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diff --git a/45823-0.txt b/45823-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dda529b --- /dev/null +++ b/45823-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1635 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 45823 *** + + ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM + + BY + CHARLES ROBERT NEWMAN + (Brother of Cardinal Newman.) + + WITH PREFACE + BY + GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE. + + AND + + BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH + BY + J. M. WHEELER. + + + + LONDON: + PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY, + 28 Stonecutter Street, E.C. + 1891 + + + + + + + + LONDON: + PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTE, + 28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C. + + + + + + + +ESSAYS IN RATIONALISM. + + +PUBLISHER'S NOTE. + + +Whether this little volume will find sufficient patrons to defray +the cost of its production is at least doubtful. The writer whose +essays it contains lived in obscurity and will never be popular. But +he possessed a fine intellect, however frustrated by circumstances; +he belonged to an illustrious family; and it is well to let the public +have access to the opinions of a brother of Cardinal Newman and of +Professor Newman, a brother who took his own course, as they did, +and thought out for himself an independent philosophy. + +All Charles Robert Newman's writings that are known to have been +printed, appeared in the Reasoner, edited by Mr. George Jacob Holyoake, +at various dates during 1860-61. With trifling exceptions they are +all reprinted in this collection. + +Mr. Holyoake has kindly supplied a brief account of the atheistic +Newman, and Mr. J. M. Wheeler has gathered all the information that +is obtainable as to his life and personality. + + + + + + + +BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. + + +Of Charles Robert Newman, until the death of his brother, the Cardinal, +almost nothing was known. Some reminiscences of him by Mr. Thomas +Purnell and Precentor Edmund Venables appeared in the Athenæum at +the time of his death in 1884, and these remain the chief sources +of information concerning him. Mr. G. J. Holyoake also, in his paper +The Present Day, wrote: "If the public come to know more of Charles +R. Newman, it will be seen that all the brothers, John Henry, Francis +William, and Charles R. Newman, were men of unusual distinction of +character, and that while each held diverse views, all had the family +qualities of perspicacity, candor and conscience." But these notes +attracted little attention. Most people were under the impression +there were only two brothers, who had long figured in the public eye +as types of the opposite courses of modern thought towards Romanism +and Rationalism. Yet the real type of antagonism to Rome was to be +found in Charles Robert, who is dismissed by the Rev. Thomas Mozley +with the words: "There was also another brother, not without his +share in the heritage of natural gifts." + +In a notable passage on change of religion, in his Essay in Aid of +a Grammar of Assent, chap. vii., Cardinal Newman seems to allude +to the career of himself and his brothers. He says: "Thus of three +Protestants, one becomes a Catholic, a second a Unitarian, and a +third an unbeliever: how is this? The first becomes a Catholic, +because he assented, as a Protestant, to the doctrine of our Lord's +divinity, with a real assent and a genuine conviction, and because +this certitude, taking possession of his mind, led him on to welcome +the Catholic doctrines of the Real Presence and of the Theotocos, +till his Protestantism fell off from him, and he submitted himself +to the Church. The second became a Unitarian, because, proceeding +on the principle that Scripture was the rule of faith, and that a +man's private judgment was its rule of interpretation, and finding +that the doctrine of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds did not follow +by logical necessity from the text of Scripture, he said to himself, +'The word of God has been made of none effect by the traditions of +men,' and therefore nothing was left for him but to profess what he +considered primitive Christianity and to become a Humanitarian. The +third gradually subsided into infidelity, because he started with +the Protestant dogma, cherished in the depths of his nature, that a +priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the Gospel. First, +then, he would protest against the sacrifice of the Mass; next he gave +up baptismal regeneration and the sacramental principle; then he asked +himself whether dogmas were not a restraint on Christian liberty as +well as Sacraments; then came the question, What after all was the +use of teachers of religion? Why should any one stand between him and +his Maker? After a time it struck him that this obvious question had +to be answered by the Apostles, as well as by the Anglican clergy; +so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revelation of God +to man is that which is written on the heart. This did for a time, +and he remained a Deist. But then it occurred to him, that this inward +moral law was there within the breast, whether there was a God or not, +and that it was a roundabout way of enforcing that law, to say that it +came from God and simply unnecessary, considering it carried with it +its own sacred and sovereign authority, as our feelings instinctively +testified, and when he turned to look at the physical world around +him, he really did not see what scientific proof there was of the +Being of God at all, and it seemed to him as if all things would +go quite as well as at present without that hypothesis as with it; +so he dropped it, and became a purus putus Atheist." + +I have transcribed this lengthy, but remarkable passage, not because +I think it correctly describes the process of thought in his two +brothers, but rather as an illustration that his own imaginative +synthesis of their position derives its life and force from the fact +that he had before him concrete instances in the person of his own +nearest relatives. + +Charles Robert Newman, younger brother of the Cardinal and elder +brother of the Professor, was born on June 16, 1802, being one year and +four months the junior of the former, and three years the senior of the +latter. [1] Their father, a London man, and friend of Capel the eminent +stockbroker, from having been clerk in a bank, became a partner, +though he afterwards failed at a time of great commercial depression, +both in this business and as a brewer. He was a Freemason, a musician, +and had schemes of social improvement by reclaiming waste land and +planting with trees. In religion his views appear to have been of a +broad cast approximating to those of Benjamin Franklin. The mother, +whose maiden name was Jemima Fourdrinier, was of Hugenot family, and +of religious cast of mind. There were six children, equally divided +as to sex. Harriet, the eldest girl, married the Rev. Thomas Mozley; +Jemima, the second, married Mr. John Mozley; while Mary, the youngest, +died unmarried. + +Charles Robert was educated at the same school as his two brothers, +John Henry and Francis William, that of Dr. George Nicholas at Ealing, +Middlesex. + +Of the influences which moulded his mind we can only speak from what +is known of his brothers. John Henry has told how, in youth, he read +Paine's tracts against the Old Testament--we presume he means the +Age of Reason--and also boasted of reading Hume, though, as he says, +this was possibly but by way of brag. + +Evidently, though the family was brought up in the habit of Bible +reading, there was considerable freedom allowed as to the direction of +their studies. While the father lived family prayer was unknown, nor +was there any inculcation of dogma. "We read," says Francis William, +"the Psalms appointed by the church every day, and went to the parish +church on Sunday." + +Francis William Newman, in his "Contributions, Chiefly to the Early +History of Cardinal Newman," says: "In opening life, my brother +C. R. N. became a convert to Robert Owen, the philanthropic Socialist, +who was then an Atheist. [2] But soon breaking loose from him, +Charles tried to originate a 'New Moral World' of his own, which +seemed to others absurd and immoral, as well as very unamiable. He +disowned us all, on my father's death, as 'too religious for him.' To +keep a friend, or to act under a superior, seemed alike impossible +to him. His brother (the late Cardinal) humbled himself to beg a +clerkship for him in the Bank of England; but Charles thought it +'his duty' to write to the Directors letters of advice, so they could +not keep him. Nor could he keep any place long. He said he ought to +take a literary degree at Bonn: his two brothers managed it for him, +but he came away without seeking the degree. His brother-in-law, +the Rev. Thomas Mozley, then took him up very liberally; but after +my sister Harriet's death, J. H. N. and I bore his expenses to his +dying day. His meanness seemed to me like that of an old cynic; +yet his moderation was exemplary, and at last he undoubtedly won the +respect of the mother and daughter who waited on him." + +In this, which is nearly all he has to say of this elder brother, +it appears to me Professor Newman has either said too little or +too much. The title of his work did not necessitate any reference +to Charles Robert; but having said so much he should at least have +explained further. For instance, in reference to the visit to Bonn, +it was exceedingly natural in the second brother seeking to take a +degree, since both his senior and junior had a college education. That +he did not share in this advantage may have well tended to sour +his life. Mr. Meynell explains why he returned without seeking the +degree. He says: "But he came away without even offering himself for +examination, a step he explained by saying that the judges would not +grant him a degree because he had given offence by his treatment of +faith and morals [it is a Catholic who writes] in an essay which they +call teterrima." Charles may have acted with extreme imprudence, both +in regard to the bank directors and the Bonn examiners; but we should +need to know the cases before we can determine whether he was actuated +by wilful waywardness or by adherence to a higher than common standard +of conduct. Each of the brothers had evidently exquisite sensitiveness +of conscience, though, as proved by the Professor's last book--that +unique criticism of a brother who died at ninety by another aged +eighty-five--they could not always enter into sympathy with each other. + +Of this we may be quite sure. The life of one who had thought himself +into Atheism, yet contemplated becoming a tutor, must have been a most +uncomfortable one. The treatment he was likely to receive could not +be calculated to evoke his better qualities. Finding everywhere his +Atheism a bar to his advancement, whose is the fault if it resulted +in a character of petulance and cynicism, and in--what it evidently +did result in--a largely wasted life? + +The Rev. Edward Venables, Precentor of Lincoln, speaks of him as having +been, between 1834 and 1844, usher in a large school for farmers' sons, +kept by a Mr. Allfree at Windmill Hill, in the parish of Herstmonceaux, +Sussex, where Julius