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Murray + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Reality of War + A Companion to Clausewitz + +Author: Stewart L. Murray + +Editor: A. Hilliard Atteridge + +Release Date: November 17, 2013 [EBook #44200] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE REALITY OF WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Charlie Howard and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<div class="hidepub"> +<div class="figcenter" style="width: 264px;"> +<img src="images/coversmall.jpg" width="264" height="400" alt="cover" /> +</div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<h1>THE REALITY OF WAR</h1> + +<hr /> + +<p class="newpage p4 center vspace larger"> +<span class="small">THE</span><br /> +<span class="larger">REALITY OF WAR</span></p> + +<p class="p1 center">A COMPANION<br /> +TO CLAUSEWITZ</p> + +<p class="p2 center vspace"><span class="small">BY</span><br /> +<span class="large">MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY</span><br /> +<span class="small">LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS</span></p> + +<p class="p2 center vspace"><span class="smaller">POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY</span><br /> +<span class="larger">A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE</span></p> + +<p class="p4 center">LONDON<br /> +<span class="large">HODDER AND STOUGHTON</span><br /> +WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.</p> + +<p class="phalf center"><span class="larger">HUGH REES, LTD.</span><br /> +5 REGENT STREET, S.W.</p> + +<p class="p4 center smaller"><i>Reprinted in 1914</i></p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">v</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="EDITORS_PREFACE" id="EDITORS_PREFACE">EDITOR'S PREFACE</a></h2> + +<p>Great books, the masterpieces of the +special branch of knowledge with which +they deal, are often very big books; +and busy men, who have not unlimited +time for reading, find it helpful to have +some one who will give them a general +summary of a famous writer's teaching, +and point out the most important passages +in which the author himself embodies +the very essence of his argument.</p> + +<p>This is what Major Murray has done +for the most important work on war +that was ever written. He does not give +a mere dry summary of its contents. + +He sets forth, in language so plain that +even the civilian reader or the youngest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">vi</a></span> +soldier can read it with interest, the +essence of the teaching of Clausewitz, +and he embodies in his book the most +striking passages of the original work. +He adds to each section of his subject +some useful criticisms, and at the end of +the book he sums up the effect of recent +changes on the practice of war.</p> + +<p>The book is a popular manual of the +realities of war, which should be read not +only by soldiers, but by every one who +takes an intelligent interest in the great +events of our time.</p> + +<p>As to the practical value of the writings +of Clausewitz, it may be well to quote +here the words of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, +the Professor of Military History at +Oxford, from his introduction to the +original edition of Major Murray's +work:</p> + +<p>"Clausewitz was a Prussian officer +who first saw fighting as a boy in 1793,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">vii</a></span> +and whose experience of war lasted until +1815, when the great war ended. He +was then thirty-five and spent the next +fifteen years in trying to clear his mind +on the subject of war, which he did by +writing a number of military histories +and a systematic treatise 'On War.' +At the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts +into a parcel, hoping to work at them +again on the conclusion of the duties +for which he was ordered from home. A +little more than a year later he died at +Breslau of cholera, and the papers, to +which he had never put the finishing +touch, were afterwards published by his +widow.</p> + +<p>"Part of the value of his work is due +to the exceptional opportunities which he +enjoyed. When the war of 1806 began +he had long been the personal adjutant +of one of the Prussian princes, and an +intimate friend of Scharnhorst, who was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">viii</a></span> +probably the greatest of Napoleon's contemporaries. +In the period of reorganization +which followed the Peace of Tilsit he +made the acquaintance of Gneisenau, +and of almost all the officers who made +their mark in the subsequent wars of +liberation. During the years of preparation +he was Scharnhorst's assistant, first +in the Ministry of War and then on the +General Staff. During the campaign of +1812 he served with the Russian army +as a staff officer. Thus his experience +during the four years of the Wars of +Liberation was that of one who was continually +behind the scenes, always in +touch with the Governments and Generals, +and therefore better able than any one +not so favourably placed to see everything +in its proper perspective, and to follow +and appreciate the considerations which +directed the decisions both of statesmen +and of the commanders of armies. His<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">ix</a></span> +personal character was of the finest +mould, and his writings have the sincerity, +the absence of which makes it so +difficult to rely upon those of Napoleon.</p> + +<p>"The ultimate test of the value of books +is time. When Clausewitz died, the two +books on war which were thought the +best were those of the Archduke Charles +of Austria and General Jomini. To-day +the book of Clausewitz, 'On War,' easily +holds the first place. It is the least +technical of all the great books on war; +from beginning to end it is nothing but +common sense applied to the subject, +but for that reason it is the hardest to +digest, because common sense or a man's +natural instinctive judgment on any subject +is exceedingly hard to analyse and +put into words. An exceptionally gifted +man can go through this process, but +few can follow it for any length of time +without a distinct effort.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">x</a></span> +"Almost every good institution has +arisen out of the effort to provide a remedy +for some evil, but in the imperfection of +human nature nearly every institution +brings with it fresh evils, which in their +turn have to be counteracted. The +modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism +and its belief in knowledge, has grafted +the examination system upon every form +of education from the lowest to the +highest. The British army shares in the +benefits and in the disadvantages of the +system, of which, in the case of an +officer, the danger to be guarded against +is that it tends to accustom a man to +rely rather on his memory than his +intelligence, and to lean more on other +people's thinking than on his own. Clausewitz +aimed at producing the very opposite +result. He does not offer specific solutions +of the various problems of war lest +officers, in moments when their business<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">xi</a></span> +is to decide and to act, should be trying +to recall his precepts instead of using +their eyes and their wits. His purpose +rather is to enable them to understand +what war is. He believed that if a man +had accustomed himself to think of war +as it really is, had got to know the +different elements which go to make it +up, and to distinguish those that are +important from those that are comparative +trifles, he would be more likely to +know of himself what to do in a given +situation, and would be much less likely +to confuse himself by trying to remember +what some general, long since +dead, did on some occasion in which +after all the position was by no means +the same as that in which he finds +himself."</p> + +<p>What is said here of the soldier actually +engaged in war, is true also even of the +onlooker who takes a patriotic interest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">xii</a></span> +in the progress of a war in which his +country is involved. Unless he has a +clear idea of the real character of modern +war, and the principles on which success +or failure depend, he will be utterly +unable to grasp the significance of the +events of which he reads each day. +And it is of real importance that in time +of war every citizen should judge soundly +the course of events, for opinion influences +action, and public opinion is +made up of the ideas of the units who +compose the public. In this connection +it is well to bear in mind a point that +is often overlooked, a point on which +Clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing +passage​—​namely, the fact that +one of the main objects of a nation +waging war is to force the enemy's +population into a state of mind favourable +to submission. This fact is sufficient +proof of the importance of public opinion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">xiii</a></span> +being well informed not only as to the +course of events, but also as to the +principles that give to these events their +real significance.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">xv</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></h2> + +<table summary="Contents"> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a></td></tr> + <tr class="smaller"> + <td> </td> + <td class="tdr">PAGE</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ</td> + <td class="tdr">3</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN POLICY AND WAR</td> + <td class="tdr">11</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ</td> + <td class="tdr">23</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR</td> + <td class="tdr">33</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR</td> + <td class="tdr">47</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">xvi</a></span></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR</td> + <td class="tdr">65</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">THE NATURE OF WAR</td> + <td class="tdr">79</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">WAR AS POLICY</td> + <td class="tdr">119</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">STRATEGY</td> + <td class="tdr">137</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY</td> + <td class="tdr">161</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">TACTICS</td> + <td class="tdr">177</td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc chap" colspan="2"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a></td></tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ</td> + <td class="tdr">213</td></tr> +</table> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ</span></h2> + +<p>In an endeavour, such as the present, to +interest the British public in even the +greatest military writer, the first necessity +is to show that he was not a mere theorist +or bookworm. The wide and varied +experience which the British officer gradually +gains in so many different parts +of the world shows up the weak points +of most theories, and produces a certain +distrust of them. Also a distrust of +theory is undoubtedly one of our national +characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal +to the British officer or civilian, a writer +must be a practical soldier.</p> + +<p>Such was General Clausewitz: a practical +soldier of very great experience in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span> +the long series of wars 1793 to 1815, +and one present throughout that most +awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian +campaign in 1812.</p> + +<p>"General Karl von Clausewitz was +born near Magdeburg in 1780, and entered +the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in +1792. He served in the campaigns of +1793–1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he +entered the military school at Berlin as +an officer, and remained there till 1803. +He here attracted the notice of Scharnhorst. +In the campaign of 1806 he +served as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus +of Prussia, was present at the battle of +Jena, and saw that awful retreat which +ended a fortnight later in the surrender +at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured, +he was sent into France as a +prisoner till the end of the war." "On +his return (in November, 1807) he was +placed on General Scharnhorst's staff,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span> +and employed on the work then going +on for the reorganization of the Prussian +army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the +Russian service, was employed on the +general staff, and was thus able to gain +much experience in the most gigantic of +all the struggles of his time." "In the +spring campaign of 1813 (battles of +Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as a Russian +officer, was attached to Blucher's staff; +during the winter campaign he found +employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count +Walmoden, who fought against Davoust +on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid +action of the Goerde was entirely the +result of his able dispositions. In 1815 +he again entered the Prussian service, +and was chief-of-the-staff to the III. +Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny +formed the left of the line of battle, and +at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's +army." "In addition to this, we may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span> +say, considerable practical training (note, +enormous and varied indeed compared +to any obtainable in the present day), +he also possessed a comprehensive and +thorough knowledge of military history, +and also an uncommonly clear perception +of general history" (Von Caemmerer). +After the Peace he was employed in a +command on the Rhine. In 1818 he +became major-general, and was made +Director of the Military School at Berlin. +Here he remained for some years. This +was the chief period of his writings. As +General von Caemmerer, in his "Development +of Strategical Science," puts it: +"This practical and experienced, and at +the same time highly cultured soldier, +feels now, in peaceful repose, as he himself +confesses, the urgent need to develop +and systematize the whole world of +thought which occupies him, yet also +resolves to keep secret till his death the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span> +fruit of his researches, in order that his +soul, which is thirsting for <em>Truth</em>, may +be safely and finally spared all temptations +from subordinate considerations."</p> + +<p>In 1830 he was appointed Director of +Artillery at Breslau, and, having no more +time for writing, sealed up and put away +his papers, unfinished as they were. In +the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff +to Field-Marshal Gneisenau's +army. In the winter of that year war +with France was considered imminent, +and Clausewitz had prospects of acting +as chief of the general staff of the Commander-in-Chief +Gneisenau. He then +drew up two plans for war with France, +which bear the stamp of that practical +knowledge of war and adaptation of +means to ends which distinguish his +writings.</p> + +<p>In the same year the war scare passed +away, the army of Gneisenau was disbanded,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span> +and Clausewitz returned to Breslau, +where after a few days he was seized +with cholera, and died in November, 1831, +aged only 51.</p> + +<p>His works were published after his +death by his widow.</p> +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN +POLICY AND WAR</span></h2> + +<p>From the day of their publication until +now the influence of the writings of +Clausewitz has been steadily growing, +till to-day it is impossible to over-estimate +the extent of that influence upon modern +military and political thought, especially +in Germany. As General von Caemmerer, +in his "Development of Strategical +Science," says: "Karl von Clausewitz, +the pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and +the confidant of Gneisenau, is in Germany +generally recognized as the most prominent +theorist on war, as the real +philosopher on war, to whom our famous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span> +victors on the more modern battlefields +owe their spiritual training."</p> + +<p>Field-Marshal Moltke was "his most +distinguished pupil," and adapted the +teaching of Clausewitz to the conditions +of to-day.</p> + +<p>General von der Goltz, in the introduction +to his great work, "The Nation +in Arms," thus describes the veneration +which he inspires: "A military writer +who, after Clausewitz, writes upon the +subject of war, runs the risk of being +likened to a poet who, after Goethe, +attempts a <em>Faust</em>, or, after Shakespeare, +a <em>Hamlet</em>. Everything important that +can be told about the nature of war can +be found stereotyped in the works which +that great military genius has left behind +him. Although Clausewitz has himself +described his book as being something as +yet incomplete, this remark of his must +be taken to mean that he, too, was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span> +subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits, +and was forced to feel that all he attained +lay far beneath his ideal. For us, who +knew not what that ideal was, his labours +are a complete work. I have, accordingly, +not attempted to write anything new, or +of universal applicability about the science +of warfare, but have limited myself to +turning my attention to the military operations +of our own day." One can hardly +imagine a stronger tribute of admiration.</p> + +<p>And, as Moltke was Clausewitz's most +distinguished pupil, so also are all those +trained in the school of Moltke pupils of +Clausewitz, including the most eminent +of modern German military writers, such +as General von Blume, in his "Strategy"; +Von der Goltz, in his "Nation in Arms" +and "The Conduct of War," who trained +the Turkish General Staff for the campaign +of 1897 against Greece and the +battle of Pharsalia, etc.; General von<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span> +Boguslawski; General von Verdy du +Vernois, the father of the study of +Applied Tactics; General von Schlichting, +in his "Tactical and Strategical Principles +of the Present"; General Meckel, who +trained the Japanese Staff, etc., etc.</p> + +<p>We all remember the telegram sent to +General Meckel by Marshal Oyama after +the battle of Liao-yang: "We hope you +are proud of your pupils."</p> + +<p>Some time ago, when asked to give a +lecture at Aldershot to the officers of the +2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me +that it would be very interesting, anxious +as we all were then to know the causes +of the wonderful Japanese efficiency and +success, if I could obtain a pronouncement +from General Meckel how far he had +been influenced in his teaching by Clausewitz. +My friend Herr von Donat did me +the favour to write to General von Caemmerer +and ask him if he could procure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span> +me such a pronouncement which I might +publish. General Meckel, whose death +both Japan and Germany have since had +to mourn, most kindly consented, and I +esteem it a great honour to be allowed to +quote part of his letter. He said: "I, +like every other German officer, have, +consciously or unconsciously, instructed +in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz +is the <em>founder</em> of that theory of war which +resulted from the Napoleonic. I maintain +that <em>every one</em> who nowadays either +makes or teaches war in a modern sense, +bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if +he is not conscious of it." This opinion +of General Meckel, to whose training of +the Japanese General Staff the success of +the Japanese armies must be largely +attributed, is most interesting. It is not +possible to give a stronger or more up-to-date +example of the magnitude of the +influence of Clausewitz.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span> +In this connection I should like to +make a short quotation from "The War +in the Far East," by the <i>Times</i> military +correspondent. In his short but suggestive +chapter on "Clausewitz in Manchuria" +he says: "But as all save +one of the great battles in Manchuria +have been waged by the Japanese in +close accordance with the spirit and +almost the letter of Clausewitz's doctrine, +and as the same battles have been fought +by the Russians in absolute disregard of +them (though his works had been translated +into Russian by General Dragomiroff +long before the war), it is certainly worth +showing how reading and reflection may +profit one army, and how the neglect of +this respectable practice may ruin another." +"Clausewitz in Manchuria"! +That brings us up to date. It is a far cry +for his influence to have reached, and +triumphed.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span></p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3> + +<p>Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for +statesmen as well as soldiers. We may +be sure, therefore, that the influence of +Clausewitz on the Continent has penetrated +the realm of policy little less widely than +the realm of war. From this thought +arise many reflections. It will be sufficient +here to suggest one. I would +suggest that we should regard every +foreign statesman, especially in Germany, +as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple +of Clausewitz. That is to say, we +should regard him as a man who, underneath +everything else, underneath the +most pacific assurances for the present, +considers war an unalterable part of +policy. He will regard war as part of +the ordinary intercourse of nations, and +occasional warlike struggles as inevitable +as commercial struggles. He will consider<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span> +war also as an instrument of policy, +which he himself may have to use, and +to be studied accordingly. He will consider +it not as a thing merely for speeches, +but for practical use in furthering or +defending the interests of his State. He +will regard war as the means by which +some day his nation shall impose its will +upon another nation. He will be prepared +to wait and wait, to make "every +imaginable preparation," and finally to +let loose war in its most absolute and +ruthless character, war carried out with +the utmost means, the utmost energy, +and the utmost effort of a whole nation-in-arms, +determined to achieve its political +object and compel submission to +its will by force.</p> + +<p>To talk to such a man of "the evils of +war," or of "the burden of armaments"; +or to propose to him "disarmament" or +"reduction of armed forces," and so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</a></span> +forth can only appear to him as the +result of "imperfect knowledge." He +will not say so, but he will think so, and +act accordingly. To the partially instructed +opponent of such a man one can +only say, "Let him that thinketh he +standeth take heed lest he fall."</p> +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ</span></h2> + +<p>The writings of Clausewitz are contained +in nine volumes, published after his +death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly +on his three volumes "On War," which +have been translated by Colonel J. J. +Graham (the last edition edited by Colonel +F. N. Maude, and published by Messrs. +Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls +them "a collection of materials," "a +mass of conceptions not brought into +form," and states that he intended to +revise, and throw the whole into more +complete shape.</p> + +<p>We must lament that he did not live +to complete his revision. But, on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span> +other hand, it is perhaps possible that +this unfinished state is really an advantage, +for it leaves us free to apply his great +maxims and principles and mode of +thought to the ever-varying conditions +of the present and future, unhampered +by too complete a crystallization of his +ideas written before more modern conditions +of railways, telegraphs, and rapid +long-ranging arms of precision, etc., +arose. It is perhaps this unfinished state +which renders Clausewitz so essentially +in touch with, and a part of, the onward +movement and evolution of military +thought. For his great aim was "the +truth, the whole truth, and nothing but +the truth," without preconception or +favour, as far as he could go​—​essentially +"a realist" of war​—​and what better aim +can we set before ourselves?</p> + +<p>As Sir Arthur Helps has so well put it +in his "Friends in Council," every man<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span> +needs a sort of central stem for his +reading and culture. I wish here to say +why I think that Clausewitz is admirably +adapted to form such a main stem in +the military culture of British officers.</p> + +<p>In the first place there is a lofty sort +of tone about his writings which one +gradually realizes as one reads them, and +which I will not attempt to describe +further than by saying that they stamp +themselves as the writings of a gentleman +of fine character.