diff options
Diffstat (limited to '4967-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 4967-0.txt | 8713 |
1 files changed, 8713 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/4967-0.txt b/4967-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b9b222 --- /dev/null +++ b/4967-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8713 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Luck or Cunning, by Samuel Butler, Edited by +Henry Festing Jones + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Luck or Cunning + as the Main Means of Organic Modification + + +Author: Samuel Butler + +Editor: Henry Festing Jones + +Release Date: August 3, 2014 [eBook #4967] +[This file was first posted on April 5, 2002] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LUCK OR CUNNING*** + + +Transcribed from the 1922 Jonathan Cape edition by David Price, email +ccx074@pglaf.org + + + + + + Luck, or Cunning + As the Main Means of + Organic Modification? + + +[Picture: Decorative graphic] + + * * * * * + + Jonathan Cape + Eleven Gower Street, London + + * * * * * + +_First Published_ 1887 +_Second Edition_ 1920 +_Re-issued_ 1922 + + * * * * * + + TO THE MEMORY OF + THE LATE + + _ALFRED TAYLOR_, ESQ., _&c._ + + WHOSE EXPERIMENTS AT CARSHALTON + IN THE YEARS 1883 AND 1884 + ESTABLISHED THAT PLANTS ALSO ARE ENDOWED WITH + INTELLIGENTIAL AND VOLITIONAL FACULTIES + THIS BOOK + BEGUN AT HIS INSTIGATION + IS GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED + + + + +Note + + +THIS second edition of _Luck_, _or Cunning_? is a reprint of the first +edition, dated 1887, but actually published in November, 1886. The only +alterations of any consequence are in the Index, which has been enlarged +by the incorporation of several entries made by the author in a copy of +the book which came into my possession on the death of his literary +executor, Mr. R. A. Streatfeild. I thank Mr. G. W. Webb, of the +University Library, Cambridge, for the care and skill with which he has +made the necessary alterations; it was a troublesome job because owing to +the re-setting, the pagination was no longer the same. + +_Luck_, _or Cunning_? is the fourth of Butler’s evolution books; it was +followed in 1890 by three articles in _The Universal Review_ entitled +“The Deadlock in Darwinism” (republished in _The Humour of Homer_), after +which he published no more upon that subject. + +In this book, as he says in his Introduction, he insists upon two main +points: (1) the substantial identity between heredity and memory, and (2) +the reintroduction of design into organic development; and these two +points he treats as though they have something of that physical life with +which they are so closely associated. He was aware that what he had to +say was likely to prove more interesting to future generations than to +his immediate public, “but any book that desires to see out a literary +three-score years and ten must offer something to future generations as +well as to its own.” By next year one half of the three-score years and +ten will have passed, and the new generation by their constant enquiries +for the work have already begun to show their appreciation of Butler’s +method of treating the subject, and their readiness to listen to what was +addressed to them as well as to their fathers. + + HENRY FESTING JONES. + +_March_, 1920. + + + + +Author’s Preface to First Edition + + +THIS book, as I have said in my concluding chapter, has turned out very +different from the one I had it in my mind to write when I began it. It +arose out of a conversation with the late Mr. Alfred Tylor soon after his +paper on the growth of trees and protoplasmic continuity was read before +the Linnean Society—that is to say, in December, 1884—and I proposed to +make the theory concerning the subdivision of organic life into animal +and vegetable, which I have broached in my concluding chapter, the main +feature of the book. One afternoon, on leaving Mr. Tylor’s bedside, much +touched at the deep disappointment he evidently felt at being unable to +complete the work he had begun so ably, it occurred to me that it might +be some pleasure to him if I promised to dedicate my own book to him, and +thus, however unworthy it might be, connect it with his name. It +occurred to me, of course, also that the honour to my own book would be +greater than any it could confer, but the time was not one for balancing +considerations nicely, and when I made my suggestion to Mr. Tylor on the +last occasion that I ever saw him, the manner in which he received it +settled the question. If he had lived I should no doubt have kept more +closely to my plan, and should probably have been furnished by him with +much that would have enriched the book and made it more worthy of his +acceptance; but this was not to be. + +In the course of writing I became more and more convinced that no +progress could be made towards a sounder view of the theory of descent +until people came to understand what the late Mr. Charles Darwin’s theory +of natural selection amounted to, and how it was that it ever came to be +propounded. Until the mindless theory of Charles Darwinian natural +selection was finally discredited, and a mindful theory of evolution was +substituted in its place, neither Mr. Tylor’s experiments nor my own +theories could stand much chance of being attended to. I therefore +devoted myself mainly, as I had done in “Evolution Old and New,” and in +“Unconscious Memory,” to considering whether the view taken by the late +Mr. Darwin, or the one put forward by his three most illustrious +predecessors, should most command our assent. + +The deflection from my original purpose was increased by the appearance, +about a year ago, of Mr. Grant Allen’s “Charles Darwin,” which I imagine +to have had a very large circulation. So important, indeed, did I think +it not to leave Mr. Allen’s statements unchallenged, that in November +last I recast my book completely, cutting out much that I had written, +and practically starting anew. How far Mr. Tylor would have liked it, or +even sanctioned its being dedicated to him, if he were now living, I +cannot, of course, say. I never heard him speak of the late Mr. Darwin +in any but terms of warm respect, and am by no means sure that he would +have been well pleased at an attempt to connect him with a book so +polemical as the present. On the other hand, a promise made and received +as mine was, cannot be set aside lightly. The understanding was that my +next book was to be dedicated to Mr. Tylor; I have written the best I +could, and indeed never took so much pains with any other; to Mr. Tylor’s +memory, therefore, I have most respectfully, and regretfully, inscribed +it. + +Desiring that the responsibility for what has been done should rest with +me, I have avoided saying anything about the book while it was in +progress to any of Mr Tylor’s family or representatives. They know +nothing, therefore, of its contents, and if they did, would probably feel +with myself very uncertain how far it is right to use Mr. Tylor’s name in +connection with it. I can only trust that, on the whole, they may think +I have done most rightly in adhering to the letter of my promise. + +_October_ 15, 1886. + + + + +Contents + + Page + NOTE, BY HENRY FESTING JONES 6 + AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION 7 + I. INTRODUCTION 13 + II. MR. HERBERT SPENCER 28 + III. MR. HERBERT SPENCER (_continued_) 42 + IV. MR. ROMANES’ “MENTAL EVOLUTION IN ANIMALS” 52 + V. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION AT ISSUE 70 + VI. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION AT ISSUE 80 + (_continued_) + VII. MR. SPENCER’S “THE FACTORS OF ORGANIC 100 + EVOLUTION” + VIII. PROPERTY, COMMON SENSE, AND PROTOPLASM 112 + IX. PROPERTY, COMMON SENSE, AND PROTOPLASM 125 + (_continued_) + X. THE ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE MIND 135 + XI. THE WAY OF ESCAPE 147 + XII. WHY DARWIN’S VARIATIONS WERE ACCIDENTAL 156 + XIII. DARWIN’S CLAIM TO DESCENT WITH MODIFICATION 168 + XIV. DARWIN AND DESCENT WITH MODIFICATION 177 + (_continued_) + XV. THE EXCISED “MY’S” 202 + XVI. MR. GRANT ALLEN’S “CHARLES DARWIN” 211 + XVII. PROFESSOR RAY LANKESTER AND LAMARCK 225 + XVIII. PER CONTRA 239 + XIX. CONCLUSION 251 + + + + +Chapter I +Introduction + + +I SHALL perhaps best promote the acceptance of the two main points on +which I have been insisting for some years past, I mean, the substantial +identity between heredity and memory, and the reintroduction of design +into organic development, by treating them as if they had something of +that physical life with which they are so closely connected. Ideas are +like plants and animals in this respect also, as in so many others, that +they are more fully understood when their relations to other ideas of +their time, and the history of their development are known and borne in +mind. By development I do not merely mean their growth in the minds of +those who first advanced them, but that larger development which consists +in their subsequent good or evil fortunes—in their reception, favourable +or otherwise, by those to whom they were presented. This is to an idea +what its surroundings are to an organism, and throws much the same light +upon it that knowledge of the conditions under which an organism lives +throws upon the organism itself. I shall, therefore, begin this new work +with a few remarks about its predecessors. + +I am aware that what I may say on this head is likely to prove more +interesting to future students of the literature of descent than to my +immediate public, but any book that desires to see out a literary +three-score years and ten must offer something to future generations as +well as to its own. It is a condition of its survival that it shall do +this, and herein lies one of the author’s chief difficulties. If books +only lived as long as men and women, we should know better how to grow +them; as matters stand, however, the author lives for one or two +generations, whom he comes in the end to understand fairly well, while +the book, if reasonable pains have been taken with it, should live more +or less usefully for a dozen. About the greater number of these +generations the author is in the dark; but come what may, some of them +are sure to have arrived at conclusions diametrically opposed to our own +upon every subject connected with art, science, philosophy, and religion; +it is plain, therefore, that if posterity is to be pleased, it can only +be at the cost of repelling some present readers. Unwilling as I am to +do this, I still hold it the lesser of two evils; I will be as brief, +however, as the interests of the opinions I am supporting will allow. + +In “Life and Habit” I contended that heredity was a mode of memory. I +endeavoured to show that all hereditary traits, whether of mind or body, +are inherited in virtue of, and as a manifestation of, the same power +whereby we are able to remember intelligently what we did half an hour, +yesterday, or a twelvemonth since, and this in no figurative but in a +perfectly real sense. If life be compared to an equation of a hundred +unknown quantities, I followed Professor Hering of Prague in reducing it +to one of ninety-nine only, by showing two of the supposed unknown +quantities to be so closely allied that they should count as one. I +maintained that instinct was inherited memory, and this without admitting +more exceptions and qualifying clauses than arise, as it were, by way of +harmonics from every proposition, and must be neglected if thought and +language are to be possible. + +I showed that if the view for which I was contending was taken, many +facts which, though familiar, were still without explanation or +connection with our other ideas, would remain no longer isolated, but be +seen at once as joined with the mainland of our most assured convictions. +Among the things thus brought more comfortably home to us was the +principle underlying longevity. It became apparent why some living +beings should live longer than others, and how any race must be treated +whose longevity it is desired to increase. Hitherto we had known that an +elephant was a long-lived animal and a fly short-lived, but we could give +no reason why the one should live longer than the other; that is to say, +it did not follow in immediate coherence with, or as intimately +associated with, any familiar principle that an animal which is late in +the full development of its reproductive system will tend to live longer +than one which reproduces early. If the theory of “Life and Habit” be +admitted, the fact of a slow-growing animal being in general longer lived +than a quick developer is seen to be connected with, and to follow as a +matter of course from, the fact of our being able to remember anything at +all, and all the well-known traits of memory, as observed where we can +best take note of them, are perceived to be reproduced with singular +fidelity in the development of an animal from its embryonic stages to +maturity. + +Take this view, and the very general sterility of hybrids from being a +_crux_ of the theory of descent becomes a stronghold of defence. It +appears as part of the same story as the benefit derived from judicious, +and the mischief from injudicious, crossing; and this, in its turn, is +seen as part of the same story, as the good we get from change of air and +scene when we are overworked. I will not amplify; but reversion to +long-lost, or feral, characteristics, the phenomena of old age, the fact +of the reproductive system being generally the last to arrive at +maturity—few further developments occurring in any organism after this +has been attained—the sterility of many animals in confinement, the +development in both males and females under certain circumstances of the +characteristics of the opposite sex, the latency of memory, the +unconsciousness with which we grow, and indeed perform all familiar +actions, these points, though hitherto, most of them, so apparently +inexplicable that no one even attempted to explain them, became at once +intelligible, if the contentions of “Life and Habit” were admitted. + +Before I had finished writing this book I fell in with Professor Mivart’s +“Genesis of Species,” and for the first time understood the distinction +between the Lamarckian and Charles-Darwinian systems of evolution. This +had not, so far as I then knew, been as yet made clear to us by any of +our more prominent writers upon the subject of descent with modification; +the distinction was unknown to the general public, and indeed is only now +beginning to be widely understood. While reading Mr. Mivart’s book, +however, I became aware that I was being faced by two facts, each +incontrovertible, but each, if its leading exponents were to be trusted, +incompatible with the other. + +On the one hand there was descent; we could not read Mr. Darwin’s books +and doubt that all, both animals and plants, were descended from a common +source. On the other, there was design; we could not read Paley and +refuse to admit that design, intelligence, adaptation of means to ends, +must have had a large share in the development of the life we saw around +us; it seemed indisputable that the minds and bodies of all living beings +must have come to be what they are through a wise ordering and +administering of their estates. We could not, therefore, dispense either +with descent or with design, and yet it seemed impossible to keep both, +for those who offered us descent stuck to it that we could have no +design, and those, again, who spoke so wisely and so well about design +would not for a moment hear of descent with modification. + +Each, moreover, had a strong case. Who could reflect upon rudimentary +organs, and grant Paley the kind of design that alone would content him? +And yet who could examine the foot or the eye, and grant Mr. Darwin his +denial of forethought and plan? + +For that Mr. Darwin did deny skill and contrivance in connection with the +greatly preponderating part of organic developments cannot be and is not +now disputed. In the first chapter of “Evolution Old and New” I brought +forward passages to show how completely he and his followers deny design, +but will here quote one of the latest of the many that have appeared to +the same effect since “Evolution Old and New” was published; it is by Mr. +Romanes, and runs as follows:— + +“It is the _very essence_ of the Darwinian hypothesis that it only seeks +to explain the _apparently_ purposive variations, or variations of an +adaptive kind.” {17a} + +The words “apparently purposive” show that those organs in animals and +plants which at first sight seem to have been designed with a view to the +work they have to do—that is to say, with a view to future function—had +not, according to Mr. Darwin, in reality any connection with, or +inception in, effort; effort involves purpose and design; they had +therefore no inception in design, however much they might present the +appearance of being designed; the appearance was delusive; Mr. Romanes +correctly declares it to be “the very essence” of Mr. Darwin’s system to +attempt an explanation of these seemingly purposive variations which +shall be compatible with their having arisen without being in any way +connected with intelligence or design. + +As it is indisputable that Mr. Darwin denied design, so neither can it be +doubted that Paley denied descent with modification. What, then, were +the wrong entries in these two sets of accounts, on the detection and +removal of which they would be found to balance as they ought? + +Paley’s weakest place, as already implied, is in the matter of +rudimentary organs; the almost universal presence in the higher organisms +of useless, and sometimes even troublesome, organs is fatal to the kind +of design he is trying to uphold; granted that there is design, still it +cannot be so final and far-foreseeing as he wishes to make it out. Mr. +Darwin’s weak place, on the other hand, lies, firstly, in the supposition +that because rudimentary organs imply no purpose now, they could never in +time past have done so—that because they had clearly not been designed +with an eye to all circumstances and all time, they never, therefore, +could have been designed with an eye to any time or any circumstances; +and, secondly, in maintaining that “accidental,” “fortuitous,” +“spontaneous” variations could be accumulated at all except under +conditions that have never been fulfilled yet, and never will be; in +other words, his weak place lay in the contention (for it comes to this) +that there can be sustained accumulation of bodily wealth, more than of +wealth of any other kind, unless sustained experience, watchfulness, and +good sense preside over the accumulation. In “Life and Habit,” following +Mr. Mivart, and, as I now find, Mr. Herbert Spencer, I showed (pp. +279–281) how impossible it was for variations to accumulate unless they +were for the most part underlain by a sustained general principle; but +this subject will be touched upon more fully later on. + +The accumulation of accidental variations which owed nothing to mind +either in their inception, or their accumulation, the pitchforking, in +fact, of mind out of the universe, or at any rate its exclusion from all +share worth talking about in the process of organic development, this was +the pill Mr. Darwin had given us to swallow; but so thickly had he gilded +it with descent with modification, that we did as we were told, swallowed +it without a murmur, were lavish in our expressions of gratitude, and, +for some twenty years or so, through the mouths of our leading +biologists, ordered design peremptorily out of court, if she so much as +dared to show herself. Indeed, we have even given life pensions to some +of the most notable of these biologists, I suppose in order to reward +them for having hoodwinked us so much to our satisfaction. + +Happily the old saying, _Naturam expellas furcâ_, _tamen usque recurret_, +still holds true, and the reaction that has been gaining force for some +time will doubtless ere long brush aside the cobwebs with which those who +have a vested interest in Mr. Darwin’s reputation as a philosopher still +try to fog our outlook. Professor Mivart was, as I have said, among the +first to awaken us to Mr. Darwin’s denial of design, and to the absurdity +involved therein. He well showed how incredible Mr Darwin’s system was +found to be, as soon as it was fully realised, but there he rather left +us. He seemed to say that we must have our descent and our design too, +but he did not show how we were to manage this with rudimentary organs +still staring us in the face. His work rather led up to the clearer +statement of the difficulty than either put it before us in so many +words, or tried to remove it. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that +the “Genesis of Species” gave Natural Selection what will prove sooner or +later to be its death-blow, in spite of the persistence with which many +still declare that it has received no hurt, and the sixth edition of the +“Origin of Species,” published in the following year, bore abundant +traces of the fray. Moreover, though Mr. Mivart gave us no overt aid, he +pointed to the source from which help might come, by expressly saying +that his most important objection to Neo-Darwinism had no force against +Lamarck. + +To Lamarck, therefore, I naturally turned, and soon saw that the theory +on which I had been insisting in “Life and Habit” was in reality an easy +corollary on his system, though one which he does not appear to have +caught sight of. I saw also that his denial of design was only, so to +speak, skin deep, and that his system was in reality teleological, +inasmuch as, to use Isidore Geoffroy’s words, it makes the organism +design itself. In making variations depend on changed actions, and +these, again, on changed views of life, efforts, and designs, in +consequence of changed conditions of life, he in effect makes effort, +intention, will, all of which involve design (or at any rate which taken +together involve it), underlie progress in organic development. True, he +did not know he was a teleologist, but he was none the less a teleologist +for this. He was an unconscious teleologist, and as such perhaps more +absolutely an upholder of teleology than Paley himself; but this is +neither here nor there; our concern is not with what people think about +themselves, but with what their reasoning makes it evident that they +really hold. + +How strange the irony that hides us from ourselves! When Isidore +Geoffroy said that according to Lamarck organisms designed themselves, +{20a} and endorsed this, as to a great extent he did, he still does not +appear to have seen that either he or Lamarck were in reality +reintroducing design into organism; he does not appear to have seen this +more than Lamarck himself had seen it, but, on the contrary, like +Lamarck, remained under the impression that he was opposing teleology or +purposiveness. + +Of course in one sense he did oppose it; so do we all, if the word design +be taken to intend a very far-foreseeing of minute details, a riding out +to meet trouble long before it comes, a provision on academic principles +for contingencies that are little likely to arise. We can see no +evidence of any such design as this in nature, and much everywhere that +makes against it. There is no such improvidence as over providence, and +whatever theories we may form about the origin and development of the +universe, we may be sure that it is not the work of one who is unable to +understand how anything can possibly go right unless he sees to it +himself. Nature works departmentally and by way of leaving details to +subordinates. But though those who see nature thus do indeed deny design +of the prescient-from-all-eternity order, they in no way impugn a method +which is far more in accord with all that we commonly think of as design. +A design which is as incredible as that a ewe should give birth to a lion +becomes of a piece with all that we observe most frequently if it be +regarded rather as an aggregation of many small steps than as a single +large one. This principle is very simple, but it seems rather difficult +to understand. It has taken several generations before people would +admit it as regards organism even after it was pointed out to them, and +those who saw it as regards organism still failed to understand it as +regards design; an inexorable “Thus far shalt thou go and no farther” +barred them from fruition of the harvest they should have been the first +to reap. The very men who most insisted that specific difference was the +accumulation of differences so minute as to be often hardly, if at all, +perceptible, could not see that the striking and baffling phenomena of +design in connection with organism admitted of exactly the same solution +as the riddle of organic development, and should be seen not as a result +reached _per saltum_, but as an accumulation of small steps or leaps in a +given direction. It was as though those who had insisted on the +derivation of all forms of the steam-engine from the common kettle, and +who saw that this stands in much the same relations to the engines, we +will say, of the Great Eastern steamship as the amœba to man, were to +declare that the Great Eastern engines were not designed at all, on the +ground that no one in the early kettle days had foreseen so great a +future development, and were unable to understand that a piecemeal +_solvitur ambulando_ design is more omnipresent, all-seeing, and +all-searching, and hence more truly in the strictest sense design, than +any speculative leap of fancy, however bold and even at times successful. + +From Lamarck I went on to Buffon and Erasmus Darwin—better men both of +them than Lamarck, and treated by him much as he has himself been treated +by those who have come after him—and found that the system of these three +writers, if considered rightly, and if the corollary that heredity is +only a mode of memory were added, would get us out of our dilemma as +regards descent and design, and enable us to keep both. We could do this +by making the design manifested in organism more like the only design of +which we know anything, and therefore the only design of which we ought +to speak—I mean our own. + +Our own design is tentative, and neither very far-foreseeing nor very +retrospective; it is a little of both, but much of neither; it is like a +comet with a little light in front of the nucleus and a good deal more +behind it, which ere long, however, fades away into the darkness; it is +of a kind that, though a little wise before the event, is apt to be much +wiser after it, and to profit even by mischance so long as the disaster +is not an overwhelming one; nevertheless, though it is so interwoven with +luck, there is no doubt about its being design; why, then, should the +design which must have attended organic development be other than this? +If the thing that has been is the thing that also shall be, must not the +thing which is be that which also has been? Was there anything in the +phenomena of organic life to militate against such a view of design as +this? Not only was there nothing, but this view made things plain, as +the connecting of heredity and memory had already done, which till now +had been without explanation. Rudimentary organs were no longer a +hindrance to our acceptance of design, they became weighty arguments in +its favour. + +I therefore wrote “Evolution Old and New,” with the object partly of +backing up “Life and Habit,” and showing the easy rider it admitted, +partly to show how superior the old view of descent had been to Mr. +Darwin’s, and partly to reintroduce design into organism. I wrote “Life +and Habit” to show that our mental and bodily acquisitions were mainly +stores of memory: I wrote “Evolution Old and New” to add that the memory +must be a mindful and designing memory. + +I followed up these two books with “Unconscious Memory,” the main object +of which was to show how Professor Hering of Prague had treated the +connection between memory and heredity; to show, again, how substantial +was the difference between Von Hartmann and myself in spite of some +little superficial resemblance; to put forward a suggestion as regards +the physics of memory, and to meet the most plausible objection which I +have yet seen brought against “Life and Habit.” + +Since writing these three books I have published nothing on the +connection between heredity and memory, except a few pages of remarks on +Mr. Romanes’ “Mental Evolution in Animals” in my book, {23a} from which I +will draw whatever seems to be more properly placed here. I have +collected many facts that make my case stronger, but am precluded from +publishing them by the reflection that it is strong enough already. I +have said enough in “Life and Habit” to satisfy any who wish to be +satisfied, and those who wish to be dissatisfied would probably fail to +see the force of what I said, no matter how long and seriously I held +forth to them; I believe, therefore, that I shall do well to keep my +facts for my own private reading and for that of my executors. + +I once saw a copy of “Life and Habit” on Mr. Bogue’s counter, and was +told by the very obliging shopman that a customer had just written +something in it which I might like to see. I said of course I should +like to see, and immediately taking the book read the following—which it +occurs to me that I am not justified in publishing. What was written ran +thus:— + +“As a reminder of our pleasant hours on the broad Atlantic, will Mr. — +please accept this book (which I think contains more truth, and less +evidence of it, than any other I have met with) from his friend —?” + +I presume the gentleman had met with the Bible—a work which lays itself +open to a somewhat similar comment. I was gratified, however, at what I +had read, and take this opportunity of thanking the writer, an American, +for having liked my book. It was so plain he had been relieved at not +finding the case smothered to death in the weight of its own evidences, +that I resolved not to forget the lesson his words had taught me. + +The only writer in connection with “Life and Habit” to whom I am anxious +to reply is Mr. Herbert Spencer, but before doing this I will conclude +the present chapter with a consideration of some general complaints that +have been so often brought against me that it may be worth while to +notice them. + +These general criticisms have resolved themselves mainly into two. + +Firstly, it is said that I ought not to write about biology on the ground +of my past career, which my critics declare to have been purely literary. +I wish I might indulge a reasonable hope of one day becoming a literary +man; the expression is not a good one, but there is no other in such +common use, and this must excuse it; if a man can be properly called +literary, he must have acquired the habit of reading accurately, thinking +attentively, and expressing himself clearly. He must have endeavoured in +all sorts of ways to enlarge the range of his sympathies so as to be able +to put himself easily _en rapport_ with those whom he is studying, and +those whom he is addressing. If he cannot speak with tongues himself, he +is the interpreter of those who can—without whom they might as well be +silent. I wish I could see more signs of literary culture among my +scientific opponents; I should find their books much more easy and +agreeable reading if I could; and then they tell me to satirise the +follies and abuses of the age, just as if it was not this that I was +doing in writing about themselves. + +What, I wonder, would they say if I were to declare that they ought not +to write books at all, on the ground that their past career has been too +purely scientific to entitle them to a hearing? They would reply with +justice that I should not bring vague general condemnations, but should +quote examples of their bad writing. I imagine that I have done this +more than once as regards a good many of them, and I dare say I may do it +again in the course of this book; but though I must own to thinking that +the greater number of our scientific men write abominably, I should not +bring this against them if I believed them to be doing their best to help +us; many such men we happily have, and doubtless always shall have, but +they are not those who push to the fore, and it is these last who are +most angry with me for writing on the subjects I have chosen. They +constantly tell me that I am not a man of science; no one knows this +better than I do, and I am quite used to being told it, but I am not used +to being confronted with the mistakes that I have made in matters of +fact, and trust that this experience is one which I may continue to spare +no pains in trying to avoid. + +Nevertheless I again freely grant that I am not a man of science. I have +never said I was. I was educated for the Church. I was once inside the +Linnean Society’s rooms, but have no present wish to go there again; +though not a man of science, however, I have never affected indifference +to the facts and arguments which men of science have made it their +business to lay before us; on the contrary, I have given the greater part +of my time to their consideration for several years past. I should not, +however, say this unless led to do so by regard to the interests of +theories which I believe to be as nearly important as any theories can be +which do not directly involve money or bodily convenience. + +The second complaint against me is to the effect that I have made no +original experiments, but have taken all my facts at second hand. This +is true, but I do not see what it has to do with the question. If the +facts are sound, how can it matter whether A or B collected them? If +Professor Huxley, for example, has made a series of valuable original +observations (not that I know of his having done so), why am I to make +them over again? What are fact-collectors worth if the fact +co-ordinators may not rely upon them? It seems to me that no one need do +more than go to the best sources for his facts, and tell his readers +where he got them. If I had had occasion for more facts I daresay I +should have taken the necessary steps to get hold of them, but there was +no difficulty on this score; every text-book supplied me with all, and +more than all, I wanted; my complaint was that the facts which Mr. Darwin +supplied would not bear the construction he tried to put upon them; I +tried, therefore, to make them bear another which seemed at once more +sound and more commodious; rightly or wrongly I set up as a builder, not +as a burner of bricks, and the complaint so often brought against me of +not having made experiments is about as reasonable as complaint against +an architect on the score of his not having quarried with his own hands a +single one of the stones which he has used in building. Let my opponents +show that the facts which they and I use in common are unsound, or that I +have misapplied them, and I will gladly learn my mistake, but this has +hardly, to my knowledge, been attempted. To me it seems that the chief +difference between myself and some of my opponents lies in this, that I +take my facts from them with acknowledgment, and they take their theories +from me—without. + +One word more and I have done. I should like to say that I do not return +to the connection between memory and heredity under the impression that I +shall do myself much good by doing so. My own share in the matter was +very small. The theory that heredity is only a mode of memory is not +mine, but Professor Hering’s. He wrote in 1870, and I not till 1877. I +should be only too glad if he would take his theory and follow it up +himself; assuredly he could do so much better than I can; but with the +exception of his one not lengthy address published some fifteen or +sixteen years ago he has said nothing upon the subject, so far at least +as I have been able to ascertain; I tried hard to draw him in 1880, but +could get nothing out of him. If, again, any of our more influential +writers, not a few of whom evidently think on this matter much as I do, +would eschew ambiguities and tell us what they mean in plain language, I +would let the matter rest in their abler hands, but of this there does +not seem much chance at present. + +I wish there was, for in spite of the interest I have felt in working the +theory out and the information I have been able to collect while doing +so, I must confess that I have found it somewhat of a white elephant. It +has got me into the hottest of hot water, made a literary Ishmael of me, +lost me friends whom I have been sorry to lose, cost me a good deal of +money, done everything to me, in fact, which a good theory ought not to +do. Still, as it seems to have taken up with me, and no one else is +inclined to treat it fairly, I shall continue to report its developments +from time to time as long as life and health are spared me. Moreover, +Ishmaels are not without their uses, and they are not a drug in the +market just now. + +I may now go on to Mr. Spencer. + + + + +Chapter II +Mr. Herbert Spencer + + +MR. HERBERT SPENCER wrote to the _Athenæum_ (April 5, 1884), and quoted +certain passages from the 1855 edition of his “Principles of Psychology,” +“the meanings and implications” from which he contended were sufficiently +clear. The passages he quoted were as follows:— + + Though it is manifest that reflex and instinctive sequences are not + determined by the experiences of the _individual_ organism + manifesting them, yet there still remains the hypothesis that they + are determined by the experiences of the _race_ of organisms forming + its ancestry, which by infinite repetition in countless successive + generations have established these sequences as organic relations (p. + 526). + + The modified nervous tendencies produced by such new habits of life + are also bequeathed (p. 526). + + That is to say, the tendencies to certain combinations of psychical + changes have become organic (p. 527). + + The doctrine that the connections among our ideas are determined by + experience must, in consistency, be extended not only to all the + connections established by the accumulated experiences of every + individual, but to all those established by the accumulated + experiences of every race (p. 529). + + Here, then, we have one of the simpler forms of instinct which, under + the requisite conditions, must necessarily be established by + accumulated experiences (p. 547). + + And manifestly, if the organisation of inner relations, in + correspondence with outer relations, results from a continual + registration of experiences, &c. (p. 551). + + On the one hand, Instinct may be regarded as a kind of organised + memory; on the other hand, Memory may be regarded as a kind of + incipient instinct (pp. 555–6). + + Memory, then, pertains to all that class of psychical states which + are in process of being organised. It continues so long as the + organising of them continues; and disappears when the organisation of + them is complete. In the advance of the correspondence, each more + complex class of phenomena which the organism acquires the power of + recognising is responded to at first irregularly and uncertainly; and + there is then a weak remembrance of the relations. By multiplication + of experiences this remembrance becomes stronger, and the response + more certain. By further multiplication of experiences the internal + relations are at last automatically organised in correspondence with + the external ones; and so conscious memory passes into unconscious or + organic memory. At the same time, a new and still more complex order + of experiences is thus rendered appreciable; the relations they + present occupy the memory in place of the simpler one; they become + gradually organised; and, like the previous ones, are succeeded by + others more complex still (p. 563). + + Just as we saw that the establishment of those compound reflex + actions which we call instincts is comprehensible on the principle + that inner relations are, by perpetual repetition, organised into + correspondence with outer relations; so the establishment of those + consolidated, those indissoluble, those instinctive mental relations + constituting our ideas of Space and Time, is comprehensible on the + same principle (p. 579). + +In a book published a few weeks before Mr. Spencer’s letter appeared +{29a} I had said that though Mr. Spencer at times closely approached +Professor Hering and “Life and Habit,” he had nevertheless nowhere shown +that he considered memory and heredity to be parts of the same story and +parcel of one another. In his letter to the _Athenæum_, indeed, he does +not profess to have upheld this view, except “by implications;” nor yet, +though in the course of the six or seven years that had elapsed since +“Life and Habit” was published I had brought out more than one book to +support my earlier one, had he said anything during those years to lead +me to suppose that I was trespassing upon ground already taken by +himself. Nor, again, had he said anything which enabled me to appeal to +his authority—which I should have been only too glad to do; at last, +however, he wrote, as I have said, to the _Athenæum_ a letter which, +indeed, made no express claim, and nowhere mentioned myself, but “the +meanings and implications” from which were this time as clear as could be +desired, and amount to an order to Professor Hering and myself to stand +aside. + +The question is, whether the passages quoted by Mr. Spencer, or any +others that can be found in his works, show that he regarded heredity in +all its manifestations as a mode of memory. I submit that this +conception is not derivable from Mr. Spencer’s writings, and that even +the passages in which he approaches it most closely are unintelligible +till read by the light of Professor Hering’s address and of “Life and +Habit.” + +True, Mr. Spencer made abundant use of such expressions as “the +experience of the race,” “accumulated experiences,” and others like them, +but he did not explain—and it was here the difficulty lay—how a race +could have any experience at all. We know what we mean when we say that +an individual has had experience; we mean that he is the same person now +(in the common use of the words), on the occasion of some present action, +as the one who performed a like action at some past time or times, and +that he remembers how he acted before, so as to be able to turn his past +action to account, gaining in proficiency through practice. Continued +personality and memory are the elements that constitute experience; where +these are present there may, and commonly will, be experience; where they +are absent the word “experience” cannot properly be used. + +Formerly we used to see an individual as one, and a race as many. We now +see that though this is true as far as it goes, it is by no means the +whole truth, and that in certain important respects it is the race that +is one, and the individual many. We all admit and understand this +readily enough now, but it was not understood when Mr. Spencer wrote the +passages he adduced in the letter to the _Athenæum_ above referred to. +In the then state of our ideas a race was only a succession of +individuals, each one of them new persons, and as such incapable of +profiting by the experience of its predecessors except in the very +limited number of cases where oral teaching, or, as in recent times, +writing, was possible. The thread of life was, as I have elsewhere said, +remorselessly shorn between each successive generation, and the +importance of the physical and psychical connection between parents and +offspring had been quite, or nearly quite, lost sight of. It seems +strange how this could ever have been allowed to come about, but it +should be remembered that the Church in the Middle Ages would strongly +discourage attempts to emphasize a connection that would raise +troublesome questions as to who in a future state was to be responsible +for what; and, after all, for nine purposes of life out of ten the +generally received opinion that each person is himself and nobody else is +on many grounds the most convenient. Every now and then, however, there +comes a tenth purpose, for which the continued personality side of the +connection between successive generations is as convenient as the new +personality side is for the remaining nine, and these tenth purposes—some +of which are not unimportant—are obscured and fulfilled amiss owing to +the completeness with which the more commonly needed conception has +overgrown the other. + +Neither view is more true than the other, but the one was wanted every +hour and minute of the day, and was therefore kept, so to speak, in +stock, and in one of the most accessible places of our mental storehouse, +while the other was so seldom asked for that it became not worth while to +keep it. By-and-by it was found so troublesome to send out for it, and +so hard to come by even then, that people left off selling it at all, and +if any one wanted it he must think it out at home as best he could; this +was troublesome, so by common consent the world decided no longer to busy +itself with the continued personality of successive generations—which was +all very well until it also decided to busy itself with the theory of +descent with modification. On the introduction of a foe so inimical to +many of our pre-existing ideas the balance of power among them was upset, +and a readjustment became necessary, which is still far from having +attained the next settlement that seems likely to be reasonably +permanent. + +To change the illustration, the ordinary view is true for seven places of +decimals, and this commonly is enough; occasions, however, have now +arisen when the error caused by neglect of the omitted places is +appreciably disturbing, and we must have three or four more. Mr. Spencer +showed no more signs of seeing that he must supply these, and make +personal identity continue between successive generations before talking +about inherited (as opposed to post-natal and educational) experience, +than others had done before him; the race with him, as with every one +else till recently, was not one long individual living indeed in +pulsations, so to speak, but no more losing continued personality by +living in successive generations, than an individual loses it by living +in consecutive days; a race was simply a succession of individuals, each +one of which was held to be an entirely new person, and was regarded +exclusively, or very nearly so, from this point of view. + +When I wrote “Life and Habit” I knew that the words “experience of the +race” sounded familiar, and were going about in magazines and newspapers, +but I did not know where they came from; if I had, I should have given +their source. To me they conveyed no meaning, and vexed me as an attempt +to make me take stones instead of bread, and to palm off an illustration +upon me as though it were an explanation. When I had worked the matter +out in my own way, I saw that the illustration, with certain additions, +would become an explanation, but I saw also that neither he who had +adduced it nor any one else could have seen how right he was, till much +had been said which had not, so far as I knew, been said yet, and which +undoubtedly would have been said if people had seen their way to saying +it. + +“What is this talk,” I wrote, “which is made about the experience of the +race, as though the experience of one man could profit another who knows +nothing about him? If a man eats his dinner it nourishes him and not his +neighbour; if he learns a difficult art it is he that can do it and not +his neighbour” (“Life and Habit,” p. 49). + +When I wrote thus in 1877, it was not generally seen that though the +father is not nourished by the dinners that the son eats, yet the son was +fed when the father ate before he begot him. + +“Is there any way,” I continued, “of showing that this experience of the +race about which so much is said without the least attempt to show in +what way it may, or does, become the experience of the individual, is in +sober seriousness the experience of one single being only, who repeats on +a great many different occasions, and in slightly different ways, certain +performances with which he has already become exceedingly familiar?” + +I felt, as every one else must have felt who reflected upon the +expression in question, that it was fallacious till this was done. When +I first began to write “Life and Habit” I did not believe it could be +done, but when I had gone right up to the end, as it were, of my _cu de +sac_, I saw the path which led straight to the point I had despaired of +reaching—I mean I saw that personality could not be broken as between +generations, without also breaking it between the years, days, and +moments of a man’s life. What differentiates “Life and Habit” from the +“Principles of Psychology” is the prominence given to continued personal +identity, and hence to _bonâ fide_ memory, as between successive +generations; but surely this makes the two books differ widely. + +Ideas can be changed to almost any extent in almost any direction, if the +change is brought about gradually and in accordance with the rules of all +development. As in music we may take almost any possible discord with +pleasing effect if we have prepared and resolved it rightly, so our ideas +will outlive and outgrow almost any modification which is approached and +quitted in such a way as to fuse the old and new harmoniously. Words are +to ideas what the fairy invisible cloak was to the prince who wore +it—only that the prince was seen till he put on the cloak, whereas ideas +are unseen until they don the robe of words which reveals them to us; the +words, however, and the ideas, should be such as fit each other and stick +to one another in our minds as soon as they are brought together, or the +ideas will fly off, and leave the words void of that spirit by the aid of +which alone they can become transmuted into physical action and shape +material things with their own impress. Whether a discord is too violent +or no, depends on what we have been accustomed to, and on how widely the +new differs from the old, but in no case can we fuse and assimilate more +than a very little new at a time without exhausting our tempering +power—and hence presently our temper. + +Mr. Spencer appears to have forgotten that though _de minimis non curat +lex_,—though all the laws fail when applied to trifles,—yet too sudden a +change in the manner in which our ideas are associated is as cataclysmic +and subversive of healthy evolution as are material convulsions, or too +violent revolutions in politics. This must always be the case, for +change is essentially miraculous, and the only lawful home of the miracle +is in the microscopically small. Here, indeed, miracles were in the +beginning, are now, and ever shall be, but we are deadened if they are +required of us on a scale which is visible to the naked eye. If we are +told to work them our hands fall nerveless down; if, come what may, we +must do or die, we are more likely to die than to succeed in doing. If +we are required to believe them—which only means to fuse them with our +other ideas—we either take the law into our own hands, and our minds +being in the dark fuse something easier of assimilation, and say we have +fused the miracle; or if we play more fairly and insist on our minds +swallowing and assimilating it, we weaken our judgments, and _pro tanto_ +kill our souls. If we stick out beyond a certain point we go mad, as +fanatics, or at the best make Coleridges of ourselves; and yet upon a +small scale these same miracles are the breath and essence of life; to +cease to work them is to die. And by miracle I do not merely mean +something new, strange, and not very easy of comprehension—I mean +something which violates every canon of thought which in the palpable +world we are accustomed to respect; something as alien to, and +inconceivable by, us as contradiction in terms, the destructibility of +force or matter, or the creation of something out of nothing. This, +which when writ large maddens and kills, writ small is our meat and +drink; it attends each minutest and most impalpable detail of the +ceaseless fusion and diffusion in which change appears to us as +consisting, and which we recognise as growth and decay, or as life and +death. + +Claude Bernard says, _Rien ne nait_, _rien ne se crée_, _tout se +continue_. _La nature ne nous offre le spectacle d’aucune création_, +_elle est d’une éternelle continuation_; {35a} but surely he is insisting +upon one side of the truth only, to the neglect of another which is just +as real, and just as important; he might have said, _Rien ne se +continue_, _tout nait_, _tout se crée_. _La nature ne nous offre le +spectacle d’aucune continuation_. _Elle est d’une éternelle création_; +for change is no less patent a fact than continuity, and, indeed, the two +stand or fall together. True, discontinuity, where development is +normal, is on a very small scale, but this is only the difference between +looking at distances on a small instead of a large map; we cannot have +even the smallest change without a small partial corresponding +discontinuity; on a small scale—too small, indeed, for us to +cognise—these breaks in continuity, each one of which must, so far as our +understanding goes, rank as a creation, are as essential a factor of the +phenomena we see around us, as is the other factor that they shall +normally be on too small a scale for us to find it out. Creations, then, +there must be, but they must be so small that practically they are no +creations. We must have a continuity in discontinuity, and a +discontinuity in continuity; that is to say, we can only conceive the +help of change at all by the help of flat contradiction in terms. It +comes, therefore, to this, that if we are to think fluently and +harmoniously upon any subject into which change enters (and there is no +conceivable subject into which it does not), we must begin by flying in +the face of every rule that professors of the art of thinking have drawn +up for our instruction. These rules may be good enough as servants, but +we have let them become the worst of masters, forgetting that philosophy +is made for man, not man for philosophy. Logic has been the true Tower +of Babel, which we have thought to build so that we might climb up into +the heavens, and have no more miracle, but see God and live—nor has +confusion of tongues failed to follow on our presumption. Truly St. Paul +said well that the just shall live by faith; and the question “By what +faith?” is a detail of minor moment, for there are as many faiths as +species, whether of plants or animals, and each of them is in its own way +both living and saving. + +All, then, whether fusion or diffusion, whether of ideas or things, is +miraculous. It is the two in one, and at the same time one in two, which +is only two and two making five put before us in another shape; yet this +fusion—so easy to think so long as it is not thought about, and so +unthinkable if we try to think it—is, as it were, the matrix from which +our more thinkable thought is taken; it is the cloud gathering in the +unseen world from which the waters of life descend in an impalpable dew. +Granted that all, whether fusion or diffusion, whether of ideas or +things, is, if we dwell upon it and take it seriously, an outrage upon +our understandings which common sense alone enables us to brook; granted +that it carries with it a distinctly miraculous element which should +vitiate the whole process _ab initio_, still, if we have faith we can so +work these miracles as Orpheus-like to charm denizens of the unseen world +into the seen again—provided we do not look back, and provided also we do +not try to charm half a dozen Eurydices at a time. To think is to fuse +and diffuse ideas, and to fuse and diffuse ideas is to feed. We can all +feed, and by consequence within reasonable limits we can fuse ideas; or +we can fuse ideas, and by consequence within reasonable limits we can +feed; we know not which comes first, the food or the ideas, but we must +not overtax our strength; the moment we do this we taste of death. + +It is in the closest connection with this that we must chew our food fine +before we can digest it, and that the same food given in large lumps will +choke and kill which in small pieces feeds us; or, again, that that which +is impotent as a pellet may be potent as a gas. Food is very thoughtful: +through thought it comes, and back through thought it shall return; the +process of its conversion and comprehension within our own system is +mental as well as physical, and here, as everywhere else with mind and +evolution, there must be a cross, but not too wide a cross—that is to +say, there must be a miracle, but not upon a large scale. Granted that +no one can draw a clear line and define the limits within which a miracle +is healthy working and beyond which it is unwholesome, any more than he +can prescribe the exact degree of fineness to which we must comminute our +food; granted, again, that some can do more than others, and that at all +times all men sport, so to speak, and surpass themselves, still we know +as a general rule near enough, and find that the strongest can do but +very little at a time, and, to return to Mr. Spencer, the fusion of two +such hitherto unassociated ideas as race and experience was a miracle +beyond our strength. + +Assuredly when Mr. Spencer wrote the passages he quoted in the letter to +the _Athenæum_ above referred to, we were not in the habit of thinking of +any one as able to remember things that had happened before he had been +born or thought of. This notion will still strike many of my non-readers +as harsh and strained; no such discord, therefore, should have been taken +unprepared, and when taken it should have been resolved with pomp and +circumstance. Mr Spencer, however, though he took it continually, never +either prepared it or resolved it at all, but by using the words +“experience of the race” sprang this seeming paradox upon us, with the +result that his words were barren. They were barren because they were +incoherent; they were incoherent because they were approached and quitted +too suddenly. While we were realising “experience” our minds excluded +“race,” inasmuch as experience was an idea we had been accustomed +hitherto to connect only with the individual; while realising the idea +“race,” for the same reason, we as a matter of course excluded +experience. We were required to fuse two ideas that were alien to one +another, without having had those other ideas presented to us which would +alone flux them. The absence of these—which indeed were not immediately +ready to hand, or Mr. Spencer would have doubtless grasped them—made +nonsense of the whole thing; we saw the ideas propped up as two cards one +against the other, on one of Mr. Spencer’s pages, only to find that they +had fallen asunder before we had turned over to the next, so we put down +his book resentfully, as written by one who did not know what to do with +his meaning even if he had one, or bore it meekly while he chastised us +with scorpions, as Mr. Darwin had done with whips, according to our +temperaments. + +I may say, in passing, that the barrenness of incoherent ideas, and the +sterility of widely distant species and genera of animals and plants, are +one in principle—the sterility of hybrids being just as much due to +inability to fuse widely unlike and unfamiliar ideas into a coherent +whole, as barrenness of ideas is, and, indeed, resolving itself +ultimately into neither more nor less than barrenness of ideas—that is to +say, into inability to think at all, or at any rate to think as their +neighbours do. + +If Mr. Spencer had made it clear that the generations of any race are +_bonâ fide_ united by a common personality, and that in virtue of being +so united each generation remembers (within, of course, the limits to +which all memory is subject) what happened to it while still in the +persons of its progenitors—then his order to Professor Hering and myself +should be immediately obeyed; but this was just what was at once most +wanted, and least done by Mr. Spencer. Even in the passages given +above—passages collected by Mr. Spencer himself—this point is altogether +ignored; make it clear as Professor Hering made it—put continued +personality and memory in the foreground as Professor Hering did, instead +of leaving them to be discovered “by implications,” and then such +expressions as “accumulated experiences” and “experience of the race” +become luminous; till this had been done they were _Vox et præterea +nihil_. + +To sum up briefly. The passages quoted by Mr. Spencer from his +“Principles of Psychology” can hardly be called clear, even now that +Professor Hering and others have thrown light upon them. If, indeed, +they had been clear Mr. Spencer would probably have seen what they +necesitated, and found the way of meeting the difficulties of the case +which occurred to Professor Hering and myself. Till we wrote, very few +writers had even suggested this. The