1792. He served in the
+campaigns of 1793-1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he entered the military
+school at Berlin as an officer, and remained there till 1803. He here
+attracted the notice of Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served
+as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, was present at the
+battle of Jena, and saw that awful retreat which ended a fortnight
+later in the surrender at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured, he
+was sent into France as a prisoner till the end of the war." "On his
+return (in November, 1807) he was placed on General Scharnhorst's
+staff, and employed on the work then going on for the reorganization
+of the Prussian army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the Russian service,
+was employed on the general staff, and was thus able to gain much
+experience in the most gigantic of all the struggles of his time." "In
+the spring campaign of 1813 (battles of Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as
+a Russian officer, was attached to Blucher's staff; during the winter
+campaign he found employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count Walmoden,
+who fought against Davoust on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid action
+of the Goerde was entirely the result of his able dispositions. In 1815
+he again entered the Prussian service, and was chief-of-the-staff to
+the III. Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny formed the left of the
+line of battle, and at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's army." "In
+addition to this, we may say, considerable practical training (note,
+enormous and varied indeed compared to any obtainable in the present
+day), he also possessed a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of
+military history, and also an uncommonly clear perception of general
+history" (Von Caemmerer). After the Peace he was employed in a command
+on the Rhine. In 1818 he became major-general, and was made Director of
+the Military School at Berlin. Here he remained for some years. This
+was the chief period of his writings. As General von Caemmerer, in his
+"Development of Strategical Science," puts it: "This practical and
+experienced, and at the same time highly cultured soldier, feels now,
+in peaceful repose, as he himself confesses, the urgent need to develop
+and systematize the whole world of thought which occupies him, yet also
+resolves to keep secret till his death the fruit of his researches, in
+order that his soul, which is thirsting for _Truth_, may be safely and
+finally spared all temptations from subordinate considerations."
+
+In 1830 he was appointed Director of Artillery at Breslau, and, having
+no more time for writing, sealed up and put away his papers, unfinished
+as they were. In the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff to
+Field-Marshal Gneisenau's army. In the winter of that year war with
+France was considered imminent, and Clausewitz had prospects of acting
+as chief of the general staff of the Commander-in-Chief Gneisenau. He
+then drew up two plans for war with France, which bear the stamp of
+that practical knowledge of war and adaptation of means to ends which
+distinguish his writings.
+
+In the same year the war scare passed away, the army of Gneisenau was
+disbanded, and Clausewitz returned to Breslau, where after a few days
+he was seized with cholera, and died in November, 1831, aged only 51.
+
+His works were published after his death by his widow.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN POLICY AND WAR
+
+
+From the day of their publication until now the influence of the
+writings of Clausewitz has been steadily growing, till to-day it is
+impossible to over-estimate the extent of that influence upon modern
+military and political thought, especially in Germany. As General von
+Caemmerer, in his "Development of Strategical Science," says: "Karl
+von Clausewitz, the pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and the confidant
+of Gneisenau, is in Germany generally recognized as the most prominent
+theorist on war, as the real philosopher on war, to whom our famous
+victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training."
+
+Field-Marshal Moltke was "his most distinguished pupil," and adapted
+the teaching of Clausewitz to the conditions of to-day.
+
+General von der Goltz, in the introduction to his great work, "The
+Nation in Arms," thus describes the veneration which he inspires: "A
+military writer who, after Clausewitz, writes upon the subject of war,
+runs the risk of being likened to a poet who, after Goethe, attempts a
+_Faust_, or, after Shakespeare, a _Hamlet_. Everything important that
+can be told about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the
+works which that great military genius has left behind him. Although
+Clausewitz has himself described his book as being something as yet
+incomplete, this remark of his must be taken to mean that he, too,
+was subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits, and was forced to
+feel that all he attained lay far beneath his ideal. For us, who knew
+not what that ideal was, his labours are a complete work. I have,
+accordingly, not attempted to write anything new, or of universal
+applicability about the science of warfare, but have limited myself to
+turning my attention to the military operations of our own day." One
+can hardly imagine a stronger tribute of admiration.
+
+And, as Moltke was Clausewitz's most distinguished pupil, so also
+are all those trained in the school of Moltke pupils of Clausewitz,
+including the most eminent of modern German military writers, such as
+General von Blume, in his "Strategy"; Von der Goltz, in his "Nation in
+Arms" and "The Conduct of War," who trained the Turkish General Staff
+for the campaign of 1897 against Greece and the battle of Pharsalia,
+etc.; General von Boguslawski; General von Verdy du Vernois, the
+father of the study of Applied Tactics; General von Schlichting, in his
+"Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present"; General Meckel,
+who trained the Japanese Staff, etc., etc.
+
+We all remember the telegram sent to General Meckel by Marshal Oyama
+after the battle of Liao-yang: "We hope you are proud of your pupils."
+
+Some time ago, when asked to give a lecture at Aldershot to the
+officers of the 2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me that it would
+be very interesting, anxious as we all were then to know the causes
+of the wonderful Japanese efficiency and success, if I could obtain a
+pronouncement from General Meckel how far he had been influenced in his
+teaching by Clausewitz. My friend Herr von Donat did me the favour to
+write to General von Caemmerer and ask him if he could procure me such
+a pronouncement which I might publish. General Meckel, whose death both
+Japan and Germany have since had to mourn, most kindly consented, and
+I esteem it a great honour to be allowed to quote part of his letter.
+He said: "I, like every other German officer, have, consciously or
+unconsciously, instructed in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz is
+the _founder_ of that theory of war which resulted from the Napoleonic.
+I maintain that _every one_ who nowadays either makes or teaches war
+in a modern sense, bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if he is not
+conscious of it." This opinion of General Meckel, to whose training of
+the Japanese General Staff the success of the Japanese armies must be
+largely attributed, is most interesting. It is not possible to give a
+stronger or more up-to-date example of the magnitude of the influence
+of Clausewitz.
+
+In this connection I should like to make a short quotation from "The
+War in the Far East," by the _Times_ military correspondent. In his
+short but suggestive chapter on "Clausewitz in Manchuria" he says: "But
+as all save one of the great battles in Manchuria have been waged by
+the Japanese in close accordance with the spirit and almost the letter
+of Clausewitz's doctrine, and as the same battles have been fought by
+the Russians in absolute disregard of them (though his works had been
+translated into Russian by General Dragomiroff long before the war),
+it is certainly worth showing how reading and reflection may profit
+one army, and how the neglect of this respectable practice may ruin
+another." "Clausewitz in Manchuria"! That brings us up to date. It is a
+far cry for his influence to have reached, and triumphed.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers.
+We may be sure, therefore, that the influence of Clausewitz on the
+Continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than
+the realm of war. From this thought arise many reflections. It will be
+sufficient here to suggest one. I would suggest that we should regard
+every foreign statesman, especially in Germany, as, consciously or
+unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. That is to say, we should
+regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the
+most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable
+part of policy. He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse
+of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as
+commercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument
+of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied
+accordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches,
+but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his
+State. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation
+shall impose its will upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait
+and wait, to make "every imaginable preparation," and finally to let
+loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out
+with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a
+whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and
+compel submission to its will by force.
+
+To talk to such a man of "the evils of war," or of "the burden of
+armaments"; or to propose to him "disarmament" or "reduction of
+armed forces," and so forth can only appear to him as the result of
+"imperfect knowledge." He will not say so, but he will think so, and
+act accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man
+one can only say, "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he
+fall."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ
+
+
+The writings of Clausewitz are contained in nine volumes, published
+after his death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly on his three
+volumes "On War," which have been translated by Colonel J. J. Graham
+(the last edition edited by Colonel F. N. Maude, and published by
+Messrs. Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls them "a collection of
+materials," "a mass of conceptions not brought into form," and states
+that he intended to revise, and throw the whole into more complete
+shape.
+
+We must lament that he did not live to complete his revision. But,
+on the other hand, it is perhaps possible that this unfinished
+state is really an advantage, for it leaves us free to apply his
+great maxims and principles and mode of thought to the ever-varying
+conditions of the present and future, unhampered by too complete a
+crystallization of his ideas written before more modern conditions of
+railways, telegraphs, and rapid long-ranging arms of precision, etc.,
+arose. It is perhaps this unfinished state which renders Clausewitz
+so essentially in touch with, and a part of, the onward movement and
+evolution of military thought. For his great aim was "the truth, the
+whole truth, and nothing but the truth," without preconception or
+favour, as far as he could go--essentially "a realist" of war--and what
+better aim can we set before ourselves?
+
+As Sir Arthur Helps has so well put it in his "Friends in Council,"
+every man needs a sort of central stem for his reading and culture. I
+wish here to say why I think that Clausewitz is admirably adapted to
+form such a main stem in the military culture of British officers.
+
+In the first place there is a lofty sort of tone about his writings
+which one gradually realizes as one reads them, and which I will not
+attempt to describe further than by saying that they stamp themselves
+as the writings of a gentleman of fine character.
+
+In the second place it is a book which "any fellow" can read, for
+there is nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse or mathematical or
+formal, no formulae or lines and angles and technical terms, such as in
+other writers, Jomini, Hamley, etc. Clausewitz is free from all such
+pedantries, which for my part, and I dare say for the part of many
+others, often "put one off" a book, and made one instinctively feel
+that there was something wrong, something unpractical about it, which
+rendered it hardly worth the sacrifice of time involved in its study.
+There is in Clausewitz nothing of that kind at all. All those lines and
+angles and formulae he dismisses in a few pages as of little practical
+importance.
+
+In the third place Clausewitz only goes in for experience and the
+practical facts of war. As he somewhat poetically puts it, "The
+flowers of Speculation require to be cut down low near the ground of
+Experience, their proper soil."[1] He is the great apostle of human
+nature and character as being everything in war. "All war supposes
+human weakness, and against that it is directed."[2] I believe that the
+British officer will find himself in sympathy with the great thinker
+on war, who asserts that "_Of_ _all military virtues Energy in the
+conduct of Operations has always conduced most to glory and success of
+arms_."[3]
+
+In the fourth place, to the practical mind will appeal his denunciation
+of all elaborate plans, because _Time_ is required for all elaborate
+combinations, and Time is just the one thing that an active enemy
+will not give us,--and his consequent deduction that all plans must
+be of the simplest possible form. His famous sentence, "_In war all
+things are simple, but the simple are difficult_,"[4] gives the key
+to his writings, for to _overcome those simple yet great difficulties
+he regards as the art of war_, which can only be done by the military
+virtues of perseverance, energy, and boldness.
+
+In the fifth place he does not want men to be bookworms, for he says:
+
+"_Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations
+in which we can be placed in war_."[5] And we can all reflect, without
+reading too many books. Also he says: "Much reading of history is
+not required for the above object. The knowledge of a few separate
+battles, _in their details_, is more useful than a general knowledge of
+several campaigns. On this account it is more useful to read detailed
+narratives and journals than regular works of history."[6] He wants
+history in detail, not a general smattering and a loose application
+thereof, which fault he strongly denounces. And he expressly states
+that the history of the very latest war is the most useful. All of
+which is very practical, and in accord with what we feel to be true.
+
+As he pictures war, "_the struggle between the spiritual and moral
+forces_ on _both_ sides is the centre of all,"[7] and to this aspect
+of the subject he gives much more attention than Jomini and most of
+Jomini's disciples. He has freed us once for all from all formalism.
+The formation of character, careful, practical, detailed study, and
+thorough preparation in peace, the simplest plans carried out with the
+utmost perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness in war--these are
+the practical fruits of his teaching.
+
+Therefore, I say again, that I do not think that the British officer
+could possibly find a more interesting or a better guide for the main
+stem of his reading than Clausewitz, nor any one that will appeal
+to his practical instincts of what is _True_ half so well. I do not
+believe that he could possibly do better than with Clausewitz as
+main stem, and a detailed study of the latest campaigns and modern
+technicalities as the up-to-date addition required to transform
+knowledge into action. I trust that every reader of Clausewitz will
+agree with me in this.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR
+
+
+"Moltke, the most gifted pupil of Clausewitz," "Moltke, who knew
+Clausewitz's book well, and often liked to describe him as the
+theoretical instructor." As Chaucer would say, "What needeth wordes
+more?"
+
+Clausewitz has treated practically every chief branch of strategy
+and tactics (except, of course, the present-day developments of
+railways, telegraphs, quick-firing guns, smokeless powder, universal
+service armies, etc.). The whole of his bulky work "On War" is full
+of interesting and sometimes eloquent and almost poetical passages,
+of concentrated, pregnant, and far-reaching thoughts on every
+subject. Through all these it is, of course, impossible to follow
+him in any introduction. One can really do no more than urge all to
+read Clausewitz for themselves, to go to the fountain-head, to the
+master-work itself. In the short space to which I have restricted
+myself, I propose, therefore, to concentrate on a few of his leading
+ideas, reluctantly leaving out many others which are really almost just
+as good.
+
+
+THEORY AND PRACTICE
+
+One of the things for which we are most deeply indebted to Clausewitz
+is that he has shown us clearly the proper place of theory in relation
+to practice. "It should educate the mind of the future leader in
+war, or, rather, guide him in his _self-instruction_, but _not_
+accompany him on to the battlefield; just as a sensible tutor forms
+and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without therefore keeping
+him in leading-strings all his life."[8] Again, "In real action most
+men are guided by the tact of judgment, which hits the object more or
+less accurately, according as they possess more or less genius. This
+is the way in which all great generals have acted, and therein partly
+lay their greatness and their genius, in that they always hit upon what
+was right by this tact. Thus also it will always be in _action_, and
+so far this tact is amply sufficient. But when it is a question not of
+acting one's self, but of convincing others _in consultation_, then
+all depends upon clear conceptions and demonstrations and the inherent
+relations; and so little progress has been made in this respect that
+most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no
+firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion,
+or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle
+course really without any value. Clear ideas on these matters are not,
+therefore, wholly useless."[9]
+
+How true this is any one will admit who reflects for a moment upon
+the great diversity of opinions on almost every subject held in our
+army, just because of this want of a central theory common to all. In
+the domain of tactics it is evident that this holds good even as in
+strategy, for a common central theory of war will produce a more or
+less common way of looking at things, from which results more or less
+common action towards the attainment of the common object.
