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| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-14 19:04:38 -0700 |
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| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-14 19:04:38 -0700 |
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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/45823-0.txt b/45823-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dda529b --- /dev/null +++ b/45823-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1635 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 45823 *** + + ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM + + BY + CHARLES ROBERT NEWMAN + (Brother of Cardinal Newman.) + + WITH PREFACE + BY + GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE. + + AND + + BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH + BY + J. M. WHEELER. + + + + LONDON: + PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY, + 28 Stonecutter Street, E.C. + 1891 + + + + + + + + LONDON: + PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTE, + 28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C. + + + + + + + +ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM. + + +PUBLISHER'S NOTE. + + +Whether this little volume will find sufficient patrons to defray +the cost of its production is at least doubtful. The writer whose +essays it contains lived in obscurity and will never be popular. But +he possessed a fine intellect, however frustrated by circumstances; +he belonged to an illustrious family; and it is well to let the public +have access to the opinions of a brother of Cardinal Newman and of +Professor Newman, a brother who took his own course, as they did, +and thought out for himself an independent philosophy. + +All Charles Robert Newman's writings that are known to have been +printed, appeared in the Reasoner, edited by Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, +at various dates during 1860-61. With trifling exceptions they are +all reprinted in this collection. + +Mr. Holyoake has kindly supplied a brief account of the atheistic +Newman, and Mr. J. M. Wheeler has gathered all the information that +is obtainable as to his life and personality. + + + + + + + +BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. + + +Of Charles Robert Newman, until the death of his brother, the Cardinal, +almost nothing was known. Some reminiscences of him by Mr. Thomas +Purnell and Precentor Edmund Venables appeared in the Athenæum at +the time of his death in 1884, and these remain the chief sources +of information concerning him. Mr. G. J. Holyoake also, in his paper +The Present Day, wrote: "If the public come to know more of Charles +R. Newman, it will be seen that all the brothers, John Henry, Francis +William, and Charles R. Newman, were men of unusual distinction of +character, and that while each held diverse views, all had the family +qualities of perspicacity, candor and conscience." But these notes +attracted little attention. Most people were under the impression +there were only two brothers, who had long figured in the public eye +as types of the opposite courses of modern thought towards Romanism +and Rationalism. Yet the real type of antagonism to Rome was to be +found in Charles Robert, who is dismissed by the Rev. Thomas Mozley +with the words: "There was also another brother, not without his +share in the heritage of natural gifts." + +In a notable passage on change of religion, in his Essay in Aid of +a Grammar of Assent, chap. vii., Cardinal Newman seems to allude +to the career of himself and his brothers. He says: "Thus of three +Protestants, one becomes a Catholic, a second a Unitarian, and a +third an unbeliever: how is this? The first becomes a Catholic, +because he assented, as a Protestant, to the doctrine of our Lord's +divinity, with a real assent and a genuine conviction, and because +this certitude, taking possession of his mind, led him on to welcome +the Catholic doctrines of the Real Presence and of the Theotocos, +till his Protestantism fell off from him, and he submitted himself +to the Church. The second became a Unitarian, because, proceeding +on the principle that Scripture was the rule of faith, and that a +man's private judgment was its rule of interpretation, and finding +that the doctrine of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds did not follow +by logical necessity from the text of Scripture, he said to himself, +'The word of God has been made of none effect by the traditions of +men,' and therefore nothing was left for him but to profess what he +considered primitive Christianity and to become a Humanitarian. The +third gradually subsided into infidelity, because he started with +the Protestant dogma, cherished in the depths of his nature, that a +priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the Gospel. First, +then, he would protest against the sacrifice of the Mass; next he gave +up baptismal regeneration and the sacramental principle; then he asked +himself whether dogmas were not a restraint on Christian liberty as +well as Sacraments; then came the question, What after all was the +use of teachers of religion? Why should any one stand between him and +his Maker? After a time it struck him that this obvious question had +to be answered by the Apostles, as well as by the Anglican clergy; +so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revelation of God +to man is that which is written on the heart. This did for a time, +and he remained a Deist. But then it occurred to him, that this inward +moral law was there within the breast, whether there was a God or not, +and that it was a roundabout way of enforcing that law, to say that it +came from God and simply unnecessary, considering it carried with it +its own sacred and sovereign authority, as our feelings instinctively +testified, and when he turned to look at the physical world around +him, he really did not see what scientific proof there was of the +Being of God at all, and it seemed to him as if all things would +go quite as well as at present without that hypothesis as with it; +so he dropped it, and became a purus putus Atheist." + +I have transcribed this lengthy, but remarkable passage, not because +I think it correctly describes the process of thought in his two +brothers, but rather as an illustration that his own imaginative +synthesis of their position derives its life and force from the fact +that he had before him concrete instances in the person of his own +nearest relatives. + +Charles Robert Newman, younger brother of the Cardinal and elder +brother of the Professor, was born on June 16, 1802, being one year and +four months the junior of the former, and three years the senior of the +latter. [1] Their father, a London man, and friend of Capel the eminent +stockbroker, from having been clerk in a bank, became a partner, +though he afterwards failed at a time of great commercial depression, +both in this business and as a brewer. He was a Freemason, a musician, +and had schemes of social improvement by reclaiming waste land and +planting with trees. In religion his views appear to have been of a +broad cast approximating to those of Benjamin Franklin. The mother, +whose maiden name was Jemima Fourdrinier, was of Hugenot family, and +of religious cast of mind. There were six children, equally divided +as to sex. Harriet, the eldest girl, married the Rev. Thomas Mozley; +Jemima, the second, married Mr. John Mozley; while Mary, the youngest, +died unmarried. + +Charles Robert was educated at the same school as his two brothers, +John Henry and Francis William, that of Dr. George Nicholas at Ealing, +Middlesex. + +Of the influences which moulded his mind we can only speak from what +is known of his brothers. John Henry has told how, in youth, he read +Paine's tracts against the Old Testament--we presume he means the +Age of Reason--and also boasted of reading Hume, though, as he says, +this was possibly but by way of brag. + +Evidently, though the family was brought up in the habit of Bible +reading, there was considerable freedom allowed as to the direction of +their studies. While the father lived family prayer was unknown, nor +was there any inculcation of dogma. "We read," says Francis William, +"the Psalms appointed by the church every day, and went to the parish +church on Sunday." + +Francis William Newman, in his "Contributions, Chiefly to the Early +History of Cardinal Newman," says: "In opening life, my brother +C. R. N. became a convert to Robert Owen, the philanthropic Socialist, +who was then an Atheist. [2] But soon breaking loose from him, +Charles tried to originate a 'New Moral World' of his own, which +seemed to others absurd and immoral, as well as very unamiable. He +disowned us all, on my father's death, as 'too religious for him.' To +keep a friend, or to act under a superior, seemed alike impossible +to him. His brother (the late Cardinal) humbled himself to beg a +clerkship for him in the Bank of England; but Charles thought it +'his duty' to write to the Directors letters of advice, so they could +not keep him. Nor could he keep any place long. He said he ought to +take a literary degree at Bonn: his two brothers managed it for him, +but he came away without seeking the degree. His brother-in-law, +the Rev. Thomas Mozley, then took him up very liberally; but after +my sister Harriet's death, J. H. N. and I bore his expenses to his +dying day. His meanness seemed to me like that of an old cynic; +yet his moderation was exemplary, and at last he undoubtedly won the +respect of the mother and daughter who waited on him." + +In this, which is nearly all he has to say of this elder brother, +it appears to me Professor Newman has either said too little or +too much. The title of his work did not necessitate any reference +to Charles Robert; but having said so much he should at least have +explained further. For instance, in reference to the visit to Bonn, +it was exceedingly natural in the second brother seeking to take a +degree, since both his senior and junior had a college education. That +he did not share in this advantage may have well tended to sour +his life. Mr. Meynell explains why he returned without seeking the +degree. He says: "But he came away without even offering himself for +examination, a step he explained by saying that the judges would not +grant him a degree because he had given offence by his treatment of +faith and morals [it is a Catholic who writes] in an essay which they +call teterrima." Charles may have acted with extreme imprudence, both +in regard to the bank directors and the Bonn examiners; but we should +need to know the cases before we can determine whether he was actuated +by wilful waywardness or by adherence to a higher than common standard +of conduct. Each of the brothers had evidently exquisite sensitiveness +of conscience, though, as proved by the Professor's last book--that +unique criticism of a brother who died at ninety by another aged +eighty-five--they could not always enter into sympathy with each other. + +Of this we may be quite sure. The life of one who had thought himself +into Atheism, yet contemplated becoming a tutor, must have been a most +uncomfortable one. The treatment he was likely to receive could not +be calculated to evoke his better qualities. Finding everywhere his +Atheism a bar to his advancement, whose is the fault if it resulted +in a character of petulance and cynicism, and in--what it evidently +did result in--a largely wasted life? + +The Rev. Edward Venables, Precentor of Lincoln, speaks of him as having +been, between 1834 and 1844, usher in a large school for farmers' sons, +kept by a Mr. Allfree at Windmill Hill, in the parish of Herstmonceaux, +Sussex, where Julius Charles Hare, Archdeacon of Lewes, was rector, +and John Sterling for a short while curate. Mr. Venables says Newman +"interested Archdeacon Hare very much, and I have often heard him +speak of the long conversations he had had with him on literary +and philosophical subjects, and of the remarkable mental power he +displayed. At that time the future Cardinal's brother had entirely +discarded the Christian faith, and declared himself an unbeliever +in revelation." There can be no doubt the tribute from Hare, a man +of very superior culture, was deserved, though the archdeacon also +expressed the opinion "there was a screw loose somewhere." + +The task of teaching the Sussex rustics was, as Precentor Venables +remarks, intolerably irksome to a man of Newman's high intellectual +power. It was like chopping logs with a fine-edged razor. His +relations with his principal became strained, and a tussle between +the usher and his class led to his dismissal. At this time he +was miserably poor. Precentor Venables says: "To Hare he lamented +the narrow-mindedness of his brothers John and Francis, who, as he +asserted, had entirely cast him off, and left him to fight his way in +the world unaided, because of his professed infidelity, in which the +younger of the two, then an ardent Evangelical, was before very long +to follow him." No reproach whatever is due to the younger brother on +this account, and the elder is probably as little blameworthy. John +Henry could not be expected to recommend as tutor one whose views +upon faith and morals he considered unsound. Francis William had +gone to Bagdad with the object of assisting in a Christian mission, +and intercourse with Mohammedans and other studies were but gradually +loosening his orthodoxy. After his return, and when his works and +professorship at London University assured his position, he put himself +into regular monthly communication with his brother. In the meantime +he had been assisted by his sister Harriet's husband. But the iron had +already entered his soul; he was an Atheist and an outcast. Forced to +receive the bounty of relatives who deplored his opinions, he seems to +have resented their kindness as an attempt to bribe his intellectual +conscience. The world rang with the fame--as theologian, historian, +poet, and preacher--of the elder, whose creed he had outgrown and +despised; while his convictions, to the full as honest, everywhere +stood in his way, and were contemned as an offence against faith and +morals. He had no contact with minds congenial to his own, and doomed +himself to the life of a recluse. + +Each of the brothers was of a retiring, meditative disposition. Reading +the Apologia Pro Vita Sua of the eldest, one may see how this +contributed towards his seeking a refuge in the Catholic Church. The +same disposition of mind may be traced in the Phases of Faith of +the youngest, equally impelling him from the evangelicalism of his +surroundings and leading to the rejection of historic Christianity, +and finally to the surrender of all belief in revelation. In Charles +Robert Newman the same qualities were seen to excess, removing him +from contact with his fellows to the life of a solitary thinker in +a quiet Welsh watering-place. From about 1853, he had a room in a +small cottage on the Marsh road, Tenby. + +Mr. Thomas Purnell, who says he had for years "the inestimable +privilege of enjoying his close intimacy," remarks, "never before +or since have I met a man endowed with as rare an intellectual +equipment." Mr. Purnell thus describes his own first visit to the +recluse: "He stood at the top of the topmost stair. I cannot imagine a +more distinguished head and face. There was a touch of Mephistopheles +in him. There was also a touch of Jupiter Olympius. Although dressed +in ill-fitting clothes, and with a sort of blanket over his shoulders, +he appeared to me to be the ideal of courtly grace. He bowed me without +a word into his apartments. This was in the roof of the building, +and the only light came from a window which opened with a notched iron +bar. The room was as meagrely furnished as Goethe's study in Weimar. A +bed, a chest of drawers, a table and two or three chairs, with a few +books, constituted the whole goods and chattels." Mr. Purnell says +"his health, means and inclination made him averse to society. The +rector called on him, but was not admitted; visitors to the town who +had known his brothers would send in their cards, but they received no +response; local medical men, when they heard he was ill, volunteered +their services, but they were declined with courteous thanks conveyed +by letter." + +It appears he but seldom left his house, and when he went out he did +not often enter the town, but took his exercise in the road which +led into the country. Dressed in a pea-jacket, with a shawl or a rug +thrown across his shoulders, and with a sou'-wester over his head, he +marched erect, looking neither to left nor right. He wore shoes, and, +as his trousers were short, displayed an interval of white socks. The +lads and lasses were apt to regard such a figure with derision. + +It was through Mr. Purnell that he communicated the papers here +reprinted to the Reasoner. Although but of the character of fragments, +they bespeak an original mind. The secret of the Cardinal's great +influence and strength was that what he spoke and wrote came not +from books, but forthright out of his own head and heart. The topics +with which his brother deals were those only needing the mind, +and his treatment shows they were viewed in the dry light of an +original intellect. The Reasoner ceased soon after the appearance +of these papers, and thus closed the one opening for his literary +activity. Francis William Newman was, at least till the present year, +unaware that his arguments for Theism were challenged by his own +brother under the signature of "A Recluse." He informs me that he +had never heard that anyone would publish anything from his pen, and +that he heard that at his death, in March, 1884, he left a box full +of manuscripts, which were destroyed as useless. Whether this was done +by order of his relatives, whether the landlady decided the question, +or whether the vicar or neighbors were called in, will perhaps remain +as unknown as the worth of the manuscripts. The following specimens +are all by which the latter question can be judged. + +Mr. Meynell says that two years before he died he had a short visit +from his eldest brother. It must have been a strange meeting, and +one worthy the brush of a great artist. Surely in all England there +were not two men of eighty whose thoughts were so divergent or two +brothers whose lives were so diversified. The one a saintly cardinal, +called by the Pope the Light of England, who, by his rare urbanity, +had gained the respect of all, replete with all that should accompany +old age--as honor, love, obedience, troops of friends: the other, +fallen, too, into the sere and yellow leaf, and without them all--poor, +solitary, unknown and despised, a scorn and wonderment to his nearest +neighbors. And all from following his own thought that had made him +a purus putus Atheist. + + + J. M. Wheeler. + + + + + + + +CHARACTER OF CHARLES NEWMAN. + + +There is little to say and less need to add anything to what +Mr. Wheeler writes, whose industry and discernment collect together all +the accessible facts of his subject. My knowledge of Charles Robert +Newman is confined to his correspondence, which, with my present +engagements, I could not refer to and examine without delaying the +printer longer than would be convenient to you, as Mr. Wheeler's +article is in type. The impression Mr. C. R. Newman conveyed to me by +his letters is, I judge, sufficient for the purpose in hand. Charles +Newman had an intermittent mind. He would write with great force +and clearness, and in another letter, which was confused in parts, +he would frankly say that his mind was leaving him, as was its wont +as I understood him, and after a few months less or more, it would +return to him, when he would write again. In this manly frankness +and strong self-consciousness he resembled his two eminent brothers +Francis and John. I trusted to his friend Mr. Purnell, who was the +medium in communicating with me, to send me further letters when +Mr. Charles was able or disposed to write them. I expected to hear +from him again. Much occupied with debates and otherwise at the time, +I neglected writing further to him myself. Afterwards thinking his +disablement might have grown upon him with years, disinclined me +from asking him to resume his letters. Mr. Wheeler seems ignorant of +Charles Newman's mental peculiarity, and does not recognise what may +be generous delicacy on the part of his brothers in not referring to +it. To do so would have subjected them to the imputation, very frequent +formerly, of imputing difference of opinion to want of saneness. Even +so liberal a preacher as W. J. Fox accounted, in 1841, for my disbelief +in Theism by conjecturing the existence of some mental deficiency. No +doubt many persons with whom Charles Newman had dealings in offices +he held, would regard his Atheism--which it was contrary to his nature +to conceal--as a personal disqualification. He avowed his opinions as +naturally and as boldly as Professor Newman and the Cardinal avowed +theirs. It is not conceivable that Cardinal Newman ever intermitted +his aid--or Professor Newman either--on this account. They were both +incapable of personal intolerance. They might deplore that their +brother Charles's opinions were so alien, so contrary to theirs; +but this they would never make matter of reproach. It was doubtless +a great trial to them that their brother, having fine powers like +their own, making no persistent effort for his own maintenance, +although he knew it must render independence impossible. Possibly +the solitariness which he chose caused his tendency to unusualness +of conduct, not to say eccentricity, to grow upon him--which they +could not control or mitigate without an interference, which might +subject them to resentment and reproach. Charles no doubt inherited +his father's sympathy for social improvement, which led to his sharing +Robert Owen's sociologic views. But he did not acquire his Atheism +from Robert Owen--as Professor Newman has said--for Robert Owen was +not an Atheist--always believing in some Great Power. + +Professor Newman has told me that in any further edition of his +little book upon his brother, the Cardinal, he will, on my authority, +correct his description of Robert Owen as an Atheist. Charles owed +his Atheism to himself, as his brothers owed their opinions to their +own conclusions and reflections. Charles not taking a degree was less +likely to be owing to means not being furnished to him than to his +intermittent indecision of mind and his strong discernment, which +produced satisfaction with the world, with others, and with himself. + + + George Jacob Holyoake. + + + + + + + +TWO PRINCIPLES OF ORDER. + + +In my proof of the invalidity of that argument--it being indeed what +is called "the Argument from Design"--I point out that our experience +simultaneously informs us of two modes of producing order, otherwise +called arrangement, relation of parts to each other and to the whole +direction of means towards some recognisable end; or, to describe +the phenomenon in the most summary, as well as the most practical, +way--two modes of producing effects identical with those that proceed +from design. I explain that, of these two principles of order, the one +is Design itself, a modus operandi of intelligence (such as we find +it here below, of which the human mind affords the best examples), +while the other is something to which no name has been assigned, +and which, consequently, we can only shortly describe by saying that +it is not design. It becomes necessary, therefore, to give a farther +periphrastic account of it as follows:-- + +This nameless principle of order, considered as a vague popular +surmise, is as familiar to our experience as design. We all +see, for instance, that water has a tendency to form a perfectly +level and horizontal surface, that heavy bodies fall to the earth +perpendicularly, that the plummet performs a straight line in just +the same direction, that dew-drops and soap-bubbles assume a globular +shape, that crystallisation observes similar artist-like rules, +and so on. We are accustomed to say, "It is the nature of things," +and we ground our daily actions on a confidence in this regularity of +proceeding, without generally attempting to explain it. Science comes +to our help, and shows us that this orderly action of things around +us may be traced to, and is the necessary result of, the operation of +certain powers or properties inherent in these natural things. Grant +that the property called gravitation belongs to moving bodies, +and an innumerable quantity of orderly phenomena may be predicated +as springing of their own accord by inevitable consequence from +this datum; which same phenomena, moreover, intelligence is able +coincidently to reproduce in its own special mental way. + +Here, then, is a principle of order, less popularly appreciated, +but not less certainly evidenced and known, than design. It is, no +doubt, a principle infinitely inferior in dignity, for it is blind +and unintelligent, while design sees and understands, but this is +not the question. The question, superseded by an answer derived from +human experience, is to this effect--that nature and natural things +are, with no less propriety, assignable as the doers of a certain +non-designing kind of order, than man is assignable as the doer of +the designing kind; that we just as truly perceive that nature, +in the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in +her, produces order in a dew-drop or in a crystal, as that man, in +the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in him, +produces order in a poem or in a cathedral, and that, consequently, +the argument from design, based as it is on the assertion that our +experience assures us of only one principle of order, is invalid. + +Mr. F. W. Newman's argument is one of this erroneous class. He points +to "Animal Instincts" as an effect, which, owing to our knowing of +no other agency by which it could have been produced, can alone +be accounted for by reference to a designer, and consequently as +manifesting the objective existence of that designer, who could only be +the theistic God. The question that Mr. F. Newman's adduced instance +required him to consider was, whether the non-designing principle of +order, which, we are aware, is in many cases able to produce the same +effects as the other, could have been thus operative here, and he had +got to prove that it could not have been so, that there was something +in the nature of the case that forced us exclusively to have recourse +to the intelligent principle of order, and resisted any solution from +the other principle. The result of a proof so conducted would have +been, that Mr. F. Newman was entitled to conclude that (granting our +earthly experience was a sufficient test of the matter) Design must +have been the sole worker of the debated phenomenon. He would then +have established his theistic argument. Instead of doing this, he +simplifies his proceeding by being incognisant of a notorious fact, +and ignoring the non-designing principle altogether. + +1. The fact is, that there is not one way only of producing the +phenomena of design (I am here using an ordinary elliptical mode +of speaking, since literal metaphysical correctness is sometimes +cumbrous)--but there are two ways: one, the mind of a designer, and +the other (whatever may be its nature, which the present question +does not call upon me to define) not the mind of a designer. + +2. The shortest way of proving this theorem, is to state that there +are two ways of your obtaining a facsimile of your own person. One +is to have your portrait taken, and the other is to stand before +a looking-glass, and that of these two ways the former is that of +design, and the latter confessedly not design, being the well-known +necessary effect of certain so-called second causes, whose operation +in this instance is familiar to modern science. + +3. Consequently, S. D. Collet is incorrect in the principle which +she makes the foundation of her argument at p. 27, where it is said, +"What the Theist maintains is this, that when we see the exercise of +Force in the direction of a purpose, we, by an inevitable inference, +attribute the phenomenon to some conscious agent." + +4. Force is seen to be exercised in the direction of a purpose--the +purpose being that of producing similitude--with equal evidence in +the two cases just compared; for though the force exercised in said +direction is less in the case of the painter than it is in that of the +looking-glass (for the resemblance produced by the former is in less +degree a resemblance than that produced by the latter), the evidence +cannot be said to be less, since it is no less able to convince. We +are as perfectly sure that the painter could not have produced that +lesser similitude of a man, and a particular man, by chance (the +alternative of this supposition, according to our experience, being +that he must have used design) as we are that the looking-glass could +not have produced that greater similitude of a man, and a particular +man, by chance (the alternative of this supposition, according to +our experience, being that it must have used certain so-called laws +of nature); this collective experience of ours, equally assuring us +on the one hand, that the only way of the painter's achieving these +effects is by design, and on the other, that the only way of the +looking-glass's doing so, is by the natural agencies referred to. + +5. The human experience on which the decision of this question must +be founded--though not at the present era essentially different--may +yet be said to be considerably so from what it was in certain former +periods. In no times could mankind think and observe without becoming +aware of these two principles of order--whether you call them facts +or inferences--as a portion of their familiar experience. And so far +as they might have compared them, they must have abundantly seen that +the natural one is more powerful than the artificial one, and that the +straight line or the circle must seek its perfection much rather from +the plummet or the revolving radius, than from the pencil of Apelles. + +6. Thus the essential point of the existence of the two principles +has always been known, but the idea of their respective spheres and +limits, of the efficient prevalence of each within our experience, has +fluctuated in society. Art and handicraft are, of course, peculiarly +competent to appreciate the artificial principle of order, while +physical science is especially conversant with the natural one. As the +ancients were equal to the moderns in the former pursuits, but vastly +inferior to them in the latter, they must so far have had a tendency to +think more of the designing principle, and less of the other principle +than we do. But it must be remembered, that one or other of these two +principles, or at least the arbitrament between them, is the animating +basis of all religion, and of all religious sects and persuasions; +and further, that of these two principles, the religion founded on +the artificial one, which is the one traditionally derived to us, +is liable to be, and is wont to be, a far more powerful religion +(because it deals far more intensely in personification, having +reference singly to some supposed artist) than either the religion +that is constituted by the natural principle, or that which results +from a mixture of the two principles. And indeed, I will incidentally +say that this last kind of religion seems to me to have much analogy +on its side, and that the old idea of "the two principles" might, +on several grounds besides the present one, and in several respects, +perhaps, be found to shadow forth a certain amount of most important +truth and applicability. + +7. To return. By considering the state of religion and of religious +belief in the times of Socrates and Cicero, in connection with +the state of art, handicraft, and science, in the same time, and +coincidently taking care not to forget that religious sentiment +(that at least of the kind which had in their era already been, +and much more since has been, communicated from the east to the +west) is an incomparably more vigorous impeller of opinion, than +reason and argument; we shall have some of the principal data, and +in a main matter shall be prepared to use them judiciously in any +inquiry we might make, why it was that Socrates and Cicero, having +their attention arrested by the artificial principle of order and +arrangement, seemed absolutely to forget the existence of the natural +one, and why in consequence it was, that the latter wrote to this +effect: "He who can look up to the heavenly vault, and doubt the +existence of a one personal God, the designer and governor of all +things, is equivalent to a madman"; and why, further, we, spite of +our vast physical science, are prone to the same fallacy. + +8. Having thus proved that the argument of the Theist generally, +as well as the particular one advanced by S. D. C. at p. 27, is, by +being based on the erroneous statement that there is only one means +known to human experience, of producing phenomena identical with those +that are the product of design, and that this one is design itself; +there being, on the contrary, two such means, one of which is not +design; having, I say, proved that your argument, by being so based, +is invalid, I find I must fully agree with you, that there is evidence +of "an unmistakable cosmical unity." + +9. The true inquiry, therefore, is, which of those two principles +of order is, in the agency inquired into, the agent under these +circumstances, and whether both, and how far, under our ignorance of +what may be (a most important point that is carefully to be considered) +we are entitled to affirm as indubitable, to denounce as contradictory, +to advance as probable, to conjecture, to surmise, or to speculate +on this question. + + + + + + + +THE TRUTH OF FIRST PRINCIPLES. + + +1. You ask "my idea on the impossibility of proving the truth of +First Principles?" + +By "truth" you mean the ascertained existence of any idea or thing, +and the ascertained consistency of any statement with some such idea +or thing. + +By "principles" you mean not simply cardinal propositions, but cardinal +propositions that we have ascertained to be true. + +By "first principles" you mean the indubitably true but unprovable +elementary principles of all our knowledge. You mean that these +principles are the ground whereon we build in our reasonings; all that +we build upon them must, in consequence of being so built, admit of +being "proved" whether we have built rightly--that is, admit of being +subjected to the test whether the reasoning is correct; but these +"first principles" are confessedly exempted from this test, and yet +are received as true, no less than the others that have sustained this +ordeal. You ask the meaning of this privilege, whether it is right; +and, if so, to what propriety or necessity of the case it is due? + +2. You ask, "How is truth ascertained to be truth?" or, in other words, +"What is the criterion of truth?" + +With respect to the first query--In accordance with the definition I +have above given of truth, it would seem that it must have two sources, +experience and reason, experience who notifies the existence of +certain ideas or things, and reason, who forms propositions suggested +by them. Experience, therefore, acts the simple part of supplying +all the materials of truth; while reason, besides his acknowledged +office of judge of all truth, exercises the quite different function +of being himself the purveyor of a portion of it. + +So indubitable is it that truth can have these two sources only, +that even fanaticism would be found confessing the principle; while +it appeals to the experience of those who agree with it, as well as +professes to be reasonable. + +First principles must, accordingly, be of two kinds. Of those that +are based upon experience, I will give the following instances:--I +hear the chirping of a bird, and I see an inkstand before me. That +I have the sensation of hearing and seeing in these two cases, are +facts of which it is impossible I can doubt. Reason perceives that +these are primary facts or first principles, neither admitting nor +requiring any proof, testified by consciousness, and self-evidently +verified on that testimony. + +By reason, of course is meant the reason of all mankind--that is, +of all who are presumably competent to judge on the subject. So that +any just or reasonable confidence in the verdict of my own reason--in +this or in any other matter, presupposes a due comparison of my own +reason with that of others, nay, in some cases, a consideration of +the supposably more enlightened reason of future times. + +I discriminate first principles from derived ones thus:--"I see the +sun," is a first principle to me; "you see it," is a first principle to +you; by comparing these two ideas, each attains the derived principle +that the other sees what he does, and the further derived principle +that the sun is an existence independent of both. His own existence +is, indeed, to every one the first principle, by means of which he +infers the existence of other things and beings. + +In coming now to the other kind of first principles, consisting of +propositions formed by reason, we perceive that these show symptoms +of still further difference from the above, than that which results +from the difference of their source, of difference that affects their +philosophical character, and their technical right to the name under +which they present themselves to us. In short, the primary philosophy +has not yet settled their title. + +They are perceived by us to be true by an act of reason called +intuition. Not similarly, however, does our reason inform us that they +really are first principles, and our science is hitherto unequal to +this inquiry. + +Take, for instance, the following celebrated thesis, so often cited +as the most fundamental of all the propositions of reason, insomuch +as to be tacitly implied in all our reasonings; which yet we are +not sure is a first principle, all that can be said in favor of its +pretensions being that we can find no one who is able to reduce it +to more primary elements:-- + +It is impossible for a thing at the same time to be and not to be. + +Any one agreeing, as every one must, that this is true, might +still justly put the query, Why is it impossible? thereby calling +its assertion in question, demanding its credentials of proof, +seeking some ground for its truth other than its own testimony, and +hypothesising some other proposition more fundamental than it of which +it would be a derivative, and by all and each of these proceedings, +rejecting its claim to be a first principle. + +Its resisting our analysis is a good subjective ground for our ranking +this and other similar propositions among our first principles. But +they could only have the true claim by its being made clear that +the inability results from the nature of the case, and not from our +own incompetency. + +This test is borne by the former description of first principles; we +are able to see that the instances I adduced, such as the statements, +"I see the sun," "I see an inkstand," "I hear a bird," "I am conscious +that I exist," evade our power of ordinary proving, because they do +not admit of such proof. + +When we perceive that no one can answer this query, we are prompted to +another. Why cannot we answer it? whence our inability? what prevents +us? But here also we find ourselves completely in the dark, which is +somewhat strange, considering that in every human pursuit, whether of +science or any other, when we wish to do a thing and cannot do it, we +are generally able to specify some particular, either of self-defect +or outward impediment that is supposed to be in fault. But I imagine, +if the reader were to experiment on the specimen I have given, he +would not only find himself to fail in solving the problem, Why is +it that a thing cannot at once be and not be? but would not have a +word to advance in the way of accounting for his failure. + +These remarks apply to all other propositions of the sort. Euclid's +axioms, which undoubtedly aim to be as elementary as possible, and +therefore may be said to aim to be first principles, are confessedly, +under this aspect, unsatisfactory to the learned. "Things that are +equal to the same are equal to each other." Every one is inclined +to ask, Why? "A straight line is the shortest distance between two +points." Again, Why? + +The sum of the above strictures on this kind of so-called first +principles, is--1. That they have not made good their title, +and therefore are not to be accredited with it. 2. That there +is a decided presumption against that title from the doubt and +dissatisfaction with which it is met, where want of candor and +intelligence cannot be imputed, especially when it is considered that +the other, the sensuous experimental kind of first principles, have +so frank an acceptance. 3. It seems to be absolutely provable, and I +suppose I have above incidentally proved it, that they are not first +principles. 4. The task is set to metaphysics of supplying the most +satisfactory proof of all by bringing to light such propositions as +would be perceived to underlie these so-called first principles, and to +be the real first principles to which the others would give precedence. + +As regards their name, it being so much in point, excuses the old +remark that the elements of our knowledge stand in a reversed order +in respect to this knowledge to what they assume in our process of +acquiring it. A first principle, therefore, means also a last one; +it is the last in whatsoever endeavors to descend to the bottom or +to penetrate to the source of our knowledge, but it becomes the first +when we trace it from this source through its derivative ideas. + +The investigating act should not be confounded with the prospecting +one. The sensible horizon of subjective vision can, by no mediation, +be exalted into the real horizon of truth, wherein the genuine first +principles that bound human capability are exclusively to be found. + +It may be asked, apart from the inquiry what first principles there +are, Is there a necessity that some first principles should be? So it +seems from the data of the case. It is patent to common observation +that the mind of man is recipient of ideas from the things that +surround it. The contact of its apprehending faculty with the things it +apprehends, must, it would seem, constitute first principles. After it +has got them it might conceivably elicit from them derived principles, +but the original ones cannot be thus derived, since there are none +earlier from which to derive them. + +Again, it is to be inquired, Does the mind, in receiving its ideas, +possess and exercise in reference to the things on which it operates, +a copying faculty or a transforming faculty? Does it import them simply +in their native character, in the way a mirror does the object it +reflects, or does it manufacture, cook, and assimilate them, so as +to change them into something partaking of its own? + +And, if it changes them, what is the extent of the change? Does it +go so far only as the semi-idealism of Locke, or extend into the +absolute idealism of the German school? + +Because these questions have been wont to puzzle either the learned, +or the public, or both, it does not follow that they are difficult. I +suppose them to admit of decided answers before a supposed competent +audience. + +As I am unprovided with proof, although I suppose it is to be provable, +that first principles of reason must needs be, I must speculate for +a moment on the possibility of a proposition of the form of "two and +two make four," being derived from one of the form of "I scent the +rose," for this seems to be the alternative of there being no first +principles of reason. Evidently I must confess to having no grounds +for pronouncing such a derivation impossible, though I must grant +it to be paradoxical. Our mal-cultivation of non-material science, +and the imperfection of our metaphysics, is probably the only cause +of the strange predicament. + +No doubt M. Cousin, and several other eminent teachers of youth, +to whose office it belongs to expound received metaphysics, have +comprised First Principles in their course of philosophy; but as I +have barely met with any of their writings, I must confess such an +ignorance of them, as not even to know how far I am either adopting, +or evading their phraseology, in discussing the same subjects. Mine, +however, cannot be wrong, since the term "first principles," that I +have chosen, is one of familiar popular use; so that were this mode +of speech, as indeed it is, peculiarly liable to ambiguity, it would, +for that very reason, be preferable to any other, till such time as +that ambiguity should have been explained, and the wrong thinking, of +which it might have been the source, exposed and obviated. Not till +this had been done would it be time to inquire whether the current +metaphysics had invented any intrinsically better ways of speaking +on these topics, for though the veriest tyro in such investigations +would be justified in objecting to some of its technicalities, +such as the invention of the word free-will, for instance, for the +same reason that a beginner in zoology might object, were such an +attempt ever made, to the introduction of the word sphynx or griffin +into that branch of inquiry, there can be no doubt that other of its +speculations are more happily conceived. Hence I suppose it would be +a decided mistake to imagine, for example, that no trouve whatever is +to be elicited from the obscurities of Kant, but on the other hand, +one must as much take care to entertain sober conjectures of the +possible value of such unsunned treasures, as to keep in mind that +quackery may be not unqualified with some merit, and I might surmise +that it was perhaps in virtue of his fabulous expectations in this +direction, that Coleridge could not execute his long-meditated plan of +elucidating that writer; or rather, perhaps--to speak more curtly--a +spirit more differing from that which compounded the amalgam, was +necessary to resolve and detect it. + +According to this estimate of the value of our achieved studies, it +would be expectable, in regard to my present topic, that almost all +the materials for right conclusions on it must be extant somewhere or +other in our books, no great amount of ability being required to turn +them to proper account: an easily suppliable desideratum being thus +left unsupplied, the public indifference manifested thereby would seem +to bear the ascription of our unsatisfactory metaphysics to the fault, +however apportioned between the many and the few, not of the intellect, +but of the reason. + +Indeed, it is held as a pretty general rule, that where there is want +of reform, there is want of reason; and Bacon, by implication, thought +the rule here applicable, when, in defending his "new philosophy" +from the charge of arrogance, he apologised by saying that a "cripple +in the right road would make better progress than a racehorse in the +wrong." That is, he claimed for himself, as he was bound logically to +do, the plain good sense of directing his supposably humble faculties +with an obvious regard to the end he proposed and professed, and he was +ready to concede to his competitors all kinds of superiority but this. + +The same simplicity characterises the reforming animus of the other +great patriarch of "the new philosophy," in its sister branch. The +still debated point between the school of Locke and the old philosophy +was, and is, of such a form as may be figured by the following +hypothetical, and it may be, well-founded statement. Locke seems to +have battled mainly for the principle that ideas that every one allows +to be inferences, should be acknowledged by philosophy to be such, +while the adherents of the old ideas maintained, in opposition to +him, that ideas that every one allows to be inferences, should not +be acknowledged by philosophy to be such. Or, in other words, Locke +aimed to realise a certain first principle of reason, which I shall +have hereafter to consider, which stands thus:--"That which it is," +while his opponents withstood this innovating pretension, finding +it fatal to their doctrine. If the reader is somewhat startled at +the statement I have just made, I will remind him that it amounts +to nothing more than saying that in the contest between the new and +the old philosophy, reason is entirely and absolutely on the side of +the former, an assertion which, of course, I must both think admits +of being substantiated, and must take myself, in some degree, to be +able to aid in its being so. + +The existing quarrel between the two philosophies might, perhaps, +be personified through the medium of a principal champion on each +side. For the new ideas I could only choose Locke, since he is admitted +to have had no equally eminent successor; for the old I would choose +M. Cousin, both on account of his superior merit and popularity, and +also of his having made Locke the subject of some elaborate strictures +that I happen to have read. On these, when they come again to hand, +I should perhaps have something to remark; meanwhile I must content +myself with addressing myself to one of them in the following manner:-- + +In antiquity and the middle ages, the schoolmaster and the +philosopher were one and the same individual. The new philosophy +was the first to separate these two departments; perceiving that the +communication of truth is a distinct office from its investigation, +and that that difference of office in each case necessitates a +corresponding difference in the public, that is the proper object of +its exercise. Since, moreover, society may be discriminated into two +sorts of mind, admitting of being pictured as the childish and the +adults, it is evident that the instructor must find his audience +more especially in the former, while the investigator of truth +must appeal exclusively to the latter. This he must needs do, to +whichever of the sciences he ministers; and not only so, but he must +more particularly address himself to a small and select portion of +this itself selecter class, constitute them the witnesses and judges +of his proceedings, and perceive that both his success in philosophy +and the acknowledgment of it can only be founded first and foremost on +their approbation. As even in jockeyism and prize-fighting, there are +"the knowing ones," similar referees are, by the nature of things, +required for the flourishing estate of any science; and evidently in +proportion as they might be incompetent to such an office, false or +imperfect science must be the result. + +Locke, acting on this instinctive view, communicated to the +public certain observations he had made in mental philosophy, and +entitled his work, An Essay on the Human Understanding. He properly +called it an essay, because a person who simply aims to investigate +truth, undertakes to do his best in the way of trial, endeavor, and +experiment, in such sort as to make the word essay appropriate to what +he does. The word moreover implies that the thing done, though it is +the writer's best, is liable to be incomplete, comparatively imperfect, +and, indeed, in the more difficult questions of philosophy, as well as +in the less advanced stages of philosophising, is sure to be so. Locke +accordingly, having had his attention struck with certain phenomena of +the human mind, told the public just what he had observed, and nothing +else. Among the observations that he thus imparted, was the process +through which the mind seems to go in arriving at the sum of its ideas, +and especially the points from which it seems to start in this process. + +M. Cousin, having apparently no conception of a way of acting so +proper to legitimate inquiry, and having himself written a Course +of Philosophy, evidently thinks Locke ought to have done the same; +for he says that Locke is erroneous in the method of his philosophy, +that he begins at the wrong end, that instead of having told us as he +has how the ideas arise in the mind, he ought to have told us what +the ideas are, instead of describing their origin to have described +their actuality, to have given a list of the faculties of the mind, +and so on. Which is just the same thing as saying that a traveller +who publishes his explorations in America, ought instead to have gone +to China. + +I shall have to make some objections to Locke, but they will be of +a nature exactly contrary to those of which he is usually made the +subject. Instead of accusing his principles I shall have to impute +to him the not sufficiently carrying them out; a fault due to his +position as an early reformer, and perfectly consistent with his high +character as such. + +I have the more reason to note this distinction between M. Cousin's +department and the function exercised by Locke, because I am forced +myself to take the benefit of it. Want of erudition would form very +vulnerable points, were I to be judged by the former standard. In +the little I have yet put forth on the subject of First Principles, +I already find two or three errors of that sort, which a greater amount +of reading would no doubt have enabled me to escape. My present letter +may close with some correction of one of these. + +Preliminary, I will venture to call "That which is is," a first +principle of reason, and "Two and two make four," one of its +derivatives, leaving this topic for future explanation, and then +proceed thus:--When in my last letter I represented first principles +as bounding the horizon of human knowledge, I left it to be inferred +that both the kinds of "first principles" I had mentioned were thus +describable in common. I find, however, that this metaphysical +character belongs exclusively to first principles of sensuous +experience, and no more belongs to first principles of reason than to +first principles of grammar, or to first principles of rhetoric. That +is, first principles of reason are merely the result of one of those +analytical inquiries in which we arrive at something absolutely simple, +and must there stop, just as in the science of numbers we may thus +arrive at unity. + + + +Having long ago defined First Principles of sensuous experience, +I find there is a difficulty attached to the other kind of first +principles derived from the various use of the word reason--which +I will say betrayed me into a wrong inference in the concluding +paragraph of my last letter. + +Locke, in the 17th chapter of his fourth book, confesses that this +word, in the proper use of the English language, is liable to bear +several senses. Due discrimination in such a case, and a cautious +avoidance of the dangers to which philosophy is exposed, and has +so amply incurred, from this kind of source might, above all, have +been, expected from Locke, since he was the first who inculcated it, +and is generally remarkable for the observance of his own precepts +in this matter. Hence the charge I have now got to bring against him +is a little surprising. + +Indeed, it might be asserted that his position and circumstances do +not seem very readily to bear the entire responsibility of some of his +proceedings. Perhaps he might be characterised as a writer of somewhat +humorous idiosyncracy in respect to tendency to fixed ideas. His +lapses, indeed, are not many, but they are highly significant, as +I shall have occasion in more than one instance to show, and among +these must evidently be reckoned that I am now going to notice, since +it imports the wrong definition of a word of such cardinal meaning. + +In defining the word reason, in its proper and specific sense +wherein it is used to denote a certain well-known quality of the +human mind--that is, as approvedly ascertained and appreciated under +this name, as are certain weights and measures under those of pound, +gallon, or mile, he assigns a meaning to it that comes short of the +proportions thus justly prefigured as belonging to it. He confounds +reason with reasoning--that is, he emerges the entire faculty or modus +operandi, to which we give the name of reason, in that partial exercise +of its function to which we give the name of reasoning. He says that, +in matters of certainty, such as the proof of any of Euclid's theorems, +the acts by which the mind ascertains the fit coherence of the several +links in the chain of reasoning are acts of reason. Granted. + +Also, that in weighing probabilities, a similar coherence is similarly +verified by reason. Granted--with liberty of comment that these arts +of reason, in either of the two cases have, by the approved practice +of language, received the name of reasoning. + +But he further signifies--that is, he does not expressly affirm, but, +with equivalent certification, he implicitly asserts, and inferentially +states that, in examining such a proposition as the following:--"What +is, is" (an examination to which confessedly no reasoning is attached), +the act by which the mind assents to the truth of this statement +is not to be described as an act of reason. He adopts a different +phraseology, and calls it intuition. + +Observe, my objection is not that he invests the idea with this new +name, but that he disparages its old one. I do not object to your +calling a spade a shovel, under a certain view of its use, but it +remains still necessary that you should admit that a spade is, in +the full sense of the word, a spade. + +Indeed, I will incidentally remark that I suspect the word "intuition" +has been a very good addition to our vocabulary, and I suppose +its proper import might be represented as follows:--Reason has two +modes of his exercise, the one is called reasoning, and the other +intuition. Intuition is the decision of reason on one single point; +reasoning--a word proper to demonstrative truth--seems to be nothing +more than intuition looking not merely at one point, but at several +points successively. So that intuition and reasoning would constitute +the self-same function of reason, and the difference in their meanings +would be solely owing to the difference in the circumstances under +which that function is exercised. + +Observe, that I am here only venturing to speculate, and am now +returning from that digression. + +Whether or not Locke is herein psychologically consistent with +himself; whether, indeed, his real theory is not that which I have +just conjecturally intimated, is another question, which I shall +defer to a future occasion; but whether or not he herein opposes the +ordinary, prevailing, and inveterate use of language, which is what +I am charging him with doing, and whether or not he has justifiable +ground for this innovation which I am denying that he has, are points +that must be tried by the ordeal of these three considerations. How +are we accustomed to speak? How are we accustomed to write? and what +sort of a call for changing our customs in either of these particulars +is that which constitutes a genuine call to do so? + +In regard to the first of these tests, the literature of all sects +and parties has been accustomed to assert that, both in matters of +science and of worldly business, reason is the judge of all truth +whatever, without exception. + +Locke, on the other hand, informs us that reason is the judge of +demonstrative truth, of logical truth, of casuistical truth, and of +lawyers' truth, and of these kinds of truth alone, but is not the +judge of intuitive or self-evident truth. Our writers would tell us +that to deny "what is, is" to be a true statement, would be an offence +against reason; but we learn from Locke that reason has no cognisance +in this matter, but intuition only has, and consequently that the +wrong committed would not be against reason, but against intuition. + +Our current speech accords with our literature in this view +of the meaning of the word reason; whose efficiency, moreover, +it endeavors to amplify, by surrounding it with satellites of +adjectives formed from it, the principal of which are "reasonable" and +"unreasonable." Provided with this vocabulary, we pronounce it to be +unreasonable to deny any truth whatever that can be well and clearly +ascertained; and so far are we from reserving these adjectives for +the occasion of demonstrative truth, and holding them inapplicable +where self-evident or intuitive truth comes on the carpet, that we +account it, if possible, still more unreasonable to deny the latter +than the former. + +But if the nomenclature adopted by Locke be the right one, there ought +to be a change in these current modes of speaking and writing. One who +should reject the proofs of Euclid, would be unreasonable; one who +should maintain that Thurtel or Greenacre were innocent of murder, +would be unreasonable; but, one who should deny the truth of any +self-evident proposition, would not be unreasonable; for to say this, +would be to say that reason has cognisance of such propositions, +whereas, according to him, it is expressly not reason, but intuition +that takes this office. The words "intuitional" and "unintuitional," +must be invented to supply the obvious need which the apparent gap +discovers; there seems no other way of supplying it. + +Lest I should be suspected of somewhat making up a case; of having, +perhaps, represented not so much what Locke really means, as what he +seems to mean, I will remind the reader that Locke is undertaking the +formal definition of a word, and that on such a critical occasion, +it is proper to give him credit for not meaning otherwise than he +seems to mean. + +The passage which is my text, will be found in the earlier part of +the seventeenth chapter of the fourth book. Indeed, I could at once +prove my indictment by citing a few words from it, accompanied by a +comment of my own, had I any right to impose on the reader a belief +in the discriminating fairness and matter-of-fact accuracy, both of +my extracts and my comment. + +I will, however, venture on such a step; I will suppose myself +commenting on this passage, and proceed thus: Locke, it will be seen +in this, his foremost and professed definition of the word reason, +contrasts it with "sense and intuition." + +Whether he holds these to be identical with what he calls "the +outward and the inward sense," is not quite clear. That, however, +is not the question. + +He says, that these two faculties "reach but a very little way"; +for that "the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions +and intermediate ideas." Now, reason, he says, may be defined to be +that faculty, whose specific office it is "to find out and apply" +those intermediate ideas and deductions by which we obtain knowledge +that consists of two kinds, one that which exalts us into "certainty," +the other that which, though less generous diet for the mind, we have +constantly good ground for gladly acquiescing in, and which we call +"probability." So that, says Locke, if you ask, "What room is there +for the exercise of any other faculty but outward sense and inward +perception?" I can abundantly reply, "Very much." I have shown you +that without this "demonstrative" faculty, our knowledge would be +but a skeleton; it would, indeed, not be properly speaking knowledge, +but mere rudiments of knowledge. + +Such is my interpretation of Locke's definition of reason, in the +proper and specific sense of this word. If it is strictly correct, +as I believe the intelligent reader will find by reference, then it +is Locke confounds reason with reasoning, mistakes a part for the +whole, and the whole for a part, and acts similarly--to borrow his +own way of illustration--to the representing a gallon to be a quart, +or a half-sovereign to be a sovereign. + +It is to be observed, too, that it is entirely in behalf of the more +showy kind of knowledge, that the mistake is made. The respected name +of reason is given exclusively to logic and demonstrating. Good sense, +good feeling, just instinct, if they stand alone, have no claim to +it; they are put on an inferior footing; true, they are intuition; +but what then? they are not reason. + +Now, the century introduced by Locke is accused by the present, +and it is generally admitted, with some degree of justice, of having +"materialistic" tendencies. We may see, then, how Locke's doctrine, +as just described, founded though it is only on nomenclature, hinging +merely on definition, incurring whatever wrongness it implicates from +no other lapse than that of confounding a word with its derivative, +doing nothing, in short, but annul the difference of meaning between +the two words, reason and reasoning; we may see how this apparently +harmless experiment might tend to supplying these materialistic +tendencies with a ground, a rationale, a principle, and thus to exalt +their authority, and how, indeed! it just smacks of their spirit. + +It may be seen, too, how, from a few slips, such as this on the +part of the champion of the "new philosophy," competing schools of +the present age might be able to make up a case, specious enough to +gain the acquiescence of a portion of the public against both--with +how great futility, I believe, would appear, if the accusations were +weighed by a competent tribunal. + +And, finally, it might be expected, that the undue exaltation of +the demonstrative department of reason, should issue in a reaction +into a contrary extreme, and that some Mr. Carlyle might be found to +inveigh against "logic," to sneer at "analysis," to denounce "cause +and effect philosophy" and to praise "mysticism." + +I have already assumed that the third test that I promised, goes +against Locke, and requires no examination, simply because he has not +advanced it in his behalf. He has assigned no ground for changing +the meaning of the word reason, and it is presumable that none is +assignable. + + + +The question, What is the Criterion of Truth?