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diff --git a/old/50554-0.txt b/old/50554-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 1ed8ffc..0000000 --- a/old/50554-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4749 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's The Campaign of Königgrätz, by Arthur L. Wagner - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Campaign of Königgrätz - A Study of the Austro-Prussian Conflict in the Light of - the American Civil War - -Author: Arthur L. Wagner - -Release Date: November 26, 2015 [EBook #50554] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CAMPAIGN OF KONIGGRATZ *** - - - - -Produced by Craig Kirkwood and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive.) - - - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes: - -Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - -Additional Transcriber’s Notes are at the end. - - * * * * * - -[Illustration: MAP OF GERMANY PREVIOUS TO THE WAR OF 1866.] - - - - -_THE_ Campaign of Königgrätz, - - - _A Study of the Austro-Prussian Conflict in the Light - of the American Civil War._ - - --BY-- - - ARTHUR L. WAGNER, - - First Lieut. 6th U. S. Infantry, - - _Assistant Instructor in the Art of War, at the U. S. Infantry and - Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas._ - - FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS, - 1889. - - - - -PREFACE. - - -The greater part of the subject-matter of this volume was originally -given as a lecture to the officers at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry -School. The kindly reception accorded to the lecture has encouraged me -to revise and amplify it, and to publish it in its present form. - -As to the narrative portion of the book, no other claim is made than -that it is based upon the story of the campaign as given in the -Prussian Official History of the Campaign of 1866, Hozier’s “Seven -Weeks’ War,” Derrécagaix’s “_La Guerre Moderne_,” and Adams’ “Great -Campaigns in Europe.” I have not deemed it necessary to cumber the -pages with notes of reference, but will here express my indebtedness -to the works mentioned, giving precedence to them in the order -named. Other works have been consulted, which are enumerated in the -bibliographical note at the end of the volume. I have also personally -visited the scene of the operations described, and, especially in -regard to the topography of the battle field of Königgrätz, I am able -to speak from my own observation. - -My object has been: 1. To give a brief, but accurate, historical sketch -of a great campaign, to which but little attention has been given in -this country. 2. To make a comparison of some of the military features -of the War of Secession with corresponding features of the European war -which occurred one year later. - -European critics have generally been loth to acknowledge the military -excellence displayed during the War of Secession; and, even when giving -full credit for the valor exhibited by our soldiers, have too often -regarded our veteran armies as mere “armed mobs.” Chesney, Adams, -Trench and Maude have recognized the value of the lessons taught -by the American armies, and Lord Wolseley has recently developed an -appreciation of such American generalship and soldierly worth as -he can see through Confederate spectacles. But European military -writers generally, and those of the Continent especially, still fail -to recognize in the developments of our war the germ, if not the -prototype, of military features which are regarded as new in Europe. -The remarks of Colonel Chesney still hold true: “There is a disposition -to regard the American generals, and the troops they led, as altogether -inferior to regular soldiers. This prejudice was born out of the -blunders and want of coherence exhibited by undisciplined volunteers at -the outset--faults amply atoned for by the stubborn courage displayed -by both sides throughout the rest of the struggle; while, if a man’s -claims to be regarded as a veteran are to be measured by the amount -of actual fighting he has gone through, the most seasoned soldiers -of Europe are but as conscripts compared with the survivors of that -conflict. The conditions of war on a grand scale were illustrated to -the full as much in the contest in America, as in those more recently -waged on the Continent.” - -But it is not only among European critics that the military excellence -displayed by our armies has been depreciated. There is a small class -among the professional soldiers in our own country, who are wont to -bestow all possible admiration upon the military operations in recent -European wars, not because they were excellent, but because they were -European; and to belittle the operations in our own war, not because -they were not excellent, but because they were American. To this small -class, whose humility in regard to our national achievements is rarely -combined with individual modesty, this book is not addressed. It is -to the true American soldier that this little volume is offered, with -the hope that the views expressed may meet with his approval and be -sanctioned by his judgment. - - A. L. W. - - - - -THE CAMPAIGN OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ. - - -THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING NATIONS. - -The German war of 1866, generally known as “the Seven Weeks’ War,” -presents many features of interest to the student, the statesman and -the soldier. It closed a strife of centuries between opposing nations -and antagonistic political ideas. It resulted in the formation of the -North German Confederation, and thus planted the seeds of a nation, -which germinated four years later, during the bloody war with France. -It banished Austria from all participation in the affairs of Germany, -expelled her from Italy, and deflected her policy thenceforth towards -the east and south. It demonstrated that preparation for war is a more -potent factor than mere numbers in computing the strength of a nation; -and it gave an illustration on a grand scale of the new conditions -of war resulting from the use of the telegraph, the railroad and -breech-loading firearms. - -It is not the intention here to consider any but the military features -of the great Germanic contest. Beginning the subject at the period when -the quarrel between Austria and Prussia over the provinces that they -had wrested from Denmark, passed from the tortuous paths of diplomacy -to the direct road of war, we will consider the relative strength of -the combatant nations. - -As the advocate of the admission of Schleswig-Holstein as a sovereign -state in the Germanic Confederation, Austria gained first the -sympathy, and then the active alliance, of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, -Hesse-Cassel, Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. Prussia -aimed at the incorporation of the duchies within her own territory; -and, though loudly championing the cause of German unity, her course -was so manifestly inspired by designs for her own aggrandizement, that -she could count on the support of only a few petty duchies, whose -aggregate military strength did not exceed 28,000 men. As an offset to -Austria’s formidable German allies, Prussia had concluded an offensive -and defensive alliance with Italy, whose army, though new and inferior -in organization, armament and equipment, to that of her antagonist, -might be relied upon to “contain” at least three Austrian army corps -in Venetia. The main struggle was certain to be between the two great -Germanic nations. - -At a first glance Prussia would seem to be almost hopelessly -overmatched in her contest with Austria. The latter nation possessed -an area more than twice as great as the former, and in contrast -with the Prussian population of less than 20,000,000, it could show -an aggregate of 35,000,000 people. But a more careful examination -discloses the great superiority of the Prussian kingdom. The population -of Prussia was almost exclusively German; that of Austria was a -heterogeneous aggregation of Germans, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, Croats -and Italians, bound together in a purely artificial nationality. -The Austrian national debt amounted to nearly $1,550,000,000; the -annual expenditures so far exceeded the revenue as to cause a yearly -deficit of more than $16,000,000, and the nation was threatened with -bankruptcy. On the other hand, the Prussian national debt was only -$210,000,000, the revenue exceeded the expenditures, and the finances -were in a healthy condition. But the great superiority of the northern -kingdom over its opponent lay in the organization, armament, equipment -and _personnel_ of its army. - -The old adage, “Experience is a severe, but good, schoolmaster,” is -true of nations as well as individuals. A crushing disaster, bringing -with it humiliation, sorrow and disgrace, is often the birth of a -stronger, better, life in the apparent victim of misfortune. The -greatness of Prussia was not born in the brilliant victories of -Rossbach, Leuthen and Zorndorf. It was in the bitter travail of Jena -and the treaty of Tilsit that birth was given to the power of the -kingdom. Forbidden by Napoleon to maintain an army of more than 42,000 -men, the great Prussian war minister, Scharnhorst, determined to create -an army while obeying the commands of the conqueror. There was no -stipulation in the treaty as to the length of service of the soldiers; -and after a few months of careful instruction and almost incessant -drill, they were quietly discharged, and their places were taken by -recruits, who were soon replaced in the same manner. Thus the little -army became, as it were, a lake of military training, into which flowed -a continuous stream of recruits, and from which there came a steady -current of efficient soldiers. When the army of Napoleon returned -from its disastrous campaign in Russia, there arose, as by magic, a -formidable Prussian army, of which nearly 100,000 men were trained -warriors. - -The success of the Prussian arms in the final struggle with Napoleon -was so manifestly due to the measures adopted by Scharnhorst, that his -system was made the permanent basis of the national military policy. -The “Reorganization of 1859” nearly doubled the standing army, and -made some important changes in the length of service required with the -colors and in the Landwehr; but the essential features of the Prussian -system are the same now as in the days of Leipsic and Waterloo. - -Every Prussian twenty years of age is subject to military duty. The -term of service is twelve years, of which three are with the colors, -four with the reserve and five in the Landwehr. The number of soldiers -in the active army is definitely fixed at a little more than one per -cent of the population, and the number of recruits annually required -is regulated by the number of men necessary to keep the regular force -on its authorized peace footing. A list of the young men available for -military service is annually made out, and the selection of recruits -is made by lot. There are but few exceptions; such, for instance, as -young men who are the sole support of indigent parents. Students who -are preparing for the learned professions are permitted to serve as -“one-year volunteers,” on condition of passing certain examinations -satisfactorily, and furnishing their own clothing and equipments. -The name of a man convicted of crime is never placed on the list of -available recruits; and however humble the position of a private -soldier may be, his uniform is the honorable badge of an honest man. -Every young man may be called up for draft three years in succession. -Those who are not drawn for service at the end of the third year are -passed into the Ersatz reserve, in which are also men whose physical -imperfections are not sufficient to exempt them entirely, where they -are free from service in time of peace, but from which they may be -called in time of war to replace drafts from the reserve. In time of -peace the military demands upon the soldiers of the reserve or Landwehr -are very light. A soldier participates in at least two field maneuvers, -aggregating about sixteen weeks, during his four years of service in -the reserve. He is also required to attend muster once every spring and -autumn. During his five years in the Landwehr he is generally called -out twice for drill, the drill period not exceeding fourteen days. - -The active army is the regular army, or permanent establishment. When -the decree for the mobilization of the army is promulgated, this force -is at once put upon its war footing by drafts from the reserve. The -depots are immediately formed, and one-half of the troops stationed -therein are drawn from the reserve; the other half being recruits from -the Ersatz reserve. As these two classes become exhausted, the depot -battalions are filled from the Landwehr, the youngest classes being -taken first; or, if needs be, the entire Landwehr is called out in -battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, or even army corps, and -sent into the field. After exhausting the Landwehr, there still remains -the Landsturm, which embraces all able-bodied men between the ages of -seventeen and forty-nine years who do not belong to the active army, -the reserve, or the Landwehr. Though the calling out of the Landsturm -would imply the exhaustion of the organized forces of the nation, it -would be more than a mere levy _en masse_, as it would bring back into -the army many soldiers whose twelve years of service would not have -been completely forgotten in the midst of civil vocations. - -The machinery for the rapid mobilization of the army is kept in perfect -order. Each army corps, except the Guards, is assigned to a particular -province. The province is divided into divisional districts, which are -again subdivided so that each brigade, regiment and battalion has its -own district, from which it draws its recruits both in peace and war. -A register is kept of every man available for military duty, and in -time of peace every officer knows just what part he is to perform the -minute mobilization is decreed, and each soldier knows where he is to -report for duty. The secret of the efficiency of the German military -system lies in the division of responsibility, and the thorough -decentralization, by which every man, from the monarch to the private -soldier, has his own especial part to perform. - -In 1866 the active army, on a war footing, comprised nine army corps, -and aggregated 335,000 men. Each corps consisted of twenty-four -battalions of infantry, sixteen batteries of artillery, twenty-four -squadrons of cavalry, one battalion of rifles, one battalion of -engineers, an engineer train, and a military train conveying ammunition -and subsistence, quartermaster’s and hospital supplies. Each infantry -battalion numbered 1,000 men. Three battalions formed a regiment, -two regiments a brigade, and two brigades a division. Each battery -contained six guns. Four batteries were assigned to each infantry -division, two batteries of horse artillery were attached to the cavalry -division, and four batteries of field and two of horse artillery -constituted the reserve artillery of each corps. Each squadron of -cavalry numbered about 140 sabres. Four squadrons composed a regiment, -two regiments a brigade, two brigades a division. A regiment of cavalry -was attached to each infantry division. Each corps numbered about -31,000 combatants, except the Guards, which numbered 36,000--having -four additional battalions and eight additional squadrons. During the -campaign under consideration, the cavalry of an army corps consisted of -only one regiment to each division of infantry; the cavalry division -being taken from each corps, and merged into the corps of reserve -cavalry. - -The depot troops consisted of a battalion for each regiment of -infantry, a squadron for each regiment of cavalry, an _abtheilung_ [3 -or 4 batteries] for the artillery of each corps, and a company for each -rifle battalion, engineer battalion and train battalion. The army in -the field was constantly kept up to a full war strength by men drawn -from the depots. The fortresses were garrisoned by Landwehr; and on -troops of the same class devolved the duty of pushing forward to occupy -invaded territory, and to relieve the active army from the necessity of -leaving detachments to guard its communications. - -This is a brief outline of the organization that enabled a nation of -less than 20,000,000 people eventually to bring 600,000 soldiers upon -the theatre of war, and to place a quarter of a million of them upon -the decisive field of Königgrätz. - -The Austrian regular army, when placed upon its war footing, numbered -about 384,000 men; and by calling out all of the reserve, this force -could be raised to a formidable total of 700,000. But in organization -and system of recruitment the Austrian army was inferior to its -antagonist, notwithstanding its war experience in 1849 and in the -struggle with France and Italy ten years later. The superb system by -which Prussia was enabled to send forth a steady stream of trained -soldiers to replace the losses of battle was wanting in Austria; -and the machinery of military administration seemed deranged by the -effort required to place the first gigantic armies in the field. The -difference between the two military systems is shown in a striking -manner by the fact that the mobilization of the Prussian army of -490,000 men, decreed early in May, was completed in fourteen days, and -by the 5th of June 325,000 were massed on the hostile frontiers; while -the mobilization of the Austrian army, begun ten weeks earlier than -that of Prussia, was far from complete on that date. - -Nor was the superiority of the Prussian to the Austrian army, as -a collective body, greater than the individual superiority of the -Prussian soldier to his antagonist. As a result of the admirable -Prussian school system, every Prussian soldier was an educated man. -Baron Stoffel, the French military _attaché_ at Berlin from 1866 to -1870, says: “‘When,’ said the Prussian officers, ‘our men came in -contact with the Austrian prisoners, and on speaking to them found that -they hardly knew their right hand from their left, there was not one -who did not look upon himself as a god in comparison with such ignorant -beings, and this conviction increased our strength tenfold.’” - -The Prussian army was the first that ever took the field armed entirely -with breech-loading firearms. In the War of Secession a portion of -the Federal troops were, towards the end of the struggle, armed with -breech-loading rifles; but now the entire Prussian army marched forth -with breech-loaders, to battle against an army which still retained -the muzzle-loading rifle. Great as was the superiority of the needle -gun over the Austrian musket, it would seem but a sorry weapon at -the present day. The breech mechanism was clumsy, the cartridge case -was made of paper, the accuracy of the rifle did not extend beyond -300 yards, and its extreme range was scarcely more than twice that -distance. Yet this rifle was the best infantry weapon of the time, and -it contributed greatly to the success of the Prussians. The Prussian -artillery was armed mainly with steel breech-loading rifled guns. These -guns were classed as 6-pounders and 4-pounders, though the larger piece -fired a shell weighing 15 lbs., and the smaller one used a similar -projectile weighing 9 lbs.[1] Shell fire seems to have been exclusively -used, and the shells to have been uniformly provided with percussion -fuses. - -In the Austrian army the artillery was provided with bronze -muzzle-loading rifled guns, classified as 8-pdrs. and 4-pdrs. The -infantry was armed with the muzzle-loading Lorenz rifle. - -The German allies of Austria could place about 150,000 men in the -field; Italy, about 200,000. - - -THE GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION. - -The geographical situation was unfavorable to Prussia. The map of -Germany, as it existed before the Austro-Prussian war, shows Rhineland -and Westphalia completely separated from the other provinces of Prussia -by the hostile territory of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, which, extending -from the north, joined the South German States which were in arms -against the northern kingdom. The Austrian province of Bohemia, with -the adjacent kingdom of Saxony, formed a salient, pushing forward, -as it were, into the Prussian dominions, and furnishing a base from -which either Silesia or Lusatia might be invaded. In the language of -the Prussian Staff History of the Campaign of 1866: “In one direction -stood the Saxon army as a powerful advanced guard only six or seven -marches distant from the Prussian capital, which is protected from the -south by no considerable vantage ground; in the other Breslau could -the more easily be reached in five marches, because, trusting to a -former federal compact with Austria, Schweidnitz had been given up as -a fortress.” The forces of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, numbering 25,000 -men, could operate against the communications of the Prussian armies, -or withdraw to the south and unite with the Austrians or Bavarians. The -South German armies might form a junction in Saxony or Bohemia with the -Austro-Saxon army. - - -THE PLANS OF VON MOLTKE AND VON BENEDEK, AND THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE -OPPOSING ARMIES. - -The Prussian army was commanded by the King. His chief-of-staff was -Baron Hellmuth Von Moltke, a soldier of reputation in Prussia, but as -yet almost unknown beyond the boundaries of his own country. - -The object of Von Moltke was to protect the Prussian rear by defeating -the Hanoverian and Hessian troops; to prevent a junction of these -troops with their South German allies; to “contain” the latter with -as small a force as possible, and to hurl the crushing weight of the -Prussian forces upon the Austro-Saxon army. - -On the 14th of June the Prussian armies were stationed as follows: - -The “Army of the Elbe,” consisting of three divisions, two cavalry -brigades and 144 guns, in cantonments round Torgau, under command of -General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld; - -The “First Army,” consisting of three army corps, a cavalry corps of -six brigades, and 300 guns, near Görlitz, under command of Prince -Frederick Charles; - -The “Second Army,” consisting of four army corps, a cavalry division of -three brigades, and 336 guns, in the vicinity of Neisse, under command -of the Crown Prince. - -Besides the three main armies, there were other forces stationed as -follows: - -One division at Altona, in Holstein, under Von Manteuffel; - -One division at Minden, under Vogel Von Falckenstein; - -One division (made up principally of the Prussian garrisons withdrawn -from the Federal fortresses of Mayence, Rastadt and Frankfort) at -Wetzlar, under Von Beyer. - -The Austrian “Army of the North” was posted as follows: - -Ist Corps, at Prague, Teplitz, Theresienstadt and Josephstadt; - -IInd Corps, near Bömisch Trübau; - -IVth Corps, near Teschen; - -VIth Corps, at Olmütz; - -IIId Corps, at Brünn; - -Xth Corps at Brünn; - -VIIIth Corps, in the neighborhood of Austerlitz. - -To these corps were attached five divisions of cavalry and more than -750 guns. - -This army was under command of Field Marshal Von Benedek, an officer of -great experience and high reputation. - -The Saxon army, 25,000 strong, with fifty-eight guns, was at Dresden, -under command of the Crown Prince of Saxony. - -The Bavarian army was concentrating on the line of the Main between -Amberg and Würzburg. It numbered 52,000 men, and was under command of -Prince Charles of Bavaria. - -The VIIIth Federal Corps was forming at Frankfort. It consisted of the -contingents of Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau, and an -Austrian division drawn from the Federal fortresses. It numbered about -42,000 men, and was under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse. - -The Vth, VIIth and IXth Austrian corps, under the Archduke Albrecht, -were in Venetia, opposed to an Italian army of four corps. - -Von Benedek expected to assume the offensive and invade Prussia. He -had announced this intention before the beginning of hostilities, even -going so far as to prescribe rules for the behavior of his soldiers -while in the enemy’s country. It is hard to understand (in the light of -subsequent events) the slight esteem in which the Austrians held their -opponents before the commencement of hostilities. In a general order -issued to his army on June 17, 1866, the Austrian commander says: “We -are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the line -and partly of Landwehr. The first comprises young men not accustomed -to privations and fatigue, and who have never yet made an important -campaign; the latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, -which, rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their -government. In consequence of a long course of years of peace, the -enemy does not possess a single general who has had an opportunity of -learning his duties on the field of battle.” - -Von Benedek’s unfavorable opinion of his adversaries was probably -shared by many other prominent European soldiers; for the excellence of -the military system of Prussia was, as yet, not appreciated by other -nations. Absurd as Von Benedek’s order now appears, it seems to have -excited no unfavorable comment at the time of its appearance; and, in -fact, the expectation of Austrian success was quite general in Europe. - -On the 15th of June the Austrian outposts were notified of the -intention of the Prussians to begin hostilities, and war was formally -declared against Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Saxony. Within twenty-four -hours after the declaration of war, the invasion of each of these minor -states was begun. - - -OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HESSIANS AND HANOVERIANS.[2] - -Von Falckenstein from Minden, and Von Manteuffel from Altona, moved -upon Hanover, and Von Beyer invaded Hesse-Cassel from Wetzlar. On -the night of the 15th the Hanoverian army, accompanied by the blind -monarch, King George, retreated, chiefly by rail, to Göttingen; the -retreat being conducted in such haste that even the reserve ammunition -and hospital supplies were left behind. On the 17th Von Falckenstein -entered the Hanoverian capital; on the 19th Von Manteuffel marched into -the city; and by the 22d all Hanover, except Göttingen, was in the -possession of the Prussians. - -Von Beyer pushed into Hesse-Cassel, the Hessian army retiring before -him, by way of Fulda, upon Hanau, where it formed a junction with the -Federal forces. On the 19th the Prussians entered Cassel, and an army -was thus placed across the path of the retreating Hanoverians. - -The Hanoverian army, which had been compelled to wait several days -at Göttingen to complete its organization, resumed its march on the -21st, intending to cross a portion of the Prussian territory _via_ -Heiligenstadt and Langensalza, and thence through Eisenach or Gotha, to -form a junction with the Bavarians in the neighborhood of Fulda. Von -Falckenstein pursued from Hanover, detachments were sent from Magdeburg -and Erfurt to Bleicherode and Eisenach, and Von Beyer occupied the -line of the Werra between Allendorf and Eisenach. Though the route -through Eisenach was thus blocked, energetic measures on the part of -the allies might easily have extricated the Hanoverian army from the -constricting grasp of the Prussians. Gotha was occupied by a weak -force of six battalions, two squadrons and three batteries, while -the retreating army numbered 20,500 men. Had the Bavarian army been -well prepared and ably led, a junction might have been formed with -the Hanoverians, and the Prussian force at Gotha captured. But the -Bavarian commander was inefficient, and the over-estimate placed by -King George upon the number of his enemies at Gotha was strengthened -by the receipt, from the commander of the petty force, of an audacious -summons to surrender. Negotiations were entered upon by the Prussian -and Hanoverian representatives; but the armistice (begun on the 24th -and continued until the 26th) produced no other result than the -reinforcement of the force at Gotha; General Von Flies, with five -battalions, being detached from Von Falckenstein’s army, and sent by -rail, _via_ Magdeburg and Halle, to Gotha. - -At Treffurt, Kreutzberg, Eisenach and Gotha, points on a semi-circle in -front of the Hanoverians, and within a day’s march of them, were nearly -30,000 Prussians. - -On the 27th General Von Flies, advancing through Warza upon -Langensalza, with about 9,000 men, struck the army of King George, -which was well posted on the left bank of the Unstrut river. A battle -followed, in which the Hanoverians defeated Von Flies, and drove his -army several miles towards Warza. - -But the Hanoverian victory was a barren one. Von Flies was reinforced -at Warza by a strong detachment from Von Goeben’s division at Eisenach. -Von Goeben and Von Beyer advanced from Eisenach upon Langensalza, -and Von Manteuffel, moving _via_ Heiligenstadt, Worbis, Dingelstadt, -Mühlhausen and Gross Gottern, closed upon the Hanoverians from the -north. The army of King George was now surrounded by 40,000 Prussians, -united under the command of Von Falckenstein. Further resistance was -hopeless, and on the 29th of June the Hanoverians surrendered. The men -were dismissed to their homes, the officers were paroled, and King -George was banished from his kingdom. - - -THE INVASION OF SAXONY, AND ITS RESULTS. - -In the meantime the main armies had not been idle. The invasion of -Saxony was begun on the 16th of June by the Army of the Elbe and the -First Army. On the night of the 15th of June the Saxon army began its -retreat to Bohemia, detachments of pioneers tearing up the railroad -track between Rieza and Dresden, and between the latter city and -Bautzen. The work of destruction, except the burning of the bridge at -Rieza, was hurriedly and imperfectly done, and did not appreciably -delay the Prussian advance. The Army of the Elbe advanced from Torgau, -_via_ Wurzen, Dahlen and Strehla; a division to each road, and a -detachment from the right division moving _via_ Ostrau and Dobeln to -cover the right flank. The First Army advanced from the neighborhood -of Görlitz, through Löbau and Bautzen, a strong detachment being sent -out on the Zittau road, beyond Ostritz, to observe the passes of -Reichenberg and Gabel, for the army was making a flank march, and the -Austrians might attack through these passes. A cavalry detachment was -pushed out through