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diff --git a/old/51865-0.txt b/old/51865-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 400383f..0000000 --- a/old/51865-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6741 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Lost Fruits of Waterloo, by John Spencer -Bassett - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: The Lost Fruits of Waterloo - - -Author: John Spencer Bassett - - - -Release Date: April 26, 2016 [eBook #51865] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO*** - - -E-text prepared by Chris Curnow, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images -generously made available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) - - - -Note: Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive. See - https://archive.org/details/lostfruitsofwate00bassrich - - - - - -THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO - - - * * * * * * - -[Illustration] - -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - -NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO · DALLAS -ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO - -MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED - -LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA -MELBOURNE - -THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - -TORONTO - - * * * * * * - - -THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO - -by - -JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, PH.D., LL.D. - -Author of “Life of Andrew Jackson,” “A Short History -of the United States,” “The Middle Group -of American Historians,” “The -Federalist System,” etc. - - - - - - - -New York -The Macmillan Company -1918 -All rights reserved - -Copyright, 1918 -By the Macmillan Company - -Set up and printed. Published April, 1918 - - - - -PREFACE - - -This book was begun under the influence of the enthusiasm aroused by -President Wilson’s address to Congress on January 22, 1917. It was -then that he first gave definite utterance of his plan for a league, -or federation, of nations to establish a permanent peace. The idea -had long been before the world, but it was generally dismissed as too -impracticable for the support of serious minded men. By taking it -up the President brought it into the realm of the possible. In the -presence of the great world catastrophe that hung over us it seemed -well to dare much in order that we might avoid a repetition of existing -evils. And if the idea was worth trying, it was certainly worth a -careful examination in the light of history. It was with the hope of -making such a careful examination that I set to work on the line of -thought that has led to this book. - -As my work has progressed the great drama has been unfolding itself -with terrible realism. New characters have come upon the stage, -characters not contemplated in the original cast of the play. At the -same time some of the old parts have undergone such changes that they -appear in new relations. I am not unmindful of the fact that events -now unforeseen may make other and radical changes in the _dramatis -personæ_ before this book is placed in the hand of the reader. But -always the great problem must be the same, the prevention of a return -to the present state of world madness. That end we must ever keep in -mind as we consider the arguments here advanced, and any inconsistency -discovered between the argument and the actual state of events will, -I hope, be treated with as much leniency as the transitions of the -situation seem to warrant. - -As I write, many things indicate that the great conflict is approaching -dissolution. The exhaustion of the nations, the awakening voices of -the masses, the evident failure of militarism to lead Germany to world -empire, the rising spectre of the international solidarity of the -laborers, and many other portents seem to show that the world will soon -have to say “yes” or “no” to the plain question: “Shall we, or shall we -not, have a union of nations to promote permanent peace?” - -The warning that they must answer the question is shouted to many -classes. Bankers are threatened with the repudiation of the securities -of the greatest nations, manufacturers may soon see their vast gains -swallowed up in the destruction of the forms of credit which hitherto -have seemed most substantial, churches and every form of intellectual -life that should promote civilization may have their dearest ideals -swept away in a rush toward radicalism, and even the German autocracy -is fighting for its life against an infuriated and despairing -proletariat. Are not these dangers enough to make us ask if the old -menace shall continue? - -It is not my purpose to answer all the questions I ask. It is -sufficient to unfold the situation and show how it has arisen out of -the past. If the reader finds that mistakes were once made, he will -have to consider the means of correcting them. No pleader can compel -the opinions of intelligent men and women. It is enough if he lays -the case before clear and conscientious minds in an impersonal way. -More than this he should not try to do: as much as this I have sought -to do. If the world really lost the fruits of its victory over a world -conqueror at Waterloo, it is for the citizen of today to say in what -way the lost fruits can be recovered. - -Many friends have aided me in my efforts to present my views to the -public, and among them Dr. Frederick P. Keppel, Dean of Columbia -University, deserves special acknowledgment. I am also under -obligation to Dean Ada C. Comstock, of Smith College, for very careful -proofreading. But for the opinions here expressed and the errors which -may be discovered I alone am responsible. - - JOHN SPENCER BASSETT. - - Northampton, Massachusetts, - February 5, 1918. - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -The nations of Europe fought a great war to a finish a hundred and two -years ago, defeating a master leader of men and ending the ambitions -of a brilliantly organized nation. They were so well satisfied with -their achievement that they imagined that peace, won after many years -of suffering, was a sufficient reward for their sacrifices. To escape -impending subjugation seemed enough good fortune for the moment. They -forgot that it was a principle and not merely a man they had been -contending against, and when they had made sure that Napoleon was -beyond the possibility of a return to power, they thought the future -was secure. But the principle lived and has come to life again. It was -the inherent tendency to unification in government, a principle that -appeals to the national pride of most peoples when they find themselves -in a position to make it operate to the supposed advantage of their own -country. It has been seized upon by the Germans in our own generation, -to whom it has been as glittering a prize as it was to the Frenchmen of -the early nineteenth century. To conquer the world and win a place in -the sun is no mean ideal; and if the efforts of the _Entente_ allies -succeed in defeating it in its present form, it is reasonably certain -that it will appear again to distress the future inhabitants of the -earth, unless sufficient steps are taken to bind it down by bonds which -cannot be broken. - -This conviction has led to the suggestion that when Germany is beaten, -as she must be beaten, steps should be taken, not only to insure that -she shall not again disturb the earth, but that no other power coming -after her shall lay the foundations and form the ambition which will -again put the world to the necessity of fighting the present war -over again. When the North broke the bonds of slavery in the South -in 1865 it was filled with a firm determination that slavery should -stay broken. In the same way, when the nations shall have put down the -menace of world domination now rampant in Europe, they should make it -their first concern to devise a means by which the menace shall stay -broken. - -To kill a principle demands a principle equally strong and inclusive. -No one nation can keep down war and subjugation; for it must be so -strong to carry out that purpose that it becomes itself a conqueror. -It would be as intolerable to Germany, for example, to be ruled -by the United States as it would be to the United States if they -were ruled by Germany. The only restraint that will satisfy all the -nations will be exercised by some organ of power in which all have -fair representation and in which no nation is able to do things which -stimulate jealousy and give grounds for the belief that some are being -exploited by others. This suggestion does not demand a well integrated -federal government for all the functions of the state but merely the -adoption of a system of coöperation with authority over the outbreak -of international war and strong enough to make its will obeyed. It is -federation for only one purpose and such a purpose as will never be -brought into vital action as long as the federated will is maintained -at such a point of strength and exercised with such a degree of -fairness that individual states will not question that will. - -This principle of federated action for a specific purpose was adopted -by the United States in 1789, and though hailed by the practical -statesmen of Europe as an experiment, it has proved the happiest form -of government that has yet been established over a vast territory in -which are divergent economic and social interests. In it is much more -integration than would exist in a federated system to prevent war, -where the action of the central authority would be limited to one main -object. If it could be formed and put into operation by the present -generation, who know so well what it costs to beat back the spectre of -world conquest it might pass through the preliminary critical stages -of its existence successfully. At any rate, the world is full of the -feeling that such things may be possible, and it would be unwise to -dismiss the suggestion without giving it fair and full consideration. - -The discussion brings up what seems to be a law of human activities, -that as the ages run and as men develop their minds they combine in -larger and larger units for carrying on the particular thing they are -interested in. And they make these combinations by force or through -mutual agreement. We have before us the consideration of the most -important form of this unifying process, the unification of nations, -which has generally come through force, but sometimes has come through -agreement. - -In recent industrial history is a parallel process so well illustrating -the point at issue that I can not refrain from mentioning it. In his -book, _My Four Years in Germany_, Mr. James W. Gerard contrasts great -industrial combinations in the United States and Germany. In one -country are trusts, in the other great companies known as cartels. -The development of the trust we know well. It came out of a process -of competitive war. Some large manufacturer who possessed ability for -war, formed an initial group of manufacturers with the prospect of -controlling a large part of the market. He was careful to see that -his own group had the best possible organization, central control, -and a loyal body of subordinates. Then he opened his attack on his -smaller rivals, and in most cases they were driven into surrender or -bankruptcy. It was a hard process, but it led to industrial unity with -its many advantages. - -The cartel began with co-operation. All the persons or companies -manufacturing a given article were asked to unite in its creation. They -pooled their resources, adopted common buying and selling agencies, -and shared the returns amicably. They proved very profitable for the -shareholders, and they strengthened the national industry in its -competition against foreigners. In the United States the trust has been -unpopular, despite its many economic advantages. The reason is the -battle-like methods by which it destroyed its rivals. The result was -the enactment of laws to restrain its development, laws so contrary -to the trend of the times that they have been very tardily enforced. -The cartel, established with the co-operation of the whole group of -manufacturers, aroused no antagonism and obtained the approval of the -laws. It is not necessary to say which is the better of these two -methods of arriving at the same object. - -Turning to the subject with which we are here chiefly concerned, it -is interesting to note that Germany has undertaken in the last years -to carry forward her world expansion by methods that are entirely -different. While she has federated in industrial life she appears in -her foreign relations as a true representative of the spirit that -built up the trusts. She means to unify her competitor states, not as -she has united her industries, but as the American trusts secured the -whole field of operations. First she forms a small group with herself -at the head. In the group are Germany, Austria, Turkey, and, later on, -Bulgaria. At this stage of her progress she has gone as far as the -Standard Oil Company had gone when Mr. Rockefeller had perfected the -idea of the “trust” in 1882. Her next step was to attack her rivals. -France she would crush at a blow, first lulling Great Britain to -inactivity by feigned friendship and the promise of gains in the Near -East. Then she would do what she would with Russia. With these two -nations disposed of, Britain, the unready, could be easily brought to -terms, and the United States would then be at her mercy. The mass of -German people had not, perhaps, reasoned the process out in this way; -but it was so easily seen that it could not have escaped the minds of -the leaders of the German military party. No trust builder ever made -fairer plans for the upbuilding of his enterprise than these gentlemen -made for putting through their combination, before which they saw in -their minds the states of the world toppling. So well were the plans -made and so efficient were the strokes that the utmost efforts of the -rest of the world have become necessary to defeat the German hopes. - -The United States have approached the problem of world relations in -another spirit. Rejecting the spirit of the trust magnate, which -Germany accepted, we have turned to coöperation as the means of -avoiding international competition and distrust. President Wilson’s -repeated suggestions of a federated peace are couched in the exact -spirit of the cartel. He asks that war may be replaced by coöperation, -pointing out the tremendous advantage to all if the machinery of -competition can be discarded. - -Viewed in its largest aspects, therefore, the present struggle has -resolved itself into a debate over the amount of unity that shall in -the future exist between states. It does not seem possible that Austria -will ever be a thoroughly sovereign state again, nor that Turkey will -escape from the snare in which her feet are caught. What degree of -unity this will engender between France and Great Britain, if the old -system of international relations continues, it is not hard to guess. -And as for the small states of Europe, their future is very perplexing. - -This much rests on the assumption that Germany and her allied -neighbours are going to make peace without defeat and without victory. -If they should be able to carry off a triumph, which now seems -impossible, it would not be hard to tell in what manner unification -would come. However the result, the separateness of European states -will probably be diminished, and their interdependence, either in two -large groupings or in some more or less strong general grouping, will -be increased. - -No wise man will undertake to say which form of interdependence will -be the result. But it seems certain that we stand today with two roads -before us, each leading to the same end, a stronger degree of unity. -One goes by way of German domination, the other by way of equal and -mutual agreement. I do not need to say which will be pleasanter to -those who travel. We cannot stand at the crossing forever: some day we -shall pass down one of the roads. It is said that the world is not yet -ready to choose the second road, and that it must go on in the old way, -fighting off attempts at domination, until it learns the advantages of -co-operation. It may be so; but meanwhile it is a glorious privilege to -strike a blow, however weak, in behalf of reason. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - INTRODUCTION ix - - CHAPTER - - I THE QUESTION OF PERMANENT PEACE 1 - - II EARLY ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 23 - - III PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 43 - - IV EUROPE UNDER THE CONCERT OF THE POWERS 65 - - V THE LATER PHASES OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE 83 - - VI THE BALKAN STATES 103 - - VII GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 132 - - VIII THE FAILURE OF THE OLD EUROPEAN SYSTEM 154 - - IX IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 184 - - X OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 205 - - XI ARGUMENTS FOR A FEDERATION OF STATES 229 - - XII A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 254 - - - - -THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE QUESTION OF PERMANENT PEACE - - -When war broke over the world three years ago many ministers and other -people declared that Armageddon had come. They had in mind a tradition -founded on a part of the sixteenth chapter of Revelations, in which -the prophet was supposed to describe a vision of the end of the world. -In that awful day seven angels appeared with seven vials of wrath, and -the contents of each when poured out wiped away something that was dear -to the men of the earth. The sixth angel poured out on the waters of -the river Euphrates, and they were dried up; and then unclean spirits -issued from the mouths of the dragons and of other beasts and from the -mouth of the false prophet, and they went into the kings of the earth, -then the political rulers of mankind, and induced them to bring the -people together “to the battle of that great day of God Almighty.” And -the armies met at Armageddon and fought there the last battle of time. -This striking figure made a deep impression on the early Christians, -and out of it arose the belief that some day would come a great and -final war, in which the nations of the earth would unite for their -mutual destruction, after which the spirit of righteousness would -establish a millennial reign of peace. And so when most of the nations -of the world came together in war in 1914, many persons pronounced the -struggle the long expected Armageddon. - -It was easy to say in those days of excitement that this war was going -to be the last. Madness it certainly was, and surely a mad world would -come back to reasonableness after a season of brutal destruction. -Common sense, humanity, and the all powerful force of economic interest -would bring the struggle to an end, and then by agreement steps would -be taken to make a recurrence of the situation impossible. - -It was in the days when we still had confidence in civilization. -Humanity, we said, had developed to such an extent that it could not -return to the chaos that an age of war would imply. International law -was still considered a binding body of morality, if not of actual law. -International public opinion was believed to have power to punish -national wrong-doers. We who teach said as much to our classes many -times in those days of innocence. In all sincerity we felt that a -nation could not do this or that thing because public opinion would not -tolerate it. How far distant seem now the days of early summer in 1914! - -We had adopted many specific rules to restrain needless barbarity in -war. For example, we would not use dum-dum bullets, nor drop bombs -on non-combatants, nor shell the homes of innocent dwellers on the -seashore. It was considered an achievement of the civilized spirit -that an army occupying enemy territory would respect the rights of the -non-combatant inhabitants, set guards over private property, protect -women and children from injury, and permit civilians to go about their -business as long as they did not intermeddle with military matters. -In three and a half horrible years we have drifted a long way from -these protestations. Those of us who once studied the elements of -international law may well study them again when the war is over, if, -indeed, international law is still thought worth studying. - -In the vision the angel poured out his vial on the great river, to the -early men of Mesapotamia the symbol of the great waters. In our own -day we have seen strange engines of wrath placed in the great waters, -foul spirits that destroy men and ships in disregard of the rules of -fair fighting. And out of the mouths of dragons and other loathsome -beasts, and of false prophets as well, evil spirits have issued in -these sad days. They have taken their places in the hearts and minds of -self-willed men and made beasts of them; so that the rest of humanity -have had to fight against them and suffer themselves to be killed by -them, in order that the wicked shall not triumph over the whole earth. - -The war has been gruesome beyond the imagination of man. No other -recorded experience has told us of so much killing, and of so many -different ways of killing. Men have been slain with swords, cannon, -great howitzers, rifles, machine guns, tanks, liquid fire, electrified -wires, and finally with the germs of disease deliberately planted. -Nothing that science could invent for destroying human life has been -omitted, except, possibly, dum-dum bullets; and in view of the use of -much more cruel means we may well ask, “Why not dum-dums also?” - -We must admit that if the author of the Book of Revelations had -prophetic insight and foresaw the world struggle that now is, he did -not overpaint its terrors. And so, asks the man of faith, if the first -part of the vision comes true, why may not the second part likewise -come true? If the seer could foresee the war and its horrors, may he -not also have spoken truly when he foretold that after Armageddon wars -would be no more; for God would wipe away the desire for them from the -hearts of men? - -To this question I answer: If a man is left in the world when this -conflict is ended who glories in deliberate war, he is too bad to live -in civilized society. Certain it is that the vast majority of men and -women are already convinced that the desire for war, henceforth and -forever, is wiped out of their hearts. In the stress of actual battle -or in the preparations to sustain those who fight they may forget the -fundamental folly of the whole thing for the time; but it is always at -the bottom of their hearts. What is the human power of reasoning worth, -if it is not able to devise some way to escape from this obsession of -self-slaughter? - -Do not be deceived by the strut of Mars. His _Day_ has come with a -vengeance. He has shot up rapidly, like a jimson-weed, and blossomed -like a cactus. We may have laughed at him in the days of peace, but we -now look to him for protection. We cannot decry the men who are dying -for us, dying in the best sportsmanslike manner. But we do not like -their business as a business, and we wish at the bottom of our hearts -that it were abolished as a peril to humanity. And we believe that -of all who hate war, none hate it more than those who are actually -fighting in this struggle. Let us give Mars his _Day_ and all the glory -that belongs to it, but let us not forget peace while we serve war. - -Nor should we be deceived by the pallid pacifist. He has his -counterpart in every struggle; and in general he serves some good -purpose in a multitude of opinions. But the day of stress and world -crisis is not his _Day_; and the practical world loses little time in -putting him in his place. The pacifist does not represent the peace -movement in its freest and most significant form. The advocates of -peace today who are best serving its promotion are those who are out in -the armies bent on putting down that nation who is the most dangerous -enemy of peace. - -These men are not mere pieces of machinery in a great driving process. -They are thinking men with political power in their hands, either -actually or potentially. War is a great schoolteacher. It has lasted -in our own time nearly as long as a course in college. The soldiers -who survive from the beginning of this conflict may now be considered -as more than half through their senior year. They know what war is -and what it means, and they know something about the necessary form -of coöperation that must exist in any society before the will of the -people can be carried into effect. They knew little about war four -years ago: they now know all the professors know. Behind the lines and -here in our homes one never sees man nor woman who does not admit that -it would be a blessing to make war impossible; but few of us have any -idea how to go about getting it made impossible. Many of us think we -shall never get people to act together in such a cause. But it seems -unreasonable to expect that men who have raided through “No Man’s -Land,” captured trenches and defeated great armies through organization -and initiative should quail before the inertia of opinion, perhaps the -chief obstacle confronting those who labor for a coöperative peace. - -The example of the Russians is a useful point in this connection. At -the beginning of the war their armies were as machine-like as any -armies could be. The privates were generally peasants who did not know -why they fought, and who certainly had nothing to say about the origin -of the war. They were typical “cannon-fodder,” and as unthinking as -any modern soldier can be. They have learned much from less than three -years of war. They slowly acquired purpose, a sense of organization, -and leaders whom they follow. Having made this progress they overthrew -the imperial government, drove away the great nobles, put an ensign in -the place of a former grand duke and two exiles in the seats of the -highest officials, and stripped the highest born army officers of their -titles and insignia. - -At the present writing they are holding out against all attempts to -overthrow them, they are playing the diplomatic game with Germany -without discredit,[1] and they are reported to be shaking the -foundations of autocracy in Austria. At any rate, it must be confessed -that a small group of the Russian “cannon-fodder” have made commendable -progress in the process of education during the last ten months. The -process seems to have been under the direction of the socialists, a -small but well organized group of intelligent persons who do not lack -initiative. It is they who are educating the Russian peasants into -political self-expression. - - [1] Since the above was written events have occurred in - Russia which seem to discredit the diplomacy of the - revolutionists; but the general situation is so unsettled - that no conclusions can be drawn at this time, February 27, - 1918. - -The possible results of this incident are tremendous. Nowhere else in -the world have the agricultural classes fallen into one party with -vigorous and trained leaders. If Russia is now embarking on an era of -representative government, as seems probable, she is passing through -a stage in which political parties are being crystallized. So far, -it does not appear that any considerable party is organized in the -vast empire on what we should call a conservative basis. It will be -an interesting experiment in political history if Russia has a great -peasant party in control of the administration. - -The party that now controls Russia is committed to the idea of -a peace through the coöperation of the nations. It is true that -internationalism goes further than mere federation of nations; for it -also implies the socialization of industry, the equal distribution of -property. In short, it is the internationalism and unification of the -industrial classes in all nations for a combined opposition to capital. -With these aims we shall, probably, not be pleased. But they imply the -destruction of war; and it now seems possible that Russia will stand -before the world, at least until the radical elements fall before -conservatives, as the most prominent champion of coöperative peace. - -As to the socialistic purpose of the internationalists, it stands -apart logically from that feature of their doctrine that relates -to the mere coöperation of nations. They would say, probably, that -coöperation is but incidental to their main desire, the unification of -the workers of the world. But it is right to expect that they would -support coöperation among the nations to obtain the destruction of -war, since it would make it easier for the world to accept their other -ideals. On the other hand the man who opposes internationalism as such, -could accept the aid of a radical Russia in obtaining federated peace, -without feeling that in doing so he was necessarily contributing to the -promotion of the socialistic features of internationalism. - -This remarkable shifting of power in Russia has had its counterpart on -a less impressive scale in other countries. Whether it comes to the -point of explosion or not, there is in the minds of all--the thoughtful -people, the working-men, and all intermediate classes--a growing belief -that a new idea should rule the relations of nations among themselves. -From an age of international competition they are turning to the hope -of an era of international agreement; and it does not appear that their -influence will be unheeded when men come to face steadily the problems -the war is sure to leave behind it. - -Most notable influence of all in behalf of a federated peace is the -position taken by President Wilson. In the beginning of this conflict -he had the scholar’s horror of warfare, and he has taken more than one -opportunity to suggest the formation of a league of nations to prevent -the outbreak of future wars. His address to Congress on January 22, -1917, was a notable presentation of the idea to the world. Enthusiastic -hearers pronounced the occasion a turning-point in history. Whether a -league of nations is established or not, according to the president’s -desires, his support of the idea has given it a great push forward. -He has taken it out of the realm of the ideal and made it a practical -thing, to be discussed gravely in the cabinets of rulers. - -A year after the question has been brought forward, it should be -possible to form an opinion of the attitude of European nations in -regard to the suggestion. From all of them, including Germany and -Austria, have come courteous allusions to the idea of the president; -and the pope has given it his support. But it is not clear that all -are sincerely in favor of a logically constituted league that will -have power to do what it is expected to do. That President Wilson will -continue to urge steps in this direction is to be taken as certain. The -measure of his success will be the amount of hearty and substantial -support he has from that large class of people who still ask: “Can’t -something be done to stop war forever?” - -When this page is being written the newspapers are full of a discussion -of the two speeches that came from the central powers on January 25, -1918, one from Chancellor von Hertling of Germany, and the other from -Count Czernin, of Austria. In the former is the following utterance: - - “I am sympathetically disposed, as my political activity shows, - toward every idea which eliminates for the future a possibility or - a probability of war, and will promote a peaceful and harmonious - collaboration of nations. If the idea of a bond of nations, as - suggested by President Wilson, proves on closer examination really - to be conceived in a spirit of complete justice and complete - impartiality toward all, then the imperial government is gladly - ready, when all other pending questions have been settled, to begin - the examination of the basis of such a bond of nations.” - -This very guarded utterance means much or little, as the German rulers -may hereafter determine. By offering impossible conditions of what -they may pronounce “complete justice and complete impartiality to all” -they may be able to nullify whatever promise may be incorporated in -it. On the other hand, the sentiment, if accepted in a fair spirit -and without exaggerated demands, may be a real step toward realizing -President Wilson’s desires. If, for example, Germany should insist, -as a condition for the formation of a “bond of nations,” that Great -Britain give up her navy, or dismantle Gibraltar, while she herself -retained her immense Krupp works and her power to assemble her army at -a moment’s notice, it is hardly likely the demand would be granted. We -can best know what Germany will do in this matter when we see to what -extent she is willing to acknowledge that her war is a failure and -that her military policy is a vast and expensive affair that profits -nothing. Moreover, there is a slight sneer in the chancellor’s words, -as though he does not consider the president’s idea entirely within -the range of the diplomacy of experienced statesmen; and this is not -very promising for the outcome--unless, indeed, the logic of future -events opens his eyes to the meaning of the new spirit that the war has -aroused. - -Among our own allies the suggestion of our president has found a -kinder reception. Mr. Lloyd George has announced his general support -of the proposition, and Lord Bryce and others have given it cordial -indorsement. It seems that if the United States urges the formation of -a league of peace, she will have the coöperation of Great Britain. As -to the position of France and Italy, the matter is not so clear. They -probably are too deeply impressed by the danger they will ever face -from powerful neighbors to feel warranted in dismissing their armies, -unless the best assurance is given that Germany and Austria accept -federated peace in all good faith. - -As the contending nations approach that state of exhaustion which -presages an end of the war, the question of such a peace becomes -increasingly important. Everything points to the conclusion that the -time has arrived to debate this subject. If the hopes of August, 1914, -that Armageddon would be succeeded by an era of permanent peace are to -be realized, they will not come without the serious thought of men who -are willing to dare something for their ideals. And if they come out -of the present cataclysm it is time to be up and doing. The sentiment -that exists in this country, and in other countries, must be organized -and made effective at the critical moment. There is nothing more -dispiriting to the student of history than to observe as he reads how -many favorable moments for turning some happy corner in the progress -of humanity were allowed to pass without effort to utilize them. It -has been a hundred years since the world had another opportunity like -this that faces us, and if it is not now tried out to the utmost -possibility, there is little hope that the next century will be as -bloodless as the past has been, even with the present conflict included. - -Every general war in Europe since the days of the Roman Empire has -brought humanity there to a state of exhaustion similar to that which -now exists. So it was with the Thirty Years’ War, with the wars -inaugurated by Louis XIV to establish the predominance of France, -and with the Napoleonic wars a century ago. Each of these struggles, -it will be observed, extended to a larger portion of Europe than its -predecessor; and it was because the common interests of nations were -progressively stronger; for it was ever becoming so that what concerned -one state concerned others. In the present war the interrelations of -nations is such that Japan and the United States have been brought into -the conflict, along with China and several of the smaller American -states. If the conflict recurs in the future it may be expected to -involve a still wider area. - -There is evidence that in each of these struggles the humane men then -living were filled with the same longing for permanent peace that -many men feel today.[2] The feeling was especially strong during -the last stages of the Napoleonic wars and immediately after they -ended. Singularly enough it was strongest in Russia, due, however -to the accident that an enthusiastic and idealistic tsar was ruling -in that country. He had received his ideals from a French tutor who -was deeply imbued with the equality theories of the revolution that -swept over his own country. The tsar accepted them with sincerity and -spent several years of conscientious effort in his attempts to have -them adopted. More singularly still, they found their only sincere -indorsement, among the rulers who had the right to indorse or reject, -with the king of Prussia, who at that time was a very religious man. -Most peculiar of all they found very strong opposition in England, -where practical statesmen were in power. As I read the history of that -day and reflect on what has been the train of events from the battle of -Waterloo to the invasion of Belgium in 1914, it is hard to keep from -wishing that a better effort had been made in 1815 to carry out the -suggestion which the tsar urged on his royal brothers in Europe. - - [2] See below, pp. 46-62. - -The defeat of Napoleon was purchased at immense sacrifices. To the -people of the day the most desirable thing in the world seemed to be -a prevention of his reappearance to trouble mankind. They took the -greatest care to keep his body a prisoner until he was dead; but they -did not seriously try to lay his ghost. Probably they did not think, -being practical men, that his spirit would walk again in the earth. -They were mistaken; for not only has the ghost come back, but it has -come with increased power and subtlety. In fact, it was an old ghost, -and having once inhabited the bodies of Louis XIV, Augustus Cæsar, and -Alexander of Macedon, as well as that of Napoleon I, it knew much more -than the grave gentlemen who undertook to arrange the future of Europe -in practical ways in 1815. - -As we approach again the re-making of our relations after a world war, -it is worth while to glance over the things that were done in 1815, -to understand what choice of events was presented to the men of that -day, and what results came from the course they deliberately decided to -follow. Thus we may know whether or not the course proved a happy one, -and whether or not it is the course that we, also, should follow. And -if it is not such a course, we ought as thinking people to try to adopt -a better. - -We should always remember that the conditions of today are more -suitable to a wise decision than the conditions of 1815. We have, for -one thing, the advantage of the experience of the past hundred years. -There is no doubt in our minds as to how the old plan has worked and -how it may be expected to work if again followed. It led to the Concert -of Europe and the Balance of Power, both of which served in certain -emergencies, but failed in the hour of supreme need. Indeed, it is -probable that they promoted the crash that at last arrived. - -Another advantage is that we have today in the world a vastly greater -amount of democracy than in 1815. The people who pay the bills of Mars -today can say what shall be done about keeping Mars in chains; and that -is something they could not do in 1815. It is for them to know all his -capers, and his clever ways of getting out of prison, and to look under -his shining armor to see the grizzly hairs that cover his capacious -ribs; and having done this to decide what will be their attitude toward -him. - -It is not the business of an author to offer his views to his reader -ready made. Enough if he offers the material facts out of which the -reader may form his own opinions. That is my object in this book. I -do not disguise my conviction that some of the fruits of the war that -ended at Waterloo were lost through the inexperience of the men who -set the world on its course again. Whether or not the men were as -wise as they should have been is now a profitless inquiry. My only -object is to set before the reader as clearly as I can the idea of a -permanent peace through federated action, to show how that idea came up -in connection with the war against Napoleon, how it was rejected for a -concerted and balanced international system, what came of the decision -in the century that followed, and finally in what way the failure of -the old system is responsible for the present war. If the reader will -follow me through these considerations, he will be prepared to examine -in a judicial spirit the arguments for and against President Wilson’s -suggested union of nations to end war. - -As these introductory remarks are written, we seem to be girding up -our loins again with the firm conviction that we cannot talk of peace -until Germany knows she is beaten. The decision is eminently wise. But -if it is worth while to fight two or ten years more to crush Germany’s -confidence in her military policy, how much ought it not to be worth to -make the nations realize that if they really wish to destroy war they -can do it by taking two steps: first, end this struggle in a spirit of -amity; and second, make an effective agreement to preserve that state -of amity by preventing the occurrence of the things and feelings that -disturb it. That is the task as well as the opportunity of wise men, -who can govern themselves; and it is for their information that this -volume is written which undertakes to point out “The Lost Fruits of -Waterloo” and the conditions under which we may seek to recover them. -It is not a book of propaganda, unless facts are propagandists. It is -not a pacifist book, although its pages may make for peace, if God -wills. It is only a plain statement of the lessons of history as they -appear to one of the many thousands of puzzled persons now habitants of -this globe who are trying to grope their ways out of this fog of folly. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -EARLY ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE - - -Those who have tried to point the world to universal peace may be -divided into two schools: one advocating a form of coöperation in -which the final reliance is to be reason, the other looking forward to -some effective form of common action behind which shall be sufficient -force to carry out the measures necessary to enforce the common will. -It is convenient to describe the former group as advocating a league -of peace, since we are generally agreed that a league is a form of -concert from which the constituent members may withdraw at will, and -in which does not reside power to force them to do what they do not -find reasonable. The second group wish to have a federation, if by that -term we understand a united group in which exists power sufficient to -preserve the common cause against any possible disobedient member. -To form a league is easier than to form a federation. States are -tenacious of sovereignty. The Swiss cantons, the Dutch provinces, and -the original thirteen states of North America are the most striking -illustrations of states that were willing to submit themselves to the -more strenuous process of union. They acted under stress of great -common peril, and their first steps in federation were short and timid; -but none of them have regretted that the steps were taken. It was the -good fortune of these groups of states that they were able to unite -at the proper time and that their actions were not overclouded by the -counsel of “practical statesmen” to whom ideals were things to be -distrusted. - -In other states in periods of great distress from war men lived who -dreamed of coöperation to promote peace, but their voices were too weak -for the times. The most notable early advocate of this scheme was the -Duke of Sully, if we may accept the notion that he wrote the work known -as the _Grand Design_ of Henry IV. In that plan was contemplated a -Christian Republic, composed of fifteen states in Europe, only three of -which were to have a republican form of government. They were to give -up warring among themselves and to refer to a common council, modeled -on the Ionic League, all matters of interstate relation that were of -importance to the “very Christian Republic.” The only war this republic -was to wage was the common war to expel the Turks from Europe. It was -after Henry’s death that Sully published the plan with the assertion -that his former master had formed it just after the treaty of Vervins, -1598. - -Whether it was the work of king or duke, no attempt was made to put it -into force. In 1598 Europe was in the throes of a long and hopeless -struggle for religion. Cities were destroyed, men and women were -butchered, and the safety of states was threatened. The _Grand Design_ -represents the reaction of either Henry’s or Sully’s mind against such -a terror. It was a thing to be desired, if it could have been attained. -One of the marks of peace that it displayed was the attitude it took -towards the branches of the Christian faith. Complete tolerance was to -exist for the three forms, Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism. -This was a kind of idealism that was then unattainable; but in the -course of time it has been achieved. I should not like to say the day -will not come when the other side of the scheme, interstate peace, will -also cease to be too ideal for realization. - -The next important suggestion of union for peace was made by William -Penn in 1693 in an _Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of -Europe_. At that time the Continent was racked with war--a result of -the ambition of Louis XIV to raise France to a dominating position -among the other nations--, the Palatinate had been devastated, and -the will of the “Grand Monarch” was the dreaded fact in international -politics. Penn realized that great sacrifices were ahead; for it was as -true then as now that when a strong state rises to a position in which -it can threaten universal rule, there is nothing for the other states -but to combine and fight as long as they can. - -Penn’s proposal was that the sovereigns of Europe should form a Great -Diet in which all their disputes should be adjusted. If any state -refused to submit to the judgment of the diet and appealed to arms, -all the other states were to fall upon it with their armies and make -it rue the course it had taken. Quaker though he was, he would have -war to prevent war. His proposal made no impression on his “practical” -contemporaries; but he was prepared for that. Men of his faith were -used to “bearing testimony” in the expectation that “the world” would -scoff. Although it was not included in the original folio edition of -his works this essay remains to this day the best known thing he wrote. -It is one of the most logical arguments for peace that we have. - -From 1701 to 1714 was waged the War of the Spanish Succession, the last -of the series of struggles in which Louis XIV wore out his kingdom in -trying to make it supreme over its neighbors. It left France exhausted -and miserable, and it had not realized the king’s ambition. In 1713, -the year in which Louis was forced to accept the Treaty of Utrecht in -token of his defeat, was published by the Abbé Castel de St. Pierre -a book called _Projet de Traité pour rendre la Paix Perpetuelle_. -Like the utterances of Sully and Penn, it was wrung out of the mind -of the author by the ruin that lay around him. It differed from them -in nothing but in its more abundant details. The abbé had taken many -things into account, and the union of nations that he proposed was to -do six important things. - -1. There was to be a perpetual alliance of European rulers with a diet -composed of plenipotentiary agents in which disputed points were to -be settled amicably. 2. What sovereigns were to be admitted to the -alliance was to be determined by the act of alliance, which was also to -fix the proportion in which each should contribute to the common fund. -3. The union was to guarantee the sovereignty of the constituent states -with existing boundaries, and future disputes of this nature were to -be referred to the arbitration of the council. 4. States offending -against the laws of the diet were to be put under the ban of Europe. -5. A state under the ban was to be coërced by the other states until -it accepted the laws it had violated. 6. The council was to make such -laws, on instruction from the sovereigns, as were thought necessary to -the objects for which the perpetual alliance was created. - -Like the two preceding plans the abbé’s scheme was too strong to be -rated as a league. It does not allow us to think that a state could -withdraw at pleasure from the alliance; and it gave to the council the -authority to lay taxes, make laws that were binding, and punish defiant -members. It is noteworthy for the large amount of power it gave to the -sovereigns, since the members of the council were their agents and -acted only on instructions. Under the prevalent notions of the divine -right of kings no other method of selecting the members of the council -would have been considered in France, Spain, or Germany. On the other -hand, the abbé’s scheme was less liberal in this respect than Penn’s, -which provided that the wisest and justest men in each nation should be -sent to the council. It was also a part of Penn’s plan that the council -should be a really deliberative body, a parliament of Europe as truly -as there was in England a parliament of the realm. - -We have no evidence that the arguments of the good abbé made a profound -impression upon any of the sovereigns upon whose favor the scheme -depended. The Treaty of Utrecht was followed by a season of peace. So -deeply wounded was Europe by conflict that it had no stomach for war -during a generation. It was a time of great industrial prosperity in -England, France, and Prussia. Walpole, the wise guardian of peaceful -society, dominated the first of these nations, Fleury, also a man of -peace, was for a large part of the time the guiding hand in the second, -and Frederic William I directed the development of the third with -a sure sense of economy and the efficient use of resources. At the -same time Austria was under the direction of Charles VI, a peaceful -monarch who had too many anxieties at home to think of wars against -the Christian sovereigns around him. The small struggles that occurred -were without significance; and it was not until 1740, when a new -generation was on the scene, that Europe again had a period of general -war, precipitated by an imaginative young king who could not resist the -temptation to use the excellent tool with which his father had provided -him. Out of the twenty years’ struggle that now followed, no new plan -arose for a system of coöperation to secure peace, but one of the great -philosophers of the time made a new statement of the Abbé St. Pierre’s -plan, which served as a new proposition. - -It was during the last years of the Seven Years’ War that Rousseau -received the papers of the good abbé, with the expectation that he -would prepare them for publication in a more popular form than the -twenty-one volumes in which the author’s thoughts were buried. He -eventually gave up the task, but he produced two short summaries, -one of which was entitled _Extrait du Projet de Paix perpetuelle de -M. L’Abbé de Saint-Pierre_. The “extract” proper was followed by a -“judgment” in which Rousseau voiced his own views. He advocated the -creation of a confederacy mutually dependent, no state to be permitted -to resist all the other states united nor to form an alliance with any -other state in rivalry with the confederacy. The scope of the central -authority was defined, and there was to be a legislature to make laws -in amplification of that authority, such laws to be administered by a -federal court. No state was to withdraw from the union. Thus, Rousseau -made his proposed confederacy rest on force. In his mind it was to be -vitally efficient government, capable of doing all it was created to do. - -All the plans I have mentioned contemplated the creation of a central -authority strong enough to make itself obeyed. They implied, therefore, -that each constituent state should relinquish a part of its sovereignty -in order to form the federation. Now this was, as at the present time, -a strong objection to the scheme. No one has met it better than William -Penn, who said: - - “I am come now to the last Objection, _That Sovereign Princes - and States will hereby become not Sovereign: a Thing they will - never endure_. But this also, under Correction, is a Mistake, for - they remain as Sovereign at Home as ever they were. Neither their - Power over their People, nor the usual Revenue they pay them, - is diminished: It may be the War Establishment may be reduced, - which will indeed of Course follow, or be better employed to the - Advantage of the Publick. So that the _Soveraignties_ are as they - were, for none of them have now any Soveraignty over one another: - And if this be called a lessening of their Power, it must be only - because the great Fish can no longer eat up the little ones, and - that each Soveraignty is _equally defended_ from Injuries, and - disabled from committing them.” - -A quarter of a century later, in the beginning of the French -Revolution, Jeremy Bentham, the English philosopher, advocated the -union of states in behalf of common peace, but he rested his argument -on morality, not on force. There was to be a league of states, -with a legislature and courts of justice, but the decisions were to -be executed by the states themselves. He held that after the court -gave a decision in a specified case and published the evidence and -arguments, public opinion would be strong enough to enforce the -judgment. By discarding force Bentham had the advantage of preserving -the sovereignty of the states, a thing that is particularly esteemed by -an Englishman. He is to be considered the first of a series of eminent -peace advocates who look no further than a league of states bound -together by their plighted word and relying on the weight of public -opinion to coërce the individual states. - -He had given his life to the task of fixing the sway of law in the -minds of humanity, and it was a part of his general idea that a high -court of justice, investigating a controversy, and exposing all the -sides of it before a world of fair minded observers, would lessen the -asperity of opposing passions so that the verdict of the court would be -received as saving credit and honor to the party who had to yield. It -is out of this attitude that our whole doctrine of arbitration as an -expedient for escaping war has its rise, a doctrine of such importance -in our general subject that no peace advocate would dare reject it -wholly. - -Bentham’s opinion was expressed in a stray pamphlet that made little -impression in his time and has nearly escaped the notice of posterity. -A more conspicuous achievement, and nearly contemporary, was an essay -by Immanuel Kant, philosopher at Königsberg, in Prussia. In 1795 he -published _Zum ewigen Frieden_, an outline for a league of perpetual -peace. There was a time, he argued, when men lived by force under the -laws of nature, each regulating his own conduct toward his neighbors, -the strongest man having his way through his ability to overawe his -associates. Then came the state and the rule of law, and with their -arrival one saw the exit of personal combat. Kant applied the same -argument to the intercourse of the nations, saying they were in a state -of nature toward one another. He proposed to organize a super-state -over them, with authority to bring them under a law prohibiting wars -among themselves. He would assign a definite field of action to the new -power, with the function of making laws in enforcing that authority, -and it would have the necessary administrative and judicial officers. -The law made by the united government was to be as good law for its own -purposes as the law made by the individual states for their purposes. - -Kant’s suggestion was closely kin to Rousseau’s ideas of the state, -but he wrote at a time when the world, stampeded by the excesses -of the Jacobins, was turning away from all the political theories -that underlay the French Revolution. It had no use for the idea that -government was the outcome of a social contract; and if this idea was -not accepted for the state itself, how much less would it be accepted -as a means of organizing the international state! The world suffered -too much at the hands of Napoleon to like ideas that were responsible -for the very beginning of the letting out of the waters. And this was -especially true in Prussia, where the foot of the French conqueror was -extremely heavy. - -At the moment when Kant’s ideas were at the height of unpopularity -came the young philosopher, Hegel, who announced a philosophical -view of war that pleased the governing class of Prussia, bent on -establishing a system of military training that would be sufficient -for a redeemed country. He taught that war through action burns away -moral excrescences, purifies the health of society, and stimulates -the growth of manly virtue. This idea became the basis of much German -reasoning, and it is not improbable that its defenders in trying to -discern the virtues they argued for, were led to develop them. But in -their enthusiasm they came to exaggerate these virtues into habits that -were often mere manifestations of an exalted egoism. As to the claim -that war burns up the effete products of society, it may be met by the -undeniable assertion that it also burns much that is best. One does not -burn a city to destroy the vermin that are in it. - -The next attempt to bring about a system of coöperation to secure -peace among the nations was the formation of the Holy Alliance, a -futile attempt to apply principles like those just described, made by -Alexander I, of Russia, at the close of the Napoleonic wars. It is -considered at length in the chapter following this, where it finds -its proper setting. The extremely religious spirit in which it was -conceived was a drawback to success, but it is not likely that it -would have fared better than it did fare, even if stripped of all its -pious fantasy, since the world was not educated to its acceptance as a -purely political idea. - -At this stage one must notice the development of peace societies. -Organized at first as local bodies they were drawn together into -national organizations in the early decades of the nineteenth century. -It was in 1816 that such a society was created in Great Britain, and in -1828 that the American Peace Society was formed out of local societies -in the United States. In the same year was established at Geneva the -first peace society on the Continent, the second being organized at -Paris in 1841. The influence of such societies was weak for a long -time; but within the past twenty years it has been much stronger. - -One of the most striking examples of the prevalence of the peace -idea in recent times is the growing use of arbitration as a means -of settling international disputes. Another is the meeting of the -Hague conferences to promote peace. The first was called by the tsar, -Nicholas II, in 1899 and laid a broad outline of the work that -such conferences ought to do. A second assembled in the year 1907, -and a third was about to convene when the Great War began in 1914. -The conferences devoted their strongest efforts to the reduction of -armaments and the checking of militarism; but in each case they found -the German Empire planted boldly across their path, and in this respect -their efforts were futile. It is not to be doubted that the attitude of -Germany contributed much to develop the widespread suspicion of that -country which has been one of her handicaps in the present war. - -The “peace movement,” as the totality of these activities is called, -has thus gained strength, and it would seem that it must eventually -prevail in public opinion. It received an important momentum in -1910, when Mr. Andrew Carnegie gave $10,000,000 to establish the -Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an organization which has -contributed powerfully to the promotion of peace ideas. It acts on -scientific principles, seeking to gather and publish such facts bearing -on international relations, the laws of economics and history, and the -science of international law, as will show in what respect war is to be -removed from its hold on society. - -The careless enthusiasm with which a great many people hailed the -outbreak of war in 1914 swept the peace advocates into the background -and was the occasion of some sarcasm at their expense. But as the -struggle grew in grimness and horrors the advocates of peace on -principle returned to their old position in public esteem, and have -steadily gained on it. It seems undeniable that the war has done more -to convince the world of the madness of war than many decades of -agitation could do. - -One of the manifestations of the rebound here mentioned was the -organization in June, 1915, of “The League to Enforce Peace.” This -society was created in a meeting of representative men assembled in -Carpenters’ Hall, Philadelphia, the place in which the Declaration -of Independence was adopted. Its principles are embraced in the -following proposals: 1. A judicial tribunal to which will be referred -judiciable disputes between the signatory powers, subject to existing -treaties, the tribunals to have power to pass on the merits of the -disputes submitted as well as on its jurisdiction over them. 2. The -reference of other disputes between the signatory states to a council -of conciliation, which will hear the cases submitted and recommend -settlements in accordance with its ideas of justice. 3. If any -signatory state threatens war before its case is submitted to the -judicial tribunal or the council of conciliation, the other states will -jointly employ diplomatic pressure to prevent war; and if hostilities -actually begin under such circumstances they will jointly use their -military forces against the power in contempt of the league. 4. The -signatory states will from time to time hold conferences to formulate -rules of international law which are to be executed by the tribunal of -arbitration unless within a stated time some state vetoes the proposal. - -The system of coöperation embodied in these proposals is not a -federation, within the meaning that I have given to that term. It is -what it pretends to be, merely a league. It seems to concede the right -of a state to secede from the league at will. As to what would happen -under it if a signatory state refusing to abide the decision of the -tribunal or council of conciliation should attempt to withdraw and -make war at once, we can have little doubt. In such a case the attempt -to secede would probably be considered defiance and steps be taken to -reduce the state to submission. Nevertheless it might happen that a -state within the league, finding its action restricted so that it could -not adopt some policy which it considered essential to its welfare, -might proceed to withdraw in view of a line of conduct it intended -to take at a later time. In that case it is difficult to see how the -league could resist unless it was willing to take the position that it -had a kind of sovereignty over all interstate relations, a position -that involves more concentration than the form of the league seems to -imply. - -At this point in our inquiry into the subject of coöperation to secure -universal peace an inviting field of speculation opens before us, but -we must turn aside for the time, in order to consider various phases -of the process by which the world has arrived at the crisis now before -it. This chapter will serve its purpose if it gives the reader a view -of the earliest suggestions of systems of common action and if it makes -clear the differences between the two general plans that have been -formulated, the league and the federation. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS - - -The career of Napoleon, which has long commanded the greatest interest, -not to say enthusiasm, of students of history, aroused grave fears in -the minds of most of the thoughtful men of his day who did not live -in France. His design to conquer all his neighbors was most evident, -and his apparent ability to carry it into execution caused him to -be regarded as the embodiment of greed and insatiable ambition. Not -since the days of Louis XIV had Europe felt such thrills of danger and -horror. All its energy was called into play to withstand his attacks. -Wars followed wars in a series of campaigns that ended after many years -of extreme anxiety in his ruin, only when France had been worn out -by his repeated victories. When he began his wars he was at the head -of the best prepared nation in the world. He struck with sudden and -vigorous blows against nations that were not united, defeating one -after the other with startling effect. Their lack of preparation was -most marked and was probably the most effective cause of his initial -success. After years of conflict they learned how to oppose him. From -his own example they learned the value of organization and method in -fighting, and from their own disasters they at last acquired the sense -of union that was necessary to give him the final blow that made him -no longer a menace to their national integrity. It was not until 1815 -that he was finally defeated and reduced to the state of ineffective -personal power from which he had risen. - -From the beginning of the struggle he was to his opponents the -incarnation of all that was hateful in government. Few of the epithets -now hurled at the kaiser were not as lavishly cast at Napoleon. He was -tyrant, robber, brute, and murderer in turn, and it was pronounced a -service to humanity to suppress him. In the beginning of the wars his -pretensions were treated with disdain, but as his victories followed -one another in bewildering rapidity, his power was treated with more -respect, although there was no greater disposition to contemplate -his triumph with complacency. As the struggle became fiercer, the -other states than France began to think of some permanent form of -coöperation for restraining him; and they even began to speculate on -the possibility of some permanent arrangement by which the world might -be saved from a recurrence of such a vast waste of life and treasure as -was involved in the struggle. It was thus that suggestions were made -during the Napoleonic era for abolishing war through international -effort. For us, who are today burdened with the ruin of a similar -but more stupendous struggle, these efforts have a special interest, -and the space of a single chapter is none too much to give to their -consideration. - -It is singular that these plans should have found their most -conspicuous supporters in the heads of the two governments most widely -apart with reference to the popular character of their institutions. -It was in autocratic Russia that one found the most advanced idea of -dealing with the future, and in Great Britain, the most liberal of -the great powers, that the most conservative design was held. Each -plan was supported by the head of these two governments respectively, -each ran through its own development while the armies were locked in -deadly struggle, and each was debated with seriousness in the moment of -victory when the statesmen of the winning powers met to arrange for the -future relations of the states whose victories made them the arbiters -of Europe. - -The initiative was taken by Alexander I, of Russia. He was a man -of the best intentions, and throughout the period with which we -are now dealing he showed himself persistently favorable to views -which, to say the least, were a hundred years ahead of his time. By -temperament he was imaginative and sympathetic. In his personal life -were irregularities, but not as many as in Napoleon’s, Louis XIV’s, -or Talleyrand’s. He lacked the royal vice of despotism, and his -escape from it was probably due to the influence of Fréderic César -de La Harpe, an instructor of his youth, who arrived in Russia with -his head full of the dynamic ideas of the French philosophers of the -pre-revolutionary period. - -While “liberty, equality, and fraternity” maddened France, long -oppressed by the dull repression of the ancient régime, La Harpe was -converting his royal pupil to the doctrine of the “Rights of Man.” So -well was the lesson taught that a long series of encounters with the -solid wall of Russian autocracy was necessary before the pupil ceased -to try to do something to ameliorate the condition of his people. -Historians have called Alexander a dreamer, but what is a man to do -who is born a tsar and has the misfortune to believe in the doctrines -for which we honor Lincoln and Jefferson? I am willing to call him -impractical, but I cannot withhold sympathy from a man who tried, as -he, to strike blows in behalf of the forms of government which makes my -own country a home of liberty. - -Alexander I came to the throne of Russia in 1801, anxious to carry -out his liberal plans.[3] In 1804, through his minister in London, he -suggested to Pitt, the prime minister, a plan for settling the affairs -of Europe after the defeat of Napoleon. France, he said, must be made -to realize that the allies did not war against her people but against -Napoleon, from whose false power they proposed to set her free. Once -liberated she was to be allowed to choose any government she desired. -From La Harpe he had imbibed a deep repugnance to the government of the -Bourbons, and in all his future discussions of the subject he showed no -enthusiasm for restoring that line to their throne. - - [3] For an excellent treatment of the events discussed in this - chapter see W. A. Phillips, _The Confederation of Europe_, - London, 1914. - -One of the charges often made by the allies was that Napoleon overthrew -international law. It was a part of Alexander’s plan to reëstablish its -potency and to have the nations see to it that no future violations -of it could occur. He also suggested that the firm agreement then -existing between Russia and Great Britain should continue after the -establishment of peace and that other great powers should be brought -into it so that there should be a means of securing common action in -affairs of mutual significance. At this time he had not, it seems, -fully determined just what form of coöperation ought to be adopted, -but in the suggestion of 1804 can be found the germ of all his later -designs for permanent peace. - -At that moment Pitt was looking for the renewal of the European war -and he expected the formation of the great coalition of 1805, in which -Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Sweden undertook to defeat France. -He did not dare, therefore, reject the tsar’s proposals outright. -He gave approval to the suggestion in regard to the restoration of -international law, but he qualified his sanction of the scheme for a -future league of nations. Napoleon crushed, he said, it would be for -the states to guarantee such an adjustment of European affairs as they -should agree upon in solemn treaty. Looking into these two statements -it is seen that the tsar had in mind the formation of some kind of -league of nations, with well defined powers and duties, while Pitt -looked forward to that kind of international coöperation which was -later described by the term “Concert of Europe.” In the subsequent -dealing of Alexander with the British leaders over this matter there -was always this difference between them. - -In 1807 Napoleon won the battle of Friedland over Russia and occupied -a large part of the tsar’s domain. Then came the Treaty of Tilsit -in which Alexander and Napoleon standing face to face came to an -unexpected agreement to divide the accessible part of the world between -them, Alexander ruling one half and Napoleon ruling the other. It is -certain, however, that the tsar had in his mind that both he and his -new ally would rule their respective halves in the spirit of La Harpe’s -teaching. Napoleon baited his trap with no less attractive a morsel -than self-government under a wise monarch in order to catch Alexander I. - -The Moscow campaign brought the tsar to his senses. He himself said -that it was the burning of the ancient city, 1812, that illuminated -his mind and enabled him to see the true character of the Corsican. -For five years he had been lulled into inactivity by the belief -that some form of permanent peace was coming to the world through -Napoleon. He now realized that he had been duped, and after making -due acknowledgment of his error turned to the task of destroying the -deceiver. From that time he did not waver in his determination. - -Russia and Great Britain were thus in close alliance, and immediately -began consideration of a permanent alliance looking toward a -regulation of affairs in Europe after the war was ended. The British -cabinet took up the question and in 1813 passed a resolution in which -occurs the following declaration: “The Treaty of Alliance [between the -states which were united against Napoleon] is not to terminate with the -war, but is to contain defensive engagements, with mutual obligations -to support the Power attacked by France with a certain extent of -stipulated succors. The _casus foederis_ is to be an attack by France -on the European dominions of any one of the contracting parties.”[4] -This provision was kept secret for the time, but it remained the basis -of the British policy throughout the negotiations that followed. -Castlereagh, in ability and character the greatest statesman of his -day, was then at the head of the British cabinet, and it seems certain -that he inspired its policy. - - [4] Phillips, _loc. cit._, 67. - -He was already suspicious of the position of the tsar in reference -to France. That sovereign had in no way relaxed his friendship for -the French people. Hating the Bourbons he would have prevented their -restoration to the throne, and he had a project for allowing the French -to determine whom they would have for king after Napoleon. If he could -carry this plan through he would make himself very popular in France -and would have a strong position with the ruler whose selection he -should thus make possible. To Castlereagh this was nothing but a shrewd -piece of policy for laying the foundation of a Franco-Russian alliance -which would have overweening influence in Europe, and he set himself -against its execution. He was forced to proceed cautiously, however, -since Napoleon was not beaten and the aid of the tsar was essential. -There is nothing to suggest that Alexander did not entertain his -French views in all singleness of purpose. The worst his enemies said -of him was that he was a dreamer; but he was not given to a policy of -calculation. - -To thwart Alexander and carry through his own views Castlereagh set -himself to “group” the tsar, that is, to draw him into an agreement -with other sovereigns in which such a policy was accepted as would -serve to deflect the whole group of allies from the direct course which -the tsar would have followed if left alone. Early in 1814 a treaty was -signed at Chaumont by Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia -in which all the problems then before the allies were taken up. The -sixteenth article of the treaty dealt with the point which had caused -Castlereagh so much anxiety. It ran: - - “The present Treaty of Alliance having for its object the - maintenance of the Balance of Europe, to secure the repose and - independence of the Powers, and to prevent the invasions which - for so many years have devastated the world, the High Contracting - Parties have agreed among themselves to extend its duration for - twenty years from the date of signature, and they reserve the right - of agreeing, if circumstances demand it, three years before its - expiration, on its further prolongation.”[5] - - [5] Phillips, _loc. cit._, 78. - -By this means Alexander was “grouped” with his three allies in the -support of a kind of coöperation which was not what he had hitherto -insisted upon. It is probable that he did not realize how completely -he was outplayed, when he was forced by the logic of events to set his -hand to a treaty that provided for the Concert of Europe, and not for -the league to which he had long looked forward. At any rate, he did -not give up his ideals and he seems to have thought that in the hour -of victory he could do what he had not been able to do in the hour of -necessity. - -The Treaty of Chaumont was followed by the battle of Leipzig, and that -was followed by several smaller battles in which the allies fought -their way through French territory until they stood before the gates -of Paris in the autumn of 1814. Napoleon fled the Nemesis that had -overtaken him, the city was opened to his enemies, and Alexander I, -at the head of his splendid guard, led the conquering army down the -broad avenue of Champs Elysée, the inhabitants of the city cheering -the radiant pageant. Men reflected that two years earlier a great -French army had penetrated to the Russian city of Moscow and found it -smoking ruins; and they could but observe the contrast. It was worthy -of the greatness of the tsar of the Russias to show a generous face -to a beaten foe; and the Frenchmen were gallant enough to receive the -friendship of the tsar in the spirit in which it was given. A lenient -treaty by which France was saved from humiliation and Napoleon was -given Elba, was also due chiefly to the good will of Alexander. An -Englishman on the spot, who did not see things with the broad vision -of the prime minister, wrote that the tsar “by a series of firm and -glorious conduct has richly deserved the appellation of the liberator -of mankind.” But as Alexander continued to “play the part of Providence -in France” the same writer became alarmed and five days later wrote to -London urging that Castlereagh come to the French capital. The hint was -taken, and soon the manly stride of the handsome tsar was intercepted -by the deftly woven webs of the skilled diplomat. Erelong France was -handed over to the Bourbons, who came back to show that they had -learned nothing and forgotten nothing. - -The center of interest now shifted to the Congress of Vienna, whose -sessions lasted from September 10, 1814, to June 9, 1815. Europe -had looked forward to it for many years as the means of effecting a -wise and just reform in all the evils that afflicted the continent. -“Men had promised themselves,” said Gentz, “an all-embracing reform -of the political system of Europe, guarantees for universal peace, -in one word, the return of the golden age.” Thus Alexander was not -entirely ahead of his time. There were enlightened men then, as -now, who hoped for a spirit that would rise above mere diplomatic -self-interest; and we may look upon the tsar as their exponent. But -they were to be disappointed. Spoils were to be divided and in the -disputes that the expected division engendered, the spirit of reform -was dissipated. Alexander spent his energy in trying to reëstablish -the kingdom of Poland with liberal institutions, but his desire that -it should be under his protection aroused the keenest opposition from -the neighboring nations. If a victorious Russia stood as protector of -a reëstablished France and a renewed Poland, who could foretell her -power in future dealings among nations? Considering the extent to which -jealousy carried the contentions of the states at Vienna, it is enough -that the congress did not break up in an appeal to arms. - -Gentz, whom we recall as the secretary of the congress, was one of the -men who had entertained hopes that it would give a new and better form -to the political structure of Europe. He avowed his disappointment at -the results in saying: - - “The Congress has resulted in nothing but restorations, which had - already been effected by arms, agreements between the Great Powers - of little value for the future balance and preservation of the - peace of Europe, quite arbitrary alterations in the possessions of - the smaller states; but no act of a higher nature, no great measure - for public order or for the general good, which might compensate - humanity for its long sufferings or pacify it for the future.... - But to be just, the treaty, such as it is, has the undeniable - merit of having prepared the world for a more complete political - structure. If ever the Powers should meet again to establish a - political system by which wars of conquest would be rendered - impossible, and the rights of all guaranteed, the Congress of - Vienna, as a preparatory assembly, will not have been without use. - A number of vexatious details have been settled, and the ground has - been prepared for building up a better social structure.”[6] - - [6] See Phillips, _loc. cit._, 118. - -Looking back over the past century it is hard to find justification for -Gentz’s optimism. The respite that Europe had for a generation from war -was due in a sense to the lesson learned in the Napoleonic struggle; -but it was not a permanent lesson. We shall proceed to examine the -expedients that came to be used for the end specified; but it is -certain that they did not achieve permanently the end desired. Had the -Congress of Vienna done all that was expected of it, the world might -today be at peace. If not at peace, we might at least say that the men -of the Congress did all they could to secure peace. - -If we ask for the fundamental cause of the failure of the Congress of -Vienna to satisfy the hopes of liberal men in constructing what Gentz -called “a more complete political structure,” the answer must lie in -the illiberal views of the ruling classes in the European states. -Self-government was less developed than in the most conservative state -of today. Had the people of these states been in power, and had they -been to a fair degree trained in the principles of good government, the -result could hardly have been as it was. But the ignorant bureaucrats -and arbitrary rulers were in power, men who in their own lives never -knew the burdens of war, and to whom national egotism appeared a high -virtue; and they thought only of gaining territory for their states. -They placed such things above the high opportunity to reform the -political structure of Europe. They turned to the future with the old -principles still dominant, hoping that by a system of concert among the -great states they could stave off war for an indefinitely long period. -They could place self-interest against self-interest, forgetting that -a time was likely to come when self-interest might lead the strongest -to dare the rest of the world, hoping to move quickly in a moment -of temporary advantage and thus gain ends that only the most severe -sacrifices could take away. But that is a story reserved for another -chapter. - -Before we take up the Concert of Europe we must deal with the Holy -Alliance, which, though but an interlude in the play, is so frequently -mentioned in the books that it cannot be omitted from this discussion. -It was signed at Paris, November 20, 1815, and may be considered only -one of the forms in which the tsar’s ideal was embodied. Its religious -character made it the butt of ridicule for the “practical” statesmen -of the day, and the historian has been prone to look at it from their -standpoint. But it was then popular to express political principles in -religious phrases, and the alliance is to be interpreted by the purpose -that lay underneath, rather than by the mere form in which it was set -forth. - -As we have seen, Alexander I had formulated his plan for a league of -states long before the end of the war. He had relaxed his intentions in -no sense when he met Baroness Krüdener in June, 1815. This remarkable -woman, though nobly born, was a religious enthusiast who to the faculty -of intense conviction added the gift of preaching. Wherever she went -she found followers who hung on her words and yielded themselves to -her impassioned appeals for religious devotion. In the height of her -enthusiasm she came to think that she had revelations from God. Many -a popular revivalist of recent times could be compared with her; and -if we are tolerant of their undoubtedly well-meant efforts to stir -humanity to righteousness, we may allow her also a fair share of our -esteem as a would-be agent of good through the employment of human -means to attain human ends. - -Like the other religious teachers of the day she was deeply impressed -by the calamities of the war. She knew of the tsar’s desire to -establish a régime of peace and came to believe she was divinely called -to induce him to take a conspicuous step in that direction. At first -Alexander, who was not always religious, refused to see her; but in -June, 1815, an interview was arranged while he was at Heilbron, on the -campaign. He was deeply impressed and asked her to remain near him. -When he went to Paris after the second defeat of Napoleon she was given -quarters near his palace, and it was there, in the following autumn, -that he drew up the plan of the Holy Alliance. - -The “Alliance” was expressed in the spirit of a mediæval religious -brotherhood. The signatory sovereigns pledged themselves to take the -will of God for highest law, to give aid to an imperiled brother -sovereign, and to hold the Alliance as “a true and indissoluble -fraternity.” The constituent states were to make “one great Christian -nation” and their sovereigns were to act “as delegates of Providence” -in ruling their respective states. If such an ideal could have been -accomplished at all, a stronger grip of the church on the springs of -government would have been necessary than existed in that day. The tsar -proclaimed the Holy Alliance on November 26, 1815. It was signed by -all the states of Europe except Turkey, Great Britain, and the Papal -State. Great Britain’s refusal to sign was due to Castlereagh, to whom -the tsar seemed mentally unbalanced. He gave as his justification that -the prince-regent, ruling in the place of his insane father, had no -authority to sign, but said that he would support the principles of the -Alliance. As it was to be a union of Christian states the sultan was -not invited to sign. The Pope was not asked because of his overwhelming -influence in matters connected with religion. Frederick William, of -Prussia, was a religious man and is believed to have signed in good -faith. Metternich advised the emperor of Austria to sign but said that -the document was mere verbiage. - -In all I have said hitherto about the tsar’s idea of preserving peace -no definite plan has been mentioned. His most specific utterance was -to ask for a league of nations, but he said nothing of its powers, its -specific organization, or the limits of its action. The suggestion -was vague, probably because the mind of its author was itself vague. -If taken seriously it could be made to serve as the foundation of a -unified state of Europe which might hold all other states under its -hand, a unified state largely under the domination of Russia. That its -author had no such object in view is not to be doubted for an instant; -but who could tell how long he would remain in his existing state of -mind, and how soon he might be succeeded by a tsar of far other spirit? -As a plan for permanent peace the Holy Alliance was impossible, not -only because it was cast in religious forms and thrown to a world in -which the authority of religion had lost much of its ancient hold on -the minds of men of influence, but because its indefinite form made it -a possible instrument of greater evils than war. - -Beneath its defects, however, was the great idea of a unified Europe, -in which justice has the place of suspicion and intrigue, in which runs -one law, one order, and one obedience to the majesty of the state. -Alexander not only believed in such an ideal, but he was willing to -cast his nation into the melting-pot in order to fuse such a state. -He could have given no better proof of his support of his ideal. Of -course, it was ahead of the time, how much so it is hard to say. The -widespread popular longing for permanent peace would have gone far in -accepting unification of the states, and in this sphere of opinion the -religious cast of the scheme was not a great disadvantage. The thing -which stood firmly in its way was the dull practicality of the upper, -ruling class. If it could have passed these lions in the way, it might -have had a chance of working its way forward into some acceptable form -of a league in perpetuity. But it is a big _if_ that I have used. Upper -ruling classes know more about government than the lower classes, and -that is a source of conservatism. The lower classes, knowing little, -usually act upon their impulses; the members of the upper, ruling -class, having information in varying degrees, usually strike an average -of mediocre enlightenment, and it is a difficult thing for a new idea -to gain possession of them. In 1815 the upper, ruling class was well -settled in power in Europe, and it was most convinced of its superior -wisdom. It never accepted the tsar’s plan; and failing to get its -acceptance the plan was futile. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -EUROPE UNDER THE CONCERT OF THE POWERS - - -Having disposed of Alexander’s plan for a federation of nations it now -remains to consider the other plan which, under the name of “Concert of -Europe,” was adopted by Castlereagh and Metternich, though not for the -same purpose as that which had inspired the tsar. Its fundamental idea -had been in the positions taken by Pitt and Castlereagh when replying -to the tsar’s proposals, but it found its official basis in a Treaty -of Alliance signed by Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia at -Paris, November 20, 1815, the same day they accepted the Holy Alliance. -Its chief provisions were as follows: 1. The Powers bound themselves to -see that the second treaty of Paris, regulating affairs between France -and the allies, was executed. 2. They agreed to meet from time to time -to take cognizance of the state of affairs in Europe. 3. They promised -to suppress any recurrence of the revolutionary activity of France. 4. -They settled upon the quota of men and supplies that each nation should -furnish in case common action became necessary. 5. They undertook to -“consolidate the intimate tie which unites the four sovereigns for the -happiness of the world.” The most important of these provisions for the -purpose of this inquiry was the second, taken in connection with the -fifth. - -The first meeting that may be said to have been called under the -agreement was the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818. It was called -to determine whether or not France should be relieved of her garrisons -of occupation, a matter which was soon adjusted. Alexander I saw his -opportunity and urged that the sovereigns should take steps to make the -Holy Alliance a more vital kind of league. But Castlereagh interposed, -as in former meetings, and turned the efforts of the tsar aside without -arousing his displeasure. This may be considered the last gasp of the -Holy Alliance, as it was the complete triumph of the Concert over -it. At the same time France was admitted to the alliance of the four -powers, which henceforth was known as the Quintuple Alliance. But if -ever a question were to come up in which France was at variance with -the four other Powers over matters connected with her obligations -assumed in recent treaties, these four Powers would continue to act -in their old capacity. Mr. W. A. Phillips remarks that the Quadruple -Alliance still survived as “a rod in pickle for a France but doubtfully -disciplined.” For us, who are chiefly concerned to see the result of -the attempt to take the affairs of Europe under the protection of the -great Powers, it is sufficient to remember that France gave no further -trouble of the kind anticipated, and that the Quintuple Alliance, as -the formal expression of the Concert of Europe, had other problems to -consider. - -The first arose out of revolutions in Spain and Naples, where armed men -seized the power and forced the kings to accept liberal constitutions. -Alexander I and Metternich looked on with different feelings. The -former had been encouraging the liberals in Italy and was not greatly -shocked by the revolution there, but he was deeply concerned over -the upheaval in Spain and would have led a Russian army thither to -suppress it. The suggestion alarmed Metternich, who did not relish -the idea of Alexander’s marching through Austrian lands with a great -body of men. He did what he could to discourage the expedition against -Spain. At the same time he believed that Naples should be disciplined, -since its revolution endangered the safety of Austrian possessions in -Italy. It is amusing to see how self-interest ran across the currents -of the general good as proclaimed in the Concert of Europe. - -The tsar thought the situation warranted calling another conference of -the Quintuple Alliance. Metternich objected, being chiefly concerned -by the seeming certainty that the tsar would wish to carry into the -situation his well-known views in support of liberalism. To him it -seemed sufficient that the powers should agree severally to give their -arms to the suppression of revolution, without meeting in conference. -After much discussion a conference was called, at Troppau, but it was -regularly attended by only three of the five powers. The suppression -of constitutional government was not popular in Great Britain, and -her government took no official part in the conference. France held -aloof also; she was so much under the protection of Great Britain that -she did not dare risk British displeasure by allying herself with the -forces of repression. - -Did the absence of two nations from Troppau presage the dissolution of -the Alliance? Castlereagh gave a negative reply. His nation, he said, -was not bound beyond her treaty obligations, the terms of which were -clear and specific. They were embodied in the Treaties of Chaumont -and Paris. He considered the project of dealing with revolution in -its present form as beyond the meaning of these agreements. “If,” -he said, “it is desired to extend the Alliance so as to include all -objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change -its character to such an extent and carry us so far, that we should -see in it an additional motive for adhering to our course at the risk -of seeing the Alliance move away from us without our having quitted -it.” These frank words show that the Alliance was strained but not -broken. It would seem that a system like that of which we speak should -have at bottom some broad common principles. In purpose it should -be harmonious. As between the prevailing British idea of liberty -and Metternich’s ideas of legitimacy there was no ground for mutual -support; and out of this divergence of views was to grow the disruption -of the Alliance, as we shall soon see. - -Up to this time the two ideas that had run side by side were the tsar’s -plan for a league to secure coöperation of a general nature and the -British plan limiting common action to a few specific matters, chiefly -connected with the repression of France in case she wished to return -to a policy which would threaten the peace of Europe. As it became -increasingly apparent that France was no longer a menace this type -of union became less important, and the British ardor for it cooled, -especially since it was becoming more and more certain that the -Alliance was being used to support repression. - -At the same time a change was passing through the mind of the tsar. In -all he had done he had been supported by liberal ministers, against -whose influence at his court Metternich did not hesitate to intrigue. -Alexander’s conversion to the cause of repression came suddenly and -completely in 1820, when there was a mutiny in a favorite regiment of -his guard. Sober advisers pointed out to him that the action of the -regiment had no political significance, but he would not be convinced. -He insisted he would not countenance revolt abroad, lest it encourage -insurrection at home. All the fervor he had shown in behalf of liberal -ideas he now manifested in behalf of repression. At Troppau he met -Metternich in a spirit of profound repentance for what he had done -in the past, saying with an outburst of emotion: “So we are at one, -Prince, and it is to you that we owe it. You have correctly judged -the state of affairs. I deplore the waste of time, which we must try -to repair. I am here without any fixed ideas; without any plan; but I -bring you a firm and unalterable resolution. It is for your Emperor to -use it as he wills. Tell me what you desire, and what you wish me to -do, and I will do it.” The speech astonished the Prince as much as it -pleased him. All his schemes had lost in the defection of Castlereagh, -and probably more, was made up in the accession of his new ally. Not -only was the cause of legitimacy, as he advocated it, made safe; but -the danger was removed of a Franco-Russian alliance, always a thing to -be dreaded by the great Powers in the center of Europe. - -In the conference at Troppau, Austria, Russia, and Prussia now acted -together. Up to that time Metternich had ignored the Holy Alliance. -He now brought it out as his stalking horse. The three sovereigns, -controlling the conference, issued a declaration suspending from -the Alliance any state that tolerated revolution in its borders and -declaring that the other Powers in the Alliance would bring back the -offending state by force of arms. Under the indefinite terms of the -instrument this was a legal interpretation of power, but it was not -in the spirit of the benevolent sovereign who made the Holy Alliance -possible. - -Those of us who now favor a league or federation of states as a means -of preserving peace perpetually may well study the crisis to which a -similar system had come in the development of international relations -in 1820. The tsar’s ideal was a thing of glory thrown before a sordid -world. Not even he, as we see, was proof against the debasement of his -surroundings. If his plan had been adopted by all the nations, it is -likely that the time would have come when the confederation thus formed -would have become an agency for reaction against which liberal views -would have been unable to contend. - -On the other hand, we must not ignore the weight that a confederation -would have had as an idea in promoting respect for liberal government. -If it had been established under the protection of the tsar, it may -well have been that Metternich would not have taken up the crusade of -legitimacy, that the tsar and Castlereagh acting together in behalf of -liberal institutions would have insured a steadier attitude on the part -of the former, and that under such circumstances the kings of Spain -and Naples would have been less inclined to the severe measures which -provoked revolution. Of course, these are mere conjectures, but it is -only fair to mention them as things to be said for the other side of -the question. - -When we come to apply the lessons of 1815-1820 to the present day, we -must not forget that conditions are now very greatly changed. It was -the supremacy of arbitrary government in Europe that made the hopes -of 1815 come to naught. Of all the agents who then controlled affairs -in the great states of Europe, Castlereagh, next to the tsar, was the -most liberal. If a plan of union were adopted after the present war, -it might not be a success, but the failure would not be for the same -reasons as those that brought the Alliance of 1815 to a nullity. - -Castlereagh made a protest against the purposes of the three Powers -at Troppau in which were some telling arguments against such a league -as was threatening. They were well made and would be applicable to -the situation today, if it were proposed to establish a league like -that which found favor at Troppau. The plan proposed, said he, was too -general in its scope. It gave the projected confederation the right to -interfere in the internal affairs of independent states on the ground -that the general good was concerned, and if carried out the Alliance -would, in effect, be charged with the function of policing such states. -Against all this he protested, and he pointed out that so many grounds -of dissatisfaction lay in the scheme that to try to enforce it would -surely lead to counter alliances, the end of which would be war. It -ought to be said, also, that Castlereagh was opposed to giving up war -as a means of settling disputes. “The extreme right of interference,” -he said, “between nation and nation can never be made a matter of -written stipulation or be assumed as the attribute of an alliance.” If -a man takes that position he can hardly be expected to see good points -in any scheme to preserve peace perpetually. - -The evils he pointed out are largely eliminated in the modern plans -that are offered. For example, the jurisdiction of the proposed leagues -or federations is strictly limited to the enforcement of peace. A -supreme court held by eminent judges would pass upon cases as they come -up and say whether or not the central authority should employ force. -Under the plan it would be hard to bring a purely internal question -before the court, and if brought there it would not be considered -by the judges, since the pact of the federation would specify that -such cases were not to be tried. The pact would be the constitution -of the federation, and the court would be expected to pass on the -constitutionality of measures from the standpoint of that instrument. -Under a system like that recently advocated a revolution in Naples -would have to be submitted to a court whose members were appointed from -states in which free institutions are in existence. It could not be the -tool of a Metternich. Under such a system the whim of a tsar, if such a -ruler ever again wears a crown, could not make or mar a question like -that which underlay the calling of the Conference of Troppau. So many -are the differences that it is, perhaps, not profitable to dwell longer -on this point. The study of the peace problem and the attempt to solve -it a hundred years ago is extremely interesting to one who considers -the situation now existing, but it is chiefly because the mind, having -grasped the development of the former problem and become accustomed -to see the process as a whole, is in a better state to understand -the present and to know wherein it differs from the past and in what -respect old factors are supplemented by new factors. Such lessons from -the past are open to all who will but read. - -These reflections should not make us forget the main thread of our -story, which became relatively weak after Troppau. From that time it -was clear that Europe had no hopes of peace through coöperation under -either of the two plans that had been suggested. Almost immediately -began a train of events which gave added impulse to the dissolution of -the Alliance. In 1821 began the Greek War of Independence. Austria was -in consternation lest the revolution should spread to her own people. -Russia, however, was deeply sympathetic with the Greeks, partly through -religious affiliations and partly because the Russian people, looking -toward the possession of Constantinople, were anxious to weaken the -Turk in any of his European possessions. Alexander I showed signs -of going to war for the Greeks, and Metternich hastily sought to -counteract any such course. - -At the same time the situation in Spain’s American colonies was -becoming more urgent, because the weakness of the government had -stimulated the South American revolutionists to renewed activity until -Mexico as well as the rest of the Continental colonies except Peru was -in successful revolt. Metternich would have helped Turkey against the -Greeks and allowed the tsar to carry out his long cherished wish of -intervening in Spain, as a means of keeping him quiet. The situation -seemed to call for another conference and after some discussion a -meeting was arranged at Verona, 1822. France was anxious to take over -the task of punishing the Spanish revolutionists, and as Russia, -Austria, and Prussia agreed to her plan, four of the five Great Powers -now stood side by side in favor of repression. They would have gone -further, and settled the fate of the American revolutionists, but -against that course Great Britain made such a protest that the question -was left open. - -It was not definitely closed until the next year, and then through -the action of the United States, taken in association with Great -Britain. For when France had performed her task, she looked forward -to taking some of the Spanish colonies as indemnity for her expenses. -The principle of federation among the Powers was working so well that -it was considered only a natural thing to call another conference at -which France could be assigned the right of conquering the colonies. -Canning, at the head of the British government, was genuinely alarmed. -The four united Powers were willing to defy Great Britain if she stood -alone. He turned to the United States as the only ally in sight. Would -we support him in opposition to the designs of the Powers? President -Monroe, influenced by John Quincy Adams’ stout patriotism, replied -in the affirmative and went a step further; for he insisted that the -defiance of the Powers should be announced in Washington, not as a mere -expedient to meet an isolated case, but as a general policy of our -government. The Monroe Doctrine was one of the things that broke up the -Quintuple Alliance, already weakened by the alienation of Great Britain. - -The last blow was the revolution in France in 1880, which drove the -Bourbon king into exile and made a liberal government possible. At the -same time so strong were the manifestations of republicanism in other -countries that the old conservatism was lowered in tone and chastened -in pride. From France the revolutionary movement passed into Belgium, -which the Congress of Vienna had decreed should be a part of the -kingdom of the Netherlands. So completely was the revolution successful -that even the Great Powers had to bow to it, and in a congress at -London they recognized Belgium as a separate state and saw it set up a -liberal constitution with a king at the head of the government. Several -of the small German governments also adopted more liberal forms. Poland -broke into rebellion and before its power of resistance was crushed by -Russia the infection spread into Lithuania and Podolia. At last the -arms of the tsar overpowered all resistance and peace reigned; but -the reactionaries were sobered, and the dream of a league to enforce -repression passed away. - -Glancing backward we may see through what a development the ideas -of reform had passed. Europe, distressed by the wars of 1800-1815, -had hungered for peace. Having issued from a decade of discussion of -liberty and humanity, the friends of freedom were more than ordinarily -earnest for replacing war by an age of reason. In our own day the cause -of universal peace stands on a broader and better laid foundation than -a hundred years ago, but it is, perhaps, no more impressive. At any -rate the philosophically inclined men of the earlier period supported -Kant and Rousseau, among them, Alexander I. A considerable portion of -the world believed that the outcome of the war madness then reigning -must be an era of sanity. - -We have seen that two plans of improvement were formed in the minds -of men who were in position to have practical influence: the tsar’s -scheme for a league, or federation, that was so strongly integrated -that the central authority should be able to enforce its commands -upon constituent states; and the plan of Castlereagh for prolonging -the existing system of coöperation in a form which we may call the -Concert of the Great Powers. We have seen that the tsar’s plan, ignored -at first, was seized on by Metternich as a possibility for enforcing -a system of reaction, that it met the opposition of Great Britain -and aroused the revolutionary protest of 1830, and thus it came to -an end. It was never the dream of any of the philosophers that a -federation should be formed which might become an engine of despotism, -yet practical use showed that such a course was within the bounds of -possibility. The mere glimpse of such a thing was enough to make Europe -prefer the old era of wars. - -One does not have to look far into the situation to see that the real -failure of the plan was due to the wide use of arbitrary government -in Europe. Had Austria, Russia, and Prussia been ruled by the people, -either as republics or as liberal monarchies, the great alliance of -Europe could hardly have been turned to the side of repression; and -under the guidance of enlightened statesmen it might have been the -beginning of a long era of peace and international good will. The -failure of the nineteenth century, therefore, does not prove that -federation is essentially impossible. It only proves that a century ago -the world was not ready to employ it successfully. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE LATER PHASES OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE - - -The revolutionary movement of 1830 did not destroy the influence of -Metternich in Europe. He was too able a man to be overthrown as leader -of the legitimists merely because the people were in a ferment. To his -party he was still the man to be trusted, and as legitimacy managed to -beat down revolution in most of the areas in which commotion appeared, -the scope of his power was wide, although it was evident that he could -not use it with former impunity. - -At the same time he gave up the pretense of making the Alliance of -the Powers a federation. He was content to try to secure that concert -of action that would enable the states that leaned to legitimacy to -act together against incipient revolution; and for a time he was -successful. In anticipation of the failure of the plan to permit France -to interfere in the Spanish colonies, Canning exclaimed: “Things are -getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and -God for us all!” But the cry of joy was premature. The time had not -returned in which each crisis was to be met in its own way, without -reference to a recognized concert of action, and the reason was the -deep consciousness of the states that certain grave questions that ever -hung over the horizon had in them the possibilities of general war. -Let one of these questions loom large, and common action was taken to -avert the threatened danger. In such way the Concert of Europe was kept -alive, and remained something to be reckoned with as a part of the -background of European policy. In spite of its temporary disuse, it was -a thing to be brought forth again if the nations decided that it was -needed to meet an emergency. - -In fact, it reappeared many times in the course of the nineteenth -century, notably in 1840, when the so-called Eastern question became -prominent. At that time Mehemet Ali, who had made himself lord of Egypt -and seized Syria, was threatening Constantinople, having the support of -France. Russia became alarmed, made a close alliance with the sultan, -and seemed about to get that secure foothold on the Bosphorus for -which she had striven many years. Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia -resented this prospect and took steps jointly to counteract it. Their -object was to preserve Turkey from the dangers that threatened to -divide her. Before such a combination Russia was not able to stand, -and she gave up her pretensions in order to join the other three -powers. France, however, held to her purpose, supporting the adventurer -of Egypt. Thus it happened that the four Great Powers, reviving the -Concert of Europe, but leaving out the government of Louis Philippe, -had a conference in London to settle Eastern affairs. They decided -to offer Mehemet Ali certain concessions and to make war on him if -he refused to accept them. He spurned their counsel and was expelled -from Syria but was saved from utter destruction by the interference -of France, who secured a settlement by which he was left in firm -possession of Egypt, as hereditary ruler under the nominal authority of -Turkey. All the powers now united in an agreement by which Turkey was -to exclude foreign warships from the Dardanelles. Thus, by an appeal -to the principle of the Concert of Europe, a grave crisis was averted, -and war between Great Britain and Russia was avoided. - -In 1848, seven years after the conclusion of these negotiations, -Europe was thrown into convulsions by the appearance of a new era of -revolution. France became a republic, and Germany, Austria, and Hungary -went through such violent upheavals that the existence of arbitrary -government hung for a time in the balance. Out of the struggle emerged -Napoleon III, of France, who thought some military achievement was -necessary to stabilize his power. At that time Russia was asserting -a protectorate over all Christians in Turkey, and it was generally -believed that she was about to establish vital political control. -Napoleon took up the sword against her and Great Britain came to help, -the result being the Crimean War, 1854-1856. - -In the beginning of this struggle the Concert of Europe seemed to be -dead, but two years of heavy fighting and nearly futile losses brought -it to life again. The war, which began in an outburst of international -rivalry, ended in the Conference of Paris, 1856, in which all the -Great Powers but Prussia undertook to settle the Eastern question by -neutralizing the Euxine and the Danube and by making new allotments of -territory which were supposed to adjust boundaries in such a manner -that rivalries would disappear. The Conference went on to take up the -work of a true European congress by agreeing upon the Declaration of -Paris, in which were assembled a body of rules regulating neutral trade -in time of war. England gave up her long defended pretension to seize -enemy goods on neutral ships and neutral goods on enemy ships, and in -return gained the recognition that privateering was unlawful. Thus the -Crimean War, fought by Great Britain and France against Russia, and in -support of Turkey--with Austria and Prussia as neutrals--was at last -ended by an agreement between all the parties concerned. The nations -undertook to settle the long Eastern dispute by pledging the sultan to -reforms which it was not in his nature to carry out. - -The next three wars were fought without respect to the Concert of -Europe. They arose from local causes and were soon determined without -the aid of the Great Powers. They were the war of Austria and France -over the liberation of Italy, 1859; the war between Prussia and -Austria, 1866, in which Prussia overthrew the Austrian predominancy in -Germany; and the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-1871, in which Prussia -crushed France and made herself the head of the German Empire. In the -first of these struggles no state could gain enough power to become -a menace to the other states, since Italy was to be the recipient of -all territory gained. Had the contest gone so far as to promise the -vast enlargement of the power of France by reason of an alliance with -enlarged Italy, interference might have resulted. In fact, the German -states began to suspect such a result, and the realization of it was -one of Napoleon’s reasons for withdrawing very unceremoniously from -the war. Here we see, therefore, that the principle of concert was not -entirely dead. The second and third wars were fought by a brilliantly -organized state, Prussia, with whose successful armies no nation cared -to make a trial of strength. - -In 1877 Russia made war on Turkey and proceeded with such energy -that she soon forced the sultan to sign the treaty of San Stefano, -altogether in favor of Russia. The particulars of the struggle belong -to another chapter,[7] but here it is only necessary to point out that -the Concert of Europe was now suddenly revived by the Great Powers, and -Russia was forced to submit her well won victory to the Congress of -Berlin, which scaled down the awards of San Stefano until Russia might -well ask what was left of her victory. A similar thing happened in the -Balkan War of 1912-1913. Here the parties concerned had fought their -quarrel out to the end and had nearly expelled Turkey from Europe, -dividing the spoils among themselves. Then in stepped the Great Powers, -prescribing in a treaty at London the limits of gain to the successful -contestants. They acted in the interest of peace; for Austria, watching -the actions of Serbia and Greece, let it be known that she would not -allow Serbia to have Albania, and the Powers interfered in order to -prevent such action from kindling a great European war. - - [7] See below, p. 112. - -Thus in three notable wars, the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War, -and the Balkan War, the action of the Great Powers was not to prevent -war, but to neutralize its gains. So far did this principle go that -writers were known to suggest that war would no longer be profitable -to nations, since in a Concert of Europe the Great Powers would ever -nullify the gains of the contestants. - -At this time concert had come to mean another thing than it meant in -the decade after the fall of Napoleon. Then it was a fixed system of -consultation and decision in anticipation of some issue that threatened -war: now it was concerted action to keep a local war from going so -far as to involve a general conflict. It was a last resort in the -presence of dire danger. A more present means of preserving peace was -the Balance of Power, which consisted in forming the states in groups -one of which balanced another group and prevented the development of -overwhelming strength. The principle was well known in the past history -of Europe, but it was never so clearly defined in the remote past as in -the last half century. For our purposes its modern phase begins after -the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871. - -Before that time Prussia was strong in Europe but not over-whelmingly -great. On one side was Austria, long her enemy, and on the other was -France. Within five years they were defeated with such quick and -crushing blows that the world was startled and the Germans themselves -were as much astonished as delighted. Out of this brilliant period of -success arose the German Empire, with Prussia for its corner-stone and -Bismarck for its builder and guardian. Immediately a singular thing -happened. One would hardly expect that a beaten state would straightway -form an alliance with the power that had humiliated her; yet such a -relation was established between Germany and Austria, and it has lasted -to this day. Where Germany has loved Austria has loved, where Germany -has hated Austria has hated, and the ambition of one has been supported -by the other. Bismarck’s policy had this state of friendship in view -and he gave Austria generous terms of peace in 1866, when she was at -his feet. Common blood bound the two states together and later led to -the hope of unification in a great Pan-German empire. - -With France, however, the empire which Bismarck founded was to have -no such state of amity. Between them was no brotherhood, not even in -the tenuous bonds of the theory of the rights of man. Back of 1871 were -many acts of aggression, many bitter wars, and some very humiliating -experiences for states inhabited by Germans. And now the tables were -turned. France was weak and the often beaten Germans were strong and -victorious. Their vengeance was expressed in the long siege of Paris, -the proclamation of the German Empire in the château of the old French -kings, the humiliating indemnity levied on the French people, and -the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, so long in the quiet keeping -of France that they were thoroughly French in sympathy and political -purpose. Bismarck usually ruled his heart with his head, but he lost -himself for the moment when he sent a defeated neighbor under the yoke -of needless disgrace, and Germany has paid the price many times over in -maintaining a great army and parrying the diplomatic thrusts of France. -The hostile feelings thus engendered gave rise to the particular kind -of balance of power that has existed in Europe since 1871; for on -whatever side Germany was found France was on the other, and however -the elements shifted in the grouping of nations these two states were -always opponents. - -It was Bismarck’s idea to form an alliance so powerful that no other -state nor group of states would dare attack it, and by holding his -allies in hand to preserve peace. That was the way the Balance of Power -was to serve to prevent war. For his purpose he formed what was known -as the Three Emperors’ League, consisting of the rulers of Germany, -Russia, and Austria. The combination was weak in one important point; -for Russia and Austria had rival hopes of territorial gains in the -Near East, and they were not likely to remain permanently in accord. -With an eye to such a disruption of the alliance Bismarck looked about -for another state which could be added to the group. He turned to -Italy, bound to him because he had befriended her in her struggle for -nationality. - -To bring Italy into the alliance was not easy; for she was bitterly -hostile to Austria, who still held the unredeemed part of the Italian -people and who was still hated in the peninsula for her ancient -oppression of Italian provinces. The Iron Chancellor generally carried -his point, partly because of his personal ability and partly because -it was felt that he could and would live up to his promises. He showed -the king of Italy the advantages the kingdom would have under German -protection, which would support it against France, strengthen it in the -quarrel with the pope, and even hold back Austria if that power was -inclined to pay off old scores. These arrangements were completed in -1882 and gave rise to the Triple Alliance, until 1914 a strong factor -in European affairs. The greatness of Bismarck is well shown in the -fact that he could carry this plan through and still retain Russia in -coöperation with Austria and Germany. Until he retired from office in -1890 he had the support of the tsar. - -After he withdrew the union of the three emperors was dissolved. But -for his strong hand it could hardly have been formed. Russia and -Austria were at bottom rivals. If Germany supported Russia in her plans -for the Near East she would offend Austria, and if she lent herself to -Austria she would lose Russia. Moreover, if she favored Russia openly -she was likely to arouse the opposition of Great Britain, who was at -that time very suspicious of the tsar’s designs on Constantinople. It -was a delicate situation, and it was only good luck and Bismarck’s -character that kept it intact for more than fifteen years. - -After 1890 the Triple Alliance continued its existence, Italy -suppressing her dislike for Austria as well as she could in view of her -need of strong friends among the nations. But Russia fell away and in -1895 announced that she had formed a Dual Alliance with France, a thing -which Bismarck had been very solicitous to prevent. By holding Russia -in hand he had been able to isolate France in Europe, but her isolation -was now a thing of the past. The Dual Alliance confronted the Triple -Alliance and the result was peace. At the same time the rivalry of -Russia and Austria over Turkey became more energetic, which tended to -increase the probability of war. - -Succeeding Bismarck came German statesmen who were not so steady as -he, and their weaker hold on the situation added to the gravity of -the prospects of peace. It can hardly be doubted that the fall of -Bismarck lessened the prospect that Europe would remain at peace. The -Balance of Power, which took so clear a form with the organization of -the Dual Alliance, was not as good a guarantee of peace as it seemed; -for while it made the checking of powers by powers more apparent, its -very existence was evidence of a state of stronger rivalry of nations -than existed before the Dual Alliance was formed. At the same time the -men who now guided the fortunes of Germany were not so convinced as -Bismarck that the country should have peace. - -While these things happened Great Britain remained generally neutral. -She was busy with trade expansion and the development of her colonies, -especially in Africa; and her chief interest, so far as the schemes -of the Continental nations were concerned, was to see that none of -them interfered with her progress in that field of endeavor. Late -in Bismarck’s time, however, she became convinced that Germany was -becoming a rival both in trade and colonization. It is true that -France was also a rival, and between her and Great Britain occurred -some sharp passages; but France was not an aggressive nation and had -no strong military resources to back her ambitions in the field of -peaceful activities. Germany, on the other hand, was increasingly -militaristic and the logic of events seemed to indicate that she would -at some time in the future be willing to support her commercial and -colonial ambition with a formidable appeal to arms. British anxiety was -quickened when the young kaiser began to build a great navy, with the -avowed object of making it equal to the British navy. For centuries -it had been the key-note of British policy to have a navy that could -control the seas; and while there was nothing in the will of Father -Adam that gave Britons the dominion of the seas, the kaiser must have -known that he could not challenge their superiority on water without -arousing their gravest apprehension. During the Boer war (1899-1902) -Germany gave added offense to Britain. She showed sympathy openly for -the Boers, and it was generally believed in Great Britain that she took -advantage of the opportunity to try to form a grand alliance to curb -the power of the “Mistress of the Seas.” Rumor said that the plan was -defeated only by the refusal of France to lend her assistance unless -she received Alsace-Lorraine. If the report is true, it only shows what -a costly thing to Germany was the hatred that Bismarck created when he -put France to the humiliating dismemberment of 1871. - -During this period Théophile Delcassé was head of the French foreign -office (1898-1905). He was a man of great original ability and was -desirous of restoring the prestige of France. When he came into office -the French public was excited over the Fashoda incident, a clash of -French and British interests in the Sudan which seemed to threaten -war. The British government took a strong attitude, as it was likely -at that time to do, when it felt that it was dealing with a weaker -nation. Delcassé realized that the true welfare of his country demanded -friendship with the one power which could help it against Germany, and -at the risk of denunciation at home he gave up all that Great Britain -demanded in the Sudan. He thus showed that he possessed that high trait -of statesmanship which consists in the ability to convert an opponent -into a firm friend. - -The opportunity to which he was looking forward came when Germany set -her plans into operation during the Boer war. He not only held out for -the return of the lost provinces but, that failing, made overtures for -a better understanding with the British. It was a time when a friendly -hand was gladly received by the London government. The result was a -series of agreements which became known as the _Entente Cordiale_, -1904. They marked the reappearance of Great Britain as a leading power -in Continental affairs, after a long period of aloofness. She had -become an active part of the Balance of Power, and her strength was -thrown to the side which was bent on restraining the vast influence -of Germany. Her action caused great alarm at Berlin, where her motive -was interpreted as commercial jealousy, the statesmen of that city -apparently forgetting that they had provoked it by their unfriendly -attitude in the Boer war. - -In the same year began the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905). At first -glance it would seem that this conflict threatened to weaken the -_Entente Cordiale_, for Japan was allied to Great Britain and Russia -was bound up with France by the Dual Alliance. But the result was -just the opposite. The _Entente_ was not only left intact, but it was -actually strengthened. When Japan defeated Russia, Great Britain ceased -to fear Russian aggression in the Far East, which made it possible for -her to draw nearer to the Muscovite power. At the same time, Russia, -always seeking an outlet to the sea, turned her eyes with greater -eagerness than ever to the Near East, which brought her into a more -intense state of opposition to Austria and Germany. Delcassé seized -the opportunity offered him and succeeded in bringing together these -two great nations, which for many years had been continually ready to -fly at one another. He put into motion the negotiations out of which -was formed the Triple _Entente_ (1907) in which Great Britain, France, -and Russia announced that they had settled their differences and would -stand together in future crises. - -The incidents that followed the culmination of Delcassé’s diplomacy -are very striking, but they must be deferred until I reach a later -stage of my subject. Here it is only proper to observe that it brought -the theory of the Balance of Power to its logical development. Delcassé -was in a world in which one great and most efficiently armed nation -stood in a position to turn suddenly on the rest of Europe and sweep -it into her lap. By her military and naval power, by her vast trained -army, by her readiness for instantaneous action, by her well planned -strategic railroads, and by her alliances with the middle-European -states she was in a threatening position. At a given signal she could -seize great domains, fortify herself, and defy all the world to drive -her out of what she had taken. There was hardly an intelligent German -who did not believe that this course would be followed in the near -future and who did not feel confident that it would make Germany -the dominating nation of the world. Against this system the Triple -_Entente_ was formed, as a means of balance. It was larger than the -Triple Alliance but not so effectively led. - -And here I must observe that these two groups had come into existence -in the most natural way. Bismarck had founded the Triple Alliance as -a means of preserving peace, not as a means of aggression; but it had -become something more than he intended it to be. It had enabled Germany -to play such a part in European politics that the creation of another -great group as a balance was apparently demanded. Immediately that -her position was lowered Germany felt aggrieved that the combination -had been made against her. So powerful were her convictions about her -wrongs that she threw away all thought of a concert of the Great Powers -for the settlement of the difficulty. She had trusted to the Balance to -protect her; but she now considered it something more than a state of -equilibrium and she appealed to arms. Before this narrative recounts -the actual events by which she felt that she was justified in taking -this step, it is necessary to consider the Balkan question, a series of -causes and events which for nearly a century has been an open menace to -European peace and stability. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE BALKAN STATES - - -Viscount Grey has been criticized for not understanding the Balkan -problem. If his critics understood how complex is the story of the last -century in this part of Europe they would withold their strictures. -I, at least, do not blame any man for failing to carry in his mind -an appreciation of all that the mixed mass of races and religions -in the Balkan country have striven and hoped for during the recent -past. In this chapter the best that can be promised is an account of -the main facts of Balkan history. A more detailed narrative would be -confusing to the reader. A failure to mention the subject would leave -much unexplained that is essential to an understanding of the origin -of the present war. And we shall hardly know how to decide what kind -of a peace the future security of Europe demands, if we leave out of -consideration the proper disposition to be made of the small states of -the Southeast. - -In 1453 Turkey took Constantinople and began a series of conquests that -carried her to the very gates of the city of Vienna. That important -stronghold seemed about to fall into her hands in 1683, when an army -of Polish and German soldiers came to its rescue in the name of -Christianity, drove off the infidels, and wrenched Hungary out of their -hands for the benefit of the Austrian power. This struggle proved the -highwater mark of Turkish conquest in Europe. From that time to this, -wars of reconquest have followed one another, the pagans always playing -a losing game. But for a long time all that part of Southeastern Europe -that could be reached from the Black Sea was held by the Turks, the -part that was easily reached from Germany was held by the Christians, -and the part that lay between, a broad belt of hilly country, was -continually in dispute. Across it armies fought back and forth, each -side winning and losing in turn, but with the general result in favor -of the Christians, who slowly pushed back the frontier of their enemies. - -The region held by the Turks was tenacious of its Christian faith and -recognized the religious authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, -who, Christian though he was, stood under the control of the sultan. -The inhabitants suffered many hardships and were reduced to the -condition of serfs under Mohammedan masters. The long bondage to their -overlords had a peculiar effect on their characters. They came to -think it right to use fraud, violence, and subterfuge against their -oppressors, and so they employed religion and patriotism to defend the -commission of acts which in ordinary situations are considered without -the pale of civilized conduct. To this day the Balkan states are not -rid of their heritage from these years of moral darkness. - -The Balkan people, ruled long as Turkish subjects, have gradually -formed themselves into five principal groups as follows: the Serbians, -dwelling in the interior of the country northwest of Turkey proper -and occupying much of the hinterland lying east of the Adriatic; the -Bulgars, settled east of the Serbs and extending as far as the shores -of the Black Sea; the Wallachians and Moldavians, who were of kindred -stock and became known as Rumanians because they believed themselves -the descendants of the inhabitants of the ancient Roman colony of -Dacia; the Albanians living along the lower eastern shores of the -Adriatic; and the Montenegrins, of the same race as the Serbians, -who defended themselves so well in their mountain strongholds that -they could say they had never been conquered by the Turks. Many race -elements entered into these groups, but the Serbs and Montenegrins were -largely Slavic, while the Bulgars were generally of a distinct race -of Asiatic origin, and the Rumanians were generally Vlachs, a name -given to the Latin speaking population of the Eastern Roman Empire. -The Albanians seem to be of mixed stock, but they have a strong sense -of nationality. These five groups correspond respectively to the five -civil divisions that have emerged from the Turkish provinces, each -playing its part in the modern Balkan problem. - -Montenegro aside, the first group to become a state was Serbia, whose -hardy mountain inhabitants rose in revolt in 1804. A number of brave -leaders appeared and valley by valley the Turks were forced out of -the country. The Serbs were practically independent for a time, -but the sultan did not acquiesce in their freedom, and the constant -preparedness that was necessary to repel any attack he might launch was -a source of much expense and anxiety to the people. - -In 1821 the Greeks, also under the domination of Turkey, rose in -revolt. Great sympathy was aroused in the rest of Europe and in spite -of the disposition of the Great Powers to allow Turkey a free hand to -preserve her territory intact, lest one of them gain over-balancing -territory, public opinion forced them to intervene. The first to -show sympathy was Russia, who had an interest in making herself the -protector of the Christians in Turkey. The other powers resented -her assistance to the Greeks, and finally Great Britain and France -united in a project of intervention, sending a joint fleet to the -Mediterranean which destroyed the Turkish fleet at Navarino in 1827. -The stubborn sultan remained unyielding, and in 1828 Russia entered -the war openly, having come to an agreement with the other Powers. She -sent an army across the border which carried all before it, and the -sultan was forced to make the treaty of Adrianople, in which Turkey -recognized the independence of Greece and acknowledged Serbia as an -autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty. At the same time Wallachia -and Moldavia, where Rumans lived, were recognized as independent -under a Russian protectorate. Thus one sovereign and three dependent -but locally autonomous states stood forth out of the confused and -misgoverned Christian area of Turkey in Europe. - -The rest of the region, occupied by Bulgars and Albanians, with Bosnia -and Herzegovina, claimed by the Serbs as legitimate parts of their -national habitat, remained in an unredeemed condition and were governed -by agents appointed by the sultan. Montenegro retained her position of -practical independence, which Turkey had been forced to acknowledge in -1799. These arrangements were confirmed in a more formal treaty in 1832. - -The successes of this period quickened the spirit of nationality in -the Balkans. Just as the Greeks were swept by a wave of enthusiasm for -their classical culture and sought to revive the language and ideals of -the remote past, so the Balkan peoples set out to revive their ancient -culture, long obscured by the shadow of Turkish masters. Serbs, Rumans, -and Bulgars made grammars of their own languages, gathered up what was -preserved of their ancient literatures and traditions, taught their -children to revere the national heroes, and sought in many other ways -to stimulate the spirit of nationality. The Slavic portion turned -to Russia for support, whom they called their “big brother,” while -the Rumans cultivated an appreciation of Italy and France, whom they -considered kindred descendants of the ancient Romans. To their national -hopes in these things was added the desire for religious independence. -They disliked being under the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch -of Constantinople, who was appointed by the sultan, and looked forward -to a time when they might have exarchs of their own, with jurisdiction -not limited by the Patriarch. - -In 1854 Russia was ready for another advance in the region of the -Balkans, hoping to gain at last what Peter the Great had declared was -essential to her progress, a window looking out on the Mediterranean. -Great Britain and France came to the help of the sultan and the -Crimean War followed. After a hard struggle it ended in Russia’s -defeat, and at the Conference of Paris, 1856, the affairs of the -Balkans were again up for settlement, but this time the victory leaned -to the side of the Turk, although it was modified by the restraining -hand of his two allies. The purport of the treaty was to reduce the -power of Russia, and in doing so the aspirations of the Balkans -states were checked. The protectorate the tsar had established over -Wallachia and Moldavia was destroyed, and Bulgars, who had expected -independence, remained under the rule of the sultan, while Greece, who -had desired a large portion of Macedonia, was forced to continue in -her old boundaries. This crisis was not the last in which the vexed -Balkan question, seemingly near solution, was made to give way before -the complicated problems of the general European situation. Looking -backward we may well say that if Russia had secured her wish, expelled -the Turk from Constantinople and liberated the Balkan states, the -fortunes of France would not have been lessened, and Great Britain, -safe through her supremacy at sea, would not have lost any of the -strength she had in India. At the same time the sore spot of European -relations would have been healed, and we should probably have had no -war in 1914. - -Wallachia and Moldavia were of the same stock and wished to unite as -one kingdom. They made their desires known in the negotiations that -resulted in the Treaty of Paris, but the Powers did not mean to create -a large state on the borders of Russia which might prove a bulwark -of influence for the tsar, and accordingly they denied the request. -The two states found a way to accomplish their desire, soon after the -conference at Paris adjourned. Meeting to select rulers each chose -Alexander John Cuza simultaneously, and after hesitating two years the -Powers acknowledged him as king. Thus was formed the united kingdom -of Rumania; and its formation illustrated a weak point in the Concert -of Europe. However much the Powers might interfere to prevent the -consummation of an act they considered dangerous, they would think -twice before trying to punish a Balkan state, since in doing so they -might set off an explosion in the very system they were working to keep -peaceful. Rumania understood this phase of the matter and took her -chances. Her firm course had its reward. - -The influence of Great Britain was now paramount at Constantinople. -The sultan was satisfied with his ally, since he knew that of all the -Powers he had least to fear from this state, which had no territories -in that part of the Mediterranean and was committed to the preservation -of his rule as a means of keeping Russia away from the Bosphorus. -To justify herself for defending the Turk, Great Britain gave the -world assurances that the sultan was about to become good. Under her -insistance a series of reforms was announced, but they did not go far -in the realization. Some of the promises referred to the government of -the Balkans, but they were as fruitless as the others. Meanwhile French -and British merchants found large profits in Turkish trade. - -The tsar was humiliated by his loss of influence in the Southeast, -and in 1877 he began another war against Turkey. He thought the time -favorable for such action. Impeded for a while at Plevna, in Bulgaria, -he at last swept the enemy before him and took Adrianople on January -16, 1878. His successes created great enthusiasm among the Serbs, -Bulgars, and Rumans, who flocked to his victorious standard. The -panic-stricken sultan sued for peace and at San Stefano signed a treaty -which granted all that was demanded of him. Serbia, Montenegro, and -Rumania were recognized as completely independent, Bulgaria as an -autonomous tributary province, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were assured -of important administrative reforms. Russia was awarded some territory -not strictly in the Balkans, but her greatest gain was the prestige she -now had as liberator of Christian states. - -The treaty of San Stefano alarmed Great Britain and Austria, both -of whom felt that they had major interests at stake. They got a -congress of the Great Powers to meet at Berlin, 1878, which revised -the treaty in what they were pleased to call the interest of European -peace. Complete independence was announced for Serbia, Rumania, -and Montenegro, and the sultan accepted the fact of their perfect -sovereignty. By the treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria was to include -Macedon and eastern Rumelia, making one great buffer province between -the Turkish and the Christian states. The three parts were now -left distinct, Bulgaria proper being autonomous but under Turkish -suzerainty, and the other two less independent. - -To create a “Big Bulgaria” as a bulwark against Turkey had been -Russia’s chief hope in the war. Her initial success awakened enthusiasm -in all the Balkan people, and the results were expressed in the way -in which they rallied to her aid. At last, said the onlookers, an -opportunity had come to found a strong Balkan confederacy which would -play an important part in the development of the Near East. The hand of -Russia seemed strong enough to hold these nascent states to one policy, -allay their incipient jealousies, and bring them to a great common -ideal. If such a course could have been adopted the future of Europe -would have been profoundly altered. It was defeated by that Concert of -Europe which was supposed to exist in order that the world might be -spared the burden of war. It was really prevented through the operation -of the forces of national selfishness, safely esconced in the system -which we have called the Concert of Europe. - -The ambition of Austria-Hungary played a large part at the Congress -of Berlin. This nation had long looked upon the region that separated -her from the Adriatic as a sphere through which she was justified in -extending her power at the expense of Turkey, and she now felt that -the time had come to realize her plans. If she waited, Russia would -acquire such an influence as to forestall Austrian advancement. Her -eyes were fixed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, for some time in revolt -against Turkish misgovernment. Her influence was such that the congress -gave her the right to occupy and administer the two provinces under -the reservation of sovereignty to the sultan. The inhabitants, who -were largely Slavic, were forced to accept the decision, although they -did not relax their cherished hopes of independence. They were pawns -thrown to Austria as a balance for the gains of Russia. The transaction -only whetted the Austrian appetite for more and deepened the Serbian -resentment for Austria. - -Great Britain had her advantage out of the bargain also. She retained -her position of paramount friend at Constantinople, justifying herself -with the assurance that the sultan would carry out reforms in his -empire. She seemed to think that the “Sick Man of Europe” would cure -himself under her guidance and then defend himself against states -that tried to oust him from his seat of power. To enable her to watch -the bedside of her patient from a convenient position, as well as -to safeguard the Suez Canal, Great Britain was given the right to -occupy and administer the island of Cyprus under nominal authority of -Turkey. To be perfectly fair we must admit that there is little moral -difference between her acquisition of Cyprus and Austria’s gain in -Bosnia and Herzegovina; and it is clear that in this case the Concert -of Europe was a concert for the gain of selfish ends. It is also worth -while to note that two of the Great Powers took no benefit from the -agreement. France was slowly recovering from the war of 1870-1871 -and was in no condition to fight, although in 1881 she established -a protectorate over Tunis. The German Empire, newly founded and not -yet fully adapted to the imperial system, was also in no condition to -undertake a stiff encounter. There were many Germans who wished that -their government should not allow the other states to get large gains -of territory while Germany got nothing; but they yielded to Bismarck’s -wise policy which held that it was not yet time for Germany to assume -an aggressive position in the world. The impatience of the German -patriots lost nothing through having to wait. - -No treaty ends the march of time, and the Balkan situation continued -to develop along the old lines. In 1881 Greece acquired Thessaly in -accordance with a promise made to her at the Congress of Berlin. In -1885 East Rumelia declared herself united to Bulgaria, acting in -defiance of the will of the Congress of Berlin. The Powers did not -interfere for the same reason that they did not act when Wallachia -and Moldavia united in 1862. To attempt to undo the union would have -precipitated a general war. The Concert was stronger to prevent a given -action than to correct it after it was done. Serbia, however, took -the action of the two provinces as a menace and declared war against -the new state of Bulgaria. She seemed about to throw herself on her -adversary when she suddenly made peace, evidently feeling she was not -strong enough to carry on the war alone. - -Thenceforth the Powers showed that they did not mean to allow the -Balkan states to profit by seizing parts of the decaying Turkish -Empire. But for their restraint it seems that the Turk would have been -expelled from Europe before the end of the nineteenth century. - -Their intention was clearly manifested in regard to the island of -Crete, whose population long suffered from Turkish oppression. In -1896 the island was in revolt and the sultan was forced to promise -reforms. The assurance proved empty and in 1897 Greece interfered in -behalf of Crete. In the war that followed the Greeks fought heroically -but alone and were no match for Turkey in operations on land. They -made peace without success, but through the instrumentality of the -Great Powers the sultan agreed to allow Crete self-government under -an elected assembly. The powers let it be known that they would not -have the island annexed to Greece, which they did not mean to make a -preponderating influence in the Balkans. Now appeared a great Cretan -leader, Eleutherios Venezelos, whom his admirers call the Cavour of -Greece. Under his influence the Cretan assembly voted the union of the -island with Greece in 1905, but again the Powers interposed, insisting -that the sovereignty of the sultan should not be abrogated. However, -they permitted the Greek king to appoint a representative to rule the -island as a Turkish fief, and Greek officers were allowed to train the -Cretan soldiers and police. At last the Balkan war (1912-1913) brought -the completion of union, the Great Powers yielding their assent. - -The explanation of the conduct of the Powers in this incident is to be -found in the delicate nature of the whole Balkan question. With Austria -and Russia keenly aroused and each of the Balkan states anxiously -looking for the moment when the rest of the sultan’s territory in -Europe was to be divided between them, it was evident that a little -thing could precipitate a serious conflict. It was in view of this -phase of the situation that the Balkans were called “the tinder-box of -Europe.” - -It will be observed that while these things happened the Balkan states -were developing steadily in national resources and spirit. Greece, -Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania became vitally organized powers, it -became more and more evident that they were no longer mere pawns in the -diplomatic game, and the time was fast approaching when they would wish -to take parts on their own initiative. So assertive were they becoming -that it was certain that the time would soon come when the Great Powers -would tire of the process of holding conferences to keep these states -out of trouble. It is not an easy task to serve as custodian for a -“tinder-box.” - -A fair warning of this kind of danger occurred in 1908. For -twenty-three years Bulgaria had remained undisturbed, giving herself -to a rapid process of educational and industrial development, in both -of which lines she had come under the influence of German methods. -Suddenly she threw off her nominal Turkish sovereignty and declared -herself an entirely independent state. At the same time, and evidently -by agreement with the German Empire, Austria-Hungary announced that -she would hold Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral part of her empire, -thus superseding the “occupation” that was authorized by the congress -of Berlin, in 1878. Serbia took the matter as a great injury, but she -could do nothing alone. Her natural ally was Russia, then recovering -from the severe losses of the war against Japan. Had the tsar been -ready for war it is doubtful if he would have drawn the sword in this -instance; for a world war would have resulted, and the nations were -not yet ready to think of such an undertaking. But Serbia nursed her -wrongs and to Russia the sense of her shame grew as she thought how her -weakness had been flaunted in the face of the world. The day came when -the fire could no longer be smothered. - -To understand Serbia’s feelings we must recall the national ideal by -which her hopes had been formed for many years. Most of the people -of Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Novi-Bazar, and the northwestern -corner of Macedonia were Serbs by blood. To unite them into a great -Serbia had long been spoken of in Serbia as the “Great Idea.” When, -therefore, Austria took definite possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina the -“Great Idea” seemed defeated forever. Rage and despair possessed the -Serbs wherever they lived, patriotic societies voiced the feeling of -the people, and vengeance was plotted. Probably it was the feeling that -this wide-spread hatred should be uprooted in the most thorough manner -that prompted Austria to make the heavy conditions that were demanded -as atonement for the crime of Sarajevo. - -After Austria took the fateful step of 1908 Turkey still held the -territory just north of the Bosphorus, organized as the province of -Adrianople. She also had in Europe the provinces of Macedonia, Albania, -and the sanjak of Novi-Bazar. To drive her out of these possessions -was the object of the Balkan states. In 1911 Italy began a war against -the sultan to gain Tripoli. The Balkan States seeing their enemy -embarrassed, concluded that the hour of fate had come. They formed the -Balkan League, made up of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, and -made ready for war. Their action alarmed the Great Powers, who brought -the Concert of Europe to bear against the League. They gave the allies -fair notice that they would not permit them to take any of the sultan’s -territory in Europe, even though a war was won against him. The reply -to this threat shows how weak the Concert had become. It was voiced by -Montenegro, the smallest of the states, whose king immediately declared -war and called on his allies to aid him in driving the pagan out of -Europe. The call was accepted gladly and an ultimatum was sent to the -sultan, who, relying on the promise of the Powers, defied his opponents. - -In the war that followed Turkey was confronted by a united army of -nearly a million men. It was impossible to withstand them and in two -months most of Macedonia was lost, Constantinople was threatened, -and Turkey asked for an armistice. Negotiations began in London, the -Powers seemingly forgetting their empty threat that they “would not -permit at the end of the conflict any modification of the territorial -_status quo_ in European Turkey.” The allies demanded hard terms which -seemed about to be accepted by Turkey when by a _coup d’état_ the -“Young Turks,” a patriotic party of reformers, got possession of the -government at Constantinople and resumed the fighting. Although they -fought well, they could not withstand the large numbers that were -against them. Janina fell to the Greeks, Adrianople was taken by a -Serbo-Bulgarian force, and Scutari was taken by the Montenegrins. The -Turks now yielded definitely and negotiations for peace were resumed. - -Behind the diplomatic proceedings was the following interesting -situation: Austria-Hungary was dismayed at the prospect of having a -strong and permanent league organized in the Balkans; for it would -probably make it impossible for her to realize her desire to extend -her territory in that direction. She was especially unwilling to allow -Serbia and Montenegro to hold the conquered shore of the Adriatic, -since it was here that she designed to gain additional outlets to the -seas. Italy at the same time was alarmed at the extension of Serbian -power, since she, also, did not relish the prospect of having a -strong state on the eastern side of the sea. It was with unexpected -short-sightedness, however, that she was willing to block Serbia in -order to promote the schemes of Austria, a far more formidable rival -in that quarter, if she were ever firmly established there. Both -states, therefore, appeared at London to limit the expansion of Serbia, -and Germany supported them, seemingly on the principle that she was -merely standing by the members of the Triple Alliance. It has been -supposed that she expected that Ferdinand, heir-apparent of Austria, -when he came to rule, would promote a vital union of the two great -Mid-Continental empires. If we accept this theory, we must conclude -that she had a still more vital reason for wishing Austria to have a -large Adriatic coast-line, with important commercial harbors. - -These considerations ran exactly counter to Serbia’s hopes in Albania. -She had already occupied the Albanian port of Durazzo and expected to -make it the center of a fair commercial life. When ordered to withdraw -she did not dare refuse; but it was a great humiliation to her to cut -off the possibility of her future growth. For a second time Austria had -given her a vital blow, and there was another wrong to be remembered -by those Serbians who were inclined to remember. By the decree of the -Powers Albania was made an autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty, -and later on a German prince was appointed to rule it. - -While these affairs were being discussed Montenegro besieged Scutari, -in northern Albania and continued operation until the place was -taken, notwithstanding the purpose of the Powers was well known. -Her courageous conduct won the admiration of lovers of brave men -everywhere. Eight days after the capture of Scutari, Austria announced -that she would enter the war if the place was not evacuated, and Italy -and Germany declared they would support her. Throughout all Slavic -countries arose a cry of indignation. In Russia especially it was loud -and bitter; and it seemed that a great war was about to begin when -King Nicholas, of Montenegro, gave the world the assurance of peace by -withdrawing his army from Scutari. - -Then came that unhappy turn of affairs by which the Balkan League was -dissolved and the hope disappeared that a strong power would arise -which would take the Near East out of the position of pawn for the -greed of the Great Powers. Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria had made an -ante-bellum agreement for the disposal of the territory they would take -from Turkey, and the first was to have a large part of Albania. Denied -this region she asked her allies to make a new allotment. Bulgaria -raised strong objection, since the new demand, if granted, would mean -that her gains would be smaller than was first agreed. Angry speeches -led to war, and after a sharp struggle Bulgaria was beaten and forced -to make peace without honor. While they were locked in the conflict -Turkey seized the opportunity to recover Adrianople, and eventually -held it. It illustrates the sordid nature of some of the Balkan states -that Rumania entered this war for purely predatory purposes. She had -remained neutral during the common effort to drive the Turk out; but -now that Bulgaria was marching to sure defeat she came into the battle -against her, and at the end of the war she demanded and was given a -large part of Bulgarian territory. The “July War,” as this stage of -the Balkan conflict is called, left the allies filled with bitter -hatred for one another, and Bulgaria, weakened as she was, felt little -inclined to lean on any of her immediate neighbors. She was ripe for -the reception of Teutonic offers of friendship, and the result was soon -seen of all men. - -I have thus followed the complex story of the Balkan States to the -year 1913. Through a century of war and intrigue Serbia, Bulgaria, -Rumania, Greece, and the small state of Montenegro had emerged from the -Christian lands over which the Turks had ruled. Russia and Austria had -taken small portions of those lands and had definite plans to secure -influence over larger portions. In the Balkans Russian prestige was -great, but if a state feared it she was apt to look to Austria, or to -Germany--which was the same thing--as a means of balancing against -Russia. At the same time it was known that Russia was planning to -construct strategic lines of railroad leading to the Black Sea along -the western border of her empire, and this was considered an ominous -sign for the future. Altogether, the “tinder-box” was ready for -ignition. - -As to Turkey, her fortunes shrank steadily. At the end of the Balkan -War she retained only 1,900,000 subjects in Europe, inhabitants of -the district around Adrianople. She was becoming a distinctly Asiatic -power, and the sultan must have felt that his hold on Constantinople -was precarious. At the same time, as we shall see later on, Great -Britain had secured a foothold on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and -Russia was extending her influence in Persia, two threats from the -eastward. Any far sighted Turk could see that his country was in danger -of being crushed in a vise of foreign aggression. To which of the great -states should Turkey turn for that protection which had long been her -safety? Not to Russia, whose ambition was for Constantinople itself, -nor to Great Britain, who seemed to desire the Euphrates Valley, and -who was safely established in Egypt. In her extremity she listened to -the suggestions of German wooers, who promised industrial development, -railroads, and financial aid. Here was laid the foundation of -Turko-German sympathy which was to be very important in the Great War. - -After a calamity has occurred it is easy to point out the course by -which it might have been avoided. It seems certain that if we stood -again where the world stood in 1914 we should not do what we did in -1914. So we can see in what respects the events of the Balkan history -went wrong. But the men who settled the crises of the past were not -able to see what we see. They had the same blindness for the future -that we have for that which lies before us now. They fumbled their -problems as most men fumble problems, as we shall, perhaps, go on -fumbling until the end of time. It is asking much to expect that -statesmen shall be as wise as we who review their deeds. - -But there are great facts in history which it is possible to know and -use with profit. One of them is the incompetency of the principle -of the Concert of Europe to deal with a situation like that we have -reviewed in the Balkans. Concert predicates a group of satisfied great -states, without over-reaching ambitions, who are willing to unite -their efforts to restrain small states, or even one large state, from -a course which shall force the rest of the world into conflict. When -a group of great states have united to carry out a certain policy, -and another tries to restrain the first group, concert is in great -danger of breaking down. That was the situation in the Balkans. These -states were drawn into the whirl of general European politics, and they -intensified its velocity at one particular corner, so that what may -be contemplated as a harmonious rotary movement broke into a twisting -tornado. If, when the present war is over, the nations of the world -undertake to go on under the old system, trusting to concert as the -means of avoiding war, there is no reason to expect that the future -will be less turbulent than the past. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION - - -When wars begin between nations we usually see the leaders of thought -on each side busy developing distrust among their own citizens for the -people against whom they are fighting. In accordance with this fact, -the people of the United States have read a great deal since August, -1914, to make them think very unkindly of Germany. - -This chapter is not a plea for the Germans, and I agree that they did -unnecessarily cruel and impossible things in Belgium. It is not to be -denied that they played a most unwise part in the war game, when they -tried to steal a march on France by invading through Belgium, a thing -they were pledged not to do. It pays to keep faith; and when a nation -does not keep faith other nations have no recourse but to treat it as -if it were a pirate. If they do otherwise, the whole game will become -a pirate’s game, and good faith will disappear from international -relations. If Germany may violate Belgium at will, why may she not -violate Switzerland, Holland, or any other state that stands in her -way; and who would not expect her to do it, if no powers faced her that -were willing and able to dispute her will? - -It is not improbable that German leaders understood this as well as we -who now pass it under review. They must have made their calculations on -arousing the opposition of the world and proceeded with the expectation -that they would gain so much by their sweep through forbidden Belgium -that they could defy the world. And if things had gone well for them, -the calculation would have been well made. For if Germany had carried -France off her feet and placed her in a position to offer no further -menace during the next ten years, and if she had dealt a similar blow -to Russia, what power could have checked her in the future decade? By -glancing at the situation in Europe today we may see how an intrenched -Germany defies the united and unwhipped world. How much more might she -not have had her way, if the thrust through Belgium had succeeded! - -Let us suppose that the game of bad faith had proved successful as -planned, what would have been the result? Probably Great Britain would -have wakened slowly to her peril, but her position was such that she -could have done nothing. Her fleet would have been useless against an -enemy that rules on land. Her army could not have met the combined -Teutonic armies, and she would have had no allies. Meanwhile, Germany -and Austria at their leisure could have digested the Balkans and -drawing Turkey into their net could have established a “Mittel-Europa” -that would have left the rest of the world at their mercy. These were -alluring stakes to play for, and it is not hard to see how a nation -whose leaders have thrown aside the homely motto that “Righteousness -exalteth a nation” would be willing to take a chance in order to obtain -them. - -When we think of such things as these we are in danger of concluding -that they represent the real Germany. We look back to that Germany of -the past which we saw in our youth, whose music we have heard all our -lives, whose Goethe we have read, whose scholarship we have built upon, -and whose toys have amused us and our children through many decades -and ask ourselves whether or not we were mistaken in our ideas of -Germany. Are there two Germanies, and if so, which is the true Germany? -Probably the answer is that each is the real Germany manifesting -herself in different moods. Fundamentally we have an intense and -emotional people, swayed in one instance by artistic emotions, in -another by the love of exact research for facts, in another by the -feeling of domesticity, and in still another by the powerful impulse -of a great national egoism. They are a people who can love much, -hate much, play much, sacrifice much, and serve well when called -into service. In their war-maddened mood they have stained a fair -reputation, and they are now trying to think that the stain will not -matter if they can only fight through to victory. But nations are like -men in this that however successful one may become personally he never -gets to be so great that he can afford to carry a tarnished reputation. - -Let us turn to the Germany of old and see if we cannot observe the -process by which she came to her present state of mind. While I realize -that it is absolutely necessary for the world to crush her attempt -to rule Europe, I cannot find it in my heart to hate her. She has -risen to such a state of efficiency in social organization and in the -capacity to spread the light of civilization that she commands respect -from thinking foes. It is the duty of the world to chasten the spirit -of arrogance out of her, but to leave her sound and able to deal with -the future in that way in which she is so well fitted to play a strong -and beneficial part. If ever a great people needed the discipline of -disaster to teach them that nations, like men, should do to others as -they wish others to do to them, that nation is the Germany of today. To -understand in what way this splendid state has run away from its past -we shall have to glance at its history in the recent past. - -For a point of departure let us take the Seven Years’ War. This -struggle was the result of the ambition of young Frederick, a strong -and unethical king of Prussia. When he came to the throne he found -that a parsimonious father had left him a full treasury, an excellent -army, and a united kingdom, while fate had sent the neighboring state -Austria, a young woman for ruler and an army that was not formidable. -It was a favorable opportunity to seize Silesia, which Prussia -considered necessary to her welfare, and to which she had the flimsiest -pretense of right. The rapacity of Frederick, her king, cannot be -justified on moral grounds, and it threw Europe into commotions for -which nearly a quarter of a century was needed for settlement. The last -phase of this quarter-of-a-century was the Seven Years’ War, 1756-1763. -By the time it began Frederick of Prussia was looked upon by his -neighbors as a menace to Europe; and Austria, France, and Russia united -to crush him. He had a friend in Great Britain, who was generally found -among the foes of France. In the great war he waged through seven years -he fought off foes first on one side and then on the other until the -war ended at last with Prussia still unconquered. - -If hard and valiant fighting and solicitude for the welfare of his -country could redeem the error of the invasion of Silesia the Seven -Years’ War would relieve Frederick, whom posterity calls “Frederick -the Great,” of all odium on account of the thoughtless way in which -he began his wars. Unlike the present kaiser, he began a long reign -rashly and ended it wisely. Administrative reforms and a policy of -peace with his neighbors made his last years a period of happiness for -Prussia. - -But Silesia fixed a firm hold on the Prussian imagination. Long -justified as an act necessary to the safety of the Fatherland, and -therefore permissible, it has given sanction for the idea that wrong -may be done that good shall result, if only the state is to be -benefitted. It is a false doctrine, and it can do nothing but lead to -wars. Nations are under the same obligations to do right as individuals. - -The next phase of German history which has interest for us in -connection with this study is that which lies between the years 1806 -and 1813. It was a period of deep humiliation at the hands of Napoleon. -The small states were huddled together in a Confederation which was, in -fact, a tool of the Emperor of France, and Prussia lay like a trembling -and crushed thing in his hand. No living man who hates Germany for the -deeds of the present war could wish her a worse fate than Napoleon -inflicted on her after the battle of Jena in 1806. He insulted the -king, burdened the people with requisitions, and limited their armies. -It was the acme of national shame for the nation that is now so strong. - -The cause of these woes was the lack of organization, and perhaps -Napoleon did the nation a service when he beat the Prussians into a -realization of it. No nation is so poor that it has not reformers who -see in what way its evils may be corrected. In the days that preceded -the calamities of which I speak Prussia had her prophets crying to deaf -men. Misfortune opened the ears of the rulers so that the prophets -might be heard. Reforms were adopted out of which has grown the Germany -of today. They all looked toward the unification of national energy, -whatever its form; but they are expressed in three notable ways: -universal military service, the correction of waste energy in civil -life, and the inculcation of the spirit of obedience to authority. On -these principles chiefly a new Germany was built. - -We have said a great deal recently about crushing the German military -system. Probably we do not know just what we mean in saying this. At -least, it was not always our habit to decry the system. Many a time we -have spoken with admiration of the reforms of Scharnhorst, of the glory -of Leipzig and of the services of Blücher at Waterloo. If we stop to -think we shall see that our real objection is the purpose for which the -German military system has been used. And it seems that if it is to be -broken into pieces it must be opposed with a stronger system built on a -similar plan. - -The next period that expresses Germany’s peculiar spirit is the era of -Bismarck, 1862 to 1890. It was the time of the cult of iron. Bismarck -was the “Iron Chancellor,” the nation offered its enemies “blood and -iron.” Iron cannon, iron words, and iron laws became the ideals of the -people. Statesmen, historians, poets, editors, professors, and all -other patriots began to worship according to the rite of the new cult. -And iron entered into the blood of the Germans. - -To carry out Bismarck’s policy it was necessary to break down a -promising liberal movement that seemed on the point of giving Prussia -responsible government. It was his faith that a united Germany must -hew her way into the position of great power in Europe, and in order -to have a state that could do this there must be a strong central -authority, able to direct all the resources of the state to the -desired end. The large number of small nobles had long ago formed the -celebrated Junker autocracy, a body with like ideals. He gave their -restless energy a more definite political and military object, and made -them take places as parts of his great state machine. - -He had his reward. In 1866 he fought a decisive war against Prussia’s -old enemy, Austria, and won it so quickly that even the Prussians were -astonished. In 1870-1871 he threw the state against France in a war -that left the land of Napoleon as completely at his feet as Prussia had -been at the feet of the Corsican. And then in the moment of exultation -over the victory he founded the German empire by uniting with Prussia -the numerous smaller German states. There is much to support the -suggestion that a similar stroke is held in reserve to create a -Mittel-Europa of Germany and Austria-Hungary as a final glory of the -present war, if Germany shows herself able to carry off the victory. - -Bismarck’s ambition for Germany was to hold a position of arbiter in -Continental affairs. He felt that this was the best way to make his -country safe from hostile combinations, and it met his ideal of the -dignity to which Germany ought