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- margin-bottom: .1em; - visibility: hidden; - color: white; - width: .01em; - display: none; - } - - ul {margin-left: 1em; padding-left: 0;} - li {list-style-type: none; padding-left: 1em; text-indent: -1.5em;} - - blockquote {margin: 1.5em 3% 1.5em 3%;} - - .transnote { - page-break-inside: avoid; - margin-left: 2%; - margin-right: 2%; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-bottom: 1em; - padding: .5em; - } - .covernote {visibility: visible; display: block; text-align: center;} -} - - h1.pg { margin-top: 0em; } - hr.full { width: 100%; - margin-top: 3em; - margin-bottom: 0em; - margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto; - height: 4px; - border-width: 4px 0 0 0; /* remove all borders except the top one */ - border-style: solid; - border-color: #000000; - clear: both; } - </style> -</head> -<body> -<h1 class="pg">The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Lost Fruits of Waterloo, by John Spencer -Bassett</h1> -<p>This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States -and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no -restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it -under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this -eBook or online at <a -href="http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you are not -located in the United States, you'll have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this ebook.</p> -<p>Title: The Lost Fruits of Waterloo</p> -<p>Author: John Spencer Bassett</p> -<p>Release Date: April 26, 2016 [eBook #51865]</p> -<p>Language: English</p> -<p>Character set encoding: UTF-8</p> -<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO***</p> -<p> </p> -<h4 class="center">E-text prepared by Chris Curnow, Charlie Howard,<br /> - and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br /> - (<a href="http://www.pgdp.net">http://www.pgdp.net</a>)<br /> - from page images generously made available by<br /> - Internet Archive<br /> - (<a href="https://archive.org">https://archive.org</a>)</h4> -<p> </p> -<table border="0" style="background-color: #ccccff;margin: 0 auto;" cellpadding="10"> - <tr> - <td valign="top"> - Note: - </td> - <td> - Images of the original pages are available through - Internet Archive. See - <a href="https://archive.org/details/lostfruitsofwate00bassrich"> - https://archive.org/details/lostfruitsofwate00bassrich</a> - </td> - </tr> -</table> -<p> </p> -<div class="transnote covernote"> -<p class="center">Transcriber’s Note<br /> -The book cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.</p> -</div> -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - -<h1>THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO</h1> - -<div class="newpage p4 figcenter" style="width: 183px;"> -<img src="images/i_002.jpg" width="183" height="60" class="p4" alt="Macmillan logo" /> -</div> - -<p class="center"> -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY<br /> -<span class="small">NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO · DALLAS<br /> -ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO</span><br /> -<br /> -MACMILLAN & CO., <span class="smcap">Limited</span><br /> -<span class="small">LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA<br /> -MELBOURNE</span><br /> -<br /> -THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, <span class="smcap">Ltd.</span><br /> -<span class="small">TORONTO</span> -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="newpage p4 center vspace bold xxlarge"> -The<br /> -Lost Fruits of Waterloo</p> - -<p class="p2 center vspace">BY<br /> -<span class="larger"><span class="smcap">JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, Ph.D., LL.D.</span></span></p> - -<p class="p1 center smaller">Author of “Life of Andrew Jackson,” “A Short History<br /> -of the United States,” “The Middle Group<br /> -of American Historians,” “The<br /> -Federalist System,” etc.</p> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - -<p class="p2 center vspace"><span class="bold">New York</span><br /> -<span class="larger">THE MACMILLAN COMPANY<br /> -1918</span><br /> -<span class="smaller"><i>All rights reserved</i></span> -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="newpage p4 center"> -<span class="smcap">Copyright, 1918</span><br /> -<span class="larger"><span class="smcap">By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY</span></span><br /> -<br /> -Set up and printed. Published April, 1918 -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v">v</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE</h2> -</div> - -<p>This book was begun under the influence -of the enthusiasm aroused by President Wilson’s -address to Congress on January 22, 1917. It -was then that he first gave definite utterance of -his plan for a league, or federation, of nations to -establish a permanent peace. The idea had long -been before the world, but it was generally dismissed -as too impracticable for the support of -serious minded men. By taking it up the President -brought it into the realm of the possible. -In the presence of the great world catastrophe -that hung over us it seemed well to dare much -in order that we might avoid a repetition of -existing evils. And if the idea was worth trying, -it was certainly worth a careful examination in -the light of history. It was with the hope of -making such a careful examination that I set -to work on the line of thought that has led to -this book.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi">vi</a></span> -As my work has progressed the great drama -has been unfolding itself with terrible realism. -New characters have come upon the stage, characters -not contemplated in the original cast of -the play. At the same time some of the old -parts have undergone such changes that they -appear in new relations. I am not unmindful -of the fact that events now unforeseen may make -other and radical changes in the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">dramatis -personæ</i> before this book is placed in the hand -of the reader. But always the great problem -must be the same, the prevention of a return to -the present state of world madness. That end -we must ever keep in mind as we consider the -arguments here advanced, and any inconsistency -discovered between the argument and the actual -state of events will, I hope, be treated with as -much leniency as the transitions of the situation -seem to warrant.</p> - -<p>As I write, many things indicate that the great -conflict is approaching dissolution. The exhaustion -of the nations, the awakening voices -of the masses, the evident failure of militarism -to lead Germany to world empire, the rising -spectre of the international solidarity of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii">vii</a></span> -laborers, and many other portents seem to show -that the world will soon have to say “yes” or -“no” to the plain question: “Shall we, or shall -we not, have a union of nations to promote permanent -peace?”</p> - -<p>The warning that they must answer the question -is shouted to many classes. Bankers are -threatened with the repudiation of the securities -of the greatest nations, manufacturers may soon -see their vast gains swallowed up in the destruction -of the forms of credit which hitherto have -seemed most substantial, churches and every -form of intellectual life that should promote -civilization may have their dearest ideals swept -away in a rush toward radicalism, and even the -German autocracy is fighting for its life against -an infuriated and despairing proletariat. Are -not these dangers enough to make us ask if the -old menace shall continue?</p> - -<p>It is not my purpose to answer all the questions -I ask. It is sufficient to unfold the situation -and show how it has arisen out of the past. -If the reader finds that mistakes were once made, -he will have to consider the means of correcting -them. No pleader can compel the opinions of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii">viii</a></span> -intelligent men and women. It is enough if he -lays the case before clear and conscientious minds -in an impersonal way. More than this he should -not try to do: as much as this I have sought to -do. If the world really lost the fruits of its -victory over a world conqueror at Waterloo, it is -for the citizen of today to say in what way the -lost fruits can be recovered.</p> - -<p>Many friends have aided me in my efforts to -present my views to the public, and among them -Dr. Frederick P. Keppel, Dean of Columbia -University, deserves special acknowledgment. I -am also under obligation to Dean Ada C. Comstock, -of Smith College, for very careful proofreading. -But for the opinions here expressed -and the errors which may be discovered I alone -am responsible.</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="smcap">John Spencer Bassett.</span> -</p> - -<p class="in0"> -Northampton, Massachusetts,<br /> -<span class="in2">February 5, 1918.</span> -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix">ix</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="INTRODUCTION"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> -</div> - -<p>The nations of Europe fought a great war to a -finish a hundred and two years ago, defeating a -master leader of men and ending the ambitions -of a brilliantly organized nation. They were so -well satisfied with their achievement that they -imagined that peace, won after many years of -suffering, was a sufficient reward for their sacrifices. -To escape impending subjugation -seemed enough good fortune for the moment. -They forgot that it was a principle and not -merely a man they had been contending against, -and when they had made sure that Napoleon was -beyond the possibility of a return to power, they -thought the future was secure. But the principle -lived and has come to life again. It was -the inherent tendency to unification in government, -a principle that appeals to the national -pride of most peoples when they find themselves -in a position to make it operate to the supposed -advantage of their own country. It has been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x">x</a></span> -seized upon by the Germans in our own generation, -to whom it has been as glittering a prize as it -was to the Frenchmen of the early nineteenth -century. To conquer the world and win a place -in the sun is no mean ideal; and if the efforts of -the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> allies succeed in defeating it in its -present form, it is reasonably certain that it will -appear again to distress the future inhabitants of -the earth, unless sufficient steps are taken to -bind it down by bonds which cannot be broken.</p> - -<p>This conviction has led to the suggestion that -when Germany is beaten, as she must be beaten, -steps should be taken, not only to insure that she -shall not again disturb the earth, but that no other -power coming after her shall lay the foundations -and form the ambition which will again put the -world to the necessity of fighting the present war -over again. When the North broke the bonds of -slavery in the South in 1865 it was filled with -a firm determination that slavery should stay -broken. In the same way, when the nations shall -have put down the menace of world domination -now rampant in Europe, they should make it their -first concern to devise a means by which the -menace shall stay broken.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi">xi</a></span> -To kill a principle demands a principle equally -strong and inclusive. No one nation can keep -down war and subjugation; for it must be so -strong to carry out that purpose that it becomes -itself a conqueror. It would be as intolerable to -Germany, for example, to be ruled by the United -States as it would be to the United States if they -were ruled by Germany. The only restraint that -will satisfy all the nations will be exercised by -some organ of power in which all have fair representation -and in which no nation is able to do -things which stimulate jealousy and give grounds -for the belief that some are being exploited by -others. This suggestion does not demand a well -integrated federal government for all the functions -of the state but merely the adoption of a -system of coöperation with authority over the -outbreak of international war and strong enough -to make its will obeyed. It is federation for only -one purpose and such a purpose as will never -be brought into vital action as long as the federated -will is maintained at such a point of strength -and exercised with such a degree of fairness that -individual states will not question that will.</p> - -<p>This principle of federated action for a specific<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii">xii</a></span> -purpose was adopted by the United States in -1789, and though hailed by the practical statesmen -of Europe as an experiment, it has proved -the happiest form of government that has yet -been established over a vast territory in which are -divergent economic and social interests. In it -is much more integration than would exist in a -federated system to prevent war, where the -action of the central authority would be limited to -one main object. If it could be formed and put -into operation by the present generation, who -know so well what it costs to beat back the spectre -of world conquest it might pass through the preliminary -critical stages of its existence successfully. -At any rate, the world is full of the feeling -that such things may be possible, and it would -be unwise to dismiss the suggestion without giving -it fair and full consideration.</p> - -<p>The discussion brings up what seems to be a -law of human activities, that as the ages run and -as men develop their minds they combine in -larger and larger units for carrying on the particular -thing they are interested in. And they -make these combinations by force or through -mutual agreement. We have before us the consideration<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiii">xiii</a></span> -of the most important form of this -unifying process, the unification of nations, -which has generally come through force, but -sometimes has come through agreement.</p> - -<p>In recent industrial history is a parallel process -so well illustrating the point at issue that I -can not refrain from mentioning it. In his book, -<cite>My Four Years in Germany</cite>, Mr. James W. -Gerard contrasts great industrial combinations in -the United States and Germany. In one country -are trusts, in the other great companies -known as cartels. The development of the trust -we know well. It came out of a process of competitive -war. Some large manufacturer who -possessed ability for war, formed an initial group -of manufacturers with the prospect of controlling -a large part of the market. He was careful to -see that his own group had the best possible organization, -central control, and a loyal body of -subordinates. Then he opened his attack on his -smaller rivals, and in most cases they were driven -into surrender or bankruptcy. It was a hard -process, but it led to industrial unity with its -many advantages.</p> - -<p>The cartel began with co-operation. All the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiv">xiv</a></span> -persons or companies manufacturing a given -article were asked to unite in its creation. They -pooled their resources, adopted common buying -and selling agencies, and shared the returns -amicably. They proved very profitable for the -shareholders, and they strengthened the national -industry in its competition against foreigners. -In the United States the trust has been unpopular, -despite its many economic advantages. The -reason is the battle-like methods by which it destroyed -its rivals. The result was the enactment -of laws to restrain its development, laws so contrary -to the trend of the times that they have -been very tardily enforced. The cartel, established -with the co-operation of the whole group -of manufacturers, aroused no antagonism and -obtained the approval of the laws. It is not necessary -to say which is the better of these two -methods of arriving at the same object.</p> - -<p>Turning to the subject with which we are here -chiefly concerned, it is interesting to note that -Germany has undertaken in the last years to -carry forward her world expansion by methods -that are entirely different. While she has federated -in industrial life she appears in her foreign<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xv">xv</a></span> -relations as a true representative of the spirit -that built up the trusts. She means to unify -her competitor states, not as she has united her -industries, but as the American trusts secured the -whole field of operations. First she forms a -small group with herself at the head. In the -group are Germany, Austria, Turkey, and, later -on, Bulgaria. At this stage of her progress she -has gone as far as the Standard Oil Company had -gone when Mr. Rockefeller had perfected the -idea of the “trust” in 1882. Her next step was -to attack her rivals. France she would crush at -a blow, first lulling Great Britain to inactivity -by feigned friendship and the promise of gains -in the Near East. Then she would do what she -would with Russia. With these two nations disposed -of, Britain, the unready, could be easily -brought to terms, and the United States would -then be at her mercy. The mass of German people -had not, perhaps, reasoned the process out in -this way; but it was so easily seen that it could -not have escaped the minds of the leaders of the -German military party. No trust builder ever -made fairer plans for the upbuilding of his enterprise -than these gentlemen made for putting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xvi">xvi</a></span> -through their combination, before which they -saw in their minds the states of the world toppling. -So well were the plans made and so -efficient were the strokes that the utmost efforts -of the rest of the world have become necessary to -defeat the German hopes.</p> - -<p>The United States have approached the problem -of world relations in another spirit. Rejecting -the spirit of the trust magnate, which -Germany accepted, we have turned to coöperation -as the means of avoiding international -competition and distrust. President Wilson’s -repeated suggestions of a federated peace are -couched in the exact spirit of the cartel. He -asks that war may be replaced by coöperation, -pointing out the tremendous advantage to all -if the machinery of competition can be discarded.</p> - -<p>Viewed in its largest aspects, therefore, the -present struggle has resolved itself into a debate -over the amount of unity that shall in the future -exist between states. It does not seem possible -that Austria will ever be a thoroughly sovereign -state again, nor that Turkey will escape from -the snare in which her feet are caught. What -degree of unity this will engender between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xvii">xvii</a></span> -France and Great Britain, if the old system of -international relations continues, it is not hard -to guess. And as for the small states of Europe, -their future is very perplexing.</p> - -<p>This much rests on the assumption that Germany -and her allied neighbours are going to -make peace without defeat and without victory. -If they should be able to carry off a triumph, -which now seems impossible, it would not be hard -to tell in what manner unification would come. -However the result, the separateness of European -states will probably be diminished, and -their interdependence, either in two large groupings -or in some more or less strong general -grouping, will be increased.</p> - -<p>No wise man will undertake to say which form -of interdependence will be the result. But it -seems certain that we stand today with two roads -before us, each leading to the same end, a stronger -degree of unity. One goes by way of German -domination, the other by way of equal and mutual -agreement. I do not need to say which will be -pleasanter to those who travel. We cannot -stand at the crossing forever: some day we shall -pass down one of the roads. It is said that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xviii">xviii</a></span> -world is not yet ready to choose the second road, -and that it must go on in the old way, fighting -off attempts at domination, until it learns the -advantages of co-operation. It may be so; but -meanwhile it is a glorious privilege to strike a -blow, however weak, in behalf of reason.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xix">xix</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2> -</div> - -<table summary="Contents"> - <tr class="small"> - <td> </td> - <td class="tdr" colspan="2">PAGE</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdl" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_ix">ix</a></td></tr> - <tr class="small"> - <td class="tdl" colspan="2">CHAPTER</td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">I</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Question of Permanent Peace</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">1</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">II</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Early Advocates of Universal Peace</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">23</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">III</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Problems of the Napoleonic Wars</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">43</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">IV</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Europe Under the Concert of the Powers</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">65</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">V</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Later Phases of the Concert of Europe</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">83</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VI</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Balkan States</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">103</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">German Ideals and Organization</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">132</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">VIII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Failure of the Old European System</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">154</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">IX</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">If the Submarines Fail</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">184</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">X</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Obstacles to an Enduring Peace</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">205</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XI</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Arguments for a Federation of States</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">229</a></td></tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr top">XII</td> - <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">A Federation of Nations</span></td> - <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">254</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">1</a></span></p> - -<h2><span class="larger">THE LOST FRUITS OF<br /> -WATERLOO</span></h2> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="nobreak p2 vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE QUESTION OF PERMANENT PEACE</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>When war broke over the world three years -ago many ministers and other people declared -that Armageddon had come. They had in mind -a tradition founded on a part of the sixteenth -chapter of Revelations, in which the prophet was -supposed to describe a vision of the end of the -world. In that awful day seven angels appeared -with seven vials of wrath, and the contents of each -when poured out wiped away something that was -dear to the men of the earth. The sixth angel -poured out on the waters of the river Euphrates, -and they were dried up; and then unclean spirits -issued from the mouths of the dragons and of -other beasts and from the mouth of the false -prophet, and they went into the kings of the -earth, then the political rulers of mankind, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2">2</a></span> -induced them to bring the people together “to -the battle of that great day of God Almighty.” -And the armies met at Armageddon and fought -there the last battle of time. This striking figure -made a deep impression on the early Christians, -and out of it arose the belief that some -day would come a great and final war, in which -the nations of the earth would unite for their -mutual destruction, after which the spirit of -righteousness would establish a millennial reign -of peace. And so when most of the nations of -the world came together in war in 1914, many -persons pronounced the struggle the long expected -Armageddon.</p> - -<p>It was easy to say in those days of excitement -that this war was going to be the last. Madness -it certainly was, and surely a mad world would -come back to reasonableness after a season of -brutal destruction. Common sense, humanity, -and the all powerful force of economic interest -would bring the struggle to an end, and then by -agreement steps would be taken to make a recurrence -of the situation impossible.</p> - -<p>It was in the days when we still had confidence -in civilization. Humanity, we said, had developed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3">3</a></span> -to such an extent that it could not return to -the chaos that an age of war would imply. International -law was still considered a binding body -of morality, if not of actual law. International -public opinion was believed to have power to punish -national wrong-doers. We who teach said as -much to our classes many times in those days of -innocence. In all sincerity we felt that a nation -could not do this or that thing because public -opinion would not tolerate it. How far distant -seem now the days of early summer in 1914!</p> - -<p>We had adopted many specific rules to restrain -needless barbarity in war. For example, -we would not use dum-dum bullets, nor drop -bombs on non-combatants, nor shell the homes of -innocent dwellers on the seashore. It was considered -an achievement of the civilized spirit that -an army occupying enemy territory would respect -the rights of the non-combatant inhabitants, -set guards over private property, protect women -and children from injury, and permit civilians to -go about their business as long as they did not intermeddle -with military matters. In three and -a half horrible years we have drifted a long -way from these protestations. Those of us who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4">4</a></span> -once studied the elements of international law -may well study them again when the war is over, -if, indeed, international law is still thought worth -studying.</p> - -<p>In the vision the angel poured out his vial on -the great river, to the early men of Mesapotamia -the symbol of the great waters. In our own day -we have seen strange engines of wrath placed in -the great waters, foul spirits that destroy men -and ships in disregard of the rules of fair fighting. -And out of the mouths of dragons and other -loathsome beasts, and of false prophets as well, -evil spirits have issued in these sad days. They -have taken their places in the hearts and minds -of self-willed men and made beasts of them; so -that the rest of humanity have had to fight against -them and suffer themselves to be killed by them, -in order that the wicked shall not triumph over -the whole earth.</p> - -<p>The war has been gruesome beyond the imagination -of man. No other recorded experience -has told us of so much killing, and of so many -different ways of killing. Men have been slain -with swords, cannon, great howitzers, rifles, -machine guns, tanks, liquid fire, electrified wires,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span> -and finally with the germs of disease deliberately -planted. Nothing that science could invent for -destroying human life has been omitted, except, -possibly, dum-dum bullets; and in view of the -use of much more cruel means we may well ask, -“Why not dum-dums also?”</p> - -<p>We must admit that if the author of the Book -of Revelations had prophetic insight and foresaw -the world struggle that now is, he did not overpaint -its terrors. And so, asks the man of faith, -if the first part of the vision comes true, why -may not the second part likewise come true? -If the seer could foresee the war and its horrors, -may he not also have spoken truly when he foretold -that after Armageddon wars would be no -more; for God would wipe away the desire for -them from the hearts of men?</p> - -<p>To this question I answer: If a man is left -in the world when this conflict is ended who -glories in deliberate war, he is too bad to live in -civilized society. Certain it is that the vast -majority of men and women are already convinced -that the desire for war, henceforth and -forever, is wiped out of their hearts. In the -stress of actual battle or in the preparations to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">6</a></span> -sustain those who fight they may forget the -fundamental folly of the whole thing for the time; -but it is always at the bottom of their hearts. -What is the human power of reasoning worth, -if it is not able to devise some way to escape -from this obsession of self-slaughter?</p> - -<p>Do not be deceived by the strut of Mars. His -<em>Day</em> has come with a vengeance. He has shot -up rapidly, like a jimson-weed, and blossomed -like a cactus. We may have laughed at him in -the days of peace, but we now look to him for -protection. We cannot decry the men who are -dying for us, dying in the best sportsmanslike -manner. But we do not like their business as a -business, and we wish at the bottom of our hearts -that it were abolished as a peril to humanity. -And we believe that of all who hate war, none -hate it more than those who are actually fighting -in this struggle. Let us give Mars his <em>Day</em> and -all the glory that belongs to it, but let us not -forget peace while we serve war.</p> - -<p>Nor should we be deceived by the pallid pacifist. -He has his counterpart in every struggle; -and in general he serves some good purpose in -a multitude of opinions. But the day of stress<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span> -and world crisis is not his <em>Day</em>; and the practical -world loses little time in putting him in his place. -The pacifist does not represent the peace movement -in its freest and most significant form. -The advocates of peace today who are best serving -its promotion are those who are out in the -armies bent on putting down that nation who is -the most dangerous enemy of peace.</p> - -<p>These men are not mere pieces of machinery -in a great driving process. They are thinking -men with political power in their hands, either -actually or potentially. War is a great schoolteacher. -It has lasted in our own time nearly as -long as a course in college. The soldiers who -survive from the beginning of this conflict may -now be considered as more than half through -their senior year. They know what war is and -what it means, and they know something about -the necessary form of coöperation that must -exist in any society before the will of the people -can be carried into effect. They knew little -about war four years ago: they now know all the -professors know. Behind the lines and here in -our homes one never sees man nor woman who -does not admit that it would be a blessing to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8">8</a></span> -make war impossible; but few of us have any idea -how to go about getting it made impossible. -Many of us think we shall never get people to -act together in such a cause. But it seems unreasonable -to expect that men who have raided -through “No Man’s Land,” captured trenches -and defeated great armies through organization -and initiative should quail before the inertia -of opinion, perhaps the chief obstacle confronting -those who labor for a coöperative peace.