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diff --git a/old/51776-0.txt b/old/51776-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index f7e8883..0000000 --- a/old/51776-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10830 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The History of the 33rd Divisional -Artillery, in the War, 1914-1918., by J. Macartney-Filgate - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The History of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, in the War, 1914-1918. - -Author: J. Macartney-Filgate - -Release Date: April 17, 2016 [EBook #51776] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 33RD DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY, 1914-1918 *** - - - - -Produced by Richard Tonsing, Brian Coe and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - - - - - - - - - The History - _of the_ - 33rd DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY - in the War - 1914-1918. - - - _By_ - J. MACARTNEY-FILGATE, - Late Major R.F.A. [S.R.] - - _With a Foreword by_ - GENERAL LORD HORNE - G.C.B., K.C.M.G., A.D.C. - - LONDON: - VACHER & SONS, LTD., - GREAT SMITH STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W.1. - - - - - To our Men - - Who in this, as in all other units, - bore the full fury and sacrifice of War, - this book is dedicated. - - - - - FOREWORD. - - -"Yet the record of their actions is their best memorial." Field-Marshal -Earl Haig wrote the above words in his foreword to the Royal Artillery -War Commemoration Book. When it is recalled that during the Great War -some three-quarters of a million of men fought guns of all calibres in -every quarter of the globe, it may be realised that to write the history -of the part taken by the Royal Regiment of Artillery as a whole must -prove an impossible task. - -All the more important therefore that each unit should take steps to -place on record its own doings. - -The 33rd Divisional Artillery fought in many important battles and -engagements, and always fought with distinction and with the devotion -worthy of the tradition of the Royal Regiment. This record bears witness -of the high stage of efficiency attained by the Brigades and Batteries -of the New Army, and we may say with our great Commander-in-Chief "The -record of their actions is their best memorial." - - HORNE OF STIRKOKE, - _General_. - - H.Q., EASTERN COMMAND. - _May 31st, 1921._ - - - - - CONTENTS. - - - PAGE - FOREWORD v - LIST OF MAPS ix - INTRODUCTION xi - CHAP. - I.— EARLY DAYS 1 - II.— FIRST EXPERIENCES OF WAR IN THE LA BASSÉE SECTOR 6 - III.— THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME, 1916 24 - IV.— DAINVILLE, HEBUTERNE AND THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE 52 - V.— WINTER ON THE SOMME, 1916-1917 62 - VI.— THE BATTLE OF ARRAS AND VIMY RIDGE, 1917 78 - VII.— THE HINDENBURG LINE AND THE OPERATIONS ON THE COAST 100 - VIII.— THE AUTUMN BATTLES OF YPRES AND PASSCHENDAELE, 1917 112 - IX.— WINTER IN THE SALIENT, 1917-1918 135 - X.— PART I. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS, 1918 147 - PART II. HOLDING THE ENEMY IN THE NORTH 168 - XI.— THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE ON THE THIRD ARMY FRONT, 1918 174 - XII.— FINALE 194 - APPENDIX I. 199 - APPENDIX II. 202 - APPENDIX III. 203 - INDEX 205 - - - - - LIST OF MAPS. - - - PAGE - CUINCHY, CAMBRIN AND THE LA BASSÉE SECTOR 12 - THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 28 - HEBUTERNE, DAINVILLE AND GOMMECOURT 56 - ARRAS, MONCHY AND THE SCARPE 84 - ZILLEBEKE, MAPLE COPSE AND THE PASSCHENDAELE BATTLES 114 - PASSCHENDAELE, GRAVENSTAFEL AND ZONNEBEKE 138 - KEMMEL AND THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE 150 - THE FINAL BRITISH OFFENSIVE—PEIZIÈRE—VILLERS OUTREAUX 176 - CLARY—FOREST 182 - OVILLERS—ENGLEFONTAINE 186 - - - - - INTRODUCTION. - - -To write the history of a unit in the war must, even to the most able -pen, prove a mighty task, for it is not given to many to be able in -words to describe deeds greater almost than human intellect can grasp. -But when the task falls to the lot of one who, himself neither author -nor historian, can claim as a sole reason the fact that it was his -humble privilege to serve with the unit in question, the work becomes -doubly and trebly difficult. In a book of this nature it is probably -desirable that personal experience should have preference to powers of -rhetoric, and a knowledge of facts to fluency with the pen, and for this -reason, after much hesitation, the work was undertaken. No skilful -framing of words can portray in any way adequately a war history; far -better is it that in simple language should be recounted the story of -the batteries, so that each man may judge of it according to his lights. - -This History has been written primarily as a permanent record for all -those who served with the 33rd Divisional Artillery, a record which they -may keep for the benefit of themselves and their descendants when, in -years to come, the intervening space becomes blurred by the mist of -forgetfulness, and the story of those mighty days in France lies in -danger of being relegated to the shadowy past. Secondly, it has been -published in order that all those who were in any way connected with the -gunners of this Division may learn something of their doings in France, -may gain a little insight into the daily lives of those whose deeds they -can but dimly comprehend. Moreover, although many regimental histories -have already been published, this is one of the first to devote itself -to the doings of a Divisional Artillery, and, throwing much light as it -does upon the daily life of a field gunner in France, it must be of -considerable interest to all those who wish to know something of the -work of an artillery unit in the war. Lastly, since it deals in detail -with every battle in which the 33rd Divisional Artillery was concerned, -it will be found to contain records of minor incidents and operations -into which the wider histories of the war cannot enter, but which were -of vital importance to the actual troops concerned. - -The expense of publishing the History has been borne entirely by old -members of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, and in this respect I must -express my deep gratitude to Captain Leonard Vestey, Major D. M. Coffin -and Colonel Sir Frederick Hall, by whose generosity, combined with that -of several others, the publication of this book has been rendered -possible. For personal help in collecting information and facts, -checking dates and generally verifying the accuracy of the work I am -also indebted to Brigadier-General C. G. Stewart, Lieut.-Col. O. M. -Harris, Lieut.-Col. E. J. Skinner, Major M. A. Studd, Major D. M. -Coffin, Major R. D. Russell and Major S. G. Taylor. - -Finally, I wish to acknowledge the courtesy of the War Office in -permitting the reproduction in this volume of the official maps used in -France during the war. - - JOHN MACARTNEY-FILGATE. - - LONDON, - _May, 1921_. - - - - - CHAPTER I. - EARLY DAYS - - -August 1914 and its succeeding months will ever recall to the minds of -that generation which was privileged to live through those epic days -memories of a great turmoil, a chaos, a shattering of that normal—and in -many cases humdrum—existence which to the majority represented Life. The -outstanding impression will depend upon the character of the person who -looks back—to some it will be a sense of overwhelming surprise, to some -a rending and shattering of all their dreams of a long-awaited happy -future, while to some it will be the promise of Great Adventure, the -chance of seeing Life face to face and stripped of all its petty -adornments and falsities, a sight vouchsafed to few and one which of -necessity brings with it the presence of that companion Death, so -closely allied to Life in its fierce and primitive state. Yet whatever -the recollection and whatever may be the impressions retained, to one -and all remains that proud memory of the wild enthusiasm which greeted -the call to arms, the readiness to fight, to leave comfortable homes, to -give up everything because the Country called for men; because the -Country, whatever the cause of the war might be, was in peril. - -The 33rd Divisional Artillery, as its number implies, was not one of the -first to be formed. So great was the early rush to the recruiting -stations that the machinery to deal with the enlistment of men was -unable to cope with it, and it was not until January 14th, 1915, that a -War Office letter addressed to the Mayor of Camberwell authorised the -recruiting of the 156th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, by Major -Frederick Hall M.P. in the Borough of Camberwell. So prompt was the -response to this call that in March further authority was granted for -the recruitment of the 162nd Brigade R.F.A. in the same neighbourhood, -the formation of this Brigade being completed by the middle of May, when -it was placed under the command of Major Duncan. It was then brought to -the attention of the authorities that there still remained masses of -excellent material in Camberwell, that the district was overflowing with -would-be recruits not yet enlisted, and that the whole of the 33rd -Divisional Artillery might well be raised from there—a scheme which was -received by the Borough with the greatest enthusiasm. The required -authority was obtained; the 166th and 167th Brigades R.F.A., the 126th -Battery of Heavy Artillery and the attendant Ammunition Column were -formed, and on June 1st 1915 the 33rd Divisional Artillery, as such, was -complete, manned to its full strength, and manned by the men of -Camberwell and Dulwich. - -Meantime, from the day on which the first recruits had arrived, training -was carried on with the utmost vigour. N.C.O. instructors were scarce, -very few officers had been posted to the Division, and any kind of -uniform was noticeable by its absence. The early training of recruits in -those days was not calculated to enhance in their minds the glamour of -war; clad in the roughest and, in many cases, most tattered of civilian -clothes, shod in the boots which they had brought with them, they were -taught—day in, day out—that there were many accomplishments which they -must learn before they would be fit for service in the field; that -personal gallantry, a feeling of complete superiority over the enemy, -and a fixed intention of "sticking it with the best" would not alone -take them to France. They must learn to indulge in that strange form of -recreation known as "knees bending with arms raising," and all its -accompanying acrobatics; they must be initiated into the mysteries of -knotting and lashing, of horse management, of dismounted drill and a -hundred and one other matters which go to form the training of a -soldier. And then, when their knees ached with bending and stretching, -when their brains whirled in trying to fashion some especially important -and therefore, to their minds, difficult knot, when some of the most -tender portions of their anatomy felt as though one more minute in the -saddle would cut right through to the bone, Gunnery descended upon them. -Gunnery, with its drill and its intricate and complicated mechanism, -opened out a completely new item of training, a hitherto untrodden part -of the long and tedious road which led from Camberwell and Dulwich to -the battlefields of France. Yet to the weary mind of the recruit there -was one great consolation. Here at last was something tangible; here was -something which spoke of War, which brought him much nearer to the goal -of his endeavours. "Physical jerks" and the lurid remarks of riding -masters were all very well in their way, but the average recruit had no -intention of lying on his back outside a trench in France and of -solemnly raising his feet in the air to let them have a look, as it -were, at fresh surroundings; he had no desire to trot along a road -behind the Line without stirrups or reins, although he was quite -prepared to recognise that it was a useful feat to be able to perform. -No, he wanted to fling shells at the enemy, to be able to inflict upon -the "other side" all that extreme discomfort which artillery is capable -of administering; he wanted, in short, a gun, and at last he saw one -before him. - -It was this shortage of guns for drill and instructional purposes which -of necessity delayed the training of the batteries. During the time the -brigades were at Dulwich there were only dummy loaders and three -15-pounders available, nor was it until July that four 18-pounders -arrived to be divided up amongst the whole Division. Training, however, -in other essentials was briskly carried on in and around Dulwich. Cold -shoers were sent to Herold's Institute at Bermondsey, cooks to St. -John's Wood, artificers to Woolwich, while every officer on joining was -sent on a course of instruction to either Larkhill or Shoeburyness. -Map-reading classes were conducted by Army-Schoolmaster Wilmot, and Lady -Bathurst, with the assistance of ladies of the district, gave lessons in -French and German twice a week. As far as billeting was concerned, the -men of the 156th Brigade and the Divisional Ammunition Column were -allowed to live at their own homes; the 162nd Brigade was housed at -Gordon's Brewery, the 166th Brigade at the Tramway Depôt, Peckham, while -the 167th Brigade was partly billeted at home and partly at the East -Dulwich Baths. Such an arrangement of scattered billets could hardly be -hoped to succeed, especially when it is remembered that in the earlier -days the men were without uniform—a red, blue or white armlet alone -denoting the exalted presence of a Sergeant, Corporal or Bombardier -respectively. Yet gradually and steadily a change became visible; slowly -there appeared from out of the disorganised and shapeless mass of men a -clear-cut, firm formation, a sense of discipline and orderliness, the -beginnings of a unit of the British Army. - -Inspections were numerous at this time; during the months from March to -July the Divisional Artillery was, in fact, inspected no fewer than -seven times by Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, Major-General Sir T. -Perrott, and Colonel M. Peake. At the earlier inspections the men were -still in civilian clothes, as was the 167th Brigade at the recruiting -march on Peckham Rye which took place on May 1st, but shortly after that -date a full supply of uniform was received, and the men were properly -and thoroughly equipped in every way. Much could be related, -incidentally, with regard to the recruiting march just mentioned; it was -the march of the men of a district through that district, and aimed at -getting more recruits for the men's own unit. Suffice it to say that -those recruits were obtained, and if the enthusiasm of the proceedings -gave rise to some curious and amusing situations, if there rode upon the -ammunition wagons (with which the batteries were now fully equipped) -some whose right to ride there might well be questioned, who could -object? The war was still young, enthusiasm was still high, men were -still wanted. - -It was probably in the first two weeks of August that Camberwell really -grasped what the 33rd Divisional Artillery meant to it, for in those -days it lost it. It is a curious irony of life that few things are -really appreciated until they are gone, and then appreciation comes too -late. Through all these earlier days of training the men had been living -in or near their homes, but now there came a change, Adventure became -Reality, for the batteries were moved for the rest of their training -from London to Bulford. Night after night, from August 4th till August -10th, there crept out of Waterloo station trains bound for Bulford, -packed with horses, men and wagons, setting out on the second stage of -their work; night after night there were left in Camberwell homes very -empty, hearts very dreary at the arrival of that time which all had -known must come, but the coming of which was in no wise softened by this -fore-knowledge. - -Bulford wrought a tremendous change in the Divisional Artillery, which -was now under the command of its own C.R.A. Brigadier-General Stuart. -Here there was room to move; there was different country to work over -each day; there were schemes on a far more elaborate scale than had been -possible at Dulwich. The official syllabus of training was steadily -worked through, and gradually this training became more interesting, -more attractive as dull routine was left behind and sham warfare put -into practice. The batteries were fully equipped with guns, even the -167th Brigade, which was a 4·5 in. howitzer brigade and had been greatly -handicapped by a total inability to get howitzers from anywhere, being -finally fitted out, and at last, in the early part of November, the -batteries were given a chance of putting into effect on the practice -ranges all that they had been learning by tedious and hard work during -the period of training. One hundred rounds per battery were fired, and -in most cases the results were very satisfactory when the shortness of -training and the utter lack of previous experience were taken into -account. The batteries were complimented by General Drake on the good -service and drill at the guns, and returned to camp more anxious than -ever to get to France, more keen than ever to fire a shot in anger now -that they had fired one in cold blood. Rumour, already in high activity -throughout the camp, became trebly busy since there appeared no further -obstacle to keep the Division in England, and rumour was strengthened by -the granting to the men of that last leave—overseas leave—which was -given prior to departure for France. - -It was in December that it came, December 6th to be quite accurate. Just -a bald official order to proceed overseas, accompanied by a mass of -typewritten time-tables, march tables and all the paraphernalia -inevitable in a move of such dimensions. The great moment had arrived at -last, the moment for which all had waited so long, so eagerly and with -such excitement, and any pangs which might naturally have been felt at a -parting such as this, any dark forebodings which a look into the future -might have called up, were mercifully and naturally effaced by the -bustle, the excitement, the "fever," if you like, of the whole affair. - -On December 10th, at 4 P.M., the entraining of the batteries began at -Amesbury and continued at intervals throughout the night. Fifty-one -trains in all it took to move the batteries and their attendant -ammunition columns, the last train leaving Amesbury at 4.5 P.M. on -December 12th. Two days of bustle and excitement, two days of movement -and stir around Amesbury, two days during which the station was crowded -and packed with horses, guns and men sweating, heaving, swearing—and -then silence. As though by a magic hand the 33rd Divisional Artillery -was picked up and disappeared, and for a space it was hidden from the -sight of man. - - - - - CHAPTER II. - FIRST EXPERIENCES OF WAR IN THE LA BASSÉE SECTOR. - (DECEMBER 1915—JULY 1916). - - -On a foggy afternoon, typical of Flanders in December, there crept into -Aire station a long and heavy train obvious even to the lay mind as a -troop train, consisting as it did not only of ordinary passenger -coaches, but also of innumerable horse boxes and a line of long open -trucks crammed with guns and wagons. Every window was crowded with -faces—the faces of British soldiers surveying with interest this, to -most of them, new and strange land, listening with a thrill to the -distant mutter of guns, looking with eagerness for signs of war and for -a first view of the billets in which, for the next few days at any rate, -they were to live. At Hazebrouck and at Lillers similar trains were -pulling in, disgorging on to the track men, horses and guns in what -might appear to be indescribable confusion, but which had in it all a -method and a certain order. To the inhabitants there was nothing new in -this sight; scores of times had they seen the arrival of fresh units -from England in just this manner, but to the men themselves the affair -was one of the utmost significance. As a unit they were making their -first appearance within actual reach of the scene of war, and the unit -was that one whose history the ensuing pages will endeavour to record; -it was the 33rd Divisional Artillery once more, the batteries of which -for days had been swallowed up, not exactly in the fog of actual war, -but in the impenetrable maze of Lines of Communication. For days they -had been just a memory, a rumour, an entry on the time-tables of various -R.T.O.s, scattered about the railway line between Havre and Aire; for -days they had indulged in wanderings which at times made them wonder -exactly where the war was to be found, and at last in their estimation -they had found it. - -It must not be supposed that the journey of the Division from Amesbury -to its billets in the "rest" area was one long, smooth, perfectly run -affair. Far from it! On arrival at Southampton it was found that two of -the transports were in the wrong berths, while the engines of a third -had broken down; as a result, one brigade had to disembark and be broken -up into small parties, each party going on to a different ship. On -arrival at Havre mistakes had been made with regard to the accommodation -of the men, and one wretched party which marched seven miles out to -Harfleur had to return again over the same weary road before a shelter -could be found. In fact, the journey in trucks marked "Hommes 40, -chevaux 8" (a phrase no less sinister in practice than in meaning) -marked the termination of a period of discomfort and homelessness which -few who shared therein will ever forget. When one remembers, however, -the mighty forces which during these months were moved from England to -France, the actual fresh units which came over railways overloaded with -ammunition and supplies for troops already in the Line, one cannot help -recognising the ability and organisation which enabled such work to be -carried out, and which moved a division of artillery to scheduled time -across a railway system already strained to breaking point. - -It was on December 10th, it will be remembered, that the Divisional -Artillery disappeared so mysteriously from England; on December 16th, at -2.30 P.M., the concentration of the same Divisional Artillery was -reported to be complete in the Aire-Thiennes area. The cloud of mystery -was once more lifted: the batteries were known to be "somewhere in -France." Actually, the area in which they were billeted was the rest -area of the First Corps; they were attached to the division in reserve, -and were billeted in the villages of Mazinghem, Berguette, Guarbecque -and Mt. Bernanchon. - -The first few days in France proved rather a disappointment. Everybody -(other than those who had been "out" before) had come full of ideas -about the war, mostly taken from picture papers and so-called war -stories; most of the men had somehow expected to find themselves well -within sight and hearing of the battle itself, with all the accompanying -thrills of aeroplane fights, shelling in the distance, ambulances and -what not, and what did they find? An ordinary village, rather dirty and -very muddy; a flat, uninteresting country and the usual routine of -stables, watering, exercise and gun drill—just a continuation of the -training which they had carried out at Bulford, with the difference that -away on the horizon there was that continuous giant thudding, that heavy -sullen muttering which betokened artillery at work, not now in mere -practice but in grim earnest. - -However, it was not of much good being in France unless use was made of -the proximity of the war for instructional purposes, and so, two days -after the completed concentration, parties were sent from each of the -brigades to be attached to the 2nd Divisional Artillery, then holding -the line on the La Bassée front from Givenchy on the north nearly to -Fosse 8, the scene of such fierce fighting in the Loos offensive, on the -south. These parties were conveyed by motor-bus to Cambrin, Annequin and -Gorre, whence they were led on foot by guides to the positions of the -batteries to which they were attached. Six parties in all went up from -the brigades between December 18th and January 11th, the duration of -stay in the line being usually four days, so that by the end of the -second week in January all the officers, N.C.O.s, and gunners had had -their first look at the war, had seen their first glimpse of the enemy -lines, had had their first experience of shell fire. - -About the middle of January the batteries were considered to have gained -sufficient experience to merit their taking a more strenuous part in the -war, and complete batteries were accordingly sent up in turn to take -over the positions of the 12th Divisional Artillery (63rd and 64th -Brigades R.F.A.) and of the 2nd Divisional Artillery (9th, 17th, 48th, -56th and 71st batteries), stretching from Givenchy down to Vermelles. As -a rule three batteries were sent up at a time for six days, the wagon -line work and ammunition supply being carried out by the batteries to -which they were attached, while those not in the line continued -training, with a few inspections and sudden wild rumours to help pass -the time. Of inspections there were two:—on January 20th C/166 was -reviewed by General Joffre, while on January 26th the 162nd, 166th and -167th Brigades were inspected by Lieut.-General Sir Hubert Gough, then -commanding the 1st Corps. As, prior to this, the 156th Brigade had lined -the route in December to bid farewell to Field-Marshal Lord French, the -whole Division in its early days had an opportunity of seeing three -great men whose names were to be connected so closely with the history -of the war. - -The demon Rumour held widespread popularity at this time; rumours of -sudden moves to a different part of the line; rumours of a sudden -advance to support our infantry—anything, in fact, which billet gossip -could evolve on a quiet evening. Nor was this gossip entirely to blame -if it gave rise to so many rumours, for official orders and -counter-orders themselves gave plenty of scope for wonder to the average -brain. As an example of the continual uncertainty which prevailed -regarding future movements, the case of the Divisional Ammunition Column -might well be taken. On January 26th it was ordered to stand by, ready -for a sudden move; this order was cancelled at 1.30 A.M. on January -27th, was revived again at 5.30 the same evening with the additional -information that it must be ready to move at two hours' notice, and was -finally cancelled at 11.35 P.M. that night. Nothing immediate came of -these rumours, and all through February the same training, now grown -very tedious after the interest of a first visit to the Line, was -carried on. A somewhat ambitious plan of two-day manœuvres was carried -out in the First Army area around Estrée-Blanche and Therouane on the -last days of January by those batteries which were not at the time -undergoing training in the Line, but February 1st saw a resumption of -the old billet life again. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - DECEMBER 1915—MAY 1916. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major Sheppard. Capt. T. Usher. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel F. Hall, M.P. Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, - (_till February_). D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. W. Holden Lieut. W. G. Pringle. - (_till February_). - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major Alcard Capt. R. D. Capt. G. Lomer. Capt. S. Talbot. - (_till January_). Russell. - - Capt. L. R. Hill - (_after - January_). - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Duncan. - - Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. F. C. Major R. G. M. Capt. A. van Major D. Stewart. - Packham. Johnston. Straubenzee. - - 166th Brigade. - - Colonel A. H. S. Goff. - - Adjutant: Lieut. E. G. Lutyens. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. D. M. Major T. E. Capt. H. Freeman. Capt. G. - Coffin. Durie. Fetherston. - - 167th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel Du Plat Taylor. - - Lieut.-Colonel Harpur. - - Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff. - - Adjutant: Lieut. W. D. Watson Lieut. H. C. Cory. - (_till January_). - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. M. A. Major Barkworth. Major W. P. Capt. W. A. T. - Studd. Bennett. Barstow. - -Three units, however, escaped the general air of boredom which was now -gradually pervading the Divisional Artillery—one at an early stage and -the others later. C/167 (Major Bennett), as far back as December 30th, -marched up to the Line and came permanently into action in a disused -battery position about 150 yards south of the La Bassée Canal, midway -between Vauxhall Bridge and Pont Fixe. It was attached to the 1st Corps -Heavy Artillery for counter-battery work, and, covering as it did the -wide front from Violaines on the north to Auchy on the south, with -observation stations in Givenchy ("N"), Cambrin, "King's Clere" and -"Mountain House," it had an excellent opportunity of learning accurately -the whole of the front which the Divisional Artillery was at a later -date to cover. The wagon lines were bad, but the battery position, -despite the fact that it had to be built while the guns were actually -there, was not too uncomfortable. An occasional shelling with -whizz-bangs at that early stage did nothing more than arouse interest -and teach a few healthy lessons, while the daily shelling of Pont Fixe, -about 300 yards away, by a 5·9 in. howitzer was regarded as a free -entertainment of great attraction. - -A/162 (Captain Packham) and A/166 (Captain Coffin), the other two -batteries to go into action independently, were rather later than C/167; -they did not move into action until February 13th, when they were -attached to the 1st Corps Heavy Artillery for counter-battery work and, -having marched up through Béthune, Beuvry and Annequin, took up -positions covering, with C/167, the same wide front. - -At last orders came, on February 15th, for the whole of the 33rd -Divisional Artillery to take over the line from the 12th Divisional -Artillery. The relief began on February 23rd, when the first sections of -the batteries relieved their opposite numbers in action; three batteries -(C/156, C/162, A/166) which were already in the line for training stayed -there, and on February 25th the remaining sections of the batteries came -into action. C/167 vacated its position at Cuinchy, marched to the wagon -line on the night of the 23rd/24th and was split up, the right section -going to D/167 (Captain Barstow) and the left to A/167 (Captain Studd) -to form six-gun batteries. B/167 (Major Barkworth) had on February 14th -been posted to the 1/4th London Brigade R.F.A. (T.F.), and was -permanently struck off the strength of the Division. - -At noon on Saturday, February 26th, the relief was reported complete, -the 33rd Divisional Artillery under its C.R.A., Brig.-General C. F. -Blane, assumed responsibility for the artillery support of the front -covered by the 33rd infantry, and for the first time held the line -entirely on its own. The front extended from Boyau 1 to Boyau 53, that -is from Mad Point to just south of Givenchy. The four brigades, -commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, Lieut.-Colonel Duncan, -Colonel A. H. S. Goff and Lieut.-Colonel Harpur, were divided into two -groups, "Z," the Northern Group, being commanded by Colonel Goff, "A," -the Auchy Group, by Colonel Harpur; the batteries of both groups were -dispersed all along the front from the La Bassée Canal to as far south -as Vermelles. - -Here a slight digression may well be permitted. It will be noticed that -Lieut.-Colonel F. Hall is not mentioned above as one of the Brigade -Commanders. To the regret of all ranks he returned to England on -February 15th, handing over the command of the 156th Brigade to -Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd. It would be impossible to over-estimate -the work which Lieut.-Colonel Hall did in organising the recruitment of -the 33rd Divisional Artillery in Camberwell; without his work, and the -work of Lieut.-Colonel Duncan who was also lost to the Division in March -when he handed over the command of the 162nd Brigade to Lieut.-Colonel -O. M. Harris, the brigades could never have been formed so rapidly as -they were. In these pages, which perpetuate the history of the 33rd -Divisional Artillery, it is essential that there should also be recorded -the great effort made by Lieut.-Colonel Hall in raising the four -brigades, an effort which was appreciated by His Majesty the King at a -later date, when he bestowed upon him a Knighthood of the Order of the -British Empire. - -To return, however, to the war. The trench system here, as everywhere on -the Flanders front, was situated in very flat ground, and O.P.'s in the -front line were of little use except for shooting on the enemy fire -trench. Providentially, along the rising ground a few hundred yards -behind the front line there were a number of ruined houses dotted about -at odd intervals, sometimes singly, sometimes in groups; all of these -were practically destroyed by shell fire, but had just enough left -standing to offer a precarious perch to anyone wishing to observe -therefrom, and to provide a screen for such sandbagging, strengthening -and revetting as an ingenious mind, coupled with no small influence with -the Sappers and a desire for greater comfort, might devise. "N" and -Artillery House in Givenchy were but little used as they were rather too -far to the north, but King's Clere and Mountain House (in Cambrin), -Braddell Castle, The Ruin and the Four Hundred on either side of the La -Bassée road, with Dead Man's House, Wilson's House, Ridge View and -Maison Rouge stretching along the line just south of the road, made -excellent spots from which, perched usually in the wreckage of the roof, -one could direct fire on to every spot in the zone. The Ruin and, before -it was rebuilt, the Four Hundred were trying in the extreme to the -nerves, for they hung together in a manner which might have appeared -impossible even to the ingenious mind of a Heath Robinson; moreover, -they were almost daily attended to by an ever-persistent German gunner -with an unlimited supply of 5·9 in. ammunition and a nice taste in house -removing, but King's Clere, a little further to the north, provided an -excellent view of all the front and back areas, and had been thoroughly -and effectively secured by means of cement and iron girders. This part -of the front was, indeed, a most fascinating one for shooting over, -provided a good O.P. was available. North of the canal had little of -interest, save the ruins of Violaines and Canteleux, but to the south, -and just on the bank, was the Railway Triangle with its mysterious tower -and mound. Auchy offered several moderately undamaged houses whence, in -the early morning, smoke could be seen issuing, while loopholes appeared -and disappeared, or were camouflaged, with extraordinary frequency. Les -Briques, with its dead trees and ruined house, struck a grim and -forbidding note, but, just south of it, the green fields around Lone -Farm were always full of possibilities. Many and varied were the ideas -as to the use which was made of Lone Farm; as a farm it had totally -disappeared and suggested nothing more than a few dead trees and a mound -of bricks, but underneath those bricks there must have been some -splendid cellars. Every morning, just as day broke, parties of twenty or -thirty Germans could be seen there, and every morning some battery or -other, with an unexpected burst of shrapnel, used to lengthen the German -casualty list in no small manner. It took the Germans an extraordinary -time to learn the lesson of Lone Farm, and for quite a considerable -period it was there that the newly-arrived battery officer from England -saw the first grey-clad figures of the enemy; there, as like as not, -that he first saw his shells actually bring death. South of Lone Farm -again came the Corons de Maron and the "Dump," or, to give it its -correct title, Fosse 8 de Béthune, but both of these were out of the -zone of the batteries and had, therefore, to be left undisturbed. - -[Illustration: - - Scale 1:20,000. -] - -Behind Auchy and Lone Farm could be seen Indian Well House, Haisnes, -Douvrin and the road running up to La Bassée. For normal purposes this -area was out of range, but was none the less interesting in that it -afforded all manner of unexpected sights. A train, a lorry going along -the road, a couple of horsemen trotting down a bridle path are -commonplace sights in England, but when you are separated from that -train or lorry by a network of ditches containing death in a hundred -forms, when that train or lorry is carrying men who will probably -to-morrow be trying their best to kill you, and whom you may, with -considerable fortune, kill first, then the matter appears in a different -light, and you feel an intense interest in the objects visible. - -Up to the present this chapter has been devoted to a description of the -front on which the Division was operating. It may be that too much space -has been given to what is, after all, merely of personal interest, but -it should be remembered that this was the first front upon which the -Divisional Artillery served as a unit, and therefore the memory of it -has been impressed upon the minds of both officers and men probably to a -far greater extent than has any other portion of the British Front in -France. Now, however, regard must be had for the tactical situation as -it presented itself in the winter of 1915-16. - -It will be remembered that, since the battle of Loos in September and -October 1915, no attack on any large scale had been carried out by the -British troops. Heavy fighting continued throughout the winter along the -newly-formed salient at Loos, and this in itself proved such a drain -upon the forces of both sides that the remainder of the 1st Army front -was comparatively quiet. On December 19th the Germans launched a heavy -gas attack in the Ypres salient, and on February 13th, in the same area, -occurred the famous attack on the Bluff. The end of February saw the -beginning of the great battle of Verdun, and it was therefore a natural -result that the La Bassée front, situated as it was outside the zone of -these different operations, remained in a state of comparative quiet, -and was disturbed solely by the raids, mine explosions and artillery -activity which were the invariable régime of trench warfare. - -This period of the campaign saw the arrival in France of a great number -of New Army divisions, and as far as possible these divisions, with one -or two noteworthy exceptions, were placed in a part of the line which -was not likely to be subjected to any large scale operations but which, -by the opportunities it offered of raiding, patrolling and the like, -formed an excellent training ground for troops not yet experienced in -modern warfare. No better part of the firing line could, in fact, have -been chosen than the La Bassée sector. The famous Brickstack area was a -centre of great mining activities; raids were the order rather than the -exception, and big trench minenwerfer were daily in action. The back -areas of the German zone were in full view of the artillery observation -stations whence practice could be obtained, day in day out, on every -possible type of target. Salient features presented themselves for -registration and calibration of the guns, and during these shoots the -accuracy and drill of the gun detachments could be fully and carefully -noted. Numerous houses, in a more or less advanced state of -dilapidation, gave all ranks a good idea of the effect of modern -artillery fire on fortifications, while working parties and moving -targets of all descriptions taught observing officers and gun -detachments the essential lesson of quick shooting without loss of -accuracy, and the absolute necessity of a familiarity with every inch of -the ground covered. - -It has already been stated that the mining activities of both sides were -very marked. Although this would appear to concern the infantry rather -than the artillery, the effect on the latter was of great importance. -The explosion of a mine was in many cases followed by an infantry raid, -and for this reason gun detachments and officers on duty with the -infantry were kept up to a high pitch of speed and smartness in putting -down an immediate barrage. Moreover, this barrage shooting was most -effective in instilling confidence in the accuracy and good shooting of -gun detachments. It was a very strong but utterly fatal temptation to a -battery commander to add twenty-five or even fifty yards to the range of -his guns, to ensure that no shell fell short and inflicted casualties on -our own infantry. To withstand this temptation needed the most complete -confidence in the guns of the battery, but, on the other hand, to add -the margin of safety almost invariably meant that the barrage dropped -beyond its mark and inflicted no damage whatever upon the raiding party -or trench for which it was intended. Gradually did the infantry learn -completely to trust their gunners in barrage firing, and once and for -all did the battery officers realise that there was only one range which -would hit their target, and that any addition to that range, although -satisfying their own peace of mind, would effectually wipe out any good -which their efforts might have done, and would leave the infantry to the -mercies of a hand to hand encounter with the enemy. - -On March 8th an important alteration was made in the disposition of -troops along the Divisional front. From this date two infantry brigades -were kept in the line, each brigade maintaining two battalions in the -front line. Each artillery section was divided into two sub-sections -composed of two 18-pdr. batteries apiece, and it therefore worked out -that each battalion of infantry in the front line had two 18-pdr. -batteries to provide it with direct artillery support. This system -appeared on paper excellent, and indeed from the point of view of -establishing close co-operation between the Divisional Artillery and its -own Infantry no fault in the plan could be found, but there was one -tremendous handicap which every day made itself felt more vitally -amongst gunners and infantry alike. Throughout this period the supply of -ammunition for daily firing was most closely limited, and on March 18th -the allowance was restricted to sixteen rounds per battery per day. It -is not intended here to enter into the great ammunition controversy. -Such a matter would be out of place in what is meant to be an historical -record of an artillery unit throughout the war, but it is mentioned in -view of certain remarks which will later be made concerning the mutual -relations of the infantry with the artillery, and is one of the chief -difficulties with which the artillery had to contend at this time. - -March 18th saw the first attack of any dimensions which had so far taken -place in the neighbourhood of the 33rd Divisional zone. After a short -but very heavy artillery bombardment and the explosion of three mines, -the Germans made an attack upon the 12th Division which was at that time -on the right of the 33rd Division and was confronting the Hohenzollern -redoubt. Apart from a heavy bombardment of Annequin with gas shells and -the general searching with long range fire of all the roads leading up -to the front, no material effect was felt by the 33rd Divisional -Artillery. It gave the batteries, however, some idea of what would be -expected of them in the event of a hostile attack on their own front, -and, although conducted at a distance, enabled them by sight and hearing -to realise the weight of shell fire to which they would be subjected if -they were themselves attacked. - -April 27th saw a much larger attack by the Germans, once again upon the -right of the 33rd Division, and this time on the 16th Division in the -Hulluch sector. Early in the morning of that day a very heavy -bombardment began on the Division's right, and shortly afterwards a call -for mutual support was received. A heavy mist lay upon the ground, but -through it could be heard the throb and roar of a battle in progress, -mingling with the nearer and more persistent thunder of our own guns and -of the German retaliation. Gradually the mist thickened instead of -clearing, and gradually did the firing become more intense; suddenly in -the distance was heard the wail of a siren which was taken up by one -closer at hand. The Division had never before been subjected to a gas -attack, and at first the true meaning of these sirens was only suspected -and not fully realised, but a certain pungency soon made itself felt in -the morning air. The men began coughing and sneezing, the atmosphere -became thick and unbreathable, and in a very few minutes all batteries -were working under the protection of their gas helmets. The battle was -over by the middle of the morning, and the batteries were able to return -to the ordinary routine of the day, but a lesson and a valuable lesson -at that had been learnt, and it was brought home even more clearly than -before that the detachments must be prepared to work under more -difficult conditions than they had as yet experienced. Whilst on the -subject of this gas attack it is important to note that, on the occasion -in question, so dense were the gas clouds that they were even felt at -the wagon lines as far back as Beuvry. - -After this attack followed renewed trench activity and mutual -retaliation. On April 28th the wagon lines of the 166th Brigade at -Beuvry were heavily shelled by a long range gun, and numerous casualties -were suffered by horses and men. The shelling of wagon lines is at all -times most unsettling and likely to do great damage, but this particular -case, being the first of its kind of which the batteries of the Division -had had experience, created a great impression. - -About this time a somewhat curious incident occurred between the German -Air Service and our Artillery. On April 28th a German aeroplane flew -over the battery position of A/167 (Captain Studd) and dropped a long -streamer to which was attached a message. This message stated that -German headquarters were aware that No. 1 Harley Street (a big building -used as a dressing station and situated in a road which derived its name -from the number of aid posts which lay along it) was a dressing station, -but that, owing to the great damage which was being done by the battery -of howitzers in action behind this particular house, they were -reluctantly compelled to destroy it by shell fire. Apart from anything -else, this was a considerable compliment to the work of A/167, the -battery referred to, but it did not say much for the observation powers -of the German aircraft. A/167 was then in action on the eastern end of -Tourbiers loop, and was at least 600 yds. from the dressing station in -question. Next day the bombardment of No. 1 Harley Street by aeroplane -observation began; a great number of direct hits were obtained, and, -although the Red Cross was clearly visible, the building was entirely -destroyed. It is pleasant to note, however, that this incident did not -pass unavenged. Early one morning a short time afterwards, the battery -commander of A/166 (Captain Coffin) saw a large convoy of German -ambulances proceeding along the road near Haisnes. A burst of high -explosive blocked the front and rear of the convoy, a steady and -destructive fire of high explosive and shrapnel swept the length and -breadth of the road, and in a short time the debt owing to the Germans -by the destruction of the dressing station in Harley Street was more -than wiped out. The shelling of dressing stations and ambulances was -not, at this time, a practice usually indulged in by our guns, but of -late the enemy had been consistently shelling all our aid posts, our -dressing stations and our field ambulances, and it was hoped that a -short sharp lesson such as that detailed above might tend to lessen in -the future the sufferings of our own wounded. - -Quite soon after this incident another opportunity very fortunately -presented itself of impressing upon the Germans our intention of brisk -and immediate retaliation for any attacks on their part. Three big -minenwerfers had, of late, been harassing our infantry to an undue -extent every night from the vicinity of the Railway Triangle, Spotted -Dog and Ryan's Keep, and it was decided to organise a really efficient -shell storm to try and discourage the enemy from this particular form of -attack. Accordingly it was arranged that, at 3.25 on a certain morning, -a sudden and concentrated bombardment by 9·2 in., 6 in., 4·5 in. -howitzers and 18-pdrs. should take place on the area from which the -"Minnie" worked. By a great stroke of fortune, ten minutes before the -bombardment was due to begin, the minenwerfer in question started its -nightly bombardment. Hardly had it begun than from all sides there -poured down shells of every description, trench mortar bombs and rifle -grenades, and for upwards of twenty minutes the German trench system was -one vast mass of smoke, flame and dust. Not for many days afterwards did -that minenwerfer worry our troops, and the Germans must indeed have been -impressed by the organisation which in the space of a few minutes -brought down upon them such a concentrated and well-timed barrage. - -On May 19th an important reorganisation of the Divisional Artillery took -place. When the 33rd Division embarked for France its artillery -consisted of four brigades:—the 156th, 162nd, 166th and 167th. Of these, -the first three brigades were made up of 18-pdr. batteries, while the -167th was a 4·5 in. howitzer brigade. By an order which now was issued, -the brigades were reconstituted to consist each of three 18-pdr. -batteries and one 4·5 in. howitzer battery. The effect of such an -organisation was that each Brigade Commander had a small but complete -tactical force under his direct command, and, in the event of open -warfare and a moving battle, was so disposed that he had a percentage of -both types of artillery under his control. Everything, in fact, was now -clearly indicating the early resumption of active operations, and June -18th might be considered to mark the first step in this direction in the -La Bassée sector. - -On June 18th the 39th Division, then holding the line on the left of the -33rd, was withdrawn, and the 33rd extended its front northward as far as -Grenadier Road in Givenchy. For one division this was an extraordinarily -wide front, and necessitated the alteration and widening of gun pits, -the establishing of new observation stations in Givenchy, with the -consequent laying of telephone lines—a very heavy strain on the -batteries who were responsible for the support and protection of such a -widely spread body of infantry. The group system of batteries was -reorganised into two new groups—Givenchy and Cuinchy—and the late Auchy -group became a subsection of Cuinchy group. As an example of the width -of front to be guarded by the batteries, it may be stated that the -howitzers had to cover a front of 120°. In addition to the extension of -the front, preparations for operations on a large scale were ordered to -be taken. Every battery had to make accommodation for keeping around the -guns four times the amount of ammunition to what had previously been the -rule; all ranks were made acquainted with the forward zone and the best -lines of advance in case of a German withdrawal, advance positions were -selected and the whole front began to seethe with an undercurrent of -preparation and anticipation. To the inexperienced minds of the troops -this appeared to indicate an offensive on the La Bassée front. Never -before had the batteries been in a big battle; they did not know that, -had an attack been contemplated on their front, the activity would have -been multiplied tenfold. They did not know that, far away in the south, -preparations on a vast and unprecedented scale were being made; that -there were in the Somme area concentrations of artillery, infantry, -ammunition and material which exceeded anything yet seen in war. They -only saw their own preparations and formed their opinions accordingly. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - MAY 1916—JUNE 1916. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major H. K. Capt. T. Usher. - Sadler, M.C. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. W. G. Pringle. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. L. R. Hill. Capt. R. D. Capt. G. Lomer. Capt. M. A. - Russell. Studd. - - Capt. Lutyens. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. F. C. Major R. G. M. Capt. A. van Major W. P. - Packham. Johnston Straubenzee. Bennett. - - 166th Brigade. - - Colonel A. H. S. Goff, C.M.G. - - Adjutant: Lieut. E. G. Lutyens. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. D. M. Major T. E. Capt. H. Freeman. Capt. W. A. T. - Coffin. Durie. Barstow, M.C. - - 167th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff. - - Adjutant: Lieut. H. C. Cory. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. - - Capt. S. Talbot. Major D. Stewart. Capt. G. - Fetherston. - -On June 24th these suspicions, already fostered by the Higher Command in -order to cover operations elsewhere, were more than doubled. On that day -the whole of the British line burst into flame. From Ypres to the Somme -a steady bombardment of the German trench system began, wire was cut and -kept open, repairs to damaged trenches were prevented by persistent -bursts of fire, and in every sector did it appear that an attack was -imminent; unless the German Headquarters could discover where the main -concentration was taking place it was impossible for them to gauge the -most probable place of assault. That they did discover it was realised, -and realised bitterly, on July 1st and the succeeding days, but there is -no doubt that the artillery activity along the whole front kept them in -a considerable state of apprehension, nor did they dare to dispatch -troops to the Somme in such a whole-hearted way as would otherwise have -been possible. - -Naturally, with both sides in such a state of activity, it was -inevitable that a great deal of raiding should go on—raids by the -Germans to try and discover in what strength we were holding the line, -raids by our troops to determine the German order of battle and to -follow, by identification, the arrival or departure of troops to and -from the zone. On June 22nd, at 2 A.M., a tremendous mine was exploded -by the Germans near the Duck's Bill in Givenchy. So great was the mine, -which had been dug right underneath Company Headquarters of the 2nd -Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, that a complete company was almost -annihilated. Following the explosion, the Germans raided the trenches -under cover of a heavy barrage, and for several hours hand to hand -fighting of the fiercest nature was carried on. Every gun which could be -brought to bear upon that area gave such support to our harassed troops -as was possible, and eventually the position was more or less restored. -It is doubtful whether this raid had any connection with the forthcoming -Somme offensive. It was conducted on such a large scale, and the mine -shaft itself extended for such a distance, that preparations must have -been begun some long time previously. - -On June 27th it was our turn to harass the enemy by one of the swiftest -and best planned raids which had yet been carried out. Two parties of -the 9th Battalion Highland Light Infantry went across No Man's Land at -Mad Point and, under cover of a barrage, entered the German front line -at two spots some 250 yards apart. The barrage in this case was a most -difficult one for the batteries to carry out, as not only had the two -parties to be covered on their front and flanks, but the reserve -trenches behind the gap which lay between the two parties had also to be -blocked. This, however, was only the beginning of the affair. Gradually -the Highlanders, having destroyed all the dug-outs, mine shafts and -hostile troops within their reach, began to bomb their way along the -trench inwards towards each other. Gradually such Germans as were not -bombed retreated before the hostile raiders and congregated in a herd in -the middle, with the raiding parties closing in on both sides and the -barrage roaring over their heads to cut off all retreat. And then, when -the Germans were crowded and wedged into one section of the front line, -unable to move either way and awaiting a bombing attack from both -flanks, the raiding parties suddenly ceased pressing on, a mine was -exploded right underneath the spot where the Germans were assembled, and -the raiding parties returned to our own trenches, all further work on -their part being unnecessary. It was a triumph of organisation and -accuracy, and fully merited the results it achieved. - -On July 2nd the 2nd Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment raided the -enemy lines for one hour and a half, and inflicted numerous casualties -on the enemy, and on July 5th the 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers -raided the enemy opposite the Duck's Bill and remained in their trench -system for over two hours. By now the German infantry were in an -advanced state of nerves. Although the news of the offensive on the -Somme had reached them and they realised that the main attack was to the -south, the continued bombardment on their own front and the nightly -raids gave them not one moment's peace of mind, nor dared they -materially weaken this part of the line. The raid by the Royal Welsh -Fusiliers on July 5th deserves rather more than a passing word. It will -be remembered that, on June 22nd, they had suffered heavily at the hands -of a German raid. On July 5th they were given a chance of retaliation, -and never has a raiding party gone over the top with such a thirst for -blood and revenge. Not only did the infantry attack, but with them went -a party of the Tunnelling Company who were sore at the thought that the -German miners had evaded their counter-mining and had managed to carry a -shaft so far beneath the British trenches. It was not their fault—in -that marshy ground the most up-to-date and scientific apparatus was -necessary to carry a shaft to any depth beneath the ground. That -apparatus the Germans possessed and we did not, and as a result they -carried their shaft far deeper than we could reach, and blew up a -company of British infantry with one touch of an electric contact. July -5th, however, proved an adequate revenge. For upwards of two hours the -infantry bombed and bayoneted, the sappers blew up all the mine shafts, -whilst the Cuinchy group of artillery alone fired 6,000 rounds, relays -of detachments keeping the guns firing at "gun fire" practically all the -time. - -That operation proved to be the last carried out by the 33rd Divisional -Artillery on the La Bassée sector. No hint had been received by the -batteries of a move, no word of warning was given of an early departure, -but suddenly, at about five o'clock on the afternoon of Thursday, July -6th, there came a bolt from the blue. Orders were received that the 33rd -Divisional Artillery was to move down to the Somme, that it would be -relieved forthwith by the 39th, and that the first half-batteries would -march to the wagon lines at 2 A.M. on the 7th, _i.e._, in eleven hours' -time. Now the batteries had been in action in the same positions for -nearly five months, and a few hours was but scanty notice to give in -which to move out from long-inhabited trench positions, ready and -equipped for fighting of any sort. Yet the order was complied with, and, -when dawn broke the following day, all traces of the departure had -disappeared, and away in the wagon lines were to be found the guns and -men who, the previous evening, had been in action within, in some cases, -1,700 yards of the enemy. - -Before the further activities of the batteries are followed, a word must -be spoken in summary of the doings of the Divisional Artillery on this -front during the five months in which they were in action. It may be -complained that the foregoing chapter deals too fully with the action of -the Division as a whole, and that not enough detailed information has -been given concerning the daily life of the batteries. The answer is, -that what concerned the Division vitally concerned the batteries, and -that it has been considered more desirable to give a general _résumé_ of -the work carried out by the Division, for in that work the Artillery -played a most active part. It would have been easy, and to a few people -interesting, to have recorded the shelling to which the batteries were -subjected, the difficulties and trials they had to undergo, and -individual cases in which particularly brilliant or destructive shoots -were carried out, but in so doing the general picture would have been -lost and the value of this record greatly reduced. The period spent on -the La Bassée front was a period of stationary warfare during which the -batteries were hardened and experienced, and, as such, lacked the -interest which the ensuing part of the campaign supplies. The -description which has been given of the type of fighting carried out -during this time will enable an idea to be gained of the work of the -batteries, but two points in particular are worthy of record. - -When the batteries arrived in France they were raw and untrained as far -as actual fighting was concerned. The resulting strain upon all battery -commanders was tremendous, for no man knows, until he has been under -shell fire, the actual sensations of that experience, and no battery -commander knew exactly how his men would bear the very great trial to -which they were going to be put. In those five months every battery had -to suffer such shelling and bombardment, had to carry out such accurate -and wearying shooting, and to work under conditions of such difficulty -as to satisfy commanding officers that the 33rd Divisional Artillery was -indeed one of which to be proud, and that the men could be relied upon -to undergo any trial, to meet danger and death in any form without -deviating one inch from the work put before them. When the batteries -moved south to the Somme there was but one feeling which pervaded -officers and men alike, a feeling of complete confidence, of complete -determination and of keenness to take part in real active operations -which they fully realised, from the previous five months' experience, -they were well qualified to take. - -And the other lesson learnt—what was that? It was the most valuable one -of co-operation and even of personal intimacy with the infantry. During -the whole of the La Bassée period, with one short exception, the 33rd -Divisional Infantry were holding the line. Day in day out, officers from -every battery were attached to battalion and company headquarters, and -the friendship of the infantry for the gunners and _vice versa_ became -very real. Even the N.C.O.s got to know each other by name, and the -resulting feeling of confidence and friendship was of the greatest -value. It was difficult to maintain this practice in later days when -casualties in the infantry and gunners increased by leaps and bounds, -when old friends were lost and new faces were ever appearing, and when -the batteries were continually being attached to strange divisions and -were covering infantry other than their own; but the lesson had been -learnt, and throughout the war the Divisional Artillery made it an aim -and object to get to know the infantry it was covering, to live and -fight with them, and to perfect that liaison which was so important, not -only by the teachings of the cold official text books, but by the -invariable lesson of human nature. - - * * * * * - -From the wagon lines to which they had marched on the night of July -6th-7th, the batteries moved to Mt. Bernanchon and Guarbecque, and there -the Divisional Artillery concentrated. One day it spent in overhauling, -refitting and inspecting, and on the 9th it entrained at Fouquereuil, -Chocques and Lillers, and moved to the Somme, a unit no longer raw, -inexperienced and untried, but a unit trained and hardened by five -months' trench fighting, now setting off to take part for the first time -in large scale operations, in pitched battle, open fighting and all the -trials and sufferings attendant thereto. - - - - - CHAPTER III. - THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME. - (JULY 14th—SEPTEMBER 6th 1916). - - -Early on the morning of July 10th the long troop trains carrying the -batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery drew into the stations of -Longueau and Sallieux, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, and began to -unload with every due speed. All ranks fully expected to march into -action forthwith, and therefore with something akin to dismay it was -learnt that the destination of the batteries was the area around Soues, -Arouves and Le Mesge, villages some miles _west_ of Amiens, and far away -from the battle lines. The 156th Brigade and half of the 162nd Brigade -marched first to Cardonette, but their stay there was only temporary, -and on the evening of the 10th, after a long and exceedingly dusty march -in great heat through Amiens, Ailly and Picquigny, the Divisional -Artillery was reported concentrated in the area allotted to it. There it -stayed during the whole of the 11th, resting, overhauling after the long -journey and generally making preparations for the great battle which all -realised was very near indeed at hand. - -This was different country to the late surroundings of the batteries. -Hills and valleys, pleasant little villages with orchards and pastures -proved an agreeable change to the flat monotony of Flanders, and, keen -as the men were to prove their mettle in the great struggle being waged -over the far horizon, a day of rest in this quiet country proved very -welcome. On the 12th, however, all was hustle and stir once again, and -the four brigades marched together as a Divisional Artillery to the -Vecquemont-Daours area. The heat was tremendous, and several inches of -fine dust lay on the roads; the result of a column, many miles in -length, of horses and guns on the march under these conditions may well -be imagined, and on their arrival—the 156th Brigade at Corbie, the 162nd -Brigade at Daours, with the 166th and 167th Brigades at Vecquemont—all -were covered and half choked with a mixture of dust and perspiration -which nothing short of a dip in the neighbouring stream could remove. -Here the batteries bivouacked for the night, while battery commanders -were detached from the column to ride on at daybreak to reconnoitre the -front and generally to learn the tactical position into which they must -shortly lead their batteries; and from here at 8.0 A.M. on the 13th the -column, after the previous night's halt, continued the march to Treux -and the neighbouring Marette Wood, where the brigades waited and gained -such rest as was possible in view of the fact that they were ordered to -be prepared to move at thirty minutes' notice. - -Not until 1.30 A.M. on the 14th were the expected orders to move -received, and even then for one and a half hours the batteries stood -tense and expectant, gunners by their guns, drivers at the horses' -heads, while in the distance the throb and roar of the great attack on -the second German line of defence came down to them. At last, at 3.0 -A.M. in the half-light the 162nd, 166th and 167th Brigades moved off to -Becordel-Becourt, the 162nd Brigade proceeding in the first place to -Méaulte for a few hours, while the 156th Brigade moved off in the -afternoon of the same day to Méaulte, bivouacking on the spot which the -162nd Brigade had just vacated on completing the march to Becordel. Now -was the battle very close at hand indeed; the roads were choked with -infantry, guns and transport moving up, always moving up, with their -faces set towards the east where lay a mighty, seething cauldron, the -melting pot of two great armies in mortal conflict. Against this -never-ending stream came down, in a slowly moving column, the -fruits—fruits indeed, though often very bitter—of victory. Ambulances, -walking wounded, shattered guns, depleted and exhausted infantry -battalions coming out to rest, and, a sight more cheering to the -up-going troops, long lines of German prisoners. The appearance of this -highway, one of the main arteries to the actual front line, brought home -to the batteries, who were drawn up off the side of the road awaiting -orders, a very grim realisation of the ordeal they were about to -undergo, but detracted not one whit of eagerness from the minds of the -men to plunge into that struggle just as soon as circumstances should -permit. - -At 4.30 P.M. on the 14th the brigade commanders of the three brigades at -Becordel rode on to reconnoitre positions; it was generally understood -that no move into action would take place until shortly before dawn of -the following morning, and preparations were accordingly made for a -night bivouac. It was a disturbed night; the road hummed and buzzed with -traffic unceasingly, the battery horse lines were twice shelled by a -4-in. high velocity gun—once so heavily that the horses had temporarily -to be withdrawn—and at 1.0 A.M. on the morning of Saturday, the 15th, -two brigades, the 162nd and the 166th, received orders to march into -action at dawn. - -Independently at 3.0 A.M. the batteries of these two brigades moved off -in full fighting order, and, passing over the old front line system near -Fricourt, headed for the positions which had been reconnoitred on the -previous day on the slopes of the valleys running from Caterpillar Wood -to Montauban and Bazentin. Gas hung thickly in the valley east of -Fricourt and necessitated the wearing of P.H. helmets, while a thick fog -rendered progress of the utmost difficulty, but gradually the batteries -pushed their way up past the ruins of Mametz and, topping the ridge, -moved down the slopes into the ill-famed and deadly Caterpillar Valley -which, in the next few days, was destined to be subjected to the most -ruthless of shell-storms. Here certain of the batteries in their -innocence halted and prepared for action, and Providence for once smiled -upon them. A few stray shells pitched over Mametz Wood, a few fell on -the road ahead, but Caterpillar Valley at that particular hour remained -untouched, and the batteries, after a short halt, continued unharmed. -Signs of battle were now to be found everywhere; the dead, friend and -foe alike, lay all around, broken and twisted guns and transport, -discarded equipment, rifles, bombs, all the disorder of battle were -strewn about, while the shell-pocked ground offered that dead and -forbidding appearance which is a characteristic only to be found in -ground recently fought over. - -Through the now clearing mist the batteries advanced and, as in open -fighting, manœuvred in the manner so often taught in the plains around -Bulford. A, B and C/162 took up positions on the northern slopes of the -Caterpillar Wood-Montauban valley several hundred yards north of -Montauban, as previously reconnoitred, but D/162, by an unfortunate -misunderstanding, dropped into action just short of the crest of the -slope four hundred yards north of Caterpillar Wood and about a mile to -the left of the 18-pdrs., instead of falling in practically alongside -them. This alteration was very regrettable, for, although for tactical -purposes the range was the same in either position, D Battery and its -teams almost immediately came under heavy fire directed at the cavalry -in the valley between it and Caterpillar Wood, and lost its battery -commander, Major W. P. Bennett, who was killed by a shell within the -first few minutes. The 166th Brigade at the same time came into action -two hundred yards east of Mametz Wood, and by 8.30 A.M. both brigades -were heavily bombarding that portion of Switch Trench which ran west -from High Wood. Of the remaining brigades the 156th marched through -Fricourt during the morning in rear of the 19th Infantry Brigade (33rd -Division), halted in reserve and reconnoitred the whole position, while -the 167th Brigade moved to a position of assembly midway between -Caterpillar and Bazentin-le-Grand Woods, experiencing great difficulty -_en route_ in getting past our heavy batteries which, in many cases, -were in action off the side of the road and firing directly across it. -These two brigades came into action on the night of the 15th/16th, with -the exception of A/167 which was not in action till 7.0 P.M. on the -16th, and took up positions at 1.0 A.M., the 156th Brigade just north of -Bazentin-le-Grand village, the 167th Brigade close together in line half -a mile north of Caterpillar Wood. The wagon lines of all batteries lay -immediately west of Becordel. Thus, by dawn on the 15th, two brigades -were in action, while at dawn on the 16th the whole of the 33rd -Divisional Artillery was in the very midst of the Battle of the Somme, -and was bombarding the enemy to the utmost of its ability. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - JULY—AUGUST 1916. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major H. K. Capt. T. C. - Sadler, M.C. Usher. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. E. H. Prior. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. Lutyens. Capt. R. D. Capt. G. Lomer. Capt. M. A. - Russell Studd. - (_wounded_). - - Lieut. W. G. - Pringle - (_temporarily_). - - Capt. Mansell. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. Hill. - - Lieut. B. R. Heape. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. F. C. Major R. G. M. Capt. A. van Major W. P. - Packham. Johnston Straubenzee. Bennett - (_killed_). (_killed_). - - Capt. Hill. Capt. V. Capt. T. St. P. - Benett-Stanford. Bunbury. - - 166th Brigade. - - Colonel A. H. S. Goff, C.M.G. - - Lieut.-Colonel Murray. - - Adjutant: Lieut. S. M. Wood. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. H. A. Major T. E. Capt. H. Freeman. Capt. W. A. T. - Littlejohn. Durie. Barstow, M.C. - (_wounded_). - - Capt. Maxwell. - - 167th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff. - - Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. H. C. Cory. - - Lieut. J. S. Campbell. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. - - Capt. S. Talbot. Major D. Stewart. Capt. G. - Fetherston. - -It is now necessary, in order to understand what follows, to turn our -attention from the affairs of the batteries, and to endeavour to grasp -the tactical situation as it presented itself at 4.0 A.M. on July 15th -1916. At dawn on July 14th the great attack had been launched on the -German Second Line from Contalmaison on the left to Longueval on the -right. This line covered the important villages of Bazentin-le-Petit, -Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval, while to the rear of it lay the -sinister woods of Bazentin, High Wood and Delville Wood. The actual -assault was carried out by the 23rd, 7th, 3rd and 9th Divisions, the -23rd being on the left opposite the northern end of Bazentin-le-Petit, -while the 9th Division on the right faced the village of Longueval. At -3.25 A.M. the great attack began, and the German Second Line on a front -of three miles was broken; the flanks remained firm, however, and before -the advance could be carried further it was considered essential that -the gap should be widened by an attack towards Pozières on the left, and -against Ginchy and Guillemont on the right. In addition to this, certain -local operations had to be carried out upon the front from -Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval, which embraced the zone covered by the -33rd Divisional Artillery, and it is with these operations that we must -necessarily concern ourselves. - -[Illustration: - - Scale 1:20,000. -] - -By nightfall on the 14th the whole of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, village -and windmill, Bazentin-le-Grand and the southern portion of Longueval -were in our hands, our line running just to the north of these places; -but High Wood, although reached and captured by a gallant charge of -cavalry supported by infantry, proved too tough a nut to crack, and -remained in German hands together with the still uncaptured Delville -Wood and the northern end of Longueval Village which was under the fire -of enemy machine guns in High Wood. To clear these two woods and the -remainder of Longueval was essential, and therefore, on the morning of -July 15th, an advance was ordered by the 98th and 100th infantry -brigades of the 33rd Division upon that portion of Switch Trench which -ran westwards from High Wood, while a South African brigade was ordered -up from Montauban to capture Delville Wood and the northern part of -Longueval which still lay in German hands. With the latter attack, which -indeed culminated into a battle of assaults and counter-assaults spread -over several days, we cannot concern ourselves now. This history aims at -perpetuating the deeds solely of one unit, and, to preserve the sequence -of events, it is manifest that the operations upon that unit's immediate -front must receive the closest attention; for this purpose we shall turn -to the attack on Switch Trench launched on the morning of the 15th by -the 98th and 100th infantry brigades covered by the guns of, amongst -others, the 162nd and 166th Brigades of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, -the first big attack in which these brigades took part. - -From 8.30 A.M. for one hour the guns of both brigades bombarded Switch -Trench where it ran west from High Wood, and at the end of the hour -lifted on to Martinpuich, while the infantry assaulted the objectives -which had just undergone this short but intense shelling. On the left -the 98th infantry brigade reached its objective, but the 100th brigade -was held up by machine-gun fire on the flanks and, after suffering some -casualties, returned to its original line; the 98th brigade, with its -right flank left thus in the air, had to follow suit, and by ten o'clock -in the morning the battle had died down, leaving the guns free, apart -from the usual day firing and registration, to get slightly more settled -in their new surroundings. It should be remembered that the batteries -had been marching, travelling by train and marching, day in day out, -since the early morning of the 9th, and now, plunged into a great -battle, it might have been hoped that at least a few hours' rest could -have been obtained. This was not to be, however; no sooner had the -batteries ceased co-operating in the infantry operation above referred -to than they set to digging rough shelter trenches for the men in case -of bombardment, digging pits for ammunition, camouflaging the guns as -far as possible, getting up from the wagon lines heavy dumps of -ammunition, and generally trying to get the battery positions into such -a condition as would enable the guns to inflict the maximum of damage -upon the enemy with the minimum of casualties to themselves. Open -warfare was still the order of the day, and at any moment orders might -be received for a further advance by the batteries, but on the other -hand those orders might never come, and all ranks had already seen -sufficient of the fierceness of the enemy's barrage to give them will to -urge their already tired limbs to further efforts at self-protection. - -As events turned out, no further assaults were made by the infantry on -the zone covered by the 33rd Division batteries till the 20th; for five -days the batteries were able to register accurately every outstanding -feature and point of importance on their zones, while communications -were elaborated and perfected from the somewhat rough and ready open -warfare methods which had been set up when first the brigades came into -action. O.P.'s were established in the old German second line between -Longueval and Bazentin, from which points very clear observation upon -High Wood and the ground lying to right and left thereof could be -obtained, although the ground, consisting as it did of open undulating -downs, offered but few salient objects upon which to register; there -were, however, one or two points—the corner of High Wood, the orchards -north of Longueval and the mysterious iron gate standing on the sky line -between High Wood and Delville Wood—which enabled every battery -commander to divide his zone up into areas each containing at least one -fairly clear reference point, while to the left of High Wood an odd bush -or tree and an occasional view of Switch Trench served the same purpose. - -It must not be supposed, however, that because there was no infantry -assault the guns had little to do. From the 15th until the night of the -19th/20th every battery kept Switch Trench under continual fire, cutting -wire, bombarding the trench itself and generally rendering that line of -defence as difficult and as uninhabitable as possible to the enemy. By -night Switch Trench and Martinpuich were kept under intermittent bursts -of fire, and it is safe to say that at no moment between the dates given -above were all four batteries of any one brigade silent. This was no -trench fighting position; the enemy had been got on the move, he must be -kept on the move, and to do this every battery was firing more -ammunition in twenty-four hours than had been normally fired by a whole -brigade in a week on its late front opposite to La Bassée. On the 17th -C/156 (Captain Lomer) was forced to withdraw to Flatiron Copse, 800 -yards south of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, as part of High Wood was still in -German hands, and the battery, being under direct observation, was not -only subject to a galling fire but was in serious danger of being rushed -by a counter-attack on the part of the enemy. B (Captain Russell) and D -(Captain Studd) batteries of the same brigade stuck it out until the -early morning of the 21st, and then, the operations of the 20th which we -shall shortly describe being over, withdrew to south of -Bazentin-le-Petit Wood and Flatiron Copse respectively. As A/156 -(Captain Lutyens) had in the first place dropped into action at the -northern end of the valley running from Caterpillar Wood to Bazentin, -the result of this movement was that the whole of the 156th Brigade was -now behind, that is south of, Bazentin-le-Grand Wood, and no longer in -the exposed position north of the village which it had hitherto -occupied. - -It has already been stated that, from the O.P.'s in the old German -second line, a very fair view of the ground to the right and left of -High Wood could be obtained; this was indeed a fact, but with such skill -had the Germans sited their main front line—the ill-omened Switch -Trench—that it was exceedingly difficult to observe the actual effect -upon it of the shelling to which it had been subjected, nor was the -condition of the wire visible even through powerful field-glasses. -Accordingly it was ordered that one officer per artillery brigade should -advance from the outpost line of our infantry and make such examination -of the German wire by daylight as was possible at close range. The -opposing infantry were still in a condition of open fighting—sentry -groups and outposts being the order of the day, with the main front line -some distance behind them; shortly before dawn on July 19th, therefore, -the officers in question crawled out from our sentry groups and, passing -in some cases right through the line of German outposts, made an -examination, as careful and thorough as the proximity of the enemy in -broad daylight would permit, of the condition of the Switch Trench wire. -The examination was not reassuring; in many cases the wire stood firm -and untouched, and it was realised that further and strenuous efforts by -the batteries would be essential that day if the coming attack was to -have any chance of success. It is a regrettable duty to relate that one -of the officers (Lieut. Elliott) who made this reconnaissance never -returned; having passed beyond a German sentry group he was severely -wounded, and, although his orderly dragged him into a shell-hole and -left him in such shelter as it offered while he went for help to bring -him back into our lines, his body was never again found. The whole of -the day was, indeed, a bad one for the 33rd Divisional Artillery. -Colonel A. H. S. Goff (166th Brigade) was wounded and evacuated; all the -batteries were heavily shelled, in particular the batteries of 162nd -Brigade which wilted beneath a storm of shrapnel during the entire day, -while the headquarters of the same brigade received a three-hour -bombardment of lachrymose gas shell, making the carrying on of the -administration extremely difficult. None of this, however, was allowed -to cause any interruption of the day's work, and by nightfall all -batteries of the Division had received orders for the following day's -assault upon High Wood, and had made the necessary preparations. - -At 3.25 A.M. on Thursday, July 20th, the first infantry operation took -place in this zone since the attack on the morning of the 15th. -Following on a half-hour bombardment by the 33rd and 21st Divisional -Artilleries (XV. Corps) which began at 2.55 A.M., the 19th infantry -brigade advanced to the assault of High Wood. Two thousand rounds of -18-pdr. and 500 rounds of 4·5 in. howitzer ammunition per brigade were -fired in support of the infantry, the target of the batteries being High -Wood until "zero" hour (3.25 A.M.), when the batteries lifted to the -northern or enemy edge of the wood, bombarding it for half an hour until -3.55 A.M. and then making the final lift to the far side of the wood. -The assault was successful, the wood was carried, but during the whole -day the infantry were subjected to the most intense and galling -artillery fire by the enemy guns, light and heavy. All day long our -batteries searched the roads and approaches from Flers, and the hollows -north of the wood—anywhere whence an enemy counter-attack might -develop—and, with the exception of one which was launched at 12.30 P.M. -and beaten back by artillery and infantry combined, this fire was -successful in keeping the enemy at bay. - -The hostile artillery fire, however, was terrible; not one inch of the -wood but was torn and swept by high explosive shell, rent by shrapnel -and rendered completely uninhabitable to any human being. At 6 P.M. the -effect of this shell-storm came to a head, and for half an hour our -batteries put down a heavy barrage along the northern edge of the wood, -under cover of which the infantry retired to the southern half; it was -no hostile counter-attack which thus drove them back—it was the sheer -weight and force of the thousands of shells which, from all around, the -enemy poured into the wood, and which smashed and shattered the -unfortunate troops who were trying to hold what they had so gallantly -won. At first the report came through that the whole of the wood had -been evacuated and that the infantry were back in their original line in -front of Bazentin, but this was proved to be erroneous, and the southern -half of High Wood at any rate was retained in our grasp. At 9.30 P.M. -the enemy opened a vicious gas shell barrage on the ridge in front of -D/162 and on the batteries of the 167th Brigade, and at 11 P.M. followed -this up by a counter-attack on the scene of the morning's fight. After -three hours' firing the situation became quieter, and in the morning the -position on the whole had not changed since dusk the previous evening. - -For the next two days there ensued another period of comparative -inactivity as far as infantry assaults were concerned. Both sides -paused, as it were, to draw breath, but not for one moment did this -cause a lull in artillery activity. The enemy, as well as our own Higher -Command, was beginning to realise more and more the immense importance -of counter-battery work, and these intervals between the attacks were, -from the gunners' point of view, almost more to be feared than the -attacks themselves. Morning, noon and night first one battery and then -another would be subjected to a sudden burst of intense fire, while at -other times a ponderous and deliberate bombardment of a fixed area in -which a number of batteries were in position would be carried out—a -system which had the most harassing effect upon the men, and to the -success of which an ever-lengthening casualty list of guns and gunners -bore eloquent testimony. July 21st was a typical day of this sort; -starting at 10 A.M., a prolonged and widespread enemy bombardment was -carried out during the whole day with 4·2 in. and 5·9 in. upon the -valley running from Longueval to Montauban, and its adjacent slopes. The -18-pdr. batteries of the 162nd Brigade, together with the headquarters -of the brigade itself, came heavily under fire, and a long casualty list -was only averted by the use of the shelter trenches which by this time -had been dug in all the battery positions. While this was in progress -the 167th Brigade, farther to the left, was also undergoing a severe -bombardment by 5·9 in. howitzers. Direct hits were obtained upon B/167 -(Major Stewart), and in all the batteries, including D/162 which lay -just behind the 167th Brigade, a number of casualties were sustained. -Murderous fire was, at the same time, opened upon Caterpillar Valley, -from the fork between Mametz and Caterpillar Woods down the entire -length of the valley nearly to Mametz village itself, and at times -during the day it was almost impossible to see a single battery position -from which the smoke, flame and dust of bursting shells were not flying. -Nothing could be done; it was a case of "wait and see"—the hardest test -to which troops can be put—and to the eternal credit of the men it may -be said that they waited on this, as on all other similar occasions, -with quiet philosophy and with a stoicism which it would be hard to -equal. - -Meanwhile, what of our friends the infantry? On the morning of the 21st -the hard-pressed 33rd Division was withdrawn from the line and was -succeeded by the infantry of the 51st Division (153rd, 154th, and 155th -infantry brigades). At the same time the zones of the 33rd Divisional -batteries side-slipped to the right and, coming under the 51st -Divisional Artillery for tactical purposes, covered the line to the -right (_i.e._ east) of High Wood. Day firing was carried out upon Switch -Trench, the new zones were registered and night firing, consisting of -500 18-pdr. and 75 4·5 in. howitzer rounds per brigade, was directed -upon the hollows in rear of and approaches to the divisional zone. At -10.15 P.M. Caterpillar Wood and the neighbouring localities were heavily -bombarded by gas shell and high explosive, and all communications of the -167th Brigade were cut; lamp signalling was immediately taken up, -however, and proved itself entirely reliable as a means of -communication, despite the gun flashes all around and in the sky. - -The morning of July 22nd was devoted to further registration and short -bombardments. From 3.0 A.M. until 3.30 a general bombardment of Switch -Trench was ordered at the rate of 2 rounds per minute from the 18-pdrs. -and one round per minute from the howitzers, totalling upwards of three -thousand rounds fired by the fifteen batteries. At the end of the -bombardment the 162nd Brigade stood by to carry out a registration by -aeroplane, but no machine ever appeared and soon afterwards normal -firing for the day was continued, D/162 shortly after one o'clock -carrying out a destructive shoot on some machine guns and dug-outs to -the west of High Wood which were, by their enfilade fire, holding up the -whole situation and preventing an advance in the neighbourhood. Their -destruction was essential, for an advance had been ordered for the -following day, and at 7 P.M. in the evening the whole of the front burst -into flame in preliminary bombardment for the assault. At the rate of 80 -rounds per battery per hour the guns of the XIII., XV. and III. Corps -bombarded the positions which troops of the 5th (on the right), 51st and -19th (on the left) divisions were to attack next day, the objective of -the 51st division, which was covered by the guns of the 33rd Divisional -Artillery, being the N.E. and N.W. edges of High Wood, together with a -portion of Switch Trench running E. and W. therefrom. - -"Zero" was 1.30 A.M. on July 23rd, and seven minutes previous to that -hour the fire of the batteries was increased to intense rate. At -half-past one to the second the infantry went over the top, and the -batteries searched back by short lifts to a line 200 yards beyond the -objective. For half an hour was this searching fire continued, and at -two o'clock the batteries slowed down and set up a protective barrage -200 yards beyond the late German trench, under cover of which it was -hoped the infantry would be able to consolidate their position. Such, -however, was not the case. Although in places the attacking troops had -gained their objectives, at many points our men had been held up by -machine gun fire and, by their failure to advance, had compelled their -more successful comrades to retire to their starting place. All along -the line the assault failed, and when at 5 A.M. the enemy -counter-attacked fiercely the guns shortened their range and bombarded -Switch Trench once more. By 8.30 A.M. all was quiet again, the attack -was over—and our infantry were back holding the same line from which -they had advanced earlier in the morning. - -From July 23rd-27th there ensued another of those lulls which have -already been described; for the moment our advance was checked and held -up while the Higher Command appeared to be seeking a solution to the -very determined and successful opposition which the enemy showed to our -troops in this sector, and during the interval which elapsed the usual -harassing was carried out night and day by the now rapidly wearying -batteries. Two thousand rounds by day and 700 by night were poured on to -the German defences by each brigade, and in return the German batteries -gave no peace to our guns, daily subjecting the area in which the -batteries were located to a vicious and effective bombardment. Mametz -and Caterpillar Woods, the valleys running from Caterpillar Wood to -Bazentin on the one hand and Montauban on the other were daily ploughed -from end to end by shells varying in calibre from 77 mm. to 12 in., -while the valley running from Longueval to Montauban, together with the -ridge to the west thereof, became a veritable death trap. It was of no -use seeking to move the battery positions; one place was as bad as -another, and there was nothing to do but to sit tight and trust that, -before our batteries were completely wiped out, a further advance might -check the ever-increasing storm of German shells. - -There was another, and a very serious, difficulty to be faced at this -time also; owing to the enormous strain placed upon the guns by the -incessant day and night firing, the running-out springs began to give -way and to fail, and great difficulty was found in obtaining new ones. -Previous to the war almost all these springs had come from Germany, and, -with this source of supply cut off, British manufacturers at home had -found it impossible as yet so to organise their output as to meet the -ever-increasing and insistent demands from the various theatres of war. -As an instance of the seriousness of this trouble it may be mentioned -that on July 26th only five guns of the 162nd Brigade were in action, -the remainder having no serviceable springs left, whilst of these five -two had to be pushed up by hand after the firing of each round. Such a -state of affairs, which cut down the volume of fire of the brigade by -over one half, was bound to reflect seriously upon the preliminary -bombardments and barrages in any attack, nor was the trouble confined to -the 162nd Brigade alone. - -On July 24th the 33rd Divisional Artillery ceased to work in contact -with the infantry, and was put under direct orders of the XV. Corps to -carry out counter-battery work on the whole Corps front, searching -hostile battery positions, hollows and approaches, and in addition -answering any S.O.S. call when required upon all portions of the Corps -front. Such duties naturally incurred still more firing and work; two -batteries (A and B) of the 162nd Brigade were unable to get sufficient -right switch to cover the now wider front, and were forced to move -further up the slope, new O.P.'s in front of Longueval had to be -reconnoitred and linked up with the batteries by telephone, while the -new zone which stretched from the south of Martinpuich to Delville Wood -had to be registered before dusk. Hardly had this been done than, at -8.30 P.M., a report was received that the enemy were leaving their -trenches between High Wood and Delville Wood, and the batteries -immediately opened a rapid rate of fire to break up the expected -counter-attack which, surely enough, was launched at 8.45 P.M. under a -very heavy barrage. Both sides bombarded with the utmost fury, and -ultimately the counter-attack melted under our fire, but not till -midnight were the tired batteries able to report "all quiet," and even -then night firing was carried on in the usual way. The 51st Divisional -Artillery was at this time responsible for the direct support of the -infantry, and it was by way of co-operation that this bombardment of the -hostile trenches was carried out. - -It has been previously stated that from the 23rd to the 27th a lull -occurred in the infantry operations. This, broadly speaking, is a fact, -but it must not be supposed that during that time our front line troops -were entirely inactive. Bit by bit each day they had been bombing their -way through Longueval, sometimes without artillery support, sometimes -assisted by the guns, as on the 26th when for one hour from dawn the -guns poured shells into the northern end of the village. It was slow -work, this gradual penetration, but by the evening of the 26th a very -appreciable advance had been made, and, when orders were received at 4 -P.M. that a general assault on Delville Wood and the orchards north of -Longueval would take place next day (27th), our troops were in a far -more favourable position for "taking off" than they had been a week -earlier. - -The assault was delivered at 7.10 A.M. on the morning of Thursday, the -27th, and was preceded by an artillery bombardment beginning at 5.30 -A.M. For this bombardment 1,500 18-pdr. and 400 4·5 in. howitzer rounds -were fired by each brigade, and were directed mainly upon the trenches -to be assaulted and the back areas thereof. To the 5th Division was -entrusted the capture of the objectives on the front directly under the -guns of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, and the line of this ran from the -north-west edge of Delville Wood through the enclosures 150 yards north -of Longueval village, along the sunken road running west from these -enclosures to the High Wood-Longueval road. The chief interest of the -attack, however, lay in the fact that the creeping barrage, as already -practised in the opening days of the Somme battle, was now being more -and more carefully elaborated. It had not yet reached that high stage of -perfection which, in the offensives of Arras and Passchendaele in 1917, -enabled the gunners to provide what was almost an ever-moving curtain of -fire advancing yard by yard in front of the infantry, but it did even -now remain upon one point until the very last moment and then lift off, -but scarcely creep, to the next point to be attacked while the infantry -stormed the first. - -All day long fierce fighting continued but, although on the right of the -line the 2nd Division gained their objectives, on the left the men of -the 5th Division were held up at points. The climax of the day was -reached at six o'clock in the evening, when a heavy counter-attack was -launched all along the line by the enemy, but this counter-attack, in -common with a similar one launched at 10.30 P.M. on the following night -(28th), broke up under the fire of our guns. During this attack green -flares were lighted all along the front by our foremost infantry at -specified times, and although it was difficult to persuade them to do -this, inasmuch as they considered that the flares would be equally -useful to the enemy as well as to our guns in showing up their position, -the information thus obtained of the progress of the assault was of very -great value. - -During the 28th and 29th the batteries busied themselves in preparing -for future operations. Casualties in men and guns had been severe -throughout the fighting, vast quantities of ammunition had been -expended, and all this had now to be replaced. On the morning of the -27th a 5·9 in. shell had exploded directly in the pit where the men of -B/162 (Major Johnston) were getting their breakfasts, killing and -wounding every man in the pit, while on the afternoon of the 29th D/162 -(Captain Bunbury) was heavily shelled and lost one and a half -detachments who were practically blown to pieces. A 5·9 in. shell burst -right upon a pile of ammunition beside one of its guns and exploded a -number of rounds; in addition to the wiping out of the detachments, the -gun itself was completely destroyed by the explosion, and only the piece -and a portion of the spade were ever found afterwards. It is curious to -note that the force of the explosion, which made a huge crater in the -ground, threw a complete wagon of ammunition so high into the air that -it came down some 150 yards from the battery, yet not a single round in -the wagon exploded. As, in addition to this, all the guns of C/167 -(Captain Fetherston) were out of action and the other batteries had -suffered the usual daily casualties which now had become inevitable, it -will be seen that the Divisional Artillery was in a fairly serious -plight. However, the work had to be carried on, and on the afternoon of -the 29th the batteries set themselves to the now familiar task of -bombarding Switch Trench with 45 rounds per gun, in preparation for -another attack which was due to take place on the morrow. - -The bombardment proper for this attack began at 4.45 P.M. on the 30th, -but previous to this there had been the short burst already referred to -and another similar effort in the early morning from 3.15 to 5.15. At -the same time our heavy artillery carried out a series of -destructive—or, at least, would-be destructive—shoots on the enemy -batteries; this was a most essential procedure, for the work of the -batteries had been greatly impeded all the morning by an intense hostile -gas shelling of the positions while, during the whole of the afternoon, -the batteries on the ridge north of Caterpillar Wood were raked from end -to end by high explosive. At last, however, the final bombardment -opened, and from 4.45 P.M. till 6.10 P.M. the German defences between -High Wood and Delville Wood were subjected to 800 rounds per 18-pdr. -battery and 400 rounds per 4·5 in. howitzer battery all along the front. -Seven minutes before zero, which was at 6.10 P.M., fire was quickened to -intense rate, and at zero hour troops of the XIII. and XV. Corps -advanced to the attack, having for their objectives the sunken road -running from the N.W. face of Delville Wood to the east corner of High -Wood. The XIII. Corps, who were on the right, reached their objectives -successfully, but the XV. Corps, advancing on the left of the XIII., -were not so fortunate; enfilade machine gun fire from strong points near -the orchards north of Longueval held them up, while their left, although -successful in reaching the sunken road near the corner of High Wood, was -subjected to such a perfect hell of high explosive that it was shelled -out and forced to retire. Thus at 8 P.M., when firing was reduced to -normal, the situation was but little different to what it had been -before the attack. - -The attack of the 30th was very typical of the tactics in practice at -this time in the Somme battle. The same thing had been seen in the -previous assaults of the 20th and 23rd, and the same thing was to be -seen in subsequent operations; small attacks on limited areas—perhaps -only on a two division front—were launched and, nine times out of ten, -were doomed to failure by their narrow scope. There is no doubt that -individual strong points were holding up the general advance and had to -be overwhelmed before any more ambitious plans were undertaken, but -there is also no doubt that, when these unfortunate battalions went over -the parapet upon some purely local undertaking, they were immediately -subjected to machine gun fire in enfilade from the flanks, where no -attack was taking place, and to overwhelming shell fire from batteries -on neighbouring zones, which, owing to the undisturbed state of their -own zone, were able to add to the already heavy volume of fire on the -front attacked. It may be that the Higher Command was right in its -handling of the situation, but for the men on the spot it was -heart-breaking to see battalions of the finest material launched to -certain death on an attack which, by the narrowness of its front, was -doomed to failure before it ever began. - -July 30th and 31st contained nothing more of importance than three -S.O.S. calls from Delville Wood, and on Tuesday, August 1st, at 5.30 -A.M. orders were received with dramatic suddenness for the 162nd and -166th Brigades to be relieved by the 78th and 79th Brigades of the 17th -Divisional Artillery. In a fever-heat of expectation the batteries of -the two brigades waited all day long for the orders to take effect; at -last, between four and seven o'clock in the afternoon, the incoming -units arrived, and with heartfelt thanks the batteries, taking their -guns with them, marched back to the wagon lines. It was unfortunate that -D/78 should have chosen the moment to relieve D/162 when four low-flying -German aeroplanes were right overhead, but choose it they did, and the -price had to be paid. The incoming battery was a little ahead of its -time, and, as a result, when the teams and limbers of D/162 appeared on -the scene the shell storm for which the aeroplanes had called was just -beginning. Whizz bangs, 4·2 in. and 5·9 in. shell poured down upon the -battery position and horses for over half an hour, and how the battery -escaped with such light casualties as it did, was a marvel. One gun and -one ammunition dump were destroyed, several drivers and horses were hit, -but in no way was the relief disorganised, and D/162, after manœuvring -under a hail of shells, ultimately withdrew towards the Montauban flank. -For the rest of the evening Caterpillar Valley all around and south-west -of Mametz Wood was deluged with shells, and the batteries who chose that -route for their outgoing march had an extremely unpleasant time. All got -away in the end, however, and after a short halt at the wagon lines -continued the march. Dernancourt, which was the destination of the -batteries, was reached at 2.30 A.M., and here they remained till the -11th resting, refitting and generally cleaning up after the ordeal of -the past eighteen days. - -Only two brigades were now left in the line—the 156th and the 167th—and, -as Headquarters staff of the 33rd Divisional Artillery had gone into -rest at Dernancourt, these two were put under the command of the 51st -Division. The zone covered by the 156th Brigade extended along the High -Wood—Bazentin-le-Petit road southwards from the north-west corner of the -wood, while the 167th Brigade looked after the road running south-east -from the eastern edge of High Wood; D/156 (Captain Studd) carried out -counter-battery duties. From August 1st to August 11th little of -importance in the way of operations occurred. Hostile attacks on -Bazentin-le-Petit on the 2nd and against High Wood on the 10th were -repulsed by our fire, while on the 4th and the 7th minor infantry -engagements were carried out by our troops on the orchards and houses -along the north-west edge of Delville Wood and on High Wood -respectively. - -Very heavy firing took place throughout this period, and during the week -ending August 17th the 156th Brigade fired no less than twelve thousand -rounds, while the German artillery must have flung something like the -same amount into our positions. B/167 (Major Stewart) was shelled out -and had to move on the 3rd to a position six hundred yards east of -Caterpillar Wood, where it was joined next day by Captain Fetherston's -battery (C/167) which had also undergone a severe gruelling at the hands -of the enemy. A/167 (Captain Talbot) proved no less unfortunate than the -other two batteries, and on the 5th, after a very heavy shelling which -lasted all day, it was compelled to move to a position alongside "B" and -"C," where it went to form two six-gun batteries instead of three -consisting of four guns each. At the same time the brigade was -temporarily handed over to the command of Major Stewart, for -Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff had on the previous day been evacuated sick to -England. Thus the two brigades remained shelling and being shelled, day -in day out, until August 11th, when the other two brigades (162nd and -166th) came up into the line from the Dernancourt rest area and relieved -them. The 156th and 167th had been in action continuously since July -16th under the most trying and harassing of conditions. They had been -subjected to shelling more severe than any yet experienced in the war, -and, when they marched out to rest on the evening of the 11th, they were -utterly exhausted, utterly worn out, a party of very tired and weary -men. - -On returning to the line on the 11th the batteries of the 162nd Brigade -did not reoccupy their old positions but, after reconnaissance by -Lieut.-Colonel Harris, formed two six-gun 18-pdr. batteries under the -command of Major Johnston and Captain van Straubenzee, and took up -positions on the southern slopes bordering Caterpillar Valley, at a -point about three hundred yards N.N.W. of Montauban. At the same time -D/162, which from the 8th onwards had been sending parties up from -Dernancourt to dig gun-pits and prepare the place for occupation, came -into action under the northern bank of Caterpillar Valley about five -hundred yards to the right front of the other two batteries, which was -the position it had originally been intended to occupy on July 15th. The -166th Brigade took up positions 500 yards north of Caterpillar Wood. - -While these two brigades had been out at rest a change had taken place -amongst the infantry, and the guns now covered the 33rd Division -(forming part of the XV. Corps), with the 14th Division on the right and -the 1st Division on the left, the tactical command of the batteries -being in the hands of the 14th Divisional Artillery. From the 11th until -the 18th the lull in infantry fighting, which had been noticeable in -this sector since the beginning of the month, continued, but the work of -the guns was as usual very heavy. In addition to counter-battery work -and minor bombardments, four hundred and fifteen 18-pdr. rounds by day -and five hundred by night had to be expended by each brigade on -searching and sweeping roads and hollows behind the brigade zone, while -the 4·5 in. howitzers carried out the same work to the extent of two -hundred and thirty-three rounds by day and one hundred and sixty-six by -night. The zone in question was the extreme right of the 33rd Divisional -front, along the enemy front line known as Wood Lane. Fortunately for -the batteries, hostile shelling upon the gun positions was far less -violent than had been the case before the two brigades went into rest, -and it was now possible to get through a very fair amount of -registration without interference from enemy shell fire; this was -important, for the guns had to be ranged upon a number of new points -owing to the change in position, while a wireless set which had been -installed at Brigade Headquarters enabled numerous "N.F." calls to be -picked up from our aeroplanes, all of which were acted upon by the -howitzer batteries of the respective brigades. - -On the 16th orders were received for an attack to be delivered on -Friday, the 18th, and in preparation for this the ammunition allotted -for night firing was doubled on the nights of the 16th and 17th, while -by day the guns bombarded Wood Lane, cutting the wire and shelling not -only the trench but also No Man's Land in front thereof, lest the German -machine-gunners should creep out forward and thereby escape our barrage. -At 2.45 P.M. on the 18th the attack was launched by the 33rd Division, -with the 14th Division on its right. In addition to the preceding -two-days shelling, the whole of the morning of the attack, with two -short forty-minute intervals, was devoted to barrage firing on the enemy -trenches, the barrage of 18-pdrs. lifting at three given times to -suggest an impending assault, whereupon the 4·5 in. howitzers, a few -minutes after the "lift," dropped back on to Wood Lane (the enemy front -line) to catch such of the enemy as had manned the parapet to withstand -an attack. Immediately prior to zero hour there was no bombardment; it -was hoped to start the attack simultaneously along the whole front, and -the best means of achieving this was considered to be an opening of the -barrage at zero itself, without any bombardment during the preceding -five minutes. - -The order of battle in this attack showed the XIII. Corps on the right, -the III. Corps on the left and the XV. Corps in the centre. The two -flank Corps successfully gained their objectives, as did also the right -of the XV. Corps, but the 33rd Division was held up partly by flank -machine-gun fire and partly by hostile machine guns which had, after -all, succeeded in pushing forward into shell holes in No Man's Land, and -had thus avoided our barrage. The objective of the 33rd had been Wood -Lane Trench, from about 150 yards north-west of its junction with -Orchard Trench to the cross-roads just outside the western corner of -High Wood; at 3.15 P.M., when the failure of the infantry to gain the -objectives was realised, the batteries of the 162nd and 166th brigades -dropped their range from the protective barrage they had established -four hundred yards beyond Wood Lane Trench, and put down a heavy barrage -along a line two hundred yards north-east of the trench. This was -maintained throughout the afternoon until, the position on the right -being somewhat obscure, the batteries were requested by the 14th -Division to lengthen their range by one hundred yards. A situation -report was received shortly afterwards, however, which entirely -justified the original shortening of the range, and this was resumed -till half-past seven in the evening when normal night firing was begun. -Once again the attack had been beaten off by the deadly and ubiquitous -machine guns, and once again our infantry looked at the grim and -forbidding Wood Lane Trench across a No Man's Land thick with dead and -wounded. - -On the 19th the zones of the batteries side-slipped two hundred yards to -the right, and for two days registration, in addition to the usual -harassing fire, was carried out on the new zones. Teams were at work day -and night to replenish ammunition which the past few days had seen so -lavishly expended, and, thus reinforced, a further effort was made on -the 21st to advance our line in the neighbourhood of Wood Lane and Tea -Trench (running N.E. from Wood Lane), while the 14th Division advanced -to the capture of the last line of enemy defences in Delville Wood. - -Once again we were defeated; after a short preliminary bombardment Wood -Lane was assaulted at 3.30 P.M., while at 1.30 A.M. on the following -morning (22nd) the attack on Tea Trench was carried out, but in neither -case were we able to advance. The enemy front line was stiff with men -and machine guns, and our troops were swept away by a blast of fire -before they were even able to get to grips with the enemy. Thus ended a -tragic series of short attacks on portions of the enemy trenches, -attacks which failed in their objects, which wore out our -troops—infantry and gunners alike—and which cost us many thousands of -lives that we could ill spare. - -On the afternoon of August 22nd signs and portents were not lacking of a -new and great effort all along the line to continue the advance which -latterly had been so severely held up. The previous day Lieut.-Colonel -Harris (162nd Brigade) had been ordered to reconnoitre a position for a -forward gun which should be able, at a range of not more than 2,000 -yards, to enfilade the new German trench running north-east from Wood -Lane, and such a position had, after taking bearings from various -O.P.'s, been chosen. Now, at 4 P.M. on the 22nd, the gun was ordered -into action, and was accordingly brought into position in a shell-hole -on the southern edge of the road which ran east and west due north of -Bazentin-le-Grand. Three hundred rounds were dumped alongside it, the -whole was placed under command of Lieutenant V. Benett-Stanford (C/162), -and a most satisfactory registration was obtained with seventy rounds -burst immediately over and into the enemy trench in true enfilade at a -range of 1,600 yards. Following on this, on the morning of the 23rd, the -156th Brigade came out of rest and went into action about half a mile -south-west of Montauban, as a group under Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd; -to this group was added A/167 which took up a position in the same area, -and later B/167 which, on the 25th, joined the 156th Brigade group in a -position near A/167. The 167th Brigade, now under the command of -Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, did not come into action as a unit, but -kept its remaining battery out at rest to replace casualties as they -might occur. - -On the 23rd the orders for the attack were received. This time it was to -be the biggest operation since July 14th, the order of battle showing -the French to attack on the right from the Somme itself to Maurepas, the -XIV. Corps from south of Guillemont to the western edge of Ginchy -Village, the XV. Corps from a point in the Longueval-Flers road north of -Delville Wood to the western edge of High Wood, and the III. Corps from -that point westwards to the extreme left of the attack. - -On the immediate front of the batteries (of which the 156th group was -attached to the 7th Division, the 162nd and 166th to the 14th Division), -the right infantry brigade (100th) of the 33rd Division was to establish -itself in Wood Lane, while the 14th Division was to advance the right of -its line so as to connect up with the left of the XIV. Corps, to clear -the remainder of Delville Wood, to establish a line outside the wood -from the position already held by the Division in Beer Trench to the -Longueval-Flers road, and there to connect up with the right of the 33rd -Division. The bombardment began at 3.45 P.M. on Thursday, the 24th, and, -so far as the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery were concerned, -consisted in shelling New Trench (behind Wood Lane) and the ground in -rear thereof, Tea Trench, Tea Lane and Tea Support (west of the -Longueval-Flers road), but chiefly Tea Trench, while the advanced -enfilade gun of the 162nd Brigade was ordered to sweep New Trench in -enfilade from 5.45 P.M. until the moment of attack. The average rate of -fire was one round per gun per minute, but towards the close of the -bombardment the rate gradually quickened up until, at zero, the rate of -fire became intense. - -Zero hour was at 6.45 P.M. on the 24th, and, two minutes after the -infantry had gone over the top, a general lift was started by the guns. -The howitzers lengthened their range straight away and bombarded the -Flers-Longueval road, while the 18-pdr. barrage gradually crept forward -by 25 yards at a time, until it finally came to rest along a line about -200 yards north-east of the infantry objective. At a quarter-past six -the rate of fire dropped to the original one round per gun per minute, -while at half-past ten the close barrage was terminated and intermittent -searching and sweeping of the enemy zone was adopted in its stead. - -Meanwhile, how had the day gone with the infantry? On the extreme right -the French had won a great victory and had swept all before them; the -XV. Corps had gained all its objectives save the extreme eastern corner -of Delville Wood and a small portion of Beer Trench, while on our own -immediate zone the infantry had at last swept over the objectives they -had for so long striven to capture; the enfilade gun in particular did -tremendous damage, the infantry reporting numbers of the enemy found -dead in New Trench and thereby testifying to the great effects which may -be expected of field guns firing in true enfilade. All night long till -7.30 A.M. on the 25th the batteries stood by to answer S.O.S. calls, and -kept a slow rate of fire on their zones whilst the infantry consolidated -the position, but no counter-attack materialised, and in the morning we -still held firmly the ground we had captured the previous day. Great -praise accrued to infantry and gunners for the success of these -operations; in particular the G.O.C. R.A. 14th Division sent personal -congratulations to Lieut.-Colonel Harris (162nd Brigade) who, from his -observation station near Longueval whence all the battle could clearly -be viewed, sent back situation reports which reached the General Officer -commanding the 33rd Division before reports came in from any other -source, thereby enabling him to deal quickly with every new point as it -arose. There was only one disappointing feature in the whole of the -attack, and that was the enormous number of "dud" shells fired by our -heavy artillery. Not more than 40 per cent. of their shells burst -properly, whilst the German heavies obtained at least 95 per cent. -detonations which caused the most appalling destruction wherever they -occurred. It was a sidelight—but an important one—of the battle, nor, -for many months, did this serious state of affairs right itself. - -Hitherto the enemy had not shown many signs of retaliation for the -operations of the past few days, but at 8 o'clock on the morning of -Friday, the 25th, the storm broke. Every battery position was heavily -bombarded throughout the day with shells of every calibre up to 8 in., -and this at a time when it was essential that ammunition wagons should -be able to reach the guns to refill their depleted stocks. All day long -the storm raged so severely that in certain cases the detachments had to -be withdrawn from the guns. Major Johnston of B/162 was killed whilst -sending his men into cover—a loss which the brigade ill could suffer—and -many of the detachments were killed and wounded; so violent, indeed, was -the shell fire that the 18-pdr. battery positions of the 162nd Brigade, -churned up from end to end, were rendered quite uninhabitable, and -during that night and the following day new positions were taken up -about 500 yards further to the north-east. - -While this was going on, the batteries of the 156th Brigade group were -also changing positions, but this time for tactical purposes. In order -to be able to bombard Ginchy, new positions 1,500 yards south-east of -Longueval and along the sunken road running from that village to -Bernafay Wood had been reconnoitred, and were now taken up, while the -zones of the other brigades at the same time side-slipped 800 yards to -the right and covered the ground immediately north-east of Delville -Wood. Fearful weather, moreover, broke over the whole battlefield. Rain -and wind in endless storms turned the countryside into a vast sea of -mud, and, catching the batteries of the 156th and 162nd Brigades in -their new and only partially prepared positions, caused them not merely -extreme discomfort but real difficulty in being able to fight their guns -at all. No roads led to the batteries, but merely dry weather tracks -across roughly beaten-down shell holes and trenches, and for a time it -seemed as though they must be cut off from all sources of ammunition -supply. Nevertheless, during the 27th and 28th the wagons of the -batteries, aided by our own D.A.C. and the Column of the 7th Division, -struggled through the mud with load after load, gunners and passing -infantry helping the teams to reach the positions, and by the evening of -the 27th not only had all the batteries refilled their normal gun-line -dumps, but the 156th Brigade had gone even further and had brought up -6,000 rounds per battery in conformation with an order they had only -received 24 hours previously! It had been intended on the 29th to resume -the offensive with the French and Fourth Armies, and indeed the 156th -Brigade group did actually carry out a seven-hour bombardment of Ginchy -before the order to stop reached them; the weather was too bad, no -infantry could have attacked with any hope of success, and accordingly -the operations were postponed until finer weather should supervene. - -This lull was very welcome, for it gave the batteries an opportunity of -digging in and of draining their positions so as to render them slightly -more habitable. The infantry of the 14th Division had, on the 26th and -27th, bombed their way with only minor artillery support right through -the remaining corner of Delville Wood, and now held the entire wood -together with a portion of Beer Trench which hitherto had successfully -resisted capture. The position therefore seemed entirely favourable for -a renewal of the attack if only the weather would clear, but this it -showed no signs of doing. - -As a matter of fact, the first renewal of hostilities came from the -German side. On the 30th the 33rd Division infantry had been relieved by -the 24th Division, and hardly had the latter settled into their trenches -when, at 1 P.M. on the 31st, the Germans launched a big attack along the -whole line from High Wood to east and south-east of Delville Wood. A -heavy barrage was immediately opened upon them, while Captain van -Straubenzee and Lieut. Body, who were at the O.P. at the time, got all -the guns of the 162nd Brigade to bear with tremendous effect upon a -large force of the enemy in Cocoa Lane, and the infantry on the front of -the 33rd Divisional batteries held their ground. For a long time the -situation was obscure and, indeed, extremely anxious; the final report, -however, showed that the part of Tea Trench lying west of the Flers Road -and a portion of Wood Lane had been evacuated by our infantry, but that -elsewhere no serious encroachment had occurred on our front, although -serious reports were heard of the state of affairs to the east of -Delville Wood. - -So ended the month of August, and with September there came an -improvement in the weather, and a consequent promise of further -operations. On the afternoon of the 1st the expected orders were -received; once again the French and the Fourth Army were to attack, once -again was an attempt to be made to beat down the stubborn German -resistance. The bombardment was due to begin on the 2nd, but before this -could be done a slight rearrangement of the batteries had to be carried -out. On the night of August 31st, from 11 P.M. till 4 P.M. on the -morning of the 1st, thousands of lethal and lachrymose shells had been -poured down upon the batteries of the 156th Brigade group, and -especially upon A and B/167. Casualties from gas poisoning were -fortunately slight owing to the immunity offered by P.H. helmets, but -B/167 proved an exception and suffered so many casualties, including its -battery commander, that it had to be withdrawn immediately from the -line, its place being taken by C/167 which, it will be remembered, was -still out at rest. At the same time Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart took -over the command of the 166th Brigade in place of Lieut.-Colonel Murray, -who was evacuated also suffering from gas poisoning. - -The bombardment for this new attack began at 8 A.M. on the 2nd, -operation orders showing that it was to be on a great scale, extending -along the whole of the Fourth Army front from Thiepval on the left to -Guillemont on the right, and from there being carried on by the French -to as far south as the Somme. The Fourth Army attack was to be carried -out by the XIV. Corps (on the right), the XV. (centre) and the III. -Corps (on the left), the objectives of the XIV. Corps being Falfemont -Farm and Guillemont, and from there to advance and establish a line -along the Wedge Wood-Ginchy road to as far north as the right of the XV. -Corps. The XV. Corps aimed at capturing Ginchy and its surrounding -trenches, also Vat Alley, Pint Trench to its junction with Ale Alley, -and Ale Alley itself. Further to the left the 24th Division were ordered -to capture Beer Trench from its junction with Ale Alley, or such -portions as had not been previously captured, to retake the portion of -Wood Lane which they had lost during the previous two days and to link -up with the 1st Division on their left, the objective of which was the -north-east half of Wood Lane and the German intermediate line both to -High Wood and to a point 200 yards west thereof. The 162nd and 166th -Brigades were supporting the 24th Division, while the 156th Brigade -group bombarded Ginchy. - -All the day and night of the 2nd and during the morning of the 3rd the -guns bombarded their allotted targets—the enemy front and support line -and the hollows in which his reserves might congregate. Very special -injunctions had been issued by the Commander-in-Chief for every possible -step to be taken which would lead to success, and all ranks were to be -fully impressed with the necessity of knowing what was expected of them. -In addition, every care was to be taken to nurse guns and howitzers -during the bombardment, so that as many as possible might be in action -when the infantry assault took place. - -Zero hour was noon on Sunday, September 3rd, and it is most satisfactory -to note that, as the infantry went over the top, every gun and howitzer -in the brigades was in action, firing at intense rate and none the -worse, owing to careful attention, for the heavy work of the previous -days. Lieut.