+
+
+REJECTION OF SET AND GEOMETRICAL THEORIES
+
+"It should educate the mind of the future leader in war" is what
+Clausewitz demands from a useful theory; but he most expressly and
+unreservedly rejects every attempt at a method "by which definite
+plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if
+from a machine."[10] He mocks at Buelow's including at first in the
+one term "base" all sorts of things, like the supply of the army, its
+reinforcements and equipments, the security of its communications with
+the home country, and lastly the security of its line of retreat, and
+then fixing the extent of the base, and finally fixing an angle for the
+extent of that base: "And all this was done merely to obtain a pure
+geometrical result utterly useless" (Von Caemmerer).
+
+For the same reason Jomini's principle of the Inner Line does not
+satisfy him, owing to its mere geometrical nature, although he right
+willingly acknowledges "that it rests on a sound foundation, on
+the truth that the combat is the only effectual means in war" (Von
+Caemmerer). All such attempts at theory seem to him therefore perfectly
+useless, "because they strive to work with fixed quantities, while in
+war everything is _uncertain_, and all considerations must reckon with
+all kinds of variable quantities; because they only consider _material_
+objects, while every action in war is saturated with _moral_ forces and
+effects; lastly, because they deal only with the action of _one_ party,
+while war is a constant reciprocal effect of _both_ parties" (Von
+Caemmerer).
+
+"Pity the warrior," says Clausewitz, "who is contented to crawl about
+in this beggardom of rules." "Pity the theory which sets itself in
+opposition to the mind"[11] (note, the moral forces).
+
+
+A THEORY TO BE PRACTICALLY USEFUL
+
+Clausewitz insists that a useful theory cannot be more than a thorough
+knowledge of military history and "reflection upon all the situations
+in which we can be placed in war." "What genius does must be just the
+best of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to show just how
+and why it is so." "It is an analytical investigation of the subject
+which leads to exact knowledge: and if brought to bear on the results
+of experience, which in our case would be military history, to a
+_thorough_ familiarity with it. If theory investigates the subjects
+which constitute war; if it separates more distinctly that which at
+first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the properties of
+the means; if it shows their probable effects; if it makes evident the
+nature of objects; _if it brings to bear all over the field of war the
+light of essentially critical investigation_,--then it has fulfilled
+the chief duties of its province. It becomes then a guide to him who
+wishes to make himself acquainted with war from books; it lights up the
+whole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his judgment,
+and shields him from error."[12]
+
+
+KNOWLEDGE MUST BE THOROUGH
+
+This Clausewitz considers most important. He says that "Knowledge of
+the conduct of war ... _must pass completely into the mind_, and almost
+cease to be something objective." For in war "The moral reaction, the
+ever-changing form of things makes it necessary for the chief actor
+to carry _in himself_ the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, in
+order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving
+the requisite decision _from himself_. Knowledge must, by this complete
+assimilation with his own mind and life, be converted into real power."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+So much for Clausewitz, therefore, as the greatest yet the simplest and
+least theoretical of theorists on war. Mark well his comforting dictum
+that "Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations
+in which we can be placed in war." That is a task which we have all
+more or less attempted. Therefore we are all more or less theorists.
+The only question is that of comparative "thoroughness" in our
+reflections. And it is essentially this "thoroughness" in investigation
+and reflection towards which Clausewitz helps us. Like every other
+habit, the _habit_ of military reflection gradually grows with use;
+till, fortified and strengthened by detailed knowledge, it gradually
+becomes Power.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+The theory of war is simple, and there is no reason why any man who
+chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or
+two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a
+fair knowledge thereof. He may with reasonable trouble attain to such
+knowledge of the theory of war as will enable him to follow with
+intelligent appreciation the discussions of experienced soldier or
+soldiers. Such knowledge as will prevent his misunderstanding the
+experienced soldier's argument from pure ignorance, and such knowledge
+as will enable him to understand the military reasons put forward and
+the military object proposed. To the opinion of such a man all respect
+will be due. Thus, and thus only.
+
+It is indeed the plain duty of all who aspire to rule either thus to
+qualify themselves to understand, or else to abstain from interference
+with, the military interests of the State.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR
+
+
+This point is here illustrated with more detail from Clausewitz than
+may seem necessary to some, because it is precisely the point regarding
+modern war which is least understood in this country.
+
+"The complete overthrow of the enemy is the natural end of the art of
+war." "As this idea must apply to both the belligerent parties, it
+must follow, that there can be no suspension in the military act, and
+peace cannot take place until one or other of the parties concerned is
+completely overthrown." This is what Clausewitz means by Absolute War,
+that is war carried to its absolute and logical conclusion with the
+utmost force, the utmost effort and the utmost energy. He then proceeds
+to show that war, owing "to all the natural inertia and friction of its
+parts, the whole of the inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation (or
+timidity) of the human mind," usually takes a weaker or less absolute
+form according to circumstances. "All this, theory must admit, but it
+is its duty to give the foremost place to the absolute form of war, and
+to use that form as a general point of direction." He then proceeds to
+show that war finally took its absolute form under Napoleon. To-day we
+may say that war takes its absolute form in the modern great national
+war, which is waged by each belligerent with the whole concentrated
+physical and mental power of the nation-in-arms.
+
+This requires to be gone into a little more in detail, for it is a
+most important point.
+
+Clausewitz in Book VIII. approaches this part of his subject by an
+historical survey of war from the time of the Roman Empire to that
+of Napoleon. He shows how as the feudal system gradually merged into
+the later monarchical States of Europe, armies gradually became less
+and less national, more and more mercenary. Omitting this, we arrive
+at the seventeenth century. He says: "The end of the seventeenth
+century, the time of Louis XIV., is to be regarded as the point in
+history at which the standing military power, such as it existed in the
+eighteenth century, reached its zenith. That military force was based
+on enlistment and money. States had organized themselves into complete
+unities; and the governments, by commuting the personal services of
+their subjects into money payments, had concentrated their whole power
+in their treasuries. Through the rapid strides in social improvements,
+and a more enlightened system of government, this power had become very
+great in comparison with what it had been. France appeared in the field
+with a standing army of a couple of hundred thousand men, and the other
+Powers in proportion."
+
+Armies were supported out of the Treasury, which the sovereign regarded
+partly as his privy purse, at least as a resource belonging to the
+Government, and not to the people. Relations with other States, except
+with respect to a few commercial subjects, mostly concerned only the
+interests of the Treasury or of the Government, not those of the
+people; at least ideas tended everywhere in that way. The Cabinets
+therefore looked upon themselves as the owners and administrators
+of large estates, which they were continually seeking to increase,
+without the tenants on those estates being particularly interested in
+this improvement.
+
+The people, therefore, who in the Tartar invasions were everything in
+war, who in the old republics and in the Middle Ages were of great
+consequence, were in the eighteenth century absolutely nothing directly.
+
+In this manner, in proportion as the Government separated itself more
+from the people, and regarded itself as the State, war became more and
+more exclusively a business of the Government, which it carried on
+by means of the money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds it could
+pick up in its own and neighbouring countries. The army was a State
+property, very expensive, and not to be lightly risked in battle.
+"In its signification war was only diplomacy somewhat intensified, a
+more vigorous way of negotiating, in which battles and sieges were
+substituted for diplomatic notes."
+
+"Plundering and devastating the enemy's country were no longer in
+accordance with the spirit of the age." "They were justly looked upon
+as unnecessary barbarity." "War, therefore, confined itself more and
+more, both as regards means and ends, to the army itself. The army,
+with its fortresses and some prepared positions, constituted a State in
+a State, within which the element of war slowly consumed itself. All
+Europe rejoiced at its taking this direction, and held it to be the
+necessary consequence of the spirit of progress."
+
+So think many in this country to-day. They are only a hundred years
+behind the times.
+
+"The plan of a war on the part of the State assuming the offensive in
+those times consisted generally in the conquest of one or other of the
+enemy's provinces; the plan of the defender was to prevent this. The
+plan of campaign was to take one or other of the enemy's fortresses, or
+to prevent one of our own being taken; it was only when a battle became
+unavoidable for this purpose that it was sought for and fought. Whoever
+fought a battle without this unavoidable necessity, from mere innate
+desire of gaining a victory, was reckoned a general with too much
+daring." For armies were too precious to be lightly risked. "Winter
+quarters, in which the mutual relations of the two parties almost
+entirely ceased, formed a distinct limit to the activity which was
+considered to belong to one campaign." "As long as war was universally
+conducted in this manner, all was considered to be in the most regular
+order." "Thus there was eminence and perfection of every kind, and
+even Field-Marshal Daun, to whom it was chiefly owing that Frederick
+the Great completely attained his object, and Maria Theresa completely
+failed in hers, notwithstanding that could still pass for a great
+general."
+
+Beyond this stage of military thought, many in this country have not
+yet advanced.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+"Thus matters stood when the French Revolution broke out; Austria
+and Prussia tried their diplomatic art of war; this very soon proved
+insufficient. Whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things,
+all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in 1793, such
+a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. War had
+suddenly become again an affair of the people, and that of a people
+numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself as a
+citizen of the State." "_By this participation of the people in the
+war_, instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural
+weight came into the scale. Henceforth the means available--the efforts
+which might be called forth--had no longer any definite limits; the
+energy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer any
+counterpoise, and consequently the danger to the adversary had risen to
+the extreme."
+
+If only our politicians could learn this old lesson of the French
+Revolution! For many, too many, of them appear to derive their ideas of
+war to-day from some dim reminiscent recollections of school histories
+of the wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
+
+To continue: "After all this was perfected by the hand of Bonaparte,
+this military power based on the strength of the whole nation, marched
+over Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly,
+that where it only encountered the old-fashioned armies the result was
+not doubtful for a moment.
+
+"A reaction, however, awoke in due time. In Spain the war became of
+itself an affair of the people." In Austria. In Russia. "In Germany
+Prussia rose up the first, made the war a national cause, and without
+either money or credit, and with a population reduced one-half, took
+the field with an army twice as strong as in 1806. The rest of Germany
+followed the example of Prussia sooner or later." "Thus it was that
+Germany and Russia, in the years 1813 and 1814, appeared against France
+with about a million of men."
+
+"Under these circumstances the energy thrown into the conduct of war
+was quite different." "In eight months the theatre of war was removed
+from the Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had to bow its head for the
+first time; and the redoubtable Bonaparte lay fettered on the ground."
+
+"Therefore, since the time of Bonaparte, war, through being, first on
+one side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has
+assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer
+to its real nature, to its absolute perfection. The means then called
+forth had no visible limit, the limit losing itself in the energy
+and enthusiasm of the Government and its subjects. By the extent of
+the means, and the wide field of possible results, as well as by
+the powerful excitement of feeling which prevailed, energy in the
+conduct of war was immensely increased; the object of its action was
+the downfall of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerless on
+the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop, or to come to any
+understanding with regard to the mutual objects of the contest.
+
+"Thus, therefore the element of war, freed from all conventional
+restrictions, broke loose with all its natural force. The cause was the
+participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this
+participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on
+the internal affairs of other countries, partly from the threatening
+attitude of the French towards all nations.
+
+"Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars
+hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the
+States, and, consequently, _will only take place on account of great
+interests closely affecting the people_, would be a difficult point to
+settle. But every one will agree with us that, at least, _Whenever
+great interests are in dispute_, mutual hostility will discharge itself
+in the same manner as it has done in our times."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+This is so true, that every war since the days of Clausewitz has made
+its truth more apparent. Since he wrote, the participation of the
+people in war has become, not a revolutionary fact, but an organized
+fact, an ordinary fact in the everyday life of nations. To-day every
+State except Great Britain, securely based on the system of the
+universal training of its sons to arms, stands ready to defend its
+interests with the whole concentrated power, physical, intellectual,
+and material, of its whole manhood. Consequently, European war,
+as Clausewitz foresaw, "will only take place on account of great
+interests closely affecting the people." The character of such war
+will be absolute, the object of its action will be the downfall of the
+foe, and not till the foe (be it Great Britain or not) lies powerless
+on the ground will it be supposed possible to stop. In the prosecution
+of such a national war the means available, the energy and the effort
+called forth, will be without limits. Such must be the conflicts of
+nations-in-arms.
+
+Yet, even now, so many years after Clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he
+himself stated, "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists
+and statesmen," the great transformation in the character of modern
+war, due to the participation of the people therein, has not yet been
+adequately realized by many men in this country _who ought to know_.
+It is earnestly to be hoped that they will endeavour to adjust their
+minds, as regards war, to the fact that we are living, not in the
+eighteenth century, but in the twentieth, and that they will consider
+that war has once for all become an affair of the people, that our
+opponents will be a people-in-arms, using the uttermost means of their
+whole manhood to crush us, and that disaster can only be prevented by a
+like utmost effort on our part, by an effort regardless of everything
+except self-preservation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR
+
+
+"War belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the
+province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is
+settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from
+others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to
+liken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and
+activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on
+its part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale.