</p> - -<p>The example of the Russians is a useful point -in this connection. At the beginning of the war -their armies were as machine-like as any armies -could be. The privates were generally peasants -who did not know why they fought, and who certainly -had nothing to say about the origin of the -war. They were typical “cannon-fodder,” and -as unthinking as any modern soldier can be. -They have learned much from less than three -years of war. They slowly acquired purpose, -a sense of organization, and leaders whom they -follow. Having made this progress they overthrew -the imperial government, drove away the -great nobles, put an ensign in the place of a -former grand duke and two exiles in the seats<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span> -of the highest officials, and stripped the highest -born army officers of their titles and insignia.</p> - -<p>At the present writing they are holding out -against all attempts to overthrow them, they are -playing the diplomatic game with Germany -without discredit,<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> and they are reported to be -shaking the foundations of autocracy in Austria. -At any rate, it must be confessed that a small -group of the Russian “cannon-fodder” have -made commendable progress in the process of -education during the last ten months. The -process seems to have been under the direction -of the socialists, a small but well organized group -of intelligent persons who do not lack initiative. -It is they who are educating the Russian peasants -into political self-expression.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> Since the above was written events have occurred in Russia -which seem to discredit the diplomacy of the revolutionists; but -the general situation is so unsettled that no conclusions can be -drawn at this time, February 27, 1918.</p></div> - -<p>The possible results of this incident are tremendous. -Nowhere else in the world have the -agricultural classes fallen into one party with -vigorous and trained leaders. If Russia is now -embarking on an era of representative government,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span> -as seems probable, she is passing through -a stage in which political parties are being -crystallized. So far, it does not appear that any -considerable party is organized in the vast empire -on what we should call a conservative basis. It -will be an interesting experiment in political -history if Russia has a great peasant party in -control of the administration.</p> - -<p>The party that now controls Russia is committed -to the idea of a peace through the coöperation -of the nations. It is true that internationalism -goes further than mere federation of -nations; for it also implies the socialization of industry, -the equal distribution of property. In -short, it is the internationalism and unification of -the industrial classes in all nations for a combined -opposition to capital. With these aims -we shall, probably, not be pleased. But they -imply the destruction of war; and it now seems -possible that Russia will stand before the world, -at least until the radical elements fall before -conservatives, as the most prominent champion -of coöperative peace.</p> - -<p>As to the socialistic purpose of the internationalists, -it stands apart logically from that feature<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span> -of their doctrine that relates to the mere -coöperation of nations. They would say, probably, -that coöperation is but incidental to their -main desire, the unification of the workers of -the world. But it is right to expect that they -would support coöperation among the nations -to obtain the destruction of war, since it would -make it easier for the world to accept their other -ideals. On the other hand the man who opposes -internationalism as such, could accept the aid of -a radical Russia in obtaining federated peace, -without feeling that in doing so he was necessarily -contributing to the promotion of the socialistic -features of internationalism.</p> - -<p>This remarkable shifting of power in Russia -has had its counterpart on a less impressive scale -in other countries. Whether it comes to the -point of explosion or not, there is in the minds -of all—the thoughtful people, the working-men, -and all intermediate classes—a growing belief -that a new idea should rule the relations of -nations among themselves. From an age of international -competition they are turning to the -hope of an era of international agreement; and -it does not appear that their influence will be unheeded<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span> -when men come to face steadily the -problems the war is sure to leave behind it.</p> - -<p>Most notable influence of all in behalf of a -federated peace is the position taken by President -Wilson. In the beginning of this conflict -he had the scholar’s horror of warfare, and he has -taken more than one opportunity to suggest the -formation of a league of nations to prevent the -outbreak of future wars. His address to Congress -on January 22, 1917, was a notable presentation -of the idea to the world. Enthusiastic -hearers pronounced the occasion a turning-point -in history. Whether a league of nations is established -or not, according to the president’s -desires, his support of the idea has given it a -great push forward. He has taken it out of the -realm of the ideal and made it a practical thing, -to be discussed gravely in the cabinets of rulers.</p> - -<p>A year after the question has been brought -forward, it should be possible to form an opinion -of the attitude of European nations in regard -to the suggestion. From all of them, including -Germany and Austria, have come courteous -allusions to the idea of the president; and the -pope has given it his support. But it is not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span> -clear that all are sincerely in favor of a logically -constituted league that will have power to do -what it is expected to do. That President Wilson -will continue to urge steps in this direction -is to be taken as certain. The measure of his -success will be the amount of hearty and substantial -support he has from that large class of -people who still ask: “Can’t something be done -to stop war forever?”</p> - -<p>When this page is being written the newspapers -are full of a discussion of the two speeches -that came from the central powers on January -25, 1918, one from Chancellor von Hertling of -Germany, and the other from Count Czernin, of -Austria. In the former is the following utterance:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“I am sympathetically disposed, as my political activity -shows, toward every idea which eliminates for the future -a possibility or a probability of war, and will promote -a peaceful and harmonious collaboration of nations. If the -idea of a bond of nations, as suggested by President -Wilson, proves on closer examination really to be conceived -in a spirit of complete justice and complete impartiality -toward all, then the imperial government is gladly ready, -when all other pending questions have been settled, to -begin the examination of the basis of such a bond of nations.”</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span> -This very guarded utterance means much or -little, as the German rulers may hereafter determine. -By offering impossible conditions of what -they may pronounce “complete justice and complete -impartiality to all” they may be able to -nullify whatever promise may be incorporated in -it. On the other hand, the sentiment, if accepted -in a fair spirit and without exaggerated demands, -may be a real step toward realizing President -Wilson’s desires. If, for example, Germany -should insist, as a condition for the formation -of a “bond of nations,” that Great Britain give -up her navy, or dismantle Gibraltar, while she -herself retained her immense Krupp works and -her power to assemble her army at a moment’s -notice, it is hardly likely the demand would be -granted. We can best know what Germany -will do in this matter when we see to what extent -she is willing to acknowledge that her war -is a failure and that her military policy is a -vast and expensive affair that profits nothing. -Moreover, there is a slight sneer in the chancellor’s -words, as though he does not consider the -president’s idea entirely within the range of the -diplomacy of experienced statesmen; and this is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span> -not very promising for the outcome—unless, -indeed, the logic of future events opens his eyes -to the meaning of the new spirit that the war has -aroused.</p> - -<p>Among our own allies the suggestion of our -president has found a kinder reception. Mr. -Lloyd George has announced his general support -of the proposition, and Lord Bryce and others -have given it cordial indorsement. It seems -that if the United States urges the formation -of a league of peace, she will have the coöperation -of Great Britain. As to the position of -France and Italy, the matter is not so clear. -They probably are too deeply impressed by the -danger they will ever face from powerful neighbors -to feel warranted in dismissing their armies, -unless the best assurance is given that Germany -and Austria accept federated peace in all good -faith.</p> - -<p>As the contending nations approach that state -of exhaustion which presages an end of the war, -the question of such a peace becomes increasingly -important. Everything points to the conclusion -that the time has arrived to debate this subject. -If the hopes of August, 1914, that Armageddon<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span> -would be succeeded by an era of permanent -peace are to be realized, they will not come without -the serious thought of men who are willing -to dare something for their ideals. And if they -come out of the present cataclysm it is time to -be up and doing. The sentiment that exists in -this country, and in other countries, must be -organized and made effective at the critical -moment. There is nothing more dispiriting to -the student of history than to observe as he reads -how many favorable moments for turning some -happy corner in the progress of humanity were -allowed to pass without effort to utilize them. -It has been a hundred years since the world had -another opportunity like this that faces us, and -if it is not now tried out to the utmost possibility, -there is little hope that the next century will be as -bloodless as the past has been, even with the -present conflict included.</p> - -<p>Every general war in Europe since the days -of the Roman Empire has brought humanity -there to a state of exhaustion similar to that -which now exists. So it was with the Thirty -Years’ War, with the wars inaugurated by Louis -XIV to establish the predominance of France,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span> -and with the Napoleonic wars a century ago. -Each of these struggles, it will be observed, extended -to a larger portion of Europe than its -predecessor; and it was because the common interests -of nations were progressively stronger; -for it was ever becoming so that what concerned -one state concerned others. In the present war -the interrelations of nations is such that Japan -and the United States have been brought into the -conflict, along with China and several of the -smaller American states. If the conflict recurs -in the future it may be expected to involve a -still wider area.</p> - -<p>There is evidence that in each of these struggles -the humane men then living were filled with -the same longing for permanent peace that many -men feel today.<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> The feeling was especially -strong during the last stages of the Napoleonic -wars and immediately after they ended. Singularly -enough it was strongest in Russia, due, however -to the accident that an enthusiastic and -idealistic tsar was ruling in that country. He -had received his ideals from a French tutor who -was deeply imbued with the equality theories<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">18</a></span> -of the revolution that swept over his own country. -The tsar accepted them with sincerity and spent -several years of conscientious effort in his attempts -to have them adopted. More singularly -still, they found their only sincere indorsement, -among the rulers who had the right to indorse or -reject, with the king of Prussia, who at that time -was a very religious man. Most peculiar of all -they found very strong opposition in England, -where practical statesmen were in power. As I -read the history of that day and reflect on what -has been the train of events from the battle of -Waterloo to the invasion of Belgium in 1914, it -is hard to keep from wishing that a better effort -had been made in 1815 to carry out the suggestion -which the tsar urged on his royal brothers -in Europe.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> See below, pp. <a href="#Page_46">46–62</a>.</p></div> - -<p>The defeat of Napoleon was purchased at immense -sacrifices. To the people of the day the -most desirable thing in the world seemed to be a -prevention of his reappearance to trouble mankind. -They took the greatest care to keep his -body a prisoner until he was dead; but they did -not seriously try to lay his ghost. Probably -they did not think, being practical men, that his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span> -spirit would walk again in the earth. They -were mistaken; for not only has the ghost come -back, but it has come with increased power and -subtlety. In fact, it was an old ghost, and having -once inhabited the bodies of Louis XIV, Augustus -Cæsar, and Alexander of Macedon, as well as -that of Napoleon I, it knew much more than -the grave gentlemen who undertook to arrange -the future of Europe in practical ways in 1815.</p> - -<p>As we approach again the re-making of our -relations after a world war, it is worth while to -glance over the things that were done in 1815, to -understand what choice of events was presented -to the men of that day, and what results came -from the course they deliberately decided to -follow. Thus we may know whether or not the -course proved a happy one, and whether or not -it is the course that we, also, should follow. And -if it is not such a course, we ought as thinking -people to try to adopt a better.</p> - -<p>We should always remember that the conditions -of today are more suitable to a wise decision -than the conditions of 1815. We have, for one -thing, the advantage of the experience of the -past hundred years. There is no doubt in our<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span> -minds as to how the old plan has worked and -how it may be expected to work if again followed. -It led to the Concert of Europe and the Balance -of Power, both of which served in certain emergencies, -but failed in the hour of supreme need. -Indeed, it is probable that they promoted the -crash that at last arrived.</p> - -<p>Another advantage is that we have today in -the world a vastly greater amount of democracy -than in 1815. The people who pay the bills of -Mars today can say what shall be done about -keeping Mars in chains; and that is something -they could not do in 1815. It is for them to know -all his capers, and his clever ways of getting out -of prison, and to look under his shining armor to -see the grizzly hairs that cover his capacious ribs; -and having done this to decide what will be their -attitude toward him.</p> - -<p>It is not the business of an author to offer -his views to his reader ready made. Enough if -he offers the material facts out of which the -reader may form his own opinions. That is my -object in this book. I do not disguise my conviction -that some of the fruits of the war that -ended at Waterloo were lost through the inexperience<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span> -of the men who set the world on its -course again. Whether or not the men were as -wise as they should have been is now a profitless -inquiry. My only object is to set before -the reader as clearly as I can the idea of a permanent -peace through federated action, to show -how that idea came up in connection with the -war against Napoleon, how it was rejected for a -concerted and balanced international system, -what came of the decision in the century that -followed, and finally in what way the failure of -the old system is responsible for the present war. -If the reader will follow me through these considerations, -he will be prepared to examine in a -judicial spirit the arguments for and against -President Wilson’s suggested union of nations -to end war.</p> - -<p>As these introductory remarks are written, we -seem to be girding up our loins again with the -firm conviction that we cannot talk of peace until -Germany knows she is beaten. The decision is -eminently wise. But if it is worth while to fight -two or ten years more to crush Germany’s confidence -in her military policy, how much ought it -not to be worth to make the nations realize that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span> -if they really wish to destroy war they can do -it by taking two steps: first, end this struggle -in a spirit of amity; and second, make an effective -agreement to preserve that state of amity by preventing -the occurrence of the things and feelings -that disturb it. That is the task as well as the -opportunity of wise men, who can govern themselves; -and it is for their information that this -volume is written which undertakes to point out -“The Lost Fruits of Waterloo” and the conditions -under which we may seek to recover them. -It is not a book of propaganda, unless facts are -propagandists. It is not a pacifist book, although -its pages may make for peace, if God -wills. It is only a plain statement of the lessons -of history as they appear to one of the many -thousands of puzzled persons now habitants of -this globe who are trying to grope their ways out -of this fog of folly.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II<br /> - -<span class="subhead">EARLY ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>Those who have tried to point the world to -universal peace may be divided into two schools: -one advocating a form of coöperation in which -the final reliance is to be reason, the other looking -forward to some effective form of common action -behind which shall be sufficient force to carry -out the measures necessary to enforce the common -will. It is convenient to describe the former -group as advocating a league of peace, since we -are generally agreed that a league is a form of -concert from which the constituent members may -withdraw at will, and in which does not reside -power to force them to do what they do not find -reasonable. The second group wish to have a -federation, if by that term we understand a united -group in which exists power sufficient to preserve -the common cause against any possible -disobedient member. To form a league is easier -than to form a federation. States are tenacious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span> -of sovereignty. The Swiss cantons, the Dutch -provinces, and the original thirteen states of -North America are the most striking illustrations -of states that were willing to submit themselves -to the more strenuous process of union. They -acted under stress of great common peril, and -their first steps in federation were short and -timid; but none of them have regretted that the -steps were taken. It was the good fortune of -these groups of states that they were able to -unite at the proper time and that their actions -were not overclouded by the counsel of “practical -statesmen” to whom ideals were things to -be distrusted.</p> - -<p>In other states in periods of great distress from -war men lived who dreamed of coöperation to -promote peace, but their voices were too weak for -the times. The most notable early advocate of -this scheme was the Duke of Sully, if we may -accept the notion that he wrote the work known -as the <cite>Grand Design</cite> of Henry IV. In that -plan was contemplated a Christian Republic, -composed of fifteen states in Europe, only three -of which were to have a republican form of government. -They were to give up warring among<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span> -themselves and to refer to a common council, -modeled on the Ionic League, all matters of -interstate relation that were of importance to -the “very Christian Republic.” The only war -this republic was to wage was the common war -to expel the Turks from Europe. It was after -Henry’s death that Sully published the plan with -the assertion that his former master had formed -it just after the treaty of Vervins, 1598.</p> - -<p>Whether it was the work of king or duke, no -attempt was made to put it into force. In 1598 -Europe was in the throes of a long and hopeless -struggle for religion. Cities were destroyed, -men and women were butchered, and the safety -of states was threatened. The <cite>Grand Design</cite> -represents the reaction of either Henry’s or -Sully’s mind against such a terror. It was a -thing to be desired, if it could have been attained. -One of the marks of peace that it displayed was -the attitude it took towards the branches of the -Christian faith. Complete tolerance was to -exist for the three forms, Catholicism, Lutheranism, -and Calvinism. This was a kind of idealism -that was then unattainable; but in the course of -time it has been achieved. I should not like to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span> -say the day will not come when the other side of -the scheme, interstate peace, will also cease to be -too ideal for realization.</p> - -<p>The next important suggestion of union for -peace was made by William Penn in 1693 in an -<cite>Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of -Europe</cite>. At that time the Continent was racked -with war—a result of the ambition of Louis XIV -to raise France to a dominating position among -the other nations—, the Palatinate had been devastated, -and the will of the “Grand Monarch” -was the dreaded fact in international politics. -Penn realized that great sacrifices were ahead; -for it was as true then as now that when a strong -state rises to a position in which it can threaten -universal rule, there is nothing for the other -states but to combine and fight as long as they -can.</p> - -<p>Penn’s proposal was that the sovereigns of -Europe should form a Great Diet in which all -their disputes should be adjusted. If any -state refused to submit to the judgment of the -diet and appealed to arms, all the other states -were to fall upon it with their armies and make -it rue the course it had taken. Quaker though<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span> -he was, he would have war to prevent war. His -proposal made no impression on his “practical” -contemporaries; but he was prepared for that. -Men of his faith were used to “bearing testimony” -in the expectation that “the world” would -scoff. Although it was not included in the original -folio edition of his works this essay remains -to this day the best known thing he wrote. It -is one of the most logical arguments for peace -that we have.</p> - -<p>From 1701 to 1714 was waged the War of -the Spanish Succession, the last of the series of -struggles in which Louis XIV wore out his kingdom -in trying to make it supreme over its neighbors. -It left France exhausted and miserable, -and it had not realized the king’s ambition. -In 1713, the year in which Louis was forced to -accept the Treaty of Utrecht in token of his -defeat, was published by the Abbé Castel de St. -Pierre a book called <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Projet de Traité pour rendre -la Paix Perpetuelle</cite>. Like the utterances of -Sully and Penn, it was wrung out of the mind of -the author by the ruin that lay around him. It -differed from them in nothing but in its more -abundant details. The abbé had taken many<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span> -things into account, and the union of nations that -he proposed was to do six important things.</p> - -<p>1. There was to be a perpetual alliance of -European rulers with a diet composed of plenipotentiary -agents in which disputed points were -to be settled amicably. 2. What sovereigns -were to be admitted to the alliance was to be determined -by the act of alliance, which was also -to fix the proportion in which each should contribute -to the common fund. 3. The union -was to guarantee the sovereignty of the constituent -states with existing boundaries, and -future disputes of this nature were to be referred -to the arbitration of the council. 4. States -offending against the laws of the diet were to be -put under the ban of Europe. 5. A state under -the ban was to be coërced by the other states -until it accepted the laws it had violated. 6. The -council was to make such laws, on instruction -from the sovereigns, as were thought necessary -to the objects for which the perpetual alliance -was created.</p> - -<p>Like the two preceding plans the abbé’s scheme -was too strong to be rated as a league. It does -not allow us to think that a state could withdraw<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span> -at pleasure from the alliance; and it gave to the -council the authority to lay taxes, make laws that -were binding, and punish defiant members. It -is noteworthy for the large amount of power it -gave to the sovereigns, since the members of the -council were their agents and acted only on instructions. -Under the prevalent notions of the -divine right of kings no other method of selecting -the members of the council would have been -considered in France, Spain, or Germany. On -the other hand, the abbé’s scheme was less liberal -in this respect than Penn’s, which provided that -the wisest and justest men in each nation should -be sent to the council. It was also a part of -Penn’s plan that the council should be a really -deliberative body, a parliament of Europe as -truly as there was in England a parliament of the -realm.</p> - -<p>We have no evidence that the arguments of the -good abbé made a profound impression upon -any of the sovereigns upon whose favor the -scheme depended. The Treaty of Utrecht was -followed by a season of peace. So deeply -wounded was Europe by conflict that it had no -stomach for war during a generation. It was a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span> -time of great industrial prosperity in England, -France, and Prussia. Walpole, the wise guardian -of peaceful society, dominated the first of -these nations, Fleury, also a man of peace, was -for a large part of the time the guiding hand -in the second, and Frederic William I directed -the development of the third with a sure sense of -economy and the efficient use of resources. At -the same time Austria was under the direction of -Charles VI, a peaceful monarch who had too -many anxieties at home to think of wars against -the Christian sovereigns around him. The small -struggles that occurred were without significance; -and it was not until 1740, when a new -generation was on the scene, that Europe again -had a period of general war, precipitated by an -imaginative young king who could not resist -the temptation to use the excellent tool with -which his father had provided him. Out of the -twenty years’ struggle that now followed, no -new plan arose for a system of coöperation to -secure peace, but one of the great philosophers -of the time made a new statement of the Abbé -St. Pierre’s plan, which served as a new proposition.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span> -It was during the last years of the Seven -Years’ War that Rousseau received the papers -of the good abbé, with the expectation that he -would prepare them for publication in a more -popular form than the twenty-one volumes in -which the author’s thoughts were buried. He -eventually gave up the task, but he produced two -short summaries, one of which was entitled -<cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Extrait du Projet de Paix perpetuelle de M. -L’Abbé de Saint-Pierre</cite>. The “extract” proper -was followed by a “judgment” in which Rousseau -voiced his own views. He advocated the creation -of a confederacy mutually dependent, no state to -be permitted to resist all the other states united -nor to form an alliance with any other state in -rivalry with the confederacy. The scope of the -central authority was defined, and there was to -be a legislature to make laws in amplification -of that authority, such laws to be administered -by a federal court. No state was to withdraw -from the union. Thus, Rousseau made his proposed -confederacy rest on force. In his mind it -was to be vitally efficient government, capable -of doing all it was created to do.</p> - -<p>All the plans I have mentioned contemplated<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span> -the creation of a central authority strong enough -to make itself obeyed. They implied, therefore, -that each constituent state should relinquish a -part of its sovereignty in order to form the federation. -Now this was, as at the present time, a -strong objection to the scheme. No one has met -it better than William Penn, who said:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“I am come now to the last Objection, <em>That Sovereign -Princes and States will hereby become not Sovereign: a -Thing they will never endure</em>. But this also, under Correction, -is a Mistake, for they remain as Sovereign at Home -as ever they were. Neither their Power over their People, -nor the usual Revenue they pay them, is diminished: It -may be the War Establishment may be reduced, which will -indeed of Course follow, or be better employed to the Advantage -of the Publick. So that the <em>Soveraignties</em> are as -they were, for none of them have now any Soveraignty -over one another: And if this be called a lessening of their -Power, it must be only because the great Fish can no -longer eat up the little ones, and that each Soveraignty is -<em>equally defended</em> from Injuries, and disabled from committing -them.”</p></blockquote> - -<p>A quarter of a century later, in the beginning -of the French Revolution, Jeremy Bentham, the -English philosopher, advocated the union of -states in behalf of common peace, but he rested -his argument on morality, not on force. There<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span> -was to be a league of states, with a legislature -and courts of justice, but the decisions were to -be executed by the states themselves. He held -that after the court gave a decision in a specified -case and published the evidence and arguments, -public opinion would be strong enough to enforce -the judgment. By discarding force Bentham -had the advantage of preserving the sovereignty -of the states, a thing that is particularly -esteemed by an Englishman. He is to be considered -the first of a series of eminent peace -advocates who look no further than a league of -states bound together by their plighted word and -relying on the weight of public opinion to coërce -the individual states.</p> - -<p>He had given his life to the task of fixing the -sway of law in the minds of humanity, and it was -a part of his general idea that a high court of justice, -investigating a controversy, and exposing -all the sides of it before a world of fair minded -observers, would lessen the asperity of opposing -passions so that the verdict of the court would be -received as saving credit and honor to the party -who had to yield. It is out of this attitude that -our whole doctrine of arbitration as an expedient<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span> -for escaping war has its rise, a doctrine of such -importance in our general subject that no peace -advocate would dare reject it wholly.