Bischofswerda to feel the left of the Army of the -Elbe. - -On the 18th of June the Army of the Elbe occupied Dresden, and pushed -its outposts beyond the city as far as Lockwitz and Pillnitz. On -the following day the junction of the two armies was perfected. The -1st Reserve Division was sent from Berlin to reinforce Herwarth Von -Bittenfeld, and the combined forces of the Army of the Elbe and the -First Army were placed under the command of Prince Frederick Charles. -To guard against a possible invasion of Saxony by the Bavarians, -measures were at once taken to fortify Dresden, which was occupied -by the 2nd Reserve Division from Berlin; Leipsic and Chemnitz were -occupied by Landwehr; and the Leipsic-Plauen railway beyond Werdau was -destroyed. - -On the 17th of June the Emperor of Austria issued a manifesto, in which -he formally announced to his subjects the state of war existing between -Austria and Prussia. Italy declared war against Austria three days -later. - -We can now see the immense results following from the thorough military -preparation of Prussia. Launching, as it were, a thunderbolt of -military force upon her enemies at the first moment of war, less than -two weeks sufficed for the complete conquest of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel -and Saxony. Indeed, four days had sufficed for the seizure of the -last two. The King of Hanover had been dethroned; the Elector of -Hesse-Cassel was a prisoner, and the King of Saxony was a fugitive with -his army in Bohemia. The military results were even greater than the -political consequences. The severed portions of the Prussian kingdom -were united. The Hanoverian army had been eliminated from the military -problem, and there was no longer any menace to Prussia from the rear. -Von Falckenstein was now free to turn his undivided attention to the -Bavarians and the Federal Corps, and the occupation of Saxony prevented -all possibility of a junction of the Bavarian and Saxon armies. But the -strategical advantages gained in regard to operations in Bohemia were -the grandest result of the occupation of Saxony. - -We have seen that on the 14th of June the Army of the Elbe was -around Torgau, the First Army near Görlitz; and the Second Army in -the vicinity of Neisse; being thus separated from each other by from -100 to 125 miles. The Second Army covered Breslau, the Army of the -Elbe covered Berlin, and the First Army was in a position to support -either of the others. Geographical circumstances thus compelled the -separation of the Prussian armies, and only two of them were available -for the invasion of Bohemia. The occupation of Saxony changed matters -for the better. The distance between the Army of the Elbe and the First -Army was reduced to the extent of actual junction, and these combined -armies were only about 120 miles from Landshut, where the right of the -Second Army now rested, and with which there was communication by means -of the hill road of Schreiberschau. The entire force was now available -for the invasion of Bohemia; the northern passes of the Bohemian -frontier were secured; and if compelled to act upon the defensive, -Frederick Charles could find in the mountains of Southern Saxony many -advantageous positions for defensive battle. - -The Prussian plan of operations required an advance of Frederick -Charles’ armies from Saxony into Bohemia, and an invasion of that -province by the Second Army, advancing from Silesia; both armies -to unite at Gitschin, or in its vicinity. It is clear that in thus -advancing from divergent bases, the Prussians gave to their adversary -the advantage of operating by interior lines; generally a serious -military error, as the general operating by interior lines, holding -one of the opponent’s armies by a containing force, and falling with -superior numbers upon the other, may defeat both in succession. Von -Moltke’s plan was, however, sound and proper, for the following reasons: - -1. The geographical configuration of the Prussian frontier compelled -the separation of the Prussian armies, in order that Lusatia and -Silesia might both be protected from Austrian invasion; and the -only possible concentration that would not yield to the enemy the -advantage of the initiative, and permit him to invade Prussia, was a -concentration to the front, in the hostile territory. - -2. The entire army “could not have advanced in effective order by one -set of mountain roads, but would have extended in columns so lengthened -that it would have been impossible to form to a front commensurate -with its numbers.” - -3. The re-entering base of the Prussians would enable each of their -armies to cover its communications with its base, while one of these -armies would surely menace the communications of the Austrians, if Von -Benedek should advance against either. - -4. The certainty that the Prussian armies could act with celerity, and -the probability that the Austrian army was not yet fully prepared for -prompt offensive maneuvers, justified the hope that the concentration -might be effected at a point some distance in front of the enemy’s -line. The distance from Görlitz and Neisse to Gitschin was less than -the distance from Olmütz, Brünn and Bömisch Trübau to the same point, -and there was an excellent prospect of being able to concentrate before -Von Benedek could get his army well in hand to strike the Prussian -armies separately. - -5. By keeping up telegraphic communication between the two separated -armies, their co-operation and simultaneous action could be assured. - -6. If the Prussians could reach the Iser and the Elbe without serious -check, the contracted theatre of operations would render Von Benedek’s -interior position one of danger, rather than one of advantage. Von -Moltke himself, in commenting upon his strategical combination, says: -“If it is advantageous for a general to place his army on an interior -line of operation, it is necessary, in order that he may profit by -it, to have sufficient space to enable him to move against one of -his adversaries at a distance of several days’ march, and to have -time enough then to return against the other. If this space is very -contracted, he will run the risk of having both adversaries on his -hands at once. When an army, on the field of battle, is attacked in -front and on the flank, it avails nothing that it is on an interior -line of operations. That which was a strategical advantage becomes a -tactical disadvantage. If the Prussians were allowed to advance to the -Iser and to the Elbe, if the several defiles which it was necessary to -pass fell into their power, it is evident that it would be extremely -perilous to advance between their two armies. In attacking one, the -risk would be incurred of being attacked in rear by the other.” The -combination, on the field of battle, of the two armies operating from -divergent bases, would admit of just such a front and flank attack -as would convert Von Benedek’s strategical advantage into a serious -tactical disadvantage. It would be a repetition of Waterloo. - -7. A failure to unite before encountering the main force of the enemy, -though unfortunate, would not necessarily have been disastrous. -According to Jomini, the advantages of an interior position diminish as -the armies operating increase in size; for the following reasons: - -(a). “Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary -to bring a very large force into action on the day of the battle, an -army of 130,000 or 140,000 men may easily resist a much larger force. - -(b). “If driven from the field, there will be at least 100,000 men to -protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one of -the other armies. - -(c). “The central army ... requires such a quantity of provisions, -munitions, horses and _materiel_ of every kind, that it will possess -less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of -the zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining -provisions from a region too restricted to support such numbers. - -(d). “The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold -in check two armies of 135,000 men each must be very strong (from -80,000 to 90,000 each); and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn -into a serious engagement, they will probably suffer reverses, the -effect of which might outweigh the advantages gained by the principal -army.” - -Finally, the increased defensive power given to infantry by the -introduction of breech-loading rifles might be counted upon to increase -greatly the probability of either of the Prussian armies being able to -fight successfully a _purely defensive_ battle against the entire army -of Von Benedek, armed, as it was, with muzzle-loaders. - -In view of these reasons, Von Moltke’s strategy was not only -justifiable, but perfect. The Prussian objective was the Austrian army, -wherever it might be. - -Before the commencement of hostilities Von Benedek had, as we have -seen, announced his intention of invading Prussia. Two routes offered -themselves to his choice: one by way of Görlitz and Bautzen to Berlin; -the other by way of the valley of the Oder into Silesia. The latter -route was obstructed by the fortresses of Glatz, Neisse and Kosel; -the former would have led to the unobstructed occupation of Saxony, -and would have enabled the Bavarian army to concentrate, _via_ the -passes of the Saale and Wittenberg, with the Austrians and Saxons. -But, at a time when minutes were worth millions, Von Benedek was slow; -and the preparation and energy of the Prussians enabled them to take -the initiative and throw the Austrians upon the defensive in Bohemia. -Von Benedek then decided to concentrate his army in the vicinity of -Josephstadt and Königinhof; to hold the strong defiles of the Iser or -the Elbe with comparatively weak detachments, and throw his main army -upon the Crown Prince or Frederick Charles, as circumstances might -decide. - -Von Benedek’s concentration began on the 18th of June; and on the 25th -his army stood as follows: - -The Ist Corps, with one brigade of the IIIrd Corps and a cavalry -division, on the left bank of the Iser, from Turnau, through -Müchengrätz to Jung Buntzlau, where the retreating Saxons formed on the -left. - -The Xth Corps, with one cavalry division, at Jaromir. - -The IVth Corps at Opocno. - -The VIth Corps at Solnitz. - -The IIIrd Corps on the left of the VIth, at Tynist. - -The VIIIth Corps at Wamberg. - -The IId Corps at Geyersberg. - -Four cavalry divisions were at Gabel, Leitomischel, Abtsdorf and -Policzka, respectively. - -The force on the Iser, under Count Clam-Gallas, was thus opposed to -the entire army of Frederick Charles; while Von Benedek confronted -the Crown Prince with six corps. The Austrian line extended beyond -Gitschin, the point at which the Prussian armies were to concentrate. - - -THE INVASION OF BOHEMIA. - -It was now certain that Bohemia was to be the theater of war. This -province of the Austrian Empire may be described as a huge basin, -whose rim is composed of mountains. It is separated from Silesia by -the Riesengebirge (Giant Mountains), from Saxony by the Erzgebirge -(Iron Mountains), from Moravia by the Moravian Hills, and from Bavaria -by the Fichtelgebirge and the Böhmerwald; the Moravian Hills and the -Böhmerwald separating it from the valley of the Danube. This great -basin is drained by the Elbe river, which, rising in the Riesengebirge, -makes a huge loop, flowing first south, then west, and finally north, -and receives the waters of the Iser, Adler, Moldau and Eger rivers -before it issues forth from the Bohemian frontier into Saxony. This -theater is well suited to defensive operations, as the mountain -frontiers are penetrated by few passes, and the forests and rivers -constitute additional obstacles. On the Silesian frontier the only -issues by which an invader can enter Bohemia are the passes of -Trautenau, Eypel, Kosteletz, Nachod and Neustadt. These passes could -all be easily defended, while on the Saxon frontier the passes of -Reichenberg, Gabel and Königstein-Tetschen could be used by retarding -forces, which could afterwards find a strong defensive line on the Iser. - -[Illustration: No. 2. 1st. ARMY ON 22ND., 23RD. & 24TH. JUNE.] - -Two railway lines lay in the theater of war, and were of great -importance to the contending armies. One line ran from Vienna, _via_ -Kosel, Breslau and Görlitz, to Dresden. The other connected the -Austrian capital with Prague, _via_ Olmütz (or Brünn) and Bömisch -Trübau. The two lines were joined by a railway from Dresden to Prague, -and by one which, running from Löbau to Turnau, branched from the -latter point to Prague and Pardubitz. These railways connected with -others leading to all the important cities of Prussia. The two Prussian -armies could cover their railway communications while advancing; but -the Prague-Olmütz line, which was of vital importance to the Austrian -army, ran parallel to, and dangerously near, the Silesian frontier, and -was not covered by the Austrian front during the operations in Bohemia. - -The Prussian advance began on the 20th of June. The Army of the -Elbe marched from the vicinity of Dresden, _via_ Stolpen, Neustadt, -Schluckenau and Rumburg, to Gabel. As the greater part of this march -had to be made by one road, it required six days, though the distance -was only 65 miles. The First Army had concentrated at Zittau, Herrnhut, -Hirschfelde, Seidenberg and Marklissa. From these points it began its -march on the 22d of June, each division marching by a separate road; -and on the 25th it was closely concentrated around Reichenberg. The -entire Prussian front was now reduced to about 100 miles, and Herwarth -Von Bittenfeld was only twelve miles from Frederick Charles. - -It would have been dangerous in the extreme for the Crown Prince to -begin his march while Von Benedek held six corps in hand to hurl -upon him. The passage of the Second Army through the defiles depended -on surprise; and in the face of a superior and concentrated army, it -would have been a desperate undertaking. It was necessary, therefore, -to distract the plans of the enemy by false maneuvers, and to wait for -Frederick Charles to menace the Austrian left, on the Iser, before -beginning the forward movement with the Second Army. With these objects -in view, the VIth Corps was ordered to push forward towards Olmütz, -and Frederick Charles received the following instructions from Von -Moltke: “Since the difficult task of debouching from the mountains -falls upon the Second, weaker, Army, so, as soon as the junction -with Herwarth’s corps is effected, the First Army must, by its rapid -advance, shorten the crisis.” The VIth Corps moved from Neisse into -the Austrian dominions as far as Freiwaldau, where its advanced-guard -had a successful skirmish with a party of Austrian cavalry. This corps -was supposed by the Austrians to be the advanced-guard of the Crown -Prince’s army marching upon Olmütz; and the demonstration had the -effect of holding a large force of Austrians between Hohenmauth and -Bömisch Trübau, where it could not be used to oppose the real advance -of the Second Army. - -The Crown Prince’s army was to move as follows: - -The Ist Corps[3] _via_ Liebau and Trautenau, to Arnau; - -The Guards, _via_ Neurode, Braunau, Eypel, to Königinhof; - -The Vth Corps, _via_ Glatz, Reinerz, Nachod, to Gradlitz; - -The cavalry, from Waldenburg, _via_ Trautenau, to Königinhof. - -[Illustration: No. 1. PROPOSED ADVANCE OF 2ND. ARMY FROM 25TH. TO 28TH. - JUNE.] - -[Illustration: No. 3. POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE - 25TH. JUNE.] - -The VIth Corps, having made the diversion to Freiwaldau, was withdrawn -to Glatz and Patschkau, from which points it was to follow the Vth. -A corps of observation, consisting of two regiments of infantry, one -of cavalry, and a light battery, was detached at Ratibor to make -demonstrations against Austrian Silesia. In case this detachment -should encounter a large force of the enemy, it was to fall back upon -the fortress of Kosel. During the campaign an unimportant war of -detachments was carried on in this region, generally to the advantage -of the Prussians. - - -JUNE 26TH. - -On the 26th of June the Army of the Elbe marched upon Niemes and -Oschitz. The advanced-guard encountered an Austrian outpost near -Hühnerwasser, and drove it back after a sharp skirmish. The main body -of the Army of the Elbe bivouacked at Hühnerwasser, with outposts -towards Weisswasser, Münchengrätz and Gablonz. In the evening there was -another brisk outpost fight in the direction of Münchengrätz, in which -the Austrians were again worsted. - -In the First Army the advance on this day was begun by General Von -Horn, whose division had held the outposts the night before. At -Liebenau Von Horn struck the Austrians, whose force consisted of a -small body of infantry, four regiments of cavalry and two batteries of -horse artillery. Driven out of the village, and from the field where -they next made a stand, the Austrians retreated across the Iser, _via_ -Turnau, to Podol. The First Army now occupied a position extending -through Reichenberg, Gablonz, Liebenau and Turnau; Von Horn’s division -extending down the Iser from Turnau, with outposts near Podol. Free -communication--in fact a junction--was now established with the Army of -the Elbe, one division of which occupied Bömisch Aicha. - -An attempt made by a company of Prussian riflemen to seize the bridges -at Podol, about dusk in the evening, brought on a sharp fight. The -forces on each side were reinforced until parts of two Prussian and two -Austrian brigades were engaged. A stubborn infantry battle was carried -on by moonlight until 1 o’clock in the morning, when the Austrians -retreated towards Münchengrätz. By this victory the Prussians secured -the passage of the Iser at Podol; the shortest line to Gitschin was -opened to them; the communications of Count Clam-Gallas with the main -army were threatened; and a plan which he had formed to _riposte_ upon -the Prussians at Turnau was thwarted. - -We will now turn to the Second Army. On this day the Ist Corps -concentrated at Liebau and Schomberg, ready to cross the frontier. -The Vth Corps was at Reinerz, about twenty miles from the Ist. -The Guard Corps, which had just crossed the frontier, in front of -Neurode, midway between the two corps, was in a position to support -either. The VIth Corps was at Landeck and Glatz, part of its cavalry -being sent forward to cover the left of the Vth Corps and maintain -communication between the two. After passing the mountains, the entire -army, pivoted on Nachod and Skalitz, was to wheel to the left, seize -the Josephstadt-Turnau railway, and form a junction along that line -with the armies of Frederick Charles. On the evening of the 26th, the -advanced-guard of the Vth Corps occupied Nachod. The distance between -the Crown Prince and Frederick Charles had now been reduced to about -fifty miles, while the distance between the extreme corps of the -Austrian army was about the same. Von Benedek’s strategical advantages -were already beginning to disappear. The Prussian demonstrations -towards Olmütz had caused the Austrian IId Corps to be retained -dangerously far to the right; Count Clam-Gallas was struggling against -superior numbers on the Iser, and Von Benedek had only four corps with -which he could immediately oppose the four corps of the Crown Prince. - -[Illustration: No. 4. POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE - 26TH. JUNE.] - -The Austrian commander ordered the following movements for the next -day: - -The Xth Corps, from Josephstadt and Schurz, upon Trautenau; - -The VIth Corps, from Opocno to Skalitz; - -The IVth Corps, from Lanzow to Jaromir; - -The VIIIth Corps, from Tynist to beyond Jaromir, to support the VIth; - -The IIId Corps, from Königgrätz to Miletin; - -The IId Corps, from Senftenberg to Solnitz; - -The Reserve Cavalry, from Hohenmauth and Wildenschwerdt to Hohenbrück; - -The Light Cavalry to accompany the IId Corps. - - -JUNE 27TH. - -On the 27th of June the Crown Prince pushed forward the Ist Corps -against Trautenau, and the main body of the Vth Corps upon Nachod. One -division of the Guard supported each corps. - -The Ist Corps, under Von Bonin, marched in two columns from Liebau and -Schomberg, and was to concentrate at Parschnitz, about two miles east -of Trautenau, where it was to rest two hours before moving upon the -latter place. - -Contrary to expectation, the left column arrived first at Parschnitz, -the right (with the advanced-guard) being delayed by bad roads. -Trautenau was as yet unoccupied by the Austrians; but instead of -seizing the town and the heights which overlooked it, on the farther -bank of the Aupa river, Von Clausewitz (commanding the left column) -obeyed the strict letter of his orders, and waited at Parschnitz two -hours, from 8 to 10 A. M., until the advanced guard of the right column -arrived. - -While Von Clausewitz was thus idly waiting, Mondl’s brigade of the -Xth Austrian Corps arrived, and took up a strong position in the town -and on the heights which commanded it. A stubborn fight took place -before the Austrians could be dislodged; and Mondl fell back in good -order upon the main body of the Xth Corps, which was hurrying towards -Trautenau. Believing himself in complete possession of the field, Von -Bonin, at 1 o’clock, declined the assistance of the 1st Division of -Guards, which had hurried up to Parschnitz, and the division, after a -halt of two hours, marched off to the left, towards Eypel. About half -past 3 o’clock the entire Xth Corps, under Von Gablentz, arrived on -the field, and made a vigorous attack upon the Prussians. Von Bonin’s -left wing was turned; and, after fighting six hours, the Prussians were -driven from the field, and retreated to the positions from which they -had begun their march in the morning. - -The Prussian defeat was due to two causes: - -1. The delay of Von Clausewitz at Parschnitz, when common sense should -have prompted him to exceed his orders, and seize the unoccupied town -and heights of Trautenau. For two hours these positions were completely -undefended by the Austrians, and could have been occupied by Von -Clausewitz without firing a shot.[4] - -2. The fatuity of Von Bonin in declining the assistance of the Guards. -Von Bonin knew that Mondl had not been routed, that he had fallen -back “slowly and fighting,” and he did not know what other force -might be in his immediate front. He had no reason to expect that he -would be allowed to pass through the defile without the most stubborn -opposition. He knew that he had been opposed by a single brigade, -and the plucky resistance of that small force should have made him -suspicious that it had stronger forces at its back. His orders were -to push on to Arnau, some twelve miles from Trautenau, and to carry -out these orders it was necessary to sweep aside the opposition in -his front. His declension of assistance when the firing had scarcely -ceased, and when the aid of the Guards would have enabled him to -clinch his success, was inexcusable. Like Beauregard at Shiloh, Von -Bonin seems to have labored under the delusion that a victory could -be sufficiently complete while the enemy’s army still remained in his -front.[5] - -The Austrians had certainly gained a brilliant victory. With a force -of 33,600 men, they had defeated 35,000 Prussians, armed, too, with -breech-loaders, while the victors had only muzzle-loading rifles. -The loss of the Prussians was 56 officers and 1,282 men, while the -Austrians lost 196 officers and more than 5,000 men. This disparity of -loss illustrates the difference in the power of the old and the new -rifles; it also speaks volumes for the pluck of the Austrian soldiers. - -But the Austrian victory was doomed to be as fruitless as it was -costly; for Prussian skill and valor on other fields obliterated all -that was gained by Von Gablentz in the bloody combat of Trautenau. - -The march of the Vth Corps, under Von Steinmetz, lay through the defile -of Nachod, five miles in length, in which the entire corps was obliged -to march in a single column. The advanced-guard, which had seized -Nachod the night before, pushed forward rapidly, beyond the outlet -of the defile, to the junction of the roads leading to Skalitz and -Neustadt, where it received orders to halt, and thus cover the issue of -the main body through the defile. While the advanced-guard was making -preparations for bivouacking, its commander, General Von Loewenfeldt, -received news of the approach of the Austrian VIth Corps, which, as we -have seen, had been ordered upon Nachod. Hastily forming for action, -the Prussian advanced guard received the attack of a brigade, which was -reinforced until nearly the whole Austrian corps was engaged. It was a -desperate struggle of six and one-half battalions, five squadrons and -twelve guns, against twenty-one battalions, eighty guns and a greatly -superior force of cavalry. For three hours the advanced-guard sustained -the unequal conflict, with no other reinforcement than Wnuck’s cavalry -brigade. The Prussian force, in one line 3,000 paces long, without -reserves, was sorely pressed, until the main body began to issue from -the defile and deploy upon the field. The entire Austrian corps was now -engaged. Finally, after a successful charge of Wnuck’s cavalry brigade -upon the Austrian cuirassiers, and the repulse of a heavy infantry -attack, Von Steinmetz assumed the offensive, and the Austrians, -defeated with great loss, retreated to Skalitz. In the latter part of -this action the Prussians were under the immediate command of the Crown -Prince. The Prussian loss was 1,122, killed and wounded; the Austrians -lost 7,510, of which number about 2,500 were prisoners. - -[Illustration: No. 5. POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE - 27TH. JUNE.] - -The 1st Division of the Guards halted this night at Eypel; the 2d -Division at Kosteletz. - -This day, which had seen two bloody actions fought by the Second Army, -was one of inaction on the part of the armies of Frederick Charles. The -day was consumed in constructing bridges across the Iser, at Turnau and -Podol, and in concentrating the main body of the army on the plateau -of Sichrow, preparatory to an attack upon the Austrian position at -Münchengrätz. - - -JUNE 28TH. - -The First Army and the Army of the Elbe made a combined attack upon -Count Clam-Gallas at Münchengrätz, the Austrians being assailed in -front and on both flanks. The Austrian commander had begun his retreat -before the Prussian attack commenced; and after a brief resistance, -he fell back upon Gitschin, with a loss of about 2,000 men, killed, -wounded and prisoners. The Prussian loss was only 341. The armies of -Frederick Charles were now completely united. One division was pushed -forward to Rowensko, and the remaining eight, numbering, with the -cavalry, upwards of 100,000 men, were concentrated upon an area of -about twenty square miles. Some distress began to be felt because of -the short supply of food and the difficulty of getting water; for only -part of the provision trains had come up, and the Austrian inhabitants, -when they abandoned their homes, had filled up the wells. Two roads led -east from the Prussian position; one _via_ Podkost, and the other _via_ -Fürstenbrück, but both united at Sobotka. The Austrian rear guard was -driven from Podkost during the night, and both roads were open for the -Prussian advance on the following morning. - -Frederick Charles has been severely (and it would seem justly) -criticised for his inaction on the 27th of June. His explicit -instructions from Von Moltke should have been enough to cause him to -hasten forward, and so threaten the Austrian left as to relieve the -pressure on the Crown Prince. And there was another reason for prompt -action. As already mentioned, the victory of Podol had opened to -Frederick Charles the shortest line to Gitschin, from which place he -was now distant only fifteen miles, while Clam-Gallas, at Münchengrätz, -was twenty miles away from the same point. The town of Gitschin, like -Ivrea in 1800, or Sombref and Quatre-Bras in 1815, had accidentally -become a strategic point of the first importance by reason of the -relative positions of the opposing armies and the direction of the -roads necessary for the concentration of each. All the roads leading -from the Iser, from Turnau to Jung Bunzlau, center at Gitschin, -whence other roads branch out to Neu Bidsow, Königgrätz, Josephstadt, -Königinhof, and other important points. The possession of Gitschin by -either army would seriously delay, and perhaps eventually prevent, the -concentration of the other. A prompt movement to Gitschin by Frederick -Charles would have cut off Clam-Gallas, who could then have effected -a junction with Von Benedek only by a circuitous march of such length -as to make it probable that his two corps would have been eliminated -altogether from the problem solved on the field of Königgrätz. As the -Austro-Saxons at Münchengrätz, covering the roads to Prague, could -have protected their communications with that city, while menacing the -communications of the Prussians with their base, it was, doubtless, -necessary to dislodge them from that position; but Frederick Charles -might have promptly pushed to Gitschin a force sufficient to seize and -hold the place, and still have kept in hand enough troops to defeat -Clam-Gallas so heavily as to drive him back in complete rout; for -Frederick Charles’ force numbered, at this time, nearly 140,000 men, -while Clam-Gallas had not more than 60,000. - -This movement would not have really divided Frederick Charles’ army, -for the force at Gitschin and the one attacking at Münchengrätz would -have been practically within supporting distance, and in direct and -unimpeded communication with each other. Moreover, the nearest troops -available to oppose such a force thrust forward to Gitschin would have -been the single Austrian Corps (the IIId) which was at Miletin, quite -as far from Gitschin as the main body of Frederick Charles’ army would -have been. Frederick Charles’ entire army could have been at Gitschin -quite as soon as Von Benedek could have sent thither any force large -enough to offer respectable opposition; and the necessity of hurrying -troops to that point would have caused the Austrian commander to -relax materially the pressure upon the Crown Prince; a pressure which -Frederick Charles had every reason to believe greater than it really -was. Hozier states that the Prussian commander had formed a plan to -capture the entire army of Clam-Gallas; but Adams truly remarks that -the destruction of the Austro-Saxons at Münchengrätz would not have -compensated for a severe defeat of the Crown Prince. Moreover, as we -have seen, Clam-Gallas was not captured but fell back upon Gitschin, -whence he was able to form a junction with the main army. Had Frederick -Charles pushed a force to Gitschin, and with the rest of his army dealt -Clam-Gallas such a blow as to send him reeling back towards Prague, the -Prussian general would have reaped the double advantage of interposing -between the divided forces of the enemy, and facilitating his own -junction with the Crown Prince. Adams correctly says of Frederick -Charles: “The fault attributable to the Prince is, that with a -superiority of force at his command, which gave him unbounded advantage -over his enemy, he refused to incur risks which that fact reduced to a -minimum, in the general interests of the campaign.”