--that is, What are the +proper means of distinguishing whether anything that is asserted to be +true is so or not? claims immediate notice, because such a criterion +exists, and the new philosophy necessarily appeals to it when it comes +before the public, while it has shown with what effect it can do so, +in the case of those of its branches--namely, the purely material +and the mathematical, that flourish in society. + +Premising that it is a way of certifying truth that has been +immemorially used by mankind in their daily affairs, and which they +have always, to some extent, instinctively transferred to their +judgments in philosophy, and that it is the only possible general +and summary criterion of truth, I may describe it as consisting in +the unanimous assent to some idea or assertion of all who are thought +competent to pronounce concerning it. + +Viewed in connection with the thing it verifies, and the parties who +use it, the criterion may be thus represented: Any idea, assertion, +or opinion, must, by any inquirer, be found true, when he perceives +it to be such as would be unanimously assented to by all presumably +competent judges of the kind of truth to which it refers. + +So that those who use this criterion, and are convinced of the truth of +anything through its medium--a proceeding which I have represented as +common and habitual to mankind--in thereby pronouncing certain supposed +persons to be judges of truth in the said matter, claim themselves +to be also judges of it in the matter of so pronouncing. The acts +of judgment they thus tacitly challenge to themselves may be said to +be to the following effect:--1. They assign the qualifications that +constitute competency for a certain function. 2. They decide that there +are persons in the community answering to this character. 3. They +opine that the view such persons take or would take, imports an +assertion of the truth of the idea in question. 4. They accredit +that view with being strictly one, supposing that all qualified to +arbitrate would acquiesce and agree in the same. 5. They attribute +to themselves a similar unanimity. 6. They assume the sufficiency of +their own judgment to make all the above conclusions. + +These assumptions on their part, so complicated in description, are +simple enough in performance. It is plain that mankind--more properly +here to be called the public--simply attach themselves to some opinion +which they find current in society; while, however, the assumptions +I have just described are, in their full measure, but a necessary +consequence of their so doing, doubtless their so doing must itself +have been dictated by some kind of anticipation of them, but this may, +to any degree, have been vague, undetermined, partial, and imperfect. + +The rationale of this double bench of judges is thus explained. In +reference to almost every kind of truth there is always a certain +portion of the community better able to judge than the rest. Hence +it becomes clearly the part of the latter, if they wish to be +rightly informed, to defer to the opinion of those confessedly +better judges--confessed to be such from the general opinion to that +effect. Thus a second set of judges perforce, in addition to those that +were originally conceived by choice, is implicated in this transaction. + +For the primary sort I must seek a name from the French language, +which calls them "experts," the English supplying, I believe, none, +except a very vernacular one, the "knowing ones"; the others have +already got a well-known name--the public. + +The public, in deciding on the occasions in question, what are the +qualifications that constitute "experts" may be said to choose them, +thereby, however, choosing persons in idea, and not bodily. The +relation of the public to these conceptions of theirs is the same +as that of the constituencies to the members of Parliament, in the +point of one being the choosers and the others the chosen, with a +common object in view. + +I suppose, to stop the current of my discourse, and adjourn its topic, +for the sake of at once bringing the general principle discussed to +the test of exemplification, would have its want of logical harmony +excused by its being desiderated by the reader. + +I had undertaken to prove that this principle--which, for distinction's +sake, I will call the unanimity principle--is the proper and only +criterion of scientific truth to the great non-scientific world, +and consequently that modern philosophy necessarily appeals to it +when it comes before the public. What I had thus taken upon myself +to do, obviously was--first, to display and explicate the principle +by definition, and this I had already done; and next--to describe +it theoretically by showing its manner of existing, and this I was +engaged in doing. Leaving this inquiry in the midst, I am now going to +deviate into the practical phase of its description, by showing, not +how it is, but how it acts. This seems necessary for the satisfaction +of the reader, as being the only way of securing him from any, even +were it but temporary, misapprehension as to the working value of +the principle for which his attention is demanded. I therefore select +the six following examples, the two first homely, and the four last +philosophical, of its ordinary use by the public. + +They will be at once seen to justify my assertion of its having for +its main characteristics the two facts--first, that mankind habitually +use it, and have always done so; and next, that propositions thus +warranted are universally accepted as established truth, and that no +one thinks of calling them in question. + +1. Thus no one doubts, when coming to the intersection of two roads, +he sees a sign-post, on one of whose pointers is written "To London," +and on the other "To Windsor," no one hesitates to believe that the +information thus conveyed to him is true; because he is aware that +those who give it are competent to do so, and that none similarly +competent will gainsay it. + +2. Again, no one doubts that the sun rises and sets once in +every twenty-four hours; no one doubts that he so rose and set +yesterday. Every one is ready to affirm the certainty of these two +facts, but very few can do so, in any great degree, from their +own experience; but they help the lack of this by that of their +neighbors. Neither is it necessary that they should have any near, +nor even the most remote, idea of the personality of those on whose +testimony they thus implicitly rely; it suffices they are sure, +whoever they may be, they have the right qualifications for testifying +in the way they do, and that no one so qualified can contradict their +evidence, or dream of doing so. + +The above are examples of the criterion of truth, applied to the ideas +and proceedings of ordinary life. It will be seen therefrom, first +that mankind have in all ages been educated in an acceptance of its +principle, according to my definition of it, the principle, namely, of +an indubitable certainty of truth, resulting from the unanimous assent +to some idea of all who are thought by self and neighbors competent +to pronounce thereon; possibly too they may be said to have been +educated in some imperfect theoretical appreciation of this principle. + +It will secondly be seen therefrom, that the two kinds of unanimity +which I have predicated as essential to the proper use and results of +this criterion, an unanimity, namely, on the part of the supposed good +judges of certain descriptions of truth, who may be called the adepts +or knowing ones imagined by the public; and again an unanimity on the +part of the public itself in interpreting and adopting their opinion; +it will be seen, I say, that this double unanimity is perfectly +attainable, nay, perfectly attained, and that too so extensively, +as to constitute a common and familiar occurrence on all manner of +occasions of daily life. + +I will now give instances of their similar use of it in directing +their judgments on philosophical questions. + +3. Very few of the public are able to examine the proof of any of +the theorems of Euclid, yet there is none of them who would think of +seriously doubting the truth of anything contained in that book, the +ground of their confidence being solely their knowledge of the fact, +that the learned in these matters have unanimously so decided. + +Every one, again, believes in certain facts that are asserted by +navigators, explorers, and geographers, respecting the existence, +position, and products of various countries of the globe. Every one, +further, believes in certain deductions derived from these facts by +naturalists, geologists, astronomers, and so forth. The belief is +owing to the unanimous testimony of all these confessedly competent +authorities; but whenever they are seen to differ among themselves, the +public withholds its entire belief, and either doubts or disbelieves +the things asserted. Thus the public is at this day doubtful and +divided whether there is such a creature as the sea-serpent. Similarly +the public is dubious--for it must needs be so if any section of it is +so--whether a certain explorer who was authoritatively sent out about a +dozen years ago conjointly by the French Government and Institute, was, +in any degree, justified in bringing home the account he did of there +being a tribe of men in the interior of Africa having tails, whether +this unexpected information is, in any important particular, true. + +The two last examples have been furnished by material science. I will +now draw one from the other department, with the view of indicating +that in non-material science also, numerous propositions circulate +among the public that are franked by the same principle to pass as +undoubted truth. Such is the maxim of heathen philosophy, recorded +by Cicero in his "Officiis": "Do not to another what you would not +he should do to you"; or the same maxim, in its modified form, as +given in the New Testament, with the characteristic omission of the +negative. The truth of this moral maxim is universally admitted, +because it is supposed that no person of presumable moral judgment +has ever been known to call it in question. + +It would seem, then, that this criterion of truth is--what confessedly, +or from easy proof, it is predicable that no other criterion of +truth is--a general criterion of truth. I will, however, restrict +this pretension to the statement--to be hereafter more largely +explained--that it is a general criterion of truth to the public +as such, to the public considered as a public; for, indeed, it is +not properly usable at all by anyone except in the character of a +member of the public. This means that it is a general criterion of +truth in the following way: it is applicable to the verification of +all truth, so far as it admits of being verified before the public, +and made the common property of the community. + +6. For even where at first sight you might think it most out of place, +I mean in relation to that kind of truth whose primary evidence is +the consciousness of the individual, so that the competent witness +of truth is necessarily but one person, there is oneness of opinion, +there is unanimity, and the testimony of the one competent witness +is not contradicted or doubted by that of any other presumably +competent. When, for instance, I am conscious of the sensation +of seeing an inkstand before me, no one seeing reason to doubt my +assertion to that effect, all presumably competent testimony on the +subject must needs be concentrated in myself; and the fact of my +seeing an inkstand, though for my own conviction verified in a way +independent of any such argument, is, for the conviction of others, +only pronounceable as true, because all presumably competent authority +is of one mind in alleging its truth. + +In thus far exemplifying the use of this principle, I have exhibited +it in the exercise of its primary office only, which, however, is +not that which, on behalf of philosophy, I am here demanding from +it. I have shown it, namely, as used by the public to establish truth +positively, and not in the way wherein it may be used to distinguish +truth comparatively. + +But it is solely in this latter office that it becomes a criterion of +truth, an arbiter between the true and the false, an indicator of both, +and more especially of what has the character of ascertained truth, +and what has not; and this, it will be remembered, was the office I +sought from it, and constituted the ultimate purpose of my taking up +the consideration of the subject. + +Having with as much brevity as just suffices for that purpose, +explained the nature of the principle in question, and its use by +society at large, it now only remains that I should explain that +purpose itself, by theory and example. + +What I am doing in tracing the unanimity principle from its first +instinctive use by the public to its secondary and meditated one +by philosophy, is a purely critical act, comparable to that of +the rhetorician who appreciates the character of certain modes of +thinking which have long since been practised by mankind, and shows +what therein is approvable--all the rest being liable to censure. + +It was the universal conviction of European Christendom, during +many centuries, that the Church, which was popularly supposed to be +represented by the Pope, enjoyed peculiarly a divine guidance which +made it an infallible judge of truth. This idea was thought to be +warranted by the unanimous assent of all right-minded persons, and the +denial of it to be the mark of a reprobate spirit, as well as contrary +to common sense. We now know the entire futility of this assumption, +and that the heretics were not inferior to the orthodox in the power +of judging such subjects. Hence in discussing the unanimity principle +the question presents itself, How came the public thus wrongly to +apply it? What error did they commit in so doing? When the revival +of learning and the consequent rise of Protestantism had exposed +the error in that form of it, it was still continued under the new +social regimes; so that even Locke, the boldest advocate of the +rights of man that was tolerated even in his time, stigmatised the +dissentients from certain Protestant tenets in the same unjust way +that Popery had done to the dissentients from certain Popish ones; +speaking of them in two or three places of his essay as persons at +once notoriously disreputable in character and weak in intellect; +consistently with which estimate he came to the conclusion that the +reigning theology was established truth, as being accredited by all +those whose opinion was worth taking account of. + +Later times have again manifested the futility of the assumption +against the new race of dissentients. No one will say that Goethe +and Neibuhr (to mention only two) must count for nothing on questions +wherein they were as likely to be well informed as their opponents. So +that Locke's side, instead of being warranted by the decisive verdict +he imagines, is but one of two suitors in an undetermined cause, +neither having yet attracted the votes of the whole jury, and neither +consequently yet occupying the position of ascertained truth. Giving +everyone a fair hearing is that trial and test of competency which +yields the only means of learning who said competent judges are. + +A little consideration, even in Locke's time of less advanced thought, +might have informed an intelligent mind, if free from prejudice, +that mere prohibitory laws must be of themselves less adverse to the +free expression of people's sentiments than that averted state of the +public mind of which they are one of the symptoms. Both from theory and +experience we may collect that very much the same laws of supply and +demand obtain in matters of opinion as in those of food and raiment; +the tongue and the pen, and the previous thought by which these are +instructed, must evidently hold back from offering to the public, +nay, in a great measure from suggesting to the agent himself, any such +ideas as they know the public will not, and must confine themselves to +putting forth such only as they suppose it will understand, appreciate, +and regard. + + + + + + + +THE RIGHTS OF REASON. + + +To the two queries you put to me, "What are first principles?" and +"What is the criterion of truth?" I find it suitable to append some +preliminary remarks on "The Rights of Reason." + +The solution you expect is, I presume, a reasonable one. You do not +wish me to take into account any opinions that cannot bear the test +of reason. + +Your queries derive their greatest pertinency from the state of +non-material philosophy; and, possibly, might have been, in some +measure, prompted by this consideration. That double-minded way of +inquiring into truth, which only in part reasons, while it in part +dogmatises, imagines, and assumes, is, it is obvious, in morals, +metaphysics, and religion, one of our inheritances from former +times. The battle has been won in the material department, but is +still undecided on the other wing. + +What, then, is Reason, and what are its Rights? + +Every human inquiry that asks, What is right, proper, or +correct? necessarily, in doing so, asks, What is it reasonable +to think, believe, or do? in the points inquired into. The +faculty--whatever may be its nature--whereby we find ourselves +able, under certain circumstances, to answer this question, we call +reason. The rights of reason may be said to consist in the concession +to it of a certain absolute power in the decision of truth, divisible +under two heads thus--a power of deciding what are the questions +whereon it is able to decide, and a power of deciding those questions. + +One of the many ways of disparaging the rights of reason is--openly +or covertly to doubt or deny that morals, metaphysics, and religion, +are--in the full sense of the word--sciences. This is to withdraw +them from the empire of reason, and to hand them over to some rival +pretender. + +No science can flourish while it is understood that its discussion +must be made palatable to the public. In any supposable code of the +rights of reason, one primary article would limit and define the +functions of the public in the investigation of truth--a topic which, +together with the kindred inquiry, Who are the public? is suggested +by your second query. + +Mankind have naturally a degree of antipathy for reason. They have +found Reason, in the work he affects, dull, in the help he furnishes, +deficient, in the truth he unveils, ugly, in the rule he arrogates, +imperious. Barbarism, in all its stages, may be said to be founded, +not merely on ignorance, but on a state of the inclinations that +revolts from reason. + +Two competitors have always disputed the rights of reason; authority +or precedent, and faith or conscience. Conscience, early or late, must +receive almost all his light from authority; and, therefore, in respect +to opinion, may generally be called the creature of authority. Yet, in +a moral aspect, authority is confessedly of no account, and conscience +has a sole jurisdiction. A large portion of mankind have, in our times, +outgrown the error of resting their sense of duty on the mere dictate +of other men. The only legitimate directors of human conduct are now +generally admitted to be conscience and reason; the conscience must be +exclusively one's own, but the reason need not entirely--and, indeed, +cannot in any great proportion--be one's own, but may be partly that +of one's neighbor. + +The question of the division of power between these two potentates, +though not yet understood by the public, does not seem to be more +complicated than that analogous one just alluded to, and of which +they evidently understand the gist. + +For authority, as above intimated, though the venerable instructor of +conscience, is yet morally subjected to him; and, not dissimilarly, +have conscience and reason reciprocal claims of precedence on each +other. Reason is the judge, but he is bound, under conscience, to give +a sufficient and attentive hearing to any pleadings that conscience +may have to offer, and conscience is the pleader, but he is bound, +under reason, to conform to whatever verdicts reason declares himself +competent to render. + +If history in this particular can be considered as having disclosed +a necessary sequence, civilisation progresses in the following +order:--The general mind, in becoming acquainted with its own powers, +first learns an evolution of conscience (and this can only take place +through the medium of religion), and last learns to appreciate reason +(and this can only happen through the medium of science). While the +prerogatives of conscience were insufficiently known, authority usurped +them, and while the prerogatives of reason are insufficiently known, +authority and conscience conjointly usurp them. + +The word conscience I here use in its proper sense, wherein it means +either an individual conscience, or the united consciences of more +than one supposed to be in accord together, so as to make the acts +resulting from this accord constitute single acts of conscience. But +the word has taken an improper enlargement of meaning in being often +used to signify one conscience claiming something in contravention +of another conscience. These two, so different meanings of the word +conscience, are seldom duly discriminated by those who use them. + +To the rights of reason belongs a certain degree of power, both in +regulating the individual conscience, and in solving the differences +between opposing ones. Under what conditions, and how far, reason +can exercise this office, and what rule he is to follow in so doing, +would be an inquiry suggested by my answer to your second query. + +Having above mentioned religion and science as the two prime ministers +respectively of conscience and reason, I will pursue the subject a +little further. + +Religion has aimed to have a moral animus by means of a free +conscience. Religion has not yet immediately aimed at moral conduct; +but, indeed, has been wont, by the mouth of her most strenuous +ministers, to assume that the aim at this is already included in that +other aim. But a moral animus is but one ingredient in moral conduct, +involving the intent only to act morally, without having of itself +the least power to realise that intent. Knowledge,--that is, science, +exclusively keeps the keys of this power. Such knowledge religion +has not yet made one of her aims and ends either directly, or by +any coalition with those who have so aimed. Accordingly religion +cannot be said hitherto to have been an advocate of the rights of +reason. Whatever good things she may have achieved in this cause have +been incidental to her advocacy of the Rights of Conscience. Here +reason was her weapon (sharpened for this use, and so far valued and +treasured), against authority. Her tendency meanwhile, is to impel +conscience to infringe on the rights of reason. + +Science alone has hitherto been the immediate champion of these +rights. But it seems he cannot expect to make that advocacy complete +and effectual till he allies himself with religion. This alliance, +since it is persuaded by reason, and not by passion, can have science +alone for its real mover. + +The Rights of Reason may at present be said to be in such a germ of +their acknowledgment as were the rights of conscience three centuries +ago. Mankind have not hitherto come to acquiesce in the idea of +that parsimony of guidance vouchsafed to man, which is found to be +the result of claiming for reason the power of calling all human +thoughts before his tribunal, and seeing whether he has anything +to object to them. Their idea has been that not only suggesting +inspiration--(which it does not seem necessary that the advocate of +the rights of reason should deny)--but guiding inspiration is given, +given too to some rather than to others, and given in such a quality, +as to dispense with the supervision of reason. A generation successive +to many among whom this doctrine has been taught and believed, will not +be prone to any decided rejection of it. Pride of species inclining +to exaggerated human pretensions above other earthly creatures, and +party pride inclining to exalt self and an associated confraternity +into a superiority over the rest of mankind, and supplied with a +traditional store of modes of thought and practice adapted to such +exclusive pretensions, and other native tendencies of the human mind, +persuade in the same direction. + +I have thought it suitable to premise this short sketch of the Rights +of Reason, and the opponents of them, to an endeavor to answer your +queries in a thoroughly reasonable way, a way which cannot be said to +be the more fashionable one in the treatment of metaphysical questions. + + + + + + + +NOTES + + +[1] Wilfrid Meynell, in his John Henry Newman, erroneously speaks of +Charles Robert as the "youngest son." + +[2] This is a mistake. Owen in 1817 renounced the religions of the +world, and proclaimed that man's character was formed for him not by +him. But he was not an Atheist. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Essays in Rationalism, by Charles Robert Newman + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 45823 *** diff --git a/45823-h/45823-h.htm b/45823-h/45823-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8c0a37 --- /dev/null +++ b/45823-h/45823-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,3822 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> +<!-- This HTML file has been automatically generated from an XML source on 2014-05-30T06:46:03Z. --> +<html lang="en"> +<head> +<meta name="generator" content= +"HTML Tidy for Windows (vers 25 March 2009), see www.w3.org"> +<title>Essays in Rationalism</title> +<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"> +<meta name="generator" content= +"tei2html.xsl, see http://code.google.com/p/tei2html/"> +<meta name="author" content="Charles Robert Newman"> +<link rel="coverpage" href="images/new-cover.jpg"> +<link rel="schema.DC" href= +"http://dublincore.org/documents/1998/09/dces/"> +<meta name="DC.Creator" content="Charles Robert Newman"> +<meta name="DC.Title" content="Essays in Rationalism"> +<meta name="DC.Language" content="en"> +<meta name="DC.Format" content="text/html"> +<meta name="DC.Publisher" content="Project Gutenberg"> +<meta name="DC:Subject" content="#####"> +<style type="text/css"> +body +{ +font-family: "Times New Roman", Times, serif; 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+} +.xd21e799 +{ +text-align:center; +} +.xd21e1859 +{ +font-size:xx-large; text-align:center; +} +.xd21e1863 +{ +font-size:large; text-align:center; +} +.xd21e1878 +{ +font-size:small; text-align:center; +} +.xd21e2028 +{ +margin-left:0; border-spacing:0; +} +@media handheld +{ +} +</style> +</head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 45823 ***</div> + +<div class="front"> +<div class="div1 cover"> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"></p> +<div class="figure xd21e98width"><img src="images/new-cover.jpg" alt= +"Newly Designed Front Cover." width="480" height="720"></div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 titlepage"> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"></p> +<div class="figure xd21e105width"><img src="images/titlepage.png" alt= +"Original Title Page." width="463" height="720"></div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="titlePage"> +<div class="docTitle"> +<div class="mainTitle">ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM</div> +</div> +<div class="byline">BY<br> +<span class="docAuthor">CHARLES ROBERT NEWMAN</span><br> +(<i>Brother of Cardinal Newman.</i>)<br> +WITH PREFACE<br> +BY<br> +<span class="docAuthor">GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE.</span><br> +AND<br> +BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH<br> +BY<br> +<span class="docAuthor">J. M. WHEELER.</span></div> +<div class="docImprint">LONDON:<br> +PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY,<br> +<span class="sc">28 Stonecutter Street</span>, E.C.<br> +<span class="docDate">1891</span></div> +</div> +<div class="div1 imprint"> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first xd21e161">LONDON:<br> +PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTE,<br> +28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 frenchtitle"> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first xd21e161">ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb5" href="#pb5" name="pb5">5</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 foreword"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">PUBLISHER’S NOTE.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Whether this little volume will find sufficient +patrons to defray the cost of its production is at least doubtful. The +writer whose essays it contains lived in obscurity and will never be +popular. But he possessed a fine intellect, however frustrated by +circumstances; he belonged to an illustrious family; and it is well to +let the public have access to the opinions of a brother of Cardinal +Newman and of Professor Newman, a brother who took his own course, as +they did, and thought out for himself an independent philosophy.</p> +<p>All Charles Robert Newman’s writings that are known to have +been printed, appeared in the Reasoner, edited by Mr. George Jacob +Holyoake, at various dates during 1860–61. With trifling +exceptions they are all reprinted in this collection.</p> +<p>Mr. Holyoake has kindly supplied a brief account of the atheistic +Newman, and Mr. J. M. Wheeler has gathered all the information that is +obtainable as to his life and personality. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb7" href="#pb7" name="pb7">7</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 biography"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Of Charles Robert Newman, until the death of his +brother, the Cardinal, almost nothing was known. Some reminiscences of +him by Mr. Thomas Purnell and Precentor Edmund Venables appeared in the +<i>Athenæum</i> at the time of his death in 1884, and these +remain the chief sources of information concerning him. Mr. G. J. +Holyoake also, in his paper <i>The Present Day</i>, wrote: “If +the public come to know more of Charles R. Newman, it will be seen that +all the brothers, John Henry, Francis William, and Charles R. Newman, +were men of unusual distinction of character, and that while each held +diverse views, all had the family qualities of perspicacity, candor and +conscience.” But these notes attracted little attention. Most +people were under the impression there were only two brothers, who had +long figured in the public eye as types of the opposite courses of +modern thought towards Romanism and Rationalism. Yet the real type of +antagonism to Rome was to be found in Charles Robert, who is dismissed +by the Rev. Thomas Mozley with the words: “There was also another +brother, not without his share in the heritage of natural +gifts.”</p> +<p>In a notable passage on change of religion, in his <i>Essay in Aid +of a Grammar of Assent</i>, chap. vii., Cardinal Newman seems to allude +to the career of himself and his brothers. He says: “Thus of +three Protestants, one becomes a Catholic, a second a Unitarian, and a +third an unbeliever: how is this? The <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb8" href="#pb8" name="pb8">8</a>]</span>first becomes a Catholic, +because he assented, as a Protestant, to the doctrine of our +Lord’s divinity, with a real assent and a genuine conviction, and +because this certitude, taking possession of his mind, led him on to +welcome the Catholic doctrines of the Real Presence and of the +Theotocos, till his Protestantism fell off from him, and he submitted +himself to the Church. The second became a Unitarian, because, +proceeding on the principle that Scripture was the rule of faith, and +that a man’s private judgment was its rule of interpretation, and +finding that the doctrine of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds did not +follow by logical necessity from the text of Scripture, he said to +himself, ‘The word of God has been made of none effect by the +traditions of men,’ and therefore nothing was left for him but to +profess what he considered primitive Christianity and to become a +Humanitarian. The third gradually subsided into infidelity, because he +started with the Protestant dogma, cherished in the depths of his +nature, that a priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the +Gospel. First, then, he would protest against the sacrifice of the +Mass; next he gave up baptismal regeneration and the sacramental +principle; then he asked himself whether dogmas were not a restraint on +Christian liberty as well as Sacraments; then came the question, What +after all was the use of teachers of religion? Why should any one stand +between him and his Maker? After a time it struck him that this obvious +question had to be answered by the Apostles, as well as by the Anglican +clergy; so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revelation +of God to man is that which is written on the heart. This did for a +time, and he remained a Deist. But then it occurred to him, that this +inward moral law was there within the breast, whether there was a God +or not, and that <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb9" href="#pb9" name= +"pb9">9</a>]</span>it was a roundabout way of enforcing that law, to +say that it came from God and simply unnecessary, considering it +carried with it its own sacred and sovereign authority, as our feelings +instinctively testified, and when he turned to look at the physical +world around him, he really did not see what scientific proof there was +of the Being of God at all, and it seemed to him as if all things would +go quite as well as at present without that hypothesis as with it; so +he dropped it, and became a <i lang="la">purus putus</i> +Atheist.”</p> +<p>I have transcribed this lengthy, but remarkable passage, not because +I think it correctly describes the process of thought in his two +brothers, but rather as an illustration that his own imaginative +synthesis of their position derives its life and force from the fact +that he had before him concrete instances in the person of his own +nearest relatives.</p> +<p>Charles Robert Newman, younger brother of the Cardinal and elder +brother of the Professor, was born on June 16, 1802, being one year and +four months the junior of the former, and three years the senior of the +latter.<a class="noteref" id="xd21e209src" href="#xd21e209" name= +"xd21e209src">1</a> Their father, a London man, and friend of Capel the +eminent stockbroker, from having been clerk in a bank, became a +partner, though he afterwards failed at a time of great commercial +depression, both in this business and as a brewer. He was a Freemason, +a musician, and had schemes of social improvement by reclaiming waste +land and planting with trees. In religion his views appear to have been +of a broad cast approximating to those of Benjamin Franklin. The +mother, whose maiden name was Jemima Fourdrinier, was of Hugenot +family, and of religious cast of mind. There were six children, equally +divided as to sex. Harriet, the eldest girl, married the Rev. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb10" href="#pb10" name= +"pb10">10</a>]</span>Thomas Mozley; Jemima, the second, married Mr. +John Mozley; while Mary, the youngest, died unmarried.</p> +<p>Charles Robert was educated at the same school as his two brothers, +John Henry and Francis William, that of Dr. George Nicholas at Ealing, +Middlesex.</p> +<p>Of the influences which moulded his mind we can only speak from what +is known of his brothers. John Henry has told how, in youth, he read +Paine’s tracts against the Old Testament—we presume he +means the <i>Age of Reason</i>—and also boasted of reading Hume, +though, as he says, this was possibly but by way of brag.</p> +<p>Evidently, though the family was brought up in the habit of Bible +reading, there was considerable freedom allowed as to the direction of +their studies. While the father lived family prayer was unknown, nor +was there any inculcation of dogma. “We read,” says Francis +William, “the Psalms appointed by the church every day, and went +to the parish church on Sunday.”</p> +<p>Francis William Newman, in his “Contributions, Chiefly to the +Early History of Cardinal Newman,” says: “In opening life, +my brother C. R. N. became a convert to Robert Owen, the philanthropic +Socialist, who was <i>then</i> an Atheist.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd21e231src" href="#xd21e231" name="xd21e231src">2</a> But soon +breaking loose from him, Charles tried to originate a ‘New Moral +World’ of his own, which seemed to others absurd and immoral, as +well as very unamiable. He disowned us all, on my father’s death, +as ‘too religious for him.’ To keep a friend, or to act +under a superior, seemed alike impossible to him. His brother (the late +Cardinal) humbled himself to beg a clerkship for him in the Bank of +England; but Charles thought it ‘his duty’ to write to the +Directors letters of advice, so they could <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb11" href="#pb11" name="pb11">11</a>]</span>not keep +him. Nor could he keep any place long. He said he ought to take a +literary degree at Bonn: his two brothers managed it for him, but he +came away <i>without</i> seeking the degree. His brother-in-law, the +Rev<span class="corr" id="xd21e239" title="Source: ,">.</span> Thomas +Mozley, then took him up very liberally; but after my sister +Harriet’s death, J. H. N. and I bore his expenses to his dying +day. His meanness seemed to me like that of an old cynic; yet his +moderation was exemplary, and at last he undoubtedly won the respect of +the mother and daughter who waited on him.”</p> +<p>In this, which is nearly all he has to say of this elder brother, it +appears to me Professor Newman has either said too little or too much. +The title of his work did not necessitate any reference to Charles +Robert; but having said so much he should at least have explained +further. For instance, in reference to the visit to Bonn, it was +exceedingly natural in the second brother seeking to take a degree, +since both his senior and junior had a college education. That he did +not share in this advantage may have well tended to sour his life. Mr. +Meynell explains why he returned without seeking the degree. He says: +“But he came away without even offering himself for examination, +a step he explained by saying that the judges would not grant him a +degree because he had given offence by his treatment of faith and +morals [it is a Catholic who writes] in an essay which they call +<i>teterrima</i>.” Charles may have acted with extreme +imprudence, both in regard to the bank directors and the Bonn +examiners; but we should need to know the cases before we can determine +whether he was actuated by wilful waywardness or by adherence to a +higher than common standard of conduct. Each of the brothers had +evidently exquisite sensitiveness of conscience, though, as proved by +the Professor’s <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb12" href="#pb12" +name="pb12">12</a>]</span>last book—that unique criticism of a +brother who died at ninety by another aged eighty-five—they could +not always enter into sympathy with each other.</p> +<p>Of this we may be quite sure. The life of one who had thought +himself into Atheism, yet contemplated becoming a tutor, must have been +a most uncomfortable one. The treatment he was likely to receive could +not be calculated to evoke his better qualities. Finding everywhere his +Atheism a bar to his advancement, whose is the fault if it resulted in +a character of petulance and cynicism, and in—what it evidently +did result in—a largely wasted life?</p> +<p>The Rev. Edward Venables, Precentor of Lincoln, speaks of him as +having been, between 1834 and 1844, usher in a large school for +farmers’ sons, kept by a Mr. Allfree at Windmill Hill, in the +parish of Herstmonceaux, Sussex, where Julius Charles Hare, Archdeacon +of Lewes, was rector, and John Sterling for a short while curate. Mr. +Venables says Newman “interested Archdeacon Hare very much, and I +have often heard him speak of the long conversations he had had with +him on literary and philosophical subjects, and of the remarkable +mental power he displayed. At that time the future Cardinal’s +brother had entirely discarded the Christian faith, and declared +himself an unbeliever in revelation.” There can be no doubt the +tribute from Hare, a man of very superior culture, was deserved, though +the archdeacon also expressed the opinion “there was a screw +loose somewhere.”</p> +<p>The task of teaching the Sussex rustics was, as Precentor Venables +remarks, intolerably irksome to a man of Newman’s high +intellectual power. It was like chopping logs with a fine-edged razor. +His relations with his principal became strained, and a tussle between +the usher and his class led to his dismissal. At this time he was +miserably poor. Precentor <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb13" href= +"#pb13" name="pb13">13</a>]</span>Venables says: “To Hare he +lamented the narrow-mindedness of his brothers John and Francis, who, +as he asserted, had entirely cast him off, and left him to fight his +way in the world unaided, because of his professed infidelity, in which +the younger of the two, then an ardent Evangelical, was before very +long to follow him.” No reproach whatever is due to the younger +brother on this account, and the elder is probably as little +blameworthy. John Henry could not be expected to recommend as tutor one +whose views upon faith and morals he considered unsound. Francis +William had gone to Bagdad with the object of assisting in a Christian +mission, and intercourse with Mohammedans and other studies were but +gradually loosening his orthodoxy. After his return, and when his works +and professorship at London University assured his position, he put +himself into regular monthly communication with his brother. In the +meantime he had been assisted by his sister Harriet’s husband. +But the iron had already entered his soul; he was an Atheist and an +outcast. Forced to receive the bounty of relatives who deplored his +opinions, he seems to have resented their kindness as an attempt to +bribe his intellectual conscience. The world rang with the +fame—as theologian, historian, poet, and preacher—of the +elder, whose creed he had outgrown and despised; while his convictions, +to the full as honest, everywhere stood in his way, and were contemned +as an offence against faith and morals. He had no contact with minds +congenial to his own, and doomed himself to the life of a recluse.</p> +<p>Each of the brothers was of a retiring, meditative disposition. +Reading the <i>Apologia Pro Vita Sua</i> of the eldest, one may see how +this contributed towards his seeking a refuge in the Catholic Church. +The same disposition of mind may be traced in the <i>Phases +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb14" href="#pb14" name= +"pb14">14</a>]</span>of Faith</i> of the youngest, equally impelling +him from the evangelicalism of his surroundings and leading to the +rejection of historic Christianity, and finally to the surrender of all +belief in revelation. In Charles Robert Newman the same qualities were +seen to excess, removing him from contact with his fellows to the life +of a solitary thinker in a quiet Welsh watering-place. From about 1853, +he had a room in a small cottage on the Marsh road, Tenby.</p> +<p>Mr. Thomas Purnell, who says he had for years “the inestimable +privilege of enjoying his close intimacy,” remarks, “never +before or since have I met a man endowed with as rare an intellectual +equipment.” Mr. Purnell thus describes his own first visit to the +recluse: “He stood at the top of the topmost stair. I cannot +imagine a more distinguished head and face. There was a touch of +Mephistopheles in him. There was also a touch of Jupiter Olympius. +Although dressed in ill-fitting clothes, and with a sort of blanket +over his shoulders, he appeared to me to be the ideal of courtly grace. +He bowed me without a word into his apartments. This was in the roof of +the building, and the only light came from a window which opened with a +notched iron bar. The room was as meagrely furnished as Goethe’s +study in Weimar. A bed, a chest of drawers, a table and two or three +chairs, with a few books, constituted the whole goods and +chattels.” Mr. Purnell says “his health, means and +inclination made him averse to society. The rector called on him, but +was not admitted; visitors to the town who had known his brothers would +send in their cards, but they received no response; local medical men, +when they heard he was ill, volunteered their services, but they were +declined with courteous thanks conveyed by letter.”</p> +<p>It appears he but seldom left his house, and when he <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb15" href="#pb15" name="pb15">15</a>]</span>went out +he did not often enter the town, but took his exercise in the road +which led into the country. Dressed in a pea-jacket, with a shawl or a +rug thrown across his shoulders, and with a sou’-wester over his +head, he marched erect, looking neither to left nor right. He wore +shoes, and, as his trousers were short, displayed an interval of white +socks. The lads and lasses were apt to regard such a figure with +derision.</p> +<p>It was through Mr. Purnell that he communicated the papers here +reprinted to the <i>Reasoner</i>. Although but of the character of +fragments, they bespeak an original mind. The secret of the +Cardinal’s great influence and strength was that what he spoke +and wrote came not from books, but forthright out of his own head and +heart. The topics with which his brother deals were those only needing +the mind, and his treatment shows they were viewed in the dry light of +an original intellect. The <i>Reasoner</i> ceased soon after the +appearance of these papers, and thus closed the one opening for his +literary activity. Francis William Newman was, at least till the +present year, unaware that his arguments for Theism were challenged by +his own brother under the signature of “A Recluse.” He +informs me that he had never heard that anyone would publish anything +from his pen, and that he heard that at his death, in March, 1884, he +left a box full of manuscripts, which were destroyed as useless. +Whether this was done by order of his relatives, whether the landlady +decided the question, or whether the vicar or neighbors were called in, +will perhaps remain as unknown as the worth of the manuscripts. The +following specimens are all by which the latter question can be +judged.</p> +<p>Mr. Meynell says that two years before he died he had a short visit +from his eldest brother. It must have been a strange meeting, and one +worthy the brush of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb16" href="#pb16" +name="pb16">16</a>]</span>a great artist. Surely in all England there +were not two men of eighty whose thoughts were so divergent or two +brothers whose lives were so diversified. The one a saintly cardinal, +called by the Pope the Light of England, who, by his rare urbanity, had +gained the respect of all, replete with all that should accompany old +age—as honor, love, obedience, troops of friends: the other, +fallen, too, into the sere and yellow leaf, and without them +all—poor, solitary, unknown and despised, a scorn and wonderment +to his nearest neighbors. And all from following his own thought that +had made him a <i lang="la">purus putus</i> Atheist.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">J. M. Wheeler.</span> <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb17" href="#pb17" name="pb17">17</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd21e209" href="#xd21e209src" name="xd21e209">1</a></span> Wilfrid +Meynell, in his <i>John Henry Newman</i>, erroneously speaks of Charles +Robert as the “youngest son.” <a class="fnarrow" href= +"#xd21e209src">↑</a></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd21e231" href="#xd21e231src" name="xd21e231">2</a></span> This is a +mistake. Owen in 1817 renounced the religions of the world, and +proclaimed that man’s character was formed for him not by him. +But he was not an Atheist. <a class="fnarrow" href= +"#xd21e231src">↑</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 chapter"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">CHARACTER OF CHARLES NEWMAN.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">There is little to say and less need to add anything +to what Mr. Wheeler writes, whose industry and discernment collect +together all the accessible facts of his subject. My knowledge of +Charles Robert Newman is confined to his correspondence, which, with my +present engagements, I could not refer to and examine without delaying +the printer longer than would be convenient to you, as Mr. +Wheeler’s article is in type. The impression Mr. C. R. Newman +conveyed to me by his letters is, I judge, sufficient for the purpose +in hand. Charles Newman had an intermittent mind. He would write with +great force and clearness, and in another letter, which was confused in +parts, he would frankly say that his mind was leaving him, as was its +wont as I understood him, and after a few months less or more, it would +return to him, when he would write again. In this manly frankness and +strong self-consciousness he resembled his two eminent brothers Francis +and John. I trusted to his friend Mr. Purnell, who was the medium in +communicating with me, to send me further letters when Mr. Charles was +able or disposed to write them. I expected to hear from him again. Much +occupied with debates and otherwise at the time, I neglected writing +further to him myself. Afterwards thinking his disablement might have +grown upon him with years, disinclined me from asking him to resume his +letters. Mr. Wheeler seems ignorant of Charles Newman’s mental +peculiarity, and does not <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb18" href= +"#pb18" name="pb18">18</a>]</span>recognise what may be generous +delicacy on the part of his brothers in not referring to it. To do so +would have subjected them to the imputation, very frequent formerly, of +imputing difference of opinion to want of saneness. Even so liberal a +preacher as W. J. Fox accounted, in 1841, for my disbelief in Theism by +conjecturing the existence of some mental deficiency. No doubt many +persons with whom Charles Newman had dealings in offices he held, would +regard his Atheism—which it was contrary to his nature to +conceal—as a personal disqualification. He avowed his opinions as +naturally and as boldly as Professor Newman and the Cardinal avowed +theirs. It is not conceivable that Cardinal Newman ever intermitted his +aid—or Professor Newman either—on this account. They were +both incapable of personal intolerance. They might deplore that their +brother Charles’s opinions were so alien, so contrary to theirs; +but this they would never make matter of reproach. It was doubtless a +great trial to them that their brother, having fine powers like their +own, making no persistent effort for his own maintenance, although he +knew it must render independence impossible. Possibly the solitariness +which he chose caused his tendency to unusualness of conduct, not to +say eccentricity, to grow upon him—which they could not control +or mitigate without an interference, which might subject them to +resentment and reproach. Charles no doubt inherited his father’s +sympathy for social improvement, which led to his sharing Robert +Owen’s sociologic views. But he did not acquire his Atheism from +Robert Owen—as Professor Newman has said—for Robert Owen +was not an Atheist—always believing in some Great Power.</p> +<p>Professor Newman has told me that in any further edition of his +little book upon his brother, the Cardinal, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb19" href="#pb19" name="pb19">19</a>]</span>he will, +on my authority, correct his description of Robert Owen as an Atheist. +Charles owed his Atheism to himself, as his brothers owed their +opinions to their own conclusions and reflections. Charles not taking a +degree was less likely to be owing to means not being furnished to him +than to his intermittent indecision of mind and his strong discernment, +which produced satisfaction with the world, with others, and with +himself.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">George Jacob Holyoake.</span> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb21" href="#pb21" name= +"pb21">21</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="body"> +<div class="div1 chapter"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">TWO PRINCIPLES OF ORDER.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">In my proof of the invalidity of that +argument—it being indeed what is called “the Argument from +Design”—I point out that our experience simultaneously +informs us of two modes of producing order, otherwise called +arrangement, relation of parts to each other and to the whole direction +of means towards some recognisable end; or, to describe the phenomenon +in the most summary, as well as the most practical, way—two modes +of producing effects identical with those that proceed from design. I +explain that, of these two principles of order, the one is Design +itself, a <i>modus operandi</i> of intelligence (such as we find it +here below, of which the human mind affords the best examples), while +the other is something to which no name has been assigned, and which, +consequently, we can only shortly describe by saying that it is +<i>not</i> design. It becomes necessary, therefore, to give a farther +periphrastic account of it as follows:—</p> +<p>This nameless principle of order, considered as a vague popular +surmise, is as familiar to our experience as design. We all see, for +instance, that water has a tendency to form a perfectly level and +horizontal surface, that heavy bodies fall to the earth +perpendicularly, that the plummet performs a straight line in just the +same direction, that dew-drops and soap-bubbles <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb22" href="#pb22" name="pb22">22</a>]</span>assume a +globular shape, that crystallisation observes similar artist-like +rules, and so on. We are accustomed to say, “It is the nature of +things,” and we ground our daily actions on a confidence in this +regularity of proceeding, without generally attempting to explain it. +Science comes to our help, and shows us that this orderly action of +things around us may be traced to, and is the necessary result of, the +operation of certain powers or properties inherent in these natural +things. Grant that the property called gravitation belongs to moving +bodies, and an innumerable quantity of orderly phenomena may be +predicated as springing of their own accord by inevitable consequence +from this datum; which same phenomena, moreover, intelligence is able +coincidently to reproduce in its own special mental way.</p> +<p>Here, then, is a principle of order, less popularly appreciated, but +not less certainly evidenced and known, than design. It is, no doubt, a +principle infinitely inferior in dignity, for it is blind and +unintelligent, while design sees and understands, but this is not the +question. The question, superseded by an answer derived from human +experience, is to this effect—that nature and natural things are, +with no less propriety, assignable as the doers of a certain +non-designing kind of order, than man is assignable as the doer of the +designing kind; that we just as truly perceive that nature, in the +exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in her, produces +order in a dew-drop or in a crystal, as that man, in the exercise of +certain powers that we find to be inherent in him, produces order in a +poem or in a cathedral, and that, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb23" +href="#pb23" name="pb23">23</a>]</span>consequently, the argument from +design, based as it is on the assertion that our experience assures us +of only one principle of order, is invalid.</p> +<p>Mr. F. W. Newman’s argument is one of this erroneous class. He +points to “Animal Instincts” as an effect, which, owing to +our knowing of no other agency by which it could have been produced, +can alone be accounted for by reference to a designer, and consequently +as manifesting the objective existence of that designer, who could only +be the theistic God. The question that Mr. F. Newman’s adduced +instance required him to consider was, whether the non-designing +principle of order, which, we are aware, is in many cases able to +produce the same effects as the other, could have been thus operative +here, and he had got to prove that it could <i>not</i> have been so, +that there was something in the nature of the case that forced us +exclusively to have recourse to the intelligent principle of order, and +resisted any solution from the other principle. The result of a proof +so conducted would have been, that Mr. F. Newman was entitled to +conclude that (granting our earthly experience was a sufficient test of +the matter) Design must have been the sole worker of the debated +phenomenon. He would then have established his theistic argument. +Instead of doing this, he simplifies his proceeding by being +incognisant of a notorious fact, and ignoring the non-designing +principle altogether.</p> +<p>1. The fact is, that there is <i>not</i> one way only of producing +the phenomena of design (I am here using an ordinary elliptical mode of +speaking, since literal metaphysical correctness is sometimes +cumbrous)—but <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb24" href="#pb24" +name="pb24">24</a>]</span>there are two ways: one, the mind of a +designer, and the other (whatever may be its nature, which the present +question does not call upon me to define) <i>not</i> the mind of a +designer.</p> +<p>2. The shortest way of proving this theorem, is to state that there +are two ways of your obtaining a facsimile of your own person. One is +to have your portrait taken, and the other is to stand before a +looking-glass, and that of these two ways the former is that of design, +and the latter confessedly <i>not</i> design, being the well-known +necessary effect of certain so-called second causes, whose operation in +this instance is familiar to modern science.</p> +<p>3. Consequently, S. D. Collet is incorrect in the principle which +she makes the foundation of her argument at p. 27, where it is said, +“What the Theist maintains is this, that when we see the exercise +of Force in the direction of a purpose, we, by an inevitable inference, +attribute the phenomenon to <i>some</i> conscious agent.”</p> +<p>4. Force is seen to be exercised in the direction of a +purpose—the purpose being that of producing similitude—with +equal evidence in the two cases just compared; for though the force +exercised in said direction is less in the case of the painter than it +is in that of the looking-glass (for the resemblance produced by the +former is in less degree a resemblance than that produced by the +latter), the <i>evidence</i> cannot be said to be less, since it is no +less able to convince. We are as perfectly sure that the painter could +not have produced that <i>lesser</i> similitude of a man, and a +particular man<span class="corr" id="xd21e363" title= +"Not in source">,</span> by chance (the alternative of this +supposition, according <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb25" href="#pb25" +name="pb25">25</a>]</span>to our experience, being that <i>he</i> must +have used design) as we are that the looking-glass could not have +produced that <i>greater</i> similitude of a man, and a particular man, +by chance (the alternative of this supposition, according to our +experience, being that <i>it</i> must have used certain so-called laws +of nature); this collective experience of ours, equally assuring us on +the one hand, that the only way of the painter’s achieving these +effects is by design, and on the other, that the only way of the +looking-glass’s doing so, is by the natural agencies referred +to.</p> +<p>5. The human experience on which the decision of this question must +be founded—though not at the present era <i>essentially</i> +different—may yet be said to be considerably so from what it was +in certain former periods. In no times could mankind think and observe +without becoming aware of these two principles of order—whether +you call them facts or inferences—as a portion of their familiar +experience. And so far as they might have compared them, they must have +abundantly seen that the natural one is more powerful than the +artificial one, and that the straight line or the circle must seek its +perfection much rather from the plummet or the revolving radius, than +from the pencil of Apelles.</p> +<p>6. Thus the <i>essential</i> point of the existence of the two +principles has always been known, but the idea of their respective +spheres and limits, of the efficient prevalence of each within our +experience, has fluctuated in society. Art and handicraft are, of +course, peculiarly competent to appreciate the artificial principle of +order, while physical science is especially conversant with the +<i>natural</i> one. As the ancients were equal to the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb26" href="#pb26" name="pb26">26</a>]</span>moderns +in the former pursuits, but vastly inferior to them in the latter, they +must so far have had a tendency to think more of the designing +principle, and less of the other principle than we do. But it must be +remembered, that one or other of these two principles, or at least the +arbitrament between them, is the animating basis of all religion, and +of all religious sects and persuasions; and further, that of these two +principles, the religion founded on the <i>artificial</i> one, which is +the one traditionally derived to us, is liable to be, and is wont to +be, a far more powerful religion (because it deals far more intensely +in personification, having reference singly to some supposed artist) +than either the religion that is constituted by the <i>natural</i> +principle, or that which results from a mixture of the two principles. +And indeed, I will incidentally say that this last kind of religion +seems to me to have much analogy on its side, and that the old idea of +“the two principles” might, on several grounds besides the +present one, and in several respects, perhaps, be found <span class= +"corr" id="xd21e400" title="Source: so">to</span> shadow forth a +certain amount of most important truth and applicability.</p> +<p>7. To return. By considering the state of religion and of religious +belief in the times of Socrates and Cicero, in connection with the +state of art, handicraft, and science, in the same time, and +coincidently taking care not to forget that religious sentiment (that +at least of the kind which had in their era already been, and much more +since has been, communicated from the east to the west) is an +incomparably more vigorous impeller of opinion, than reason and +argument; we shall have some of the principal data, and in a main +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb27" href="#pb27" name= +"pb27">27</a>]</span>matter shall be prepared to use them judiciously +in any inquiry we might make, why it was that Socrates and Cicero, +having their attention arrested by the artificial principle of order +and arrangement, seemed absolutely to forget the existence of the +natural one, and why in consequence it was, that the latter wrote to +this effect: “He who can look up to the heavenly vault, and doubt +the existence of a one personal God, the designer and governor of all +things, is equivalent to a madman”; and why, further, we, spite +of our vast physical science, are prone to the same fallacy.</p> +<p>8. Having thus proved that the argument of the Theist generally, as +well as the particular one advanced by S. D. C. at p. 27, is, by being +based on the erroneous statement that there is <i>only one</i> means +known to human experience, of producing phenomena identical with those +that are the product of design, and that this one is design itself; +there being, on the contrary, <i>two</i> such means, one of which is +<i>not</i> design; having, I say, proved that your argument, by being +so based, is <i>invalid</i>, I find I must fully agree with you, that +there is evidence of “an unmistakable cosmical unity.”</p> +<p>9. The true inquiry, therefore, is, which of those two principles of +order is, in the agency inquired into, the agent under these +circumstances, and whether both, and how far, under our ignorance of +what <i>may be</i> (a most important point that is carefully to be +considered) we are entitled to affirm as indubitable, to denounce as +contradictory, to advance as probable, to conjecture, to surmise, or to +speculate on this question. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb28" href= +"#pb28" name="pb28">28</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 chapter"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">THE TRUTH OF FIRST PRINCIPLES.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">1. You ask “my idea on the impossibility of +proving the truth of First Principles?”</p> +<p>By “truth” you mean the ascertained existence of any +idea or thing, and the ascertained consistency of any statement with +some such idea or thing.</p> +<p>By “principles” you mean not simply cardinal +propositions, but cardinal propositions that we have ascertained to be +true.</p> +<p>By “first principles” you mean the indubitably true but +unprovable elementary principles of all our knowledge. You mean that +these principles are the ground whereon we build in our reasonings; all +that we build upon them must, in consequence of being so built, admit +of being “proved” whether we have built rightly—that +is, admit of being subjected to the test whether the reasoning is +correct; but these “first principles” are confessedly +exempted from this test, and yet are received as true, no less than the +others that have sustained this ordeal. You ask the meaning of this +privilege, whether it is right; and, if so, to what propriety or +necessity of the case it is due?</p> +<p>2. You ask, “How is truth ascertained to be truth?” or, +in other words, “What is the criterion of truth?”</p> +<p>With respect to the first query—In accordance with the +definition I have above given of truth, it would <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb29" href="#pb29" name="pb29">29</a>]</span>seem +that it must have two sources, experience and reason, experience who +notifies the existence of certain ideas or things, and reason, who +forms propositions suggested by them. Experience, therefore, acts the +simple part of supplying all the materials of truth; while reason, +besides his acknowledged office of judge of all truth, exercises the +quite different function of being himself the purveyor of a portion of +it.</p> +<p>So indubitable is it that truth can have these two sources only, +that even fanaticism would be found confessing the principle; while it +appeals to the experience of those who agree with it, as well as +professes to be reasonable.</p> +<p>First principles must, accordingly, be of two kinds. Of those that +are based upon experience, I will give the following instances:—I +hear the chirping of a bird, and I see an inkstand before me. That I +have the sensation of hearing and seeing in these two cases, are facts +of which it is impossible I can doubt. Reason perceives that these are +primary facts or first principles, neither admitting nor requiring any +proof, testified by consciousness, and self-evidently verified on that +testimony.