idea that offspring was only “an +elongation or branch proceeding from its parents” had scintillated in the +ingenious brain of Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and in that of the designer of +Jesse tree windows, but it had kindled no fire; it now turns out that +Canon Kingsley had once called instinct inherited memory, {40a} but the +idea, if born alive at all, died on the page on which it saw light: +Professor Ray Lankester, again called attention to Professor Hering’s +address (_Nature_, July 13, 1876), but no discussion followed, and the +matter dropped without having produced visible effect. As for offspring +remembering in any legitimate sense of the words what it had done, and +what had happened to it, before it was born, no such notion was +understood to have been gravely mooted till very recently. I doubt +whether Mr. Spencer and Mr. Romanes would accept this even now, when it +is put thus undisguisedly; but this is what Professor Hering and I mean, +and it is the only thing that should be meant, by those who speak of +instinct as inherited memory. Mr Spencer cannot maintain that these two +startling novelties went without saying “by implication” from the use of +such expressions as “accumulated experiences” or “experience of the +race.” + + + + +Chapter III +Mr. Herbert Spencer (_continued_) + + +WHETHER they ought to have gone or not, they did not go. + +When “Life and Habit” was first published no one considered Mr. Spencer +to be maintaining the phenomena of heredity to be in reality phenomena of +memory. When, for example, Professor Ray Lankester first called +attention to Professor Hering’s address, he did not understand Mr. +Spencer to be intending this. “Professor Hering,” he wrote (_Nature_, +July 13, 1876), “helps us to a comprehensive view of the nature of +heredity and adaptation, by giving us the word ‘memory,’ conscious or +unconscious, for the continuity of Mr. Spencer’s polar forces or +polarities of physiological units.” He evidently found the prominence +given to memory a help to him which he had not derived from reading Mr. +Spencer’s works. + +When, again, he attacked me in the _Athenæum_ (March 29, 1884), he spoke +of my “tardy recognition” of the fact that Professor Hering had preceded +me “in treating all manifestations of heredity as a form of memory.” +Professor Lankester’s words could have no force if he held that any other +writer, and much less so well known a writer as Mr. Spencer, had preceded +me in putting forward the theory in question. + +When Mr. Romanes reviewed “Unconscious Memory” in _Nature_ (January 27, +1881) the notion of a “race-memory,” to use his own words, was still so +new to him that he declared it “simply absurd” to suppose that it could +“possibly be fraught with any benefit to science,” and with him too it +was Professor Hering who had anticipated me in the matter, not Mr. +Spencer. + +In his “Mental Evolution in Animals” (p. 296) he said that Canon +Kingsley, writing in 1867, was the first to advance the theory that +instinct is inherited memory; he could not have said this if Mr. Spencer +had been understood to have been upholding this view for the last thirty +years. + +Mr. A. R. Wallace reviewed “Life and Habit” in _Nature_ (March 27, 1879), +but he did not find the line I had taken a familiar one, as he surely +must have done if it had followed easily by implication from Mr. +Spencer’s works. He called it “an ingenious and paradoxical explanation” +which was evidently new to him. He concluded by saying that “it might +yet afford a clue to some of the deepest mysteries of the organic world.” + +Professor Mivart, when he reviewed my books on Evolution in the _American +Catholic Quarterly Review_ (July 1881), said, “Mr Butler is not only +perfectly logical and consistent in the startling consequences he deduces +from his principles, but,” &c. Professor Mivart could not have found my +consequences startling if they had already been insisted upon for many +years by one of the best-known writers of the day. + +The reviewer of “Evolution Old and New” in the _Saturday Review_ (March +31, 1879), of whom all I can venture to say is that he or she is a person +whose name carries weight in matters connected with biology, though he +(for brevity) was in the humour for seeing everything objectionable in me +that could be seen, still saw no Mr. Spencer in me. He said—“Mr Butler’s +own particular contribution to the terminology of Evolution is the phrase +two or three times repeated with some emphasis” (I repeated it not two or +three times only, but whenever and wherever I could venture to do so +without wearying the reader beyond endurance) “oneness of personality +between parents and offspring.” The writer proceeded to reprobate this +in language upon which a Huxley could hardly improve, but as he declares +himself unable to discover what it means, it may be presumed that the +idea of continued personality between successive generations was new to +him. + +When Dr. Francis Darwin called on me a day or two before “Life and Habit” +went to the press, he said the theory which had pleased him more than any +he had seen for some time was one which referred all life to memory; +{44a} he doubtless intended “which referred all the phenomena of heredity +to memory.” He then mentioned Professor Ray Lankester’s article in +_Nature_, of which I had not heard, but he said nothing about Mr. +Spencer, and spoke of the idea as one which had been quite new to him. + +The above names comprise (excluding Mr. Spencer himself) perhaps those of +the best-known writers on evolution that can be mentioned as now before +the public; it is curious that Mr Spencer should be the only one of them +to see any substantial resemblance between the “Principles of Psychology” +and Professor Hering’s address and “Life and Habit.” + +I ought, perhaps, to say that Mr. Romanes, writing to the _Athenæum_ +(March 8, 1884), took a different view of the value of the theory of +inherited memory to the one he took in 1881. + +In 1881 he said it was “simply absurd” to suppose it could “possibly be +fraught with any benefit to science” or “reveal any truth of profound +significance;” in 1884 he said of the same theory, that “it formed the +backbone of all the previous literature upon instinct” by Darwin, +Spencer, Lewes, Fiske, and Spalding, “not to mention their numerous +followers, and is by all of them elaborately stated as clearly as any +theory can be stated in words.” + +Few except Mr. Romanes will say this. I grant it ought to “have formed +the backbone,” &c., and ought “to have been elaborately stated,” &c., but +when I wrote “Life and Habit” neither Mr Romanes nor any one else +understood it to have been even glanced at by more than a very few, and +as for having been “elaborately stated,” it had been stated by Professor +Hering as elaborately as it could be stated within the limits of an +address of only twenty-two pages, but with this exception it had never +been stated at all. It is not too much to say that “Life and Habit,” +when it first came out, was considered so startling a paradox that people +would not believe in my desire to be taken seriously, or at any rate were +able to pretend that they thought I was not writing seriously. + +Mr. Romanes knows this just as well as all must do who keep an eye on +evolution; he himself, indeed, had said (_Nature_, January 27, 1881) that +so long as I “aimed only at entertaining” my “readers by such works as +‘Erewhon’ and ‘Life and Habit’” (as though these books were of kindred +character) I was in my proper sphere. It would be doing too little +credit to Mr. Romanes’ intelligence to suppose him not to have known when +he said this that “Life and Habit” was written as seriously as my +subsequent books on evolution, but it suited him at the moment to join +those who professed to consider it another book of paradoxes such as, I +suppose, “Erewhon” had been, so he classed the two together. He could +not have done this unless enough people thought, or said they thought, +the books akin, to give colour to his doing so. + +One alone of all my reviewers has, to my knowledge, brought Mr. Spencer +against me. This was a writer in the _St. James’s Gazette_ (December 2, +1880). I challenged him in a letter which appeared (December 8, 1880), +and said, “I would ask your reviewer to be kind enough to refer your +readers to those passages of Mr. Spencer’s “Principles of Psychology” +which in any direct intelligible way refer the phenomena of instinct and +heredity generally, to memory on the part of offspring of the action it +_bonâ fide_ took in the persons of its forefathers.” The reviewer made +no reply, and I concluded, as I have since found correctly, that he could +not find the passages. + +True, in his “Principles of Psychology” (vol. ii. p. 195) Mr. Spencer +says that we have only to expand the doctrine that all intelligence is +acquired through experience “so as to make it include with the experience +of each individual the experiences of all ancestral individuals,” &c. +This is all very good, but it is much the same as saying, “We have only +got to stand on our heads and we shall be able to do so and so.” We did +not see our way to standing on our heads, and Mr. Spencer did not help +us; we had been accustomed, as I am afraid I must have said _usque ad +nauseam_ already, to lose sight of the physical connection existing +between parents and offspring; we understood from the marriage service +that husband and wife were in a sense one flesh, but not that parents and +children were so also; and without this conception of the matter, which +in its way is just as true as the more commonly received one, we could +not extend the experience of parents to offspring. It was not in the +bond or _nexus_ of our ideas to consider experience as appertaining to +more than a single individual in the common acceptance of the term; these +two ideas were so closely bound together that wherever the one went the +other went perforce. Here, indeed, in the very passage of Mr. Spencer’s +just referred to, the race is throughout regarded as “a series of +individuals”—without an attempt to call attention to that other view, in +virtue of which we are able to extend to many an idea we had been +accustomed to confine to one. + +In his chapter on Memory, Mr. Spencer certainly approaches the Heringian +view. He says, “On the one hand, Instinct may be regarded as a kind of +organised memory; on the other, Memory may be regarded as a kind of +incipient instinct” (“Principles of Psychology,” ed. 2, vol. i. p. 445). +Here the ball has fallen into his hands, but if he had got firm hold of +it he could not have written, “Instinct _may be_ regarded as _a kind of_, +&c.;” to us there is neither “may be regarded as” nor “kind of” about it; +we require, “Instinct is inherited memory,” with an explanation making it +intelligible how memory can come to be inherited at all. I do not like, +again, calling memory “a kind of incipient instinct;” as Mr. Spencer puts +them the words have a pleasant antithesis, but “instinct is inherited +memory” covers all the ground, and to say that memory is inherited +instinct is surplusage. + +Nor does he stick to it long when he says that “instinct is a kind of +organised memory,” for two pages later he says that memory, to be memory +at all, must be tolerably conscious or deliberate; he, therefore (vol. i. +p. 447), denies that there can be such a thing as unconscious memory; but +without this it is impossible for us to see instinct as the “kind of +organised memory” which he has just been calling it, inasmuch as instinct +is notably undeliberate and unreflecting. + +A few pages farther on (vol. i. p. 452) he finds himself driven to +unconscious memory after all, and says that “conscious memory passes into +unconscious or organic memory.” Having admitted unconscious memory, he +declares (vol. i. p. 450) that “as fast as those connections among +psychical states, which we form in memory, grow by constant repetition +automatic—they _cease to be part of memory_,” or, in other words, he +again denies that there can be an unconscious memory. + +Mr. Spencer doubtless saw that he was involved in contradiction in terms, +and having always understood that contradictions in terms were very +dreadful things—which, of course, under some circumstances they +are—thought it well so to express himself that his readers should be more +likely to push on than dwell on what was before them at the moment. I +should be the last to complain of him merely on the ground that he could +not escape contradiction in terms: who can? When facts conflict, +contradict one another, melt into one another as the colours of the +spectrum so insensibly that none can say where one begins and the other +ends, contradictions in terms become first fruits of thought and speech. +They are the basis of intellectual consciousness, in the same way that a +physical obstacle is the basis of physical sensation. No opposition, no +sensation, applies as much to the psychical as to the physical kingdom, +as soon as these two have got well above the horizon of our thoughts and +can be seen as two. No contradiction, no consciousness; no cross, no +crown; contradictions are the very small deadlocks without which there is +no going; going is our sense of a succession of small impediments or +deadlocks; it is a succession of cutting Gordian knots, which on a small +scale please or pain as the case may be; on a larger, give an ecstasy of +pleasure, or shock to the extreme of endurance; and on a still larger, +kill whether they be on the right side or the wrong. Nature, as I said +in “Life and Habit,” hates that any principle should breed +hermaphroditically, but will give to each an helpmeet for it which shall +cross it and be the undoing of it; and in the undoing, do; and in the +doing, undo, and so _ad infinitum_. Cross-fertilisation is just as +necessary for continued fertility of ideas as for that of organic life, +and the attempt to frown this or that down merely on the ground that it +involves contradiction in terms, without at the same time showing that +the contradiction is on a larger scale than healthy thought can stomach, +argues either small sense or small sincerity on the part of those who +make it. The contradictions employed by Mr. Spencer are objectionable, +not on the ground of their being contradictions at all, but on the ground +of their being blinked, and used unintelligently. + +But though it is not possible for any one to get a clear conception of +Mr. Spencer’s meaning, we may say with more confidence what it was that +he did not mean. He did not mean to make memory the keystone of his +system; he has none of that sense of the unifying, binding force of +memory which Professor Hering has so well expressed, nor does he show any +signs of perceiving the far-reaching consequences that ensue if the +phenomena of heredity are considered as phenomena of memory. Thus, when +he is dealing with the phenomena of old age (vol. i. p. 538, ed. 2) he +does not ascribe them to lapse and failure of memory, nor surmise the +principle underlying longevity. He never mentions memory in connection +with heredity without presently saying something which makes us +involuntarily think of a man missing an easy catch at cricket; it is only +rarely, however, that he connects the two at all. I have only been able +to find the word “inherited” or any derivative of the verb “to inherit” +in connection with memory once in all the 1300 long pages of the +“Principles of Psychology.” It occurs in vol ii. p. 200, 2d ed., where +the words stand, “Memory, inherited or acquired.” I submit that this was +unintelligible when Mr. Spencer wrote it, for want of an explanation +which he never gave; I submit, also, that he could not have left it +unexplained, nor yet as an unrepeated expression not introduced till late +in his work, if he had had any idea of its pregnancy. + +At any rate, whether he intended to imply what he now implies that he +intended to imply (for Mr. Spencer, like the late Mr. Darwin, is fond of +qualifying phrases), I have shown that those most able and willing to +understand him did not take him to mean what he now appears anxious to +have it supposed that he meant. Surely, moreover, if he had meant it he +would have spoken sooner, when he saw his meaning had been missed. I +can, however, have no hesitation in saying that if I had known the +“Principles of Psychology” earlier, as well as I know the work now, I +should have used it largely. + +It may be interesting, before we leave Mr. Spencer, to see whether he +even now assigns to continued personality and memory the place assigned +to it by Professor Hering and myself. I will therefore give the +concluding words of the letter to the _Athenæum_ already referred to, in +which he tells us to stand aside. He writes “I still hold that +inheritance of functionally produced modifications is the chief factor +throughout the higher stages of organic evolution, bodily as well as +mental (see ‘Principles of Biology,’ i. 166), while I recognise the truth +that throughout the lower stages survival of the fittest is the chief +factor, and in the lowest the almost exclusive factor.” + +This is the same confused and confusing utterance which Mr. Spencer has +been giving us any time this thirty years. According to him the fact +that variations can be inherited and accumulated has less to do with the +first development of organic life, than the fact that if a square +organism happens to get into a square hole, it will live longer and more +happily than a square organism which happens to get into a round one; he +declares “the survival of the fittest”—and this is nothing but the fact +that those who “fit” best into their surroundings will live longest and +most comfortably—to have more to do with the development of the amœba +into, we will say, a mollusc than heredity itself. True, “inheritance of +functionally produced modifications” is allowed to be the chief factor +throughout the “higher stages of organic evolution,” but it has very +little to do in the lower; in these “the almost exclusive factor” is not +heredity, or inheritance, but “survival of the fittest.” + +Of course we know that Mr. Spencer does not believe this; of course, +also, all who are fairly well up in the history of the development theory +will see why Mr. Spencer has attempted to draw this distinction between +the “factors” of the development of the higher and lower forms of life; +but no matter how or why Mr. Spencer has been led to say what he has, he +has no business to have said it. What can we think of a writer who, +after so many years of writing upon his subject, in a passage in which he +should make his meaning doubly clear, inasmuch as he is claiming ground +taken by other writers, declares that though hereditary use and disuse, +or, to use his own words, “the inheritance of functionally produced +modifications,” is indeed very important in connection with the +development of the higher forms of life, yet heredity itself has little +or nothing to do with that of the lower? Variations, whether produced +functionally or not, can only be perpetuated and accumulated because they +can be inherited;—and this applies just as much to the lower as to the +higher forms of life; the question which Professor Hering and I have +tried to answer is, “How comes it that anything can be inherited at all? +In virtue of what power is it that offspring can repeat and improve upon +the performances of their parents?” Our answer was, “Because in a very +valid sense, though not perhaps in the most usually understood, there is +continued personality and an abiding memory between successive +generations.” How does Mr. Spencer’s confession of faith touch this? If +any meaning can be extracted from his words, he is no more supporting +this view now than he was when he wrote the passages he has adduced to +show that he was supporting it thirty years ago; but after all no +coherent meaning can be got out of Mr. Spencer’s letter—except, of +course, that Professor Hering and myself are to stand aside. I have +abundantly shown that I am very ready to do this in favour of Professor +Hering, but see no reason for admitting Mr. Spencer’s claim to have been +among the forestallers of “Life and Habit.” + + + + +Chapter IV {52a} +Mr. Romanes’ “Mental Evolution in Animals” + + +WITHOUT raising the unprofitable question how Mr. Romanes, in spite of +the indifference with which he treated the theory of Inherited Memory in +1881, came, in 1883, to be sufficiently imbued with a sense of its +importance, I still cannot afford to dispense with the weight of his +authority, and in this chapter will show how closely he not infrequently +approaches the Heringian position. + +Thus, he says that the analogies between the memory with which we are +familiar in daily life and hereditary memory “are so numerous and +precise” as to justify us in considering them to be of essentially the +same kind. {52b} + +Again, he says that although the memory of milk shown by new-born infants +is “at all events in large part hereditary, it is none the less memory” +of a certain kind. {52c} + +Two lines lower down he writes of “hereditary memory or instinct,” +thereby implying that instinct is “hereditary memory.” “It makes no +essential difference,” he says, “whether the past sensation was actually +experienced by the individual itself, or bequeathed it, so to speak, by +its ancestors. {52d} For it makes no essential difference whether the +nervous changes . . . were occasioned during the life-time of the +individual or during that of the species, and afterwards impressed by +heredity on the individual.” + +Lower down on the same page he writes:— + +“As showing how close is the connection between hereditary memory and +instinct,” &c. + +And on the following page:— + +“And this shows how closely the phenomena of hereditary memory are +related to those of individual memory: at this stage . . . it is +practically impossible to disentangle the effects of hereditary memory +from those of the individual.” + +Again:— + +“Another point which we have here to consider is the part which heredity +has played in forming the perceptive faculty of the individual prior to +its own experience. We have already seen that heredity plays an +important part in forming memory of ancestral experiences, and thus it is +that many animals come into the world with their power of perception +already largely developed. The wealth of ready-formed information, and +therefore of ready-made powers of perception, with which many newly-born +or newly-hatched animals are provided, is so great and so precise that it +scarcely requires to be supplemented by the subsequent experience of the +individual.” {53a} + +Again:— + +“Instincts probably owe their origin and development to one or other of +the two principles. + +“I. The first mode of origin consists in natural selection or survival +of the fittest, continuously preserving actions, &c. &c. + +“II. The second mode of origin is as follows:—By the effects of habit in +successive generations, actions which were originally intelligent become +as it were stereotyped into permanent instincts. Just as in the lifetime +of the individual adjustive actions which were originally intelligent may +by frequent repetition become automatic, so in the lifetime of species +actions originally intelligent may by frequent repetition and heredity so +write their effects on the nervous system that the latter is prepared, +even before individual experience, to perform adjustive actions +mechanically which in previous generations were performed intelligently. +This mode of origin of instincts has been appropriately called (by +Lewes—see “Problems of Life and Mind” {54a}) the ‘lapsing of +intelligence.’” {54b} + +I may say in passing that in spite of the great stress laid by Mr. +Romanes both in his “Mental Evolution in Animals” and in his letters to +the _Athenæum_ in March 1884, on Natural Selection as an originator and +developer of instinct, he very soon afterwards let the Natural Selection +part of the story go as completely without saying as I do myself, or as +Mr. Darwin did during the later years of his life. Writing to _Nature_, +April 10, 1884, he said: “To deny _that experience in the course of +successive generations is the source of instinct_, is not to meet by way +of argument the enormous mass of evidence which goes to prove _that this +is the case_.” Here, then, instinct is referred, without reservation, to +“experience in successive generations,” and this is nonsense unless +explained as Professor Hering and I explain it. Mr. Romanes’ words, in +fact, amount to an unqualified acceptance of the chapter “Instinct as +Inherited Memory” given in “Life and Habit,” of which Mr. Romanes in +March 1884 wrote in terms which it is not necessary to repeat. + +Later on:— + +“That ‘practice makes perfect’ is a matter, as I have previously said, of +daily observation. Whether we regard a juggler, a pianist, or a +billiard-player, a child learning his lesson or an actor his part by +frequently repeating it, or a thousand other illustrations of the same +process, we see at once that there is truth in the cynical definition of +a man as a ‘bundle of habits.’ And the same, of course, is true of +animals.” {55a} + +From this Mr. Romanes goes on to show “that automatic actions and +conscious habits may be inherited,” {55b} and in the course of doing this +contends that “instincts may be lost by disuse, and conversely that they +may be acquired as instincts by the hereditary transmission of ancestral +experience.” + +On another page Mr. Romanes says:— + +“Let us now turn to the second of these two assumptions, viz., that some +at least among migratory birds must possess, by inheritance alone, a very +precise knowledge of the particular direction to be pursued. It is +without question an astonishing fact that a young cuckoo should be +prompted to leave its foster parents at a particular season of the year, +and without any guide to show the course previously taken by its own +parents, but this is a fact which must be met by any theory of instinct +which aims at being complete. Now upon our own theory it can only be met +by taking it to be due to inherited memory.” + +A little lower Mr. Romanes says: “Of what kind, then, is the inherited +memory on which the young cuckoo (if not also other migratory birds) +depends? We can only answer, of the same kind, whatever this may be, as +that upon which the old bird depends.” {55c} + +I have given above most of the more marked passages which I have been +able to find in Mr. Romanes’ book which attribute instinct to memory, and +which admit that there is no fundamental difference between the kind of +memory with which we are all familiar and hereditary memory as +transmitted from one generation to another. + +But throughout his work there are passages which suggest, though less +obviously, the same inference. + +The passages I have quoted show that Mr. Romanes is upholding the same +opinions as Professor Hering’s and my own, but their effect and tendency +is more plain here than in Mr Romanes’ own book, where they are overlaid +by nearly 400 long pages of matter which is not always easy of +comprehension. + +Moreover, at the same time that I claim the weight of Mr. Romanes’ +authority, I am bound to admit that I do not find his support +satisfactory. The late Mr. Darwin himself—whose mantle seems to have +fallen more especially and particularly on Mr. Romanes—could not +contradict himself more hopelessly than Mr. Romanes often does. Indeed +in one of the very passages I have quoted in order to show that Mr. +Romanes accepts the phenomena of heredity as phenomena of memory, he +speaks of “heredity as playing an important part _in forming memory_ of +ancestral experiences;” so that, whereas I want him to say that the +phenomena of heredity are due to memory, he will have it that the memory +is due to the heredity, which seems to me absurd. + +Over and over again Mr. Romanes insists that it is heredity which does +this or that. Thus it is “_heredity with natural selection which adapt_ +the anatomical plan of the ganglia.” {56a} It is heredity which +impresses nervous changes on the individual. {56b} “In the lifetime of +species actions originally intelligent may by frequent repetition and +heredity,” &c.; {56c} but he nowhere tells us what heredity is any more +than Messrs. Herbert Spencer, Darwin, and Lewes have done. This, +however, is exactly what Professor Hering, whom I have unwittingly +followed, does. He resolves all phenomena of heredity, whether in +respect of body or mind, into phenomena of memory. He says in effect, “A +man grows his body as he does, and a bird makes her nest as she does, +because both man and bird remember having grown body and made nest as +they now do, or very nearly so, on innumerable past occasions.” He thus, +as I have said on an earlier page, reduces life from an equation of say +100 unknown quantities to one of 99 only by showing that heredity and +memory, two of the original 100 unknown quantities, are in reality part +of one and the same thing. + +That he is right Mr. Romanes seems to me to admit, though in a very +unsatisfactory way. + +What, for example, can be more unsatisfactory than the following?—Mr. +Romanes says that the most fundamental principle of mental operation is +that of memory, and that this “is the _conditio sine quâ non_ of all +mental life” (page 35). + +I do not understand Mr. Romanes to hold that there is any living being +which has no mind at all, and I do understand him to admit that +development of body and mind are closely interdependent. + +If, then, “the most fundamental principle” of mind is memory, it follows +that memory enters also as a fundamental principle into development of +body. For mind and body are so closely connected that nothing can enter +largely into the one without correspondingly affecting the other. + +On a later page Mr. Romanes speaks point-blank of the new-born child as +“_embodying_ the results of a great mass of _hereditary experience_” (p. +77), so that what he is driving at can be collected by those who take +trouble, but is not seen until we call up from our own knowledge matter +whose relevancy does not appear on the face of it, and until we connect +passages many pages asunder, the first of which may easily be forgotten +before we reach the second. There can be no doubt, however, that Mr. +Romanes does in reality, like Professor Hering and myself, regard +development, whether of mind or body, as due to memory, for it is now +pretty generally seen to be nonsense to talk about “hereditary +experience” or “hereditary memory” if anything else is intended. + +I have said above that on page 113 of his recent work Mr. Romanes +declares the analogies between the memory with which we are familiar in +daily life, and hereditary memory, to be “so numerous and precise” as to +justify us in considering them as of one and the same kind. + +This is certainly his meaning, but, with the exception of the words +within inverted commas, it is not his language. His own words are +these:— + +“Profound, however, as our ignorance unquestionably is concerning the +physical substratum of memory, I think we are at least justified in +regarding this substratum as the same both in ganglionic or organic, and +in the conscious or psychological memory, seeing that the analogies +between them are so numerous and precise. Consciousness is but an +adjunct which arises when the physical processes, owing to infrequency of +repetition, complexity of operation, or other causes, involve what I have +before called ganglionic friction.” + +I submit that I have correctly translated Mr. Romanes’ meaning, and also +that we have a right to complain of his not saying what he has to say in +words which will involve less “ganglionic friction” on the part of the +reader. + +Another example may be found on p. 43 of Mr. Romanes’ book. “Lastly,” he +writes, “just as innumerable special mechanisms of muscular +co-ordinations are found to be inherited, innumerable special +associations of ideas are found to be the same, and in one case as in the +other the strength of the organically imposed connection is found to bear +a direct proportion to the frequency with which in the history of the +species it has occurred.” + +Mr. Romanes is here intending what the reader will find insisted on on p. +51 of “Life and Habit;” but how difficult he has made what could have +been said intelligibly enough, if there had been nothing but the reader’s +comfort to be considered. Unfortunately that seems to have been by no +means the only thing of which Mr. Romanes was thinking, or why, after +implying and even saying over and over again that instinct is inherited +habit due to inherited memory, should he turn sharply round on p. 297 and +praise Mr. Darwin for trying to snuff out “the well-known doctrine of +inherited habit as advanced by Lamarck”? The answer is not far to seek. +It is because Mr. Romanes did not merely want to tell us all about +instinct, but wanted also, if I may use a homely metaphor, to hunt with +the hounds and run with the hare at one and the same time. + +I remember saying that if the late Mr. Darwin “had told us what the +earlier evolutionists said, why they said it, wherein he differed from +them, and in what way he proposed to set them straight, he would have +taken a course at once more agreeable with usual practice, and more +likely to remove misconception from his own mind and from those of his +readers.” {59a} This I have no doubt was one of the passages which made +Mr. Romanes so angry with me. I can find no better words to apply to Mr. +Romanes himself. He knows perfectly well what others have written about +the connection between heredity and memory, and he knows no less well +that so far as he is intelligible at all he is taking the same view that +they have taken. If he had begun by saying what they had said, and had +then improved on it, I for one should have been only too glad to be +improved upon. + +Mr. Romanes has spoiled his book just because this plain old-fashioned +method of procedure was not good enough for him. One-half the obscurity +which makes his meaning so hard to apprehend is due to exactly the same +cause as that which has ruined so much of the late Mr. Darwin’s work—I +mean to a desire to appear to be differing altogether from others with +whom he knew himself after all to be in substantial agreement. He +adopts, but (probably quite unconsciously) in his anxiety to avoid +appearing to adopt, he obscures what he is adopting. + +Here, for example, is Mr. Romanes’ definition of instinct:— + +“Instinct is reflex action into which there is imported the element of +consciousness. The term is therefore a generic one, comprising all those +faculties of mind which are concerned in conscious and adaptive action, +antecedent to individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the +relation between means employed and ends attained, but similarly +performed under similar and frequently recurring circumstances by all the +individuals of the same species.” {60a} + +If Mr. Romanes would have been content to build frankly upon Professor +Hering’s foundation, the soundness of which he has elsewhere abundantly +admitted, he might have said— + +“Instinct is knowledge or habit acquired in past generations—the new +generation remembering what happened to it before it parted company with +the old. More briefly, Instinct is inherited memory.” Then he might +have added a rider— + +“If a habit is acquired as a new one, during any given lifetime, it is +not an instinct. If having been acquired in one lifetime it is +transmitted to offspring, it is an instinct in the offspring, though it +was not an instinct in the parent. If the habit is transmitted +partially, it must be considered as partly instinctive and partly +acquired.” + +This is easy; it tells people how they may test any action so as to know +what they ought to call it; it leaves well alone by avoiding all such +debatable matters as reflex action, consciousness, intelligence, purpose, +knowledge of purpose, &c.; it both introduces the feature of inheritance +which is the one mainly distinguishing instinctive from so-called +intelligent actions, and shows the manner in which these last pass into +the first, that is to say, by way of memory and habitual repetition; +finally it points the fact that the new generation is not to be looked +upon as a new thing, but (as Dr. Erasmus Darwin long since said {61a}) as +“a branch or elongation” of the one immediately preceding it. + +In Mr. Darwin’s case it is hardly possible to exaggerate the waste of +time, money and trouble that has been caused, by his not having been +content to appear as descending with modification like other people from +those who went before him. It will take years to get the evolution +theory out of the mess in which Mr. Darwin has left it. He was heir to a +discredited truth; he left behind him an accredited fallacy. Mr. +Romanes, if he is not stopped in time, will get the theory connecting +heredity and memory into just such another muddle as Mr. Darwin has got +evolution, for surely the writer who can talk about “_heredity being able +to work up_ the faculty of homing into the instinct of migration,” {61b} +or of “the principle of (natural) selection combining with that of +lapsing intelligence to the formation of a joint result,” {61c} is little +likely to depart from the usual methods of scientific procedure with +advantage either to himself or any one else. Fortunately Mr. Romanes is +not Mr. Darwin, and though he has certainly got Mr. Darwin’s mantle, and +got it very much too, it will not on Mr. Romanes’ shoulders hide a good +deal that people were not going to observe too closely while Mr. Darwin +wore it. + +I ought to say that the late Mr. Darwin appears himself eventually to +have admitted the soundness of the theory connecting heredity and memory. +Mr. Romanes quotes a letter written by Mr. Darwin in the last year of his +life, in which he speaks of an intelligent action gradually becoming +“_instinctive_, _i.e._, _memory transmitted from one generation to +another_.” {62a} + +Briefly, the stages of Mr. Darwin’s opinion upon the subject of +hereditary memory are as follows:— + +1859. “It would be _the most serious error_ to suppose that the greater +number of instincts have been acquired by habit in one generation and +transmitted by inheritance to succeeding generations.” {62b} And this +more especially applies to the instincts of many ants. + +1876. “It would be a _serious error_ to suppose,” &c., as before. {62c} + +1881. “We should remember _what a mass of inherited knowledge_ is +crowded into the minute brain of a worker ant.” {62d} + +1881 or 1882. Speaking of a given habitual action Mr. Darwin writes: “It +does not seem to me at all incredible that this action [and why this more +than any other habitual action?] should then become instinctive:” i.e., +_memory transmitted from one generation to another_. {62e} + +And yet in 1839, or thereabouts, Mr. Darwin had pretty nearly grasped the +conception from which until the last year or two of his life he so +fatally strayed; for in his contribution to the volumes giving an account +of the voyages of the _Adventure_ and _Beagle_, he wrote: “Nature by +making habit omnipotent and its effects hereditary, has fitted the +Fuegian for the climate and productions of his country” (p. 237). + +What is the secret of the long departure from the simple common-sense +view of the matter which he took when he was a young man? I imagine +simply what I have referred to in the preceding chapter, over-anxiety to +appear to be differing from his grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and +Lamarck. + +I believe I may say that Mr. Darwin before he died not only admitted the +connection between memory and heredity, but came also to see that he must +readmit that design in organism which he had so many years opposed. For +in the preface to Hermann Müller’s “Fertilisation of Flowers,” {63a} +which bears a date only a very few weeks prior to Mr. Darwin’s death, I +find him saying:—“Design in nature has for a long time deeply interested +many men, and though the subject must now be looked at from a somewhat +different point of view from what was formerly the case, it is not on +that account rendered less interesting.” This is mused forth as a +general gnome, and may mean anything or nothing: the writer of the +letterpress under the hieroglyph in Old Moore’s Almanac could not be more +guarded; but I think I know what it does mean. + +I cannot, of course, be sure; Mr. Darwin did not probably intend that I +should; but I assume with confidence that whether there is design in +organism or no, there is at any rate design in this passage of Mr. +Darwin’s. This, we may be sure, is not a fortuitous variation; and, +moreover, it is introduced for some reason which made Mr. Darwin think it +worth while to go out of his way to introduce it. It has no fitness in +its connection with Hermann Müller’s book, for what little Hermann Müller +says about teleology at all is to condemn it; why, then, should Mr. +Darwin muse here of all places in the world about the interest attaching +to design in organism? Neither has the passage any connection with the +rest of the preface. There is not another word about design, and even +here Mr. Darwin seems mainly anxious to face both ways, and pat design as +it were on the head while not committing himself to any proposition which +could be disputed. + +The explanation is sufficiently obvious. Mr Darwin wanted to hedge. He +saw that the design which his works had been mainly instrumental in +pitchforking out of organisms no less manifestly designed than a +burglar’s jemmy is designed, had nevertheless found its way back again, +and that though, as I insisted in “Evolution Old and New,” and +“Unconscious Memory,” it must now be placed within the organism instead +of outside it, as “was formerly the case,” it was not on that account any +the less—design, as well as interesting. + +I should like to have seen Mr. Darwin say this more explicitly. Indeed I +should have liked to have seen Mr. Darwin say anything at all about the +meaning of which there could be no mistake, and without contradicting +himself elsewhere; but this was not Mr. Darwin’s manner. + +In passing I will give another example of Mr Darwin’s manner when he did +not quite dare even to hedge. It is to be found in the preface which he +wrote to Professor Weismann’s “Studies in the Theory of Descent,” +published in 1881. + +“Several distinguished naturalists,” says Mr. Darwin, “maintain with much +confidence that organic beings tend to vary and to rise in the scale, +independently of the conditions to which they and their progenitors have +been exposed; whilst others maintain that all variation is due to such +exposure, though the manner in which the environment acts is as yet quite +unknown. At the present time there is hardly any question in biology of +more importance than this of the nature and causes of variability; and +the reader will find in the present work an able discussion on the whole +subject, which will probably lead him to pause before he admits the +existence of an innate tendency to perfectibility”—or towards _being able +to be perfected_. + +I could find no able discussion upon the whole subject in Professor +Weismann’s book. There was a little something here and there, but not +much. + +It may be expected that I should say something here about Mr. Romanes’ +latest contribution to biology—I mean his theory of physiological +selection, of which the two first instalments have appeared in _Nature_ +just as these pages are leaving my hands, and many months since the +foregoing, and most of the following chapters were written. I admit to +feeling a certain sense of thankfulness that they did not appear earlier; +as it is, my book is too far advanced to be capable of further embryonic +change, and this must be my excuse for saying less about Mr. Romanes’ +theory than I might perhaps otherwise do. I cordially, however, agree +with the _Times_, which says that “Mr. George Romanes appears to be the +biological investigator on whom the mantle of Mr. Darwin has most +conspicuously descended” (August 16, 1886). Mr. Romanes is just the +person whom the late Mr. Darwin would select to carry on his work, and +Mr. Darwin was just the kind of person towards whom Mr. Romanes would +find himself instinctively attracted. + +The _Times_ continues—“The position which Mr. Romanes takes up is the +result of his perception shared by many evolutionists, that the theory of +natural selection is not really a theory of the origin of species. . . .” +What, then, becomes of Mr. Darwin’s most famous work, which was written +expressly to establish natural selection as the main means of organic +modification? “The new factor which Mr. Romanes suggests,” continues the +_Times_, “is that at a certain stage of development of varieties in a +state of nature a change takes place in their reproductive systems, +rendering those which differ in some particulars mutually infertile, and +thus the formation of new permanent species takes place without the +swamping effect of free intercrossing. . . . How his theory can be +properly termed one of selection he fails to make clear. If correct, it +is a law or principle of operation rather than a process of selection. +It has been objected to Mr. Romanes’ theory that it is the re-statement +of a fact. This objection is less important than the lack of facts in +support of the theory.” The _Times_, however, implies it as its opinion +that the required facts will be forthcoming by and by, and that when they +have been found Mr. Romanes’ suggestion will constitute “the most +important addition to the theory of evolution since the publication of +the ‘Origin of Species.’” Considering that the _Times_ has just implied +the main thesis of the “Origin of Species” to be one which does not stand +examination, this is rather a doubtful compliment. + +Neither Mr. Romanes nor the writer in the _Times_ appears to perceive +that the results which may or may not be supposed to ensue on choice +depend upon what it is that is supposed to be chosen from; they do not +appear to see that though the expression natural selection must be always +more or less objectionable, as too highly charged with metaphor for +purposes of science, there is nevertheless a natural selection which is +open to no other objection than this, and which, when its metaphorical +character is borne well in mind, may be used without serious risk of +error, whereas natural selection from variations that are mainly +fortuitous is chimerical as well as metaphorical. Both writers speak of +natural selection as though there could not possibly be any selection in +the course of nature, or natural survival, of any but accidental +variations. Thus Mr. Romanes says: {66a} “The swamping effect of free +inter-crossing upon an individual variation constitutes perhaps the most +formidable difficulty with which _the theory of natural selection_ is +beset.” And the writer of the article in the _Times_ above referred to +says: “In truth _the theory of natural selection_ presents many facts and +results which increase rather than diminish the difficulty of accounting +for the existence of species.” The assertion made in each case is true +if the Charles-Darwinian selection from fortuitous variations is +intended, but it does not hold good if the selection is supposed to be +made from variations under which there lies a general principle of wide +and abiding application. It is not likely that a man of Mr. Romanes’ +antecedents should not be perfectly awake to considerations so obvious as +the foregoing, and I am afraid I am inclined to consider his whole +suggestion as only an attempt upon the part of the wearer of Mr. Darwin’s +mantle to carry on Mr. Darwin’s work in Mr. Darwin’s spirit. + +I have seen Professor Hering’s theory adopted recently more unreservedly +by Dr. Creighton in his “Illustrations of Unconscious Memory in Disease.” +{67a} Dr. Creighton avowedly bases his system on Professor Hering’s +address, and endorses it; it is with much pleasure that I have seen him +lend the weight of his authority to the theory that each cell and organ +has an individual memory. In “Life and Habit” I expressed a hope that +the opinions it upheld would be found useful by medical men, and am +therefore the more glad to see that this has proved to be the case. I +may perhaps be pardoned if I quote the passage in “Life and Habit” to +which I am referring. It runs:— + +“_Mutatis mutandis_, the above would seem to hold as truly about medicine +as about politics. We cannot reason with our cells, for they know so +much more” (of course I mean “about their own business”) “than we do, +that they cannot understand us;—but though we cannot reason with them, we +can find out what they have been most accustomed to, and what, therefore, +they are most likely to expect; we can see that they get this as far as +it is in our power to give it them, and may then generally leave the rest +to them, only bearing in mind that they will rebel equally against too +sudden a change of treatment and no change at all” (p. 305). + +Dr. Creighton insists chiefly on the importance of change, which—though I +did not notice his saying so—he would doubtless see as a mode of +cross-fertilisation, fraught in all respects with the same advantages as +this, and requiring the same precautions against abuse; he would not, +however, I am sure, deny that there could be no fertility of good results +if too wide a cross were attempted, so that I may claim the weight of his +authority as supporting both the theory of an unconscious memory in +general, and the particular application of it to medicine which I had +ventured to suggest. + +“Has the word ‘memory,’” he asks, “a real application to unconscious +organic phenomena, or do we use it outside its ancient limits only in a +figure of speech?” + +“If I had thought,” he continues later, “that unconscious memory was no +more than a metaphor, and the detailed application of it to these various +forms of disease merely allegorical, I should still have judged it not +unprofitable to represent a somewhat hackneyed class of maladies in the +light of a parable. None of our faculties is more familiar to us in its +workings than the memory, and there is hardly any force or power in +nature which every one knows so well as the force of habit. To say that +a neurotic subject is like a person with a retentive memory, or that a +diathesis gradually acquired is like an over-mastering habit, is at all +events to make comparisons with things that we all understand. + +“For reasons given chiefly in the first chapter, I conclude that +retentiveness, with reproduction, is a single undivided faculty +throughout the whole of our life, whether mental or bodily, conscious or +unconscious; and I claim the description of a certain class of maladies +according to the phraseology of memory and habit as a real description +and not a figurative.” (p. 2.) + +As a natural consequence of the foregoing he regards “alterative action” +as “habit-breaking action.” + +As regards the organism’s being guided throughout its development to +maturity by an unconscious memory, Dr. Creighton says that “Professor +Bain calls reproduction the acme of organic complication.” “I should +prefer to say,” he adds, “the acme of organic implication; for the reason +that the sperm and germ elements are perfectly simple, having nothing in +their form or structure to show for the marvellous potentialities within +them. + +“I now come to the application of these considerations to the doctrine of +unconscious memory. If generation is the acme of organic implicitness, +what is its correlative in nature, what is the acme of organic +explicitness? Obviously the fine flower of consciousness. Generation is +implicit memory, consciousness is explicit memory; generation is +potential memory, consciousness is actual memory.” + +I am not sure that I understand the preceding paragraph as clearly as I +should wish, but having quoted enough to perhaps induce the reader to +turn to Dr. Creighton’s book, I will proceed to the subject indicated in +my title. + + + + +Chapter V +Statement of the Question at Issue + + +OF the two points referred to in the opening sentence of this book—I mean +the connection between heredity and memory, and the reintroduction of +design into organic modification—the second is both the more important +and the one which stands most in need of support. The substantial +identity between heredity and memory is becoming generally admitted; as +regards my second point, however, I cannot flatter myself that I have +made much way against the formidable array of writers on the +neo-Darwinian side; I shall therefore devote the rest of my book as far +as possible to this subject only. Natural selection (meaning by these +words the preservation in the ordinary course of nature of favourable +variations that are supposed to be mainly matters of pure good luck and +in no way arising out of function) has been, to use an Americanism than +which I can find nothing apter, the biggest biological boom of the last +quarter of a century; it is not, therefore, to be wondered at that +Professor Ray Lankester, Mr. Romanes, Mr. Grant Allen, and others, should +show some impatience at seeing its value as prime means of modification +called in question. Within the last few months, indeed, Mr. Grant Allen +{70a} and Professor Ray Lankester {70b} in England, and Dr. Ernst Krause +{70c} in Germany, have spoken and written warmly in support of the theory +of natural selection, and in opposition to the views taken by myself; if +they are not to be left in possession of the field the sooner they are +met the better. + +Stripped of detail the point at issue is this;—whether luck or cunning is +the fitter to be insisted on as the main means of organic development. +Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck answered this question in favour of cunning. +They settled it in favour of intelligent perception of the +situation—within, of course, ever narrower and narrower limits as +organism retreats farther backwards from ourselves—and persistent effort +to turn it to account. They made this the soul of all development +whether of mind or body. + +And they made it, like all other souls, liable to aberration both for +better and worse. They held that some organisms show more ready wit and +_savoir faire_ than others; that some give more proofs of genius and have +more frequent happy thoughts than others, and that some have even gone +through waters of misery which they have used as wells. + +The sheet anchor both of Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck is in good sense and +thrift; still they are aware that money has been sometimes made by +“striking oil,” and ere now been transmitted to descendants in spite of +the haphazard way in which it was originally acquired. No speculation, +no commerce; “nothing venture, nothing have,” is as true for the +development of organic wealth as for that of any other kind, and neither +Erasmus Darwin nor Lamarck hesitated about admitting that highly +picturesque and romantic incidents of developmental venture do from time +to time occur in the race histories even of the dullest and most +dead-level organisms under the name of “sports;” but they would hold that +even these occur most often and most happily to those that have +persevered in well-doing for some generations. Unto the organism that +hath is given, and from the organism that hath not is taken away; so that +even “sports” prove to be only a little off thrift, which still remains +the sheet anchor of the early evolutionists. They believe, in fact, that +more organic wealth has been made by saving than in any other way. The +race is not in the long run to the phenomenally swift nor the battle to +the phenomenally strong, but to the good average all-round organism that +is alike shy of Radical crotchets and old world obstructiveness. +_Festina_, but _festina lente_—perhaps as involving so completely the +contradiction in terms which must underlie all modification—is the motto +they would assign to organism, and _Chi va piano va lontano_, they hold +to be a maxim as old, if not as the hills (and they have a hankering even +after these), at any rate as the amœba. + +To repeat in other words. All enduring forms establish a _modus vivendi_ +with their surroundings. They can do this because both they and the +surroundings are plastic within certain undefined but somewhat narrow +limits. They are plastic because they can to some extent change their +habits, and changed habit, if persisted in, involves corresponding +change, however slight, in the organs employed; but their plasticity +depends in great measure upon their failure to perceive that they are +moulding themselves. If a change is so great that they are seriously +incommoded by its novelty, they are not likely to acquiesce in it kindly +enough to grow to it, but they will make no difficulty about the miracle +involved in accommodating themselves to a difference of only two or three +per cent. {72a} + +As long as no change exceeds this percentage, and as long, also, as fresh +change does not supervene till the preceding one is well established, +there seems no limit to the amount of modification which may be +accumulated in the course of generations—provided, of course, always, +that the modification continues to be in conformity with the instinctive +habits and physical development of the organism in their collective +capacity. Where the change is too great, or where an organ has been +modified cumulatively in some one direction, until it has reached a +development too seriously out of harmony with the habits of the organism +taken collectively, then the organism holds itself excused from further +effort, throws up the whole concern, and takes refuge in the liquidation +and reconstruction of death. It is only on the relinquishing of further +effort that this death ensues; as long as effort endures, organisms go on +from change to change, altering and being altered—that is to say, either +killing themselves piecemeal in deference to the surroundings or killing +the surroundings piecemeal to suit themselves. There is a ceaseless +higgling and haggling, or rather a life-and-death struggle between these +two things as long as life lasts, and one or other or both have in no +small part to re-enter into the womb from whence they came and be born +again in some form which shall give greater satisfaction. + +All change is _pro tanto_ death or _pro tanto_ birth. Change is the +common substratum which underlies both life and death; life and death are +not two distinct things absolutely antagonistic to one another; in the +highest life there is still much death, and in the most complete death +there is still not a little life. _La vie_, says Claud Bernard, {73a} +_c’est la mort_: he might have added, and perhaps did, _et la mort ce +n’est que la vie transformée_. Life and death are the extreme modes of +something which is partly both and wholly neither; this something is +common, ordinary change; solve any change and the mystery of life and +death will be revealed; show why and how anything becomes ever anything +other in any respect than what it is at any given moment, and there will +be little secret left in any other change. One is not in its ultimate +essence more miraculous that another; it may be more striking—a greater +_congeries_ of shocks, it may be more credible or more incredible, but +not more miraculous; all change is _quâ_ us absolutely incomprehensible +and miraculous; the smallest change baffles the greatest intellect if its +essence, as apart from its phenomena, be inquired into. + +But however this may be, all organic change is either a growth or a +dissolution, or a combination of the two. Growth is the coming together +of elements with _quasi_ similar characteristics. I understand it is +believed to be the coming together of matter in certain states of motion +with other matter in states so nearly similar that the rhythms of the one +coalesce with and hence reinforce the rhythms pre-existing in the +other—making, rather than marring and undoing them. Life and growth are +an attuning, death and decay are an untuning; both involve a succession +of greater or smaller attunings and untunings; organic life is “the +diapason closing full in man”; it is the fulness of a tone that varies in +pitch, quality, and in the harmonics to which it gives rise; it ranges +through every degree of complexity from the endless combinations of +life-and-death within life-and-death which we find in the mammalia, to +the comparative simplicity of the amœba. Death, again, like life, ranges +through every degree of complexity. All pleasant changes are recreative; +they are _pro tanto_ births; all unpleasant changes are wearing, and, as +such, _pro tanto_ deaths, but we can no more exhaust either wholly of the +other, than we can exhaust all the air out of a receiver; pleasure and +pain lurk within one another, as life in death, and death in life, or as +rest and unrest