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diff --git a/4967-h/4967-h.htm b/4967-h/4967-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4bc2073 --- /dev/null +++ b/4967-h/4967-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,9790 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=US-ASCII" /> +<title>Luck or Cunning, by Samuel Butler</title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + P { margin-top: .75em; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + P.gutsumm { margin-left: 5%;} + P.poetry {margin-left: 3%; } + .GutSmall { font-size: 0.7em; } + H1, H2 { + text-align: center; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + } + H3, H4, H5 { + text-align: center; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + } + BODY{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + table { border-collapse: collapse; } +table {margin-left:auto; margin-right:auto;} + td { vertical-align: top; border: 1px solid black;} + td p { margin: 0.2em; } + .blkquot {margin-left: 4em; margin-right: 4em;} /* block indent */ + + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + + .pagenum {position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: small; + text-align: right; + font-weight: normal; + color: gray; + } + img { border: none; } + img.dc { float: left; width: 50px; height: 50px; } + p.gutindent { margin-left: 2em; } + div.gapspace { height: 0.8em; } + div.gapline { height: 0.8em; width: 100%; border-top: 1px solid;} + div.gapmediumline { height: 0.3em; width: 40%; margin-left:30%; + border-top: 1px solid; } + div.gapmediumdoubleline { height: 0.3em; width: 40%; margin-left:30%; + border-top: 1px solid; border-bottom: 1px solid;} + div.gapshortdoubleline { height: 0.3em; width: 20%; + margin-left: 40%; border-top: 1px solid; + border-bottom: 1px solid; } + div.gapdoubleline { height: 0.3em; width: 50%; + margin-left: 25%; border-top: 1px solid; + border-bottom: 1px solid;} + div.gapshortline { height: 0.3em; width: 20%; margin-left:40%; + border-top: 1px solid; } + .citation {vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: none;} + img.floatleft { float: left; + margin-right: 1em; + margin-top: 0.5em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + img.floatright { float: right; + margin-left: 1em; margin-top: 0.5em; + margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + img.clearcenter {display: block; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; margin-top: 0.5em; + margin-bottom: 0.5em} + --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> +</head> +<body> +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Luck or Cunning, by Samuel Butler, Edited by +Henry Festing Jones + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Luck or Cunning + as the Main Means of Organic Modification + + +Author: Samuel Butler + +Editor: Henry Festing Jones + +Release Date: August 3, 2014 [eBook #4967] +[This file was first posted on April 5, 2002] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LUCK OR CUNNING*** +</pre> +<p>Transcribed from the 1922 Jonathan Cape edition by David +Price, email ccx074@pglaf.org</p> +<h1>Luck, or Cunning<br /> +As the Main Means of<br /> +Organic Modification?</h1> +<p style="text-align: center"> +<a href="images/tpb.jpg"> +<img alt= +"Decorative graphic" +title= +"Decorative graphic" +src="images/tps.jpg" /> +</a></p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p style="text-align: center">Jonathan Cape<br /> +Eleven Gower Street, London</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<table> +<tr> +<td><p><i>First Published</i></p> +</td> +<td><p>1887</p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><i>Second Edition</i></p> +</td> +<td><p>1920</p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><i>Re-issued</i></p> +</td> +<td><p>1922</p> +</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="GutSmall">TO THE +MEMORY OF</span><br /> +<span class="GutSmall">THE LATE</span></p> +<p style="text-align: center"><i>ALFRED TAYLOR</i>, <span +class="smcap">Esq</span>., <i>&c.</i></p> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="GutSmall">WHOSE +EXPERIMENTS AT CARSHALTON</span><br /> +<span class="GutSmall">IN THE YEARS 1883 AND 1884</span><br /> +<span class="GutSmall">ESTABLISHED THAT PLANTS ALSO ARE ENDOWED +WITH</span><br /> +<span class="GutSmall">INTELLIGENTIAL AND VOLITIONAL +FACULTIES</span><br /> +<span class="GutSmall">THIS BOOK</span><br /> +<span class="GutSmall">BEGUN AT HIS INSTIGATION</span><br /> +<span class="GutSmall">IS GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY +INSCRIBED</span></p> +<h2><a name="page6"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +6</span>Note</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">This</span> second edition of <i>Luck</i>, +<i>or Cunning</i>? is a reprint of the first edition, dated 1887, +but actually published in November, 1886. The only +alterations of any consequence are in the Index, which has been +enlarged by the incorporation of several entries made by the +author in a copy of the book which came into my possession on the +death of his literary executor, Mr. R. A. Streatfeild. I +thank Mr. G. W. Webb, of the University Library, Cambridge, for +the care and skill with which he has made the necessary +alterations; it was a troublesome job because owing to the +re-setting, the pagination was no longer the same.</p> +<p><i>Luck</i>, <i>or Cunning</i>? is the fourth of +Butler’s evolution books; it was followed in 1890 by three +articles in <i>The Universal Review</i> entitled “The +Deadlock in Darwinism” (republished in <i>The Humour of +Homer</i>), after which he published no more upon that +subject.</p> +<p>In this book, as he says in his Introduction, he insists upon +two main points: (1) the substantial identity between heredity +and memory, and (2) the reintroduction of design into organic +development; and these two points he treats as though they have +something of that physical life with which they are so closely +associated. He was aware that what he had to say was likely +to prove more interesting to future generations than to his +immediate public, “but any book that desires to see out a +literary three-score years and ten must offer something to future +generations as well as to its own.” By next year one +half of the three-score years and ten will have passed, and the +new generation by their constant enquiries for the work have +already begun to show their appreciation of Butler’s method +of treating the subject, and their readiness to listen to what +was addressed to them as well as to their fathers.</p> +<p style="text-align: right">HENRY FESTING JONES.</p> +<p><i>March</i>, 1920.</p> +<h2><a name="page7"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +7</span>Author’s Preface to First Edition</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">This</span> book, as I have said in my +concluding chapter, has turned out very different from the one I +had it in my mind to write when I began it. It arose out of +a conversation with the late Mr. Alfred Tylor soon after his +paper on the growth of trees and protoplasmic continuity was read +before the Linnean Society—that is to say, in December, +1884—and I proposed to make the theory concerning the +subdivision of organic life into animal and vegetable, which I +have broached in my concluding chapter, the main feature of the +book. One afternoon, on leaving Mr. Tylor’s bedside, +much touched at the deep disappointment he evidently felt at +being unable to complete the work he had begun so ably, it +occurred to me that it might be some pleasure to him if I +promised to dedicate my own book to him, and thus, however +unworthy it might be, connect it with his name. It occurred +to me, of course, also that the honour to my own book would be +greater than any it could confer, but the time was not one for +balancing considerations nicely, and when I made my suggestion to +Mr. Tylor on the last occasion that I ever saw him, the manner in +which he received it settled the question. If he had lived +I should no doubt have kept more closely to my plan, and should +probably have been furnished by him with much that would have +enriched the book and made it more worthy of his acceptance; but +this was not to be.</p> +<p>In the course of writing I became more and more convinced that +no progress could be made towards a sounder view of the theory of +descent until people came to understand what the late Mr. Charles +Darwin’s theory of natural selection amounted to, and how +it was that it ever came to be propounded. Until the +mindless theory of Charles Darwinian natural selection was +finally discredited, and a mindful theory of evolution was +substituted in its place, neither Mr. Tylor’s experiments +nor my own theories could stand much chance of being attended +to. I therefore devoted myself mainly, as I had done in +“Evolution Old and New,” and in “Unconscious +Memory,” to considering whether the view taken by the late +Mr. Darwin, or the one put forward by his three most illustrious +predecessors, should most command our assent.</p> +<p>The deflection from my original purpose was increased by the +appearance, about a year ago, of Mr. Grant Allen’s +“Charles Darwin,” which I imagine to have had a very +large circulation. So important, indeed, did I think it not +to leave Mr. Allen’s statements unchallenged, that in +November last I recast my book completely, cutting out much that +I had written, and practically starting anew. How far Mr. +Tylor would have liked it, or even sanctioned its being dedicated +to him, if he were now living, I cannot, of course, say. I +never heard him speak of the late Mr. Darwin in any but terms of +warm respect, and am by no means sure that he would have been +well pleased at an attempt to connect him with a book so +polemical as the present. On the other hand, a promise made +and received as mine was, cannot be set aside lightly. The +understanding was that my next book was to be dedicated to Mr. +Tylor; I have written the best I could, and indeed never took so +much pains with any other; to Mr. Tylor’s memory, +therefore, I have most respectfully, and regretfully, inscribed +it.</p> +<p>Desiring that the responsibility for what has been done should +rest with me, I have avoided saying anything about the book while +it was in progress to any of Mr Tylor’s family or +representatives. They know nothing, therefore, of its +contents, and if they did, would probably feel with myself very +uncertain how far it is right to use Mr. Tylor’s name in +connection with it. I can only trust that, on the whole, +they may think I have done most rightly in adhering to the letter +of my promise.</p> +<p><i>October</i> 15, 1886.</p> +<h2>Contents</h2> +<table> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right"> </p> +</td> +<td><p> </p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span +class="GutSmall">Page</span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right"> </p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Note</span>, <span class="smcap">by +Henry Festing Jones</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page6">6</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right"> </p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Author’s Preface to First +Edition</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page7">7</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">I.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page13">13</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">II.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Mr. Herbert Spencer</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page28">28</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">III.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Mr. Herbert Spencer</span> +(<i>continued</i>)</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page42">42</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">IV.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Mr. Romanes’ “Mental +Evolution in Animals”</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page52">52</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">V.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Statement of the Question at +Issue</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page70">70</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">VI.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Statement of the Question at +Issue</span> (<i>continued</i>)</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page80">80</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">VII.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Mr. Spencer’s “The Factors +of Organic Evolution”</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page100">100</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">VIII.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Property</span>, <span +class="smcap">Common Sense</span>, <span class="smcap">and +Protoplasm</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page112">112</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">IX.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Property</span>, <span +class="smcap">Common Sense</span>, <span class="smcap">and +Protoplasm</span> (<i>continued</i>)</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page125">125</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">X.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">The Attempt to Eliminate +Mind</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page135">135</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">XI.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">The Way of Escape</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page147">147</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">XII.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Why Darwin’s Variations were +Accidental</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page156">156</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">XIII.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Darwin’s Claim to Descent with +Modification</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page168">168</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">XIV.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Darwin and Descent with +Modification</span> (<i>continued</i>)</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page177">177</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">XV.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">The Excised +“My’s”</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page202">202</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">XVI.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Mr. Grant Allen’s “Charles +Darwin”</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page211">211</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">XVII.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Professor Ray Lankester and +Lamarck</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page225">225</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">XVIII.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Per Contra</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page239">239</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p style="text-align: right">XIX.</p> +</td> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Conclusion</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page251">251</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +</table> +<h2><a name="page13"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +13</span>Chapter I<br /> +Introduction</h2> +<p>I <span class="smcap">shall</span> perhaps best promote the +acceptance of the two main points on which I have been insisting +for some years past, I mean, the substantial identity between +heredity and memory, and the reintroduction of design into +organic development, by treating them as if they had something of +that physical life with which they are so closely +connected. Ideas are like plants and animals in this +respect also, as in so many others, that they are more fully +understood when their relations to other ideas of their time, and +the history of their development are known and borne in +mind. By development I do not merely mean their growth in +the minds of those who first advanced them, but that larger +development which consists in their subsequent good or evil +fortunes—in their reception, favourable or otherwise, by +those to whom they were presented. This is to an idea what +its surroundings are to an organism, and throws much the same +light upon it that knowledge of the conditions under which an +organism lives throws upon the organism itself. I shall, +therefore, begin this new work with a few remarks about its +predecessors.</p> +<p>I am aware that what I may say on this head is likely to prove +more interesting to future students of the literature of descent +than to my immediate public, but any book that desires to see out +a literary three-score years and ten must offer something to +future generations as well as to its own. It is a condition +of its survival that it shall do this, and herein lies one of the +author’s chief difficulties. If books only lived as +long as men and women, we should know better how to grow them; as +matters stand, however, the author lives for one or two +generations, whom he comes in the end to understand fairly well, +while the book, if reasonable pains have been taken with it, +should live more or less usefully for a dozen. About the +greater number of these generations the author is in the dark; +but come what may, some of them are sure to have arrived at +conclusions diametrically opposed to our own upon every subject +connected with art, science, philosophy, and religion; it is +plain, therefore, that if posterity is to be pleased, it can only +be at the cost of repelling some present readers. Unwilling +as I am to do this, I still hold it the lesser of two evils; I +will be as brief, however, as the interests of the opinions I am +supporting will allow.</p> +<p>In “Life and Habit” I contended that heredity was +a mode of memory. I endeavoured to show that all hereditary +traits, whether of mind or body, are inherited in virtue of, and +as a manifestation of, the same power whereby we are able to +remember intelligently what we did half an hour, yesterday, or a +twelvemonth since, and this in no figurative but in a perfectly +real sense. If life be compared to an equation of a hundred +unknown quantities, I followed Professor Hering of Prague in +reducing it to one of ninety-nine only, by showing two of the +supposed unknown quantities to be so closely allied that they +should count as one. I maintained that instinct was +inherited memory, and this without admitting more exceptions and +qualifying clauses than arise, as it were, by way of harmonics +from every proposition, and must be neglected if thought and +language are to be possible.</p> +<p>I showed that if the view for which I was contending was +taken, many facts which, though familiar, were still without +explanation or connection with our other ideas, would remain no +longer isolated, but be seen at once as joined with the mainland +of our most assured convictions. Among the things thus +brought more comfortably home to us was the principle underlying +longevity. It became apparent why some living beings should +live longer than others, and how any race must be treated whose +longevity it is desired to increase. Hitherto we had known +that an elephant was a long-lived animal and a fly short-lived, +but we could give no reason why the one should live longer than +the other; that is to say, it did not follow in immediate +coherence with, or as intimately associated with, any familiar +principle that an animal which is late in the full development of +its reproductive system will tend to live longer than one which +reproduces early. If the theory of “Life and +Habit” be admitted, the fact of a slow-growing animal being +in general longer lived than a quick developer is seen to be +connected with, and to follow as a matter of course from, the +fact of our being able to remember anything at all, and all the +well-known traits of memory, as observed where we can best take +note of them, are perceived to be reproduced with singular +fidelity in the development of an animal from its embryonic +stages to maturity.</p> +<p>Take this view, and the very general sterility of hybrids from +being a <i>crux</i> of the theory of descent becomes a stronghold +of defence. It appears as part of the same story as the +benefit derived from judicious, and the mischief from +injudicious, crossing; and this, in its turn, is seen as part of +the same story, as the good we get from change of air and scene +when we are overworked. I will not amplify; but reversion +to long-lost, or feral, characteristics, the phenomena of old +age, the fact of the reproductive system being generally the last +to arrive at maturity—few further developments occurring in +any organism after this has been attained—the sterility of +many animals in confinement, the development in both males and +females under certain circumstances of the characteristics of the +opposite sex, the latency of memory, the unconsciousness with +which we grow, and indeed perform all familiar actions, these +points, though hitherto, most of them, so apparently inexplicable +that no one even attempted to explain them, became at once +intelligible, if the contentions of “Life and Habit” +were admitted.</p> +<p>Before I had finished writing this book I fell in with +Professor Mivart’s “Genesis of Species,” and +for the first time understood the distinction between the +Lamarckian and Charles-Darwinian systems of evolution. This +had not, so far as I then knew, been as yet made clear to us by +any of our more prominent writers upon the subject of descent +with modification; the distinction was unknown to the general +public, and indeed is only now beginning to be widely +understood. While reading Mr. Mivart’s book, however, +I became aware that I was being faced by two facts, each +incontrovertible, but each, if its leading exponents were to be +trusted, incompatible with the other.</p> +<p>On the one hand there was descent; we could not read Mr. +Darwin’s books and doubt that all, both animals and plants, +were descended from a common source. On the other, there +was design; we could not read Paley and refuse to admit that +design, intelligence, adaptation of means to ends, must have had +a large share in the development of the life we saw around us; it +seemed indisputable that the minds and bodies of all living +beings must have come to be what they are through a wise ordering +and administering of their estates. We could not, +therefore, dispense either with descent or with design, and yet +it seemed impossible to keep both, for those who offered us +descent stuck to it that we could have no design, and those, +again, who spoke so wisely and so well about design would not for +a moment hear of descent with modification.</p> +<p>Each, moreover, had a strong case. Who could reflect +upon rudimentary organs, and grant Paley the kind of design that +alone would content him? And yet who could examine the foot +or the eye, and grant Mr. Darwin his denial of forethought and +plan?</p> +<p>For that Mr. Darwin did deny skill and contrivance in +connection with the greatly preponderating part of organic +developments cannot be and is not now disputed. In the +first chapter of “Evolution Old and New” I brought +forward passages to show how completely he and his followers deny +design, but will here quote one of the latest of the many that +have appeared to the same effect since “Evolution Old and +New” was published; it is by Mr. Romanes, and runs as +follows:—</p> +<p>“It is the <i>very essence</i> of the Darwinian +hypothesis that it only seeks to explain the <i>apparently</i> +purposive variations, or variations of an adaptive kind.” +<a name="citation17a"></a><a href="#footnote17a" +class="citation">[17a]</a></p> +<p>The words “apparently purposive” show that those +organs in animals and plants which at first sight seem to have +been designed with a view to the work they have to do—that +is to say, with a view to future function—had not, +according to Mr. Darwin, in reality any connection with, or +inception in, effort; effort involves purpose and design; they +had therefore no inception in design, however much they might +present the appearance of being designed; the appearance was +delusive; Mr. Romanes correctly declares it to be “the very +essence” of Mr. Darwin’s system to attempt an +explanation of these seemingly purposive variations which shall +be compatible with their having arisen without being in any way +connected with intelligence or design.</p> +<p>As it is indisputable that Mr. Darwin denied design, so +neither can it be doubted that Paley denied descent with +modification. What, then, were the wrong entries in these +two sets of accounts, on the detection and removal of which they +would be found to balance as they ought?</p> +<p>Paley’s weakest place, as already implied, is in the +matter of rudimentary organs; the almost universal presence in +the higher organisms of useless, and sometimes even troublesome, +organs is fatal to the kind of design he is trying to uphold; +granted that there is design, still it cannot be so final and +far-foreseeing as he wishes to make it out. Mr. +Darwin’s weak place, on the other hand, lies, firstly, in +the supposition that because rudimentary organs imply no purpose +now, they could never in time past have done so—that +because they had clearly not been designed with an eye to all +circumstances and all time, they never, therefore, could have +been designed with an eye to any time or any circumstances; and, +secondly, in maintaining that “accidental,” +“fortuitous,” “spontaneous” variations +could be accumulated at all except under conditions that have +never been fulfilled yet, and never will be; in other words, his +weak place lay in the contention (for it comes to this) that +there can be sustained accumulation of bodily wealth, more than +of wealth of any other kind, unless sustained experience, +watchfulness, and good sense preside over the accumulation. +In “Life and Habit,” following Mr. Mivart, and, as I +now find, Mr. Herbert Spencer, I showed (pp. 279–281) how +impossible it was for variations to accumulate unless they were +for the most part underlain by a sustained general principle; but +this subject will be touched upon more fully later on.</p> +<p>The accumulation of accidental variations which owed nothing +to mind either in their inception, or their accumulation, the +pitchforking, in fact, of mind out of the universe, or at any +rate its exclusion from all share worth talking about in the +process of organic development, this was the pill Mr. Darwin had +given us to swallow; but so thickly had he gilded it with descent +with modification, that we did as we were told, swallowed it +without a murmur, were lavish in our expressions of gratitude, +and, for some twenty years or so, through the mouths of our +leading biologists, ordered design peremptorily out of court, if +she so much as dared to show herself. Indeed, we have even +given life pensions to some of the most notable of these +biologists, I suppose in order to reward them for having +hoodwinked us so much to our satisfaction.</p> +<p>Happily the old saying, <i>Naturam expellas furcâ</i>, +<i>tamen usque recurret</i>, still holds true, and the reaction +that has been gaining force for some time will doubtless ere long +brush aside the cobwebs with which those who have a vested +interest in Mr. Darwin’s reputation as a philosopher still +try to fog our outlook. Professor Mivart was, as I have +said, among the first to awaken us to Mr. Darwin’s denial +of design, and to the absurdity involved therein. He well +showed how incredible Mr Darwin’s system was found to be, +as soon as it was fully realised, but there he rather left +us. He seemed to say that we must have our descent and our +design too, but he did not show how we were to manage this with +rudimentary organs still staring us in the face. His work +rather led up to the clearer statement of the difficulty than +either put it before us in so many words, or tried to remove +it. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that the +“Genesis of Species” gave Natural Selection what will +prove sooner or later to be its death-blow, in spite of the +persistence with which many still declare that it has received no +hurt, and the sixth edition of the “Origin of +Species,” published in the following year, bore abundant +traces of the fray. Moreover, though Mr. Mivart gave us no +overt aid, he pointed to the source from which help might come, +by expressly saying that his most important objection to +Neo-Darwinism had no force against Lamarck.</p> +<p>To Lamarck, therefore, I naturally turned, and soon saw that +the theory on which I had been insisting in “Life and +Habit” was in reality an easy corollary on his system, +though one which he does not appear to have caught sight +of. I saw also that his denial of design was only, so to +speak, skin deep, and that his system was in reality +teleological, inasmuch as, to use Isidore Geoffroy’s words, +it makes the organism design itself. In making variations +depend on changed actions, and these, again, on changed views of +life, efforts, and designs, in consequence of changed conditions +of life, he in effect makes effort, intention, will, all of which +involve design (or at any rate which taken together involve it), +underlie progress in organic development. True, he did not +know he was a teleologist, but he was none the less a teleologist +for this. He was an unconscious teleologist, and as such +perhaps more absolutely an upholder of teleology than Paley +himself; but this is neither here nor there; our concern is not +with what people think about themselves, but with what their +reasoning makes it evident that they really hold.</p> +<p>How strange the irony that hides us from ourselves! When +Isidore Geoffroy said that according to Lamarck organisms +designed themselves, <a name="citation20a"></a><a +href="#footnote20a" class="citation">[20a]</a> and endorsed this, +as to a great extent he did, he still does not appear to have +seen that either he or Lamarck were in reality reintroducing +design into organism; he does not appear to have seen this more +than Lamarck himself had seen it, but, on the contrary, like +Lamarck, remained under the impression that he was opposing +teleology or purposiveness.</p> +<p>Of course in one sense he did oppose it; so do we all, if the +word design be taken to intend a very far-foreseeing of minute +details, a riding out to meet trouble long before it comes, a +provision on academic principles for contingencies that are +little likely to arise. We can see no evidence of any such +design as this in nature, and much everywhere that makes against +it. There is no such improvidence as over providence, and +whatever theories we may form about the origin and development of +the universe, we may be sure that it is not the work of one who +is unable to understand how anything can possibly go right unless +he sees to it himself. Nature works departmentally and by +way of leaving details to subordinates. But though those +who see nature thus do indeed deny design of the +prescient-from-all-eternity order, they in no way impugn a method +which is far more in accord with all that we commonly think of as +design. A design which is as incredible as that a ewe +should give birth to a lion becomes of a piece with all that we +observe most frequently if it be regarded rather as an +aggregation of many small steps than as a single large one. +This principle is very simple, but it seems rather difficult to +understand. It has taken several generations before people +would admit it as regards organism even after it was pointed out +to them, and those who saw it as regards organism still failed to +understand it as regards design; an inexorable “Thus far +shalt thou go and no farther” barred them from fruition of +the harvest they should have been the first to reap. The +very men who most insisted that specific difference was the +accumulation of differences so minute as to be often hardly, if +at all, perceptible, could not see that the striking and baffling +phenomena of design in connection with organism admitted of +exactly the same solution as the riddle of organic development, +and should be seen not as a result reached <i>per saltum</i>, but +as an accumulation of small steps or leaps in a given +direction. It was as though those who had insisted on the +derivation of all forms of the steam-engine from the common +kettle, and who saw that this stands in much the same relations +to the engines, we will say, of the Great Eastern steamship as +the amœba to man, were to declare that the Great Eastern +engines were not designed at all, on the ground that no one in +the early kettle days had foreseen so great a future development, +and were unable to understand that a piecemeal <i>solvitur +ambulando</i> design is more omnipresent, all-seeing, and +all-searching, and hence more truly in the strictest sense +design, than any speculative leap of fancy, however bold and even +at times successful.</p> +<p>From Lamarck I went on to Buffon and Erasmus +Darwin—better men both of them than Lamarck, and treated by +him much as he has himself been treated by those who have come +after him—and found that the system of these three writers, +if considered rightly, and if the corollary that heredity is only +a mode of memory were added, would get us out of our dilemma as +regards descent and design, and enable us to keep both. We +could do this by making the design manifested in organism more +like the only design of which we know anything, and therefore the +only design of which we ought to speak—I mean our own.</p> +<p>Our own design is tentative, and neither very far-foreseeing +nor very retrospective; it is a little of both, but much of +neither; it is like a comet with a little light in front of the +nucleus and a good deal more behind it, which ere long, however, +fades away into the darkness; it is of a kind that, though a +little wise before the event, is apt to be much wiser after it, +and to profit even by mischance so long as the disaster is not an +overwhelming one; nevertheless, though it is so interwoven with +luck, there is no doubt about its being design; why, then, should +the design which must have attended organic development be other +than this? If the thing that has been is the thing that +also shall be, must not the thing which is be that which also has +been? Was there anything in the phenomena of organic life +to militate against such a view of design as this? Not only +was there nothing, but this view made things plain, as the +connecting of heredity and memory had already done, which till +now had been without explanation. Rudimentary organs were +no longer a hindrance to our acceptance of design, they became +weighty arguments in its favour.</p> +<p>I therefore wrote “Evolution Old and New,” with +the object partly of backing up “Life and Habit,” and +showing the easy rider it admitted, partly to show how superior +the old view of descent had been to Mr. Darwin’s, and +partly to reintroduce design into organism. I wrote +“Life and Habit” to show that our mental and bodily +acquisitions were mainly stores of memory: I wrote +“Evolution Old and New” to add that the memory must +be a mindful and designing memory.</p> +<p>I followed up these two books with “Unconscious +Memory,” the main object of which was to show how Professor +Hering of Prague had treated the connection between memory and +heredity; to show, again, how substantial was the difference +between Von Hartmann and myself in spite of some little +superficial resemblance; to put forward a suggestion as regards +the physics of memory, and to meet the most plausible objection +which I have yet seen brought against “Life and +Habit.”</p> +<p>Since writing these three books I have published nothing on +the connection between heredity and memory, except a few pages of +remarks on Mr. Romanes’ “Mental Evolution in +Animals” in my book, <a name="citation23a"></a><a +href="#footnote23a" class="citation">[23a]</a> from which I will +draw whatever seems to be more properly placed here. I have +collected many facts that make my case stronger, but am precluded +from publishing them by the reflection that it is strong enough +already. I have said enough in “Life and Habit” +to satisfy any who wish to be satisfied, and those who wish to be +dissatisfied would probably fail to see the force of what I said, +no matter how long and seriously I held forth to them; I believe, +therefore, that I shall do well to keep my facts for my own +private reading and for that of my executors.</p> +<p>I once saw a copy of “Life and Habit” on Mr. +Bogue’s counter, and was told by the very obliging shopman +that a customer had just written something in it which I might +like to see. I said of course I should like to see, and +immediately taking the book read the following—which it +occurs to me that I am not justified in publishing. What +was written ran thus:—</p> +<p>“As a reminder of our pleasant hours on the broad +Atlantic, will Mr. — please accept this book (which I think +contains more truth, and less evidence of it, than any other I +have met with) from his friend —?”</p> +<p>I presume the gentleman had met with the Bible—a work +which lays itself open to a somewhat similar comment. I was +gratified, however, at what I had read, and take this opportunity +of thanking the writer, an American, for having liked my +book. It was so plain he had been relieved at not finding +the case smothered to death in the weight of its own evidences, +that I resolved not to forget the lesson his words had taught +me.</p> +<p>The only writer in connection with “Life and +Habit” to whom I am anxious to reply is Mr. Herbert +Spencer, but before doing this I will conclude the present +chapter with a consideration of some general complaints that have +been so often brought against me that it may be worth while to +notice them.</p> +<p>These general criticisms have resolved themselves mainly into +two.</p> +<p>Firstly, it is said that I ought not to write about biology on +the ground of my past career, which my critics declare to have +been purely literary. I wish I might indulge a reasonable +hope of one day becoming a literary man; the expression is not a +good one, but there is no other in such common use, and this must +excuse it; if a man can be properly called literary, he must have +acquired the habit of reading accurately, thinking attentively, +and expressing himself clearly. He must have endeavoured in +all sorts of ways to enlarge the range of his sympathies so as to +be able to put himself easily <i>en rapport</i> with those whom +he is studying, and those whom he is addressing. If he +cannot speak with tongues himself, he is the interpreter of those +who can—without whom they might as well be silent. I +wish I could see more signs of literary culture among my +scientific opponents; I should find their books much more easy +and agreeable reading if I could; and then they tell me to +satirise the follies and abuses of the age, just as if it was not +this that I was doing in writing about themselves.</p> +<p>What, I wonder, would they say if I were to declare that they +ought not to write books at all, on the ground that their past +career has been too purely scientific to entitle them to a +hearing? They would reply with justice that I should not +bring vague general condemnations, but should quote examples of +their bad writing. I imagine that I have done this more +than once as regards a good many of them, and I dare say I may do +it again in the course of this book; but though I must own to +thinking that the greater number of our scientific men write +abominably, I should not bring this against them if I believed +them to be doing their best to help us; many such men we happily +have, and doubtless always shall have, but they are not those who +push to the fore, and it is these last who are most angry with me +for writing on the subjects I have chosen. They constantly +tell me that I am not a man of science; no one knows this better +than I do, and I am quite used to being told it, but I am not +used to being confronted with the mistakes that I have made in +matters of fact, and trust that this experience is one which I +may continue to spare no pains in trying to avoid.</p> +<p>Nevertheless I again freely grant that I am not a man of +science. I have never said I was. I was educated for +the Church. I was once inside the Linnean Society’s +rooms, but have no present wish to go there again; though not a +man of science, however, I have never affected indifference to +the facts and arguments which men of science have made it their +business to lay before us; on the contrary, I have given the +greater part of my time to their consideration for several years +past. I should not, however, say this unless led to do so +by regard to the interests of theories which I believe to be as +nearly important as any theories can be which do not directly +involve money or bodily convenience.</p> +<p>The second complaint against me is to the effect that I have +made no original experiments, but have taken all my facts at +second hand. This is true, but I do not see what it has to +do with the question. If the facts are sound, how can it +matter whether A or B collected them? If Professor Huxley, +for example, has made a series of valuable original observations +(not that I know of his having done so), why am I to make them +over again? What are fact-collectors worth if the fact +co-ordinators may not rely upon them? It seems to me that +no one need do more than go to the best sources for his facts, +and tell his readers where he got them. If I had had +occasion for more facts I daresay I should have taken the +necessary steps to get hold of them, but there was no difficulty +on this score; every text-book supplied me with all, and more +than all, I wanted; my complaint was that the facts which Mr. +Darwin supplied would not bear the construction he tried to put +upon them; I tried, therefore, to make them bear another which +seemed at once more sound and more commodious; rightly or wrongly +I set up as a builder, not as a burner of bricks, and the +complaint so often brought against me of not having made +experiments is about as reasonable as complaint against an +architect on the score of his not having quarried with his own +hands a single one of the stones which he has used in +building. Let my opponents show that the facts which they +and I use in common are unsound, or that I have misapplied them, +and I will gladly learn my mistake, but this has hardly, to my +knowledge, been attempted. To me it seems that the chief +difference between myself and some of my opponents lies in this, +that I take my facts from them with acknowledgment, and they take +their theories from me—without.</p> +<p>One word more and I have done. I should like to say that +I do not return to the connection between memory and heredity +under the impression that I shall do myself much good by doing +so. My own share in the matter was very small. The +theory that heredity is only a mode of memory is not mine, but +Professor Hering’s. He wrote in 1870, and I not till +1877. I should be only too glad if he would take his theory +and follow it up himself; assuredly he could do so much better +than I can; but with the exception of his one not lengthy address +published some fifteen or sixteen years ago he has said nothing +upon the subject, so far at least as I have been able to +ascertain; I tried hard to draw him in 1880, but could get +nothing out of him. If, again, any of our more influential +writers, not a few of whom evidently think on this matter much as +I do, would eschew ambiguities and tell us what they mean in +plain language, I would let the matter rest in their abler hands, +but of this there does not seem much chance at present.</p> +<p>I wish there was, for in spite of the interest I have felt in +working the theory out and the information I have been able to +collect while doing so, I must confess that I have found it +somewhat of a white elephant. It has got me into the +hottest of hot water, made a literary Ishmael of me, lost me +friends whom I have been sorry to lose, cost me a good deal of +money, done everything to me, in fact, which a good theory ought +not to do. Still, as it seems to have taken up with me, and +no one else is inclined to treat it fairly, I shall continue to +report its developments from time to time as long as life and +health are spared me. Moreover, Ishmaels are not without +their uses, and they are not a drug in the market just now.</p> +<p>I may now go on to Mr. Spencer.</p> +<h2><a name="page28"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +28</span>Chapter II<br /> +Mr. Herbert Spencer</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">Mr. Herbert Spencer</span> wrote to the +<i>Athenæum</i> (April 5, 1884), and quoted certain +passages from the 1855 edition of his “Principles of +Psychology,” “the meanings and implications” +from which he contended were sufficiently clear. The +passages he quoted were as follows:—</p> +<blockquote><p>Though it is manifest that reflex and instinctive +sequences are not determined by the experiences of the +<i>individual</i> organism manifesting them, yet there still +remains the hypothesis that they are determined by the +experiences of the <i>race</i> of organisms forming its ancestry, +which by infinite repetition in countless successive generations +have established these sequences as organic relations (p. +526).</p> +<p>The modified nervous tendencies produced by such new habits of +life are also bequeathed (p. 526).</p> +<p>That is to say, the tendencies to certain combinations of +psychical changes have become organic (p. 527).</p> +<p>The doctrine that the connections among our ideas are +determined by experience must, in consistency, be extended not +only to all the connections established by the accumulated +experiences of every individual, but to all those established by +the accumulated experiences of every race (p. 529).</p> +<p>Here, then, we have one of the simpler forms of instinct +which, under the requisite conditions, must necessarily be +established by accumulated experiences (p. 547).</p> +<p>And manifestly, if the organisation of inner relations, in +correspondence with outer relations, results from a continual +registration of experiences, &c. (p. 551).</p> +<p>On the one hand, Instinct may be regarded as a kind of +organised memory; on the other hand, Memory may be regarded as a +kind of incipient instinct (pp. 555–6).</p> +<p>Memory, then, pertains to all that class of psychical states +which are in process of being organised. It continues so +long as the organising of them continues; and disappears when the +organisation of them is complete. In the advance of the +correspondence, each more complex class of phenomena which the +organism acquires the power of recognising is responded to at +first irregularly and uncertainly; and there is then a weak +remembrance of the relations. By multiplication of +experiences this remembrance becomes stronger, and the response +more certain. By further multiplication of experiences the +internal relations are at last automatically organised in +correspondence with the external ones; and so conscious memory +passes into unconscious or organic memory. At the same +time, a new and still more complex order of experiences is thus +rendered appreciable; the relations they present occupy the +memory in place of the simpler one; they become gradually +organised; and, like the previous ones, are succeeded by others +more complex still (p. 563).</p> +<p>Just as we saw that the establishment of those compound reflex +actions which we call instincts is comprehensible on the +principle that inner relations are, by perpetual repetition, +organised into correspondence with outer relations; so the +establishment of those consolidated, those indissoluble, those +instinctive mental relations constituting our ideas of Space and +Time, is comprehensible on the same principle (p. 579).</p> +</blockquote> +<p>In a book published a few weeks before Mr. Spencer’s +letter appeared <a name="citation29a"></a><a href="#footnote29a" +class="citation">[29a]</a> I had said that though Mr. Spencer at +times closely approached Professor Hering and “Life and +Habit,” he had nevertheless nowhere shown that he +considered memory and heredity to be parts of the same story and +parcel of one another. In his letter to the +<i>Athenæum</i>, indeed, he does not profess to have upheld +this view, except “by implications;” nor yet, though +in the course of the six or seven years that had elapsed since +“Life and Habit” was published I had brought out more +than one book to support my earlier one, had he said anything +during those years to lead me to suppose that I was trespassing +upon ground already taken by himself. Nor, again, had he +said anything which enabled me to appeal to his +authority—which I should have been only too glad to do; at +last, however, he wrote, as I have said, to the +<i>Athenæum</i> a letter which, indeed, made no express +claim, and nowhere mentioned myself, but “the meanings and +implications” from which were this time as clear as could +be desired, and amount to an order to Professor Hering and myself +to stand aside.</p> +<p>The question is, whether the passages quoted by Mr. Spencer, +or any others that can be found in his works, show that he +regarded heredity in all its manifestations as a mode of +memory. I submit that this conception is not derivable from +Mr. Spencer’s writings, and that even the passages in which +he approaches it most closely are unintelligible till read by the +light of Professor Hering’s address and of “Life and +Habit.”</p> +<p>True, Mr. Spencer made abundant use of such expressions as +“the experience of the race,” “accumulated +experiences,” and others like them, but he did not +explain—and it was here the difficulty lay—how a race +could have any experience at all. We know what we mean when +we say that an individual has had experience; we mean that he is +the same person now (in the common use of the words), on the +occasion of some present action, as the one who performed a like +action at some past time or times, and that he remembers how he +acted before, so as to be able to turn his past action to +account, gaining in proficiency through practice. Continued +personality and memory are the elements that constitute +experience; where these are present there may, and commonly will, +be experience; where they are absent the word +“experience” cannot properly be used.</p> +<p>Formerly we used to see an individual as one, and a race as +many. We now see that though this is true as far as it +goes, it is by no means the whole truth, and that in certain +important respects it is the race that is one, and the individual +many. We all admit and understand this readily enough now, +but it was not understood when Mr. Spencer wrote the passages he +adduced in the letter to the <i>Athenæum</i> above referred +to. In the then state of our ideas a race was only a +succession of individuals, each one of them new persons, and as +such incapable of profiting by the experience of its predecessors +except in the very limited number of cases where oral teaching, +or, as in recent times, writing, was possible. The thread +of life was, as I have elsewhere said, remorselessly shorn +between each successive generation, and the importance of the +physical and psychical connection between parents and offspring +had been quite, or nearly quite, lost sight of. It seems +strange how this could ever have been allowed to come about, but +it should be remembered that the Church in the Middle Ages would +strongly discourage attempts to emphasize a connection that would +raise troublesome questions as to who in a future state was to be +responsible for what; and, after all, for nine purposes of life +out of ten the generally received opinion that each person is +himself and nobody else is on many grounds the most +convenient. Every now and then, however, there comes a +tenth purpose, for which the continued personality side of the +connection between successive generations is as convenient as the +new personality side is for the remaining nine, and these tenth +purposes—some of which are not unimportant—are +obscured and fulfilled amiss owing to the completeness with which +the more commonly needed conception has overgrown the other.</p> +<p>Neither view is more true than the other, but the one was +wanted every hour and minute of the day, and was therefore kept, +so to speak, in stock, and in one of the most accessible places +of our mental storehouse, while the other was so seldom asked for +that it became not worth while to keep it. By-and-by it was +found so troublesome to send out for it, and so hard to come by +even then, that people left off selling it at all, and if any one +wanted it he must think it out at home as best he could; this was +troublesome, so by common consent the world decided no longer to +busy itself with the continued personality of successive +generations—which was all very well until it also decided +to busy itself with the theory of descent with +modification. On the introduction of a foe so inimical to +many of our pre-existing ideas the balance of power among them +was upset, and a readjustment became necessary, which is still +far from having attained the next settlement that seems likely to +be reasonably permanent.</p> +<p>To change the illustration, the ordinary view is true for +seven places of decimals, and this commonly is enough; occasions, +however, have now arisen when the error caused by neglect of the +omitted places is appreciably disturbing, and we must have three +or four more. Mr. Spencer showed no more signs of seeing +that he must supply these, and make personal identity continue +between successive generations before talking about inherited (as +opposed to post-natal and educational) experience, than others +had done before him; the race with him, as with every one else +till recently, was not one long individual living indeed in +pulsations, so to speak, but no more losing continued personality +by living in successive generations, than an individual loses it +by living in consecutive days; a race was simply a succession of +individuals, each one of which was held to be an entirely new +person, and was regarded exclusively, or very nearly so, from +this point of view.</p> +<p>When I wrote “Life and Habit” I knew that the +words “experience of the race” sounded familiar, and +were going about in magazines and newspapers, but I did not know +where they came from; if I had, I should have given their +source. To me they conveyed no meaning, and vexed me as an +attempt to make me take stones instead of bread, and to palm off +an illustration upon me as though it were an explanation. +When I had worked the matter out in my own way, I saw that the +illustration, with certain additions, would become an +explanation, but I saw also that neither he who had adduced it +nor any one else could have seen how right he was, till much had +been said which had not, so far as I knew, been said yet, and +which undoubtedly would have been said if people had seen their +way to saying it.</p> +<p>“What is this talk,” I wrote, “which is made +about the experience of the race, as though the experience of one +man could profit another who knows nothing about him? If a +man eats his dinner it nourishes him and not his neighbour; if he +learns a difficult art it is he that can do it and not his +neighbour” (“Life and Habit,” p. 49).</p> +<p>When I wrote thus in 1877, it was not generally seen that +though the father is not nourished by the dinners that the son +eats, yet the son was fed when the father ate before he begot +him.</p> +<p>“Is there any way,” I continued, “of showing +that this experience of the race about which so much is said +without the least attempt to show in what way it may, or does, +become the experience of the individual, is in sober seriousness +the experience of one single being only, who repeats on a great +many different occasions, and in slightly different ways, certain +performances with which he has already become exceedingly +familiar?”</p> +<p>I felt, as every one else must have felt who reflected upon +the expression in question, that it was fallacious till this was +done. When I first began to write “Life and +Habit” I did not believe it could be done, but when I had +gone right up to the end, as it were, of my <i>cu de sac</i>, I +saw the path which led straight to the point I had despaired of +reaching—I mean I saw that personality could not be broken +as between generations, without also breaking it between the +years, days, and moments of a man’s life. What +differentiates “Life and Habit” from the +“Principles of Psychology” is the prominence given to +continued personal identity, and hence to <i>bonâ fide</i> +memory, as between successive generations; but surely this makes +the two books differ widely.</p> +<p>Ideas can be changed to almost any extent in almost any +direction, if the change is brought about gradually and in +accordance with the rules of all development. As in music +we may take almost any possible discord with pleasing effect if +we have prepared and resolved it rightly, so our ideas will +outlive and outgrow almost any modification which is approached +and quitted in such a way as to fuse the old and new +harmoniously. Words are to ideas what the fairy invisible +cloak was to the prince who wore it—only that the prince +was seen till he put on the cloak, whereas ideas are unseen until +they don the robe of words which reveals them to us; the words, +however, and the ideas, should be such as fit each other and +stick to one another in our minds as soon as they are brought +together, or the ideas will fly off, and leave the words void of +that spirit by the aid of which alone they can become transmuted +into physical action and shape material things with their own +impress. Whether a discord is too violent or no, depends on +what we have been accustomed to, and on how widely the new +differs from the old, but in no case can we fuse and assimilate +more than a very little new at a time without exhausting our +tempering power—and hence presently our temper.</p> +<p>Mr. Spencer appears to have forgotten that though <i>de +minimis non curat lex</i>,—though all the laws fail when +applied to trifles,—yet too sudden a change in the manner +in which our ideas are associated is as cataclysmic and +subversive of healthy evolution as are material convulsions, or +too violent revolutions in politics. This must always be +the case, for change is essentially miraculous, and the only +lawful home of the miracle is in the microscopically small. +Here, indeed, miracles were in the beginning, are now, and ever +shall be, but we are deadened if they are required of us on a +scale which is visible to the naked eye. If we are told to +work them our hands fall nerveless down; if, come what may, we +must do or die, we are more likely to die than to succeed in +doing. If we are required to believe them—which only +means to fuse them with our other ideas—we either take the +law into our own hands, and our minds being in the dark fuse +something easier of assimilation, and say we have fused the +miracle; or if we play more fairly and insist on our minds +swallowing and assimilating it, we weaken our judgments, and +<i>pro tanto</i> kill our souls. If we stick out beyond a +certain point we go mad, as fanatics, or at the best make +Coleridges of ourselves; and yet upon a small scale these same +miracles are the breath and essence of life; to cease to work +them is to die. And by miracle I do not merely mean +something new, strange, and not very easy of +comprehension—I mean something which violates every canon +of thought which in the palpable world we are accustomed to +respect; something as alien to, and inconceivable by, us as +contradiction in terms, the destructibility of force or matter, +or the creation of something out of nothing. This, which +when writ large maddens and kills, writ small is our meat and +drink; it attends each minutest and most impalpable detail of the +ceaseless fusion and diffusion in which change appears to us as +consisting, and which we recognise as growth and decay, or as +life and death.</p> +<p>Claude Bernard says, <i>Rien ne nait</i>, <i>rien ne se +crée</i>, <i>tout se continue</i>. <i>La nature ne +nous offre le spectacle d’aucune création</i>, +<i>elle est d’une éternelle continuation</i>; <a +name="citation35a"></a><a href="#footnote35a" +class="citation">[35a]</a> but surely he is insisting upon one +side of the truth only, to the neglect of another which is just +as real, and just as important; he might have said, <i>Rien ne se +continue</i>, <i>tout nait</i>, <i>tout se crée</i>. +<i>La nature ne nous offre le spectacle d’aucune +continuation</i>. <i>Elle est d’une éternelle +création</i>; for change is no less patent a fact than +continuity, and, indeed, the two stand or fall together. +True, discontinuity, where development is normal, is on a very +small scale, but this is only the difference between looking at +distances on a small instead of a large map; we cannot have even +the smallest change without a small partial corresponding +discontinuity; on a small scale—too small, indeed, for us +to cognise—these breaks in continuity, each one of which +must, so far as our understanding goes, rank as a creation, are +as essential a factor of the phenomena we see around us, as is +the other factor that they shall normally be on too small a scale +for us to find it out. Creations, then, there must be, but +they must be so small that practically they are no +creations. We must have a continuity in discontinuity, and +a discontinuity in continuity; that is to say, we can only +conceive the help of change at all by the help of flat +contradiction in terms. It comes, therefore, to this, that +if we are to think fluently and harmoniously upon any subject +into which change enters (and there is no conceivable subject +into which it does not), we must begin by flying in the face of +every rule that professors of the art of thinking have drawn up +for our instruction. These rules may be good enough as +servants, but we have let them become the worst of masters, +forgetting that philosophy is made for man, not man for +philosophy. Logic has been the true Tower of Babel, which +we have thought to build so that we might climb up into the +heavens, and have no more miracle, but see God and live—nor +has confusion of tongues failed to follow on our +presumption. Truly St. Paul said well that the just shall +live by faith; and the question “By what faith?” is a +detail of minor moment, for there are as many faiths as species, +whether of plants or animals, and each of them is in its own way +both living and saving.</p> +<p>All, then, whether fusion or diffusion, whether of ideas or +things, is miraculous. It is the two in one, and at the +same time one in two, which is only two and two making five put +before us in another shape; yet this fusion—so easy to +think so long as it is not thought about, and so unthinkable if +we try to think it—is, as it were, the matrix from which +our more thinkable thought is taken; it is the cloud gathering in +the unseen world from which the waters of life descend in an +impalpable dew. Granted that all, whether fusion or +diffusion, whether of ideas or things, is, if we dwell upon it +and take it seriously, an outrage upon our understandings which +common sense alone enables us to brook; granted that it carries +with it a distinctly miraculous element which should vitiate the +whole process <i>ab initio</i>, still, if we have faith we can so +work these miracles as Orpheus-like to charm denizens of the +unseen world into the seen again—provided we do not look +back, and provided also we do not try to charm half a dozen +Eurydices at a time. To think is to fuse and diffuse ideas, +and to fuse and diffuse ideas is to feed. We can all feed, +and by consequence within reasonable limits we can fuse ideas; or +we can fuse ideas, and by consequence within reasonable limits we +can feed; we know not which comes first, the food or the ideas, +but we must not overtax our strength; the moment we do this we +taste of death.</p> +<p>It is in the closest connection with this that we must chew +our food fine before we can digest it, and that the same food +given in large lumps will choke and kill which in small pieces +feeds us; or, again, that that which is impotent as a pellet may +be potent as a gas. Food is very thoughtful: through +thought it comes, and back through thought it shall return; the +process of its conversion and comprehension within our own system +is mental as well as physical, and here, as everywhere else with +mind and evolution, there must be a cross, but not too wide a +cross—that is to say, there must be a miracle, but not upon +a large scale. Granted that no one can draw a clear line +and define the limits within which a miracle is healthy working +and beyond which it is unwholesome, any more than he can +prescribe the exact degree of fineness to which we must comminute +our food; granted, again, that some can do more than others, and +that at all times all men sport, so to speak, and surpass +themselves, still we know as a general rule near enough, and find +that the strongest can do but very little at a time, and, to +return to Mr. Spencer, the fusion of two such hitherto +unassociated ideas as race and experience was a miracle beyond +our strength.