+Besides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which
+its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of
+living creatures in their germs."[13]
+
+These conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of
+feeling that "even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate
+hatred of each other." It is an unpleasant fact for the philosopher,
+for the social reformer, to contemplate, but history repeats and
+repeats the lesson. Still more, "It is quite possible for such a state
+of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political
+motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact, a
+perfect explosion."
+
+"War is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its
+elements--hatred and animosity--which may be looked upon as blind
+instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free
+activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political
+instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.
+
+"The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second,
+more the general and his army; the third more the Government. _The
+passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence
+in the peoples._
+
+"These three tendencies are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject.
+A theory which would leave any one of them out of account would
+immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality,
+that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone."[14]
+
+Clausewitz is the great thinker, the great realist, the great
+philosopher of war. His aim was, free from all bias, to get at _the
+truth of things_. His view of war as a social act, as part of the
+intercourse of nations, so that occasional warlike struggles can no
+more be avoided than occasional commercial struggles, is a view which
+requires to be most carefully pondered over by every statesman. It
+is based upon the essential fundamental characteristics of human
+nature, which do not alter. It is not to be lightly set aside by
+declamation about the blessings of peace, the evils of war, the burden
+of armaments, and such-like sophistries. To submit without a struggle
+to injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in
+passionate human nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile
+people. It is indeed to be most sincerely hoped that _arbitration_
+will be resorted to more and more as a means of peacefully settling
+all non-vital causes of dispute. But arbitration has its limits. For
+_no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that
+it regards as absolutely vital_. The view of war, therefore, as a
+social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, with all that it
+implies, appears to be the only one which a statesman, however much he
+may regret the fact, can take. It has, therefore, been brought forward
+here at once, as it underlies the whole subject and is essential to all
+clear thought thereon.
+
+So much for the influence of Public Opinion in producing war. Now for
+its influence in and during war.
+
+"There are three principal objects in carrying on war," says Clausewitz.
+
+  "(_a_) To conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force.
+
+  "(_b_) To get possession of the material elements of aggression,
+  and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army.
+
+  "(_c_) _To gain Public Opinion._[15]
+
+"To attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be
+directed against the enemy's principal army, for it must be beaten
+before we can follow up the other two objects with success.
+
+"In order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against
+those points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated:
+principal towns, magazines, great fortresses. On the road to these the
+enemy's principal force, or a considerable part of his army, will be
+encountered.
+
+"Public Opinion is ultimately gained by great victories, and by the
+possession of the enemy's capital."[16]
+
+This almost prophetic (as it was in his day) recognition by Clausewitz
+of the vast importance of gaining Public Opinion _as one of the
+three great aims in war_, is fundamental. It is just one of those
+instances of his rare insight into the principles and development of
+modern national war which make his book of such great and enduring
+value to us. For since his day Europe has become organized into great
+industrial nations, democracy and popular passion have become more
+and more a force to be reckoned with, and the gaining and preserving
+of Public Opinion in war has become more and more important. It has,
+in fact, become the statesman's chief business during a great modern
+national war. It has become necessary for him to study intently war in
+its relation to industry, and to the industrial millions over whom he
+presides, or over whom he may preside.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in Britain were a nation of
+18,000,000, practically self-supporting, and governed by an
+aristocracy. To-day we are a crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent
+upon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw
+materials, for our trade, for our staying power, _and_ we are governed
+by a democracy. In a modern democratic State it will only be possible
+to carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships
+brought on the democracy by the war do not become intolerable. To
+prevent these hardships from thus becoming intolerable to the people,
+to Public Opinion, will be the task of the modern statesman during war,
+and this can only be done by wise prevision and timely preparation. _It
+requires the internal organization of the Industrial State for war._
+
+It appears to the _writer_ that internal organization can be subdivided
+as follows:--
+
+I. An adequate gold reserve.
+
+II. The protection of our ships carrying raw material, food, and
+exports during their passage on the high seas from the places of
+origin to the consumers: (A) by the few available cruisers which could
+be spared from the fighting fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well
+thought out and prepared scheme of national indemnity (_vide_ Blue Book
+thereon); (B) by insuring the distribution to the consumers of food
+and raw material, after it has arrived in the country, by preparing a
+thorough organization which would deal with the blocking of any of the
+principal ports of arrival, and by guarding the vulnerable points of
+our internal lines of communications to and from the shipping centres.
+
+III. Organization of Poor Law system to bring immediate relief by
+selling at peace price food to those unable to pay war prices owing to
+(A) normal poverty (7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works,
+due to effect of war on trade.
+
+Work and wages the State _must_ guarantee during modern war, and
+before the State _can_ guarantee these, it is absolutely necessary
+that it should satisfy itself that the above preparations are actually
+_in being_. This pre-supposes a more earnest study of the industrial
+effects of a great national war than has yet been given to the subject
+by our political leaders. For in the warfare of the present and future
+the importance of gaining and preserving Public Opinion, as pointed
+out by Clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. It is as fundamentally
+important _to safeguard our own Public Opinion as it is to attack,
+weaken, and gain over that of the enemy_. This has not yet passed
+the stage of thought. But good thoughts are no better than good dreams
+unless they be put into action. We are waiting for the statesman to DO
+it. There is no great difficulty.
+
+(2) In arousing the national spirit to the requisite height of
+patriotic self-denial and self-sacrifice, in elevating, preserving, and
+safe-guarding Public Opinion during a great national struggle, much
+may be hoped for from the patriotism of our Press. Only in fairness to
+those whose patriotism is self-originating and spontaneous, it must
+be made compulsory upon ALL, so that no journal may suffer loss of
+circulation or pecuniary injury thereby.
+
+(3) There lies a practical task immediately to the hand of our
+statesmen if they will seriously set themselves to the task of
+improving the _moral_ of our nation by reforming our education
+_curriculum_, on the leading principle that the moral is to the
+physical as three to one in life, and that therefore character-building
+must be its chief aim. Then they will do much towards strengthening
+us for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's idea of the gaining and
+preserving of our Public Opinion in War.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE NATURE OF WAR
+
+
+"It is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the
+whole, because it is particularly necessary that, in the consideration
+of any of the parts, the whole should be kept constantly in view. We
+shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by
+Publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a
+duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would
+conceive as a unit the countless numbers of duels which make up a
+war, we shall do so best by supposing two wrestlers. Each strives
+by physical force to throw his adversary, and thus to render him
+incapable of further resistance.
+
+"Violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and science in
+order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost
+imperceptible, and _hardly worth mentioning_, termed _usages of
+International Law_, accompany it without essentially impairing its
+power.
+
+"Violence, that is to say physical force, is therefore _the Means_;
+the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate
+_object_. In order to attain this object fully the enemy must first be
+disarmed: and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities
+in theory."[17]
+
+Now, "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful
+method of disarming and overcoming an adversary without causing great
+bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war.
+However plausible this may appear, _still it is an error which must
+be extirpated_, for in such dangerous things as war _the errors which
+proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_. As the
+use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the
+co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that _he who uses force
+unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed_, MUST
+_obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise_." "To
+introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation
+would be an absurdity." "We therefore repeat our proposition, that _War
+is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds_."
+
+
+THE POLITICAL NATURE OF WAR
+
+In endeavouring briefly to describe Clausewitz's method of looking at
+war, one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting
+a few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant
+passages. However, a selection must be made.
+
+I assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy,
+because that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical
+way of looking at things. This point of view is as necessary for
+the strategist as for the statesman, indeed for every man who would
+understand the nature of war. For otherwise it is impossible to
+understand the military conduct of many campaigns and battles, in which
+the political outweighed the military influence, and led to action
+incomprehensible almost from a purely military point of view. History
+is full of such examples.
+
+Clausewitz clearly lays down: "_War is only a continuation of State
+policy by other means._ This point of view being adhered to will
+introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and
+things will be more easily disentangled from each other."[18] "It
+is only thus that we can obtain a clear conception of war, for the
+political view is the _object_, war is the _means_, and the means
+must always include the object in our conception." "Each (nation or
+government) strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to
+its will."[19]
+
+Owing to the great importance of this point of view, so little
+understood in this country, I have devoted the next chapter to it
+alone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's view more in detail. We can,
+therefore, pass on for the present.
+
+
+THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY
+
+Secondly, I select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory,
+because that is essential in order to understand his division of all
+wars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be
+able to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating
+point, where reaction may set in.[20]
+
+"The conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his
+adversary completely. Often, in fact almost _universally, there is a
+culminating point of victory_. Experience shows this sufficiently."[21]
+As the attack or invasion progresses it becomes weaker even from its
+successes, from sieges or corps left to observe fortified places, from
+the troops required to guard the territory gained, and the lengthening
+line of communications, from the fact that we are removing further
+from our resource while the enemy is falling back upon and drawing
+nearer to his, from the danger of other States joining in to prevent
+the utter destruction of the defeated nation, from the rousing of
+the whole nation in extremity to save themselves by a people's war,
+from the slackening of effort in the victorious army itself, etc.,
+etc. Leoben, Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances of such a
+culminating point, and probably in the late Russo-Japanese war Harbin
+would have proved so, too, if peace had not intervened.
+
+Clausewitz continues: "It is necessary to know how far it (our
+preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and,
+instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster." He defines it as "_The
+point at which the offensive changes into the defensive_," and says,
+"to overstep this point is more than simply a useless expenditure of
+power yielding no further results, it is a _destructive_ step which
+causes reaction, and the reaction is, according to all experience,
+productive of most disproportionate effects."[22] The reader will find
+it an interesting exercise to search for this culminating point of
+victory in historical campaigns, and mark the result where it has been
+overstepped and where it has not been overstepped.
+
+
+THE TWO CLASSES OF WARS
+
+From this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the
+two classes into which Clausewitz divides all wars.
+
+"The two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the
+complete _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be that we aim at his
+destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to
+conclude peace on our terms; and, _next_, those in which our aim is
+merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either
+for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to
+account as matters for exchange in the settlement of Peace."[23]
+
+All wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the
+enemy, _i.e._ "unlimited object," or wars with a "limited object."
+In the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in
+accordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with
+the enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point
+of victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or
+beyond it. If the former--then the plan should be one with a "limited
+object," such as the Crimea, Manchuria, etc.; if the latter--then the
+plan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of
+Napoleon's campaigns, or the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as 1866,
+or 1870. As Clausewitz says: "_Now, the first, the grandest, and most
+decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is
+rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages_,
+not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which,
+by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. _This,
+therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical
+questions._"[24]
+
+In Clausewitz's two plans for war with France in 1831,[25] this
+difference is plain. In the first plan, he considered Prussia, Austria,
+the German Confederation, and Great Britain united as allies against
+France,--and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack
+by two armies, each of 300,000 men, one marching on Paris from Belgium,
+one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine. In the second plan the political
+conditions had meanwhile changed; Austria and Great Britain were
+doubtful, and Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if Prussia and
+the German Confederation alone could appear before Paris in sufficient
+strength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it
+would be permissible to venture even beyond Paris. So he proposed to
+limit the object to the conquest of Belgium, and to attack the French
+vigorously the moment they entered that country.
+
+Which strict limitation of the object within the means available to
+attain it is characteristic of Clausewitz's practical way of looking
+at things. In each plan, however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a
+decisive victory was to be adopted.
+
+
+PREPARATION FOR WAR
+
+The third place, in respect to its present-day importance, I assign to
+Clausewitz's clear statement that--
+
+"If we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then
+the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal
+classes, into such as are only _preparations for war_ and into _the war
+itself_. This distinction must also be made in theory."
+
+Nothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater
+honour peace preparations. Like his doctrine of the importance of
+gaining public opinion in war, it is one of those almost prophetic
+utterances which make Clausewitz the germ of modern military evolution.
+
+Clausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not, foresaw to a certain extent
+(probably owing to his employment in organizing the new Prussian
+short-service army after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the present day.
+And, since his time, the greater the forces which have to be prepared,
+the greater has become the value of preparation for war. It has been
+continually growing, till to-day it has obtained such overwhelming
+importance that one may almost say that a modern war is practically (or
+nearly so) decided _before_ war breaks out, according to which nation
+has made the greatest and most thorough peace preparations.
+
+Clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every imaginable preparation." We may
+nowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that
+that nation which is beaten in preparation is already beaten BEFORE
+the war breaks out.
+
+A failure to understand this fact is a fundamental error at the root
+of the idea of war as held by civilians, for many of them think that
+speeches are a substitute for preparations.
+
+It is plain that these three ideas of Clausewitz regarding the nature
+of war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an
+unlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace-time,
+are as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier, and require
+study and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part
+of the latter.
+
+
+FRICTION IN WAR
+
+I place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual
+war, of war in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war
+on paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the
+part of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway
+between the two.
+
+Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. He
+always looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction
+and the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be
+the chief characteristic of real war as distinguished from theoretical
+war or war on paper, it is chiefly this habit or mode of thought which
+makes his writings of such great and permanent value. It is also a
+habit which we ought sedulously to cultivate in ourselves.
+
+"_In war everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is
+difficult_,"[26] runs his famous saying. Why is the simplest thing
+difficult? Because of the friction of war. And how can that friction
+be minimized? Only by force of character, and the military virtues of
+discipline, perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. Hence the
+great emphasis which he always and everywhere lays upon character and
+these military virtues as the deciding factors in war.
+
+"_Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to
+that which distinguishes real war from war on paper_," he says. Each
+individual of the army "keeps up his own friction in all directions."