in one another. + +There is no greater mystery in life than in death. We talk as though the +riddle of life only need engage us; this is not so; death is just as +great a miracle as life; the one is two and two making five, the other is +five splitting into two and two. Solve either, and we have solved the +other; they should be studied not apart, for they are never parted, but +together, and they will tell more tales of one another than either will +tell about itself. If there is one thing which advancing knowledge makes +clearer than another, it is that death is swallowed up in life, and life +in death; so that if the last enemy that shall be subdued is death, then +indeed is our salvation nearer than what we thought, for in strictness +there is neither life nor death, nor thought nor thing, except as figures +of speech, and as the approximations which strike us for the time as most +convenient. There is neither perfect life nor perfect death, but a being +ever with the Lord only, in the eternal φορα, or going to and fro and +heat and fray of the universe. When we were young we thought the one +certain thing was that we should one day come to die; now we know the one +certain thing to be that we shall never wholly do so. _Non omnis +moriar_, says Horace, and “I die daily,” says St. Paul, as though a life +beyond the grave, and a death on this side of it, were each some strange +thing which happened to them alone of all men; but who dies absolutely +once for all, and for ever at the hour that is commonly called that of +death, and who does not die daily and hourly? Does any man in continuing +to live from day to day or moment to moment, do more than continue in a +changed body, with changed feelings, ideas, and aims, so that he lives +from moment to moment only in virtue of a simultaneous dying from moment +to moment also? Does any man in dying do more than, on a larger and more +complete scale, what he has been doing on a small one, as the most +essential factor of his life, from the day that he became “he” at all? +When the note of life is struck the harmonics of death are sounded, and +so, again, to strike death is to arouse the infinite harmonics of life +that rise forthwith as incense curling upwards from a censer. If in the +midst of life we are in death, so also in the midst of death we are in +life, and whether we live or whether we die, whether we like it and know +anything about it or no, still we do it to the Lord—living always, dying +always, and in the Lord always, the unjust and the just alike, for God is +no respecter of persons. + +Consciousness and change, so far as we can watch them, are as +functionally interdependent as mind and matter, or condition and +substance, are—for the condition of every substance may be considered as +the expression and outcome of its mind. Where there is consciousness +there is change; where there is no change there is no consciousness; may +we not suspect that there is no change without a _pro tanto_ +consciousness however simple and unspecialised? Change and motion are +one, so that we have substance, feeling, change (or motion), as the +ultimate three-in-one of our thoughts, and may suspect all change, and +all feeling, attendant or consequent, however limited, to be the +interaction of those states which for want of better terms we call mind +and matter. Action may be regarded as a kind of middle term between mind +and matter; it is the throe of thought and thing, the quivering clash and +union of body and soul; commonplace enough in practice; miraculous, as +violating every canon on which thought and reason are founded, if we +theorise about it, put it under the microscope, and vivisect it. It is +here, if anywhere, that body or substance is guilty of the contradiction +in terms of combining with that which is without material substance and +cannot, therefore, be conceived by us as passing in and out with matter, +till the two become a body ensouled and a soul embodied. + +All body is more or less ensouled. As it gets farther and farther from +ourselves, indeed, we sympathise less with it; nothing, we say to +ourselves, can have intelligence unless we understand all about it—as +though intelligence in all except ourselves meant the power of being +understood rather than of understanding. We are intelligent, and no +intelligence, so different from our own as to baffle our powers of +comprehension deserves to be called intelligence at all. The more a +thing resembles ourselves, the more it thinks as we do—and thus by +implication tells us that we are right, the more intelligent we think it; +and the less it thinks as we do, the greater fool it must be; if a +substance does not succeed in making it clear that it understands our +business, we conclude that it cannot have any business of its own, much +less understand it, or indeed understand anything at all. But letting +this pass, so far as we are concerned, χρημάτων πάντων μέτρον άνθρωπος; +we are body ensouled, and soul embodied, ourselves, nor is it possible +for us to think seriously of anything so unlike ourselves as to consist +either of soul without body, or body without soul. Unmattered condition, +therefore, is as inconceivable by us as unconditioned matter; and we must +hold that all body with which we can be conceivably concerned is more or +less ensouled, and all soul, in like manner, more or less embodied. +Strike either body or soul—that is to say, effect either a physical or a +mental change, and the harmonics of the other sound. So long as body is +minded in a certain way—so long, that is to say, as it feels, knows, +remembers, concludes, and forecasts one set of things—it will be in one +form; if it assumes a new one, otherwise than by external violence, no +matter how slight the change may be, it is only through having changed +its mind, through having forgotten and died to some trains of thought, +and having been correspondingly born anew by the adoption of new ones. +What it will adopt depends upon which of the various courses open to it +it considers most to its advantage. + +What it will think to its advantage depends mainly on the past habits of +its race. Its past and now invisible lives will influence its desires +more powerfully than anything it may itself be able to add to the sum of +its likes and dislikes; nevertheless, over and above preconceived opinion +and the habits to which all are slaves, there is a small salary, or, as +it were, agency commission, which each may have for himself, and spend +according to his fancy; from this, indeed, income-tax must be deducted; +still there remains a little margin of individual taste, and here, high +up on this narrow, inaccessible ledge of our souls, from year to year a +breed of not unprolific variations build where reason cannot reach them +to despoil them; for _de gustibus non est disputandum_. + +Here we are as far as we can go. Fancy, which sometimes sways so much +and is swayed by so little, and which sometimes, again, is so hard to +sway, and moves so little when it is swayed; whose ways have a method of +their own, but are not as our ways—fancy, lies on the extreme borderland +of the realm within which the writs of our thoughts run, and extends into +that unseen world wherein they have no jurisdiction. Fancy is as the +mist upon the horizon which blends earth and sky; where, however, it +approaches nearest to the earth and can be reckoned with, it is seen as +melting into desire, and this as giving birth to design and effort. As +the net result and outcome of these last, living forms grow gradually but +persistently into physical conformity with their own intentions, and +become outward and visible signs of the inward and spiritual faiths, or +wants of faith, that have been most within them. They thus very +gradually, but none the less effectually, design themselves. + +In effect, therefore, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck introduce uniformity +into the moral and spiritual worlds as it was already beginning to be +introduced into the physical. According to both these writers +development has ever been a matter of the same energy, effort, good +sense, and perseverance, as tend to advancement of life now among +ourselves. In essence it is neither more nor less than this, as the +rain-drop which denuded an ancient formation is of the same kind as that +which is denuding a modern one, though its effect may vary in geometrical +ratio with the effect it has produced already. As we are extending +reason to the lower animals, so we must extend a system of moral +government by rewards and punishments no less surely; and if we admit +that to some considerable extent man is man, and master of his fate, we +should admit also that all organic forms which are saved at all have been +in proportionate degree masters of their fate too, and have worked out, +not only their own salvation, but their salvation according, in no small +measure, to their own goodwill and pleasure, at times with a light heart, +and at times in fear and trembling. I do not say that Erasmus Darwin and +Lamarck saw all the foregoing as clearly as it is easy to see it now; +what I have said, however, is only the natural development of their +system. + + + + +Chapter VI +Statement of the Question at Issue (_continued_) + + +SO much for the older view; and now for the more modern opinion. +According to Messrs. Darwin and Wallace, and ostensibly, I am afraid I +should add, a great majority of our most prominent biologists, the view +taken by Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck is not a sound one. Some organisms, +indeed, are so admirably adapted to their surroundings, and some organs +discharge their functions with so much appearance of provision, that we +are apt to think they must owe their development to sense of need and +consequent contrivance, but this opinion is fantastic; the appearance of +design is delusive; what we are tempted to see as an accumulated outcome +of desire and cunning, we should regard as mainly an accumulated outcome +of good luck. + +Let us take the eye as a somewhat crucial example. It is a +seeing-machine, or thing to see with. So is a telescope; the telescope +in its highest development is a secular accumulation of cunning, +sometimes small, sometimes great; sometimes applied to this detail of the +instrument, and sometimes to that. It is an admirable example of design; +nevertheless, as I said in “Evolution Old and New,” he who made the first +rude telescope had probably no idea of any more perfect form of the +instrument than the one he had himself invented. Indeed, if he had, he +would have carried his idea out in practice. He would have been unable +to conceive such an instrument as Lord Rosse’s; the design, therefore, at +present evidenced by the telescope was not design all on the part of one +and the same person. Nor yet was it unmixed with chance; many a detail +has been doubtless due to an accident or coincidence which was forthwith +seized and made the best of. Luck there always has been and always will +be, until all brains are opened, and all connections made known, but luck +turned to account becomes design; there is, indeed, if things are driven +home, little other design than this. The telescope, therefore, is an +instrument designed in all its parts for the purpose of seeing, and, take +it all round, designed with singular skill. + +Looking at the eye, we are at first tempted to think that it must be the +telescope over again, only more so; we are tempted to see it as something +which has grown up little by little from small beginnings, as the result +of effort well applied and handed down from generation to generation, +till, in the vastly greater time during which the eye has been developing +as compared with the telescope, a vastly more astonishing result has been +arrived at. We may indeed be tempted to think this, but, according to +Mr. Darwin, we should be wrong. Design had a great deal to do with the +telescope, but it had nothing or hardly anything whatever to do with the +eye. The telescope owes its development to cunning, the eye to luck, +which, it would seem, is so far more cunning than cunning that one does +not quite understand why there should be any cunning at all. The main +means of developing the eye was, according to Mr. Darwin, not use as +varying circumstances might direct with consequent slow increase of power +and an occasional happy flight of genius, but natural selection. Natural +selection, according to him, though not the sole, is still the most +important means of its development and modification. {81a} What, then, +is natural selection? + +Mr. Darwin has told us this on the title-page of the “Origin of Species.” +He there defines it as “The Preservation of Favoured Races;” “Favoured” +is “Fortunate,” and “Fortunate” “Lucky;” it is plain, therefore, that +with Mr. Darwin natural selection comes to “The Preservation of Lucky +Races,” and that he regarded luck as the most important feature in +connection with the development even of so apparently purposive an organ +as the eye, and as the one, therefore, on which it was most proper to +insist. And what is luck but absence of intention or design? What, +then, can Mr. Darwin’s title-page amount to when written out plainly, but +to an assertion that the main means of modification has been the +preservation of races whose variations have been unintentional, that is +to say, not connected with effort or intention, devoid of mind or +meaning, fortuitous, spontaneous, accidental, or whatever kindred word is +least disagreeable to the reader? It is impossible to conceive any more +complete denial of mind as having had anything to do with organic +development, than is involved in the title-page of the “Origin of +Species” when its doubtless carefully considered words are studied—nor, +let me add, is it possible to conceive a title-page more likely to make +the reader’s attention rest much on the main doctrine of evolution, and +little, to use the words now most in vogue concerning it, on Mr. Darwin’s +own “distinctive feature.” + +It should be remembered that the full title of the “Origin of Species” +is, “On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the +preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life.” The +significance of the expansion of the title escaped the greater number of +Mr. Darwin’s readers. Perhaps it ought not to have done so, but we +certainly failed to catch it. The very words themselves escaped us—and +yet there they were all the time if we had only chosen to look. We +thought the book was called “On the Origin of Species,” and so it was on +the outside; so it was also on the inside fly-leaf; so it was on the +title-page itself as long as the most prominent type was used; the +expanded title was only given once, and then in smaller type; so the +three big “Origins of Species” carried us with them to the exclusion of +the rest. + +The short and working title, “On the Origin of Species,” in effect claims +descent with modification generally; the expanded and technically true +title only claims the discovery that luck is the main means of organic +modification, and this is a very different matter. The book ought to +have been entitled, “On Natural Selection, or the preservation of +favoured races in the struggle for life, as the main means of the origin +of species;” this should have been the expanded title, and the short +title should have been “On Natural Selection.” The title would not then +have involved an important difference between its working and its +technical forms, and it would have better fulfilled the object of a +title, which is, of course, to give, as far as may be, the essence of a +book in a nutshell. We learn on the authority of Mr. Darwin himself +{83a} that the “Origin of Species” was originally intended to bear the +title “Natural Selection;” nor is it easy to see why the change should +have been made if an accurate expression of the contents of the book was +the only thing which Mr. Darwin was considering. It is curious that, +writing the later chapters of “Life and Habit” in great haste, I should +have accidentally referred to the “Origin of Species” as “Natural +Selection;” it seems hard to believe that there was no intention in my +thus unconsciously reverting to Mr. Darwin’s own original title, but +there certainly was none, and I did not then know what the original title +had been. + +If we had scrutinised Mr. Darwin’s title-page as closely as we should +certainly scrutinise anything written by Mr. Darwin now, we should have +seen that the title did not technically claim the theory of descent; +practically, however, it so turned out that we unhesitatingly gave that +theory to the author, being, as I have said, carried away by the three +large “Origins of Species” (which we understood as much the same thing as +descent with modification), and finding, as I shall show in a later +chapter, that descent was ubiquitously claimed throughout the work, +either expressly or by implication, as Mr. Darwin’s theory. It is not +easy to see how any one with ordinary instincts could hesitate to believe +that Mr. Darwin was entitled to claim what he claimed with so much +insistance. If _ars est celare artem_ Mr. Darwin must be allowed to have +been a consummate artist, for it took us years to understand the ins and +outs of what had been done. + +I may say in passing that we never see the “Origin of Species” spoken of +as “On the Origin of Species, &c.,” or as “The Origin of Species, &c.” +(the word “on” being dropped in the latest editions). The distinctive +feature of the book lies, according to its admirers, in the “&c.,” but +they never give it. To avoid pedantry I shall continue to speak of the +“Origin of Species.” + +At any rate it will be admitted that Mr. Darwin did not make his +title-page express his meaning so clearly that his readers could readily +catch the point of difference between himself and his grandfather and +Lamarck; nevertheless the point just touched upon involves the only +essential difference between the systems of Mr. Charles Darwin and those +of his three most important predecessors. All four writers agree that +animals and plants descend with modification; all agree that the fittest +alone survive; all agree about the important consequences of the +geometrical ratio of increase; Mr. Charles Darwin has said more about +these last two points than his predecessors did, but all three were alike +cognisant of the facts and attached the same importance to them, and +would have been astonished at its being supposed possible that they +disputed them. The fittest alone survive; yes—but the fittest from among +what? Here comes the point of divergence; the fittest from among +organisms whose variations arise mainly through use and disuse? In other +words, from variations that are mainly functional? Or from among +organisms whose variations are in the main matters of luck? From +variations into which a moral and intellectual system of payment +according to results has largely entered? Or from variations which have +been thrown for with dice? From variations among which, though cards +tell, yet play tells as much or more? Or from those in which cards are +everything and play goes for so little as to be not worth taking into +account? Is “the survival of the fittest” to be taken as meaning “the +survival of the luckiest” or “the survival of those who know best how to +turn fortune to account”? Is luck the only element of fitness, or is not +cunning even more indispensable? + +Mr. Darwin has a habit, borrowed, perhaps, _mutatis mutandis_, from the +framers of our collects, of every now and then adding the words “through +natural selection,” as though this squared everything, and descent with +modification thus became his theory at once. This is not the case. +Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck believed in natural selection to the +full as much as any follower of Mr. Charles Darwin can do. They did not +use the actual words, but the idea underlying them is the essence of +their system. Mr. Patrick Matthew epitomised their doctrine more +tersely, perhaps, than was done by any other of the pre-Charles-Darwinian +evolutionists, in the following passage which appeared in 1831, and which +I have already quoted in “Evolution Old and New” (pp. 320, 323). The +passage runs:— + +“The self-regulating adaptive disposition of organised life may, in part, +be traced to the extreme fecundity of nature, who, as before stated, has +in all the varieties of her offspring a prolific power much beyond (in +many cases a thousandfold) what is necessary to fill up the vacancies +caused by senile decay. As the field of existence is limited and +preoccupied, it is only the hardier, more robust, better suited to +circumstance individuals, who are able to struggle forward to maturity, +these inhabiting only the situations to which they have superior +adaptation and greater power of occupancy than any other kind; the weaker +and less circumstance-suited being prematurely destroyed. This principle +is in constant action; it regulates the colour, the figure, the +capacities, and instincts; those individuals in each species whose colour +and covering are best suited to concealment or protection from enemies, +or defence from inclemencies or vicissitudes of climate, whose figure is +best accommodated to health, strength, defence, and support; whose +capacities and instincts can best regulate the physical energies to +self-advantage according to circumstances—in such immense waste of +primary and youthful life those only come forward to maturity from _the +strict ordeal by which nature tests their adaptation to her standard of +perfection_ and fitness to continue their kind by reproduction.” {86a} A +little lower down Mr. Matthew speaks of animals under domestication “_not +having undergone selection by the law of nature_, _of which we have +spoken_, and hence being unable to maintain their ground without culture +and protection.” + +The distinction between Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism is generally believed +to lie in the adoption of a theory of natural selection by the younger +Darwin and its non-adoption by the elder. This is true in so far as that +the elder Darwin does not use the words “natural selection,” while the +younger does, but it is not true otherwise. Both writers agree that +offspring tends to inherit modifications that have been effected, from +whatever cause, in parents; both hold that the best adapted to their +surroundings live longest and leave most offspring; both, therefore, hold +that favourable modifications will tend to be preserved and intensified +in the course of many generations, and that this leads to divergence of +type; but these opinions involve a theory of natural selection or +quasi-selection, whether the words “natural selection” are used or not; +indeed it is impossible to include wild species in any theory of descent +with modification without implying a quasi-selective power on the part of +nature; but even with Mr. Charles Darwin the power is only +quasi-selective; there is no conscious choice, and hence there is nothing +that can in strictness be called selection. + +It is indeed true that the younger Darwin gave the words “natural +selection” the importance which of late years they have assumed; he +probably adopted them unconsciously from the passage of Mr. Matthew’s +quoted above, but he ultimately said, {87a} “In the literal sense of the +word (_sic_) no doubt natural selection is a false term,” as personifying +a fact, making it exercise the conscious choice without which there can +be no selection, and generally crediting it with the discharge of +functions which can only be ascribed legitimately to living and reasoning +beings. Granted, however, that while Mr. Charles Darwin adopted the +expression natural selection and admitted it to be a bad one, his +grandfather did not use it at all; still Mr. Darwin did not mean the +natural selection which Mr. Matthew and those whose opinions he was +epitomising meant. Mr. Darwin meant the selection to be made from +variations into which purpose enters to only a small extent +comparatively. The difference, therefore, between the older +evolutionists and their successor does not lie in the acceptance by the +more recent writer of a quasi-selective power in nature which his +predecessors denied, but in the background—hidden behind the words +natural selection, which have served to cloak it—in the views which the +old and the new writers severally took of the variations from among which +they are alike agreed that a selection or quasi-selection is made. + +It now appears that there is not one natural selection, and one survival +of the fittest only, but two natural selections, and two survivals of the +fittest, the one of which may be objected to as an expression more fit +for religious and general literature than for science, but may still be +admitted as sound in intention, while the other, inasmuch as it supposes +accident to be the main purveyor of variations, has no correspondence +with the actual course of things; for if the variations are matters of +chance or hazard unconnected with any principle of constant application, +they will not occur steadily enough, throughout a sufficient number of +successive generations, nor to a sufficient number of individuals for +many generations together at the same time and place, to admit of the +fixing and permanency of modification at all. The one theory of natural +selection, therefore, may, and indeed will, explain the facts that +surround us, whereas the other will not. Mr. Charles Darwin’s +contribution to the theory of evolution was not, as is commonly supposed, +“natural selection,” but the hypothesis that natural selection from +variations that are in the main fortuitous could accumulate and result in +specific and generic differences. + +In the foregoing paragraph I have given the point of difference between +Mr. Charles Darwin and his predecessors. Why, I wonder, have neither he +nor any of his exponents put this difference before us in such plain +words that we should readily apprehend it? Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck +were understood by all who wished to understand them; why is it that the +misunderstanding of Mr. Darwin’s “distinctive feature” should have been +so long and obstinate? Why is it that, no matter how much writers like +Mr. Grant Allen and Professor Ray Lankester may say about “Mr. Darwin’s +master-key,” nor how many more like hyperboles they brandish, they never +put a succinct _résumé_ of Mr. Darwin’s theory side by side with a +similar _résumé_ of his grandfather’s and Lamarck’s? Neither Mr. Darwin +himself, not any of those to whose advocacy his reputation is mainly due, +have done this. Professor Huxley is the man of all others who foisted +Mr. Darwin most upon us, but in his famous lecture on the coming of age +of the “Origin of Species” he did not explain to his hearers wherein the +Neo-Darwinian theory of evolution differed from the old; and why not? +Surely, because no sooner is this made clear than we perceive that the +idea underlying the old evolutionists is more in accord with instinctive +feelings that we have cherished too long to be able now to disregard them +than the central idea which underlies the “Origin of Species.” + +What should we think of one who maintained that the steam-engine and +telescope were not developed mainly through design and effort (letting +the indisputably existing element of luck go without saying), but to the +fact that if any telescope or steam-engine “happened to be made ever such +a little more conveniently for man’s purposes than another,” &c., &c.? + +Let us suppose a notorious burglar found in possession of a jemmy; it is +admitted on all hands that he will use it as soon as he gets a chance; +there is no doubt about this; how perverted should we not consider the +ingenuity of one who tried to persuade us we were wrong in thinking that +the burglar compassed the possession of the jemmy by means involving +ideas, however vague in the first instance, of applying it to its +subsequent function. + +If any one could be found so blind to obvious inferences as to accept +natural selection, “or the preservation of favoured machines,” as the +main means of mechanical modification, we might suppose him to argue much +as follows:—“I can quite understand,” he would exclaim, “how any one who +reflects upon the originally simple form of the earliest jemmies, and +observes the developments they have since attained in the hands of our +most accomplished housebreakers, might at first be tempted to believe +that the present form of the instrument has been arrived at by +long-continued improvement in the hands of an almost infinite succession +of thieves; but may not this inference be somewhat too hastily drawn? +Have we any right to assume that burglars work by means analogous to +those employed by other people? If any thief happened to pick up any +crowbar which happened to be ever such a little better suited to his +purpose than the one he had been in the habit of using hitherto, he would +at once seize and carefully preserve it. If it got worn out or broken he +would begin searching for a crowbar as like as possible to the one that +he had lost; and when, with advancing skill, and in default of being able +to find the exact thing he wanted, he took at length to making a jemmy +for himself, he would imitate the latest and most perfect adaptation, +which would thus be most likely to be preserved in the struggle of +competitive forms. Let this process go on for countless generations, +among countless burglars of all nations, and may we not suppose that a +jemmy would be in time arrived at, as superior to any that could have +been designed as the effect of the Niagara Falls is superior to the puny +efforts of the landscape gardener?” + +For the moment I will pass over the obvious retort that there is no +sufficient parallelism between bodily organs and mechanical inventions to +make a denial of design in the one involve in equity a denial of it in +the other also, and that therefore the preceding paragraph has no force. +A man is not bound to deny design in machines wherein it can be clearly +seen because he denies it in living organs where at best it is a matter +of inference. This retort is plausible, but in the course of the two +next following chapters but one it will be shown to be without force; for +the moment, however, beyond thus calling attention to it, I must pass it +by. + +I do not mean to say that Mr. Darwin ever wrote anything which made the +utility of his contention as apparent as it is made by what I have above +put into the mouth of his supposed follower. Mr. Darwin was the +Gladstone of biology, and so old a scientific hand was not going to make +things unnecessarily clear unless it suited his convenience. Then, +indeed, he was like the man in “The Hunting of the Snark,” who said, “I +told you once, I told you twice, what I tell you three times is true.” +That what I have supposed said, however, above about the jemmy is no +exaggeration of Mr. Darwin’s attitude as regards design in organism will +appear from the passage about the eye already referred to, which it may +perhaps be as well to quote in full. Mr. Darwin says:— + +“It is scarcely possible to avoid comparing the eye to a telescope. We +know that this instrument has been perfected by the long-continued +efforts of the highest human intellects, and we naturally infer that the +eye has been formed by a somewhat analogous process. But may not this +inference be presumptuous? Have we any right to assume that the Creator +works by intellectual powers like those of men? If we must compare the +eye to an optical instrument, we ought in imagination to take a thick +layer of transparent tissue, with a nerve sensitive to light beneath, and +then suppose every part of this layer to be continually changing slowly +in density, so as to separate into layers of different densities and +thicknesses, placed at different distances from each other, and with the +surfaces of each layer slowly changing in form. Further, we must suppose +that there is a power always intently watching each slight accidental +alteration in the transparent layers, and carefully selecting each +alteration which, under varied circumstances, may in any way, or in any +degree, tend to produce a distincter image. We must suppose each new +state of the instrument to be multiplied by the million, and each to be +preserved till a better be produced, and then the old ones to be +destroyed. In living bodies variation will cause the slight alterations, +generation will multiply them almost infinitely, and natural selection +will pick out with unerring skill each improvement. Let this process go +on for millions on millions of years, and during each year on millions of +individuals of many kinds; and may we not believe that a living optical +instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of glass as the works +of the Creator are to those of man?” {92a} + +Mr. Darwin does not in this passage deny design, or cunning, point blank; +he was not given to denying things point blank, nor is it immediately +apparent that he is denying design at all, for he does not emphasize and +call attention to the fact that the _variations_ on whose accumulation he +relies for his ultimate specific difference are accidental, and, to use +his own words, in the passage last quoted, caused by _variation_. He +does, indeed, in his earlier editions, call the variations “accidental,” +and accidental they remained for ten years, but in 1869 the word +“accidental” was taken out. Mr. Darwin probably felt that the variations +had been accidental as long as was desirable; and though they would, of +course, in reality remain as accidental as ever, still, there could be no +use in crying “accidental variations” further. If the reader wants to +know whether they were accidental or no, he had better find out for +himself. Mr. Darwin was a master of what may be called scientific +chiaroscuro, and owes his reputation in no small measure to the judgment +with which he kept his meaning dark when a less practised hand would have +thrown light upon it. There can, however, be no question that Mr. +Darwin, though not denying purposiveness point blank, was trying to refer +the development of the eye to the accumulation of small accidental +improvements, which were not as a rule due to effort and design in any +way analogous to those attendant on the development of the telescope. + +Though Mr. Darwin, if he was to have any point of difference from his +grandfather, was bound to make his variations accidental, yet, to do him +justice, he did not like it. Even in the earlier editions of the “Origin +of Species,” where the “alterations” in the passage last quoted are +called “accidental” in express terms, the word does not fall, so to +speak, on a strong beat of the bar, and is apt to pass unnoticed. +Besides, Mr. Darwin does not say point blank “we may believe,” or “we +ought to believe;” he only says “may we not believe?” The reader should +always be on his guard when Mr. Darwin asks one of these bland and +child-like questions, and he is fond of asking them; but, however this +may be, it is plain, as I pointed out in “Evolution Old and New” {93a} +that the only “skill,” that is to say the only thing that can possibly +involve design, is “the unerring skill” of natural selection. + +In the same paragraph Mr. Darwin has already said: “Further, we must +suppose that there is a power represented by natural selection or the +survival of the fittest always intently watching each slight alteration, +&c.” Mr. Darwin probably said “a power represented by natural selection” +instead of “natural selection” only, because he saw that to talk too +frequently about the fact that the most lucky live longest as “intently +watching” something was greater nonsense than it would be prudent even +for him to write, so he fogged it by making the intent watching done by +“a power represented by” a fact, instead of by the fact itself. As the +sentence stands it is just as great nonsense as it would have been if +“the survival of the fittest” had been allowed to do the watching instead +of “the power represented by” the survival of the fittest, but the +nonsense is harder to dig up, and the reader is more likely to pass it +over. + +This passage gave Mr. Darwin no less trouble than it must have given to +many of his readers. In the original edition of the “Origin of Species” +it stood, “Further, we must suppose that there is a power always intently +watching each slight accidental variation.” I suppose it was felt that +if this was allowed to stand, it might be fairly asked what natural +selection was doing all this time? If the power was able to do +everything that was necessary now, why not always? and why any natural +selection at all? This clearly would not do, so in 1861 the power was +allowed, by the help of brackets, actually to become natural selection, +and remained so till 1869, when Mr. Darwin could stand it no longer, and, +doubtless for the reason given above, altered the passage to “a power +represented by natural selection,” at the same time cutting out the word +“accidental.” + +It may perhaps make the workings of Mr. Darwin’s mind clearer to the +reader if I give the various readings of this passage as taken from the +three most important editions of the “Origin of Species.” + +In 1859 it stood, “Further, we must suppose that there is a power always +intently watching each slight accidental alteration,” &c. + +In 1861 it stood, “Further, we must suppose that there is a power +(natural selection) always intently watching each slight accidental +alteration,” &c. + +And in 1869, “Further, we must suppose that there is a power represented +by natural selection or the survival of the fittest always intently +watching each slight alteration,” &c. {94a} + +The hesitating feeble gait of one who fears a pitfall at every step, so +easily recognisable in the “numerous, successive, slight alterations” in +the foregoing passage, may be traced in many another page of the “Origin +of Species” by those who will be at the trouble of comparing the several +editions. It is only when this is done, and the working of Mr. Darwin’s +mind can be seen as though it were the twitchings of a dog’s nose, that +any idea can be formed of the difficulty in which he found himself +involved by his initial blunder of thinking he had got a distinctive +feature which entitled him to claim the theory of evolution as an +original idea of his own. He found his natural selection hang round his +neck like a millstone. There is hardly a page in the “Origin of Species” +in which traces of the struggle going on in Mr. Darwin’s mind are not +discernible, with a result alike exasperating and pitiable. I can only +repeat what I said in “Evolution Old and New,” namely, that I find the +task of extracting a well-defined meaning out of Mr. Darwin’s words +comparable only to that of trying to act on the advice of a lawyer who +has obscured the main issue as much as he can, and whose chief aim has +been to leave as many loopholes as possible for himself to escape by, if +things should go wrong hereafter. Or, again, to that of one who has to +construe an Act of Parliament which was originally drawn with a view to +throwing as much dust as possible in the eyes of those who would oppose +the measure, and which, having been found utterly unworkable in practice, +has had clauses repealed up and down it till it is now in an inextricable +tangle of confusion and contradiction. + +The more Mr. Darwin’s work is studied, and more especially the more his +different editions are compared, the more impossible is it to avoid a +suspicion of _arrière pensée_ as pervading it whenever the “distinctive +feature” is on the _tapis_. It is right to say, however, that no such +suspicion attaches to Mr. A. R. Wallace, Mr. Darwin’s fellow discoverer +of natural selection. It is impossible to doubt that Mr. Wallace +believed he had made a real and important improvement upon the Lamarckian +system, and, as a natural consequence, unlike Mr. Darwin, he began by +telling us what Lamarck had said. He did not, I admit, say quite all +that I should have been glad to have seen him say, nor use exactly the +words I should myself have chosen, but he said enough to make it +impossible to doubt his good faith, and his desire that we should +understand that with him, as with Mr. Darwin, variations are mainly +accidental, not functional. Thus, in his memorable paper communicated to +the Linnean Society in 1858 he said, in a passage which I have quoted in +“Unconscious Memory”: + +“The hypothesis of Lamarck—that progressive changes in species have been +produced by the attempts of the animals to increase the development of +their own organs, and thus modify their structures and habits—has been +repeatedly and easily refuted by all writers on the subject of varieties +and species; . . . but the view here developed renders such an hypothesis +quite unnecessary. . . . The powerful retractile talons of the falcon +and cat tribes have not been produced or increased by the volition of +those animals; . . . neither did the giraffe acquire its long neck by +desiring to reach the foliage of the more lofty shrubs, and constantly +stretching its neck for this purpose, but because any varieties which +occurred among its antitypes with a longer neck than usual _at once +secured a fresh range of pasture over the same ground as their +shorter-necked companions_, _and on the first scarcity of food were thus +enabled to outlive them_” (italics in original). {96a} + +“Which occurred” is obviously “which happened to occur, by some chance or +accident entirely unconnected with use and disuse;” and though the word +“accidental” is never used, there can be no doubt about Mr. Wallace’s +desire to make the reader catch the fact that with him accident, and not, +as with Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck, sustained effort, is the main +purveyor of the variations whose accumulation amounts ultimately to +specific difference. It is a pity, however, that instead of contenting +himself like a theologian with saying that his opponent had been refuted +over and over again, he did not refer to any particular and tolerably +successful attempt to refute the theory that modifications in organic +structure are mainly functional. I am fairly well acquainted with the +literature of evolution, and have never met with any such attempt. But +let this pass; as with Mr. Darwin, so with Mr. Wallace, and so indeed +with all who accept Mr. Charles Darwin’s natural selection as the main +means of modification, the central idea is luck, while the central idea +of the Erasmus-Darwinian system is cunning. + +I have given the opinions of these contending parties in their extreme +development; but they both admit abatements which bring them somewhat +nearer to one another. Design, as even its most strenuous upholders will +admit, is a difficult word to deal with; it is, like all our ideas, +substantial enough until we try to grasp it—and then, like all our ideas, +it mockingly eludes us; it is like life or death—a rope of many strands; +there is design within design, and design within undesign; there is +undesign within design (as when a man shuffles cards designing that there +shall be no design in their arrangement), and undesign within undesign; +when we speak of cunning or design in connection with organism we do not +mean cunning, all cunning, and nothing but cunning, so that there shall +be no place for luck; we do not mean that conscious attention and +forethought shall have been bestowed upon the minutest details of action, +and nothing been left to work itself out departmentally according to +precedent, or as it otherwise best may according to the chapter of +accidents. + +So, again, when Mr. Darwin and his followers deny design and effort to +have been the main purveyors of the variations whose accumulation results +in specific difference, they do not entirely exclude the action of use +and disuse—and this at once opens the door for cunning; nevertheless, +according to Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck, the human eye and the long neck +of the giraffe are alike due to the accumulation of variations that are +mainly functional, and hence practical; according to Charles Darwin they +are alike due to the accumulation of variations that are accidental, +fortuitous, spontaneous, that is to say, mainly cannot be reduced to any +known general principle. According to Charles Darwin “the preservation +of favoured,” or lucky, “races” is by far the most important means of +modification; according to Erasmus Darwin effort _non sibi res sed se +rebus subjungere_ is unquestionably the most potent means; roughly, +therefore, there is no better or fairer way of putting the matter, than +to say that Charles Darwin is the apostle of luck, and his grandfather, +and Lamarck, of cunning. + +It should be observed also that the distinction between the organism and +its surroundings—on which both systems are founded—is one that cannot be +so universally drawn as we find it convenient to allege. There is a +debatable ground of considerable extent on which _res_ and _me_, ego and +non ego, luck and cunning, necessity and freewill, meet and pass into one +another as night and day, or life and death. No one can draw a sharp +line between ego and non ego, nor indeed any sharp line between any +classes of phenomena. Every part of the ego is non ego _quâ_ organ or +tool in use, and much of the non ego runs up into the ego and is +inseparably united with it; still there is enough that it is obviously +most convenient to call ego, and enough that it is no less obviously most +convenient to call non ego, as there is enough obvious day and obvious +night, or obvious luck and obvious cunning, to make us think it advisable +to keep separate accounts for each. + +I will say more on this head in a following chapter; in this present one +my business should be confined to pointing out as clearly and succinctly +as I can the issue between the two great main contending opinions +concerning organic development that obtain among those who accept the +theory of descent at all; nor do I believe that this can be done more +effectually and accurately than by saying, as above, that Mr. Charles +Darwin (whose name, by the way, was “Charles Robert,” and not, as would +appear from the title-pages of his books, “Charles” only), Mr. A. R. +Wallace, and their supporters are the apostles of luck, while Erasmus +Darwin and Lamarck, followed, more or less timidly, by the Geoffroys and +by Mr. Herbert Spencer, and very timidly indeed by the Duke of Argyll, +preach cunning as the most important means of organic modification. + + * * * * * + +NOTE.—It appears from “Samuel Butler: A Memoir” (II, 29) that Butler +wrote to his father (Dec. 1885) about a passage in Horace (near the +beginning of the First Epistle of the First Book)— + + Nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor, + Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor. + +On the preceding page he is adapting the second of these two verses to +his own purposes.—H. F. J. + + + + +Chapter VII +(_Intercalated_) +Mr. Spencer’s “The Factors of Organic Evolution” + + +SINCE the foregoing and several of the succeeding chapters were written, +Mr. Herbert Spencer has made his position at once more clear and more +widely understood by his articles “The Factors of Organic Evolution” +which appeared in the _Nineteenth Century_ for April and May, 1886. The +present appears the fittest place in which to intercalate remarks +concerning them. + +Mr. Spencer asks whether those are right who regard Mr. Charles Darwin’s +theory of natural selection as by itself sufficient to account for +organic evolution. + +“On critically examining the evidence” (modern writers never examine +evidence, they always “critically,” or “carefully,” or “patiently,” +examine it), he writes, “we shall find reason to think that it by no +means explains all that has to be explained. Omitting for the present +any consideration of a factor which may be considered primordial, it may +be contended that one of the factors alleged by Erasmus Darwin and +Lamarck must be recognised as a co-operator. Unless that increase of a +part resulting from extra activity, and that decrease of it resulting +from inactivity, are transmissible to descendants, we are without a key +to many phenomena of organic evolution. _Utterly inadequate to explain +the major part of the facts as is the hypothesis of the inheritance of +functionally produced modifications_, yet there is a minor part of the +facts very extensive though less, which must be ascribed to this cause.” +(Italics mine.) + +Mr. Spencer does not here say expressly that Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck +considered inheritance of functionally produced modifications to be the +sole explanation of the facts of organic life; modern writers on +evolution for the most part avoid saying anything expressly; this +nevertheless is the conclusion which the reader naturally draws—and was +doubtless intended to draw—from Mr. Spencer’s words. He gathers that +these writers put forward an “utterly inadequate” theory, which cannot +for a moment be entertained in the form in which they left it, but which, +nevertheless, contains contributions to the formation of a just opinion +which of late years have been too much neglected. + +This inference would be, as Mr. Spencer ought to know, a mistaken one. +Erasmus Darwin, who was the first to depend mainly on functionally +produced modifications, attributes, if not as much importance to +variations induced either by what we must call chance, or by causes +having no connection with use and disuse, as Mr. Spencer does, still so +nearly as much that there is little to choose between them. Mr. +Spencer’s words show that he attributes, if not half, still not far off +half the modification that has actually been produced, to use and disuse. +Erasmus Darwin does not say whether he considers use and disuse to have +brought about more than half or less than half; he only says that animal +and vegetable modification is “in part produced” by the exertions of the +animals and vegetables themselves; the impression I have derived is, that +just as Mr. Spencer considers rather less than half to be due to use and +disuse, so Erasmus Darwin considers decidedly more than half—so much +more, in fact, than half as to make function unquestionably the factor +most proper to be insisted on if only one can be given. Further than +this he did not go. I will quote enough of Dr. Erasmus Darwin’s own +words to put his position beyond doubt. He writes:— + +“Thirdly, when we enumerate the great changes produced in the species of +animals before their nativity, as, for example, when the offspring +reproduces the effects produced upon the parent by accident or culture, +or the changes produced by the mixture of species, as in mules; or the +changes produced probably by exuberance of nourishment supplied to the +foetus, as in monstrous births with additional limbs; many of these +enormities are propagated and continued as a variety at least, if not as +a new species of animal. I have seen a breed of cats with an additional +claw on every foot; of poultry also with an additional claw and with +wings to their feet; and of others without rumps. Mr. Buffon” (who, by +the way, surely, was no more “Mr. Buffon” than Lord Salisbury is “Mr. +Salisbury”) “mentions a breed of dogs without tails which are common at +Rome and Naples—which he supposes to have been produced by a custom long +established of cutting their tails close off.” {102a} + +Here not one of the causes of variation adduced is connected with use and +disuse, or effort, volition, and purpose; the manner, moreover, in which +they are brought forward is not that of one who shows signs of +recalcitrancy about admitting other causes of modification as well as use +and disuse; indeed, a little lower down he almost appears to assign the +subordinate place to functionally produced modifications, for he +says—“Fifthly, from their first rudiments or primordium to the +termination of their lives, all animals undergo perpetual +transformations; _which are in part produced_ by their own exertions in +consequence of their desires and aversions, of their pleasures and their +pains, or of irritations or of associations; and many of these acquired +forms or propensities are transmitted to their posterity.” + +I have quoted enough to show that Dr. Erasmus Darwin would have protested +against the supposition that functionally produced modifications were an +adequate explanation of all the phenomena of organic modification. He +declares accident and the chances and changes of this mortal life to be +potent and frequent causes of variations, which, being not infrequently +inherited, result in the formation of varieties and even species, but +considers these causes if taken alone as no less insufficient to account +for observable facts than the theory of functionally produced +modifications would be if not supplemented by inheritance of so-called +fortuitous, or spontaneous variations. The difference between Dr. +Erasmus Darwin and Mr. Spencer does not consist in the denial by the +first, that a variety which happens, no matter how accidentally, to have +varied in a way that enables it to comply more fully and readily with the +conditions of its existence, is likely to live longer and leave more +offspring than one less favoured; nor in the denial by the second of the +inheritance and accumulation of functionally produced modifications; but +in the amount of stress which they respectively lay on the relative +importance of the two great factors of organic evolution, the existence +of which they are alike ready to admit. + +With Erasmus Darwin there is indeed luck, and luck has had a great deal +to do with organic modification, but no amount of luck would have done +unless cunning had known how to take advantage of it; whereas if cunning +be given, a very little luck at a time will accumulate in the course of +ages and become a mighty heap. Cunning, therefore, is the factor on +which, having regard to the usage of language and the necessity for +simplifying facts, he thinks it most proper to insist. Surely this is as +near as may be the opinion which common consent ascribes to Mr. Spencer +himself. It is certainly the one which, in supporting Erasmus Darwin’s +system as against his grandson’s, I have always intended to support. +With Charles Darwin, on the other hand, there is indeed cunning, effort, +and consequent use and disuse; nor does he deny that these have produced +some, and sometimes even an important, effect in modifying species, but +he assigns by far the most important _rôle_ in the whole scheme to +natural selection, which, as I have already shown, must, with him, be +regarded as a synonym for luck pure and simple. This, for reasons well +shown by Mr. Spencer in the articles under consideration, is so untenable +that it seems only possible to account for its having been advanced at +all by supposing Mr. Darwin’s judgment to have been perverted by some one +or more of the many causes that might tend to warp them. What the chief +of those causes may have been I shall presently point out. + +Buffon erred rather on the side of ignoring functionally produced +modifications than of insisting on them. The main agency with him is the +direct action of the environment upon the organism. This, no doubt, is a +flaw in Buffon’s immortal work, but it is one which Erasmus Darwin and +Lamarck easily corrected; nor can we doubt that Buffon would have readily +accepted their amendment if it had been suggested to him. Buffon did +infinitely more in the way of discovering and establishing the theory of +descent with modification than any one has ever done either before or +since. He was too much occupied with proving the fact of evolution at +all, to dwell as fully as might have been wished upon the details of the +process whereby the amœba had become man, but we have already seen that +he regarded inherited mutilation as the cause of establishing a new breed +of dogs, and this is at any rate not laying much stress on functionally +produced modifications. Again, when writing of the dog, he speaks of +variations arising “_by some chance_ common enough with nature,” {104a} +and clearly does not contemplate function as the sole cause of +modification. Practically, though I grant I should be less able to quote +passages in support of my opinion than I quite like, I do not doubt that +his position was much the same as that of his successors, Erasmus Darwin +and Lamarck. + +Lamarck is more vulnerable than either Erasmus Darwin or Buffon on the +score of unwillingness to assign its full share to mere chance, but I do +not for a moment believe his comparative reticence to have been caused by +failure to see that the chapter of accidents is a fateful one. He saw +that the cunning or functional side had been too much lost sight of, and +therefore insisted on it, but he did not mean to say that there is no +such thing as luck. “Let us suppose,” he says, “that a grass growing in +a low-lying meadow, gets carried _by some accident_ to the brow of a +neighbouring hill, where the soil is still damp enough for the plant to +be able to exist.” {105a} Or again—“With sufficient time, favourable +conditions of life, successive changes in the condition of the globe, and +the power of new surroundings and habits to modify the organs of living +bodies, all animal and vegetable forms have been imperceptibly rendered +such as we now see them.” {105b} Who can doubt that accident is here +regarded as a potent factor of evolution, as well as the design that is +involved in the supposition that modification is, in the main, +functionally induced? Again he writes, “As regards the circumstances +that give rise to variation, the principal are climatic changes, +different temperatures of any of a creature’s environments, differences +of abode, of habit, of the most frequent actions, and lastly of the means +of obtaining food, self-defence, reproduction,” &c. {105c} I will not +dwell on the small inconsistencies which may be found in the passages +quoted above; the reader will doubtless see them, and will also doubtless +see that in spite of them there can be no doubt that Lamarck, while +believing modification to be effected mainly by the survival in the +struggle for existence of modifications which had been induced +functionally, would not have hesitated to admit the survival of +favourable variations due to mere accident as also a potent factor in +inducing the results we see around us. + +For the rest, Mr. Spencer’s articles have relieved me from the necessity +of going into the evidence which proves that such structures as a +giraffe’s neck, for example, cannot possibly have been produced by the +accumulation of variations which had their origin mainly in accident. +There is no occasion to add anything to what Mr. Spencer has said on this +score, and I am satisfied that those who do not find his argument +convince them would not be convinced by anything I might say; I shall, +therefore, omit what I had written on this subject, and confine myself to +giving the substance of Mr. Spencer’s most telling argument against Mr. +Darwin’s theory that accidental variations, if favourable, would +accumulate and result in seemingly adaptive structures. Mr. Spencer well +shows that luck or chance is insufficient as a motive-power, or helm, of +evolution; but luck is only absence of design; if, then, absence of +design is found to fail, it follows that there must have been design +somewhere, nor can the design be more conveniently placed than in +association with function. + +Mr. Spencer contends that where life is so simple as to consist +practically in the discharge of only one function, or where circumstances +are such that some one function is supremely important (a state of +things, by the way, more easily found in hypothesis than in nature—at +least as continuing without modification for many successive seasons), +then accidental variations, if favourable, would indeed accumulate and +result in modification, without the aid of the transmission of +functionally produced modification. This is true; it is also true, +however, that only a very small number of species in comparison with +those we see around us could thus arise, and that we should never have +got plants and animals as embodiments of the two great fundamental +principles on which it is alone possible that life can be conducted, +{107a} and species of plants and animals as embodiments of the details +involved in carrying out these two main principles. + +If the earliest organism could have only varied favourably in one +direction, the one possible favourable accidental variation would have +accumulated so long as the organism continued to exist at all, inasmuch +as this would be preserved whenever it happened to occur, while every +other would be lost in the struggle of competitive forms; but even in the +lowest forms of life there is more than one condition in