to attain. He achieved his desire in -the Three Emperors’ League and the Triple Alliance. Predominance in -influence was the height of his ambition. The conquest of new lands, -and the support of industry and trade by a policy of territorial -expansion, were not within his plans. He was a man of an older -generation to whom a predominance among the Great Powers was better -than chasing the rainbow of world empire. - -In 1888 died Wilhelm I, the king whom Bismarck made Emperor. He was -an honest man who loved the simple and sound Germany in which he -was reared. At this time the leading men of 1871 were passing from -power and a group was coming on the scene who were young men in the -intoxicating times of Sedan and Metz. A new emperor came to the throne, -possessing great energy and the capacity of forming vast plans. He was -eleven years old when the empire was proclaimed at Versailles, the age -at which ordinary boys begin to wake from the dreams of childhood. -From such dreams Wilhelm II passed to dreams of imperial glory. The -idea of bigness of authority that he thus formed has remained with him -to this day. Add the effects of an impulsive disposition and an unusual -amount of confidence in himself and you will account for the peculiar -gloss spread over a character that is strong and otherwise wholesome. - -Early in his reign he gave ground for alarm by several acts that are -hardly to be described in a less severe word than “bumptious.” He -dismissed Bismarck from the Chancellorship, seemingly for no other -reason than that he wished a chancellor who would be more obedient to -the imperial will, and he uttered many sentiments which caused sober -men to wonder what kind of emperor he was going to be. But as the years -passed it was noticed that all his aberrations fell short of disaster, -and as he was very energetic and devoted to efficiency in civil and -military matters the world came at last to regard him with real esteem. - -When the present war began the kaiser became its leader, as was his -duty and privilege. Opinion in hostile countries pronounced him the -agent responsible for its outbreak. Around his striking personality -have collected many stories of dark complexion. At this time it is not -possible to test their accuracy, but it is safe to say that many of -them are chiefly assumption. On the other hand, it is undoubted that he -is now a firm friend of the military party, and that he supports the -autocracy in its purpose to carry the war to the bitter end. He has -been a diligent war lord and he has shown a willingness to share the -sacrifices of the people. Stories of apparent reliability that have -come out of Germany in recent months imply that he has steadily gained -in popularity during the conflict, while most of the other members of -his family have lost. - -If it is important to clear thinking to see the kaiser in an impartial -light, it is equally necessary to understand the German _Kultur_. This -term is used in Germany to indicate the mass of ideas and habits of -thought of a people. It applies to art and industry, to religion and -war, to whatever the human mind directs. From the German’s standpoint -we have a _Kultur_ of our own. We have no corresponding term, nor -concept, and we cannot realize all he means in using the term if we do -not put ourselves in his place. Now it is true that the German has won -great success in intellectual ways. Scholarship, scientific invention, -the application of art to industry, and well planned efficiency in -social organization are his in a large degree. He is proud of his -achievements; and when the war began he felt that it was the German -mission to give this _Kultur_ to other peoples. From his standpoint, a -Germanized world would be a world made happy. It was an honest opinion, -and it went far to support his desire for expansion. - -The Germans are a docile people with respect to their superiors, -and this trait is a condition of their _Kultur_. It is traditional -in Germany for the peasant to obey his lord, the lord to obey his -over-lord, and the over-lord to obey his ruler. To the kaiser look -all the people in a sense which no citizen of the United States can -understand without using a fair amount of imagination. The lords and -over-lords constitute the _Junkers_, who in the modern military system -make up the officer class. A high sense of authority runs through the -whole population, the upper classes knowing how to give orders and the -lower classes knowing how to take them. - -Before the battle of Jena, 1806, the Prussian army was made up of -peasants forced to serve under the nobles, who took the offices. -Townsmen were excluded from the army. The peasant’s forced service -lasted twenty years. The system was as inefficient as it was unequal, -and a commission was appointed to reform it. The result was the modern -system of universal service, put into complete operation in 1813. After -a hundred years it is possible to see some of the effects of the system -on the ideals of the people. It has taught them to work together in -their places, formed habits of promptness and cleanliness, and lessened -the provincialism of the lower classes. It has been a great training -school in nationalism, preserving the love of country and instilling in -the minds of the masses a warm devotion to the military traditions of -the nation. - -It has also produced results of a questionable value. By fostering -the military spirit it has developed a desire for war, on the same -principle that a boy in possession of a sharp hatchet has a strong -impulse to hack away at his neighbor’s shrubbery. It is probable -that the temptation to use a great and superior army was a vital fact -in bringing on the present war. Furthermore, the wide-spread habit -of docility leaves a people without self-assertion and enables their -rulers to impose upon them. As to the influence of universal service in -promoting militarism, that has been frequently mentioned. - -On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that not all states that -have had universal military training have been saddled with these -evils. France, for example, has had universal training without becoming -obsessed with the passion for war and without the loss of popular -individualism. It seems well to say that universal training itself does -not produce the evils sometimes attributed to it. In Germany, at least, -it seems that it was the purpose for which the army existed, and not -the army itself, that developed militarism and brought other unhappy -effects. - -Probably the German army before the war was the most efficient great -human machine then in existence. There was less waste in it and less -graft than in any other army. Since the army included all the men of -the empire at some stage or other of their existence, it was a great -training school in organization. Its effects on German history are -hardly to be exaggerated. - -I have said that military organization alone was not sufficient to make -the modern Germany. It was also necessary to give the nation a definite -national purpose, and this was the task of its intellectual leaders. -The purpose itself was expressed in the idea of German nationality. -By a bold stretch of fancy every part of Europe that had once been -ruled by Germans, that spoke the German language, or that could be -considered as a part that ought to speak that language was fixed upon -as territory to be brought within the authority of the Fatherland. -It was in accordance with this principle that Schleswig-Holstein was -taken from Denmark in 1864 and Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Here the -march of annexation paused. Bismarck was too wise to carry the theory -to an extreme; but a growing number of writers and speakers in the -empire took up the idea and kept it before the people with winning -persistence. It is thus that Pan-Germanism has come to be one of the -great facts in German public opinion. By preaching race unity with -patriotic zeal the intellectual leaders have established a powerful -propaganda of expansion. - -Of the men most prominently associated with this movement especial -attention must be given to Heinrich von Treitschke, for years professor -of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Berlin, whose -remarkable influence reached all classes of people. He was a handsome -man with an open face that invited admiration without appearing to -care whether it was given or not. When he spoke the auditor heard “a -raucous, half-strangled, uneasy voice” and noticed that his movements -were mechanical and his utterances were without regard to the pauses -that usually stand for commas and periods, while his pleasant facial -expression had no apparent relation to what he was saying. The -explanation was that he was so deaf that he did not hear himself speak. -That such a speaker could fire the heart of a nation is evidence that -he was filled with unusual earnestness and sympathy. - -He had great love of country, and if he exalted royalty and strong -government it was because he thought that Germany would reach her -highest authority through them. It was no selfish or incompetent king -that he worshiped, but one that lived righteously and sought diligently -to promote the interest of the people. He held that the nobility should -serve as thoroughly as the common men. Strong government in his idea -did not mean privilege, as ordinarily understood, but vital energy in -all the organs of administration, efficiently directed by a will that -was not hampered by the contrarywise tugging of individual opinions. - -Treitschke’s penetrating eloquence was heard throughout the land. -Editors, preachers of religion, schoolmasters, authors, members of -the legislative assemblies, high officials, and even ministers of -state came to his class-room and went away to carry his ideas into -other channels. He inspired the men who did the actual thinking for -the nation. All his efforts were expended for what he considered the -enhancement of Germany’s position among nations. - -In giving him his due we must not overlook his faults. He was narrow -in his ideas of international relations. His exaltation of Germany -would have left other nations at her mercy. He seems to have had small -respect for the principle of live-and-let-live among states. As much as -any one in his country he was responsible for the idea that the British -are a pack of hypocrites, offering inferior races the Bible with one -hand and opium with the other. That they had not a good record with -respect to the opium trade is true, but it was sheer narrowness to make -it the chief characteristic of a people who have done a great work in -behalf of the backward races. - -Although Treitschke wrote many pamphlets on topics of current interest, -all bearing upon what he considered the destiny of Germany, he was -preëminently a historian. It was by telling the story of Germany since -the revival of national feeling after the battle of Jena that he wished -to serve best the generation in which he lived. For him it was the -historian to whom was committed the task of making the citizen realize -what place he had in the nation’s complex of duties and hopes. - -He came upon the scene when history had become fixed upon the basis of -accuracy and detached research. Men like Leopold von Ranke had insisted -that history should deal with the cold exploitation of universal laws. -For them Treitschke was a bad historian, and they used their influence -to prevent his appointment at the University of Berlin. He was a -Chauvinist, undoubtedly, and his _History of Germany in the Nineteenth -Century_ is a highly colored picture of what he conceived the reader -should know about the history of his country. It is a work written to -arouse the enthusiasm of the people for their country, rather than -to instruct them in the universal laws of human development; and it -would be a sad day for the world if all history were written as he -wrote this. But it was a powerful appeal to national pride and energy. -It played a great part in the formation of the Germany with which -we are concerned in this chapter, the striving, self-confident, and -aspiring empire that set for itself the task of dominating the European -continent. - -This chapter is not written to reconcile American readers to the German -side of the controversy that now engages the attention of all men. I -wish to enable the reader to have a clear view of the people with whom -we fight. It is they with whom we must deal in building up the system -out of which the future is to be constructed again; and we shall not -know how to deal with them if we do not see their point of view and -know what they are thinking about. - -If in some of their ideals they are superior to other peoples, and if -their organization of individuals into the state has some elements -of strength not found in other systems, it is not for us to seek to -destroy the advantage they have won. It would be better for us to adopt -their good points, in order that we might the more surely defeat them -on the field of battle. Having won the victory we desire, we should -certainly not seek to destroy that which we cannot replace. Live and -let live, a principle which Germans have ignored in some important -respects, must be recognized after the military ambition of Germany is -broken, if we are to have an enduring peace. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE FAILURE OF THE OLD EUROPEAN SYSTEM - - -Much has been written to prove that one side or the other was -responsible for the present war. Minute facts, as the words in a -dispatch, or the time at which the troops were mobilized, or whether -or not a preliminary summons of troops to the colors was in itself an -act of mobilization, have become the subjects of bitter debate. Such -questions will have to be settled by the historians of the future -years: they cannot be discussed here with any profit, since this book -is an appeal to the reason of men on each side of the controversy. - -Back of the events of July, 1914, is a more fundamental cause of the -war. It is the breakdown of the systems of concert and balance to -which the powers had trusted themselves. Castlereagh and Metternich -allowed themselves to slip into these theories, when they set aside -the suggestion of a federated Europe, which came from Alexander I. -Granted that the tsar’s dream was too ethereal for a world steeped in -selfishness, it does not follow that a policy entirely devoted to the -balancing of selfishness with selfishness would have preserved peace. - -On the other hand, we must admit that nations are not idealists. -Selfishness is their doctrine. So long as the project of a federation -is viewed idealistically it is practically impossible. But if it ever -comes to be admitted by the people who count in political things that -it is for the interests of the nations to adopt it, that is, if it is -brought within what we may call the sphere of selfishness, it ceases to -be idealistic and comes to be a subject worthy of the consideration of -the practical statesman. - -Furthermore, the political philosopher has ever to answer the question, -“What about the future?” What are we going to do after the present -debauch of waste and murder is over? Are we to trust the world to -the same old forces that brought us this ruin? One says that human -nature is the same forever, that it learns only in the hard school of -experience, and that it must fight its wars as the price it pays for -being human nature. To such a man the Napoleonic wars did all that -could be expected of them when they so impressed the world with the -cost of war that a system was adopted which gave the world a measure -of peace for a hundred years. “What more can you ask?” said such a -philosopher to me. In humble responsibility to the throne of reason I -reply that we can try as intelligent beings to remove the war madness -permanently, making it our duty to posterity to do the best we can. -Some generation must make the start, or we shall wring our hands -forever. - -In this chapter I wish to show in what way the old system crumbled -before the desire of world power. It seems a vicious system by virtue -of its innate qualities of selfishness, and it is all the more to be -feared because its subtle spirit gets control of our own hearts as -well as the hearts of other men. While our opponents--Germany and -Austria--were following the system to its bitter conclusion, our -friends--Great Britain, France, and Italy--were doing nearly the -same things, but in a slightly different way. And there is no reason -to expect that under the continuation of the balancing of great and -ambitious world powers we shall have more respect for the rights of -one another than we had in the past. - -The system of Balance of Power flourished best in Bismarck’s time. -It was his strong personality that held together the Three Emperors’ -League for a brief season and the Triple Alliance for a longer period. -Each of these groups had certain interests in common which gave them -coherence: Bismarck alone knew how to exploit these mutual advantages -and lessen the jars of clashing feelings. His objects were made easier -by the fact that most of the other nations of Europe at that time had -developed quarrels of their own. Great Britain and Russia were at -swords’ points over the Far Eastern question, and France and Great -Britain had not forgotten their century old antagonism, which only a -minor dispute was sufficient to set aflame. - -Moreover, Great Britain was engaged in a vast task of empire building. -Manufactures increased rapidly in the United Kingdom, an ever growing -trade threw out ever expanding tentacles to the remotest parts of the -world, and the growth of the colonies produced greater prosperity at -home and abroad than the most hopeful Briton had previously thought -within the bounds of probability. She was too busy with this splendid -process of internal prosperity to take notice of what was happening on -the Continent, so long as her own interests were not threatened. From -her standpoint Bismarck’s policy of preserving peace through the means -of a German predominating influence was a welcome relief from other -burdens. - -This state of affairs was prolonged for at least fifteen years after -the death of Bismarck. Kaiser Wilhelm II’s temperamental impetuousness -did not break up the balance that had been established, although many -prophets had foretold such a thing. As the corner-stone of the Triple -Alliance Germany was looked upon as the protector of European peace, -and the kaiser, it is said, was pleased to regard himself as the man -especially responsible for that policy. - -It is difficult to say when and how this happy situation began to -be undermined and whose was the responsibility. One cause of the -rupture was the rapid growth of German manufactures and trade, which -brought about stern competition between the business interests of -Germany and Great Britain. The newspapers of the two nations, like -all other newspapers of modern times, were closely connected with the -capitalistic interests of the respective states, and voiced the alarm -and antipathy of the industrial classes. Thus the people of Germany -and the people of Britain were stimulated to a condition of mutual -distrust. They believed that each practiced the most disreputable -tricks of competition against the other, and each talked of destroying -the industry of the other. It is difficult to say who is responsible -for the beginning of commercial rivalry. - -Late in the last century Germany began to enlarge her navy with the -evident purpose of making it rival the navy of Great Britain. Her -justification was found in the idea that a navy was necessary to -protect the great commerce that she was building up. At the same time -German writers began to make many criticisms on the British claim of -being mistress of the seas. “Freedom of the seas” became a phrase of -comfort in their mouths. It is not clear that it meant what it seemed -to say; for the seas were as free to the Germans in times of peace as -to any other people, and Germany’s plan to build a great fleet that -would defeat the British fleet would establish that same kind of rule -at sea that Great Britain through her naval superiority then held. - -Now it is very certain that Germany had a perfect right to enter each -of these two fields of endeavor. The contests of industry are open to -all, and the laws of peace protect them. She had the right, also, to -build up her navy, although she should not have expected to overtop the -British navy specifically without arousing the hostility of the British -people. The insular position of the United Kingdom and its relations -with its colonies are such that a navy is its surest protection if -assailed in war; and to fall into a second position is to hold its life -at the permission of another state. Germany must have seen this phase -of the situation. Her statesmen were poor leaders of men if they did -not realize that they were entering upon a rivalry in which was the -possibility of great resistance. - -Another phase of the opposition that was steadily rising against -Germany was the general alarm at the growth of her military power. Her -army and navy ever increased in size and readiness for that initial -rush to victory which is half the struggle in modern war. At the same -time German leaders did not disguise their desire for the enlargement -of German territory on the Continent. The Pan-German party made a great -deal of noise, and other nations were not reassured by being told that -the party was not as strong as its agitation seemed to indicate. - -Now and again one read in some German paper an assertion to the effect -that Germany was bound to become the dominant power in Europe and that -she would next turn on the United States. How many Americans have -not heard some over-confident German friend make a prophecy of like -import? It was evident that many Germans regarded the great republic -of the West as an over-fattened commercial nation without the power of -resistance and destined at the proper time to furnish rich nourishment -for their conquering arms. That we considered these thoughts but the -idle boasts of a nation intoxicated by success did not lessen the -conviction of ourselves and others that Germany was running into a -state of mind that required coöperative measures of resistance on the -part of people who might become victims of her infatuation. - -While these two processes of national feeling ran their courses, -several political events, which have already been described added -vigor to the antagonism that was rising against Germany. Her attitude -toward the Boers when they were at war against Great Britain was one, -Delcassé’s wise adjustment of the Fashoda incident was another, his -clever formation of the _Entente Cordiale_ between France and Britain -was another, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was still -another, the defeat of Russia by Japan and her elimination as a threat -against British interests in India was another, and the formation of -the Triple _Entente_ by Great Britain, France, and Russia, announced in -1907, was the final act of the series. Great Britain was not only again -seriously concerned in Continental affairs, but a combination had been -formed of three great European nations, with the strongest power of the -East as a flying buttress, to hold back the much dreaded aggressions -of the Triple Alliance, consisting of Germany, Austria, and Italy. The -Balance of Power had come to its most logical state of development; -for instead of having one great state balancing between the other -states around it, we now had the great states of the world ranged in -two camps, each side checking the other in the belief that in so doing -it was preserving the world from war. - -It is hard to establish a balance when two opposing sides are strong -and mutually jealous of one another; for the opposition of forces is -then formed to secure mutual advantages, and not to promote the common -interest through the preservation of equilibrium. In such a case one -side or the other, possibly each side, is apt to fancy itself the -stronger, and if it acts on that assumption it arouses the apprehension -of the other which finds itself tempted to make a counter stroke. -Once such a step is taken equilibrium is lost. This is what happened -in 1914. The train of events that led up to the destruction of the -international balance is now to be described. - -Here we must go back to the days when Delcassé was foreign secretary -in Paris, 1898-1905. One of his achievements was to come to agreement -with Spain and Italy in reference to the northern coast of Africa. He -effected a treaty with the former nation by which French and Spanish -spheres of influence in Morocco were defined, and another with Italy -by which the right of France in Tunis was accorded in exchange for -recognition of the right of Italy to Tripoli and Cyrenaica. - -Making this treaty by Italy did not constitute treason to the Triple -Alliance, since it was clearly advantageous for Italy without -infringing the rights of either Germany or Austria; but it alarmed -Germany, already drawing close to Turkey, because the object of Italian -policy was to get territory over which Turkey had a vital claim. Nor -was it pleasant for the kaiser to see one of the members of the Triple -Alliance acting in coöperation with the members of the _Entente_ in so -important a matter. - -Taking these achievements in connection with the formation of the Dual -Alliance and the mutual approach of France and Great Britain, Germany -had reason to feel that she was being isolated. Her whole population -resented this turn of events, seeing in it a sort of challenge hurled -forth by France, who at last found herself strong enough to assume -a position of self-assertion. It is true that Delcassé only placed -Germany in a position of isolation like that which Bismarck imposed on -France for many years; and it was, in strict logic, as fair for him -to treat Germany thus as for Bismarck to isolate France. Let Germany -submit to her fate, as France submitted, when she had to submit. But -we are not dealing with logical matters here. It is a plain fact that -confronts us. Germany, who had been strong through three decades -without seeking to expand her territory, suddenly realized that -her opponents were forming a combination stronger than hers, their -acquisition of territory that followed set her in a rage, and she made -plans for getting her share in the world that was to be taken. Under -the system of balance then recognized as the proper means of regulating -international relations her course was a natural result of Delcassé’s -policy. - -The particular portion of the earth to which she turned her eyes was -Turkey. While she supported the plans of Austria-Hungary to acquire -territory on the Adriatic, she herself looked further to the East. She -encouraged the party at Constantinople known as the “Young Turks,” -she furnished improved arms to the Turkish army, she formed plans -to establish her influence in Palestine, and she projected a great -railroad to Bagdad in the center of the Euphrates-Tigris Valley. It was -a sphere of influence that might be considered more than a fair offset -for the lands her rivals were about to gain. - -At the same time Germany found a means of restoring her prestige, which -was sorely wilted by the progress of her rivals. The occasion arose in -connection with France’s occupation of Morocco, which had begun without -the aid or consent of the kaiser. - -Morocco had long been under a line of independent sultans. Most of -her commerce was with Great Britain although German capitalists had -received concessions within her border. As the country next to the -French province of Algeria, France looked upon it as her own particular -sphere of influence. We have already seen that Italy conceded this -claim, 1901, while France conceded Italy’s claim to Tripoli and -Cyrenaica. In 1904 France conceded Great Britain’s practical supremacy -in Egypt and in return was assured the protectorate over Morocco. She -asked no concession from Germany but came to an agreement with Spain, -who had a small strip of territory south of the Straits of Gibraltar. - -In 1905 Delcassé was quietly preparing to carry out his plan for the -development of Morocco, when the kaiser landed in Tangiers without -the slightest warning, and announced in a public address that he had -come to visit his friend, the independent sultan of Morocco, in whose -country all foreign nations had equal rights. The speech was received -by the world as a challenge to France and a means of announcing that -Germany was no longer to be ignored. The moment of the landing at -Tangiers was well chosen by the kaiser; for only three weeks earlier -Russia, the ally of France, had been defeated by the Japanese at Mukden -and could give her no assistance. - -In this unfortunate situation it was necessary for France to bend -before the storm. She agreed to submit the whole Moroccan question -to an international congress, thus appealing to the principle of the -Concert of Europe, and when she learned that the kaiser demanded that -she dismiss the minister whose hands had been played so skillfully -against Germany, she agreed to that also. - -The dismissal of Delcassé recalls an incident of 1807. In that year -Napoleon forced the king of Prussia to dismiss Stein, his great -minister, who was bending all his efforts to reëstablish Prussia on a -war footing. It marked the triumph of Napoleon’s power for the time -being, but it was a futile action; for Stein out of office under such -circumstances had more influence than ever, and the shameful way in -which he was treated only emphasized Prussia’s humiliation and made the -Prussians more determined than ever to assert their national power. -Similar results in France in 1905 followed the stab given to that -nation’s faithful and efficient minister. - -The international congress assembled at Algeciras in 1906. It adopted -a compromise decision, which gave something to each side and satisfied -neither. Germany was supposed to have gained when the congress -recognized the territorial integrity of Morocco under the sovereignty -of the sultan and guaranteed equal rights of trade in the country to -the citizens of all the signatory powers. On the other hand, France -and Spain were jointly to have the right to instruct and furnish -officers for the Moroccan police force. Winning in a quarrel rarely -makes the victor think well of the vanquished. Certainly Germany, -who had now blocked the plans of France, was not less bitter in her -attitude toward that nation; while France, feeling that she had been -caught at a disadvantage, smothered her indignation and waited for the -opportunity to make things even. - -In 1907 disturbances occurred in Moroccan ports and French marines -were landed to preserve order. When they were not withdrawn in a year -Germany protested and an irritating diplomatic discussion followed. At -last Germany was persuaded to submit the point actually at issue to -the Hague tribunal, whose decision was not conclusive and satisfied -neither side. Then a Franco-German convention was held to pass on the -rights of each nation in Morocco. Its decision, given in February, -1909, announced that the interest of Germany in the province was -only economic; and as France agreed to give equal protection in such -matters, the kaiser promised he would not interfere in the country. In -each of these incidents war seemed about to begin, and Europe awaited -the results in great anxiety. When the clouds lifted the nations -breathed freely again. - -Still there was no way under the existing system to solve the -difficulty that presented itself, had Germany only decided that she -would not trust her cause to peaceful negotiation. The fact that she -took such a step was to her own people but a mark of the kaiser’s -love of peace. This and similar incidents, in which the militarists -carried their country to the verge of war only to be held back by the -hand of the emperor served to lay the foundation for that popular -belief in Germany that a peace policy had been steadily followed under -provocations and that Europe was indebted to Wilhelm II for immunity -from war. In reality the system of balance of power had needlessly -brought the world to the verge of a bitter and unnecessary conflict. - -Almost immediately after the war clouds lifted Europe had evidence of -the small amount of tolerance the leading classes of Germany had for -the slightest manifestation of the spirit of compromise in the matter -under discussion. The chancellor under whom the recent settlement was -made was von Bülow, who thought it better to adjust so small a quarrel -than to incur the responsibility of war. His action received the stern -denunciation of the military party. So strong was the criticism that he -was forced to retire from office, his place going to Bethmann-Hollweg, -who had the support of the militarists. The only explanation to be -advanced for this turn of the affair is that the German national spirit -was so much excited by the long agitation of men like Treitschke that a -concession which others might consider only trifling seemed to them a -sacrifice of national honor. - -In 1911 occurred a third Moroccan incident, in which Bethmann-Hollweg -took occasion to recover some of the attitude of assertiveness that -von Bülow had given up in 1909. In pursuance of their plan to extend -their protectorate over Morocco the French occupied Fez with a military -force. A short time later the German warship _Panther_ entered the -Moroccan port of Agadir, ostensibly to protect German property. It was -soon known that the German government proposed to hold the _Panther_ at -Agadir until the French withdrew from Fez. The war spirit again flared -up. Russia still suffered from the wounds received from the hands -of the Japanese, which Germany well knew; but Great Britain was in -fighting condition and announced her support of France. After a short -discussion Germany took a more complaisant attitude, and a settlement -was made whereby the French were allowed a protectorate over Morocco -on condition that they guarantee an “open door” in Moroccan trade and -transfer to Germany two valuable strips of territory in the French -Congo region. - -Again Europe breathed easily, and again wise men reflected that no real -settlement had been made. France had been bluffed out of a valuable -portion of her Congo colony and was not disposed to endure the affront -longer than was necessary. Some day Russia would be fully restored -to her strength and ready to help her ally in the face of German -aggression. Until then France would have to yield. Meanwhile she was -consoled by the reflection that Great Britain had pronounced for her -openly. That was something to take to heart. The great sea power, -though slow to anger, was at last conscious of her danger if Germany -overran France and seized a channel port. - -On the other hand, Germany was not fully pleased at the outcome of -the affair. The appearance of Great Britain in it was an indication -that the _Entente_ was a thing of vitality. Germany had been forced -to moderate her demands, taking colonial territory while her whole -thought for the future was not developing African colonies but curbing -the power of France. Not only was France not checked, but she was much -strengthened in a vital part of her power. She had acquired lands in -just the region that she needed them to carry out her ambition to -control the western end of the Mediterranean. If some day Spain were to -become a republic, could she fail to establish cordial relations with -the republic of France, and thus be swept into the anti-German group? -It may well be that in these reflections were born two German impulses: -first to win Great Britain to some kind of a compromise with Germany, -detaching her, at least for a time, from the _Entente_; and second, to -strike a vital blow before Russia was entirely recovered. Within the -next three years she acted on each of these impulses. - -At the same time it became evident that the Triple Alliance was -crumbling, and this was another source of anxiety to Germany. It meant -that she should hasten her steps if she was to carry forward her great -purpose. It was in September, 1911, while the Agadir incident was still -unsettled, that Italy began the war with Turkey to establish control -of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In view of Germany’s well-known friendliness -with Turkey, this step was most unexpected. It could only mean that -Italy was not disposed to subordinate her own interests to those of -Germany at Constantinople. If she had not felt certain of support by -the _Entente_ powers, in case Germany turned on her, she would hardly -have ventured to begin the war. - -Another advance made by _Entente_ powers within the period under -consideration was in Persia. This ancient state was in sad disorder. -Weak and unpatriotic shahs, bold bands of brigands, and foreign -intrigues plunged it into such a condition that it invited the -domination of foreign nations. Russia approached from the north, and -Great Britain appeared in the south, where rich oil fields had caught -her eye. - -After some initial gains the two powers came to an agreement in 1907 -by which they established their respective spheres of influence, so -that Persia was occupied at the two ends, north and south, by strong -powers, and the middle portion was in such a chaotic state that its -future seemed very doubtful. By making loans to the shah and furnishing -capital for public improvements British and Russian capitalists enabled -their respective countries to tighten their grips on Persia. Soon that -country was in the throes of revolution, a so-called Nationalist party -came into power which was not able to rule without the aid of Russia -and Great Britain. So far did the foreign influence go that Morgan W. -Shuster, an American financial adviser of the shah who had tried hard -to place the government on a satisfactory basis, was fain to withdraw -from Persia in despair. To the rest of the world it seemed that the -independence of the country was near its end. - -A mere glance will show us what these developments meant for Germany -and Austria-Hungary. Remembering that Italy was acting with the -_Entente_ in her African policy, we see that the entire southern shore -of the Mediterranean was passing into hands adverse to the central -powers, and that the new combination stretched out a long arm to the -Persian Gulf and the region south of the Caspian. In view of Germany’s -hope that she would some day gain through Syria a railway route to the -Far East, the trend of things in Persia threatened to close the narrow -gap that was left her for such a route by completing the absorption -of the kingdom of the shah. Should she allow the gap to be stopped, -or should she strike while there was still time? And if she did not -strike, what was there in the system of the Balance of Power that could -be counted on as a guarantee that she was not a passive victim to the -play of politics in the system then in use? - -Furthermore, it was evident that Germany’s prestige was being -undermined by the progressive steps of her rivals. Three times had -she rattled the saber over the Moroccan incidents, and each time with -decreasing terror in the minds of her opponents. Perhaps its rattling -had been one of the main facts in promoting the union of those -opponents, since it always brought before them the picture of Germany -embattled against the rest of Europe. To strike a blow that would teach -France and Russia a lesson would restore German prestige and bring the -balance back to the German side of the rivalry, if it did not do more. - -There is good ground for the guess that it was expected in high -quarters in Berlin that the blow would do far more than restore -prestige. It is true that the plan to which I am about to refer has not -been openly accepted by responsible agents of state, but it was widely -advocated by a portion of the people, the Pan-Germans. It involved the -union of Austria-Hungary and Germany in a great state, Mittel-Europa, -with strong influence in the Near East. Treitschke and many others had -written and spoken for such a thing, and to a large number of Germans -it had become a sacred ideal. When some one spoke to the deaf Colussus -about the acquisition of territory in Africa he exclaimed: “Cameroons? -What are we to do with this sand-box? Let us take Holland; then we -shall have colonies.” It was a part of the dream of the Pan-Germans -that the proposed Mittel-Europa should extend from the Baltic to the -Black Sea. If such a thing could be carried through, how excellent a -trump card to play against the _Entente_ plotters! - -Francis Joseph, of Austria-Hungary, was too stout a patriot to hand his -country over to the schemes of the Pan-Germans, but he was approaching -an already long deferred demise. The heir-apparent, Ferdinand, was -supposed to be a great admirer of the kaiser, and the advocates of -union had high hopes that he would promote their desires. Suddenly -came the crime of Sarajevo. In a peculiar manner it dashed the hopes -of the dreamers; for not only was their chief reliance taken away, -but the new heir-apparent was supposed to be a pacific man who would -favor constitutional government. Such a ruler would hardly support -the formation of a great empire built after the fashion of Prussian -autocracy. It was the inspiration of the moment to have the war come, -and demonstrate the glory of Germany and Austria-Hungary, while the -old emperor still lived. And if it was precipitated in the interest of -Austria-Hungary, that was all the greater reason that the people of -the dual empire should feel under obligation to the military power that -carried it through. Possibly they would be so much impressed that they -would sweep a youthful emperor on with them in the realization of a -great united empire. - -It is not certain how far the Pan-German party controlled the policy of -government in July, 1914; but it does not seem too much to attribute -such plans to men who did not hesitate to dream of the annexation -of Holland and who had definitely planned for the acquisition of -Constantinople. The imagination of a German patriot is no mean thing -in ordinary situations; but a great sweep would be vouchsafed to it -when its possessor realized that his country was being outplayed by -the diplomats and the grim Captain of Death. It was an extraordinary -situation that the Germans confronted in July, 1914, and there was not -much time for deliberation. - -This chapter is not written to show that Germany was, or was not, -responsible for the war. If it explains how it was that the German -people believed that the war was forced on them, it will accomplish -more than it was designed to accomplish. But it is intended to enable -persons to keep calm heads in these times of perplexity in order to -understand how each side approached the great conflict. It is evident -that the _Entente_ powers thought that Germany wished to change Europe -into a great empire with herself at the head, while the central powers -felt that the chains were being riveted around about them. - -In view of this long train of events the last week in that fateful July -assumes small proportions. If Ferdinand had not been killed war would -still have hung over the horizon. If Serbia had accepted the Austrian -ultimatum war would still have threatened; for though it may have been -averted for the moment, the Triple _Entente_ would still have existed, -nor would it have brooked the increase of German prestige that the -backdown of Serbia would have implied. If Russia had not mobilized her -army, Germany may not have mobilized, but the ancient fear of Russia as -an overwhelming opponent when she was once organized in the modern way -would have remained as a threat of dire consequences. - -The theory of the Balance of Power is built upon the idea that states -act for their own interests in the restraint of one another from -overweening ambition. At bottom it is selfish. It assumes a state -of rivalry; and it is necessary to the theory that as fast as one -side gains in strength the other shall gain also. If the _Entente_ -nations acquire Morocco, Tripoli, Cyrenaica, and parts of Persia, the -central powers must gain also or they are over-balanced. And who is to -determine how much they shall gain? Manifestly each will strive to get -all it can. The very process of gaining stimulates antipathy and makes -war a probability. - -Another observation that is worthy of consideration is that balance is -logically possible only when more than two sides are opposed to one -another. When Great Britain, France and Russia had varying purposes -it was not difficult for Bismarck to play one against the other and -so keep the equilibrium. But when it happened that the central powers -became so strong that they constituted a threat against every other -nation in the world, it was natural for the other nations to unite to -check them. In such a condition no true balance of power could exist, -and it was folly to expect that theory to serve as it served in former -days. - -One of the things the world ought to learn from the war that now -afflicts it is that no nation can conquer the world by stealth. It is -one of the happy shortcomings of political selfishness that its agents -usually fancy they can cover their tracks. How often do we see a bad -politician doing something wrong in the false confidence that while he -knows what he is doing the people cannot see it! So with Germany in the -years before the war. Making her plans for large accretions of power, -she thought she could steal a march on other nations and gain in a -spurt a position from which at a later time she could extend her power -by other and still larger sweeps of conquest. She did not think that -the other nations would take part until it was too late. - -But the rest of the world was as wide awake as she. No man in England -accustomed to view political things in the large failed to see the -instant the war began that the hour of crisis for his country was at -hand. If Great Britain had not fought in August, 1914, she would have -been the stupidest nation in the world. To have allowed her greatest -rival to sit down in the French channel ports would have been suicidal -for her. The only probable explanation of Germany’s failure to realize -this is that she had become so confident of the superiority of her own -mind that she thought all other minds were sodden. - -In a similar way, when she had carried on the war for two years and -a half and resorted to the submarine in ruthless attacks on American -ships of commerce, she should have known that she was giving the United -States a reason for participating in the war at a time when it was -clear to most Americans that their national safety demanded that they -should take part. If by this kind of battle the Germans forced Europe -to bend to her, what could we expect in the future? The very imminence -of German success demanded that the United States should throw herself -into the struggle. And after the war is over this truth will be written -indelibly in the pages of history: No great nation can be allowed to -conquer the world piecemeal. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL - - -The German people say the submarines will not fail. They seem to think -that what they call the highest achievement of the scientific mind of -Germany cannot fail. There is little doubt that they pin on this arm of -the service their last hope of securing a decision in actual warfare. -If it fails them they can look forward only to a long course of sheer -dogged resistance, hoping they can last longer than their adversaries. -Let us consider the probable results respectively of the success and -the failure of the submarine campaign. - -If the under-sea boats do all the Germans expect of them the result is -soon told. Great Britain will be forced to make lame and inefficient -war, France will be unable to do more than hold on to the line that -she occupies, and the United States, unable to send her vast army -across the seas in large numbers, will not be able to repair the loss -of strength that her allies sustain. Under such circumstances Russia, -even if she should recover from her present state of weakness, could -hardly deliver the blows that would bring Germany to reason. - -Under such conditions the war would end without the defeat of the -Teutons, and Mittel-Europa would still be impending. If the enthusiasm -of victory would stimulate such a union, the realization that Germany -and Austria-Hungary were pressed back to the wall and must fight -for their future existence might equally bring them to unite their -fortunes. In fact, if these two states wish to unite it is hard to see -how they are to be prevented, unless at the end of the war they are so -much weaker than their opponents that they can be forbidden to take -such a step, with assurance that the prohibition will be respected. - -To form such a union would be, in fact, to snatch victory out of -sore distress; for the united empires, even though Serbia, Bulgaria, -and Turkey were left out of account, would have a population of -116,000,000, which is more than the population of the United States and -smaller only than that of Russia and China. Ten years’ breathing space -in which to reorganize the industrial and social life of so large a -body of men would work wonders with them; and when reorganized and -fired by a common ambition they would be able to dictate terms to any -two of the nations of Western Europe. It is the probable union of these -states rather than the power of either when acting alone, that makes it -necessary for the rest of the world to procure their defeat. - -In two ways the union can be prevented. One is to inflict such a defeat -on the central allies that they will not dare run the risk of another -war through endeavoring to combine. Possibly such a defeat could be -inflicted by fighting long and winning great victories. It would have -to be a greater victory than was won by Prussia over France in 1871; -for after that victory France, fired with hatred for all that was -German, was so much feared by her conquerors that it became a chief -object of their diplomacy to keep her isolated by drawing possible -allies over to the German interest. The great military strength of -Germany at present hardly warrants the hope that she can be brought to -a lower state than France at the end of the siege of Paris. - -The other method is to bring about such a situation that union shall -not be desired in the Teutonic states. For it is not to be disputed -that if ever a strong and competent group of states wish to become -an empire, nothing short of a great war by other states can stop -them. It behooves us, therefore, to make our appeal to the reasons of -the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians. It is not necessary to limit -our arguments to words merely; it is, however, essential that the -Teutonic mind shall understand what to threaten the equilibrium of -nations means. To show that such a preponderance cannot be established -practically would be an effective warning to those leaders who set up -to preach Germanic militarism in the future. - -As this chapter is being printed, it seems that the submarines are not -a success. They have taken a great toll but not all the grist. Enough -ships are left on the sea to carry the minimum of food and war material -that our allies must have to maintain their grip on Germany. The war of -the central powers does not force their enemies to their knees, and it -seems that the best the kaiser can hope for is to hold out for a time -with the expectation that victory will be snatched by accident out of -the gloom that hangs over his cause. - -When the war began it was essentially a contest between two groups of -powers, each of which had been pursuing policies of aggrandizement. -One group had progressively acquired territory in Africa and Asia, -and the other had a plan equally definite for acquiring territory in -Southeastern Europe and the Near East. If the war had been fought out -as begun it would probably have led to the realization of one or the -other of these desires. Either the _Entente_ powers would have fixed -their hold on their respective spheres of influence and broken the -schemes of Germany and Austria-Hungary, or Germany would have made a -great sweep forward and established herself in the keystone position of -Europe, with immense consequences for the future. - -As the war progressed it became evident that it was becoming a supreme -test of the ability of one combination of nations to create a new -empire that would dominate Europe. It is no stretch of imagination -to say that the Germans dreamed of reëstablishing a modern Roman -Empire of the Germans. If the scheme had materialized--and the future -historian will probably conclude that it was near success at one -time--the fate of the rest of the world would have been far different -from what we wish it to be. A gigantic struggle would have been thrust -upon the United States to save the Western World from conquest. It was -the conviction that such a crisis actually menaced us that brought us -to join in the attempt to block the German plans. - -Assuming, therefore, that the anti-German allies are victorious, it is -unthinkable that the war shall be allowed to end as a mere check on -the plans of the central powers. To do so would be to grant that the -_Entente_ powers should be left to carry on their plans for national -aggrandizement with _carte blanche_ approval by the United States. It -would mean that we are fighting at a great sacrifice in order to enable -Great Britain to maintain her position as mistress of the sea and ruler -of a far distant empire. Now we do not object to British rule in the -distant parts of the earth: we have found it a tolerable thing that she -should be entrusted with the task of developing the backward races over -whom she has established her authority. But we have never meant to -save her toppling empire for her own comfort, as an act of grace merely. - -If we are to contribute a material part to the suppression of -aggression in the world, we have a right to say in what way and -to what end our sacrifice will have been made. As the greatest of -the anti-German allies we shall have the largest burden to bear in -proportion to the time in which we are to fight. That we should -guarantee to Great Britain and our other allies the full existence -of their rights is but fair. It is equally reasonable that we shall -demand that the future does not inure to the special advantage of any -one of the group; but in fixing upon the terms under which it shall be -arranged the main end in view should be the good of all the nations in -the world. - -This is a view which is likely to have the support of all the -anti-German allies, with the possible exception of Britain. France and -Russia, to say nothing of the smaller states, have the same interest as -we in making the common welfare the chief aim in peace negotiations. -If we were not in the group and if victory came to it, these nations -would perforce have to yield the lead to Great Britain, since she -would outclass them in strength by reason of her sea power. She might -well say that as the nation on which would fall the largest burden in -keeping Germany in a state of restraint, she should have the largest -influence in deciding what was to be done. She cannot make such a claim -under existing conditions. - -Of course, there is the difficulty that the United States may not -be guided by statesmen who realize the importance of following a -thoroughly American policy. It has long been a practice with a great -many Americans to follow the lead of Great Britain. Unaccustomed to -take a normal share of responsibility in world problems, we may now be -inclined to hold back, leaving the game to hands that have acquired -greater skill in playing it. Such a course would be a misfortune. It -would mean that statesmen would be given charge of the situation who -derived all their ideas under the old system of Balance of Power, and -it would be strange if they did not try to carry on the world in the -future with a strong squint at the only principles of international -policy they know anything about. To break into this well crystallized -realm of so-called practical ideas, demands an unusually strong man, -a man well founded in principles and able to convince others of the -wisdom of his views. - -It is true that the President of the United States now in office has -many of the traits that seem necessary to a correct conduct of the -situation. A man who had the training of a mere politician might well -be less than able to deal with the situation that faces us. President -Wilson’s knowledge of history enables him to think in terms of large -national movements. That is the chief value of historical training to -a statesman. If he knows the history of the attempts to settle the -affairs of the nations after the great world struggles of the past, he -is better able to understand how the various suggested plans will work -in the crisis that is to be passed through. - -President Wilson has, also, the unusual faculty of doing what he wishes -to do. When he has formed a purpose it is not generally a compromise -with a number of men whose chief concern is how the result of action -will affect their party support. At least this is true in matters not -clearly within the bounds of party activity. Moreover, he has spoken -and written words which seem to show that he understands the need of -providing for such a course of conduct between the nations as will -assure us of coöperation for the elimination of future wars. In his -long delay in urging war and in his early pronouncement for a league of -peace, he gave us the assurance, if nothing else, that he understands -the situation and is capable of holding a firm course in accordance -with his principles. - -If the submarines fail, therefore, and if we come to a settlement of -the largely new world problems that will confront us, and if our policy -is in the hands of wise men, what principles will guide our actions -and the actions of the rest of the world? This is a question that all -intelligent citizens should consider, since it cannot be answered -well unless there is a restrained and broad-minded public opinion to -support the leaders of the people. It is a matter for the consideration -of Germans as well as their opponents; for their attitude toward any -policy adopted will have a strong effect upon the continuation of the -policy. - -The first question we should ask ourselves is: What are we to do to -the Germans? How shall we punish them for what they have done to make -the world miserable? My answer to that is: Let God punish them. For -us it is not a question of giving the Germans their deserts but a -question of coming out of this cataclysm with a clear gain for the -cause of human happiness. Let us look upon the Germans as suffering -from a kind of disease of the mind which produces bad results on those -with whom they are in contact. It is ours to prescribe a cure, both -for their sake and for ours. I suggest that we first put them on a -liquid diet to reduce their exuberant vitality and then give them the -rest cure. At any rate, that is better than cropping their ears or -putting them into strait-jackets. To treat an impassioned man you do -not kick and beat him but try to bring him to his senses. To bring the -Germans into a realization that this world is run on the principle of -live-and-let-live, we ourselves must show a willingness to let live. - -We had a large amount of the opposite spirit in the United States from -1865 to 1875. The South, passionately convinced that slavery was no -evil, had made as good a fight to preserve her cause as Germany has -made or can make. She held out to the last with what her own people -called a stout heart, but her foes said with a stiff neck. For a year -and a half after the outside world concluded that she could never win, -she held on in the hope that her adversaries would tire of war and make -peace without victory. Now all this was exasperating, and the mass -of the Northern people felt in 1865 that some punishment should be -inflicted on the perverse people who had inflicted so much unnecessary -misery on the country. But Lincoln did not feel that way. There is no -reason to think that he gave a moment’s thought to making the South -suffer for her course. For him all thought was how to smooth the -wrinkles out of the present, and how to make the Southern people cast -out their hatred of the union and come back to their former loyalty. -The Lincoln spirit should guide the world at the end of the present -struggle. - -War lives on hatred. To make your people put all their energy into -the fight make them hate the other people; and you may rest in the -assurance that the leaders of the others are striving to make their -followers hate the men on your side. The mill of hate grinds steadily -and at a high speed while war lasts. In Germany in these days is a vast -amount of industrious abusing of England. That makes the German people -support the war. In Great Britain is a great activity in describing -atrocities in Belgium and Armenia, and it exists in order to make the -British people mad for war. When you see a new crop of the testimony -concerning the torturing horrors of the first month of war in Belgium, -you may know that the war spirit is running low in Britain. Unhappily, -such propaganda is a necessary feature of war. We are naturally -good-hearted, and we do not go out to kill men until we are made to -hate them. - -The moment war ends all this kind of thing should cease. The time will -then have come for the propaganda of peace. Unfortunately there are few -men whose mission it is to spread such ideas. Merchants and tourists -may do what is their nature to do, but they are not sufficient; and it -generally takes years for the fires to cool off. - -The aftermath of our civil war was as unhappy a series of events as we -have encountered within our national history. Undertaken as a means -of making sure of the gains of the civil war, it became a procession -of passion in which stalked all the worst feelings that divided the -people in actual warfare. There are still men in the North who have -Andersonville in mind when they vote, and men in the South who can -never respect the republican party because it was responsible for the -reconstruction acts of 1867. It will be extremely unfortunate if we -take up the problems that are soon to be upon us in the spirit with -which we assumed the duties of reconstructing the South. - -During the civil war the South was possessed of a fixed idea: the same -thing is true of Germany today. The South was committed to a position -that the rest of the world had abandoned: Germany is committed to a -type of bureaucratic government which is as much out of date in a -modern world as slavery. No ordinary system of reasoning could show -fair and honest Southern men in what respect they had the sentiment -of civilization against them: the German is thoroughly convinced that -he is fighting for the preservation of the most efficient type of -government the world has seen. The South went to her defeat after -a long and astonishingly effective resistance: Germany seems to be -destined to a similarly long and steady process of reduction into -complete prostration. The South was ruled by a small but able class of -landed proprietors who refused to see the plain truth of the situation -before them and prolonged the struggle until they were exhausted, -although by making a favorable adjustment in accordance with the logic -of the conditions before them they might have ended the war in 1864 -and saved their people from the uttermost bitterness of defeat: the -Germans, ruled by their Junkers, are equally deaf to argument, equally -determined to die at their posts, and equally opposed to a compromise -by which they will have to give up their antiquated “institution,” -relinquish their special privileges, and make their country like -the rest of the world. There are so many parallels between the two -countries that we wonder if there will not also be a disposition of the -victorious opposing allies to degrade Germany in her defeat. - -Probably her best adjusted punishment will be the reflection that her -“peculiar institution” proved a failure in time of need. For a century -she has been training an army, but it is not the army that has failed -her. It has done all that could have been expected of it. Nor did the -Southern army fail the South. It is not the sense of loyalty, nor the -scientific efficiency, nor the unity of purpose within the empire, -that have failed her. They are all splendid and have done what could -be demanded of them. The thing that has failed is the peculiar way in -which the German ruling classes have made use of these forces. They -have used army, scientific efficiency, loyalty, and unity of purpose to -promote the ends of an aggressive ruling class. Now the best treatment -is to defeat them in the war and allow them plenty of time, with no -unnecessary antagonisms, to learn that their system does not pay, and -that any attempt to revive it in the future will be followed by another -punishment as severe as that which this war brought. The support of -a military caste and the training of all the men in a great army are -heavy burdens on the economic life of the state. Will any nation -continue to bear them if they come to nothing in the day of trial? -Armies for defense do not demand the great expenditures that Germany -has made in the last decades. - -No penalty that the victors could lay on Germany would be permanently -effective in reducing her. So great are her economic energies that they -would restore her to prosperity within a short time, and she would -be ready to take advantage of any favorable combination to strike in -revenge. Disarmament would not be a guaranty that she would cease to be -troublesome to her neighbors; for she would still have her excellently -trained soldiers who could be reassembled in a great army at short -notice. She might well be required to dismantle her great armament -factories; and since they are essential to the re-arming of a great -army some check on her restoration would come from such dismantling. -But it would be a temporary check. It is only necessary to remember -that the beginning of the present German army was the attempt of one -conqueror, Napoleon, to limit the Prussian army to 42,000 men. - -Moreover, what nations could be expected to agree among themselves -while standing guard over Germany? Under the Balance of Power, we -might expect a fair amount of mobility of alliances. We have just -seen that not even the Triple Alliance was proof against the skillful -hands of Delcassé. If Italy could be withdrawn by France from that -powerful combination, how can we doubt that a humiliated Germany -would find means of weakening the combination against her? She would -have the greatest inducement to do so; and it is not probable that -complete harmony would prevail long between the victors, if they were -held together only by the bonds of mutual friendship. The history of -diplomacy is the record of broken friendships. - -To see what readjustment might occur with respect to a humiliated -Germany, it is only necessary to recall the position of France after -the Napoleonic wars. Beaten beyond resistance, suspected of carrying -the germs of bad government from which all other nations felt that they -must be protected as from deadly disease, and held down by great armies -of occupation, her situation would seem to have been most deplorable. -But her isolation lasted for only a moment. She was admitted to -the Congress of Vienna,--called to pass on the future arrangements -of Europe,--because there was division among her conquerors. From -that time she was suspected less and less, and at the Conference of -Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, she was admitted to the Concert of Europe, -but not with full fellowship; for the other powers made a secret -agreement to watch her for a while longer. She progressed so rapidly -in eliminating the republican virus in her system that in 1823 she was -entrusted with the task of suppressing the constitution of Spain. Thus -in eight years after the battle of Waterloo France was again in full -accord with the other powers. Probably few people would have said in -1815 that her restoration would come about so rapidly. It would be no -more singular if within ten years after the end of the present struggle -a conquered Germany were to forget her antipathies of 1918 and be ready -to give and be given in diplomatic alliances with as little regard for -the past. - -If, for example, a restored and highly nationalized Russia becomes a -threat against Western Europe some years hence, the antagonisms of -today would be forgotten and Germany, France, and Great Britain would -probably be found fighting side by side to restrain the Muscovite -giant. The old system is intensely selfish and it lends itself to -rapid changes in policies. But it is an expensive thing to keep up the -system. Large armies are necessary, great debts are created, and a -vast amount of nervous strength is diverted from the normal activities -of humanity. It is small hope for him who longs to see war put down -permanently that only by fighting a war like that now raging may we -expect the nations to defeat any future aspirant for universal power. - -Finally, if the submarines fail and the anti-German allies break down -the defenses of their enemies and thus are able to determine the kind -of peace that is to be made, the treaty of peace should not have for -its end the prolongation of the power of the _Entente_ group. The -history of the first half of the nineteenth century shows how easy it -is for such a group to be re-arranged with the result that new wars -threaten. We must trust the fair mindedness of human nature and the -logic of the situation to do much for the Germans. It is on their -acceptance of the issue that we must rest our hopes for a peaceful -future. - -These truths are especially pertinent to the interests of the United -States. We are not fighting Europe’s war, but the world’s. We are the -only nation in the struggle that has not a special interest at stake. -We are the only member of our group of allies that has a right to take -the side of the weakest member of that group against the desire of -the strongest. If any one member should in a moment of more or less -pardonable forgetfulness of the common good advance claims that would -be based on a desire to recoup herself for her sufferings, we best -of all could demand equal treatment and see that the seed of future -discord are not sown. These are principles that every American citizen -should understand. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE - - -By an enduring peace I mean a peace that shall last as long as we can -see into the future. It is such a peace as has in it, so far as we can -see, no fact that would seem to make for its ruin. If we adopt a peace -that has the seed of destruction in its very nature, we cannot hope for -relief from the evils of war. We must, under such a condition, take -account of war as one of the permanent burdens of civilization, with -the full consciousness that it will become increasingly expensive in -life and property, and with the result that at recurring periods an -intelligent world will drop its peaceful tasks to try to reduce its -population to a nullity. From the possibility of such a strife we turn -to ask the question: “Can nothing be done to save humanity from such -madness?” - -The answer is very simple: All people are unreasonable to some extent. -In connection with the question now under consideration, each of the -great states of the world, our own included, has its own special -form of unreasonableness, which acts as an obstacle to the formation -of a régime of peace. If the immense disaster by which we are -depressed could serve as a means of bringing us to a state of entire -reasonableness, the present war would be worth all it costs. Whether or -not it can lead to such a result the reader must determine for himself. - -An important obstacle to such a result is the economic competition of -nations. Economic competition by individuals has ugly sides, but it is -not dangerous in the sense in which national competition is dangerous. -When two merchants undersell until one breaks down the business of the -other, the victim passes out of sight in the business world, and the -current of trade soon goes on as before. When two corporations, however -great, engage in a business “war” and one is crushed or absorbed by -its competitor, the ripple that was made is soon obliterated, and the -victor serves the human wants with which it has to do without serious -damage to humanity. - -But when one nation finds itself in strong competition with another -in the hope of controlling a sphere of trade, it is apt to seek -territorial annexation to gain the desired field of exploitation. The -competitor can only follow the same course. It is the only thing it can -do, if it is not willing to give up the contest. If it is strong enough -to dispute the will of the rival, its very sense of individuality -demands that it shall not tamely yield before the aggression of a -rival. When France acquired Morocco, Italy acquired Tripoli, and Great -Britain acquired the southern part of Persia, economic advantage was -a strong motive, but not the only motive. When Germany laid out the -field of her future expansion in Turkish lands and when she expected to -establish a permanent influence over the Balkans, the extension of her -sphere of commerce was a chief motive. - -Probably the fundamental wrong here was the idea, widely held by the -present generation, that a nation has a right to establish bars around -her national territory to keep the trade of other nations out, so that -her own citizens shall have preferential advantages in the exploitation -of the territory. That idea is so firmly held today that one must be -a rash man who attempts to get the nations to give it up. But it is -a fundamental obstacle to permanent peace in the world. Probably it -is not too much to say that as long as the business men of the world -insist on dividing themselves into national groups with these national -preferences, so long may they expect business at recurring intervals to -be burdened with the waste and ruin of war. - -Against the existing practice we may place the “open door” policy, -which we have known chiefly in connection with the trade of the -undeveloped nations. It means the free opening of the trade of a given -state to all the nations that may care to have it. We heard much of -the “open door” in China a few years ago, and most of the benevolent -governments approved of the suggestion. To have been perfectly logical -they should have applied the same idea to their own commerce; and if -the world ever comes to a perfect state of international comity, it is -likely that national tariff barriers will be broken down. - -It is true, however, that we can have enduring peace and have national -protective tariffs, also. If nations agree that tariffs are one of the -unhappy excrescences of an unreasonable world, they may find it in -their hearts to tolerate such growths. To tolerate them would be, no -doubt, better than going to war. But when a state sets its eyes on a -certain part of the earth which it feels it must acquire in order to -enlarge the territory in which it can trade without fair competition, -the peace of the world is imperiled. - -It is probable that this kind of motive played a large part in -Germany’s decision to begin the present war. For a long time her -industries had been developing at a rapid rate. Protected at home by -tariffs they were able to sell goods to the German people at high -prices, while they sold at cheap prices in foreign markets in order -to drive their competitors away. The volume of German trade increased -immensely, factories were multiplied, and large credits were extended -by the banks in order to support this great structure. At last the -situation became unsteady. The expansion of the foreign part of the -national trade at small profits was a clog on the home trade, which -could not be made to yield enough profit to keep the business of the -country in a healthy condition. Then the manufacturers and capitalists -came to the conclusion that it was to their interest for the country -to go into a war of conquest in which new national territory should -be laid at their feet for profitable exploitation. Thus, the large -business interests, usually supporters of peace, swung to the support -of the militarists. It is significant that the liberals, that party in -the Reichstag which speaks especially for the traders, capitalists, -and manufacturers, have been among the most outspoken advocates of -annexation. - -In a powerful, if indirect, way the laborers are reached by this -argument. They see that if the manufacturers and transportation -companies expand their business wages are better and employment more -abundant, and this leads them to favor a policy of expansion. To what -extent the remote organs of the business world are thus reached it is -difficult to say. But it is evident that in a phase of human activity -which has been organized most intricately the influence of the initial -idea that a war of annexation helps business is far reaching. - -We frequently encounter the assertion that economic laws are -unchangeable; but the statement is not true, as it is made. Many -economic processes that appeared fundamental in their time have changed -as the minds of men have taken new grips on human life. The world -has outgrown the mercantile school of economic ideas. The attitude -toward private property and monopolies, and the view of the right of -individual bargaining have been greatly modified in the process of -time. If a so-called economic law stands in the way of a reasonable -adjustment of human relations, it can be altered, if enough time and -effort be given to the attempt to change it. Although it may seem to be -fundamentally fixed in the minds of business men and laborers that a -war for annexation is in their interests, if reason shows that they are -mistaken, there should be a way of bringing reason to their minds, even -as it has come to ours. - -Another obstacle to enduring peace is a false sense of patriotism. If -a man extols his own virtues we say he is a boaster: if he extols the -good qualities of his town, state, or nation, we say he is a patriot. -I am inclined to say that it is not permitted to a man to praise his -country--I do not say love his country--in any sense but that in which -he may praise himself, modestly and with reservations. At any rate, he -should praise and magnify his country in the most restrained spirit -possible. Patriotism does not demand national egotism in the good -citizen. Those writers and teachers who try to create a national spirit -should be careful lest they make men mere chauvinists. - -Especially perilous is the doctrine that “self-preservation is the -first law of nature” as applied to nations. Times come when a man -is not justified in preserving his life. So to nations come crises -in which they are not permitted by the rules of morality to save -themselves by what appear to be the only means left. In the present war -Germany asserted that she was justified by this principle in adopting -the ruthless war of the submarine, since it was the only thing that -would save her from destruction. It is better for a state to go to -destruction, just as it is better for a man to go to his death, with -clean hands than to live foully. - -It is but an extension of this doctrine for men of normal morality to -say they may do things for the benefit of the state which they may not -do for their own benefit. A statesman has no more right to make his -state steal another state’s lands than he has to take his neighbor’s -watch. It is not a virtue if he lies for his state. The state cannot -speak of itself: it speaks through its agents. It is sullied, even as -a man is sullied in his character, when its only voice, the words and -acts of its servants, is not true. Judged by the standards here set -up, the world’s diplomacy needs amendment, and if amended one of the -obstacles to peace will be removed. - -A false sense of patriotism may lead to acts that imperil peace. -When France acquired Morocco her object was not wholly to extend -her economic interests. To increase the national strength was also -a motive. Likewise, Germany’s desire to establish control over the -territory southeast of her was not entirely economic in its origin. She -also wished to increase the glory and strength of the Fatherland. How -much we are to condemn this desire of a citizen for the glory of his -country it is hard to say; but it seems to be clear that such a desire -may manifest itself in such a way as to become a serious obstacle to -peace. - -At the end of the present war the victorious nations will be in a -position to abate national glory in the interest of enduring peace. -Our own citizens are supposed to be particularly proud of the -achievements of the United States. If our efforts should contribute as -much as we wish to the triumph of our own side, we should be careful -lest we forget that we entered the war with the modest purpose of -making the world a fit place of habitation for _all_ people. Likewise -we should be justified in using our influence among our allies to see -that the desire of no statesman to enhance the glory of his nation -leads to action which may imperil peace in the future. When we shall -have fought long and suffered greatly our hearts are likely to become -harder than now, in the beginning of the war; and there is danger that -we shall forget early resolutions if we are not firmly committed to -them at the outset. - -Another obstacle to enduring peace is the sense of nationality. The -older men of this generation who were students in Germany in their -youth acquired much respect for the passionate desire of Germans to -build up unity among all German speaking people. It was a sacred -idea to young men and imaginative writers. Long had North Germany -been disunited, stumbling forward under the lead of the Hapsburgs. -To be able to form a dominating group among all the Germans in the -world seemed no more than was their just due. We did not realize in -those days to what an end these people who lost so many opportunities -through internal weakness would put their strength when they had at -last developed it. And yet, it was the right of the Germans to unite -themselves into as strong a nation as they might form. The wrong came -in the improper extension of the idea. When men like Treitschke talk -about including Holland in the German Fatherland we may well ask where -nationality’s pretensions are taking us? - -It was natural, also, that the sense of nationality should be -manifested in many other European countries. Each of the Balkan states -had its own phase of it. Russia had a large hope of uniting in her -control all the peoples of Slavic blood. Italy demanded Trieste as a -part of the Italian-speaking world. Greece lived for the acquisition -of Macedonia and the Greek Islands, and France never diminished her -pathetic longing for Alsace-Lorraine, where lived French-speaking -peoples. - -Often the desire for nationality runs directly counter to economic -laws. For example, what are we to do when we have Austria holding on -to her only great Adriatic seaport as the essential outlet of her -trade to the sea, and nationality proclaiming that this port shall be -handed over to Italy? Moreover, different peoples are so intermixed in -some parts of Europe that it is impossible for any but a scientific -specialist to say which states, or sections of states, are occupied by -a majority of one race and which by a majority of another. If we are to -set out to divide Europe according to nationality we shall have a large -task on our hands. In the United States the principle of nationality -is not to be pleaded, since we are so intimately intermixed that it -would be hopeless to try to range us into racial groups. Moreover, we -get along very well as it is, having once agreed that we shall have to -get along together. Perhaps if the nationalizing propaganda ceased in -Europe race antagonism would subside. - -Autocratic classes in society constitute still another obstacle to -peace. We have heard much on this subject of late, and some of the -things that have been said have been so ill-established in truth that -they must make the real autocrats smile. It will probably help us to -understand the situation if we undertake to enumerate the good things -an autocracy can do. For truth never profits by falsehood, and the most -autocratic people in the world have sense enough to know when they are -misrepresented. - -Let us remember that under favorable conditions an autocracy is -composed of the more capable people in the community in which it -exists. They are more capable because they have been brought up most -carefully, that is, because they have the best trained minds. There is -no law of nature by which more fools are born in an aristocracy than -in a proletariat. In fact, the tendency is the other way; for since -the aristocrats are in a position to cultivate themselves in a given -generation, it is natural that a comparatively large portion of their -children shall be well endowed mentally. To this gift of nature add the -influence of better educational training, and you see how natural it -is to expect an autocracy to be stronger mentally than those who would -have to replace it if it were overthrown. - -Again, an autocracy is not necessarily unpatriotic. Of course, it has -its own idea of what patriotism is, but so have the classes below the -autocracy. Its patriotism usually embraces an honestly held opinion -that the autocratic state is the best form of society. On this basis it -is willing to sacrifice much for the state. We see it putting “lives, -fortunes, and sacred honor” literally at the entire command of the -state. No man can do more than give his all for that which he holds -right. - -An autocracy may be composed of men of the best private manners and -principles. They frequently include the best poets, historians, -novelists, philosophers, and teachers of the nation. It is they who -encourage art, and set standards of taste in architecture, landscape -gardening, and general culture. Compared with the leisure class of -a prosperous industrial country they may be more courteous, more -unassuming, and less given to offensive use of their wealth. They are -the kind of men whom any of us could love if we knew them personally. -These words do not, of course, apply to all members of the class, but -to the group as a whole in ordinary conditions. - -Of the German autocracy most of these things can be said, and more. -It is a hard working group and generally speaking it is honest. In -the service of the state it has a record of efficient government that -few democratic countries can show. The officials of German towns and -cities, provinces and states, taken from the hereditary upper classes, -are well trained, faithful, and free from the suggestion of corruption. -It will take New York or Chicago many years to develop the state of -good government that exists in Berlin. Moreover, the German autocracy -has the respect of the German people. - -Up to last winter the Russian autocracy was an obstacle to peace. -Many who looked