+"The danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it
+requires, augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the
+greatest causes of it."[27] "_This enormous friction is everywhere
+brought into contact with chance_, and thus facts take place
+upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being
+chance. As an instance of one such chance take the weather. Here the
+fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time,--a battery from
+firing, or a report from reaching the general. The rain (mud) prevents
+a battalion from arriving,--or the cavalry from charging effectively,
+because it had stuck fast in the heavy ground." And so on. Consider
+for examples the foggy mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau, the
+Katzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz, Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud
+of Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest, the mud of Manchuria.
+
+"_Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium._" "_The knowledge
+of friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in
+war_, which is required in a good general." "It is therefore this
+friction which makes that which appears easy in war so difficult in
+reality."[28] In considering any situation in war we must therefore
+always add to the known circumstances--friction.
+
+
+WAR ITSELF
+
+In Clausewitz's way of looking at war itself I assign at once the first
+place to his doctrine, "_The destruction of the enemy's military force
+is the leading principle of war_, and for the whole chapter of positive
+action _the direct way to the aim_."[29] This dictum, repeated in
+many different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. All the
+old theoretical ideas about threatening by manoeuvring, conquering by
+manoeuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manoeuvring, and so forth,
+in which his predecessors entangled strategy, and from which even the
+Archduke Charles and Jomini had not completely freed themselves, he
+brushes aside by "our assertion is that ONLY great tactical results can
+lead to great strategical results."[30] Thus he leads and concentrates
+our thoughts in strategy on the central idea of victory in battle,
+and frees us once for all from the obscuring veil of lines and angles
+and geometrical forms by which other writers have hidden that truth.
+"Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of
+overcoming and disarming an adversary without causing great bloodshed,
+and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However
+plausible this may appear, _it is an error which must be extirpated_,
+for, in such dangerous things as war, _the errors which spring from a
+spirit of benevolence are just the worst_."[31] For "he who uses force
+unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, _must_
+obtain the superiority if his adversary does not act likewise." And the
+"worst of all errors in wars" is still the idea of war too commonly
+held by civilians in this country, as witness the outcries which
+greeted every loss during the South African war, which shows how much
+Clausewitz is needed as a tonic to brace their minds to the reality.
+
+"War is an act of violence which in its application knows NO bounds."
+"Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed; if a bloody
+slaughter be a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more
+respect to war (for avoiding unnecessary war), but not for making the
+sword we wear blunt and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity,
+till some one steps in with a sword that is sharp, and lops off the
+arm from our body."
+
+
+SIMPLE PLANS
+
+The second place I assign to his doctrine of _the simplest plans_,
+because time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions,
+but "a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have _time_
+for wide-reaching skilful combination."[32] "By this it appears to us
+that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are
+complicated is conclusively shown."
+
+"We must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike," or the
+opponent will get his thrust in first.
+
+"Whenever this is the case, we must ourselves choose the shorter."
+"Therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by
+complicated plans, _we must always rather endeavour to be beforehand
+with him by the simplest and shortest_."
+
+
+STRATEGIC LINES
+
+The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between
+the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation,
+and lines of manoeuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in Jomini and his
+predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing
+a part,--for these Clausewitz has little respect. In his chapter on
+"The Geometrical Element,"[33] he says, "We therefore do not hesitate
+to regard it as an established truth that _in strategy more depends
+upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the
+form of the great lines by which they are connected_."[34] Of course
+he does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above
+sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. He
+therefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to
+the heart of things.
+
+
+FRICTION
+
+has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about
+its components.
+
+
+DANGER
+
+"An ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger.
+"Danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is
+necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under
+notice here."[35]
+
+
+BODILY EXERTION
+
+Clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on
+the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul."
+"Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction."[36]
+
+To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen the retreat from Moscow, the
+awful passage of the Beresina, and the battle of the nations round
+Leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. Had he not seen
+bodily exertion and hardship break up the Grand Army into a small horde
+of stragglers, and destroy the army of Kutusoff in almost an equal
+measure, in 1812, as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely
+break up the great army of Napoleon in 1813?
+
+As for the effects of bodily exertion on the mind, purpose, and
+resolution of the general, compare Benningsen at Eylau after thirty-six
+hours in the saddle, or Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost all the
+results of his victory.
+
+
+INFORMATION IN WAR
+
+"_The foundation of all our ideas and actions_," but "in a few words,
+_most reports are false_." "When in the thick of war itself one
+report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if
+these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of
+probability." In another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual
+uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he
+compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and
+groping uncertainly for one another.
+
+"These things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war
+and make it a _resistant medium for every activity_, we have designated
+danger, bodily exertion, information, and friction."[37] He never loses
+sight of this; it pervades everything he writes.
+
+
+THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL
+
+"And therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in
+this book are composed _half of physical, half of moral causes and
+effects_, and we might say that the physical are almost no more than
+the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real
+bright polished weapon."[38] Pages might be filled with extracts
+showing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader
+is already convinced of that. Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral
+is to the physical as three to one." Clausewitz regards all military
+questions from this point. His psychological attitude is what chiefly
+characterizes Clausewitz from all writers who came before him, and
+which makes his deductions so realistic, so interesting and so valuable
+for all who come after him.
+
+
+TENSION AND REST IN WAR
+
+In order not to weary the reader I will bring this chapter to a
+conclusion with one or two extracts relating to "tension and rest;
+the suspension of the act in warfare." This is explanatory of those
+frequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first
+sight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. These halts are
+due to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty,
+irresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc.
+
+In this connection one must remember that war is "a chain of battles
+all strung together, one of which always brings on another." But they
+seldom follow each other immediately; there is usually a certain
+pause between. As soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new
+combinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the
+next. Whilst these new combinations are being developed, or perhaps
+considered, there may be a greater or less suspension of the act, a
+longer or shorter halt in the forward movement. Then another spring
+forward. Clausewitz has a great many interesting things to say on this
+subject.[39]
+
+"If there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither
+party for the moment wills anything positive, there is _rest_, and for
+the moment equilibrium.... As soon as ever one of the parties proposes
+to himself a new positive object, and commences active steps towards
+it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy
+opposes this, there is _tension_ of the powers; this lasts until the
+decision takes place.... This decision, the foundation of which lies
+always in the battle-combinations which are made on each side, ... is
+followed by a movement in one or other direction."
+
+"It may so happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not only
+feel themselves too weak to attack, but are so in reality."
+
+"Wild as is the nature of war it still wears the claims of human
+weakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates
+dangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one."
+
+"If we cast a glance at military history in general, there we find
+so much the opposite of an incessant advance towards the aim, that
+_standing still_ and _doing nothing_ is quite plainly the _normal
+condition_ of an army in the midst of war, _acting_ the _exception_.
+This must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception.
+But if military history has this effect by the great body of its
+events, so also the latest series of wars redeem the view. The war of
+the French Revolution shows only too plainly its reality, and only
+proves too plainly its necessity. In that war, and especially in the
+campaigns of Bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited
+degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the
+element. This degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then
+it is necessary."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So that is how Clausewitz regards
+International Law, Clausewitz to whom in Germany "our most famous
+victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training,"
+and on whom "everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war
+bases himself, even if he is not conscious of it." And we must regard
+nearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a
+disciple of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time that we should
+cease to pin our faith on International Law, or think that it can in
+any way protect us, if we neglect strongly to protect ourselves. Power
+and expediency are the only rules that the practical politicians of
+foreign countries recognize, and the only question they ask themselves
+is, "Have we got sufficient power to do this," and if so, "Is it
+expedient to do it?"
+
+(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length
+of time? None whatever. For treaties are only considered binding as
+long as the interests of _both_ contracting parties remain the same.
+Directly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most
+solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia tore up the Treaty of Paris, or
+as Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history is full of torn-up
+treaties. And as it has been so it will be. The European waste-paper
+basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way,
+and a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste-paper basket
+is, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. Only
+in ourselves can we trust. Therefore no treaties at present existing
+should be allowed in any way to alter or lessen our preparations to
+enable us to fight _alone_ when necessary.
+
+(3) It cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted on, that the
+success or failure of a State policy is dependent upon the amount of
+armed force behind it. For upon the amount of armed force behind a
+policy depends the greater or less amount of resistance, of friction,
+which that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. The
+prestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength.
+The less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its
+rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have
+been prevented if its prestige, or armed force, had been greater. On
+the other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more
+reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. So
+that the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is, the
+more likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful
+compromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace.
+
+Therefore, under this consideration, those who would reduce our
+national forces are deeply mistaken, for such action would imperil our
+prestige, imperil our negotiations, imperil our peace, and perhaps lead
+eventually to a war that we might otherwise have avoided. Therefore
+no such deeply mistaken economy for us. A few hundred thousand pounds
+saved would be dear economy indeed if it led, as well it might, to the
+payment before many years of a War Indemnity of L800,000,000 or so.
+Better the evils we know than the far greater evils we know not of.
+
+(4) Surprise in war is what we have to fear. There are two sorts of
+national surprise that we must consider. These are (A) the _surprise
+by actual hostilities_ taking place before the actual declaration of
+war, such as the Japanese surprise and practical destruction of the
+fighting force of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; (B) the _surprise
+by superior preparation_, silently carried out till all is ready for a
+decisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defence,
+and then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly
+ready, as the surprise in this sense of France by Germany in 1870.
+
+(A) Every successful example is always copied, and usually on a larger
+scale. We may be quite certain that our rivals have taken to heart
+the lesson of Port Arthur. It is possible that our next war will open
+with a similar night attack on our fleet, either just before, or
+simultaneously with the declaration of war. If it is successful, or
+even partially successful, it may produce the most grave results, as in
+the Russo-Japanese War. It _may_ render possible a naval action with
+almost equal forces, in which our opponents _might_ be victorious. The
+invasion of this country on a gigantic scale by 300,000 men or more
+would then follow as a certainty. This is not a probability, but a
+possibility which requires to be kept in our view.
+
+(B) _The surprise by superior preparation_, as I term it, for want
+of a better name, is a danger to which we are peculiarly liable. As
+Lord Salisbury said, "The British constitution is a bad fighting
+machine," and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by
+the lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all
+that appertains to war. Hence they are always liable to oppose, as
+excessive, preparations which are in reality the minimum consistent
+with national safety. Consequently our preparations for war, controlled
+as they are by those who have no special knowledge of war, are always
+apt to be insufficient, as were those of France in 1870. In former
+days this did not perhaps so very much matter, although it resulted
+in the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of British lives and
+hundreds of millions of British treasure. But still we were able, at
+this somewhat excessive price, to "muddle through," owing to the heroic
+efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make bricks without straw and
+retrieve the mistakes of our policy. For our opponents then conducted
+war in such a slow way as to give us time to repair _after_ the
+outbreak of war our lack of preparation _before_ it. But opposed to a
+modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen and led by generals brought
+up in the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Moltke--all will be
+different. In such a war the national forces brought into play are so
+immense that it is only possible to do so efficaciously if everything
+has been most carefully prepared and organized beforehand. It is not
+_possible_ to improvise such organization of national force _after_
+the war has begun, for there cannot be sufficient time. If our rival
+makes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that
+war the _whole_ of its national force, material, moral, and physical,
+while we only prepare to bring to bear a _small portion_ thereof, then
+there will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. The
+war will be conducted with the utmost energy, and the aim will be to
+utilize to the utmost the superiority obtained by superior preparation,
+so as to make the decision as rapid as possible before we have time to
+recover from the effects of our surprise. That is the danger we have to
+fear, and to keep ever in mind.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+WAR AS POLICY
+
+
+"War," says Clausewitz, "is only a continuation of State policy by
+other means." The first question that at once arises in the mind is
+what is meant by Policy. We may safely lay down that State policy is
+the defence and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole
+amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards
+acquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. There
+can, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength
+or weakness, of success or failure, in the policy of a State.
+
+Clausewitz expressly stated that he hoped "to iron out many creases
+in the heads of strategists and statesmen," such, for instance, as
+the idea that it is possible to consider either policy or war as
+independent of the other.
+
+It is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy if we
+regard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes peace
+negotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to
+attain the political object.
+
+War is only a part of policy, a continuance of the previous
+negotiations; but the instrument is now the sword and not the pen. As
+Clausewitz says, "_In one word, the art of war, in its highest point
+of view, is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead
+of writing notes._" War is merely a means whereby a nation attempts
+to impose its will upon another nation in order to attain a political
+object. This object is settled by policy, which also orders the war,
+determines what sort of war it is to be, with what means and resources
+and expenditure it is to be waged, when its object has been attained,
+and when it is to cease. In fact, policy prepares, leads up to, orders,
+supports, guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz said, "_All the
+leading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet--that
+is, by a political, not a military functionary._"
+
+Unity of thought is only to be obtained by "the conception that
+war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means
+an independent thing in itself." "And how can we conceive it to be
+otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political
+relations between different nations and governments? Is not war
+merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts?"
+"Accordingly war can never be separated from political intercourse;
+and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way,
+all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent,
+broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object."
+
+"If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from
+policy. If the policy is grand and powerful, so will also be the war,
+and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its
+absolute form." "Only through this kind of view war recovers unity;
+only by it can we see _all_ wars of _one_ kind, and it is only through
+it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of
+view from which _great plans_ may be traced out and determined upon."
+
+"There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find
+out the _right_ point of view from which things should be looked at and
+judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend
+the mass of events in their unity from _one_ standpoint; and it is only
+the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency."
+"We can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests
+generally of the whole community," and "_wars are in reality only the
+expressions or manifestations of policy itself_."