</p> +<p>Assuredly when Mr. Spencer wrote the passages he quoted in the +letter to the <i>Athenæum</i> above referred to, we were +not in the habit of thinking of any one as able to remember +things that had happened before he had been born or thought +of. This notion will still strike many of my non-readers as +harsh and strained; no such discord, therefore, should have been +taken unprepared, and when taken it should have been resolved +with pomp and circumstance. Mr Spencer, however, though he +took it continually, never either prepared it or resolved it at +all, but by using the words “experience of the race” +sprang this seeming paradox upon us, with the result that his +words were barren. They were barren because they were +incoherent; they were incoherent because they were approached and +quitted too suddenly. While we were realising +“experience” our minds excluded “race,” +inasmuch as experience was an idea we had been accustomed +hitherto to connect only with the individual; while realising the +idea “race,” for the same reason, we as a matter of +course excluded experience. We were required to fuse two +ideas that were alien to one another, without having had those +other ideas presented to us which would alone flux them. +The absence of these—which indeed were not immediately +ready to hand, or Mr. Spencer would have doubtless grasped +them—made nonsense of the whole thing; we saw the ideas +propped up as two cards one against the other, on one of Mr. +Spencer’s pages, only to find that they had fallen asunder +before we had turned over to the next, so we put down his book +resentfully, as written by one who did not know what to do with +his meaning even if he had one, or bore it meekly while he +chastised us with scorpions, as Mr. Darwin had done with whips, +according to our temperaments.</p> +<p>I may say, in passing, that the barrenness of incoherent +ideas, and the sterility of widely distant species and genera of +animals and plants, are one in principle—the sterility of +hybrids being just as much due to inability to fuse widely unlike +and unfamiliar ideas into a coherent whole, as barrenness of +ideas is, and, indeed, resolving itself ultimately into neither +more nor less than barrenness of ideas—that is to say, into +inability to think at all, or at any rate to think as their +neighbours do.</p> +<p>If Mr. Spencer had made it clear that the generations of any +race are <i>bonâ fide</i> united by a common personality, +and that in virtue of being so united each generation remembers +(within, of course, the limits to which all memory is subject) +what happened to it while still in the persons of its +progenitors—then his order to Professor Hering and myself +should be immediately obeyed; but this was just what was at once +most wanted, and least done by Mr. Spencer. Even in the +passages given above—passages collected by Mr. Spencer +himself—this point is altogether ignored; make it clear as +Professor Hering made it—put continued personality and +memory in the foreground as Professor Hering did, instead of +leaving them to be discovered “by implications,” and +then such expressions as “accumulated experiences” +and “experience of the race” become luminous; till +this had been done they were <i>Vox et præterea +nihil</i>.</p> +<p>To sum up briefly. The passages quoted by Mr. Spencer +from his “Principles of Psychology” can hardly be +called clear, even now that Professor Hering and others have +thrown light upon them. If, indeed, they had been clear Mr. +Spencer would probably have seen what they necesitated, and found +the way of meeting the difficulties of the case which occurred to +Professor Hering and myself. Till we wrote, very few +writers had even suggested this. The idea that offspring +was only “an elongation or branch proceeding from its +parents” had scintillated in the ingenious brain of Dr. +Erasmus Darwin, and in that of the designer of Jesse tree +windows, but it had kindled no fire; it now turns out that Canon +Kingsley had once called instinct inherited memory, <a +name="citation40a"></a><a href="#footnote40a" +class="citation">[40a]</a> but the idea, if born alive at all, +died on the page on which it saw light: Professor Ray Lankester, +again called attention to Professor Hering’s address +(<i>Nature</i>, July 13, 1876), but no discussion followed, and +the matter dropped without having produced visible effect. +As for offspring remembering in any legitimate sense of the words +what it had done, and what had happened to it, before it was +born, no such notion was understood to have been gravely mooted +till very recently. I doubt whether Mr. Spencer and Mr. +Romanes would accept this even now, when it is put thus +undisguisedly; but this is what Professor Hering and I mean, and +it is the only thing that should be meant, by those who speak of +instinct as inherited memory. Mr Spencer cannot maintain +that these two startling novelties went without saying “by +implication” from the use of such expressions as +“accumulated experiences” or “experience of the +race.”</p> +<h2><a name="page42"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +42</span>Chapter III<br /> +Mr. Herbert Spencer (<i>continued</i>)</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">Whether</span> they ought to have gone or +not, they did not go.</p> +<p>When “Life and Habit” was first published no one +considered Mr. Spencer to be maintaining the phenomena of +heredity to be in reality phenomena of memory. When, for +example, Professor Ray Lankester first called attention to +Professor Hering’s address, he did not understand Mr. +Spencer to be intending this. “Professor +Hering,” he wrote (<i>Nature</i>, July 13, 1876), +“helps us to a comprehensive view of the nature of heredity +and adaptation, by giving us the word ‘memory,’ +conscious or unconscious, for the continuity of Mr. +Spencer’s polar forces or polarities of physiological +units.” He evidently found the prominence given to +memory a help to him which he had not derived from reading Mr. +Spencer’s works.</p> +<p>When, again, he attacked me in the <i>Athenæum</i> +(March 29, 1884), he spoke of my “tardy recognition” +of the fact that Professor Hering had preceded me “in +treating all manifestations of heredity as a form of +memory.” Professor Lankester’s words could have +no force if he held that any other writer, and much less so well +known a writer as Mr. Spencer, had preceded me in putting forward +the theory in question.</p> +<p>When Mr. Romanes reviewed “Unconscious Memory” in +<i>Nature</i> (January 27, 1881) the notion of a +“race-memory,” to use his own words, was still so new +to him that he declared it “simply absurd” to suppose +that it could “possibly be fraught with any benefit to +science,” and with him too it was Professor Hering who had +anticipated me in the matter, not Mr. Spencer.</p> +<p>In his “Mental Evolution in Animals” (p. 296) he +said that Canon Kingsley, writing in 1867, was the first to +advance the theory that instinct is inherited memory; he could +not have said this if Mr. Spencer had been understood to have +been upholding this view for the last thirty years.</p> +<p>Mr. A. R. Wallace reviewed “Life and Habit” in +<i>Nature</i> (March 27, 1879), but he did not find the line I +had taken a familiar one, as he surely must have done if it had +followed easily by implication from Mr. Spencer’s +works. He called it “an ingenious and paradoxical +explanation” which was evidently new to him. He +concluded by saying that “it might yet afford a clue to +some of the deepest mysteries of the organic world.”</p> +<p>Professor Mivart, when he reviewed my books on Evolution in +the <i>American Catholic Quarterly Review</i> (July 1881), said, +“Mr Butler is not only perfectly logical and consistent in +the startling consequences he deduces from his principles, +but,” &c. Professor Mivart could not have found +my consequences startling if they had already been insisted upon +for many years by one of the best-known writers of the day.</p> +<p>The reviewer of “Evolution Old and New” in the +<i>Saturday Review</i> (March 31, 1879), of whom all I can +venture to say is that he or she is a person whose name carries +weight in matters connected with biology, though he (for brevity) +was in the humour for seeing everything objectionable in me that +could be seen, still saw no Mr. Spencer in me. He +said—“Mr Butler’s own particular contribution +to the terminology of Evolution is the phrase two or three times +repeated with some emphasis” (I repeated it not two or +three times only, but whenever and wherever I could venture to do +so without wearying the reader beyond endurance) “oneness +of personality between parents and offspring.” The +writer proceeded to reprobate this in language upon which a +Huxley could hardly improve, but as he declares himself unable to +discover what it means, it may be presumed that the idea of +continued personality between successive generations was new to +him.</p> +<p>When Dr. Francis Darwin called on me a day or two before +“Life and Habit” went to the press, he said the +theory which had pleased him more than any he had seen for some +time was one which referred all life to memory; <a +name="citation44a"></a><a href="#footnote44a" +class="citation">[44a]</a> he doubtless intended “which +referred all the phenomena of heredity to memory.” He +then mentioned Professor Ray Lankester’s article in +<i>Nature</i>, of which I had not heard, but he said nothing +about Mr. Spencer, and spoke of the idea as one which had been +quite new to him.</p> +<p>The above names comprise (excluding Mr. Spencer himself) +perhaps those of the best-known writers on evolution that can be +mentioned as now before the public; it is curious that Mr Spencer +should be the only one of them to see any substantial resemblance +between the “Principles of Psychology” and Professor +Hering’s address and “Life and Habit.”</p> +<p>I ought, perhaps, to say that Mr. Romanes, writing to the +<i>Athenæum</i> (March 8, 1884), took a different view of +the value of the theory of inherited memory to the one he took in +1881.</p> +<p>In 1881 he said it was “simply absurd” to suppose +it could “possibly be fraught with any benefit to +science” or “reveal any truth of profound +significance;” in 1884 he said of the same theory, that +“it formed the backbone of all the previous literature upon +instinct” by Darwin, Spencer, Lewes, Fiske, and Spalding, +“not to mention their numerous followers, and is by all of +them elaborately stated as clearly as any theory can be stated in +words.”</p> +<p>Few except Mr. Romanes will say this. I grant it ought +to “have formed the backbone,” &c., and ought +“to have been elaborately stated,” &c., but when +I wrote “Life and Habit” neither Mr Romanes nor any +one else understood it to have been even glanced at by more than +a very few, and as for having been “elaborately +stated,” it had been stated by Professor Hering as +elaborately as it could be stated within the limits of an address +of only twenty-two pages, but with this exception it had never +been stated at all. It is not too much to say that +“Life and Habit,” when it first came out, was +considered so startling a paradox that people would not believe +in my desire to be taken seriously, or at any rate were able to +pretend that they thought I was not writing seriously.</p> +<p>Mr. Romanes knows this just as well as all must do who keep an +eye on evolution; he himself, indeed, had said (<i>Nature</i>, +January 27, 1881) that so long as I “aimed only at +entertaining” my “readers by such works as +‘Erewhon’ and ‘Life and Habit’” (as +though these books were of kindred character) I was in my proper +sphere. It would be doing too little credit to Mr. +Romanes’ intelligence to suppose him not to have known when +he said this that “Life and Habit” was written as +seriously as my subsequent books on evolution, but it suited him +at the moment to join those who professed to consider it another +book of paradoxes such as, I suppose, “Erewhon” had +been, so he classed the two together. He could not have +done this unless enough people thought, or said they thought, the +books akin, to give colour to his doing so.</p> +<p>One alone of all my reviewers has, to my knowledge, brought +Mr. Spencer against me. This was a writer in the <i>St. +James’s Gazette</i> (December 2, 1880). I challenged +him in a letter which appeared (December 8, 1880), and said, +“I would ask your reviewer to be kind enough to refer your +readers to those passages of Mr. Spencer’s +“Principles of Psychology” which in any direct +intelligible way refer the phenomena of instinct and heredity +generally, to memory on the part of offspring of the action it +<i>bonâ fide</i> took in the persons of its +forefathers.” The reviewer made no reply, and I +concluded, as I have since found correctly, that he could not +find the passages.</p> +<p>True, in his “Principles of Psychology” (vol. ii. +p. 195) Mr. Spencer says that we have only to expand the doctrine +that all intelligence is acquired through experience “so as +to make it include with the experience of each individual the +experiences of all ancestral individuals,” &c. +This is all very good, but it is much the same as saying, +“We have only got to stand on our heads and we shall be +able to do so and so.” We did not see our way to +standing on our heads, and Mr. Spencer did not help us; we had +been accustomed, as I am afraid I must have said <i>usque ad +nauseam</i> already, to lose sight of the physical connection +existing between parents and offspring; we understood from the +marriage service that husband and wife were in a sense one flesh, +but not that parents and children were so also; and without this +conception of the matter, which in its way is just as true as the +more commonly received one, we could not extend the experience of +parents to offspring. It was not in the bond or +<i>nexus</i> of our ideas to consider experience as appertaining +to more than a single individual in the common acceptance of the +term; these two ideas were so closely bound together that +wherever the one went the other went perforce. Here, +indeed, in the very passage of Mr. Spencer’s just referred +to, the race is throughout regarded as “a series of +individuals”—without an attempt to call attention to +that other view, in virtue of which we are able to extend to many +an idea we had been accustomed to confine to one.</p> +<p>In his chapter on Memory, Mr. Spencer certainly approaches the +Heringian view. He says, “On the one hand, Instinct +may be regarded as a kind of organised memory; on the other, +Memory may be regarded as a kind of incipient instinct” +(“Principles of Psychology,” ed. 2, vol. i. p. +445). Here the ball has fallen into his hands, but if he +had got firm hold of it he could not have written, +“Instinct <i>may be</i> regarded as <i>a kind of</i>, +&c.;” to us there is neither “may be regarded +as” nor “kind of” about it; we require, +“Instinct is inherited memory,” with an explanation +making it intelligible how memory can come to be inherited at +all. I do not like, again, calling memory “a kind of +incipient instinct;” as Mr. Spencer puts them the words +have a pleasant antithesis, but “instinct is inherited +memory” covers all the ground, and to say that memory is +inherited instinct is surplusage.</p> +<p>Nor does he stick to it long when he says that “instinct +is a kind of organised memory,” for two pages later he says +that memory, to be memory at all, must be tolerably conscious or +deliberate; he, therefore (vol. i. p. 447), denies that there can +be such a thing as unconscious memory; but without this it is +impossible for us to see instinct as the “kind of organised +memory” which he has just been calling it, inasmuch as +instinct is notably undeliberate and unreflecting.</p> +<p>A few pages farther on (vol. i. p. 452) he finds himself +driven to unconscious memory after all, and says that +“conscious memory passes into unconscious or organic +memory.” Having admitted unconscious memory, he +declares (vol. i. p. 450) that “as fast as those +connections among psychical states, which we form in memory, grow +by constant repetition automatic—they <i>cease to be part +of memory</i>,” or, in other words, he again denies that +there can be an unconscious memory.</p> +<p>Mr. Spencer doubtless saw that he was involved in +contradiction in terms, and having always understood that +contradictions in terms were very dreadful things—which, of +course, under some circumstances they are—thought it well +so to express himself that his readers should be more likely to +push on than dwell on what was before them at the moment. I +should be the last to complain of him merely on the ground that +he could not escape contradiction in terms: who can? When +facts conflict, contradict one another, melt into one another as +the colours of the spectrum so insensibly that none can say where +one begins and the other ends, contradictions in terms become +first fruits of thought and speech. They are the basis of +intellectual consciousness, in the same way that a physical +obstacle is the basis of physical sensation. No opposition, +no sensation, applies as much to the psychical as to the physical +kingdom, as soon as these two have got well above the horizon of +our thoughts and can be seen as two. No contradiction, no +consciousness; no cross, no crown; contradictions are the very +small deadlocks without which there is no going; going is our +sense of a succession of small impediments or deadlocks; it is a +succession of cutting Gordian knots, which on a small scale +please or pain as the case may be; on a larger, give an ecstasy +of pleasure, or shock to the extreme of endurance; and on a still +larger, kill whether they be on the right side or the +wrong. Nature, as I said in “Life and Habit,” +hates that any principle should breed hermaphroditically, but +will give to each an helpmeet for it which shall cross it and be +the undoing of it; and in the undoing, do; and in the doing, +undo, and so <i>ad infinitum</i>. Cross-fertilisation is +just as necessary for continued fertility of ideas as for that of +organic life, and the attempt to frown this or that down merely +on the ground that it involves contradiction in terms, without at +the same time showing that the contradiction is on a larger scale +than healthy thought can stomach, argues either small sense or +small sincerity on the part of those who make it. The +contradictions employed by Mr. Spencer are objectionable, not on +the ground of their being contradictions at all, but on the +ground of their being blinked, and used unintelligently.</p> +<p>But though it is not possible for any one to get a clear +conception of Mr. Spencer’s meaning, we may say with more +confidence what it was that he did not mean. He did not +mean to make memory the keystone of his system; he has none of +that sense of the unifying, binding force of memory which +Professor Hering has so well expressed, nor does he show any +signs of perceiving the far-reaching consequences that ensue if +the phenomena of heredity are considered as phenomena of +memory. Thus, when he is dealing with the phenomena of old +age (vol. i. p. 538, ed. 2) he does not ascribe them to lapse and +failure of memory, nor surmise the principle underlying +longevity. He never mentions memory in connection with +heredity without presently saying something which makes us +involuntarily think of a man missing an easy catch at cricket; it +is only rarely, however, that he connects the two at all. I +have only been able to find the word “inherited” or +any derivative of the verb “to inherit” in connection +with memory once in all the 1300 long pages of the +“Principles of Psychology.” It occurs in vol +ii. p. 200, 2d ed., where the words stand, “Memory, +inherited or acquired.” I submit that this was +unintelligible when Mr. Spencer wrote it, for want of an +explanation which he never gave; I submit, also, that he could +not have left it unexplained, nor yet as an unrepeated expression +not introduced till late in his work, if he had had any idea of +its pregnancy.</p> +<p>At any rate, whether he intended to imply what he now implies +that he intended to imply (for Mr. Spencer, like the late Mr. +Darwin, is fond of qualifying phrases), I have shown that those +most able and willing to understand him did not take him to mean +what he now appears anxious to have it supposed that he +meant. Surely, moreover, if he had meant it he would have +spoken sooner, when he saw his meaning had been missed. I +can, however, have no hesitation in saying that if I had known +the “Principles of Psychology” earlier, as well as I +know the work now, I should have used it largely.</p> +<p>It may be interesting, before we leave Mr. Spencer, to see +whether he even now assigns to continued personality and memory +the place assigned to it by Professor Hering and myself. I +will therefore give the concluding words of the letter to the +<i>Athenæum</i> already referred to, in which he tells us +to stand aside. He writes “I still hold that +inheritance of functionally produced modifications is the chief +factor throughout the higher stages of organic evolution, bodily +as well as mental (see ‘Principles of Biology,’ i. +166), while I recognise the truth that throughout the lower +stages survival of the fittest is the chief factor, and in the +lowest the almost exclusive factor.”</p> +<p>This is the same confused and confusing utterance which Mr. +Spencer has been giving us any time this thirty years. +According to him the fact that variations can be inherited and +accumulated has less to do with the first development of organic +life, than the fact that if a square organism happens to get into +a square hole, it will live longer and more happily than a square +organism which happens to get into a round one; he declares +“the survival of the fittest”—and this is +nothing but the fact that those who “fit” best into +their surroundings will live longest and most +comfortably—to have more to do with the development of the +amœba into, we will say, a mollusc than heredity +itself. True, “inheritance of functionally produced +modifications” is allowed to be the chief factor throughout +the “higher stages of organic evolution,” but it has +very little to do in the lower; in these “the almost +exclusive factor” is not heredity, or inheritance, but +“survival of the fittest.”</p> +<p>Of course we know that Mr. Spencer does not believe this; of +course, also, all who are fairly well up in the history of the +development theory will see why Mr. Spencer has attempted to draw +this distinction between the “factors” of the +development of the higher and lower forms of life; but no matter +how or why Mr. Spencer has been led to say what he has, he has no +business to have said it. What can we think of a writer +who, after so many years of writing upon his subject, in a +passage in which he should make his meaning doubly clear, +inasmuch as he is claiming ground taken by other writers, +declares that though hereditary use and disuse, or, to use his +own words, “the inheritance of functionally produced +modifications,” is indeed very important in connection with +the development of the higher forms of life, yet heredity itself +has little or nothing to do with that of the lower? +Variations, whether produced functionally or not, can only be +perpetuated and accumulated because they can be +inherited;—and this applies just as much to the lower as to +the higher forms of life; the question which Professor Hering and +I have tried to answer is, “How comes it that anything can +be inherited at all? In virtue of what power is it that +offspring can repeat and improve upon the performances of their +parents?” Our answer was, “Because in a very +valid sense, though not perhaps in the most usually understood, +there is continued personality and an abiding memory between +successive generations.” How does Mr. Spencer’s +confession of faith touch this? If any meaning can be +extracted from his words, he is no more supporting this view now +than he was when he wrote the passages he has adduced to show +that he was supporting it thirty years ago; but after all no +coherent meaning can be got out of Mr. Spencer’s +letter—except, of course, that Professor Hering and myself +are to stand aside. I have abundantly shown that I am very +ready to do this in favour of Professor Hering, but see no reason +for admitting Mr. Spencer’s claim to have been among the +forestallers of “Life and Habit.”</p> +<h2><a name="page52"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +52</span>Chapter IV <a name="citation52a"></a><a +href="#footnote52a" class="citation">[52a]</a><br /> +Mr. Romanes’ “Mental Evolution in Animals”</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">Without</span> raising the unprofitable +question how Mr. Romanes, in spite of the indifference with which +he treated the theory of Inherited Memory in 1881, came, in 1883, +to be sufficiently imbued with a sense of its importance, I still +cannot afford to dispense with the weight of his authority, and +in this chapter will show how closely he not infrequently +approaches the Heringian position.</p> +<p>Thus, he says that the analogies between the memory with which +we are familiar in daily life and hereditary memory “are so +numerous and precise” as to justify us in considering them +to be of essentially the same kind. <a name="citation52b"></a><a +href="#footnote52b" class="citation">[52b]</a></p> +<p>Again, he says that although the memory of milk shown by +new-born infants is “at all events in large part +hereditary, it is none the less memory” of a certain kind. +<a name="citation52c"></a><a href="#footnote52c" +class="citation">[52c]</a></p> +<p>Two lines lower down he writes of “hereditary memory or +instinct,” thereby implying that instinct is +“hereditary memory.” “It makes no +essential difference,” he says, “whether the past +sensation was actually experienced by the individual itself, or +bequeathed it, so to speak, by its ancestors. <a +name="citation52d"></a><a href="#footnote52d" +class="citation">[52d]</a> For it makes no essential +difference whether the nervous changes . . . were occasioned +during the life-time of the individual or during that of the +species, and afterwards impressed by heredity on the +individual.”</p> +<p>Lower down on the same page he writes:—</p> +<p>“As showing how close is the connection between +hereditary memory and instinct,” &c.</p> +<p>And on the following page:—</p> +<p>“And this shows how closely the phenomena of hereditary +memory are related to those of individual memory: at this stage . +. . it is practically impossible to disentangle the effects of +hereditary memory from those of the individual.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Another point which we have here to consider is the +part which heredity has played in forming the perceptive faculty +of the individual prior to its own experience. We have +already seen that heredity plays an important part in forming +memory of ancestral experiences, and thus it is that many animals +come into the world with their power of perception already +largely developed. The wealth of ready-formed information, +and therefore of ready-made powers of perception, with which many +newly-born or newly-hatched animals are provided, is so great and +so precise that it scarcely requires to be supplemented by the +subsequent experience of the individual.” <a +name="citation53a"></a><a href="#footnote53a" +class="citation">[53a]</a></p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Instincts probably owe their origin and development to +one or other of the two principles.</p> +<p>“I. The first mode of origin consists in natural +selection or survival of the fittest, continuously preserving +actions, &c. &c.</p> +<p>“II. The second mode of origin is as +follows:—By the effects of habit in successive generations, +actions which were originally intelligent become as it were +stereotyped into permanent instincts. Just as in the +lifetime of the individual adjustive actions which were +originally intelligent may by frequent repetition become +automatic, so in the lifetime of species actions originally +intelligent may by frequent repetition and heredity so write +their effects on the nervous system that the latter is prepared, +even before individual experience, to perform adjustive actions +mechanically which in previous generations were performed +intelligently. This mode of origin of instincts has been +appropriately called (by Lewes—see “Problems of Life +and Mind” <a name="citation54a"></a><a href="#footnote54a" +class="citation">[54a]</a>) the ‘lapsing of +intelligence.’” <a name="citation54b"></a><a +href="#footnote54b" class="citation">[54b]</a></p> +<p>I may say in passing that in spite of the great stress laid by +Mr. Romanes both in his “Mental Evolution in Animals” +and in his letters to the <i>Athenæum</i> in March 1884, on +Natural Selection as an originator and developer of instinct, he +very soon afterwards let the Natural Selection part of the story +go as completely without saying as I do myself, or as Mr. Darwin +did during the later years of his life. Writing to +<i>Nature</i>, April 10, 1884, he said: “To deny <i>that +experience in the course of successive generations is the source +of instinct</i>, is not to meet by way of argument the enormous +mass of evidence which goes to prove <i>that this is the +case</i>.” Here, then, instinct is referred, without +reservation, to “experience in successive +generations,” and this is nonsense unless explained as +Professor Hering and I explain it. Mr. Romanes’ +words, in fact, amount to an unqualified acceptance of the +chapter “Instinct as Inherited Memory” given in +“Life and Habit,” of which Mr. Romanes in March 1884 +wrote in terms which it is not necessary to repeat.</p> +<p>Later on:—</p> +<p>“That ‘practice makes perfect’ is a matter, +as I have previously said, of daily observation. Whether we +regard a juggler, a pianist, or a billiard-player, a child +learning his lesson or an actor his part by frequently repeating +it, or a thousand other illustrations of the same process, we see +at once that there is truth in the cynical definition of a man as +a ‘bundle of habits.’ And the same, of course, +is true of animals.” <a name="citation55a"></a><a +href="#footnote55a" class="citation">[55a]</a></p> +<p>From this Mr. Romanes goes on to show “that automatic +actions and conscious habits may be inherited,” <a +name="citation55b"></a><a href="#footnote55b" +class="citation">[55b]</a> and in the course of doing this +contends that “instincts may be lost by disuse, and +conversely that they may be acquired as instincts by the +hereditary transmission of ancestral experience.”</p> +<p>On another page Mr. Romanes says:—</p> +<p>“Let us now turn to the second of these two assumptions, +viz., that some at least among migratory birds must possess, by +inheritance alone, a very precise knowledge of the particular +direction to be pursued. It is without question an +astonishing fact that a young cuckoo should be prompted to leave +its foster parents at a particular season of the year, and +without any guide to show the course previously taken by its own +parents, but this is a fact which must be met by any theory of +instinct which aims at being complete. Now upon our own +theory it can only be met by taking it to be due to inherited +memory.”</p> +<p>A little lower Mr. Romanes says: “Of what kind, then, is +the inherited memory on which the young cuckoo (if not also other +migratory birds) depends? We can only answer, of the same +kind, whatever this may be, as that upon which the old bird +depends.” <a name="citation55c"></a><a href="#footnote55c" +class="citation">[55c]</a></p> +<p>I have given above most of the more marked passages which I +have been able to find in Mr. Romanes’ book which attribute +instinct to memory, and which admit that there is no fundamental +difference between the kind of memory with which we are all +familiar and hereditary memory as transmitted from one generation +to another.</p> +<p>But throughout his work there are passages which suggest, +though less obviously, the same inference.</p> +<p>The passages I have quoted show that Mr. Romanes is upholding +the same opinions as Professor Hering’s and my own, but +their effect and tendency is more plain here than in Mr +Romanes’ own book, where they are overlaid by nearly 400 +long pages of matter which is not always easy of +comprehension.</p> +<p>Moreover, at the same time that I claim the weight of Mr. +Romanes’ authority, I am bound to admit that I do not find +his support satisfactory. The late Mr. Darwin +himself—whose mantle seems to have fallen more especially +and particularly on Mr. Romanes—could not contradict +himself more hopelessly than Mr. Romanes often does. Indeed +in one of the very passages I have quoted in order to show that +Mr. Romanes accepts the phenomena of heredity as phenomena of +memory, he speaks of “heredity as playing an important part +<i>in forming memory</i> of ancestral experiences;” so +that, whereas I want him to say that the phenomena of heredity +are due to memory, he will have it that the memory is due to the +heredity, which seems to me absurd.</p> +<p>Over and over again Mr. Romanes insists that it is heredity +which does this or that. Thus it is “<i>heredity with +natural selection which adapt</i> the anatomical plan of the +ganglia.” <a name="citation56a"></a><a href="#footnote56a" +class="citation">[56a]</a> It is heredity which impresses +nervous changes on the individual. <a name="citation56b"></a><a +href="#footnote56b" class="citation">[56b]</a> “In +the lifetime of species actions originally intelligent may by +frequent repetition and heredity,” &c.; <a +name="citation56c"></a><a href="#footnote56c" +class="citation">[56c]</a> but he nowhere tells us what heredity +is any more than Messrs. Herbert Spencer, Darwin, and Lewes have +done. This, however, is exactly what Professor Hering, whom +I have unwittingly followed, does. He resolves all +phenomena of heredity, whether in respect of body or mind, into +phenomena of memory. He says in effect, “A man grows +his body as he does, and a bird makes her nest as she does, +because both man and bird remember having grown body and made +nest as they now do, or very nearly so, on innumerable past +occasions.” He thus, as I have said on an earlier +page, reduces life from an equation of say 100 unknown quantities +to one of 99 only by showing that heredity and memory, two of the +original 100 unknown quantities, are in reality part of one and +the same thing.</p> +<p>That he is right Mr. Romanes seems to me to admit, though in a +very unsatisfactory way.</p> +<p>What, for example, can be more unsatisfactory than the +following?—Mr. Romanes says that the most fundamental +principle of mental operation is that of memory, and that this +“is the <i>conditio sine quâ non</i> of all mental +life” (page 35).</p> +<p>I do not understand Mr. Romanes to hold that there is any +living being which has no mind at all, and I do understand him to +admit that development of body and mind are closely +interdependent.</p> +<p>If, then, “the most fundamental principle” of mind +is memory, it follows that memory enters also as a fundamental +principle into development of body. For mind and body are +so closely connected that nothing can enter largely into the one +without correspondingly affecting the other.</p> +<p>On a later page Mr. Romanes speaks point-blank of the new-born +child as “<i>embodying</i> the results of a great mass of +<i>hereditary experience</i>” (p. 77), so that what he is +driving at can be collected by those who take trouble, but is not +seen until we call up from our own knowledge matter whose +relevancy does not appear on the face of it, and until we connect +passages many pages asunder, the first of which may easily be +forgotten before we reach the second. There can be no +doubt, however, that Mr. Romanes does in reality, like Professor +Hering and myself, regard development, whether of mind or body, +as due to memory, for it is now pretty generally seen to be +nonsense to talk about “hereditary experience” or +“hereditary memory” if anything else is intended.</p> +<p>I have said above that on page 113 of his recent work Mr. +Romanes declares the analogies between the memory with which we +are familiar in daily life, and hereditary memory, to be +“so numerous and precise” as to justify us in +considering them as of one and the same kind.</p> +<p>This is certainly his meaning, but, with the exception of the +words within inverted commas, it is not his language. His +own words are these:—</p> +<p>“Profound, however, as our ignorance unquestionably is +concerning the physical substratum of memory, I think we are at +least justified in regarding this substratum as the same both in +ganglionic or organic, and in the conscious or psychological +memory, seeing that the analogies between them are so numerous +and precise. Consciousness is but an adjunct which arises +when the physical processes, owing to infrequency of repetition, +complexity of operation, or other causes, involve what I have +before called ganglionic friction.”</p> +<p>I submit that I have correctly translated Mr. Romanes’ +meaning, and also that we have a right to complain of his not +saying what he has to say in words which will involve less +“ganglionic friction” on the part of the reader.</p> +<p>Another example may be found on p. 43 of Mr. Romanes’ +book. “Lastly,” he writes, “just as +innumerable special mechanisms of muscular co-ordinations are +found to be inherited, innumerable special associations of ideas +are found to be the same, and in one case as in the other the +strength of the organically imposed connection is found to bear a +direct proportion to the frequency with which in the history of +the species it has occurred.”</p> +<p>Mr. Romanes is here intending what the reader will find +insisted on on p. 51 of “Life and Habit;” but how +difficult he has made what could have been said intelligibly +enough, if there had been nothing but the reader’s comfort +to be considered. Unfortunately that seems to have been by +no means the only thing of which Mr. Romanes was thinking, or +why, after implying and even saying over and over again that +instinct is inherited habit due to inherited memory, should he +turn sharply round on p. 297 and praise Mr. Darwin for trying to +snuff out “the well-known doctrine of inherited habit as +advanced by Lamarck”? The answer is not far to +seek. It is because Mr. Romanes did not merely want to tell +us all about instinct, but wanted also, if I may use a homely +metaphor, to hunt with the hounds and run with the hare at one +and the same time.</p> +<p>I remember saying that if the late Mr. Darwin “had told +us what the earlier evolutionists said, why they said it, wherein +he differed from them, and in what way he proposed to set them +straight, he would have taken a course at once more agreeable +with usual practice, and more likely to remove misconception from +his own mind and from those of his readers.” <a +name="citation59a"></a><a href="#footnote59a" +class="citation">[59a]</a> This I have no doubt was one of +the passages which made Mr. Romanes so angry with me. I can +find no better words to apply to Mr. Romanes himself. He +knows perfectly well what others have written about the +connection between heredity and memory, and he knows no less well +that so far as he is intelligible at all he is taking the same +view that they have taken. If he had begun by saying what +they had said, and had then improved on it, I for one should have +been only too glad to be improved upon.</p> +<p>Mr. Romanes has spoiled his book just because this plain +old-fashioned method of procedure was not good enough for +him. One-half the obscurity which makes his meaning so hard +to apprehend is due to exactly the same cause as that which has +ruined so much of the late Mr. Darwin’s work—I mean +to a desire to appear to be differing altogether from others with +whom he knew himself after all to be in substantial +agreement. He adopts, but (probably quite unconsciously) in +his anxiety to avoid appearing to adopt, he obscures what he is +adopting.</p> +<p>Here, for example, is Mr. Romanes’ definition of +instinct:—</p> +<p>“Instinct is reflex action into which there is imported +the element of consciousness. The term is therefore a +generic one, comprising all those faculties of mind which are +concerned in conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to +individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the +relation between means employed and ends attained, but similarly +performed under similar and frequently recurring circumstances by +all the individuals of the same species.” <a +name="citation60a"></a><a href="#footnote60a" +class="citation">[60a]</a></p> +<p>If Mr. Romanes would have been content to build frankly upon +Professor Hering’s foundation, the soundness of which he +has elsewhere abundantly admitted, he might have said—</p> +<p>“Instinct is knowledge or habit acquired in past +generations—the new generation remembering what happened to +it before it parted company with the old. More briefly, +Instinct is inherited memory.” Then he might have +added a rider—</p> +<p>“If a habit is acquired as a new one, during any given +lifetime, it is not an instinct. If having been acquired in +one lifetime it is transmitted to offspring, it is an instinct in +the offspring, though it was not an instinct in the parent. +If the habit is transmitted partially, it must be considered as +partly instinctive and partly acquired.”</p> +<p>This is easy; it tells people how they may test any action so +as to know what they ought to call it; it leaves well alone by +avoiding all such debatable matters as reflex action, +consciousness, intelligence, purpose, knowledge of purpose, +&c.; it both introduces the feature of inheritance which is +the one mainly distinguishing instinctive from so-called +intelligent actions, and shows the manner in which these last +pass into the first, that is to say, by way of memory and +habitual repetition; finally it points the fact that the new +generation is not to be looked upon as a new thing, but (as Dr. +Erasmus Darwin long since said <a name="citation61a"></a><a +href="#footnote61a" class="citation">[61a]</a>) as “a +branch or elongation” of the one immediately preceding +it.</p> +<p>In Mr. Darwin’s case it is hardly possible to exaggerate +the waste of time, money and trouble that has been caused, by his +not having been content to appear as descending with modification +like other people from those who went before him. It will +take years to get the evolution theory out of the mess in which +Mr. Darwin has left it. He was heir to a discredited truth; +he left behind him an accredited fallacy. Mr. Romanes, if +he is not stopped in time, will get the theory connecting +heredity and memory into just such another muddle as Mr. Darwin +has got evolution, for surely the writer who can talk about +“<i>heredity being able to work up</i> the faculty of +homing into the instinct of migration,” <a +name="citation61b"></a><a href="#footnote61b" +class="citation">[61b]</a> or of “the principle of +(natural) selection combining with that of lapsing intelligence +to the formation of a joint result,” <a +name="citation61c"></a><a href="#footnote61c" +class="citation">[61c]</a> is little likely to depart from the +usual methods of scientific procedure with advantage either to +himself or any one else. Fortunately Mr. Romanes is not Mr. +Darwin, and though he has certainly got Mr. Darwin’s +mantle, and got it very much too, it will not on Mr. +Romanes’ shoulders hide a good deal that people were not +going to observe too closely while Mr. Darwin wore it.</p> +<p>I ought to say that the late Mr. Darwin appears himself +eventually to have admitted the soundness of the theory +connecting heredity and memory. Mr. Romanes quotes a letter +written by Mr. Darwin in the last year of his life, in which he +speaks of an intelligent action gradually becoming +“<i>instinctive</i>, <i>i.e.</i>, <i>memory transmitted +from one generation to another</i>.” <a +name="citation62a"></a><a href="#footnote62a" +class="citation">[62a]</a></p> +<p>Briefly, the stages of Mr. Darwin’s opinion upon the +subject of hereditary memory are as follows:—</p> +<p>1859. “It would be <i>the most serious error</i> +to suppose that the greater number of instincts have been +acquired by habit in one generation and transmitted by +inheritance to succeeding generations.” <a +name="citation62b"></a><a href="#footnote62b" +class="citation">[62b]</a> And this more especially applies +to the instincts of many ants.</p> +<p>1876. “It would be a <i>serious error</i> to +suppose,” &c., as before. <a name="citation62c"></a><a +href="#footnote62c" class="citation">[62c]</a></p> +<p>1881. “We should remember <i>what a mass of +inherited knowledge</i> is crowded into the minute brain of a +worker ant.” <a name="citation62d"></a><a +href="#footnote62d" class="citation">[62d]</a></p> +<p>1881 or 1882. Speaking of a given habitual action Mr. +Darwin writes: “It does not seem to me at all incredible +that this action [and why this more than any other habitual +action?] should then become instinctive:” i.e., <i>memory +transmitted from one generation to another</i>. <a +name="citation62e"></a><a href="#footnote62e" +class="citation">[62e]</a></p> +<p>And yet in 1839, or thereabouts, Mr. Darwin had pretty nearly +grasped the conception from which until the last year or two of +his life he so fatally strayed; for in his contribution to the +volumes giving an account of the voyages of the <i>Adventure</i> +and <i>Beagle</i>, he wrote: “Nature by making habit +omnipotent and its effects hereditary, has fitted the Fuegian for +the climate and productions of his country” (p. 237).</p> +<p>What is the secret of the long departure from the simple +common-sense view of the matter which he took when he was a young +man? I imagine simply what I have referred to in the +preceding chapter, over-anxiety to appear to be differing from +his grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck.</p> +<p>I believe I may say that Mr. Darwin before he died not only +admitted the connection between memory and heredity, but came +also to see that he must readmit that design in organism which he +had so many years opposed. For in the preface to Hermann +Müller’s “Fertilisation of Flowers,” <a +name="citation63a"></a><a href="#footnote63a" +class="citation">[63a]</a> which bears a date only a very few +weeks prior to Mr. Darwin’s death, I find him +saying:—“Design in nature has for a long time deeply +interested many men, and though the subject must now be looked at +from a somewhat different point of view from what was formerly +the case, it is not on that account rendered less +interesting.” This is mused forth as a general gnome, +and may mean anything or nothing: the writer of the letterpress +under the hieroglyph in Old Moore’s Almanac could not be +more guarded; but I think I know what it does mean.</p> +<p>I cannot, of course, be sure; Mr. Darwin did not probably +intend that I should; but I assume with confidence that whether +there is design in organism or no, there is at any rate design in +this passage of Mr. Darwin’s. This, we may be sure, +is not a fortuitous variation; and, moreover, it is introduced +for some reason which made Mr. Darwin think it worth while to go +out of his way to introduce it. It has no fitness in its +connection with Hermann Müller’s book, for what little +Hermann Müller says about teleology at all is to condemn it; +why, then, should Mr. Darwin muse here of all places in the world +about the interest attaching to design in organism? Neither +has the passage any connection with the rest of the +preface. There is not another word about design, and even +here Mr. Darwin seems mainly anxious to face both ways, and pat +design as it were on the head while not committing himself to any +proposition which could be disputed.</p> +<p>The explanation is sufficiently obvious. Mr Darwin +wanted to hedge. He saw that the design which his works had +been mainly instrumental in pitchforking out of organisms no less +manifestly designed than a burglar’s jemmy is designed, had +nevertheless found its way back again, and that though, as I +insisted in “Evolution Old and New,” and +“Unconscious Memory,” it must now be placed within +the organism instead of outside it, as “was formerly the +case,” it was not on that account any the +less—design, as well as interesting.</p> +<p>I should like to have seen Mr. Darwin say this more +explicitly. Indeed I should have liked to have seen Mr. +Darwin say anything at all about the meaning of which there could +be no mistake, and without contradicting himself elsewhere; but +this was not Mr. Darwin’s manner.</p> +<p>In passing I will give another example of Mr Darwin’s +manner when he did not quite dare even to hedge. It is to +be found in the preface which he wrote to Professor +Weismann’s “Studies in the Theory of Descent,” +published in 1881.</p> +<p>“Several distinguished naturalists,” says Mr. +Darwin, “maintain with much confidence that organic beings +tend to vary and to rise in the scale, independently of the +conditions to which they and their progenitors have been exposed; +whilst others maintain that all variation is due to such +exposure, though the manner in which the environment acts is as +yet quite unknown. At the present time there is hardly any +question in biology of more importance than this of the nature +and causes of variability; and the reader will find in the +present work an able discussion on the whole subject, which will +probably lead him to pause before he admits the existence of an +innate tendency to perfectibility”—or towards +<i>being able to be perfected</i>.</p> +<p>I could find no able discussion upon the whole subject in +Professor Weismann’s book. There was a little +something here and there, but not much.</p> +<p>It may be expected that I should say something here about Mr. +Romanes’ latest contribution to biology—I mean his +theory of physiological selection, of which the two first +instalments have appeared in <i>Nature</i> just as these pages +are leaving my hands, and many months since the foregoing, and +most of the following chapters were written. I admit to +feeling a certain sense of thankfulness that they did not appear +earlier; as it is, my book is too far advanced to be capable of +further embryonic change, and this must be my excuse for saying +less about Mr. Romanes’ theory than I might perhaps +otherwise do. I cordially, however, agree with the +<i>Times</i>, which says that “Mr. George Romanes appears +to be the biological investigator on whom the mantle of Mr. +Darwin has most conspicuously descended” (August 16, +1886). Mr. Romanes is just the person whom the late Mr. +Darwin would select to carry on his work, and Mr. Darwin was just +the kind of person towards whom Mr. Romanes would find himself +instinctively attracted.</p> +<p>The <i>Times</i> continues—“The position which Mr. +Romanes takes up is the result of his perception shared by many +evolutionists, that the theory of natural selection is not really +a theory of the origin of species. . . .” What, then, +becomes of Mr. Darwin’s most famous work, which was written +expressly to establish natural selection as the main means of +organic modification? “The new factor which Mr. +Romanes suggests,” continues the <i>Times</i>, “is +that at a certain stage of development of varieties in a state of +nature a change takes place in their reproductive systems, +rendering those which differ in some particulars mutually +infertile, and thus the formation of new permanent species takes +place without the swamping effect of free intercrossing. . . +. How his theory can be properly termed one of selection he +fails to make clear. If correct, it is a law or principle +of operation rather than a process of selection. It has +been objected to Mr. Romanes’ theory that it is the +re-statement of a fact. This objection is less important +than the lack of facts in support of the theory.” The +<i>Times</i>, however, implies it as its opinion that the +required facts will be forthcoming by and by, and that when they +have been found Mr. Romanes’ suggestion will constitute +“the most important addition to the theory of evolution +since the publication of the ‘Origin of +Species.’” Considering that the <i>Times</i> +has just implied the main thesis of the “Origin of +Species” to be one which does not stand examination, this +is rather a doubtful compliment.</p> +<p>Neither Mr. Romanes nor the writer in the <i>Times</i> appears +to perceive that the results which may or may not be supposed to +ensue on choice depend upon what it is that is supposed to be +chosen from; they do not appear to see that though the expression +natural selection must be always more or less objectionable, as +too highly charged with metaphor for purposes of science, there +is nevertheless a natural selection which is open to no other +objection than this, and which, when its metaphorical character +is borne well in mind, may be used without serious risk of error, +whereas natural selection from variations that are mainly +fortuitous is chimerical as well as metaphorical. Both +writers speak of natural selection as though there could not +possibly be any selection in the course of nature, or natural +survival, of any but accidental variations. Thus Mr. +Romanes says: <a name="citation66a"></a><a href="#footnote66a" +class="citation">[66a]</a> “The swamping effect of +free inter-crossing upon an individual variation constitutes +perhaps the most formidable difficulty with which <i>the theory +of natural selection</i> is beset.” And the writer of +the article in the <i>Times</i> above referred to says: “In +truth <i>the theory of natural selection</i> presents many facts +and results which increase rather than diminish the difficulty of +accounting for the existence of species.” The +assertion made in each case is true if the Charles-Darwinian +selection from fortuitous variations is intended, but it does not +hold good if the selection is supposed to be made from variations +under which there lies a general principle of wide and abiding +application. It is not likely that a man of Mr. +Romanes’ antecedents should not be perfectly awake to +considerations so obvious as the foregoing, and I am afraid I am +inclined to consider his whole suggestion as only an attempt upon +the part of the wearer of Mr. Darwin’s mantle to carry on +Mr. Darwin’s work in Mr. Darwin’s spirit.</p> +<p>I have seen Professor Hering’s theory adopted recently +more unreservedly by Dr. Creighton in his “Illustrations of +Unconscious Memory in Disease.” <a +name="citation67a"></a><a href="#footnote67a" +class="citation">[67a]</a> Dr. Creighton avowedly bases his +system on Professor Hering’s address, and endorses it; it +is with much pleasure that I have seen him lend the weight of his +authority to the theory that each cell and organ has an +individual memory. In “Life and Habit” I +expressed a hope that the opinions it upheld would be found +useful by medical men, and am therefore the more glad to see that +this has proved to be the case. I may perhaps be pardoned +if I quote the passage in “Life and Habit” to which I +am referring. It runs:—</p> +<p>“<i>Mutatis mutandis</i>, the above would seem to hold +as truly about medicine as about politics. We cannot reason +with our cells, for they know so much more” (of course I +mean “about their own business”) “than we do, +that they cannot understand us;—but though we cannot reason +with them, we can find out what they have been most accustomed +to, and what, therefore, they are most likely to expect; we can +see that they get this as far as it is in our power to give it +them, and may then generally leave the rest to them, only bearing +in mind that they will rebel equally against too sudden a change +of treatment and no change at all” (p. 305).</p> +<p>Dr. Creighton insists chiefly on the importance of change, +which—though I did not notice his saying so—he would +doubtless see as a mode of cross-fertilisation, fraught in all +respects with the same advantages as this, and requiring the same +precautions against abuse; he would not, however, I am sure, deny +that there could be no fertility of good results if too wide a +cross were attempted, so that I may claim the weight of his +authority as supporting both the theory of an unconscious memory +in general, and the particular application of it to medicine +which I had ventured to suggest.</p> +<p>“Has the word ‘memory,’” he asks, +“a real application to unconscious organic phenomena, or do +we use it outside its ancient limits only in a figure of +speech?”</p> +<p>“If I had thought,” he continues later, +“that unconscious memory was no more than a metaphor, and +the detailed application of it to these various forms of disease +merely allegorical, I should still have judged it not +unprofitable to represent a somewhat hackneyed class of maladies +in the light of a parable. None of our faculties is more +familiar to us in its workings than the memory, and there is +hardly any force or power in nature which every one knows so well +as the force of habit. To say that a neurotic subject is +like a person with a retentive memory, or that a diathesis +gradually acquired is like an over-mastering habit, is at all +events to make comparisons with things that we all +understand.</p> +<p>“For reasons given chiefly in the first chapter, I +conclude that retentiveness, with reproduction, is a single +undivided faculty throughout the whole of our life, whether +mental or bodily, conscious or unconscious; and I claim the +description of a certain class of maladies according to the +phraseology of memory and habit as a real description and not a +figurative.” (p. 2.)</p> +<p>As a natural consequence of the foregoing he regards +“alterative action” as “habit-breaking +action.”</p> +<p>As regards the organism’s being guided throughout its +development to maturity by an unconscious memory, Dr. Creighton +says that “Professor Bain calls reproduction the acme of +organic complication.” “I should prefer to +say,” he adds, “the acme of organic implication; for +the reason that the sperm and germ elements are perfectly simple, +having nothing in their form or structure to show for the +marvellous potentialities within them.</p> +<p>“I now come to the application of these considerations +to the doctrine of unconscious memory. If generation is the +acme of organic implicitness, what is its correlative in nature, +what is the acme of organic explicitness? Obviously the +fine flower of consciousness. Generation is implicit +memory, consciousness is explicit memory; generation is potential +memory, consciousness is actual memory.”</p> +<p>I am not sure that I understand the preceding paragraph as +clearly as I should wish, but having quoted enough to perhaps +induce the reader to turn to Dr. Creighton’s book, I will +proceed to the subject indicated in my title.</p> +<h2><a name="page70"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +70</span>Chapter V<br /> +Statement of the Question at Issue</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">Of</span> the two points referred to in +the opening sentence of this book—I mean the connection +between heredity and memory, and the reintroduction of design +into organic modification—the second is both the more +important and the one which stands most in need of support. +The substantial identity between heredity and memory is becoming +generally admitted; as regards my second point, however, I cannot +flatter myself that I have made much way against the formidable +array of writers on the neo-Darwinian side; I shall therefore +devote the rest of my book as far as possible to this subject +only. Natural selection (meaning by these words the +preservation in the ordinary course of nature of favourable +variations that are supposed to be mainly matters of pure good +luck and in no way arising out of function) has been, to use an +Americanism than which I can find nothing apter, the biggest +biological boom of the last quarter of a century; it is not, +therefore, to be wondered at that Professor Ray Lankester, Mr. +Romanes, Mr. Grant Allen, and others, should show some impatience +at seeing its value as prime means of modification called in +question. Within the last few months, indeed, Mr. Grant +Allen <a name="citation70a"></a><a href="#footnote70a" +class="citation">[70a]</a> and Professor Ray Lankester <a +name="citation70b"></a><a href="#footnote70b" +class="citation">[70b]</a> in England, and Dr. Ernst Krause <a +name="citation70c"></a><a href="#footnote70c" +class="citation">[70c]</a> in Germany, have spoken and written +warmly in support of the theory of natural selection, and in +opposition to the views taken by myself; if they are not to be +left in possession of the field the sooner they are met the +better.</p> +<p>Stripped of detail the point at issue is this;—whether +luck or cunning is the fitter to be insisted on as the main means +of organic development. Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck answered +this question in favour of cunning. They settled it in +favour of intelligent perception of the situation—within, +of course, ever narrower and narrower limits as organism retreats +farther backwards from ourselves—and persistent effort to +turn it to account. They made this the soul of all +development whether of mind or body.</p> +<p>And they made it, like all other souls, liable to aberration +both for better and worse. They held that some organisms +show more ready wit and <i>savoir faire</i> than others; that +some give more proofs of genius and have more frequent happy +thoughts than others, and that some have even gone through waters +of misery which they have used as wells.</p> +<p>The sheet anchor both of Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck is in good +sense and thrift; still they are aware that money has been +sometimes made by “striking oil,” and ere now been +transmitted to descendants in spite of the haphazard way in which +it was originally acquired. No speculation, no commerce; +“nothing venture, nothing have,” is as true for the +development of organic wealth as for that of any other kind, and +neither Erasmus Darwin nor Lamarck hesitated about admitting that +highly picturesque and romantic incidents of developmental +venture do from time to time occur in the race histories even of +the dullest and most dead-level organisms under the name of +“sports;” but they would hold that even these occur +most often and most happily to those that have persevered in +well-doing for some generations. Unto the organism that +hath is given, and from the organism that hath not is taken away; +so that even “sports” prove to be only a little off +thrift, which still remains the sheet anchor of the early +evolutionists. They believe, in fact, that more organic +wealth has been made by saving than in any other way. The +race is not in the long run to the phenomenally swift nor the +battle to the phenomenally strong, but to the good average +all-round organism that is alike shy of Radical crotchets and old +world obstructiveness. <i>Festina</i>, but <i>festina +lente</i>—perhaps as involving so completely the +contradiction in terms which must underlie all +modification—is the motto they would assign to organism, +and <i>Chi va piano va lontano</i>, they hold to be a maxim as +old, if not as the hills (and they have a hankering even after +these), at any rate as the amœba.</p> +<p>To repeat in other words. All enduring forms establish a +<i>modus vivendi</i> with their surroundings. They can do +this because both they and the surroundings are plastic within +certain undefined but somewhat narrow limits. They are +plastic because they can to some extent change their habits, and +changed habit, if persisted in, involves corresponding change, +however slight, in the organs employed; but their plasticity +depends in great measure upon their failure to perceive that they +are moulding themselves. If a change is so great that they +are seriously incommoded by its novelty, they are not likely to +acquiesce in it kindly enough to grow to it, but they will make +no difficulty about the miracle involved in accommodating +themselves to a difference of only two or three per cent. <a +name="citation72a"></a><a href="#footnote72a" +class="citation">[72a]</a></p> +<p>As long as no change exceeds this percentage, and as long, +also, as fresh change does not supervene till the preceding one +is well established, there seems no limit to the amount of +modification which may be accumulated in the course of +generations—provided, of course, always, that the +modification continues to be in conformity with the instinctive +habits and physical development of the organism in their +collective capacity. Where the change is too great, or +where an organ has been modified cumulatively in some one +direction, until it has reached a development too seriously out +of harmony with the habits of the organism taken collectively, +then the organism holds itself excused from further effort, +throws up the whole concern, and takes refuge in the liquidation +and reconstruction of death. It is only on the +relinquishing of further effort that this death ensues; as long +as effort endures, organisms go on from change to change, +altering and being altered—that is to say, either killing +themselves piecemeal in deference to the surroundings or killing +the surroundings piecemeal to suit themselves. There is a +ceaseless higgling and haggling, or rather a life-and-death +struggle between these two things as long as life lasts, and one +or other or both have in no small part to re-enter into the womb +from whence they came and be born again in some form which shall +give greater satisfaction.