forward to a reign of reason wondered how they were -going to make the theory work while the largest _Entente_ nation was -in the hands of an autocracy that was less tolerable than the German -autocracy. Fortunately, fate has settled the question, for the time -at least. So uncertain is the condition of affairs in Russia, that no -one can say what will be the outcome. It is by no means certain that -the peasants, workers, and soldiers, will not make actual war against -the former autocrats, leading to a state of chaos like the worst -phases of the French Revolution. If such a thing happens, a reaction -in favor of the former ruling class may well follow. If the war ends -before the newly established government is firmly seated in power some -such upheaval may be expected. Certainly the time of danger is not yet -passed. - -The German autocracy is better than that which ruled Russia. In fact, -it would be less dangerous if it were less serviceable. Its sins are -not the patent sins of peculation, cruelty, laziness, or despotism. It -offends in that it takes away the confidence of nation in nation. It -offends because it is filled with unfortunate purposes. It is possible -to think of an autocracy that would be no menace for the peace of the -world, an autocracy filled with no ambition for world conquest. It is -true that most autocratic governments have not been of this kind, and -they seem militarists by nature, whence arise the ideals with which -they trouble the world. - -When Hegel preached the philosophy of war that underlies the German’s -devotion to war, he was largely right from the Prussian standpoint. -He held that the mind becomes sluggish through inactivity and that -war burns up its waste matter and leads to energy of character. This -doctrine would not be essentially true in any normally organized -society; for there are as many opportunities for self-expression in -commerce, finance, manufactures, art, and other peaceful occupations -as in war. But a century ago Prussia was filled, even more than today, -with a mass of small nobles, unaccustomed to any ordinary form of -labor, and with slender incomes. They were just the class that would -fall into the effete vices of an aristocracy. To them the military life -was an avenue of steady and moral employment. They took places in the -great machine, and by 1870 they had been bred into its very spirit. The -process saved the German nobles from vapidity. At the same time, as a -class, they preserved their political privileges, and it has happened -that they, with their official heads, the kaiser, kings, and princes, -have been able to unite political power and military purposes until -they have made of their country the most military state of modern -times. If Germany has fought the present war with great ability, it is -the organized autocracy that deserves the credit. - -It is, therefore, the union of the political and military power in -the hands of a privileged class in Germany that now constitutes the -greatest obstacle to peace. It enables a small and efficient portion -of the German population to wield the rest of the people for the ends -they have decided are best. If this union of functions could be broken -up, and if political power could be distributed as in the countries -governed by the people, the obstacle would be reduced in size. It is -not necessary to suppose that it would be removed altogether; for even -if equal suffrage were established in Germany, and if autocracy were -shorn of its preponderating electoral power, the nobles would still be -the most capable class in the empire. Their personality would go a long -way in perpetuating their influence. If they played the game of trying -to lead the people they might remain rulers of Germany for a long time -after losing their present electoral advantages. - -It is fair to assume that a democracy will be less likely to go to -war than an autocracy. It is the middle and lower classes that bear -the chief burdens of war. They fight for no promotions. Generally the -happiest thing that can come to one of them is a disabling wound to -send him home with his head safely on his shoulders. Kings and their -sons are rarely killed in battle. When this war began the kaiser was -one of the proud Germans who had five tall sons of military age. After -nearly four years of fighting none of them have been seriously injured. -It would be interesting to know if there is another German father of -five sons who has been so gently treated by fortune. Report says that -fifty thousand schoolmasters were killed in Germany during the first -two years of the war. It would be interesting to learn whether or not -the titled class has given up so large a proportion of its members for -the cause of the Fatherland. - -And yet, it must not be thought that wars cannot exist in democratic -countries. When Rome was a republic war was a constant thing. Athens in -her republican days had many wars. In the region that is now the United -States of America have been several wars. The war for independence was -essentially popular. It was organized by that part of the population -which resented British aristocratic institutions, the class we should -today call “the plain people.” In the civil war the demand that slavery -be destroyed did not come from the wealthy men of the North, the class -that stood for the American aristocracy, but from the middle classes, -men who filled the churches and who followed the common impulses of -the heart. It was resisted by the South, as democratically organized -as Germany would be with the Junkers turned out of power, and the -struggle was as bitter as any the world had seen up to the fatal year -1914. Democratic states can fight, and they do fight, but they are less -likely to go to war than autocratic states. - -If it seems to any of us a necessary thing that autocracy must be -removed from the earth, it is well to remember that autocracy can be -removed only through the operation of a long and slow process. It can -be reduced by some great catastrophe, but it cannot be smitten out in -a day. Take away its political power, and perhaps its financial power -will be left. Undermine that by raising up a rich bourgeoisie, and its -social influence will perhaps still exist. You do not abolish it by -decree; you banish it only when you have substituted a better thing. - -What force exists in Germany with which the autocracy can be -supplanted? Next to the radicals, a small faction at best, we have the -socialists, numerous enough to have great influence, but committed to a -theory of society which cannot be established until humanity has gone -through centuries of development in the principles of equality. Then we -find the national liberals, whose name is likely to mislead liberals -in other parts of the world. They would be called the stand-pat, -capitalistic portion of society in the United States, men who believe -first of all in the protection of their large interests. In the present -struggle they are committed to the Pan-Germany policy since it means -the expansion of markets for German wares. Next come the centrists, -Catholics in their primary interests, and fundamentally opposed to -the doctrines for which the socialists stand. Finally we come to the -conservatives, who believe in the autocracy. What magician can fuse -these parties into a solid movement for the establishment of really -parliamentary government? - -Last obstacle of all that I shall mention here is the accumulated -machinery of war that has been built up in modern states. I do not -refer to ideas but to materials and men. Much has been written to show -that munition makers have deliberately fostered a belief in war, so -as to make a market for their products. Probably some exaggeration -exists in most of these arguments and statements. The Krupps and their -brethren have plausible grounds for saying that war is inevitable, -and that they serve it but do not promote it. But giving them as -much benefit of the doubt as they can expect, it must be true that -their very existence, and their fine application of science to their -business, have led states to count on war as a matter of course. -These great aggregations of capital have vast influence in political -circles. They have so many stockholders that they affect a large number -of influential men. So much are they committed to the cause in which -their fortunes and hearts are enlisted that they ought not to have the -opportunity to wield their peculiar influence. When this war is over, -it would be a real service if every munitions factory as such were -taken into government hands and its capital stock closed out as a -business enterprise. It is only the state, and the state in the hands -of the people, that can safely be trusted with this powerful weapon for -the creation of war sentiment. - -The professional soldiers are also a part of the war machinery which -stands in the way of an enduring peace. They can hardly be expected to -become pacifists. They are trained to regard war as a necessity. All -their ideas of virtue are wrapped up in the fine qualities of a brave -soldier. Any other standard is strange to them. They may be expected -to throw all their weight of influence in favor of recurring wars. Not -that they wish wars to recur, but that they consider it improper to -contemplate anything else in the natural order of events. This is a -hard problem to deal with. A few professional soldiers may be brought -to set their faces against war; but as to the great majority, I fear -that those who try to abolish war will have to count on the opposition -of the professional warriors until the end of the chapter. - -This array of obstacles to enduring peace, is it not formidable? -Economic competition, the actual if false sense of patriotism, the -desire for nationality--which is liable to run into extreme assertions -and sometimes to run counter to the strongest economic interests--the -existence of autocratic government, and the powerful influence of -munition makers and professional warriors--these are some of the -obstacles against which those must contend who try to convince the -world that peace is the better way. They may well appal the stoutest -hearted friend of enduring peace. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -ARGUMENTS FOR A FEDERATION OF STATES - - -The arguments against attempting to establish an enduring peace are -undoubtedly formidable, but they do not leave the idealist entirely -vanquished. On his side fight humanity and reason, and it is his -function to stand by humanity and reason. He has long ago formed the -habit of attacking obstacles. In this case the objections he meets are -all rooted in the opinions of men, and he loves to change opinions, -or, if he does not change them, to hammer away at them as long as life -lasts. For his fine optimism we can but have great respect, and in -this chapter I intend to summarize his arguments and give them to the -public in as strong a light of plausibility as possible. If the stolid -opposition of the “practical” world is not to be broken down, let it be -shaken as much as may be. The time of its defeat is written in the book -of fate. It may be that the time is near at hand. - -In the first place, let me recall a statement made in the preceding -chapter. To get any desired reform adopted and carried out, it is -first necessary to get the people to imagine the reform in operation. -I mean that they must have a clear mental picture of themselves living -contentedly under the proposed plan. Let the proposition be made in -such a way that the effective people who direct the government can not, -or will not, in the mind’s eye see it in operation, and it will surely -fail. Let them imagine its successful use and they will most likely -find it unobjectionable. Likewise, if the people of the world could -imagine a great coöperative union to promote peace, with enough force -behind it to enforce the will of the union, if in their minds they -could see themselves adjusted into such a system, with all its economy -in taxes, human suffering, and ordinary governmental effort, it would -not be very difficult to make such a scheme work in actual experience. - -The “practical” man has but little imagination. He has to be deceived -into the acceptance of reforms. Make him believe that a given plan -has been made to work and his objections are diminished, if not -overcome altogether. This is not said for scolding but as a sober -fact confronting the man who reasons his way through matters that -perplex him. The “practical” man is not responsible for his weakness, -and he is in the majority among men. On the other hand, the man with -imagination is not to be faint-hearted. If he can see and talk, he may, -by reiteration finally make his brothers see also. - -Fundamentally his position rests upon the reasonableness of his -proposition: war is madness, brutality, useless waste of wealth -and life, and the negation of civilization. It proceeds from the -unnecessarily irritated state of the public mind. Reason demands that -she be allowed to have an opportunity to exert her influence in a -reasonable world over reasonable beings. Since law is the expression of -the will of reasonable beings, let law be given the supervision of all -the disputes which may possibly lead to war. How true all this sounds! -And the preacher of peace says boldly that it is more worth while to -plan, spend money, and take a chance in a great world effort to bring -such a reasonable situation to pass than to go on planning, spending, -and risking things in the efforts to make a system work that has ever -led us around in a circle to the same old end, war and misery. - -The advocate of peace points to the duel. There was a time when every -man felt it his right and duty to settle his own quarrels. He was -his own judge and his own sheriff. The result was so bad that law -was created to enforce peace between individuals. The old condition -survived in the duel, but in most countries this at last was brought -under the authority of law. Private combat in its nature does not -differ from public combat, and if one was eliminated by the creation of -a law that was strong enough to forbid it, the other can be abolished -by creating a still stronger law, powerful enough to restrain states as -criminal law restrains individuals. - -Kant’s argument for perpetual peace ran like this, but he, in sympathy -with Rousseau’s social contract theory, argued that the law that -restrained individuals was the result of agreement between individuals; -and he went further and argued that all that was necessary to secure -perpetual peace would be for the states to agree to establish a league, -or a federation, to enforce it. - -Now there was a fallacy in Kant’s argument that has a bearing on the -subject immediately before us today. There is no reason to suppose that -any state ever arose from an agreement of individuals. The ordinary -process was growth out of several conditions. An enlarged family might -become a state, or one tribe might conquer another and enlarge itself -into a state. Kinship and force were probably the chief causes in -producing the state; and reason seems to have played a small part. -Similarly, law grew up, not as the result of reason, but as a body of -tribal customs, reasonably interpreted by the wise men of the early -state. - -There is, therefore, no analogy between the proposed method of forming -a great super-state with its own body of law, the object of which is -to restrain the states from going to war, and the method by which the -early state was created. In fact, if one great nation were to conquer -the rest of the world and impose its peace on all the world, as it -would do, we should have a process more analogous to the origin of the -early state. And that is one way of having peace. Within the last years -it has seemed a horribly possible method; for if Mittel-Europa becomes -a fact, it will have such predominating power that it is difficult to -see what will stop its march to general authority. - -Pointing out Kant’s fallacy weakens his argument as such, but it leaves -us in such a dilemma that we are prone to pronounce his suggestion -worth trying as an escape from conquest by one great power. For if the -world is tending toward unity through conquest, who can doubt that it -would be better to anticipate the process, save a great sum of human -suffering, and by agreement found the world federation which is the -same result to which ages of war will lead us. That we could have such -a super-state by contract is not to be doubted. It would be as possible -as the creation of the United States of America by agreement. - -Another argument of the peace advocate is that the old system by which -the world was kept in equilibrium, the balance of power, has broken -down, and cannot be trusted to preserve the peace of the future. Its -chief characteristic was that several states mutually checked one -another. If one manifested an intention that was alarming to the rest -they combined to restrict the action of the aggressor. The several -states were with regard to one another in a condition mobile enough to -permit any state to shift from one side to another as the situation -demanded. Now this condition no longer exists. There has developed a -mid-continental alliance, apparently expecting to continue to act as -one state for practical purposes, which in itself threatens to dominate -Europe. To hold it in check calls forth all the united force of the -other states and then success is obtained only through the greatest -amount of preparedness. Such a condition is anything but the old system -which was to work through balance and concert of action. - -The central position of the Germans and Austrians gives them an immense -advantage, if the world is to go on in its national rivalries. On -the west lie the two nations who are today doing most to hold them -in restraint, France and Great Britain. The former could never stand -against Germany alone, and the latter is remote enough from the German -frontier to make it improbable that her forces could reach that spot in -time to prevent the Germans from gaining the initial advantage which, -in a state of efficient preparation is the only military success that -either side can hope to win. In the face of a strong and threatening -Germany it would be very likely that these two nations would have to -make a more than formal alliance. Even if that happened, it is possible -that Germany would construe it as a threat and begin war. - -The only other strong check on the central powers is Russia, now -in a sad state of change. What her future is going to be is still -problematic. It is a stupendous task for so large a nation, composed -of landlords and peasants for the most part, to pass from an autocracy -to a self-governing nation. It took France, a smaller country, from -1789 to 1879 to pass through the various changes and counter-changes by -which she reformed her government into a republic. It is safe to say -that in the Russian development the changes will come more rapidly, but -it is not impossible that in this country a period of prolonged unrest -is ahead. Under such circumstances Russia could hardly be counted on to -give much aid to the Western nations who wished to restrain Germany. In -fact, so fluid would be the state of her society that she might well -become the victim of German ambition and contribute valuable parts of -her empire to swell the resources of her aggressive western neighbors. - -One insecure spot must be pointed out in this argument. It is the -continuous close alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary. If that -breaks down the whole argument fails. At the present time it is -impossible to say what may happen in this respect. Much will depend -on the new emperor of the Dual Empire. That he has a very difficult -problem before him is without question. On one hand is the intense -Hungarian aversion to absorption by Germany, on the other the -passionate desire for union by the German people in the Dual Empire. It -is supposed that the emperor does not favor absorption; but it seems -certain that he is not able at this time to take an open stand against -it. - -The strong part Germany has taken in saving Austria from Russia gives -Germany a firm hold over the imagination of the Austrian people. It is -possible that financial aid has also been extended to such an amount -that Austria would be embarrassed if called on to pay back. Nor is the -kaiser in Berlin in a mood to brook defiance from Vienna. If, therefore -Kaiser Karl wishes to be free of his too intimate dependence on Kaiser -Wilhelm, he will find it to his advantage to conceal his desire for -the time being. It is probable that we shall not know the present true -state of feelings in Austria for several years after the war. But -unless she is very well Germanized, it would seem that she must soon -realize that she is playing a losing game in the combined movement. -The real advantages of this war, if any are obtained, are German -advantages. It is German trade, German _kultur_, and German prestige -that are being enhanced by the war. Austria as Austria is not reaping -advantages commensurate with the gains of her greater partner. - -The financial argument seems to be much on the side of the peace -advocate. Let us consider the situation in which the European states -will find themselves after the return of peace. Bankruptcy is a -relative term, if we so interpret it. That is to say, if the people -are willing to bear patiently their great burdens they will bear them, -and the debts that have been acquired will be shouldered. If one -nation repudiates this debt, or scales it down, it is probable that -the others will do the same, since to continue to carry the debt would -leave the faithful nation at a disadvantage with the other nations in -reference to future struggles with one another. - -No one knows as yet just who owns the bonds in the several nations. -From Germany we hear that they are widely held. It is the policy of -the government of any nation to distribute a heavy debt as widely as -possible; and we have in recent history instances of great patriotism -in assuming debts of this kind. Now it is fair to say that the -more widely the debt is distributed, the greater its likelihood of -permanency. The larger the number of poor people who own it, the harder -it will be to lessen the burden of the nation. It follows that in this -case the immense interest charge is likely to persist as a permanent -encumbrance on the economic life of the country. - -On the other hand, let us say that it turns out that the debt is not -very widely distributed after all, or that after the war it follows the -course of most national debts and passes into the hands of the rich. -Then we have the situation likely to promote class friction. The taxes -necessary to pay the interest will fall on the mass of people, who -will probably come to believe that they are taxed for the benefit of -the wealthy. Class jealousy will lead to suggestions of repudiation. -Such a course is more than ordinarily easy in Germany, France, and -Russia, where there are well organized socialist parties, already -keenly suspicious of the capitalists. - -Thus, whether the debt is widely distributed or not, it contains a -menace to society. In one case it constitutes such a burden that it -absorbs the financial strength of the government. In the other it -invites the most formidable struggle of the poor against the rich that -the world has seen in a century. - -Such a situation is bad enough in itself, but it does not directly -affect the question of peace, our main consideration at this time; -for the debt will exist as a result of the war, and nothing in the -view of the friends of peace can prevent it. But through whichever of -the two contingent courses it goes, the state will have difficulty in -continuing the old system. - -Let us say that we have a permanent great debt with a huge interest -fund, and the state wishes to add to the taxes in order to keep up -its measures of preparedness. The result must be to produce uneasiness -in the minds of the taxpayers. In Germany, for example, the interest -charge and the provision for pensions on account of the present war -will probably be considerably more than a billion dollars a year. -Added to the ordinary expenses of government it will make a burden -more than double that of 1913. Can the government go on providing -armaments, that may lead to another war, without jeopardizing the -loans that are already issued? In the face of such heavy taxation it -would not be surprising if the people sold their holdings of bonds -to the capitalists and later turned toward repudiation. On the other -hand, it would be to the interest of the capitalists to favor moderate -expenditures for armaments and armies, lest the patience of the people -under their burdens might be exhausted. - -But suppose the debt was not distributed widely in the first place, -and suppose it was repudiated after a class struggle, or for any other -reason scaled down. The result would be a severe blow to credit, and -in the future it might be so difficult to raise funds that war could -not be carried on. No nation can afford to contemplate war if it has -not borrowing capacity. If the debts of one war are repudiated those of -another may also be repudiated. It behooves the capitalists, therefore, -to support a policy which will make armed conflict impossible. While -bonds benefit the banker when issued up to a certain point, they can -in some conditions become his most serious difficulty. So many perils -await the capitalist from a renewal of struggles like the present, that -it is not too much to count upon him as a supporter of peace until the -financial situation in Europe shall become better than it will be for -many a day. It is his true interest to support a federated peace, which -will tend to make his bonds secure. - -As to the influence of autocracy, the advocate of peace must admit -that it is by nature hostile to his system of coöperative peace. -Such coöperation must depend on mutual confidence and trust between -nations; and it is natural for distrust to exist between republican and -autocratic states. The whole trend of autocracy is to self-assertion. -As it exists in Germany today it could hardly be relied on to take its -place in any union of states which would involve the subordination of -individual national interests to the common good. - -Granting this, the advocate of peace can assert that Germany must -eventually give up autocracy. As the only great nations that hold to -this relic of a departed age Germany and Austria-Hungary are becoming -anachronisms. They are set against the spirit of the twentieth -century. If they tide over the crisis that now confronts them they -will encounter more furious storms at a later time, and eventually -autocracy must be broken down. The argument rests on faith in progress. -It is the result of confidence in the innate qualities of human nature. -So many times in the past ages have the people risen against bad -government, that it is safe to say they will repeat the process until -all inequality shall have been reduced. - -German autocracy, a survival of a past century, exists only because it -takes for its object the good government of a parliamentary system. -In intelligence and honesty it is not like the ancient system. The -resemblance is only in forms. The republican says: “I will give the -people just, intelligent, and honest government.” The German autocrat -says: “I will do all these things”; and he redeems his promise. His -brother of the eighteenth century had no such purpose, being so certain -of his position that he did not have to promise the people anything. -The German autocrat lives in fear of an overthrow. Perhaps some day he -will make a slip--it may be from the action of an unwise emperor or a -selfish party clique--and away will go the whole system. - -Last summer a crisis arose in Berlin. The very life of the autocracy -seemed about to be taken. It was saved finally by a narrow margin, -and with the making of promises which seem a long step forward. The -people were assured that such was their meaning. If the promises are -broken, there will be a reckoning. It may be said that there will never -again be so good an opportunity to force the granting of parliamentary -reforms. That statement is contestable. The autocracy needs the support -of the people at present, in order to bring Germany through the crisis -that has arisen from the action of the autocracy, and it may seem from -that standpoint that the people never had and will never have an -equally good opportunity to strike a blow. But the call of patriotism -is strong in Germany, and if the liberally minded persons were to -stand deliberately for the defeat of the war credits unless they were -given the reforms they demanded, it is doubtful if the people would -support them. It is hard to carry a country through a great political -revolution while the very life of the country is threatened. - -After war comes a time of questioning. The German people will have -reason to ask themselves what has been done to them. The burdens of -taxes, the loss of commerce, the wrecks of human life through maiming, -and the great gaps in population through death, all these things can -but come to the minds of the people. At that time the press must lose -something of its rigorous control, for it is impossible that when the -Germans get over the feeling that their country is in danger they will -continue to tolerate a press whose every word is dictated by the one -thought of keeping the people solidly united in war sentiment. If it -should happen that the empire has an emperor who is not trusted by the -people it may be that the questioning will sweep away many old doubts -and forms. - -These things should not be taken as prophecy, but as possibilities -for tempering the opinion that Germany is destined to be permanently -autocratic. The advocate of an enduring peace has a right to think a -self-governing Germany well within the bounds of possibility before -another decade has elapsed. If such a thing happens, certainly one of -the most serious obstacles to peace will have been removed. - -I shall venture to put one more argument into the mouth of the advocate -of peace. Probably he has not used it as I am going to use it, but it -works his way; for it shows that a tremendous fate threatens, unless -some coöperative movement is established to avert it. Stated briefly it -is this: Through the ages runs a law of unification in society, and it -seems probable that the world has today come to the point at which the -unifying force is likely to take a long stride forward, a force which -may operate in one of two directions. I mean that with the next century -unification seems imminent by conquest, if not by common consent. - -It is not easy to say that the process of concentration in human -society is a law in the sense in which there is law in natural science. -But there is a general social tendency, seemingly irrepressible, -operating steadily from the beginning of history, for the political -units to be larger and ever larger. If this tendency is not a law it is -an extremely strong force; and we may well ask if it is not about to -take one of its great steps forward. - -A glance at the past will show how the process has gone on. In ancient -times diminutive states were absorbed by larger but still very small -states, which in turn were welded into so-called confederacies, or -leagues, which at last became integrated states. The concentration -went forward in cycles, one empire rising in power until it ruled most -of its known world, and then it broke into pieces through its lack of -cohesive power. Thus it was with Babylon, Assyria, Persia, Greece, and -Rome. Whenever the bubble burst the process of unification began again -immediately, and on a larger scale. After the fall of Rome it was again -set in motion in an area that included most of Europe, the unifying -hand belonging to Charlemagne, king of the Franks. His personal valor -won the triumph of his will, but his empire fell away soon after he -relaxed his hold upon it. - -Then began a rebuilding process. Feudal states evolved out of clashing -duchies, counties, and bishoprics. Immediately feudal states began to -devour one another. With each century the unit of government became -larger. At last rose the great power of Spain, so great that it became -a threat to other powers, and then followed a series of wars to decide -whether or not Spain should be the supreme state in Europe, and Spain -lost. A century later France seemed to be seeking to establish herself -in the same kind of supremacy, and again the combined force of Europe -was necessary to break her purposes. Still later came the Napoleonic -wars, in which Europe seemed for a moment to be subjected by one -central will, but again it was saved through great suffering. To some -people it seemed that the Napoleonic attempt would be the last. - -Of these modern struggles in Europe it is seen that each has been -harder than the struggle that preceded it. That is because in each the -implements and organization of warfare were improved as compared with -the former struggle, and because states were stronger and more capable -of endurance. It is also evident that each of these great wars was the -result of the ambition of one sovereign, supported by a strong and well -united nobility, while in each case the most effective resistance was -offered by the states in which some degree of self-government had been -adopted. - -The struggle that now exists is the highest manifestation of this -tendency to unification that the world has seen since the fall of Rome. -Although Napoleon seemed at certain moments in his career to stand -nearer absolute success than Germany now stands, he never really gained -as much as the kaiser now holds; for he won his successes against the -poorly trained and dispirited troops of Prussia, Austria, and Spain, -while the Germans have won what they have won against some of the -best troops of history. Moreover, Napoleon’s power was founded on his -success solely, while the German victories rest on the long established -and certain foundation of the German empire. It seems reasonable to say -that Europe stands today nearer to unification than it has stood since -the fall of Charlemagne’s power. - -Two great combinations are fighting for mastery. One has the avowed -purpose of extending its power until it is in a fair way to absorb the -rest of the states one after the other. The other group fights to beat -off the fate that threatens, and it acknowledges that it cannot succeed -unless it crushes its opponents into such a state as will take from -them the desire and the power to attempt another war for supremacy. -Whichever side wins, the other will feel an impulse to continue to act -in alliance. And we may have a Europe of two great federal states, with -the little states at their mercy. - -For example, how can Great Britain and France ever be opponents again, -as in the old days? The sense of common sacrifices would of itself make -them more than friends, but the consciousness that each depends on the -other in dealing with the great danger will never fail them, and it -will force them into some kind of political union. In the same way, we -should expect to see a greatly altered relation between Great Britain -and her colonies. Three-quarters of a million of colonial defenders -constitute a contribution that demands reward. As the colonies depend -on the mother country for some important elements of defense, and Great -Britain cannot comfort herself with the assurance of safety unless she -has a broad imperial power for its basis, it would seem natural to -expect some kind of imperial union. As to Belgium, when she escapes -from the grasp of Germany, what mind has the ingenuity to foresee her -fate? If she relies on the promise of neutralization, she is again -tempting fate. If she is annexed to France, with some kind of autonomy, -German enmity will be aroused. - -Probably her fate is to be bound up with the fate of the other small -states of Europe, states which in the present war are hardly entirely -sovereign. Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, and -Portugal have lost something of the power to direct their internal -affairs. In war they have had a lesson of the necessity of bending to -the will of an external government, which they will probably remember -many times in the days of peace. When once a state has yielded at the -dictation of a neighbor, and made money out of it, the next time it -is pressed yielding becomes an easier thing. The fate of these small -states in a possible era of fierce competition between two great groups -would be very perplexing. In an era of peace through federation, says -the advocate of peace, it would be much happier. - -In short, it is a practical question that our idealist puts to us. Here -is a world that has gone mad, shall it not turn to reason again? The -old system has broken down, shall we try to make it work again? To do -so will lead us to just the disaster that now overwhelms us. Shall we -not try a plan which will not cost us in money half what the old system -of preparation cost, and which if it fails cannot be more of a failure -than the old system has proved? If autocracy stands in the way, let us -hope that autocracy will give way before the march of the spirit of the -times. And finally, the law of unification is working so strongly in -these days of international relations, that we are at last at the point -at which we cannot longer elect to remain distinct in our national -activities. We must choose between a world state through conquest, and -a world state through mutual agreement. Which shall we take? To try to -go on with the states entirely distinct, is to invite their conquest by -a great state. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -A FEDERATION OF NATIONS - - -Taking into consideration the obstacles and the advantages summarized -in the two preceding chapters what are we going to do when the war -comes to an end? The easiest and most likely thing is to adjust -ourselves as quickly and quietly as possible to the peace that is given -to us, take up the old problems of living as nearly as we can where -we left them in 1914--or in 1917, when the war began for the United -States--and trust to our good stars to guide us to a happy haven. But -if there is one thing this war has shown, it is that trusting to stars -is not a safe protection against war. The only thing sensible people -ought to count on in these days is the judgment of their capable and -efficient minds. And it seems that the suggestion of the men who wish -to obtain peace by coöperation is worthy of the most careful debate by -men who have the best interest of humanity at heart. - -When the war ends it may be that the world will not have arrived -at the time when such a scheme can be adopted, but we should not be -hasty in saying so. It is not a scheme to be disposed of by newspaper -editors, who rarely have time to weigh the conditions of such a serious -matter, or of senators and representatives, whose views arise out of -party interests, or of high officials as a class, who are usually -overburdened with administrative matters. It is a thing for all the -people to consider, and in order that it may have the fairest and -most conspicuous hearing, there should be a great world congress, not -composed of theorists merely, but of the most practical statesmen, who -will take up the matter in a spirit of friendliness, with the intention -of adopting the scheme if it can be received in a manner that warrants -the hope of success. - -Every nation in the world has reason to desire the establishment of an -enduring peace; but the United States has a larger interest in such -an issue of the war than any other nation. Since we became a nation -we have gone on developing along peaceful lines. Having had no reason -to fear our neighbors and being so remote from Europe that we were -not likely to be molested from that part of the world, we formed -our institutions on the basis of peace. Our public ideals, our sense -of citizenship, the aims of our law-making have all been such as are -natural for a nation that has nothing to fear from external enemies. - -One result of the present war is to relegate these ideals into the -junk-heap of institutions, unless we can be assured that peace is a -certainty. Under a system of competition between states we cannot -afford to be less ready for war than any other great nation. We must -have a large navy and a great army ready to meet the blows of any -power that feels that it has reason to interfere with our peaceful -development. We must become a militaristic republic, a thing which -seems against nature. When such an attempt has been made in the past, -the result has been an oligarchy. In the United States it would -probably lead to a sad clash of social classes mingled with vicious -party politics and timidity in the national legislature. And yet, under -a continuation of the old system it would be folly to endeavor to get -along without an army and navy large enough to protect us from the -initial swoop of some powerful adversary. - -If from this fate the advocate of coöperation can offer an escape, it -behooves us to listen to his scheme. We should weigh it carefully and -be willing to take some kind of a chance to secure its adoption, if in -it there is the possibility of successful operation. - -To be perfectly fair to those who suggest leagues or federations we -should remember that we are not dealing with the ideas of pacifists, as -such. The schemes that are set forth by the friends of lasting peace -come from men who are giving all their energies to the prosecution of -the war. They believe, as much as any of us, that the war should be -pressed with every ounce of the nation’s strength. They are fighting as -hard as any one in the country, and they desire the defeat of Germany -as much as any soldier or statesman in the world. They are fighting to -establish a basis on which the peace of the world can be built. They -are not cranks, and even if they are mistaken, they are honestly trying -to call mankind to the better way. - -One of their suggestions is a league of peace, to be composed of the -civilized nations. As we have seen, it is loosely organized and does -not allow the central authority of the league enough power to punish -a state that tries to withdraw from the league. Nor does it grant the -central authority the right to punish a state which, after submitting -its case to the proposed tribunal of arbitration and losing the -decision, decides to go to war in defiance of the tribunal’s judgment. -What would Germany do, for example, if she had lost such a judgment and -did not wish to accept her defeat? Strong and well prepared for war, -she might disregard all respect for the opinion of the world, if she -felt that her future was at stake, and we can hardly doubt that her own -people would support her. - -Connected with the idea of a league is the plan, advocated by those -who place respect for law above all other considerations, for creating -a high court of judicature, with judges selected from all nations, -which shall have authority to try and give judgment on all disputes -of nations. As a part of a strongly organized federation such a court -would have great influence, but if it existed under a league it could -hardly have enough authority to secure the obedience of the great -states. As for the small states, they never give trouble any how, -except as they act in association with some great state, or as they -are threatened by some great power. No union for peace can accomplish -its object that does not deal with the great states, and any scheme -suggested may leave the small states out of consideration. On the other -hand, the small states are deeply interested in forming such a union, -since it would give them a safety they could hardly get otherwise. - -The proposed plans for a league of peace and for an international -court of arbitration were announced before the war or in its early -stages. They were made with an eye to the most that the nations could -be induced to give up of their control over their own actions. It is -possible that their authors would not follow the same plans if they -were forced to make them today. The war has shown us several things. -It has revealed Germany’s reason for opposing steadily all the real -peace plans at the Hague conferences. It has shown us what fate -awaits the world after the war, unless there is a return to reason -and coöperation. It is possible that in writing out a plan for peace -today the gentlemen who met in Carpenters’ Hall, Philadelphia, in June, -1915, would feel justified in supporting a stronger proposition. - -Mr. H. N. Brailsford, in a book called _A League of Nations_, London, -1917, announces the outline of a working scheme, which he hopes -the friends of peace will consider. Its chief features are: 1. An -international court of justice to consider and pass on justiciable -cases, with a council of conciliation to pass on non-justiciable cases, -and a pledge by the states that they will not make war nor mobilize -their troops until the court or council has within a stipulated time -passed on the several matters in dispute. 