+
+To the student of history this unity of conception is equally
+necessary, for it supplies the key to many a military puzzle. Without
+it we can never understand, for instance, Napoleon's conduct in
+1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can we see the compelling reason of
+many battles, apparently fought against military judgment, such, for
+instance, as Borodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have to remember that
+these and many other battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were fought
+from a political, not a military, motive. It is a well-known fact that
+the strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to
+suit overmastering political necessity. Yet many people have failed to
+draw therefrom the generalization of Clausewitz that "war is only a
+continuation of State policy by other means." But having got it now,
+let us hold fast to it, with all its consequences.
+
+
+SOME KNOWLEDGE OF WAR NECESSARY FOR STATESMEN
+
+"From this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things
+a necessary conflict between the political and military interests,
+and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as _imperfect
+knowledge_ only. That policy makes demands upon the war which it
+cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that _it knows
+the instrument it is going to use_, therefore contrary to a natural and
+_indispensable supposition_."
+
+"_None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made
+without an insight into the political relations_; and in reality when
+people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy
+on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different
+to what they intend. It is not this influence, but the policy itself
+which should be found fault with. If policy is right, if it succeeds
+in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war also with
+advantage; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the
+object, the cause is to be looked for in a mistaken policy.
+
+"It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain
+military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it
+can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes.
+Just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant
+sometimes says what he does not intend, _so policy, when intending
+right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views_.
+
+"_This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain
+knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of
+political intercourse._"
+
+
+THE WAR MINISTER
+
+"Before going further we must guard ourselves against a false
+interpretation of which this is very susceptible. We do not mean to
+say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the _principal_
+qualification for a war minister. Elevation, superiority of mind,
+strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he
+must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another."
+
+
+POLICY AND THE MEANS TO CARRY OUT THAT POLICY MUST HARMONIZE
+
+"_If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy
+to accommodate itself to the means available for war_, there is only
+one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are
+not combined in one person (note, as William of Orange, Frederick
+the Great, or Napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an
+_ex-officio_ member of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its
+councils and decisions on important occasions."
+
+"The influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the
+Cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous
+action."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+We shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding
+dicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree.
+
+Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to
+policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much
+as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy.
+
+Secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may
+be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of
+his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering,
+guiding, and controlling of war. As Clausewitz says, "it is an
+_indispensable supposition_ that policy knows the instrument it is
+going to use." It is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations
+between two States cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the
+political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued
+in another form--in the form of war. The statesman still retains
+control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his
+object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well
+as of the peaceful, policy of the nation.
+
+Thirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is
+theoretically allowable during the course of actual operations, _i.e._
+after the war has actually begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy
+should only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should
+keep clear during the actual operations. Clausewitz, however, holds
+that the two are so intimately related that the political influence
+cannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. Between two
+such authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and
+must seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly, in history policy often
+has really affected the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813, 1814,
+1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan, or Bismarck's interference to hurry
+on the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith in the Boer War, and in
+many other cases. That, we must admit. We must also admit that its
+interference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations.
+Clausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is
+wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle way rule appears to be this,
+that policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but
+during actual operations the statesman should exercise the greatest
+possible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded by
+_overwhelming political necessity_.
+
+Fourthly, a politician is bound to study war. He is bound to study war
+as well as diplomacy, his two instruments. If he only studies how to
+use one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed.
+It is plain that he MUST study war, so that he may not try to use an
+instrument of which he knows nothing. It is not meant, of course,
+that a politician should study all the details of naval and military
+matters, but only that he should study the general principles of war,
+and the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political
+object of war, through the submission of the enemy.
+
+Fifthly, in order that the object and the means of policy may
+harmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests
+are entrusted should study the principles of war, so that _he may keep
+his policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it_. That is to say,
+he must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely
+to be strongly opposed by another Power, unless he has from careful
+study and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at
+his disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his
+policy and declares war. He should not even consider a policy without
+_at the same time_ considering with his military and naval advisers the
+nation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. He must
+not think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do
+so, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give a
+reasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. Otherwise,
+
+Sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war
+will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall
+of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be Great Britain or not)
+lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as
+we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy,
+the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,--these points deserve the
+most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the
+destinies of the Anglo-Saxon Race.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+STRATEGY
+
+
+Clausewitz defines strategy as "_the use of the battle to gain the
+object of the war_." War is "a chain of battles all strung together,
+one of which always brings on another."[40] The great thing in strategy
+is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits.
+"_The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally;
+secondly, at the decisive point._"[41]
+
+"In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the
+most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be
+sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating
+circumstances. The direct result of all this is that the _greatest
+possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive
+point_.[42] Whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not,
+we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is
+_the first great principle of strategy_, as well suited for Greeks or
+Persians, or for Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French or Germans."
+
+It sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. How
+many generals have been ruined in consequence!
+
+
+SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR STRATEGIC CERTAINTY
+
+Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we may search modern military
+history in vain for a battle (except Leuthen or Rosbach) in which an
+army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no
+means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of
+modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception,
+that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in
+numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and
+when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon,
+Waterloo, he was beaten."[43] "From this we may infer, in the present
+state of Europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented
+general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now, if
+we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even
+the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small
+as well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but
+which need not be over _two to one_, will be sufficient to _ensure the
+victory_, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be."[44]
+
+The double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore,
+the ideal of strategy. "_The superiority of numbers is, therefore, to
+be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before
+all_, and as far as possible." If strategy has done this, then it has
+done its utmost duty. It is then for the tactician to make the most
+of this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory.
+Strategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to
+the altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the
+hostile armed force is destroyed.
+
+This _superiority of numbers_ in battle as the _first principle of
+strategy_ we require, on all occasions in season and out of season, to
+repeat and repeat. At present we have not the numbers we shall want. We
+must get them. Otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and
+"the best strategy" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for
+us. This rests with our statesmen.
+
+
+THE DECISIVE POINT
+
+If the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the
+decisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point?
+
+Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz. Jomini, even after Napoleon,
+confuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre
+of war, but Clausewitz clears the air by asserting only _one_.
+
+"But whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against
+which we are to direct our ultimate operations, _still the conquest and
+destruction of his army is the surest commencement_ and, _in all cases,
+the most essential_."[45]
+
+Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force is THERE
+is the decisive point, against which we must concentrate ALL our forces.
+
+"There are," said Napoleon, "many good generals in Europe, but they
+see too many things at one time. _As for me, I see only one thing, the
+enemy's chief army, and I concentrate all my efforts to destroy it._"
+
+
+THE SIMULTANEOUS USE OF ALL THE FORCES
+
+"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which we have been endeavouring to set
+forth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and
+destined for a strategic object should be _simultaneously_ applied
+to it. And this application will be all the more complete the more
+everything is compressed into one act and one moment."[46] This he
+calls "_the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in
+strategy_."[47] "In strategy we can never employ too many forces."[48]
+"What can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of force must be
+regarded in strategy as a means of giving expansion to success."
+"_No troops should be kept back as a strategic reserve_," but every
+available man hurried up to the first battlefield, fresh levies being
+meanwhile formed in rear. As an instance of what not to do, Prussia, in
+1806, kept back 45,000 men in Brandenburg and East Prussia; they might,
+if present at Jena, have turned defeat into victory, but they were
+useless afterwards.[49] A fault so often made may be made again.
+
+
+CONCENTRATION
+
+"It is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point," said
+Napoleon. To concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive
+point so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the
+enemy will be making a similar attempt. "The calculation of time and
+space appears the most essential thing to this end. But the calculation
+of time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of
+strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither
+the most difficult nor the most decisive one." "Much more frequently
+the relative superiority, that is the skilful assemblage of superior
+forces at the decisive point, has its foundation in the right
+appreciation of those points, in the judicious distribution which by
+that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in
+_the resolution to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the
+important_. In this respect Frederick the Great and Bonaparte are
+especially characteristic."[50]
+
+"There is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy than _to
+keep all the forces concentrated. No portion to be separated from the
+main body unless called away by some urgent necessity._ On this maxim
+we stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be depended upon."[51]
+
+"_The concentration of the whole force_ (_i.e._ within supporting
+distance) _should be the rule_, and _every separation or division is an
+exception which must be justified_."[52] Of course, this does not
+mean that all the troops are to be kept concentrated in one mass upon
+one road, but within supporting distance, for he expressly states, "_It
+is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of
+the action._"[53] This doctrine, qualified by the last sentence, makes
+Clausewitz the germ of modern military thought, for the last sentence
+leaves room for all the modern developments of new roads, railways,
+telegraphs, wire and wireless, and so forth.
+
+Therefore in war, according to Clausewitz, concentration,
+concentration, concentration, and _every division or detachment is an
+evil which can only be justified by urgent necessity_. Here again we
+find a simple truth, which, however, the history of all wars shows us
+to be very difficult to carry out. Hence the value of keeping such an
+imperative maxim always in our minds.
+
+
+THE FIRST PITCHED BATTLE
+
+"The more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as
+well as of every other contest, that he must and _will_ conquer, the
+more will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first
+battle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. Napoleon hardly
+ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at
+once in the first battle."[54]
+
+"_At the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the
+first battle_, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage
+to which no one would willingly expose himself, and also because the
+first decision, though not the only one, still will have the more
+influence on subsequent events the greater it is in itself."[1]
+
+"The law of the simultaneous use of the forces in strategy lets the
+principal result (which need not be the final one) take place almost
+always at the commencement of the great act."[55] A great victory thus
+won at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow
+us to carry out our own. The first pitched battle is, therefore, the
+crisis of the rival strategies, and towards its favourable decision
+all our preparations, all our forces, and all our energies should be
+directed. This is a point that civilians seem to find hard to grasp.
+Witness all our history, with inadequate forces at the beginning of
+every war, as even in the latest of our wars--that in South Africa. It
+is a point which our statesmen should very seriously consider.
+
+The difficulty of concentrating superior numbers for the first battle
+is that the enemy will be, or should be, of the same opinion, and will
+be making equal efforts to win the first battle. So, then, the crisis
+will be all the more acute, the battle greater, and the result greater.
+
+"_We would not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the
+crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's main force, is
+the first-born son of war._"[56]
+
+Till this is done, the first great victory gained, strategy should
+think of nothing else.
+
+Then, and only then, a further combination in accordance with the
+altered circumstances to win the next.
+
+"For we maintain that, with few exceptions, _the victory at the
+decisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor
+points_"[57] over the whole theatre of war. Therefore nothing else
+matters for long, and to victory in the first great battle "everything
+else must be sacrificed." For concentration can only be obtained by
+sacrifice.
+
+
+PURSUIT
+
+"Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about
+rest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only
+of pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the
+enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever
+else appears as a rallying point for the enemy."[58]
+
+Clausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel
+his exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requires GREAT
+force of WILL on the part of the equally exhausted commander. We need
+only remember that Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis of his fate,
+being physically tired, failed to pursue the allies after his victory
+at Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the fruits of his victory, and
+indeed his last chance of ultimate success.
+
+
+SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
+
+Leaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical
+thoughts, I hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at
+Clausewitz's admirable summary[59] of strategic principles:--
+
+"_The first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves
+is to employ_ ALL _the forces which we can make available with the_
+UTMOST ENERGY. Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it
+is extremely unwise not to make it _perfectly certain_.
+
+"_The second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible
+at the point where the_ DECISIVE _blow is to be struck. The success at
+that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points._
+
+"_The third principle is not to lose time. Rapidity and surprise are
+the most powerful elements of victory._
+
+"_Lastly, the fourth principle is to_ FOLLOW UP THE SUCCESS _we gain
+with the_ UTMOST ENERGY. _The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the
+only means of gathering up the fruits of victory._
+
+"The first of these principles is the foundation of all the others. _If
+we have followed the first principle, we can venture any length with
+regard to the three others without risking our all._ It gives the means
+of _continually creating new forces behind us_, and with new forces
+every disaster may be repaired. _In this, and not in going forward
+with timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise._"
+
+These great principles are everything in war, and "due regard being
+paid to these principles, the form (_i.e._ the geometrical element)
+in which the operations are carried on is in the end of little
+consequence."
+
+"Therefore I am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his
+powers to appear _incessantly with new masses_, whoever adopts _every
+imaginable means of preparation_, whoever _concentrates his force at
+the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with
+resolution and energy_, has done all that can be done in a general
+way for the strategical conduct of the war, and that, unless he is
+altogether unfortunate in battle, will undoubtedly be victorious in the
+same measure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and
+energy."
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+When we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy
+firmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of
+our knowledge. For principles are no use unless we apply them. On
+consideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all
+apply these principles with advantage.
+
+I. It will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise
+to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about,
+to search for indications of their application in the strategy of each
+belligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to
+carry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded
+or failed, and the results of doing or not doing so. Also to search
+for the interaction of the political motive of the war on the military
+operations, and to see how far the belligerent statesmen gained or
+failed to gain their political object, according to the comparative
+degree of preparation they had made for it, and the magnitude of
+effort which they made or did not make to support it with the whole
+means of the nation, material, moral and physical. Also to see how
+far the national spirit was aroused or not, and the causes thereof,
+and to note the greater or less energy, resolution and boldness which
+was consequently infused into the war. Also to note how the thorough
+application of these great simple principles of strategy shortens the
+war and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to 1870), and how the neglect of
+them by statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards, lengthens a war
+and adds to its cost enormously (South Africa, etc.). Used thus, these
+principles give us a theoretically correct ground for criticism.
+
+II. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for
+anticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will
+be, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will
+direct those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness
+with which they will use them against us. It is an axiom always to
+assume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare
+accordingly.
+
+III. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for
+our own counter-preparations. We require to take the most dangerous war
+which is probable or possible, and make every imaginable preparation to
+carry out these principles therein.