</p> +<p>All change is <i>pro tanto</i> death or <i>pro tanto</i> +birth. Change is the common substratum which underlies both +life and death; life and death are not two distinct things +absolutely antagonistic to one another; in the highest life there +is still much death, and in the most complete death there is +still not a little life. <i>La vie</i>, says Claud Bernard, +<a name="citation73a"></a><a href="#footnote73a" +class="citation">[73a]</a> <i>c’est la mort</i>: he might +have added, and perhaps did, <i>et la mort ce n’est que la +vie transformée</i>. Life and death are the extreme +modes of something which is partly both and wholly neither; this +something is common, ordinary change; solve any change and the +mystery of life and death will be revealed; show why and how +anything becomes ever anything other in any respect than what it +is at any given moment, and there will be little secret left in +any other change. One is not in its ultimate essence more +miraculous that another; it may be more striking—a greater +<i>congeries</i> of shocks, it may be more credible or more +incredible, but not more miraculous; all change is +<i>quâ</i> us absolutely incomprehensible and miraculous; +the smallest change baffles the greatest intellect if its +essence, as apart from its phenomena, be inquired into.</p> +<p>But however this may be, all organic change is either a growth +or a dissolution, or a combination of the two. Growth is +the coming together of elements with <i>quasi</i> similar +characteristics. I understand it is believed to be the +coming together of matter in certain states of motion with other +matter in states so nearly similar that the rhythms of the one +coalesce with and hence reinforce the rhythms pre-existing in the +other—making, rather than marring and undoing them. +Life and growth are an attuning, death and decay are an untuning; +both involve a succession of greater or smaller attunings and +untunings; organic life is “the diapason closing full in +man”; it is the fulness of a tone that varies in pitch, +quality, and in the harmonics to which it gives rise; it ranges +through every degree of complexity from the endless combinations +of life-and-death within life-and-death which we find in the +mammalia, to the comparative simplicity of the amœba. +Death, again, like life, ranges through every degree of +complexity. All pleasant changes are recreative; they are +<i>pro tanto</i> births; all unpleasant changes are wearing, and, +as such, <i>pro tanto</i> deaths, but we can no more exhaust +either wholly of the other, than we can exhaust all the air out +of a receiver; pleasure and pain lurk within one another, as life +in death, and death in life, or as rest and unrest in one +another.</p> +<p>There is no greater mystery in life than in death. We +talk as though the riddle of life only need engage us; this is +not so; death is just as great a miracle as life; the one is two +and two making five, the other is five splitting into two and +two. Solve either, and we have solved the other; they +should be studied not apart, for they are never parted, but +together, and they will tell more tales of one another than +either will tell about itself. If there is one thing which +advancing knowledge makes clearer than another, it is that death +is swallowed up in life, and life in death; so that if the last +enemy that shall be subdued is death, then indeed is our +salvation nearer than what we thought, for in strictness there is +neither life nor death, nor thought nor thing, except as figures +of speech, and as the approximations which strike us for the time +as most convenient. There is neither perfect life nor +perfect death, but a being ever with the Lord only, in the +eternal φορα, or going to and fro and heat +and fray of the universe. When we were young we thought the +one certain thing was that we should one day come to die; now we +know the one certain thing to be that we shall never wholly do +so. <i>Non omnis moriar</i>, says Horace, and “I die +daily,” says St. Paul, as though a life beyond the grave, +and a death on this side of it, were each some strange thing +which happened to them alone of all men; but who dies absolutely +once for all, and for ever at the hour that is commonly called +that of death, and who does not die daily and hourly? Does +any man in continuing to live from day to day or moment to +moment, do more than continue in a changed body, with changed +feelings, ideas, and aims, so that he lives from moment to moment +only in virtue of a simultaneous dying from moment to moment +also? Does any man in dying do more than, on a larger and +more complete scale, what he has been doing on a small one, as +the most essential factor of his life, from the day that he +became “he” at all? When the note of life is +struck the harmonics of death are sounded, and so, again, to +strike death is to arouse the infinite harmonics of life that +rise forthwith as incense curling upwards from a censer. If +in the midst of life we are in death, so also in the midst of +death we are in life, and whether we live or whether we die, +whether we like it and know anything about it or no, still we do +it to the Lord—living always, dying always, and in the Lord +always, the unjust and the just alike, for God is no respecter of +persons.</p> +<p>Consciousness and change, so far as we can watch them, are as +functionally interdependent as mind and matter, or condition and +substance, are—for the condition of every substance may be +considered as the expression and outcome of its mind. Where +there is consciousness there is change; where there is no change +there is no consciousness; may we not suspect that there is no +change without a <i>pro tanto</i> consciousness however simple +and unspecialised? Change and motion are one, so that we +have substance, feeling, change (or motion), as the ultimate +three-in-one of our thoughts, and may suspect all change, and all +feeling, attendant or consequent, however limited, to be the +interaction of those states which for want of better terms we +call mind and matter. Action may be regarded as a kind of +middle term between mind and matter; it is the throe of thought +and thing, the quivering clash and union of body and soul; +commonplace enough in practice; miraculous, as violating every +canon on which thought and reason are founded, if we theorise +about it, put it under the microscope, and vivisect it. It +is here, if anywhere, that body or substance is guilty of the +contradiction in terms of combining with that which is without +material substance and cannot, therefore, be conceived by us as +passing in and out with matter, till the two become a body +ensouled and a soul embodied.</p> +<p>All body is more or less ensouled. As it gets farther +and farther from ourselves, indeed, we sympathise less with it; +nothing, we say to ourselves, can have intelligence unless we +understand all about it—as though intelligence in all +except ourselves meant the power of being understood rather than +of understanding. We are intelligent, and no intelligence, +so different from our own as to baffle our powers of +comprehension deserves to be called intelligence at all. +The more a thing resembles ourselves, the more it thinks as we +do—and thus by implication tells us that we are right, the +more intelligent we think it; and the less it thinks as we do, +the greater fool it must be; if a substance does not succeed in +making it clear that it understands our business, we conclude +that it cannot have any business of its own, much less understand +it, or indeed understand anything at all. But letting this +pass, so far as we are concerned, +χρημάτων +πάντων μέτρον +άνθρωπος; we are body +ensouled, and soul embodied, ourselves, nor is it possible for us +to think seriously of anything so unlike ourselves as to consist +either of soul without body, or body without soul. +Unmattered condition, therefore, is as inconceivable by us as +unconditioned matter; and we must hold that all body with which +we can be conceivably concerned is more or less ensouled, and all +soul, in like manner, more or less embodied. Strike either +body or soul—that is to say, effect either a physical or a +mental change, and the harmonics of the other sound. So +long as body is minded in a certain way—so long, that is to +say, as it feels, knows, remembers, concludes, and forecasts one +set of things—it will be in one form; if it assumes a new +one, otherwise than by external violence, no matter how slight +the change may be, it is only through having changed its mind, +through having forgotten and died to some trains of thought, and +having been correspondingly born anew by the adoption of new +ones. What it will adopt depends upon which of the various +courses open to it it considers most to its advantage.</p> +<p>What it will think to its advantage depends mainly on the past +habits of its race. Its past and now invisible lives will +influence its desires more powerfully than anything it may itself +be able to add to the sum of its likes and dislikes; +nevertheless, over and above preconceived opinion and the habits +to which all are slaves, there is a small salary, or, as it were, +agency commission, which each may have for himself, and spend +according to his fancy; from this, indeed, income-tax must be +deducted; still there remains a little margin of individual +taste, and here, high up on this narrow, inaccessible ledge of +our souls, from year to year a breed of not unprolific variations +build where reason cannot reach them to despoil them; for <i>de +gustibus non est disputandum</i>.</p> +<p>Here we are as far as we can go. Fancy, which sometimes +sways so much and is swayed by so little, and which sometimes, +again, is so hard to sway, and moves so little when it is swayed; +whose ways have a method of their own, but are not as our +ways—fancy, lies on the extreme borderland of the realm +within which the writs of our thoughts run, and extends into that +unseen world wherein they have no jurisdiction. Fancy is as +the mist upon the horizon which blends earth and sky; where, +however, it approaches nearest to the earth and can be reckoned +with, it is seen as melting into desire, and this as giving birth +to design and effort. As the net result and outcome of +these last, living forms grow gradually but persistently into +physical conformity with their own intentions, and become outward +and visible signs of the inward and spiritual faiths, or wants of +faith, that have been most within them. They thus very +gradually, but none the less effectually, design themselves.</p> +<p>In effect, therefore, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck introduce +uniformity into the moral and spiritual worlds as it was already +beginning to be introduced into the physical. According to +both these writers development has ever been a matter of the same +energy, effort, good sense, and perseverance, as tend to +advancement of life now among ourselves. In essence it is +neither more nor less than this, as the rain-drop which denuded +an ancient formation is of the same kind as that which is +denuding a modern one, though its effect may vary in geometrical +ratio with the effect it has produced already. As we are +extending reason to the lower animals, so we must extend a system +of moral government by rewards and punishments no less surely; +and if we admit that to some considerable extent man is man, and +master of his fate, we should admit also that all organic forms +which are saved at all have been in proportionate degree masters +of their fate too, and have worked out, not only their own +salvation, but their salvation according, in no small measure, to +their own goodwill and pleasure, at times with a light heart, and +at times in fear and trembling. I do not say that Erasmus +Darwin and Lamarck saw all the foregoing as clearly as it is easy +to see it now; what I have said, however, is only the natural +development of their system.</p> +<h2><a name="page80"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +80</span>Chapter VI<br /> +Statement of the Question at Issue (<i>continued</i>)</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">So</span> much for the older view; and now +for the more modern opinion. According to Messrs. Darwin +and Wallace, and ostensibly, I am afraid I should add, a great +majority of our most prominent biologists, the view taken by +Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck is not a sound one. Some +organisms, indeed, are so admirably adapted to their +surroundings, and some organs discharge their functions with so +much appearance of provision, that we are apt to think they must +owe their development to sense of need and consequent +contrivance, but this opinion is fantastic; the appearance of +design is delusive; what we are tempted to see as an accumulated +outcome of desire and cunning, we should regard as mainly an +accumulated outcome of good luck.</p> +<p>Let us take the eye as a somewhat crucial example. It is +a seeing-machine, or thing to see with. So is a telescope; +the telescope in its highest development is a secular +accumulation of cunning, sometimes small, sometimes great; +sometimes applied to this detail of the instrument, and sometimes +to that. It is an admirable example of design; +nevertheless, as I said in “Evolution Old and New,” +he who made the first rude telescope had probably no idea of any +more perfect form of the instrument than the one he had himself +invented. Indeed, if he had, he would have carried his idea +out in practice. He would have been unable to conceive such +an instrument as Lord Rosse’s; the design, therefore, at +present evidenced by the telescope was not design all on the part +of one and the same person. Nor yet was it unmixed with +chance; many a detail has been doubtless due to an accident or +coincidence which was forthwith seized and made the best +of. Luck there always has been and always will be, until +all brains are opened, and all connections made known, but luck +turned to account becomes design; there is, indeed, if things are +driven home, little other design than this. The telescope, +therefore, is an instrument designed in all its parts for the +purpose of seeing, and, take it all round, designed with singular +skill.</p> +<p>Looking at the eye, we are at first tempted to think that it +must be the telescope over again, only more so; we are tempted to +see it as something which has grown up little by little from +small beginnings, as the result of effort well applied and handed +down from generation to generation, till, in the vastly greater +time during which the eye has been developing as compared with +the telescope, a vastly more astonishing result has been arrived +at. We may indeed be tempted to think this, but, according +to Mr. Darwin, we should be wrong. Design had a great deal +to do with the telescope, but it had nothing or hardly anything +whatever to do with the eye. The telescope owes its +development to cunning, the eye to luck, which, it would seem, is +so far more cunning than cunning that one does not quite +understand why there should be any cunning at all. The main +means of developing the eye was, according to Mr. Darwin, not use +as varying circumstances might direct with consequent slow +increase of power and an occasional happy flight of genius, but +natural selection. Natural selection, according to him, +though not the sole, is still the most important means of its +development and modification. <a name="citation81a"></a><a +href="#footnote81a" class="citation">[81a]</a> What, then, +is natural selection?</p> +<p>Mr. Darwin has told us this on the title-page of the +“Origin of Species.” He there defines it as +“The Preservation of Favoured Races;” +“Favoured” is “Fortunate,” and +“Fortunate” “Lucky;” it is plain, +therefore, that with Mr. Darwin natural selection comes to +“The Preservation of Lucky Races,” and that he +regarded luck as the most important feature in connection with +the development even of so apparently purposive an organ as the +eye, and as the one, therefore, on which it was most proper to +insist. And what is luck but absence of intention or +design? What, then, can Mr. Darwin’s title-page +amount to when written out plainly, but to an assertion that the +main means of modification has been the preservation of races +whose variations have been unintentional, that is to say, not +connected with effort or intention, devoid of mind or meaning, +fortuitous, spontaneous, accidental, or whatever kindred word is +least disagreeable to the reader? It is impossible to +conceive any more complete denial of mind as having had anything +to do with organic development, than is involved in the +title-page of the “Origin of Species” when its +doubtless carefully considered words are studied—nor, let +me add, is it possible to conceive a title-page more likely to +make the reader’s attention rest much on the main doctrine +of evolution, and little, to use the words now most in vogue +concerning it, on Mr. Darwin’s own “distinctive +feature.”</p> +<p>It should be remembered that the full title of the +“Origin of Species” is, “On the origin of +species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of +favoured races in the struggle for life.” The +significance of the expansion of the title escaped the greater +number of Mr. Darwin’s readers. Perhaps it ought not +to have done so, but we certainly failed to catch it. The +very words themselves escaped us—and yet there they were +all the time if we had only chosen to look. We thought the +book was called “On the Origin of Species,” and so it +was on the outside; so it was also on the inside fly-leaf; so it +was on the title-page itself as long as the most prominent type +was used; the expanded title was only given once, and then in +smaller type; so the three big “Origins of Species” +carried us with them to the exclusion of the rest.</p> +<p>The short and working title, “On the Origin of +Species,” in effect claims descent with modification +generally; the expanded and technically true title only claims +the discovery that luck is the main means of organic +modification, and this is a very different matter. The book +ought to have been entitled, “On Natural Selection, or the +preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life, as the +main means of the origin of species;” this should have been +the expanded title, and the short title should have been +“On Natural Selection.” The title would not +then have involved an important difference between its working +and its technical forms, and it would have better fulfilled the +object of a title, which is, of course, to give, as far as may +be, the essence of a book in a nutshell. We learn on the +authority of Mr. Darwin himself <a name="citation83a"></a><a +href="#footnote83a" class="citation">[83a]</a> that the +“Origin of Species” was originally intended to bear +the title “Natural Selection;” nor is it easy to see +why the change should have been made if an accurate expression of +the contents of the book was the only thing which Mr. Darwin was +considering. It is curious that, writing the later chapters +of “Life and Habit” in great haste, I should have +accidentally referred to the “Origin of Species” as +“Natural Selection;” it seems hard to believe that +there was no intention in my thus unconsciously reverting to Mr. +Darwin’s own original title, but there certainly was none, +and I did not then know what the original title had been.</p> +<p>If we had scrutinised Mr. Darwin’s title-page as closely +as we should certainly scrutinise anything written by Mr. Darwin +now, we should have seen that the title did not technically claim +the theory of descent; practically, however, it so turned out +that we unhesitatingly gave that theory to the author, being, as +I have said, carried away by the three large “Origins of +Species” (which we understood as much the same thing as +descent with modification), and finding, as I shall show in a +later chapter, that descent was ubiquitously claimed throughout +the work, either expressly or by implication, as Mr. +Darwin’s theory. It is not easy to see how any one +with ordinary instincts could hesitate to believe that Mr. Darwin +was entitled to claim what he claimed with so much +insistance. If <i>ars est celare artem</i> Mr. Darwin must +be allowed to have been a consummate artist, for it took us years +to understand the ins and outs of what had been done.</p> +<p>I may say in passing that we never see the “Origin of +Species” spoken of as “On the Origin of Species, +&c.,” or as “The Origin of Species, +&c.” (the word “on” being dropped in +the latest editions). The distinctive feature of the book +lies, according to its admirers, in the “&c.,” +but they never give it. To avoid pedantry I shall continue +to speak of the “Origin of Species.”</p> +<p>At any rate it will be admitted that Mr. Darwin did not make +his title-page express his meaning so clearly that his readers +could readily catch the point of difference between himself and +his grandfather and Lamarck; nevertheless the point just touched +upon involves the only essential difference between the systems +of Mr. Charles Darwin and those of his three most important +predecessors. All four writers agree that animals and +plants descend with modification; all agree that the fittest +alone survive; all agree about the important consequences of the +geometrical ratio of increase; Mr. Charles Darwin has said more +about these last two points than his predecessors did, but all +three were alike cognisant of the facts and attached the same +importance to them, and would have been astonished at its being +supposed possible that they disputed them. The fittest +alone survive; yes—but the fittest from among what? +Here comes the point of divergence; the fittest from among +organisms whose variations arise mainly through use and +disuse? In other words, from variations that are mainly +functional? Or from among organisms whose variations are in +the main matters of luck? From variations into which a +moral and intellectual system of payment according to results has +largely entered? Or from variations which have been thrown +for with dice? From variations among which, though cards +tell, yet play tells as much or more? Or from those in +which cards are everything and play goes for so little as to be +not worth taking into account? Is “the survival of +the fittest” to be taken as meaning “the survival of +the luckiest” or “the survival of those who know best +how to turn fortune to account”? Is luck the only +element of fitness, or is not cunning even more +indispensable?</p> +<p>Mr. Darwin has a habit, borrowed, perhaps, <i>mutatis +mutandis</i>, from the framers of our collects, of every now and +then adding the words “through natural selection,” as +though this squared everything, and descent with modification +thus became his theory at once. This is not the case. +Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck believed in natural selection +to the full as much as any follower of Mr. Charles Darwin can +do. They did not use the actual words, but the idea +underlying them is the essence of their system. Mr. Patrick +Matthew epitomised their doctrine more tersely, perhaps, than was +done by any other of the pre-Charles-Darwinian evolutionists, in +the following passage which appeared in 1831, and which I have +already quoted in “Evolution Old and New” (pp. 320, +323). The passage runs:—</p> +<p>“The self-regulating adaptive disposition of organised +life may, in part, be traced to the extreme fecundity of nature, +who, as before stated, has in all the varieties of her offspring +a prolific power much beyond (in many cases a thousandfold) what +is necessary to fill up the vacancies caused by senile +decay. As the field of existence is limited and +preoccupied, it is only the hardier, more robust, better suited +to circumstance individuals, who are able to struggle forward to +maturity, these inhabiting only the situations to which they have +superior adaptation and greater power of occupancy than any other +kind; the weaker and less circumstance-suited being prematurely +destroyed. This principle is in constant action; it +regulates the colour, the figure, the capacities, and instincts; +those individuals in each species whose colour and covering are +best suited to concealment or protection from enemies, or defence +from inclemencies or vicissitudes of climate, whose figure is +best accommodated to health, strength, defence, and support; +whose capacities and instincts can best regulate the physical +energies to self-advantage according to circumstances—in +such immense waste of primary and youthful life those only come +forward to maturity from <i>the strict ordeal by which nature +tests their adaptation to her standard of perfection</i> and +fitness to continue their kind by reproduction.” <a +name="citation86a"></a><a href="#footnote86a" +class="citation">[86a]</a> A little lower down Mr. Matthew +speaks of animals under domestication “<i>not having +undergone selection by the law of nature</i>, <i>of which we have +spoken</i>, and hence being unable to maintain their ground +without culture and protection.”</p> +<p>The distinction between Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism is +generally believed to lie in the adoption of a theory of natural +selection by the younger Darwin and its non-adoption by the +elder. This is true in so far as that the elder Darwin does +not use the words “natural selection,” while the +younger does, but it is not true otherwise. Both writers +agree that offspring tends to inherit modifications that have +been effected, from whatever cause, in parents; both hold that +the best adapted to their surroundings live longest and leave +most offspring; both, therefore, hold that favourable +modifications will tend to be preserved and intensified in the +course of many generations, and that this leads to divergence of +type; but these opinions involve a theory of natural selection or +quasi-selection, whether the words “natural +selection” are used or not; indeed it is impossible to +include wild species in any theory of descent with modification +without implying a quasi-selective power on the part of nature; +but even with Mr. Charles Darwin the power is only +quasi-selective; there is no conscious choice, and hence there is +nothing that can in strictness be called selection.</p> +<p>It is indeed true that the younger Darwin gave the words +“natural selection” the importance which of late +years they have assumed; he probably adopted them unconsciously +from the passage of Mr. Matthew’s quoted above, but he +ultimately said, <a name="citation87a"></a><a href="#footnote87a" +class="citation">[87a]</a> “In the literal sense of the +word (<i>sic</i>) no doubt natural selection is a false +term,” as personifying a fact, making it exercise the +conscious choice without which there can be no selection, and +generally crediting it with the discharge of functions which can +only be ascribed legitimately to living and reasoning +beings. Granted, however, that while Mr. Charles Darwin +adopted the expression natural selection and admitted it to be a +bad one, his grandfather did not use it at all; still Mr. Darwin +did not mean the natural selection which Mr. Matthew and those +whose opinions he was epitomising meant. Mr. Darwin meant +the selection to be made from variations into which purpose +enters to only a small extent comparatively. The +difference, therefore, between the older evolutionists and their +successor does not lie in the acceptance by the more recent +writer of a quasi-selective power in nature which his +predecessors denied, but in the background—hidden behind +the words natural selection, which have served to cloak +it—in the views which the old and the new writers severally +took of the variations from among which they are alike agreed +that a selection or quasi-selection is made.</p> +<p>It now appears that there is not one natural selection, and +one survival of the fittest only, but two natural selections, and +two survivals of the fittest, the one of which may be objected to +as an expression more fit for religious and general literature +than for science, but may still be admitted as sound in +intention, while the other, inasmuch as it supposes accident to +be the main purveyor of variations, has no correspondence with +the actual course of things; for if the variations are matters of +chance or hazard unconnected with any principle of constant +application, they will not occur steadily enough, throughout a +sufficient number of successive generations, nor to a sufficient +number of individuals for many generations together at the same +time and place, to admit of the fixing and permanency of +modification at all. The one theory of natural selection, +therefore, may, and indeed will, explain the facts that surround +us, whereas the other will not. Mr. Charles Darwin’s +contribution to the theory of evolution was not, as is commonly +supposed, “natural selection,” but the hypothesis +that natural selection from variations that are in the main +fortuitous could accumulate and result in specific and generic +differences.</p> +<p>In the foregoing paragraph I have given the point of +difference between Mr. Charles Darwin and his predecessors. +Why, I wonder, have neither he nor any of his exponents put this +difference before us in such plain words that we should readily +apprehend it? Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck were understood by +all who wished to understand them; why is it that the +misunderstanding of Mr. Darwin’s “distinctive +feature” should have been so long and obstinate? Why +is it that, no matter how much writers like Mr. Grant Allen and +Professor Ray Lankester may say about “Mr. Darwin’s +master-key,” nor how many more like hyperboles they +brandish, they never put a succinct <i>résumé</i> +of Mr. Darwin’s theory side by side with a similar +<i>résumé</i> of his grandfather’s and +Lamarck’s? Neither Mr. Darwin himself, not any of +those to whose advocacy his reputation is mainly due, have done +this. Professor Huxley is the man of all others who foisted +Mr. Darwin most upon us, but in his famous lecture on the coming +of age of the “Origin of Species” he did not explain +to his hearers wherein the Neo-Darwinian theory of evolution +differed from the old; and why not? Surely, because no +sooner is this made clear than we perceive that the idea +underlying the old evolutionists is more in accord with +instinctive feelings that we have cherished too long to be able +now to disregard them than the central idea which underlies the +“Origin of Species.”</p> +<p>What should we think of one who maintained that the +steam-engine and telescope were not developed mainly through +design and effort (letting the indisputably existing element of +luck go without saying), but to the fact that if any telescope or +steam-engine “happened to be made ever such a little more +conveniently for man’s purposes than another,” +&c., &c.?</p> +<p>Let us suppose a notorious burglar found in possession of a +jemmy; it is admitted on all hands that he will use it as soon as +he gets a chance; there is no doubt about this; how perverted +should we not consider the ingenuity of one who tried to persuade +us we were wrong in thinking that the burglar compassed the +possession of the jemmy by means involving ideas, however vague +in the first instance, of applying it to its subsequent +function.</p> +<p>If any one could be found so blind to obvious inferences as to +accept natural selection, “or the preservation of favoured +machines,” as the main means of mechanical modification, we +might suppose him to argue much as follows:—“I can +quite understand,” he would exclaim, “how any one who +reflects upon the originally simple form of the earliest jemmies, +and observes the developments they have since attained in the +hands of our most accomplished housebreakers, might at first be +tempted to believe that the present form of the instrument has +been arrived at by long-continued improvement in the hands of an +almost infinite succession of thieves; but may not this inference +be somewhat too hastily drawn? Have we any right to assume +that burglars work by means analogous to those employed by other +people? If any thief happened to pick up any crowbar which +happened to be ever such a little better suited to his purpose +than the one he had been in the habit of using hitherto, he would +at once seize and carefully preserve it. If it got worn out +or broken he would begin searching for a crowbar as like as +possible to the one that he had lost; and when, with advancing +skill, and in default of being able to find the exact thing he +wanted, he took at length to making a jemmy for himself, he would +imitate the latest and most perfect adaptation, which would thus +be most likely to be preserved in the struggle of competitive +forms. Let this process go on for countless generations, +among countless burglars of all nations, and may we not suppose +that a jemmy would be in time arrived at, as superior to any that +could have been designed as the effect of the Niagara Falls is +superior to the puny efforts of the landscape +gardener?”</p> +<p>For the moment I will pass over the obvious retort that there +is no sufficient parallelism between bodily organs and mechanical +inventions to make a denial of design in the one involve in +equity a denial of it in the other also, and that therefore the +preceding paragraph has no force. A man is not bound to +deny design in machines wherein it can be clearly seen because he +denies it in living organs where at best it is a matter of +inference. This retort is plausible, but in the course of +the two next following chapters but one it will be shown to be +without force; for the moment, however, beyond thus calling +attention to it, I must pass it by.</p> +<p>I do not mean to say that Mr. Darwin ever wrote anything which +made the utility of his contention as apparent as it is made by +what I have above put into the mouth of his supposed +follower. Mr. Darwin was the Gladstone of biology, and so +old a scientific hand was not going to make things unnecessarily +clear unless it suited his convenience. Then, indeed, he +was like the man in “The Hunting of the Snark,” who +said, “I told you once, I told you twice, what I tell you +three times is true.” That what I have supposed said, +however, above about the jemmy is no exaggeration of Mr. +Darwin’s attitude as regards design in organism will appear +from the passage about the eye already referred to, which it may +perhaps be as well to quote in full. Mr. Darwin +says:—</p> +<p>“It is scarcely possible to avoid comparing the eye to a +telescope. We know that this instrument has been perfected +by the long-continued efforts of the highest human intellects, +and we naturally infer that the eye has been formed by a somewhat +analogous process. But may not this inference be +presumptuous? Have we any right to assume that the Creator +works by intellectual powers like those of men? If we must +compare the eye to an optical instrument, we ought in imagination +to take a thick layer of transparent tissue, with a nerve +sensitive to light beneath, and then suppose every part of this +layer to be continually changing slowly in density, so as to +separate into layers of different densities and thicknesses, +placed at different distances from each other, and with the +surfaces of each layer slowly changing in form. Further, we +must suppose that there is a power always intently watching each +slight accidental alteration in the transparent layers, and +carefully selecting each alteration which, under varied +circumstances, may in any way, or in any degree, tend to produce +a distincter image. We must suppose each new state of the +instrument to be multiplied by the million, and each to be +preserved till a better be produced, and then the old ones to be +destroyed. In living bodies variation will cause the slight +alterations, generation will multiply them almost infinitely, and +natural selection will pick out with unerring skill each +improvement. Let this process go on for millions on +millions of years, and during each year on millions of +individuals of many kinds; and may we not believe that a living +optical instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of +glass as the works of the Creator are to those of man?” <a +name="citation92a"></a><a href="#footnote92a" +class="citation">[92a]</a></p> +<p>Mr. Darwin does not in this passage deny design, or cunning, +point blank; he was not given to denying things point blank, nor +is it immediately apparent that he is denying design at all, for +he does not emphasize and call attention to the fact that the +<i>variations</i> on whose accumulation he relies for his +ultimate specific difference are accidental, and, to use his own +words, in the passage last quoted, caused by +<i>variation</i>. He does, indeed, in his earlier editions, +call the variations “accidental,” and accidental they +remained for ten years, but in 1869 the word +“accidental” was taken out. Mr. Darwin probably +felt that the variations had been accidental as long as was +desirable; and though they would, of course, in reality remain as +accidental as ever, still, there could be no use in crying +“accidental variations” further. If the reader +wants to know whether they were accidental or no, he had better +find out for himself. Mr. Darwin was a master of what may +be called scientific chiaroscuro, and owes his reputation in no +small measure to the judgment with which he kept his meaning dark +when a less practised hand would have thrown light upon it. +There can, however, be no question that Mr. Darwin, though not +denying purposiveness point blank, was trying to refer the +development of the eye to the accumulation of small accidental +improvements, which were not as a rule due to effort and design +in any way analogous to those attendant on the development of the +telescope.</p> +<p>Though Mr. Darwin, if he was to have any point of difference +from his grandfather, was bound to make his variations +accidental, yet, to do him justice, he did not like it. +Even in the earlier editions of the “Origin of +Species,” where the “alterations” in the +passage last quoted are called “accidental” in +express terms, the word does not fall, so to speak, on a strong +beat of the bar, and is apt to pass unnoticed. Besides, Mr. +Darwin does not say point blank “we may believe,” or +“we ought to believe;” he only says “may we not +believe?” The reader should always be on his guard +when Mr. Darwin asks one of these bland and child-like questions, +and he is fond of asking them; but, however this may be, it is +plain, as I pointed out in “Evolution Old and New” <a +name="citation93a"></a><a href="#footnote93a" +class="citation">[93a]</a> that the only “skill,” +that is to say the only thing that can possibly involve design, +is “the unerring skill” of natural selection.</p> +<p>In the same paragraph Mr. Darwin has already said: +“Further, we must suppose that there is a power represented +by natural selection or the survival of the fittest always +intently watching each slight alteration, &c.” +Mr. Darwin probably said “a power represented by natural +selection” instead of “natural selection” only, +because he saw that to talk too frequently about the fact that +the most lucky live longest as “intently watching” +something was greater nonsense than it would be prudent even for +him to write, so he fogged it by making the intent watching done +by “a power represented by” a fact, instead of by the +fact itself. As the sentence stands it is just as great +nonsense as it would have been if “the survival of the +fittest” had been allowed to do the watching instead of +“the power represented by” the survival of the +fittest, but the nonsense is harder to dig up, and the reader is +more likely to pass it over.</p> +<p>This passage gave Mr. Darwin no less trouble than it must have +given to many of his readers. In the original edition of +the “Origin of Species” it stood, “Further, we +must suppose that there is a power always intently watching each +slight accidental variation.” I suppose it was felt +that if this was allowed to stand, it might be fairly asked what +natural selection was doing all this time? If the power was +able to do everything that was necessary now, why not always? and +why any natural selection at all? This clearly would not +do, so in 1861 the power was allowed, by the help of brackets, +actually to become natural selection, and remained so till 1869, +when Mr. Darwin could stand it no longer, and, doubtless for the +reason given above, altered the passage to “a power +represented by natural selection,” at the same time cutting +out the word “accidental.”</p> +<p>It may perhaps make the workings of Mr. Darwin’s mind +clearer to the reader if I give the various readings of this +passage as taken from the three most important editions of the +“Origin of Species.”</p> +<p>In 1859 it stood, “Further, we must suppose that there +is a power always intently watching each slight accidental +alteration,” &c.</p> +<p>In 1861 it stood, “Further, we must suppose that there +is a power (natural selection) always intently watching each +slight accidental alteration,” &c.</p> +<p>And in 1869, “Further, we must suppose that there is a +power represented by natural selection or the survival of the +fittest always intently watching each slight alteration,” +&c. <a name="citation94a"></a><a href="#footnote94a" +class="citation">[94a]</a></p> +<p>The hesitating feeble gait of one who fears a pitfall at every +step, so easily recognisable in the “numerous, successive, +slight alterations” in the foregoing passage, may be traced +in many another page of the “Origin of Species” by +those who will be at the trouble of comparing the several +editions. It is only when this is done, and the working of +Mr. Darwin’s mind can be seen as though it were the +twitchings of a dog’s nose, that any idea can be formed of +the difficulty in which he found himself involved by his initial +blunder of thinking he had got a distinctive feature which +entitled him to claim the theory of evolution as an original idea +of his own. He found his natural selection hang round his +neck like a millstone. There is hardly a page in the +“Origin of Species” in which traces of the struggle +going on in Mr. Darwin’s mind are not discernible, with a +result alike exasperating and pitiable. I can only repeat +what I said in “Evolution Old and New,” namely, that +I find the task of extracting a well-defined meaning out of Mr. +Darwin’s words comparable only to that of trying to act on +the advice of a lawyer who has obscured the main issue as much as +he can, and whose chief aim has been to leave as many loopholes +as possible for himself to escape by, if things should go wrong +hereafter. Or, again, to that of one who has to construe an +Act of Parliament which was originally drawn with a view to +throwing as much dust as possible in the eyes of those who would +oppose the measure, and which, having been found utterly +unworkable in practice, has had clauses repealed up and down it +till it is now in an inextricable tangle of confusion and +contradiction.</p> +<p>The more Mr. Darwin’s work is studied, and more +especially the more his different editions are compared, the more +impossible is it to avoid a suspicion of <i>arrière +pensée</i> as pervading it whenever the “distinctive +feature” is on the <i>tapis</i>. It is right to say, +however, that no such suspicion attaches to Mr. A. R. Wallace, +Mr. Darwin’s fellow discoverer of natural selection. +It is impossible to doubt that Mr. Wallace believed he had made a +real and important improvement upon the Lamarckian system, and, +as a natural consequence, unlike Mr. Darwin, he began by telling +us what Lamarck had said. He did not, I admit, say quite +all that I should have been glad to have seen him say, nor use +exactly the words I should myself have chosen, but he said enough +to make it impossible to doubt his good faith, and his desire +that we should understand that with him, as with Mr. Darwin, +variations are mainly accidental, not functional. Thus, in +his memorable paper communicated to the Linnean Society in 1858 +he said, in a passage which I have quoted in “Unconscious +Memory”:</p> +<p>“The hypothesis of Lamarck—that progressive +changes in species have been produced by the attempts of the +animals to increase the development of their own organs, and thus +modify their structures and habits—has been repeatedly and +easily refuted by all writers on the subject of varieties and +species; . . . but the view here developed renders such an +hypothesis quite unnecessary. . . . The powerful retractile +talons of the falcon and cat tribes have not been produced or +increased by the volition of those animals; . . . neither did the +giraffe acquire its long neck by desiring to reach the foliage of +the more lofty shrubs, and constantly stretching its neck for +this purpose, but because any varieties which occurred among its +antitypes with a longer neck than usual <i>at once secured a +fresh range of pasture over the same ground as their +shorter-necked companions</i>, <i>and on the first scarcity of +food were thus enabled to outlive them</i>” (italics in +original). <a name="citation96a"></a><a href="#footnote96a" +class="citation">[96a]</a></p> +<p>“Which occurred” is obviously “which +happened to occur, by some chance or accident entirely +unconnected with use and disuse;” and though the word +“accidental” is never used, there can be no doubt +about Mr. Wallace’s desire to make the reader catch the +fact that with him accident, and not, as with Erasmus Darwin and +Lamarck, sustained effort, is the main purveyor of the variations +whose accumulation amounts ultimately to specific +difference. It is a pity, however, that instead of +contenting himself like a theologian with saying that his +opponent had been refuted over and over again, he did not refer +to any particular and tolerably successful attempt to refute the +theory that modifications in organic structure are mainly +functional. I am fairly well acquainted with the literature +of evolution, and have never met with any such attempt. But +let this pass; as with Mr. Darwin, so with Mr. Wallace, and so +indeed with all who accept Mr. Charles Darwin’s natural +selection as the main means of modification, the central idea is +luck, while the central idea of the Erasmus-Darwinian system is +cunning.</p> +<p>I have given the opinions of these contending parties in their +extreme development; but they both admit abatements which bring +them somewhat nearer to one another. Design, as even its +most strenuous upholders will admit, is a difficult word to deal +with; it is, like all our ideas, substantial enough until we try +to grasp it—and then, like all our ideas, it mockingly +eludes us; it is like life or death—a rope of many strands; +there is design within design, and design within undesign; there +is undesign within design (as when a man shuffles cards designing +that there shall be no design in their arrangement), and undesign +within undesign; when we speak of cunning or design in connection +with organism we do not mean cunning, all cunning, and nothing +but cunning, so that there shall be no place for luck; we do not +mean that conscious attention and forethought shall have been +bestowed upon the minutest details of action, and nothing been +left to work itself out departmentally according to precedent, or +as it otherwise best may according to the chapter of +accidents.</p> +<p>So, again, when Mr. Darwin and his followers deny design and +effort to have been the main purveyors of the variations whose +accumulation results in specific difference, they do not entirely +exclude the action of use and disuse—and this at once opens +the door for cunning; nevertheless, according to Erasmus Darwin +and Lamarck, the human eye and the long neck of the giraffe are +alike due to the accumulation of variations that are mainly +functional, and hence practical; according to Charles Darwin they +are alike due to the accumulation of variations that are +accidental, fortuitous, spontaneous, that is to say, mainly +cannot be reduced to any known general principle. According +to Charles Darwin “the preservation of favoured,” or +lucky, “races” is by far the most important means of +modification; according to Erasmus Darwin effort <i>non sibi res +sed se rebus subjungere</i> is unquestionably the most potent +means; roughly, therefore, there is no better or fairer way of +putting the matter, than to say that Charles Darwin is the +apostle of luck, and his grandfather, and Lamarck, of +cunning.</p> +<p>It should be observed also that the distinction between the +organism and its surroundings—on which both systems are +founded—is one that cannot be so universally drawn as we +find it convenient to allege. There is a debatable ground +of considerable extent on which <i>res</i> and <i>me</i>, ego and +non ego, luck and cunning, necessity and freewill, meet and pass +into one another as night and day, or life and death. No +one can draw a sharp line between ego and non ego, nor indeed any +sharp line between any classes of phenomena. Every part of +the ego is non ego <i>quâ</i> organ or tool in use, and +much of the non ego runs up into the ego and is inseparably +united with it; still there is enough that it is obviously most +convenient to call ego, and enough that it is no less obviously +most convenient to call non ego, as there is enough obvious day +and obvious night, or obvious luck and obvious cunning, to make +us think it advisable to keep separate accounts for each.</p> +<p>I will say more on this head in a following chapter; in this +present one my business should be confined to pointing out as +clearly and succinctly as I can the issue between the two great +main contending opinions concerning organic development that +obtain among those who accept the theory of descent at all; nor +do I believe that this can be done more effectually and +accurately than by saying, as above, that Mr. Charles Darwin +(whose name, by the way, was “Charles Robert,” and +not, as would appear from the title-pages of his books, +“Charles” only), Mr. A. R. Wallace, and their +supporters are the apostles of luck, while Erasmus Darwin and +Lamarck, followed, more or less timidly, by the Geoffroys and by +Mr. Herbert Spencer, and very timidly indeed by the Duke of +Argyll, preach cunning as the most important means of organic +modification.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p><span class="smcap">Note</span>.—It appears from +“Samuel Butler: A Memoir” (II, 29) that Butler wrote +to his father (Dec. 1885) about a passage in Horace (near the +beginning of the First Epistle of the First Book)—</p> +<p class="poetry">Nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor,<br +/> +Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor.</p> +<p>On the preceding page he is adapting the second of these two +verses to his own purposes.—H. F. J.</p> +<h2><a name="page100"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +100</span>Chapter VII<br /> +(<i>Intercalated</i>)<br /> +Mr. Spencer’s “The Factors of Organic +Evolution”</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">Since</span> the foregoing and several of +the succeeding chapters were written, Mr. Herbert Spencer has +made his position at once more clear and more widely understood +by his articles “The Factors of Organic Evolution” +which appeared in the <i>Nineteenth Century</i> for April and +May, 1886. The present appears the fittest place in which +to intercalate remarks concerning them.</p> +<p>Mr. Spencer asks whether those are right who regard Mr. +Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection as by itself +sufficient to account for organic evolution.</p> +<p>“On critically examining the evidence” (modern +writers never examine evidence, they always +“critically,” or “carefully,” or +“patiently,” examine it), he writes, “we shall +find reason to think that it by no means explains all that has to +be explained. Omitting for the present any consideration of +a factor which may be considered primordial, it may be contended +that one of the factors alleged by Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck +must be recognised as a co-operator. Unless that increase +of a part resulting from extra activity, and that decrease of it +resulting from inactivity, are transmissible to descendants, we +are without a key to many phenomena of organic evolution. +<i>Utterly inadequate to explain the major part of the facts as +is the hypothesis of the inheritance of functionally produced +modifications</i>, yet there is a minor part of the facts very +extensive though less, which must be ascribed to this +cause.” (Italics mine.)</p> +<p>Mr. Spencer does not here say expressly that Erasmus Darwin +and Lamarck considered inheritance of functionally produced +modifications to be the sole explanation of the facts of organic +life; modern writers on evolution for the most part avoid saying +anything expressly; this nevertheless is the conclusion which the +reader naturally draws—and was doubtless intended to +draw—from Mr. Spencer’s words. He gathers that +these writers put forward an “utterly inadequate” +theory, which cannot for a moment be entertained in the form in +which they left it, but which, nevertheless, contains +contributions to the formation of a just opinion which of late +years have been too much neglected.</p> +<p>This inference would be, as Mr. Spencer ought to know, a +mistaken one. Erasmus Darwin, who was the first to depend +mainly on functionally produced modifications, attributes, if not +as much importance to variations induced either by what we must +call chance, or by causes having no connection with use and +disuse, as Mr. Spencer does, still so nearly as much that there +is little to choose between them. Mr. Spencer’s words +show that he attributes, if not half, still not far off half the +modification that has actually been produced, to use and +disuse. Erasmus Darwin does not say whether he considers +use and disuse to have brought about more than half or less than +half; he only says that animal and vegetable modification is +“in part produced” by the exertions of the animals +and vegetables themselves; the impression I have derived is, that +just as Mr. Spencer considers rather less than half to be due to +use and disuse, so Erasmus Darwin considers decidedly more than +half—so much more, in fact, than half as to make function +unquestionably the factor most proper to be insisted on if only +one can be given. Further than this he did not go. I +will quote enough of Dr. Erasmus Darwin’s own words to put +his position beyond doubt. He writes:—</p> +<p>“Thirdly, when we enumerate the great changes produced +in the species of animals before their nativity, as, for example, +when the offspring reproduces the effects produced upon the +parent by accident or culture, or the changes produced by the +mixture of species, as in mules; or the changes produced probably +by exuberance of nourishment supplied to the foetus, as in +monstrous births with additional limbs; many of these enormities +are propagated and continued as a variety at least, if not as a +new species of animal. I have seen a breed of cats with an +additional claw on every foot; of poultry also with an additional +claw and with wings to their feet; and of others without +rumps. Mr. Buffon” (who, by the way, surely, was no +more “Mr. Buffon” than Lord Salisbury is “Mr. +Salisbury”) “mentions a breed of dogs without tails +which are common at Rome and Naples—which he supposes to +have been produced by a custom long established of cutting their +tails close off.” <a name="citation102a"></a><a +href="#footnote102a" class="citation">[102a]</a></p> +<p>Here not one of the causes of variation adduced is connected +with use and disuse, or effort, volition, and purpose; the +manner, moreover, in which they are brought forward is not that +of one who shows signs of recalcitrancy about admitting other +causes of modification as well as use and disuse; indeed, a +little lower down he almost appears to assign the subordinate +place to functionally produced modifications, for he +says—“Fifthly, from their first rudiments or +primordium to the termination of their lives, all animals undergo +perpetual transformations; <i>which are in part produced</i> by +their own exertions in consequence of their desires and +aversions, of their pleasures and their pains, or of irritations +or of associations; and many of these acquired forms or +propensities are transmitted to their posterity.”</p> +<p>I have quoted enough to show that Dr. Erasmus Darwin would +have protested against the supposition that functionally produced +modifications were an adequate explanation of all the phenomena +of organic modification. He declares accident and the +chances and changes of this mortal life to be potent and frequent +causes of variations, which, being not infrequently inherited, +result in the formation of varieties and even species, but +considers these causes if taken alone as no less insufficient to +account for observable facts than the theory of functionally +produced modifications would be if not supplemented by +inheritance of so-called fortuitous, or spontaneous +variations. The difference between Dr. Erasmus Darwin and +Mr. Spencer does not consist in the denial by the first, that a +variety which happens, no matter how accidentally, to have varied +in a way that enables it to comply more fully and readily with +the conditions of its existence, is likely to live longer and +leave more offspring than one less favoured; nor in the denial by +the second of the inheritance and accumulation of functionally +produced modifications; but in the amount of stress which they +respectively lay on the relative importance of the two great +factors of organic evolution, the existence of which they are +alike ready to admit.</p> +<p>With Erasmus Darwin there is indeed luck, and luck has had a +great deal to do with organic modification, but no amount of luck +would have done unless cunning had known how to take advantage of +it; whereas if cunning be given, a very little luck at a time +will accumulate in the course of ages and become a mighty +heap. Cunning, therefore, is the factor on which, having +regard to the usage of language and the necessity for simplifying +facts, he thinks it most proper to insist. Surely this is +as near as may be the opinion which common consent ascribes to +Mr. Spencer himself. It is certainly the one which, in +supporting Erasmus Darwin’s system as against his +grandson’s, I have always intended to support. With +Charles Darwin, on the other hand, there is indeed cunning, +effort, and consequent use and disuse; nor does he deny that +these have produced some, and sometimes even an important, effect +in modifying species, but he assigns by far the most important +<i>rôle</i> in the whole scheme to natural selection, +which, as I have already shown, must, with him, be regarded as a +synonym for luck pure and simple. This, for reasons well +shown by Mr. Spencer in the articles under consideration, is so +untenable that it seems only possible to account for its having +been advanced at all by supposing Mr. Darwin’s judgment to +have been perverted by some one or more of the many causes that +might tend to warp them. What the chief of those causes may +have been I shall presently point out.</p> +<p>Buffon erred rather on the side of ignoring functionally +produced modifications than of insisting on them. The main +agency with him is the direct action of the environment upon the +organism. This, no doubt, is a flaw in Buffon’s +immortal work, but it is one which Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck +easily corrected; nor can we doubt that Buffon would have readily +accepted their amendment if it had been suggested to him. +Buffon did infinitely more in the way of discovering and +establishing the theory of descent with modification than any one +has ever done either before or since. He was too much +occupied with proving the fact of evolution at all, to dwell as +fully as might have been wished upon the details of the process +whereby the amœba had become man, but we have already seen +that he regarded inherited mutilation as the cause of +establishing a new breed of dogs, and this is at any rate not +laying much stress on functionally produced modifications. +Again, when writing of the dog, he speaks of variations arising +“<i>by some chance</i> common enough with nature,” <a +name="citation104a"></a><a href="#footnote104a" +class="citation">[104a]</a> and clearly does not contemplate +function as the sole cause of modification. Practically, +though I grant I should be less able to quote passages in support +of my opinion than I quite like, I do not doubt that his position +was much the same as that of his successors, Erasmus Darwin and +Lamarck.</p> +<p>Lamarck is more vulnerable than either Erasmus Darwin or +Buffon on the score of unwillingness to assign its full share to +mere chance, but I do not for a moment believe his comparative +reticence to have been caused by failure to see that the chapter +of accidents is a fateful one. He saw that the cunning or +functional side had been too much lost sight of, and therefore +insisted on it, but he did not mean to say that there is no such +thing as luck. “Let us suppose,” he says, +“that a grass growing in a low-lying meadow, gets carried +<i>by some accident</i> to the brow of a neighbouring hill, where +the soil is still damp enough for the plant to be able to +exist.” <a name="citation105a"></a><a href="#footnote105a" +class="citation">[105a]</a> Or again—“With +sufficient time, favourable conditions of life, successive +changes in the condition of the globe, and the power of new +surroundings and habits to modify the organs of living bodies, +all animal and vegetable forms have been imperceptibly rendered +such as we now see them.” <a name="citation105b"></a><a +href="#footnote105b" class="citation">[105b]</a> Who can +doubt that accident is here regarded as a potent factor of +evolution, as well as the design that is involved in the +supposition that modification is, in the main, functionally +induced? Again he writes, “As regards the +circumstances that give rise to variation, the principal are +climatic changes, different temperatures of any of a +creature’s environments, differences of abode, of habit, of +the most frequent actions, and lastly of the means of obtaining +food, self-defence, reproduction,” &c. <a +name="citation105c"></a><a href="#footnote105c" +class="citation">[105c]</a> I will not dwell on the small +inconsistencies which may be found in the passages quoted above; +the reader will doubtless see them, and will also doubtless see +that in spite of them there can be no doubt that Lamarck, while +believing modification to be effected mainly by the survival in +the struggle for existence of modifications which had been +induced functionally, would not have hesitated to admit the +survival of favourable variations due to mere accident as also a +potent factor in inducing the results we see around us.</p> +<p>For the rest, Mr. Spencer’s articles have relieved me +from the necessity of going into the evidence which proves that +such structures as a giraffe’s neck, for example, cannot +possibly have been produced by the accumulation of variations +which had their origin mainly in accident. There is no +occasion to add anything to what Mr. Spencer has said on this +score, and I am satisfied that those who do not find his argument +convince them would not be convinced by anything I might say; I +shall, therefore, omit what I had written on this subject, and +confine myself to giving the substance of Mr. Spencer’s +most telling argument against Mr. Darwin’s theory that +accidental variations, if favourable, would accumulate and result +in seemingly adaptive structures. Mr. Spencer well shows +that luck or chance is insufficient as a motive-power, or helm, +of evolution; but luck is only absence of design; if, then, +absence of design is found to fail, it follows that there must +have been design somewhere, nor can the design be more +conveniently placed than in association with function.