Charles Hare, Archdeacon of Lewes, was rector, +and John Sterling for a short while curate. Mr. Venables says Newman +"interested Archdeacon Hare very much, and I have often heard him +speak of the long conversations he had had with him on literary +and philosophical subjects, and of the remarkable mental power he +displayed. At that time the future Cardinal's brother had entirely +discarded the Christian faith, and declared himself an unbeliever +in revelation." There can be no doubt the tribute from Hare, a man +of very superior culture, was deserved, though the archdeacon also +expressed the opinion "there was a screw loose somewhere." + +The task of teaching the Sussex rustics was, as Precentor Venables +remarks, intolerably irksome to a man of Newman's high intellectual +power. It was like chopping logs with a fine-edged razor. His +relations with his principal became strained, and a tussle between +the usher and his class led to his dismissal. At this time he +was miserably poor. Precentor Venables says: "To Hare he lamented +the narrow-mindedness of his brothers John and Francis, who, as he +asserted, had entirely cast him off, and left him to fight his way in +the world unaided, because of his professed infidelity, in which the +younger of the two, then an ardent Evangelical, was before very long +to follow him." No reproach whatever is due to the younger brother on +this account, and the elder is probably as little blameworthy. John +Henry could not be expected to recommend as tutor one whose views +upon faith and morals he considered unsound. Francis William had +gone to Bagdad with the object of assisting in a Christian mission, +and intercourse with Mohammedans and other studies were but gradually +loosening his orthodoxy. After his return, and when his works and +professorship at London University assured his position, he put himself +into regular monthly communication with his brother. In the meantime +he had been assisted by his sister Harriet's husband. But the iron had +already entered his soul; he was an Atheist and an outcast. Forced to +receive the bounty of relatives who deplored his opinions, he seems to +have resented their kindness as an attempt to bribe his intellectual +conscience. The world rang with the fame--as theologian, historian, +poet, and preacher--of the elder, whose creed he had outgrown and +despised; while his convictions, to the full as honest, everywhere +stood in his way, and were contemned as an offence against faith and +morals. He had no contact with minds congenial to his own, and doomed +himself to the life of a recluse. + +Each of the brothers was of a retiring, meditative disposition. Reading +the Apologia Pro Vita Sua of the eldest, one may see how this +contributed towards his seeking a refuge in the Catholic Church. The +same disposition of mind may be traced in the Phases of Faith of +the youngest, equally impelling him from the evangelicalism of his +surroundings and leading to the rejection of historic Christianity, +and finally to the surrender of all belief in revelation. In Charles +Robert Newman the same qualities were seen to excess, removing him +from contact with his fellows to the life of a solitary thinker in +a quiet Welsh watering-place. From about 1853, he had a room in a +small cottage on the Marsh road, Tenby. + +Mr. Thomas Purnell, who says he had for years "the inestimable +privilege of enjoying his close intimacy," remarks, "never before +or since have I met a man endowed with as rare an intellectual +equipment." Mr. Purnell thus describes his own first visit to the +recluse: "He stood at the top of the topmost stair. I cannot imagine a +more distinguished head and face. There was a touch of Mephistopheles +in him. There was also a touch of Jupiter Olympius. Although dressed +in ill-fitting clothes, and with a sort of blanket over his shoulders, +he appeared to me to be the ideal of courtly grace. He bowed me without +a word into his apartments. This was in the roof of the building, +and the only light came from a window which opened with a notched iron +bar. The room was as meagrely furnished as Goethe's study in Weimar. A +bed, a chest of drawers, a table and two or three chairs, with a few +books, constituted the whole goods and chattels." Mr. Purnell says +"his health, means and inclination made him averse to society. The +rector called on him, but was not admitted; visitors to the town who +had known his brothers would send in their cards, but they received no +response; local medical men, when they heard he was ill, volunteered +their services, but they were declined with courteous thanks conveyed +by letter." + +It appears he but seldom left his house, and when he went out he did +not often enter the town, but took his exercise in the road which +led into the country. Dressed in a pea-jacket, with a shawl or a rug +thrown across his shoulders, and with a sou'-wester over his head, he +marched erect, looking neither to left nor right. He wore shoes, and, +as his trousers were short, displayed an interval of white socks. The +lads and lasses were apt to regard such a figure with derision. + +It was through Mr. Purnell that he communicated the papers here +reprinted to the Reasoner. Although but of the character of fragments, +they bespeak an original mind. The secret of the Cardinal's great +influence and strength was that what he spoke and wrote came not +from books, but forthright out of his own head and heart. The topics +with which his brother deals were those only needing the mind, +and his treatment shows they were viewed in the dry light of an +original intellect. The Reasoner ceased soon after the appearance +of these papers, and thus closed the one opening for his literary +activity. Francis William Newman was, at least till the present year, +unaware that his arguments for Theism were challenged by his own +brother under the signature of "A Recluse." He informs me that he +had never heard that anyone would publish anything from his pen, and +that he heard that at his death, in March, 1884, he left a box full +of manuscripts, which were destroyed as useless. Whether this was done +by order of his relatives, whether the landlady decided the question, +or whether the vicar or neighbors were called in, will perhaps remain +as unknown as the worth of the manuscripts. The following specimens +are all by which the latter question can be judged. + +Mr. Meynell says that two years before he died he had a short visit +from his eldest brother. It must have been a strange meeting, and +one worthy the brush of a great artist. Surely in all England there +were not two men of eighty whose thoughts were so divergent or two +brothers whose lives were so diversified. The one a saintly cardinal, +called by the Pope the Light of England, who, by his rare urbanity, +had gained the respect of all, replete with all that should accompany +old age--as honor, love, obedience, troops of friends: the other, +fallen, too, into the sere and yellow leaf, and without them all--poor, +solitary, unknown and despised, a scorn and wonderment to his nearest +neighbors. And all from following his own thought that had made him +a purus putus Atheist. + + + J. M. Wheeler. + + + + + + + +CHARACTER OF CHARLES NEWMAN. + + +There is little to say and less need to add anything to what +Mr. Wheeler writes, whose industry and discernment collect together all +the accessible facts of his subject. My knowledge of Charles Robert +Newman is confined to his correspondence, which, with my present +engagements, I could not refer to and examine without delaying the +printer longer than would be convenient to you, as Mr. Wheeler's +article is in type. The impression Mr. C. R. Newman conveyed to me by +his letters is, I judge, sufficient for the purpose in hand. Charles +Newman had an intermittent mind. He would write with great force +and clearness, and in another letter, which was confused in parts, +he would frankly say that his mind was leaving him, as was its wont +as I understood him, and after a few months less or more, it would +return to him, when he would write again. In this manly frankness +and strong self-consciousness he resembled his two eminent brothers +Francis and John. I trusted to his friend Mr. Purnell, who was the +medium in communicating with me, to send me further letters when +Mr. Charles was able or disposed to write them. I expected to hear +from him again. Much occupied with debates and otherwise at the time, +I neglected writing further to him myself. Afterwards thinking his +disablement might have grown upon him with years, disinclined me +from asking him to resume his letters. Mr. Wheeler seems ignorant of +Charles Newman's mental peculiarity, and does not recognise what may +be generous delicacy on the part of his brothers in not referring to +it. To do so would have subjected them to the imputation, very frequent +formerly, of imputing difference of opinion to want of saneness. Even +so liberal a preacher as W. J. Fox accounted, in 1841, for my disbelief +in Theism by conjecturing the existence of some mental deficiency. No +doubt many persons with whom Charles Newman had dealings in offices +he held, would regard his Atheism--which it was contrary to his nature +to conceal--as a personal disqualification. He avowed his opinions as +naturally and as boldly as Professor Newman and the Cardinal avowed +theirs. It is not conceivable that Cardinal Newman ever intermitted +his aid--or Professor Newman either--on this account. They were both +incapable of personal intolerance. They might deplore that their +brother Charles's opinions were so alien, so contrary to theirs; +but this they would never make matter of reproach. It was doubtless +a great trial to them that their brother, having fine powers like +their own, making no persistent effort for his own maintenance, +although he knew it must render independence impossible. Possibly +the solitariness which he chose caused his tendency to unusualness +of conduct, not to say eccentricity, to grow upon him--which they +could not control or mitigate without an interference, which might +subject them to resentment and reproach. Charles no doubt inherited +his father's sympathy for social improvement, which led to his sharing +Robert Owen's sociologic views. But he did not acquire his Atheism +from Robert Owen--as Professor Newman has said--for Robert Owen was +not an Atheist--always believing in some Great Power. + +Professor Newman has told me that in any further edition of his +little book upon his brother, the Cardinal, he will, on my authority, +correct his description of Robert Owen as an Atheist. Charles owed +his Atheism to himself, as his brothers owed their opinions to their +own conclusions and reflections. Charles not taking a degree was less +likely to be owing to means not being furnished to him than to his +intermittent indecision of mind and his strong discernment, which +produced satisfaction with the world, with others, and with himself. + + + George Jacob Holyoake. + + + + + + + +TWO PRINCIPLES OF ORDER. + + +In my proof of the invalidity of that argument--it being indeed what +is called "the Argument from Design"--I point out that our experience +simultaneously informs us of two modes of producing order, otherwise +called arrangement, relation of parts to each other and to the whole +direction of means towards some recognisable end; or, to describe +the phenomenon in the