+
+In such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals
+to win, and thus save the nation from the irreparable consequences
+and the huge war indemnity of L800,000,000 or so, which would follow
+defeat? How are we going to do it? How are we going to render it
+possible for our generals to employ the best strategy? The ideal of
+strategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers.
+How are we going to give our generals that? If we cannot do that,
+how are we going to give them even any superiority _at all_, so that
+they may be able to carry out the first principle of strategy? How?
+Or are we going to make NO _adequate preparations_ for these three
+eventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to
+save us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the
+impossible? It is in this way that a statesman should use these few
+great simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political
+object and safeguard the interests of the nation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY
+
+
+Now, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory of war is easy enough to
+understand. There is no reason--one might almost say no excuse--why
+every one, soldier or statesman, should not know it fairly well. The
+great leading principles of strategy are few and simple. There is no
+reason why every one, soldier and statesman, should not understand
+and know these few simple principles thoroughly, and have them at his
+finger ends ready to apply them to the consideration of any military
+question, past, present, or future. So far all is easy. But when it
+is a question of carrying out in actual war this easy theory, these
+simple strategical principles, then it is QUITE a different matter,
+then it is a matter of the very greatest difficulty. This is a
+difference which the mind always finds very hard to grasp, as witness
+the denunciations with which any failure in execution by a general, no
+matter how great the real difficulties with which he had to contend,
+is nearly always greeted. Observers rarely make allowances for these
+difficulties, very largely probably because they do not understand
+them. The present chapter is devoted to these difficulties of execution
+in war.
+
+
+THE GENIUS FOR WAR
+
+In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the genius for war"[60] he sets forth
+the difficulties which confront a general, the character and genius,
+the driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of
+war. It is impossible to abstract it adequately; I can only advise all
+to read it for themselves. But I will endeavour to give an idea of it.
+
+After discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general,
+physical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength
+of body and mind, the personal pride, the patriotism, the enthusiasm,
+etc., he comes to the unexpected.
+
+"_War_," he says, "_is the province of uncertainty. Three-fourths of
+those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden
+more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty._ Here, then, above
+all other, a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the
+truth by the tact of its judgment." Mark this point, that three-fourths
+of the things that we as critics AFTER the event know, when all
+information of the situation has been collected and published, were
+unknown to the general who had to decide, or only dimly guessed at from
+a number of contradictory reports.
+
+"From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, _this
+continual interposition of chance_." "Now, if he is to get safely
+through _this perpetual conflict with the unexpected_, two qualities
+are indispensable; in the first place _an understanding which, even
+in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces
+of inner light_, which _lead to the truth_, and then _the courage to
+follow this faint light_. The first is expressed by the French phrase
+_coup d'oeil_; the second is resolution."
+
+"Resolution is an _act of courage in face of responsibility_." "The
+forerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making plain the
+necessity of venturing and thus influencing the will. This quite
+peculiar direction of the mind, which conquers every other fear in man
+by the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes up resolution in
+strong minds."
+
+The vital importance of firmness and resolution, so strongly urged
+by Clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the
+strongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation
+in war. Compare, for instance, York _v._ Wartenburg's masterly
+exposition of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation in 1813 at
+Dresden.
+
+Also there is required "_the power of listening to reason in the midst
+of the most intense excitement_, in the storm of the most violent
+passions."
+
+"But to keep to the result of by-gone reflections in opposition to the
+stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it, is
+just THE difficulty." "Here nothing else can help us but an imperative
+maxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that maxim
+is, _in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to
+give it up till a clear conviction forces us to do so_."
+
+"But as soon as difficulties arise, and that must always happen
+when great results are at stake, then the machine, the army itself,
+begins to offer a sort of passive resistance, and to overcome this
+the commander must have great force of will." Driving power, such as
+Napoleon's. And also "the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice,
+which the commander has to contend with in himself."
+
+"These are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of
+the commander have to contend with and OVERCOME, if he is to make his
+name illustrious." If he is to prevent the downfall of his country.
+
+
+REFLECTIONS
+
+(1) In connection with these difficulties I would like to put forward a
+suggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though
+not exactly Clausewitz's, is a corollary from Clausewitz. It is this.
+In reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history
+nearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of
+one or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in
+the previous chapter. But we must assume that the defeated general was
+_familiar_ with that principle, and that his _will_ was to carry it
+out. What, then, were the difficulties, the friction, which, on any
+particular day or days, overcame his will and made him sacrifice the
+principle? This is where most critics fail us. Here seems the matter
+to search for. And could a stronger resolution have enabled him to
+overcome those difficulties, that friction? And if so, how and by what
+means? But we must first discover the difficulties and uncertainties
+of the particular day when his will gave way. Take the Manchurian
+campaign as an instance. If we could only have a military history of
+the campaign of 1870 or that of Manchuria, written in the form of a
+series of "appreciations of the situation," so that we know nothing but
+what the general knew at the time as we read, and if the true state of
+affairs could be withheld from us till the end, this, I think, would
+be very instructive and helpful. It would be a more difficult way of
+writing a military history, but I think that the extra trouble would be
+repaid by the extra value. So at least it appears.
+
+(2) If we reflect upon the enormous difficulties, so strikingly
+brought out by Clausewitz, which _our_ generals have to contend with
+and _overcome_ in actual war, it should surely teach us to curb our
+criticism. It should surely also make us resolve in future to try to
+aid them as far as is in our power at home, and not thoughtlessly to
+increase their already stupendous burdens. In the past we at home have
+much to accuse ourselves of, much to regret. In the past often have
+we added to the difficulties of our generals, often have we greatly
+weakened their chances, and increased those of their opponents, often
+have we, unintentionally, through ignorance cast a weight into the
+scale against our country.
+
+(3) The ignorance of the public regarding the conduct of war
+constitutes for us a very serious national danger. If this ignorance
+were less pronounced, if our statesmen understood the vast importance
+of information to the enemy, and the equal importance to our generals
+that this information the enemy should NOT obtain, then the public
+craving for information regarding every detail of what occurs in
+the field, and the demand for the wide publication thereof, would
+certainly be repressed. Nothing occurs in any of our campaigns which
+is not immediately made known; reports of actions with the fullest
+details as to the troops engaged, and the casualties that have befallen
+them, appear in the columns of the Press within a few hours of their
+occurrence. _Any efforts, therefore, of our generals_ in the field
+to maintain _secrecy as to strength, intentions, and movements are
+deliberately_, though probably unintentionally, _counteracted by
+their own countrymen_. This is due to pure ignorance of war, no doubt,
+but the effect of this ignorance is as bad as if it were due to evil
+intention. In fairness, however, we must admit that, in the past, the
+immense value of reticence has not been fully appreciated by some of
+our soldiers themselves, and it were well if, in the future, more
+attention were directed to the importance of secrecy.
+
+The results of such almost criminal stupidity may not be apparent
+when we are fighting with a savage foe, but if we ever have, as we
+undoubtedly some day shall have, the misfortune to find ourselves
+engaged with a civilized Power, we may be certain that not only will
+the operations be indefinitely prolonged, _and their cost enormously
+increased_, but their successful issue will be for us highly
+problematical.
+
+In this connection it must be remembered that every Great Power has
+secret agents in every country, including Great Britain, and that it
+will be easy for such a secret agent to telegraph in cypher or in
+some agreed code to an agent in a neutral State all war information
+published here, who will telegraph it on at once to the hostile
+general, who will thus get, within a very short time of its publication
+in London, perhaps just exactly the information he requires to clear up
+the strategical or tactical situation for him, and enable him to defeat
+the combinations of our generals. As a case in point, take Macmahon's
+march on Sedan to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy was absolutely
+necessary for success, but which became known to the Germans by the
+English newspapers.--Result, Sedan.
+
+That this cannot be allowed is plain. It is believed that the
+patriotism of our Press will welcome any necessary measure to this end
+if it is made compulsory upon ALL.[61]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+TACTICS
+
+
+Some will probably feel inclined to ask what Clausewitz, who wrote more
+than eighty years ago, can possibly have to say about tactics which can
+be valuable in the twentieth century.
+
+It was said by Napoleon that tactics change every ten years, according,
+of course, to the progress of technicalities, etc. Weapons indeed
+change, but there is one thing that never changes, and that is human
+nature. The most important thing in tactics, the man behind the gun,
+never alters; in his heart and feelings, his strength and weakness, he
+is always much the same.
+
+Therefore, Clausewitz's tactical deductions, founded on the immense
+and varied data supplied by the desperate and long-continued fighting
+of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, permeated as they are by his
+all-pervading psychological or moral view, can never lose their value
+to us.
+
+It is true, no doubt, that our rifles of to-day can be used with
+effect at a distance ten times as great as the old smooth bores of
+Clausewitz's day, our shrapnel five times as far as his cannon, and
+that cover and ground play a far more important part now than then, and
+so on. All these things, of course, considerably modify the tactics of
+Clausewitz. Not so much, however, as some text-books would lead us to
+suppose, which always seem to assume clear ground and clear weather.
+For, after all, how many combats are fought on ground where there is
+a very restricted field of fire (_vide_ Herbert's "Defence of Plevna,"
+etc.), or at night? How many battles are fought during rain, or snow,
+or mist, or fog, which destroys all long range? Compare the tremendous
+fighting with "bullets, bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and even
+fists," of Nogi's attempt to cut the Russian line of retreat at Mukden,
+with the hand-to-hand fighting of Eylau, Friedland, Borodino, or with
+the desperate efforts of the French in 1812 to open their line of
+retreat through Maro-Jaroslawitz, where all day the masses of troops
+fought hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town was taken and retaken
+seven times, and the rival nations fought with the bayonet in the midst
+of the burning houses" (Alison).
+
+When it comes to push of pike, as in all great decisions between
+equally resolute adversaries it is bound to do, the difference between
+the fighting of Clausewitz's day and ours is but small. The most recent
+instances of all, the hand-to-hand fighting in Manchuria, take us back
+to the Napoleonic struggles.
+
+Therefore, despite the eighty years that have intervened, the writings
+of Clausewitz are still valuable from a tactical point of view, always
+considering of course the difference in weapons, because of the human
+heart in battle.
+
+His ideas on tactics have largely filtered through his German pupils
+into our textbooks, minus the psychological or moral note, so that it
+is not necessary to go at length into the subject, or give a number of
+extracts. It would be wearisome. I will, however, give a few passages
+at haphazard as illustrations.
+
+
+FLANK ATTACKS
+
+The endeavour to gain the enemy's line of retreat, and protect our own,
+on which so much learned erudition has been spent by various writers,
+he regards as a NATURAL instinct, which will ALWAYS produce itself both
+in generals and subalterns.
+
+"From this arises, in the whole conduct of war, and especially in great
+and small combats, a PERFECT INSTINCT, which is the security of our
+own line of retreat and the seizure of the enemy's; this follows from
+the conception of victory, which, as we have seen, is something beyond
+mere slaughter. In this effort we see, therefore, the FIRST immediate
+purpose in the combat, and one which is quite universal. No combat
+is _imaginable_ in which this effort, either in its double or single
+form, is not to go hand in hand with the plain and simple stroke of
+force. Even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon the enemy
+without thinking of its line of retreat, and in most cases it will have
+an eye upon that of the enemy."[62] "This is a great _natural law_ of
+the combat," "and so becomes the pivot upon which ALL strategical and
+tactical manoeuvres turn."
+
+
+RESERVES--DESTRUCTIVE AND DECISIVE ACT
+
+The combat he regards as settled by whoever has the preponderance of
+moral force at the end; that is, in fresh or only partly used up troops.
+
+The combat itself he divides into a destructive and a decisive act.
+During the long destructive act, or period of fire preparation, the
+troops engaged gradually wear each other out, and gradually almost
+cease to count as factors in the decision. "After a fire combat of
+some hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe
+losses--for instance, a quarter or one-third of its numbers--the
+_debris_ may for the time be looked upon as a heap of cinders. For the
+men are physically exhausted; they have spent their ammunition; many
+have left the field with the wounded, though not themselves wounded
+(compare, for instance, Eylau and the 1870 battles); the rest think
+they have done their part for the day, and if they get beyond the
+sphere of danger, do not willingly return to it. The feeling of courage
+with which they originally started has had the edge taken off, the
+longing for the fight is satisfied, the original organization is partly
+destroyed, and the formations broken up."
+
+"So that the amount of moral force lost may be estimated by the amount
+of the Reserves used up, almost as with a foot rule."[63]
+
+This goes on till, "In all probability, only the untouched reserve and
+some troops which, though they have been in action, have suffered very
+little, are in reality to be regarded as serviceable, and the remainder
+(perhaps four-sixths) may be looked upon for the present as a "caput
+mortuum."
+
+Therefore the art of the commander he regards as "economy of force"
+during the destructive period; that is, to employ as few troops as
+possible, by taking advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to use a smaller
+number of men in the combat with firearms than the enemy employs," so
+that a smaller proportionate number of his own are reduced to a "heap
+of cinders" and more are left, more moral force, for the decision.
+
+"Hundreds of times," he says, "a line of fire has maintained its own
+against one twice its strength" (_e.g._ the Boers).
+
+To do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect demands very skilful
+handling of the troops, both on the part of the chief and subordinate
+leaders.
+
+With the preponderance thus obtained the commander at last starts the
+decision. "Towards the close of a battle the line of retreat is always
+regarded with increased jealousy, therefore a threat against that
+line is always a potent means of bringing on the decision (Liao-yang,
+Mukden). On that account, when circumstances permit, the plan of battle
+will be aimed at that point from the very first." Or, "If this wear and
+tear and exhaustion of the forces has reached a certain pitch, then a
+rapid advance in concentrated masses on one side against the line of
+battle of the other" (_i.e._ the Napoleonic breaking the centre, of
+recent years thought almost hopeless, but revived in Manchuria with
+success, in the case of Nodzu breaking the centre at Mukden).