</p> +<p>By reason, of course is meant the reason of all mankind—that +is, of all who are presumably competent to judge on the subject. So +that any just or reasonable confidence in the verdict of my own +reason—in this or in any other matter, presupposes a due +comparison of my own reason with that of others, nay, in some cases, a +consideration of the supposably more enlightened reason of future +times. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb30" href="#pb30" name= +"pb30">30</a>]</span></p> +<p>I discriminate first principles from derived ones +thus:—“I see the sun,” is a first principle to me; +“you see it,” is a first principle to you; by comparing +these two ideas, each attains the derived principle that the other sees +what he does, and the further derived principle that the sun is an +existence independent of both. His own existence is, indeed, to every +one the first principle, by means of which he infers the existence of +other things and beings.</p> +<p>In coming now to the other kind of first principles, consisting of +propositions formed by reason, we perceive that these show symptoms of +still further difference from the above, than that which results from +the difference of their source, of difference that affects their +philosophical character, and their technical right to the name under +which they present themselves to us. In short, the primary philosophy +has not yet settled their title.</p> +<p>They are perceived by us to be true by an act of reason called +intuition. Not similarly, however, does our reason inform us that they +really are first principles, and our science is hitherto unequal to +this inquiry.</p> +<p>Take, for instance, the following celebrated thesis, so often cited +as the most fundamental of all the propositions of reason, insomuch as +to be tacitly implied in all our reasonings; which yet we are not sure +<i>is</i> a first principle, all that can be said in favor of its +pretensions being that we can find no one who is able to reduce it to +more primary elements:—</p> +<p>It is impossible for a thing at the same time to be and not to +be.</p> +<p>Any one agreeing, as every one must, that this is <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb31" href="#pb31" name="pb31">31</a>]</span>true, +might still justly put the query, Why is it impossible? thereby calling +its assertion in question, demanding its credentials of proof, seeking +some ground for its truth other than its own testimony, and +hypothesising some other proposition more fundamental than it of which +it would be a derivative, and by all and each of these proceedings, +rejecting its claim to be a first principle.</p> +<p>Its resisting our analysis is a good subjective ground for our +ranking this and other similar propositions among our first principles. +But they could only have the true claim by its being made clear that +the inability results from the nature of the case, and not from our own +incompetency.</p> +<p>This test is borne by the former description of first principles; we +are able to see that the instances I adduced, such as the statements, +“I see the sun,” “I see an inkstand,” “I +hear a bird,” “I am conscious that <i>I</i> exist,” +evade our power of ordinary proving, because they do not admit of such +proof.</p> +<p>When we perceive that no one can answer this query, we are prompted +to another. Why cannot we answer it? whence our inability? what +prevents us? But here also we find ourselves completely in the +dark<span class="corr" id="xd21e479" title="Source: ?">,</span> which +is somewhat strange, considering that in every human pursuit, whether +of science or any other, when we wish to do a thing and cannot do it, +we are generally able to specify some particular, either of self-defect +or outward impediment that is supposed to be in fault. But I imagine, +if the reader were to experiment on the specimen I have given, he would +not only find himself to fail in solving the problem, Why is it that +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb32" href="#pb32" name= +"pb32">32</a>]</span>a thing cannot at once be and not be? but would +not have a word to advance in the way of accounting for his +failure.</p> +<p>These remarks apply to all other propositions of the sort. +Euclid’s axioms, which undoubtedly aim to be as elementary as +possible, and therefore may be said to aim to be first principles, are +confessedly, under this aspect, unsatisfactory to the learned. +“Things that are equal to the same are equal to each +other.” Every one is inclined to ask, Why? “A straight line +is the shortest distance between two points.” Again, Why?</p> +<p>The sum of the above strictures on this kind of so-called first +principles, is—1. That they have not made good their title, and +therefore are not to be accredited with it. 2. That there is a decided +presumption against that title from the doubt and dissatisfaction with +which it is met, where want of candor and intelligence cannot be +imputed, especially when it is considered that the other, the sensuous +experimental kind of first principles, have so frank an acceptance. 3. +It seems to be absolutely provable, and I suppose I have above +incidentally proved it, that they are <i>not</i> first principles. 4. +The task is set to metaphysics of supplying the most satisfactory proof +of all by bringing to light such propositions as would be perceived to +underlie these so-called first principles, and to be the real first +principles to which the others would give precedence.</p> +<p>As regards their name, it being so much in point, excuses the old +remark that the elements of our knowledge stand in a reversed order in +respect to this knowledge to what they assume in our process of +acquiring it. A first principle, therefore, means also a <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb33" href="#pb33" name="pb33">33</a>]</span>last +one; it is the last in whatsoever endeavors to descend to the bottom or +to penetrate to the source of our knowledge, but it becomes the first +when we trace it from this source through its derivative ideas.</p> +<p>The investigating act should not be confounded with the prospecting +one. The sensible horizon of subjective vision can, by no mediation, be +exalted into the real horizon of truth, wherein the genuine first +principles that bound human capability are exclusively to be found.</p> +<p>It may be asked, apart from the inquiry what first principles there +are, Is there a necessity that some first principles should be? So it +seems from the data of the case. It is patent to common observation +that the mind of man is recipient of ideas from the things that +surround it. The contact of its apprehending faculty with the things it +apprehends, must, it would seem, constitute first principles. After it +has got them it might conceivably elicit from them derived principles, +but the original ones cannot be thus derived, since there are none +earlier from which to derive them.</p> +<p>Again, it is to be inquired, Does the mind, in receiving its ideas, +possess and exercise in reference to the things on which it operates, a +copying faculty or a transforming faculty? Does it import them simply +in their native character, in the way a mirror does the object it +reflects, or does it manufacture, cook, and assimilate them, so as to +change them into something partaking of its own?</p> +<p>And, if it changes them, what is the extent of the change? Does it +go so far only as the semi-idealism <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb34" +href="#pb34" name="pb34">34</a>]</span>of Locke, or extend into the +absolute idealism of the German school?</p> +<p>Because these questions have been wont to puzzle either the learned, +or the public, or both, it does not follow that they are difficult. I +suppose them to admit of decided answers before a supposed competent +audience.</p> +<p>As I am unprovided with proof, although I suppose it is to be +provable, that first principles of reason must needs be, I must +speculate for a moment on the possibility of a proposition of the form +of “two and two make four,” being derived from one of the +form of “I scent the rose,” for this seems to be the +alternative of there being no first principles of reason. Evidently I +must confess to having no grounds for pronouncing such a derivation +impossible, though I must grant it to be paradoxical. Our +mal-cultivation of non-material science, and the imperfection of our +metaphysics, is probably the only cause of the strange predicament.</p> +<p>No doubt M. Cousin, and several other eminent teachers of youth, to +whose office it belongs to expound received metaphysics, have comprised +First Principles in their course of philosophy; but as I have barely +met with any of their writings, I must confess such an ignorance of +them, as not even to know how far I am either adopting, or evading +their phraseology, in discussing the same subjects. Mine, however, +cannot be wrong, since the term “first principles,” that I +have chosen, is one of familiar popular use; so that were this mode of +speech, as indeed it is, peculiarly liable to ambiguity, it would, for +that very reason, be preferable to any other, till such time as that +ambiguity <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb35" href="#pb35" name= +"pb35">35</a>]</span>should have been explained, and the wrong +thinking, of which it might have been the source, exposed and obviated. +Not till this had been done would it be time to inquire whether the +current metaphysics had invented any intrinsically better ways of +speaking on these topics, for though the veriest tyro in such +investigations would be justified in objecting to some of its +technicalities, such as the invention of the word free-will, for +instance, for the same reason that a beginner in zoology might object, +were such an attempt ever made, to the introduction of the word sphynx +or griffin into that branch of inquiry, there can be no doubt that +other of its speculations are more happily conceived. Hence I suppose +it would be a decided mistake to imagine, for example, that no +<i>trouve</i> whatever is to be elicited from the obscurities of Kant, +but on the other hand, one must as much take care to entertain sober +conjectures of the possible value of such unsunned treasures, as to +keep in mind that quackery may be not unqualified with some merit, and +I might surmise that it was perhaps in virtue of his fabulous +expectations in this direction, that Coleridge could not execute his +long-meditated plan of elucidating that writer; or rather, +perhaps—to speak more curtly—a spirit more differing from +that which compounded the amalgam, was necessary to resolve and detect +it.</p> +<p>According to this estimate of the value of our achieved studies, it +would be expectable, in regard to my present topic, that almost all the +materials for right conclusions on it must be extant somewhere or other +in our books, no great amount of ability being required <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb36" href="#pb36" name="pb36">36</a>]</span>to turn +them to proper account: an easily suppliable desideratum being thus +left unsupplied, the public indifference manifested thereby would seem +to bear the ascription of our unsatisfactory metaphysics to the fault, +however apportioned between the many and the few, not of the intellect, +but of the reason.</p> +<p>Indeed, it is held as a pretty general rule, that where there is +want of reform, there is want of reason; and Bacon, by implication, +thought the rule here applicable, when, in defending his “new +philosophy” from the charge of arrogance, he apologised by saying +that a “cripple in the right road would make better progress than +a racehorse in the wrong.” That is, he claimed for himself, as he +was bound logically to do, the plain good sense of directing his +supposably humble faculties with an obvious regard to the end he +proposed and professed, and he was ready to concede to his competitors +all kinds of superiority but this.</p> +<p>The same simplicity characterises the reforming animus of the other +great patriarch of “the new philosophy,” in its sister +branch. The still debated point between the school of Locke and the old +philosophy was, and is, of such a form as may be figured by the +following hypothetical, and it may be, well-founded statement. Locke +seems to have battled mainly for the principle that ideas that every +one allows to be inferences, should be acknowledged by philosophy to be +such, while the adherents of the old ideas maintained, in opposition to +him, that ideas that every one allows to be inferences, should +<i>not</i> be acknowledged by philosophy to be such. Or, in other +words, Locke aimed to realise a certain first principle of reason, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb37" href="#pb37" name= +"pb37">37</a>]</span>which I shall have hereafter to consider, which +stands thus:—“That which it is,” while his opponents +withstood this innovating pretension, finding it fatal to their +doctrine. If the reader is somewhat startled at the statement I have +just made, I will remind him that it amounts to nothing more than +saying that in the contest between the new and the old philosophy, +reason is entirely and absolutely on the side of the former, an +assertion which, of course, I must both think admits of being +substantiated, and must take myself, in some degree, to be able to aid +in its being so.</p> +<p>The existing quarrel between the two philosophies might, perhaps, be +personified through the medium of a principal champion on each side. +For the new ideas I could only choose Locke, since he is admitted to +have had no equally eminent successor; for the old I would choose M. +Cousin, both on account of his superior merit and popularity, and also +of his having made Locke the subject of some elaborate strictures that +I happen to have read. On these, when they come again to hand, I should +perhaps have something to remark; meanwhile I must content myself with +addressing myself to one of them in the following manner:—</p> +<p>In antiquity and the middle ages, the schoolmaster and the +philosopher were one and the same individual. The new philosophy was +the first to separate these two departments; perceiving that the +communication of truth is a distinct office from its investigation, and +that that difference of office in each case necessitates a +corresponding difference in the public, that is the proper object of +its exercise. Since, moreover, society may be discriminated into two +sorts of mind, admitting <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb38" href= +"#pb38" name="pb38">38</a>]</span>of being pictured as the childish and +the adults, it is evident that the instructor must find his audience +more especially in the former, while the investigator of truth must +appeal exclusively to the latter. This he must needs do, to whichever +of the sciences he ministers; and not only so, but he must more +particularly address himself to a small and select portion of this +itself selecter class, constitute them the witnesses and judges of his +proceedings, and perceive that both his success in philosophy and the +acknowledgment of it can only be founded first and foremost on their +approbation. As even in jockeyism and prize-fighting, there are +“the knowing ones,” similar referees are, by the nature of +things, required for the flourishing estate of any science; and +evidently in proportion as they might be incompetent to such an office, +false or imperfect science must be the result.</p> +<p>Locke, acting on this instinctive view, communicated to the public +certain observations he had made in mental philosophy, and entitled his +work, <i>An Essay on the Human Understanding</i>. He properly called it +an essay, because a person who simply aims to investigate truth, +undertakes to do his best in the way of trial, endeavor, and +experiment, in such sort as to make the word essay appropriate to what +he does. The word moreover implies that the thing done, though it is +the writer’s best, is liable to be incomplete, comparatively +imperfect, and, indeed, in the more difficult questions of philosophy, +as well as in the less advanced stages of philosophising, is sure to be +so. Locke accordingly, having had his attention struck with certain +phenomena of the human mind, told the public <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb39" href="#pb39" name="pb39">39</a>]</span>just +what he had observed, and nothing else. Among the observations that he +thus imparted, was the process through which the mind seems to go in +arriving at the sum of its ideas, and especially the points from which +it seems to start in this process.</p> +<p>M. Cousin, having apparently no conception of a way of acting so +proper to legitimate inquiry, and having himself written a <i>Course of +Philosophy</i>, evidently thinks Locke ought to have done the same; for +he says that Locke is erroneous in the method of his philosophy, that +he begins at the wrong end, that instead of having told us as he has +how the ideas arise in the mind, he ought to have told us what the +ideas are, instead of describing their origin to have described their +actuality, to have given a list of the faculties of the mind, and so +on. Which is just the same thing as saying that a traveller who +publishes his explorations in America, ought instead to have gone to +China.</p> +<p>I shall have to make some objections to Locke, but they will be of a +nature exactly contrary to those of which he is usually made the +subject. Instead of accusing his principles I shall have to impute to +him the not sufficiently carrying them out; a fault due to his position +as an early reformer, and perfectly consistent with his high character +as such.</p> +<p>I have the more reason to note this distinction between M. +Cousin’s department and the function exercised by Locke, because +I am forced myself to take the benefit of it. Want of erudition would +form very vulnerable points, were I to be judged by the former +standard. In the little I have yet put forth on the subject of First +Principles, I already find two or three <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb40" href="#pb40" name="pb40">40</a>]</span>errors of that sort, +which a greater amount of reading would no doubt have enabled me to +escape. My present letter may close with some correction of one of +these.</p> +<p>Preliminary, I will venture to call “That which is is,” +a first principle of reason, and “Two and two make four,” +one of its derivatives, leaving this topic for future explanation, and +then proceed thus:—When in my last letter I represented first +principles as bounding the horizon of human knowledge, I left it to be +inferred that both the kinds of “first principles” I had +mentioned were thus describable in common. I find, however, that this +metaphysical character belongs exclusively to first principles of +sensuous experience, and no more belongs to first principles of reason +than to first principles of grammar, or to first principles of +rhetoric. That is, first principles of reason are merely the result of +one of those analytical inquiries in which we arrive at something +absolutely simple, and must there stop, just as in the science of +numbers we may thus arrive at unity.</p> +<hr class="tb"> +<p>Having long ago defined First Principles of sensuous experience, I +find there is a difficulty attached to the other kind of first +principles derived from the various use of the word reason—which +I will say betrayed me into a wrong inference in the concluding +paragraph of my last letter.</p> +<p>Locke, in the 17th chapter of his fourth book, confesses that this +word, in the proper use of the English language, is liable to bear +several senses. Due discrimination in such a case, and a cautious +avoidance <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb41" href="#pb41" name= +"pb41">41</a>]</span>of the dangers to which philosophy is exposed, and +has so amply incurred, from this kind of source might, above all, have +been, expected from Locke, since he was the first who inculcated it, +and is generally remarkable for the observance of his own precepts in +this matter. Hence the charge I have now got to bring against him is a +little surprising.</p> +<p>Indeed, it might be asserted that his position and circumstances do +not seem very readily to bear the entire responsibility of some of his +proceedings. Perhaps he might be characterised as a writer of somewhat +humorous idiosyncracy in respect to tendency to fixed ideas. His +lapses, indeed, are not many, but they are highly significant, as I +shall have occasion in more than one instance to show, and among these +must evidently be reckoned that I am now going to notice, since it +imports the wrong definition of a word of such cardinal meaning.</p> +<p>In defining the word reason, in its proper and specific sense +wherein it is used to denote a certain well-known quality of the human +mind—that is, as approvedly ascertained and appreciated under +this name, as are certain weights and measures under those of pound, +gallon, or mile, he assigns a meaning to it that comes short of the +proportions thus justly prefigured as belonging to it. He confounds +reason with reasoning—that is, he emerges the entire faculty or +<i>modus operandi</i>, to which we give the name of reason, in that +partial exercise of its function to which we give the name of +reasoning. He says that, in matters of certainty, such as the proof of +any of Euclid’s theorems, the acts by which the mind ascertains +the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb42" href="#pb42" name= +"pb42">42</a>]</span>fit coherence of the several links in the chain of +reasoning are acts of reason. Granted.</p> +<p>Also, that in weighing probabilities, a similar coherence is +similarly verified by reason. Granted—with liberty of comment +that these arts of reason, in either of the two cases have, by the +approved practice of language, received the name of reasoning.</p> +<p>But he further signifies—that is, he does not expressly +affirm, but, with equivalent certification, he implicitly asserts, and +inferentially states that, in examining such a proposition as the +following:—“What is, is” (an examination to which +confessedly no reasoning is attached), the act by which the mind +assents to the truth of this statement is not to be described as an act +of reason. He adopts a different phraseology, and calls it +intuition.</p> +<p>Observe, my objection is not that he invests the idea with this new +name, but that he disparages its old one. I do not object to your +calling a spade a shovel, under a certain view of its use, but it +remains still necessary that you should admit that a spade is, in the +full sense of the word, a spade.</p> +<p>Indeed, I will incidentally remark that I suspect the word +“intuition” has been a very good addition to our +vocabulary, and I suppose its proper import might be represented as +follows:—Reason has two modes of his exercise, the one is called +reasoning, and the other intuition. Intuition is the decision of reason +on one single point; reasoning—a word proper to demonstrative +truth—seems to be nothing more than intuition looking not merely +at one point, but at several points successively. So that intuition and +reasoning would <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb43" href="#pb43" name= +"pb43">43</a>]</span>constitute the self-same function of reason, and +the difference in their meanings would be solely owing to the +difference in the circumstances under which that function is +exercised.</p> +<p>Observe, that I am here only venturing to speculate, and am now +returning from that digression.</p> +<p>Whether or not Locke is herein psychologically consistent with +himself; whether, indeed, his real theory is not that which I have just +conjecturally intimated, is another question, which I shall defer to a +future occasion; but whether or not he herein opposes the ordinary, +prevailing, and inveterate use of language, which is what I am charging +him with doing, and whether or not he has justifiable ground for this +innovation which I am denying that he has, are points that must be +tried by the ordeal of these three considerations. How are we +accustomed to speak? How are we accustomed to write? and what sort of a +call for changing our customs in either of these particulars is that +which constitutes a genuine call to do so?</p> +<p>In regard to the first of these tests, the literature of all sects +and parties has been accustomed to assert that, both in matters of +science and of worldly business, reason is the judge of all truth +whatever, without exception.</p> +<p>Locke, on the other hand, informs us that reason is the judge of +demonstrative truth, of logical truth, of casuistical truth, and of +lawyers’ truth, and of these kinds of truth alone, but is +<i>not</i> the judge of intuitive or self-evident truth. Our writers +would tell us that to deny “what is, is” to be a true +statement, would be an <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb44" href="#pb44" +name="pb44">44</a>]</span>offence against reason; but we learn from +Locke that reason has no cognisance in this matter, but intuition only +has, and consequently that the wrong committed would not be against +reason, but against intuition.</p> +<p>Our current speech accords with our literature in this view of the +meaning of the word reason; whose efficiency, moreover, it endeavors to +amplify, by surrounding it with satellites of adjectives formed from +it, the principal of which are “reasonable” and +“unreasonable.” Provided with this vocabulary, we pronounce +it to be unreasonable to deny any truth whatever that can be well and +clearly ascertained; and so far are we from reserving these adjectives +for the occasion of demonstrative truth, and holding them inapplicable +where self-evident or intuitive truth comes on the carpet, that we +account it, if possible, still more unreasonable to deny the latter +than the former.</p> +<p>But if the nomenclature adopted by Locke be the right one, there +ought to be a change in these current modes of speaking and writing. +One who should reject the proofs of Euclid, would be unreasonable; one +who should maintain that Thurtel or Greenacre were innocent of murder, +would be unreasonable; but, one who should deny the truth of any +self-evident proposition, would not be unreasonable; for to say this, +would be to say that reason has cognisance of such propositions, +whereas, according to him, it is expressly <i>not</i> reason, but +intuition that takes this office. The words “intuitional” +and “unintuitional,” must be invented to supply the obvious +need which the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb45" href="#pb45" name= +"pb45">45</a>]</span>apparent gap discovers; there seems no other way +of supplying it.</p> +<p>Lest I should be suspected of somewhat making up a case; of having, +perhaps, represented not so much what Locke really means, as what he +seems to mean, I will remind the reader that Locke is undertaking the +formal definition of a word, and that on such a critical occasion, it +is proper to give him credit for not meaning otherwise than he seems to +mean.</p> +<p>The passage which is my text, will be found in the earlier part of +the seventeenth chapter of the fourth book. Indeed, I could at once +prove my indictment by citing a few words from it, accompanied by a +comment of my own, had I any right to impose on the reader a belief in +the discriminating fairness and matter-of-fact accuracy, both of my +extracts and my comment.</p> +<p>I will, however, venture on such a step; I will suppose myself +commenting on this passage, and proceed thus: Locke, it will be seen in +this, his foremost and professed definition of the word reason, +contrasts it with “sense and intuition.”</p> +<p>Whether he holds these to be identical with what he calls “the +outward and the inward sense,” is not quite clear. That, however, +is not the question.</p> +<p>He says, that these two faculties “reach but a very little +way”; for that “the greatest part of our knowledge depends +upon deductions and intermediate ideas.” Now, reason, he says, +may be defined to be that faculty, whose specific office it is +“to find out and apply” those intermediate ideas and +deductions by which we obtain knowledge that consists of two kinds, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb46" href="#pb46" name= +"pb46">46</a>]</span>one that which exalts us into +“certainty,” the other that which, though less generous +diet for the mind, we have constantly good ground for gladly +acquiescing in, and which we call “probability.” So that, +says Locke, if you ask, “What room is there for the exercise of +any other faculty but outward sense and inward perception?” I can +abundantly reply, “Very much.” I have shown you that +without this “demonstrative” faculty, our knowledge would +be but a skeleton; it would, indeed, not be properly speaking +knowledge, but mere rudiments of knowledge.</p> +<p>Such is my interpretation of Locke’s definition of reason, in +the proper and specific sense of this word. If it is strictly correct, +as I believe the intelligent reader will find by reference, then it is +Locke confounds reason with reasoning, mistakes a part for the whole, +and the whole for a part, and acts similarly—to borrow his own +way of illustration—to the representing a gallon to be a quart, +or a half-sovereign to be a sovereign.</p> +<p>It is to be observed, too, that it is entirely in behalf of the more +showy kind of knowledge, that the mistake is made. The respected name +of reason is given exclusively to logic and demonstrating. Good sense, +good feeling, just instinct, if they stand alone, have no claim to it; +they are put on an inferior footing; true, they are intuition; but what +then? they are not reason.</p> +<p>Now, the century introduced by Locke is accused by the present, and +it is generally admitted, with some degree of justice, of having +“materialistic” tendencies. We may see, then, how +Locke’s doctrine, as just <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb47" +href="#pb47" name="pb47">47</a>]</span>described, founded though it is +only on nomenclature, hinging merely on definition, incurring whatever +wrongness it implicates from no other lapse than that of confounding a +word with its derivative, doing nothing, in short, but annul the +difference of meaning between the two words, reason and reasoning; we +may see how this apparently harmless experiment might tend to supplying +these materialistic tendencies with a ground, a rationale, a principle, +and thus to exalt their authority, and how, indeed! it just smacks of +their spirit.</p> +<p>It may be seen, too, how, from a few slips, such as this on the part +of the champion of the “new philosophy,” competing schools +of the present age might be able to make up a case, specious enough to +gain the acquiescence of a portion of the public against +both—with how great futility, I believe, would appear, if the +accusations were weighed by a competent tribunal.</p> +<p>And, finally, it might be expected, that the undue exaltation of the +demonstrative department of reason, should issue in a reaction into a +contrary extreme, and that some Mr. Carlyle might be found to inveigh +against “logic,” to sneer at “analysis,” to +denounce “cause and effect philosophy” and to praise +“mysticism.”</p> +<p>I have already assumed that the third test that I promised, goes +against Locke, and requires no examination, simply because he has not +advanced it in his behalf. He has assigned no ground for changing the +meaning of the word reason, and it is presumable that none is +assignable.</p> +<hr class="tb"> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb48" href="#pb48" name= +"pb48">48</a>]</span></p> +<p>The question, What is the Criterion of Truth?—that is, What +are the proper means of distinguishing whether anything that is +asserted to be true is so or not? claims immediate notice, because such +a criterion exists, and the new philosophy necessarily appeals to it +when it comes before the public, while it has shown with what effect it +can do so, in the case of those of its branches—namely, the +purely material and the mathematical, that flourish in society.</p> +<p>Premising that it is a way of certifying truth that has been +immemorially used by mankind in their daily affairs, and which they +have always, to some extent, instinctively transferred to their +judgments in philosophy, and that it is the only possible general and +summary criterion of truth, I may describe it as consisting in the +unanimous assent to some idea or assertion of all who are thought +competent to pronounce concerning it.</p> +<p>Viewed in connection with the thing it verifies, and the parties who +use it, the criterion may be thus represented: Any idea, assertion, or +opinion, must, by any inquirer, be found true, when he perceives it to +be such as would be unanimously assented to by all presumably competent +judges of the kind of truth to which it refers.</p> +<p>So that those who use this criterion, and are convinced of the truth +of anything through its medium—a proceeding which I have +represented as common and habitual to mankind—in thereby +pronouncing certain supposed persons to be judges of truth in the said +matter, claim themselves to be also judges of it in the matter of so +pronouncing. The acts of judgment they <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb49" href="#pb49" name="pb49">49</a>]</span>thus tacitly challenge to +themselves may be said to be to the following effect:—1. They +assign the qualifications that constitute competency for a certain +function. 2. They decide that there are persons in the community +answering to this character. 3. They opine that the view such persons +take or would take, imports an assertion of the truth of the idea in +question. 4. They accredit that view with being strictly one, supposing +that all qualified to arbitrate would acquiesce and agree in the same. +5. They attribute to themselves a similar unanimity. 6. They assume the +sufficiency of their own judgment to make all the above +conclusions.</p> +<p>These assumptions on their part, so complicated in description, are +simple enough in performance. It is plain that mankind—more +properly here to be called the public—simply attach themselves to +some opinion which they find current in society; while, however, the +assumptions I have just described are, in their full measure, but a +necessary consequence of their so doing, doubtless their so doing must +itself have been dictated by some kind of anticipation of them, but +this may, to any degree, have been vague, undetermined, partial, and +imperfect.</p> +<p>The rationale of this double bench of judges is thus explained. In +reference to almost every kind of truth there is always a certain +portion of the community better able to judge than the rest. Hence it +becomes clearly the part of the latter, if they wish to be rightly +informed, to defer to the opinion of those confessedly better +judges—confessed to be such from the general opinion to that +effect. Thus a second set of judges <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb50" +href="#pb50" name="pb50">50</a>]</span>perforce, in addition to those +that were originally conceived by choice, is implicated in this +transaction.</p> +<p>For the primary sort I must seek a name from the French language, +which calls them “experts,” the English supplying, I +believe, none, except a very vernacular one, the “knowing +ones”; the others have already got a well-known name—the +public.</p> +<p>The public, in deciding on the occasions in question, what are the +qualifications that constitute “experts” may be said to +<i>choose</i> them, thereby, however, choosing persons in idea, and not +bodily. The relation of the public to these conceptions of theirs is +the same as that of the constituencies to the members of Parliament, in +the point of one being the choosers and the others the chosen, with a +common object in view.</p> +<p>I suppose, to stop the current of my discourse, and adjourn its +topic, for the sake of at once bringing the general principle discussed +to the test of exemplification, would have its want of logical harmony +excused by its being desiderated by the reader.</p> +<p>I had undertaken to prove that this principle—which, for +distinction’s sake, I will call the unanimity principle—is +the proper and only criterion of scientific truth to the great +non-scientific world, and consequently that modern philosophy +necessarily appeals to it when it comes before the public. What I had +thus taken upon myself to do, obviously was—first, to display and +explicate the principle by definition, and this I had already done; and +next—to describe it theoretically by showing its manner of +existing, and this I was engaged in doing. Leaving this inquiry in the +midst, I am now going to deviate into the practical phase of +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb51" href="#pb51" name= +"pb51">51</a>]</span>its description, by showing, not how it <i>is</i>, +but how it <i>acts</i>. This seems necessary for the satisfaction of +the reader, as being the only way of securing him from any, even were +it but temporary, misapprehension as to the working value of the +principle for which his attention is demanded. I therefore select the +six following examples, the two first homely, and the four last +philosophical, of its ordinary use by the public.</p> +<p>They will be at once seen to justify my assertion of its having for +its main characteristics the two facts—<i>first</i>, that mankind +habitually use it, and have always done so; and <i>next</i>, that +propositions thus warranted are universally accepted as established +truth, and that no one thinks of calling them in question.</p> +<p>1. Thus no one doubts, when coming to the intersection of two roads, +he sees a sign-post, on one of whose pointers is written “To +London,” and on the other “To Windsor,” no one +hesitates to believe that the information thus conveyed to him is true; +because he is aware that those who give it are competent to do so, and +that none similarly competent will gainsay it.</p> +<p>2. Again, no one doubts that the sun rises and sets once in every +twenty-four hours; no one doubts that he so rose and set yesterday. +Every one is ready to affirm the certainty of these two facts, but very +few can do so, in any great degree, from their own experience; but they +help the lack of this by that of their neighbors. Neither is it +necessary that they should have any near, nor even the most remote, +idea of the personality of those on whose testimony they thus +implicitly rely; it suffices they are sure, whoever they may be, they +have the right qualifications for testifying <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb52" href="#pb52" name="pb52">52</a>]</span>in the +way they do, and that no one so qualified can contradict their +evidence, or dream of doing so.</p> +<p>The above are examples of the criterion of truth, applied to the +ideas and proceedings of ordinary life. It will be seen therefrom, +<i>first</i> that mankind have in all ages been educated in an +acceptance of its principle, according to my definition of it, the +principle, namely, of an indubitable certainty of truth, resulting from +the unanimous assent to some idea of all who are thought by self and +neighbors competent to pronounce thereon; possibly too they may be said +to have been educated in some imperfect theoretical appreciation of +this principle.</p> +<p>It will <i>secondly</i> be seen therefrom, that the two kinds of +unanimity which I have predicated as essential to the proper use and +results of this criterion, an unanimity, namely, on the part of the +supposed good judges of certain descriptions of truth, who may be +called the adepts or knowing ones imagined by the public; and again an +unanimity on the part of the public itself in interpreting and adopting +their opinion; it will be seen, I say, that this double unanimity is +perfectly attainable, nay, perfectly attained, and that too so +extensively, as to constitute a common and familiar occurrence on all +manner of occasions of daily life.</p> +<p>I will now give instances of their similar use of it in directing +their judgments on philosophical questions.</p> +<p>3. Very few of the public are able to examine the proof of any of +the theorems of Euclid, yet there is none of them who would think of +seriously doubting the truth of anything contained in that book, the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb53" href="#pb53" name= +"pb53">53</a>]</span>ground of their confidence being solely their +knowledge of the fact, that the learned in these matters have +unanimously so decided.</p> +<p>Every one, again, believes in certain facts that are asserted by +navigators, explorers, and geographers, respecting the existence, +position, and products of various countries of the globe. Every one, +further, believes in certain deductions derived from these facts by +naturalists, geologists, astronomers, and so forth. The belief is owing +to the unanimous testimony of all these confessedly competent +authorities; but whenever they are seen to differ among themselves, the +public withholds its entire belief, and either doubts or disbelieves +the things asserted. Thus the public is at this day doubtful and +divided whether there is such a creature as the sea-serpent. Similarly +the public is dubious—for it must needs be so if any section of +it is so—whether a certain explorer who was authoritatively sent +out about a dozen years ago conjointly by the French Government and +Institute, was, in any degree, justified in bringing home the account +he did of there being a tribe of men in the interior of Africa having +tails, whether this unexpected information is, in any important +particular, true.</p> +<p>The two last examples have been furnished by material science. I +will now draw one from the other department, with the view of +indicating that in non-material science also, numerous propositions +circulate among the public that are franked by the same principle to +pass as undoubted truth. Such is the maxim of heathen philosophy, +recorded by Cicero in his “Officiis”: “Do not to +another what you would <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb54" href="#pb54" +name="pb54">54</a>]</span>not he should do to you”; or the same +maxim, in its modified form, as given in the New Testament, with the +characteristic omission of the negative. The truth of this moral maxim +is universally admitted, because it is supposed that no person of +presumable moral judgment has ever been known to call it in +question.</p> +<p>It would seem, then, that this criterion of truth is—what +confessedly, or from easy proof, it is predicable that no other +criterion of truth is—a <i>general</i> criterion of truth. I +will, however, restrict this pretension to the statement—to be +hereafter more largely explained—that it is a general criterion +of truth to the public as such, to the public considered as a public; +for, indeed, it is not properly <span class="corr" id="xd21e715" title= +"Source: useable">usable</span> at all by anyone except in the +character of a member of the public. This means that it is a general +criterion of truth in the following way: it is applicable to the +verification of all truth, so far as it admits of being verified before +the public, and made the common property of the community.</p> +<p>6. For even where at first sight you might think it most out of +place, I mean in relation to that kind of truth whose primary evidence +is the consciousness of the individual, so that the competent witness +of truth is necessarily but one person, there is oneness of opinion, +there is unanimity, and the testimony of the one competent witness is +not contradicted or doubted by that of any other presumably competent. +When, for instance, I am conscious of the sensation of seeing an +inkstand before me, no one seeing reason to doubt my assertion to that +effect, all presumably competent testimony on the subject must needs be +concentrated in myself; and the fact of my seeing an inkstand, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb55" href="#pb55" name= +"pb55">55</a>]</span>though for my own conviction verified in a way +independent of any such argument, is, for the conviction of others, +only pronounceable as true, because all presumably competent authority +is of one mind in alleging its truth.</p> +<p>In thus far exemplifying the use of this principle, I have exhibited +it in the exercise of its primary office only, which, however, is not +that which, on behalf of philosophy, I am here demanding from it. I +have shown it, namely, as used by the public to establish truth +positively, and not in the way wherein it may be used to distinguish +truth comparatively.</p> +<p>But it is solely in this latter office that it becomes a criterion +of truth, an arbiter between the true and the false, an indicator of +both, and more especially of what has the character of ascertained +truth, and what has not; and this, it will be remembered, was the +office I sought from it, and constituted the ultimate purpose of my +taking up the consideration of the subject.</p> +<p>Having with as much brevity as just suffices for that purpose, +explained the nature of the principle in question, and its use by +society at large, it now only remains that I should explain that +purpose itself, by theory and example.</p> +<p>What I am doing in tracing the unanimity principle from its first +instinctive use by the public to its secondary and meditated one by +philosophy, is a purely critical act, comparable to that of the +rhetorician who appreciates the character of certain modes of thinking +which have long since been practised by mankind, and shows what therein +is approvable—all the rest being liable to censure. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb56" href="#pb56" name="pb56">56</a>]</span></p> +<p>It was the universal conviction of European Christendom, during many +centuries, that the Church, which was popularly supposed to be +represented by the Pope, enjoyed peculiarly a divine guidance which +made it an infallible judge of truth. This idea was thought to be +warranted by the unanimous assent of all right-minded persons, and the +denial of it to be the mark of a reprobate spirit, as well as contrary +to common sense. We now know the entire futility of this assumption, +and that the heretics were not inferior to the orthodox in the power of +judging such subjects. Hence in discussing the unanimity principle the +question presents itself, How came the public thus wrongly to apply it? +What error did they commit in so doing? When the revival of learning +and the consequent rise of Protestantism had exposed the error in that +form of it, it was still continued under the new social regimes; so +that even Locke, the boldest advocate of the rights of man that was +tolerated even in his time, stigmatised the dissentients from certain +Protestant tenets in the same unjust way that Popery had done to the +dissentients from certain Popish ones; speaking of them in two or three +places of his essay as persons at once notoriously disreputable in +character and weak in intellect; consistently with which estimate he +came to the conclusion that the reigning theology was established +truth, as being accredited by all those whose opinion was worth taking +account of.</p> +<p>Later times have again manifested the futility of the assumption +against the new race of dissentients. No one will say that <span class= +"corr" id="xd21e736" title="Source: Goëthe">Goethe</span> and +Neibuhr (to mention only two) must count for nothing on questions +wherein they <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb57" href="#pb57" name= +"pb57">57</a>]</span>were as likely to be well informed as their +opponents. So that Locke’s side, instead of being warranted by +the decisive verdict he imagines, is but one of two suitors in an +undetermined cause, neither having yet attracted the votes of the whole +jury, and neither consequently yet occupying the position of +ascertained truth. Giving everyone a fair hearing is that trial and +test of competency which yields the only means of learning who said +competent judges are.</p> +<p>A little consideration, even in Locke’s time of less advanced +thought, might have informed an intelligent mind, if free from +prejudice, that mere prohibitory laws must be of themselves less +adverse to the free expression of people’s sentiments than that +averted state of the public mind of which they are one of the symptoms. +Both from theory and experience we may collect that very much the same +laws of supply and demand obtain in matters of opinion as in those of +food and raiment; the tongue and the pen, and the previous thought by +which these are instructed, must evidently hold back from offering to +the public, nay, in a great measure from suggesting to the agent +himself, any such ideas as they know the public will not, and must +confine themselves to putting forth such only as they suppose it will +understand, appreciate, and regard. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb58" +href="#pb58" name="pb58">58</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 chapter"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">THE RIGHTS OF REASON.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">To the two queries you put to me, “What are +first principles?” and “What is the criterion of +truth?” I find it suitable to append some preliminary remarks on +“The Rights of Reason.”</p> +<p>The solution you expect is, I presume, a reasonable one. You do not +wish me to take into account any opinions that cannot bear the test of +reason.</p> +<p>Your queries derive their greatest pertinency from the state of +non-material philosophy; and, possibly, might have been, in some +measure, prompted by this consideration. That double-minded way of +inquiring into truth, which only in part reasons, while it in part +dogmatises, imagines, and assumes, is, it is obvious, in morals, +metaphysics, and religion, one of our inheritances from former times. +The battle has been won in the material department, but is still +undecided on the other wing.</p> +<p>What, then, is Reason, and what are its Rights?</p> +<p>Every human inquiry that asks, What is right, proper, or correct? +necessarily, in doing so, asks, What is it reasonable to think, +believe, or do? in the points inquired into. The faculty—whatever +may be its nature—whereby we find ourselves able, under certain +circumstances, to answer this question, we call reason. The rights of +reason may be said to consist in the concession <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb59" href="#pb59" name="pb59">59</a>]</span>to it of +a certain absolute power in the decision of truth, divisible under two +heads thus—a power of deciding what are the questions whereon it +is able to decide, and a power of deciding those questions.</p> +<p>One of the many ways of disparaging the rights of reason +is—openly or covertly to doubt or deny that morals, metaphysics, +and religion, are—in the full sense of the word—sciences. +This is to withdraw them from the empire of reason, and to hand them +over to some rival pretender.</p> +<p>No science can flourish while it is understood that its discussion +must be made palatable to the public. In any supposable code of the +rights of reason, one primary article would limit and define the +functions of the public in the investigation of truth—a topic +which, together with the kindred inquiry, Who are the public? is +suggested by your second query.</p> +<p>Mankind have naturally a degree of antipathy for reason. They have +found Reason, in the work he affects, dull, in the help he furnishes, +deficient, in the truth he unveils, ugly, in the rule he arrogates, +imperious. Barbarism, in all its stages, may be said to be founded, not +merely on ignorance, but on a state of the inclinations that revolts +from reason.</p> +<p>Two competitors have always disputed the rights of reason; authority +or precedent, and faith or conscience. Conscience, early or late, must +receive almost all his light from authority; and, therefore, in respect +to opinion, may generally be called the creature of authority. Yet, in +a moral aspect, authority is confessedly of no account, and conscience +has a sole jurisdiction. A large portion of mankind have, in our +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb60" href="#pb60" name= +"pb60">60</a>]</span>times, outgrown the error of resting their sense +of duty on the mere dictate of other men. The only legitimate directors +of human conduct are now generally admitted to be conscience and +reason; the conscience must be exclusively one’s own, but the +reason need not entirely—and, indeed, cannot in any great +proportion—be one’s own, but may be partly that of +one’s neighbor.</p> +<p>The question of the division of power between these two potentates, +though not yet understood by the public, does not seem to be more +complicated than that analogous one just alluded to, and of which they +evidently understand the gist.</p> +<p>For authority, as above intimated, though the venerable instructor +of conscience, is yet morally subjected to him; and, not dissimilarly, +have conscience and reason reciprocal claims of precedence on each +other. Reason is the judge, but he is bound, under conscience, to give +a sufficient and attentive hearing to any pleadings that conscience may +have to offer, and conscience is the pleader, but he is bound, under +reason, to conform to whatever verdicts reason declares himself +competent to render.</p> +<p>If history in this particular can be considered as having disclosed +a necessary sequence, civilisation progresses in the following +order:—The general mind, in becoming acquainted with its own +powers, first learns an evolution of conscience (and this can only take +place through the medium of religion), and last learns to appreciate +reason (and this can only happen through the medium of science). While +the prerogatives of conscience were insufficiently known, authority +usurped <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb61" href="#pb61" name= +"pb61">61</a>]</span>them, and while the prerogatives of reason are +insufficiently known, authority and conscience conjointly usurp +them.</p> +<p>The word conscience I here use in its proper sense, wherein it means +either an individual conscience, or the united consciences of more than +one supposed to be in accord together, so as to make the acts resulting +from this accord constitute single acts of conscience. But the word has +taken an improper enlargement of meaning in being often used to signify +one conscience claiming something in contravention of another +conscience. These two, so different meanings of the word conscience, +are seldom duly discriminated by those who use them.</p> +<p>To the rights of reason belongs a certain degree of power, both in +regulating the individual conscience, and in solving the differences +between opposing ones. Under what conditions, and how far, reason can +exercise this office, and what rule he is to follow in so doing, would +be an inquiry suggested by my answer to your second query.</p> +<p>Having above mentioned religion and science as the two prime +ministers respectively of conscience and reason, I will pursue the +subject a little further.</p> +<p>Religion has aimed to have a moral animus by means of a free +conscience. Religion has not yet immediately aimed at moral conduct; +but, indeed, has been wont, by the mouth of her most strenuous +ministers, to assume that the aim at this is already included in that +other aim. But a moral animus is but one ingredient in moral conduct, +involving the intent only to act morally, without having of itself +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb62" href="#pb62" name= +"pb62">62</a>]</span>the least power to realise that intent. +Knowledge,—that is, science, exclusively keeps the keys of this +power. Such knowledge religion has not yet made one of her aims and +ends either directly, or by any coalition with those who have so aimed. +Accordingly religion cannot be said hitherto to have been an advocate +of the rights of reason. Whatever good things she may have achieved in +this cause have been incidental to her advocacy of the Rights of +Conscience. Here reason was her weapon (sharpened for this use, and so +far valued and treasured), against authority. Her tendency meanwhile, +is to impel conscience to infringe on the rights of reason.</p> +<p>Science alone has hitherto been the immediate champion of these +rights. But it seems he cannot expect to make that advocacy complete +and effectual till he allies himself with religion. This alliance, +since it is persuaded by reason, and not by passion, can have science +alone for its real mover.</p> +<p>The Rights of Reason may at present be said to be in such a germ of +their acknowledgment as were the rights of conscience three centuries +ago. Mankind have not hitherto come to acquiesce in the idea of that +parsimony of guidance vouchsafed to man, which is found to be the +result of claiming for reason the power of calling all human thoughts +before his tribunal, and seeing whether he has anything to object to +them. Their idea has been that not only suggesting +inspiration—(which it does not seem necessary that the advocate +of the rights of reason should deny)—but guiding inspiration is +given, given too to some rather than to others, and given in such a +quality, as to dispense with <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb63" href= +"#pb63" name="pb63">63</a>]</span>the supervision of reason. A +generation successive to many among whom this doctrine has been taught +and believed, will not be prone to any decided rejection of it. Pride +of species inclining to exaggerated human pretensions above other +earthly creatures, and party pride inclining to exalt self and an +associated confraternity into a superiority over the rest of mankind, +and supplied with a traditional store of modes of thought and practice +adapted to such exclusive pretensions, and other native tendencies of +the human mind, persuade in the same direction.</p> +<p>I have thought it suitable to premise this short sketch of the +Rights of Reason, and the opponents of them, to an endeavor to answer +your queries in a thoroughly reasonable way, a way which cannot be said +to be the more fashionable one in the treatment of metaphysical +questions. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb65" href="#pb65" name= +"pb65">65</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="back"> +<div class="div1 ads"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main xd21e799">THE<br> +PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING<br> +COMPANY’S<br> +CATALOGUE.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"><i>All Orders to be sent, with remittance to</i> +<span class="sc">R. Forder</span>, <i>28 Stonecutter Street, London, +E.C. Rate of postage—Orders under 3d., one halfpenny; orders +under 6d., one penny. Orders over 6d. post free</i>.</p> +<p class="xd21e161">SEPTEMBER, 1891.</p> +<p class="adAuthor">AVELING, DR. E. B.</p> +<p><b>Darwin Made Easy.</b> Cloth +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Dr. Aveling is a Fellow of the London University, and +this is the best popular exposition of Darwinism extant.</p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">BACON, LORD</p> +<p><b>Pagan Mythology; or, the Wisdom of the Ancients</b> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">BENTHAM, JEREMY</p> +<p><b>The Church of England Catechism Examined.</b> A trenchant +analysis, in Bentham’s best manner, showing how the Catechism is +calculated to make children hypocrites or fools, if not worse. Sir +Samuel Romilly was of opinion that the work would be prosecuted for +blasphemy, though it escaped that fate in consequence of the +writer’s eminence. With a Biographical Preface by J. M. Wheeler + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>Utilitarianism</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 3</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“A place must be assigned to Bentham among the +masters of wisdom.”—<i>John Stuart Mill.</i></p> +<p>“A man of first-rate genius.”—<i>Edward +Dicey.</i></p> +<p>“It is impossible to know Bentham without admiring and +revering him<span class="corr" id="xd21e870" title= +"Not in source">.</span>”—<i>Sir Samuel Romilly.</i></p> +<p>“Everything that comes from the pen or from the mind of Mr. +Bentham is entitled to profound regard.”—<i>James +Mill.</i></p> +<p>“He found jurisprudence a gibberish and left it a +science.”—<i>Macaulay.</i></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb66" href="#pb66" name= +"pb66">66</a>]</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">COLLINS, ANTHONY</p> +<p><b>Free Will and Necessity.</b> A Philosophical Inquiry concerning +Human Liberty. First published in 1715. Now reprinted with Preface and +Annotations by <span class="sc">G. W. Foote</span>, and a Biographical +Introduction by J. M. Wheeler +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“I do not know of anything that has been +advanced by later writers in support of the scheme of Necessity, of +which the germ is not to be found in the Inquiry of +Collins.”—<i>Prof. Dugald Stewart.</i></p> +<p>“Collins states the arguments against human freedom with a +logical force unsurpassed by any Necessitarian.”—<i>Prof. +A. C. Fraser.</i></p> +<p>“Collins writes with wonderful power and closeness of +reasoning.”—<i>Professor Huxley.</i></p> +<p>“Collins was one of the most terrible enemies of the Christian +religion.”—<i>Voltaire.</i></p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">DIDEROT & D’HOLBACH</p> +<p><b>The Code of Nature</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">FEUERBACH, LUDWIG</p> +<p><b>The Essence of Religion.</b> God the Image of Man, Man’s +Dependence upon Nature the Last and Only Source of Religion + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“No one has demonstrated, and explained the +purely human origin of the idea of God better than Ludwig +Feuerbach.”—<i>Büchner.</i></p> +<p>“I confess that to Feuerbach I owe a debt of inestimable +gratitude. Feeling about in uncertainty for the ground, and finding +everywhere shifting sands, Feuerbach cast a sudden blaze in the +darkness and disclosed to me the way.”—<i>Rev. S. Baring +Gould.</i></p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">FOOTE, G. W.</p> +<p><b>The Grand Old Book.</b> A Reply to the Grand Old Man. An +Exhaustive Answer to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone’s +“Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture” + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><i>Bound in cloth</i> +<span class="adPrice">1 6</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><span class= +"sc">Contents</span>:—Preface—Preliminary View—The +Creation Story—The Fall of Man—The Psalms—The Mosaic +Legislation—Corroborations of Scripture—Gladstone and +Huxley—Modern Scepticism.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Is Socialism Sound?</b> Four Nights’ Public Debate with +Annie Besant <span class= +"adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +0</span></p> +<p><b>Christianity and Secularism.</b> Four <span class="corr" id= +"xd21e998" title="Source: Night’s">Nights’</span> Public +Debate with the Rev. Dr. James McCann + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 6</span> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb67" href="#pb67" name= +"pb67">67</a>]</span></p> +<p><b>Darwin on God</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><span class="sc">Contents</span>:—Darwin’s +Grandfather—Darwin’s Father—Darwin’s Early +Piety—Almost a Clergyman—On Board the +“Beagle”—Settling at Down—Death and +Burial—Purpose of Pamphlet—Some Objections—Darwin +Abandons Christianity—Deism—Creation—Origin of +Life—Origin of Man—Animism—A Personal +Creator—Design—Divine Beneficence—Religion and +Morality—Agnosticism and Atheism.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Reminiscences of Charles Bradlaugh</b> + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>Infidel Death-Beds.</b> Second Edition, much enlarged + <span class="adPrice">0 +8</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +3</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">List of Freethinkers dealt with: Lord Amberley, +Baskerville, Bayle, Bentham, Bert, Lord Bolingbroke, Broussais, Bruno, +Buckle, Byron, Carlile, Clifford, Clootz, Collins, Comte, Condorcet, +Cooper, D’Alembert, Danton, Charles and Erasmus Darwin, Delambre, +Diderot, Dolet, George Eliot, Frederick the Great, Gambetta, Garibaldi, +Gendre, Gibbon, Godwin, Gœthe, Grote, Helvetius, Hetherington, +Hobbes, Austin Holyoake, Hugo, Hume, Littré, Harriet Martineau, +Jean Meslier, James and John Stuart Mill, Mirabeau, Robt. Owen, Paine, +Palmer, Rabelais, Read, Mdme. Roland, George Sand, Schiller, Shelley, +Spinoza, Strauss, Toland, Vanini, Voltaire, Volney, Watson, John Watts, +Woolston.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Letters to the Clergy.</b> <i>First Series.</i> 128pp. + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">1, <span class="sc">Creation</span>, to the Bishop of +Carlisle; 2, <span class="sc">The Believing Thief</span>, to the Rev. +C. H. Spurgeon; 3, <span class="sc">The Atonement</span>, to the Bishop +of Peterborough; 4, <span class="sc">Old Testament Morality</span>, to +the Rev. E. Conder, D.D.; 5, <span class="sc">Inspiration</span>, to +the Rev. R. F. Horton, M.A.; 6, <span class="sc">Credentials of the +Gospel</span>, to the Rev. Prof. J. A. Beet; 7, <span class= +"sc">Miracles</span>, to the Rev. Brownlow Maitland; 8, <span class= +"sc">Prayer</span>, to the Rev. T. Teignmouth Shore, M.A.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Defence of Free Speech.</b> Three Hours’ Address to the +Jury before Lord Coleridge. 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Mill + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“Christian Evidence writers make the passage on +Christ their stock reliance, and Mr. Foote thoroughly dissects and +analyses it, and denounces it as valueless.”—<i>National +Reformer.</i></p> +</div> +<p><b>The Shadow of the Sword.</b> A Moral and Statistical Essay on War + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“An ably written pamphlet, exposing the horrors +of war and the burden imposed upon the people by the war systems of +Europe.”