diff options
Diffstat (limited to '44200-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 44200-0.txt | 3240 |
1 files changed, 3240 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/44200-0.txt b/44200-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11eaa8a --- /dev/null +++ b/44200-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3240 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44200 *** + +THE REALITY OF WAR + + + + + THE + REALITY OF WAR + + A COMPANION + TO CLAUSEWITZ + + BY + MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY + LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS + + POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY + A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE + + LONDON + HODDER AND STOUGHTON + WARWICK SQUARE, E.C. + + HUGH REES, LTD. + 5 REGENT STREET, S.W. + + + _Reprinted in 1914_ + + + + +EDITOR'S PREFACE + + +Great books, the masterpieces of the special branch of knowledge with +which they deal, are often very big books; and busy men, who have not +unlimited time for reading, find it helpful to have some one who will +give them a general summary of a famous writer's teaching, and point +out the most important passages in which the author himself embodies +the very essence of his argument. + +This is what Major Murray has done for the most important work on war +that was ever written. He does not give a mere dry summary of its +contents. He sets forth, in language so plain that even the civilian +reader or the youngest soldier can read it with interest, the essence +of the teaching of Clausewitz, and he embodies in his book the most +striking passages of the original work. He adds to each section of his +subject some useful criticisms, and at the end of the book he sums up +the effect of recent changes on the practice of war. + +The book is a popular manual of the realities of war, which should be +read not only by soldiers, but by every one who takes an intelligent +interest in the great events of our time. + +As to the practical value of the writings of Clausewitz, it may be +well to quote here the words of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, the Professor +of Military History at Oxford, from his introduction to the original +edition of Major Murray's work: + +"Clausewitz was a Prussian officer who first saw fighting as a boy in +1793, and whose experience of war lasted until 1815, when the great +war ended. He was then thirty-five and spent the next fifteen years in +trying to clear his mind on the subject of war, which he did by writing +a number of military histories and a systematic treatise 'On War.' At +the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts into a parcel, hoping to work +at them again on the conclusion of the duties for which he was ordered +from home. A little more than a year later he died at Breslau of +cholera, and the papers, to which he had never put the finishing touch, +were afterwards published by his widow. + +"Part of the value of his work is due to the exceptional opportunities +which he enjoyed. When the war of 1806 began he had long been the +personal adjutant of one of the Prussian princes, and an intimate +friend of Scharnhorst, who was probably the greatest of Napoleon's +contemporaries. In the period of reorganization which followed +the Peace of Tilsit he made the acquaintance of Gneisenau, and of +almost all the officers who made their mark in the subsequent wars +of liberation. During the years of preparation he was Scharnhorst's +assistant, first in the Ministry of War and then on the General Staff. +During the campaign of 1812 he served with the Russian army as a +staff officer. Thus his experience during the four years of the Wars +of Liberation was that of one who was continually behind the scenes, +always in touch with the Governments and Generals, and therefore better +able than any one not so favourably placed to see everything in its +proper perspective, and to follow and appreciate the considerations +which directed the decisions both of statesmen and of the commanders +of armies. His personal character was of the finest mould, and his +writings have the sincerity, the absence of which makes it so difficult +to rely upon those of Napoleon. + +"The ultimate test of the value of books is time. When Clausewitz +died, the two books on war which were thought the best were those of +the Archduke Charles of Austria and General Jomini. To-day the book +of Clausewitz, 'On War,' easily holds the first place. It is the +least technical of all the great books on war; from beginning to end +it is nothing but common sense applied to the subject, but for that +reason it is the hardest to digest, because common sense or a man's +natural instinctive judgment on any subject is exceedingly hard to +analyse and put into words. An exceptionally gifted man can go through +this process, but few can follow it for any length of time without a +distinct effort. + +"Almost every good institution has arisen out of the effort to provide +a remedy for some evil, but in the imperfection of human nature nearly +every institution brings with it fresh evils, which in their turn have +to be counteracted. The modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism +and its belief in knowledge, has grafted the examination system upon +every form of education from the lowest to the highest. The British +army shares in the benefits and in the disadvantages of the system, +of which, in the case of an officer, the danger to be guarded against +is that it tends to accustom a man to rely rather on his memory than +his intelligence, and to lean more on other people's thinking than on +his own. Clausewitz aimed at producing the very opposite result. He +does not offer specific solutions of the various problems of war lest +officers, in moments when their business is to decide and to act, +should be trying to recall his precepts instead of using their eyes and +their wits. His purpose rather is to enable them to understand what war +is. He believed that if a man had accustomed himself to think of war as +it really is, had got to know the different elements which go to make +it up, and to distinguish those that are important from those that are +comparative trifles, he would be more likely to know of himself what +to do in a given situation, and would be much less likely to confuse +himself by trying to remember what some general, long since dead, did +on some occasion in which after all the position was by no means the +same as that in which he finds himself." + +What is said here of the soldier actually engaged in war, is true also +even of the onlooker who takes a patriotic interest in the progress of +a war in which his country is involved. Unless he has a clear idea of +the real character of modern war, and the principles on which success +or failure depend, he will be utterly unable to grasp the significance +of the events of which he reads each day. And it is of real importance +that in time of war every citizen should judge soundly the course of +events, for opinion influences action, and public opinion is made up of +the ideas of the units who compose the public. In this connection it is +well to bear in mind a point that is often overlooked, a point on which +Clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing passage--namely, the fact +that one of the main objects of a nation waging war is to force the +enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. This +fact is sufficient proof of the importance of public opinion being +well informed not only as to the course of events, but also as to the +principles that give to these events their real significance. + + + + +CONTENTS + + + CHAPTER I + + PAGE + THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ 3 + + + CHAPTER II + + THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN + POLICY AND WAR 11 + + + CHAPTER III + + THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ 23 + + + CHAPTER IV + + THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR 33 + + + CHAPTER V + + THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED + IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR 47 + + + CHAPTER VI + + PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR 65 + + + CHAPTER VII + + THE NATURE OF WAR 79 + + + CHAPTER VIII + + WAR AS POLICY 119 + + + CHAPTER IX + + STRATEGY 137 + + + CHAPTER X + + THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY 161 + + + CHAPTER XI + + TACTICS 177 + + + CHAPTER XII + + CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ 213 + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ + + +In an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the British public in +even the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that +he was not a mere theorist or bookworm. The wide and varied experience +which the British officer gradually gains in so many different parts +of the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces +a certain distrust of them. Also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly +one of our national characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal to the +British officer or civilian, a writer must be a practical soldier. + +Such was General Clausewitz: a practical soldier of very great +experience in the long series of wars 1793 to 1815, and one present +throughout that most awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian +campaign in 1812. + +"General Karl von Clausewitz was born near Magdeburg in 1780, and +entered the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in 1792. He served in the +campaigns of 1793-1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he entered the military +school at Berlin as an officer, and remained there till 1803. He here +attracted the notice of Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served +as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, was present at the +battle of Jena, and saw that awful retreat which ended a fortnight +later in the surrender at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured, he +was sent into France as a prisoner till the end of the war." "On his +return (in November, 1807) he was placed on General Scharnhorst's +staff, and employed on the work then going on for the reorganization +of the Prussian army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the Russian service, +was employed on the general staff, and was thus able to gain much +experience in the most gigantic of all the struggles of his time." "In +the spring campaign of 1813 (battles of Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as +a Russian officer, was attached to Blucher's staff; during the winter +campaign he found employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count Walmoden, +who fought against Davoust on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid action +of the Goerde was entirely the result of his able dispositions. In 1815 +he again entered the Prussian service, and was chief-of-the-staff to +the III. Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny formed the left of the +line of battle, and at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's army." "In +addition to this, we may say, considerable practical training (note, +enormous and varied indeed compared to any obtainable in the present +day), he also possessed a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of +military history, and also an uncommonly clear perception of general +history" (Von Caemmerer). After the Peace he was employed in a command +on the Rhine. In 1818 he became major-general, and was made Director of +the Military School at Berlin. Here he remained for some years. This +was the chief period of his writings. As General von Caemmerer, in his +"Development of Strategical Science," puts it: "This practical and +experienced, and at the same time highly cultured soldier, feels now, +in peaceful repose, as he himself confesses, the urgent need to develop +and systematize the whole world of thought which occupies him, yet also +resolves to keep secret till his death the fruit of his researches, in +order that his soul, which is thirsting for _Truth_, may be safely and +finally spared all temptations from subordinate considerations." + +In 1830 he was appointed Director of Artillery at Breslau, and, having +no more time for writing, sealed up and put away his papers, unfinished +as they were. In the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff to +Field-Marshal Gneisenau's army. In the winter of that year war with +France was considered imminent, and Clausewitz had prospects of acting +as chief of the general staff of the Commander-in-Chief Gneisenau. He +then drew up two plans for war with France, which bear the stamp of +that practical knowledge of war and adaptation of means to ends which +distinguish his writings. + +In the same year the war scare passed away, the army of Gneisenau was +disbanded, and Clausewitz returned to Breslau, where after a few days +he was seized with cholera, and died in November, 1831, aged only 51. + +His works were published after his death by his widow. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN POLICY AND WAR + + +From the day of their publication until now the influence of the +writings of Clausewitz has been steadily growing, till to-day it is +impossible to over-estimate the extent of that influence upon modern +military and political thought, especially in Germany. As General von +Caemmerer, in his "Development of Strategical Science," says: "Karl +von Clausewitz, the pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and the confidant +of Gneisenau, is in Germany generally recognized as the most prominent +theorist on war, as the real philosopher on war, to whom our famous +victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training." + +Field-Marshal Moltke was "his most distinguished pupil," and adapted +the teaching of Clausewitz to the conditions of to-day. + +General von der Goltz, in the introduction to his great work, "The +Nation in Arms," thus describes the veneration which he inspires: "A +military writer who, after Clausewitz, writes upon the subject of war, +runs the risk of being likened to a poet who, after Goethe, attempts a +_Faust_, or, after Shakespeare, a _Hamlet_. Everything important that +can be told about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the +works which that great military genius has left behind him. Although +Clausewitz has himself described his book as being something as yet +incomplete, this remark of his must be taken to mean that he, too, +was subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits, and was forced to +feel that all he attained lay far beneath his ideal. For us, who knew +not what that ideal was, his labours are a complete work. I have, +accordingly, not attempted to write anything new, or of universal +applicability about the science of warfare, but have limited myself to +turning my attention to the military operations of our own day." One +can hardly imagine a stronger tribute of admiration. + +And, as Moltke was Clausewitz's most distinguished pupil, so also +are all those trained in the school of Moltke pupils of Clausewitz, +including the most eminent of modern German military writers, such as +General von Blume, in his "Strategy"; Von der Goltz, in his "Nation in +Arms" and "The Conduct of War," who trained the Turkish General Staff +for the campaign of 1897 against Greece and the battle of Pharsalia, +etc.; General von Boguslawski; General von Verdy du Vernois, the +father of the study of Applied Tactics; General von Schlichting, in his +"Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present"; General Meckel, +who trained the Japanese Staff, etc., etc. + +We all remember the telegram sent to General Meckel by Marshal Oyama +after the battle of Liao-yang: "We hope you are proud of your pupils." + +Some time ago, when asked to give a lecture at Aldershot to the +officers of the 2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me that it would +be very interesting, anxious as we all were then to know the causes +of the wonderful Japanese efficiency and success, if I could obtain a +pronouncement from General Meckel how far he had been influenced in his +teaching by Clausewitz. My friend Herr von Donat did me the favour to +write to General von Caemmerer and ask him if he could procure me such +a pronouncement which I might publish. General Meckel, whose death both +Japan and Germany have since had to mourn, most kindly consented, and +I esteem it a great honour to be allowed to quote part of his letter. +He said: "I, like every other German officer, have, consciously or +unconsciously, instructed in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz is +the _founder_ of that theory of war which resulted from the Napoleonic. +I maintain that _every one_ who nowadays either makes or teaches war +in a modern sense, bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if he is not +conscious of it." This opinion of General Meckel, to whose training of +the Japanese General Staff the success of the Japanese armies must be +largely attributed, is most interesting. It is not possible to give a +stronger or more up-to-date example of the magnitude of the influence +of Clausewitz. + +In this connection I should like to make a short quotation from "The +War in the Far East," by the _Times_ military correspondent. In his +short but suggestive chapter on "Clausewitz in Manchuria" he says: "But +as all save one of the great battles in Manchuria have been waged by +the Japanese in close accordance with the spirit and almost the letter +of Clausewitz's doctrine, and as the same battles have been fought by +the Russians in absolute disregard of them (though his works had been +translated into Russian by General Dragomiroff long before the war), +it is certainly worth showing how reading and reflection may profit +one army, and how the neglect of this respectable practice may ruin +another." "Clausewitz in Manchuria"! That brings us up to date. It is a +far cry for his influence to have reached, and triumphed. + + +REFLECTIONS + +Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers. +We may be sure, therefore, that the influence of Clausewitz on the +Continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than +the realm of war. From this thought arise many reflections. It will be +sufficient here to suggest one. I would suggest that we should regard +every foreign statesman, especially in Germany, as, consciously or +unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. That is to say, we should +regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the +most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable +part of policy. He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse +of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as +commercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument +of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied +accordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches, +but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his +State. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation +shall impose its will upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait +and wait, to make "every imaginable preparation," and finally to let +loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out +with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a +whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and +compel submission to its will by force. + +To talk to such a man of "the evils of war," or of "the burden of +armaments"; or to propose to him "disarmament" or "reduction of +armed forces," and so forth can only appear to him as the result of +"imperfect knowledge." He will not say so, but he will think so, and +act accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man +one can only say, "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he +fall." + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ + + +The writings of Clausewitz are contained in nine volumes, published +after his death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly on his three +volumes "On War," which have been translated by Colonel J. J. Graham +(the last edition edited by Colonel F. N. Maude, and published by +Messrs. Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls them "a collection of +materials," "a mass of conceptions not brought into form," and states +that he intended to revise, and throw the whole into more complete +shape. + +We must lament that he did not live to complete his revision. But, +on the other hand, it is perhaps possible that this unfinished +state is really an advantage, for it leaves us free to apply his +great maxims and principles and mode of thought to the ever-varying +conditions of the present and future, unhampered by too complete a +crystallization of his ideas written before more modern conditions of +railways, telegraphs, and rapid long-ranging arms of precision, etc., +arose. It is perhaps this unfinished state which renders Clausewitz +so essentially in touch with, and a part of, the onward movement and +evolution of military thought. For his great aim was "the truth, the +whole truth, and nothing but the truth," without preconception or +favour, as far as he could go--essentially "a realist" of war--and what +better aim can we set before ourselves? + +As Sir Arthur Helps has so well put it in his "Friends in Council," +every man needs a sort of central stem for his reading and culture. I +wish here to say why I think that Clausewitz is admirably adapted to +form such a main stem in the military culture of British officers. + +In the first place there is a lofty sort of tone about his writings +which one gradually realizes as one reads them, and which I will not +attempt to describe further than by saying that they stamp themselves +as the writings of a gentleman of fine character. + +In the second place it is a book which "any fellow" can read, for +there is nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse or mathematical or +formal, no formulæ or lines and angles and technical terms, such as in +other writers, Jomini, Hamley, etc. Clausewitz is free from all such +pedantries, which for my part, and I dare say for the part of many +others, often "put one off" a book, and made one instinctively feel +that there was something wrong, something unpractical about it, which +rendered it hardly worth the sacrifice of time involved in its study. +There is in Clausewitz nothing of that kind at all. All those lines and +angles and formulæ he dismisses in a few pages as of little practical +importance. + +In the third place Clausewitz only goes in for experience and the +practical facts of war. As he somewhat poetically puts it, "The +flowers of Speculation require to be cut down low near the ground of +Experience, their proper soil."[1] He is the great apostle of human +nature and character as being everything in war. "All war supposes +human weakness, and against that it is directed."[2] I believe that the +British officer will find himself in sympathy with the great thinker +on war, who asserts that "_Of_ _all military virtues Energy in the +conduct of Operations has always conduced most to glory and success of +arms_."[3] + +In the fourth place, to the practical mind will appeal his denunciation +of all elaborate plans, because _Time_ is required for all elaborate +combinations, and Time is just the one thing that an active enemy +will not give us,--and his consequent deduction that all plans must +be of the simplest possible form. His famous sentence, "_In war all +things are simple, but the simple are difficult_,"[4] gives the key +to his writings, for to _overcome those simple yet great difficulties +he regards as the art of war_, which can only be done by the military +virtues of perseverance, energy, and boldness. + +In the fifth place he does not want men to be bookworms, for he says: + +"_Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations +in which we can be placed in war_."[5] And we can all reflect, without +reading too many books. Also he says: "Much reading of history is +not required for the above object. The knowledge of a few separate +battles, _in their details_, is more useful than a general knowledge of +several campaigns. On this account it is more useful to read detailed +narratives and journals than regular works of history."[6] He wants +history in detail, not a general smattering and a loose application +thereof, which fault he strongly denounces. And he expressly states +that the history of the very latest war is the most useful. All of +which is very practical, and in accord with what we feel to be true. + +As he pictures war, "_the struggle between the spiritual and moral +forces_ on _both_ sides is the centre of all,"[7] and to this aspect +of the subject he gives much more attention than Jomini and most of +Jomini's disciples. He has freed us once for all from all formalism. +The formation of character, careful, practical, detailed study, and +thorough preparation in peace, the simplest plans carried out with the +utmost perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness in war--these are +the practical fruits of his teaching. + +Therefore, I say again, that I do not think that the British officer +could possibly find a more interesting or a better guide for the main +stem of his reading than Clausewitz, nor any one that will appeal +to his practical instincts of what is _True_ half so well. I do not +believe that he could possibly do better than with Clausewitz as +main stem, and a detailed study of the latest campaigns and modern +technicalities as the up-to-date addition required to transform +knowledge into action. I trust that every reader of Clausewitz will +agree with me in this. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR + + +"Moltke, the most gifted pupil of Clausewitz," "Moltke, who knew +Clausewitz's book well, and often liked to describe him as the +theoretical instructor." As Chaucer would say, "What needeth wordes +more?" + +Clausewitz has treated practically every chief branch of strategy +and tactics (except, of course, the present-day developments of +railways, telegraphs, quick-firing guns, smokeless powder, universal +service armies, etc.). The whole of his bulky work "On War" is full +of interesting and sometimes eloquent and almost poetical passages, +of concentrated, pregnant, and far-reaching thoughts on every +subject. Through all these it is, of course, impossible to follow +him in any introduction. One can really do no more than urge all to +read Clausewitz for themselves, to go to the fountain-head, to the +master-work itself. In the short space to which I have restricted +myself, I propose, therefore, to concentrate on a few of his leading +ideas, reluctantly leaving out many others which are really almost just +as good. + + +THEORY AND PRACTICE + +One of the things for which we are most deeply indebted to Clausewitz +is that he has shown us clearly the proper place of theory in relation +to practice. "It should educate the mind of the future leader in +war, or, rather, guide him in his _self-instruction_, but _not_ +accompany him on to the battlefield; just as a sensible tutor forms +and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without therefore keeping +him in leading-strings all his life."[8] Again, "In real action most +men are guided by the tact of judgment, which hits the object more or +less accurately, according as they possess more or less genius. This +is the way in which all great generals have acted, and therein partly +lay their greatness and their genius, in that they always hit upon what +was right by this tact. Thus also it will always be in _action_, and +so far this tact is amply sufficient. But when it is a question not of +acting one's self, but of convincing others _in consultation_, then +all depends upon clear conceptions and demonstrations and the inherent +relations; and so little progress has been made in this respect that +most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no +firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion, +or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle +course really without any value. Clear ideas on these matters are not, +therefore, wholly useless."[9] + +How true this is any one will admit who reflects for a moment upon +the great diversity of opinions on almost every subject held in our +army, just because of this want of a central theory common to all. In +the domain of tactics it is evident that this holds good even as in +strategy, for a common central theory of war will produce a more or +less common way of looking at things, from which results more or less +common action towards the attainment of the common object. + + +REJECTION OF SET AND GEOMETRICAL THEORIES + +"It should educate the mind of the future leader in war" is what +Clausewitz demands from a useful theory; but he most expressly and +unreservedly rejects every attempt at a method "by which definite +plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if +from a machine."[10] He mocks at Bülow's including at first in the +one term "base" all sorts of things, like the supply of the army, its +reinforcements and equipments, the security of its communications with +the home country, and lastly the security of its line of retreat, and +then fixing the extent of the base, and finally fixing an angle for the +extent of that base: "And all this was done merely to obtain a pure +geometrical result utterly useless" (Von Caemmerer). + +For the same reason Jomini's principle of the Inner Line does not +satisfy him, owing to its mere geometrical nature, although he right +willingly acknowledges "that it rests on a sound foundation, on +the truth that the combat is the only effectual means in war" (Von +Caemmerer). All such attempts at theory seem to him therefore perfectly +useless, "because they strive to work with fixed quantities, while in +war everything is _uncertain_, and all considerations must reckon with +all kinds of variable quantities; because they only consider _material_ +objects, while every action in war is saturated with _moral_ forces and +effects; lastly, because they deal only with the action of _one_ party, +while war is a constant reciprocal effect of _both_ parties" (Von +Caemmerer). + +"Pity the warrior," says Clausewitz, "who is contented to crawl about +in this beggardom of rules." "Pity the theory which sets itself in +opposition to the mind"[11] (note, the moral forces). + + +A THEORY TO BE PRACTICALLY USEFUL + +Clausewitz insists that a useful theory cannot be more than a thorough +knowledge of military history and "reflection upon all the situations +in which we can be placed in war." "What genius does must be just the +best of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to show just how +and why it is so." "It is an analytical investigation of the subject +which leads to exact knowledge: and if brought to bear on the results +of experience, which in our case would be military history, to a +_thorough_ familiarity with it. If theory investigates the subjects +which constitute war; if it separates more distinctly that which at +first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the properties of +the means; if it shows their probable effects; if it makes evident the +nature of objects; _if it brings to bear all over the field of war the +light of essentially critical investigation_,--then it has fulfilled +the chief duties of its province. It becomes then a guide to him who +wishes to make himself acquainted with war from books; it lights up the +whole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his judgment, +and shields him from error."[12] + + +KNOWLEDGE MUST BE THOROUGH + +This Clausewitz considers most important. He says that "Knowledge of +the conduct of war ... _must pass completely into the mind_, and almost +cease to be something objective." For in war "The moral reaction, the +ever-changing form of things makes it necessary for the chief actor +to carry _in himself_ the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, in +order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving +the requisite decision _from himself_. Knowledge must, by this complete +assimilation with his own mind and life, be converted into real power." + + * * * * * + +So much for Clausewitz, therefore, as the greatest yet the simplest and +least theoretical of theorists on war. Mark well his comforting dictum +that "Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations +in which we can be placed in war." That is a task which we have all +more or less attempted. Therefore we are all more or less theorists. +The only question is that of comparative "thoroughness" in our +reflections. And it is essentially this "thoroughness" in investigation +and reflection towards which Clausewitz helps us. Like every other +habit, the _habit_ of military reflection gradually grows with use; +till, fortified and strengthened by detailed knowledge, it gradually +becomes Power. + + +REFLECTIONS + +The theory of war is simple, and there is no reason why any man who +chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or +two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a +fair knowledge thereof. He may with reasonable trouble attain to such +knowledge of the theory of war as will enable him to follow with +intelligent appreciation the discussions of experienced soldier or +soldiers. Such knowledge as will prevent his misunderstanding the +experienced soldier's argument from pure ignorance, and such knowledge +as will enable him to understand the military reasons put forward and +the military object proposed. To the opinion of such a man all respect +will be due. Thus, and thus only. + +It is indeed the plain duty of all who aspire to rule either thus to +qualify themselves to understand, or else to abstain from interference +with, the military interests of the State. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR + + +This point is here illustrated with more detail from Clausewitz than +may seem necessary to some, because it is precisely the point regarding +modern war which is least understood in this country. + +"The complete overthrow of the enemy is the natural end of the art of +war." "As this idea must apply to both the belligerent parties, it +must follow, that there can be no suspension in the military act, and +peace cannot take place until one or other of the parties concerned is +completely overthrown." This is what Clausewitz means by Absolute War, +that is war carried to its absolute and logical conclusion with the +utmost force, the utmost effort and the utmost energy. He then proceeds +to show that war, owing "to all the natural inertia and friction of its +parts, the whole of the inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation (or +timidity) of the human mind," usually takes a weaker or less absolute +form according to circumstances. "All this, theory must admit, but it +is its duty to give the foremost place to the absolute form of war, and +to use that form as a general point of direction." He then proceeds to +show that war finally took its absolute form under Napoleon. To-day we +may say that war takes its absolute form in the modern great national +war, which is waged by each belligerent with the whole concentrated +physical and mental power of the nation-in-arms. + +This requires to be gone into a little more in detail, for it is a +most important point. + +Clausewitz in Book VIII. approaches this part of his subject by an +historical survey of war from the time of the Roman Empire to that +of Napoleon. He shows how as the feudal system gradually merged into +the later monarchical States of Europe, armies gradually became less +and less national, more and more mercenary. Omitting this, we arrive +at the seventeenth century. He says: "The end of the seventeenth +century, the time of Louis XIV., is to be regarded as the point in +history at which the standing military power, such as it existed in the +eighteenth century, reached its zenith. That military force was based +on enlistment and money. States had organized themselves into complete +unities; and the governments, by commuting the personal services of +their subjects into money payments, had concentrated their whole power +in their treasuries. Through the rapid strides in social improvements, +and a more enlightened system of government, this power had become very +great in comparison with what it had been. France appeared in the field +with a standing army of a couple of hundred thousand men, and the other +Powers in proportion." + +Armies were supported out of the Treasury, which the sovereign regarded +partly as his privy purse, at least as a resource belonging to the +Government, and not to the people. Relations with other States, except +with respect to a few commercial subjects, mostly concerned only the +interests of the Treasury or of the Government, not those of the +people; at least ideas tended everywhere in that way. The Cabinets +therefore looked upon themselves as the owners and administrators +of large estates, which they were continually seeking to increase, +without the tenants on those estates being particularly interested in +this improvement. + +The people, therefore, who in the Tartar invasions were everything in +war, who in the old republics and in the Middle Ages were of great +consequence, were in the eighteenth century absolutely nothing directly. + +In this manner, in proportion as the Government separated itself more +from the people, and regarded itself as the State, war became more and +more exclusively a business of the Government, which it carried on +by means of the money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds it could +pick up in its own and neighbouring countries. The army was a State +property, very expensive, and not to be lightly risked in battle. +"In its signification war was only diplomacy somewhat intensified, a +more vigorous way of negotiating, in which battles and sieges were +substituted for diplomatic notes." + +"Plundering and devastating the enemy's country were no longer in +accordance with the spirit of the age." "They were justly looked upon +as unnecessary barbarity." "War, therefore, confined itself more and +more, both as regards means and ends, to the army itself. The army, +with its fortresses and some prepared positions, constituted a State in +a State, within which the element of war slowly consumed itself. All +Europe rejoiced at its taking this direction, and held it to be the +necessary consequence of the spirit of progress." + +So think many in this country to-day. They are only a hundred years +behind the times. + +"The plan of a war on the part of the State assuming the offensive in +those times consisted generally in the conquest of one or other of the +enemy's provinces; the plan of the defender was to prevent this. The +plan of campaign was to take one or other of the enemy's fortresses, or +to prevent one of our own being taken; it was only when a battle became +unavoidable for this purpose that it was sought for and fought. Whoever +fought a battle without this unavoidable necessity, from mere innate +desire of gaining a victory, was reckoned a general with too much +daring." For armies were too precious to be lightly risked. "Winter +quarters, in which the mutual relations of the two parties almost +entirely ceased, formed a distinct limit to the activity which was +considered to belong to one campaign." "As long as war was universally +conducted in this manner, all was considered to be in the most regular +order." "Thus there was eminence and perfection of every kind, and +even Field-Marshal Daun, to whom it was chiefly owing that Frederick +the Great completely attained his object, and Maria Theresa completely +failed in hers, notwithstanding that could still pass for a great +general." + +Beyond this stage of military thought, many in this country have not +yet advanced. + + * * * * * + +"Thus matters stood when the French Revolution broke out; Austria +and Prussia tried their diplomatic art of war; this very soon proved +insufficient. Whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things, +all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in 1793, such +a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. War had +suddenly become again an affair of the people, and that of a people +numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself as a +citizen of the State." "_By this participation of the people in the +war_, instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural +weight came into the scale. Henceforth the means available--the efforts +which might be called forth--had no longer any definite limits; the +energy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer any +counterpoise, and consequently the danger to the adversary had risen to +the extreme." + +If only our politicians could learn this old lesson of the French +Revolution! For many, too many, of them appear to derive their ideas of +war to-day from some dim reminiscent recollections of school histories +of the wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. + +To continue: "After all this was perfected by the hand of Bonaparte, +this military power based on the strength of the whole nation, marched +over Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly, +that where it only encountered the old-fashioned armies the result was +not doubtful for a moment. + +"A reaction, however, awoke in due time. In Spain the war became of +itself an affair of the people." In Austria. In Russia. "In Germany +Prussia rose up the first, made the war a national cause, and without +either money or credit, and with a population reduced one-half, took +the field with an army twice as strong as in 1806. The rest of Germany +followed the example of Prussia sooner or later." "Thus it was that +Germany and Russia, in the years 1813 and 1814, appeared against France +with about a million of men." + +"Under these circumstances the energy thrown into the conduct of war +was quite different." "In eight months the theatre of war was removed +from the Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had to bow its head for the +first time; and the redoubtable Bonaparte lay fettered on the ground." + +"Therefore, since the time of Bonaparte, war, through being, first on +one side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has +assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer +to its real nature, to its absolute perfection. The means then called +forth had no visible limit, the limit losing itself in the energy +and enthusiasm of the Government and its subjects. By the extent of +the means, and the wide field of possible results, as well as by +the powerful excitement of feeling which prevailed, energy in the +conduct of war was immensely increased; the object of its action was +the downfall of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerless on +the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop, or to come to any +understanding with regard to the mutual objects of the contest. + +"Thus, therefore the element of war, freed from all conventional +restrictions, broke loose with all its natural force. The cause was the +participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this +participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on +the internal affairs of other countries, partly from the threatening +attitude of the French towards all nations. + +"Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars +hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the +States, and, consequently, _will only take place on account of great +interests closely affecting the people_, would be a difficult point to +settle. But every one will agree with us that, at least, _Whenever +great interests are in dispute_, mutual hostility will discharge itself +in the same manner as it has done in our times." + + +REFLECTIONS + +This is so true, that every war since the days of Clausewitz has made +its truth more apparent. Since he wrote, the participation of the +people in war has become, not a revolutionary fact, but an organized +fact, an ordinary fact in the everyday life of nations. To-day every +State except Great Britain, securely based on the system of the +universal training of its sons to arms, stands ready to defend its +interests with the whole concentrated power, physical, intellectual, +and material, of its whole manhood. Consequently, European war, +as Clausewitz foresaw, "will only take place on account of great +interests closely affecting the people." The character of such war +will be absolute, the object of its action will be the downfall of the +foe, and not till the foe (be it Great Britain or not) lies powerless +on the ground will it be supposed possible to stop. In the prosecution +of such a national war the means available, the energy and the effort +called forth, will be without limits. Such must be the conflicts of +nations-in-arms. + +Yet, even now, so many years after Clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he +himself stated, "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists +and statesmen," the great transformation in the character of modern +war, due to the participation of the people therein, has not yet been +adequately realized by many men in this country _who ought to know_. +It is earnestly to be hoped that they will endeavour to adjust their +minds, as regards war, to the fact that we are living, not in the +eighteenth century, but in the twentieth, and that they will consider +that war has once for all become an affair of the people, that our +opponents will be a people-in-arms, using the uttermost means of their +whole manhood to crush us, and that disaster can only be prevented by a +like utmost effort on our part, by an effort regardless of everything +except self-preservation. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR + + +"War belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the +province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is +settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from +others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to +liken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and +activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on +its part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale. +Besides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which +its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of +living creatures in their germs."[13] + +These conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of +feeling that "even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate +hatred of each other." It is an unpleasant fact for the philosopher, +for the social reformer, to contemplate, but history repeats and +repeats the lesson. Still more, "It is quite possible for such a state +of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political +motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact, a +perfect explosion." + +"War is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its +elements--hatred and animosity--which may be looked upon as blind +instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free +activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political +instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason. + +"The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, +more the general and his army; the third more the Government. _The +passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence +in the peoples._ + +"These three tendencies are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject. +A theory which would leave any one of them out of account would +immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality, +that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone."[14] + +Clausewitz is the great thinker, the great realist, the great +philosopher of war. His aim was, free from all bias, to get at _the +truth of things_. His view of war as a social act, as part of the +intercourse of nations, so that occasional warlike struggles can no +more be avoided than occasional commercial struggles, is a view which +requires to be most carefully pondered over by every statesman. It +is based upon the essential fundamental characteristics of human +nature, which do not alter. It is not to be lightly set aside by +declamation about the blessings of peace, the evils of war, the burden +of armaments, and such-like sophistries. To submit without a struggle +to injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in +passionate human nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile +people. It is indeed to be most sincerely hoped that _arbitration_ +will be resorted to more and more as a means of peacefully settling +all non-vital causes of dispute. But arbitration has its limits. For +_no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that +it regards as absolutely vital_. The view of war, therefore, as a +social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, with all that it +implies, appears to be the only one which a statesman, however much he +may regret the fact, can take. It has, therefore, been brought forward +here at once, as it underlies the whole subject and is essential to all +clear thought thereon. + +So much for the influence of Public Opinion in producing war. Now for +its influence in and during war. + +"There are three principal objects in carrying on war," says Clausewitz. + + "(_a_) To conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force. + + "(_b_) To get possession of the material elements of aggression, + and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army. + + "(_c_) _To gain Public Opinion._[15] + +"To attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be +directed against the enemy's principal army, for it must be beaten +before we can follow up the other two objects with success. + +"In order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against +those points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated: +principal towns, magazines, great fortresses. On the road to these the +enemy's principal force, or a considerable part of his army, will be +encountered. + +"Public Opinion is ultimately gained by great victories, and by the +possession of the enemy's capital."[16] + +This almost prophetic (as it was in his day) recognition by Clausewitz +of the vast importance of gaining Public Opinion _as one of the +three great aims in war_, is fundamental. It is just one of those +instances of his rare insight into the principles and development of +modern national war which make his book of such great and enduring +value to us. For since his day Europe has become organized into great +industrial nations, democracy and popular passion have become more +and more a force to be reckoned with, and the gaining and preserving +of Public Opinion in war has become more and more important. It has, +in fact, become the statesman's chief business during a great modern +national war. It has become necessary for him to study intently war in +its relation to industry, and to the industrial millions over whom he +presides, or over whom he may preside. + + +REFLECTIONS + +(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in Britain were a nation of +18,000,000, practically self-supporting, and governed by an +aristocracy. To-day we are a crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent +upon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw +materials, for our trade, for our staying power, _and_ we are governed +by a democracy. In a modern democratic State it will only be possible +to carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships +brought on the democracy by the war do not become intolerable. To +prevent these hardships from thus becoming intolerable to the people, +to Public Opinion, will be the task of the modern statesman during war, +and this can only be done by wise prevision and timely preparation. _It +requires the internal organization of the Industrial State for war._ + +It appears to the _writer_ that internal organization can be subdivided +as follows:-- + +I. An adequate gold reserve. + +II. The protection of our ships carrying raw material, food, and +exports during their passage on the high seas from the places of +origin to the consumers: (A) by the few available cruisers which could +be spared from the fighting fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well +thought out and prepared scheme of national indemnity (_vide_ Blue Book +thereon); (B) by insuring the distribution to the consumers of food +and raw material, after it has arrived in the country, by preparing a +thorough organization which would deal with the blocking of any of the +principal ports of arrival, and by guarding the vulnerable points of +our internal lines of communications to and from the shipping centres. + +III. Organization of Poor Law system to bring immediate relief by +selling at peace price food to those unable to pay war prices owing to +(A) normal poverty (7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works, +due to effect of war on trade. + +Work and wages the State _must_ guarantee during modern war, and +before the State _can_ guarantee these, it is absolutely necessary +that it should satisfy itself that the above preparations are actually +_in being_. This pre-supposes a more earnest study of the industrial +effects of a great national war than has yet been given to the subject +by our political leaders. For in the warfare of the present and future +the importance of gaining and preserving Public Opinion, as pointed +out by Clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. It is as fundamentally +important _to safeguard our own Public Opinion as it is to attack, +weaken, and gain over that of the enemy_. This has not yet passed +the stage of thought. But good thoughts are no better than good dreams +unless they be put into action. We are waiting for the statesman to DO +it. There is no great difficulty. + +(2) In arousing the national spirit to the requisite height of +patriotic self-denial and self-sacrifice, in elevating, preserving, and +safe-guarding Public Opinion during a great national struggle, much +may be hoped for from the patriotism of our Press. Only in fairness to +those whose patriotism is self-originating and spontaneous, it must +be made compulsory upon ALL, so that no journal may suffer loss of +circulation or pecuniary injury thereby. + +(3) There lies a practical task immediately to the hand of our +statesmen if they will seriously set themselves to the task of +improving the _moral_ of our nation by reforming our education +_curriculum_, on the leading principle that the moral is to the +physical as three to one in life, and that therefore character-building +must be its chief aim. Then they will do much towards strengthening +us for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's idea of the gaining and +preserving of our Public Opinion in War. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE NATURE OF WAR + + +"It is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the +whole, because it is particularly necessary that, in the consideration +of any of the parts, the whole should be kept constantly in view. We +shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by +Publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a +duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would +conceive as a unit the countless numbers of duels which make up a +war, we shall do so best by supposing two wrestlers. Each strives +by physical force to throw his adversary, and thus to render him +incapable of further resistance. + +"Violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and science in +order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost +imperceptible, and _hardly worth mentioning_, termed _usages of +International Law_, accompany it without essentially impairing its +power. + +"Violence, that is to say physical force, is therefore _the Means_; +the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate +_object_. In order to attain this object fully the enemy must first be +disarmed: and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities +in theory."[17] + +Now, "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful +method of disarming and overcoming an adversary without causing great +bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. +However plausible this may appear, _still it is an error which must +be extirpated_, for in such dangerous things as war _the errors which +proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_. As the +use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the +co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that _he who uses force +unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed_, MUST +_obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise_." "To +introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation +would be an absurdity." "We therefore repeat our proposition, that _War +is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds_." + + +THE POLITICAL NATURE OF WAR + +In endeavouring briefly to describe Clausewitz's method of looking at +war, one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting +a few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant +passages. However, a selection must be made. + +I assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy, +because that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical +way of looking at things. This point of view is as necessary for +the strategist as for the statesman, indeed for every man who would +understand the nature of war. For otherwise it is impossible to +understand the military conduct of many campaigns and battles, in which +the political outweighed the military influence, and led to action +incomprehensible almost from a purely military point of view. History +is full of such examples. + +Clausewitz clearly lays down: "_War is only a continuation of State +policy by other means._ This point of view being adhered to will +introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and +things will be more easily disentangled from each other."[18] "It +is only thus that we can obtain a clear conception of war, for the +political view is the _object_, war is the _means_, and the means +must always include the object in our conception." "Each (nation or +government) strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to +its will."[19] + +Owing to the great importance of this point of view, so little +understood in this country, I have devoted the next chapter to it +alone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's view more in detail. We can, +therefore, pass on for the present. + + +THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY + +Secondly, I select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory, +because that is essential in order to understand his division of all +wars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be +able to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating +point, where reaction may set in.[20] + +"The conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his +adversary completely. Often, in fact almost _universally, there is a +culminating point of victory_. Experience shows this sufficiently."[21] +As the attack or invasion progresses it becomes weaker even from its +successes, from sieges or corps left to observe fortified places, from +the troops required to guard the territory gained, and the lengthening +line of communications, from the fact that we are removing further +from our resource while the enemy is falling back upon and drawing +nearer to his, from the danger of other States joining in to prevent +the utter destruction of the defeated nation, from the rousing of +the whole nation in extremity to save themselves by a people's war, +from the slackening of effort in the victorious army itself, etc., +etc. Leoben, Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances of such a +culminating point, and probably in the late Russo-Japanese war Harbin +would have proved so, too, if peace had not intervened. + +Clausewitz continues: "It is necessary to know how far it (our +preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and, +instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster." He defines it as "_The +point at which the offensive changes into the defensive_," and says, +"to overstep this point is more than simply a useless expenditure of +power yielding no further results, it is a _destructive_ step which +causes reaction, and the reaction is, according to all experience, +productive of most disproportionate effects."[22] The reader will find +it an interesting exercise to search for this culminating point of +victory in historical campaigns, and mark the result where it has been +overstepped and where it has not been overstepped. + + +THE TWO CLASSES OF WARS + +From this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the +two classes into which Clausewitz divides all wars. + +"The two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the +complete _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be that we aim at his +destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to +conclude peace on our terms; and, _next_, those in which our aim is +merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either +for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to +account as matters for exchange in the settlement of Peace."[23] + +All wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the +enemy, _i.e._ "unlimited object," or wars with a "limited object." +In the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in +accordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with +the enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point +of victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or +beyond it. If the former--then the plan should be one with a "limited +object," such as the Crimea, Manchuria, etc.; if the latter--then the +plan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of +Napoleon's campaigns, or the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as 1866, +or 1870. As Clausewitz says: "_Now, the first, the grandest, and most +decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is +rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages_, +not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which, +by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. _This, +therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical +questions._"[24] + +In Clausewitz's two plans for war with France in 1831,[25] this +difference is plain. In the first plan, he considered Prussia, Austria, +the German Confederation, and Great Britain united as allies against +France,--and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack +by two armies, each of 300,000 men, one marching on Paris from Belgium, +one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine. In the second plan the political +conditions had meanwhile changed; Austria and Great Britain were +doubtful, and Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if Prussia and +the German Confederation alone could appear before Paris in sufficient +strength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it +would be permissible to venture even beyond Paris. So he proposed to +limit the object to the conquest of Belgium, and to attack the French +vigorously the moment they entered that country. + +Which strict limitation of the object within the means available to +attain it is characteristic of Clausewitz's practical way of looking +at things. In each plan, however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a +decisive victory was to be adopted. + + +PREPARATION FOR WAR + +The third place, in respect to its present-day importance, I assign to +Clausewitz's clear statement that-- + +"If we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then +the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal +classes, into such as are only _preparations for war_ and into _the war +itself_. This distinction must also be made in theory." + +Nothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater +honour peace preparations. Like his doctrine of the importance of +gaining public opinion in war, it is one of those almost prophetic +utterances which make Clausewitz the germ of modern military evolution. + +Clausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not, foresaw to a certain extent +(probably owing to his employment in organizing the new Prussian +short-service army after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the present day. +And, since his time, the greater the forces which have to be prepared, +the greater has become the value of preparation for war. It has been +continually growing, till to-day it has obtained such overwhelming +importance that one may almost say that a modern war is practically (or +nearly so) decided _before_ war breaks out, according to which nation +has made the greatest and most thorough peace preparations. + +Clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every imaginable preparation." We may +nowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that +that nation which is beaten in preparation is already beaten BEFORE +the war breaks out. + +A failure to understand this fact is a fundamental error at the root +of the idea of war as held by civilians, for many of them think that +speeches are a substitute for preparations. + +It is plain that these three ideas of Clausewitz regarding the nature +of war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an +unlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace-time, +are as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier, and require +study and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part +of the latter. + + +FRICTION IN WAR + +I place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual +war, of war in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war +on paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the +part of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway +between the two. + +Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. He +always looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction +and the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be +the chief characteristic of real war as distinguished from theoretical +war or war on paper, it is chiefly this habit or mode of thought which +makes his writings of such great and permanent value. It is also a +habit which we ought sedulously to cultivate in ourselves. + +"_In war everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is +difficult_,"[26] runs his famous saying. Why is the simplest thing +difficult? Because of the friction of war. And how can that friction +be minimized? Only by force of character, and the military virtues of +discipline, perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. Hence the +great emphasis which he always and everywhere lays upon character and +these military virtues as the deciding factors in war. + +"_Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to +that which distinguishes real war from war on paper_," he says. Each +individual of the army "keeps up his own friction in all directions." +"The danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it +requires, augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the +greatest causes of it."[27] "_This enormous friction is everywhere +brought into contact with chance_, and thus facts take place +upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being +chance. As an instance of one such chance take the weather. Here the +fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time,--a battery from +firing, or a report from reaching the general. The rain (mud) prevents +a battalion from arriving,--or the cavalry from charging effectively, +because it had stuck fast in the heavy ground." And so on. Consider +for examples the foggy mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau, the +Katzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz, Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud +of Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest, the mud of Manchuria. + +"_Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium._" "_The knowledge +of friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in +war_, which is required in a good general." "It is therefore this +friction which makes that which appears easy in war so difficult in +reality."[28] In considering any situation in war we must therefore +always add to the known circumstances--friction. + + +WAR ITSELF + +In Clausewitz's way of looking at war itself I assign at once the first +place to his doctrine, "_The destruction of the enemy's military force +is the leading principle of war_, and for the whole chapter of positive +action _the direct way to the aim_."[29] This dictum, repeated in +many different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. All the +old theoretical ideas about threatening by manoeuvring, conquering by +manoeuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manoeuvring, and so forth, +in which his predecessors entangled strategy, and from which even the +Archduke Charles and Jomini had not completely freed themselves, he +brushes aside by "our assertion is that ONLY great tactical results can +lead to great strategical results."[30] Thus he leads and concentrates +our thoughts in strategy on the central idea of victory in battle, +and frees us once for all from the obscuring veil of lines and angles +and geometrical forms by which other writers have hidden that truth. +"Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of +overcoming and disarming an adversary without causing great bloodshed, +and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However +plausible this may appear, _it is an error which must be extirpated_, +for, in such dangerous things as war, _the errors which spring from a +spirit of benevolence are just the worst_."[31] For "he who uses force +unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, _must_ +obtain the superiority if his adversary does not act likewise." And the +"worst of all errors in wars" is still the idea of war too commonly +held by civilians in this country, as witness the outcries which +greeted every loss during the South African war, which shows how much +Clausewitz is needed as a tonic to brace their minds to the reality. + +"War is an act of violence which in its application knows NO bounds." +"Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed; if a bloody +slaughter be a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more +respect to war (for avoiding unnecessary war), but not for making the +sword we wear blunt and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, +till some one steps in with a sword that is sharp, and lops off the +arm from our body." + + +SIMPLE PLANS + +The second place I assign to his doctrine of _the simplest plans_, +because time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions, +but "a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have _time_ +for wide-reaching skilful combination."[32] "By this it appears to us +that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are +complicated is conclusively shown." + +"We must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike," or the +opponent will get his thrust in first. + +"Whenever this is the case, we must ourselves choose the shorter." +"Therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by +complicated plans, _we must always rather endeavour to be beforehand +with him by the simplest and shortest_." + + +STRATEGIC LINES + +The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between +the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation, +and lines of manoeuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in Jomini and his +predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing +a part,--for these Clausewitz has little respect. In his chapter on +"The Geometrical Element,"[33] he says, "We therefore do not hesitate +to regard it as an established truth that _in strategy more depends +upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the +form of the great lines by which they are connected_."[34] Of course +he does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above +sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. He +therefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to +the heart of things. + + +FRICTION + +has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about +its components. + + +DANGER + +"An ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger. +"Danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is +necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under +notice here."[35] + + +BODILY EXERTION + +Clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on +the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul." +"Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction."[36] + +To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen the retreat from Moscow, the +awful passage of the Beresina, and the battle of the nations round +Leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. Had he not seen +bodily exertion and hardship break up the Grand Army into a small horde +of stragglers, and destroy the army of Kutusoff in almost an equal +measure, in 1812, as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely +break up the great army of Napoleon in 1813? + +As for the effects of bodily exertion on the mind, purpose, and +resolution of the general, compare Benningsen at Eylau after thirty-six +hours in the saddle, or Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost all the +results of his victory. + + +INFORMATION IN WAR + +"_The foundation of all our ideas and actions_," but "in a few words, +_most reports are false_." "When in the thick of war itself one +report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if +these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of +probability." In another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual +uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he +compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and +groping uncertainly for one another. + +"These things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war +and make it a _resistant medium for every activity_, we have designated +danger, bodily exertion, information, and friction."[37] He never loses +sight of this; it pervades everything he writes. + + +THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL + +"And therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in +this book are composed _half of physical, half of moral causes and +effects_, and we might say that the physical are almost no more than +the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real +bright polished weapon."[38] Pages might be filled with extracts +showing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader +is already convinced of that. Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral +is to the physical as three to one." Clausewitz regards all military +questions from this point. His psychological attitude is what chiefly +characterizes Clausewitz from all writers who came before him, and +which makes his deductions so realistic, so interesting and so valuable +for all who come after him. + + +TENSION AND REST IN WAR + +In order not to weary the reader I will bring this chapter to a +conclusion with one or two extracts relating to "tension and rest; +the suspension of the act in warfare." This is explanatory of those +frequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first +sight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. These halts are +due to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty, +irresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc. + +In this connection one must remember that war is "a chain of battles +all strung together, one of which always brings on another." But they +seldom follow each other immediately; there is usually a certain +pause between. As soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new +combinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the +next. Whilst these new combinations are being developed, or perhaps +considered, there may be a greater or less suspension of the act, a +longer or shorter halt in the forward movement. Then another spring +forward. Clausewitz has a great many interesting things to say on this +subject.[39] + +"If there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither +party for the moment wills anything positive, there is _rest_, and for +the moment equilibrium.... As soon as ever one of the parties proposes +to himself a new positive object, and commences active steps towards +it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy +opposes this, there is _tension_ of the powers; this lasts until the +decision takes place.... This decision, the foundation of which lies +always in the battle-combinations which are made on each side, ... is +followed by a movement in one or other direction." + +"It may so happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not only +feel themselves too weak to attack, but are so in reality." + +"Wild as is the nature of war it still wears the claims of human +weakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates +dangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one." + +"If we cast a glance at military history in general, there we find +so much the opposite of an incessant advance towards the aim, that +_standing still_ and _doing nothing_ is quite plainly the _normal +condition_ of an army in the midst of war, _acting_ the _exception_. +This must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception. +But if military history has this effect by the great body of its +events, so also the latest series of wars redeem the view. The war of +the French Revolution shows only too plainly its reality, and only +proves too plainly its necessity. In that war, and especially in the +campaigns of Bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited +degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the +element. This degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then +it is necessary." + + +REFLECTIONS + +(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So that is how Clausewitz regards +International Law, Clausewitz to whom in Germany "our most famous +victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training," +and on whom "everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war +bases himself, even if he is not conscious of it." And we must regard +nearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a +disciple of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time that we should +cease to pin our faith on International Law, or think that it can in +any way protect us, if we neglect strongly to protect ourselves. Power +and expediency are the only rules that the practical politicians of +foreign countries recognize, and the only question they ask themselves +is, "Have we got sufficient power to do this," and if so, "Is it +expedient to do it?" + +(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length +of time? None whatever. For treaties are only considered binding as +long as the interests of _both_ contracting parties remain the same. +Directly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most +solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia tore up the Treaty of Paris, or +as Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history is full of torn-up +treaties. And as it has been so it will be. The European waste-paper +basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way, +and a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste-paper basket +is, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. Only +in ourselves can we trust. Therefore no treaties at present existing +should be allowed in any way to alter or lessen our preparations to +enable us to fight _alone_ when necessary. + +(3) It cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted on, that the +success or failure of a State policy is dependent upon the amount of +armed force behind it. For upon the amount of armed force behind a +policy depends the greater or less amount of resistance, of friction, +which that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. The +prestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength. +The less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its +rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have +been prevented if its prestige, or armed force, had been greater. On +the other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more +reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. So +that the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is, the +more likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful +compromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace. + +Therefore, under this consideration, those who would reduce our +national forces are deeply mistaken, for such action would imperil our +prestige, imperil our negotiations, imperil our peace, and perhaps lead +eventually to a war that we might otherwise have avoided. Therefore +no such deeply mistaken economy for us. A few hundred thousand pounds +saved would be dear economy indeed if it led, as well it might, to the +payment before many years of a War Indemnity of £800,000,000 or so. +Better the evils we know than the far greater evils we know not of. + +(4) Surprise in war is what we have to fear. There are two sorts of +national surprise that we must consider. These are (A) the _surprise +by actual hostilities_ taking place before the actual declaration of +war, such as the Japanese surprise and practical destruction of the +fighting force of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; (B) the _surprise +by superior preparation_, silently carried out till all is ready for a +decisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defence, +and then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly +ready, as the surprise in this sense of France by Germany in 1870. + +(A) Every successful example is always copied, and usually on a larger +scale. We may be quite certain that our rivals have taken to heart +the lesson of Port Arthur. It is possible that our next war will open +with a similar night attack on our fleet, either just before, or +simultaneously with the declaration of war. If it is successful, or +even partially successful, it may produce the most grave results, as in +the Russo-Japanese War. It _may_ render possible a naval action with +almost equal forces, in which our opponents _might_ be victorious. The +invasion of this country on a gigantic scale by 300,000 men or more +would then follow as a certainty. This is not a probability, but a +possibility which requires to be kept in our view. + +(B) _The surprise by superior preparation_, as I term it, for want +of a better name, is a danger to which we are peculiarly liable. As +Lord Salisbury said, "The British constitution is a bad fighting +machine," and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by +the lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all +that appertains to war. Hence they are always liable to oppose, as +excessive, preparations which are in reality the minimum consistent +with national safety. Consequently our preparations for war, controlled +as they are by those who have no special knowledge of war, are always +apt to be insufficient, as were those of France in 1870. In former +days this did not perhaps so very much matter, although it resulted +in the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of British lives and +hundreds of millions of British treasure. But still we were able, at +this somewhat excessive price, to "muddle through," owing to the heroic +efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make bricks without straw and +retrieve the mistakes of our policy. For our opponents then conducted +war in such a slow way as to give us time to repair _after_ the +outbreak of war our lack of preparation _before_ it. But opposed to a +modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen and led by generals brought +up in the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Moltke--all will be +different. In such a war the national forces brought into play are so +immense that it is only possible to do so efficaciously if everything +has been most carefully prepared and organized beforehand. It is not +_possible_ to improvise such organization of national force _after_ +the war has begun, for there cannot be sufficient time. If our rival +makes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that +war the _whole_ of its national force, material, moral, and physical, +while we only prepare to bring to bear a _small portion_ thereof, then +there will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. The +war will be conducted with the utmost energy, and the aim will be to +utilize to the utmost the superiority obtained by superior preparation, +so as to make the decision as rapid as possible before we have time to +recover from the effects of our surprise. That is the danger we have to +fear, and to keep ever in mind. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +WAR AS POLICY + + +"War," says Clausewitz, "is only a continuation of State policy by +other means." The first question that at once arises in the mind is +what is meant by Policy. We may safely lay down that State policy is +the defence and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole +amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards +acquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. There +can, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength +or weakness, of success or failure, in the policy of a State. + +Clausewitz expressly stated that he hoped "to iron out many creases +in the heads of strategists and statesmen," such, for instance, as +the idea that it is possible to consider either policy or war as +independent of the other. + +It is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy if we +regard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes peace +negotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to +attain the political object. + +War is only a part of policy, a continuance of the previous +negotiations; but the instrument is now the sword and not the pen. As +Clausewitz says, "_In one word, the art of war, in its highest point +of view, is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead +of writing notes._" War is merely a means whereby a nation attempts +to impose its will upon another nation in order to attain a political +object. This object is settled by policy, which also orders the war, +determines what sort of war it is to be, with what means and resources +and expenditure it is to be waged, when its object has been attained, +and when it is to cease. In fact, policy prepares, leads up to, orders, +supports, guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz said, "_All the +leading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet--that +is, by a political, not a military functionary._" + +Unity of thought is only to be obtained by "the conception that +war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means +an independent thing in itself." "And how can we conceive it to be +otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political +relations between different nations and governments? Is not war +merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts?" +"Accordingly war can never be separated from political intercourse; +and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, +all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, +broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object." + +"If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from +policy. If the policy is grand and powerful, so will also be the war, +and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its +absolute form." "Only through this kind of view war recovers unity; +only by it can we see _all_ wars of _one_ kind, and it is only through +it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of +view from which _great plans_ may be traced out and determined upon." + +"There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find +out the _right_ point of view from which things should be looked at and +judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend +the mass of events in their unity from _one_ standpoint; and it is only +the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency." +"We can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests +generally of the whole community," and "_wars are in reality only the +expressions or manifestations of policy itself_." + +To the student of history this unity of conception is equally +necessary, for it supplies the key to many a military puzzle. Without +it we can never understand, for instance, Napoleon's conduct in +1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can we see the compelling reason of +many battles, apparently fought against military judgment, such, for +instance, as Borodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have to remember that +these and many other battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were fought +from a political, not a military, motive. It is a well-known fact that +the strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to +suit overmastering political necessity. Yet many people have failed to +draw therefrom the generalization of Clausewitz that "war is only a +continuation of State policy by other means." But having got it now, +let us hold fast to it, with all its consequences. + + +SOME KNOWLEDGE OF WAR NECESSARY FOR STATESMEN + +"From this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things +a necessary conflict between the political and military interests, +and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as _imperfect +knowledge_ only. That policy makes demands upon the war which it +cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that _it knows +the instrument it is going to use_, therefore contrary to a natural and +_indispensable supposition_." + +"_None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made +without an insight into the political relations_; and in reality when +people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy +on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different +to what they intend. It is not this influence, but the policy itself +which should be found fault with. If policy is right, if it succeeds +in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war also with +advantage; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the +object, the cause is to be looked for in a mistaken policy. + +"It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain +military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it +can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes. +Just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant +sometimes says what he does not intend, _so policy, when intending +right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views_. + +"_This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain +knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of +political intercourse._" + + +THE WAR MINISTER + +"Before going further we must guard ourselves against a false +interpretation of which this is very susceptible. We do not mean to +say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the _principal_ +qualification for a war minister. Elevation, superiority of mind, +strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he +must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another." + + +POLICY AND THE MEANS TO CARRY OUT THAT POLICY MUST HARMONIZE + +"_If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy +to accommodate itself to the means available for war_, there is only +one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are +not combined in one person (note, as William of Orange, Frederick +the Great, or Napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an +_ex-officio_ member of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its +councils and decisions on important occasions." + +"The influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the +Cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous +action." + + +REFLECTIONS + +We shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding +dicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree. + +Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to +policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much +as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy. + +Secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may +be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of +his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering, +guiding, and controlling of war. As Clausewitz says, "it is an +_indispensable supposition_ that policy knows the instrument it is +going to use." It is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations +between two States cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the +political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued +in another form--in the form of war. The statesman still retains +control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his +object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well +as of the peaceful, policy of the nation. + +Thirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is +theoretically allowable during the course of actual operations, _i.e._ +after the war has actually begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy +should only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should +keep clear during the actual operations. Clausewitz, however, holds +that the two are so intimately related that the political influence +cannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. Between two +such authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and +must seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly, in history policy often +has really affected the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813, 1814, +1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan, or Bismarck's interference to hurry +on the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith in the Boer War, and in +many other cases. That, we must admit. We must also admit that its +interference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations. +Clausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is +wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle way rule appears to be this, +that policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but +during actual operations the statesman should exercise the greatest +possible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded by +_overwhelming political necessity_. + +Fourthly, a politician is bound to study war. He is bound to study war +as well as diplomacy, his two instruments. If he only studies how to +use one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed. +It is plain that he MUST study war, so that he may not try to use an +instrument of which he knows nothing. It is not meant, of course, +that a politician should study all the details of naval and military +matters, but only that he should study the general principles of war, +and the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political +object of war, through the submission of the enemy. + +Fifthly, in order that the object and the means of policy may +harmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests +are entrusted should study the principles of war, so that _he may keep +his policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it_. That is to say, +he must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely +to be strongly opposed by another Power, unless he has from careful +study and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at +his disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his +policy and declares war. He should not even consider a policy without +_at the same time_ considering with his military and naval advisers the +nation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. He must +not think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do +so, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give a +reasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. Otherwise, + +Sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war +will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall +of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be Great Britain or not) +lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as +we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy, +the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,--these points deserve the +most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the +destinies of the Anglo-Saxon Race. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +STRATEGY + + +Clausewitz defines strategy as "_the use of the battle to gain the +object of the war_." War is "a chain of battles all strung together, +one of which always brings on another."[40] The great thing in strategy +is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits. +"_The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally; +secondly, at the decisive point._"[41] + +"In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the +most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be +sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating +circumstances. The direct result of all this is that the _greatest +possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive +point_.[42] Whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not, +we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is +_the first great principle of strategy_, as well suited for Greeks or +Persians, or for Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French or Germans." + +It sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. How +many generals have been ruined in consequence! + + +SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR STRATEGIC CERTAINTY + +Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we may search modern military +history in vain for a battle (except Leuthen or Rosbach) in which an +army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no +means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of +modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception, +that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in +numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and +when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon, +Waterloo, he was beaten."[43] "From this we may infer, in the present +state of Europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented +general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now, if +we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even +the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small +as well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but +which need not be over _two to one_, will be sufficient to _ensure the +victory_, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be."[44] + +The double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore, +the ideal of strategy. "_The superiority of numbers is, therefore, to +be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before +all_, and as far as possible." If strategy has done this, then it has +done its utmost duty. It is then for the tactician to make the most +of this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory. +Strategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to +the altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the +hostile armed force is destroyed. + +This _superiority of numbers_ in battle as the _first principle of +strategy_ we require, on all occasions in season and out of season, to +repeat and repeat. At present we have not the numbers we shall want. We +must get them. Otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and +"the best strategy" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for +us. This rests with our statesmen. + + +THE DECISIVE POINT + +If the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the +decisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point? + +Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz. Jomini, even after Napoleon, +confuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre +of war, but Clausewitz clears the air by asserting only _one_. + +"But whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against +which we are to direct our ultimate operations, _still the conquest and +destruction of his army is the surest commencement_ and, _in all cases, +the most essential_."[45] + +Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force is THERE +is the decisive point, against which we must concentrate ALL our forces. + +"There are," said Napoleon, "many good generals in Europe, but they +see too many things at one time. _As for me, I see only one thing, the +enemy's chief army, and I concentrate all my efforts to destroy it._" + + +THE SIMULTANEOUS USE OF ALL THE FORCES + +"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which we have been endeavouring to set +forth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and +destined for a strategic object should be _simultaneously_ applied +to it. And this application will be all the more complete the more +everything is compressed into one act and one moment."[46] This he +calls "_the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in +strategy_."[47] "In strategy we can never employ too many forces."[48] +"What can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of force must be +regarded in strategy as a means of giving expansion to success." +"_No troops should be kept back as a strategic reserve_," but every +available man hurried up to the first battlefield, fresh levies being +meanwhile formed in rear. As an instance of what not to do, Prussia, in +1806, kept back 45,000 men in Brandenburg and East Prussia; they might, +if present at Jena, have turned defeat into victory, but they were +useless afterwards.[49] A fault so often made may be made again. + + +CONCENTRATION + +"It is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point," said +Napoleon. To concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive +point so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the +enemy will be making a similar attempt. "The calculation of time and +space appears the most essential thing to this end. But the calculation +of time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of +strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither +the most difficult nor the most decisive one." "Much more frequently +the relative superiority, that is the skilful assemblage of superior +forces at the decisive point, has its foundation in the right +appreciation of those points, in the judicious distribution which by +that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in +_the resolution to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the +important_. In this respect Frederick the Great and Bonaparte are +especially characteristic."[50] + +"There is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy than _to +keep all the forces concentrated. No portion to be separated from the +main body unless called away by some urgent necessity._ On this maxim +we stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be depended upon."[51] + +"_The concentration of the whole force_ (_i.e._ within supporting +distance) _should be the rule_, and _every separation or division is an +exception which must be justified_."[52] Of course, this does not +mean that all the troops are to be kept concentrated in one mass upon +one road, but within supporting distance, for he expressly states, "_It +is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of +the action._"[53] This doctrine, qualified by the last sentence, makes +Clausewitz the germ of modern military thought, for the last sentence +leaves room for all the modern developments of new roads, railways, +telegraphs, wire and wireless, and so forth. + +Therefore in war, according to Clausewitz, concentration, +concentration, concentration, and _every division or detachment is an +evil which can only be justified by urgent necessity_. Here again we +find a simple truth, which, however, the history of all wars shows us +to be very difficult to carry out. Hence the value of keeping such an +imperative maxim always in our minds. + + +THE FIRST PITCHED BATTLE + +"The more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as +well as of every other contest, that he must and _will_ conquer, the +more will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first +battle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. Napoleon hardly +ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at +once in the first battle."[54] + +"_At the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the +first battle_, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage +to which no one would willingly expose himself, and also because the +first decision, though not the only one, still will have the more +influence on subsequent events the greater it is in itself."[1] + +"The law of the simultaneous use of the forces in strategy lets the +principal result (which need not be the final one) take place almost +always at the commencement of the great act."[55] A great victory thus +won at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow +us to carry out our own. The first pitched battle is, therefore, the +crisis of the rival strategies, and towards its favourable decision +all our preparations, all our forces, and all our energies should be +directed. This is a point that civilians seem to find hard to grasp. +Witness all our history, with inadequate forces at the beginning of +every war, as even in the latest of our wars--that in South Africa. It +is a point which our statesmen should very seriously consider. + +The difficulty of concentrating superior numbers for the first battle +is that the enemy will be, or should be, of the same opinion, and will +be making equal efforts to win the first battle. So, then, the crisis +will be all the more acute, the battle greater, and the result greater. + +"_We would not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the +crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's main force, is +the first-born son of war._"[56] + +Till this is done, the first great victory gained, strategy should +think of nothing else. + +Then, and only then, a further combination in accordance with the +altered circumstances to win the next. + +"For we maintain that, with few exceptions, _the victory at the +decisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor +points_"[57] over the whole theatre of war. Therefore nothing else +matters for long, and to victory in the first great battle "everything +else must be sacrificed." For concentration can only be obtained by +sacrifice. + + +PURSUIT + +"Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about +rest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only +of pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the +enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever +else appears as a rallying point for the enemy."[58] + +Clausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel +his exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requires GREAT +force of WILL on the part of the equally exhausted commander. We need +only remember that Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis of his fate, +being physically tired, failed to pursue the allies after his victory +at Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the fruits of his victory, and +indeed his last chance of ultimate success. + + +SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES + +Leaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical +thoughts, I hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at +Clausewitz's admirable summary[59] of strategic principles:-- + +"_The first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves +is to employ_ ALL _the forces which we can make available with the_ +UTMOST ENERGY. Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it +is extremely unwise not to make it _perfectly certain_. + +"_The second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible +at the point where the_ DECISIVE _blow is to be struck. The success at +that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points._ + +"_The third principle is not to lose time. Rapidity and surprise are +the most powerful elements of victory._ + +"_Lastly, the fourth principle is to_ FOLLOW UP THE SUCCESS _we gain +with the_ UTMOST ENERGY. _The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the +only means of gathering up the fruits of victory._ + +"The first of these principles is the foundation of all the others. _If +we have followed the first principle, we can venture any length with +regard to the three others without risking our all._ It gives the means +of _continually creating new forces behind us_, and with new forces +every disaster may be repaired. _In this, and not in going forward +with timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise._" + +These great principles are everything in war, and "due regard being +paid to these principles, the form (_i.e._ the geometrical element) +in which the operations are carried on is in the end of little +consequence." + +"Therefore I am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his +powers to appear _incessantly with new masses_, whoever adopts _every +imaginable means of preparation_, whoever _concentrates his force at +the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with +resolution and energy_, has done all that can be done in a general +way for the strategical conduct of the war, and that, unless he is +altogether unfortunate in battle, will undoubtedly be victorious in the +same measure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and +energy." + + +REFLECTIONS + +When we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy +firmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of +our knowledge. For principles are no use unless we apply them. On +consideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all +apply these principles with advantage. + +I. It will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise +to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about, +to search for indications of their application in the strategy of each +belligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to +carry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded +or failed, and the results of doing or not doing so. Also to search +for the interaction of the political motive of the war on the military +operations, and to see how far the belligerent statesmen gained or +failed to gain their political object, according to the comparative +degree of preparation they had made for it, and the magnitude of +effort which they made or did not make to support it with the whole +means of the nation, material, moral and physical. Also to see how +far the national spirit was aroused or not, and the causes thereof, +and to note the greater or less energy, resolution and boldness which +was consequently infused into the war. Also to note how the thorough +application of these great simple principles of strategy shortens the +war and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to 1870), and how the neglect of +them by statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards, lengthens a war +and adds to its cost enormously (South Africa, etc.). Used thus, these +principles give us a theoretically correct ground for criticism. + +II. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for +anticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will +be, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will +direct those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness +with which they will use them against us. It is an axiom always to +assume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare +accordingly. + +III. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for +our own counter-preparations. We require to take the most dangerous war +which is probable or possible, and make every imaginable preparation to +carry out these principles therein. + +In such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals +to win, and thus save the nation from the irreparable consequences +and the huge war indemnity of £800,000,000 or so, which would follow +defeat? How are we going to do it? How are we going to render it +possible for our generals to employ the best strategy? The ideal of +strategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers. +How are we going to give our generals that? If we cannot do that, +how are we going to give them even any superiority _at all_, so that +they may be able to carry out the first principle of strategy? How? +Or are we going to make NO _adequate preparations_ for these three +eventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to +save us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the +impossible? It is in this way that a statesman should use these few +great simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political +object and safeguard the interests of the nation. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY + + +Now, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory of war is easy enough to +understand. There is no reason--one might almost say no excuse--why +every one, soldier or statesman, should not know it fairly well. The +great leading principles of strategy are few and simple. There is no +reason why every one, soldier and statesman, should not understand +and know these few simple principles thoroughly, and have them at his +finger ends ready to apply them to the consideration of any military +question, past, present, or future. So far all is easy. But when it +is a question of carrying out in actual war this easy theory, these +simple strategical principles, then it is QUITE a different matter, +then it is a matter of the very greatest difficulty. This is a +difference which the mind always finds very hard to grasp, as witness +the denunciations with which any failure in execution by a general, no +matter how great the real difficulties with which he had to contend, +is nearly always greeted. Observers rarely make allowances for these +difficulties, very largely probably because they do not understand +them. The present chapter is devoted to these difficulties of execution +in war. + + +THE GENIUS FOR WAR + +In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the genius for war"[60] he sets forth +the difficulties which confront a general, the character and genius, +the driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of +war. It is impossible to abstract it adequately; I can only advise all +to read it for themselves. But I will endeavour to give an idea of it. + +After discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general, +physical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength +of body and mind, the personal pride, the patriotism, the enthusiasm, +etc., he comes to the unexpected. + +"_War_," he says, "_is the province of uncertainty. Three-fourths of +those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden +more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty._ Here, then, above +all other, a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the +truth by the tact of its judgment." Mark this point, that three-fourths +of the things that we as critics AFTER the event know, when all +information of the situation has been collected and published, were +unknown to the general who had to decide, or only dimly guessed at from +a number of contradictory reports. + +"From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, _this +continual interposition of chance_." "Now, if he is to get safely +through _this perpetual conflict with the unexpected_, two qualities +are indispensable; in the first place _an understanding which, even +in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces +of inner light_, which _lead to the truth_, and then _the courage to +follow this faint light_. The first is expressed by the French phrase +_coup d'oeil_; the second is resolution." + +"Resolution is an _act of courage in face of responsibility_." "The +forerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making plain the +necessity of venturing and thus influencing the will. This quite +peculiar direction of the mind, which conquers every other fear in man +by the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes up resolution in +strong minds." + +The vital importance of firmness and resolution, so strongly urged +by Clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the +strongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation +in war. Compare, for instance, York _v._ Wartenburg's masterly +exposition of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation in 1813 at +Dresden. + +Also there is required "_the power of listening to reason in the midst +of the most intense excitement_, in the storm of the most violent +passions." + +"But to keep to the result of by-gone reflections in opposition to the +stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it, is +just THE difficulty." "Here nothing else can help us but an imperative +maxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that maxim +is, _in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to +give it up till a clear conviction forces us to do so_." + +"But as soon as difficulties arise, and that must always happen +when great results are at stake, then the machine, the army itself, +begins to offer a sort of passive resistance, and to overcome this +the commander must have great force of will." Driving power, such as +Napoleon's. And also "the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice, +which the commander has to contend with in himself." + +"These are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of +the commander have to contend with and OVERCOME, if he is to make his +name illustrious." If he is to prevent the downfall of his country. + + +REFLECTIONS + +(1) In connection with these difficulties I would like to put forward a +suggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though +not exactly Clausewitz's, is a corollary from Clausewitz. It is this. +In reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history +nearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of +one or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in +the previous chapter. But we must assume that the defeated general was +_familiar_ with that principle, and that his _will_ was to carry it +out. What, then, were the difficulties, the friction, which, on any +particular day or days, overcame his will and made him sacrifice the +principle? This is where most critics fail us. Here seems the matter +to search for. And could a stronger resolution have enabled him to +overcome those difficulties, that friction? And if so, how and by what +means? But we must first discover the difficulties and uncertainties +of the particular day when his will gave way. Take the Manchurian +campaign as an instance. If we could only have a military history of +the campaign of 1870 or that of Manchuria, written in the form of a +series of "appreciations of the situation," so that we know nothing but +what the general knew at the time as we read, and if the true state of +affairs could be withheld from us till the end, this, I think, would +be very instructive and helpful. It would be a more difficult way of +writing a military history, but I think that the extra trouble would be +repaid by the extra value. So at least it appears. + +(2) If we reflect upon the enormous difficulties, so strikingly +brought out by Clausewitz, which _our_ generals have to contend with +and _overcome_ in actual war, it should surely teach us to curb our +criticism. It should surely also make us resolve in future to try to +aid them as far as is in our power at home, and not thoughtlessly to +increase their already stupendous burdens. In the past we at home have +much to accuse ourselves of, much to regret. In the past often have +we added to the difficulties of our generals, often have we greatly +weakened their chances, and increased those of their opponents, often +have we, unintentionally, through ignorance cast a weight into the +scale against our country. + +(3) The ignorance of the public regarding the conduct of war +constitutes for us a very serious national danger. If this ignorance +were less pronounced, if our statesmen understood the vast importance +of information to the enemy, and the equal importance to our generals +that this information the enemy should NOT obtain, then the public +craving for information regarding every detail of what occurs in +the field, and the demand for the wide publication thereof, would +certainly be repressed. Nothing occurs in any of our campaigns which +is not immediately made known; reports of actions with the fullest +details as to the troops engaged, and the casualties that have befallen +them, appear in the columns of the Press within a few hours of their +occurrence. _Any efforts, therefore, of our generals_ in the field +to maintain _secrecy as to strength, intentions, and movements are +deliberately_, though probably unintentionally, _counteracted by +their own countrymen_. This is due to pure ignorance of war, no doubt, +but the effect of this ignorance is as bad as if it were due to evil +intention. In fairness, however, we must admit that, in the past, the +immense value of reticence has not been fully appreciated by some of +our soldiers themselves, and it were well if, in the future, more +attention were directed to the importance of secrecy. + +The results of such almost criminal stupidity may not be apparent +when we are fighting with a savage foe, but if we ever have, as we +undoubtedly some day shall have, the misfortune to find ourselves +engaged with a civilized Power, we may be certain that not only will +the operations be indefinitely prolonged, _and their cost enormously +increased_, but their successful issue will be for us highly +problematical. + +In this connection it must be remembered that every Great Power has +secret agents in every country, including Great Britain, and that it +will be easy for such a secret agent to telegraph in cypher or in +some agreed code to an agent in a neutral State all war information +published here, who will telegraph it on at once to the hostile +general, who will thus get, within a very short time of its publication +in London, perhaps just exactly the information he requires to clear up +the strategical or tactical situation for him, and enable him to defeat +the combinations of our generals. As a case in point, take Macmahon's +march on Sedan to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy was absolutely +necessary for success, but which became known to the Germans by the +English newspapers.--Result, Sedan. + +That this cannot be allowed is plain. It is believed that the +patriotism of our Press will welcome any necessary measure to this end +if it is made compulsory upon ALL.