[6] - -To return to the Second Army: - -The Crown Prince received information, at 1 o’clock in the morning, of -the defeat of the Ist Corps at Trautenau. - -The 1st Division of the Guards was at once ordered to move against -Von Gablentz from Eypel, and the 2d Division (which had been intended -to support the Vth Corps) was ordered from Kosteletz to support the -1st Division. The movement was begun at 4 A. M. Anticipating the -attack, Von Gablentz took up a position facing east, with his left in -Trautenau and his right at Prausnitz, about five miles south of the -former village. A brigade of the Austrian IVth Corps, ordered to his -assistance from Jaromir, mistook the route, and did not arrive in time -to participate in the action. - -The Prussian attack was begun by the 1st Division of the Guards at -9:30 A. M. The Austrian center and right were forced back upon Soor -and Altenbach. The brigade on the Austrian left was contained by two -Prussian battalions until the arrival of the 2d Division, at 12:30 P. -M., when it was driven back upon Trautenau, and the greater part of it -captured. The main body of the Austrians was driven from the field, -and retreated upon Neustadt and Neuschloss. The Prussian loss was -713, killed and wounded; the Austrian loss 3,674, killed, wounded and -prisoners. - -[Illustration: No. 6. POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE - 28TH. JUNE.] - -While the Guards were thus engaged in repairing the defeat of the -Ist Corps, the Vth Corps was battling with the Austrians at Skalitz. -Baron Ramming, commanding the Austrian VIth Corps, having called for -reinforcements, Von Benedek ordered the VIIIth Corps to Dolan, about -four miles wrest of Skalitz, and gave the command of both corps to the -Archduke Leopold. Early on the morning of the 28th the VIIIth Corps -relieved the VIth in its position on the east bank of the Aupa, in -front of Skalitz, and the latter took up a position as a reserve in -rear of the right wing. The IVth Corps was stationed at Dolan. On the -Prussian side, Von Steinmetz had been reinforced by a brigade of the -VIth Corps. The Austrians had begun a retrograde movement before the -Prussian attack commenced; and the corps of Baron Ramming was already -too far to the rear to give efficient support to the VIIIth Corps. -After a severe action, the Austrians were driven from their position, -and retreated upon Lanzow and Salney; the IVth Corps, as a rear guard, -holding Dolan. The Prussian loss in the battle of Skalitz was 1,365 -killed, wounded and missing; the Austrians lost nearly 6,000 men, of -whom 2,500 were prisoners. - -The battles of Soor and Skalitz opened the passes of Trautenau and -Nachod to the unimpeded advance of the Ist and VIth Corps. During these -battles the Crown Prince was stationed at Kosteletz, from which point -he might easily reach either battle field, if his presence should -become necessary. In the night he went to Trautenau. - -The distance between the advanced guard of Frederick Charles, at Ztowa, -and that of the Crown Prince, at Burkersdorf (near Soor), was only -twenty-seven miles. - - -JUNE 29TH. - -Intelligence received at the Prussian headquarters of the battles in -which the armies had been engaged, rendered it certain that of the -seven Austrian army corps, the IVth, VIth, VIIIth and Xth were opposed -to the Crown Prince, and that only the Ist Corps and the Saxons were -arrayed against Frederick Charles. The position of the IIId Corps was -unknown; but it was clear that it was the only one that could come to -the assistance of Count Clam-Gallas, as the IId Corps was known to be -far to the rear. The necessity of relieving the Crown Prince from the -overwhelming numbers of Von Benedek,[7] and the prospect of being able -to deliver a crushing blow upon the inferior force in his front, alike -rendered it of the utmost importance that Frederick Charles should move -promptly upon Gitschin. Apparently impatient at the Prince’s delay, -Von Moltke reiterated the instructions already given him, saying, -in a telegram from Berlin on June 29th: “His Majesty expects that a -speedy advance of the First Army will disengage the Second Army, which, -notwithstanding a series of successful actions, is still momentarily in -a precarious situation.” - -Frederick Charles, who had already decided to advance without further -delay, at once moved as follows: - -The Left, from Turnau, _via_ Rowensko; - -The Center, from Podol, _via_ Sabotka; - -The Right, from Münchengrätz, _via_ Ober Bautzen and Sabotka; - -The Army of the Elbe, from Münchengrätz, _via_ Unter Bautzen and Libau. - -The advance of the army was rendered difficult by the small number -of roads available. The leading divisions were started as early as -possible, to make a long march, in order that the other divisions might -march in the evening on the same roads. It was, even then, necessary -for the Army of the Elbe to make a long detour. - -Count Clam-Gallas, having been promised the assistance of the IIId -Corps, resolved to make a stand near Gitschin. His position was on a -range of hills west and north of that village, his right resting upon -the village of Eisenstadt, his left on the Anna Berg, near Lochow. In -front of the center were the rocky heights of Prywicin, which, being -almost impassable for ordinary pedestrians, would isolate the attacks -of the enemy, while, terminating in front of the Austrian position, -they could not interfere with the free movements of the troops on the -defensive. In front of the hills were ravines, gullies and broken -ground. The position was thus very strong for an army whose _rôle_ was -a purely defensive one. - -Von Tümpling’s division, (5th) leaving Rowensko at 1:30 P. M., came in -contact with the enemy shortly after 3 o’clock. Von Werder’s division -(3d) left Zehrow at noon; but, having a greater distance to march, did -not strike the enemy until 5:30. Von Tümpling immediately attacked -the Austrian right, with a view to cutting off Count Clam-Gallas from -the main army of Von Benedek. The action continued, with varying -fortune, until 7:30, when, Von Tümpling having carried the village of -Dielitz, in the center of the Austrian right wing, Von Werder having -gained ground on the left, and Von Benedek having sent word that the -assistance of the IIId Corps could not be given, Count Clam-Gallas -ordered a retreat. The Austrians retired in good order upon Gitschin; -the retreat of the right wing being covered by an attack of a brigade -upon the Prussians at Dielitz; that of the left by an attack of a -regiment of infantry and a battalion of rifles. Both attacks were -repulsed with heavy loss. Following the enemy, the Prussians, after -a sharp fight with the Austrian rear guard in the streets, occupied -Gitschin after midnight. The Prussian loss was 2,612 killed, wounded -and missing; the Austrians lost about 7,000 men, of whom 4,000 were -prisoners. Count Clam-Gallas reported to Von Benedek that he had been -defeated, that he was no longer able to oppose Frederick Charles, and -that he was retreating upon Königgrätz. - -Von Benedek now determined to throw his main force on Frederick -Charles, leaving a containing force to oppose the Crown Prince. But -with this object in view, his dispositions were faulty. Strangely -ignoring the results of the battles of Nachod, Soor and Skalitz, he -seems to have thought that one corps would suffice to hold the Crown -Prince in check; and on the morning of the 29th he issued orders for -the advance of the IIId Corps to Gitschin and the Reserve Cavalry to -Horzitz. The IId, VIth, VIIIth and Xth were to follow on the next day -in the direction of Lomnitz and Turnau. But during the day events -occurred which necessitated a complete change of plan. - -In the Second Army the Ist Corps marched _via_ Trautenau to Pilnikau, -and the cavalry division following it halted at Kaile, where the Crown -Prince established his headquarters. - -The Guards advanced upon Königinhof, from which place they drove out a -brigade of the Austrian IVth Corps, capturing about 400 prisoners. - -The Vth Corps (with one brigade of the VIth) marching upon Gradlitz, -encountered the other brigades of the Austrian IVth Corps at -Schweinschädel, and after an action of three hours, drove them from the -field with a loss of nearly 5,000 men, killed, wounded and prisoners. -The Austrians retreated to Salney. The Crown Prince had now reached the -Elbe. - -During the day Von Benedek, becoming alarmed at the progress of the -Second Army, countermanded the order for the IIId Corps to move upon -Gitschin, and directed it to remain at Miletin. The Ist Corps and the -Saxons were ordered to join the main army _via_ Horzitz and Miletin; -but the orders, as we have seen, came too late to save them from their -defeat at Gitschin. The rest of the army was concentrated before night -upon the plateau of Dubenetz, against the army of the Crown Prince, as -follows: - -[Illustration: No. 7. POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE - 29TH. JUNE] - -The IVth Corps at Salney, with the 1st Reserve Cavalry Division, and -the 2d Light Cavalry Division on its right and rear; - -The IId Corps at Kukus, on left of IVth; - -The VIIIth Corps near Kasow (one brigade in line on left of IId Corps, -the other brigades as reserve); - -The VIth Corps on the left of the VIIIth; - -The 3d Reserve Cavalry Division on the left of the VIth Corps; - -The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division on the extreme left wing; - -The Xth Corps, in reserve, between Stern and Liebthal. - -Five army corps and four cavalry divisions were thus concentrated on -a line five and one-half miles long. The nature of the ground was -unfavorable to the interior communications of the line, but it was, -in the main, a strong position, with the Elbe on its front, and the -fortress of Josephstadt protecting its right flank. - -The junction of the Prussian armies now seemed assured, and the -strategical situation was decidedly against Von Benedek. His great -fault was his failure to decide promptly in regard to the army which -he should contain while throwing his weight upon the other. Placing -an exaggerated value upon his interior position, he does not seem to -have considered that every hour of Prussian advance diminished his -advantages; and he was, apparently, unable to make his choice of the -two plans of operations which presented themselves. His best move, -if made in time, would have been against Frederick Charles. True, -his communications could have been quickly cut, in this case, by a -successful advance of the Second Army across the Elbe; while in moving -against the Crown Prince, his communications could not so readily have -been seized by Frederick Charles. But, on the other hand, topographical -features made it an easier matter to contain the Second Army than the -First Army and the Army of the Elbe. If the Austrian field marshal had -learned the lesson taught at Atlanta, Franklin and Petersburg, he would -have made use of hasty entrenchments. The Xth Corps and VIth Corps, -strongly entrenched, could certainly have held the passes against -the assaults of the Crown Prince. The ground was admirably adapted -to defense, and the entrenchments would have more than neutralized -the superiority of the needle gun over the Lorenz rifle. To have -invested and reduced the entrenched camps, if possible at all, would -have required much more time than Von Benedek would have needed for -disposing of Frederick Charles. To have advanced by the road leading to -Olmütz or Bömisch Trübau, the Crown Prince would have been compelled to -mask the passes with at least as many troops as garrisoned the camps -at their outlets, or his own communications would have been at the -mercy of the Austrians. This would have left him only two corps; and an -invasion of Moravia with this small force, every step of the advance -carrying him farther away from Frederick Charles, would have been an -act of suicidal madness, which he would not have seriously contemplated -for a moment. When Osman Pasha, eleven years later, paralyzed the -advance of 110,000 Russians, by placing 40,000 Turks in a hastily -entrenched position on their right, at Plevna, he showed plainly -how Von Benedek might have baulked the Second Army with entrenched -positions at the Silesian passes. - -Leaving, then, two corps to take care of the Crown Prince, the Austrian -commander would have had (including the Saxons) six corps, and nearly -all of the reserve cavalry and artillery, to use against Frederick -Charles. Count Clam-Gallas, instead of undertaking the task of holding -the line of the Iser, should have destroyed the bridges; and opposing -the Prussians with a strong rear-guard at the different crossings, -obstructing the roads, offering just enough resistance to compel his -adversary to deploy and thus lose time, but avoiding anything like a -serious action, he should have fallen back _via_ Gitschin to form a -junction with Von Benedek. He could thus have gained sufficient time -for his chief to arrive at Gitschin as soon as Frederick Charles; and -the army of the latter, numbering not more than 130,000 men,[8] would -have been opposed by an army of fully 200,000 Austrians. What the -result would have been we can best judge from the course of the battle -of Königgrätz before the Crown Prince arrived upon the field. - -Hozier, Adams, Derrécagaix and (above all) the Prussian Official -History of the Campaign of 1866, claim that the best move of Von -Benedek would have been against the Crown Prince. If we consider the -successful passage of the defiles by the Second Army as a thing to be -taken for granted in Von Benedek’s plan of campaign, there can be no -doubt that the Austrian commander should have turned his attention to -the Crown Prince, and that he should have attacked him with six corps, -as soon as the Prussians debouched from the defiles of Trautenau and -Nachod. The line of action here suggested as one that would probably -have resulted in Austrian success, is based entirely on the condition -that the Second Army should be contained at the defiles, by a force -strongly entrenched after the American manner of 1864-5; a condition -not considered by the eminent authorities mentioned above. After the -Crown Prince had safely passed the defiles, Von Benedek had either -to attack him or fall back. The time for a successful move against -Frederick Charles had passed. - -Von Benedek had carefully planned an invasion of Prussia. Had he been -able to carry the war into that country, his operations might, perhaps, -have been admirable; but when the superior preparation of the Prussians -enabled them to take the initiative, he seems to have been incapable of -throwing aside his old plans and promptly adopting new ones suited to -the altered condition of affairs. Von Benedek was a good tactician and -a stubborn fighter; but when he told the Emperor “Your Majesty, I am no -strategist,” and wished to decline the command of the army, he showed a -power of correct self-analysis equal to that displayed by Burnside when -he expressed an opinion of his own unfitness for the command of the -Army of the Potomac. The brave old soldier did not seem to appreciate -the strategical situation, and was apparently losing his head.[9] With -all the advantages of interior lines, he had everywhere opposed the -Prussians with inferior numbers; he had allowed the Crown Prince to -pass through the defiles of the mountains before he opposed him at -all; six of his eight corps had suffered defeat; he had lost more than -30,000 men; and now he was in a purely defensive position, and one -which left open the road from Arnau to Gitschin for the junction of the -Prussian armies. - -It would have been better than this had the Austrians everywhere -fallen back without firing a shot, even at the expense of opposing no -obstacles to the Prussian concentration; for they could then, at least, -have concentrated their own army for a decisive battle without the -demoralization attendant upon repeated defeats. - - -JUNE 30TH. - -A detachment of cavalry, sent by Frederick Charles towards Arnau, met -the advanced-guard of the 1st Corps at that place. Communication was -thus opened between the two armies. - -It was evident that the advance of Frederick Charles would, by -threatening the left and rear of the Austrians, cause them to abandon -their position on the Elbe, and thus loosening Von Benedek’s hold on -the passages of the river, permit the Crown Prince to cross without -opposition. - -The following orders were therefore sent by Von Moltke: - -“The Second Army will hold its ground on the Upper Elbe; its right wing -will be prepared to effect a junction with the left wing of the First -Army, by way of Königinhof, as the latter advances. The First Army will -press on towards Königgrätz without delay. - -“Any forces of the enemy that may be on the right flank of this advance -will be attacked by General Von Herwarth, and separated from the -enemy’s main force.” - -On this day the armies of Frederick Charles marched as follows: - -The IIId Corps, to Aulibitz and Chotec; - -The IVth Corps, to Konetzchlum and Milicowes; - -The IId Corps, to Gitschin and Podhrad; - -The Cavalry Corps, to Dworetz and Robaus; - -The Army of the Elbe, to the vicinity of Libau; - -The Landwehr Guard Division, which had been pushed forward from Saxony, -arrived at Jung Buntzlau.[10] - -The Second Army remained in the position of the preceding day. - -Von Benedek’s army remained in its position on the plateau of Dubenetz. - - -JULY 1ST. - -At 1 o’clock in the morning Von Benedek began his retreat towards -Königgrätz. - -The IIId Corps moved to Sadowa; - -The Xth Corps, to Lipa; - -The 3d Reserve Cavalry Division, to Dohalica; - -The VIth Corps, to Wsestar; - -The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division, to a position between Wsestar and -Königgrätz; - -The VIIIth Corps, to Nedelist, on left of the village; - -The IVth Corps, to Nedelist, on right of the village; - -The IId Corps, to Trotina; - -The 2d Light Cavalry Division, to the right of the IId Corps; - -The 1st Reserve Cavalry Division, behind Trotina; - -The 1st Corps took up a position in front of Königgrätz; - -The 1st Light Cavalry Division, on the left of the 1st Corps; - -The Saxons were stationed at Neu Prim. - -[Illustration: POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES On the evening of the 2nd. July, - 1866.] - -The Prussian armies, though at liberty to concentrate, remained -separated for tactical considerations. The armies were to make their -junction, if possible, upon the field of battle, in a combined front -and flank attack upon the enemy. In the meantime, as they were only a -short day’s march from each other, the danger to be apprehended from -separation was reduced to a minimum. - -Frederick Charles’ armies moved as follows: - -The IIId Corps, to Miletin and Dobes; - -The IVth Corps, to Horzitz and Gutwasser; - -The IId Corps, to Aujezd and Wostromer; - -The 1st Cavalry Division, to Baschnitz; - -The 2d Cavalry Division, to Liskowitz; - -The Army of the Elbe, to a position between Libau and Hochwesely. - -In the Second Army, the Ist Corps was thrown across the Elbe to -Prausnitz, and the VIth Corps arrived at Gradlitz. - - -JULY 2ND. - -The Army of the Elbe moved forward to Chotetitz, Lhota and Hochweseley, -with an advanced-guard at Smidar. - -The Guard Landwehr Division advanced to Kopidlno, a few miles west of -Hochweseley. - -The Austrians remained in the positions of the preceding day, but sent -their train to the left bank of the Elbe. - -Incredible as it seems, the Prussians were ignorant of the withdrawal -of the Austrians from the plateau of Dubenetz, and did not, in -fact, even know that Von Benedek had occupied that position. The -Austrians were supposed to be behind the Elbe, between Josephstadt -and Königgrätz. On the other hand, Von Benedek seems to have been -completely in the dark in regard to the movements of the Prussians. The -Prussian Staff History acknowledges that “the outposts of both armies -faced each other on this day within a distance of four and one-half -miles, without either army suspecting the near and concentrated -presence of the other one.” Each commander ignorant of the presence, -almost within cannon shot, of an enormous hostile army! Such a blunder -during our Civil War would, probably, have furnished European military -critics with a text for a sermon on the mob-like character of American -armies. - -Supposing the Austrians to be between Josephstadt and Königgrätz, two -plans were open to Von Moltke’s choice. First: To attack the Austrian -position in front with the First Army and the Army of the Elbe, and on -its right with the Second Army. This would have necessitated forcing -the passage of a river in the face of a formidable enemy; but this -passage would have been facilitated by the flank attack of the Crown -Prince, whose entire army (except the Ist Corps) was across the river. -It would have been a repetition of Magenta on a gigantic scale, with -the Crown Prince playing the part of McMahon, and Frederick Charles -enacting the _rôle_ of the French Emperor. Second: To maneuver the -enemy out of his position by moving upon Pardubitz; the occupation -of which place would be a serious menace to his communications. The -latter movement would necessitate the transfer of the Second Army to -the right bank of the Elbe, and then the execution of a flank march in -dangerous proximity to the enemy; but its successful execution might -have produced decisive results. This movement by the right would have -been strikingly similar to Von Moltke’s movement by the left, across -the Moselle, four years later. The resulting battle might have been -an antedated Gravelotte, and Von Benedek might have found a Metz in -Königgrätz or Josephstadt. At the very least, the Austrians would, -probably, have been maneuvered out of their position behind the Elbe. - -Before determining upon a plan of operations, it was decided to -reconnoiter the Elbe and the Aupa. The Army of the Elbe was directed -to watch the country towards Prague, and to seize the passages of the -river at Pardubitz. The First Army was ordered to take up the line Neu -Bidsow-Horzitz and to send a detachment from its left wing to Sadowa, -to reconnoiter the line of the Elbe between Königgrätz and Josephstadt. -The Ist Corps was to observe the latter fortress, and to cover the -flank march of the Second Army, if the movement in question should be -decided upon. The remaining corps of the Second Army were, for the -present, to remain in their positions, merely reconnoitering towards -the Aupa and the Metau. - -These orders were destined to be speedily countermanded. - -Colonel Von Zychlinsky, who commanded an outpost at the castle of -Cerakwitz, reported an Austrian encampment near Lipa, and scouting -parties, which were then sent out, returned, after a vigorous pursuit -by the Austrian cavalry, and reported the presence of the Austrian army -in force, behind the Bistritz, extending from Problus to the village -of Benatek. These reports, received after 6 o’clock P. M., entirely -changed the aspect of matters. - -Under the influence of his war experience, Frederick Charles -was rapidly developing the qualities of a great commander; his -self-confidence was increasing; and his actions now displayed the vigor -and military perspicacity of Mars-la-Tour, rather than the hesitation -of Münchengrätz.[11] He believed that Von Benedek, with at least four -corps, was about to attack him; but he unhesitatingly decided to -preserve the advantages of the initiative, by himself attacking the -Austrians in front, in the early morning, while the Army of the Elbe -should attack their left. The co-operation of the Crown Prince was -counted upon to turn the Austrian right, and thus secure victory. - -With these objects in view, the following movements were promptly -ordered: - -The 8th Division to be in position at Milowitz at 2 A. M.; - -The 7th Division to take post at Cerakwitz by 2 A. M.; - -The 5th and 6th Divisions to start at 1:30 A. M., and take post as -reserves south of Horzitz, the 5th west, and the 6th east, of the -Königgrätz road; - -The 3d Division to Psanek, and the 4th to Bristan; both to be in -position by 2 A. M.; - -The Cavalry Corps to be saddled by daybreak, and await orders; - -The reserve Artillery to Horzitz; - -General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld, with all available troops of the Army -of the Elbe, to Nechanitz, as soon as possible. - -Lieutenant Von Normand was sent to the Crown Prince with a request that -he take post with one or two corps in front of Josephstadt, and march -with another to Gross Burglitz. - -The chief-of-staff of the First Army, General Von Voigts-Rhetz, -hastened to report the situation of matters to the King, who -had assumed command of the armies on June 30th, and now had his -headquarters at Gitschin. The measures taken by Frederick Charles were -approved, and Von Moltke at once issued orders for the advance of the -entire Second Army, as requested by that commander. These orders were -sent at midnight, one copy being sent through Frederick Charles at -Kamenitz; the other being carried by Count Finkenstein direct to the -Crown Prince at Königinhof. The officer who had been sent by Frederick -Charles to the Crown Prince was returning, with an answer that the -orders from army headquarters made it impossible to support the First -Army with more than the Ist Corps and the Reserve Cavalry. Fortunately, -he met Finkenstein a short distance from Königinhof. Comparing notes, -the two officers returned together to the Crown Prince, who at once -issued orders for the movement of his entire army to the assistance of -Frederick Charles. - -In order to deliver his dispatches to the Crown Prince, Finkenstein had -ridden twenty-two and one-half miles, over a strange road, on a dark, -rainy night. Had he lost his way; had his horse suffered injury; had he -encountered an Austrian patrol, the history of Germany might have been -different. It is almost incredible that the Prussian general should -have diverged so widely from the characteristic German prudence as to -make success contingent upon the life of an aide-de-camp, or possibly -the life of a horse. Even had the other courier, riding _via_ Kamenitz, -reached his destination safely, the time that must have elapsed between -the Crown Prince’s declension of co-operation and his later promise to -co-operate, would have been sufficient to derange, and perhaps destroy, -the combinations of Von Moltke. - -Let us now examine the Austrian position. Derrécagaix describes it as -follows: - -“In front of the position, on the west, ran the Bistritz, a little -river difficult to cross in ordinary weather, and then very much -swollen by the recent rains. - -“On the north, between the Bistritz and the Trotina, was a space of -about five kilometers, by which the columns of the assailant might -advance. Between these two rivers and the Elbe the ground is broken -with low hills, covered with villages and woods, which gave the defense -advantageous points of support. In the center the hill of Chlum -formed the key of the position, and commanded the road from Sadowa to -Königgrätz. The heights of Horenowes covered the right on the north. -The heights of Problus and Hradek constituted a solid support for the -left. At the south the position of Liebau afforded protection on this -side to the communications of the army.