respect of which +the organism must be supposed sensitive, and there are as many directions +in which variations may be favourable as there are conditions of the +environment that affect the organism. We cannot conceive of a living +form as having a power of adaptation limited to one direction only; the +elasticity which admits of a not being “extreme to mark that which is +done amiss” in one direction will commonly admit of it in as many +directions as there are possible favourable modes of variation; the +number of these, as has been just said, depends upon the number of the +conditions of the environment that affect the organism, and these last, +though in the long run and over considerable intervals of time tolerably +constant, are over shorter intervals liable to frequent and great +changes; so that there is nothing in Mr. Charles Darwin’s system of +modification through the natural survival of the lucky, to prevent gain +in one direction one year from being lost irretrievably in the next, +through the greater success of some in no way correlated variation, the +fortunate possessors of which alone survive. This, in its turn, is as +likely as not to disappear shortly through the arising of some difficulty +in some entirely new direction, and so on; nor, if function be regarded +as of small effect in determining organism, is there anything to ensure +either that, even if ground be lost for a season or two in any one +direction, it shall be recovered presently on resumption by the organism +of the habits that called it into existence, or that it shall appear +synchronously in a sufficient number of individuals to ensure its not +being soon lost through gamogenesis. + +How is progress ever to be made if races keep reversing, Penelope-like, +in one generation all that they have been achieving in the preceding? +And how, on Mr. Darwin’s system, of which the accumulation of strokes of +luck is the greatly preponderating feature, is a hoard ever to be got +together and conserved, no matter how often luck may have thrown good +things in an organism’s way? Luck, or absence of design, may be +sometimes almost said to throw good things in our way, or at any rate we +may occasionally get more through having made no design than any design +we should have been likely to have formed would have given us; but luck +does not hoard these good things for our use and make our wills for us, +nor does it keep providing us with the same good gifts again and again, +and no matter how often we reject them. + +I had better, perhaps, give Mr. Spencer’s own words as quoted by himself +in his article in the _Nineteenth Century_ for April, 1886. He there +wrote as follows, quoting from § 166 of his “Principles of Biology,” +which appeared in 1864:— + +“Where the life is comparatively simple, or where surrounding +circumstances render some one function supremely important, the survival +of the fittest” (which means here the survival of the luckiest) “may +readily bring about the appropriate structural change, without any aid +from the transmission of functionally-acquired modifications” (into which +effort and design have entered). “But in proportion as the life grows +complex—in proportion as a healthy existence cannot be secured by a large +endowment of some one power, but demands many powers; in the same +proportion do there arise obstacles to the increase of any particular +power, by ‘the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life’” +(that is to say, through mere survival of the luckiest). “As fast as the +faculties are multiplied, so fast does it become possible for the several +members of a species to have various kinds of superiority over one +another. While one saves its life by higher speed, another does the like +by clearer vision, another by keener scent, another by quicker hearing, +another by greater strength, another by unusual power of enduring cold or +hunger, another by special sagacity, another by special timidity, another +by special courage; and others by other bodily and mental attributes. +Now it is unquestionably true that, other things equal, each of these +attributes, giving its possessor an equal extra chance of life, is likely +to be transmitted to posterity. But there seems no reason to believe it +will be increased in subsequent generations by natural selection. That +it may be thus increased, the animals not possessing more than average +endowments of it must be more frequently killed off than individuals +highly endowed with it; and this can only happen when the attribute is +one of greater importance, for the time being, than most of the other +attributes. If those members of the species which have but ordinary +shares of it, nevertheless survive by virtue of other superiorities which +they severally possess, then it is not easy to see how this particular +attribute can be developed by natural selection in subsequent +generations.” (For if some other superiority is a greater source of +luck, then natural selection, or survival of the luckiest, will ensure +that this other superiority be preserved at the expense of the one +acquired in the earlier generation.) “The probability seems rather to +be, that by gamogenesis, this extra endowment will, on the average, be +diminished in posterity—just serving in the long run to compensate the +deficient endowments of other individuals, whose special powers lie in +other directions; and so to keep up the normal structure of the species. +The working out of the process is here somewhat difficult to follow” +(there is no difficulty as soon as it is perceived that Mr. Darwin’s +natural selection invariably means, or ought to mean, the survival of the +luckiest, and that seasons and what they bring with them, though fairly +constant on an average, yet individually vary so greatly that what is +luck in one season is disaster in another); “but it appears to me that as +fast as the number of bodily and mental faculties increases, and as fast +as the maintenance of life comes to depend less on the amount of any one, +and more on the combined action of all, so fast does the production of +specialities of character by natural selection alone become difficult. +Particularly does this seem to be so with a species so multitudinous in +powers as mankind; and above all does it seem to be so with such of the +human powers as have but minor shares in aiding the struggle for life—the +æsthetic faculties, for example. + +“Dwelling for a moment on this last illustration of the class of +difficulties described, let us ask how we are to interpret the +development of the musical faculty; how came there that endowment of +musical faculty which characterises modern Europeans at large, as +compared with their remote ancestors? The monotonous chants of low +savages cannot be said to show any melodic inspiration; and it is not +evident that an individual savage who had a little more musical +perception than the rest would derive any such advantage in the +maintenance of life as would secure the spread of his superiority by +inheritance of the variation,” &c. + +It should be observed that the passage given in the last paragraph but +one appeared in 1864, only five years after the first edition of the +“Origin of Species,” but, crushing as it is, Mr. Darwin never answered +it. He treated it as nonexistent—and this, doubtless from a business +standpoint, was the best thing he could do. How far such a course was +consistent with that single-hearted devotion to the interests of science +for which Mr. Darwin developed such an abnormal reputation, is a point +which I must leave to his many admirers to determine. + + + + +Chapter VIII +Property, Common Sense, and Protoplasm + + +ONE would think the issue stated in the three preceding chapters was +decided in the stating. This, as I have already implied, is probably the +reason why those who have a vested interest in Mr. Darwin’s philosophical +reputation have avoided stating it. + +It may be said that, seeing the result is a joint one, inasmuch as both +“res” and “me,” or both luck and cunning, enter so largely into +development, neither factor can claim pre-eminence to the exclusion of +the other. But life is short and business long, and if we are to get the +one into the other we must suppress details, and leave our words +pregnant, as painters leave their touches when painting from nature. If +one factor concerns us greatly more than the other, we should emphasize +it, and let the other go without saying, by force of association. There +is no fear of its being lost sight of; association is one of the few +really liberal things in nature; by liberal, I mean precipitate and +inaccurate; the power of words, as of pictures, and indeed the power to +carry on life at all, vests in the fact that association does not stick +to the letter of its bond, but will take the half for the whole without +even looking closely at the coin given to make sure that it is not +counterfeit. Through the haste and high pressure of business, errors +arise continually, and these errors give us the shocks of which our +consciousness is compounded. Our whole conscious life, therefore, grows +out of memory and out of the power of association, in virtue of which not +only does the right half pass for the whole, but the wrong half not +infrequently passes current for it also, without being challenged and +found out till, as it were, the accounts come to be balanced, and it is +found that they will not do so. + +Variations are an organism’s way of getting over an unexpected +discrepancy between its resources as shown by the fly-leaves of its own +cheques and the universe’s passbook; the universe is generally right, or +would be upheld as right if the matter were to come before the not too +incorruptible courts of nature, and in nine cases out of ten the organism +has made the error in its own favour, so that it must now pay or die. It +can only pay by altering its mode of life, and how long is it likely to +be before a new departure in its mode of life comes out in its own person +and in those of its family? Granted it will at first come out in their +appearance only, but there can be no change in appearance without some +slight corresponding organic modification. In practice there is usually +compromise in these matters. The universe, if it does not give an +organism short shrift and eat it at once, will commonly abate something +of its claim; it gets tricked out of an additional moiety by the +organism; the organism really does pay something by way of changed +habits; this results in variation, in virtue of which the accounts are +cooked, cobbled, and passed by a series of those miracles of +inconsistency which was call compromises, and after this they cannot be +reopened—not till next time. + +Surely of the two factors which go to the making up of development, +cunning is the one more proper to be insisted on as determining the +physical and psychical well or ill being, and hence, ere long, the future +form of the organism. We can hardly open a newspaper without seeing some +sign of this; take, for example, the following extract from a letter in +the _Times_ of the day on which I am writing (February 8, 1886)—“You may +pass along a road which divides a settlement of Irish Celts from one of +Germans. They all came to the country equally without money, and have +had to fight their way in the forest, but the difference in their +condition is very remarkable; on the German side there is comfort, +thrift, peace, but on the other side the spectacle is very different.” +Few will deny that slight organic differences, corresponding to these +differences of habit, are already perceptible; no Darwinian will deny +that these differences are likely to be inherited, and, in the absence of +intermarriage between the two colonies, to result in still more typical +difference than that which exists at present. According to Mr. Darwin, +the improved type of the more successful race would not be due mainly to +transmitted perseverance in well-doing, but to the fact that if any +member of the German colony “happened” to be born “ever so slightly,” &c. +Of course this last is true to a certain extent also; if any member of +the German colony does “happen to be born,” &c., then he will stand a +better chance of surviving, and, if he marries a wife like himself, of +transmitting his good qualities; but how about the happening? How is it +that this is of such frequent occurrence in the one colony, and is so +rare in the other? _Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis_. True, but how +and why? Through the race being favoured? In one sense, doubtless, it +is true that no man can have anything except it be given him from above, +but it must be from an above into the composition of which he himself +largely enters. God gives us all things; but we are a part of God, and +that part of Him, moreover, whose department it more especially is to +look after ourselves. It cannot be through luck, for luck is blind, and +does not pick out the same people year after year and generation after +generation; shall we not rather say, then, that it is because mind, or +cunning, is a great factor in the achievement of physical results, and +because there is an abiding memory between successive generations, in +virtue of which the cunning of an earlier one enures to the benefit of +its successors? + +It is one of the commonplaces of biology that the nature of the organism +(which is mainly determined by ancestral antecedents) is greatly more +important in determining its future than the conditions of its +environment, provided, of course, that these are not too cruelly +abnormal, so that good seed will do better on rather poor soil, than bad +seed on rather good soil; this alone should be enough to show that +cunning, or individual effort, is more important in determining organic +results than luck is, and therefore that if either is to be insisted on +to the exclusion of the other, it should be cunning, not luck. Which is +more correctly said to be the main means of the development of +capital—Luck? or Cunning? Of course there must be something to be +developed—and luck, that is to say, the unknowable and unforeseeable, +enters everywhere; but is it more convenient with our oldest and +best-established ideas to say that luck is the main means of the +development of capital, or that cunning is so? Can there be a moment’s +hesitation in admitting that if capital is found to have been developed +largely, continuously, by many people, in many ways, over a long period +of time, it can only have been by means of continued application, energy, +effort, industry, and good sense? Granted there has been luck too; of +course there has, but we let it go without saying, whereas we cannot let +the skill or cunning go without saying, inasmuch as we feel the cunning +to have been the essence of the whole matter. + +Granted, again, that there is no test more fallacious on a small scale +than that of immediate success. As applied to any particular individual, +it breaks down completely. It is unfortunately no rare thing to see the +good man striving against fate, and the fool born with a silver spoon in +his mouth. Still on a large scale no test can be conceivably more +reliable; a blockhead may succeed for a time, but a succession of many +generations of blockheads does not go on steadily gaining ground, adding +field to field and farm to farm, and becoming year by year more capable +and prosperous. Given time—of which there is no scant in the matter of +organic development—and cunning will do more with ill luck than folly +with good. People do not hold six trumps every hand for a dozen games of +whist running, if they do not keep a card or two up their sleeves. +Cunning, if it can keep its head above water at all, will beat mere luck +unaided by cunning, no matter what start luck may have had, if the race +be a fairly long one. Growth is a kind of success which does indeed come +to some organisms with less effort than to others, but it cannot be +maintained and improved upon without pains and effort. A foolish +organism and its fortuitous variation will be soon parted, for, as a +general rule, unless the variation has so much connection with the +organism’s past habits and ways of thought as to be in no proper sense of +the word “fortuitous,” the organism will not know what to do with it when +it has got it, no matter how favourable it may be, and it is little +likely to be handed down to descendants. Indeed the kind of people who +get on best in the world—and what test to a Darwinian can be comparable +to this?—commonly do insist on cunning rather than on luck, sometimes +perhaps even unduly; speaking, at least, from experience, I have +generally found myself more or less of a failure with those Darwinians to +whom I have endeavoured to excuse my shortcomings on the score of luck. + +It may be said that the contention that the nature of the organism does +more towards determining its future than the conditions of its immediate +environment do, is only another way of saying that the accidents which +have happened to an organism in the persons of its ancestors throughout +all time are more irresistible by it for good or ill than any of the more +ordinary chances and changes of its own immediate life. I do not deny +this; but these ancestral accidents were either turned to account, or +neglected where they might have been taken advantage of; they thus passed +either into skill, or want of skill; so that whichever way the fact is +stated the result is the same; and if simplicity of statement be +regarded, there is no more convenient way of putting the matter than to +say that though luck is mighty, cunning is mightier still. Organism +commonly shows its cunning by practising what Horace preached, and +treating itself as more plastic than its surroundings; those indeed who +have had the greatest the first to admit that they had gained their ends +more by reputation as moulders of circumstances have ever been shaping +their actions and themselves to suit events, than by trying to shape +events to suit themselves and their actions. Modification, like charity, +begins at home. + +But however this may be, there can be no doubt that cunning is in the +long run mightier than luck as regards the acquisition of property, and +what applies to property applies to organism also. Property, as I have +lately seen was said by Rosmini, is a kind of extension of the +personality into the outside world. He might have said as truly that it +is a kind of penetration of the outside world within the limits of the +personality, or that it is at any rate a prophesying of, and essay after, +the more living phase of matter in the direction of which it is tending. +If approached from the dynamical or living side of the underlying +substratum, it is the beginning of the comparatively stable equilibrium +which we call brute matter; if from the statical side, that is to say, +from that of brute matter, it is the beginning of that dynamical state +which we associate with life; it is the last of ego and first of non ego, +or _vice versâ_, as the case may be; it is the ground whereon the two +meet and are neither wholly one nor wholly the other, but a whirling mass +of contradictions such as attends all fusion. + +What property is to a man’s mind or soul that his body is also, only more +so. The body is property carried to the bitter end, or property is the +body carried to the bitter end, whichever the reader chooses; the +expression “organic wealth” is not figurative; none other is so apt and +accurate; so universally, indeed, is this recognised that the fact has +found expression in our liturgy, which bids us pray for all those who are +any wise afflicted “in mind, body, or estate;” no inference, therefore, +can be more simple and legitimate than the one in accordance with which +the laws that govern the development of wealth generally are supposed +also to govern the particular form of health and wealth which comes most +closely home to us—I mean that of our bodily implements or organs. What +is the stomach but a living sack, or purse of untanned leather, wherein +we keep our means of subsistence? Food is money made easy; it is petty +cash in its handiest and most reduced form; it is our way of assimilating +our possessions and making them indeed our own. What is the purse but a +kind of abridged extra corporeal stomach wherein we keep the money which +we convert by purchase into food, as we presently convert the food by +digestion into flesh and blood? And what living form is there which is +without a purse or stomach, even though it have to job it by the meal as +the amœba does, and exchange it for some other article as soon as it has +done eating? How marvellously does the analogy hold between the purse +and the stomach alike as regards form and function; and I may say in +passing that, as usual, the organ which is the more remote from +protoplasm is at once more special, more an object of our consciousness, +and less an object of its own. + +Talk of ego and non ego meeting, and of the hopelessness of avoiding +contradiction in terms—talk of this, and look, in passing, at the amœba. +It is itself _quâ_ maker of the stomach and being fed; it is not itself +_quâ_ stomach and _quâ_ its using itself as a mere tool or implement to +feed itself with. It is active and passive, object and subject, _ego_ +and _non ego_—every kind of Irish bull, in fact, which a sound logician +abhors—and it is only because it has persevered, as I said in “Life and +Habit,” in thus defying logic and arguing most virtuously in a most +vicious circle, that it has come in the persons of some of its +descendants to reason with sufficient soundness. And what the amœba is +man is also; man is only a great many amœbas, most of them dreadfully +narrow-minded, going up and down the country with their goods and +chattels like gipsies in a caravan; he is only a great many amœbas that +have had much time and money spent on their education, and received large +bequests of organised intelligence from those that have gone before them. + +The most incorporate tool—we will say an eye, or a tooth, or the closed +fist when used to strike—has still something of the _non ego_ about it in +so far as it is used; those organs, again, that are the most completely +separate from the body, as the locomotive engine, must still from time to +time kiss the soil of the human body, and be handled and thus crossed +with man again if they would remain in working order. They cannot be cut +adrift from the most living form of matter (I mean most living from our +point of view), and remain absolutely without connection with it for any +length of time, any more than a seal can live without coming up sometimes +to breathe; and in so far as they become linked on to living beings they +live. Everything is living which is in close communion with, and +interpermeated by, that something which we call mind or thought. +Giordano Bruno saw this long ago when he made an interlocutor in one of +his dialogues say that a man’s hat and cloak are alive when he is wearing +them. “Thy boots and spurs live,” he exclaims, “when thy feet carry +them; thy hat lives when thy head is within it; and so the stable lives +when it contains the horse or mule, or even yourself;” nor is it easy to +see how this is to be refuted except at a cost which no one in his senses +will offer. + +It may be said that the life of clothes in wear and implements in use is +no true life, inasmuch as it differs from flesh and blood life in too +many and important respects; that we have made up our minds about not +letting life outside the body too decisively to allow the question to be +reopened; that if this be tolerated we shall have societies for the +prevention of cruelty to chairs and tables, or cutting clothes amiss, or +wearing them to tatters, or whatever other absurdity may occur to idle +and unkind people; the whole discussion, therefore, should be ordered out +of court at once. + +I admit that this is much the most sensible position to take, but it can +only be taken by those who turn the deafest of deaf ears to the teachings +of science, and tolerate no going even for a moment below the surface of +things. People who take this line must know how to put their foot down +firmly in the matter of closing a discussion. Some one may perhaps +innocently say that some parts of the body are more living and vital than +others, and those who stick to common sense may allow this, but if they +do they must close the discussion on the spot; if they listen to another +syllable they are lost; if they let the innocent interlocutor say so much +as that a piece of well-nourished healthy brain is more living than the +end of a finger-nail that wants cutting, or than the calcareous parts of +a bone, the solvent will have been applied which will soon make an end of +common sense ways of looking at the matter. Once even admit the use of +the participle “dying,” which involves degrees of death, and hence an +entry of death in part into a living body, and common sense must either +close the discussion at once, or ere long surrender at discretion. + +Common sense can only carry weight in respect of matters with which every +one is familiar, as forming part of the daily and hourly conduct of +affairs; if we would keep our comfortable hard and fast lines, our rough +and ready unspecialised ways of dealing with difficult questions, our +impatience of what St. Paul calls “doubtful disputations,” we must refuse +to quit the ground on which the judgments of mankind have been so long +and often given that they are not likely to be questioned. Common sense +is not yet formulated in manners of science or philosophy, for only few +consider them; few decisions, therefore, have been arrived at which all +hold final. Science is, like love, “too young to know what conscience,” +or common sense, is. As soon as the world began to busy itself with +evolution it said good-bye to common sense, and must get on with uncommon +sense as best it can. The first lesson that uncommon sense will teach it +is that contradiction in terms is the foundation of all sound +reasoning—and, as an obvious consequence, compromise, the foundation of +all sound practice. This, it follows easily, involves the corollary that +as faith, to be of any value, must be based on reason, so reason, to be +of any value, must be based on faith, and that neither can stand alone or +dispense with the other, any more than culture or vulgarity can stand +unalloyed with one another without much danger of mischance. + +It may not perhaps be immediately apparent why the admission that a piece +of healthy living brain is more living than the end of a finger-nail, is +so dangerous to common sense ways of looking at life and death; I had +better, therefore, be more explicit. By this admission degrees of +livingness are admitted within the body; this involves approaches to +non-livingness. On this the question arises, “Which are the most living +parts?” The answer to this was given a few years ago with a flourish of +trumpets, and our biologists shouted with one voice, “Great is +protoplasm. There is no life but protoplasm, and Huxley is its prophet.” +Read Huxley’s “Physical Basis of Mind.” Read Professor Mivart’s article, +“What are Living Beings?” in the _Contemporary Review_, July, 1879. Read +Dr. Andrew Wilson’s article in the _Gentleman’s Magazine_, October, 1879. +Remember Professor Allman’s address to the British Association, 1879; +ask, again, any medical man what is the most approved scientific attitude +as regards the protoplasmic and non-protoplasmic parts of the body, and +he will say that the thinly veiled conclusion arrived at by all of them +is, that the protoplasmic parts are alone truly living, and that the +non-protoplasmic are non-living. + +It may suffice if I confine myself to Professor Allman’s address to the +British Association in 1879, as a representative utterance. Professor +Allman said:— + +“Protoplasm lies at the base of every vital phenomenon. It is, as Huxley +has well expressed it, ‘the physical basis of life;’ wherever there is +life from its lowest to its highest manifestation there is protoplasm; +wherever there is protoplasm there is life.” {122a} + +To say wherever there is life there is protoplasm, is to say that there +can be no life without protoplasm, and this is saying that where there is +no protoplasm there is no life. But large parts of the body are +non-protoplasmic; a bone is, indeed, permeated by protoplasm, but it is +not protoplasm; it follows, therefore, that according to Professor Allman +bone is not in any proper sense of words a living substance. From this +it should follow, and doubtless does follow in Professor Allman’s mind, +that large tracts of the human body, if not the greater part by weight +(as bones, skin, muscular tissues, &c.), are no more alive than a coat or +pair of boots in wear is alive, except in so far as the bones, &c., are +more closely and nakedly permeated by protoplasm than the coat or boots, +and are thus brought into closer, directer, and more permanent +communication with that which, if not life itself, still has more of the +ear of life, and comes nearer to its royal person than anything else +does. Indeed that this is Professor Allman’s opinion appears from the +passage on page 26 of the report, in which he says that in “protoplasm we +find the only form of matter in which life can manifest itself.” + +According to this view the skin and other tissues are supposed to be made +from dead protoplasm which living protoplasm turns to account as the +British Museum authorities are believed to stuff their new specimens with +the skins of old ones; the matter used by the living protoplasm for this +purpose is held to be entirely foreign to protoplasm itself, and no more +capable of acting in concert with it than bricks can understand and act +in concert with the bricklayer. As the bricklayer is held to be living +and the bricks non-living, so the bones and skin which protoplasm is +supposed to construct are held non-living and the protoplasm alone +living. Protoplasm, it is said, goes about masked behind the clothes or +habits which it has fashioned. It has habited itself as animals and +plants, and we have mistaken the garment for the wearer—as our dogs and +cats doubtless think with Giordano Bruno that our boots live when we are +wearing them, and that we keep spare paws in our bedrooms which lie by +the wall and go to sleep when we have not got them on. + +If, in answer to the assertion that the osseous parts of bone are +non-living, it is said that they must be living, for they heal if broken, +which no dead matter can do, it is answered that the broken pieces of +bone do not grow together; they are mended by the protoplasm which +permeates the Haversian canals; the bones themselves are no more living +merely because they are tenanted by something which really does live, +than a house lives because men and women inhabit it; and if a bone is +repaired, it no more repairs itself than a house can be said to have +repaired itself because its owner has sent for the bricklayer and seen +that what was wanted was done. + +We do not know, it is said, by what means the structureless viscid +substance which we call protoplasm can build for itself a solid bone; we +do not understand how an amœba makes its test; no one understands how +anything is done unless he can do it himself; and even then he probably +does not know how he has done it. Set a man who has never painted, to +watch Rembrandt paint the Burgomaster Six, and he will no more understand +how Rembrandt can have done it, than we can understand how the amœba +makes its test, or the protoplasm cements two broken ends of a piece of +bone. _Ces choses se font mais ne s’expliquent pas_. So some denizen of +another planet looking at our earth through a telescope which showed him +much, but still not quite enough, and seeing the St. Gothard tunnel plumb +on end so that he could not see the holes of entry and exit, would think +the trains there a kind of caterpillar which went through the mountain by +a pure effort of the will—that enabled them in some mysterious way to +disregard material obstacles and dispense with material means. We know, +of course, that it is not so, and that exemption from the toil attendant +on material obstacles has been compounded for, in the ordinary way, by +the single payment of a tunnel; and so with the cementing of a bone, our +biologists say that the protoplasm, which is alone living, cements it +much as a man might mend a piece of broken china, but that it works by +methods and processes which elude us, even as the holes of the St. +Gothard tunnel may be supposed to elude a denizen of another world. + +The reader will already have seen that the toils are beginning to close +round those who, while professing to be guided by common sense, still +parley with even the most superficial probers beneath the surface; this, +however, will appear more clearly in the following chapter. It will also +appear how far-reaching were the consequences of the denial of design +that was involved in Mr. Darwin’s theory that luck is the main element in +survival, and how largely this theory is responsible for the fatuous +developments in connection alike with protoplasm and automatism which a +few years ago seemed about to carry everything before them. + + + + +Chapter IX +Property, Common Sense, and Protoplasm (_continued_) + + +THE position, then, stands thus. Common sense gave the inch of admitting +some parts of the body to be less living than others, and philosophy took +the ell of declaring the body to be almost all of it stone dead. This is +serious; still if it were all, for a quiet life, we might put up with it. +Unfortunately we know only too well that it will not be all. Our bodies, +which seemed so living and now prove so dead, have served us such a trick +that we can have no confidence in anything connected with them. As with +skin and bones to-day, so with protoplasm to-morrow. Protoplasm is +mainly oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon; if we do not keep a sharp +look out, we shall have it going the way of the rest of the body, and +being declared dead in respect, at any rate, of these inorganic +components. Science has not, I believe, settled all the components of +protoplasm, but this is neither here nor there; she has settled what it +is in great part, and there is no trusting her not to settle the rest at +any moment, even if she has not already done so. As soon as this has +been done we shall be told that nine-tenths of the protoplasm of which we +are composed must go the way of our non-protoplasmic parts, and that the +only really living part of us is the something with a new name that runs +the protoplasm that runs the flesh and bones that run the organs— + +Why stop here? Why not add “which run the tools and properties which are +as essential to our life and health as much that is actually incorporate +with us?” The same breach which has let the non-living effect a lodgment +within the body must, in all equity, let the organic +character—bodiliness, so to speak—pass out beyond its limits and effect a +lodgment in our temporary and extra-corporeal limbs. What, on the +protoplasmic theory, the skin and bones are, that the hammer and spade +are also; they differ in the degree of closeness and permanence with +which they are associated with protoplasm, but both bones and hammers are +alike non-living things which protoplasm uses for its own purposes and +keeps closer or less close at hand as custom and convenience may +determine. + +According to this view, the non-protoplasmic parts of the body are tools +of the first degree; they are not living, but they are in such close and +constant contact with that which really lives, that an aroma of life +attaches to them. Some of these, however, such as horns, hooves, and +tusks, are so little permeated by protoplasm that they cannot rank much +higher than the tools of the second degree, which come next to them in +order. + +These tools of the second degree are either picked up ready-made, or are +manufactured directly by the body, as being torn or bitten into shape, or +as stones picked up to throw at prey or at an enemy. + +Tools of the third degree are made by the instrumentality of tools of the +second and first degrees; as, for example, chipped flint, arrow-heads, +&c. + +Tools of the fourth degree are made by those of the third, second, and +first. They consist of the simpler compound instruments that yet require +to be worked by hand, as hammers, spades, and even hand flour-mills. + +Tools of the fifth degree are made by the help of those of the fourth, +third, second, and first. They are compounded of many tools, worked, it +may be, by steam or water and requiring no constant contact with the +body. + +But each one of these tools of the fifth degree was made in the first +instance by the sole instrumentality of the four preceding kinds of tool. +They must all be linked on to protoplasm, which is the one original +tool-maker, but which can only make the tools that are more remote from +itself by the help of those that are nearer, that is to say, it can only +work when it has suitable tools to work with, and when it is allowed to +use them in its own way. There can be no direct communication between +protoplasm and a steam-engine; there may be and often is direct +communication between machines of even the fifth order and those of the +first, as when an engine-man turns a cock, or repairs something with his +own hands if he has nothing better to work with. But put a hammer, for +example, to a piece of protoplasm, and the protoplasm will no more know +what to do with it than we should be able to saw a piece of wood in two +without a saw. Even protoplasm from the hand of a carpenter who has been +handling hammers all his life would be hopelessly put off its stroke if +not allowed to work in its usual way but put bare up against a hammer; it +would make a slimy mess and then dry up; still there can be no doubt (so +at least those who uphold protoplasm as the one living substance would +say) that the closer a machine can be got to protoplasm and the more +permanent the connection, the more living it appears to be, or at any +rate the more does it appear to be endowed with spontaneous and reasoning +energy, so long, of course, as the closeness is of a kind which +protoplasm understands and is familiar with. This, they say, is why we +do not like using any implement or tool with gloves on, for these impose +a barrier between the tool and its true connection with protoplasm by +means of the nervous system. For the same reason we put gloves on when +we box so as to bar the connection. + +That which we handle most unglovedly is our food, which we handle with +our stomachs rather than with our hands. Our hands are so thickly +encased with skin that protoplasm can hold but small conversation with +what they contain, unless it be held for a long time in the closed fist, +and even so the converse is impeded as in a strange language; the inside +of our mouths is more naked, and our stomachs are more naked still; it is +here that protoplasm brings its fullest powers of suasion to bear on +those whom it would proselytise and receive as it were into its own +communion—whom it would convert and bring into a condition of mind in +which they shall see things as it sees them itself, and, as we commonly +say, “agree with” it, instead of standing out stiffly for their own +opinion. We call this digesting our food; more properly we should call +it being digested by our food, which reads, marks, learns, and inwardly +digests us, till it comes to understand us and encourage us by assuring +us that we were perfectly right all the time, no matter what any one +might have said, or say, to the contrary. Having thus recanted all its +own past heresies, it sets to work to convert everything that comes near +it and seems in the least likely to be converted. Eating is a mode of +love; it is an effort after a closer union; so we say we love roast beef. +A French lady told me once that she adored veal; and a nurse tells her +child that she would like to eat it. Even he who caresses a dog or horse +_pro tanto_ both weds and eats it. Strange how close the analogy between +love and hunger; in each case the effort is after closer union and +possession; in each case the outcome is reproduction (for nutrition is +the most complete of reproductions), and in each case there are +_residua_. But to return. + +I have shown above that one consequence of the attempt so vigorously made +a few years ago to establish protoplasm as the one living substance, is +the making it clear that the non-protoplasmic parts of the body and the +simpler extra-corporeal tools or organs must run on all fours in the +matter of livingness and non-livingness. If the protoplasmic parts of +the body are held living in virtue of their being used by something that +really lives, then so, though in a less degree, must tools and machines. +If, on the other hand, tools and machines are held non-living inasmuch as +they only owe what little appearance of life they may present when in +actual use to something else that lives, and have no life of their +own—so, though in a less degree, must the non-protoplasmic parts of the +body. Allow an overflowing aroma of life to vivify the horny skin under +the heel, and from this there will be a spilling which will vivify the +boot in wear. Deny an aroma of life to the boot in wear, and it must ere +long be denied to ninety-nine per cent. of the body; and if the body is +not alive while it can walk and talk, what in the name of all that is +unreasonable can be held to be so? + +That the essential identity of bodily organs and tools is no ingenious +paradoxical way of putting things is evident from the fact that we speak +of bodily organs at all. Organ means tool. There is nothing which +reveals our most genuine opinions to us so unerringly as our habitual and +unguarded expressions, and in the case under consideration so completely +do we instinctively recognise the underlying identity of tools and limbs, +that scientific men use the word “organ” for any part of the body that +discharges a function, practically to the exclusion of any other term. +Of course, however, the above contention as to the essential identity of +tools and organs does not involve a denial of their obvious superficial +differences—differences so many and so great as to justify our classing +them in distinct categories so long as we have regard to the daily +purposes of life without looking at remoter ones. + +If the above be admitted, we can reply to those who in an earlier chapter +objected to our saying that if Mr. Darwin denied design in the eye he +should deny it in the burglar’s jemmy also. For if bodily and non-bodily +organs are essentially one in kind, being each of them both living and +non-living, and each of them only a higher development of principles +already admitted and largely acted on in the other, then the method of +procedure observable in the evolution of the organs whose history is +within our ken should throw light upon the evolution of that whose +history goes back into so dim a past that we can only know it by way of +inference. In the absence of any show of reason to the contrary we +should argue from the known to the unknown, and presume that even as our +non-bodily organs originated and were developed through gradual +accumulation of design, effort, and contrivance guided by experience, so +also must our bodily organs have been, in spite of the fact that the +contrivance has been, as it were, denuded of external evidences in the +course of long time. This at least is the most obvious inference to +draw; the burden of proof should rest not with those who uphold function +as the most important means of organic modification, but with those who +impugn it; it is hardly necessary, however, to say that Mr. Darwin never +attempted to impugn by way of argument the conclusions either of his +grandfather or of Lamarck. He waved them both aside in one or two short +semi-contemptuous sentences, and said no more about them—not, at least, +until late in life he wrote his “Erasmus Darwin,” and even then his +remarks were purely biographical; he did not say one syllable by way of +refutation, or even of explanation. + +I am free to confess that, overwhelming as is the evidence brought +forward by Mr. Spencer in the articles already referred to, as showing +that accidental variations, unguided by the helm of any main general +principle which should as it were keep their heads straight, could never +accumulate with the results supposed by Mr. Darwin; and overwhelming, +again, as is the consideration that Mr. Spencer’s most crushing argument +was allowed by Mr. Darwin to go without reply, still the considerations +arising from the discoveries of the last forty years or so in connection +with protoplasm, seem to me almost more overwhelming still. This +evidence proceeds on different lines from that adduced by Mr. Spencer, +but it points to the same conclusion, namely, that though luck will avail +much if backed by cunning and experience, it is unavailing for any +permanent result without them. There is an irony which seems almost +always to attend on those who maintain that protoplasm is the only living +substance which ere long points their conclusions the opposite way to +that which they desire—in the very last direction, indeed, in which they +of all people in the world would willingly see them pointed. + +It may be asked why I should have so strong an objection to seeing +protoplasm as the only living substance, when I find this view so useful +to me as tending to substantiate design—which I admit that I have as much +and as seriously at heart as I can allow myself to have any matter which, +after all, can so little affect daily conduct; I reply that it is no part +of my business to inquire whether this or that makes for my pet theories +or against them; my concern is to inquire whether or no it is borne out +by facts, and I find the opinion that protoplasm is the one living +substance unstable, inasmuch as it is an attempt to make a halt where no +halt can be made. This is enough; but, furthermore, the fact that the +protoplasmic parts of the body are _more_ living than the +non-protoplasmic—which I cannot deny, without denying that it is any +longer convenient to think of life and death at all—will answer my +purpose to the full as well or better. + +I pointed out another consequence, which, again, was cruelly the reverse +of what the promoters of the protoplasm movement might be supposed +anxious to arrive at—in a series of articles which appeared in the +_Examiner_ during the summer of 1879, and showed that if protoplasm were +held to be the sole seat of life, then this unity in the substance +vivifying all, both animals and plants, must be held as uniting them into +a single corporation or body—especially when their community of descent +is borne in mind—more effectually than any merely superficial separation +into individuals can be held to disunite them, and that thus protoplasm +must be seen as the life of the world—as a vast body corporate, never +dying till the earth itself shall pass away. This came practically to +saying that protoplasm was God Almighty, who, of all the forms open to +Him, had chosen this singularly unattractive one as the channel through +which to make Himself manifest in the flesh by taking our nature upon +Him, and animating us with His own Spirit. Our biologists, in fact, were +fast nearing the conception of a God who was both personal and material, +but who could not be made to square with pantheistic notions inasmuch as +no provision was made for the inorganic world; and, indeed, they seem to +have become alarmed at the grotesqueness of the position in which they +must ere long have found themselves, for in the autumn of 1879 the boom +collapsed, and thenceforth the leading reviews and magazines have known +protoplasm no more. About the same time bathybius, which at one time +bade fair to supplant it upon the throne of popularity, died suddenly, as +I am told, at Norwich, under circumstances which did not transpire, nor +has its name, so far as I am aware, been ever again mentioned. + +So much for the conclusions in regard to the larger aspect of life taken +as a whole which must follow from confining life to protoplasm; but there +is another aspect—that, namely, which regards the individual. The +inevitable consequences of confining life to the protoplasmic parts of +the body were just as unexpected and unwelcome here as they had been with +regard to life at large; for, as I have already pointed out, there is no +drawing the line at protoplasm and resting at this point; nor yet at the +next halting-point beyond; nor at the one beyond that. How often is this +process to be repeated? and in what can it end but in the rehabilitation +of the soul as an ethereal, spiritual, vital principle, apart from +matter, which, nevertheless, it animates, vivifying the clay of our +bodies? No one who has followed the course either of biology or +psychology during this century, and more especially during the last +five-and-twenty years, will tolerate the reintroduction of the soul as +something apart from the substratum in which both feeling and action must +be held to inhere. The notion of matter being ever changed except by +other matter in another state is so shocking to the intellectual +conscience that it may be dismissed without discussion; yet if bathybius +had not been promptly dealt with, it must have become apparent even to +the British public that there were indeed but few steps from protoplasm, +as the only living substance, to vital principle. Our biologists +therefore stifled bathybius, perhaps with justice, certainly with +prudence, and left protoplasm to its fate. + +Any one who reads Professor Allman’s address above referred to with due +care will see that he was uneasy about protoplasm, even at the time of +its greatest popularity. Professor Allman never says outright that the +non-protoplasmic parts of the body are no more alive than chairs and +tables are. He said what involved this as an inevitable consequence, and +there can be no doubt that this is what he wanted to convey, but he never +insisted on it with the outspokenness and emphasis with which so +startling a paradox should alone be offered us for acceptance; nor is it +easy to believe that his reluctance to express his conclusion _totidem +verbis_ was not due to a sense that it might ere long prove more +convenient not to have done so. When I advocated the theory of the +livingness, or quasi-livingness of machines, in the chapters of “Erewhon” +of which all else that I have written on biological subjects is a +development, I took care that people should see the position in its +extreme form; the non-livingness of bodily organs is to the full as +startling a paradox as the livingness of non-bodily ones, and we have a +right to expect the fullest explicitness from those who advance it. Of +course it must be borne in mind that a machine can only claim any +appreciable even aroma of livingness so long as it is in actual use. In +“Erewhon” I did not think it necessary to insist on this, and did not, +indeed, yet fully know what I was driving at. + +The same disposition to avoid committing themselves to the assertion that +any part of the body is non-living may be observed in the writings of the +other authorities upon protoplasm above referred to; I have searched all +they said, and cannot find a single passage in which they declare even +the osseous parts of a bone to be non-living, though this conclusion was +the _raison d’être_ of all they were saying and followed as an obvious +inference. The reader will probably agree with me in thinking that such +reticence can only have been due to a feeling that the ground was one on +which it behoved them to walk circumspectly; they probably felt, after a +vague, ill-defined fashion, that the more they reduced the body to +mechanism the more they laid it open to an opponent to raise mechanism to +the body, but, however this may be, they dropped protoplasm, as I have +said, in some haste with the autumn of 1879. + + + + +Chapter X +The Attempt to Eliminate Mind + + +WHAT, it may be asked, were our biologists really aiming at?—for men like +Professor Huxley do not serve protoplasm for nought. They wanted a good +many things, some of them more righteous than others, but all +intelligible. Among the more lawful of their desires was a craving after +a monistic conception of the universe. We all desire this; who can turn +his thoughts to these matters at all and not instinctively lean towards +the old conception of one supreme and ultimate essence as the source from +which all things proceed and have proceeded, both now and ever? The most +striking and apparently most stable theory of the last quarter of a +century had been Sir William Grove’s theory of the conservation of +energy; and yet wherein is there any substantial difference between this +recent outcome of modern amateur, and hence most sincere, +science—pointing as it does to an imperishable, and as such unchangeable, +and as such, again, for ever unknowable underlying substance the modes of +which alone change—wherein, except in mere verbal costume, does this +differ from the conclusions arrived at by the psalmist? + +“Of old,” he exclaims, “hast Thou laid the foundation of the earth; and +the heavens are the work of Thy hands. They shall perish, but Thou shalt +endure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt +Thou change them and they shall be changed; but Thou art the same, and +Thy years shall have no end.” {135a} + +I know not what theologians may think of this passage, but from a +scientific point of view it is unassailable. So again, “O Lord,” he +exclaims, “Thou hast searched me out, and known me: Thou knowest my +down-sitting and mine up-rising; Thou understandest my thoughts long +before. Thou art about my path, and about my bed: and spiest out all my +ways. For lo, there is not a word in my tongue but Thou, O Lord, knowest +it altogether . . . Whither shall I go, then, from Thy Spirit? Or +whither shall I go, then, from Thy presence? If I climb up into heaven +Thou art there: if I go down to hell, Thou art there also. If I take the +wings of the morning, and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea, even +there also shall Thy hand lead me and Thy right hand shall hold me. If I +say, Peradventure the darkness shall cover me, then shall my night be +turned to day. Yea, the darkness is no darkness with Thee, but . . . the +darkness and light to Thee are both alike.” {136a} + +What convention or short cut can symbolise for us the results of laboured +and complicated chains of reasoning or bring them more aptly and +concisely home to us than the one supplied long since by the word God? +What can approach more nearly to a rendering of that which cannot be +rendered—the idea of an essence omnipresent in all things at all times +everywhere in sky and earth and sea; ever changing, yet the same +yesterday, to-day, and for ever; the ineffable contradiction in terms +whose presence none can either ever enter, or ever escape? Or rather, +what convention would have been more apt if it had not been lost sight of +as a convention and come to be regarded as an idea in actual +correspondence with a more or less knowable reality? A convention was +converted into a fetish, and now that its worthlessness as a fetish is +being generally felt, its great value as a hieroglyph or convention is in +danger of being lost sight of. No doubt the psalmist was seeking for Sir +William Grove’s conception, if haply he might feel after it and find it, +and assuredly it is not far from every one of us. But the course of true +philosophy never did run smooth; no sooner have we fairly grasped the +conception of a single eternal and for ever unknowable underlying +substance, then we are faced by mind and matter. Long-standing ideas and +current language alike lead us to see these as distinct things—mind being +still commonly regarded as something that acts on body from without as +the wind blows upon a leaf, and as no less an actual entity than the +body. Neither body nor mind seems less essential to our existence than +the other; not only do we feel this as regards our own existence, but we +feel it also as pervading the whole world of life; everywhere we see body +and mind working together towards results that must be ascribed equally +to both; but they are two, not one; if, then, we are to have our monistic +conception, it would seem as though one of these must yield to the other; +which, therefore, is it to be? + +This is a very old question. Some, from time immemorial, have tried to +get rid of matter by reducing it to a mere concept of the mind, and their +followers have arrived at conclusions that may be logically irrefragable, +but are as far removed from common sense as they are in accord with +logic; at any rate they have failed to satisfy, and matter is no nearer +being got rid of now than it was when the discussion first began. +Others, again, have tried materialism, have declared the causative action +of both thought and feeling to be deceptive, and posit matter obeying +fixed laws of which thought and feeling must be admitted as concomitants, +but with which they have no causal connection. The same thing has +happened to these men as to their opponents; they made out an excellent +case on paper, but thought and feeling still remain the mainsprings of +action that they have been always held to be. We still say, “I gave him +£5 because I felt pleased with him, and thought he would like it;” or, “I +knocked him down because I felt angry, and thought I would teach him +better manners.” Omnipresent life and mind with appearances of brute +non-livingness—which appearances are deceptive; this is one view. +Omnipresent non-livingness or mechanism with appearances as though the +mechanism were guided and controlled by thought—which appearances are +deceptive; this is the other. Between these two views the slaves of +logic have oscillated for centuries, and to all appearance will continue +to oscillate for centuries more. + +People who think—as against those who feel and act—want hard and fast +lines—without which, indeed, they cannot think at all; these lines are as +it were steps cut on a slope of ice without which there would be no +descending it. When we have begun to travel the downward path of +thought, we ask ourselves questions about life and death, ego and non +ego, object and subject, necessity and free will, and other kindred +subjects. We want to know where we are, and in the hope of simplifying +matters, strip, as it were, each subject to the skin, and finding that +even this has not freed it from all extraneous matter, flay it alive in +the hope that if we grub down deep enough we shall come upon it in its +pure unalloyed state free from all inconvenient complication through +intermixture with anything alien to itself. Then, indeed, we can docket +it, and pigeon-hole it for what it is; but what can we do with it till we +have got it pure? We want to account for things, which means that we +want to know to which of the various accounts opened in our mental ledger +we ought to carry them—and how can we do this if we admit a phenomenon to +be neither one thing nor the other, but to belong to half-a-dozen +different accounts in proportions which often cannot even approximately +be determined? If we are to keep accounts we must keep them in +reasonable compass; and if keeping them within reasonable compass +involves something of a Procrustean arrangement, we may regret it, but +cannot help it; having set up as thinkers we have got to think, and must +adhere to the only conditions under which thought is possible; life, +therefore, must be life, all life, and nothing but life, and so with +death, free will, necessity, design, and everything else. This, at +least, is how philosophers must think concerning them in theory; in +practice, however, not even John Stuart Mill himself could eliminate all +taint of its opposite from any one of these things, any more than Lady +Macbeth could clear her hand of blood; indeed, the more nearly we think +we have succeeded the more certain are we to find ourselves ere long +mocked and baffled; and this, I take it, is what our biologists began in +the autumn of 1879 to discover had happened to themselves. + +For some years they had been trying to get rid of feeling, consciousness, +and mind generally, from active participation in the evolution of the +universe. They admitted, indeed, that feeling and consciousness attend +the working of the world’s gear, as noise attends the working of a +steam-engine, but they would not allow that consciousness produced more +effect in the working of the world than noise on that of the +steam-engine. Feeling and noise were alike accidental unessential +adjuncts and nothing more. Incredible as it may seem to those who are +happy enough not to know that this attempt is an old one, they were +trying to reduce the world to the level of a piece of unerring though +sentient mechanism. Men and animals must be allowed to feel and even to +reflect; this much must be conceded, but granted that they do, still (so, +at least, it was contended) it has no effect upon the result; it does not +matter as far as this is concerned whether they feel and think or not; +everything would go on exactly as it does and always has done, though +neither man nor beast knew nor felt anything at all. It is only by +maintaining things like this that people will get pensions out of the +British public. + +Some such position as this is a _sine quâ non_ for the Neo-Darwinistic +doctrine of natural selection, which, as Von Hartmann justly observes, +involves an essentially mechanical mindless conception of the universe; +to natural selection’s door, therefore, the blame of the whole movement +in favour of mechanism must be justly laid. It was natural that those +who had been foremost in preaching mindless designless luck as the main +means of organic modification, should lend themselves with alacrity to +the task of getting rid of thought and feeling from all share in the +direction and governance of the world. Professor Huxley, as usual, was +among the foremost in this good work, and whether influenced by Hobbes, +or Descartes, or Mr. Spalding, or even by the machine chapters in +“Erewhon” which were still recent, I do not know, led off with his +article “On the hypothesis that animals are automata” (which it may be +observed is the exact converse of the hypothesis that automata are +animated) in the _Fortnightly Review_ for November 1874. Professor +Huxley did not say outright that men and women were just as living and +just as dead as their own watches, but this was what his article came to +in substance. The conclusion arrived at was that animals were automata; +true, they were probably sentient, still they were automata pure and +simple, mere sentient pieces of exceedingly elaborate clockwork, and +nothing more. + +“Professor Huxley,” says Mr. Romanes, in his Rede Lecture for 1885, +{140a} “argues by way of perfectly logical deduction from this statement, +that thought and feeling have nothing to do with determining action; they +are merely the bye-products of cerebration, or, as he expresses it, the +indices of changes which are going on in the brain. Under this view we +are all what he terms conscious automata, or machines which happen, as it +were by chance, to be conscious of some of their own movements. But the +consciousness is altogether adventitious, and bears the same ineffectual +relation to the activity of the brain as a steam whistle bears to the +activity of a locomotive, or the striking of a clock to the time-keeping +adjustments of the clockwork. Here, again, we meet with an echo of +Hobbes, who opens his work on the commonwealth with these words:— + +“‘Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the +_art_ of man, as in many other things, in this also imitated, that it can +make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the +beginning whereof is in the principal part within; why may we not say +that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as +doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the _heart_ but a +spring, and the _nerves_ but so many _strings_; and the _joints_ but so +many _wheels_ giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by +the artificer?’ + +“Now this theory of conscious automatism is not merely a legitimate +outcome of the theory that nervous changes are the causes of mental +changes, but it is logically the only possible outcome. Nor do I see any +way in which this theory can be fought on grounds of physiology.” + +In passing, I may say the theory that living beings are conscious +machines, can be fought just as much and just as little as the theory +that machines are unconscious living beings; everything that goes to +prove either of these propositions goes just as well to prove the other +also. But I have perhaps already said as much as is necessary on this +head; the main point with which I am concerned is the fact that Professor +Huxley was trying to expel consciousness and sentience from any causative +action in the working of the universe. In the following month appeared +the late Professor Clifford’s hardly less outspoken article, “Body and +Mind,” to the same effect, also in the _Fortnightly Review_, then edited +by Mr. John Morley. Perhaps this view attained its frankest expression +in an article by the late Mr. Spalding, which appeared in _Nature_, +August 2, 1877; the following extracts will show that Mr. Spalding must +be credited with not playing fast and loose with his own conclusions, and +knew both how to think a thing out to its extreme consequences, and how +to put those consequences clearly before his readers. Mr. Spalding +said:— + +“Against Mr. Lewes’s proposition that the movements of living beings are +prompted and guided by feeling, I urged that the amount and direction of +every nervous discharge must depend solely on physical conditions. And I +contended that to see this clearly is to see that when we speak of +movement being guided by feeling, we use the language of a less advanced +stage of enlightenment. This view has since occupied a good deal of +attention. Under the name of automatism it has been advocated by +Professor Huxley, and with firmer logic by Professor Clifford. In the +minds of our savage ancestors feeling was the source of all movement . . . +Using the word feeling in its ordinary sense . . . _we assert not only +that no evidence can be given that feeling ever does guide or prompt +action_, _but that the process of its doing so is inconceivable_. +(Italics mine.) How can we picture to ourselves a state of consciousness +putting in motion any particle of matter, large or small? Puss, while +dozing before the fire, hears a light rustle in the corner, and darts +towards the spot. What has happened? Certain sound-waves have reached +the ear, a series of physical changes have taken place within the +organism, special groups of muscles have been called into play, and the +body of the cat has changed its position on the floor. Is it asserted +that this chain of physical changes is not at all points complete and +sufficient in itself?” + +I have been led to turn to this article of Mr. Spalding’s by Mr. Stewart +Duncan, who, in his “Conscious Matter,” {142a} quotes the latter part of +the foregoing extract. Mr. Duncan goes on to quote passages from +Professor Tyndall’s utterances of about the same date which show that he +too took much the same line—namely, that there is no causative connection +between mental and physical processes; from this it is obvious he must +have supposed that physical processes would go on just as well if there +were no accompaniment of feeling and consciousness at all. + +I have said enough to show that in the decade, roughly, between 1870 and +1880 the set of opinion among our leading biologists was strongly against +mind, as having in any way influenced the development of animal and +vegetable life, and it is not likely to be denied that the prominence +which the mindless theory of natural selection had assumed in men’s +thoughts since 1860 was one of the chief reasons, if not the chief, for +the turn opinion was taking. Our leading biologists had staked so +heavily upon natural selection from among fortuitous variations that they +would have been more than human if they had not caught at everything that +seemed to give it colour and support. It was while this mechanical fit +was upon them, and in the closest connection with it, that the protoplasm +boom developed. It was doubtless felt that if the public could be got to +dislodge life, consciousness, and mind from any considerable part of the +body, it would be no hard matter to dislodge it, presently, from the +remainder; on this the deceptiveness of mind as a causative agent, and +the sufficiency of a purely automatic conception of the universe, as of +something that will work if a penny be dropped into the box, would be +proved to demonstration. It would be proved from the side of mind by +considerations derivable from automatic and unconscious action where mind +_ex hypothesi_ was not, but where action went on as well or better +without it than with it; it would be proved from the side of body by what +they would doubtless call the “most careful and exhaustive” examination +of the body itself by the aid of appliances more ample than had ever +before been within the reach of man. + +This was all very well, but for its success one thing was a _sine quâ +non_—I mean the dislodgment must be thorough; the key must be got clean +of even the smallest trace of blood, for unless this could be done all +the argument went to the profit not of the mechanism, with which, for +some reason or other, they were so much enamoured, but of the soul and +design, the ideas which of all others were most distasteful to them. +They shut their eyes to this for a long time, but in the end appear to +have seen that if they were in search of an absolute living and absolute +non-living, the path along which they were travelling would never lead +them to it. They were driving life up into a corner, but they were not +eliminating it, and, moreover, at the very moment of their thinking they +had hedged it in and could throw their salt upon it, it flew mockingly +over their heads and perched upon the place of all others where they were +most scandalised to see it—I mean upon machines in use. So they retired +sulkily to their tents baffled but not ashamed. + + * * * * * + +Some months subsequent to the completion of the foregoing chapter, and +indeed just as this book is on the point of leaving my hands, there +appears in _Nature_ {144a} a letter from the Duke of Argyll, which shows +that he too is impressed with the conviction expressed above—I mean that +the real object our men of science have lately had in view has been the +getting rid of mind from among the causes of evolution. The Duke says:— + +“The violence with which false interpretations were put upon this theory +(natural selection) and a function was assigned to it which it could +never fulfil, will some day be recognised as one of the least creditable +episodes in the history of science. With a curious perversity it was the +weakest elements in the theory which were seized upon as the most +valuable, particularly the part assigned to blind chance in the +occurrence of variations. This was valued not for its scientific +truth,—for it could pretend to none,—but because of its assumed bearing +upon another field of thought and the weapon it afforded for expelling +mind from the causes of evolution.” + +The Duke, speaking of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s two articles in the +_Nineteenth Century_ for April and May, 1886, to which I have already +called attention, continues:— + +“In these two articles we have for the first time an avowed and definite +declaration against some of the leading ideas on which the mechanical +philosophy depends; and yet the caution, and almost timidity, with which +a man so eminent approaches the announcement of conclusions of the most +self-evident truth is a most curious proof of the reign of terror which +has come to be established.” + +Against this I must protest; the Duke cannot seriously maintain that the +main scope and purpose of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s articles is new. Their +substance has been before us in Mr. Spencer’s own writings for some +two-and-twenty years, in the course of which Mr. Spencer has been +followed by Professor Mivart, the Rev. J. J. Murphy, the Duke of Argyll +himself, and many other writers of less note. When the Duke talks about +the establishment of a scientific reign of terror, I confess I regard +such an exaggeration with something like impatience. Any one who has +known his own mind and has had the courage of his opinions has been able +to say whatever he wanted to say with as little let or hindrance during +the last twenty years, as during any other period in the history of +literature. Of course, if a man will keep blurting out unpopular truths +without considering whose toes he may or may not be treading on, he will +make enemies some of whom will doubtless be able to give effect to their +displeasure; but that is part of the game. It is hardly possible for any +one to oppose the fallacy involved in the Charles-Darwinian theory of +natural selection more persistently and unsparingly than I have done +myself from the year 1877 onwards; naturally I have at times been very +angrily attacked in consequence, and as a matter of business have made +myself as unpleasant as I could in my rejoinders, but I cannot remember +anything having been ever attempted against me which could cause fear in +any ordinarily constituted person. If, then, the Duke of Argyll is right +in saying that Mr. Spencer has shown a caution almost amounting to +timidity in attacking Mr. Darwin’s theory, either Mr. Spencer must be a +singularly timid person, or there must be some cause for his timidity +which is not immediately obvious. If terror reigns anywhere among +scientific men, I should say it reigned among those who have staked +imprudently on Mr. Darwin’s reputation as a philosopher. I may add that +the discovery of the Duke’s impression that there exists a scientific +reign of terror, explains a good deal in his writings which it has not +been easy to understand hitherto. + +As regards the theory of natural selection, the Duke says:— + +“From the first discussions which arose on this subject, I have ventured +to maintain that . . . the phrase ‘natural-selection’ represented no true +physical cause, still less the complete set of causes requisite to +account for the orderly procession of organic forms in Nature; that in so +far as it assumed variations to arise by accident it was not only +essentially faulty and incomplete, but fundamentally erroneous; in short, +that its only value lay in the convenience with which it groups under one +form of words, highly charged with metaphor, an immense variety of +causes, some purely mental, some purely vital, and others purely physical +or mechanical.” + + + + +Chapter XI +The Way of Escape + + +TO sum up the conclusions hitherto arrived at. Our philosophers have +made the mistake of forgetting that they cannot carry the rough-and-ready +language of common sense into precincts within which politeness and +philosophy are supreme. Common sense sees life and death as distinct +states having nothing in common, and hence in all respects the antitheses +of one another; so that with common sense there should be no degrees of +livingness, but if a thing is alive at all it is as much alive as the +most living of us, and if dead at all it is stone dead in every part of +it. Our philosophers have exercised too little consideration in +retaining this view of the matter. They say that an amœba is as much a +living being as a man is, and do not allow that a well-grown, highly +educated man in robust health is more living than an idiot cripple. They +say he differs from the cripple in many important respects, but not in +degree of livingness. Yet, as we have seen already, even common sense by +using the word “dying” admits degrees of life; that is to say, it admits +a more and a less; those, then, for whom the superficial aspects of +things are insufficient should surely find no difficulty in admitting +that the degrees are more numerous than is dreamed of in the somewhat +limited philosophy which common sense alone knows. Livingness depends on +range of power, versatility, wealth of body and mind—how often, indeed, +do we not see people taking a new lease of life when they have come into +money even at an advanced age; it varies as these vary, beginning with +things that, though they have mind enough for an outsider to swear by, +can hardly be said to have yet found it out themselves, and advancing to +those that know their own minds as fully as anything in this world does +so. The more a thing knows its own mind the more living it becomes, for +life viewed both in the individual and in the general as the outcome of +accumulated developments, is one long process of specialising +consciousness and sensation; that is to say, of getting to know one’s own +mind more and more fully upon a greater and greater variety of subjects. +On this I hope to touch more fully in another book; in the meantime I +would repeat that the error of our philosophers consists in not having +borne in mind that when they quitted the ground on which common sense can +claim authority, they should have reconsidered everything that common +sense had taught them. + +The votaries of common sense make the same mistake as philosophers do, +but they make it in another way. Philosophers try to make the language +of common sense serve for purposes of philosophy, forgetting that they +are in another world, in which another tongue is current; common sense +people, on the other hand, every now and then attempt to deal with +matters alien to the routine of daily life. The boundaries between the +two kingdoms being very badly defined, it is only by giving them a wide +berth and being so philosophical as almost to deny that there is any +either life or death at all, or else so full of common sense as to refuse +to see one part of the body as less living than another, that we can hope +to steer clear of doubt, inconsistency, and contradiction in terms in +almost every other word we utter. We cannot serve the God of philosophy +and the Mammon of common sense at one and the same time, and yet it would +almost seem as though the making the best that can be made of both these +worlds were the whole duty of organism. + +It is easy to understand how the error of philosophers arose, for, slaves +of habit as we all are, we are more especially slaves when the habit is +one that has not been found troublesome. There is no denying that it +saves trouble to have things either one thing or the other, and indeed +for all the common purposes of life if a thing is either alive or dead +the small supplementary residue of the opposite state should be neglected +as too small to be observable. If it is good to eat we have no +difficulty in knowing when it is dead enough to be eaten; if not good to +eat, but valuable for its skin, we know when it is dead enough to be +skinned with impunity; if it is a man, we know when he has presented +enough of the phenomena of death to allow of our burying him and +administering his estate; in fact, I cannot call to mind any case in +which the decision of the question whether man or beast is alive or dead +is frequently found to be perplexing; hence we have become so accustomed +to think there can be no admixture of the two states, that we have found +it almost impossible to avoid carrying this crude view of life and death +into domains of thought in which it has no application. There can be no +doubt that when accuracy is required we should see life and death not as +fundamentally opposed, but as supplementary to one another, without +either’s being ever able to exclude the other altogether; thus we should +indeed see some things as more living than others, but we should see +nothing as either unalloyedly living or unalloyedly non-living. If a +thing is living, it is so living that it has one foot in the grave +already; if dead, it is dead as a thing that has already re-entered into +the womb of Nature. And within the residue of life that is in the dead +there is an element of death; and within this there is an element of +life, and so _ad infinitum_—again, as reflections in two mirrors that +face one another. + +In brief, there is nothing in life of which there are not germs, and, so +to speak, harmonics in death, and nothing in death of which germs and +harmonics may not be found in life. Each emphasizes what the other +passes over most lightly—each carries to its extreme conceivable +development that which in the other is only sketched in by a faint +suggestion—but neither has any feature rigorously special to itself. +Granted that death is a greater new departure in an organism’s life, than +any since that _congeries_ of births and deaths to which the name +embryonic stages is commonly given, still it is a new departure of the +same essential character as any other—that is to say, though there be +much new there is much, not to say more, old along with it. We shrink +from it as from any other change to the unknown, and also perhaps from an +instinctive sense that the fear of death is a _sine quâ non_ for physical +and moral progress, but the fear is like all else in life, a substantial +thing which, if its foundations be dug about, is found to rest on a +superstitious basis. + +Where, and on what principle, are the dividing lines between living and +non-living to be drawn? All attempts to draw them hitherto have ended in +deadlock and disaster; of this M. Vianna De Lima, in his “Exposé Sommaire +des Théories transformistes de Lamarck, Darwin, et Haeckel,” {150a} says +that all attempts to trace _une ligne de démarcation nette et profonde +entre la matière vivante et la matière inerte_ have broken down. {150b} +_Il y a un reste de vie dans le cadavre_, says Diderot, {150c} speaking +of the more gradual decay of the body after an easy natural death, than +after a sudden and violent one; and so Buffon begins his first volume by +saying that “we can descend, by almost imperceptible degrees, from the +most perfect creature to the most formless matter—from the most highly +organised matter to the most entirely inorganic substance.” {150d} + +Is the line to be so drawn as to admit any of the non-living within the +body? If we answer “yes,” then, as we have seen, moiety after moiety is +filched from us, till we find ourselves left face to face with a tenuous +quasi immaterial vital principle or soul as animating an alien body, with +which it not only has no essential underlying community of substance, but +with which it has no conceivable point in common to render a union +between the two possible, or give the one a grip of any kind over the +other; in fact, the doctrine of disembodied spirits, so instinctively +rejected by all who need be listened to, comes back as it would seem, +with a scientific _imprimatur_; if, on the other hand, we exclude the +non-living from the body, then what are we to do with nails that want +cutting, dying skin, or hair that is ready to fall off? Are they less +living than brain? Answer “yes,” and degrees are admitted, which we have +already seen prove fatal; answer “no,” and we must deny that one part of +the body is more vital than another—and this is refusing to go as far +even as common sense does; answer that these things are not very +important, and we quit the ground of equity and high philosophy on which +we have given ourselves such airs, and go back to common sense as unjust +judges that will hear those widows only who importune us. + +As with the non-living so also with the living. Are we to let it pass +beyond the limits of the body, and allow a certain temporary overflow of +livingness to ordain as it were machines in use? Then death will fare, +if we once let life without the body, as life fares if we once let death +within it. It becomes swallowed up in life, just as in the other case +life was swallowed up in death. Are we to confine it to the body? If +so, to the whole body, or to parts? And if to parts, to what parts, and +why? The only way out of the difficulty is to rehabilitate contradiction +in terms, and say that everything is both alive and dead at one and the +same time—some things being much living and little dead, and others, +again, much dead and little living. Having done this we have only got to +settle what a thing is—when a thing is a thing pure and simple, and when +it is only a _congeries_ of things—and we shall doubtless then live very +happily and very philosophically ever afterwards. + +But here another difficulty faces us. Common sense does indeed know what +is meant by a “thing” or “an individual,” but philosophy cannot settle +either of these two points. Professor Mivart made the question “What are +Living Beings?” the subject of an article in one of our leading magazines +only a very few years ago. He asked, but he did not answer. And so +Professor Moseley was reported (_Times_, January 16, 1885) as having said +that it was “almost impossible” to say what an individual was. Surely if +it is only “almost” impossible for philosophy to determine this, +Professor Moseley should have at any rate tried to do it; if, however, he +had tried and failed, which from my own experience I should think most +likely, he might have spared his “almost.” “Almost” is a very dangerous +word. I once heard a man say that an escape he had had from drowning was +“almost” providential. The difficulty about defining an individual +arises from the fact that we may look at “almost” everything from two +different points of view. If we are in a common-sense humour for +simplifying things, treating them broadly, and emphasizing resemblances +rather than differences, we can find excellent reasons for ignoring +recognised lines of demarcation, calling everything by a new name, and +unifying up till we have united the two most distant stars in heaven as +meeting and being linked together in the eyes and souls of men; if we are +in this humour individuality after individuality disappears, and ere +long, if we are consistent, nothing will remain but one universal whole, +one true and only atom from which alone nothing can be cut off and thrown +away on to something else; if, on the other hand, we are in a subtle +philosophically accurate humour for straining at gnats and emphasizing +differences rather than resemblances, we can draw distinctions, and give +reasons for subdividing and subdividing, till, unless we violate what we +choose to call our consistency somewhere, we shall find ourselves with as +many names as atoms and possible combinations and permutations of atoms. +The lines we draw, the moments we choose for cutting this or that off at +this or that place, and thenceforth the dubbing it by another name, are +as arbitrary as the moments chosen by a South-Eastern Railway porter for +leaving off beating doormats; in each case doubtless there is an +approximate equity, but it is of a very rough and ready kind. + +What else, however, can we do? We can only escape the Scylla of calling +everything by one name, and recognising no individual existences of any +kind, by falling into the Charybdis of having a name for everything, or +by some piece of intellectual sharp practice like that of the shrewd but +unprincipled Ulysses. If we were consistent honourable gentlemen, into +Charybdis or on to Scylla we should go like lambs; every subterfuge by +the help of which we escape our difficulty is but an arbitrary +high-handed act of classification that turns a deaf ear to everything not +robust enough to hold its own; nevertheless even the most scrupulous of +philosophers pockets his consistency at a pinch, and refuses to let the +native hue of resolution be sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought, +nor yet fobbed by the rusty curb of logic. He is right, for assuredly +the poor intellectual abuses of the time want countenancing now as much +as ever, but so far as he countenances them, he should bear in mind that +he is returning to the ground of common sense, and should not therefore +hold himself too stiffly in the matter of logic. + +As with life and death so with design and absence of design or luck. So +also with union and disunion. There is never either absolute design +rigorously pervading every detail, nor yet absolute absence of design +pervading any detail rigorously, so, as between substances, there is +neither absolute union and homogeneity, not absolute disunion and +heterogeneity; there is always a little place left for repentance; that +is to say, in theory we should admit that both design and chance, however +well defined, each have an aroma, as it were, of the other. Who can +think of a case in which his own design—about which he should know more +than any other, and from which, indeed, all his ideas of design are +derived—was so complete that there was no chance in any part of it? Who, +again, can bring forward a case even of the purest chance or good luck +into which no element of design had entered directly or indirectly at any +juncture? This, nevertheless, does not involve our being unable ever to +ascribe a result baldly either to luck or cunning. In some cases a +decided preponderance of the action, whether seen as a whole or looked at +in detail, is recognised at once as due to design, purpose, forethought, +skill, and effort, and then we properly disregard the undesigned element; +in others the details cannot without violence be connected with design, +however much the position which rendered the main action possible may +involve design—as, for example, there is no design in the way in which +individual pieces of coal may hit one another when shot out of a sack, +but there may be design in the sack’s being brought to the particular +place where it is emptied; in others design may be so hard to find that +we rightly deny its existence, nevertheless in each case there will be an +element of the opposite, and the residuary element would, if seen through +a mental microscope, be found to contain a residuary element of _its_ +opposite, and this again of _its_ opposite, and so on _ad infinitum_, as +with mirrors standing face to face. This having been explained, and it +being understood that when we speak of design in organism we do so with a +mental reserve of _exceptis excipiendis_, there should be no hesitation +in holding the various modifications of plants and animals to be in such +preponderating measure due to function, that design, which underlies +function, is the fittest idea with which to connect them in our minds. + +We will now proceed to inquire how Mr. Darwin came to substitute, or try +to substitute, the survival of the luckiest fittest, for the survival of +the most cunning fittest, as held by Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck; or more +briefly how he came to substitute luck for cunning. + + + + +Chapter XII +Why Darwin’s Variations were Accidental + + +SOME may perhaps deny that Mr. Darwin did this, and say he laid so much +stress on use and disuse as virtually to make function his main factor of +evolution. + +If, indeed, we confine ourselves to isolated passages, we shall find +little difficulty in making out a strong case to this effect. Certainly +most people believe this to be Mr. Darwin’s doctrine, and considering how +long and fully he had the ear of the public, it is not likely they would +think thus if Mr. Darwin had willed otherwise, nor could he have induced +them to think as they do if he had not said a good deal that was capable +of the construction so commonly put upon it; but it is hardly necessary, +when addressing biologists, to insist on the fact that Mr. Darwin’s +distinctive doctrine is the denial of the comparative importance of +function, or use and disuse, as a purveyor of variations,—with some, but +not very considerable, exceptions, chiefly in the cases of domesticated +animals. + +He did not, however, make his distinctive feature as distinct as he +should have done. Sometimes he said one thing, and sometimes the +directly opposite. Sometimes, for example, the conditions of existence +“included natural selection” or the fact that the best adapted to their +surroundings live longest and leave most offspring; {156a} sometimes “the +principle of natural selection” “fully embraced” “the expression of +conditions of existence.” {156b} It would not be easy to find more +unsatisfactory writing than this is, nor any more clearly indicating a +mind ill at ease with itself. Sometimes “ants work _by inherited +instincts_ and inherited tools;” {157a} sometimes, again, it is +surprising that the case of ants working by inherited instincts has not +been brought as a demonstrative argument “against the well-known doctrine +of _inherited habit_, as advanced by Lamarck.” {157b} Sometimes the +winglessness of beetles inhabiting ocean islands is “mainly due to +natural selection,” {157c} and though we might be tempted to ascribe the +rudimentary condition of the wing to disuse, we are on no account to do +so—though disuse was probably to some extent “combined with” natural +selection; at other times “it is probable that disuse has been the main +means of rendering the wings of beetles living on small exposed islands” +rudimentary. {157d} We may remark in passing that if disuse, as Mr. +Darwin admits on this occasion, is the main agent in rendering an organ +rudimentary, use should have been the main agent in rendering it the +opposite of rudimentary—that is to say, in bringing about its +development. The ostensible _raison d’être_, however, of the “Origin of +Species” is to maintain that this is not the case. + +There is hardly an opinion on the subject of descent with modification +which does not find support in some one passage or another of the “Origin +of Species.” If it were desired to show that there is no substantial +difference between the doctrine of Erasmus Darwin and that of his +grandson, it would be easy to make out a good case for this, in spite of +Mr. Darwin’s calling his grandfather’s views “erroneous,” in the +historical sketch prefixed to the later editions of the “Origin of +Species.” Passing over the passage already quoted on p. 62 of this book, +in which Mr. Darwin declares “habit omnipotent and its effects +hereditary”—a sentence, by the way, than which none can be either more +unfalteringly Lamarckian or less tainted with the vices of Mr. Darwin’s +later style—passing this over as having been written some twenty years +before the “Origin of Species”—the last paragraph of the “Origin of +Species” itself is purely Lamarckian and Erasmus-Darwinian. It declares +the laws in accordance with which organic forms assumed their present +shape to be—“Growth with reproduction; Variability from the indirect and +direct action of the external conditions of life and from use and disuse, +&c.” {158a} Wherein does this differ from the confession of faith made +by Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck? Where are the accidental fortuitous, +spontaneous variations now? And if they are not found important enough +to demand mention in this peroration and _stretto_, as it were, of the +whole matter, in which special prominence should be given to the special +feature of the work, where ought they to be made important? + +Mr. Darwin immediately goes on: “A ratio of existence so high as to lead +to a struggle for life, and as a consequence to natural selection, +entailing divergence of character and the extinction of less improved +forms;” so that natural selection turns up after all. Yes—in the letters +that compose it, but not in the spirit; not in the special sense up to +this time attached to it in the “Origin of Species.” The expression as +used here is one with which Erasmus Darwin would have found little fault, +for it means not as elsewhere in Mr. Darwin’s book and on his title-page +the preservation of “favoured” or lucky varieties, but the preservation +of varieties that have come to be varieties through the causes assigned +in the preceding two or three lines of Mr. Darwin’s sentence; and these +are mainly functional or Erasmus-Darwinian; for the indirect action of +the conditions of life is mainly functional, and the direct action is +admitted on all hands to be but small. + +It now appears more plainly, as insisted upon on an earlier page, that +there is not one natural selection and one survival of the fittest, but +two, inasmuch as there are two classes of variations from which nature +(supposing no exception taken to her personification) can select. The +bottles have the same labels, and they are of the same colour, but the +one holds brandy, and the other toast and water. Nature can, by a figure +of speech, be said to select from variations that are mainly functional +or from variations that are mainly accidental; in the first case she will +eventually get an accumulation of variation, and widely different types +will come into existence; in the second, the variations will not occur +with sufficient steadiness for accumulation to be possible. In the body +of Mr. Darwin’s book the variations are supposed to be mainly due to +accident, and function, though not denied all efficacy, is declared to be +the greatly subordinate factor; natural selection, therefore, has been +hitherto throughout tantamount to luck; in the peroration the position is +reversed _in toto_; the selection is now made from variations into which +luck has entered so little that it may be neglected, the greatly +preponderating factor being function; here, then, natural selection is +tantamount to cunning. We are such slaves of words that, seeing the +words “natural selection” employed—and forgetting that the results +ensuing on natural selection will depend entirely on what it is that is +selected from, so that the gist of the matter lies in this and not in the +words “natural selection”—it escaped us that a change of front had been +made, and a conclusion entirely alien to the tenor of the whole book +smuggled into the last paragraph as the one which it had been written to +support; the book preached luck, the peroration cunning. + +And there can be no doubt Mr. Darwin intended that the change of front +should escape us; for it cannot be believed that he did not perfectly +well know what he had done. Mr. Darwin edited and re-edited with such +minuteness of revision that it may be said no detail escaped him provided +it was small enough; it is incredible that he should have allowed this +paragraph to remain from first to last unchanged (except for the +introduction of the words “by the Creator,” which are wanting in the +first edition) if they did not convey the conception he most wished his +readers to retain. Even if in his first edition he had failed to see +that he was abandoning in his last paragraph all that it had been his +ostensible object most especially to support in the body of his book, he +must have become aware of it long before he revised the “Origin of +Species” for the last time; still he never altered it, and never put us +on our guard. + +It was not Mr. Darwin’s manner to put his reader on his guard; we might +as well expect Mr. Gladstone to put us on our guard about the Irish land +bills. Caveat _lector_ seems to have been his motto. Mr. Spencer, in +the articles already referred to, is at pains to show that Mr. Darwin’s +opinions in later life underwent a change in the direction of laying +greater stress on functionally produced modifications, and points out +that in the sixth edition of the “Origin of Species” Mr. Darwin says, “I +think there can be no doubt that use in our domestic animals has +strengthened and enlarged certain parts, and disuse diminished them;” +whereas in his first edition he said, “I think there can be _little_ +doubt” of this. Mr. Spencer also quotes a passage from “The Descent of +Man,” in which Mr. Darwin said that _even in the first edition_ of the +“Origin of Species” he had attributed great effect to function, as though +in the later ones he had attributed still more; but if there was any +considerable change of position, it should not have been left to be +toilsomely collected by collation of editions, and comparison of passages +far removed from one another in other books. If his mind had undergone +the modification supposed by Mr. Spencer, Mr. Darwin should have said so +in a prominent passage of some later edition of the “Origin of Species.” +He should have said—“In my earlier editions I underrated, as now seems +probable, the effects of use and disuse as purveyors of the slight +successive modifications whose accumulation in the ordinary course of +things results in specific difference, and I laid too much stress on the +accumulation of merely accidental variations;” having said this, he +should have summarised the reasons that had made him change his mind, and +given a list of the most important cases in which he has seen fit to +alter what he had originally written. If Mr. Darwin had dealt thus with +us we should have readily condoned all the mistakes he would have been at +all likely to have made, for we should have known him as one who was +trying to help us, tidy us up, keep us straight, and enable us to use our +judgments to the best advantage. The public will forgive many errors +alike of taste and judgment, where it feels that a writer persistently +desires this. + +I can only remember a couple of sentences in the later editions of the +“Origin of Species” in which Mr. Darwin directly admits a change of +opinion as regards the main causes of organic modification. How +shuffling the first of these is I have already shown in “Life and Habit,” +p. 260, and in “Evolution, Old and New,” p. 359; I need not, therefore, +say more here, especially as there has been no rejoinder to what I then +said. Curiously enough the sentence does not bear out Mr. Spencer’s +contention that Mr. Darwin in his later years leaned more decidedly +towards functionally produced modifications, for it runs: {161a}—“In the +earlier editions of this work I underrated, as now seems probable, the +frequency and importance of modifications due,” not, as Mr. Spencer would +have us believe, to use and disuse, but “to spontaneous variability,” by +which can only be intended, “to variations in no way connected with use +and disuse,” as not being assignable to any known cause of general +application, and referable as far as we are concerned to accident only; +so that he gives the natural survival of the luckiest, which is indeed +his distinctive feature, if it deserve to be called a feature at all, +greater prominence than ever. Nevertheless there is no change in his +concluding paragraph, which still remains an embodiment of the views of +Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. + +The other passage is on p. 421 of the edition of 1876. It stands:—“I +have now recapitulated the facts and considerations which have +thoroughly” (why “thoroughly”?) “convinced me that species have been +modified during a long course of descent. This has been effected chiefly +through the natural selection of numerous, successive, slight, favourable +variations; aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the +use and disuse of parts; and in an unimportant manner, that is, in +relation to adaptive structures, whether past or present, by the direct +action of external conditions, and by variations which seem to us in our +ignorance to arise spontaneously. It appears that I formerly underrated +the frequency and value of these latter forms of variation as leading to +permanent modifications of structure independently of natural selection.” + +Here, again, it is not use and disuse which Mr. Darwin declares himself +to have undervalued, but spontaneous variations. The sentence just given +is one of the most confusing I ever read even in the works of Mr Darwin. +It is the essence of his theory that the “numerous successive, slight, +favourable variations,” above referred to, should be fortuitous, +accidental, spontaneous; it is evident, moreover, that they are intended +in this passage to be accidental or spontaneous, although neither of +these words is employed, inasmuch as use and disuse and the action of the +conditions of existence, whether direct or indirect, are mentioned +specially as separate causes which purvey only the minor part of the +variations from among which nature selects. The words “that is, in +relation to adaptive forms” should be omitted, as surplusage that draws +the reader’s attention from the point at issue; the sentence really +amounts to this—that modification has been effected _chiefly through +selection_ in the ordinary course of nature _from among spontaneous +variations_, _aided in an unimportant manner by variations which quâ us +are spontaneous_. Nevertheless, though these spontaneous variations are +still so trifling in effect that they only aid spontaneous variations in +an unimportant manner, in his earlier editions Mr. Darwin thought them +still less important than he does now. + +This comes of tinkering. We do not know whether we are on our heads or +our heels. We catch ourselves repeating “important,” “unimportant,” +“unimportant,” “important,” like the King when addressing the jury in +“Alice in Wonderland;” and yet this is the book of which Mr. Grant Allen +{163a} says that it is “one of the greatest, and most learned, the most +lucid, the most logical, the most crushing, the most conclusive, that the +world has ever seen. Step by step, and principle by principle, it proved +every point in its progress triumphantly before it went on to the next. +So vast an array of facts so thoroughly in hand had never before been +mustered and marshalled in favour of any biological theory.” The book +and the eulogy are well mated. + +I see that in the paragraph following on the one just quoted, Mr. Allen +says, that “to the world at large Darwinism and evolution became at once +synonymous terms.” Certainly it was no fault of Mr. Darwin’s if they did +not, but I will add more on this head presently; for the moment, +returning to Mr. Darwin, it is hardly credible, but it is nevertheless +true, that Mr Darwin begins the paragraph next following on the one on +which I have just reflected so severely, with the words, “It can hardly +be supposed that a false theory would explain in so satisfactory a manner +as does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of +facts above specified.” If Mr. Darwin found the large classes of facts +“satisfactorily” explained by the survival of the luckiest irrespectively +of the cunning which enabled them to turn their luck to account, he must +have been easily satisfied. Perhaps he was in the same frame of mind as +when he said {164a} that “even an imperfect answer would be +satisfactory,” but surely this is being thankful for small mercies. + +On the following page Mr. Darwin says:—“Although I am fully” (why +“fully”?) “convinced of the truth of the views given in this volume under +the form of an abstract, I by no means expect to convince experienced +naturalists,” &c. I have not quoted the whole of Mr. Darwin’s sentence, +but it implies that any experienced naturalist who remained unconvinced +was an old-fashioned, prejudiced person. I confess that this is what I +rather feel about the experienced naturalists who differ in only too +great numbers from myself, but I did not expect to find so much of the +old Adam remaining in Mr. Darwin; I did not expect to find him support me +in the belief that naturalists are made of much the same stuff as other +people, and, if they are wise, will look upon new theories with distrust +until they find them becoming generally accepted. I am not sure that Mr. +Darwin is not just a little bit flippant here. + +Sometimes I ask myself whether it is possible that, not being convinced, +I may be an experienced naturalist after all; at other times, when I read +Mr. Darwin’s works and those of his eulogists, I wonder whether there is +not some other Mr. Darwin, some other “Origin of Species,” some other +Professors Huxley, Tyndal, and Ray Lankester, and whether in each case +some malicious fiend has not palmed off a counterfeit upon me that +differs _toto cælo_ from the original. I felt exactly the same when I +read Goethe’s “Wilhelm Meister”; I could not believe my eyes, which +nevertheless told me that the dull diseased trash I was so toilsomely +reading was a work which was commonly held to be one of the great +literary masterpieces of the world. It seemed to me that there must be +some other Goethe and some other Wilhelm Meister. Indeed I find myself +so depressingly out of harmony with the prevailing not opinion only, but +spirit—if, indeed, the Huxleys, Tyndals, Miss Buckleys, Ray Lankesters, +and Romaneses express the prevailing spirit as accurately as they appear +to do—that at times I find it difficult to believe I am not the victim of +hallucination; nevertheless I know that either every canon, whether of +criticism or honourable conduct, which I have learned to respect is an +impudent swindle, suitable for the cloister only, and having no force or +application in the outside world; or else that Mr. Darwin and his +supporters are misleading the public to the full as much as the +theologians of whom they speak at times so disapprovingly. They sin, +moreover, with incomparably less excuse. Right as they doubtless are in +much, and much as we doubtless owe them (so we owe much also to the +theologians, and they also are right in much), they are giving way to a +temper which cannot be indulged with impunity. I know the great power of +academicism; I know how instinctively academicism everywhere must range +itself on Mr. Darwin’s side, and how askance it must look on those who +write as I do; but I know also that there is a power before which even +academicism must bow, and to this power I look not unhopefully for +support. + +As regards Mr. Spencer’s contention that Mr. Darwin leaned more towards +function as he grew older, I do not doubt that at the end of his life Mr. +Darwin believed modification to be mainly due to function, but the +passage quoted on page 62 written in 1839, coupled with the concluding +paragraph of the “Origin of Species” written in 1859, and allowed to +stand during seventeen years of revision, though so much else was +altered—these passages, when their dates and surroundings are considered, +suggest strongly that Mr. Darwin thought during all the forty years or so +thus covered exactly as his grandfather and Lamarck had done, and indeed +as all sensible people since Buffon wrote have done if they have accepted +evolution at all. + +Then why should he not have said so? What object could he have in +writing an elaborate work to support a theory which he knew all the time +to be untenable? The impropriety of such a course, unless the work was, +like Buffon’s, transparently ironical, could only be matched by its +fatuousness, or indeed by the folly of one who should assign action so +motiveless to any one out of a lunatic asylum. + +This sounds well, but unfortunately we cannot forget that when Mr. Darwin +wrote the “Origin of Species” he claimed to be the originator of the +theory of descent with modification generally; that he did this without +one word of reference either to Buffon or Erasmus Darwin until the first +six thousand copies of his book had been sold, and then with as meagre, +inadequate notice as can be well conceived. Lamarck was just named in +the first editions of the “Origin of Species,” but only to be told that +Mr. Darwin had not got anything to give him, and he must go away; the +author of the “Vestiges of Creation” was also just mentioned, but only in +a sentence full of such gross misrepresentation that Mr. Darwin did not +venture to stand by it, and expunged it in later editions, as usual, +without calling attention to what he had done. It would have been in the +highest degree imprudent, not to say impossible, for one so conscientious +as Mr. Darwin to have taken the line he took in respect of descent with +modification generally, if he were not provided with some ostensibly +distinctive feature, in virtue of which, if people said anything, he +might claim to have advanced something different, and widely different, +from the theory of evolution propounded by his illustrious predecessors; +a distinctive theory of some sort, therefore, had got to be looked +for—and if people look in this spirit they can generally find. + +I imagine that Mr. Darwin, casting about for a substantial difference, +and being unable to find one, committed the Gladstonian blunder of +mistaking an unsubstantial for a substantial one. It was doubtless +because he suspected it that he never took us fully into his confidence, +nor in all probability allowed even to himself how deeply he distrusted +it. Much, however, as he disliked the accumulation of accidental +variations, he disliked not claiming the theory of descent with +modification still more; and if he was to claim this, accidental his +variations had got to be. Accidental they accordingly were, but in as +obscure and perfunctory a fashion as Mr. Darwin could make them +consistently with their being to hand as accidental variations should +later developments make this convenient. Under these circumstances it +was hardly to be expected that Mr. Darwin should help the reader to +follow the workings of his mind—nor, again, that a book the writer of +which was hampered as I have supposed should prove clear and easy +reading. + +The attitude of Mr. Darwin’s mind, whatever it may have been in regard to +the theory of descent with modification generally, goes so far to explain +his attitude in respect to the theory of natural selection (which, it +cannot be too often repeated, is only one of the conditions of existence +advanced as the main means of modification by the earlier evolutionists), +that it is worth while to settle the question once for all whether Mr. +Darwin did or did not believe himself justified in claiming the theory of +descent as an original discovery of his own. This will be a task of some +little length, and may perhaps try the reader’s patience, as it assuredly +tried mine; if, however, he will read the two following chapters, he will +probably be able to make up his mind upon much that will otherwise, if he +thinks about it at all, continue to puzzle him. + + + + +Chapter XIII +Darwin’s Claim to Descent with Modification + + +MR. ALLEN, in his “Charles Darwin,” {168a} says that “in the public mind +Mr. Darwin is commonly regarded as the discoverer and founder of the +evolution hypothesis,” and on p. 177 he says that to most men Darwinism +and evolution mean one and the same thing. Mr. Allen declares +misconception on this matter to be “so extremely general” as to be +“almost universal;” this is more true than creditable to Mr. Darwin. + +Mr. Allen says {168b} that though Mr. Darwin gained “far wider general +acceptance” for both the doctrine of descent in general, and for that of +the descent of man from a simious or semi-simious ancestor in particular, +“he laid no sort of claim to originality or proprietorship in either +theory.” This is not the case. No one can claim a theory more +frequently and more effectually than Mr. Darwin claimed descent with +modification, nor, as I have already said, is it likely that the +misconception of which Mr. Allen complains would be general, if he had +not so claimed it. The “Origin of Species” begins:— + +“When on board H.M.S. _Beagle_, as naturalist, I was much struck with +certain facts in the distribution of the inhabitants of South America, +and in the geological relation of the present to the past inhabitants of +that continent. These facts seemed to me to throw some light on the +origin of species—that mystery of mysteries, as it has been called by one +of our greatest philosophers. On my return home it occurred to me, in +1837, that something might perhaps be made out on this question by +patiently accumulating and reflecting upon all sorts of facts which could +possibly have any bearing on it. After five years’ work I allowed myself +to speculate upon the subject, and drew up some short notes; these I +enlarged in 1844 {169a} into a sketch of the conclusions which then +seemed to me probable. From that period to the present day I have +steadily pursued the same object. I hope I may be excused these personal +details, as I give them to show that I have not been hasty in coming to a +decision.” + +This is bland, but peremptory. Mr. Darwin implies that the mere asking +of the question how species has come about opened up a field into which +speculation itself had hardly yet ventured to intrude. It was the +mystery of mysteries; one of our greatest philosophers had said so; not +one little feeble ray of light had ever yet been thrown upon it. Mr. +Darwin knew all this, and was appalled at the greatness of the task that +lay before him; still, after he had pondered on what he had seen in South +America, it really did occur to him, that if he was very very patient, +and went on reflecting for years and years longer, upon all sorts of +facts, good, bad, and indifferent, which could possibly have any bearing +on the subject—and what fact might not possibly have some bearing?