most summary, as well as the most practical, +way--two modes of producing effects identical with those that proceed +from design. I explain that, of these two principles of order, the one +is Design itself, a modus operandi of intelligence (such as we find +it here below, of which the human mind affords the best examples), +while the other is something to which no name has been assigned, +and which, consequently, we can only shortly describe by saying that +it is not design. It becomes necessary, therefore, to give a farther +periphrastic account of it as follows:-- + +This nameless principle of order, considered as a vague popular +surmise, is as familiar to our experience as design. We all +see, for instance, that water has a tendency to form a perfectly +level and horizontal surface, that heavy bodies fall to the earth +perpendicularly, that the plummet performs a straight line in just +the same direction, that dew-drops and soap-bubbles assume a globular +shape, that crystallisation observes similar artist-like rules, +and so on. We are accustomed to say, "It is the nature of things," +and we ground our daily actions on a confidence in this regularity of +proceeding, without generally attempting to explain it. Science comes +to our help, and shows us that this orderly action of things around +us may be traced to, and is the necessary result of, the operation of +certain powers or properties inherent in these natural things. Grant +that the property called gravitation belongs to moving bodies, +and an innumerable quantity of orderly phenomena may be predicated +as springing of their own accord by inevitable consequence from +this datum; which same phenomena, moreover, intelligence is able +coincidently to reproduce in its own special mental way. + +Here, then, is a principle of order, less popularly appreciated, +but not less certainly evidenced and known, than design. It is, no +doubt, a principle infinitely inferior in dignity, for it is blind +and unintelligent, while design sees and understands, but this is +not the question. The question, superseded by an answer derived from +human experience, is to this effect--that nature and natural things +are, with no less propriety, assignable as the doers of a certain +non-designing kind of order, than man is assignable as the doer of +the designing kind; that we just as truly perceive that nature, +in the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in +her, produces order in a dew-drop or in a crystal, as that man, in +the exercise of certain powers that we find to be inherent in him, +produces order in a poem or in a cathedral, and that, consequently, +the argument from design, based as it is on the assertion that our +experience assures us of only one principle of order, is invalid. + +Mr. F. W. Newman's argument is one of this erroneous class. He points +to "Animal Instincts" as an effect, which, owing to our knowing of +no other agency by which it could have been produced, can alone +be accounted for by reference to a designer, and consequently as +manifesting the objective existence of that designer, who could only be +the theistic God. The question that Mr. F. Newman's adduced instance +required him to consider was, whether the non-designing principle of +order, which, we are aware, is in many cases able to produce the same +effects as the other, could have been thus operative here, and he had +got to prove that it could not have been so, that there was something +in the nature of the case that forced us exclusively to have recourse +to the intelligent principle of order, and resisted any solution from +the other principle. The result of a proof so conducted would have +been, that Mr. F. Newman was entitled to conclude that (granting our +earthly experience was a sufficient test of the matter) Design must +have been the sole worker of the debated phenomenon. He would then +have established his theistic argument. Instead of doing this, he +simplifies his proceeding by being incognisant of a notorious fact, +and ignoring the non-designing principle altogether. + +1. The fact is, that there is not one way only of producing the +phenomena of design (I am here using an ordinary elliptical mode +of speaking, since literal metaphysical correctness is sometimes +cumbrous)--but there are two ways: one, the mind of a designer, and +the other (whatever may be its nature, which the present question +does not call upon me to define) not the mind of a designer. + +2. The shortest way of proving this theorem, is to state that there +are two ways of your obtaining a facsimile of your own person. One +is to have your portrait taken, and the other is to stand before +a looking-glass, and that of these two ways the former is that of +design, and the latter confessedly not design, being the well-known +necessary effect of certain so-called second causes, whose operation +in this instance is familiar to modern science. + +3. Consequently, S. D. Collet is incorrect in the principle which +she makes the foundation of her argument at p. 27, where it is said, +"What the Theist maintains is this, that when we see the exercise of +Force in the direction of a purpose, we, by an inevitable inference, +attribute the phenomenon to some conscious agent." + +4. Force is seen to be exercised in the direction of a purpose--the +purpose being that of producing similitude--with equal evidence in +the two cases just compared; for though the force exercised in said +direction is less in the case of the painter than it is in that of the +looking-glass (for the resemblance produced by the former is in less +degree a resemblance than that produced by the latter), the evidence +cannot be said to be less, since it is no less able to convince. We +are as perfectly sure that the painter could not have produced that +lesser similitude of a man, and a particular man, by chance (the +alternative of this supposition, according to our experience, being +that he must have used design) as we are that the looking-glass could +not have produced that greater similitude of a man, and a particular +man, by chance (the alternative of this supposition, according to +our experience, being that it must have used certain so-called laws +of nature); this collective experience of ours, equally assuring us +on the one hand, that the only way of the painter's achieving these +effects is by design, and on the other, that the only way of the +looking-glass's doing so, is by the natural agencies referred to. + +5. The human experience on which the decision of this question must +be founded--though not at the present era essentially different--may +yet be said to be considerably so from what it was in certain former +periods. In no times could mankind think and observe without becoming +aware of these two principles of order--whether you call them facts +or inferences--as a portion of their familiar experience. And so far +as they might have compared them, they must have abundantly seen that +the natural one is more powerful than the artificial one, and that the +straight line or the circle must seek its perfection much rather from +the plummet or the revolving radius, than from the pencil of Apelles. + +6. Thus the essential point of the existence of the two principles +has always been known, but the idea of their respective spheres and +limits, of the efficient prevalence of each within our experience, has +fluctuated in society. Art and handicraft are, of course, peculiarly +competent to appreciate the artificial principle of order, while +physical science is especially conversant with the natural one. As the +ancients were equal to the moderns in the former pursuits, but vastly +inferior to them in the latter, they must so far have had a tendency to +think more of the designing principle, and less of the other principle +than we do. But it must be remembered, that one or other of these two +principles, or at least the arbitrament between them, is the animating +basis of all religion, and of all religious sects and persuasions; +and further, that of these two principles, the religion founded on +the artificial one, which is the one traditionally derived to us, +is liable to be, and is wont to be, a far more powerful religion +(because it deals far more intensely in personification, having +reference singly to some supposed artist) than either the religion +that is constituted by the natural principle, or that which results +from a mixture of the two principles. And indeed, I will incidentally +say that this last kind of religion seems to me to have much analogy +on its side, and that the old idea of "the two principles" might, +on several grounds besides the present one, and in several respects, +perhaps, be found to shadow forth a certain amount of most important +truth and applicability. + +7. To return. By considering the state of religion and of religious +belief in the times of Socrates and Cicero, in connection with +the state of art, handicraft, and science, in the same time, and +coincidently taking care not to forget that religious sentiment +(that at least of the kind which had in their era already been, +and much more since has been, communicated from the east to the +west) is an incomparably more vigorous impeller of opinion, than +reason and argument; we shall have some of the principal data, and +in a main matter shall be prepared to use them judiciously in any +inquiry we might make, why it was that Socrates and Cicero, having +their attention arrested by the artificial principle of order and +arrangement, seemed absolutely to forget the existence of the natural +one, and why in consequence it was, that the latter wrote to this +effect: "He who can look up to the heavenly vault, and doubt the +existence of a one personal God, the designer and governor of all +things, is equivalent to a madman"; and why, further, we, spite of +our vast physical science, are prone to the same fallacy. + +8. Having thus proved that the argument of the Theist generally, +as well as the particular one advanced by S. D. C. at p. 27, is, by +being based on the erroneous statement that there is only one means +known to human experience, of producing phenomena identical with those +that are the product of design, and that this one is design itself; +there being, on the contrary, two such means, one of which is not +design; having, I say, proved that your argument, by being so based, +is invalid, I find I must fully agree with you, that there is evidence +of "an unmistakable cosmical unity." + +9. The true inquiry, therefore, is, which of those two principles +of order is, in the agency inquired into, the agent under these +circumstances, and whether both, and how far, under our ignorance of +what may be (a most important point that is carefully to be considered) +we are entitled to affirm as indubitable, to denounce as contradictory, +to advance as probable, to conjecture, to surmise, or to speculate +on this question. + + + + + + + +THE TRUTH OF FIRST PRINCIPLES. + + +1. You ask "my idea on the impossibility of proving the truth of +First Principles?" + +By "truth" you mean the ascertained existence of any idea or thing, +and the ascertained consistency of any statement with some such idea +or thing. + +By "principles" you mean not simply cardinal propositions, but cardinal +propositions that we have ascertained to be true. + +By "first principles" you mean the indubitably true but unprovable +elementary principles of all our knowledge. You mean that these +principles are the ground whereon we build in our reasonings; all that +we build upon them must, in consequence of being so built, admit of +being "proved" whether we have built rightly--that is, admit of being +subjected to the test whether the reasoning is correct; but these +"first principles" are confessedly exempted from this test, and yet +are received as true, no less than the others that have sustained this +ordeal. You ask the meaning of this privilege, whether it is right; +and, if so, to what propriety or necessity of the case it is due? + +2. You ask, "How is truth ascertained to be truth?" or, in other words, +"What is the criterion of truth?" + +With respect to the first query--In accordance with the definition I +have above given of truth, it would seem that it must have two sources, +experience and reason, experience who notifies the existence of +certain ideas or things, and reason, who forms propositions suggested +by them. Experience, therefore, acts the simple part of supplying +all the materials of truth; while reason, besides his acknowledged +office of judge of all truth, exercises the quite different function +of being himself the purveyor of a portion of it. + +So indubitable is it that truth can have these two sources only, +that even fanaticism would be found confessing the principle; while +it appeals to the experience of those who agree with it, as well as +professes to be reasonable. + +First principles must, accordingly, be of two kinds. Of those that +are based upon experience, I will give the following instances:--I +hear the chirping of a bird, and I see an inkstand before me. That +I have the sensation of hearing and seeing in these two cases, are +facts of which it is impossible I can doubt. Reason perceives that +these are primary facts or first principles, neither admitting nor +requiring any proof, testified by consciousness, and self-evidently +verified on that testimony. + +By reason, of course is meant the reason of all mankind--that is, +of all who are presumably competent to judge on the subject. So that +any just or reasonable confidence in the verdict of my own reason--in +this or in any other matter, presupposes a due comparison of my own +reason with that of others, nay, in some cases, a consideration of +the supposably more enlightened reason of future times. + +I discriminate first principles from derived ones thus:--"I see the +sun," is a first principle to me; "you see it," is a first principle to +you; by comparing these two ideas, each attains the derived principle +that the other sees what he does, and the further derived principle +that the sun is an existence independent of both. His own existence +is, indeed, to every one the first principle, by means of which he +infers the existence of other things and beings. + +In coming now to the other kind of first principles, consisting of +propositions formed by reason, we perceive that these show symptoms +of still further difference from the above, than that which results +from the difference of their source, of difference that affects their +philosophical character, and their technical right to the name under +which they present themselves to us. In short, the primary philosophy +has not yet settled their title. + +They are perceived by us to be true by an act of reason called +intuition. Not similarly, however, does our reason inform us that they +really are first principles, and our science is hitherto unequal to +this inquiry. + +Take, for instance, the following celebrated thesis, so often cited +as the most fundamental of all the propositions of reason, insomuch +as to be tacitly implied in all our reasonings; which yet we are +not sure is a first principle, all that can be said in favor of its +pretensions being that we can find no one who is able to reduce it +to more primary elements:-- + +It is impossible for a thing at the same time to be and not to be. + +Any one agreeing, as every one must, that this is true, might +still justly put the query, Why is it impossible? thereby calling +its assertion in question, demanding its credentials of proof, +seeking some ground for its truth other than its own testimony, and +hypothesising some other proposition more fundamental than it of which +it would be a derivative, and by all and each of these proceedings, +rejecting its claim to be a first principle. + +Its resisting our analysis is a good subjective ground for our ranking +this and other similar propositions among our first principles. But +they could only have the true claim by its being made clear that +the inability results from the nature of the case, and not from our +own incompetency. + +This test is borne by the former description of first principles; we +are able to see that the instances I adduced, such as the statements, +"I see the sun," "I see an inkstand," "I hear a bird," "I am conscious +that I exist," evade our power of ordinary proving, because they do +not admit of such proof. + +When we perceive that no one can answer this query, we are prompted to +another. Why cannot we answer it? whence our inability? what prevents +us? But here also we find ourselves completely in the dark, which is +somewhat strange, considering that in every human pursuit, whether of +science or any other, when we wish to do a thing and cannot do it, we +are generally able to specify some particular, either of self-defect +or outward impediment that is supposed to be in fault. But I imagine, +if the reader were to experiment on the specimen I have given, he +would not only find himself to fail in solving the problem, Why is +it that a thing cannot at once be and not be? but would not have a +word to advance in the way of accounting for his failure. + +These remarks apply to all other propositions of the sort. Euclid's +axioms, which undoubtedly aim to be as elementary as possible, and +therefore may be said to aim to be first principles, are confessedly, +under this aspect, unsatisfactory to the learned. "Things that are +equal to the same are equal to each other." Every one is inclined +to ask, Why? "A straight line is the shortest distance between two +points." Again, Why? + +The sum of the above strictures on this kind of so-called first +principles, is--1. That they have not made good their title, +and therefore are not to be accredited with it. 2. That there +is a decided presumption against that title from the doubt and +dissatisfaction with which it is met, where want of candor and +intelligence cannot be imputed, especially when it is considered that +the other, the sensuous experimental kind of first principles, have +so frank an acceptance. 3. It seems to be absolutely provable, and I +suppose I have above incidentally proved it, that they are not first +principles. 4. The task is set to metaphysics of supplying the most +satisfactory proof of all by bringing to light such propositions as +would be perceived to underlie these so-called first principles, and to +be the real first principles to which the others would give precedence. + +As regards their name, it being so much in point, excuses the old +remark that the elements of our knowledge stand in a reversed order +in respect to this knowledge to what they assume in our process of +acquiring it. A first principle, therefore, means also a last one; +it is the last in whatsoever endeavors to descend to the bottom or +to penetrate to the source of our knowledge, but it becomes the first +when we trace it from this source through its derivative ideas. + +The investigating act should not be confounded with the prospecting +one. The sensible horizon of subjective vision can, by no mediation, +be exalted into the real horizon of truth, wherein the genuine first +principles that bound human capability are exclusively to be found. + +It may be asked, apart from the inquiry what first principles there +are, Is there a necessity that some first principles should be? So it +seems from the data of the case. It is patent to common observation +that the mind of man is recipient of ideas from the things that +surround it. The contact of its apprehending faculty with the things it +apprehends, must, it would seem, constitute first principles. After it +has got them it might conceivably elicit from them derived principles, +but the original ones cannot be thus derived, since there are none +earlier from which to derive them. + +Again, it is to be inquired, Does the mind, in receiving its ideas, +possess and exercise in reference to the things on which it operates, +a copying faculty or a transforming faculty? Does it import them simply +in their native character, in the way a mirror does the object it +reflects, or does it manufacture, cook, and assimilate them, so as +to change them into something partaking of its own? + +And, if it changes them, what is the extent of the change? Does it +go so far only as the semi-idealism of Locke, or extend into the +absolute idealism of the German school? + +Because these questions have been wont to puzzle either the learned, +or the public, or both, it does not follow that they are difficult. I +suppose them to admit of decided answers before a supposed competent +audience. + +As I am unprovided with proof, although I suppose it is to be provable, +that first principles of reason must needs be, I must speculate for +a moment on the possibility of a proposition of the form of "two and +two make four," being derived from one of the form of "I scent the +rose," for this seems to be the alternative of there being no first +principles of reason. Evidently I must confess to having no grounds +for pronouncing such a derivation impossible, though I must grant +it to be paradoxical. Our mal-cultivation of non-material science, +and the imperfection of our metaphysics, is probably the only cause +of the strange predicament. + +No doubt M. Cousin, and several other eminent teachers of youth, +to whose office it belongs to expound received metaphysics, have +comprised First Principles in their course of philosophy; but as I +have barely met with any of their writings, I must confess such an +ignorance of them, as not even to know how far I am either adopting, +or evading their phraseology, in discussing the same subjects. Mine, +however, cannot be wrong, since the term "first principles," that I +have chosen, is one of familiar popular use; so that were this mode +of speech, as indeed it is, peculiarly liable to ambiguity, it would, +for that very reason, be preferable to any other, till such time as +that ambiguity should have been explained, and the wrong thinking, of +which it might have been the source, exposed and obviated. Not till +this had been done would it be time to inquire whether the current +metaphysics had invented any intrinsically better ways of speaking +on these topics, for though the veriest tyro in such investigations +would be justified in objecting to some of its technicalities, +such as the invention of the word free-will, for instance, for the +same reason that a beginner in zoology might object, were such an +attempt ever made, to the introduction of the word sphynx or griffin +into that branch of inquiry, there can be no doubt that other of its +speculations are more happily conceived. Hence I suppose it would be +a decided mistake to imagine, for example, that no trouve whatever is +to be elicited from the obscurities of Kant, but on the other hand, +one must as much take care to entertain sober conjectures of the +possible value of such unsunned treasures, as to keep in mind that +quackery may be not unqualified with some merit, and I might surmise +that it was perhaps in virtue of his fabulous expectations in this +direction, that Coleridge could not execute his long-meditated plan of +elucidating that writer; or rather, perhaps--to speak more curtly--a +spirit more differing from that which compounded the amalgam, was +necessary to resolve and detect it. + +According to this estimate of the value of our achieved studies, it +would be expectable, in regard to my present topic, that almost all +the materials for right conclusions on it must be extant somewhere or +other in our books, no great amount of ability being required to turn +them to proper account: an easily suppliable desideratum being thus +left unsupplied, the public indifference manifested thereby would seem +to bear the ascription of our unsatisfactory metaphysics to the fault, +however apportioned between the many and the few, not of the intellect, +but of the reason. + +Indeed, it is held as a pretty general rule, that where there is want +of reform, there is want of reason; and Bacon, by implication, thought +the rule here applicable, when, in defending his "new philosophy" +from the charge of arrogance, he apologised by saying that a "cripple +in the right road would make better progress than a racehorse in the +wrong." That is, he claimed for himself, as he was bound logically to +do, the plain good sense of directing his supposably humble faculties +with an obvious regard to the end he proposed and professed, and he was +ready to concede to his competitors all kinds of superiority but this. + +The same simplicity characterises the reforming animus of the other +great patriarch of "the new philosophy," in its sister branch. The +still debated point between the school of Locke and the old philosophy +was, and is, of such a form as may be figured by the following +hypothetical, and it may be, well-founded statement. Locke seems to +have battled mainly for the principle that ideas that every one allows +to be inferences, should be acknowledged by philosophy to be such, +while the adherents of the old ideas maintained, in opposition to +him, that ideas that every one allows to be inferences, should not +be acknowledged by philosophy to be such. Or, in other words, Locke +aimed to realise a certain first principle of reason, which I shall +have hereafter to consider, which stands thus:--"That which it is," +while his opponents withstood this innovating pretension, finding +it fatal to their doctrine. If the reader is somewhat startled at +the statement I have just made, I will remind him that it amounts +to nothing more than saying that in the contest between the new and +the old philosophy, reason is entirely and absolutely on the side of +the former, an assertion which, of course, I must both think admits +of being substantiated, and must take myself, in some degree, to be +able to aid in its being so. + +The existing quarrel between the two philosophies might, perhaps, +be personified through the medium of a principal champion on each +side. For the new ideas I could only choose Locke, since he is admitted +to have had no equally eminent successor; for the old I would choose +M. Cousin, both on account of his superior merit and popularity, and +also of his having made Locke the subject of some elaborate strictures +that I happen to have read. On these, when they come again to hand, +I should perhaps have something to remark; meanwhile I must content +myself with addressing myself to one of them in the following manner:-- + +In antiquity and the middle ages, the schoolmaster and the +philosopher were one and the same individual. The new philosophy +was the first to separate these two departments; perceiving that the +communication of truth is a distinct office from its investigation, +and that that difference of office in each case necessitates a +corresponding difference in the public, that is the proper object of +its exercise. Since, moreover, society may be discriminated into two +sorts of mind, admitting of being pictured as the childish and the +adults, it is evident that the instructor must find his audience +more especially in the former, while the investigator of truth +must appeal exclusively to the latter. This he must needs do, to +whichever of the sciences he ministers; and not only so, but he must +more particularly address himself to a small and select portion of +this itself selecter class, constitute them the witnesses and judges +of his proceedings, and perceive that both his success in philosophy +and the acknowledgment of it can only be founded first and foremost on +their approbation. As even in jockeyism and prize-fighting, there are +"the knowing ones," similar referees are, by the nature of things, +required for the flourishing estate of any science; and evidently in +proportion as they might be incompetent to such an office, false or +imperfect science must be the result. + +Locke, acting on this instinctive view, communicated to the +public certain observations he had made in mental philosophy, and +entitled his work, An Essay on the Human Understanding. He properly +called it an essay, because a person who simply aims to investigate +truth, undertakes to do his best in the way of trial, endeavor, and +experiment, in such sort as to make the word essay appropriate to what +he does. The word moreover implies that the thing done, though it is +the writer's best, is liable to be incomplete, comparatively imperfect, +and, indeed, in the more difficult questions of philosophy, as well as +in the less advanced stages of philosophising, is sure to be so. Locke +accordingly, having had his attention struck with certain phenomena of +the human mind, told the public just what he had observed, and nothing +else. Among the observations that he thus imparted, was the process +through which the mind seems to go in arriving at the sum of its ideas, +and especially the points from which it seems to start in this process. + +M. Cousin, having apparently no conception of a way of acting so +proper to legitimate inquiry, and having himself written a Course +of Philosophy, evidently thinks Locke ought to have done the same; +for he says that Locke is erroneous in the method of his philosophy, +that he begins at the wrong end, that instead of having told us as he +has how the ideas arise in the mind, he ought to have told us what +the ideas are, instead of describing their origin to have described +their actuality, to have given a list of the faculties of the mind, +and so on. Which is just the same thing as saying that a traveller +who publishes his explorations in America, ought instead to have gone +to China. + +I shall have to make some objections to Locke, but they will be of +a nature exactly contrary to those of which he is usually made the +subject. Instead of accusing his principles I shall have to impute +to him the not sufficiently carrying them out; a fault due to his +position as an early reformer, and perfectly consistent with his high +character as such. + +I have the more reason to note this distinction between M. Cousin's +department and the function exercised by Locke, because I am forced +myself to take the benefit of it. Want of erudition would form very +vulnerable points, were I to be judged by the former standard. In +the little I have yet put forth on the subject of First Principles, +I already find two or three errors of that sort, which a greater amount +of reading would no doubt have enabled me to escape. My present letter +may close with some correction of one of these. + +Preliminary, I will venture to call "That which is is," a first +principle of reason, and "Two and two make four," one of its +derivatives, leaving this topic for future explanation, and then +proceed thus:--When in my last letter I represented first principles +as bounding the horizon of human knowledge, I left it to be inferred +that both the kinds of "first principles" I had mentioned were thus +describable in common. I find, however, that this metaphysical +character belongs exclusively to first principles of sensuous +experience, and no more belongs to first principles of reason than to +first principles of grammar, or to first principles of rhetoric. That +is, first principles of reason are merely the result of one of those +analytical inquiries in which we arrive at something absolutely simple, +and must there stop, just as in the science of numbers we may thus +arrive at unity. + + + +Having long ago defined First Principles of sensuous experience, +I find there is a difficulty attached to the other kind of first +principles derived from the various use of the word reason--which +I will say betrayed me into a wrong inference in the concluding +paragraph of my last letter. + +Locke, in the 17th chapter of his fourth book, confesses that this +word, in the proper use of the English language, is liable to bear +several senses. Due discrimination in such a case, and a cautious +avoidance of the dangers to which philosophy is exposed, and has +so amply incurred, from this kind of source might, above all, have +been, expected from Locke, since he was the first who inculcated it, +and is generally remarkable for the observance of his own precepts +in this matter. Hence the charge I have now got to bring against him +is a little surprising. + +Indeed, it might be asserted that his position and circumstances do +not seem very readily to bear the entire responsibility of some of his +proceedings. Perhaps he might be characterised as a writer of somewhat +humorous idiosyncracy in respect to tendency to fixed ideas. His +lapses, indeed, are not many, but they are highly significant, as +I shall have occasion in more than one instance to show, and among +these must evidently be reckoned that I am now going to notice, since +it imports the wrong definition of a word of such cardinal meaning. + +In defining the word reason, in its proper and specific sense +wherein it is used to denote a certain well-known quality of the +human mind--that is, as approvedly ascertained and appreciated under +this name, as are certain weights and measures under those of pound, +gallon, or mile, he assigns a meaning to it that comes short of the +proportions thus justly prefigured as belonging to it. He confounds +reason with reasoning--that is, he emerges the entire faculty or modus +operandi, to which we give the name of reason, in that partial exercise +of its function to which we give the name of reasoning. He says that, +in matters of certainty, such as the proof of any of Euclid's theorems, +the acts by which the mind ascertains the fit coherence of the several +links in the chain of reasoning are acts of reason. Granted. + +Also, that in weighing probabilities, a similar coherence is similarly +verified by reason. Granted--with liberty of comment that these arts +of reason, in either of the two cases have, by the approved practice +of language, received the name of reasoning. + +But he further signifies--that is, he does not expressly affirm, but, +with equivalent certification, he implicitly asserts, and inferentially +states that, in examining such a proposition as the following:--"What +is, is" (an examination to which confessedly no reasoning is attached), +the act by which the mind assents to the truth of this statement +is not to be described as an act of reason. He adopts a different +phraseology, and calls it intuition. + +Observe, my objection is not that he invests the idea with this new +name, but that he disparages its old one. I do not object to your +calling a spade a shovel, under a certain view of its use, but it +remains still necessary that you should admit that a spade is, in +the full sense of the word, a spade. + +Indeed, I will incidentally remark that I suspect the word "intuition" +has been a very good addition to our vocabulary, and I suppose +its proper import might be represented as follows:--Reason has two +modes of his exercise, the one is called reasoning, and the other +intuition. Intuition is the decision of reason on one single point; +reasoning--a word proper to demonstrative truth--seems to be nothing +more than intuition looking not merely at one point, but at several +points successively. So that intuition and reasoning would constitute +the self-same function of reason, and the difference in their meanings +would be solely owing to the difference in the circumstances under +which that function is exercised. + +Observe, that I am here only venturing to speculate, and am now +returning from that digression. + +Whether or not Locke is herein psychologically consistent with +himself; whether, indeed, his real theory is not that which I have +just conjecturally intimated, is another question, which I shall +defer to a future occasion; but whether or not he herein opposes the +ordinary, prevailing, and inveterate use of language, which is what +I am charging him with doing, and whether or not he has justifiable +ground for this innovation which I am denying that he has, are points +that must be tried by the ordeal of these three considerations. How +are we accustomed to speak? How are we accustomed to write? and what +sort of a call for changing our customs in either of these particulars +is that which constitutes a genuine call to do so? + +In regard to the first of these tests, the literature of all sects +and parties has been accustomed to assert that, both in matters of +science and of worldly business, reason is the judge of all truth +whatever, without exception. + +Locke, on the other hand, informs us that reason is the judge of +demonstrative truth, of logical truth, of casuistical truth, and of +lawyers' truth, and of these kinds of truth alone, but is not the +judge of intuitive or self-evident truth. Our writers would tell us +that to deny "what is, is" to be a true statement, would be an offence +against reason; but we learn from Locke that reason has no cognisance +in this matter, but intuition only has, and consequently that the +wrong committed would not be against reason, but against intuition. + +Our current speech accords with our literature in this view +of the meaning of the word reason; whose efficiency, moreover, +it endeavors to amplify, by surrounding it with satellites of +adjectives formed from it, the principal of which are "reasonable" and +"unreasonable." Provided with this vocabulary, we pronounce it to be +unreasonable to deny any truth whatever that can be well and clearly +ascertained; and so far are we from reserving these adjectives for +the occasion of demonstrative truth, and holding them inapplicable +where self-evident or intuitive truth comes on the carpet, that we +account it, if possible, still more unreasonable to deny the latter +than the former. + +But if the nomenclature adopted by Locke be the right one, there ought +to be a change in these current modes of speaking and writing. One who +should reject the proofs of Euclid, would be unreasonable; one who +should maintain that Thurtel or Greenacre were innocent of murder, +would be unreasonable; but, one who should deny the truth of any +self-evident proposition, would not be unreasonable; for to say this, +would be to say that reason has cognisance of such propositions, +whereas, according to him, it is expressly not reason, but intuition +that takes this office. The words "intuitional" and "unintuitional," +must be invented to supply the obvious need which the apparent gap +discovers; there seems no other way of supplying it. + +Lest I should be suspected of somewhat making up a case; of having, +perhaps, represented not so much what Locke really means, as what he +seems to mean, I will remind the reader that Locke is undertaking the +formal definition of a word, and that on such a critical occasion, +it is proper to give him credit for not meaning otherwise than he +seems to mean. + +The passage which is my text, will be found in the earlier part of +the seventeenth chapter of the fourth book. Indeed, I could at once +prove my indictment by citing a few words from it, accompanied by a +comment of my own, had I any right to impose on the reader a belief +in the discriminating fairness and matter-of-fact accuracy, both of +my extracts and my comment. + +I will, however, venture on such a step; I will suppose myself +commenting on this passage, and proceed thus: Locke, it will be seen +in this, his foremost and professed definition of the word reason, +contrasts it with "sense and intuition." + +Whether he holds these to be identical with what he calls "the +outward and the inward sense," is not quite clear. That, however, +is not the question. + +He says, that these two faculties "reach but a very little way"; +for that "the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions +and intermediate ideas." Now, reason, he says, may be defined to be +that faculty, whose specific office it is "to find out and apply" +those intermediate ideas and deductions by which we obtain knowledge +that consists of two kinds, one that which exalts us into "certainty," +the other that which, though less generous diet for the mind, we have +constantly good ground for gladly acquiescing in, and which we call +"probability." So that, says Locke, if you ask, "What room is there +for the exercise of any other faculty but outward sense and inward +perception?" I can abundantly reply, "Very much." I have shown you +that without this "demonstrative" faculty, our knowledge would be +but a skeleton; it would, indeed, not be properly speaking knowledge, +but mere rudiments of knowledge. + +Such is my interpretation of Locke's definition of reason, in the +proper and specific sense of this word. If it is strictly correct, +as I believe the intelligent reader will find by reference, then it +is Locke confounds reason with reasoning, mistakes a part for the +whole, and the whole for a part, and acts similarly--to borrow his +own way of illustration--to the representing a gallon to be a quart, +or a half-sovereign to be a sovereign. + +It is to be observed, too, that it is entirely in behalf of the more +showy kind of knowledge, that the mistake is made. The respected name +of reason is given exclusively to logic and demonstrating. Good sense, +good feeling, just instinct, if they stand alone, have no claim to +it; they are put on an inferior footing; true, they are intuition; +but what then? they are not reason. + +Now, the century introduced by Locke is accused by the present, +and it is generally admitted, with some degree of justice, of having +"materialistic" tendencies. We may see, then, how Locke's doctrine, +as just described, founded though it is only on nomenclature, hinging +merely on definition, incurring whatever wrongness it implicates from +no other lapse than that of confounding a word with its derivative, +doing nothing, in short, but annul the difference of meaning between +the two words, reason and reasoning; we may see how this apparently +harmless experiment might tend to supplying these materialistic +tendencies with a ground, a rationale, a principle, and thus to exalt +their authority, and how, indeed! it just smacks of their spirit. + +It may be seen, too, how, from a few slips, such as this on the +part of the champion of the "new philosophy," competing schools of +the present age might be able to make up a case, specious enough to +gain the acquiescence of a portion of the public against both--with +how great futility, I believe, would appear, if the accusations were +weighed by a competent tribunal. + +And, finally, it might be expected, that the undue exaltation of +the demonstrative department of reason, should issue in a reaction +into a contrary extreme, and that some Mr. Carlyle might be found to +inveigh against "logic," to sneer at "analysis," to denounce "cause +and effect philosophy" and to praise "mysticism." + +I have already assumed that the third test that I promised, goes +against Locke, and requires no examination, simply because he has not +advanced it in his behalf. He has assigned no ground for changing +the meaning of the word reason, and it is presumable that none is +assignable. + + + +The question, What is the Criterion of Truth?--that is, What are the +proper means of distinguishing whether anything that is asserted to be +true is so or not? claims immediate notice, because such a criterion +exists, and the new philosophy necessarily appeals to it when it comes +before the public, while it has shown with what effect it can do so, +in the case of those of its branches--namely, the purely material +and the mathematical, that flourish in society. + +Premising that it is a way of certifying truth that has been +immemorially used by mankind in their daily affairs, and which they +have always, to some extent, instinctively transferred to their +judgments in philosophy, and that it is the only possible general +and summary criterion of truth, I may describe it as consisting in +the unanimous assent to some idea or assertion of all who are thought +competent to pronounce concerning it. + +Viewed in connection with the thing it verifies, and the parties who +use it, the criterion may be thus represented: Any idea, assertion, +or opinion, must, by any inquirer, be found true, when he perceives +it to be such as would be unanimously assented to by all presumably +competent judges of the kind of truth to which it refers. + +So that those who use this criterion, and are convinced of the truth of +anything through its medium--a proceeding which I have represented as +common and habitual to mankind--in thereby pronouncing certain supposed +persons to be judges of truth in the said matter, claim themselves +to be also judges of it in the matter of so pronouncing. The acts +of judgment they thus tacitly challenge to themselves may be said to +be to the following effect:--1. They assign the qualifications that +constitute competency for a certain function. 2. They decide that there +are persons in the community answering to this character. 3. They +opine that the view such persons take or would take, imports an +assertion of the truth of the idea in question. 4. They accredit +that view with being strictly one, supposing that all qualified to +arbitrate would acquiesce and agree in the same. 5. They attribute +to themselves a similar unanimity. 6. They assume the sufficiency of +their own judgment to make all the above conclusions. + +These assumptions on their part, so complicated in description, are +simple enough in performance. It is plain that mankind--more properly +here to be called the public--simply attach themselves to some opinion +which they find current in society; while, however, the assumptions +I have just described are, in their full measure, but a necessary +consequence of their so doing, doubtless their so doing must itself +have been dictated by some kind of anticipation of them, but this may, +to any degree, have been vague, undetermined, partial, and imperfect. + +The rationale of this double bench of judges is thus explained. In +reference to almost every kind of truth there is always a certain +portion of the community better able to judge than the rest. Hence +it becomes clearly the part of the latter, if they wish to be +rightly informed, to defer to the opinion of those confessedly +better judges--confessed to be such from the general opinion to that +effect. Thus a second set of judges perforce, in addition to those that +were originally conceived by choice, is implicated in this transaction. + +For the primary sort I must seek a name from the French language, +which calls them "experts," the English supplying, I believe, none, +except a very vernacular one, the "knowing ones"; the others have +already got a well-known name--the public. + +The public, in deciding on the occasions in question, what are the +qualifications that constitute "experts" may be said to choose them, +thereby, however, choosing persons in idea, and not bodily. The +relation of the public to these conceptions of theirs is the same +as that of the constituencies to the members of Parliament, in the +point of one being the choosers and the others the chosen, with a +common object in view. + +I suppose, to stop the current of my discourse, and adjourn its topic, +for the sake of at once bringing the general principle discussed to +the test of exemplification, would have its want of logical harmony +excused by its being desiderated by the reader. + +I had undertaken to prove that this principle--which, for distinction's +sake, I will call the unanimity principle--is the proper and only +criterion of scientific truth to the great non-scientific world, +and consequently that modern philosophy necessarily appeals to it +when it comes before the public. What I had thus taken upon myself +to do, obviously was--first, to display and explicate the principle +by definition, and this I had already done; and next--to describe +it theoretically by showing its manner of existing, and this I was +engaged in doing. Leaving this inquiry in the midst, I am now going to +deviate into the practical phase of its description, by showing, not +how it is, but how it acts. This seems necessary for the satisfaction +of the reader, as being the only way of securing him from any, even +were it but temporary, misapprehension as to the working value of +the principle for which his attention is demanded. I therefore select +the six following examples, the two first homely, and the four last +philosophical, of its ordinary use by the public. + +They will be at once seen to justify my assertion of its having for +its main characteristics the two facts--first, that mankind habitually +use it, and have always done so; and next, that propositions thus +warranted are universally accepted as established truth, and that no +one thinks of calling them in question. + +1. Thus no one doubts, when coming to the intersection of two roads, +he sees a sign-post, on one of whose pointers is written "To London," +and on the other "To Windsor," no one hesitates to believe that the +information thus conveyed to him is true; because he is aware that +those who give it are competent to do so, and that none similarly +competent will gainsay it. + +2. Again, no one doubts that the sun rises and sets once in +every twenty-four hours; no one doubts that he so rose and set +yesterday. Every one is ready to affirm the certainty of these two +facts, but very few can do so, in any great degree, from their +own experience; but they help the lack of this by that of their +neighbors. Neither is it necessary that they should have any near, +nor even the most remote, idea of the personality of those on whose +testimony they thus implicitly rely; it suffices they are sure, +whoever they may be, they have the right qualifications for testifying +in the way they do, and that no one so qualified can contradict their +evidence, or dream of doing so. + +The above are examples of the criterion of truth, applied to the ideas +and proceedings of ordinary life. It will be seen therefrom, first +that mankind have in all ages been educated in an acceptance of its +principle, according to my definition of it, the principle, namely, of +an indubitable certainty of truth, resulting from the unanimous assent +to some idea of all who are thought by self and neighbors competent +to pronounce thereon; possibly too they may be said to have been +educated in some imperfect theoretical appreciation of this principle. + +It will secondly be seen therefrom, that the two kinds of unanimity +which I have predicated as essential to the proper use and results of +this criterion, an unanimity, namely, on the part of the supposed good +judges of certain descriptions of truth, who may be called the adepts +or knowing ones imagined by the public; and again an unanimity on the +part of the public itself in interpreting and adopting their opinion; +it will be seen, I say, that this double unanimity is perfectly +attainable, nay, perfectly attained, and that too so extensively, +as to constitute a common and familiar occurrence on all manner of +occasions of daily life. + +I will now give instances of their similar use of it in directing +their judgments on philosophical questions. + +3. Very few of the public are able to examine the proof of any of +the theorems of Euclid, yet there is none of them who would think of +seriously doubting the truth of anything contained in that book, the +ground of their confidence being solely their knowledge of the fact, +that the learned in these matters have unanimously so decided. + +Every one, again, believes in certain facts that are asserted by +navigators, explorers, and geographers, respecting the existence, +position, and products of various countries of the globe. Every one, +further, believes in certain deductions derived from these facts by +naturalists, geologists, astronomers, and so forth. The belief is +owing to the unanimous testimony of all these confessedly competent +authorities; but whenever they are seen to differ among themselves, the +public withholds its entire belief, and either doubts or disbelieves +the things asserted. Thus the public is at this day doubtful and +divided whether there is such a creature as the sea-serpent. Similarly +the public is dubious--for it must needs be so if any section of it is +so--whether a certain explorer who was authoritatively sent out about a +dozen years ago conjointly by the French Government and Institute, was, +in any degree, justified in bringing home the account he did of there +being a tribe of men in the interior of Africa having tails, whether +this unexpected information is, in any important particular, true. + +The two last examples have been furnished by material science. I will +now draw one from the other department, with the view of indicating +that in non-material science also, numerous propositions circulate +among the public that are franked by the same principle to pass as +undoubted truth. Such is the maxim of heathen philosophy, recorded +by Cicero in his "Officiis": "Do not to another what you would not +he should do to you"; or the same maxim, in its modified form, as +given in the New Testament, with the characteristic omission of the +negative. The truth of this moral maxim is universally admitted, +because it is supposed that no person of presumable moral judgment +has ever been known to call it in question. + +It would seem, then, that this criterion of truth is--what confessedly, +or from easy proof, it is predicable that no other criterion of +truth is--a general criterion of truth. I will, however, restrict +this pretension to the statement--to be hereafter more largely +explained--that it is a general criterion of truth to the public +as such, to the public considered as a public; for, indeed, it is +not properly usable at all by anyone except in the character of a +member of the public. This means that it is a general criterion of +truth in the following way: it is applicable to the verification of +all truth, so far as it admits of being verified before the public, +and made the common property of the community. + +6. For even where at first sight you might think it most out of place, +I mean in relation to that kind of truth whose primary evidence is +the consciousness of the individual, so that the competent witness +of truth is necessarily but one person, there is oneness of opinion, +there is unanimity, and the testimony of the one competent witness +is not contradicted or doubted by that of any other presumably +competent. When, for instance, I am conscious of the sensation +of seeing an inkstand before me, no one seeing reason to doubt my +assertion to that effect, all presumably competent testimony on the +subject must needs be concentrated in myself; and the fact of my +seeing an inkstand, though for my own conviction verified in a way +independent of any such argument, is, for the conviction of others, +only pronounceable as true, because all presumably competent authority +is of one mind in alleging its truth. + +In thus far exemplifying the use of this principle, I have exhibited +it in the exercise of its primary office only, which, however, is +not that which, on behalf of philosophy, I am here demanding from +it. I have shown it, namely, as used by the public to establish truth +positively, and not in the way wherein it may be used to distinguish +truth comparatively. + +But it is solely in this latter office that it becomes a criterion of +truth, an arbiter between the true and the false, an indicator of both, +and more especially of what has the character of ascertained truth, +and what has not; and this, it will be remembered, was the office I +sought from it, and constituted the ultimate purpose of my taking up +the consideration of the subject. + +Having with as much brevity as just suffices for that purpose, +explained the nature of the principle in question, and its use by +society at large, it now only remains that I should explain that +purpose itself, by theory and example. + +What I am doing in tracing the unanimity principle from its first +instinctive use by the public to its secondary and meditated one +by philosophy, is a purely critical act, comparable to that of +the rhetorician who appreciates the character of certain modes of +thinking which have long since been practised by mankind, and shows +what therein is approvable--all the rest being liable to censure. + +It was the universal conviction of European Christendom, during +many centuries, that the Church, which was popularly supposed to be +represented by the Pope, enjoyed peculiarly a divine guidance which +made it an infallible judge of truth. This idea was thought to be +warranted by the unanimous assent of all right-minded persons, and the +denial of it to be the mark of a reprobate spirit, as well as contrary +to common sense. We now know the entire futility of this assumption, +and that the heretics were not inferior to the orthodox in the power +of judging such subjects. Hence in discussing the unanimity principle +the question presents itself, How came the public thus wrongly to +apply it? What error did they commit in so doing? When the revival +of learning and the consequent rise of Protestantism had exposed +the error in that form of it, it was still continued under the new +social regimes; so that even Locke, the boldest advocate of the +rights of man that was tolerated even in his time, stigmatised the +dissentients from certain Protestant tenets in the same unjust way +that Popery had done to the dissentients from certain Popish ones; +speaking of them in two or three places of his essay as persons at +once notoriously disreputable in character and weak in intellect; +consistently with which estimate he came to the conclusion that the +reigning theology was established truth, as being accredited by all +those whose opinion was worth taking account of. + +Later times have again manifested the futility of the assumption +against the new race of dissentients. No one will say that Goethe +and Neibuhr (to mention only two) must count for nothing on questions +wherein they were as likely to be well informed as their opponents. So +that Locke's side, instead of being warranted by the decisive verdict +he imagines, is but one of two suitors in an undetermined cause, +neither having yet attracted the votes of the whole jury, and neither +consequently yet occupying the position of ascertained truth. Giving +everyone a fair hearing is that trial and test of competency which +yields the only means of learning who said competent judges are. + +A little consideration, even in Locke's time of less advanced thought, +might have informed an intelligent mind, if free from prejudice, +that mere prohibitory laws must be of themselves less adverse to the +free expression of people's sentiments than that averted state of the +public mind of which they are one of the symptoms. Both from theory and +experience we may collect that very much the same laws of supply and +demand obtain in matters of opinion as in those of food and raiment; +the tongue and the pen, and the previous thought by which these are +instructed, must evidently hold back from offering to the public, +nay, in a great measure from suggesting to the agent himself, any such +ideas as they know the public will not, and must confine themselves to +putting forth such only as they suppose it will understand, appreciate, +and regard. + + + + + + + +THE RIGHTS OF REASON. + + +To the two queries you put to me, "What are first principles?" and +"What is the criterion of truth?" I find it suitable to append some +preliminary remarks on "The Rights of Reason." + +The solution you expect is, I presume, a reasonable one. You do not +wish me to take into account any opinions that cannot bear the test +of reason. + +Your queries derive their greatest pertinency from the state of +non-material philosophy; and, possibly, might have been, in some +measure, prompted by this consideration. That double-minded way of +inquiring into truth, which only in part reasons, while it in part +dogmatises, imagines, and assumes, is, it is obvious, in morals, +metaphysics, and religion, one of our inheritances from former +times. The battle has been won in the material department, but is +still undecided on the other wing. + +What, then, is Reason, and what are its Rights? + +Every human inquiry that asks, What is right, proper, or +correct? necessarily, in doing so, asks, What is it reasonable +to think, believe, or do? in the points inquired into. The +faculty--whatever may be its nature--whereby we find ourselves +able, under certain circumstances, to answer this question, we call +reason. The rights of reason may be said to consist in the concession +to it of a certain absolute power in the decision of truth, divisible +under two heads thus--a power of deciding what are the questions +whereon it is able to decide, and a power of deciding those questions. + +One of the many ways of disparaging the rights of reason is--openly +or covertly to doubt or deny that morals, metaphysics, and religion, +are--in the full sense of the word--sciences. This is to withdraw +them from the empire of reason, and to hand them over to some rival +pretender. + +No science can flourish while it is understood that its discussion +must be made palatable to the public. In any supposable code of the +rights of reason, one primary article would limit and define the +functions of the public in the investigation of truth--a topic which, +together with the kindred inquiry, Who are the public? is suggested +by your second query. + +Mankind have naturally a degree of antipathy for reason. They have +found Reason, in the work he affects, dull, in the help he furnishes, +deficient, in the truth he unveils, ugly, in the rule he arrogates, +imperious. Barbarism, in all its stages, may be said to be founded, +not merely on ignorance, but on a state of the inclinations that +revolts from reason. + +Two competitors have always disputed the rights of reason; authority +or precedent, and faith or conscience. Conscience, early or late, must +receive almost all his light from authority; and, therefore, in respect +to opinion, may generally be called the creature of authority. Yet, in +a moral aspect, authority is confessedly of no account, and conscience +has a sole jurisdiction. A large portion of mankind have, in our times, +outgrown the error of resting their sense of duty on the mere dictate +of other men. The only legitimate directors of human conduct are now +generally admitted to be conscience and reason; the conscience must be +exclusively one's own, but the reason need not entirely--and, indeed, +cannot in any great proportion--be one's own, but may be partly that +of one's neighbor. + +The question of the division of power between these two potentates, +though not yet understood by the public, does not seem to be more +complicated than that analogous one just alluded to, and of which +they evidently understand the gist. + +For authority, as above intimated, though the venerable instructor of +conscience, is yet morally subjected to him; and, not dissimilarly, +have conscience and reason reciprocal claims of precedence on each +other. Reason is the judge, but he is bound, under conscience, to give +a sufficient and attentive hearing to any pleadings that conscience +may have to offer, and conscience is the pleader, but he is bound, +under reason, to conform to whatever verdicts reason declares himself +competent to render. + +If history in this particular can be considered as having disclosed +a necessary sequence, civilisation progresses in the following +order:--The general mind, in becoming acquainted with its own powers, +first learns an evolution of conscience (and this can only take place +through the medium of religion), and last learns to appreciate reason +(and this can only happen through the medium of science). While the +prerogatives of conscience were insufficiently known, authority usurped +them, and while the prerogatives of reason are insufficiently known, +authority and conscience conjointly usurp them. + +The word conscience I here use in its proper sense, wherein it means +either an individual conscience, or the united consciences of more +than one supposed to be in accord together, so as to make the acts +resulting from this accord constitute single acts of conscience. But +the word has taken an improper enlargement of meaning in being often +used to signify one conscience claiming something in contravention +of another conscience. These two, so different meanings of the word +conscience, are seldom duly discriminated by those who use them. + +To the rights of reason belongs a certain degree of power, both in +regulating the individual conscience, and in solving the differences +between opposing ones. Under what conditions, and how far, reason +can exercise this office, and what rule he is to follow in so doing, +would be an inquiry suggested by my answer to your second query. + +Having above mentioned religion and science as the two prime ministers +respectively of conscience and reason, I will pursue the subject a +little further. + +Religion has aimed to have a moral animus by means of a free +conscience. Religion has not yet immediately aimed at moral conduct; +but, indeed, has been wont, by the mouth of her most strenuous +ministers, to assume that the aim at this is already included in that +other aim. But a moral animus is but one ingredient in moral conduct, +involving the intent only to act morally, without having of itself +the least power to realise that intent. Knowledge,--that is, science, +exclusively keeps the keys of this power. Such knowledge religion +has not yet made one of her aims and ends either directly, or by +any coalition with those who have so aimed. Accordingly religion +cannot be said hitherto to have been an advocate of the rights of +reason. Whatever good things she may have achieved in this cause have +been incidental to her advocacy of the Rights of Conscience. Here +reason was her weapon (sharpened for this use, and so far valued and +treasured), against authority. Her tendency meanwhile, is to impel +conscience to infringe on the rights of reason. + +Science alone has hitherto been the immediate champion of these +rights. But it seems he cannot expect to make that advocacy complete +and effectual till he allies himself with religion. This alliance, +since it is persuaded by reason, and not by passion, can have science +alone for its real mover. + +The Rights of Reason may at present be said to be in such a germ of +their acknowledgment as were the rights of conscience three centuries +ago. Mankind have not hitherto come to acquiesce in the idea of +that parsimony of guidance vouchsafed to man, which is found to be +the result of claiming for reason the power of calling all human +thoughts before his tribunal, and seeing whether he has anything +to object to them. Their idea has been that not only suggesting +inspiration--(which it does not seem necessary that the advocate of +the rights of reason should deny)--but guiding inspiration is given, +given too to some rather than to others, and given in such a quality, +as to dispense with the supervision of reason. A generation successive +to many among whom this doctrine has been taught and believed, will not +be prone to any decided rejection of it. Pride of species inclining +to exaggerated human pretensions above other earthly creatures, and +party pride inclining to exalt self and an associated confraternity +into a superiority over the rest of mankind, and supplied with a +traditional store of modes of thought and practice adapted to such +exclusive pretensions, and other native tendencies of the human mind, +persuade in the same direction. + +I have thought it suitable to premise this short sketch of the Rights +of Reason, and the opponents of them, to an endeavor to answer your +queries in a thoroughly reasonable way, a way which cannot be said to +be the more fashionable one in the treatment of metaphysical questions. + + + + + + + +NOTES + + +[1] Wilfrid Meynell, in his John Henry Newman, erroneously speaks of +Charles Robert as the "youngest son." + +[2] This is a mistake. Owen in 1817 renounced the religions of the +world, and proclaimed that man's character was formed for him not by +him. But he was not an Atheist. + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Essays in Rationalism, by Charles Robert Newman + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 45823 *** |