[12] - -“The position selected had, then, considerable defensive value; but it -had the defect of having at its back the Elbe and the defiles formed by -the bridges.” - -On this subject, however, Hozier says: “The Austrian commander took the -precaution to throw bridges over the river. With plenty of bridges, a -river in rear of a position became an advantage. After the retreating -army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges were broken, and the -river became an obstacle to the pursuit. Special, as well as general, -conditions also came into play.... The heavy guns of the fortress -scoured the banks of the river, both up and down stream, and, with -superior weight of metal and length of range, were able to cover the -passage of the Austrians.” - -In considering the Austrian retreat, we shall find that neither of -these distinguished authorities is entirely right, or wholly wrong, in -regard to the defects and advantages of the position described. - -The following dispositions were ordered by Von Benedek: - -The Saxons to occupy the heights of Popowitz, the left wing slightly -refused, and covered by the Saxon Cavalry; - -The 1st Light Cavalry Division, to the rear and left, at Problus and -Prim; - -The Xth Corps on the right of the Saxons; - -The IIId Corps to occupy the heights of Lipa and Chlum, on the right of -the Xth Corps; - -The VIIIth Corps in reserve, in rear of the Saxons. - -In case the attack should be confined to the left wing, the other corps -were merely to hold themselves in readiness. If, however, the attack -should extend to the center and right, the following dispositions were -to be made: - -The IVth Corps to move up on the right of the IIId to the heights of -Chlum and Nedelist; - -The IId Corps, on the right of the IVth, constituting the extreme right -flank; - -The 2d Light Cavalry Division, to the rear of Nedelist; - -The VIth Corps to be massed on the heights of Wsestar; - -The Ist Corps to be massed at Rosnitz; - -The 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions to take position at Sweti; - -The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division, at Briza; - -The Reserve Artillery behind the Ist and VIth Corps. - -The Ist and VIth Corps, the five cavalry divisions and the Reserve -Artillery were to constitute the general reserve. - -A slight attempt was made to strengthen the position by throwing up -entrenchments. Six batteries were constructed on the right, as well -as breastworks for about eight companies of supporting infantry. The -infantry breastworks, as well as the batteries, were constructed by -engineer soldiers, and were of strong profile, with traverses, and had -a command of eight feet. There was not the slightest attempt to have -the infantry shelter themselves with hasty entrenchments. Even the -earthworks that were constructed were of no use; for a misunderstanding -of orders caused the line of battle to be established far in advance of -them. On the left but little was done to strengthen the position before -the Prussian attack began. - - -THE BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ, JULY 3D. - -Notwithstanding the heavy rain, the muddy roads, and the late hour at -which the orders had been received, the divisions of the First Army -were all at their appointed places soon after dawn. The Army of the -Elbe pushed forward energetically, and at 5:45 o’clock its commander -notified Frederick Charles that he would be at Nechanitz between 7 -and 9 o’clock, with thirty-six battalions. The First Army was at once -ordered forward. - -The 8th Division marched on the left of the high road, as the -advanced-guard of the troops moving upon Sadowa. - -The 4th and 3d Divisions marched on the right of the road, abreast of -the 8th. - -The 5th and 6th Divisions followed the 8th on the right and left of the -road respectively, while the Reserve Artillery followed on the road -itself. - -The Cavalry Corps had started from Gutwasser at 5 o’clock, and it now -marched behind the right wing to maintain communication with the Army -of the Elbe. - -The 7th Division was to leave Cerekwitz as soon as the noise of the -opening battle was heard, and was to join in the action according to -circumstances. - -The divisional cavalry of the 5th and 6th Divisions was formed into a -brigade, and a brigade of the Cavalry Division was attached to the IId -Corps. - -[Illustration: BATTLEFIELD OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ.] - -About 7:30 the advanced-guard of the Army of the Elbe reached -Nechanitz, where it encountered a Saxon outpost, which retired after -destroying the bridges. - -About the same time the 8th Division advanced in line of battle upon -Sadowa. The Austrian artillery opened fire as soon as the Prussians -came in sight. The latter took up a position near the Sadowa -brickfield, and skirmishing began. - -The 4th Division took up a position at Mzan, on the right of the 8th, -and its batteries engaged in combat with the Austrian artillery. - -The 3d Division formed on the right of the 4th, near Zawadilka. - -The 5th and 6th Divisions formed line at Klenitz; one on each side of -the road. - -The Reserve Cavalry was stationed at Sucha. - -At the first sound of the cannon Von Fransecky opened fire upon the -village of Benatek, which was soon set on fire by the Prussian shells. -The village was then carried by assault by the advanced-guard of the -7th Division. - -There was now a heavy cannonade all along the line. The heavy downpour -of the last night had given place to a dense fog and a drizzling rain; -and the obscurity was heightened by the clouds of smoke which rose from -the guns. Frederick Charles rode along the right wing, giving orders to -respond to the Austrian batteries by firing slowly, and forbidding the -crossing of the Bistritz. His object was merely to contain Von Benedek, -while waiting for the weather to clear up, and for the turning armies -to gain time. - -At 8 o’clock loud cheering announced the arrival of the King of Prussia -upon the battle field. As soon as Frederick Charles reported to him -the condition of affairs, the King ordered an advance upon the line -of the Bistritz. The object of this movement was to gain good points -of support for the divisions upon the left bank of the Bistritz, from -which they might launch forth, at the proper time, upon the main -position of the enemy. The divisions were cautioned not to advance too -far beyond the stream, nor up to the opposite heights. - -The Austrian position differed slightly from the one ordered on the -eve of the battle. The Saxons, instead of holding the heights eastward -of Popowitz and Tresowitz, found a more advantageous position on the -heights between Problus and Prim, with a brigade holding the hills -behind Lubno, Popowitz and Tresowitz. Nechanitz was held merely as an -outpost. The remaining dispositions of the center and left were, on -the whole, as ordered the night before; on the right they differed -materially from the positions designated. - -Instead of the line Chlum-Nedelist, the IVth Corps took up its position -on the line Cistowes-Maslowed-Horenowes, 2,000 paces in advance of the -batteries that had been thrown up. - -The IId Corps formed on the right of the IVth, on the heights of -Maslowed-Horenowes. - -The Ist and VIth Corps and the Cavalry took their appointed positions, -and the Reserve Artillery was stationed on the heights of Wsestar and -Sweti. - -In the language of the Prussian Staff History: “Instead of the -semi-circle originally intended, the Austrian line of battle now -formed only a very gentle curve, the length of which, from Ober-Prim -to Horenowes, was about six and three-fourths miles, on which four and -three-fourths corps d’armee were drawn up. The left wing had a reserve -of three weak brigades behind it, and on the right wing only one -brigade covered the ground between the right flank and the Elbe. On the -other hand, a main reserve of two corps of infantry and five cavalry -divisions stood ready for action fully two miles behind the center of -the whole line of battle.” - -The strength of the Austrian army was 206,100 men and 770 guns. At this -period of the battle it was opposed by a Prussian army of 123,918 men, -with 444 guns. The arrival of the Second Army would, however, increase -this force to 220,984 men and 792 guns. - -The 7th Division, which had already occupied the village of Benatek, -was the first to come into serious conflict with the Austrians. The -attack, beginning thus on the left, was successively taken up by the -8th, 4th and 3d Divisions; and the advanced-guard of the Army of the -Elbe being engaged at the same time, the roar of battle extended along -the entire line. - -In front of the 7th Division were the wooded heights of Maslowed, known -also as the Swiep Wald. This forest, extending about 2,000 paces from -east to west, and about 1,200 from north to south, covered a steep -ridge intersected on its northern slope by ravines, but falling off -more gradually towards the Bistritz. Against this formidable position -Von Fransecky sent four battalions, which encountered two Austrian -battalions, and, after a severe struggle, drove them from the wood. Now -was the time to break the Austrian line between Maslowed and Cistowes, -and, turning upon either point, or both, roll up the flanks of the -broken line. The advanced battalions were quickly reinforced by the -rest of the division; but all attempts to _débouche_ from the wood were -baffled. Heavy reinforcements were drawn from the Austrian IVth and -IId Corps, and a furious counter-attack was made upon the Prussians. -Calling for assistance, Von Fransecky was reinforced by two battalions -of the 8th Division; but he was still struggling against appalling -odds. With fourteen battalions and twenty-four guns, he was contending -against an Austrian force of forty battalions and 128 guns. Falling -back slowly, contesting the ground inch by inch, the Prussian division, -after a fierce struggle of three hours, still clung stubbornly to the -northern portion of the wood. Still the Austrians had here a reserve of -eleven battalions and twenty-four guns, which might have been hurled -with decisive effect upon the exhausted Prussians, had not other events -interfered. - -As soon as the 7th Division had advanced beyond Benatek, the 8th -Division advanced against the woods of Skalka and Sadowa. Two bridges -were thrown across the Bistritz, west of the Skalka wood, by the side -of two permanent bridges, which the Austrians had neglected to destroy. -The reserve divisions (5th and 6th) advanced, at the same time, to -Sowetitz, and the Reserve Artillery to the Roskosberg. As soon as the -8th Division crossed the Bistritz, it was to establish communication -with the 7th Division, and turn towards the Königgrätz highroad. The -woods of Skalka and Sadowa were occupied without much difficulty; the -Austrian brigade which occupied them falling back in good order to the -heights of Lipa, where the other brigades of the IIId Austrian Corps -were stationed. On these heights, between Lipa and Langenhof, 160 guns -were concentrated in a great battery, which sent such a “hailstorm -of shells” upon the advancing Prussians as to check effectually all -attempts to _débouche_ from the forests. - -The 4th Division advanced from Mzan, and the 3d from Zawadilka, soon -after the 8th Division moved forward. The retreat of the Austrian -brigade from Sadowa had uncovered the flank of the outposts, and -compelled the withdrawal of the troops successively from Dohalitz, -Dohalica and Mokrowous to the main position westward of Langenhof -and Stresetitz, and these outposts were consequently gained by the -Prussians with slight loss. Further advance of the 4th and 3d -Divisions was, however, prevented by the rapid and accurate fire of the -Austrian batteries. - -The advanced-guard of the Army of the Elbe had gained the left bank of -the Bistritz, part of the left wing crossing by the bridge of Nechanitz -(which had been repaired with gates and barn doors) and part by wading -breast-deep across the stream. The right wing of the advanced-guard -was obliged to march down stream to Kuncitz, where it crossed, after -dislodging a small force of Saxons and repairing the bridge. The Saxon -outposts were all driven back to the main position, and the Prussian -advanced-guard occupied the line Hradek-Lubno, thus covering the -crossing of the main body. The Prussians succeeded in throwing only -one bridge at this part of the field; and as the entire Army of the -Elbe was obliged to cross upon it and defile through Nechanitz, the -deployment was necessarily slow. - -At 11 o’clock the Prussian advance had been checked. The Army of the -Elbe was slowly forming in rear of the line Hradek-Lubno. The First -Army, advancing, as we have seen, by echelon of divisions from the -left, had gained the position Maslowed-Sadowa Wood-Mokrowous, thus -executing a wheel of about an eighth of a circle to the right. The -immediate object of the advance had been practically gained, it is -true, by the occupation of the line of the Bistritz, and the conversion -of the strong advanced posts of the Austrians into good points of -support for the Prussians. Yet Fransecky was sorely pushed on the left, -and the 8th Division was suffering so severely from the fire of the -Austrian guns, that Frederick Charles deemed it necessary to order -the 5th and 6th Divisions to move up to the Sadowa wood. All attempts -of these fresh troops to gain ground towards the heights of Lipa were -repulsed, and the Prussian advance again came to a standstill. A -counter-attack by a single Austrian brigade against the Sadowa wood -(made without Von Benedek’s permission) was repulsed. - -The position of the First Army was now critical. The last battalion -of the infantry reserves had been brought into action. Von Fransecky -was on a desperate defensive. The other divisions were all subjected -to a furious, crushing fire from nearly 250 pieces of artillery, -which the Austrians had brought into action on the heights from Lipa -to Problus; while, owing partly to the wooded ground, partly to the -difficulty of crossing the stream, and partly to the inefficiency of -the Prussian artillery officers, only 42 guns were on the left bank -of the Bistritz to reply to this formidable cannonade. Only a portion -of Frederick Charles’ guns were brought into action at all; and their -long range fire from the positions west of the Bistritz was ignored by -the Austrian batteries, whose entire energy was devoted to a merciless -pelting of the Prussian infantry. - -The statement of the Prussian Staff History that the center was in no -danger, seems, therefore, to savor more of patriotism than of candor. -To advance was impossible. The infantry was suffering terribly from the -Austrian fire; the artillery was feebly handled; and the cavalry could -render no assistance. There was danger that the army would be shaken -to pieces by Von Benedek’s artillery, and that the demoralized troops -would then be swept from the field by the comparatively fresh infantry -and cavalry of the Austrians. The King and his generals eagerly scanned -the northern horizon with their glasses; and, with the intense anxiety -of Wellington at Waterloo, waited for tidings from the army on the -left, and strained their vision for a sight of the advancing columns. -The question of retreat was discussed. The Reserve Cavalry was ordered -up to Sadowa, apparently with a view to covering the withdrawal of the -army to the right bank of the stream. It was now past 1 o’clock. It was -resolved to hold the line of the Bistritz at all hazards, and a heavy -artillery fire was kept up. In the meantime, events on other parts of -the field were already beginning to extricate the First Army from its -perilous situation. - -At 11:30, the 14th and 15th Divisions of the Army of the Elbe having -come upon the field, an attack was ordered upon both flanks of the -Saxons. The 15th Division, followed by a brigade of cavalry, moved, -through Hradek, against Ober-Prim. The 14th Division moved on the -heights east of Popowitz, through the forest, against Problus. The -advanced-guard, between the two divisions, moved to the attack, pushing -its flanks forward, for the double purpose of avoiding the heavy -fire from the enemy’s front and masking the movements of the turning -divisions. The Prince of Saxony, believing it a favorable opportunity -to assume the offensive, attacked the Prussian advanced-guard with -a Saxon brigade. The attack, though made with great spirit, was -repulsed. Again the Prince attacked, this time with two brigades; -but the advancing Saxons being struck on the left flank by the 15th -Division, were driven back with heavy loss, and Ober-Prim was carried -by the Prussians. General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld had succeeded in -bringing 66 guns to the left bank of the Bistritz, and he now pushed -them forward to within 2,000 paces of Nieder Prim, upon which they -concentrated a heavy fire, under cover of which the place was carried -by a regiment of the 15th Division. The 14th Division, having gained -possession of Popowitz and the wood east of that village, now joined -the 15th Division in a concentric attack upon Problus. The Prince of -Saxony had not only observed the preparations for this attack, but he -had also observed the arrival of the Prussian Second Army at Chlum; -and he now, at 3 o’clock, ordered a retreat to the heights southwest -of Rosnitz. The troops at Problus, acting as a rear-guard, offered a -stubborn resistance to the advancing Prussians; but they were driven -from the village, and the advance of the 14th and 15th Divisions was -checked only by the artillery fire of the Saxons and the VIIIth Corps, -stationed on the hills north-east of Problus. - -During this time the Second Army had been working great results. At 8 -o’clock Von Alvensleben, commanding the advanced-guard of the Guard -Corps, at Daubrowitz, heard the cannonade in the direction of Benatek. -Without waiting for orders, he at once put his command in march for the -scene of conflict, notifying his corps commander of his departure, and -sending word to Von Fransecky that he would be at Jericek by 11:30. The -rest of the corps quickly followed, marching straight across country, -up hill and down hill, pushing through the heavy mud with such restless -energy that several of the artillery horses dropped dead from fatigue. -The advanced-guard arrived at Jericek at 11 o’clock, and at the same -hour the heads of the columns of the main body arrived at Choteborek, -to which point the Crown Prince had hurried in advance of the troops. - -The VIth Corps advanced from its position, near Gradlitz, in two -columns. The 12th Division marched, _via_ Kukus and Ertina, to the -heights east of Rosnow, detaching a battalion and a squadron to -mask the fortress of Josephstadt. The 11th Division marched, _via_ -Schurz, to Welchow. As soon as it neared the latter place Von Mutius, -commanding the corps, ordered both divisions to keep connection and -march to the sound of the cannonade. The troops pushed on “over hills, -meadows and ditches, through copses and hedgerows,” across the swampy -valley of the Trotina, part of the troops crossing the stream by the -single bridge, and part wading breast-deep through the water. At 11 -o’clock the 11th Division arrived at the heights north of Racitz, and -came under the fire of the enemy’s batteries. - -At 8 o’clock the Vth Corps began its march, _via_ Schurz and Dubenitz, -to Choteborek; and at 11 o’clock its advanced-guard was approaching -that village. - -The Ist Corps did not start until 9:30. It marched _via_ Zabres, -Gross-Trotin and Weiss Polikau; and at 11 o’clock it had not yet -reached Gross-Burglitz. - -Thus, at 11 o’clock, the only troops that had reached the Trotina were -the Guards and the VIth Corps; and they were still two and one-half -miles from the left wing of the First Army. In three hours the Second -Army had been so concentrated as to reduce its front from twenty-two -and one-half miles to nine miles; and it now occupied the line -Burglitz-Jericek-Choteborek-Welchow. - -The Crown Prince, from his station on the heights of Choteborek, about -four and one-half miles from Maslowed, had an extended view towards the -valley of the Bistritz; and notwithstanding the rain and fog, he could -trace the direction of the contending lines by the smoke of the burning -villages and flashes of the guns. It was evident that his columns -were marching in such a direction as to bring them directly upon the -flank and rear of the Austrian troops already engaged; but, though the -formidable heights of Horenowes appeared to be occupied by only one -battery, it seemed probable that the passage of the Elbe by the Crown -Prince was known by Von Benedek, and that the troops on the Austrian -right were waiting behind the crest of the hills, to spring forward -into action when the Prussians should undertake to cross the swampy -valley between the Trotina and the heights of Horenowes. The different -divisions were ordered to direct their march upon a prominent group of -trees on the Horenowes hill. - -The Austrians were now in a position of extreme danger. The heights -of Horenowes, which seemed to offer such a formidable obstacle to the -advance of the Crown Prince, had been left almost defenseless. As -we have seen, the Austrian IVth and IId Corps had taken up the line -Cistowes-Maslowed-Horenowes, and the space between the right flank -and the Elbe was guarded by only one brigade and two battalions. To -make matters worse, the IVth and IId Corps had been drawn into the -fight with Von Fransecky in the Swiep Wald, and, facing west, they now -presented a flank to the advancing columns of the Crown Prince. The -advance of these two corps beyond the line Chlum-Nedelist had carried -them far beyond support; and now, with the Prussian Second Army within -two and one-half miles of them, their reserves were fully three miles -away. - -Von Benedek discovering that these two corps had not taken up their -designated positions, sent orders, before 11 o’clock, to their -commanders, to fall back to the positions originally assigned to -them. Unfortunately, the commander of the IVth Corps, ignorant of the -approach of the Crown Prince, and flushed with his success against -Von Fransecky, thought it an opportune moment to assume a vigorous -offensive against the Prussian left, and would not make the movement -ordered until he had sent a report to that effect to his chief. The -projected offensive was disapproved, and the former order was repeated. -The two corps now retired to the positions originally designated, the -movement being covered by the fire of 64 pieces of artillery posted -on the plateau of Nedelist. The withdrawal had been delayed too long; -for the Crown Prince already had 48 guns in position between Racitz -and Horenowes, the Prussian infantry was advancing, and the Austrian -movement partook, consequently, of the nature of a retreat. Yet it is -greatly to the credit of the Austrian troops that they were able to -execute a flank movement--and a retrograde movement, too--under the -fire of the enemy; though they had been in action fully three hours. - -At noon Von Benedek received a telegram from Salney, _via_ Josephstadt, -announcing the approach of the Second Army. At this very moment the -guns of the Crown Prince were playing upon the Austrian right flank. - -The advanced-guard of the 1st Division of Guards had debouched from -Zizilowes at 11:15 A. M.; its right flank being covered by the -cavalry brigade which had covered the left of the 7th Division. The -advanced-guard of the 2d Guard Division, (which had been separated from -the main body by the Reserve Artillery of the 1st Division cutting -into the column on the road) without waiting for the arrival of its -comrades, joined the 1st Division in its attack upon Horenowes. At noon -the 12th Division had captured the Horicka Berg, the 11th Division had -driven the Austrians from Racitz, and the Guards were advancing upon -Horenowes. The withdrawal of the Austrian IId Corps had been covered by -40 guns posted east of Horenowes, which kept up a heavy fire upon the -Prussians. But the Guards easily carried Horenowes, the position of the -great battery was turned, the hostile infantry was advancing upon its -flank, and the artillery was forced to retire. The 12th Division, in -the meantime, had captured Sendrasitz, cutting off the Austrian brigade -which had been covering the right flank. The 11th Division then moved -up to a position north of Sendrasitz, on the left of the Guards, and -the latter advanced to Maslowed. The Prussians now had 90 guns on the -heights of Horenowes; and most of these pieces were hurried forward -beyond Maslowed, within 1,300 paces of the Austrian position, where -they prepared the way for the infantry assault by a vigorous cannonade. - -When the Guards advanced, the Austrian IVth Corps was still engaged in -taking up its new position. Unchecked by the fire of more than 100 guns -in position west of Nedelist, the Guards crushed the two battalions -on the left of the IVth Corps, and penetrated into the gap; the left -wing rolling up the flank of an Austrian brigade, and pushing on in -the direction of Sweti; while the right wing, changing front to the -right, stormed the village of Chlum, which, though the key of the -Austrian position, was occupied by only a single battalion. As the -Guards advanced, the force under Von Alvensleben, which had constituted -the advanced-guard in the morning, moved forward in echelon on their -right. A brigade of the Austrian IVth Corps, which, by some mistake, -had been left at Cistowes, and was now marching to the new position of -its corps, was struck by Von Alvensleben, and driven to the westward of -Chlum with heavy loss. Simultaneously with the Guards, the VIth Corps -advanced upon the enemy, the 11th Division capturing Nedelist, and the -12th driving the cut-off Austrian brigade into Lochenitz. The Austrians -made several determined attacks from Langenhof and the Lipa wood upon -the Prussians in Chlum; but though they fought with great bravery and -penetrated into the village, they were repulsed by the Guards, who -then seized Rosberitz and the forest of Lipa. The 1st Austrian Reserve -Cavalry Division, consisting of five regiments, charged the Prussians -south of Chlum. The brigade on the left consisted of two regiments of -cuirassiers, and was formed in double column: the one on the right was -composed of two regiments (one of cuirassiers and one of lancers), -formed in double column, with a regiment of cuirassiers following as a -second line. The charge was repulsed by four companies of the infantry -of the Guard. It is remarkable that in this case, the cavalry came -within 200 yards of the infantry before the latter opened fire. - -At 3 o’clock matters had, consequently, changed very much for the worse -with the Austrians. On the left, the Saxons had been driven from their -position; on the right, the Prussian Guards and VIth Corps occupied the -line Rosberitz-Nedelist-Lochenitz. The Austrian IVth and IId Corps had -been defeated, and were retreating upon Wsestar, Sweti, Predmeritz and -Lochenitz. The 1st Division of the Guards had captured 55 guns, and had -seized the key of the Austrian position. The Austrian IIId Corps was -sandwiched between the Guards and the First Army. Yet the position of -the Guards was full of danger. In the valley of Sweti-Wsestar-Rosnitz -were the two intact corps of Austrian reserves, with more than 70 -squadrons of cavalry; and between Wsestar and Langenhof were massed -the powerful batteries of the reserve artillery, which kept Rosberitz -and Chlum under a heavy fire. The main body of the 2d Division of the -Guards was just ascending the heights of Maslowed. There were no other -troops within a mile and a quarter upon whom they could depend for -assistance. - -Von Benedek, who had taken his position between Lipa and Chlum, -hearing of the occupation of the latter village by the Prussians, -could scarcely believe the surprising news. As he rode hurriedly -toward Chlum, the information was rudely corroborated by a volley from -the Prussians, which mortally wounded an aide-de-camp, and seriously -injured several other members of his escort. There was no longer any -doubt. Victory was now out of the question, and it was necessary to -take prompt measures to save the right wing from annihilation, and to -prevent the retreat of the rest of the army from being cut off. - -A brigade of the Austrian Ist Corps was sent to reinforce the Saxons -near Problus, and another brigade of the same corps was sent against -the Lipa wood and the heights west of Chlum. The latter brigade, -reinforced by a brigade of the IIId Corps and fragments of the IVth -Corps, made three desperate attacks upon the advanced-guard of the 2d -Division and part of the 1st Division of the Prussian Guards at these -points, only to recoil, completely baffled, before the deadly fire of -the needle gun. The IIId Corps no longer had any intact troops; it was -between two fires; it began its retreat, and abandoned the village of -Lipa to the Prussians. On the left, the main body of the 1st Division -of the Guards was engaged at Rosberitz with the Austrian VIth Corps. -Advancing resolutely to the attack, the Austrians dislodged the Guards -from the village after a bloody struggle; but as they halted at the -outskirts of the town to re-form for another assault, the Guards were -reinforced by the advanced-guard of the Ist Corps. At the same time, -the commander of the Prussian VIth Corps, leaving the 12th Division -engaged with the Austrians at Lochenitz, half-wheeled the 11th Division -to the right, and advanced from Nedelist upon Rosberitz. The Austrian -IId Corps was already in retreat. A counter-attack of the Guards and -the Ist Corps drove the Austrians out of Rosberitz; and the 11th -Division striking them on the flank routed them with heavy loss. The -11th Division then attacked a brigade of the Austrian IVth Corps, which -had taken up a position near Sweti to protect the reserve artillery. -The brigade and the artillery were driven back to the village, which -was carried by assault, many cannon being captured. The Vth Corps -reached Horenowes at 4 o’clock, and was designated as the general -reserve of the army. - -The full tide of Prussian success had now set in. The 16th Division -had not yet crossed at Nechanitz, but the 14th and 15th Divisions had -defeated the Saxons and the Austrian VIIIth Corps, and the allies were -in retreat. Both of the Austrian flanks had been crushed, and the First -Army was now actively engaged in an attack upon Von Benedek’s front. - -The aide-de-camp sent by the Crown Prince to announce his approach -had been delayed by the condition of the roads and the necessity of -making a long detour, and did not arrive at the royal headquarters -until late in the afternoon. The Crown Prince’s advance was first made -known to the commander of the First Army by the flashes of the Prussian -guns on the heights of Horenowes. Soon after, the Prussian columns -were seen ascending the heights of Maslowed. The fire of the Austrian -guns in front perceptibly diminished, and it was evident that some of -the batteries had changed front to the right. It was clear that the -Second Army had struck the Austrian flank; and at 3:30 o’clock the -King ordered “an advance all along the line” of the First Army. The -retreat of the Austrian Xth Corps had begun, but it was concealed by -the nature of the ground, and covered by the line of artillery, which -devotedly maintained its position, and kept up a heavy fire, until its -own existence was imperiled by the advance of the foe. The Xth Corps -had passed well beyond the danger of infantry pursuit when the advance -of the First Army was ordered. The Austrian artillerists held to their -position until the enemy was almost at the muzzle of the cannon, and -then withdrawing to Rosnitz and Briza, with all the guns that their -stubborn defense had not compelled them to sacrifice, again opened -fire upon the Prussians. The cavalry, too, devoted itself to the task -of covering the retreat. The Prussian cavalry, which had been delayed -by the blocking of the bridges by the artillery, and the crowding of -the roads by the infantry, now appeared in the front of the pursuers, -and fierce cavalry combats took place near Langenhof, Stresetitz and -Problus. Though eventually overmatched, the Austrian cavalry made -a noble fight, and, at the sacrifice of its best blood, materially -assisted in covering the retreat of the army. - -Frederick Charles, bringing up 54 guns to the heights of Wsestar -and Sweti, opened fire upon the new line of Austrian artillery. The -Austrian batteries replied with spirit, until the advance of the 11th -Division upon Rosnitz and Briza compelled them to withdraw, with -the loss of 36 guns. Still undaunted, the artillery took up a new -position on the line Stösser-Freihofen-Zeigelshag. Here all available -guns were brought into action, and under their fire the Prussian -pursuit virtually ended. Withdrawing in excellent order to the line -Placitz-Kuklena, the Austrian artillery kept up a duel with the -Prussian guns on the line Klacow-Stezerek until long after darkness had -set in. - -The Prussian Staff History says: “The behavior of the cavalry and the -well-sustained fire of the powerful line of artillery at Placitz and -Kuklena, proved that part, at least of the hostile army still retained -its full power of resistance. - -“It is true that affairs behind this line of artillery bore a very -different aspect. At first the corps had, for the most part, taken the -direction of the bridges northward of Königgrätz, but were prevented -from using them by the advance of the Prussian extreme left wing. This -caused the different bodies of troops to become promiscuously and -confusedly mingled together. The flying cavalry, shells bursting on all -sides, still further increased the confusion, which reached its climax -when the commandant of Königgrätz closed the gates of the fortress. - -“Hundreds of wagons, either overturned or thrust off from the highroad, -riderless horses and confused crowds of men trying to escape across the -inundated environs of the fortress and the river, many of them up to -their necks in water--this spectacle of wildest flight and utter rout, -immediately before the gates of Königgrätz, was naturally hidden from -the view of the pursuing enemy.” - -A prompt pursuit would, however, have been impracticable, even if -the Prussians had fully appreciated the extent of the Austrian -demoralization. The concentric attacks, so magnificently decisive on -the field, had produced an almost chaotic confusion on the part of -the victors themselves. Owing to the direction of their attacks, the -Second Army and the Army of the Elbe were “telescoped” together; and -the advance of the First Army had jammed it into the right flank of -the former and the left flank of the latter. At noon the front of -the combined Prussian armies had been more than sixteen miles long. -The front of this great host was now but little more than two miles; -and men of different regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and even -armies, were now indiscriminately mingled together. Aside from this -confusion, the exhaustion of the Prussian soldiers precluded pursuit. -Most of them had left their bivouacs long before dawn, and it had -been a day of hard marching and hard fighting for all. Many had been -entirely without food, all were suffering from extreme fatigue, and -several officers had fallen dead on the field from sheer exhaustion. - -As a result of the exhaustion of the Prussians and the excellent -conduct of the Austrian cavalry and artillery, Von Benedek slipped -across the Elbe, and gained such a start on his adversaries that for -three days the Prussians lost all touch with him, and were in complete -ignorance of the direction of his retreat. - -Thus ended the great battle of Königgrätz. The Prussian losses were -9,153, killed, wounded and missing. The Austrians lost 44,200, killed, -wounded and missing, including in the last classification 19,800 -prisoners. They also lost 161 guns, five stands of colors, several -thousand muskets, several hundred wagons and a ponton train. The sum -total of the killed, wounded and missing (exclusive of prisoners) in -this battle was 27,656. - -It is not necessary, for the present, even to sketch the retreat of the -Austrian army upon Olmütz and Vienna; the masterly march of Von Moltke -to the Danube; the Italian disasters of Custozza and Lissa; and the -campaign in which the Army of the Maine defeated the Bavarians and the -VIIIth Federal Corps.