—<i>Echo.</i></p> +<p>“A trenchant exposure of the folly of war, which everyone +should read.”—<i>Weekly Times.</i></p> +</div> +<p><b>Royal Paupers.</b> Showing what Royalty does for the People, and +what the People do for Royalty +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p><b>The Dying Atheist.</b> A Story + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>Was Jesus Insane?</b> A searching inquiry into the mental +condition of the Prophet of Nazareth + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>Is the Bible Inspired?</b> A Criticism on <i>Lux Mundi</i> + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>The Rev. Hugh Price Hughes’s Converted Atheist<span class= +"corr" id="xd21e1249" title="Not in source">.</span></b> A Lie in Five +Chapters <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>Bible Heroes.</b> <i>First Series</i>, in elegant wrapper + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">(1) Mr. Adam, (2) Captain Noah, (3) Father Abraham, +(4) Juggling Jacob, (5) Master Joseph, (6) Joseph’s Brethren, (7) +Holy Moses I., (8) Moses II., (9) Parson Aaron, (10) General Joshua, +(11) Jephthah and Co., (12) Professor Samson. <i>One Penny each +singly</i></p> +</div> +<p><b>Bible Heroes.</b> <i>Second Series</i>, in elegant wrapper + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">(13) Prophet Samuel, (14) King Saul, (15) Saint David +I., (16) Saint David II., (17) Sultan Solomon, (18) Poor Job, (19) +Hairy Elijah, (20) Bald Elisha, (21) General Jehu, (22) Doctor Daniel, +(23) The Prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Hosea), (24) St. Peter, +(25) St. Paul.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Bible Romances.</b> New Edition. Revised and largely +rewritten.—(1) The Creation Story, 2d.; (2) Eve and the Apple, +1d.; (3) Cain and Abel, 1d.; (4) Noah’s Flood, 2d.; (5) The Tower +of Babel, 1d.; (6) Lot’s Wife, 1d.; (7) The Ten Plagues, 1d.; (8) +The Wandering Jews, 1d.; (9) Balaam’s Ass, 1d.; (10) God in a +Box, 1d.; (11) Jonah and the Whale, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb69" +href="#pb69" name="pb69">69</a>]</span>1d.; (12) Bible Animals, 1d.; +(13) A Virgin Mother, 2d.; (14) The Resurrection, 2d.; (15) The +Crucifixion, 1d.; (16) John’s Nightmare, 1d.</p> +<p class="adAuthor">G. W. FOOTE & W. P. BALL</p> +<p><b>Bible Handbook for Freethinkers and Inquiring Christians.</b> +Complete, paper covers +<span class="adPrice">1 4</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +0</span></p> +<p>Sold also in separate Parts as follows—</p> +<p><b>1. Bible Contradictions.</b> The Contradictions are printed in +parallel columns <span class= +"adPrice">0 4</span></p> +<p><b>2. Bible Absurdities.</b> All the chief Absurdities from Genesis +to Revelation, conveniently and strikingly arranged, with appropriate +headlines, giving the point of each absurdity in a sentence + <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p><b>3. Bible Atrocities.</b> Containing all the godly wickedness from +Genesis to Revelation. Each infamy has a separate headline for easy +reference <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p><b>4. Bible Immoralities, Indecencies, Obscenities, Broken Promises, +and Unfulfilled Prophecies</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 4</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">G. W. FOOTE & J. M. WHEELER</p> +<p><b>The Jewish Life of Christ.</b> Being the <i>Sepher Toldoth +Jeshu</i>, or Book of the Generation of Jesus. With an Historical +Preface and Voluminous Notes +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“Messrs. G. W. Foote and J. M. Wheeler have laid +the Freethought party under great obligation by the careful manner in +which they have collected and stated the information on a very doubtful +and difficult subject.... We have no hesitation in giving unqualified +praise to the voluminous and sometimes very erudite +notes.”—<i>National Reformer.</i></p> +</div> +<p><b>Crimes of Christianity.</b> Vol. I., cloth gilt, 216pp. Hundreds +of exact References to Standard Authorities. No pains spared to make it +a complete, trustworthy, final, unanswerable Indictment of Christianity + <span class="adPrice">2 +6</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><span class="sc">Chapters</span>:—(1) Christ to +Constantine; (2) Constantine to Hypatia; (3) Monkery; (4) Pious +Forgeries; (5) Pious Frauds; (6) Rise of the Papacy; (7) Crimes of the +Popes; (8) Persecution of the Jews; (9) The Crusades.</p> +</div> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“The book is very carefully compiled, the +references are given with exactitude, and the work is calculated to be +of the greatest use to the opponents of +Christianity.”—<i>National Reformer.</i> <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb70" href="#pb70" name="pb70">70</a>]</span></p> +<p>“The book is worth reading. It is fair, and on the whole +correct.”—<i>Weekly Times.</i></p> +<p>“The book has a purpose, and is entitled to a fair +hearing.”<span class="corr" id="xd21e1390" title= +"Source: ">—</span><i>Huddersfield Examiner.</i></p> +<p>“The work should be scattered like autumn +leaves.”—<i>Ironclad Age</i> (U.S.A.)</p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">HUME, DAVID</p> +<p><b>The Mortality of the Soul.</b> With an Introduction by +<span class="sc">G. W. Foote</span>. This essay was first published +after Hume’s death. It is not included in the ordinary editions +of the <i>Essays</i>. Prof. Huxley calls it “A remarkable +essay” and “a model of clear and vigorous statement” + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>Liberty and Necessity.</b> An argument against Free Will and in +favor of Moral Causation +<span class="adPrice">0 4</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">INGERSOLL, COL. ROBERT G.</p> +<p><b>Some Mistakes of Moses.</b> The only complete edition in England. +Accurate as Colenso, and fascinating as a novel. 132pp. + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p><b>Defence of Freethought.</b> A five hours’ speech at the +Trial of C. B. Reynolds for Blasphemy + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>Reply to Gladstone.</b> With a Biography by J. M. Wheeler + <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p><b>Rome or Reason?</b> A Reply to Cardinal Manning + <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p><b>Crimes against Criminals</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 3</span></p> +<p><b>Why am I an Agnostic?</b> Parts I. and II., each + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>Faith and Fact.</b> Reply to Rev. Dr. Field + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>God and Man.</b> Second Reply to Dr. Field + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>The Dying Creed</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p><b>The Household of Faith</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p><b>The Limits of Toleration.</b> A Discussion with the Hon. F. D. +Coudert and Gov. S. L. 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M. Wheeler + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">PAINE, THOMAS</p> +<p><b>The Age of Reason.</b> New edition, with Preface by <span class= +"sc">G. W. Foote</span> +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><b>Miscellaneous Theological Works</b> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>Rights of Man.</b> With a Political Biography by J. M Wheeler. +Paper covers <span class= +"adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><i>Bound in cloth</i> +<span class="adPrice">2 0</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">SHELLEY</p> +<p><b>A Refutation of Deism.</b> In a Dialogue. With an Introduction by +G. W. Foote <span class= +"adPrice">0 4</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">THOMSON, JAMES (B.V.)</p> +<p><b>Satires and Profanities.</b> New edition + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><span class="sc">Contents</span>:—The Story of a +Famous Old Jewish Firm (Jehovah, Son & Co.)—The Devil in the +Church of England—Religion in the Rocky Mountains—Christmas +Eve in the Upper Circles—A Commission of Inquiry on +Royalty—A Bible Lesson on Monarchy—The One Thing +Needful.</p> +</div> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“It cannot be neglected by any who are +interested in one of the most pathetic personages of our +time”—<i>Academy.</i></p> +<p>“As clever as they are often profane”—<i>Christian +World.</i></p> +<p>“Well worth preserving”—<i>Weekly +Dispatch.</i></p> +<p>“Reminds one of the genius of Swift.”—<i>Oldham +Chronicle.</i></p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">WHEELER, J. 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Portrait and Biography, <i>cloth gilt</i> + <span class="adPrice">8 +0</span></p> +<p>The Influence of Heredity on Free-will + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>CATTELL, CHARLES C.</b></p> +<p>Thoughts for Thinking, from the Literature of all Ages + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p>Against Christianity: showing its Theory Incredible and its Practice +Impossible <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p>The Religion of this Life +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p>The Second Coming of Christ +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p>Recollections of Charles Bradlaugh + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>CARLILE, RICHARD.</b></p> +<p>A Manual of Freemasonry, cloth, gilt + <span class="adPrice">2 +6</span></p> +<p><b>C. N.</b></p> +<p>What is Religion? A vindication of Freethought + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>COLLINS, W. 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W.</b>, M.D., LL.D.</p> +<p>The Conflict between Religion and Science + <span class="adPrice">5 +0</span></p> +<p><b>DOCTOR OF MEDICINE</b> (<b>A</b>).</p> +<p>The Elements of Social Science; or Physical, Sexual and Natural +Religion. An exposition of the true cause and only cure of the three +primary social evils—Poverty, Prostitution and Celibacy. 604 pp., +<i>cloth</i> <span class= +"adPrice">3 0</span></p> +<p><b>DREW, MENA</b> (<b>Miss</b>).</p> +<p>Hints on Nursing; with a Preface by Dr. Allbutt + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p>Monthly Nursing <span class= +"adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><b>DRYSDALE, C. R.</b>, M.D.</p> +<p>Vegetarian Fallacies +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p>The Cause of Poverty +<span class="adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>The Length of Life of Total Abstainers and Moderate Drinkers +Compared <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>DYMOND, C.</b>, F.S.A., <b>and BROADHURST-NICHOLS</b>, Rev. +J.</p> +<p>The Practical Value of Christianity. Prize Essays, for and against + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>EADON, S.</b>, M.A., M.D., LL.D.</p> +<p>A Few Facts Relative to the Antiquity of Man; with an Appendix from +an Astronomical Standpoint +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p><b>ELLIOTT, F. J.</b>, M.R.A.C., F.H.A.S.</p> +<p>The Land Question; its Examination and Solution, from an +Agricultural point of view. Published at 5/– Reduced to [Postage +4½d.] <span class= +"adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><b>FOOTE, G. W.</b></p> +<p>Bible Romances. New Edition. Revised and largely +rewritten.—(1) The Creation Story, 2d.; (2) Eve and the Apple, +1d.; (3) Cain and Abel, 1d.; (4) Noah’s Flood, 2d.; (5) The Tower +of Babel, 1d.; (6) Lot’s Wife, 1d.; (7) The Ten Plagues, 1d.; (8) +The Wandering Jews, 1d.; (9) Balaam’s Ass, 1d.; (10) God in a +Box, 1d.; (11) Jonah and the Whale, 1d.; (12) Bible Animals, 1d.; (13) +A Virgin Mother, 2d.; (14) The Resurrection, 2d.; (15) The Crucifixion, +1d.; (16) St. John’s Nightmare, 1d.</p> +<p>The Grand Old Book: a Reply to the Grand Old Man. An exhaustive +reply to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone’s “Impregnable Rock +of Holy Scripture,” <i>cloth</i> 1/6 + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p>Reminiscences of Charles Bradlaugh + <span class="adPrice">0 6</span> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb77" href="#pb77" name= +"pb77">77</a>]</span></p> +<p><b>FOOTE, G. W., and G. BERNARD SHAW.</b></p> +<p>Two Nights’ Debate on the Eight Hours Question; 77 pp. + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>FORDER, R.</b></p> +<p>“There was War in Heaven” (Rev. xii. 7), a Satirical +Infidel Sermon <span class= +"adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>St. Agnes and St. Bridget, and their Pagan Prototypes + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>FOURNIER, ALFRED.</b></p> +<p>Syphilis and Marriage. Translated from the French by Alfred Lingard, +F.R.C.S.; pub. at 10/6, reduced to +<span class="adPrice">5 0</span></p> +<p><b>GASKELL, G. A.</b></p> +<p>The Futility of Pecuniary Thrift as a means to General Well-being + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p>Social Control of the Birth-rate and Endowment of Mothers + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>GIBBON, EDWARD.</b></p> +<p>Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. With Notes and Memoirs by +Guizot. Containing 1,340 pp., with complete Indices, and a Portrait of +Gibbon from a painting by Reynolds. In two vols., super royal 8vo. +(pub. by Virtue and Co. at 36/–) + <span class="adPrice">8 +6</span></p> +<p><b>GILES, Rev. Dr.</b></p> +<p>Apostolical Records, from the date of the Crucifixion to the middle +of the second century. Pub. at 10/6. pp. 438 + <span class="adPrice">3 +6</span></p> +<p>“One feels astonished that the man who wrote this book could +remain a priest in the Church of England. To justify their existence, +the young lions of the Christian Evidence Society ought certainly to +attempt a reply to this remarkable work.”—Extract from a +Letter from a Cambridge M.A.</p> +<p><b>GILBERT, WILLIAM.</b></p> +<p>The City; an inquiry into the Corporation, its Livery Companies, and +the Administration of their Charities and Endowments. <i>Cloth, gilt +lettered</i>, pub. at 5/– Reduced to [postage 4½d.] + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>GOULD, F. J.</b></p> +<p>The Agnostic Island: a Novel +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><b>HARTMANN, EDWARD von.</b></p> +<p>The Religion of the Future. Translated from the German by Ernest +Dare; <i>cloth</i> <span class= +"adPrice">2 0</span></p> +<p><b>HARDAKER, W.</b></p> +<p>(Translated by) Old Thoughts for New Thinkers. Selections from the +“<span lang="fr">Pensées Philosophiques</span>” of +Diderot <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb78" href="#pb78" name= +"pb78">78</a>]</span></p> +<p><b>HERSHON, PAUL ISAAC.</b></p> +<p>Genesis, with a Talmudical Commentary. With an Introductory Essay on +the Talmud by H. D. Spencer; <i>cloth gilt</i>, 560 pp., pub. at 10/6; +by parcel post, 2/6 <span class= +"adPrice">2 0</span></p> +<p>“<b>HISTORICUS.</b>”</p> +<p>The Lords and what they have done + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>HITHERSAY, R. & G. ERNEST.</b></p> +<p>Life of Saladin <span class= +"adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><b>HONE, WILLIAM.</b></p> +<p>The Apocryphal New Testament. Being all the Gospels and Epistles now +extant, attributed to Jesus Christ, his Apostles and companions, not +included in the new Testament. Royal 8vo., <i>cloth</i>, pub. at +5/–; postage 4½d. +<span class="adPrice">2 6</span></p> +<p>Ancient Mysteries Described. With engravings on copper and wood; +very curious, pub. at 5/–; postage 4½d. + <span class="adPrice">2 +6</span></p> +<p><b>HUGHAN, SAMUEL.</b></p> +<p>Hereditary Peers and Hereditary Paupers: the two extremes of English +Society. 142 large pages, pub. at 1/–; post free, 9d., reduced to + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>HUGO, VICTOR.</b></p> +<p>Oration on Voltaire +<span class="adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p><b>HOWELL, MISS CONSTANCE</b></p> +<p>A Biography of Jesus Christ; <i>cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p>The After Life of the Apostles; <i>cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p>A History of the Jews, <i>cloth</i> 1 6</p> +<p>The above works were written for young Freethinkers.</p> +<p><b>HOLYOAKE, G. J.</b></p> +<p>The Trial of Theism; Accused of Obstructing Secular Life; <i>cloth, +gilt lettered</i>, pub. at 4/–. Reduced to [postage 3d.] + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p>What would Follow the Effacement of Christianity? + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p>The Last Trial for Atheism in England: a Fragment of an +Autobiography. Pub. at 1/6, post free + <span class="adPrice">0 +8</span></p> +<p>The Principles of Secularism Illustrated, post free + <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p>Secularism, A Religion that gives Heaven no Trouble + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p>The Logic of Death <span class= +"adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>New Ideas of the Day +<span class="adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>“<b>HUMANITAS.</b>”</p> +<div class="table"> +<table class="xd21e2028"> +<tr> +<td class="cellLeft cellTop">Jacob the Wrestler,</td> +<td class="cellRight cellTop"><i>cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +6</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="cellLeft cellBottom"> +<table class="ditto"> +<tr class="s"> +<td>Jacob</td> +</tr> +<tr class="d"> +<td>,,</td> +</tr> +</table> +<table class="ditto"> +<tr class="s"> +<td>the</td> +</tr> +<tr class="d"> +<td>,,</td> +</tr> +</table> +<table class="ditto"> +<tr class="s"> +<td>Wrestler,</td> +</tr> +<tr class="d"> +<td>,,</td> +</tr> +</table> +</td> +<td class="cellRight cellBottom"><i>paper</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +0</span></td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The most exhaustive criticism of Jacob that has ever +been written.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb79" href="#pb79" name= +"pb79">79</a>]</span></p> +<p>Thoughts upon Heaven +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p>Is God the First Cause? +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p>Christ’s Temptation +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p>Charles Bradlaugh and the Irish Nation + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p>Socialism a Curse <span class= +"adPrice">0 3</span></p> +<p>A Fish in Labor, or Jonah and the Whale + <span class="adPrice">0 +3</span></p> +<p>Against Agnosticism +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p>Charles Bradlaugh and the Oath Question + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p>How Charles Bradlaugh was treated by House of Commons + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p>The Follies of the Lord’s Prayer Exposed + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p>Against Socialism <span class= +"adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>God: Being a brief statement of Arguments against Agnosticism + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>HUME, DAVID.</b></p> +<p>On Miracles. With an Appendix, &c., by J. M. Wheeler + <span class="adPrice">0 +3</span></p> +<p>The Natural History of Religion. Complete and unexpurgated edition, +with the original notes, and an Introduction by J. M. Robertson; +<i>cloth</i> <span class= +"adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p>Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Originally issued in two +1/– parts, now complete in one vol. + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>HYNDMAN, H. M.</b></p> +<p>Booth’s Book Refuted +<span class="adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>The Indian Famine and the Crisis in India; pub. at 1/<span class= +"corr" id="xd21e2784" title="Not in source">–</span> + <span class="adPrice">0 +3</span></p> +<p><b>ILLINGWORTH, THOMAS</b></p> +<p>Distribution Reform; The Remedy for Industrial Depression and for +the removal of many Social Evils. 180 pp., pub. at 1/–. Reduced +to [post free] <span class= +"adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><b>INDIAN OFFICER, AN.</b></p> +<p>A Voice from the Ganges; or the True Source of Christianity. In +<i>cloth</i>, 1/6, in <i>paper covers</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>JANES, LEWIS G.</b></p> +<p>A Study of Primitive Christianity; <i>cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">6 +0</span></p> +<p><b>JANES, A.</b></p> +<p>A Practical Introduction to Shorthand + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p>Shorthand without Complications: a complete guide to verbatim +Reporting <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>JONES, L. A. ATHERLEY</b>, M.P.</p> +<p>The Miners’ Handy Book to the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, +with notes; <i>cloth</i> +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb80" +href="#pb80" name="pb80">80</a>]</span></p> +<p><b>“JULIAN.”</b></p> +<p>The Pillars of the Church; or the Gospels and Councils + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>LAIRD, JAMES L.</b></p> +<p>(Translated by) The Darwinian Theory and the Law of the Migration of +Organisms. 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Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c72eec --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #45823 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/45823) diff --git a/old/45823-8.txt b/old/45823-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..69d2905 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/45823-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2030 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Essays in Rationalism, by Charles Robert Newman + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: Essays in Rationalism + +Author: Charles Robert Newman + +Release Date: May 30, 2014 [EBook #45823] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM *** + + + + +Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net/ for Project +Gutenberg (This book was produced from scanned images of +public domain material from the Google Print project.) + + + + + + + + + ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM + + BY + CHARLES ROBERT NEWMAN + (Brother of Cardinal Newman.) + + WITH PREFACE + BY + GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE. + + AND + + BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH + BY + J. M. WHEELER. + + + + LONDON: + PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY, + 28 Stonecutter Street, E.C. + 1891 + + + + + + + + LONDON: + PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTE, + 28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C. + + + + + + + +ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM. + + +PUBLISHER'S NOTE. + + +Whether this little volume will find sufficient patrons to defray +the cost of its production is at least doubtful. The writer whose +essays it contains lived in obscurity and will never be popular. But +he possessed a fine intellect, however frustrated by circumstances; +he belonged to an illustrious family; and it is well to let the public +have access to the opinions of a brother of Cardinal Newman and of +Professor Newman, a brother who took his own course, as they did, +and thought out for himself an independent philosophy. + +All Charles Robert Newman's writings that are known to have been +printed, appeared in the Reasoner, edited by Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, +at various dates during 1860-61. With trifling exceptions they are +all reprinted in this collection. + +Mr. Holyoake has kindly supplied a brief account of the atheistic +Newman, and Mr. J. M. Wheeler has gathered all the information that +is obtainable as to his life and personality. + + + + + + + +BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. + + +Of Charles Robert Newman, until the death of his brother, the Cardinal, +almost nothing was known. Some reminiscences of him by Mr. Thomas +Purnell and Precentor Edmund Venables appeared in the Athenæum at +the time of his death in 1884, and these remain the chief sources +of information concerning him. Mr. G. J. Holyoake also, in his paper +The Present Day, wrote: "If the public come to know more of Charles +R. Newman, it will be seen that all the brothers, John Henry, Francis +William, and Charles R. Newman, were men of unusual distinction of +character, and that while each held diverse views, all had the family +qualities of perspicacity, candor and conscience." But these notes +attracted little attention. Most people were under the impression +there were only two brothers, who had long figured in the public eye +as types of the opposite courses of modern thought towards Romanism +and Rationalism. Yet the real type of antagonism to Rome was to be +found in Charles Robert, who is dismissed by the Rev. Thomas Mozley +with the words: "There was also another brother, not without his +share in the heritage of natural gifts." + +In a notable passage on change of religion, in his Essay in Aid of +a Grammar of Assent, chap. vii., Cardinal Newman seems to allude +to the career of himself and his brothers. He says: "Thus of three +Protestants, one becomes a Catholic, a second a Unitarian, and a +third an unbeliever: how is this? The first becomes a Catholic, +because he assented, as a Protestant, to the doctrine of our Lord's +divinity, with a real assent and a genuine conviction, and because +this certitude, taking possession of his mind, led him on to welcome +the Catholic doctrines of the Real Presence and of the Theotocos, +till his Protestantism fell off from him, and he submitted himself +to the Church. The second became a Unitarian, because, proceeding +on the principle that Scripture was the rule of faith, and that a +man's private judgment was its rule of interpretation, and finding +that the doctrine of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds did not follow +by logical necessity from the text of Scripture, he said to himself, +'The word of God has been made of none effect by the traditions of +men,' and therefore nothing was left for him but to profess what he +considered primitive Christianity and to become a Humanitarian. The +third gradually subsided into infidelity, because he started with +the Protestant dogma, cherished in the depths of his nature, that a +priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the Gospel. First, +then, he would protest against the sacrifice of the Mass; next he gave +up baptismal regeneration and the sacramental principle; then he asked +himself whether dogmas were not a restraint on Christian liberty as +well as Sacraments; then came the question, What after all was the +use of teachers of religion? Why should any one stand between him and +his Maker? After a time it struck him that this obvious question had +to be answered by the Apostles, as well as by the Anglican clergy; +so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revelation of God +to man is that which is written on the heart. This did for a time, +and he remained a Deist. But then it occurred to him, that this inward +moral law was there within the breast, whether there was a God or not, +and that it was a roundabout way of enforcing that law, to say that it +came from God and simply unnecessary, considering it carried with it +its own sacred and sovereign authority, as our feelings instinctively +testified, and when he turned to look at the physical world around +him, he really did not see what scientific proof there was of the +Being of God at all, and it seemed to him as if all things would +go quite as well as at present without that hypothesis as with it; +so he dropped it, and became a purus putus Atheist." + +I have transcribed this lengthy, but remarkable passage, not because +I think it correctly describes the process of thought in his two +brothers, but rather as an illustration that his own imaginative +synthesis of their position derives its life and force from the fact +that he had before him concrete instances in the person of his own +nearest relatives. + +Charles Robert Newman, younger brother of the Cardinal and elder +brother of the Professor, was born on June 16, 1802, being one year and +four months the junior of the former, and three years the senior of the +latter. [1] Their father, a London man, and friend of Capel the eminent +stockbroker, from having been clerk in a bank, became a partner, +though he afterwards failed at a time of great commercial depression, +both in this business and as a brewer. He was a Freemason, a musician, +and had schemes of social improvement by reclaiming waste land and +planting with trees. In religion his views appear to have been of a +broad cast approximating to those of Benjamin Franklin. The mother, +whose maiden name was Jemima Fourdrinier, was of Hugenot family, and +of religious cast of mind. There were six children, equally divided +as to sex. Harriet, the eldest girl, married the Rev. Thomas Mozley; +Jemima, the second, married Mr. John Mozley; while Mary, the youngest, +died unmarried. + +Charles Robert was educated at the same school as his two brothers, +John Henry and Francis William, that of Dr. George Nicholas at Ealing, +Middlesex. + +Of the influences which moulded his mind we can only speak from what +is known of his brothers. John Henry has told how, in youth, he read +Paine's tracts against the Old Testament--we presume he means the +Age of Reason--and also boasted of reading Hume, though, as he says, +this was possibly but by way of brag. + +Evidently, though the family was brought up in the habit of Bible +reading, there was considerable freedom allowed as to the direction of +their studies. While the father lived family prayer was unknown, nor +was there any inculcation of dogma. "We read," says Francis William, +"the Psalms appointed by the church every day, and went to the parish +church on Sunday." + +Francis William Newman, in his "Contributions, Chiefly to the Early +History of Cardinal Newman," says: "In opening life, my brother +C. R. N. became a convert to Robert Owen, the philanthropic Socialist, +who was then an Atheist. [2] But soon breaking loose from him, +Charles tried to originate a 'New Moral World' of his own, which +seemed to others absurd and immoral, as well as very unamiable. He +disowned us all, on my father's death, as 'too religious for him.' To +keep a friend, or to act under a superior, seemed alike impossible +to him. His brother (the late Cardinal) humbled himself to beg a +clerkship for him in the Bank of England; but Charles thought it +'his duty' to write to the Directors letters of advice, so they could +not keep him. Nor could he keep any place long. He said he ought to +take a literary degree at Bonn: his two brothers managed it for him, +but he came away without seeking the degree. His brother-in-law, +the Rev. Thomas Mozley, then took him up very liberally; but after +my sister Harriet's death, J. H. N. and I bore his expenses to his +dying day. His meanness seemed to me like that of an old cynic; +yet his moderation was exemplary, and at last he undoubtedly won the +respect of the mother and daughter who waited on him." + +In this, which is nearly all he has to say of this elder brother, +it appears to me Professor Newman has either said too little or +too much. The title of his work did not necessitate any reference +to Charles Robert; but having said so much he should at least have +explained further. For instance, in reference to the visit to Bonn, +it was exceedingly natural in the second brother seeking to take a +degree, since both his senior and junior had a college education. That +he did not share in this advantage may have well tended to sour +his life. Mr. Meynell explains why he returned without seeking the +degree. He says: "But he came away without even offering himself for +examination, a step he explained by saying that the judges would not +grant him a degree because he had given offence by his treatment of +faith and morals [it is a Catholic who writes] in an essay which they +call teterrima." Charles may have acted with extreme imprudence, both +in regard to the bank directors and the Bonn examiners; but we should +need to know the cases before we can determine whether he was actuated +by wilful waywardness or by adherence to a higher than common standard +of conduct. Each of the brothers had evidently exquisite sensitiveness +of conscience, though, as proved by the Professor's last book--that +unique criticism of a brother who died at ninety by another aged +eighty-five--they could not always enter into sympathy with each other. + +Of this we may be quite sure. The life of one who had thought himself +into Atheism, yet contemplated becoming a tutor, must have been a most +uncomfortable one. The treatment he was likely to receive could not +be calculated to evoke his better qualities. Finding everywhere his +Atheism a bar to his advancement, whose is the fault if it resulted +in a character of petulance and cynicism, and in--what it evidently +did result in--a largely wasted life? + +The Rev. Edward Venables, Precentor of Lincoln, speaks of him as having +been, between 1834 and 1844, usher in a large school for farmers' sons, +kept by a Mr. Allfree at Windmill Hill, in the parish of Herstmonceaux, +Sussex, where Julius Charles Hare, Archdeacon of Lewes, was rector, +and John Sterling for a short while curate. Mr. Venables says Newman +"interested Archdeacon Hare very much, and I have often heard him +speak of the long conversations he had had with him on literary +and philosophical subjects, and of the remarkable mental power he +displayed. At that time the future Cardinal's brother had entirely +discarded the Christian faith, and declared himself an unbeliever +in revelation." There can be no doubt the tribute from Hare, a man +of very superior culture, was deserved, though the archdeacon also +expressed the opinion "there was a screw loose somewhere." + +The task of teaching the Sussex rustics was, as Precentor Venables +remarks, intolerably irksome to a man of Newman's high intellectual +power. It was like chopping logs with a fine-edged razor. His +relations with his principal became strained, and a tussle between +the usher and his class led to his dismissal. At this time he +was miserably poor. Precentor Venables says: "To Hare he lamented +the narrow-mindedness of his brothers John and Francis, who, as he +asserted, had entirely cast him off, and left him to fight his way in +the world unaided, because of his professed infidelity, in which the +younger of the two, then an ardent Evangelical, was before very long +to follow him." No reproach whatever is due to the younger brother on +this account, and the elder is probably as little blameworthy. John +Henry could not be expected to recommend as tutor one whose views +upon faith and morals he considered unsound. Francis William had +gone to Bagdad with the object of assisting in a Christian mission, +and intercourse with Mohammedans and other studies were but gradually +loosening his orthodoxy. After his return, and when his works and +professorship at London University assured his position, he put himself +into regular monthly communication with his brother. In the meantime +he had been assisted by his sister Harriet's husband. But the iron had +already entered his soul; he was an Atheist and an outcast. Forced to +receive the bounty of relatives who deplored his opinions, he seems to +have resented their kindness as an attempt to bribe his intellectual +conscience. The world rang with the fame--as theologian, historian, +poet, and preacher--of the elder, whose creed he had outgrown and +despised; while his convictions, to the full as honest, everywhere +stood in his way, and were contemned as an offence against faith and +morals. He had no contact with minds congenial to his own, and doomed +himself to the life of a recluse. + +Each of the brothers was of a retiring, meditative disposition. Reading +the Apologia Pro Vita Sua of the eldest, one may see how this +contributed towards his seeking a refuge in the Catholic Church. The +same disposition of mind may be traced in the Phases of Faith of +the youngest, equally impelling him from the evangelicalism of his +surroundings and leading to the rejection of historic Christianity, +and finally to the surrender of all belief in revelation. In Charles +Robert Newman the same qualities were seen to excess, removing him +from contact with his fellows to the life of a solitary thinker in +a quiet Welsh watering-place. From about 1853, he had a room in a +small cottage on the Marsh road, Tenby. + +Mr. Thomas Purnell, who says he had for years "the inestimable +privilege of enjoying his close intimacy," remarks, "never before +or since have I met a man endowed with as rare an intellectual +equipment." Mr. Purnell thus describes his own first visit to the +recluse: "He stood at the top of the topmost stair. I cannot imagine a +more distinguished head and face. There was a touch of Mephistopheles +in him. There was also a touch of Jupiter Olympius. Although dressed +in ill-fitting clothes, and with a sort of blanket over his shoulders, +he appeared to me to be the ideal of courtly grace. He bowed me without +a word into his apartments. This was in the roof of the building, +and the only light came from a window which opened with a notched iron +bar. The room was as meagrely furnished as Goethe's study in Weimar. A +bed, a chest of drawers, a table and two or three chairs, with a few +books, constituted the whole goods and chattels." Mr. Purnell says +"his health, means and inclination made him averse to society. The +rector called on him, but was not admitted; visitors to the town who +had known his brothers would send in their cards, but they received no +response; local medical men, when they heard he was ill, volunteered +their services, but they were declined with courteous thanks conveyed +by letter." + +It appears he but seldom left his house, and when he went out he did +not often enter the town, but took his exercise in the road which +led into the country. Dressed in a pea-jacket, with a shawl or a rug +thrown across his shoulders, and with a sou'-wester over his head, he +marched erect, looking neither to left nor right. He wore shoes, and, +as his trousers were short, displayed an interval of white socks. The +lads and lasses were apt to regard such a figure with derision. + +It was through Mr. Purnell that he communicated the papers here +reprinted to the Reasoner. Although but of the character of fragments, +they bespeak an original mind. The secret of the Cardinal's great +influence and strength was that what he spoke and wrote came not +from books, but forthright out of his own head and heart. The topics +with which his brother deals were those only needing the mind, +and his treatment shows they were viewed in the dry light of an +original intellect. The Reasoner ceased soon after the appearance +of these papers, and thus closed the one opening for his literary +activity. Francis William Newman was, at least till the present year, +unaware that his arguments for Theism were challenged by his own +brother under the signature of "A Recluse." He informs me that he +had never heard that anyone would publish anything from his pen, and +that he heard that at his death, in March, 1884, he left a box full +of manuscripts, which were destroyed as useless. Whether this was done +by order of his relatives, whether the landlady decided the question, +or whether the vicar or neighbors were called in, will perhaps remain +as unknown as the worth of the manuscripts. The following specimens +are all by which the latter question can be judged. + +Mr. Meynell says that two years before he died he had a short visit +from his eldest brother. It must have been a strange meeting, and +one worthy the brush of a great artist. Surely in all England there +were not two men of eighty whose thoughts were so divergent or two +brothers whose lives were so diversified. The one a saintly cardinal, +called by the Pope the Light of England, who, by his rare urbanity, +had gained the respect of all, replete with all that should accompany +old age--as honor, love, obedience, troops of friends: the other, +fallen, too, into the sere and yellow leaf, and without them all--poor, +solitary, unknown and despised, a scorn and wonderment to his nearest +neighbors. And all from following his own thought that had made him +a purus putus Atheist. + + + J. M. Wheeler. + + + + + + + +CHARACTER OF CHARLES NEWMAN. + + +There is little to say and less need to add anything to what +Mr. Wheeler writes, whose industry and discernment collect together all +the accessible facts of his subject. My knowledge of Charles Robert +Newman is confined to his correspondence, which, with my present +engagements, I could not refer to and examine without delaying the +printer longer than would be convenient to you, as Mr. Wheeler's +article is in type. The impression Mr. C. R. Newman conveyed to me by +his letters is, I judge, sufficient for the purpose in hand. Charles +Newman had an intermittent mind. He would write with great force +and clearness, and in another letter, which was confused in parts, +he would frankly say that his mind was leaving him, as was its wont +as I understood him, and after a few months less or more, it would +return to him, when he would write again. In this manly frankness +and strong self-consciousness he resembled his two eminent brothers +Francis and John. I trusted to his friend Mr. Purnell, who was the +medium in communicating with me, to send me further letters when +Mr. Charles was able or disposed to write them. I expected to hear +from him again. Much occupied with debates and otherwise at the time, +I neglected writing further to him myself. Afterwards thinking his +disablement might have grown upon him with years, disinclined me +from asking him to resume his letters. Mr. Wheeler seems ignorant of +Charles Newman's mental peculiarity, and does not recognise what may +be generous delicacy on the part of his brothers in not referring to +it. To do so would have subjected them to the imputation, very frequent +formerly, of imputing difference of opinion to want of saneness. Even +so liberal a preacher as W. J. Fox accounted, in 1841, for my disbelief +in Theism by conjecturing the existence of some mental deficiency. No +doubt many persons with whom Charles Newman had dealings in offices +he held, would regard his Atheism--which it was contrary to his nature +to conceal--as a personal disqualification. He avowed his opinions as +naturally and as boldly as Professor Newman and the Cardinal avowed +theirs. It is not conceivable that Cardinal Newman ever intermitted +his aid--or Professor Newman either--on this account. They were both +incapable of personal intolerance. They might deplore that their +brother Charles's opinions were so alien, so contrary to theirs; +but this they would never make matter of reproach. It was doubtless +a great trial to them that their brother, having fine powers like +their own, making no persistent effort for his own maintenance, +although he knew it must render independence impossible. Possibly +the solitariness which he chose caused his tendency to unusualness +of conduct, not to say eccentricity, to grow upon him--which they +could not control or mitigate without an interference, which might +subject them to resentment and reproach. Charles no doubt inherited +his father's sympathy for social improvement, which led to his sharing +Robert Owen's sociologic views. But he did not acquire his Atheism +from Robert Owen--as Professor Newman has said--for Robert Owen was +not an Atheist--always believing in some Great Power. + +Professor Newman has told me that in any further edition of his +little book upon his brother, the Cardinal, he will, on my authority, +correct his description of Robert Owen as an Atheist. Charles owed +his Atheism to himself, as his brothers owed their opinions to their +own conclusions and reflections. Charles not taking a degree was less +likely to be owing to means not being furnished to him than to his +intermittent indecision of mind and his strong discernment, which +produced satisfaction with the world, with others, and with himself. + + + George Jacob Holyoake. + + + + + + + +TWO PRINCIPLES OF ORDER. + + +In my proof of the invalidity of that argument--it being indeed what +is called "the Argument from Design"--I point out that our experience +simultaneously informs us of two modes of producing order, otherwise +called arrangement, relation of parts to each other and to the whole +direction of means towards some recognisable end; or, to describe +the phenomenon in the most summary, as well as the most practical, +way--two modes of producing effects identical with those that proceed +from design. I explain that, of these two principles of order, the one +is Design itself, a modus operandi of intelligence (such as we find +it here below, of which the human mind affords the best examples), +while the other is something to which no name has been assigned, +and which, consequently, we can only shortly describe by saying that +it is not design. It becomes necessary, therefore, to give a farther +periphrastic account of it as follows:-- + +This nameless principle of order, considered as a vague popular +surmise, is as familiar to our experience as design. We all +see, for instance, that water has a tendency to form a perfectly +level and horizontal surface, that heavy bodies fall to the earth +perpendicularly, that the plummet performs a straight line in just +the same direction, that dew-drops and soap-bubbles assume a globular +shape, that crystallisation observes similar artist-like rules, +and so on. We are accustomed to say, "It is the nature of things," +and we ground our daily actions on a confidence in this regularity of +proceeding, without generally attempting to explain it. Science comes +to our help, and shows us that this orderly action of things around +us may be traced to, and is the necessary result of, the operation of +certain powers or properties inherent in these natural things. Grant +that the property called gravitation belongs to moving bodies, +and an innumerable quantity of orderly phenomena may be predicated +as springing of their own accord by inevitable consequence from +this datum; which same phenomena, moreover, intelligence is able +coincidently to reproduce in its own special mental way. + +Here, then, is a principle of order, less popularly appreciated, +but not less certainly evidenced and known, than design. It is, no +doubt, a principle infinitely inferior in dignity, for it is blind +and unintelligent, while design sees and understands, but this is +not the question. The question, superseded by an answer derived from +human experience, is to this effect--that nature and natural things +are, with no less propriety, assignable as the doers of a certain +non-designing kind of order, than man is assignable as the doer of +the designing kind; that we just as truly perceive that nature, +in the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in +her, produces order in a dew-drop or in a crystal, as that man, in +the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in him, +produces order in a poem or in a cathedral, and that, consequently, +the argument from design, based as it is on the assertion that our +experience assures us of only one principle of order, is invalid. + +Mr. F. W. Newman's argument is one of this erroneous class. He points +to "Animal Instincts" as an effect, which, owing to our knowing of +no other agency by which it could have been produced, can alone +be accounted for by reference to a designer, and consequently as +manifesting the objective existence of that designer, who could only be +the theistic God. The question that Mr. F. Newman's adduced instance +required him to consider was, whether the non-designing principle of +order, which, we are aware, is in many cases able to produce the same +effects as the other, could have been thus operative here, and he had +got to prove that it could not have been so, that there was something +in the nature of the case that forced us exclusively to have recourse +to the intelligent principle of order, and resisted any solution from +the other principle. The result of a proof so conducted would have +been, that Mr. F. Newman was entitled to conclude that (granting our +earthly experience was a sufficient test of the matter) Design must +have been the sole worker of the debated phenomenon. He would then +have established his theistic argument. Instead of doing this, he +simplifies his proceeding by being incognisant of a notorious fact, +and ignoring the non-designing principle altogether. + +1. The fact is, that there is not one way only of producing the +phenomena of design (I am here using an ordinary elliptical mode +of speaking, since literal metaphysical correctness is sometimes +cumbrous)--but there are two ways: one, the mind of a designer, and +the other (whatever may be its nature, which the present question +does not call upon me to define) not the mind of a designer. + +2. The shortest way of proving this theorem, is to state that there +are two ways of your obtaining a facsimile of your own person. One +is to have your portrait taken, and the other is to stand before +a looking-glass, and that of these two ways the former is that of +design, and the latter confessedly not design, being the well-known +necessary effect of certain so-called second causes, whose operation +in this instance is familiar to modern science. + +3. Consequently, S. D. Collet is incorrect in the principle which +she makes the foundation of her argument at p. 27, where it is said, +"What the Theist maintains is this, that when we see the exercise of +Force in the direction of a purpose, we, by an inevitable inference, +attribute the phenomenon to some conscious agent." + +4. Force is seen to be exercised in the direction of a purpose--the +purpose being that of producing similitude--with equal evidence in +the two cases just compared; for though the force exercised in said +direction is less in the case of the painter than it is in that of the +looking-glass (for the resemblance produced by the former is in less +degree a resemblance than that produced by the latter), the evidence +cannot be said to be less, since it is no less able to convince. We +are as perfectly sure that the painter could not have produced that +lesser similitude of a man, and a particular man, by chance (the +alternative of this supposition, according to our experience, being +that he must have used design) as we are that the looking-glass could +not have produced that greater similitude of a man, and a particular +man, by chance (the alternative of this supposition, according to +our experience, being that it must have used certain so-called laws +of nature); this collective experience of ours, equally assuring us +on the one hand, that the only way of the painter's achieving these +effects is by design, and on the other, that the only way of the +looking-glass's doing so, is by the natural agencies referred to. + +5. The human experience on which the decision of this question must +be founded--though not at the present era essentially different--may +yet be said to be considerably so from what it was in certain former +periods. In no times could mankind think and observe without becoming +aware of these two principles of order--whether you call them facts +or inferences--as a portion of their familiar experience. And so far +as they might have compared them, they must have abundantly seen that +the natural one is more powerful than the artificial one, and that the +straight line or the circle must seek its perfection much rather from +the plummet or the revolving radius, than from the pencil of Apelles. + +6. Thus the essential point of the existence of the two principles +has always been known, but the idea of their respective spheres and +limits, of the efficient prevalence of each within our experience, has +fluctuated in society. Art and handicraft are, of course, peculiarly +competent to appreciate the artificial principle of order, while +physical science is especially conversant with the natural one. As the +ancients were equal to the moderns in the former pursuits, but vastly +inferior to them in the latter, they must so far have had a tendency to +think more of the designing principle, and less of the other principle +than we do. But it must be remembered, that one or other of these two +principles, or at least the arbitrament between them, is the animating +basis of all religion, and of all religious sects and persuasions; +and further, that of these two principles, the religion founded on +the artificial one, which is the one traditionally derived to us, +is liable to be, and is wont to be, a far more powerful religion +(because it deals far more intensely in personification, having +reference singly to some supposed artist) than either the religion +that is constituted by the natural principle, or that which results +from a mixture of the two principles. And indeed, I will incidentally +say that this last kind of religion seems to me to have much analogy +on its side, and that the old idea of "the two principles" might, +on several grounds besides the present one, and in several respects, +perhaps, be found to shadow forth a certain amount of most important +truth and applicability. + +7. To return. By considering the state of religion and of religious +belief in the times of Socrates and Cicero, in connection with +the state of art, handicraft, and science, in the same time, and +coincidently taking care not to forget that religious sentiment +(that at least of the kind which had in their era already been, +and much more since has been, communicated from the east to the +west) is an incomparably more vigorous impeller of opinion, than +reason and argument; we shall have some of the principal data, and +in a main matter shall be prepared to use them judiciously in any +inquiry we might make, why it was that Socrates and Cicero, having +their attention arrested by the artificial principle of order and +arrangement, seemed absolutely to forget the existence of the natural +one, and why in consequence it was, that the latter wrote to this +effect: "He who can look up to the heavenly vault, and doubt the +existence of a one personal God, the designer and governor of all +things, is equivalent to a madman"; and why, further, we, spite of +our vast physical science, are prone to the same fallacy. + +8. Having thus proved that the argument of the Theist generally, +as well as the particular one advanced by S. D. C. at p. 27, is, by +being based on the erroneous statement that there is only one means +known to human experience, of producing phenomena identical with those +that are the product of design, and that this one is design itself; +there being, on the contrary, two such means, one of which is not +design; having, I say, proved that your argument, by being so based, +is invalid, I find I must fully agree with you, that there is evidence +of "an unmistakable cosmical unity." + +9. The true inquiry, therefore, is, which of those two principles +of order is, in the agency inquired into, the agent under these +circumstances, and whether both, and how far, under our ignorance of +what may be (a most important point that is carefully to be considered) +we are entitled to affirm as indubitable, to denounce as contradictory, +to advance as probable, to conjecture, to surmise, or to speculate +on this question. + + + + + + + +THE TRUTH OF FIRST PRINCIPLES. + + +1. You ask "my idea on the impossibility of proving the truth of +First Principles?" + +By "truth" you mean the ascertained existence of any idea or thing, +and the ascertained consistency of any statement with some such idea +or thing. + +By "principles" you mean not simply cardinal propositions, but cardinal +propositions that we have ascertained to be true. + +By "first principles" you mean the indubitably true but unprovable +elementary principles of all our knowledge. You mean that these +principles are the ground whereon we build in our reasonings; all that +we build upon them must, in consequence of being so built, admit of +being "proved" whether we have built rightly--that is, admit of being +subjected to the test whether the reasoning is correct; but these +"first principles" are confessedly exempted from this test, and yet +are received as true, no less than the others that have sustained this +ordeal. You ask the meaning of this privilege, whether it is right; +and, if so, to what propriety or necessity of the case it is due? + +2. You ask, "How is truth ascertained to be truth?" or, in other words, +"What is the criterion of truth?" + +With respect to the first query--In accordance with the definition I +have above given of truth, it would seem that it must have two sources, +experience and reason, experience who notifies the existence of +certain ideas or things, and reason, who forms propositions suggested +by them. Experience, therefore, acts the simple part of supplying +all the materials of truth; while reason, besides his acknowledged +office of judge of all truth, exercises the quite different function +of being himself the purveyor of a portion of it. + +So indubitable is it that truth can have these two sources only, +that even fanaticism would be found confessing the principle; while +it appeals to the experience of those who agree with it, as well as +professes to be reasonable. + +First principles must, accordingly, be of two kinds. Of those that +are based upon experience, I will give the following instances:--I +hear the chirping of a bird, and I see an inkstand before me. That +I have the sensation of hearing and seeing in these two cases, are +facts of which it is impossible I can doubt. Reason perceives that +these are primary facts or first principles, neither admitting nor +requiring any proof, testified by consciousness, and self-evidently +verified on that testimony. + +By reason, of course is meant the reason of all mankind--that is, +of all who are presumably competent to judge on the subject. So that +any just or reasonable confidence in the verdict of my own reason--in +this or in any other matter, presupposes a due comparison of my own +reason with that of others, nay, in some cases, a consideration of +the supposably more enlightened reason of future times. + +I discriminate first principles from derived ones thus:--"I see the +sun," is a first principle to me; "you see it," is a first principle to +you; by comparing these two ideas, each attains the derived principle +that the other sees what he does, and the further derived principle +that the sun is an existence independent of both. His own existence +is, indeed, to every one the first principle, by means of which he +infers the existence of other things and beings. + +In coming now to the other kind of first principles, consisting of +propositions formed by reason, we perceive that these show symptoms +of still further difference from the above, than that which results +from the difference of their source, of difference that affects their +philosophical character, and their technical right to the name under +which they present themselves to us. In short, the primary philosophy +has not yet settled their title. + +They are perceived by us to be true by an act of reason called +intuition. Not similarly, however, does our reason inform us that they +really are first principles, and our science is hitherto unequal to +this inquiry. + +Take, for instance, the following celebrated thesis, so often cited +as the most fundamental of all the propositions of reason, insomuch +as to be tacitly implied in all our reasonings; which yet we are +not sure is a first principle, all that can be said in favor of its +pretensions being that we can find no one who is able to reduce it +to more primary elements:-- + +It is impossible for a thing at the same time to be and not to be. + +Any one agreeing, as every one must, that this is true, might +still justly put the query, Why is it impossible? thereby calling +its assertion in question, demanding its credentials of proof, +seeking some ground for its truth other than its own testimony, and +hypothesising some other proposition more fundamental than it of which +it would be a derivative, and by all and each of these proceedings, +rejecting its claim to be a first principle. + +Its resisting our analysis is a good subjective ground for our ranking +this and other similar propositions among our first principles. But +they could only have the true claim by its being made clear that +the inability results from the nature of the case, and not from our +own incompetency. + +This test is borne by the former description of first principles; we +are able to see that the instances I adduced, such as the statements, +"I see the sun," "I see an inkstand," "I hear a bird," "I am conscious +that I exist," evade our power of ordinary proving, because they do +not admit of such proof. + +When we perceive that no one can answer this query, we are prompted to +another. Why cannot we answer it? whence our inability? what prevents +us? But here also we find ourselves completely in the dark, which is +somewhat strange, considering that in every human pursuit, whether of +science or any other, when we wish to do a thing and cannot do it, we +are generally able to specify some particular, either of self-defect +or outward impediment that is supposed to be in fault. But I imagine, +if the reader were to experiment on the specimen I have given, he +would not only find himself to fail in solving the problem, Why is +it that a thing cannot at once be and not be? but would not have a +word to advance in the way of accounting for his failure. + +These remarks apply to all other propositions of the sort. Euclid's +axioms, which undoubtedly aim to be as elementary as possible, and +therefore may be said to aim to be first principles, are confessedly, +under this aspect, unsatisfactory to the learned. "Things that are +equal to the same are equal to each other." Every one is inclined +to ask, Why? "A straight line is the shortest distance between two +points." Again, Why? + +The sum of the above strictures on this kind of so-called first +principles, is--1. That they have not made good their title, +and therefore are not to be accredited with it. 2. That there +is a decided presumption against that title from the doubt and +dissatisfaction with which it is met, where want of candor and +intelligence cannot be imputed, especially when it is considered that +the other, the sensuous experimental kind of first principles, have +so frank an acceptance. 3. It seems to be absolutely provable, and I +suppose I have above incidentally proved it, that they are not first +principles. 