-Colonel Harris observed and reported upon the battle during -the entire day from his observation station in an old German trench west -of Delville Wood, and from his position informed Divisional Headquarters -of the somewhat sensational events of the day, sensational in victory -upon most parts, in unexpected reverses around High Wood. - -At first the attack swept forward unchecked; at 12.15 P.M. Cameron -Highlanders of the 1st Division were seen to advance into Wood Lane -almost without opposition; parties proceeded round the east corner and -along the north-east face of the trench[1] and reached, towards the -east, a point fifty yards beyond the enemy trench. At the same time -parties crossed Wood Lane and were seen to jump into the trench running -eastwards along the crest. At 12.30 P.M. a second infantry battalion -left Black Watch Trench, about three hundred yards south-west of Wood -Lane, and advanced towards the latter under heavy machine-gun fire from -the right flank; the Camerons were still seen to be advancing over the -sky-line east of High Wood, and seemed to be working towards New Trench -which ran at right angles to Wood Lane. At 1.25 P.M. these troops -appeared to be held up by parties of the enemy, but the Camerons -surrounded the latter to the north and bombing encounters took place; -the whole of the remainder of the Camerons then disappeared over the -sky-line towards Switch Trench, where they were stopped and suffered -heavy casualties. During all this time there was very little hostile -artillery activity except for a medium barrage of 5·9 in.'s upon -Delville Wood, and the infantry attack continued successfully and -uninterrupted, the depth of assault being small. - -Footnote 1: - - _The front-line here ran north-west and south-east._ - -At two o'clock in the afternoon, however, came the first hint of the -turn of the tide. A report was received that large numbers of the enemy -were collecting in Switch Trench along two hundred yards of its length -east of the Flers-Longueval road, and the howitzers opened a fifteen -minutes' intense bombardment for their dispersal. At twenty-five minutes -past three the enemy were seen to advance on Wood Lane, our infantry -retiring about two hundred yards in front of them. The Germans came from -a north-easterly direction, entered the east corner of High Wood, the -north-west portion of Wood Lane and the trench running east along the -crest; we still held the southern portion of Wood Lane. As soon as this -was seen, nine guns of the 162nd Brigade were pulled out and switched -round on to the enemy counter-attack which, however, did not advance -over the crest but halted on reaching the trench running along the -crest. At the same time small parties of the enemy were seen advancing -westwards from the gate which stood out on the sky-line midway between -High Wood and Delville Wood. By 3.35 P.M. the enemy were occupying the -whole of the sky-line from High Wood for three hundred yards eastwards, -and appeared to be unmolested by any artillery fire except that of the -nine guns already referred to. No other battery or brigade appeared to -get on to them or even to observe them, and this extraordinary and quite -inexplicable state of affairs lasted for a considerable time. Not till -very late was any sort of barrage put down upon them, and even then it -was a long way over the crest and very meagre in quality. In the -meantime the enemy dug themselves in again, and at ten minutes to six -about one hundred of our men were seen actually retiring from the -direction of Switch Trench. - -Thus, on this front, the whole attack was rendered utterly fruitless by -the assaulting troops being apparently ignorant of the nature and -locality of their objective; consequently, finding little resistance, -they overran the points to be taken, and were cut up on retiring. The -attack itself in its initial stages was as fine as there ever has been, -and had the promise of a great victory, but the final result of the -whole day's operation was that our line at seven o'clock in the evening -between High Wood and Delville Wood was the same as before the attack, -while the sacrifice and loss of life had been appalling. It was all the -more difficult to bear this disappointment, moreover, when news of the -battle on the rest of the front was received. All along the line great -successes had been achieved both by our troops and by the French; the -roll of prisoners and captured guns was appreciably swelled, and a -considerable and important advance had been made. Only on the High -Wood-Delville Wood sector did the front remain unchanged; there the two -woods, black, forbidding and grim, shattered by shells and burnt by both -sides to clear the appalling stench of the dead, stood like two -sentinels barring all further progress, obstacles of the most deadly -type. - -It was not granted to the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery to -see these two woods completely and permanently in our hands. On the -morning of the 5th the battery commanders of the 1st and 2nd New Zealand -Field Artillery Brigades came up with one section apiece, and began to -take over from the 33rd battery commanders. Next day, Wednesday the 6th, -the relief was complete; New Zealanders took over our positions together -with the support of the front, and the batteries wound their way wearily -back to the wagon lines, whence, after a short halt, they continued the -march to Bonnay (156th and 162nd Brigades) and to Neuville (166th and -167th Brigades). - -Thus closed a chapter in the life of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. For -eight continuous weeks—with one rest of ten days in the middle—they had -been in action in the Battle of the Somme, the greatest offensive -undertaken up to that date. For eight weeks they had continuously -bombarded the enemy and had, as continuously, been raked by hostile -shell fire in return. It would be impossible to estimate the number of -shells—which ran into tens of thousands—which the batteries had fired in -that period; suffice it to say that in spite of nervous and physical -exhaustion, in spite of the fact that seldom could more than two hours' -sleep in twenty-four be obtained, that food was oft-times short, that -daily the men saw their comrades maimed, shattered, blown to pieces -before their eyes, and daily waited for their own turn to come; despite -all these trials and horrors not one single order was ever issued to the -batteries, not one single request was ever made by the infantry which -was not immediately acted upon by the guns. Eight different divisions -were covered by the batteries during the period July 15th to September -6th; fourteen separate attacks were carried out during that time and, -whether acting under the orders of their own C.R.A. or of the C.R.A. of -a strange division, the part allotted to the batteries was invariably -carried out to the letter. - -From August 1st onwards the headquarters of the 33rd Divisional -Artillery had remained out at rest, and the tactical handling of the -brigades had, during all the remainder of the time and in all the -succeeding battles, been under the control of other and strange -divisions. In view of this, it would be impossible to praise too highly -the Brigade commanders who throughout the operations were responsible -for the handling of the batteries; to the battery commanders there was -always—even in the worst of times—the supreme comfort of knowing that -behind them was their own brigade headquarters, and that whatever -happened they were amongst friends; but to the brigade commanders there -was the great responsibility, the great burden of knowing, during the -final five weeks, that above them, watching them, relying upon them, was -a strange division with whom they had never co-operated before, whose -officers were, in many cases, unknown to them. - -Yet the real and full measure of praise was due and was agreed by all to -be due entirely to—the men. No words can aptly describe their splendid -courage and endurance maintained right up to the end of these eight -weeks of continual battle; those men who, some of them twelve months -before, had been ordinary civilians, who in the early days of July had -marched from Cuinchy and Cambrin, full of enthusiasm and eagerness, up -to this their first battle, _they_ were the real victors. As they -marched back now to the wagon lines, a body of tired and weary men with -the strain of the past weeks writ deeply in their faces and in their -eyes; as they turned their backs upon the battery positions, where the -torn and shell-strewn ground held many a rough cross and many a mound to -bear silent but eloquent testimony to the sacrifices which had been -made, they presented a spectacle to silence for ever the pessimists and -pacifists at home who, by their whining and selfishness, were -undermining the morale of the nation. If the men of England, -half-trained, inexperienced, civilians of twelve months ago can perform -such deeds as these, then must England indeed live! - - - - - CHAPTER IV. - DAINVILLE, HEBUTERNE AND THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE. - (SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER 1916.) - - -In the foregoing chapter the doings of the Divisional Artillery in the -Battle of the Somme have been chronicled, and, in view of the very heavy -strain undergone by all ranks, it might be expected that at least a -short rest would have been granted before the batteries went into action -again. This, however, was not to be, for the wastage of men was -tremendous at the moment, and so great was the necessary concentration -of guns for any attack that every available battery was kept in the -line. The nearest approach to a rest that could be hoped for was the -taking over of some part of the line which was quiet—changing places, in -fact, with batteries on some other portion of the front, and this is -practically what was done by the artillery whose doings we are -following. - -On September 6th, as already noted, the brigades moved out of action and -spent the night around Bonnay and La Neuville (just north of Corbie). On -the 7th the whole Divisional Artillery, under orders to go into action -on the Arras front, marched northwards and, passing through La Houssoye, -Behincourt, Molliens-au-Bois and Villiers Bocage, spent the night at -Havernas (156th Brigade), Wargnies (162nd Brigade) and Flesselles (166th -and 167th Brigades). Next morning the march was resumed, and the night -of the 8th was passed at Le Meillard (156th and 162nd Brigades), -Outrebois (166th Brigade) and Occoches-le-Petit (167th Brigade). On and -on they went, stopping on the 9th at Grouches, Lucheux, Bout-des-Pres -and Le Marais Sec, and on the 10th at Hauteville, Wanquetin and -Montenescourt, the day's march as a rule beginning about 9.30 A.M. and -finishing shortly after two o'clock in the afternoon. A short halt was -called in the Wanquetin-Montenescourt area on the 10th, nor was any -further move made till the 13th, the time being occupied in a -reorganisation of the Divisional Artillery. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER 1916. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major H. K. Capt. T. C. - Sadler, D.S.O. Usher. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd. - - Adjutant: Lieut. E. H. Prior. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major S. Talbot. Major M. A. Major G. Lomer, Capt. W. G. - Studd, M.C. D.S.O. Pringle (4-gun). - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. T. D. Shepherd. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major Hill. Major V. Major A. van Capt. T. St. P. - Benett-Stanford, Straubenzee, M.C. Bunbury. - M.C. - - 166th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. S. M. Wood. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. H. A. Capt. Hon. T. P. Capt. Freeman. Capt. B. - Littlejohn. P. Butler. McCallum, M.C. - - Capt. Dust. - - 167th Brigade. - - Broken up. - -It will be remembered that just before the Battle of the Somme a change -had been made in the formation of the brigades, and that the 167th -Brigade (until then a 4·5 in. Howitzer Brigade) was so split up that the -four brigades each had three 18-pdr. batteries and one 4·5 in. howitzer -battery, each battery consisting of four guns. Very early in 1916, -however, B/167 had been posted away to another division, and therefore, -after the reorganisation of the brigades before the Battle of the Somme, -the 167th Brigade consisted only of the three 18-pdr. batteries which it -had received from each of the brigades in return for the 4·5 in. -howitzer battery it had sent to them. It was now ordered that all -18-pdr. batteries should consist of six guns, and therefore from -September 11th the 167th Brigade ceased to exist. Sections of each of -its batteries were sent to the 156th and 162nd Brigades, Lieut.-Colonel -C. G. Stewart assumed command of the 166th Brigade, and on September -13th, with six-gun batteries of 18-pdrs. (except for the 166th Brigade), -but with the 4·5 in. howitzer batteries still consisting of only four -pieces each, the Divisional Artillery resumed its march and moved into -action once more on the Arras front near Dainville. One section per -battery went up on the first night and began taking over from the 37th -Divisional Artillery, and on the night of the 14th/15th the remaining -sections of the batteries moved in, assuming, from 6 A.M. on the morning -of Friday the 15th, responsibility for the artillery support of the -infantry on their front; the 156th Brigade covered the 35th Division, -the 162nd and 166th Brigades the 12th Division, each brigade for -fighting being under the control of the C.R.A. of the Division behind -whose infantry it lay. In addition, the artillery on the front was -divided up into groups, and Lieut.-Colonel Harris, from his headquarters -in the white house on the Arras-Doullens road, controlled not only his -own batteries but also C/63 and D/64 which, together with the 162nd -Brigade, went to form "G" group. "H" group was administered by -Lieut.-Colonel Stewart. - -At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that, owing to the huge -concentration of artillery on the "live" sectors of the front, no -batteries could be spared to go into the rest area, and that therefore -the best which could be hoped for was a comparatively quiet time on a -peaceful part of the line. This was what the batteries at Dainville were -hoping for, and this was what they badly needed after the strenuous days -of the Somme fighting; it is therefore interesting to note what happened -to them in the following few days, for it will give a good idea of the -worry and hardship which thoroughly bad staff work can give, and which -it did give, to men already tired by fighting. - -By their northward march the batteries had left the XV. Corps of the -Fourth Army and were now under the orders of the XVII. Corps, Third -Army. On the night of September 14th/15th, after six weeks' heavy -fighting and four days' marching to follow, the batteries moved into -action; at seven o'clock on the evening of the 15th, just eleven hours -after the batteries had assumed responsibility for the defence of the -front, orders were received to move out of action and to march south to -the VII. Corps area to cover the infantry of the 33rd Division, the 12th -Divisional Artillery taking over the Dainville sector. This in itself -was not so very bad; it is true that, as a result of the orders, leave -which had just reopened both for England and for the Boulogne rest camp -was stopped, and it was generally felt that the batteries might equally -as well have marched to the VII. Corps area in the first case. There was -the consolation of knowing, however, that once again the batteries were -to cover their own infantry, and occasional mistakes of this kind were -not altogether unusual. - -This, unfortunately, was not all. On the night of the 15th/16th one -section per battery withdrew from action and moved to the -Coullemont-Warlincourt-Couturelle area, the remainder of the batteries, -except those of the 156th Brigade, following on twenty-four hours later. -The next night the leading sections marched into action as ordered on -the Gommecourt front, relieving the batteries of the 17th Divisional -Artillery, and twenty-four hours later, on the night of the 17th/18th, -they were joined by the remaining sections who had left the Dainville -positions vacant; at the same time the 156th Brigade marched to -Gaudiempré and came into action, on the morning of the 19th, north-east -of Sailly-au-Bois. Thus on September 19th all the batteries were in -action on the Gommecourt front, and wagon-lines had been established -around Gaudiempré and Pas. - -So far, so good, but now chaos set in. On the 20th, after the batteries -had been in action just twenty-four hours, orders were received for the -162nd Brigade to sideslip and relieve the batteries of the 78th Brigade, -forming the northern group. This was done by one section per battery and -was to have been completed on the 21st, but was cancelled late on that -evening; instead of sideslipping, the batteries were ordered to return -to their old positions on the Arras front which they had quitted five -days previously, were relieved by the 46th Divisional Artillery and -retired to their wagon-lines at Pas, while at the same time -half-batteries of the 156th Brigade moved out of the line to wagon-lines -around Wanquetin and Montenescourt. At noon on the 22nd the remaining -sections of the 46th Divisional Artillery relieved what had been left in -the line of the 33rd, and the batteries of the latter returned to their -old wagon-lines around Wanquetin and Sombrin. Two sections per battery -(156th and 162nd Brigades) moved into action the same night (22nd/23rd) -in the Dainville sector and were joined by the remaining sections next -day, while on the 24th the 166th Brigade came into action between -Dainville and Arras, forming once again "H" Group of Artillery in the -Dainville sector. Thus after a general shuffle, numerous orders and -counter orders, general disturbance and three days' marching, the -batteries were in exactly the same positions which they had occupied ten -days before. They had marched all the way to Gommecourt for -nothing—merely to inhabit positions for twelve hours and then to return -to Arras and Dainville again. Yet these were tired men who ached for -rest and a little comfort. - -It may be thought that at this stage the Higher Authority would have -been able to sort matters out and to run their administration on -slightly more efficient lines, but nothing of the sort was experienced. -On October 1st, six days later, the good game of battledore and -shuttlecock between XVII. and VII. Corps was continued, and orders were -again received to march to the VII. Corps area, the scene of the -previous excursion. On the 3rd the leading sections of the batteries set -out over the now well-known road and, after establishing themselves once -more in wagon-lines around Gaudiempré on the 4th, came into action on -the Gommecourt front on the 5th, where they were joined 48 hours later -by the remaining sections which had stayed behind at Arras to cover the -move. Thus, in order to carry out the apparently simple work of -transferring a Divisional Artillery from the Arras to the Gommecourt -front, somebody amongst the Higher Command had forced the unfortunate -batteries to march down from one front to the other, sideslip, return -along the road to their original Arras front, and then march all the way -down again to the zone they had been in after the very first march! - -Strange to say, the batteries really did remain now on the Gommecourt -front, and, as they took part from there in operations connected with -the Battle of the Ancre, it will be well to examine their positions -carefully. - -The 156th Brigade established itself around Sailly, the 162nd just south -of Fonquevillers, and the 166th Brigade north of the same village, the -advantage of these positions being that the hostile trenches west of -Gommecourt could be barraged in enfilade—the deadly effect of which had -already been proved in the Battle of the Somme—while the batteries could -also cut wire on various parts of the front east of Hebuterne to as far -as Rossignol Wood. This wire-cutting was, indeed, the main occupation of -the batteries, and every moment of good visibility was utilised to carry -out the tedious and extremely difficult work. - -[Illustration: - - Scale 1:40.000. -] - -The 49th Division was holding the line at the time, and the batteries -working under 33rd Divisional Artillery Headquarters (who in its turn -was controlled by the 49th Division) covered the front from "The Z" to -the south-west corner of Gommecourt Park, wire-cutting being carried out -mainly just below and south of the Gommecourt-Fonquevillers road. From -the 7th till the 11th, when the wire-cutting was finished, the work went -on daily without interruption; on the 8th D/162 (Major Belgrave) had -exchanged positions with a battery of the 48th Division and had moved -into Hebuterne itself, while on the 9th the batteries were placed under -control of VII. Corps direct, and were relieved of the responsibility of -covering the 49th Divisional front as far as infantry support was -concerned, but apart from these small interruptions no distraction of -any importance was suffered. Hostile artillery was sufficiently active -to be rather troublesome—the tactics employed being occasional short -bursts of shelling and sniping rounds into the battery positions, a -procedure which kept all ranks unpleasantly on the _qui vive_, and it -was with a feeling of satisfaction that the report was made on the 11th -that wire-cutting was complete. - -Here the batteries had a slight rest from the continual firing of the -previous days, but not so the brigade commanders. On the 12th orders -were received that the brigade commanders of the 33rd Divisional -Artillery should supervise the wire-cutting of the 79th Brigade, and no -sooner was this done than positions had to be reconnoitred for the -batteries on the neighbouring Serre front. The reconnaissance was -carried out on September 18th, and the following day the batteries moved -into positions from which they were destined to take part in the Battle -of the Ancre. The move in this case was of no magnitude whatever; the -batteries of the 156th Brigade lay east of Sailly-au-Bois, the 162nd -Brigade took up positions south of Hebuterne, with the exception of "D" -battery which was in Hebuterne itself, while the 166th Brigade shifted -to the north of the same village. Once again wire-cutting was the order -of the day. The front covered by the batteries, held at this time by -infantry of the 31st Division, extended from west of Puisieux to as far -south as Serre, and wire-cutting was concentrated on the zone stretching -from the cross roads south-east of The Point to 300 yards north-east of -John Copse, the batteries being under direct control of the XIII. Corps. - -From October 20th until November 13th the batteries were kept in a state -of high activity. Every day wire-cutting was continued, and bursts of -fire were directed day and night upon the gaps cut in the wire to -prevent the repair thereof. At the same time all the hostile approaches, -communication trenches and trench junctions were constantly bombarded, -and here again every endeavour was made to prevent the enemy from -putting right such damage as had been done. These tactics naturally used -up a large amount of ammunition, and as naturally evoked swift -retaliation from the enemy. Every night, as the ammunition wagons toiled -up from the wagon-lines around Couin and St. Leger with supplies for the -guns, they met the blast of the German shells searching the approaches -around Sailly, Colincamps and Hebuterne. Nightly did the Germans take -their toll of men and horses engaged upon the work of ammunition supply, -while an ever-lengthening casualty list in the battery positions showed -that the enemy, provoked to wrath and apprehension by the obviously -deliberate and premeditated cutting of his wire, was not replying in -vain. He knew, from the destruction of his wire, that an attack was -imminent, and realising this he turned the full blast of his attention -upon the batteries; they were the chief danger at the moment, whereas -the infantry could be attended to later when the day of assault grew -nearer at hand. - -The tactics of the enemy were as before; not usually long bombardments, -but sudden short bursts of fire upon the battery positions, catching men -unawares and making them dread even the narrow open spaces between the -guns. Every day these bursts—sometimes only a few sniping rounds—cut -down the effectives at the gun positions, until Hebuterne became a word -of ill omen to all. Still the work continued; the back areas of the -enemy system began to receive attention, Puisieux was bombarded on the -22nd in conjunction with the heavy artillery, and on the 26th the first -infantry raiding party went over to obtain identification of the troops -opposite and to examine the effect of the previous six days' -wire-cutting. After two half-hour bombardments, with an interval of two -hours between, a party of the 93rd Infantry Brigade set out to enter the -hostile lines, but an enemy better known almost than the Germans and in -its way equally deadly, the enemy Mud, prevented them from even reaching -the German parapet. So heavy was the going in No Man's Land that it -became a physical impossibility to get across, and after many efforts -the infantry returned to our own trenches. - -Once again wire-cutting and trench bombardment were resumed, and now the -enemy became more violent still in his reply. Nightly did he pour -thousands of gas shells into the battery positions, forcing the men to -wear their box-respirators during what little rest they could achieve -and depriving them of their badly-needed sleep. Practically every day -the villages of Sailly and Hebuterne were shelled by 15 cm. and 10 cm. -howitzers, while a deliberate bombardment of batteries and brigade -headquarters was carried out during the last three days of the month. On -November 2nd another attempt was made by the 31st Division to raid the -enemy trenches east of Hebuterne, and throughout the night of the -2nd/3rd a heavy flank and covering barrage was kept up by the batteries -to support the infantry in their hazardous task. Once again, however, -failure had to be confessed. The utter impassability of No Man's Land, -owing to mud and water-filled shell-holes, combined with very brisk -enemy opposition forced the raiding parties back to their trenches -again, and once more were the batteries left in ignorance of the effect -of their work. - -It was essential, however, that the enemy lines should be penetrated, -for the non-success of the previous two raids had led to a lack of -knowledge of the hostile troops opposite, and had prevented an -examination being made of the German wire. Accordingly, on November 6th, -a third and this time in part successful attempt was made. After a -20-minute bombardment during which three raiding parties crept into No -Man's Land, a hurricane barrage for six minutes was carried out, under -cover of which the raiders set out for the enemy trenches between The -Point and the Sunken Road. Heavy machine-gun fire was encountered and -the two raiding parties on the left were held up, but on the right the -party covered by the 162nd Brigade forced its way into the enemy line, -bombed dug-outs, examined the wire and returned safely to its own -trenches bringing with it, for purposes of identification, five -prisoners, of whom one died on arrival. - -Matters now began to move rapidly. From the 7th to the 10th the enemy -bombarded Sailly and Hebuterne heavily, and on the night of the 9th -fired 4,000 gas shells into our battery positions; on the 10th also -began the final three-day bombardment by our batteries before the -launching of the assault to be known in history as the Battle of the -Ancre. The 10th, 11th and 12th, designated in the secret operation -orders as W, X and Y days, marked a doubling and trebling intensity of -bombardment on the enemy trenches; the German front and support lines -were pounded and flung in all directions, wire was cut, gaps and -breaches were kept under constant bursts of fire to prevent repair, and -when November 13th dawned it seemed that no more could be done, and -that, in view of the bad visibility and weather existing during these -days, every possible preparation had been made. - -Zero hour on Monday, the 13th, was a quarter to six in the morning; -sharp to the second the guns roared forth the barrage, the infantry -advanced to the assault and the Battle of the Ancre, which for so long -had been fomenting, burst out in all its fury. The 33rd Divisional -Artillery was covering the extreme left of the battle line, its zone -extending from John Copse on the right through the Touvert Farm-La -Louverie Farm road to the left of the line of assault, and was -supporting the infantry of the 31st Division by whom the attack was to -be made. On the front of the batteries the wire was found to be -completely and successfully cut, the barrage proved entirely -satisfactory and the infantry, assaulting and passing over the German -front line, advanced to their next objective—the German second -line—along the whole of the front from Puisieux to as far south as -Serre. - -On the whole the hostile barrage was not severe until noon, when No -Man's Land and our front system were very heavily bombarded. Every -morning from 5.45 till 6 A.M. for the previous three days a heavy -barrage had been fired on the German trenches so that, after the first -two occasions, the enemy grew used to these barrages and could not tell -whether an attack was coming or not. During the assault itself, which -was helped by a heavy fog, the chief casualties were suffered from rifle -and machine-gun fire coming from the German second line, while heavy mud -in No Man's Land made the advance extremely tedious. The German front -line, as already noted, was successfully captured in spite of these -difficulties, the enemy in most cases being caught by surprise and -surrendering on close fighting, and it was not until the advance on the -second line began that real trouble was met. - -The 3rd Division, to whom had been allotted the capture of Serre, was -unable, owing to the mud and heavy enemy opposition, to reach its -objective, and the 31st Division found itself with its right flank in -the air. All day long fighting continued, our casualties being terribly -heavy, while the batteries barraged with all their might in the hope of -protecting the 31st Division until such time as the 3rd Division, by -advancing on the right, should secure the flank. It was all of no avail, -however; after twelve hours of raging battle orders were received from -Corps Headquarters to evacuate the captured ground, and this was done in -the evening under a protective barrage from the guns of the 33rd -Divisional Artillery. Thus on this particular front no advance was made, -while the casualties were so heavy that strong patrols had to be sent -out during the night to cover the bringing in of the wounded. It should -be remembered, however, that the operations described formed only the -extreme left of a great battle, and that, although the flank was held -up, the centre advanced with such success that Beaumont-Hamel was -captured together with 3,000 prisoners, while an advance was made on to -the outskirts of Beaumont village itself. Therefore, in considering the -results of the Battle of the Ancre, the foregoing narrative which -concerns only the batteries on the extreme flank must not be taken -alone, but in connection with the history of the rest of that day along -the whole front of assault. - -Next day, after firing a dummy barrage in the early morning in -co-operation with an attack further to the south, the batteries of the -33rd Divisional Artillery gave up their part in the Battle of the Ancre -and began to retire to their wagon-lines. Two batteries per brigade—"C" -and D/156 with "B" and "D" of 162nd and 166th—moved out on the night of -the 14th/15th to the area around Couin and St. Leger, and on the -following night were joined by the rest of the brigades. Here they -remained till the 22nd, cleaning, reorganising and resting, with -occasional very unwelcome returns to their old battery positions to -remove ammunition; here with the most profound regret they bade farewell -to Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd, whose gallantry and personality had won -for him a firm affection and friendship in the hearts of all ranks, and -who now, on handing the command of the 156th Brigade to Major Bridges, -went to take over a Horse Artillery Brigade with the 1st Indian Cavalry -Division (there to meet his death while directing the batteries in the -Cambrai offensive of 1917); and from here they marched on November 22nd -through Villers Bocage and Talmas to Airaines, to enjoy in this, the -middle of November 1916, the first rest which they had been granted, -with the exception of ten days during the Battle of the Somme, since -they had gone into action nine months previously. - -At Airaines they remained till December 5th, when they set out once more -with their faces turned towards the east to relieve the French and to -hold, throughout the winter, the ground wrested from the Germans in the -Battle of the Somme. The story of that long and trying winter in bitter -cold and deep mud, the tale of how the Germans were so continually -harassed by artillery fire that they were forced to carry out the -retreat of February 1917 to the famous Hindenburg line, belongs to -another chapter in the life-story of the batteries, and as such must be -relegated thereto. - - - - - CHAPTER V. - WINTER ON THE SOMME 1916. - - -From November 23rd, the date of arrival at Airaines, until December 5th -when the first units began the march back to the line again, a complete -rest was enjoyed by the batteries, and badly was it needed. Clothing, -harness and equipment had to be overhauled carefully, casualties amongst -men and horses replaced, while many of the reinforcements lately arrived -from England were not fit to take their place in the gun detachments or -teams, and needed a thorough drilling to change them from the half-raw -condition in which they had left England to something more nearly -approaching the necessary smartness and accuracy required in the field. -Moreover a certain staleness, the inevitable result of a long period of -continuous fighting, had descended upon the batteries as a whole, and it -needed a period of brisk training interspersed with half-holidays, -concerts and games of every description to bring back the old spring and -confidence. - -On November 29th the first hint was received of the destination of the -batteries when fighting should once more become the order of the day, -for on that date Brig.-Gen. Blane set off for Maurepas—the extreme left -of the French on the Somme—there to hold a conference with the French -General commanding the artillery of the French XX. Corps. On December -1st the full facts were known, and a warning order was received that the -33rd Division was to take over the line from the French from -Sailly-Saillisel to a point opposite Bouchavesnes, the batteries -occupying the positions of the 127th French Regiment of Artillery. -Further it was learnt that the artillery support of the line was to be -carried out by the combined brigades of the 33rd and 40th Divisions, -each Division keeping two artillery brigades in the line and one in -rest. - -On Tuesday, December 5th, the move began. A/162 and C/156 with No. 2 -Section of the Divisional Ammunition Column set off early in the morning -on what was to be a three-day march, and passing through Picquigny and -Ailly-sur-Somme, halted for the first night at St. Sauveur. The second -day saw them leave Vecquemont and Corbie behind them, and on the third -day, after spending the previous night at Vaux-sur-Somme, they arrived -at Camp 14 on the Corbie-Bray road some few miles west of Bray itself. -So the move went on; on December 8th B/156 and C/162 shook the dust—or -rather mud—of Airaines from off their feet and followed the first two -batteries by the same stages; next day A/156 and B/162 followed suit, -and on December 10th the two remaining batteries—D/156 and D/162—turned -their backs upon the rest area, arriving at Camp 14 two days later. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - OCTOBER 1916—FEBRUARY 1917. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major H. K. Capt. W. E. - Sadler, D.S.O., Bownass. - M.C. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel Bridges. - - Adjutant: Lieut. E. H. Prior (_until January_). - - Lieut. F. L. Lee. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major S. Talbot. Major M. A. Major G. Lomer, Capt. W. G. - Studd, M.C. D.S.O. Pringle - (_till January_). - - Major W. A. T. - Barstow, M.C. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris. - - Adjutant: Lieut. R. H. Pavitt. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major G. Major V. Major A. van Major J. D. - Fetherston, M.C. Benett-Stanford, Straubenzee, M.C. Belgrave, D.S.O. - M.C. - - 166th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. S. M. Wood. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. H. A. Capt. Dust. Capt. H. Freeman. Capt. B. - Littlejohn, M.C. McCallum, M.C. - -While this march was in progress matters had been moving up in front, -for on December 8th the 156th and 162nd Brigade commanders (166th -Brigade had been left in rest at Airaines) went up to take over from the -French the headquarters and battery positions of the 127th Regiment of -Artillery. Taking over from the army of another nation was a somewhat -more lengthy business than an ordinary relief on the British front; the -trouble of language was not insuperable, but the difficulty of -reconciling their methods of communication and control with our own, and -of making the alterations necessary to fall in with the usual practice -of brigade and battery administration was by no means light, nor were -matters simplified by the oft-recurring phrase "ça ne marche pas" when -discussing some important telephone line from brigade to battery or O.P. - -However, by December 12th all was ready for the arrival of the -batteries, and on that day there marched into action two sections each -of C/156, A/162 and C/162 who had left Camp 14 on the previous day and -had established wagon-lines at Camp 21, one mile south of Maricourt, on -the Suzanne-Maricourt road. They were followed on December 13th by -A/156, B/156 and B/162, while the 15th saw the arrival of the "D" -batteries, so that exactly ten days before Christmas the whole of the -Divisional Artillery was "back to work" again. Camp 14 had only been -used as a very brief halting place in the scheme; it acted, in fact, -merely as a place for the partial concentration of the batteries, and it -was well that this was the case, for a worse spot and a more unsuitable -artillery camp it would be difficult to find. Some distance from the -road, approached only by the roughest of tracks, it lay in a valley and -quickly showed itself to be a veritable mud-trap. The horse-lines were -bad, the men's quarters were worse, and the effort of pulling into the -camp off the road, and of struggling back on to the road again when the -march was resumed, more than counteracted any benefit which might -otherwise have accrued from the two days spent there in rest. It was -with a feeling of relief, therefore, that the batteries turned their -backs upon this much-hated spot and set out for Camp 21, their permanent -wagon-lines whilst in action. Nothing could be worse than Camp 14; -perhaps Camp 21 might be better. Perhaps! - -As events turned out, Camp 21 between Suzanne and Maricourt was a slight -improvement, but very slight. It was on ground which had been the scene -of the summer and autumn offensive, and nothing could solidify the earth -which had been so torn and shattered by high explosives. The least -suspicion of rain—even of damp—turned everything into mud, while the -neighbourhood of the water-troughs, unless built up from a timber -foundation, became absolutely and completely impassable. Certain of the -batteries, in fact, which were forced to establish their wagon-lines on -the west of the road struck such fearful conditions that a number of -horses were actually drowned in the mud. It was not the fault of the -batteries or brigades—they were ordered to establish wagon-lines in a -certain spot and perforce they had to do it, nor could the most -strenuous of efforts put things right in a few days. To whomever the -fault was due, it was heart-breaking to battery commanders to see the -effects of a three weeks' rest being wiped out almost in as many days by -the impossible conditions in which some of them found themselves. - -To return, however, to the tactical situation. By December 16th all the -batteries, less one section in some cases, were in action in the -Maurepas-Bouchavesnes area. Only two brigades—the 156th and the 162nd—of -the 33rd Divisional Artillery were in the line, for the 166th Brigade -had been left behind at Airaines, but to General Blane's command were -added two brigades of the 40th Divisional Artillery—the 178th and -181st—in action in Anderlu and Marrières Woods respectively, and with -these four brigades it was considered that sufficient artillery support -for the divisional front would be forthcoming. The batteries of the -162nd Brigade, with the exception of "D" Battery, lay just west of the -Clery-Le Forest road and about half-way between the two villages; "D" -battery, for reasons to be discussed presently, took up a position two -hundred yards east of Hospital Wood, while the battery positions of the -156th Brigade were congregated in the area around and east of Le Forest. - -In taking over from the French a portion of the line, as was done in -this case, very considerable difficulties had to be faced from the -brigade and battery commanders' point of view. The French field -batteries consisted almost always of four guns, and to relieve them with -six-gun batteries involved either the digging of further gun-pits and -shelters for the men or the splitting up of the batteries into two -portions. In this case the 33rd Divisional Artillery was relieving three -groups (the 3rd, 4th and 5th) of French artillery, each group consisting -of three four-gun batteries, and accordingly it was resolved to take one -section each from "B" and C/156 and to combine them into a third -four-gun battery, while "A" and B/162 carried out the same procedure in -the other brigade; two guns of C/162 relieved on their own a French -battery, and A/156 was fortunate enough to take up a position in which -it was possible to keep all six guns in action together. Thus it will be -seen that the brigades were thrown into rather a disorganised condition, -but this was not all. The French Army did not maintain any batteries of -field howitzers, and therefore the 4·5 in. howitzer batteries of the two -brigades found themselves nobody's children, left out in the cold with -nobody to relieve, no battery position to take over. They were forced on -this, as on another later occasion, to buckle to and dig their own -position, and for this reason D/162, as already stated, came to the edge -of Hospital Wood and dug itself in under a small bank. - -By the 16th and 17th of December the main work of establishing the -positions had been overcome, and, preliminary registration being -completed, the batteries had a chance of looking around them. The -surroundings were not inspiring; they had been wrested from the enemy -during the Somme offensive and, in common with the rest of the -battlefield, were torn and pitted with shell-holes in all directions. -The autumn and winter rains had turned the whole countryside into a vast -sea of mud, mud so deep, so thick and of such peculiar consistency that -it was altogether impossible to remove it, drain or even dig through it. -Conditions were, indeed, pitiable; every yard walked was an effort -involving absolute wading; thigh gum-boots were powerless to keep the -men dry; ammunition, rations and mail had to be brought to the battery -positions by pack-horse, for no wagon could approach, and on top of all -this it rained, rained continuously and steadfastly during the whole -period. It was indeed a wretched place, rendered more wretched by the -knowledge that Christmas—a season usually associated with comfort and -merrymaking—was fast approaching. - -For some time after the arrival of the batteries on this part of the -front there was no war, for the simple reason that war was impossible. -The battery positions consisted merely of six semi-dry platforms for the -guns, separated and surrounded by apparently bottomless mud; the men -lived in wet and muddy shelters and dug-outs, and were scarcely ever -dry; telephone lines forward ran through mud which made the repair of -breaks a clumsy, maddening business, while up with the infantry there -were no trenches, no dug-outs, nothing but mud and water. Along the -whole of the divisional front there were only about four places where -anything approaching the semblance of a communication trench could be -found, and these were so bad as to be rather deeper of mud than the -surrounding ground. There was only one way to reach the front line—a -ditch full of water with a little wire in front—and that was to walk -straight over the open up to the fire trench itself, and there, if a new -arrival, drop in; if an old hand, sit on the parados. - -This state of affairs may sound fantastic and even an exaggeration, but -it is only too true an account. The French, finding conditions were -well-nigh impossible for fighting, decided philosophically not to fight, -and arranged with the enemy accordingly. It was muddy for them, but just -as muddy for the enemy; it was a beastly business wading up -communication trenches which were practically non-existent to a front -line which was scarcely habitable, but it was just as beastly for the -Germans; therefore, forward observing officers going up to visit the -infantry had the strange experience of walking up to our front line over -the open, of sitting on the parapet in full view of the enemy one -hundred yards away, and of seeing the enemy doing exactly the same thing -themselves. So extraordinary were the conditions, in fact, that a -battery commander of the 162nd Brigade walked over the open with one of -his subalterns not only up to the front line but over it at a spot where -it was deserted, and had got well into No Man's Land before a sentry in -one of the adjoining bays called him back. - -Whether the French method of thus maintaining an unofficial truce was a -good one need not be debated in these pages. It certainly led them to -give up making any effort to dig communication trenches at all, even in -spots where with trouble it would have been possible, and it by no means -helped to foster the "cultivation of the fighting spirit," the -importance of which was being impressed so busily upon all ranks at the -time. On the other hand it gave them a tiny measure of comfort which -made life just endurable, and by resuming active operations and reducing -the enemy to a state of misery they would have let themselves in for -similar wretchedness. - -When the 33rd Division took over the line, however, the question was -left in doubt no longer. Where there was war there was to be real war -and no unofficial truce; the French protested, they tried in vain to -prevent the infantry sniping, but it was of no avail. One morning a -whole platoon of Germans marched calmly down to the front line over the -open, following the custom of bygone days; the temptation was too great, -and a Lewis gunner, hastily putting together the gun he had been -cleaning, raised it on to the parapet and browned the lot! From that -moment onwards not a head dared show above the parapet, and everybody -living in the front line or visiting it endured discomfort and hardship -beyond imagination. - -Gradually, as the 33rd Division settled in, hostilities increased and -boiled up. Even so the majority of the firing was upon the back areas, -for the forward trench system—engulfed in a sea of mud—offered no target -whatever. Duckboard tracks, valleys hidden from infantry and artillery -observers where the enemy might walk about in the open, suspected -battery positions, cross-roads and other similar targets received as a -rule the attention of our guns, while the enemy administered the same -treatment to corresponding features behind our lines. The actual front -covered by the batteries extended from the enemy trenches on the -Bouchavesnes ridge northwards through Moislains Wood to the great wood -of St. Pierre Vaast. From observation stations along the ridge east of -Aiguille Ravine (in which was the artillery forward telephone exchange) -a very good view of all the enemy system could be seen except in the -extreme north of the zone, though the trenches behind the support line -were hidden owing to the steep valley which ran down towards Moislains. - -Thus the year drew slowly to a close. On Christmas Day the brigades took -part in an artillery bombardment carried out along the whole Corps front -to show that "Peace on Earth, Goodwill toward Men" was not considered to -apply to Germans. In reply, the enemy increased in violence his sniping -with whizz-bangs of any portion of duckboard track and road where he -might catch ration parties or artillery teams toiling up with ammunition -from Plateau Siding, and then, on December 31st, the 166th Brigade -arrived from Airaines and relieved the batteries of the 156th. By the -system already outlined one brigade of each Divisional Artillery was -kept in rest, and beneath the envious eyes of the 162nd Brigade, whose -turn was not yet, the 156th turned their backs to the mud and marched -away to the rest and comparative comfort of G.H.Q. reserve. - -The first fortnight of January proved uneventful. The same harassing -fire was continued, the same mud prevailed everywhere and the greatest -problem of all to be contended with at the time was not the enemy, but -the weather. An alarming increase in the number of cases of trench-feet -and frost-bite began to show itself, not only in the infantry but in the -artillery. For the infantry special drying rooms were erected and dry -socks were issued to every man on leaving the trenches, but the gunners -were thought to be better off, and for them there were no such -arrangements. Consequently there fell upon brigade and battery -commanders a very great strain, a strain which had to be withstood at -the time when more work began to show itself in the offing. - -More work there certainly was. On January 2nd General Blane, on the -relief of the 33rd Division by the 40th, had handed over control of the -brigades to the C.R.A. 40th Division and had gone with headquarters into -rest at Belloy-sur-Somme. On January 10th there came a warning order -from his headquarters that a sideslip of the division to the right was -about to take place, and that brigade commanders were to visit the -French positions along the actual borders of the Somme next day. Close -on the heels of this came directions for the batteries to withdraw from -the line, the 166th getting away first on January 12th, followed by the -162nd Brigade four days later, and January 16th found both brigades in -rest at their wagon-lines—Camp 21, west of Maricourt. - -The following six days were spent at these wagon-lines, and during the -period yet another reorganisation of the Divisional Artillery took -place. Since September 1916 there had been three brigades, the full -establishment of a brigade being three six-gun 18-pdr. batteries and one -four-gun 4·5 in. howitzer battery. It was now decreed that a Divisional -Artillery should consist of two brigades, each brigade to be of the same -composition as before but with six-gun howitzer batteries, and not four -as previously. To bring this about the 166th Brigade was broken up. One -section of D/166 went to D/156, the other to D/162; A/166 (Captain -Littlejohn) marched to Mirvaux and became part of the 26th Brigade, -while B/166 (Captain Dust) joined the 93rd Brigade at Morlancourt and -was merged in that unit. The Divisional Artillery did not lose all its -old friends, however, by this breaking up. Major Barstow was transferred -to the 156th Brigade, as was also Lieut.-Colonel Stewart who, with the -whole of the staff of the 166th Brigade H.Q., came to 156th H.Q.; the -late headquarter staff of that brigade took over the nominal command of -166th Brigade—now a brigade in name only and not in substance—and -awaited orders at Belloy as to future movements. - -While this change-about had been going on, the batteries at Camp 21 had -been busy in other respects as well. Cold, dry weather had set in, and, -remembering the mud of Bouchavesnes and realising that similar -conditions existed in the positions which were shortly to be occupied on -the banks of the Somme itself, teams had been out every day making use -of the good going occasioned by the hard weather, and filling up the -ammunition pits at the battery positions which by now had been -reconnoitred by battery commanders themselves. It was the only advantage -which the 162nd Brigade, deprived by this move of the rest for which it -was nearly due, managed to gain over the 156th Brigade who were now -marching up from the rest area to the new wagon-lines around Vaux Wood -and Eclusier. - -On January 22nd the move into action began. From the wagon-lines west of -Frise the batteries marched up to take over the defence of the line from -the River Somme itself on the right to the junction with the 4th -Division, some three-quarters of a mile south of Bouchavesnes, on the -left. The infantry had relieved the French 17th Division two days -previously and had been supported temporarily by the French batteries, -but now on the 24th the guns came up and, taking over from the groups of -Commandants de St. Paule, Le Gros and Rouziers of the 30th, 29th and -49th Regiments of Artillery, assumed responsibility for the support of -the line from eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Under the -control of General Blane at P.C. Jean the batteries were split up into -two groups; the left group, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, -consisted of the 156th and the 14th Brigades, while the 162nd and the -33rd Brigades, at first under the control of Lieut.-Colonel Nevinson but -ultimately, from the 31st, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Harris, went to -form the right group, each group covering one brigade of infantry in the -front line. - -Battery positions on the south of the Somme had been very difficult to -find, for on clear days Mt. St. Quentin, which was in German hands, -commanded the whole of the countryside, and the concealment of flashes -was a practical impossibility. After a certain amount of debating Major -Fetherston's battery (A/162) took up a position just south of Buscourt -Cemetery, with D/162 (Major Belgrave) two hundred yards in front under -the shelter of a bank; C/162 (Major van Straubenzee) lay between -Buscourt Cemetery and the river, while Major Benett-Stanford established -his battery (B/162) with four guns to the south-east of these positions, -the remaining section being detached for enfilade work about seven -hundred yards south of Feuillières. With Brigade headquarters situated -in an old German second-line trench one hundred yards behind "C" -battery, the whole of the 162nd was thoroughly compact and well together -and, from the point of view of administration, excellently placed. - -The 162nd was the only brigade of the 33rd Division lying south of the -Somme. The batteries were, in fact, the first British guns to return -there since the very early days of the war, and it fell to them now to -occupy the extreme right of the British line in France, just as they -also occupied the extreme left of that same line on the beach at -Nieuport some six months later. The batteries of the 156th Brigade all -lay to the north of the river, "A" and C/156 (Major Talbot and Major -Lomer) to the east of Howitzer Wood and 2,000 yards N.W. of -Clery-sur-Somme, "B" and D/156 (Major Studd and Major Barstow) south of -the same wood, and from here they continued the good work of harassing -the enemy in the position to which he had been forced back by the -offensive of the foregoing months. - -On January 25th battery commanders studied and registered their new -zones. The German line here ran from the river Somme to the west corner -of Limberlost Wood, and on through Freckles Wood in a north-easterly -direction. Observation stations north of the river were situated on the -high ground west of Hersfeld Trench, while to the south of the river, -from a high hill running sheer down to the water about 1,200 yards due -west of Halle, a magnificent enfilade view right down on to the front -covered could be obtained, and also an extensive back area view of the -country round Péronne, Mont St. Quentin, Feuillaucourt, Allaines and -along the Paris-Lille road in the direction of Nurlu. The line just here -offered an extraordinary feature which was to be found in very few other -places along the front; owing to a big "hair-pin bend" of the river and -to the fact that the two arms of the bend enclosed a marsh, the trenches -ran straight down to the river on the north side and there ceased -altogether, reappearing on the southern bend again some 2,500 yards -further down. It was impossible to dig trenches or to keep men in the -marshes enclosed by the bend of the river, and similarly it was -practically impossible for men to get across to raid our lines, but a -danger—and a very serious one—now presented itself, for a spell of -intensely cold weather set in; the river, the canal and the marshes were -all frozen solid, and the situation suddenly arose that between the -batteries and the German lines there lay nothing but two isolated -machine-gun posts. Our old ally, the marsh, which had hitherto proved a -safe defence against hostile raids on the guns, now offered a perfectly -secure passage. So feasible in fact did a raid appear, that plans were -actually being formulated for a descent upon the German batteries -opposite this bend by our people—plans which in the end had to be -abandoned, as two howitzer batteries, at the request of the infantry, -shelled the frozen river and with sixteen rounds cut a channel thirty -yards wide across the ice. - -The weather had indeed turned intensely cold. Every night some thirty -degrees of frost were registered, and the ground was deeply covered, in -snow. It was, of course, exceedingly healthy, but involved a great deal -of suffering, while the handling of guns and ammunition, the cold metal -of which seemed to bite right into the flesh, was a matter to be taken -by no means lightly. Fortunately there was but little activity at the -time. Hostile minenwerfers and rifle-grenades worried our infantry to a -large extent, but prompt retaliation, coupled with the arrival into -action of X, V and Y/33 trench mortar batteries, reduced this source of -trouble to a minimum. Apart from this the batteries were more or less -left to themselves to register such targets as they chose until February -arrived, bringing with it a more definite sequence of events. - -February heralded the commencement of more active operations, but before -these started the period in the rest area, for which the 162nd Brigade -was due, began to be granted to certain of the batteries. On February -1st A/162 stored its guns in the northern part of Marrières Wood, -leaving them there under a guard and eventually handing them over to the -33rd Brigade. At the same time orders were received to build positions -east of Marrières Wood for the guns stored there, while the 8th Division -got positions ready south-west of Rancourt to be taken up at a later -date by "A" and B/156. A/162, with its guns stored away, marched out to -rest at Vaux-sur-Somme, to be followed on the 7th by D/162 which went -into billets at Sailly-le-Sec; in the latter case, however, two guns -were handed over _in situ_ to the 55th Battery to be served by them from -there, while the remaining four were left under a guard until such time -as the battery should return to man them once more. - -With two batteries out at rest, the remainder found themselves engaged -in rapidly increasing work. On February 2nd a lengthy bombardment of the -enemy trenches was carried out by field and heavy artillery, and the -next day began the deliberate cutting of the enemy wire by the 18-pdrs., -which was to extend over a very considerable period. To carry this out -more effectively the enfilade section of B/162 (which had been in action -south of Feuillières) moved to a point on the south side of the Somme -east of Clery, where the canal lock adjoined the river; the old position -south of Feuillières was taken over by a section of C/162 which moved -thither from east of Chapter Wood. At first hostile retaliation was -slight, and until about the 8th, with the exception of a severe -lachrymose shelling endured by B/162, the work went on more or less -unhindered. Gradually, however, the enemy grew apprehensive over the -continued cutting of his wire, and his anger was brought to a -culminating point on the 7th when the 9th H.L.I. raided the trenches -and, after killing ten machine gunners and bombing two dug-outs full of -men, returned to their own lines with two prisoners and a machine-gun as -proof of their exploit. For their assistance in this raid the batteries -received the thanks of General Baird (100th Infantry Brigade) who was -especially pleased with the way in which the wire had been cut. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - FEBRUARY—MARCH 1917. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. F. Blane, C.M.G. Major H. K. Capt. W. E. - Sadler, D.S.O., Bownass. - M.C. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. F. L. Lee. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Capt. S. Talbot. Major M. A. Major G. Lomer, Major W. A. T. - Studd, M.C. D.S.O. Barstow, M.C. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Lieut. R. H. Pavitt. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major G. Major V. Major A. van Major J. D. - Fetherston, M.C. Benett-Stanford, Straubenzee, M.C. Belgrave, D.S.O. - M.C. - - Capt. A. E. G. - Champion. - - 166th Brigade. - - Broken up. - -On February 10th, after a further interval of wire-cutting, another -bombardment of the enemy trenches took place. From 1.0 P.M. on that day -until 6.15 A.M. the following morning a long and deliberate artillery -attack was carried out, finishing with a fifteen-minute intense -bombardment which crept over the enemy front line as though to be -followed by an assault, and then suddenly dropped back on to the fire -trench again to catch such infantry as might have manned the parapet. -The enemy was now fully aroused; all day he bombarded the right brigade -zone and especially 162nd Brigade Headquarters, and from this day -onwards he was always ready to retaliate heavily for any operations -carried out against him. - -A raid on the 14th by the 4th Suffolks round Pekly Bulge (south of the -Clery-Feuillaucourt road) did not tend to calm the increasing activity -which was now becoming general, and, although no prisoners were brought -to our trenches (four, with their escort, were killed by a heavy German -trench mortar while crossing No Man's Land), a great deal of damage and -many casualties were inflicted upon the enemy in their dug-outs. On the -19th, however, matters ought to have reached their climax, for on that -day should have taken place the attack on Hersfeld Trench, in -preparation for which all the previous bombardments and wire-cutting had -been carried out. It was postponed, however; postponed until the 22nd -because foggy weather had prevented any full examination of the -condition of the wire after its bombardment, and because the mud in No -Man's Land was so bad as to prevent the infantry from reaching the gaps. -In point of fact this attack was again postponed on the 22nd, and -finally, after being fixed for March 2nd, was abandoned altogether. - -The work now resolved itself into a slow but ever-persistent harassing -of the enemy. "A" and D/162 returned into action on February 20th and -joined in the general artillery attack which was in progress all along -this portion of the front—an attack the result of which ultimately -showed itself in the great German retreat to the Hindenburg Line early -in March. The operation on Hersfeld Trench had been abandoned, but a new -assault by the 8th Division further to the north had been in course of -preparation for some time, and now definite steps were taken to carry it -out. It will be remembered that at the beginning of the month the 8th -Division were preparing battery positions for "A" and B/156 south-west -of Rancourt; on the morning of the 21st the leading sections of the two -batteries moved up to these positions, and at the same time the right -group, temporarily under the command of Major J. D. Belgrave while -Colonel Harris was on leave, pushed forward an advance gun of A/162 to a -position two hundred yards east of Clery, whence wire-cutting on the -group zone could more effectively be carried out. Although no attack on -the 33rd Divisional front was to be launched it was essential to employ -tactics which would mislead the enemy, and by continual harassing to -prevent him from concentrating all his attention upon the 8th Division. - -There was, however, another reason for this continual bombardment. -Rumours began to circulate that the German Higher Command, finding the -present positions if not untenable at least strategically unsound, -intended to withdraw to the great trench system known as the Hindenburg -Line which for a long time past had been in preparation well to the -rear, and which was supposed to be a model of siting and fortified -field-work. At first rumours were vague and of doubtful origin; but -gradually it became evident, from the explosions which every day could -be seen behind the enemy lines, that a great deal of destructive and -demolition work was being carried out, all of which pointed to the fact -that the area was shortly to be evacuated. - -Under these circumstances it was necessary that information should be -obtained as to the strength in which the enemy was holding the line, and -for this purpose a series of raids was carried out. On the night of -February 27th/28th the 2nd Worcesters raided the enemy trenches around -Pekly Bulge in two parties, the first party going over at 8.40 P.M. and -remaining in the trenches for half an hour, while the second raid -started at 1.0 A.M. and lasted for sixty-five minutes. Rumour had it -that many of the first party—who were nearly all old hands, and for -whose benefit the first raid was said to have been organised—went over -again with the second party to complete a few odd jobs which they had -not had time to finish thoroughly earlier in the night! Whatever the -truth of this story may be, the raid was eminently successful. -Twenty-two prisoners were taken, thirty-six of the enemy were killed in -hand-to-hand fighting and six dug-outs full of men were bombed. -Moreover, the prisoners proved to be men of the 2nd Guards Grenadier -Regiment, and this identification, together with the discovery that the -German line was still strongly held, was of the greatest value to -Headquarters. - -On March 1st the hostile trenches were again raided, this time by the -2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and on March 3rd the attack by -the 8th Division was carried out on the left with the object of securing -a jutting-out portion of the enemy front and support lines. The attack -was too far to the north to permit of the 33rd Divisional Artillery -batteries taking any share therein, except for "A" and B/156 who had on -the 1st completed their move to the left to reinforce the artillery -supporting the assault. The 33rd Division did, however, carry out a -feint bombardment synchronising with the barrage of the 8th Division, -and this in itself was of considerable value since once again -information was obtained concerning the strength of the enemy. The -infantry in and on the left of Limberlost Wood not only let off smoke -during the feint attack, but also fired rockets of every conceivable -colour and variety, and the effect of this upon the enemy was -surprising. Completely mystified, very nervous and on edge, he bombarded -the trenches held by the 33rd Division with all his might and main, and -disclosed the strength of artillery which he still held upon the front. -This strength was, indeed, quite normal and seemed to belie any ideas of -an early retreat on his part, but one feature stood out prominently. -Artillery officers from each of the brigades, who were sent down to the -infantry to report on the hostile artillery strength, pointed out that -the entire retaliation was carried out by field-guns and 10 cm. -howitzers; of heavy guns and even 15 cm. howitzers there were none. -Perhaps, after all, this supposed retirement was near at hand. Whether -it was or was not, from the 4th until the 9th a steady bombardment was -kept up upon the enemy communications. Infantry patrols reported the -line lightly held, and the sniping and movement going on was suspected -of being carried out by a few picked men moving from place to place in -the trenches and utilising fixed and automatically-fired rifles to the -full. Even a raid by the enemy in the early morning of the 8th did not -wipe out this idea; the opinion was formed that it was sheer bluff, and -that only a very few machine-guns and individual gunners, making a -lavish use of Very lights, were maintaining the appearance of strength -on the enemy's part. - -The 33rd Divisional Artillery never saw the climax of this affair. On -the morning of Friday the 9th, half batteries of the 156th and 162nd -Brigades were relieved by the 178th and 181st Brigades respectively of -the 40th Division. The remaining half batteries withdrew on the 11th, -and the two brigades, turning their backs upon the battlefields of the -Somme, marched into rest at Vaux-sur-Somme and Sailly-le-Sec. Rumour had -it that they were to go into training for some great battle shortly to -take place, a battle in which the line was to be broken, open fighting -was to be the order of the day, the German line was to be turned and -British arms were to be victorious over the enemy once and for all. -Rumour, as on all such occasions, ran wild amongst the men, but where -the attack was to be and when, whether it was in connection with the -expected German retreat or elsewhere was kept from all except a favoured -few. Officially it was said that there was to be fighting, and open -fighting at that, and that the batteries must train accordingly; more -than that they were not to know. - -From the 11th until the 25th the batteries trained hard in every form of -exercise; gun drill, driving drill, flag and lamp signalling, battery -staff work and movement into action over open ground were carried out -day by day, while in the evening concerts and sing-songs were -interspersed with lectures to build up the fighting spirit of the men, -to raise their morale to the highest and to give them that quiet -confidence and assuredness of being the better man which is so essential -to troops who have a battle lying before them. - -Moreover, the fighting spirit of the men was raised in other ways than -by lectures. The batteries, drawn up in hollow square at church parade, -saw the Corps Commander decorate officers and men for gallantry; heard -the citation which accompanied the Order of the Crown of Italy awarded -to Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris; heard the Corps Commander tell them how, -shortly after they had been withdrawn from the line, infantry patrols -had discovered the enemy trenches to be unoccupied; learnt how, with the -enemy in general retreat, the whole of our line southwards from Arras -was pressing forward on the heels of the enemy, and even as he spoke was -occupying and advancing east from Péronne. It was no concern of the -men's that the enemy was relinquishing very bad ground merely in order -to take up a vastly superior and stronger position which he had, under -the most favourable circumstances, been preparing for some time. They -returned to their billets feeling that the enemy really was the -under-dog, that his tail was down and consequently that theirs was -decidedly up. - -Only one incident of this period marred the pleasure of the rest which -was being enjoyed. Before the batteries moved northward they lost their -C.R.A., Brigadier-General C. F. Blane who, on undertaking new duties, -left the Divisional Artillery with whom he was so closely connected. -General Blane brought out the (then) four artillery brigades to France -in their early raw state in 1915. He helped to mould and to shape them, -and, after leading them through all the hazardous times of the Battle of -the Somme and through the dreary and trying conditions of the winter, he -now handed them over, a splendid fighting unit, to his successor. -General Blane did a tremendous amount towards building up the 33rd -Divisional Artillery, and in its future history the name of the man who -did so much for it in its earlier stages must always be remembered. - -The orders to move were ultimately received in the fourth week of March. -On the 24th the C.R.A., Brigadier-General Stewart, who had succeeded -General Blane in the command of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, set out -in a motor bus with his brigade and battery commanders to make a -preliminary reconnaissance of the new front on which the batteries were -to operate. Next day the latter in full fighting order moved off towards -the north on the four-day march which was to terminate at Arras, and was -to bring them to the positions from which they would assist in the great -offensive of April 9th—the battle of Arras and Vimy Ridge. - - - - - CHAPTER VI. - THE BATTLE OF ARRAS AND VIMY RIDGE. - (APRIL-JUNE 1917.) - - -The march of the batteries from the Somme to Arras proved very exacting; -not only were the weather conditions rather more than bad—intense cold -and wet being experienced the whole time—but also the batteries, already -deprived of their commanders, were further depleted on the second day of -the march, when an order was received for one officer and twenty men -from every battery to go forward by motor lorry to work upon the -positions which had been allotted for occupation. A measure of praise is -due to those, in many cases, junior officers who under difficult -conditions, short of personnel and in foul weather led the batteries -over the long road through Talmas and Bealcourt towards Arras, now at -last disclosed as the goal of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. - -All along the line of that march the direction of the coming battle was -clearly indicated. Vast columns filled the road, columns of infantry, -guns and transport, columns of motor-lorries and ambulances, all with -their faces set towards the north, all forming part of a great moving -stream inexorable in its progress. Even to the inexperienced the sight -of these masses moving up, with scarcely a single vehicle passing in the -opposite direction, indicated a great concentration in progress, a -mighty gathering of the storm clouds, and only two questions remained -unanswered; exactly where, and how soon? - -While the batteries were marching steadily along, pondering over these -questions, the brigade and battery commanders, who had covered the whole -distance on the 24th, were busily engaged in examining the positions -they were to occupy and the zones to be covered. The 15th Divisional -Artillery, who were in the line at the time, had already in part -prepared the positions to be occupied by the 33rd, and the work and -trouble they had expended thereon won for them a very deep feeling of -gratitude amongst the officers and men who were to benefit by their -labours. Until the arrival of the working parties who had been detached -from the batteries on the line of march, however, no material work could -be done, and accordingly the time was spent in studying the zone to be -covered and in reconnoitring the best O.P.'s from which to shoot. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - APRIL—MAY 1917. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E. - D.S.O. Durie, M.C. Bownass. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler. - - Adjutant: Capt. B. L. Oxley. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major Lutyens. Major M. A. Major G. Lomer, Major W. A. T. - Studd, M.C. D.S.O. Barstow, M.C. - - Major H. McA. Major Barker. - Richards, M.C. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris. - - Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major G. Major V. Major A. van Major W. P. - Fetherston, M.C. Benett-Stanford, Straubenzee, M.C. Colfox. - M.C. (_wounded_). - (_wounded_). - - Major H. C. Cory, Capt. W. G. - M.C. Pringle. - - Major L. Hill. - -The strategical cat was now well out of the bag. A great attack, it was -learnt, was to be launched upon the whole German system from and -including Vimy Ridge on the left to a point well south of Arras on the -right. The 33rd Divisional Artillery was to be responsible for the zone -immediately south of the river Scarpe, and, after taking part in the -preliminary bombardment, was to advance in support of the assaulting -infantry so as to keep in touch with the foremost troops throughout the -battle. With this knowledge the importance of a thorough acquaintance -with the enemy lines was realised, and many hours were spent in front -line and observation station studying the hostile wire, trenches and all -the back areas. For wire-cutting and bombardment of the German front -line our own fire-trench was the best place, and from it a very clear -view of the objectives could, in certain parts, be obtained. In order to -see the opposing support lines and back areas, however, a higher view -point was necessary, and for this purpose certain ruined houses were -utilised in the Faubourg St. Sauveur—an outskirt of Arras on the Cambrai -road—together with the ruins of Blangy and some tall factory chimneys on -the eastern edge of Arras. - -The latter offered the most hair-raising experiences at times. On normal -occasions the top of a tall chimney sways in a most noticeable manner -with every gust of wind; when, as was often the case here, a deliberate -shoot was carried out upon it by the enemy, and 5·9 in. shells were -bursting around its base, it really seemed to the wretched observer, -perched on an iron cross-bar at the top, that the chimney must sooner or -later sway right over and break in two, even if a well-aimed shell did -not by a direct hit effect the same result. Moreover the inhabitants of -these chimneys, being quite near to the enemy trenches, had often the -pleasure of hearing a shell, aimed at some object behind them, whisk -past their ears in the course of its flight so close that it seemed -inevitable that ultimately the chimney must be hit. - -With the arrival of the working parties on March 27th real activity set -in. Not only did the pits, platforms and dug-outs begun by the 15th -Division require to be completed, but also accommodation for twelve -thousand rounds of ammunition in every battery position had to be made -ready, while the ammunition which was already there needed sorting. -Moreover, the word was passed round to hurry—time was short, and the day -of attack was not far off. Hurry, indeed, was the watchword, and for -four days the men toiled unceasingly; on the 30th work was redoubled, -for on that day the remainder of the gunners of each battery, which had -arrived at Duisans the previous night, came up into billets at Arras and -continued the work of preparation. In addition to making ready the -battery positions in Arras, advanced positions were ordered to be dug -and ammunition dumped just behind our own front line, whither the -batteries would advance as soon as the first objective in the attack had -been secured. This work was of necessity slow, for detection was easy -and by day hostile aeroplanes caused a maddening series of -interruptions. - -On the 30th/31st the first guns of the Divisional Artillery came into -action. "A" and B/156 (Major Lutyens and Major Studd) placed advanced -wire-cutting guns five hundred yards behind Arras Cemetery, while Major -Fetherston (A/162) put a forward section in the garden of a house on the -eastern outskirts of Arras, with the task of cutting wire just south of -the river Scarpe on the enemy second and third lines. Wire-cutting was -immediately begun, and from this date the 33rd Divisional Artillery -started to take its active share in the forthcoming battle. - -By April 1st the remaining guns of the brigades which had been left at -the wagon lines were brought into action. From their headquarters in 6, -Rue Jeanne d'Arc and 34, Rue des Capucins, Lieut.-Colonel Butler, who -had just been posted to the 156th Brigade, and Lieut.-Colonel Harris -directed the work of the batteries, which was now exceedingly heavy. -Work on the positions was still in progress, wire-cutting—always a slow -business—was continued day in day out, ammunition needed constant -replenishing, registrations had to be checked and renewed, and gunners -and drivers were being instructed in the route by which the advance to -the forward positions would be made. The brigades lay between the -Baudimont Gate and St. Nicholas, and the advance from there must -inevitably take the batteries over a canal bridge and through narrow -winding streets before they could reach Blangy. Whether that bridge -would be intact when the time came and whether the streets would not be -blocked by shell-torn houses remained to be seen; the route was laid -down for the batteries, and that route had to be known by all ranks. - -On Wednesday, April 4th, began the bombardment proper, the five-day -bombardment which was to precede the launching of the Spring offensive. -In secret orders it was known as "V" day, the succeeding days being -designated "W," "X," "Y" and "Z"—"Z" representing zero. From this it -will be seen that originally April 8th was fixed for the attack; on the -6th, however, orders were received that between "X" and "Y" days there -should be a "Q" day, for the attack was postponed for twenty-four hours -and it was necessary that the code system should be continued. Each day -had its own special programme with targets, rates of fire and hours of -bombardment fixed. One day was devoted to the destruction of all woods, -another to trench-junctions, a third to villages and cross-roads, and so -on; the enemy front and support line and his wire were at the same time -kept under continual bombardment by day and night, and every night -prolonged gas-shelling of known and suspected battery positions was -carried out. - -The "village" day was a wonderful sight; all around behind the enemy -lines great clouds of smoke and brick-dust hung heavily, in which every -now and then further explosions took place. From Tilloy on the -right—handed over to the mercies of a 15 in. howitzer—from Athies, -Feuchy, Fampoux and numberless others these mighty columns of -destruction could be seen rising, and the casualties amongst the enemy -in the villages, which until now had been left more or less untouched, -must have been tremendous. The enemy retaliation was not heavy; in fact, -its weakness gave rise to the rumour that he, knowing what was coming, -had filled his trenches with wire and had retired to a rear position. -Patrols, however, proved the falsity of this, as did also the harassing -fire which was intermittently directed upon the 33rd Divisional -batteries, and which, although not heavy, was sufficient to cause -casualties and give rise to great worry lest some of the vast piles of -ammunition in the positions should be exploded. - -Gradually the day of attack—now definitely fixed for the 9th—drew near. -On the 5th the last armoured telephone cable was laid to the batteries -through the wonderful sewers of Arras, those sewers which, converted -into underground passages and lit with electric light, acted as routes -to the front line and afforded underground shelter for all the reserve -troops when the attack was launched. On the 8th the wagon-lines were -advanced from Duisans to a position just west of Arras; on the 8th also -took place the final reconnaissance of the routes forward which were -carefully marked out with flags—one colour for infantry, another for -guns and a third for cavalry. On the evening of the 8th tanks, lumbering -across country, passed the batteries en route for their position of -assembly, and early on the morning of Easter Monday, April 9th, the -tired detachments, after shelling the enemy battery positions with gas -all night long, set dial sight and range drum for the opening rounds of -the barrage. Huddled under shelter of the gun shields from the cold -drizzle which was falling, they peered out through the gradually -thinning darkness, listening for the blast of the whistle which would -herald the opening burst. All around hung a strange silence; in every -battery position sights were being set and checked, ammunition prepared, -the last necessary arrangements made. In every gun pit along the whole -of that long front Nos. 1 stood waiting for the signal which would turn -the countryside into a roaring volcano. - -Sharp to the second at 5.30 A.M. the thin blast of countless whistles -cut the air, long sheets of orange flame stabbed the darkness, and with -a roar and a crash the hundreds of guns burst out, lighting up the -countryside, drowning all other sound and putting down a furious barrage -to protect the infantry who, at the same moment, advanced in long lines -to the assault. Standing in the eastern outskirts of St. Nicholas, the -scene was wonderful. Dark night was of a sudden converted into day by -the flashes of countless guns; with a vast eruption the mine prepared -under the enemy trenches opposite Blangy flung skywards what once had -been solid ground, while to the flashes and tumult were now added -countless rockets and Very lights, fired despairingly by the enemy when -he realised that the expected attack had indeed been launched. At the -same time the ominous rattle and clatter of machine-guns broke out with -increasing intensity as the enemy strove to avoid the hand-to-hand -fighting which, above all others, he dreaded the most. - -The front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery ran southwards from -the river Scarpe and was assaulted by the 44th and 45th Infantry -Brigades of the 15th Division. To the right of this Division the 12th -and 3rd were advancing to the assault, while the left of the 15th -Division kept in touch with the attacking troops of the 9th to the north -of the Scarpe. The 15th Division formed part of the VI. Corps, with the -VII. Corps on the right and the XVII. on the left. The attacking troops -of the 15th Division were faced by the 10th Grenadier Regiment of the -11th German Division, and it was estimated that six German battalions -were in the actual front line between the river Scarpe and the village -of Tilloy. - -The first objective to be taken was the German forward system, and this -was quickly overrun, our troops capturing many prisoners and -establishing themselves along the so-called "Black Line" as arranged, -which ran from the Scarpe, through Fred's Wood and southwards to Tilloy. -Here they halted for a space while our protective barrage roared over -their heads, and then at 7.30 A.M., the scheduled time, they advanced -once more with their ranks reorganised to assault the German Second -Line, known as the "Blue Line," which ran down between the Railway -Triangle and Watery Wood, and was continued along Observatory Ridge to -the Cambrai Road. This line was known to be more strongly held than the -first objective, and here it was feared that our troops would be held -up, for there were many formidable obstacles, such as the Railway -Triangle, to be overcome before the objectives could be secured. - -As events turned out, these expectations were in part realised. When the -infantry went over the top at the beginning of the day a subaltern from -each of the artillery brigades accompanied the foremost assaulting line, -while a Captain from the same brigades was attached to each battalion -headquarters. In addition to this, from every battery of the 33rd -Divisional Artillery one subaltern was sent with the attacking troops, -to advance with them and to act as a duplicate source of information -with the other F.O.O.'s; as all these officers were accompanied by -telephonists, signallers and linesmen it was expected that at least some -of them would be able to keep their telephone lines uncut, and would -thereby be able to supply first-hand information of the immediate -tactical situation. It was from this source that information now -arrived. - -The Railway Triangle just south of the river had proved, as was -expected, the first serious obstacle to the 15th Division. Here stiff -opposition was met, for the enemy machine gunners in their dug-outs in -the embankment escaped unscathed from the barrage, and succeeded in -bringing heavy fire to bear upon the attacking troops before the latter -were able to get to grips with them. What followed was one of the -inevitable results of a creeping barrage, but also gave occasion for a -very fine feat of arms on the part of the batteries. The barrage -automatically crept on towards the German second line, leaving the -infantry, held up by machine-gun fire, farther and farther behind it. -The forward observing officers, however, seeing the crisis which had -arisen, got news back to the batteries; urgent orders were sent to all -the guns concerned, and the barrage, moving away towards Feuchy, -suddenly halted and returned to the Railway Triangle. Back it came to -drop mightily, inexorably upon the embankment itself, pounding and -blasting away at the hostile machine gunners who had been the cause of -all the trouble, until at a given moment, hastily arranged with the -infantry, it lifted and crept forward again, and the programme from -there onwards was continued once more. As a result of the operation the -capture of this very important strategical position was effected at the -second assault with the loss by our infantry of only three men wounded; -every living soul on the embankment had been wiped out by the second -visit of the barrage, and the advance was resumed unchecked! It was a -very fine example of the tactical handling of guns, and fully deserved -the long accounts given of it in the newspapers two days later. - -[Illustration: - - Scale 1:40,000. -] - -With the fall of the Railway Triangle the German second line was quickly -captured, and here, on the immediate front covered by the 33rd -Divisional Artillery, the weary men of the 44th and 45th Infantry -Brigades halted. The assault upon the third German line, the "Brown -Line," had been entrusted to the 46th Infantry Brigade who, during the -attack on the first two systems of defence, had issued forth from the -cellars and sewers of Arras into a position of assembly in the German -front line, and this brigade now advanced to the attack. - -As soon as the German second system had fallen, the batteries began to -advance so as to keep touch with the infantry. The delay occasioned by -the holding up of the latter at the Railway Triangle had until now -rendered any move of the guns impossible, for it was essential that -every piece should be brought to bear upon the obstacle which was -stopping the progress of the infantry. Now, however, the move forward -began; one section at a time, the guns advanced to the positions already -prepared for them in Blangy just behind our original front line, battery -commanders going forward to register the guns immediately the trails -were dropped. As soon as the first sections were registered and in -action, the second sections began to advance; directly they were in -action and firing, the third sections joined them, and thus every -battery maintained four guns in action throughout the move forward, and -was able to keep a barrage in front of the infantry who now, in the -afternoon, were advancing to the assault on the German third line. - -Strange to relate, the advance of the batteries, which of necessity was -carried out through the outskirts of Arras, was not greatly hampered by -shell fire. It was generally anticipated that the enemy would bombard -the eastern exits of the town as soon as ever the attack was launched, -for he must have known that troops would be issuing forth from there, -and, as the route of the batteries lay over a bridge and through some -very narrow streets, it was fully expected that casualties would be -suffered in this operation. It was therefore with a feeling of relief -that battery commanders saw the whole of their batteries in action in -the new positions around the eastern edge of Blangy, bombarding -throughout the afternoon the defences between Orange Hill and the river -Scarpe. - -Throughout that afternoon it did indeed seem as though British arms were -winning the day. All around troops appeared to be pressing forward; up -the road from Arras there suddenly came squadron after squadron of -cavalry which wheeled into a big field in Blangy, dismounted, halted for -a space while reconnoitring parties pushed on ahead, then mounted and -pressed away on over the captured ground for some advanced objective. -Long columns of infantry, transport, ammunition columns and all the -necessary material of war poured steadily out of Arras and moved on ever -towards the east, until it seemed as though the whole of the front were -pushing forward. The batteries in Blangy, firing though they were upon -the enemy as hard as they could, felt somehow that they were being left -behind, and longed to receive the order to limber up and join more -closely in the pursuit which was now going on. - -Orders were not long in coming for the 162nd Brigade at any rate. -Leaving the other brigade still in action around the eastern outskirts -of Arras, it threw forward reconnoitring detachments in the middle -afternoon, and by evening had begun to advance to new positions—the -third occupied that day—around the Railway Triangle which, a few hours -before, had been the scene of such close infantry fighting. All day it -had been raining on and off; now it started to snow, and for the -batteries of the 162nd Brigade there began a night of real -heart-breaking work. - -Ground which has been barraged, captured and counter-barraged a few -hours previously, rained upon all day, trampled by cavalry and countless -advancing reserves; ground which consists of shell-torn earth hastily -shovelled down by a pioneer battalion to make a rough track, and carried -over trenches by arched wooden bridges or not at all; ground of this -nature churned up into deep sticky mud is, for tired horses and men, a -difficult obstacle over which to drag guns and ammunition on a rapidly -darkening night. Yet it had to be done; the infantry were thought to be -still advancing, and unless they were covered by the guns they must, -sooner or later, meet with disaster. All that evening the four batteries -of the brigade struggled and fought their way through the rapidly -increasing throng on the track; pushed their way past the inevitable -broken-down wagons they met; manhandled each gun in turn through and -over trenches which were not bridged, and ultimately, soaked with mud -and perspiration, utterly worn out but victoriously aware of the fact -that they were still the most advanced batteries and that there were -none ahead of them, they arrived at the Railway Triangle and dropped -into action, A/162 on the eastern side of the embankment, "B," "C" and -"D" on the western. Here they remained throughout the night of the -9th/10th waiting for daylight to come for the advance to be resumed. - -Thus ended the first day of the great Spring offensive. The infantry, -pushing on all the evening towards the German third line, had -established posts on the northern slopes of Orange Hill (N.W. of -Monchy); the guns were still keeping touch with them despite the -rapidity of the advance and the appalling weather conditions; many -prisoners and guns had been taken, a considerable number of the enemy -lay dead on the captured ground, and nothing, so far, seemed to be -holding up the advance of our troops. - -On the morning of Tuesday, the 10th, the infantry occupied the remainder -of Orange Hill. They had, in the first day of battle, engaged in very -heavy fighting; they had made a rapid advance and now, tired out, were -unwilling to continue until all the batteries were not only in a -position to give them close support, but were in better communication -with them. For this purpose the 156th Brigade advanced up to the Railway -Triangle, while the 162nd pushed forward once again, this time bound for -positions on the western slopes of Orange Hill. - -Fortunately there was very little fighting during the 10th; the infantry -were busy consolidating, reorganising themselves and carrying out -reliefs, and therefore it was possible to spend the day in getting all -the guns well forward, replenishing ammunition and making arrangements -for thorough support of the infantry in their next advance. - -It was well that the whole of the day was available for this, or rather -it was inevitable that it should be. So fearful was the mud east of the -Railway Triangle, where the Scarpe had helped the rain and snow to form -a bog, that the batteries had to make their way across country to the -outskirts of Arras once again, and, crossing the railway, worked up -towards Monchy along the Cambrai road. The congestion was terrible -everywhere, and movement along the road, which was double-banked by -traffic in both directions, proved maddeningly slow. Not till the early -morning of the 11th did the batteries arrive in their new positions -after a night of bogging and digging-out guns, of marching along chaotic -roads, of urging tired men and tired horses to further work; but now, -grouped on both sides of the road which ran from Feuchy to Feuchy Chapel -cross-roads on the Arras-Cambrai road, they were right up close behind -the advancing infantry on the western slopes of Orange Hill itself, and -were in the best of positions for observation and close artillery -support. - -On Wednesday, the 11th, the battle broke out again. The 37th Division, -who had been in reserve hitherto, took up the attack and assaulted -Monchy-le-Preux from the north; at the same time the cavalry advanced on -the village from Orange Hill, and after severe fighting Monchy was -captured. This cavalry action was much criticized at a later date; it -was an attempt to get through a supposed gap in the enemy line, and -consisted of a mounted advance across some seven hundred yards of -perfectly smooth and open ground dipping slightly and then rising again. -In this advance fairly heavy casualties were suffered both from machine -gun and shell fire—the latter being mainly time high-explosive burst the -height of a man's head in the saddle—and the operation ended in a -dismounted action around Monchy; it certainly proved a valuable -distraction from the 37th Division attacking on foot, and, had not the -cavalry put their horses in the village itself when they adopted -dismounted action, it is probable that their losses would not have been -so severe. While this operation, which advanced our line four hundred -yards east of Monchy and up to the river Scarpe, was in progress, the -flanks also tried to advance, but were held up and were forced to return -to the trenches they had left. - -During the 11th the 156th Brigade came on from the Railway Triangle and -dropped into action slightly to the north of the 162nd Brigade, and -between it and Feuchy. At the same time the wagon-lines of the brigades -were brought forward and were kept right up close (in the case of the -162nd Brigade, 500 yards) behind the battery positions, for it was -expected that the advance would soon be resumed. Although the Army on -the right, which had captured Bullecourt and Riencourt, had been driven -out again to its original positions, the Army on the left had taken and -held the Vimy Ridge, and it seemed that, with the fall of this important -feature, further progress must very soon be made. - -Now, however, the advance, which for three days had been so brilliant, -began to be checked. On April 12th the 29th Division on the right and -the 9th on the left tried to advance their line, but were beaten back. -Hostile artillery, so comparatively silent since the 9th, began to show -increasing activity in barraging our troops and in carrying out -counter-battery work. It was manifest that the enemy, after two days of -disaster, was pulling himself together, and after losing the majority of -his artillery on April 9th and 10th, had now rushed up fresh guns to -stiffen the support of the front. - -This opinion was strengthened on the 13th, when every battery and -wagon-line was heavily shelled, the enemy fire being directed not upon -any particular unit, but in a great shell storm over different areas in -which the guns and horses were congregated. It was clear that a -determined resistance was going to be offered to any further attack, and -accordingly the order was circulated that on this part of the front the -line should be held until the flanks had made further progress. Since -this course removed the possibility of any sudden need of teams for a -quick advance, the wagon-lines were ordered to return immediately to the -eastern outskirts of Arras, only a small number of animals for pack-work -being maintained by each battery in forward wagon-lines at the Railway -Triangle. With a sigh of relief battery commanders saw their teams wind -their way down Battery Valley to Arras again; the neighbourhood of -Orange Hill was no place for horses. - -The wisdom of thus removing the horses was very soon put beyond all -manner of doubt. All through the early morning and day of the 14th the -batteries were heavily bombarded with gas shell and high explosive, -especially heavy punishment descending upon the area where the horses -had been. Serious casualties would inevitably have been suffered if they -had remained there, but as matters stood the only casualties sustained -were those in the gun positions themselves, and even these did not -prevent the batteries from opening a smashing fire upon the enemy when -in the evening he delivered a violent counter-attack upon Monchy, a -counter-attack which was broken up under our fire, melted away and -failed completely. - -The batteries now settled down to what was to be temporarily a "holding" -job, and from the 12th until the 23rd nothing more than the usual -harassing fire and registration was carried out. The brigades were -placed under the administration of the 17th Divisional Artillery and -were ordered to dig themselves in, for heavy casualties had of late been -suffered amongst the detachments, and it was vital that no more wastage -should occur. Digging in was, in the present surroundings, extremely -difficult; two feet below the surface thick solid chalk was met with, -and every shovelful thrown up offered an unmistakable mark to the keen -eyes of the enemy aeroplanes which were now actively patrolling the -front. Not to dig in meant casualties from the usual shell-fire to which -the batteries were inevitably subjected; digging in meant increased -safety for the men but also, despite the fullest use of camouflage, the -attracting of further bombardment by the enemy. Surely a choice between -the devil and the deep sea! - -In front of the batteries, on the forward slopes of Orange Hill and in -Monchy, excellent O.P.'s were obtainable and were made full use of. The -weather—hitherto bitterly cold with snow and icy blizzards—began to -improve, and visibility got consequently better. Greenland Hill, Roeux, -the Chemical Works and the Scarpe were clear targets on the left, while -on the right Pelves Mill on the cross-roads, with the ruins of the -little cottage beneath it, showed up clearly as a datum line for the -enemy trench system south of the river. Jigsaw Wood, Hatchet Wood and -Bois du Sars, all on the sky-line, blocked further view, but sufficient -was visible west of them to enable accurate registration to be carried -out on all the enemy forward zone; his actual fire trench could always -be observed from our own front line or even, in the case of the trenches -near the river, from the commanding slopes of Orange Hill. - -On Monday, April 23rd, a fresh attack was made by the 17th Division, -with the 29th and 15th on the right and the 51st on the left, the -objectives on the batteries' zone being Bayonet Trench north-east of -Monchy, together with a small enemy salient which had been formed on -this part of the front. Three attacks in all were made, and all failed; -enfilade machine-gun fire from Roeux and from both sides of the river -cut down our men, and eventually the operation had to be called off. On -the 24th the attack was renewed and this time slight progress was made, -but no advance of any account was effected and the losses amongst our -troops were enormous. The battle was indeed becoming costly, and the -gunners, as well as the infantry, were showing the effects of it. Every -day the usual harassing fire took its toll of the detachments, and on -the days when heavy bombardments were carried out on the battery -positions (as on the 22nd when B/162 lost Major Benett-Stanford and -Captain Body wounded, with two out of the three subalterns, Bostock and -Neate, killed) numbers were cut down to an alarming minimum. - -On April 28th the battle was again resumed on a grand scale. The 12th -Division assaulted on the front of the batteries, this time with the 3rd -Division on the right and the 34th on the left; at 4.25 A.M. the -infantry attack was launched under cover of a very heavy artillery -barrage, the objectives being those portions of Bayonet and Rifle -trenches which still lay in the hands of the enemy. Three minutes after -the attack began the enemy put down a light barrage of 10·5 cm. and 77 -mm. shells, which became heavier on Bayonet Trench itself at about 7.30 -A.M., but generally speaking the hostile artillery fire was slight. In -the main the enemy appeared to depend upon his machine guns to ward off -attacks, and in this he was fairly successful. Mist and smoke shell -rendered observation very difficult, but by six o'clock the objective -was reported to have been gained; from here, however, machine-gun fire -began to tell and, although the right battalion of the brigade covered -by the 33rd Divisional Artillery advanced according to plan, and was -reported to have reached the second objective, the left battalion was -held up by machine guns and could not advance. - -At half-past six in the morning a smoke barrage was put down along the -south bank of the Scarpe to try and help the left battalion, while at -the same time the field howitzers turned on to the troublesome machine -guns. All day long the batteries kept up a protective barrage in front -of the infantry, increasing at times to intense rate when an enemy -counter-attack showed signs of being launched. At 11.30 A.M. the -infantry endeavoured to consolidate their positions under a now heavy -enemy barrage which had been increasing in intensity upon Bayonet Trench -since ten o'clock, but it was of no avail. Heavy machine-gun fire from -across the river Scarpe prevented them from achieving anything, and not -until nightfall was the position clear. - -It was then found that Bayonet Trench had been captured in its entirety, -but that only a portion of Rifle Trench had been wrested from the enemy; -all along the infantry had been greatly impeded by machine-gun fire from -which they suffered heavy casualties. From observation and reports -received it would appear that the enemy had concentrated in considerable -force upon this front, and it was probably due to the work of Forward -Observing Officers from the batteries that the many hostile -counter-attacks attempted had been smashed before they came to fruition. -On the early morning of the 29th the infantry established a line of -posts and generally consolidated the ground captured on the previous -day, but no further gains were possible. A final effort at 3.0 A.M. on -the 30th to capture the remainder of Rifle Trench from the enemy proved -a failure, and the infantry, suffering heavy losses, were forced to -return once more to their trenches. - -Thus ended April, which had opened so brilliantly, and with the arrival -of May a less cheering period was destined to begin. Thursday, May 3rd, -in fact, marked the last great effort which was made to continue the -advance along the whole of the front; on the 1st an unsuccessful attempt -to capture the remainder of Rifle Trench had been tried, but this was -purely a local operation, and on the 3rd all three Armies pulled -themselves together and launched a combined assault stretching from -Arleux-en-Gohelle on the left to east of Bullecourt on the right. On the -immediate front of the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, with -whom were also the 12th Divisional batteries and the VIth Corps Heavy -Artillery, an intense barrage was put down on the enemy front line for -three minutes before zero. At 3.45 A.M. the infantry assaulted, while -the barrage crept on at the rate of thirty-three yards per minute; -intense machine-gun fire was immediately encountered, together with a -heavy barrage which fell upon infantry and gunners alike, but the front -wave of assaulting infantry by keeping close up to our curtain-fire -succeeded in reaching the line Pelves Mill-Gun Trench. Here the -situation became very obscure; owing to the fact that zero hour had been -fixed for an hour of darkness, all communication between the front and -succeeding waves was lost, while a heavy machine-gun barrage put down by -the enemy prevented our second wave from getting beyond Scabbard Trench. -At ten o'clock a party of Germans entered Scabbard Trench and bombed our -men out as far as the junction with New Trench, with the result that the -infantry forming the first wave were left entirely cut off. - -All this time the 18-pdrs. had been keeping up a protective barrage -beyond the first objective, in the hopes of saving such of the leading -troops as had got there. At 12.10 P.M. a new bombardment was organised -and two hours later a fresh attack was launched, this time under a very -novel barrage. The enemy, strongly dug in in Scabbard Trench, could not -be reached by the flat trajectory of the 18-pdrs., and accordingly it -was decided to organise a creeping barrage of 4·5 in. howitzers. For a -quarter of an hour four batteries of field howitzers poured high -explosive into Scabbard Trench, our own men lying not only close up to -the trench but also all round it, and at 2.10 P.M. the howitzers lifted -off and ceased firing, whereupon the infantry, keeping close to the -barrage, rushed the trench. It was a desperate measure, this howitzer -barrage, for it was like firing into the centre of a circle with our own -men all round, and, with the infantry lying right up to and following so -closely on the heels of the barrage, it seemed inevitable that a few -rounds should fall short—and only a few short rounds of 4·5 in. H.E. are -sufficient to do inestimable havoc and wreck the confidence of attacking -troops. Like many desperate measures, however, it succeeded; some fifty -Germans, unable to stand the appalling weight of fire (about 80 rounds -of H.E. per minute in a confined space), fled from Scabbard Trench and -rushed down the bank running east towards Pelves Mill, while -simultaneously a party of about one hundred of the enemy left the same -bank and made for the cross-roads just west of the mill. Immediately -they broke cover the 18-pdrs. switched on to the parties with excellent -results, and two companies of the 17th Royal Sussex Regiment, profiting -by the distraction, rushed Scabbard Trench in its entirety; this they -captured almost without casualties, and found seventy dead Germans, the -victims of the howitzer bombardment. - -The enemy now opened a furious bombardment upon Scabbard Trench, -realising that it had at last fallen, and at 2.20 P.M. launched a heavy -counter-attack which was beaten off after hand-to-hand fighting, in -which we captured one officer, twenty-five men and two machine guns. All -the afternoon the batteries were busy on various targets, especially -upon enemy infantry who kept massing behind Keeling Copse and running in -small batches to Cartridge Trench. At the same time a good view of the -hostile counter-attacks on Greenland Hill, north of the Scarpe, was -obtained, and on several occasions the guns were switched round to the -left and dealt smashing blows to the enemy every time he attempted to -leave his trenches. - -The total result of the battle was that on the extreme right the 5th -Army advanced beyond Bullecourt, but was forced back again by the enemy -who reoccupied the village; around Cherisy all objectives were gained, -but here again the enemy counter-attacked and drove out our troops; on -the immediate front of the batteries a partial success with enormous -loss of life was obtained; on the north of the river the attack on Roeux -failed also, and only on the extreme left was any real success achieved. -Here the 1st Army took Fresnoy and all the objectives north of Oppy. -Oppy itself, however, proved too difficult for the attacking troops, nor -were any of the objectives between it and the river captured. In short, -the attack began well, almost brilliantly, but finished badly; it was -not a defeat—the operations north of Oppy saved it from being called -that—but it was at least a partial failure which had cost many thousands -of lives. - -May, then, did not begin very well, and, after spending the whole of the -4th in consolidating the ground of the previous day's battle, a lull set -in—a lull which was not broken until the 11th. At 7.30 P.M. on that day -the 4th Division just north of the river carried out an attack upon -Roeux Chemical Works and Cemetery, the 33rd Divisional Artillery -supporting the operation on the flank. Covered by a barrage, the density -of which was one 18-pdr. for every seven yards of front, the infantry -rushed all the objectives and held them, together with 300 prisoners; to -this gain was added a further advance along the river's edge at 6.0 A.M. -next morning, which was covered by a barrage put down on the -north-western end of Roeux, and by midday on the 12th the infantry were -secure in their newly-won positions. The ominous Chemical Works, from -which such deadly machine-gun fire had been directed on our attacks -south of the river, was now in our hands, and there seemed every chance -of an advance being possible on the front of the batteries. - -Orders for this advance were not long in coming. At 6.45 P.M. on that -same evening (12th) the 12th Division, which was covered by the 33rd -Divisional batteries, advanced to the assault on Devil's Trench, while -the 3rd Division prolonged the attack to the right. After a three-minute -bombardment with a density of one 18-pdr. to every ten yards of front, -the 36th and 37th infantry brigades advanced upon the portion of Devil's -Trench which ran northwards from Bit Lane to Harness Lane. -Simultaneously with the attack, however, very heavy rifle and -machine-gun fire was opened by the enemy from both flanks—Gun and Devil -Trenches—which were held in force, and fifty yards short of the trench -our infantry were stopped, unable to advance any farther. Lieut. -Wingfield, the forward observing officer of the 156th Brigade who was -with the attacking company commander, got through to the guns and -reported that the infantry intended to assault again at 10.45 P.M. -Accordingly, for fifteen minutes prior to that time the batteries put -down a heavy barrage and then lifted on to the enemy support trenches. -Close on the heels of the barrage the infantry rose to the attack, but -circumstances were against them; darkness supervened everywhere, the -infantry were scattered all over the place owing to the non-success of -the first attempt, and Devil's Trench was only assaulted here and there. -By midnight it was reported that the remnants of the attacking company -were back in their own original front line again. The operation had -failed completely. - -The operations of May 3rd, costly enough by themselves, had now been -followed by the two attacks on the 11th and 12th, and so heavy were the -casualties amongst the infantry that, for a time at any rate, the -infantry battle was broken off, and to the guns was given the task of -wearing down the enemy and of destroying his morale. This new period was -ushered in on the 14th by a Chinese bombardment of the enemy trenches; a -bombardment, that is to say, which bore all the signs of a barrage -covering assaulting troops but which, in reality, crept forward -unfollowed by any infantry, and then dropped back suddenly on to the -hostile fire-trench to catch such of the enemy as had manned the parapet -to meet the expected assault. In this case our guns pounded Devil's -Trench for a short time, and then crept on by lifts of one hundred yards -every minute. After three lifts the barrage suddenly dropped without -warning on to the fire-trench again and blasted it with high explosives -and shrapnel, while the Division on the left swept the area with -enfilade machine-gun fire. No movement was seen, but the enemy doubtless -expected that another attack on Devil's Trench was being launched and -would therefore have manned the parapet; if he did so, his losses must -have been severe. - -Having thus attacked his forward infantry, the guns now turned their -attention to enemy ration parties and back areas. Every night, for the -past week or so, a part of the night firing programme (which was carried -out every night by each battery mainly on back areas) had been to keep -up intermittent shell fire upon the road running east from Pelves -towards Hamblain. Aeroplane photographs now received, however, showed -tracks running parallel to this road and about 150 yards south of it, -tracks which became clearer every day. It was manifest that the enemy -had given up using the road and was cutting across country; on the night -of the 15th, therefore, the guns directed their fire in intermittent -bursts on to the original road up till 9.0 P.M., and then at that hour, -by which time all traffic would have been diverted on to the -cross-country tracks, swept up and down those tracks with H.E. and -shrapnel for ten minutes at an intense rate of fire. That this fire was -effective in its object was clearly proved next day, when the enemy -retaliated strongly upon our own lines of communication—sure sign that -we had done something seriously to annoy him. - -The batteries now began to have a bad time. Free from infantry attacks -and suffering most of his casualties from the guns, the enemy turned the -full fury of his attention upon the gunners. "B" and C/162 were engaged -by a 5·9 in. high velocity gun, their positions being badly damaged; -D/162 was registered by an enemy aeroplane which carried out an all-day -bombardment upon it in co-operation with an 8 in. howitzer battery. Both -brigades suffered severely from bombardment by 5·9 in. howitzers, while -a couple of whizz-bang batteries devoted themselves to putting -intermittent bursts and sniping rounds into all the battery positions, -and especially those of the 156th Brigade, causing many casualties by -the unexpectedness of their attacks. As a rule, in fact, these sudden -bursts did far more damage to personnel than the long all-day -bombardments, and it was just such a burst which killed Captain Heape of -A/162 and so wounded Lieut. Tucker that he died next day—a loss -grievously felt, for both officers were of the very finest type which -the brigade contained. From day to day each battery in turn underwent a -severe shelling, and the casualties in men and guns mounted, ever -mounted. - -On May 16th the lull in infantry fighting was broken, this time by the -enemy. After bombarding our front trenches immediately north of the -Scarpe, together with the village of Feuchy and the back areas in -general, during the whole of the 15th, a big hostile attack was launched -at 3.0 A.M. on the 16th and drove our troops out of Roeux Cemetery and -Chemical Works. By 7.30 A.M. we had counter-attacked and recaptured the -lost ground, and at 9.50 A.M. a hostile counter-attack was driven off. -Shortly after ten o'clock our men were seen advancing north-west from -the Chemical Works, but a furious hostile barrage was put down on them -and they were forced to retire. All day long the batteries poured shell -into Roeux and the adjoining trenches, and all day long fighting -continued; by evening the situation had calmed down, and little change -showed itself on the front as a result of the twenty-four hours' -fighting. It was clear, however, that the enemy was not only going to -offer a stubborn resistance but was even assuming an offensive attitude -in places, and a bitter struggle was anticipated when orders were -received for another attack on Devil's Trench. - -On the 19th our troops were once again flung upon this deadly little -objective—flung, as they had so often been before, on a narrow limited -front with the knowledge that flank machine-gun fire must inevitably be -met with. - -Major Colfox (D/162) had, on the previous night, run a forward gun right -up to Chinstrap Lane, twelve hundred yards west of Roeux, and had -registered it over open sights in the early morning, in the hope that -enfilade fire from here might assist the infantry in their oft-tried -task. Under a heavy barrage the infantry rushed to grips with the enemy, -but no sooner had our guns started than the enemy opened a heavy -concentrated machine-gun fire all along the front, while his guns put -down a dense barrage within thirty seconds of the beginning of the -attack. A footing was gained in the part of Tool Trench still held by -the enemy, but strong bombing attacks were delivered from both flanks, -and our troops under the pressure of these attacks were forced to -withdraw. Devil's Trench once more had proved a death-trap. - -This venture was followed up at 11.30 P.M. on May 30th by an assault on -Hook and Tool Trenches, but the attack only added one more item to the -now growing list of local failures. Our troops were evidently seen -leaving their trenches, and this enabled the enemy to open heavy -machine-gun and artillery fire on them. In spite of this, and of the mud -and water caused by a thunderstorm during the afternoon, the attacking -troops reached their objectives, but so heavy had been the casualties -suffered whilst crossing No Man's Land that the remnants were not strong -enough to deal with the garrison of the trench. Most of the attackers -were driven out by a counter-attack following immediately on the -assault, but a party of the Manchester Regiment established itself in -Hook Trench and managed to hold on till noon next day. The guns poured -shell over their heads and put down barrage after barrage for their -protection, but it was of no avail. Shortly after midday a superior -force of the enemy counter-attacked with fury, and this gallant little -party was overcome. - -The advent of June brought with it a further succession of local -attacks—efforts to straighten our line, to remove important points held -by the enemy and generally to improve our tactical position. It was -evident, from the non-success of the French offensive in the south, that -no more operations on a large scale would be carried out here, but it -was also clear that Higher Command had decided in its mind that our line -must embrace certain tactical features now in the hands of the enemy, -and to this end further local undertakings had to be effected. Following -on two Chinese bombardments on June 3rd and 4th, in which the 33rd -Divisional Artillery took part to the south of the river, the 9th -Division carried out a short and successful attack around Greenland Hill -on the night of the 5th, and consolidated all its gains. Soon -afterwards, on the 13th, a very successful attack upon Hook and Long -Trenches was made by the 76th Infantry Brigade. During the previous week -a systematic bombardment had been carried out night and day upon the -enemy defences to obliterate his trenches and to weaken his morale. Each -day, however, there had been no firing between 5.0 A.M. and 9.0 A.M., -and the enemy had grown accustomed to a period of quiet at this time. -When, therefore, the infantry rushed across at 7.20 A.M., our barrage -not starting till 7.21 by which time they were in the hostile trenches, -they caught the enemy quite unprepared and showing little resistance. -All gains were held and, under cover of a protective barrage, the ground -was consolidated. - -At 7.15 A.M. next day (14th) a further attack under cover of a barrage -resulted in the capture of Infantry Hill by our troops, and the morale -of the latter, somewhat shaken by the continued reverses at Roeux and -Devil's Trench during the previous weeks, began now to rise again to the -pitch of confidence and assuredness so badly needed. So greatly did it -improve, in fact, that when the enemy counter-attacked at 2.15 A.M. on -the 16th, in an endeavour to regain Infantry Hill, he was severely -punished and beaten off—except for the loss of two southern posts in -front of Long Trench—despite the fact that the attack had been delivered -with a strength of some seven hundred bayonets under cover of an intense -artillery bombardment. A second hostile attempt at 2.30 A.M. on the -17th, although preceded by a two-hour bombardment, only resulted in our -losing a small portion of Long Trench, and it now seemed as though -Infantry Hill were securely in our hands. - -Just prior to these attacks the 33rd Divisional Artillery had received -orders to move out to the wagon-lines and to take over part of the line -further south. The enemy's attitude, however, appeared threatening, and -accordingly the departure of the batteries was postponed until the -activity had died down. By June 20th all appeared to be quiet, and at -6.0 P.M., after twelve weeks of continuous battle on this front, the -march to the wagon-lines was effected. Taking their guns with them, the -batteries topped the ridge west of Battery Valley and marched back to -the peace and rest of Arras once more. - -The three months' fighting in this offensive had marked a brilliant -chapter in the doings of the 33rd Divisional batteries. Under all -conditions, in blizzards, in snow and mud, under intense shell-fire from -the enemy they had maintained their reputation for straight shooting and -complete reliability; moreover, and this was above all the most valued, -they had won the entire confidence of the infantry. When the 3rd -Division, which had carried out the operations of June 14th-19th under -cover of the guns of 33rd Divisional Artillery, was withdrawn from the -line, its G.O.C. Major-General Deverell wrote to General Stewart and -asked that the personal thanks of the infantry might be conveyed to the -batteries. "We wish them" he concluded in his letter, "all good fortune -in the future and hope that we may again fight together with that close -co-operation which has been so conspicuously marked whilst we have been -together." High praise, that, and praise dearly won, for there were many -gaps in the ranks as the brigades turned westwards. On each and every -battery the offensive had left a heavy mark, and the faces of new -arrivals bore witness to the many blanks which had had to be filled, but -the greatest loss which the Divisional Artillery as a whole had suffered -was borne especially by the 162nd Brigade. On May 23rd Lieut.-Colonel O. -M. Harris was carried away on a stretcher in the advanced stages of -para-typhoid. To the officers and men of his brigade his name seemed -inextricably interwoven with the brigade itself, for he had "made" it, -working it up from its early raw stage at La Bassée to the fine fighting -instrument it now was. With his going a certain gloom fell upon the -brigade, for all ranks realised that they had lost not only a very -gallant leader but a very true friend. - -Before he left, however, Colonel Harris had one great satisfaction. -Throughout the battle of Arras the 162nd Brigade had made it its object -always to be the furthest forward, always to be the nearest to the -infantry. Its batteries were the first across No Man's Land on April -9th, the first to advance as each enemy line fell, the closest up behind -the infantry throughout the operations, and early in May this -achievement was officially recognised. There came one day from -Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig a message saying that a captured German -5·9 in. howitzer would be presented to the 162nd Brigade in recognition -of the work it had carried out during the advance, and of the very fine -manner in which it had on all occasions pushed up so close behind the -infantry. Such a distinction has rarely, if ever before, been conferred -upon a brigade of artillery, and to its commanding officer was due a -full measure of praise in that he had worked it up to a pitch of -efficiency which made such deeds possible. - - * * * * * - -One night the brigades spent in their wagon-lines at Arras, and early on -the morning of the 21st they hooked in and moved off through Beaurains -down the long road which led to Bapaume, to pit their strength this time -against the fortifications of the Hindenburg Line. - - - - - CHAPTER VII. - THE HINDENBURG LINE AND THE OPERATIONS ON THE COAST. - (JUNE-AUGUST 1917). - - -When the batteries marched back to the wagon-lines on June 20th they -knew that they were to set off next day to go into action immediately on -another portion of the front, but their actual destination remained -somewhat of a mystery. There was a rumour that they were going a -considerable distance northwards, even to the Coast it was suggested, -and therefore, when they set out in a southerly direction on the morning -of the 21st, a certain amount of surprise prevailed amongst the rank and -file. Southwards they headed, passing through Beaurains along the great -road running down to Bapaume, and gradually they penetrated more and -more deeply into the wilderness created by the enemy when he retreated -to the Hindenburg Line in February and early March. - -As events turned out, the march was to be a short one. After leaving the -Bapaume road a few miles south of Arras, wagon-lines were established -around Hamelincourt, Boyelles and Boiry St. Rictrude in the VII. Corps -area, and one section per battery moved up into action the very same -afternoon; the march had represented nothing more than a sideslip of -some three miles to the right, but even this short distance brought the -batteries into totally different surroundings. They were now moving -through the country over which the enemy right had retired in his -withdrawal earlier in the year, and on all sides they saw proof positive -of the stories of destruction which had been related to them. Every -tree, every bush, even the slender apple trees lay cut down and -destroyed; roads had been blown up, houses demolished, and the country -had the appearance of a great wilderness with every natural feature -shaved off as though by a giant razor. The Bapaume road, no longer a -stately route bordered by trees, lay like a piece of tape across the -naked ground; houses gaped and tottered, blown up not by the shells of -the pursuing army but by the prearranged handiwork of the retreating -foe. It was a case of wanton destruction, wrath vented upon the -countryside by a bitter and chagrined enemy, and, although it has been -suggested that all this work was carried out in order to open the -country for the great and last German drive westwards which was destined -to begin some nine months later, there can be little doubt but that it -was merely a continuance of that policy of frightfulness and destruction -which marked all his doings. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - MAY—AUGUST 1917. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E. - D.S.O. Durie, M.C. Bownass, M.C. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler. - - Adjutant: Capt. B. L. Oxley, M.C. - - Capt. W. G. Sheeres. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major H. McA. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major W. A. T. - Richards, M.C. Studd, M.C. M.C. Barstow, M.C. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel Conolly. - - Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major G. Major H. C. Cory. Major L. Hill. Major W. P. - Fetherston, M.C. Colfox. - - Major W. G. Major Walker, - Pringle. D.S.O. - -Despite this, very fair wagon-lines were obtainable around the ruins of -the villages aforementioned, for the ground was dry and rolling and, -there being no inhabitants in this area of desolation, there were no -restrictions as to the setting up of horse-lines. Quickly the brigades -settled down in their new surroundings, and as quickly the first -sections moved up into action, to be followed next day by the remainder -of the batteries. - -Ever since May 12th General Stewart and his staff had been near -Hamelincourt, controlling the artillery covering the infantry of the -33rd Division in the Bullecourt sector (at that time the 21st and 37th -Divisional Artilleries, together with the 150th, 293rd and 79th Field -Artillery Brigades), and on going into the line now the batteries came -under the administration of the 50th Divisional Artillery. The 156th -Brigade occupied the positions vacated by the 123rd Brigade of the 37th -Division, situated east-south-east of Henin-sur-Cojeul and just west of -the Hindenburg Line. The batteries of the 162nd Brigade were distributed -at first amongst the 82nd, 83rd and 250th Brigade groups; ultimately, on -the 23rd, they were placed under the control of the 250th (C and D/162) -and the 251st (A and B/162) Brigade Groups, and supported the infantry -from positions in Heninel (C/162) and east of Henin, all batteries -except A/162 being just to the left of the 156th Brigade. The front -covered by the brigades was roughly the line running southwards from -Fontaine-lez-Croisilles nearly to Bullecourt. - -This part of the front was of intense interest to the batteries. To -begin with, they were in touch with the infantry of their own Division -for the first time since February; the 162nd Brigade, it is true, was -shooting over the trenches north of that part of the Hindenburg Line -garrisoned by the 19th and 98th Infantry Brigades, but the 156th Brigade -was actually covering the 33rd Divisional Infantry, and to the men there -was a feeling almost of being home once more when they thus found -themselves amongst their own. Added interest, moreover, was gained from -the fact that the much-talked-of Hindenburg Line could here be examined, -for the fall of Monchy had outflanked this part of the system, and the -enemy with much reluctance but of dire necessity had had to retreat from -it, leaving it to be occupied by our troops. - -It was a mighty piece of fortification; in front of the fire-trench were -three thick belts of wire thirty yards apart, each belt some fifteen -yards deep; between the belts, which were so thick that hardly a mouse -could get through them, lay concrete emplacements for machine guns or -trench-mortars, reached from the front line by underground shafts. The -fire-trench itself, about twelve feet in depth, contained concrete -pill-boxes at every turn and on every tactical point, while the -communication trenches running back to the support line were so wired as -to form a defensive flank should any portion of the front be penetrated. -On reaching the support line an exact replica of the fire-trench was met -with; three belts of wire and the accompanying pill-boxes and -machine-gun emplacements lay in front of the trench, but this time a -further feature was added. Throughout the entire length of the -Hindenburg support, from Beaurains right down to Bullecourt, there ran -an underground tunnel seven feet high, three and a half feet wide and -thirty feet below the surface. Shafts ran down to it at intervals of -twenty yards, and to all intents and purposes it formed a vast dug-out -exactly under the parapet of the trench and running beneath it -throughout all the miles of its length. Its existence could only be -proved as far as Bullecourt, for from that point onwards it was held by -the enemy, but doubtless it continued southwards with the Hindenburg -Line itself since, offering as it did a perfect refuge for the garrison, -it formed an integral part of the defences of this great system. For -that portion of the passage which lay in British hands a "Town Major" -even had been appointed, and from him could be obtained so many yards of -the dug-out as the lawful habitation of the unit on the spot! - -The batteries were not slow to get to work here. June 22nd and 23rd were -spent in registration of the zone and in careful study of the front to -be covered. On the 23rd the 156th Brigade bombarded Tunnel Trench at -11.35 A.M. and 7.30 P.M., and at midnight on the 23rd/24th supported an -attack on it by the 19th Infantry Brigade from Lump Lane. The attack -proved unsuccessful, and throughout the 24th the bombardment was -continued, while the 162nd Brigade took up the running on the left in an -attack on York, Bush and Wood Trenches. The 5th E. Yorkshire Regiment -(50th Div.) carried out this assault at 12.30 A.M. on the 26th, and at -first were successful. All the objectives except for the cross-roads -north-west of Fontaine-lez-Croisilles were gained, thirty prisoners were -captured and two hostile counter-attacks driven off. There followed, -however, such a deluge of hostile shell fire that the newly-gained -trenches were entirely demolished, and a large part of the ground gained -had to be relinquished. - -After this outburst the brigades settled themselves down to "artillery -activity," searching for the opposing batteries and shelling all tracks -and approaches to the enemy front line. The two brigades each fired some -six hundred rounds every twenty-four hours on targets of this nature, -and by so doing aroused the ire of the enemy to no small extent. Hostile -counter-battery work increased rapidly in activity, but very few -casualties were suffered. A/162 (Major Pringle) were much damaged by -hostile bombardments on the 22nd and 24th, while Major Richards' guns -(A/156) on July 2nd were so heavily shelled that they had to shift their -position, having lost three sergeants killed and a number of men -wounded. But if the batteries suffered in this manner, at least they -gave as good as they took; nightly activity was more than ever directed -upon the hostile back areas and gun positions rather than upon the -infantry, and to this was added a chemical shell bombardment carried on -throughout the night of the 28th/29th which must have worried the enemy -to a considerable extent, if the weight of his retaliation on the 29th -were to be taken as a guide! - -When the batteries came out of action prior to moving down to this part -of the front a rumour was circulated, as already mentioned, that their -destination was to be the Coast, and surprise prevailed that their route -should take them southwards. Battery commanders were told by their Group -Commanders on arrival, however, that the Cherisy-Fontaine sector was -nothing more than a sorting-area, and that they, like the batteries -before them, would probably remain in action only some ten days or so -before moving elsewhere. Therefore, when orders were received on July -9th to move out of action in a couple of days' time, the news was not -altogether unexpected. The preceding period had been spent in the usual -artillery activity with no infantry action of any sort, but -unfortunately the enemy, by this continued harassing of his battery -positions and roads, had been roused to an extreme pitch of retaliation. -He had of late taken to subjecting the valley from Heninel through St. -Martin-sur-Cojeul down to Henin to a miniature shell storm, and as -certain of the batteries had to utilise this route for their move out it -seemed as though his efforts, hitherto fruitless, might meet for once -with some success. - -As matters turned out, however, the nightly searching took place some -thirty minutes before the batteries moved, and the actual march away was -carried out undisturbed on the night of July 11th/12th. A/162, -nevertheless, and one or two other batteries were very heavily shelled -by 5·9 in. howitzers just as the teams and limbers arrived, and only by -the greatest good fortune, coupled with some very marked gallantry -amongst the men, did the guns get away without serious casualties. - -On arrival at the wagon-lines it was found that no further destination -had been determined, and that here for the present the batteries were to -remain. There was no reason, indeed, for a move to any more distant -area, for the horse-lines here were good and dry, tents had been pitched -to shelter the men, harness "rooms" had been erected while the batteries -were in action, and a very fair degree of comfort offered itself to all -ranks. True, the horse-lines were in view of enemy territory at points, -but they were a long way back—some five miles from the line—and no -trouble from long-range fire was expected; on the other hand the -uninhabited state of the area, due to the destructive march by the -Germans early in the year, offered an excellent training ground for work -of every description. - -Refitting, overhauling and training began immediately after the arrival -of the batteries at their horse-lines. From the 13th to the 15th a -Divisional Artillery scheme with skeleton batteries was carried out -around Adinfer Wood; this was followed by days of battery training, gun -drill, driving and riding drill, battery staff work, training the -detachments to cut gaps through wire entanglements and rush their guns -over trenches, and every conceivable form of preparation for more open -fighting. - -All was not work, however; the weather was glorious and every -opportunity was taken of giving the men a holiday, a rest from fighting -and preparation for fighting, a chance of enjoying themselves. Five or -six jumps were put up near each battery, and the respective wheelers -knocked together gates for exhibition driving; the Divisional band came -down and gave a concert one afternoon, while another half-day was spent -in a cricket match between the two Brigades. Batteries arranged mule -races for their own edification or ran off heats for the forthcoming -sports, and altogether managed to make the time very pleasant. - -As a final flourish, two days were allotted for a Horse Show and sports. -On the 18th the Divisional Artillery Horse Show was held near Boiry St. -Martin, and produced an excellent programme. Events were ushered in by -the somewhat precipitous arrival on the course of a six-in-hand -emanating from D/162; a six-in-hand which, although only hooked in to a -G.S. wagon and consisting of horses quite unused to this form of -equitation, was driven up the course by Major Colfox in true coaching -style, the battery trumpeter rendering weird noises from the back, while -General Stewart's A.D.C. took a prominent seat "to add tone to the -picture!" Followed a series of jumping, driving and "turnout" -competitions, mule races and the like, till at last a very cheerful day -and one producing some fine horses and horsemanship came to an end. -Major Studd won the officers' jumping event. A/156 gathered up many of -the other prizes, and the remainder were scattered amongst all the -batteries. - -Four days later a day was given up to Divisional Artillery Sports, the -programme consisting not only of the usual flat race, jumping and -obstacle items but also of one or two mounted events, and then the -batteries packed their wagons, hooked in the teams and turned their -backs sadly on this pleasant spot. They were off to the war once more, -and rumour had at last been verified—the Coast was their destination. - -The knowledge of this destination had been obtained by the batteries -some time back. As early as July 4th General Stewart and his -Brigade-Major (Major Durie), who had been relieved in the line by the -C.R.A. of the 21st Divisional Artillery three days previously, set out -for XV. Corps Headquarters to attend a conference, and did not return -until the 8th. On the 13th orders had been received for one officer and -fourteen men per battery to move ahead of the main body and report at -headquarters of the 1st Division at Coxyde Bains, to prepare the -positions which the guns were to take up, and with the name of the -destination now disclosed an immediate rush had been made for maps to -discover its locality. "Bains" certainly suggested the Coast, and surely -enough it was ultimately found there—a small village some four miles -west of Nieuport and right on the sea front. It was therefore with the -knowledge of great events impending that the batteries marched off on -July 23rd, glistening in the new paint and added burnish which eleven -days in the rest area had made possible. Authieule and Amplier, both in -the neighbourhood of Doullens, were their destinations that night, and -these they reached in the evening after a march through very fine -country under a glorious sky. - -From 6.0 P.M. and throughout the night of Tuesday, the 24th, the -batteries entrained at Doullens North and South and at Authieule. Eight -horses in each van, guns and wagons lashed to long trucks by French -porters, men crowded into big cattle trucks, they journeyed throughout -the night and early morning past Hazebrouck and Bergues, and finally -arrived in the forenoon of the 25th, the 156th Brigade at Adinkerke, the -162nd Brigade at Dunkirk. A rapid detrainment, water and feed for the -horses and a hasty meal for the men, and the batteries set out in long -columns for their wagon-lines. The 156th Brigade went right up to Coxyde -Bains and established wagon-lines in the dunes behind the village; the -162nd Brigade marched to Ghyvelde, a village two miles from the Belgian -frontier and some distance behind the line, and sent up one section of -horses from each battery to be attached to the 156th Brigade at Coxyde -for use as a forward wagon-line. - -The next morning battery and brigade commanders rode up to the line to -reconnoitre the positions they were to occupy, and to inspect the work -done by the advance parties, while on the 27th and 28th the guns of -every battery were calibrated at the Coxyde Bains range, firing out to -sea through electric screens, by which process the muzzle velocities of -the guns were measured. On the night of the 28th/29th the 156th Brigade, -with "A," "B" and C/162, moved up into action in the positions already -prepared, and next night were followed by D/162. Considerable difficulty -was experienced on both occasions owing to an enemy bombardment of the -neighbourhood with gas shell throughout the night; respirators were worn -for two and a half hours and casualties were thereby averted, but the -difficulty of finding the way in the darkness on an unknown road was -naturally greatly increased. - -On July 30th, when the batteries had opportunity to review their new -positions, they found themselves in surroundings totally different from -any yet experienced. On their left lay the sea, all around them was sand -broken up by huge dunes, and practically nowhere could any shell holes -be seen. This did not, unfortunately, mean that there was no hostile -artillery activity; on the contrary the enemy artillery, and in -particular his high-velocity guns, showed the most amazing persistence -in raking our battery positions. The reason for the absence of -shell-holes was that the sand, continually kept shifting by the wind, -silted up and filled in any hole within a few hours of its being made, -leaving all the shell splinters lying on the surface like pebbles on a -sandy beach. There arose from this the disadvantage of not being able to -tell from the nature of the ground whether it was subject to enemy -shelling or not, but on the other hand it offered real relief to eyes -now physically wearied by the continual sight of torn and desolated -country. - -These coastal positions, indeed, offered many new and hitherto -unexperienced features, but for every advantage there was at least one -disadvantage. The sand, kept moving by the wind, removed the depressing -sight of shell-holes; but the same sand blew into men's eyes, blinding -them, and jammed the guns at almost every other round fired. The view of -Ostend—visible on a clear day from the Grand Dune—with the German -destroyers occasionally entering and leaving its harbour, offered an -object of great interest; but the proximity of Ostend involved the -presence of an infinite host of high velocity naval guns on land -mountings, which blasted impartially infantry, batteries and roads right -back to and beyond the wagon-lines. The sand was excellent in the -wagon-lines for harness cleaning, and ensured dry standings for the -horses; but it offered a constant threat to any animal which should eat -of it, and necessitated the setting up of double picket-ropes for the -horses, to prevent them from getting their heads down and contracting -sand colic. - -There was only one real consolation, and that was the presence of the -sea. The sea, with its submerged wire entanglements, offered a zone free -from the enemy; the sea occasionally provided the thrills of destroyers -passing and of monitors bombarding Ostend and Westende. The sea, on a -fine evening, somehow brought Home very near as it stretched in a glory -of shimmering gold, unconcerned and utterly oblivious of warfare, back -to and beyond the far horizon whither lay England. The land could be -smashed, the land could be blasted and torn, but the sea remained ever -the same, stronger and mightier than any war, the connecting link -between Hell and the peace of an English home. - -The batteries were very close to the sea, for they were on the extreme -left of the whole of the line. Headquarters of the 162nd Brigade were -established in the West Sand Dunes about 700 yards south of Groenendyk -Plage. "A" and B/162 lay some 150 yards in rear of headquarters; D/162 -was almost on the beach, for it took up a position in the East Dunes 150 -yards from the water's edge, with C/162 not far off in the West Dunes -about three hundred yards from the shore; both these batteries lay in -front of headquarters and south of the Groenendyk Plage-Nieuport Bains -road. The 156th Brigade was farther inland but still quite close to the -coast, B/156, the southernmost battery, being 300 yards south of the -Yser. Both brigades, since they were situated on the extreme left of the -line, covered the left or Nieuport Bains sector, which ran from the -Coast along the south side of the Yser and along New Trench to Barnes -Bridge. In addition to the 33rd Divisional Artillery, the infantry of -the 66th Division, who held this front with one infantry brigade (two -battalions in the line), were also covered by the 66th Divisional -Artillery and three Army Field Artillery Brigades, the whole being under -the command of Brigadier-General D. B. Stewart, C.R.A. 66th Division. - -It may seem strange that such a great mass of guns should cover a -one-brigade front, and in the ordinary course of trench fighting this -weight of artillery would far have out-reached requirements. The coastal -zone, however, was not an ordinary part of the line; there was a great -deal of mystery hanging around it, a great deal of "hush-hush" talk and, -to give a hint as to the truth of this talk, a vast concentration of -artillery. Ever since the batteries had detrained at Adinkerke and -Dunkirk the men at the wagon-lines had seen, day after day and hour -after hour, heavily laden trains pull in, disgorge batteries and -battalions, shunt out and be replaced by more trains. Every day fresh -batteries marched up the pavé road long the Nieuport canal to occupy -positions amongst the sandhills; every day an inspection of the dunes -around Nieuport discovered fresh batteries congregated in every hollow, -in every depression of the ground, until there seemed to be no room for -more. - -It was, indeed, a mighty concentration; close up to Nieuport the field -guns lay in tier upon tier; behind them the six-inch howitzers occupied -every possible position and many that were almost impossible; -eight-inch, sixty-pounders and 9·2 in. jostled each other for room -further back, while over their heads rushed the shells of the long-range -guns in action near Coxyde Bains. Clearly an offensive was impending, -but how and where? The area immediately in front of the 66th Division -was flooded and impassable, and on the left lay the sea. Was it from -there that the blow was to fall, or was the right to attack and, -piercing the German lines, force the enemy troops facing Nieuport to -retire? Rumour held orgy. - -Meantime the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery to all outward -appearances cared for none of these things. They were in action, there -was certain destructive work to be done, and the enemy was making the -doing of it very uncomfortable. From Dune 18 and the neighbouring O.P.'s -targets were registered and bombarded, destructive and harassing fire -was maintained on selected "sore" spots, and the front was kept in -continual turmoil. On August 2nd the 49th Division on the right carried -out a daylight raid with the assistance of the batteries, and on the -night of the 7th/8th the guns supported two raids on the Lombardzyde and -St. Georges sectors, both of which were successful. There followed, on -the night after this raid, a projector gas attack which was launched on -the enemy in the Nieuport Bains sector in conjunction with a barrage -fired by all batteries, and it is scarcely surprising to record that the -enemy's temper now became extremely frayed. Every battery was shelled by -high-velocity guns, 5·9 in. howitzers and innumerable gas shells; the -roads and approaches—especially the Coast road—were under continual -bombardment, and the strain upon the detachments grew increasingly -heavy. 162nd Brigade wagon-lines, in order to cope with the -ever-increasing demand for ammunition, had moved up on July 31st to St. -Idesbalde, and the 156th Brigade, which on August 1st had sent its -horses back to La Panne, now, on the 5th, brought them up to Coxyde -Bains once more. - -The night of the 15th/16th saw another projector gas attack on the -Nieuport Bains sector, during which the batteries fired on the areas -around Golf Road and Polder Trench, and which was followed by increased -enemy artillery activity. Nieuport and the batteries around it, Pelican -Ridge and the roads running inland from the coast were all raked by -enemy fire which increased in violence on the 18th, when a practice -barrage on the right divisional front was carried out. There followed -four more days of practice barrages and then, on the night of the -24th/25th, the 19th Infantry Brigade, supported by the guns, attacked -and captured Geleide Post. It was only a small operation, however, and -the batteries covering it merely fired on their S.O.S. lines; moreover -it was a short-lived success, for the following night the enemy won it -back again. - -For four weeks now the batteries had carried out continual bombardments -of the enemy; practice barrages had been fired, and an immense -concentration of artillery had gathered together. An attack was clearly -impending and it was evident that the enemy realised the fact, for his -guns had shown the very greatest activity for some weeks; they were -forever bombarding battery positions, roads and communications, usually -with high-velocity naval guns on land mountings, but also with 5·9 in. -and 8 in. howitzers, while of late a 17 in. howitzer had been in the -habit of blasting the field batteries around Nieuport. Therefore the -news came like a bombshell when, on the night of August 27th/28th, the -batteries were ordered to withdraw to their wagon-lines. It seemed -incredible that this great concentration of artillery should be broken -up without being used for any offensive operations, and at first it was -thought that the 33rd Divisional Artillery might be an isolated case. -But no! Every day battery after battery—some heavy, some of field -guns—pulled out from the sand dunes and headed for the rest area, their -work over, their object unfulfilled. The mighty hosts of batteries, -which for weeks now had been lying in every hollow and valley amongst -the dunes, melted away and disappeared without ever learning the object -of their coming. - -Many and varied have been the reasons put forward for the breaking off -of this attack. Some say that the advance of the enemy at Lombardzyde -early in July put a check to our plans; some attribute it to the long -spell of wet weather and to the non-success of the great attacks at -Ypres on July 31st and August 16th, while many assert, not without -truth, that the enemy obtained our entire operation orders for the -battle and took counter-preparations accordingly. Undoubtedly an attack -had been planned, and an attack on some entirely novel lines. The 1st -Division had, for weeks past, been kept isolated from all other troops -while it practised unusual offensive operations. Some of the batteries -had received orders that on a certain date they were to embark on a -certain ship at a certain port—all at present described in code—and the -general belief was that an offensive by land was to be launched in -conjunction with an attack somewhere near Ostend from the sea. -Imagination, running riot, spread the report that large rafts were to be -towed inshore on which there would be field-batteries firing as they -floated in, while other rafts were to carry infantry and tanks. The -whole idea sounded fantastic and a desperate adventure in view of the -manner in which the Belgian coast bristled with enemy guns and submerged -wire-entanglements; and, with the memory of Gallipoli fresh in the minds -of all, it is surprising how any such operation could have been -considered worth the gamble and the inevitable cost. - -Whatever had been planned, however, nothing was carried out. The -batteries were left to reorganise in their wagon-lines for two days—a -period which the enemy utilised by bombarding with long-range -high-velocity guns the horse-lines of both brigades, and especially -those of the D.A.C. which suffered severe casualties—and on Saturday, -September 1st, under sudden orders they marched out, battery by battery, -on a three-day trek which brought them in glorious weather through -Ghyvelde and Cassel to the back areas of the Ypres Salient. At -Reninghelst and at Dickebusch their march terminated, and wagon-lines -were there established while parties went up to the line to prepare -positions for the guns to occupy. At last, after nearly two years' -fighting, they were to experience the desolation and horror of the -Salient, the deadliest portion of the whole line for gunners, and were -to take part in the autumn battles for the Passchendaele Ridge; had they -known it, few of the men who, early in September, marched up past -Dickebusch and Shrapnel Corner to the battery positions beyond Zillebeke -Lake were ever destined to return, while the majority of those who did -came down on stretchers, the wreckage of modern war. - - - - - CHAPTER VIII. - THE AUTUMN BATTLES OF YPRES AND PASSCHENDAELE. - (SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1917.) - - -In and around the Salient of Ypres there are to be found the graves of -more gunners than in any portion of the line, and even those graves -represent a mere particle only of the many thousands to whom Ypres -brought death. That much discussed, much described and oft-portrayed -area will never and can never be properly comprehended by any man who -has not fought there, for, before the real meaning of the Salient can be -understood, the picture of destruction which it offered must be -accompanied by the realisation of the dread, the feeling of utter -desolation and misery, the terrible haunting horror which seized all men -as they stepped out through the Lille or Menin Gates with their faces -set towards the east. No man, be he ever so brave, was without fear in -that place, while the majority were in constant terror, a terror so -rending, so utterly shattering that death came often as a merciful -release. Yet of that fear no man need be ashamed; it was a terror -entirely within and invisible, and to outward appearances there were no -signs thereof; in the which there is not shame but honour. - -The 33rd Divisional Artillery had yet to undergo these trials, but their -beginning was not long delayed. On the night of September 5th/6th, -twenty-four hours after the conclusion of the march, one section of each -of the 18-pdr. batteries of the 156th Brigade went into action and -relieved portions of the 11th, 12th and A/298 batteries; "A" and B/156 -occupied positions south-west of Fosse Wood, C/156 lay north of Maple -Copse, and on the two succeeding nights, one section at a time, the -remainder of the batteries came up. The 162nd Brigade was not so rushed -as it had no "opposite numbers" to relieve, but on the other hand the -batteries had to prepare the positions they were to inhabit, and this, -in view of the appalling state of the ground, was extremely difficult. -To begin with, the finding of any patch of ground which guns could -possibly reach, and from which they would be able to fire more than two -or three rounds without sinking into the mud, proved an arduous task, -while the work of preparing platforms and shelters on the positions, -when chosen, involved not only great labour but a still greater -patience. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1917. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E. - D.S.O. Durie, M.C. Bownass, M.C. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler. - - Adjutant: Capt. W. G. Sheeres - - Capt. H. W. Smail. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major H. McA. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major W. A. T. - Richards, M.C. Studd, M.C. M.C. Barstow, M.C. - (_wounded_). - - Capt. W. G. - Sheeres, M.C. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major W. G. Major Walker, Major L. Hill, Major W. P. - Pringle. D.S.O. M.C. Colfox, M.C. - (_gassed in (_wounded_). - September_). - - Major H. C. Cory, Major Beerbohm - M.C. (_killed_). - - Major F. L. Lee. - -The enemy, fully alive to the indications of a renewed offensive on our -part, swept the whole of the battery positions with shell storms of -increasing density, inflicting casualties amongst the working parties -and wrecking the work they had done, so that at times it appeared as -though nothing would be ready for the remaining guns of the division -when they were ordered up into action. No sooner was one platform in a -position prepared, with a few sandbags thrown up around it for the -protection of the detachments, than a 5·9 in. shell would blow the whole -thing to pieces, and the work had to be begun all over again. Day after -day the working parties, reinforced by men from the D.A.C. and from the -Trench Mortar batteries, toiled unceasingly not only at their own -positions but at the two positions they had been ordered to prepare for -the 23rd Divisional Artillery, for they saw, after a very few hours of -the Salient, that without protection of some sort or other no detachment -could possibly survive a single barrage. - -At length, after eight days' work, some reward for the labours of the -working parties showed itself, and it was well that this was so for now -the remaining batteries were ordered to move up into action. On the -night of the 13th/14th "A," "B" and C/162 took up the positions marked -out for them, to be followed on the next night by D/162, and by the -early morning of Saturday the 15th the whole of the Divisional Artillery -was in action and registered on the zones to be covered. - -Already severe casualties had been suffered by the 156th Brigade -south-east of Zillebeke, who since September 5th had been in action -under the 24th Divisional Artillery, while the 162nd Brigade working -parties had also borne the weight of the hostile fire. From the 15th -onwards, however, conditions became far more severe, for on that day -began the organised bombardment by our guns prior to the forthcoming -attack, and the resulting increase of counter-battery work by the enemy. -On September 13th the 156th was put under the control of the 23rd -Divisional Artillery on the relief by the latter of the 24th, and with -A/103 formed part of the right group under Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. -Butler (O.C. 156th Brigade) whose headquarters were at Tor Top. On its -arrival in the line on the 14th the 162nd Brigade was also controlled by -the 23rd Divisional Artillery, but, with the exception of C/162 which -was placed in the right group, the batteries went to form part of the -left group, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Groves (O.C. 103rd Brigade) -whose own batteries less A/103 made up the rest of the group. "A," "B" -and D/162 lay on the northern, southern and western edges of Maple Copse -(due east of Zillebeke) while C/162 was in action just south of Fosse -Wood; the positions of the 156th Brigade have already been noted. - -[Illustration: - - Scale 1:20,000. -] - -It will be remembered that throughout July and August, 1917, a -succession of big attacks was carried out by the British troops in the -Ypres Sector, with the object of driving the enemy back from the -semi-circle of low-lying hills which overlooked our trenches in the -Salient. The proposed coastal operations of the foregoing chapter had, -indeed, been planned in connection with the Ypres offensive, and with -the breaking off of the former the batteries were sent down to take part -in further undertakings against the Passchendaele-Gheluvelt ridge. The -ill-omened autumn offensive against the Passchendaele ridge was, in -fact, about to begin, and the first battle of the series was fixed for -September 20th. For this, the limits of the zone covered by the -Divisional Artillery were Clapham Junction on the north and Dumbarton -Lakes on the south, the 162nd taking the left portion of the zone, that -is from the northern limit for 700 yards southwards to Polderhoek -Château, the 156th the right portion of the zone from Dumbarton Lakes -700 yards northwards; the middle gap was covered by the centre group of -which the 33rd Divisional Artillery formed no part. It had been -extraordinarily hard to find any marked feature upon which to range the -guns, but Gheluvelt Mill, situated as it was upon a small mound, offered -a tolerably clear feature for registration purposes, and this was -utilised by the majority of the battery commanders prior to the barrages -which now began. - -The whole barrage table for the forthcoming attack had, by the 15th, -been issued to the batteries, and the practice barrages which now began -to be carried out consisted sometimes of portions of this table, -sometimes of the complete barrage fired in its entirety. As a rule these -"rehearsals" were fired at half the rate which would be used on the day -of the attack, but the same proportions of shrapnel, H.E. and smoke -shell were adhered to, and therefore if only a part even of the barrage -were fired—such as the portion behind which the infantry would advance -from the first to the second objective—the curtain of fire as it -appeared on the ground would offer an exact model of the real attack -barrage, except for a certain diminution of density. This fact was -important, for it was realised that the bad state of the ground to be -attacked over would force the infantry to advance very slowly, and that -therefore a great deal depended upon the barrage to keep enemy -machine-gun fire down until our infantry could get to grips with their -assailants. Every day one and sometimes two practice barrages were -fired, and on each occasion one officer of considerable experience was -sent up from every artillery group to observe the effect thereof. In -particular, reports were rendered dealing with the density of the -barrage, whether all batteries opened fire simultaneously, whether there -were any gaps or rounds falling short, whether the average height of the -shrapnel bursts was correct and whether the barrage crept forward -uniformly. After every barrage these reports were examined and -collected, and before the next practice was carried out the necessary -alterations had been made. - -The first practice barrage began at 4.0 P.M. on September 15th and was -carried out along the whole Corps front; followed certain minor -adjustments, and at 5.30 A.M. on the 16th it was fired again. At 10.0 -A.M. on the same day an "Army barrage," _i.e._, a barrage on the whole -of the Army front, was fired, to be followed on the afternoon of the -17th by another Corps barrage. On September 18th the last two Army -barrages were fired, one at 6.0 A.M. and one at 8.30 P.M., and at 11.0 -A.M. on the 19th the Corps had its last rehearsal. It was a relief when -these practices were over; they invariably called down heavy retaliation -from the enemy who, as soon as he saw an infantry attack was not -pending, turned the full blast of his guns on to our batteries. It was -impossible to cease firing and put the detachments under cover, for this -action would have resulted in gaps appearing in the barrage and -confusing the observers who, unaware of what was happening, would have -reported that the barrage was uneven and full of "holes." The programme -had to be carried out from start to finish whatever the enemy did, and -if the batteries lost heavily in these days it was all that was to be -expected of the Salient. Lose heavily they did, both in officers and -men, and as the latter stood around their guns in the small hours of the -20th, ready to begin this time the real barrage covering the assault, -there was not one detachment which had not already been seriously -depleted in numbers, which had not been compelled to call up -considerable reinforcements from the wagon-lines. - -It was on September 18th that the orders had been received which fixed -the 20th as the day of attack, and on the last two nights, the 18th/19th -and 19th/20th, the howitzers of both brigades busied themselves with -prolonged gas bombardments of the enemy batteries. The only hope of -salvation for the guns lay in silencing some of those batteries, and -they knew that their chances of surviving the long all-day barrage which -they were to carry out on the day of the attack rested almost entirely -on the efforts of the two preceding nights, and on the work of the heavy -artillery which, by intense counter-battery work on the 20th, would try -to keep down the enemy fire. - -Twenty minutes to six in the morning of Thursday, the 20th, had been -fixed for the delivery of the assault, and some thirty minutes before -this the detachments of all batteries manned their guns and stood by, -ready for the signal to go. Very feverish were those last few minutes of -waiting, for nearly every battery was being heavily shelled, and it was -probable that, as soon as the attack was launched, the enemy guns which -were causing all the trouble would come under the counter-fire of our -own "heavies," and would at any rate diminish the now alarmingly heavy -fire which they were directing upon the wretched detachments. - -With terrible slowness and deliberation the minutes passed; 5·9 in. and -4·2 in. shell were crashing every moment into the battery positions, -ammunition was exploding, men were being knocked out and a number of -direct hits were destroying the guns, killing and wounding every single -man of the detachments. In some of the batteries a few more minutes of -this would have put every gun out of action, but mercifully zero hour -was at last reached, a sheet of flame lit up the entire countryside and -with a great roar the barrage began. The batteries of the 33rd Division -poured forth a curtain of fire in front of the advancing infantry, the -heavy artillery bombarded the enemy batteries and roads, and, whatever -happened all round them, whatever bombardment they suffered, the -detachments were now fully occupied and took heed of nothing but their -work. The assault had begun! - -The infantry who were even now advancing under cover of the guns of, -amongst others, the 156th and 162nd Brigades were, as already stated, -troops of the 23rd Division. On the right the attack was continued by -the 41st Division, on the left by the 2nd Australian Division, and -together the long line advanced slowly through the mud towards the enemy -trenches. The ground was very bad; it was estimated that the infantry -advancing across No Man's Land could not cover one hundred yards in less -than six minutes, and accordingly the barrage was so timed as to move -forward twenty-five yards every minute and a half. Even at this slow -pace the infantry were hard put to keep up with it, while the work of -the gunners was rendered exceedingly heavy; for the ultimate objectives -were fairly deep within the enemy lines, and with the barrage moving so -slowly the infantry were not due to reach their farthest goal till a -late hour, while an intense rate of fire had to be maintained over their -heads the whole time. Moreover, there was not one battery which by now -had not had some of its guns knocked out, and the speed of the remainder -had, of necessity, to be increased in order to keep up the full volume -of fire. - -From 5.40 A.M. onwards the batteries roared forth at intense rate; -slowly the barrage crept on ahead of the infantry till it reached and -covered the first objective; halted there for fifty minutes while the -assaulting troops reorganised themselves, and at 7.8 A.M. moved off to -the second objective, now at the slower rate of one hundred yards in -eight minutes. At 7.40 A.M. the second objective was reached and -covered, and for two hours and thirteen minutes a protective barrage was -maintained what time both infantry brigades in the forward line brought -up their reserve battalions for the attack on the 3rd and last -objective. At 9.53 A.M. the last phase of the attack began and, moving -forward now at only ten yards per minute, the barrage started to creep -towards the third objective, reached it at twenty-five minutes past ten -and, passing over it, put up a protective curtain of fire beyond while -the infantry established themselves in the newly won trenches. This -protective barrage, covering as it did the ultimate objective of the -day's fighting, had to be maintained until well on in the afternoon; -since it was fired at a slower rate, however, it now became possible to -relieve some of the detachments at the guns and to set about clearing up -the battery positions. - -As already described, nearly all the batteries were heavily shelled just -before the launching of the attack early in the morning. Shortly after -the earlier phases of the barrage this hostile bombardment had eased off -under the counter-battery work of our own heavy artillery, but -throughout the morning—and, in fact, during the whole of that day and -night—every one of the battery positions was searched and swept at -intervals by 5·9 in. and 4·2 in. howitzers, the resulting damage to -personnel and equipment being very great. With gun muzzles pointed now -to a high elevation, small detachments maintained a protective barrage -at a slow rate of fire while the remainder of the men—after eating a -hasty meal—began to repair and reorganise the positions. - -Yawning holes gaped everywhere; guns had been knocked out and had to be -dragged from the pits on to the road; ammunition, buried or scattered by -hostile fire, was dug up; the dead were removed and placed away near the -road, whither presently a wagon would come for them, while the gun pits -themselves required to be rebuilt so as to be fit for the new guns which -the wagon-lines had already been ordered to bring up. It was gloomy -work, this, and was rendered all the more depressing by the certain -knowledge that presently the enemy would open fire and would wreak the -same havoc all over again, but the outstanding necessity presented -itself of keeping every gun and every battery fully ready at a moment's -notice to support the infantry and prepared to open fire on any target -within range. - -All this time news at the batteries had been scarce. A Captain from the -right and left artillery groups had been attached to the two infantry -brigades (68th and 69th) covered by the guns, and, in addition, -subalterns from the same artillery groups had accompanied the two -assaulting battalions in the attack on the third objective. Their duty, -however, was to report straight to Group headquarters, and therefore it -was left to the batteries only to surmise from the continuity of the -progress of the barrage that the attack must have, at any rate at first, -succeeded. The primary objective—the "Red Line"—ran from Fitzclarence -Farm through Herenthage Château to the eastern edge of Dumbarton Wood, -while the second objective—the "Blue Line"—extended from a point midway -between Black Watch Corner and Cameron House down east of Veldhoek to -the eastern edge of Bass Wood, and, as the weight of artillery forming -the barrage on the divisional front alone consisted of 84 18-pdrs., 30 -4·5 in. howitzers and 42 heavier guns and howitzers, not counting the -batteries detailed for special work, it was hoped that these two -objectives at least might be overrun with comparative ease. It was in -the advance to the "Green Line," the final objective of the day's -battle, which ran from Carlisle Farm due south for eleven hundred yards, -bending back slightly to the west of Gheluvelt Wood but embracing Tower -Hamlets, that trouble might be forthcoming, for by then the enemy should -have recovered from his first surprise and might offer very considerable -resistance. - -At last news was received. A short message stated that all objectives -had been taken but that very heavy fighting had occurred in the advance -upon the last objective, and only the excellence of the creeping barrage -had made success possible. The official report written later by the 23rd -Division stated: "The barrages were very punctual and effective. -Prisoners seemed dazed and utterly demoralised. The creeping barrage -from the second to the third objective and the protective barrage beyond -the latter are deserving of special mention. Replies to S.O.S. were both -prompt and effective, rapidly dispersing any attempts at concentration -or counter-attack. This instilled great confidence into our infantry." -These last remarks were not received till a later date; at the time -there came only the bare news that all objectives had been taken and -that a large part of the success gained was owed to the excellence of -the barrage. It was good to learn that the day was won, that success had -been achieved, and it offered some slight comfort to know that the -service of the guns, which had involved such heavy losses amongst the -detachments, had been of avail. Only on the right had non-success been -met with, and there the left brigade of the 41st Division had been -unable to advance beyond the second objective. The troops covered by the -33rd Divisional Artillery, however, threw out a protective flank; the -S.O.S. barrage was so arranged as especially to protect the right of the -23rd Division which was in the air except for the thin defensive flank -already referred to, and gunners and infantry set themselves to watch -for the inevitable counter-attacks. - -All through the afternoon the batteries had been busy breaking up -concentrations of the enemy, and hitherto had been successful in keeping -them at bay. The valley of the Reutelbeek and the area around Reutel -Village offered some cover, and continued calls from the infantry kept -the guns at work on these areas. A determined counter-attack launched -shortly after 7.0 P.M. was beaten off under our artillery fire; all -night intermittent bursts from every battery swept the enemy hollows and -approaches, and at 4.30 A.M. on the 21st a special barrage was fired -with the object of breaking up any enemy operation which might have been -planned for daybreak. By these means, and by continuing these methods -throughout the day of the 21st, the infantry were able to maintain all -their gains, and by the evening of the 21st were assured of their -position. Two furious counter-attacks by the enemy, delivered after an -artillery bombardment lasting one and a half hours in each case, were -broken up at 3.0 P.M. and at 7.0 P.M. by our artillery fire, and gunners -and infantry alike now set themselves to try and repair the wreckage of -their positions before offensive operations should break out anew. - -The heavy firing which preceded the attack, the all-day barrage which -had been maintained on the 20th and the wastage of ammunition incurred -through enemy shells blowing up the dumps around the guns necessitated -very heavy work all through the 21st and 22nd in bringing up ammunition -from the wagon-lines. The lines of the 162nd Brigade were a great deal -too far back for carrying out so much gun-line work, and, as early as -the 15th, forward wagon-lines composed of one section per battery had at -first been maintained on the eastern outskirts of Dickebusch; later, -after being heavily shelled on the night following the attack, they had -been moved across the road to the neighbourhood of Dickebusch church. -From here, and from the 156th Brigade lines a little farther back, -parties of pack horses came up on the 21st to carry ammunition from the -nearest dumps to the battery positions, for it was impossible in the -majority of cases to bring ammunition wagons and teams anywhere near the -guns. Light railway tracks had been run as far forward as possible, and, -from the termini at Valley Cottages, Verbrandenmolen and other points -which the little petrol-driven trucks were able to reach about once in -four days, the pack animals carried the ammunition to the batteries. -During the whole of the two days following the attack this transport of -ammunition was carried out, although continually interrupted by hostile -shell storms which inflicted many casualties amongst men and horses, and -by the 23rd not only were dumps at the guns completely up to strength -again, but further new guns had come up from the Corps gun "pool" on the -Reninghelst-Steenvoorde Road, and had in the majority of cases replaced -all the guns knocked out during the previous week's fighting. - -It was well that the guns had succeeded in replenishing their ammunition -on the 21st and 22nd, for on the 23rd began preparations for a fresh -attack. Throughout the two preceding days the enemy had pounded and -smashed every battery position in the attempt to prevent as far as -possible any further operations, but as fast as the guns were damaged -repairs were executed, and at seven o'clock in the morning of the 23rd -every battery was able to take part in the Corps practice barrage which -had been fixed for that hour. Like its predecessors it was fired at a -reduced rate to that at which the real attack barrage was to be fired, -and like its predecessors it called down severe hostile retaliation. -C/162 (Major Hill) was so heavily shelled that it was compelled to move -out to a fresh position three hundred yards to the left flank, and every -battery received the usual searching which now had come to be regarded -as inevitable, while the rest of the day saw shell storms of increasing -violence delivered upon every area where any of our batteries were to be -found. - -On the night of September 24th/25th the infantry of the 33rd Division -relieved the 23rd Division, and General Stewart, moving up to -Burgomaster Farm in Dickebusch, assumed command of the artillery -covering the front. The whole of the 25th marked a day of intense -activity amongst the guns. At 5.40 A.M., while the infantry relief was -still in progress, a strong counter-attack was launched by the enemy, -preceded by a heavy barrage. For one and a half hours our batteries -maintained a rapid rate of fire on their S.O.S. lines, but were unable -to prevent the right of the 100th Infantry Brigade astride the Menin -Road and the whole of the 98th Brigade from being driven back to the -support line. At 11.35 A.M. the S.O.S. signal was again sent up by the -100th Brigade, and again the guns burst forth in their support—this time -with success. - -At 2.15 P.M. a Corps practice barrage was fired, and at 3.30 P.M., -before the practice was over, devastating bombardment by guns of all -calibres was opened upon our battery positions. For upwards of half an -hour this bombardment continued, inflicting considerable damage upon the -battery positions, and then for a short time the weary detachments had a -rest. Not for long, however! At 5.30 P.M. the storm broke out afresh, -this time upon gunners and infantry alike, and once again, now under -heavy shell fire, the batteries responded to the S.O.S. signal sent up -an hour later by the left brigade and by the Australians further to the -left. This counter-attack was also repulsed, and by midnight it was -found that the right brigade held their line intact except for a small -portion of trench north of Menin Road, but that the left brigade north -of the Reutelbeek had been beaten back three hundred yards, though -possibly some posts were still held 150 yards in front. - -Such a day as the 25th was not very favourable for preceding an attack, -yet when Wednesday, the 26th, dawned it found the infantry of the 33rd -Division assembling for the assault which had been fixed for 5.50 A.M. -It will be remembered that just prior to the attack on the 20th the -field batteries were all subjected to an intense bombardment, while the -infantry were allowed to assemble in the front line almost untouched. -Now the positions were reversed; at 5.0 A.M. the enemy put down an -intense barrage on the infantry, just as the latter were forming up for -the attack, and inflicted very heavy casualties upon them. For fifty -minutes the hostile bombardment tore them and shook them, and it was in -greatly diminished numbers that the infantry advanced across No Man's -Land when, at 5.50 A.M., the guns blazed out in the assault barrage. - -For this attack one hundred and two 18-pdrs., thirty-six 4·5 in. -howitzers and a large number of heavy guns were covering the divisional -front, which stretched from the southern edge of the Polygon de -Zonnebeke on the north to a point three hundred yards short of Gheluvelt -on the south. Dumps of eight hundred and thirty rounds per 18-pdr. gun -and seven hundred and fifty rounds per 4·5 in. howitzer were maintained -at the guns for, as previously, the barrage was to move at the very slow -rate of one hundred yards in six minutes to the first objective, and one -hundred yards in eight minutes to the final line to be taken. Moreover, -a protective barrage was to be maintained beyond the final objective for -half an hour after its capture (8.40 A.M.), and from then until 2.15 -P.M. was to continue at a reduced rate searching all the ground beyond -the infantry to a depth of one thousand yards. From this it will be seen -that allowance had to be made for a very heavy expenditure of -ammunition. - -At 5.50 A.M. the infantry went over the top, and at 7.45 A.M. came the -first news. A captain from the right and left artillery groups (between -which two groups the 33rd Divisional Artillery was split up) had been -attached to the headquarters of the two infantry brigades delivering the -attack, while a subaltern from each group accompanied the battalions -assaulting the final objective, and from them came the information. The -39th Division on the right and the 5th Australian Division on the left -had captured the Red Line—the first objective—but the 33rd Division had -been held up. The first objective on the front of the latter ran from -Joist Farm past Jut Farm and through Polderhoek to the northern edge of -Gheluvelt Wood, and had proved too strong for the troops who, during the -previous twenty-four hours, had been fighting hand to hand in numberless -counter-attacks and had endured the most intense bombardments. At 8.40 -A.M. the trench which had been lost in the previous day's fighting just -north of the Menin Road was recaptured, and at 11.55 A.M., after calling -back the barrage, a fresh attack under the creeping fire of the -batteries was launched upon the first objective. For twenty minutes the -guns carried out this new programme, but at 12.15 P.M. a message was -received asking the batteries to keep up a protective barrage beyond the -Red Line until further notice, as a heavy barrage was being maintained -by the enemy upon our assaulting troops. This protective barrage was -continued for upwards of an hour, which fact indicated that no further -progress had been made by the infantry, and throughout the afternoon -intermittent fire was directed upon the enemy beyond the first objective -until such time as orders should be received for a fresh attack. - -In the middle of the afternoon a severe enemy shell storm descended upon -all the batteries and inflicted serious casualties. At the same time a -heavy bombardment of our infantry was reported, and at 5.0 P.M. our -guns, themselves heavily shelled by the enemy, opened fire on their -S.O.S. lines until 6.30 P.M. when they slowed down. At 6.40 P.M. the -S.O.S. signal was again sent up, and again for one and a quarter hours -the batteries put down a barrage. Scarcely had they stopped than the -enemy launched yet another counter-attack, and not till nine o'clock at -night did the gun detachments cease the barrage firing which they had -begun shortly before 6.0 A.M. that morning. With the arrival of night -matters became quieter and no further operations were attempted. From -information received it was gathered that the infantry of the 33rd -Division held the original line from which they had been driven on the -preceding day, and had established advanced posts in the first objective -although not occupying it in force. The casualties were reported to have -been terribly heavy. - -On the morning of the 27th a resumption of the advance was carried out. -Ammunition was running low but, with pack horses hard at work bringing -up fresh supplies, the batteries kept a covering fire over the infantry, -and by 9.45 A.M. the latter had established themselves in force in the -first objective of the previous day's fighting and had pushed out posts -beyond. At midday the left brigade were very heavily shelled and asked -for covering fire from the batteries, and half an hour later the 5th -Australian Division on the left reported that they could see the enemy -massing in Polderhoek Château Wood. On hearing this the guns of the -156th and 162nd Brigades were immediately turned on to this area, -searching and sweeping it for upwards of three-quarters of an hour, and -the threatened counter-attack was broken up. At 2.15 P.M., however, it -developed again, and for an hour the guns of the 162nd Brigade -maintained a medium rate of fire on their S.O.S. lines, at the end of -which time all was reported quiet. - -So the day wore on; the guns in continual action, the detachments, -depleted by hostile shell fire and weary almost to death, seizing what -opportunities they could of getting a few moments' rest. At a quarter to -seven in the evening the never-ending S.O.S. call was sent out again, -and for another hour the batteries fired on the lines indicated, -breaking up the attempted counter-attack and assisting our troops to -advance slightly upon the Blue Line—the final objective of the previous -day's battle—towards which they had been working gradually the whole day -long. When this barrage was finished night firing began and was -continued throughout the night, two calls for support from the infantry -being responded to at 1.15 A.M. and 5.10 A.M. respectively, and at -twenty minutes past five on the morning of the 28th such gunners as -still survived pulled themselves together to fire a Corps practice -barrage. - -This practice barrage had a threefold object. In addition to further -shattering the enemy's defences and upsetting his morale, it was so -timed as to coincide with any enemy counter-attack which might have been -fixed for dawn, and which would therefore be dispersed by the fire of -our guns before it could come to a head. Moreover, it also helped our -front line troops under cover of its fire further to improve their -position, and so well did it succeed in this respect that, at 8.0 A.M., -the infantry reported that they had consolidated their front only one -hundred yards short of the Blue Line. This operation, apart from an Army -barrage at 5.15 A.M. on the 29th which coincided with and broke up a -pending enemy counter-attack, proved the last combined operation between -infantry and gunners to take place in the month of September; with the -two brigades now engaged in the usual harassing fire which was the order -of the day on this front, we must turn our attention to the life of the -batteries and, leaving their tactical operations alone for a few -moments, see how they had fared during the previous four days' battle. - -The losses amongst the detachments had been cruel. In all the fighting a -very heavy portion of the enemy's fire had been directed in -counter-battery work upon the gun positions, and the batteries, being -almost continually engaged with S.O.S. calls and unable to take any form -of cover, had been shot down time and again. Moreover, the work had been -desperate; with weakened detachments an incessant fire had had to be -kept up almost without a break, and such intervals as offered themselves -were necessarily utilised in rebuilding damaged gun platforms and in -restocking with ammunition. The men were in an advanced stage of -fatigue, and as yet no signs were forthcoming of any possibility of a -rest. On September 27th B/162 (Major Cory) was relieved by B/102 and -marched down to St. Hubertshoek, near Hallebast Corner, whither the -162nd Brigade wagon-lines had moved on September 25th, and here this one -battery remained in rest until October 7th, but for the remainder there -was no relief. With men from the D.A.C. and from the Trench Mortar -batteries the guns were kept in action, but this course involved the use -of many unskilled numbers, and few detachments had more than one man who -could safely be trusted to lay the piece in a barrage. - -On September 28th two moves took place which brought home to the -batteries the fact that, for the present at any rate, they were not to -be relieved. On that day General Stewart and his Staff, on the relief of -the 33rd Division infantry by the 23rd Division, handed over control of -the artillery to the incoming C.R.A. and moved out to rest at Boeschepe, -where the headquarter staff remained until the batteries themselves at a -later date were ultimately relieved. Simultaneously, Lieut.-Colonel E. -J. Skinner, commanding the 162nd Brigade, came up and took over the -control of the Left Group from Lieut.-Colonel Groves (103rd Brigade) and -set up his headquarters first at Dormy House but later, on October 1st, -at Bedford House, one thousand yards south of Shrapnel Corner. The zone -covered by the two brigades was very slightly altered and now ran from -Gheluvelt on the Ypres-Menin road to a point about 1,700 yards -northwards, but the battery positions remained the same, and October -came in to find them preparing for offensive operations again. - -On October 1st an Army practice barrage had been fixed to begin at 5.15 -A.M., and, just as the gunners were assembling to fire the opening -rounds, a furious shell-storm was opened by the enemy upon our own front -line and the whole area up to one thousand yards in rear of it. It was -manifest, from hostile aeroplane activity and the weight of artillery -fire which was being brought to bear, that a big counter-attack was -impending, and the Army barrage accordingly came down at a very -opportune moment. At 5.50 A.M., while it was at its height, the enemy -were seen advancing in a series of waves upon our front line, and with -that action there began a day of the most intense fighting. All -communications with the front line were cut, not even pigeons succeeded -in finding a way through the dense hostile barrage, and until the -evening every battery was kept in almost continuous action answering the -numerous S.O.S. rockets which appeared, and replying to the enemy -bombardment which, even without the evidence of rockets, called by its -weight for active reply. Not until midnight did the situation ease, and -then it was found that the infantry had maintained their whole front -except for the left which had been bent back very slightly. To the -extraordinary heroism of the infantry the G.O.C. 23rd Division ascribed -the defeat of the hostile attack—and with this the gunners very heartily -agreed—but he added in his report that the field batteries had -maintained such splendid protective fire that the enemy had, on frequent -occasions, been broken up before they could get to grips with the -garrison of our front line. - -Although the Army barrage on October 1st had coincided with and had -helped to defeat an enemy counter-attack, its primary object was to -prepare for a renewed offensive on our part, and this offensive now took -definite shape. After firing another practice barrage on October 2nd and -maintaining throughout the 2nd and 3rd a destructive fire upon the enemy -system—the while long strings of pack horses refilled the -ever-diminishing dumps of ammunition around the guns—the batteries in -the early morning of October 4th set range-drum and dial sight to the -opening elevation of yet another barrage, this time no practice but as a -definite and vital protection to infantry moving forward to the assault. -Despite the rain and the ever deepening mud the offensive was ordered to -be continued. - -At 6.0 A.M. on Thursday, October 4th, on the zone covered by the 33rd -Divisional Artillery the infantry of the 5th Division advanced to the -attack, supported by one hundred and eight 18-pdrs., thirty-six 4·5 in. -howitzers, sixteen 6 in. howitzers and an assortment of heavier -howitzers and 60-pdrs. Their right lay upon the northern edge of -Gheluvelt Wood and their left upon Juniper Cottages, and, with the -barrage moving ahead of them at the rate of one hundred yards in six -minutes, they essayed the capture of the high ground south-west of -Reutel together with the eastern slopes of the Polderhoek spur. The -actual line of their one and final objective ran from a point 500 yards -south of Reutel, past the south-west corner of Juniper Wood and east of -Polderhoek Château to the northern edge of Gheluvelt Wood, the holding -of which line would cover the communications of the 21st Division across -Polygon Beek on the left in their attempt to capture Reutel; the -objective of the 5th Division, in fact, was the southward continuation -of the first objective of the 21st Division, and formed the right flank -of an attack which, further north, was intended to penetrate deeply into -the enemy lines. On the right of the troops covered by the 33rd -Divisional Artillery the infantry of the 37th Division were to advance -their left slightly to conform with the line of attack. - -Throughout the night of the 3rd/4th the enemy had carried out an intense -bombardment of our front line system and had, from time to time, swept -the battery positions with shell-storms from 5·9 in. and 4·2 in. -howitzers. To this hostile bombardment the batteries had, at the request -of the infantry, energetically replied at intervals during the night, -but the opening rounds of the barrage at six o'clock in the morning -smashed their way into the beginnings of an enemy counter-attack which -was concentrating on the front of our own attack. Fortunately the -barrage dropped before the enemy concentration was complete, and the -fire of our guns at zero broke up the enemy attempt before it could come -to a head. Notwithstanding this, however, very considerable opposition -was met with, and only on those parts of the front where the infantry -managed to keep right close under the barrage fire of the batteries was -complete success achieved. - -The barrage, as already stated, had been arranged to move forward at the -rate of sixteen yards per minute until it should reach a line two -hundred yards beyond the objective. Here it was to halt, fire a round of -smoke shell from every alternate gun as a warning that the protective -line had been reached, and be maintained at a slow rate to cover the -infantry while they were digging in. In addition, moreover, to this -standing barrage, it was arranged that every now and then the batteries -should search by short lifts for one thousand yards beyond the line of -the protective barrage; while at 8.10 A.M., by which time the objective -of the 5th Division should have been fully secured, the barrage was to -move on towards Gheluvelt in conformation with the fire covering the -21st Division further north in their advance on the second objective, -thereby suggesting a resumption of the advance on the 5th Division -front. In point of fact, however, no further advance beyond the first -objective on the front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery was -intended; the batteries, when they reached the extreme limit of their -range, were to drop back to the protective barrage line again, their -work of drawing attention away from the 21st Divisional front being -finished. - -As events turned out, the operations of the 5th Division were not -entirely successful. The 13th Infantry Brigade, under the guns of -Lieut.