[13] Königgrätz was the decisive battle of the -war. Austria could not rally from her disaster, and twenty-three days -after the battle the truce of Nikolsburg virtually ended the contest. - - -COMMENTS. - -It is not only on account of its great and far-reaching results that -Königgrätz must be rated as one of the greatest battles of the world. -In point of numbers engaged, it was the greatest battle of modern -times; for the two contending armies aggregated nearly half a million -men. In this respect it exceeded Gravelotte, dwarfed Solferino and -even surpassed the “Battle of Nations” fought on the plains of Leipsic, -fifty-two years before. - -Yet, considering the numbers engaged, the loss of life was not great. -The sum total of the killed and wounded was nearly 6,000 less than at -Gettysburg, though in that sanguinary struggle the combined strength -of the Union and Confederate armies was less than that of the Austrian -army alone at Königgrätz.[14] In fact, of all the battles of the War of -Secession, Fredericksburg, Chattanooga and Cold Harbor were the only -ones in which the losses of the _victors_, in killed and wounded, did -not exceed, in proportion to the numbers engaged, the losses of the -_defeated_ army at Königgrätz. A bit of reflection upon these facts -might convince certain European critics that the failure of victorious -American armies to pursue their opponents vigorously was due to other -causes than inefficient organization or a lack of military skill. In -the words of Colonel Chesney: “In order to pursue, there must be some -one to run away; and, to the credit of the Americans, the ordinary -conditions of European warfare in this respect were usually absent -from the great battles fought across the Atlantic. Hence, partly, the -frequent repetition of the struggle, almost on the same ground, of -which the last campaign of Grant and Lee is the crowning example.” It -is, perhaps, not too much to say, that had Von Benedek been a Lee, -and had his army been of the nature of Lee’s army, even if defeated -at Königgrätz, the next day would have found him on the left bank -of the Elbe, under the shelter of hasty entrenchments, presenting -a bold front to the Prussians; for there was no reason, aside from -demoralization, for the retreat of the Austrians far from the scene -of their defeat. Their communications were neither intercepted nor -seriously endangered; their losses had not been excessive; and, but for -their discouragement and loss of _morale_, there is no reason why their -defeat at Königgrätz should have been decisive. - - * * * * * - -Not the least of the causes of the Austrian defeat was the autocratic -policy of Von Benedek, which caused the entire management of the -army to be centralized in his own person, and the plan of battle to -be locked up in his own mind. However brave, willing and obedient a -subordinate officer may be, there can be no doubt that his duties will -be better done, because more intelligently done, if he has a clear -knowledge of the part that he is called upon to perform. The higher the -rank, and the more important the command, of the subordinate officer, -the more certainly is this the case. Yet Von Benedek seems to have -desired from his corps commanders nothing more than the blind obedience -of the private soldier. On the day before the battle of Königgrätz all -the corps commanders were summoned to headquarters; but Von Benedek, -after alluding merely to unimportant matters of routine, dismissed them -without a word of instruction as to the part to be performed by them in -the battle which he must have known to be imminent. On the day of the -battle the commanders of the corps and divisions on the right were not -informed of the construction of the batteries, and were not notified -that these entrenchments were intended to mark their line. Instead -of being thrown up by the divisions themselves, these works were -constructed by the chief engineer, without one word of consultation or -explanation with the corps commanders. Had the commanders of the IIId, -IVth and IId Corps been informed that their principal duty would be -to guard against a possible, if not probable, advance of the Crown -Prince, it is not likely that the line Cistowes-Maslowed-Horenowes -would have been occupied by the right wing; but these generals seem to -have taken up their positions with no more idea of their object or of -their influence upon the result of the battle than had the men in the -ranks. - - * * * * * - -The selection made by Von Benedek of a field for the coming battle -cannot be condemned. On the whole, the position was a strong one, and -the fault lay in the dispositions purposely made, or accidentally -assumed, rather than in any inherent weakness in the position. - -According to some writers, Von Benedek committed an error in holding -his advanced posts in the villages on the Bistritz with small forces -(which in some cases did not exceed a battalion), while the Prussian -advanced-guards generally consisted of a brigade at least. Derrécagaix -says: “It was of importance to the Imperial Army to compel the Prussian -forces to deploy at the earliest moment; to tire them before their -arrival at the Bistritz; to dispute the passage of that river, which -constituted an obstacle, in order that they might approach the main -position only after having exhausted their efforts and lost their -_élan_ through heavy casualties.” To this end, he suggests that the -Austrians should have established west of the Bistritz, on the two -roads by which the Prussians must necessarily have advanced, two strong -advanced posts, composed of troops of all three arms, and sufficiently -strong to resist the enemy’s advanced-guards. He continues: “The -Bistritz formed a first line of defense, on which it would have been -possible to check the assailant’s efforts. It possessed the peculiarity -of having all along its course villages distant from 1,000 to 1,500 -meters, and separated by marshy meadows with difficult approaches. With -some batteries in rear of the intervals which separated the villages, -it would have been possible to hold them a certain time, and compel -the enemy to execute a complete deployment. The Imperial Army had, -it is true, on the Bistritz and beyond, detachments of considerable -strength. But they played an insignificant part, by reason of the -orders given, or modified their positions in the morning. As a result, -the line of the Bistritz, its banks, the villages and the woods beyond, -were occupied by the Prussians without great efforts, and they had from -that moment defensive _points d’appui_ on which it was possible to -await events and sustain the fight.” - -It is impossible to agree fully with Derrécagaix on this point. -Speaking of defensible points in front of a position, Hamley says: -“A feature of this kind will be especially valuable in front of what -would otherwise be a weak part of the position. Strong in itself, and -its garrison constantly reinforced from the line; while the ground -in front is swept by batteries, such a point is difficult to attack -directly; the enemy cannot attempt to surround it without exposing the -flank and rear of the attacking troops; and to pass by it in order -to reach the position, the assailants must expose their flank to its -fire. If several such points exist, they support each other, isolate -the parts of the enemy’s attack, and force him to expend his strength -in costly attacks on them: in fact, they play the part of bastions -in a line of fortification. But it is important that they should be -within supporting distance and easy of covered access from the rear; -failing these conditions, they had better be destroyed, if possible, as -defenses, and abandoned to the enemy.” - -Now, none of the advanced posts in question were in front of a -weak part of the position (for the line adopted by Von Benedek was -incomparably stronger than anything on the line of the Bistritz), and -it would have been impossible to use artillery in them with anything -like the murderous effect produced by the batteries on the line -Lipa-Problus. They were more than a mile and a quarter in front of -the position, and were not “easy of covered access from the rear.” -They were, it is true, within supporting distance of each other; -but, while attacking them, the Prussians would have been beyond the -best effect of the powerful artillery in the main Austrian line. The -preliminary combats would have largely fallen on the infantry; and, -owing to the inferior arms and impaired _morale_ of his infantry, it -was, doubtless, the first aim of the Austrian commander to use his -artillery to the fullest extent; for in that arm he knew that he was -superior to the Prussians. Von Benedek’s plan was, apparently, to lure -Frederick Charles into a position where he should have the Bistritz at -his back; where he should be at the mercy of the Austrian artillery; -and where he could be overwhelmed by the attack of superior numbers of -infantry and cavalry, after he had been demoralized and shattered by -a crushing cannonade. The Bistritz (above Lubno) is an insignificant -obstacle; but it might have been a troublesome obstruction in the rear -of a defeated army. Had the Crown Prince been delayed five or six -hours, it is probable that Von Benedek’s plan would have succeeded. The -terrible battering which Frederick Charles received, as it actually -was, is shown by the fact that his losses exceeded those of the Second -Army and the Army of the Elbe combined. In fact, the event proved that, -so far as the repulse of a front attack was concerned, Von Benedek’s -position fulfilled every condition that could be desired; and it does -not seem that anything could have been gained by the occupation in -force of the villages on the Bistritz above Lubno. They should rather -have been abandoned and destroyed, and everything left to depend on the -magnificent position in rear--a position scarcely inferior in strength -to Marye’s Heights or St. Privat. - -The only village on the Bistritz that had any real value was Nechanitz. -Von Benedek’s weak points were his flanks. Had Nechanitz been occupied -in strong force, the turning of the Austrian left by the Army of the -Elbe would have been a matter of extreme difficulty, if not a downright -impossibility. We have seen that the retreat of the Austrian brigade -from Sadowa uncovered the flanks of the advanced posts, and compelled -the withdrawal of the troops successively from Dohalitz, Dohalica -and Mokrowous; and it might seem, at first, that the abandonment of -Nechanitz might have been caused in a similar manner: but such is -not the case. The heights in rear of that village, and between it -and Hradek, should have been held by two corps, from which a strong -detachment should have been placed in Nechanitz. This detachment could -easily have been reinforced as occasion demanded. Any attempt to make -a flank attack upon the village, from the direction of Popowitz, would -have been made over unfavorable ground, and the attacking force could -have been assailed in flank by Austrian troops from the heights. -Attempts to cross at Kuncitz or Boharna could have been promptly met -and repulsed; and attempts to cross further down would have extended -the Prussian front to such a degree as to expose it to a dangerous -counter-attack through Nechanitz. This occupation of Nechanitz would, -it is true, have thrust Von Benedek’s left flank forward, towards the -enemy; but that flank would have been strong in numbers and position; -it would have been covered by the Bistritz (where that stream is -swollen into a true obstacle); and it would have occupied a position -commanding Nechanitz and Kuncitz, and within easy reinforcing distance -of each. Nechanitz would have been to Von Benedek’s left what Hougomont -was to Wellington’s right; and in the event of Austrian success, it -would have given the same enveloping front that the British had at -Waterloo. The neglect of Von Benedek to hold Nechanitz in force is -surprising; for the position of his reserves indicates that he expected -an attack upon his left--a not unsound calculation, as his main line of -retreat lay in rear of his left wing. - -On the right there were three positions, any one of which might have -been so occupied as to check the attack of the Crown Prince; namely: 1. -The line Trotina-Horenowes; 2. The line Trotina-Sendrasitz-Maslowed; -3. The line Lochenitz-Nedelist-Chlum. The first is regarded as the -best by the Austrian Staff. The third is the one actually chosen by -Von Benedek, but not taken up, owing to a misunderstanding of orders. -Without undertaking to discuss in detail the dispositions that should -have been made by the Austrian commander, or the relative merits of the -three defensive positions available on the right, the assertion may -be ventured that, in order to make them well suited to the ground and -the circumstances of the battle, the Austrian dispositions actually -made needed only to be modified so as to make the left strong in the -vicinity of Nechanitz and the heights of Hradek, and to occupy any one -of the three defensive positions on the right with two corps, with -another corps in reserve within easy supporting distance. If then, -profiting by American experience, Von Benedek had covered his position -with hasty entrenchments (for the construction of which the battle -field afforded every facility), he should have been able to repulse -the combined Prussian armies; for the numerical odds against him were -not great at any time; his reserves would have been in a position -to push forward promptly to any point seriously endangered; and his -entrenchments would have fully counterbalanced the superior firearms -of the Prussian infantry. Though he could not, in all probability, -have gained a decisive victory, he could have inflicted greater losses -than he received, he could have given his adversaries a bloody check, -and the mere possession of a hard-fought field would have raised the -_morale_ of his depressed army. - -For a defensive battle, the formation on a salient angle would, in -this case, have been deprived of its usual objections. Considering the -nature of the country, and the enormous armies engaged, it is plain -that the whole force of the assailant could not be brought to bear on -one face of the angle; and the heights of Chlum would have served as a -huge traverse to protect the lines from enfilade fire by the enemy’s -artillery. - -A serious defect of the Austrian position was its want of proper -extent. As we have seen, the entire army occupied a position only six -and three-quarters miles long. Including the reserves, there were, -then, more than 30,000 men to a mile. The entire army was crowded, and -the cavalry had no room for action. The latter should have operated -across the Bistritz against the Prussian right; or (sacrificing itself -if necessary) it should have operated against the Prussian left, -opposing the advance of the Crown Prince, and gaining time for the -infantry to take up the new position. - - * * * * * - -The “spectacle of wildest flight and utter rout” in the passage of the -defeated army over the Elbe[15] would surely seem to support the views -of Derrécagaix, rather than those of Hozier, in regard to a position -with a river at its back, even though the river be spanned by many -bridges. Yet Von Benedek undoubtedly derived considerable advantage -from having the Elbe at his back; for the Prussian Staff History says: -“The Elbe formed a considerable barrier to any further immediate -pursuit. As soon as the bridges over the river were once reached by the -enemy--to whom moreover the fortress of Königgrätz, which commands so -large a tract of the surrounding country, afforded a perfectly secure -place of crossing--the pursuers were obliged to make the detour by way -of Pardubitz.” If Von Benedek had encountered only a front attack, and -had been defeated, it is probable that the Elbe at his back would have -been advantageous to him in the highest degree; for the superb behavior -of his artillery and cavalry would have effectually covered the -retreat of his infantry over the numerous bridges, and the Elbe would -have played the same part in favor of the Austrians that the Mincio -did after Solferino. But the direction of the Crown Prince’s attack -destroyed the value of the bridges north of Königgrätz; and, but for -the protection afforded by the fortress, the Elbe, instead of being of -the slightest advantage, would have completely barred the retreat of a -great part of the Austrian army. - - * * * * * - -Von Benedek’s selection of his individual station for watching the -progress of the battle was unfortunate. From his station on the slope -between Lipa and Chlum, his view of the field was limited by the Swiep -Wald on the north, and Problus on the south; and his view of the -entire northeastern portion of the field was cut off by the hill and -village of Chlum. The hill of Chlum was his proper station, and the -church tower in that hamlet should have been used as a lookout by some -officer of his staff. From that point the Horica Berg, the heights -of Horenowes, the Swiep Wald, the village and wood of Sadowa, the -villages on the Bistritz (almost as far as Nechanitz), the villages -of Langenhof and Problus--in brief, every important part of the -field--can be plainly seen. Had this important lookout been utilized, -Von Benedek could not have been taken by surprise by the advance of the -Crown Prince. Even the rain, mist and low-hanging smoke could not have -wholly obscured the advance of the Second Army from view; for the Crown -Prince was able to trace the direction of the contending lines from the -heights of Choteborek, a point much farther from the scene of action -than Maslowed and Horenowes are from Chlum. Von Benedek’s neglect to -make use of the church tower of Chlum probably had not a little to do -with the extent of his defeat.[16] - - * * * * * - -Among the causes of Prussian success in this campaign, the needle gun -has been given a high place by all writers; and Colonel Home, in his -admirable “_Précis_ of Modern Tactics,” says: “It is not a little -remarkable that rapidity of fire has twice placed Prussia at the head -of the military nations of Europe--in 1749 and 1866.” Nevertheless, -the importance of the breech-loader in this campaign has probably been -over-estimated. The moral and physical effects of the needle gun upon -the Austrian soldiers were tremendous, and were felt from the very -beginning of the campaign. All other things equal, the needle gun -would have given the victory to the Prussians; but all other things -were _not_ equal. The strategy and tactics of the Prussians were as -much superior to those of their opponents as the needle gun was to the -Austrian muzzle-loader. In every case, the Prussian victory was due to -greater numbers or better tactics, rather than to superior rapidity of -fire; and when we consider the tactical features of each engagement, it -is hard to see how the result could have been different, even if the -Prussians had been no better armed than their adversaries. The needle -gun, undoubtedly, enabled the Prussian Guards to repulse the attacks -of the Austrian reserves at Chlum; but the battle had already gone -irretrievably against the Austrians, and if they had driven back the -Guards, the Ist and Vth Corps would have quickly recovered the lost -ground, and the result would have been the same. Derrécagaix, too, -overestimates the influence of the needle gun when he points, for proof -of its value, to the great disparity of loss between the Prussians -and Austrians at Königgrätz. The same enormous disproportion of loss -existed in favor of the Germans at Sedan, though the needle gun was -notoriously inferior to the Chassepot. This inequality of loss is to be -attributed mainly to the superior strategical and tactical movements -of the Prussians, by which, in both these battles, they crowded their -opponents into a limited space, and crushed them with a concentric fire. - -It is a remarkable fact, moreover, that the superiority of the needle -gun over the muzzle-loader did not arise so much from the greater -rapidity of fire, as from the greater rapidity and security of loading. -Baron Stoffel says: “On the 29th of June, 1866, at Königinhof, the -Prussians had a sharp action with the enemy. After the action, which -took place in fields covered with high corn, Colonel Kessel went over -the ground, and to his astonishment, found five or six Austrian bodies -for every dead Prussian. The Austrians killed had been mostly hit in -the head. His [Kessel’s] men, far from firing fast, had hardly fired as -many rounds as the enemy. The Austrian officers who were made prisoners -said to the Prussians: ‘Our men are demoralized, not by the rapidity -of your fire, for we could find some means, perhaps, to counterbalance -that, but because you are always ready to fire. This morning your men, -like ours, were concealed in the corn; but, in this position, yours -could, without being seen, load their rifles easily and rapidly: ours, -on the other hand, were compelled to stand up and show themselves when -they loaded, and you then took the opportunity of firing at them. -Thus we had the greatest difficulty in getting our men to stand up at -all; and such was their terror when they did stand up to load that -their hands trembled, and they could hardly put the cartridge into the -barrel. Our men fear the advantage the quick and easy loading of the -needle gun gives you; it is this that demoralizes them. In action they -feel themselves disarmed the greater part of the time, whereas you are -always ready to fire.’” - -As to rapidity of fire, it only remains to add that in the battle of -Königgrätz the number of cartridges fired by the infantry averaged -scarcely more than one round per man. This, however, is largely -accounted for by the fact that during a great part of the battle -the Austrian artillery kept most of Frederick Charles’ army beyond -effective infantry fire, as well as by the circumstance that a large -part of the Crown Prince’s army did not fire a shot--the Vth Corps not -coming into action at all. - -The needle gun was of inestimable value to the Prussians, but it -was by no means the principal cause of their triumph. The great -cause of the success of Prussia was, without doubt, the thorough -military preparation which enabled her to take the field while her -adversaries were yet unprepared, and to begin operations the minute -war was declared. This, combined with the able strategy of Von Moltke, -enabled the Prussians to seize the initiative; to throw the Austrians -everywhere upon the defensive; and to strike them with superior numbers -at every move, so that Von Benedek’s troops were demoralized before the -decisive battle was fought. - - * * * * * - -The tactics of the Prussians can be best described in the words of -Derrécagaix: - -“In advancing to the attack, the Prussian divisions generally adopted, -in this battle, a formation in three groups; the advanced-guard, -the center and the reserve. In the 7th Division, for instance, the -advanced-guard consisted of four battalions, four squadrons, one -battery and one-half company of pioneers. The center, or main body, was -composed of six battalions and one battery. In the reserve there were -one and three-fourths battalions, two batteries and one and one-half -companies of pioneers. - -“These dispositions enabled them to launch against the first points -assailed a succession of attacks, which soon gave a great numerical -superiority to the assailants. This accounts for the rapidity with -which the points of support fell into the hands of the Prussians. Their -groups gained the first shelter by defiling behind the rising ground, -and when a point was stubbornly defended, the artillery opened fire -upon it, while the infantry sought to turn it by pushing forward on the -flanks.” - -On this point Hamley says: “When it is said that the Prussians are -specially alive to the necessity of flank attacks, it is not to be -supposed that the turning of the enemy’s line alone is meant; for -that is a matter for the direction of the commanding general, and -concerns only a fraction of the troops engaged. The common application -lies in the attack of all occupied ground which is wholly or in -part disconnected from the general line, such as advanced posts, -hamlets, farm buildings, woods, or parts of a position which project -bastion-like, and are weakly defended in flank.” - -The Prussians seem, in almost every case, to have advanced to the -attack in company columns, supported by half-battalion columns, or even -by battalions formed in double column on the center. Though the columns -were preceded by skirmishers, the latter seem to have played only the -comparatively unimportant part of feeling and developing the enemy; and -the present system by which a battle is begun, continued and ended, -by a constantly reinforced skirmish line, was not yet dreamed of. It -is remarkable that, after witnessing the destructive effects of the -needle gun upon their adversaries, the Prussians should have retained -their old attack formation, until, four years later, the thickly strewn -corpses of the Prussian Guards at St. Privat gave a ghastly warning -that the time had come for a change. - -It is interesting to compare the tactical features of the campaign of -1866 with those of our own war. The necessity of launching upon the -points assailed a succession of attacks was recognized in the tactical -disposition frequently made, during the War of Secession, in which -the assaulting divisions were drawn up in three lines of brigades, -at distances of about 150 yards, the leading brigade being preceded -by one, or sometimes two, lines of skirmishers.[17] The skirmishers -being reinforced by, and absorbed in, the first line, the latter, if -checked, being reinforced and pushed forward by the second, and the -third line being similarly absorbed, the assaulting force, at the -moment of collision, generally consisted of all the successive lines -merged into one dense line. This formation was the outgrowth of bitter -experience in attacking in column, though the attack with battalions -ployed in close column had not altogether disappeared in 1864.[18] In -comparison with the beautiful tactics by which the Germans now attack, -with a firing line constantly reinforced from supports and reserves -kept in small columns for the double purpose of obtaining the greatest -possible combination of mobility and shelter, the attack formation -used in the Civil War seems far from perfect; but it was certainly -superior to the Prussian attack formation of 1866, for it recognized -the hopelessness of attacks in column, and provided for the successive -reinforcement of an attacking line. General Sherman, in describing the -tactics in use in his campaigns, says: “The men generally fought in -strong skirmish lines, taking advantage of the shape of the ground, and -of every cover.” Dispositions being, of course, made for the constant -reinforcement of these lines, we find Sherman’s army habitually using -tactics embracing the essential features of the German tactics of the -present day.