4. The task is set to metaphysics of supplying the most +satisfactory proof of all by bringing to light such propositions as +would be perceived to underlie these so-called first principles, and to +be the real first principles to which the others would give precedence. + +As regards their name, it being so much in point, excuses the old +remark that the elements of our knowledge stand in a reversed order +in respect to this knowledge to what they assume in our process of +acquiring it. A first principle, therefore, means also a last one; +it is the last in whatsoever endeavors to descend to the bottom or +to penetrate to the source of our knowledge, but it becomes the first +when we trace it from this source through its derivative ideas. + +The investigating act should not be confounded with the prospecting +one. The sensible horizon of subjective vision can, by no mediation, +be exalted into the real horizon of truth, wherein the genuine first +principles that bound human capability are exclusively to be found. + +It may be asked, apart from the inquiry what first principles there +are, Is there a necessity that some first principles should be? So it +seems from the data of the case. It is patent to common observation +that the mind of man is recipient of ideas from the things that +surround it. The contact of its apprehending faculty with the things it +apprehends, must, it would seem, constitute first principles. After it +has got them it might conceivably elicit from them derived principles, +but the original ones cannot be thus derived, since there are none +earlier from which to derive them. + +Again, it is to be inquired, Does the mind, in receiving its ideas, +possess and exercise in reference to the things on which it operates, +a copying faculty or a transforming faculty? Does it import them simply +in their native character, in the way a mirror does the object it +reflects, or does it manufacture, cook, and assimilate them, so as +to change them into something partaking of its own? + +And, if it changes them, what is the extent of the change? Does it +go so far only as the semi-idealism of Locke, or extend into the +absolute idealism of the German school? + +Because these questions have been wont to puzzle either the learned, +or the public, or both, it does not follow that they are difficult. I +suppose them to admit of decided answers before a supposed competent +audience. + +As I am unprovided with proof, although I suppose it is to be provable, +that first principles of reason must needs be, I must speculate for +a moment on the possibility of a proposition of the form of "two and +two make four," being derived from one of the form of "I scent the +rose," for this seems to be the alternative of there being no first +principles of reason. Evidently I must confess to having no grounds +for pronouncing such a derivation impossible, though I must grant +it to be paradoxical. Our mal-cultivation of non-material science, +and the imperfection of our metaphysics, is probably the only cause +of the strange predicament. + +No doubt M. Cousin, and several other eminent teachers of youth, +to whose office it belongs to expound received metaphysics, have +comprised First Principles in their course of philosophy; but as I +have barely met with any of their writings, I must confess such an +ignorance of them, as not even to know how far I am either adopting, +or evading their phraseology, in discussing the same subjects. Mine, +however, cannot be wrong, since the term "first principles," that I +have chosen, is one of familiar popular use; so that were this mode +of speech, as indeed it is, peculiarly liable to ambiguity, it would, +for that very reason, be preferable to any other, till such time as +that ambiguity should have been explained, and the wrong thinking, of +which it might have been the source, exposed and obviated. Not till +this had been done would it be time to inquire whether the current +metaphysics had invented any intrinsically better ways of speaking +on these topics, for though the veriest tyro in such investigations +would be justified in objecting to some of its technicalities, +such as the invention of the word free-will, for instance, for the +same reason that a beginner in zoology might object, were such an +attempt ever made, to the introduction of the word sphynx or griffin +into that branch of inquiry, there can be no doubt that other of its +speculations are more happily conceived. Hence I suppose it would be +a decided mistake to imagine, for example, that no trouve whatever is +to be elicited from the obscurities of Kant, but on the other hand, +one must as much take care to entertain sober conjectures of the +possible value of such unsunned treasures, as to keep in mind that +quackery may be not unqualified with some merit, and I might surmise +that it was perhaps in virtue of his fabulous expectations in this +direction, that Coleridge could not execute his long-meditated plan of +elucidating that writer; or rather, perhaps--to speak more curtly--a +spirit more differing from that which compounded the amalgam, was +necessary to resolve and detect it. + +According to this estimate of the value of our achieved studies, it +would be expectable, in regard to my present topic, that almost all +the materials for right conclusions on it must be extant somewhere or +other in our books, no great amount of ability being required to turn +them to proper account: an easily suppliable desideratum being thus +left unsupplied, the public indifference manifested thereby would seem +to bear the ascription of our unsatisfactory metaphysics to the fault, +however apportioned between the many and the few, not of the intellect, +but of the reason. + +Indeed, it is held as a pretty general rule, that where there is want +of reform, there is want of reason; and Bacon, by implication, thought +the rule here applicable, when, in defending his "new philosophy" +from the charge of arrogance, he apologised by saying that a "cripple +in the right road would make better progress than a racehorse in the +wrong." That is, he claimed for himself, as he was bound logically to +do, the plain good sense of directing his supposably humble faculties +with an obvious regard to the end he proposed and professed, and he was +ready to concede to his competitors all kinds of superiority but this. + +The same simplicity characterises the reforming animus of the other +great patriarch of "the new philosophy," in its sister branch. The +still debated point between the school of Locke and the old philosophy +was, and is, of such a form as may be figured by the following +hypothetical, and it may be, well-founded statement. Locke seems to +have battled mainly for the principle that ideas that every one allows +to be inferences, should be acknowledged by philosophy to be such, +while the adherents of the old ideas maintained, in opposition to +him, that ideas that every one allows to be inferences, should not +be acknowledged by philosophy to be such. Or, in other words, Locke +aimed to realise a certain first principle of reason, which I shall +have hereafter to consider, which stands thus:--"That which it is," +while his opponents withstood this innovating pretension, finding +it fatal to their doctrine. If the reader is somewhat startled at +the statement I have just made, I will remind him that it amounts +to nothing more than saying that in the contest between the new and +the old philosophy, reason is entirely and absolutely on the side of +the former, an assertion which, of course, I must both think admits +of being substantiated, and must take myself, in some degree, to be +able to aid in its being so. + +The existing quarrel between the two philosophies might, perhaps, +be personified through the medium of a principal champion on each +side. For the new ideas I could only choose Locke, since he is admitted +to have had no equally eminent successor; for the old I would choose +M. Cousin, both on account of his superior merit and popularity, and +also of his having made Locke the subject of some elaborate strictures +that I happen to have read. On these, when they come again to hand, +I should perhaps have something to remark; meanwhile I must content +myself with addressing myself to one of them in the following manner:-- + +In antiquity and the middle ages, the schoolmaster and the +philosopher were one and the same individual. The new philosophy +was the first to separate these two departments; perceiving that the +communication of truth is a distinct office from its investigation, +and that that difference of office in each case necessitates a +corresponding difference in the public, that is the proper object of +its exercise. Since, moreover, society may be discriminated into two +sorts of mind, admitting of being pictured as the childish and the +adults, it is evident that the instructor must find his audience +more especially in the former, while the investigator of truth +must appeal exclusively to the latter. This he must needs do, to +whichever of the sciences he ministers; and not only so, but he must +more particularly address himself to a small and select portion of +this itself selecter class, constitute them the witnesses and judges +of his proceedings, and perceive that both his success in philosophy +and the acknowledgment of it can only be founded first and foremost on +their approbation. As even in jockeyism and prize-fighting, there are +"the knowing ones," similar referees are, by the nature of things, +required for the flourishing estate of any science; and evidently in +proportion as they might be incompetent to such an office, false or +imperfect science must be the result. + +Locke, acting on this instinctive view, communicated to the +public certain observations he had made in mental philosophy, and +entitled his work, An Essay on the Human Understanding. He properly +called it an essay, because a person who simply aims to investigate +truth, undertakes to do his best in the way of trial, endeavor, and +experiment, in such sort as to make the word essay appropriate to what +he does. The word moreover implies that the thing done, though it is +the writer's best, is liable to be incomplete, comparatively imperfect, +and, indeed, in the more difficult questions of philosophy, as well as +in the less advanced stages of philosophising, is sure to be so. Locke +accordingly, having had his attention struck with certain phenomena of +the human mind, told the public just what he had observed, and nothing +else. Among the observations that he thus imparted, was the process +through which the mind seems to go in arriving at the sum of its ideas, +and especially the points from which it seems to start in this process. + +M. Cousin, having apparently no conception of a way of acting so +proper to legitimate inquiry, and having himself written a Course +of Philosophy, evidently thinks Locke ought to have done the same; +for he says that Locke is erroneous in the method of his philosophy, +that he begins at the wrong end, that instead of having told us as he +has how the ideas arise in the mind, he ought to have told us what +the ideas are, instead of describing their origin to have described +their actuality, to have given a list of the faculties of the mind, +and so on. Which is just the same thing as saying that a traveller +who publishes his explorations in America, ought instead to have gone +to China. + +I shall have to make some objections to Locke, but they will be of +a nature exactly contrary to those of which he is usually made the +subject. Instead of accusing his principles I shall have to impute +to him the not sufficiently carrying them out; a fault due to his +position as an early reformer, and perfectly consistent with his high +character as such. + +I have the more reason to note this distinction between M. Cousin's +department and the function exercised by Locke, because I am forced +myself to take the benefit of it. Want of erudition would form very +vulnerable points, were I to be judged by the former standard. In +the little I have yet put forth on the subject of First Principles, +I already find two or three errors of that sort, which a greater amount +of reading would no doubt have enabled me to escape. My present letter +may close with some correction of one of these. + +Preliminary, I will venture to call "That which is is," a first +principle of reason, and "Two and two make four," one of its +derivatives, leaving this topic for future explanation, and then +proceed thus:--When in my last letter I represented first principles +as bounding the horizon of human knowledge, I left it to be inferred +that both the kinds of "first principles" I had mentioned were thus +describable in common. I find, however, that this metaphysical +character belongs exclusively to first principles of sensuous +experience, and no more belongs to first principles of reason than to +first principles of grammar, or to first principles of rhetoric. That +is, first principles of reason are merely the result of one of those +analytical inquiries in which we arrive at something absolutely simple, +and must there stop, just as in the science of numbers we may thus +arrive at unity. + + + +Having long ago defined First Principles of sensuous experience, +I find there is a difficulty attached to the other kind of first +principles derived from the various use of the word reason--which +I will say betrayed me into a wrong inference in the concluding +paragraph of my last letter. + +Locke, in the 17th chapter of his fourth book, confesses that this +word, in the proper use of the English language, is liable to bear +several senses. Due discrimination in such a case, and a cautious +avoidance of the dangers to which philosophy is exposed, and has +so amply incurred, from this kind of source might, above all, have +been, expected from Locke, since he was the first who inculcated it, +and is generally remarkable for the observance of his own precepts +in this matter. Hence the charge I have now got to bring against him +is a little surprising. + +Indeed, it might be asserted that his position and circumstances do +not seem very readily to bear the entire responsibility of some of his +proceedings. Perhaps he might be characterised as a writer of somewhat +humorous idiosyncracy in respect to tendency to fixed ideas. His +lapses, indeed, are not many, but they are highly significant, as +I shall have occasion in more than one instance to show, and among +these must evidently be reckoned that I am now going to notice, since +it imports the wrong definition of a word of such cardinal meaning. + +In defining the word reason, in its proper and specific sense +wherein it is used to denote a certain well-known quality of the +human mind--that is, as approvedly ascertained and appreciated under +this name, as are certain weights and measures under those of pound, +gallon, or mile, he assigns a meaning to it that comes short of the +proportions thus justly prefigured as belonging to it. He confounds +reason with reasoning--that is, he emerges the entire faculty or modus +operandi, to which we give the name of reason, in that partial exercise +of its function to which we give the name of reasoning. He says that, +in matters of certainty, such as the proof of any of Euclid's theorems, +the acts by which the mind ascertains the fit coherence of the several +links in the chain of reasoning are acts of reason. Granted. + +Also, that in weighing probabilities, a similar coherence is similarly +verified by reason. Granted--with liberty of comment that these arts +of reason, in either of the two cases have, by the approved practice +of language, received the name of reasoning. + +But he further signifies--that is, he does not expressly affirm, but, +with equivalent certification, he implicitly asserts, and inferentially +states that, in examining such a proposition as the following:--"What +is, is" (an examination to which confessedly no reasoning is attached), +the act by which the mind assents to the truth of this statement +is not to be described as an act of reason. He adopts a different +phraseology, and calls it intuition. + +Observe, my objection is not that he invests the idea with this new +name, but that he disparages its old one. I do not object to your +calling a spade a shovel, under a certain view of its use, but it +remains still necessary that you should admit that a spade is, in +the full sense of the word, a spade. + +Indeed, I will incidentally remark that I suspect the word "intuition" +has been a very good addition to our vocabulary, and I suppose +its proper import might be represented as follows:--Reason has two +modes of his exercise, the one is called reasoning, and the other +intuition. Intuition is the decision of reason on one single point; +reasoning--a word proper to demonstrative truth--seems to be nothing +more than intuition looking not merely at one point, but at several +points successively. So that intuition and reasoning would constitute +the self-same function of reason, and the difference in their meanings +would be solely owing to the difference in the circumstances under +which that function is exercised. + +Observe, that I am here only venturing to speculate, and am now +returning from that digression. + +Whether or not Locke is herein psychologically consistent with +himself; whether, indeed, his real theory is not that which I have +just conjecturally intimated, is another question, which I shall +defer to a future occasion; but whether or not he herein opposes the +ordinary, prevailing, and inveterate use of language, which is what +I am charging him with doing, and whether or not he has justifiable +ground for this innovation which I am denying that he has, are points +that must be tried by the ordeal of these three considerations. How +are we accustomed to speak? How are we accustomed to write? and what +sort of a call for changing our customs in either of these particulars +is that which constitutes a genuine call to do so? + +In regard to the first of these tests, the literature of all sects +and parties has been accustomed to assert that, both in matters of +science and of worldly business, reason is the judge of all truth +whatever, without exception. + +Locke, on the other hand, informs us that reason is the judge of +demonstrative truth, of logical truth, of casuistical truth, and of +lawyers' truth, and of these kinds of truth alone, but is not the +judge of intuitive or self-evident truth. Our writers would tell us +that to deny "what is, is" to be a true statement, would be an offence +against reason; but we learn from Locke that reason has no cognisance +in this matter, but intuition only has, and consequently that the +wrong committed would not be against reason, but against intuition. + +Our current speech accords with our literature in this view +of the meaning of the word reason; whose efficiency, moreover, +it endeavors to amplify, by surrounding it with satellites of +adjectives formed from it, the principal of which are "reasonable" and +"unreasonable." Provided with this vocabulary, we pronounce it to be +unreasonable to deny any truth whatever that can be well and clearly +ascertained; and so far are we from reserving these adjectives for +the occasion of demonstrative truth, and holding them inapplicable +where self-evident or intuitive truth comes on the carpet, that we +account it, if possible, still more unreasonable to deny the latter +than the former. + +But if the nomenclature adopted by Locke be the right one, there ought +to be a change in these current modes of speaking and writing. One who +should reject the proofs of Euclid, would be unreasonable; one who +should maintain that Thurtel or Greenacre were innocent of murder, +would be unreasonable; but, one who should deny the truth of any +self-evident proposition, would not be unreasonable; for to say this, +would be to say that reason has cognisance of such propositions, +whereas, according to him, it is expressly not reason, but intuition +that takes this office. The words "intuitional" and "unintuitional," +must be invented to supply the obvious need which the apparent gap +discovers; there seems no other way of supplying it. + +Lest I should be suspected of somewhat making up a case; of having, +perhaps, represented not so much what Locke really means, as what he +seems to mean, I will remind the reader that Locke is undertaking the +formal definition of a word, and that on such a critical occasion, +it is proper to give him credit for not meaning otherwise than he +seems to mean. + +The passage which is my text, will be found in the earlier part of +the seventeenth chapter of the fourth book. Indeed, I could at once +prove my indictment by citing a few words from it, accompanied by a +comment of my own, had I any right to impose on the reader a belief +in the discriminating fairness and matter-of-fact accuracy, both of +my extracts and my comment. + +I will, however, venture on such a step; I will suppose myself +commenting on this passage, and proceed thus: Locke, it will be seen +in this, his foremost and professed definition of the word reason, +contrasts it with "sense and intuition." + +Whether he holds these to be identical with what he calls "the +outward and the inward sense," is not quite clear. That, however, +is not the question. + +He says, that these two faculties "reach but a very little way"; +for that "the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions +and intermediate ideas." Now, reason, he says, may be defined to be +that faculty, whose specific office it is "to find out and apply" +those intermediate ideas and deductions by which we obtain knowledge +that consists of two kinds, one that which exalts us into "certainty," +the other that which, though less generous diet for the mind, we have +constantly good ground for gladly acquiescing in, and which we call +"probability." So that, says Locke, if you ask, "What room is there +for the exercise of any other faculty but outward sense and inward +perception?" I can abundantly reply, "Very much." I have shown you +that without this "demonstrative" faculty, our knowledge would be +but a skeleton; it would, indeed, not be properly speaking knowledge, +but mere rudiments of knowledge. + +Such is my interpretation of Locke's definition of reason, in the +proper and specific sense of this word. If it is strictly correct, +as I believe the intelligent reader will find by reference, then it +is Locke confounds reason with reasoning, mistakes a part for the +whole, and the whole for a part, and acts similarly--to borrow his +own way of illustration--to the representing a gallon to be a quart, +or a half-sovereign to be a sovereign. + +It is to be observed, too, that it is entirely in behalf of the more +showy kind of knowledge, that the mistake is made. The respected name +of reason is given exclusively to logic and demonstrating. Good sense, +good feeling, just instinct, if they stand alone, have no claim to +it; they are put on an inferior footing; true, they are intuition; +but what then? they are not reason. + +Now, the century introduced by Locke is accused by the present, +and it is generally admitted, with some degree of justice, of having +"materialistic" tendencies. We may see, then, how Locke's doctrine, +as just described, founded though it is only on nomenclature, hinging +merely on definition, incurring whatever wrongness it implicates from +no other lapse than that of confounding a word with its derivative, +doing nothing, in short, but annul the difference of meaning between +the two words, reason and reasoning; we may see how this apparently +harmless experiment might tend to supplying these materialistic +tendencies with a ground, a rationale, a principle, and thus to exalt +their authority, and how, indeed! it just smacks of their spirit. + +It may be seen, too, how, from a few slips, such as this on the +part of the champion of the "new philosophy," competing schools of +the present age might be able to make up a case, specious enough to +gain the acquiescence of a portion of the public against both--with +how great futility, I believe, would appear, if the accusations were +weighed by a competent tribunal. + +And, finally, it might be expected, that the undue exaltation of +the demonstrative department of reason, should issue in a reaction +into a contrary extreme, and that some Mr. Carlyle might be found to +inveigh against "logic," to sneer at "analysis," to denounce "cause +and effect philosophy" and to praise "mysticism." + +I have already assumed that the third test that I promised, goes +against Locke, and requires no examination, simply because he has not +advanced it in his behalf. He has assigned no ground for changing +the meaning of the word reason, and it is presumable that none is +assignable. + + + +The question, What is the Criterion of Truth?--that is, What are the +proper means of distinguishing whether anything that is asserted to be +true is so or not? claims immediate notice, because such a criterion +exists, and the new philosophy necessarily appeals to it when it comes +before the public, while it has shown with what effect it can do so, +in the case of those of its branches--namely, the purely material +and the mathematical, that flourish in society. + +Premising that it is a way of certifying truth that has been +immemorially used by mankind in their daily affairs, and which they +have always, to some extent, instinctively transferred to their +judgments in philosophy, and that it is the only possible general +and summary criterion of truth, I may describe it as consisting in +the unanimous assent to some idea or assertion of all who are thought +competent to pronounce concerning it. + +Viewed in connection with the thing it verifies, and the parties who +use it, the criterion may be thus represented: Any idea, assertion, +or opinion, must, by any inquirer, be found true, when he perceives +it to be such as would be unanimously assented to by all presumably +competent judges of the kind of truth to which it refers. + +So that those who use this criterion, and are convinced of the truth of +anything through its medium--a proceeding which I have represented as +common and habitual to mankind--in thereby pronouncing certain supposed +persons to be judges of truth in the said matter, claim themselves +to be also judges of it in the matter of so pronouncing. The acts +of judgment they thus tacitly challenge to themselves may be said to +be to the following effect:--1. They assign the qualifications that +constitute competency for a certain function. 2. They decide that there +are persons in the community answering to this character. 3. They +opine that the view such persons take or would take, imports an +assertion of the truth of the idea in question. 4. They accredit +that view with being strictly one, supposing that all qualified to +arbitrate would acquiesce and agree in the same. 5. They attribute +to themselves a similar unanimity. 6. They assume the sufficiency of +their own judgment to make all the above conclusions. + +These assumptions on their part, so complicated in description, are +simple enough in performance. It is plain that mankind--more properly +here to be called the public--simply attach themselves to some opinion +which they find current in society; while, however, the assumptions +I have just described are, in their full measure, but a necessary +consequence of their so doing, doubtless their so doing must itself +have been dictated by some kind of anticipation of them, but this may, +to any degree, have been vague, undetermined, partial, and imperfect. + +The rationale of this double bench of judges is thus explained. In +reference to almost every kind of truth there is always a certain +portion of the community better able to judge than the rest. Hence +it becomes clearly the part of the latter, if they wish to be +rightly informed, to defer to the opinion of those confessedly +better judges--confessed to be such from the general opinion to that +effect. Thus a second set of judges perforce, in addition to those that +were originally conceived by choice, is implicated in this transaction. + +For the primary sort I must seek a name from the French language, +which calls them "experts," the English supplying, I believe, none, +except a very vernacular one, the "knowing ones"; the others have +already got a well-known name--the public. + +The public, in deciding on the occasions in question, what are the +qualifications that constitute "experts" may be said to choose them, +thereby, however, choosing persons in idea, and not bodily. The +relation of the public to these conceptions of theirs is the same +as that of the constituencies to the members of Parliament, in the +point of one being the choosers and the others the chosen, with a +common object in view. + +I suppose, to stop the current of my discourse, and adjourn its topic, +for the sake of at once bringing the general principle discussed to +the test of exemplification, would have its want of logical harmony +excused by its being desiderated by the reader. + +I had undertaken to prove that this principle--which, for distinction's +sake, I will call the unanimity principle--is the proper and only +criterion of scientific truth to the great non-scientific world, +and consequently that modern philosophy necessarily appeals to it +when it comes before the public. What I had thus taken upon myself +to do, obviously was--first, to display and explicate the principle +by definition, and this I had already done; and next--to describe +it theoretically by showing its manner of existing, and this I was +engaged in doing. Leaving this inquiry in the midst, I am now going to +deviate into the practical phase of its description, by showing, not +how it is, but how it acts. This seems necessary for the satisfaction +of the reader, as being the only way of securing him from any, even +were it but temporary, misapprehension as to the working value of +the principle for which his attention is demanded. I therefore select +the six following examples, the two first homely, and the four last +philosophical, of its ordinary use by the public. + +They will be at once seen to justify my assertion of its having for +its main characteristics the two facts--first, that mankind habitually +use it, and have always done so; and next, that propositions thus +warranted are universally accepted as established truth, and that no +one thinks of calling them in question. + +1. Thus no one doubts, when coming to the intersection of two roads, +he sees a sign-post, on one of whose pointers is written "To London," +and on the other "To Windsor," no one hesitates to believe that the +information thus conveyed to him is true; because he is aware that +those who give it are competent to do so, and that none similarly +competent will gainsay it. + +2. Again, no one doubts that the sun rises and sets once in +every twenty-four hours; no one doubts that he so rose and set +yesterday. Every one is ready to affirm the certainty of these two +facts, but very few can do so, in any great degree, from their +own experience; but they help the lack of this by that of their +neighbors. Neither is it necessary that they should have any near, +nor even the most remote, idea of the personality of those on whose +testimony they thus implicitly rely; it suffices they are sure, +whoever they may be, they have the right qualifications for testifying +in the way they do, and that no one so qualified can contradict their +evidence, or dream of doing so. + +The above are examples of the criterion of truth, applied to the ideas +and proceedings of ordinary life. It will be seen therefrom, first +that mankind have in all ages been educated in an acceptance of its +principle, according to my definition of it, the principle, namely, of +an indubitable certainty of truth, resulting from the unanimous assent +to some idea of all who are thought by self and neighbors competent +to pronounce thereon; possibly too they may be said to have been +educated in some imperfect theoretical appreciation of this principle. + +It will secondly be seen therefrom, that the two kinds of unanimity +which I have predicated as essential to the proper use and results of +this criterion, an unanimity, namely, on the part of the supposed good +judges of certain descriptions of truth, who may be called the adepts +or knowing ones imagined by the public; and again an unanimity on the +part of the public itself in interpreting and adopting their opinion; +it will be seen, I say, that this double unanimity is perfectly +attainable, nay, perfectly attained, and that too so extensively, +as to constitute a common and familiar occurrence on all manner of +occasions of daily life. + +I will now give instances of their similar use of it in directing +their judgments on philosophical questions. + +3. Very few of the public are able to examine the proof of any of +the theorems of Euclid, yet there is none of them who would think of +seriously doubting the truth of anything contained in that book, the +ground of their confidence being solely their knowledge of the fact, +that the learned in these matters have unanimously so decided. + +Every one, again, believes in certain facts that are asserted by +navigators, explorers, and geographers, respecting the existence, +position, and products of various countries of the globe. Every one, +further, believes in certain deductions derived from these facts by +naturalists, geologists, astronomers, and so forth. The belief is +owing to the unanimous testimony of all these confessedly competent +authorities; but whenever they are seen to differ among themselves, the +public withholds its entire belief, and either doubts or disbelieves +the things asserted. Thus the public is at this day doubtful and +divided whether there is such a creature as the sea-serpent. Similarly +the public is dubious--for it must needs be so if any section of it is +so--whether a certain explorer who was authoritatively sent out about a +dozen years ago conjointly by the French Government and Institute, was, +in any degree, justified in bringing home the account he did of there +being a tribe of men in the interior of Africa having tails, whether +this unexpected information is, in any important particular, true. + +The two last examples have been furnished by material science. I will +now draw one from the other department, with the view of indicating +that in non-material science also, numerous propositions circulate +among the public that are franked by the same principle to pass as +undoubted truth. Such is the maxim of heathen philosophy, recorded +by Cicero in his "Officiis": "Do not to another what you would not +he should do to you"; or the same maxim, in its modified form, as +given in the New Testament, with the characteristic omission of the +negative. The truth of this moral maxim is universally admitted, +because it is supposed that no person of presumable moral judgment +has ever been known to call it in question. + +It would seem, then, that this criterion of truth is--what confessedly, +or from easy proof, it is predicable that no other criterion of +truth is--a general criterion of truth. I will, however, restrict +this pretension to the statement--to be hereafter more largely +explained--that it is a general criterion of truth to the public +as such, to the public considered as a public; for, indeed, it is +not properly usable at all by anyone except in the character of a +member of the public. This means that it is a general criterion of +truth in the following way: it is applicable to the verification of +all truth, so far as it admits of being verified before the public, +and made the common property of the community. + +6. For even where at first sight you might think it most out of place, +I mean in relation to that kind of truth whose primary evidence is +the consciousness of the individual, so that the competent witness +of truth is necessarily but one person, there is oneness of opinion, +there is unanimity, and the testimony of the one competent witness +is not contradicted or doubted by that of any other presumably +competent. When, for instance, I am conscious of the sensation +of seeing an inkstand before me, no one seeing reason to doubt my +assertion to that effect, all presumably competent testimony on the +subject must needs be concentrated in myself; and the fact of my +seeing an inkstand, though for my own conviction verified in a way +independent of any such argument, is, for the conviction of others, +only pronounceable as true, because all presumably competent authority +is of one mind in alleging its truth. + +In thus far exemplifying the use of this principle, I have exhibited +it in the exercise of its primary office only, which, however, is +not that which, on behalf of philosophy, I am here demanding from +it. I have shown it, namely, as used by the public to establish truth +positively, and not in the way wherein it may be used to distinguish +truth comparatively. + +But it is solely in this latter office that it becomes a criterion of +truth, an arbiter between the true and the false, an indicator of both, +and more especially of what has the character of ascertained truth, +and what has not; and this, it will be remembered, was the office I +sought from it, and constituted the ultimate purpose of my taking up +the consideration of the subject. + +Having with as much brevity as just suffices for that purpose, +explained the nature of the principle in question, and its use by +society at large, it now only remains that I should explain that +purpose itself, by theory and example. + +What I am doing in tracing the unanimity principle from its first +instinctive use by the public to its secondary and meditated one +by philosophy, is a purely critical act, comparable to that of +the rhetorician who appreciates the character of certain modes of +thinking which have long since been practised by mankind, and shows +what therein is approvable--all the rest being liable to censure. + +It was the universal conviction of European Christendom, during +many centuries, that the Church, which was popularly supposed to be +represented by the Pope, enjoyed peculiarly a divine guidance which +made it an infallible judge of truth. This idea was thought to be +warranted by the unanimous assent of all right-minded persons, and the +denial of it to be the mark of a reprobate spirit, as well as contrary +to common sense. We now know the entire futility of this assumption, +and that the heretics were not inferior to the orthodox in the power +of judging such subjects. Hence in discussing the unanimity principle +the question presents itself, How came the public thus wrongly to +apply it? What error did they commit in so doing? When the revival +of learning and the consequent rise of Protestantism had exposed +the error in that form of it, it was still continued under the new +social regimes; so that even Locke, the boldest advocate of the +rights of man that was tolerated even in his time, stigmatised the +dissentients from certain Protestant tenets in the same unjust way +that Popery had done to the dissentients from certain Popish ones; +speaking of them in two or three places of his essay as persons at +once notoriously disreputable in character and weak in intellect; +consistently with which estimate he came to the conclusion that the +reigning theology was established truth, as being accredited by all +those whose opinion was worth taking account of. + +Later times have again manifested the futility of the assumption +against the new race of dissentients. No one will say that Goethe +and Neibuhr (to mention only two) must count for nothing on questions +wherein they were as likely to be well informed as their opponents. So +that Locke's side, instead of being warranted by the decisive verdict +he imagines, is but one of two suitors in an undetermined cause, +neither having yet attracted the votes of the whole jury, and neither +consequently yet occupying the position of ascertained truth. Giving +everyone a fair hearing is that trial and test of competency which +yields the only means of learning who said competent judges are. + +A little consideration, even in Locke's time of less advanced thought, +might have informed an intelligent mind, if free from prejudice, +that mere prohibitory laws must be of themselves less adverse to the +free expression of people's sentiments than that averted state of the +public mind of which they are one of the symptoms. Both from theory and +experience we may collect that very much the same laws of supply and +demand obtain in matters of opinion as in those of food and raiment; +the tongue and the pen, and the previous thought by which these are +instructed, must evidently hold back from offering to the public, +nay, in a great measure from suggesting to the agent himself, any such +ideas as they know the public will not, and must confine themselves to +putting forth such only as they suppose it will understand, appreciate, +and regard. + + + + + + + +THE RIGHTS OF REASON. + + +To the two queries you put to me, "What are first principles?" and +"What is the criterion of truth?" I find it suitable to append some +preliminary remarks on "The Rights of Reason." + +The solution you expect is, I presume, a reasonable one. You do not +wish me to take into account any opinions that cannot bear the test +of reason. + +Your queries derive their greatest pertinency from the state of +non-material philosophy; and, possibly, might have been, in some +measure, prompted by this consideration. That double-minded way of +inquiring into truth, which only in part reasons, while it in part +dogmatises, imagines, and assumes, is, it is obvious, in morals, +metaphysics, and religion, one of our inheritances from former +times. The battle has been won in the material department, but is +still undecided on the other wing. + +What, then, is Reason, and what are its Rights? + +Every human inquiry that asks, What is right, proper, or +correct? necessarily, in doing so, asks, What is it reasonable +to think, believe, or do? in the points inquired into. The +faculty--whatever may be its nature--whereby we find ourselves +able, under certain circumstances, to answer this question, we call +reason. The rights of reason may be said to consist in the concession +to it of a certain absolute power in the decision of truth, divisible +under two heads thus--a power of deciding what are the questions +whereon it is able to decide, and a power of deciding those questions. + +One of the many ways of disparaging the rights of reason is--openly +or covertly to doubt or deny that morals, metaphysics, and religion, +are--in the full sense of the word--sciences. This is to withdraw +them from the empire of reason, and to hand them over to some rival +pretender. + +No science can flourish while it is understood that its discussion +must be made palatable to the public. In any supposable code of the +rights of reason, one primary article would limit and define the +functions of the public in the investigation of truth--a topic which, +together with the kindred inquiry, Who are the public? is suggested +by your second query. + +Mankind have naturally a degree of antipathy for reason. They have +found Reason, in the work he affects, dull, in the help he furnishes, +deficient, in the truth he unveils, ugly, in the rule he arrogates, +imperious. Barbarism, in all its stages, may be said to be founded, +not merely on ignorance, but on a state of the inclinations that +revolts from reason. + +Two competitors have always disputed the rights of reason; authority +or precedent, and faith or conscience. Conscience, early or late, must +receive almost all his light from authority; and, therefore, in respect +to opinion, may generally be called the creature of authority. Yet, in +a moral aspect, authority is confessedly of no account, and conscience +has a sole jurisdiction. A large portion of mankind have, in our times, +outgrown the error of resting their sense of duty on the mere dictate +of other men. The only legitimate directors of human conduct are now +generally admitted to be conscience and reason; the conscience must be +exclusively one's own, but the reason need not entirely--and, indeed, +cannot in any great proportion--be one's own, but may be partly that +of one's neighbor. + +The question of the division of power between these two potentates, +though not yet understood by the public, does not seem to be more +complicated than that analogous one just alluded to, and of which +they evidently understand the gist. + +For authority, as above intimated, though the venerable instructor of +conscience, is yet morally subjected to him; and, not dissimilarly, +have conscience and reason reciprocal claims of precedence on each +other. Reason is the judge, but he is bound, under conscience, to give +a sufficient and attentive hearing to any pleadings that conscience +may have to offer, and conscience is the pleader, but he is bound, +under reason, to conform to whatever verdicts reason declares himself +competent to render. + +If history in this particular can be considered as having disclosed +a necessary sequence, civilisation progresses in the following +order:--The general mind, in becoming acquainted with its own powers, +first learns an evolution of conscience (and this can only take place +through the medium of religion), and last learns to appreciate reason +(and this can only happen through the medium of science). While the +prerogatives of conscience were insufficiently known, authority usurped +them, and while the prerogatives of reason are insufficiently known, +authority and conscience conjointly usurp them. + +The word conscience I here use in its proper sense, wherein it means +either an individual conscience, or the united consciences of more +than one supposed to be in accord together, so as to make the acts +resulting from this accord constitute single acts of conscience. But +the word has taken an improper enlargement of meaning in being often +used to signify one conscience claiming something in contravention +of another conscience. These two, so different meanings of the word +conscience, are seldom duly discriminated by those who use them. + +To the rights of reason belongs a certain degree of power, both in +regulating the individual conscience, and in solving the differences +between opposing ones. Under what conditions, and how far, reason +can exercise this office, and what rule he is to follow in so doing, +would be an inquiry suggested by my answer to your second query. + +Having above mentioned religion and science as the two prime ministers +respectively of conscience and reason, I will pursue the subject a +little further. + +Religion has aimed to have a moral animus by means of a free +conscience. Religion has not yet immediately aimed at moral conduct; +but, indeed, has been wont, by the mouth of her most strenuous +ministers, to assume that the aim at this is already included in that +other aim. But a moral animus is but one ingredient in moral conduct, +involving the intent only to act morally, without having of itself +the least power to realise that intent. Knowledge,--that is, science, +exclusively keeps the keys of this power. Such knowledge religion +has not yet made one of her aims and ends either directly, or by +any coalition with those who have so aimed. Accordingly religion +cannot be said hitherto to have been an advocate of the rights of +reason. Whatever good things she may have achieved in this cause have +been incidental to her advocacy of the Rights of Conscience. Here +reason was her weapon (sharpened for this use, and so far valued and +treasured), against authority. Her tendency meanwhile, is to impel +conscience to infringe on the rights of reason. + +Science alone has hitherto been the immediate champion of these +rights. But it seems he cannot expect to make that advocacy complete +and effectual till he allies himself with religion. This alliance, +since it is persuaded by reason, and not by passion, can have science +alone for its real mover. + +The Rights of Reason may at present be said to be in such a germ of +their acknowledgment as were the rights of conscience three centuries +ago. Mankind have not hitherto come to acquiesce in the idea of +that parsimony of guidance vouchsafed to man, which is found to be +the result of claiming for reason the power of calling all human +thoughts before his tribunal, and seeing whether he has anything +to object to them. Their idea has been that not only suggesting +inspiration--(which it does not seem necessary that the advocate of +the rights of reason should deny)--but guiding inspiration is given, +given too to some rather than to others, and given in such a quality, +as to dispense with the supervision of reason. A generation successive +to many among whom this doctrine has been taught and believed, will not +be prone to any decided rejection of it. Pride of species inclining +to exaggerated human pretensions above other earthly creatures, and +party pride inclining to exalt self and an associated confraternity +into a superiority over the rest of mankind, and supplied with a +traditional store of modes of thought and practice adapted to such +exclusive pretensions, and other native tendencies of the human mind, +persuade in the same direction. + +I have thought it suitable to premise this short sketch of the Rights +of Reason, and the opponents of them, to an endeavor to answer your +queries in a thoroughly reasonable way, a way which cannot be said to +be the more fashionable one in the treatment of metaphysical questions. + + + + + + + +NOTES + + +[1] Wilfrid Meynell, in his John Henry Newman, erroneously speaks of +Charles Robert as the "youngest son." + +[2] This is a mistake. Owen in 1817 renounced the religions of the +world, and proclaimed that man's character was formed for him not by +him. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: Essays in Rationalism + +Author: Charles Robert Newman + +Release Date: May 30, 2014 [EBook #45823] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM *** + + + + +Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net/ for Project +Gutenberg (This book was produced from scanned images of +public domain material from the Google Print project.) + + + + + + +</pre> + +<div class="front"> +<div class="div1 cover"> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"></p> +<div class="figure xd21e98width"><img src="images/new-cover.jpg" alt= +"Newly Designed Front Cover." width="480" height="720"></div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 titlepage"> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"></p> +<div class="figure xd21e105width"><img src="images/titlepage.png" alt= +"Original Title Page." width="463" height="720"></div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="titlePage"> +<div class="docTitle"> +<div class="mainTitle">ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM</div> +</div> +<div class="byline">BY<br> +<span class="docAuthor">CHARLES ROBERT NEWMAN</span><br> +(<i>Brother of Cardinal Newman.</i>)<br> +WITH PREFACE<br> +BY<br> +<span class="docAuthor">GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE.</span><br> +AND<br> +BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH<br> +BY<br> +<span class="docAuthor">J. M. WHEELER.</span></div> +<div class="docImprint">LONDON:<br> +PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY,<br> +<span class="sc">28 Stonecutter Street</span>, E.C.<br> +<span class="docDate">1891</span></div> +</div> +<div class="div1 imprint"> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first xd21e161">LONDON:<br> +PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTE,<br> +28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.</p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 frenchtitle"> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first xd21e161">ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb5" href="#pb5" name="pb5">5</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 foreword"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">PUBLISHER’S NOTE.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Whether this little volume will find sufficient +patrons to defray the cost of its production is at least doubtful. The +writer whose essays it contains lived in obscurity and will never be +popular. But he possessed a fine intellect, however frustrated by +circumstances; he belonged to an illustrious family; and it is well to +let the public have access to the opinions of a brother of Cardinal +Newman and of Professor Newman, a brother who took his own course, as +they did, and thought out for himself an independent philosophy.</p> +<p>All Charles Robert Newman’s writings that are known to have +been printed, appeared in the Reasoner, edited by Mr. George Jacob +Holyoake, at various dates during 1860–61. With trifling +exceptions they are all reprinted in this collection.</p> +<p>Mr. Holyoake has kindly supplied a brief account of the atheistic +Newman, and Mr. J. M. Wheeler has gathered all the information that is +obtainable as to his life and personality. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb7" href="#pb7" name="pb7">7</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 biography"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">Of Charles Robert Newman, until the death of his +brother, the Cardinal, almost nothing was known. Some reminiscences of +him by Mr. Thomas Purnell and Precentor Edmund Venables appeared in the +<i>Athenæum</i> at the time of his death in 1884, and these +remain the chief sources of information concerning him. Mr. G. J. +Holyoake also, in his paper <i>The Present Day</i>, wrote: “If +the public come to know more of Charles R. Newman, it will be seen that +all the brothers, John Henry, Francis William, and Charles R. Newman, +were men of unusual distinction of character, and that while each held +diverse views, all had the family qualities of perspicacity, candor and +conscience.” But these notes attracted little attention. Most +people were under the impression there were only two brothers, who had +long figured in the public eye as types of the opposite courses of +modern thought towards Romanism and Rationalism. Yet the real type of +antagonism to Rome was to be found in Charles Robert, who is dismissed +by the Rev. Thomas Mozley with the words: “There was also another +brother, not without his share in the heritage of natural +gifts.”</p> +<p>In a notable passage on change of religion, in his <i>Essay in Aid +of a Grammar of Assent</i>, chap. vii., Cardinal Newman seems to allude +to the career of himself and his brothers. He says: “Thus of +three Protestants, one becomes a Catholic, a second a Unitarian, and a +third an unbeliever: how is this? The <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb8" href="#pb8" name="pb8">8</a>]</span>first becomes a Catholic, +because he assented, as a Protestant, to the doctrine of our +Lord’s divinity, with a real assent and a genuine conviction, and +because this certitude, taking possession of his mind, led him on to +welcome the Catholic doctrines of the Real Presence and of the +Theotocos, till his Protestantism fell off from him, and he submitted +himself to the Church. The second became a Unitarian, because, +proceeding on the principle that Scripture was the rule of faith, and +that a man’s private judgment was its rule of interpretation, and +finding that the doctrine of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds did not +follow by logical necessity from the text of Scripture, he said to +himself, ‘The word of God has been made of none effect by the +traditions of men,’ and therefore nothing was left for him but to +profess what he considered primitive Christianity and to become a +Humanitarian. The third gradually subsided into infidelity, because he +started with the Protestant dogma, cherished in the depths of his +nature, that a priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the +Gospel. First, then, he would protest against the sacrifice of the +Mass; next he gave up baptismal regeneration and the sacramental +principle; then he asked himself whether dogmas were not a restraint on +Christian liberty as well as Sacraments; then came the question, What +after all was the use of teachers of religion? Why should any one stand +between him and his Maker? After a time it struck him that this obvious +question had to be answered by the Apostles, as well as by the Anglican +clergy; so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revelation +of God to man is that which is written on the heart. This did for a +time, and he remained a Deist. But then it occurred to him, that this +inward moral law was there within the breast, whether there was a God +or not, and that <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb9" href="#pb9" name= +"pb9">9</a>]</span>it was a roundabout way of enforcing that law, to +say that it came from God and simply unnecessary, considering it +carried with it its own sacred and sovereign authority, as our feelings +instinctively testified, and when he turned to look at the physical +world around him, he really did not see what scientific proof there was +of the Being of God at all, and it seemed to him as if all things would +go quite as well as at present without that hypothesis as with it; so +he dropped it, and became a <i lang="la">purus putus</i> +Atheist.”</p> +<p>I have transcribed this lengthy, but remarkable passage, not because +I think it correctly describes the process of thought in his two +brothers, but rather as an illustration that his own imaginative +synthesis of their position derives its life and force from the fact +that he had before him concrete instances in the person of his own +nearest relatives.</p> +<p>Charles Robert Newman, younger brother of the Cardinal and elder +brother of the Professor, was born on June 16, 1802, being one year and +four months the junior of the former, and three years the senior of the +latter.<a class="noteref" id="xd21e209src" href="#xd21e209" name= +"xd21e209src">1</a> Their father, a London man, and friend of Capel the +eminent stockbroker, from having been clerk in a bank, became a +partner, though he afterwards failed at a time of great commercial +depression, both in this business and as a brewer. He was a Freemason, +a musician, and had schemes of social improvement by reclaiming waste +land and planting with trees. In religion his views appear to have been +of a broad cast approximating to those of Benjamin Franklin. The +mother, whose maiden name was Jemima Fourdrinier, was of Hugenot +family, and of religious cast of mind. There were six children, equally +divided as to sex. Harriet, the eldest girl, married the Rev. +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb10" href="#pb10" name= +"pb10">10</a>]</span>Thomas Mozley; Jemima, the second, married Mr. +John Mozley; while Mary, the youngest, died unmarried.</p> +<p>Charles Robert was educated at the same school as his two brothers, +John Henry and Francis William, that of Dr. George Nicholas at Ealing, +Middlesex.</p> +<p>Of the influences which moulded his mind we can only speak from what +is known of his brothers. John Henry has told how, in youth, he read +Paine’s tracts against the Old Testament—we presume he +means the <i>Age of Reason</i>—and also boasted of reading Hume, +though, as he says, this was possibly but by way of brag.</p> +<p>Evidently, though the family was brought up in the habit of Bible +reading, there was considerable freedom allowed as to the direction of +their studies. While the father lived family prayer was unknown, nor +was there any inculcation of dogma. “We read,” says Francis +William, “the Psalms appointed by the church every day, and went +to the parish church on Sunday.”</p> +<p>Francis William Newman, in his “Contributions, Chiefly to the +Early History of Cardinal Newman,” says: “In opening life, +my brother C. R. N. became a convert to Robert Owen, the philanthropic +Socialist, who was <i>then</i> an Atheist.<a class="noteref" id= +"xd21e231src" href="#xd21e231" name="xd21e231src">2</a> But soon +breaking loose from him, Charles tried to originate a ‘New Moral +World’ of his own, which seemed to others absurd and immoral, as +well as very unamiable. He disowned us all, on my father’s death, +as ‘too religious for him.’ To keep a friend, or to act +under a superior, seemed alike impossible to him. His brother (the late +Cardinal) humbled himself to beg a clerkship for him in the Bank of +England; but Charles thought it ‘his duty’ to write to the +Directors letters of advice, so they could <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb11" href="#pb11" name="pb11">11</a>]</span>not keep +him. Nor could he keep any place long. He said he ought to take a +literary degree at Bonn: his two brothers managed it for him, but he +came away <i>without</i> seeking the degree. His brother-in-law, the +Rev<span class="corr" id="xd21e239" title="Source: ,">.</span> Thomas +Mozley, then took him up very liberally; but after my sister +Harriet’s death, J. H. N. and I bore his expenses to his dying +day. His meanness seemed to me like that of an old cynic; yet his +moderation was exemplary, and at last he undoubtedly won the respect of +the mother and daughter who waited on him.”</p> +<p>In this, which is nearly all he has to say of this elder brother, it +appears to me Professor Newman has either said too little or too much. +The title of his work did not necessitate any reference to Charles +Robert; but having said so much he should at least have explained +further. For instance, in reference to the visit to Bonn, it was +exceedingly natural in the second brother seeking to take a degree, +since both his senior and junior had a college education. That he did +not share in this advantage may have well tended to sour his life. Mr. +Meynell explains why he returned without seeking the degree. He says: +“But he came away without even offering himself for examination, +a step he explained by saying that the judges would not grant him a +degree because he had given offence by his treatment of faith and +morals [it is a Catholic who writes] in an essay which they call +<i>teterrima</i>.” Charles may have acted with extreme +imprudence, both in regard to the bank directors and the Bonn +examiners; but we should need to know the cases before we can determine +whether he was actuated by wilful waywardness or by adherence to a +higher than common standard of conduct. Each of the brothers had +evidently exquisite sensitiveness of conscience, though, as proved by +the Professor’s <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb12" href="#pb12" +name="pb12">12</a>]</span>last book—that unique criticism of a +brother who died at ninety by another aged eighty-five—they could +not always enter into sympathy with each other.</p> +<p>Of this we may be quite sure. The life of one who had thought +himself into Atheism, yet contemplated becoming a tutor, must have been +a most uncomfortable one. The treatment he was likely to receive could +not be calculated to evoke his better qualities. Finding everywhere his +Atheism a bar to his advancement, whose is the fault if it resulted in +a character of petulance and cynicism, and in—what it evidently +did result in—a largely wasted life?</p> +<p>The Rev. Edward Venables, Precentor of Lincoln, speaks of him as +having been, between 1834 and 1844, usher in a large school for +farmers’ sons, kept by a Mr. Allfree at Windmill Hill, in the +parish of Herstmonceaux, Sussex, where Julius Charles Hare, Archdeacon +of Lewes, was rector, and John Sterling for a short while curate. Mr. +Venables says Newman “interested Archdeacon Hare very much, and I +have often heard him speak of the long conversations he had had with +him on literary and philosophical subjects, and of the remarkable +mental power he displayed. At that time the future Cardinal’s +brother had entirely discarded the Christian faith, and declared +himself an unbeliever in revelation.” There can be no doubt the +tribute from Hare, a man of very superior culture, was deserved, though +the archdeacon also expressed the opinion “there was a screw +loose somewhere.”</p> +<p>The task of teaching the Sussex rustics was, as Precentor Venables +remarks, intolerably irksome to a man of Newman’s high +intellectual power. It was like chopping logs with a fine-edged razor. +His relations with his principal became strained, and a tussle between +the usher and his class led to his dismissal. At this time he was +miserably poor. Precentor <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb13" href= +"#pb13" name="pb13">13</a>]</span>Venables says: “To Hare he +lamented the narrow-mindedness of his brothers John and Francis, who, +as he asserted, had entirely cast him off, and left him to fight his +way in the world unaided, because of his professed infidelity, in which +the younger of the two, then an ardent Evangelical, was before very +long to follow him.” No reproach whatever is due to the younger +brother on this account, and the elder is probably as little +blameworthy. John Henry could not be expected to recommend as tutor one +whose views upon faith and morals he considered unsound. Francis +William had gone to Bagdad with the object of assisting in a Christian +mission, and intercourse with Mohammedans and other studies were but +gradually loosening his orthodoxy. After his return, and when his works +and professorship at London University assured his position, he put +himself into regular monthly communication with his brother. In the +meantime he had been assisted by his sister Harriet’s husband. +But the iron had already entered his soul; he was an Atheist and an +outcast. Forced to receive the bounty of relatives who deplored his +opinions, he seems to have resented their kindness as an attempt to +bribe his intellectual conscience. The world rang with the +fame—as theologian, historian, poet, and preacher—of the +elder, whose creed he had outgrown and despised; while his convictions, +to the full as honest, everywhere stood in his way, and were contemned +as an offence against faith and morals. He had no contact with minds +congenial to his own, and doomed himself to the life of a recluse.</p> +<p>Each of the brothers was of a retiring, meditative disposition. +Reading the <i>Apologia Pro Vita Sua</i> of the eldest, one may see how +this contributed towards his seeking a refuge in the Catholic Church. +The same disposition of mind may be traced in the <i>Phases +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb14" href="#pb14" name= +"pb14">14</a>]</span>of Faith</i> of the youngest, equally impelling +him from the evangelicalism of his surroundings and leading to the +rejection of historic Christianity, and finally to the surrender of all +belief in revelation. In Charles Robert Newman the same qualities were +seen to excess, removing him from contact with his fellows to the life +of a solitary thinker in a quiet Welsh watering-place. From about 1853, +he had a room in a small cottage on the Marsh road, Tenby.</p> +<p>Mr. Thomas Purnell, who says he had for years “the inestimable +privilege of enjoying his close intimacy,” remarks, “never +before or since have I met a man endowed with as rare an intellectual +equipment.” Mr. Purnell thus describes his own first visit to the +recluse: “He stood at the top of the topmost stair. I cannot +imagine a more distinguished head and face. There was a touch of +Mephistopheles in him. There was also a touch of Jupiter Olympius. +Although dressed in ill-fitting clothes, and with a sort of blanket +over his shoulders, he appeared to me to be the ideal of courtly grace. +He bowed me without a word into his apartments. This was in the roof of +the building, and the only light came from a window which opened with a +notched iron bar. The room was as meagrely furnished as Goethe’s +study in Weimar. A bed, a chest of drawers, a table and two or three +chairs, with a few books, constituted the whole goods and +chattels.” Mr. Purnell says “his health, means and +inclination made him averse to society. The rector called on him, but +was not admitted; visitors to the town who had known his brothers would +send in their cards, but they received no response; local medical men, +when they heard he was ill, volunteered their services, but they were +declined with courteous thanks conveyed by letter.”</p> +<p>It appears he but seldom left his house, and when he <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb15" href="#pb15" name="pb15">15</a>]</span>went out +he did not often enter the town, but took his exercise in the road +which led into the country. Dressed in a pea-jacket, with a shawl or a +rug thrown across his shoulders, and with a sou’-wester over his +head, he marched erect, looking neither to left nor right. He wore +shoes, and, as his trousers were short, displayed an interval of white +socks. The lads and lasses were apt to regard such a figure with +derision.</p> +<p>It was through Mr. Purnell that he communicated the papers here +reprinted to the <i>Reasoner</i>. Although but of the character of +fragments, they bespeak an original mind. The secret of the +Cardinal’s great influence and strength was that what he spoke +and wrote came not from books, but forthright out of his own head and +heart. The topics with which his brother deals were those only needing +the mind, and his treatment shows they were viewed in the dry light of +an original intellect. The <i>Reasoner</i> ceased soon after the +appearance of these papers, and thus closed the one opening for his +literary activity. Francis William Newman was, at least till the +present year, unaware that his arguments for Theism were challenged by +his own brother under the signature of “A Recluse.” He +informs me that he had never heard that anyone would publish anything +from his pen, and that he heard that at his death, in March, 1884, he +left a box full of manuscripts, which were destroyed as useless. +Whether this was done by order of his relatives, whether the landlady +decided the question, or whether the vicar or neighbors were called in, +will perhaps remain as unknown as the worth of the manuscripts. The +following specimens are all by which the latter question can be +judged.</p> +<p>Mr. Meynell says that two years before he died he had a short visit +from his eldest brother. It must have been a strange meeting, and one +worthy the brush of <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb16" href="#pb16" +name="pb16">16</a>]</span>a great artist. Surely in all England there +were not two men of eighty whose thoughts were so divergent or two +brothers whose lives were so diversified. The one a saintly cardinal, +called by the Pope the Light of England, who, by his rare urbanity, had +gained the respect of all, replete with all that should accompany old +age—as honor, love, obedience, troops of friends: the other, +fallen, too, into the sere and yellow leaf, and without them +all—poor, solitary, unknown and despised, a scorn and wonderment +to his nearest neighbors. And all from following his own thought that +had made him a <i lang="la">purus putus</i> Atheist.