</p> - -<p>Bentham’s opinion was expressed in a stray -pamphlet that made little impression in his time -and has nearly escaped the notice of posterity. -A more conspicuous achievement, and nearly -contemporary, was an essay by Immanuel Kant, -philosopher at Königsberg, in Prussia. In 1795 -he published <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Zum ewigen Frieden</cite>, an outline for -a league of perpetual peace. There was a time, -he argued, when men lived by force under the -laws of nature, each regulating his own conduct -toward his neighbors, the strongest man having -his way through his ability to overawe his associates. -Then came the state and the rule of law, -and with their arrival one saw the exit of personal -combat. Kant applied the same argument to -the intercourse of the nations, saying they were -in a state of nature toward one another. He -proposed to organize a super-state over them, -with authority to bring them under a law prohibiting -wars among themselves. He would assign -a definite field of action to the new power, -with the function of making laws in enforcing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span> -that authority, and it would have the necessary -administrative and judicial officers. The -law made by the united government was to be as -good law for its own purposes as the law made -by the individual states for their purposes.</p> - -<p>Kant’s suggestion was closely kin to Rousseau’s -ideas of the state, but he wrote at a time -when the world, stampeded by the excesses of -the Jacobins, was turning away from all the political -theories that underlay the French Revolution. -It had no use for the idea that government -was the outcome of a social contract; and -if this idea was not accepted for the state itself, -how much less would it be accepted as a means of -organizing the international state! The world -suffered too much at the hands of Napoleon to -like ideas that were responsible for the very beginning -of the letting out of the waters. And -this was especially true in Prussia, where the foot -of the French conqueror was extremely heavy.</p> - -<p>At the moment when Kant’s ideas were at -the height of unpopularity came the young -philosopher, Hegel, who announced a philosophical -view of war that pleased the governing -class of Prussia, bent on establishing a system<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span> -of military training that would be sufficient for a -redeemed country. He taught that war through -action burns away moral excrescences, purifies -the health of society, and stimulates the growth -of manly virtue. This idea became the basis of -much German reasoning, and it is not improbable -that its defenders in trying to discern the -virtues they argued for, were led to develop -them. But in their enthusiasm they came to exaggerate -these virtues into habits that were often -mere manifestations of an exalted egoism. As -to the claim that war burns up the effete products -of society, it may be met by the undeniable assertion -that it also burns much that is best. One -does not burn a city to destroy the vermin that -are in it.</p> - -<p>The next attempt to bring about a system of -coöperation to secure peace among the nations -was the formation of the Holy Alliance, a futile -attempt to apply principles like those just described, -made by Alexander I, of Russia, at the -close of the Napoleonic wars. It is considered at -length in the chapter following this, where it -finds its proper setting. The extremely religious -spirit in which it was conceived was a drawback<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span> -to success, but it is not likely that it would have -fared better than it did fare, even if stripped of -all its pious fantasy, since the world was not -educated to its acceptance as a purely political -idea.</p> - -<p>At this stage one must notice the development -of peace societies. Organized at first as local -bodies they were drawn together into national -organizations in the early decades of the nineteenth -century. It was in 1816 that such a -society was created in Great Britain, and in 1828 -that the American Peace Society was formed out -of local societies in the United States. In the -same year was established at Geneva the first -peace society on the Continent, the second being -organized at Paris in 1841. The influence of -such societies was weak for a long time; but -within the past twenty years it has been much -stronger.</p> - -<p>One of the most striking examples of the -prevalence of the peace idea in recent times is the -growing use of arbitration as a means of settling -international disputes. Another is the meeting -of the Hague conferences to promote peace. -The first was called by the tsar, Nicholas II, in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span> -1899 and laid a broad outline of the work that -such conferences ought to do. A second assembled -in the year 1907, and a third was about -to convene when the Great War began in 1914. -The conferences devoted their strongest efforts -to the reduction of armaments and the checking -of militarism; but in each case they found the -German Empire planted boldly across their path, -and in this respect their efforts were futile. It -is not to be doubted that the attitude of Germany -contributed much to develop the widespread suspicion -of that country which has been one of her -handicaps in the present war.</p> - -<p>The “peace movement,” as the totality of these -activities is called, has thus gained strength, and -it would seem that it must eventually prevail in -public opinion. It received an important momentum -in 1910, when Mr. Andrew Carnegie -gave $10,000,000 to establish the Carnegie Endowment -for International Peace, an organization -which has contributed powerfully to the promotion -of peace ideas. It acts on scientific -principles, seeking to gather and publish such -facts bearing on international relations, the laws<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span> -of economics and history, and the science of international -law, as will show in what respect war -is to be removed from its hold on society.</p> - -<p>The careless enthusiasm with which a great -many people hailed the outbreak of war in 1914 -swept the peace advocates into the background -and was the occasion of some sarcasm at their -expense. But as the struggle grew in grimness -and horrors the advocates of peace on principle -returned to their old position in public esteem, -and have steadily gained on it. It seems undeniable -that the war has done more to convince -the world of the madness of war than many decades -of agitation could do.</p> - -<p>One of the manifestations of the rebound -here mentioned was the organization in June, -1915, of “The League to Enforce Peace.” This -society was created in a meeting of representative -men assembled in Carpenters’ Hall, Philadelphia, -the place in which the Declaration of -Independence was adopted. Its principles are -embraced in the following proposals: 1. A -judicial tribunal to which will be referred judiciable -disputes between the signatory powers,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span> -subject to existing treaties, the tribunals to have -power to pass on the merits of the disputes submitted -as well as on its jurisdiction over them. -2. The reference of other disputes between the -signatory states to a council of conciliation, which -will hear the cases submitted and recommend -settlements in accordance with its ideas of justice. -3. If any signatory state threatens war -before its case is submitted to the judicial tribunal -or the council of conciliation, the other -states will jointly employ diplomatic pressure to -prevent war; and if hostilities actually begin -under such circumstances they will jointly use -their military forces against the power in contempt -of the league. 4. The signatory states -will from time to time hold conferences to formulate -rules of international law which are to be -executed by the tribunal of arbitration unless -within a stated time some state vetoes the proposal.</p> - -<p>The system of coöperation embodied in these -proposals is not a federation, within the meaning -that I have given to that term. It is what it -pretends to be, merely a league. It seems to -concede the right of a state to secede from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span> -league at will. As to what would happen under -it if a signatory state refusing to abide the decision -of the tribunal or council of conciliation should -attempt to withdraw and make war at once, we -can have little doubt. In such a case the attempt -to secede would probably be considered defiance -and steps be taken to reduce the state to submission. -Nevertheless it might happen that a -state within the league, finding its action restricted -so that it could not adopt some policy -which it considered essential to its welfare, might -proceed to withdraw in view of a line of conduct -it intended to take at a later time. In that case -it is difficult to see how the league could resist -unless it was willing to take the position that it -had a kind of sovereignty over all interstate relations, -a position that involves more concentration -than the form of the league seems to imply.</p> - -<p>At this point in our inquiry into the subject of -coöperation to secure universal peace an inviting -field of speculation opens before us, but we must -turn aside for the time, in order to consider -various phases of the process by which the world -has arrived at the crisis now before it. This -chapter will serve its purpose if it gives the reader<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span> -a view of the earliest suggestions of systems of -common action and if it makes clear the differences -between the two general plans that have -been formulated, the league and the federation.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III<br /> - -<span class="subhead">PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>The career of Napoleon, which has long commanded -the greatest interest, not to say enthusiasm, -of students of history, aroused grave -fears in the minds of most of the thoughtful -men of his day who did not live in France. His -design to conquer all his neighbors was most -evident, and his apparent ability to carry it into -execution caused him to be regarded as the embodiment -of greed and insatiable ambition. -Not since the days of Louis XIV had Europe -felt such thrills of danger and horror. All its -energy was called into play to withstand his attacks. -Wars followed wars in a series of campaigns -that ended after many years of extreme -anxiety in his ruin, only when France had been -worn out by his repeated victories. When he -began his wars he was at the head of the best -prepared nation in the world. He struck with -sudden and vigorous blows against nations that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span> -were not united, defeating one after the other -with startling effect. Their lack of preparation -was most marked and was probably the most -effective cause of his initial success. After years -of conflict they learned how to oppose him. -From his own example they learned the value of -organization and method in fighting, and from -their own disasters they at last acquired the sense -of union that was necessary to give him the final -blow that made him no longer a menace to their -national integrity. It was not until 1815 that he -was finally defeated and reduced to the state of -ineffective personal power from which he had -risen.</p> - -<p>From the beginning of the struggle he was to -his opponents the incarnation of all that was -hateful in government. Few of the epithets -now hurled at the kaiser were not as lavishly cast -at Napoleon. He was tyrant, robber, brute, and -murderer in turn, and it was pronounced a service -to humanity to suppress him. In the beginning -of the wars his pretensions were treated with -disdain, but as his victories followed one another -in bewildering rapidity, his power was treated -with more respect, although there was no greater<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span> -disposition to contemplate his triumph with complacency. -As the struggle became fiercer, the -other states than France began to think of some -permanent form of coöperation for restraining -him; and they even began to speculate on the -possibility of some permanent arrangement by -which the world might be saved from a recurrence -of such a vast waste of life and treasure as -was involved in the struggle. It was thus that -suggestions were made during the Napoleonic -era for abolishing war through international effort. -For us, who are today burdened with the -ruin of a similar but more stupendous struggle, -these efforts have a special interest, and the space -of a single chapter is none too much to give to -their consideration.</p> - -<p>It is singular that these plans should have -found their most conspicuous supporters in -the heads of the two governments most widely -apart with reference to the popular character -of their institutions. It was in autocratic -Russia that one found the most advanced idea -of dealing with the future, and in Great Britain, -the most liberal of the great powers, that the -most conservative design was held. Each plan<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span> -was supported by the head of these two governments -respectively, each ran through its -own development while the armies were locked -in deadly struggle, and each was debated with -seriousness in the moment of victory when the -statesmen of the winning powers met to arrange -for the future relations of the states whose -victories made them the arbiters of Europe.</p> - -<p>The initiative was taken by Alexander I, of -Russia. He was a man of the best intentions, -and throughout the period with which we are -now dealing he showed himself persistently favorable -to views which, to say the least, were a -hundred years ahead of his time. By temperament -he was imaginative and sympathetic. In -his personal life were irregularities, but not as -many as in Napoleon’s, Louis XIV’s, or Talleyrand’s. -He lacked the royal vice of despotism, -and his escape from it was probably due to the -influence of Fréderic César de La Harpe, an -instructor of his youth, who arrived in Russia -with his head full of the dynamic ideas of the -French philosophers of the pre-revolutionary -period.</p> - -<p>While “liberty, equality, and fraternity” maddened<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span> -France, long oppressed by the dull repression -of the ancient régime, La Harpe was converting -his royal pupil to the doctrine of the -“Rights of Man.” So well was the lesson taught -that a long series of encounters with the solid -wall of Russian autocracy was necessary before -the pupil ceased to try to do something to -ameliorate the condition of his people. Historians -have called Alexander a dreamer, but -what is a man to do who is born a tsar and has -the misfortune to believe in the doctrines for -which we honor Lincoln and Jefferson? I am -willing to call him impractical, but I cannot withhold -sympathy from a man who tried, as he, to -strike blows in behalf of the forms of government -which makes my own country a home of liberty.</p> - -<p>Alexander I came to the throne of Russia in -1801, anxious to carry out his liberal plans.<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> In -1804, through his minister in London, he suggested -to Pitt, the prime minister, a plan for -settling the affairs of Europe after the defeat of -Napoleon. France, he said, must be made to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span> -realize that the allies did not war against her -people but against Napoleon, from whose false -power they proposed to set her free. Once liberated -she was to be allowed to choose any government -she desired. From La Harpe he had -imbibed a deep repugnance to the government of -the Bourbons, and in all his future discussions -of the subject he showed no enthusiasm for restoring -that line to their throne.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> For an excellent treatment of the events discussed in this -chapter see W. A. Phillips, <cite>The Confederation of Europe</cite>, London, -1914.</p></div> - -<p>One of the charges often made by the allies -was that Napoleon overthrew international law. -It was a part of Alexander’s plan to reëstablish -its potency and to have the nations see to it that -no future violations of it could occur. He also -suggested that the firm agreement then existing -between Russia and Great Britain should continue -after the establishment of peace and that -other great powers should be brought into it so -that there should be a means of securing common -action in affairs of mutual significance. At this -time he had not, it seems, fully determined just -what form of coöperation ought to be adopted, -but in the suggestion of 1804 can be found the -germ of all his later designs for permanent peace.</p> - -<p>At that moment Pitt was looking for the renewal<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span> -of the European war and he expected the -formation of the great coalition of 1805, in which -Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Sweden undertook -to defeat France. He did not dare, -therefore, reject the tsar’s proposals outright. -He gave approval to the suggestion in regard to -the restoration of international law, but he qualified -his sanction of the scheme for a future league -of nations. Napoleon crushed, he said, it would -be for the states to guarantee such an adjustment -of European affairs as they should agree upon in -solemn treaty. Looking into these two statements -it is seen that the tsar had in mind the -formation of some kind of league of nations, -with well defined powers and duties, while Pitt -looked forward to that kind of international coöperation -which was later described by the term -“Concert of Europe.” In the subsequent dealing -of Alexander with the British leaders over -this matter there was always this difference between -them.</p> - -<p>In 1807 Napoleon won the battle of Friedland -over Russia and occupied a large part of the -tsar’s domain. Then came the Treaty of Tilsit -in which Alexander and Napoleon standing face<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span> -to face came to an unexpected agreement to -divide the accessible part of the world between -them, Alexander ruling one half and Napoleon -ruling the other. It is certain, however, that -the tsar had in his mind that both he and his new -ally would rule their respective halves in the -spirit of La Harpe’s teaching. Napoleon baited -his trap with no less attractive a morsel than -self-government under a wise monarch in order -to catch Alexander I.</p> - -<p>The Moscow campaign brought the tsar to his -senses. He himself said that it was the burning -of the ancient city, 1812, that illuminated his -mind and enabled him to see the true character of -the Corsican. For five years he had been lulled -into inactivity by the belief that some form of permanent -peace was coming to the world through -Napoleon. He now realized that he had been -duped, and after making due acknowledgment -of his error turned to the task of destroying the -deceiver. From that time he did not waver in his -determination.</p> - -<p>Russia and Great Britain were thus in close -alliance, and immediately began consideration of -a permanent alliance looking toward a regulation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span> -of affairs in Europe after the war was ended. -The British cabinet took up the question and in -1813 passed a resolution in which occurs the following -declaration: “The Treaty of Alliance -[between the states which were united against -Napoleon] is not to terminate with the war, but -is to contain defensive engagements, with mutual -obligations to support the Power attacked by -France with a certain extent of stipulated succors. -The <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">casus foederis</i> is to be an attack by -France on the European dominions of any one -of the contracting parties.”<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> This provision was -kept secret for the time, but it remained the -basis of the British policy throughout the negotiations -that followed. Castlereagh, in ability and -character the greatest statesman of his day, was -then at the head of the British cabinet, and it -seems certain that he inspired its policy.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> Phillips, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">loc. cit.</i>, 67.</p></div> - -<p>He was already suspicious of the position of -the tsar in reference to France. That sovereign -had in no way relaxed his friendship for the -French people. Hating the Bourbons he would -have prevented their restoration to the throne, -and he had a project for allowing the French to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span> -determine whom they would have for king after -Napoleon. If he could carry this plan through -he would make himself very popular in France -and would have a strong position with the ruler -whose selection he should thus make possible. -To Castlereagh this was nothing but a shrewd -piece of policy for laying the foundation of a -Franco-Russian alliance which would have overweening -influence in Europe, and he set himself -against its execution. He was forced to proceed -cautiously, however, since Napoleon was not -beaten and the aid of the tsar was essential. -There is nothing to suggest that Alexander did -not entertain his French views in all singleness -of purpose. The worst his enemies said of him -was that he was a dreamer; but he was not given -to a policy of calculation.</p> - -<p>To thwart Alexander and carry through his -own views Castlereagh set himself to “group” the -tsar, that is, to draw him into an agreement with -other sovereigns in which such a policy was accepted -as would serve to deflect the whole group -of allies from the direct course which the tsar -would have followed if left alone. Early in -1814 a treaty was signed at Chaumont by Great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span> -Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia in which all -the problems then before the allies were taken -up. The sixteenth article of the treaty dealt -with the point which had caused Castlereagh so -much anxiety. It ran:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“The present Treaty of Alliance having for its object -the maintenance of the Balance of Europe, to secure the repose -and independence of the Powers, and to prevent the -invasions which for so many years have devastated the -world, the High Contracting Parties have agreed among -themselves to extend its duration for twenty years from -the date of signature, and they reserve the right of agreeing, -if circumstances demand it, three years before its -expiration, on its further prolongation.”<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a></p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Phillips, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">loc. cit.</i>, 78.</p></div> - -<p>By this means Alexander was “grouped” with -his three allies in the support of a kind of coöperation -which was not what he had hitherto -insisted upon. It is probable that he did not -realize how completely he was outplayed, when -he was forced by the logic of events to set his -hand to a treaty that provided for the Concert -of Europe, and not for the league to which he had -long looked forward. At any rate, he did not -give up his ideals and he seems to have thought -that in the hour of victory he could do what he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span> -had not been able to do in the hour of necessity.</p> - -<p>The Treaty of Chaumont was followed by the -battle of Leipzig, and that was followed by several -smaller battles in which the allies fought -their way through French territory until they -stood before the gates of Paris in the autumn of -1814. Napoleon fled the Nemesis that had overtaken -him, the city was opened to his enemies, -and Alexander I, at the head of his splendid -guard, led the conquering army down the broad -avenue of Champs Elysée, the inhabitants of the -city cheering the radiant pageant. Men reflected -that two years earlier a great French army had -penetrated to the Russian city of Moscow and -found it smoking ruins; and they could but -observe the contrast. It was worthy of the greatness -of the tsar of the Russias to show a generous -face to a beaten foe; and the Frenchmen -were gallant enough to receive the friendship of -the tsar in the spirit in which it was given. A -lenient treaty by which France was saved from -humiliation and Napoleon was given Elba, was -also due chiefly to the good will of Alexander. -An Englishman on the spot, who did not see -things with the broad vision of the prime minister,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span> -wrote that the tsar “by a series of firm -and glorious conduct has richly deserved the -appellation of the liberator of mankind.” But -as Alexander continued to “play the part -of Providence in France” the same writer became -alarmed and five days later wrote to London -urging that Castlereagh come to the French -capital. The hint was taken, and soon the manly -stride of the handsome tsar was intercepted by -the deftly woven webs of the skilled diplomat. -Erelong France was handed over to the Bourbons, -who came back to show that they had -learned nothing and forgotten nothing.</p> - -<p>The center of interest now shifted to the Congress -of Vienna, whose sessions lasted from -September 10, 1814, to June 9, 1815. Europe -had looked forward to it for many years as the -means of effecting a wise and just reform in -all the evils that afflicted the continent. “Men -had promised themselves,” said Gentz, “an all-embracing -reform of the political system of -Europe, guarantees for universal peace, in one -word, the return of the golden age.” Thus -Alexander was not entirely ahead of his time. -There were enlightened men then, as now, who<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span> -hoped for a spirit that would rise above mere -diplomatic self-interest; and we may look upon -the tsar as their exponent. But they were to be -disappointed. Spoils were to be divided and in -the disputes that the expected division engendered, -the spirit of reform was dissipated. -Alexander spent his energy in trying to reëstablish -the kingdom of Poland with liberal institutions, -but his desire that it should be under his -protection aroused the keenest opposition from -the neighboring nations. If a victorious Russia -stood as protector of a reëstablished France and -a renewed Poland, who could foretell her power -in future dealings among nations? Considering -the extent to which jealousy carried the contentions -of the states at Vienna, it is enough that -the congress did not break up in an appeal to -arms.</p> - -<p>Gentz, whom we recall as the secretary of the -congress, was one of the men who had entertained -hopes that it would give a new and better form to -the political structure of Europe. He avowed -his disappointment at the results in saying:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“The Congress has resulted in nothing but restorations, -which had already been effected by arms, agreements<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span> between -the Great Powers of little value for the future -balance and preservation of the peace of Europe, quite arbitrary -alterations in the possessions of the smaller states; -but no act of a higher nature, no great measure for public -order or for the general good, which might compensate -humanity for its long sufferings or pacify it for the future.... -But to be just, the treaty, such as it is, has the undeniable -merit of having prepared the world for a more -complete political structure. If ever the Powers should -meet again to establish a political system by which wars -of conquest would be rendered impossible, and the rights -of all guaranteed, the Congress of Vienna, as a preparatory -assembly, will not have been without use. A number of -vexatious details have been settled, and the ground has been -prepared for building up a better social structure.”<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a></p></blockquote> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> See Phillips, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">loc. cit.</i>, 118.</p></div> - -<p>Looking back over the past century it is hard -to find justification for Gentz’s optimism. The -respite that Europe had for a generation from -war was due in a sense to the lesson learned -in the Napoleonic struggle; but it was not a -permanent lesson. We shall proceed to examine -the expedients that came to be used for the end -specified; but it is certain that they did not -achieve permanently the end desired. Had the -Congress of Vienna done all that was expected -of it, the world might today be at peace. If not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span> -at peace, we might at least say that the men of -the Congress did all they could to secure peace.</p> - -<p>If we ask for the fundamental cause of the -failure of the Congress of Vienna to satisfy the -hopes of liberal men in constructing what Gentz -called “a more complete political structure,” the -answer must lie in the illiberal views of the ruling -classes in the European states. Self-government -was less developed than in the most conservative -state of today. Had the people of these -states been in power, and had they been to a fair -degree trained in the principles of good government, -the result could hardly have been as it was. -But the ignorant bureaucrats and arbitrary -rulers were in power, men who in their own lives -never knew the burdens of war, and to whom -national egotism appeared a high virtue; and -they thought only of gaining territory for -their states. They placed such things above the -high opportunity to reform the political structure -of Europe. They turned to the future with the -old principles still dominant, hoping that by a -system of concert among the great states they -could stave off war for an indefinitely long period. -They could place self-interest against self-interest,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span> -forgetting that a time was likely to come -when self-interest might lead the strongest to -dare the rest of the world, hoping to move quickly -in a moment of temporary advantage and thus -gain ends that only the most severe sacrifices -could take away. But that is a story reserved -for another chapter.</p> - -<p>Before we take up the Concert of Europe we -must deal with the Holy Alliance, which, though -but an interlude in the play, is so frequently mentioned -in the books that it cannot be omitted -from this discussion. It was signed at Paris, -November 20, 1815, and may be considered only -one of the forms in which the tsar’s ideal was -embodied. Its religious character made it the -butt of ridicule for the “practical” statesmen -of the day, and the historian has been prone to -look at it from their standpoint. But it was then -popular to express political principles in religious -phrases, and the alliance is to be interpreted -by the purpose that lay underneath, rather -than by the mere form in which it was set forth.