[19] - -The Austrian infantry tactics possessed the double attribute of -antiquity and imbecility. Major Adams, of the Royal Military and Staff -Colleges, says: “Since the Italian war, when Napoleon III. declared -that ‘arms of precision were dangerous only at a distance,’ it had -been the endeavor of Austria to imitate the tactics to which she -attributed her own defeat. If the uniform success of the French in -1859 had established the trustworthiness of the Emperor’s theory, how -much more necessary must it now be to arrive at close quarters, where -precision was accompanied by unusual rapidity of fire? The more recent -experiences of the American war would seem indeed to have excited but -little interest in Austria. Could it really be reasonably expected -that Austrian soldiers should effect what American generals had long -discarded as no longer to be attained? The advocacy of the bayonet, so -loudly proclaimed in Austrian circles, would surely have elicited a -contemptuous smile from the veterans of the Army of the Potomac. During -three years of war, but 143 cases of bayonet wounds were treated in the -northern hospitals; of these, but two-thirds were received in action, -and six only proved eventually fatal. How, then, could it be imagined -that tactics, which had already failed against the common rifle, ... -should now prevail against the Prussian breech-loaders? The manner in -which these naked Austrian battalions were ignorantly flung against the -murderous fire of the enemy soon produced results which every novice -in the art of war will readily appreciate. Even under cover the dread -of the Prussian weapon became such that, as the enemy approached, the -Austrian infantry either broke or surrendered.” - - * * * * * - -The important aid that the Austrians might have derived from hasty -entrenchments has already been pointed out.[20] In not one single -instance did they make use of such shelter-trenches or breastworks -as were habitually used by the American armies, though the theater -of war offered the best of opportunities for the quick construction -and valuable use of such works. Such attempts at the construction of -entrenchments as were made, savor more of the days of Napoleon than -of the era of arms of precision. But the Austrians were not alone in -their neglect to profit by American experience in this respect. It -was not until Osman Pasha showed on European soil the value of hasty -entrenchments, that European military men generally took note of a -lesson of war that they might have learned thirteen years earlier.[21] - - * * * * * - -The great value of hasty entrenchments, and the immeasurable -superiority of fire action over “cold steel,” were not the only lessons -taught by our war which were unheeded by Austrian soldiers steeped -in conservatism and basking serenely in the sunshine of their own -military traditions. Their use of cavalry showed either an ignorance -of, or contempt for, the experience of the American armies; but, in -this respect, the Austrians were not less perspicacious than their -adversaries. The campaign produced some fine examples of combats -between opposing forces of cavalry; but it also produced many instances -in which the Austrians hurled their cavalry against intact infantry -armed with breech-loaders, only to learn from their own defeat and an -appalling list of killed and wounded, that they had applied the tactics -of a past age to the conditions of a new era. Both armies seem to have -been afraid to let their cavalry get out of sight, and to have reserved -their mounted troops solely for use on the field of battle. If they had -studied the great raids of the American cavalry leaders, they would -have learned a lesson which there were excellent opportunities to apply. - -It would, probably, have been impossible for the Austrian cavalry to -cut the Prussian communications before the junction of the invading -armies was effected. A cavalry column attempting to move around the -left of Frederick Charles would almost certainly have been caught -between the First Army and the impassable Isergebirge, and captured -before doing any damage. A column moving around the Prussian right, -into Saxony, would have encountered the cavalry division of Von Mülbe’s -reserve corps, to say nothing of the infantry and artillery; and the -movement would, doubtless, have come to naught. A movement against the -communications of the Crown Prince could have been made only _via_ the -valley of the Oder, where it could have been effectually opposed. But -it is certain that after the battle of Königgrätz the Austrians had -it in their power to balk the advance of Von Moltke by operating with -cavalry against his communications. In this case the raiders would have -been operating in their own country, and among a friendly population; -the railways could have been cut without difficulty, and the cavalry -could have retreated without serious danger of being intercepted. The -effect upon the invading army does not admit of doubt. We have seen -that, with unobstructed communications, the Prussian army was subjected -to no slight distress, after the battle of Münchengrätz, for want of -rations. Even two days after peace had been agreed upon, the Austrian -garrison of Theresienstadt, ignorant of the termination of the war, -by a successful sally destroyed the railway bridge near Kralup. The -line of communication of the Prussians with the secondary base of -supplies at Turnau was thus broken; and, though hostilities were at -an end, the invaders were subjected to much inconvenience. It is easy -to imagine what would have been the effect upon the Prussians during -their advance to the Danube, if a Stuart, a Forrest or a Grierson had -operated against the railways upon which the supply of the invading -army necessarily depended. - -Nor were the raiding opportunities altogether on the side of the -Austrians. The Prague-Olmütz line of railway, of the most vital -importance to Von Benedek, ran parallel to the Silesian frontier, -and in close proximity to it. This line of railway should have been -a tempting object to a raiding column of cavalry. If it had been cut -at any point near Böhmisch-Trübau, the Austrian army would have been -in sore straits for supplies. Vigorous and determined cavalry raids -against the railroad between Böhmisch-Trübau and Olmütz would surely -have been productive of good results, even if the road had not been -cut; for Von Benedek was extremely solicitous about his communications -in this part of the theater (as is shown by his long detention of the -IId Corps in this region), and an alert and enterprising raider might -have found means of detaining from the main Austrian army a force much -larger than his own. - -But neither the Austrian nor the Prussian cavalry was so armed as to -be able to make raiding movements with much hope of success. Cavalry -without the power of using effective fire-action can never accomplish -anything of importance on a raid; for a small force of hostile infantry -can easily thwart its objects. The dragoon regiments were armed with -the carbine, it is true, but they seem to have been studiously taught -to feel a contempt for its use. At Tischnowitz (on the advance from -Königgrätz to Brünn) a Prussian advanced-guard, consisting of dragoons, -kept off a large force of Austrian cavalry by means of carbine fire, -until the arrival of reinforcements enabled the dragoons to charge -with the saber. According to Hozier, the Austrian cavalry pulled up -sharply, “half surprised, half frightened, to find that a carbine could -be of any use, except to make noise or smoke, in the hands of a mounted -man.” Yet nothing seems to have been learned from this incident, and -it was not until a brigade of German cavalry, consisting of three -regiments, was stopped at the village of Vibray, in December, 1870, -by a bare dozen of riflemen, and the Uhlans were everywhere forced to -retire before the undisciplined _Francs-tireurs_, that the necessity of -fire-action on the part of all cavalry was forced home to the Germans. -Even yet the strategical value of the American cavalry raids seems -to be under-estimated by European military critics, who seem also to -regard anything like extensive fire-action on the part of cavalry as -scarcely short of military heresy. Von der Goltz says: “Much has been -spoken in modern times of far-reaching excursions of great masses of -cavalry in the flank and rear of the enemy, which go beyond the object -of intelligence, and have for their aim the destruction of railways, -telegraph wires, bridges, magazines and depots. The American War of -Secession made us familiar with many such ‘raids,’ on which the names -of a Stuart, an Ashby, a Morgan and others, attained great renown. -But, in attempting to transfer them to our theaters of war, we must -primarily take into consideration the different nature, civilization -and extent of the most European countries, but more especially those -of the west. Then, regard must be paid to the different constitution -of the forces. If a squadron of horse, improvised by a partisan, was -defeated in such an enterprise, or if, when surrounded by the enemy, it -broke itself up, that was of little consequence. It was only necessary -that it was first paid for by some successes. Quite a different -impression would be caused by the annihilation of one of our cavalry -regiments, that by history and tradition is closely bound up with the -whole army, and which, when once destroyed, cannot so easily rise again -as can a volunteer association of adventurous farmers’ sons. - -“The thorough organization of the defensive power of civilized nations -is also a preventive to raids. Even when the armies have already -marched away, squadrons of horse can, in thickly populated districts, -with a little preparation, be successfully repulsed by levies. The -French _Francs-tireurs_ in the western departments attacked our -cavalry, as soon as they saw it isolated.” - -With all deference to the great military writer here quoted, it is -impossible to concede that he has grasped the true idea of cavalry -raids. The slight esteem in which he holds “a volunteer association -of adventurous farmers’ sons” is not surprising, for Europeans have -rarely formed a just idea of American volunteers, and the effective -fire-action of the American cavalry seems to be taken by foreign -critics as proof positive that those troops were not _cavalry_, but -merely mounted infantry--a view not shared by those who participated in -the saber charges of Merritt, Custer and Devin. As to the annihilation -of a Prussian cavalry regiment, there should be no objection to the -annihilation of any regiment, however rich it may be in glorious -history and tradition, provided that the emergency demands it, and the -results obtained be of sufficient value to justify the sacrifice. Von -Bredow’s charge at Mars-la-Tour was deemed well worth the sacrifice of -two superb cavalry regiments; yet the results obtained by that famous -charge certainly were not greater than those achieved by Van Dorn in -the capture of Holly Springs. The former is supposed to have stopped -a dangerous French attack; the latter is known to have checked a -Federal campaign at its outset. Even had Van Dorn’s entire force been -captured or slain (instead of escaping without loss) the result would -have justified the sacrifice. Nor is the danger of annihilation great, -if the cavalry be properly armed and trained. That cavalry untrained -in fire-action can be successfully repulsed by levies, in thickly -populated districts, is undoubtedly true; but such cavalry as that -which, under Wilson, dismounted and carried entrenchments by a charge -on foot, would hardly be stopped by such troops as _Francs-tireurs_ or -any other hasty levies that could be raised in a country covered with -villages. Superior mobility should enable cavalry to avoid large forces -of infantry, and it should be able to hold its own against any equal -force of opposing cavalry or infantry. The objections of Von der Goltz -and Prince Hohenlohe to raids by large bodies of cavalry, lose their -force if we consider the cavalry so armed and trained as to be capable -of effective fire-action. When cavalry is so armed and organized as to -make it possible for Prince Hohenlohe to state that a cavalry division -of six regiments “could put only 1,400 carbines into the firing line,” -and that “in a difficult country it could have no chance against even a -battalion of infantry decently well posted,” we must acknowledge that a -respectable raid is out of the question. - -We do not find, in 1866, the cavalry pushed forward as a strategic -veil covering the operations of the army. On the contrary we find the -cavalry divisions kept well to the rear, and the divisional cavalry -alone entrusted with reconnoissance duty, which it performed in -anything but an efficient manner. At Trautenau, Von Bonin’s cavalry -does not seem to have followed the retreat of Mondl, or to have -discovered the approach of Von Gablentz. If it was of any use whatever, -the fact is not made apparent in history. At Nachod, Steinmetz’s -cavalry did better, and gave timely warning of the approach of the -enemy; but generally, throughout the campaign, the Prussian cavalry -did not play a part of much importance either in screening or -reconnoitering. It profited greatly by its experience, however, and -in the Franco-German war we find it active, alert, ubiquitous, and -never repeating the drowsy blunder committed when it allowed Frederick -Charles unwittingly to bivouac within four miles and a half of Von -Benedek’s entire army, or the inertness shown when it permitted the -Austrian army to escape from all touch, sight or hearing, for three -days, after the battle of Königgrätz. - -On the part of the Austrians, the cavalry was even more negligent -and inefficient. Outpost and reconnoissance duties were carelessly -performed; and Von Benedek was greatly hampered by a want of timely -and correct information of the enemy’s movements. In only one instance -does the Austrian cavalry seem to have been used profitably; namely, in -covering the retreat of the defeated army at Königgrätz. In the words -of Hozier: “Although operations had been conducted in its own country, -where every information concerning the Prussian movements could have -been readily obtained from the inhabitants, the Austrian cavalry had -made no raids against the flank or rear of the advancing army, had -cut off no ammunition or provision trains, had broken up no railway -communications behind the marching columns, had destroyed no telegraph -lines between the front and the base of supplies, had made no sudden -or night attacks against the outposts so as to make the weary infantry -stand to their arms and lose their night’s rest, and, instead of -hovering around the front and flanks to irritate and annoy the pickets, -had been rarely seen or fallen in with, except when it had been marched -down upon and beaten up by the Prussian advanced-guards.” Surely it -needed all the energy and valor shown in the last hours of Königgrätz -to atone, in even a small degree, for such inefficiency. - - * * * * * - -The full offensive value of artillery was not yet understood in any -army; and it is not surprising to notice in this campaign the utter -absence of the tactics which, in the war with France, brought the -German guns almost up to the skirmish line, and kept them actively -engaged at close range until the end of the battle. It is, however, -amazing to observe the slowness and general inefficiency of the -Prussian artillery in every action. At Trautenau, though there were 96 -guns belonging to Von Bonin’s corps, only 32 were brought into action, -while 42 remained in the immediate vicinity without firing a shot. The -remaining 22 guns do not seem to have reached the field at all. At -Soor the Austrians brought 64 guns into action; but of the 72 guns of -the Prussians, only 18 were brought into action from first to last. At -Nachod, Skalitz and Gitschin it is the same story--plenty of Prussian -artillery, but only a small portion of the guns brought into action, -and those without appreciable effect. - -Prince Hohenlohe says that in the entire campaign “the Prussian -artillery, which numbered as many pieces as its adversary, had only -once been able to obtain the numerical superiority. It had, on all -occasions, fought against forces two, three, or even four times -superior in number.” At Königgrätz the Prussian artillery was handled -with surprising feebleness. The Crown Prince finally succeeded in -bringing to bear on the Austrian right a force of artillery superior -in numbers to that opposed to him; but, even in this case, his guns -accomplished but little. As to the artillery of Frederick Charles, -it practically accomplished nothing at all; and it was scarcely of -more use on the Bistritz than it would have been in Berlin. From the -beginning to the end of the battle, the Austrians had everywhere a -decided superiority of artillery fire, except only in the one case on -their right. - -The Prussian Staff History says, in regard to the engagement south of -the Sadowa wood: “A want of unity in the direction of the artillery -was painfully evident on this part of the field. Two commandants of -regiments were on the spot, but the eleven batteries then present -belonged to five different artillery divisions, some of them to the -divisional artillery and some to the reserve. This accounts for the -want of unity of action at this spot; some batteries advanced perfectly -isolated, whilst others retired behind the Bistritz at the same time.” -To this Colonel Home adds: “A great deal of this was due to the fact -that the guns came into action on one side of a small, muddy, stream, -over which there were very few bridges, and across which bridges might -have been thrown with ease, while the wagons remained on the other.” It -may be further added, that the Prussian artillery seems to have been -unduly afraid of encountering infantry fire, and to have had a bad -habit of withdrawing to refit and to renew its ammunition. It is said -of the Prussian artillery, that “they planted themselves here and there -among the reserves, and never found places anywhere to engage.”[22] -On the march the artillery was kept too far to the rear, and, owing -to its inefficient action, the infantry, long before the close of the -campaign, generally showed a disposition to despise its help, and to -hurry into action without it, crowding the roads, and refusing to -let the guns pass. Much had been expected of their artillery by the -Prussians, and its feeble action was a severe disappointment to them. -It is to the glory of the Prussians that they were quick to fathom -the causes of the inefficiency of their artillery, and that they were -able, in four years, to replace the impotence of Königgrätz with the -annihilating “circle of fire” of Sedan. - -The Austrians far surpassed their adversaries in the skill and -effectiveness with which they used their artillery. The superiority of -the French artillery had largely contributed to the Austrian disasters -in Italy seven years before, and the lesson had not been forgotten. -From the beginning of the Campaign of 1866, the Austrian artillery was -an important factor in every engagement, and at Königgrätz it was -handled superbly. But, in every case, it was used defensively, and the -Austrian artillerists originated no new tactical features, and taught -no lessons that could not have been learned from Gettysburg, Malvern -Hill, Solferino, or even Wagram. - - * * * * * - -The concentration of the Prussian armies preparatory to hostilities -was made partly by marching, and partly by railroad transportation. -The work accomplished by the railroads may, perhaps, be best expressed -in the words of the Prussian Staff History: “The whole of the marches -and of the railway movements were so arranged by the General Staff, -in harmony with the railway department, that in their execution, in -which both the military and civil powers were concerned, no impediments -or delays could occur. The result of these arrangements was, that in -the twenty-one days allowed, 197,000 men, 55,000 horses, and 5,300 -wagons were transported for distances varying between 120 and 300 -miles, without any failure, and in such a manner that they attained the -required spots at the very hour requisite.” Prussia was thus enabled, -in the short space of three weeks, to place 325,000 men on the hostile -frontiers, of which number 267,000 were ready for operations against -Austria. Yet, great as this achievement was, it shows that the Prussian -military system had not yet reached the perfection shown in 1870, when -nineteen days sufficed for the mobilization of an army of 440,000 -Germans, and its concentration on the frontier of France. - -Further than in the matter of mobilization and concentration, the use -of railways in the Austro-Prussian war presented no new features. In -the matter of supplying armies in the field, the small area of the -theater of war, and the inertness of the cavalry, were such that it -is almost impossible to make a comparison of the use of railways in -this campaign with the use of the same means of transport in the War -of Secession. If we imagine a Prussian army pushing entirely through -the Austrian Empire, to the vicinity of Belgrade, and dependent for its -supplies on a single line of railway, back to a base on the Prussian -frontier; and if we imagine, moreover, that the Austrian cavalry -possessed vigilance, enterprise, good firearms and modern ideas, -instead of being a mere military anachronism, we can picture a parallel -to Sherman’s Atlanta campaign. - - * * * * * - -In regard to the use of the electric telegraph by the Prussians, -Hamley says: “The telegraphic communication between the two Prussian -armies invading Bohemia in 1866 was not maintained up to the battle -of Königgrätz: had it been, and had the situation on both sides been -fully appreciated, their joint attack might have been so timed as -to obviate the risk of separate defeat which the premature onset of -Prince Frederick Charles’ army entailed.” Yet Hozier describes in -glowing terms the equipment of Frederick Charles’ telegraph train, -and speaks with somewhat amusing admiration of the feat of placing -the Prince’s headquarters, at the castle of Grafenstein, in direct -telegraphic communication with Berlin, though the castle was five -miles from the nearest permanent telegraph station. With each of the -Prussian armies was a telegraph train, provided with the wire and other -material requisite for the construction of forty miles of line. Yet, -though communication was opened between the Crown Prince and Frederick -Charles early on June 30th; though there were three days in which -to construct a telegraph line; though the headquarters at Gitschin, -Kamenitz and Königinhof could have been put in direct communication -without exhausting much more than half the capacity of a single -telegraph train, the Prussians neglected even to preserve telegraphic -communications to the rear of their armies (and thus with each other -_via_ Berlin), and, as we have seen, staked their success upon the safe -delivery of a message carried by a courier, over an unknown road, on a -night of pitchy darkness. Here again a valuable lesson might have been -learned from the Americans.[23] - - * * * * * - -Though the War of Secession was begun without military preparation on -either side; though its earlier operations sometimes presented features -that would have been ludicrous but for the earnestness and valor -displayed, and the mournful loss of life which resulted; our armies -and generals grew in excellence as the war continued; and before the -close of the conflict, the art of war had reached a higher development -in America than it attained in Europe in 1866, and, in some respects, -higher than it reached in 1870. - -Notwithstanding the excellent organization, the superior arms and -thorough preparation of the Prussian armies; notwithstanding the genius -of Von Moltke and the intelligence and energy of his subordinates, -the prime cause of Austrian failure is found in the neglect of the -Austrian generals to watch the development of the art of war on our -side of the Atlantic. Had they profited by our experience, their -infantry, on one side of the theater of operations, would have been -able, behind entrenchments, to contain many more than their own numbers -of the Prussians; and Von Benedek, profiting by his interior lines, -could then have thrown superior numbers against the other armies of -his adversary. Opposing the Prussian columns with heavy skirmish -lines constantly reinforced from the rear, the men of the firing line -availing themselves of the cover afforded by the ground, he would have -neutralized, by superior tactics, the superior arms of his opponent. -His cavalry, instead of using the tactics of a by-gone age, would have -been used, in part, in cutting the Prussian communications, bringing -their advance to a halt, gaining time for him, when time was of -priceless value, and enabling him to seize the initiative. - -Possibly the war might, nevertheless, have resulted in Prussian -success; for Von Moltke has always shown a power to solve quickly, -and in the most perfect manner, any problem of war with which he has -been confronted, while Von Benedek had only the half-development of -a general possessing tactical skill without strategical ability. -But the great Prussian strategist would have failed in his first -plan of campaign, and he could have been successful only when, like -his opponent, he availed himself of the new developments in warfare -illustrated by the American campaigns. The Seven Weeks’ War would have -been at least a matter of months; Austria would not have been struck -down at a single blow; other nations might have been drawn into the -prolonged conflict, and the entire history of Europe might have been -different. - -[Illustration: KÖNIGGRÄTZ TO THE DANUBE] - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] These guns were classed, not according to the weight of the -projectile, but according to the diameter of the bore. Thus the gun -firing a 15-lb. shell was rated as a 6-pdr., because the diameter of -its bore was the same as that of a 6-pdr. smooth-bore gun. - -[2] See frontispiece map. - -[3] It may be of assistance to the reader, in the following pages, to -note that the divisions in the Prussian army are numbered consecutively -throughout the several army corps. Thus, the Ist Corps consists of the -1st and 2d Divisions; the IId Corps, of the 3d and 4th Divisions; the -VIth Corps, of the 11th and 12th Divisions, and so on. - -[4] Derrécagaix and the Prussian Official History both condemn Von -Clausewitz’s delay. Adams, however, finds an excuse for it. He says: -“The first question that arises is, should Clausewitz have occupied -Trautenau? Mondl was up, in all probability, and he would have been -deeply engaged before Grossmann [commanding the right column] came -up, against orders. He could not have been acquainted with the -situation, for Bonin himself was not, and it is difficult, therefore, -to attach blame to him. The cause of Grossmann’s delay is said to -have been the hilly character of the road. Mondl, on the other hand, -reaching Hohenbrück about 7:30, seems to have halted there to form. -The Austrian official account states that he had occupied the heights -since 9:15, and before this he had reached Hohenbrück at 7:45. When -he had formed--that is to say, waited to mass his brigade before -deploying--the position must have been taken up by him between 8:30 and -9:15. Had Clausewitz advanced, it would have taken three-quarters of -an hour to debouch in force south of Trautenau, so that he would have -had to continue his march without halting to cross the Aupa, and push -forward from Trautenau, contrary to orders, in order to engage Mondl on -the very strong ground he by that time had fully occupied. - -“Probably the latter was informed ... that no immediate danger was -impending, or he would not have waited leisurely to form. The first -duty of the advance, on coming into collision with the enemy, is to -occupy rapidly such localities as may prove of use in the impending -action.” - -Nevertheless, the fact remains that the heights were unoccupied when -Von Clausewitz arrived at Parschnitz; and it was _his_ duty, as well -as that of Mondl, on coming into collision with the enemy, to occupy -rapidly such localities as might have proved of use in the impending -action. As to engaging Mondl “on the very strong ground he by that -time had fully occupied,” it is sufficient to state that he had only a -brigade, while Von Clausewitz had a division. A subordinate commander -assumes a grave responsibility when he violates or exceeds his orders; -but it is hardly to be expected that an able division commander will -fetter himself by observing the strict letter of an order, when he -knows, and his superior does not know, that the condition of affairs -in his front is such as to offer an opportunity for a successful and -valuable stroke, even though that stroke be not contemplated in the -orders of his chief. Von Alvensleben understood matters better when -he marched without orders to assist Von Fransecky at Königgrätz. -If a division commander were never expected to act upon his own -responsibility when a movement is urged by his own common sense, it is -evident that the position of general of division could be filled by a -man of very limited abilities. - -[5] “While this was going on a staff-officer ... of General -Beauregard’s headquarters ... came up to General Bragg and said, -‘The General directs that the pursuit be stopped; the victory is -sufficiently complete; it is needless to expose our men to the fire -of the gun-boats.’ General Bragg said, ‘My God! was a victory ever -sufficiently complete?’”--_Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. -I., p. 605._ - -[6] The above criticism on the delay of Frederick Charles is based -mainly on the comments of Major Adams, in his “Great Campaigns in -Europe.” Hozier, who, in the main, follows the Prussian Staff History -of the war, has nothing but praise for the Prince. The absence of -adverse criticism on the action of Frederick Charles in the Prussian -Official History is, perhaps, explained by the high military and -social position of that general. Adams seems to think that a forward -movement by Frederick Charles would have caused Clam-Gallas to abandon -Münchengrätz at once, and does not seem to consider that if the -Austro-Saxons had not been dislodged, Clam-Gallas would have had the -Prussian communications by the throat, while covering his own, and -that this advantage might have compensated him for his separation from -Von Benedek. It may be urged in objection to these comments, that -Frederick Charles did not know the exact condition of affairs in his -front at the time. To this it may be replied that ability to appreciate -a strategical advantage, and power to form a correct estimate of the -enemy’s dispositions, are a test of a general’s merits as a strategist. -McClellan is not excused for believing that, when Lee was attacking -his right at Gaines’ Mill, the enemy was in strong force between the -Federal army and Richmond; and Hamley is not gentle in his comments on -Napoleon’s failure to estimate correctly the force and dispositions -of the Prussians at Jena; though, being an Englishman, he does not -hesitate to adopt another standard of criticism when he finds it -necessary to defend Wellington for his error in leaving at Hal 17,000 -men so sorely needed at Waterloo.