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">J. M. Wheeler.</span> <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb17" href="#pb17" name="pb17">17</a>]</span></p> +</div> +<div class="footnotes"> +<hr class="fnsep"> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd21e209" href="#xd21e209src" name="xd21e209">1</a></span> Wilfrid +Meynell, in his <i>John Henry Newman</i>, erroneously speaks of Charles +Robert as the “youngest son.” <a class="fnarrow" href= +"#xd21e209src">↑</a></p> +<p class="footnote"><span class="label"><a class="noteref" id= +"xd21e231" href="#xd21e231src" name="xd21e231">2</a></span> This is a +mistake. Owen in 1817 renounced the religions of the world, and +proclaimed that man’s character was formed for him not by him. +But he was not an Atheist. <a class="fnarrow" href= +"#xd21e231src">↑</a></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 chapter"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">CHARACTER OF CHARLES NEWMAN.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">There is little to say and less need to add anything +to what Mr. Wheeler writes, whose industry and discernment collect +together all the accessible facts of his subject. My knowledge of +Charles Robert Newman is confined to his correspondence, which, with my +present engagements, I could not refer to and examine without delaying +the printer longer than would be convenient to you, as Mr. +Wheeler’s article is in type. The impression Mr. C. R. Newman +conveyed to me by his letters is, I judge, sufficient for the purpose +in hand. Charles Newman had an intermittent mind. He would write with +great force and clearness, and in another letter, which was confused in +parts, he would frankly say that his mind was leaving him, as was its +wont as I understood him, and after a few months less or more, it would +return to him, when he would write again. In this manly frankness and +strong self-consciousness he resembled his two eminent brothers Francis +and John. I trusted to his friend Mr. Purnell, who was the medium in +communicating with me, to send me further letters when Mr. Charles was +able or disposed to write them. I expected to hear from him again. Much +occupied with debates and otherwise at the time, I neglected writing +further to him myself. Afterwards thinking his disablement might have +grown upon him with years, disinclined me from asking him to resume his +letters. Mr. Wheeler seems ignorant of Charles Newman’s mental +peculiarity, and does not <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb18" href= +"#pb18" name="pb18">18</a>]</span>recognise what may be generous +delicacy on the part of his brothers in not referring to it. To do so +would have subjected them to the imputation, very frequent formerly, of +imputing difference of opinion to want of saneness. Even so liberal a +preacher as W. J. Fox accounted, in 1841, for my disbelief in Theism by +conjecturing the existence of some mental deficiency. No doubt many +persons with whom Charles Newman had dealings in offices he held, would +regard his Atheism—which it was contrary to his nature to +conceal—as a personal disqualification. He avowed his opinions as +naturally and as boldly as Professor Newman and the Cardinal avowed +theirs. It is not conceivable that Cardinal Newman ever intermitted his +aid—or Professor Newman either—on this account. They were +both incapable of personal intolerance. They might deplore that their +brother Charles’s opinions were so alien, so contrary to theirs; +but this they would never make matter of reproach. It was doubtless a +great trial to them that their brother, having fine powers like their +own, making no persistent effort for his own maintenance, although he +knew it must render independence impossible. Possibly the solitariness +which he chose caused his tendency to unusualness of conduct, not to +say eccentricity, to grow upon him—which they could not control +or mitigate without an interference, which might subject them to +resentment and reproach. Charles no doubt inherited his father’s +sympathy for social improvement, which led to his sharing Robert +Owen’s sociologic views. But he did not acquire his Atheism from +Robert Owen—as Professor Newman has said—for Robert Owen +was not an Atheist—always believing in some Great Power.</p> +<p>Professor Newman has told me that in any further edition of his +little book upon his brother, the Cardinal, <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb19" href="#pb19" name="pb19">19</a>]</span>he will, +on my authority, correct his description of Robert Owen as an Atheist. +Charles owed his Atheism to himself, as his brothers owed their +opinions to their own conclusions and reflections. Charles not taking a +degree was less likely to be owing to means not being furnished to him +than to his intermittent indecision of mind and his strong discernment, +which produced satisfaction with the world, with others, and with +himself.</p> +<p class="signed"><span class="sc">George Jacob Holyoake.</span> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb21" href="#pb21" name= +"pb21">21</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="body"> +<div class="div1 chapter"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">TWO PRINCIPLES OF ORDER.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">In my proof of the invalidity of that +argument—it being indeed what is called “the Argument from +Design”—I point out that our experience simultaneously +informs us of two modes of producing order, otherwise called +arrangement, relation of parts to each other and to the whole direction +of means towards some recognisable end; or, to describe the phenomenon +in the most summary, as well as the most practical, way—two modes +of producing effects identical with those that proceed from design. I +explain that, of these two principles of order, the one is Design +itself, a <i>modus operandi</i> of intelligence (such as we find it +here below, of which the human mind affords the best examples), while +the other is something to which no name has been assigned, and which, +consequently, we can only shortly describe by saying that it is +<i>not</i> design. It becomes necessary, therefore, to give a farther +periphrastic account of it as follows:—</p> +<p>This nameless principle of order, considered as a vague popular +surmise, is as familiar to our experience as design. We all see, for +instance, that water has a tendency to form a perfectly level and +horizontal surface, that heavy bodies fall to the earth +perpendicularly, that the plummet performs a straight line in just the +same direction, that dew-drops and soap-bubbles <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb22" href="#pb22" name="pb22">22</a>]</span>assume a +globular shape, that crystallisation observes similar artist-like +rules, and so on. We are accustomed to say, “It is the nature of +things,” and we ground our daily actions on a confidence in this +regularity of proceeding, without generally attempting to explain it. +Science comes to our help, and shows us that this orderly action of +things around us may be traced to, and is the necessary result of, the +operation of certain powers or properties inherent in these natural +things. Grant that the property called gravitation belongs to moving +bodies, and an innumerable quantity of orderly phenomena may be +predicated as springing of their own accord by inevitable consequence +from this datum; which same phenomena, moreover, intelligence is able +coincidently to reproduce in its own special mental way.</p> +<p>Here, then, is a principle of order, less popularly appreciated, but +not less certainly evidenced and known, than design. It is, no doubt, a +principle infinitely inferior in dignity, for it is blind and +unintelligent, while design sees and understands, but this is not the +question. The question, superseded by an answer derived from human +experience, is to this effect—that nature and natural things are, +with no less propriety, assignable as the doers of a certain +non-designing kind of order, than man is assignable as the doer of the +designing kind; that we just as truly perceive that nature, in the +exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in her, produces +order in a dew-drop or in a crystal, as that man, in the exercise of +certain powers that we find to be inherent in him, produces order in a +poem or in a cathedral, and that, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb23" +href="#pb23" name="pb23">23</a>]</span>consequently, the argument from +design, based as it is on the assertion that our experience assures us +of only one principle of order, is invalid.</p> +<p>Mr. F. W. Newman’s argument is one of this erroneous class. He +points to “Animal Instincts” as an effect, which, owing to +our knowing of no other agency by which it could have been produced, +can alone be accounted for by reference to a designer, and consequently +as manifesting the objective existence of that designer, who could only +be the theistic God. The question that Mr. F. Newman’s adduced +instance required him to consider was, whether the non-designing +principle of order, which, we are aware, is in many cases able to +produce the same effects as the other, could have been thus operative +here, and he had got to prove that it could <i>not</i> have been so, +that there was something in the nature of the case that forced us +exclusively to have recourse to the intelligent principle of order, and +resisted any solution from the other principle. The result of a proof +so conducted would have been, that Mr. F. Newman was entitled to +conclude that (granting our earthly experience was a sufficient test of +the matter) Design must have been the sole worker of the debated +phenomenon. He would then have established his theistic argument. +Instead of doing this, he simplifies his proceeding by being +incognisant of a notorious fact, and ignoring the non-designing +principle altogether.</p> +<p>1. The fact is, that there is <i>not</i> one way only of producing +the phenomena of design (I am here using an ordinary elliptical mode of +speaking, since literal metaphysical correctness is sometimes +cumbrous)—but <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb24" href="#pb24" +name="pb24">24</a>]</span>there are two ways: one, the mind of a +designer, and the other (whatever may be its nature, which the present +question does not call upon me to define) <i>not</i> the mind of a +designer.</p> +<p>2. The shortest way of proving this theorem, is to state that there +are two ways of your obtaining a facsimile of your own person. One is +to have your portrait taken, and the other is to stand before a +looking-glass, and that of these two ways the former is that of design, +and the latter confessedly <i>not</i> design, being the well-known +necessary effect of certain so-called second causes, whose operation in +this instance is familiar to modern science.</p> +<p>3. Consequently, S. D. Collet is incorrect in the principle which +she makes the foundation of her argument at p. 27, where it is said, +“What the Theist maintains is this, that when we see the exercise +of Force in the direction of a purpose, we, by an inevitable inference, +attribute the phenomenon to <i>some</i> conscious agent.”</p> +<p>4. Force is seen to be exercised in the direction of a +purpose—the purpose being that of producing similitude—with +equal evidence in the two cases just compared; for though the force +exercised in said direction is less in the case of the painter than it +is in that of the looking-glass (for the resemblance produced by the +former is in less degree a resemblance than that produced by the +latter), the <i>evidence</i> cannot be said to be less, since it is no +less able to convince. We are as perfectly sure that the painter could +not have produced that <i>lesser</i> similitude of a man, and a +particular man<span class="corr" id="xd21e363" title= +"Not in source">,</span> by chance (the alternative of this +supposition, according <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb25" href="#pb25" +name="pb25">25</a>]</span>to our experience, being that <i>he</i> must +have used design) as we are that the looking-glass could not have +produced that <i>greater</i> similitude of a man, and a particular man, +by chance (the alternative of this supposition, according to our +experience, being that <i>it</i> must have used certain so-called laws +of nature); this collective experience of ours, equally assuring us on +the one hand, that the only way of the painter’s achieving these +effects is by design, and on the other, that the only way of the +looking-glass’s doing so, is by the natural agencies referred +to.</p> +<p>5. The human experience on which the decision of this question must +be founded—though not at the present era <i>essentially</i> +different—may yet be said to be considerably so from what it was +in certain former periods. In no times could mankind think and observe +without becoming aware of these two principles of order—whether +you call them facts or inferences—as a portion of their familiar +experience. And so far as they might have compared them, they must have +abundantly seen that the natural one is more powerful than the +artificial one, and that the straight line or the circle must seek its +perfection much rather from the plummet or the revolving radius, than +from the pencil of Apelles.</p> +<p>6. Thus the <i>essential</i> point of the existence of the two +principles has always been known, but the idea of their respective +spheres and limits, of the efficient prevalence of each within our +experience, has fluctuated in society. Art and handicraft are, of +course, peculiarly competent to appreciate the artificial principle of +order, while physical science is especially conversant with the +<i>natural</i> one. As the ancients were equal to the <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb26" href="#pb26" name="pb26">26</a>]</span>moderns +in the former pursuits, but vastly inferior to them in the latter, they +must so far have had a tendency to think more of the designing +principle, and less of the other principle than we do. But it must be +remembered, that one or other of these two principles, or at least the +arbitrament between them, is the animating basis of all religion, and +of all religious sects and persuasions; and further, that of these two +principles, the religion founded on the <i>artificial</i> one, which is +the one traditionally derived to us, is liable to be, and is wont to +be, a far more powerful religion (because it deals far more intensely +in personification, having reference singly to some supposed artist) +than either the religion that is constituted by the <i>natural</i> +principle, or that which results from a mixture of the two principles. +And indeed, I will incidentally say that this last kind of religion +seems to me to have much analogy on its side, and that the old idea of +“the two principles” might, on several grounds besides the +present one, and in several respects, perhaps, be found <span class= +"corr" id="xd21e400" title="Source: so">to</span> shadow forth a +certain amount of most important truth and applicability.</p> +<p>7. To return. By considering the state of religion and of religious +belief in the times of Socrates and Cicero, in connection with the +state of art, handicraft, and science, in the same time, and +coincidently taking care not to forget that religious sentiment (that +at least of the kind which had in their era already been, and much more +since has been, communicated from the east to the west) is an +incomparably more vigorous impeller of opinion, than reason and +argument; we shall have some of the principal data, and in a main +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb27" href="#pb27" name= +"pb27">27</a>]</span>matter shall be prepared to use them judiciously +in any inquiry we might make, why it was that Socrates and Cicero, +having their attention arrested by the artificial principle of order +and arrangement, seemed absolutely to forget the existence of the +natural one, and why in consequence it was, that the latter wrote to +this effect: “He who can look up to the heavenly vault, and doubt +the existence of a one personal God, the designer and governor of all +things, is equivalent to a madman”; and why, further, we, spite +of our vast physical science, are prone to the same fallacy.</p> +<p>8. Having thus proved that the argument of the Theist generally, as +well as the particular one advanced by S. D. C. at p. 27, is, by being +based on the erroneous statement that there is <i>only one</i> means +known to human experience, of producing phenomena identical with those +that are the product of design, and that this one is design itself; +there being, on the contrary, <i>two</i> such means, one of which is +<i>not</i> design; having, I say, proved that your argument, by being +so based, is <i>invalid</i>, I find I must fully agree with you, that +there is evidence of “an unmistakable cosmical unity.”</p> +<p>9. The true inquiry, therefore, is, which of those two principles of +order is, in the agency inquired into, the agent under these +circumstances, and whether both, and how far, under our ignorance of +what <i>may be</i> (a most important point that is carefully to be +considered) we are entitled to affirm as indubitable, to denounce as +contradictory, to advance as probable, to conjecture, to surmise, or to +speculate on this question. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb28" href= +"#pb28" name="pb28">28</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 chapter"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">THE TRUTH OF FIRST PRINCIPLES.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">1. You ask “my idea on the impossibility of +proving the truth of First Principles?”</p> +<p>By “truth” you mean the ascertained existence of any +idea or thing, and the ascertained consistency of any statement with +some such idea or thing.</p> +<p>By “principles” you mean not simply cardinal +propositions, but cardinal propositions that we have ascertained to be +true.</p> +<p>By “first principles” you mean the indubitably true but +unprovable elementary principles of all our knowledge. You mean that +these principles are the ground whereon we build in our reasonings; all +that we build upon them must, in consequence of being so built, admit +of being “proved” whether we have built rightly—that +is, admit of being subjected to the test whether the reasoning is +correct; but these “first principles” are confessedly +exempted from this test, and yet are received as true, no less than the +others that have sustained this ordeal. You ask the meaning of this +privilege, whether it is right; and, if so, to what propriety or +necessity of the case it is due?</p> +<p>2. You ask, “How is truth ascertained to be truth?” or, +in other words, “What is the criterion of truth?”</p> +<p>With respect to the first query—In accordance with the +definition I have above given of truth, it would <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb29" href="#pb29" name="pb29">29</a>]</span>seem +that it must have two sources, experience and reason, experience who +notifies the existence of certain ideas or things, and reason, who +forms propositions suggested by them. Experience, therefore, acts the +simple part of supplying all the materials of truth; while reason, +besides his acknowledged office of judge of all truth, exercises the +quite different function of being himself the purveyor of a portion of +it.</p> +<p>So indubitable is it that truth can have these two sources only, +that even fanaticism would be found confessing the principle; while it +appeals to the experience of those who agree with it, as well as +professes to be reasonable.</p> +<p>First principles must, accordingly, be of two kinds. Of those that +are based upon experience, I will give the following instances:—I +hear the chirping of a bird, and I see an inkstand before me. That I +have the sensation of hearing and seeing in these two cases, are facts +of which it is impossible I can doubt. Reason perceives that these are +primary facts or first principles, neither admitting nor requiring any +proof, testified by consciousness, and self-evidently verified on that +testimony.</p> +<p>By reason, of course is meant the reason of all mankind—that +is, of all who are presumably competent to judge on the subject. So +that any just or reasonable confidence in the verdict of my own +reason—in this or in any other matter, presupposes a due +comparison of my own reason with that of others, nay, in some cases, a +consideration of the supposably more enlightened reason of future +times. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb30" href="#pb30" name= +"pb30">30</a>]</span></p> +<p>I discriminate first principles from derived ones +thus:—“I see the sun,” is a first principle to me; +“you see it,” is a first principle to you; by comparing +these two ideas, each attains the derived principle that the other sees +what he does, and the further derived principle that the sun is an +existence independent of both. His own existence is, indeed, to every +one the first principle, by means of which he infers the existence of +other things and beings.</p> +<p>In coming now to the other kind of first principles, consisting of +propositions formed by reason, we perceive that these show symptoms of +still further difference from the above, than that which results from +the difference of their source, of difference that affects their +philosophical character, and their technical right to the name under +which they present themselves to us. In short, the primary philosophy +has not yet settled their title.</p> +<p>They are perceived by us to be true by an act of reason called +intuition. Not similarly, however, does our reason inform us that they +really are first principles, and our science is hitherto unequal to +this inquiry.</p> +<p>Take, for instance, the following celebrated thesis, so often cited +as the most fundamental of all the propositions of reason, insomuch as +to be tacitly implied in all our reasonings; which yet we are not sure +<i>is</i> a first principle, all that can be said in favor of its +pretensions being that we can find no one who is able to reduce it to +more primary elements:—</p> +<p>It is impossible for a thing at the same time to be and not to +be.</p> +<p>Any one agreeing, as every one must, that this is <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb31" href="#pb31" name="pb31">31</a>]</span>true, +might still justly put the query, Why is it impossible? thereby calling +its assertion in question, demanding its credentials of proof, seeking +some ground for its truth other than its own testimony, and +hypothesising some other proposition more fundamental than it of which +it would be a derivative, and by all and each of these proceedings, +rejecting its claim to be a first principle.</p> +<p>Its resisting our analysis is a good subjective ground for our +ranking this and other similar propositions among our first principles. +But they could only have the true claim by its being made clear that +the inability results from the nature of the case, and not from our own +incompetency.</p> +<p>This test is borne by the former description of first principles; we +are able to see that the instances I adduced, such as the statements, +“I see the sun,” “I see an inkstand,” “I +hear a bird,” “I am conscious that <i>I</i> exist,” +evade our power of ordinary proving, because they do not admit of such +proof.</p> +<p>When we perceive that no one can answer this query, we are prompted +to another. Why cannot we answer it? whence our inability? what +prevents us? But here also we find ourselves completely in the +dark<span class="corr" id="xd21e479" title="Source: ?">,</span> which +is somewhat strange, considering that in every human pursuit, whether +of science or any other, when we wish to do a thing and cannot do it, +we are generally able to specify some particular, either of self-defect +or outward impediment that is supposed to be in fault. But I imagine, +if the reader were to experiment on the specimen I have given, he would +not only find himself to fail in solving the problem, Why is it that +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb32" href="#pb32" name= +"pb32">32</a>]</span>a thing cannot at once be and not be? but would +not have a word to advance in the way of accounting for his +failure.</p> +<p>These remarks apply to all other propositions of the sort. +Euclid’s axioms, which undoubtedly aim to be as elementary as +possible, and therefore may be said to aim to be first principles, are +confessedly, under this aspect, unsatisfactory to the learned. +“Things that are equal to the same are equal to each +other.” Every one is inclined to ask, Why? “A straight line +is the shortest distance between two points.” Again, Why?</p> +<p>The sum of the above strictures on this kind of so-called first +principles, is—1. That they have not made good their title, and +therefore are not to be accredited with it. 2. That there is a decided +presumption against that title from the doubt and dissatisfaction with +which it is met, where want of candor and intelligence cannot be +imputed, especially when it is considered that the other, the sensuous +experimental kind of first principles, have so frank an acceptance. 3. +It seems to be absolutely provable, and I suppose I have above +incidentally proved it, that they are <i>not</i> first principles. 4. +The task is set to metaphysics of supplying the most satisfactory proof +of all by bringing to light such propositions as would be perceived to +underlie these so-called first principles, and to be the real first +principles to which the others would give precedence.</p> +<p>As regards their name, it being so much in point, excuses the old +remark that the elements of our knowledge stand in a reversed order in +respect to this knowledge to what they assume in our process of +acquiring it. A first principle, therefore, means also a <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb33" href="#pb33" name="pb33">33</a>]</span>last +one; it is the last in whatsoever endeavors to descend to the bottom or +to penetrate to the source of our knowledge, but it becomes the first +when we trace it from this source through its derivative ideas.</p> +<p>The investigating act should not be confounded with the prospecting +one. The sensible horizon of subjective vision can, by no mediation, be +exalted into the real horizon of truth, wherein the genuine first +principles that bound human capability are exclusively to be found.</p> +<p>It may be asked, apart from the inquiry what first principles there +are, Is there a necessity that some first principles should be? So it +seems from the data of the case. It is patent to common observation +that the mind of man is recipient of ideas from the things that +surround it. The contact of its apprehending faculty with the things it +apprehends, must, it would seem, constitute first principles. After it +has got them it might conceivably elicit from them derived principles, +but the original ones cannot be thus derived, since there are none +earlier from which to derive them.</p> +<p>Again, it is to be inquired, Does the mind, in receiving its ideas, +possess and exercise in reference to the things on which it operates, a +copying faculty or a transforming faculty? Does it import them simply +in their native character, in the way a mirror does the object it +reflects, or does it manufacture, cook, and assimilate them, so as to +change them into something partaking of its own?</p> +<p>And, if it changes them, what is the extent of the change? Does it +go so far only as the semi-idealism <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb34" +href="#pb34" name="pb34">34</a>]</span>of Locke, or extend into the +absolute idealism of the German school?</p> +<p>Because these questions have been wont to puzzle either the learned, +or the public, or both, it does not follow that they are difficult. I +suppose them to admit of decided answers before a supposed competent +audience.</p> +<p>As I am unprovided with proof, although I suppose it is to be +provable, that first principles of reason must needs be, I must +speculate for a moment on the possibility of a proposition of the form +of “two and two make four,” being derived from one of the +form of “I scent the rose,” for this seems to be the +alternative of there being no first principles of reason. Evidently I +must confess to having no grounds for pronouncing such a derivation +impossible, though I must grant it to be paradoxical. Our +mal-cultivation of non-material science, and the imperfection of our +metaphysics, is probably the only cause of the strange predicament.</p> +<p>No doubt M. Cousin, and several other eminent teachers of youth, to +whose office it belongs to expound received metaphysics, have comprised +First Principles in their course of philosophy; but as I have barely +met with any of their writings, I must confess such an ignorance of +them, as not even to know how far I am either adopting, or evading +their phraseology, in discussing the same subjects. Mine, however, +cannot be wrong, since the term “first principles,” that I +have chosen, is one of familiar popular use; so that were this mode of +speech, as indeed it is, peculiarly liable to ambiguity, it would, for +that very reason, be preferable to any other, till such time as that +ambiguity <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb35" href="#pb35" name= +"pb35">35</a>]</span>should have been explained, and the wrong +thinking, of which it might have been the source, exposed and obviated. +Not till this had been done would it be time to inquire whether the +current metaphysics had invented any intrinsically better ways of +speaking on these topics, for though the veriest tyro in such +investigations would be justified in objecting to some of its +technicalities, such as the invention of the word free-will, for +instance, for the same reason that a beginner in zoology might object, +were such an attempt ever made, to the introduction of the word sphynx +or griffin into that branch of inquiry, there can be no doubt that +other of its speculations are more happily conceived. Hence I suppose +it would be a decided mistake to imagine, for example, that no +<i>trouve</i> whatever is to be elicited from the obscurities of Kant, +but on the other hand, one must as much take care to entertain sober +conjectures of the possible value of such unsunned treasures, as to +keep in mind that quackery may be not unqualified with some merit, and +I might surmise that it was perhaps in virtue of his fabulous +expectations in this direction, that Coleridge could not execute his +long-meditated plan of elucidating that writer; or rather, +perhaps—to speak more curtly—a spirit more differing from +that which compounded the amalgam, was necessary to resolve and detect +it.</p> +<p>According to this estimate of the value of our achieved studies, it +would be expectable, in regard to my present topic, that almost all the +materials for right conclusions on it must be extant somewhere or other +in our books, no great amount of ability being required <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb36" href="#pb36" name="pb36">36</a>]</span>to turn +them to proper account: an easily suppliable desideratum being thus +left unsupplied, the public indifference manifested thereby would seem +to bear the ascription of our unsatisfactory metaphysics to the fault, +however apportioned between the many and the few, not of the intellect, +but of the reason.</p> +<p>Indeed, it is held as a pretty general rule, that where there is +want of reform, there is want of reason; and Bacon, by implication, +thought the rule here applicable, when, in defending his “new +philosophy” from the charge of arrogance, he apologised by saying +that a “cripple in the right road would make better progress than +a racehorse in the wrong.” That is, he claimed for himself, as he +was bound logically to do, the plain good sense of directing his +supposably humble faculties with an obvious regard to the end he +proposed and professed, and he was ready to concede to his competitors +all kinds of superiority but this.</p> +<p>The same simplicity characterises the reforming animus of the other +great patriarch of “the new philosophy,” in its sister +branch. The still debated point between the school of Locke and the old +philosophy was, and is, of such a form as may be figured by the +following hypothetical, and it may be, well-founded statement. Locke +seems to have battled mainly for the principle that ideas that every +one allows to be inferences, should be acknowledged by philosophy to be +such, while the adherents of the old ideas maintained, in opposition to +him, that ideas that every one allows to be inferences, should +<i>not</i> be acknowledged by philosophy to be such. Or, in other +words, Locke aimed to realise a certain first principle of reason, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb37" href="#pb37" name= +"pb37">37</a>]</span>which I shall have hereafter to consider, which +stands thus:—“That which it is,” while his opponents +withstood this innovating pretension, finding it fatal to their +doctrine. If the reader is somewhat startled at the statement I have +just made, I will remind him that it amounts to nothing more than +saying that in the contest between the new and the old philosophy, +reason is entirely and absolutely on the side of the former, an +assertion which, of course, I must both think admits of being +substantiated, and must take myself, in some degree, to be able to aid +in its being so.</p> +<p>The existing quarrel between the two philosophies might, perhaps, be +personified through the medium of a principal champion on each side. +For the new ideas I could only choose Locke, since he is admitted to +have had no equally eminent successor; for the old I would choose M. +Cousin, both on account of his superior merit and popularity, and also +of his having made Locke the subject of some elaborate strictures that +I happen to have read. On these, when they come again to hand, I should +perhaps have something to remark; meanwhile I must content myself with +addressing myself to one of them in the following manner:—</p> +<p>In antiquity and the middle ages, the schoolmaster and the +philosopher were one and the same individual. The new philosophy was +the first to separate these two departments; perceiving that the +communication of truth is a distinct office from its investigation, and +that that difference of office in each case necessitates a +corresponding difference in the public, that is the proper object of +its exercise. Since, moreover, society may be discriminated into two +sorts of mind, admitting <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb38" href= +"#pb38" name="pb38">38</a>]</span>of being pictured as the childish and +the adults, it is evident that the instructor must find his audience +more especially in the former, while the investigator of truth must +appeal exclusively to the latter. This he must needs do, to whichever +of the sciences he ministers; and not only so, but he must more +particularly address himself to a small and select portion of this +itself selecter class, constitute them the witnesses and judges of his +proceedings, and perceive that both his success in philosophy and the +acknowledgment of it can only be founded first and foremost on their +approbation. As even in jockeyism and prize-fighting, there are +“the knowing ones,” similar referees are, by the nature of +things, required for the flourishing estate of any science; and +evidently in proportion as they might be incompetent to such an office, +false or imperfect science must be the result.</p> +<p>Locke, acting on this instinctive view, communicated to the public +certain observations he had made in mental philosophy, and entitled his +work, <i>An Essay on the Human Understanding</i>. He properly called it +an essay, because a person who simply aims to investigate truth, +undertakes to do his best in the way of trial, endeavor, and +experiment, in such sort as to make the word essay appropriate to what +he does. The word moreover implies that the thing done, though it is +the writer’s best, is liable to be incomplete, comparatively +imperfect, and, indeed, in the more difficult questions of philosophy, +as well as in the less advanced stages of philosophising, is sure to be +so. Locke accordingly, having had his attention struck with certain +phenomena of the human mind, told the public <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb39" href="#pb39" name="pb39">39</a>]</span>just +what he had observed, and nothing else. Among the observations that he +thus imparted, was the process through which the mind seems to go in +arriving at the sum of its ideas, and especially the points from which +it seems to start in this process.</p> +<p>M. Cousin, having apparently no conception of a way of acting so +proper to legitimate inquiry, and having himself written a <i>Course of +Philosophy</i>, evidently thinks Locke ought to have done the same; for +he says that Locke is erroneous in the method of his philosophy, that +he begins at the wrong end, that instead of having told us as he has +how the ideas arise in the mind, he ought to have told us what the +ideas are, instead of describing their origin to have described their +actuality, to have given a list of the faculties of the mind, and so +on. Which is just the same thing as saying that a traveller who +publishes his explorations in America, ought instead to have gone to +China.</p> +<p>I shall have to make some objections to Locke, but they will be of a +nature exactly contrary to those of which he is usually made the +subject. Instead of accusing his principles I shall have to impute to +him the not sufficiently carrying them out; a fault due to his position +as an early reformer, and perfectly consistent with his high character +as such.</p> +<p>I have the more reason to note this distinction between M. +Cousin’s department and the function exercised by Locke, because +I am forced myself to take the benefit of it. Want of erudition would +form very vulnerable points, were I to be judged by the former +standard. In the little I have yet put forth on the subject of First +Principles, I already find two or three <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb40" href="#pb40" name="pb40">40</a>]</span>errors of that sort, +which a greater amount of reading would no doubt have enabled me to +escape. My present letter may close with some correction of one of +these.</p> +<p>Preliminary, I will venture to call “That which is is,” +a first principle of reason, and “Two and two make four,” +one of its derivatives, leaving this topic for future explanation, and +then proceed thus:—When in my last letter I represented first +principles as bounding the horizon of human knowledge, I left it to be +inferred that both the kinds of “first principles” I had +mentioned were thus describable in common. I find, however, that this +metaphysical character belongs exclusively to first principles of +sensuous experience, and no more belongs to first principles of reason +than to first principles of grammar, or to first principles of +rhetoric. That is, first principles of reason are merely the result of +one of those analytical inquiries in which we arrive at something +absolutely simple, and must there stop, just as in the science of +numbers we may thus arrive at unity.</p> +<hr class="tb"> +<p>Having long ago defined First Principles of sensuous experience, I +find there is a difficulty attached to the other kind of first +principles derived from the various use of the word reason—which +I will say betrayed me into a wrong inference in the concluding +paragraph of my last letter.</p> +<p>Locke, in the 17th chapter of his fourth book, confesses that this +word, in the proper use of the English language, is liable to bear +several senses. Due discrimination in such a case, and a cautious +avoidance <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb41" href="#pb41" name= +"pb41">41</a>]</span>of the dangers to which philosophy is exposed, and +has so amply incurred, from this kind of source might, above all, have +been, expected from Locke, since he was the first who inculcated it, +and is generally remarkable for the observance of his own precepts in +this matter. Hence the charge I have now got to bring against him is a +little surprising.</p> +<p>Indeed, it might be asserted that his position and circumstances do +not seem very readily to bear the entire responsibility of some of his +proceedings. Perhaps he might be characterised as a writer of somewhat +humorous idiosyncracy in respect to tendency to fixed ideas. His +lapses, indeed, are not many, but they are highly significant, as I +shall have occasion in more than one instance to show, and among these +must evidently be reckoned that I am now going to notice, since it +imports the wrong definition of a word of such cardinal meaning.</p> +<p>In defining the word reason, in its proper and specific sense +wherein it is used to denote a certain well-known quality of the human +mind—that is, as approvedly ascertained and appreciated under +this name, as are certain weights and measures under those of pound, +gallon, or mile, he assigns a meaning to it that comes short of the +proportions thus justly prefigured as belonging to it. He confounds +reason with reasoning—that is, he emerges the entire faculty or +<i>modus operandi</i>, to which we give the name of reason, in that +partial exercise of its function to which we give the name of +reasoning. He says that, in matters of certainty, such as the proof of +any of Euclid’s theorems, the acts by which the mind ascertains +the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb42" href="#pb42" name= +"pb42">42</a>]</span>fit coherence of the several links in the chain of +reasoning are acts of reason. Granted.</p> +<p>Also, that in weighing probabilities, a similar coherence is +similarly verified by reason. Granted—with liberty of comment +that these arts of reason, in either of the two cases have, by the +approved practice of language, received the name of reasoning.</p> +<p>But he further signifies—that is, he does not expressly +affirm, but, with equivalent certification, he implicitly asserts, and +inferentially states that, in examining such a proposition as the +following:—“What is, is” (an examination to which +confessedly no reasoning is attached), the act by which the mind +assents to the truth of this statement is not to be described as an act +of reason. He adopts a different phraseology, and calls it +intuition.</p> +<p>Observe, my objection is not that he invests the idea with this new +name, but that he disparages its old one. I do not object to your +calling a spade a shovel, under a certain view of its use, but it +remains still necessary that you should admit that a spade is, in the +full sense of the word, a spade.</p> +<p>Indeed, I will incidentally remark that I suspect the word +“intuition” has been a very good addition to our +vocabulary, and I suppose its proper import might be represented as +follows:—Reason has two modes of his exercise, the one is called +reasoning, and the other intuition. Intuition is the decision of reason +on one single point; reasoning—a word proper to demonstrative +truth—seems to be nothing more than intuition looking not merely +at one point, but at several points successively. So that intuition and +reasoning would <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb43" href="#pb43" name= +"pb43">43</a>]</span>constitute the self-same function of reason, and +the difference in their meanings would be solely owing to the +difference in the circumstances under which that function is +exercised.</p> +<p>Observe, that I am here only venturing to speculate, and am now +returning from that digression.</p> +<p>Whether or not Locke is herein psychologically consistent with +himself; whether, indeed, his real theory is not that which I have just +conjecturally intimated, is another question, which I shall defer to a +future occasion; but whether or not he herein opposes the ordinary, +prevailing, and inveterate use of language, which is what I am charging +him with doing, and whether or not he has justifiable ground for this +innovation which I am denying that he has, are points that must be +tried by the ordeal of these three considerations. How are we +accustomed to speak? How are we accustomed to write? and what sort of a +call for changing our customs in either of these particulars is that +which constitutes a genuine call to do so?</p> +<p>In regard to the first of these tests, the literature of all sects +and parties has been accustomed to assert that, both in matters of +science and of worldly business, reason is the judge of all truth +whatever, without exception.</p> +<p>Locke, on the other hand, informs us that reason is the judge of +demonstrative truth, of logical truth, of casuistical truth, and of +lawyers’ truth, and of these kinds of truth alone, but is +<i>not</i> the judge of intuitive or self-evident truth. Our writers +would tell us that to deny “what is, is” to be a true +statement, would be an <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb44" href="#pb44" +name="pb44">44</a>]</span>offence against reason; but we learn from +Locke that reason has no cognisance in this matter, but intuition only +has, and consequently that the wrong committed would not be against +reason, but against intuition.</p> +<p>Our current speech accords with our literature in this view of the +meaning of the word reason; whose efficiency, moreover, it endeavors to +amplify, by surrounding it with satellites of adjectives formed from +it, the principal of which are “reasonable” and +“unreasonable.” Provided with this vocabulary, we pronounce +it to be unreasonable to deny any truth whatever that can be well and +clearly ascertained; and so far are we from reserving these adjectives +for the occasion of demonstrative truth, and holding them inapplicable +where self-evident or intuitive truth comes on the carpet, that we +account it, if possible, still more unreasonable to deny the latter +than the former.</p> +<p>But if the nomenclature adopted by Locke be the right one, there +ought to be a change in these current modes of speaking and writing. +One who should reject the proofs of Euclid, would be unreasonable; one +who should maintain that Thurtel or Greenacre were innocent of murder, +would be unreasonable; but, one who should deny the truth of any +self-evident proposition, would not be unreasonable; for to say this, +would be to say that reason has cognisance of such propositions, +whereas, according to him, it is expressly <i>not</i> reason, but +intuition that takes this office. The words “intuitional” +and “unintuitional,” must be invented to supply the obvious +need which the <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb45" href="#pb45" name= +"pb45">45</a>]</span>apparent gap discovers; there seems no other way +of supplying it.</p> +<p>Lest I should be suspected of somewhat making up a case; of having, +perhaps, represented not so much what Locke really means, as what he +seems to mean, I will remind the reader that Locke is undertaking the +formal definition of a word, and that on such a critical occasion, it +is proper to give him credit for not meaning otherwise than he seems to +mean.</p> +<p>The passage which is my text, will be found in the earlier part of +the seventeenth chapter of the fourth book. Indeed, I could at once +prove my indictment by citing a few words from it, accompanied by a +comment of my own, had I any right to impose on the reader a belief in +the discriminating fairness and matter-of-fact accuracy, both of my +extracts and my comment.</p> +<p>I will, however, venture on such a step; I will suppose myself +commenting on this passage, and proceed thus: Locke, it will be seen in +this, his foremost and professed definition of the word reason, +contrasts it with “sense and intuition.”</p> +<p>Whether he holds these to be identical with what he calls “the +outward and the inward sense,” is not quite clear. That, however, +is not the question.</p> +<p>He says, that these two faculties “reach but a very little +way”; for that “the greatest part of our knowledge depends +upon deductions and intermediate ideas.” Now, reason, he says, +may be defined to be that faculty, whose specific office it is +“to find out and apply” those intermediate ideas and +deductions by which we obtain knowledge that consists of two kinds, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb46" href="#pb46" name= +"pb46">46</a>]</span>one that which exalts us into +“certainty,” the other that which, though less generous +diet for the mind, we have constantly good ground for gladly +acquiescing in, and which we call “probability.” So that, +says Locke, if you ask, “What room is there for the exercise of +any other faculty but outward sense and inward perception?” I can +abundantly reply, “Very much.” I have shown you that +without this “demonstrative” faculty, our knowledge would +be but a skeleton; it would, indeed, not be properly speaking +knowledge, but mere rudiments of knowledge.</p> +<p>Such is my interpretation of Locke’s definition of reason, in +the proper and specific sense of this word. If it is strictly correct, +as I believe the intelligent reader will find by reference, then it is +Locke confounds reason with reasoning, mistakes a part for the whole, +and the whole for a part, and acts similarly—to borrow his own +way of illustration—to the representing a gallon to be a quart, +or a half-sovereign to be a sovereign.</p> +<p>It is to be observed, too, that it is entirely in behalf of the more +showy kind of knowledge, that the mistake is made. The respected name +of reason is given exclusively to logic and demonstrating. Good sense, +good feeling, just instinct, if they stand alone, have no claim to it; +they are put on an inferior footing; true, they are intuition; but what +then? they are not reason.</p> +<p>Now, the century introduced by Locke is accused by the present, and +it is generally admitted, with some degree of justice, of having +“materialistic” tendencies. We may see, then, how +Locke’s doctrine, as just <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb47" +href="#pb47" name="pb47">47</a>]</span>described, founded though it is +only on nomenclature, hinging merely on definition, incurring whatever +wrongness it implicates from no other lapse than that of confounding a +word with its derivative, doing nothing, in short, but annul the +difference of meaning between the two words, reason and reasoning; we +may see how this apparently harmless experiment might tend to supplying +these materialistic tendencies with a ground, a rationale, a principle, +and thus to exalt their authority, and how, indeed! it just smacks of +their spirit.</p> +<p>It may be seen, too, how, from a few slips, such as this on the part +of the champion of the “new philosophy,” competing schools +of the present age might be able to make up a case, specious enough to +gain the acquiescence of a portion of the public against +both—with how great futility, I believe, would appear, if the +accusations were weighed by a competent tribunal.</p> +<p>And, finally, it might be expected, that the undue exaltation of the +demonstrative department of reason, should issue in a reaction into a +contrary extreme, and that some Mr. Carlyle might be found to inveigh +against “logic,” to sneer at “analysis,” to +denounce “cause and effect philosophy” and to praise +“mysticism.”</p> +<p>I have already assumed that the third test that I promised, goes +against Locke, and requires no examination, simply because he has not +advanced it in his behalf. He has assigned no ground for changing the +meaning of the word reason, and it is presumable that none is +assignable.</p> +<hr class="tb"> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb48" href="#pb48" name= +"pb48">48</a>]</span></p> +<p>The question, What is the Criterion of Truth?—that is, What +are the proper means of distinguishing whether anything that is +asserted to be true is so or not? claims immediate notice, because such +a criterion exists, and the new philosophy necessarily appeals to it +when it comes before the public, while it has shown with what effect it +can do so, in the case of those of its branches—namely, the +purely material and the mathematical, that flourish in society.</p> +<p>Premising that it is a way of certifying truth that has been +immemorially used by mankind in their daily affairs, and which they +have always, to some extent, instinctively transferred to their +judgments in philosophy, and that it is the only possible general and +summary criterion of truth, I may describe it as consisting in the +unanimous assent to some idea or assertion of all who are thought +competent to pronounce concerning it.</p> +<p>Viewed in connection with the thing it verifies, and the parties who +use it, the criterion may be thus represented: Any idea, assertion, or +opinion, must, by any inquirer, be found true, when he perceives it to +be such as would be unanimously assented to by all presumably competent +judges of the kind of truth to which it refers.</p> +<p>So that those who use this criterion, and are convinced of the truth +of anything through its medium—a proceeding which I have +represented as common and habitual to mankind—in thereby +pronouncing certain supposed persons to be judges of truth in the said +matter, claim themselves to be also judges of it in the matter of so +pronouncing. The acts of judgment they <span class="pagenum">[<a id= +"pb49" href="#pb49" name="pb49">49</a>]</span>thus tacitly challenge to +themselves may be said to be to the following effect:—1. They +assign the qualifications that constitute competency for a certain +function. 2. They decide that there are persons in the community +answering to this character. 3. They opine that the view such persons +take or would take, imports an assertion of the truth of the idea in +question. 4. They accredit that view with being strictly one, supposing +that all qualified to arbitrate would acquiesce and agree in the same. +5. They attribute to themselves a similar unanimity. 6. They assume the +sufficiency of their own judgment to make all the above +conclusions.</p> +<p>These assumptions on their part, so complicated in description, are +simple enough in performance. It is plain that mankind—more +properly here to be called the public—simply attach themselves to +some opinion which they find current in society; while, however, the +assumptions I have just described are, in their full measure, but a +necessary consequence of their so doing, doubtless their so doing must +itself have been dictated by some kind of anticipation of them, but +this may, to any degree, have been vague, undetermined, partial, and +imperfect.</p> +<p>The rationale of this double bench of judges is thus explained. In +reference to almost every kind of truth there is always a certain +portion of the community better able to judge than the rest. Hence it +becomes clearly the part of the latter, if they wish to be rightly +informed, to defer to the opinion of those confessedly better +judges—confessed to be such from the general opinion to that +effect. Thus a second set of judges <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb50" +href="#pb50" name="pb50">50</a>]</span>perforce, in addition to those +that were originally conceived by choice, is implicated in this +transaction.</p> +<p>For the primary sort I must seek a name from the French language, +which calls them “experts,” the English supplying, I +believe, none, except a very vernacular one, the “knowing +ones”; the others have already got a well-known name—the +public.</p> +<p>The public, in deciding on the occasions in question, what are the +qualifications that constitute “experts” may be said to +<i>choose</i> them, thereby, however, choosing persons in idea, and not +bodily. The relation of the public to these conceptions of theirs is +the same as that of the constituencies to the members of Parliament, in +the point of one being the choosers and the others the chosen, with a +common object in view.</p> +<p>I suppose, to stop the current of my discourse, and adjourn its +topic, for the sake of at once bringing the general principle discussed +to the test of exemplification, would have its want of logical harmony +excused by its being desiderated by the reader.</p> +<p>I had undertaken to prove that this principle—which, for +distinction’s sake, I will call the unanimity principle—is +the proper and only criterion of scientific truth to the great +non-scientific world, and consequently that modern philosophy +necessarily appeals to it when it comes before the public. What I had +thus taken upon myself to do, obviously was—first, to display and +explicate the principle by definition, and this I had already done; and +next—to describe it theoretically by showing its manner of +existing, and this I was engaged in doing. Leaving this inquiry in the +midst, I am now going to deviate into the practical phase of +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb51" href="#pb51" name= +"pb51">51</a>]</span>its description, by showing, not how it <i>is</i>, +but how it <i>acts</i>. This seems necessary for the satisfaction of +the reader, as being the only way of securing him from any, even were +it but temporary, misapprehension as to the working value of the +principle for which his attention is demanded. I therefore select the +six following examples, the two first homely, and the four last +philosophical, of its ordinary use by the public.</p> +<p>They will be at once seen to justify my assertion of its having for +its main characteristics the two facts—<i>first</i>, that mankind +habitually use it, and have always done so; and <i>next</i>, that +propositions thus warranted are universally accepted as established +truth, and that no one thinks of calling them in question.</p> +<p>1. Thus no one doubts, when coming to the intersection of two roads, +he sees a sign-post, on one of whose pointers is written “To +London,” and on the other “To Windsor,” no one +hesitates to believe that the information thus conveyed to him is true; +because he is aware that those who give it are competent to do so, and +that none similarly competent will gainsay it.</p> +<p>2. Again, no one doubts that the sun rises and sets once in every +twenty-four hours; no one doubts that he so rose and set yesterday. +Every one is ready to affirm the certainty of these two facts, but very +few can do so, in any great degree, from their own experience; but they +help the lack of this by that of their neighbors. Neither is it +necessary that they should have any near, nor even the most remote, +idea of the personality of those on whose testimony they thus +implicitly rely; it suffices they are sure, whoever they may be, they +have the right qualifications for testifying <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb52" href="#pb52" name="pb52">52</a>]</span>in the +way they do, and that no one so qualified can contradict their +evidence, or dream of doing so.</p> +<p>The above are examples of the criterion of truth, applied to the +ideas and proceedings of ordinary life. It will be seen therefrom, +<i>first</i> that mankind have in all ages been educated in an +acceptance of its principle, according to my definition of it, the +principle, namely, of an indubitable certainty of truth, resulting from +the unanimous assent to some idea of all who are thought by self and +neighbors competent to pronounce thereon; possibly too they may be said +to have been educated in some imperfect theoretical appreciation of +this principle.</p> +<p>It will <i>secondly</i> be seen therefrom, that the two kinds of +unanimity which I have predicated as essential to the proper use and +results of this criterion, an unanimity, namely, on the part of the +supposed good judges of certain descriptions of truth, who may be +called the adepts or knowing ones imagined by the public; and again an +unanimity on the part of the public itself in interpreting and adopting +their opinion; it will be seen, I say, that this double unanimity is +perfectly attainable, nay, perfectly attained, and that too so +extensively, as to constitute a common and familiar occurrence on all +manner of occasions of daily life.</p> +<p>I will now give instances of their similar use of it in directing +their judgments on philosophical questions.</p> +<p>3. Very few of the public are able to examine the proof of any of +the theorems of Euclid, yet there is none of them who would think of +seriously doubting the truth of anything contained in that book, the +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb53" href="#pb53" name= +"pb53">53</a>]</span>ground of their confidence being solely their +knowledge of the fact, that the learned in these matters have +unanimously so decided.</p> +<p>Every one, again, believes in certain facts that are asserted by +navigators, explorers, and geographers, respecting the existence, +position, and products of various countries of the globe. Every one, +further, believes in certain deductions derived from these facts by +naturalists, geologists, astronomers, and so forth. The belief is owing +to the unanimous testimony of all these confessedly competent +authorities; but whenever they are seen to differ among themselves, the +public withholds its entire belief, and either doubts or disbelieves +the things asserted. Thus the public is at this day doubtful and +divided whether there is such a creature as the sea-serpent. Similarly +the public is dubious—for it must needs be so if any section of +it is so—whether a certain explorer who was authoritatively sent +out about a dozen years ago conjointly by the French Government and +Institute, was, in any degree, justified in bringing home the account +he did of there being a tribe of men in the interior of Africa having +tails, whether this unexpected information is, in any important +particular, true.</p> +<p>The two last examples have been furnished by material science. I +will now draw one from the other department, with the view of +indicating that in non-material science also, numerous propositions +circulate among the public that are franked by the same principle to +pass as undoubted truth. Such is the maxim of heathen philosophy, +recorded by Cicero in his “Officiis”: “Do not to +another what you would <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb54" href="#pb54" +name="pb54">54</a>]</span>not he should do to you”; or the same +maxim, in its modified form, as given in the New Testament, with the +characteristic omission of the negative. The truth of this moral maxim +is universally admitted, because it is supposed that no person of +presumable moral judgment has ever been known to call it in +question.</p> +<p>It would seem, then, that this criterion of truth is—what +confessedly, or from easy proof, it is predicable that no other +criterion of truth is—a <i>general</i> criterion of truth. I +will, however, restrict this pretension to the statement—to be +hereafter more largely explained—that it is a general criterion +of truth to the public as such, to the public considered as a public; +for, indeed, it is not properly <span class="corr" id="xd21e715" title= +"Source: useable">usable</span> at all by anyone except in the +character of a member of the public. This means that it is a general +criterion of truth in the following way: it is applicable to the +verification of all truth, so far as it admits of being verified before +the public, and made the common property of the community.</p> +<p>6. For even where at first sight you might think it most out of +place, I mean in relation to that kind of truth whose primary evidence +is the consciousness of the individual, so that the competent witness +of truth is necessarily but one person, there is oneness of opinion, +there is unanimity, and the testimony of the one competent witness is +not contradicted or doubted by that of any other presumably competent. +When, for instance, I am conscious of the sensation of seeing an +inkstand before me, no one seeing reason to doubt my assertion to that +effect, all presumably competent testimony on the subject must needs be +concentrated in myself; and the fact of my seeing an inkstand, +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb55" href="#pb55" name= +"pb55">55</a>]</span>though for my own conviction verified in a way +independent of any such argument, is, for the conviction of others, +only pronounceable as true, because all presumably competent authority +is of one mind in alleging its truth.</p> +<p>In thus far exemplifying the use of this principle, I have exhibited +it in the exercise of its primary office only, which, however, is not +that which, on behalf of philosophy, I am here demanding from it. I +have shown it, namely, as used by the public to establish truth +positively, and not in the way wherein it may be used to distinguish +truth comparatively.</p> +<p>But it is solely in this latter office that it becomes a criterion +of truth, an arbiter between the true and the false, an indicator of +both, and more especially of what has the character of ascertained +truth, and what has not; and this, it will be remembered, was the +office I sought from it, and constituted the ultimate purpose of my +taking up the consideration of the subject.</p> +<p>Having with as much brevity as just suffices for that purpose, +explained the nature of the principle in question, and its use by +society at large, it now only remains that I should explain that +purpose itself, by theory and example.