</p> +<p>Mr. Spencer contends that where life is so simple as to +consist practically in the discharge of only one function, or +where circumstances are such that some one function is supremely +important (a state of things, by the way, more easily found in +hypothesis than in nature—at least as continuing without +modification for many successive seasons), then accidental +variations, if favourable, would indeed accumulate and result in +modification, without the aid of the transmission of functionally +produced modification. This is true; it is also true, +however, that only a very small number of species in comparison +with those we see around us could thus arise, and that we should +never have got plants and animals as embodiments of the two great +fundamental principles on which it is alone possible that life +can be conducted, <a name="citation107a"></a><a +href="#footnote107a" class="citation">[107a]</a> and species of +plants and animals as embodiments of the details involved in +carrying out these two main principles.</p> +<p>If the earliest organism could have only varied favourably in +one direction, the one possible favourable accidental variation +would have accumulated so long as the organism continued to exist +at all, inasmuch as this would be preserved whenever it happened +to occur, while every other would be lost in the struggle of +competitive forms; but even in the lowest forms of life there is +more than one condition in respect of which the organism must be +supposed sensitive, and there are as many directions in which +variations may be favourable as there are conditions of the +environment that affect the organism. We cannot conceive of +a living form as having a power of adaptation limited to one +direction only; the elasticity which admits of a not being +“extreme to mark that which is done amiss” in one +direction will commonly admit of it in as many directions as +there are possible favourable modes of variation; the number of +these, as has been just said, depends upon the number of the +conditions of the environment that affect the organism, and these +last, though in the long run and over considerable intervals of +time tolerably constant, are over shorter intervals liable to +frequent and great changes; so that there is nothing in Mr. +Charles Darwin’s system of modification through the natural +survival of the lucky, to prevent gain in one direction one year +from being lost irretrievably in the next, through the greater +success of some in no way correlated variation, the fortunate +possessors of which alone survive. This, in its turn, is as +likely as not to disappear shortly through the arising of some +difficulty in some entirely new direction, and so on; nor, if +function be regarded as of small effect in determining organism, +is there anything to ensure either that, even if ground be lost +for a season or two in any one direction, it shall be recovered +presently on resumption by the organism of the habits that called +it into existence, or that it shall appear synchronously in a +sufficient number of individuals to ensure its not being soon +lost through gamogenesis.</p> +<p>How is progress ever to be made if races keep reversing, +Penelope-like, in one generation all that they have been +achieving in the preceding? And how, on Mr. Darwin’s +system, of which the accumulation of strokes of luck is the +greatly preponderating feature, is a hoard ever to be got +together and conserved, no matter how often luck may have thrown +good things in an organism’s way? Luck, or absence of +design, may be sometimes almost said to throw good things in our +way, or at any rate we may occasionally get more through having +made no design than any design we should have been likely to have +formed would have given us; but luck does not hoard these good +things for our use and make our wills for us, nor does it keep +providing us with the same good gifts again and again, and no +matter how often we reject them.</p> +<p>I had better, perhaps, give Mr. Spencer’s own words as +quoted by himself in his article in the <i>Nineteenth Century</i> +for April, 1886. He there wrote as follows, quoting from +§ 166 of his “Principles of Biology,” which +appeared in 1864:—</p> +<p>“Where the life is comparatively simple, or where +surrounding circumstances render some one function supremely +important, the survival of the fittest” (which means here +the survival of the luckiest) “may readily bring about the +appropriate structural change, without any aid from the +transmission of functionally-acquired modifications” (into +which effort and design have entered). “But in +proportion as the life grows complex—in proportion as a +healthy existence cannot be secured by a large endowment of some +one power, but demands many powers; in the same proportion do +there arise obstacles to the increase of any particular power, by +‘the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for +life’” (that is to say, through mere survival of the +luckiest). “As fast as the faculties are multiplied, +so fast does it become possible for the several members of a +species to have various kinds of superiority over one +another. While one saves its life by higher speed, another +does the like by clearer vision, another by keener scent, another +by quicker hearing, another by greater strength, another by +unusual power of enduring cold or hunger, another by special +sagacity, another by special timidity, another by special +courage; and others by other bodily and mental attributes. +Now it is unquestionably true that, other things equal, each of +these attributes, giving its possessor an equal extra chance of +life, is likely to be transmitted to posterity. But there +seems no reason to believe it will be increased in subsequent +generations by natural selection. That it may be thus +increased, the animals not possessing more than average +endowments of it must be more frequently killed off than +individuals highly endowed with it; and this can only happen when +the attribute is one of greater importance, for the time being, +than most of the other attributes. If those members of the +species which have but ordinary shares of it, nevertheless +survive by virtue of other superiorities which they severally +possess, then it is not easy to see how this particular attribute +can be developed by natural selection in subsequent +generations.” (For if some other superiority is a +greater source of luck, then natural selection, or survival of +the luckiest, will ensure that this other superiority be +preserved at the expense of the one acquired in the earlier +generation.) “The probability seems rather to be, +that by gamogenesis, this extra endowment will, on the average, +be diminished in posterity—just serving in the long run to +compensate the deficient endowments of other individuals, whose +special powers lie in other directions; and so to keep up the +normal structure of the species. The working out of the +process is here somewhat difficult to follow” (there is no +difficulty as soon as it is perceived that Mr. Darwin’s +natural selection invariably means, or ought to mean, the +survival of the luckiest, and that seasons and what they bring +with them, though fairly constant on an average, yet individually +vary so greatly that what is luck in one season is disaster in +another); “but it appears to me that as fast as the number +of bodily and mental faculties increases, and as fast as the +maintenance of life comes to depend less on the amount of any +one, and more on the combined action of all, so fast does the +production of specialities of character by natural selection +alone become difficult. Particularly does this seem to be +so with a species so multitudinous in powers as mankind; and +above all does it seem to be so with such of the human powers as +have but minor shares in aiding the struggle for life—the +æsthetic faculties, for example.</p> +<p>“Dwelling for a moment on this last illustration of the +class of difficulties described, let us ask how we are to +interpret the development of the musical faculty; how came there +that endowment of musical faculty which characterises modern +Europeans at large, as compared with their remote +ancestors? The monotonous chants of low savages cannot be +said to show any melodic inspiration; and it is not evident that +an individual savage who had a little more musical perception +than the rest would derive any such advantage in the maintenance +of life as would secure the spread of his superiority by +inheritance of the variation,” &c.</p> +<p>It should be observed that the passage given in the last +paragraph but one appeared in 1864, only five years after the +first edition of the “Origin of Species,” but, +crushing as it is, Mr. Darwin never answered it. He treated +it as nonexistent—and this, doubtless from a business +standpoint, was the best thing he could do. How far such a +course was consistent with that single-hearted devotion to the +interests of science for which Mr. Darwin developed such an +abnormal reputation, is a point which I must leave to his many +admirers to determine.</p> +<h2><a name="page112"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +112</span>Chapter VIII<br /> +Property, Common Sense, and Protoplasm</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">One</span> would think the issue stated in +the three preceding chapters was decided in the stating. +This, as I have already implied, is probably the reason why those +who have a vested interest in Mr. Darwin’s philosophical +reputation have avoided stating it.</p> +<p>It may be said that, seeing the result is a joint one, +inasmuch as both “res” and “me,” or both +luck and cunning, enter so largely into development, neither +factor can claim pre-eminence to the exclusion of the +other. But life is short and business long, and if we are +to get the one into the other we must suppress details, and leave +our words pregnant, as painters leave their touches when painting +from nature. If one factor concerns us greatly more than +the other, we should emphasize it, and let the other go without +saying, by force of association. There is no fear of its +being lost sight of; association is one of the few really liberal +things in nature; by liberal, I mean precipitate and inaccurate; +the power of words, as of pictures, and indeed the power to carry +on life at all, vests in the fact that association does not stick +to the letter of its bond, but will take the half for the whole +without even looking closely at the coin given to make sure that +it is not counterfeit. Through the haste and high pressure +of business, errors arise continually, and these errors give us +the shocks of which our consciousness is compounded. Our +whole conscious life, therefore, grows out of memory and out of +the power of association, in virtue of which not only does the +right half pass for the whole, but the wrong half not +infrequently passes current for it also, without being challenged +and found out till, as it were, the accounts come to be balanced, +and it is found that they will not do so.</p> +<p>Variations are an organism’s way of getting over an +unexpected discrepancy between its resources as shown by the +fly-leaves of its own cheques and the universe’s passbook; +the universe is generally right, or would be upheld as right if +the matter were to come before the not too incorruptible courts +of nature, and in nine cases out of ten the organism has made the +error in its own favour, so that it must now pay or die. It +can only pay by altering its mode of life, and how long is it +likely to be before a new departure in its mode of life comes out +in its own person and in those of its family? Granted it +will at first come out in their appearance only, but there can be +no change in appearance without some slight corresponding organic +modification. In practice there is usually compromise in +these matters. The universe, if it does not give an +organism short shrift and eat it at once, will commonly abate +something of its claim; it gets tricked out of an additional +moiety by the organism; the organism really does pay something by +way of changed habits; this results in variation, in virtue of +which the accounts are cooked, cobbled, and passed by a series of +those miracles of inconsistency which was call compromises, and +after this they cannot be reopened—not till next time.</p> +<p>Surely of the two factors which go to the making up of +development, cunning is the one more proper to be insisted on as +determining the physical and psychical well or ill being, and +hence, ere long, the future form of the organism. We can +hardly open a newspaper without seeing some sign of this; take, +for example, the following extract from a letter in the +<i>Times</i> of the day on which I am writing (February 8, +1886)—“You may pass along a road which divides a +settlement of Irish Celts from one of Germans. They all +came to the country equally without money, and have had to fight +their way in the forest, but the difference in their condition is +very remarkable; on the German side there is comfort, thrift, +peace, but on the other side the spectacle is very +different.” Few will deny that slight organic +differences, corresponding to these differences of habit, are +already perceptible; no Darwinian will deny that these +differences are likely to be inherited, and, in the absence of +intermarriage between the two colonies, to result in still more +typical difference than that which exists at present. +According to Mr. Darwin, the improved type of the more successful +race would not be due mainly to transmitted perseverance in +well-doing, but to the fact that if any member of the German +colony “happened” to be born “ever so +slightly,” &c. Of course this last is true to a +certain extent also; if any member of the German colony does +“happen to be born,” &c., then he will stand a +better chance of surviving, and, if he marries a wife like +himself, of transmitting his good qualities; but how about the +happening? How is it that this is of such frequent +occurrence in the one colony, and is so rare in the other? +<i>Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis</i>. True, but how and +why? Through the race being favoured? In one sense, +doubtless, it is true that no man can have anything except it be +given him from above, but it must be from an above into the +composition of which he himself largely enters. God gives +us all things; but we are a part of God, and that part of Him, +moreover, whose department it more especially is to look after +ourselves. It cannot be through luck, for luck is blind, +and does not pick out the same people year after year and +generation after generation; shall we not rather say, then, that +it is because mind, or cunning, is a great factor in the +achievement of physical results, and because there is an abiding +memory between successive generations, in virtue of which the +cunning of an earlier one enures to the benefit of its +successors?</p> +<p>It is one of the commonplaces of biology that the nature of +the organism (which is mainly determined by ancestral +antecedents) is greatly more important in determining its future +than the conditions of its environment, provided, of course, that +these are not too cruelly abnormal, so that good seed will do +better on rather poor soil, than bad seed on rather good soil; +this alone should be enough to show that cunning, or individual +effort, is more important in determining organic results than +luck is, and therefore that if either is to be insisted on to the +exclusion of the other, it should be cunning, not luck. +Which is more correctly said to be the main means of the +development of capital—Luck? or Cunning? Of course +there must be something to be developed—and luck, that is +to say, the unknowable and unforeseeable, enters everywhere; but +is it more convenient with our oldest and best-established ideas +to say that luck is the main means of the development of capital, +or that cunning is so? Can there be a moment’s +hesitation in admitting that if capital is found to have been +developed largely, continuously, by many people, in many ways, +over a long period of time, it can only have been by means of +continued application, energy, effort, industry, and good +sense? Granted there has been luck too; of course there +has, but we let it go without saying, whereas we cannot let the +skill or cunning go without saying, inasmuch as we feel the +cunning to have been the essence of the whole matter.</p> +<p>Granted, again, that there is no test more fallacious on a +small scale than that of immediate success. As applied to +any particular individual, it breaks down completely. It is +unfortunately no rare thing to see the good man striving against +fate, and the fool born with a silver spoon in his mouth. +Still on a large scale no test can be conceivably more reliable; +a blockhead may succeed for a time, but a succession of many +generations of blockheads does not go on steadily gaining ground, +adding field to field and farm to farm, and becoming year by year +more capable and prosperous. Given time—of which +there is no scant in the matter of organic development—and +cunning will do more with ill luck than folly with good. +People do not hold six trumps every hand for a dozen games of +whist running, if they do not keep a card or two up their +sleeves. Cunning, if it can keep its head above water at +all, will beat mere luck unaided by cunning, no matter what start +luck may have had, if the race be a fairly long one. Growth +is a kind of success which does indeed come to some organisms +with less effort than to others, but it cannot be maintained and +improved upon without pains and effort. A foolish organism +and its fortuitous variation will be soon parted, for, as a +general rule, unless the variation has so much connection with +the organism’s past habits and ways of thought as to be in +no proper sense of the word “fortuitous,” the +organism will not know what to do with it when it has got it, no +matter how favourable it may be, and it is little likely to be +handed down to descendants. Indeed the kind of people who +get on best in the world—and what test to a Darwinian can +be comparable to this?—commonly do insist on cunning rather +than on luck, sometimes perhaps even unduly; speaking, at least, +from experience, I have generally found myself more or less of a +failure with those Darwinians to whom I have endeavoured to +excuse my shortcomings on the score of luck.</p> +<p>It may be said that the contention that the nature of the +organism does more towards determining its future than the +conditions of its immediate environment do, is only another way +of saying that the accidents which have happened to an organism +in the persons of its ancestors throughout all time are more +irresistible by it for good or ill than any of the more ordinary +chances and changes of its own immediate life. I do not +deny this; but these ancestral accidents were either turned to +account, or neglected where they might have been taken advantage +of; they thus passed either into skill, or want of skill; so that +whichever way the fact is stated the result is the same; and if +simplicity of statement be regarded, there is no more convenient +way of putting the matter than to say that though luck is mighty, +cunning is mightier still. Organism commonly shows its +cunning by practising what Horace preached, and treating itself +as more plastic than its surroundings; those indeed who have had +the greatest the first to admit that they had gained their ends +more by reputation as moulders of circumstances have ever been +shaping their actions and themselves to suit events, than by +trying to shape events to suit themselves and their +actions. Modification, like charity, begins at home.</p> +<p>But however this may be, there can be no doubt that cunning is +in the long run mightier than luck as regards the acquisition of +property, and what applies to property applies to organism +also. Property, as I have lately seen was said by Rosmini, +is a kind of extension of the personality into the outside +world. He might have said as truly that it is a kind of +penetration of the outside world within the limits of the +personality, or that it is at any rate a prophesying of, and +essay after, the more living phase of matter in the direction of +which it is tending. If approached from the dynamical or +living side of the underlying substratum, it is the beginning of +the comparatively stable equilibrium which we call brute matter; +if from the statical side, that is to say, from that of brute +matter, it is the beginning of that dynamical state which we +associate with life; it is the last of ego and first of non ego, +or <i>vice versâ</i>, as the case may be; it is the ground +whereon the two meet and are neither wholly one nor wholly the +other, but a whirling mass of contradictions such as attends all +fusion.</p> +<p>What property is to a man’s mind or soul that his body +is also, only more so. The body is property carried to the +bitter end, or property is the body carried to the bitter end, +whichever the reader chooses; the expression “organic +wealth” is not figurative; none other is so apt and +accurate; so universally, indeed, is this recognised that the +fact has found expression in our liturgy, which bids us pray for +all those who are any wise afflicted “in mind, body, or +estate;” no inference, therefore, can be more simple and +legitimate than the one in accordance with which the laws that +govern the development of wealth generally are supposed also to +govern the particular form of health and wealth which comes most +closely home to us—I mean that of our bodily implements or +organs. What is the stomach but a living sack, or purse of +untanned leather, wherein we keep our means of subsistence? +Food is money made easy; it is petty cash in its handiest and +most reduced form; it is our way of assimilating our possessions +and making them indeed our own. What is the purse but a +kind of abridged extra corporeal stomach wherein we keep the +money which we convert by purchase into food, as we presently +convert the food by digestion into flesh and blood? And +what living form is there which is without a purse or stomach, +even though it have to job it by the meal as the amœba +does, and exchange it for some other article as soon as it has +done eating? How marvellously does the analogy hold between +the purse and the stomach alike as regards form and function; and +I may say in passing that, as usual, the organ which is the more +remote from protoplasm is at once more special, more an object of +our consciousness, and less an object of its own.</p> +<p>Talk of ego and non ego meeting, and of the hopelessness of +avoiding contradiction in terms—talk of this, and look, in +passing, at the amœba. It is itself <i>quâ</i> +maker of the stomach and being fed; it is not itself +<i>quâ</i> stomach and <i>quâ</i> its using itself as +a mere tool or implement to feed itself with. It is active +and passive, object and subject, <i>ego</i> and <i>non +ego</i>—every kind of Irish bull, in fact, which a sound +logician abhors—and it is only because it has persevered, +as I said in “Life and Habit,” in thus defying logic +and arguing most virtuously in a most vicious circle, that it has +come in the persons of some of its descendants to reason with +sufficient soundness. And what the amœba is man is +also; man is only a great many amœbas, most of them +dreadfully narrow-minded, going up and down the country with +their goods and chattels like gipsies in a caravan; he is only a +great many amœbas that have had much time and money spent +on their education, and received large bequests of organised +intelligence from those that have gone before them.</p> +<p>The most incorporate tool—we will say an eye, or a +tooth, or the closed fist when used to strike—has still +something of the <i>non ego</i> about it in so far as it is used; +those organs, again, that are the most completely separate from +the body, as the locomotive engine, must still from time to time +kiss the soil of the human body, and be handled and thus crossed +with man again if they would remain in working order. They +cannot be cut adrift from the most living form of matter (I mean +most living from our point of view), and remain absolutely +without connection with it for any length of time, any more than +a seal can live without coming up sometimes to breathe; and in so +far as they become linked on to living beings they live. +Everything is living which is in close communion with, and +interpermeated by, that something which we call mind or +thought. Giordano Bruno saw this long ago when he made an +interlocutor in one of his dialogues say that a man’s hat +and cloak are alive when he is wearing them. “Thy +boots and spurs live,” he exclaims, “when thy feet +carry them; thy hat lives when thy head is within it; and so the +stable lives when it contains the horse or mule, or even +yourself;” nor is it easy to see how this is to be refuted +except at a cost which no one in his senses will offer.</p> +<p>It may be said that the life of clothes in wear and implements +in use is no true life, inasmuch as it differs from flesh and +blood life in too many and important respects; that we have made +up our minds about not letting life outside the body too +decisively to allow the question to be reopened; that if this be +tolerated we shall have societies for the prevention of cruelty +to chairs and tables, or cutting clothes amiss, or wearing them +to tatters, or whatever other absurdity may occur to idle and +unkind people; the whole discussion, therefore, should be ordered +out of court at once.</p> +<p>I admit that this is much the most sensible position to take, +but it can only be taken by those who turn the deafest of deaf +ears to the teachings of science, and tolerate no going even for +a moment below the surface of things. People who take this +line must know how to put their foot down firmly in the matter of +closing a discussion. Some one may perhaps innocently say +that some parts of the body are more living and vital than +others, and those who stick to common sense may allow this, but +if they do they must close the discussion on the spot; if they +listen to another syllable they are lost; if they let the +innocent interlocutor say so much as that a piece of +well-nourished healthy brain is more living than the end of a +finger-nail that wants cutting, or than the calcareous parts of a +bone, the solvent will have been applied which will soon make an +end of common sense ways of looking at the matter. Once +even admit the use of the participle “dying,” which +involves degrees of death, and hence an entry of death in part +into a living body, and common sense must either close the +discussion at once, or ere long surrender at discretion.</p> +<p>Common sense can only carry weight in respect of matters with +which every one is familiar, as forming part of the daily and +hourly conduct of affairs; if we would keep our comfortable hard +and fast lines, our rough and ready unspecialised ways of dealing +with difficult questions, our impatience of what St. Paul calls +“doubtful disputations,” we must refuse to quit the +ground on which the judgments of mankind have been so long and +often given that they are not likely to be questioned. +Common sense is not yet formulated in manners of science or +philosophy, for only few consider them; few decisions, therefore, +have been arrived at which all hold final. Science is, like +love, “too young to know what conscience,” or common +sense, is. As soon as the world began to busy itself with +evolution it said good-bye to common sense, and must get on with +uncommon sense as best it can. The first lesson that +uncommon sense will teach it is that contradiction in terms is +the foundation of all sound reasoning—and, as an obvious +consequence, compromise, the foundation of all sound +practice. This, it follows easily, involves the corollary +that as faith, to be of any value, must be based on reason, so +reason, to be of any value, must be based on faith, and that +neither can stand alone or dispense with the other, any more than +culture or vulgarity can stand unalloyed with one another without +much danger of mischance.</p> +<p>It may not perhaps be immediately apparent why the admission +that a piece of healthy living brain is more living than the end +of a finger-nail, is so dangerous to common sense ways of looking +at life and death; I had better, therefore, be more +explicit. By this admission degrees of livingness are +admitted within the body; this involves approaches to +non-livingness. On this the question arises, “Which +are the most living parts?” The answer to this was +given a few years ago with a flourish of trumpets, and our +biologists shouted with one voice, “Great is +protoplasm. There is no life but protoplasm, and Huxley is +its prophet.” Read Huxley’s “Physical +Basis of Mind.” Read Professor Mivart’s +article, “What are Living Beings?” in the +<i>Contemporary Review</i>, July, 1879. Read Dr. Andrew +Wilson’s article in the <i>Gentleman’s Magazine</i>, +October, 1879. Remember Professor Allman’s address to +the British Association, 1879; ask, again, any medical man what +is the most approved scientific attitude as regards the +protoplasmic and non-protoplasmic parts of the body, and he will +say that the thinly veiled conclusion arrived at by all of them +is, that the protoplasmic parts are alone truly living, and that +the non-protoplasmic are non-living.</p> +<p>It may suffice if I confine myself to Professor Allman’s +address to the British Association in 1879, as a representative +utterance. Professor Allman said:—</p> +<p>“Protoplasm lies at the base of every vital +phenomenon. It is, as Huxley has well expressed it, +‘the physical basis of life;’ wherever there is life +from its lowest to its highest manifestation there is protoplasm; +wherever there is protoplasm there is life.” <a +name="citation122a"></a><a href="#footnote122a" +class="citation">[122a]</a></p> +<p>To say wherever there is life there is protoplasm, is to say +that there can be no life without protoplasm, and this is saying +that where there is no protoplasm there is no life. But +large parts of the body are non-protoplasmic; a bone is, indeed, +permeated by protoplasm, but it is not protoplasm; it follows, +therefore, that according to Professor Allman bone is not in any +proper sense of words a living substance. From this it +should follow, and doubtless does follow in Professor +Allman’s mind, that large tracts of the human body, if not +the greater part by weight (as bones, skin, muscular tissues, +&c.), are no more alive than a coat or pair of boots in wear +is alive, except in so far as the bones, &c., are more +closely and nakedly permeated by protoplasm than the coat or +boots, and are thus brought into closer, directer, and more +permanent communication with that which, if not life itself, +still has more of the ear of life, and comes nearer to its royal +person than anything else does. Indeed that this is +Professor Allman’s opinion appears from the passage on page +26 of the report, in which he says that in “protoplasm we +find the only form of matter in which life can manifest +itself.”</p> +<p>According to this view the skin and other tissues are supposed +to be made from dead protoplasm which living protoplasm turns to +account as the British Museum authorities are believed to stuff +their new specimens with the skins of old ones; the matter used +by the living protoplasm for this purpose is held to be entirely +foreign to protoplasm itself, and no more capable of acting in +concert with it than bricks can understand and act in concert +with the bricklayer. As the bricklayer is held to be living +and the bricks non-living, so the bones and skin which protoplasm +is supposed to construct are held non-living and the protoplasm +alone living. Protoplasm, it is said, goes about masked +behind the clothes or habits which it has fashioned. It has +habited itself as animals and plants, and we have mistaken the +garment for the wearer—as our dogs and cats doubtless think +with Giordano Bruno that our boots live when we are wearing them, +and that we keep spare paws in our bedrooms which lie by the wall +and go to sleep when we have not got them on.</p> +<p>If, in answer to the assertion that the osseous parts of bone +are non-living, it is said that they must be living, for they +heal if broken, which no dead matter can do, it is answered that +the broken pieces of bone do not grow together; they are mended +by the protoplasm which permeates the Haversian canals; the bones +themselves are no more living merely because they are tenanted by +something which really does live, than a house lives because men +and women inhabit it; and if a bone is repaired, it no more +repairs itself than a house can be said to have repaired itself +because its owner has sent for the bricklayer and seen that what +was wanted was done.</p> +<p>We do not know, it is said, by what means the structureless +viscid substance which we call protoplasm can build for itself a +solid bone; we do not understand how an amœba makes its +test; no one understands how anything is done unless he can do it +himself; and even then he probably does not know how he has done +it. Set a man who has never painted, to watch Rembrandt +paint the Burgomaster Six, and he will no more understand how +Rembrandt can have done it, than we can understand how the +amœba makes its test, or the protoplasm cements two broken +ends of a piece of bone. <i>Ces choses se font mais ne +s’expliquent pas</i>. So some denizen of another +planet looking at our earth through a telescope which showed him +much, but still not quite enough, and seeing the St. Gothard +tunnel plumb on end so that he could not see the holes of entry +and exit, would think the trains there a kind of caterpillar +which went through the mountain by a pure effort of the +will—that enabled them in some mysterious way to disregard +material obstacles and dispense with material means. We +know, of course, that it is not so, and that exemption from the +toil attendant on material obstacles has been compounded for, in +the ordinary way, by the single payment of a tunnel; and so with +the cementing of a bone, our biologists say that the protoplasm, +which is alone living, cements it much as a man might mend a +piece of broken china, but that it works by methods and processes +which elude us, even as the holes of the St. Gothard tunnel may +be supposed to elude a denizen of another world.</p> +<p>The reader will already have seen that the toils are beginning +to close round those who, while professing to be guided by common +sense, still parley with even the most superficial probers +beneath the surface; this, however, will appear more clearly in +the following chapter. It will also appear how far-reaching +were the consequences of the denial of design that was involved +in Mr. Darwin’s theory that luck is the main element in +survival, and how largely this theory is responsible for the +fatuous developments in connection alike with protoplasm and +automatism which a few years ago seemed about to carry everything +before them.</p> +<h2><a name="page125"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +125</span>Chapter IX<br /> +Property, Common Sense, and Protoplasm (<i>continued</i>)</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">The</span> position, then, stands +thus. Common sense gave the inch of admitting some parts of +the body to be less living than others, and philosophy took the +ell of declaring the body to be almost all of it stone +dead. This is serious; still if it were all, for a quiet +life, we might put up with it. Unfortunately we know only +too well that it will not be all. Our bodies, which seemed +so living and now prove so dead, have served us such a trick that +we can have no confidence in anything connected with them. +As with skin and bones to-day, so with protoplasm +to-morrow. Protoplasm is mainly oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, +and carbon; if we do not keep a sharp look out, we shall have it +going the way of the rest of the body, and being declared dead in +respect, at any rate, of these inorganic components. +Science has not, I believe, settled all the components of +protoplasm, but this is neither here nor there; she has settled +what it is in great part, and there is no trusting her not to +settle the rest at any moment, even if she has not already done +so. As soon as this has been done we shall be told that +nine-tenths of the protoplasm of which we are composed must go +the way of our non-protoplasmic parts, and that the only really +living part of us is the something with a new name that runs the +protoplasm that runs the flesh and bones that run the +organs—</p> +<p>Why stop here? Why not add “which run the tools +and properties which are as essential to our life and health as +much that is actually incorporate with us?” The same +breach which has let the non-living effect a lodgment within the +body must, in all equity, let the organic +character—bodiliness, so to speak—pass out beyond its +limits and effect a lodgment in our temporary and extra-corporeal +limbs. What, on the protoplasmic theory, the skin and bones +are, that the hammer and spade are also; they differ in the +degree of closeness and permanence with which they are associated +with protoplasm, but both bones and hammers are alike non-living +things which protoplasm uses for its own purposes and keeps +closer or less close at hand as custom and convenience may +determine.</p> +<p>According to this view, the non-protoplasmic parts of the body +are tools of the first degree; they are not living, but they are +in such close and constant contact with that which really lives, +that an aroma of life attaches to them. Some of these, +however, such as horns, hooves, and tusks, are so little +permeated by protoplasm that they cannot rank much higher than +the tools of the second degree, which come next to them in +order.</p> +<p>These tools of the second degree are either picked up +ready-made, or are manufactured directly by the body, as being +torn or bitten into shape, or as stones picked up to throw at +prey or at an enemy.</p> +<p>Tools of the third degree are made by the instrumentality of +tools of the second and first degrees; as, for example, chipped +flint, arrow-heads, &c.</p> +<p>Tools of the fourth degree are made by those of the third, +second, and first. They consist of the simpler compound +instruments that yet require to be worked by hand, as hammers, +spades, and even hand flour-mills.</p> +<p>Tools of the fifth degree are made by the help of those of the +fourth, third, second, and first. They are compounded of +many tools, worked, it may be, by steam or water and requiring no +constant contact with the body.</p> +<p>But each one of these tools of the fifth degree was made in +the first instance by the sole instrumentality of the four +preceding kinds of tool. They must all be linked on to +protoplasm, which is the one original tool-maker, but which can +only make the tools that are more remote from itself by the help +of those that are nearer, that is to say, it can only work when +it has suitable tools to work with, and when it is allowed to use +them in its own way. There can be no direct communication +between protoplasm and a steam-engine; there may be and often is +direct communication between machines of even the fifth order and +those of the first, as when an engine-man turns a cock, or +repairs something with his own hands if he has nothing better to +work with. But put a hammer, for example, to a piece of +protoplasm, and the protoplasm will no more know what to do with +it than we should be able to saw a piece of wood in two without a +saw. Even protoplasm from the hand of a carpenter who has +been handling hammers all his life would be hopelessly put off +its stroke if not allowed to work in its usual way but put bare +up against a hammer; it would make a slimy mess and then dry up; +still there can be no doubt (so at least those who uphold +protoplasm as the one living substance would say) that the closer +a machine can be got to protoplasm and the more permanent the +connection, the more living it appears to be, or at any rate the +more does it appear to be endowed with spontaneous and reasoning +energy, so long, of course, as the closeness is of a kind which +protoplasm understands and is familiar with. This, they +say, is why we do not like using any implement or tool with +gloves on, for these impose a barrier between the tool and its +true connection with protoplasm by means of the nervous +system. For the same reason we put gloves on when we box so +as to bar the connection.</p> +<p>That which we handle most unglovedly is our food, which we +handle with our stomachs rather than with our hands. Our +hands are so thickly encased with skin that protoplasm can hold +but small conversation with what they contain, unless it be held +for a long time in the closed fist, and even so the converse is +impeded as in a strange language; the inside of our mouths is +more naked, and our stomachs are more naked still; it is here +that protoplasm brings its fullest powers of suasion to bear on +those whom it would proselytise and receive as it were into its +own communion—whom it would convert and bring into a +condition of mind in which they shall see things as it sees them +itself, and, as we commonly say, “agree with” it, +instead of standing out stiffly for their own opinion. We +call this digesting our food; more properly we should call it +being digested by our food, which reads, marks, learns, and +inwardly digests us, till it comes to understand us and encourage +us by assuring us that we were perfectly right all the time, no +matter what any one might have said, or say, to the +contrary. Having thus recanted all its own past heresies, +it sets to work to convert everything that comes near it and +seems in the least likely to be converted. Eating is a mode +of love; it is an effort after a closer union; so we say we love +roast beef. A French lady told me once that she adored +veal; and a nurse tells her child that she would like to eat +it. Even he who caresses a dog or horse <i>pro tanto</i> +both weds and eats it. Strange how close the analogy +between love and hunger; in each case the effort is after closer +union and possession; in each case the outcome is reproduction +(for nutrition is the most complete of reproductions), and in +each case there are <i>residua</i>. But to return.</p> +<p>I have shown above that one consequence of the attempt so +vigorously made a few years ago to establish protoplasm as the +one living substance, is the making it clear that the +non-protoplasmic parts of the body and the simpler +extra-corporeal tools or organs must run on all fours in the +matter of livingness and non-livingness. If the +protoplasmic parts of the body are held living in virtue of their +being used by something that really lives, then so, though in a +less degree, must tools and machines. If, on the other +hand, tools and machines are held non-living inasmuch as they +only owe what little appearance of life they may present when in +actual use to something else that lives, and have no life of +their own—so, though in a less degree, must the +non-protoplasmic parts of the body. Allow an overflowing +aroma of life to vivify the horny skin under the heel, and from +this there will be a spilling which will vivify the boot in +wear. Deny an aroma of life to the boot in wear, and it +must ere long be denied to ninety-nine per cent. of the body; and +if the body is not alive while it can walk and talk, what in the +name of all that is unreasonable can be held to be so?</p> +<p>That the essential identity of bodily organs and tools is no +ingenious paradoxical way of putting things is evident from the +fact that we speak of bodily organs at all. Organ means +tool. There is nothing which reveals our most genuine +opinions to us so unerringly as our habitual and unguarded +expressions, and in the case under consideration so completely do +we instinctively recognise the underlying identity of tools and +limbs, that scientific men use the word “organ” for +any part of the body that discharges a function, practically to +the exclusion of any other term. Of course, however, the +above contention as to the essential identity of tools and organs +does not involve a denial of their obvious superficial +differences—differences so many and so great as to justify +our classing them in distinct categories so long as we have +regard to the daily purposes of life without looking at remoter +ones.</p> +<p>If the above be admitted, we can reply to those who in an +earlier chapter objected to our saying that if Mr. Darwin denied +design in the eye he should deny it in the burglar’s jemmy +also. For if bodily and non-bodily organs are essentially +one in kind, being each of them both living and non-living, and +each of them only a higher development of principles already +admitted and largely acted on in the other, then the method of +procedure observable in the evolution of the organs whose history +is within our ken should throw light upon the evolution of that +whose history goes back into so dim a past that we can only know +it by way of inference. In the absence of any show of +reason to the contrary we should argue from the known to the +unknown, and presume that even as our non-bodily organs +originated and were developed through gradual accumulation of +design, effort, and contrivance guided by experience, so also +must our bodily organs have been, in spite of the fact that the +contrivance has been, as it were, denuded of external evidences +in the course of long time. This at least is the most +obvious inference to draw; the burden of proof should rest not +with those who uphold function as the most important means of +organic modification, but with those who impugn it; it is hardly +necessary, however, to say that Mr. Darwin never attempted to +impugn by way of argument the conclusions either of his +grandfather or of Lamarck. He waved them both aside in one +or two short semi-contemptuous sentences, and said no more about +them—not, at least, until late in life he wrote his +“Erasmus Darwin,” and even then his remarks were +purely biographical; he did not say one syllable by way of +refutation, or even of explanation.</p> +<p>I am free to confess that, overwhelming as is the evidence +brought forward by Mr. Spencer in the articles already referred +to, as showing that accidental variations, unguided by the helm +of any main general principle which should as it were keep their +heads straight, could never accumulate with the results supposed +by Mr. Darwin; and overwhelming, again, as is the consideration +that Mr. Spencer’s most crushing argument was allowed by +Mr. Darwin to go without reply, still the considerations arising +from the discoveries of the last forty years or so in connection +with protoplasm, seem to me almost more overwhelming still. +This evidence proceeds on different lines from that adduced by +Mr. Spencer, but it points to the same conclusion, namely, that +though luck will avail much if backed by cunning and experience, +it is unavailing for any permanent result without them. +There is an irony which seems almost always to attend on those +who maintain that protoplasm is the only living substance which +ere long points their conclusions the opposite way to that which +they desire—in the very last direction, indeed, in which +they of all people in the world would willingly see them +pointed.</p> +<p>It may be asked why I should have so strong an objection to +seeing protoplasm as the only living substance, when I find this +view so useful to me as tending to substantiate +design—which I admit that I have as much and as seriously +at heart as I can allow myself to have any matter which, after +all, can so little affect daily conduct; I reply that it is no +part of my business to inquire whether this or that makes for my +pet theories or against them; my concern is to inquire whether or +no it is borne out by facts, and I find the opinion that +protoplasm is the one living substance unstable, inasmuch as it +is an attempt to make a halt where no halt can be made. +This is enough; but, furthermore, the fact that the protoplasmic +parts of the body are <i>more</i> living than the +non-protoplasmic—which I cannot deny, without denying that +it is any longer convenient to think of life and death at +all—will answer my purpose to the full as well or +better.</p> +<p>I pointed out another consequence, which, again, was cruelly +the reverse of what the promoters of the protoplasm movement +might be supposed anxious to arrive at—in a series of +articles which appeared in the <i>Examiner</i> during the summer +of 1879, and showed that if protoplasm were held to be the sole +seat of life, then this unity in the substance vivifying all, +both animals and plants, must be held as uniting them into a +single corporation or body—especially when their community +of descent is borne in mind—more effectually than any +merely superficial separation into individuals can be held to +disunite them, and that thus protoplasm must be seen as the life +of the world—as a vast body corporate, never dying till the +earth itself shall pass away. This came practically to +saying that protoplasm was God Almighty, who, of all the forms +open to Him, had chosen this singularly unattractive one as the +channel through which to make Himself manifest in the flesh by +taking our nature upon Him, and animating us with His own +Spirit. Our biologists, in fact, were fast nearing the +conception of a God who was both personal and material, but who +could not be made to square with pantheistic notions inasmuch as +no provision was made for the inorganic world; and, indeed, they +seem to have become alarmed at the grotesqueness of the position +in which they must ere long have found themselves, for in the +autumn of 1879 the boom collapsed, and thenceforth the leading +reviews and magazines have known protoplasm no more. About +the same time bathybius, which at one time bade fair to supplant +it upon the throne of popularity, died suddenly, as I am told, at +Norwich, under circumstances which did not transpire, nor has its +name, so far as I am aware, been ever again mentioned.</p> +<p>So much for the conclusions in regard to the larger aspect of +life taken as a whole which must follow from confining life to +protoplasm; but there is another aspect—that, namely, which +regards the individual. The inevitable consequences of +confining life to the protoplasmic parts of the body were just as +unexpected and unwelcome here as they had been with regard to +life at large; for, as I have already pointed out, there is no +drawing the line at protoplasm and resting at this point; nor yet +at the next halting-point beyond; nor at the one beyond +that. How often is this process to be repeated? and in what +can it end but in the rehabilitation of the soul as an ethereal, +spiritual, vital principle, apart from matter, which, +nevertheless, it animates, vivifying the clay of our +bodies? No one who has followed the course either of +biology or psychology during this century, and more especially +during the last five-and-twenty years, will tolerate the +reintroduction of the soul as something apart from the substratum +in which both feeling and action must be held to inhere. +The notion of matter being ever changed except by other matter in +another state is so shocking to the intellectual conscience that +it may be dismissed without discussion; yet if bathybius had not +been promptly dealt with, it must have become apparent even to +the British public that there were indeed but few steps from +protoplasm, as the only living substance, to vital +principle. Our biologists therefore stifled bathybius, +perhaps with justice, certainly with prudence, and left +protoplasm to its fate.</p> +<p>Any one who reads Professor Allman’s address above +referred to with due care will see that he was uneasy about +protoplasm, even at the time of its greatest popularity. +Professor Allman never says outright that the non-protoplasmic +parts of the body are no more alive than chairs and tables +are. He said what involved this as an inevitable +consequence, and there can be no doubt that this is what he +wanted to convey, but he never insisted on it with the +outspokenness and emphasis with which so startling a paradox +should alone be offered us for acceptance; nor is it easy to +believe that his reluctance to express his conclusion <i>totidem +verbis</i> was not due to a sense that it might ere long prove +more convenient not to have done so. When I advocated the +theory of the livingness, or quasi-livingness of machines, in the +chapters of “Erewhon” of which all else that I have +written on biological subjects is a development, I took care that +people should see the position in its extreme form; the +non-livingness of bodily organs is to the full as startling a +paradox as the livingness of non-bodily ones, and we have a right +to expect the fullest explicitness from those who advance +it. Of course it must be borne in mind that a machine can +only claim any appreciable even aroma of livingness so long as it +is in actual use. In “Erewhon” I did not think +it necessary to insist on this, and did not, indeed, yet fully +know what I was driving at.</p> +<p>The same disposition to avoid committing themselves to the +assertion that any part of the body is non-living may be observed +in the writings of the other authorities upon protoplasm above +referred to; I have searched all they said, and cannot find a +single passage in which they declare even the osseous parts of a +bone to be non-living, though this conclusion was the <i>raison +d’être</i> of all they were saying and followed as an +obvious inference. The reader will probably agree with me +in thinking that such reticence can only have been due to a +feeling that the ground was one on which it behoved them to walk +circumspectly; they probably felt, after a vague, ill-defined +fashion, that the more they reduced the body to mechanism the +more they laid it open to an opponent to raise mechanism to the +body, but, however this may be, they dropped protoplasm, as I +have said, in some haste with the autumn of 1879.</p> +<h2><a name="page135"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +135</span>Chapter X<br /> +The Attempt to Eliminate Mind</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">What</span>, it may be asked, were our +biologists really aiming at?—for men like Professor Huxley +do not serve protoplasm for nought. They wanted a good many +things, some of them more righteous than others, but all +intelligible. Among the more lawful of their desires was a +craving after a monistic conception of the universe. We all +desire this; who can turn his thoughts to these matters at all +and not instinctively lean towards the old conception of one +supreme and ultimate essence as the source from which all things +proceed and have proceeded, both now and ever? The most +striking and apparently most stable theory of the last quarter of +a century had been Sir William Grove’s theory of the +conservation of energy; and yet wherein is there any substantial +difference between this recent outcome of modern amateur, and +hence most sincere, science—pointing as it does to an +imperishable, and as such unchangeable, and as such, again, for +ever unknowable underlying substance the modes of which alone +change—wherein, except in mere verbal costume, does this +differ from the conclusions arrived at by the psalmist?</p> +<p>“Of old,” he exclaims, “hast Thou laid the +foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the work of Thy +hands. They shall perish, but Thou shalt endure; yea, all +of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt Thou +change them and they shall be changed; but Thou art the same, and +Thy years shall have no end.” <a name="citation135a"></a><a +href="#footnote135a" class="citation">[135a]</a></p> +<p>I know not what theologians may think of this passage, but +from a scientific point of view it is unassailable. So +again, “O Lord,” he exclaims, “Thou hast +searched me out, and known me: Thou knowest my down-sitting and +mine up-rising; Thou understandest my thoughts long before. +Thou art about my path, and about my bed: and spiest out all my +ways. For lo, there is not a word in my tongue but Thou, O +Lord, knowest it altogether . . . Whither shall I go, then, from +Thy Spirit? Or whither shall I go, then, from Thy +presence? If I climb up into heaven Thou art there: if I go +down to hell, Thou art there also. If I take the wings of +the morning, and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea, even +there also shall Thy hand lead me and Thy right hand shall hold +me. If I say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me, +then shall my night be turned to day. Yea, the darkness is +no darkness with Thee, but . . . the darkness and light to Thee +are both alike.” <a name="citation136a"></a><a +href="#footnote136a" class="citation">[136a]</a></p> +<p>What convention or short cut can symbolise for us the results +of laboured and complicated chains of reasoning or bring them +more aptly and concisely home to us than the one supplied long +since by the word God? What can approach more nearly to a +rendering of that which cannot be rendered—the idea of an +essence omnipresent in all things at all times everywhere in sky +and earth and sea; ever changing, yet the same yesterday, to-day, +and for ever; the ineffable contradiction in terms whose presence +none can either ever enter, or ever escape? Or rather, what +convention would have been more apt if it had not been lost sight +of as a convention and come to be regarded as an idea in actual +correspondence with a more or less knowable reality? A +convention was converted into a fetish, and now that its +worthlessness as a fetish is being generally felt, its great +value as a hieroglyph or convention is in danger of being lost +sight of. No doubt the psalmist was seeking for Sir William +Grove’s conception, if haply he might feel after it and +find it, and assuredly it is not far from every one of us. +But the course of true philosophy never did run smooth; no sooner +have we fairly grasped the conception of a single eternal and for +ever unknowable underlying substance, then we are faced by mind +and matter. Long-standing ideas and current language alike +lead us to see these as distinct things—mind being still +commonly regarded as something that acts on body from without as +the wind blows upon a leaf, and as no less an actual entity than +the body. Neither body nor mind seems less essential to our +existence than the other; not only do we feel this as regards our +own existence, but we feel it also as pervading the whole world +of life; everywhere we see body and mind working together towards +results that must be ascribed equally to both; but they are two, +not one; if, then, we are to have our monistic conception, it +would seem as though one of these must yield to the other; which, +therefore, is it to be?</p> +<p>This is a very old question. Some, from time immemorial, +have tried to get rid of matter by reducing it to a mere concept +of the mind, and their followers have arrived at conclusions that +may be logically irrefragable, but are as far removed from common +sense as they are in accord with logic; at any rate they have +failed to satisfy, and matter is no nearer being got rid of now +than it was when the discussion first began. Others, again, +have tried materialism, have declared the causative action of +both thought and feeling to be deceptive, and posit matter +obeying fixed laws of which thought and feeling must be admitted +as concomitants, but with which they have no causal +connection. The same thing has happened to these men as to +their opponents; they made out an excellent case on paper, but +thought and feeling still remain the mainsprings of action that +they have been always held to be. We still say, “I +gave him £5 because I felt pleased with him, and thought he +would like it;” or, “I knocked him down because I +felt angry, and thought I would teach him better +manners.” Omnipresent life and mind with appearances +of brute non-livingness—which appearances are deceptive; +this is one view. Omnipresent non-livingness or mechanism +with appearances as though the mechanism were guided and +controlled by thought—which appearances are deceptive; this +is the other. Between these two views the slaves of logic +have oscillated for centuries, and to all appearance will +continue to oscillate for centuries more.</p> +<p>People who think—as against those who feel and +act—want hard and fast lines—without which, indeed, +they cannot think at all; these lines are as it were steps cut on +a slope of ice without which there would be no descending +it. When we have begun to travel the downward path of +thought, we ask ourselves questions about life and death, ego and +non ego, object and subject, necessity and free will, and other +kindred subjects. We want to know where we are, and in the +hope of simplifying matters, strip, as it were, each subject to +the skin, and finding that even this has not freed it from all +extraneous matter, flay it alive in the hope that if we grub down +deep enough we shall come upon it in its pure unalloyed state +free from all inconvenient complication through intermixture with +anything alien to itself. Then, indeed, we can docket it, +and pigeon-hole it for what it is; but what can we do with it +till we have got it pure? We want to account for things, +which means that we want to know to which of the various accounts +opened in our mental ledger we ought to carry them—and how +can we do this if we admit a phenomenon to be neither one thing +nor the other, but to belong to half-a-dozen different accounts +in proportions which often cannot even approximately be +determined? If we are to keep accounts we must keep them in +reasonable compass; and if keeping them within reasonable compass +involves something of a Procrustean arrangement, we may regret +it, but cannot help it; having set up as thinkers we have got to +think, and must adhere to the only conditions under which thought +is possible; life, therefore, must be life, all life, and nothing +but life, and so with death, free will, necessity, design, and +everything else. This, at least, is how philosophers must +think concerning them in theory; in practice, however, not even +John Stuart Mill himself could eliminate all taint of its +opposite from any one of these things, any more than Lady Macbeth +could clear her hand of blood; indeed, the more nearly we think +we have succeeded the more certain are we to find ourselves ere +long mocked and baffled; and this, I take it, is what our +biologists began in the autumn of 1879 to discover had happened +to themselves.</p> +<p>For some years they had been trying to get rid of feeling, +consciousness, and mind generally, from active participation in +the evolution of the universe. They admitted, indeed, that +feeling and consciousness attend the working of the world’s +gear, as noise attends the working of a steam-engine, but they +would not allow that consciousness produced more effect in the +working of the world than noise on that of the +steam-engine. Feeling and noise were alike accidental +unessential adjuncts and nothing more. Incredible as it may +seem to those who are happy enough not to know that this attempt +is an old one, they were trying to reduce the world to the level +of a piece of unerring though sentient mechanism. Men and +animals must be allowed to feel and even to reflect; this much +must be conceded, but granted that they do, still (so, at least, +it was contended) it has no effect upon the result; it does not +matter as far as this is concerned whether they feel and think or +not; everything would go on exactly as it does and always has +done, though neither man nor beast knew nor felt anything at +all. It is only by maintaining things like this that people +will get pensions out of the British public.</p> +<p>Some such position as this is a <i>sine quâ non</i> for +the Neo-Darwinistic doctrine of natural selection, which, as Von +Hartmann justly observes, involves an essentially mechanical +mindless conception of the universe; to natural selection’s +door, therefore, the blame of the whole movement in favour of +mechanism must be justly laid. It was natural that those +who had been foremost in preaching mindless designless luck as +the main means of organic modification, should lend themselves +with alacrity to the task of getting rid of thought and feeling +from all share in the direction and governance of the +world. Professor Huxley, as usual, was among the foremost +in this good work, and whether influenced by Hobbes, or +Descartes, or Mr. Spalding, or even by the machine chapters in +“Erewhon” which were still recent, I do not know, led +off with his article “On the hypothesis that animals are +automata” (which it may be observed is the exact converse +of the hypothesis that automata are animated) in the +<i>Fortnightly Review</i> for November 1874. Professor +Huxley did not say outright that men and women were just as +living and just as dead as their own watches, but this was what +his article came to in substance. The conclusion arrived at +was that animals were automata; true, they were probably +sentient, still they were automata pure and simple, mere sentient +pieces of exceedingly elaborate clockwork, and nothing more.