</p> - -<p>As we have seen, Alexander I had formulated -his plan for a league of states long before the end -of the war. He had relaxed his intentions in no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span> -sense when he met Baroness Krüdener in June, -1815. This remarkable woman, though nobly -born, was a religious enthusiast who to the faculty -of intense conviction added the gift of preaching. -Wherever she went she found followers who hung -on her words and yielded themselves to her impassioned -appeals for religious devotion. In the -height of her enthusiasm she came to think that -she had revelations from God. Many a popular -revivalist of recent times could be compared with -her; and if we are tolerant of their undoubtedly -well-meant efforts to stir humanity to righteousness, -we may allow her also a fair share of our -esteem as a would-be agent of good through the -employment of human means to attain human -ends.</p> - -<p>Like the other religious teachers of the day -she was deeply impressed by the calamities of the -war. She knew of the tsar’s desire to establish -a régime of peace and came to believe she was -divinely called to induce him to take a conspicuous -step in that direction. At first Alexander, -who was not always religious, refused to see her; -but in June, 1815, an interview was arranged -while he was at Heilbron, on the campaign. He<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span> -was deeply impressed and asked her to remain -near him. When he went to Paris after the -second defeat of Napoleon she was given quarters -near his palace, and it was there, in the following -autumn, that he drew up the plan of the Holy -Alliance.</p> - -<p>The “Alliance” was expressed in the spirit of -a mediæval religious brotherhood. The signatory -sovereigns pledged themselves to take the -will of God for highest law, to give aid to an imperiled -brother sovereign, and to hold the Alliance -as “a true and indissoluble fraternity.” The -constituent states were to make “one great Christian -nation” and their sovereigns were to act -“as delegates of Providence” in ruling their respective -states. If such an ideal could have -been accomplished at all, a stronger grip of the -church on the springs of government would have -been necessary than existed in that day. The -tsar proclaimed the Holy Alliance on November -26, 1815. It was signed by all the states of -Europe except Turkey, Great Britain, and the -Papal State. Great Britain’s refusal to sign -was due to Castlereagh, to whom the tsar seemed -mentally unbalanced. He gave as his justification<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span> -that the prince-regent, ruling in the place of -his insane father, had no authority to sign, but -said that he would support the principles of the -Alliance. As it was to be a union of Christian -states the sultan was not invited to sign. The -Pope was not asked because of his overwhelming -influence in matters connected with religion. -Frederick William, of Prussia, was a religious -man and is believed to have signed in good faith. -Metternich advised the emperor of Austria to -sign but said that the document was mere verbiage.</p> - -<p>In all I have said hitherto about the tsar’s idea -of preserving peace no definite plan has been -mentioned. His most specific utterance was to -ask for a league of nations, but he said nothing -of its powers, its specific organization, or the -limits of its action. The suggestion was vague, -probably because the mind of its author was itself -vague. If taken seriously it could be made to -serve as the foundation of a unified state of -Europe which might hold all other states under -its hand, a unified state largely under the domination -of Russia. That its author had no such -object in view is not to be doubted for an instant;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span> -but who could tell how long he would -remain in his existing state of mind, and how -soon he might be succeeded by a tsar of far other -spirit? As a plan for permanent peace the Holy -Alliance was impossible, not only because it was -cast in religious forms and thrown to a world in -which the authority of religion had lost much of -its ancient hold on the minds of men of influence, -but because its indefinite form made it a possible -instrument of greater evils than war.</p> - -<p>Beneath its defects, however, was the great -idea of a unified Europe, in which justice has the -place of suspicion and intrigue, in which runs one -law, one order, and one obedience to the majesty -of the state. Alexander not only believed in such -an ideal, but he was willing to cast his nation into -the melting-pot in order to fuse such a state. He -could have given no better proof of his support of -his ideal. Of course, it was ahead of the time, -how much so it is hard to say. The widespread -popular longing for permanent peace would have -gone far in accepting unification of the states, -and in this sphere of opinion the religious cast -of the scheme was not a great disadvantage. The -thing which stood firmly in its way was the dull<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span> -practicality of the upper, ruling class. If it -could have passed these lions in the way, it might -have had a chance of working its way forward -into some acceptable form of a league in perpetuity. -But it is a big <em>if</em> that I have used. -Upper ruling classes know more about government -than the lower classes, and that is a source -of conservatism. The lower classes, knowing -little, usually act upon their impulses; the members -of the upper, ruling class, having information -in varying degrees, usually strike an average -of mediocre enlightenment, and it is a difficult -thing for a new idea to gain possession of them. -In 1815 the upper, ruling class was well settled -in power in Europe, and it was most convinced -of its superior wisdom. It never accepted the -tsar’s plan; and failing to get its acceptance the -plan was futile.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV<br /> - -<span class="subhead">EUROPE UNDER THE CONCERT OF THE POWERS</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>Having disposed of Alexander’s plan for a -federation of nations it now remains to consider -the other plan which, under the name of “Concert -of Europe,” was adopted by Castlereagh and -Metternich, though not for the same purpose as -that which had inspired the tsar. Its fundamental -idea had been in the positions taken by -Pitt and Castlereagh when replying to the tsar’s -proposals, but it found its official basis in a Treaty -of Alliance signed by Great Britain, Russia, -Austria, and Prussia at Paris, November 20, -1815, the same day they accepted the Holy -Alliance. Its chief provisions were as follows: -1. The Powers bound themselves to see that -the second treaty of Paris, regulating affairs between -France and the allies, was executed. 2. -They agreed to meet from time to time to take -cognizance of the state of affairs in Europe. 3. -They promised to suppress any recurrence of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span> -revolutionary activity of France. 4. They settled -upon the quota of men and supplies that each -nation should furnish in case common action became -necessary. 5. They undertook to “consolidate -the intimate tie which unites the four -sovereigns for the happiness of the world.” The -most important of these provisions for the purpose -of this inquiry was the second, taken in connection -with the fifth.</p> - -<p>The first meeting that may be said to have been -called under the agreement was the Conference -of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818. It was called to -determine whether or not France should be relieved -of her garrisons of occupation, a matter -which was soon adjusted. Alexander I saw -his opportunity and urged that the sovereigns -should take steps to make the Holy Alliance a -more vital kind of league. But Castlereagh interposed, -as in former meetings, and turned the -efforts of the tsar aside without arousing his displeasure. -This may be considered the last gasp -of the Holy Alliance, as it was the complete triumph -of the Concert over it. At the same time -France was admitted to the alliance of the four -powers, which henceforth was known as the Quintuple<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span> -Alliance. But if ever a question were -to come up in which France was at variance with -the four other Powers over matters connected -with her obligations assumed in recent treaties, -these four Powers would continue to act in their -old capacity. Mr. W. A. Phillips remarks that -the Quadruple Alliance still survived as “a rod -in pickle for a France but doubtfully disciplined.” -For us, who are chiefly concerned to see the result -of the attempt to take the affairs of Europe under -the protection of the great Powers, it is sufficient -to remember that France gave no further -trouble of the kind anticipated, and that the -Quintuple Alliance, as the formal expression of -the Concert of Europe, had other problems to -consider.</p> - -<p>The first arose out of revolutions in Spain -and Naples, where armed men seized the power -and forced the kings to accept liberal constitutions. -Alexander I and Metternich looked on -with different feelings. The former had been -encouraging the liberals in Italy and was not -greatly shocked by the revolution there, but he -was deeply concerned over the upheaval in Spain -and would have led a Russian army thither to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span> -suppress it. The suggestion alarmed Metternich, -who did not relish the idea of Alexander’s -marching through Austrian lands with a great -body of men. He did what he could to discourage -the expedition against Spain. At the -same time he believed that Naples should be -disciplined, since its revolution endangered the -safety of Austrian possessions in Italy. It is -amusing to see how self-interest ran across the -currents of the general good as proclaimed in the -Concert of Europe.</p> - -<p>The tsar thought the situation warranted calling -another conference of the Quintuple Alliance. -Metternich objected, being chiefly concerned by -the seeming certainty that the tsar would wish -to carry into the situation his well-known views -in support of liberalism. To him it seemed sufficient -that the powers should agree severally to -give their arms to the suppression of revolution, -without meeting in conference. After much -discussion a conference was called, at Troppau, -but it was regularly attended by only three of -the five powers. The suppression of constitutional -government was not popular in Great -Britain, and her government took no official part<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span> -in the conference. France held aloof also; she -was so much under the protection of Great -Britain that she did not dare risk British displeasure -by allying herself with the forces of repression.</p> - -<p>Did the absence of two nations from Troppau -presage the dissolution of the Alliance? Castlereagh -gave a negative reply. His nation, he said, -was not bound beyond her treaty obligations, the -terms of which were clear and specific. They -were embodied in the Treaties of Chaumont and -Paris. He considered the project of dealing with -revolution in its present form as beyond the meaning -of these agreements. “If,” he said, “it is desired -to extend the Alliance so as to include all -objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, -it would change its character to such an extent -and carry us so far, that we should see in it -an additional motive for adhering to our course at -the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us -without our having quitted it.” These frank -words show that the Alliance was strained but -not broken. It would seem that a system like -that of which we speak should have at bottom -some broad common principles. In purpose it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span> -should be harmonious. As between the prevailing -British idea of liberty and Metternich’s ideas -of legitimacy there was no ground for mutual -support; and out of this divergence of views was -to grow the disruption of the Alliance, as we shall -soon see.</p> - -<p>Up to this time the two ideas that had run side -by side were the tsar’s plan for a league to secure -coöperation of a general nature and the -British plan limiting common action to a few -specific matters, chiefly connected with the repression -of France in case she wished to return -to a policy which would threaten the peace of -Europe. As it became increasingly apparent -that France was no longer a menace this type of -union became less important, and the British -ardor for it cooled, especially since it was becoming -more and more certain that the Alliance was -being used to support repression.</p> - -<p>At the same time a change was passing through -the mind of the tsar. In all he had done he had -been supported by liberal ministers, against whose -influence at his court Metternich did not hesitate -to intrigue. Alexander’s conversion to the cause -of repression came suddenly and completely in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span> -1820, when there was a mutiny in a favorite regiment -of his guard. Sober advisers pointed out -to him that the action of the regiment had no -political significance, but he would not be convinced. -He insisted he would not countenance -revolt abroad, lest it encourage insurrection at -home. All the fervor he had shown in behalf of -liberal ideas he now manifested in behalf of repression. -At Troppau he met Metternich in a -spirit of profound repentance for what he had -done in the past, saying with an outburst of -emotion: “So we are at one, Prince, and it is to -you that we owe it. You have correctly judged -the state of affairs. I deplore the waste of time, -which we must try to repair. I am here without -any fixed ideas; without any plan; but I bring -you a firm and unalterable resolution. It is for -your Emperor to use it as he wills. Tell me what -you desire, and what you wish me to do, and I -will do it.” The speech astonished the Prince -as much as it pleased him. All his schemes had -lost in the defection of Castlereagh, and probably -more, was made up in the accession of his new -ally. Not only was the cause of legitimacy, as -he advocated it, made safe; but the danger was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span> -removed of a Franco-Russian alliance, always -a thing to be dreaded by the great Powers in -the center of Europe.</p> - -<p>In the conference at Troppau, Austria, Russia, -and Prussia now acted together. Up to that -time Metternich had ignored the Holy Alliance. -He now brought it out as his stalking horse. -The three sovereigns, controlling the conference, -issued a declaration suspending from the Alliance -any state that tolerated revolution in its borders -and declaring that the other Powers in the -Alliance would bring back the offending state by -force of arms. Under the indefinite terms of the -instrument this was a legal interpretation of -power, but it was not in the spirit of the benevolent -sovereign who made the Holy Alliance possible.</p> - -<p>Those of us who now favor a league or federation -of states as a means of preserving peace -perpetually may well study the crisis to which a -similar system had come in the development of -international relations in 1820. The tsar’s ideal -was a thing of glory thrown before a sordid -world. Not even he, as we see, was proof against -the debasement of his surroundings. If his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span> -plan had been adopted by all the nations, it is -likely that the time would have come when -the confederation thus formed would have become -an agency for reaction against which liberal -views would have been unable to contend.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, we must not ignore the -weight that a confederation would have had as -an idea in promoting respect for liberal government. -If it had been established under the protection -of the tsar, it may well have been that -Metternich would not have taken up the crusade -of legitimacy, that the tsar and Castlereagh -acting together in behalf of liberal institutions -would have insured a steadier attitude on the -part of the former, and that under such circumstances -the kings of Spain and Naples would -have been less inclined to the severe measures -which provoked revolution. Of course, these -are mere conjectures, but it is only fair to mention -them as things to be said for the other side -of the question.</p> - -<p>When we come to apply the lessons of 1815–1820 -to the present day, we must not forget that -conditions are now very greatly changed. It -was the supremacy of arbitrary government in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">74</a></span> -Europe that made the hopes of 1815 come to -naught. Of all the agents who then controlled -affairs in the great states of Europe, Castlereagh, -next to the tsar, was the most liberal. If a plan -of union were adopted after the present war, it -might not be a success, but the failure would not -be for the same reasons as those that brought -the Alliance of 1815 to a nullity.</p> - -<p>Castlereagh made a protest against the purposes -of the three Powers at Troppau in which -were some telling arguments against such a -league as was threatening. They were well made -and would be applicable to the situation today, -if it were proposed to establish a league like that -which found favor at Troppau. The plan proposed, -said he, was too general in its scope. It -gave the projected confederation the right to -interfere in the internal affairs of independent -states on the ground that the general good was -concerned, and if carried out the Alliance would, -in effect, be charged with the function of policing -such states. Against all this he protested, and -he pointed out that so many grounds of dissatisfaction -lay in the scheme that to try to enforce -it would surely lead to counter alliances, the end<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span> -of which would be war. It ought to be said, also, -that Castlereagh was opposed to giving up war -as a means of settling disputes. “The extreme -right of interference,” he said, “between nation -and nation can never be made a matter of written -stipulation or be assumed as the attribute of -an alliance.” If a man takes that position he -can hardly be expected to see good points in any -scheme to preserve peace perpetually.</p> - -<p>The evils he pointed out are largely eliminated -in the modern plans that are offered. For example, -the jurisdiction of the proposed leagues -or federations is strictly limited to the enforcement -of peace. A supreme court held by eminent -judges would pass upon cases as they -come up and say whether or not the central authority -should employ force. Under the plan it -would be hard to bring a purely internal question -before the court, and if brought there it -would not be considered by the judges, since the -pact of the federation would specify that such -cases were not to be tried. The pact would be -the constitution of the federation, and the court -would be expected to pass on the constitutionality -of measures from the standpoint of that instrument.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span> -Under a system like that recently advocated -a revolution in Naples would have to be -submitted to a court whose members were appointed -from states in which free institutions -are in existence. It could not be the tool of -a Metternich. Under such a system the whim of -a tsar, if such a ruler ever again wears a crown, -could not make or mar a question like that -which underlay the calling of the Conference of -Troppau. So many are the differences that it -is, perhaps, not profitable to dwell longer on -this point. The study of the peace problem and -the attempt to solve it a hundred years ago is -extremely interesting to one who considers the -situation now existing, but it is chiefly because -the mind, having grasped the development of the -former problem and become accustomed to see -the process as a whole, is in a better state to understand -the present and to know wherein it -differs from the past and in what respect old -factors are supplemented by new factors. Such -lessons from the past are open to all who will but -read.</p> - -<p>These reflections should not make us forget the -main thread of our story, which became relatively<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span> -weak after Troppau. From that time it was -clear that Europe had no hopes of peace through -coöperation under either of the two plans that -had been suggested. Almost immediately began -a train of events which gave added impulse to the -dissolution of the Alliance. In 1821 began the -Greek War of Independence. Austria was in -consternation lest the revolution should spread -to her own people. Russia, however, was deeply -sympathetic with the Greeks, partly through -religious affiliations and partly because the Russian -people, looking toward the possession of -Constantinople, were anxious to weaken the -Turk in any of his European possessions. -Alexander I showed signs of going to war for -the Greeks, and Metternich hastily sought to -counteract any such course.</p> - -<p>At the same time the situation in Spain’s -American colonies was becoming more urgent, -because the weakness of the government had -stimulated the South American revolutionists to -renewed activity until Mexico as well as the rest -of the Continental colonies except Peru was in -successful revolt. Metternich would have helped -Turkey against the Greeks and allowed the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span> -tsar to carry out his long cherished wish of intervening -in Spain, as a means of keeping him quiet. -The situation seemed to call for another conference -and after some discussion a meeting was -arranged at Verona, 1822. France was anxious -to take over the task of punishing the Spanish -revolutionists, and as Russia, Austria, and Prussia -agreed to her plan, four of the five Great -Powers now stood side by side in favor of repression. -They would have gone further, and settled -the fate of the American revolutionists, but -against that course Great Britain made such a -protest that the question was left open.</p> - -<p>It was not definitely closed until the next year, -and then through the action of the United States, -taken in association with Great Britain. For -when France had performed her task, she looked -forward to taking some of the Spanish colonies as -indemnity for her expenses. The principle of -federation among the Powers was working so well -that it was considered only a natural thing to -call another conference at which France could be -assigned the right of conquering the colonies. -Canning, at the head of the British government, -was genuinely alarmed. The four united Powers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span> -were willing to defy Great Britain if she stood -alone. He turned to the United States as the -only ally in sight. Would we support him in opposition -to the designs of the Powers? President -Monroe, influenced by John Quincy Adams’ -stout patriotism, replied in the affirmative and -went a step further; for he insisted that the defiance -of the Powers should be announced in -Washington, not as a mere expedient to meet an -isolated case, but as a general policy of our government. -The Monroe Doctrine was one of the -things that broke up the Quintuple Alliance, -already weakened by the alienation of Great -Britain.</p> - -<p>The last blow was the revolution in France -in 1880, which drove the Bourbon king into exile -and made a liberal government possible. At the -same time so strong were the manifestations of -republicanism in other countries that the old conservatism -was lowered in tone and chastened in -pride. From France the revolutionary movement -passed into Belgium, which the Congress of -Vienna had decreed should be a part of the kingdom -of the Netherlands. So completely was the -revolution successful that even the Great Powers<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span> -had to bow to it, and in a congress at London -they recognized Belgium as a separate state and -saw it set up a liberal constitution with a king at -the head of the government. Several of the -small German governments also adopted more -liberal forms. Poland broke into rebellion and -before its power of resistance was crushed by -Russia the infection spread into Lithuania and -Podolia. At last the arms of the tsar overpowered -all resistance and peace reigned; but the -reactionaries were sobered, and the dream of a -league to enforce repression passed away.</p> - -<p>Glancing backward we may see through what -a development the ideas of reform had passed. -Europe, distressed by the wars of 1800–1815, -had hungered for peace. Having issued from a -decade of discussion of liberty and humanity, the -friends of freedom were more than ordinarily -earnest for replacing war by an age of reason. -In our own day the cause of universal peace -stands on a broader and better laid foundation -than a hundred years ago, but it is, perhaps, no -more impressive. At any rate the philosophically -inclined men of the earlier period supported Kant -and Rousseau, among them, Alexander I. A<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span> -considerable portion of the world believed that -the outcome of the war madness then reigning -must be an era of sanity.</p> - -<p>We have seen that two plans of improvement -were formed in the minds of men who were in -position to have practical influence: the tsar’s -scheme for a league, or federation, that was so -strongly integrated that the central authority -should be able to enforce its commands upon constituent -states; and the plan of Castlereagh for -prolonging the existing system of coöperation in -a form which we may call the Concert of the -Great Powers. We have seen that the tsar’s -plan, ignored at first, was seized on by Metternich -as a possibility for enforcing a system of reaction, -that it met the opposition of Great Britain -and aroused the revolutionary protest of -1830, and thus it came to an end. It was never -the dream of any of the philosophers that a federation -should be formed which might become an -engine of despotism, yet practical use showed -that such a course was within the bounds of possibility. -The mere glimpse of such a thing was -enough to make Europe prefer the old era of -wars.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span> -One does not have to look far into the situation -to see that the real failure of the plan was due -to the wide use of arbitrary government in Europe. -Had Austria, Russia, and Prussia been -ruled by the people, either as republics or as liberal -monarchies, the great alliance of Europe -could hardly have been turned to the side of repression; -and under the guidance of enlightened -statesmen it might have been the beginning of a -long era of peace and international good will. -The failure of the nineteenth century, therefore, -does not prove that federation is essentially impossible. -It only proves that a century ago the -world was not ready to employ it successfully.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE LATER PHASES OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>The revolutionary movement of 1830 did not -destroy the influence of Metternich in Europe. -He was too able a man to be overthrown as leader -of the legitimists merely because the people were -in a ferment. To his party he was still the man -to be trusted, and as legitimacy managed to beat -down revolution in most of the areas in which -commotion appeared, the scope of his power was -wide, although it was evident that he could not -use it with former impunity.</p> - -<p>At the same time he gave up the pretense of -making the Alliance of the Powers a federation. -He was content to try to secure that concert of -action that would enable the states that leaned -to legitimacy to act together against incipient -revolution; and for a time he was successful. -In anticipation of the failure of the plan to permit -France to interfere in the Spanish colonies, -Canning exclaimed: “Things are getting back<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span> -to a wholesome state again. Every nation for -itself and God for us all!” But the cry of joy -was premature. The time had not returned in -which each crisis was to be met in its own way, -without reference to a recognized concert of action, -and the reason was the deep consciousness -of the states that certain grave questions that -ever hung over the horizon had in them the possibilities -of general war. Let one of these questions -loom large, and common action was taken -to avert the threatened danger. In such way the -Concert of Europe was kept alive, and remained -something to be reckoned with as a part of the -background of European policy. In spite of -its temporary disuse, it was a thing to be brought -forth again if the nations decided that it was -needed to meet an emergency.</p> - -<p>In fact, it reappeared many times in the course -of the nineteenth century, notably in 1840, when -the so-called Eastern question became prominent. -At that time Mehemet Ali, who had made -himself lord of Egypt and seized Syria, was -threatening Constantinople, having the support -of France. Russia became alarmed, made a -close alliance with the sultan, and seemed about<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span> -to get that secure foothold on the Bosphorus for -which she had striven many years. Great Britain, -Austria, and Prussia resented this prospect -and took steps jointly to counteract it. Their -object was to preserve Turkey from the dangers -that threatened to divide her. Before such a -combination Russia was not able to stand, and -she gave up her pretensions in order to join the -other three powers. France, however, held to -her purpose, supporting the adventurer of -Egypt. Thus it happened that the four Great -Powers, reviving the Concert of Europe, but -leaving out the government of Louis Philippe, -had a conference in London to settle Eastern -affairs. They decided to offer Mehemet Ali certain -concessions and to make war on him if he -refused to accept them. He spurned their counsel -and was expelled from Syria but was saved -from utter destruction by the interference of -France, who secured a settlement by which he -was left in firm possession of Egypt, as hereditary -ruler under the nominal authority of Turkey. -All the powers now united in an agreement -by which Turkey was to exclude foreign -warships from the Dardanelles. Thus, by an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span> -appeal to the principle of the Concert of Europe, -a grave crisis was averted, and war between -Great Britain and Russia was avoided.</p> - -<p>In 1848, seven years after the conclusion of -these negotiations, Europe was thrown into convulsions -by the appearance of a new era of -revolution. France became a republic, and Germany, -Austria, and Hungary went through such -violent upheavals that the existence of arbitrary -government hung for a time in the balance. Out -of the struggle emerged Napoleon III, of -France, who thought some military achievement -was necessary to stabilize his power. At that -time Russia was asserting a protectorate over all -Christians in Turkey, and it was generally believed -that she was about to establish vital political -control. Napoleon took up the sword against -her and Great Britain came to help, the result -being the Crimean War, 1854–1856.</p> - -<p>In the beginning of this struggle the Concert -of Europe seemed to be dead, but two years of -heavy fighting and nearly futile losses brought it -to life again. The war, which began in an outburst -of international rivalry, ended in the Conference -of Paris, 1856, in which all the Great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span> -Powers but Prussia undertook to settle the -Eastern question by neutralizing the Euxine and -the Danube and by making new allotments of -territory which were supposed to adjust boundaries -in such a manner that rivalries would disappear. -The Conference went on to take up the -work of a true European congress by agreeing -upon the Declaration of Paris, in which were -assembled a body of rules regulating neutral -trade in time of war. England gave up her long -defended pretension to seize enemy goods on -neutral ships and neutral goods on enemy ships, -and in return gained the recognition that privateering -was unlawful. Thus the Crimean War, -fought by Great Britain and France against -Russia, and in support of Turkey—with Austria -and Prussia as neutrals—was at last ended by -an agreement between all the parties concerned. -The nations undertook to settle the long Eastern -dispute by pledging the sultan to reforms which -it was not in his nature to carry out.</p> - -<p>The next three wars were fought without -respect to the Concert of Europe. They arose -from local causes and were soon determined without -the aid of the Great Powers. They were the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span> -war of Austria and France over the liberation of -Italy, 1859; the war between Prussia and Austria, -1866, in which Prussia overthrew the Austrian -predominancy in Germany; and the Franco-Prussian -war in 1870–1871, in which Prussia -crushed France and made herself the head of the -German Empire. In the first of these struggles -no state could gain enough power to become a -menace to the other states, since Italy was to be -the recipient of all territory gained. Had the -contest gone so far as to promise the vast enlargement -of the power of France by reason of -an alliance with enlarged Italy, interference -might have resulted. In fact, the German states -began to suspect such a result, and the realization -of it was one of Napoleon’s reasons for withdrawing -very unceremoniously from the war. -Here we see, therefore, that the principle of concert -was not entirely dead. The second and third -wars were fought by a brilliantly organized state, -Prussia, with whose successful armies no nation -cared to make a trial of strength.</p> - -<p>In 1877 Russia made war on Turkey and proceeded -with such energy that she soon forced -the sultan to sign the treaty of San Stefano, altogether<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span> -in favor of Russia. The particulars -of the struggle belong to another chapter,<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> but -here it is only necessary to point out that the -Concert of Europe was now suddenly revived by -the Great Powers, and Russia was forced to submit -her well won victory to the Congress of Berlin, -which scaled down the awards of San Stefano -until Russia might well ask what was left of her -victory. A similar thing happened in the Balkan -War of 1912–1913. Here the parties concerned -had fought their quarrel out to the end -and had nearly expelled Turkey from Europe, -dividing the spoils among themselves. Then -in stepped the Great Powers, prescribing in a -treaty at London the limits of gain to the successful -contestants. They acted in the interest -of peace; for Austria, watching the actions of Serbia -and Greece, let it be known that she would -not allow Serbia to have Albania, and the Powers -interfered in order to prevent such action from -kindling a great European war.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.</p></div> - -<p>Thus in three notable wars, the Crimean War, -the Russo-Turkish War, and the Balkan War, -the action of the Great Powers was not to prevent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span> -war, but to neutralize its gains. So far did -this principle go that writers were known to suggest -that war would no longer be profitable to -nations, since in a Concert of Europe the Great -Powers would ever nullify the gains of the contestants.</p> - -<p>At this time concert had come to mean another -thing than it meant in the decade after the fall -of Napoleon. Then it was a fixed system of consultation -and decision in anticipation of some -issue that threatened war: now it was concerted -action to keep a local war from going so far -as to involve a general conflict. It was a -last resort in the presence of dire danger. A -more present means of preserving peace was the -Balance of Power, which consisted in forming -the states in groups one of which balanced another -group and prevented the development of -overwhelming strength. The principle was well -known in the past history of Europe, but it was -never so clearly defined in the remote past as in -the last half century. For our purposes its -modern phase begins after the Franco-Prussian -War, 1870–1871.</p> - -<p>Before that time Prussia was strong in Europe<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span> -but not over-whelmingly great. On one side -was Austria, long her enemy, and on the other -was France. Within five years they were defeated -with such quick and crushing blows that -the world was startled and the Germans themselves -were as much astonished as delighted. -Out of this brilliant period of success arose the -German Empire, with Prussia for its corner-stone -and Bismarck for its builder and guardian. -Immediately a singular thing happened. One -would hardly expect that a beaten state would -straightway form an alliance with the power that -had humiliated her; yet such a relation was established -between Germany and Austria, and it -has lasted to this day. Where Germany has -loved Austria has loved, where Germany has -hated Austria has hated, and the ambition of -one has been supported by the other. Bismarck’s -policy had this state of friendship in view -and he gave Austria generous terms of peace in -1866, when she was at his feet. Common blood -bound the two states together and later led to -the hope of unification in a great Pan-German -empire.</p> - -<p>With France, however, the empire which Bismarck<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span> -founded was to have no such state of -amity. Between them was no brotherhood, not -even in the tenuous bonds of the theory of the -rights of man. Back of 1871 were many acts -of aggression, many bitter wars, and some very -humiliating experiences for states inhabited by -Germans. And now the tables were turned. -France was weak and the often beaten Germans -were strong and victorious. Their vengeance -was expressed in the long siege of Paris, the -proclamation of the German Empire in the -château of the old French kings, the humiliating -indemnity levied on the French people, and the -annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, so long in -the quiet keeping of France that they were thoroughly -French in sympathy and political purpose. -Bismarck usually ruled his heart with his -head, but he lost himself for the moment when -he sent a defeated neighbor under the yoke of -needless disgrace, and Germany has paid the -price many times over in maintaining a great -army and parrying the diplomatic thrusts of -France. The hostile feelings thus engendered -gave rise to the particular kind of balance of -power that has existed in Europe since 1871;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span> -for on whatever side Germany was found France -was on the other, and however the elements -shifted in the grouping of nations these two states -were always opponents.</p> - -<p>It was Bismarck’s idea to form an alliance so -powerful that no other state nor group of states -would dare attack it, and by holding his allies -in hand to preserve peace. That was the way -the Balance of Power was to serve to prevent -war. For his purpose he formed what was -known as the Three Emperors’ League, consisting -of the rulers of Germany, Russia, and Austria. -The combination was weak in one important -point; for Russia and Austria had rival -hopes of territorial gains in the Near East, and -they were not likely to remain permanently in -accord. With an eye to such a disruption of the -alliance Bismarck looked about for another state -which could be added to the group. He turned -to Italy, bound to him because he had befriended -her in her struggle for nationality.</p> - -<p>To bring Italy into the alliance was not easy; -for she was bitterly hostile to Austria, who still -held the unredeemed part of the Italian people -and who was still hated in the peninsula for her<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span> -ancient oppression of Italian provinces. The -Iron Chancellor generally carried his point, -partly because of his personal ability and partly -because it was felt that he could and would live -up to his promises. He showed the king of Italy -the advantages the kingdom would have under -German protection, which would support it -against France, strengthen it in the quarrel with -the pope, and even hold back Austria if that -power was inclined to pay off old scores. These -arrangements were completed in 1882 and gave -rise to the Triple Alliance, until 1914 a strong -factor in European affairs. The greatness of -Bismarck is well shown in the fact that he could -carry this plan through and still retain Russia -in coöperation with Austria and Germany. -Until he retired from office in 1890 he had the -support of the tsar.</p> - -<p>After he withdrew the union of the three emperors -was dissolved. But for his strong hand -it could hardly have been formed. Russia and -Austria were at bottom rivals. If Germany -supported Russia in her plans for the Near East -she would offend Austria, and if she lent herself -to Austria she would lose Russia. Moreover, if<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span> -she favored Russia openly she was likely to -arouse the opposition of Great Britain, who was -at that time very suspicious of the tsar’s designs -on Constantinople. It was a delicate situation, -and it was only good luck and Bismarck’s character -that kept it intact for more than fifteen -years.</p> - -<p>After 1890 the Triple Alliance continued its -existence, Italy suppressing her dislike for -Austria as well as she could in view of her need -of strong friends among the nations. But Russia -fell away and in 1895 announced that she had -formed a Dual Alliance with France, a thing -which Bismarck had been very solicitous to -prevent. By holding Russia in hand he had been -able to isolate France in Europe, but her isolation -was now a thing of the past. The Dual -Alliance confronted the Triple Alliance and the -result was peace. At the same time the rivalry -of Russia and Austria over Turkey became more -energetic, which tended to increase the probability -of war.</p> - -<p>Succeeding Bismarck came German statesmen -who were not so steady as he, and their -weaker hold on the situation added to the gravity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span> -of the prospects of peace. It can hardly be -doubted that the fall of Bismarck lessened the -prospect that Europe would remain at peace. -The Balance of Power, which took so clear a -form with the organization of the Dual Alliance, -was not as good a guarantee of peace as it seemed; -for while it made the checking of powers by -powers more apparent, its very existence was -evidence of a state of stronger rivalry of nations -than existed before the Dual Alliance was -formed. At the same time the men who now -guided the fortunes of Germany were not so convinced -as Bismarck that the country should have -peace.</p> - -<p>While these things happened Great Britain remained -generally neutral. She was busy with -trade expansion and the development of her -colonies, especially in Africa; and her chief interest, -so far as the schemes of the Continental -nations were concerned, was to see that none of -them interfered with her progress in that field -of endeavor. Late in Bismarck’s time, however, -she became convinced that Germany was becoming -a rival both in trade and colonization. It is -true that France was also a rival, and between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span> -her and Great Britain occurred some sharp passages; -but France was not an aggressive nation -and had no strong military resources to back her -ambitions in the field of peaceful activities. Germany, -on the other hand, was increasingly militaristic -and the logic of events seemed to indicate -that she would at some time in the future be -willing to support her commercial and colonial -ambition with a formidable appeal to arms. -British anxiety was quickened when the young -kaiser began to build a great navy, with the -avowed object of making it equal to the British -navy. For centuries it had been the key-note -of British policy to have a navy that could control -the seas; and while there was nothing in the -will of Father Adam that gave Britons the dominion -of the seas, the kaiser must have known -that he could not challenge their superiority on -water without arousing their gravest apprehension. -During the Boer war (1899–1902) -Germany gave added offense to Britain. She -showed sympathy openly for the Boers, and it -was generally believed in Great Britain that she -took advantage of the opportunity to try to form -a grand alliance to curb the power of the “Mistress<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span> -of the Seas.” Rumor said that the plan -was defeated only by the refusal of France to -lend her assistance unless she received Alsace-Lorraine. -If the report is true, it only shows -what a costly thing to Germany was the hatred -that Bismarck created when he put France to -the humiliating dismemberment of 1871.</p> - -<p>During this period Théophile Delcassé was -head of the French foreign office (1898–1905). -He was a man of great original ability and was -desirous of restoring the prestige of France. -When he came into office the French public was -excited over the Fashoda incident, a clash of -French and British interests in the Sudan which -seemed to threaten war. The British government -took a strong attitude, as it was likely at -that time to do, when it felt that it was dealing -with a weaker nation. Delcassé realized that -the true welfare of his country demanded friendship -with the one power which could help it -against Germany, and at the risk of denunciation -at home he gave up all that Great Britain demanded -in the Sudan. He thus showed that -he possessed that high trait of statesmanship<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span> -which consists in the ability to convert an opponent -into a firm friend.</p> - -<p>The opportunity to which he was looking forward -came when Germany set her plans into -operation during the Boer war. He not only -held out for the return of the lost provinces but, -that failing, made overtures for a better understanding -with the British. It was a time when -a friendly hand was gladly received by the London -government. The result was a series of -agreements which became known as the <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente -Cordiale</cite>, 1904. They marked the reappearance -of Great Britain as a leading power in Continental -affairs, after a long period of aloofness. -She had become an active part of the Balance -of Power, and her strength was thrown to the -side which was bent on restraining the vast influence -of Germany. Her action caused great -alarm at Berlin, where her motive was interpreted -as commercial jealousy, the statesmen of -that city apparently forgetting that they had provoked -it by their unfriendly attitude in the Boer -war.</p> - -<p>In the same year began the Russo-Japanese<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span> -war (1904–1905). At first glance it would seem -that this conflict threatened to weaken the <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente -Cordiale</cite>, for Japan was allied to Great -Britain and Russia was bound up with France -by the Dual Alliance. But the result was just -the opposite. The <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> was not only left intact, -but it was actually strengthened. When -Japan defeated Russia, Great Britain ceased to -fear Russian aggression in the Far East, which -made it possible for her to draw nearer to the -Muscovite power. At the same time, Russia, -always seeking an outlet to the sea, turned her -eyes with greater eagerness than ever to the -Near East, which brought her into a more intense -state of opposition to Austria and Germany. -Delcassé seized the opportunity offered him and -succeeded in bringing together these two great -nations, which for many years had been continually -ready to fly at one another. He put -into motion the negotiations out of which was -formed the Triple <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> (1907) in which -Great Britain, France, and Russia announced -that they had settled their differences and would -stand together in future crises.</p> - -<p>The incidents that followed the culmination<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span> -of Delcassé’s diplomacy are very striking, but -they must be deferred until I reach a later stage -of my subject. Here it is only proper to observe -that it brought the theory of the Balance of -Power to its logical development. Delcassé was -in a world in which one great and most efficiently -armed nation stood in a position to turn suddenly -on the rest of Europe and sweep it into -her lap. By her military and naval power, by -her vast trained army, by her readiness for instantaneous -action, by her well planned strategic -railroads, and by her alliances with the middle-European -states she was in a threatening position. -At a given signal she could seize great domains, -fortify herself, and defy all the world to drive -her out of what she had taken. There was hardly -an intelligent German who did not believe that -this course would be followed in the near future -and who did not feel confident that it would make -Germany the dominating nation of the world. -Against this system the Triple <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> was -formed, as a means of balance. It was larger -than the Triple Alliance but not so effectively -led.</p> - -<p>And here I must observe that these two groups<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span> -had come into existence in the most natural way. -Bismarck had founded the Triple Alliance as a -means of preserving peace, not as a means of -aggression; but it had become something more -than he intended it to be. It had enabled Germany -to play such a part in European politics -that the creation of another great group as a -balance was apparently demanded. Immediately -that her position was lowered Germany -felt aggrieved that the combination had been -made against her. So powerful were her convictions -about her wrongs that she threw away -all thought of a concert of the Great Powers for -the settlement of the difficulty. She had trusted -to the Balance to protect her; but she now considered -it something more than a state of equilibrium -and she appealed to arms. Before this -narrative recounts the actual events by which -she felt that she was justified in taking this step, -it is necessary to consider the Balkan question, a -series of causes and events which for nearly a -century has been an open menace to European -peace and stability.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE BALKAN STATES</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>Viscount Grey has been criticized for not -understanding the Balkan problem. If his -critics understood how complex is the story of the -last century in this part of Europe they would -withold their strictures. I, at least, do not -blame any man for failing to carry in his mind -an appreciation of all that the mixed mass of -races and religions in the Balkan country have -striven and hoped for during the recent past. In -this chapter the best that can be promised is an -account of the main facts of Balkan history. A -more detailed narrative would be confusing to -the reader. A failure to mention the subject -would leave much unexplained that is essential to -an understanding of the origin of the present -war. And we shall hardly know how to decide -what kind of a peace the future security of -Europe demands, if we leave out of consideration -the proper disposition to be made of the small -states of the Southeast.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span> -In 1453 Turkey took Constantinople and began -a series of conquests that carried her to the -very gates of the city of Vienna. That important -stronghold seemed about to fall into her -hands in 1683, when an army of Polish and German -soldiers came to its rescue in the name of -Christianity, drove off the infidels, and wrenched -Hungary out of their hands for the benefit of -the Austrian power. This struggle proved the -highwater mark of Turkish conquest in Europe. -From that time to this, wars of reconquest have -followed one another, the pagans always playing -a losing game. But for a long time all that part -of Southeastern Europe that could be reached -from the Black Sea was held by the Turks, the -part that was easily reached from Germany -was held by the Christians, and the part that lay -between, a broad belt of hilly country, was continually -in dispute. Across it armies fought -back and forth, each side winning and losing in -turn, but with the general result in favor of the -Christians, who slowly pushed back the frontier -of their enemies.</p> - -<p>The region held by the Turks was tenacious of -its Christian faith and recognized the religious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span> -authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, -who, Christian though he was, stood under the -control of the sultan. The inhabitants suffered -many hardships and were reduced to the condition -of serfs under Mohammedan masters. The -long bondage to their overlords had a peculiar -effect on their characters. They came to think it -right to use fraud, violence, and subterfuge -against their oppressors, and so they employed -religion and patriotism to defend the commission -of acts which in ordinary situations are considered -without the pale of civilized conduct. To -this day the Balkan states are not rid of their -heritage from these years of moral darkness.</p> - -<p>The Balkan people, ruled long as Turkish -subjects, have gradually formed themselves into -five principal groups as follows: the Serbians, -dwelling in the interior of the country northwest -of Turkey proper and occupying much of the -hinterland lying east of the Adriatic; the Bulgars, -settled east of the Serbs and extending as -far as the shores of the Black Sea; the Wallachians -and Moldavians, who were of kindred stock -and became known as Rumanians because they -believed themselves the descendants of the inhabitants<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span> -of the ancient Roman colony of Dacia; -the Albanians living along the lower eastern -shores of the Adriatic; and the Montenegrins, of -the same race as the Serbians, who defended -themselves so well in their mountain strongholds -that they could say they had never been conquered -by the Turks. Many race elements -entered into these groups, but the Serbs and -Montenegrins were largely Slavic, while the -Bulgars were generally of a distinct race of -Asiatic origin, and the Rumanians were generally -Vlachs, a name given to the Latin speaking -population of the Eastern Roman Empire. -The Albanians seem to be of mixed stock, but -they have a strong sense of nationality. These -five groups correspond respectively to the five -civil divisions that have emerged from the Turkish -provinces, each playing its part in the modern -Balkan problem.</p> - -<p>Montenegro aside, the first group to become a -state was Serbia, whose hardy mountain inhabitants -rose in revolt in 1804. A number of -brave leaders appeared and valley by valley the -Turks were forced out of the country. The -Serbs were practically independent for a time,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span> -but the sultan did not acquiesce in their freedom, -and the constant preparedness that was necessary -to repel any attack he might launch was a source -of much expense and anxiety to the people.</p> - -<p>In 1821 the Greeks, also under the domination -of Turkey, rose in revolt. Great sympathy was -aroused in the rest of Europe and in spite of -the disposition of the Great Powers to allow -Turkey a free hand to preserve her territory intact, -lest one of them gain over-balancing territory, -public opinion forced them to intervene. -The first to show sympathy was Russia, who had -an interest in making herself the protector of the -Christians in Turkey. The other powers resented -her assistance to the Greeks, and finally -Great Britain and France united in a project of -intervention, sending a joint fleet to the Mediterranean -which destroyed the Turkish fleet at -Navarino in 1827. The stubborn sultan remained -unyielding, and in 1828 Russia entered -the war openly, having come to an agreement -with the other Powers. She sent an army across -the border which carried all before it, and the -sultan was forced to make the treaty of Adrianople, -in which Turkey recognized the independence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span> -of Greece and acknowledged Serbia as an -autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty. -At the same time Wallachia and Moldavia, where -Rumans lived, were recognized as independent -under a Russian protectorate. Thus one sovereign -and three dependent but locally autonomous -states stood forth out of the confused -and misgoverned Christian area of Turkey in -Europe.</p> - -<p>The rest of the region, occupied by Bulgars -and Albanians, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, -claimed by the Serbs as legitimate parts of their -national habitat, remained in an unredeemed condition -and were governed by agents appointed -by the sultan. Montenegro retained her position -of practical independence, which Turkey -had been forced to acknowledge in 1799. These -arrangements were confirmed in a more formal -treaty in 1832.</p> - -<p>The successes of this period quickened the -spirit of nationality in the Balkans. Just as the -Greeks were swept by a wave of enthusiasm for -their classical culture and sought to revive the -language and ideals of the remote past, so the -Balkan peoples set out to revive their ancient<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span> -culture, long obscured by the shadow of Turkish -masters. Serbs, Rumans, and Bulgars made -grammars of their own languages, gathered up -what was preserved of their ancient literatures -and traditions, taught their children to revere -the national heroes, and sought in many other -ways to stimulate the spirit of nationality. The -Slavic portion turned to Russia for support, -whom they called their “big brother,” while the -Rumans cultivated an appreciation of Italy and -France, whom they considered kindred descendants -of the ancient Romans. To their national -hopes in these things was added the desire for -religious independence. They disliked being under -the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch -of Constantinople, who was appointed by the sultan, -and looked forward to a time when they -might have exarchs of their own, with jurisdiction -not limited by the Patriarch.</p> - -<p>In 1854 Russia was ready for another advance -in the region of the Balkans, hoping to gain at -last what Peter the Great had declared was essential -to her progress, a window looking out on -the Mediterranean. Great Britain and France -came to the help of the sultan and the Crimean<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span> -War followed. After a hard struggle it ended -in Russia’s defeat, and at the Conference of -Paris, 1856, the affairs of the Balkans were again -up for settlement, but this time the victory leaned -to the side of the Turk, although it was modified -by the restraining hand of his two allies. The -purport of the treaty was to reduce the power -of Russia, and in doing so the aspirations of the -Balkans states were checked. The protectorate -the tsar had established over Wallachia and Moldavia -was destroyed, and Bulgars, who had -expected independence, remained under the rule -of the sultan, while Greece, who had desired a -large portion of Macedonia, was forced to continue -in her old boundaries. This crisis was not -the last in which the vexed Balkan question, -seemingly near solution, was made to give way -before the complicated problems of the general -European situation. Looking backward we may -well say that if Russia had secured her wish, expelled -the Turk from Constantinople and liberated -the Balkan states, the fortunes of France -would not have been lessened, and Great Britain, -safe through her supremacy at sea, would not -have lost any of the strength she had in India.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span> -At the same time the sore spot of European -relations would have been healed, and we should -probably have had no war in 1914.</p> - -<p>Wallachia and Moldavia were of the same -stock and wished to unite as one kingdom. They -made their desires known in the negotiations -that resulted in the Treaty of Paris, but the -Powers did not mean to create a large state on -the borders of Russia which might prove a bulwark -of influence for the tsar, and accordingly -they denied the request. The two states found -a way to accomplish their desire, soon after the -conference at Paris adjourned. Meeting to -select rulers each chose Alexander John Cuza -simultaneously, and after hesitating two years -the Powers acknowledged him as king. Thus -was formed the united kingdom of Rumania; -and its formation illustrated a weak point in the -Concert of Europe. However much the Powers -might interfere to prevent the consummation of -an act they considered dangerous, they would -think twice before trying to punish a Balkan -state, since in doing so they might set off an -explosion in the very system they were working -to keep peaceful. Rumania understood this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span> -phase of the matter and took her chances. Her -firm course had its reward.</p> - -<p>The influence of Great Britain was now paramount -at Constantinople. The sultan was satisfied -with his ally, since he knew that of all the -Powers he had least to fear from this state, which -had no territories in that part of the Mediterranean -and was committed to the preservation of -his rule as a means of keeping Russia away from -the Bosphorus. To justify herself for defending -the Turk, Great Britain gave the world assurances -that the sultan was about to become good. -Under her insistance a series of reforms was announced, -but they did not go far in the realization. -Some of the promises referred to the government -of the Balkans, but they were as fruitless -as the others. Meanwhile French and -British merchants found large profits in Turkish -trade.</p> - -<p>The tsar was humiliated by his loss of influence -in the Southeast, and in 1877 he began another -war against Turkey. He thought the time -favorable for such action. Impeded for a while -at Plevna, in Bulgaria, he at last swept the enemy -before him and took Adrianople on January 16,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span> -1878. His successes created great enthusiasm -among the Serbs, Bulgars, and Rumans, who -flocked to his victorious standard. The panic-stricken -sultan sued for peace and at San Stefano -signed a treaty which granted all that was demanded -of him. Serbia, Montenegro, and -Rumania were recognized as completely independent, -Bulgaria as an autonomous tributary -province, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were assured -of important administrative reforms. -Russia was awarded some territory not strictly in -the Balkans, but her greatest gain was the prestige -she now had as liberator of Christian states.