</p> +<p>What I am doing in tracing the unanimity principle from its first +instinctive use by the public to its secondary and meditated one by +philosophy, is a purely critical act, comparable to that of the +rhetorician who appreciates the character of certain modes of thinking +which have long since been practised by mankind, and shows what therein +is approvable—all the rest being liable to censure. <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb56" href="#pb56" name="pb56">56</a>]</span></p> +<p>It was the universal conviction of European Christendom, during many +centuries, that the Church, which was popularly supposed to be +represented by the Pope, enjoyed peculiarly a divine guidance which +made it an infallible judge of truth. This idea was thought to be +warranted by the unanimous assent of all right-minded persons, and the +denial of it to be the mark of a reprobate spirit, as well as contrary +to common sense. We now know the entire futility of this assumption, +and that the heretics were not inferior to the orthodox in the power of +judging such subjects. Hence in discussing the unanimity principle the +question presents itself, How came the public thus wrongly to apply it? +What error did they commit in so doing? When the revival of learning +and the consequent rise of Protestantism had exposed the error in that +form of it, it was still continued under the new social regimes; so +that even Locke, the boldest advocate of the rights of man that was +tolerated even in his time, stigmatised the dissentients from certain +Protestant tenets in the same unjust way that Popery had done to the +dissentients from certain Popish ones; speaking of them in two or three +places of his essay as persons at once notoriously disreputable in +character and weak in intellect; consistently with which estimate he +came to the conclusion that the reigning theology was established +truth, as being accredited by all those whose opinion was worth taking +account of.</p> +<p>Later times have again manifested the futility of the assumption +against the new race of dissentients. No one will say that <span class= +"corr" id="xd21e736" title="Source: Goëthe">Goethe</span> and +Neibuhr (to mention only two) must count for nothing on questions +wherein they <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb57" href="#pb57" name= +"pb57">57</a>]</span>were as likely to be well informed as their +opponents. So that Locke’s side, instead of being warranted by +the decisive verdict he imagines, is but one of two suitors in an +undetermined cause, neither having yet attracted the votes of the whole +jury, and neither consequently yet occupying the position of +ascertained truth. Giving everyone a fair hearing is that trial and +test of competency which yields the only means of learning who said +competent judges are.</p> +<p>A little consideration, even in Locke’s time of less advanced +thought, might have informed an intelligent mind, if free from +prejudice, that mere prohibitory laws must be of themselves less +adverse to the free expression of people’s sentiments than that +averted state of the public mind of which they are one of the symptoms. +Both from theory and experience we may collect that very much the same +laws of supply and demand obtain in matters of opinion as in those of +food and raiment; the tongue and the pen, and the previous thought by +which these are instructed, must evidently hold back from offering to +the public, nay, in a great measure from suggesting to the agent +himself, any such ideas as they know the public will not, and must +confine themselves to putting forth such only as they suppose it will +understand, appreciate, and regard. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb58" +href="#pb58" name="pb58">58</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +<div class="div1 chapter"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main">THE RIGHTS OF REASON.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first">To the two queries you put to me, “What are +first principles?” and “What is the criterion of +truth?” I find it suitable to append some preliminary remarks on +“The Rights of Reason.”</p> +<p>The solution you expect is, I presume, a reasonable one. You do not +wish me to take into account any opinions that cannot bear the test of +reason.</p> +<p>Your queries derive their greatest pertinency from the state of +non-material philosophy; and, possibly, might have been, in some +measure, prompted by this consideration. That double-minded way of +inquiring into truth, which only in part reasons, while it in part +dogmatises, imagines, and assumes, is, it is obvious, in morals, +metaphysics, and religion, one of our inheritances from former times. +The battle has been won in the material department, but is still +undecided on the other wing.</p> +<p>What, then, is Reason, and what are its Rights?</p> +<p>Every human inquiry that asks, What is right, proper, or correct? +necessarily, in doing so, asks, What is it reasonable to think, +believe, or do? in the points inquired into. The faculty—whatever +may be its nature—whereby we find ourselves able, under certain +circumstances, to answer this question, we call reason. The rights of +reason may be said to consist in the concession <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb59" href="#pb59" name="pb59">59</a>]</span>to it of +a certain absolute power in the decision of truth, divisible under two +heads thus—a power of deciding what are the questions whereon it +is able to decide, and a power of deciding those questions.</p> +<p>One of the many ways of disparaging the rights of reason +is—openly or covertly to doubt or deny that morals, metaphysics, +and religion, are—in the full sense of the word—sciences. +This is to withdraw them from the empire of reason, and to hand them +over to some rival pretender.</p> +<p>No science can flourish while it is understood that its discussion +must be made palatable to the public. In any supposable code of the +rights of reason, one primary article would limit and define the +functions of the public in the investigation of truth—a topic +which, together with the kindred inquiry, Who are the public? is +suggested by your second query.</p> +<p>Mankind have naturally a degree of antipathy for reason. They have +found Reason, in the work he affects, dull, in the help he furnishes, +deficient, in the truth he unveils, ugly, in the rule he arrogates, +imperious. Barbarism, in all its stages, may be said to be founded, not +merely on ignorance, but on a state of the inclinations that revolts +from reason.</p> +<p>Two competitors have always disputed the rights of reason; authority +or precedent, and faith or conscience. Conscience, early or late, must +receive almost all his light from authority; and, therefore, in respect +to opinion, may generally be called the creature of authority. Yet, in +a moral aspect, authority is confessedly of no account, and conscience +has a sole jurisdiction. A large portion of mankind have, in our +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb60" href="#pb60" name= +"pb60">60</a>]</span>times, outgrown the error of resting their sense +of duty on the mere dictate of other men. The only legitimate directors +of human conduct are now generally admitted to be conscience and +reason; the conscience must be exclusively one’s own, but the +reason need not entirely—and, indeed, cannot in any great +proportion—be one’s own, but may be partly that of +one’s neighbor.</p> +<p>The question of the division of power between these two potentates, +though not yet understood by the public, does not seem to be more +complicated than that analogous one just alluded to, and of which they +evidently understand the gist.</p> +<p>For authority, as above intimated, though the venerable instructor +of conscience, is yet morally subjected to him; and, not dissimilarly, +have conscience and reason reciprocal claims of precedence on each +other. Reason is the judge, but he is bound, under conscience, to give +a sufficient and attentive hearing to any pleadings that conscience may +have to offer, and conscience is the pleader, but he is bound, under +reason, to conform to whatever verdicts reason declares himself +competent to render.</p> +<p>If history in this particular can be considered as having disclosed +a necessary sequence, civilisation progresses in the following +order:—The general mind, in becoming acquainted with its own +powers, first learns an evolution of conscience (and this can only take +place through the medium of religion), and last learns to appreciate +reason (and this can only happen through the medium of science). While +the prerogatives of conscience were insufficiently known, authority +usurped <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb61" href="#pb61" name= +"pb61">61</a>]</span>them, and while the prerogatives of reason are +insufficiently known, authority and conscience conjointly usurp +them.</p> +<p>The word conscience I here use in its proper sense, wherein it means +either an individual conscience, or the united consciences of more than +one supposed to be in accord together, so as to make the acts resulting +from this accord constitute single acts of conscience. But the word has +taken an improper enlargement of meaning in being often used to signify +one conscience claiming something in contravention of another +conscience. These two, so different meanings of the word conscience, +are seldom duly discriminated by those who use them.</p> +<p>To the rights of reason belongs a certain degree of power, both in +regulating the individual conscience, and in solving the differences +between opposing ones. Under what conditions, and how far, reason can +exercise this office, and what rule he is to follow in so doing, would +be an inquiry suggested by my answer to your second query.</p> +<p>Having above mentioned religion and science as the two prime +ministers respectively of conscience and reason, I will pursue the +subject a little further.</p> +<p>Religion has aimed to have a moral animus by means of a free +conscience. Religion has not yet immediately aimed at moral conduct; +but, indeed, has been wont, by the mouth of her most strenuous +ministers, to assume that the aim at this is already included in that +other aim. But a moral animus is but one ingredient in moral conduct, +involving the intent only to act morally, without having of itself +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb62" href="#pb62" name= +"pb62">62</a>]</span>the least power to realise that intent. +Knowledge,—that is, science, exclusively keeps the keys of this +power. Such knowledge religion has not yet made one of her aims and +ends either directly, or by any coalition with those who have so aimed. +Accordingly religion cannot be said hitherto to have been an advocate +of the rights of reason. Whatever good things she may have achieved in +this cause have been incidental to her advocacy of the Rights of +Conscience. Here reason was her weapon (sharpened for this use, and so +far valued and treasured), against authority. Her tendency meanwhile, +is to impel conscience to infringe on the rights of reason.</p> +<p>Science alone has hitherto been the immediate champion of these +rights. But it seems he cannot expect to make that advocacy complete +and effectual till he allies himself with religion. This alliance, +since it is persuaded by reason, and not by passion, can have science +alone for its real mover.</p> +<p>The Rights of Reason may at present be said to be in such a germ of +their acknowledgment as were the rights of conscience three centuries +ago. Mankind have not hitherto come to acquiesce in the idea of that +parsimony of guidance vouchsafed to man, which is found to be the +result of claiming for reason the power of calling all human thoughts +before his tribunal, and seeing whether he has anything to object to +them. Their idea has been that not only suggesting +inspiration—(which it does not seem necessary that the advocate +of the rights of reason should deny)—but guiding inspiration is +given, given too to some rather than to others, and given in such a +quality, as to dispense with <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb63" href= +"#pb63" name="pb63">63</a>]</span>the supervision of reason. A +generation successive to many among whom this doctrine has been taught +and believed, will not be prone to any decided rejection of it. Pride +of species inclining to exaggerated human pretensions above other +earthly creatures, and party pride inclining to exalt self and an +associated confraternity into a superiority over the rest of mankind, +and supplied with a traditional store of modes of thought and practice +adapted to such exclusive pretensions, and other native tendencies of +the human mind, persuade in the same direction.</p> +<p>I have thought it suitable to premise this short sketch of the +Rights of Reason, and the opponents of them, to an endeavor to answer +your queries in a thoroughly reasonable way, a way which cannot be said +to be the more fashionable one in the treatment of metaphysical +questions. <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb65" href="#pb65" name= +"pb65">65</a>]</span></p> +</div> +</div> +</div> +<div class="back"> +<div class="div1 ads"> +<div class="divHead"> +<h2 class="main xd21e799">THE<br> +PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING<br> +COMPANY’S<br> +CATALOGUE.</h2> +</div> +<div class="divBody"> +<p class="first"><i>All Orders to be sent, with remittance to</i> +<span class="sc">R. Forder</span>, <i>28 Stonecutter Street, London, +E.C. Rate of postage—Orders under 3d., one halfpenny; orders +under 6d., one penny. Orders over 6d. post free</i>.</p> +<p class="xd21e161">SEPTEMBER, 1891.</p> +<p class="adAuthor">AVELING, DR. E. B.</p> +<p><b>Darwin Made Easy.</b> Cloth +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">Dr. Aveling is a Fellow of the London University, and +this is the best popular exposition of Darwinism extant.</p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">BACON, LORD</p> +<p><b>Pagan Mythology; or, the Wisdom of the Ancients</b> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">BENTHAM, JEREMY</p> +<p><b>The Church of England Catechism Examined.</b> A trenchant +analysis, in Bentham’s best manner, showing how the Catechism is +calculated to make children hypocrites or fools, if not worse. Sir +Samuel Romilly was of opinion that the work would be prosecuted for +blasphemy, though it escaped that fate in consequence of the +writer’s eminence. With a Biographical Preface by J. M. Wheeler + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>Utilitarianism</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 3</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“A place must be assigned to Bentham among the +masters of wisdom.”—<i>John Stuart Mill.</i></p> +<p>“A man of first-rate genius.”—<i>Edward +Dicey.</i></p> +<p>“It is impossible to know Bentham without admiring and +revering him<span class="corr" id="xd21e870" title= +"Not in source">.</span>”—<i>Sir Samuel Romilly.</i></p> +<p>“Everything that comes from the pen or from the mind of Mr. +Bentham is entitled to profound regard.”—<i>James +Mill.</i></p> +<p>“He found jurisprudence a gibberish and left it a +science.”—<i>Macaulay.</i></p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb66" href="#pb66" name= +"pb66">66</a>]</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">COLLINS, ANTHONY</p> +<p><b>Free Will and Necessity.</b> A Philosophical Inquiry concerning +Human Liberty. First published in 1715. Now reprinted with Preface and +Annotations by <span class="sc">G. W. Foote</span>, and a Biographical +Introduction by J. M. Wheeler +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“I do not know of anything that has been +advanced by later writers in support of the scheme of Necessity, of +which the germ is not to be found in the Inquiry of +Collins.”—<i>Prof. Dugald Stewart.</i></p> +<p>“Collins states the arguments against human freedom with a +logical force unsurpassed by any Necessitarian.”—<i>Prof. +A. C. Fraser.</i></p> +<p>“Collins writes with wonderful power and closeness of +reasoning.”—<i>Professor Huxley.</i></p> +<p>“Collins was one of the most terrible enemies of the Christian +religion.”—<i>Voltaire.</i></p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">DIDEROT & D’HOLBACH</p> +<p><b>The Code of Nature</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">FEUERBACH, LUDWIG</p> +<p><b>The Essence of Religion.</b> God the Image of Man, Man’s +Dependence upon Nature the Last and Only Source of Religion + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“No one has demonstrated, and explained the +purely human origin of the idea of God better than Ludwig +Feuerbach.”—<i>Büchner.</i></p> +<p>“I confess that to Feuerbach I owe a debt of inestimable +gratitude. Feeling about in uncertainty for the ground, and finding +everywhere shifting sands, Feuerbach cast a sudden blaze in the +darkness and disclosed to me the way.”—<i>Rev. S. Baring +Gould.</i></p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">FOOTE, G. W.</p> +<p><b>The Grand Old Book.</b> A Reply to the Grand Old Man. An +Exhaustive Answer to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone’s +“Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture” + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><i>Bound in cloth</i> +<span class="adPrice">1 6</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><span class= +"sc">Contents</span>:—Preface—Preliminary View—The +Creation Story—The Fall of Man—The Psalms—The Mosaic +Legislation—Corroborations of Scripture—Gladstone and +Huxley—Modern Scepticism.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Is Socialism Sound?</b> Four Nights’ Public Debate with +Annie Besant <span class= +"adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +0</span></p> +<p><b>Christianity and Secularism.</b> Four <span class="corr" id= +"xd21e998" title="Source: Night’s">Nights’</span> Public +Debate with the Rev. Dr. James McCann + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 6</span> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb67" href="#pb67" name= +"pb67">67</a>]</span></p> +<p><b>Darwin on God</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><span class="sc">Contents</span>:—Darwin’s +Grandfather—Darwin’s Father—Darwin’s Early +Piety—Almost a Clergyman—On Board the +“Beagle”—Settling at Down—Death and +Burial—Purpose of Pamphlet—Some Objections—Darwin +Abandons Christianity—Deism—Creation—Origin of +Life—Origin of Man—Animism—A Personal +Creator—Design—Divine Beneficence—Religion and +Morality—Agnosticism and Atheism.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Reminiscences of Charles Bradlaugh</b> + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>Infidel Death-Beds.</b> Second Edition, much enlarged + <span class="adPrice">0 +8</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +3</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">List of Freethinkers dealt with: Lord Amberley, +Baskerville, Bayle, Bentham, Bert, Lord Bolingbroke, Broussais, Bruno, +Buckle, Byron, Carlile, Clifford, Clootz, Collins, Comte, Condorcet, +Cooper, D’Alembert, Danton, Charles and Erasmus Darwin, Delambre, +Diderot, Dolet, George Eliot, Frederick the Great, Gambetta, Garibaldi, +Gendre, Gibbon, Godwin, Gœthe, Grote, Helvetius, Hetherington, +Hobbes, Austin Holyoake, Hugo, Hume, Littré, Harriet Martineau, +Jean Meslier, James and John Stuart Mill, Mirabeau, Robt. Owen, Paine, +Palmer, Rabelais, Read, Mdme. Roland, George Sand, Schiller, Shelley, +Spinoza, Strauss, Toland, Vanini, Voltaire, Volney, Watson, John Watts, +Woolston.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Letters to the Clergy.</b> <i>First Series.</i> 128pp. + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">1, <span class="sc">Creation</span>, to the Bishop of +Carlisle; 2, <span class="sc">The Believing Thief</span>, to the Rev. +C. H. Spurgeon; 3, <span class="sc">The Atonement</span>, to the Bishop +of Peterborough; 4, <span class="sc">Old Testament Morality</span>, to +the Rev. E. Conder, D.D.; 5, <span class="sc">Inspiration</span>, to +the Rev. R. F. Horton, M.A.; 6, <span class="sc">Credentials of the +Gospel</span>, to the Rev. Prof. J. A. Beet; 7, <span class= +"sc">Miracles</span>, to the Rev. Brownlow Maitland; 8, <span class= +"sc">Prayer</span>, to the Rev. T. Teignmouth Shore, M.A.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Defence of Free Speech.</b> Three Hours’ Address to the +Jury before Lord Coleridge. 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Mill + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“Christian Evidence writers make the passage on +Christ their stock reliance, and Mr. Foote thoroughly dissects and +analyses it, and denounces it as valueless.”—<i>National +Reformer.</i></p> +</div> +<p><b>The Shadow of the Sword.</b> A Moral and Statistical Essay on War + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“An ably written pamphlet, exposing the horrors +of war and the burden imposed upon the people by the war systems of +Europe.”—<i>Echo.</i></p> +<p>“A trenchant exposure of the folly of war, which everyone +should read.”—<i>Weekly Times.</i></p> +</div> +<p><b>Royal Paupers.</b> Showing what Royalty does for the People, and +what the People do for Royalty +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p><b>The Dying Atheist.</b> A Story + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>Was Jesus Insane?</b> A searching inquiry into the mental +condition of the Prophet of Nazareth + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>Is the Bible Inspired?</b> A Criticism on <i>Lux Mundi</i> + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>The Rev. Hugh Price Hughes’s Converted Atheist<span class= +"corr" id="xd21e1249" title="Not in source">.</span></b> A Lie in Five +Chapters <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>Bible Heroes.</b> <i>First Series</i>, in elegant wrapper + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">(1) Mr. Adam, (2) Captain Noah, (3) Father Abraham, +(4) Juggling Jacob, (5) Master Joseph, (6) Joseph’s Brethren, (7) +Holy Moses I., (8) Moses II., (9) Parson Aaron, (10) General Joshua, +(11) Jephthah and Co., (12) Professor Samson. <i>One Penny each +singly</i></p> +</div> +<p><b>Bible Heroes.</b> <i>Second Series</i>, in elegant wrapper + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">(13) Prophet Samuel, (14) King Saul, (15) Saint David +I., (16) Saint David II., (17) Sultan Solomon, (18) Poor Job, (19) +Hairy Elijah, (20) Bald Elisha, (21) General Jehu, (22) Doctor Daniel, +(23) The Prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Hosea), (24) St. Peter, +(25) St. Paul.</p> +</div> +<p><b>Bible Romances.</b> New Edition. Revised and largely +rewritten.—(1) The Creation Story, 2d.; (2) Eve and the Apple, +1d.; (3) Cain and Abel, 1d.; (4) Noah’s Flood, 2d.; (5) The Tower +of Babel, 1d.; (6) Lot’s Wife, 1d.; (7) The Ten Plagues, 1d.; (8) +The Wandering Jews, 1d.; (9) Balaam’s Ass, 1d.; (10) God in a +Box, 1d.; (11) Jonah and the Whale, <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb69" +href="#pb69" name="pb69">69</a>]</span>1d.; (12) Bible Animals, 1d.; +(13) A Virgin Mother, 2d.; (14) The Resurrection, 2d.; (15) The +Crucifixion, 1d.; (16) John’s Nightmare, 1d.</p> +<p class="adAuthor">G. W. FOOTE & W. P. BALL</p> +<p><b>Bible Handbook for Freethinkers and Inquiring Christians.</b> +Complete, paper covers +<span class="adPrice">1 4</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +0</span></p> +<p>Sold also in separate Parts as follows—</p> +<p><b>1. Bible Contradictions.</b> The Contradictions are printed in +parallel columns <span class= +"adPrice">0 4</span></p> +<p><b>2. Bible Absurdities.</b> All the chief Absurdities from Genesis +to Revelation, conveniently and strikingly arranged, with appropriate +headlines, giving the point of each absurdity in a sentence + <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p><b>3. Bible Atrocities.</b> Containing all the godly wickedness from +Genesis to Revelation. Each infamy has a separate headline for easy +reference <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p><b>4. Bible Immoralities, Indecencies, Obscenities, Broken Promises, +and Unfulfilled Prophecies</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 4</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">G. W. FOOTE & J. M. WHEELER</p> +<p><b>The Jewish Life of Christ.</b> Being the <i>Sepher Toldoth +Jeshu</i>, or Book of the Generation of Jesus. With an Historical +Preface and Voluminous Notes +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“Messrs. G. W. Foote and J. M. Wheeler have laid +the Freethought party under great obligation by the careful manner in +which they have collected and stated the information on a very doubtful +and difficult subject.... We have no hesitation in giving unqualified +praise to the voluminous and sometimes very erudite +notes.”—<i>National Reformer.</i></p> +</div> +<p><b>Crimes of Christianity.</b> Vol. I., cloth gilt, 216pp. Hundreds +of exact References to Standard Authorities. No pains spared to make it +a complete, trustworthy, final, unanswerable Indictment of Christianity + <span class="adPrice">2 +6</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><span class="sc">Chapters</span>:—(1) Christ to +Constantine; (2) Constantine to Hypatia; (3) Monkery; (4) Pious +Forgeries; (5) Pious Frauds; (6) Rise of the Papacy; (7) Crimes of the +Popes; (8) Persecution of the Jews; (9) The Crusades.</p> +</div> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“The book is very carefully compiled, the +references are given with exactitude, and the work is calculated to be +of the greatest use to the opponents of +Christianity.”—<i>National Reformer.</i> <span class= +"pagenum">[<a id="pb70" href="#pb70" name="pb70">70</a>]</span></p> +<p>“The book is worth reading. It is fair, and on the whole +correct.”—<i>Weekly Times.</i></p> +<p>“The book has a purpose, and is entitled to a fair +hearing.”<span class="corr" id="xd21e1390" title= +"Source: ">—</span><i>Huddersfield Examiner.</i></p> +<p>“The work should be scattered like autumn +leaves.”—<i>Ironclad Age</i> (U.S.A.)</p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">HUME, DAVID</p> +<p><b>The Mortality of the Soul.</b> With an Introduction by +<span class="sc">G. W. Foote</span>. This essay was first published +after Hume’s death. It is not included in the ordinary editions +of the <i>Essays</i>. Prof. Huxley calls it “A remarkable +essay” and “a model of clear and vigorous statement” + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>Liberty and Necessity.</b> An argument against Free Will and in +favor of Moral Causation +<span class="adPrice">0 4</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">INGERSOLL, COL. ROBERT G.</p> +<p><b>Some Mistakes of Moses.</b> The only complete edition in England. +Accurate as Colenso, and fascinating as a novel. 132pp. + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><i>Superior Edition, on superfine paper, bound in cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p><b>Defence of Freethought.</b> A five hours’ speech at the +Trial of C. B. Reynolds for Blasphemy + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>Reply to Gladstone.</b> With a Biography by J. M. Wheeler + <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p><b>Rome or Reason?</b> A Reply to Cardinal Manning + <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p><b>Crimes against Criminals</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 3</span></p> +<p><b>Why am I an Agnostic?</b> Parts I. and II., each + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>Faith and Fact.</b> Reply to Rev. Dr. Field + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>God and Man.</b> Second Reply to Dr. Field + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>The Dying Creed</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p><b>The Household of Faith</b> +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p><b>The Limits of Toleration.</b> A Discussion with the Hon. F. D. +Coudert and Gov. S. L. 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M. Wheeler + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">PAINE, THOMAS</p> +<p><b>The Age of Reason.</b> New edition, with Preface by <span class= +"sc">G. W. Foote</span> +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><b>Miscellaneous Theological Works</b> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>Rights of Man.</b> With a Political Biography by J. M Wheeler. +Paper covers <span class= +"adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><i>Bound in cloth</i> +<span class="adPrice">2 0</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">SHELLEY</p> +<p><b>A Refutation of Deism.</b> In a Dialogue. With an Introduction by +G. W. Foote <span class= +"adPrice">0 4</span></p> +<p class="adAuthor">THOMSON, JAMES (B.V.)</p> +<p><b>Satires and Profanities.</b> New edition + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first"><span class="sc">Contents</span>:—The Story of a +Famous Old Jewish Firm (Jehovah, Son & Co.)—The Devil in the +Church of England—Religion in the Rocky Mountains—Christmas +Eve in the Upper Circles—A Commission of Inquiry on +Royalty—A Bible Lesson on Monarchy—The One Thing +Needful.</p> +</div> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">“It cannot be neglected by any who are +interested in one of the most pathetic personages of our +time”—<i>Academy.</i></p> +<p>“As clever as they are often profane”—<i>Christian +World.</i></p> +<p>“Well worth preserving”—<i>Weekly +Dispatch.</i></p> +<p>“Reminds one of the genius of Swift.”—<i>Oldham +Chronicle.</i></p> +</div> +<p class="adAuthor">WHEELER, J. 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Portrait and Biography, <i>cloth gilt</i> + <span class="adPrice">8 +0</span></p> +<p>The Influence of Heredity on Free-will + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>CATTELL, CHARLES C.</b></p> +<p>Thoughts for Thinking, from the Literature of all Ages + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p>Against Christianity: showing its Theory Incredible and its Practice +Impossible <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p>The Religion of this Life +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p>The Second Coming of Christ +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p>Recollections of Charles Bradlaugh + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>CARLILE, RICHARD.</b></p> +<p>A Manual of Freemasonry, cloth, gilt + <span class="adPrice">2 +6</span></p> +<p><b>C. N.</b></p> +<p>What is Religion? A vindication of Freethought + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>COLLINS, W. 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W.</b>, M.D., LL.D.</p> +<p>The Conflict between Religion and Science + <span class="adPrice">5 +0</span></p> +<p><b>DOCTOR OF MEDICINE</b> (<b>A</b>).</p> +<p>The Elements of Social Science; or Physical, Sexual and Natural +Religion. An exposition of the true cause and only cure of the three +primary social evils—Poverty, Prostitution and Celibacy. 604 pp., +<i>cloth</i> <span class= +"adPrice">3 0</span></p> +<p><b>DREW, MENA</b> (<b>Miss</b>).</p> +<p>Hints on Nursing; with a Preface by Dr. Allbutt + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p>Monthly Nursing <span class= +"adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><b>DRYSDALE, C. R.</b>, M.D.</p> +<p>Vegetarian Fallacies +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p>The Cause of Poverty +<span class="adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>The Length of Life of Total Abstainers and Moderate Drinkers +Compared <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>DYMOND, C.</b>, F.S.A., <b>and BROADHURST-NICHOLS</b>, Rev. +J.</p> +<p>The Practical Value of Christianity. Prize Essays, for and against + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>EADON, S.</b>, M.A., M.D., LL.D.</p> +<p>A Few Facts Relative to the Antiquity of Man; with an Appendix from +an Astronomical Standpoint +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p><b>ELLIOTT, F. J.</b>, M.R.A.C., F.H.A.S.</p> +<p>The Land Question; its Examination and Solution, from an +Agricultural point of view. Published at 5/– Reduced to [Postage +4½d.] <span class= +"adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><b>FOOTE, G. W.</b></p> +<p>Bible Romances. New Edition. Revised and largely +rewritten.—(1) The Creation Story, 2d.; (2) Eve and the Apple, +1d.; (3) Cain and Abel, 1d.; (4) Noah’s Flood, 2d.; (5) The Tower +of Babel, 1d.; (6) Lot’s Wife, 1d.; (7) The Ten Plagues, 1d.; (8) +The Wandering Jews, 1d.; (9) Balaam’s Ass, 1d.; (10) God in a +Box, 1d.; (11) Jonah and the Whale, 1d.; (12) Bible Animals, 1d.; (13) +A Virgin Mother, 2d.; (14) The Resurrection, 2d.; (15) The Crucifixion, +1d.; (16) St. John’s Nightmare, 1d.</p> +<p>The Grand Old Book: a Reply to the Grand Old Man. An exhaustive +reply to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone’s “Impregnable Rock +of Holy Scripture,” <i>cloth</i> 1/6 + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p>Reminiscences of Charles Bradlaugh + <span class="adPrice">0 6</span> +<span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb77" href="#pb77" name= +"pb77">77</a>]</span></p> +<p><b>FOOTE, G. W., and G. BERNARD SHAW.</b></p> +<p>Two Nights’ Debate on the Eight Hours Question; 77 pp. + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>FORDER, R.</b></p> +<p>“There was War in Heaven” (Rev. xii. 7), a Satirical +Infidel Sermon <span class= +"adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>St. Agnes and St. Bridget, and their Pagan Prototypes + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p><b>FOURNIER, ALFRED.</b></p> +<p>Syphilis and Marriage. Translated from the French by Alfred Lingard, +F.R.C.S.; pub. at 10/6, reduced to +<span class="adPrice">5 0</span></p> +<p><b>GASKELL, G. A.</b></p> +<p>The Futility of Pecuniary Thrift as a means to General Well-being + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p>Social Control of the Birth-rate and Endowment of Mothers + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p><b>GIBBON, EDWARD.</b></p> +<p>Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. With Notes and Memoirs by +Guizot. Containing 1,340 pp., with complete Indices, and a Portrait of +Gibbon from a painting by Reynolds. In two vols., super royal 8vo. +(pub. by Virtue and Co. at 36/–) + <span class="adPrice">8 +6</span></p> +<p><b>GILES, Rev. Dr.</b></p> +<p>Apostolical Records, from the date of the Crucifixion to the middle +of the second century. Pub. at 10/6. pp. 438 + <span class="adPrice">3 +6</span></p> +<p>“One feels astonished that the man who wrote this book could +remain a priest in the Church of England. To justify their existence, +the young lions of the Christian Evidence Society ought certainly to +attempt a reply to this remarkable work.”—Extract from a +Letter from a Cambridge M.A.</p> +<p><b>GILBERT, WILLIAM.</b></p> +<p>The City; an inquiry into the Corporation, its Livery Companies, and +the Administration of their Charities and Endowments. <i>Cloth, gilt +lettered</i>, pub. at 5/– Reduced to [postage 4½d.] + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>GOULD, F. J.</b></p> +<p>The Agnostic Island: a Novel +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><b>HARTMANN, EDWARD von.</b></p> +<p>The Religion of the Future. Translated from the German by Ernest +Dare; <i>cloth</i> <span class= +"adPrice">2 0</span></p> +<p><b>HARDAKER, W.</b></p> +<p>(Translated by) Old Thoughts for New Thinkers. Selections from the +“<span lang="fr">Pensées Philosophiques</span>” of +Diderot <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb78" href="#pb78" name= +"pb78">78</a>]</span></p> +<p><b>HERSHON, PAUL ISAAC.</b></p> +<p>Genesis, with a Talmudical Commentary. With an Introductory Essay on +the Talmud by H. D. Spencer; <i>cloth gilt</i>, 560 pp., pub. at 10/6; +by parcel post, 2/6 <span class= +"adPrice">2 0</span></p> +<p>“<b>HISTORICUS.</b>”</p> +<p>The Lords and what they have done + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>HITHERSAY, R. & G. ERNEST.</b></p> +<p>Life of Saladin <span class= +"adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><b>HONE, WILLIAM.</b></p> +<p>The Apocryphal New Testament. Being all the Gospels and Epistles now +extant, attributed to Jesus Christ, his Apostles and companions, not +included in the new Testament. Royal 8vo., <i>cloth</i>, pub. at +5/–; postage 4½d. +<span class="adPrice">2 6</span></p> +<p>Ancient Mysteries Described. With engravings on copper and wood; +very curious, pub. at 5/–; postage 4½d. + <span class="adPrice">2 +6</span></p> +<p><b>HUGHAN, SAMUEL.</b></p> +<p>Hereditary Peers and Hereditary Paupers: the two extremes of English +Society. 142 large pages, pub. at 1/–; post free, 9d., reduced to + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>HUGO, VICTOR.</b></p> +<p>Oration on Voltaire +<span class="adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p><b>HOWELL, MISS CONSTANCE</b></p> +<p>A Biography of Jesus Christ; <i>cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p>The After Life of the Apostles; <i>cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p>A History of the Jews, <i>cloth</i> 1 6</p> +<p>The above works were written for young Freethinkers.</p> +<p><b>HOLYOAKE, G. J.</b></p> +<p>The Trial of Theism; Accused of Obstructing Secular Life; <i>cloth, +gilt lettered</i>, pub. at 4/–. Reduced to [postage 3d.] + <span class="adPrice">1 +6</span></p> +<p>What would Follow the Effacement of Christianity? + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p>The Last Trial for Atheism in England: a Fragment of an +Autobiography. Pub. at 1/6, post free + <span class="adPrice">0 +8</span></p> +<p>The Principles of Secularism Illustrated, post free + <span class="adPrice">0 +4</span></p> +<p>Secularism, A Religion that gives Heaven no Trouble + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p>The Logic of Death <span class= +"adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>New Ideas of the Day +<span class="adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>“<b>HUMANITAS.</b>”</p> +<div class="table"> +<table class="xd21e2028"> +<tr> +<td class="cellLeft cellTop">Jacob the Wrestler,</td> +<td class="cellRight cellTop"><i>cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +6</span></td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td class="cellLeft cellBottom"> +<table class="ditto"> +<tr class="s"> +<td>Jacob</td> +</tr> +<tr class="d"> +<td>,,</td> +</tr> +</table> +<table class="ditto"> +<tr class="s"> +<td>the</td> +</tr> +<tr class="d"> +<td>,,</td> +</tr> +</table> +<table class="ditto"> +<tr class="s"> +<td>Wrestler,</td> +</tr> +<tr class="d"> +<td>,,</td> +</tr> +</table> +</td> +<td class="cellRight cellBottom"><i>paper</i> + <span class="adPrice">2 +0</span></td> +</tr> +</table> +</div> +<div class="blockquote"> +<p class="first">The most exhaustive criticism of Jacob that has ever +been written.</p> +</div> +<p><span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb79" href="#pb79" name= +"pb79">79</a>]</span></p> +<p>Thoughts upon Heaven +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p>Is God the First Cause? +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p>Christ’s Temptation +<span class="adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p>Charles Bradlaugh and the Irish Nation + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p>Socialism a Curse <span class= +"adPrice">0 3</span></p> +<p>A Fish in Labor, or Jonah and the Whale + <span class="adPrice">0 +3</span></p> +<p>Against Agnosticism +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p>Charles Bradlaugh and the Oath Question + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p>How Charles Bradlaugh was treated by House of Commons + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p>The Follies of the Lord’s Prayer Exposed + <span class="adPrice">0 +2</span></p> +<p>Against Socialism <span class= +"adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>God: Being a brief statement of Arguments against Agnosticism + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>HUME, DAVID.</b></p> +<p>On Miracles. With an Appendix, &c., by J. M. Wheeler + <span class="adPrice">0 +3</span></p> +<p>The Natural History of Religion. Complete and unexpurgated edition, +with the original notes, and an Introduction by J. M. Robertson; +<i>cloth</i> <span class= +"adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p>Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Originally issued in two +1/– parts, now complete in one vol. + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>HYNDMAN, H. M.</b></p> +<p>Booth’s Book Refuted +<span class="adPrice">0 1</span></p> +<p>The Indian Famine and the Crisis in India; pub. at 1/<span class= +"corr" id="xd21e2784" title="Not in source">–</span> + <span class="adPrice">0 +3</span></p> +<p><b>ILLINGWORTH, THOMAS</b></p> +<p>Distribution Reform; The Remedy for Industrial Depression and for +the removal of many Social Evils. 180 pp., pub. at 1/–. Reduced +to [post free] <span class= +"adPrice">0 6</span></p> +<p><b>INDIAN OFFICER, AN.</b></p> +<p>A Voice from the Ganges; or the True Source of Christianity. In +<i>cloth</i>, 1/6, in <i>paper covers</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>JANES, LEWIS G.</b></p> +<p>A Study of Primitive Christianity; <i>cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">6 +0</span></p> +<p><b>JANES, A.</b></p> +<p>A Practical Introduction to Shorthand + <span class="adPrice">0 +1</span></p> +<p>Shorthand without Complications: a complete guide to verbatim +Reporting <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p><b>JONES, L. A. ATHERLEY</b>, M.P.</p> +<p>The Miners’ Handy Book to the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, +with notes; <i>cloth</i> +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span> <span class="pagenum">[<a id="pb80" +href="#pb80" name="pb80">80</a>]</span></p> +<p><b>“JULIAN.”</b></p> +<p>The Pillars of the Church; or the Gospels and Councils + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>LAIRD, JAMES L.</b></p> +<p>(Translated by) The Darwinian Theory and the Law of the Migration of +Organisms. From the German of Moritz Wagner, Honorary Professor at the +Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, and Member Extraordinary of the +Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><b>LEWINS, ROBERT</b>, M.D.</p> +<p>Life and Mind: on the Basis of Modern Medicine; <i>cloth</i> + <span class="adPrice">1 +0</span></p> +<p>Auto-Centricism ; or the Brain-Theory of Life and Mind + <span class="adPrice">0 +6</span></p> +<p><b>LENNSTRAND, VICTOR.</b></p> +<p>The God Idea. A Lecture; for delivering which the author was +sentenced to six months imprisonment. Translated from the Swedish. With +an Introduction by J. M. Wheeler +<span class="adPrice">0 2</span></p> +<p><b>MACCALL, W.</b></p> +<p>The Newest Materialism. Sundry Papers on the Books of Mill, Comte, +Bain, Spencer, Atkinson, and Feuerbach; <i>cloth</i>; pub. at +5/<span class="corr" id="xd21e2908" title= +"Not in source">–</span> +<span class="adPrice">1 0</span></p> +<p><b>MAJOR F——</b></p> +<p>The Agonies of Hanging. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license + + +Title: Essays in Rationalism + +Author: Charles Robert Newman + +Release Date: May 30, 2014 [EBook #45823] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM *** + + + + +Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net/ for Project +Gutenberg (This book was produced from scanned images of +public domain material from the Google Print project.) + + + + + + + + + ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM + + BY + CHARLES ROBERT NEWMAN + (Brother of Cardinal Newman.) + + WITH PREFACE + BY + GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE. + + AND + + BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH + BY + J. M. WHEELER. + + + + LONDON: + PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY, + 28 Stonecutter Street, E.C. + 1891 + + + + + + + + LONDON: + PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTE, + 28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C. + + + + + + + +ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM. + + +PUBLISHER'S NOTE. + + +Whether this little volume will find sufficient patrons to defray +the cost of its production is at least doubtful. The writer whose +essays it contains lived in obscurity and will never be popular. But +he possessed a fine intellect, however frustrated by circumstances; +he belonged to an illustrious family; and it is well to let the public +have access to the opinions of a brother of Cardinal Newman and of +Professor Newman, a brother who took his own course, as they did, +and thought out for himself an independent philosophy. + +All Charles Robert Newman's writings that are known to have been +printed, appeared in the Reasoner, edited by Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, +at various dates during 1860-61. With trifling exceptions they are +all reprinted in this collection. + +Mr. Holyoake has kindly supplied a brief account of the atheistic +Newman, and Mr. J. M. Wheeler has gathered all the information that +is obtainable as to his life and personality. + + + + + + + +BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. + + +Of Charles Robert Newman, until the death of his brother, the Cardinal, +almost nothing was known. Some reminiscences of him by Mr. Thomas +Purnell and Precentor Edmund Venables appeared in the Athenaeum at +the time of his death in 1884, and these remain the chief sources +of information concerning him. Mr. G. J. Holyoake also, in his paper +The Present Day, wrote: "If the public come to know more of Charles +R. Newman, it will be seen that all the brothers, John Henry, Francis +William, and Charles R. Newman, were men of unusual distinction of +character, and that while each held diverse views, all had the family +qualities of perspicacity, candor and conscience." But these notes +attracted little attention. Most people were under the impression +there were only two brothers, who had long figured in the public eye +as types of the opposite courses of modern thought towards Romanism +and Rationalism. Yet the real type of antagonism to Rome was to be +found in Charles Robert, who is dismissed by the Rev. Thomas Mozley +with the words: "There was also another brother, not without his +share in the heritage of natural gifts." + +In a notable passage on change of religion, in his Essay in Aid of +a Grammar of Assent, chap. vii., Cardinal Newman seems to allude +to the career of himself and his brothers. He says: "Thus of three +Protestants, one becomes a Catholic, a second a Unitarian, and a +third an unbeliever: how is this? The first becomes a Catholic, +because he assented, as a Protestant, to the doctrine of our Lord's +divinity, with a real assent and a genuine conviction, and because +this certitude, taking possession of his mind, led him on to welcome +the Catholic doctrines of the Real Presence and of the Theotocos, +till his Protestantism fell off from him, and he submitted himself +to the Church. The second became a Unitarian, because, proceeding +on the principle that Scripture was the rule of faith, and that a +man's private judgment was its rule of interpretation, and finding +that the doctrine of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds did not follow +by logical necessity from the text of Scripture, he said to himself, +'The word of God has been made of none effect by the traditions of +men,' and therefore nothing was left for him but to profess what he +considered primitive Christianity and to become a Humanitarian. The +third gradually subsided into infidelity, because he started with +the Protestant dogma, cherished in the depths of his nature, that a +priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the Gospel. First, +then, he would protest against the sacrifice of the Mass; next he gave +up baptismal regeneration and the sacramental principle; then he asked +himself whether dogmas were not a restraint on Christian liberty as +well as Sacraments; then came the question, What after all was the +use of teachers of religion? Why should any one stand between him and +his Maker? After a time it struck him that this obvious question had +to be answered by the Apostles, as well as by the Anglican clergy; +so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revelation of God +to man is that which is written on the heart. This did for a time, +and he remained a Deist. But then it occurred to him, that this inward +moral law was there within the breast, whether there was a God or not, +and that it was a roundabout way of enforcing that law, to say that it +came from God and simply unnecessary, considering it carried with it +its own sacred and sovereign authority, as our feelings instinctively +testified, and when he turned to look at the physical world around +him, he really did not see what scientific proof there was of the +Being of God at all, and it seemed to him as if all things would +go quite as well as at present without that hypothesis as with it; +so he dropped it, and became a purus putus Atheist." + +I have transcribed this lengthy, but remarkable passage, not because +I think it correctly describes the process of thought in his two +brothers, but rather as an illustration that his own imaginative +synthesis of their position derives its life and force from the fact +that he had before him concrete instances in the person of his own +nearest relatives. + +Charles Robert Newman, younger brother of the Cardinal and elder +brother of the Professor, was born on June 16, 1802, being one year and +four months the junior of the former, and three years the senior of the +latter. [1] Their father, a London man, and friend of Capel the eminent +stockbroker, from having been clerk in a bank, became a partner, +though he afterwards failed at a time of great commercial depression, +both in this business and as a brewer. He was a Freemason, a musician, +and had schemes of social improvement by reclaiming waste land and +planting with trees. In religion his views appear to have been of a +broad cast approximating to those of Benjamin Franklin. The mother, +whose maiden name was Jemima Fourdrinier, was of Hugenot family, and +of religious cast of mind. There were six children, equally divided +as to sex. Harriet, the eldest girl, married the Rev. Thomas Mozley; +Jemima, the second, married Mr. John Mozley; while Mary, the youngest, +died unmarried. + +Charles Robert was educated at the same school as his two brothers, +John Henry and Francis William, that of Dr. George Nicholas at Ealing, +Middlesex. + +Of the influences which moulded his mind we can only speak from what +is known of his brothers. John Henry has told how, in youth, he read +Paine's tracts against the Old Testament--we presume he means the +Age of Reason--and also boasted of reading Hume, though, as he says, +this was possibly but by way of brag. + +Evidently, though the family was brought up in the habit of Bible +reading, there was considerable freedom allowed as to the direction of +their studies. While the father lived family prayer was unknown, nor +was there any inculcation of dogma. "We read," says Francis William, +"the Psalms appointed by the church every day, and went to the parish +church on Sunday." + +Francis William Newman, in his "Contributions, Chiefly to the Early +History of Cardinal Newman," says: "In opening life, my brother +C. R. N. became a convert to Robert Owen, the philanthropic Socialist, +who was then an Atheist. [2] But soon breaking loose from him, +Charles tried to originate a 'New Moral World' of his own, which +seemed to others absurd and immoral, as well as very unamiable. He +disowned us all, on my father's death, as 'too religious for him.' To +keep a friend, or to act under a superior, seemed alike impossible +to him. His brother (the late Cardinal) humbled himself to beg a +clerkship for him in the Bank of England; but Charles thought it +'his duty' to write to the Directors letters of advice, so they could +not keep him. Nor could he keep any place long. He said he ought to +take a literary degree at Bonn: his two brothers managed it for him, +but he came away without seeking the degree. His brother-in-law, +the Rev. Thomas Mozley, then took him up very liberally; but after +my sister Harriet's death, J. H. N. and I bore his expenses to his +dying day. His meanness seemed to me like that of an old cynic; +yet his moderation was exemplary, and at last he undoubtedly won the +respect of the mother and daughter who waited on him." + +In this, which is nearly all he has to say of this elder brother, +it appears to me Professor Newman has either said too little or +too much. The title of his work did not necessitate any reference +to Charles Robert; but having said so much he should at least have +explained further. For instance, in reference to the visit to Bonn, +it was exceedingly natural in the second brother seeking to take a +degree, since both his senior and junior had a college education. That +he did not share in this advantage may have well tended to sour +his life. Mr. Meynell explains why he returned without seeking the +degree. He says: "But he came away without even offering himself for +examination, a step he explained by saying that the judges would not +grant him a degree because he had given offence by his treatment of +faith and morals [it is a Catholic who writes] in an essay which they +call teterrima." Charles may have acted with extreme imprudence, both +in regard to the bank directors and the Bonn examiners; but we should +need to know the cases before we can determine whether he was actuated +by wilful waywardness or by adherence to a higher than common standard +of conduct. Each of the brothers had evidently exquisite sensitiveness +of conscience, though, as proved by the Professor's last book--that +unique criticism of a brother who died at ninety by another aged +eighty-five--they could not always enter into sympathy with each other. + +Of this we may be quite sure. The life of one who had thought himself +into Atheism, yet contemplated becoming a tutor, must have been a most +uncomfortable one. The treatment he was likely to receive could not +be calculated to evoke his better qualities. Finding everywhere his +Atheism a bar to his advancement, whose is the fault if it resulted +in a character of petulance and cynicism, and in--what it evidently +did result in--a largely wasted life? + +The Rev. Edward Venables, Precentor of Lincoln, speaks of him as having +been, between 1834 and 1844, usher in a large school for farmers' sons, +kept by a Mr. Allfree at Windmill Hill, in the parish of Herstmonceaux, +Sussex, where Julius Charles Hare, Archdeacon of Lewes, was rector, +and John Sterling for a short while curate. Mr. Venables says Newman +"interested Archdeacon Hare very much, and I have often heard him +speak of the long conversations he had had with him on literary +and philosophical subjects, and of the remarkable mental power he +displayed. At that time the future Cardinal's brother had entirely +discarded the Christian faith, and declared himself an unbeliever +in revelation." There can be no doubt the tribute from Hare, a man +of very superior culture, was deserved, though the archdeacon also +expressed the opinion "there was a screw loose somewhere." + +The task of teaching the Sussex rustics was, as Precentor Venables +remarks, intolerably irksome to a man of Newman's high intellectual +power. It was like chopping logs with a fine-edged razor. His +relations with his principal became strained, and a tussle between +the usher and his class led to his dismissal. At this time he +was miserably poor. Precentor Venables says: "To Hare he lamented +the narrow-mindedness of his brothers John and Francis, who, as he +asserted, had entirely cast him off, and left him to fight his way in +the world unaided, because of his professed infidelity, in which the +younger of the two, then an ardent Evangelical, was before very long +to follow him." No reproach whatever is due to the younger brother on +this account, and the elder is probably as little blameworthy. John +Henry could not be expected to recommend as tutor one whose views +upon faith and morals he considered unsound. Francis William had +gone to Bagdad with the object of assisting in a Christian mission, +and intercourse with Mohammedans and other studies were but gradually +loosening his orthodoxy. After his return, and when his works and +professorship at London University assured his position, he put himself +into regular monthly communication with his brother. In the meantime +he had been assisted by his sister Harriet's husband. But the iron had +already entered his soul; he was an Atheist and an outcast. Forced to +receive the bounty of relatives who deplored his opinions, he seems to +have resented their kindness as an attempt to bribe his intellectual +conscience. The world rang with the fame--as theologian, historian, +poet, and preacher--of the elder, whose creed he had outgrown and +despised; while his convictions, to the full as honest, everywhere +stood in his way, and were contemned as an offence against faith and +morals. He had no contact with minds congenial to his own, and doomed +himself to the life of a recluse. + +Each of the brothers was of a retiring, meditative disposition. Reading +the Apologia Pro Vita Sua of the eldest, one may see how this +contributed towards his seeking a refuge in the Catholic Church. The +same disposition of mind may be traced in the Phases of Faith of +the youngest, equally impelling him from the evangelicalism of his +surroundings and leading to the rejection of historic Christianity, +and finally to the surrender of all belief in revelation. In Charles +Robert Newman the same qualities were seen to excess, removing him +from contact with his fellows to the life of a solitary thinker in +a quiet Welsh watering-place. From about 1853, he had a room in a +small cottage on the Marsh road, Tenby. + +Mr. Thomas Purnell, who says he had for years "the inestimable +privilege of enjoying his close intimacy," remarks, "never before +or since have I met a man endowed with as rare an intellectual +equipment." Mr. Purnell thus describes his own first visit to the +recluse: "He stood at the top of the topmost stair. I cannot imagine a +more distinguished head and face. There was a touch of Mephistopheles +in him. There was also a touch of Jupiter Olympius. Although dressed +in ill-fitting clothes, and with a sort of blanket over his shoulders, +he appeared to me to be the ideal of courtly grace. He bowed me without +a word into his apartments. This was in the roof of the building, +and the only light came from a window which opened with a notched iron +bar. The room was as meagrely furnished as Goethe's study in Weimar. A +bed, a chest of drawers, a table and two or three chairs, with a few +books, constituted the whole goods and chattels." Mr. Purnell says +"his health, means and inclination made him averse to society. The +rector called on him, but was not admitted; visitors to the town who +had known his brothers would send in their cards, but they received no +response; local medical men, when they heard he was ill, volunteered +their services, but they were declined with courteous thanks conveyed +by letter." + +It appears he but seldom left his house, and when he went out he did +not often enter the town, but took his exercise in the road which +led into the country. Dressed in a pea-jacket, with a shawl or a rug +thrown across his shoulders, and with a sou'-wester over his head, he +marched erect, looking neither to left nor right. He wore shoes, and, +as his trousers were short, displayed an interval of white socks. The +lads and lasses were apt to regard such a figure with derision. + +It was through Mr. Purnell that he communicated the papers here +reprinted to the Reasoner. Although but of the character of fragments, +they bespeak an original mind. The secret of the Cardinal's great +influence and strength was that what he spoke and wrote came not +from books, but forthright out of his own head and heart. The topics +with which his brother deals were those only needing the mind, +and his treatment shows they were viewed in the dry light of an +original intellect. The Reasoner ceased soon after the appearance +of these papers, and thus closed the one opening for his literary +activity. Francis William Newman was, at least till the present year, +unaware that his arguments for Theism were challenged by his own +brother under the signature of "A Recluse." He informs me that he +had never heard that anyone would publish anything from his pen, and +that he heard that at his death, in March, 1884, he left a box full +of manuscripts, which were destroyed as useless. Whether this was done +by order of his relatives, whether the landlady decided the question, +or whether the vicar or neighbors were called in, will perhaps remain +as unknown as the worth of the manuscripts. The following specimens +are all by which the latter question can be judged. + +Mr. Meynell says that two years before he died he had a short visit +from his eldest brother. It must have been a strange meeting, and +one worthy the brush of a great artist. Surely in all England there +were not two men of eighty whose thoughts were so divergent or two +brothers whose lives were so diversified. The one a saintly cardinal, +called by the Pope the Light of England, who, by his rare urbanity, +had gained the respect of all, replete with all that should accompany +old age--as honor, love, obedience, troops of friends: the other, +fallen, too, into the sere and yellow leaf, and without them all--poor, +solitary, unknown and despised, a scorn and wonderment to his nearest +neighbors. And all from following his own thought that had made him +a purus putus Atheist. + + + J. M. Wheeler. + + + + + + + +CHARACTER OF CHARLES NEWMAN. + + +There is little to say and less need to add anything to what +Mr. Wheeler writes, whose industry and discernment collect together all +the accessible facts of his subject. My knowledge of Charles Robert +Newman is confined to his correspondence, which, with my present +engagements, I could not refer to and examine without delaying the +printer longer than would be convenient to you, as Mr. Wheeler's +article is in type. The impression Mr. C. R. Newman conveyed to me by +his letters is, I judge, sufficient for the purpose in hand. Charles +Newman had an intermittent mind. He would write with great force +and clearness, and in another letter, which was confused in parts, +he would frankly say that his mind was leaving him, as was its wont +as I understood him, and after a few months less or more, it would +return to him, when he would write again. In this manly frankness +and strong self-consciousness he resembled his two eminent brothers +Francis and John. I trusted to his friend Mr. Purnell, who was the +medium in communicating with me, to send me further letters when +Mr. Charles was able or disposed to write them. I expected to hear +from him again. Much occupied with debates and otherwise at the time, +I neglected writing further to him myself. Afterwards thinking his +disablement might have grown upon him with years, disinclined me +from asking him to resume his letters. Mr. Wheeler seems ignorant of +Charles Newman's mental peculiarity, and does not recognise what may +be generous delicacy on the part of his brothers in not referring to +it. To do so would have subjected them to the imputation, very frequent +formerly, of imputing difference of opinion to want of saneness. Even +so liberal a preacher as W. J. Fox accounted, in 1841, for my disbelief +in Theism by conjecturing the existence of some mental deficiency. No +doubt many persons with whom Charles Newman had dealings in offices +he held, would regard his Atheism--which it was contrary to his nature +to conceal--as a personal disqualification. He avowed his opinions as +naturally and as boldly as Professor Newman and the Cardinal avowed +theirs. It is not conceivable that Cardinal Newman ever intermitted +his aid--or Professor Newman either--on this account. They were both +incapable of personal intolerance. They might deplore that their +brother Charles's opinions were so alien, so contrary to theirs; +but this they would never make matter of reproach. It was doubtless +a great trial to them that their brother, having fine powers like +their own, making no persistent effort for his own maintenance, +although he knew it must render independence impossible. Possibly +the solitariness which he chose caused his tendency to unusualness +of conduct, not to say eccentricity, to grow upon him--which they +could not control or mitigate without an interference, which might +subject them to resentment and reproach. Charles no doubt inherited +his father's sympathy for social improvement, which led to his sharing +Robert Owen's sociologic views. But he did not acquire his Atheism +from Robert Owen--as Professor Newman has said--for Robert Owen was +not an Atheist--always believing in some Great Power. + +Professor Newman has told me that in any further edition of his +little book upon his brother, the Cardinal, he will, on my authority, +correct his description of Robert Owen as an Atheist. Charles owed +his Atheism to himself, as his brothers owed their opinions to their +own conclusions and reflections. Charles not taking a degree was less +likely to be owing to means not being furnished to him than to his +intermittent indecision of mind and his strong discernment, which +produced satisfaction with the world, with others, and with himself. + + + George Jacob Holyoake. + + + + + + + +TWO PRINCIPLES OF ORDER. + + +In my proof of the invalidity of that argument--it being indeed what +is called "the Argument from Design"--I point out that our experience +simultaneously informs us of two modes of producing order, otherwise +called arrangement, relation of parts to each other and to the whole +direction of means towards some recognisable end; or, to describe +the phenomenon in the most summary, as well as the most practical, +way--two modes of producing effects identical with those that proceed +from design. I explain that, of these two principles of order, the one +is Design itself, a modus operandi of intelligence (such as we find +it here below, of which the human mind affords the best examples), +while the other is something to which no name has been assigned, +and which, consequently, we can only shortly describe by saying that +it is not design. It becomes necessary, therefore, to give a farther +periphrastic account of it as follows:-- + +This nameless principle of order, considered as a vague popular +surmise, is as familiar to our experience as design. We all +see, for instance, that water has a tendency to form a perfectly +level and horizontal surface, that heavy bodies fall to the earth +perpendicularly, that the plummet performs a straight line in just +the same direction, that dew-drops and soap-bubbles assume a globular +shape, that crystallisation observes similar artist-like rules, +and so on. We are accustomed to say, "It is the nature of things," +and we ground our daily actions on a confidence in this regularity of +proceeding, without