—well, +something, as against the nothing that had been made out hitherto, might +by some faint far-away possibility be one day dimly seem. It was only +what he had seen in South America that made all this occur to him. He +had never seen anything about descent with modification in any book, nor +heard any one talk about it as having been put forward by other people; +if he had, he would, of course, have been the first to say so; he was not +as other philosophers are; so the mountain went on for years and years +gestating, but still there was no labour. + +“My work,” continues Mr. Darwin, “is now nearly finished; but as it will +take me two or three years to complete it, and as my health is far from +strong, I have been urged to publish this abstract. I have been more +especially induced to do this, as Mr. Wallace, who is now studying the +natural history of the Malay Archipelago, has arrived at almost exactly +the same general conclusions that I have on the origin of species.” Mr. +Darwin was naturally anxious to forestall Mr. Wallace, and hurried up +with his book. What reader, on finding descent with modification to be +its most prominent feature, could doubt—especially if new to the subject, +as the greater number of Mr. Darwin’s readers in 1859 were—that this same +descent with modification was the theory which Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace +had jointly hit upon, and which Mr. Darwin was so anxious to show that he +had not been hasty in adopting? When Mr. Darwin went on to say that his +abstract would be very imperfect, and that he could not give references +and authorities for his several statements, we did not suppose that such +an apology could be meant to cover silence concerning writers who during +their whole lives, or nearly so, had borne the burden and heat of the day +in respect of descent with modification in its most extended application. +“I much regret,” says Mr. Darwin, “that want of space prevents my having +the satisfaction of acknowledging the generous assistance I have received +from very many naturalists, some of them personally unknown to me.” This +is like what the Royal Academicians say when they do not intend to hang +our pictures; they can, however, generally find space for a picture if +they want to hang it, and we assume with safety that there are no +master-works by painters of the very highest rank for which no space has +been available. Want of space will, indeed, prevent my quoting from more +than one other paragraph of Mr. Darwin’s introduction; this paragraph, +however, should alone suffice to show how inaccurate Mr. Allen is in +saying that Mr. Darwin “laid no sort of claim to originality or +proprietorship” in the theory of descent with modification, and this is +the point with which we are immediately concerned. Mr. Darwin says:— + +“In considering the origin of species, it is quite conceivable that a +naturalist, reflecting on the mutual affinities of organic beings, on +their embryological relations, their geographical distribution, +geological succession, and other such facts, might come to the conclusion +that each species had not been independently created, but had descended +like varieties from other species.” + +It will be observed that not only is no hint given here that descent with +modification was a theory which, though unknown to the general public, +had been occupying the attention of biologists for a hundred years and +more, but it is distinctly implied that this was not the case. When Mr. +Darwin said it was “conceivable that a naturalist might” arrive at the +theory of descent, straightforward readers took him to mean that though +this was conceivable, it had never, to Mr. Darwin’s knowledge, been done. +If we had a notion that we had already vaguely heard of the theory that +men and the lower animals were descended from common ancestors, we must +have been wrong; it was not this that we had heard of, but something +else, which, though doubtless a little like it, was all wrong, whereas +this was obviously going to be all right. + +To follow the rest of the paragraph with the closeness that it merits +would be a task at once so long and so unpleasant that I will omit +further reference to any part of it except the last sentence. That +sentence runs:— + +“In the case of the mistletoe, which draws its nourishment from certain +trees, which has seeds that must be transported by certain birds, and +which has flowers with separate sexes absolutely requiring the agency of +certain insects to bring pollen from one flower to the other, it is +equally preposterous to account for the structure of this parasite, with +its relations to several distinct organic beings, by the effects of the +external conditions, or of habit, or of the volition of the plant +itself.” + +Doubtless it would be preposterous to refer the structure of either +woodpecker or mistletoe to the single agency of any one of these three +causes; but neither Lamarck nor any other writer on evolution has, so far +as I know, even contemplated this; the early evolutionists supposed +organic modification to depend on the action and interaction of all +three, and I venture to think that this will ere long be considered as, +to say the least of it, not more preposterous than the assigning of the +largely preponderating share in the production of such highly and +variously correlated organisms as the mistletoe and woodpecker mainly to +luck pure and simple, as is done by Mr. Charles Darwin’s theory. + +It will be observed that in the paragraph last quoted from, Mr. Darwin, +_more suo_, is careful not to commit himself. All he has said is, that +it would be preposterous to do something the preposterousness of which +cannot be reasonably disputed; the impression, however, is none the less +effectually conveyed, that some one of the three assigned agencies, taken +singly, was the only cause of modification ever yet proposed, if, indeed, +any writer had even gone so far as this. We knew we did not know much +about the matter ourselves, and that Mr. Darwin was a naturalist of long +and high standing; we naturally, therefore, credited him with the same +good faith as a writer that we knew in ourselves as readers; it never so +much as crossed our minds to suppose that the head which he was holding +up all dripping before our eyes as that of a fool, was not that of a fool +who had actually lived and written, but only of a figure of straw which +had been dipped in a bucket of red paint. Naturally enough we concluded, +since Mr. Darwin seemed to say so, that if his predecessors had nothing +better to say for themselves than this, it would not be worth while to +trouble about them further; especially as we did not know who they were, +nor what they had written, and Mr. Darwin did not tell us. It would be +better and less trouble to take the goods with which it was plain Mr. +Darwin was going to provide us, and ask no questions. We have seen that +even tolerably obvious conclusions were rather slow in occurring to poor +simple-minded Mr. Darwin, and may be sure that it never once occurred to +him that the British public would be likely to argue thus; he had no +intention of playing the scientific confidence trick upon us. I dare say +not, but unfortunately the result has closely resembled the one that +would have ensued if Mr. Darwin had had such an intention. + +The claim to originality made so distinctly in the opening sentences of +the “Origin of Species” is repeated in a letter to Professor Haeckel, +written October 8, 1864, and giving an account of the development of his +belief in descent with modification. This letter, part of which is +quoted by Mr. Allen, {173a} is given on p. 134 of the English translation +of Professor Haeckel’s “History of Creation,” {173b} and runs as +follows:— + +“In South America three classes of facts were brought strongly before my +mind. Firstly, the manner in which closely allied species replace +species in going southward. Secondly, the close affinity of the species +inhabiting the islands near South America to those proper to the +continent. This struck me profoundly, especially the difference of the +species in the adjoining islets in the Galapagos Archipelago. Thirdly, +the relation of the living Edentata and Rodentia to the extinct species. +I shall never forget my astonishment when I dug out a gigantic piece of +armour like that of the living armadillo. + +“Reflecting on these facts, and collecting analogous ones, it seemed to +me probable that allied species were descended from a common ancestor. +But during several years I could not conceive how each form could have +been modified so as to become admirably adapted to its place in nature. +I began, therefore, to study domesticated animals and cultivated plants, +and after a time perceived that man’s power of selecting and breeding +from certain individuals was the most powerful of all means in the +production of new races. Having attended to the habits of animals and +their relations to the surrounding conditions, I was able to realise the +severe struggle for existence to which all organisms are subjected, and +my geological observations had allowed me to appreciate to a certain +extent the duration of past geological periods. Therefore, when I +happened to read Malthus on population, the idea of natural selection +flashed on me. Of all minor points, the last which I appreciated was the +importance and cause of the principle of divergence.” + +This is all very naïve, and accords perfectly with the introductory +paragraphs of the “Origin of Species;” it gives us the same picture of a +solitary thinker, a poor, lonely, friendless student of nature, who had +never so much as heard of Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, or Lamarck. +Unfortunately, however, we cannot forget the description of the +influences which, according to Mr. Grant Allen, did in reality surround +Mr. Darwin’s youth, and certainly they are more what we should have +expected than those suggested rather than expressly stated by Mr. Darwin. +“Everywhere around him,” says Mr. Allen, {174a} “in his childhood and +youth these great but formless” (why “formless”?) “evolutionary ideas +were brewing and fermenting. The scientific society of his elders and of +the contemporaries among whom he grew up was permeated with the leaven of +Laplace and Lamarck, of Hutton and of Herschel. Inquiry was especially +everywhere rife as to the origin and nature of specific distinctions +among plants and animals. Those who believed in the doctrine of Buffon +and of the ‘Zoonomia,’ and those who disbelieved in it, alike, were +profoundly interested and agitated in soul by the far-reaching +implications of that fundamental problem. On every side evolutionism, in +its crude form.” (I suppose Mr. Allen could not help saying “in its +crude form,” but descent with modification in 1809 meant, to all intents +and purposes, and was understood to mean, what it means now, or ought to +mean, to most people.) “The universal stir,” says Mr. Allen on the +following page, “and deep prying into evolutionary questions which +everywhere existed among scientific men in his early days was naturally +communicated to a lad born of a scientific family and inheriting directly +in blood and bone the biological tastes and tendencies of Erasmus +Darwin.” + +I confess to thinking that Mr. Allen’s account of the influences which +surrounded Mr. Darwin’s youth, if tainted with picturesqueness, is still +substantially correct. On an earlier page he had written:—“It is +impossible to take up any scientific memoirs or treatises of the first +half of our own century without seeing at a glance how every mind of high +original scientific importance was permeated and disturbed by the +fundamental questions aroused, but not fully answered, by Buffon, +Lamarck, and Erasmus Darwin. In Lyell’s letters, and in Agassiz’s +lectures, in the ‘Botanic Journal’ and in the ‘Philosophical +Transactions,’ in treatises on Madeira beetles and the Australian flora, +we find everywhere the thoughts of men profoundly influenced in a +thousand directions by this universal evolutionary solvent and leaven. + +“And while the world of thought was thus seething and moving restlessly +before the wave of ideas set in motion by these various independent +philosophers, another group of causes in another field was rendering +smooth the path beforehand for the future champion of the amended +evolutionism. Geology on the one hand and astronomy on the other were +making men’s minds gradually familiar with the conception of slow natural +development, as opposed to immediate and miraculous creation. + + . . . + +“The influence of these novel conceptions upon the growth and spread of +evolutionary ideas was far-reaching and twofold. In the first place, the +discovery of a definite succession of nearly related organic forms +following one another with evident closeness through the various ages, +inevitably suggested to every inquiring observer the possibility of their +direct descent one from the other. In the second place, the discovery +that geological formations were not really separated each from its +predecessor by violent revolutions, but were the result of gradual and +ordinary changes, discredited the old idea of frequent fresh creations +after each catastrophe, and familiarised the minds of men of science with +the alternative notion of slow and natural evolutionary processes. The +past was seen in effect to be the parent of the present; the present was +recognised as the child of the past.” + +This is certainly not Mr. Darwin’s own account of the matter. Probably +the truth will lie somewhere between the two extreme views: and on the +one hand, the world of thought was not seething quite so badly as Mr. +Allen represents it, while on the other, though “three classes of fact,” +&c., were undoubtedly “brought strongly before” Mr. Darwin’s “mind in +South America,” yet some of them had perhaps already been brought before +it at an earlier time, which he did not happen to remember at the moment +of writing his letter to Professor Haeckel and the opening paragraph of +the “Origin of Species.” + + + + +Chapter XIV +Darwin and Descent with Modification (_continued_) + + +I HAVE said enough to show that Mr. Darwin claimed I to have been the +originator of the theory of descent with modification as distinctly as +any writer usually claims any theory; but it will probably save the +reader trouble in the end if I bring together a good many, though not, +probably, all (for I much disliked the task, and discharged it +perfunctorily), of the passages in the “Origin of Species” in which the +theory of descent with modification in its widest sense is claimed +expressly or by implication. I shall quote from the original edition, +which, it should be remembered, consisted of the very unusually large +number of four thousand copies, and from which no important deviation was +made either by addition or otherwise until a second edition of two +thousand further copies had been sold; the “Historical Sketch,” &c., +being first given with the third edition. The italics, which I have +employed so as to catch the reader’s eye, are mine, not Mr. Darwin’s. +Mr. Darwin writes:— + +“Although much remains obscure, and will long remain obscure, _I can +entertain no doubt_, _after the most deliberate study and dispassionate +judgment of which I am capable_, _that the view which most naturalists +entertain_, _and which I formerly entertained—namely that each species +has been independently created—is erroneous_. I am fully convinced that +species are not immutable, but that those belonging to what are called +the same genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally +extinct species, in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of any +one species are the descendants of that species. Furthermore, I am +convinced that natural selection” (or the preservation of fortunate +races) “has been the main but not exclusive means of modification” (p. +6). + +It is not here expressly stated that the theory of the mutability of +species is Mr. Darwin’s own; this, nevertheless, is the inference which +the great majority of his readers were likely to draw, and did draw, from +Mr. Darwin’s words. + +Again:— + +“It is not that all large genera are now varying much, and are thus +increasing in the number of their species, or that no small genera are +now multiplying and increasing; for if this had been so it would have +been fatal to _my theory_; inasmuch as geology,” &c. (p. 56). + +The words “my theory” stand in all the editions. Again:— + +“This relation has a clear meaning _on my view_ of the subject; I look +upon all the species of any genus as having as certainly descended from +the same progenitor, as have the two sexes of any one of the species” (p. +157). + +“My view” here, especially in the absence of reference to any other +writer as having held the same opinion, implies as its most natural +interpretation that descent pure and simple is Mr. Darwin’s view. +Substitute “the theory of descent” for “my view,” and we do not feel that +we are misinterpreting the author’s meaning. The words “my view” remain +in all editions. + +Again:— + +“Long before having arrived at this part of my work, a crowd of +difficulties will have occurred to the reader. Some of them are so grave +that to this day I can never reflect on them without being staggered; but +to the best of my belief the greater number are only apparent, and those +that are real are not, I think, _fatal to my theory_. + +“These difficulties and objections may be classed under the following +heads:—Firstly, if species have descended from other species by +insensibly fine gradations, why do we not everywhere see?” &c. (p. 171). + +We infer from this that “my theory” is the theory “that species have +descended from other species by insensibly fine gradations”—that is to +say, that it is the theory of descent with modification; for the theory +that is being objected to is obviously the theory of descent _in toto_, +and not a mere detail in connection with that theory. + +The words “my theory” were altered in 1872, with the sixth edition of the +“Origin of species,” into “the theory;” but I am chiefly concerned with +the first edition of the work, my object being to show that Mr. Darwin +was led into his false position as regards natural selection by a desire +to claim the theory of descent with modification; if he claimed it in the +first edition, this is enough to give colour to the view which I take; +but it must be remembered that descent with modification remained, by the +passage just quoted “my theory,” for thirteen years, and even when in +1869 and 1872, for a reason that I can only guess at, “my theory” became +generally “the theory,” this did not make it become any one else’s +theory. It is hard to say whose or what it became, if the words are to +be construed technically; practically, however, with all ingenuous +readers, “the theory” remained as much Mr. Darwin’s theory as though the +words “my theory” had been retained, and Mr. Darwin cannot be supposed so +simple-minded as not to have known this would be the case. Moreover, it +appears, from the next page but one to the one last quoted, that Mr. +Darwin claimed the theory of descent with modification generally, even to +the last, for we there read, “_By my theory_ these allied species have +descended from a common parent,” and the “my” has been allowed, for some +reason not quite obvious, to survive the general massacre of Mr. Darwin’s +“my’s” which occurred in 1869 and 1872. + +Again:— + +“He who believes that each being has been created as we now see it, must +occasionally have felt surprise when he has met,” &c. (p. 185). + +Here the argument evidently lies between descent and independent acts of +creation. This appears from the paragraph immediately following, which +begins, “He who believes in separate and innumerable acts of creation,” +&c. We therefore understand descent to be the theory so frequently +spoken of by Mr. Darwin as “my.” + +Again:— + +“He who will go thus far, if he find on finishing this treatise that +large bodies of facts, otherwise inexplicable, can be explained _by the +theory of descent_, ought not to hesitate to go farther, and to admit +that a structure even as perfect as an eagle’s eye might be formed _by +natural selection_, although in this case he does not know any of the +transitional grades” (p. 188). + +The natural inference from this is that descent and natural selection are +one and the same thing. + +Again:— + +“If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could +not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight +modifications, _my theory_ would absolutely break down. But I can find +out no such case. No doubt many organs exist of which we do not know the +transitional grades, more especially if we look to much-isolated species, +round which, according to my _theory_, there has been much extinction” +(p. 189). + +This makes “my theory” to be “the theory that complex organs have arisen +by numerous, successive, slight modifications;” that is to say, to be the +theory of descent with modification. The first of the two “my theory’s” +in the passage last quoted has been allowed to stand. The second became +“the theory” in 1872. It is obvious, therefore, that “the theory” means +“my theory;” it is not so obvious why the change should have been made at +all, nor why the one “my theory” should have been taken and the other +left, but I will return to this question. + +Again, Mr. Darwin writes:— + +“Although we must be extremely cautious in concluding that any organ +could not possibly have been produced by small successive transitional +gradations, yet, undoubtedly grave cases of difficulty occur, some of +which will be discussed in my future work” (p. 192). + +This, as usual, implies descent with modification to be the theory that +Mr. Darwin is trying to make good. + +Again:— + +“I have been astonished how rarely an organ can be named towards which no +transitional variety is known to lead . . . Why, _on the theory of +creation_, should this be so? Why should not nature have taken a leap +from structure to structure? _On the theory of natural selection_ we can +clearly understand why she should not; for natural selection can act only +by taking advantage of slight successive variations; she can never take a +leap, but must advance by the slowest and shortest steps” (p. 194). + +Here “the theory of natural selection” is opposed to “the theory of +creation;” we took it, therefore, to be another way of saying “the theory +of descent with modification.” + +Again:— + +“We have in this chapter discussed some of the difficulties and +objections which may be urged against _my theory_. Many of them are very +grave, but I think that in the discussion light has been thrown on +several facts which, _on the theory of independent acts of creation_, are +utterly obscure” (p. 203). + +Here we have, on the one hand, “my theory,” on the other, “independent +acts of creation.” The natural antithesis to independent acts of +creation is descent, and we assumed with reason that Mr. Darwin was +claiming this when he spoke of “my theory.” “My theory” became “the +theory” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“On the theory of natural selection we can clearly understand the full +meaning of that old canon in natural history, ‘_Natura non facit +saltum_.’ This canon, if we look only to the present inhabitants of the +world is not strictly correct, but if we include all those of past times, +it must _by my theory_ be strictly true” (p. 206). + +Here the natural interpretation of “by my theory” is “by the theory of +descent with modification;” the words “on the theory of natural +selection,” with which the sentence opens, lead us to suppose that Mr. +Darwin regarded natural selection and descent as convertible terms. “My +theory” was altered to “this theory” in 1872. Six lines lower down we +read, “_On my theory_ unity of type is explained by unity of descent.” +The “my” here has been allowed to stand. + +Again:— + +“Again, as in the case of corporeal structure, and conformably with _my +theory_, the instinct of each species is good for itself, but has never,” +&c. (p. 210). + +Who was to see that “my theory” did not include descent with +modification? The “my” here has been allowed to stand. + +Again:— + +“The fact that instincts . . . are liable to make mistakes;—that no +instinct has been produced for the exclusive good of other animals, but +that each animal takes advantage of the instincts of others;—that the +canon of natural history, ‘_Natura non facit saltum_,’ is applicable to +instincts as well as to corporeal structure, and is plainly explicable on +the foregoing views, but is otherwise inexplicable,—_all tend to +corroborate the theory of natural selection_” (p. 243). + +We feel that it is the theory of evolution, or descent with modification, +that is here corroborated, and that it is this which Mr. Darwin is mainly +trying to establish; the sentence should have ended “all tend to +corroborate the theory of descent with modification;” the substitution of +“natural selection” for descent tends to make us think that these +conceptions are identical. That they are so regarded, or at any rate +that it is the theory of descent in full which Mr. Darwin has in his +mind, appears from the immediately succeeding paragraph, which begins +“_This theory_,” and continues six lines lower, “For instance, we can +understand, on the _principle of inheritance_, how it is that,” &c. + +Again:— + +“In the first place, it should always be borne in mind what sort of +intermediate forms must, _on my theory_, formerly have existed” (p. 280). + +“My theory” became “the theory” in 1869. No reader who read in good +faith could doubt that the theory of descent with modification was being +here intended. + +“It is just possible _by my theory_, that one of two living forms might +have descended from the other; for instance, a horse from a tapir; but in +this case _direct_ intermediate links will have existed between them” (p. +281). + +“My theory” became “the theory” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“_By the theory of natural selection_ all living species have been +connected with the parent species of each genus,” &c. We took this to +mean, “By the theory of descent with modification all living species,” +&c. (p. 281). + +Again:— + +“Some experienced conchologists are now sinking many of the very fine +species of D’Orbigny and others into the rank of varieties; and on this +view we do find the kind of evidence of change which _on my theory_ we +ought to find” (p. 297). + +“My theory” became “the theory” in 1869. + +In the fourth edition (1866), in a passage which is not in either of the +two first editions, we read (p. 359), “So that here again we have +undoubted evidence of change in the direction required by _my theory_.” +“My theory” became “the theory” in 1869; the theory of descent with +modification is unquestionably intended. + +Again:— + +“Geological research has done scarcely anything in breaking down the +distinction between species, by connecting them together by numerous, +fine, intermediate varieties; and this not having been effected, is +probably the gravest and most obvious of all the many objections which +may be urged against _my views_” (p. 299). + +We naturally took “my views” to mean descent with modification. The “my” +has been allowed to stand. + +Again:— + +“If, then, there be some degree of truth in these remarks, we have no +right to expect to find in our geological formations an infinite number +of those transitional forms which _on my theory_ assuredly have connected +all the past and present species of the same group in one long and +branching chain of life . . . But I do not pretend that I should ever +have suspected how poor was the record in the best preserved geological +sections, had not the absence of innumerable transitional links between +the species which lived at the commencement and at the close of each +formation pressed so hardly _on my theory_” (pp. 301, 302). + +Substitute “descent with modification” for “my theory” and the meaning +does not suffer. The first of the two “my theories” in the passage last +quoted was altered in 1869 into “our theory;” the second has been allowed +to stand. + +Again:— + +“The abrupt manner in which whole groups of species suddenly appear in +some formations, has been urged by several palæontologists . . . as a +fatal objection _to the belief in the transmutation of species_. If +numerous species, belonging to the same genera or families, have really +started into life all at once, the fact would be fatal _to the theory of +descent with slow modification through natural selection_” (p. 302). + +Here “the belief in the transmutation of species,” or descent with +modification, is treated as synonymous with “the theory of descent with +slow modification through natural selection;” but it has nowhere been +explained that there are two widely different “theories of descent with +slow modification through natural selection,” the one of which may be +true enough for all practical purposes, while the other is seen to be +absurd as soon as it is examined closely. The theory of descent with +modification is not properly convertible with either of these two views, +for descent with modification deals with the question whether species are +transmutable or no, and dispute as to the respective merits of the two +natural selections deals with the question how it comes to be transmuted; +nevertheless, the words “the theory of descent with slow modification +through the ordinary course of things” (which is what “descent with +modification through natural selection” comes to) may be considered as +expressing the facts with practical accuracy, if the ordinary course of +nature is supposed to be that modification is mainly consequent on the +discharge of some correlated function, and that modification, if +favourable, will tend to accumulate so long as the given function +continues important to the wellbeing of the organism; the words, however, +have no correspondence with reality if they are supposed to imply that +variations which are mainly matters of pure chance and unconnected in any +way with function will accumulate and result in specific difference, no +matter how much each one of them may be preserved in the generation in +which it appears. In the one case, therefore, the expression natural +selection may be loosely used as a synonym for descent with modification, +and in the other it may not. Unfortunately with Mr. Charles Darwin the +variations are mainly accidental. The words “through natural selection,” +therefore, in the passage last quoted carry no weight, for it is the +wrong natural selection that is, or ought to be, intended; practically, +however, they derived a weight from Mr. Darwin’s name to which they had +no title of their own, and we understood that “the theory of descent with +slow modification” through the kind of natural selection ostensibly +intended by Mr. Darwin was a quasi-synonymous expression for the +transmutation of species. We understood—so far as we understood anything +beyond that we were to believe in descent with modification—that natural +selection was Mr. Darwin’s theory; we therefore concluded, since Mr. +Darwin seemed to say so, that the theory of the transmutation of species +generally was so also. At any rate we felt as regards the passage last +quoted that the theory of descent with modification was the point of +attack and defence, and we supposed it to be the theory so often referred +to by Mr. Darwin as “my.” + +Again:— + +“Some of the most ancient Silurian animals, as the Nautilus, Lingula, +&c., do not differ much from the living species; and it cannot _on my +theory_ be supposed that these old species were the progenitors,” &c. (p. +306) . . . “Consequently _if my theory be true_, it is indisputable,” &c. +(p. 307). + +Here the two “my theories” have been altered, the first into “our +theory,” and the second into “the theory,” both in 1869; but, as usual, +the thing that remains with the reader is the theory of descent, and it +remains morally and practically as much claimed when called “the +theory”—as during the many years throughout which the more open “my” +distinctly claimed it. + +Again:— + +“All the most eminent palæontologists, namely, Cuvier, Owen, Agassiz, +Barrande, E. Forbes, &c., and all our greatest geologists, as Lyell, +Murchison, Sedgwick, &c., have unanimously, often vehemently, maintained +_the immutability of species_. . . . I feel how rash it is to differ from +these great authorities . . . Those who think the natural geological +record in any degree perfect, and who do not attach much weight to the +facts and arguments of other kinds brought forward in this volume, will +undoubtedly at once _reject my theory_” (p. 310). + +What is “my theory” here, if not that of the mutability of species, or +the theory of descent with modification? “My theory” became “the theory” +in 1869. + +Again:— + +“Let us now see whether the several facts and rules relating to the +geological succession of organic beings, better accord with the common +view of the immutability of species, or with that of their _slow and +gradual modification_, _through descent and natural selection_” (p. 312). + +The words “natural selection” are indeed here, but they might as well be +omitted for all the effect they produce. The argument is felt to be +about the two opposed theories of descent, and independent creative +efforts. + +Again:— + +“These several facts accord well with _my theory_” (p. 314). That “my +theory” is the theory of descent is the conclusion most naturally drawn +from the context. “My theory” became “our theory” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“This gradual increase in the number of the species of a group is +strictly conformable _with my theory_; for the process of modification +and the production of a number of allied forms must be slow and gradual, +. . . like the branching of a great tree from a single stem, till the +group becomes large” (p. 314). + +“My theory” became “the theory” in 1869. We took “my theory” to be the +theory of descent; that Mr. Darwin treats this as synonymous with the +theory of natural selection appears from the next paragraph, on the third +line of which we read, “On _the theory of natural selection_ the +extinction of old forms,” &c. + +Again:— + +“_The theory of natural selection_ is grounded on the belief that each +new variety and ultimately each new species, is produced and maintained +by having some advantage over those with which it comes into competition; +and the consequent extinction of less favoured forms almost inevitably +follows” (p. 320). Sense and consistency cannot be made of this passage. +Substitute “The theory of the preservation of favoured races in the +struggle for life” for “The theory of natural selection” (to do this is +only taking Mr. Darwin’s own synonym for natural selection) and see what +the passage comes to. “The preservation of favoured races” is not a +theory, it is a commonly observed fact; it is not “grounded on the belief +that each new variety,” &c., it is one of the ultimate and most +elementary principles in the world of life. When we try to take the +passage seriously and think it out, we soon give it up, and pass on, +substituting “the theory of descent” for “the theory of natural +selection,” and concluding that in some way these two things must be +identical. + +Again:— + +“The manner in which single species and whole groups of species become +extinct accords well with _the theory of natural selection_” (p. 322). + +Again:— + +“This great fact of the parallel succession of the forms of life +throughout the world, is explicable _on the theory of natural selection_” +(p. 325). + +Again:— + +“Let us now look to the mutual affinities of extinct and living species. +They all fall into one grand natural system; and this is at once +explained _on the principle of descent_” (p. 329). + +Putting the three preceding passages together, we naturally inferred that +“the theory of natural selection” and “the principle of descent” were the +same things. We knew Mr. Darwin claimed the first, and therefore +unhesitatingly gave him the second at the same time. + +Again:— + +“Let us see how far these several facts and inferences accord with _the +theory of descent with modification_” (p. 331) + +Again:— + +“Thus, _on the theory of descent with modification_, the main facts with +regard to the mutual affinities of the extinct forms of life to each +other and to living forms, seem to me explained in a satisfactory manner. +And they are wholly inexplicable _on any other view_” (p. 333). + +The words “seem to me” involve a claim in the absence of so much as a +hint in any part of the book concerning indebtedness to earlier writers. + +Again:— + +“_On the theory of descent_, the full meaning of the fossil remains,” &c. +(p. 336). + +In the following paragraph we read:— + +“But in one particular sense the more recent forms must, _on my theory_, +be higher than the more ancient.” + +Again:— + +“Agassiz insists that ancient animals resemble to a certain extent the +embryos of recent animals of the same classes; or that the geological +succession of extinct forms is in some degree parallel to the +embryological development of recent forms. . . . This doctrine of Agassiz +accords well with _the theory of natural selection_” (p. 338). + +“The theory of natural selection” became “our theory” in 1869. The +opinion of Agassiz accords excellently with the theory of descent with +modification, but it is not easy to see how it bears upon the fact that +lucky races are preserved in the struggle for life—which, according to +Mr. Darwin’s title-page, is what is meant by natural selection. + +Again:— + +“_On the theory of descent with modification_, the great law of the +long-enduring but not immutable succession of the same types within the +same areas, is at once explained” (p. 340). + +Again:— + +“It must not be forgotten that, _on my theory_, all the species of the +same genus have descended from some one species” (p. 341). + +“My theory” became “our theory” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“He who rejects these views on the nature of the geological record, will +rightly reject _my whole theory_” (p. 342). + +“My” became “our” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“Passing from these difficulties, the other great leading facts in +palæontology agree admirably with _the theory of descent with +modification through variation and natural selection_” (p. 343). + +Again:— + +The succession of the same types of structure within the same areas +during the later geological periods _ceases to be mysterious_, and _is +simply explained by inheritance_ (p. 345). + +I suppose inheritance was not when Mr. Darwin wrote considered +mysterious. The last few words have been altered to “and is intelligible +on the principle of inheritance.” It seems as though Mr. Darwin did not +like saying that inheritance was not mysterious, but had no objection to +implying that it was intelligible. + +The next paragraph begins—“If, then, the geological record be as +imperfect as I believe it to be, . . . the main objections _to the theory +of natural selection_ are greatly diminished or disappear. On the other +hand, all the chief laws of palæontology plainly proclaim, _as it seems +to me_, _that species have been produced by ordinary generation_.” + +Here again the claim to the theory of descent with modification is +unmistakable; it cannot, moreover, but occur to us that if species “have +been produced by ordinary generation,” then ordinary generation has as +good a claim to be the main means of originating species as natural +selection has. It is hardly necessary to point out that ordinary +generation involves descent with modification, for all known offspring +differ from their parents, so far, at any rate, as that practised judges +can generally tell them apart. + +Again:— + +“We see in these facts some deep organic bond, prevailing throughout +space and time, over the same areas of land and water, and independent of +their physical condition. The naturalist must feel little curiosity who +is not led to inquire what this bond is. + +“This bond, _on my theory_, _is simply inheritance_, that cause which +alone,” &c. (p. 350). + +This passage was altered in 1869 to “The bond is simply inheritance.” +The paragraph concludes, “_On this principle of inheritance with +modification_, we can understand how it is that sections of genera . . . +are confined to the same areas,” &c. + +Again:— + +“He who rejects it rejects the _vera causa of ordinary_ generation,” &c. +(p. 352). + +We naturally ask, Why call natural selection the “main means of +modification,” if “ordinary generation” is a _vera causa_? + +Again:— + +“In discussing this subject, we shall be enabled at the same time to +consider a point equally important for us, namely, whether the several +distinct species of a genus, _which on my theory have all descended from +a common ancestor_, can have migrated (undergoing modification during +some part of their migration) from the area inhabited by their +progenitor” (p. 354). + +The words “on my theory” became “on our theory” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“With those organic beings which never intercross (if such exist) _the +species_, _on my theory_, _must have descended from a succession of +improved varieties_,” &c. (p. 355). + +The words “on my theory” were cut out in 1869. + +Again:— + +“A slow southern migration of a marine fauna will account, _on the theory +of modification_, for many closely allied forms,” &c. (p. 372). + +Again:— + +“But the existence of several quite distinct species, belonging to genera +exclusively confined to the southern hemisphere, is, _on my theory of +descent with modification_, a far more remarkable case of difficulty” (p. +381). + +“My” became “the” in 1866 with the fourth edition. This was the most +categorical claim to the theory of descent with modification in the +“Origin of Species.” The “my” here is the only one that was taken out +before 1869. I suppose Mr. Darwin thought that with the removal of this +“my” he had ceased to claim the theory of descent with modification. +Nothing, however, could be gained by calling the reader’s attention to +what had been done, so nothing was said about it. + +Again:— + +“Some species of fresh-water shells have a very wide range, _and allied +species_, _which_, _on my theory_, _are descended from a single source_, +prevail throughout the world” (p. 385). + +“My theory” became “our theory” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“In the following remarks I shall not confine myself to the mere question +of dispersal, but shall consider some other facts which bear upon the +truth of _the two theories of independent creation and of descent with +modification_” (p. 389). What can be plainer than that the theory which +Mr. Darwin espouses, and has so frequently called “my,” is descent with +modification? + +Again:— + +“But as these animals and their spawn are known to be immediately killed +by sea-water, _on my view_, we can see that there would be great +difficulty in their transportal across the sea, and therefore why they do +not exist on any oceanic island. But why, _on the theory of creation_, +they should not have been created there, it would be very difficult to +explain” (p. 393). + +“On my view” was cut out in 1869. + +On the following page we read—“On my view this question can easily be +answered.” “On my view” is retained in the latest edition. + +Again:— + +“Yet there must be, _on my view_, some unknown but highly efficient means +for their transportation” (p. 397). + +“On my view” became “according to our view” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“I believe this grand fact can receive no sort of explanation _on the +ordinary view of independent creation_; whereas, _on the view here +maintained_, it is obvious that the Galapagos Islands would be likely to +receive colonists . . . from America, and the Cape de Verde Islands from +Africa; and that such colonists would be liable to modification; the +principle of inheritance still betraying their original birth-place” (p. +399). + +Again:— + +“With respect to the distinct species of the same genus which, _on my +theory_, must have spread from one parent source, if we make the same +allowances as before,” &c. + +“On my theory” became “on our theory” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“_On my theory_ these several relations throughout time and space are +intelligible; . . . the forms within each class have been connected by +the same bond of ordinary generation; . . . in both cases the laws of +variation have been the same, and modifications have been accumulated by +the same power of natural selection” (p. 410). + +“On my theory” became “according to our theory” in 1869, and natural +selection is no longer a power, but has become a means. + +Again:— + +“_I believe that something more is included_, and that propinquity of +descent—the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings—is the +bond, hidden as it is by various degrees of modification, which is +partially revealed to us by our classification” (p. 418). + +Again:— + +“_Thus_, _on the view which I hold_, the natural system is genealogical +in its arrangement, like a pedigree” (p. 422). + +“On the view which I hold” was cut out in 1872. + +Again:— + +“We may feel almost sure, _on the theory of descent_, that these +characters have been inherited from a common ancestor” (p. 426). + +Again:— + +“_On my view of characters being of real importance for classification +only in so far as they reveal descent_, we can clearly understand,” &c. +(p. 427). + +“On my view” became “on the view” in 1872. + +Again:— + +“The more aberrant any form is, the greater must be the number of +connecting forms which, _on my theory_, have been exterminated and +utterly lost” (p. 429). + +The words “on my theory” were excised in 1869. + +Again:— + +“Finally, we have seen that _natural selection_ _. . . explains_ that +great and universal feature in the affinities of all organic beings, +namely, their subordination in group under group. _We use the element of +descent_ in classing the individuals of both sexes, &c.; . . . _we use +descent_ in classing acknowledged varieties; . . . and I believe this +element of descent is the hidden bond of connection which naturalists +have sought under the term of the natural system” (p. 433). + +Lamarck was of much the same opinion, as I showed in “Evolution Old and +New.” He wrote:—“An arrangement should be considered systematic, or +arbitrary, when it does not conform to the genealogical order taken by +nature in the development of the things arranged, and when, by +consequence, it is not founded on well-considered analogies. There is a +natural order in every department of nature; it is the order in which its +several component items have been successively developed.” {195a} The +point, however, which should more particularly engage our attention is +that Mr. Darwin in the passage last quoted uses “natural selection” and +“descent” as though they were convertible terms. + +Again:— + +“Nothing can be more hopeless than to attempt to explain this similarity +of pattern in members of the same class by utility or the doctrine of +final causes . . . _On the ordinary view of the independent creation of +each being_, we can only say that so it is . . . _The explanation is +manifest on the theory of the natural selection of successive slight_ +modifications,” &c. (p. 435). + +This now stands—“The explanation is to a large extent simple, on the +theory of the selection of successive, slight modifications.” I do not +like “a large extent” of simplicity; but, waiving this, the point at +issue is not whether the ordinary course of things ensures a +quasi-selection of the types that are best adapted to their surroundings, +with accumulation of modification in various directions, and hence wide +eventual difference between species descended from common progenitors—no +evolutionist since 1750 has doubted this—but whether a general principle +underlies the modifications from among which the quasi-selection is made, +or whether they are destitute of such principle and referable, as far as +we are concerned, to chance only. Waiving this again, we note that the +theories of independent creation and of natural selection are contrasted, +as though they were the only two alternatives; knowing the two +alternatives to be independent creation and descent with modification, we +naturally took natural selection to mean descent with modification. + +Again:— + +“_On the theory of natural selection_ we can satisfactorily answer these +questions” (p. 437). + +“Satisfactorily” now stands “to a certain extent.” + +Again:— + +“_On my view_ these terms may be used literally” (pp. 438, 439). + +“On my view” became “according to the views here maintained such language +may be,” &c., in 1869. + +Again:— + +“I believe all these facts can be explained as follows, _on the view of +descent with modification_” (p. 443). + +This sentence now ends at “follows.” + +Again:— + +“Let us take a genus of birds, _descended_, _on my theory_, _from some +one parent species_, and of which the several new species _have become +modified through natural selection_ in accordance with their divers +habits” (p. 446). + +The words “on my theory” were cut out in 1869, and the passage now +stands, “Let us take a group of birds, descended from some ancient form +and modified through natural selection for different habits.” + +Again:— + +“_On my view of descent with modification_, the origin of rudimentary +organs is simple” (p. 454). + +“On my view” became “_on the view_” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“_On the view of descent with modification_,” &c. (p. 455). + +Again:— + +“_On this same view of descent with modification_ all the great facts of +morphology become intelligible” (p. 456). + +Again:— + +“That many and grave objections may be advanced against _the theory of +descent with modification through natural selection_, I do not deny” (p. +459). + +This now stands, “That many and serious objections may be advanced +against _the theory of descent with modification through variation and +natural selection_, I do not deny.” + +Again:— + +“There are, it must be admitted, cases of special difficulty _on the +theory of natural selection_” (p. 460). + +“On” has become “opposed to;” it is not easy to see why this alteration +was made, unless because “opposed to” is longer. + +Again:— + +“Turning to geographical distribution, the difficulties encountered _on +the theory of descent with modification_ are grave enough.” + +“Grave” has become “serious,” but there is no other change (p. 461). + +Again:— + +“As _on the theory of natural selection_ an interminable number of +intermediate forms must have existed,” &c. + +“On” has become “according to”—which is certainly longer, but does not +appear to possess any other advantage over “on.” It is not easy to +understand why Mr. Darwin should have strained at such a gnat as “on,” +though feeling no discomfort in such an expression as “an interminable +number.” + +Again:— + +“This is the most forcible of the many objections which may be urged +_against my theory_ . . . For certainly, _on my theory_,” &c. (p. 463). + +The “my” in each case became “the” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“Such is the sum of the several chief objections and difficulties which +may be justly urged _against my theory_” (p. 465). + +“My” became “the” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“Grave as these several difficulties are, _in my judgment_ they do not +overthrow _the theory of descent with modifications_” (p. 466). + +This now stands, “Serious as these several objections are, in my judgment +they are by no means sufficient to overthrow _the theory of descent with +subsequent modification_;” which, again, is longer, and shows at what +little, little gnats Mr. Darwin could strain, but is no material +amendment on the original passage. + +Again:— + +“_The theory of natural selection_, even if we looked no further than +this, _seems to me to be in itself probable_” (p. 469). + +This now stands, “The theory of natural selection, even if we look no +further than this, _seems to be in the highest degree probable_.” It is +not only probable, but was very sufficiently proved long before Mr. +Darwin was born, only it must be the right natural selection and not Mr. +Charles Darwin’s. + +Again:— + +“It is inexplicable, _on the theory of creation_, why a part developed, +&c., . . . _but_, _on my view_, this part has undergone,” &c. (p. 474). + +“On my view” became “on our view” in 1869. + +Again:— + +“Glancing at instincts, marvellous as some are, they offer no greater +difficulty than does corporeal structure _on the theory of the natural +selection of successive_, _slight_, _but profitable modifications_” (p. +474). + +Again:— + +“_On the view of all the species of the same genus having descended from +a common parent_, and having inherited much in common, we can understand +how it is,” &c. (p. 474). + +Again:— + +“If we admit that the geological record is imperfect in an extreme +degree, then such facts as the record gives, support _the theory of +descent with modification_. + +“ . . . The extinction of species . . . almost inevitably follows on _the +principle of natural selection_” (p. 475). + +The word “almost” has got a great deal to answer for. + +Again:— + +“We can understand, _on the theory of descent with modification_, most of +the great leading facts in Distribution” (p. 476). + +Again:— + +“The existence of closely allied or representative species in any two +areas, implies, _on the theory of descent with modification_, that the +same parents formerly inhabited both areas . . . It must be admitted that +these facts receive no explanation _on the theory of creation_ . . . The +fact . . . is intelligible _on the theory of natural selection_, with its +contingencies of extinction and divergence of character” (p. 478). + +Again:— + +“Innumerable other such facts at once explain themselves _on the theory +of descent with slow and slight successive modifications_” (p. 479). + +“Any one whose disposition leads him to attach more weight to unexplained +difficulties than to the explanation of a certain number of facts, _will +certainly reject my theory_” (p. 482). + +“My theory” became “the theory” in 1869. + + * * * * * + +From this point to the end of the book the claim is so ubiquitous, either +expressly or by implication, that it is difficult to know what not to +quote. I must, however, content myself with only a few more extracts. +Mr. Darwin says:— + +“It may be asked _how far I extend the doctrine of the modification of +species_” (p. 482). + +Again:— + +“Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all +animals and plants have descended from some one prototype . . . Therefore +I should infer from analogy that probably all the organic beings which +have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial +form, into which life was first breathed.” + +From an amœba—Adam, in fact, though not in name. This last sentence is +now completely altered, as well it might be. + +Again:— + +“When _the views entertained in this volume on the origin of species_, +_or when analogous views are generally admitted_, we can dimly foresee +that there will be a considerable revolution in natural history” (p. +434). + +Possibly. This now stands, “When the views advanced by me in this +volume, and by Mr. Wallace, or when analogous views on the origin of +species are generally admitted, we can dimly foresee,” &c. When the +“Origin of Species” came out we knew nothing of any analogous views, and +Mr. Darwin’s words passed unnoticed. I do not say that he knew they +would, but he certainly ought to have known. + +Again:— + +“_A grand and almost untrodden field of inquiry will be opened_, on the +causes and laws of variation, on correlation of growth, on the effects of +use and disuse, on the direct action of external conditions, and so +forth” (p. 486). + +Buffon and Lamarck had trodden this field to some purpose, but not a hint +to this effect is vouchsafed to us. Again;— + +“_When I view all beings not as special creations_, _but as the lineal +descendants of some few beings which lived long before_ the first bed of +the Silurian system was deposited, they seem to me to become ennobled . . . +We can so far take a prophetic glance into futurity as to foretell that +it will be the common and widely spread species, belonging to the larger +and dominant groups, which will ultimately prevail and procreate new and +dominant species.” + +There is no alteration in this except that “Silurian” has become +“Cambrian.” + +The idyllic paragraph with which Mr. Darwin concludes his book contains +no more special claim to the theory of descent _en bloc_ than many +another which I have allowed to pass unnoticed; it has been, moreover, +dealt with in an earlier chapter (Chapter XII.) + + + + +Chapter XV +The Excised “My’s” + + +I HAVE quoted in all ninety-seven passages, as near as I can make them, +in which Mr. Darwin claimed the theory of descent, either expressly by +speaking of “my theory” in such connection that the theory of descent +ought to be, and, as the event has shown, was, understood as being +intended, or by implication, as in the opening passages of the “Origin of +Species,” in which he tells us how he had thought the matter out without +acknowledging obligation of any kind to earlier writers. The original +edition of the “Origin of Species” contained 490 pp., exclusive of index; +a claim, therefore, more or less explicit, to the theory of descent was +made on the average about once in every five pages throughout the book +from end to end; the claims were most prominent in the most important +parts, that is to say, at the beginning and end of the work, and this +made them more effective than they are made even by their frequency. A +more ubiquitous claim than this it would be hard to find in the case of +any writer advancing a new theory; it is difficult, therefore, to +understand how Mr. Grant Allen could have allowed himself to say that Mr. +Darwin “laid no sort of claim to originality or proprietorship” in the +theory of descent with modification. + +Nevertheless I have only found one place where Mr. Darwin pinned himself +down beyond possibility of retreat, however ignominious, by using the +words “my theory of descent with modification.” {202a} He often, as I +have said, speaks of “my theory,” and then shortly afterwards of “descent +with modification,” under such circumstances that no one who had not been +brought up in the school of Mr. Gladstone could doubt that the two +expressions referred to the same thing. He seems to have felt that he +must be a poor wriggler if he could not wriggle out of this; give him any +loophole, however small, and Mr. Darwin could trust himself to get out +through it; but he did not like saying what left no loophole at all, and +“my theory of descent with modification” closed all exits so firmly that +it is surprising he should ever have allowed himself to use these words. +As I have said, Mr. Darwin only used this direct categorical form of +claim in one place; and even here, after it had stood through three +editions, two of which had been largely altered, he could stand it no +longer, and altered the “my” into “the” in 1866, with the fourth edition +of the “Origin of Species.” + +This was the only one of the original forty-five my’s that was cut out +before the appearance of the fifth edition in 1869, and its excision +throws curious light upon the working of Mr. Darwin’s mind. The +selection of the most categorical my out of the whole forty-five, shows +that Mr. Darwin knew all about his my’s, and, while seeing reason to +remove this, held that the others might very well stand. He even left +“On my _view_ of descent with modification,” {203a} which, though more +capable of explanation than “my theory,” &c., still runs it close; +nevertheless the excision of even a single my that had been allowed to +stand through such close revision as those to which the “Origin of +Species” had been subjected betrays uneasiness of mind, for it is +impossible that even Mr. Darwin should not have known that though the my +excised in 1866 was the most technically categorical, the others were in +reality just as guilty, though no tower of Siloam in the shape of +excision fell upon them. If, then, Mr. Darwin was so uncomfortable about +this one as to cut it out, it is probable he was far from comfortable +about the others. + +This view derives confirmation from the fact that in 1869, with the fifth +edition of the “Origin of Species,” there was a stampede of my’s +throughout the whole work, no less than thirty out of the original +forty-five being changed into “the,” “our,” “this,” or some other word, +which, though having all the effect of my, still did not say “my” +outright. These my’s were, if I may say so, sneaked out; nothing was +said to explain their removal to the reader or call attention to it. +Why, it may be asked, having been considered during the revisions of 1861 +and 1866, and with only one exception allowed to stand, why should they +be smitten with a homing instinct in such large numbers with the fifth +edition? It cannot be maintained that Mr. Darwin had had his attention +called now for the first time to the fact that he had used my perhaps a +little too freely, and had better be more sparing of it for the future. +The my excised in 1866 shows that Mr. Darwin had already considered this +question, and saw no reason to remove any but the one that left him no +loophole. Why, then, should that which was considered and approved in +1859, 1861, and 1866 (not to mention the second edition of 1859 or 1860) +be retreated from with every appearance of panic in 1869? Mr. Darwin +could not well have cut out more than he did—not at any rate without +saying something about it, and it would not be easy to know exactly what +say. Of the fourteen my’s that were left in 1869, five more were cut out +in 1872, and nine only were allowed eventually to remain. We naturally +ask, Why leave any if thirty-six ought to be cut out, or why cut out +thirty-six if nine ought to be left—especially when the claim remains +practically just the same after the excision as before it? + +I imagine complaint had early reached Mr. Darwin that the difference +between himself and his predecessors was unsubstantial and hard to grasp; +traces of some such feeling appear even in the late Sir Charles Lyell’s +“Principles of Geology,” in which he writes that he had reprinted his +abstract of Lamarck’s doctrine word for word, “in justice to Lamarck, in +order to show how nearly the opinions taught by him at the beginning of +this century resembled those now in vogue among a large body of +naturalists respecting the infinite variability of species, and the +progressive development in past time of the organic world.” {205a} Sir +Charles Lyell could not have written thus if he had thought that Mr. +Darwin had already done “justice to Lamarck,” nor is it likely that he +stood alone in thinking as he did. It is probable that more reached Mr. +Darwin than reached the public, and that the historical sketch prefixed +to all editions after the first six thousand copies had been sold—meagre +and slovenly as it is—was due to earlier manifestation on the part of +some of Mr. Darwin’s friends of the feeling that was afterwards expressed +by Sir Charles Lyell in the passage quoted above. I suppose the removal +of the my that was cut out in 1866 to be due partly to the Gladstonian +tendencies of Mr. Darwin’s mind, which would naturally make that +particular my at all times more or less offensive to him, and partly to +the increase of objection to it that must have ensued on the addition of +the “brief but imperfect” historical sketch in 1861; it is doubtless only +by an oversight that this particular my was not cut out in 1861. The +stampede of 1869 was probably occasioned by the appearance in Germany of +Professor Haeckel’s “History of Creation.” This was published in 1868, +and Mr. Darwin no doubt foresaw that it would be translated into English, +as indeed it subsequently was. In this book some account is given—very +badly, but still much more fully than by Mr. Darwin—of Lamarck’s work; +and even Erasmus Darwin is mentioned—inaccurately—but still he is +mentioned. Professor Haeckel says:— + +“Although the theory of development had been already maintained at the +beginning of this century by several great naturalists, especially by +Lamarck and Goethe, it only received complete demonstration and causal +foundation nine years ago through Darwin’s work, and it is on this +account that it is now generally (though not altogether rightly) regarded +as exclusively Mr. Darwin’s theory.” {206a} + +Later on, after giving nearly a hundred pages to the works of the early +evolutionists—pages that would certainly disquiet the sensitive writer +who had cut out the “my” which disappeared in 1866—he continued:— + +“We must distinguish clearly (though this is not usually done) between, +firstly, the theory of descent as advanced by Lamarck, which deals only +with the fact of all animals and plants being descended from a common +source, and secondly, Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which shows +us _why_ this progressive modification of organic forms took place” (p. +93). + +This passage is as inaccurate as most of those by Professor Haeckel that +I have had occasion to examine have proved to be. Letting alone that +Buffon, not Lamarck, is the foremost name in connection with descent, I +have already shown in “Evolution Old and New” that Lamarck goes +exhaustively into the how and why of modification. He alleges the +conservation, or preservation, in the ordinary course of nature, of the +most favourable among