</p> +<p>“Professor Huxley,” says Mr. Romanes, in his Rede +Lecture for 1885, <a name="citation140a"></a><a +href="#footnote140a" class="citation">[140a]</a> “argues by +way of perfectly logical deduction from this statement, that +thought and feeling have nothing to do with determining action; +they are merely the bye-products of cerebration, or, as he +expresses it, the indices of changes which are going on in the +brain. Under this view we are all what he terms conscious +automata, or machines which happen, as it were by chance, to be +conscious of some of their own movements. But the +consciousness is altogether adventitious, and bears the same +ineffectual relation to the activity of the brain as a steam +whistle bears to the activity of a locomotive, or the striking of +a clock to the time-keeping adjustments of the clockwork. +Here, again, we meet with an echo of Hobbes, who opens his work +on the commonwealth with these words:—</p> +<p>“‘Nature, the art whereby God hath made and +governs the world, is by the <i>art</i> of man, as in many other +things, in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial +animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the +beginning whereof is in the principal part within; why may we not +say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs +and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For +what is the <i>heart</i> but a spring, and the <i>nerves</i> but +so many <i>strings</i>; and the <i>joints</i> but so many +<i>wheels</i> giving motion to the whole body, such as was +intended by the artificer?’</p> +<p>“Now this theory of conscious automatism is not merely a +legitimate outcome of the theory that nervous changes are the +causes of mental changes, but it is logically the only possible +outcome. Nor do I see any way in which this theory can be +fought on grounds of physiology.”</p> +<p>In passing, I may say the theory that living beings are +conscious machines, can be fought just as much and just as little +as the theory that machines are unconscious living beings; +everything that goes to prove either of these propositions goes +just as well to prove the other also. But I have perhaps +already said as much as is necessary on this head; the main point +with which I am concerned is the fact that Professor Huxley was +trying to expel consciousness and sentience from any causative +action in the working of the universe. In the following +month appeared the late Professor Clifford’s hardly less +outspoken article, “Body and Mind,” to the same +effect, also in the <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, then edited by Mr. +John Morley. Perhaps this view attained its frankest +expression in an article by the late Mr. Spalding, which appeared +in <i>Nature</i>, August 2, 1877; the following extracts will +show that Mr. Spalding must be credited with not playing fast and +loose with his own conclusions, and knew both how to think a +thing out to its extreme consequences, and how to put those +consequences clearly before his readers. Mr. Spalding +said:—</p> +<p>“Against Mr. Lewes’s proposition that the +movements of living beings are prompted and guided by feeling, I +urged that the amount and direction of every nervous discharge +must depend solely on physical conditions. And I contended +that to see this clearly is to see that when we speak of movement +being guided by feeling, we use the language of a less advanced +stage of enlightenment. This view has since occupied a good +deal of attention. Under the name of automatism it has been +advocated by Professor Huxley, and with firmer logic by Professor +Clifford. In the minds of our savage ancestors feeling was +the source of all movement . . . Using the word feeling in its +ordinary sense . . . <i>we assert not only that no evidence can +be given that feeling ever does guide or prompt action</i>, +<i>but that the process of its doing so is +inconceivable</i>. (Italics mine.) How can we picture +to ourselves a state of consciousness putting in motion any +particle of matter, large or small? Puss, while dozing +before the fire, hears a light rustle in the corner, and darts +towards the spot. What has happened? Certain +sound-waves have reached the ear, a series of physical changes +have taken place within the organism, special groups of muscles +have been called into play, and the body of the cat has changed +its position on the floor. Is it asserted that this chain +of physical changes is not at all points complete and sufficient +in itself?”</p> +<p>I have been led to turn to this article of Mr. +Spalding’s by Mr. Stewart Duncan, who, in his +“Conscious Matter,” <a name="citation142a"></a><a +href="#footnote142a" class="citation">[142a]</a> quotes the +latter part of the foregoing extract. Mr. Duncan goes on to +quote passages from Professor Tyndall’s utterances of about +the same date which show that he too took much the same +line—namely, that there is no causative connection between +mental and physical processes; from this it is obvious he must +have supposed that physical processes would go on just as well if +there were no accompaniment of feeling and consciousness at +all.</p> +<p>I have said enough to show that in the decade, roughly, +between 1870 and 1880 the set of opinion among our leading +biologists was strongly against mind, as having in any way +influenced the development of animal and vegetable life, and it +is not likely to be denied that the prominence which the mindless +theory of natural selection had assumed in men’s thoughts +since 1860 was one of the chief reasons, if not the chief, for +the turn opinion was taking. Our leading biologists had +staked so heavily upon natural selection from among fortuitous +variations that they would have been more than human if they had +not caught at everything that seemed to give it colour and +support. It was while this mechanical fit was upon them, +and in the closest connection with it, that the protoplasm boom +developed. It was doubtless felt that if the public could +be got to dislodge life, consciousness, and mind from any +considerable part of the body, it would be no hard matter to +dislodge it, presently, from the remainder; on this the +deceptiveness of mind as a causative agent, and the sufficiency +of a purely automatic conception of the universe, as of something +that will work if a penny be dropped into the box, would be +proved to demonstration. It would be proved from the side +of mind by considerations derivable from automatic and +unconscious action where mind <i>ex hypothesi</i> was not, but +where action went on as well or better without it than with it; +it would be proved from the side of body by what they would +doubtless call the “most careful and exhaustive” +examination of the body itself by the aid of appliances more +ample than had ever before been within the reach of man.</p> +<p>This was all very well, but for its success one thing was a +<i>sine quâ non</i>—I mean the dislodgment must be +thorough; the key must be got clean of even the smallest trace of +blood, for unless this could be done all the argument went to the +profit not of the mechanism, with which, for some reason or +other, they were so much enamoured, but of the soul and design, +the ideas which of all others were most distasteful to +them. They shut their eyes to this for a long time, but in +the end appear to have seen that if they were in search of an +absolute living and absolute non-living, the path along which +they were travelling would never lead them to it. They were +driving life up into a corner, but they were not eliminating it, +and, moreover, at the very moment of their thinking they had +hedged it in and could throw their salt upon it, it flew +mockingly over their heads and perched upon the place of all +others where they were most scandalised to see it—I mean +upon machines in use. So they retired sulkily to their +tents baffled but not ashamed.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>Some months subsequent to the completion of the foregoing +chapter, and indeed just as this book is on the point of leaving +my hands, there appears in <i>Nature</i> <a +name="citation144a"></a><a href="#footnote144a" +class="citation">[144a]</a> a letter from the Duke of Argyll, +which shows that he too is impressed with the conviction +expressed above—I mean that the real object our men of +science have lately had in view has been the getting rid of mind +from among the causes of evolution. The Duke +says:—</p> +<p>“The violence with which false interpretations were put +upon this theory (natural selection) and a function was assigned +to it which it could never fulfil, will some day be recognised as +one of the least creditable episodes in the history of +science. With a curious perversity it was the weakest +elements in the theory which were seized upon as the most +valuable, particularly the part assigned to blind chance in the +occurrence of variations. This was valued not for its +scientific truth,—for it could pretend to none,—but +because of its assumed bearing upon another field of thought and +the weapon it afforded for expelling mind from the causes of +evolution.”</p> +<p>The Duke, speaking of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s two articles +in the <i>Nineteenth Century</i> for April and May, 1886, to +which I have already called attention, continues:—</p> +<p>“In these two articles we have for the first time an +avowed and definite declaration against some of the leading ideas +on which the mechanical philosophy depends; and yet the caution, +and almost timidity, with which a man so eminent approaches the +announcement of conclusions of the most self-evident truth is a +most curious proof of the reign of terror which has come to be +established.”</p> +<p>Against this I must protest; the Duke cannot seriously +maintain that the main scope and purpose of Mr. Herbert +Spencer’s articles is new. Their substance has been +before us in Mr. Spencer’s own writings for some +two-and-twenty years, in the course of which Mr. Spencer has been +followed by Professor Mivart, the Rev. J. J. Murphy, the Duke of +Argyll himself, and many other writers of less note. When +the Duke talks about the establishment of a scientific reign of +terror, I confess I regard such an exaggeration with something +like impatience. Any one who has known his own mind and has +had the courage of his opinions has been able to say whatever he +wanted to say with as little let or hindrance during the last +twenty years, as during any other period in the history of +literature. Of course, if a man will keep blurting out +unpopular truths without considering whose toes he may or may not +be treading on, he will make enemies some of whom will doubtless +be able to give effect to their displeasure; but that is part of +the game. It is hardly possible for any one to oppose the +fallacy involved in the Charles-Darwinian theory of natural +selection more persistently and unsparingly than I have done +myself from the year 1877 onwards; naturally I have at times been +very angrily attacked in consequence, and as a matter of business +have made myself as unpleasant as I could in my rejoinders, but I +cannot remember anything having been ever attempted against me +which could cause fear in any ordinarily constituted +person. If, then, the Duke of Argyll is right in saying +that Mr. Spencer has shown a caution almost amounting to timidity +in attacking Mr. Darwin’s theory, either Mr. Spencer must +be a singularly timid person, or there must be some cause for his +timidity which is not immediately obvious. If terror reigns +anywhere among scientific men, I should say it reigned among +those who have staked imprudently on Mr. Darwin’s +reputation as a philosopher. I may add that the discovery +of the Duke’s impression that there exists a scientific +reign of terror, explains a good deal in his writings which it +has not been easy to understand hitherto.</p> +<p>As regards the theory of natural selection, the Duke +says:—</p> +<p>“From the first discussions which arose on this subject, +I have ventured to maintain that . . . the phrase +‘natural-selection’ represented no true physical +cause, still less the complete set of causes requisite to account +for the orderly procession of organic forms in Nature; that in so +far as it assumed variations to arise by accident it was not only +essentially faulty and incomplete, but fundamentally erroneous; +in short, that its only value lay in the convenience with which +it groups under one form of words, highly charged with metaphor, +an immense variety of causes, some purely mental, some purely +vital, and others purely physical or mechanical.”</p> +<h2><a name="page147"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +147</span>Chapter XI<br /> +The Way of Escape</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">To</span> sum up the conclusions hitherto +arrived at. Our philosophers have made the mistake of +forgetting that they cannot carry the rough-and-ready language of +common sense into precincts within which politeness and +philosophy are supreme. Common sense sees life and death as +distinct states having nothing in common, and hence in all +respects the antitheses of one another; so that with common sense +there should be no degrees of livingness, but if a thing is alive +at all it is as much alive as the most living of us, and if dead +at all it is stone dead in every part of it. Our +philosophers have exercised too little consideration in retaining +this view of the matter. They say that an amœba is as +much a living being as a man is, and do not allow that a +well-grown, highly educated man in robust health is more living +than an idiot cripple. They say he differs from the cripple +in many important respects, but not in degree of +livingness. Yet, as we have seen already, even common sense +by using the word “dying” admits degrees of life; +that is to say, it admits a more and a less; those, then, for +whom the superficial aspects of things are insufficient should +surely find no difficulty in admitting that the degrees are more +numerous than is dreamed of in the somewhat limited philosophy +which common sense alone knows. Livingness depends on range +of power, versatility, wealth of body and mind—how often, +indeed, do we not see people taking a new lease of life when they +have come into money even at an advanced age; it varies as these +vary, beginning with things that, though they have mind enough +for an outsider to swear by, can hardly be said to have yet found +it out themselves, and advancing to those that know their own +minds as fully as anything in this world does so. The more +a thing knows its own mind the more living it becomes, for life +viewed both in the individual and in the general as the outcome +of accumulated developments, is one long process of specialising +consciousness and sensation; that is to say, of getting to know +one’s own mind more and more fully upon a greater and +greater variety of subjects. On this I hope to touch more +fully in another book; in the meantime I would repeat that the +error of our philosophers consists in not having borne in mind +that when they quitted the ground on which common sense can claim +authority, they should have reconsidered everything that common +sense had taught them.</p> +<p>The votaries of common sense make the same mistake as +philosophers do, but they make it in another way. +Philosophers try to make the language of common sense serve for +purposes of philosophy, forgetting that they are in another +world, in which another tongue is current; common sense people, +on the other hand, every now and then attempt to deal with +matters alien to the routine of daily life. The boundaries +between the two kingdoms being very badly defined, it is only by +giving them a wide berth and being so philosophical as almost to +deny that there is any either life or death at all, or else so +full of common sense as to refuse to see one part of the body as +less living than another, that we can hope to steer clear of +doubt, inconsistency, and contradiction in terms in almost every +other word we utter. We cannot serve the God of philosophy +and the Mammon of common sense at one and the same time, and yet +it would almost seem as though the making the best that can be +made of both these worlds were the whole duty of organism.</p> +<p>It is easy to understand how the error of philosophers arose, +for, slaves of habit as we all are, we are more especially slaves +when the habit is one that has not been found troublesome. +There is no denying that it saves trouble to have things either +one thing or the other, and indeed for all the common purposes of +life if a thing is either alive or dead the small supplementary +residue of the opposite state should be neglected as too small to +be observable. If it is good to eat we have no difficulty +in knowing when it is dead enough to be eaten; if not good to +eat, but valuable for its skin, we know when it is dead enough to +be skinned with impunity; if it is a man, we know when he has +presented enough of the phenomena of death to allow of our +burying him and administering his estate; in fact, I cannot call +to mind any case in which the decision of the question whether +man or beast is alive or dead is frequently found to be +perplexing; hence we have become so accustomed to think there can +be no admixture of the two states, that we have found it almost +impossible to avoid carrying this crude view of life and death +into domains of thought in which it has no application. +There can be no doubt that when accuracy is required we should +see life and death not as fundamentally opposed, but as +supplementary to one another, without either’s being ever +able to exclude the other altogether; thus we should indeed see +some things as more living than others, but we should see nothing +as either unalloyedly living or unalloyedly non-living. If +a thing is living, it is so living that it has one foot in the +grave already; if dead, it is dead as a thing that has already +re-entered into the womb of Nature. And within the residue +of life that is in the dead there is an element of death; and +within this there is an element of life, and so <i>ad +infinitum</i>—again, as reflections in two mirrors that +face one another.</p> +<p>In brief, there is nothing in life of which there are not +germs, and, so to speak, harmonics in death, and nothing in death +of which germs and harmonics may not be found in life. Each +emphasizes what the other passes over most lightly—each +carries to its extreme conceivable development that which in the +other is only sketched in by a faint suggestion—but neither +has any feature rigorously special to itself. Granted that +death is a greater new departure in an organism’s life, +than any since that <i>congeries</i> of births and deaths to +which the name embryonic stages is commonly given, still it is a +new departure of the same essential character as any +other—that is to say, though there be much new there is +much, not to say more, old along with it. We shrink from it +as from any other change to the unknown, and also perhaps from an +instinctive sense that the fear of death is a <i>sine quâ +non</i> for physical and moral progress, but the fear is like all +else in life, a substantial thing which, if its foundations be +dug about, is found to rest on a superstitious basis.</p> +<p>Where, and on what principle, are the dividing lines between +living and non-living to be drawn? All attempts to draw +them hitherto have ended in deadlock and disaster; of this M. +Vianna De Lima, in his “Exposé Sommaire des +Théories transformistes de Lamarck, Darwin, et +Haeckel,” <a name="citation150a"></a><a +href="#footnote150a" class="citation">[150a]</a> says that all +attempts to trace <i>une ligne de démarcation nette et +profonde entre la matière vivante et la matière +inerte</i> have broken down. <a name="citation150b"></a><a +href="#footnote150b" class="citation">[150b]</a> <i>Il y a +un reste de vie dans le cadavre</i>, says Diderot, <a +name="citation150c"></a><a href="#footnote150c" +class="citation">[150c]</a> speaking of the more gradual decay of +the body after an easy natural death, than after a sudden and +violent one; and so Buffon begins his first volume by saying that +“we can descend, by almost imperceptible degrees, from the +most perfect creature to the most formless matter—from the +most highly organised matter to the most entirely inorganic +substance.” <a name="citation150d"></a><a +href="#footnote150d" class="citation">[150d]</a></p> +<p>Is the line to be so drawn as to admit any of the non-living +within the body? If we answer “yes,” then, as +we have seen, moiety after moiety is filched from us, till we +find ourselves left face to face with a tenuous quasi immaterial +vital principle or soul as animating an alien body, with which it +not only has no essential underlying community of substance, but +with which it has no conceivable point in common to render a +union between the two possible, or give the one a grip of any +kind over the other; in fact, the doctrine of disembodied +spirits, so instinctively rejected by all who need be listened +to, comes back as it would seem, with a scientific +<i>imprimatur</i>; if, on the other hand, we exclude the +non-living from the body, then what are we to do with nails that +want cutting, dying skin, or hair that is ready to fall +off? Are they less living than brain? Answer +“yes,” and degrees are admitted, which we have +already seen prove fatal; answer “no,” and we must +deny that one part of the body is more vital than +another—and this is refusing to go as far even as common +sense does; answer that these things are not very important, and +we quit the ground of equity and high philosophy on which we have +given ourselves such airs, and go back to common sense as unjust +judges that will hear those widows only who importune us.</p> +<p>As with the non-living so also with the living. Are we +to let it pass beyond the limits of the body, and allow a certain +temporary overflow of livingness to ordain as it were machines in +use? Then death will fare, if we once let life without the +body, as life fares if we once let death within it. It +becomes swallowed up in life, just as in the other case life was +swallowed up in death. Are we to confine it to the +body? If so, to the whole body, or to parts? And if +to parts, to what parts, and why? The only way out of the +difficulty is to rehabilitate contradiction in terms, and say +that everything is both alive and dead at one and the same +time—some things being much living and little dead, and +others, again, much dead and little living. Having done +this we have only got to settle what a thing is—when a +thing is a thing pure and simple, and when it is only a +<i>congeries</i> of things—and we shall doubtless then live +very happily and very philosophically ever afterwards.</p> +<p>But here another difficulty faces us. Common sense does +indeed know what is meant by a “thing” or “an +individual,” but philosophy cannot settle either of these +two points. Professor Mivart made the question “What +are Living Beings?” the subject of an article in one of our +leading magazines only a very few years ago. He asked, but +he did not answer. And so Professor Moseley was reported +(<i>Times</i>, January 16, 1885) as having said that it was +“almost impossible” to say what an individual +was. Surely if it is only “almost” impossible +for philosophy to determine this, Professor Moseley should have +at any rate tried to do it; if, however, he had tried and failed, +which from my own experience I should think most likely, he might +have spared his “almost.” “Almost” +is a very dangerous word. I once heard a man say that an +escape he had had from drowning was “almost” +providential. The difficulty about defining an individual +arises from the fact that we may look at “almost” +everything from two different points of view. If we are in +a common-sense humour for simplifying things, treating them +broadly, and emphasizing resemblances rather than differences, we +can find excellent reasons for ignoring recognised lines of +demarcation, calling everything by a new name, and unifying up +till we have united the two most distant stars in heaven as +meeting and being linked together in the eyes and souls of men; +if we are in this humour individuality after individuality +disappears, and ere long, if we are consistent, nothing will +remain but one universal whole, one true and only atom from which +alone nothing can be cut off and thrown away on to something +else; if, on the other hand, we are in a subtle philosophically +accurate humour for straining at gnats and emphasizing +differences rather than resemblances, we can draw distinctions, +and give reasons for subdividing and subdividing, till, unless we +violate what we choose to call our consistency somewhere, we +shall find ourselves with as many names as atoms and possible +combinations and permutations of atoms. The lines we draw, +the moments we choose for cutting this or that off at this or +that place, and thenceforth the dubbing it by another name, are +as arbitrary as the moments chosen by a South-Eastern Railway +porter for leaving off beating doormats; in each case doubtless +there is an approximate equity, but it is of a very rough and +ready kind.</p> +<p>What else, however, can we do? We can only escape the +Scylla of calling everything by one name, and recognising no +individual existences of any kind, by falling into the Charybdis +of having a name for everything, or by some piece of intellectual +sharp practice like that of the shrewd but unprincipled +Ulysses. If we were consistent honourable gentlemen, into +Charybdis or on to Scylla we should go like lambs; every +subterfuge by the help of which we escape our difficulty is but +an arbitrary high-handed act of classification that turns a deaf +ear to everything not robust enough to hold its own; nevertheless +even the most scrupulous of philosophers pockets his consistency +at a pinch, and refuses to let the native hue of resolution be +sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought, nor yet fobbed +by the rusty curb of logic. He is right, for assuredly the +poor intellectual abuses of the time want countenancing now as +much as ever, but so far as he countenances them, he should bear +in mind that he is returning to the ground of common sense, and +should not therefore hold himself too stiffly in the matter of +logic.</p> +<p>As with life and death so with design and absence of design or +luck. So also with union and disunion. There is never +either absolute design rigorously pervading every detail, nor yet +absolute absence of design pervading any detail rigorously, so, +as between substances, there is neither absolute union and +homogeneity, not absolute disunion and heterogeneity; there is +always a little place left for repentance; that is to say, in +theory we should admit that both design and chance, however well +defined, each have an aroma, as it were, of the other. Who +can think of a case in which his own design—about which he +should know more than any other, and from which, indeed, all his +ideas of design are derived—was so complete that there was +no chance in any part of it? Who, again, can bring forward +a case even of the purest chance or good luck into which no +element of design had entered directly or indirectly at any +juncture? This, nevertheless, does not involve our being +unable ever to ascribe a result baldly either to luck or +cunning. In some cases a decided preponderance of the +action, whether seen as a whole or looked at in detail, is +recognised at once as due to design, purpose, forethought, skill, +and effort, and then we properly disregard the undesigned +element; in others the details cannot without violence be +connected with design, however much the position which rendered +the main action possible may involve design—as, for +example, there is no design in the way in which individual pieces +of coal may hit one another when shot out of a sack, but there +may be design in the sack’s being brought to the particular +place where it is emptied; in others design may be so hard to +find that we rightly deny its existence, nevertheless in each +case there will be an element of the opposite, and the residuary +element would, if seen through a mental microscope, be found to +contain a residuary element of <i>its</i> opposite, and this +again of <i>its</i> opposite, and so on <i>ad infinitum</i>, as +with mirrors standing face to face. This having been +explained, and it being understood that when we speak of design +in organism we do so with a mental reserve of <i>exceptis +excipiendis</i>, there should be no hesitation in holding the +various modifications of plants and animals to be in such +preponderating measure due to function, that design, which +underlies function, is the fittest idea with which to connect +them in our minds.</p> +<p>We will now proceed to inquire how Mr. Darwin came to +substitute, or try to substitute, the survival of the luckiest +fittest, for the survival of the most cunning fittest, as held by +Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck; or more briefly how he came to +substitute luck for cunning.</p> +<h2><a name="page156"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +156</span>Chapter XII<br /> +Why Darwin’s Variations were Accidental</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">Some</span> may perhaps deny that Mr. +Darwin did this, and say he laid so much stress on use and disuse +as virtually to make function his main factor of evolution.</p> +<p>If, indeed, we confine ourselves to isolated passages, we +shall find little difficulty in making out a strong case to this +effect. Certainly most people believe this to be Mr. +Darwin’s doctrine, and considering how long and fully he +had the ear of the public, it is not likely they would think thus +if Mr. Darwin had willed otherwise, nor could he have induced +them to think as they do if he had not said a good deal that was +capable of the construction so commonly put upon it; but it is +hardly necessary, when addressing biologists, to insist on the +fact that Mr. Darwin’s distinctive doctrine is the denial +of the comparative importance of function, or use and disuse, as +a purveyor of variations,—with some, but not very +considerable, exceptions, chiefly in the cases of domesticated +animals.</p> +<p>He did not, however, make his distinctive feature as distinct +as he should have done. Sometimes he said one thing, and +sometimes the directly opposite. Sometimes, for example, +the conditions of existence “included natural +selection” or the fact that the best adapted to their +surroundings live longest and leave most offspring; <a +name="citation156a"></a><a href="#footnote156a" +class="citation">[156a]</a> sometimes “the principle of +natural selection” “fully embraced” “the +expression of conditions of existence.” <a +name="citation156b"></a><a href="#footnote156b" +class="citation">[156b]</a> It would not be easy to find +more unsatisfactory writing than this is, nor any more clearly +indicating a mind ill at ease with itself. Sometimes +“ants work <i>by inherited instincts</i> and inherited +tools;” <a name="citation157a"></a><a href="#footnote157a" +class="citation">[157a]</a> sometimes, again, it is surprising +that the case of ants working by inherited instincts has not been +brought as a demonstrative argument “against the well-known +doctrine of <i>inherited habit</i>, as advanced by +Lamarck.” <a name="citation157b"></a><a +href="#footnote157b" class="citation">[157b]</a> Sometimes +the winglessness of beetles inhabiting ocean islands is +“mainly due to natural selection,” <a +name="citation157c"></a><a href="#footnote157c" +class="citation">[157c]</a> and though we might be tempted to +ascribe the rudimentary condition of the wing to disuse, we are +on no account to do so—though disuse was probably to some +extent “combined with” natural selection; at other +times “it is probable that disuse has been the main means +of rendering the wings of beetles living on small exposed +islands” rudimentary. <a name="citation157d"></a><a +href="#footnote157d" class="citation">[157d]</a> We may +remark in passing that if disuse, as Mr. Darwin admits on this +occasion, is the main agent in rendering an organ rudimentary, +use should have been the main agent in rendering it the opposite +of rudimentary—that is to say, in bringing about its +development. The ostensible <i>raison +d’être</i>, however, of the “Origin of +Species” is to maintain that this is not the case.</p> +<p>There is hardly an opinion on the subject of descent with +modification which does not find support in some one passage or +another of the “Origin of Species.” If it were +desired to show that there is no substantial difference between +the doctrine of Erasmus Darwin and that of his grandson, it would +be easy to make out a good case for this, in spite of Mr. +Darwin’s calling his grandfather’s views +“erroneous,” in the historical sketch prefixed to the +later editions of the “Origin of Species.” +Passing over the passage already quoted on p. 62 of this book, in +which Mr. Darwin declares “habit omnipotent and its effects +hereditary”—a sentence, by the way, than which none +can be either more unfalteringly Lamarckian or less tainted with +the vices of Mr. Darwin’s later style—passing this +over as having been written some twenty years before the +“Origin of Species”—the last paragraph of the +“Origin of Species” itself is purely Lamarckian and +Erasmus-Darwinian. It declares the laws in accordance with +which organic forms assumed their present shape to +be—“Growth with reproduction; Variability from the +indirect and direct action of the external conditions of life and +from use and disuse, &c.” <a name="citation158a"></a><a +href="#footnote158a" class="citation">[158a]</a> Wherein +does this differ from the confession of faith made by Erasmus +Darwin and Lamarck? Where are the accidental fortuitous, +spontaneous variations now? And if they are not found +important enough to demand mention in this peroration and +<i>stretto</i>, as it were, of the whole matter, in which special +prominence should be given to the special feature of the work, +where ought they to be made important?</p> +<p>Mr. Darwin immediately goes on: “A ratio of existence so +high as to lead to a struggle for life, and as a consequence to +natural selection, entailing divergence of character and the +extinction of less improved forms;” so that natural +selection turns up after all. Yes—in the letters that +compose it, but not in the spirit; not in the special sense up to +this time attached to it in the “Origin of +Species.” The expression as used here is one with +which Erasmus Darwin would have found little fault, for it means +not as elsewhere in Mr. Darwin’s book and on his title-page +the preservation of “favoured” or lucky varieties, +but the preservation of varieties that have come to be varieties +through the causes assigned in the preceding two or three lines +of Mr. Darwin’s sentence; and these are mainly functional +or Erasmus-Darwinian; for the indirect action of the conditions +of life is mainly functional, and the direct action is admitted +on all hands to be but small.</p> +<p>It now appears more plainly, as insisted upon on an earlier +page, that there is not one natural selection and one survival of +the fittest, but two, inasmuch as there are two classes of +variations from which nature (supposing no exception taken to her +personification) can select. The bottles have the same +labels, and they are of the same colour, but the one holds +brandy, and the other toast and water. Nature can, by a +figure of speech, be said to select from variations that are +mainly functional or from variations that are mainly accidental; +in the first case she will eventually get an accumulation of +variation, and widely different types will come into existence; +in the second, the variations will not occur with sufficient +steadiness for accumulation to be possible. In the body of +Mr. Darwin’s book the variations are supposed to be mainly +due to accident, and function, though not denied all efficacy, is +declared to be the greatly subordinate factor; natural selection, +therefore, has been hitherto throughout tantamount to luck; in +the peroration the position is reversed <i>in toto</i>; the +selection is now made from variations into which luck has entered +so little that it may be neglected, the greatly preponderating +factor being function; here, then, natural selection is +tantamount to cunning. We are such slaves of words that, +seeing the words “natural selection” +employed—and forgetting that the results ensuing on natural +selection will depend entirely on what it is that is selected +from, so that the gist of the matter lies in this and not in the +words “natural selection”—it escaped us that a +change of front had been made, and a conclusion entirely alien to +the tenor of the whole book smuggled into the last paragraph as +the one which it had been written to support; the book preached +luck, the peroration cunning.</p> +<p>And there can be no doubt Mr. Darwin intended that the change +of front should escape us; for it cannot be believed that he did +not perfectly well know what he had done. Mr. Darwin edited +and re-edited with such minuteness of revision that it may be +said no detail escaped him provided it was small enough; it is +incredible that he should have allowed this paragraph to remain +from first to last unchanged (except for the introduction of the +words “by the Creator,” which are wanting in the +first edition) if they did not convey the conception he most +wished his readers to retain. Even if in his first edition +he had failed to see that he was abandoning in his last paragraph +all that it had been his ostensible object most especially to +support in the body of his book, he must have become aware of it +long before he revised the “Origin of Species” for +the last time; still he never altered it, and never put us on our +guard.</p> +<p>It was not Mr. Darwin’s manner to put his reader on his +guard; we might as well expect Mr. Gladstone to put us on our +guard about the Irish land bills. Caveat <i>lector</i> +seems to have been his motto. Mr. Spencer, in the articles +already referred to, is at pains to show that Mr. Darwin’s +opinions in later life underwent a change in the direction of +laying greater stress on functionally produced modifications, and +points out that in the sixth edition of the “Origin of +Species” Mr. Darwin says, “I think there can be no +doubt that use in our domestic animals has strengthened and +enlarged certain parts, and disuse diminished them;” +whereas in his first edition he said, “I think there can be +<i>little</i> doubt” of this. Mr. Spencer also quotes +a passage from “The Descent of Man,” in which Mr. +Darwin said that <i>even in the first edition</i> of the +“Origin of Species” he had attributed great effect to +function, as though in the later ones he had attributed still +more; but if there was any considerable change of position, it +should not have been left to be toilsomely collected by collation +of editions, and comparison of passages far removed from one +another in other books. If his mind had undergone the +modification supposed by Mr. Spencer, Mr. Darwin should have said +so in a prominent passage of some later edition of the +“Origin of Species.” He should have +said—“In my earlier editions I underrated, as now +seems probable, the effects of use and disuse as purveyors of the +slight successive modifications whose accumulation in the +ordinary course of things results in specific difference, and I +laid too much stress on the accumulation of merely accidental +variations;” having said this, he should have summarised +the reasons that had made him change his mind, and given a list +of the most important cases in which he has seen fit to alter +what he had originally written. If Mr. Darwin had dealt +thus with us we should have readily condoned all the mistakes he +would have been at all likely to have made, for we should have +known him as one who was trying to help us, tidy us up, keep us +straight, and enable us to use our judgments to the best +advantage. The public will forgive many errors alike of +taste and judgment, where it feels that a writer persistently +desires this.</p> +<p>I can only remember a couple of sentences in the later +editions of the “Origin of Species” in which Mr. +Darwin directly admits a change of opinion as regards the main +causes of organic modification. How shuffling the first of +these is I have already shown in “Life and Habit,” p. +260, and in “Evolution, Old and New,” p. 359; I need +not, therefore, say more here, especially as there has been no +rejoinder to what I then said. Curiously enough the +sentence does not bear out Mr. Spencer’s contention that +Mr. Darwin in his later years leaned more decidedly towards +functionally produced modifications, for it runs: <a +name="citation161a"></a><a href="#footnote161a" +class="citation">[161a]</a>—“In the earlier editions +of this work I underrated, as now seems probable, the frequency +and importance of modifications due,” not, as Mr. Spencer +would have us believe, to use and disuse, but “to +spontaneous variability,” by which can only be intended, +“to variations in no way connected with use and +disuse,” as not being assignable to any known cause of +general application, and referable as far as we are concerned to +accident only; so that he gives the natural survival of the +luckiest, which is indeed his distinctive feature, if it deserve +to be called a feature at all, greater prominence than +ever. Nevertheless there is no change in his concluding +paragraph, which still remains an embodiment of the views of +Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck.</p> +<p>The other passage is on p. 421 of the edition of 1876. +It stands:—“I have now recapitulated the facts and +considerations which have thoroughly” (why +“thoroughly”?) “convinced me that species have +been modified during a long course of descent. This has +been effected chiefly through the natural selection of numerous, +successive, slight, favourable variations; aided in an important +manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts; +and in an unimportant manner, that is, in relation to adaptive +structures, whether past or present, by the direct action of +external conditions, and by variations which seem to us in our +ignorance to arise spontaneously. It appears that I +formerly underrated the frequency and value of these latter forms +of variation as leading to permanent modifications of structure +independently of natural selection.”</p> +<p>Here, again, it is not use and disuse which Mr. Darwin +declares himself to have undervalued, but spontaneous +variations. The sentence just given is one of the most +confusing I ever read even in the works of Mr Darwin. It is +the essence of his theory that the “numerous successive, +slight, favourable variations,” above referred to, should +be fortuitous, accidental, spontaneous; it is evident, moreover, +that they are intended in this passage to be accidental or +spontaneous, although neither of these words is employed, +inasmuch as use and disuse and the action of the conditions of +existence, whether direct or indirect, are mentioned specially as +separate causes which purvey only the minor part of the +variations from among which nature selects. The words +“that is, in relation to adaptive forms” should be +omitted, as surplusage that draws the reader’s attention +from the point at issue; the sentence really amounts to +this—that modification has been effected <i>chiefly through +selection</i> in the ordinary course of nature <i>from among +spontaneous variations</i>, <i>aided in an unimportant manner by +variations which quâ us are spontaneous</i>. +Nevertheless, though these spontaneous variations are still so +trifling in effect that they only aid spontaneous variations in +an unimportant manner, in his earlier editions Mr. Darwin thought +them still less important than he does now.</p> +<p>This comes of tinkering. We do not know whether we are +on our heads or our heels. We catch ourselves repeating +“important,” “unimportant,” +“unimportant,” “important,” like the King +when addressing the jury in “Alice in Wonderland;” +and yet this is the book of which Mr. Grant Allen <a +name="citation163a"></a><a href="#footnote163a" +class="citation">[163a]</a> says that it is “one of the +greatest, and most learned, the most lucid, the most logical, the +most crushing, the most conclusive, that the world has ever +seen. Step by step, and principle by principle, it proved +every point in its progress triumphantly before it went on to the +next. So vast an array of facts so thoroughly in hand had +never before been mustered and marshalled in favour of any +biological theory.” The book and the eulogy are well +mated.</p> +<p>I see that in the paragraph following on the one just quoted, +Mr. Allen says, that “to the world at large Darwinism and +evolution became at once synonymous terms.” Certainly +it was no fault of Mr. Darwin’s if they did not, but I will +add more on this head presently; for the moment, returning to Mr. +Darwin, it is hardly credible, but it is nevertheless true, that +Mr Darwin begins the paragraph next following on the one on which +I have just reflected so severely, with the words, “It can +hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain in so +satisfactory a manner as does the theory of natural selection, +the several large classes of facts above specified.” +If Mr. Darwin found the large classes of facts +“satisfactorily” explained by the survival of the +luckiest irrespectively of the cunning which enabled them to turn +their luck to account, he must have been easily satisfied. +Perhaps he was in the same frame of mind as when he said <a +name="citation164a"></a><a href="#footnote164a" +class="citation">[164a]</a> that “even an imperfect answer +would be satisfactory,” but surely this is being thankful +for small mercies.</p> +<p>On the following page Mr. Darwin says:—“Although I +am fully” (why “fully”?) “convinced of +the truth of the views given in this volume under the form of an +abstract, I by no means expect to convince experienced +naturalists,” &c. I have not quoted the whole of +Mr. Darwin’s sentence, but it implies that any experienced +naturalist who remained unconvinced was an old-fashioned, +prejudiced person. I confess that this is what I rather +feel about the experienced naturalists who differ in only too +great numbers from myself, but I did not expect to find so much +of the old Adam remaining in Mr. Darwin; I did not expect to find +him support me in the belief that naturalists are made of much +the same stuff as other people, and, if they are wise, will look +upon new theories with distrust until they find them becoming +generally accepted. I am not sure that Mr. Darwin is not +just a little bit flippant here.</p> +<p>Sometimes I ask myself whether it is possible that, not being +convinced, I may be an experienced naturalist after all; at other +times, when I read Mr. Darwin’s works and those of his +eulogists, I wonder whether there is not some other Mr. Darwin, +some other “Origin of Species,” some other Professors +Huxley, Tyndal, and Ray Lankester, and whether in each case some +malicious fiend has not palmed off a counterfeit upon me that +differs <i>toto cælo</i> from the original. I felt +exactly the same when I read Goethe’s “Wilhelm +Meister”; I could not believe my eyes, which nevertheless +told me that the dull diseased trash I was so toilsomely reading +was a work which was commonly held to be one of the great +literary masterpieces of the world. It seemed to me that +there must be some other Goethe and some other Wilhelm +Meister. Indeed I find myself so depressingly out of +harmony with the prevailing not opinion only, but +spirit—if, indeed, the Huxleys, Tyndals, Miss Buckleys, Ray +Lankesters, and Romaneses express the prevailing spirit as +accurately as they appear to do—that at times I find it +difficult to believe I am not the victim of hallucination; +nevertheless I know that either every canon, whether of criticism +or honourable conduct, which I have learned to respect is an +impudent swindle, suitable for the cloister only, and having no +force or application in the outside world; or else that Mr. +Darwin and his supporters are misleading the public to the full +as much as the theologians of whom they speak at times so +disapprovingly. They sin, moreover, with incomparably less +excuse. Right as they doubtless are in much, and much as we +doubtless owe them (so we owe much also to the theologians, and +they also are right in much), they are giving way to a temper +which cannot be indulged with impunity. I know the great +power of academicism; I know how instinctively academicism +everywhere must range itself on Mr. Darwin’s side, and how +askance it must look on those who write as I do; but I know also +that there is a power before which even academicism must bow, and +to this power I look not unhopefully for support.</p> +<p>As regards Mr. Spencer’s contention that Mr. Darwin +leaned more towards function as he grew older, I do not doubt +that at the end of his life Mr. Darwin believed modification to +be mainly due to function, but the passage quoted on page 62 +written in 1839, coupled with the concluding paragraph of the +“Origin of Species” written in 1859, and allowed to +stand during seventeen years of revision, though so much else was +altered—these passages, when their dates and surroundings +are considered, suggest strongly that Mr. Darwin thought during +all the forty years or so thus covered exactly as his grandfather +and Lamarck had done, and indeed as all sensible people since +Buffon wrote have done if they have accepted evolution at +all.</p> +<p>Then why should he not have said so? What object could +he have in writing an elaborate work to support a theory which he +knew all the time to be untenable? The impropriety of such +a course, unless the work was, like Buffon’s, transparently +ironical, could only be matched by its fatuousness, or indeed by +the folly of one who should assign action so motiveless to any +one out of a lunatic asylum.</p> +<p>This sounds well, but unfortunately we cannot forget that when +Mr. Darwin wrote the “Origin of Species” he claimed +to be the originator of the theory of descent with modification +generally; that he did this without one word of reference either +to Buffon or Erasmus Darwin until the first six thousand copies +of his book had been sold, and then with as meagre, inadequate +notice as can be well conceived. Lamarck was just named in +the first editions of the “Origin of Species,” but +only to be told that Mr. Darwin had not got anything to give him, +and he must go away; the author of the “Vestiges of +Creation” was also just mentioned, but only in a sentence +full of such gross misrepresentation that Mr. Darwin did not +venture to stand by it, and expunged it in later editions, as +usual, without calling attention to what he had done. It +would have been in the highest degree imprudent, not to say +impossible, for one so conscientious as Mr. Darwin to have taken +the line he took in respect of descent with modification +generally, if he were not provided with some ostensibly +distinctive feature, in virtue of which, if people said anything, +he might claim to have advanced something different, and widely +different, from the theory of evolution propounded by his +illustrious predecessors; a distinctive theory of some sort, +therefore, had got to be looked for—and if people look in +this spirit they can generally find.</p> +<p>I imagine that Mr. Darwin, casting about for a substantial +difference, and being unable to find one, committed the +Gladstonian blunder of mistaking an unsubstantial for a +substantial one. It was doubtless because he suspected it +that he never took us fully into his confidence, nor in all +probability allowed even to himself how deeply he distrusted +it. Much, however, as he disliked the accumulation of +accidental variations, he disliked not claiming the theory of +descent with modification still more; and if he was to claim +this, accidental his variations had got to be. Accidental +they accordingly were, but in as obscure and perfunctory a +fashion as Mr. Darwin could make them consistently with their +being to hand as accidental variations should later developments +make this convenient. Under these circumstances it was +hardly to be expected that Mr. Darwin should help the reader to +follow the workings of his mind—nor, again, that a book the +writer of which was hampered as I have supposed should prove +clear and easy reading.</p> +<p>The attitude of Mr. Darwin’s mind, whatever it may have +been in regard to the theory of descent with modification +generally, goes so far to explain his attitude in respect to the +theory of natural selection (which, it cannot be too often +repeated, is only one of the conditions of existence advanced as +the main means of modification by the earlier evolutionists), +that it is worth while to settle the question once for all +whether Mr. Darwin did or did not believe himself justified in +claiming the theory of descent as an original discovery of his +own. This will be a task of some little length, and may +perhaps try the reader’s patience, as it assuredly tried +mine; if, however, he will read the two following chapters, he +will probably be able to make up his mind upon much that will +otherwise, if he thinks about it at all, continue to puzzle +him.</p> +<h2><a name="page168"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +168</span>Chapter XIII<br /> +Darwin’s Claim to Descent with Modification</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">Mr. Allen</span>, in his “Charles +Darwin,” <a name="citation168a"></a><a href="#footnote168a" +class="citation">[168a]</a> says that “in the public mind +Mr. Darwin is commonly regarded as the discoverer and founder of +the evolution hypothesis,” and on p. 177 he says that to +most men Darwinism and evolution mean one and the same +thing. Mr. Allen declares misconception on this matter to +be “so extremely general” as to be “almost +universal;” this is more true than creditable to Mr. +Darwin.</p> +<p>Mr. Allen says <a name="citation168b"></a><a +href="#footnote168b" class="citation">[168b]</a> that though Mr. +Darwin gained “far wider general acceptance” for both +the doctrine of descent in general, and for that of the descent +of man from a simious or semi-simious ancestor in particular, +“he laid no sort of claim to originality or proprietorship +in either theory.” This is not the case. No one +can claim a theory more frequently and more effectually than Mr. +Darwin claimed descent with modification, nor, as I have already +said, is it likely that the misconception of which Mr. Allen +complains would be general, if he had not so claimed it. +The “Origin of Species” begins:—</p> +<p>“When on board H.M.S. <i>Beagle</i>, as naturalist, I +was much struck with certain facts in the distribution of the +inhabitants of South America, and in the geological relation of +the present to the past inhabitants of that continent. +These facts seemed to me to throw some light on the origin of +species—that mystery of mysteries, as it has been called by +one of our greatest philosophers. On my return home it +occurred to me, in 1837, that something might perhaps be made out +on this question by patiently accumulating and reflecting upon +all sorts of facts which could possibly have any bearing on +it. After five years’ work I allowed myself to +speculate upon the subject, and drew up some short notes; these I +enlarged in 1844 <a name="citation169a"></a><a +href="#footnote169a" class="citation">[169a]</a> into a sketch of +the conclusions which then seemed to me probable. From that +period to the present day I have steadily pursued the same +object. I hope I may be excused these personal details, as +I give them to show that I have not been hasty in coming to a +decision.”</p> +<p>This is bland, but peremptory. Mr. Darwin implies that +the mere asking of the question how species has come about opened +up a field into which speculation itself had hardly yet ventured +to intrude. It was the mystery of mysteries; one of our +greatest philosophers had said so; not one little feeble ray of +light had ever yet been thrown upon it. Mr. Darwin knew all +this, and was appalled at the greatness of the task that lay +before him; still, after he had pondered on what he had seen in +South America, it really did occur to him, that if he was very +very patient, and went on reflecting for years and years longer, +upon all sorts of facts, good, bad, and indifferent, which could +possibly have any bearing on the subject—and what fact +might not possibly have some bearing?—well, something, as +against the nothing that had been made out hitherto, might by +some faint far-away possibility be one day dimly seem. It +was only what he had seen in South America that made all this +occur to him. He had never seen anything about descent with +modification in any book, nor heard any one talk about it as +having been put forward by other people; if he had, he would, of +course, have been the first to say so; he was not as other +philosophers are; so the mountain went on for years and years +gestating, but still there was no labour.</p> +<p>“My work,” continues Mr. Darwin, “is now +nearly finished; but as it will take me two or three years to +complete it, and as my health is far from strong, I have been +urged to publish this abstract. I have been more especially +induced to do this, as Mr. Wallace, who is now studying the +natural history of the Malay Archipelago, has arrived at almost +exactly the same general conclusions that I have on the origin of +species.” Mr. Darwin was naturally anxious to +forestall Mr. Wallace, and hurried up with his book. What +reader, on finding descent with modification to be its most +prominent feature, could doubt—especially if new to the +subject, as the greater number of Mr. Darwin’s readers in +1859 were—that this same descent with modification was the +theory which Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace had jointly hit upon, and +which Mr. Darwin was so anxious to show that he had not been +hasty in adopting? When Mr. Darwin went on to say that his +abstract would be very imperfect, and that he could not give +references and authorities for his several statements, we did not +suppose that such an apology could be meant to cover silence +concerning writers who during their whole lives, or nearly so, +had borne the burden and heat of the day in respect of descent +with modification in its most extended application. +“I much regret,” says Mr. Darwin, “that want of +space prevents my having the satisfaction of acknowledging the +generous assistance I have received from very many naturalists, +some of them personally unknown to me.” This is like +what the Royal Academicians say when they do not intend to hang +our pictures; they can, however, generally find space for a +picture if they want to hang it, and we assume with safety that +there are no master-works by painters of the very highest rank +for which no space has been available. Want of space will, +indeed, prevent my quoting from more than one other paragraph of +Mr. Darwin’s introduction; this paragraph, however, should +alone suffice to show how inaccurate Mr. Allen is in saying that +Mr. Darwin “laid no sort of claim to originality or +proprietorship” in the theory of descent with modification, +and this is the point with which we are immediately +concerned. Mr. Darwin says:—</p> +<p>“In considering the origin of species, it is quite +conceivable that a naturalist, reflecting on the mutual +affinities of organic beings, on their embryological relations, +their geographical distribution, geological succession, and other +such facts, might come to the conclusion that each species had +not been independently created, but had descended like varieties +from other species.”</p> +<p>It will be observed that not only is no hint given here that +descent with modification was a theory which, though unknown to +the general public, had been occupying the attention of +biologists for a hundred years and more, but it is distinctly +implied that this was not the case. When Mr. Darwin said it +was “conceivable that a naturalist might” arrive at +the theory of descent, straightforward readers took him to mean +that though this was conceivable, it had never, to Mr. +Darwin’s knowledge, been done. If we had a notion +that we had already vaguely heard of the theory that men and the +lower animals were descended from common ancestors, we must have +been wrong; it was not this that we had heard of, but something +else, which, though doubtless a little like it, was all wrong, +whereas this was obviously going to be all right.</p> +<p>To follow the rest of the paragraph with the closeness that it +merits would be a task at once so long and so unpleasant that I +will omit further reference to any part of it except the last +sentence. That sentence runs:—</p> +<p>“In the case of the mistletoe, which draws its +nourishment from certain trees, which has seeds that must be +transported by certain birds, and which has flowers with separate +sexes absolutely requiring the agency of certain insects to bring +pollen from one flower to the other, it is equally preposterous +to account for the structure of this parasite, with its relations +to several distinct organic beings, by the effects of the +external conditions, or of habit, or of the volition of the plant +itself.”</p> +<p>Doubtless it would be preposterous to refer the structure of +either woodpecker or mistletoe to the single agency of any one of +these three causes; but neither Lamarck nor any other writer on +evolution has, so far as I know, even contemplated this; the +early evolutionists supposed organic modification to depend on +the action and interaction of all three, and I venture to think +that this will ere long be considered as, to say the least of it, +not more preposterous than the assigning of the largely +preponderating share in the production of such highly and +variously correlated organisms as the mistletoe and woodpecker +mainly to luck pure and simple, as is done by Mr. Charles +Darwin’s theory.</p> +<p>It will be observed that in the paragraph last quoted from, +Mr. Darwin, <i>more suo</i>, is careful not to commit +himself. All he has said is, that it would be preposterous +to do something the preposterousness of which cannot be +reasonably disputed; the impression, however, is none the less +effectually conveyed, that some one of the three assigned +agencies, taken singly, was the only cause of modification ever +yet proposed, if, indeed, any writer had even gone so far as +this. We knew we did not know much about the matter +ourselves, and that Mr. Darwin was a naturalist of long and high +standing; we naturally, therefore, credited him with the same +good faith as a writer that we knew in ourselves as readers; it +never so much as crossed our minds to suppose that the head which +he was holding up all dripping before our eyes as that of a fool, +was not that of a fool who had actually lived and written, but +only of a figure of straw which had been dipped in a bucket of +red paint. Naturally enough we concluded, since Mr. Darwin +seemed to say so, that if his predecessors had nothing better to +say for themselves than this, it would not be worth while to +trouble about them further; especially as we did not know who +they were, nor what they had written, and Mr. Darwin did not tell +us. It would be better and less trouble to take the goods +with which it was plain Mr. Darwin was going to provide us, and +ask no questions. We have seen that even tolerably obvious +conclusions were rather slow in occurring to poor simple-minded +Mr. Darwin, and may be sure that it never once occurred to him +that the British public would be likely to argue thus; he had no +intention of playing the scientific confidence trick upon +us. I dare say not, but unfortunately the result has +closely resembled the one that would have ensued if Mr. Darwin +had had such an intention.</p> +<p>The claim to originality made so distinctly in the opening +sentences of the “Origin of Species” is repeated in a +letter to Professor Haeckel, written October 8, 1864, and giving +an account of the development of his belief in descent with +modification. This letter, part of which is quoted by Mr. +Allen, <a name="citation173a"></a><a href="#footnote173a" +class="citation">[173a]</a> is given on p. 134 of the English +translation of Professor Haeckel’s “History of +Creation,” <a name="citation173b"></a><a +href="#footnote173b" class="citation">[173b]</a> and runs as +follows:—</p> +<p>“In South America three classes of facts were brought +strongly before my mind. Firstly, the manner in which +closely allied species replace species in going southward. +Secondly, the close affinity of the species inhabiting the +islands near South America to those proper to the +continent. This struck me profoundly, especially the +difference of the species in the adjoining islets in the +Galapagos Archipelago. Thirdly, the relation of the living +Edentata and Rodentia to the extinct species. I shall never +forget my astonishment when I dug out a gigantic piece of armour +like that of the living armadillo.