-Colonel Butler's Group (the right group), reached the final -objective with the right battalion in the afternoon, after being held up -for a time by a strong point north of Lewis House. The left battalion of -the same brigade, however, encountered strong opposition at Polderhoek -Château and was unable to keep up with the barrage. Survivors of the -assaulting troops actually reached Polderhoek Château and even -penetrated beyond it, but after severe hand to hand fighting a line was -taken up two hundred yards west of the Château. The left infantry -brigade (95th), covered by the guns of Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's Group, -was also unable in places to keep up with the barrage. The right -battalion found that the ground between the Reutelbeek and the company -on the southern edge of Cameron Covert was so sodden as to be absolutely -impassable; a detour to the right and left was accordingly made, and a -line consolidated in the 13th Brigade area and between Cameron Covert -and the stream. The left battalion of this brigade at the same time did -actually reach its final objective, but so heavy was the hostile fire -coming from the high ground around Poezelhoek that the position became -untenable, and a line was taken up in the area of the 21st Division on -the left, running from Reutel westward and facing south, while the 21st -Division formed a defensive flank by continuing this line to Cameron -Covert. - -By three o'clock in the afternoon the right brigade disentangled the -muddle and formed a general line running from the northern edge of -Gheluvelt Wood north-north-east to the Scherriabeek and then on to a -point fifty yards short of Polderhoek Château; here there was a gap of -some 150 yards, and the line then continued due north for another -hundred yards, to be carried on northwards through Polderhoek Wood to -Cameron Covert by the left brigade. It was well that even this rough -line was organised, for throughout the afternoon infantry and gunners -alike were hotly engaged by the enemy in numerous counter-attacks. In -all, five attacks were launched by the enemy on the right brigade front -during the afternoon, and three more in the evening, and in each case -every gun which could be brought to bear was switched round to help the -exhausted infantry. After the most severe fighting, and after continuous -firing by the batteries throughout the remainder of the day, the -infantry were able to report that all gains were held; rifle and -artillery fire had smashed every enemy attempt to advance, and our new -line was securely held. During the night of October 4th/5th the left -battalion of the left brigade, under cover of the guns, withdrew from -the 21st Divisional area and took up a line through the middle of -Cameron Covert, and so on the morning of the 5th the line stood solid. -On this part of the front the objective had not been captured except -upon the extreme right, and the casualties had been tremendous. Further -to the left, however, success had been met with, and Reutel Village, -Abraham Heights and Gravenstafel were now in our hands. - -It may be complained that this chapter has dealt too fully with the -infantry operations, and has not sufficiently recorded the daily life of -the batteries and their experiences during the attacks. The answer to -this complaint is, briefly, that the batteries had no daily life but -rather a daily death, while their experiences—day in, day out—were -invariably the same. Morning, noon and night the men were splashing -about in mud, trying to keep their ammunition clean and their guns -serviceable; daily they were shelled, sometimes with long deliberate -bombardments, sometimes in hurricane shell-storms which descended upon -them for forty minutes or so two or three times a day. They were always -wet, always cold; they continually saw the guns and ammunition, which -they had spent hours in cleaning and preparing, blown to bits in the -passing of a second; they helped to bring up more guns, more ammunition, -and saw, in the serving of these new guns, their mates blown to pieces, -shattered, torn. They grew to believe that relief would never come, that -for all time they must exist in the grim shadows of Maple Copse, of -Fosse Wood and of Armagh Wood. They felt, as they saw the shells -crashing down all around them, that they were forgotten by God and man. -There _is_ no daily history of the batteries to record save the success -or failure of the operations in which they took part, and for the -supporting of which they paid this heavy price. There lies the true -history of the batteries, and that it is which in these pages must be -recorded. - -From October 5th there ensued a pause during which the batteries -strained every nerve to get up more ammunition from the dumps, to clear -up their shell-wrecked positions and to sort out the gun line personnel -into some sort of workable detachments. B/162 came up into action again -from the wagon-lines on the 7th and took over its old position from -B/242, and for a few days such registration and reconstruction of -positions was carried out as was possible, having regard for the heavy -enemy fire which continually swept the entire area in which the -batteries were located. Only for a short time was there a lull, however, -for a fresh attack had been ordered to be carried out on October 9th. - -On Tuesday, the 9th, the 5th Division attempted to complete the capture -of the Polderhoek ridge and, by extending its left to Polygon Beek, to -form connection with the 17th Division. For this purpose the weight of -artillery, the pace of the creeping barrage and the formation of the -standing barrage were to be identical with those of the 4th, but the -objective in this case was to include the whole of Polderhoek Château -and Wood together with Cameron Covert, and was to bend back to the then -front line at Joist Farm on the north. The 15th Infantry Brigade was -responsible for the attack on the right, while on the left the 95th -Infantry Brigade was ordered to pivot on a stationary left flank and, -clearing all the ground east of Cameron Covert to as far south as the -Reutelbeek and as far eastwards as the line of the objective, was to -form the connection between the left of the 15th Brigade and the right -of the 17th Division. - -Zero hour was shortly after 6.0 A.M., and three minutes after the -beginning of the barrage the infantry advanced to the assault. The -ground, already a sea of mud, was churned up yet more by the intensity -of the barrage, and the troops forming the extreme right of the 5th -Division, by their efforts to avoid portions of ground which were -utterly impassable, lost direction and moved towards the south-east. The -mistake was presently discovered, but too late to catch up the barrage, -and a line was taken up a little in advance of the previous front line -immediately north of the Scherriabeek. Simultaneously the left and -centre companies of the right battalion advanced on their proper course, -but came under intense fire from Gheluvelt and Polderhoek Château, and -only one platoon—themselves all wounded—reached the Château; ultimately, -owing to heavy casualties, they withdrew to their original front line. -Loss of direction was responsible also for the failure of the left -battalion of this brigade to reach its objective. Moving too much -towards the right it came under heavy fire from some houses north of the -Château and, suffering many casualties, was held up. By ten o'clock in -the morning, despite the fiercest efforts by the batteries to beat down -the opposition, the whole brigade was back in its old line. The left -brigade, having no forward movement on the right to which to conform, -did not advance at all. - -The state of the ground was now becoming appalling, and, with two -successive attacks rendered failures by the mud, a lull set in on this -part of the front—a lull during which each of the batteries in turn -managed to seize a few days' rest at the wagon-lines. The news that -these short rests were to be granted was received with mixed feelings; -clearly, if it was thought necessary to send each battery in turn for a -short spell at the wagon-lines, the brigades were not destined to move -right out of the line yet awhile, but on the other hand this new plan -did assure a short interruption of the nerve-racking conditions of the -gun line, and for this reason at any rate it was welcome. On October -13th Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel Skinner handed over the -control of their groups to the commanding officers of the 27th and 103rd -Brigades respectively and, accompanied by the personnel of one battery -from each brigade (A/156 and D/162), moved out to the wagon-lines. On -the 17th these two batteries moved back into action again after a -four-day rest, and on the 18th three more batteries moved out. Each -battery in turn had four days at the wagon-lines of comparative rest and -quiet, and then moved up into action again, and by the 24th all the -batteries except C/162 were back in the line once more, slightly -refreshed, slightly reorganised, but still suffering greatly from an -almost complete lack of trained men. C/162 (Major Hill) had been left at -the wagon-lines owing to the fact that the severe casualties sustained -by the battery just prior to moving out had rendered it unfit to go back -into action again. - -On October 24th 162nd Brigade Headquarters moved back into the line -also, and took over command of "C" Group at Bedford House under the 7th -Divisional Artillery. This group consisted of "A" and D/162, "B" and -C/156, and also of the 46th, 47th and 112th Australian batteries. The -front covered by the group and held by the infantry of the 7th Division -was, at the same time, changed from north of Gheluvelt to just south of -it, as the batteries could reach this new zone at a slightly shorter -range; with the new front allotted and registered, orders were received -for this group and also for the 156th Brigade to cover an attack by the -7th Division to be launched on the 21st. It seemed madness for any such -attack to be contemplated, for the weather had been wet and stormy since -October 9th and the ground was even more impassable, even more -treacherous than it had been earlier in the month. The only hope of -salvation for the infantry lay in the putting down by the batteries of -such a curtain of fire as would completely cover the assaulting troops -while they waded through the mud, and this the batteries now prepared to -do. D/162 (Major Lee), its position at Maple Copse being almost -completely untenable owing to the searching fire which the enemy -continually directed upon it, moved eight hundred yards northwards on -the 24th to a position just west of Zouave Wood. D/156 (Major Barstow) -moved forward to the middle of what had been Sanctuary Wood, dropping -the trails just off the road under the shelter of the slopes in the -western half of the wood, and at dawn on Friday, the 26th, all batteries -manned their guns to support this, as it seemed to them, desperate -venture. - -The actual front of the attack by the 7th Division, which the guns of -the 33rd Divisional Artillery were to cover, included Gheluvelt and the -ground for six hundred yards north and south of it, and the assault was -supported by one hundred and forty-four 18-pdrs., forty-eight 4·5 in. -howitzers, thirty-two six-inch and twenty heavier howitzers. Two -objectives were fixed, the first including the whole of Gheluvelt except -the extreme eastern outskirts and running down south-west to Berry -Cottages, while the final objective reached from the lake north-west of -Gheluvelt down to Reigate farm, running one hundred yards east of -Gheluvelt Village, the object of the operation being to capture -Gheluvelt and some ground along the Zandvoorde Spur, and so to secure -the hold on Tower Hamlets. "C" Group covered the 20th Infantry Brigade -on the left, while "A" and D/156 with B/162 were acting under the orders -of Lieut.-Colonel Marriott, commanding "B" Group, and covered the 91st -Infantry Brigade on the right. - -At 5.40 A.M. the barrage began, the nearest fringe of it dropping one -hundred and fifty yards in front of the infantry as they formed up for -the attack. There it remained for six minutes, and then started -gradually to creep forward at the rate of twelve yards per minute; after -traversing two hundred yards at this pace the speed of advance was -slackened down to ten yards per minute for another two hundred yards, -and then, at a uniform pace of seven yards per minute, it moved on to -the protective line beyond the first objective. Here it remained from -7.4 A.M. until 7.50 A.M. to give the infantry time to reorganise and -prepare for the next attack; at 7.50 A.M. it moved forward again, after -four minutes' intense fire to warn the assaulting troops that the time -to advance had come, and so forward at the same slow rate to the -protective line beyond the final objective; this it reached at 8.46 A.M. -and there remained as a protective barrage to allow the infantry to -consolidate the ground won. - -Thus moved the barrage, but what of the infantry who should have been -close behind it? Already attention has been called to the bog-like -nature of the ground across which they were to attack, and, even had it -not, the extraordinarily slow rate of the barrage—twelve yards per -minute—should be sufficient evidence of the opinion formed by the Higher -Command of the sort of conditions with which the infantry would have to -contend. As events turned out it was this very mud which denied success -to our troops. Enemy artillery fire on the forward system had been light -up till zero, and not for seven minutes after our barrage dropped did -the enemy put down any sort of reply with his guns. The cause of the -infantry's undoing was the machine-guns which played upon them and swept -them while they struggled helplessly in the mud—machine-guns safely -ensconced in concrete pill-boxes while our men were in the mud up to -their waists. By twenty minutes to eight the 91st Brigade was held up at -Lewis House and forced back to its original line; at half-past eight -elements of the 20th Brigade had reached Gheluvelt, but were stopped by -the enemy pill-boxes and ultimately had to come back. Throughout the -morning the gunners maintained a protective barrage beyond the infantry -to try and assist them in their now almost hopeless task, but at 2.35 -P.M. the barrage was called off and the battle ceased. - -All along the line of the 7th Division, and further to the right, the -assaulting troops had been beaten back to their original positions and -in some cases even west thereof. Machine-gun fire from Lewis House and -Berry Cottages had stopped the 91st Infantry Brigade, while the men of -the 20th Brigade had been beaten by the mud itself. They had fought -their way right through to Gheluvelt but, on reaching it, had been -unable to ward off counter-attacks as they were up to their waists in -mud and every rifle was clogged and smothered with the same substance. A -message sent that afternoon to headquarters urged that the advanced -battalions should instantly be relieved "owing to heavy officer -casualties, disorganisation and the condition of the rifles," and that -sentence in itself very aptly summed up the conditions. Disorganisation -there had been, and very considerable at that, but such was the -condition of the ground that nothing else could have been expected. Thus -the day ended in failure on this particular portion of the front; under -normal circumstances, and with anything like firm ground over which to -attack, success might well have been achieved, but the weather -conditions stepped in and tilted the balance in favour of the enemy with -overwhelming effect. - -This was the last infantry operation in which the 33rd Divisional -Artillery took part. On October 28th "A" and C/156 moved out to the -wagon-lines; three days later they were followed by D/156, which had -been very heavily gas shelled on the night of the 29th/30th. B/156 was -relieved on November 2nd, and next day the whole of the 162nd Brigade -withdrew from the line and marched back to Dickebusch, this time with -the promise before them of a real period of rest in the back areas. - -The losses of the batteries in this autumn fighting had been appalling. -For fifty-one days they had been in continuous action under the worst of -conditions, covering attack after attack and undergoing interminable -shell fire from enemy guns of every calibre. The smallest possible -personnel was kept at each position, and seldom did the total strength -at the gun line of any one battery exceed thirty-six officers and men. -Yet the battle casualties of the 162nd Brigade numbered three hundred -and fifteen for this period, while those of the 156th Brigade were -almost as great. A/156, a six-gun battery, had twenty-six guns disabled -during the time it was in the line, while D/162, which had suffered the -loss of one hundred and six casualties including six officers, had had -nineteen guns put out of action by the enemy. The batteries had, in -fact, been practically wiped out, and it was a mere remnant of their -former selves which reached the wagon-lines. They had marched up to the -Salient a fine fighting weapon, the outcome of many months' training and -experience, hardened and versed in all the methods of war. They came -away from that murderous spot smashed, depleted, worn out, their work -accomplished but at a tremendous cost. Ypres was no longer to them a -legendary spot, but a plain, ghastly reality, a grim and deadly place -where the batteries learnt, as they had never learnt before, the full -horror of war. In trench fighting it is the infantry who look more -closely into the depths of Hell than do any other branches of the -Service; but at Ypres the field guns share this deadly privilege, and -the price of it is high, higher than can be bought with anything save -human life itself. The 33rd Divisional Artillery had shared that -privilege, had paid that price, and the account thereof may be seen -to-day in the cemeteries which cluster round Reninghelst, Dickebusch and -La Clytte, in the nameless graves lying amid the shell holes of Maple -Copse, Sanctuary Wood and Armagh Wood. - - - - - CHAPTER IX. - WINTER IN THE SALIENT. - (DECEMBER 1917—MARCH 1918.) - - -After the tremendous fighting of the autumn offensive at Ypres and the -smashing casualties which were suffered therein by the batteries, a full -month in the rest area was required to bring the 33rd Divisional -Artillery back to anything like its normal pitch of efficiency once -more. Every detachment in every battery had to be reorganised and built -up on the foundation of the few remaining gunners who had survived the -two months' battle; raw recruits from England needed instruction and -drilling, gaps in the non-commissioned ranks awaited filling, -newly-joined officers were watched and tested. From highest to lowest -the personnel of the two brigades were busily engaged in the tremendous -work of smartening up and training, of teaching and of learning, of -overhauling equipment and of filling up stores, of removing all traces -of the scorching fires through which the batteries had recently passed. -By November 3rd both brigades had completed the withdrawal to the -wagon-lines at Dickebusch; on the 4th the 156th Brigade marched to the -training area around La Nieppe, to be followed the next day by the 162nd -Brigade which moved into billets in Bavinchove, Zuytpanne and Trois -Rois, all in the neighbourhood of Cassel. Here for a week they remained, -at first resting and refitting, then beginning the more elementary forms -of training and gradually bringing the batteries back to something -approaching a state of efficiency once more. - -On November 12th a move was made to the Bouvelinghem area, still further -from the line. The 156th Brigade found billets in Bas Loquin and Warlez, -the 162nd in Alquines, Le Buisson and Haute Planque. Billets were none -too good and horse lines had to be set up in the open, but the -surrounding country was more suitable for the advanced training which -now became possible, and in real earnest did the instruction and -drilling of the batteries set in. Gun drill and driving drill became a -daily affair, while battery staff work and manœuvring in the open were -added to the curriculum. Training of every description, combined with -sports, races and concerts, kept the men busy and contented, with the -result that efficiency and smartness appeared once more and the havoc of -the autumn became almost completely effaced. As the month wore on and -time for a return into action drew near the condition of the batteries -grew daily better, and by the end of November it could fairly be said -that both brigades had very nearly reached their old high standard once -more. - -It had been generally understood that a bare four weeks of rest could be -hoped for, and that the end of the month would see a return into action. -On November 22nd Brigadier-General Stewart and his staff had moved up to -the Menin Gate at Ypres to take over command of the artillery covering -the infantry of the 33rd Division, then holding the line at -Passchendaele, and daily the order was expected for the batteries to -follow. Semi-officially it had been stated that the brigades would be in -action by December 3rd, but night set in on November 30th without any -warning order having been received, and the line was distant a full -three days' march. It was difficult to believe that, with so much time -to spare for the issuing of warning orders, any sudden move could be -contemplated, yet that was actually what took place. At five o'clock on -the evening of Saturday, December 1st, orders were received for the -batteries to march at 8.0 A.M. on the following morning and, moreover, -to be in action by the evening of December 3rd. - -Such haste, such rushing and such short notice seemed strange, in view -of the fact that for over a week the batteries might have had the -preliminary notice; yet fourteen hours, and fourteen hours of darkness -at that, was all the warning that was received, and far into the night -the detachments laboured by the light of lanterns, packing the vehicles -and getting ready to move at daybreak. To reach the line in two days -meant a very considerable march table for each day, and Zermezeele had -accordingly been fixed as the billeting area of the batteries for the -night of December 2nd/3rd. Late in that evening and in darkness the -brigades, after a long day of trekking, laboured in to the lines -allotted to them and hastily settled for the night, as an early start -was ordered to be made on the following day. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - DECEMBER 1917—MARCH 1918. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E. - D.S.O. Durie, D.S.O., Bownass, M.C. - M.C. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major F. B. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major D. Jones, - Carrell. Studd, M.C. D.S.O., M.C. M.C. - - Capt. S. G. - Taylor. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major W. G. Major H. C. Cory, Major M. M. I. Major F. L. Lee, - Pringle, M.C. M.C. Body, M.C. M.C. - - Major G. - Fetherston, M.C. - -At daybreak on December 3rd the march was resumed, and now further rush -tactics were adopted. The personnel of one section per battery was -conveyed to Ypres by motor lorry while the remainder of the batteries -continued the march by road, for it was intended to take over a portion -of the battery positions that very night in the line, so that on the -following morning the 33rd Divisional Artillery would be able to assume -responsibility for the artillery support of the zone without further -delay. By midday these advance parties had "debussed" at Potijze -Château, where guides were waiting for them, and by three o'clock in the -afternoon control of one section per battery had been taken over, while -every battery commander was busying himself in learning from his -"opposite number" the zone to be covered and the general characteristics -of the battery position itself. Thus the programme had been adhered to, -and by the evening of the 3rd a portion of the relief was carried out; -just forty-eight hours after the receipt of the warning order, and -thirty-six hours since the beginning of the march from a training area -so far distant as to be within ten miles of Boulogne, two guns per -battery of both brigades were in action once more. - -While all this had been going on at the gun line, the remainder of the -brigades had marched to the wagon-lines which they were to occupy during -such time as the batteries were in action—the 156th Brigade taking over -an area 1,200 yards south-east of Vlamertinghe, where permanent huts and -stables were being built on either side of the road, while to the 162nd -Brigade had been allotted an open area half a mile west of Ypres, -between Goldfish Château and Belgian Battery Corner. These lines were -reached late on the evening of the 3rd and were extremely difficult to -get into, in the case of the 162nd Brigade, owing to the fact that the -approaches from the road were rendered quite impassable by mud. A most -uncomfortable night was spent on the side of the road, and not until -daylight came was there any chance of getting horses and men into their -permanent "billets"—mud lines and tents in the month of December! Longer -notice, less rushing and a spreading of the march over three days would -have meant much to both horses and men, yet the programme had been -organised and ordered by some Higher Command which was for ever -impressing upon Divisional Artilleries the importance of the care of -horses and the need of avoiding any unnecessary overwork or strain! - -On Tuesday, December 4th, the remaining two sections per battery marched -up to the gun line, led by guides from the advance parties, and -completed the relief of the outgoing units, the 26th and 311th Army -Field Artillery Brigades. The 156th Brigade together with D/162 formed -No. 1 Group of the artillery covering the divisional front and was -placed under the command of 158th Brigade Headquarters, while -Lieut.-Colonel Skinner (162nd Brigade) commanded No. 2 Group which -comprised the 18-pdr. batteries of his own brigade. This was, however, -only a temporary arrangement, for on December 17th Lieut.-Colonel Butler -(156th Brigade) took over command of No. 1 Group which was enlarged to -contain the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, while Colonel -Skinner and his headquarters moved out to the wagon-line, leaving the -186th Brigade to form No. 2 Group. - -[Illustration: - - Scale 1:20,000. -] - -As matters now stood, the whole of the 33rd Division was concentrated -together, the artillery covering for once its own infantry on the -Passchendaele Ridge-Crest Farm-Meetcheele Line. The batteries of the -156th Brigade all lay along the Langemarck-Zonnebeke road north-west of -Zonnebeke, between Windmill Cabaret and Kansas Cross, and covered the -right of the zone, while the 162nd Brigade supported the left zone from -positions around Gravenstafel. "A" and B/156, however, moved their guns -to the vicinity of Otto Farm on the 12th and 14th respectively. - -Infantry action was at a standstill, for the mud and general condition -of the ground precluded movement of any sort; in few places, indeed, was -there any fire-trench at all, fortified shell-holes linked together in -groups and half-full of water offering the only possible cover to the -front-line troops. The forward system was almost completely cut off by a -vast sea of mud which extended back to and beyond the battery positions -and was traversed at intervals by narrow duckboard tracks, the sole -means of communication from front to rear. Any smashing of those tracks, -any detour from them to avoid shell-fire meant hours of struggling -through the slime, while the wretched men who got wounded while crossing -the morass were, as likely as not, engulfed in the mud and never seen -again. - -Infantry operations, it has been said, were at a standstill, but the -same could by no means be recorded of the artillery. From dawn till dusk -the enemy was for ever pounding away at our lines, raking battery -positions from end to end and destroying the wooden roads which offered -the only possible route for the supply of ammunition and rations. -Gravenstafel, Kansas Cross and the road right back to Wieltje were in a -continual state of eruption, while devastating shell-storms daily -descended upon the battery area between Gravenstafel and Zonnebeke. It -was a grievous time for the gunners; dug-outs were impossible, as water -was met only eighteen inches below the surface, and pill-boxes were few -and far between. Even the latter, with their doors facing towards the -east, were by no means sure refuges, and it was while actually standing -inside such an one that Captain Gallie, who had distinguished himself so -wonderfully in the autumn fighting, was killed on December 14th. The -only way to minimise casualties was to scatter a number of little -shelters all around the battery positions and, by keeping the men thus -separated, to reduce the damage which one direct hit alone could do. Yet -even so the strain of being eternally wet and cold, of being for ever -soaked with mud and under continuous shell-fire was tremendous, and, as -far as was possible, detachments at the guns were relieved every four -days. - -There was, indeed, little for the men to do except to keep the gun-pits -and ammunition serviceable, and to try to keep themselves alive. Firing -was reduced to the minimum of registration, calibration and response to -infantry calls, for it needed a full day's work by every man to keep the -guns clean, to rebuild the gun-pits after their daily destruction by -hostile shell-fire and to keep dry the ammunition which, even when it -was not blown up by enemy bombardment, used to sink of its own accord in -that bottomless mud which rendered almost any form of foundation -useless. Moreover, every round fired necessitated the bringing up of -fresh supplies from the wagon-lines, and this was work not lightly to be -undertaken. As late as September 1920 the road from Wieltje to -Gravenstafel was still but a faint track of ploughed-up earth winding -across the shell holes and literally paved with the skeletons of horses -and, in some cases, of men; it was one of the main arteries—and there -were but few in that wilderness of mud—from the wagon-lines to the -batteries, and, to the terrible cost of the drivers and teams, well the -enemy knew it. - -Thus, from December 4th, the batteries just barely existed; they had had -a month's rest in the back area and knew that, for gunners, this would -be considered sufficient to keep them going for a long time to -come—hopes of relief, therefore, were not even entertained. At intervals -the guns were registered on the Gasometers east of Passchendaele; at -intervals they bombarded enemy positions around Moorslede, but mostly -the detachments contented themselves with preparing for emergencies by -keeping the guns as serviceable as was possible. It was a nightmare -existence from which all ranks hoped that they might one day awaken, but -the awakening was not yet expected. - -It seemed, therefore, scarcely credible to the 162nd Brigade when, on -December 19th, orders were received to march out next day to the -wagon-lines. Foul as were the conditions in the line, a mere seventeen -days of continuous action was never regarded by Higher Authority as -sufficient to entitle a battery to a rest, and neither officers nor men -had in their wildest dreams hoped to spend Christmas out of the line; -yet such was now to be the case. On Thursday, December 20th, all -batteries of the brigade had reached their wagon-lines in safety, and on -December 23rd they marched back to Divisional reserve in a camp on the -Poperinghe-Busseboom road, leaving their less fortunate comrades of the -156th Brigade to carry on the war in their absence. Less fortunate the -latter certainly were, for they were destined to spend Christmas in -action, but on the other hand the positions they were occupying were not -so bad as those of the 162nd Brigade, nor had they been subjected to -such violent shell-storms. - -December 23rd to the 26th were spent by the 162nd Brigade in overhauling -kit and equipment, in helping to build permanent standings in the camp -they were occupying, and in celebrating the unexpected luxury of a -Christmas in rest. On Christmas night a dinner for the officers was -given at "Skindles" in Poperinghe, while on Boxing Night the batteries -organised dinners for their men. On this day, also, the 156th Brigade -was relieved by the 48th Army Field Artillery Brigade and came down to -the wagon-lines, with the result that the whole of the 33rd Divisional -Artillery was able to see out in peace the old year which held for it -such mighty, such proud and such undying memories. - -In peace the old year went out, but by no means in idleness. On Boxing -Day orders had come for the preparation of ten reserve battery positions -to cover the Army defence zone and to be occupied in the event of a -German offensive on the Ypres sector, and every day before dawn working -parties from each battery set out in motor lorries to Potijze Château, -between which spot and Oxford Road the proposed positions lay. From -December 26th to January 7th the work was carried out during every hour -of daylight, for orders, inspired possibly by the fears of a German -Spring offensive, were imperative that the work should be pushed on as -hard as possible. - -On January 7th the work ceased temporarily and one section per battery -of each brigade went into the line again, relieving the 250th and 251st -Brigades of the 50th Divisional Artillery. January 8th saw the relief -complete, and once more the brigades were back in action, the 162nd -occupying the same positions around Gravenstafel, the 156th remaining as -before round Windmill Cabaret, Otto Farm (the pill-box where Captain -Gallie of A/156 was killed) and Van Issacker's Farm, but with two guns -of B/156 (Major Studd) and two 4·5 in. howitzers of D/156 (Major Jones) -in forward positions for use as anti-tank guns. The front to be covered -remained unchanged, while the "grouping" of the batteries showed but -little alteration—Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler commanding No. 1 Group -which consisted of the whole of the 156th Brigade and B/119, while No. 2 -group (162nd Brigade) was controlled by Major N. G. Jervis from a -pill-box east of Frezenburg. Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner commanded the -whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery group which was made up of the -156th, 162nd and 119th Brigades. - -The organisation and allocation of the brigades were therefore but -little changed since the previous tour of duty in the line before -Christmas, but a great difference showed itself in the attitude of the -enemy. Hostile artillery activity had died down in an extraordinary way, -and comparative quiet reigned in the battery area after the shell-storms -of the earlier period. Roads were only occasionally searched, battery -positions were subjected merely to a few sniping rounds or at most to -short neutralising bursts of fire, and the long concentrated -bombardments which previously had been the order of the day were now -exceptional events. "Quiet day," "light shelling of tracks," -"intermittent bursts of fire on Zonnebeke Road and Windmill Cabaret" -appear frequently in the official diaries of that period, and only on -two days—January 13th and 20th—did the hostile artillery show any marked -activity. On those two days the Zonnebeke-Windmill Cabaret area and the -Crest Farm-Meetcheele line were bombarded respectively, the latter very -heavily indeed, but these two outbursts marked isolated exceptions to -the quietness which had now set in and were not of long duration. - -On January 29th, after a most uneventful period in the line, one section -per battery of each brigade was relieved by the 50th Divisional -Artillery and marched again to the wagon-lines. Next day the relief was -completed and the batteries marched to the Oudezeele area, the gun line -parties handing over their guns in action and moving by lorry to the -first night's halting place, there to join up with the wagon-line -personnel who had marched by road in the ordinary way. The next day saw -a continuation of the move to Zudrove and Le Bas, and on February 1st -the ultimate rest billets were reached in Thiembronne, Merck St. Lievin -and Bout de la Ville. Here the batteries carried out the usual -overhauling and training, rejoicing at the quite phenomenal number of -"rests" which they had of late been enjoying. - -It was, indeed, most unusual for artillery to reach the rest area so -often as had the 156th and 162nd Brigades of late. Gunners were usually -kept in the line almost continuously, staying on after the infantry of -their division had been relieved and covering the incoming troops. A -scheme was now in practice by which the whole of the 33rd -Division—infantry and gunners alike—held the line together and went into -rest together, the 50th Division acting as their "opposite number," and -by this scheme the two brigades were benefiting. It could not last for -long—it was too good for that; but while it lasted it was wondrously -pleasant! - -There came an interruption in the ordinary routine of training on -February 12th; the 18-pdr. batteries of the 156th Brigade were ordered -to march to Tilques, there to have their guns calibrated by the -Sound-ranging Section, after which they were attached to the 98th -Infantry Brigade for tactical exercises. On the 14th the 18-pdrs. of -162nd Brigade were also calibrated, so that, by the 15th, all guns were -ready for the return into action which had been ordered for February -22nd. Before this march took place, however, C/162 (Major Hill) was -detached from the Divisional Artillery for special duties. On February -18th it marched to Tilques to join the 2nd Army Artillery School as a -training battery, and there it was left when once more the move to the -line was made. - -On February 19th the 156th Brigade moved to the Elnes area and on the -20th to La Nieppe, the 162nd Brigade reaching Renescure on the same day. -On the 21st advance parties from each brigade moved by rail to -Vlamertinghe to take over the wagon-lines of the 50th Divisional -Artillery, while the batteries continued their march to Zermezeele and -Rietveld—D/162, which had gone round by Tilques to calibrate its guns, -rejoining the rest of the brigade on this day. February 22nd saw the -arrival of the batteries at their wagon-lines east and south-east of -Vlamertinghe, the same which they had occupied on the return to action -in early January; A/162, however, remained near Goldfish Château, and -B/156 went to Ypres Asylum. On the 22nd also lorries took one section -per battery direct to the forward area, the 156th Brigade this time -relieving No. 2 Group (251st Brigade), the 162nd Brigade No. 1 Group -(250th Brigade). - -The relief was complete by Saturday, February 23rd, and on the next day -33rd Divisional Artillery Headquarters took over the control, at Menin -Gate, of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division on a -two thousand yard front opposite Passchendaele and due west of -Moorslede. On this occasion the 162nd Brigade took over the positions -previously held by the 156th along the Langemarck-Zonnebeke road, "A" -and D/162 (Major Fetherston and Major Lee) at Windmill Cabaret, some six -hundred yards north-west of Zonnebeke, B/162 (Major Cory) about two -thousand yards also to the north-west of the village, while Brigade -headquarters were situate in a pill-box one thousand yards north-east of -Frezenburg. The 156th Brigade positions, with the exception of Major -Carrell's battery (A/156) which remained at Otto Farm, were those which -had previously been held by the 162nd Brigade at Gravenstafel. - -The policy adopted by the batteries on their return into action now was -to remain quiet, only registration and calibration being carried out. -The enemy on the whole were also inactive until the end of the month; -one or two attempts were made to rush our advanced posts, and a large -raid was executed—unsuccessfully, however—upon the division on the -right. Apart from this, and from a certain amount of activity with -high-velocity guns upon our back areas, the enemy attitude was very -similar to ours. - -March saw a change in the general policy of the Germans holding this -part of the line. An ever-increasing volume of artillery fire began to -be directed upon our battery positions, while high-velocity guns were -continually searching the roads and back areas. On the 2nd nearly all -our batteries were heavily shelled, while severe bombardments were -carried out upon both flanks of the division; on the 3rd enemy -aeroplanes were very active and continued so for several days, -especially on the 7th when low-flying machines appeared everywhere. On -the 6th a big shoot was carried out on the Windmill Cabaret area N.W. of -Zonnebeke, and on the 9th the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery -were bombarded with gas shell. The front was indeed gradually boiling up -to a state of high enemy activity, and, with the fine weather which -supervened and the knowledge that an enemy offensive was almost -inevitably coming on some part of the front, the plan of action to deal -with such an emergency was continually tested. On March 10th in the -early morning all batteries fired "counter-preparation," a slow barrage -which was to be used in the event of an enemy attack being expected. On -this and the succeeding days fire was also directed upon special -targets, upon machine guns, dug-outs and likely places for the -concentration of hostile troops, while all batteries constantly -practised the drill of pulling their guns out of the pits at short -notice and of engaging targets on the flanks and at short ranges. - -On the 14th a heavy German raid was repulsed, a prisoner who had been -taken beforehand having given information concerning it, and on the 17th -all batteries again fired in response to an S.O.S. call at 4.40 A.M., -but in this case no infantry action took place. All this time the enemy -long-range guns were for ever bombarding Ypres, Wieltje, St. Jean, -Potijze and every road leading up from the back area, as many as one -thousand high-velocity shells being poured into the neighbourhood of -Ypres each day. At the same time battery positions, and especially the -area between "Seine" and Abraham Heights, were continually shelled, gas -at night being the usual practice. - -Thursday, March 21st, 1918, was a comparatively quiet day in the Ypres -sector. The batteries had not been worried much, and for their own -part had not done more than to direct bursts of fire upon enemy -dug-outs and machine guns which were annoying the infantry. About 1.0 -P.M., just as the detachments were sitting down to their midday meal, -came the first message, telephoned up from Divisional Headquarters, of -the beginning of the great German offensive in the south. Little news -was given beyond the fact that the attack had been launched and that -our troops, after giving up the advanced system, "were holding the -enemy on the main Army Defence Line." Every few hours further messages -came in, admitting certain losses of ground but stating that the enemy -was being held in the main, and that the day was going in our favour. -Such reports were certainly encouraging to the men, and in no way gave -any suggestion of defeat; bit by bit, however, names of villages which -had been captured by the enemy began to appear, and reference to a map -disclosed the disquieting fact that a deep penetration into our lines -had been made, a penetration which must necessarily become deeper -still owing to the loss of certain tactical points. Information was -very sparse and rumours immediately became rife everywhere, so that a -fair idea of the situation could hardly be obtained. It was, indeed, -of little use to worry; the batteries had their own share of the front -to look after and knew that, sooner or later, they would be plunged -into the battle themselves—"sufficient unto the day ..." then, for in -France it was not good to worry about troubles before they came. - -On March 25th the front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery was -extended some five hundred yards further to the south, S.O.S. lines -being rearranged accordingly, and on March 28th/29th one section each of -"B," "C" and D/156 moved out to alternate positions S.E. of Kansas -Cross, S.E. of Bostin Farm and east of Kansas Cross respectively. During -the preceding weeks the enemy had been constantly shelling the Abraham -Heights area with gas and had rendered it quite untenable, B/156 having -as many as forty gas casualties in one week; the change of position -described above had therefore become an urgent necessity. Although the -enemy artillery activity had died down since the 21st it was still -fairly vigorous, especially upon roads, back areas and wagon-lines—the -latter suffering considerably. - -A further extension of the brigade zones to the south was made on March -29th, and on the same day another section of "B," "C" and D/156 moved -back to the alternative positions described above. Next day Major Hill's -battery (C/162), which had left Tilques on the 27th and had marched up -via Godewaersvelde to wagon-lines at Goldfish Château, sent one section -into action at Bostin Farm, one thousand yards west of Zonnebeke Church, -to be joined by the rest of the battery on the night of March 31st/April -1st; by the end of March, therefore, the 33rd Division had its guns well -distributed in depth, and could be certain of giving adequate protection -to the infantry even should the latter be forced back behind the line of -forward guns. - -Thus the batteries remained for the first week of April. March had made -its exit with a heavy enemy bombardment on the evening of the 31st upon -the forward, battery and back areas, with a heavy gas concentration upon -the Frezenburg line, to all of which the batteries had at infantry -request responded. April came in, bringing with it little news save an -ever-increasing expectation of attack on the Divisional sector, and so -the first week passed while everybody held his breath, as it were, in -anticipation. - -On Sunday, April 7th, portions of the 156th and 162nd Brigades were -relieved by the 28th Army Field Artillery Brigade (Colonel Paynter) and -marched out to their wagon-lines near Vlamertinghe. On the 8th the -relief was completed and the batteries were all resting in the -wagon-lines, hourly expecting orders to move down south to the aid of -the hard-pressed 5th Army, for thither they all believed they were to -go, nor is it too much to say that considerable despondency was felt in -both Brigades at not being engaged in the battle then in progress. -Before any such orders were issued, however, an enemy offensive was -suddenly launched upon them from much nearer at hand, and, although the -162nd Brigade marched to the Peselhoek-Poperinghe area on April 9th, -there was to be neither for them nor for the 156th Brigade any rest. The -Germans were about to start their great attack in the north which grew -into a drive for the coast, and every man, every gun, every available -round of ammunition was needed in the great struggle shortly to begin. - - - - - CHAPTER X. - PART I. - THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN FLANDERS. - (APRIL-MAY 1918.) - - -Early on the morning of Tuesday, April 9th, there came to the batteries, -as they lay resting in their wagon-lines, the sound of tremendous -shelling to the south, a continuous thunder which was maintained -throughout the whole of that and the succeeding day (April 10th), giving -rise to considerable speculation and rumour. Clearly a great weight of -artillery was at work and almost certainly an attack was, if not already -begun, at least imminent, but what was happening and why did not the -batteries move up to take part in the battle? Of news or orders there -were none, and not for many hours did the men learn of the mighty German -thrust which even then was in progress, the thrust which, starting -between Givenchy and Bois Grenier on the 9th, spread northwards to -Messines on the 10th and marked the beginning of the greatest battle yet -seen on the Flanders front. - -At last, on the afternoon of April 10th, news came to the 156th Brigade -that the Germans had attacked and advanced on a long front between -Ploegsteert Wood and Givenchy; that they had taken Armentières and had -advanced well in the direction of Bailleul, though Neuve Église was -still ours, and that the batteries were to move up into action -immediately to stop this onslaught. At 5.0 P.M. the march began, and the -brigade set out for its rendezvous, a point about one mile -west-north-west of Neuve Église, which it reached in pitch darkness -after many weary hours on roads greatly congested by traffic and by -refugees who, in the last stage of exhaustion, had scarcely strength to -get out of the way of our troops. Here the situation was found to be -very obscure; nobody knew where the infantry were, but warnings were -received that parties of Germans were believed to be little more than a -mile to the south, and at any moment the guns might be called upon to -open fire. Consequently the horses remained fully harnessed up all night -and practically alongside the guns, the latter having their trails -dropped in a position ready to fire, Lewis guns and guards were posted -in every battery position, and so the brigade stood awaiting information -which would clear up a little the prevailing chaos. - -At three o'clock on the morning of Thursday, the 11th, the expected -orders arrived, and at half-past four began the march to Vierstraat, -where positions had been allotted to the brigade. By ten o'clock -Lieut.-Colonel Butler had completed his reconnaissance of Vierstraat -cross-roads, by half-past ten the four battery commanders were engaged -upon the same work, and midday saw the batteries in action bombarding -the enemy who had by then reached a line running just east of Wytschaete -and curving away thence towards the north-east. The battery positions -lay around Vierstraat and between that village and Kemmel, and from -observation stations north-east of Wytschaete the S.O.S. lines of the -guns were quickly registered. - -Meanwhile the 162nd Brigade, farther back in the Poperinghe rest area, -had also received urgent orders to move into action. On the morning of -April 10th the batteries had paraded for a drill order of the whole -brigade and had moved off to some open country near by to begin the -exercise. While this was actually in progress a dispatch rider arrived -and brought the parade to an abrupt conclusion, for he carried with him -orders for the brigade to join the 19th Division at Dranoutre -immediately and to move into action without a moment's delay. Leaving -Captain Pavitt (the Adjutant) to collect the batteries and lead them to -the rendezvous, Lieut.-Colonel Skinner (O.C. 162nd Brigade) set off by -motor with his orderly officer to report for orders to the C.R.A. 19th -Division near Neuve Église. Owing to various difficulties on the way -these orders were not received until 2.0 P.M., but their effect was that -Colonel Skinner should bring his batteries into action immediately near -Spanbroekmolen. As no horses were available, the reconnaissance of these -positions had to be carried out on foot and took a long time, but when -the positions were finally chosen the orderly officer (Lieut. -Bartholomew) was sent back to Dranoutre to await the arrival of the -batteries and to guide them to their positions. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - APRIL—AUGUST 1918. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E. - D.S.O. Durie, D.S.O., Bownass, M.C. - M.C. - - Brig.-Gen. G. H. W. Nicholson, Major W. A. T. - C.M.G. Barstow, D.S.O., - M.C. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major F. B. Major M. A. Major Barker, Major D. Jones, - Carrell. Studd, D.S.O., D.S.O., M.C. M.C. - M.C. - - Capt. S. G. - Taylor, M.C. - - Major W. G. - Sheeres, M.C. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner, D.S.O. (_wounded_). - - Lieut.-Colonel Ramsden. - - Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Warren, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt, M.C. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major G. Major H. C. Cory, Major M. M. I. Major F. L. Lee, - Fetherston, M.C. Body, M.C. M.C. - D.S.O., M.C. - - Major R. D. - Russell, M.C. - -Meantime Colonel Skinner set out to find the infantry Brigadier in that -part of the line, so that he might inform him of his plans. This was a -long and tedious business in an unknown place in a now dark and rainy -night, and, on finding the Brigadier, Colonel Skinner to his disgust, if -not surprise, was told that the positions he had chosen had, since he -had left them, practically fallen into the hands of the enemy. There was -only one thing to do, and that quickly. Setting out as fast as possible, -he covered the four miles to Dranoutre in pitch darkness and, arriving -there at the same time as the batteries, he stopped them and held a -consultation with the C.R.A. of the 19th Division, who had just been -shelled out of his headquarters. After a short discussion regarding the -general situation which, as can be judged by the foregoing narrative, -was very obscure, the batteries marched at once into action between -Rossignol Wood and Parrot Camp (North of Kemmel Village), and by 3.0 -A.M. on Thursday, April 11th, were in action, Brigade Headquarters being -at Parrot Camp. Thus they found themselves after a seventeen-mile march -along roads congested with troops, transport, refugees and cattle, a -march which had been preceded by over an hour's work on drill order the -previous morning; unfavourable conditions, those, to usher in one of the -greatest battles yet fought. - -From April 11th onwards the batteries were under the administration of -the 19th Division. Brig.-Gen. Stewart and his staff had, on April 9th, -handed over control of the artillery in the Passchendaele sector to -Colonel Paterson (119th Brigade R.F.A.), but had marched straight to -Dranoutre, and on the 11th remained with headquarters of the 33rd -Division. On that fateful day General Stewart commanded a composite -infantry brigade until the early morning of the 12th, when he took over -command of the artillery covering the infantry of the 33rd Division on -the Meteren front, south of the 156th and 162nd Brigades. The latter -were therefore left with the C.R.A. 19th Division. - -During this period from the 11th onwards both brigades underwent the -severest trials. Great demands were made upon them; the batteries were -required to shoot on a big area whenever an enemy attack showed signs of -developing, yet never did the guns fail to carry out their work. -Attempts were daily made to man O.P.'s on Kemmel Hill, but although the -gallantry of observing officers and signallers always enabled -communication to be established, the heavy and continuous fire which the -enemy brought to bear upon the hill rendered it impossible for that -communication to be maintained. In the case of the 156th Brigade -observation was usually carried out from a point north-east of -Wytschaete, while the batteries of the 162nd Brigade were able to obtain -a very good view of the enemy from the ridge just in front of the guns. - -From the moment that the batteries dropped into action they were shelled -almost continuously, but no infantry actions developed. This was in a -large part due probably to the efforts of the batteries, by which every -sign of concentration was smashed at the outset. Especially was this the -case on the 12th, when small bodies of the enemy were continually -advancing in the open, but were as continually broken up by the fire of -the guns. Every suspicion of movement was shelled and, whether movement -was visible or not, harassing fire was maintained night and day. On the -15th information was received that our line was to be withdrawn to -Vierstraat-Lindenhoek, but in the evening this retirement was cancelled, -and the fatal morning of April 16th dawned to find the batteries still -occupying the same positions. - -[Illustration: - - Scale. 1:20,000. -] - -A dense fog hung over the ground on Wednesday, 16th April, blotting out -all vision and deadening sound. There was no suggestion of an enemy -attack on the front covered by the batteries, no preliminary -bombardment—other than the continuous shelling which had characterised -every day since the offensive began—no S.O.S. signals, yet early in the -morning of that day the enemy made a heavy attack from the south and, -advancing his line in a north-westerly direction, captured Wytschaete -Ridge, Wytschaete Village and Wood, together with the Hospice and -Peckham. Apparently the Germans, making use of the thick fog, advanced -without an artillery barrage, and the same fog hid the infantry S.O.S. -signals. The first intimation of an attack was obtained by the Forward -Observing officer of the 156th Brigade, who from his O.P. three hundred -yards north-east of Wytschaete suddenly saw Germans twenty-five yards -away. He opened rifle fire upon these at point-blank range, but needless -to say was unable to stop them. He then tried to get away in order to -warn the neighbouring batteries, but was shot in the stomach and later -died of his wounds. The batteries, however, were by now fully roused and -were pouring gun fire into the advancing troops to try and check their -onslaught. Those of the 156th Brigade were just able to remain in their -positions, and, as soon as dawn broke, set up O.P.'s on the ridge of the -Kemmel-Vierstraat road, the original O.P.'s being by then in enemy -hands. From this ridge observed fire was directed all day upon -Wytschaete Village and Ridge, and great havoc was wrought amongst the -Germans as they advanced in the open. - -Meanwhile the 162nd Brigade was also enduring a deluge of shell similar -to that which was descending upon the 156th but, being further to the -right, was in more imminent danger of being captured, since the enemy -advance was, as already described, taking the form of a north-westerly -sweep from the south. Shorter and shorter grew the ranges of the guns, -until at last the necessity of a retirement became imperative; -reluctantly the withdrawal began, one section per battery at a time. In -this operation conspicuous gallantry was shown by all ranks, for the gun -positions were being torn and swept by a veritable tornado of shell -which rendered the approach of the teams well-nigh impossible. As an -instance of this, the retirement of a section of A/162 under Lieut. J. -R. B. Turner may well be quoted; such heavy fire was directed upon his -guns that the teams could not get near them, and guns and wagons had to -be manhandled out of action. Under a hail of shell each gun in turn was -saved, every temporary lull being taken advantage of for a team to dash -in, limber up and get clear, and ultimately the section was successfully -withdrawn. Similar deeds were enacted in every battery, and ultimately -the whole brigade was withdrawn, the leading sections coming into action -in fresh positions and covering the withdrawal of the remainder by their -fire. By this means every gun was saved, while the continuity of the -barrage covering our own infantry was never broken—a most gallant -performance by the personnel of the batteries, and a fine example of the -tactical handling of a brigade of artillery. - -After the first rush the enemy advance slowed down and ultimately -stopped, there being no further attack on the evening of the 16th nor on -the night of the 16th/17th. Lieut. Bruce and Lieut. McDonald of the -156th Brigade went forward to Byron Farm and got good information -regarding the position of the infantry, and during the whole of the -night the batteries kept up a slow harassing fire upon all likely places -where the enemy might concentrate for a further assault. 162nd Brigade -Headquarters, which had been set up in the ruins of a small cottage a -short distance in front of the new positions occupied by the batteries, -was heavily shelled, although hitherto the spot had been more or less -immune; after losing the wireless operator and several men, together -with a great deal of stores destroyed, it moved out and was established -at dawn with D/162. - -Thursday, April 17th, brought with it a heavy enemy bombardment of all -the battery positions. The 162nd Brigade, as a result of its retirement -on the previous day, lay east of the Millekruisse-Hallebast road, -between the road and Kemmel-Beek; Major Cory's battery (B/162) was on -the left, nearest Hallebast Corner, with C/162 (Major Body) next on the -right. A/162 (Major Fetherston) lay further to the right still, and then -came Major Lee's guns (D/162) on the Millekruisse-Kemmel road. The 156th -Brigade was still hanging on to the original positions held prior to the -enemy attack on the previous day, but the flashes of the more forward -batteries must have been clearly visible to the enemy on Wytschaete -Ridge, and the guns came in for a heavy gruelling. This did not prevent -them, however, from giving the utmost support to a counter-attack -launched by our infantry upon Wytschaete at 7.30 P.M., in which the guns -of the 162nd Brigade also took a large share. The counter-attack was -unsuccessful, and, with the enemy still on Wytschaete Ridge, the -necessity of a withdrawal of a portion of the 156th Brigade to a more -covered position became apparent. Next day (April 18th) a reconnaissance -was carried out and positions were chosen some one thousand yards -further west, behind the road known as Cheapside which ran parallel with -and about eleven hundred yards west of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road. On -the 19th these positions were occupied by two batteries and the guns -were registered from just in front, the whole Brigade except for Major -Carrell's battery (A/156) being now clustered around Lieut.-Colonel -Butler's headquarters in a line five hundred yards in length. A/156 lay -further to the north-east, little more than a quarter of a mile from -Ridge Wood. - -From April 17th until the 25th the enemy did not make any considerable -advance, and, although the batteries were daily shelled, a fair amount -of opportunity offered itself for strengthening the gun line. A certain -readjusting of positions also took place about this time. D/162 sent -forward a section under Lieut. Bennet and Lieut. Garrod to a position -two hundred yards south of Siege Farm, near the old position which had -been held prior to the loss of the Wytschaete Ridge, and from which some -excellent harassing fire was carried out. On the 22nd Major Studd -(B/156), with only four serviceable guns left, moved two of them some -three hundred yards further south on the Kemmel-Ridge Wood road, and to -this latter position was added on the 23rd a third gun, received that -morning from the I.O.M. On April 24th A/156, who had been very heavily -shelled on the previous day, moved two guns to a position three hundred -yards north of Siege Farm; the remainder were to have moved thither on -the morning of the 25th, but the events of that day, as will presently -be shown, put an end to any such ideas. About the 23rd also Major Jones -(D/156) put one 4·5 in. howitzer two hundred yards to the north of the -A/156 "Siege Farm" section. Thus the batteries were more split up, each -brigade having a main line of guns with detached sections thrown out -slightly in front, from which latter the majority of the firing was -done. - -Before the further operations on this front are described a word must -here be spoken of the battery wagon-lines. As a rule the wagon-lines -were looked upon as comparatively safe—a "cushy" job for those whose lot -it was to live there—but the wagon-lines during the German advance were -far from restful. True, they did not suffer the dense barrages which the -gun line had to face; but they were constantly shelled by high-velocity -guns at long range, a most disconcerting performance which meant that -day and night, at odd intervals, a shell would crash into the crowded -horse-lines or work havoc amongst the men's bivouacs, and even -occasional shells are terribly upsetting when they burst amongst a mass -of horses. In addition, enemy aeroplanes came nightly and scattered -bombs along the length and breadth of the lines, while daily the weary -drivers and teams had to make their way up to the batteries with -ammunition, usually being shelled all along the road. The consequent -strain upon horses and men may well be imagined. - -Throughout this period the wagon-lines were kept in two portions—a -forward wagon-line, in which were kept the gun teams and such wagons as -were necessary to the batteries in a move of any emergency, and rear -wagon-lines where lived the main body of drivers and teams. From April -12th until the loss of Kemmel on April 25th the forward wagon-lines of -both brigades were situated between Hallebast Corner and Vierstraat, the -rear wagon-lines of the 156th Brigade being in the Reninghelst-Ouderdom -area, while those of the 162nd Brigade lay at first at Canada Corner, -north of Locre, moving on the 17th to the area between Reninghelst and -Busseboom. There they were all kept continually moving, sometimes in -Reninghelst, sometimes nearer Busseboom, every spot they inhabited being -shelled by the enemy and, after a very short period, rendered -uninhabitable. In both rear and advanced wagon-lines the casualties -amongst horses and men mounted rapidly, but it is safe to say that the -"emergency" teams at Hallebast Corner had far the worst time. - -To return to the tactical situation, however. On April 19th both -brigades had been put under the command of the C.R.A. 9th Division, but -on the 22nd the French 28th Division came up into the line and the -French Artillery Commander took over control of the 162nd Brigade. -Headquarters of the latter moved over to Scherpenberg to be near the -French commander, but the distance from there to the batteries was too -great for any efficient control to be carried on, and permission was -obtained by Lieut.-Colonel Skinner to move his headquarters back to -Millekruisse so as to be near the batteries, and also near the commander -of a "groupe" of French artillery which had just come up and lay in -action to the east of and near the village. Lieut. Norton (C/162), who -could speak French fluently, was left as liaison officer with the -"C.R.A." of the French division. - -The disposition of the two brigades on April 24th, therefore, was as -follows. The batteries of the 156th were grouped together about 1,800 -yards due north of Kemmel, with an advanced section of 18-pdrs. (A/156) -and one advanced 4·5 in. howitzer (D/156) near Siege Farm and about 600 -yards in front of the main line of guns. Lieut.-Colonel Butler's -headquarters were right amongst his guns, between "C" and B/156, but the -remaining two sections of A/156 were some 1,200 yards to the north-east -and were so far away that, when the battle began on April 25th, it was -found impossible to exercise command over them. - -The 162nd Brigade also lay together between the Millekruisse-Hallebast -road and the Kemmel-Beek, and therefore slightly in rear of the 156th -Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters were in Millekruisse, and -in this case one advanced section of 4·5 in. howitzers (D/162) was -thrown forward in a position just west of Rossignol Wood. - -As far as communications were concerned, a party of scouts was kept on -the top of Mount Kemmel in visual signalling with the guns, while O.P.'s -were manned at Desinet Farm, at Vierstraat Cross-roads and elsewhere, -whence good observation of Wytschaete Valley and Wood and all the -country to Spanbroekmolen was obtainable; these O.P.'s were also in -visual communication with the guns, but the fog and smoke during the -battle of the 25th rendered all their work impossible. Each brigade had, -in addition, a liaison officer with the infantry battalion in the line, -and therefore the system of communication between infantry and -artillery, and the observation kept upon the enemy by the guns, was as -good as could be hoped for. Buried cables, however, were scarce, and it -needed but a few well-placed shells to cut off all connection of this -kind. - -April 24th was an unusually quiet day, though prior to this date the -enemy counter-batteries had been very active, each of our batteries -being carefully and accurately registered. This may have been done by -sound-rangers, but stringent precautions to avoid being located by them -were taken, and the universal opinion, which was reported by Colonel -Butler to Corps Headquarters, was that the location of the batteries was -being carried out by expert observers in the German balloons. These had -come very close to the line and numbers of them were constantly in the -air, entirely unmolested either by the Flying Corps or by the R.G.A. -April 24th, therefore, gave little hint of what was coming, unless the -exceptional activity of the German anti-aircraft guns were taken as a -sign. The quietness, however, was soon to be broken; at 1.0 A.M. on -Friday the 25th a few of the batteries were warned that an enemy attack -might be expected at dawn, but the remainder were completely unaware -that any untoward events were impending until suddenly, at 2.0 A.M., -there descended upon them with a roar and a crash the most appalling -barrage that they had ever yet undergone. - -With a fairly extensive experience of shelling, it was acknowledged by -all ranks that never before had such a bombardment been endured. In the -battery positions it was hell, the gunners working their pieces in a -perfect hailstorm of shell fire, while, to add to this tremendous test -of endurance, a large proportion of the barrage consisted of gas shell -which necessitated the wearing of gas helmets by all ranks. How any of -the guns or gunners survived that terrible morning remains to this day a -mystery, yet survive it they did and to most excellent effect. The -barrage which enveloped the guns was also beating down upon the front -line system, and the batteries, in order to show the infantry that they -were not forgotten, opened fire on their S.O.S. lines. It was soon very -clear, however, that an attack was imminent, and accordingly -"counter-preparation" was begun and continued for several hours. - -From 2.0 A.M. until 5.30 A.M. the barrage did not relax, but from 4.30 -A.M. onwards high explosive gradually superseded gas shell until the -bombardment became one almost entirely of high explosive. Although this -change did even more to wreck the battery positions than had the -chemical shell, it at least dispersed the gas and enabled the men -ultimately to remove their respirators; they were by now almost dropping -with the physical exhaustion of firing their guns at top speed in gas -helmets, combined with the nervous strain of this terrific bombardment, -and a breath of fresh air came to them as a blessed relief. - -At 5.30 A.M. a considerable bombardment was maintained on the battery -positions, but the full fury of the barrage dropped back on to the -infantry and, after resting on the trenches for about forty-five -minutes, began to creep forward towards the batteries once more. Under -cover of this creeping barrage the enemy infantry advanced to the -assault, and as it rolled up inexorably towards the guns again—who all -this time were being pounded and smashed by the enemy artillery—the -Germans advanced swiftly over the front line and began to approach the -battery area. Thick fog enveloped their movements, practically every -telephone wire was cut and, as the same fog prevented any visual -signalling at all, the situation became extremely obscure. With a -visibility of only fifty yards it was impossible for battery commanders -to know when the enemy might not be right up to and amongst the guns. - -At 6.10 A.M. the infantry got through their last message to the guns; on -a buried cable to 156th Brigade Headquarters the company commander of a -front-line company stated that he was still being shelled, but that the -Germans had so far made no movement. Shortly afterwards the cable was -destroyed and a terrible silence, as far as information was concerned, -set in. It would appear that, very shortly after the despatch of that -last message, the enemy assault was delivered. - -At about 7.0 A.M. Lieut.-Colonel MacCullock of the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. rode -up to the battery positions. His battalion had been lying in support in -the valley of the Kemmel-Beek, where it had been heavily gas shelled, -and he now decided to move up to a line of disused trenches on the -forward slopes of Hill 44, just in front of the guns. While his men were -settling down into position, Colonel MacCullock rode up along the main -road to find out what was happening towards Wytschaete, and, penetrating -as far as the Grand Bois, he discovered that this was still in our -hands, whereupon he returned to complete his dispositions for the -defence of Hill 44. While this was still in progress, Lieut. Phipps -(156th Brigade) returned from Desinet Farm at about 7.50 A.M. and -reported that the enemy's rifle fire had got very near. Owing to the fog -he had been unable to see any Germans, but there was no doubt but that -they were rapidly approaching; he further added that there were -practically no French troops to be seen in that area. Even while he was -making his report some French infantry retired through the line of guns, -shouting that the enemy were in Kemmel village and were coming on fast. -It was therefore clear that there now remained no infantry between the -guns and the enemy except for the K.O.Y.L.I. whose right flank -terminated in front of B/156, there being from there southwards an -ominous gap. - -At 8.45 A.M. patrols sent out reported that there were no British troops -to be seen on the other side of the Kemmel-Vierstraat road, and -following almost immediately upon this news small parties of Germans -were seen coming across the road. These were immediately engaged by such -of the guns as were still serviceable, but by 10 A.M. the enemy had -pushed across the road and, although he did not appear to have made much -progress in the visible ground near Godizonne Farm, had got beyond Siege -Farm further to the south and was within five hundred yards of the -batteries. - -Shortly before this last period a decision had had to be come to as to -the withdrawal of the guns. The only infantry in the neighbourhood were -the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. and some stragglers of the late front-line battalion -whom Major Barker (C/156) had collected to form an escort to his guns; -the line held by these troops ran about one hundred yards in front of -the batteries, but stopped on the right at Hill 44, and south of this -point no troops were to be seen at all. Northwards the left of the -K.O.Y.L.I. was continued by some other infantry, but the whole line was -terribly thin and could not hope to stop a determined rush by the enemy. -Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel Skinner were therefore faced -with this problem:—Hill 44, a slight rise in the ground on the -Ridge-Wood—Kemmel road, had a surprisingly good command over the country -from Dickebusch Lake round by the west to the northern slopes of Mount -Kemmel; it was, therefore, very important to hold it. For this purpose -the only infantry available were the 9th K.O.Y.L.I., but they were in -the best of spirits. On the other hand, reconnaissance showed that, -whereas the Germans were only using volatile gas on Hill 44, they were -using mustard gas some 700 yards to the rear, and the natural deduction -was that Hill 44 was part of the enemy objective. If, therefore, the -enemy gained the hill he would capture the guns _en bloc_, and there -would be no further obstacle to impede his progress. It was accordingly -decided to withdraw, one by one, a proportion of those guns which were -still undamaged, but to keep the remainder in action in their present -positions until the retired guns, from a line further back, could open a -full volume of covering fire upon the enemy opposite Hill 44. - -Hitherto the tactical continuity of the narrative has been maintained in -order to relate, as clearly as possible, the true story of the attack by -which the Germans captured Kemmel Hill, but now a digression must be -made so as to follow closely the action of the batteries in their -withdrawal. To do this, the story of each Brigade will be taken -separately, beginning with the 156th. - -At 9.0 A.M., shortly after the first crossing of the Kemmel-Vierstraat -road by the Germans, the order to prepare for a withdrawal was issued -from Lieut.-Colonel Butler's headquarters. Since as early as 6.0 A.M. -A/156 had in its main position only one gun capable of firing, and by -8.45 A.M. this gun also had been silenced; therefore, on receipt of -Colonel Butler's message, the battery withdrew from its main position -and moved to a fresh line in the direction of Ouderdom. Shortly -afterwards a section of Major Barker's battery (C/156) was also -withdrawn. - -By 11 A.M. practically all the ammunition in B/156 southern position had -been expended, and moreover the guns were unable, owing to trees, to -fire at ranges of less than 1,200 yards. Major Studd therefore removed -the breech-blocks and dial sights from these guns and, sending back a -portion of his detachments to the wagon-lines to hurry up the teams -which had already been sent for, concentrated his efforts on the two -guns which he had kept in a position 300 yards further north. Of these -two guns, one was taken away by a team belonging to C/156 to a -previously reconnoitred spot north of La Clytte; the other was run -forward by hand, with the assistance of nine men of the K.O.Y.L.I., for -a distance of some one hundred yards to the crest of the hill, whence -Major Studd and his four remaining gunners engaged the enemy over open -sights at a range of 300 yards. - -By 11.15 A.M. the remaining two sections of C/156 were in full view of -the enemy, some five hundred yards away, and, as their ammunition was -running out, a withdrawal to a line north of La Clytte was decided upon. -From a position of assembly two hundred yards to the rear the limbers -were brought up, one at a time; the first gun got away without being -fired upon; the second and third escaped under heavy rifle fire, but the -lead driver of the fourth gun took it through a patch of soft ground -which made the pace so slow that all the horses and one of the drivers -were shot, and the gun had to be abandoned for the time. The withdrawal -of this battery was rendered very difficult by the fact that there were -only one sergeant and six men still unwounded; all the officers and the -remaining other ranks had been either killed or disabled, though Major -Barker continued to command his battery despite his wound. They had put -up a most brilliant fight, and the gallantry of all ranks was -unsurpassable, typical of every battery on this grim morning. - -There remained now only the advanced section of A/156, D/156, and the -single gun of B/156. The advanced section of A/156 (Lieut. Blackwell in -charge) for a long time had been firing upon the enemy at point-blank -range; early in the morning teams were sent up to try and save these two -guns, but the rapid advance of the enemy had not been realised and, -fight to the last though they did with the enemy all around them, the -guns together with their teams were captured. The advanced gun of D/156 -near by had been knocked out earlier in the day and had to be abandoned, -after the withdrawal of dial sights and breech-blocks. D/156 main -position had also to be abandoned temporarily. - -Thus, by 11.0 A.M. the only gun in action in the forward positions was -the solitary 18-pdr. manned by Major Studd and his four men. This little -party was now joined by Colonel Butler who, by his quiet bearing and -confidence, greatly inspired both gunners and infantry. He collected and -controlled a party of machine gunners whose officer had just been -killed, and for some time remained with Major Studd's gun, the capture -of which was only prevented by the thin line of K.O.Y.L.I. in front. -Machine guns and a 5·9 in. howitzer worried this party considerably, but -steady harassing fire was kept upon the enemy and prevented them from -making any further advance. - -At about 11.30 A.M. this single gun was switched round through 180° to -fire on some Germans who were making for La Clytte, almost directly in -rear. At first about twenty of the enemy were visible who, on being -fired at, ran back one hundred yards into some scrub. This movement, -however, caused some three hundred of the enemy to get up and bunch -round their officers. Major Studd turned his gun on these and obtained a -number of bursts right amongst them, with the result that they ran back -five hundred yards into a patch of dead ground. - -So the morning wore on, the enemy making no considerable advance since -he had established himself well across the Kemmel-Vierstraat road. By -1.0 P.M. the ammunition of B/156 solitary gun had all been expended; as -its presence was drawing fire upon the K.O.Y.L.I., it was run back -behind the slope, and Major Studd, removing breech-block and dial sight, -set out with his four men to find out what had happened to the remainder -of his battery. - -Thus, at 1.0 P.M., the last gun of the 156th Brigade ceased to operate -in the forward positions; all the remainder had either got away or been -silenced by 11.0 A.M., and it only remained to remove those which had -had to be abandoned. At 5.0 P.M. in the evening Captain S. G. Taylor -took up teams and attempted to save the guns of B/156, but was only able -to reach the single gun in the northern position as it was impossible in -the darkness to tell where the enemy was. During the night of 25th/26th -and the morning of the 26th the howitzers of D/156 (less the advanced -one, which had been hit) were removed from under the enemy's nose, as -was also the one gun of C/156 which had been abandoned, and on the -morning of the 26th also Captain Taylor brought up his teams and saved -the three guns of B/156 in broad daylight with the enemy only four -hundred yards away—a very fine performance. - -So ended the doings of the 156th Brigade on April 25th; three guns had -fallen into the hands of the enemy, but all the remainder, although a -few had temporarily to be abandoned, were saved; in every case the guns -had been fought to the last, tremendous casualties being inflicted upon -the enemy. Let us now turn to the 162nd Brigade and follow their doings -also on this memorable day. - -The four batteries of the 162nd Brigade had, in common with all the -other guns, been enveloped in the tremendous barrage which the enemy put -down at two o'clock in the morning. In spite of this terrific storm of -shell—the intensity of which may be judged from the fact that Lieut. -Squire of B/162 was killed by the concussion of the bursting shell all -around him, his body being otherwise unwounded—the detachments under -their battery officers' control maintained a steady rate of fire upon -the enemy. All communication between "A," "B" and C/162 and Brigade -headquarters completely broke down, and runners were either killed or -prevented by wounds from reaching their destination; to quote the words -of one who was a witness of the batteries' deeds:—"Standing on the -fringe of that barrage was hell enough for me; to think of Fetherston, -Body, Lee and Cory (the four battery commanders) and all the others -walking about in their batteries in the thick of it—I don't know how -they ever got out." Casualties came thick and fast amongst the -detachments, guns were disabled or completely knocked out, yet the fire -of the guns never faltered, and all through the morning they offered a -determined opposition to the enemy advance. - -The first guns to move back were, of course, the forward section of -D/162 at Rossignol Wood. By great good fortune the wire between this -forward section and the main battery position remained intact, as did -also the wire from there on to Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's headquarters, -and the most useful information was thereby transmitted to the -Divisional Commander. At about 8.0 A.M., the enemy being then almost on -top of the two forward guns, orders were sent to Major Lee to withdraw -this section, and teams were immediately sent forward under Lieut. -Escott to carry this into effect. Making their way through the barrage, -the little party reached the forward section just as the latter, who had -been firing at intense rate the whole morning, had expended practically -all the ammunition. In front the enemy were only three hundred yards -away; on either flank they had worked right round until they had almost -closed in on the guns, yet the withdrawal was carried out successfully -under heavy rifle, machine-gun and shell fire, the gunners with their -officers walking beside the guns. It is impossible to say too much for -such a fine feat; the section, under two young officers (Lieut. Bennet -and Lieut. Garrod, and later Lieut. Escott who was in charge of the -teams), had been in a very exposed and advanced position; it came under -the most intense fire both prior to and during the retirement, every -horse in both teams—there were no wagons—was hit, yet the guns were -saved without the loss of a single small store, and all the wounded were -brought safely away. In recognition of this performance every driver of -both teams was awarded the Military Medal. - -Shortly after the return of this advanced section to the main line of -guns, the withdrawal of the latter to previously reconnoitred positions -began. The batteries had now been firing for many hours in the face of a -perfect hail of shell, and, great as had been the tenacity and -determination shown by officers and men in keeping up a vigorous rate of -fire upon the enemy in spite of terrific retaliation, still greater -tenacity and courage was shown in the carrying out of the retirement. -For some time past not a single runner had succeeded in making the -double journey from Brigade Headquarters to the batteries and back, each -man in turn falling a victim to the intensity of the enemy barrage, but -finally Lieut. Stanley-Clarke of B/162, with much good fortune and -considerable gallantry, succeeded in conveying to the guns the order to -withdraw. - -Gun by gun the retirement began, each battery retaining a proportion of -its guns in the forward position until the remainder had got safely -away. It was a performance on the part of the officers, gunners and -drivers which has never been surpassed; while other brigades were being -forced to abandon their guns, the 162nd Brigade retained practically its -full tactical powers. Only three guns, two of C/162 and one of A/162, -could not be removed until nightfall and were then got away with the -enemy only a few hundred yards distant, but not one single gun was lost -to the Germans by the 162nd Brigade on April 25th, and in this -achievement they stood practically alone. Many of the neighbouring -batteries of other Divisions had earlier been silenced or had been -forced to abandon their guns, and too much praise cannot be given to the -officers and men of this Brigade who, in the face of overwhelming -short-range fire, continued to serve their guns long after they might -reasonably have been expected to retire, and even then withdrew them in -an orderly manner. - -On the withdrawal of the batteries being completed, Brigade Headquarters -moved back to a prearranged rendezvous on the Reninghelst-Ouderdom road. -No horses or transport could come up to assist in this, and the entire -equipment had to be carried by the Headquarters' staff under the -direction of Captain Pavitt (the Adjutant). A number of casualties were -suffered during the march from shell-fire and from low-flying -aeroplanes, but ultimately the new control-post was reached and command -of the batteries was carried out from there. - -Thus has been described in detail the story of the two brigades and the -part they played in one of the great battles which threatened the -Channel ports. Before we return to the main narrative again and describe -the doings of the rest of that day, a word must be said of the officers -and men who put up such a wonderful fight. Names have already been -mentioned in connection with deeds of especial gallantry, and yet with -hesitation has this been done, for how can one name in one battery be -singled out from amongst the others when all behaved in such a -magnificent way? Every officer, every man on that day showed such -gallantry as can never be surpassed, and proud should be he who can say, -"I served with the 33rd Divisional Artillery on April 25th, 1918!" - -Yet two names must be mentioned, for without them this narrative would -be incomplete. Through all the trials and horrors of the day, through -all the great strain of the whole of this period every battery was -inspired and encouraged by the presence of the two Brigade Commanders, -Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler and Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Skinner. When -times were grim and depressing, when the enemy seemed to be pushing -remorselessly on, when the brigades, with their backs to the wall, -appeared to be forgotten by God and man, there was ever the presence of -those two to cheer up and hearten the weary spirits of their officers -and men. With the control of the artillery continually passing from one -Division to another, even from one nation to another, but little was -done for the gunners who were left to look after themselves. Orders from -above were few and far between, and in many cases came too late to be of -any use; communications from Division and Corps were seldom received, -and it remained with the two Brigade Commanders to discuss between -themselves the situation as it appeared to them, and to issue orders to -the batteries accordingly. The battery commanders and their officers and -men—wonderfully gallant fellows all—had behind them the moral support of -their Brigade Commanders, but Lieut.-Colonel Butler and Lieut.-Colonel -Skinner had no such comforting support from above. Yet they were for -ever calm, confident and cheerful, and bore the tremendous strain of -acting on their own initiative in a way which the batteries strove hard -to repay. Colonel Skinner was wounded on May 10th and taken away in an -ambulance; Colonel Butler met a soldier's death in the final British -advance in the autumn, but the names of both will ever bring to the -minds of those who served under them a sense of deep gratitude and a -happy memory of a very highly valued friendship. - -The main narrative of the battle was broken off at the point where, at -10.0 A.M., the Germans had established themselves firmly across the -Kemmel-Vierstraat road and had pushed on past Siege Farm towards the -battery positions. It was about this time—shortly before it, to be -exact—that the withdrawal of the 156th Brigade had begun, and it was -about now that the culminating point of the battle was reached. Having -got past Siege Farm, the enemy advance seemed to slow down as though -requiring a breathing space, and for this the fire of the guns and of -the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. who were still on Hill 44 was largely responsible. At -11.30 A.M., as already recounted, a strong attempt was made by some five -hundred of the enemy to work round by the south to La Clytte so as to -cut off the retreat of our troops, but this manœuvre was defeated, and -Colonel MacCullock, taking the initiative, decided to counter-attack -without delay. As many guns as could be collected were warned of the -plan but, just as the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. prepared to launch their assault, a -counter-attack was delivered by fresh British troops from the direction -of La Clytte, with the result that Colonel MacCullock considered that -any movement on his part was unnecessary. - -A condition of stalemate now ensued. Whenever the enemy showed himself -he was fired on, while he on his part began sniping very actively. -Artillery fire was slow, taking the form of occasional rounds thrown -about promiscuously and varied by five-minute barrages. The roads, -however, were kept under constant fire by enemy high-velocity guns, -while counter-battery work on both sides was maintained. About 3.30 P.M. -one section of A/162, still in action near Millekruisse, fired at the -request of the infantry on some Germans who were collected in huts on -the far side of Cheapside, and shortly afterwards our infantry -reinforcements arrived. - -The situation now seemed well in hand, and during that night and the -following day no further enemy advance took place. The 162nd Brigade, -having succeeded in withdrawing all its guns except three, was able to -come into action again immediately, and indeed some of its guns were in -their fresh positions before the withdrawal of the remainder had begun. -Therefore in a very short time they were all bombarding the enemy from a -line east of the Zevecoten-Ouderdom road and, under the orders of the -9th Division, were covering an infantry brigade of the 49th Division -along the La Clytte-Millekruisse road. The 156th Brigade had fewer -serviceable guns and did not come into action again as a unit until next -day, when positions were taken up one mile north of La Clytte and were -occupied until the 28th. On the night of the 28th/29th the 156th Brigade -pulled out and began to march to the Winnezeele rest area; the German -attack on the 29th, about to be described, delayed this march for a few -hours, but ultimately Winnezeele was reached. Next morning (30th) this -brigade was again called up into action, but only for a few hours, and -ultimately returned to Winnezeele with the prospect of a few days of -rest ahead. - -From April 26th to 28th the whole of the battery area was heavily -shelled by the enemy, while the roads and wagon-lines were searched by -high-velocity guns. The wagon-lines, indeed, came in for a very bad time -and, after being shelled out of different camps, came ultimately to rest -about one mile west-south-west of Poperinghe, with forward wagon-lines -between Ouderdom and Reninghelst. On the 26th Lieut.-Colonel Skinner's -headquarters were shelled out and forced to move to Reninghelst, and on -the 27th the whole of the 162nd Brigade changed positions; "A," "B" and -"C" batteries occupied an area near Goed Moet Mill, east-north-east of -Ouderdom, "D" battery moved 600 yards north of Ouderdom, while Brigade -headquarters went to De Drie Goen Farm. - -On Tuesday, April 29th, even while the relief of the 156th Brigade was -still in progress, the combined effort of both brigades was called upon -to resist yet another German attack, for at 5.0 A.M. the enemy assaulted -with eleven divisions in mass formation, the density being from six to -eight bayonets to the yard. It was again the same story, from the -batteries' point of view, of terrific shelling resolutely borne, but -this time there was the satisfaction of knowing that the work of the -guns had been successful. The attack, after getting up to within one -hundred yards of the line held by the 49th Division, was repulsed, as -was also a second assault at 6.0 A.M.; the German effort to turn the -Ridge Wood flank proved a costly failure, and the enemy dead lay in rows -in front of our line. - -The fight of April 29th was the last big episode of the German offensive -in Flanders. From that date onwards there were a number of local actions -but no large-scale attacks, nor was any serious penetration made by the -enemy. From May 1st until the 7th the 162nd Brigade continued to bombard -the enemy and to be heavily shelled in return. On the 6th -Brigadier-General Stewart and his Staff took over from the C.R.A. 9th -Division the control of the artillery covering the front, which extended -from Kruisstraathoek cross-roads on the north to just south of -Vierstraat. This artillery consisted of the 50th, 51st and 122nd -Brigades (9th Division), the 149th Brigade (30th Division) and the 162nd -Brigade. On the 7th/8th, however, one section of the 162nd Brigade was -relieved by the 121st and marched into rest at Winnezeele, while at the -same time the 156th Brigade came up from the back area and took over the -positions of the 149th Brigade, in the very area where the wagon-lines -had been when the batteries were in action at Passchendaele five short -weeks earlier. - -April 29th had been the last large-scale operation which the enemy -undertook on the Lys front, but Thursday, May 8th, saw a most determined -local action, in which the 156th Brigade and the two sections per -battery of the 162nd Brigade still in the line took an active part. At -3.0 A.M. on the morning of the 8th the enemy put down a very heavy -barrage on the battery and back areas, to which was added, at 5.0. A.M., -a severe bombardment on the front system. All the morning until 11.0 -A.M. this barrage continued, and under cover of it the Germans attacked. -The right brigade front was penetrated, but the left brigade formed a -defensive flank from Hallebast Corner to the southern end of Dickebusch -Lake. All day long the batteries fired on their S.O.S. lines, a steady -rate being maintained until 6.15 P.M., when a quarter of an hour's -intense bombardment was followed by a counter-attack on the part of the -19th Infantry Brigade. By this counter-attack all objectives were -regained except on the extreme left where the situation remained -obscure, and, after a night of intermittent harassing fire with -counter-preparation fired at 3.30 A.M. in the morning (9th), the -remainder of the 162nd Brigade withdrew from the line and marched to -Winnezeele for a short period of rest. - - SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY - - BY - - FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., - COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE. - - I wish to convey to all ranks of the Royal Regiment of Artillery my - deep appreciation of the splendid service rendered by them in all - stages of the Somme and Lys battles since the opening of the enemy's - attack. - - The difficult conditions imposed by a defensive fight against - greatly superior numbers have been faced with the same skill, - courage and devotion to duty which characterised the work of all - branches of the Artillery throughout the offensive battles of 1917. - With less constant and loyal co-operation on the part of both field, - heavy and siege batteries, the great bravery and determination of - the infantry could scarcely have availed to hold up the enemy's - advance. The infantry are the first to admit the inestimable value - of the artillery support so readily given to them on all occasions. - - The knowledge possessed by each arm, doubly confirmed by the severe - tests already passed through successfully, that it can rely with - absolute confidence upon the most whole-hearted and self-sacrificing - co-operation of the other is the greatest possible assurance that - all further assaults of the enemy will be met and defeated. I thank - the Artillery for what it has already done, and count without fear - of disappointment upon the maintenance of the same gallant spirit - and high standard of achievement in the future. - - (Signed) D. HAIG, F.-M., - British Armies in France. - - General Headquarters. - _May 9th, 1918._ - - - - - CHAPTER X. - PART II. - HOLDING THE ENEMY IN THE NORTH. - (MAY-AUGUST 1918.) - - -Following on the two checks which had been administered to the Germans -on April 29th and May 8th, there now set in a period of holding the line -and of taking every possible step to prevent the enemy from renewing the -offensive. From May 9th until the 12th counter-preparation was fired -morning and evening, and to the weight of artillery employed in this was -added, on the 10th, three groups of the French 47th Regiment of -Artillery together with the 107th French heavy battery. On the same day -also the 44th French Regiment relieved the 19th Infantry Brigade. - -On May 12th the 162nd Brigade, after a very short three days' rest, -moved into action in the II. Corps area and relieved the 17th Brigade -R.F.A. in the vicinity of Salvation Corner, Ypres. A/162 relieved the -13th Battery, "B" the 26th, "C" the 92nd and "D" relieved D/17, and here -they remained under the command of the C.R.A. 29th Division until the -17th. On Friday, the 17th, after an uneventful period they were -themselves relieved by the 187th Brigade (41st Divisional Artillery) and -moved to their wagon-lines one and three-quarter miles E.N.E. of -Poperinghe, continuing the march next day to wagon-lines in fields one -mile north-east of Houtkerque. Previous to this the 156th Brigade had -come out of action on the 12th and had marched on the 15th to Clifford -Rest Camp, near Proven; the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, -therefore, was now concentrated in II. Corps Reserve. - -From May 18th to the 31st a period of rest and training—very badly -needed by all ranks—was enjoyed. The two brigades were attached to the -49th Division, and were detailed to support with the latter the right -flank of the Belgian Army in case of enemy attack. This involved a -certain amount of reconnaissance of various battery positions to cover -the different lines of defence, but apart from this there was little to -do, and the blessed absence of shell-fire and of constant expectation of -attack came as a tremendous relief. - -On the 20th General Sir Herbert Plumer inspected the 33rd Division, in -the following week all guns were recalibrated at Tilques, and on the -29th, as a final distraction, the 162nd Brigade held mounted and -dismounted sports at D/162 wagon-lines. A final distraction it was, for -on May 31st orders were received for the two brigades to relieve the -245th and 246th Brigades (49th Divisional Artillery) in the Ypres -sector, and on June 1st the march began. - -The relief was spread over two days, but the morning of Tuesday, June -3rd, found the whole of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in action just -south of Ypres—an area which the men were beginning to regard with an -air of regular proprietorship. Both brigades occupied positions midway -between Vlamertinghe and Ypres; with main wagon-lines just east and -north-east of Poperinghe, and forward wagon-lines in the vicinity and -north-west of Vlamertinghe, the batteries settled down to cover the -right brigade of the 6th Division opposite Voormezeele. - -From June 3rd to the 7th the time was passed in harassing the enemy, -while he in return kept up a heavy shelling of the battery positions and -roads. On Saturday the 8th, at 4.57 A.M., the French 46th Regiment on -the right attacked Ridge and Scottish Woods under cover of a barrage, in -which the 33rd Divisional Artillery took part, and captured both places, -but counter-attacks at noon left Ridge Wood in enemy hands again. On the -8th also the 33rd Division relieved the 6th Division, and the two -brigades found themselves covering their own infantry once more. - -During the rest of June little of any importance took place. On the 10th -Major Lee's battery (D/162) moved its position some 500 yards further -south to some old horse standings, and during the whole of this period -considerable counter-battery work was carried on by both brigades with -excellent effect. On June 13th the French attacked and captured Ridge -Wood for the second time, but again lost it in a counter-attack during -the afternoon. On the 20th two raids were carried out, one by the 1st -Middlesex on Lankhof Château, just north of Voormezeele, at 12.15 A.M., -the other by the 2nd Worcesters at the same hour on Manor Farm, south of -Zillebeke. The latter was completely successful, but in the Middlesex -raid the British covering party met a German covering party in No Man's -Land at three minutes before "zero." Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued -and the British covering party, reinforced by the raiders who were -forming up at the time, drove the enemy back to his trenches. No -identifications were, however, obtained. - -Following this raid there was but little hostile retaliation. The enemy -activity had died down considerably of late, although from the 17th to -the 19th heavy area shell-storms occurred once more upon the guns, and -indeed it seemed that the enemy was devoting all his attention to the -battery and back areas. This, in fact, was hardly surprising. The chief -work of the 156th and 162nd Brigades at the time was the bombardment of -enemy roads and battery positions, and in the latter considerable -success had attended their efforts. Many explosions were caused amongst -the enemy batteries which were the targets, and it was only natural—a -compliment, in fact, to the accuracy of the British guns—that the -Germans should turn the chief blast of their hatred upon the originators -of this trouble. - -Thus the month passed out uneventfully but uncomfortably, and July came -in to continue the conditions which had been prevailing. On June 30th a -slight change in the disposition of the brigades had been made, for on -that day the 11th Army Field Artillery Brigade withdrew from the line -and the 156th Brigade was left to cover the entire front of the left -infantry brigade, the 162nd looking after the right. To simplify this -"A," "B" and D/156 took over the positions of the 83rd, 85th and D/11 -batteries respectively, and July found them in action in the Canal -sector. The policy of the batteries remained the same—harassing fire on -roads and tracks, constant counter-battery work and occasional responses -to infantry calls, while the enemy continued the practice of frequent -shell-storms on the batteries, with high-velocity guns looking after the -roads and back areas. In particular the forward gun positions at Groenen -Jager and the area around Vlamertinghe and Goldfish Château received -exceptionally heavy bombardment. - -At the end of the first week certain alterations of the front covered by -the batteries were made; the infantry of the 33rd Division handed over -to the division on their left the front from Zillebeke Lake to the -Ypres-Comines Canal and, sideslipping to the right, took over from the -6th Division on the right (who had relieved the French 46th Division on -June 26th) the front to as far south as the Vijverhoek-Eizenwalle -railway. No infantry operations took place, however, until the 14th. - -On Monday, July 14th, at 6.0 A.M. the right battalion, right brigade of -the 33rd Division (1st Middlesex), together with the 18th Infantry -Brigade of the 6th Division on the right, attacked under cover of the -guns to recapture the original front line east of Ridge Wood and from -there to Voormezeele, and succeeded in every detail. The enemy barrage -was not really strong, and only for short periods was it heavy. At first -it was confined to the forward area but later in the day spread to the -batteries, and during the afternoon the latter came in for a fairly -severe gruelling. All gains were held, and the Forward Observing -Officers dealt very effectively with small parties of the enemy who kept -dribbling up as though concentrating for a counter-attack. No such -concentration, however, was permitted by the guns to be carried out. -Counter-preparation was fired daily, morning and evening, and so the -British troops were able to boast of a successful advance on their part -on the scene of the late German offensive; the strategic initiative was -once more in our hands. - -Following on this attack, hostile artillery activity greatly increased. -All battery positions were heavily shelled, Goldfish Château and -Vlamertinghe being bombarded with great severity, and C/162 forward -section had both its guns knocked out by direct hits. It was a typical -period of trench warfare, when the artilleries of both sides sought each -other out and pounded away at the opposing positions, keeping the while -a watchful and active eye on the doings of the infantry. - -It was therefore a most suitable time for "new hands" to come and learn -the ropes, and fortunately come they did. On July 14th five American -artillery officers were posted to each brigade, to see what active -service was like and to learn British methods. They were the advance -party of a division shortly to come into the line, and for several days -they remained with the batteries before they returned to their own -units, there to expound to the latter the information and experience -they had gained. On July 25th a battalion of the 30th American Division -took over part of the front of the right infantry brigade, 33rd -Division, and thus the United States of America began to take a part in -the war in the north. - -The only striking feature which presented itself during the month of -July on this sector was the constant fear of a renewed enemy offensive. -The German reserves, even as late as July 20th, numbered some -thirty-five divisions opposite this part of the front alone, and, with -the presence of such an enemy concentration, it was only natural that -there should be continued warnings and alarms of impending attacks. On -July 21st the wagon-lines of all batteries were ordered to "stand by" -throughout the night, with teams fully harnessed up; on July 24th a -message was received at 1 A.M. that the enemy would attack at dawn. -Again on the 26th the battery wagon-lines were rudely disturbed by a -warning that an enemy assault was hourly awaited, and once again the -drivers stood by their teams expecting at each moment to hear the -distant crash of the opening barrage. As a result of these rumours every -battery was called upon to reconnoitre tiers of positions to be occupied -in case of a successful enemy attack, but such an event never took -place, and the month drew to a close with no untoward affair to mark its -going. - -Thus July passed out as its predecessor had gone—uneventfully, but with -considerable liveliness. With its going, however, the Division lost -Brigadier-General Stewart, who on July 29th handed over the command of -the Divisional Artillery to Brigadier-General G. H. W. Nicholson. -General Stewart had been with the Divisional Artillery for many months, -first as Colonel, later as Brigadier, and, although the exigencies of -war often took him away from the brigades to other sections of the front -where the infantry of the Division was being covered by artillery not of -its own, his presence was familiar and welcome to all ranks. His -departure was a cause of great regret to his many friends, but he left -behind him a unit of which any Commander might justly be proud. - -August 1918, a month of great deeds amongst the troops farther south, -brought little change of conditions in Flanders, and the holding of the -line continued as before. On the 2nd the 156th and 162nd Brigades -assisted in a raid which gained identification of the 8th German -Division in this sector; the 8th Division, however, seemed to be -following a policy exactly similar to its predecessors, and life in the -batteries continued as before, with rather an unusual interlude on the -6th, when His Majesty the King inspected selected officers from the 33rd -Divisional Artillery at Lovie Château. - -On August 7th the rear position of A/162 (Major Fetherston) was moved to -a point 500 yards north-east of Goldfish Château, midway between -Vlamertinghe and Ypres, and on the 10th C/162 took a similar step. At -this time two more American officers, Captain Westfeldt and Captain -Fields, were attached to the 156th and 162nd Brigades respectively, -while forty-eight hour visits of infantry officers to the batteries also -began—a most welcome interruption to the monotony of these days, and a -very interesting diversion for all concerned. - -On Saturday, August 17th, the 119th and 120th Infantry Regiments of the -30th American Division relieved the infantry of the 33rd Division in the -line, and the 156th and 162nd Brigades found themselves under the -control of an American C.R.A. for the first time. It was a novel -experience; the 33rd Divisional Artillery had at different times covered -nearly half the British divisions in France; it had worked alongside the -Belgians, and had supported and been controlled by the French on various -occasions. Now the guns found themselves co-operating with the United -States Army whose troops they covered for the remainder of the month. - -On August 28th came a sudden change. After a period of artillery duels, -of enemy bombardments on certain areas and of vigorous counter-battery -work by both sides, there appeared the advance parties of the 330th and -331st Brigades (66th Divisional Artillery) who came to relieve sections -of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. One section per battery moved out to -the wagon-lines on Wednesday the 28th, and on the 29th/30th the relief -was completed, the 156th Brigade marching back to wagon-lines in the -Haandehote area, the 162nd to a camp near Houtkerque. By August 30th the -concentration of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in the back area was -complete, and on the evening of that day there came the warning order to -prepare to entrain for the 3rd Army. - -On August 31st-September 1st the brigades entrained—the 156th at Proven, -the 162nd at Heidebeke and Waayenburg—and left for ever the dismal -surroundings of the Ypres sector, where they had been for twelve long -months. Down in the south, whither they were now going, the British -offensive was in full swing; finished for ever was the stagnation of -trench warfare. The batteries, after manfully holding the gate of the -north, were about to be thrown into the great advance in the south which -thrust the enemy back on to his own frontier, and were to take part in -that wonderful pursuit which ended in victory for the Allied arms, -bringing to a close the world-wide struggle of over four weary years. - - - - - CHAPTER XI. - THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1918. - FINAL ADVANCE TO VICTORY ON THE 3RD ARMY FRONT. - - -Before the doings of the 33rd Divisional Artillery in the 3rd Army -advance are followed, it will be wise to review the tactical situation -on this part of the front from the opening of the British offensive on -August 8th up to the point where the 156th and 162nd Brigades joined in -the battle. Accordingly, the movements of the batteries in question must -be left for a moment while the broad aspect of these operations is -considered. - -On August 8th Rawlinson's (4th) Army had opened the offensive with a -brilliant victory between the Ancre and the Avre, and on the 21st Byng -(3rd Army) extended the zone of attack northwards to beyond Albert. A -succession of attacks from August 23rd onwards pushed the enemy back -over the old Somme battlefields until, on the 31st, our troops had -forced the crossing of the Somme at Clery and entered Péronne next day. - -By September 6th, after constant attacks, Rawlinson's Army had -penetrated seven miles to the east of Péronne, while Byng had reached -the western edge of Havrincourt Wood. On the 7th the greater part of the -wood was in our hands, and three days later the 3rd Army was beyond our -original front line of March 21st. The result of these operations was -that the Germans were forced back to the Siegfried line—a great -defensive zone seven miles in depth and many times stronger than the -Hindenburg line—with a few strong positions still held in front thereof, -and, before the grand assault on the Siegfried line could take place, it -was necessary that these few strong positions should be captured. To -achieve this, Byng struck on September 12th with the IV. and V. Corps -between Trescault and Havrincourt, capturing both villages and clearing -the ground for the coming battle. On the 13th he made a further advance -on the 3rd Army front between Havrincourt and Gouzeaucourt, and there -now only remained the capture of certain strategical features, marked -down for assault on the 18th, before the 3rd Army front would be ready -to take part in Foch's supreme effort against the Siegfried line. - - ORDER OF BATTLE. - - SEPTEMBER—NOVEMBER 1918. - - H.Q.R.A. - - C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain. - - Brig.-Gen. G. H. W. Nicholson, Major W. A. T. Capt. W. E. - C.M.G. Barstow, D.S.O., Bownass, M.C. - M.C. - - Capt. S. D. - Graham. - - Major C. E. - Boyce, D.S.O. - - 156th Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler, D.S.O. (_killed_). - - Major W. G. Sheeres, M.C. - - Adjutant: Capt. H. W. Smail, M.C. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major F. B. Major W. G. Major Barker, Major D. Jones, - Carrell. Sheeres, M.C. D.S.O., M.C. M.C. - (_till end of - September_). - - Major K. W. Capt. L. Vestey. - Milne, M.C. - - 162nd Brigade. - - Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Warren, D.S.O. - - Adjutant: Capt. D. Strachan. - - "A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery. - - Major G. Major H. C. Cory, Major J. R. Major R. D. - Fetherston, M.C. Barnes, M.C. Russell, M.C. - D.S.O, M.C. - - Major S. G. Major - Taylor, M.C. Vaughan-Hughes, - M.C. - -Thus matters stood when, on September 16th/17th, the 156th and 162nd -Brigades moved into action. They had not gone into the line directly on -arrival in the Army area but, on detraining at Petit Houvain, Frevent -and Bouquemaison, had marched to billets around Rebreuviette and Roziere -on the main Frevent-Avesnes-le-Comte road, where they remained for -thirteen days. This period was spent in training, in the carrying out of -tactical schemes and in general practising of open warfare, and on -September 14th/15th the march into action began. Great secrecy was being -maintained regarding the concentration of troops on any part of the -front, for the element of surprise was proving a tremendous factor in -the success of every attack; the march of the batteries up to the Line -was therefore conducted by night, the brigades leaving their billets at -evening on the 14th and, after an all-night march through Bouquemaison -and Doullens, arriving at Acheux (156th) and Louvencourt (162nd) at 5 -A.M. on the 15th. Next night the performance was repeated and, passing -through Albert and Le Sars, the batteries reached Le Transloy in the -early morning of the 16th. From here positions were reconnoitred in the -V. Corps area around Heudecourt to support the 17th Division in an -attack on the Gouzeaucourt-Peizière line, and wagon-lines were -established on the afternoon of the same day in the neighbourhood of -Bus. - -On the night of the 16th/17th the batteries advanced into action north -of Heudecourt in a tremendous thunderstorm; officers and men, after the -long marches of the preceding nights, were completely exhausted and, as -soon as the guns were unlimbered, literally dropped where they stood -while awaiting daylight. They were all worn out with bodily fatigue and -ached for rest, and a few hours they now obtained before, on the 17th, a -rapid but accurate registration was carried out. There was little time -for this latter to be achieved as the attack had been fixed for the next -day, but twelve hours of daylight sufficed for the essential -preparations to be made, and by nightfall on the 17th the batteries were -ready to fulfil their part of the programme in the coming battle, -despite the fact that the barrage table was not received until 11.0 P.M. - -On September 18th at 5.20 A.M. the assault was delivered in heavy rain -along the whole Corps front, the 156th and 162nd Brigades covering the -infantry of the 17th Division, with the 38th Division on the left and -the 21st on the right. The division on the left was held up, but the -17th, after fierce fighting, gained their objectives and consolidated a -line north and east of Gauche Wood. Many prisoners and guns were -captured, and during the whole afternoon the batteries of the 33rd -Divisional Artillery were busy engaging numerous moving targets and -silencing hostile machine-guns and trench mortars. Two counter-attacks -were broken up by the fire of the guns, and at nine o'clock at night a -further creeping barrage was put down under cover of which the 17th -Division pushed north and consolidated a line just north of St. Quentin -Redoubt. - -[Illustration: - - Scale 1:40,000. -] - -After three days of active artillery fire, during which the infantry of -the 33rd Division (which had relieved the 21st on the 20th) slightly -advanced its line, the batteries of the 156th and 162nd Brigades began -to move up. On the night of the 21st the wagon-lines had been brought to -the Equancourt area, and on the 23rd the guns themselves advanced, 156th -Brigade to an area about 1,700 yards north of Peizière, 162nd Brigade to -new positions about 2,000 yards S.S.E. This move was not carried out -without loss, for the advanced guns moving up in the afternoon were -subjected to the most intense shell-fire, but ultimately all guns -reached the new line and from there the harassing of the enemy was -continued. - -It was on this day (23rd), or rather on the night of 23rd/24th, that a -serious calamity befell the 162nd Brigade. An intense enemy gas -bombardment put the whole of the Headquarters staff and "B" battery out -of action, reducing the personnel of the Brigade by nearly a quarter; it -was a very severe loss in view of the active operations which were being -conducted, but Major Fetherston (A/162) from his own battery position -commanded from midnight onwards the rest of the brigade in addition to -his own guns, despite the fact that since the 18th he had been suffering -from a severe wound in the back which had to be dressed twice a day. It -was, indeed, a great feat of endurance and devotion to duty on Major -Fetherston's part, for he carried on for a number of days in command of -the 162nd Brigade, and took no notice of a wound which, of itself -intensely painful, took a long time to heal when ultimately he was -forced to go into hospital. - -The period 25th/28th was one of much front trench and outpost fighting, -bringing many calls for support to the batteries and keeping all guns -actively engaged day and night. Pigeon Trench, Targelle Ravine and -Honnecourt Wood were frequently bombarded at request of the infantry, -while concentrations were continuously fired upon all hostile -communications and approaches. On the 25th "A" and C/162 were -strengthened by the attaching to them of one gun each from B/162 which -owing to casualties on the 23rd was unable to man all its guns, while on -the 26th yet another addition, and a strange one at that, was made to -the same two batteries. Four captured German 77 mm. guns with a large -supply of German "Yellow Cross" gas shells were allotted to them; with -grim delight the detachments bombarded the enemy that very evening and -far into the night with his own gas, and a particularly deadly form of -it at that. - -On the 29th the attack broke out afresh in conjunction with the whole of -the 3rd, 4th and Debeney's French Armies. On the previous day battery -commanders had reconnoitred the forward areas with a view to a possible -advance should the forthcoming operations prove successful, and at 3.30 -A.M. the assault was delivered. Covered by the guns of the 156th and -162nd Brigades, the 98th Infantry Brigade moved forward to capture -Villers Guislain, one company working round on the north-west, one from -the south-east and one making a frontal attack up the centre. With each -company there went a Tank which latter, however, were all knocked out -very early in the day or were blown up in our own minefield, and in -front of the whole body an artillery barrage rolled through the village. - -Villers Guislain was captured together with two hundred prisoners, but -unfortunately the various enemy machine-gun posts, strong points and -dug-outs were not mopped up, and the attacking troops found themselves -with parties of Germans behind them. From here onwards the situation -became very obscure; a second attack—a continuation of the first—was -launched at 5.50 A.M. when the 100th Infantry Brigade assaulted the -trenches east of Villers Guislain, the objective being the line Evett -Copse-Crawford Crater, an attack which was accompanied by the advance of -the 21st and 12th Divisions on the left and right respectively, but -progress by the infantry was very irregular. Owing to the presence of -Germans who had not been mopped up in the rear of the attacking -infantry, and as a result of stiff resistance put up by the enemy all -along the line, the day developed into one long hard fight, every -battery being heavily engaged. A company of the 1st Middlesex was -completely cut off by Germans whose dug-outs had been overlooked in the -first assault, and, when our troops ultimately succeeded in capturing -this ground next day, the whole of the company which had been surrounded -was found lying dead all around. Whether the Middlesex had been captured -and slaughtered in cold blood it was impossible to say, but their -general appearance gave grounds for such an idea, and little mercy was -shown to the enemy in the succeeding days' operations. By 2.30 P.M. the -right infantry brigade was back on its original front line and the enemy -had practically regained Villers Guislain, and by evening the whole of -the attacking troops had retired once more to their starting point. - -Meanwhile, with the success of the earlier part of the day, orders had -come for the 162nd Brigade to advance to positions south and south-east -of Villers Guislain, and at 2.0 P.M. "A" and C/162 had begun to move -forward in accordance with these orders. Hardly had they started, -however, than they came under intense fire which continued all along -their line of advance, while later, in the intermediate positions which -they were compelled to take up owing to the retirement of the infantry, -they were heavily bombarded by 4·2 in. and 77 mm. B/156, another battery -to move up according to prearranged orders—which had been drafted on the -assumption that the attack would be a success—went right on to its -forward position and stayed there within four hundred yards of the -enemy, but it suffered heavily for its temerity. - -The night of the 29th/30th passed quietly, and at 10.30 A.M. on the 30th -the enemy was reported to be evacuating the ground west of the Canal de -l'Escaut. Sunday's attack, although not a success on the batteries' -immediate front, had elsewhere pierced the mighty Siegfried line, the -effect of which was so great that the enemy was forced to carry out a -retirement along the whole front. As soon as information of this -withdrawal was received a general advance began, the batteries -reconnoitring the ground which covered the crossings of the canal and -the zone east thereof, while the infantry reached the line which had -been the objective of the 5.50 A.M. attack on the previous day and threw -out patrols to the western bank of the canal. Between 11.0 A.M. and 2.0 -P.M. the 156th Brigade advanced to positions 2,000 yards east of -Peizière, while A/162 came into action just west of Villers Guislain. - -During the night 31st/1st the 162nd Brigade brought forward its guns, -and by dawn on October 1st was in action 1,000 yards east of Villers -Guislain, while the 156th Brigade also advanced its guns to the vicinity -of Pigeon and Targelle ravines, 2,000 yards south of the village. From -3.30 A.M. to 7.0 A.M. such guns as had reached the forward position -fired a barrage in support of an infantry advance on the right, and for -the rest of the day were kept hard at work in engaging the many targets -and movement which presented themselves on the far side of the canal. At -the same time the batteries were subjected to intense area shoots by the -enemy who was trying desperately to cover his retreat. - -These area shoots were undoubtedly extremely unpleasant, but just at -this time the batteries were given visible proof that counter-battery -work was not entirely confined to the German side. During the advance to -the Canal, four 5·9 in. enemy howitzers were found deserted, but still -in the firing position, along a road. On this road just behind them a -German field battery of four 77 mm. guns had apparently been -marching—_had_, it should be noticed, for it would never march again. -Whether it had been caught in a shell-storm directed upon the 5·9 in. -howitzer battery, or whether an aeroplane had seen it and had switched -some of our batteries round to catch it will never be known, but -whatever had occurred the work was most effectual. The entire battery, -personnel and guns, lay dead and smashed upon the ground; the battery -commander at the head of the column, behind him his trumpeter and the -whole of the battery staff, all lay dead beneath their horses. Every -team of every gun was still in its harness, all three drivers of each -team were still in their places, but all were dead, torn and riven by -our shells. It was a most uncanny sight, this battery complete in every -detail laid out along the road, and swift must have been the storm from -our guns which transformed it and its surroundings into a shambles. - -October 1st/5th was a period of probing the enemy line and of trying to -force the pace of his retreat. Day and night his communications were -shelled, his front system bombarded and every sign of movement engaged. -Patrols pushed out to the edge of the canal on the 3rd found it still -held by machine-gun parties, and as a result certain batteries sent -forward sections so as better to engage Honnecourt and the numerous -targets which presented themselves in the neighbourhood. On one occasion -an aeroplane reported enemy transport to be on the move near Basket -Wood, and a storm of shell was immediately directed upon the area -involved. During the advance a couple of days later the batteries passed -the locality where this transport had been, and the sight of the smashed -and broken wagons and the dead drivers and horses who had been killed by -the batteries' own fire was most uplifting to the detachments who had -done the work. All this time gas concentrations were fired into La -Terrière and Basket Wood, and everything was done to render as difficult -as possible the retirement which the enemy was clearly carrying out. - -At last, on the 5th, the line gave. Further to the right our troops had -captured Montbrehain and Beaurevoir, and their loss necessitated a -withdrawal by the enemy from the La Terrière Plateau. At dawn the 5th -Scottish Rifles, accompanied by forward observing officers from each -brigade, pushed patrols across the river and, meeting only slight -resistance, advanced to Franque Wood and on through La Terrière, -establishing themselves in Aubencheul by 3.0 P.M. As soon as it was -known that the enemy had retired to the east of the canal, the 156th and -162nd Brigades began to make rapid preparations for the crossing, the -repairing of bridges at Les Tranchées and elsewhere being taken in hand -without delay. By 4.0 P.M. the 156th Brigade had completed a rough -bridge in the southern end of Honnecourt, and an hour later both -brigades were ordered to move across the Canal in support of the -infantry. A/156 and a section of C/156 immediately effected a crossing -and dropped into action midway between Vendhuille and La Terrière. At -dusk D/156 went into action 1,000 yards south of La Terrière, and the -remainder of C/156 crossed the canal and took up a position of readiness -one thousand yards to the east thereof. - -Thus the batteries pushed their way over one of the great barriers which -lay across the line of advance, and before night had fallen a proportion -of guns was firmly established on the eastern side. Darkness prevented -any further work from being done, but with the arrival of dawn on the -6th, B/156 and the remainder of the 156th Brigade crossed over and took -up positions covering Aubencheul from south of La Pannerie Wood. The -162nd Brigade, in the meantime, had been seriously held up at the lock -south of Honnecourt, as the bridge, although repaired once, had again -been broken, but at 4.0 P.M. on the 5th after several hours' delay the -crossing was successfully carried out by portions of the batteries; at -dawn on the 6th the remainder came into action in the vicinity of -Franque Wood and La Terrière after a perilous march along the east bank -of the canal, between the latter and a marsh, with only two inches of -clearance on either side of the wheels. - -On October 7th the 162nd Brigade again advanced to Basket Wood, while -wagon-lines were brought forward to the vicinity of the Canal, and at -1.0 A.M. on October 8th all batteries put down a barrage in support of -an attack by the 115th Infantry Brigade of the 38th Division. This -Division had relieved the 33rd at 10.0 P.M. on the 5th, and now advanced -to the assault of the Beaurevoir Line and Villers Outreaux in -conjunction with a general attack on the last of the Siegfried zone by -Byng, Rawlinson and Debeney. After much opposition and very severe -fighting the final objectives were gained at 10.0 A.M., and -three-quarters of an hour later the 162nd Brigade again moved -forward—the third advance in three days—to the west of Mortho Wood, -while the 156th Brigade guns advanced to the southern edge of -Aubencheul. From here another barrage was fired at 11.30 A.M., almost in -fact before the guns had dropped their trails—"limber supply" being -adopted by certain batteries until the ammunition wagons, arriving at -the gallop, came up just in time to prevent a stoppage—and under cover -of it the 114th Infantry Brigade assaulted Malincourt and the -Malincourt-Serain road beyond. - -At about noon it was clear that the enemy was in full retreat, and -accordingly the barrage was stopped, the infantry pushing on with little -opposition through Malincourt and reaching the final objective at three -o'clock in the afternoon. At two o'clock one section of B/156, and -shortly afterwards three howitzers of D/156, advanced until they were -almost up with the attacking infantry, and by shooting in close support -and co-operation with the latter did excellent work in the engaging of -hostile movement, machine-guns and strong points. At the same time the -whole of 156th Brigade advanced so as to keep touch with the infantry, -reaching by 4.0 P.M. the area just south of Malincourt. - -At dawn on October 9th the advance was resumed. Tuesday's battle had -wiped out the whole of the Siegfried Line, the enemy was now well on the -run and the 19th Infantry Brigade (33rd Division) pushed on through the -114th, the C.R.A. 33rd Division taking over control of the guns, which -consisted of the 121st and 122nd Brigades in addition to the 156th and -162nd. Little resistance was met with until Clary was reached, but here -the infantry were held up by snipers and machine-gun fire. Two guns of -A/156 and three of B/156 together with some advanced sections of the -162nd Brigade, which had followed close on the heels of the infantry, -came into action immediately on the western outskirts of the village and -successfully engaged the enemy machine-guns over open sights. Shortly -afterwards the infantry established themselves on the eastern outskirts -of Clary, whereupon two of the advanced guns of B/156 were pushed -through the village and again came into action, shooting over open -sights with extremely good effect at a range of 800 yards. In the -meantime the rest of the 156th and 162nd Brigades had been advancing -rapidly and, after passing through Villers Outreaux and Malincourt, had -dropped into action just west of Clary to help the infantry in the -assault on the eastern outskirts. With the fall of Clary the advance -quickened and the infantry went right through Bertry unchecked and on to -La Fayte and Troisvilles, closely followed by the forward guns of the -156th and 162nd Brigades, which were shooting at very close ranges over -open sights all the afternoon and were successfully dealing with every -sign of enemy resistance. Keeping pace with the advance came on also the -main body of guns of the two brigades, which searched out and broke up -every sign of enemy movement and opposition. So rapid was the move -forward that the batteries took up three successive positions during the -day, night finding them in the vicinity of Bertry with forward guns on -the western edge of Troisvilles. - -[Illustration: - - Scale 1:40,000. -] - -The speed of the advance, indeed, was now beginning to make itself felt; -ammunition and food supply became a most serious problem, and on this -day (October 9th) tremendous difficulty was met with by the wagon-lines -in keeping touch with their firing batteries without either crowding -upon or losing all sight of them. The day, with its eight mile advance -and the occupation of three successive positions, laid a heavy strain -upon all the wagon-lines which, unable to move in a direct line across -country, had to complete a long march before they joined up with their -guns at Bertry in the evening; yet throughout this period the guns and -detachments were never without ammunition and food, a fact which -compares very favourably with the batteries of the United States army -which in some cases, being without food, were completely unable to keep -up with the advance. There was another and most novel proof of the pace -at which the line was pushing forward; on entering Clary and Bertry the -infantry and guns were met by cheering French civilians who, in their -exultation at the departure of the enemy after so many weary years, -rushed to greet our troops with an outburst of joy—quite embarrassing! -Unable to cope with the rapidity of the attack the Germans had allowed -these people to stay behind, and in their excitement at this unexpected -relief they vented their delight upon the British troops in the most -amazing and whole-hearted manner. - -Seven o'clock on the morning of the 10th saw all batteries on the move -again, supporting an advance by the 98th Infantry Brigade, assisted by -cavalry, upon the bridgeheads east of the River Selle between Neuvilly -and Montay. This was a great day for the guns and, indeed, for all the -troops concerned, for the advance was carried out according to the true -style laid down in the drill book for open fighting. Cavalry patrols in -front, infantry following on, batteries first in "battery column" and -then manœuvring into line, the whole countryside around Troisvilles -presented the amazing spectacle of vast masses of troops moving steadily -forward exactly as though on an Aldershot field day. The 156th Brigade -lay on the right of the 162nd, and together the two brigades manœuvred -up to the crest of the hill which commanded the crossing of the Selle. -By 8.0 A.M. the infantry were within 800 yards of the river, where they -halted until such time as the Divisions on the right and left had come -up into line, and by the same hour the batteries had pushed through -Troisvilles to a point midway between that village and Le Cateau, from -which positions they vigorously shelled hostile batteries and machine -guns. - -In addition to the delay on the flanks, the enemy on the immediate front -was showing clear signs of increased resistance. Several field batteries -had come up and were firing over open sights at the infantry, while our -own batteries, as they neared the crest of the hill, came under very -heavy shell fire. With ammunition wagons detached, however, the guns -pressed on under severe fire and reached the crest whence, over open -sights, they were able to assist the infantry in no small measure, and -throughout the day continued to engage hostile troops and movement of -every description. At the same time the German batteries rendered our -positions very uncomfortable with 77 mm. and long-range fire, while the -teams which went back to Troisvilles to water found the village -congested with cavalry, artillery and infantry pack horses, all of whom -suffered severe casualties through being spotted by an enemy aeroplane -which called down a shell-storm upon the entire village. - -The whole of the 10th was spent in registration, harassing fire and -counter-battery work, D/156 and D/162 engaging with great success four -hostile batteries in action on the forward slopes of the high ground -east of the River Selle. Many enemy machine-guns and snipers also -demanded the attention of the guns, and so, despite fairly active -artillery fire on the part of the enemy, the batteries were kept busy -until 5 P.M.; at that hour a barrage was fired to cover the 98th -Infantry Brigade in an attempt to cross the river and to form -bridgeheads on the crest of the hill to the north-east, in conjunction -with the 17th Division on the left. - -This attack met with considerable opposition as the River Selle formed a -most important part of the enemy defensive line, and nowhere was an -advance made beyond the railway. Night fell with the enemy still holding -the high ground, and brought with it a most unpleasant time for the -batteries. Without cover of any sort or description, lying out in the -open and being consistently shelled with 77 mm. and 4·2 in., the -detachments awaited the dawn, when it was hoped that this stand on the -part of the enemy might be broken down. - -Dawn, however, brought no further success, but on the contrary a -temporary reverse. The 98th Infantry Brigade at 10.15 A.M. reported that -it had been counter-attacked and now only had two posts on the eastern -side of the Selle; the 162nd Brigade was accordingly detailed to look -after the troops across the river, while the remainder of the artillery -covering the infantry were left to fire on observed targets and to -engage all movement and all possible hostile batteries. The latter -during the morning were quiet, but from 2.0 P.M. until 4.0 P.M. a very -considerable bombardment of 5·9 in., 4·2 in. and 77 mm., mainly from the -Ovillers direction, descended upon the whole area occupied by the -batteries. - -No further move was now made until 5.0 A.M. on the 12th when the 100th -Infantry Brigade assaulted the high ground east of the river, the -objective being the line of the road running from Amerval to the -outskirts of Montay. No creeping barrage was utilised in this attack, -the batteries firing on selected and observed targets throughout the -day. By 8.0 A.M. the left battalion was reported to have gained its -objective in spite of strong enemy opposition, but the right battalion -was held up by machine-gun fire from the river. An early morning mist -rendered observed artillery fire—the only kind of any use at the -moment—impossible, and not till the middle of the day could anything be -done. Excellent work was then carried out by the batteries but came too -late, for by then the left battalion had been forced back to the railway -by strong enemy counter-attacks; evening found our troops, in spite of -stubborn fighting and most gallant resistance, back to the west of the -river whither they had been driven by superior numbers of the enemy, -only a few posts remaining on the eastern bank. - -With S.O.S. lines along the railway, both brigades now began a period of -continuous harassing fire on all enemy strong points and communications, -with synchronised bombardments on areas of especial importance. A lull -in the infantry action had set in, but it was essential that the enemy -should have no chance of organising his front or improving his defences, -and to prevent this the full powers of the batteries were called upon. -From October 13th to the 20th under the control of the C.R.A. 38th -Division (which had relieved the 33rd on the 13th) the guns bombarded -the railway, the hostile trenches and batteries, the ravines east of the -Selle and every possible point which might be utilised by the enemy. Gas -was fired nightly into the ravines, every hostile effort to put out wire -was nullified, and two 6 in. trench mortars were brought into position -to help in the bombardment. The result of this firing, although not -apparent at the time, was clearly shown later when the batteries, on -advancing, found the railway embankment covered with the bodies of dead -Germans, all of whom had obviously, from their mangled state, been -killed by shell fire. Daily the enemy replied to this activity by -shelling the forward and battery areas, but the initiative had passed -for ever into the hands of the British Army, and the lull, although of a -week's duration, was but a temporary measure. On October 20th Byng -struck with seven divisions in an attempt to capture the Selle line -north of Le Cateau to Denain, five miles from Valenciennes, and the 38th -Division, covered by a barrage from the guns, assaulted and captured by -10.0 A.M. the high ground between Forest and the Selle as its share of -the operation; this, together with victories on other parts of the 3rd -Army front, left the way clear for a further general advance. - -Next day (21st) the expected orders to resume the advance were received. -A general assault by the 3rd and 4th Armies was planned, the objectives -of the 33rd Division being Wagnonville and Poix-du-Nord; the attack was -to be on a grandiose scale, tanks assisting the infantry, while in -addition to the 156th and 162nd Brigades the whole of the 38th -Divisional Artillery and the 223rd Brigade R.F.A. (Naval Division) were -to form the creeping barrage behind which the infantry would move -forward. Two 6 in. trench mortars were allotted to each infantry -brigade, the 6 in. howitzers of the V. Corps Heavy Artillery were -detailed to bombard selected targets and engage in counter-battery work, -and one 18-pdr. battery of the 162nd Brigade was placed at the disposal -of the G.O.C. 19th Infantry Brigade. - -In order to cover the Ovillers Slaughter House road for this attack the -156th Brigade moved to within 1,000 yards of the Selle, north-west of -Montay. From here all necessary points were registered during the -21st/22nd, and on the 22nd every battery sent forward a reconnoitring -party to examine the approaches to and crossings of the River Selle. -This was to be no local attack but an operation on the very largest -scale with tremendous issues hanging in the balance, for it marked the -beginning of the destruction of the new water front, the Scheldt and the -Sambre Canal, which the enemy was seeking to hold, and the start of the -last of the great conflicts in the west. No precaution was to be -overlooked, no step left untaken which in any way might assist in -bringing success to this great combined effort further to hurl the enemy -back towards his frontiers. - -During the night of the 22nd/23rd the infantry of the 33rd Division -relieved the 38th, the C.R.A. 33rd Division taking over control of the -guns, and at 2.0 A.M. on the 23rd the attack was launched behind a -creeping barrage with the 98th Infantry Brigade on the right, the 19th -on the left. By 4.30 A.M. the 1st Middlesex were in Forest, and the 4th -King's had passed through their lines and were pushing on towards the -next objective; an hour later B/156 with one section of D/156 crossed -the Selle and followed up the leading battalion of the 98th Infantry -Brigade with whom they kept in close touch throughout the day, and by -6.45 A.M. both artillery brigades had crossed the Selle, the 156th -shortly afterwards taking up positions 1,000 yards west of Croix, the -162nd dropping into action west of Forest. - -Meantime the infantry, in face of strong opposition, were pushing slowly -on, and by 10.30 A.M. were lining the Croix-Vendegies road ready for the -next advance. Before this took place the guns of the 162nd Brigade again -moved up, this time to Richemont, while C/156 pressed on nearly to -Croix. So successful was the attack, however, that the batteries found -themselves being left too far behind, and accordingly at 12.30 P.M. the -162nd Brigade again advanced its guns in close support of the infantry -and came into action 1,000 yards north of Croix. Here it remained -throughout the rest of the day, neutralizing machine-gun fire and -generally assisting in every possible way the infantry who were slowly -making their way through Vendegies Wood. - -[Illustration: - - Scale 1:40,000. -] - -By 5.0 P.M. the British line ran approximately along the northern edge -of the wood, and here the advance was stayed for the night, the 156th -Brigade, who had occupied the same positions since before midday, -pushing up to an area 1,000 yards north of Croix where it remained -throughout the hours of darkness. The day had been a complete and -overwhelming success all along the line, and the batteries, after -sixteen hours of continuous fighting and advancing, were thankful to -snatch a short rest. The strain had been great, nor had the victory been -won without loss; all batteries had suffered to a more or less marked -extent, but in particular must be mentioned the tragic and yet glorious -death of Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler. While riding up from his -headquarters at Richemont to visit the batteries he was severely wounded -and died the same evening, a loss which the 156th Brigade could ill -afford. Elsewhere has been related the story of his gallantry during the -enemy offensive, and in the advance of the British line his courage and -example were no less marked. His death robbed the Brigade of a friend -and a leader than whom a better could not be found, and with victory -almost in sight it seemed doubly hard that he should not have survived -to share in it. - -On the 24th at 4.0 A.M. the advance on Englefontaine was resumed, Major -W. G. Sheeres, M.C., taking over command of the 156th Brigade. Heavy -bursts of fire were put down in front of the infantry under cover of -which they moved forward towards Paul Jacques Farm and Wagnonville, and -at dawn, although all ranks were now very exhausted, the batteries began -to advance. At 6.0 A.M. the 162nd Brigade had reached the southern -outskirts of Vendegies and was directing fire upon the eastern outskirts -of Poix-du-Nord, where the enemy was reported to be retreating. By 8.0 -A.M. the same brigade had again advanced to a position in observation -1,000 yards further on, the 156th Brigade reaching the edge of the Bois -de Vendegies one hour later. From here harassing fire was kept up on the -approaches to Englefontaine, while A/156 kept in close touch with the -leading battalion of infantry. News was then received that, after the -overcoming of strong opposition, Wagnonville had been captured and -Englefontaine itself was being rapidly threatened. Upon receipt of this -information further battery positions were hastily reconnoitred and all -the guns were moved up, the 156th Brigade coming into action between -Poix-du-Nord and Wagnonville, the 162nd Brigade in Poix-du-Nord itself. - -As events turned out, the infantry were held up between Poix-du-Nord and -Englefontaine, and the latter was accordingly kept under the fire of the -guns. All through the night of the 24th/25th and during the day of the -25th the exits from the village were continually bombarded, and at 1.0 -A.M. on the 26th an attack was carried out by both infantry brigades of -the 33rd Division under cover of a thick barrage in which ten per cent. -of gas shells were used. The programme for this barrage was worked out -almost entirely by Brig.-General G. H. W. Nicholson who, depleted of his -staff by "Spanish influenza" and other causes, tackled the work -single-handed and with such skill that the operation was a complete -success. Five hundred prisoners and many machine-guns were taken, and -with the fall of the village one battery of the 162nd Brigade pushed -forward to a previously reconnoitred position from which close support -of the infantry was possible. - -From the 26th until the end of the month the batteries remained in the -same positions, and it was well that this was so, for the so-called -Spanish influenza was now raging in both brigades. It was believed that -this epidemic had been contracted through sleeping in dug-outs and barns -recently occupied by the enemy who was known to be suffering from it -very badly, but whatever the cause it handicapped the guns to a marked -extent. At one time the brigade commander and all four battery -commanders of the 162nd Brigade were down with the disease, but despite -this counter-preparations were fired morning and evening to break up any -would-be counter-attacks by the enemy, while frequent gas concentrations -were fired into the hostile lines. On the 29th a successful "mopping-up" -of houses on the Englefontaine-Bavai road was carried out by the 17th -R.W.F. (the 38th Division had relieved the 33rd on the evening of the -26th), and on the 29th/30th there came to the weary batteries a short -relief. On that night the 122nd Brigade R.F.A. "took over" from the -162nd who marched back to Bertry for a 72-hour rest, to be followed two -nights later by the 156th Brigade. - -For over six long weeks the batteries had been fighting, advancing and -fighting again, covering in all a depth of 30 miles and never once -enjoying rest of any kind. Upon Brigade and Battery commanders there had -been the constant strain of dealing with the ever-arising fresh -situations, and of keeping in close touch with the infantry in every -stage of the advance; amongst all the battery personnel there had been -no rest, no respite from unending firing, marching and enemy shelling, -while the wagon-lines had been hard put to it each day to keep touch -with the gun lines in every move and to keep them fully supplied with -ammunition. It is scarcely surprising, then, that officers and men were -dropping with fatigue when the orders for a 72-hour rest were received, -yet so high was the morale of the troops at the time and so inflamed -were all with the sense of victory, that grudgingly did they give up -their share in the battle and move back to the quieter surroundings of -Bertry. - -They need not have feared, however, that they would be long left out of -the line. The so-called 72-hour rest, although achieved by the 162nd -Brigade, was reduced in the case of the 156th to one of twenty-four -hours, and November 2nd saw both brigades back into action once more. A -great combined attack by the 1st, 3rd and 4th Armies, together with the -1st French Army, was about to be launched upon the formidable defences -of the Sambre, the great Mormal Forest and the fortifications of the -town of Le Quesnoy, and to take part in this the two brigades were -ordered to cover the line due east of Englefontaine from positions in -the western outskirts of Poix-du-Nord (156th Brigade) and from -Wagnonville (162nd Brigade). These positions they occupied in the -afternoon of November 2nd, Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Boyce temporarily -commanding the 156th Brigade, and Colonel Pim (who was wounded next day -and succeeded by Major Vaughan-Hughes) the 162nd in place of -Lieut.-Colonel Warren. - -Before any further details of the fighting are entered upon, a word of -explanation is called for with regard to this chapter. Hitherto a -careful chronicle of the events of each day has been given, the -movements of the batteries being followed in detail. As a result, -perhaps, of this strict attention to tactics the personal element has -found itself excluded, the interest of the chapter being in the main -historical. Yet this is unavoidable; in one short chapter must be -described the whole of that brilliant advance from September 16th until -November 11th, with all its attacks, its changes of position and forward -marches. To digress from this and enter upon personal narratives must -inevitably destroy the continuity of the story, and moreover, another -difficulty has to be faced. In those days no battery had time to think -of the doings of any other guns save of its own; no battery had really -sufficient time to think and record what it was doing itself, and -therefore, were stories of individual exploits narrated in these pages, -only a particle could be put down and many as deserving of mention would -have to be left untold. On frequent occasions every battery of both -brigades performed brilliant exploits in galloping forward guns to a -level with the most advanced infantry and in shooting upon the enemy -over open sights at almost point-blank range; on frequent occasions -batteries had to pass through shell-storms to drop into the positions -chosen for them, and had to maintain effective covering fire under the -full weight of an enemy bombardment, but each and all did it in turn and -the singling out of any one in particular would be invidious. All eight -batteries took an equal share in this wonderful advance, and the valour -of their work can best be appreciated by an account of the battles in -which they were engaged. - -On November 2nd the brigades had come back into action; November 3rd was -spent in reconnoitring advance positions and in maintaining close -co-operation between the infantry and the guns, and on November 4th -began the great attack on the Forêt de Mormal. At 6.15 A.M. under a -creeping barrage the 38th Division moved forward to the assault, and for -two hours the guns continued to maintain a curtain of fire in front of -the infantry as they pushed their way on towards the objective. At 8.15 -A.M. both the 156th and 162nd Brigades began to advance, one battery at -a time, to positions already chosen east of Englefontaine, and by -adopting this procedure the continuity of the barrage was in no way -interrupted, the rear positions maintaining a brisk rate of fire until a -proportion of guns had reached the forward positions and had begun to -carry on the work from there. The 162nd Brigade successfully reached the -new positions, although heavily shelled on the way, but the 156th was -prevented from doing so by intense machine-gun fire, which mere fact -alone goes to show how closely the batteries were following up the -infantry. Only A/156 was able to get through, the remainder having to -drop into action temporarily to the west of the village, but after a -time the machine-gun fire slackened and the move was completed, the -whole of the 156th Brigade lying 1,000 yards south-east of Englefontaine -in the outskirts of the Forêt de Mormal and close alongside the 162nd -Brigade. - -From here the barrage was continued until 3.0 P.M., when the final -objectives were reached. Positions were then reconnoitred 3,000 yards -further forward, and at dusk all batteries advanced again. Great -difficulty was now experienced as numerous trees had been felled across -the roads which had, in addition, been blown up, but by 8.0 P.M. all -batteries were in action again in the reconnoitred positions around a -_carrefour_ or meeting of roads in the forest. The state of the roads, -in point of fact, prevented the moving up of any heavy guns except the -60-pounders, the six-inch howitzers being compelled to remain halted far -behind until some sort of track had been repaired for them. - -During the night of the 4th/5th the batteries again moved forward and -were deployed along the Sassegnies-Ribaumet-Sarbaras line, covering the -River Sambre, while the infantry of the 33rd Division relieved that of -the 38th. At 4.30 A.M. the advance began again, and each battery -immediately sent one section forward to keep in touch with the battalion -commanders. These sections pushed on through La Grande Pature and took -up positions east of Sarbaras which gave easy command of the crossings -of and ground beyond the River Sambre, and from which very successful -observed fire was carried out, much enemy movement being engaged. In the -meantime the remainder of the batteries hurried forward as fast as -possible, but great delay was caused by congestion on the roads and by -mine craters and felled trees. Not until noon had all the batteries, in -extremely wet weather, made their way through the Forêt de Mormal, but -by that time they were in action east of Sarbaras and bombarding the -ground beyond the Sambre with the utmost vigour. - -This day, Tuesday, November 5th, marked the final breaking of the -enemy's resistance. With the two wings of his army separated, with the -Siegfried and Brynhild zones overrun, he was no longer in retreat but in -full flight, and during the afternoon of the 5th a careful -reconnaissance of the routes forward and of the crossings over the -Sambre was carried out, for the rout of the enemy might enable a -crossing to be effected at any moment. During the night of the 5th/6th -the enemy retired to the east of the river and the 162nd Brigade was -ordered to follow him, the 156th being told to remain in their present -positions to the west. Night and day the enemy kept the bridgeheads -under the most intense shell and machine-gun fire, and entirely -prevented the Sappers and the battery working parties from repairing the -bridges sufficiently for the guns to get across. Ultimately, at dawn on -the 7th, a rough structure had been thrown up, and the batteries began -to move over the river. On the previous evening a reconnaissance of the -approach to the bridge had been made by Major Taylor and Captain Heads, -and it was found that the proper approach had been hopelessly blocked. -The batteries, when they did advance, had to move down a steep, winding -and very narrow track, while the only route on the eastern side of the -river was a tortuous towing path and necessitated the cutting of gaps in -hedges and the manhandling of guns across rivulets and swamps—a very -difficult task. - -D/162 was the first battery actually to cross the Sambre, but it was so -closely followed by A/162 that the latter got into action first, -dropping its gun trails just west of Pot de Vin at the moment when the -infantry were assembling along a sunken road for the attack on the -village. The gratitude of the infantry for this close support by the -artillery was very marked, and several of their officers came up to the -batteries to express their thanks, for they knew with what difficulty -and at what a cost this advance of the guns close under the enemy's nose -had been effected. "B" and C/162 were prevented for some time from -crossing the river, for an infantry wagon broke down right in the middle -of the bridge shortly after "A" battery had got over, but after a delay -of about two hours the whole brigade was across the last barrier and, -despite severe casualties suffered in the operation, was supporting the -infantry to the full extent of its power. November 7th was the last real -fighting day of the war on this part of the front, but it was none the -less a very nasty day, and in every battery a certain number of -casualties were suffered. The enemy was putting up a stiff resistance -for he was trying to bar to us the road to Namur, but his was only a -forlorn hope and did little more than to slow down slightly our rate of -advance. - -From this date onwards the only batteries of the 33rd Divisional -Artillery to the east of the Sambre were those of the 162nd Brigade, as -the 156th Brigade had not been called upon to advance. In fact, the -162nd Brigade shared with the 169th Army Field Artillery Brigade the -distinction of being the only guns across the river on this section from -the 6th until the conclusion of hostilities. - -On the 8th, even while a little group of men were sitting round a table -in the Forest of Compiègne discussing the terms of Armistice, the -infantry of the 38th Division advanced to the Maubeuge-Avesnes road and -later to the Bois de Beugnies, supported as far as possible by the 162nd -Brigade which pushed on beyond the cross-roads north-west of Dourlers. -On the 9th the enemy retreat became general; the infantry followed up as -far as Wattignies, and "B" and C/162 moved into action 1,000 yards west -of the village, "A" and "D" batteries remaining at Dourlers. Saturday, -the 9th, was in fact the last day of the war for the 33rd Divisional -Artillery. In the early morning of that day the 162nd Brigade fired upon -the enemy rearguards—the 156th were already out of the battle—and -reconnoitred forward as far as Wattignies where the infantry had halted. -Small patrols of cavalry pushed further on to try and establish contact -with the rearguard of the German army, and desultory machine-gun fire -could be heard every now and then away in the distance, but to all -intents and purposes the enemy had completely vanished and nowhere could -our troops get into contact with them. - -On November 10th came orders for the wagon-lines to join up with the -guns and for all four batteries of the 162nd Brigade to remain in a -position of readiness between Dourlers and Ecuelin. To the east all the -bridges had been blown up by the retreating enemy, and pursuit by the -batteries was utterly impossible. Moreover, it was known by all ranks -that German plenipotentiaries had passed through our lines some days -before to sue for terms, and the knowledge of that fact, combined with -the utter rout of the enemy on the batteries' own front, prepared the -men for the news which was shortly to come. - -At 9.0 A.M. on Monday, November 11th, 1918, came the news that the war -was over. In the Wattignies sector the order to break off hostilities -did not come, as many accounts strove to describe it, in the midst of -the battle, with raging gun-fire at one moment and our troops all -shouting and waving their helmets at the next. The orders merely -confirmed what already was known and anticipated, and although, when the -message from G.H.Q. was read out to the assembled batteries, there was -such cheering as comes from deep down in the heart, the occasion was far -too great to be grasped in a single moment, and the gunners, as soon as -the parade was over, set off to play a football match against the -infantry! Such an attitude of mind must have seemed inexplicable to -onlookers of other nationalities who could not understand the -temperament of the British soldier, yet in a way the action was only -natural. The Great Pursuit was over; nay, more, the war, the terrible -nightmare of four years, was finished. How could the realisation of such -a mighty event be grasped in a moment by men who for months and years -had been hourly awaiting death, and now saw death pass from them? - - - - - CHAPTER XII. - FINALE. - - -And so the work is done, the record finished. In all humbleness the pen -was taken up to chronicle the deeds of these men; in all humbleness it -is laid down again with the closing of the story. In mere bald words it -has been impossible to describe the wonderful gallantry, the grand -determination and the final success over insuperable difficulties which -typified the men of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. The true tale of -their heroism, of their suffering and sacrifice can never really be -understood by any save those whose privilege it was to be a witness -thereof, but the story of the battles in which they took part may -perhaps convey a small idea of the glory of their war record. - -In December, 1915, they had their first experience of active service; in -November, 1918, the last "Cease Firing" sounded and their work was -accomplished. In all those ten hundred and fifty days of war the -batteries were in the line for over eight hundred days, and these -figures offer perhaps the most striking testimonial that can be given of -their work. They had been at one time the extreme right-hand unit of the -British line, on another occasion at Nieuport they guarded the extreme -left. On April 9th, 1917, the guns of one of the brigades were the first -of the whole line to follow up the enemy in every successive advance; in -November, 1918, they were the first guns to cross the River Sambre. All -along the British front they fought, at Nieuport, amid the grim horrors -of Passchendaele and Ypres, at Kemmel, Givenchy, Cambrin and Arras; in -the ruins of Hebuterne and the wilderness of Gommecourt, High Wood and -Delville Wood; in the sea of mud round Bouchavesnes and in the Somme -marshes. In the dark days of early 1918 they held with glorious -obstinacy and determination the gate of the north; in that wonderful -autumn of the same year it was the 33rd Divisional Artillery who took -part in that mighty onslaught which flung the enemy back upon his -frontiers and ultimately forced him to ask for peace. At this point it -would have been gratifying to have been able to record in fuller detail -the individual services of various officers and men who were especially -connected with the doings of the brigades and batteries during the war, -yet to attempt to do such a thing is well-nigh impossible. Each and all -contributed their share, each and all played a noble part, and who is to -judge as between man and man in the scorching fires of battle? Elsewhere -has been described the great work done by Colonel Frederick Hall, whose -sheer determination and personal endeavour got all the batteries out to -France within eleven months of the date of their first recruitment—a -record probably unequalled by any other New Army unit. Already mention -has been made of Brig.-General C. F. Blane who took the brigades out to -France and initiated them in the rigours of active service; of -Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd who led the 156th Brigade in the earlier -days, and of Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris who commanded so gallantly the -162nd; of Colonel A. H. S. Goff and Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Goff, and of -Brig.-General C. G. Stewart who succeeded General Blane as C.R.A. of the -Division. Already we have spoken of Lieut.-Colonel Butler and -Lieut.-Colonel Skinner, the two Brigade Commanders of the latter period -of the war, and of Brig.-General G. H. W. Nicholson who controlled the -batteries in the final victorious advance in 1918. Yet memory still -teems with the names of many others, for who is there from out of all -the batteries who is not also worthy of mention? Major Johnston and -Major Bennett, both killed on the Somme; Captain Heap and Lieut. Tucker -who died at Arras; Majors Studd, Barstow and Fetherston who were never -away from the Divisional Artillery for long; Taylor, Sheeres and Heads -of the 156th Brigade, Warr the "Mayor of King's Clere"; Benett-Stanford -and van Straubenzee of the 162nd Brigade; Cory and Pavitt, Lutyens and -Hill, Talbot and Bruce, Turner and Barnes; Gallie who died at -Passchendaele, Colonel Johnson and Captain Rhodes of the D.A.C., both -killed at Zillebeke. There is no end to the names of those who should be -spoken of, since for every name mentioned at least three more -immediately present themselves to the mind. One and all did their best, -and better than that no man can do. - -To follow the movements of the 33rd Divisional Artillery after the -Armistice would indeed seem an anti-climax, and yet, just as the story -has been told of its first formation, the gradual evolving of a unit of -artillery from the original raw mass, so must the final days be recorded -until the date when the men cast from them the apparel of war and -returned to civilian life once more, men who had for ever deserved from -their country the full rights of Citizenship. From November 11th until -the 14th the batteries remained in the areas they had been occupying -when hostilities ceased, and on the 14th they turned their faces towards -the west and began to retrace their steps over the scenes of the late -fighting. It was not decreed that they should take part in the -occupation of Germany, and accordingly they marched back through Forest, -Bertry and Clary to billets in Villers Outreaux (156th) and Lesdain -(162nd). Here they remained until December 6th and here, or rather at -Crevecoeur near by, was held on November 22nd a thanksgiving service at -which officers and men were decorated for gallantry in the fighting now -past and done with; here also the men were visited by His Majesty the -King who had come over to France to thank in person his victorious -troops, and on December 6th began the six-day march to the last rest -billets which the men were to occupy in France. - -Two routes were followed, one by each brigade, and, as mile after mile -rolled by, the batteries turned their backs once and for all upon ground -which for them held memories that can never be effaced. Through Tincourt -and Manancourt, past Riencourt and Méaulte where they had assembled -before moving into the Somme battle of 1916, through Blangy-Tronville -and Pont Noyelles, Le Mesge and Picquigny, on beyond Selincourt and St. -Maulvis they marched until at last they reached their permanent billets -around Brocourt-Liomer, Inval Boiron and Hornoy. Here they stopped and -here, for many weeks, they passed the time in educational schemes, in -physical training and recreation until such time as authority should -permit of their return to civil life once more. - -All through the war demobilisation, a return to England, to Peace with -no threat of war hanging over their heads, had seemed to these men a -wonderful dream which could never come true by any possibility, which -was so far removed from the order of things as to be something quite -intangible and incredible. It seemed that the war must still be in -progress beyond the eastern horizon, that soon they must be flung into -the scorching fires of battle again, that this talk of a return to -England for ever was fantastic, imaginary—a trick of their brains. Yet -even this most wonderful of events did actually occur; in March, 1919, -all units were reduced to "Cadre A," the surplus men being sent to the -Base for demobilisation, in May a further 25 per cent. of these cadres -was dispatched home, and in the second week of June only an equipment -guard remained with each battery. - -In July these last remnants of the 33rd Divisional Artillery departed -from the land of France which owed to them so much. All through the -first week of the month the skeletons of the batteries entrained and -moved to Havre, and the 9th found them in that port waiting for a ship -to carry them home. On Thursday, the 10th, the 156th Brigade embarked -for Southampton, on the 12th and 17th the D.A.C. followed, and on Sunday -July 27th, 1919, the 162nd Brigade, last remaining unit of the 33rd -Divisional Artillery, watched the quays and houses of Havre glide slowly -by as the ship gathered way and headed for the coast of England. - -Thus the Brigades left France and set foot in England again, their work -accomplished, the battle won. Camberwell turned out and gave right royal -welcome to its Gunners when, a few days later, they marched as victors -through the crowded streets; and well might it be so, for they had -returned with such glory as can hardly be believed of mortal man. -Several days did the people spend in rejoicing and in welcoming their -citizen-soldiers home once more, days in which the pangs and miseries of -those dark times of watching and waiting were put aside and forgotten. -Yet in all those festivities, beneath all the laughter and song of that -week there was for ever present the divine and sacred memory of those -whose good fortune it had not been to return from the battle, of those -many hundreds who had died in the service of the guns of the 33rd -Division and who lay in soldiers' graves along the length and breadth of -the far-flung battle line. Their example, their sacrifice must stand for -all time as a memorial and a constant reminder to those who come after -of the price which has been paid that they may live, and there will ever -remain to those who mourn the loss of many whose places can never be -filled, the proud memory of their heroism and endurance, the glad -knowledge of a man's part nobly played. - - "Their seed shall remain for ever and their glory shall not be - blotted out. Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth - for evermore." - - THE END. - - - - - APPENDIX I. - - - CASUALTIES. - - 33rd Divisional Artillery. - - 1916. - - _Officers:_ _Other Ranks:_ - Killed 9 Killed 117 - Wounded 43 Wounded 419 - Missing 1 Missing 5 - ——— ——— - Total 53 Total 541 - - Officer Casualties. - - _Killed:_ - - Baldwin, 2/Lt. H. D. - Bennett, Major W. P. - Briggs, 2/Lt. H. K. - Fell, 2/Lt. D. M. - Gardner, 2/Lt. F. G. B. - Haylett, 2/Lt. N. - Johnston, Major R. G. M. - Peerless, 2/Lt. C. S. - Prior, 2/Lt. M. S. - - _Wounded:_ - - Barlow, 2/Lt. C. G. - Barstow, Capt. W. A. T. - Beresford, Lt. F. R. - Body, 2/Lt. M. M. I. - Collins, 2/Lt. G. R. - Cooper, 2/Lt. F. D'A. - Fisher, 2/Lt. L. E. - Forbes, 2/Lt. W. F. - Goff, Col. A. H. S. - Goff, Lt.-Col. L. T. - Greenwood, 2/Lt. T. A. - Hailey, 2/Lt. V. - Hancock, 2/Lt. G. E. L. - Harvey, 2/Lt. W. E. - Henley, 2/Lt. A. W. - Hewitt, 2/Lt. H. H. - Hill, Capt. L. R. - Huddart, 2/Lt. G. H. - Jacobs, 2/Lt. P. A. - Keable, 2/Lt. A. M. - Kernan, Capt. G. E. - Kerr, 2/Lt. J. C. - Macartney-Filgate, 2/Lt. J. - Maxwell, Capt. A. - Milne, 2/Lt. K. W. - Mocatta, 2/Lt. H. - Moore, Lt. C. - Murray, Major A. D. - Ormond, 2/Lt. E. C. - Osborne, 2/Lt. M. - Russell, Capt. R. D. - Shepherd, Lt. T. D. - Swinton, 2/Lt. R. A. - Tait, 2/Lt. J. A. - Thompson, Major R. H. - Turner, 2/Lt. K. F. S. - Vick, Lt. D. M. - Watson, Lt. W. D. - Watson, 2/Lt. J. Irvine - White, 2/Lt. L. H. - Woodroffe, 2/Lt. F. G. - Wreford, 2/Lt. W. J. - - _Missing:_ - - Elliott, 2/Lt. F. W. - - - CASUALTIES 1917. - - 156th Brigade, R.F.A. - - _Officers:_ _Other Ranks:_ - Killed 6 Killed 65[2] - Wounded 16 Wounded 281[2] - Missing — Missing — - ——— ——— - Total 22 346 - - 162nd Brigade, R.F.A. - - _Officers:_ _Other Ranks:_ - Killed.. 7 Killed.. 62 - Wounded 22 Wounded 313 - Missing.. — Missing.. 2 - ——— ——— - Total 29 377 - - GRAND TOTAL Officer Casualties 51 - - Other Ranks do. 723 - -Footnote 2: - - Not quite complete. - - Officer Casualties. - - _Killed:_ - - Barlow, 2/Lt. C. G. (156th). - Barton, 2/Lt. V. A. (162nd). - Beerbohm, Capt. C. (156th). - Bostock, 2/Lt. N. S. (162nd). - Dean, 2/Lt. G. F. (162nd). - Fitch, 2/Lt. D. (162nd). - Grant, 2/Lt. N. (156th). - Heape, Capt. B. R. (162nd). - Johnson, Lt.-Col. A. G. (D.A.C.). - Lutyens, 2/Lt. C. J. (156th). - Neate, 2/Lt. A. B. (162nd). - Rhodes, Capt. H. (D.A.C.). - Tucker, 2/Lt. A. R. (162nd). - Vickers, 2/Lt. R. (162nd). - Wheatley, 2/Lt. E. R. (156th). - Wimbush, 2/Lt. E. T. (D.A.C.). - - _Wounded:_ - - Barstow, Major W. A. T. (156th). - Beadle, 2/Lt. F. W. (156th). - Beal, 2/Lt. S. N. (162nd). - Benett-Stanford, Major V. (162nd). - Body, Capt. M. M. I. (162nd). - Bloor, 2/Lt. C. A. (156th). - Bunbury, Capt. T. St. P. (162nd). - Chapman, 2/Lt. J. G. J. (162nd). - Colfox, Major W. P. (162nd). - Cunis, Lt. V. W. (162nd). - Donovan, 2/Lt. E. T. G. (162nd). - Edwards, 2/Lt. H. R. (162nd). - Escott, 2/Lt. H. J. (162nd). - Hanna, 2/Lt. P. R. (156th). - Hannaford, 2/Lt. W. (162nd). - Harrison, 2/Lt. W. E. (162nd). - Howard, 2/Lt. L. M. (162nd). - Kitchin, 2/Lt. E. J. H. (162nd). - Lee, Major F. L. (162nd). - Leigh, 2/Lt. R. (156th). - MacDonald, 2/Lt. A. (156th). - McEwan, 2/Lt. A. (156th). - McLeod, 2/Lt. D. (156th). - Molyneux, 2/Lt. H. P. (156th). - Mousley, 2/Lt. (156th). - Odhams, 2/Lt. R. C. (162nd). - Oxley, Lt. B. L. (156th). - Phipps, 2/Lt. H. E. (156th). - Revels, 2/Lt. D. (156th). - Sall, 2/Lt. B. (156th). - Thompson, 2/Lt. H. A. (162nd). - van Straubenzee, Capt. A. (162nd). - Walker, Major C. H. (162nd). - Whiting, 2/Lt. A. H. (D.A.C.) - Willett, 2/Lt. S. W. (156th). - Wingfield, 2/Lt. R. M. (156th). - Two others—unknown. - - - CASUALTIES 1918. - - 156th Brigade, R.F.A. - - _Officers:_ _Other Ranks:_ - Killed 3[3] Killed } Lists - Wounded 7[3] Wounded } unobtainable - Missing 2 Missing } - - 162nd Brigade, R.F.A. - - _Officers:_ _Other Ranks:_ - Killed 2 Killed 49 - Wounded 21 Wounded.. 266 - ——— ——— - Total 23 Total 315 - -Footnote 3: - - Lists incomplete. - - Officer Casualties. - - _Killed:_ - - Bruce, Lt. W. G. (156th). - Bruce, 2/Lt. A. P. (156th). - Butler, Lt.-Col. B. A. B. (156th). - Essex, Lt. E. C. (162nd). - Squire, 2/Lt. C. A. (162nd). - - _Missing:_ - - Blackwell, 2/Lt. K. R. (156th). - Clow, 2/Lt. O. W. (156th). - - _Wounded:_ - - Barker, Major A. (156th). - Bedford-Pim, Lt.-Col. G. (162nd). - Coleman, Capt. G. (162nd). - Cory, Major H. C. (162nd). - Escott, 2/Lt. H. J. (162nd). - Evans, 2/Lt. A. J. (162nd). - Fetherston, Major G. (162nd). - Garrod, Lt. R. G. (162nd). - Gough, Lt. H. L. R. (162nd). - Greig, 2/Lt. J. G. (156th). - Groves, 2/Lt. F. E. S. (156th). - Hadley, 2/Lt. P. A. S. (162nd). - Herlihy, 2/Lt. W. (162nd). - Lawson, 2/Lt. E. B. (156th). - McNabb, 2/Lt. I. B. (162nd). - Mitcheson, 2/Lt. J. C. (162nd). - Paterson, Lt. B. S. McC. (162nd). - Pavitt, Capt. and Adjt. R. H. (162nd). - Phipps, 2/Lt. H. E. (156th). - Rollason, 2/Lt. M. H. (162nd). - Saunders, 2/Lt. G. (162nd). - Skinner, Lt.-Col. E. J. (162nd). - Tetlow, 2/Lt. (156th). - Warren, Lt. F. D. (162nd). - Williamson, Lt. G. W. (156th). - Wimshurst, 2/Lt. T. E. (162nd). - Two others—unknown. - - - - - APPENDIX II. - - - A LIST OF THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS THE INFANTRY OF WHICH WERE COVERED - BY THE GUNS OF THE 33RD DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS. - - _La Bassée._ - - February—July, 1916 33rd Division. - 39th Division. - - _Battle of the Somme._ - - July—September, 1916 1st Division. - 5th Division. - 7th Division. - 14th Division. - 24th Division. - 33rd Division. - 51st Division. - - _Dainville, Hebuterne and the Battle of the Ancre._ - - September—November, 1916 12th Division. - 31st Division. - 33rd Division. - 35th Division. - 49th Division. - - _The Somme._ - - November, 1916—March, 1917 4th Division. - 8th Division. - 33rd Division. - 40th Division. - - _Battle of Arras._ - - April—June, 1917 Cavalry Division. - 3rd Division. - 4th Division. - 9th Division. - 12th Division. - 15th Division. - 17th Division. - 29th Division. - 37th Division. - - _Hindenburg Line and the Coast._ - - June—August, 1917 49th Division. - 50th Division. - 66th Division. - - _Battles of Ypres and Passchendaele._ - - September—November, 1917 5th Division. - 7th Division. - 17th Division. - 23rd Division. - 24th Division. - 33rd Division. - - _Passchendaele._ - - December, 1917—April, 1918 33rd Division. - 50th Division. - - _German Flanders Offensive, Kemmel._ - - April—August, 1918 6th Division. - 9th Division. - 19th Division. - 33rd Division. - 49th Division. - 28th French Division. - 44th French Regiment. - 46th French Regiment. - 30th American Division. - - _British Final Offensive, 3rd Army._ - - September—November, 1918 17th Division. - 21st Division. - 33rd Division. - 38th Division. - - - - - APPENDIX III. - - - THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE BATTLE-LINE IN FRANCE - AND FLANDERS. - - Together with the Official Names of the Battles in which the - 33rd Divisional Artillery took part. - - Period. Sector. Battles. - - Dec. 1915—July La Bassée. (Holding the line.) - 1916, - - Givenchy-Cuinchy. - - July—Sept. 1916. The Somme. The Battles of the Somme 1916: - - High Wood-Delville (i.) Battle of Bazentin - Wood. Ridge. - - (ii.) Battle of Delville - Wood. - - (iii.) Attacks on High Wood. - - (iv.) Battle of Guillemont. - - Sept.—Nov. 1916. Dainville. (Holding the line.) - - Hebuterne-Gommecourt. The Battle of the Ancre 1916. - - Dec. 1916—Mar. Bouchavesnes-Clery- (Holding the line.) - 1917. sur-Somme. - - April—June 1917. Arras. The Battles of Arras 1917: - - Feuchy-Monchy. (i.) First Battle of the - Scarpe 1917. - - (ii.) Second Battle of the - Scarpe 1917. - - (iii.) Battle of Arleux. - - (iv.) Third Battle of the - Scarpe 1917. - - (_a_) Capture of Roeux. - - June—July 1917. Cherisy-Bullecourt. (Holding the line.) - - - July—August Nieuport. (Preparation for an offensive.) - 1917. - - Sept.—Nov. 1917. Ypres Salient. (i.) Battle of the Menin Road - Ridge. - - Reutel-Gheluvelt. (ii.) Battle of Polygon Wood. - - (iii.) Battle of Broodseinde. - - (iv.) Battle of Poelcappelle. - - (v.) First Battle of - Passchendaele. - - (vi.) Second Battle of - Passchendaele. - - Dec. 1917—April Ypres Salient. - 1918. - - Passchendaele. (Holding the line.) - - April—August Ypres Salient. The Battles of the Lys: - 1918. - - Mt. Kemmel. (i.) Battle of Messines 1918. - - (ii.) Battle of Bailleul. - - (iii.) First Battle of Kemmel - Ridge. - - (iv.) Second Battle of Kemmel - Ridge. - - (v.) Battle of the - Scherpenberg. - - - Sept.—Nov. 1918. Third Army. The Battles of the Hindenburg - Line: - - Peizière—Bertry— (i.) Battle of Epehy. - - Englefontaine— (ii.) Battle of the St. - Quentin Canal. - - Forêt de Mormal— (iii.) Battle of the - Beaurevoir Line. - - Wattignies. (iv.) Battle of Cambrai 1918. - - The Battle of the Selle. - - The Battle of Valenciennes. - - The Battle of the Sambre. - - - - - INDEX. - - - Abraham Heights, 129, 144, 145. - - Adinfer Wood, 105. - - Adinkerke, 106, 109. - - Aiguille Ravine, 68. - - Ailly-sur-Somme, 24, 62. - - Airaines, 61, 62, 65, 68. - - Aire, 6, 7. - - Air Service, German, 16. - - Albert, 174, 176. - - Aldershot, 183. - - Allaines, 71. - - Alquines, 135. - - Amerval, 184. - - Amesbury, 4, 6. - - Amiens, 24. - - Ammunition supply, 15. - - Amplier, 106. - - Ancre, The, 56, 57, 60, 61, 174. - - Anderlu Wood, 65. - - Annequin, 8, 10, 15. - - Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (2nd), 75. - - Arleux-en-Gohelle, 91. - - Armagh Wood, 129, 134. - - Armentières, 147. - - Arouves, 24. - - Arras, 37, 53-56, 77, 78, 80-82, 85-87, 89, 98-100, 194, 195. - - Asylum (Ypres), 143. - - Athies, 82. - - Aubencheul, 180, 181. - - Auchy, 10-13, 18. - - Authieule, 106. - - Avesnes, 192. - - Avesnes-le-Comte, 176. - - Avre, River, 174. - - - Bailleul, 147. - - Baird, Brig.-General, 72. - - Bapaume, 99, 100. - - Barker, Major, 157-159. - - Barkworth, Major, 11. - - Barnes, Major, 195. - - Barstow, Captain, 11; - Major, 69, 70, 131, 195. - - Bartholomew, Lieut., 148. - - Basket Wood, 180, 181. - - Bas Loquin, 135. - - Bass Wood, 119. - - Bathurst, Lady, 3. - - Battery Valley, 89, 98. - - Baudimont Gate, 81. - - Bavai, 188. - - Bavinchove, 135. - - Bayonet Trench, 90, 91. - - Bazentin, 26, 28, 30-32, 35, 40, 43. - - Beaumont-Hamel, 61. - - Beaurains, 99-100, 103. - - Beaurevoir, 180, 181. - - Becordel, 25. - - Bedford House, 125, 131. - - Belgian Battery Corner, 138. - - Belgrave, Major, 57, 70, 74. - - Belloy-sur-Somme, 69. - - Benett-Stanford, Lieut. V., 43; - Major, 70, 90, 195. - - Bennet, Lieut. C. H., 153, 161. - - Bennett, Major W. P., 10, 26, 195. - - Bergues, 106. - - Berguette, 7. - - Bertry, 182, 183, 188, 196. - - Béthune, 10, 13. - - Beugnies, Bois de, 192. - - Beuvry, 10, 16. - - Black Watch Corner, 119. - - Blackwell, Lieut., 159. - - Blane, Brig.-General C. F., 11, 62, 65, 68, 70, 77, 195. - - Blangy, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86. - - Blangy-Tronville, 196. - - Bluff, The, 13. - - Body, Lieut. M. M. I., 46; - Captain, 90; - Major, 152, 160. - - Boeschepe, 125. - - Boiry St. Martin, 105. - - Boiry St. Rictrude, 100. - - Bois du Sars, 89. - - Bois Grenier, 147. - - Bonnay, 50, 52. - - Bostin Farm, 145. - - Bostock, Lieut., 90. - - Bouchavesnes, 62, 65, 68-70, 194. - - Boulogne, 55, 138. - - Bouquemaison, 176. - - Bout de la Ville, 142. - - Bouvelinghem, 135. - - Boyce, Lieut.-Colonel, C. E., 189. - - Boyelles, 100. - - Braddell Castle, 12. - - Bray-sur-Somme, 64. - - Brickstacks, The, 13, 14. - - Bridges, Major, 61. - - Brocourt-Liomer, 196. - - Bruce, Lieut., 152, 195. - - Brynhild Line, 191. - - Bulford, 3, 7, 26. - - Bullecourt, 88, 91, 93, 102, 103. - - Bunbury, Captain, 37. - - Burgomaster Farm, 121. - - Bury Cottages, 132, 133. - - Bus, 176. - - Buscourt, 70. - - Busseboom, 140, 154. - - Butler, Lieut.-Colonel, 81, 114, 127, 130, 138, 141, 148, 153-155, 157- - 159, 163, 187, 195. - - Byng, General, 174, 181, 185. - - Byron Farm, 152. - - - Camberwell, 11, 197. - - Camberwell, Mayor of, 3. - - Cambrai, 61, 80, 84, 87. - - Cambrin, 8, 10, 12, 51, 194. - - Cameron Covert, 128, 130. - - Cameron Highlanders, 48. - - Cameron House, 119. - - Camp 14, 62, 64. - - Camp 21, 64, 65, 69. - - Canada Corner, 154. - - Canal de l'Escaut, 179. - - Canteleux, 12. - - Cardonette, 24. - - Carlisle Farm, 119. - - Carrell, Major, 143, 153. - - Cassel, 111, 135. - - Caterpillar Valley, 26, 33, 39, 41. - - Caterpillar Wood, 26, 28, 31, 33, 35, 38, 40, 41. - - Chapter Wood, 72. - - Cheapside, 153, 164. - - Chemical Works, 89, 93, 95. - - Cherisy, 93, 104. - - Chocques, 23. - - Clapham Junction, 115. - - Clary, 182, 183, 196. - - Clery-sur-Somme, 65, 70, 72, 74, 174. - - Clifford Rest Camp, 168. - - Coast, The, 104, 106, 146. - - Coffin, Captain, 10, 17. - - Colfox, Major, 96, 105. - - Comines, 170. - - Compiègne, Forest of, 192. - - Contalmaison, 28. - - Corbie, 24, 62. - - Corons de Maron, 12. - - Cory, Major, 125, 143, 152, 161, 195. - - Couin, 58, 61. - - Coxyde Bains, 106, 107, 109, 110. - - Crawford Crater, 178. - - Crest Farm, 139, 142. - - Crevecoeur, 196. - - Croix, 186, 187. - - Cuinchy, 11, 18, 21, 51. - - - Dainville, 54-56. - - Daours, 24. - - Dead Man's House, 12. - - Debeney, General, 178, 181. - - De Drie Goen Farm, 164. - - Delville Wood, 28-30, 36-40, 44, 46, 48, 49, 194. - - Denain, 185. - - Dernancourt, 40. - - De St. Paule, Commandant, 70. - - Desinet Farm, 155, 157. - - Deverell, Major-General, 98. - - Devil's Trench, 93, 94, 96, 97. - - Dickebusch, 111, 120, 121, 133-135, 158, 165. - - Divisional Ammunition Column, 8, 46, 62, 111, 114, 125, 195. - - Dormy House, 125. - - Doullens, 54, 106, 176. - - Dourlers, 192. - - Douvrin, 13. - - Drake, General, 3. - - Dranoutre, 148, 150. - - Duck's Bill, 20, 21. - - Duisans, 81, 82. - - Dumbarton Lakes, 115. - - Dumbarton Wood, 119. - - Dump, The, 12. - - Duncan, Major, 1, 11. - - Dunkirk, 106, 109. - - Durie, Major, 106. - - Dust, Captain, 69. - - - East Yorks. Regiment (15th), 103. - - Eclusier, 69. - - Ecuelin, 192. - - Elliott, Lieut., 31. - - Elnes, 143. - - Englefontaine, 187-190. - - Equancourt, 177. - - Escott, Lieut., 161. - - Estrée-Blanche, 10. - - Evett Copse, 178. - - - Falfemont Farm, 47. - - Fampoux, 82. - - Fetherston, Captain, 38, 40; - Major, 70, 81, 143, 152, 160, 172, 177, 195. - - Feuchy, 82, 84, 87, 88, 95. - - Feuchy Chapel, 87. - - Feuillaucourt, 71, 74. - - Feuillières, 70, 72. - - Fitzclarence Farm, 119. - - Flatiron Copse, 30, 31. - - Flers, 32, 44. - - Foch, Maréchal, 174. - - Fonquevillers, 56, 57. - - Fontaine-lez-Croisilles, 102-104. - - Forest, 185, 186, 196. - - Fosse 8, 8, 12. - - Fosse Wood, 112, 115, 129. - - Fouquereuil, 23. - - Four Hundred, The, 12. - - Franque Wood, 180, 181. - - Freckles Wood, 71. - - Fred's Wood, 83. - - French, Field-Marshal Lord, 8. - - Fresnoy, 93. - - Frevent, 176. - - Frezenburg, 141, 143, 146. - - Fricourt, 26, 28. - - Frise, 69. - - - Gallie, Captain, 139, 141, 195. - - Gallipoli, 111. - - Garrod, Lieut., 153, 161. - - Gauche Wood, 176. - - Gaudiempré, 55, 56. - - Geleide Post, 110. - - Gheluvelt, 115, 119, 122, 123, 125-128, 130-133. - - G.H.Q. Reserve, 68. - - Ghyvelde, 106, 111. - - Ginchy, 28, 44-48. - - Givenchy, 8, 10-12, 18, 20, 147, 194. - - Godewaersvelde, 145. - - Godizonne Farm, 157. - - Goed Moet Mill, 164. - - Goff, Colonel A. H. S., 11, 31, 195. - - Goff, Lieut.-Colonel L. T., 40, 195. - - Goldfish Château, 138, 143, 145, 170-172. - - Gommecourt, 55-57, 194. - - Gordon's Brewery, 3. - - Gorre, 8. - - Gough, Lieut.-General Sir Hubert, 8. - - Gouzeaucourt, 174, 176. - - Grand Dune, 107. - - Gravenstafel, 129, 139-141, 143. - - Greenland Hill, 89, 93, 97. - - Groenendyk, 108. - - Groenen Jager, 170. - - Groves, Lieut.-Colonel, 114, 125. - - Guarbecque, 7, 23. - - Guards Grenadier Regiment, German, 75. - - Guillemont, 28, 44, 47. - - - Haandehote, 173. - - Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas, 98, 167. - - Haisnes, 13, 17. - - Hall, Major Frederick, 1; - Lieut.-Colonel, 11, 195. - - Halle, 71. - - Hallebast Corner, 125, 152, 154, 155, 165. - - Hamblain, 94. - - Hamelincourt, 100, 102. - - Harfleur, 7. - - Harley Street, 16, 17. - - Harpur, Lieut.-Colonel, 11. - - Harris, Lieut.-Colonel, 11, 41, 43, 44, 48, 54, 70, 74, 77, 81, 98, - 195. - - Hatchet Wood, 89. - - Haute Planque, 135. - - Havrincourt Wood, 174. - - Hazebrouck, 6, 106. - - Heads, Captain, 191, 195. - - Heape, Captain, 95, 195. - - Hebuterne, 56-59, 194. - - Heidebeke, 173. - - Heninel, 102, 104. - - Henin-sur-Cojeul, 102, 104. - - Herenthage Château, 119. - - Herold's Institute, 3. - - Hersfeld Trench, 74. - - Heudecourt, 176. - - Highland Light Infantry (9th), 20, 72. - - High Wood, 26, 28-32, 34, 36-38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 49, 194. - - Hill 44 (Ypres), 157, 158, 163. - - Hill, Major, 121, 131, 143, 145, 195. - - Hindenburg Line, 61, 74, 75, 99, 100, 102, 103, 174. - - Hohenzollern Redoubt, 15. - - Honnecourt, 177, 180, 181. - - Hornoy, 196. - - Horse Show, 105. - - Hospital Wood, 65, 66. - - Houtkerque, 168, 173. - - Howitzer Wood, 70. - - Hulluch, 15. - - - Indian Well House, 13. - - Infantry Hill, 97. - - Inval Boiron, 196. - - - Jean, P. C., 70. - - Jervis, Major, 141. - - Jigsaw Wood, 89. - - Joffre, General, 8. - - John Copse, 57, 60. - - Johnson, Colonel, 195. - - Johnston, Major, 37, 41, 45, 195. - - Joist Farm, 123, 130. - - Jones, Major, 141, 153. - - Juniper Cottages, 126. - - Jut Farm, 123. - - - Kansas Cross, 139, 145. - - Keeling Copse, 92. - - Kemmel, 148, 150-155, 157, 158, 160, 163, 194. - - Kemmel Beek, 152, 155, 157. - - King's Clere, 10, 12, 195. - - King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (9th), 157-160, 163. - - Kruisstraathoek, 165. - - - La Bassée, 8, 13, 18, 21, 22, 30, 98. - - La Bassée Canal, 10, 11. - - La Bassée Road, 12. - - La Clytte, 134, 158, 159, 163, 164. - - La Fayte, 182. - - La Grande Pature, 191. - - La Louverie Farm, 60. - - La Lovie, 172. - - Langemarck, 139, 143. - - La Nieppe, 135, 143. - - Lankhof Château, 169. - - La Panne, 109. - - La Pannerie Wood, 181. - - Larkhill, 3. - - La Terrière, 180, 181. - - Le Bas, 142. - - Le Buisson, 135. - - Le Cateau, 183, 185. - - Lee, Major, 131, 143, 152, 160, 161, 169. - - Le Forest, 65. - - Le Gros, Commandant, 70. - - Le Havre, 6, 7, 196, 197. - - Le Mesge, 24, 196. - - Le Quesnoy, 189. - - Les Briques, 12. - - Lesdain, 196. - - Les Tranchées, 180. - - Le Transloy, 176. - - Lewis House, 128, 132, 133. - - Lille, 71. - - Lille Gate, 112. - - Lillers, 6, 23. - - Limberlost Wood, 71, 76. - - Lindenhoek, 151. - - Littlejohn, Captain, 69. - - Lloyd, Major-General Sir Francis, 3. - - Locre, 154. - - Lombardzyde, 109, 110. - - Lomer, Captain, 30, 70. - - Lone Farm, 12, 13. - - Longueau, 24. - - Longueval, 28-30, 33, 35-38, 44, 45. - - Loos, 8, 13. - - Lutyens, Captain, 30; - Major, 81, 195. - - Lys, 165. - - - MacCullock, Lieut.-Colonel, 157, 163, 164. - - Mad Point, 11, 20. - - Maison Rouge, 12. - - Malincourt, 181, 182. - - Mametz, 26, 33, 35, 39. - - Manancourt, 196. - - Manchester Regiment, 96. - - Maple Copse, 112, 115, 129, 131, 134. - - Maricourt, 64, 65, 69. - - Marrières, 65, 72. - - Marriott, Lieut.-Colonel, 132. - - Martinpuich, 29, 30, 36. - - Maubeuge, 192. - - Maurepas, 44, 62, 65. - - Mazinghem, 7. - - McDonald, Lieut., 152. - - Méaulte, 25, 196. - - Meetcheele, 139, 142. - - Menin Gate, 112, 136, 143. - - Menin Road, 121-123, 125. - - Merck St. Lievin, 142. - - Messines, 147. - - Meteren, 150. - - Middlesex (1st), 169, 170, 178, 186. - - Millekruisse, 152, 154, 155, 164. - - Moislains, 68. - - Monchy-le-Preux, 87-90, 102. - - Montauban, 26, 29, 33, 35, 39, 41, 43. - - Montay, 183, 184, 186. - - Mont Bernanchon, 7, 23. - - Montbrehain, 180. - - Montenescourt, 53. - - Mont St. Quentin, 70, 71. - - Moorslede, 140, 143. - - Mormal Forest, 189-191. - - Mortho Wood, 181. - - Mountain House, 10, 12. - - Murray, Lieut.-Colonel, 47. - - - Namur, 192. - - Naval Division, 186. - - Neate, Lieut., 90. - - Neuve Église, 147, 148. - - Neuville, 50, 52. - - Neuvilly, 183. - - Nevinson, Colonel, 70. - - New Zealand Field Artillery, 50. - - Nicholson, Brig.-General G. H. W., 172, 188, 195. - - Nieuport, 70, 106, 108-110, 194. - - Norton, Lieut., 154. - - Nurlu, 71. - - - Observatory Ridge, 84. - - Oppy, 93. - - Orange Hill, 85, 87, 89, 90. - - Order of Battle, 9, 19, 27, 54, 63, 73, 79, 101, 113, 137, 149, 175. - - Ostend, 107, 108, 110. - - Otto Farm, 139, 141, 143. - - Ouderdom, 154, 158, 162, 164. - - Oudezeele, 142. - - Ovillers, 184, 186. - - - Packham, Captain, 10. - - Paris, 71. - - Parrot Camp, 150. - - Passchendaele, 37, 111, 115, 136, 139, 140, 143, 150, 165, 194, 195. - - Paterson, Lieut.-Colonel, 150. - - Paul Jacques Farm, 187. - - Pavitt, Captain, 148, 162, 195. - - Paynter, Lieut.-Colonel, 146. - - Peake, Colonel, 3. - - Peckham Tramway Depôt, 3. - - Peizière, 176, 177, 179. - - Pekly Bulge, 74, 75. - - Pelican Ridge, 110. - - Pelves, 89, 91, 92, 94. - - Péronne, 71, 77, 174. - - Perrott, Major-General Sir T., 3. - - Peselhoek, 146. - - Petit Houvain, 176. - - Phipps, Lieut., 157. - - Picquigny, 24, 62, 196. - - Pigeon Trench, 177, 179. - - Pim, Lieut.-Colonel, 189. - - Plateau Siding, 68. - - Ploegsteert Wood, 147. - - Plumer, General Sir Herbert, 169. - - Poezelhoek, 128. - - Point, The, 57, 59. - - Poix-du-Nord, 185, 187-189. - - Polderhoek Château, 115, 123, 124, 126, 128-130. - - Polygon Beek, 126, 129. - - Polygon de Zonnebeke, 122. - - Pont Fixe, 10. - - Pont Noyelles, 196. - - Poperinghe, 140, 141, 146, 148, 164, 168, 169. - - Pot de Vin, 191. - - Potijze Château, 138, 141, 144. - - Pozières, 28. - - Pringle, Major, 104. - - Proven, 168, 173. - - Puisieux, 57, 58, 60. - - - Railway Triangle, 12, 17, 83-89. - - Rancourt, 72, 74. - - Rawlinson, General Sir H., 174, 181. - - Rebreuviette, 176. - - Reigate Farm, 132. - - Renescure, 143. - - Reninghelst, 111, 121, 134, 154, 162, 164. - - Reorganisation of Divisional Artillery, 17, 53, 69. - - Reutel, 120, 126, 128, 129. - - Reutelbeek, 120, 122, 128, 130. - - Rhodes, Captain, 195. - - Ribaumet, 190. - - Richards, Major, 104. - - Richemont, 186, 187. - - Ridge View, 12. - - Ridge Wood, 153, 157, 165, 169, 170. - - Riencourt, 88, 196. - - Rietveld, 143. - - Rifle Trench, 90, 91. - - Rochfort-Boyd, Lieut.-Colonel, 11, 43, 61, 195. - - Roeux, 89, 90, 93, 95-97. - - Rossignol Wood (Arras), 56. - - Rossignol Wood (Kemmel), 150, 155, 161. - - Rouziers, Commandant, 70. - - Royal Sussex Regiment (17th), 92. - - Royal Welsh Fusiliers (2nd), 20, 21. - - Royal Welsh Fusiliers (17th), 188. - - Roziere, 176. - - Ruin, The, 12. - - Running-out Springs, 35. - - Russell, Captain, 30. - - Ryan's Keep, 17. - - - Sailly-au-Bois, 55-59. - - Sailly-le-Sec, 72, 76. - - Sailly-Saillisel, 62. - - Sallieux, 24. - - Salvation Corner, 168. - - Sambre, River, 186, 189, 191, 194. - - Sanctuary Wood, 131, 134. - - Sarbaras, 190, 191. - - Sassegnies, 190. - - Scabbard Trench, 92. - - Scarpe, River, 80, 81, 83, 85, 87-91, 93, 95. - - Scheldt, River, 186. - - Scherpenberg, 154. - - Scherriabeek, 128, 130. - - Scottish Rifles (5th), 180. - - Scottish Wood, 169. - - Seine, River, 144. - - Selincourt, 196. - - Selle, River, 183-186. - - Serain, 181. - - Serre, 57, 60. - - Sheeres, Major, 187, 195. - - Shoeburyness, 3. - - Shrapnel Corner, 111, 125. - - Siege Farm, 153, 154, 157, 163. - - Siegfried Line, 174, 179, 181, 182, 191. - - Skindles, 141. - - Skinner, Lieut.-Colonel, 125, 128, 130, 138, 141, 148, 154, 155, 157, - 161, 163, 164, 195. - - Slaughter House, 186. - - Somme, River, 18, 20, 22, 23, 28, 38, 44, 47, 61, 66, 69-72, 76, 78, - 174, 194-196. - - Soues, 24. - - Southampton, 6, 197. - - Spanbroekmolen, 148, 155. - - Spanish Influenza, 188. - - Spotted Dog, 17. - - Squire, Lieut., 160. - - Stanley-Clarke, Lieut., 161. - - Steenvoorde, 121. - - Stewart, Lieut.-Colonel C. G., 43, 47, 53, 54, 69, 70; - Brig.-General, 77, 98, 102, 106, 121, 125, 136, 150, 165, 172, 195. - - Stewart, Major D., 33, 40. - - Stewart, Brig.-Gen. D. B., 108. - - St. Hubertshoek, 125. - - St. Idesbalde, 109. - - St. Jean, 144. - - St. John's Wood, 3. - - St. Leger, 58, 61. - - St. Martin-sur-Cojeul, 104. - - St. Maulvis, 196. - - St. Nicholas, 81, 83. - - St. Pierre Vaast Wood, 68. - - Stuart, Brig.-General, 3. - - Studd, Captain, 11, 16, 30, 40; - Major, 70, 81, 106, 141, 153, 158-160, 195. - - Suffolk Regiment (4th), 74. - - Suzanne, 64, 65. - - Switch Trench, 26, 29-31, 34, 35, 38, 48, 49. - - - Talbot, Captain, 40; - Major, 70, 195. - - Targelle Ravine, 177, 179. - - Taylor, Captain, 160; - Major, 191, 195. - - Therouane, 10. - - Thiembronne, 142. - - Thiennes, 7. - - Thiepval, 47. - - Tilloy, 82, 83. - - Tilques, 142, 143, 145, 169. - - Tincourt, 196. - - Tor Top, 114. - - Tourbière Loop, 16. - - Touvert Farm, 60. - - Tower Hamlets, 119, 132. - - Trench Mortars, 71, 114, 125. - - Trescault, 174. - - Treux, 25. - - Trois Rois, 135. - - Troisvilles, 182-184. - - Tucker, Lieut., 95, 195. - - Tunnelling Company, 21. - - Turner, Lieut. J. R. B., 151, 195. - - - United States Army, 171, 172, 183. - - - Valenciennes, 185. - - Valley Cottages, 120. - - Van Issacker's Farm, 141. - - van Straubenzee, Captain, 41, 46; - Major, 70, 195. - - Vaughan-Hughes, Major, 189. - - Vauxhall Bridge, 10. - - Vaux-sur-Somme, 62, 72, 76. - - Vaux Wood, 69. - - Vecquemont, 24, 62. - - Veldhoek, 119. - - Vendegies, 186, 187. - - Vendhuille, 181. - - Verbrandenmolen, 120. - - Verdun, 13. - - Vermelles 8, 11. - - Vierstraat, 148, 151, 153-155, 157, 158, 160, 163, 165. - - Villers Guislain, 178, 179. - - Villers Outreaux, 181, 182, 196. - - Vimy Ridge, 77, 80, 88. - - Violaines, 10, 12. - - Vlamertinghe, 138, 143, 146, 169-172. - - Voormezeele, 169, 170. - - - Waayenburg, 173. - - Wagnonville, 185, 187-189. - - Wanquetin, 53, 55, 56. - - Warr, Captain, 195. - - Warren, Lieut.-Colonel, 189. - - Watery Wood, 83. - - Wattignies, 192, 193. - - Westende, 108. - - Wieltje, 139, 140, 144. - - Wilmot, Army Schoolmaster, 3. - - Wilson's House, 12. - - Windmill Cabaret, 139, 141-144. - - Wingfield, Lieut., 94. - - Winnezeele, 164-166. - - Wood Lane, 41-44, 47, 49. - - Woolwich, 3. - - Worcestershire Regiment (2nd), 21, 75, 169. - - Wytschaete, 148, 150-153, 155, 157. - - - Ypres, 13, 18, 110-112, 115, 125, 134-136, 138, 141, 144, 169, 170, - 172, 173, 194. - - Yser, River, 108. - - - Zandvoorde, 132. - - Zermezeele, 136, 143. - - Zevecoten, 164. - - Zillebeke, 111, 114, 115, 169, 170, 195. - - Zonnebeke, 139, 142-144. - - Zouave Wood, 131. - - Z, The, 57. - - Zuytpanne, 135. - - - 1st Army, 10, 93, 189. - - 1st Corps, 7, 8, 10. - - 1st Division, 41, 47, 48, 106, 111. - - 1st French Army, 189. - - 1st Indian Cavalry Division, 61. - - 2nd Army Artillery School, 143. - - 2nd Australian Division, 117. - - 2nd Corps, 168. - - 2nd Division, 8, 37. - - 3rd Army, 54, 174, 178, 185, 189. - - 3rd Corps, 34, 42, 44, 47. - - 3rd Division, 28, 60, 83, 90, 93, 98. - - 4th Army, 54, 174, 178, 185, 189. - - 4th Corps, 174. - - 4th Division, 70, 93. - - 5th Army, 93. - - 5th Australian Division, 123, 124. - - 5th Corps, 174, 176, 186. - - 5th Division, 34, 37, 126, 127, 129, 130. - - 6th Corps, 83, 91. - - 6th Division, 169, 170. - - 7th Corps, 55-57, 83, 100. - - 7th Division, 28, 44, 46, 131, 133. - - 8th Division, 72, 74, 75. - - 8th German Division, 172. - - 9th Division, 28, 83, 88, 97, 154, 164, 165. - - 11th German Division, 83. - - 12th Division, 8, 10, 15, 54, 55, 83, 90, 91, 93, 178. - - 13th Corps, 34, 38, 42, 57. - - 14th Corps, 44, 47. - - 14th Division, 41-46. - - 15th Corps, 32, 34, 36, 38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 54, 106. - - 15th Division, 78, 80, 83, 84, 90. - - 16th Division, 15. - - 17th Corps, 54, 56, 83. - - 17th Division, 39, 55, 89, 90, 129, 130, 176, 177, 184. - - 17th French Division, 70. - - 19th Division, 34, 148, 150. - - 20th French Corps, 62. - - 21st Division, 32, 102, 106, 126-128, 176-178. - - 23rd Division, 28, 114, 117, 119-121, 125, 126. - - 24th Division, 46-48, 114. - - 28th French Division, 154. - - 29th Division, 88, 90, 168. - - 29th French Regiment of Artillery, 70. - - 30th Division, 165. - - 30th French Regiment of Artillery, 70. - - 30th U.S.A. Division, 171, 172. - - 31st Division, 57, 60. - - 33rd Division, 11, 15, 18, 23, 28, 29, 32, 33, 41, 42, 44-46, 62, 67, - 68, 75, 76, 102, 121-123, 125, 136, 139, 142, 143, 150, 169-172, - 177, 181, 185, 186, 188, 191, 197. - - 34th Division, 90. - - 35th Division, 54. - - 37th Division, 54, 87, 88, 102, 127. - - 38th Division, 176, 181, 185, 186, 188, 190-192. - - 39th Division, 18, 122. - - 40th Division, 62, 65, 68, 76. - - 41st Division, 117, 119, 168. - - 44th French Regiment, 168. - - 46th Division, 55. - - 46th French Regiment, 169, 170. - - 47th French Regiment of Artillery, 168. - - 48th Division, 57. - - 49th Division, 57, 109, 164, 165, 168, 169. - - 49th French Regiment of Artillery, 70. - - 50th Division, 102, 103, 141-143. - - 51st Division, 33, 34, 36, 40, 90. - - 66th Division, 108, 109, 173. - - 127th French Regiment of Artillery, 62, 64. - - - - - TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES - - - 1. Silently corrected simple spelling, grammar, and typographical - errors. - 2. Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed. - 3. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The History of the 33rd Divisional -Artillery, in the War, 1914-1918., by J. 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