variations that have been induced mainly by +function; this, I have sufficiently explained, is natural selection, +though the words “natural selection” are not employed; but it is the true +natural selection which (if so metaphorical an expression is allowed to +pass) actually does take place with the results ascribed to it by +Lamarck, and not the false Charles-Darwinian natural selection that does +not correspond with facts, and cannot result in specific differences such +as we now observe. But, waiving this, the “my’s,” within which a little +rift had begun to show itself in 1866, might well become as mute in 1869 +as they could become without attracting attention, when Mr. Darwin saw +the passages just quoted, and the hundred pages or so that lie between +them. + +I suppose Mr. Darwin cut out the five more my’s that disappeared in 1872 +because he had not yet fully recovered from his scare, and allowed nine +to remain in order to cover his retreat, and tacitly say that he had not +done anything and knew nothing whatever about it. Practically, indeed, +he had not retreated, and must have been well aware that he was only +retreating technically; for he must have known that the absence of +acknowledgment to any earlier writers in the body of his work, and the +presence of the many passages in which every word conveyed the impression +that the writer claimed descent with modification, amounted to a claim as +much when the actual word “my” had been taken out as while it was allowed +to stand. We took Mr. Darwin at his own estimate because we could not +for a moment suppose that a man of means, position, and education,—one, +moreover, who was nothing if he was not unself-seeking—could play such a +trick upon us while pretending to take us into his confidence; hence the +almost universal belief on the part of the public, of which Professors +Haeckel and Ray Lankester and Mr. Grant Allen alike complain—namely, that +Mr. Darwin is the originator of the theory of descent, and that his +variations are mainly functional. Men of science must not be surprised +if the readiness with which we responded to Mr. Darwin’s appeal to our +confidence is succeeded by a proportionate resentment when the peculiar +shabbiness of his action becomes more generally understood. For myself, +I know not which most to wonder at—the meanness of the writer himself, or +the greatness of the service that, in spite of that meanness, he +unquestionably rendered. + +If Mr. Darwin had been dealing fairly by us, when he saw that we had +failed to catch the difference between the Erasmus-Darwinian theory of +descent through natural selection from among variations that are mainly +functional, and his own alternative theory of descent through natural +selection from among variations that are mainly accidental, and, above +all, when he saw we were crediting him with other men’s work, he would +have hastened to set us right. “It is with great regret,” he might have +written, “and with no small surprise, that I find how generally I have +been misunderstood as claiming to be the originator of the theory of +descent with modification; nothing can be further from my intention; the +theory of descent has been familiar to all biologists from the year 1749, +when Buffon advanced it in its most comprehensive form, to the present +day.” If Mr. Darwin had said something to the above effect, no one would +have questioned his good faith, but it is hardly necessary to say that +nothing of the kind is to be found in any one of Mr. Darwin’s many books +or many editions; nor is the reason why the requisite correction was +never made far to seek. For if Mr. Darwin had said as much as I have put +into his mouth above, he should have said more, and would ere long have +been compelled to have explained to us wherein the difference between +himself and his predecessors precisely lay, and this would not have been +easy. Indeed, if Mr. Darwin had been quite open with us he would have +had to say much as follows:— + +“I should point out that, according to the evolutionists of the last +century, improvement in the eye, as in any other organ, is mainly due to +persistent, rational, employment of the organ in question, in such +slightly modified manner as experience and changed surroundings may +suggest. You will have observed that, according to my system, this goes +for very little, and that the accumulation of fortunate accidents, +irrespectively of the use that may be made of them, is by far the most +important means of modification. Put more briefly still, the distinction +between me and my predecessors lies in this;—my predecessors thought they +knew the main normal cause or principle that underlies variation, whereas +I think that there is no general principle underlying it at all, or that +even if there is, we know hardly anything about it. This is my +distinctive feature; there is no deception; I shall not consider the +arguments of my predecessors, nor show in what respect they are +insufficient; in fact, I shall say nothing whatever about them. Please +to understand that I alone am in possession of the master key that can +unlock the bars of the future progress of evolutionary science; so great +an improvement, in fact, is my discovery that it justifies me in claiming +the theory of descent generally, and I accordingly claim it. If you ask +me in what my discovery consists, I reply in this;—that the variations +which we are all agreed accumulate are caused—by variation. {209a} I +admit that this is not telling you much about them, but it is as much as +I think proper to say at present; above all things, let me caution you +against thinking that there is any principle of general application +underlying variation.” + +This would have been right. This is what Mr. Darwin would have had to +have said if he had been frank with us; it is not surprising, therefore, +that he should have been less frank than might have been wished. I have +no doubt that many a time between 1859 and 1882, the year of his death, +Mr. Darwin bitterly regretted his initial error, and would have been only +too thankful to repair it, but he could only put the difference between +himself and the early evolutionists clearly before his readers at the +cost of seeing his own system come tumbling down like a pack of cards; +this was more than he could stand, so he buried his face, ostrich-like, +in the sand. I know no more pitiable figure in either literature or +science. + +As I write these lines (July 1886) I see a paragraph in _Nature_ which I +take it is intended to convey the impression that Mr. Francis Darwin’s +life and letters of his father will appear shortly. I can form no idea +whether Mr. F. Darwin’s forthcoming work is likely to appear before this +present volume; still less can I conjecture what it may or may not +contain; but I can give the reader a criterion by which to test the good +faith with which it is written. If Mr. F. Darwin puts the distinctive +feature that differentiates Mr. C. Darwin from his predecessors clearly +before his readers, enabling them to seize and carry it away with them +once for all—if he shows no desire to shirk this question, but, on the +contrary, faces it and throws light upon it, then we shall know that his +work is sincere, whatever its shortcomings may be in other respects; and +when people are doing their best to help us and make us understand all +that they understand themselves, a great deal may be forgiven them. If, +on the other hand, we find much talk about the wonderful light which Mr. +Charles Darwin threw on evolution by his theory of natural selection, +without any adequate attempt to make us understand the difference between +the natural selection, say, of Mr. Patrick Matthew, and that of his more +famous successor, then we may know that we are being trifled with; and +that an attempt is being again made to throw dust in our eyes. + + + + +Chapter XVI +Mr. Grant Allen’s “Charles Darwin” + + +IT is here that Mr. Grant Allen’s book fails. It is impossible to +believe it written in good faith, with no end in view, save to make +something easy which might otherwise be found difficult; on the contrary, +it leaves the impression of having been written with a desire to hinder +us, as far as possible, from understanding things that Mr. Allen himself +understood perfectly well. + +After saying that “in the public mind Mr. Darwin is perhaps most commonly +regarded as the discoverer and founder of the evolution hypothesis,” he +continues that “the grand idea which he did really originate was not the +idea of ‘descent with modification,’ but the idea of ‘natural +selection,’” and adds that it was Mr. Darwin’s “peculiar glory” to have +shown the “nature of the machinery” by which all the variety of animal +and vegetable life might have been produced by slow modifications in one +or more original types. “The theory of evolution,” says Mr. Allen, +“already existed in a more or less shadowy and undeveloped shape;” it was +Mr. Darwin’s “task in life to raise this theory from the rank of a mere +plausible and happy guess to the rank of a highly elaborate and almost +universally accepted biological system” (pp. 3–5). + +We all admit the value of Mr. Darwin’s work as having led to the general +acceptance of evolution. No one who remembers average middle-class +opinion on this subject before 1860 will deny that it was Mr. Darwin who +brought us all round to descent with modification; but Mr. Allen cannot +rightly say that evolution had only existed before Mr. Darwin’s time in +“a shadowy, undeveloped state,” or as “a mere plausible and happy guess.” +It existed in the same form as that in which most people accept it now, +and had been carried to its extreme development, before Mr. Darwin’s +father had been born. It is idle to talk of Buffon’s work as “a mere +plausible and happy guess,” or to imply that the first volume of the +“Philosophie Zoologique” of Lamarck was a less full and sufficient +demonstration of descent with modification than the “Origin of Species” +is. It has its defects, shortcomings, and mistakes, but it is an +incomparably sounder work than the “Origin of Species;” and though it +contains the deplorable omission of any reference to Buffon, Lamarck does +not first grossly misrepresent Buffon, and then tell him to go away, as +Mr. Darwin did to the author of the “Vestiges” and to Lamarck. If Mr. +Darwin was believed and honoured for saying much the same as Lamarck had +said, it was because Lamarck had borne the brunt of the laughing. The +“Origin of Species” was possible because the “Vestiges” had prepared the +way for it. The “Vestiges” were made possible by Lamarck and Erasmus +Darwin, and these two were made possible by Buffon. Here a somewhat +sharper line can be drawn than is usually found possible when defining +the ground covered by philosophers. No one broke the ground for Buffon +to anything like the extent that he broke it for those who followed him, +and these broke it for one another. + +Mr. Allen says (p. 11) that, “in Charles Darwin’s own words, Lamarck +‘first did the eminent service of arousing attention to the probability +of all change in the organic as well as in the inorganic world being the +result of law, and not of miraculous interposition.’” Mr. Darwin did +indeed use these words, but Mr. Allen omits the pertinent fact that he +did not use them till six thousand copies of his work had been issued, +and an impression been made as to its scope and claims which the event +has shown to be not easily effaced; nor does he say that Mr. Darwin only +pays these few words of tribute in a quasi-preface, which, though +prefixed to his later editions of the “Origin of Species,” is amply +neutralised by the spirit which I have shown to be omnipresent in the +body of the work itself. Moreover, Mr. Darwin’s statement is inaccurate +to an unpardonable extent; his words would be fairly accurate if applied +to Buffon, but they do not apply to Lamarck. + +Mr. Darwin continues that Lamarck “seems to attribute all the beautiful +adaptations in nature, such as the long neck of the giraffe for browsing +on the branches of trees,” to the effects of habit. Mr. Darwin should +not say that Lamarck “seems” to do this. It was his business to tell us +what led Lamarck to his conclusions, not what “seemed” to do so. Any one +who knows the first volume of the “Philosophie Zoologique” will be aware +that there is no “seems” in the matter. Mr. Darwin’s words “seem” to say +that it really could not be worth any practical naturalist’s while to +devote attention to Lamarck’s argument; the inquiry might be of interest +to antiquaries, but Mr. Darwin had more important work in hand than +following the vagaries of one who had been so completely exploded as +Lamarck had been. “Seem” is to men what “feel” is to women; women who +feel, and men who grease every other sentence with a “seem,” are alike to +be looked on with distrust. + +“Still,” continues Mr. Allen, “Darwin gave no sign. A flaccid, +cartilaginous, unphilosophic evolutionism had full possession of the +field for the moment, and claimed, as it were, to be the genuine +representative of the young and vigorous biological creed, while he +himself was in truth the real heir to all the honours of the situation. +He was in possession of the master-key which alone could unlock the bars +that opposed the progress of evolution, and still he waited. He could +afford to wait. He was diligently collecting, amassing, investigating; +eagerly reading every new systematic work, every book of travels, every +scientific journal, every record of sport, or exploration, or discovery, +to extract from the dead mass of undigested fact whatever item of +implicit value might swell the definite co-ordinated series of notes in +his own commonplace books for the now distinctly contemplated ‘Origin of +Species.’ His way was to make all sure behind him, to summon up all his +facts in irresistible array, and never to set out upon a public progress +until he was secure against all possible attacks of the ever-watchful and +alert enemy in the rear,” &c. (p. 73). + +It would not be easy to beat this. Mr. Darwin’s worst enemy could wish +him no more damaging eulogist. + +Of the “Vestiges” Mr. Allen says that Mr. Darwin “felt sadly” the +inaccuracy and want of profound technical knowledge everywhere displayed +by the anonymous author. Nevertheless, long after, in the “Origin of +Species,” the great naturalist wrote with generous appreciation of the +“Vestiges of Creation”—“In my opinion it has done excellent service in +this country in calling attention to the subject, in removing prejudice, +and in thus preparing the ground for the reception of analogous views.” + +I have already referred to the way in which Mr. Darwin treated the author +of the “Vestiges,” and have stated the facts at greater length in +“Evolution Old and New,” but it may be as well to give Mr. Darwin’s words +in full; he wrote as follows on the third page of the original edition of +the “Origin of Species”:— + +“The author of the ‘Vestiges of Creation’ would, I presume, say that, +after a certain unknown number of generations, some bird had given birth +to a woodpecker, and some plant to the mistletoe, and that these had been +produced perfect as we now see them; but this assumption seems to me to +be no explanation, for it leaves the case of the coadaptation of organic +beings to each other and to their physical conditions of life untouched +and unexplained.” + +The author of the “Vestiges” did, doubtless, suppose that “_some_ bird” +had given birth to a woodpecker, or more strictly, that a couple of birds +had done so—and this is all that Mr. Darwin has committed himself to—but +no one better knew that these two birds would, according to the author of +the “Vestiges,” be just as much woodpeckers, and just as little +woodpeckers, as they would be with Mr. Darwin himself. Mr. Chambers did +not suppose that a woodpecker became a woodpecker _per saltum_ though +born of some widely different bird, but Mr. Darwin’s words have no +application unless they convey this impression. The reader will note +that though the impression is conveyed, Mr. Darwin avoids conveying it +categorically. I suppose this is what Mr. Allen means by saying that he +“made all things sure behind him.” Mr. Chambers did indeed believe in +occasional sports; so did Mr. Darwin, and we have seen that in the later +editions of the “Origin of Species” he found himself constrained to lay +greater stress on these than he had originally done. Substantially, Mr. +Chambers held much the same opinion as to the suddenness or slowness of +modification as Mr. Darwin did, nor can it be doubted that Mr. Darwin +knew this perfectly well. + +What I have said about the woodpecker applies also to the mistletoe. +Besides, it was Mr. Darwin’s business not to presume anything about the +matter; his business was to tell us what the author of the “Vestiges” had +said, or to refer us to the page of the “Vestiges” on which we should +find this. I suppose he was too busy “collecting, amassing, +investigating,” &c., to be at much pains not to misrepresent those who +had been in the field before him. There is no other reference to the +“Vestiges” in the “Origin of Species” than this suave but singularly +fraudulent passage. + +In his edition of 1860 the author of the “Vestiges” showed that he was +nettled, and said it was to be regretted Mr. Darwin had read the +“Vestiges” “almost as much amiss as if, like its declared opponents, he +had an interest in misunderstanding it;” and a little lower he adds that +Mr. Darwin’s book “in no essential respect contradicts the ‘Vestiges,’” +but that, on the contrary, “while adding to its explanations of nature, +it expressed the same general ideas.” {216a} This is substantially true; +neither Mr. Darwin’s nor Mr. Chambers’s are good books, but the main +object of both is to substantiate the theory of descent with +modification, and, bad as the “Vestiges” is, it is ingenuous as compared +with the “Origin of Species.” Subsequently to Mr. Chambers’ protest, and +not till, as I have said, six thousand copies of the “Origin of Species” +had been issued, the sentence complained of by Mr. Chambers was expunged, +but without a word of retractation, and the passage which Mr. Allen +thinks so generous was inserted into the “brief but imperfect” sketch +which Mr. Darwin prefixed—after Mr. Chambers had been effectually snuffed +out—to all subsequent editions of his “Origin of Species.” There is no +excuse for Mr. Darwin’s not having said at least this much about the +author of the “Vestiges” in his first edition; and on finding that he had +misrepresented him in a passage which he did not venture to retain, he +should not have expunged it quietly, but should have called attention to +his mistake in the body of his book, and given every prominence in his +power to the correction. + +Let us now examine Mr. Allen’s record in the matter of natural selection. +For years he was one of the foremost apostles of Neo-Darwinism, and any +who said a good word for Lamarck were told that this was the “kind of +mystical nonsense” from which Mr. Allen “had hoped Mr. Darwin had for +ever saved us.” {216b} Then in October 1883 came an article in “Mind,” +from which it appeared as though Mr. Allen had abjured Mr. Darwin and all +his works. + +“There are only two conceivable ways,” he then wrote, “in which any +increment of brain power can ever have arisen in any individual. The one +is the Darwinian way, by spontaneous variation, that is to say, by +variation due to minute physical circumstances affecting the individual +in the germ. The other is the Spencerian way, by functional increment, +that is to say, by the effect of increased use and constant exposure to +varying circumstances during conscious life.” + +Mr. Allen calls this the Spencerian view, and so it is in so far as that +Mr. Spencer has adopted it. Most people will call it Lamarckian. This, +however, is a detail. Mr. Allen continues:— + +“I venture to think that the first way, if we look it clearly in the +face, will be seen to be practically unthinkable; and that we have no +alternative, therefore, but to accept the second.” + +I like our looking a “way” which is “practically unthinkable” “clearly in +the face.” I particularly like “practically unthinkable.” I suppose we +can think it in theory, but not in practice. I like almost everything +Mr. Allen says or does; it is not necessary to go far in search of his +good things; dredge up any bit of mud from him at random and we are +pretty sure to find an oyster with a pearl in it, if we look it clearly +in the face; I mean, there is sure to be something which will be at any +rate “almost” practically unthinkable. But however this may be, when Mr. +Allen wrote his article in “Mind” two years ago, he was in substantial +agreement with myself about the value of natural selection as a means of +modification—by natural selection I mean, of course, the commonly known +Charles-Darwinian natural selection from fortuitous variations; now, +however, in 1885, he is all for this same natural selection again, and in +the preface to his “Charles Darwin” writes (after a handsome +acknowledgment of “Evolution Old and New”) that he “differs from” me +“fundamentally in” my “estimate of the worth of Charles Darwin’s +distinctive discovery of natural selection.” + +This he certainly does, for on page 81 of the work itself he speaks of +“the distinctive notion of natural selection” as having, “like all true +and fruitful ideas, more than once flashed,” &c. I have explained _usque +ad nauseam_, and will henceforth explain no longer, that natural +selection is no “distinctive notion” of Mr. Darwin’s. Mr. Darwin’s +“distinctive notion” is natural selection from among fortuitous +variations. + +Writing again (p. 89) of Mr. Spencer’s essay in the “Leader,” {218a} Mr. +Allen says:— + +“It contains, in a very philosophical and abstract form, the theory of +‘descent with modification’ without the distinctive Darwinian adjunct of +‘natural selection’ or survival of the fittest. Yet it was just that +lever dexterously applied, and carefully weighted with the whole weight +of his endlessly accumulated inductive instances, that finally enabled +our modern Archimedes to move the world.” + +Again:— + +“To account for adaptation, for the almost perfect fitness of every plant +and every animal to its position in life, for the existence (in other +words) of definitely correlated parts and organs, we must call in the aid +of survival of the fittest. Without that potent selective agent, our +conception of the becoming of life is a mere chaos; order and +organisation are utterly inexplicable save by the brilliant illuminating +ray of the Darwinian principle” (p. 93). + +And yet two years previously this same principle, after having been +thinkable for many years, had become “unthinkable.” + +Two years previously, writing of the Charles-Darwinian scheme of +evolution, Mr. Allen had implied it as his opinion “that all brains are +what they are in virtue of antecedent function.” “The one creed,” he +wrote—referring to Mr Darwin’s—“makes the man depend mainly upon the +accidents of molecular physics in a colliding germ cell and sperm cell; +the other makes him depend mainly on the doings and gains of his +ancestors as modified and altered by himself.” + +This second creed is pure Erasmus-Darwinism and Lamarck. + +Again:— + +“It seems to me easy to understand how survival of the fittest may result +in progress _starting from such functionally produced gains_ (italics +mine), but impossible to understand how it could result in progress, if +it had to start in mere accidental structural increments due to +spontaneous variation alone.” {219a} + +Which comes to saying that it is easy to understand the Lamarckian system +of evolution, but not the Charles-Darwinian. Mr. Allen concluded his +article a few pages later on by saying:— + +“The first hypothesis” (Mr. Darwin’s) “is one that throws no light upon +any of the facts. The second hypothesis” (which is unalloyed Erasmus +Darwin and Lamarck) “is one that explains them all with transparent +lucidity.” Yet in his “Charles Darwin” Mr. Allen tells us that though +Mr. Darwin “did not invent the development theory, he made it believable +and comprehensible” (p. 4). + +In his “Charles Darwin” Mr. Allen does not tell us how recently he had, +in another place, expressed an opinion about the value of Mr. Darwin’s +“distinctive contribution” to the theory of evolution, so widely +different from the one he is now expressing with characteristic +appearance of ardour. He does not explain how he is able to execute such +rapid changes of front without forfeiting his claim on our attention; +explanations on matters of this sort seem out of date with modern +scientists. I can only suppose that Mr. Allen regards himself as having +taken a brief, as it were, for the production of a popular work, and +feels more bound to consider the interests of the gentleman who pays him +than to say what he really thinks; for surely Mr. Allen would not have +written as he did in such a distinctly philosophical and scientific +journal as “Mind” without weighing his words, and nothing has transpired +lately, _apropos_ of evolution, which will account for his present +recantation. I said in my book “Selections,” &c., that when Mr. Allen +made stepping-stones of his dead selves, he jumped upon them to some +tune. I was a little scandalised then at the completeness and suddenness +of the movement he executed, and spoke severely; I have sometimes feared +I may have spoken too severely, but his recent performance goes far to +warrant my remarks. + +If, however, there is no dead self about it, and Mr. Allen has only taken +a brief, I confess to being not greatly edified. I grant that a good +case can be made out for an author’s doing as I suppose Mr. Allen to have +done; indeed I am not sure that both science and religion would not gain +if every one rode his neighbour’s theory, as at a donkey-race, and the +least plausible were held to win; but surely, as things stand, a writer +by the mere fact of publishing a book professes to be giving a _bonâ +fide_ opinion. The analogy of the bar does not hold, for not only is it +perfectly understood that a barrister does not necessarily state his own +opinions, but there exists a strict though unwritten code to protect the +public against the abuses to which such a system must be liable. In +religion and science no such code exists—the supposition being that these +two holy callings are above the necessity for anything of the kind. +Science and religion are not as business is; still, if the public do not +wish to be taken in, they must be at some pains to find out whether they +are in the hands of one who, while pretending to be a judge, is in +reality a paid advocate, with no one’s interests at heart except his +client’s, or in those of one who, however warmly he may plead, will say +nothing but what springs from mature and genuine conviction. + +The present unsettled and unsatisfactory state of the moral code in this +respect is at the bottom of the supposed antagonism between religion and +science. These two are not, or never ought to be, antagonistic. They +should never want what is spoken of as reconciliation, for in reality +they are one. Religion is the quintessence of science, and science the +raw material of religion; when people talk about reconciling religion and +science they do not mean what they say; they mean reconciling the +statements made by one set of professional men with those made by another +set whose interests lie in the opposite direction—and with no recognised +president of the court to keep them within due bounds this is not always +easy. + +Mr. Allen says:— + +“At the same time it must be steadily remembered that there are many +naturalists at the present day, especially among those of the lower order +of intelligence, who, while accepting evolutionism in a general way, and +therefore always describing themselves as Darwinians, do not believe, and +often cannot even understand, the distinctive Darwinian addition to the +evolutionary doctrine—namely, the principle of natural selection. Such +hazy and indistinct thinkers as these are still really at the prior stage +of Lamarckian evolution” (p. 199). + +Considering that Mr. Allen was at that stage himself so recently, he +might deal more tenderly with others who still find “the distinctive +Darwinian adjunct” “unthinkable.” It is perhaps, however, because he +remembers his difficulties that Mr. Allen goes on as follows:— + +“It is probable that in the future, while a formal acceptance of +Darwinism becomes general, the special theory of natural selection will +be thoroughly understood and assimilated only by the more abstract and +philosophical minds.” + +By the kind of people, in fact, who read the _Spectator_ and are called +thoughtful; and in point of fact less than a twelvemonth after this +passage was written, natural selection was publicly abjured as “a theory +of the origin of species” by Mr. Romanes himself, with the implied +approval of the _Times_. + +“Thus,” continues Mr. Allen, “the name of Darwin will often no doubt be +tacked on to what are in reality the principles of Lamarck.” + +It requires no great power of prophecy to foretell this, considering that +it is done daily by nine out of ten who call themselves Darwinians. Ask +ten people of ordinary intelligence how Mr. Darwin explains the fact that +giraffes have long necks, and nine of them will answer “through +continually stretching them to reach higher and higher boughs.” They do +not understand that this is the Lamarckian view of evolution, not the +Darwinian; nor will Mr. Allen’s book greatly help the ordinary reader to +catch the difference between the two theories, in spite of his frequent +reference to Mr. Darwin’s “distinctive feature,” and to his “master-key.” +No doubt the British public will get to understand all about it some day, +but it can hardly be expected to do so all at once, considering the way +in which Mr. Allen and so many more throw dust in its eyes, and will +doubtless continue to throw it as long as an honest penny is to be turned +by doing so. Mr. Allen, then, is probably right in saying that “the name +of Darwin will no doubt be often tacked on to what are in reality the +principles of Lamarck,” nor can it be denied that Mr. Darwin, by his +practice of using “the theory of natural selection” as though it were a +synonym for “the theory of descent with modification,” contributed to +this result. + +I do not myself doubt that he intended to do this, but Mr. Allen would +say no less confidently he did not. He writes of Mr. Darwin as follows:— + +“Of Darwin’s pure and exalted moral nature no Englishman of the present +generation can trust himself to speak with becoming moderation.” + +He proceeds to trust himself thus:— + +“His love of truth, his singleness of heart, his sincerity, his +earnestness, his modesty, his candour, his absolute sinking of self and +selfishness—these, indeed are all conspicuous to every reader on the very +face of every word he ever printed.” + +This “conspicuous sinking of self” is of a piece with the “delightful +unostentatiousness _which every one must have noticed_” about which Mr. +Allen writes on page 65. Does he mean that Mr. Darwin was +“ostentatiously unostentatious,” or that he was “unostentatiously +ostentatious”? I think we may guess from this passage who it was that in +the old days of the _Pall Mall Gazelle_ called Mr. Darwin “a master of a +certain happy simplicity.” + +Mr. Allen continues:— + +“Like his works themselves, they must long outlive him. But his +sympathetic kindliness, his ready generosity, the staunchness of his +friendship, the width and depth and breadth of his affections, the manner +in which ‘he bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them +again’—these things can never be so well known to any other generation of +men as to the three generations that walked the world with him” (pp. 174, +175). + +Again:— + +“He began early in life to collect and arrange a vast encyclopædia of +facts, all finally focussed with supreme skill upon the great principle +he so clearly perceived and so lucidly expounded. He brought to bear +upon the question an amount of personal observation, of minute +experiment, of world-wide book knowledge, of universal scientific +ability, such as never, perhaps, was lavished by any other man upon any +other department of study. His conspicuous and beautiful love of truth, +his unflinching candour, his transparent fearlessness and honesty of +purpose, his childlike simplicity, his modesty of demeanour, his charming +manner, his affectionate disposition, his kindliness to friends, his +courtesy to opponents, his gentleness to harsh and often bitter +assailants, kindled in the minds of men of science everywhere throughout +the world a contagious enthusiasm only equalled perhaps among the +disciples of Socrates and the great teachers of the revival of learning. +His name became a rallying-point for the children of light in every +country” (pp. 196, 197). + +I need not quote more; the sentence goes on to talk about “firmly +grounding” something which philosophers and speculators might have taken +a century or two more “to establish in embryo;” but those who wish to see +it must turn to Mr. Allen’s book. + +If I have formed too severe an estimate of Mr. Darwin’s work and +character—and this is more than likely—the fulsomeness of the adulation +lavished on him by his admirers for many years past must be in some +measure my excuse. We grow tired even of hearing Aristides called just, +but what is so freely said about Mr. Darwin puts us in mind more of what +the people said about Herod—that he spoke with the voice of a God, not of +a man. So we saw Professor Ray Lankester hail him not many years ago as +the “greatest of living men.” {224a} + +It is ill for any man’s fame that he should be praised so extravagantly. +Nobody ever was as good as Mr. Darwin looked, and a counterblast to such +a hurricane of praise as has been lately blowing will do no harm to his +ultimate reputation, even though it too blow somewhat fiercely. Art, +character, literature, religion, science (I have named them in +alphabetical order), thrive best in a breezy, bracing air; I heartily +hope I may never be what is commonly called successful in my own +lifetime—and if I go on as I am doing now, I have a fair chance of +succeeding in not succeeding. + + + + +Chapter XVII +Professor Ray Lankester and Lamarck + + +BEING anxious to give the reader a sample of the arguments against the +theory of natural selection from among variations that are mainly either +directly or indirectly functional in their inception, or more briefly +against the Erasmus-Darwinian and Lamarckian systems, I can find nothing +more to the point, or more recent, than Professor Ray Lankester’s letter +to the _Athenæum_ of March 29, 1884, to the latter part of which, +however, I need alone call attention. Professor Ray Lankester says:— + +“And then we are introduced to the discredited speculations of Lamarck, +which have found a worthy advocate in Mr. Butler, as really solid +contributions to the discovery of the _veræ causæ_ of variation! A much +more important attempt to do something for Lamarck’s hypothesis, of the +transmission to offspring of structural peculiarities acquired by the +parents, was recently made by an able and experienced naturalist, +Professor Semper of Wurzburg. His book on ‘Animal Life,’ &c., is +published in the ‘International Scientific Series.’ Professor Semper +adduces an immense number and variety of cases of structural change in +animals and plants brought about in the individual by adaptation (during +its individual life-history) to new conditions. Some of these are very +marked changes, such as the loss of its horny coat in the gizzard of a +pigeon fed on meat; _but in no single instance could Professor Semper +show_—although it was his object and desire to do so if possible—that +such change was transmitted from parent to offspring. Lamarckism looks +all very well on paper, but, as Professor Semper’s book shows, when put +to the test of observation and experiment it collapses absolutely.” + +I should have thought it would have been enough if it had collapsed +without the “absolutely,” but Professor Ray Lankester does not like doing +things by halves. Few will be taken in by the foregoing quotation, +except those who do not greatly care whether they are taken in or not; +but to save trouble to readers who may have neither Lamarck nor Professor +Semper at hand, I will put the case as follows:— + +Professor Semper writes a book to show, we will say, that the hour-hand +of the clock moves gradually forward, in spite of its appearing +stationary. He makes his case sufficiently clear, and then might have +been content to leave it; nevertheless, in the innocence of his heart, he +adds the admission that though he had often looked at the clock for a +long time together, he had never been able actually to see the hour-hand +moving. “There now,” exclaims Professor Ray Lankester on this, “I told +you so; the theory collapses absolutely; his whole object and desire is +to show that the hour-hand moves, and yet when it comes to the point, he +is obliged to confess that he cannot see it do so.” It is not worth +while to meet what Professor Ray Lankester has been above quoted as +saying about Lamarckism beyond quoting the following passage from a +review of “The Neanderthal Skull on Evolution” in the “Monthly Journal of +Science” for June, 1885 (p. 362):— + +“On the very next page the author reproduces the threadbare objection +that the ‘supporters of the theory have never yet succeeded in observing +a single instance in all the millions of years invented (!) in its +support of one species of animal turning into another.’ Now, _ex +hypothesi_, one species turns into another not rapidly, as in a +transformation scene, but in successive generations, each being born a +shade different from its progenitors. Hence to observe such a change is +excluded by the very terms of the question. Does Mr. Saville forget Mr. +Herbert Spencer’s apologue of the ephemeron which had never witnessed the +change of a child into a man?” + +The apologue, I may say in passing, is not Mr. Spencer’s; it is by the +author of the “Vestiges,” and will be found on page 161 of the 1853 +edition of that book; but let this pass. How impatient Professor Ray +Lankester is of any attempt to call attention to the older view of +evolution appears perhaps even more plainly in a review of this same book +of Professor Semper’s that appeared in “Nature,” March 3, 1881. The +tenor of the remarks last quoted shows that though what I am about to +quote is now more than five years old, it may be taken as still giving us +the position which Professor Ray Lankester takes on these matters. He +wrote:— + +“It is necessary,” he exclaims, “to plainly and emphatically state” (Why +so much emphasis? Why not “it should be stated”?) “that Professor Semper +and a few other writers of similar views” {227a} (I have sent for the +number of “Modern Thought” referred to by Professor Ray Lankester but +find no article by Mr. Henslow, and do not, therefore, know what he had +said) “are not adding to or building on Mr. Darwin’s theory, but are +actually opposing all that is essential and distinctive in that theory, +by the revival of the exploded notion of ‘directly transforming agents’ +advocated by Lamarck and others.” + +It may be presumed that these writers know they are not “adding to or +building on” Mr. Darwin’s theory, and do not wish to build on it, as not +thinking it a sound foundation. Professor Ray Lankester says they are +“actually opposing,” as though there were something intolerably audacious +in this; but it is not easy to see why he should be more angry with them +for “actually opposing” Mr. Darwin than they may be with him, if they +think it worth while, for “actually defending” the exploded notion of +natural selection—for assuredly the Charles-Darwinian system is now more +exploded than Lamarck’s is. + +What Professor Ray Lankester says about Lamarck and “directly +transforming agents” will mislead those who take his statement without +examination. Lamarck does not say that modification is effected by means +of “directly transforming agents;” nothing can be more alien to the +spirit of his teaching. With him the action of the external conditions +of existence (and these are the only transforming agents intended by +Professor Ray Lankester) is not direct, but indirect. Change in +surroundings changes the organism’s outlook, and thus changes its +desires; desires changing, there is corresponding change in the actions +performed; actions changing, a corresponding change is by-and-by induced +in the organs that perform them; this, if long continued, will be +transmitted; becoming augmented by accumulation in many successive +generations, and further modifications perhaps arising through further +changes in surroundings, the change will amount ultimately to specific +and generic difference. Lamarck knows no drug, nor operation, that will +medicine one organism into another, and expects the results of adaptive +effort to be so gradual as to be only perceptible when accumulated in the +course of many generations. When, therefore, Professor Ray Lankester +speaks of Lamarck as having “advocated directly transforming agents,” he +either does not know what he is talking about, or he is trifling with his +readers. Professor Ray Lankester continues:— + +“They do not seem to be aware of this, for they make no attempt to +examine Mr. Darwin’s accumulated facts and arguments.” Professor Ray +Lankester need not shake Mr. Darwin’s “accumulated facts and arguments” +at us. We have taken more pains to understand them than Professor Ray +Lankester has taken to understand Lamarck, and by this time know them +sufficiently. We thankfully accept by far the greater number, and rely +on them as our sheet-anchors to save us from drifting on to the +quicksands of Neo-Darwinian natural selection; few of them, indeed, are +Mr. Darwin’s, except in so far as he has endorsed them and given them +publicity, but I do not know that this detracts from their value. We +have paid great attention to Mr. Darwin’s facts, and if we do not +understand all his arguments—for it is not always given to mortal man to +understand these—yet we think we know what he was driving at. We believe +we understand this to the full as well as Mr. Darwin intended us to do, +and perhaps better. Where the arguments tend to show that all animals +and plants are descended from a common source we find them much the same +as Buffon’s, or as those of Erasmus Darwin or Lamarck, and have nothing +to say against them; where, on the other hand, they aim at proving that +the main means of modification has been the fact that if an animal has +been “favoured” it will be “preserved”—then we think that the animal’s +own exertions will, in the long run, have had more to do with its +preservation than any real or fancied “favour.” Professor Ray Lankester +continues:— + +“The doctrine of evolution has become an accepted truth” (Professor Ray +Lankester writes as though the making of truth and falsehood lay in the +hollow of Mr. Darwin’s hand. Surely “has become accepted” should be +enough; Mr. Darwin did not make the doctrine true) “entirely in +consequence of Mr. Darwin’s having demonstrated the mechanism.” (There +is no mechanism in the matter, and if there is, Mr. Darwin did not show +it. He made some words which confused us and prevented us from seeing +that “the preservation of favoured races” was a cloak for “luck,” and +that this was all the explanation he was giving) “by which the evolution +is possible; it was almost universally rejected, while such +undemonstrable agencies as those arbitrarily asserted to exist by +Professor Semper and Mr. George Henslow were the only means suggested by +its advocates.” + +Undoubtedly the theory of descent with modification, which received its +first sufficiently ample and undisguised exposition in 1809 with the +“Philosophie Zoologique” of Lamarck, shared the common fate of all +theories that revolutionise opinion on important matters, and was +fiercely opposed by the Huxleys, Romaneses, Grant Allens, and Ray +Lankesters of its time. It had to face the reaction in favour of the +Church which began in the days of the First Empire, as a natural +consequence of the horrors of the Revolution; it had to face the social +influence and then almost Darwinian reputation of Cuvier, whom Lamarck +could not, or would not, square; it was put forward by one who was old, +poor, and ere long blind. What theory could do more than just keep +itself alive under conditions so unfavourable? Even under the most +favourable conditions descent with modification would have been a hard +plant to rear, but, as things were, the wonder is that it was not killed +outright at once. We all know how large a share social influences have +in deciding what kind of reception a book or theory is to meet with; +true, these influences are not permanent, but at first they are almost +irresistible; in reality it was not the theory of descent that was +matched against that of fixity, but Lamarck against Cuvier; who can be +surprised that Cuvier for a time should have had the best of it? + +And yet it is pleasant to reflect that his triumph was not, as triumphs +go, long lived. How is Cuvier best known now? As one who missed a great +opportunity; as one who was great in small things, and stubbornly small +in great ones. Lamarck died in 1831; in 1861 descent with modification +was almost universally accepted by those most competent to form an +opinion. This result was by no means so exclusively due to Mr. Darwin’s +“Origin of Species” as is commonly believed. During the thirty years +that followed 1831 Lamarck’s opinions made more way than Darwinians are +willing to allow. Granted that in 1861 the theory was generally accepted +under the name of Darwin, not under that of Lamarck, still it was Lamarck +and not Darwin that was being accepted; it was descent, not descent with +modification by means of natural selection from among fortuitous +variations, that we carried away with us from the “Origin of Species.” +The thing triumphed whether the name was lost or not. I need not waste +the reader’s time by showing further how little weight he need attach to +the fact that Lamarckism was not immediately received with open arms by +an admiring public. The theory of descent has become accepted as +rapidly, if I am not mistaken, as the Copernican theory, or as Newton’s +theory of gravitation. + +When Professor Ray Lankester goes on to speak of the “undemonstrable +agencies” “arbitrarily asserted” to exist by Professor Semper, he is +again presuming on the ignorance of his readers. Professor Semper’s +agencies are in no way more undemonstrable than Mr. Darwin’s are. Mr. +Darwin was perfectly cogent as long as he stuck to Lamarck’s +demonstration; his arguments were sound as long as they were Lamarck’s, +or developments of, and riders upon, Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck, +and almost incredibly silly when they were his own. Fortunately the +greater part of the “Origin of Species” is devoted to proving the theory +of descent with modification, by arguments against which no exception +would have been taken by Mr. Darwin’s three great precursors, except in +so far as the variations whose accumulation results in specific +difference are supposed to be fortuitous—and, to do Mr. Darwin justice, +the fortuitousness, though always within hail, is kept as far as possible +in the background. + +“Mr. Darwin’s arguments,” says Professor Ray Lankester, “rest on the +_proved_ existence of minute, many-sided, irrelative variations _not_ +produced by directly transforming agents.” Mr. Darwin throughout the +body of the “Origin of Species” is not supposed to know what his +variations are or are not produced by; if they come, they come, and if +they do not come, they do not come. True, we have seen that in the last +paragraph of the book all this was changed, and the variations were +ascribed to the conditions of existence, and to use and disuse, but a +concluding paragraph cannot be allowed to override a whole book +throughout which the variations have been kept to hand as accidental. +Mr. Romanes is perfectly correct when he says {232a} that “natural +selection” (meaning the Charles-Darwinian natural selection) “trusts to +the chapter of accidents in the matter of variation” this is all that Mr. +Darwin can tell us; whether they come from directly transforming agents +or no he neither knows nor says. Those who accept Lamarck will know that +the agencies are not, as a rule, directly transforming, but the followers +of Mr. Darwin cannot. + +“But showing themselves,” continues Professor Ray Lankester, “at each new +act of reproduction, as part of the phenomena of heredity such minute +‘sports’ or ‘variations’ are due to constitutional disturbance” (No +doubt. The difference, however, between Mr. Darwin and Lamarck consists +in the fact that Lamarck believes he knows what it is that so disturbs +the constitution as generally to induce variation, whereas Mr. Darwin +says he does not know), “and appear not in individuals subjected to new +conditions” (What organism can pass through life without being subjected +to more or less new conditions? What life is ever the exact fac-simile +of another? And in a matter of such extreme delicacy as the adjustment +of psychical and physical relations, who can say how small a disturbance +of established equilibrium may not involve how great a rearrangement?), +“but in the offspring of all, though more freely in the offspring of +those subjected to special causes of constitutional disturbance. Mr. +Darwin has further proved that these slight variations can be transmitted +and intensified by selective breeding.” + +Mr. Darwin did, indeed, follow Buffon and Lamarck in at once turning to +animals and plants under domestication in order to bring the plasticity +of organic forms more easily home to his readers, but the fact that +variations can be transmitted and intensified by selective breeding had +been so well established and was so widely known long before Mr. Darwin +was born, that he can no more be said to have proved it than Newton can +be said to have proved the revolution of the earth on its own axis. +Every breeder throughout the world had known it for centuries. I believe +even Virgil knew it. + +“They have,” continues Professor Ray Lankester, “in reference to +breeding, a remarkably tenacious, persistent character, as might be +expected from their origin in connection with the reproductive process.” + +The variations do not normally “originate in connection with the +reproductive process,” though it is during this process that they receive +organic expression. They originate mainly, so far as anything originates +anywhere, in the life of the parent or parents. Without going so far as +to say that no variation can arise in connection with the reproductive +system—for, doubtless, striking and successful sports do occasionally so +arise—it is more probable that the majority originate earlier. Professor +Ray Lankester proceeds:— + +“On the other hand, mutilations and other effects of directly +transforming agents are rarely, if ever, transmitted.” Professor Ray +Lankester ought to know the facts better than to say that the effects of +mutilation are rarely, if ever, transmitted. The rule is, that they will +not be transmitted unless they have been followed by disease, but that +where disease has supervened they not uncommonly descend to offspring. +{234a} I know Brown-Séquard considered it to be the morbid state of the +nervous system consequent upon the mutilation that is transmitted, rather +than the immediate effects of the mutilation, but this distinction is +somewhat finely drawn. + +When Professor Ray Lankester talks about the “other effects of directly +transforming agents” being rarely transmitted, he should first show us +the directly transforming agents. Lamarck, as I have said, knows them +not. “It is little short of an absurdity,” he continues, “for people to +come forward at this epoch, when evolution is at length accepted solely +because of Mr. Darwin’s doctrine, and coolly to propose to replace that +doctrine by the old notion so often tried and rejected.” + +Whether this is an absurdity or no, Professor Lankester will do well to +learn to bear it without showing so much warmth, for it is one that is +becoming common. Evolution has been accepted not “because of” Mr. +Darwin’s doctrine, but because Mr. Darwin so fogged us about his doctrine +that we did not understand it. We thought we were backing his bill for +descent with modification, whereas we were in reality backing it for +descent with modification by means of natural selection from among +fortuitous variations. This last really is Mr. Darwin’s theory, except +in so far as it is also Mr. A. R. Wallace’s; descent, alone, is just as +much and just as little Mr. Darwin’s doctrine as it is Professor Ray +Lankester’s or mine. I grant it is in great measure through Mr. Darwin’s +books that descent has become so widely accepted; it has become so +through his books, but in spite of, rather than by reason of, his +doctrine. Indeed his doctrine was no doctrine, but only a back-door for +himself to escape by in the event of flood or fire; the flood and fire +have come; it remains to be seen how far the door will work +satisfactorily. + +Professor Ray Lankester, again, should not say that Lamarck’s doctrine +has been “so often tried and rejected.” M. Martins, in his edition of +the “Philosophie Zoologique,” {235a} said truly that Lamarck’s theory had +never yet had the honour of being seriously discussed. It never has—not +at least in connection with the name of its propounder. To mention +Lamarck’s name in the presence of the conventional English society +naturalist has always been like shaking a red rag at a cow; he is at once +infuriated; “as if it were possible,” to quote from Isidore Geoffroy St. +Hilaire, whose defence of Lamarck is one of the best things in his book, +{235b} “that so great labour on the part of so great a naturalist should +have led him to ‘a fantastic conclusion’ only—to ‘a flighty error,’ and, +as has been often said, though not written, to ‘one absurdity the more.’ +Such was the language which Lamarck heard during his protracted old age, +saddened alike by the weight of years and blindness; this was what people +did not hesitate to utter over his grave, yet barely closed, and what, +indeed, they are still saying—commonly too, without any knowledge of what +Lamarck maintained, but merely repeating at second hand bad caricatures +of his teaching. + +“When will the time come when we may see Lamarck’s theory discussed, and +I may as well at once say refuted, in some important points, with at any +rate the respect due to one of the most illustrious masters of our +science? And when will this theory, the hardihood of which has been +greatly exaggerated, become freed from the interpretations and +commentaries by the false light of which so many naturalists have formed +their opinion concerning it? If its author is to be condemned, let it, +at any rate, not be before he has been heard.” + +Lamarck was the Lazarus of biology. I wish his more fortunate brethren, +instead of intoning the old Church argument that he has “been refuted +over and over again,” would refer us to some of the best chapters in the +writers who have refuted him. My own reading has led me to become +moderately well acquainted with the literature of evolution, but I have +never come across a single attempt fairly to grapple with Lamarck, and it +is plain that neither Isidore Geoffroy nor M. Martins knows of such an +attempt any more than I do. When Professor Ray Lankester puts his finger +on Lamarck’s weak places, then, but not till then, may he complain of +those who try to replace Mr. Darwin’s doctrine by Lamarck’s. + +Professor Ray Lankester concludes his note thus:— + +“That such an attempt should be made is an illustration of a curious +weakness of humanity. Not infrequently, after a long contested cause has +triumphed, and all have yielded allegiance thereto, you will find, when +few generations have passed, that men have clean forgotten what and who +it was that made that cause triumphant, and ignorantly will set up for +honour the name of a traitor or an impostor, or attribute to a great man +as a merit deeds and thoughts which he spent a long life in opposing.” + +Exactly so; that is what one rather feels, but surely Professor Ray +Lankester should say “in trying to filch while pretending to oppose and +to amend.” He is complaining here that people persistently ascribe +Lamarck’s doctrine to Mr. Darwin. Of course they do; but, as I have +already perhaps too abundantly asked, whose fault is this? If a man +knows his own mind, and wants others to understand it, it is not often +that he is misunderstood for any length of time. If he finds he is being +misapprehended in a way he does not like, he will write another book and +make his meaning plainer. He will go on doing this for as long time as +he thinks necessary. I do not suppose, for example, that people will say +I originated the theory of descent by means of natural selection from +among fortunate accidents, or even that I was one of its supporters as a +means of modification; but if this impression were to prevail, I cannot +think I should have much difficulty in removing it. At any rate no such +misapprehension could endure for more than twenty years, during which I +continued to address a public who welcomed all I wrote, unless I myself +aided and abetted the mistake. Mr. Darwin wrote many books, but the +impression that Darwinism and evolution, or descent with modification, +are identical is still nearly as prevalent as it was soon after the +appearance of the “Origin of Species;” the reason of this is, that Mr. +Darwin was at no pains to correct us. Where, in any one of his many +later books, is there a passage which sets the matter in its true light, +and enters a protest against the misconception of which Professor Ray +Lankester complains so bitterly? The only inference from this is, that +Mr. Darwin was not displeased at our thinking him to be the originator of +the theory of descent with modification, and did not want us to know more +about Lamarck than he could help. If we wanted to know about him, we +must find out what he had said for ourselves, it was no part of Mr. +Darwin’s business to tell us; he had no interest in our catching the +distinctive difference between himself and that writer; perhaps not; but +this approaches closely to wishing us to misunderstand it. When Mr. +Darwin wished us to understand this or that, no one knew better how to +show it to us. + +We were aware, on reading the “Origin of Species,” that there was a +something about it of which we had not full hold; nevertheless we gave +Mr. Darwin our confidence at once, partly because he led off by telling +us that we must trust him to a great extent, and explained that the +present book was only an instalment of a larger work which, when it came +out, would make everything perfectly clear; partly, again, because the +case for descent with modification, which was the leading idea throughout +the book, was so obviously strong, but perhaps mainly because every one +said Mr. Darwin was so good, and so much less self-heeding than other +people; besides, he had so “patiently” and “carefully” accumulated “such +a vast store of facts” as no other naturalist, living or dead, had ever +yet even tried to get together; he was so kind to us with his, “May we +not believe?” and his “Have we any right to infer that the Creator?” &c. +“Of course we have not,” we exclaimed, almost with tears in our eyes—“not +if you ask us in that way.” Now that we understand what it was that +puzzled us in Mr. Darwin’s work we do not think highly either of the +chief offender, or of the accessories after the fact, many of whom are +trying to brazen the matter out, and on a smaller scale to follow his +example. + + + + +Chapter XVIII +Per Contra + + +“‘THE evil that men do lives after them” {239a} is happily not so true as +that the good lives after them, while the ill is buried with their bones, +and to no one does this correction of Shakespeare’s unwonted spleen apply +more fully than to Mr. Darwin. Indeed it was somewhat thus that we +treated his books even while he was alive; the good, descent, remained +with us, while the ill, the deification of luck, was forgotten as soon as +we put down his work. Let me now, therefore, as far as possible, quit +the ungrateful task of dwelling on the defects of Mr. Darwin’s work and +character, for the more pleasant one of insisting upon their better side, +and of explaining how he came to be betrayed into publishing the “Origin +of Species” without reference to the works of his predecessors. + +In the outset I would urge that it is not by any single book that Mr. +Darwin should be judged. I do not believe that any one of the three +principal works on which his reputation is founded will maintain with the +next generation the place it has acquired with ourselves; nevertheless, +if asked to say who was the man of our own times whose work had produced +the most important, and, on the whole, beneficial effect, I should +perhaps wrongly, but still both instinctively and on reflection, name him +to whom I have, unfortunately, found myself in more bitter opposition +than to any other in the whole course of my life. I refer, of course, to +Mr. Darwin. + +His claim upon us lies not so much in what is actually found within the +four corners of any one of his books, as in the fact of his having +written them at all—in the fact of his having brought out one after +another, with descent always for its keynote, until the lesson was +learned too thoroughly to make it at all likely that it will be +forgotten. Mr. Darwin wanted to move his generation, and had the +penetration to see that this is not done by saying a thing once for all +and leaving it. It almost seems as though it matters less what a man +says than the number of times he repeats it, in a more or less varied +form. It was here the author of the “Vestiges of Creation” made his most +serious mistake. He relied on new editions, and no one pays much +attention to new editions—the mark a book makes is almost always made by +its first edition. If, instead of bringing out a series of amended +editions during the fifteen years’ law which Mr. Darwin gave him, Mr. +Chambers had followed up the “Vestiges” with new book upon new book, he +would have learned much more, and, by consequence, not have been snuffed +out so easily once for all as he was in 1859 when the “Origin of Species” +appeared. + +The tenacity of purpose which appears to have been one of Mr. Darwin’s +most remarkable characteristics was visible even in his outward +appearance. He always reminded me of Raffaelle’s portrait of Pope Julius +the Second, which, indeed, would almost do for a portrait of Mr. Darwin +himself. I imagine that these two men, widely as the sphere of their +action differed, must have been like each other in more respects than +looks alone. Each, certainly, had a hand of iron; whether Pope Julius +wore a velvet glove or no, I do not know; I rather think not, for, if I +remember rightly, he boxed Michael Angelo’s ears for giving him a saucy +answer. We cannot fancy Mr. Darwin boxing any one’s ears; indeed there +can be no doubt he wore a very thick velvet glove, but the hand +underneath it was none the less of iron. It was to his tenacity of +purpose, doubtless, that his success was mainly due; but for this he must +inevitably have fallen before the many inducements to desist from the +pursuit of his main object, which beset him in the shape of ill health, +advancing years, ample private means, large demands upon his time, and a +reputation already great enough to satisfy the ambition of any ordinary +man. + +I do not gather from those who remember Mr. Darwin as a boy, and as a +young man, that he gave early signs of being likely to achieve greatness; +nor, as it seems to me, is there any sign of unusual intellectual power +to be detected in his earliest book. Opening this “almost” at random I +read—“Earthquakes alone are sufficient to destroy the prosperity of any +country. If, for instance, beneath England the now inert subterraneous +forces should exert those powers which most assuredly in former +geological ages they have exerted, how completely would the entire +condition of the country be changed! What would become of the lofty +houses, thickly-packed cities, great manufacturies (_sic_), the beautiful +public and private edifices? If the new period of disturbance were to +commence by some great earthquake in the dead of night, how terrific +would be the carnage! England would be at once bankrupt; all papers, +records, and accounts would from that moment be lost. Government being +unable to collect the taxes, and failing to maintain its authority, the +hand of violence and rapine would go uncontrolled. In every large town +famine would be proclaimed, pestilence and death following in its train.” +{240a} Great allowance should be made for a first work, and I admit that +much interesting matter is found in Mr. Darwin’s journal; still, it was +hardly to be expected that the writer who at the age of thirty-three +could publish the foregoing passage should twenty years later achieve the +reputation of being the profoundest philosopher of his time. + +I have not sufficient technical knowledge to enable me to speak +certainly, but I question his having been the great observer and master +of experiment which he is generally believed to have been. His accuracy +was, I imagine, generally to be relied upon as long as accuracy did not +come into conflict with his interests as a leader in the scientific +world; when these were at stake he was not to be trusted for a moment. +Unfortunately they were directly or indirectly at stake more often than +one could wish. His book on the action of worms, however, was shown by +Professor Paley and other writers {242a} to contain many serious errors +and omissions, though it involved no personal question; but I imagine him +to have been more or less _hébété_ when he wrote this book. On the whole +I should doubt his having been a better observer of nature than nine +country gentlemen out of ten who have a taste for natural history. + +Presumptuous as I am aware it must appear to say so, I am unable to see +more than average intellectual power even in Mr. Darwin’s later books. +His great contribution to science is supposed to have been the theory of +natural selection, but enough has been said to show that this, if +understood as he ought to have meant it to be understood, cannot be rated +highly as an intellectual achievement. His other most important +contribution was his provisional theory of pan-genesis, which is admitted +on all hands to have been a failure. Though, however, it is not likely +that posterity will consider him as a man of transcendent intellectual +power, he must be admitted to have been richly endowed with a much more +valuable quality than either originality or literary power—I mean with +_savoir faire_. The cards he held—and, on the whole, his hand was a good +one—he played with judgment; and though not one of those who would have +achieved greatness under any circumstances, he nevertheless did achieve +greatness of no mean order. Greatness, indeed, of the highest kind—that +of one who is without fear and without reproach—will not ultimately be +allowed him, but greatness of a rare kind can only be denied him by those +whose judgment is perverted by temper or personal ill-will. He found the +world believing in fixity of species, and left it believing—in spite of +his own doctrine—in descent with modification. + +I have said on an earlier page that Mr. Darwin was heir to a discredited +truth, and left behind him an accredited fallacy. This is true as +regards men of science and cultured classes who understood his +distinctive feature, or thought they did, and so long as Mr. Darwin lived +accepted it with very rare exceptions; but it is not true as regards the +unreading, unreflecting public, who seized the salient point of descent +with modification only, and troubled themselves little about the +distinctive feature. It would almost seem as if Mr. Darwin had reversed +the usual practice of philosophers and given his esoteric doctrine to the +world, while reserving the exoteric for his most intimate and faithful +adherents. This, however, is a detail; the main fact is, that Mr. Darwin +brought us all round to evolution. True, it was Mr. Darwin backed by the +_Times_ and the other most influential organs of science and culture, but +it was one of Mr. Darwin’s great merits to have developed and organised +this backing, as part of the work which he knew was essential if so great +a revolution was to be effected. + +This is an exceedingly difficult and delicate thing to do. If people +think they need only write striking and well-considered books, and that +then the _Times_ will immediately set to work to call attention to them, +I should advise them not to be too hasty in basing action upon this +hypothesis. I should advise them to be even less hasty in basing it upon +the assumption that to secure a powerful literary backing is a matter +within the compass of any one who chooses to undertake it. No one who +has not a strong social position should ever advance a new theory, unless +a life of hard fighting is part of what he lays himself out for. It was +one of Mr. Darwin’s great merits that he had a strong social position, +and had the good sense to know how to profit by it. The magnificent feat +which he eventually achieved was unhappily tarnished by much that +detracts from the splendour that ought to have attended it, but a +magnificent feat it must remain. + +Whose work in this imperfect world is not tarred and tarnished by +something that detracts from its ideal character? It is enough that a +man should be the right man in the right place, and this Mr. Darwin +pre-eminently was. If he had been more like the ideal character which +Mr. Allen endeavours to represent him, it is not likely that he would +have been able to do as much, or nearly as much, as he actually did; he +would have been too wide a cross with his generation to produce much +effect upon it. Original thought is much more common than is generally +believed. Most people, if they only knew it, could write a good book or +play, paint a good picture, compose a fine oratorio; but it takes an +unusually able person to get the book well reviewed, persuade a manager +to bring the play out, sell the picture, or compass the performance of +the oratorio; indeed, the more vigorous and original any one of these +things may be, the more difficult will it prove to even bring it before +the notice of the public. The error of most original people is in being +just a trifle too original. It was in his business qualities—and these, +after all, are the most essential to success, that Mr. Darwin showed +himself so superlative. These are not only the most essential to +success, but it is only by blaspheming the world in a way which no good +citizen of the world will do, that we can deny them to be the ones which +should most command our admiration. We are in the world; surely so long +as we are in it we should be of it, and not give ourselves airs as though +we were too good for our generation, and would lay ourselves out to +please any other by preference. Mr. Darwin played for his own +generation, and he got in the very amplest measure the recognition which +he endeavoured, as we all do, to obtain. + +His success was, no doubt, in great measure due to the fact that he knew +our little ways, and humoured them; but if he had not had little ways of +his own, he never could have been so much _au fait_ with ours. He knew, +for example, we should be pleased to hear that he had taken his boots off +so as not to disturb his worms when watching them by night, so he told us +of this, and we were delighted. He knew we should like his using the +word “sag,” so he used it, {245a} and we said it was beautiful. True, he +used it wrongly, for he was writing about tesselated pavement, and +builders assure me that “sag” is a word which applies to timber only, but +this is not to the point; the point was, that Mr. Darwin should have used +a word that we did not understand; this showed that he had a vast fund of +knowledge at his command about all sorts of practical details with which +he might have well been unacquainted. We do not deal the same measure to +man and to the lower animals in the matter of intelligence; the less we +understand these last, the less, we say, not we, but they can understand; +whereas the less we can understand a man, the more intelligent we are apt +to think him. No one should neglect by-play of this description; if I +live to be strong enough to carry it through, I mean to play “cambre,” +and I shall spell it “camber.” I wonder Mr. Darwin never abused this +word. Laugh at him, however, as we may for having said “sag,” if he had +not been the kind of man to know the value of these little hits, neither +would he have been the kind of man to persuade us into first tolerating, +and then cordially accepting, descent with modification. There is a +correlation of mental as well as of physical growth, and we could not +probably have had one set of Mr. Darwin’s qualities without the other. +If he had been more faultless, he might have written better books, but we +should have listened worse. A book’s prosperity is like a jest’s—in the +ear of him that hears it. + +Mr. Spencer would not—at least one cannot think he would—have been able +to effect the revolution which will henceforth doubtless be connected +with Mr. Darwin’s name. He had been insisting on evolution for some +years before the “Origin of Species” came out, but he might as well have +preached to the winds, for all the visible effect that had been produced. +On the appearance of Mr. Darwin’s book the effect was instantaneous; it +was like the change in the condition of a patient when the right medicine +has been hit on after all sorts of things have been tried and failed. +Granted that it was comparatively easy for Mr. Darwin, as having been +born into the household of one of the prophets of evolution, to arrive at +conclusions about the fixity of species which, if not so born, he might +never have reached at all; this does not make it any easier for him to +have got others to agree with him. Any one, again, may have money left +him, or run up against it, or have it run up against him, as it does +against some people, but it is only a very sensible person who does not +lose it. Moreover, once begin to go behind achievement and there is an +end of everything. Did the world give much heed to or believe in +evolution before Mr. Darwin’s time? Certainly not. Did we begin to +attend and be persuaded soon after Mr. Darwin began to write? Certainly +yes. Did we ere long go over _en masse_? Assuredly. If, as I said in +“Life and Habit,” any one asks who taught the world to believe in +evolution, the answer to the end of time must be that it was Mr. Darwin. +And yet the more his work is looked at, the more marvellous does its +success become. It seems as if some organisms can do anything with +anything. Beethoven picked his teeth with the snuffers, and seems to +have picked them sufficiently to his satisfaction. So Mr. Darwin with +one of the worst styles imaginable did all that the clearest, tersest +writer could have done. Strange, that such a master of cunning (in the +sense of my title) should have been the apostle of luck, and one so +terribly unlucky as Lamarck, of cunning, but such is the irony of nature. +Buffon planted, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck watered, but it was Mr. Darwin +who said, “That fruit is ripe,” and shook it into his lap. + +With this Mr. Darwin’s best friends ought to be content; his admirers are +not well advised in representing him as endowed with all sorts of +qualities which he was very far from possessing. Thus it is pretended +that he was one of those men who were ever on the watch for new ideas, +ever ready to give a helping hand to those who were trying to advance our +knowledge, ever willing to own to a mistake and give up even his most +cherished ideas if truth required them at his hands. No conception can +be more wantonly inexact. I grant that if a writer was sufficiently at +once incompetent and obsequious Mr. Darwin was “ever ready,” &c. So the +Emperors of Austria wash a few poor people’s feet on some one of the +festivals of the Church, but it would not be safe to generalise from this +yearly ceremony, and conclude that the Emperors of Austria are in the +habit of washing poor people’s feet. I can understand Mr. Darwin’s not +having taken any public notice, for example, of “Life and Habit,” for +though I did not attack him in force in that book, it was abundantly +clear that an attack could not be long delayed, and a man may be pardoned +for not doing anything to advertise the works of his opponents; but there +is no excuse for his never having referred to Professor Hering’s work +either in “Nature,” when Professor Ray Lankester first called attention +to it (July 13, 1876), or in some one of his subsequent books. If his +attitude towards those who worked in the same field as himself had been +the generous one which his admirers pretend, he would have certainly come +forward, not necessarily as adopting Professor Hering’s theory, but still +as helping it to obtain a hearing. + +His not having done so is of a piece with his silence about Buffon, +Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck in the early editions of the “Origin of +Species,” and with the meagre reference to them which is alone found in +the later ones. It is of a piece also with the silence which Mr. Darwin +invariably maintained when he saw his position irretrievably damaged, as, +for example, by Mr. Spencer’s objection already referred to, and by the +late Professor Fleeming Jenkin in the _North British Review_ (June 1867). +Science, after all, should form a kingdom which is more or less not of +this world. The ideal scientist should know neither self nor friend nor +foe—he should be able to hob-nob with those whom he most vehemently +attacks, and to fly at the scientific throat of those to whom he is +personally most attached; he should be neither grateful for a favourable +review nor displeased at a hostile one; his literary and scientific life +should be something as far apart as possible from his social; it is thus, +at least, alone that any one will be able to keep his eye single for +facts, and their legitimate inferences. We have seen Professor Mivart +lately taken to task by Mr. Romanes for having said {248a} that Mr. +Darwin was singularly sensitive to criticism, and made it impossible for +Professor Mivart to continue friendly personal relations with him after +he had ventured to maintain his own opinion. I see no reason to question +Professor Mivart’s accuracy, and find what he has said to agree alike +with my own personal experience of Mr. Darwin, and with all the light +that his works throw upon his character. + +The most substantial apology that can be made for his attempt to claim +the theory of descent with modification is to be found in the practice of +Lamarck, Mr. Patrick Matthew, the author of the “Vestiges of Creation,” +and Mr. Herbert Spencer, and, again, in the total absence of complaint +which this practice met with. If Lamarck might write the “Philosophie +Zoologique” without, so far as I remember, one word of reference to +Buffon, and without being complained of, why might not Mr. Darwin write +the “Origin of Species” without more than a passing allusion to Lamarck? +Mr. Patrick Matthew, again, though writing what is obviously a _résumé_ +of the evolutionary theories of his time, makes no mention of Lamarck, +Erasmus Darwin, or Buffon. I have not the original edition of the +“Vestiges of Creation” before me, but feel sure I am justified in saying +that it claimed to be a more or less Minerva-like work, that sprang full +armed from the brain of Mr. Chambers himself. This at least is how it +was received by the public; and, however violent the opposition it met +with, I cannot find that its author was blamed for not having made +adequate mention of Lamarck. When Mr. Spencer wrote his first essay on +evolution in the _Leader_ (March 20, 1852) he did indeed begin his +argument, “Those who cavalierly reject the doctrine of Lamarck,” &c., so +that his essay purports to be written in support of Lamarck; but when he +republished his article in 1858, the reference to Lamarck was cut out. + +I make no doubt that it was the bad example set him by the writers named +in the preceding paragraph which betrayed Mr. Darwin into doing as they +did, but being more conscientious than they, he could not bring himself +to do it without having satisfied himself that he had got hold of a more +or less distinctive feature, and this, of course, made matters worse. +The distinctive feature was not due to any deep-laid plan for +pitchforking mind out of the universe, or as part of a scheme of +materialistic philosophy, though it has since been made to play an +important part in the attempt to further this; Mr. Darwin was perfectly +innocent of any intention of getting rid of mind, and did not, probably, +care the toss of sixpence whether the universe was instinct with mind or +no—what he did care about was carrying off the palm in the matter of +descent with modification, and the distinctive feature was an adjunct +with which his nervous, sensitive, Gladstonian nature would not allow him +to dispense. + +And why, it may be asked, should not the palm be given to Mr. Darwin if +he wanted it, and was at so much pains to get it? Why, if science is a +kingdom not of this world, make so much fuss about settling who is +entitled to what? At best such questions are of a sorry personal nature, +that can have little bearing upon facts, and it is these that alone +should concern us. The answer is, that if the question is so merely +personal and unimportant, Mr. Darwin may as well yield as Buffon, Erasmus +Darwin, and Lamarck; Mr. Darwin’s admirers find no difficulty in +appreciating the importance of a personal element as far as he is +concerned; let them not wonder, then, if others, while anxious to give +him the laurels to which he is entitled, are somewhat indignant at the +attempt to crown him with leaves that have been filched from the brows of +the great dead who went before him. _Palmam qui meruit ferat_. The +instinct which tells us that no man in the scientific or literary world +should claim more than his due is an old and, I imagine, a wholesome one, +and if a scientific self-denying ordinance is demanded, we may reply with +justice, _Que messieurs les Charles-Darwinies commencent_. Mr. Darwin +will have a crown sufficient for any ordinary brow remaining in the +achievement of having done more than any other writer, living or dead, to +popularise evolution. This much may be ungrudgingly conceded to him, but +more than this those who have his scientific position most at heart will +be well advised if they cease henceforth to demand. + + + + +Chapter XIX +Conclusion + + +AND now I bring this book to a conclusion. So many things requiring +attention have happened since it was begun that I leave it in a very +different shape to the one which it was originally intended to bear. I +have omitted much that I had meant to deal with, and have been tempted +sometimes to introduce matter the connection of which with my subject is +not immediately apparent. Such however, as the book is, it must now go +in the form into which it has grown almost more in spite of me than from +_malice prepense_ on my part. I was afraid that it might thus set me at +defiance, and in an early chapter expressed a doubt whether I should find +it redound greatly to my advantage with men of science; in this +concluding chapter I may say that doubt has deepened into something like +certainty. I regret this, but cannot help it. + +Among the points with which it was most incumbent upon me to deal was +that of vegetable intelligence. A reader may well say that unless I give +plants much the same sense of pleasure and pain, memory, power of will, +and intelligent perception of the best way in which to employ their +opportunities that I give to low animals, my argument falls to the +ground. If I declare organic modification to be mainly due to function, +and hence in the closest correlation with mental change, I must give +plants, as well as animals, a mind, and endow them with power to reflect +and reason upon all that most concerns them. Many who will feel little +difficulty about admitting that animal modification is upon the whole +mainly due to the secular cunning of the animals themselves will yet +hesitate before they admit that plants also can have a reason and cunning +of their own. + +Unwillingness to concede this is based principally upon the error +concerning intelligence to which I have already referred—I mean to our +regarding intelligence not so much as the power of understanding as that +of being understood by ourselves. Once admit that the evidence in favour +of a plant’s knowing its own business depends more on the efficiency with +which that business is conducted than either on our power of +understanding how it can be conducted, or on any signs on the plant’s +part of a capacity for understanding things that do not concern it, and +there will be no further difficulty about supposing that in its own +sphere a plant is just as intelligent as an animal, and keeps a sharp +look-out upon its own interests, however indifferent it may seem to be to +ours. So strong has been the set of recent opinion in this direction +that with botanists the foregoing now almost goes without saying, though +few five years ago would have accepted it. + +To no one of the several workers in this field are we more indebted for +the change which has been brought about in this respect than to my late +valued and lamented friend Mr. Alfred Tylor. Mr. Tylor was not the +discoverer of the protoplasmic continuity that exists in plants, but he +was among the very first to welcome this discovery, and his experiments +at Carshalton in the years 1883 and 1884 demonstrated that, whether there +was protoplasmic continuity in plants or no, they were at any rate +endowed with some measure of reason, forethought, and power of +self-adaptation to varying surroundings. It is not for me to give the +details of these experiments. I had the good fortune to see them more +than once while they were in progress, and was present when they were +made the subject of a paper read by Mr. Sydney B. J. Skertchly before the +Linnean Society, Mr. Tylor being then too ill to read it himself. The +paper has since been edited by Mr. Skertchly, and published. {253a} +Anything that should be said further about it will come best from Mr. +Skertchly; it will be enough here if I give the _résumé_ of it prepared +by Mr. Tylor himself. + +In this Mr. Tylor said:—“The principles which underlie this paper are the +individuality of plants, the necessity for some co-ordinating system to +enable the parts to act in concert, and the probability that this also +necessitates the admission that plants have a dim sort of intelligence. + +“It is shown that a tree, for example, is something more than an +aggregation of tissues, but is a complex being performing acts as a +whole, and not merely responsive to the direct influence of light, &c. +The tree knows more than its branches, as the species know more than the +individual, the community than the unit. + +“Moreover, inasmuch as my experiments show that many plants and trees +possess the power of adapting themselves to unfamiliar circumstances, +such as, for instance, avoiding obstacles by bending aside before +touching, or by altering the leaf arrangement, it seems probable that at +least as much voluntary power must be accorded to such plants as to +certain lowly organised animals. + +“Finally, a connecting system by means of which combined movements take +place is found in the threads of protoplasm which unite the various +cells, and which I have now shown to exist even in the wood of trees. + +“One of the important facts seems to be the universality of the upward +curvature of the tips of growing branches of trees, and the power +possessed by the tree to straighten its branches afterwards, so that new +growth shall by similar means be able to obtain the necessary light and +air. + +“A house, to use a sanitary analogy, is functionally useless without it +obtains a good supply of light and air. The architect strives so to +produce the house as to attain this end, and still leave the house +comfortable. But the house, though dependent upon, is not produced by, +the light and air. So a tree is functionally useless, and cannot even +exist without a proper supply of light and air; but, whereas it has been +the custom to ascribe the heliotropic and other motions to the direct +influence of those agents, I would rather suggest that the movements are +to some extent due to the desire of the plant to acquire its necessaries +of life.” + +The more I have reflected upon Mr. Tylor’s Carshalton experiments, the +more convinced I am of their great value. No one, indeed, ought to have +doubted that plants were intelligent, but we all of us do much that we +ought not to do, and Mr. Tylor supplied a demonstration which may be +henceforth authoritatively appealed to. + +I will take the present opportunity of insisting upon a suggestion which +I made in “Alps and Sanctuaries” (New edition, pp. 152, 153), with which +Mr. Tylor was much pleased, and which, at his request, I made the subject +of a few words that I ventured to say at the Linnean Society’s rooms +after his paper had been read. “Admitting,” I said, “the common +protoplasmic origin of animals and plants, and setting aside the notion +that plants preceded animals, we are still faced by the problem why +protoplasm should have developed into the organic life of the world, +along two main lines, and only two—the animal and the vegetable. Why, if +there was an early schism—and this there clearly was—should there not +have been many subsequent ones of equal importance? We see innumerable +sub-divisions of animals and plants, but we see no other such great +subdivision of organic life as that whereby it ranges itself, for the +most part readily, as either animal or vegetable. Why any +subdivision?—but if any, why not more than two great classes?” + +The two main stems of the tree of life ought, one would think, to have +been formed on the same principle as the boughs which represent genera, +and the twigs which stand for species and varieties. If specific +differences arise mainly from differences of action taken in consequence +of differences of opinion, then, so ultimately do generic; so, therefore, +again, do differences between families; so therefore, by analogy, should +that greatest of differences in virtue of which the world of life is +mainly animal, or vegetable. In this last case as much as in that of +specific difference, we ought to find divergent form the embodiment and +organic expression of divergent opinion. Form is mind made manifest in +flesh through action: shades of mental difference being expressed in +shades of physical difference, while broad fundamental differences of +opinion are expressed in broad fundamental differences of bodily shape. + +Or to put it thus:— + +If form and habit be regarded as functionally interdependent, that is to +say, if neither form nor habit can vary without corresponding variation +in the other, and if habit and opinion concerning advantage are also +functionally interdependent, it follows self-evidently that form and +opinion concerning advantage (and hence form and cunning) will be +functionally interdependent also, and that there can be no great +modification of the one without corresponding modification of the other. +Let there, then, be a point in respect of which opinion might be early +and easily divided—a point in respect of which two courses involving +different lines of action presented equally-balanced advantages—and there +would be an early subdivision of primordial life, according as the one +view or the other was taken. + +It is obvious that the pros and cons for either course must be supposed +very nearly equal, otherwise the course which presented the fewest +advantages would be attended with the probable gradual extinction of the +organised beings that adopted it, but there being supposed two possible +modes of action very evenly balanced as regards advantage and +disadvantages, then the ultimate appearance of two corresponding forms of +life is a _sequitur_ from the admission that form varies as function, and +function as opinion concerning advantage. If there are three, four, +five, or six such opinions tenable, we ought to have three, four, five, +or six main subdivisions of life. As things are, we have two only. Can +we, then, see a matter on which opinion was likely to be easily and early +divided into two, and only two, main divisions—no third course being +conceivable? If so, this should suggest itself as the probable source +from which the two main forms of organic life have been derived. + +I submit that we can see such a matter in the question whether it pays +better to sit still and make the best of what comes in one’s way, or to +go about in search of what one can find. Of course we, as animals, +naturally hold that it is better to go about in search of what we can +find than to sit still and make the best of what comes; but there is +still so much to be said on the other side, that many classes of animals +have settled down into sessile habits, while a perhaps even larger number +are, like spiders, habitual liers in wait rather than travellers in +search of food. I would ask my reader, therefore, to see the opinion +that it is better to go in search of prey as formulated, and finding its +organic expression, in animals; and the other—that it is better to be +ever on the look-out to make the best of what chance brings up to them—in +plants. Some few intermediate forms still record to us the long struggle +during which the schism was not yet complete, and the halting between two +opinions which it might be expected that some organisms should exhibit. + +“Neither class,” I said in “Alps and Sanctuaries,” “has been quite +consistent. Who ever is or can be? Every extreme—every opinion carried +to its logical end—will prove to be an absurdity. Plants throw out roots +and boughs and leaves; this is a kind of locomotion; and, as Dr. Erasmus +Darwin long since pointed out, they do sometimes approach nearly to what +may be called travelling; a man of consistent character will never look +at a bough, a root, or a tendril without regarding it as a melancholy and +unprincipled compromise” (New edition, p. 153). + +Having called attention to this view, and commended it to the +consideration of my readers, I proceed to another which should not have +been left to be touched upon only in a final chapter, and which, indeed, +seems to require a book to itself—I refer to the origin and nature of the +feelings, which those who accept volition as having had a large share in +organic modification must admit to have had a no less large share in the +formation of volition. Volition grows out of ideas, ideas from feelings. +What, then, is feeling, and the subsequent mental images or ideas? + +The image of a stone formed in our minds is no representation of the +object which has given rise to it. Not only, as has been often remarked, +is there no resemblance between the particular thought and the particular +thing, but thoughts and things generally are too unlike to be compared. +An idea of a stone may be like an idea of another stone, or two stones +may be like one another; but an idea of a stone is not like a stone; it +cannot be thrown at anything, it occupies no room in space, has no +specific gravity, and when we come to know more about stones, we find our +ideas concerning them to be but rude, epitomised, and highly conventional +renderings of the actual facts, mere hieroglyphics, in fact, or, as it +were, counters or bank-notes, which serve to express and to convey +commodities with which they have no pretence of analogy. + +Indeed we daily find that, as the range of our perceptions becomes +enlarged either by invention of new appliances or after use of old ones, +we change our ideas though we have no reason to think that the thing +about which we are thinking has changed. In the case of a stone, for +instance, the rude, unassisted, uneducated senses see it as above all +things motionless, whereas assisted and trained ideas concerning it +represent motion as its most essential characteristic; but the stone has +not changed. So, again, the uneducated idea represents it as above all +things mindless, and is as little able to see mind in connection with it +as it lately was to see motion; it will be no greater change of opinion +than we have most of us undergone already if we come presently to see it +as no less full of elementary mind than of elementary motion, but the +stone will not have changed. + +The fact that we modify our opinions suggests that our ideas are formed +not so much in involuntary self-adjusting mimetic correspondence with the +objects that we believe to give rise to them, as by what was in the +outset voluntary, conventional arrangement in whatever way we found +convenient, of sensation and perception-symbols, which had nothing +whatever to do with the objects, and were simply caught hold of as the +only things we could grasp. It would seem as if, in the first instance, +we must have arbitrarily attached some one of the few and vague +sensations which we could alone at first command, to certain motions of +outside things as echoed by our brain, and used them to think and feel +the things with, so as to docket them, and recognise them with greater +force, certainty, and clearness—much as we use words to help us to docket +and grasp our feelings and thoughts, or written characters to help us to +docket and grasp our words. + +If this view be taken we stand in much the same attitude towards our +feelings as a dog may be supposed to do towards our own reading and +writing. The dog may be supposed to marvel at the wonderful instinctive +faculty by which we can tell the price of the different railway stocks +merely by looking at a sheet of paper; he supposes this power to be a +part of our nature, to have come of itself by luck and not by cunning, +but a little reflection will show that feeling is not more likely to have +“come by nature” than reading and writing are. Feeling is in all +probability the result of the same kind of slow laborious development as +that which has attended our more recent arts and our bodily organs; its +development must be supposed to have followed the same lines as that of +our other arts, and indeed of the body itself, which is the _ars +artium_—for growth of mind is throughout coincident with growth of +organic resources, and organic resources grow with growing mind. + +Feeling is the art the possession of which differentiates the civilised +organic world from that of brute inorganic matter, but still it is an +art; it is the outcome of a mind that is common both to organic and +inorganic, and which the organic has alone cultivated. It is not a part +of mind itself; it is no more this than language and writing are parts of +thought. The organic world can alone feel, just as man can alone speak; +but as speech is only the development of powers the germs of which are +possessed by the lower animals, so feeling is only a sign of the +employment and development of powers the germs of which exist in +inorganic substances. It has all the characteristics of an art, and +though it must probably rank as the oldest of those arts that are +peculiar to the organic world, it is one which is still in process of +development. None of us, indeed, can feel well on more than a very few +subjects, and many can hardly feel at all. + +But, however this may be, our sensations and perceptions of material +phenomena are attendant on the excitation of certain motions in the +anterior parts of the brain. Whenever certain motions are excited in +this substance, certain sensations and ideas of resistance, extension, +&c., are either concomitant, or ensue within a period too brief for our +cognisance. It is these sensations and ideas that we directly cognise, +and it is to them that we have attached the idea of the particular kind +of matter we happen to be thinking of. As this idea is not like the +thing itself, so neither is it like the motions in our brain on which it +is attendant. It is no more like these than, say, a stone is like the +individual characters, written or spoken, that form the word “stone,” or +than these last are, in sound, like the word “stone” itself, whereby the +idea of a stone is so immediately and vividly presented to us. True, +this does not involve that our idea shall not resemble the object that +gave rise to it, any more than the fact that a looking-glass bears no +resemblance to the things reflected in it involves that the reflection +shall not resemble the things reflected; the shifting nature, however, of +our ideas and conceptions is enough to show that they must be symbolical, +and conditioned by changes going on within ourselves as much as by those +outside us; and if, going behind the ideas which suffice for daily use, +we extend our inquiries in the direction of the reality underlying our +conception, we find reason to think that the brain-motions which attend +our conception correspond with exciting motions in the object that +occasions it, and that these, rather than anything resembling our +conception itself, should be regarded as the reality. + +This leads to a third matter, on which I can only touch with extreme +brevity. + +Different modes of motion have long been known as the causes of our +different colour perceptions, or at any rate as associated therewith, and +of late years, more especially since the promulgation of Newlands’ {260a} +law, it has been perceived that what we call the kinds or properties of +matter are not less conditioned by motion than colour is. The substance +or essence of unconditioned matter, as apart from the relations between +its various states (which we believe to be its various conditions of +motion) must remain for ever unknown to us, for it is only the relations +between the conditions of the underlying substance that we cognise at +all, and where there are no conditions, there is nothing for us to seize, +compare, and, hence, cognise; unconditioned matter must, therefore, be as +inconceivable by us as unmattered condition; {261a} but though we can +know nothing about matter as apart from its conditions or states, opinion +has been for some time tending towards the belief that what we call the +different states, or kinds, of matter are only our ways of mentally +characterising and docketing our estimates of the different kinds of +motion going on in this otherwise uncognisable substratum. + +Our conception, then, concerning the nature of any matter depends solely +upon its kind and degree of unrest, that is to say, on the +characteristics of the vibrations that are going on within it. The +exterior object vibrating in a certain way imparts some of its vibrations +to our brain—but if the state of the thing itself depends upon its +vibrations, it must be considered as to all intents and purposes the +vibrations themselves—plus, of course, the underlying substance that is +vibrating. If, for example, a pat of butter is a portion of the +unknowable underlying substance in such-and-such a state of molecular +disturbance, and it is only by alteration of the disturbance that the +substance can be altered—the disturbance of the substance is practically +equivalent to the substance: a pat of butter is such-and-such a +disturbance of the unknowable underlying substance, and such-and-such a +disturbance of the underlying substance is a pat of butter. In +communicating its vibrations, therefore, to our brain a substance does +actually communicate what is, as far as we are concerned, a portion of +itself. Our perception of a thing and its attendant feeling are symbols +attaching to an introduction within our brain of a feeble state of the +thing itself. Our recollection of it is occasioned by a feeble +continuance of this feeble state in our brains, becoming less feeble +through the accession of fresh but similar vibrations from without. The +molecular vibrations which make the thing an idea of which is conveyed to +our minds, put within our brain a little feeble emanation from the thing +itself—if we come within their reach. This being once put there, will +remain as it were dust, till dusted out, or till it decay, or till it +receive accession of new vibrations. + +The vibrations from a pat of butter do, then, actually put butter into a +man’s head. This is one of the commonest of expressions, and would +hardly be so common if it were not felt to have some foundation in fact. +At first the man does not know what feeling or complex of feelings to +employ so as to docket the vibrations, any more than he knows what word +to employ so as to docket the feelings, or with what written characters +to docket his word; but he gets over this, and henceforward the +vibrations of the exterior object (that is to say, the thing) never set +up their characteristic disturbances, or, in other words, never come into +his head, without the associated feeling presenting itself as readily as +word and characters present themselves, on the presence of the feeling. +The more butter a man sees and handles, the more he gets butter on the +brain—till, though he can never get anything like enough to be strictly +called butter, it only requires the slightest molecular disturbance with +characteristics like those of butter to bring up a vivid and highly +sympathetic idea of butter in the man’s mind. + +If this view is adopted, our memory of a thing is our retention within +the brain of a small leaven of the actual thing itself, or of what _quâ_ +us is the thing that is remembered, and the ease with which habitual +actions come to be performed is due to the power of the vibrations having +been increased and modified by continual accession from without till they +modify the molecular disturbances of the nervous system, and therefore +its material substance, which we have already settled to be only our way +of docketing molecular disturbances. The same vibrations, therefore, +form the substance remembered, introduce an infinitesimal dose of it +within the brain, modify the substance remembering, and, in the course of +time, create and further modify the mechanism of both the sensory and +motor nerves. Thought and thing are one. + +I commend these two last speculations to the reader’s charitable +consideration, as feeling that I am here travelling beyond the ground on +which I can safely venture; nevertheless, as it may be some time before I +have another opportunity of coming before the public, I have thought it, +on the whole, better not to omit them, but to give them thus +provisionally. I believe they are both substantially true, but am by no +means sure that I have expressed them either clearly or accurately; I +cannot, however, further delay the issue of my book. + +Returning to the point raised in my title, is luck, I would ask, or +cunning, the more fitting matter to be insisted upon in connection with +organic modification? Do animals and plants grow into conformity with +their surroundings because they and their fathers and mothers take pains, +or because their uncles and aunts go away? For the survival of the +fittest is only the non-survival or going away of the unfittest—in whose +direct line the race is not continued, and who are therefore only uncles +and aunts of the survivors. I can quite understand its being a good +thing for any race that its uncles and aunts should go away, but I do not +believe the accumulation of lucky accidents could result in an eye, no +matter how many uncles and aunts may have gone away during how many +generations. + +I would ask the reader to bear in mind the views concerning life and +death expressed in an early chapter. They seem to me not, indeed, to +take away any very considerable part of the sting from death; this should +not be attempted or desired, for with the sting of death the sweets of +life are inseparably bound up so that neither can be weakened without +damaging the other. Weaken the fear of death, and the love of life would +be weakened. Strengthen it, and we should cling to life even more +tenaciously than we do. But though death must always remain as a shock +and change of habits from which we must naturally shrink—still it is not +the utter end of our being, which, until lately, it must have seemed to +those who have been unable to accept the grosser view of the resurrection +with which we were familiarised in childhood. We too now know that +though worms destroy this body, yet in our flesh shall we so far see God +as to be still in Him and of Him—biding our time for a resurrection in a +new and more glorious body; and, moreover, that we shall be to the full +as conscious of this as we are at present of much that concerns us as +closely as anything can concern us. + +The thread of life cannot be shorn between successive generations, except +upon grounds which will in equity involve its being shorn between +consecutive seconds, and fractions of seconds. On the other hand, it +cannot be left unshorn between consecutive seconds without necessitating +that it should be left unshorn also beyond the grave, as well as in +successive generations. Death is as salient a feature in what we call +our life as birth was, but it is no more than this. As a salient +feature, it is a convenient epoch for the drawing of a defining line, by +the help of which we may better grasp the conception of life, and think +it more effectually, but it is a _façon de parler_ only; it is, as I said +in “Life and Habit,” {264a} “the most inexorable of all conventions,” but +our idea of it has no correspondence with eternal underlying realities. + +Finally, we must have evolution; consent is too spontaneous, instinctive, +and universal among those most able to form an opinion, to admit of +further doubt about this. We must also have mind and design. The +attempt to eliminate intelligence from among the main agencies of the +universe has broken down too signally to be again ventured upon—not until +the recent rout has been forgotten. Nevertheless the old, far-foreseeing +_Deus ex machinâ_ design as from a point outside the universe, which +indeed it directs, but of which it is no part, is negatived by the facts +of organism. What, then, remains, but the view that I have again in this +book endeavoured to uphold—I mean, the supposition that the mind or +cunning of which we see such abundant evidence all round us, is, like the +kingdom of heaven, within us, and within all things at all times +everywhere? There is design, or cunning, but it is a cunning not +despotically fashioning us from without as a potter fashions his clay, +but inhering democratically within the body which is its highest outcome, +as life inheres within an animal or plant. + +All animals and plants are corporations, or forms of democracy, and may +be studied by the light of these, as democracies, not infrequently, by +that of animals and plants. The solution of the difficult problem of +reflex action, for example, is thus facilitated, by supposing it to be +departmental in character; that is to say, by supposing it to be action +of which the department that attends to it is alone cognisant, and which +is not referred to the central government so long as things go normally. +As long, therefore, as this is the case, the central government is +unconscious of what is going on, but its being thus unconscious is no +argument that the department is unconscious also. + +I know that contradiction in terms lurks within much that I have said, +but the texture of the world is a warp and woof of contradiction in +terms; of continuity in discontinuity, and discontinuity in continuity; +of unity in diversity, and of diversity in unity. As in the development +of a fugue, where, when the subject and counter subject have been +enounced, there must henceforth be nothing new, and yet all must be new, +so throughout organic life—which is as a fugue developed to great length +from a very simple subject—everything is linked on to and grows out of +that which comes next to it in order—errors and omissions excepted. It +crosses and thwarts what comes next to it with difference that involves +resemblance, and resemblance that involves difference, and there is no +juxtaposition of things that differ too widely by omission of necessary +links, or too sudden departure from recognised methods of procedure. + +To conclude; bodily form may be almost regarded as idea and memory in a +solidified state—as an accumulation of things each one of them so tenuous +as to be practically without material substance. It is as a million +pounds formed by accumulated millionths of farthings; more compendiously +it arises normally from, and through, action. Action arises normally +from, and through, opinion. Opinion, from, and through, hypothesis. +“Hypothesis,” as the derivation of the word itself shows, is singularly +near akin to “underlying, and only in part knowable, substratum;” and +what is this but “God” translated from the language of Moses into that of +Mr. Herbert Spencer? The conception of God is like nature—it returns to +us in another shape, no matter how often we may expel it. Vulgarised as +it has been by Michael Angelo, Raffaelle, and others who shall be +nameless, it has been like every other _corruptio optimi—pessimum_: used +as a hieroglyph by the help of which we may better acknowledge the height +and depth of our own ignorance, and at the same time express our sense +that there is an unseen world with which we in some mysterious way come +into contact, though the writs of our thoughts do not run within it—used +in this way, the idea and the word have been found enduringly convenient. +The theory that luck is the main means of organic modification is the +most absolute denial of God which it is possible for the human mind to +conceive—while the view that God is in all His creatures, He in them and +they in Him, is only expressed in other words by declaring that the main +means of organic modification is, not luck, but cunning. + + + + +Footnotes + + +{17a} “_Nature_,” Nov. 12, 1885. + +{20a} “Hist. Nat. Gén.,” tom. ii. p. 411, 1859. + +{23a} “Selections, &c.” Trübner & Co., 1884. [Out of print.] + +{29a} “Selections, &c., and Remarks on Romanes’ ‘Mental Intelligence in +Animals,’” Trübner & Co., 1884. pp. 228, 229. [Out of print.] + +{35a} Quoted by M. Vianna De Lima in his “Exposé Sommaire,” &c., p. 6. +Paris, Delagrave, 1886. + +{40a} I have given the passage in full on p. 254a of my “Selections,” +&c. [Now out of print.] I observe that Canon Kingsley felt exactly the +same difficulty that I had felt myself, and saw also how alone it could +be met. He makes the wood-wren say, “Something told him his mother had +done it before him, and he was flesh of her flesh, life of her life, and +had inherited her instinct (as we call hereditary memory, to avoid the +trouble of finding out what it is and how it comes).”—_Fraser_, June, +1867. Canon Kingsley felt he must insist on the continued personality of +the two generations before he could talk about inherited memory. On the +other hand, though he does indeed speak of this as almost a synonym for +instinct, he seems not to have realised how right he was, and implies +that we should find some fuller and more satisfactory explanation behind +this, only that we are too lazy to look for it. + +{44a} 26 Sept., 1877. “Unconscious Memory.” ch. ii. + +{52a} This chapter is taken almost entirely from my book, “Selections, +&c.. and Remarks on Romanes’ ‘Mental Evolution in Animals.’” Trübner, +1884. [Now out of print.] + +{52b} “Mental Evolution in Animals,” p. 113. Kegan Paul, Nov., 1883. + +{52c} Ibid. p. 115. + +{52d} Ibid. p. 116. + +{53a} “Mental Evolution in Animals.” p. 131. Kegan Paul, Nov., 1883. + +{54a} Vol. I, 3rd ed., 1874, p. 141, and Problem I. 21. + +{54b} “Mental Evolution in Animals,” pp. 177, 178. Nov., 1883. + +{55a} “Mental Evolution in Animals,” p. 192. + +{55b} _Ibid._ p. 195. + +{55c} _Ibid._ p. 296. Nov., 1883. + +{56a} “Mental Evolution in Animals,” p. 33. Nov., 1883. + +{56b} _Ibid._, p. 116. + +{56c} _Ibid._, p. 178. + +{59a} “Evolution Old and New,” pp. 357, 358. + +{60a} “Mental Evolution in Animals,” p. 159. Kegan Paul & Co., 1883. + +{61a} “Zoonomia,” vol. i. p. 484. + +{61b} “Mental Evolution in Animals,” p. 297. Kegan Paul & Co., 1883. + +{61c} _Ibid._, p. 201. Kegan Paul & Co., 1883. + +{62a} “Mental Evolution in Animals,” p. 301. November, 1883. + +{62b} “Origin of Species,” ed. i. p. 209. + +{62c} _Ibid._, ed. vi., 1876. p. 206. + +{62d} “Formation of Vegetable Mould,” etc., p. 98. + +{62e} Quoted by Mr. Romanes as written in the last year of Mr. Darwin’s +life. + +{63a} Macmillan, 1883. + +{66a} “Nature,” August 5, 1886. + +{67a} London, H. K. Lewis, 1886. + +{70a} “Charles Darwin.” Longmans, 1885. + +{70b} Lectures at the London Institution, Feb., 1886. + +{70c} “Charles Darwin.” Leipzig. 1885. + +{72a} See Professor Hering’s “Zur Lehre von der Beziehung zwischen Leib +und Seele. Mittheilung über Fechner’s psychophysisches Gesetz.” + +{73a} Quoted by M. Vianna De Lima in his “Exposé Sommaire des Théories +Transformistes de Lamarck, Darwin, et Hæckel.” Paris, 1886, p. 23. + +{81a} “Origin of Species,” ed. i., p. 6; see also p. 43. + +{83a} “I think it can be shown that there is such a power at work in +‘Natural Selection’ (the title of my book).”—“Proceedings of the Linnean +Society for 1858,” vol. iii., p. 51. + +{86a} “On Naval Timber and Arboriculture,” 1831, pp. 384, 385. See also +“Evolution Old and New,” pp. 320, 321. + +{87a} “Origin of Species,” p. 49, ed. vi. + +{92a} “Origin of Species,” ed. i., pp. 188, 189. + +{93a} Page 9. + +{94a} Page 226. + +{96a} “Journal of the Proceedings of the Linnean Society.” Williams and +Norgate, 1858, p. 61. + +{102a} “Zoonomia,” vol. i., p. 505. + +{104a} See “Evolution Old and New.” p. 122. + +{105a} “Phil. Zool.,” i., p. 80. + +{105b} _Ibid._, i. 82. + +{105c} _Ibid._ vol. i., p. 237. + +{107a} See concluding chapter. + +{122a} Report, 9, 26. + +{135a} Ps. cii. 25–27, Bible version. + +{136a} Ps. cxxxix., Prayer-book version. + +{140a} _Contemporary Review_, August, 1885, p. 84. + +{142a} London, David Bogue, 1881, p. 60. + +{144a} August 12, 1886. + +{150a} Paris, Delagrave, 1886. + +{150b} Page 60. + +{150c} “Œuvre complètes,” tom. ix. p. 422. Paris, Garnier frères, 1875. + +{150d} “Hist. Nat.,” tom. i., p. 13, 1749, quoted “Evol. Old and New,” +p. 108. + +{156a} “Origin of Species,” ed. vi., p. 107. + +{156b} _Ibid._, ed. vi., p. 166. + +{157a} “Origin of Species,” ed. vi., p. 233. + +{157b} _Ibid._ + +{157c} _Ibid._, ed. vi., p. 109. + +{157d} _Ibid._, ed. vi., p. 401. + +{158a} “Origin of Species,” ed. i., p. 490. + +{161a} “Origin of Species,” ed. vi., 1876, p. 171. + +{163a} “Charles Darwin,” p. 113. + +{164a} “Animals and Plants under Domestication,” vol. ii., p. 367, ed. +1875. + +{168a} Page 3. + +{168b} Page 4. + +{169a} It should be remembered this was the year in which the “Vestiges +of Creation” appeared. + +{173a} “Charles Darwin,” p. 67. + +{173b} H. S. King & Co., 1876. + +{174a} Page 17. + +{195a} “Phil. Zool.,” tom. i., pp. 34, 35. + +{202a} “Origin of Species,” p. 381, ed. i. + +{203a} Page 454, ed. i. + +{205a} “Principles of Geology,” vol. ii., chap. xxxiv., ed. 1872. + +{206a} “Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte,” p. 3. Berlin, 1868. + +{209a} See “Evolution Old and New,” pp. 8, 9. + +{216a} “Vestiges,” &c., ed. 1860; Proofs, Illustrations, &c., p. xiv. + +{216b} _Examiner_, May 17, 1879, review of “Evolution Old and New.” + +{218a} Given in part in “Evolution Old and New.” + +{219a} “Mind,” p. 498, Oct., 1883. + +{224a} “Degeneration,” 1880, p. 10. + +{227a} E.g. the Rev. George Henslow, in “Modern Thought,” vol. ii., No. +5, 1881. + +{232a} “Nature,” Aug. 6, 1886. + +{234a} See Mr. Darwin’s “Animals and Plants under Domestication,” vol. +i., p. 466, &c., ed. 1875. + +{235a} Paris, 1873, Introd., p. vi. + +{235b} “Hist. Nat. Gen.,” ii. 404, 1859. + +{239a} As these pages are on the point of going to press, I see that the +writer of an article on Liszt in the “Athenæum” makes the same emendation +on Shakespeare’s words that I have done. + +{240a} “Voyages of the _Adventure_ and _Beagle_,” vol. iii., p. 373. +London, 1839. + +{242a} See Professor Paley, “Fraser,” Jan., 1882, “Science Gossip,” Nos. +162, 163, June and July, 1878, and “Nature,” Jan. 3, Jan. 10, Feb. 28, +and March 27, 1884. + +{245a} “Formation of Vegetable Mould,” etc., p. 217. Murray, 1882. + +{248a} “Fortnightly Review,” Jan., 1886. + +{253a} “On the Growth of Trees and Protoplasmic Continuity.” London, +Stanford, 1886. + +{260a} Sometimes called Mendelejeff’s (see “Monthly Journal of Science,” +April, 1884). + +{261a} I am aware that attempts have been made to say that we can +conceive a condition of matter, although there is no matter in connection +with it—as, for example, that we can have motion without anything moving +(see “Nature,” March 5, March 12, and April 9, 1885)—but I think it +little likely that this opinion will meet general approbation. + +{264a} Page 53. + + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LUCK OR CUNNING*** + + +******* This file should be named 4967-0.txt or 4967-0.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/4/9/6/4967 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at + www.gutenberg.org/license. + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 +North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email +contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the +Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |