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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/4723-h.zip b/4723-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c99cd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/4723-h.zip diff --git a/4723-h/4723-h.htm b/4723-h/4723-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83ccb42 --- /dev/null +++ b/4723-h/4723-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,4273 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<HTML> +<HEAD> + +<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> + +<TITLE> +The Project Gutenberg E-text of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, +by George Berkeley +</TITLE> + +<STYLE TYPE="text/css"> +BODY { color: Black; + background: White; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; + text-align: justify } + +P {text-indent: 4% } + +P.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +P.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: small } + +P.letter {text-indent: 0%; + font-size: small ; + margin-left: 10% ; + margin-right: 10% } + +P.footnote {font-size: smaller ; + text-indent: 0% ; + margin-left: 10% ; + margin-right: 10% } + +P.finis { font-size: larger ; + text-align: center ; + text-indent: 0% ; + margin-left: 0% ; + margin-right: 0% } + +</STYLE> + +</HEAD> + +<BODY> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of +Human Knowledge, by George Berkeley + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge + +Author: George Berkeley + +Posting Date: June 29, 2009 [EBook #4723] +Release Date: December, 2003 +First Posted: March 7, 2002 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TREATISE CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE *** + + + + +Produced by Col Choat. HTML version by Al Haines. + + + + + +</pre> + + +<BR><BR> + +<H1 ALIGN="center"> +A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge +</H1> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +by +</H3> + +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +George Berkeley (1685-1753) +</H2> + +<BR><BR> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE SCIENCES,<BR> +WITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION,<BR> +ARE INQUIRED INTO. +</H4> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +DEDICATION +</H3> + +<BR> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> + To the Right Honourable<BR> + THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE, &C.,<BR> + Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of<BR> + the Lords of Her Majesty's most honourable privy council.<BR> +</H4> + +<P CLASS="letter"> +My Lord, +</P> + +<P CLASS="letter"> +You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to +be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. +But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful +Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship +for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not +altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and +learning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you +are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present +of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native +goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might +add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been +pleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be +unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These +considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's +feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am +with the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning +and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship, MY LORD, +Your lordship's most humble and most devoted servant, +</P> + +<P CLASS="letter"> +GEORGE BERKELEY +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<HR ALIGN="center" WIDTH="60%"> + +<BR> + +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +CONTENTS +</H2> + +<H4> + <A HREF="#preface">PREFACE</A><BR> + <A HREF="#intro">INTRODUCTION</A><BR> + <A HREF="#knowledge">OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE</A><BR> +</H4> + +<BR> + +<HR ALIGN="center" WIDTH="60%"> + +<BR><BR> + +<A NAME="preface"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PREFACE +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed +to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known--particularly to those +who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence +and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether +it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; since +I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I +have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may +not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment +till he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of +attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to deserve. +For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very +liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be +charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an +entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though +the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is +very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I +flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the +characters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions +may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that +account. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted +with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of +demonstration, for no other reason but because it is newly known, and +contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to +premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort +of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly +comprehend it. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="intro"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +INTRODUCTION +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +1. Philosophy being nothing else but THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND TRUTH, it +may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains +in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater +clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts +and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk +of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are +governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and +undisturbed. To them nothing THAT IS FAMILIAR appears unaccountable or +difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in +their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming SCEPTICS. But no +sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a +superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of +things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those +things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors +of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, +endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into +uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and +grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having +wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we +were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the +natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the +faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the SUPPORT +and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the INWARD ESSENCE and +constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it +treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at +if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is +impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of +infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault +originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of +them. IT IS A HARD THING TO SUPPOSE THAT RIGHT DEDUCTIONS FROM TRUE +PRINCIPLES SHOULD EVER END IN CONSEQUENCES WHICH CANNOT BE MAINTAINED or +made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully +with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge +which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to +the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it +may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such +means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the +whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of +those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked +up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves--that we have +first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those +Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and +uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects +of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance +incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation +of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to +make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, +to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some +grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and +embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any +darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the +understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted +on, and might have been avoided. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I +consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the +like designs, yet I am not without some hopes--upon the consideration +that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is +short--sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, +perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far +better eyes. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +6. A CHIEF SOURCE OF ERROR IN ALL PARTS OF KNOWLEDGE.--In order to +prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what +follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, +concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this +matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice +of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate +and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties +in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind +has a power of framing ABSTRACT IDEAS or notions of things. He who is +not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must +needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract +ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of +those sciences which go by the name of LOGIC and METAPHYSICS, and of all +that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime +learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such +a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is +well acquainted with them. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +7. PROPER ACCEPTATION OF ABSTRACTION.--It is agreed on all hands that the +qualities or modes of things do never REALLY EXIST EACH OF THEM APART BY +ITSELF, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and +blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind +being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other +qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself +abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object +extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind +resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, +exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, +and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without +extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by ABSTRACTION the +idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both +colour and extension. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +8. OF GENERALIZING [Note].--Again, the mind having observed that in the +particular extensions perceived by sense there is something COMMON and +alike IN ALL, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or +magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or +singles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract +idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any +figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So +likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by +sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that +only which is COMMON TO ALL, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is +neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, +in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body +moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular +directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which +equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be +perceived by sense. +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: Vide Reid, on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay V, +chap iii. sec. 1, edit. 1843] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +9. OF COMPOUNDING.--And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of +qualities or MODES, so does it, by the same precision or mental +separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded BEINGS +which include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind +having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other +in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves +out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and +any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining +only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein +all the particulars equally partake--abstracting entirely from +and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might +determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is +said we come by the abstract idea of MAN, or, if you please, humanity, or +human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there +is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor +black, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular +colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, +but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle +stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. +Moreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that partake in +some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of MAN, the mind, leaving +out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which +are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of ANIMAL, which +abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, +fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal +are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By BODY is meant body +without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or +figure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or +feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and +nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and +for that reason left out of the ABSTRACT IDEA. Upon the same account the +spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it +is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to +conceive[Note.]. +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: Vide Hobbes' Tripos, ch. v. sect. 6.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +10. TWO OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.--Whether +others have this wonderful faculty of ABSTRACTING THEIR IDEAS, +they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of +imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular +things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. +I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to +the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by +itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then +whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and +colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of +a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a +low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive +the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to +form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which +is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may +be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I +own myself able to abstract IN ONE SENSE, as when I consider some +particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though +they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist +without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or +conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist +so separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from +particulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two proper +acceptations of ABSTRACTION. And there are grounds to think most men will +acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are +simple and illiterate never pretend to ABSTRACT NOTIONS. It is said +they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study; we may +therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined +only to the learned. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in DEFENCE OF THE DOCTRINE +OF ABSTRACTION, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the +men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as +that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher +who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think +the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in +point of understanding betwixt man and beast. "The having of general +ideas," saith he, "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man +and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no +means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of +making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have +reason to imagine that they have not the FACULTY OF ABSTRACTING, or +making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other +general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose +that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, +and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and +which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas +at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot +deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, +some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it +is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. +They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have +not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of +ABSTRACTION." Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily +agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no +means attain to ABSTRACTION. But then if this be made the distinguishing +property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass +for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here +assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general +ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general +signs; which is built on this supposition--that the making use of words +implies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who use +language are able to ABSTRACT or GENERALIZE their ideas. That this is the +sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the +question he in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only +particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words become +general by being made the signs of general ideas."--Essay on Human +Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But [Note. 1] it seems that a word becomes +general by being made the sign, not of an ABSTRACT general idea, but of +several particular ideas [Note. 2], any one of which it indifferently +suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion +is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension +is divisible," these propositions are to be understood of motion +and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that +they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, +or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive +an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, +nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any +other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular +motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, +horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning +it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, +it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or +that magnitude or figure. +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note 1: "TO THIS I CANNOT ASSENT, BEING OF OPINION," edit of 1710.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note 2: Of the same sort.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +12. EXISTENCE OF GENERAL IDEAS ADMITTED.--By observing how ideas +become general we may the better judge how words are made so. +And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there +are general ideas, but only that there are any ABSTRACT GENERAL +IDEAS; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is +mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by +ABSTRACTION, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we +will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can +conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered +in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or +stand for all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT. To make this plain +by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of +cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line +of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is +nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is +there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what +is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, +of a line in general. And, as that particular line becomes general by +being made a sign, so the name LINE, which taken absolutely is +PARTICULAR, by being a sign is made GENERAL. And as the former owes its +generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but +of ALL PARTICULAR right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must +be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the +VARIOUS PARTICULAR lines which it indifferently denotes. [Note.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: "I look upon this (doctrine) to be one of the greatest and most +valuable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republic +of letters."--Treatise of Human Nature, book i, part i, sect. 7. Also +Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind, part i, chapt. iv. sect. iii. p. 99.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +13. ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS NECESSARY, ACCORDING TO LOCKE.--To give +the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, +and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more +passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV. vii. 9) which is as +follows: "ABSTRACT IDEAS are not so obvious or easy to children or the +yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it +is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when +we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are +fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, +and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For +example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general +idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, +comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor +rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but ALL AND +NONE of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot +exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and INCONSISTENT +ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has +need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the +CONVENIENCY OF COMMUNICATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE, to both which +it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect +such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show +that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is +first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge +is conversant about."--If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind +such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend +to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that +the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such +an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to +perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own +thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea +that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the +general idea of a triangle, which is NEITHER OBLIQUE NOR RECTANGLE, +EQUILATERAL, EQUICRURAL NOR SCALENON, BUT ALL AND NONE OF THESE AT ONCE? +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +14. BUT THEY ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR COMMUNICATION.--Much is here +said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and +the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on +all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, +to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to +those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From +all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so DIFFICULT a +thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for COMMUNICATION, +which is so EASY and familiar to ALL SORTS OF MEN. But, we are told, if +they seem obvious and easy to grown men, IT IS ONLY BECAUSE BY CONSTANT +AND FAMILIAR USE THEY ARE MADE SO. Now, I would fain know at what time it +is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing +themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when +they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such +painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. +And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions +will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to +imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their +sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they +have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in +their minds ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS, and annexed them to every common name +they make use of? +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +15. NOR FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.--Nor do I think them +a whit more needful for the ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE than for +COMMUNICATION. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that +all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to +which I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions +are formed by ABSTRACTION in the manner PREMISED--UNIVERSALITY, so far as +I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, POSITIVE nature or +conception of anything, but in the RELATION it bears to the particulars +signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, +names, or notions, being in their own nature PARTICULAR, are rendered +UNIVERSAL. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, +it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a +triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of +a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; +but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that +sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear +triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense UNIVERSAL. All which seems +very plain and not to include any difficulty in it. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +16. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But here it will be demanded, HOW WE CAN KNOW ANY +PROPOSITION TO BE TRUE OF ALL PARTICULAR TRIANGLES, EXCEPT we have first +seen it DEMONSTRATED OF THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE which equally +agrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to +some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally +belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with +it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles +rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore +conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither +a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain +this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular +demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once +for all demonstrate it of the ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE, in which all +the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all +equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in +view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an +isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I +may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear +triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the +right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at +all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view +includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention +made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three +angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, +or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which +sufficiently shows that the right angle might have been oblique, and the +sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for +this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or +scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right--angled +equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of +the abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a +man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the +particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he +may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, +general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider +Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing the +fore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all +that is perceived is not considered. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +17. ADVANTAGE OF INVESTIGATING THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT GENERAL +IDEAS.--It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the +SCHOOLMEN, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold +inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of +abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings +and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those +matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to +mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted +on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were +confined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When +men consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many +ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, +and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains +full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to +have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most +clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are +perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking +all together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit +to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and +amusement--I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into +a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps +cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the +world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, has a more wide and +extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than [Note.] this of +abstract general ideas. +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: "That we have been endeavouring to overthrow."--Edit 1710.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +18. I come now to consider the SOURCE OF THIS PREVAILING NOTION, and that +seems to me to be LANGUAGE. And surely nothing of less extent than reason +itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received. +The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain +confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that +they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence +that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there +never had been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere +of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein +words have contributed to the origin of that mistake.--First +[Vide sect. xix.] then, it is thought that every name has, or +ought to have, ONE ONLY precise and settled signification, which +inclines men to think there are certain ABSTRACT, DETERMINATE IDEAS +that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each +general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract +ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. +Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite +signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying +indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which doth +evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear +to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be OBJECTED that every +name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain +signification. For example, a TRIANGLE is defined to be A PLAIN SURFACE +COMPREHENDED BY THREE RIGHT LINES, by which that name is limited to +denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the +definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or +white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor +with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may +be great variety, and consequently there is NO ONE SETTLED IDEA which +limits the signification of the word TRIANGLE. It is one thing for to +keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it +stand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other +useless and impracticable. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +19. SECONDLY, But, to give a farther account how WORDS came to PRODUCE THE +DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS, it must be observed that it is a received +opinion that language has NO OTHER END but the communicating our ideas, +and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it +being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether +insignificant do not always mark out PARTICULAR conceivable ideas, it is +straightway concluded that THEY STAND FOR ABSTRACT NOTIONS. That there are +many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to +others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what +nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not +necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which +stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the +understanding the ideas they are made to stand for--in reading and +discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in +ALGEBRA, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, +yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter +suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to +stand for.[Note.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: Language has become the source or origin of abstract general ideas +on account of a twofold error.--(1.) That every word has only one +signification. (2.) That the only end of language is the communication +of our ideas--Ed.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +20. SOME OF THE ENDS OF LANGUAGE.--Besides, the communicating of ideas +marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is +commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some +passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting +the mind in some particular disposition--to which the former is +in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, +when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently +happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to +reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in +hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, +admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the +perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between. At first, +indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to +produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, +when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight +of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which +at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are +now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise +of a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the +being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we +think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to +ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so +little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will +evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the +propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of +ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the +hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a +design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are +supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me +"Aristotle has said it," all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me +to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has +annexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in +the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to +authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his +person, writings, or reputation should go before [Note.]. Innumerable +examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those +things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully +suggest unto him? +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: "So close and immediate a connection may custom establish betwixt +the very word ARISTOTLE, and the motions of assent and reverence +in the minds of some men."--Edit 1710.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +21. CAUTION IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE NECESSARY.--We have, I think, +shown the impossibility of ABSTRACT IDEAS. We have considered +what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavored +to show they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought +necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from +whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.--It cannot be +denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that +stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours of +inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and +made the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must be +owned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and +darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they +are delivered.[Note 1.] Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the +understanding[Note 2.], whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to +take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far +as I am able, those names which long and constant use has so strictly +united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following +advantages: +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note 1: "That it may almost be made a question, whether language +has contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the +sciences."--Edit 1710.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note 2: "I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them +as possibly I can."--Edit 1710.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +22. FIRST, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies PURELY +VERBAL--the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has +been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. +SECONDLY, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that +fine and subtle net of ABSTRACT IDEAS which has so miserably perplexed +and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, +that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so +much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. +THIRDLY, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of +words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, +I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an +idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of +my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the +agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas +are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more +requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own +understanding. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +23. But the attainment of all THESE ADVANTAGES doth PRESUPPOSE AN ENTIRE +DELIVERANCE FROM THE DECEPTION OF WORDS, which I dare hardly promise +myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, +and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which +difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of +ABSTRACTION. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to +their words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words for +ideas--it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and +RETAIN THE ABSTRACT IDEA IN THE MIND, WHICH IN ITSELF WAS PERFECTLY +INCONCEIVABLE. This seems to me the principal cause why those men who +have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of +words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet +failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of +the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the +abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, +that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from +the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may be +they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to +it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words +was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every +general name was a DETERMINATE ABSTRACT IDEA. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +24. But, THESE BEING KNOWN TO BE MISTAKES, A MAN MAY with greater ease +PREVENT HIS BEING IMPOSED ON BY WORDS. He that knows he has no other than +particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and +conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names +do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking +for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be +wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear +view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress +and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment +and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens +and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the +writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity--we +need only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of +knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +25. Unless we take care TO CLEAR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE FROM +THE embarras and DELUSION OF WORDS, we may make infinite reasonings upon +them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be +never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more +irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. +Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to +make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain +the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this +means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I +say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do +not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, +undisguised ideas. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="knowledge"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +1. OBJECTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.--It is evident to any one who takes a +survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either IDEAS +actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by +attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas +formed by help of memory and imagination--either compounding, dividing, +or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. +By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees +and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion +and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or +degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and +hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and +composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each +other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one +thing. Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and +consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one +distinct thing, signified by the name APPLE. Other collections of ideas +constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things--which +as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, +hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +2. MIND--SPIRIT--SOUL.--But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or +objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives +them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, +about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call MIND, SPIRIT, +SOUL, or MYSELF. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a +thing entirely distinct from them, WHEREIN THEY EXIST, or, which is the +same thing, whereby they are perceived--for the existence of an idea +consists in being perceived. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +3. HOW FAR THE ASSENT OF THE VULGAR CONCEDED.--That neither our thoughts, +nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist WITHOUT the mind, +is what EVERYBODY WILL ALLOW. And it seems no less evident that the +various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended +or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), +cannot exist otherwise than IN a mind perceiving them. I think an +intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall +attend to WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM EXIST, when applied to sensible +things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel +it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed--meaning +thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other +spirit actually does perceive it.[Note.] There was an odour, that is, it +was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, +and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand +by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute +existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being +perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their ESSE is PERCIPI, +nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or +thinking things which perceive them. +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: First argument in support of the author's theory.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +4. THE VULGAR OPINION INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--It is indeed +an opinion STRANGELY prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, +rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, +natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the +understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever +this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in +his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to +involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned +objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we PERCEIVE +BESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? and is it not plainly repugnant that +any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +5. CAUSE OF THIS PREVALENT ERROR.--If we thoroughly examine this +tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine +of ABSTRACT IDEAS. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction +than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their +being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? +Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures--in a +word the things we see and feel--what are they but so many sensations, +notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to +separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I +might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my +thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps +I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a +human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without +thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract--if +that may properly be called ABSTRACTION which extends only to the +conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or +be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does +not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, +as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual +sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my +thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or +perception of it.[Note.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: "In truth the object and the sensation are the same thing, and +cannot therefore be abstracted from each other--Edit 1710."] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need +only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, +viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word +all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not +any subsistence without a mind, that their BEING (ESSE) is to be perceived +or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by +me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other CREATED SPIRIT, they +must either have no existence at all, OR ELSE SUBSIST IN THE MIND OF SOME +ETERNAL SPIRIT--it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the +absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an +existence independent of a spirit [Note.]. To be convinced of which, the +reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the +being of a sensible thing from its being perceived. +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: "To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an axiom, +it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflection of the reader, +that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and in turn his +thoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarrass +of words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes."--Edit 1710] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +7. SECOND ARGUMENT.[Note.]--From what has been said it follows there is +NOT ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE THAN SPIRIT, or that which perceives. But, for the +fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities +are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived +by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a +manifest contradiction, for TO HAVE AN IDEA IS ALL ONE AS TO PERCEIVE; +that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must +perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no UNTHINKING substance or +SUBSTRATUM of those ideas. +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: Vide sect. iii. and xxv.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +8. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not +exist without the mind, yet there may be things LIKE them, whereof they +are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an +unthinking substance. I ANSWER, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a +colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we +look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible +for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask +whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas +are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If +they are, THEN THEY ARE IDEAS and we have gained our point; but if you say +they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour +is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which +is intangible; and so of the rest. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +9. THE PHILOSOPHICAL NOTION OF MATTER INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--Some +there are who make a DISTINCTION betwixt PRIMARY and SECONDARY +qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, +solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all +other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The +ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of +anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have +our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things +which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call +MATTER. By MATTER, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless +substance, in which extension, figure, and motion DO ACTUALLY SUBSIST. +But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, +figure, and motion are ONLY IDEAS EXISTING IN THE MIND, and that an idea +can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they +nor their archetypes can exist in an UNPERCEIVING substance. Hence, it is +plain that the very notion of what is called MATTER or CORPOREAL +SUBSTANCE, involves a contradiction in it.[Note.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: "Insomuch that I should not think it necessary to spend more time +in exposing its absurdity. But because the tenet of the existence of +matter seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, +and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be +thought prolix and tedious, than omit anything that might conduce to +the full discovery and extirpation of the prejudice."--Edit 1710.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +10. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--They who assert that figure, motion, and the +rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in +unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, +sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not--which they +tell us are sensations existing IN THE MIND ALONE, that depend on and are +occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute +particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can +demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those +original qualities ARE INSEPARABLY UNITED WITH THE OTHER SENSIBLE +QUALITIES, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted +from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. +But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any +abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a +body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see +evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body +extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other +sensible quality which is ACKNOWLEDGED to exist only in the mind. In +short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other +qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible +qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere +else. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +11. A SECOND ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--Again, GREAT and SMALL, SWIFT and SLOW, +ARE ALLOWED TO EXIST NOWHERE WITHOUT THE MIND, being entirely +RELATIVE, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of +sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the +mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, +that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension +in general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet +of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on +the strange doctrine of ABSTRACT IDEAS. And here I cannot but remark how +nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal +substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own +principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of +MATERIA PRIMA, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without +extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shown +that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also +be true of solidity. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +12. That NUMBER is entirely THE CREATURE OF THE MIND, even though the +other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever +considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as +the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is +one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with +reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, +and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any +one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one +book, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units, though some +contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the +unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put +together by the mind. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +13. UNITY I know some will have to be A SIMPLE OR UNCOMPOUNDED IDEA, +accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea +answering the word UNITY I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could +not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to +my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to +be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, +it is an ABSTRACT IDEA. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +14. A THIRD ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--I shall farther add, that, after +the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible +qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, +the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities +whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are +affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, +existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that +the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. +Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not +patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the +same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the +same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of +anything SETTLED AND DETERMINATE WITHOUT THE MIND? Again, it is proved +that SWEETNESS is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing +remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a +fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that +MOTION is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the +mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower +without any alteration in any external object? +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +15. NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO EXTENSION.--In short, let any one consider +those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours +and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with +equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, +and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing +does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in +an outward object, as that we do not know by SENSE which is the TRUE +extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly +show it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other +sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an UNTHINKING subject +without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an +outward object. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.--It is said +EXTENSION is a MODE or accident OF MATTER, and that Matter is the +SUBSTRATUM that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me +what is meant by Matter's SUPPORTING extension. Say you, I have no idea +of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no +positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a +relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be +supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant +by its supporting them. It is evident SUPPORT cannot here be taken in +its usual or literal sense--as when we say that pillars support a +building; in what sense therefore must it be taken? [Note.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: "For my part, I am not able to discover any sense at all that can +be applicable to it."--Edit 1710.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +17. PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF "MATERIAL SUBSTANCE" DIVISIBLE INTO TWO +PARTS.--If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare +themselves to mean by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, we shall find them acknowledge +they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of BEING +IN GENERAL, together WITH THE RELATIVE NOTION OF ITS SUPPORTING +ACCIDENTS. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract +and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, +this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common +sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but +what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the TWO PARTS +or branches which make the signification of the words MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, +I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why +should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material +SUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? +Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not +this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable? +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +18. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES WANTS PROOF.--But, though it +were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist +without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, +yet HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO KNOW THIS? Either we must know it by +sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge ONLY +OF OUR SENSATIONS, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived +by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things +exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are +perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains +therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it +must be by REASON, inferring their existence from what is immediately +perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the +existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the +very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is ANY NECESSARY +CONNEXION BETWIXT THEM AND OUR IDEAS? I say it is granted on all hands +(and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond +dispute) that IT IS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT BE AFFECTED WITH ALL THE IDEAS WE +HAVE NOW, THOUGH THERE WERE NO BODIES EXISTING WITHOUT RESEMBLING THEM. +Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary +for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced +sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we +see them in at present, without their concurrence. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +19. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES AFFORDS NO EXPLICATION OF THE +MANNER IN WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE PRODUCED.--But, though we might possibly +have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought +EASIER to conceive and explain the MANNER of their production, +by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; +and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies +that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; +for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they +by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas +are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in +what manner BODY CAN ACT UPON SPIRIT, or how it is possible it should +imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas +or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter +or corporeal substances, SINCE THAT IS ACKNOWLEDGED TO REMAIN EQUALLY +INEXPLICABLE WITH OR WITHOUT THIS SUPPOSITION. If therefore it were +possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, +must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without +any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings THAT ARE +ENTIRELY USELESS, AND SERVE TO NO MANNER OF PURPOSE. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +20. DILEMMA.--In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we +should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very +same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no one +can deny possible--an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to +be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, +imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask +whether that intelligence has not all the reason to believe the +existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting +them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same +thing? Of this there can be no question--which one consideration were +enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever +arguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies +without the mind. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +21. Were it necessary to add any FURTHER PROOF AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF +MATTER after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors +and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that +tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in +philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall +not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think +arguments A POSTERIORI are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I +mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated A PRIORI, as because I shall +hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in +handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which +may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one +that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own +thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, +or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. +This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a +downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon +this issue:--If you can but CONCEIVE it possible for one extended movable +substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to +exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the +cause. And, as for all that COMPAGES of external bodies you contend for, +I shall grant you its existence, THOUGH (1.) YOU CANNOT EITHER GIVE ME ANY +REASON WHY YOU BELIEVE IT EXISTS [Vide sect. lviii.], OR (2.) ASSIGN ANY +USE TO IT WHEN IT IS SUPPOSED TO EXIST [Vide sect. lx.]. I say, the bare +possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that +it is so. [Note: i.e. although your argument be deficient in the two +requisites of an hypothesis.--Ed.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine +trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody +by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; +but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind +certain ideas which you call BOOKS and TREES, and the same time omitting +to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? BUT DO NOT YOU +YOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? This therefore is +nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or +forming ideas in your mind: but it does not show that you can conceive it +possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make +out this, IT IS NECESSARY THAT YOU CONCEIVE THEM EXISTING UNCONCEIVED OR +UNTHOUGHT OF, WHICH IS A MANIFEST REPUGNANCY. When we do our utmost to +conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only +contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is +deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or +without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or +exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth +and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on +any other proofs against the existence of material substance. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +24. THE ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF UNTHINKING THINGS ARE WORDS WITHOUT +A MEANING.--It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, +to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the +ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF SENSIBLE OBJECTS IN THEMSELVES, OR WITHOUT THE MIND. +To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or +else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or +fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own +thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those +expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the +conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the +ABSOLUTE existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or +which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and +earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +25. THIRD ARGUMENT.[Note: Vide sect. iii. and vii.]--REFUTATION +OF LOCKE.--All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we +perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly +inactive--there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that +ONE IDEA or object of thought CANNOT PRODUCE or make ANY ALTERATION IN +ANOTHER. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else +requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every +part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in +them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether +of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; +there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little +attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies +passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an +idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: +neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is +evident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, +figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, +therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the +configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly +be false. [Note: Vide sect. cii.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +26. CAUSE OF IDEAS.--We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are +anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore +some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and +changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination +of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a +substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material +substance: it remains therefore that the CAUSE OF IDEAS is an incorporeal +active substance or Spirit. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +27. NO IDEA OF SPIRIT.--A spirit is one simple, undivided, active +being--as it perceives ideas it is called the UNDERSTANDING, and as it +produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the WILL. Hence +there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, +being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, +by way of image or LIKENESS, that which acts. A little attention will make +it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active +principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is +the nature of SPIRIT, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself +perceived, BUT ONLY BY THE EFFECTS WHICH IT PRODUCETH. If any man shall +doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try +if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has +ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names WILL and UNDERSTANDING, +distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or +Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the +subject of the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name SOUL or +SPIRIT. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words +WILL [Note: "Understanding, mind."--Edit 1710.], SOUL, SPIRIT, do not stand +for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something +which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be +like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned +at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the +operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating--inasmuch as we +know or understand the meaning of these words. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift +the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and +straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power +it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of +ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain +and grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of +exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +29. IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR MEMORY.--But, +whatever power I may have over MY OWN thoughts, I find the ideas +actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When +in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether +I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present +themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other +senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There +is THEREFORE SOME OTHER WILL OR SPIRIT that PRODUCES THEM. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +30. LAWS OF NATURE.--The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and +DISTINCT than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, +order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are +the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, +the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and +benevolence of its Author. Now THE SET RULES OR ESTABLISHED METHODS +WHEREIN THE MIND WE DEPEND ON EXCITES IN US THE IDEAS OF SENSE, ARE CALLED +THE LAWS OF NATURE; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us +that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in +the ordinary course of things. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +31. KNOWLEDGE OF THEM NECESSARY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WORLDLY AFFAIRS.--This +gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our +actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally +at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us +the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food +nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the +seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to +obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive--all this we +know, NOT BY DISCOVERING ANY NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWEEN OUR IDEAS, but +only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we +should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know +how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +32. And yet THIS consistent UNIFORM WORKING, which so evidently displays +the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes +the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it +rather SENDS THEM A WANDERING AFTER SECOND CAUSES. For, when we perceive +certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and WE KNOW +THIS IS NOT OF OUR OWN DOING, we forthwith attribute power and agency to +the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which +nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having +observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure +we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called HEAT, +we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like +manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with +sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +33. OF REAL THINGS AND IDEAS OR CHIMERAS.--The ideas imprinted on the +Senses by the Author of nature are called REAL THINGS; and those +excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, +are more properly termed IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which they +copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid +and distinct, are nevertheless IDEAS, that is, they exist in the +mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. +The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to +be more (1)STRONG, (2)ORDERLY, and (3)COHERENT than the creatures of the +mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are +also (4)LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SPIRIT [Note: Vide sect. xxix.--Note.], +or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by +the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS, +and certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than +in a mind perceiving it. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +34. FIRST GENERAL OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Before we proceed any farther +it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which +may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid +down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick +apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not +equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be +understood by every one. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +FIRST, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles ALL +THAT IS REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE IS BANISHED OUT OF THE WORLD, and +instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that +exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What +therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think of +houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? +Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all +which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I ANSWER, that +by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in +nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand +remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a RERUM +NATURA, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its +full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have +shown what is meant by REAL THINGS in opposition to CHIMERAS or ideas of +our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in +that sense they are alike IDEAS. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +35. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER, AS UNDERSTOOD BY PHILOSOPHERS, +DENIED.[Vide sect. lxxxiv.]--I do not argue against the existence of +any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. +That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, +really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose +existence we deny IS THAT WHICH PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATTER or corporeal +substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest +of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed +will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and +the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for +trifling and disputation. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +36. READILY EXPLAINED.--If any man thinks this detracts from the existence +or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what has been +premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an +abstract of what has been said:--There are spiritual substances, +minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at +pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of +others they perceive by sense--which, being impressed upon them +according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the +effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These +latter are said to have more REALITY in them than the former:--by +which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, +and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And +in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I +imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of +REALITY it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general +each part of the mundane system, is as much a REAL BEING by our +principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term +REALITY different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own +thoughts and see. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +37. THE PHILOSOPHIC, NOT THE VULGAR SUBSTANCE, TAKEN AWAY.--I will +be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take +away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word +SUBSTANCE be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible +qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we +cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic +sense--for the SUPPORT of accidents or QUALITIES WITHOUT THE MIND--then +indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take +away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +38. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink +ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so--the word +IDEA not being used in common discourse to signify the several +combinations of sensible qualities which are called THINGS; and it is +certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of +language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the +truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we +are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by +our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, +or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several +sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shown to exist only in the mind +that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them IDEAS; +which word if it was as ordinarily used as THING, would sound no harsher +nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, +but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we +eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which +cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is +more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things +rather than ideas. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +39. THE TERM IDEA PREFERABLE TO THING.--If it be demanded why I make +use of the word IDEA, and do not rather in compliance with custom +call them THINGS. I answer, I do it for two reasons:--first, because +the term THING in contra-distinction to IDEA, is generally supposed +to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because +THING has a more comprehensive signification than IDEA, including +SPIRIT or thinking things as well as IDEAS. Since therefore the +objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless +and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word IDEA, which implies +those properties. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +40. THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES NOT DISCREDITED.--But, say what we can, +some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his +senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, +to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence +of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. +That what I see, hear, and feel DOTH EXIST, THAT IS to say, IS PERCEIVED +BY ME, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how +the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of +anything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man +turn SCEPTIC and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all +the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more +opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down [Note.], as shall be +hereafter clearly shown. +</P> + +<P CLASS="footnote"> +[Note: They extirpate the very root of scepticism, "the fallacy +of the senses."--Ed.] +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +41. SECOND OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Secondly, it will be OBJECTED +that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, +and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, +and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of +fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be +convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition +to our tenets. To all which the ANSWER is evident from what has +been already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real +fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain +that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet +nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an +unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +42. THIRD OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Thirdly, it will be objected that +we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which +consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those +things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be +as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it +may be considered that in a DREAM we do oft perceive things as +existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things +are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to +consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a +distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see EXTERNAL space, and +bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to +carry with it some opposition to what has been said of their existing +nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was +that gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," which was +published not long since, wherein it is shown (1) that DISTANCE or outness +is NEITHER IMMEDIATELY of itself PERCEIVED by sight, nor yet apprehended +or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that has a necessary +connexion with it; but (2) that it is ONLY SUGGESTED to our thoughts by +certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own +nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or +things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us BY EXPERIENCE, +they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that +WORDS of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for; +insomuch that a man BORN blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at +first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any +distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and +heterogeneous. THE FORMER ARE MARKS AND PROGNOSTICS OF THE LATTER. That +the proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the +images of external things, was shown even in that treatise. Though +throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible +objects--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for +establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my +purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning VISION. So +that in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them +distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to +us things ACTUALLY existing at a distance, but only admonish us what +ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances +of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, +evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, +and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that +visible ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit on whom we +depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in +case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller +information in this point I refer to the Essay itself. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +45. FOURTH OBJECTION, FROM PERPETUAL ANNIHILATION AND +CREATION.--ANSWER.--Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing +principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created +anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees +therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than +while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon SHUTTING MY EYES all +the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening +them it is again created. In ANSWER to all which, I refer the reader to +what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider +whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct +from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could +make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those +words; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and +not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it +possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being +perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will +acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows +not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting +to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +46. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--It will not be amiss to observe how far +the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable +with those pretended absurdities. (1) It is thought strangely absurd +that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me +should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers +commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and +colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, +are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? +(2)Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should +be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the +schools. For the SCHOOLMEN, though they acknowledge the existence of +Matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are +nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine +conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +47. (3) Further, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow +the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably +follow, FROM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE NOW GENERALLY ADMITTED, that the +PARTICULAR bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they +are not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the following +sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible +somewhat, WHICH HAS NONE OF THOSE PARTICULAR QUALITIES WHEREBY THE +BODIES FALLING UNDER OUR SENSES ARE DISTINGUISHED ONE FROM ANOTHER. +(2) But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite +divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most +approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles +demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an +infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not +perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems +to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to +sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains +an infinite number of parts, BUT BECAUSE THE SENSE IS NOT ACUTE ENOUGH TO +DISCERN THEM. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more +acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the +object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its +extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in +very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. +And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense +becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which +there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. EACH BODY +THEREFORE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, IS INFINITELY EXTENDED, AND CONSEQUENTLY +VOID OF ALL SHAPE OR FIGURE. From which it follows that, though we should +grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as +certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced +to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, +nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each +particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, AND IT IS +THE MIND THAT FRAMES ALL THAT VARIETY OF BODIES WHICH COMPOSE THE VISIBLE +WORLD, ANY ONE WHEREOF DOES NOT EXIST LONGER THAN IT IS PERCEIVED. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be +found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in +truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we +hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which +cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no +existence except only while they are perceived by US, since THERE MAY BE +SOME OTHER SPIRIT THAT PERCEIVES THEM THOUGH WE DO NOT. Wherever bodies +are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood +to mean this or that particular mind, but ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER. It does +not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are +annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the +intervals between our perception of them. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +49. FIFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Fifthly, it may perhaps be OBJECTED +that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows +that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or +attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the +subject in which it exists. I ANSWER, (1) Those qualities are in the +mind ONLY AS THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY IT--that is, not by way of MODE +or ATTRIBUTE, but only by way of IDEA; and it no more follows the +soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone, +than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are ON +ALL HANDS acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. (2) As to what +philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and +unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, +extended, and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a +subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure +which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot +comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things +which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, +extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject +distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning +of the word DIE. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +50. SIXTH OBJECTION, FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.--ANSWER.--Sixthly, +you will say there have been a great many things explained by +matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole +corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which +have been applied with so much success to account for the PHENOMENA. In +short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern +philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition +that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I ANSWER +that there is not any one PHENOMENON explained on that supposition which +may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear +by an INDUCTION OF PARTICULARS. To explain the PHENOMENA, is all one as +to show why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and +such ideas. But (1) how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any +idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is +therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. +Besides, (2) they who attempt to account for things do it not by CORPOREAL +SUBSTANCE, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth +no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, +as has been already shown. See sect. 25. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +51. SEVENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Seventhly, it will upon this be +demanded whether it does not seem ABSURD TO TAKE AWAY NATURAL CAUSES, +AND ASCRIBE EVERYTHING TO THE IMMEDIATE OPERATION OF SPIRITS? We +must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water +cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be +deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I ANSWER, +he would so; in such things we ought to THINK WITH THE LEARNED, +AND SPEAK WITH THE VULGAR. They who to demonstration are convinced +of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sun +rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian"; and if they +affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear +very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it +manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of +alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +52. IN THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE, ANY PHRASES MAY BE RETAINED, so long +as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a +manner as is necessary for our WELL-BEING, how false soever they may be +if taken in a strict and SPECULATIVE SENSE. Nay, this is unavoidable, +since, propriety being regulated by CUSTOM, language is suited to the +RECEIVED opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is +impossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to +alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a +handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a +fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor +and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate +modes of speech which use has made inevitable. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +53. As to the OPINION THAT THERE ARE NO CORPOREAL CAUSES, this has been +heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by +others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to +exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all +things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was +none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by +consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to +exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But +then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created +beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one +effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, +since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say, +though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and +extravagant supposition. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +54. EIGHTH OBJECTION.--TWOFOLD ANSWER.--In the eighth place, the +universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some +an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of +external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? +And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant +an error? I answer, FIRST, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will +not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the +existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to +believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is +impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I +refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, +indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they ACT +as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every +moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking +being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by +those words, and form thereof a settled SPECULATIVE opinion, is what I am +not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose +upon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they +have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +55. But SECONDLY, though we should grant a notion to be never so +universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its +truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false +opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the +unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a +time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as +monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered +what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find +that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable +footing in the world. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +56. NINTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But it is demanded that we assign +A CAUSE OF THIS PREJUDICE, and account for its obtaining in the +world. To this I ANSWER, that men knowing they perceived several +ideas, WHEREOF THEY THEMSELVES WERE NOT THE AUTHORS--as not being +excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills--this +made them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an +EXISTENCE INDEPENDENT OF AND WITHOUT THE MIND, without ever dreaming +that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers +having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do +not exist without the mind, THEY IN SOME DEGREE CORRECTED the +mistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another which +seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really +existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being +perceived, OF WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE ONLY IMAGES or resemblances, imprinted +by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes +its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being +conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which +they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must +have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +57. BUT WHY THEY SHOULD SUPPOSE THE IDEAS OF SENSE TO BE EXCITED IN US BY +THINGS IN THEIR LIKENESS, and not rather have recourse to SPIRIT which +alone can act, may be accounted for, FIRST, because they were not aware +of the repugnancy there is, (1) as well in supposing things like unto our +ideas existing without, as in (2) attributing to them POWER OR ACTIVITY. +SECONDLY, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our +minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite +collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, +complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are +regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a +miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when +we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any +reflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the +greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant +and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a +Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, +though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +58. TENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Tenthly, it will be objected that +the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths +in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth +is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on +the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing +principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an +idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but the +motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, +if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles +we have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no +amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have +reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that +if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a +position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the +former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all +respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature +which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the +phenomena. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession +of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, +but sure and well--grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be +affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to +pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were +placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. +Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and +certainty very consistently with what has been said. It will be easy to +apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the +magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +60. ELEVENTH OBJECTION.--In the eleventh place, it will be demanded +to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the +animal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, +and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their +motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts +so elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have +nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion +with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately +produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think all +that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, +to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist has made the +spring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them +in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, +yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an +Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the +day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the +pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an +empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that +whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some +corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended +by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the +clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle +as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be +asked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or +any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and +machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common +philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain +abundance of phenomena? +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +61. ANSWER.--To all which I answer, first, that though there were some +difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses +by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by +the foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight +against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a +priori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, +but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties; +for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those +roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which +no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will +without all that apparatus; nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall +find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold +the existence of those machines without of mind; for it has been made +evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no +activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one +effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist +(allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it +manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as +they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects +which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +62. (FOURTHLY.)--But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed +that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not +absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary +to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to +the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through +the whole chain of natural effects; these are learned by the observation +and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing +artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the +explaining various phenomena--which explication consists only in +showing the conformity any particular phenomenon has to the general +laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the +uniformity there is in the production of natural effects; as will +be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein +philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a +great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of +working observed by the Supreme Agent has been shown in sect. 31. +And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, +and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to +the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the +standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be +denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary +course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all +the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the +movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the +rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in +the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, +whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the +production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be +attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the +movements, which being once corrected all is right again. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of +nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of +the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of +nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of the +Divine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is +a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to +choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of +nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and +are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, +rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and +surprising events. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what +has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than +this:--ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain +order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; there +are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and +artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of +nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret +operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of +the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the +philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what +purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barely +inefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the +production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in +other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a +close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so +artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being +credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all +that art and regularity to no purpose. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does +not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign +with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the +pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of +it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or +that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. +Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, +artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining +letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a +great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously +combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, +these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By +this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what +we are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper +to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is all +that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by +discerning a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of +bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several +uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +66. PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHER.--Hence, it is evident +that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating +or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, +and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, +and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are +considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is +the searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs +instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of +the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by +corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the +minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "in +whom we live, move, and have our being." +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +67. TWELFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--In the twelfth place, it may perhaps +be objected that--though it be clear from what has been said that +there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, +figured, movable substance existing without the mind, such as +philosophers describe Matter--yet, if any man shall leave out of +his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity +and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, +senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, +which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is +pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken +in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that +it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it +is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we +should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it +be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it +exists not in place is no less certain--since all place or extension +exists only in the mind, as has been already proved. It remains +therefore that it exists nowhere at all. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +68. MATTER SUPPORTS NOTHING, AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EXISTENCE.--Let us +examine a little the description that is here given us of +matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all +that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; +which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the +relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be +observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to +the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, +it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in +us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present +to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable +of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor has any +form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present," when thus +applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and +which I am not able to comprehend. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can +gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the +agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to +accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it +is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of +those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot +be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid +of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our +perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said to +be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant +by calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense at +all, or else in some very distant from its received signification. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +70. You will Perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, +is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting +ideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be +imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to +suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being +produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct +parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not +excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being +altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, +by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him +when and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in +a constant uniform manner. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here +stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing +distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but +whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind +of God which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce +sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method--much after the +same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce +that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, +though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be +entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter seems too +extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no +objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless +unperceived substance. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +72. THE ORDER OF OUR PERCEPTIONS SHOWS THE GOODNESS OF GOD, BUT +AFFORDS NO PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER.--If we follow the light +of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our +sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who +excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably +concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a +spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to +explain all the appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless +Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or +leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the +meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or show any manner of reason, though +in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or +even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to +its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shown that with regard +to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, +the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we +have just now seen. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced +men to suppose the existence of material substance; that so having +observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, +we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. +First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the +rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the +mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking +substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be +conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men +being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, +secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this +substratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the +primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to +exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material +support. But, it having been shown that none even of these can possibly +exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it follows +that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay, +that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as +that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or +accidents wherein they exist without the mind. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter +was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason +entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without +any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded +thereon; yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we +can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since +the thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name, which we +apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or +occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can +see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all +the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either +by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an +inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the +part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us +believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite +ideas in our minds? +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +75. ABSURDITY OF CONTENDING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER AS THE OCCASION +OF IDEAS.--It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, +and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, +against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by +the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the +Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the +world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of +Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our +opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge +ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to +make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are +certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all +that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at +the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and +whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But, +if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of +extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most +evidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plain +repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an +unperceiving substance. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +77. THAT A SUBSTRATUM NOT PERCEIVED, MAY EXIST, UNIMPORTANT.--But, +say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support +of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, +yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or +substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours +are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. +But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their +existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and +colours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the +unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is +such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the +advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know +not why. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with +new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against +their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered +with relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as has +been shown, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in +a mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are +acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas +whatsoever. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the +existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain +anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it +is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in +general a substance, or occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about to +unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words +may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used +without a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger +of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two +is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of +that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not +what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless +substance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we +shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of +material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown +somewhat--neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, +thoughtless, indivisible, immovable, unextended, existing in no place. +For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, or any +other positive or relative notion of Matter, has no place at all, so +long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you +may, if so it shall seem good, use the word "Matter" in the same sense as +other men use "nothing," and so make those terms convertible in your +style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of +that definition, the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either +collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any +kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is +excited by the term nothing. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-said definition is included +what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing--the positive abstract +idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who +pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if +they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general +notion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. +That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and +capacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding +those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. +And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted narrow inlets +of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit +may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and +presumption--since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts +of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that +I have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may +be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the +endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any +one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit +and idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright +repugnancy and trifling with words.--It remains that we consider the +objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +82. OBJECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES ANSWERED.--Some there are +who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of +bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to +demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as +will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really +exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ +innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber +and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I +answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use +those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a +meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question +by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are +bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has +been shown to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixt +things and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. +See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what +philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind, +is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +83. NO OBJECTION AS TO LANGUAGE TENABLE.--Again, whether there can +be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the +proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only +as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows +that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent +with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, +of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. +But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth +in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +84. But, secondly it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much +of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' +rod? was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change +of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our +Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the +sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the +appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other +miracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be +looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I +reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into +real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have +elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of +real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and +so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily +answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the +reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I +shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and +smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me +there could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scruple +concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the +received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what +has been said. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +85. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRECEDING TENETS.--Having done with the +Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, +and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the +next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. +Some of these appear at first sight--as that several difficult and +obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been +thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. "Whether +corporeal substance can think," "whether Matter be infinitely divisible," +and "how it operates on spirit"--these and like inquiries have given +infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but depending on the +existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles. +Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the +sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been +premised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +86. THE REMOVAL OF MATTER GIVES CERTAINTY TO KNOWLEDGE.--From the +principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally +be reduced to two heads--that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each +of these I shall treat in order. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has +been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very +dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of +sense--the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without +the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural +subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, +which, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless and +absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men +thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their +knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real +things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge +at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are +conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as +so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing +in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or +images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then +are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not +the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or +motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible +for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our +senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or +even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really +existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for +aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain +chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum +natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference +between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without +the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show +how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition +of external objects. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +88. IF THERE BE EXTERNAL MATTER, NEITHER THE NATURE NOR EXISTENCE +OF THINGS CAN BE KNOWN.--So long as we attribute a real existence to +unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not +only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real +unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see +philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of +heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own +bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, they +are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative +knowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness, +which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy +ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning +to our words, and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute," +"external," "exist," and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can as +well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I +actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any +sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at +the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an +unthinking being consists in being perceived. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +89. OF THING OR BEING.--Nothing seems of more importance towards +erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be +proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning +in a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, +existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence +of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have +not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most +general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely +distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the +name. viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible +substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which +subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or +spiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling +or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have +some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, +whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and +have a notion of relations between things or ideas--which relations are +distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be +perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that +ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the +object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term +idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have +any notion of. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +90. EXTERNAL THINGS EITHER IMPRINTED BY OR PERCEIVED BY SOME OTHER +MIND.--Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; +this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which +perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing +without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in +being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the +things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their +origin--in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, +but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. +Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in another +sense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my +eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +91. SENSIBLE QUALITIES REAL.--It were a mistake to think that what +is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. +It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, +motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support, +as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived +by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, +and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed +on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an +existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may +exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and +are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, +according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no +existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in +any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or +spirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers +vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, +unperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute a +natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from +being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the +Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances +created by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +92. OBJECTIONS OF ATHEISTS OVERTURNED.--For, as we have shown the +doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main +pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation +have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. +Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter +produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient +philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, +have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How +great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were +needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and +necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once +removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch +that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on +the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +93. AND OF FATALISTS ALSO.--That impious and profane persons should +readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, +by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be +divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all +freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, +and instead thereof make a self--existent, stupid, unthinking +substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should +hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior +Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series +of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from +the impulse of one body or another--all this is very natural. And, +on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies +of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all +of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, +methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, +and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, +Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but +become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +94. OF IDOLATORS.--The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, +has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, +but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various +forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, +and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations +in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being +perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their +own ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND +which produces and sustains all things. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +95. AND SOCINIANS.--The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with +the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to +Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and +objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the +most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is +denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is +perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the +same under several forms? Take away this material substance, about +the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every +plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is +immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible +qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections +come to nothing. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +96. SUMMARY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPELLING MATTER.--Matter being once +expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious +notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, +which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, +and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments +we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration +(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, +peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another +great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is +the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it has been set forth in the +Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most +intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered +in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. +Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what +everybody knows, but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, +they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary +sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he +shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in +conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is +to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken +exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the +day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, +then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +98. DILEMMA.--For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea +of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows +uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in +inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear +others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner +as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that +doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he +passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is +annihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. +Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas in +our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be +estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that +same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul +always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his +thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation, +will, I believe, find it no easy task. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all +other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight +of them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold +abstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be +abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the +entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, +whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if +I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike +sensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the +colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only +in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those +sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted +together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may +think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded +from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is +good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and +virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion +that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from +all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very +difficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect +the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling +the most useful parts of knowledge. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +101. OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS.--The two great provinces +of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, +are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of these +I shall make some observations. And first I shall say somewhat of +Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. +All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties +and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally +from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness +as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, +and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our +senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real +essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest +object, is hid from our view; something there is in every drop of water, +every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding +to fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shown that +all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false +principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know +nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the +nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within +itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an +inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, +and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances +by occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical +causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of +insensible particles; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or +efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as all +other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to +explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, +magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we +see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be +said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is +assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and +speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged +by this doctrine. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +103. ATTRACTION SIGNIFIES THE EFFECT, NOT THE MANNER OR CAUSE.--The great +mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone +falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some +appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by +being told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the +manner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies +instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, +nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for +aught we know) be termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction." +Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is +accounted for by attraction; but, in this as in the other instances, I do +not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as +to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which +produces it, these are not so much as aimed at. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them +together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For +example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the +sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc, there is +something alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that +any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising +to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For +that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out +of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend +towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is +what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a +like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and +unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But +a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having +observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as +the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency +towards each other, which he denotes by the general name "attraction," +whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he +explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the +moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a +particular example of a general rule or law of nature. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural +philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the +phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the +efficient cause that produces them--for that can be no other than the +will of a spirit--but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, +whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works +of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to +general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and +uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most +agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect +beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very +probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great +distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; which +sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +106. CAUTION AS TO THE USE OF ANALOGIES.--But we should proceed warily +in such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies, +and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind +whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. +For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, +because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for +pronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attracted +by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies +whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such +tendency towards each other; and, so far is that gravitation from being +essential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle +seems to show itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the +elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the +case, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who +causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other +according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; +and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He +sees convenient. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following +conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, +when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind +or spirit. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship of +a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ +their thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of +things; and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends +to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally +with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of +accounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from +what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature +should not still be studied, and observations and experiments made, +which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general +conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations +between things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men +in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31 Fourthly, by a +diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover +the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; I +do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on a +supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a +constant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we +cannot evidently know. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +108. THREE ANALOGIES.--Those men who frame general rules from the +phenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem +to consider signs rather than causes. A man may well understand +natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say +by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to +write improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar +rules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible +we may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +109. As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts +on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical +remarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems +beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each +particular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from +them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate +and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order. extent, and +variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our +notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and +lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, +subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the +sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be +easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In +the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion +are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, +mathematical and vulgar; which distinction, as it is at large explained +by the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence without +the mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to +sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no +relation at all. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted +sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I +have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said +on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author +holds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, +remains in itself similar and immovable; and relative space to be the +measure thereof, which, being movable and defined by its situation in +respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immovable space. Place +he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and +according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. +Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute +place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to +another. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our +senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures, +and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we +regard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must +abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which +seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved +relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may +be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative +motions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. +All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at +all in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in +philosophy. And the true as we are told are distinguished from apparent +or relative motions by the following properties.--First, in true or +absolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect +of the whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place +being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body +moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its +place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than +by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always +changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion +barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, in +that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of +motion. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +112. MOTION, WHETHER REAL OR APPARENT, RELATIVE.--But, notwithstanding +what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that +there can be any motion other than relative; so that to conceive +motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the +distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there +was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems +evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include +relation. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +113. APPARENT MOTION DENIED.--But, though in every motion it be +necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one +only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change +in the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however +some may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved +which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force +or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as +relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in +the ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of common +sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any +one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the +stones he passes over may be said to move, because they change distance +with his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of +one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the +relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which +does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is +not therefore itself in motion. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is +related to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with +relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the +land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in +respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond +the earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in +respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who +have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of +things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to +fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, +and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby +they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we +may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom +no other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been already +observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is +incomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the +above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute +motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of +the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular +relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which +is brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, +in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it +is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, has, I think, no +motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that it +change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and +secondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If +either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense +of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in +motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which +we see change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no +force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but +then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined +by us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; which +indeed shows we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is +not, and that is all. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +116. ANY IDEA OF PURE SPACE RELATIVE.--From what has been said it follows +that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the +being of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived +by sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without the +mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like +of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, +we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive +of all body. This I must confess seems impossible, as being a most +abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, +if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space; but if I +find a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in proportion as the +resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or +less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be +supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or +conceivable without body and motion--though indeed we are apt to think +every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated +from all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, +supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say +there still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only +that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all +sides without the least resistance, but if that, too, were annihilated +then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps, +may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure +space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shown, that the ideas +of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay +concerning Vision. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and +difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the +nature of pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we +are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed +their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of +thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something +beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. +Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is +certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, +have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or +annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have +set themselves particularly to show the incommunicable attributes of God +agree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the +Divine Nature, yet I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we +adhere to the received opinions. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +118. THE ERRORS ARISING FROM THE DOCTRINES OF ABSTRACTION AND EXTERNAL +MATERIAL EXISTENCES, INFLUENCE MATHEMATICAL REASONINGS.--Hitherto of +Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry concerning +that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics. +These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and +certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be +found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if +in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the +professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, +though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet +their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and +they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental +maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, +Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors +involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are +true, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and +incontestible, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain +erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and +for that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed +throughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects +of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches +thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other +men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general +ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of +Number; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is +supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure +and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem +with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness +and elevation of thought. It has set a price on the most trifling +numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only +for amusement; and has therefore so far infected the minds of some, that +they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted +the explication of natural things by them. But, if we inquire into our +own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps +entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look +on all inquiries, about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far +as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which +and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is +not any such idea. But, number being defined a "collection of units," we +may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in +abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral +names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are +abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and +practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed +to have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely +the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and +trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show +of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical +theorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we +more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will +plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and +observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that +science, and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that +at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of +counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each +whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e., some one thing of whatever +kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more +compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several +strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians +came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, +and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it +obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have +been done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed +betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures +answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, +corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those +conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived +methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what +figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And +having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed +throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes +perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to +be known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement) +that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs +being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any +part of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing in +signs (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct +multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able +rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we +intend to number. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, +which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they +direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of +them. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general +(sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are +thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not +suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present +enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only +observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which +pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality +conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, +except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered +on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly +whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows +that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as +good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention +and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent +criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which, considered as +relative, is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite +extension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or +theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same +everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a +connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that +mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of +it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those +amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the +plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance +into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so it is the principal +occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of +Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear +that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely +divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry +from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever +been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment +thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object +of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently +each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive +innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain +they are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I cannot +distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, +which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind: +wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer +to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own +ideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas +into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not +infinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinct +from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot +affirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms "extension," "parts," +&c., are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say +a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so +manifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it +to be so; and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any +reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, +as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and +rooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositions +which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only +themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought +privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, +which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +125. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract +general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of +sense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks +the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue +thereof be brought to admit that a line but an inch long may contain +innumerable parts--really existing, though too small to be discerned. +These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of +other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no +difficult thing to show how the arguments from Geometry made use of to +support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. At +present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians +are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems and +demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. +15, Introd.); where it is explained in what sense this ought to be +understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the +diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; +or, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their +magnitude--which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only +that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or +small, but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration. Hence +it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of +as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in +itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only in its +signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than +itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though +there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties +of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the +sign, and thence, through mistake, though to appertain to it considered +in its own nature. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible +there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain +parts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch +taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not +retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that +the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts +innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten--thousandth part of an +inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be +signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, +and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the +radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more; +for, though the ten-thousandth part of that line considered in itself is +nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without an error or +inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for +greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten--thousandth part is very +considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the +radius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +128. LINES WHICH ARE INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.--From what has been said +the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal in +its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper +as though they contained parts which really they do not. In doing +of which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps +discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, +or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which +is far greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say +a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely +great. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to +suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought +necessary in geometry. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this +false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many +demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that +proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating +to infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind +to reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could +have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever +considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on +purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in +an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe +examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and +grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and +disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great +note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into +an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those +infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or +infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, +assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., +without ever coming to an end; so that according to them an inch does not +barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an +infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold +all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all; +thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive +quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can +never equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it +seems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a +positive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold +infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, +are obliged to maintain. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +131. OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--Have we not therefore +reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is +in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite +number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will +say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations +of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised +that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while +building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is +useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still +remain firm and unshaken on our principles; that science considered as +practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has +been said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business of +another place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the +more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared +off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be +thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be +wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw +off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of +such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct +influence on the manners. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +132. SECOND OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--If it be said +that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods +in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have +been if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answer +that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any +instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts +of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, +it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +133. IF THE DOCTRINE WERE ONLY AN HYPOTHESIS IT SHOULD BE RESPECTED +FOR ITS CONSEQUENCES.--By what we have premised, it is plain that very +numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false +Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise; +and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be +most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences +highly advantageous to true philosophy, as well as to religion. +Particularly Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, has +been shown to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of +all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief +strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real +existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing +them a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing +is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable +difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as +not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences +cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen +themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites being +incomprehensible"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended +with the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, +but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, +both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only +spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both +to Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted and +firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the +existence of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have +evidently demonstrated that it is not. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several +disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, +are rejected as useless. But, how great a prejudice soever against our +notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and +make large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it +will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and +tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make +human sciences far more clear, compendious and attainable than they were +before. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge +of IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of +SPIRITS--with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so +deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for +our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an +idea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a +human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it +is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I +mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here +add that a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support +wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance +which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an +idea is evidently absurd. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +136. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--It will perhaps be said that we want a sense +(as some have imagined) proper to know substances withal, which, +if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this +I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we +could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. +But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul +and substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. +We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is +not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not +furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it +would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round +square. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an +idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much +scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this +opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at +all distinct from their body since upon inquiry they could not find they +had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existence +whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of +an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than +barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will +say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, +or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not +necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it +should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of +willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else +wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean +only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, +constitutes the signification of the term. If therefore it is impossible +that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is +evident there can be no idea of a spirit. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the +terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have +no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real +thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which +perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, +that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul +or spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a +word, and that, since the immediately significations of other names are +by common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which +is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same +appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in +that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in +being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose +existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and +thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and +confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish +between spirit and idea. See sect. 27. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +140. OUR IDEA OF SPIRIT.--In a large sense, indeed, we may be said +to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand +the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny +anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the +minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be +resemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of our own +soul--which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having +a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived +has to those ideas perceived by another. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +141. THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE +OF THE FOREGOING DOCTRINE.--It must not be supposed that they who +assert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that it +is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power +of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not +liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature +or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin +vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and +corruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipated +than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive +the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notion +has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, +as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue +and religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or +texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more +distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We have +shown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is +consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, +changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural +bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot +possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being +therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, "the +soul of man is naturally immortal." +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are +not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by +way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when +we say "they exist," "they are known," or the like, these words must not +be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing +alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or +enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do +a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is +inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several +important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning +the nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an +idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have +a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its +acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these +words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the +terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have +it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we +distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be +remarked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so +properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations +and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is +extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an +affair of verbal concern. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas has +had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure +which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have +imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the +mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit +itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great +number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract +notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from +these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in +controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of +the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed +from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the +soul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, +impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that +is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of +dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be +cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but +philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively +consider their own meaning. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +145. KNOWLEDGE OF SPIRITS NOT IMMEDIATE.--From what has been said, +it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits +otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited +in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, +that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, +which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the +knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the +knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me +referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or +concomitant signs. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are +concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those +things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater +part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or +dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that +causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by +themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant +regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising +magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite +contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact +harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the +never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or +natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we +consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and +import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and +Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid +Spirit, "who works all in all," and "by whom all things consist." +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +147. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD MORE EVIDENT THAN THAT OF MAN.--Hence, +it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as +any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may +even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived +than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely +more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There +is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which +does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author +of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of +man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; +but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the +mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it +is who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that +intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the +existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which +enlightens every one is itself invisible. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they +cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we +should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we +need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a +more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow--creatures. Not +that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and +immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing +that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I +must confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;--A +human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; +when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we +perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and +these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve +to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like +ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man--if by man is meant that +which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do--but only such a +certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct +principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and +represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the +difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of +ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, +we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the +Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, +being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those +very motions which are produced by men. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one +that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a +Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that +variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we +have an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and +move, and have our being." That the discovery of this great truth, which +lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason +of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of +men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of +the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, +blinded with excess of light. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +150. OBJECTION ON BEHALF OF NATURE.--ANSWER.--But you will say, +has Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must +they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? +I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects +or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed +and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, +cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being +distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things +perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound +without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this +acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not +just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it +is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, +professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those +effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont +to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He +maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his +treasures." Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death into the +morning, and maketh the day dark with night." Amos, 5. 8. "He visiteth +the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing +thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures +are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn." See +Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of +Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God +concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a +great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His +stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from every +one of us." +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +151. OBJECTION TO THE HAND OF GOD BEING THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE, +THREEFOLD.--ANSWER.--It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and +gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem +to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, +monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in +desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many +arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and +superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer +to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being +visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in +order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady +and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. +Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, +whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand +which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and +blood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that hidest thyself." +Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the +sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to +an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than +the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and +sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have +elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated +laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting +us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of +thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of +purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or +powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly +outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of +nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of +variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in +a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We +would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds +and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before +they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be +not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent +and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things +which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed +wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an +animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in +its production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that +an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat +or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of +natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the +agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the +riches of His power. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, +pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, +imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is +indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too +narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into +our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as +to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, +on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and +pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are +put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those +particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, +have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system +of beings. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +154. ATHEISM AND MANICHEISM WOULD HAVE FEW SUPPORTERS IF MANKIND WERE +IN GENERAL ATTENTIVE.--From what has been said, it will be manifest +to any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention +and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism +or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls +may indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order +whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to +comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent +of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently +admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout +the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so +strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting +of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered +at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or +pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should +not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might +be expected in reasonable creatures? +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to +neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an +evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of +parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through a +supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downright +impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of +the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should +persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, +earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may +attain conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord are in +every place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and +keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and +raiment to put on"; that He is present and conscious to our innermost +thoughts; and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on +Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts +with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest +incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the +consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main +drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless +and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with +a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shown the falseness or +vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of +learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the +salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the +highest perfection of human nature. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR><BR> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Treatise Concerning the Principles +of Human Knowledge, by George Berkeley + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TREATISE CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE *** + +***** This file should be named 4723-h.htm or 4723-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/4/7/2/4723/ + +Produced by Col Choat. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge + +Author: George Berkeley + +Posting Date: June 29, 2009 [EBook #4723] +Release Date: December, 2003 +First Posted: March 7, 2002 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TREATISE CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE *** + + + + +Produced by Col Choat. HTML version by Al Haines. + + + + + + + + + +A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge + + +by + +George Berkeley (1685-1753) + + +WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE SCIENCES, +WITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION, +ARE INQUIRED INTO. + + + + +DEDICATION + + + + To the Right Honourable + THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE, &C., + Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of + the Lords of Her Majesty's most honourable privy council. + +My Lord, + +You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to +be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. +But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful +Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship +for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not +altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and +learning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you +are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present +of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native +goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might +add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been +pleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be +unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These +considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's +feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am +with the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning +and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship, MY LORD, +Your lordship's most humble and most devoted servant, + + +GEORGE BERKELEY + + + +* * * * * + + +CONTENTS + + PREFACE + INTRODUCTION + OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE + + +* * * * * + + + +PREFACE + + +What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed +to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known--particularly to those +who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence +and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether +it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; since +I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I +have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may +not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment +till he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of +attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to deserve. +For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very +liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be +charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an +entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though +the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is +very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I +flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the +characters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions +may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that +account. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted +with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of +demonstration, for no other reason but because it is newly known, and +contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to +premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort +of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly +comprehend it. + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +1. Philosophy being nothing else but THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND TRUTH, it +may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains +in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater +clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts +and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk +of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are +governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and +undisturbed. To them nothing THAT IS FAMILIAR appears unaccountable or +difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in +their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming SCEPTICS. But no +sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a +superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of +things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those +things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors +of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, +endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into +uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and +grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having +wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we +were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism. + +2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the +natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the +faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the SUPPORT +and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the INWARD ESSENCE and +constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it +treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at +if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is +impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of +infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite. + +3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault +originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of +them. IT IS A HARD THING TO SUPPOSE THAT RIGHT DEDUCTIONS FROM TRUE +PRINCIPLES SHOULD EVER END IN CONSEQUENCES WHICH CANNOT BE MAINTAINED or +made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully +with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge +which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to +the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it +may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such +means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the +whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of +those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked +up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves--that we have +first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see. + +4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those +Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and +uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects +of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance +incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation +of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to +make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, +to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some +grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and +embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any +darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the +understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted +on, and might have been avoided. + +5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I +consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the +like designs, yet I am not without some hopes--upon the consideration +that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is +short--sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, +perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far +better eyes. + +6. A CHIEF SOURCE OF ERROR IN ALL PARTS OF KNOWLEDGE.--In order to +prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what +follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, +concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this +matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice +of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate +and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties +in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind +has a power of framing ABSTRACT IDEAS or notions of things. He who is +not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must +needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract +ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of +those sciences which go by the name of LOGIC and METAPHYSICS, and of all +that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime +learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such +a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is +well acquainted with them. + +7. PROPER ACCEPTATION OF ABSTRACTION.--It is agreed on all hands that the +qualities or modes of things do never REALLY EXIST EACH OF THEM APART BY +ITSELF, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and +blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind +being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other +qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself +abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object +extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind +resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, +exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, +and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without +extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by ABSTRACTION the +idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both +colour and extension. + +8. OF GENERALIZING [Note].--Again, the mind having observed that in the +particular extensions perceived by sense there is something COMMON and +alike IN ALL, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or +magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or +singles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract +idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any +figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So +likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by +sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that +only which is COMMON TO ALL, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is +neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, +in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body +moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular +directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which +equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be +perceived by sense. + +[Note: Vide Reid, on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay V, +chap iii. sec. 1, edit. 1843] + +9. OF COMPOUNDING.--And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of +qualities or MODES, so does it, by the same precision or mental +separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded BEINGS +which include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind +having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other +in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves +out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and +any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining +only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein +all the particulars equally partake--abstracting entirely from +and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might +determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is +said we come by the abstract idea of MAN, or, if you please, humanity, or +human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there +is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor +black, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular +colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, +but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle +stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. +Moreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that partake in +some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of MAN, the mind, leaving +out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which +are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of ANIMAL, which +abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, +fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal +are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By BODY is meant body +without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or +figure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or +feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and +nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and +for that reason left out of the ABSTRACT IDEA. Upon the same account the +spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it +is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to +conceive[Note.]. + +[Note: Vide Hobbes' Tripos, ch. v. sect. 6.] + +10. TWO OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.--Whether +others have this wonderful faculty of ABSTRACTING THEIR IDEAS, +they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of +imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular +things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. +I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to +the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by +itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then +whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and +colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of +a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a +low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive +the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to +form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which +is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may +be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I +own myself able to abstract IN ONE SENSE, as when I consider some +particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though +they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist +without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or +conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist +so separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from +particulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two proper +acceptations of ABSTRACTION. And there are grounds to think most men will +acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are +simple and illiterate never pretend to ABSTRACT NOTIONS. It is said +they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study; we may +therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined +only to the learned. + +11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in DEFENCE OF THE DOCTRINE +OF ABSTRACTION, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the +men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as +that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher +who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think +the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in +point of understanding betwixt man and beast. "The having of general +ideas," saith he, "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man +and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no +means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of +making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have +reason to imagine that they have not the FACULTY OF ABSTRACTING, or +making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other +general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose +that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, +and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and +which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas +at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot +deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, +some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it +is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. +They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have +not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of +ABSTRACTION." Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily +agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no +means attain to ABSTRACTION. But then if this be made the distinguishing +property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass +for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here +assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general +ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general +signs; which is built on this supposition--that the making use of words +implies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who use +language are able to ABSTRACT or GENERALIZE their ideas. That this is the +sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the +question he in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only +particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words become +general by being made the signs of general ideas."--Essay on Human +Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But [Note. 1] it seems that a word becomes +general by being made the sign, not of an ABSTRACT general idea, but of +several particular ideas [Note. 2], any one of which it indifferently +suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion +is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension +is divisible," these propositions are to be understood of motion +and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that +they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, +or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive +an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, +nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any +other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular +motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, +horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning +it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, +it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or +that magnitude or figure. + +[Note 1: "TO THIS I CANNOT ASSENT, BEING OF OPINION," edit of 1710.] + +[Note 2: Of the same sort.] + +12. EXISTENCE OF GENERAL IDEAS ADMITTED.--By observing how ideas +become general we may the better judge how words are made so. +And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there +are general ideas, but only that there are any ABSTRACT GENERAL +IDEAS; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is +mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by +ABSTRACTION, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we +will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can +conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered +in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or +stand for all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT. To make this plain +by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of +cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line +of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is +nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is +there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what +is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, +of a line in general. And, as that particular line becomes general by +being made a sign, so the name LINE, which taken absolutely is +PARTICULAR, by being a sign is made GENERAL. And as the former owes its +generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but +of ALL PARTICULAR right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must +be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the +VARIOUS PARTICULAR lines which it indifferently denotes. [Note.] + +[Note: "I look upon this (doctrine) to be one of the greatest and most +valuable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republic +of letters."--Treatise of Human Nature, book i, part i, sect. 7. Also +Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind, part i, chapt. iv. sect. iii. p. 99.] + +13. ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS NECESSARY, ACCORDING TO LOCKE.--To give +the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, +and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more +passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV. vii. 9) which is as +follows: "ABSTRACT IDEAS are not so obvious or easy to children or the +yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it +is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when +we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are +fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, +and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For +example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general +idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, +comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor +rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but ALL AND +NONE of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot +exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and INCONSISTENT +ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has +need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the +CONVENIENCY OF COMMUNICATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE, to both which +it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect +such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show +that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is +first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge +is conversant about."