--[See Hamley’s “Operations of War,” -p. 94 _et seq._, and p. 198]. - -[7] It should be remembered that, in addition to the four corps -immediately opposed to the Crown Prince, the IIId and IId Austrian -Corps were at Von Benedek’s disposal; the latter being scarcely more -than two marches distant from Josephstadt. - -[8] At the battle of Königgrätz, Frederick Charles had 123,918 men. -His losses at Gitschin aggregated 2,612 men. It seems, therefore, that -130,000 men is a high estimate of the maximum force which he would have -been able to oppose to Von Benedek at Gitschin, had the latter made a -junction with Clam-Gallas at that point. - -[9] Col. C. B. Brackenbury, R. A., who accompanied the Austrian -headquarters during the campaign, says that on one occasion he heard -Von Benedek say, hotly, to his disputing staff, “For God’s sake do -something!” and mentions the following incident: “After the battles of -Nachod and Trautenau the second officer of the Intelligence Department -examined all the prisoners, and obtained clear information of the -whereabouts of all the columns of the Crown Prince, then struggling -through the mountain passes. He wrote his report and took it to the -officer who had been sent to Benedek to decide the strategy of the -campaign. At that time several Austrian corps were close by. The -General looked at the paper and had all the facts explained to him. He -then dismissed the Captain, who, however, remained and said, probably -in that tone of distrust which prevailed, ‘Now, Herr General, I have -shown you that the Crown Prince can be beaten in detail if attacked by -our great force within half a day’s march; may I ask what you propose -to do with the Austrian army?’ The General replied, ‘I shall send it -against Prince Frederick Charles.’ The Captain put his hands together -in an attitude of supplication and said, ‘For God’s sake, sir, do -not,’ but was ordered out of the room. I did not know this fact when -Benedek said, the day after the defeat of Königgrätz, ‘Did you ever -see such a fine army so thrown away?’”--“_Field Works_,” by Col. C. B. -Brackenbury, R. A., p. 205 and note. - -[10] Gitschin, Jung Buntzlau, and Libau are shown on Map No. 6. The -positions of the other places here mentioned are, in reference to -Gitschin, as follows: Aulibitz, nearly 4 miles east; Chotec, about -7-1/2 miles east; Konetzchlum, about 6-1/2 miles east-south-east; -Milicowes, about 4-1/2 miles south-south-east; Podhrad, about 2 miles -south-west; Robaus, about 2 miles east; Dworetz, near, and north of, -Robaus. - -[11] It is interesting to note the growth of great generals under the -influence of their actual experience in war. The Frederick of Rossbach -and Leuthen was very different from the Frederick of Mollwitz. In 1796 -we find Napoleon calling a council of war before hazarding a second -attempt upon Colli’s position at St. Michel, and showing, even in -that vigorous and brilliant campaign, a hesitation never shown by the -Napoleon of Ulm and Austerlitz. The Grant of Vicksburg was not the -Grant of Shiloh; and Lee at Chancellorsville and Petersburg does not -seem like the same commander who conducted the impotent campaign of -1861 in West Virginia. The old saying, “Great generals are born, not -made,” is not altogether true. It would be more correct to say, “Great -generals are born, and then made.” - -[12] The author’s own observations of the topography of the field -correspond, in the main, with the description given above. The -Bistritz, however, is not such a formidable obstacle as one might -infer from the description quoted. At the village of Sadowa it is a -mere ditch, not much larger than some of the _acequias_ in Colorado or -Utah. It is perhaps eight feet wide and three feet in depth. It could -hardly have been an obstacle to infantry. Its muddy bottom and marshy -banks doubtless rendered it a considerable obstacle for artillery, but -the eight villages through which it flows, within the limits of the -battle field, certainly could have furnished abundant material for -any number of small bridges required for crossing it. In the vicinity -of Nechanitz, the Bistritz, having received the waters of a tributary -creek, becomes a true obstacle, as it spreads out to a width of about -thirty yards, and the banks are swampy. It should be remarked that at -the time of the author’s visit to Königgrätz, there had been very heavy -rains, and the condition of the stream was probably the same as on the -day of the battle. - -[13] A sketch of these operations is given in the appendices. - -[14] The strength of the Union army at Gettysburg was 78,043. The -Confederate army numbered about 70,000. The Union army lost 3,072 -killed, and 14,497 wounded. The Confederates lost 2,592 killed, and -12,709 wounded. In comparing the losses of Gettysburg with those of -Königgrätz, no account is here taken of the “missing” in either the -Union or the Confederate losses; though the missing (exclusive of -prisoners) are figured in with the killed and wounded of the Prussian -and Austrian armies. The figures in regard to Gettysburg are taken from -the tables (compiled from official records) in “Battles and Leaders of -the Civil War.” The figures in regard to Königgrätz are taken from the -Prussian Official History. - -[15] See page 70. - -[16] Although the above comment coincides in its main features with the -criticism of Hozier on the same subject, it is based upon the author’s -own observation of the views of the field afforded from the church -tower of Chlum, and from Von Benedek’s position near Lipa. - -[17] For example, the formation of Sedgwick’s division at Antietam, -Meade’s at Fredericksburg, Pickett’s at Gettysburg, and Sheridan’s at -Chattanooga. - -[18] See the interesting comments of General J. D. Cox on the assaults -in column at Kenesaw Mountain, p. 129, Vol. IX., (“Atlanta”), -Scribner’s “Army and Navy in the Civil War.” - -[19] The following remarks of Captain F. N. Maude, R. E., on “The -Tactics of the American War” sustain the views expressed above, and are -interesting as showing an able English military critic’s appreciation -of the advanced tactical development of the American armies: - -“It is curious to note how little attention has been devoted to the -study of the fighting of this most bloody of modern wars; and yet it -would seem that the records of these campaigns fought out to the bitter -end by men of our own Anglo-Saxon races, would be a far more likely -source of information, from which to deduce the theory of an attack -formation specially designed to meet our needs, than the histories -of struggles between French and Germans, or Russians and Turks. Von -Moltke is reported to have said that ‘nothing was to be learnt from -the struggle of two armed mobs.’ If that is really the case, which we -venture to doubt exceedingly, the great strategist must ere this have -been sorry he ever spoke, for, armed mobs or not, both Southern and -Northern troops bore, and bore victoriously, a per centage of loss -before which even the best disciplined troops in Germany, the Prussian -Guard Corps, failed to make headway. It is of no relevance to the -argument to say that the breech-loader was not then in use. When a man -is hard hit himself, or sees his comrade rolled over, it never enters -his head to consider whether the hit was scored by muzzle-loader or -breech-loader; the fact itself, that he or the other man is down, is -the only one he concerns himself with, and when the percentage of hits -in a given time rises high enough, the attack collapses equally, no -matter against what weapon it may be delivered. - -“Actually, though the armament was inferior, the per centage of hits -was frequently far higher than in breech-loading campaigns. There is no -action on record during recent years in which the losses rose so high, -and in so short a time, as in the American fights.” - -After a brief description of Meagher’s attack at Fredericksburg, and -Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg, Captain Maude continues: - -“Surely, Moltke never spoke of such gallant soldiers as an armed mob, -seeing that they succeeded in driving an attack home against four -times the per centage of loss that stopped the Prussian guard at St. -Privat.... And assuming, for the moment, that the saying attributed to -him is really true, we cannot help fancying that he must have often -bitterly regretted it when watching his own men in the manœuvers of -late years, attacking in what is really, practically the same formation -which the armed mobs worked out for themselves. - -“The points of contrast between ourselves and the Americans are far -too numerous to be dismissed without comment. They began the war with -a drill book and system modeled on our own, and they carried it out to -its conclusion, with only a few modifications of detail, but none of -principle. The normal prescribed idea of an attack appears to have been -as follows: A line of scouts, thickened to skirmishers according to the -requirements of the ground; from 2 to 300 paces in rear, the 1st line, -two deep, precisely like our own, then in rear a 2d line and reserve. -Of course, their lines did not advance with the steady precision of our -old peninsula battalions. Their level of instruction was altogether -too low, and besides, the extent of fire-swept ground had greatly -increased. Eye witnesses say that after the first few yards, the line -practically dissolved itself into a dense line of skirmishers, who -threw themselves forward generally at a run as far as their momentum -would carry them; sometimes, if the distance was short, carrying the -position at the first rush, but more generally the heavy losses brought -them to a halt and a standing fire fight ensued. They knew nothing of -Scherff’s great principle, on which the ‘Treffen Abstande’ or distances -between the lines are based, but they generally worked it out in -practice pretty successfully. The second line came up in the best order -they could and carried the wreck of the first on with them; if they -were stopped, the reserve did the same for them, and either broke too, -or succeeded. - - * * * * * - -“It will be seen that except in its being more scientifically put -together, this German attack is, practically, precisely similar to -that employed by the Americans, with the sole difference that the -breech-loader has conferred on the assailants the advantage of being -able to make a more extended use of their weapons, and has reduced to a -certain extent the disadvantage of having to halt. - - * * * * * - -“Had we, in 1871, been thoroughly well informed as to the methods -employed across the Atlantic, we should have seen at once that the new -weapons did not necessarily entail any alteration in principle in our -drill book, and with a little alteration in detail, have attained at -one bound to a point of efficiency not reached even in Germany till -several years after the war.”--“_Tactics and Organization_,” by Capt. -F. N. Maude, R. E., p. 299, _et seq._ - -[20] See pp. 42 and 78. - -[21] In Clery’s “Minor Tactics” occurs the following astonishing -passage: “The use made of entrenchments by the Turks was not the least -remarkable feature of the war of 1877. Field works, as aids in defense, -had been used with advantage in previous wars, but no similar instance -exists of an impregnable system of earthworks being improvised under -the very noses of the enemy.” Col. Clery’s book is an evidence of his -intelligent study and thorough knowledge of European military history; -yet, as late as 1885, this professor of tactics at the Royal Military -College at Sandhurst seems not to have heard of Johnston’s works at -Kenesaw Mountain, or the fortifications constructed at Spottsylvania -and Petersburg. - -[22] May’s “Tactical Retrospect.” - -[23] For a description of the American military telegraph, see Grant’s -Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 205, _et seq._ See also the comments on the -military telegraph, in Sherman’s Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 398. - - - - -APPENDIX I. - -THE PRUSSIAN ADVANCE FROM KÖNIGGRÄTZ TO THE DANUBE. - - -The day after the battle of Königgrätz was occupied by the Prussians in -resting their fatigued troops, and in separating the mingled corps and -detachments of the different armies. Late in the afternoon the first -movements in advance began. - -The fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz were still in the hands -of the Austrians. They were well garrisoned, and could only be taken -by siege. Both were summoned to surrender, and both refused. These -fortresses were of the greatest importance, as they commanded the line -of railway on which the Prussians depended for supplies, and controlled -the passage of the Elbe in the vicinity of the battle field. Strong -detachments were, therefore, left to mask the fortresses, and on the -5th of July the Prussian armies marched to Pardubitz and Przelautsch, -at which points they crossed the Elbe. A division of Landwehr was sent -to Prague, which city surrendered, without resistance, on the 8th of -July. The Prussians were thus able to open communications with the rear -by rail, _via_ Pardubitz, Prague, Turnau and Reichenberg, in spite of -the fortresses of Theresienstadt, Königgrätz and Josephstadt. - -After the battle of Königgrätz all touch with the Austrians had been -lost, and for three days the Prussians were completely in the dark -as to the direction taken by the retreating army. On July 6th it was -learned that Von Benedek, with the greater portion of his army, had -retreated upon Olmütz. - -After the battle two lines of retreat were open to Von Benedek. It was -desirable to retreat upon Vienna, for the double purpose of protecting -the city, and effecting a junction with the victorious troops, -withdrawn from Italy for the defense of the capital.[24] But Vienna -was 135 miles distant; the army had been heavily defeated; and there -was danger that a retreat of such a distance would degenerate into a -demoralized rout. Olmütz was only half as far away; its fortress would -afford the necessary protection for reorganizing and resting the army; -and its position on the flank of the Prussians would be a serious -menace to their communications, in case of their advance on Vienna. Von -Benedek, therefore, retreated upon Olmütz, sending the Xth Corps by -rail to Vienna, and the greater part of his cavalry by ordinary roads -to the same point. - -The situation was now favorable to Von Moltke. He had the advantage -of interior lines, and he did not hesitate to make use of them. Yet -the problem was by no means devoid of difficulties. The Austrian -army at Olmütz was still formidable in numbers; the extent of its -demoralization was not known; the Austrian troops had a high reputation -for efficiency, and for a capacity to present an undaunted front after -a defeat; and it was thought possible that Von Benedek might assume -the offensive. To leave such a formidable army unopposed on his flank -was not to be thought of; yet it was desirable to reach Vienna before -the arrival at that city of the troops recalled from Italy, or, at any -rate, before a considerable army could be concentrated for the defense -of the capital. A division of the Prussian forces was, therefore, -necessary. The Army of the Elbe and the First Army were directed upon -Vienna: the former to move _via_ Iglau and Znaym; the latter, _via_ -Brünn. The Crown Prince was directed upon Olmütz to watch Von Benedek. -There were three courses open to the Austrian commander: 1. To attack -the flank of the First Army, between Olmütz and Vienna; 2. To withdraw -rapidly to the capital; 3. To attack the Crown Prince. In the first -case, the First Army would be supported by the Army of the Elbe, and -the combined forces would be able to take care of themselves. In the -second case, the Crown Prince was to attack the retiring army and -harass its march. In the third case, the Crown Prince, who, though -inferior in numbers, was superior in _morale_, might be more than -a match for the Austrians. In case of defeat, however, he was to -retreat into Silesia, where he would have the support of the Prussian -fortresses; while Von Moltke, freed from Von Benedek, could seize the -Austrian capital and command peace. - -On July 7th the cavalry of the Second Army recovered touch with the -Austrians, and there was some skirmishing with their rear guards. - -On July 8th the Austrian government made overtures for an armistice -of not less than eight weeks, nor more than three months; as a -condition to which the fortresses of Königgrätz and Josephstadt were -to be surrendered. The proposition was rejected by the Prussians, who -continued to advance. - -Von Benedek was relieved from the chief command of the Austrian army, -being superseded by Archduke Albrecht, who had won the victory of -Custozza over the Italians. Von Benedek retained command, however, -until the arrival of his army on the Danube. The Austrians were now -straining every nerve to assemble an army at Vienna. Leaving only one -corps and one division in Italy, the Archduke’s army had been recalled -from Venetia, and was proceeding, by rail and by forced marches, to the -Danube. - -On the 11th of July Von Benedek’s army was ordered to Vienna. This -army, after a continuous retreat of eight days duration, had just -completed its concentration at Olmütz; but the movement to Vienna -was begun without delay, the IIId Corps being sent on the day the -order was received. The withdrawal of the army from Olmütz to Vienna -was not an easy operation. The railway was, as yet, beyond the reach -of the Prussians; but the aid that it could lend was not great. It -was estimated that the withdrawal of the entire army by the single -line of railway would require a full month. Part of the troops were, -accordingly, hurried on by rail, and the bulk of the army was ordered -to march by the valley of the March to Pressburg. This was the most -direct route, and the one which offered the best roads for marching, -though by taking this line the Austrian army would expose a flank to -the attack of the Prussians. Above all things, celerity was necessary, -in order that the march might be completed without fatal interruption. -Von Benedek’s army marched in three echelons. The first, composed of -the IId and IVth Corps, with the greater part of the Saxon cavalry, -started on the 14th of July. The second, consisting of the VIIIth and -Ist Corps, left the next day; and the third, made up of the VIth Corps -and the Saxons, followed on the 16th. - -The Austrian cavalry presented a bold front to the Prussian armies -moving on Vienna, and a sharp action was fought at Tischnowitz, on the -11th of July, between the cavalry of Frederick Charles’ advanced-guard -and a division of Austrian lancers, resulting in the defeat of the -latter. On the 12th Frederick Charles took possession of Brünn without -resistance. The next day, after some skirmishing with the Austrian -cavalry, the Army of the Elbe occupied Znaym. - -After a rest of two days, the Army of the Elbe and the First Army -continued their march towards the Danube; the former being directed -towards Krems, the latter moving _via_ Nikolsburg. - -The Austrian troops from Italy began to arrive at Vienna on the 14th -of July. In the meantime, the Crown Prince, hearing of Von Benedek’s -withdrawal from Olmütz, directed his march on Prerau, and, on the -14th, reached Prosnitz, about twelve miles south of Olmütz. The first -Austrian echelon, marching by the right bank of the March, just escaped -serious collision with the Crown Prince, the cavalry of the Second -Army skirmishing with the Saxon cavalry, and becoming engaged with a -battalion of infantry on the flank of the Austrian IId Corps. - -On the following day Von Bonin, with the Ist Corps and Von Hartmann’s -cavalry division, attacked the second echelon of Von Benedek’s army, -and defeated it in the actions of Tobitschau and Rokienitz. As a result -of these actions, the right bank of the March was no longer available -for the Austrian retreat. Von Benedek had, however, succeeded in -slipping away from the Crown Prince, though at the expense of losing -his best and most direct road to Vienna. - -Learning that large bodies of Austrians had been seen moving south -from Olmütz for some days, Von Moltke saw at once that it would -be impossible to bar Von Benedek’s path with the Second Army, and -immediately ordered the First Army to Lundenburg. The railway and -telegraph at Göding were cut by a detachment of Prussian cavalry, on -the 15th, and Frederick Charles occupied Lundenburg the next day. - -This was a severe blow to Von Benedek, for he thus lost his railway -communication with Vienna, his march by the valley of the March was -headed by the Prussians, and he was compelled to make a detour by -crossing the Carpathian mountains and following the valley of the -Waag. To compensate, as far as possible, for the loss of the shorter -road, Von Benedek hastened his troops by forced marches. Von Moltke -did not deem it prudent to send the Second Army after Von Benedek -into the valley of the Waag, as communication between the Crown Prince -and Frederick Charles would thus be lost, and it was now desirable to -concentrate rather than separate. It was accordingly determined to -push forward with all available troops to the Danube. The Crown Prince -had already seen the impossibility of thwarting Von Benedek’s retreat, -and, as early as the 15th, had left the Ist Corps to mask Olmütz, had -directed the Vth Corps and a cavalry division to follow on the flank -of Von Benedek, and had pushed forward with the rest of his army upon -Brünn, where he arrived on the 17th. On the same day the Army of the -Elbe and the First Army were in the neighborhood of Nikolsburg. - -On the 19th the heads of the Prussian armies were within less than two -days’ march of the Austrian capital, but part of the Prussian forces -were as far back as Brünn. Von Moltke did not know, to a certainty, how -much of Von Benedek’s army had been brought back from Olmütz before the -obstruction of the railway. A large part of it might already be in his -front; he knew that large bodies of troops had come in from Italy; the -fortifications of Florisdorf were extensive; and it seemed possible -that the Austrians might, by a last great effort, have assembled an -army large enough to enable them to push forward from Florisdorf, to -deliver battle on the Marchfeld for the defense of their capital. -With the double object of preparing to attack and being in readiness -to receive an attack, Von Moltke ordered the Army of the Elbe to -Wolkersdorf, the First Army to Wagram, and the Second Army in reserve -at Schönkirchen. The Prussian army was thus concentrated behind the -Russbach, in position to meet an attack of 150,000 Austrians from -Florisdorf; to reconnoiter and attack the Florisdorf entrenchments; or -to leave a corps of observation in front of them and push to the left -and seize Pressburg. The Second Army, with the exception of the Vth -Corps, was to be in position to support the other two by the 21st. The -Vth Corps was to be hurried up as rapidly as possible, in order that -the entire army might be concentrated for a decisive battle. - -The only troops of Von Benedek’s army which had reached Vienna by -the 20th were the Xth and IIId Corps, part of the Saxons, and four -cavalry divisions, numbering altogether from 55,000 to 60,000 men. The -reinforcements from Italy which had arrived at the capital numbered -about 50,000 men. - -Although the occupation of Pressburg was absolutely necessary to secure -the prompt junction of the divided Austrian armies, that important -point was held by only a single brigade. As soon as the Austrian IId -Corps had reached Tyrnau, its leading brigade was pushed forward -rapidly, in country carts, to reinforce the brigade at Pressburg, -and the rest of the corps hastened towards the same place by forced -marches. If Pressburg fell into the hands of the Prussians, the force -still with Von Benedek, constituting the bulk of his army, would not be -able to reach Vienna, and form a junction with the Archduke Albrecht, -except by making a long detour _via_ Komorn, and would probably be -delayed so long as to be helpless to prevent the capture of the capital. - -On the 21st of July the Army of the Elbe and the First Army were in -position behind the Russbach, and the Second Army was drawing near, its -two advanced corps being not more than one day’s march distant. The -situation of the Austrians was critical. Their IId Corps had not yet -reached Pressburg, and that all-important point was still held by only -two brigades. The Ist, VIth and VIIIth Corps, and a division of Saxons, -had gotten no farther than Neustadtl and Trentschin, nearly sixty -miles from Pressburg. On the same day Von Fransecky, with the Prussian -IVth Corps and a cavalry division, crossed the March, in the vicinity -of Marchegg, advancing upon Pressburg. Everything portended to the -Austrians the loss of that valuable strategic point, and the consequent -cutting off of Von Benedek from Vienna. The Prussian army, numbering, -at least, 184,000 men, was concentrated and opposed to an army of not -more than 110,000 men, at most, at Vienna. The capture of the capital -seemed certain; and Von Moltke, with his forces augmented to 200,000 -men, by the reinforcements that were pushing on to join him, could then -turn upon Von Benedek, and give a _coup de grace_ to the last remnant -of Austria’s military power. - -At this junction, however, diplomacy stepped in, and, through the -mediation of France, a five days’ armistice, as a preliminary to peace, -was agreed upon; the armistice to go into effect at noon on the 22d of -July. - -[Illustration: VALLEY OF THE MAINE.] - -On the 22d Von Fransecky struck the two Austrian brigades at Blumenau, -just in front of Pressburg. While everything was going in favor -of the Prussians, and they seemed to be not only on the point of -defeating the Austrians, but of capturing their entire force, the -hour of noon arrived; the armistice went into effect, the action was, -with difficulty, broken off, and, after the sudden termination of the -battle, both armies bivouacked on the field. - -The preliminary terms of peace were signed at Nikolsburg on the 26th -of July, and definitely ratified at Prague on the 30th of August. The -orders for the withdrawal of the Prussian armies were issued on the -25th of August, and the Austrian territory was entirely evacuated by -them by the 20th of September. - -By the terms of the treaty of peace, Venetia was ceded to Italy; the -old Germanic confederation was dissolved; Schleswig-Holstein became -the property of Prussia; Austria consented to the formation of a North -German Confederation, and a union of the South German States, from both -of which confederations she was to be excluded; and the defeated power -agreed to pay 40,000,000 Prussian thalers to the victor. From this sum, -however, 15,000,000 thalers were deducted as the price of the Austrian -claims to Schleswig-Holstein, and 5,000,000 thalers for the free -maintenance of the Prussian army in the Austrian provinces from the -preliminary truce to the final establishment of peace. Peace with the -German allies of Austria was made at about the same time. As a result -of the war, Prussia annexed the territories of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, -Nassau and the free city of Frankfort. The population of the victorious -kingdom was increased by 4,285,700 people; and its area, by nearly -25,000 square miles of land. - -FOOTNOTE: - -[24] A brief sketch of the operations in Italy is given in Appendix III. - - - - -APPENDIX II. - -THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN GERMANY. - - -The surrender of the Hanoverian army at Langensalza, on June 29, 1866, -left Von Falckenstein free to operate against the armies of the South -German States. His army, now designated “The Army of the Maine,” -numbered 45,000 men and 97 guns. - -Opposed to him were the Bavarian Corps, numbering 40,000 men and 136 -guns, and the VIIIth Federal Corps, numbering 46,000 men and 134 guns. -The former, under the command of Prince Charles of Bavaria, had -concentrated at Schweinfurt; the latter, under the command of Prince -Alexander of Hesse, at Frankfort. - -Having been informed that the Hanoverians were marching on Fulda, -Prince Charles began a forward movement, to effect a junction with -them at that point; but receiving later news to the effect that the -occupation of Hesse-Cassel had caused the Hanoverians to turn off -towards Mühlhausen, and that Prussian forces were concentrating at -Eisenach, he decided to direct his march more to the right, so as to -be able to operate either by way of Fulda or the Thuringian Forest -[_Thüringer Wald_], as circumstances might decide. The march of the -Bavarians was begun on June 22d; but much was wanting to complete their -organization and equipment, and their progress was so slow that on the -26th their most advanced division had only reached Neustadt, on the -Saale, scarcely twenty miles from Schweinfurt. - -A prompt union of the separated forces of the allies was of the utmost -importance. Yet the most precious time was aimlessly wasted, and it -was not until June 26th that any definite steps were taken towards -effecting a junction of the Bavarians and the VIIIth Corps. On that day -Prince Charles and Prince Alexander held a conference, at which it was -decided to move forward and effect the junction of the two corps at -Hersfeld, about twenty-one miles north of Fulda. They overlooked the -important fact that they were twice as far away from the designated -point as the Prussians were. - -Nothing but the most energetic action on the part of the allies could -overcome the disadvantages of their strategical situation. Yet Prince -Charles, learning that negotiations were being conducted between -the Hanoverians and the Prussians, delayed his march, evidently -losing confidence in the sincerity of his allies, and fearing that a -surrender of the Hanoverians might leave him to contend alone with -Von Falckenstein. For three days the Bavarians remained inactive; -then, hearing of the