</p> + +<p>In the second place it is a book which +"any fellow" can read, for there is +nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse +or mathematical or formal, no formulæ +or lines and angles and technical terms, +such as in other writers, Jomini, Hamley, +etc. Clausewitz is free from all such +pedantries, which for my part, and I +dare say for the part of many others, +often "put one off" a book, and made<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span> +one instinctively feel that there was +something wrong, something unpractical +about it, which rendered it hardly worth +the sacrifice of time involved in its study. +There is in Clausewitz nothing of that +kind at all. All those lines and angles +and formulæ he dismisses in a few pages +as of little practical importance.</p> + +<p>In the third place Clausewitz only +goes in for experience and the practical +facts of war. As he somewhat poetically +puts it, "The flowers of Speculation +require to be cut down low near the +ground of Experience, their proper soil."<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> +He is the great apostle of human nature +and character as being everything in +war. "All war supposes human weakness, +and against that it is <span class="locked">directed."<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a></span> +I believe that the British officer will find +himself in sympathy with the great +thinker on war, who asserts that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span> "<em>Of +all military virtues Energy in the conduct +of Operations has always conduced most +to glory and success of arms</em>."<a name="FNanchor_3" id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> + +<p>In the fourth place, to the practical +mind will appeal his denunciation of all +elaborate plans, because <em>Time</em> is required +for all elaborate combinations, and Time +is just the one thing that an active +enemy will not give us,​—​and his consequent +deduction that all plans must be +of the simplest possible form. His famous +sentence, "<em>In war all things are simple, +but the simple are difficult</em>,"<a name="FNanchor_4" id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> gives the +key to his writings, for to <em>overcome +those simple yet great difficulties he regards +as the art of war</em>, which can only be +done by the military virtues of perseverance, +energy, and boldness.</p> + +<p>In the fifth place he does not want +men to be bookworms, for he says:</p> + +<p>"<i>Theory is nothing but rational reflection</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span> +<i>upon all the situations in which we can +be placed in war</i>."<a name="FNanchor_5" id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> And we can all +reflect, without reading too many books. +Also he says: "Much reading of history +is not required for the above object. +The knowledge of a few separate battles, +<em>in their details</em>, is more useful than a +general knowledge of several campaigns. +On this account it is more useful to read +detailed narratives and journals than +regular works of <span class="locked">history."<a name="FNanchor_6" id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a></span> He wants +history in detail, not a general smattering +and a loose application thereof, which +fault he strongly denounces. And he +expressly states that the history of the +very latest war is the most useful. All +of which is very practical, and in accord +with what we feel to be true.</p> + +<p>As he pictures war, "<i>the struggle +between the spiritual and moral forces</i> on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span> +<em>both</em> sides is the centre of <span class="locked">all,"<a name="FNanchor_7" id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a></span> and to +this aspect of the subject he gives much +more attention than Jomini and most of +Jomini's disciples. He has freed us once +for all from all formalism. The formation +of character, careful, practical, detailed +study, and thorough preparation in peace, +the simplest plans carried out with the +utmost perseverance, resolution, energy, +and boldness in war​—​these are the +practical fruits of his teaching.</p> + +<p>Therefore, I say again, that I do not +think that the British officer could possibly +find a more interesting or a better +guide for the main stem of his reading +than Clausewitz, nor any one that will +appeal to his practical instincts of what +is <em>True</em> half so well. I do not believe +that he could possibly do better than +with Clausewitz as main stem, and a +detailed study of the latest campaigns<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span> +and modern technicalities as the up-to-date +addition required to transform knowledge +into action. I trust that every +reader of Clausewitz will agree with me +in this.</p> +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR</span></h2> + +<p>"Moltke, the most gifted pupil of Clausewitz," +"Moltke, who knew Clausewitz's +book well, and often liked to describe +him as the theoretical instructor." As +Chaucer would say, "What needeth +wordes more?"</p> + +<p>Clausewitz has treated practically every +chief branch of strategy and tactics +(except, of course, the present-day developments +of railways, telegraphs, quick-firing +guns, smokeless powder, universal +service armies, etc.). The whole of his +bulky work "On War" is full of interesting +and sometimes eloquent and almost +poetical passages, of concentrated, pregnant, +and far-reaching thoughts on every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span> +subject. Through all these it is, of +course, impossible to follow him in any +introduction. One can really do no more +than urge all to read Clausewitz for +themselves, to go to the fountain-head, +to the master-work itself. In the short +space to which I have restricted myself, +I propose, therefore, to concentrate on +a few of his leading ideas, reluctantly +leaving out many others which are really +almost just as good.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Theory and Practice</span></h3> + +<p>One of the things for which we are +most deeply indebted to Clausewitz is +that he has shown us clearly the proper +place of theory in relation to practice. +"It should educate the mind of the +future leader in war, or, rather, guide +him in his <em>self-instruction</em>, but <em>not</em> accompany +him on to the battlefield; just as +a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span> +opening mind of a youth without therefore +keeping him in leading-strings all +his <span class="locked">life."<a name="FNanchor_8" id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a></span> Again, "In real action most +men are guided by the tact of judgment, +which hits the object more or less accurately, +according as they possess more +or less genius. This is the way in which +all great generals have acted, and therein +partly lay their greatness and their genius, +in that they always hit upon what was +right by this tact. Thus also it will +always be in <em>action</em>, and so far this tact +is amply sufficient. But when it is a +question not of acting one's self, but of +convincing others <em>in consultation</em>, then +all depends upon clear conceptions and +demonstrations and the inherent relations; +and so little progress has been +made in this respect that most deliberations +are merely a contention of words, +resting on no firm basis, and ending<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span> +either in every one retaining his own +opinion, or in a compromise from mutual +considerations of respect, a middle course +really without any value. Clear ideas +on these matters are not, therefore, +wholly <span class="locked">useless."<a name="FNanchor_9" id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></span></p> + +<p>How true this is any one will admit +who reflects for a moment upon the great +diversity of opinions on almost every +subject held in our army, just because +of this want of a central theory common +to all. In the domain of tactics it is +evident that this holds good even as in +strategy, for a common central theory +of war will produce a more or less common +way of looking at things, from which +results more or less common action +towards the attainment of the common +object.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span></p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Rejection of Set and Geometrical Theories</span></h3> + +<p>"It should educate the mind of the +future leader in war" is what Clausewitz +demands from a useful theory; but he +most expressly and unreservedly rejects +every attempt at a method "by which +definite plans for wars or campaigns are +to be given out all ready made as if from +a <span class="locked">machine."<a name="FNanchor_10" id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a></span> He mocks at Bülow's +including at first in the one term "base" +all sorts of things, like the supply of +the army, its reinforcements and equipments, +the security of its communications +with the home country, and lastly the +security of its line of retreat, and then +fixing the extent of the base, and finally +fixing an angle for the extent of that +base: "And all this was done merely +to obtain a pure geometrical result utterly +useless" (Von Caemmerer).</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span> +For the same reason Jomini's principle +of the Inner Line does not satisfy him, +owing to its mere geometrical nature, +although he right willingly acknowledges +"that it rests on a sound foundation, +on the truth that the combat is the only +effectual means in war" (Von Caemmerer). +All such attempts at theory +seem to him therefore perfectly useless, +"because they strive to work with fixed +quantities, while in war everything is +<em>uncertain</em>, and all considerations must +reckon with all kinds of variable quantities; +because they only consider <em>material</em> +objects, while every action in war is +saturated with <em>moral</em> forces and effects; +lastly, because they deal only with the +action of <em>one</em> party, while war is a constant +reciprocal effect of <em>both</em> parties" (Von +Caemmerer).</p> + +<p>"Pity the warrior," says Clausewitz, +"who is contented to crawl about in this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span> +beggardom of rules." "Pity the theory +which sets itself in opposition to the +<span class="locked">mind"<a name="FNanchor_11" id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a></span> (note, the moral forces).</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">A Theory to be Practically Useful</span></h3> + +<p>Clausewitz insists that a useful theory +cannot be more than a thorough knowledge +of military history and "reflection +upon all the situations in which we can +be placed in war." "What genius does +must be just the best of all rules, and +theory cannot do better than to show +just how and why it is so." "It is an +analytical investigation of the subject +which leads to exact knowledge: and if +brought to bear on the results of experience, +which in our case would be +military history, to a <em>thorough</em> familiarity +with it. If theory investigates the subjects +which constitute war; if it separates<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span> +more distinctly that which at first sight +seems amalgamated; if it explains fully +the properties of the means; if it shows +their probable effects; if it makes evident +the nature of objects; <em>if it brings +to bear all over the field of war the light +of essentially critical investigation</em>,​—​then +it has fulfilled the chief duties of its +province. It becomes then a guide to +him who wishes to make himself acquainted +with war from books; it lights +up the whole road for him, facilitates +his progress, educates his judgment, and +shields him from <span class="locked">error."<a name="FNanchor_12" id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a></span></p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Knowledge must be Thorough</span></h3> + +<p>This Clausewitz considers most important. +He says that "Knowledge of the +conduct of war ... <em>must pass completely +into the mind</em>, and almost cease to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span> +something objective." For in war "The +moral reaction, the ever-changing form +of things makes it necessary for the chief +actor to carry <em>in himself</em> the whole +mental apparatus of his knowledge, in +order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat +he may be capable of giving the +requisite decision <em>from himself</em>. Knowledge +must, by this complete assimilation +with his own mind and life, be converted +into real power."</p> + +<div class="tb">*<span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span></div> + +<p>So much for Clausewitz, therefore, as +the greatest yet the simplest and least +theoretical of theorists on war. Mark +well his comforting dictum that "Theory +is nothing but rational reflection upon +all the situations in which we can be +placed in war." That is a task which we +have all more or less attempted. Therefore +we are all more or less theorists. +The only question is that of comparative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span> +"thoroughness" in our reflections. And +it is essentially this "thoroughness" in +investigation and reflection towards which +Clausewitz helps us. Like every other +habit, the <em>habit</em> of military reflection +gradually grows with use; till, fortified +and strengthened by detailed knowledge, +it gradually becomes Power.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3> + +<p>The theory of war is simple, and there +is no reason why any man who chooses +to take the trouble to read and reflect +carefully on one or two of the acknowledged +best books thereon, should not +attain to a fair knowledge thereof. He +may with reasonable trouble attain to +such knowledge of the theory of war as +will enable him to follow with intelligent +appreciation the discussions of experienced +soldier or soldiers. Such knowledge as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span> +will prevent his misunderstanding the +experienced soldier's argument from pure +ignorance, and such knowledge as will +enable him to understand the military +reasons put forward and the military +object proposed. To the opinion of such +a man all respect will be due. Thus, and +thus only.</p> + +<p>It is indeed the plain duty of all who +aspire to rule either thus to qualify themselves +to understand, or else to abstain +from interference with, the military interests +of the State.</p> +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A +MODERN NATIONAL WAR</span></h2> + +<p>This point is here illustrated with more +detail from Clausewitz than may seem +necessary to some, because it is precisely +the point regarding modern war which is +least understood in this country.</p> + +<p>"The complete overthrow of the enemy +is the natural end of the art of war." +"As this idea must apply to both the +belligerent parties, it must follow, that +there can be no suspension in the military +act, and peace cannot take place until +one or other of the parties concerned is +completely overthrown." This is what +Clausewitz means by Absolute War, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</a></span> +is war carried to its absolute and logical +conclusion with the utmost force, the +utmost effort and the utmost energy. +He then proceeds to show that war, +owing "to all the natural inertia and +friction of its parts, the whole of the +inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation +(or timidity) of the human mind," +usually takes a weaker or less absolute +form according to circumstances. "All +this, theory must admit, but it is its duty +to give the foremost place to the absolute +form of war, and to use that form as a +general point of direction." He then +proceeds to show that war finally took +its absolute form under Napoleon. To-day +we may say that war takes its absolute +form in the modern great national war, +which is waged by each belligerent with +the whole concentrated physical and +mental power of the nation-in-arms.</p> + +<p>This requires to be gone into a little<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span> +more in detail, for it is a most important +point.</p> + +<p>Clausewitz in Book VIII. approaches +this part of his subject by an historical +survey of war from the time of the +Roman Empire to that of Napoleon. He +shows how as the feudal system gradually +merged into the later monarchical States +of Europe, armies gradually became less +and less national, more and more mercenary. +Omitting this, we arrive at the +seventeenth century. He says: "The +end of the seventeenth century, the time +of Louis XIV., is to be regarded as the +point in history at which the standing +military power, such as it existed in the +eighteenth century, reached its zenith. +That military force was based on enlistment +and money. States had organized +themselves into complete unities; and +the governments, by commuting the personal +services of their subjects into money<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span> +payments, had concentrated their whole +power in their treasuries. Through the +rapid strides in social improvements, and a +more enlightened system of government, +this power had become very great in +comparison with what it had been. France +appeared in the field with a standing army +of a couple of hundred thousand men, +and the other Powers in proportion."</p> + +<p>Armies were supported out of the +Treasury, which the sovereign regarded +partly as his privy purse, at least as a +resource belonging to the Government, +and not to the people. Relations with +other States, except with respect to a few +commercial subjects, mostly concerned +only the interests of the Treasury or of +the Government, not those of the people; +at least ideas tended everywhere in that +way. The Cabinets therefore looked upon +themselves as the owners and administrators +of large estates, which they were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span> +continually seeking to increase, without +the tenants on those estates being particularly +interested in this improvement.</p> + +<p>The people, therefore, who in the +Tartar invasions were everything in war, +who in the old republics and in the +Middle Ages were of great consequence, +were in the eighteenth century absolutely +nothing directly.</p> + +<p>In this manner, in proportion as the +Government separated itself more from +the people, and regarded itself as the +State, war became more and more exclusively +a business of the Government, +which it carried on by means of the +money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds +it could pick up in its own and +neighbouring countries. The army was +a State property, very expensive, and not +to be lightly risked in battle. "In its +signification war was only diplomacy +somewhat intensified, a more vigorous<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span> +way of negotiating, in which battles and +sieges were substituted for diplomatic +notes."</p> + +<p>"Plundering and devastating the +enemy's country were no longer in accordance +with the spirit of the age." +"They were justly looked upon as unnecessary +barbarity." "War, therefore, +confined itself more and more, both as +regards means and ends, to the army +itself. The army, with its fortresses and +some prepared positions, constituted a +State in a State, within which the element +of war slowly consumed itself. All Europe +rejoiced at its taking this direction, and +held it to be the necessary consequence of +the spirit of progress."</p> + +<p>So think many in this country to-day. +They are only a hundred years behind +the times.</p> + +<p>"The plan of a war on the part of the +State assuming the offensive in those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">53</a></span> +times consisted generally in the conquest +of one or other of the enemy's provinces; +the plan of the defender was to prevent +this. The plan of campaign was to take +one or other of the enemy's fortresses, +or to prevent one of our own being taken; +it was only when a battle became unavoidable +for this purpose that it was sought +for and fought. Whoever fought a battle +without this unavoidable necessity, from +mere innate desire of gaining a victory, +was reckoned a general with too much +daring." For armies were too precious +to be lightly risked. "Winter quarters, +in which the mutual relations of the two +parties almost entirely ceased, formed a +distinct limit to the activity which was +considered to belong to one campaign." +"As long as war was universally conducted +in this manner, all was considered +to be in the most regular order." "Thus +there was eminence and perfection of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">54</a></span> +every kind, and even Field-Marshal Daun, +to whom it was chiefly owing that +Frederick the Great completely attained +his object, and Maria Theresa completely +failed in hers, notwithstanding that could +still pass for a great general."</p> + +<p>Beyond this stage of military thought, +many in this country have not yet +advanced.</p> + +<div class="tb">*<span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span></div> + +<p>"Thus matters stood when the French +Revolution broke out; Austria and +Prussia tried their diplomatic art of war; +this very soon proved insufficient. Whilst, +according to the usual way of seeing +things, all hopes were placed on a very +limited military force in 1793, such a +force as no one had any conception of +made its appearance. War had suddenly +become again an affair of the people, +and that of a people numbering thirty +millions, every one of whom regarded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">55</a></span> +himself as a citizen of the State." "<em>By +this participation of the people in the +war</em>, instead of a cabinet and an army, +a whole nation with its natural weight +came into the scale. Henceforth the +means available​—​the efforts which might +be called forth​—​had no longer any +definite limits; the energy with which +the war itself might be conducted had +no longer any counterpoise, and consequently +the danger to the adversary had +risen to the extreme."</p> + +<p>If only our politicians could learn this +old lesson of the French Revolution! +For many, too many, of them appear +to derive their ideas of war to-day from +some dim reminiscent recollections of +school histories of the wars in the seventeenth +and eighteenth centuries.</p> + +<p>To continue: "After all this was +perfected by the hand of Bonaparte, this +military power based on the strength of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">56</a></span> +the whole nation, marched over Europe, +smashing everything in pieces so surely +and certainly, that where it only encountered +the old-fashioned armies the +result was not doubtful for a moment.</p> + +<p>"A reaction, however, awoke in due +time. In Spain the war became of itself +an affair of the people." In Austria. +In Russia. "In Germany Prussia rose +up the first, made the war a national +cause, and without either money or +credit, and with a population reduced +one-half, took the field with an army +twice as strong as in 1806. The rest of +Germany followed the example of Prussia +sooner or later." "Thus it was that +Germany and Russia, in the years 1813 +and 1814, appeared against France with +about a million of men."</p> + +<p>"Under these circumstances the energy +thrown into the conduct of war was +quite different." "In eight months the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">57</a></span> +theatre of war was removed from the +Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had to +bow its head for the first time; and the +redoubtable Bonaparte lay fettered on +the ground."</p> + +<p>"Therefore, since the time of Bonaparte, +war, through being, first on one +side, then again on the other, an affair +of the whole nation, has assumed quite +a new nature, or rather it has approached +much nearer to its real nature, to its +absolute perfection. The means then +called forth had no visible limit, the limit +losing itself in the energy and enthusiasm +of the Government and its subjects. By +the extent of the means, and the wide +field of possible results, as well as by the +powerful excitement of feeling which +prevailed, energy in the conduct of war +was immensely increased; the object +of its action was the downfall of the foe; +and not until the enemy lay powerless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">58</a></span> +on the ground was it supposed to be +possible to stop, or to come to any understanding +with regard to the mutual +objects of the contest.</p> + +<p>"Thus, therefore the element of war, +freed from all conventional restrictions, +broke loose with all its natural force. +The cause was the participation of the +people in this great affair of State, and +this participation arose partly from the +effects of the French Revolution on the +internal affairs of other countries, partly +from the threatening attitude of the +French towards all nations.</p> + +<p>"Now, whether this will be the case +always in future, whether all wars hereafter +in Europe will be carried on with +the whole power of the States, and, +consequently, <em>will only take place on +account of great interests closely affecting +the people</em>, would be a difficult point to +settle. But every one will agree with us<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">59</a></span> +that, at least, <em>Whenever great interests +are in dispute</em>, mutual hostility will discharge +itself in the same manner as it +has done in our times."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3> + +<p>This is so true, that every war since +the days of Clausewitz has made its +truth more apparent. Since he wrote, +the participation of the people in war +has become, not a revolutionary fact, +but an organized fact, an ordinary fact +in the everyday life of nations. To-day +every State except Great Britain, securely +based on the system of the universal +training of its sons to arms, stands ready +to defend its interests with the whole +concentrated power, physical, intellectual, +and material, of its whole manhood. +Consequently, European war, as Clausewitz +foresaw, "will only take place on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">60</a></span> +account of great interests closely affecting +the people." The character of such war +will be absolute, the object of its action +will be the downfall of the foe, and not +till the foe (be it Great Britain or not) +lies powerless on the ground will it be +supposed possible to stop. In the prosecution +of such a national war the means +available, the energy and the effort +called forth, will be without limits. Such +must be the conflicts of nations-in-arms.</p> + +<p>Yet, even now, so many years after +Clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he +himself stated, "to iron out many creases +in the heads of strategists and statesmen," +the great transformation in the character +of modern war, due to the participation of +the people therein, has not yet been +adequately realized by many men in this +country <em>who ought to know</em>. It is earnestly +to be hoped that they will endeavour to +adjust their minds, as regards war, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">61</a></span> +the fact that we are living, not in the +eighteenth century, but in the twentieth, +and that they will consider that war +has once for all become an affair of the +people, that our opponents will be a +people-in-arms, using the uttermost means +of their whole manhood to crush us, and +that disaster can only be prevented by a +like utmost effort on our part, by an +effort regardless of everything except +self-preservation.</p> +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">65</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR</span></h2> + +<p>"War belongs, not to the province of +arts and sciences, but to the province +of social life. It is a conflict of great +interests which is settled by bloodshed, +and only in that respect is it different +from others. It would be better, instead +of comparing it with any art, to liken +it to trade, which is also a conflict of +human interests and activities; and it is +still more like state policy, which again, +on its part, may be looked upon as a +kind of trade on a great scale. Besides, +state policy is the womb in which war is +developed, in which its outlines lie hidden<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">66</a></span> +in a rudimentary state, like the qualities +of living creatures in their <span class="locked">germs."<a name="FNanchor_13" id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a></span></p> + +<p>These conflicts of interest can bring +about gradually such a state of feeling +that "even the most civilized nations +may burn with passionate hatred of each +other." It is an unpleasant fact for +the philosopher, for the social reformer, +to contemplate, but history repeats and +repeats the lesson. Still more, "It is +quite possible for such a state of feeling +to exist between two States that a very +trifling political motive for war may +produce an effect quite disproportionate​—​in +fact, a perfect explosion."</p> + +<p>"War is a wonderful trinity, composed +of the original violence of its elements​—​hatred +and animosity​—​which may be +looked upon as blind instinct; of the +play of probabilities and chance, which +make it a free activity of the soul; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">67</a></span> +of the subordinate nature of a political +instrument, by which it belongs purely +to the reason.</p> + +<p>"The first of these three phases concerns +more the people; the second, more +the general and his army; the third +more the Government. <em>The passions +which break forth in war must already +have a latent existence in the peoples.</em></p> + +<p>"These three tendencies are deeply +rooted in the nature of the subject. A +theory which would leave any one of +them out of account would immediately +become involved in such a contradiction +with the reality, that it might be regarded +as destroyed at once by that <span class="locked">alone."<a name="FNanchor_14" id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a></span></p> + +<p>Clausewitz is the great thinker, the +great realist, the great philosopher of +war. His aim was, free from all bias, +to get at <em>the truth of things</em>. His view +of war as a social act, as part of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">68</a></span> +intercourse of nations, so that occasional +warlike struggles can no more be avoided +than occasional commercial struggles, is +a view which requires to be most carefully +pondered over by every statesman. +It is based upon the essential fundamental +characteristics of human nature, which +do not alter. It is not to be lightly set +aside by declamation about the blessings +of peace, the evils of war, the burden of +armaments, and such-like sophistries. To +submit without a struggle to injustice +or to the destruction of one's vital +interests is not in passionate human +nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature +of a virile people. It is indeed to be +most sincerely hoped that <em>arbitration</em> will +be resorted to more and more as a means +of peacefully settling all non-vital causes +of dispute. But arbitration has its limits. +For <em>no great nation will ever submit to +arbitration any interest that it regards as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">69</a></span> +absolutely vital</em>. The view of war, therefore, +as a social act, as part of the intercourse +of nations, with all that it implies, +appears to be the only one which a statesman, +however much he may regret the +fact, can take. It has, therefore, been +brought forward here at once, as it +underlies the whole subject and is essential +to all clear thought thereon.</p> + +<p>So much for the influence of Public +Opinion in producing war. Now for its +influence in and during war.</p> + +<p>"There are three principal objects in +carrying on war," says Clausewitz.</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p class="hang">"(<i>a</i>) <span class="in1">To conquer and destroy the +enemy's armed force.</span></p> + +<p class="hang">"(<i>b</i>) <span class="in1">To get possession of the material +elements of aggression, and of the +other sources of existence of the +hostile army.</span></p> + +<p class="hang">"(<i>c</i>) <span class="in1"><em>To gain Public Opinion.</em></span><a name="FNanchor_15" id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a></p></blockquote> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">70</a></span> +"To attain the first of these objects, +the chief operation must be directed +against the enemy's principal army, for +it must be beaten before we can follow +up the other two objects with success.</p> + +<p>"In order to seize the material forces, +operations are directed against those +points at which those resources are chiefly +concentrated: principal towns, magazines, +great fortresses. On the road to +these the enemy's principal force, or a +considerable part of his army, will be +encountered.</p> + +<p>"Public Opinion is ultimately gained +by great victories, and by the possession +of the enemy's <span class="locked">capital."<a name="FNanchor_16" id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a></span></p> + +<p>This almost prophetic (as it was in his +day) recognition by Clausewitz of the +vast importance of gaining Public Opinion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">71</a></span> +<em>as one of the three great aims in war</em>, is +fundamental. It is just one of those +instances of his rare insight into the +principles and development of modern +national war which make his book of +such great and enduring value to us. +For since his day Europe has become +organized into great industrial nations, +democracy and popular passion have become +more and more a force to be reckoned +with, and the gaining and preserving of +Public Opinion in war has become more +and more important. It has, in fact, +become the statesman's chief business +during a great modern national war. It +has become necessary for him to study +intently war in its relation to industry, +and to the industrial millions over whom +he presides, or over whom he may +preside.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">72</a></span></p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3> + +<p>(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in +Britain were a nation of 18,000,000, +practically self-supporting, and governed +by an aristocracy. To-day we are a +crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent +upon over-sea sources for three-fourths +of our food, for our raw materials, for +our trade, for our staying power, <em>and</em> we +are governed by a democracy. In a +modern democratic State it will only be +possible to carry on the most just and +unavoidable war so long as the hardships +brought on the democracy by the war +do not become intolerable. To prevent +these hardships from thus becoming intolerable +to the people, to Public Opinion, +will be the task of the modern statesman +during war, and this can only be done by +wise prevision and timely preparation. +<em>It requires the internal organization of +the Industrial State for war.</em></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">73</a></span> +It appears to the <em>writer</em> that internal +organization can be subdivided as +<span class="locked">follows:​—​</span></p> + +<p>I. An adequate gold reserve.</p> + +<p>II. The protection of our ships carrying +raw material, food, and exports +during their passage on the high seas +from the places of origin to the consumers: +(A) by the few available cruisers +which could be spared from the fighting +fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well +thought out and prepared scheme of +national indemnity (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vide</i> Blue Book thereon); +(B) by insuring the distribution to +the consumers of food and raw material, +after it has arrived in the country, by +preparing a thorough organization which +would deal with the blocking of any of +the principal ports of arrival, and by +guarding the vulnerable points of our +internal lines of communications to and +from the shipping centres.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">74</a></span> +III. Organization of Poor Law system +to bring immediate relief by selling at +peace price food to those unable to pay +war prices owing to (A) normal poverty +(7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works, +due to effect of war on trade.</p> + +<p>Work and wages the State <em>must</em> guarantee +during modern war, and before the +State <em>can</em> guarantee these, it is absolutely +necessary that it should satisfy itself +that the above preparations are actually +<em>in being</em>. This pre-supposes a more +earnest study of the industrial effects of +a great national war than has yet been +given to the subject by our political +leaders. For in the warfare of the +present and future the importance of +gaining and preserving Public Opinion, +as pointed out by Clausewitz, cannot be +over-estimated. It is as fundamentally +important <em>to safeguard our own Public +Opinion as it is to attack, weaken, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">75</a></span> +gain over that of the enemy</em>. This has +not yet passed the stage of thought. +But good thoughts are no better than +good dreams unless they be put into +action. We are waiting for the statesman +to DO it. There is no great difficulty.</p> + +<p>(2) In arousing the national spirit to +the requisite height of patriotic self-denial +and self-sacrifice, in elevating, +preserving, and safe-guarding Public +Opinion during a great national struggle, +much may be hoped for from the patriotism +of our Press. Only in fairness to +those whose patriotism is self-originating +and spontaneous, it must be made compulsory +upon <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span>, so that no journal +may suffer loss of circulation or pecuniary +injury thereby.</p> + +<p>(3) There lies a practical task immediately +to the hand of our statesmen +if they will seriously set themselves to +the task of improving the <em>moral</em> of our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">76</a></span> +nation by reforming our education <em>curriculum</em>, +on the leading principle that the +moral is to the physical as three to one +in life, and that therefore character-building +must be its chief aim. Then +they will do much towards strengthening +us for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's +idea of the gaining and preserving +of our Public Opinion in War.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">79</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">THE NATURE OF WAR</span></h2> + +<p>"It is necessary for us to commence +with a glance at the nature of the whole, +because it is particularly necessary that, +in the consideration of any of the parts, +the whole should be kept constantly in +view. We shall not enter into any of +the abstruse definitions of war used by +Publicists. We shall keep to the element +of the thing itself, to a duel. War is +nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. +If we would conceive as a unit the +countless numbers of duels which make +up a war, we shall do so best by supposing +two wrestlers. Each strives by physical +force to throw his adversary, and thus<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">80</a></span> +to render him incapable of further resistance.</p> + +<p>"Violence arms itself with the inventions +of arts and science in order to +contend against violence. Self-imposed +restrictions, almost imperceptible, and +<em>hardly worth mentioning</em>, termed <i>usages +of International Law</i>, accompany it without +essentially impairing its power.</p> + +<p>"Violence, that is to say physical +force, is therefore <em>the Means</em>; the compulsory +submission of the enemy to our +will is the ultimate <em>object</em>. In order to +attain this object fully the enemy must +first be disarmed: and this is, correctly +speaking, the real aim of hostilities in +<span class="locked">theory."<a name="FNanchor_17" id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a></span></p> + +<p>Now, "philanthropists may easily imagine +that there is a skilful method of disarming +and overcoming an adversary without +causing great bloodshed, and that this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">81</a></span> +is the proper tendency of the art of war. +However plausible this may appear, <em>still +it is an error which must be extirpated</em>, +for in such dangerous things as war <em>the +errors which proceed from a spirit of +benevolence are just the worst</em>. As the +use of physical power to the utmost +extent by no means excludes the co-operation +of the intelligence, it follows +that <em>he who uses force unsparingly without +reference to the quantity of bloodshed</em>, +<span class="smcap smaller">MUST</span> <em>obtain a superiority if his adversary +does not act likewise</em>." "To introduce +into the philosophy of war itself a principle +of moderation would be an absurdity." +"We therefore repeat our proposition, +that <em>War is an act of violence which in +its application knows no bounds</em>."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Political Nature of War</span></h3> + +<p>In endeavouring briefly to describe +Clausewitz's method of looking at war,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">82</a></span> +one is continually confronted by the +difficulty of selecting a few leading ideas +out of so many profound thoughts and +pregnant passages. However, a selection +must be made.</p> + +<p>I assign the first place to his conception +of war as a part of policy, because that +is fundamentally necessary to understand +his practical way of looking at +things. This point of view is as necessary +for the strategist as for the statesman, +indeed for every man who would understand +the nature of war. For otherwise +it is impossible to understand the military +conduct of many campaigns and battles, +in which the political outweighed the +military influence, and led to action +incomprehensible almost from a purely +military point of view. History is full +of such examples.</p> + +<p>Clausewitz clearly lays down: "<em>War +is only a continuation of State policy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">83</a></span> +by other means.</em> This point of view being +adhered to will introduce much more +unity into the consideration of the subject, +and things will be more easily +disentangled from each <span class="locked">other."<a name="FNanchor_18" id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a></span> "It is +only thus that we can obtain a clear +conception of war, for the political view +is the <em>object</em>, war is the <em>means</em>, and the +means must always include the object +in our conception." "Each (nation or +government) strives by physical force to +compel the other to submit to its <span class="locked">will."<a name="FNanchor_19" id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a></span></p> + +<p>Owing to the great importance of this +point of view, so little understood in this +country, I have devoted the next chapter +to it alone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's +view more in detail. We can, therefore, +pass on for the present.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">84</a></span></p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Culminating Point of Victory</span></h3> + +<p>Secondly, I select his doctrine of the +culminating point of victory, because +that is essential in order to understand +his division of all wars into two classes, +according to how far the attack is likely +to be able to extend into the hostile +country before reaching its culminating +point, where reaction may set <span class="locked">in.<a name="FNanchor_20" id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a></span></p> + +<p>"The conqueror in a war is not always +in a condition to subdue his adversary +completely. Often, in fact almost <em>universally, +there is a culminating point of +victory</em>. Experience shows this <span class="locked">sufficiently."<a name="FNanchor_21" id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a></span> +As the attack or invasion +progresses it becomes weaker even from +its successes, from sieges or corps left +to observe fortified places, from the +troops required to guard the territory +gained, and the lengthening line of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">85</a></span> +communications, from the fact that we +are removing further from our resource +while the enemy is falling back upon and +drawing nearer to his, from the danger +of other States joining in to prevent the +utter destruction of the defeated nation, +from the rousing of the whole nation in +extremity to save themselves by a people's +war, from the slackening of effort in the +victorious army itself, etc., etc. Leoben, +Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances +of such a culminating point, and +probably in the late Russo-Japanese war +Harbin would have proved so, too, if +peace had not intervened.</p> + +<p>Clausewitz continues: "It is necessary +to know how far it (our preponderance) +will reach, in order not to go +beyond that point and, instead of fresh +advantage, reap disaster." He defines +it as "<em>The point at which the offensive +changes into the defensive</em>," and says, "to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">86</a></span> +overstep this point is more than simply +a useless expenditure of power yielding +no further results, it is a <em>destructive</em> step +which causes reaction, and the reaction +is, according to all experience, productive +of most disproportionate <span class="locked">effects."<a name="FNanchor_22" id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a></span> The +reader will find it an interesting exercise +to search for this culminating point of +victory in historical campaigns, and mark +the result where it has been overstepped +and where it has not been overstepped.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Two Classes of Wars</span></h3> + +<p>From this consideration of the culminating +point of victory follow the two +classes into which Clausewitz divides all +wars.</p> + +<p>"The two kinds of war are, first, those +in which the object is the complete <em>overthrow +of the enemy</em>, whether it be that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">87</a></span> +we aim at his destruction politically, or +merely at disarming him and forcing +him to conclude peace on our terms; and, +<em>next</em>, those in which our aim is merely +to make some conquests on the frontiers +of his country, either for the purpose +of retaining them permanently, or of +turning them to account as matters for +exchange in the settlement of <span class="locked">Peace."<a name="FNanchor_23" id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a></span></p> + +<p>All wars, therefore, are wars for the +complete destruction of the enemy, <abbr>i.e.</abbr> +"unlimited object," or wars with a +"limited object." In the plan of a war +it is necessary to settle which it is to be +in accordance with our powers and +resources of attack compared with the +enemy's resources for defence, and where +our culminating point of victory is likely +to be, on this side of the enemy's capital +or beyond it. If the former​—​then the +plan should be one with a "limited<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">88</a></span> +object," such as the Crimea, Manchuria, +etc.; if the latter​—​then the plan should +aim at the enemy's total destruction, +such as most of Napoleon's campaigns, or +the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as +1866, or 1870. As Clausewitz says: +"<em>Now, the first, the grandest, and most +decisive act of judgment which the statesman +and general exercises, is rightly to +understand in this respect the war in +which he engages</em>, not to take it for something +or to wish to make of it something +which, by the nature of its relations, it +is impossible for it to be. <em>This, therefore, +is the first and most comprehensive of all +strategical questions.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_24" id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> + +<p>In Clausewitz's two plans for war +with France in <span class="locked">1831,<a name="FNanchor_25" id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a></span> this difference is +plain. In the first plan, he considered +Prussia, Austria, the German Confederation, +and Great Britain united as allies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">89</a></span> +against France,​—​and with this great +superiority of numbers he plans an attack +by two armies, each of 300,000 men, +one marching on Paris from Belgium, +one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine. +In the second plan the political conditions +had meanwhile changed; Austria +and Great Britain were doubtful, and +Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious +if Prussia and the German Confederation +alone could appear before Paris in sufficient +strength to guarantee victory in a +decisive battle, and with which it would +be permissible to venture even beyond +Paris. So he proposed to limit the object +to the conquest of Belgium, and to +attack the French vigorously the moment +they entered that country.</p> + +<p>Which strict limitation of the object +within the means available to attain it is +characteristic of Clausewitz's practical +way of looking at things. In each plan,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">90</a></span> +however, a vigorous offensive aiming at +a decisive victory was to be adopted.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Preparation for War</span></h3> + +<p>The third place, in respect to its present-day +importance, I assign to Clausewitz's +clear statement <span class="locked">that​—​</span></p> + +<p>"If we have clearly understood the +result of our reflections, then the activities +belonging to war divide themselves into +two principal classes, into such as are +only <em>preparations for war</em> and into <em>the +war itself</em>. This distinction must also be +made in theory."</p> + +<p>Nothing could be more clearly stated +than this, or place in greater honour +peace preparations. Like his doctrine +of the importance of gaining public +opinion in war, it is one of those almost +prophetic utterances which make Clausewitz<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">91</a></span> +the germ of modern military evolution.</p> + +<p>Clausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not, +foresaw to a certain extent (probably +owing to his employment in organizing +the new Prussian short-service army +after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the +present day. And, since his time, the +greater the forces which have to be prepared, +the greater has become the value +of preparation for war. It has been +continually growing, till to-day it has +obtained such overwhelming importance +that one may almost say that a modern +war is practically (or nearly so) decided +<em>before</em> war breaks out, according to which +nation has made the greatest and most +thorough peace preparations.</p> + +<p>Clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every +imaginable preparation." We may nowadays +almost go so far as to say that +preparation is war, and that that nation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">92</a></span> +which is beaten in preparation is already +beaten <span class="smcap smaller">BEFORE</span> the war breaks out.</p> + +<p>A failure to understand this fact is a +fundamental error at the root of the idea +of war as held by civilians, for many of +them think that speeches are a substitute +for preparations.</p> + +<p>It is plain that these three ideas of +Clausewitz regarding the nature of war, +its political nature, the distinction between +wars with an unlimited object +and a limited object, and preparations in +peace-time, are as much matters for the +statesman as for the soldier, and require +study and reflection on the part of the +former as much as on the part of the +latter.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Friction in War</span></h3> + +<p>I place friction here before the more +detailed consideration of actual war, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">93</a></span> +war in itself, because it is that which +distinguishes war on paper from real +war, the statesman's and soldier's part +from the part of the soldier only, and is +therefore to be fitly treated midway +between the two.</p> + +<p>Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's +most characteristic ideas. He always +looks at everything from that point of +view, and as friction and the fog of war, +and their influence on human nature +will always be the chief characteristic +of real war as distinguished from theoretical +war or war on paper, it is chiefly +this habit or mode of thought which +makes his writings of such great and +permanent value. It is also a habit +which we ought sedulously to cultivate +in ourselves.</p> + +<p>"<em>In war everything is very simple, but +the simplest thing is difficult</em>,"<a name="FNanchor_26" id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> runs his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">94</a></span> +famous saying. Why is the simplest +thing difficult? Because of the friction +of war. And how can that friction be +minimized? Only by force of character, +and the military virtues of discipline, +perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. +Hence the great emphasis which +he always and everywhere lays upon +character and these military virtues as +the deciding factors in war.</p> + +<p>"<em>Friction is the only conception which +in a general way corresponds to that which +distinguishes real war from war on paper</em>," +he says. Each individual of the army +"keeps up his own friction in all directions." +"The danger which war brings +with it, the bodily exertions which it +requires, augment this evil so much +that they may be regarded as the greatest +causes of <span class="locked">it."<a name="FNanchor_27" id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a></span> "<em>This enormous friction +is everywhere brought into contact with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">95</a></span> +chance</em>, and thus facts take place upon +which it was impossible to calculate, their +chief origin being chance. As an instance +of one such chance take the weather. +Here the fog prevents the enemy from +being discovered in time,​—​a battery from +firing, or a report from reaching the +general. The rain (mud) prevents a +battalion from arriving,​—​or the cavalry +from charging effectively, because it had +stuck fast in the heavy ground." And +so on. Consider for examples the foggy +mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau, +the Katzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz, +Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud +of Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest, +the mud of Manchuria.</p> + +<p>"<em>Activity in war is movement in a +resistant medium.</em>" "<em>The knowledge of +friction is a chief part of that so often +talked of experience in war</em>, which is +required in a good general." "It is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">96</a></span> +therefore this friction which makes that +which appears easy in war so difficult in +<span class="locked">reality."<a name="FNanchor_28" id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a></span> In considering any situation +in war we must therefore always add to +the known circumstances​—​friction.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">War Itself</span></h3> + +<p>In Clausewitz's way of looking at war +itself I assign at once the first place to +his doctrine, "<em>The destruction of the +enemy's military force is the leading +principle of war</em>, and for the whole chapter +of positive action <em>the direct way to the +aim</em>."<a name="FNanchor_29" id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> This dictum, repeated in many +different forms, underlies his whole conception +of war. All the old theoretical +ideas about threatening by manœuvring, +conquering by manœuvring, forcing the +enemy to retreat by manœuvring, and +so forth, in which his predecessors entangled<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">97</a></span> +strategy, and from which even the +Archduke Charles and Jomini had not +completely freed themselves, he brushes +aside by "our assertion is that <span class="smcap smaller">ONLY</span> +great tactical results can lead to great +strategical <span class="locked">results."<a name="FNanchor_30" id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a></span> Thus he leads and +concentrates our thoughts in strategy on +the central idea of victory in battle, and +frees us once for all from the obscuring +veil of lines and angles and geometrical +forms by which other writers have hidden +that truth. "Philanthropists may easily +imagine that there is a skilful method of +overcoming and disarming an adversary +without causing great bloodshed, and +that this is the proper tendency of the +art of war. However plausible this may +appear, <em>it is an error which must be +extirpated</em>, for, in such dangerous things +as war, <em>the errors which spring from a +spirit of benevolence are just the worst</em>."<a name="FNanchor_31" id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">98</a></span> +For "he who uses force unsparingly +without reference to the quantity of +bloodshed, <em>must</em> obtain the superiority if +his adversary does not act likewise." +And the "worst of all errors in wars" is +still the idea of war too commonly held +by civilians in this country, as witness +the outcries which greeted every loss +during the South African war, which +shows how much Clausewitz is needed as +a tonic to brace their minds to the +reality.</p> + +<p>"War is an act of violence which in its +application knows <span class="smcap smaller">NO</span> bounds." "Let +us not hear of generals who conquer +without bloodshed; if a bloody slaughter +be a horrible sight, then that is a ground +for paying more respect to war (for avoiding +unnecessary war), but not for making +the sword we wear blunt and blunter by +degrees from feelings of humanity, till +some one steps in with a sword that is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">99</a></span> +sharp, and lops off the arm from our +body."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Simple Plans</span></h3> + +<p>The second place I assign to his doctrine +of <em>the simplest plans</em>, because time is +required for the completion of complicated +evolutions, but "a bold, courageous, +resolute enemy will not let us have <em>time</em> +for wide-reaching skilful <span class="locked">combination."<a name="FNanchor_32" id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a></span> +"By this it appears to us that the advantage +of simple and direct results over +those that are complicated is conclusively +shown."</p> + +<p>"We must not lift the arm too far for +the room given to strike," or the opponent +will get his thrust in first.</p> + +<p>"Whenever this is the case, we must +ourselves choose the shorter." "Therefore, +far from making it our aim to gain +upon the enemy by complicated plans,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">100</a></span> +<em>we must always rather endeavour to be +beforehand with him by the simplest and +shortest</em>."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Strategic Lines</span></h3> + +<p>The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the +subtle distinctions between the numerous +kinds of strategic lines, and lines of +operation, and lines of manœuvre, etc., +etc., etc., which in Jomini and his predecessors +and followers play so great, so +pedantic, and so confusing a part,​—​for +these Clausewitz has little respect. In +his chapter on "The Geometrical <span class="locked">Element,"<a name="FNanchor_33" id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a></span> +he says, "We therefore do not +hesitate to regard it as an established +truth that <em>in strategy more depends upon +the number and magnitude of the victorious +battles than on the form of the great lines +by which they are connected</em>."<a name="FNanchor_34" id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> Of course<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">101</a></span> +he does not altogether leave out such +considerations, but the above sentence +shows how he regards them as only of +minor importance. He therefore frees +us from a great deal of pedantry, and +takes us back to the heart of things.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Friction</span></h3> + +<p class="in0">has been already dealt with, so no more +need be said here, except about its +components.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Danger</span></h3> + +<p>"An ordinary character never attains +to complete coolness" in danger. "Danger +in war belongs to its friction, and a +correct idea of it is necessary for truth +of perception, and therefore it is brought +under notice <span class="locked">here."<a name="FNanchor_35" id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a></span></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">102</a></span></p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Bodily Exertion</span></h3> + +<p>Clausewitz says that bodily exertion +and fatigue in war "put fetters on the +action of the mind, and wear out in +secret the powers of the soul." "Like +danger, they belong to the fundamental +causes of <span class="locked">friction."<a name="FNanchor_36" id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a></span></p> + +<p>To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen +the retreat from Moscow, the awful +passage of the Beresina, and the battle +of the nations round Leipzig, bodily +exertion could not be overlooked. Had +he not seen bodily exertion and hardship +break up the Grand Army into a small +horde of stragglers, and destroy the army +of Kutusoff in almost an equal measure, +in 1812, as well as practically ruin the +spirit, and largely break up the great +army of Napoleon in 1813?</p> + +<p>As for the effects of bodily exertion on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">103</a></span> +the mind, purpose, and resolution of the +general, compare Benningsen at Eylau +after thirty-six hours in the saddle, or +Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost +all the results of his victory.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Information in War</span></h3> + +<p>"<em>The foundation of all our ideas and +actions</em>," but "in a few words, <em>most +reports are false</em>." "When in the thick +of war itself one report follows hard upon +the heels of another, it is fortunate if +these reports in contradicting each other +show a certain balance of probability." +In another passage, in order to illustrate +this perpetual uncertainty under which +all decisions in war have to be made, he +compares two opposing commanders to +two men fighting in a dark room and +groping uncertainly for one another.</p> + +<p>"These things which as elements meet<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">104</a></span> +together in the atmosphere of war and +make it a <em>resistant medium for every +activity</em>, we have designated danger, bodily +exertion, information, and <span class="locked">friction."<a name="FNanchor_37" id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a></span> He +never loses sight of this; it pervades +everything he writes.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Moral and Physical</span></h3> + +<p>"And therefore the most of the subjects +which we shall go through in this book +are composed <em>half of physical, half of +moral causes and effects</em>, and we might +say that the physical are almost no more +than the wooden handle, whilst the +moral are the noble metal, the real bright +polished <span class="locked">weapon."<a name="FNanchor_38" id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a></span> Pages might be +filled with extracts showing his opinion +that the moral is everything in war, but +the reader is already convinced of that. +Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moral<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">105</a></span> +is to the physical as three to one." +Clausewitz regards all military questions +from this point. His psychological attitude +is what chiefly characterizes Clausewitz +from all writers who came before +him, and which makes his deductions so +realistic, so interesting and so valuable +for all who come after him.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Tension and Rest in War</span></h3> + +<p>In order not to weary the reader I will +bring this chapter to a conclusion with +one or two extracts relating to "tension +and rest; the suspension of the act in +warfare." This is explanatory of those +frequent halts which take place in a +campaign, which appear at first sight +contradictory to the absolute theory of +war. These halts are due to many +causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, +uncertainty, irresolution, friction, waiting +for reinforcements, etc.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">106</a></span> +In this connection one must remember +that war is "a chain of battles all strung +together, one of which always brings on +another." But they seldom follow each +other immediately; there is usually a +certain pause between. As soon as one +battle is gained, strategy makes new +combinations in accordance with the +altered circumstances to win the next. +Whilst these new combinations are being +developed, or perhaps considered, there +may be a greater or less suspension of the +act, a longer or shorter halt in the forward +movement. Then another spring forward. +Clausewitz has a great many +interesting things to say on this <span class="locked">subject.<a name="FNanchor_39" id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a></span></p> + +<p>"If there is a suspension of the act +in war, that is to say, if neither party +for the moment wills anything positive, +there is <em>rest</em>, and for the moment equilibrium.... +As soon as ever one of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">107</a></span> +parties proposes to himself a new positive +object, and commences active steps towards +it, even if it is only by preparations, +and as soon as the enemy opposes this, +there is <em>tension</em> of the powers; this lasts +until the decision takes place.... This +decision, the foundation of which lies +always in the battle-combinations which +are made on each side, ... is followed by +a movement in one or other direction."</p> + +<p>"It may so happen that both parties, +at one and the same time, not only feel +themselves too weak to attack, but are so +in reality."</p> + +<p>"Wild as is the nature of war it still +wears the claims of human weakness, and +the contradiction we see here, that man +seeks and creates dangers which he fears +at the same time, will astonish no one."</p> + +<p>"If we cast a glance at military history +in general, there we find so much the +opposite of an incessant advance towards<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">108</a></span> +the aim, that <em>standing still</em> and <em>doing +nothing</em> is quite plainly the <em>normal condition</em> +of an army in the midst of war, +<em>acting</em> the <em>exception</em>. This must almost +raise a doubt as to the correctness of our +conception. But if military history has +this effect by the great body of its events, +so also the latest series of wars redeem +the view. The war of the French Revolution +shows only too plainly its reality, +and only proves too plainly its necessity. +In that war, and especially in the campaigns +of Bonaparte, the conduct of war +attained to that unlimited degree of +energy which we have represented as the +natural law of the element. This degree +is therefore possible, and if it is possible +then it is necessary."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3> + +<p>(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So +that is how Clausewitz regards International<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">109</a></span> +Law, Clausewitz to whom in +Germany "our most famous victors on +the more modern battlefields owe their +spiritual training," and on whom "everybody +who to-day either makes or teaches +modern war bases himself, even if he is +not conscious of it." And we must +regard nearly every foreign statesman as, +consciously or unconsciously, a disciple +of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time +that we should cease to pin our faith on +International Law, or think that it can +in any way protect us, if we neglect +strongly to protect ourselves. Power and +expediency are the only rules that the +practical politicians of foreign countries +recognize, and the only question they ask +themselves is, "Have we got sufficient +power to do this," and if so, "Is it +expedient to do it?"</p> + +<p>(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we +place upon them for any length of time?<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">110</a></span> +None whatever. For treaties are only +considered binding as long as the interests +of <em>both</em> contracting parties remain the +same. Directly circumstances change, +and they change constantly, the most +solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia +tore up the Treaty of Paris, or as Austria +tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history +is full of torn-up treaties. And as it has +been so it will be. The European waste-paper +basket is the place to which all +treaties eventually find their way, and a +thing which can any day be thrown into +a waste-paper basket is, indeed, a poor +thing on which to hang our national +safety. Only in ourselves can we trust. +Therefore no treaties at present existing +should be allowed in any way to alter +or lessen our preparations to enable us +to fight <em>alone</em> when necessary.</p> + +<p>(3) It cannot be too often repeated, +or too much insisted on, that the success<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">111</a></span> +or failure of a State policy is dependent +upon the amount of armed force behind +it. For upon the amount of armed force +behind a policy depends the greater or +less amount of resistance, of friction, +which that policy will meet with on the +part of other nations. The prestige of a +nation depends upon the general belief in +its strength. The less its prestige, the +more it will be checked and foiled by its +rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded +into a war which would have been prevented +if its prestige, or armed force, had +been greater. On the other hand, the +greater its prestige, its armed force, the +more reasonable and inclined to a fair +compromise are its rivals found. So that +the greater the prestige, the armed force, +of our nation is, the more likely is it +that all our negotiations will be settled +by peaceful compromise, and the longer +we shall enjoy peace.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">112</a></span> +Therefore, under this consideration, +those who would reduce our national +forces are deeply mistaken, for such +action would imperil our prestige, imperil +our negotiations, imperil our peace, and +perhaps lead eventually to a war that we +might otherwise have avoided. Therefore +no such deeply mistaken economy +for us. A few hundred thousand pounds +saved would be dear economy indeed if +it led, as well it might, to the payment +before many years of a War Indemnity +of £800,000,000 or so. Better the evils +we know than the far greater evils we +know not of.</p> + +<p>(4) Surprise in war is what we have +to fear. There are two sorts of national +surprise that we must consider. These +are (A) the <em>surprise by actual hostilities</em> +taking place before the actual declaration +of war, such as the Japanese surprise and +practical destruction of the fighting force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">113</a></span> +of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; +(B) the <em>surprise by superior preparation</em>, +silently carried out till all is ready for a +decisive blow, whilst we are not ready +for equally efficient defence, and then a +declaration of war before we have time +to get properly ready, as the surprise in +this sense of France by Germany in +1870.</p> + +<p>(A) Every successful example is always +copied, and usually on a larger scale. +We may be quite certain that our rivals +have taken to heart the lesson of Port +Arthur. It is possible that our next war +will open with a similar night attack on +our fleet, either just before, or simultaneously +with the declaration of war. +If it is successful, or even partially successful, +it may produce the most grave +results, as in the Russo-Japanese War. +It <em>may</em> render possible a naval action with +almost equal forces, in which our opponents<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">114</a></span> +<em>might</em> be victorious. The invasion +of this country on a gigantic scale by +300,000 men or more would then follow +as a certainty. This is not a probability, +but a possibility which requires to be +kept in our view.</p> + +<p>(B) <em>The surprise by superior preparation</em>, +as I term it, for want of a better +name, is a danger to which we are +peculiarly liable. As Lord Salisbury said, +"The British constitution is a bad fighting +machine," and it is made an infinitely +worse fighting machine by the lack of +interest which our politicians appear to +take in all that appertains to war. Hence +they are always liable to oppose, as +excessive, preparations which are in +reality the minimum consistent with +national safety. Consequently our preparations +for war, controlled as they are +by those who have no special knowledge +of war, are always apt to be insufficient,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">115</a></span> +as were those of France in 1870. In +former days this did not perhaps so very +much matter, although it resulted in the +unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands +of British lives and hundreds of millions +of British treasure. But still we were +able, at this somewhat excessive price, to +"muddle through," owing to the heroic +efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make +bricks without straw and retrieve the +mistakes of our policy. For our opponents +then conducted war in such a +slow way as to give us time to repair +<em>after</em> the outbreak of war our lack of +preparation <em>before</em> it. But opposed to a +modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen +and led by generals brought up in +the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and +Moltke​—​all will be different. In such a +war the national forces brought into play +are so immense that it is only possible +to do so efficaciously if everything has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">116</a></span> +been most carefully prepared and organized +beforehand. It is not <em>possible</em> to +improvise such organization of national +force <em>after</em> the war has begun, for there +cannot be sufficient time. If our rival +makes adequate preparation before the +war to bring to bear in that war the <em>whole</em> +of its national force, material, moral, and +physical, while we only prepare to bring +to bear a <em>small portion</em> thereof, then +there will be no time afterwards for us +to repair our negligence. The war will +be conducted with the utmost energy, +and the aim will be to utilize to the +utmost the superiority obtained by superior +preparation, so as to make the decision +as rapid as possible before we have time +to recover from the effects of our surprise. +That is the danger we have to fear, and +to keep ever in mind.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">119</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">WAR AS POLICY</span></h2> + +<p>"War," says Clausewitz, "is only a +continuation of State policy by other +means." The first question that at once +arises in the mind is what is meant by +Policy. We may safely lay down that +State policy is the defence and furtherance +of the interests of the nation as a whole +amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies +towards rest and towards acquisition, +and that its instruments are the +pen and the sword. There can, of course, +be any degree of consistency or fickleness, +of strength or weakness, of success or +failure, in the policy of a State.</p> + +<p>Clausewitz expressly stated that he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">120</a></span> +hoped "to iron out many creases in the +heads of strategists and statesmen," such, +for instance, as the idea that it is possible +to consider either policy or war as +independent of the other.</p> + +<p>It is only possible to obtain a proper +conception of policy if we regard it as +continuous both in peace and war, using +sometimes peace negotiations, sometimes +war negotiations, as circumstances require, +to attain the political object.</p> + +<p>War is only a part of policy, a continuance +of the previous negotiations; +but the instrument is now the sword +and not the pen. As Clausewitz says, +"<em>In one word, the art of war, in its +highest point of view, is policy; but no +doubt a policy which fights battles instead +of writing notes.</em>" War is merely a +means whereby a nation attempts to +impose its will upon another nation in +order to attain a political object. This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">121</a></span> +object is settled by policy, which also +orders the war, determines what sort of +war it is to be, with what means and +resources and expenditure it is to be +waged, when its object has been attained, +and when it is to cease. In fact, policy +prepares, leads up to, orders, supports, +guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz +said, "<em>All the leading outlines of a war +are always determined by the Cabinet​—​that +is, by a political, not a military +functionary.</em>"</p> + +<p>Unity of thought is only to be obtained +by "the conception that war is only a +part of political intercourse, therefore by +no means an independent thing in itself." +"And how can we conceive it to be +otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic +notes stop the political relations +between different nations and governments? +Is not war merely another kind +of writing and language for political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">122</a></span> +thoughts?" "Accordingly war can +never be separated from political intercourse; +and if, in the consideration +of the matter, this is done in any way, +all the threads of the different relations +are, to a certain extent, broken, and we +have before us a senseless thing without +an object."</p> + +<p>"If war belongs to policy, it will +naturally take its character from policy. +If the policy is grand and powerful, so +will also be the war, and this may be +carried to the point at which war attains +to its absolute form." "Only through +this kind of view war recovers unity; +only by it can we see <em>all</em> wars of <em>one</em> +kind, and it is only through it that the +judgment can obtain the true and perfect +basis and point of view from which <em>great +plans</em> may be traced out and determined +upon."</p> + +<p>"There is upon the whole nothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">123</a></span> +more important in life than to find out +the <em>right</em> point of view from which things +should be looked at and judged of, and +then to keep to that point; for we can +only apprehend the mass of events in +their unity from <em>one</em> standpoint; and +it is only the keeping to one point of +view that guards us from inconsistency." +"We can only look at policy here as the +representative of the interests generally +of the whole community," and "<em>wars +are in reality only the expressions or +manifestations of policy itself</em>."</p> + +<p>To the student of history this unity of +conception is equally necessary, for it +supplies the key to many a military +puzzle. Without it we can never understand, +for instance, Napoleon's conduct +in 1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can +we see the compelling reason of many +battles, apparently fought against military +judgment, such, for instance, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">124</a></span> +Borodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have +to remember that these and many other +battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were +fought from a political, not a military, +motive. It is a well-known fact that +the strategist frequently has to alter and +adapt his plans so as to suit overmastering +political necessity. Yet many people have +failed to draw therefrom the generalization +of Clausewitz that "war is only a +continuation of State policy by other +means." But having got it now, let us +hold fast to it, with all its consequences.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Some Knowledge of War necessary for +Statesmen</span></h3> + +<p>"From this point of view there is no +longer in the nature of things a necessary +conflict between the political and military +interests, and where it appears it is therefore +to be regarded as <em>imperfect knowledge</em><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">125</a></span> +only. That policy makes demands upon +the war which it cannot respond to, +would be contrary to the supposition that +<em>it knows the instrument it is going to use</em>, +therefore contrary to a natural and +<em>indispensable supposition</em>."</p> + +<p>"<em>None of the principal plans which +are required for a war can be made without +an insight into the political relations</em>; +and in reality when people speak, as +they often do, of the prejudicial influence +of policy on the conduct of a war, they +say in reality something very different +to what they intend. It is not this +influence, but the policy itself which +should be found fault with. If policy is +right, if it succeeds in hitting the object, +then it can only act on the war also with +advantage; and if this influence of +policy causes a divergence from the +object, the cause is to be looked for in +a mistaken policy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">126</a></span> +"It is only when policy promises itself +a wrong effect from certain military +means and measures, an effect opposed +to their nature, that it can exercise a +prejudicial effect on war by the course +it prescribes. Just as a person in a +language with which he is not conversant +sometimes says what he does not intend, +<em>so policy, when intending right, may +often order things which do not tally with +its own views</em>.</p> + +<p>"<em>This has happened times without +end, and it shows that a certain knowledge +of the nature of war is essential to the +management of political intercourse.</em>"</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The War Minister</span></h3> + +<p>"Before going further we must guard +ourselves against a false interpretation +of which this is very susceptible. We do +not mean to say that this acquaintance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">127</a></span> +with the nature of war is the <em>principal</em> +qualification for a war minister. Elevation, +superiority of mind, strength of +character, these are the principal qualifications +which he must possess; a knowledge +of war may be supplied in one way +or another."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Policy and the means to carry out that +Policy must Harmonize</span></h3> + +<p>"<em>If war is to harmonize entirely with +the political views, and policy to accommodate +itself to the means available for +war</em>, there is only one alternative to be +recommended when the statesman and +soldier are not combined in one person +(note, as William of Orange, Frederick +the Great, or Napoleon), which is to +make the chief commander an <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ex-officio</i> +member of the Cabinet, that he may +take part in its councils and decisions on +important occasions."</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">128</a></span> +"The influence of any military man +except the general-in-chief in the Cabinet +is extremely dangerous; it very seldom +leads to able, vigorous action."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3> + +<p>We shall conclude this chapter with a +few reflections on the preceding dicta +of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped +that the reader will agree.</p> + +<p>Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that +war is subordinate to policy, is an instrument +of policy, is a part of policy, just +as much as diplomatic negotiations are a +part of policy.</p> + +<p>Secondly, a statesman, however good +at peaceful administration he may be, +who is ignorant of war is, therefore, +ignorant of one part of his profession; +that part which deals with the preparing, +ordering, guiding, and controlling of war.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">129</a></span> +As Clausewitz says, "it is an <em>indispensable +supposition</em> that policy knows the instrument +it is going to use." It is a mistake +to suppose, when diplomatic relations +between two States cease, and war breaks +out, that therefore the political negotiations +cease, for they do not, but are +merely continued in another form​—​in +the form of war. The statesman still +retains control, and uses the military +events as they occur to attain his object. +He is still responsible for the success +of the warlike, as well as of the peaceful, +policy of the nation.</p> + +<p>Thirdly, it is a disputed point how +far the influence of policy is theoretically +allowable during the course of actual +operations, <abbr>i.e.</abbr> after the war has actually +begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy +should only act at the beginning and at +the end of a war, and should keep clear +during the actual operations. Clausewitz,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">130</a></span> +however, holds that the two are so +intimately related that the political influence +cannot be lost sight of even +during actual operations. Between two +such authorities we may well hesitate +to give a definite opinion, and must +seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly, +in history policy often has really affected +the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813, +1814, 1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan, +or Bismarck's interference to hurry on +the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith +in the Boer War, and in many other +cases. That, we must admit. We must +also admit that its interference frequently +produces a weakening effect on the +operations. Clausewitz says that that +only occurs when the policy itself is +wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle +way rule appears to be this, that policy +should be dominant at the beginning +and end of a war, but during actual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">131</a></span> +operations the statesman should exercise +the greatest possible restraint, and +avoid all interference, except when +demanded by <em>overwhelming political +necessity</em>.</p> + +<p>Fourthly, a politician is bound to study +war. He is bound to study war as well +as diplomacy, his two instruments. If +he only studies how to use one of his +two instruments, he will be a poor statesman +indeed. It is plain that he <span class="smcap smaller">MUST</span> +study war, so that he may not try to +use an instrument of which he knows +nothing. It is not meant, of course, +that a politician should study all the +details of naval and military matters, +but only that he should study the general +principles of war, and the means, resources, +and forces required to attain +the political object of war, through the +submission of the enemy.</p> + +<p>Fifthly, in order that the object and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">132</a></span> +the means of policy may harmonize, it +is necessary that the one to whom the +national interests are entrusted should +study the principles of war, so that <em>he may +keep his policy proportionate to the means +of enforcing it</em>. That is to say, he must +not propose or commit the nation to a +policy which is likely to be strongly +opposed by another Power, unless he has +from careful study and enquiry made +certain that he has sufficient armed +force at his disposal, in case the opposing +nation suddenly challenges his policy +and declares war. He should not even +consider a policy without <em>at the same +time</em> considering with his military and +naval advisers the nation's means of +enforcing that policy if challenged to do +so. He must not think of embarking +upon a war, or of provoking another +nation to do so, till he has carefully provided +sufficient armed force to give a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">133</a></span> +reasonable prospect, if not a certainty, +of success. Otherwise,</p> + +<p>Sixthly, as our next contest will be +with a nation-in-arms, as the war will +be in its character absolute, as its object +will be the downfall of the foe, as not +until the foe (whether it be Great Britain +or not) lies powerless upon the ground +will it be supposed possible to stop, as +we shall have to contend against the +utmost means, the utmost energy, the +utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,​—​these +points deserve the most serious +consideration of every politician who +aspires to guide the destinies of the +Anglo-Saxon Race.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">137</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">STRATEGY</span></h2> + +<p>Clausewitz defines strategy as "<em>the use +of the battle to gain the object of the war</em>." +War is "a chain of battles all strung +together, one of which always brings on +<span class="locked">another."<a name="FNanchor_40" id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a></span> The great thing in strategy +is to win these battles one after the +other till the enemy submits. "<em>The best +strategy is always to be very strong, first, +generally; secondly, at the decisive point.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_41" id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a></p> + +<p>"In such an aspect we grant that the +superiority of numbers is the most important +factor in the result of a battle, +only it must be sufficiently great to be a +counterpoise to all the other co-operating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">138</a></span> +circumstances. The direct result of all +this is that the <em>greatest possible number +of troops should be brought into action at +the decisive point</em>.<a name="FNanchor_42" id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Whether the troops +thus brought up are sufficient or not, +we have then done in this respect all +that our means allowed. This is <em>the +first great principle of strategy</em>, as well +suited for Greeks or Persians, or for +Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French +or Germans."</p> + +<p>It sounds so simple, and yet how many +times has it not been done. How many +generals have been ruined in consequence!</p> + +<h3 class="vspace"><span class="smcap">Superiority in Numbers<br /> +What is Required for Strategic Certainty</span></h3> + +<p>Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we +may search modern military history in +vain for a battle (except Leuthen or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">139</a></span> +Rosbach) in which an army has beaten +another double its own strength, an +occurrence by no means uncommon in +former times. Bonaparte, the greatest +general of modern days, in all his great +victorious battles, with one exception, +that of Dresden 1813, had managed to +assemble an army superior in numbers, +or at least very little inferior, to that of +his opponent, and when it was impossible +for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, +Laon, Waterloo, he was <span class="locked">beaten."<a name="FNanchor_43" id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a></span> "From +this we may infer, in the present state of +Europe, that it is very difficult for the +most talented general to gain a victory +over an enemy double his strength. +Now, if we see that double numbers are +such a weight in the scale against even +the greatest generals, we may be sure +that in ordinary cases, in small as well +as in great combats, an important superiority<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">140</a></span> +of numbers, but which need not +be over <em>two to one</em>, will be sufficient to +<em>ensure the victory</em>, however disadvantageous +other circumstances may <span class="locked">be."<a name="FNanchor_44" id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">44</a></span></p> + +<p>The double superiority of numbers at +the decisive point is, therefore, the ideal +of strategy. "<em>The superiority of numbers +is, therefore, to be regarded as the +fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, +before all</em>, and as far as possible." If +strategy has done this, then it has done +its utmost duty. It is then for the +tactician to make the most of this +superiority thus provided by strategy, +and win the victory. Strategy then repeats +the operation with new combinations +suited to the altered circumstances +to win the next battle, and so on, till the +hostile armed force is destroyed.</p> + +<p>This <em>superiority of numbers</em> in battle as +the <em>first principle of strategy</em> we require,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">141</a></span> +on all occasions in season and out of +season, to repeat and repeat. At present +we have not the numbers we shall want. +We must get them. Otherwise we are +bound to be inferior in numbers, and +"the best strategy" will be possible for +our enemies and impossible for us. This +rests with our statesmen.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Decisive Point</span></h3> + +<p>If the double superiority, or as near +the double as possible, at the decisive +point is the ideal of strategy ... what +is the decisive point?</p> + +<p>Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz. +Jomini, even after Napoleon, confuses +us with three different sorts of +decisive points in a theatre of war, but +Clausewitz clears the air by asserting +only <em>one</em>.</p> + +<p>"But whatever may be the central<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">142</a></span> +point of the enemy's power against +which we are to direct our ultimate +operations, <em>still the conquest and destruction +of his army is the surest commencement</em> +and, <em>in all cases, the most essential</em>."<a name="FNanchor_45" id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a></p> + +<p>Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever +the enemy's main force is <span class="smcap smaller">THERE</span> is the +decisive point, against which we must +concentrate <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> our forces.</p> + +<p>"There are," said Napoleon, "many +good generals in Europe, but they see +too many things at one time. <em>As for +me, I see only one thing, the enemy's +chief army, and I concentrate all my +efforts to destroy it.</em>"</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Simultaneous Use of all the Forces</span></h3> + +<p>"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which +we have been endeavouring to set forth +is, therefore, that all the forces which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">143</a></span> +are available and destined for a strategic +object should be <em>simultaneously</em> applied +to it. And this application will be all +the more complete the more everything +is compressed into one act and one +<span class="locked">moment."<a name="FNanchor_46" id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a></span> This he calls "<em>the law of +the simultaneous employment of the forces +in strategy</em>."<a name="FNanchor_47" id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> "In strategy we can +never employ too many <span class="locked">forces."<a name="FNanchor_48" id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a></span> "What +can be looked upon in tactics as an +excess of force must be regarded in +strategy as a means of giving expansion +to success." "<em>No troops should be kept +back as a strategic reserve</em>," but every +available man hurried up to the first +battlefield, fresh levies being meanwhile +formed in rear. As an instance of what +not to do, Prussia, in 1806, kept back +45,000 men in Brandenburg and East +Prussia; they might, if present at Jena,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">144</a></span> +have turned defeat into victory, but they +were useless <span class="locked">afterwards.<a name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a></span> A fault so +often made may be made again.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Concentration</span></h3> + +<p>"It is impossible to be too strong at +the decisive point," said Napoleon. To +concentrate every available man and +gun at the decisive point so as to attain +superiority there, is not an easy thing, +for the enemy will be making a similar +attempt. "The calculation of time and +space appears the most essential thing +to this end. But the calculation of time +and space, though it lies universally at +the foundation of strategy, and is to a +certain extent its daily bread, is still +neither the most difficult nor the most +decisive one." "Much more frequently +the relative superiority, that is the skilful +assemblage of superior forces at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">145</a></span> +decisive point, has its foundation in the +right appreciation of those points, in +the judicious distribution which by that +means has been given to the forces from +the very first, and in <em>the resolution to +sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage +of the important</em>. In this respect Frederick +the Great and Bonaparte are especially +<span class="locked">characteristic."<a name="FNanchor_50" id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a></span></p> + +<p>"There is no simpler and more imperative +rule for strategy than <em>to keep all the +forces concentrated</em>. <em>No portion to be +separated from the main body unless +called away by some urgent necessity.</em> On +this maxim we stand firm, and look +upon it as a fact to be depended +<span class="locked">upon."<a name="FNanchor_51" id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a></span></p> + +<p>"<em>The concentration of the whole force</em> +(<abbr>i.e.</abbr> within supporting distance) <em>should +be the rule</em>, and <em>every separation or +division is an exception which must be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">146</a></span> +justified</em>."<a name="FNanchor_52" id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Of course, this does not +mean that all the troops are to be kept +concentrated in one mass upon one +road, but within supporting distance, for +he expressly states, "<em>It is sufficient +now if the concentration takes place during +the course of the action.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_53" id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> This doctrine, +qualified by the last sentence, makes +Clausewitz the germ of modern military +thought, for the last sentence leaves +room for all the modern developments of +new roads, railways, telegraphs, wire +and wireless, and so forth.</p> + +<p>Therefore in war, according to Clausewitz, +concentration, concentration, concentration, +and <em>every division or detachment +is an evil which can only be justified +by urgent necessity</em>. Here again we find +a simple truth, which, however, the +history of all wars shows us to be very +difficult to carry out. Hence the value<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">147</a></span> +of keeping such an imperative maxim +always in our minds.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The First Pitched Battle</span></h3> + +<p>"The more a general takes the field +in the true spirit of war, as well as of +every other contest, that he must and +<em>will</em> conquer, the more will he strive to +throw every weight into the scale in the +first battle, and hope and strive to win +everything by it. Napoleon hardly ever +entered upon a war without thinking of +conquering his enemy at once in the +first <span class="locked">battle."<a name="FNanchor_54" id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a></span></p> + +<p>"<em>At the very outset of war we must +direct all our efforts to gain the first battle</em>, +because an unfavourable issue is always +a disadvantage to which no one would +willingly expose himself, and also because +the first decision, though not the only +one, still will have the more influence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">148</a></span> +on subsequent events the greater it is +in <span class="locked">itself."<a href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a></span></p> + +<p>"The law of the simultaneous use of +the forces in strategy lets the principal +result (which need not be the final one) +take place almost always at the commencement +of the great <span class="locked">act."<a name="FNanchor_55" id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a></span> A great +victory thus won at the outset will upset +all the enemy's plan of campaign and +allow us to carry out our own. The first +pitched battle is, therefore, the crisis of +the rival strategies, and towards its +favourable decision all our preparations, +all our forces, and all our energies should +be directed. This is a point that civilians +seem to find hard to grasp. Witness all +our history, with inadequate forces at +the beginning of every war, as even in +the latest of our wars​—​that in South +Africa. It is a point which our statesmen +should very seriously consider.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">149</a></span> +The difficulty of concentrating superior +numbers for the first battle is that the +enemy will be, or should be, of the same +opinion, and will be making equal efforts +to win the first battle. So, then, the +crisis will be all the more acute, the +battle greater, and the result greater.</p> + +<p>"<em>We would not avoid showing at once +that the bloody solution of the crisis, the +effort for the destruction of the enemy's +main force, is the first-born son of war.</em>"<a name="FNanchor_56" id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a></p> + +<p>Till this is done, the first great victory +gained, strategy should think of nothing +else.</p> + +<p>Then, and only then, a further combination +in accordance with the altered +circumstances to win the next.</p> + +<p>"For we maintain that, with few +exceptions, <em>the victory at the decisive +point will carry with it the decision on +all minor points</em>"<a name="FNanchor_57" id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> over the whole theatre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">150</a></span> +of war. Therefore nothing else matters +for long, and to victory in the first great +battle "everything else must be sacrificed." +For concentration can only be +obtained by sacrifice.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Pursuit</span></h3> + +<p>"Once the great victory is gained, the +next question is not about rest, not about +taking breath, not about re-organizing, +etc., but only of pursuit, of fresh blows +wherever necessary, of the capture of +the enemy's capital, of the attack of the +armies of his allies, or whatever else +appears as a rallying point for the +<span class="locked">enemy."<a name="FNanchor_58" id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a></span></p> + +<p>Clausewitz points out that this is very +difficult, and that to compel his exhausted +troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall +requires <span class="smcap smaller">GREAT</span> force of <span class="smcap smaller">WILL</span> on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">151</a></span> +part of the equally exhausted commander. +We need only remember that +Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis +of his fate, being physically tired, failed +to pursue the allies after his victory at +Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the +fruits of his victory, and indeed his last +chance of ultimate success.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Summary of Strategic Principles</span></h3> + +<p>Leaving out, for the sake of shortness, +the rest of his strategical thoughts, I hasten +to conclude this sketch with a glance at +Clausewitz's admirable <span class="locked">summary<a name="FNanchor_59" id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a></span> of strategic +<span class="locked">principles:​—​</span></p> + +<p>"<em>The first and most important maxim +which we can set before ourselves is to +employ</em> <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> <em>the forces which we can make +available with the</em> <span class="smcap smaller">UTMOST ENERGY</span>. Even +if the result is tolerably certain in itself,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">152</a></span> +it is extremely unwise not to make it +<em>perfectly certain</em>.</p> + +<p>"<em>The second principle is to concentrate +our forces as much as possible at the point +where the</em> <span class="smcap smaller">DECISIVE</span> <em>blow is to be struck. +The success at that point will compensate +for all defeats at secondary points.</em></p> + +<p>"<em>The third principle is not to lose +time. Rapidity and surprise are the most +powerful elements of victory.</em></p> + +<p>"<em>Lastly, the fourth principle is to</em> +<span class="smcap smaller">FOLLOW UP THE SUCCESS</span> <em>we gain with +the</em> <span class="smcap smaller">UTMOST ENERGY</span>. <em>The pursuit of +the enemy when defeated is the only means +of gathering up the fruits of victory.</em></p> + +<p>"The first of these principles is the +foundation of all the others. <em>If we have +followed the first principle, we can venture +any length with regard to the three others +without risking our all.</em> It gives the +means of <em>continually creating new forces +behind us</em>, and with new forces every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">153</a></span> +disaster may be repaired. <em>In this, and +not in going forward with timid steps, +lies that prudence which may be called +wise.</em>"</p> + +<p>These great principles are everything +in war, and "due regard being paid to +these principles, the form (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> the geometrical +element) in which the operations +are carried on is in the end of little consequence."</p> + +<p>"Therefore I am perfectly convinced +that whoever calls forth all his powers +to appear <em>incessantly with new masses</em>, +whoever adopts <em>every imaginable means of +preparation</em>, whoever <em>concentrates his force +at the decisive point, whoever thus armed +pursues a great object with resolution and +energy</em>, has done all that can be done +in a general way for the strategical conduct +of the war, and that, unless he is +altogether unfortunate in battle, will +undoubtedly be victorious in the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">154</a></span> +measure that his adversary has fallen +short of this exertion and energy."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3> + +<p>When we have got these great simple +leading principles of strategy firmly into +our heads, the next question is how to +make use of our knowledge. For principles +are no use unless we apply them. +On consideration it appears that there +are three ways in which we can all apply +these principles with advantage.</p> + +<p>I. It will prove a very interesting and +strengthening mental exercise to apply +these few leading principles to every +campaign we read about, to search for +indications of their application in the +strategy of each belligerent, how far each +commander succeeded, and how far failed +to carry them out in their entirety, and +where, when, and why he succeeded or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">155</a></span> +failed, and the results of doing or not +doing so. Also to search for the interaction +of the political motive of the war +on the military operations, and to see +how far the belligerent statesmen gained +or failed to gain their political object, +according to the comparative degree of +preparation they had made for it, and the +magnitude of effort which they made +or did not make to support it with the +whole means of the nation, material, +moral and physical. Also to see how far +the national spirit was aroused or not, +and the causes thereof, and to note the +greater or less energy, resolution and +boldness which was consequently infused +into the war. Also to note how the +thorough application of these great simple +principles of strategy shortens the war +and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to +1870), and how the neglect of them by +statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">156</a></span> +lengthens a war and adds to its +cost enormously (South Africa, etc.). +Used thus, these principles give us a +theoretically correct ground for criticism.</p> + +<p>II. These principles also give us a +theoretically correct ground for anticipating +what the action of our opponents in +any future war will be, the measure of +the forces they will bring to bear, how +they will direct those forces, and the +amount of energy, resolution, and boldness +with which they will use them against +us. It is an axiom always to assume that +the enemy will do the best and wisest +thing, and to prepare accordingly.</p> + +<p>III. These principles also give us a +theoretically correct ground for our own +counter-preparations. We require to take +the most dangerous war which is probable +or possible, and make every imaginable +preparation to carry out these principles +therein.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">157</a></span> +In such a case how are we going to +render it possible for our generals to win, +and thus save the nation from the irreparable +consequences and the huge war +indemnity of £800,000,000 or so, which +would follow defeat? How are we going +to do it? How are we going to render +it possible for our generals to employ +the best strategy? The ideal of strategy, +always to be aimed at, is the double +superiority of numbers. How are we +going to give our generals that? If we +cannot do that, how are we going to give +them even any superiority <em>at all</em>, so that +they may be able to carry out the first +principle of strategy? How? Or are +we going to make <span class="smcap smaller">NO</span> <em>adequate preparations</em> +for these three eventualities, and +when one of them suddenly comes ask +our generals to save us from the fate we +have brought upon ourselves, by performing +the impossible? It is in this way<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">158</a></span> +that a statesman should use these few +great simple principles of strategy in +order to attain his political object and +safeguard the interests of the nation.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">161</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY</span></h2> + +<p>Now, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory +of war is easy enough to understand. +There is no reason​—​one might almost +say no excuse​—​why every one, soldier +or statesman, should not know it fairly +well. The great leading principles of +strategy are few and simple. There is +no reason why every one, soldier and +statesman, should not understand and +know these few simple principles thoroughly, +and have them at his finger ends +ready to apply them to the consideration +of any military question, past, present, +or future. So far all is easy. But when +it is a question of carrying out in actual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">162</a></span> +war this easy theory, these simple strategical +principles, then it is <span class="smcap smaller">QUITE</span> a different +matter, then it is a matter of the very +greatest difficulty. This is a difference +which the mind always finds very hard +to grasp, as witness the denunciations +with which any failure in execution by +a general, no matter how great the real +difficulties with which he had to contend, +is nearly always greeted. Observers rarely +make allowances for these difficulties, +very largely probably because they do +not understand them. The present chapter +is devoted to these difficulties of +execution in war.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Genius for War</span></h3> + +<p>In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the +genius for <span class="locked">war"<a name="FNanchor_60" id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a></span> he sets forth the +difficulties which confront a general, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">163</a></span> +character and genius, the driving and +animating force, required to overcome +the friction of war. It is impossible to +abstract it adequately; I can only advise +all to read it for themselves. But I will +endeavour to give an idea of it.</p> + +<p>After discussing the various sorts of +courage required by a general, physical +before danger and moral before responsibility, +the strength of body and mind, +the personal pride, the patriotism, the +enthusiasm, etc., he comes to the unexpected.</p> + +<p>"<em>War</em>," he says, "<em>is the province of +uncertainty. Three-fourths of those things +upon which action in war must be calculated +are hidden more or less in the +clouds of great uncertainty.</em> Here, then, +above all other, a fine and penetrating +mind is called for, to grope out the +truth by the tact of its judgment." +Mark this point, that three-fourths of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">164</a></span> +the things that we as critics <span class="smcap smaller">AFTER</span> the +event know, when all information of the +situation has been collected and published, +were unknown to the general +who had to decide, or only dimly guessed +at from a number of contradictory reports.</p> + +<p>"From this uncertainty of all intelligence +and suppositions, <em>this continual +interposition of chance</em>." "Now, if he +is to get safely through <em>this perpetual +conflict with the unexpected</em>, two qualities +are indispensable; in the first place <em>an +understanding which, even in the midst +of this intense obscurity, is not without +some traces of inner light</em>, which <em>lead to +the truth</em>, and then <em>the courage to follow +this faint light</em>. The first is expressed by +the French phrase <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">coup d'œil</i>; the second +is resolution."</p> + +<p>"Resolution is an <em>act of courage in +face of responsibility</em>." "The forerunner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">165</a></span> +of resolution is an act of the mind making +plain the necessity of venturing and thus +influencing the will. This quite peculiar +direction of the mind, which conquers +every other fear in man by the fear of +wavering or doubting, is what makes up +resolution in strong minds."</p> + +<p>The vital importance of firmness and +resolution, so strongly urged by Clausewitz, +will be apparent to all if we reflect +how even the strongest characters have +been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation +in war. Compare, for instance, +York <abbr>v.</abbr> Wartenburg's masterly exposition +of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation +in 1813 at Dresden.</p> + +<p>Also there is required "<em>the power of +listening to reason in the midst of the +most intense excitement</em>, in the storm of +the most violent passions."</p> + +<p>"But to keep to the result of by-gone +reflections in opposition to the stream<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">166</a></span> +of opinions and phenomena which the +present brings with it, is just <span class="smcap smaller">THE</span> difficulty." +"Here nothing else can help +us but an imperative maxim which, +independent of reflection, at once controls +it: that maxim is, <em>in all doubtful cases +to adhere to the first opinion and not to +give it up till a clear conviction forces us +to do so</em>."</p> + +<p>"But as soon as difficulties arise, and +that must always happen when great +results are at stake, then the machine, +the army itself, begins to offer a sort +of passive resistance, and to overcome +this the commander must have great +force of will." Driving power, such as +Napoleon's. And also "the heart-rending +sight of the bloody sacrifice, which the +commander has to contend with in himself."</p> + +<p>"These are the weights which the +courage and intelligent faculties of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">167</a></span> +commander have to contend with and +<span class="smcap smaller">OVERCOME</span>, if he is to make his name +illustrious." If he is to prevent the +downfall of his country.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Reflections</span></h3> + +<p>(1) In connection with these difficulties +I would like to put forward a suggestion +as to criticism of a general's action in +war, which though not exactly Clausewitz's, +is a corollary from Clausewitz. +It is this. In reading a war with the +clearness and after-knowledge of history +nearly all defeats are easily seen to be +due to the non-observance of one or +other of the few leading principles of +strategy referred to in the previous +chapter. But we must assume that the +defeated general was <em>familiar</em> with that +principle, and that his <em>will</em> was to carry +it out. What, then, were the difficulties,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">168</a></span> +the friction, which, on any particular +day or days, overcame his will and +made him sacrifice the principle? This +is where most critics fail us. Here seems +the matter to search for. And could a +stronger resolution have enabled him to +overcome those difficulties, that friction? +And if so, how and by what means? +But we must first discover the difficulties +and uncertainties of the particular day +when his will gave way. Take the +Manchurian campaign as an instance. +If we could only have a military history +of the campaign of 1870 or that of +Manchuria, written in the form of a +series of "appreciations of the situation," +so that we know nothing but what the +general knew at the time as we read, and +if the true state of affairs could be withheld +from us till the end, this, I think, +would be very instructive and helpful. +It would be a more difficult way of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">169</a></span> +writing a military history, but I think +that the extra trouble would be repaid +by the extra value. So at least it appears.</p> + +<p>(2) If we reflect upon the enormous +difficulties, so strikingly brought out by +Clausewitz, which <em>our</em> generals have to +contend with and <em>overcome</em> in actual war, +it should surely teach us to curb our +criticism. It should surely also make us +resolve in future to try to aid them as +far as is in our power at home, and not +thoughtlessly to increase their already +stupendous burdens. In the past we at +home have much to accuse ourselves of, +much to regret. In the past often +have we added to the difficulties of our +generals, often have we greatly weakened +their chances, and increased those of their +opponents, often have we, unintentionally, +through ignorance cast a weight +into the scale against our country.</p> + +<p>(3) The ignorance of the public regarding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">170</a></span> +the conduct of war constitutes +for us a very serious national danger. +If this ignorance were less pronounced, +if our statesmen understood the vast +importance of information to the enemy, +and the equal importance to our generals +that this information the enemy should +<span class="smcap smaller">NOT</span> obtain, then the public craving for +information regarding every detail of +what occurs in the field, and the demand +for the wide publication thereof, would +certainly be repressed. Nothing occurs +in any of our campaigns which is not +immediately made known; reports of +actions with the fullest details as to the +troops engaged, and the casualties that +have befallen them, appear in the columns +of the Press within a few hours of their +occurrence. <em>Any efforts, therefore, of our +generals</em> in the field to maintain <em>secrecy +as to strength, intentions, and movements +are deliberately</em>, though probably unintentionally,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">171</a></span> +<em>counteracted by their own +countrymen</em>. This is due to pure ignorance +of war, no doubt, but the effect +of this ignorance is as bad as if it were +due to evil intention. In fairness, however, +we must admit that, in the past, +the immense value of reticence has not +been fully appreciated by some of our +soldiers themselves, and it were well if, +in the future, more attention were directed +to the importance of secrecy.</p> + +<p>The results of such almost criminal +stupidity may not be apparent when we +are fighting with a savage foe, but if +we ever have, as we undoubtedly some +day shall have, the misfortune to find +ourselves engaged with a civilized Power, +we may be certain that not only will the +operations be indefinitely prolonged, <em>and +their cost enormously increased</em>, but their +successful issue will be for us highly +problematical.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">172</a></span> +In this connection it must be remembered +that every Great Power has secret +agents in every country, including Great +Britain, and that it will be easy for such a +secret agent to telegraph in cypher or +in some agreed code to an agent in a +neutral State all war information published +here, who will telegraph it on at +once to the hostile general, who will +thus get, within a very short time of its +publication in London, perhaps just exactly +the information he requires to clear up +the strategical or tactical situation for +him, and enable him to defeat the combinations +of our generals. As a case in +point, take Macmahon's march on Sedan +to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy +was absolutely necessary for success, but +which became known to the Germans +by the English newspapers.​—​Result, +Sedan.</p> + +<p>That this cannot be allowed is plain.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">173</a></span> +It is believed that the patriotism of our +Press will welcome any necessary measure +to this end if it is made compulsory upon +<span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span>.<a name="FNanchor_61" id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a></p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">177</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">TACTICS</span></h2> + +<p>Some will probably feel inclined to ask +what Clausewitz, who wrote more than +eighty years ago, can possibly have to +say about tactics which can be valuable +in the twentieth century.</p> + +<p>It was said by Napoleon that tactics +change every ten years, according, of +course, to the progress of technicalities, +etc. Weapons indeed change, but there +is one thing that never changes, and +that is human nature. The most important +thing in tactics, the man behind +the gun, never alters; in his heart and +feelings, his strength and weakness, he is +always much the same.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">178</a></span> +Therefore, Clausewitz's tactical deductions, +founded on the immense and varied +data supplied by the desperate and long-continued +fighting of the Revolutionary +and Napoleonic wars, permeated as they +are by his all-pervading psychological or +moral view, can never lose their value +to us.</p> + +<p>It is true, no doubt, that our rifles of +to-day can be used with effect at a +distance ten times as great as the old +smooth bores of Clausewitz's day, our +shrapnel five times as far as his cannon, +and that cover and ground play a far +more important part now than then, and +so on. All these things, of course, considerably +modify the tactics of Clausewitz. +Not so much, however, as some text-books +would lead us to suppose, which always +seem to assume clear ground and clear +weather. For, after all, how many combats +are fought on ground where there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">179</a></span> +is a very restricted field of fire (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vide</i> +Herbert's "Defence of Plevna," etc.), or +at night? How many battles are fought +during rain, or snow, or mist, or fog, +which destroys all long range? Compare +the tremendous fighting with "bullets, +bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and +even fists," of Nogi's attempt to cut the +Russian line of retreat at Mukden, with +the hand-to-hand fighting of Eylau, Friedland, +Borodino, or with the desperate +efforts of the French in 1812 to open their +line of retreat through Maro-Jaroslawitz, +where all day the masses of troops fought +hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town +was taken and retaken seven times, and +the rival nations fought with the bayonet +in the midst of the burning houses" +(Alison).</p> + +<p>When it comes to push of pike, as in +all great decisions between equally resolute +adversaries it is bound to do, the difference<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">180</a></span> +between the fighting of Clausewitz's +day and ours is but small. The most +recent instances of all, the hand-to-hand +fighting in Manchuria, take us back to +the Napoleonic struggles.</p> + +<p>Therefore, despite the eighty years +that have intervened, the writings of +Clausewitz are still valuable from a +tactical point of view, always considering +of course the difference in weapons, +because of the human heart in battle.</p> + +<p>His ideas on tactics have largely filtered +through his German pupils into our textbooks, +minus the psychological or moral +note, so that it is not necessary to go at +length into the subject, or give a number +of extracts. It would be wearisome. I +will, however, give a few passages at haphazard +as illustrations.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">181</a></span></p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Flank Attacks</span></h3> + +<p>The endeavour to gain the enemy's line +of retreat, and protect our own, on +which so much learned erudition has +been spent by various writers, he regards +as a <span class="smcap smaller">NATURAL</span> instinct, which will <span class="smcap smaller">ALWAYS</span> +produce itself both in generals and subalterns.</p> + +<p>"From this arises, in the whole conduct +of war, and especially in great and small +combats, a <span class="smcap smaller">PERFECT INSTINCT</span>, which is +the security of our own line of retreat +and the seizure of the enemy's; this +follows from the conception of victory, +which, as we have seen, is something +beyond mere slaughter. In this effort +we see, therefore, the <span class="smcap smaller">FIRST</span> immediate +purpose in the combat, and one which +is quite universal. No combat is <em>imaginable</em> +in which this effort, either in its +double or single form, is not to go hand<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">182</a></span> +in hand with the plain and simple stroke +of force. Even the smallest troop will +not throw itself upon the enemy without +thinking of its line of retreat, and in +most cases it will have an eye upon that +of the <span class="locked">enemy."<a name="FNanchor_62" id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a></span> "This is a great +<em>natural law</em> of the combat," "and so +becomes the pivot upon which <span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> strategical +and tactical manœuvres turn."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Reserves​—​Destructive and Decisive Act</span></h3> + +<p>The combat he regards as settled by +whoever has the preponderance of moral +force at the end; that is, in fresh or only +partly used up troops.</p> + +<p>The combat itself he divides into a +destructive and a decisive act. During +the long destructive act, or period of fire +preparation, the troops engaged gradually +wear each other out, and gradually<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">183</a></span> +almost cease to count as factors in the +decision. "After a fire combat of some +hours' duration, in which a body of +troops has suffered severe losses​—​for +instance, a quarter or one-third of its +numbers​—​the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">débris</i> may for the time +be looked upon as a heap of cinders. +For the men are physically exhausted; +they have spent their ammunition; many +have left the field with the wounded, +though not themselves wounded (compare, +for instance, Eylau and the 1870 battles); +the rest think they have done their part +for the day, and if they get beyond the +sphere of danger, do not willingly return +to it. The feeling of courage with which +they originally started has had the edge +taken off, the longing for the fight is +satisfied, the original organization is partly +destroyed, and the formations broken up."</p> + +<p>"So that the amount of moral force +lost may be estimated by the amount of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">184</a></span> +the Reserves used up, almost as with a +foot <span class="locked">rule."<a name="FNanchor_63" id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">63</a></span></p> + +<p>This goes on till, "In all probability, +only the untouched reserve and some +troops which, though they have been in +action, have suffered very little, are in +reality to be regarded as serviceable, and +the remainder (perhaps four-sixths) may +be looked upon for the present as a +"caput mortuum."</p> + +<p>Therefore the art of the commander +he regards as "economy of force" during +the destructive period; that is, to employ +as few troops as possible, by taking +advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to +use a smaller number of men in the +combat with firearms than the enemy +employs," so that a smaller proportionate +number of his own are reduced to a +"heap of cinders" and more are left, +more moral force, for the decision.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">185</a></span> +"Hundreds of times," he says, "a line +of fire has maintained its own against +one twice its strength" (<abbr>e.g.</abbr> the Boers).</p> + +<p>To do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect +demands very skilful handling of +the troops, both on the part of the chief +and subordinate leaders.</p> + +<p>With the preponderance thus obtained +the commander at last starts the decision. +"Towards the close of a battle the line +of retreat is always regarded with increased +jealousy, therefore a threat against that +line is always a potent means of bringing +on the decision (Liao-yang, Mukden). +On that account, when circumstances +permit, the plan of battle will be aimed +at that point from the very first." Or, +"If this wear and tear and exhaustion +of the forces has reached a certain pitch, +then a rapid advance in concentrated +masses on one side against the line of +battle of the other" (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> the Napoleonic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">186</a></span> +breaking the centre, of recent years +thought almost hopeless, but revived in +Manchuria with success, in the case of +Nodzu breaking the centre at Mukden).</p> + +<p>From what precedes it is evident that, +as in the preparatory acts, the utmost +economy of forces must prevail, so in +the decisive act to win the mastery +through <em>numbers</em> must be the ruling idea.</p> + +<p>Just as in the preparatory acts endurance, +firmness and coolness are the first +qualities, so in the decisive act boldness +and fiery spirit must predominate.</p> + +<p>"The difference between these two +acts will never be completely lost as +respects the whole."</p> + +<p>"This is the way in which our view +is to be understood; then, on the one +hand, it will not come short of the +reality, and on the other it will direct +the attention of the leader of a combat +(be it great or small, partial or general)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">187</a></span> +to giving each of the two acts of activity +its due share, so that there may be +neither precipitation nor negligence.</p> + +<p>"<em>Precipitation</em> there will be if space +and time are not allowed for the destructive +act. <em>Negligence</em> in general there will +be if a complete decision does not take +place, either from want of moral courage +or from a wrong view of the <span class="locked">situation."<a name="FNanchor_64" id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">64</a></span></p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Duration of the Combat</span></h3> + +<p>"Even the resistance of an ordinary +division of 8,000 or 10,000 men of all +arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably +superior in numbers, will last +several hours, if the advantages of country +are not too preponderating. And if the +enemy is only a little or not at all superior +in numbers, the combat will last half a +day. A corps of three or four divisions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">188</a></span> +will prolong it to double that time; an +army of 80,000 or 100,000 men to three +or four times." "These calculations are +the result of <span class="locked">experience."<a name="FNanchor_65" id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">65</a></span></p> + +<p>As General von Caemmerer points out, +if these calculations were adhered to in +present-day German manœuvres, as they +are now in all war games, tactical exercises, +and staff rides, the dangerous +dualism of their training, the difference +between theory and manœuvre practice, +would cease.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Attack and Defence</span></h3> + +<p>I have left to the last the consideration +of three or four disputed points in Clausewitz. +In considering these I shall quote +a good deal from General von Caemmerer's +"Development of Strategical +Science," as in such matters it is best to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">189</a></span> +quote the most recent authors of established +reputation.</p> + +<p>The most important of these, and the +most disputed, is Clausewitz's famous +dictum that "the defensive is the stronger +form of making war." "The defence is +the stronger form of war with a negative +object; the attack is the weaker form +with a positive <span class="locked">object."<a name="FNanchor_66" id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">66</a></span></p> + +<p>General von Caemmerer says, "It is +strange, we Germans look upon Clausewitz +as indisputably the deepest and +acutest thinker upon the subject of war; +the beneficial effect of his intellectual +labours is universally recognized and +highly appreciated; but the more or +less keen opposition against this sentence +never ceases. And yet that sentence +can as little be cut out of his work 'On +War' as the heart out of a man. Our +most distinguished and prominent military<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">190</a></span> +writers are here at variance with +Clausewitz.</p> + +<p>"Now, of course, I do not here propose +to go into such a controversy. I only +wish to point out that Clausewitz, in +saying this, only meant the defensive-offensive, +the form in which he always +regards it, both strategically and technically, +in oft-repeated explanations all +through his works. For <span class="locked">instance​—​</span></p> + +<p>"It is a <span class="smcap smaller">FIRST</span> maxim <span class="smcap smaller">NEVER</span> to remain +perfectly passive, but to fall upon the +enemy in front and flank, even when he +is in the act of making an attack upon <span class="locked">us."<a name="FNanchor_67" id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">67</a></span></p> + +<p>And <span class="locked">again​—​</span></p> + +<p>"<em>A swift and vigorous assumption of +the offensive​—​the flashing sword of vengeance​—​is +the most brilliant point in the +defensive.</em> He who does not at once +think of it at the right moment, or rather +he who does not from the first include<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">191</a></span> +this transition in his idea of the defensive, +will never understand its superiority as a +form of <span class="locked">war."<a name="FNanchor_68" id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">68</a></span> Von Caemmerer comments +thus: "And this conception of +the defence by Clausewitz has become +part and parcel of our army​—​everywhere, +strategically and tactically, he who has +been forced into a defensive attitude at +once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack. +I am thus unable to see how +the way in which Clausewitz has contrasted +Attack and Defence could in any +way paralyse the spirit of enterprise." +Von Caemmerer also justly remarks that, +as Clausewitz always insisted both in +strategy and tactics, neither Attack nor +Defence is pure, but oscillates between +the two forms; and as the Attack is +frequently temporarily reduced to defend +itself, and also as no nation can be sure +of never being invaded by a superior<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">192</a></span> +coalition, it is most desirable to encourage +a belief in the strength of the Defence, +if properly used. In this I think that +Wellington would probably have agreed. +Certainly Austerlitz and Waterloo were +examples of battles such as Clausewitz +preferred.</p> + +<p>Still, one must admit that Clausewitz's +chapter on "The Relations of the Offensive +and Defensive to each other in +Tactics," Book VII. Chapter 2, is the +least convincing chapter of his work.</p> + +<p>Strategically, the argument is stronger. +It always seems to me that we must +remember that Clausewitz had taken +part in the defensive-offensive in its +strongest, most absolute and unlimited +form, on the greatest possible scale​—​the +Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated +before a single flake of snow fell) +of the Grand Army. If he had lived to +complete the revision of his works, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">193</a></span> +always seems to me that he would have +made his theory undeniable by stating +that the defensive is the strongest form +of war, <em>if unlimited by space</em>. What, for +instance, would have happened if the +Japanese had tried to march through +Siberia on to St. Petersburg?</p> + +<p>But, after all, which of the two is +absolutely the stronger form of war, +attack or defence, is merely a theoretical +abstraction, for, practically, the choice +is always settled for us by the pressing +necessity of circumstances. And, in this +connection, let us always bear in mind +Clausewitz's dictum: "A swift and +vigorous assumption of the offensive​—​the +flashing sword of vengeance​—​is the +most brilliant point in the defensive."</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Inner Line</span></h3> + +<p>A second disputed point is Clausewitz's +alleged preference, as a rule, for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">194</a></span> +Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary +to remember that that was only +due to the conditions of his time, before +railways and telegraphs, when it was +difficult to communicate between columns +acting on concentric lines. And he is +not in any way wedded to the Inner +Line, like Jomini, but <em>only</em> when circumstances +are favourable. He has many +sentences from which we may infer that, +had he lived in railway and telegraph +days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most +distinguished pupil, would have aimed +at envelopment as a rule. For to bring +up troops rapidly by several railways +necessitates a broad strategic front, and +Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity +as his second great principle, and <span class="locked">says​—​</span></p> + +<p>"If the concentration of the forces +would occasion detours and loss of time, +and the danger of advancing by separate +lines is not too great, then the same may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">195</a></span> +be justifiable on these grounds; for <em>to +effect an unnecessary concentration of the +forces</em> would be contrary to the second +principle we have laid down (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> 'to act +as swiftly as possible')."<a name="FNanchor_69" id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> Also: "Such +separation into several columns as is +absolutely necessary must be made use +of for the disposition of the tactical attack +in the enveloping form, <em>for that form is +natural to the attack, and must not be +disregarded without good reason</em>."<a name="FNanchor_70" id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> Also: +"<em>It is sufficient now if the concentration +takes place during the action.</em>" So that +while the conditions of his time led +Clausewitz to prefer close concentration +and the Inner Line, like Napoleon, yet his +reflections led him to propound the +germ of the strategy of Moltke. Substitute +for Clausewitz's close concentration +this: "As close concentration, the combined +movements regulated by telegraph,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">196</a></span> +as is compatible with the utmost use of +the railways and the greatest rapidity" +(as he would certainly have said), and +we arrive at Moltke's strategy.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Frontal Attacks</span></h3> + +<p>A third disputed point is his belief in +the superior tactical efficiency, under +favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic +method of breaking the enemy's +line in the centre. Breaking the line by +a frontal attack was, of course, much +easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic day +than it is with the long-ranging arms of +our day, and it is only natural that +Clausewitz in his writings should give it +the full tactical importance which it then +deserved. His book would not be true +to the tactical conditions of his day had +he not done so, with Rivoli, Austerlitz, +Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">197</a></span> +mind. But it seems hardly correct to +accuse him of over-partiality to frontal +attacks, for he has examined both frontal +and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving +to each their relative advantages and +disadvantages, and concluding: "The +envelopment may lead directly to the +<em>destruction</em> of the enemy's army, if it is +made with very superior numbers and +succeeds. If it leads to victory the early +results are <em>in every case</em> greater than by +breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the +enemy's line can only lead indirectly to +the destruction of the enemy's army, and +its effects are hardly shown so much on +the first day, but rather strategically +<span class="locked">afterwards,"<a name="FNanchor_71" id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">71</a></span> by forcing apart on different +lines of retreat the separated fragments +of the beaten army.</p> + +<p>"The breaking through the hostile +army by massing our principal force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">198</a></span> +against one point, <em>supposes an excessive +length of front on the part of the enemy</em>; +for in this form of attack the difficulty +of occupying the remainder of the enemy's +force with few troops is greater, because +the enemy's forces nearer to the principal +point of attack can easily join in opposing +it. Now in an attack upon the centre +there are such forces on both sides of +the attack; in an attack upon a flank, +only on one side. The consequence of +this is that such a central attack may +easily end in a very disadvantageous form +of combat, <em>through a convergent counter-attack</em>." +Which is exactly our modern +difficulty. "The choice between these two +forms of attack must therefore be made +according to the existing conditions of +the moment. Length of front, the nature +and direction of the line of retreat, the +military qualities of the enemy's troops, +and the characteristics of their general,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">199</a></span> +lastly the ground must determine the +choice."</p> + +<p>Speaking generally he regards the <em>concentric</em> +enveloping form of tactical attack +aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as +the most efficacious and natural. "On +the field of battle itself ... the enveloping +form must always be considered the +most <span class="locked">effectual."<a name="FNanchor_72" id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">72</a></span> And the <em>eccentric</em> or +frontal counter-attack at the extended +enveloping attack as the most efficacious +and natural form of the defence, such as +Napoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz +or Dresden, or Wellington's at Salamanca. +"And we think that one means is at +least as good as the <span class="locked">other."<a name="FNanchor_73" id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">73</a></span></p> + +<div class="tb">*<span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span><span class="in2">*</span></div> + +<p>Now I think that these extracts sufficiently +defend Clausewitz from the imputation +of too great a belief in frontal +attacks, and considering the frequent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">200</a></span> +success of such Napoleonic attacks in his +day, he gives a very fair summing up of +the relative advantages and disadvantages +thereof, and indeed such as might be +written in the present day. Indeed the +quite abnormal conditions of the Boer +war produced such a feeling against +frontal attacks, and so much loose talk +of their being extinct, that it is very +useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder +that breaking the centre, whenever +the condition he postulates, namely <em>over-extension +of front</em> on the enemy's part, is +present, will always remain one of the +two great forms of decisive attack open +to a commander.</p> + +<p>And as in our day the forces are so +enormous that to reach the hostile flank +becomes more difficult, and the extension +of front becomes so gigantic (a front of +several armies on a line of forty to seventy +miles perhaps), it is well to consider<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">201</a></span> +whether breaking the enemy's centre will +not again offer the most advantageous +form for the final decisive act, coupled +of course, as Clausewitz says it <span class="smcap smaller">ALWAYS +MUST</span> be, with a strong flank attack. +And in these gigantic battles of the +future, such as Liao-yang and Mukden, +which we must consider typical of the +future, battles which must take several +days, during which the troops in the first +line become utterly exhausted and used +up,​—​a decisive attack on the centre can +well be imagined after the hostile reserves +have been decoyed away over a day's +march by a strong flank attack. As, for +example, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden +followed by Nodzu's decisive breaking +the centre and capture of Mukden +itself.</p> + +<p>So that far from thinking Clausewitz's +remarks about frontal attacks and breaking +the line to be obsolete, it rather<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">202</a></span> +appears from the great Russo-Japanese +battles that they are worthy of close +study in view of the future.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Tactical versus Strategical +Envelopment</span></h3> + +<p>A fourth disputed point is the preference +of Clausewitz, owing to his insistence +on the greatest concentration possible +with proper regard for the circumstances, +for the tactical envelopment arranged +on or near the field to strategical envelopment +with divided forces arranged beforehand. +In this matter I will again quote +General v. Caemmerer, who disagrees +with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims +the oblique front as the most +effective strategic form of attack, ... that +is to say, when the whole army with +one united front falls upon the strategic +<em>flank</em> of the enemy, and, if victorious,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">203</a></span> +cuts him from his line of retreat. But +where such a situation cannot be brought +about, where our advance has brought +us before the strategic <em>front</em> of the enemy, +then he sees in the tactical envelopment, +in the formation of an offensive flank, +the proper means of effectively preparing +to push the enemy from his line of retreat, +and he distinctly explains that tactical +envelopment need not at all be the +<em>consequence</em> of strategical envelopment, +and need not at all be prepared long +beforehand by a corresponding advance +of divided forces."</p> + +<p>Clausewitz says, "The consequence of +this is that battles fought with enveloping +lines, or even with an oblique front, +which should properly result from an +advantageous relation of the lines of +communication, are commonly the result +of a moral and physical <span class="locked">preponderance."<a name="FNanchor_74" id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">74</a></span><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">204</a></span> +Also "he should therefore only advance +with his columns on such a width of +front as will admit of their all coming +into action together." "Such separation +into several columns should be made use +of for the disposition of the tactical attack +in the enveloping form" (<abbr>i.e.</abbr> by troops +within a day's march of each other). +"But it must be only of a tactical nature, +for a strategic envelopment, when a great +blow is to be struck, is a complete waste +of power."</p> + +<p>General v. Caemmerer comments: "He +is thus of opinion that the lateral movement +of part of the army against the +flank of the enemy could without any +difficulty still be carried out as initiated +by the plan of battle; and in order to +understand this idea we must again bear +in mind the difference between the fire-effect +of then and now. In those days a +comparatively short movement made it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">205</a></span> +still possible for a considerable portion +of the army to gain the defenders' flank; +to-day a lengthy and troublesome operation +would be necessary for the same +object, and its successful execution would +only be counted upon if the defender +remained entirely passive, and would +neither think of a counter-stroke nor +of a corresponding movement of his +forces to the threatened flank."</p> + +<p>Without going into this controversy I +will, however, quote the excellent reason +given by Clausewitz for his preference for +tactical as opposed to strategical envelopment: +"One peculiarity of the offensive +battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, +as to the position (note, and strength) +of the enemy; it is a complete groping +about amongst things that are unknown +(Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena, +Katzbach). The more this is the case +the more concentration of forces becomes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">206</a></span> +paramount, and turning a flank to be +preferred to <span class="locked">surrounding."<a name="FNanchor_75" id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a></span></p> + +<p>It is also well to recollect how many +famous generals had been ruined in +Clausewitz's experience through over-extension +or dispersion of their forces. +The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals +in the winter of 1813, Macdonald +at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren, +Ney at Dennewitz, which neutralized +Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and +began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to +this cause.</p> + +<p>And the weather may, again, have as +great influence in shortening resistance +and allowing troops to be overwhelmed +before the too-distant reinforcements +arrive, as it had in those battles. If the +weather then prevented the old muskets +going off, and enabled the attack to rush +the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">207</a></span> +snow, by restricting the field of view +and fire, may produce the same results. +When one thinks of the number of great +battles fought in such weather, as they +may well be again, one sees an additional +reason for carefully considering Clausewitz's +warning. Far from relegating his +preference for the tactical as opposed to +the strategical envelopment to the region +of the obsolete, because of our improved +armament, it seems right to give it full +weight as a corrective to a perceivable +tendency to elevate strategical envelopment +(after Königgrätz) into a formula +for victory. If in the past many great +generals have been ruined by over-extension, +so may they be again. Against +this tendency Clausewitz will for ever +lift his voice.</p> + +<p>Also it remains to be considered, with +the huge armies of to-day and the future, +such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">208</a></span> +such armies as may possibly one day +join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical +envelopment will be practicable, or +whether tactical envelopment, such as +General Kuroki's tactical enveloping +movement on Yentai, and the Russian +line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General +Nogi's tactical enveloping dash northward +on Hsinminting and the railway +at Mukden, will not be preferable.</p> + +<p>Perhaps, as a compromise, one might +call such a movement strategical-tactical, +and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of +words.</p> + +<p>I have not attempted to do more than +roughly indicate that the solution of +these four disputed tactical questions in +Clausewitz is to be sought in a study of +the latest campaign, as he would have +said himself; that is, the campaign in +Manchuria. For, as the <i>Times</i> correspondent +in the XLVth Chapter, "Clausewitz<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">209</a></span> +in Manchuria," of his book "The +War in the Far East," observes, "It will +be abundantly clear to any one who +has followed the great battles in Manchuria +that the spirit of Clausewitz has +presided over Japanese victories and wept +over Russian defeats."</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">213</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII</a><br /> + +<span class="subhead">CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ</span></h2> + +<p>In reading Clausewitz it is, first, the +great principles of the nature of war +founded on human nature, which alter +not; and, secondly, it is his spirit and +practical way of looking at things that +we want to assimilate and apply to <span class="smcap smaller">THE +PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY</span>, to which end it +is necessary to read him always with +the changed conditions of to-day in our +minds, and think what he would have +said under the circumstances. These +changes are <span class="locked">chiefly:​—​</span></p> + +<ul> +<li>(1) The improved net-work of roads.</li> +<li>(2) Railways.</li> +<li>(3) Telegraphs, wire and wireless.</li> +<li>(4) Improved arms.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">214</a></span></li> +<li>(5) Aviation</li> +<li>(6) Universal service armies.</li> +</ul> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Improved Net-work of Roads</span></h3> + +<p>The improved net-work of roads in +Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria, or +in Afghanistan where we have to consider +our future strategy, but in Europe), +as General v. Caemmerer puts it, "now +offers to the movements of armies everywhere +a whole series of useful roads +where formerly one or two only were +available," easier gradients, good bridges +instead of unreliable ones, etc. So that +the march-discipline of that day when +concentrated for battle, artillery and train +<em>on</em> the roads, infantry and cavalry <em>by the +side</em> of the roads, has disappeared. Such +close concentration is therefore now not +possible, as we move all arms <em>on</em> the road,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">215</a></span> +and an army corps with train, or two +without, is the most that we can now +calculate on bringing into action in one +day on one road.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Railways</span></h3> + +<p>"Railways have, above all, completely +altered the term 'base,'" remarks V. +Caemmerer. "Railways carry in a few +days men, horses, vehicles, and materials +of all kinds from the remotest district +to any desired point of our country, and +nobody would any longer think of accumulating +enormous supplies of all kinds +at certain fortified points on his own +frontier with the object of basing himself +on those points. One does not base one's +self any longer on a distinct district +which is specially prepared for that +object, but upon the whole country, +which has become one single magazine,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">216</a></span> +with separate store-rooms. So the term +'base' has now to be considered in this +light."</p> + +<p>It is only when operating in savage +or semi-savage countries, where there +are no railways, that the old idea of a +base applies.</p> + +<p>As we penetrate deeper and further +from our own country into the enemy's, +and as a small raiding party can demolish +the railway line so as to stop all traffic +for days or weeks, it becomes far more +necessary than it ever was in Clausewitz's +day to guard our communications. And +armies become more and more sensitive +to any attack upon their communications.</p> + +<p>Also "such a line cannot easily be +changed, and consequently those celebrated +changes of the line of communication +in an enemy's country which +Napoleon himself, on some occasion, +declared to be the ablest manœuvre in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">217</a></span> +the art of war, could scarcely be carried +out any more" (V. Caemmerer).</p> + +<p>Also concentration by means of several +railways demands a broad strategic front, +which produces that separation of corps +or armies which prepares the way for +strategical envelopment, and so on.</p> + +<p>General von der Goltz, in his "Conduct +of War," says: "The more recent +treatises on the conduct of war on a +large scale are principally taken up with +the mobilization and strategical concentration +of armies, a department of +strategy which only began to play an +important part in modern times. It is +the result of a dense net-work of railways +in Western Europe which has rendered +it possible to mass large bodies of troops +in a surprisingly brief time. Each Power +tries to outdo its neighbours in this +respect, ... which gives an opportunity +to the strategical specialist to show off<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">218</a></span> +his brilliant qualities.... Consequently +it is now frequently assumed that the +whole conduct of war is comprised in +this one section of it." This over-estimate +is of course an error, which, however, +requires to be pointed out.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Telegraphs</span></h3> + +<p>The telegraph has very greatly reduced +the danger of separation. The great +advantage of the inner line in the day +of Napoleon and of Clausewitz was that +separated forces could only communicate +by mounted messengers, so if the enemy +got between them they could not communicate +at all, nor act in concert. +This the telegraph has completely altered, +for as the field telegraph can now be laid +as quickly as an army can advance, the +most widely separated bodies of troops +can every day arrange combined operations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">219</a></span> +by telegraph through, if necessary, +a point one hundred or four hundred +miles in rear. So that to-day the chief +advantage of the inner line has gone, +while its chief disadvantage, the possibility +of being surrounded, remains.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Maps</span></h3> + +<p>We now possess complete detailed Ordnance +maps of every country in Europe, +kept up to date by the latest alterations, +whereas in the days of Clausewitz maps +were of the very roughest character, and +quite unreliable in comparison.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Improved Arms</span></h3> + +<p>Smokeless powder, quick-firing and +long-ranging artillery and rifles, the infantry +field of effective fire being ten +times, the artillery five times what it +was in Clausewitz's time, have all to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">220</a></span> +borne in mind when reading the tactical +part of his writings. In consequence, +also, cover and the tactical use of ground +are of far greater importance now than +then, etc., etc., etc.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Aviation</span></h3> + +<p>The recent wonderful developments in +aviation will obviously almost revolutionize +"Information in War." To what +extent, it is as yet impossible to say. +Each year will teach us more.</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Nation-in-Arms</span></h3> + +<p>The nation-in-arms as the common +foundation of all armies (except our +own), brought up by railways, vastly +increases the numbers in a modern battle +from what they were in Clausewitz's day. +Compare Austerlitz, Dresden, Leipzig and +Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">221</a></span> +It should be so with us also, for as +General von der Goltz says in "The +Conduct of War": "The <span class="smcap smaller">BEST</span> military +organization is that which renders available +<span class="smcap smaller">ALL</span> the intellectual and material +resources of the country in event of war. +<em>A State is not justified in trying to defend +itself with only a portion of its strength, +when the existence of the whole is at +stake.</em>"</p> + +<p>In Great Britain the difference which +the introduction of this nation-in-arms +principle has made in our military strength +compared with that of our future opponents, +a difference relatively <span class="smcap smaller">FAR GREATER +AGAINST US</span> than it was in Napoleon's +and Clausewitz's day, is as yet hardly +realized by the people, or by our statesmen. +People forget the wastage of war, +and the necessity for a constant flow of +troops to repair that wastage. As Von +der Goltz puts it: "It is characteristic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">222</a></span> +of the strategical offensive that the foremost +body of troops of an army, the +portion which fights the battles, amounts +to only a comparatively small fraction, +frequently only <em>a quarter or even one-eighth</em>, +of the total fighting strength +employed, whilst the fate of the whole +army throughout depends upon the success +or failure of this fraction. <em>Attacking +armies melt away like snow in the spring.</em>" +To condense his remarks: "In spite of +the most admirable discipline, the Prussian +Guard Corps lost 5000 to 6000 men in +the marches between the attack on St. +Privat and the battle of Sedan." "Napoleon +crossed the Niemen in 1812 with +442,000 men, but reached Moscow only +three months later with only 95,000." +In the spring of 1810, the French crossed +the Pyrenees with 400,000 men, but +still Marshal Massena in the end only +brought 45,000 men up to the lines of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">223</a></span> +Torres Vedras, near Lisbon, where the +decision lay. Again, in 1829, the Russians +put 160,000 men in the field, but +had barely 20,000 left when, at Adrianople, +a skilfully concluded peace saved +them before their weakness became apparent +and a reaction set in. In 1878 the +Russians led 460,000 across the Danube, +but they only brought 100,000 men​—​of +whom only 43,000 were effective, the +rest being sick​—​to the gates of Constantinople. +In 1870 the Germans crossed +the French frontier with 372,000 men, +but after only a six weeks' campaign +brought but 171,000 men to Paris. And +so on. The result of it all is simple​—​that +a people which is not based on the +modern principle of the nation-in-arms +cannot for long rival or contend with +one that is, for it can neither put an equal +(still less a superior) army into the field +at the outset (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">vide</i> Clausewitz's first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">224</a></span> +principle), nor even maintain in the field +the <em>inferior</em> army it does place there, +because it cannot send the ever-required +fresh supplies of trained troops. Sooner +or later this must tell. Sooner or later a +situation must arise in which the nation +based on the obsolete voluntary system +<em>must</em> go down before a nation based on +the nation-in-arms principle. Circumstances +change with time, and, as wise +Lord Bacon said long ago, "He that will +not adopt new remedies must expect new +evils." May we adopt the remedy before +we experience the evil!</p> + +<h3><span class="smcap">The Moral and Spiritual Forces in War</span></h3> + +<p>But though these changed conditions +must, of course, <em>modify</em> Clausewitz's +details in many important particulars, +still (to complete our circle and leave off +where we started) I repeat that, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">225</a></span> +human nature never changes, and as +the moral is to the physical as three to +one in war, Clausewitz, as the great +realistic and practical philosopher on the +actual nature of war, as <em>the chief exponent +of the moral and spiritual forces in war</em>, +will ever remain invaluable in the study +of war.</p> + +<p>Consider what unsurpassed opportunities +he had for observing and reflecting +on the influence of enthusiasm and +passion, of resolution and boldness, of +vacillation and weakness, of coolness and +caution, of endurance and hardship, of +patriotism and freedom, of ambition and +of glory​—​on war, either by his own +experience or by conversation with other +equally experienced soldiers, during that +long period of almost endless wars between +1793 and 1815.</p> + +<p>The fervour and enthusiasm and boundless +energy of the Revolution, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">226</a></span> +drove the French forward, smashing +everything before them, at the beginning; +the ambition, military glory, plunder +and greed, which animated them later +on; the patriotism, religious and loyal +devotion, and stern endurance, which +nerved the Russian hosts then as now; +that awful Moscow winter campaign, +when human nature rose to its highest +and sank to its lowest, when the extremes +of heroic endurance and selfish callousness +were visible side by side; the +magnificent uprising of the spirit of +liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression +in Germany, which gave to the +Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same +driving force that revolutionary enthusiasm +had formerly given to the French; +the passing, therefore, in 1813 of the +moral superiority, the greater driving +force, from the French to the allies. +Clausewitz saw all this; he conversed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">227</a></span> +intimately with such men as Scharnhorst +and Gneisenau, who saw and guided it, +too. All his friends had seen it also. +No wonder, then, that such an unexampled +series of warlike phenomena +deeply impressed his reflective mind with +the supreme importance of the moral +and spiritual factors in war.</p> + +<p>His opportunities for long-continued +observation of warlike phenomena were +far greater than those of any writer +since his day, and it is to be hoped they +will remain so. For we have no desire +to see another series of wars such as the +Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that +there was then such a man as Clausewitz +to sum up for us so simply and so clearly +the accumulated experiences of those +long, long years of carnage and devastation.</p> + +<p class="p2 center smaller"><i>Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.</i></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<h2><a name="FOOTNOTES" id="FOOTNOTES">FOOTNOTES</a></h2> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> Book IV. Chap. 10.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_3" id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_4" id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> Book I. Chap. 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_5" id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_6" id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> Summary of Instruction, p. 120.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_7" id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> Book II. Chap. 6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_8" id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> Book II. Chap. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_9" id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_10" id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Book II. Chap. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_11" id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> Book II. Chap. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_12" id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> Book II. Chap. 2.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_13" id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> Book II. Chap. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_14" id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_15" id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force +the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable +to submission.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_16" id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_17" id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_18" id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> Author's "Introduction."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_19" id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_20" id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> Book VII. Chap. 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_21" id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> Book VII. Chap. 21.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_22" id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> Book VII. Chap. 21.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_23" id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_24" id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_25" id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_26" id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> Book I. Chap. 7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_27" id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> Book I. Chap. 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_28" id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> Book I. Chap. 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_29" id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> Book IV. Chap. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_30" id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_31" id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_32" id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> Book IV. Chap. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_33" id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> Book III. Chap. 15.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_34" id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> Book VII. Chap. 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_35" id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> Book I. Chap. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_36" id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> Book I. Chap. 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_37" id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> Book I. Chap. 7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_38" id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> Book III. Chap. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_39" id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> Book III. Chaps. 16–18.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_40" id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> Book II. Chap. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_41" id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> Book III. Chap. 11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_42" id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Book III. Chap. 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_43" id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> Book V. Chap. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_44" id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> Book III. Chap. 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_45" id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> Book VIII. Chap. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_46" id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> Book III. Chap. 12.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_47" id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> Book III. Chap. 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_48" id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> Book III. Chap. 12.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_49" id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> Book III. Chap. 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_50" id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> Book III. Chap. 8.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_51" id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> Book III. Chap. 11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_52" id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Book VI. Chap. 28.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_53" id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> Book V. Chap. 10.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_54" id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> Book I. Chap. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_55" id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> Book III. Chap. 13.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_56" id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> Book I. Chap. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_57" id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_58" id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_59" id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_60" id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> Book I. Chap. 3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_61" id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> This warning as to the consequences of allowing +information to be published freely which would be helpful +to an enemy was written five years ago. In the +present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and its +loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the +enemy of any helpful information, show that the lesson +here insisted on has been learned.​—​Editor's Note.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_62" id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> Book IV. Chap. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_63" id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> Book IV. Chap. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_64" id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> "Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136–146.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_65" id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="fnanchor">65</a> Book IV. Chap. 4.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_66" id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> Book VI. Chap. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_67" id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_68" id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> Book VI. Chap. 5.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_69" id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> Book VIII. Chap. 9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_70" id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> Book VII. Chap. 15.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_71" id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_72" id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="fnanchor">72</a> Book VI. Chap. 9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_73" id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> Book VII. Chap. 9.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_74" id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> Book VII. Chap. 7.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_75" id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="fnanchor">75</a> Book VII. Chap. 7.</p></div> +</div> + +<div class="transnote"> +<h2><a name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber's Notes</a></h2> + +<p>Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant +preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> + +<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced +quotation marks retained.</p> + +<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p> + +<p>Page <a href="#Page_133">133</a>: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period.</p> +</div> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Reality of War, by Stewart L. 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