</p> - -<p>The treaty of San Stefano alarmed Great -Britain and Austria, both of whom felt that they -had major interests at stake. They got a congress -of the Great Powers to meet at Berlin, -1878, which revised the treaty in what they were -pleased to call the interest of European peace. -Complete independence was announced for -Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro, and the sultan -accepted the fact of their perfect sovereignty. -By the treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria was to -include Macedon and eastern Rumelia, making -one great buffer province between the Turkish<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span> -and the Christian states. The three parts were -now left distinct, Bulgaria proper being autonomous -but under Turkish suzerainty, and the -other two less independent.</p> - -<p>To create a “Big Bulgaria” as a bulwark -against Turkey had been Russia’s chief hope in -the war. Her initial success awakened enthusiasm -in all the Balkan people, and the results -were expressed in the way in which they rallied -to her aid. At last, said the onlookers, an opportunity -had come to found a strong Balkan -confederacy which would play an important -part in the development of the Near East. The -hand of Russia seemed strong enough to hold -these nascent states to one policy, allay their incipient -jealousies, and bring them to a great common -ideal. If such a course could have been -adopted the future of Europe would have been -profoundly altered. It was defeated by that -Concert of Europe which was supposed to exist -in order that the world might be spared the burden -of war. It was really prevented through the -operation of the forces of national selfishness, -safely esconced in the system which we have -called the Concert of Europe.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span> -The ambition of Austria-Hungary played a -large part at the Congress of Berlin. This nation -had long looked upon the region that separated -her from the Adriatic as a sphere through -which she was justified in extending her power at -the expense of Turkey, and she now felt that -the time had come to realize her plans. If she -waited, Russia would acquire such an influence -as to forestall Austrian advancement. Her eyes -were fixed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, for some -time in revolt against Turkish misgovernment. -Her influence was such that the congress gave -her the right to occupy and administer the two -provinces under the reservation of sovereignty to -the sultan. The inhabitants, who were largely -Slavic, were forced to accept the decision, although -they did not relax their cherished hopes -of independence. They were pawns thrown to -Austria as a balance for the gains of Russia. -The transaction only whetted the Austrian appetite -for more and deepened the Serbian resentment -for Austria.</p> - -<p>Great Britain had her advantage out of the -bargain also. She retained her position of paramount -friend at Constantinople, justifying herself<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span> -with the assurance that the sultan would -carry out reforms in his empire. She seemed -to think that the “Sick Man of Europe” would -cure himself under her guidance and then defend -himself against states that tried to oust him from -his seat of power. To enable her to watch the -bedside of her patient from a convenient position, -as well as to safeguard the Suez Canal, -Great Britain was given the right to occupy and -administer the island of Cyprus under nominal -authority of Turkey. To be perfectly fair we -must admit that there is little moral difference -between her acquisition of Cyprus and Austria’s -gain in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and it is clear -that in this case the Concert of Europe was a -concert for the gain of selfish ends. It is also -worth while to note that two of the Great Powers -took no benefit from the agreement. France -was slowly recovering from the war of 1870–1871 -and was in no condition to fight, although -in 1881 she established a protectorate over Tunis. -The German Empire, newly founded and not yet -fully adapted to the imperial system, was also in -no condition to undertake a stiff encounter. -There were many Germans who wished that their<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span> -government should not allow the other states to -get large gains of territory while Germany got -nothing; but they yielded to Bismarck’s wise -policy which held that it was not yet time -for Germany to assume an aggressive position -in the world. The impatience of the German -patriots lost nothing through having to -wait.</p> - -<p>No treaty ends the march of time, and the -Balkan situation continued to develop along the -old lines. In 1881 Greece acquired Thessaly in -accordance with a promise made to her at the -Congress of Berlin. In 1885 East Rumelia declared -herself united to Bulgaria, acting in defiance -of the will of the Congress of Berlin. The -Powers did not interfere for the same reason -that they did not act when Wallachia and Moldavia -united in 1862. To attempt to undo the -union would have precipitated a general war. -The Concert was stronger to prevent a given -action than to correct it after it was done. -Serbia, however, took the action of the two -provinces as a menace and declared war against -the new state of Bulgaria. She seemed about -to throw herself on her adversary when she suddenly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span> -made peace, evidently feeling she was not -strong enough to carry on the war alone.</p> - -<p>Thenceforth the Powers showed that they did -not mean to allow the Balkan states to profit -by seizing parts of the decaying Turkish Empire. -But for their restraint it seems that the -Turk would have been expelled from Europe -before the end of the nineteenth century.</p> - -<p>Their intention was clearly manifested in regard -to the island of Crete, whose population -long suffered from Turkish oppression. In 1896 -the island was in revolt and the sultan was forced -to promise reforms. The assurance proved -empty and in 1897 Greece interfered in behalf -of Crete. In the war that followed the Greeks -fought heroically but alone and were no match -for Turkey in operations on land. They made -peace without success, but through the instrumentality -of the Great Powers the sultan agreed -to allow Crete self-government under an elected -assembly. The powers let it be known that -they would not have the island annexed to Greece, -which they did not mean to make a preponderating -influence in the Balkans. Now appeared a -great Cretan leader, Eleutherios Venezelos,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span> -whom his admirers call the Cavour of Greece. -Under his influence the Cretan assembly voted the -union of the island with Greece in 1905, but again -the Powers interposed, insisting that the sovereignty -of the sultan should not be abrogated. -However, they permitted the Greek king to appoint -a representative to rule the island as a -Turkish fief, and Greek officers were allowed to -train the Cretan soldiers and police. At last -the Balkan war (1912–1913) brought the completion -of union, the Great Powers yielding their -assent.</p> - -<p>The explanation of the conduct of the Powers -in this incident is to be found in the delicate -nature of the whole Balkan question. With -Austria and Russia keenly aroused and each of -the Balkan states anxiously looking for the -moment when the rest of the sultan’s territory in -Europe was to be divided between them, it was -evident that a little thing could precipitate a -serious conflict. It was in view of this phase of -the situation that the Balkans were called “the -tinder-box of Europe.”</p> - -<p>It will be observed that while these things -happened the Balkan states were developing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span> -steadily in national resources and spirit. Greece, -Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania became vitally -organized powers, it became more and more evident -that they were no longer mere pawns in -the diplomatic game, and the time was fast approaching -when they would wish to take parts -on their own initiative. So assertive were they -becoming that it was certain that the time would -soon come when the Great Powers would tire of -the process of holding conferences to keep these -states out of trouble. It is not an easy task to -serve as custodian for a “tinder-box.”</p> - -<p>A fair warning of this kind of danger occurred -in 1908. For twenty-three years Bulgaria -had remained undisturbed, giving herself -to a rapid process of educational and industrial -development, in both of which lines she had -come under the influence of German methods. -Suddenly she threw off her nominal Turkish -sovereignty and declared herself an entirely independent -state. At the same time, and -evidently by agreement with the German Empire, -Austria-Hungary announced that she would -hold Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral part of -her empire, thus superseding the “occupation”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span> -that was authorized by the congress of Berlin, in -1878. Serbia took the matter as a great injury, -but she could do nothing alone. Her natural -ally was Russia, then recovering from the severe -losses of the war against Japan. Had the tsar -been ready for war it is doubtful if he would -have drawn the sword in this instance; for a -world war would have resulted, and the nations -were not yet ready to think of such an undertaking. -But Serbia nursed her wrongs and to -Russia the sense of her shame grew as she thought -how her weakness had been flaunted in the face -of the world. The day came when the fire could -no longer be smothered.</p> - -<p>To understand Serbia’s feelings we must recall -the national ideal by which her hopes had -been formed for many years. Most of the -people of Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, -Novi-Bazar, and the northwestern corner of -Macedonia were Serbs by blood. To unite them -into a great Serbia had long been spoken of in -Serbia as the “Great Idea.” When, therefore, -Austria took definite possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina -the “Great Idea” seemed defeated -forever. Rage and despair possessed the Serbs<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span> -wherever they lived, patriotic societies voiced the -feeling of the people, and vengeance was plotted. -Probably it was the feeling that this wide-spread -hatred should be uprooted in the most thorough -manner that prompted Austria to make the heavy -conditions that were demanded as atonement for -the crime of Sarajevo.</p> - -<p>After Austria took the fateful step of 1908 -Turkey still held the territory just north of the -Bosphorus, organized as the province of -Adrianople. She also had in Europe the provinces -of Macedonia, Albania, and the sanjak -of Novi-Bazar. To drive her out of these possessions -was the object of the Balkan states. In -1911 Italy began a war against the sultan to -gain Tripoli. The Balkan States seeing their -enemy embarrassed, concluded that the hour of -fate had come. They formed the Balkan -League, made up of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, -and Montenegro, and made ready for war. -Their action alarmed the Great Powers, who -brought the Concert of Europe to bear against -the League. They gave the allies fair notice -that they would not permit them to take any of -the sultan’s territory in Europe, even though<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span> -a war was won against him. The reply to this -threat shows how weak the Concert had become. -It was voiced by Montenegro, the smallest of -the states, whose king immediately declared war -and called on his allies to aid him in driving the -pagan out of Europe. The call was accepted -gladly and an ultimatum was sent to the sultan, -who, relying on the promise of the Powers, defied -his opponents.</p> - -<p>In the war that followed Turkey was confronted -by a united army of nearly a million -men. It was impossible to withstand them and -in two months most of Macedonia was lost, Constantinople -was threatened, and Turkey asked -for an armistice. Negotiations began in London, -the Powers seemingly forgetting their empty -threat that they “would not permit at the end of -the conflict any modification of the territorial -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">status quo</i> in European Turkey.” The allies demanded -hard terms which seemed about to be -accepted by Turkey when by a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">coup d’état</i> the -“Young Turks,” a patriotic party of reformers, -got possession of the government at Constantinople -and resumed the fighting. Although they -fought well, they could not withstand the large<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span> -numbers that were against them. Janina fell to -the Greeks, Adrianople was taken by a Serbo-Bulgarian -force, and Scutari was taken by the -Montenegrins. The Turks now yielded definitely -and negotiations for peace were resumed.</p> - -<p>Behind the diplomatic proceedings was the following -interesting situation: Austria-Hungary -was dismayed at the prospect of having a strong -and permanent league organized in the Balkans; -for it would probably make it impossible for her -to realize her desire to extend her territory in -that direction. She was especially unwilling to -allow Serbia and Montenegro to hold the conquered -shore of the Adriatic, since it was here -that she designed to gain additional outlets to -the seas. Italy at the same time was alarmed at -the extension of Serbian power, since she, also, -did not relish the prospect of having a strong -state on the eastern side of the sea. It was with -unexpected short-sightedness, however, that she -was willing to block Serbia in order to promote -the schemes of Austria, a far more formidable -rival in that quarter, if she were ever firmly established -there. Both states, therefore, appeared -at London to limit the expansion of Serbia, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span> -Germany supported them, seemingly on the -principle that she was merely standing by the -members of the Triple Alliance. It has been -supposed that she expected that Ferdinand, heir-apparent -of Austria, when he came to rule, would -promote a vital union of the two great Mid-Continental -empires. If we accept this theory, we -must conclude that she had a still more vital reason -for wishing Austria to have a large Adriatic -coast-line, with important commercial harbors.</p> - -<p>These considerations ran exactly counter to -Serbia’s hopes in Albania. She had already occupied -the Albanian port of Durazzo and expected -to make it the center of a fair commercial -life. When ordered to withdraw she did not dare -refuse; but it was a great humiliation to her to -cut off the possibility of her future growth. For -a second time Austria had given her a vital blow, -and there was another wrong to be remembered -by those Serbians who were inclined to remember. -By the decree of the Powers Albania was made -an autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty, -and later on a German prince was appointed to -rule it.</p> - -<p>While these affairs were being discussed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span> -Montenegro besieged Scutari, in northern Albania -and continued operation until the place -was taken, notwithstanding the purpose of the -Powers was well known. Her courageous conduct -won the admiration of lovers of brave men -everywhere. Eight days after the capture of -Scutari, Austria announced that she would enter -the war if the place was not evacuated, and Italy -and Germany declared they would support her. -Throughout all Slavic countries arose a cry of -indignation. In Russia especially it was loud -and bitter; and it seemed that a great war was -about to begin when King Nicholas, of Montenegro, -gave the world the assurance of peace by -withdrawing his army from Scutari.</p> - -<p>Then came that unhappy turn of affairs by -which the Balkan League was dissolved and the -hope disappeared that a strong power would -arise which would take the Near East out of the -position of pawn for the greed of the Great -Powers. Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria had made -an ante-bellum agreement for the disposal of the -territory they would take from Turkey, and the -first was to have a large part of Albania. Denied -this region she asked her allies to make a new<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span> -allotment. Bulgaria raised strong objection, -since the new demand, if granted, would mean -that her gains would be smaller than was first -agreed. Angry speeches led to war, and after -a sharp struggle Bulgaria was beaten and forced -to make peace without honor. While they were -locked in the conflict Turkey seized the opportunity -to recover Adrianople, and eventually held -it. It illustrates the sordid nature of some of -the Balkan states that Rumania entered this war -for purely predatory purposes. She had remained -neutral during the common effort to drive -the Turk out; but now that Bulgaria was marching -to sure defeat she came into the battle against -her, and at the end of the war she demanded and -was given a large part of Bulgarian territory. -The “July War,” as this stage of the Balkan conflict -is called, left the allies filled with bitter -hatred for one another, and Bulgaria, weakened -as she was, felt little inclined to lean on any of -her immediate neighbors. She was ripe for the -reception of Teutonic offers of friendship, and -the result was soon seen of all men.</p> - -<p>I have thus followed the complex story of the -Balkan States to the year 1913. Through a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span> -century of war and intrigue Serbia, Bulgaria, -Rumania, Greece, and the small state of Montenegro -had emerged from the Christian lands over -which the Turks had ruled. Russia and Austria -had taken small portions of those lands and had -definite plans to secure influence over larger portions. -In the Balkans Russian prestige was -great, but if a state feared it she was apt to look -to Austria, or to Germany—which was the same -thing—as a means of balancing against Russia. -At the same time it was known that Russia was -planning to construct strategic lines of railroad -leading to the Black Sea along the western border -of her empire, and this was considered an -ominous sign for the future. Altogether, the -“tinder-box” was ready for ignition.</p> - -<p>As to Turkey, her fortunes shrank steadily. -At the end of the Balkan War she retained only -1,900,000 subjects in Europe, inhabitants of the -district around Adrianople. She was becoming -a distinctly Asiatic power, and the sultan must -have felt that his hold on Constantinople was -precarious. At the same time, as we shall see -later on, Great Britain had secured a foothold -on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and Russia<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span> -was extending her influence in Persia, two threats -from the eastward. Any far sighted Turk could -see that his country was in danger of being -crushed in a vise of foreign aggression. To -which of the great states should Turkey turn for -that protection which had long been her safety? -Not to Russia, whose ambition was for Constantinople -itself, nor to Great Britain, who -seemed to desire the Euphrates Valley, and who -was safely established in Egypt. In her extremity -she listened to the suggestions of German -wooers, who promised industrial development, -railroads, and financial aid. Here was -laid the foundation of Turko-German sympathy -which was to be very important in the Great -War.</p> - -<p>After a calamity has occurred it is easy to -point out the course by which it might have been -avoided. It seems certain that if we stood again -where the world stood in 1914 we should not do -what we did in 1914. So we can see in what -respects the events of the Balkan history went -wrong. But the men who settled the crises of -the past were not able to see what we see. They -had the same blindness for the future that we<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span> -have for that which lies before us now. They -fumbled their problems as most men fumble -problems, as we shall, perhaps, go on fumbling -until the end of time. It is asking much to expect -that statesmen shall be as wise as we who -review their deeds.</p> - -<p>But there are great facts in history which it is -possible to know and use with profit. One of -them is the incompetency of the principle of the -Concert of Europe to deal with a situation like -that we have reviewed in the Balkans. Concert -predicates a group of satisfied great states, without -over-reaching ambitions, who are willing to -unite their efforts to restrain small states, or even -one large state, from a course which shall force -the rest of the world into conflict. When a -group of great states have united to carry out a -certain policy, and another tries to restrain the -first group, concert is in great danger of breaking -down. That was the situation in the Balkans. -These states were drawn into the whirl -of general European politics, and they intensified -its velocity at one particular corner, so that -what may be contemplated as a harmonious rotary -movement broke into a twisting tornado.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span> -If, when the present war is over, the nations of -the world undertake to go on under the old system, -trusting to concert as the means of avoiding -war, there is no reason to expect that the future -will be less turbulent than the past.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII<br /> - -<span class="subhead">GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>When wars begin between nations we usually -see the leaders of thought on each side busy developing -distrust among their own citizens for -the people against whom they are fighting. In -accordance with this fact, the people of the -United States have read a great deal since August, -1914, to make them think very unkindly of -Germany.</p> - -<p>This chapter is not a plea for the Germans, -and I agree that they did unnecessarily cruel and -impossible things in Belgium. It is not to be -denied that they played a most unwise part in -the war game, when they tried to steal a march -on France by invading through Belgium, a thing -they were pledged not to do. It pays to keep -faith; and when a nation does not keep faith -other nations have no recourse but to treat it as -if it were a pirate. If they do otherwise, the -whole game will become a pirate’s game, and -good faith will disappear from international relations.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span> -If Germany may violate Belgium at -will, why may she not violate Switzerland, Holland, -or any other state that stands in her way; -and who would not expect her to do it, if no -powers faced her that were willing and able to -dispute her will?</p> - -<p>It is not improbable that German leaders understood -this as well as we who now pass it under -review. They must have made their calculations -on arousing the opposition of the world and proceeded -with the expectation that they would gain -so much by their sweep through forbidden Belgium -that they could defy the world. And if -things had gone well for them, the calculation -would have been well made. For if Germany -had carried France off her feet and placed her -in a position to offer no further menace during -the next ten years, and if she had dealt a similar -blow to Russia, what power could have checked -her in the future decade? By glancing at the -situation in Europe today we may see how an -intrenched Germany defies the united and unwhipped -world. How much more might she not -have had her way, if the thrust through Belgium -had succeeded!</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span> -Let us suppose that the game of bad faith had -proved successful as planned, what would have -been the result? Probably Great Britain would -have wakened slowly to her peril, but her position -was such that she could have done nothing. -Her fleet would have been useless against an -enemy that rules on land. Her army could not -have met the combined Teutonic armies, and she -would have had no allies. Meanwhile, Germany -and Austria at their leisure could have digested -the Balkans and drawing Turkey into their net -could have established a “Mittel-Europa” that -would have left the rest of the world at their -mercy. These were alluring stakes to play for, -and it is not hard to see how a nation whose leaders -have thrown aside the homely motto that -“Righteousness exalteth a nation” would be willing -to take a chance in order to obtain them.</p> - -<p>When we think of such things as these we are -in danger of concluding that they represent the -real Germany. We look back to that Germany -of the past which we saw in our youth, whose -music we have heard all our lives, whose Goethe -we have read, whose scholarship we have built -upon, and whose toys have amused us and our<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span> -children through many decades and ask ourselves -whether or not we were mistaken in our -ideas of Germany. Are there two Germanies, -and if so, which is the true Germany? Probably -the answer is that each is the real Germany manifesting -herself in different moods. Fundamentally -we have an intense and emotional people, -swayed in one instance by artistic emotions, in -another by the love of exact research for facts, -in another by the feeling of domesticity, and in -still another by the powerful impulse of a great -national egoism. They are a people who can -love much, hate much, play much, sacrifice much, -and serve well when called into service. In their -war-maddened mood they have stained a fair -reputation, and they are now trying to think that -the stain will not matter if they can only fight -through to victory. But nations are like men in -this that however successful one may become -personally he never gets to be so great that he -can afford to carry a tarnished reputation.</p> - -<p>Let us turn to the Germany of old and see -if we cannot observe the process by which she -came to her present state of mind. While I -realize that it is absolutely necessary for the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span> -world to crush her attempt to rule Europe, I -cannot find it in my heart to hate her. She has -risen to such a state of efficiency in social organization -and in the capacity to spread the light of -civilization that she commands respect from -thinking foes. It is the duty of the world to -chasten the spirit of arrogance out of her, but to -leave her sound and able to deal with the future -in that way in which she is so well fitted to play -a strong and beneficial part. If ever a great -people needed the discipline of disaster to teach -them that nations, like men, should do to others -as they wish others to do to them, that nation is -the Germany of today. To understand in what -way this splendid state has run away from its -past we shall have to glance at its history in the -recent past.</p> - -<p>For a point of departure let us take the Seven -Years’ War. This struggle was the result of the -ambition of young Frederick, a strong and unethical -king of Prussia. When he came to the -throne he found that a parsimonious father had -left him a full treasury, an excellent army, and -a united kingdom, while fate had sent the neighboring -state Austria, a young woman for ruler<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span> -and an army that was not formidable. It was -a favorable opportunity to seize Silesia, which -Prussia considered necessary to her welfare, and -to which she had the flimsiest pretense of right. -The rapacity of Frederick, her king, cannot be -justified on moral grounds, and it threw Europe -into commotions for which nearly a quarter of -a century was needed for settlement. The last -phase of this quarter-of-a-century was the Seven -Years’ War, 1756–1763. By the time it began -Frederick of Prussia was looked upon by his -neighbors as a menace to Europe; and Austria, -France, and Russia united to crush him. He -had a friend in Great Britain, who was generally -found among the foes of France. In the -great war he waged through seven years he -fought off foes first on one side and then on the -other until the war ended at last with Prussia -still unconquered.</p> - -<p>If hard and valiant fighting and solicitude for -the welfare of his country could redeem the error -of the invasion of Silesia the Seven Years’ War -would relieve Frederick, whom posterity calls -“Frederick the Great,” of all odium on account -of the thoughtless way in which he began his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span> -wars. Unlike the present kaiser, he began a -long reign rashly and ended it wisely. Administrative -reforms and a policy of peace with his -neighbors made his last years a period of happiness -for Prussia.</p> - -<p>But Silesia fixed a firm hold on the Prussian -imagination. Long justified as an act necessary -to the safety of the Fatherland, and therefore -permissible, it has given sanction for the idea -that wrong may be done that good shall result, -if only the state is to be benefitted. It is a false -doctrine, and it can do nothing but lead to wars. -Nations are under the same obligations to do -right as individuals.</p> - -<p>The next phase of German history which has -interest for us in connection with this study is -that which lies between the years 1806 and 1813. -It was a period of deep humiliation at the hands -of Napoleon. The small states were huddled together -in a Confederation which was, in fact, a -tool of the Emperor of France, and Prussia lay -like a trembling and crushed thing in his hand. -No living man who hates Germany for the deeds -of the present war could wish her a worse fate -than Napoleon inflicted on her after the battle<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span> -of Jena in 1806. He insulted the king, burdened -the people with requisitions, and limited their -armies. It was the acme of national shame for -the nation that is now so strong.</p> - -<p>The cause of these woes was the lack of organization, -and perhaps Napoleon did the nation a -service when he beat the Prussians into a realization -of it. No nation is so poor that it has not -reformers who see in what way its evils may be -corrected. In the days that preceded the calamities -of which I speak Prussia had her prophets -crying to deaf men. Misfortune opened the ears -of the rulers so that the prophets might be heard. -Reforms were adopted out of which has grown -the Germany of today. They all looked toward -the unification of national energy, whatever its -form; but they are expressed in three notable -ways: universal military service, the correction -of waste energy in civil life, and the inculcation -of the spirit of obedience to authority. On these -principles chiefly a new Germany was built.</p> - -<p>We have said a great deal recently about -crushing the German military system. Probably -we do not know just what we mean in saying -this. At least, it was not always our habit<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span> -to decry the system. Many a time we have -spoken with admiration of the reforms of -Scharnhorst, of the glory of Leipzig and of the -services of Blücher at Waterloo. If we stop to -think we shall see that our real objection is the -purpose for which the German military system -has been used. And it seems that if it is to be -broken into pieces it must be opposed with a -stronger system built on a similar plan.</p> - -<p>The next period that expresses Germany’s -peculiar spirit is the era of Bismarck, 1862 to -1890. It was the time of the cult of iron. Bismarck -was the “Iron Chancellor,” the nation offered -its enemies “blood and iron.” Iron cannon, -iron words, and iron laws became the ideals -of the people. Statesmen, historians, poets, editors, -professors, and all other patriots began to -worship according to the rite of the new cult. -And iron entered into the blood of the Germans.</p> - -<p>To carry out Bismarck’s policy it was necessary -to break down a promising liberal movement -that seemed on the point of giving Prussia responsible -government. It was his faith that a -united Germany must hew her way into the position -of great power in Europe, and in order to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span> -have a state that could do this there must be a -strong central authority, able to direct all the -resources of the state to the desired end. The -large number of small nobles had long ago -formed the celebrated Junker autocracy, a body -with like ideals. He gave their restless energy -a more definite political and military object, and -made them take places as parts of his great state -machine.</p> - -<p>He had his reward. In 1866 he fought a decisive -war against Prussia’s old enemy, Austria, -and won it so quickly that even the Prussians -were astonished. In 1870–1871 he threw the -state against France in a war that left the land -of Napoleon as completely at his feet as Prussia -had been at the feet of the Corsican. And then -in the moment of exultation over the victory he -founded the German empire by uniting with -Prussia the numerous smaller German states. -There is much to support the suggestion that a -similar stroke is held in reserve to create a Mittel-Europa -of Germany and Austria-Hungary as a -final glory of the present war, if Germany shows -herself able to carry off the victory.</p> - -<p>Bismarck’s ambition for Germany was to hold<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span> -a position of arbiter in Continental affairs. He -felt that this was the best way to make his country -safe from hostile combinations, and it met -his ideal of the dignity to which Germany ought -to attain. He achieved his desire in the Three -Emperors’ League and the Triple Alliance. -Predominance in influence was the height of his -ambition. The conquest of new lands, and the -support of industry and trade by a policy of territorial -expansion, were not within his plans. -He was a man of an older generation to whom -a predominance among the Great Powers was -better than chasing the rainbow of world empire.</p> - -<p>In 1888 died Wilhelm I, the king whom Bismarck -made Emperor. He was an honest man -who loved the simple and sound Germany in -which he was reared. At this time the leading -men of 1871 were passing from power and a -group was coming on the scene who were young -men in the intoxicating times of Sedan and Metz. -A new emperor came to the throne, possessing -great energy and the capacity of forming vast -plans. He was eleven years old when the empire -was proclaimed at Versailles, the age at -which ordinary boys begin to wake from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span> -dreams of childhood. From such dreams Wilhelm -II passed to dreams of imperial glory. -The idea of bigness of authority that he thus -formed has remained with him to this day. Add -the effects of an impulsive disposition and an unusual -amount of confidence in himself and you -will account for the peculiar gloss spread over a -character that is strong and otherwise wholesome.</p> - -<p>Early in his reign he gave ground for alarm -by several acts that are hardly to be described -in a less severe word than “bumptious.” He -dismissed Bismarck from the Chancellorship, -seemingly for no other reason than that he wished -a chancellor who would be more obedient to the -imperial will, and he uttered many sentiments -which caused sober men to wonder what kind of -emperor he was going to be. But as the years -passed it was noticed that all his aberrations fell -short of disaster, and as he was very energetic -and devoted to efficiency in civil and military -matters the world came at last to regard him -with real esteem.</p> - -<p>When the present war began the kaiser became -its leader, as was his duty and privilege. Opinion -in hostile countries pronounced him the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span> -agent responsible for its outbreak. Around his -striking personality have collected many stories -of dark complexion. At this time it is not -possible to test their accuracy, but it is safe to -say that many of them are chiefly assumption. -On the other hand, it is undoubted that he is now -a firm friend of the military party, and that he -supports the autocracy in its purpose to carry -the war to the bitter end. He has been a diligent -war lord and he has shown a willingness to -share the sacrifices of the people. Stories of apparent -reliability that have come out of Germany -in recent months imply that he has steadily -gained in popularity during the conflict, while -most of the other members of his family have -lost.</p> - -<p>If it is important to clear thinking to see the -kaiser in an impartial light, it is equally necessary -to understand the German <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kultur</i>. This -term is used in Germany to indicate the mass of -ideas and habits of thought of a people. It applies -to art and industry, to religion and war, to -whatever the human mind directs. From the -German’s standpoint we have a <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kultur</i> of our -own. We have no corresponding term, nor concept,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span> -and we cannot realize all he means in using -the term if we do not put ourselves in his place. -Now it is true that the German has won great -success in intellectual ways. Scholarship, scientific -invention, the application of art to industry, -and well planned efficiency in social organization -are his in a large degree. He is proud of his -achievements; and when the war began he felt -that it was the German mission to give this <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kultur</i> -to other peoples. From his standpoint, a -Germanized world would be a world made -happy. It was an honest opinion, and it went -far to support his desire for expansion.</p> - -<p>The Germans are a docile people with respect -to their superiors, and this trait is a condition of -their <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kultur</i>. It is traditional in Germany for -the peasant to obey his lord, the lord to obey his -over-lord, and the over-lord to obey his ruler. -To the kaiser look all the people in a sense which -no citizen of the United States can understand -without using a fair amount of imagination. -The lords and over-lords constitute the <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Junkers</i>, -who in the modern military system make up the -officer class. A high sense of authority runs -through the whole population, the upper classes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span> -knowing how to give orders and the lower classes -knowing how to take them.</p> - -<p>Before the battle of Jena, 1806, the Prussian -army was made up of peasants forced to serve -under the nobles, who took the offices. Townsmen -were excluded from the army. The peasant’s -forced service lasted twenty years. The -system was as inefficient as it was unequal, and -a commission was appointed to reform it. The -result was the modern system of universal service, -put into complete operation in 1813. After -a hundred years it is possible to see some of the -effects of the system on the ideals of the people. -It has taught them to work together in their -places, formed habits of promptness and cleanliness, -and lessened the provincialism of the lower -classes. It has been a great training school in -nationalism, preserving the love of country and -instilling in the minds of the masses a warm devotion -to the military traditions of the nation.</p> - -<p>It has also produced results of a questionable -value. By fostering the military spirit it has developed -a desire for war, on the same principle -that a boy in possession of a sharp hatchet has a -strong impulse to hack away at his neighbor’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span> -shrubbery. It is probable that the temptation -to use a great and superior army was a vital fact -in bringing on the present war. Furthermore, -the wide-spread habit of docility leaves a people -without self-assertion and enables their rulers to -impose upon them. As to the influence of universal -service in promoting militarism, that has -been frequently mentioned.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, it should be borne in mind -that not all states that have had universal military -training have been saddled with these evils. -France, for example, has had universal training -without becoming obsessed with the passion for -war and without the loss of popular individualism. -It seems well to say that universal training -itself does not produce the evils sometimes attributed -to it. In Germany, at least, it seems -that it was the purpose for which the army existed, -and not the army itself, that developed -militarism and brought other unhappy effects.</p> - -<p>Probably the German army before the war was -the most efficient great human machine then in -existence. There was less waste in it and less -graft than in any other army. Since the army -included all the men of the empire at some stage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span> -or other of their existence, it was a great training -school in organization. Its effects on German -history are hardly to be exaggerated.</p> - -<p>I have said that military organization alone -was not sufficient to make the modern Germany. -It was also necessary to give the nation a definite -national purpose, and this was the task of its -intellectual leaders. The purpose itself was expressed -in the idea of German nationality. By -a bold stretch of fancy every part of Europe -that had once been ruled by Germans, that -spoke the German language, or that could be -considered as a part that ought to speak that -language was fixed upon as territory to be -brought within the authority of the Fatherland. -It was in accordance with this principle that -Schleswig-Holstein was taken from Denmark -in 1864 and Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Here the -march of annexation paused. Bismarck was too -wise to carry the theory to an extreme; but a -growing number of writers and speakers in the -empire took up the idea and kept it before the -people with winning persistence. It is thus that -Pan-Germanism has come to be one of the great -facts in German public opinion. By preaching<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span> -race unity with patriotic zeal the intellectual leaders -have established a powerful propaganda of -expansion.</p> - -<p>Of the men most prominently associated with -this movement especial attention must be given -to Heinrich von Treitschke, for years professor -of Modern and Contemporary History at the -University of Berlin, whose remarkable influence -reached all classes of people. He was a handsome -man with an open face that invited admiration -without appearing to care whether it was -given or not. When he spoke the auditor heard -“a raucous, half-strangled, uneasy voice” and -noticed that his movements were mechanical and -his utterances were without regard to the pauses -that usually stand for commas and periods, while -his pleasant facial expression had no apparent -relation to what he was saying. The explanation -was that he was so deaf that he did not hear -himself speak. That such a speaker could fire -the heart of a nation is evidence that he was filled -with unusual earnestness and sympathy.</p> - -<p>He had great love of country, and if he exalted -royalty and strong government it was because he -thought that Germany would reach her highest<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span> -authority through them. It was no selfish or incompetent -king that he worshiped, but one that -lived righteously and sought diligently to promote -the interest of the people. He held that the -nobility should serve as thoroughly as the common -men. Strong government in his idea did -not mean privilege, as ordinarily understood, but -vital energy in all the organs of administration, -efficiently directed by a will that was not hampered -by the contrarywise tugging of individual -opinions.</p> - -<p>Treitschke’s penetrating eloquence was heard -throughout the land. Editors, preachers of religion, -schoolmasters, authors, members of the -legislative assemblies, high officials, and even ministers -of state came to his class-room and went -away to carry his ideas into other channels. He -inspired the men who did the actual thinking for -the nation. All his efforts were expended for -what he considered the enhancement of Germany’s -position among nations.</p> - -<p>In giving him his due we must not overlook his -faults. He was narrow in his ideas of international -relations. His exaltation of Germany -would have left other nations at her mercy. He<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span> -seems to have had small respect for the principle -of live-and-let-live among states. As much as -any one in his country he was responsible for the -idea that the British are a pack of hypocrites, offering -inferior races the Bible with one hand and -opium with the other. That they had not a good -record with respect to the opium trade is true, -but it was sheer narrowness to make it the chief -characteristic of a people who have done a great -work in behalf of the backward races.</p> - -<p>Although Treitschke wrote many pamphlets -on topics of current interest, all bearing upon -what he considered the destiny of Germany, he -was preëminently a historian. It was by telling -the story of Germany since the revival of national -feeling after the battle of Jena that he -wished to serve best the generation in which he -lived. For him it was the historian to whom was -committed the task of making the citizen realize -what place he had in the nation’s complex of -duties and hopes.</p> - -<p>He came upon the scene when history had become -fixed upon the basis of accuracy and detached -research. Men like Leopold von Ranke -had insisted that history should deal with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span> -cold exploitation of universal laws. For them -Treitschke was a bad historian, and they used -their influence to prevent his appointment at the -University of Berlin. He was a Chauvinist, undoubtedly, -and his <cite>History of Germany in the -Nineteenth Century</cite> is a highly colored picture -of what he conceived the reader should know -about the history of his country. It is a work -written to arouse the enthusiasm of the people for -their country, rather than to instruct them in the -universal laws of human development; and it -would be a sad day for the world if all history -were written as he wrote this. But it was a -powerful appeal to national pride and energy. -It played a great part in the formation of the -Germany with which we are concerned in this -chapter, the striving, self-confident, and aspiring -empire that set for itself the task of dominating -the European continent.</p> - -<p>This chapter is not written to reconcile American -readers to the German side of the controversy -that now engages the attention of all men. -I wish to enable the reader to have a clear view -of the people with whom we fight. It is they -with whom we must deal in building up the system<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span> -out of which the future is to be constructed -again; and we shall not know how to deal with -them if we do not see their point of view and -know what they are thinking about.</p> - -<p>If in some of their ideals they are superior to -other peoples, and if their organization of individuals -into the state has some elements of -strength not found in other systems, it is not for -us to seek to destroy the advantage they have -won. It would be better for us to adopt their -good points, in order that we might the more -surely defeat them on the field of battle. Having -won the victory we desire, we should certainly -not seek to destroy that which we cannot -replace. Live and let live, a principle which -Germans have ignored in some important respects, -must be recognized after the military ambition -of Germany is broken, if we are to have -an enduring peace.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE FAILURE OF THE OLD EUROPEAN SYSTEM</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>Much has been written to prove that one side -or the other was responsible for the present war. -Minute facts, as the words in a dispatch, or the -time at which the troops were mobilized, or -whether or not a preliminary summons of troops -to the colors was in itself an act of mobilization, -have become the subjects of bitter debate. Such -questions will have to be settled by the historians -of the future years: they cannot be discussed -here with any profit, since this book is an appeal -to the reason of men on each side of the controversy.</p> - -<p>Back of the events of July, 1914, is a more -fundamental cause of the war. It is the breakdown -of the systems of concert and balance to -which the powers had trusted themselves. Castlereagh -and Metternich allowed themselves to -slip into these theories, when they set aside the -suggestion of a federated Europe, which came<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span> -from Alexander I. Granted that the tsar’s -dream was too ethereal for a world steeped in selfishness, -it does not follow that a policy entirely -devoted to the balancing of selfishness with selfishness -would have preserved peace.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, we must admit that nations -are not idealists. Selfishness is their doctrine. -So long as the project of a federation is viewed -idealistically it is practically impossible. But if -it ever comes to be admitted by the people who -count in political things that it is for the interests -of the nations to adopt it, that is, if it is brought -within what we may call the sphere of selfishness, -it ceases to be idealistic and comes to be a subject -worthy of the consideration of the practical -statesman.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, the political philosopher has -ever to answer the question, “What about the -future?” What are we going to do after the -present debauch of waste and murder is over? -Are we to trust the world to the same old forces -that brought us this ruin? One says that human -nature is the same forever, that it learns only in -the hard school of experience, and that it must -fight its wars as the price it pays for being human<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span> -nature. To such a man the Napoleonic wars -did all that could be expected of them when they -so impressed the world with the cost of war that -a system was adopted which gave the world a -measure of peace for a hundred years. “What -more can you ask?” said such a philosopher to me. -In humble responsibility to the throne of reason I -reply that we can try as intelligent beings to remove -the war madness permanently, making it -our duty to posterity to do the best we can. -Some generation must make the start, or we shall -wring our hands forever.</p> - -<p>In this chapter I wish to show in what way the -old system crumbled before the desire of world -power. It seems a vicious system by virtue of -its innate qualities of selfishness, and it is all -the more to be feared because its subtle spirit -gets control of our own hearts as well as the -hearts of other men. While our opponents—Germany -and Austria—were following the system -to its bitter conclusion, our friends—Great -Britain, France, and Italy—were doing nearly -the same things, but in a slightly different way. -And there is no reason to expect that under the -continuation of the balancing of great and ambitious<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span> -world powers we shall have more respect -for the rights of one another than we had in the -past.</p> - -<p>The system of Balance of Power flourished best -in Bismarck’s time. It was his strong personality -that held together the Three Emperors’ -League for a brief season and the Triple Alliance -for a longer period. Each of these groups -had certain interests in common which gave them -coherence: Bismarck alone knew how to exploit -these mutual advantages and lessen the jars of -clashing feelings. His objects were made easier -by the fact that most of the other nations of -Europe at that time had developed quarrels of -their own. Great Britain and Russia were at -swords’ points over the Far Eastern question, and -France and Great Britain had not forgotten their -century old antagonism, which only a minor dispute -was sufficient to set aflame.</p> - -<p>Moreover, Great Britain was engaged in a vast -task of empire building. Manufactures increased -rapidly in the United Kingdom, an ever -growing trade threw out ever expanding tentacles -to the remotest parts of the world, and the -growth of the colonies produced greater prosperity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span> -at home and abroad than the most hopeful -Briton had previously thought within the -bounds of probability. She was too busy with -this splendid process of internal prosperity to -take notice of what was happening on the Continent, -so long as her own interests were not threatened. -From her standpoint Bismarck’s policy of -preserving peace through the means of a German -predominating influence was a welcome relief -from other burdens.</p> - -<p>This state of affairs was prolonged for at least -fifteen years after the death of Bismarck. -Kaiser Wilhelm II’s temperamental impetuousness -did not break up the balance that had been -established, although many prophets had foretold -such a thing. As the corner-stone of the Triple -Alliance Germany was looked upon as the protector -of European peace, and the kaiser, it is -said, was pleased to regard himself as the man -especially responsible for that policy.</p> - -<p>It is difficult to say when and how this happy -situation began to be undermined and whose was -the responsibility. One cause of the rupture was -the rapid growth of German manufactures and -trade, which brought about stern competition between<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span> -the business interests of Germany and -Great Britain. The newspapers of the two nations, -like all other newspapers of modern times, -were closely connected with the capitalistic interests -of the respective states, and voiced the -alarm and antipathy of the industrial classes. -Thus the people of Germany and the people of -Britain were stimulated to a condition of mutual -distrust. They believed that each practiced the -most disreputable tricks of competition against -the other, and each talked of destroying the industry -of the other. It is difficult to say who is -responsible for the beginning of commercial -rivalry.</p> - -<p>Late in the last century Germany began to enlarge -her navy with the evident purpose of making -it rival the navy of Great Britain. Her -justification was found in the idea that a navy -was necessary to protect the great commerce that -she was building up. At the same time German -writers began to make many criticisms on the -British claim of being mistress of the seas. -“Freedom of the seas” became a phrase of comfort -in their mouths. It is not clear that it meant -what it seemed to say; for the seas were as free to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160">160</a></span> -the Germans in times of peace as to any other -people, and Germany’s plan to build a great -fleet that would defeat the British fleet would -establish that same kind of rule at sea that Great -Britain through her naval superiority then held.</p> - -<p>Now it is very certain that Germany had a perfect -right to enter each of these two fields of -endeavor. The contests of industry are open -to all, and the laws of peace protect them. She -had the right, also, to build up her navy, although -she should not have expected to overtop -the British navy specifically without arousing the -hostility of the British people. The insular position -of the United Kingdom and its relations with -its colonies are such that a navy is its surest protection -if assailed in war; and to fall into a second -position is to hold its life at the permission of -another state. Germany must have seen this -phase of the situation. Her statesmen were poor -leaders of men if they did not realize that they -were entering upon a rivalry in which was the possibility -of great resistance.</p> - -<p>Another phase of the opposition that was -steadily rising against Germany was the general -alarm at the growth of her military power. Her<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161">161</a></span> -army and navy ever increased in size and readiness -for that initial rush to victory which is half -the struggle in modern war. At the same time -German leaders did not disguise their desire for -the enlargement of German territory on the Continent. -The Pan-German party made a great -deal of noise, and other nations were not reassured -by being told that the party was not as -strong as its agitation seemed to indicate.</p> - -<p>Now and again one read in some German paper -an assertion to the effect that Germany was -bound to become the dominant power in Europe -and that she would next turn on the United -States. How many Americans have not heard -some over-confident German friend make a -prophecy of like import? It was evident that -many Germans regarded the great republic of the -West as an over-fattened commercial nation without -the power of resistance and destined at the -proper time to furnish rich nourishment for their -conquering arms. That we considered these -thoughts but the idle boasts of a nation intoxicated -by success did not lessen the conviction of -ourselves and others that Germany was running -into a state of mind that required coöperative<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162">162</a></span> -measures of resistance on the part of people who -might become victims of her infatuation.</p> - -<p>While these two processes of national feeling -ran their courses, several political events, which -have already been described added vigor to the -antagonism that was rising against Germany. -Her attitude toward the Boers when they were -at war against Great Britain was one, Delcassé’s -wise adjustment of the Fashoda incident was -another, his clever formation of the <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente Cordiale</cite> -between France and Britain was another, -the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance -was still another, the defeat of Russia by Japan -and her elimination as a threat against British -interests in India was another, and the formation -of the Triple <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> by Great Britain, France, -and Russia, announced in 1907, was the final act -of the series. Great Britain was not only again -seriously concerned in Continental affairs, but a -combination had been formed of three great -European nations, with the strongest power of -the East as a flying buttress, to hold back the -much dreaded aggressions of the Triple Alliance, -consisting of Germany, Austria, and Italy. The -Balance of Power had come to its most logical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163">163</a></span> -state of development; for instead of having one -great state balancing between the other states -around it, we now had the great states of the -world ranged in two camps, each side checking -the other in the belief that in so doing it was preserving -the world from war.</p> - -<p>It is hard to establish a balance when two -opposing sides are strong and mutually jealous -of one another; for the opposition of forces is -then formed to secure mutual advantages, and -not to promote the common interest through the -preservation of equilibrium. In such a case one -side or the other, possibly each side, is apt to -fancy itself the stronger, and if it acts on that -assumption it arouses the apprehension of the -other which finds itself tempted to make a counter -stroke. Once such a step is taken equilibrium -is lost. This is what happened in 1914. The -train of events that led up to the destruction of -the international balance is now to be described.</p> - -<p>Here we must go back to the days when Delcassé -was foreign secretary in Paris, 1898–1905. -One of his achievements was to come to agreement -with Spain and Italy in reference to the -northern coast of Africa. He effected a treaty<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164">164</a></span> -with the former nation by which French and -Spanish spheres of influence in Morocco were -defined, and another with Italy by which the right -of France in Tunis was accorded in exchange for -recognition of the right of Italy to Tripoli and -Cyrenaica.</p> - -<p>Making this treaty by Italy did not constitute -treason to the Triple Alliance, since it was clearly -advantageous for Italy without infringing the -rights of either Germany or Austria; but it -alarmed Germany, already drawing close to Turkey, -because the object of Italian policy was to -get territory over which Turkey had a vital -claim. Nor was it pleasant for the kaiser to see -one of the members of the Triple Alliance acting -in coöperation with the members of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> -in so important a matter.</p> - -<p>Taking these achievements in connection with -the formation of the Dual Alliance and the mutual -approach of France and Great Britain, Germany -had reason to feel that she was being isolated. -Her whole population resented this turn -of events, seeing in it a sort of challenge hurled -forth by France, who at last found herself strong -enough to assume a position of self-assertion. It<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165">165</a></span> -is true that Delcassé only placed Germany in -a position of isolation like that which Bismarck -imposed on France for many years; and it was, in -strict logic, as fair for him to treat Germany -thus as for Bismarck to isolate France. Let -Germany submit to her fate, as France submitted, -when she had to submit. But we are not -dealing with logical matters here. It is a plain -fact that confronts us. Germany, who had -been strong through three decades without seeking -to expand her territory, suddenly realized that -her opponents were forming a combination -stronger than hers, their acquisition of territory -that followed set her in a rage, and she made -plans for getting her share in the world that was -to be taken. Under the system of balance then -recognized as the proper means of regulating -international relations her course was a natural -result of Delcassé’s policy.</p> - -<p>The particular portion of the earth to which -she turned her eyes was Turkey. While she supported -the plans of Austria-Hungary to acquire -territory on the Adriatic, she herself looked -further to the East. She encouraged the party -at Constantinople known as the “Young Turks,”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166">166</a></span> -she furnished improved arms to the Turkish -army, she formed plans to establish her influence -in Palestine, and she projected a great railroad to -Bagdad in the center of the Euphrates-Tigris -Valley. It was a sphere of influence that might -be considered more than a fair offset for the lands -her rivals were about to gain.</p> - -<p>At the same time Germany found a means of -restoring her prestige, which was sorely wilted by -the progress of her rivals. The occasion arose in -connection with France’s occupation of Morocco, -which had begun without the aid or consent of the -kaiser.