[61] + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +TACTICS + + +Some will probably feel inclined to ask what Clausewitz, who wrote more +than eighty years ago, can possibly have to say about tactics which can +be valuable in the twentieth century. + +It was said by Napoleon that tactics change every ten years, according, +of course, to the progress of technicalities, etc. Weapons indeed +change, but there is one thing that never changes, and that is human +nature. The most important thing in tactics, the man behind the gun, +never alters; in his heart and feelings, his strength and weakness, he +is always much the same. + +Therefore, Clausewitz's tactical deductions, founded on the immense +and varied data supplied by the desperate and long-continued fighting +of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, permeated as they are by his +all-pervading psychological or moral view, can never lose their value +to us. + +It is true, no doubt, that our rifles of to-day can be used with +effect at a distance ten times as great as the old smooth bores of +Clausewitz's day, our shrapnel five times as far as his cannon, and +that cover and ground play a far more important part now than then, and +so on. All these things, of course, considerably modify the tactics of +Clausewitz. Not so much, however, as some text-books would lead us to +suppose, which always seem to assume clear ground and clear weather. +For, after all, how many combats are fought on ground where there is +a very restricted field of fire (_vide_ Herbert's "Defence of Plevna," +etc.), or at night? How many battles are fought during rain, or snow, +or mist, or fog, which destroys all long range? Compare the tremendous +fighting with "bullets, bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and even +fists," of Nogi's attempt to cut the Russian line of retreat at Mukden, +with the hand-to-hand fighting of Eylau, Friedland, Borodino, or with +the desperate efforts of the French in 1812 to open their line of +retreat through Maro-Jaroslawitz, where all day the masses of troops +fought hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town was taken and retaken +seven times, and the rival nations fought with the bayonet in the midst +of the burning houses" (Alison). + +When it comes to push of pike, as in all great decisions between +equally resolute adversaries it is bound to do, the difference between +the fighting of Clausewitz's day and ours is but small. The most recent +instances of all, the hand-to-hand fighting in Manchuria, take us back +to the Napoleonic struggles. + +Therefore, despite the eighty years that have intervened, the writings +of Clausewitz are still valuable from a tactical point of view, always +considering of course the difference in weapons, because of the human +heart in battle. + +His ideas on tactics have largely filtered through his German pupils +into our textbooks, minus the psychological or moral note, so that it +is not necessary to go at length into the subject, or give a number of +extracts. It would be wearisome. I will, however, give a few passages +at haphazard as illustrations. + + +FLANK ATTACKS + +The endeavour to gain the enemy's line of retreat, and protect our own, +on which so much learned erudition has been spent by various writers, +he regards as a NATURAL instinct, which will ALWAYS produce itself both +in generals and subalterns. + +"From this arises, in the whole conduct of war, and especially in great +and small combats, a PERFECT INSTINCT, which is the security of our +own line of retreat and the seizure of the enemy's; this follows from +the conception of victory, which, as we have seen, is something beyond +mere slaughter. In this effort we see, therefore, the FIRST immediate +purpose in the combat, and one which is quite universal. No combat +is _imaginable_ in which this effort, either in its double or single +form, is not to go hand in hand with the plain and simple stroke of +force. Even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon the enemy +without thinking of its line of retreat, and in most cases it will have +an eye upon that of the enemy."[62] "This is a great _natural law_ of +the combat," "and so becomes the pivot upon which ALL strategical and +tactical manoeuvres turn." + + +RESERVES--DESTRUCTIVE AND DECISIVE ACT + +The combat he regards as settled by whoever has the preponderance of +moral force at the end; that is, in fresh or only partly used up troops. + +The combat itself he divides into a destructive and a decisive act. +During the long destructive act, or period of fire preparation, the +troops engaged gradually wear each other out, and gradually almost +cease to count as factors in the decision. "After a fire combat of +some hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe +losses--for instance, a quarter or one-third of its numbers--the +_débris_ may for the time be looked upon as a heap of cinders. For the +men are physically exhausted; they have spent their ammunition; many +have left the field with the wounded, though not themselves wounded +(compare, for instance, Eylau and the 1870 battles); the rest think +they have done their part for the day, and if they get beyond the +sphere of danger, do not willingly return to it. The feeling of courage +with which they originally started has had the edge taken off, the +longing for the fight is satisfied, the original organization is partly +destroyed, and the formations broken up." + +"So that the amount of moral force lost may be estimated by the amount +of the Reserves used up, almost as with a foot rule."[63] + +This goes on till, "In all probability, only the untouched reserve and +some troops which, though they have been in action, have suffered very +little, are in reality to be regarded as serviceable, and the remainder +(perhaps four-sixths) may be looked upon for the present as a "caput +mortuum." + +Therefore the art of the commander he regards as "economy of force" +during the destructive period; that is, to employ as few troops as +possible, by taking advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to use a smaller +number of men in the combat with firearms than the enemy employs," so +that a smaller proportionate number of his own are reduced to a "heap +of cinders" and more are left, more moral force, for the decision. + +"Hundreds of times," he says, "a line of fire has maintained its own +against one twice its strength" (_e.g._ the Boers). + +To do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect demands very skilful +handling of the troops, both on the part of the chief and subordinate +leaders. + +With the preponderance thus obtained the commander at last starts the +decision. "Towards the close of a battle the line of retreat is always +regarded with increased jealousy, therefore a threat against that +line is always a potent means of bringing on the decision (Liao-yang, +Mukden). On that account, when circumstances permit, the plan of battle +will be aimed at that point from the very first." Or, "If this wear and +tear and exhaustion of the forces has reached a certain pitch, then a +rapid advance in concentrated masses on one side against the line of +battle of the other" (_i.e._ the Napoleonic breaking the centre, of +recent years thought almost hopeless, but revived in Manchuria with +success, in the case of Nodzu breaking the centre at Mukden). + +From what precedes it is evident that, as in the preparatory acts, the +utmost economy of forces must prevail, so in the decisive act to win +the mastery through _numbers_ must be the ruling idea. + +Just as in the preparatory acts endurance, firmness and coolness are +the first qualities, so in the decisive act boldness and fiery spirit +must predominate. + +"The difference between these two acts will never be completely lost as +respects the whole." + +"This is the way in which our view is to be understood; then, on the +one hand, it will not come short of the reality, and on the other +it will direct the attention of the leader of a combat (be it great +or small, partial or general) to giving each of the two acts of +activity its due share, so that there may be neither precipitation nor +negligence. + +"_Precipitation_ there will be if space and time are not allowed +for the destructive act. _Negligence_ in general there will be if +a complete decision does not take place, either from want of moral +courage or from a wrong view of the situation."[64] + + +DURATION OF THE COMBAT + +"Even the resistance of an ordinary division of 8,000 or 10,000 men +of all arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably superior in +numbers, will last several hours, if the advantages of country are not +too preponderating. And if the enemy is only a little or not at all +superior in numbers, the combat will last half a day. A corps of three +or four divisions will prolong it to double that time; an army of +80,000 or 100,000 men to three or four times." "These calculations are +the result of experience."[65] + +As General von Caemmerer points out, if these calculations were adhered +to in present-day German manoeuvres, as they are now in all war games, +tactical exercises, and staff rides, the dangerous dualism of their +training, the difference between theory and manoeuvre practice, would +cease. + + +ATTACK AND DEFENCE + +I have left to the last the consideration of three or four disputed +points in Clausewitz. In considering these I shall quote a good deal +from General von Caemmerer's "Development of Strategical Science," +as in such matters it is best to quote the most recent authors of +established reputation. + +The most important of these, and the most disputed, is Clausewitz's +famous dictum that "the defensive is the stronger form of making war." +"The defence is the stronger form of war with a negative object; the +attack is the weaker form with a positive object."[66] + +General von Caemmerer says, "It is strange, we Germans look upon +Clausewitz as indisputably the deepest and acutest thinker upon the +subject of war; the beneficial effect of his intellectual labours is +universally recognized and highly appreciated; but the more or less +keen opposition against this sentence never ceases. And yet that +sentence can as little be cut out of his work 'On War' as the heart out +of a man. Our most distinguished and prominent military writers are +here at variance with Clausewitz. + +"Now, of course, I do not here propose to go into such a controversy. +I only wish to point out that Clausewitz, in saying this, only meant +the defensive-offensive, the form in which he always regards it, both +strategically and technically, in oft-repeated explanations all through +his works. For instance-- + +"It is a FIRST maxim NEVER to remain perfectly passive, but to fall +upon the enemy in front and flank, even when he is in the act of making +an attack upon us."[67] + +And again-- + +"_A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword +of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive._ He who +does not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who +does not from the first include this transition in his idea of the +defensive, will never understand its superiority as a form of war."[68] +Von Caemmerer comments thus: "And this conception of the defence +by Clausewitz has become part and parcel of our army--everywhere, +strategically and tactically, he who has been forced into a defensive +attitude at once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack. I am thus +unable to see how the way in which Clausewitz has contrasted Attack +and Defence could in any way paralyse the spirit of enterprise." Von +Caemmerer also justly remarks that, as Clausewitz always insisted +both in strategy and tactics, neither Attack nor Defence is pure, but +oscillates between the two forms; and as the Attack is frequently +temporarily reduced to defend itself, and also as no nation can be sure +of never being invaded by a superior coalition, it is most desirable +to encourage a belief in the strength of the Defence, if properly used. +In this I think that Wellington would probably have agreed. Certainly +Austerlitz and Waterloo were examples of battles such as Clausewitz +preferred. + +Still, one must admit that Clausewitz's chapter on "The Relations +of the Offensive and Defensive to each other in Tactics," Book VII. +Chapter 2, is the least convincing chapter of his work. + +Strategically, the argument is stronger. It always seems to me that we +must remember that Clausewitz had taken part in the defensive-offensive +in its strongest, most absolute and unlimited form, on the greatest +possible scale--the Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated before +a single flake of snow fell) of the Grand Army. If he had lived to +complete the revision of his works, it always seems to me that he +would have made his theory undeniable by stating that the defensive is +the strongest form of war, _if unlimited by space_. What, for instance, +would have happened if the Japanese had tried to march through Siberia +on to St. Petersburg? + +But, after all, which of the two is absolutely the stronger form of +war, attack or defence, is merely a theoretical abstraction, for, +practically, the choice is always settled for us by the pressing +necessity of circumstances. And, in this connection, let us always bear +in mind Clausewitz's dictum: "A swift and vigorous assumption of the +offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point +in the defensive." + + +THE INNER LINE + +A second disputed point is Clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule, +for the Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary to remember that +that was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and +telegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting +on concentric lines. And he is not in any way wedded to the Inner Line, +like Jomini, but _only_ when circumstances are favourable. He has many +sentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and +telegraph days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most distinguished +pupil, would have aimed at envelopment as a rule. For to bring up +troops rapidly by several railways necessitates a broad strategic +front, and Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity as his second great +principle, and says-- + +"If the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss +of time, and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too +great, then the same may be justifiable on these grounds; for _to +effect an unnecessary concentration of the forces_ would be contrary +to the second principle we have laid down (_i.e._ 'to act as swiftly +as possible')."[69] Also: "Such separation into several columns as is +absolutely necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the +tactical attack in the enveloping form, _for that form is natural to +the attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason_."[70] +Also: "_It is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during +the action._" So that while the conditions of his time led Clausewitz +to prefer close concentration and the Inner Line, like Napoleon, +yet his reflections led him to propound the germ of the strategy of +Moltke. Substitute for Clausewitz's close concentration this: "As +close concentration, the combined movements regulated by telegraph, +as is compatible with the utmost use of the railways and the greatest +rapidity" (as he would certainly have said), and we arrive at Moltke's +strategy. + + +FRONTAL ATTACKS + +A third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical +efficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic method +of breaking the enemy's line in the centre. Breaking the line by a +frontal attack was, of course, much easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic +day than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only +natural that Clausewitz in his writings should give it the full +tactical importance which it then deserved. His book would not be true +to the tactical conditions of his day had he not done so, with Rivoli, +Austerlitz, Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before his mind. But it seems +hardly correct to accuse him of over-partiality to frontal attacks, for +he has examined both frontal and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving +to each their relative advantages and disadvantages, and concluding: +"The envelopment may lead directly to the _destruction_ of the enemy's +army, if it is made with very superior numbers and succeeds. If it +leads to victory the early results are _in every case_ greater than +by breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the enemy's line can only lead +indirectly to the destruction of the enemy's army, and its effects +are hardly shown so much on the first day, but rather strategically +afterwards,"[71] by forcing apart on different lines of retreat the +separated fragments of the beaten army. + +"The breaking through the hostile army by massing our principal force +against one point, _supposes an excessive length of front on the part +of the enemy_; for in this form of attack the difficulty of occupying +the remainder of the enemy's force with few troops is greater, because +the enemy's forces nearer to the principal point of attack can easily +join in opposing it. Now in an attack upon the centre there are such +forces on both sides of the attack; in an attack upon a flank, only +on one side. The consequence of this is that such a central attack +may easily end in a very disadvantageous form of combat, _through a +convergent counter-attack_." Which is exactly our modern difficulty. +"The choice between these two forms of attack must therefore be made +according to the existing conditions of the moment. Length of front, +the nature and direction of the line of retreat, the military qualities +of the enemy's troops, and the characteristics of their general, +lastly the ground must determine the choice." + +Speaking generally he regards the _concentric_ enveloping form of +tactical attack aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as the most +efficacious and natural. "On the field of battle itself ... the +enveloping form must always be considered the most effectual."[72] And +the _eccentric_ or frontal counter-attack at the extended enveloping +attack as the most efficacious and natural form of the defence, such as +Napoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz or Dresden, or Wellington's +at Salamanca. "And we think that one means is at least as good as the +other."[73] + + * * * * * + +Now I think that these extracts sufficiently defend Clausewitz from the +imputation of too great a belief in frontal attacks, and considering +the frequent success of such Napoleonic attacks in his day, he gives +a very fair summing up of the relative advantages and disadvantages +thereof, and indeed such as might be written in the present day. +Indeed the quite abnormal conditions of the Boer war produced such a +feeling against frontal attacks, and so much loose talk of their being +extinct, that it is very useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder +that breaking the centre, whenever the condition he postulates, namely +_over-extension of front_ on the enemy's part, is present, will +always remain one of the two great forms of decisive attack open to a +commander. + +And as in our day the forces are so enormous that to reach the hostile +flank becomes more difficult, and the extension of front becomes so +gigantic (a front of several armies on a line of forty to seventy miles +perhaps), it is well to consider whether breaking the enemy's centre +will not again offer the most advantageous form for the final decisive +act, coupled of course, as Clausewitz says it ALWAYS MUST be, with a +strong flank attack. And in these gigantic battles of the future, such +as Liao-yang and Mukden, which we must consider typical of the future, +battles which must take several days, during which the troops in the +first line become utterly exhausted and used up,--a decisive attack +on the centre can well be imagined after the hostile reserves have +been decoyed away over a day's march by a strong flank attack. As, for +example, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden followed by Nodzu's decisive +breaking the centre and capture of Mukden itself. + +So that far from thinking Clausewitz's remarks about frontal attacks +and breaking the line to be obsolete, it rather appears from the great +Russo-Japanese battles that they are worthy of close study in view of +the future. + + +TACTICAL VERSUS STRATEGICAL ENVELOPMENT + +A fourth disputed point is the preference of Clausewitz, owing to his +insistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard +for the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or +near the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged +beforehand. In this matter I will again quote General v. Caemmerer, +who disagrees with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims the oblique +front as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to +say, when the whole army with one united front falls upon the strategic +_flank_ of the enemy, and, if victorious, cuts him from his line of +retreat. But where such a situation cannot be brought about, where our +advance has brought us before the strategic _front_ of the enemy, then +he sees in the tactical envelopment, in the formation of an offensive +flank, the proper means of effectively preparing to push the enemy +from his line of retreat, and he distinctly explains that tactical +envelopment need not at all be the _consequence_ of strategical +envelopment, and need not at all be prepared long beforehand by a +corresponding advance of divided forces." + +Clausewitz says, "The consequence of this is that battles fought with +enveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which should properly +result from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication, +are commonly the result of a moral and physical preponderance."