</p> +<p>“Reflecting on these facts, and collecting analogous +ones, it seemed to me probable that allied species were descended +from a common ancestor. But during several years I could +not conceive how each form could have been modified so as to +become admirably adapted to its place in nature. I began, +therefore, to study domesticated animals and cultivated plants, +and after a time perceived that man’s power of selecting +and breeding from certain individuals was the most powerful of +all means in the production of new races. Having attended +to the habits of animals and their relations to the surrounding +conditions, I was able to realise the severe struggle for +existence to which all organisms are subjected, and my geological +observations had allowed me to appreciate to a certain extent the +duration of past geological periods. Therefore, when I +happened to read Malthus on population, the idea of natural +selection flashed on me. Of all minor points, the last +which I appreciated was the importance and cause of the principle +of divergence.”</p> +<p>This is all very naïve, and accords perfectly with the +introductory paragraphs of the “Origin of Species;” +it gives us the same picture of a solitary thinker, a poor, +lonely, friendless student of nature, who had never so much as +heard of Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, or Lamarck. Unfortunately, +however, we cannot forget the description of the influences +which, according to Mr. Grant Allen, did in reality surround Mr. +Darwin’s youth, and certainly they are more what we should +have expected than those suggested rather than expressly stated +by Mr. Darwin. “Everywhere around him,” says +Mr. Allen, <a name="citation174a"></a><a href="#footnote174a" +class="citation">[174a]</a> “in his childhood and youth +these great but formless” (why “formless”?) +“evolutionary ideas were brewing and fermenting. The +scientific society of his elders and of the contemporaries among +whom he grew up was permeated with the leaven of Laplace and +Lamarck, of Hutton and of Herschel. Inquiry was especially +everywhere rife as to the origin and nature of specific +distinctions among plants and animals. Those who believed +in the doctrine of Buffon and of the ‘Zoonomia,’ and +those who disbelieved in it, alike, were profoundly interested +and agitated in soul by the far-reaching implications of that +fundamental problem. On every side evolutionism, in its +crude form.” (I suppose Mr. Allen could not help +saying “in its crude form,” but descent with +modification in 1809 meant, to all intents and purposes, and was +understood to mean, what it means now, or ought to mean, to most +people.) “The universal stir,” says Mr. Allen +on the following page, “and deep prying into evolutionary +questions which everywhere existed among scientific men in his +early days was naturally communicated to a lad born of a +scientific family and inheriting directly in blood and bone the +biological tastes and tendencies of Erasmus Darwin.”</p> +<p>I confess to thinking that Mr. Allen’s account of the +influences which surrounded Mr. Darwin’s youth, if tainted +with picturesqueness, is still substantially correct. On an +earlier page he had written:—“It is impossible to +take up any scientific memoirs or treatises of the first half of +our own century without seeing at a glance how every mind of high +original scientific importance was permeated and disturbed by the +fundamental questions aroused, but not fully answered, by Buffon, +Lamarck, and Erasmus Darwin. In Lyell’s letters, and +in Agassiz’s lectures, in the ‘Botanic Journal’ +and in the ‘Philosophical Transactions,’ in treatises +on Madeira beetles and the Australian flora, we find everywhere +the thoughts of men profoundly influenced in a thousand +directions by this universal evolutionary solvent and leaven.</p> +<p>“And while the world of thought was thus seething and +moving restlessly before the wave of ideas set in motion by these +various independent philosophers, another group of causes in +another field was rendering smooth the path beforehand for the +future champion of the amended evolutionism. Geology on the +one hand and astronomy on the other were making men’s minds +gradually familiar with the conception of slow natural +development, as opposed to immediate and miraculous creation.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">. . .</p> +<p>“The influence of these novel conceptions upon the +growth and spread of evolutionary ideas was far-reaching and +twofold. In the first place, the discovery of a definite +succession of nearly related organic forms following one another +with evident closeness through the various ages, inevitably +suggested to every inquiring observer the possibility of their +direct descent one from the other. In the second place, the +discovery that geological formations were not really separated +each from its predecessor by violent revolutions, but were the +result of gradual and ordinary changes, discredited the old idea +of frequent fresh creations after each catastrophe, and +familiarised the minds of men of science with the alternative +notion of slow and natural evolutionary processes. The past +was seen in effect to be the parent of the present; the present +was recognised as the child of the past.”</p> +<p>This is certainly not Mr. Darwin’s own account of the +matter. Probably the truth will lie somewhere between the +two extreme views: and on the one hand, the world of thought was +not seething quite so badly as Mr. Allen represents it, while on +the other, though “three classes of fact,” &c., +were undoubtedly “brought strongly before” Mr. +Darwin’s “mind in South America,” yet some of +them had perhaps already been brought before it at an earlier +time, which he did not happen to remember at the moment of +writing his letter to Professor Haeckel and the opening paragraph +of the “Origin of Species.”</p> +<h2><a name="page177"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +177</span>Chapter XIV<br /> +Darwin and Descent with Modification (<i>continued</i>)</h2> +<p>I <span class="smcap">have</span> said enough to show that Mr. +Darwin claimed I to have been the originator of the theory of +descent with modification as distinctly as any writer usually +claims any theory; but it will probably save the reader trouble +in the end if I bring together a good many, though not, probably, +all (for I much disliked the task, and discharged it +perfunctorily), of the passages in the “Origin of +Species” in which the theory of descent with modification +in its widest sense is claimed expressly or by implication. +I shall quote from the original edition, which, it should be +remembered, consisted of the very unusually large number of four +thousand copies, and from which no important deviation was made +either by addition or otherwise until a second edition of two +thousand further copies had been sold; the “Historical +Sketch,” &c., being first given with the third +edition. The italics, which I have employed so as to catch +the reader’s eye, are mine, not Mr. Darwin’s. +Mr. Darwin writes:—</p> +<p>“Although much remains obscure, and will long remain +obscure, <i>I can entertain no doubt</i>, <i>after the most +deliberate study and dispassionate judgment of which I am +capable</i>, <i>that the view which most naturalists +entertain</i>, <i>and which I formerly entertained—namely +that each species has been independently created—is +erroneous</i>. I am fully convinced that species are not +immutable, but that those belonging to what are called the same +genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally extinct +species, in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of any +one species are the descendants of that species. +Furthermore, I am convinced that natural selection” (or the +preservation of fortunate races) “has been the main but not +exclusive means of modification” (p. 6).</p> +<p>It is not here expressly stated that the theory of the +mutability of species is Mr. Darwin’s own; this, +nevertheless, is the inference which the great majority of his +readers were likely to draw, and did draw, from Mr. +Darwin’s words.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“It is not that all large genera are now varying much, +and are thus increasing in the number of their species, or that +no small genera are now multiplying and increasing; for if this +had been so it would have been fatal to <i>my theory</i>; +inasmuch as geology,” &c. (p. 56).</p> +<p>The words “my theory” stand in all the +editions. Again:—</p> +<p>“This relation has a clear meaning <i>on my view</i> of +the subject; I look upon all the species of any genus as having +as certainly descended from the same progenitor, as have the two +sexes of any one of the species” (p. 157).</p> +<p>“My view” here, especially in the absence of +reference to any other writer as having held the same opinion, +implies as its most natural interpretation that descent pure and +simple is Mr. Darwin’s view. Substitute “the +theory of descent” for “my view,” and we do not +feel that we are misinterpreting the author’s +meaning. The words “my view” remain in all +editions.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Long before having arrived at this part of my work, a +crowd of difficulties will have occurred to the reader. +Some of them are so grave that to this day I can never reflect on +them without being staggered; but to the best of my belief the +greater number are only apparent, and those that are real are +not, I think, <i>fatal to my theory</i>.</p> +<p>“These difficulties and objections may be classed under +the following heads:—Firstly, if species have descended +from other species by insensibly fine gradations, why do we not +everywhere see?” &c. (p. 171).</p> +<p>We infer from this that “my theory” is the theory +“that species have descended from other species by +insensibly fine gradations”—that is to say, that it +is the theory of descent with modification; for the theory that +is being objected to is obviously the theory of descent <i>in +toto</i>, and not a mere detail in connection with that +theory.</p> +<p>The words “my theory” were altered in 1872, with +the sixth edition of the “Origin of species,” into +“the theory;” but I am chiefly concerned with the +first edition of the work, my object being to show that Mr. +Darwin was led into his false position as regards natural +selection by a desire to claim the theory of descent with +modification; if he claimed it in the first edition, this is +enough to give colour to the view which I take; but it must be +remembered that descent with modification remained, by the +passage just quoted “my theory,” for thirteen years, +and even when in 1869 and 1872, for a reason that I can only +guess at, “my theory” became generally “the +theory,” this did not make it become any one else’s +theory. It is hard to say whose or what it became, if the +words are to be construed technically; practically, however, with +all ingenuous readers, “the theory” remained as much +Mr. Darwin’s theory as though the words “my +theory” had been retained, and Mr. Darwin cannot be +supposed so simple-minded as not to have known this would be the +case. Moreover, it appears, from the next page but one to +the one last quoted, that Mr. Darwin claimed the theory of +descent with modification generally, even to the last, for we +there read, “<i>By my theory</i> these allied species have +descended from a common parent,” and the “my” +has been allowed, for some reason not quite obvious, to survive +the general massacre of Mr. Darwin’s +“my’s” which occurred in 1869 and 1872.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“He who believes that each being has been created as we +now see it, must occasionally have felt surprise when he has +met,” &c. (p. 185).</p> +<p>Here the argument evidently lies between descent and +independent acts of creation. This appears from the +paragraph immediately following, which begins, “He who +believes in separate and innumerable acts of creation,” +&c. We therefore understand descent to be the theory so +frequently spoken of by Mr. Darwin as “my.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“He who will go thus far, if he find on finishing this +treatise that large bodies of facts, otherwise inexplicable, can +be explained <i>by the theory of descent</i>, ought not to +hesitate to go farther, and to admit that a structure even as +perfect as an eagle’s eye might be formed <i>by natural +selection</i>, although in this case he does not know any of the +transitional grades” (p. 188).</p> +<p>The natural inference from this is that descent and natural +selection are one and the same thing.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ +existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, +successive, slight modifications, <i>my theory</i> would +absolutely break down. But I can find out no such +case. No doubt many organs exist of which we do not know +the transitional grades, more especially if we look to +much-isolated species, round which, according to my +<i>theory</i>, there has been much extinction” (p. +189).</p> +<p>This makes “my theory” to be “the theory +that complex organs have arisen by numerous, successive, slight +modifications;” that is to say, to be the theory of descent +with modification. The first of the two “my +theory’s” in the passage last quoted has been allowed +to stand. The second became “the theory” in +1872. It is obvious, therefore, that “the +theory” means “my theory;” it is not so obvious +why the change should have been made at all, nor why the one +“my theory” should have been taken and the other +left, but I will return to this question.</p> +<p>Again, Mr. Darwin writes:—</p> +<p>“Although we must be extremely cautious in concluding +that any organ could not possibly have been produced by small +successive transitional gradations, yet, undoubtedly grave cases +of difficulty occur, some of which will be discussed in my future +work” (p. 192).</p> +<p>This, as usual, implies descent with modification to be the +theory that Mr. Darwin is trying to make good.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“I have been astonished how rarely an organ can be named +towards which no transitional variety is known to lead . . . Why, +<i>on the theory of creation</i>, should this be so? Why +should not nature have taken a leap from structure to +structure? <i>On the theory of natural selection</i> we can +clearly understand why she should not; for natural selection can +act only by taking advantage of slight successive variations; she +can never take a leap, but must advance by the slowest and +shortest steps” (p. 194).</p> +<p>Here “the theory of natural selection” is opposed +to “the theory of creation;” we took it, therefore, +to be another way of saying “the theory of descent with +modification.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“We have in this chapter discussed some of the +difficulties and objections which may be urged against <i>my +theory</i>. Many of them are very grave, but I think that +in the discussion light has been thrown on several facts which, +<i>on the theory of independent acts of creation</i>, are utterly +obscure” (p. 203).</p> +<p>Here we have, on the one hand, “my theory,” on the +other, “independent acts of creation.” The +natural antithesis to independent acts of creation is descent, +and we assumed with reason that Mr. Darwin was claiming this when +he spoke of “my theory.” “My +theory” became “the theory” in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“On the theory of natural selection we can clearly +understand the full meaning of that old canon in natural history, +‘<i>Natura non facit saltum</i>.’ This canon, +if we look only to the present inhabitants of the world is not +strictly correct, but if we include all those of past times, it +must <i>by my theory</i> be strictly true” (p. 206).</p> +<p>Here the natural interpretation of “by my theory” +is “by the theory of descent with modification;” the +words “on the theory of natural selection,” with +which the sentence opens, lead us to suppose that Mr. Darwin +regarded natural selection and descent as convertible +terms. “My theory” was altered to “this +theory” in 1872. Six lines lower down we read, +“<i>On my theory</i> unity of type is explained by unity of +descent.” The “my” here has been allowed +to stand.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Again, as in the case of corporeal structure, and +conformably with <i>my theory</i>, the instinct of each species +is good for itself, but has never,” &c. (p. 210).</p> +<p>Who was to see that “my theory” did not include +descent with modification? The “my” here has +been allowed to stand.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“The fact that instincts . . . are liable to make +mistakes;—that no instinct has been produced for the +exclusive good of other animals, but that each animal takes +advantage of the instincts of others;—that the canon of +natural history, ‘<i>Natura non facit saltum</i>,’ is +applicable to instincts as well as to corporeal structure, and is +plainly explicable on the foregoing views, but is otherwise +inexplicable,—<i>all tend to corroborate the theory of +natural selection</i>” (p. 243).</p> +<p>We feel that it is the theory of evolution, or descent with +modification, that is here corroborated, and that it is this +which Mr. Darwin is mainly trying to establish; the sentence +should have ended “all tend to corroborate the theory of +descent with modification;” the substitution of +“natural selection” for descent tends to make us +think that these conceptions are identical. That they are +so regarded, or at any rate that it is the theory of descent in +full which Mr. Darwin has in his mind, appears from the +immediately succeeding paragraph, which begins “<i>This +theory</i>,” and continues six lines lower, “For +instance, we can understand, on the <i>principle of +inheritance</i>, how it is that,” &c.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“In the first place, it should always be borne in mind +what sort of intermediate forms must, <i>on my theory</i>, +formerly have existed” (p. 280).</p> +<p>“My theory” became “the theory” in +1869. No reader who read in good faith could doubt that the +theory of descent with modification was being here intended.</p> +<p>“It is just possible <i>by my theory</i>, that one of +two living forms might have descended from the other; for +instance, a horse from a tapir; but in this case <i>direct</i> +intermediate links will have existed between them” (p. +281).</p> +<p>“My theory” became “the theory” in +1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>By the theory of natural selection</i> all living +species have been connected with the parent species of each +genus,” &c. We took this to mean, “By the +theory of descent with modification all living species,” +&c. (p. 281).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Some experienced conchologists are now sinking many of +the very fine species of D’Orbigny and others into the rank +of varieties; and on this view we do find the kind of evidence of +change which <i>on my theory</i> we ought to find” (p. +297).</p> +<p>“My theory” became “the theory” in +1869.</p> +<p>In the fourth edition (1866), in a passage which is not in +either of the two first editions, we read (p. 359), “So +that here again we have undoubted evidence of change in the +direction required by <i>my theory</i>.” “My +theory” became “the theory” in 1869; the theory +of descent with modification is unquestionably intended.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Geological research has done scarcely anything in +breaking down the distinction between species, by connecting them +together by numerous, fine, intermediate varieties; and this not +having been effected, is probably the gravest and most obvious of +all the many objections which may be urged against <i>my +views</i>” (p. 299).</p> +<p>We naturally took “my views” to mean descent with +modification. The “my” has been allowed to +stand.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“If, then, there be some degree of truth in these +remarks, we have no right to expect to find in our geological +formations an infinite number of those transitional forms which +<i>on my theory</i> assuredly have connected all the past and +present species of the same group in one long and branching chain +of life . . . But I do not pretend that I should ever have +suspected how poor was the record in the best preserved +geological sections, had not the absence of innumerable +transitional links between the species which lived at the +commencement and at the close of each formation pressed so hardly +<i>on my theory</i>” (pp. 301, 302).</p> +<p>Substitute “descent with modification” for +“my theory” and the meaning does not suffer. +The first of the two “my theories” in the passage +last quoted was altered in 1869 into “our theory;” +the second has been allowed to stand.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“The abrupt manner in which whole groups of species +suddenly appear in some formations, has been urged by several +palæontologists . . . as a fatal objection <i>to the belief +in the transmutation of species</i>. If numerous species, +belonging to the same genera or families, have really started +into life all at once, the fact would be fatal <i>to the theory +of descent with slow modification through natural +selection</i>” (p. 302).</p> +<p>Here “the belief in the transmutation of species,” +or descent with modification, is treated as synonymous with +“the theory of descent with slow modification through +natural selection;” but it has nowhere been explained that +there are two widely different “theories of descent with +slow modification through natural selection,” the one of +which may be true enough for all practical purposes, while the +other is seen to be absurd as soon as it is examined +closely. The theory of descent with modification is not +properly convertible with either of these two views, for descent +with modification deals with the question whether species are +transmutable or no, and dispute as to the respective merits of +the two natural selections deals with the question how it comes +to be transmuted; nevertheless, the words “the theory of +descent with slow modification through the ordinary course of +things” (which is what “descent with modification +through natural selection” comes to) may be considered as +expressing the facts with practical accuracy, if the ordinary +course of nature is supposed to be that modification is mainly +consequent on the discharge of some correlated function, and that +modification, if favourable, will tend to accumulate so long as +the given function continues important to the wellbeing of the +organism; the words, however, have no correspondence with reality +if they are supposed to imply that variations which are mainly +matters of pure chance and unconnected in any way with function +will accumulate and result in specific difference, no matter how +much each one of them may be preserved in the generation in which +it appears. In the one case, therefore, the expression +natural selection may be loosely used as a synonym for descent +with modification, and in the other it may not. +Unfortunately with Mr. Charles Darwin the variations are mainly +accidental. The words “through natural +selection,” therefore, in the passage last quoted carry no +weight, for it is the wrong natural selection that is, or ought +to be, intended; practically, however, they derived a weight from +Mr. Darwin’s name to which they had no title of their own, +and we understood that “the theory of descent with slow +modification” through the kind of natural selection +ostensibly intended by Mr. Darwin was a quasi-synonymous +expression for the transmutation of species. We +understood—so far as we understood anything beyond that we +were to believe in descent with modification—that natural +selection was Mr. Darwin’s theory; we therefore concluded, +since Mr. Darwin seemed to say so, that the theory of the +transmutation of species generally was so also. At any rate +we felt as regards the passage last quoted that the theory of +descent with modification was the point of attack and defence, +and we supposed it to be the theory so often referred to by Mr. +Darwin as “my.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Some of the most ancient Silurian animals, as the +Nautilus, Lingula, &c., do not differ much from the living +species; and it cannot <i>on my theory</i> be supposed that these +old species were the progenitors,” &c. (p. 306) . . . +“Consequently <i>if my theory be true</i>, it is +indisputable,” &c. (p. 307).</p> +<p>Here the two “my theories” have been altered, the +first into “our theory,” and the second into +“the theory,” both in 1869; but, as usual, the thing +that remains with the reader is the theory of descent, and it +remains morally and practically as much claimed when called +“the theory”—as during the many years +throughout which the more open “my” distinctly +claimed it.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“All the most eminent palæontologists, namely, +Cuvier, Owen, Agassiz, Barrande, E. Forbes, &c., and all our +greatest geologists, as Lyell, Murchison, Sedgwick, &c., have +unanimously, often vehemently, maintained <i>the immutability of +species</i>. . . . I feel how rash it is to differ from these +great authorities . . . Those who think the natural geological +record in any degree perfect, and who do not attach much weight +to the facts and arguments of other kinds brought forward in this +volume, will undoubtedly at once <i>reject my theory</i>” +(p. 310).</p> +<p>What is “my theory” here, if not that of the +mutability of species, or the theory of descent with +modification? “My theory” became “the +theory” in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Let us now see whether the several facts and rules +relating to the geological succession of organic beings, better +accord with the common view of the immutability of species, or +with that of their <i>slow and gradual modification</i>, +<i>through descent and natural selection</i>” (p. 312).</p> +<p>The words “natural selection” are indeed here, but +they might as well be omitted for all the effect they +produce. The argument is felt to be about the two opposed +theories of descent, and independent creative efforts.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“These several facts accord well with <i>my +theory</i>” (p. 314). That “my theory” is +the theory of descent is the conclusion most naturally drawn from +the context. “My theory” became “our +theory” in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“This gradual increase in the number of the species of a +group is strictly conformable <i>with my theory</i>; for the +process of modification and the production of a number of allied +forms must be slow and gradual, . . . like the branching of a +great tree from a single stem, till the group becomes +large” (p. 314).</p> +<p>“My theory” became “the theory” in +1869. We took “my theory” to be the theory of +descent; that Mr. Darwin treats this as synonymous with the +theory of natural selection appears from the next paragraph, on +the third line of which we read, “On <i>the theory of +natural selection</i> the extinction of old forms,” +&c.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>The theory of natural selection</i> is grounded on +the belief that each new variety and ultimately each new species, +is produced and maintained by having some advantage over those +with which it comes into competition; and the consequent +extinction of less favoured forms almost inevitably +follows” (p. 320). Sense and consistency cannot be +made of this passage. Substitute “The theory of the +preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life” +for “The theory of natural selection” (to do this is +only taking Mr. Darwin’s own synonym for natural selection) +and see what the passage comes to. “The preservation +of favoured races” is not a theory, it is a commonly +observed fact; it is not “grounded on the belief that each +new variety,” &c., it is one of the ultimate and most +elementary principles in the world of life. When we try to +take the passage seriously and think it out, we soon give it up, +and pass on, substituting “the theory of descent” for +“the theory of natural selection,” and concluding +that in some way these two things must be identical.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“The manner in which single species and whole groups of +species become extinct accords well with <i>the theory of natural +selection</i>” (p. 322).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“This great fact of the parallel succession of the forms +of life throughout the world, is explicable <i>on the theory of +natural selection</i>” (p. 325).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Let us now look to the mutual affinities of extinct and +living species. They all fall into one grand natural +system; and this is at once explained <i>on the principle of +descent</i>” (p. 329).</p> +<p>Putting the three preceding passages together, we naturally +inferred that “the theory of natural selection” and +“the principle of descent” were the same +things. We knew Mr. Darwin claimed the first, and therefore +unhesitatingly gave him the second at the same time.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Let us see how far these several facts and inferences +accord with <i>the theory of descent with modification</i>” +(p. 331)</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Thus, <i>on the theory of descent with +modification</i>, the main facts with regard to the mutual +affinities of the extinct forms of life to each other and to +living forms, seem to me explained in a satisfactory +manner. And they are wholly inexplicable <i>on any other +view</i>” (p. 333).</p> +<p>The words “seem to me” involve a claim in the +absence of so much as a hint in any part of the book concerning +indebtedness to earlier writers.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On the theory of descent</i>, the full meaning of +the fossil remains,” &c. (p. 336).</p> +<p>In the following paragraph we read:—</p> +<p>“But in one particular sense the more recent forms must, +<i>on my theory</i>, be higher than the more ancient.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Agassiz insists that ancient animals resemble to a +certain extent the embryos of recent animals of the same classes; +or that the geological succession of extinct forms is in some +degree parallel to the embryological development of recent forms. +. . . This doctrine of Agassiz accords well with <i>the theory of +natural selection</i>” (p. 338).</p> +<p>“The theory of natural selection” became +“our theory” in 1869. The opinion of Agassiz +accords excellently with the theory of descent with modification, +but it is not easy to see how it bears upon the fact that lucky +races are preserved in the struggle for life—which, +according to Mr. Darwin’s title-page, is what is meant by +natural selection.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On the theory of descent with modification</i>, the +great law of the long-enduring but not immutable succession of +the same types within the same areas, is at once explained” +(p. 340).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“It must not be forgotten that, <i>on my theory</i>, all +the species of the same genus have descended from some one +species” (p. 341).</p> +<p>“My theory” became “our theory” in +1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“He who rejects these views on the nature of the +geological record, will rightly reject <i>my whole +theory</i>” (p. 342).</p> +<p>“My” became “our” in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Passing from these difficulties, the other great +leading facts in palæontology agree admirably with <i>the +theory of descent with modification through variation and natural +selection</i>” (p. 343).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>The succession of the same types of structure within the same +areas during the later geological periods <i>ceases to be +mysterious</i>, and <i>is simply explained by inheritance</i> (p. +345).</p> +<p>I suppose inheritance was not when Mr. Darwin wrote considered +mysterious. The last few words have been altered to +“and is intelligible on the principle of +inheritance.” It seems as though Mr. Darwin did not +like saying that inheritance was not mysterious, but had no +objection to implying that it was intelligible.</p> +<p>The next paragraph begins—“If, then, the +geological record be as imperfect as I believe it to be, . . . +the main objections <i>to the theory of natural selection</i> are +greatly diminished or disappear. On the other hand, all the +chief laws of palæontology plainly proclaim, <i>as it seems +to me</i>, <i>that species have been produced by ordinary +generation</i>.”</p> +<p>Here again the claim to the theory of descent with +modification is unmistakable; it cannot, moreover, but occur to +us that if species “have been produced by ordinary +generation,” then ordinary generation has as good a claim +to be the main means of originating species as natural selection +has. It is hardly necessary to point out that ordinary +generation involves descent with modification, for all known +offspring differ from their parents, so far, at any rate, as that +practised judges can generally tell them apart.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“We see in these facts some deep organic bond, +prevailing throughout space and time, over the same areas of land +and water, and independent of their physical condition. The +naturalist must feel little curiosity who is not led to inquire +what this bond is.</p> +<p>“This bond, <i>on my theory</i>, <i>is simply +inheritance</i>, that cause which alone,” &c. (p. +350).</p> +<p>This passage was altered in 1869 to “The bond is simply +inheritance.” The paragraph concludes, “<i>On +this principle of inheritance with modification</i>, we can +understand how it is that sections of genera . . . are confined +to the same areas,” &c.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“He who rejects it rejects the <i>vera causa of +ordinary</i> generation,” &c. (p. 352).</p> +<p>We naturally ask, Why call natural selection the “main +means of modification,” if “ordinary +generation” is a <i>vera causa</i>?</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“In discussing this subject, we shall be enabled at the +same time to consider a point equally important for us, namely, +whether the several distinct species of a genus, <i>which on my +theory have all descended from a common ancestor</i>, can have +migrated (undergoing modification during some part of their +migration) from the area inhabited by their progenitor” (p. +354).</p> +<p>The words “on my theory” became “on our +theory” in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“With those organic beings which never intercross (if +such exist) <i>the species</i>, <i>on my theory</i>, <i>must have +descended from a succession of improved varieties</i>,” +&c. (p. 355).</p> +<p>The words “on my theory” were cut out in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“A slow southern migration of a marine fauna will +account, <i>on the theory of modification</i>, for many closely +allied forms,” &c. (p. 372).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“But the existence of several quite distinct species, +belonging to genera exclusively confined to the southern +hemisphere, is, <i>on my theory of descent with modification</i>, +a far more remarkable case of difficulty” (p. 381).</p> +<p>“My” became “the” in 1866 with the +fourth edition. This was the most categorical claim to the +theory of descent with modification in the “Origin of +Species.” The “my” here is the only one +that was taken out before 1869. I suppose Mr. Darwin +thought that with the removal of this “my” he had +ceased to claim the theory of descent with modification. +Nothing, however, could be gained by calling the reader’s +attention to what had been done, so nothing was said about +it.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Some species of fresh-water shells have a very wide +range, <i>and allied species</i>, <i>which</i>, <i>on my +theory</i>, <i>are descended from a single source</i>, prevail +throughout the world” (p. 385).</p> +<p>“My theory” became “our theory” in +1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“In the following remarks I shall not confine myself to +the mere question of dispersal, but shall consider some other +facts which bear upon the truth of <i>the two theories of +independent creation and of descent with modification</i>” +(p. 389). What can be plainer than that the theory which +Mr. Darwin espouses, and has so frequently called +“my,” is descent with modification?</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“But as these animals and their spawn are known to be +immediately killed by sea-water, <i>on my view</i>, we can see +that there would be great difficulty in their transportal across +the sea, and therefore why they do not exist on any oceanic +island. But why, <i>on the theory of creation</i>, they +should not have been created there, it would be very difficult to +explain” (p. 393).</p> +<p>“On my view” was cut out in 1869.</p> +<p>On the following page we read—“On my view this +question can easily be answered.” “On my +view” is retained in the latest edition.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Yet there must be, <i>on my view</i>, some unknown but +highly efficient means for their transportation” (p. +397).</p> +<p>“On my view” became “according to our +view” in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“I believe this grand fact can receive no sort of +explanation <i>on the ordinary view of independent creation</i>; +whereas, <i>on the view here maintained</i>, it is obvious that +the Galapagos Islands would be likely to receive colonists . . . +from America, and the Cape de Verde Islands from Africa; and that +such colonists would be liable to modification; the principle of +inheritance still betraying their original birth-place” (p. +399).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“With respect to the distinct species of the same genus +which, <i>on my theory</i>, must have spread from one parent +source, if we make the same allowances as before,” +&c.</p> +<p>“On my theory” became “on our theory” +in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On my theory</i> these several relations throughout +time and space are intelligible; . . . the forms within each +class have been connected by the same bond of ordinary +generation; . . . in both cases the laws of variation have been +the same, and modifications have been accumulated by the same +power of natural selection” (p. 410).</p> +<p>“On my theory” became “according to our +theory” in 1869, and natural selection is no longer a +power, but has become a means.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>I believe that something more is included</i>, and +that propinquity of descent—the only known cause of the +similarity of organic beings—is the bond, hidden as it is +by various degrees of modification, which is partially revealed +to us by our classification” (p. 418).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>Thus</i>, <i>on the view which I hold</i>, the +natural system is genealogical in its arrangement, like a +pedigree” (p. 422).</p> +<p>“On the view which I hold” was cut out in +1872.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“We may feel almost sure, <i>on the theory of +descent</i>, that these characters have been inherited from a +common ancestor” (p. 426).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On my view of characters being of real importance +for classification only in so far as they reveal descent</i>, we +can clearly understand,” &c. (p. 427).</p> +<p>“On my view” became “on the view” in +1872.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“The more aberrant any form is, the greater must be the +number of connecting forms which, <i>on my theory</i>, have been +exterminated and utterly lost” (p. 429).</p> +<p>The words “on my theory” were excised in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Finally, we have seen that <i>natural selection</i> +<i>. . . explains</i> that great and universal feature in the +affinities of all organic beings, namely, their subordination in +group under group. <i>We use the element of descent</i> in +classing the individuals of both sexes, &c.; . . . <i>we use +descent</i> in classing acknowledged varieties; . . . and I +believe this element of descent is the hidden bond of connection +which naturalists have sought under the term of the natural +system” (p. 433).</p> +<p>Lamarck was of much the same opinion, as I showed in +“Evolution Old and New.” He +wrote:—“An arrangement should be considered +systematic, or arbitrary, when it does not conform to the +genealogical order taken by nature in the development of the +things arranged, and when, by consequence, it is not founded on +well-considered analogies. There is a natural order in +every department of nature; it is the order in which its several +component items have been successively developed.” <a +name="citation195a"></a><a href="#footnote195a" +class="citation">[195a]</a> The point, however, which +should more particularly engage our attention is that Mr. Darwin +in the passage last quoted uses “natural selection” +and “descent” as though they were convertible +terms.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Nothing can be more hopeless than to attempt to explain +this similarity of pattern in members of the same class by +utility or the doctrine of final causes . . . <i>On the +ordinary view of the independent creation of each being</i>, we +can only say that so it is . . . <i>The explanation is manifest +on the theory of the natural selection of successive slight</i> +modifications,” &c. (p. 435).</p> +<p>This now stands—“The explanation is to a large +extent simple, on the theory of the selection of successive, +slight modifications.” I do not like “a large +extent” of simplicity; but, waiving this, the point at +issue is not whether the ordinary course of things ensures a +quasi-selection of the types that are best adapted to their +surroundings, with accumulation of modification in various +directions, and hence wide eventual difference between species +descended from common progenitors—no evolutionist since +1750 has doubted this—but whether a general principle +underlies the modifications from among which the quasi-selection +is made, or whether they are destitute of such principle and +referable, as far as we are concerned, to chance only. +Waiving this again, we note that the theories of independent +creation and of natural selection are contrasted, as though they +were the only two alternatives; knowing the two alternatives to +be independent creation and descent with modification, we +naturally took natural selection to mean descent with +modification.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On the theory of natural selection</i> we can +satisfactorily answer these questions” (p. 437).</p> +<p>“Satisfactorily” now stands “to a certain +extent.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On my view</i> these terms may be used +literally” (pp. 438, 439).</p> +<p>“On my view” became “according to the views +here maintained such language may be,” &c., in +1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“I believe all these facts can be explained as follows, +<i>on the view of descent with modification</i>” (p. +443).</p> +<p>This sentence now ends at “follows.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Let us take a genus of birds, <i>descended</i>, <i>on +my theory</i>, <i>from some one parent species</i>, and of which +the several new species <i>have become modified through natural +selection</i> in accordance with their divers habits” (p. +446).</p> +<p>The words “on my theory” were cut out in 1869, and +the passage now stands, “Let us take a group of birds, +descended from some ancient form and modified through natural +selection for different habits.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On my view of descent with modification</i>, the +origin of rudimentary organs is simple” (p. 454).</p> +<p>“On my view” became “<i>on the +view</i>” in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On the view of descent with modification</i>,” +&c. (p. 455).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On this same view of descent with modification</i> +all the great facts of morphology become intelligible” (p. +456).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“That many and grave objections may be advanced against +<i>the theory of descent with modification through natural +selection</i>, I do not deny” (p. 459).</p> +<p>This now stands, “That many and serious objections may +be advanced against <i>the theory of descent with modification +through variation and natural selection</i>, I do not +deny.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“There are, it must be admitted, cases of special +difficulty <i>on the theory of natural selection</i>” (p. +460).</p> +<p>“On” has become “opposed to;” it is +not easy to see why this alteration was made, unless because +“opposed to” is longer.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Turning to geographical distribution, the difficulties +encountered <i>on the theory of descent with modification</i> are +grave enough.”</p> +<p>“Grave” has become “serious,” but +there is no other change (p. 461).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“As <i>on the theory of natural selection</i> an +interminable number of intermediate forms must have +existed,” &c.</p> +<p>“On” has become “according +to”—which is certainly longer, but does not appear to +possess any other advantage over “on.” It is +not easy to understand why Mr. Darwin should have strained at +such a gnat as “on,” though feeling no discomfort in +such an expression as “an interminable number.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“This is the most forcible of the many objections which +may be urged <i>against my theory</i> . . . For certainly, <i>on +my theory</i>,” &c. (p. 463).</p> +<p>The “my” in each case became “the” in +1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Such is the sum of the several chief objections and +difficulties which may be justly urged <i>against my +theory</i>” (p. 465).</p> +<p>“My” became “the” in 1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Grave as these several difficulties are, <i>in my +judgment</i> they do not overthrow <i>the theory of descent with +modifications</i>” (p. 466).</p> +<p>This now stands, “Serious as these several objections +are, in my judgment they are by no means sufficient to overthrow +<i>the theory of descent with subsequent modification</i>;” +which, again, is longer, and shows at what little, little gnats +Mr. Darwin could strain, but is no material amendment on the +original passage.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>The theory of natural selection</i>, even if we +looked no further than this, <i>seems to me to be in itself +probable</i>” (p. 469).</p> +<p>This now stands, “The theory of natural selection, even +if we look no further than this, <i>seems to be in the highest +degree probable</i>.” It is not only probable, but +was very sufficiently proved long before Mr. Darwin was born, +only it must be the right natural selection and not Mr. Charles +Darwin’s.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“It is inexplicable, <i>on the theory of creation</i>, +why a part developed, &c., . . . <i>but</i>, <i>on my +view</i>, this part has undergone,” &c. (p. 474).</p> +<p>“On my view” became “on our view” in +1869.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Glancing at instincts, marvellous as some are, they +offer no greater difficulty than does corporeal structure <i>on +the theory of the natural selection of successive</i>, +<i>slight</i>, <i>but profitable modifications</i>” (p. +474).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>On the view of all the species of the same genus +having descended from a common parent</i>, and having inherited +much in common, we can understand how it is,” &c. (p. +474).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“If we admit that the geological record is imperfect in +an extreme degree, then such facts as the record gives, support +<i>the theory of descent with modification</i>.</p> +<p>“ . . . The extinction of species . . . almost +inevitably follows on <i>the principle of natural +selection</i>” (p. 475).</p> +<p>The word “almost” has got a great deal to answer +for.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“We can understand, <i>on the theory of descent with +modification</i>, most of the great leading facts in +Distribution” (p. 476).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“The existence of closely allied or representative +species in any two areas, implies, <i>on the theory of descent +with modification</i>, that the same parents formerly inhabited +both areas . . . It must be admitted that these facts receive no +explanation <i>on the theory of creation</i> . . . The fact . . . +is intelligible <i>on the theory of natural selection</i>, with +its contingencies of extinction and divergence of +character” (p. 478).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Innumerable other such facts at once explain themselves +<i>on the theory of descent with slow and slight successive +modifications</i>” (p. 479).</p> +<p>“Any one whose disposition leads him to attach more +weight to unexplained difficulties than to the explanation of a +certain number of facts, <i>will certainly reject my +theory</i>” (p. 482).</p> +<p>“My theory” became “the theory” in +1869.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>From this point to the end of the book the claim is so +ubiquitous, either expressly or by implication, that it is +difficult to know what not to quote. I must, however, +content myself with only a few more extracts. Mr. Darwin +says:—</p> +<p>“It may be asked <i>how far I extend the doctrine of the +modification of species</i>” (p. 482).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the +belief that all animals and plants have descended from some one +prototype . . . Therefore I should infer from analogy that +probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this +earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which +life was first breathed.”</p> +<p>From an amœba—Adam, in fact, though not in +name. This last sentence is now completely altered, as well +it might be.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“When <i>the views entertained in this volume on the +origin of species</i>, <i>or when analogous views are generally +admitted</i>, we can dimly foresee that there will be a +considerable revolution in natural history” (p. 434).</p> +<p>Possibly. This now stands, “When the views +advanced by me in this volume, and by Mr. Wallace, or when +analogous views on the origin of species are generally admitted, +we can dimly foresee,” &c. When the “Origin +of Species” came out we knew nothing of any analogous +views, and Mr. Darwin’s words passed unnoticed. I do +not say that he knew they would, but he certainly ought to have +known.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“<i>A grand and almost untrodden field of inquiry will +be opened</i>, on the causes and laws of variation, on +correlation of growth, on the effects of use and disuse, on the +direct action of external conditions, and so forth” (p. +486).</p> +<p>Buffon and Lamarck had trodden this field to some purpose, but +not a hint to this effect is vouchsafed to us. +Again;—</p> +<p>“<i>When I view all beings not as special creations</i>, +<i>but as the lineal descendants of some few beings which lived +long before</i> the first bed of the Silurian system was +deposited, they seem to me to become ennobled . . . We can so far +take a prophetic glance into futurity as to foretell that it will +be the common and widely spread species, belonging to the larger +and dominant groups, which will ultimately prevail and procreate +new and dominant species.”</p> +<p>There is no alteration in this except that +“Silurian” has become “Cambrian.”</p> +<p>The idyllic paragraph with which Mr. Darwin concludes his book +contains no more special claim to the theory of descent <i>en +bloc</i> than many another which I have allowed to pass +unnoticed; it has been, moreover, dealt with in an earlier +chapter (Chapter XII.)</p> +<h2><a name="page202"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +202</span>Chapter XV<br /> +The Excised “My’s”</h2> +<p>I <span class="smcap">have</span> quoted in all ninety-seven +passages, as near as I can make them, in which Mr. Darwin claimed +the theory of descent, either expressly by speaking of “my +theory” in such connection that the theory of descent ought +to be, and, as the event has shown, was, understood as being +intended, or by implication, as in the opening passages of the +“Origin of Species,” in which he tells us how he had +thought the matter out without acknowledging obligation of any +kind to earlier writers. The original edition of the +“Origin of Species” contained 490 pp., exclusive of +index; a claim, therefore, more or less explicit, to the theory +of descent was made on the average about once in every five pages +throughout the book from end to end; the claims were most +prominent in the most important parts, that is to say, at the +beginning and end of the work, and this made them more effective +than they are made even by their frequency. A more +ubiquitous claim than this it would be hard to find in the case +of any writer advancing a new theory; it is difficult, therefore, +to understand how Mr. Grant Allen could have allowed himself to +say that Mr. Darwin “laid no sort of claim to originality +or proprietorship” in the theory of descent with +modification.</p> +<p>Nevertheless I have only found one place where Mr. Darwin +pinned himself down beyond possibility of retreat, however +ignominious, by using the words “my theory of descent with +modification.” <a name="citation202a"></a><a +href="#footnote202a" class="citation">[202a]</a> He often, +as I have said, speaks of “my theory,” and then +shortly afterwards of “descent with modification,” +under such circumstances that no one who had not been brought up +in the school of Mr. Gladstone could doubt that the two +expressions referred to the same thing. He seems to have +felt that he must be a poor wriggler if he could not wriggle out +of this; give him any loophole, however small, and Mr. Darwin +could trust himself to get out through it; but he did not like +saying what left no loophole at all, and “my theory of +descent with modification” closed all exits so firmly that +it is surprising he should ever have allowed himself to use these +words. As I have said, Mr. Darwin only used this direct +categorical form of claim in one place; and even here, after it +had stood through three editions, two of which had been largely +altered, he could stand it no longer, and altered the +“my” into “the” in 1866, with the fourth +edition of the “Origin of Species.”</p> +<p>This was the only one of the original forty-five my’s +that was cut out before the appearance of the fifth edition in +1869, and its excision throws curious light upon the working of +Mr. Darwin’s mind. The selection of the most +categorical my out of the whole forty-five, shows that Mr. Darwin +knew all about his my’s, and, while seeing reason to remove +this, held that the others might very well stand. He even +left “On my <i>view</i> of descent with +modification,” <a name="citation203a"></a><a +href="#footnote203a" class="citation">[203a]</a> which, though +more capable of explanation than “my theory,” +&c., still runs it close; nevertheless the excision of even a +single my that had been allowed to stand through such close +revision as those to which the “Origin of Species” +had been subjected betrays uneasiness of mind, for it is +impossible that even Mr. Darwin should not have known that though +the my excised in 1866 was the most technically categorical, the +others were in reality just as guilty, though no tower of Siloam +in the shape of excision fell upon them. If, then, Mr. +Darwin was so uncomfortable about this one as to cut it out, it +is probable he was far from comfortable about the others.</p> +<p>This view derives confirmation from the fact that in 1869, +with the fifth edition of the “Origin of Species,” +there was a stampede of my’s throughout the whole work, no +less than thirty out of the original forty-five being changed +into “the,” “our,” “this,” or +some other word, which, though having all the effect of my, still +did not say “my” outright. These my’s +were, if I may say so, sneaked out; nothing was said to explain +their removal to the reader or call attention to it. Why, +it may be asked, having been considered during the revisions of +1861 and 1866, and with only one exception allowed to stand, why +should they be smitten with a homing instinct in such large +numbers with the fifth edition? It cannot be maintained +that Mr. Darwin had had his attention called now for the first +time to the fact that he had used my perhaps a little too freely, +and had better be more sparing of it for the future. The my +excised in 1866 shows that Mr. Darwin had already considered this +question, and saw no reason to remove any but the one that left +him no loophole. Why, then, should that which was +considered and approved in 1859, 1861, and 1866 (not to mention +the second edition of 1859 or 1860) be retreated from with every +appearance of panic in 1869? Mr. Darwin could not well have +cut out more than he did—not at any rate without saying +something about it, and it would not be easy to know exactly what +say. Of the fourteen my’s that were left in 1869, +five more were cut out in 1872, and nine only were allowed +eventually to remain. We naturally ask, Why leave any if +thirty-six ought to be cut out, or why cut out thirty-six if nine +ought to be left—especially when the claim remains +practically just the same after the excision as before it?</p> +<p>I imagine complaint had early reached Mr. Darwin that the +difference between himself and his predecessors was unsubstantial +and hard to grasp; traces of some such feeling appear even in the +late Sir Charles Lyell’s “Principles of +Geology,” in which he writes that he had reprinted his +abstract of Lamarck’s doctrine word for word, “in +justice to Lamarck, in order to show how nearly the opinions +taught by him at the beginning of this century resembled those +now in vogue among a large body of naturalists respecting the +infinite variability of species, and the progressive development +in past time of the organic world.” <a +name="citation205a"></a><a href="#footnote205a" +class="citation">[205a]</a> Sir Charles Lyell could not +have written thus if he had thought that Mr. Darwin had already +done “justice to Lamarck,” nor is it likely that he +stood alone in thinking as he did. It is probable that more +reached Mr. Darwin than reached the public, and that the +historical sketch prefixed to all editions after the first six +thousand copies had been sold—meagre and slovenly as it +is—was due to earlier manifestation on the part of some of +Mr. Darwin’s friends of the feeling that was afterwards +expressed by Sir Charles Lyell in the passage quoted above. +I suppose the removal of the my that was cut out in 1866 to be +due partly to the Gladstonian tendencies of Mr. Darwin’s +mind, which would naturally make that particular my at all times +more or less offensive to him, and partly to the increase of +objection to it that must have ensued on the addition of the +“brief but imperfect” historical sketch in 1861; it +is doubtless only by an oversight that this particular my was not +cut out in 1861. The stampede of 1869 was probably +occasioned by the appearance in Germany of Professor +Haeckel’s “History of Creation.” This was +published in 1868, and Mr. Darwin no doubt foresaw that it would +be translated into English, as indeed it subsequently was. +In this book some account is given—very badly, but still +much more fully than by Mr. Darwin—of Lamarck’s work; +and even Erasmus Darwin is mentioned—inaccurately—but +still he is mentioned. Professor Haeckel says:—</p> +<p>“Although the theory of development had been already +maintained at the beginning of this century by several great +naturalists, especially by Lamarck and Goethe, it only received +complete demonstration and causal foundation nine years ago +through Darwin’s work, and it is on this account that it is +now generally (though not altogether rightly) regarded as +exclusively Mr. Darwin’s theory.” <a +name="citation206a"></a><a href="#footnote206a" +class="citation">[206a]</a></p> +<p>Later on, after giving nearly a hundred pages to the works of +the early evolutionists—pages that would certainly disquiet +the sensitive writer who had cut out the “my” which +disappeared in 1866—he continued:—</p> +<p>“We must distinguish clearly (though this is not usually +done) between, firstly, the theory of descent as advanced by +Lamarck, which deals only with the fact of all animals and plants +being descended from a common source, and secondly, +Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which shows us +<i>why</i> this progressive modification of organic forms took +place” (p. 93).</p> +<p>This passage is as inaccurate as most of those by Professor +Haeckel that I have had occasion to examine have proved to +be. Letting alone that Buffon, not Lamarck, is the foremost +name in connection with descent, I have already shown in +“Evolution Old and New” that Lamarck goes +exhaustively into the how and why of modification. He +alleges the conservation, or preservation, in the ordinary course +of nature, of the most favourable among variations that have been +induced mainly by function; this, I have sufficiently explained, +is natural selection, though the words “natural +selection” are not employed; but it is the true natural +selection which (if so metaphorical an expression is allowed to +pass) actually does take place with the results ascribed to it by +Lamarck, and not the false Charles-Darwinian natural selection +that does not correspond with facts, and cannot result in +specific differences such as we now observe. But, waiving +this, the “my’s,” within which a little rift +had begun to show itself in 1866, might well become as mute in +1869 as they could become without attracting attention, when Mr. +Darwin saw the passages just quoted, and the hundred pages or so +that lie between them.</p> +<p>I suppose Mr. Darwin cut out the five more my’s that +disappeared in 1872 because he had not yet fully recovered from +his scare, and allowed nine to remain in order to cover his +retreat, and tacitly say that he had not done anything and knew +nothing whatever about it. Practically, indeed, he had not +retreated, and must have been well aware that he was only +retreating technically; for he must have known that the absence +of acknowledgment to any earlier writers in the body of his work, +and the presence of the many passages in which every word +conveyed the impression that the writer claimed descent with +modification, amounted to a claim as much when the actual word +“my” had been taken out as while it was allowed to +stand. We took Mr. Darwin at his own estimate because we +could not for a moment suppose that a man of means, position, and +education,—one, moreover, who was nothing if he was not +unself-seeking—could play such a trick upon us while +pretending to take us into his confidence; hence the almost +universal belief on the part of the public, of which Professors +Haeckel and Ray Lankester and Mr. Grant Allen alike +complain—namely, that Mr. Darwin is the originator of the +theory of descent, and that his variations are mainly +functional. Men of science must not be surprised if the +readiness with which we responded to Mr. Darwin’s appeal to +our confidence is succeeded by a proportionate resentment when +the peculiar shabbiness of his action becomes more generally +understood. For myself, I know not which most to wonder +at—the meanness of the writer himself, or the greatness of +the service that, in spite of that meanness, he unquestionably +rendered.</p> +<p>If Mr. Darwin had been dealing fairly by us, when he saw that +we had failed to catch the difference between the +Erasmus-Darwinian theory of descent through natural selection +from among variations that are mainly functional, and his own +alternative theory of descent through natural selection from +among variations that are mainly accidental, and, above all, when +he saw we were crediting him with other men’s work, he +would have hastened to set us right. “It is with +great regret,” he might have written, “and with no +small surprise, that I find how generally I have been +misunderstood as claiming to be the originator of the theory of +descent with modification; nothing can be further from my +intention; the theory of descent has been familiar to all +biologists from the year 1749, when Buffon advanced it in its +most comprehensive form, to the present day.” If Mr. +Darwin had said something to the above effect, no one would have +questioned his good faith, but it is hardly necessary to say that +nothing of the kind is to be found in any one of Mr. +Darwin’s many books or many editions; nor is the reason why +the requisite correction was never made far to seek. For if +Mr. Darwin had said as much as I have put into his mouth above, +he should have said more, and would ere long have been compelled +to have explained to us wherein the difference between himself +and his predecessors precisely lay, and this would not have been +easy. Indeed, if Mr. Darwin had been quite open with us he +would have had to say much as follows:—</p> +<p>“I should point out that, according to the evolutionists +of the last century, improvement in the eye, as in any other +organ, is mainly due to persistent, rational, employment of the +organ in question, in such slightly modified manner as experience +and changed surroundings may suggest. You will have +observed that, according to my system, this goes for very little, +and that the accumulation of fortunate accidents, irrespectively +of the use that may be made of them, is by far the most important +means of modification. Put more briefly still, the +distinction between me and my predecessors lies in this;—my +predecessors thought they knew the main normal cause or principle +that underlies variation, whereas I think that there is no +general principle underlying it at all, or that even if there is, +we know hardly anything about it. This is my distinctive +feature; there is no deception; I shall not consider the +arguments of my predecessors, nor show in what respect they are +insufficient; in fact, I shall say nothing whatever about +them. Please to understand that I alone am in possession of +the master key that can unlock the bars of the future progress of +evolutionary science; so great an improvement, in fact, is my +discovery that it justifies me in claiming the theory of descent +generally, and I accordingly claim it. If you ask me in +what my discovery consists, I reply in this;—that the +variations which we are all agreed accumulate are caused—by +variation. <a name="citation209a"></a><a href="#footnote209a" +class="citation">[209a]</a> I admit that this is not +telling you much about them, but it is as much as I think proper +to say at present; above all things, let me caution you against +thinking that there is any principle of general application +underlying variation.”</p> +<p>This would have been right. This is what Mr. Darwin +would have had to have said if he had been frank with us; it is +not surprising, therefore, that he should have been less frank +than might have been wished. I have no doubt that many a +time between 1859 and 1882, the year of his death, Mr. Darwin +bitterly regretted his initial error, and would have been only +too thankful to repair it, but he could only put the difference +between himself and the early evolutionists clearly before his +readers at the cost of seeing his own system come tumbling down +like a pack of cards; this was more than he could stand, so he +buried his face, ostrich-like, in the sand. I know no more +pitiable figure in either literature or science.</p> +<p>As I write these lines (July 1886) I see a paragraph in +<i>Nature</i> which I take it is intended to convey the +impression that Mr. Francis Darwin’s life and letters of +his father will appear shortly. I can form no idea whether +Mr. F. Darwin’s forthcoming work is likely to appear before +this present volume; still less can I conjecture what it may or +may not contain; but I can give the reader a criterion by which +to test the good faith with which it is written. If Mr. F. +Darwin puts the distinctive feature that differentiates Mr. C. +Darwin from his predecessors clearly before his readers, enabling +them to seize and carry it away with them once for all—if +he shows no desire to shirk this question, but, on the contrary, +faces it and throws light upon it, then we shall know that his +work is sincere, whatever its shortcomings may be in other +respects; and when people are doing their best to help us and +make us understand all that they understand themselves, a great +deal may be forgiven them. If, on the other hand, we find +much talk about the wonderful light which Mr. Charles Darwin +threw on evolution by his theory of natural selection, without +any adequate attempt to make us understand the difference between +the natural selection, say, of Mr. Patrick Matthew, and that of +his more famous successor, then we may know that we are being +trifled with; and that an attempt is being again made to throw +dust in our eyes.</p> +<h2><a name="page211"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +211</span>Chapter XVI<br /> +Mr. Grant Allen’s “Charles Darwin”</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">It</span> is here that Mr. Grant +Allen’s book fails. It is impossible to believe it +written in good faith, with no end in view, save to make +something easy which might otherwise be found difficult; on the +contrary, it leaves the impression of having been written with a +desire to hinder us, as far as possible, from understanding +things that Mr. Allen himself understood perfectly well.</p> +<p>After saying that “in the public mind Mr. Darwin is +perhaps most commonly regarded as the discoverer and founder of +the evolution hypothesis,” he continues that “the +grand idea which he did really originate was not the idea of +‘descent with modification,’ but the idea of +‘natural selection,’” and adds that it was Mr. +Darwin’s “peculiar glory” to have shown the +“nature of the machinery” by which all the variety of +animal and vegetable life might have been produced by slow +modifications in one or more original types. “The +theory of evolution,” says Mr. Allen, “already +existed in a more or less shadowy and undeveloped shape;” +it was Mr. Darwin’s “task in life to raise this +theory from the rank of a mere plausible and happy guess to the +rank of a highly elaborate and almost universally accepted +biological system” (pp. 3–5).</p> +<p>We all admit the value of Mr. Darwin’s work as having +led to the general acceptance of evolution. No one who +remembers average middle-class opinion on this subject before +1860 will deny that it was Mr. Darwin who brought us all round to +descent with modification; but Mr. Allen cannot rightly say that +evolution had only existed before Mr. Darwin’s time in +“a shadowy, undeveloped state,” or as “a mere +plausible and happy guess.” It existed in the same +form as that in which most people accept it now, and had been +carried to its extreme development, before Mr. Darwin’s +father had been born. It is idle to talk of Buffon’s +work as “a mere plausible and happy guess,” or to +imply that the first volume of the “Philosophie +Zoologique” of Lamarck was a less full and sufficient +demonstration of descent with modification than the “Origin +of Species” is. It has its defects, shortcomings, and +mistakes, but it is an incomparably sounder work than the +“Origin of Species;” and though it contains the +deplorable omission of any reference to Buffon, Lamarck does not +first grossly misrepresent Buffon, and then tell him to go away, +as Mr. Darwin did to the author of the “Vestiges” and +to Lamarck. If Mr. Darwin was believed and honoured for +saying much the same as Lamarck had said, it was because Lamarck +had borne the brunt of the laughing. The “Origin of +Species” was possible because the “Vestiges” +had prepared the way for it. The “Vestiges” +were made possible by Lamarck and Erasmus Darwin, and these two +were made possible by Buffon. Here a somewhat sharper line +can be drawn than is usually found possible when defining the +ground covered by philosophers. No one broke the ground for +Buffon to anything like the extent that he broke it for those who +followed him, and these broke it for one another.</p> +<p>Mr. Allen says (p. 11) that, “in Charles Darwin’s +own words, Lamarck ‘first did the eminent service of +arousing attention to the probability of all change in the +organic as well as in the inorganic world being the result of +law, and not of miraculous interposition.’” Mr. +Darwin did indeed use these words, but Mr. Allen omits the +pertinent fact that he did not use them till six thousand copies +of his work had been issued, and an impression been made as to +its scope and claims which the event has shown to be not easily +effaced; nor does he say that Mr. Darwin only pays these few +words of tribute in a quasi-preface, which, though prefixed to +his later editions of the “Origin of Species,” is +amply neutralised by the spirit which I have shown to be +omnipresent in the body of the work itself. Moreover, Mr. +Darwin’s statement is inaccurate to an unpardonable extent; +his words would be fairly accurate if applied to Buffon, but they +do not apply to Lamarck.</p> +<p>Mr. Darwin continues that Lamarck “seems to attribute +all the beautiful adaptations in nature, such as the long neck of +the giraffe for browsing on the branches of trees,” to the +effects of habit. Mr. Darwin should not say that Lamarck +“seems” to do this. It was his business to tell +us what led Lamarck to his conclusions, not what +“seemed” to do so. Any one who knows the first +volume of the “Philosophie Zoologique” will be aware +that there is no “seems” in the matter. Mr. +Darwin’s words “seem” to say that it really +could not be worth any practical naturalist’s while to +devote attention to Lamarck’s argument; the inquiry might +be of interest to antiquaries, but Mr. Darwin had more important +work in hand than following the vagaries of one who had been so +completely exploded as Lamarck had been. “Seem” +is to men what “feel” is to women; women who feel, +and men who grease every other sentence with a +“seem,” are alike to be looked on with distrust.</p> +<p>“Still,” continues Mr. Allen, “Darwin gave +no sign. A flaccid, cartilaginous, unphilosophic +evolutionism had full possession of the field for the moment, and +claimed, as it were, to be the genuine representative of the +young and vigorous biological creed, while he himself was in +truth the real heir to all the honours of the situation. He +was in possession of the master-key which alone could unlock the +bars that opposed the progress of evolution, and still he +waited. He could afford to wait. He was diligently +collecting, amassing, investigating; eagerly reading every new +systematic work, every book of travels, every scientific journal, +every record of sport, or exploration, or discovery, to extract +from the dead mass of undigested fact whatever item of implicit +value might swell the definite co-ordinated series of notes in +his own commonplace books for the now distinctly contemplated +‘Origin of Species.’ His way was to make all +sure behind him, to summon up all his facts in irresistible +array, and never to set out upon a public progress until he was +secure against all possible attacks of the ever-watchful and +alert enemy in the rear,” &c. (p. 73).</p> +<p>It would not be easy to beat this. Mr. Darwin’s +worst enemy could wish him no more damaging eulogist.</p> +<p>Of the “Vestiges” Mr. Allen says that Mr. Darwin +“felt sadly” the inaccuracy and want of profound +technical knowledge everywhere displayed by the anonymous +author. Nevertheless, long after, in the “Origin of +Species,” the great naturalist wrote with generous +appreciation of the “Vestiges of +Creation”—“In my opinion it has done excellent +service in this country in calling attention to the subject, in +removing prejudice, and in thus preparing the ground for the +reception of analogous views.”</p> +<p>I have already referred to the way in which Mr. Darwin treated +the author of the “Vestiges,” and have stated the +facts at greater length in “Evolution Old and New,” +but it may be as well to give Mr. Darwin’s words in full; +he wrote as follows on the third page of the original edition of +the “Origin of Species”:—</p> +<p>“The author of the ‘Vestiges of Creation’ +would, I presume, say that, after a certain unknown number of +generations, some bird had given birth to a woodpecker, and some +plant to the mistletoe, and that these had been produced perfect +as we now see them; but this assumption seems to me to be no +explanation, for it leaves the case of the coadaptation of +organic beings to each other and to their physical conditions of +life untouched and unexplained.”</p> +<p>The author of the “Vestiges” did, doubtless, +suppose that “<i>some</i> bird” had given birth to a +woodpecker, or more strictly, that a couple of birds had done +so—and this is all that Mr. Darwin has committed himself +to—but no one better knew that these two birds would, +according to the author of the “Vestiges,” be just as +much woodpeckers, and just as little woodpeckers, as they would +be with Mr. Darwin himself. Mr. Chambers did not suppose +that a woodpecker became a woodpecker <i>per saltum</i> though +born of some widely different bird, but Mr. Darwin’s words +have no application unless they convey this impression. The +reader will note that though the impression is conveyed, Mr. +Darwin avoids conveying it categorically. I suppose this is +what Mr. Allen means by saying that he “made all things +sure behind him.” Mr. Chambers did indeed believe in +occasional sports; so did Mr. Darwin, and we have seen that in +the later editions of the “Origin of Species” he +found himself constrained to lay greater stress on these than he +had originally done. Substantially, Mr. Chambers held much +the same opinion as to the suddenness or slowness of modification +as Mr. Darwin did, nor can it be doubted that Mr. Darwin knew +this perfectly well.</p> +<p>What I have said about the woodpecker applies also to the +mistletoe. Besides, it was Mr. Darwin’s business not +to presume anything about the matter; his business was to tell us +what the author of the “Vestiges” had said, or to +refer us to the page of the “Vestiges” on which we +should find this. I suppose he was too busy +“collecting, amassing, investigating,” &c., to be +at much pains not to misrepresent those who had been in the field +before him. There is no other reference to the +“Vestiges” in the “Origin of Species” +than this suave but singularly fraudulent passage.</p> +<p>In his edition of 1860 the author of the +“Vestiges” showed that he was nettled, and said it +was to be regretted Mr. Darwin had read the +“Vestiges” “almost as much amiss as if, like +its declared opponents, he had an interest in misunderstanding +it;” and a little lower he adds that Mr. Darwin’s +book “in no essential respect contradicts the +‘Vestiges,’” but that, on the contrary, +“while adding to its explanations of nature, it expressed +the same general ideas.” <a name="citation216a"></a><a +href="#footnote216a" class="citation">[216a]</a> This is +substantially true; neither Mr. Darwin’s nor Mr. +Chambers’s are good books, but the main object of both is +to substantiate the theory of descent with modification, and, bad +as the “Vestiges” is, it is ingenuous as compared +with the “Origin of Species.” Subsequently to +Mr. Chambers’ protest, and not till, as I have said, six +thousand copies of the “Origin of Species” had been +issued, the sentence complained of by Mr. Chambers was expunged, +but without a word of retractation, and the passage which Mr. +Allen thinks so generous was inserted into the “brief but +imperfect” sketch which Mr. Darwin prefixed—after Mr. +Chambers had been effectually snuffed out—to all subsequent +editions of his “Origin of Species.” There is +no excuse for Mr. Darwin’s not having said at least this +much about the author of the “Vestiges” in his first +edition; and on finding that he had misrepresented him in a +passage which he did not venture to retain, he should not have +expunged it quietly, but should have called attention to his +mistake in the body of his book, and given every prominence in +his power to the correction.</p> +<p>Let us now examine Mr. Allen’s record in the matter of +natural selection. For years he was one of the foremost +apostles of Neo-Darwinism, and any who said a good word for +Lamarck were told that this was the “kind of mystical +nonsense” from which Mr. Allen “had hoped Mr. Darwin +had for ever saved us.” <a name="citation216b"></a><a +href="#footnote216b" class="citation">[216b]</a> Then in +October 1883 came an article in “Mind,” from which it +appeared as though Mr. Allen had abjured Mr. Darwin and all his +works.</p> +<p>“There are only two conceivable ways,” he then +wrote, “in which any increment of brain power can ever have +arisen in any individual. The one is the Darwinian way, by +spontaneous variation, that is to say, by variation due to minute +physical circumstances affecting the individual in the +germ. The other is the Spencerian way, by functional +increment, that is to say, by the effect of increased use and +constant exposure to varying circumstances during conscious +life.”</p> +<p>Mr. Allen calls this the Spencerian view, and so it is in so +far as that Mr. Spencer has adopted it. Most people will +call it Lamarckian. This, however, is a detail. Mr. +Allen continues:—</p> +<p>“I venture to think that the first way, if we look it +clearly in the face, will be seen to be practically unthinkable; +and that we have no alternative, therefore, but to accept the +second.”</p> +<p>I like our looking a “way” which is +“practically unthinkable” “clearly in the +face.” I particularly like “practically +unthinkable.” I suppose we can think it in theory, +but not in practice. I like almost everything Mr. Allen +says or does; it is not necessary to go far in search of his good +things; dredge up any bit of mud from him at random and we are +pretty sure to find an oyster with a pearl in it, if we look it +clearly in the face; I mean, there is sure to be something which +will be at any rate “almost” practically +unthinkable. But however this may be, when Mr. Allen wrote +his article in “Mind” two years ago, he was in +substantial agreement with myself about the value of natural +selection as a means of modification—by natural selection I +mean, of course, the commonly known Charles-Darwinian natural +selection from fortuitous variations; now, however, in 1885, he +is all for this same natural selection again, and in the preface +to his “Charles Darwin” writes (after a handsome +acknowledgment of “Evolution Old and New”) that he +“differs from” me “fundamentally in” my +“estimate of the worth of Charles Darwin’s +distinctive discovery of natural selection.”</p> +<p>This he certainly does, for on page 81 of the work itself he +speaks of “the distinctive notion of natural +selection” as having, “like all true and fruitful +ideas, more than once flashed,” &c. I have +explained <i>usque ad nauseam</i>, and will henceforth explain no +longer, that natural selection is no “distinctive +notion” of Mr. Darwin’s. Mr. Darwin’s +“distinctive notion” is natural selection from among +fortuitous variations.</p> +<p>Writing again (p. 89) of Mr. Spencer’s essay in the +“Leader,” <a name="citation218a"></a><a +href="#footnote218a" class="citation">[218a]</a> Mr. Allen +says:—</p> +<p>“It contains, in a very philosophical and abstract form, +the theory of ‘descent with modification’ without the +distinctive Darwinian adjunct of ‘natural selection’ +or survival of the fittest. Yet it was just that lever +dexterously applied, and carefully weighted with the whole weight +of his endlessly accumulated inductive instances, that finally +enabled our modern Archimedes to move the world.”</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“To account for adaptation, for the almost perfect +fitness of every plant and every animal to its position in life, +for the existence (in other words) of definitely correlated parts +and organs, we must call in the aid of survival of the +fittest. Without that potent selective agent, our +conception of the becoming of life is a mere chaos; order and +organisation are utterly inexplicable save by the brilliant +illuminating ray of the Darwinian principle” (p. 93).</p> +<p>And yet two years previously this same principle, after having +been thinkable for many years, had become +“unthinkable.”</p> +<p>Two years previously, writing of the Charles-Darwinian scheme +of evolution, Mr. Allen had implied it as his opinion “that +all brains are what they are in virtue of antecedent +function.” “The one creed,” he +wrote—referring to Mr Darwin’s—“makes the +man depend mainly upon the accidents of molecular physics in a +colliding germ cell and sperm cell; the other makes him depend +mainly on the doings and gains of his ancestors as modified and +altered by himself.”</p> +<p>This second creed is pure Erasmus-Darwinism and Lamarck.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“It seems to me easy to understand how survival of the +fittest may result in progress <i>starting from such functionally +produced gains</i> (italics mine), but impossible to understand +how it could result in progress, if it had to start in mere +accidental structural increments due to spontaneous variation +alone.” <a name="citation219a"></a><a href="#footnote219a" +class="citation">[219a]</a></p> +<p>Which comes to saying that it is easy to understand the +Lamarckian system of evolution, but not the +Charles-Darwinian. Mr. Allen concluded his article a few +pages later on by saying:—</p> +<p>“The first hypothesis” (Mr. Darwin’s) +“is one that throws no light upon any of the facts. +The second hypothesis” (which is unalloyed Erasmus Darwin +and Lamarck) “is one that explains them all with +transparent lucidity.” Yet in his “Charles +Darwin” Mr. Allen tells us that though Mr. Darwin +“did not invent the development theory, he made it +believable and comprehensible” (p. 4).</p> +<p>In his “Charles Darwin” Mr. Allen does not tell us +how recently he had, in another place, expressed an opinion about +the value of Mr. Darwin’s “distinctive +contribution” to the theory of evolution, so widely +different from the one he is now expressing with characteristic +appearance of ardour. He does not explain how he is able to +execute such rapid changes of front without forfeiting his claim +on our attention; explanations on matters of this sort seem out +of date with modern scientists. I can only suppose that Mr. +Allen regards himself as having taken a brief, as it were, for +the production of a popular work, and feels more bound to +consider the interests of the gentleman who pays him than to say +what he really thinks; for surely Mr. Allen would not have +written as he did in such a distinctly philosophical and +scientific journal as “Mind” without weighing his +words, and nothing has transpired lately, <i>apropos</i> of +evolution, which will account for his present recantation. +I said in my book “Selections,” &c., that when +Mr. Allen made stepping-stones of his dead selves, he jumped upon +them to some tune. I was a little scandalised then at the +completeness and suddenness of the movement he executed, and +spoke severely; I have sometimes feared I may have spoken too +severely, but his recent performance goes far to warrant my +remarks.</p> +<p>If, however, there is no dead self about it, and Mr. Allen has +only taken a brief, I confess to being not greatly edified. +I grant that a good case can be made out for an author’s +doing as I suppose Mr. Allen to have done; indeed I am not sure +that both science and religion would not gain if every one rode +his neighbour’s theory, as at a donkey-race, and the least +plausible were held to win; but surely, as things stand, a writer +by the mere fact of publishing a book professes to be giving a +<i>bonâ fide</i> opinion. The analogy of the bar does +not hold, for not only is it perfectly understood that a +barrister does not necessarily state his own opinions, but there +exists a strict though unwritten code to protect the public +against the abuses to which such a system must be liable. +In religion and science no such code exists—the supposition +being that these two holy callings are above the necessity for +anything of the kind. Science and religion are not as +business is; still, if the public do not wish to be taken in, +they must be at some pains to find out whether they are in the +hands of one who, while pretending to be a judge, is in reality a +paid advocate, with no one’s interests at heart except his +client’s, or in those of one who, however warmly he may +plead, will say nothing but what springs from mature and genuine +conviction.</p> +<p>The present unsettled and unsatisfactory state of the moral +code in this respect is at the bottom of the supposed antagonism +between religion and science. These two are not, or never +ought to be, antagonistic. They should never want what is +spoken of as reconciliation, for in reality they are one. +Religion is the quintessence of science, and science the raw +material of religion; when people talk about reconciling religion +and science they do not mean what they say; they mean reconciling +the statements made by one set of professional men with those +made by another set whose interests lie in the opposite +direction—and with no recognised president of the court to +keep them within due bounds this is not always easy.</p> +<p>Mr. Allen says:—</p> +<p>“At the same time it must be steadily remembered that +there are many naturalists at the present day, especially among +those of the lower order of intelligence, who, while accepting +evolutionism in a general way, and therefore always describing +themselves as Darwinians, do not believe, and often cannot even +understand, the distinctive Darwinian addition to the +evolutionary doctrine—namely, the principle of natural +selection. Such hazy and indistinct thinkers as these are +still really at the prior stage of Lamarckian evolution” +(p. 199).</p> +<p>Considering that Mr. Allen was at that stage himself so +recently, he might deal more tenderly with others who still find +“the distinctive Darwinian adjunct” +“unthinkable.” It is perhaps, however, because +he remembers his difficulties that Mr. Allen goes on as +follows:—</p> +<p>“It is probable that in the future, while a formal +acceptance of Darwinism becomes general, the special theory of +natural selection will be thoroughly understood and assimilated +only by the more abstract and philosophical minds.”</p> +<p>By the kind of people, in fact, who read the <i>Spectator</i> +and are called thoughtful; and in point of fact less than a +twelvemonth after this passage was written, natural selection was +publicly abjured as “a theory of the origin of +species” by Mr. Romanes himself, with the implied approval +of the <i>Times</i>.</p> +<p>“Thus,” continues Mr. Allen, “the name of +Darwin will often no doubt be tacked on to what are in reality +the principles of Lamarck.”</p> +<p>It requires no great power of prophecy to foretell this, +considering that it is done daily by nine out of ten who call +themselves Darwinians. Ask ten people of ordinary +intelligence how Mr. Darwin explains the fact that giraffes have +long necks, and nine of them will answer “through +continually stretching them to reach higher and higher +boughs.” They do not understand that this is the +Lamarckian view of evolution, not the Darwinian; nor will Mr. +Allen’s book greatly help the ordinary reader to catch the +difference between the two theories, in spite of his frequent +reference to Mr. Darwin’s “distinctive +feature,” and to his “master-key.” No +doubt the British public will get to understand all about it some +day, but it can hardly be expected to do so all at once, +considering the way in which Mr. Allen and so many more throw +dust in its eyes, and will doubtless continue to throw it as long +as an honest penny is to be turned by doing so. Mr. Allen, +then, is probably right in saying that “the name of Darwin +will no doubt be often tacked on to what are in reality the +principles of Lamarck,” nor can it be denied that Mr. +Darwin, by his practice of using “the theory of natural +selection” as though it were a synonym for “the +theory of descent with modification,” contributed to this +result.</p> +<p>I do not myself doubt that he intended to do this, but Mr. +Allen would say no less confidently he did not. He writes +of Mr. Darwin as follows:—</p> +<p>“Of Darwin’s pure and exalted moral nature no +Englishman of the present generation can trust himself to speak +with becoming moderation.”</p> +<p>He proceeds to trust himself thus:—</p> +<p>“His love of truth, his singleness of heart, his +sincerity, his earnestness, his modesty, his candour, his +absolute sinking of self and selfishness—these, indeed are +all conspicuous to every reader on the very face of every word he +ever printed.”</p> +<p>This “conspicuous sinking of self” is of a piece +with the “delightful unostentatiousness <i>which every one +must have noticed</i>” about which Mr. Allen writes on page +65. Does he mean that Mr. Darwin was “ostentatiously +unostentatious,” or that he was “unostentatiously +ostentatious”? I think we may guess from this passage +who it was that in the old days of the <i>Pall Mall Gazelle</i> +called Mr. Darwin “a master of a certain happy +simplicity.”</p> +<p>Mr. Allen continues:—</p> +<p>“Like his works themselves, they must long outlive +him. But his sympathetic kindliness, his ready generosity, +the staunchness of his friendship, the width and depth and +breadth of his affections, the manner in which ‘he bore +with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them +again’—these things can never be so well known to any +other generation of men as to the three generations that walked +the world with him” (pp. 174, 175).</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<p>“He began early in life to collect and arrange a vast +encyclopædia of facts, all finally focussed with supreme +skill upon the great principle he so clearly perceived and so +lucidly expounded. He brought to bear upon the question an +amount of personal observation, of minute experiment, of +world-wide book knowledge, of universal scientific ability, such +as never, perhaps, was lavished by any other man upon any other +department of study. His conspicuous and beautiful love of +truth, his unflinching candour, his transparent fearlessness and +honesty of purpose, his childlike simplicity, his modesty of +demeanour, his charming manner, his affectionate disposition, his +kindliness to friends, his courtesy to opponents, his gentleness +to harsh and often bitter assailants, kindled in the minds of men +of science everywhere throughout the world a contagious +enthusiasm only equalled perhaps among the disciples of Socrates +and the great teachers of the revival of learning. His name +became a rallying-point for the children of light in every +country” (pp. 196, 197).</p> +<p>I need not quote more; the sentence goes on to talk about +“firmly grounding” something which philosophers and +speculators might have taken a century or two more “to +establish in embryo;” but those who wish to see it must +turn to Mr. Allen’s book.</p> +<p>If I have formed too severe an estimate of Mr. Darwin’s +work and character—and this is more than likely—the +fulsomeness of the adulation lavished on him by his admirers for +many years past must be in some measure my excuse. We grow +tired even of hearing Aristides called just, but what is so +freely said about Mr. Darwin puts us in mind more of what the +people said about Herod—that he spoke with the voice of a +God, not of a man. So we saw Professor Ray Lankester hail +him not many years ago as the “greatest of living +men.” <a name="citation224a"></a><a href="#footnote224a" +class="citation">[224a]</a></p> +<p>It is ill for any man’s fame that he should be praised +so extravagantly. Nobody ever was as good as Mr. Darwin +looked, and a counterblast to such a hurricane of praise as has +been lately blowing will do no harm to his ultimate reputation, +even though it too blow somewhat fiercely. Art, character, +literature, religion, science (I have named them in alphabetical +order), thrive best in a breezy, bracing air; I heartily hope I +may never be what is commonly called successful in my own +lifetime—and if I go on as I am doing now, I have a fair +chance of succeeding in not succeeding.</p> +<h2><a name="page225"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +225</span>Chapter XVII<br /> +Professor Ray Lankester and Lamarck</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">Being</span> anxious to give the reader a +sample of the arguments against the theory of natural selection +from among variations that are mainly either directly or +indirectly functional in their inception, or more briefly against +the Erasmus-Darwinian and Lamarckian systems, I can find nothing +more to the point, or more recent, than Professor Ray +Lankester’s letter to the <i>Athenæum</i> of March +29, 1884, to the latter part of which, however, I need alone call +attention. Professor Ray Lankester says:—</p> +<p>“And then we are introduced to the discredited +speculations of Lamarck, which have found a worthy advocate in +Mr. Butler, as really solid contributions to the discovery of the +<i>veræ causæ</i> of variation! A much more +important attempt to do something for Lamarck’s hypothesis, +of the transmission to offspring of structural peculiarities +acquired by the parents, was recently made by an able and +experienced naturalist, Professor Semper of Wurzburg. His +book on ‘Animal Life,’ &c., is published in the +‘International Scientific Series.’ Professor +Semper adduces an immense number and variety of cases of +structural change in animals and plants brought about in the +individual by adaptation (during its individual life-history) to +new conditions. Some of these are very marked changes, such +as the loss of its horny coat in the gizzard of a pigeon fed on +meat; <i>but in no single instance could Professor Semper +show</i>—although it was his object and desire to do so if +possible—that such change was transmitted from parent to +offspring. Lamarckism looks all very well on paper, but, as +Professor Semper’s book shows, when put to the test of +observation and experiment it collapses absolutely.”</p> +<p>I should have thought it would have been enough if it had +collapsed without the “absolutely,” but Professor Ray +Lankester does not like doing things by halves. Few will be +taken in by the foregoing quotation, except those who do not +greatly care whether they are taken in or not; but to save +trouble to readers who may have neither Lamarck nor Professor +Semper at hand, I will put the case as follows:—</p> +<p>Professor Semper writes a book to show, we will say, that the +hour-hand of the clock moves gradually forward, in spite of its +appearing stationary. He makes his case sufficiently clear, +and then might have been content to leave it; nevertheless, in +the innocence of his heart, he adds the admission that though he +had often looked at the clock for a long time together, he had +never been able actually to see the hour-hand moving. +“There now,” exclaims Professor Ray Lankester on +this, “I told you so; the theory collapses absolutely; his +whole object and desire is to show that the hour-hand moves, and +yet when it comes to the point, he is obliged to confess that he +cannot see it do so.” It is not worth while to meet +what Professor Ray Lankester has been above quoted as saying +about Lamarckism beyond quoting the following passage from a +review of “The Neanderthal Skull on Evolution” in the +“Monthly Journal of Science” for June, 1885 (p. +362):—</p> +<p>“On the very next page the author reproduces the +threadbare objection that the ‘supporters of the theory +have never yet succeeded in observing a single instance in all +the millions of years invented (!) in its support of one species +of animal turning into another.’ Now, <i>ex +hypothesi</i>, one species turns into another not rapidly, as in +a transformation scene, but in successive generations, each being +born a shade different from its progenitors. Hence to +observe such a change is excluded by the very terms of the +question. Does Mr. Saville forget Mr. Herbert +Spencer’s apologue of the ephemeron which had never +witnessed the change of a child into a man?”</p> +<p>The apologue, I may say in passing, is not Mr. +Spencer’s; it is by the author of the +“Vestiges,” and will be found on page 161 of the 1853 +edition of that book; but let this pass. How impatient +Professor Ray Lankester is of any attempt to call attention to +the older view of evolution appears perhaps even more plainly in +a review of this same book of Professor Semper’s that +appeared in “Nature,” March 3, 1881. The tenor +of the remarks last quoted shows that though what I am about to +quote is now more than five years old, it may be taken as still +giving us the position which Professor Ray Lankester takes on +these matters. He wrote:—</p> +<p>“It is necessary,” he exclaims, “to plainly +and emphatically state” (Why so much emphasis? Why +not “it should be stated”?) “that Professor +Semper and a few other writers of similar views” <a +name="citation227a"></a><a href="#footnote227a" +class="citation">[227a]</a> (I have sent for the number of +“Modern Thought” referred to by Professor Ray +Lankester but find no article by Mr. Henslow, and do not, +therefore, know what he had said) “are not adding to or +building on Mr. Darwin’s theory, but are actually opposing +all that is essential and distinctive in that theory, by the +revival of the exploded notion of ‘directly transforming +agents’ advocated by Lamarck and others.”</p> +<p>It may be presumed that these writers know they are not +“adding to or building on” Mr. Darwin’s theory, +and do not wish to build on it, as not thinking it a sound +foundation. Professor Ray Lankester says they are +“actually opposing,” as though there were something +intolerably audacious in this; but it is not easy to see why he +should be more angry with them for “actually +opposing” Mr. Darwin than they may be with him, if they +think it worth while, for “actually defending” the +exploded notion of natural selection—for assuredly the +Charles-Darwinian system is now more exploded than +Lamarck’s is.</p> +<p>What Professor Ray Lankester says about Lamarck and +“directly transforming agents” will mislead those who +take his statement without examination. Lamarck does not +say that modification is effected by means of “directly +transforming agents;” nothing can be more alien to the +spirit of his teaching. With him the action of the external +conditions of existence (and these are the only transforming +agents intended by Professor Ray Lankester) is not direct, but +indirect. Change in surroundings changes the +organism’s outlook, and thus changes its desires; desires +changing, there is corresponding change in the actions performed; +actions changing, a corresponding change is by-and-by induced in +the organs that perform them; this, if long continued, will be +transmitted; becoming augmented by accumulation in many +successive generations, and further modifications perhaps arising +through further changes in surroundings, the change will amount +ultimately to specific and generic difference. Lamarck +knows no drug, nor operation, that will medicine one organism +into another, and expects the results of adaptive effort to be so +gradual as to be only perceptible when accumulated in the course +of many generations. When, therefore, Professor Ray +Lankester speaks of Lamarck as having “advocated directly +transforming agents,” he either does not know what he is +talking about, or he is trifling with his readers. +Professor Ray Lankester continues:—</p> +<p>“They do not seem to be aware of this, for they make no +attempt to examine Mr. Darwin’s accumulated facts and +arguments.” Professor Ray Lankester need not shake +Mr. Darwin’s “accumulated facts and arguments” +at us. We have taken more pains to understand them than +Professor Ray Lankester has taken to understand Lamarck, and by +this time know them sufficiently. We thankfully accept by +far the greater number, and rely on them as our sheet-anchors to +save us from drifting on to the quicksands of Neo-Darwinian +natural selection; few of them, indeed, are Mr. Darwin’s, +except in so far as he has endorsed them and given them +publicity, but I do not know that this detracts from their +value. We have paid great attention to Mr. Darwin’s +facts, and if we do not understand all his arguments—for it +is not always given to mortal man to understand these—yet +we think we know what he was driving at. We believe we +understand this to the full as well as Mr. Darwin intended us to +do, and perhaps better. Where the arguments tend to show +that all animals and plants are descended from a common source we +find them much the same as Buffon’s, or as those of Erasmus +Darwin or Lamarck, and have nothing to say against them; where, +on the other hand, they aim at proving that the main means of +modification has been the fact that if an animal has been +“favoured” it will be +“preserved”—then we think that the +animal’s own exertions will, in the long run, have had more +to do with its preservation than any real or fancied +“favour.” Professor Ray Lankester +continues:—</p> +<p>“The doctrine of evolution has become an accepted +truth” (Professor Ray Lankester writes as though the making +of truth and falsehood lay in the hollow of Mr. Darwin’s +hand. Surely “has become accepted” should be +enough; Mr. Darwin did not make the doctrine true) +“entirely in consequence of Mr. Darwin’s having +demonstrated the mechanism.” (There is no mechanism +in the matter, and if there is, Mr. Darwin did not show it. +He made some words which confused us and prevented us from seeing +that “the preservation of favoured races” was a cloak +for “luck,” and that this was all the explanation he +was giving) “by which the evolution is possible; it was +almost universally rejected, while such undemonstrable agencies +as those arbitrarily asserted to exist by Professor Semper and +Mr. George Henslow were the only means suggested by its +advocates.”</p> +<p>Undoubtedly the theory of descent with modification, which +received its first sufficiently ample and undisguised exposition +in 1809 with the “Philosophie Zoologique” of Lamarck, +shared the common fate of all theories that revolutionise opinion +on important matters, and was fiercely opposed by the Huxleys, +Romaneses, Grant Allens, and Ray Lankesters of its time. It +had to face the reaction in favour of the Church which began in +the days of the First Empire, as a natural consequence of the +horrors of the Revolution; it had to face the social influence +and then almost Darwinian reputation of Cuvier, whom Lamarck +could not, or would not, square; it was put forward by one who +was old, poor, and ere long blind. What theory could do +more than just keep itself alive under conditions so +unfavourable? Even under the most favourable conditions +descent with modification would have been a hard plant to rear, +but, as things were, the wonder is that it was not killed +outright at once. We all know how large a share social +influences have in deciding what kind of reception a book or +theory is to meet with; true, these influences are not permanent, +but at first they are almost irresistible; in reality it was not +the theory of descent that was matched against that of fixity, +but Lamarck against Cuvier; who can be surprised that Cuvier for +a time should have had the best of it?</p> +<p>And yet it is pleasant to reflect that his triumph was not, as +triumphs go, long lived. How is Cuvier best known +now? As one who missed a great opportunity; as one who was +great in small things, and stubbornly small in great ones. +Lamarck died in 1831; in 1861 descent with modification was +almost universally accepted by those most competent to form an +opinion. This result was by no means so exclusively due to +Mr. Darwin’s “Origin of Species” as is commonly +believed. During the thirty years that followed 1831 +Lamarck’s opinions made more way than Darwinians are +willing to allow. Granted that in 1861 the theory was +generally accepted under the name of Darwin, not under that of +Lamarck, still it was Lamarck and not Darwin that was being +accepted; it was descent, not descent with modification by means +of natural selection from among fortuitous variations, that we +carried away with us from the “Origin of +Species.” The thing triumphed whether the name was +lost or not. I need not waste the reader’s time by +showing further how little weight he need attach to the fact that +Lamarckism was not immediately received with open arms by an +admiring public. The theory of descent has become accepted +as rapidly, if I am not mistaken, as the Copernican theory, or as +Newton’s theory of gravitation.</p> +<p>When Professor Ray Lankester goes on to speak of the +“undemonstrable agencies” “arbitrarily +asserted” to exist by Professor Semper, he is again +presuming on the ignorance of his readers. Professor +Semper’s agencies are in no way more undemonstrable than +Mr. Darwin’s are. Mr. Darwin was perfectly cogent as +long as he stuck to Lamarck’s demonstration; his arguments +were sound as long as they were Lamarck’s, or developments +of, and riders upon, Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck, and +almost incredibly silly when they were his own. Fortunately +the greater part of the “Origin of Species” is +devoted to proving the theory of descent with modification, by +arguments against which no exception would have been taken by Mr. +Darwin’s three great precursors, except in so far as the +variations whose accumulation results in specific difference are +supposed to be fortuitous—and, to do Mr. Darwin justice, +the fortuitousness, though always within hail, is kept as far as +possible in the background.</p> +<p>“Mr. Darwin’s arguments,” says Professor Ray +Lankester, “rest on the <i>proved</i> existence of minute, +many-sided, irrelative variations <i>not</i> produced by directly +transforming agents.” Mr. Darwin throughout the body +of the “Origin of Species” is not supposed to know +what his variations are or are not produced by; if they come, +they come, and if they do not come, they do not come. True, +we have seen that in the last paragraph of the book all this was +changed, and the variations were ascribed to the conditions of +existence, and to use and disuse, but a concluding paragraph +cannot be allowed to override a whole book throughout which the +variations have been kept to hand as accidental. Mr. +Romanes is perfectly correct when he says <a +name="citation232a"></a><a href="#footnote232a" +class="citation">[232a]</a> that “natural selection” +(meaning the Charles-Darwinian natural selection) “trusts +to the chapter of accidents in the matter of variation” +this is all that Mr. Darwin can tell us; whether they come from +directly transforming agents or no he neither knows nor +says. Those who accept Lamarck will know that the agencies +are not, as a rule, directly transforming, but the followers of +Mr. Darwin cannot.</p> +<p>“But showing themselves,” continues Professor Ray +Lankester, “at each new act of reproduction, as part of the +phenomena of heredity such minute ‘sports’ or +‘variations’ are due to constitutional +disturbance” (No doubt. The difference, however, +between Mr. Darwin and Lamarck consists in the fact that Lamarck +believes he knows what it is that so disturbs the constitution as +generally to induce variation, whereas Mr. Darwin says he does +not know), “and appear not in individuals subjected to new +conditions” (What organism can pass through life without +being subjected to more or less new conditions? What life +is ever the exact fac-simile of another? And in a matter of +such extreme delicacy as the adjustment of psychical and physical +relations, who can say how small a disturbance of established +equilibrium may not involve how great a rearrangement?), +“but in the offspring of all, though more freely in the +offspring of those subjected to special causes of constitutional +disturbance. Mr. Darwin has further proved that these +slight variations can be transmitted and intensified by selective +breeding.”</p> +<p>Mr. Darwin did, indeed, follow Buffon and Lamarck in at once +turning to animals and plants under domestication in order to +bring the plasticity of organic forms more easily home to his +readers, but the fact that variations can be transmitted and +intensified by selective breeding had been so well established +and was so widely known long before Mr. Darwin was born, that he +can no more be said to have proved it than Newton can be said to +have proved the revolution of the earth on its own axis. +Every breeder throughout the world had known it for +centuries. I believe even Virgil knew it.</p> +<p>“They have,” continues Professor Ray Lankester, +“in reference to breeding, a remarkably tenacious, +persistent character, as might be expected from their origin in +connection with the reproductive process.”</p> +<p>The variations do not normally “originate in connection +with the reproductive process,” though it is during this +process that they receive organic expression. They +originate mainly, so far as anything originates anywhere, in the +life of the parent or parents. Without going so far as to +say that no variation can arise in connection with the +reproductive system—for, doubtless, striking and successful +sports do occasionally so arise—it is more probable that +the majority originate earlier. Professor Ray Lankester +proceeds:—</p> +<p>“On the other hand, mutilations and other effects of +directly transforming agents are rarely, if ever, +transmitted.” Professor Ray Lankester ought to know +the facts better than to say that the effects of mutilation are +rarely, if ever, transmitted. The rule is, that they will +not be transmitted unless they have been followed by disease, but +that where disease has supervened they not uncommonly descend to +offspring. <a name="citation234a"></a><a href="#footnote234a" +class="citation">[234a]</a> I know Brown-Séquard +considered it to be the morbid state of the nervous system +consequent upon the mutilation that is transmitted, rather than +the immediate effects of the mutilation, but this distinction is +somewhat finely drawn.</p> +<p>When Professor Ray Lankester talks about the “other +effects of directly transforming agents” being rarely +transmitted, he should first show us the directly transforming +agents. Lamarck, as I have said, knows them not. +“It is little short of an absurdity,” he continues, +“for people to come forward at this epoch, when evolution +is at length accepted solely because of Mr. Darwin’s +doctrine, and coolly to propose to replace that doctrine by the +old notion so often tried and rejected.”</p> +<p>Whether this is an absurdity or no, Professor Lankester will +do well to learn to bear it without showing so much warmth, for +it is one that is becoming common. Evolution has been +accepted not “because of” Mr. Darwin’s +doctrine, but because Mr. Darwin so fogged us about his doctrine +that we did not understand it. We thought we were backing +his bill for descent with modification, whereas we were in +reality backing it for descent with modification by means of +natural selection from among fortuitous variations. This +last really is Mr. Darwin’s theory, except in so far as it +is also Mr. A. R. Wallace’s; descent, alone, is just as +much and just as little Mr. Darwin’s doctrine as it is +Professor Ray Lankester’s or mine. I grant it is in +great measure through Mr. Darwin’s books that descent has +become so widely accepted; it has become so through his books, +but in spite of, rather than by reason of, his doctrine. +Indeed his doctrine was no doctrine, but only a back-door for +himself to escape by in the event of flood or fire; the flood and +fire have come; it remains to be seen how far the door will work +satisfactorily.</p> +<p>Professor Ray Lankester, again, should not say that +Lamarck’s doctrine has been “so often tried and +rejected.” M. Martins, in his edition of the +“Philosophie Zoologique,” <a +name="citation235a"></a><a href="#footnote235a" +class="citation">[235a]</a> said truly that Lamarck’s +theory had never yet had the honour of being seriously +discussed. It never has—not at least in connection +with the name of its propounder. To mention Lamarck’s +name in the presence of the conventional English society +naturalist has always been like shaking a red rag at a cow; he is +at once infuriated; “as if it were possible,” to +quote from Isidore Geoffroy St. Hilaire, whose defence of Lamarck +is one of the best things in his book, <a +name="citation235b"></a><a href="#footnote235b" +class="citation">[235b]</a> “that so great labour on the +part of so great a naturalist should have led him to ‘a +fantastic conclusion’ only—to ‘a flighty +error,’ and, as has been often said, though not written, to +‘one absurdity the more.’ Such was the language +which Lamarck heard during his protracted old age, saddened alike +by the weight of years and blindness; this was what people did +not hesitate to utter over his grave, yet barely closed, and +what, indeed, they are still saying—commonly too, without +any knowledge of what Lamarck maintained, but merely repeating at +second hand bad caricatures of his teaching.</p> +<p>“When will the time come when we may see Lamarck’s +theory discussed, and I may as well at once say refuted, in some +important points, with at any rate the respect due to one of the +most illustrious masters of our science? And when will this +theory, the hardihood of which has been greatly exaggerated, +become freed from the interpretations and commentaries by the +false light of which so many naturalists have formed their +opinion concerning it? If its author is to be condemned, +let it, at any rate, not be before he has been heard.”</p> +<p>Lamarck was the Lazarus of biology. I wish his more +fortunate brethren, instead of intoning the old Church argument +that he has “been refuted over and over again,” would +refer us to some of the best chapters in the writers who have +refuted him. My own reading has led me to become moderately +well acquainted with the literature of evolution, but I have +never come across a single attempt fairly to grapple with +Lamarck, and it is plain that neither Isidore Geoffroy nor M. +Martins knows of such an attempt any more than I do. When +Professor Ray Lankester puts his finger on Lamarck’s weak +places, then, but not till then, may he complain of those who try +to replace Mr. Darwin’s doctrine by Lamarck’s.</p> +<p>Professor Ray Lankester concludes his note thus:—</p> +<p>“That such an attempt should be made is an illustration +of a curious weakness of humanity. Not infrequently, after +a long contested cause has triumphed, and all have yielded +allegiance thereto, you will find, when few generations have +passed, that men have clean forgotten what and who it was that +made that cause triumphant, and ignorantly will set up for honour +the name of a traitor or an impostor, or attribute to a great man +as a merit deeds and thoughts which he spent a long life in +opposing.”</p> +<p>Exactly so; that is what one rather feels, but surely +Professor Ray Lankester should say “in trying to filch +while pretending to oppose and to amend.” He is +complaining here that people persistently ascribe Lamarck’s +doctrine to Mr. Darwin. Of course they do; but, as I have +already perhaps too abundantly asked, whose fault is this? +If a man knows his own mind, and wants others to understand it, +it is not often that he is misunderstood for any length of +time. If he finds he is being misapprehended in a way he +does not like, he will write another book and make his meaning +plainer. He will go on doing this for as long time as he +thinks necessary. I do not suppose, for example, that +people will say I originated the theory of descent by means of +natural selection from among fortunate accidents, or even that I +was one of its supporters as a means of modification; but if this +impression were to prevail, I cannot think I should have much +difficulty in removing it. At any rate no such +misapprehension could endure for more than twenty years, during +which I continued to address a public who welcomed all I wrote, +unless I myself aided and abetted the mistake. Mr. Darwin +wrote many books, but the impression that Darwinism and +evolution, or descent with modification, are identical is still +nearly as prevalent as it was soon after the appearance of the +“Origin of Species;” the reason of this is, that Mr. +Darwin was at no pains to correct us. Where, in any one of +his many later books, is there a passage which sets the matter in +its true light, and enters a protest against the misconception of +which Professor Ray Lankester complains so bitterly? The +only inference from this is, that Mr. Darwin was not displeased +at our thinking him to be the originator of the theory of descent +with modification, and did not want us to know more about Lamarck +than he could help. If we wanted to know about him, we must +find out what he had said for ourselves, it was no part of Mr. +Darwin’s business to tell us; he had no interest in our +catching the distinctive difference between himself and that +writer; perhaps not; but this approaches closely to wishing us to +misunderstand it. When Mr. Darwin wished us to understand +this or that, no one knew better how to show it to us.</p> +<p>We were aware, on reading the “Origin of Species,” +that there was a something about it of which we had not full +hold; nevertheless we gave Mr. Darwin our confidence at once, +partly because he led off by telling us that we must trust him to +a great extent, and explained that the present book was only an +instalment of a larger work which, when it came out, would make +everything perfectly clear; partly, again, because the case for +descent with modification, which was the leading idea throughout +the book, was so obviously strong, but perhaps mainly because +every one said Mr. Darwin was so good, and so much less +self-heeding than other people; besides, he had so +“patiently” and “carefully” accumulated +“such a vast store of facts” as no other naturalist, +living or dead, had ever yet even tried to get together; he was +so kind to us with his, “May we not believe?” and his +“Have we any right to infer that the Creator?” +&c. “Of course we have not,” we exclaimed, +almost with tears in our eyes—“not if you ask us in +that way.” Now that we understand what it was that +puzzled us in Mr. Darwin’s work we do not think highly +either of the chief offender, or of the accessories after the +fact, many of whom are trying to brazen the matter out, and on a +smaller scale to follow his example.</p> +<h2><a name="page239"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +239</span>Chapter XVIII<br /> +Per Contra</h2> +<p>“‘<span class="smcap">The</span> evil that men do +lives after them” <a name="citation239a"></a><a +href="#footnote239a" class="citation">[239a]</a> is happily not +so true as that the good lives after them, while the ill is +buried with their bones, and to no one does this correction of +Shakespeare’s unwonted spleen apply more fully than to Mr. +Darwin. Indeed it was somewhat thus that we treated his +books even while he was alive; the good, descent, remained with +us, while the ill, the deification of luck, was forgotten as soon +as we put down his work. Let me now, therefore, as far as +possible, quit the ungrateful task of dwelling on the defects of +Mr. Darwin’s work and character, for the more pleasant one +of insisting upon their better side, and of explaining how he +came to be betrayed into publishing the “Origin of +Species” without reference to the works of his +predecessors.</p> +<p>In the outset I would urge that it is not by any single book +that Mr. Darwin should be judged. I do not believe that any +one of the three principal works on which his reputation is +founded will maintain with the next generation the place it has +acquired with ourselves; nevertheless, if asked to say who was +the man of our own times whose work had produced the most +important, and, on the whole, beneficial effect, I should perhaps +wrongly, but still both instinctively and on reflection, name him +to whom I have, unfortunately, found myself in more bitter +opposition than to any other in the whole course of my +life. I refer, of course, to Mr. Darwin.</p> +<p>His claim upon us lies not so much in what is actually found +within the four corners of any one of his books, as in the fact +of his having written them at all—in the fact of his having +brought out one after another, with descent always for its +keynote, until the lesson was learned too thoroughly to make it +at all likely that it will be forgotten. Mr. Darwin wanted +to move his generation, and had the penetration to see that this +is not done by saying a thing once for all and leaving it. +It almost seems as though it matters less what a man says than +the number of times he repeats it, in a more or less varied +form. It was here the author of the “Vestiges of +Creation” made his most serious mistake. He relied on +new editions, and no one pays much attention to new +editions—the mark a book makes is almost always made by its +first edition. If, instead of bringing out a series of +amended editions during the fifteen years’ law which Mr. +Darwin gave him, Mr. Chambers had followed up the +“Vestiges” with new book upon new book, he would have +learned much more, and, by consequence, not have been snuffed out +so easily once for all as he was in 1859 when the “Origin +of Species” appeared.</p> +<p>The tenacity of purpose which appears to have been one of Mr. +Darwin’s most remarkable characteristics was visible even +in his outward appearance. He always reminded me of +Raffaelle’s portrait of Pope Julius the Second, which, +indeed, would almost do for a portrait of Mr. Darwin +himself. I imagine that these two men, widely as the sphere +of their action differed, must have been like each other in more +respects than looks alone. Each, certainly, had a hand of +iron; whether Pope Julius wore a velvet glove or no, I do not +know; I rather think not, for, if I remember rightly, he boxed +Michael Angelo’s ears for giving him a saucy answer. +We cannot fancy Mr. Darwin boxing any one’s ears; indeed +there can be no doubt he wore a very thick velvet glove, but the +hand underneath it was none the less of iron. It was to his +tenacity of purpose, doubtless, that his success was mainly due; +but for this he must inevitably have fallen before the many +inducements to desist from the pursuit of his main object, which +beset him in the shape of ill health, advancing years, ample +private means, large demands upon his time, and a reputation +already great enough to satisfy the ambition of any ordinary +man.</p> +<p>I do not gather from those who remember Mr. Darwin as a boy, +and as a young man, that he gave early signs of being likely to +achieve greatness; nor, as it seems to me, is there any sign of +unusual intellectual power to be detected in his earliest +book. Opening this “almost” at random I +read—“Earthquakes alone are sufficient to destroy the +prosperity of any country. If, for instance, beneath +England the now inert subterraneous forces should exert those +powers which most assuredly in former geological ages they have +exerted, how completely would the entire condition of the country +be changed! What would become of the lofty houses, +thickly-packed cities, great manufacturies (<i>sic</i>), the +beautiful public and private edifices? If the new period of +disturbance were to commence by some great earthquake in the dead +of night, how terrific would be the carnage! England would +be at once bankrupt; all papers, records, and accounts would from +that moment be lost. Government being unable to collect the +taxes, and failing to maintain its authority, the hand of +violence and rapine would go uncontrolled. In every large +town famine would be proclaimed, pestilence and death following +in its train.” <a name="citation240a"></a><a +href="#footnote240a" class="citation">[240a]</a> Great +allowance should be made for a first work, and I admit that much +interesting matter is found in Mr. Darwin’s journal; still, +it was hardly to be expected that the writer who at the age of +thirty-three could publish the foregoing passage should twenty +years later achieve the reputation of being the profoundest +philosopher of his time.</p> +<p>I have not sufficient technical knowledge to enable me to +speak certainly, but I question his having been the great +observer and master of experiment which he is generally believed +to have been. His accuracy was, I imagine, generally to be +relied upon as long as accuracy did not come into conflict with +his interests as a leader in the scientific world; when these +were at stake he was not to be trusted for a moment. +Unfortunately they were directly or indirectly at stake more +often than one could wish. His book on the action of worms, +however, was shown by Professor Paley and other writers <a +name="citation242a"></a><a href="#footnote242a" +class="citation">[242a]</a> to contain many serious errors and +omissions, though it involved no personal question; but I imagine +him to have been more or less <i>hébété</i> +when he wrote this book. On the whole I should doubt his +having been a better observer of nature than nine country +gentlemen out of ten who have a taste for natural history.</p> +<p>Presumptuous as I am aware it must appear to say so, I am +unable to see more than average intellectual power even in Mr. +Darwin’s later books. His great contribution to +science is supposed to have been the theory of natural selection, +but enough has been said to show that this, if understood as he +ought to have meant it to be understood, cannot be rated highly +as an intellectual achievement. His other most important +contribution was his provisional theory of pan-genesis, which is +admitted on all hands to have been a failure. Though, +however, it is not likely that posterity will consider him as a +man of transcendent intellectual power, he must be admitted to +have been richly endowed with a much more valuable quality than +either originality or literary power—I mean with <i>savoir +faire</i>. The cards he held—and, on the whole, his +hand was a good one—he played with judgment; and though not +one of those who would have achieved greatness under any +circumstances, he nevertheless did achieve greatness of no mean +order. Greatness, indeed, of the highest kind—that of +one who is without fear and without reproach—will not +ultimately be allowed him, but greatness of a rare kind can only +be denied him by those whose judgment is perverted by temper or +personal ill-will. He found the world believing in fixity +of species, and left it believing—in spite of his own +doctrine—in descent with modification.</p> +<p>I have said on an earlier page that Mr. Darwin was heir to a +discredited truth, and left behind him an accredited +fallacy. This is true as regards men of science and +cultured classes who understood his distinctive feature, or +thought they did, and so long as Mr. Darwin lived accepted it +with very rare exceptions; but it is not true as regards the +unreading, unreflecting public, who seized the salient point of +descent with modification only, and troubled themselves little +about the distinctive feature. It would almost seem as if +Mr. Darwin had reversed the usual practice of philosophers and +given his esoteric doctrine to the world, while reserving the +exoteric for his most intimate and faithful adherents. +This, however, is a detail; the main fact is, that Mr. Darwin +brought us all round to evolution. True, it was Mr. Darwin +backed by the <i>Times</i> and the other most influential organs +of science and culture, but it was one of Mr. Darwin’s +great merits to have developed and organised this backing, as +part of the work which he knew was essential if so great a +revolution was to be effected.</p> +<p>This is an exceedingly difficult and delicate thing to +do. If people think they need only write striking and +well-considered books, and that then the <i>Times</i> will +immediately set to work to call attention to them, I should +advise them not to be too hasty in basing action upon this +hypothesis. I should advise them to be even less hasty in +basing it upon the assumption that to secure a powerful literary +backing is a matter within the compass of any one who chooses to +undertake it. No one who has not a strong social position +should ever advance a new theory, unless a life of hard fighting +is part of what he lays himself out for. It was one of Mr. +Darwin’s great merits that he had a strong social position, +and had the good sense to know how to profit by it. The +magnificent feat which he eventually achieved was unhappily +tarnished by much that detracts from the splendour that ought to +have attended it, but a magnificent feat it must remain.</p> +<p>Whose work in this imperfect world is not tarred and tarnished +by something that detracts from its ideal character? It is +enough that a man should be the right man in the right place, and +this Mr. Darwin pre-eminently was. If he had been more like +the ideal character which Mr. Allen endeavours to represent him, +it is not likely that he would have been able to do as much, or +nearly as much, as he actually did; he would have been too wide a +cross with his generation to produce much effect upon it. +Original thought is much more common than is generally +believed. Most people, if they only knew it, could write a +good book or play, paint a good picture, compose a fine oratorio; +but it takes an unusually able person to get the book well +reviewed, persuade a manager to bring the play out, sell the +picture, or compass the performance of the oratorio; indeed, the +more vigorous and original any one of these things may be, the +more difficult will it prove to even bring it before the notice +of the public. The error of most original people is in +being just a trifle too original. It was in his business +qualities—and these, after all, are the most essential to +success, that Mr. Darwin showed himself so superlative. +These are not only the most essential to success, but it is only +by blaspheming the world in a way which no good citizen of the +world will do, that we can deny them to be the ones which should +most command our admiration. We are in the world; surely so +long as we are in it we should be of it, and not give ourselves +airs as though we were too good for our generation, and would lay +ourselves out to please any other by preference. Mr. Darwin +played for his own generation, and he got in the very amplest +measure the recognition which he endeavoured, as we all do, to +obtain.</p> +<p>His success was, no doubt, in great measure due to the fact +that he knew our little ways, and humoured them; but if he had +not had little ways of his own, he never could have been so much +<i>au fait</i> with ours. He knew, for example, we should +be pleased to hear that he had taken his boots off so as not to +disturb his worms when watching them by night, so he told us of +this, and we were delighted. He knew we should like his +using the word “sag,” so he used it, <a +name="citation245a"></a><a href="#footnote245a" +class="citation">[245a]</a> and we said it was beautiful. +True, he used it wrongly, for he was writing about tesselated +pavement, and builders assure me that “sag” is a word +which applies to timber only, but this is not to the point; the +point was, that Mr. Darwin should have used a word that we did +not understand; this showed that he had a vast fund of knowledge +at his command about all sorts of practical details with which he +might have well been unacquainted. We do not deal the same +measure to man and to the lower animals in the matter of +intelligence; the less we understand these last, the less, we +say, not we, but they can understand; whereas the less we can +understand a man, the more intelligent we are apt to think +him. No one should neglect by-play of this description; if +I live to be strong enough to carry it through, I mean to play +“cambre,” and I shall spell it +“camber.” I wonder Mr. Darwin never abused this +word. Laugh at him, however, as we may for having said +“sag,” if he had not been the kind of man to know the +value of these little hits, neither would he have been the kind +of man to persuade us into first tolerating, and then cordially +accepting, descent with modification. There is a +correlation of mental as well as of physical growth, and we could +not probably have had one set of Mr. Darwin’s qualities +without the other. If he had been more faultless, he might +have written better books, but we should have listened +worse. A book’s prosperity is like a +jest’s—in the ear of him that hears it.</p> +<p>Mr. Spencer would not—at least one cannot think he +would—have been able to effect the revolution which will +henceforth doubtless be connected with Mr. Darwin’s +name. He had been insisting on evolution for some years +before the “Origin of Species” came out, but he might +as well have preached to the winds, for all the visible effect +that had been produced. On the appearance of Mr. +Darwin’s book the effect was instantaneous; it was like the +change in the condition of a patient when the right medicine has +been hit on after all sorts of things have been tried and +failed. Granted that it was comparatively easy for Mr. +Darwin, as having been born into the household of one of the +prophets of evolution, to arrive at conclusions about the fixity +of species which, if not so born, he might never have reached at +all; this does not make it any easier for him to have got others +to agree with him. Any one, again, may have money left him, +or run up against it, or have it run up against him, as it does +against some people, but it is only a very sensible person who +does not lose it. Moreover, once begin to go behind +achievement and there is an end of everything. Did the +world give much heed to or believe in evolution before Mr. +Darwin’s time? Certainly not. Did we begin to +attend and be persuaded soon after Mr. Darwin began to +write? Certainly yes. Did we ere long go over <i>en +masse</i>? Assuredly. If, as I said in “Life +and Habit,” any one asks who taught the world to believe in +evolution, the answer to the end of time must be that it was Mr. +Darwin. And yet the more his work is looked at, the more +marvellous does its success become. It seems as if some +organisms can do anything with anything. Beethoven picked +his teeth with the snuffers, and seems to have picked them +sufficiently to his satisfaction. So Mr. Darwin with one of +the worst styles imaginable did all that the clearest, tersest +writer could have done. Strange, that such a master of +cunning (in the sense of my title) should have been the apostle +of luck, and one so terribly unlucky as Lamarck, of cunning, but +such is the irony of nature. Buffon planted, Erasmus Darwin +and Lamarck watered, but it was Mr. Darwin who said, “That +fruit is ripe,” and shook it into his lap.</p> +<p>With this Mr. Darwin’s best friends ought to be content; +his admirers are not well advised in representing him as endowed +with all sorts of qualities which he was very far from +possessing. Thus it is pretended that he was one of those +men who were ever on the watch for new ideas, ever ready to give +a helping hand to those who were trying to advance our knowledge, +ever willing to own to a mistake and give up even his most +cherished ideas if truth required them at his hands. No +conception can be more wantonly inexact. I grant that if a +writer was sufficiently at once incompetent and obsequious Mr. +Darwin was “ever ready,” &c. So the +Emperors of Austria wash a few poor people’s feet on some +one of the festivals of the Church, but it would not be safe to +generalise from this yearly ceremony, and conclude that the +Emperors of Austria are in the habit of washing poor +people’s feet. I can understand Mr. Darwin’s +not having taken any public notice, for example, of “Life +and Habit,” for though I did not attack him in force in +that book, it was abundantly clear that an attack could not be +long delayed, and a man may be pardoned for not doing anything to +advertise the works of his opponents; but there is no excuse for +his never having referred to Professor Hering’s work either +in “Nature,” when Professor Ray Lankester first +called attention to it (July 13, 1876), or in some one of his +subsequent books. If his attitude towards those who worked +in the same field as himself had been the generous one which his +admirers pretend, he would have certainly come forward, not +necessarily as adopting Professor Hering’s theory, but +still as helping it to obtain a hearing.</p> +<p>His not having done so is of a piece with his silence about +Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck in the early editions of the +“Origin of Species,” and with the meagre reference to +them which is alone found in the later ones. It is of a +piece also with the silence which Mr. Darwin invariably +maintained when he saw his position irretrievably damaged, as, +for example, by Mr. Spencer’s objection already referred +to, and by the late Professor Fleeming Jenkin in the <i>North +British Review</i> (June 1867). Science, after all, should +form a kingdom which is more or less not of this world. The +ideal scientist should know neither self nor friend nor +foe—he should be able to hob-nob with those whom he most +vehemently attacks, and to fly at the scientific throat of those +to whom he is personally most attached; he should be neither +grateful for a favourable review nor displeased at a hostile one; +his literary and scientific life should be something as far apart +as possible from his social; it is thus, at least, alone that any +one will be able to keep his eye single for facts, and their +legitimate inferences. We have seen Professor Mivart lately +taken to task by Mr. Romanes for having said <a +name="citation248a"></a><a href="#footnote248a" +class="citation">[248a]</a> that Mr. Darwin was singularly +sensitive to criticism, and made it impossible for Professor +Mivart to continue friendly personal relations with him after he +had ventured to maintain his own opinion. I see no reason +to question Professor Mivart’s accuracy, and find what he +has said to agree alike with my own personal experience of Mr. +Darwin, and with all the light that his works throw upon his +character.</p> +<p>The most substantial apology that can be made for his attempt +to claim the theory of descent with modification is to be found +in the practice of Lamarck, Mr. Patrick Matthew, the author of +the “Vestiges of Creation,” and Mr. Herbert Spencer, +and, again, in the total absence of complaint which this practice +met with. If Lamarck might write the “Philosophie +Zoologique” without, so far as I remember, one word of +reference to Buffon, and without being complained of, why might +not Mr. Darwin write the “Origin of Species” without +more than a passing allusion to Lamarck? Mr. Patrick +Matthew, again, though writing what is obviously a +<i>résumé</i> of the evolutionary theories of his +time, makes no mention of Lamarck, Erasmus Darwin, or +Buffon. I have not the original edition of the +“Vestiges of Creation” before me, but feel sure I am +justified in saying that it claimed to be a more or less +Minerva-like work, that sprang full armed from the brain of Mr. +Chambers himself. This at least is how it was received by +the public; and, however violent the opposition it met with, I +cannot find that its author was blamed for not having made +adequate mention of Lamarck. When Mr. Spencer wrote his +first essay on evolution in the <i>Leader</i> (March 20, 1852) he +did indeed begin his argument, “Those who cavalierly reject +the doctrine of Lamarck,” &c., so that his essay +purports to be written in support of Lamarck; but when he +republished his article in 1858, the reference to Lamarck was cut +out.</p> +<p>I make no doubt that it was the bad example set him by the +writers named in the preceding paragraph which betrayed Mr. +Darwin into doing as they did, but being more conscientious than +they, he could not bring himself to do it without having +satisfied himself that he had got hold of a more or less +distinctive feature, and this, of course, made matters +worse. The distinctive feature was not due to any deep-laid +plan for pitchforking mind out of the universe, or as part of a +scheme of materialistic philosophy, though it has since been made +to play an important part in the attempt to further this; Mr. +Darwin was perfectly innocent of any intention of getting rid of +mind, and did not, probably, care the toss of sixpence whether +the universe was instinct with mind or no—what he did care +about was carrying off the palm in the matter of descent with +modification, and the distinctive feature was an adjunct with +which his nervous, sensitive, Gladstonian nature would not allow +him to dispense.</p> +<p>And why, it may be asked, should not the palm be given to Mr. +Darwin if he wanted it, and was at so much pains to get it? +Why, if science is a kingdom not of this world, make so much fuss +about settling who is entitled to what? At best such +questions are of a sorry personal nature, that can have little +bearing upon facts, and it is these that alone should concern +us. The answer is, that if the question is so merely +personal and unimportant, Mr. Darwin may as well yield as Buffon, +Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck; Mr. Darwin’s admirers find no +difficulty in appreciating the importance of a personal element +as far as he is concerned; let them not wonder, then, if others, +while anxious to give him the laurels to which he is entitled, +are somewhat indignant at the attempt to crown him with leaves +that have been filched from the brows of the great dead who went +before him. <i>Palmam qui meruit ferat</i>. The +instinct which tells us that no man in the scientific or literary +world should claim more than his due is an old and, I imagine, a +wholesome one, and if a scientific self-denying ordinance is +demanded, we may reply with justice, <i>Que messieurs les +Charles-Darwinies commencent</i>. Mr. Darwin will have a +crown sufficient for any ordinary brow remaining in the +achievement of having done more than any other writer, living or +dead, to popularise evolution. This much may be +ungrudgingly conceded to him, but more than this those who have +his scientific position most at heart will be well advised if +they cease henceforth to demand.</p> +<h2><a name="page251"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +251</span>Chapter XIX<br /> +Conclusion</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">And</span> now I bring this book to a +conclusion. So many things requiring attention have +happened since it was begun that I leave it in a very different +shape to the one which it was originally intended to bear. +I have omitted much that I had meant to deal with, and have been +tempted sometimes to introduce matter the connection of which +with my subject is not immediately apparent. Such however, +as the book is, it must now go in the form into which it has +grown almost more in spite of me than from <i>malice prepense</i> +on my part. I was afraid that it might thus set me at +defiance, and in an early chapter expressed a doubt whether I +should find it redound greatly to my advantage with men of +science; in this concluding chapter I may say that doubt has +deepened into something like certainty. I regret this, but +cannot help it.</p> +<p>Among the points with which it was most incumbent upon me to +deal was that of vegetable intelligence. A reader may well +say that unless I give plants much the same sense of pleasure and +pain, memory, power of will, and intelligent perception of the +best way in which to employ their opportunities that I give to +low animals, my argument falls to the ground. If I declare +organic modification to be mainly due to function, and hence in +the closest correlation with mental change, I must give plants, +as well as animals, a mind, and endow them with power to reflect +and reason upon all that most concerns them. Many who will +feel little difficulty about admitting that animal modification +is upon the whole mainly due to the secular cunning of the +animals themselves will yet hesitate before they admit that +plants also can have a reason and cunning of their own.</p> +<p>Unwillingness to concede this is based principally upon the +error concerning intelligence to which I have already +referred—I mean to our regarding intelligence not so much +as the power of understanding as that of being understood by +ourselves. Once admit that the evidence in favour of a +plant’s knowing its own business depends more on the +efficiency with which that business is conducted than either on +our power of understanding how it can be conducted, or on any +signs on the plant’s part of a capacity for understanding +things that do not concern it, and there will be no further +difficulty about supposing that in its own sphere a plant is just +as intelligent as an animal, and keeps a sharp look-out upon its +own interests, however indifferent it may seem to be to +ours. So strong has been the set of recent opinion in this +direction that with botanists the foregoing now almost goes +without saying, though few five years ago would have accepted +it.</p> +<p>To no one of the several workers in this field are we more +indebted for the change which has been brought about in this +respect than to my late valued and lamented friend Mr. Alfred +Tylor. Mr. Tylor was not the discoverer of the protoplasmic +continuity that exists in plants, but he was among the very first +to welcome this discovery, and his experiments at Carshalton in +the years 1883 and 1884 demonstrated that, whether there was +protoplasmic continuity in plants or no, they were at any rate +endowed with some measure of reason, forethought, and power of +self-adaptation to varying surroundings. It is not for me +to give the details of these experiments. I had the good +fortune to see them more than once while they were in progress, +and was present when they were made the subject of a paper read +by Mr. Sydney B. J. Skertchly before the Linnean Society, Mr. +Tylor being then too ill to read it himself. The paper has +since been edited by Mr. Skertchly, and published. <a +name="citation253a"></a><a href="#footnote253a" +class="citation">[253a]</a> Anything that should be said +further about it will come best from Mr. Skertchly; it will be +enough here if I give the <i>résumé</i> of it +prepared by Mr. Tylor himself.</p> +<p>In this Mr. Tylor said:—“The principles which +underlie this paper are the individuality of plants, the +necessity for some co-ordinating system to enable the parts to +act in concert, and the probability that this also necessitates +the admission that plants have a dim sort of intelligence.</p> +<p>“It is shown that a tree, for example, is something more +than an aggregation of tissues, but is a complex being performing +acts as a whole, and not merely responsive to the direct +influence of light, &c. The tree knows more than its +branches, as the species know more than the individual, the +community than the unit.</p> +<p>“Moreover, inasmuch as my experiments show that many +plants and trees possess the power of adapting themselves to +unfamiliar circumstances, such as, for instance, avoiding +obstacles by bending aside before touching, or by altering the +leaf arrangement, it seems probable that at least as much +voluntary power must be accorded to such plants as to certain +lowly organised animals.</p> +<p>“Finally, a connecting system by means of which combined +movements take place is found in the threads of protoplasm which +unite the various cells, and which I have now shown to exist even +in the wood of trees.</p> +<p>“One of the important facts seems to be the universality +of the upward curvature of the tips of growing branches of trees, +and the power possessed by the tree to straighten its branches +afterwards, so that new growth shall by similar means be able to +obtain the necessary light and air.</p> +<p>“A house, to use a sanitary analogy, is functionally +useless without it obtains a good supply of light and air. +The architect strives so to produce the house as to attain this +end, and still leave the house comfortable. But the house, +though dependent upon, is not produced by, the light and +air. So a tree is functionally useless, and cannot even +exist without a proper supply of light and air; but, whereas it +has been the custom to ascribe the heliotropic and other motions +to the direct influence of those agents, I would rather suggest +that the movements are to some extent due to the desire of the +plant to acquire its necessaries of life.”</p> +<p>The more I have reflected upon Mr. Tylor’s Carshalton +experiments, the more convinced I am of their great value. +No one, indeed, ought to have doubted that plants were +intelligent, but we all of us do much that we ought not to do, +and Mr. Tylor supplied a demonstration which may be henceforth +authoritatively appealed to.</p> +<p>I will take the present opportunity of insisting upon a +suggestion which I made in “Alps and Sanctuaries” +(New edition, pp. 152, 153), with which Mr. Tylor was much +pleased, and which, at his request, I made the subject of a few +words that I ventured to say at the Linnean Society’s rooms +after his paper had been read. “Admitting,” I +said, “the common protoplasmic origin of animals and +plants, and setting aside the notion that plants preceded +animals, we are still faced by the problem why protoplasm should +have developed into the organic life of the world, along two main +lines, and only two—the animal and the vegetable. +Why, if there was an early schism—and this there clearly +was—should there not have been many subsequent ones of +equal importance? We see innumerable sub-divisions of +animals and plants, but we see no other such great subdivision of +organic life as that whereby it ranges itself, for the most part +readily, as either animal or vegetable. Why any +subdivision?—but if any, why not more than two great +classes?”</p> +<p>The two main stems of the tree of life ought, one would think, +to have been formed on the same principle as the boughs which +represent genera, and the twigs which stand for species and +varieties. If specific differences arise mainly from +differences of action taken in consequence of differences of +opinion, then, so ultimately do generic; so, therefore, again, do +differences between families; so therefore, by analogy, should +that greatest of differences in virtue of which the world of life +is mainly animal, or vegetable. In this last case as much +as in that of specific difference, we ought to find divergent +form the embodiment and organic expression of divergent +opinion. Form is mind made manifest in flesh through +action: shades of mental difference being expressed in shades of +physical difference, while broad fundamental differences of +opinion are expressed in broad fundamental differences of bodily +shape.</p> +<p>Or to put it thus:—</p> +<p>If form and habit be regarded as functionally interdependent, +that is to say, if neither form nor habit can vary without +corresponding variation in the other, and if habit and opinion +concerning advantage are also functionally interdependent, it +follows self-evidently that form and opinion concerning advantage +(and hence form and cunning) will be functionally interdependent +also, and that there can be no great modification of the one +without corresponding modification of the other. Let there, +then, be a point in respect of which opinion might be early and +easily divided—a point in respect of which two courses +involving different lines of action presented equally-balanced +advantages—and there would be an early subdivision of +primordial life, according as the one view or the other was +taken.</p> +<p>It is obvious that the pros and cons for either course must be +supposed very nearly equal, otherwise the course which presented +the fewest advantages would be attended with the probable gradual +extinction of the organised beings that adopted it, but there +being supposed two possible modes of action very evenly balanced +as regards advantage and disadvantages, then the ultimate +appearance of two corresponding forms of life is a +<i>sequitur</i> from the admission that form varies as function, +and function as opinion concerning advantage. If there are +three, four, five, or six such opinions tenable, we ought to have +three, four, five, or six main subdivisions of life. As +things are, we have two only. Can we, then, see a matter on +which opinion was likely to be easily and early divided into two, +and only two, main divisions—no third course being +conceivable? If so, this should suggest itself as the +probable source from which the two main forms of organic life +have been derived.</p> +<p>I submit that we can see such a matter in the question whether +it pays better to sit still and make the best of what comes in +one’s way, or to go about in search of what one can +find. Of course we, as animals, naturally hold that it is +better to go about in search of what we can find than to sit +still and make the best of what comes; but there is still so much +to be said on the other side, that many classes of animals have +settled down into sessile habits, while a perhaps even larger +number are, like spiders, habitual liers in wait rather than +travellers in search of food. I would ask my reader, +therefore, to see the opinion that it is better to go in search +of prey as formulated, and finding its organic expression, in +animals; and the other—that it is better to be ever on the +look-out to make the best of what chance brings up to +them—in plants. Some few intermediate forms still +record to us the long struggle during which the schism was not +yet complete, and the halting between two opinions which it might +be expected that some organisms should exhibit.</p> +<p>“Neither class,” I said in “Alps and +Sanctuaries,” “has been quite consistent. Who +ever is or can be? Every extreme—every opinion +carried to its logical end—will prove to be an +absurdity. Plants throw out roots and boughs and leaves; +this is a kind of locomotion; and, as Dr. Erasmus Darwin long +since pointed out, they do sometimes approach nearly to what may +be called travelling; a man of consistent character will never +look at a bough, a root, or a tendril without regarding it as a +melancholy and unprincipled compromise” (New edition, p. +153).</p> +<p>Having called attention to this view, and commended it to the +consideration of my readers, I proceed to another which should +not have been left to be touched upon only in a final chapter, +and which, indeed, seems to require a book to itself—I +refer to the origin and nature of the feelings, which those who +accept volition as having had a large share in organic +modification must admit to have had a no less large share in the +formation of volition. Volition grows out of ideas, ideas +from feelings. What, then, is feeling, and the subsequent +mental images or ideas?</p> +<p>The image of a stone formed in our minds is no representation +of the object which has given rise to it. Not only, as has +been often remarked, is there no resemblance between the +particular thought and the particular thing, but thoughts and +things generally are too unlike to be compared. An idea of +a stone may be like an idea of another stone, or two stones may +be like one another; but an idea of a stone is not like a stone; +it cannot be thrown at anything, it occupies no room in space, +has no specific gravity, and when we come to know more about +stones, we find our ideas concerning them to be but rude, +epitomised, and highly conventional renderings of the actual +facts, mere hieroglyphics, in fact, or, as it were, counters or +bank-notes, which serve to express and to convey commodities with +which they have no pretence of analogy.</p> +<p>Indeed we daily find that, as the range of our perceptions +becomes enlarged either by invention of new appliances or after +use of old ones, we change our ideas though we have no reason to +think that the thing about which we are thinking has +changed. In the case of a stone, for instance, the rude, +unassisted, uneducated senses see it as above all things +motionless, whereas assisted and trained ideas concerning it +represent motion as its most essential characteristic; but the +stone has not changed. So, again, the uneducated idea +represents it as above all things mindless, and is as little able +to see mind in connection with it as it lately was to see motion; +it will be no greater change of opinion than we have most of us +undergone already if we come presently to see it as no less full +of elementary mind than of elementary motion, but the stone will +not have changed.</p> +<p>The fact that we modify our opinions suggests that our ideas +are formed not so much in involuntary self-adjusting mimetic +correspondence with the objects that we believe to give rise to +them, as by what was in the outset voluntary, conventional +arrangement in whatever way we found convenient, of sensation and +perception-symbols, which had nothing whatever to do with the +objects, and were simply caught hold of as the only things we +could grasp. It would seem as if, in the first instance, we +must have arbitrarily attached some one of the few and vague +sensations which we could alone at first command, to certain +motions of outside things as echoed by our brain, and used them +to think and feel the things with, so as to docket them, and +recognise them with greater force, certainty, and +clearness—much as we use words to help us to docket and +grasp our feelings and thoughts, or written characters to help us +to docket and grasp our words.</p> +<p>If this view be taken we stand in much the same attitude +towards our feelings as a dog may be supposed to do towards our +own reading and writing. The dog may be supposed to marvel +at the wonderful instinctive faculty by which we can tell the +price of the different railway stocks merely by looking at a +sheet of paper; he supposes this power to be a part of our +nature, to have come of itself by luck and not by cunning, but a +little reflection will show that feeling is not more likely to +have “come by nature” than reading and writing +are. Feeling is in all probability the result of the same +kind of slow laborious development as that which has attended our +more recent arts and our bodily organs; its development must be +supposed to have followed the same lines as that of our other +arts, and indeed of the body itself, which is the <i>ars +artium</i>—for growth of mind is throughout coincident with +growth of organic resources, and organic resources grow with +growing mind.</p> +<p>Feeling is the art the possession of which differentiates the +civilised organic world from that of brute inorganic matter, but +still it is an art; it is the outcome of a mind that is common +both to organic and inorganic, and which the organic has alone +cultivated. It is not a part of mind itself; it is no more +this than language and writing are parts of thought. The +organic world can alone feel, just as man can alone speak; but as +speech is only the development of powers the germs of which are +possessed by the lower animals, so feeling is only a sign of the +employment and development of powers the germs of which exist in +inorganic substances. It has all the characteristics of an +art, and though it must probably rank as the oldest of those arts +that are peculiar to the organic world, it is one which is still +in process of development. None of us, indeed, can feel +well on more than a very few subjects, and many can hardly feel +at all.</p> +<p>But, however this may be, our sensations and perceptions of +material phenomena are attendant on the excitation of certain +motions in the anterior parts of the brain. Whenever +certain motions are excited in this substance, certain sensations +and ideas of resistance, extension, &c., are either +concomitant, or ensue within a period too brief for our +cognisance. It is these sensations and ideas that we +directly cognise, and it is to them that we have attached the +idea of the particular kind of matter we happen to be thinking +of. As this idea is not like the thing itself, so neither +is it like the motions in our brain on which it is +attendant. It is no more like these than, say, a stone is +like the individual characters, written or spoken, that form the +word “stone,” or than these last are, in sound, like +the word “stone” itself, whereby the idea of a stone +is so immediately and vividly presented to us. True, this +does not involve that our idea shall not resemble the object that +gave rise to it, any more than the fact that a looking-glass +bears no resemblance to the things reflected in it involves that +the reflection shall not resemble the things reflected; the +shifting nature, however, of our ideas and conceptions is enough +to show that they must be symbolical, and conditioned by changes +going on within ourselves as much as by those outside us; and if, +going behind the ideas which suffice for daily use, we extend our +inquiries in the direction of the reality underlying our +conception, we find reason to think that the brain-motions which +attend our conception correspond with exciting motions in the +object that occasions it, and that these, rather than anything +resembling our conception itself, should be regarded as the +reality.</p> +<p>This leads to a third matter, on which I can only touch with +extreme brevity.</p> +<p>Different modes of motion have long been known as the causes +of our different colour perceptions, or at any rate as associated +therewith, and of late years, more especially since the +promulgation of Newlands’ <a name="citation260a"></a><a +href="#footnote260a" class="citation">[260a]</a> law, it has been +perceived that what we call the kinds or properties of matter are +not less conditioned by motion than colour is. The +substance or essence of unconditioned matter, as apart from the +relations between its various states (which we believe to be its +various conditions of motion) must remain for ever unknown to us, +for it is only the relations between the conditions of the +underlying substance that we cognise at all, and where there are +no conditions, there is nothing for us to seize, compare, and, +hence, cognise; unconditioned matter must, therefore, be as +inconceivable by us as unmattered condition; <a +name="citation261a"></a><a href="#footnote261a" +class="citation">[261a]</a> but though we can know nothing about +matter as apart from its conditions or states, opinion has been +for some time tending towards the belief that what we call the +different states, or kinds, of matter are only our ways of +mentally characterising and docketing our estimates of the +different kinds of motion going on in this otherwise uncognisable +substratum.</p> +<p>Our conception, then, concerning the nature of any matter +depends solely upon its kind and degree of unrest, that is to +say, on the characteristics of the vibrations that are going on +within it. The exterior object vibrating in a certain way +imparts some of its vibrations to our brain—but if the +state of the thing itself depends upon its vibrations, it must be +considered as to all intents and purposes the vibrations +themselves—plus, of course, the underlying substance that +is vibrating. If, for example, a pat of butter is a portion +of the unknowable underlying substance in such-and-such a state +of molecular disturbance, and it is only by alteration of the +disturbance that the substance can be altered—the +disturbance of the substance is practically equivalent to the +substance: a pat of butter is such-and-such a disturbance of the +unknowable underlying substance, and such-and-such a disturbance +of the underlying substance is a pat of butter. In +communicating its vibrations, therefore, to our brain a substance +does actually communicate what is, as far as we are concerned, a +portion of itself. Our perception of a thing and its +attendant feeling are symbols attaching to an introduction within +our brain of a feeble state of the thing itself. Our +recollection of it is occasioned by a feeble continuance of this +feeble state in our brains, becoming less feeble through the +accession of fresh but similar vibrations from without. The +molecular vibrations which make the thing an idea of which is +conveyed to our minds, put within our brain a little feeble +emanation from the thing itself—if we come within their +reach. This being once put there, will remain as it were +dust, till dusted out, or till it decay, or till it receive +accession of new vibrations.</p> +<p>The vibrations from a pat of butter do, then, actually put +butter into a man’s head. This is one of the +commonest of expressions, and would hardly be so common if it +were not felt to have some foundation in fact. At first the +man does not know what feeling or complex of feelings to employ +so as to docket the vibrations, any more than he knows what word +to employ so as to docket the feelings, or with what written +characters to docket his word; but he gets over this, and +henceforward the vibrations of the exterior object (that is to +say, the thing) never set up their characteristic disturbances, +or, in other words, never come into his head, without the +associated feeling presenting itself as readily as word and +characters present themselves, on the presence of the +feeling. The more butter a man sees and handles, the more +he gets butter on the brain—till, though he can never get +anything like enough to be strictly called butter, it only +requires the slightest molecular disturbance with characteristics +like those of butter to bring up a vivid and highly sympathetic +idea of butter in the man’s mind.</p> +<p>If this view is adopted, our memory of a thing is our +retention within the brain of a small leaven of the actual thing +itself, or of what <i>quâ</i> us is the thing that is +remembered, and the ease with which habitual actions come to be +performed is due to the power of the vibrations having been +increased and modified by continual accession from without till +they modify the molecular disturbances of the nervous system, and +therefore its material substance, which we have already settled +to be only our way of docketing molecular disturbances. The +same vibrations, therefore, form the substance remembered, +introduce an infinitesimal dose of it within the brain, modify +the substance remembering, and, in the course of time, create and +further modify the mechanism of both the sensory and motor +nerves. Thought and thing are one.</p> +<p>I commend these two last speculations to the reader’s +charitable consideration, as feeling that I am here travelling +beyond the ground on which I can safely venture; nevertheless, as +it may be some time before I have another opportunity of coming +before the public, I have thought it, on the whole, better not to +omit them, but to give them thus provisionally. I believe +they are both substantially true, but am by no means sure that I +have expressed them either clearly or accurately; I cannot, +however, further delay the issue of my book.</p> +<p>Returning to the point raised in my title, is luck, I would +ask, or cunning, the more fitting matter to be insisted upon in +connection with organic modification? Do animals and plants +grow into conformity with their surroundings because they and +their fathers and mothers take pains, or because their uncles and +aunts go away? For the survival of the fittest is only the +non-survival or going away of the unfittest—in whose direct +line the race is not continued, and who are therefore only uncles +and aunts of the survivors. I can quite understand its +being a good thing for any race that its uncles and aunts should +go away, but I do not believe the accumulation of lucky accidents +could result in an eye, no matter how many uncles and aunts may +have gone away during how many generations.</p> +<p>I would ask the reader to bear in mind the views concerning +life and death expressed in an early chapter. They seem to +me not, indeed, to take away any very considerable part of the +sting from death; this should not be attempted or desired, for +with the sting of death the sweets of life are inseparably bound +up so that neither can be weakened without damaging the +other. Weaken the fear of death, and the love of life would +be weakened. Strengthen it, and we should cling to life +even more tenaciously than we do. But though death must +always remain as a shock and change of habits from which we must +naturally shrink—still it is not the utter end of our +being, which, until lately, it must have seemed to those who have +been unable to accept the grosser view of the resurrection with +which we were familiarised in childhood. We too now know +that though worms destroy this body, yet in our flesh shall we so +far see God as to be still in Him and of Him—biding our +time for a resurrection in a new and more glorious body; and, +moreover, that we shall be to the full as conscious of this as we +are at present of much that concerns us as closely as anything +can concern us.</p> +<p>The thread of life cannot be shorn between successive +generations, except upon grounds which will in equity involve its +being shorn between consecutive seconds, and fractions of +seconds. On the other hand, it cannot be left unshorn +between consecutive seconds without necessitating that it should +be left unshorn also beyond the grave, as well as in successive +generations. Death is as salient a feature in what we call +our life as birth was, but it is no more than this. As a +salient feature, it is a convenient epoch for the drawing of a +defining line, by the help of which we may better grasp the +conception of life, and think it more effectually, but it is a +<i>façon de parler</i> only; it is, as I said in +“Life and Habit,” <a name="citation264a"></a><a +href="#footnote264a" class="citation">[264a]</a> “the most +inexorable of all conventions,” but our idea of it has no +correspondence with eternal underlying realities.</p> +<p>Finally, we must have evolution; consent is too spontaneous, +instinctive, and universal among those most able to form an +opinion, to admit of further doubt about this. We must also +have mind and design. The attempt to eliminate intelligence +from among the main agencies of the universe has broken down too +signally to be again ventured upon—not until the recent +rout has been forgotten. Nevertheless the old, +far-foreseeing <i>Deus ex machinâ</i> design as from a +point outside the universe, which indeed it directs, but of which +it is no part, is negatived by the facts of organism. What, +then, remains, but the view that I have again in this book +endeavoured to uphold—I mean, the supposition that the mind +or cunning of which we see such abundant evidence all round us, +is, like the kingdom of heaven, within us, and within all things +at all times everywhere? There is design, or cunning, but +it is a cunning not despotically fashioning us from without as a +potter fashions his clay, but inhering democratically within the +body which is its highest outcome, as life inheres within an +animal or plant.</p> +<p>All animals and plants are corporations, or forms of +democracy, and may be studied by the light of these, as +democracies, not infrequently, by that of animals and +plants. The solution of the difficult problem of reflex +action, for example, is thus facilitated, by supposing it to be +departmental in character; that is to say, by supposing it to be +action of which the department that attends to it is alone +cognisant, and which is not referred to the central government so +long as things go normally. As long, therefore, as this is +the case, the central government is unconscious of what is going +on, but its being thus unconscious is no argument that the +department is unconscious also.</p> +<p>I know that contradiction in terms lurks within much that I +have said, but the texture of the world is a warp and woof of +contradiction in terms; of continuity in discontinuity, and +discontinuity in continuity; of unity in diversity, and of +diversity in unity. As in the development of a fugue, +where, when the subject and counter subject have been enounced, +there must henceforth be nothing new, and yet all must be new, so +throughout organic life—which is as a fugue developed to +great length from a very simple subject—everything is +linked on to and grows out of that which comes next to it in +order—errors and omissions excepted. It crosses and +thwarts what comes next to it with difference that involves +resemblance, and resemblance that involves difference, and there +is no juxtaposition of things that differ too widely by omission +of necessary links, or too sudden departure from recognised +methods of procedure.</p> +<p>To conclude; bodily form may be almost regarded as idea and +memory in a solidified state—as an accumulation of things +each one of them so tenuous as to be practically without material +substance. It is as a million pounds formed by accumulated +millionths of farthings; more compendiously it arises normally +from, and through, action. Action arises normally from, and +through, opinion. Opinion, from, and through, +hypothesis. “Hypothesis,” as the derivation of +the word itself shows, is singularly near akin to +“underlying, and only in part knowable, substratum;” +and what is this but “God” translated from the +language of Moses into that of Mr. Herbert Spencer? The +conception of God is like nature—it returns to us in +another shape, no matter how often we may expel it. +Vulgarised as it has been by Michael Angelo, Raffaelle, and +others who shall be nameless, it has been like every other +<i>corruptio optimi—pessimum</i>: used as a hieroglyph by +the help of which we may better acknowledge the height and depth +of our own ignorance, and at the same time express our sense that +there is an unseen world with which we in some mysterious way +come into contact, though the writs of our thoughts do not run +within it—used in this way, the idea and the word have been +found enduringly convenient. The theory that luck is the +main means of organic modification is the most absolute denial of +God which it is possible for the human mind to +conceive—while the view that God is in all His creatures, +He in them and they in Him, is only expressed in other words by +declaring that the main means of organic modification is, not +luck, but cunning.</p> +<h2>Footnotes</h2> +<p><a name="footnote17a"></a><a href="#citation17a" +class="footnote">[17a]</a> “<i>Nature</i>,” +Nov. 12, 1885.</p> +<p><a name="footnote20a"></a><a href="#citation20a" +class="footnote">[20a]</a> “Hist. Nat. +Gén.,” tom. ii. p. 411, 1859.</p> +<p><a name="footnote23a"></a><a href="#citation23a" +class="footnote">[23a]</a> “Selections, +&c.” Trübner & Co., 1884. [Out of +print.]</p> +<p><a name="footnote29a"></a><a href="#citation29a" +class="footnote">[29a]</a> “Selections, &c., and +Remarks on Romanes’ ‘Mental Intelligence in +Animals,’” Trübner & Co., 1884. pp. 228, +229. [Out of print.]</p> +<p><a name="footnote35a"></a><a href="#citation35a" +class="footnote">[35a]</a> Quoted by M. Vianna De Lima in +his “Exposé Sommaire,” &c., p. 6. +Paris, Delagrave, 1886.</p> +<p><a name="footnote40a"></a><a href="#citation40a" +class="footnote">[40a]</a> I have given the passage in full +on p. 254a of my “Selections,” &c. [Now out +of print.] I observe that Canon Kingsley felt exactly the +same difficulty that I had felt myself, and saw also how alone it +could be met. He makes the wood-wren say, “Something +told him his mother had done it before him, and he was flesh of +her flesh, life of her life, and had inherited her instinct (as +we call hereditary memory, to avoid the trouble of finding out +what it is and how it comes).”—<i>Fraser</i>, June, +1867. Canon Kingsley felt he must insist on the continued +personality of the two generations before he could talk about +inherited memory. On the other hand, though he does indeed +speak of this as almost a synonym for instinct, he seems not to +have realised how right he was, and implies that we should find +some fuller and more satisfactory explanation behind this, only +that we are too lazy to look for it.</p> +<p><a name="footnote44a"></a><a href="#citation44a" +class="footnote">[44a]</a> 26 Sept., 1877. +“Unconscious Memory.” ch. ii.</p> +<p><a name="footnote52a"></a><a href="#citation52a" +class="footnote">[52a]</a> This chapter is taken almost +entirely from my book, “Selections, &c.. and Remarks on +Romanes’ ‘Mental Evolution in +Animals.’” Trübner, 1884. [Now out +of print.]</p> +<p><a name="footnote52b"></a><a href="#citation52b" +class="footnote">[52b]</a> “Mental Evolution in +Animals,” p. 113. Kegan Paul, Nov., 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote52c"></a><a href="#citation52c" +class="footnote">[52c]</a> Ibid. p. 115.</p> +<p><a name="footnote52d"></a><a href="#citation52d" +class="footnote">[52d]</a> Ibid. p. 116.</p> +<p><a name="footnote53a"></a><a href="#citation53a" +class="footnote">[53a]</a> “Mental Evolution in +Animals.” p. 131. Kegan Paul, Nov., 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote54a"></a><a href="#citation54a" +class="footnote">[54a]</a> Vol. I, 3rd ed., 1874, p. +141, and Problem I. 21.</p> +<p><a name="footnote54b"></a><a href="#citation54b" +class="footnote">[54b]</a> “Mental Evolution in +Animals,” pp. 177, 178. Nov., 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote55a"></a><a href="#citation55a" +class="footnote">[55a]</a> “Mental Evolution in +Animals,” p. 192.</p> +<p><a name="footnote55b"></a><a href="#citation55b" +class="footnote">[55b]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 195.</p> +<p><a name="footnote55c"></a><a href="#citation55c" +class="footnote">[55c]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> p. 296. Nov., +1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote56a"></a><a href="#citation56a" +class="footnote">[56a]</a> “Mental Evolution in +Animals,” p. 33. Nov., 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote56b"></a><a href="#citation56b" +class="footnote">[56b]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 116.</p> +<p><a name="footnote56c"></a><a href="#citation56c" +class="footnote">[56c]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 178.</p> +<p><a name="footnote59a"></a><a href="#citation59a" +class="footnote">[59a]</a> “Evolution Old and +New,” pp. 357, 358.</p> +<p><a name="footnote60a"></a><a href="#citation60a" +class="footnote">[60a]</a> “Mental Evolution in +Animals,” p. 159. Kegan Paul & Co., 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote61a"></a><a href="#citation61a" +class="footnote">[61a]</a> “Zoonomia,” vol. i. +p. 484.</p> +<p><a name="footnote61b"></a><a href="#citation61b" +class="footnote">[61b]</a> “Mental Evolution in +Animals,” p. 297. Kegan Paul & Co., 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote61c"></a><a href="#citation61c" +class="footnote">[61c]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 201. +Kegan Paul & Co., 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote62a"></a><a href="#citation62a" +class="footnote">[62a]</a> “Mental Evolution in +Animals,” p. 301. November, 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote62b"></a><a href="#citation62b" +class="footnote">[62b]</a> “Origin of Species,” +ed. i. p. 209.</p> +<p><a name="footnote62c"></a><a href="#citation62c" +class="footnote">[62c]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, ed. vi., 1876. p. +206.</p> +<p><a name="footnote62d"></a><a href="#citation62d" +class="footnote">[62d]</a> “Formation of Vegetable +Mould,” etc., p. 98.</p> +<p><a name="footnote62e"></a><a href="#citation62e" +class="footnote">[62e]</a> Quoted by Mr. Romanes as written +in the last year of Mr. Darwin’s life.</p> +<p><a name="footnote63a"></a><a href="#citation63a" +class="footnote">[63a]</a> Macmillan, 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote66a"></a><a href="#citation66a" +class="footnote">[66a]</a> “Nature,” August 5, +1886.</p> +<p><a name="footnote67a"></a><a href="#citation67a" +class="footnote">[67a]</a> London, H. K. Lewis, 1886.</p> +<p><a name="footnote70a"></a><a href="#citation70a" +class="footnote">[70a]</a> “Charles +Darwin.” Longmans, 1885.</p> +<p><a name="footnote70b"></a><a href="#citation70b" +class="footnote">[70b]</a> Lectures at the London +Institution, Feb., 1886.</p> +<p><a name="footnote70c"></a><a href="#citation70c" +class="footnote">[70c]</a> “Charles +Darwin.” Leipzig. 1885.</p> +<p><a name="footnote72a"></a><a href="#citation72a" +class="footnote">[72a]</a> See Professor Hering’s +“Zur Lehre von der Beziehung zwischen Leib und Seele. +Mittheilung über Fechner’s psychophysisches +Gesetz.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote73a"></a><a href="#citation73a" +class="footnote">[73a]</a> Quoted by M. Vianna De Lima in +his “Exposé Sommaire des Théories +Transformistes de Lamarck, Darwin, et Hæckel.” +Paris, 1886, p. 23.</p> +<p><a name="footnote81a"></a><a href="#citation81a" +class="footnote">[81a]</a> “Origin of Species,” +ed. i., p. 6; see also p. 43.</p> +<p><a name="footnote83a"></a><a href="#citation83a" +class="footnote">[83a]</a> “I think it can be shown +that there is such a power at work in ‘Natural +Selection’ (the title of my +book).”—“Proceedings of the Linnean Society for +1858,” vol. iii., p. 51.</p> +<p><a name="footnote86a"></a><a href="#citation86a" +class="footnote">[86a]</a> “On Naval Timber and +Arboriculture,” 1831, pp. 384, 385. See also +“Evolution Old and New,” pp. 320, 321.</p> +<p><a name="footnote87a"></a><a href="#citation87a" +class="footnote">[87a]</a> “Origin of Species,” +p. 49, ed. vi.</p> +<p><a name="footnote92a"></a><a href="#citation92a" +class="footnote">[92a]</a> “Origin of Species,” +ed. i., pp. 188, 189.</p> +<p><a name="footnote93a"></a><a href="#citation93a" +class="footnote">[93a]</a> Page 9.</p> +<p><a name="footnote94a"></a><a href="#citation94a" +class="footnote">[94a]</a> Page 226.</p> +<p><a name="footnote96a"></a><a href="#citation96a" +class="footnote">[96a]</a> “Journal of the +Proceedings of the Linnean Society.” Williams and +Norgate, 1858, p. 61.</p> +<p><a name="footnote102a"></a><a href="#citation102a" +class="footnote">[102a]</a> “Zoonomia,” vol. +i., p. 505.</p> +<p><a name="footnote104a"></a><a href="#citation104a" +class="footnote">[104a]</a> See “Evolution Old and +New.” p. 122.</p> +<p><a name="footnote105a"></a><a href="#citation105a" +class="footnote">[105a]</a> “Phil. Zool.,” i., +p. 80.</p> +<p><a name="footnote105b"></a><a href="#citation105b" +class="footnote">[105b]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, i. 82.</p> +<p><a name="footnote105c"></a><a href="#citation105c" +class="footnote">[105c]</a> <i>Ibid.</i> vol. i., p. +237.</p> +<p><a name="footnote107a"></a><a href="#citation107a" +class="footnote">[107a]</a> See concluding chapter.</p> +<p><a name="footnote122a"></a><a href="#citation122a" +class="footnote">[122a]</a> Report, 9, 26.</p> +<p><a name="footnote135a"></a><a href="#citation135a" +class="footnote">[135a]</a> Ps. cii. 25–27, Bible +version.</p> +<p><a name="footnote136a"></a><a href="#citation136a" +class="footnote">[136a]</a> Ps. cxxxix., Prayer-book +version.</p> +<p><a name="footnote140a"></a><a href="#citation140a" +class="footnote">[140a]</a> <i>Contemporary Review</i>, +August, 1885, p. 84.</p> +<p><a name="footnote142a"></a><a href="#citation142a" +class="footnote">[142a]</a> London, David Bogue, 1881, p. +60.</p> +<p><a name="footnote144a"></a><a href="#citation144a" +class="footnote">[144a]</a> August 12, 1886.</p> +<p><a name="footnote150a"></a><a href="#citation150a" +class="footnote">[150a]</a> Paris, Delagrave, 1886.</p> +<p><a name="footnote150b"></a><a href="#citation150b" +class="footnote">[150b]</a> Page 60.</p> +<p><a name="footnote150c"></a><a href="#citation150c" +class="footnote">[150c]</a> “Œuvre +complètes,” tom. ix. p. 422. Paris, Garnier +frères, 1875.</p> +<p><a name="footnote150d"></a><a href="#citation150d" +class="footnote">[150d]</a> “Hist. Nat.,” tom. +i., p. 13, 1749, quoted “Evol. Old and New,” p. +108.</p> +<p><a name="footnote156a"></a><a href="#citation156a" +class="footnote">[156a]</a> “Origin of +Species,” ed. vi., p. 107.</p> +<p><a name="footnote156b"></a><a href="#citation156b" +class="footnote">[156b]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, ed. vi., p. +166.</p> +<p><a name="footnote157a"></a><a href="#citation157a" +class="footnote">[157a]</a> “Origin of +Species,” ed. vi., p. 233.</p> +<p><a name="footnote157b"></a><a href="#citation157b" +class="footnote">[157b]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p> +<p><a name="footnote157c"></a><a href="#citation157c" +class="footnote">[157c]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, ed. vi., p. +109.</p> +<p><a name="footnote157d"></a><a href="#citation157d" +class="footnote">[157d]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, ed. vi., p. +401.</p> +<p><a name="footnote158a"></a><a href="#citation158a" +class="footnote">[158a]</a> “Origin of +Species,” ed. i., p. 490.</p> +<p><a name="footnote161a"></a><a href="#citation161a" +class="footnote">[161a]</a> “Origin of +Species,” ed. vi., 1876, p. 171.</p> +<p><a name="footnote163a"></a><a href="#citation163a" +class="footnote">[163a]</a> “Charles Darwin,” +p. 113.</p> +<p><a name="footnote164a"></a><a href="#citation164a" +class="footnote">[164a]</a> “Animals and Plants under +Domestication,” vol. ii., p. 367, ed. 1875.</p> +<p><a name="footnote168a"></a><a href="#citation168a" +class="footnote">[168a]</a> Page 3.</p> +<p><a name="footnote168b"></a><a href="#citation168b" +class="footnote">[168b]</a> Page 4.</p> +<p><a name="footnote169a"></a><a href="#citation169a" +class="footnote">[169a]</a> It should be remembered this +was the year in which the “Vestiges of Creation” +appeared.</p> +<p><a name="footnote173a"></a><a href="#citation173a" +class="footnote">[173a]</a> “Charles Darwin,” +p. 67.</p> +<p><a name="footnote173b"></a><a href="#citation173b" +class="footnote">[173b]</a> H. S. King & Co., 1876.</p> +<p><a name="footnote174a"></a><a href="#citation174a" +class="footnote">[174a]</a> Page 17.</p> +<p><a name="footnote195a"></a><a href="#citation195a" +class="footnote">[195a]</a> “Phil. Zool.,” tom. +i., pp. 34, 35.</p> +<p><a name="footnote202a"></a><a href="#citation202a" +class="footnote">[202a]</a> “Origin of +Species,” p. 381, ed. i.</p> +<p><a name="footnote203a"></a><a href="#citation203a" +class="footnote">[203a]</a> Page 454, ed. i.</p> +<p><a name="footnote205a"></a><a href="#citation205a" +class="footnote">[205a]</a> “Principles of +Geology,” vol. ii., chap. xxxiv., ed. 1872.</p> +<p><a name="footnote206a"></a><a href="#citation206a" +class="footnote">[206a]</a> “Natürliche +Schöpfungsgeschichte,” p. 3. Berlin, 1868.</p> +<p><a name="footnote209a"></a><a href="#citation209a" +class="footnote">[209a]</a> See “Evolution Old and +New,” pp. 8, 9.</p> +<p><a name="footnote216a"></a><a href="#citation216a" +class="footnote">[216a]</a> “Vestiges,” +&c., ed. 1860; Proofs, Illustrations, &c., p. xiv.</p> +<p><a name="footnote216b"></a><a href="#citation216b" +class="footnote">[216b]</a> <i>Examiner</i>, May 17, 1879, +review of “Evolution Old and New.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote218a"></a><a href="#citation218a" +class="footnote">[218a]</a> Given in part in +“Evolution Old and New.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote219a"></a><a href="#citation219a" +class="footnote">[219a]</a> “Mind,” p. 498, +Oct., 1883.</p> +<p><a name="footnote224a"></a><a href="#citation224a" +class="footnote">[224a]</a> “Degeneration,” +1880, p. 10.</p> +<p><a name="footnote227a"></a><a href="#citation227a" +class="footnote">[227a]</a> E.g. the Rev. George Henslow, +in “Modern Thought,” vol. ii., No. 5, 1881.</p> +<p><a name="footnote232a"></a><a href="#citation232a" +class="footnote">[232a]</a> “Nature,” Aug. 6, +1886.</p> +<p><a name="footnote234a"></a><a href="#citation234a" +class="footnote">[234a]</a> See Mr. Darwin’s +“Animals and Plants under Domestication,” vol. i., p. +466, &c., ed. 1875.</p> +<p><a name="footnote235a"></a><a href="#citation235a" +class="footnote">[235a]</a> Paris, 1873, Introd., p. +vi.</p> +<p><a name="footnote235b"></a><a href="#citation235b" +class="footnote">[235b]</a> “Hist. Nat. Gen.,” +ii. 404, 1859.</p> +<p><a name="footnote239a"></a><a href="#citation239a" +class="footnote">[239a]</a> As these pages are on the point +of going to press, I see that the writer of an article on Liszt +in the “Athenæum” makes the same emendation on +Shakespeare’s words that I have done.</p> +<p><a name="footnote240a"></a><a href="#citation240a" +class="footnote">[240a]</a> “Voyages of the +<i>Adventure</i> and <i>Beagle</i>,” vol. iii., p. +373. London, 1839.</p> +<p><a name="footnote242a"></a><a href="#citation242a" +class="footnote">[242a]</a> See Professor Paley, +“Fraser,” Jan., 1882, “Science Gossip,” +Nos. 162, 163, June and July, 1878, and “Nature,” +Jan. 3, Jan. 10, Feb. 28, and March 27, 1884.</p> +<p><a name="footnote245a"></a><a href="#citation245a" +class="footnote">[245a]</a> “Formation of Vegetable +Mould,” etc., p. 217. Murray, 1882.</p> +<p><a name="footnote248a"></a><a href="#citation248a" +class="footnote">[248a]</a> “Fortnightly +Review,” Jan., 1886.</p> +<p><a name="footnote253a"></a><a href="#citation253a" +class="footnote">[253a]</a> “On the Growth of Trees +and Protoplasmic Continuity.” London, Stanford, +1886.</p> +<p><a name="footnote260a"></a><a href="#citation260a" +class="footnote">[260a]</a> Sometimes called +Mendelejeff’s (see “Monthly Journal of +Science,” April, 1884).</p> +<p><a name="footnote261a"></a><a href="#citation261a" +class="footnote">[261a]</a> I am aware that attempts have +been made to say that we can conceive a condition of matter, +although there is no matter in connection with it—as, for +example, that we can have motion without anything moving (see +“Nature,” March 5, March 12, and April 9, +1885)—but I think it little likely that this opinion will +meet general approbation.</p> +<p><a name="footnote264a"></a><a href="#citation264a" +class="footnote">[264a]</a> Page 53.</p> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LUCK OR CUNNING***</p> +<pre> + + +***** This file should be named 4967-h.htm or 4967-h.zip****** + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/4/9/6/4967 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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