2. An executive of the league -to take steps, military or economic, to enforce the obligations of -the members of the league. 3. The guarantee of the right of secession -together with the possibility of expelling a state. 4. A consideration -of disarmament on land and sea. 5. An international commission to -see that all the signatory powers have access to raw material in -manufactures, with a pledge to permit trading among themselves without -discrimination and to follow the “open door” policy in trade with the -undeveloped regions of the world. - -In this scheme we see the influence of the war. The author is brought -to see that some form of central authority to coërce a state is -necessary. On the other hand, he does not allow his league to become -a law-making body, an omission that goes far to weaken the united -efforts of the league. Guaranteeing the right of secession, also shows -that the author of the plan is unwilling to merge the nations into -a great state, in which they will each give up a portion of their -sovereignty. His plan is a little stronger than the American plan but -it nevertheless falls short of being a federation. - -If we are to make a serious attempt to obtain enduring peace by -coöperation it behooves us to start on the basis of sufficient force to -insure that the attempt will be worth while. If that cannot be done, -it is unwise to make the attempt, since to trust ourselves at this -juncture to that which we have good reason to believe insufficient -only lulls us to a false sense of security and dissipates resolution -that might with better effect be used in an opposite direction. If we -do not have peace through coöperation we must maintain a sharp state -of preparation for war. Furthermore, no people can be rallied to a -scheme which seems insufficient to them. Give them that which they -can trust and they can perhaps be made to support it, in spite of the -inconveniences they find in it. - -Probably it is not too much to say that the only form of united action -that can be relied on is a federation with enough cohesive force to -guard against secession, repress any constituent state that defies -the united will, make laws that concern the purposes for which the -federation is formed, exercise the right of interpreting those laws -by a system of federal courts, and maintain an executive that can -make itself obeyed. It need not have these extensive functions for -all the areas of government, but it should have them for those things -that concern the declaration of war and the preservation of peace. It -means that to escape an era of conflict ending, perhaps, in a world -united through conquest as the Roman Empire was united, we establish -by agreement a world united through federation, as the United States -of America were united. A league of nations, under the plans suggested -above, would be only a half-way house that would lead to rupture and -failure or to some future struggle out of which a world taught by -experience might possibly form “a more perfect union.” - -Some of the fundamental ideas of a federation were embodied, as we have -seen, in the plans of the Abbé St. Pierre and the philosopher, Kant. -Living at a time when the state was conceived as the seat of power, -they trusted to force to execute the will of the suggested government -that was to provide peace. Bentham, however, was deeply impressed -with morality as a force for good government, and he was willing to -trust his proposed system to the reasonable impulses of men. To him it -is possible to reply that if men were so reasonable that they would -respect an agreement to settle disputes by arbitration, they would -be reasonable enough to avoid the differences which run into such -disputes. In our modern world reason thrives best when it is reënforced -by authority. - -The attempt of Alexander I, of Russia, to obtain some practical -realization of the principle of a federated Europe in behalf of peace -followed these lines as closely as could be expected, but, it must be -confessed, in a very lame way. The failure of his efforts has been -taken as proof that the idea is impracticable. But it does not follow -that it is impracticable to the same extent and in the same way today -as in 1815. No Metternich now controls the policy of the majority of -the European courts. Republican institutions exist to an appreciable -extent in most of them. The mind of Europe is more nearly a unit today -than a century ago, and commerce, travel, and international sympathy -bind nations together as never before. Moreover all these unifying -forces are growing rapidly. When the feeling engendered by the war -subsides, and it always does subside after a war, the nations will -be more conscious of one another and less willing to challenge one -another than before they engaged in the present appalling struggle. -In these things there is a hope that the federation of Europe for the -preservation of peace would be more possible than in the times of -Metternich. I do not mean that all obstacles are removed, but they are -fewer than formerly. - -Considering these things I find myself driven, in closing my essay, -to a serious examination of the possibility of creating a world -federation out of the chaos that now floats over the globe--not an -integrated world empire, with power over all phases of political -action, but a federation that will have authority to regulate the -forces that make for war. If such a thing could be created and accepted -by the states of the world, it would make the present struggle, with -all its horrors, the best and most fortunate event that has come to -humanity since the beginning of the Christian era. If the war should -result in the thorough defeat of the present régime in Germany, -followed by the creation of a world federation into which Germany -should be forced to come, with her pride so reduced that she could be -kept obedient to the federation until the virus of world power should -get out of her system, the world would have passed a milestone in -civilization, and for our part in it future generations would thank us -to the end of time. - -The organization of the American Union in 1787-1789 was a similar -process on a smaller scale. So many of its features are analogous to -conditions that suggest themselves in connection with the proposition -of a world federation that it is worth while to recall them. If we are -not led to conclude that a similar step should be taken at this time -in the larger sphere, we shall at least have a clearer idea of what -such a federation would mean, and it may happen that we shall conclude -that it is not so difficult a thing to establish as appears on first -sight. - -Before the war for independence the American colonies it is true, -were not as separate as the present European states, but they were so -distinct in their ideals and purposes that no one thought their union -possible. When Franklin proposed a very mild sort of concentration in -1754 his suggestion was rejected in the colonies because it involved -the surrender of some of the colonial separateness. Had no pressure -come from the outside it is difficult to see what would have forced the -thirteen colonies to come together. - -The external pressure was the conviction that Great Britain was about -to adopt a policy by which the interests of the colonies would be -subservient to the interests of British traders, thus destroying their -partially avowed hope of a distinctly American policy. Then came seven -years of war and four years of fear lest Great Britain should recover -through American dissension what she had lost in the trial of arms. -Under such conditions the newly liberated states were willing to form -the American union. - -A similar pressure on the nations will exist in the burden of -preparedness and the danger of a renewal of the present struggle. The -last three years of conflict are more burdensome to the world than the -seven years of the American revolution to the states engaged against -Great Britain. Moreover, the danger of chaotic conditions in the future -is as great as the danger that confronted the Americans in 1787. Every -period is a critical period in history, but that which follows the -present struggle is especially important. - -When our revolution ended a majority of our people thought the old -system good enough. The men--and there were many of them--who pointed -out the advantages to the western world of a great federated state -were pronounced idealists. “Practical” men meant to go on living in a -“practical” way. But the idealists were led by Washington, Madison, -and Hamilton, and the logic of events came to their aid. Dissensions -appeared, taxes were not paid, and the national debt seemed on the -verge of repudiation. Then the country was willing to listen to the -idealists; and the American federated state was established. - -It was received with derision by the publicists of Europe. They could -not believe that republican government would succeed in an area as -large as that of the thirteen states. Their fears were not realized -and today most of their descendants live under republican government -of some form or other. We should not blame them too much. They had -never seen republican government operated on a large scale, and they -were not able to imagine that it could operate on a large scale. If -they could have seen it working with their mind’s eye, they would have -had confidence in its operation. The Americans were accustomed to -using their imagination, and seeing the “experiment” working in their -imagination, they could adopt it and make it work. - -The greatest obstacle to “federation” in the American constitutional -convention was the jealousy of small states toward the large states. -Since it would have been unwise to leave any state out of the proposed -system, the small states were in a position to make demands. When they -were allowed equality in the senate they became quite reasonable. This -obstacle could hardly exist in the formation of a great federation for -the elimination of war; for the small states would probably be the -first to accept such a plan, as our small states were most willing to -adopt our constitution, once it was prepared. It would give them as -perfect security as they could desire, and without such a guaranty -their continued existence is always precarious. - -Next to the fears of the small states was the unwillingness of many -people in the states to give up the idea that only a state should -control the happiness of its citizens, and that the union, if formed, -would destroy or lessen individual liberty. This idea inhered in -whatever idea of state sovereignty the people of the day held. To form -a federation to enforce peace would undoubtedly limit to some extent -the sovereignty of the present states of Europe. But sovereignty in -itself is worth nothing. It exists to give in general some forms -of life and dignity to states. If a surrender of part of a state’s -sovereignty will give that state immunity from wars perpetually, is it -not sovereignty well exchanged? No American state suffered because -it gave up control over its right to make war, but, on the contrary, -it gained immensely. Such a right is a costly necessity, a thing to -be held tenaciously as long as we are in a condition which makes wars -necessary, but to be given up as quickly as we can do without it. - -To enter a federation would mean that individual nations would give -up the right to expand their territories. Germany could not acquire -more territory under such a system, unless she got it by agreement of -the parties concerned. The British empire could become no larger by -any forceful process. But this would not be a hardship. The only real -justification of expansion is to enlarge trade areas. A federation -to eliminate war would necessarily adopt a policy which allowed all -states an “open door” in trade. This was one of the essential things in -the formation of our union; for we read that no state shall interfere -within its borders with the rights of the citizens of other states to -trade there. Under such circumstances territorial expansion becomes -useless. - -When the American states were trying to form that simple kind of union -that was expressed in the articles of confederation, Maryland long -refused to join. She was jealous of the great size of her neighbors and -especially of Virginia, whose claim to the Northwest was in general not -disputed. Experience showed that her fears were groundless. Virginia -not only never became a menace to Maryland, but she soon realized -that her wide boundaries were worthless to her under a system which -guaranteed her against quarrels with her neighbors, and as a result she -surrendered her Northwestern lands. Under a federation an undeveloped -part of Asia or Africa would be open as freely to Germans as to others -for trade, settlement, and the happiness of life, just as our Northwest -was open to Virginians, Pennsylvanians, and New Englanders alike. The -only thing that Virginia gave up in relinquishing her lands was the -right to call herself a big state, that is, self-glorification, a thing -the nations would have to give up in a federation. But might it not be -well exchanged for the right to call themselves safe from warfare? - -When the American constitution was being debated the small states -declared they would not “federate” unless they were given privileges -which guaranteed them against absorption by the large states, while the -large states declared they would not “federate” unless it was arranged -that the small states should not have the power to defeat measures that -were for the common good. Each side was very honest in suspecting the -other, and great patience and persistence were necessary to bring them -together in a compromise which gave neither what it at first demanded. -For us it is interesting to observe that in actual practice there has -never been a time when the large states seemed to threaten to devour -the small states, nor a time when the small states placed their welfare -against any measure that concerned the general good of the country. The -union formed, the people began to debate questions that had nothing -to do with this or that state, general policies that cut across great -sections of the federation, without regard to the states as such. - -It seems that if a federation of Europe were once formed a development -might be expected of a somewhat similar nature. At least, it is not -unlikely that the clashes predicted by the doubters would not be as -violent as they fear. It seems certain that at once a new class of -issues would engage the minds of the politicians, issues that would -spring from the general interests that were conceived essential to -life in the new grouping. It is not possible to say what clashes might -grow out of these general issues, but it is probable that the genius -of man would be as competent to take care of them as to direct the -issues that will arise if the world goes on under a system like that -now in use; for clashes we must have in any event. After all, humanity -has to manage its own problems, and there will never be a government -under which it will not have all it can do to make the doubts of today -resolve themselves into the confidence of tomorrow. - -In our American constitution-making one often heard the question, -“What will become of the liberties of the citizen of the state under -the federation?” The answer was well made at the time: “Will not the -citizen of the state still be the citizen of the state, and will not -the state continue to guarantee him all that it can now guarantee -him? Does he not also pass under the protection of the federation as -truly as the citizens of any of the states? All that the federation -proposes to do is to take charge of the functions that concern the -things for which the federation is founded, and these are things to -which the states are not so well adjusted as a united government.” And -so it proved in practice. No American has ever had reason to think -his liberty lessened because the union was formed; and he has been -immensely stronger in all his rights on the high seas, in traveling -abroad, in being safe from the burdens of foreign wars, and in his -rights of trade in the uttermost parts of the earth; for he has been -the citizen of a great federation of small states. - -Applying the analogy to the suggested federation of the world it -appears that under such a system the citizen of France, Great Britain, -Russia, or the United States would in nowise lose his rights under -his own government, and he would gain vastly in relief from burdens. -He would no longer have to think of wars, his trade relations would -be adjusted in such a way that no other man could have what he did -not have. In short, for all the purposes for which the federation was -founded he would stand on equal footing with any other man, and for the -purposes for which his own state existed he would have all the rights -he had before. His only losses would be in casting off the burdens -that grow out of international rivalry under the present system. - -One of the things for which the American union was created was the -payment of the revolutionary debts. Compared with the debts the colony -had incurred individually before the revolution, and compared with -their ability to pay them at the time, these debts were large, although -they proved, under the union, a very small burden. It was the sense of -security under a government which had eliminated the possibility of -interstate wars that made the burden light. - -The amount of indebtedness that the several nations in the present -war have contracted seems appalling. It would become a comparatively -light burden, if we could feel that for the future the world had -nothing to do but to pay it. The waste of interstate rivalry, the -burden of preparations for future wars, the loss to industry through -uncertainties on account of wars, all these things would disappear from -the consideration of the financiers, the credit of a federated world -would become excellent, and bonds that are likely to be quoted very low -when the artificial stimulus they get from patriotism is taken away -would be considered better investments than any bonds ever offered -under the existing system of states. The capitalists of the world, -like the American capitalists of 1787-1789, should be the most earnest -supporters of federation. - -In the United States a great deal has been said about “entangling -alliances.” As the term was used a century ago it meant an alliance -that was likely to make us parties to the quarrels of European states, -one against the other. Into such a maze of selfish maneuvers it would -never be well for us to enter. But to take our place in a federation to -preserve peace would be quite another thing. That it would pledge us to -the discharge of a duty is not to be doubted; but we should be entering -no intrigue. We should be doing the most patriotic thing possible; for -the very essence of the act would be to protect ourselves from the -possibility of being drawn into “entangling alliances” with Europe. -Let us suppose that the old system is continued, and that Germany has -a mind to pay off what she may consider an old score. Suppose she -tries to set Mexico up against us, or to induce Japan to attack the -Philippines, or to interfere with any weaker American government in -such a way as to threaten the integrity of the Monroe doctrine, have -we not an “entangling alliance” on hand? If Germany emerges from the -present war strong enough to threaten the world as before the war, -when other nations found it necessary to form _ententes_ against her, -we shall not dare remain outside of some kind of alliance that will -be formed to check her pretensions. World federation is the guaranty -against the formation of “entangling alliances” on the part of the -United States. - -In drawing the parallels between the formation of our union and the -possible creation of a federation of nations, it is hard to avoid the -inference that the two systems lead to the same end, federated general -government. And yet they are not the same. Our union was created to -take over a large area of government which the individual states could -not conduct successfully. It has a direct bearing on the citizens of -the states, it even has its own citizenship, although it was a long -time after 1787 before it was defined. It has popular elections, a -postal system, and hundreds of other things which no one would allot -to the kind of federation discussed here. It has been cited only for -the argument that can legitimately be derived from analogous conditions -relating to the difficulties of forming the union. - -A world federation, on the other hand, could have only one main -purpose, the preservation of peace. No other bonds should knit it -together except those which exist for that purpose. They would be -strong enough for the strain that would be put upon them, and no -stronger. They would be made for a specific object by persons who would -be careful that they were properly made. A federation of this kind -could not be adopted until it was approved by the authorities in the -constituent nations, which would guarantee that it did not sacrifice -the individuality of those nations. In fact, so great would be the -obstacles at this point that it is safe to say that there would be more -danger that the federation would be too weak rather than that it would -be too strong. - - * * * * * - -Here ends this statement of the arguments for the only possible plan -of coöperation that will, if adopted, give the world enduring peace. -It would be easier to form a league to enforce peace by arbitration -and moral suasion than to form a federation with power sufficient -to enforce its decrees. But a league would in all probability be -flouted by the states as often as their interests seemed to them to -make it advisable. Reverting to the analogy of our own formative -period in national government, a league would be like our articles of -confederation, weak and insufficient because they did not authorize the -central government to coërce a recalcitrant state. As a step toward a -more desirable end the articles of federation were worth while: as a -similar step a league of nations might be better than nothing, but it -would not lead to the end to which the world is looking. - -The idea of a federation of nations has been behind many a -philosopher’s dream. Jesus looked forward to it when he offered the -world “my peace,” and many another has held that somewhere in the -shadowy future a millennial era of super-government and peace will fall -upon the earth. It would be a great thing if at this day we could take -a step toward the realization of an ideal whose universality attests -its desirability. The “fruits of Waterloo” were lost a century ago by -a wide margin, due to the less perfect comprehension the world then had -of the advantages of federated peace. If they are lost at the end of -this war it will be by a smaller discrepancy. Some time they will be -secured, not because men have dreamed of them; but because, in such a -case at least, dreams are but “suppressed desires.” - -The writer of a book can do no more than raise his voice to the people -who do things. To that large class who make things happen he can only -give impulse and hope. His cry goes to those who govern, to those who -direct the press, and to all citizens who feel responsibility for the -formation of good public opinion. If he speaks to them faithfully and -without prejudice or mere enthusiasm, he has done all he can do. The -results are on the knees of the gods. - - - - -INDEX - - - Adams, John Quincy, and the Monroe Doctrine, 79. - - Agadir, 171. - - Aix-la-Chapelle, Conference of, 66. - - Albania, in the Balkan war of 1912-1913, 89, 125, 126; - origin of, 106, 108, 121. - - Alexander I, of Russia, 155; - his peace plans, 36, 45-63; - his personal qualities, 46; - his education, 46-48; - and the Treaty of Tilsit, 49; - eyes opened to Napoleon, 50; - his friendship for France, 51; - “grouped” by Castlereagh, 52; - signs treaty of Chaumont, 52; - enters Paris in 1814, 54; - at Congress of Vienna, 55; - and Poland, 56; - and the Holy Alliance, 59-64; - and Baroness Krüdener, 60; - and the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, 66; - at Conference at Troppau, 68-70; - his change of policy, 70; - and the Greek war of independence, 77; - and a federation of nations, 263. - - Algeciras, Conference at, 168 - - Alliance, the Treaty of, 65; - the Quadruple, 65, 66, 67; - the Quintuple, 66, 67, 68, 69, 79; - disruption of, 69. - See Holy Alliance. - - Alsace and Lorraine, 92. - - American Peace Society, 37. - - Armageddon, 1-5, 15. - - Austria and the Greek war of independence, 77; - and the revolution of 1848, 86; - and Congress of Berlin, 89, 113, 114; - and Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89; - and the Triple Alliance, 93; - acquires rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 115; - and the revolt in Crete, 119; - takes over Bosnia and Herzegovina, 120; - interest in the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 124-126, 128. - See Metternich. - - Austria-Hungary, see Austria. - - Autocracy, an obstacle to permanent peace, 216-224; - qualities of, 217; - in Germany, 219, 220-222; - in Russia, 219; - future bearing of German finances on, 242-246. - - - Balance of Power, 90; - under Bismarck’s policy, 93; - after Bismarck, 96; - affected by the _Entente Cordiale_, 99; - by the Triple _Entente_, 100, 101. - - Balance of Power, failure of the theory, 157, 162; - breaks down in practice, 234-236. - - Balkan States, history of, 103-131; - Turkish rule over, 104; - spirit of nationality in, 108; - growing power of, 119; - a “tinder-box,” 120; - the war against Turkey, 122-127; - The Balkan League, 122. - - Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89. - - Belgium, and the revolution of 1830, 79. - - Bentham, Jeremy, on perpetual peace, 32-34; - and a federation of nations, 263. - - Berlin, Congress of, 89. - - Bethman-Hollweg, and the Moroccan question, 171. - - Bismarck, builder of the German Empire, 91; - policy towards France, 92, 93; - and the Three Emperors’ League, 93; - and the Triple Alliance, 93-94; - his retirement, 95, 143; - his German policy, 140-143; - not for Pan-Germanism, 148; - his foreign policy, 157. - - Boer war, Germany’s attitude in, 97, 99. - - Bosnia, 108; - Austria acquires rights in, 115; - taken over by Austria, 120, 121. - - Brailsford, H. N., his idea of a league of nations, 260. - - Bryce, Lord, attitude toward federated peace, 15. - - Bulgaria, origin of, 105, 106; - its position under Turkey, 108; - national feeling in, 109; - at the Conference of Paris, 110; - in the war of 1877, 113; - “Big Bulgaria,” 114; - acquires East Rumelia, 117; - growing power of, 119; - declares complete independence, 120; - in the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 122-127. - - Bülow, Chancellor von, 171. - - - Canning, George, and the Spanish Colonies, 78; - and the Monroe Doctrine, 79; - welcomes end of the Alliance, 83. - - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 38. - - Cartels, compared with trusts, xiii-xvi. - - Castlereagh, Lord, 154; - his relations with Alexander I, 51; - and treaty of Chaumont, 52; - goes to Paris, 55; - his idea of the Concert of Europe, 65; - and the Treaty of Alliance, 65-67; - at Troppau, 68, 69; - his relation to the Concert of Europe, 74; - his object, 81. - - Chaumont, Treaty of, 52-53; - Castlereagh on the application of, 69. - - “Christian Republic” of Henry IV, 24, 25. - - Concentration, laws of, in society, xii-xvi; - progress of, 247-251. - - Concert of Europe, theory of, 49, 53, 65; - its character, 81; - its condition after the end of the Alliance, 84; - and the struggle of Mehemet Ali, 85; - and the Crimean War, 86; - and other mid-century wars, 88; - and Congress of Berlin, 89; - and the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89, 124-127; - its new meaning, 90; - and the revolution of the Greeks, 107; - and the Crimean War, 110; - defied by Moldavia and Wallachia, 111; - and the Congress of Berlin, 114, 116; - and Crete, 118; - defied by Balkan League, 123; - incompetent to deal with the situation of 1913-1914, 130; - and the Moroccan incidents, 167-173; - failure of, in 1914, 180-182, 201, 234-236. - - Conference of Paris, see Paris. - - Congo, French, given up, 172. - - Congress of Berlin, 89, 113. - - Congress of Vienna, disappointments of the, 55; - cause of its failure, 58. - - Congress of London on Balkan situation, 1913, 124. - - Contract theory of the origin of the state, 232-234. - - Crete, revolt in, 118. - - Crimean War, 86, 109. - - Cuza, John, 111. - - Cyprus, handed over to Great Britain, 116. - - - Debt, public, makes for federation, 238-242. - - Delcassé, Théophile, his foreign policy, 98, 100, 101, 163-168; - and the Fashoda incident, 162; - building up French colonial power, 163-168; - dismissed at the demand of Germany, 167. - - Democracy, not an absolute safeguard against recurring wars, 223. - - Dual Alliance, 95, 96. - - Dueling, how abolished, 232. - - Dum-dum bullets, 3, 5. - - - Economic competition as an obstacle to peace, 206-211. - - Economic laws not unchangeable, 210; - sometimes opposed to nationality, 216. - - England, see Great Britain. - - “Entangling alliances” and a federation, 276. - - _Entente Cordiale_, The, formed, 99, 162. - - - Fashoda Incident, the, 98, 162. - - Federation, definition of, 23. - - Federation of Nations, why it would now have better chance of success - than in 1815-1818, 72-76; - discussion, 261-264; - why a federation is better than a league, 261-273; - analogy with the American constitution, 267-276; - differences pointed out, 277; - the idea held up, 278-280; - arguments for, 229-253. - - Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Austria, 178, 180. - - Fez, the French in, 171. - - Finances, national debts make for federation, 238-242, 275. - - France, attitude toward federated peace, 15; - Alexander I’s friendship for, 51-53; - and the Spanish colonies, 78; - the revolution of 1830, 79; - and the wars of Mehemet Ali, 85; - and the revolution of 1848, 86; - and the Crimean War, 86; - War against Prussia, 188; - in Franco-Prussian War, 91; - later relations with Germany, 91; - new attitude towards Great Britain, 97; - influence of Delcassé, 98; - and _Entente Cordiale_, 99; - and Triple _Entente_, 100; - and the revolution of the Greeks, 107; - extends rule over Tunis, 116; - in Franco-Prussian War, 141; - military training in, 147; - foreign policy under Delcassé, 163-168; - in Morocco, 164, 166-173; - gives up the Congo for Morocco, 172; - her position after war with Prussia, 201; - future relations with Great Britain, 250. - - Francis Joseph, of Austria, 178. - - Franco-Prussian War, 88; - and the Balance of Power, 90. - - Franklin, Benjamin, his proposal for union, 266. - - Frederick William III and the Holy Alliance, 62. - - Freedom of the seas, 159. - - - Gentz, Frederick von, on the Congress of Vienna, 55-57, 58. - - George, Lloyd, attitude toward federated peace, 15. - - Gerard, James W., xiii. - - Germany, attitude of, toward federated peace, 13; - opposed plans of Hague Conference, 38; - and the revolutions of 1848, 86; - under Bismarck’s policy, 93-95; - under his successors, 95; - policy during the Boer War, 97; - growing antagonism toward Great Britain, 97; - later relations with Austria, 91; - and Three Emperors’ League, 93; - his influence for peace, 94, 95; - under his successors, 94; - attitude during the Boer War, 99; - gets nothing at the Congress of Berlin, 117; - and the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 125, 128; - ideals and organization of, 132-153; - her broken faith, 132-134; - and Mittel-Europa, 134; - a better Germany, 134, 136, 146-148; - development of pernicious ideals in, 136-138; - under the heel of Napoleon, 138; - re-making the army of Prussia, 139; - under Bismarck’s lead, 140-143; - _Kultur_ of, 144; - and Militarism, 146-148; - the work of intellectual leaders, 148-152; - national egotism, 153; - peaceful attitude under Bismarck, 157; - under Wilhelm II, 158; - growth of manufactures, 158; - building a navy, 159; - growing military power of, 160; - Pan-German hopes, 161; - isolated by Delcassé during the Boer War, 162; - eyes turned to Turkey, 165; - in the Moroccan incidents, 166-173; - attempt to win over Great Britain, 174; - alarmed by growing power of rivals, 176; - her plans in beginning the Great War, 177; - short-sighted policy in war, 182, 183; - a mild treatment after her defeat, 194, 196-202; - economic reasons for engaging in war, 209; - autocracy in, 219, 220-222, 224; - parties in, 225; - influence of munition makers, 226; - influence of the military men, 227; - future influences on surrounding nations, 235-240; - future relations with Austria, 237-239; - influences of finances, 238-242; - autocracy threatened, 242-246; - in a possible league of peace, 258; - reasons for opposing, 259. - See also Bismarck; - see Prussia. - - _Grand Design_, of Henry IV, 24, 25. - - Great Britain, attitude toward federated peace, 15; - attitude towards peace in the Napoleonic wars, 45; - approached by Alexander I to establish a peace agreement, 48; - and the Spanish American colonies, 78; - and Turkey, 85; - and the Crimean War, 86; - and the Conference of Paris of 1856, 87; - policy during Bismarck’s era, 96; - new attitude towards Germany, 96; - new attitude towards France, 97; - forms the _Entente Cordiale_, 99; - and the revolution of the Greeks, 107; - in the Crimean War, 109; - at the conference of Paris, 110; - influence over Turkey, 112, 115-117; - at Congress of Berlin, 113, 115-117; - and Cyprus, 116; - and Suez Canal, 116; - in Persia, 128, 174; - imperiled by German success, 133, 134; - former isolation in Europe, 157; - and the German naval program, 159; - reënters Continental politics, 162; - position in Egypt recognized, 166; - supports France in third Moroccan incident, 172; - necessary for her to enter the war, 182; - probable course if Russia becomes aggressive, 202; - future relations with France, 250. - - Greece and Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89. - - Greece, beginnings of modern, 107; - the revolt against Turkey, 107; - acquires Thessaly, 117; - and Cretan revolution, 118; - growing power of, 120; - in the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 122-127. - - Greek war of independence, 77. - - - Hague Conferences to promote peace, the, 37. - - Hague tribunal and the Moroccan question, 169. - - Hatred as an implement in war, 195-197. - - Hegel, his relation to the peace plans, 35; - philosophy of war, 35, 220. - - Henry IV, his _Grand Design_, 24. - - Hertling, Chancellor von, on federated peace, 13. - - Herzegovina, 108; - Austria acquires rights in, 115; - taken over by Austria, 120, 121. - - Holy Alliance, 36; - history of, 59-64; - terms of, 61; - discussed, 62-64; - compared with the Treaty of Alliance, 66; - taken up by Metternich, 72. - - - Internationalism, 10-12. - - Italy, attitude toward federated peace, 15; - wars for liberation, 88; - and the Triple Alliance, 93; - and her right to Tripoli, 164; - weakened relation with the Triple Alliance, 164, 174; - war in Tripoli, 174. - - - Japan--effect of her war with Russia, 99; - alliance with Great Britain, 100. - - Junkers, character of, 141, 145. - See Autocracy. - - - Kant, Immanuel, his plan for peace, 34; - error in his theory, 232-234; - and a federation of nations, 263. - - Krüdener, Baroness, 60. - - _Kultur_, discussion of, 144-146. - - - La Harpe, Fréderic César de, 46, 47, 48, 50. - - League, definition of, 23. - - League of peace, probable working of, 257-261. - See Federation of Nations. - - “League to Enforce Peace,” formed in 1915, 39. - - Lincoln, President, his way of dealing with conquered people, 195. - - - Mars, his _Day_, 6, 20. - - Maryland, hesitating to accept union, 271. - - Mehemet Ali, 84-86. - - Metternich, Prince, 154, and the Holy Alliance, 62; - and the Treaty of Alliance, 65; - on the situation in Naples, 67; - at Troppau, 68; - gets support of Alexander I, 70-72; - and the Greek war of independence, 77; - end of his power, 83; - his influence not existent today, 264-276. - - Military Class in Germany, influence of, 227. - - Mittel-Europa, 134, 141, 177,185; - its strength, if established, 185; - how to prevent its formation, 186; - future of, 237. - - Moldavia, 105, 110; - united with Wallachia, 111. - - Monroe Doctrine, 79. - - Montenegro, origin of, 106, 108; - opens the Balkan War, 123; - takes Scutari, 124, 126. - - Morocco, French rights in, 164; - position of, 166; - German interference in, 167-173. - - Munition makers, influence of, 226. - - - Naples, revolution in, 67, 73, 76. - - Napoleon I, repressing his spirit, 18; - hatred felt for, 43; - and Russia in 1807, 49; - his severe treatment of Prussia, 138-140. - - Napoleonic wars, and permanent peace, 17-21. - - Nationality, an obstacle to permanent peace, 214. - - Nicholas II, of Russia, 37. - - Novi-Bazar, sanjak of, 122. - - - Obstacles to permanent peace, 205-228. - - - Pan-Germanism, 148, 161; - behind the Great War, 177-179. - - _Panther_, the, at Agadir, 171. - - Paris, conference of, 86-110; - Declaration of, 87. - - Patriotism, false, an obstacle to peace, 211. - - Peace Societies, development of, 37. - - Penn, William, his plan for peace, 26, 32. - - Persia, occupied by Great Britain and Russia, 128, 174. - - Phillips, W. A., on the Quadruple Alliance, 67. - - Pitt, William, reception of Alexander I’s suggestions, 47, 48, 65. - - Poland, Alexander I’s support of, 56; - revolution in, 80. - - Prussia, supported peace policy of tsar in 1815, 17; - war against Austria, 88, 91; - against France, 91; - creates the German Empire, 91. - See Germany, Holy Alliance, and Frederick William III. - - - Quadruple Alliance. See Alliance. - - Quintuple Alliance. See Alliance. - - - Revolutionary movement of 1830, 79-80. - - Rousseau, his plan for peace, 31, 35. - - Rumania, origin of 105, 106; - under Russian protection, 108; - national feeling in, 109; - Russian protectorate abolished, 110; - union of Moldavia and Wallachia, 111; - in the war of 1877, 113; - growing power of, 120; - enters the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 127. - - Russia, recent progress of events in, 8-11; - friendly to peace under Alexander I, 17-19, 45; - and the Greek war of independence, 77; - and Turkey, 84; - in the Crimean War, 86, 109; - and war of 1877, 88; - and Bismarck, 93; - and Dual Alliance with France, 95; - effect of Russo-Japanese war, 99; - enters Triple _Entente_, 100; - and the revolution of the Greeks, 107; - nourishes Balkan hopes, 109; - at the Conference of Paris, 110; - war against Turkey in 1877, 112; - her hopes for a “Big Bulgaria,” 114; - unable to aid Serbia in 1908, 121; - and the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 126-128; - in Persia, 128, 174; - possible future aggression of, 202; - autocracy in, 219; - uncertain part in the future, 236. - See Alexander I. - - - San Stefano, treaty of, 88, 113. - - Scharnhorst, military reforms in Prussia, 140. - - Serbia, in Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89; - origin of, 105, 106; - desire for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 108, 115; - national feeling in, 109; - becomes autonomous, 108; - in the war of 1877, 113; - growing power of, 120; - and Austria’s assumption of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 120-122; - in the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 122-127. - - “Self-preservation, the law of,” 212. - - Shuster, Morgan W., 175. - - South, reconstruction of not a model for Germany, 194, 196-199. - - Spain, revolution in, 67, 73, 76; - Alexander I and, 77; - revolution of its colonies, 77, 78. - - St. Pierre, Abbé Castel de, 27-29, 263. - - Stein, Baron von, 168. - - Submarines, and the United States, 183; - if they succeed, 184; - if they fail, 185-204. - - Suez Canal, 116. - - Sully, Duke of, 24. - - - Tariffs and obstacles to perpetual peace, 207-209. - - Three Emperors’ League, the, 93, 142, 157. - - Tilsit, Treaty of, 49. - - Treaty of Alliance, the, 65. - - Treitschke, Heinrich von, his ability, 149; - his ideals, 150, 177; - his influence, 151; - his histories, 151. - - Triple Alliance formed, 93, 142, 157; - its influence, 95, 157; - balanced by the Triple _Entente_, 101, 102; - weakened by Italy, 164, 174, 201. - - Triple _Entente_ formed, 100; - its influence, 162, 173, 174. - - Tripoli, 164. - - Troppau, conference at, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74. - - Trusts compared with cartels xiii-xvi. - - Turkey and the Greek war of independence, 77; - and Mehemet Ali, 84-86; - and the Crimean War, 86; - and war of 1877, 88; - rule over Balkan States, 104; - revolt of Greece against, 107; - and Crimean war, 109-111; - under British influence, 112; - war of 1877, 112; - and Crete, 118; - and the Balkan War of 1912-1913, 122-127; - position of in 1913, 128; - approaching friendship with Germany, 165; - and the war in Tripoli, 174. - - Turks, conquer Constantinople, 104; - hold on the Balkans, 104. - See Turkey. - - “Turks, the Young,” 123. - - Tunis, under French rule, 116, 164. - - - Union, the American, as a model for a federation of nations, 265. - - United States, the, their part in the Great War, 189-193; - constitution of, the adoption of, 267-276; - an “experiment,” 267. - See Union, the American. - - - Venezelos, Eleutherios, 118. - - Vienna, threatened by Turks, 104. - - - Wallachia, 105, 110; - united with Moldavia, 111. - - War, the Great, the real cause of, 154-156; - and Pan-Germanism, 177, 178, 179; - the beginning of, 177-179; - the changing character of, 188. - - Wilhelm I, 142; - II, ideals of, 142; - his part in the war, 143; - his character, 158; - changed German policy under, 158-160; - lands in Tangiers, 167; - his sons uninjured in the war, 223. - - Wilson, Woodrow, his attitude toward a federated peace, v, 12; - address of January 22, 1917, 12; - peace views of, 192. - - -PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - - - - - The following pages contain advertisements of Macmillan books by - the same author. - - -The Middle Group of American Historians - - _Cloth, 12mo, $2.00_ - -Back in the middle of the last century there was a greater demand for -history than today, when there are more historians. 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