[74] +Also "he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width +of front as will admit of their all coming into action together." +"Such separation into several columns should be made use of for the +disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form" (_i.e._ by +troops within a day's march of each other). "But it must be only of a +tactical nature, for a strategic envelopment, when a great blow is to +be struck, is a complete waste of power." + +General v. Caemmerer comments: "He is thus of opinion that the lateral +movement of part of the army against the flank of the enemy could +without any difficulty still be carried out as initiated by the plan of +battle; and in order to understand this idea we must again bear in mind +the difference between the fire-effect of then and now. In those days a +comparatively short movement made it still possible for a considerable +portion of the army to gain the defenders' flank; to-day a lengthy +and troublesome operation would be necessary for the same object, and +its successful execution would only be counted upon if the defender +remained entirely passive, and would neither think of a counter-stroke +nor of a corresponding movement of his forces to the threatened flank." + +Without going into this controversy I will, however, quote the +excellent reason given by Clausewitz for his preference for tactical as +opposed to strategical envelopment: "One peculiarity of the offensive +battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position (note, and +strength) of the enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things +that are unknown (Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena, Katzbach). +The more this is the case the more concentration of forces becomes +paramount, and turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding."[75] + +It is also well to recollect how many famous generals had been ruined +in Clausewitz's experience through over-extension or dispersion of +their forces. The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals in the winter +of 1813, Macdonald at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren, Ney at +Dennewitz, which neutralized Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and +began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to this cause. + +And the weather may, again, have as great influence in shortening +resistance and allowing troops to be overwhelmed before the too-distant +reinforcements arrive, as it had in those battles. If the weather then +prevented the old muskets going off, and enabled the attack to rush +the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or snow, by restricting the +field of view and fire, may produce the same results. When one thinks +of the number of great battles fought in such weather, as they may +well be again, one sees an additional reason for carefully considering +Clausewitz's warning. Far from relegating his preference for the +tactical as opposed to the strategical envelopment to the region of +the obsolete, because of our improved armament, it seems right to give +it full weight as a corrective to a perceivable tendency to elevate +strategical envelopment (after Königgrätz) into a formula for victory. +If in the past many great generals have been ruined by over-extension, +so may they be again. Against this tendency Clausewitz will for ever +lift his voice. + +Also it remains to be considered, with the huge armies of to-day and +the future, such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden, such armies as +may possibly one day join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical +envelopment will be practicable, or whether tactical envelopment, +such as General Kuroki's tactical enveloping movement on Yentai, and +the Russian line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General Nogi's tactical +enveloping dash northward on Hsinminting and the railway at Mukden, +will not be preferable. + +Perhaps, as a compromise, one might call such a movement +strategical-tactical, and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of words. + +I have not attempted to do more than roughly indicate that the solution +of these four disputed tactical questions in Clausewitz is to be sought +in a study of the latest campaign, as he would have said himself; that +is, the campaign in Manchuria. For, as the _Times_ correspondent in the +XLVth Chapter, "Clausewitz in Manchuria," of his book "The War in the +Far East," observes, "It will be abundantly clear to any one who has +followed the great battles in Manchuria that the spirit of Clausewitz +has presided over Japanese victories and wept over Russian defeats." + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ + + +In reading Clausewitz it is, first, the great principles of the nature +of war founded on human nature, which alter not; and, secondly, it +is his spirit and practical way of looking at things that we want to +assimilate and apply to THE PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY, to which end it is +necessary to read him always with the changed conditions of to-day in +our minds, and think what he would have said under the circumstances. +These changes are chiefly:-- + + (1) The improved net-work of roads. + (2) Railways. + (3) Telegraphs, wire and wireless. + (4) Improved arms. + (5) Aviation + (6) Universal service armies. + + +THE IMPROVED NET-WORK OF ROADS + +The improved net-work of roads in Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria, +or in Afghanistan where we have to consider our future strategy, but in +Europe), as General v. Caemmerer puts it, "now offers to the movements +of armies everywhere a whole series of useful roads where formerly one +or two only were available," easier gradients, good bridges instead of +unreliable ones, etc. So that the march-discipline of that day when +concentrated for battle, artillery and train _on_ the roads, infantry +and cavalry _by the side_ of the roads, has disappeared. Such close +concentration is therefore now not possible, as we move all arms _on_ +the road, and an army corps with train, or two without, is the most +that we can now calculate on bringing into action in one day on one +road. + + +RAILWAYS + +"Railways have, above all, completely altered the term 'base,'" remarks +V. Caemmerer. "Railways carry in a few days men, horses, vehicles, +and materials of all kinds from the remotest district to any desired +point of our country, and nobody would any longer think of accumulating +enormous supplies of all kinds at certain fortified points on his +own frontier with the object of basing himself on those points. One +does not base one's self any longer on a distinct district which is +specially prepared for that object, but upon the whole country, which +has become one single magazine, with separate store-rooms. So the term +'base' has now to be considered in this light." + +It is only when operating in savage or semi-savage countries, where +there are no railways, that the old idea of a base applies. + +As we penetrate deeper and further from our own country into the +enemy's, and as a small raiding party can demolish the railway line so +as to stop all traffic for days or weeks, it becomes far more necessary +than it ever was in Clausewitz's day to guard our communications. +And armies become more and more sensitive to any attack upon their +communications. + +Also "such a line cannot easily be changed, and consequently those +celebrated changes of the line of communication in an enemy's country +which Napoleon himself, on some occasion, declared to be the ablest +manoeuvre in the art of war, could scarcely be carried out any more" +(V. Caemmerer). + +Also concentration by means of several railways demands a broad +strategic front, which produces that separation of corps or armies +which prepares the way for strategical envelopment, and so on. + +General von der Goltz, in his "Conduct of War," says: "The more recent +treatises on the conduct of war on a large scale are principally taken +up with the mobilization and strategical concentration of armies, a +department of strategy which only began to play an important part in +modern times. It is the result of a dense net-work of railways in +Western Europe which has rendered it possible to mass large bodies +of troops in a surprisingly brief time. Each Power tries to outdo +its neighbours in this respect, ... which gives an opportunity to +the strategical specialist to show off his brilliant qualities.... +Consequently it is now frequently assumed that the whole conduct of +war is comprised in this one section of it." This over-estimate is of +course an error, which, however, requires to be pointed out. + + +TELEGRAPHS + +The telegraph has very greatly reduced the danger of separation. +The great advantage of the inner line in the day of Napoleon and of +Clausewitz was that separated forces could only communicate by mounted +messengers, so if the enemy got between them they could not communicate +at all, nor act in concert. This the telegraph has completely altered, +for as the field telegraph can now be laid as quickly as an army can +advance, the most widely separated bodies of troops can every day +arrange combined operations by telegraph through, if necessary, +a point one hundred or four hundred miles in rear. So that to-day +the chief advantage of the inner line has gone, while its chief +disadvantage, the possibility of being surrounded, remains. + + +MAPS + +We now possess complete detailed Ordnance maps of every country in +Europe, kept up to date by the latest alterations, whereas in the days +of Clausewitz maps were of the very roughest character, and quite +unreliable in comparison. + + +IMPROVED ARMS + +Smokeless powder, quick-firing and long-ranging artillery and rifles, +the infantry field of effective fire being ten times, the artillery +five times what it was in Clausewitz's time, have all to be borne in +mind when reading the tactical part of his writings. In consequence, +also, cover and the tactical use of ground are of far greater +importance now than then, etc., etc., etc. + + +AVIATION + +The recent wonderful developments in aviation will obviously almost +revolutionize "Information in War." To what extent, it is as yet +impossible to say. Each year will teach us more. + + +THE NATION-IN-ARMS + +The nation-in-arms as the common foundation of all armies (except our +own), brought up by railways, vastly increases the numbers in a modern +battle from what they were in Clausewitz's day. Compare Austerlitz, +Dresden, Leipzig and Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden. It should be +so with us also, for as General von der Goltz says in "The Conduct of +War": "The BEST military organization is that which renders available +ALL the intellectual and material resources of the country in event of +war. _A State is not justified in trying to defend itself with only a +portion of its strength, when the existence of the whole is at stake._" + +In Great Britain the difference which the introduction of this +nation-in-arms principle has made in our military strength compared +with that of our future opponents, a difference relatively FAR GREATER +AGAINST US than it was in Napoleon's and Clausewitz's day, is as yet +hardly realized by the people, or by our statesmen. People forget the +wastage of war, and the necessity for a constant flow of troops to +repair that wastage. As Von der Goltz puts it: "It is characteristic +of the strategical offensive that the foremost body of troops of +an army, the portion which fights the battles, amounts to only a +comparatively small fraction, frequently only _a quarter or even +one-eighth_, of the total fighting strength employed, whilst the fate +of the whole army throughout depends upon the success or failure of +this fraction. _Attacking armies melt away like snow in the spring._" +To condense his remarks: "In spite of the most admirable discipline, +the Prussian Guard Corps lost 5000 to 6000 men in the marches between +the attack on St. Privat and the battle of Sedan." "Napoleon crossed +the Niemen in 1812 with 442,000 men, but reached Moscow only three +months later with only 95,000." In the spring of 1810, the French +crossed the Pyrenees with 400,000 men, but still Marshal Massena in +the end only brought 45,000 men up to the lines of Torres Vedras, +near Lisbon, where the decision lay. Again, in 1829, the Russians +put 160,000 men in the field, but had barely 20,000 left when, at +Adrianople, a skilfully concluded peace saved them before their +weakness became apparent and a reaction set in. In 1878 the Russians +led 460,000 across the Danube, but they only brought 100,000 men--of +whom only 43,000 were effective, the rest being sick--to the gates of +Constantinople. In 1870 the Germans crossed the French frontier with +372,000 men, but after only a six weeks' campaign brought but 171,000 +men to Paris. And so on. The result of it all is simple--that a people +which is not based on the modern principle of the nation-in-arms cannot +for long rival or contend with one that is, for it can neither put +an equal (still less a superior) army into the field at the outset +(_vide_ Clausewitz's first principle), nor even maintain in the field +the _inferior_ army it does place there, because it cannot send the +ever-required fresh supplies of trained troops. Sooner or later this +must tell. Sooner or later a situation must arise in which the nation +based on the obsolete voluntary system _must_ go down before a nation +based on the nation-in-arms principle. Circumstances change with time, +and, as wise Lord Bacon said long ago, "He that will not adopt new +remedies must expect new evils." May we adopt the remedy before we +experience the evil! + + +THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL FORCES IN WAR + +But though these changed conditions must, of course, _modify_ +Clausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete +our circle and leave off where we started) I repeat that, as human +nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three +to one in war, Clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical +philosopher on the actual nature of war, as _the chief exponent of the +moral and spiritual forces in war_, will ever remain invaluable in the +study of war. + +Consider what unsurpassed opportunities he had for observing and +reflecting on the influence of enthusiasm and passion, of resolution +and boldness, of vacillation and weakness, of coolness and caution, of +endurance and hardship, of patriotism and freedom, of ambition and of +glory--on war, either by his own experience or by conversation with +other equally experienced soldiers, during that long period of almost +endless wars between 1793 and 1815. + +The fervour and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the Revolution, +which drove the French forward, smashing everything before them, at +the beginning; the ambition, military glory, plunder and greed, which +animated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion, +and stern endurance, which nerved the Russian hosts then as now; that +awful Moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and +sank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance and selfish +callousness were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the +spirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in Germany, +which gave to the Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same driving +force that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the French; +the passing, therefore, in 1813 of the moral superiority, the greater +driving force, from the French to the allies. Clausewitz saw all this; +he conversed intimately with such men as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, +who saw and guided it, too. All his friends had seen it also. No +wonder, then, that such an unexampled series of warlike phenomena +deeply impressed his reflective mind with the supreme importance of the +moral and spiritual factors in war. + +His opportunities for long-continued observation of warlike phenomena +were far greater than those of any writer since his day, and it is to +be hoped they will remain so. For we have no desire to see another +series of wars such as the Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that +there was then such a man as Clausewitz to sum up for us so simply and +so clearly the accumulated experiences of those long, long years of +carnage and devastation. + + +_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._ + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Book IV. Chap. 10. + +[2] Book IV. Chap. 3. + +[3] Book IV. Chap. 3. + +[4] Book I. Chap. 8. + +[5] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince. + +[6] Summary of Instruction, p. 120. + +[7] Book II. Chap. 6. + +[8] Book II. Chap. 2. + +[9] Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz. + +[10] Book II. Chap. 4. + +[11] Book II. Chap. 2. + +[12] Book II. Chap. 2. + +[13] Book II. Chap. 3. + +[14] Book I. Chap. 1. + +[15] By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force the enemy's +population into a state of mind favourable to submission. + +[16] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince. + +[17] Book I. Chap. 1. + +[18] Author's "Introduction." + +[19] Book I. Chap. 1. + +[20] Book VII. Chap. 5. + +[21] Book VII. Chap. 21. + +[22] Book VII. Chap. 21. + +[23] Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9. + +[24] Book I. Chap. 1. + +[25] Book VIII. Chap. 9. + +[26] Book I. Chap. 7. + +[27] Book I. Chap. 8. + +[28] Book I. Chap. 8. + +[29] Book IV. Chap. 1. + +[30] Book IV. Chap. 3. + +[31] Book I. Chap. 1. + +[32] Book IV. Chap. 3. + +[33] Book III. Chap. 15. + +[34] Book VII. Chap. 13. + +[35] Book I. Chap. 4. + +[36] Book I. Chap. 5. + +[37] Book I. Chap. 7. + +[38] Book III. Chap. 3. + +[39] Book III. Chaps. 16-18. + +[40] Book II. Chap. 1. + +[41] Book III. Chap. 11. + +[42] Book III. Chap. 8. + +[43] Book V. Chap. 3. + +[44] Book III. Chap. 8. + +[45] Book VIII. Chap. 4. + +[46] Book III. Chap. 12. + +[47] Book III. Chap. 13. + +[48] Book III. Chap. 12. + +[49] Book III. Chap. 13. + +[50] Book III. Chap. 8. + +[51] Book III. Chap. 11. + +[52] Book VI. Chap. 28. + +[53] Book V. Chap. 10. + +[54] Book I. Chap. 1. + +[55] Book III. Chap. 13. + +[56] Book I. Chap. 3. + +[57] Book VIII. Chap. 9. + +[58] Book VIII. Chap. 9. + +[59] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince. + +[60] Book I. Chap. 3. + +[61] This warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be +published freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five +years ago. In the present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and +its loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the enemy of +any helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been +learned.--Editor's Note. + +[62] Book IV. Chap. 4. + +[63] Book IV. Chap. 4. + +[64] "Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136-146. + +[65] Book IV. Chap. 4. + +[66] Book VI. Chap. 1. + +[67] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince. + +[68] Book VI. Chap. 5. + +[69] Book VIII. Chap. 9. + +[70] Book VII. Chap. 15. + +[71] Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500. + +[72] Book VI. Chap. 9. + +[73] Book VII. Chap. 9. + +[74] Book VII. Chap. 7. + +[75] Book VII. Chap. 7. + + + + +Transcriber's Notes: + + +Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant +preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed. + +Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced +quotation marks retained. + +Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. + +Page 133: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period. + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Reality of War, by Stewart L. Murray + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44200 *** |