battle of Langensalza, Prince Charles advanced -towards Gotha. On June 30th the Bavarians had advanced to Meiningen, -Schleusingen and Hildburghausen, where they received news of the -surrender of the Hanoverian army. The VIIIth Corps, in the meantime, -had continued its march towards Hersfeld. - -The march of Prince Charles towards Gotha had been utterly fruitless. -He had not only failed to assist the Hanoverians, but time had been -lost, and the direction of his march had carried him away from, instead -of towards, the VIIIth Corps. The latter corps was now at Friedburg, -more than 80 miles from Meiningen, and the problem of effecting a -junction now presented many difficulties. The union of the two corps -could have been easily and safely effected by falling back to the line -of the Maine; and this should have been done, though it was feared -that a retreat, at the beginning of the campaign, and before the enemy -had been seen, might have an injurious effect on the _morale_ of the -troops. To effect a junction without falling back would necessitate a -flank march of more than 80 miles, over difficult mountain roads, in -the immediate front of the enemy. Such a hazardous movement should not -have been undertaken except as a last resort. - -Nevertheless, Prince Charles decided to form line at Meiningen, -facing Eisenach, hoping to join the VIIIth Corps _via_ Hilders-Fulda -and Geisa-Hünfeld, and requesting Prince Alexander to draw towards -him with all available forces, partly _via_ Hanau-Fulda-Hünfeld, and -partly by rail from Frankfort to Gemünden, and thence _via_ Hammelburg -to Kissingen. The commander of the VIIIth Corps consented to move on -Fulda, but did not see fit to send a force _via_ Kissingen to the -neighborhood of Schweinfurt, evidently for the military reason that he -did not wish to divide his force while executing a dangerous movement, -and for the political reason that the movement urged by Prince Charles, -while it would cover Bavaria, would expose the territories of the -contingents which composed the VIIIth Corps. Prince Charles showed a -disposition to ignore the interests of his allies; Prince Alexander -exhibited decided insubordination; both commanders displayed a lack of -military ability; and the want of hearty coöperation between the two -generals already portended disaster to the allied cause. - -On July 1st the Bavarians concentrated at Meiningen, and began their -march to Fulda. Prince Alexander, marching east, occupied Lauterbach -and Alsfeld on July 3d. His force had been diminished by detachments -left on the Lahn, both to cover Frankfort from a possible attack from -the direction of Cassel, and to protect the flank and rear of the army -marching towards Fulda. - -On July 3d a Bavarian advanced-guard found Dermbach in possession of -the Prussians, and was driven back with some loss. On the other hand, -a Prussian detachment was driven out of Wiesenthal. Von Falckenstein -had advanced from Eisenach on July 1st, and he was now in the immediate -front of the Bavarians; Von Beyer’s division in and around Geisa; Von -Goeben’s division at Dermbach, and Von Manteuffel’s division following -in reserve. - -On July 4th one of Von Goeben’s brigades struck a Bavarian division -at Zella [about 3 miles south of Dermbach], and an indecisive action -followed. With his other brigade, Von Goeben attacked another Bavarian -division at Wiesenthal. Encountering considerable resistance, and -having no immediate supports at hand, Von Goeben gave orders for the -withdrawal of his troops, after an action of some hours’ duration. At -the same time the Bavarians retreated, and the field was abandoned by -both armies. - -During this time the other Prussian divisions continued their march on -Fulda, Von Beyer reaching Hünfeld, near which place his advanced-guard -had a remarkable combat with the Bavarian reserve cavalry, which had -been sent from Schweinfurt towards Vacha, to open communications -with the VIIIth Corps. The Bavarian advanced-guard consisted of two -regiments of cuirassiers and a detachment of horse artillery. On -meeting the Prussians the Bavarians opened on them with grape. The -artillery with Von Beyer’s advanced-guard quickly came into action, -and opened fire with astonishing results; for the first shot from the -Prussian guns sent the Bavarians back in a wild panic, the confusion -being rapidly conveyed from the advanced-guard to the main body, -until the entire force (consisting of three brigades) broke into a -headlong stampede. Several regiments retreated as far as Brückenau and -Hammelburg, and many troopers did not draw rein until they arrived at -the Maine, many miles from the scene of action. Several days elapsed -before the cavalry could be rallied at Brückenau. In this case the -Bavarians could neither plead surprise nor heavy loss. They saw their -enemy in time to open fire on him first; and their total loss was only -28 men. Only a few shots, from two guns, were fired by the Prussians -before the Bavarian cavalry had scampered beyond reach of harm. - -The simultaneous retreat of both armies from Wiesenthal reminds one of -the _fiasco_ at Big Bethel in 1861; and had the Bavarians remained on -the field at Hünfeld long enough to dot the ground thickly with dead -and wounded, their action there might be worthy of comparison with that -of our undisciplined levies at Bull Run. - -After the combat at Wiesenthal, Von Falckenstein seems to have felt -considerable anxiety; for the next day he withdrew Von Goeben through -Dermbach, recalled Von Beyer to Geisa, and brought up Von Manteuffel -in close support. This concentration was evidently made with a view to -fighting a defensive battle; but, on the 6th of July, the Prussians -discovered that they had won a victory on the 4th, the Bavarians being -in retreat. Von Falckenstein at once pushed forward towards Fulda. - -After the actions of Zella and Wiesenthal Prince Charles saw that -the intended junction of the separated corps at Fulda could not be -made, unless he could open the road by defeating the Prussians. This -now seemed out of the question; and he, consequently, fell back on -Neustadt, and requested Prince Alexander to open communications with -him _via_ Brückenau and Kissingen. Prince Alexander, however, does -not seem to have been over-anxious either to comply with requests or -to obey orders. On July 5th he had advanced to within seven miles of -Fulda. Hearing of the Bavarian reverses, he fell back to Schlüchtern, -where he occupied an exceptionally favorable position at the entrance -of the Kinzig valley. The ground offered every facility for defense; he -could offer a stubborn resistance to the advance of Von Falckenstein; -his line of retreat to Frankfort was secure; and he might either wait -for the Bavarians to join him, or effect a junction with them on the -line Hammelburg-Gemünden. - -While at Schlüchtern, Prince Alexander learned of the Austrian defeat -at Königgrätz; and, without considering his allies, his only thought -seems to have been to gain the line of the Maine, between Hanau and -Mayence, where he might protect the territories of Southwest Germany. -How far he was influenced by his own judgment, and how far by the Diet -at Frankfort, is not known; but he abandoned his strong position at -Schlüchtern, and fell back to Frankfort, where he was joined by the -detachments which had been left on the Lahn. Instead of concentrating -to oppose the Prussians, the allies thus voluntarily widened the gap -between their forces, and willfully invited destruction. - -The Prussians entered Fulda on the 7th of July, and rested there one -day. From Fulda, Von Falckenstein directed Von Goeben on Brückenau, and -sent Von Beyer out on the Frankfort road to Schlüchtern, Von Manteuffel -occupying Fulda. The movement to Schlüchtern was for the double purpose -of making a feint towards Frankfort, and gaining a separate road -for the advance of the division. From Schlüchtern Von Beyer marched -direct to the suburbs of Brückenau. Von Goeben marched through and -beyond Brückenau, and Von Manteuffel, following, occupied the town. -The Army of the Maine was now closely concentrated within nine miles -of the Bavarians, who were extended along the Saale, from Neustadt to -Hammelburg, occupying a line 22-1/2 miles long. - -On July 10th Von Falckenstein directed Von Beyer on Hammelburg and Von -Goeben on Kissingen. Von Manteuffel was ordered to move on Waldaschach, -and then to follow Von Goeben. The Bavarians were encountered at -Hammelburg and Kissingen, and defeated with some loss. Minor actions, -with similar results, were fought on the same day at Friedrichshall, -Hausen and Waldaschach, up the river from Kissingen. The Bavarians -retreated to Schweinfurt and Würzburg, and the passes of the Saale -remained in the hands of the Prussians. - -All military principles now dictated an advance against Schweinfurt, -for the purpose of giving the Bavarians a crushing defeat, and -disposing of them altogether. Such a move would, doubtless, have been -made by Von Falckenstein, had not political considerations been at -this time paramount. The Prussian victories in Austria rendered it -probable that peace conferences would soon be held; and, at the request -of Bismarck, Von Falckenstein was notified that it was of political -importance to be in actual possession of the country north of the -Maine, as negotiations would probably soon take place on the _statu -quo_ basis. Von Falckenstein, therefore, decided to move against the -VIIIth Corps, for the purpose of clearing the right bank of the Maine -entirely of the hostile forces. - -Prince Alexander, thoroughly alarmed at the condition of affairs, -now sought to form a junction with the Bavarians at Würzburg, _via_ -Aschaffenburg and Gemünden. As a preliminary to this movement, a -Hessian brigade was sent to Aschaffenburg, to secure the passage of the -Maine at that point, and to reconnoiter the Prussians. The contemplated -movement was hopeless from the start, unless the Bavarians could -render assistance by advancing to Gemünden; and, after the actions on -the Saale, they were not in a condition to do so. As it was, Prince -Alexander was endeavoring to cross the difficult mountain region -between Aschaffenburg and Gemünden, in the face of a victorious army, -superior to his own in numbers and _morale_, to effect a junction with -an ally who was unable to lend him a helping hand. It was the height of -folly; for the junction could have been easily and safely made south -of the Maine. True, this would have necessitated the sacrifice of -Frankfort; but defeat north of the Maine would compel the evacuation of -the city, and defeat was now practically invited. - -Turning away from the Bavarians, Von Falckenstein moved down the -Maine; Von Goeben in advance, followed by Von Manteuffel, while Von -Beyer moved, by way of the Kinzig valley, on Hanau. On July 13th the -Hessian brigade was defeated by Von Goeben at Laufach, and fell back -on Aschaffenburg, to which place reinforcements were hurried by Prince -Alexander. On the following day the VIIIth Corps was defeated by Von -Goeben at Aschaffenburg. The brunt of the battle was borne by an -Austrian brigade attached to the Federal Corps; but few troops of the -Hessian contingents being engaged, and the Würtemberg and Baden troops -arriving too late. Had Prince Alexander concentrated his entire force -at Aschaffenburg, the result might have been bad for the Prussians, for -their march was so unskillfully conducted that Von Goeben was without -support; the other detachments of Von Falckenstein’s army being more -than thirty miles in rear. The Prussians did not pursue the enemy, but -contented themselves with remaining in possession of the field. - -Prince Alexander was now convinced of the impossibility of effecting -a junction at Würzburg _via_ Aschaffenburg. He accordingly abandoned -the line of the Lower Maine and concentrated his force at Dieburg. -Frankfort was thus left defenseless, and the remnants of the German -Diet fled to Augsburg. Prince Charles now proposed a junction of the -allies in the vicinity of Würzburg, the VIIIth Corps to move _via_ -Miltenberg and Tauberbischofsheim, and the concentration to be effected -on the 20th of July. This movement necessitated a march of some ninety -miles for the VIIIth Corps, and the uncovering of Southwest Germany, -while the Bavarians had to march only a few miles, and continued -to cover their own territories; but the imminent danger which now -threatened the VIIIth Corps caused Prince Alexander to forget local -and personal jealousies, and strive to effect the junction which the -military situation imperatively demanded. - -On the 16th of July the Prussians entered Frankfort, where they -remained until the 21st: Von Goeben’s division occupying the city, -Von Beyer’s division being stationed at Hanau, and Von Manteuffel’s -division holding Aschaffenburg. The entire region north of the Maine -was in the possession of the Prussians. Frankfort had been especially -antagonistic to Prussia, and it now felt the full force of the severity -of the conquerors. Von Falckenstein levied a contribution of $3,000,000 -on the city, and soon followed this heavy exaction by a demand for -a second enormous contribution of $10,000,000. The King of Prussia, -however, remitted the second contribution after hearing the appeal and -protest of the citizens. - -On the 16th of July Von Falckenstein was relieved from the command of -the Army of the Maine, and appointed military governor of Bohemia. -He was succeeded by Von Manteuffel, whose division was placed under -command of Von Flies. Reinforcements now raised the Army of the Maine -to a strength of 50,000 men and 121 guns. - -The capture of Frankfort and the possession of the country north of -the Maine had been obtained at the sacrifice of the great strategic -advantage enjoyed by the Prussians. It was no longer possible to -prevent the concentration of the VIIIth Corps and the Bavarians, and on -the 22d of July this junction was completed; the former corps holding -the line of the Tauber, and the latter occupying a position between -that river and Würzburg. - -Although the allied forces now numbered 80,000 men and 286 guns, Von -Manteuffel decided to move against them from Frankfort. The advantage -of the allies was in numbers alone; in _morale_, and in the strategic -situation, the advantage was with the Prussians. Von Manteuffel now -had a line of communication through Frankfort and Cassel. Though he -could no longer keep the allies asunder, he could, by marching to the -Tauber, compel them to “form front to a flank,” while his own front -securely covered his communications. His communications could be -intercepted only by a movement of the allies north of the Maine, which -would reciprocally expose their own. - -The allies had hardly effected their junction, when a want of harmony -in the views of their commanders again became evident. An offensive -movement against the Prussians was agreed upon; but Prince Charles -wished to move by the left bank of the Maine on Frankfort, while Prince -Alexander preferred a movement by the right bank on Aschaffenburg. The -former was, doubtless, the better move--at all events it was the safer; -for the allies would have covered their communications better, and a -junction might, perhaps, have been effected with the large garrison -of Mayence--but, after two days of discussion and deliberation, the -latter movement was agreed upon. In the meantime, while the allies were -deliberating, Von Manteuffel was acting; and he was now moving rapidly -towards the Tauber. - -On July 23d the Prussians touched the enemy. A slight and indecisive -action was fought by a Prussian advanced-guard with the Baden division -at Hundheim, and the advanced troops of the VIIIth Corps were pressed -back along their whole line. While the Prussians were thus closing -upon the Federal Corps, the Bavarians began the contemplated movement -by the right bank of the Maine; one division being sent by rail to -Gemünden, another to Lohr (on the right bank, farther down), and part -of a third to Wertheim. Thus the junction of the allies, which had -been effected with such difficulty, was voluntarily broken at the very -moment of contact with the enemy. The line of the allied forces, on the -evening of July 23d, was 36 miles in extent; while Von Manteuffel’s -army was closely concentrated in their immediate front. Prince -Alexander, finding himself beyond the immediate assistance of the -Bavarians, withdrew all his detachments behind the Tauber, where his -corps was spread over a space seven miles in breadth and nine in depth, -in a country full of deep ravines, which rendered prompt movements, -especially of cavalry and artillery, quite out of the question. - -On the 24th Von Goeben defeated the Würtembergers at -Tauberbischofsheim, and the Baden division at Werbach. The retreat -of the Baden troops uncovered Prince Alexander’s right flank, and -there was now imminent danger of the Prussians again pushing in and -separating the VIIIth Corps from the Bavarians. Prince Alexander, -therefore, fell back to Gerchsheim, and the Bavarians withdrew to -Helmstadt. Prince Charles ordered the VIIIth Corps back to the line of -the Tauber, though the Bavarians could render no immediate assistance. -Prince Alexander, doubtless appreciating the folly of attempting, -without reinforcements, to dislodge the victorious Prussians from a -position which he had been unable to hold against them, seems to have -paid no attention to the order, for he proceeded at once to concentrate -his scattered divisions at Gerchsheim. - -On July 25th Von Goeben formed the right of the Prussian line, Von -Beyer the center and Von Flies the left. Von Goeben was to attack the -VIIIth Corps in front, while Von Beyer turned its right and cut it off -from Würzburg. Von Flies was to keep his division concentrated on the -left; for nothing was known of the whereabouts of the Bavarians, and it -was surmised that they might be somewhere in that direction. - -Von Beyer, moving against the VIIIth Corps, unexpectedly encountered a -Bavarian division at Helmstadt, and defeated it, after an engagement -which lasted some hours. While the Prussians were resting on the field, -after the action, a second Bavarian division suddenly appeared on the -crest of a hill in the rear of Von Beyer’s left wing. So completely -was Von Beyer without information as to the position of the Bavarians, -that he was in doubt whether these troops were friend or foe. The -Bavarians were in a similar quandary. In fact, they had accidentally -stumbled upon the Prussians, and the surprise was mutual. As soon as -he discovered that he was in the presence of a hostile force, Von -Beyer executed a change of front to the left, and succeeded in gaining -another victory. - -While Von Beyer was engaged with the Bavarians, Von Goeben was battling -with the VIIIth Corps at Gerchsheim. Prince Alexander was again -defeated, and driven in rout on Würzburg. - -The night after these actions Prince Charles held a council of war, and -finally decided to attack Von Flies, who, having advanced, was now -on the Prussian left. Learning, however, that his own left had been -uncovered by the defeat of the VIIIth Corps, the Bavarian commander -resolved to stand on the defensive on the plateau of Waldbüttelbrünn -(in rear of Rossbrünn[25]), and ordered Prince Alexander to take up a -position immediately in front of Würzburg, to cover the retreat of the -army across the Maine, should such a movement be necessary. - -About 3 o’clock on the morning of July 26th, a simultaneous attempt -of the Bavarians and Von Flies to occupy some commanding ground which -lay between the outposts, brought on an action at Rossbrünn. While Von -Flies was engaged with the Bavarians, Von Beyer struck them heavily on -the flank, and by 10 o’clock the Bavarians were in full retreat. The -Prussians did not attempt a pursuit, and by 1 o’clock, P. M., Prince -Charles had rallied and concentrated his corps on the plateau of -Waldbüttelbrünn. In the meantime the VIIIth Corps had crossed the Maine. - -The position of the Bavarians was now full of peril. Their allies -had been defeated, and were glad to place a river between themselves -and the Prussians. The Bavarians were, consequently, alone on the -left bank of the Maine; their losses had been considerable; their -_morale_ was shattered; their retreat across the defiles of the Maine -was insecure; and a defeat in their present position meant absolute -ruin. The Prussian Official History says: “A renewed attack on the -part of the Prussian main forces would necessarily have forced it -[the Bavarian Corps] to a struggle for life or death. The political -situation of affairs showed no reason for bringing on so desperate a -combat. The only object henceforth was to occupy as much territory of -the allies as possible, in order to facilitate peace negotiations with -them, and maneuvering against the enemy’s left flank would oblige him -to retreat without any hard struggle.” This apology for a failure to -complete the defeat of a shattered and unsupported hostile force seems -somewhat disingenuous. A complete defeat and surrender of the Bavarians -would have been quickly followed by the capture or dispersion of the -VIIIth Corps, and the entire South-German territory would have been -at the mercy of the Prussians. Certainly such a condition of affairs -would have “facilitated peace negotiations” by rendering further -resistance hopeless. Moreover, the same history states that the retreat -of the VIIIth Corps behind the Maine was not known at the Prussian -headquarters; and it seems probable that inefficient performance of -outpost and reconnoissance duties on the part of the Prussians, rather -than any considerations of politics or magnanimity, saved the Bavarians -from destruction. Late in the day, Prince Charles withdrew across the -Maine. - -On July 27th the Prussians moved on Würzburg. Their artillery exchanged -shots with the citadel of Marienberg (on the left bank of the Maine, -opposite Würzburg), and succeeded in setting fire to the arsenal, but -withdrew without effecting anything of moment. - -The contending armies now faced each other, each in an almost -impregnable position. The situation was, however, altogether in -favor of the Prussians. Their communications were secure, while -the communications of the allies with Hesse, Baden and Würtemburg -were intercepted, and those with Bavaria were endangered, by the -position of the Army of the Maine. Moreover, the Prussian IId Reserve -Corps had moved from Saxony _via_ Leipsic, Plauen and Hof, and was -now approaching Baireuth. In the language of the Prussian Official -History: “The position of the Bavarian army at Würzburg had now become -untenable. It could only extricate itself from its present position -either by assuming the offensive against the Prussian army--which was -scarcely possible at this point--or by a retrograde movement up the -Maine, so as to face the army to the north and re-establish its base on -the Bavarian territory in its rear.” - -But the bitterness of extreme defeat was not pushed home to the allies; -for on July 28th news of the peace preliminaries between Prussia -and Austria, and of an armistice with Bavaria, was received. Though -the truce with Bavaria was not to go into effect until August 2d, -hostilities were suspended, the only movement of importance being the -occupation of Nuremberg by the Prussian IId Reserve Corps. - -Peace was concluded on August 13th with Würtemberg, on the 17th with -Baden, and on the 22d with Bavaria. - -It is hardly possible to contemplate the operations of the armies -in Western Germany, in 1866, with any feeling of admiration. In the -strategical operations of Von Falckenstein and Von Manteuffel are -found the only redeeming features of the campaign. Von Falckenstein -especially, in pushing in between the two armies of the allies, and -defeating them in succession, displayed generalship of no mean order; -but the want of harmony between the allied leaders removed every -obstacle from the path of Prussian success. The Prussians seem to -have been often completely in the dark as to the designs, and even -in regard to the positions, of the allies. We find the Army of the -Maine waiting, in a defensive position, nearly two days, in ignorance -of its own victory at Wiesenthal. We find the Prussians winning a -victory at Aschaffenburg, when their own unskillful march invited a -defeat, and their success was due solely to the greater blunders of -their opponents. Before, and even during, the battle of Helmstadt the -Prussians seem to have been in complete ignorance of the position and -movements of Prince Charles, and Von Beyer’s escape from disaster -when surprised by the Bavarians, was due solely to the fact that -the surprise was accidental and mutual. Advanced-guard, outpost and -reconnoissance duties seem to have been performed with the grossest -inefficiency. In almost every action the Prussians seem to have been -unaware of the extent of their victory, or to have shown an incapacity -to organize a pursuit. Gneisenau and his famous order to “pursue to -the last breath of horse and man” seem to have been forgotten in the -Army of the Maine; and we find Prince Charles, after the battle of -Rossbrünn, quietly slipping back, without molestation, to an almost -impregnable position, when a simple frontal attack by the Prussians -would have completed the discomfiture and insured the destruction of -the Bavarian army. - -As to the allies, every adverse criticism that can be made on their -opponents, applies to them in a still higher degree. Their leaders -rarely rose to the level of respectable mediocrity. The junction of -the allied corps, which was imperative from the first, was made only -when they were practically herded together by the movements of the -Prussians. As soon as they had been forced into the long-desired -junction, they voluntarily undertook an ill-advised movement which -separated them again, at the very moment of their contact with the -enemy. Incapacity and jealousy were characteristics of both the -allied commanders; and to these defects Prince Alexander added the -greater fault of insubordination. It would be hard to find among the -improvised “political generals” who appeared on the stage of war in the -earlier part of the American conflict, a single one who possessed in -a greater degree than Prince Charles or Prince Alexander a genius for -blundering--an eminent capacity for invariably doing the wrong thing. -It may be said of the two generals of the allied armies, that their -operations afford a fine demonstration of the principles of war by the -method of _reductio ad absurdum_. - -FOOTNOTE: - -[25] Rossbrünn is not marked on the map. It is about 7 miles due west -of Würzburg. - - - - -APPENDIX III. - -THE OPERATIONS IN ITALY. - - -Only a brief mention of the operations in Italy is here necessary. -On the night of the 23d of June, 1866, the Italian army crossed the -Mincio, and encountered the Austrians at Custozza on the next day. -The Italian army, numbering about 120,000 men, was under the nominal -command of King Victor Emmanuel, the real commander being General La -Marmora. The Austrians, numbering about 72,000, were commanded by -Archduke Albrecht. The battle resulted in the defeat of the Italians, -who withdrew across the Mincio. The Austrian commander remained on the -defensive. - -Garibaldi, with about 6,000 volunteers, invaded the Tyrol, but was -defeated in two small actions. Though he finally succeeded in gaining a -foothold on Austrian soil, his operations were of no importance. - -On the 20th of July the Austrian fleet, under Tegethoff, defeated the -Italian fleet in the great naval battle of Lissa, in which the Italians -lost three iron clads. - -Immediately after the battle of Königgrätz, Venetia was offered by -Austria to the French Emperor, and the Vth and IXth Corps were recalled -to the Danube. The Italians, under the command of Cialdini, again -advanced, and the Austrians (now numbering scarcely 30,000) fell -back to the neighborhood of Venice. On the 25th of July all military -operations were stopped by the conclusion of an armistice. - -The Italians had everywhere suffered defeat. Yet their alliance was of -the utmost advantage to Prussia; for they neutralized three army corps, -which would have been of priceless value to the Austrians in Bohemia. - - - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. - - -In the preparation of this work the following books have been consulted: - -“The Campaign of 1866 in Germany,” by the Prussian Staff. - -Hozier’s “Seven Weeks’ War.” - -Derrécagaix’s “_La Guerre Moderne_.” - -Adams’ “Great Campaigns in Europe.” - -Lewis’ “History of Germany.” - -Jomini’s “Art of War.” - -Hamley’s “Operations of War.” - -Von der Goltz’s “The Nation in Arms.” - -Chesney’s “Essays in Military Biography.” - -Brackenbury’s “Field Works.” - -Home’s “_Précis_ of Modern Tactics.” - -Clery’s “Minor Tactics.” - -Maude’s “Tactics and Organization.” - -Prince Hohenlohe’s “Letters on Cavalry.” - -Prince Hohenlohe’s “Letters on Artillery.” - -Trench’s “Cavalry in Modern War.” - -Scribner’s “Army and Navy in the Civil War.” - -“Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.” - -Swinton’s “Army of the Potomac.” - -Memoirs of Gen. U. S. Grant. - -Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman. - -Capt. F. V. Greene’s Essay on “The Important Improvements in the Art of -War, etc.” - -Capt. J. R. Lumly’s Essay on “Mounted Riflemen.” - -The quotations from Baron Stoffel and Capt. May are taken from Home’s -“_Précis_ of Modern Tactics.” - - * * * * * - -Transcriber’s Notes: - -Footnotes have been moved to the end of each chapter or appendix and -relabeled consecutively through the document. - -Illustrations have been moved to paragraph breaks near where they are -mentioned. - -Figure No. 2 comes before figure No. 1 in the text. - -Punctuation has been made consistent. - -Variations in spelling and hyphenation were retained as they appear in -the original publication, except that obvious typos have been corrected. - -Changes have been made as follows: - -p. 45: Aulubitz changed to Aulibitz (to Aulibitz and) - -p. 105: Shönkirchen changed to Schönkirchen (at Schönkirchen. The) - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's The Campaign of Königgrätz, by Arthur L. Wagner - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CAMPAIGN OF KONIGGRATZ *** - -***** This file should be named 50554-0.txt or 50554-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/5/5/50554/ - -Produced by Craig Kirkwood and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive.) - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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