+
+From what precedes it is evident that, as in the preparatory acts, the
+utmost economy of forces must prevail, so in the decisive act to win
+the mastery through _numbers_ must be the ruling idea.
+
+Just as in the preparatory acts endurance, firmness and coolness are
+the first qualities, so in the decisive act boldness and fiery spirit
+must predominate.
+
+"The difference between these two acts will never be completely lost as
+respects the whole."
+
+"This is the way in which our view is to be understood; then, on the
+one hand, it will not come short of the reality, and on the other
+it will direct the attention of the leader of a combat (be it great
+or small, partial or general) to giving each of the two acts of
+activity its due share, so that there may be neither precipitation nor
+negligence.
+
+"_Precipitation_ there will be if space and time are not allowed
+for the destructive act. _Negligence_ in general there will be if
+a complete decision does not take place, either from want of moral
+courage or from a wrong view of the situation."[64]
+
+
+DURATION OF THE COMBAT
+
+"Even the resistance of an ordinary division of 8,000 or 10,000 men
+of all arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably superior in
+numbers, will last several hours, if the advantages of country are not
+too preponderating. And if the enemy is only a little or not at all
+superior in numbers, the combat will last half a day. A corps of three
+or four divisions will prolong it to double that time; an army of
+80,000 or 100,000 men to three or four times." "These calculations are
+the result of experience."[65]
+
+As General von Caemmerer points out, if these calculations were adhered
+to in present-day German manoeuvres, as they are now in all war games,
+tactical exercises, and staff rides, the dangerous dualism of their
+training, the difference between theory and manoeuvre practice, would
+cease.
+
+
+ATTACK AND DEFENCE
+
+I have left to the last the consideration of three or four disputed
+points in Clausewitz. In considering these I shall quote a good deal
+from General von Caemmerer's "Development of Strategical Science,"
+as in such matters it is best to quote the most recent authors of
+established reputation.
+
+The most important of these, and the most disputed, is Clausewitz's
+famous dictum that "the defensive is the stronger form of making war."
+"The defence is the stronger form of war with a negative object; the
+attack is the weaker form with a positive object."[66]
+
+General von Caemmerer says, "It is strange, we Germans look upon
+Clausewitz as indisputably the deepest and acutest thinker upon the
+subject of war; the beneficial effect of his intellectual labours is
+universally recognized and highly appreciated; but the more or less
+keen opposition against this sentence never ceases. And yet that
+sentence can as little be cut out of his work 'On War' as the heart out
+of a man. Our most distinguished and prominent military writers are
+here at variance with Clausewitz.
+
+"Now, of course, I do not here propose to go into such a controversy.
+I only wish to point out that Clausewitz, in saying this, only meant
+the defensive-offensive, the form in which he always regards it, both
+strategically and technically, in oft-repeated explanations all through
+his works. For instance--
+
+"It is a FIRST maxim NEVER to remain perfectly passive, but to fall
+upon the enemy in front and flank, even when he is in the act of making
+an attack upon us."[67]
+
+And again--
+
+"_A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword
+of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive._ He who
+does not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who
+does not from the first include this transition in his idea of the
+defensive, will never understand its superiority as a form of war."[68]
+Von Caemmerer comments thus: "And this conception of the defence
+by Clausewitz has become part and parcel of our army--everywhere,
+strategically and tactically, he who has been forced into a defensive
+attitude at once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack. I am thus
+unable to see how the way in which Clausewitz has contrasted Attack
+and Defence could in any way paralyse the spirit of enterprise." Von
+Caemmerer also justly remarks that, as Clausewitz always insisted
+both in strategy and tactics, neither Attack nor Defence is pure, but
+oscillates between the two forms; and as the Attack is frequently
+temporarily reduced to defend itself, and also as no nation can be sure
+of never being invaded by a superior coalition, it is most desirable
+to encourage a belief in the strength of the Defence, if properly used.
+In this I think that Wellington would probably have agreed. Certainly
+Austerlitz and Waterloo were examples of battles such as Clausewitz
+preferred.
+
+Still, one must admit that Clausewitz's chapter on "The Relations
+of the Offensive and Defensive to each other in Tactics," Book VII.
+Chapter 2, is the least convincing chapter of his work.
+
+Strategically, the argument is stronger. It always seems to me that we
+must remember that Clausewitz had taken part in the defensive-offensive
+in its strongest, most absolute and unlimited form, on the greatest
+possible scale--the Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated before
+a single flake of snow fell) of the Grand Army. If he had lived to
+complete the revision of his works, it always seems to me that he
+would have made his theory undeniable by stating that the defensive is
+the strongest form of war, _if unlimited by space_. What, for instance,
+would have happened if the Japanese had tried to march through Siberia
+on to St. Petersburg?
+
+But, after all, which of the two is absolutely the stronger form of
+war, attack or defence, is merely a theoretical abstraction, for,
+practically, the choice is always settled for us by the pressing
+necessity of circumstances. And, in this connection, let us always bear
+in mind Clausewitz's dictum: "A swift and vigorous assumption of the
+offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point
+in the defensive."
+
+
+THE INNER LINE
+
+A second disputed point is Clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule,
+for the Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary to remember that
+that was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and
+telegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting
+on concentric lines. And he is not in any way wedded to the Inner Line,
+like Jomini, but _only_ when circumstances are favourable. He has many
+sentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and
+telegraph days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most distinguished
+pupil, would have aimed at envelopment as a rule. For to bring up
+troops rapidly by several railways necessitates a broad strategic
+front, and Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity as his second great
+principle, and says--
+
+"If the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss
+of time, and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too
+great, then the same may be justifiable on these grounds; for _to
+effect an unnecessary concentration of the forces_ would be contrary
+to the second principle we have laid down (_i.e._ 'to act as swiftly
+as possible')."[69] Also: "Such separation into several columns as is
+absolutely necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the
+tactical attack in the enveloping form, _for that form is natural to
+the attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason_."[70]
+Also: "_It is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during
+the action._" So that while the conditions of his time led Clausewitz
+to prefer close concentration and the Inner Line, like Napoleon,
+yet his reflections led him to propound the germ of the strategy of
+Moltke. Substitute for Clausewitz's close concentration this: "As
+close concentration, the combined movements regulated by telegraph,
+as is compatible with the utmost use of the railways and the greatest
+rapidity" (as he would certainly have said), and we arrive at Moltke's
+strategy.
+
+
+FRONTAL ATTACKS
+
+A third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical
+efficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic method
+of breaking the enemy's line in the centre. Breaking the line by a
+frontal attack was, of course, much easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic
+day than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only
+natural that Clausewitz in his writings should give it the full
+tactical importance which it then deserved. His book would not be true
+to the tactical conditions of his day had he not done so, with Rivoli,
+Austerlitz, Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before his mind. But it seems
+hardly correct to accuse him of over-partiality to frontal attacks, for
+he has examined both frontal and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving
+to each their relative advantages and disadvantages, and concluding:
+"The envelopment may lead directly to the _destruction_ of the enemy's
+army, if it is made with very superior numbers and succeeds. If it
+leads to victory the early results are _in every case_ greater than
+by breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the enemy's line can only lead
+indirectly to the destruction of the enemy's army, and its effects
+are hardly shown so much on the first day, but rather strategically
+afterwards,"[71] by forcing apart on different lines of retreat the
+separated fragments of the beaten army.
+
+"The breaking through the hostile army by massing our principal force
+against one point, _supposes an excessive length of front on the part
+of the enemy_; for in this form of attack the difficulty of occupying
+the remainder of the enemy's force with few troops is greater, because
+the enemy's forces nearer to the principal point of attack can easily
+join in opposing it. Now in an attack upon the centre there are such
+forces on both sides of the attack; in an attack upon a flank, only
+on one side. The consequence of this is that such a central attack
+may easily end in a very disadvantageous form of combat, _through a
+convergent counter-attack_." Which is exactly our modern difficulty.
+"The choice between these two forms of attack must therefore be made
+according to the existing conditions of the moment. Length of front,
+the nature and direction of the line of retreat, the military qualities
+of the enemy's troops, and the characteristics of their general,
+lastly the ground must determine the choice."
+
+Speaking generally he regards the _concentric_ enveloping form of
+tactical attack aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as the most
+efficacious and natural. "On the field of battle itself ... the
+enveloping form must always be considered the most effectual."[72] And
+the _eccentric_ or frontal counter-attack at the extended enveloping
+attack as the most efficacious and natural form of the defence, such as
+Napoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz or Dresden, or Wellington's
+at Salamanca. "And we think that one means is at least as good as the
+other."[73]
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Now I think that these extracts sufficiently defend Clausewitz from the
+imputation of too great a belief in frontal attacks, and considering
+the frequent success of such Napoleonic attacks in his day, he gives
+a very fair summing up of the relative advantages and disadvantages
+thereof, and indeed such as might be written in the present day.
+Indeed the quite abnormal conditions of the Boer war produced such a
+feeling against frontal attacks, and so much loose talk of their being
+extinct, that it is very useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder
+that breaking the centre, whenever the condition he postulates, namely
+_over-extension of front_ on the enemy's part, is present, will
+always remain one of the two great forms of decisive attack open to a
+commander.
+
+And as in our day the forces are so enormous that to reach the hostile
+flank becomes more difficult, and the extension of front becomes so
+gigantic (a front of several armies on a line of forty to seventy miles
+perhaps), it is well to consider whether breaking the enemy's centre
+will not again offer the most advantageous form for the final decisive
+act, coupled of course, as Clausewitz says it ALWAYS MUST be, with a
+strong flank attack. And in these gigantic battles of the future, such
+as Liao-yang and Mukden, which we must consider typical of the future,
+battles which must take several days, during which the troops in the
+first line become utterly exhausted and used up,--a decisive attack
+on the centre can well be imagined after the hostile reserves have
+been decoyed away over a day's march by a strong flank attack. As, for
+example, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden followed by Nodzu's decisive
+breaking the centre and capture of Mukden itself.
+
+So that far from thinking Clausewitz's remarks about frontal attacks
+and breaking the line to be obsolete, it rather appears from the great
+Russo-Japanese battles that they are worthy of close study in view of
+the future.
+
+
+TACTICAL VERSUS STRATEGICAL ENVELOPMENT
+
+A fourth disputed point is the preference of Clausewitz, owing to his
+insistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard
+for the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or
+near the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged
+beforehand. In this matter I will again quote General v. Caemmerer,
+who disagrees with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims the oblique
+front as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to
+say, when the whole army with one united front falls upon the strategic
+_flank_ of the enemy, and, if victorious, cuts him from his line of
+retreat. But where such a situation cannot be brought about, where our
+advance has brought us before the strategic _front_ of the enemy, then
+he sees in the tactical envelopment, in the formation of an offensive
+flank, the proper means of effectively preparing to push the enemy
+from his line of retreat, and he distinctly explains that tactical
+envelopment need not at all be the _consequence_ of strategical
+envelopment, and need not at all be prepared long beforehand by a
+corresponding advance of divided forces."
+
+Clausewitz says, "The consequence of this is that battles fought with
+enveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which should properly
+result from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication,
+are commonly the result of a moral and physical preponderance."[74]
+Also "he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width
+of front as will admit of their all coming into action together."
+"Such separation into several columns should be made use of for the
+disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form" (_i.e._ by
+troops within a day's march of each other). "But it must be only of a
+tactical nature, for a strategic envelopment, when a great blow is to
+be struck, is a complete waste of power."
+
+General v. Caemmerer comments: "He is thus of opinion that the lateral
+movement of part of the army against the flank of the enemy could
+without any difficulty still be carried out as initiated by the plan of
+battle; and in order to understand this idea we must again bear in mind
+the difference between the fire-effect of then and now. In those days a
+comparatively short movement made it still possible for a considerable
+portion of the army to gain the defenders' flank; to-day a lengthy
+and troublesome operation would be necessary for the same object, and
+its successful execution would only be counted upon if the defender
+remained entirely passive, and would neither think of a counter-stroke
+nor of a corresponding movement of his forces to the threatened flank."
+
+Without going into this controversy I will, however, quote the
+excellent reason given by Clausewitz for his preference for tactical as
+opposed to strategical envelopment: "One peculiarity of the offensive
+battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position (note, and
+strength) of the enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things
+that are unknown (Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena, Katzbach).
+The more this is the case the more concentration of forces becomes
+paramount, and turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding."[75]
+
+It is also well to recollect how many famous generals had been ruined
+in Clausewitz's experience through over-extension or dispersion of
+their forces. The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals in the winter
+of 1813, Macdonald at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren, Ney at
+Dennewitz, which neutralized Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and
+began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to this cause.
+
+And the weather may, again, have as great influence in shortening
+resistance and allowing troops to be overwhelmed before the too-distant
+reinforcements arrive, as it had in those battles. If the weather then
+prevented the old muskets going off, and enabled the attack to rush
+the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or snow, by restricting the
+field of view and fire, may produce the same results. When one thinks
+of the number of great battles fought in such weather, as they may
+well be again, one sees an additional reason for carefully considering
+Clausewitz's warning. Far from relegating his preference for the
+tactical as opposed to the strategical envelopment to the region of
+the obsolete, because of our improved armament, it seems right to give
+it full weight as a corrective to a perceivable tendency to elevate
+strategical envelopment (after Koeniggraetz) into a formula for victory.