--If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind +such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend +to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that +the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such +an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to +perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own +thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea +that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the +general idea of a triangle, which is NEITHER OBLIQUE NOR RECTANGLE, +EQUILATERAL, EQUICRURAL NOR SCALENON, BUT ALL AND NONE OF THESE AT ONCE? + +14. BUT THEY ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR COMMUNICATION.--Much is here +said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and +the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on +all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, +to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to +those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From +all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so DIFFICULT a +thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for COMMUNICATION, +which is so EASY and familiar to ALL SORTS OF MEN. But, we are told, if +they seem obvious and easy to grown men, IT IS ONLY BECAUSE BY CONSTANT +AND FAMILIAR USE THEY ARE MADE SO. Now, I would fain know at what time it +is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing +themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when +they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such +painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. +And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions +will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to +imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their +sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they +have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in +their minds ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS, and annexed them to every common name +they make use of? + +15. NOR FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.--Nor do I think them +a whit more needful for the ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE than for +COMMUNICATION. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that +all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to +which I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions +are formed by ABSTRACTION in the manner PREMISED--UNIVERSALITY, so far as +I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, POSITIVE nature or +conception of anything, but in the RELATION it bears to the particulars +signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, +names, or notions, being in their own nature PARTICULAR, are rendered +UNIVERSAL. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, +it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a +triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of +a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; +but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that +sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear +triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense UNIVERSAL. All which seems +very plain and not to include any difficulty in it. + +16. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But here it will be demanded, HOW WE CAN KNOW ANY +PROPOSITION TO BE TRUE OF ALL PARTICULAR TRIANGLES, EXCEPT we have first +seen it DEMONSTRATED OF THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE which equally +agrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to +some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally +belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with +it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles +rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore +conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither +a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain +this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular +demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once +for all demonstrate it of the ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE, in which all +the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all +equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in +view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an +isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I +may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear +triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the +right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at +all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view +includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention +made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three +angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, +or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which +sufficiently shows that the right angle might have been oblique, and the +sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for +this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or +scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right--angled +equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of +the abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a +man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the +particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he +may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, +general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider +Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing the +fore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all +that is perceived is not considered. + +17. ADVANTAGE OF INVESTIGATING THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT GENERAL +IDEAS.--It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the +SCHOOLMEN, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold +inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of +abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings +and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those +matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to +mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted +on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were +confined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When +men consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many +ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, +and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains +full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to +have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most +clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are +perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking +all together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit +to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and +amusement--I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into +a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps +cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the +world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, has a more wide and +extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than [Note.] this of +abstract general ideas. + +[Note: "That we have been endeavouring to overthrow."--Edit 1710.] + +18. I come now to consider the SOURCE OF THIS PREVAILING NOTION, and that +seems to me to be LANGUAGE. And surely nothing of less extent than reason +itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received. +The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain +confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that +they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence +that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there +never had been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere +of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein +words have contributed to the origin of that mistake.--First +[Vide sect. xix.] then, it is thought that every name has, or +ought to have, ONE ONLY precise and settled signification, which +inclines men to think there are certain ABSTRACT, DETERMINATE IDEAS +that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each +general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract +ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. +Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite +signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying +indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which doth +evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear +to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be OBJECTED that every +name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain +signification. For example, a TRIANGLE is defined to be A PLAIN SURFACE +COMPREHENDED BY THREE RIGHT LINES, by which that name is limited to +denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the +definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or +white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor +with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may +be great variety, and consequently there is NO ONE SETTLED IDEA which +limits the signification of the word TRIANGLE. It is one thing for to +keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it +stand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other +useless and impracticable. + +19. SECONDLY, But, to give a farther account how WORDS came to PRODUCE THE +DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS, it must be observed that it is a received +opinion that language has NO OTHER END but the communicating our ideas, +and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it +being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether +insignificant do not always mark out PARTICULAR conceivable ideas, it is +straightway concluded that THEY STAND FOR ABSTRACT NOTIONS. That there are +many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to +others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what +nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not +necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which +stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the +understanding the ideas they are made to stand for--in reading and +discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in +ALGEBRA, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, +yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter +suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to +stand for.[Note.] + +[Note: Language has become the source or origin of abstract general ideas +on account of a twofold error.--(1.) That every word has only one +signification. (2.) That the only end of language is the communication +of our ideas--Ed.] + +20. SOME OF THE ENDS OF LANGUAGE.--Besides, the communicating of ideas +marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is +commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some +passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting +the mind in some particular disposition--to which the former is +in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, +when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently +happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to +reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in +hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, +admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the +perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between. At first, +indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to +produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, +when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight +of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which +at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are +now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise +of a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the +being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we +think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to +ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so +little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will +evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the +propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of +ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the +hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a +design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are +supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me +"Aristotle has said it," all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me +to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has +annexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in +the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to +authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his +person, writings, or reputation should go before [Note.]. Innumerable +examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those +things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully +suggest unto him? + +[Note: "So close and immediate a connection may custom establish betwixt +the very word ARISTOTLE, and the motions of assent and reverence +in the minds of some men."--Edit 1710.] + +21. CAUTION IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE NECESSARY.--We have, I think, +shown the impossibility of ABSTRACT IDEAS. We have considered +what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavored +to show they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought +necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from +whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.--It cannot be +denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that +stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours of +inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and +made the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must be +owned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and +darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they +are delivered.[Note 1.] Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the +understanding[Note 2.], whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to +take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far +as I am able, those names which long and constant use has so strictly +united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following +advantages: + +[Note 1: "That it may almost be made a question, whether language +has contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the +sciences."--Edit 1710.] + +[Note 2: "I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them +as possibly I can."--Edit 1710.] + +22. FIRST, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies PURELY +VERBAL--the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has +been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. +SECONDLY, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that +fine and subtle net of ABSTRACT IDEAS which has so miserably perplexed +and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, +that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so +much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. +THIRDLY, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of +words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, +I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an +idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of +my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the +agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas +are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more +requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own +understanding. + +23. But the attainment of all THESE ADVANTAGES doth PRESUPPOSE AN ENTIRE +DELIVERANCE FROM THE DECEPTION OF WORDS, which I dare hardly promise +myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, +and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which +difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of +ABSTRACTION. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to +their words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words for +ideas--it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and +RETAIN THE ABSTRACT IDEA IN THE MIND, WHICH IN ITSELF WAS PERFECTLY +INCONCEIVABLE. This seems to me the principal cause why those men who +have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of +words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet +failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of +the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the +abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, +that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from +the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may be +they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to +it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words +was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every +general name was a DETERMINATE ABSTRACT IDEA. + +24. But, THESE BEING KNOWN TO BE MISTAKES, A MAN MAY with greater ease +PREVENT HIS BEING IMPOSED ON BY WORDS. He that knows he has no other than +particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and +conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names +do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking +for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be +wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear +view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress +and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment +and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens +and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the +writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity--we +need only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of +knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand. + +25. Unless we take care TO CLEAR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE FROM +THE embarras and DELUSION OF WORDS, we may make infinite reasonings upon +them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be +never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more +irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. +Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to +make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain +the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this +means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I +say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do +not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, +undisguised ideas. + + + + +OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE + + +1. OBJECTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.--It is evident to any one who takes a +survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either IDEAS +actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by +attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas +formed by help of memory and imagination--either compounding, dividing, +or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. +By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees +and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion +and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or +degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and +hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and +composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each +other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one +thing. Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and +consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one +distinct thing, signified by the name APPLE. Other collections of ideas +constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things--which +as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, +hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. + +2. MIND--SPIRIT--SOUL.--But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or +objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives +them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, +about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call MIND, SPIRIT, +SOUL, or MYSELF. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a +thing entirely distinct from them, WHEREIN THEY EXIST, or, which is the +same thing, whereby they are perceived--for the existence of an idea +consists in being perceived. + +3. HOW FAR THE ASSENT OF THE VULGAR CONCEDED.--That neither our thoughts, +nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist WITHOUT the mind, +is what EVERYBODY WILL ALLOW. And it seems no less evident that the +various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended +or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), +cannot exist otherwise than IN a mind perceiving them. I think an +intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall +attend to WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM EXIST, when applied to sensible +things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel +it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed--meaning +thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other +spirit actually does perceive it.[Note.] There was an odour, that is, it +was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, +and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand +by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute +existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being +perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their ESSE is PERCIPI, +nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or +thinking things which perceive them. + +[Note: First argument in support of the author's theory.] + +4. THE VULGAR OPINION INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--It is indeed +an opinion STRANGELY prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, +rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, +natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the +understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever +this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in +his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to +involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned +objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we PERCEIVE +BESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? and is it not plainly repugnant that +any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? + +5. CAUSE OF THIS PREVALENT ERROR.--If we thoroughly examine this +tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine +of ABSTRACT IDEAS. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction +than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their +being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? +Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures--in a +word the things we see and feel--what are they but so many sensations, +notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to +separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I +might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my +thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps +I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a +human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without +thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract--if +that may properly be called ABSTRACTION which extends only to the +conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or +be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does +not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, +as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual +sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my +thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or +perception of it.[Note.] + +[Note: "In truth the object and the sensation are the same thing, and +cannot therefore be abstracted from each other--Edit 1710."] + +6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need +only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, +viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word +all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not +any subsistence without a mind, that their BEING (ESSE) is to be perceived +or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by +me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other CREATED SPIRIT, they +must either have no existence at all, OR ELSE SUBSIST IN THE MIND OF SOME +ETERNAL SPIRIT--it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the +absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an +existence independent of a spirit [Note.]. To be convinced of which, the +reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the +being of a sensible thing from its being perceived. + +[Note: "To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an axiom, +it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflection of the reader, +that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and in turn his +thoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarrass +of words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes."--Edit 1710] + +7. SECOND ARGUMENT.[Note.]--From what has been said it follows there is +NOT ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE THAN SPIRIT, or that which perceives. But, for the +fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities +are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived +by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a +manifest contradiction, for TO HAVE AN IDEA IS ALL ONE AS TO PERCEIVE; +that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must +perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no UNTHINKING substance or +SUBSTRATUM of those ideas. + +[Note: Vide sect. iii. and xxv.] + +8. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not +exist without the mind, yet there may be things LIKE them, whereof they +are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an +unthinking substance. I ANSWER, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a +colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we +look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible +for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask +whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas +are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If +they are, THEN THEY ARE IDEAS and we have gained our point; but if you say +they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour +is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which +is intangible; and so of the rest. + +9. THE PHILOSOPHICAL NOTION OF MATTER INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--Some +there are who make a DISTINCTION betwixt PRIMARY and SECONDARY +qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, +solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all +other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The +ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of +anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have +our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things +which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call +MATTER. By MATTER, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless +substance, in which extension, figure, and motion DO ACTUALLY SUBSIST. +But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, +figure, and motion are ONLY IDEAS EXISTING IN THE MIND, and that an idea +can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they +nor their archetypes can exist in an UNPERCEIVING substance. Hence, it is +plain that the very notion of what is called MATTER or CORPOREAL +SUBSTANCE, involves a contradiction in it.[Note.] + +[Note: "Insomuch that I should not think it necessary to spend more time +in exposing its absurdity. But because the tenet of the existence of +matter seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, +and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be +thought prolix and tedious, than omit anything that might conduce to +the full discovery and extirpation of the prejudice."--Edit 1710.] + +10. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--They who assert that figure, motion, and the +rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in +unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, +sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not--which they +tell us are sensations existing IN THE MIND ALONE, that depend on and are +occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute +particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can +demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those +original qualities ARE INSEPARABLY UNITED WITH THE OTHER SENSIBLE +QUALITIES, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted +from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. +But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any +abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a +body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see +evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body +extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other +sensible quality which is ACKNOWLEDGED to exist only in the mind. In +short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other +qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible +qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere +else. + +11. A SECOND ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--Again, GREAT and SMALL, SWIFT and SLOW, +ARE ALLOWED TO EXIST NOWHERE WITHOUT THE MIND, being entirely +RELATIVE, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of +sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the +mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, +that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension +in general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet +of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on +the strange doctrine of ABSTRACT IDEAS. And here I cannot but remark how +nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal +substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own +principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of +MATERIA PRIMA, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without +extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shown +that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also +be true of solidity. + +12. That NUMBER is entirely THE CREATURE OF THE MIND, even though the +other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever +considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as +the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is +one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with +reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, +and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any +one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one +book, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units, though some +contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the +unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put +together by the mind. + +13. UNITY I know some will have to be A SIMPLE OR UNCOMPOUNDED IDEA, +accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea +answering the word UNITY I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could +not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to +my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to +be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, +it is an ABSTRACT IDEA. + +14. A THIRD ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--I shall farther add, that, after +the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible +qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, +the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities +whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are +affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, +existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that +the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. +Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not +patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the +same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the +same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of +anything SETTLED AND DETERMINATE WITHOUT THE MIND? Again, it is proved +that SWEETNESS is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing +remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a +fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that +MOTION is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the +mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower +without any alteration in any external object? + +15. NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO EXTENSION.--In short, let any one consider +those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours +and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with +equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, +and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing +does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in +an outward object, as that we do not know by SENSE which is the TRUE +extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly +show it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other +sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an UNTHINKING subject +without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an +outward object. + +16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.--It is said +EXTENSION is a MODE or accident OF MATTER, and that Matter is the +SUBSTRATUM that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me +what is meant by Matter's SUPPORTING extension. Say you, I have no idea +of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no +positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a +relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be +supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant +by its supporting them. It is evident SUPPORT cannot here be taken in +its usual or literal sense--as when we say that pillars support a +building; in what sense therefore must it be taken? [Note.] + +[Note: "For my part, I am not able to discover any sense at all that can +be applicable to it."--Edit 1710.] + +17. PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF "MATERIAL SUBSTANCE" DIVISIBLE INTO TWO +PARTS.--If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare +themselves to mean by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, we shall find them acknowledge +they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of BEING +IN GENERAL, together WITH THE RELATIVE NOTION OF ITS SUPPORTING +ACCIDENTS. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract +and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, +this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common +sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but +what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the TWO PARTS +or branches which make the signification of the words MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, +I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why +should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material +SUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? +Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not +this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable? + +18. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES WANTS PROOF.--But, though it +were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist +without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, +yet HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO KNOW THIS? Either we must know it by +sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge ONLY +OF OUR SENSATIONS, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived +by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things +exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are +perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains +therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it +must be by REASON, inferring their existence from what is immediately +perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the +existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the +very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is ANY NECESSARY +CONNEXION BETWIXT THEM AND OUR IDEAS? I say it is granted on all hands +(and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond +dispute) that IT IS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT BE AFFECTED WITH ALL THE IDEAS WE +HAVE NOW, THOUGH THERE WERE NO BODIES EXISTING WITHOUT RESEMBLING THEM. +Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary +for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced +sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we +see them in at present, without their concurrence. + +19. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES AFFORDS NO EXPLICATION OF THE +MANNER IN WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE PRODUCED.--But, though we might possibly +have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought +EASIER to conceive and explain the MANNER of their production, +by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; +and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies +that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; +for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they +by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas +are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in +what manner BODY CAN ACT UPON SPIRIT, or how it is possible it should +imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas +or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter +or corporeal substances, SINCE THAT IS ACKNOWLEDGED TO REMAIN EQUALLY +INEXPLICABLE WITH OR WITHOUT THIS SUPPOSITION. If therefore it were +possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, +must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without +any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings THAT ARE +ENTIRELY USELESS, AND SERVE TO NO MANNER OF PURPOSE. + +20. DILEMMA.--In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we +should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very +same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no one +can deny possible--an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to +be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, +imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask +whether that intelligence has not all the reason to believe the +existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting +them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same +thing? Of this there can be no question--which one consideration were +enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever +arguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies +without the mind. + +21. Were it necessary to add any FURTHER PROOF AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF +MATTER after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors +and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that +tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in +philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall +not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think +arguments A POSTERIORI are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I +mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated A PRIORI, as because I shall +hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them. + +22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in +handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which +may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one +that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own +thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, +or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. +This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a +downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon +this issue:--If you can but CONCEIVE it possible for one extended movable +substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to +exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the +cause. And, as for all that COMPAGES of external bodies you contend for, +I shall grant you its existence, THOUGH (1.) YOU CANNOT EITHER GIVE ME ANY +REASON WHY YOU BELIEVE IT EXISTS [Vide sect. lviii.], OR (2.) ASSIGN ANY +USE TO IT WHEN IT IS SUPPOSED TO EXIST [Vide sect. lx.]. I say, the bare +possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that +it is so. [Note: i.e. although your argument be deficient in the two +requisites of an hypothesis.--Ed.] + +23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine +trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody +by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; +but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind +certain ideas which you call BOOKS and TREES, and the same time omitting +to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? BUT DO NOT YOU +YOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? This therefore is +nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or +forming ideas in your mind: but it does not show that you can conceive it +possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make +out this, IT IS NECESSARY THAT YOU CONCEIVE THEM EXISTING UNCONCEIVED OR +UNTHOUGHT OF, WHICH IS A MANIFEST REPUGNANCY. When we do our utmost to +conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only +contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is +deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or +without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or +exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth +and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on +any other proofs against the existence of material substance. + +24. THE ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF UNTHINKING THINGS ARE WORDS WITHOUT +A MEANING.--It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, +to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the +ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF SENSIBLE OBJECTS IN THEMSELVES, OR WITHOUT THE MIND. +To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or +else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or +fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own +thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those +expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the +conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the +ABSOLUTE existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or +which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and +earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader. + +25. THIRD ARGUMENT.[Note: Vide sect. iii. and vii.]--REFUTATION +OF LOCKE.--All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we +perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly +inactive--there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that +ONE IDEA or object of thought CANNOT PRODUCE or make ANY ALTERATION IN +ANOTHER. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else +requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every +part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in +them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether +of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; +there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little +attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies +passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an +idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: +neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is +evident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, +figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, +therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the +configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly +be false. [Note: Vide sect. cii.] + +26. CAUSE OF IDEAS.--We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are +anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore +some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and +changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination +of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a +substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material +substance: it remains therefore that the CAUSE OF IDEAS is an incorporeal +active substance or Spirit. + +27. NO IDEA OF SPIRIT.--A spirit is one simple, undivided, active +being--as it perceives ideas it is called the UNDERSTANDING, and as it +produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the WILL. Hence +there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, +being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, +by way of image or LIKENESS, that which acts. A little attention will make +it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active +principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is +the nature of SPIRIT, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself +perceived, BUT ONLY BY THE EFFECTS WHICH IT PRODUCETH. If any man shall +doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try +if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has +ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names WILL and UNDERSTANDING, +distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or +Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the +subject of the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name SOUL or +SPIRIT. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words +WILL [Note: "Understanding, mind."--Edit 1710.], SOUL, SPIRIT, do not stand +for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something +which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be +like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned +at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the +operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating--inasmuch as we +know or understand the meaning of these words. + +28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift +the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and +straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power +it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of +ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain +and grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of +exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words. + +29. IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR MEMORY.--But, +whatever power I may have over MY OWN thoughts, I find the ideas +actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When +in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether +I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present +themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other +senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There +is THEREFORE SOME OTHER WILL OR SPIRIT that PRODUCES THEM. + +30. LAWS OF NATURE.--The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and +DISTINCT than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, +order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are +the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, +the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and +benevolence of its Author. Now THE SET RULES OR ESTABLISHED METHODS +WHEREIN THE MIND WE DEPEND ON EXCITES IN US THE IDEAS OF SENSE, ARE CALLED +THE LAWS OF NATURE; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us +that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in +the ordinary course of things. + +31. KNOWLEDGE OF THEM NECESSARY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WORLDLY AFFAIRS.--This +gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our +actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally +at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us +the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food +nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the +seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to +obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive--all this we +know, NOT BY DISCOVERING ANY NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWEEN OUR IDEAS, but +only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we +should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know +how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born. + +32. And yet THIS consistent UNIFORM WORKING, which so evidently displays +the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes +the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it +rather SENDS THEM A WANDERING AFTER SECOND CAUSES. For, when we perceive +certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and WE KNOW +THIS IS NOT OF OUR OWN DOING, we forthwith attribute power and agency to +the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which +nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having +observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure +we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called HEAT, +we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like +manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with +sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former. + +33. OF REAL THINGS AND IDEAS OR CHIMERAS.--The ideas imprinted on the +Senses by the Author of nature are called REAL THINGS; and those +excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, +are more properly termed IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which they +copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid +and distinct, are nevertheless IDEAS, that is, they exist in the +mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. +The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to +be more (1)STRONG, (2)ORDERLY, and (3)COHERENT than the creatures of the +mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are +also (4)LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SPIRIT [Note: Vide sect. xxix.--Note.], +or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by +the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS, +and certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than +in a mind perceiving it. + +34. FIRST GENERAL OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Before we proceed any farther +it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which +may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid +down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick +apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not +equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be +understood by every one. + +FIRST, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles ALL +THAT IS REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE IS BANISHED OUT OF THE WORLD, and +instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that +exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What +therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think of +houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? +Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all +which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I ANSWER, that +by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in +nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand +remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a RERUM +NATURA, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its +full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have +shown what is meant by REAL THINGS in opposition to CHIMERAS or ideas of +our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in +that sense they are alike IDEAS. + +35. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER, AS UNDERSTOOD BY PHILOSOPHERS, +DENIED.[Vide sect. lxxxiv.]--I do not argue against the existence of +any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. +That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, +really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose +existence we deny IS THAT WHICH PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATTER or corporeal +substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest +of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed +will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and +the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for +trifling and disputation. + +36. READILY EXPLAINED.--If any man thinks this detracts from the existence +or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what has been +premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an +abstract of what has been said:--There are spiritual substances, +minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at +pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of +others they perceive by sense--which, being impressed upon them +according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the +effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These +latter are said to have more REALITY in them than the former:--by +which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, +and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And +in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I +imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of +REALITY it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general +each part of the mundane system, is as much a REAL BEING by our +principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term +REALITY different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own +thoughts and see. + +37. THE PHILOSOPHIC, NOT THE VULGAR SUBSTANCE, TAKEN AWAY.--I will +be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take +away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word +SUBSTANCE be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible +qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we +cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic +sense--for the SUPPORT of accidents or QUALITIES WITHOUT THE MIND--then +indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take +away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination. + +38. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink +ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so--the word +IDEA not being used in common discourse to signify the several +combinations of sensible qualities which are called THINGS; and it is +certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of +language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the +truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we +are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by +our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, +or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several +sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shown to exist only in the mind +that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them IDEAS; +which word if it was as ordinarily used as THING, would sound no harsher +nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, +but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we +eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which +cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is +more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things +rather than ideas. + +39. THE TERM IDEA PREFERABLE TO THING.--If it be demanded why I make +use of the word IDEA, and do not rather in compliance with custom +call them THINGS. I answer, I do it for two reasons:--first, because +the term THING in contra-distinction to IDEA, is generally supposed +to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because +THING has a more comprehensive signification than IDEA, including +SPIRIT or thinking things as well as IDEAS. Since therefore the +objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless +and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word IDEA, which implies +those properties. + +40. THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES NOT DISCREDITED.--But, say what we can, +some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his +senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, +to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence +of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. +That what I see, hear, and feel DOTH EXIST, THAT IS to say, IS PERCEIVED +BY ME, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how +the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of +anything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man +turn SCEPTIC and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all +the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more +opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down [Note.], as shall be +hereafter clearly shown. + +[Note: They extirpate the very root of scepticism, "the fallacy +of the senses."--Ed.] + +41. SECOND OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Secondly, it will be OBJECTED +that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, +and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, +and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of +fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be +convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition +to our tenets. To all which the ANSWER is evident from what has +been already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real +fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain +that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet +nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an +unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea. + +42. THIRD OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Thirdly, it will be objected that +we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which +consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those +things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be +as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it +may be considered that in a DREAM we do oft perceive things as +existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things +are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind. + +43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to +consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a +distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see EXTERNAL space, and +bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to +carry with it some opposition to what has been said of their existing +nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was +that gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," which was +published not long since, wherein it is shown (1) that DISTANCE or outness +is NEITHER IMMEDIATELY of itself PERCEIVED by sight, nor yet apprehended +or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that has a necessary +connexion with it; but (2) that it is ONLY SUGGESTED to our thoughts by +certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own +nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or +things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us BY EXPERIENCE, +they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that +WORDS of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for; +insomuch that a man BORN blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at +first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any +distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise. + +44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and +heterogeneous. THE FORMER ARE MARKS AND PROGNOSTICS OF THE LATTER. That +the proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the +images of external things, was shown even in that treatise. Though +throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible +objects--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for +establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my +purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning VISION. So +that in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them +distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to +us things ACTUALLY existing at a distance, but only admonish us what +ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances +of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, +evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, +and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that +visible ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit on whom we +depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in +case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller +information in this point I refer to the Essay itself. + +45. FOURTH OBJECTION, FROM PERPETUAL ANNIHILATION AND +CREATION.--ANSWER.--Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing +principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created +anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees +therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than +while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon SHUTTING MY EYES all +the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening +them it is again created. In ANSWER to all which, I refer the reader to +what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider +whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct +from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could +make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those +words; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and +not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it +possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being +perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will +acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows +not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting +to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them. + +46. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--It will not be amiss to observe how far +the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable +with those pretended absurdities. (1) It is thought strangely absurd +that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me +should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers +commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and +colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, +are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? +(2)Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should +be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the +schools. For the SCHOOLMEN, though they acknowledge the existence of +Matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are +nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine +conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation. + +47. (3) Further, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow +the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably +follow, FROM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE NOW GENERALLY ADMITTED, that the +PARTICULAR bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they +are not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the following +sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible +somewhat, WHICH HAS NONE OF THOSE PARTICULAR QUALITIES WHEREBY THE +BODIES FALLING UNDER OUR SENSES ARE DISTINGUISHED ONE FROM ANOTHER. +(2) But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite +divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most +approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles +demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an +infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not +perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems +to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to +sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains +an infinite number of parts, BUT BECAUSE THE SENSE IS NOT ACUTE ENOUGH TO +DISCERN THEM. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more +acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the +object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its +extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in +very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. +And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense +becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which +there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. EACH BODY +THEREFORE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, IS INFINITELY EXTENDED, AND CONSEQUENTLY +VOID OF ALL SHAPE OR FIGURE. From which it follows that, though we should +grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as +certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced +to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, +nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each +particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, AND IT IS +THE MIND THAT FRAMES ALL THAT VARIETY OF BODIES WHICH COMPOSE THE VISIBLE +WORLD, ANY ONE WHEREOF DOES NOT EXIST LONGER THAN IT IS PERCEIVED. + +48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be +found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in +truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we +hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which +cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no +existence except only while they are perceived by US, since THERE MAY BE +SOME OTHER SPIRIT THAT PERCEIVES THEM THOUGH WE DO NOT. Wherever bodies +are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood +to mean this or that particular mind, but ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER. It does +not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are +annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the +intervals between our perception of them. + +49. FIFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Fifthly, it may perhaps be OBJECTED +that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows +that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or +attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the +subject in which it exists. I ANSWER, (1) Those qualities are in the +mind ONLY AS THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY IT--that is, not by way of MODE +or ATTRIBUTE, but only by way of IDEA; and it no more follows the +soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone, +than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are ON +ALL HANDS acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. (2) As to what +philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and +unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, +extended, and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a +subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure +which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot +comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things +which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, +extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject +distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning +of the word DIE. + +50. SIXTH OBJECTION, FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.--ANSWER.--Sixthly, +you will say there have been a great many things explained by +matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole +corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which +have been applied with so much success to account for the PHENOMENA. In +short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern +philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition +that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I ANSWER +that there is not any one PHENOMENON explained on that supposition which +may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear +by an INDUCTION OF PARTICULARS. To explain the PHENOMENA, is all one as +to show why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and +such ideas. But (1) how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any +idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is +therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. +Besides, (2) they who attempt to account for things do it not by CORPOREAL +SUBSTANCE, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth +no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, +as has been already shown. See sect. 25. + +51. SEVENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Seventhly, it will upon this be +demanded whether it does not seem ABSURD TO TAKE AWAY NATURAL CAUSES, +AND ASCRIBE EVERYTHING TO THE IMMEDIATE OPERATION OF SPIRITS? We +must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water +cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be +deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I ANSWER, +he would so; in such things we ought to THINK WITH THE LEARNED, +AND SPEAK WITH THE VULGAR. They who to demonstration are convinced +of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sun +rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian"; and if they +affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear +very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it +manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of +alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets. + +52. IN THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE, ANY PHRASES MAY BE RETAINED, so long +as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a +manner as is necessary for our WELL-BEING, how false soever they may be +if taken in a strict and SPECULATIVE SENSE. Nay, this is unavoidable, +since, propriety being regulated by CUSTOM, language is suited to the +RECEIVED opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is +impossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to +alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a +handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a +fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor +and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate +modes of speech which use has made inevitable. + +53. As to the OPINION THAT THERE ARE NO CORPOREAL CAUSES, this has been +heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by +others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to +exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all +things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was +none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by +consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to +exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But +then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created +beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one +effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, +since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say, +though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and +extravagant supposition. + +54. EIGHTH OBJECTION.--TWOFOLD ANSWER.--In the eighth place, the +universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some +an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of +external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? +And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant +an error? I answer, FIRST, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will +not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the +existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to +believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is +impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I +refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, +indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they ACT +as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every +moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking +being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by +those words, and form thereof a settled SPECULATIVE opinion, is what I am +not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose +upon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they +have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them. + +55. But SECONDLY, though we should grant a notion to be never so +universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its +truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false +opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the +unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a +time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as +monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered +what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find +that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable +footing in the world. + +56. NINTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But it is demanded that we assign +A CAUSE OF THIS PREJUDICE, and account for its obtaining in the +world. To this I ANSWER, that men knowing they perceived several +ideas, WHEREOF THEY THEMSELVES WERE NOT THE AUTHORS--as not being +excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills--this +made them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an +EXISTENCE INDEPENDENT OF AND WITHOUT THE MIND, without ever dreaming +that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers +having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do +not exist without the mind, THEY IN SOME DEGREE CORRECTED the +mistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another which +seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really +existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being +perceived, OF WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE ONLY IMAGES or resemblances, imprinted +by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes +its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being +conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which +they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must +have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted. + +57. BUT WHY THEY SHOULD SUPPOSE THE IDEAS OF SENSE TO BE EXCITED IN US BY +THINGS IN THEIR LIKENESS, and not rather have recourse to SPIRIT which +alone can act, may be accounted for, FIRST, because they were not aware +of the repugnancy there is, (1) as well in supposing things like unto our +ideas existing without, as in (2) attributing to them POWER OR ACTIVITY. +SECONDLY, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our +minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite +collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, +complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are +regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a +miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when +we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any +reflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the +greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant +and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a +Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, +though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom. + +58. TENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Tenthly, it will be objected that +the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths +in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth +is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on +the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing +principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an +idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but the +motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, +if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles +we have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no +amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have +reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that +if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a +position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the +former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all +respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature +which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the +phenomena. + +59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession +of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, +but sure and well--grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be +affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to +pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were +placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. +Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and +certainty very consistently with what has been said. It will be easy to +apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the +magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. + +60. ELEVENTH OBJECTION.--In the eleventh place, it will be demanded +to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the +animal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, +and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their +motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts +so elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have +nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion +with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately +produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think all +that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, +to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist has made the +spring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them +in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, +yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an +Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the +day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the +pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an +empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that +whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some +corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended +by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the +clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle +as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be +asked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or +any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and +machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common +philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain +abundance of phenomena? + +61. ANSWER.--To all which I answer, first, that though there were some +difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses +by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by +the foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight +against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a +priori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, +but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties; +for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those +roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which +no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will +without all that apparatus; nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall +find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold +the existence of those machines without of mind; for it has been made +evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no +activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one +effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist +(allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it +manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as +they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects +which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit. + +62. (FOURTHLY.)--But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed +that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not +absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary +to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to +the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through +the whole chain of natural effects; these are learned by the observation +and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing +artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the +explaining various phenomena--which explication consists only in +showing the conformity any particular phenomenon has to the general +laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the +uniformity there is in the production of natural effects; as will +be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein +philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a +great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of +working observed by the Supreme Agent has been shown in sect. 31. +And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, +and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to +the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the +standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be +denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary +course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all +the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the +movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the +rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in +the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, +whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the +production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be +attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the +movements, which being once corrected all is right again. + +63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of +nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of +the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of +nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of the +Divine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is +a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to +choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of +nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and +are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, +rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and +surprising events. + +64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what +has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than +this:--ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain +order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; there +are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and +artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of +nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret +operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of +the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the +philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what +purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barely +inefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the +production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in +other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a +close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so +artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being +credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all +that art and regularity to no purpose. + +65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does +not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign +with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the +pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of +it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or +that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. +Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, +artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining +letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a +great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously +combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, +these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By +this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what +we are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper +to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is all +that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by +discerning a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of +bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several +uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing. + +66. PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHER.--Hence, it is evident +that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating +or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, +and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, +and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are +considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is +the searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs +instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of +the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by +corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the +minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "in +whom we live, move, and have our being." + +67. TWELFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--In the twelfth place, it may perhaps +be objected that--though it be clear from what has been said that +there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, +figured, movable substance existing without the mind, such as +philosophers describe Matter--yet, if any man shall leave out of +his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity +and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, +senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, +which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is +pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken +in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that +it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it +is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we +should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it +be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it +exists not in place is no less certain--since all place or extension +exists only in the mind, as has been already proved. It remains +therefore that it exists nowhere at all. + +68. MATTER SUPPORTS NOTHING, AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EXISTENCE.--Let us +examine a little the description that is here given us of +matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all +that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; +which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the +relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be +observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to +the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, +it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in +us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present +to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable +of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor has any +form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present," when thus +applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and +which I am not able to comprehend. + +69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can +gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the +agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to +accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it +is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of +those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot +be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid +of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our +perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said to +be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant +by calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense at +all, or else in some very distant from its received signification. + +70. You will Perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, +is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting +ideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be +imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to +suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being +produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct +parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not +excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being +altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, +by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him +when and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in +a constant uniform manner. + +71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here +stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing +distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but +whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind +of God which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce +sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method--much after the +same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce +that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, +though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be +entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter seems too +extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no +objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless +unperceived substance. + +72. THE ORDER OF OUR PERCEPTIONS SHOWS THE GOODNESS OF GOD, BUT +AFFORDS NO PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER.--If we follow the light +of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our +sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who +excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably +concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a +spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to +explain all the appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless +Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or +leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the +meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or show any manner of reason, though +in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or +even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to +its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shown that with regard +to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, +the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we +have just now seen. + +73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced +men to suppose the existence of material substance; that so having +observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, +we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. +First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the +rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the +mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking +substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be +conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men +being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, +secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this +substratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the +primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to +exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material +support. But, it having been shown that none even of these can possibly +exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it follows +that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay, +that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as +that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or +accidents wherein they exist without the mind. + +74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter +was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason +entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without +any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded +thereon; yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we +can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since +the thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name, which we +apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or +occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can +see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all +the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either +by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an +inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the +part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us +believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite +ideas in our minds? + +75. ABSURDITY OF CONTENDING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER AS THE OCCASION +OF IDEAS.--It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, +and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, +against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by +the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the +Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the +world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of +Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our +opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge +ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to +make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are +certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all +that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at +the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name. + +76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and +whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But, +if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of +extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most +evidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plain +repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an +unperceiving substance. + +77. THAT A SUBSTRATUM NOT PERCEIVED, MAY EXIST, UNIMPORTANT.--But, +say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support +of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, +yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or +substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours +are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. +But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their +existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and +colours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the +unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is +such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the +advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know +not why. + +78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with +new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against +their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered +with relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as has +been shown, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in +a mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are +acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas +whatsoever. + +79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the +existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain +anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it +is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in +general a substance, or occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about to +unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words +may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used +without a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger +of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two +is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of +that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not +what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless +substance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we +shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other. + +80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of +material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown +somewhat--neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, +thoughtless, indivisible, immovable, unextended, existing in no place. +For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, or any +other positive or relative notion of Matter, has no place at all, so +long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you +may, if so it shall seem good, use the word "Matter" in the same sense as +other men use "nothing," and so make those terms convertible in your +style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of +that definition, the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either +collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any +kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is +excited by the term nothing. + +81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-said definition is included +what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing--the positive abstract +idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who +pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if +they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general +notion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. +That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and +capacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding +those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. +And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted narrow inlets +of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit +may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and +presumption--since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts +of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that +I have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may +be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the +endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any +one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit +and idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright +repugnancy and trifling with words.--It remains that we consider the +objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion. + +82. OBJECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES ANSWERED.--Some there are +who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of +bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to +demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as +will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really +exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ +innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber +and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I +answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use +those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a +meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question +by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are +bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has +been shown to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixt +things and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. +See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what +philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind, +is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. + +83. NO OBJECTION AS TO LANGUAGE TENABLE.--Again, whether there can +be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the +proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only +as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows +that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent +with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, +of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. +But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth +in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it. + +84. But, secondly it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much +of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' +rod? was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change +of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our +Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the +sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the +appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other +miracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be +looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I +reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into +real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have +elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of +real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and +so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily +answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the +reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I +shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and +smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me +there could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scruple +concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the +received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what +has been said. + +85. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRECEDING TENETS.--Having done with the +Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, +and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the +next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. +Some of these appear at first sight--as that several difficult and +obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been +thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. "Whether +corporeal substance can think," "whether Matter be infinitely divisible," +and "how it operates on spirit"--these and like inquiries have given +infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but depending on the +existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles. +Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the +sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been +premised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel. + +86. THE REMOVAL OF MATTER GIVES CERTAINTY TO KNOWLEDGE.--From the +principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally +be reduced to two heads--that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each +of these I shall treat in order. + +And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has +been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very +dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of +sense--the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without +the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural +subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, +which, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless and +absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men +thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their +knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real +things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge +at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are +conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? + +87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as +so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing +in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or +images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then +are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not +the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or +motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible +for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our +senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or +even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really +existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for +aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain +chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum +natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference +between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without +the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show +how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition +of external objects. + +88. IF THERE BE EXTERNAL MATTER, NEITHER THE NATURE NOR EXISTENCE +OF THINGS CAN BE KNOWN.--So long as we attribute a real existence to +unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not +only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real +unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see +philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of +heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own +bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, they +are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative +knowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness, +which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy +ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning +to our words, and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute," +"external," "exist," and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can as +well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I +actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any +sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at +the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an +unthinking being consists in being perceived. + +89. OF THING OR BEING.--Nothing seems of more importance towards +erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be +proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning +in a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, +existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence +of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have +not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most +general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely +distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the +name. viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible +substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which +subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or +spiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling +or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have +some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, +whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and +have a notion of relations between things or ideas--which relations are +distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be +perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that +ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the +object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term +idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have +any notion of. + +90. EXTERNAL THINGS EITHER IMPRINTED BY OR PERCEIVED BY SOME OTHER +MIND.--Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; +this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which +perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing +without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in +being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the +things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their +origin--in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, +but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. +Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in another +sense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my +eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind. + +91. SENSIBLE QUALITIES REAL.--It were a mistake to think that what +is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. +It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, +motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support, +as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived +by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, +and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed +on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an +existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may +exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and +are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, +according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no +existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in +any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or +spirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers +vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, +unperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute a +natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from +being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the +Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances +created by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created. + +92. OBJECTIONS OF ATHEISTS OVERTURNED.--For, as we have shown the +doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main +pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation +have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. +Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter +produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient +philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, +have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How +great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were +needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and +necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once +removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch +that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on +the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists. + +93. AND OF FATALISTS ALSO.--That impious and profane persons should +readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, +by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be +divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all +freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, +and instead thereof make a self--existent, stupid, unthinking +substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should +hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior +Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series +of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from +the impulse of one body or another--all this is very natural. And, +on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies +of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all +of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, +methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, +and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, +Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but +become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world. + +94. OF IDOLATORS.--The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, +has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, +but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various +forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, +and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations +in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being +perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their +own ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND +which produces and sustains all things. + +95. AND SOCINIANS.--The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with +the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to +Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and +objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the +most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is +denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is +perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the +same under several forms? Take away this material substance, about +the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every +plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is +immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible +qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections +come to nothing. + +96. SUMMARY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPELLING MATTER.--Matter being once +expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious +notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, +which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, +and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments +we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration +(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, +peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. + +97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another +great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is +the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it has been set forth in the +Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most +intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered +in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. +Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what +everybody knows, but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, +they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary +sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he +shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in +conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is +to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken +exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the +day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, +then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it. + +98. DILEMMA.--For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea +of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows +uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in +inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear +others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner +as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that +doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he +passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is +annihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. +Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas in +our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be +estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that +same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul +always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his +thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation, +will, I believe, find it no easy task. + +99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all +other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight +of them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold +abstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be +abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the +entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, +whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if +I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike +sensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the +colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only +in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those +sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted +together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived. + +100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may +think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded +from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is +good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and +virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion +that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from +all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very +difficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect +the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling +the most useful parts of knowledge. + +101. OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS.--The two great provinces +of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, +are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of these +I shall make some observations. And first I shall say somewhat of +Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. +All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties +and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally +from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness +as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, +and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our +senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real +essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest +object, is hid from our view; something there is in every drop of water, +every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding +to fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shown that +all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false +principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know +nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend. + +102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the +nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within +itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an +inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, +and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances +by occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical +causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of +insensible particles; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or +efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as all +other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to +explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, +magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we +see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be +said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is +assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and +speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged +by this doctrine. + +103. ATTRACTION SIGNIFIES THE EFFECT, NOT THE MANNER OR CAUSE.--The great +mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone +falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some +appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by +being told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the +manner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies +instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, +nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for +aught we know) be termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction." +Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is +accounted for by attraction; but, in this as in the other instances, I do +not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as +to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which +produces it, these are not so much as aimed at. + +104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them +together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For +example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the +sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc, there is +something alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that +any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising +to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For +that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out +of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend +towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is +what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a +like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and +unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But +a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having +observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as +the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency +towards each other, which he denotes by the general name "attraction," +whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he +explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the +moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a +particular example of a general rule or law of nature. + +105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural +philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the +phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the +efficient cause that produces them--for that can be no other than the +will of a spirit--but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, +whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works +of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to +general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and +uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most +agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect +beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very +probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great +distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; which +sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind. + +106. CAUTION AS TO THE USE OF ANALOGIES.--But we should proceed warily +in such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies, +and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind +whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. +For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, +because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for +pronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attracted +by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies +whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such +tendency towards each other; and, so far is that gravitation from being +essential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle +seems to show itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the +elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the +case, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who +causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other +according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; +and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He +sees convenient. + +107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following +conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, +when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind +or spirit. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship of +a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ +their thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of +things; and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends +to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally +with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of +accounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from +what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature +should not still be studied, and observations and experiments made, +which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general +conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations +between things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men +in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31 Fourthly, by a +diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover +the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; I +do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on a +supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a +constant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we +cannot evidently know. + +108. THREE ANALOGIES.--Those men who frame general rules from the +phenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem +to consider signs rather than causes. A man may well understand +natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say +by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to +write improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar +rules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible +we may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes. + +109. As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts +on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical +remarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems +beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each +particular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from +them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate +and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order. extent, and +variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our +notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and +lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, +subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the +sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. + +110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be +easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In +the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion +are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, +mathematical and vulgar; which distinction, as it is at large explained +by the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence without +the mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to +sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no +relation at all. + +111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted +sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I +have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said +on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author +holds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, +remains in itself similar and immovable; and relative space to be the +measure thereof, which, being movable and defined by its situation in +respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immovable space. Place +he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and +according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. +Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute +place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to +another. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our +senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures, +and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we +regard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must +abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which +seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved +relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may +be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative +motions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. +All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at +all in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in +philosophy. And the true as we are told are distinguished from apparent +or relative motions by the following properties.--First, in true or +absolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect +of the whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place +being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body +moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its +place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than +by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always +changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion +barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, in +that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of +motion. + +112. MOTION, WHETHER REAL OR APPARENT, RELATIVE.--But, notwithstanding +what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that +there can be any motion other than relative; so that to conceive +motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the +distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there +was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems +evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include +relation. + +113. APPARENT MOTION DENIED.--But, though in every motion it be +necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one +only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change +in the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however +some may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved +which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force +or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as +relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in +the ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of common +sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any +one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the +stones he passes over may be said to move, because they change distance +with his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of +one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the +relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which +does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is +not therefore itself in motion. + +114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is +related to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with +relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the +land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in +respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond +the earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in +respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who +have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of +things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to +fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, +and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby +they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we +may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom +no other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been already +observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is +incomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the +above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute +motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of +the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular +relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which +is brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, +in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it +is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, has, I think, no +motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section. + +115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that it +change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and +secondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If +either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense +of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in +motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which +we see change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no +force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but +then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined +by us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; which +indeed shows we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is +not, and that is all. + +116. ANY IDEA OF PURE SPACE RELATIVE.--From what has been said it follows +that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the +being of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived +by sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without the +mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like +of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, +we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive +of all body. This I must confess seems impossible, as being a most +abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, +if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space; but if I +find a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in proportion as the +resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or +less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be +supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or +conceivable without body and motion--though indeed we are apt to think +every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated +from all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, +supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say +there still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only +that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all +sides without the least resistance, but if that, too, were annihilated +then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps, +may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure +space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shown, that the ideas +of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay +concerning Vision. + +117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and +difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the +nature of pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we +are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed +their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of +thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something +beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. +Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is +certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, +have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or +annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have +set themselves particularly to show the incommunicable attributes of God +agree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the +Divine Nature, yet I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we +adhere to the received opinions. + +118. THE ERRORS ARISING FROM THE DOCTRINES OF ABSTRACTION AND EXTERNAL +MATERIAL EXISTENCES, INFLUENCE MATHEMATICAL REASONINGS.--Hitherto of +Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry concerning +that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics. +These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and +certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be +found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if +in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the +professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, +though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet +their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and +they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental +maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, +Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors +involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are +true, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and +incontestible, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain +erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and +for that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed +throughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects +of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches +thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other +men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general +ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. + +119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of +Number; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is +supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure +and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem +with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness +and elevation of thought. It has set a price on the most trifling +numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only +for amusement; and has therefore so far infected the minds of some, that +they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted +the explication of natural things by them. But, if we inquire into our +own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps +entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look +on all inquiries, about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far +as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life. + +120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which +and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is +not any such idea. But, number being defined a "collection of units," we +may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in +abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral +names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are +abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and +practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed +to have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely +the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and +trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation. + +121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show +of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical +theorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we +more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will +plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and +observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that +science, and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that +at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of +counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each +whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e., some one thing of whatever +kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more +compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several +strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians +came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, +and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it +obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have +been done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed +betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures +answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, +corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those +conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived +methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what +figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And +having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed +throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes +perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to +be known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement) +that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs +being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any +part of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing in +signs (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct +multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able +rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we +intend to number. + +122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, +which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they +direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of +them. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general +(sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are +thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not +suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present +enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only +observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which +pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality +conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, +except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered +on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly +whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows +that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as +good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention +and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent +criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal. + +123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which, considered as +relative, is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite +extension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or +theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same +everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a +connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that +mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of +it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those +amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the +plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance +into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so it is the principal +occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of +Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear +that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely +divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry +from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever +been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment +thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been. + +124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object +of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently +each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive +innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain +they are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I cannot +distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, +which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind: +wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer +to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own +ideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas +into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not +infinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinct +from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot +affirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms "extension," "parts," +&c., are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say +a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so +manifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it +to be so; and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any +reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, +as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and +rooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositions +which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only +themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought +privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, +which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow. + +125. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract +general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of +sense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks +the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue +thereof be brought to admit that a line but an inch long may contain +innumerable parts--really existing, though too small to be discerned. +These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of +other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no +difficult thing to show how the arguments from Geometry made use of to +support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. At +present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians +are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine. + +126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems and +demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. +15, Introd.); where it is explained in what sense this ought to be +understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the +diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; +or, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their +magnitude--which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only +that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or +small, but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration. Hence +it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of +as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in +itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only in its +signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than +itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though +there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties +of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the +sign, and thence, through mistake, though to appertain to it considered +in its own nature. + +127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible +there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain +parts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch +taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not +retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that +the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts +innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten--thousandth part of an +inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be +signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, +and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the +radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more; +for, though the ten-thousandth part of that line considered in itself is +nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without an error or +inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for +greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten--thousandth part is very +considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the +radius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more. + +128. LINES WHICH ARE INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.--From what has been said +the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal in +its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper +as though they contained parts which really they do not. In doing +of which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps +discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, +or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which +is far greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say +a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely +great. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to +suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought +necessary in geometry. + +129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this +false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many +demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that +proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating +to infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind +to reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could +have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever +considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on +purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in +an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe +examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true. + +130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and +grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and +disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great +note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into +an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those +infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or +infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, +assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., +without ever coming to an end; so that according to them an inch does not +barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an +infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold +all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all; +thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive +quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can +never equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it +seems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a +positive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold +infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, +are obliged to maintain. + +131. OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--Have we not therefore +reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is +in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite +number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will +say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations +of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised +that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while +building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is +useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still +remain firm and unshaken on our principles; that science considered as +practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has +been said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business of +another place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the +more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared +off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be +thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be +wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw +off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of +such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct +influence on the manners. + +132. SECOND OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--If it be said +that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods +in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have +been if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answer +that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any +instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts +of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, +it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible. + +133. IF THE DOCTRINE WERE ONLY AN HYPOTHESIS IT SHOULD BE RESPECTED +FOR ITS CONSEQUENCES.--By what we have premised, it is plain that very +numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false +Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise; +and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be +most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences +highly advantageous to true philosophy, as well as to religion. +Particularly Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, has +been shown to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of +all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief +strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real +existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing +them a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing +is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable +difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as +not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences +cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen +themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites being +incomprehensible"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended +with the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, +but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, +both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only +spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both +to Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted and +firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the +existence of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have +evidently demonstrated that it is not. + +134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several +disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, +are rejected as useless. But, how great a prejudice soever against our +notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and +make large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it +will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and +tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make +human sciences far more clear, compendious and attainable than they were +before. + +135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge +of IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of +SPIRITS--with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so +deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for +our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an +idea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a +human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it +is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I +mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here +add that a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support +wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance +which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an +idea is evidently absurd. + +136. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--It will perhaps be said that we want a sense +(as some have imagined) proper to know substances withal, which, +if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this +I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we +could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. +But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul +and substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. +We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is +not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not +furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it +would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round +square. + +137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an +idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much +scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this +opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at +all distinct from their body since upon inquiry they could not find they +had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existence +whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of +an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than +barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will +say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, +or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not +necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original. + +138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it +should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of +willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else +wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean +only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, +constitutes the signification of the term. If therefore it is impossible +that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is +evident there can be no idea of a spirit. + +139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the +terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have +no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real +thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which +perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, +that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul +or spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a +word, and that, since the immediately significations of other names are +by common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which +is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same +appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in +that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in +being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose +existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and +thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and +confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish +between spirit and idea. See sect. 27. + +140. OUR IDEA OF SPIRIT.--In a large sense, indeed, we may be said +to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand +the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny +anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the +minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be +resemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of our own +soul--which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having +a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived +has to those ideas perceived by another. + +141. THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE +OF THE FOREGOING DOCTRINE.--It must not be supposed that they who +assert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that it +is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power +of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not +liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature +or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin +vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and +corruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipated +than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive +the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notion +has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, +as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue +and religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or +texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more +distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We have +shown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is +consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, +changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural +bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot +possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being +therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, "the +soul of man is naturally immortal." + +142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are +not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by +way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when +we say "they exist," "they are known," or the like, these words must not +be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing +alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or +enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do +a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is +inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several +important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning +the nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an +idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have +a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its +acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these +words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the +terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have +it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we +distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be +remarked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so +properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations +and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is +extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an +affair of verbal concern. + +143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas has +had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure +which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have +imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the +mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit +itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great +number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract +notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from +these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned. + +144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in +controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of +the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed +from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the +soul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, +impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that +is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of +dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be +cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but +philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively +consider their own meaning. + +145. KNOWLEDGE OF SPIRITS NOT IMMEDIATE.--From what has been said, +it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits +otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited +in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, +that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, +which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the +knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the +knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me +referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or +concomitant signs. + +146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are +concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those +things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater +part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or +dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that +causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by +themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant +regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising +magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite +contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact +harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the +never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or +natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we +consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and +import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and +Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid +Spirit, "who works all in all," and "by whom all things consist." + +147. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD MORE EVIDENT THAN THAT OF MAN.--Hence, +it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as +any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may +even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived +than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely +more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There +is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which +does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author +of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of +man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; +but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the +mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it +is who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that +intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the +existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which +enlightens every one is itself invisible. + +148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they +cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we +should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we +need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a +more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow--creatures. Not +that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and +immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing +that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I +must confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;--A +human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; +when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we +perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and +these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve +to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like +ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man--if by man is meant that +which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do--but only such a +certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct +principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and +represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the +difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of +ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, +we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the +Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, +being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those +very motions which are produced by men. + +149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one +that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a +Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that +variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we +have an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and +move, and have our being." That the discovery of this great truth, which +lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason +of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of +men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of +the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, +blinded with excess of light. + +150. OBJECTION ON BEHALF OF NATURE.--ANSWER.--But you will say, +has Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must +they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? +I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects +or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed +and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, +cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being +distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things +perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound +without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this +acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not +just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it +is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, +professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those +effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont +to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He +maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his +treasures." Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death into the +morning, and maketh the day dark with night." Amos, 5. 8. "He visiteth +the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing +thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures +are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn." See +Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of +Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God +concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a +great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His +stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from every +one of us." + +151. OBJECTION TO THE HAND OF GOD BEING THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE, +THREEFOLD.--ANSWER.--It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and +gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem +to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, +monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in +desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many +arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and +superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer +to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being +visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in +order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady +and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. +Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, +whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand +which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and +blood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that hidest thyself." +Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the +sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to +an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than +the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and +sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have +elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated +laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting +us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of +thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of +purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or +powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly +outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise. + +152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of +nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of +variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in +a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We +would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds +and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before +they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be +not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent +and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things +which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed +wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an +animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in +its production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that +an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat +or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of +natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the +agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the +riches of His power. + +153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, +pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, +imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is +indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too +narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into +our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as +to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, +on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and +pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are +put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those +particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, +have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system +of beings. + +154. ATHEISM AND MANICHEISM WOULD HAVE FEW SUPPORTERS IF MANKIND WERE +IN GENERAL ATTENTIVE.--From what has been said, it will be manifest +to any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention +and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism +or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls +may indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order +whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to +comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent +of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently +admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout +the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so +strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting +of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered +at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or +pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should +not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might +be expected in reasonable creatures? + +155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to +neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an +evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of +parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through a +supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downright +impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of +the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should +persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, +earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may +attain conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord are in +every place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and +keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and +raiment to put on"; that He is present and conscious to our innermost +thoughts; and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on +Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts +with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest +incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice. + +156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the +consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main +drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless +and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with +a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shown the falseness or +vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of +learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the +salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the +highest perfection of human nature. + + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Treatise Concerning the Principles +of Human Knowledge, by George Berkeley + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TREATISE CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE *** + +***** This file should be named 4723.txt or 4723.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/4/7/2/4723/ + +Produced by Col Choat. 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Thus, we usually do not +keep etexts in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +The "legal small print" and other information about this book +may now be found at the end of this file. Please read this +important information, as it gives you specific rights and +tells you about restrictions in how the file may be used. + + + + + + + + + + + +A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge +by George Berkeley (1685-1753) + + +WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE SCIENCES, +WITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION, +ARE INQUIRED INTO. + + + + +DEDICATION + + + +To the Right Honourable +THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE, &C., +Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter and one of +the Lords of Her Majesty's most honourable privy council. + +My Lord, + +You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to +be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. +But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful +Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship +for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not +altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and +learning, and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you +are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present +of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native +goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might +add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been +pleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be +unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These +considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's +feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am +with the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning +and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship, MY LORD, +Your lordship's most humble and most devoted servant, + + +GEORGE BERKELEY + + + +* * * * + + + + +PREFACE + + + +What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed +to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known--particularly to those +who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence +and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether +it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; since +I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I +have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may +not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment +till he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of +attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to deserve. +For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very +liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be +charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an +entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though +the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is +very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I +flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the +characters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions +may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that +account. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted +with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of +demonstration, for no other reason but because it is newly known, and +contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to +premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort +of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly +comprehend it. + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + + +1. Philosophy being nothing else but THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND TRUTH, it +may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains +in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater +clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts +and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk +of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are +governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and +undisturbed. To them nothing THAT IS FAMILIAR appears unaccountable or +difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in +their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming SCEPTICS. But no +sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a +superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of +things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those +things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors +of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, +endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into +uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and +grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having +wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we +were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism. + +2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the +natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the +faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the SUPPORT +and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the INWARD ESSENCE and +constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it +treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at +if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is +impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of +infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite. + +3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault +originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of +them. IT IS A HARD THING TO SUPPOSE THAT RIGHT DEDUCTIONS FROM TRUE +PRINCIPLES SHOULD EVER END IN CONSEQUENCES WHICH CANNOT BE MAINTAINED or +made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully +with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge +which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to +the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it +may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such +means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the +whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of +those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked +up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves--that we have +first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see. + +4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those +Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and +uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects +of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance +incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation +of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to +make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, +to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some +grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and +embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any +darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the +understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted +on, and might have been avoided. + +5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I +consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the +like designs, yet I am not without some hopes--upon the consideration +that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is +short--sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, +perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far +better eyes. + +6. A CHIEF SOURCE OF ERROR IN ALL PARTS OF KNOWLEDGE.--In order to +prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what +follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, +concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this +matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice +of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate +and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties +in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind +has a power of framing ABSTRACT IDEAS or notions of things. He who is +not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must +needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract +ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of +those sciences which go by the name of LOGIC and METAPHYSICS, and of all +that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime +learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such +a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is +well acquainted with them. + +7. PROPER ACCEPTATION OF ABSTRACTION.--It is agreed on all hands that the +qualities or modes of things do never REALLY EXIST EACH OF THEM APART BY +ITSELF, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and +blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind +being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other +qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself +abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object +extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind +resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, +exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, +and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without +extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by ABSTRACTION the +idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both +colour and extension. + +8. OF GENERALIZING [Note].--Again, the mind having observed that in the +particular extensions perceived by sense there is something COMMON and +alike IN ALL, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or +magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or +singles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract +idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any +figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So +likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by +sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that +only which is COMMON TO ALL, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is +neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, +in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body +moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular +directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which +equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be +perceived by sense. + +[Note: Vide Reid, on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay V, +chap iii. sec. 1, edit. 1843] + +9. OF COMPOUNDING.--And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of +qualities or MODES, so does it, by the same precision or mental +separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded BEINGS +which include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind +having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other +in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves +out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and +any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining +only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein +all the particulars equally partake--abstracting entirely from +and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might +determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is +said we come by the abstract idea of MAN, or, if you please, humanity, or +human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there +is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor +black, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular +colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, +but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle +stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. +Moreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that partake in +some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of MAN, the mind, leaving +out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which +are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of ANIMAL, which +abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, +fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal +are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By BODY is meant body +without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or +figure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or +feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and +nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and +for that reason left out of the ABSTRACT IDEA. Upon the same account the +spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it +is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to +conceive[Note.]. [Note: Vide Hobbes' Tripos, ch. v. sect. 6.] + +10. TWO OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.--Whether +others have this wonderful faculty of ABSTRACTING THEIR IDEAS, +they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of +imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular +things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. +I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to +the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by +itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then +whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and +colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of +a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a +low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive +the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to +form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which +is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may +be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I +own myself able to abstract IN ONE SENSE, as when I consider some +particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though +they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist +without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or +conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist +so separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from +particulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two proper +acceptations of ABSTRACTION. And there are grounds to think most men will +acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are +simple and illiterate never pretend to ABSTRACT NOTIONS. It is said +they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study; we may +therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined +only to the learned. + +11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in DEFENCE OF THE DOCTRINE +OF ABSTRACTION, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the +men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as +that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher +who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think +the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in +point of understanding betwixt man and beast. "The having of general +ideas," saith he, "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man +and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no +means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of +making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have +reason to imagine that they have not the FACULTY OF ABSTRACTING, or +making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other +general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose +that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, +and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and +which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas +at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot +deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, +some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it +is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. +They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have +not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of +ABSTRACTION." Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily +agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no +means attain to ABSTRACTION. But then if this be made the distinguishing +property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass +for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here +assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general +ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general +signs; which is built on this supposition--that the making use of words +implies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who use +language are able to ABSTRACT or GENERALIZE their ideas. That this is the +sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the +question he in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only +particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words become +general by being made the signs of general ideas."--Essay on Human +Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But [Note. 1] it seems that a word becomes +general by being made the sign, not of an ABSTRACT general idea, but of +several particular ideas [Note. 2], any one of which it indifferently +suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion +is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension +is divisible," these propositions are to be understood of motion +and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that +they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, +or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive +an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, +nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any +other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular +motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, +horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning +it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, +it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or +that magnitude or figure. + +[Note 1: "TO THIS I CANNOT ASSENT, BEING OF OPINION," edit of 1710.] +[Note 2: Of the same sort.] + +12. EXISTENCE OF GENERAL IDEAS ADMITTED.--By observing how ideas +become general we may the better judge how words are made so. +And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there +are general ideas, but only that there are any ABSTRACT GENERAL +IDEAS; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is +mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by +ABSTRACTION, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we +will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can +conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered +in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or +stand for all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT. To make this plain +by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of +cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line +of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is +nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is +there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what +is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, +of a line in general. And, as that particular line becomes general by +being made a sign, so the name LINE, which taken absolutely is +PARTICULAR, by being a sign is made GENERAL. And as the former owes its +generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but +of ALL PARTICULAR right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must +be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the +VARIOUS PARTICULAR lines which it indifferently denotes. [Note.] + +[Note: "I look upon this (doctrine) to be one of the greatest and most +valuable discoveries that have been made of late years in the republic +of letters."--Treatise of Human Nature, book i, part i, sect. 7. Also +Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind, part i, chapt. iv. sect. iii. p. 99.] + +13. ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS NECESSARY, ACCORDING TO LOCKE.--To give +the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, +and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more +passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV. vii. 9) which is as +follows: "ABSTRACT IDEAS are not so obvious or easy to children or the +yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it +is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when +we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are +fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, +and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For +example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general +idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, +comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor +rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but ALL AND +NONE of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot +exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and INCONSISTENT +ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has +need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the +CONVENIENCY OF COMMUNICATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE, to both which +it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect +such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show +that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is +first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge +is conversant about."--If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind +such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend +to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that +the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such +an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to +perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own +thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea +that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the +general idea of a triangle, which is NEITHER OBLIQUE NOR RECTANGLE, +EQUILATERAL, EQUICRURAL NOR SCALENON, BUT ALL AND NONE OF THESE AT ONCE? + +14. BUT THEY ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR COMMUNICATIOPN.--Much is here +said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and +the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on +all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, +to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to +those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From +all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so DIFFICULT a +thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for COMMUNICATION, +which is so EASY and familiar to ALL SORTS OF MEN. But, we are told, if +they seem obvious and easy to grown men, IT IS ONLY BECAUSE BY CONSTANT +AND FAMILIAR USE THEY ARE MADE SO. Now, I would fain know at what time it +is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing +themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when +they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such +painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. +And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions +will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to +imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their +sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they +have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in +their minds ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS, and annexed them to every common name +they make use of? + +15. NOR FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.--Nor do I think them +a whit more needful for the ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE than for +COMMUNICATION. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that +all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to +which I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions +are formed by ABSTRACTION in the manner PREMISED--UNIVERSALITY, so far as +I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, POSITIVE nature or +conception of anything, but in the RELATION it bears to the particulars +signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, +names, or notions, being in their own nature PARTICULAR, are rendered +UNIVERSAL. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, +it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a +triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of +a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; +but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that +sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear +triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense UNIVERSAL. All which seems +very plain and not to include any difficulty in it. + +16. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But here it will be demanded, HOW WE CAN KNOW ANY +PROPOSITION TO BE TRUE OF ALL PARTICULAR TRIANGLES, EXCEPT we have first +seen it DEMONSTRATED OF THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE which equally +agrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to +some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally +belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with +it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles +rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore +conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither +a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain +this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular +demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once +for all demonstrate it of the ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE, in which all +the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all +equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in +view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an +isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I +may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear +triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the +right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at +all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view +includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention +made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three +angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, +or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which +sufficiently shows that the right angle might have been oblique, and the +sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for +this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or +scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right--angled +equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of +the abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a +man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the +particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he +may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, +general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider +Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing the +fore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all +that is perceived is not considered. + +17. ADVANTAGE OF INVESTIGATING THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS.-- +It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the +SCHOOLMEN, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold +inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of +abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings +and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those +matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to +mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted +on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were +confined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When +men consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many +ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, +and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains +full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to +have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most +clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are +perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking +all together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit +to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and +amusement--I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into +a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps +cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the +world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, has a more wide and +extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than [Note.] this of +abstract general ideas. + +[Note: "That we have been endeavouring to overthrow."--Edit 1710.] + +18. I come now to consider the SOURCE OF THIS PREVAILING NOTION, and that +seems to me to be LANGUAGE. And surely nothing of less extent than reason +itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received. +The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain +confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that +they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence +that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there +never had been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere +of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein +words have contributed to the origin of that mistake.--First +[Vide sect. xix.] then, it is thought that every name has, or +ought to have, ONE ONLY precise and settled signification, which +inclines men to think there are certain ABSTRACT, DETERMINATE IDEAS +that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each +general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract +ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. +Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite +signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying +indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which doth +evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear +to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be OBJECTED that every +name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain +signification. For example, a TRIANGLE is defined to be A PLAIN SURFACE +COMPREHENDED BY THREE RIGHT LINES, by which that name is limited to +denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the +definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or +white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor +with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may +be great variety, and consequently there is NO ONE SETTLED IDEA which +limits the signification of the word TRIANGLE. It is one thing for to +keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it +stand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other +useless and impracticable. + +19. SECONDLY, But, to give a farther account how WORDS came to PRODUCE THE +DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS, it must be observed that it is a received +opinion that language has NO OTHER END but the communicating our ideas, +and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it +being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether +insignificant do not always mark out PARTICULAR conceivable ideas, it is +straightway concluded that THEY STAND FOR ABSTRACT NOTIONS. That there are +many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to +others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what +nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not +necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which +stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the +understanding the ideas they are made to stand for--in reading and +discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in +ALGEBRA, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, +yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter +suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to +stand for.[Note.] + +[Note: Language has become the source or origin of abstract general ideas +on account of a twofold error.--(1.) That every word has only one +signification. (2.) That the only end of language is the communication +of our ideas--Ed.] + +20. SOME OF THE ENDS OF LANGUAGE.--Besides, the communicating of ideas +marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is +commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some +passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting +the mind in some particular disposition--to which the former is +in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, +when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently +happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to +reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in +hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, +admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the +perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between. At first, +indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to +produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, +when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight +of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which +at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are +now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise +of a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the +being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we +think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to +ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so +little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will +evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the +propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of +ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the +hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a +design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are +supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me +"Aristotle has said it," all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me +to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has +annexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in +the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to +authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his +person, writings, or reputation should go before [Note.]. Innumerable +examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those +things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully +suggest unto him? + +[Note: "So close and immediate a connection may custom establish betwixt +the very word ARISTOTLE, and the motions of assent and reverence +in the minds of some men."--Edit 1710.] + +21. CAUTION IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE NECESSARY.--We have, I think, +shown the impossibility of ABSTRACT IDEAS. We have considered +what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavored +to show they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought +necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from +whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.--It cannot be +denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that +stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours of +inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and +made the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must be +owned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and +darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they +are delivered.[Note 1.] Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the +understanding[Note 2.], whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to +take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far +as I am able, those names which long and constant use has so strictly +united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following +advantages: + +[Note 1: "That it may almost be made a question, whether language +has contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the +sciences."--Edit 1710.] +[Note 2: "I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them +as possibly I can."--Edit 1710.] + +22. FIRST, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies PURELY +VERBAL--the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has +been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. +SECONDLY, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that +fine and subtle net of ABSTRACT IDEAS which has so miserably perplexed +and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, +that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so +much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. +THIRDLY, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of +words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, +I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an +idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of +my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the +agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas +are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more +requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own +understanding. + +23. But the attainment of all THESE ADVANTAGES doth PRESUPPOSE AN ENTIRE +DELIVERANCE FROM THE DECEPTION OF WORDS, which I dare hardly promise +myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, +and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which +difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of +ABSTRACTION. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to +their words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words for +ideas--it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and +RETAIN THE ABSTRACT IDEA IN THE MIND, WHICH IN ITSELF WAS PERFECTLY +INCONCEIVABLE. This seems to me the principal cause why those men who +have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of +words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet +failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of +the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the +abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, +that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from +the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may be +they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to +it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words +was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every +general name was a DETERMINATE ABSTRACT IDEA. + +24. But, THESE BEING KNOWN TO BE MISTAKES, A MAN MAY with greater ease +PREVENT HIS BEING IMPOSED ON BY WORDS. He that knows he has no other than +particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and +conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names +do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking +for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be +wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear +view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress +and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment +and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens +and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the +writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity--we +need only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of +knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand. + +25. Unless we take care TO CLEAR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE FROM +THE embarras and DELUSION OF WORDS, we may make infinite reasonings upon +them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be +never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more +irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. +Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to +make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain +the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this +means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I +say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do +not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, +undisguised ideas. + + + + +OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE + + + +1. OBJECTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.--It is evident to any one who takes a +survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either IDEAS +actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by +attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas +formed by help of memory and imagination--either compounding, dividing, +or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. +By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees +and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion +and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or +degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and +hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and +composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each +other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one +thing. Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and +consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one +distinct thing, signified by the name APPLE. Other collections of ideas +constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things--which +as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, +hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. + +2. MIND--SPIRIT--SOUL.--But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or +objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives +them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, +about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call MIND, SPIRIT, +SOUL, or MYSELF. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a +thing entirely distinct from them, WHEREIN THEY EXIST, or, which is the +same thing, whereby they are perceived--for the existence of an idea +consists in being perceived. + +3. HOW FAR THE ASSENT OF THE VULGAR CONCEDED.--That neither our thoughts, +nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist WITHOUT the mind, +is what EVERYBODY WILL ALLOW. And it seems no less evident that the +various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended +or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), +cannot exist otherwise than IN a mind perceiving them. I think an +intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall +attend to WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM EXIST, when applied to sensible +things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel +it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed--meaning +thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other +spirit actually does perceive it.[Note.] There was an odour, that is, it +was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, +and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand +by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute +existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being +perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their ESSE is PERCIPI, +nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or +thinking things which perceive them. + +[Note: First argument in support of the author's theory.] + +4. THE VULGAR OPINION INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--It is indeed +an opinion STRANGELY prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, +rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, +natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the +understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever +this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in +his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to +involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned +objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we PERCEIVE +BESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? and is it not plainly repugnant that +any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? + +5. CAUSE OF THIS PREVALENT ERROR.--If we thoroughly examine this +tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine +of ABSTRACT IDEAS. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction +than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their +being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? +Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures--in a +word the things we see and feel--what are they but so many sensations, +notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to +separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I +might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my +thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps +I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a +human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without +thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract--if +that may properly be called ABSTRACTION which extends only to the +conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or +be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does +not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, +as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual +sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my +thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or +perception of it.[Note.] + +[Note: "In truth the object and the sensation are the same thing, and +cannot therefore be abstracted from each other--Edit 1710."] + +6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need +only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, +viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word +all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not +any subsistence without a mind, that their BEING (ESSE) is to be perceived +or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by +me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other CREATED SPIRIT, they +must either have no existence at all, OR ELSE SUBSIST IN THE MIND OF SOME +ETERNAL SPIRIT--it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the +absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an +existence independent of a spirit [Note.]. To be convinced of which, the +reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the +being of a sensible thing from its being perceived. + +[Note: "To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an axiom, +it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflection of the reader, +that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and in turn his +thoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarrass +of words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes."--Edit 1710] + +7. SECOND ARGUMENT.[Note.]--From what has been said it follows there is +NOT ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE THAN SPIRIT, or that which perceives. But, for the +fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities +are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived +by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a +manifest contradiction, for TO HAVE AN IDEA IS ALL ONE AS TO PERCEIVE; +that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must +perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no UNTHINKING substance or +SUBSTRATUM of those ideas. + +[Note: Vide sect. iii. and xxv.] + +8. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not +exist without the mind, yet there may be things LIKE them, whereof they +are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an +unthinking substance. I ANSWER, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a +colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we +look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible +for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask +whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas +are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If +they are, THEN THEY ARE IDEAS and we have gained our point; but if you say +they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour +is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which +is intangible; and so of the rest. + +9. THE PHILOSOPHICAL NOTION OF MATTER INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--Some +there are who make a DISTINCTION betwixt PRIMARY and SECONDARY +qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, +solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all +other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The +ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of +anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have +our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things +which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call +MATTER. By MATTER, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless +substance, in which extension, figure, and motion DO ACTUALLY SUBSIST. +But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, +figure, and motion are ONLY IDEAS EXISTING IN THE MIND, and that an idea +can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they +nor their archetypes can exist in an UNPERCEIVING substance. Hence, it is +plain that that the very notion of what is called MATTER or CORPOREAL +SUBSTANCE, involves a contradiction in it.[Note.] + +[Note: "Insomuch that I should not think it necessary to spend more time +in exposing its absurdity. But because the tenet of the existence of +matter seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, +and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be +thought prolix and tedious, than omit anything that might conduce to +the full discovery and extirpation of the prejudice."--Edit 1710.] + +10. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--They who assert that figure, motion, and the +rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in +unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, +sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not--which they +tell us are sensations existing IN THE MIND ALONE, that depend on and are +occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute +particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can +demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those +original qualities ARE INSEPARABLY UNITED WITH THE OTHER SENSIBLE +QUALITIES, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted +from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. +But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any +abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a +body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see +evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body +extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other +sensible quality which is ACKNOWLEDGED to exist only in the mind. In +short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other +qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible +qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere +else. + +11. A SECOND ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--Again, GREAT and SMALL, SWIFT and SLOW, +ARE ALLOWED TO EXIST NOWHERE WITHOUT THE MIND, being entirely +RELATIVE, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of +sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the +mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, +that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension +in general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet +of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on +the strange doctrine of ABSTRACT IDEAS. And here I cannot but remark how +nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal +substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own +principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of +MATERIA PRIMA, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without +extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shown +that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also +be true of solidity. + +12. That NUMBER is entirely THE CREATURE OF THE MIND, even though the +other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever +considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as +the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is +one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with +reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, +and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any +one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one +book, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units, though some +contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the +unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put +together by the mind. + +13. UNITY I know some will have to be A SIMPLE OR UNCOMPOUNDED IDEA, +accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea +answering the word UNITY I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could +not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to +my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to +be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, +it is an ABSTRACT IDEA. + +14. A THIRD ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--I shall farther add, that, after +the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible +qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, +the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities +whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are +affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, +existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that +the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. +Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not +patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the +same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the +same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of +anything SETTLED AND DETERMINATE WITHOUT THE MIND? Again, it is proved +that SWEETNESS is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing +remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a +fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that +MOTION is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the +mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower +without any alteration in any external object? + +15. NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO EXTENSION.--In short, let any one consider +those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours +and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with +equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, +and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing +does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in +an outward object, as that we do not know by SENSE which is the TRUE +extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly +show it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other +sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an UNTHINKING subject +without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an +outward object. + +16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.--It is said +EXTENSION is a MODE or accident OF MATTER, and that Matter is the +SUBSTRATUM that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me +what is meant by Matter's SUPPORTING extension. Say you, I have no idea +of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no +positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a +relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be +supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant +by its supporting them. It is evident SUPPORT cannot here be taken in +its usual or literal sense--as when we say that pillars support a +building; in what sense therefore must it be taken? [Note.] + +[Note: "For my part, I am not able to discover any sense at all that can +be applicable to it."--Edit 1710.] + +17. PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF "MATERIAL SUBSTANCE" DIVISIBLE INTO TWO +PARTS.--If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare +themselves to mean by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, we shall find them acknowledge +they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of BEING +IN GENERAL, together WITH THE RELATIVE NOTION OF ITS SUPPORTING +ACCIDENTS. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract +and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, +this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common +sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but +what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the TWO PARTS +or branches which make the signification of the words MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, +I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why +should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material +SUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? +Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not +this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable? + +18. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES WANTS PROOF.--But, though it +were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist +without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, +yet HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO KNOW THIS? Either we must know it by +sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge ONLY +OF OUR SENSATIONS, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived +by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things +exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are +perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains +therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it +must be by REASON, inferring their existence from what is immediately +perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the +existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the +very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is ANY NECESSARY +CONNEXION BETWIXT THEM AND OUR IDEAS? I say it is granted on all hands +(and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond +dispute) that IT IS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT BE AFFECTED WITH ALL THE IDEAS WE +HAVE NOW, THOUGH THERE WERE NO BODIES EXISTING WITHOUT RESEMBLING THEM. +Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary +for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced +sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we +see them in at present, without their concurrence. + +19. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES AFFORDS NO EXPLICATION OF THE MANNER +IN WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE PROCUCED.--But, though we might possibly +have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought +EASIER to conceive and explain the MANNER of their production, +by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; +and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies +that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; +for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they +by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas +are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in +what manner BODY CAN ACT UPON SPIRIT, or how it is possible it should +imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas +or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter +or corporeal substances, SINCE THAT IS ACKNOWLEDGED TO REMAIN EQUALLY +INEXPLICABLE WITH OR WITHOUT THIS SUPPOSITION. If therefore it were +possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, +must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without +any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings THAT ARE +ENTIRELY USELESS, AND SERVE TO NO MANNER OF PURPOSE. + +20. DILEMMA.--In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we +should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very +same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no one +can deny possible--an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to +be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, +imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask +whether that intelligence has not all the reason to believe the +existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting +them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same +thing? Of this there can be no question--which one consideration were +enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever +arguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies +without the mind. + +21. Were it necessary to add any FURTHER PROOF AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF +MATTER after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors +and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that +tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in +philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall +not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think +arguments A POSTERIORI are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I +mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated A PRIORI, as because I shall +hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them. + +22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in +handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which +may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one +that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own +thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, +or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. +This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a +downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon +this issue:--If you can but CONCEIVE it possible for one extended movable +substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to +exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the +cause. And, as for all that COMPAGES of external bodies you contend for, +I shall grant you its existence, THOUGH (1.) YOU CANNOT EITHER GIVE ME ANY +REASON WHY YOU BELIEVE IT EXISTS [Vide sect. lviii.], OR (2.) ASSIGN ANY +USE TO IT WHEN IT IS SUPPOSED TO EXIST [Vide sect. lx.]. I say, the bare +possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that +it is so. [Note: i.e. although your argument be deficient in the two +requisites of an hypothesis.--Ed.] + +23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine +trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody +by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; +but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind +certain ideas which you call BOOKS and TREES, and the same time omitting +to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? BUT DO NOT YOU +YOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? This therefore is +nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or +forming ideas in your mind: but it does not show that you can conceive it +possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make +out this, IT IS NECESSARY THAT YOU CONCEIVE THEM EXISTING UNCONCEIVED OR +UNTHOUGHT OF, WHICH IS A MANIFEST REPUGNANCY. When we do our utmost to +conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only +contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is +deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or +without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or +exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth +and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on +any other proofs against the existence of material substance. + +24. THE ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF UNTHINKING THINGS ARE WORDS WITHOUT +A MEANING.--It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, +to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the +ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF SENSIBLE OBJECTS IN THEMSELVES, OR WITHOUT THE MIND. +To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or +else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or +fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own +thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those +expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the +conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the +ABSOLUTE existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or +which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and +earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader. + +25. THIRD ARGUMENT.[Note: Vide sect. iii. and vii.]--REFUTATION +OF LOCKE.--All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we +perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly +inactive--there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that +ONE IDEA or object of thought CANNOT PRODUCE or make ANY ALTERATION IN +ANOTHER. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else +requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every +part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in +them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether +of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; +there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little +attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies +passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an +idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: +neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is +evident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, +figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, +therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the +configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly +be false. [Note: Vide sect. cii.] + +26. CAUSE OF IDEAS.--We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are +anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore +some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and +changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination +of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. I must therefore be a +substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material +substance: it remains therefore that the CAUSE OF IDEAS is an incorporeal +active substance or Spirit. + +27. NO IDEA OF SPIRIT.--A spirit is one simple, undivided, active +being--as it perceives ideas it is called the UNDERSTANDING, and as it +produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the WILL. Hence +there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, +being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, +by way of image or LIKENESS, that which acts. A little attention will make +it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active +principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is +the nature of SPIRIT, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself +perceived, BUT ONLY BY THE EFFECTS WHICH IT PRODUCETH. If any man shall +doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try +if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has +ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names WILL and UNDERSTANDING, +distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or +Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the +subject of the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name SOUL or +SPIRIT. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words +WILL [Note: "Understanding, mind."--Edit 1710.], SOUL, SPIRIT, do not stand +for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something +which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be +like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned +at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the +operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating--inasmuch as we +know or understand the meaning of these words. + +28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift +the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and +straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power +it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of +ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain +and grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of +exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words. + +29. IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR MEMORY.--But, +whatever power I may have over MY OWN thoughts, I find the ideas +actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When +in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether +I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present +themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other +senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There +is THEREFORE SOME OTHER WILL OR SPIRIT that PRODUCES THEM. + +30. LAWS OF NATURE.--The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and +DISTINCT than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, +order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are +the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, +the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and +benevolence of its Author. Now THE SET RULES OR ESTABLISHED METHODS +WHEREIN THE MIND WE DEPEND ON EXCITES IN US THE IDEAS OF SENSE, ARE CALLED +THE LAWS OF NATURE; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us +that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in +the ordinary course of things. + +31. KNOWLEDGE OF THEM NECESSARY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WORLDLY AFFAIRS.--This +gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our +actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally +at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us +the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food +nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the +seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to +obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive--all this we +know, NOT BY DISCOVERING ANY NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWEEN OUR IDEAS, but +only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we +should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know +how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born. + +32. And yet THIS consistent UNIFORM WORKING, which so evidently displays +the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes +the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it +rather SENDS THEM A WANDERING AFTER SECOND CAUSES. For, when we perceive +certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and WE KNOW +THIS IS NOT OF OUR OWN DOING, we forthwith attribute power and agency to +the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which +nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having +observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure +we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called HEAT, +we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like +manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with +sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former. + +33. OF REAL THINGS AND IDEAS OR CHIMERAS.--The ideas imprinted on the +Senses by the Author of nature are called REAL THINGS; and those +excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, +are more properly termed IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which they +copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid +and distinct, are nevertheless IDEAS, that is, they exist in the +mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. +The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to +be more (1)STRONG, (2)ORDERLY, and (3)COHERENT than the creatures of the +mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are +also (4)LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SPIRIT [Note: Vide sect. xxix.--Note.], +or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by +the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS, +and certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than +in a mind perceiving it. + +34. FIRST GENERAL OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Before we proceed any farther +it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which +may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid +down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick +apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not +equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be +understood by every one. + +FIRST, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles ALL +THAT IS REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE IS BANISHED OUT OF THE WORLD, and +instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that +exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What +therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think of +houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? +Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all +which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I ANSWER, that +by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in +nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand +remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a RERUM +NATURA, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its +full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have +shown what is meant by REAL THINGS in opposition to CHIMERAS or ideas of +our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in +that sense they are alike IDEAS. + +35. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER, AS UNDERSTOOD BY PHILOSOPHERS, +DENIED.[Vide sect. lxxxiv.]--I do not argue against the existence of +any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. +That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, +really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose +existence we deny IS THAT WHICH PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATTER or corporeal +substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest +of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed +will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and +the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for +trifling and disputation. + +36. READILY EXPLAINED.--If any man thinks this detracts from the existence +or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what has been +premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an +abstract of what has been said:--There are spiritual substances, +minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at +pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of +others they perceive by sense--which, being impressed upon them +according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the +effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These +latter are said to have more REALITY in them than the former:--by +which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, +and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And +in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I +imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of +REALITY it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general +each part of the mundane system, is as much a REAL BEING by our +principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term +REALITY different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own +thoughts and see. + +37. THE PHILOSOPHIC, NOT THE VULGAR SUBSTANCE, TAKEN AWAY.--I will +be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take +away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word +SUBSTANCE be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible +qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we +cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic +sense--for the SUPPORT of accidents or QUALITIES WITHOUT THE MIND--then +indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take +away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination. + +38. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink +ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so--the word +IDEA not being used in common discourse to signify the several +combinations of sensible qualities which are called THINGS; and it is +certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of +language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the +truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we +are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by +our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, +or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several +sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shown to exist only in the mind +that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them IDEAS; +which word if it was as ordinarily used as THING, would sound no harsher +nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, +but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we +eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which +cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is +more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things +rather than ideas. + +39. THE TERM IDEA PREFERABLE TO THING.--If it be demanded why I make +use of the word IDEA, and do not rather in compliance with custom +call them THINGS. I answer, I do it for two reasons:--first, because +the term THING in contra-distinction to IDEA, is generally supposed +to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because +THING has a more comprehensive signification than IDEA, including +SPIRIT or thinking things as well as IDEAS. Since therefore the +objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless +and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word IDEA, which implies +those properties. + +40. THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES NOT DISCREDITED.--But, say what we can, +some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his +senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, +to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence +of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. +That what I see, hear, and feel DOTH EXIST, THAT IS to say, IS PERCEIVED +BY ME, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how +the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of +anything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man +turn SCEPTIC and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all +the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more +opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down [Note.], as shall be +hereafter clearly shown. + +[Note: They extirpate the very root of scepticism, "the fallacy +of the senses."--Ed.] + +41. SECOND OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Secondly, it will be OBJECTED +that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, +and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, +and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of +fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be +convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition +to our tenets. To all which the ANSWER is evident from what has +been already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real +fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain +that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet +nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an +unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea. + +42. THIRD OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Thirdly, it will be objected that +we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which +consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those +things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be +as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it +may be considered that in a DREAM we do oft perceive things as +existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things +are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind. + +43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to +consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a +distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see EXTERNAL space, and +bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to +carry with it some opposition to what has been said of their existing +nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was +that gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," which was +published not long since, wherein it is shown (1) that DISTANCE or outness +is NEITHER IMMEDIATELY of itself PERCEIVED by sight, nor yet apprehended +or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that has a necessary +connexion with it; but (2) that it is ONLY SUGGESTED to our thoughts by +certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own +nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or +things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us BY EXPERIENCE, +they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that +WORDS of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for; +insomuch that a man BORN blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at +first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any +distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise. + +44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and +heterogeneous. THE FORMER ARE MARKS AND PROGNOSTICS OF THE LATTER. That +the proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the +images of external things, was shown even in that treatise. Though +throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible +objects--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for +establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my +purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning VISION. So +that in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them +distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to +us things ACTUALLY existing at a distance, but only admonish us what +ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances +of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, +evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, +and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that +visible ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit on whom we +depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in +case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller +information in this point I refer to the Essay itself. + +45. FOURTH OBJECTION, FROM PERPETUAL ANNIHILATION AND CREATION.--ANSWER.-- +Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it +follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects +of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in +the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is +somebody by to perceive them. Upon SHUTTING MY EYES all the furniture in +the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again +created. In ANSWER to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said +in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider whether he means anything +by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For +my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover +that anything else is meant by those words; and I once more entreat the +reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on +by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their +archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause; +but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand +up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an +absurdity the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no +meaning in them. + +46. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--It will not be amiss to observe how far +the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable +with those pretended absurdities. (1) It is thought strangely absurd +that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me +should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers +commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and +colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, +are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? +(2)Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should +be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the +schools. For the SCHOOLMEN, though they acknowledge the existence of +Matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are +nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine +conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation. + +47. (3) Further, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow +the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably +follow, FROM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE NOW GENERALLY ADMITTED, that the +PARTICULAR bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they +are not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the following +sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible +somewhat, WHICH HAS NONE OF THOSE PARTICULAR QUALITIES WHEREBY THE +BODIES FALLING UNDER OUR SENSES ARE DISTINGUISHED ONE FROM ANOTHER. +(2) But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite +divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most +approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles +demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an +infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not +perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems +to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to +sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains +an infinite number of parts, BUT BECAUSE THE SENSE IS NOT ACUTE ENOUGH TO +DISCERN THEM. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more +acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the +object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its +extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in +very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. +And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense +becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which +there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. EACH BODY +THEREFORE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, IS INFINITELY EXTENDED, AND CONSEQUENTLY +VOID OF ALL SHAPE OR FIGURE. From which it follows that, though we should +grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as +certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced +to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, +nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each +particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, AND IT IS +THE MIND THAT FRAMES ALL THAT VARIETY OF BODIES WHICH COMPOSE THE VISIBLE +WORLD, ANY ONE WHEREOF DOES NOT EXIST LONGER THAN IT IS PERCEIVED. + +48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be +found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in +truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we +hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which +cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no +existence except only while they are perceived by US, since THERE MAY BE +SOME OTHER SPIRIT THAT PERCEIVES THEM THOUGH WE DO NOT. Wherever bodies +are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood +to mean this or that particular mind, but ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER. It does +not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are +annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the +intervals between our perception of them. + +49. FIFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Fifthly, it may perhaps be OBJECTED +that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows +that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or +attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the +subject in which it exists. I ANSWER, (1) Those qualities are in the +mind ONLY AS THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY IT--that is, not by way of MODE +or ATTRIBUTE, but only by way of IDEA; and it no more follows the +soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone, +than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are ON +ALL HANDS acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. (2) As to what +philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and +unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, +extended, and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a +subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure +which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot +comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things +which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, +extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject +distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning +of the word DIE. + +50. SIXTH OBJECTION, FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.--ANSWER.--Sixthly, +you will say there have been a great many things explained by +matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole +corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which +have been applied with so much success to account for the PHENOMENA. In +short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern +philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition +that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I ANSWER +that there is not any one PHENOMENON explained on that supposition which +may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear +by an INDUCTION OF PARTICULARS. To explain the PHENOMENA, is all one as +to show why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and +such ideas. But (1) how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any +idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is +therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. +Besides, (2) they who attempt to account for things do it not by CORPOREAL +SUBSTANCE, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth +no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, +as has been already shown. See sect. 25. + +51. SEVENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Seventhly, it will upon this be +demanded whether it does not seem ABSURD TO TAKE AWAY NATURAL CAUSES, +AND ASCRIBE EVERYTHING TO THE IMMEDIATE OPERATION OF SPIRITS? We +must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water +cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be +deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I ANSWER, +he would so; in such things we ought to THINK WITH THE LEARNED, +AND SPEAK WITH THE VULGAR. They who to demonstration are convinced +of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sun +rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian"; and if they +affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear +very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it +manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of +alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets. + +52. IN THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE, ANY PHRASES MAY BE RETAINED, so long +as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a +manner as is necessary for our WELL-BEING, how false soever they may be +if taken in a strict and SPECULATIVE SENSE. Nay, this is unavoidable, +since, propriety being regulated by CUSTOM, language is suited to the +RECEIVED opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is +impossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to +alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a +handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a +fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor +and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate +modes of speech which use has made inevitable. + +53. As to the OPINION THAT THERE ARE NO CORPOREAL CAUSES, this has been +heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by +others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to +exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all +things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was +none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by +consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to +exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But +then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created +beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one +effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, +since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say, +though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and +extravagant supposition. + +54. EIGHTH OBJECTION.--TWOFOLD ANSWER.--In the eighth place, the +universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some +an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of +external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? +And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant +an error? I answer, FIRST, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will +not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the +existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to +believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is +impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I +refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, +indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they ACT +as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every +moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking +being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by +those words, and form thereof a settled SPECULATIVE opinion, is what I am +not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose +upon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they +have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them. + +55. But SECONDLY, though we should grant a notion to be never so +universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its +truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false +opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the +unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a +time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as +monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered +what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find +that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable +footing in the world. + +56. NINTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But it is demanded that we assign +A CAUSE OF THIS PREJUDICE, and account for its obtaining in the +world. To this I ANSWER, that men knowing they perceived several +ideas, WHEREOF THEY THEMSELVES WERE NOT THE AUTHORS--as not being +excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills--this +made them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an +EXISTENCE INDEPENDENT OF AND WITHOUT THE MIND, without ever dreaming +that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers +having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do +not exist without the mind, THEY IN SOME DEGREE CORRECTED the +mistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another which +seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really +existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being +perceived, OF WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE ONLY IMAGES or resemblances, imprinted +by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes +its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being +conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which +they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must +have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted. + +57. BUT WHY THEY SHOULD SUPPOSE THE IDEAS OF SENSE TO BE EXCITED IN US BY +THINGS IN THEIR LIKENESS, and not rather have recourse to SPIRIT which +alone can act, may be accounted for, FIRST, because they were not aware +of the repugnancy there is, (1) as well in supposing things like unto our +ideas existing without, as in (2) attributing to them POWER OR ACTIVITY. +SECONDLY, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our +minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite +collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, +complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are +regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a +miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when +we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any +reflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the +greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant +and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a +Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, +though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom. + +58. TENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Tenthly, it will be objected that +the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths +in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth +is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on +the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing +principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an +idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but the +motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, +if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles +we have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no +amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have +reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that +if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a +position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the +former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all +respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature +which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the +phenomena. + +59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession +of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, +but sure and well--grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be +affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to +pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were +placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. +Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and +certainty very consistently with what has been said. It will be easy to +apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the +magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. + +60. ELEVENTH OBJECTION.--In the eleventh place, it will be demanded +to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the +animal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, +and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their +motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts +so elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have +nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion +with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately +produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think all +that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, +to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist has made the +spring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them +in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, +yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an +Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the +day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the +pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an +empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that +whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some +corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended +by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the +clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle +as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be +asked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or +any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and +machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common +philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain +abundance of phenomena? + +61. ANSWER.--To all which I answer, first, that though there were some +difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses +by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by +the foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight +against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a +priori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, +but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties; +for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those +roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which +no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will +without all that apparatus; nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall +find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold +the existence of those machines without of mind; for it has been made +evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no +activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one +effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist +(allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it +manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as +they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects +which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit. + +62. (FOURTHLY.)--But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed +that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not +absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary +to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to +the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through +the whole chain of natural effects; these are learned by the observation +and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing +artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the +explaining various phenomena--which explication consists only in +showing the conformity any particular phenomenon has to the general +laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the +uniformity there is in the production of natural effects; as will +be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein +philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a +great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of +working observed by the Supreme Agent has been shown in sect. 31. +And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, +and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to +the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the +standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be +denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary +course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all +the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the +movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the +rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in +the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, +whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the +production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be +attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the +movements, which being once corrected all is right again. + +63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of +nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of +the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of +nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of the +Divine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is +a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to +choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of +nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and +are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, +rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and +surprising events. + +64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what +has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than +this:--ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain +order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; there +are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and +artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of +nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret +operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of +the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the +philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what +purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barely +inefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the +production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in +other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a +close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so +artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being +credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all +that art and regularity to no purpose. + +65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does +not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign +with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the +pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of +it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or +that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. +Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, +artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining +letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a +great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously +combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, +these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By +this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what +we are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper +to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is all +that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by +discerning a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of +bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several +uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing. + +66. PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHER.--Hence, it is evident +that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating +or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, +and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, +and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are +considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is +the searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs +instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of +the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by +corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the +minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "in +whom we live, move, and have our being." + +67. TWELFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--In the twelfth place, it may perhaps +be objected that--though it be clear from what has been said that +there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, +figured, movable substance existing without the mind, such as +philosophers describe Matter--yet, if any man shall leave out of +his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity +and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, +senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, +which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is +pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken +in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that +it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it +is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we +should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it +be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it +exists not in place is no less certain--since all place or extension +exists only in the mind, as has been already proved. It remains +therefore that it exists nowhere at all. + +68. MATTER SUPPORTS NOTHING, AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EXISTENCE.--Let us +examine a little the description that is here given us of +matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all +that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; +which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the +relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be +observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to +the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, +it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in +us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present +to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable +of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor has any +form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present," when thus +applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and +which I am not able to comprehend. + +69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can +gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the +agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to +accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it +is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of +those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot +be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid +of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our +perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said to +be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant +by calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense at +all, or else in some very distant from its received signification. + +70. You will Perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, +is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting +ideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be +imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to +suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being +produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct +parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not +excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being +altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, +by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him +when and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in +a constant uniform manner. + +71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here +stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing +distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but +whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind +of God which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce +sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method--much after the +same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce +that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, +though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be +entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter seems too +extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no +objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless +unperceived substance. + +72. THE ORDER OF OUR PERCEPTIONS SHOWS THE GOODNESS OF GOD, BUT +AFFORDS NO PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER.--If we follow the light +of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our +sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who +excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably +concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a +spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to +explain all the appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless +Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or +leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the +meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or show any manner of reason, though +in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or +even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to +its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shown that with regard +to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, +the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we +have just now seen. + +73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced +men to suppose the existence of material substance; that so having +observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, +we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. +First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the +rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the +mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking +substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be +conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men +being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, +secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this +substratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the +primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to +exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material +support. But, it having been shown that none even of these can possibly +exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it follows +that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay, +that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as +that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or +accidents wherein they exist without the mind. + +74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter +was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason +entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without +any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded +thereon; yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we +can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since +the thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name, which we +apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or +occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can +see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all +the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either +by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an +inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the +part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us +believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite +ideas in our minds? + +75. ABSURDITY OF CONTENDING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER AS THE OCCASION +OF IDEAS.--It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, +and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, +against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by +the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the +Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the +world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of +Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our +opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge +ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to +make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are +certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all +that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at +the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name. + +76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and +whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But, +if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of +extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most +evidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plain +repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an +unperceiving substance. + +77. THAT A SUBSTRATUM NOT PERCEIVED, MAY EXIST, UNIMPORTANT.--But, +say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support +of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, +yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or +substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours +are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. +But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their +existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and +colours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the +unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is +such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the +advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know +not why. + +78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with +new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against +their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered +with relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as has +been shown, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in +a mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are +acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas +whatsoever. + +79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the +existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain +anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it +is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in +general a substance, or occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about to +unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words +may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used +without a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger +of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two +is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of +that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not +what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless +substance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we +shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other. + +80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of +material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown +somewhat--neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, +thoughtless, indivisible, immovable, unextended, existing in no place. +For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, or any +other positive or relative notion of Matter, has no place at all, so +long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you +may, if so it shall seem good, use the word "Matter" in the same sense as +other men use "nothing," and so make those terms convertible in your +style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of +that definition, the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either +collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any +kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is +excited by the term nothing. + +81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-said definition is included +what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing--the positive abstract +idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who +pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if +they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general +notion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. +That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and +capacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding +those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. +And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted narrow inlets +of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit +may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and +presumption--since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts +of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that +I have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may +be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the +endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any +one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit +and idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright +repugnancy and trifling with words.--It remains that we consider the +objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion. + +82. OBJECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES ANSWERED.--Some there are +who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of +bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to +demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as +will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really +exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ +innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber +and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I +answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use +those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a +meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question +by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are +bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has +been shown to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixt +things and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. +See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what +philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind, +is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. + +83. NO OBJECTION AS TO LANGUAGE TENABLE.--Again, whether there can +be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the +proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only +as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows +that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent +with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, +of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. +But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth +in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it. + +84. But, secondly it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much +of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' +rod? was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change +of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our +Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the +sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the +appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other +miracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be +looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I +reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into +real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have +elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of +real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and +so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily +answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the +reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I +shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and +smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me +there could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scruple +concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the +received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what +has been said. + +85. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRECEDING TENETS.--Having done with the +Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, +and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the +next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. +Some of these appear at first sight--as that several difficult and +obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been +thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. "Whether +corporeal substance can think," "whether Matter be infinitely divisible," +and "how it operates on spirit"--these and like inquiries have given +infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but depending on the +existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles. +Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the +sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been +premised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel. + +86. THE REMOVAL OF MATTER GIVES CERTAINTY TO KNOWLEDGE.--From the +principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally +be reduced to two heads--that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each +of these I shall treat in order. + +And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has +been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very +dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of +sense--the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without +the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural +subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, +which, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless and +absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men +thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their +knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real +things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge +at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are +conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? + +87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as +so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing +in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or +images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then +are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not +the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or +motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible +for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our +senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or +even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really +existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for +aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain +chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum +natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference +between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without +the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show +how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition +of external objects. + +88. IF THERE BE EXTERNAL MATTER, NEITHER THE NATURE NOR EXISTENCE +OF THINGS CAN BE KNOWN.--So long as we attribute a real existence to +unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not +only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real +unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see +philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of +heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own +bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, they +are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative +knowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness, +which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy +ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning +to our words. and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute," +"external," "exist, "and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can as +well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I +actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any +sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at +the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an +unthinking being consists in being perceived. + +89. OF THING OR BEING.--Nothing seems of more importance towards +erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be +proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning +in a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, +existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence +of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have +not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most +general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely +distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the +name. viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible +substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which +subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or +spiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling +or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have +some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, +whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and +have a notion of relations between things or ideas--which relations are +distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be +perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that +ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the +object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term +idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have +any notion of. + +90. EXTERNAL THINGS EITHER IMPRINTED BY OR PERCEIVED BY SOME OTHER MIND.-- +Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; +this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which +perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing +without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in +being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the +things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their +origin--in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, +but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. +Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in another +sense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my +eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind. + +91. SENSIBLE QUALITIES REAL.--It were a mistake to think that what +is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. +It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, +motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support, +as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived +by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, +and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed +on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an +existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may +exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and +are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, +according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no +existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in +any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or +spirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers +vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, +unperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute a +natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from +being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the +Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances +created by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created. + +92. OBJECTIONS OF ATHEISTS OVERTURNED.--For, as we have shown the +doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main +pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation +have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. +Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter +produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient +philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, +have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How +great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were +needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and +necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once +removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch +that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on +the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists. + +93. AND OF FATALISTS ALSO.--That impious and profane persons should +readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, +by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be +divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all +freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, +and instead thereof make a self--existent, stupid, unthinking +substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should +hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior +Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series +of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from +the impulse of one body or another--all this is very natural. And, +on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies +of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all +of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, +methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, +and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, +Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but +become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world. + +94. OF IDOLATORS.--The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, +has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, +but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various +forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, +and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations +in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being +perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their +own ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND +which produces and sustains all things. + +95. AND SOCINIANS.--The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with +the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to +Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and +objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the +most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is +denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is +perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the +same under several forms? Take away this material substance, about +the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every +plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is +immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible +qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections +come to nothing. + +96. SUMMARY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPELLING MATTER.--Matter being once +expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious +notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, +which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, +and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments +we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration +(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, +peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. + +97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another +great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is +the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it has been set forth in the +Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most +intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered +in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. +Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what +everybody knows, but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, +they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary +sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he +shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in +conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is +to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken +exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the +day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, +then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it. + +98. DILEMMA.--For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea +of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows +uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in +inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear +others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner +as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that +doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he +passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is +annihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. +Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas in +our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be +estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that +same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul +always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his +thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation, +will, I believe, find it no easy task. + +99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all +other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight +of them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold +abstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be +abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the +entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, +whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if +I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike +sensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the +colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only +in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those +sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted +together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived. + +100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may +think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded +from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is +good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and +virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion +that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from +all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very +difficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect +the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling +the most useful parts of knowledge. + +101. OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS.--The two great provinces +of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, +are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of these +I shall make some observations. And first I shall say somewhat of +Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. +All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties +and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally +from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness +as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, +and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our +senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real +essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest +object, is hid from our view; something there is in every drop of water, +every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding +to fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shown that +all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false +principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know +nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend. + +102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the +nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within +itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an +inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, +and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances +by occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical +causes, to wit. the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of +insensible particles; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or +efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as all +other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to +explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, +magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we +see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be +said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is +assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and +speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged +by this doctrine. + +103. ATTRACTION SIGNIFIES THE EFFECT, NOT THE MANNER OR CAUSE.--The great +mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone +falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some +appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by +being told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the +manner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies +instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, +nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for +aught we know) be termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction." +Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is +accounted for by attraction; but, in this as in the other instances, I do +not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as +to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which +produces it, these are not so much as aimed at. + +104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them +together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For +example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the +sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc, there is +something alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that +any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising +to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For +that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out +of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend +towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is +what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a +like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and +unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But +a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having +observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as +the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency +towards each other, which he denotes by the general name "attraction," +whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he +explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the +moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a +particular example of a general rule or law of nature. + +105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural +philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the +phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the +efficient cause that produces them--for that can be no other than the +will of a spirit--but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, +whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works +of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to +general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and +uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most +agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect +beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very +probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great +distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; which +sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind. + +106. CAUTION AS TO THE USE OF ANALOGIES.--But we should proceed warily +in such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies, +and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind +whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. +For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, +because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for +pronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attracted +by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies +whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such +tendency towards each other; and, so far is that gravitation from being +essential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle +seems to show itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the +elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the +case, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who +causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other +according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; +and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He +sees convenient. + +107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following +conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, +when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind +or spirit. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship of +a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ +their thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of +things; and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends +to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally +with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of +accounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from +what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature +should not still be studied, and observations and experiments made, +which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general +conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations +between things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men +in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31 Fourthly, by a +diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover +the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; I +do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on a +supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a +constant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we +cannot evidently know. + +108. THREE ANALOGIES.--Those men who frame general rules from the +phenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem +to consider signs rather than causes. A man may well understand +natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say +by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to +write improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar +rules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible +we may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes. + +109. As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts +on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical +remarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems +beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each +particular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from +them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate +and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order. extent, and +variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our +notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and +lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, +subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the +sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. + +110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be +easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In +the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion +are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, +mathematical and vulgar; which distinction, as it is at large explained +by the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence without +the mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to +sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no +relation at all. + +111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted +sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I +have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said +on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author +holds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, +remains in itself similar and immovable; and relative space to be the +measure thereof, which, being movable and defined by its situation in +respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immovable space. Place +he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and +according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. +Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute +place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to +another. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our +senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures, +and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we +regard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must +abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which +seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved +relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may +be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative +motions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. +All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at +all in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in +philosophy. And the true as we are told are distinguished from apparent +or relative motions by the following properties.--First, in true or +absolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect +of the whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place +being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body +moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its +place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than +by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always +changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion +barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, in +that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of +motion. + +112. MOTION, WHETHER REAL OR APPARENT, RELATIVE.--But, notwithstanding +what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that +there can be any motion other than relative; so that to conceive +motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the +distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there +was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems +evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include +relation. + +113. APPARENT MOTION DENIED.--But, though in every motion it be +necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one +only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change +in the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however +some may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved +which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force +or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as +relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in +the ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of common +sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any +one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the +stones he passes over may be said to move, because they change distance +with his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of +one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the +relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which +does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is +not therefore itself in motion. + +114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is +related to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with +relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the +land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in +respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond +the earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in +respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who +have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of +things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to +fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, +and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby +they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we +may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom +no other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been already +observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is +incomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the +above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute +motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of +the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular +relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which +is brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, +in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it +is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, has, I think, no +motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section. + +115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that it +change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and +secondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If +either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense +of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in +motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which +we see change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no +force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but +then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined +by us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; which +indeed shows we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is +not, and that is all. + +116. ANY IDEA OF PURE SPACE RELATIVE.--From what has been said it follows +that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the +being of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived +by sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without the +mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like +of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, +we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusiv +of all body. This I must confess seems impossible, as being a mos +abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, +if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space; but if I +find a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in proportion as the +resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or +less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be +supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or +conceivable without body and motion--though indeed we are apt to think +every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated +from all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, +supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say +there still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only +that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all +sides without the least resistance, but if that, too, were annihilated +then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps, +may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure +space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shown, that the ideas +of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay +concerning Vision. + +117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and +difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the +nature of pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we +are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed +their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of +thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something +beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. +Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is +certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, +have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or +annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have +set themselves particularly to show the incommunicable attributes of God +agree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the +Divine Nature, yet I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we +adhere to the received opinions. + +118. THE ERRORS ARISING FROM THE DOCTRINES OF ABSTRACTION AND EXTERNAL +MATERIAL EXISTENCES, INFLUENCE MATHEMATICAL REASONINGS.--Hitherto of +Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry concerning +that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics. +These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and +certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be +found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if +in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the +professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, +though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet +their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and +they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental +maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, +Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors +involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are +true, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and +incontestible, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain +erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and +for that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed +throughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects +of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches +thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other +men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general +ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. + +119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of +Number; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is +supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure +and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem +with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness +and elevation of thought. It has set a price on the most trifling +numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only +for amusement; and has therefore so far infected the minds of some, that +they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted +the explication of natural things by them. But, if we inquire into our +own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps +entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look +on all inquiries, about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far +as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life. + +120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which +and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is +not any such idea. But, number being defined a "collection of units," we +may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in +abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral +names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic. if they are +abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and +practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed +to have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely +the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and +trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation. + +121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show +of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical +theorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we +more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will +plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and +observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that +science, and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that +at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of +counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each +whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e., some one thing of whatever +kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more +compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several +strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians +came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, +and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it +obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have +been done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed +betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures +answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, +corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those +conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived +methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what +figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And +having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed +throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes +perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to +be known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement) +that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs +being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any +part of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing in +signs (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct +multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able +rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we +intend to number. + +122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, +which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they +direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of +them. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general +(sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are +thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not +suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present +enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only +observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which +pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality +conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, +except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered +on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly +whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows +that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as +good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention +and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent +criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal. + +123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which, considered as +relative, is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite +extension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or +theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same +everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a +connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that +mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of +it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those +amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the +plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance +into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so it is the principal +occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of +Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear +that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely +divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry +from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever +been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment +thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been. + +124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object +of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently +each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive +innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain +they are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I cannot +distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, +which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind: +wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer +to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own +ideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas +into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not +infinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinct +from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot +affirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms "extension," "parts," +&c., are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say +a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so +manifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it +to be so; and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any +reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, +as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and +rooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositions +which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only +themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought +privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, +which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow. + +125. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract +general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of +sense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks +the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue +thereof be brought to admit that a line but an inch long may contain +innumerable parts--really existing, though too small to be discerned. +These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of +other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no +difficult thing to show how the arguments from Geometry made use of to +support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. At +present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians +are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine. + +126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems and +demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. +15, Introd.); where it is explained in what sense this ought to be +understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the +diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; +or, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their +magnitude--which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only +that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or +small, but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration. Hence +it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of +as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in +itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only in its +signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than +itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though +there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties +of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the +sign, and thence, through mistake, though to appertain to it considered +in its own nature. + +127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible +there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain +parts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch +taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not +retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that +the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts +innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten--thousandth part of an +inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be +signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, +and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the +radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more; +for, though the ten-thousandth part of that line considered in itself is +nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without an error or +inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for +greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten--thousandth part is very +considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the +radius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more. + +128. LINES WHICH ARE INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.--From what has been said +the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal in +its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper +as though they contained parts which really they do not. In doing +of which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps +discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, +or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which +is far greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say +a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely +great. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to +suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought +necessary in geometry. + +129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this +false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many +demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that +proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating +to infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind +to reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could +have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever +considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on +purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in +an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe +examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true. + +130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and +grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and +disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great +note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into +an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those +infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or +infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, +assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., +without ever coming to an end; so that according to them an inch does not +barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an +infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold +all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all; +thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive +quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can +never equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it +seems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a +positive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold +infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, +are obliged to maintain. + +131. OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--Have we not therefore +reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is +in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite +number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will +say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations +of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised +that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while +building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is +useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still +remain firm and unshaken on our principles; that science considered as +practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has +been said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business of +another place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the +more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared +off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be +thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be +wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw +off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of +such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct +influence on the manners. + +132. SECOND OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--If it be said +that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods +in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have +been if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answer +that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any +instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts +of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, +it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible. + +133. IF THE DOCTRINE WERE ONLY AN HYPOTHESIS IT SHOULD BE RESPECTED +FOR ITS CONSEQUENCES.--By what we have premised, it is plain that very +numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false +Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise; +and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be +most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences +highly advantageous to true philosophy. as well as to religion. +Particularly Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, has +been shown to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of +all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief +strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real +existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing +them a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing +is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable +difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as +not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences +cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen +themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites being +incomprehensible"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended +with the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, +but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, +both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only +spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both +to Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted and +firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the +existence of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have +evidently demonstrated that it is not. + +134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several +disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, +are rejected as useless. But, how great a prejudice soever against our +notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and +make large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it +will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and +tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make +human sciences far more clear, compendious and attainable than they were +before. + +135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge +of IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of +SPIRITS--with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so +deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for +our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an +idea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a +human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it +is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I +mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here +add that a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support +wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance +which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an +idea is evidently absurd. + +136. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--It will perhaps be said that we want a sense +(as some have imagined) proper to know substances withal, which, +if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this +I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we +could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. +But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul +and substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. +We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is +not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not +furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it +would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round +square. + +137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an +idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much +scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this +opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at +all distinct from their body since upon inquiry they could not find they +had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existence +whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of +an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than +barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will +say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, +or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not +necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original. + +138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it +should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of +willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else +wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean +only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, +constitutes the signification of the term. If therefore it is impossible +that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is +evident there can be no idea of a spirit. + +139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the +terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have +no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real +thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which +perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, +that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul +or spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a +word, and that, since the immediately significations of other names are +by common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which +is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same +appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in +that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in +being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose +existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and +thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and +confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish +between spirit and idea. See sect. 27. + +140. OUR IDEA OF SPIRIT.--In a large sense, indeed, we may be said +to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand +the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny +anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the +minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be +resemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of our own +soul--which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having +a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived +has to those ideas perceived by another. + +141. THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE +OF THE FOREGOING DOCTRINE.--It must not be supposed that they who +assert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that it +is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power +of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not +liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature +or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin +vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and +corruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipated +than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive +the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notion +has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, +as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue +and religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or +texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more +distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We have +shown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is +consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, +changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural +bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot +possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being +therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, "the +soul of man is naturally immortal." + +142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are +not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by +way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when +we say "they exist," "they are known," or the like, these words must not +be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing +alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or +enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do +a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is +inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several +important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning +the nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an +idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have +a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its +acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these +words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the +terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have +it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we +distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be +remarked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so +properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations +and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is +extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an +affair of verbal concern. + +143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas has +had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure +which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have +imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the +mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit +itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great +number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract +notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from +these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned. + +144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in +controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of +the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed +from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the +soul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, +impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that +is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of +dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be +cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but +philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively +consider their own meaning. + +145. KNOWLEDGE OF SPIRITS NOT IMMEDIATE.--From what has been said, +it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits +otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited +in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, +that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, +which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the +knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the +knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me +referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or +concomitant signs. + +146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are +concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those +things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater +part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or +dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that +causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by +themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant +regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising +magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite +contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact +harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the +never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or +natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we +consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and +import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and +Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid +Spirit, "who works all in all," and "by whom all things consist." + +147. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD MORE EVIDENT THAN THAT OF MAN.--Hence, +it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as +any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may +even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived +than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely +more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There +is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which +does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author +of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of +man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; +but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the +mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it +is who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that +intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the +existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which +enlightens every one is itself invisible. + +148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they +cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we +should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we +need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a +more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow--creatures. Not +that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and +immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing +that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I +must confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;--A +human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; +when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we +perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and +these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve +to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like +ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man--if by man is meant that +which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do--but only such a +certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct +principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and +represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the +difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of +ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, +we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the +Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, +being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those +very motions which are produced by men. + +149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one +that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a +Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that +variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we +have an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and +move, and have our being." That the discovery of this great truth, which +lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason +of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of +men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of +the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, +blinded with excess of light. + +150. OBJECTION ON BEHALF OF NATURE.--ANSWER.--But you will say, +has Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must +they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? +I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects +or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed +and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, +cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being +distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things +perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound +without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this +acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not +just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it +is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, +professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those +effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont +to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He +maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his +treasures." Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death into the +morning, and maketh the day dark with night." Amos, 5. 8. "He visiteth +the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing +thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures +are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn." See +Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of +Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God +concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a +great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His +stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from every +one of us." + +151. OBJECTION TO THE HAND OF GOD BEING THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE, +THREEFOLD.--ANSWER.--It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and +gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem +to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, +monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in +desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many +arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and +superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer +to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being +visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in +order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady +and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. +Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, +whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand +which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and +blood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that hidest thyself." +Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the +sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to +an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than +the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and +sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have +elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated +laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting +us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of +thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of +purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or +powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly +outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise. + +152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of +nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of +variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in +a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We +would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds +and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before +they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be +not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent +and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things +which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed +wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an +animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in +its production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that +an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat +or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of +natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the +agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the +riches of His power. + +153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, +pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, +imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is +indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too +narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into +our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as +to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, +on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and +pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are +put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those +particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, +have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system +of beings. + +154. ATHEISM AND MANICHEISM WOULD HAVE FEW SUPPORTERS IF MANKIND WERE +IN GENERAL ATTENTIVE.--From what has been said, it will be manifest +to any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention +and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism +or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls +may indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order +whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to +comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent +of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently +admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout +the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so +strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting +of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered +at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or +pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should +not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might +be expected in reasonable creatures? + +155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to +neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an +evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of +parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through a +supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downright +impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of +the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should +persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, +earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may +attain conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord are in +every place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and +keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and +raiment to put on"; that He is present and conscious to our innermost +thoughts; and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on +Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts +with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest +incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice. + +156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the +consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main +drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless +and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with +a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shown the falseness or +vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of +learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the +salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the +highest perfection of human nature. + + + + + + + +The Project Gutenberg Etext of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge +by George Berkeley +This file should be named prhkn10.txt or prhkn10.zip + +Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, prhkn11.txt +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, prhkn10a.txt + +Prepared by Col Choat colc@gutenberg.net.au + +More information about this book is at the top of this file. + +We are now trying to release all our etexts one year in advance +of the official release dates, leaving time for better editing. +Please be encouraged to tell us about any error or corrections, +even years after the official publication date. + +Please note neither this listing nor its contents are final til +midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement. +The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at +Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. 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