generally attempting to explain it. Science comes +to our help, and shows us that this orderly action of things around +us may be traced to, and is the necessary result of, the operation of +certain powers or properties inherent in these natural things. Grant +that the property called gravitation belongs to moving bodies, +and an innumerable quantity of orderly phenomena may be predicated +as springing of their own accord by inevitable consequence from +this datum; which same phenomena, moreover, intelligence is able +coincidently to reproduce in its own special mental way. + +Here, then, is a principle of order, less popularly appreciated, +but not less certainly evidenced and known, than design. It is, no +doubt, a principle infinitely inferior in dignity, for it is blind +and unintelligent, while design sees and understands, but this is +not the question. The question, superseded by an answer derived from +human experience, is to this effect--that nature and natural things +are, with no less propriety, assignable as the doers of a certain +non-designing kind of order, than man is assignable as the doer of +the designing kind; that we just as truly perceive that nature, +in the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in +her, produces order in a dew-drop or in a crystal, as that man, in +the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in him, +produces order in a poem or in a cathedral, and that, consequently, +the argument from design, based as it is on the assertion that our +experience assures us of only one principle of order, is invalid. + +Mr. F. W. Newman's argument is one of this erroneous class. He points +to "Animal Instincts" as an effect, which, owing to our knowing of +no other agency by which it could have been produced, can alone +be accounted for by reference to a designer, and consequently as +manifesting the objective existence of that designer, who could only be +the theistic God. The question that Mr. F. Newman's adduced instance +required him to consider was, whether the non-designing principle of +order, which, we are aware, is in many cases able to produce the same +effects as the other, could have been thus operative here, and he had +got to prove that it could not have been so, that there was something +in the nature of the case that forced us exclusively to have recourse +to the intelligent principle of order, and resisted any solution from +the other principle. The result of a proof so conducted would have +been, that Mr. F. Newman was entitled to conclude that (granting our +earthly experience was a sufficient test of the matter) Design must +have been the sole worker of the debated phenomenon. He would then +have established his theistic argument. Instead of doing this, he +simplifies his proceeding by being incognisant of a notorious fact, +and ignoring the non-designing principle altogether. + +1. The fact is, that there is not one way only of producing the +phenomena of design (I am here using an ordinary elliptical mode +of speaking, since literal metaphysical correctness is sometimes +cumbrous)--but there are two ways: one, the mind of a designer, and +the other (whatever may be its nature, which the present question +does not call upon me to define) not the mind of a designer. + +2. The shortest way of proving this theorem, is to state that there +are two ways of your obtaining a facsimile of your own person. One +is to have your portrait taken, and the other is to stand before +a looking-glass, and that of these two ways the former is that of +design, and the latter confessedly not design, being the well-known +necessary effect of certain so-called second causes, whose operation +in this instance is familiar to modern science. + +3. Consequently, S. D. Collet is incorrect in the principle which +she makes the foundation of her argument at p. 27, where it is said, +"What the Theist maintains is this, that when we see the exercise of +Force in the direction of a purpose, we, by an inevitable inference, +attribute the phenomenon to some conscious agent." + +4. Force is seen to be exercised in the direction of a purpose--the +purpose being that of producing similitude--with equal evidence in +the two cases just compared; for though the force exercised in said +direction is less in the case of the painter than it is in that of the +looking-glass (for the resemblance produced by the former is in less +degree a resemblance than that produced by the latter), the evidence +cannot be said to be less, since it is no less able to convince. We +are as perfectly sure that the painter could not have produced that +lesser similitude of a man, and a particular man, by chance (the +alternative of this supposition, according to our experience, being +that he must have used design) as we are that the looking-glass could +not have produced that greater similitude of a man, and a particular +man, by chance (the alternative of this supposition, according to +our experience, being that it must have used certain so-called laws +of nature); this collective experience of ours, equally assuring us +on the one hand, that the only way of the painter's achieving these +effects is by design, and on the other, that the only way of the +looking-glass's doing so, is by the natural agencies referred to. + +5. The human experience on which the decision of this question must +be founded--though not at the present era essentially different--may +yet be said to be considerably so from what it was in certain former +periods. In no times could mankind think and observe without becoming +aware of these two principles of order--whether you call them facts +or inferences--as a portion of their familiar experience. And so far +as they might have compared them, they must have abundantly seen that +the natural one is more powerful than the artificial one, and that the +straight line or the circle must seek its perfection much rather from +the plummet or the revolving radius, than from the pencil of Apelles. + +6. Thus the essential point of the existence of the two principles +has always been known, but the idea of their respective spheres and +limits, of the efficient prevalence of each within our experience, has +fluctuated in society. Art and handicraft are, of course, peculiarly +competent to appreciate the artificial principle of order, while +physical science is especially conversant with the natural one. As the +ancients were equal to the moderns in the former pursuits, but vastly +inferior to them in the latter, they must so far have had a tendency to +think more of the designing principle, and less of the other principle +than we do. But it must be remembered, that one or other of these two +principles, or at least the arbitrament between them, is the animating +basis of all religion, and of all religious sects and persuasions; +and further, that of these two principles, the religion founded on +the artificial one, which is the one traditionally derived to us, +is liable to be, and is wont to be, a far more powerful religion +(because it deals far more intensely in personification, having +reference singly to some supposed artist) than either the religion +that is constituted by the natural principle, or that which results +from a mixture of the two principles. And indeed, I will incidentally +say that this last kind of religion seems to me to have much analogy +on its side, and that the old idea of "the two principles" might, +on several grounds besides the present one, and in several respects, +perhaps, be found to shadow forth a certain amount of most important +truth and applicability. + +7. To return. By considering the state of religion and of religious +belief in the times of Socrates and Cicero, in connection with +the state of art, handicraft, and science, in the same time, and +coincidently taking care not to forget that religious sentiment +(that at least of the kind which had in their era already been, +and much more since has been, communicated from the east to the +west) is an incomparably more vigorous impeller of opinion, than +reason and argument; we shall have some of the principal data, and +in a main matter shall be prepared to use them judiciously in any +inquiry we might make, why it was that Socrates and Cicero, having +their attention arrested by the artificial principle of order and +arrangement, seemed absolutely to forget the existence of the natural +one, and why in consequence it was, that the latter wrote to this +effect: "He who can look up to the heavenly vault, and doubt the +existence of a one personal God, the designer and governor of all +things, is equivalent to a madman"; and why, further, we, spite of +our vast physical science, are prone to the same fallacy. + +8. Having thus proved that the argument of the Theist generally, +as well as the particular one advanced by S. D. C. at p. 27, is, by +being based on the erroneous statement that there is only one means +known to human experience, of producing phenomena identical with those +that are the product of design, and that this one is design itself; +there being, on the contrary, two such means, one of which is not +design; having, I say, proved that your argument, by being so based, +is invalid, I find I must fully agree with you, that there is evidence +of "an unmistakable cosmical unity." + +9. The true inquiry, therefore, is, which of those two principles +of order is, in the agency inquired into, the agent under these +circumstances, and whether both, and how far, under our ignorance of +what may be (a most important point that is carefully to be considered) +we are entitled to affirm as indubitable, to denounce as contradictory, +to advance as probable, to conjecture, to surmise, or to speculate +on this question. + + + + + + + +THE TRUTH OF FIRST PRINCIPLES. + + +1. You ask "my idea on the impossibility of proving the truth of +First Principles?" + +By "truth" you mean the ascertained existence of any idea or thing, +and the ascertained consistency of any statement with some such idea +or thing. + +By "principles" you mean not simply cardinal propositions, but cardinal +propositions that we have ascertained to be true. + +By "first principles" you mean the indubitably true but unprovable +elementary principles of all our knowledge. You mean that these +principles are the ground whereon we build in our reasonings; all that +we build upon them must, in consequence of being so built, admit of +being "proved" whether we have built rightly--that is, admit of being +subjected to the test whether the reasoning is correct; but these +"first principles" are confessedly exempted from this test, and yet +are received as true, no less than the others that have sustained this +ordeal. You ask the meaning of this privilege, whether it is right; +and, if so, to what propriety or necessity of the case it is due? + +2. You ask, "How is truth ascertained to be truth?" or, in other words, +"What is the criterion of truth?" + +With respect to the first query--In accordance with the definition I +have above given of truth, it would seem that it must have two sources, +experience and reason, experience who notifies the existence of +certain ideas or things, and reason, who forms propositions suggested +by them. Experience, therefore, acts the simple part of supplying +all the materials of truth; while reason, besides his acknowledged +office of judge of all truth, exercises the quite different function +of being himself the purveyor of a portion of it. + +So indubitable is it that truth can have these two sources only, +that even fanaticism would be found confessing the principle; while +it appeals to the experience of those who agree with it, as well as +professes to be reasonable. + +First principles must, accordingly, be of two kinds. Of those that +are based upon experience, I will give the following instances:--I +hear the chirping of a bird, and I see an inkstand before me. That +I have the sensation of hearing and seeing in these two cases, are +facts of which it is impossible I can doubt. Reason perceives that +these are primary facts or first principles, neither admitting nor +requiring any proof, testified by consciousness, and self-evidently +verified on that testimony. + +By reason, of course is meant the reason of all mankind--that is, +of all who are presumably competent to judge on the subject. So that +any just or reasonable confidence in the verdict of my own reason--in +this or in any other matter, presupposes a due comparison of my own +reason with that of others, nay, in some cases, a consideration of +the supposably more enlightened reason of future times. + +I discriminate first principles from derived ones thus:--"I see the +sun," is a first principle to me; "you see it," is a first principle to +you; by comparing these two ideas, each attains the derived principle +that the other sees what he does, and the further derived principle +that the sun is an existence independent of both. His own existence +is, indeed, to every one the first principle, by means of which he +infers the existence of other things and beings. + +In coming now to the other kind of first principles, consisting of +propositions formed by reason, we perceive that these show symptoms +of still further difference from the above, than that which results +from the difference of their source, of difference that affects their +philosophical character, and their technical right to the name under +which they present themselves to us. In short, the primary philosophy +has not yet settled their title. + +They are perceived by us to be true by an act of reason called +intuition. Not similarly, however, does our reason inform us that they +really are first principles, and our science is hitherto unequal to +this inquiry. + +Take, for instance, the following celebrated thesis, so often cited +as the most fundamental of all the propositions of reason, insomuch +as to be tacitly implied in all our reasonings; which yet we are +not sure is a first principle, all that can be said in favor of its +pretensions being that we can find no one who is able to reduce it +to more primary elements:-- + +It is impossible for a thing at the same time to be and not to be. + +Any one agreeing, as every one must, that this is true, might +still justly put the query, Why is it impossible? thereby calling +its assertion in question, demanding its credentials of proof, +seeking some ground for its truth other than its own testimony, and +hypothesising some other proposition more fundamental than it of which +it would be a derivative, and by all and each of these proceedings, +rejecting its claim to be a first principle. + +Its resisting our analysis is a good subjective ground for our ranking +this and other similar propositions among our first principles. But +they could only have the true claim by its being made clear that +the inability results from the nature of the case, and not from our +own incompetency. + +This test is borne by the former description of first principles; we +are able to see that the instances I adduced, such as the statements, +"I see the sun," "I see an inkstand," "I hear a bird," "I am conscious +that I exist," evade our power of ordinary proving, because they do +not admit of such proof. + +When we perceive that no one can answer this query, we are prompted to +another. Why cannot we answer it? whence our inability? what prevents +us? But here also we find ourselves completely in the dark, which is +somewhat strange, considering that in every human pursuit, whether of +science or any other, when we wish to do a thing and cannot do it, we +are generally able to specify some particular, either of self-defect +or outward impediment that is supposed to be in fault. But I imagine, +if the reader were to experiment on the specimen I have given, he +would not only find himself to fail in solving the problem, Why is +it that a thing cannot at once be and not be? but would not have a +word to advance in the way of accounting for his failure. + +These remarks apply to all other propositions of the sort. Euclid's +axioms, which undoubtedly aim to be as elementary as possible, and +therefore may be said to aim to be first principles, are confessedly, +under this aspect, unsatisfactory to the learned. "Things that are +equal to the same are equal to each other." Every one is inclined +to ask, Why? "A straight line is the shortest distance between two +points." Again, Why? + +The sum of the above strictures on this kind of so-called first +principles, is--1. That they have not made good their title, +and therefore are not to be accredited with it. 2. That there +is a decided presumption against that title from the doubt and +dissatisfaction with which it is met, where want of candor and +intelligence cannot be imputed, especially when it is considered that +the other, the sensuous experimental kind of first principles, have +so frank an acceptance. 3. It seems to be absolutely provable, and I +suppose I have above incidentally proved it, that they are not first +principles. 4. The task is set to metaphysics of supplying the most +satisfactory proof of all by bringing to light such propositions as +would be perceived to underlie these so-called first principles, and to +be the real first principles to which the others would give precedence. + +As regards their name, it being so much in point, excuses the old +remark that the elements of our knowledge stand in a reversed order +in respect to this knowledge to what they assume in our process of +acquiring it. A first principle, therefore, means also a last one; +it is the last in whatsoever endeavors to descend to the bottom or +to penetrate to the source of our knowledge, but it becomes the first +when we trace it from this source through its derivative ideas. + +The investigating act should not be confounded with the prospecting +one. The sensible horizon of subjective vision can, by no mediation, +be exalted into the real horizon of truth, wherein the genuine first +principles that bound human capability are exclusively to be found. + +It may be asked, apart from the inquiry what first principles there +are, Is there a necessity that some first principles should be? So it +seems from the data of the case. It is patent to common observation +that the mind of man is recipient of ideas from the things that +surround it. The contact of its apprehending faculty with the things it +apprehends, must, it would seem, constitute first principles. After it +has got them it might conceivably elicit from them derived principles, +but the original ones cannot be thus derived, since there are none +earlier from which to derive them. + +Again, it is to be inquired, Does the mind, in receiving its ideas, +possess and exercise in reference to the things on which it operates, +a copying faculty or a transforming faculty? Does it import them simply +in their native character, in the way a mirror does the object it +reflects, or does it manufacture, cook, and assimilate them, so as +to change them into something partaking of its own? + +And, if it changes them, what is the extent of the change? Does it +go so far only as the semi-idealism of Locke, or extend into the +absolute idealism of the German school? + +Because these questions have been wont to puzzle either the learned, +or the public, or both, it does not follow that they are difficult. I +suppose them to admit of decided answers before a supposed competent +audience. + +As I am unprovided with proof, although I suppose it is to be provable, +that first principles of reason must needs be, I must speculate for +a moment on the possibility of a proposition of the form of "two and +two make four," being derived from one of the form of "I scent the +rose," for this seems to be the alternative of there being no first +principles of reason. Evidently I must confess to having no grounds +for pronouncing such a derivation impossible, though I must grant +it to be paradoxical. Our mal-cultivation of non-material science, +and the imperfection of our metaphysics, is probably the only cause +of the strange predicament. + +No doubt M. Cousin, and several other eminent teachers of youth, +to whose office it belongs to expound received metaphysics, have +comprised First Principles in their course of philosophy; but as I +have barely met with any of their writings, I must confess such an +ignorance of them, as not even to know how far I am either adopting, +or evading their phraseology, in discussing the same subjects. Mine, +however, cannot be wrong, since the term "first principles," that I +have chosen, is one of familiar popular use; so that were this mode +of speech, as indeed it is, peculiarly liable to ambiguity, it would, +for that very reason, be preferable to any other, till such time as +that ambiguity should have been explained, and the wrong thinking, of +which it might have been the source, exposed and obviated. Not till +this had been done would it be time to inquire whether the current +metaphysics had invented any intrinsically better ways of speaking +on these topics, for though the veriest tyro in such investigations +would be justified in objecting to some of its technicalities, +such as the invention of the word free-will, for instance, for the +same reason that a beginner in zoology might object, were such an +attempt ever made, to the introduction of the word sphynx or griffin +into that branch of inquiry, there can be no doubt that other of its +speculations are more happily conceived. Hence I suppose it would be +a decided mistake to imagine, for example, that no trouve whatever is +to be elicited from the obscurities of Kant, but on the other hand, +one must as much take care to entertain sober conjectures of the +possible value of such unsunned treasures, as to keep in mind that +quackery may be not unqualified with some merit, and I might surmise +that it was perhaps in virtue of his fabulous expectations in this +direction, that Coleridge could not execute his long-meditated plan of +elucidating that writer; or rather, perhaps--to speak more curtly--a +spirit more differing from that which compounded the amalgam, was +necessary to resolve and detect it. + +According to this estimate of the value of our achieved studies, it +would be expectable, in regard to my present topic, that almost all +the materials for right conclusions on it must be extant somewhere or +other in our books, no great amount of ability being required to turn +them to proper account: an easily suppliable desideratum being thus +left unsupplied, the public indifference manifested thereby would seem +to bear the ascription of our unsatisfactory metaphysics to the fault, +however apportioned between the many and the few, not of the intellect, +but of the reason. + +Indeed, it is held as a pretty general rule, that where there is want +of reform, there is want of reason; and Bacon, by implication, thought +the rule here applicable, when, in defending his "new philosophy" +from the charge of arrogance, he apologised by saying that a "cripple +in the right road would make better progress than a racehorse in the +wrong." That is, he claimed for himself, as he was bound logically to +do, the plain good sense of directing his supposably humble faculties +with an obvious regard to the end he proposed and professed, and he was +ready to concede to his competitors all kinds of superiority but this. + +The same simplicity characterises the reforming animus of the other +great patriarch of "the new philosophy," in its sister branch. The +still debated point between the school of Locke and the old philosophy +was, and is, of such a form as may be figured by the following +hypothetical, and it may be, well-founded statement. Locke seems to +have battled mainly for the principle that ideas that every one allows +to be inferences, should be acknowledged by philosophy to be such, +while the adherents of the old ideas maintained, in opposition to +him, that ideas that every one allows to be inferences, should not +be acknowledged by philosophy to be such. Or, in other words, Locke +aimed to realise a certain first principle of reason, which I shall +have hereafter to consider, which stands thus:--"That which it is," +while his opponents withstood this innovating pretension, finding +it fatal to their doctrine. If the reader is somewhat startled at +the statement I have just made, I will remind him that it amounts +to nothing more than saying that in the contest between the new and +the old philosophy, reason is entirely and absolutely on the side of +the former, an assertion which, of course, I must both think admits +of being substantiated, and must take myself, in some degree, to be +able to aid in its being so. + +The existing quarrel between the two philosophies might, perhaps, +be personified through the medium of a principal champion on each +side. For the new ideas I could only choose Locke, since he is admitted +to have had no equally eminent successor; for the old I would choose +M. Cousin, both on account of his superior merit and popularity, and +also of his having made Locke the subject of some elaborate strictures +that I happen to have read. On these, when they come again to hand, +I should perhaps have something to remark; meanwhile I must content +myself with addressing myself to one of them in the following manner:-- + +In antiquity and the middle ages, the schoolmaster and the +philosopher were one and the same individual. The new philosophy +was the first to separate these two departments; perceiving that the +communication of truth is a distinct office from its investigation, +and that that difference of office in each case necessitates a +corresponding difference in the public, that is the proper object of +its exercise. Since, moreover, society may be discriminated into two +sorts of mind, admitting of being pictured as the childish and the +adults, it is evident that the instructor must find his audience +more especially in the former, while the investigator of truth +must appeal exclusively to the latter. This he must needs do, to +whichever of the sciences he ministers; and not only so, but he must +more particularly address himself to a small and select portion of +this itself selecter class, constitute them the witnesses and judges +of his proceedings, and perceive that both his success in philosophy +and the acknowledgment of it can only be founded first and foremost on +their approbation. As even in jockeyism and prize-fighting, there are +"the knowing ones," similar referees are, by the nature of things, +required for the flourishing estate of any science; and evidently in +proportion as they might be incompetent to such an office, false or +imperfect science must be the result. + +Locke, acting on this instinctive view, communicated to the +public certain observations he had made in mental philosophy, and +entitled his work, An Essay on the Human Understanding. He properly +called it an essay, because a person who simply aims to investigate +truth, undertakes to do his best in the way of trial, endeavor, and +experiment, in such sort as to make the word essay appropriate to what +he does. The word moreover implies that the thing done, though it is +the writer's best, is liable to be incomplete, comparatively imperfect, +and, indeed, in the more difficult questions of philosophy, as well as +in the less advanced stages of philosophising, is sure to be so. Locke +accordingly, having had his attention struck with certain phenomena of +the human mind, told the public just what he had observed, and nothing +else. Among the observations that he thus imparted, was the process +through which the mind seems to go in arriving at the sum of its ideas, +and especially the points from which it seems to start in this process. + +M. Cousin, having apparently no conception of a way of acting so +proper to legitimate inquiry, and having himself written a Course +of Philosophy, evidently thinks Locke ought to have done the same; +for he says that Locke is erroneous in the method of his philosophy, +that he begins at the wrong end, that instead of having told us as he +has how the ideas arise in the mind, he ought to have told us what +the ideas are, instead of describing their origin to have described +their actuality, to have given a list of the faculties of the mind, +and so on. Which is just the same thing as saying that a traveller +who publishes his explorations in America, ought instead to have gone +to China. + +I shall have to make some objections to Locke, but they will be of +a nature exactly contrary to those of which he is usually made the +subject. Instead of accusing his principles I shall have to impute +to him the not sufficiently carrying them out; a fault due to his +position as an early reformer, and perfectly consistent with his high +character as such. + +I have the more reason to note this distinction between M. Cousin's +department and the function exercised by Locke, because I am forced +myself to take the benefit of it. Want of erudition would form very +vulnerable points, were I to be judged by the former standard. In +the little I have yet put forth on the subject of First Principles, +I already find two or three errors of that sort, which a greater amount +of reading would no doubt have enabled me to escape. My present letter +may close with some correction of one of these. + +Preliminary, I will venture to call "That which is is," a first +principle of reason, and "Two and two make four," one of its +derivatives, leaving this topic for future explanation, and then +proceed thus:--When in my last letter I represented first principles +as bounding the horizon of human knowledge, I left it to be inferred +that both the kinds of "first principles" I had mentioned were thus +describable in common. I find, however, that this metaphysical +character belongs exclusively to first principles of sensuous +experience, and no more belongs to first principles of reason than to +first principles of grammar, or to first principles of rhetoric. That +is, first principles of reason are merely the result of one of those +analytical inquiries in which we arrive at something absolutely simple, +and must there stop, just as in the science of numbers we may thus +arrive at unity. + + + +Having long ago defined First Principles of sensuous experience, +I find there is a difficulty attached to the other kind of first +principles derived from the various use of the word reason--which +I will say betrayed me into a wrong inference in the concluding +paragraph of my last letter. + +Locke, in the 17th chapter of his fourth book, confesses that this +word, in the proper use of the English language, is liable to bear +several senses. Due discrimination in such a case, and a cautious +avoidance of the dangers to which philosophy is exposed, and has +so amply incurred, from this kind of source might, above all, have +been, expected from Locke, since he was the first who inculcated it, +and is generally remarkable for the observance of his own precepts +in this matter. Hence the charge I have now got to bring against him +is a little surprising. + +Indeed, it might be asserted that his position and circumstances do +not seem very readily to bear the entire responsibility of some of his +proceedings. Perhaps he might be characterised as a writer of somewhat +humorous idiosyncracy in respect to tendency to fixed ideas. His +lapses, indeed, are not many, but they are highly significant, as +I shall have occasion in more than one instance to show, and among +these must evidently be reckoned that I am now going to notice, since +it imports the wrong definition of a word of such cardinal meaning. + +In defining the word reason, in its proper and specific sense +wherein it is used to denote a certain well-known quality of the +human mind--that is, as approvedly ascertained and appreciated under +this name, as are certain weights and measures under those of pound, +gallon, or mile, he assigns a meaning to it that comes short of the +proportions thus justly prefigured as belonging to it. He confounds +reason with reasoning--that is, he emerges the entire faculty or modus +operandi, to which we give the name of reason, in that partial exercise +of its function to which we give the name of reasoning. He says that, +in matters of certainty, such as the proof of any of Euclid's theorems, +the acts by which the mind ascertains the fit coherence of the several +links in the chain of reasoning are acts of reason. Granted. + +Also, that in weighing probabilities, a similar coherence is similarly +verified by reason. Granted--with liberty of comment that these arts +of reason, in either of the two cases have, by the approved practice +of language, received the name of reasoning. + +But he further signifies--that is, he does not expressly affirm, but, +with equivalent certification, he implicitly asserts, and inferentially +states that, in examining such a proposition as the following:--"What +is, is" (an examination to which confessedly no reasoning is attached), +the act by which the mind assents to the truth of this statement +is not to be described as an act of reason. He adopts a different +phraseology, and calls it intuition. + +Observe, my objection is not that he invests the idea with this new +name, but that he disparages its old one. I do not object to your +calling a spade a shovel, under a certain view of its use, but it +remains still necessary that you should admit that a spade is, in +the full sense of the word, a spade. + +Indeed, I will incidentally remark that I suspect the word "intuition" +has been a very good addition to our vocabulary, and I suppose +its proper import might be represented as follows:--Reason has two +modes of his exercise, the one is called reasoning, and the other +intuition. Intuition is the decision of reason on one single point; +reasoning--a word proper to demonstrative truth--seems to be nothing +more than intuition looking not merely at one point, but at several +points successively. So that intuition and reasoning would constitute +the self-same function of reason, and the difference in their meanings +would be solely owing to the difference in the circumstances under +which that function is exercised. + +Observe, that I am here only venturing to speculate, and am now +returning from that digression. + +Whether or not Locke is herein psychologically consistent with +himself; whether, indeed, his real theory is not that which I have +just conjecturally intimated, is another question, which I shall +defer to a future occasion; but whether or not he herein opposes the +ordinary, prevailing, and inveterate use of language, which is what +I am charging him with doing, and whether or not he has justifiable +ground for this innovation which I am denying that he has, are points +that must be tried by the ordeal of these three considerations. How +are we accustomed to speak? How are we accustomed to write? and what +sort of a call for changing our customs in either of these particulars +is that which constitutes a genuine call to do so? + +In regard to the first of these tests, the literature of all sects +and parties has been accustomed to assert that, both in matters of +science and of worldly business, reason is the judge of all truth +whatever, without exception. + +Locke, on the other hand, informs us that reason is the judge of +demonstrative truth, of logical truth, of casuistical truth, and of +lawyers' truth, and of these kinds of truth alone, but is not the +judge of intuitive or self-evident truth. Our writers would tell us +that to deny "what is, is" to be a true statement, would be an offence +against reason; but we learn from Locke that reason has no cognisance +in this matter, but intuition only has, and consequently that the +wrong committed would not be against reason, but against intuition. + +Our current speech accords with our literature in this view +of the meaning of the word reason; whose efficiency, moreover, +it endeavors to amplify, by surrounding it with satellites of +adjectives formed from it, the principal of which are "reasonable" and +"unreasonable." Provided with this vocabulary, we pronounce it to be +unreasonable to deny any truth whatever that can be well and clearly +ascertained; and so far are we from reserving these adjectives for +the occasion of demonstrative truth, and holding them inapplicable +where self-evident or intuitive truth comes on the carpet, that we +account it, if possible, still more unreasonable to deny the latter +than the former. + +But if the nomenclature adopted by Locke be the right one, there ought +to be a change in these current modes of speaking and writing. One who +should reject the proofs of Euclid, would be unreasonable; one who +should maintain that Thurtel or Greenacre were innocent of murder, +would be unreasonable; but, one who should deny the truth of any +self-evident proposition, would not be unreasonable; for to say this, +would be to say that reason has cognisance of such propositions, +whereas, according to him, it is expressly not reason, but intuition +that takes this office. The words "intuitional" and "unintuitional," +must be invented to supply the obvious need which the apparent gap +discovers; there seems no other way of supplying it. + +Lest I should be suspected of somewhat making up a case; of having, +perhaps, represented not so much what Locke really means, as what he +seems to mean, I will remind the reader that Locke is undertaking the +formal definition of a word, and that on such a critical occasion, +it is proper to give him credit for not meaning otherwise than he +seems to mean. + +The passage which is my text, will be found in the earlier part of +the seventeenth chapter of the fourth book. Indeed, I could at once +prove my indictment by citing a few words from it, accompanied by a +comment of my own, had I any right to impose on the reader a belief +in the discriminating fairness and matter-of-fact accuracy, both of +my extracts and my comment. + +I will, however, venture on such a step; I will suppose myself +commenting on this passage, and proceed thus: Locke, it will be seen +in this, his foremost and professed definition of the word reason, +contrasts it with "sense and intuition." + +Whether he holds these to be identical with what he calls "the +outward and the inward sense," is not quite clear. That, however, +is not the question. + +He says, that these two faculties "reach but a very little way"; +for that "the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions +and intermediate ideas." Now, reason, he says, may be defined to be +that faculty, whose specific office it is "to find out and apply" +those intermediate ideas and deductions by which we obtain knowledge +that consists of two kinds, one that which exalts us into "certainty," +the other that which, though less generous diet for the mind, we have +constantly good ground for gladly acquiescing in, and which we call +"probability." So that, says Locke, if you ask, "What room is there +for the exercise of any other faculty but outward sense and inward +perception?" I can abundantly reply, "Very much." I have shown you +that without this "demonstrative" faculty, our knowledge would be +but a skeleton; it would, indeed, not be properly speaking knowledge, +but mere rudiments of knowledge. + +Such is my interpretation of Locke's definition of reason, in the +proper and specific sense of this word. If it is strictly correct, +as I believe the intelligent reader will find by reference, then it +is Locke confounds reason with reasoning, mistakes a part for the +whole, and the whole for a part, and acts similarly--to borrow his +own way of illustration--to the representing a gallon to be a quart, +or a half-sovereign to be a sovereign. + +It is to be observed, too, that it is entirely in behalf of the more +showy kind of knowledge, that the mistake is made. The respected name +of reason is given exclusively to logic and demonstrating. Good sense, +good feeling, just instinct, if they stand alone, have no claim to +it; they are put on an inferior footing; true, they are intuition; +but what then? they are not reason. + +Now, the century introduced by Locke is accused by the present, +and it is generally admitted, with some degree of justice, of having +"materialistic" tendencies. We may see, then, how Locke's doctrine, +as just described, founded though it is only on nomenclature, hinging +merely on definition, incurring whatever wrongness it implicates from +no other lapse than that of confounding a word with its derivative, +doing nothing, in short, but annul the difference of meaning between +the two words, reason and reasoning; we may see how this apparently +harmless experiment might tend to supplying these materialistic +tendencies with a ground, a rationale, a principle, and thus to exalt +their authority, and how, indeed! it just smacks of their spirit. + +It may be seen, too, how, from a few slips, such as this on the +part of the champion of the "new philosophy," competing schools of +the present age might be able to make up a case, specious enough to +gain the acquiescence of a portion of the public against both--with +how great futility, I believe, would appear, if the accusations were +weighed by a competent tribunal. + +And, finally, it might be expected, that the undue exaltation of +the demonstrative department of reason, should issue in a reaction +into a contrary extreme, and that some Mr. Carlyle might be found to +inveigh against "logic," to sneer at "analysis," to denounce "cause +and effect philosophy" and to praise "mysticism." + +I have already assumed that the third test that I promised, goes +against Locke, and requires no examination, simply because he has not +advanced it in his behalf. He has assigned no ground for changing +the meaning of the word reason, and it is presumable that none is +assignable. + + + +The question, What is the Criterion of Truth?--that is, What are the +proper means of distinguishing whether anything that is asserted to be +true is so or not? claims immediate notice, because such a criterion +exists, and the new philosophy necessarily appeals to it when it comes +before the public, while it has shown with what effect it can do so, +in the case of those of its branches--namely, the purely material +and the mathematical, that flourish in society. + +Premising that it is a way of certifying truth that has been +immemorially used by mankind in their daily affairs, and which they +have always, to some extent, instinctively transferred to their +judgments in philosophy, and that it is the only possible general +and summary criterion of truth, I may describe it as consisting in +the unanimous assent to some idea or assertion of all who are thought +competent to pronounce concerning it. + +Viewed in connection with the thing it verifies, and the parties who +use it, the criterion may be thus represented: Any idea, assertion, +or opinion, must, by any inquirer, be found true, when he perceives +it to be such as would be unanimously assented to by all presumably +competent judges of the kind of truth to which it refers. + +So that those who use this criterion, and are convinced of the truth of +anything through its medium--a proceeding which I have represented as +common and habitual to mankind--in thereby pronouncing certain supposed +persons to be judges of truth in the said matter, claim themselves +to be also judges of it in the matter of so pronouncing. The acts +of judgment they thus tacitly challenge to themselves may be said to +be to the following effect:--1. They assign the qualifications that +constitute competency for a certain function. 2. They decide that there +are persons in the community answering to this character. 3. They +opine that the view such persons take or would take, imports an +assertion of the truth of the idea in question. 4. They accredit +that view with being strictly one, supposing that all qualified to +arbitrate would acquiesce and agree in the same. 5. They attribute +to themselves a similar unanimity. 6. They assume the sufficiency of +their own judgment to make all the above conclusions. + +These assumptions on their part, so complicated in description, are +simple enough in performance. It is plain that mankind--more properly +here to be called the public--simply attach themselves to some opinion +which they find current in society; while, however, the assumptions +I have just described are, in their full measure, but a necessary +consequence of their so doing, doubtless their so doing must itself +have been dictated by some kind of anticipation of them, but this may, +to any degree, have been vague, undetermined, partial, and imperfect. + +The rationale of this double bench of judges is thus explained. In +reference to almost every kind of truth there is always a certain +portion of the community better able to judge than the rest. Hence +it becomes clearly the part of the latter, if they wish to be +rightly informed, to defer to the opinion of those confessedly +better judges--confessed to be such from the general opinion to that +effect. Thus a second set of judges perforce, in addition to those that +were originally conceived by choice, is implicated in this transaction. + +For the primary sort I must seek a name from the French language, +which calls them "experts," the English supplying, I believe, none, +except a very vernacular one, the "knowing ones"; the others have +already got a well-known name--the public. + +The public, in deciding on the occasions in question, what are the +qualifications that constitute "experts" may be said to choose them, +thereby, however, choosing persons in idea, and not bodily. The +relation of the public to these conceptions of theirs is the same +as that of the constituencies to the members of Parliament, in the +point of one being the choosers and the others the chosen, with a +common object in view. + +I suppose, to stop the current of my discourse, and adjourn its topic, +for the sake of at once bringing the general principle discussed to +the test of exemplification, would have its want of logical harmony +excused by its being desiderated by the reader. + +I had undertaken to prove that this principle--which, for distinction's +sake, I will call the unanimity principle--is the proper and only +criterion of scientific truth to the great non-scientific world, +and consequently that modern philosophy necessarily appeals to it +when it comes before the public. What I had thus taken upon myself +to do, obviously was--first, to display and explicate the principle +by definition, and this I had already done; and next--to describe +it theoretically by showing its manner of existing, and this I was +engaged in doing. Leaving this inquiry in the midst, I am now going to +deviate into the practical phase of its description, by showing, not +how it is, but how it acts. This seems necessary for the satisfaction +of the reader, as being the only way of securing him from any, even +were it but temporary, misapprehension as to the working value of +the principle for which his attention is demanded. I therefore select +the six following examples, the two first homely, and the four last +philosophical, of its ordinary use by the public. + +They will be at once seen to justify my assertion of its having for +its main characteristics the two facts--first, that mankind habitually +use it, and have always done so; and next, that propositions thus +warranted are universally accepted as established truth, and that no +one thinks of calling them in question. + +1. Thus no one doubts, when coming to the intersection of two roads, +he sees a sign-post, on one of whose pointers is written "To London," +and on the other "To Windsor," no one hesitates to believe that the +information thus conveyed to him is true; because he is aware that +those who give it are competent to do so, and that none similarly +competent will gainsay it. + +2. Again, no one doubts that the sun rises and sets once in +every twenty-four hours; no one doubts that he so rose and set +yesterday. Every one is ready to affirm the certainty of these two +facts, but very few can do so, in any great degree, from their +own experience; but they help the lack of this by that of their +neighbors. Neither is it necessary that they should have any near, +nor even the most remote, idea of the personality of those on whose +testimony they thus implicitly rely; it suffices they are sure, +whoever they may be, they have the right qualifications for testifying +in the way they do, and that no one so qualified can contradict their +evidence, or dream of doing so. + +The above are examples of the criterion of truth, applied to the ideas +and proceedings of ordinary life. It will be seen therefrom, first +that mankind have in all ages been educated in an acceptance of its +principle, according to my definition of it, the principle, namely, of +an indubitable certainty of truth, resulting from the unanimous assent +to some idea of all who are thought by self and neighbors competent +to pronounce thereon; possibly too they may be said to have been +educated in some imperfect theoretical appreciation of this principle. + +It will secondly be seen therefrom, that the two kinds of unanimity +which I have predicated as essential to the proper use and results of +this criterion, an unanimity, namely, on the part of the supposed good +judges of certain descriptions of truth, who may be called the adepts +or knowing ones imagined by the public; and again an unanimity on the +part of the public itself in interpreting and adopting their opinion; +it will be seen, I say, that this double unanimity is perfectly +attainable, nay, perfectly attained, and that too so extensively, +as to constitute a common and familiar occurrence on all manner of +occasions of daily life. + +I will now give instances of their similar use of it in directing +their judgments on philosophical questions. + +3. Very few of the public are able to examine the proof of any of +the theorems of Euclid, yet there is none of them who would think of +seriously doubting the truth of anything contained in that book, the +ground of their confidence being solely their knowledge of the fact, +that the learned in these matters have unanimously so decided. + +Every one, again, believes in certain facts that are asserted by +navigators, explorers, and geographers, respecting the existence, +position, and products of various countries of the globe. Every one, +further, believes in certain deductions derived from these facts by +naturalists, geologists, astronomers, and so forth. The belief is +owing to the unanimous testimony of all these confessedly competent +authorities; but whenever they are seen to differ among themselves, the +public withholds its entire belief, and either doubts or disbelieves +the things asserted. Thus the public is at this day doubtful and +divided whether there is such a creature as the sea-serpent. Similarly +the public is dubious--for it must needs be so if any section of it is +so--whether a certain explorer who was authoritatively sent out about a +dozen years ago conjointly by the French Government and Institute, was, +in any degree, justified in bringing home the account he did of there +being a tribe of men in the interior of Africa having tails, whether +this unexpected information is, in any important particular, true. + +The two last examples have been furnished by material science. I will +now draw one from the other department, with the view of indicating +that in non-material science also, numerous propositions circulate +among the public that are franked by the same principle to pass as +undoubted truth. Such is the maxim of heathen philosophy, recorded +by Cicero in his "Officiis": "Do not to another what you would not +he should do to you"; or the same maxim, in its modified form, as +given in the New Testament, with the characteristic omission of the +negative. The truth of this moral maxim is universally admitted, +because it is supposed that no person of presumable moral judgment +has ever been known to call it in question. + +It would seem, then, that this criterion of truth is--what confessedly, +or from easy proof, it is predicable that no other criterion of +truth is--a general criterion of truth. I will, however, restrict +this pretension to the statement--to be hereafter more largely +explained--that it is a general criterion of truth to the public +as such, to the public considered as a public; for, indeed, it is +not properly usable at all by anyone except in the character of a +member of the public. This means that it is a general criterion of +truth in the following way: it is applicable to the verification of +all truth, so far as it admits of being verified before the public, +and made the common property of the community. + +6. For even where at first sight you might think it most out of place, +I mean in relation to that kind of truth whose primary evidence is +the consciousness of the individual, so that the competent witness +of truth is necessarily but one person, there is oneness of opinion, +there is unanimity, and the testimony of the one competent witness +is not contradicted or doubted by that of any other presumably +competent. When, for instance, I am conscious of the sensation +of seeing an inkstand before me, no one seeing reason to doubt my +assertion to that effect, all presumably competent testimony on the +subject must needs be concentrated in myself; and the fact of my +seeing an inkstand, though for my own conviction verified in a way +independent of any such argument, is, for the conviction of others, +only pronounceable as true, because all presumably competent authority +is of one mind in alleging its truth. + +In thus far exemplifying the use of this principle, I have exhibited +it in the exercise of its primary office only, which, however, is +not that which, on behalf of philosophy, I am here demanding from +it. I have shown it, namely, as used by the public to establish truth +positively, and not in the way wherein it may be used to distinguish +truth comparatively. + +But it is solely in this latter office that it becomes a criterion of +truth, an arbiter between the true and the false, an indicator of both, +and more especially of what has the character of ascertained truth, +and what has not; and this, it will be remembered, was the office I +sought from it, and constituted the ultimate purpose of my taking up +the consideration of the subject. + +Having with as much brevity as just suffices for that purpose, +explained the nature of the principle in question, and its use by +society at large, it now only remains that I should explain that +purpose itself, by theory and example. + +What I am doing in tracing the unanimity principle from its first +instinctive use by the public to its secondary and meditated one +by philosophy, is a purely critical act, comparable to that of +the rhetorician who appreciates the character of certain modes of +thinking which have long since been practised by mankind, and shows +what therein is approvable--all the rest being liable to censure. + +It was the universal conviction of European Christendom, during +many centuries, that the Church, which was popularly supposed to be +represented by the Pope, enjoyed peculiarly a divine guidance which +made it an infallible judge of truth. This idea was thought to be +warranted by the unanimous assent of all right-minded persons, and the +denial of it to be the mark of a reprobate spirit, as well as contrary +to common sense. We now know the entire futility of this assumption, +and that the heretics were not inferior to the orthodox in the power +of judging such subjects. Hence in discussing the unanimity principle +the question presents itself, How came the public thus wrongly to +apply it? What error did they commit in so doing? When the revival +of learning and the consequent rise of Protestantism had exposed +the error in that form of it, it was still continued under the new +social regimes; so that even Locke, the boldest advocate of the +rights of man that was tolerated even in his time, stigmatised the +dissentients from certain Protestant tenets in the same unjust way +that Popery had done to the dissentients from certain Popish ones; +speaking of them in two or three places of his essay as persons at +once notoriously disreputable in character and weak in intellect; +consistently with which estimate he came to the conclusion that the +reigning theology was established truth, as being accredited by all +those whose opinion was worth taking account of. + +Later times have again manifested the futility of the assumption +against the new race of dissentients. No one will say that Goethe +and Neibuhr (to mention only two) must count for nothing on questions +wherein they were as likely to be well informed as their opponents. So +that Locke's side, instead of being warranted by the decisive verdict +he imagines, is but one of two suitors in an undetermined cause, +neither having yet attracted the votes of the whole jury, and neither +consequently yet occupying the position of ascertained truth. Giving +everyone a fair hearing is that trial and test of competency which +yields the only means of learning who said competent judges are. + +A little consideration, even in Locke's time of less advanced thought, +might have informed an intelligent mind, if free from prejudice, +that mere prohibitory laws must be of themselves less adverse to the +free expression of people's sentiments than that averted state of the +public mind of which they are one of the symptoms. Both from theory and +experience we may collect that very much the same laws of supply and +demand obtain in matters of opinion as in those of food and raiment; +the tongue and the pen, and the previous thought by which these are +instructed, must evidently hold back from offering to the public, +nay, in a great measure from suggesting to the agent himself, any such +ideas as they know the public will not, and must confine themselves to +putting forth such only as they suppose it will understand, appreciate, +and regard. + + + + + + + +THE RIGHTS OF REASON. + + +To the two queries you put to me, "What are first principles?" and +"What is the criterion of truth?" I find it suitable to append some +preliminary remarks on "The Rights of Reason." + +The solution you expect is, I presume, a reasonable one. You do not +wish me to take into account any opinions that cannot bear the test +of reason. + +Your queries derive their greatest pertinency from the state of +non-material philosophy; and, possibly, might have been, in some +measure, prompted by this consideration. That double-minded way of +inquiring into truth, which only in part reasons, while it in part +dogmatises, imagines, and assumes, is, it is obvious, in morals, +metaphysics, and religion, one of our inheritances from former +times. The battle has been won in the material department, but is +still undecided on the other wing. + +What, then, is Reason, and what are its Rights? + +Every human inquiry that asks, What is right, proper, or +correct? necessarily, in doing so, asks, What is it reasonable +to think, believe, or do? in the points inquired into. The +faculty--whatever may be its nature--whereby we find ourselves +able, under certain circumstances, to answer this question, we call +reason. The rights of reason may be said to consist in the concession +to it of a certain absolute power in the decision of truth, divisible +under two heads thus--a power of deciding what are the questions +whereon it is able to decide, and a power of deciding those questions. + +One of the many ways of disparaging the rights of reason is--openly +or covertly to doubt or deny that morals, metaphysics, and religion, +are--in the full sense of the word--sciences. This is to withdraw +them from the empire of reason, and to hand them over to some rival +pretender. + +No science can flourish while it is understood that its discussion +must be made palatable to the public. In any supposable code of the +rights of reason, one primary article would limit and define the +functions of the public in the investigation of truth--a topic which, +together with the kindred inquiry, Who are the public? is suggested +by your second query. + +Mankind have naturally a degree of antipathy for reason. They have +found Reason, in the work he affects, dull, in the help he furnishes, +deficient, in the truth he unveils, ugly, in the rule he arrogates, +imperious. Barbarism, in all its stages, may be said to be founded, +not merely on ignorance, but on a state of the inclinations that +revolts from reason. + +Two competitors have always disputed the rights of reason; authority +or precedent, and faith or conscience. Conscience, early or late, must +receive almost all his light from authority; and, therefore, in respect +to opinion, may generally be called the creature of authority. Yet, in +a moral aspect, authority is confessedly of no account, and conscience +has a sole jurisdiction. A large portion of mankind have, in our times, +outgrown the error of resting their sense of duty on the mere dictate +of other men. The only legitimate directors of human conduct are now +generally admitted to be conscience and reason; the conscience must be +exclusively one's own, but the reason need not entirely--and, indeed, +cannot in any great proportion--be one's own, but may be partly that +of one's neighbor. + +The question of the division of power between these two potentates, +though not yet understood by the public, does not seem to be more +complicated than that analogous one just alluded to, and of which +they evidently understand the gist. + +For authority, as above intimated, though the venerable instructor of +conscience, is yet morally subjected to him; and, not dissimilarly, +have conscience and reason reciprocal claims of precedence on each +other. Reason is the judge, but he is bound, under conscience, to give +a sufficient and attentive hearing to any pleadings that conscience +may have to offer, and conscience is the pleader, but he is bound, +under reason, to conform to whatever verdicts reason declares himself +competent to render. + +If history in this particular can be considered as having disclosed +a necessary sequence, civilisation progresses in the following +order:--The general mind, in becoming acquainted with its own powers, +first learns an evolution of conscience (and this can only take place +through the medium of religion), and last learns to appreciate reason +(and this can only happen through the medium of science). While the +prerogatives of conscience were insufficiently known, authority usurped +them, and while the prerogatives of reason are insufficiently known, +authority and conscience conjointly usurp them. + +The word conscience I here use in its proper sense, wherein it means +either an individual conscience, or the united consciences of more +than one supposed to be in accord together, so as to make the acts +resulting from this accord constitute single acts of conscience. But +the word has taken an improper enlargement of meaning in being often +used to signify one conscience claiming something in contravention +of another conscience. These two, so different meanings of the word +conscience, are seldom duly discriminated by those who use them. + +To the rights of reason belongs a certain degree of power, both in +regulating the individual conscience, and in solving the differences +between opposing ones. Under what conditions, and how far, reason +can exercise this office, and what rule he is to follow in so doing, +would be an inquiry suggested by my answer to your second query. + +Having above mentioned religion and science as the two prime ministers +respectively of conscience and reason, I will pursue the subject a +little further. + +Religion has aimed to have a moral animus by means of a free +conscience. Religion has not yet immediately aimed at moral conduct; +but, indeed, has been wont, by the mouth of her most strenuous +ministers, to assume that the aim at this is already included in that +other aim. But a moral animus is but one ingredient in moral conduct, +involving the intent only to act morally, without having of itself +the least power to realise that intent. Knowledge,--that is, science, +exclusively keeps the keys of this power. Such knowledge religion +has not yet made one of her aims and ends either directly, or by +any coalition with those who have so aimed. Accordingly religion +cannot be said hitherto to have been an advocate of the rights of +reason. Whatever good things she may have achieved in this cause have +been incidental to her advocacy of the Rights of Conscience. Here +reason was her weapon (sharpened for this use, and so far valued and +treasured), against authority. Her tendency meanwhile, is to impel +conscience to infringe on the rights of reason. + +Science alone has hitherto been the immediate champion of these +rights. But it seems he cannot expect to make that advocacy complete +and effectual till he allies himself with religion. This alliance, +since it is persuaded by reason, and not by passion, can have science +alone for its real mover. + +The Rights of Reason may at present be said to be in such a germ of +their acknowledgment as were the rights of conscience three centuries +ago. Mankind have not hitherto come to acquiesce in the idea of +that parsimony of guidance vouchsafed to man, which is found to be +the result of claiming for reason the power of calling all human +thoughts before his tribunal, and seeing whether he has anything +to object to them. Their idea has been that not only suggesting +inspiration--(which it does not seem necessary that the advocate of +the rights of reason should deny)--but guiding inspiration is given, +given too to some rather than to others, and given in such a quality, +as to dispense with the supervision of reason. A generation successive +to many among whom this doctrine has been taught and believed, will not +be prone to any decided rejection of it. Pride of species inclining +to exaggerated human pretensions above other earthly creatures, and +party pride inclining to exalt self and an associated confraternity +into a superiority over the rest of mankind, and supplied with a +traditional store of modes of thought and practice adapted to such +exclusive pretensions, and other native tendencies of the human mind, +persuade in the same direction. + +I have thought it suitable to premise this short sketch of the Rights +of Reason, and the opponents of them, to an endeavor to answer your +queries in a thoroughly reasonable way, a way which cannot be said to +be the more fashionable one in the treatment of metaphysical questions. + + + + + + + +NOTES + + +[1] Wilfrid Meynell, in his John Henry Newman, erroneously speaks of +Charles Robert as the "youngest son." + +[2] This is a mistake. Owen in 1817 renounced the religions of the +world, and proclaimed that man's character was formed for him not by +him. 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