+If in the past many great generals have been ruined by over-extension,
+so may they be again. Against this tendency Clausewitz will for ever
+lift his voice.
+
+Also it remains to be considered, with the huge armies of to-day and
+the future, such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden, such armies as
+may possibly one day join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical
+envelopment will be practicable, or whether tactical envelopment,
+such as General Kuroki's tactical enveloping movement on Yentai, and
+the Russian line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General Nogi's tactical
+enveloping dash northward on Hsinminting and the railway at Mukden,
+will not be preferable.
+
+Perhaps, as a compromise, one might call such a movement
+strategical-tactical, and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of words.
+
+I have not attempted to do more than roughly indicate that the solution
+of these four disputed tactical questions in Clausewitz is to be sought
+in a study of the latest campaign, as he would have said himself; that
+is, the campaign in Manchuria. For, as the _Times_ correspondent in the
+XLVth Chapter, "Clausewitz in Manchuria," of his book "The War in the
+Far East," observes, "It will be abundantly clear to any one who has
+followed the great battles in Manchuria that the spirit of Clausewitz
+has presided over Japanese victories and wept over Russian defeats."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ
+
+
+In reading Clausewitz it is, first, the great principles of the nature
+of war founded on human nature, which alter not; and, secondly, it
+is his spirit and practical way of looking at things that we want to
+assimilate and apply to THE PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY, to which end it is
+necessary to read him always with the changed conditions of to-day in
+our minds, and think what he would have said under the circumstances.
+These changes are chiefly:--
+
+    (1) The improved net-work of roads.
+    (2) Railways.
+    (3) Telegraphs, wire and wireless.
+    (4) Improved arms.
+    (5) Aviation
+    (6) Universal service armies.
+
+
+THE IMPROVED NET-WORK OF ROADS
+
+The improved net-work of roads in Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria,
+or in Afghanistan where we have to consider our future strategy, but in
+Europe), as General v. Caemmerer puts it, "now offers to the movements
+of armies everywhere a whole series of useful roads where formerly one
+or two only were available," easier gradients, good bridges instead of
+unreliable ones, etc. So that the march-discipline of that day when
+concentrated for battle, artillery and train _on_ the roads, infantry
+and cavalry _by the side_ of the roads, has disappeared. Such close
+concentration is therefore now not possible, as we move all arms _on_
+the road, and an army corps with train, or two without, is the most
+that we can now calculate on bringing into action in one day on one
+road.
+
+
+RAILWAYS
+
+"Railways have, above all, completely altered the term 'base,'" remarks
+V. Caemmerer. "Railways carry in a few days men, horses, vehicles,
+and materials of all kinds from the remotest district to any desired
+point of our country, and nobody would any longer think of accumulating
+enormous supplies of all kinds at certain fortified points on his
+own frontier with the object of basing himself on those points. One
+does not base one's self any longer on a distinct district which is
+specially prepared for that object, but upon the whole country, which
+has become one single magazine, with separate store-rooms. So the term
+'base' has now to be considered in this light."
+
+It is only when operating in savage or semi-savage countries, where
+there are no railways, that the old idea of a base applies.
+
+As we penetrate deeper and further from our own country into the
+enemy's, and as a small raiding party can demolish the railway line so
+as to stop all traffic for days or weeks, it becomes far more necessary
+than it ever was in Clausewitz's day to guard our communications.
+And armies become more and more sensitive to any attack upon their
+communications.
+
+Also "such a line cannot easily be changed, and consequently those
+celebrated changes of the line of communication in an enemy's country
+which Napoleon himself, on some occasion, declared to be the ablest
+manoeuvre in the art of war, could scarcely be carried out any more"
+(V. Caemmerer).
+
+Also concentration by means of several railways demands a broad
+strategic front, which produces that separation of corps or armies
+which prepares the way for strategical envelopment, and so on.
+
+General von der Goltz, in his "Conduct of War," says: "The more recent
+treatises on the conduct of war on a large scale are principally taken
+up with the mobilization and strategical concentration of armies, a
+department of strategy which only began to play an important part in
+modern times. It is the result of a dense net-work of railways in
+Western Europe which has rendered it possible to mass large bodies
+of troops in a surprisingly brief time. Each Power tries to outdo
+its neighbours in this respect, ... which gives an opportunity to
+the strategical specialist to show off his brilliant qualities....
+Consequently it is now frequently assumed that the whole conduct of
+war is comprised in this one section of it." This over-estimate is of
+course an error, which, however, requires to be pointed out.
+
+
+TELEGRAPHS
+
+The telegraph has very greatly reduced the danger of separation.
+The great advantage of the inner line in the day of Napoleon and of
+Clausewitz was that separated forces could only communicate by mounted
+messengers, so if the enemy got between them they could not communicate
+at all, nor act in concert. This the telegraph has completely altered,
+for as the field telegraph can now be laid as quickly as an army can
+advance, the most widely separated bodies of troops can every day
+arrange combined operations by telegraph through, if necessary,
+a point one hundred or four hundred miles in rear. So that to-day
+the chief advantage of the inner line has gone, while its chief
+disadvantage, the possibility of being surrounded, remains.
+
+
+MAPS
+
+We now possess complete detailed Ordnance maps of every country in
+Europe, kept up to date by the latest alterations, whereas in the days
+of Clausewitz maps were of the very roughest character, and quite
+unreliable in comparison.
+
+
+IMPROVED ARMS
+
+Smokeless powder, quick-firing and long-ranging artillery and rifles,
+the infantry field of effective fire being ten times, the artillery
+five times what it was in Clausewitz's time, have all to be borne in
+mind when reading the tactical part of his writings. In consequence,
+also, cover and the tactical use of ground are of far greater
+importance now than then, etc., etc., etc.
+
+
+AVIATION
+
+The recent wonderful developments in aviation will obviously almost
+revolutionize "Information in War." To what extent, it is as yet
+impossible to say. Each year will teach us more.
+
+
+THE NATION-IN-ARMS
+
+The nation-in-arms as the common foundation of all armies (except our
+own), brought up by railways, vastly increases the numbers in a modern
+battle from what they were in Clausewitz's day. Compare Austerlitz,
+Dresden, Leipzig and Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden. It should be
+so with us also, for as General von der Goltz says in "The Conduct of
+War": "The BEST military organization is that which renders available
+ALL the intellectual and material resources of the country in event of
+war. _A State is not justified in trying to defend itself with only a
+portion of its strength, when the existence of the whole is at stake._"
+
+In Great Britain the difference which the introduction of this
+nation-in-arms principle has made in our military strength compared
+with that of our future opponents, a difference relatively FAR GREATER
+AGAINST US than it was in Napoleon's and Clausewitz's day, is as yet
+hardly realized by the people, or by our statesmen. People forget the
+wastage of war, and the necessity for a constant flow of troops to
+repair that wastage. As Von der Goltz puts it: "It is characteristic
+of the strategical offensive that the foremost body of troops of
+an army, the portion which fights the battles, amounts to only a
+comparatively small fraction, frequently only _a quarter or even
+one-eighth_, of the total fighting strength employed, whilst the fate
+of the whole army throughout depends upon the success or failure of
+this fraction. _Attacking armies melt away like snow in the spring._"
+To condense his remarks: "In spite of the most admirable discipline,
+the Prussian Guard Corps lost 5000 to 6000 men in the marches between
+the attack on St. Privat and the battle of Sedan." "Napoleon crossed
+the Niemen in 1812 with 442,000 men, but reached Moscow only three
+months later with only 95,000." In the spring of 1810, the French
+crossed the Pyrenees with 400,000 men, but still Marshal Massena in
+the end only brought 45,000 men up to the lines of Torres Vedras,
+near Lisbon, where the decision lay. Again, in 1829, the Russians
+put 160,000 men in the field, but had barely 20,000 left when, at
+Adrianople, a skilfully concluded peace saved them before their
+weakness became apparent and a reaction set in. In 1878 the Russians
+led 460,000 across the Danube, but they only brought 100,000 men--of
+whom only 43,000 were effective, the rest being sick--to the gates of
+Constantinople. In 1870 the Germans crossed the French frontier with
+372,000 men, but after only a six weeks' campaign brought but 171,000
+men to Paris. And so on. The result of it all is simple--that a people
+which is not based on the modern principle of the nation-in-arms cannot
+for long rival or contend with one that is, for it can neither put
+an equal (still less a superior) army into the field at the outset
+(_vide_ Clausewitz's first principle), nor even maintain in the field
+the _inferior_ army it does place there, because it cannot send the
+ever-required fresh supplies of trained troops. Sooner or later this
+must tell. Sooner or later a situation must arise in which the nation
+based on the obsolete voluntary system _must_ go down before a nation
+based on the nation-in-arms principle. Circumstances change with time,
+and, as wise Lord Bacon said long ago, "He that will not adopt new
+remedies must expect new evils." May we adopt the remedy before we
+experience the evil!
+
+
+THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL FORCES IN WAR
+
+But though these changed conditions must, of course, _modify_
+Clausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete
+our circle and leave off where we started) I repeat that, as human
+nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three
+to one in war, Clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical
+philosopher on the actual nature of war, as _the chief exponent of the
+moral and spiritual forces in war_, will ever remain invaluable in the
+study of war.
+
+Consider what unsurpassed opportunities he had for observing and
+reflecting on the influence of enthusiasm and passion, of resolution
+and boldness, of vacillation and weakness, of coolness and caution, of
+endurance and hardship, of patriotism and freedom, of ambition and of
+glory--on war, either by his own experience or by conversation with
+other equally experienced soldiers, during that long period of almost
+endless wars between 1793 and 1815.
+
+The fervour and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the Revolution,
+which drove the French forward, smashing everything before them, at
+the beginning; the ambition, military glory, plunder and greed, which
+animated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion,
+and stern endurance, which nerved the Russian hosts then as now; that
+awful Moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and
+sank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance and selfish
+callousness were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the
+spirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in Germany,
+which gave to the Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same driving
+force that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the French;
+the passing, therefore, in 1813 of the moral superiority, the greater
+driving force, from the French to the allies. Clausewitz saw all this;
+he conversed intimately with such men as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,
+who saw and guided it, too. All his friends had seen it also. No
+wonder, then, that such an unexampled series of warlike phenomena
+deeply impressed his reflective mind with the supreme importance of the
+moral and spiritual factors in war.
+
+His opportunities for long-continued observation of warlike phenomena
+were far greater than those of any writer since his day, and it is to
+be hoped they will remain so. For we have no desire to see another
+series of wars such as the Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that
+there was then such a man as Clausewitz to sum up for us so simply and
+so clearly the accumulated experiences of those long, long years of
+carnage and devastation.
+
+
+_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] Book IV. Chap. 10.
+
+[2] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[3] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[4] Book I. Chap. 8.
+
+[5] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[6] Summary of Instruction, p. 120.
+
+[7] Book II. Chap. 6.
+
+[8] Book II. Chap. 2.
+
+[9] Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz.
+
+[10] Book II. Chap. 4.
+
+[11] Book II. Chap. 2.
+
+[12] Book II. Chap. 2.
+
+[13] Book II. Chap. 3.
+
+[14] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[15] By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force the enemy's
+population into a state of mind favourable to submission.
+
+[16] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[17] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[18] Author's "Introduction."
+
+[19] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[20] Book VII. Chap. 5.
+
+[21] Book VII. Chap. 21.
+
+[22] Book VII. Chap. 21.
+
+[23] Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.
+
+[24] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[25] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[26] Book I. Chap. 7.
+
+[27] Book I. Chap. 8.
+
+[28] Book I. Chap. 8.
+
+[29] Book IV. Chap. 1.
+
+[30] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[31] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[32] Book IV. Chap. 3.
+
+[33] Book III. Chap. 15.
+
+[34] Book VII. Chap. 13.
+
+[35] Book I. Chap. 4.
+
+[36] Book I. Chap. 5.
+
+[37] Book I. Chap. 7.
+
+[38] Book III. Chap. 3.
+
+[39] Book III. Chaps. 16-18.
+
+[40] Book II. Chap. 1.
+
+[41] Book III. Chap. 11.
+
+[42] Book III. Chap. 8.
+
+[43] Book V. Chap. 3.
+
+[44] Book III. Chap. 8.
+
+[45] Book VIII. Chap. 4.
+
+[46] Book III. Chap. 12.
+
+[47] Book III. Chap. 13.
+
+[48] Book III. Chap. 12.
+
+[49] Book III. Chap. 13.
+
+[50] Book III. Chap. 8.
+
+[51] Book III. Chap. 11.
+
+[52] Book VI. Chap. 28.
+
+[53] Book V. Chap. 10.
+
+[54] Book I. Chap. 1.
+
+[55] Book III. Chap. 13.
+
+[56] Book I. Chap. 3.
+
+[57] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[58] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[59] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[60] Book I. Chap. 3.
+
+[61] This warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be
+published freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five
+years ago. In the present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and
+its loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the enemy of
+any helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been
+learned.--Editor's Note.
+
+[62] Book IV. Chap. 4.
+
+[63] Book IV. Chap. 4.
+
+[64] "Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136-146.
+
+[65] Book IV. Chap. 4.
+
+[66] Book VI. Chap. 1.
+
+[67] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.
+
+[68] Book VI. Chap. 5.
+
+[69] Book VIII. Chap. 9.
+
+[70] Book VII. Chap. 15.
+
+[71] Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500.
+
+[72] Book VI. Chap. 9.
+
+[73] Book VII. Chap. 9.
+
+[74] Book VII. Chap. 7.
+
+[75] Book VII. Chap. 7.
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's Notes:
+
+
+Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
+preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.
+
+Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
+
+Page 133: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Reality of War, by Stewart L. Murray
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