</p> - -<p>Morocco had long been under a line of independent -sultans. Most of her commerce was -with Great Britain although German capitalists -had received concessions within her border. As -the country next to the French province of Algeria, -France looked upon it as her own particular -sphere of influence. We have already seen -that Italy conceded this claim, 1901, while France -conceded Italy’s claim to Tripoli and Cyrenaica. -In 1904 France conceded Great Britain’s practical -supremacy in Egypt and in return was assured -the protectorate over Morocco. She asked<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167">167</a></span> -no concession from Germany but came to an -agreement with Spain, who had a small strip of -territory south of the Straits of Gibraltar.</p> - -<p>In 1905 Delcassé was quietly preparing to -carry out his plan for the development of Morocco, -when the kaiser landed in Tangiers without -the slightest warning, and announced in a public -address that he had come to visit his friend, the -independent sultan of Morocco, in whose country -all foreign nations had equal rights. The speech -was received by the world as a challenge to -France and a means of announcing that Germany -was no longer to be ignored. The moment -of the landing at Tangiers was well chosen by the -kaiser; for only three weeks earlier Russia, the -ally of France, had been defeated by the Japanese -at Mukden and could give her no assistance.</p> - -<p>In this unfortunate situation it was necessary -for France to bend before the storm. She agreed -to submit the whole Moroccan question to an international -congress, thus appealing to the principle -of the Concert of Europe, and when she -learned that the kaiser demanded that she dismiss -the minister whose hands had been played<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168">168</a></span> -so skillfully against Germany, she agreed to that -also.</p> - -<p>The dismissal of Delcassé recalls an incident of -1807. In that year Napoleon forced the king of -Prussia to dismiss Stein, his great minister, who -was bending all his efforts to reëstablish Prussia -on a war footing. It marked the triumph of -Napoleon’s power for the time being, but it -was a futile action; for Stein out of office under -such circumstances had more influence than ever, -and the shameful way in which he was treated -only emphasized Prussia’s humiliation and made -the Prussians more determined than ever to assert -their national power. Similar results in -France in 1905 followed the stab given to that -nation’s faithful and efficient minister.</p> - -<p>The international congress assembled at Algeciras -in 1906. It adopted a compromise decision, -which gave something to each side and satisfied -neither. Germany was supposed to have -gained when the congress recognized the territorial -integrity of Morocco under the sovereignty -of the sultan and guaranteed equal rights of trade -in the country to the citizens of all the signatory -powers. On the other hand, France and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169">169</a></span> -Spain were jointly to have the right to instruct -and furnish officers for the Moroccan police force. -Winning in a quarrel rarely makes the victor -think well of the vanquished. Certainly Germany, -who had now blocked the plans of France, -was not less bitter in her attitude toward that -nation; while France, feeling that she had been -caught at a disadvantage, smothered her indignation -and waited for the opportunity to make -things even.</p> - -<p>In 1907 disturbances occurred in Moroccan -ports and French marines were landed to preserve -order. When they were not withdrawn in -a year Germany protested and an irritating -diplomatic discussion followed. At last Germany -was persuaded to submit the point actually -at issue to the Hague tribunal, whose decision -was not conclusive and satisfied neither side. -Then a Franco-German convention was held to -pass on the rights of each nation in Morocco. -Its decision, given in February, 1909, announced -that the interest of Germany in the province was -only economic; and as France agreed to give -equal protection in such matters, the kaiser -promised he would not interfere in the country.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170">170</a></span> -In each of these incidents war seemed about to -begin, and Europe awaited the results in great -anxiety. When the clouds lifted the nations -breathed freely again.</p> - -<p>Still there was no way under the existing system -to solve the difficulty that presented itself, -had Germany only decided that she would not -trust her cause to peaceful negotiation. The -fact that she took such a step was to her own -people but a mark of the kaiser’s love of peace. -This and similar incidents, in which the militarists -carried their country to the verge of war only -to be held back by the hand of the emperor served -to lay the foundation for that popular belief -in Germany that a peace policy had been steadily -followed under provocations and that Europe -was indebted to Wilhelm II for immunity from -war. In reality the system of balance of power -had needlessly brought the world to the verge of -a bitter and unnecessary conflict.</p> - -<p>Almost immediately after the war clouds lifted -Europe had evidence of the small amount of -tolerance the leading classes of Germany had for -the slightest manifestation of the spirit of compromise -in the matter under discussion. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171">171</a></span> -chancellor under whom the recent settlement was -made was von Bülow, who thought it better to -adjust so small a quarrel than to incur the responsibility -of war. His action received the -stern denunciation of the military party. So -strong was the criticism that he was forced to -retire from office, his place going to Bethmann-Hollweg, -who had the support of the militarists. -The only explanation to be advanced for this -turn of the affair is that the German national -spirit was so much excited by the long agitation -of men like Treitschke that a concession which -others might consider only trifling seemed to -them a sacrifice of national honor.</p> - -<p>In 1911 occurred a third Moroccan incident, in -which Bethmann-Hollweg took occasion to recover -some of the attitude of assertiveness that -von Bülow had given up in 1909. In pursuance -of their plan to extend their protectorate over -Morocco the French occupied Fez with a military -force. A short time later the German warship -<i>Panther</i> entered the Moroccan port of Agadir, -ostensibly to protect German property. It was -soon known that the German government proposed -to hold the <i>Panther</i> at Agadir until the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172">172</a></span> -French withdrew from Fez. The war spirit -again flared up. Russia still suffered from the -wounds received from the hands of the Japanese, -which Germany well knew; but Great Britain -was in fighting condition and announced her support -of France. After a short discussion Germany -took a more complaisant attitude, and a -settlement was made whereby the French were -allowed a protectorate over Morocco on condition -that they guarantee an “open door” in Moroccan -trade and transfer to Germany two valuable -strips of territory in the French Congo region.</p> - -<p>Again Europe breathed easily, and again wise -men reflected that no real settlement had been -made. France had been bluffed out of a valuable -portion of her Congo colony and was not -disposed to endure the affront longer than was -necessary. Some day Russia would be fully restored -to her strength and ready to help her ally -in the face of German aggression. Until then -France would have to yield. Meanwhile she -was consoled by the reflection that Great Britain -had pronounced for her openly. That was something -to take to heart. The great sea power,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173">173</a></span> -though slow to anger, was at last conscious of her -danger if Germany overran France and seized a -channel port.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Germany was not fully -pleased at the outcome of the affair. The appearance -of Great Britain in it was an indication -that the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> was a thing of vitality. Germany -had been forced to moderate her demands, -taking colonial territory while her whole thought -for the future was not developing African colonies -but curbing the power of France. Not only -was France not checked, but she was much -strengthened in a vital part of her power. She -had acquired lands in just the region that she -needed them to carry out her ambition to control -the western end of the Mediterranean. If some -day Spain were to become a republic, could she -fail to establish cordial relations with the republic -of France, and thus be swept into the anti-German -group? It may well be that in these reflections -were born two German impulses: first to -win Great Britain to some kind of a compromise -with Germany, detaching her, at least for a time, -from the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i>; and second, to strike a vital -blow before Russia was entirely recovered.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174">174</a></span> -Within the next three years she acted on each -of these impulses.</p> - -<p>At the same time it became evident that the -Triple Alliance was crumbling, and this was another -source of anxiety to Germany. It meant -that she should hasten her steps if she was to carry -forward her great purpose. It was in September, -1911, while the Agadir incident was still -unsettled, that Italy began the war with Turkey -to establish control of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In -view of Germany’s well-known friendliness with -Turkey, this step was most unexpected. It -could only mean that Italy was not disposed to -subordinate her own interests to those of Germany -at Constantinople. If she had not felt certain -of support by the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> powers, in case -Germany turned on her, she would hardly have -ventured to begin the war.</p> - -<p>Another advance made by <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> powers -within the period under consideration was in -Persia. This ancient state was in sad disorder. -Weak and unpatriotic shahs, bold bands of -brigands, and foreign intrigues plunged it into -such a condition that it invited the domination of -foreign nations. Russia approached from the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175">175</a></span> -north, and Great Britain appeared in the south, -where rich oil fields had caught her eye.</p> - -<p>After some initial gains the two powers -came to an agreement in 1907 by which they -established their respective spheres of influence, -so that Persia was occupied at the two ends, -north and south, by strong powers, and the middle -portion was in such a chaotic state that its -future seemed very doubtful. By making loans -to the shah and furnishing capital for public improvements -British and Russian capitalists enabled -their respective countries to tighten their -grips on Persia. Soon that country was in the -throes of revolution, a so-called Nationalist party -came into power which was not able to rule without -the aid of Russia and Great Britain. So far -did the foreign influence go that Morgan W. -Shuster, an American financial adviser of the -shah who had tried hard to place the government -on a satisfactory basis, was fain to withdraw from -Persia in despair. To the rest of the world it -seemed that the independence of the country was -near its end.</p> - -<p>A mere glance will show us what these developments -meant for Germany and Austria-<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176">176</a></span>Hungary. -Remembering that Italy was acting -with the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> in her African policy, we -see that the entire southern shore of the Mediterranean -was passing into hands adverse to the -central powers, and that the new combination -stretched out a long arm to the Persian Gulf and -the region south of the Caspian. In view of -Germany’s hope that she would some day gain -through Syria a railway route to the Far East, -the trend of things in Persia threatened to close -the narrow gap that was left her for such a route -by completing the absorption of the kingdom of -the shah. Should she allow the gap to be -stopped, or should she strike while there was still -time? And if she did not strike, what was there -in the system of the Balance of Power that could -be counted on as a guarantee that she was not a -passive victim to the play of politics in the system -then in use?</p> - -<p>Furthermore, it was evident that Germany’s -prestige was being undermined by the progressive -steps of her rivals. Three times had she -rattled the saber over the Moroccan incidents, -and each time with decreasing terror in the minds -of her opponents. Perhaps its rattling had been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177">177</a></span> -one of the main facts in promoting the union of -those opponents, since it always brought before -them the picture of Germany embattled against -the rest of Europe. To strike a blow that would -teach France and Russia a lesson would restore -German prestige and bring the balance back to -the German side of the rivalry, if it did not do -more.</p> - -<p>There is good ground for the guess that it was -expected in high quarters in Berlin that the blow -would do far more than restore prestige. It is -true that the plan to which I am about to refer -has not been openly accepted by responsible -agents of state, but it was widely advocated by -a portion of the people, the Pan-Germans. It -involved the union of Austria-Hungary and Germany -in a great state, Mittel-Europa, with strong -influence in the Near East. Treitschke and -many others had written and spoken for such a -thing, and to a large number of Germans it had -become a sacred ideal. When some one spoke to -the deaf Colussus about the acquisition of territory -in Africa he exclaimed: “Cameroons? -What are we to do with this sand-box? Let us -take Holland; then we shall have colonies.” It<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178">178</a></span> -was a part of the dream of the Pan-Germans -that the proposed Mittel-Europa should extend -from the Baltic to the Black Sea. If such a thing -could be carried through, how excellent a trump -card to play against the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> plotters!</p> - -<p>Francis Joseph, of Austria-Hungary, was too -stout a patriot to hand his country over to the -schemes of the Pan-Germans, but he was approaching -an already long deferred demise. -The heir-apparent, Ferdinand, was supposed to -be a great admirer of the kaiser, and the advocates -of union had high hopes that he would promote -their desires. Suddenly came the crime of -Sarajevo. In a peculiar manner it dashed the -hopes of the dreamers; for not only was their chief -reliance taken away, but the new heir-apparent -was supposed to be a pacific man who would -favor constitutional government. Such a ruler -would hardly support the formation of a great -empire built after the fashion of Prussian autocracy. -It was the inspiration of the moment to -have the war come, and demonstrate the glory of -Germany and Austria-Hungary, while the old -emperor still lived. And if it was precipitated -in the interest of Austria-Hungary, that was all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179">179</a></span> -the greater reason that the people of the dual -empire should feel under obligation to the military -power that carried it through. Possibly -they would be so much impressed that they would -sweep a youthful emperor on with them in the -realization of a great united empire.</p> - -<p>It is not certain how far the Pan-German party -controlled the policy of government in July, -1914; but it does not seem too much to attribute -such plans to men who did not hesitate to dream -of the annexation of Holland and who had definitely -planned for the acquisition of Constantinople. -The imagination of a German patriot is -no mean thing in ordinary situations; but a great -sweep would be vouchsafed to it when its possessor -realized that his country was being outplayed -by the diplomats and the grim Captain of -Death. It was an extraordinary situation that -the Germans confronted in July, 1914, and there -was not much time for deliberation.</p> - -<p>This chapter is not written to show that Germany -was, or was not, responsible for the war. -If it explains how it was that the German people -believed that the war was forced on them, it will -accomplish more than it was designed to accomplish.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180">180</a></span> -But it is intended to enable persons to -keep calm heads in these times of perplexity in -order to understand how each side approached -the great conflict. It is evident that the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> -powers thought that Germany wished to change -Europe into a great empire with herself at the -head, while the central powers felt that the chains -were being riveted around about them.</p> - -<p>In view of this long train of events the last -week in that fateful July assumes small proportions. -If Ferdinand had not been killed war -would still have hung over the horizon. If Serbia -had accepted the Austrian ultimatum war -would still have threatened; for though it may -have been averted for the moment, the Triple -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> would still have existed, nor would it -have brooked the increase of German prestige -that the backdown of Serbia would have implied. -If Russia had not mobilized her army, Germany -may not have mobilized, but the ancient fear of -Russia as an overwhelming opponent when -she was once organized in the modern way -would have remained as a threat of dire consequences.</p> - -<p>The theory of the Balance of Power is built<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181">181</a></span> -upon the idea that states act for their own interests -in the restraint of one another from overweening -ambition. At bottom it is selfish. It -assumes a state of rivalry; and it is necessary to -the theory that as fast as one side gains in -strength the other shall gain also. If the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> -nations acquire Morocco, Tripoli, Cyrenaica, -and parts of Persia, the central powers -must gain also or they are over-balanced. And -who is to determine how much they shall gain? -Manifestly each will strive to get all it can. The -very process of gaining stimulates antipathy and -makes war a probability.</p> - -<p>Another observation that is worthy of consideration -is that balance is logically possible only -when more than two sides are opposed to one -another. When Great Britain, France and -Russia had varying purposes it was not difficult -for Bismarck to play one against the other and -so keep the equilibrium. But when it happened -that the central powers became so strong that -they constituted a threat against every other nation -in the world, it was natural for the other -nations to unite to check them. In such a condition -no true balance of power could exist, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182">182</a></span> -it was folly to expect that theory to serve as it -served in former days.</p> - -<p>One of the things the world ought to learn -from the war that now afflicts it is that no nation -can conquer the world by stealth. It is one of -the happy shortcomings of political selfishness -that its agents usually fancy they can cover their -tracks. How often do we see a bad politician -doing something wrong in the false confidence -that while he knows what he is doing the people -cannot see it! So with Germany in the years -before the war. Making her plans for large -accretions of power, she thought she could steal -a march on other nations and gain in a spurt a -position from which at a later time she could extend -her power by other and still larger sweeps -of conquest. She did not think that the other -nations would take part until it was too late.</p> - -<p>But the rest of the world was as wide awake -as she. No man in England accustomed to view -political things in the large failed to see the instant -the war began that the hour of crisis for -his country was at hand. If Great Britain had -not fought in August, 1914, she would have been -the stupidest nation in the world. To have allowed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183">183</a></span> -her greatest rival to sit down in the French -channel ports would have been suicidal for her. -The only probable explanation of Germany’s failure -to realize this is that she had become so confident -of the superiority of her own mind that -she thought all other minds were sodden.</p> - -<p>In a similar way, when she had carried on the -war for two years and a half and resorted to -the submarine in ruthless attacks on American -ships of commerce, she should have known that -she was giving the United States a reason for -participating in the war at a time when it was -clear to most Americans that their national safety -demanded that they should take part. If by this -kind of battle the Germans forced Europe to -bend to her, what could we expect in the future? -The very imminence of German success demanded -that the United States should throw herself -into the struggle. And after the war is -over this truth will be written indelibly in the -pages of history: No great nation can be allowed -to conquer the world piecemeal.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184">184</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX<br /> - -<span class="subhead">IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>The German people say the submarines will -not fail. They seem to think that what they call -the highest achievement of the scientific mind of -Germany cannot fail. There is little doubt -that they pin on this arm of the service their -last hope of securing a decision in actual warfare. -If it fails them they can look forward -only to a long course of sheer dogged resistance, -hoping they can last longer than their adversaries. -Let us consider the probable results respectively -of the success and the failure of the -submarine campaign.</p> - -<p>If the under-sea boats do all the Germans -expect of them the result is soon told. Great -Britain will be forced to make lame and inefficient -war, France will be unable to do more -than hold on to the line that she occupies, and -the United States, unable to send her vast army -across the seas in large numbers, will not be able -to repair the loss of strength that her allies sustain.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185">185</a></span> -Under such circumstances Russia, even if -she should recover from her present state of -weakness, could hardly deliver the blows that -would bring Germany to reason.</p> - -<p>Under such conditions the war would end without -the defeat of the Teutons, and Mittel-Europa -would still be impending. If the enthusiasm -of victory would stimulate such a union, the realization -that Germany and Austria-Hungary -were pressed back to the wall and must fight for -their future existence might equally bring them -to unite their fortunes. In fact, if these two -states wish to unite it is hard to see how they are -to be prevented, unless at the end of the war they -are so much weaker than their opponents that -they can be forbidden to take such a step, with -assurance that the prohibition will be respected.</p> - -<p>To form such a union would be, in fact, to -snatch victory out of sore distress; for the united -empires, even though Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey -were left out of account, would have a population -of 116,000,000, which is more than the -population of the United States and smaller only -than that of Russia and China. Ten years’ -breathing space in which to reorganize the industrial<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186">186</a></span> -and social life of so large a body of men -would work wonders with them; and when reorganized -and fired by a common ambition they -would be able to dictate terms to any two of the -nations of Western Europe. It is the probable -union of these states rather than the power of -either when acting alone, that makes it necessary -for the rest of the world to procure their defeat.</p> - -<p>In two ways the union can be prevented. One -is to inflict such a defeat on the central allies -that they will not dare run the risk of another -war through endeavoring to combine. Possibly -such a defeat could be inflicted by fighting long -and winning great victories. It would have to -be a greater victory than was won by Prussia -over France in 1871; for after that victory -France, fired with hatred for all that was German, -was so much feared by her conquerors that -it became a chief object of their diplomacy to -keep her isolated by drawing possible allies over -to the German interest. The great military -strength of Germany at present hardly warrants -the hope that she can be brought to a lower -state than France at the end of the siege of -Paris.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187">187</a></span> -The other method is to bring about such a -situation that union shall not be desired in the -Teutonic states. For it is not to be disputed -that if ever a strong and competent group of -states wish to become an empire, nothing short of -a great war by other states can stop them. -It behooves us, therefore, to make our appeal to -the reasons of the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians. -It is not necessary to limit our arguments -to words merely; it is, however, essential -that the Teutonic mind shall understand what -to threaten the equilibrium of nations means. -To show that such a preponderance cannot be -established practically would be an effective -warning to those leaders who set up to preach -Germanic militarism in the future.</p> - -<p>As this chapter is being printed, it seems that -the submarines are not a success. They have -taken a great toll but not all the grist. Enough -ships are left on the sea to carry the minimum of -food and war material that our allies must -have to maintain their grip on Germany. The -war of the central powers does not force their -enemies to their knees, and it seems that the best -the kaiser can hope for is to hold out for a time<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188">188</a></span> -with the expectation that victory will be snatched -by accident out of the gloom that hangs over his -cause.</p> - -<p>When the war began it was essentially a contest -between two groups of powers, each of which -had been pursuing policies of aggrandizement. -One group had progressively acquired territory -in Africa and Asia, and the other had a plan -equally definite for acquiring territory in Southeastern -Europe and the Near East. If the war -had been fought out as begun it would probably -have led to the realization of one or the other of -these desires. Either the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> powers would -have fixed their hold on their respective spheres -of influence and broken the schemes of Germany -and Austria-Hungary, or Germany would have -made a great sweep forward and established herself -in the keystone position of Europe, with immense -consequences for the future.</p> - -<p>As the war progressed it became evident that -it was becoming a supreme test of the ability of -one combination of nations to create a new empire -that would dominate Europe. It is no stretch -of imagination to say that the Germans dreamed -of reëstablishing a modern Roman Empire of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189">189</a></span> -the Germans. If the scheme had materialized—and -the future historian will probably conclude -that it was near success at one time—the fate -of the rest of the world would have been far -different from what we wish it to be. A gigantic -struggle would have been thrust upon the United -States to save the Western World from conquest. -It was the conviction that such a crisis -actually menaced us that brought us to join in the -attempt to block the German plans.</p> - -<p>Assuming, therefore, that the anti-German allies -are victorious, it is unthinkable that the war -shall be allowed to end as a mere check on the -plans of the central powers. To do so would -be to grant that the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> powers should be -left to carry on their plans for national aggrandizement -with <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">carte blanche</i> approval by the -United States. It would mean that we are fighting -at a great sacrifice in order to enable Great -Britain to maintain her position as mistress of -the sea and ruler of a far distant empire. Now -we do not object to British rule in the distant -parts of the earth: we have found it a tolerable -thing that she should be entrusted with the task -of developing the backward races over whom she<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190">190</a></span> -has established her authority. But we have -never meant to save her toppling empire for her -own comfort, as an act of grace merely.</p> - -<p>If we are to contribute a material part to the -suppression of aggression in the world, we have -a right to say in what way and to what end our -sacrifice will have been made. As the greatest -of the anti-German allies we shall have the largest -burden to bear in proportion to the time in -which we are to fight. That we should guarantee -to Great Britain and our other allies the -full existence of their rights is but fair. It is -equally reasonable that we shall demand that -the future does not inure to the special advantage -of any one of the group; but in fixing -upon the terms under which it shall be arranged -the main end in view should be the good of all -the nations in the world.</p> - -<p>This is a view which is likely to have the support -of all the anti-German allies, with the possible -exception of Britain. France and Russia, -to say nothing of the smaller states, have the -same interest as we in making the common welfare -the chief aim in peace negotiations. If -we were not in the group and if victory came to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191">191</a></span> -it, these nations would perforce have to yield the -lead to Great Britain, since she would outclass -them in strength by reason of her sea power. -She might well say that as the nation on which -would fall the largest burden in keeping Germany -in a state of restraint, she should have -the largest influence in deciding what was to be -done. She cannot make such a claim under existing -conditions.</p> - -<p>Of course, there is the difficulty that the United -States may not be guided by statesmen who realize -the importance of following a thoroughly -American policy. It has long been a practice -with a great many Americans to follow the lead -of Great Britain. Unaccustomed to take a normal -share of responsibility in world problems, we -may now be inclined to hold back, leaving the -game to hands that have acquired greater skill -in playing it. Such a course would be a misfortune. -It would mean that statesmen would be -given charge of the situation who derived all -their ideas under the old system of Balance of -Power, and it would be strange if they did not try -to carry on the world in the future with a strong -squint at the only principles of international<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192">192</a></span> -policy they know anything about. To break into -this well crystallized realm of so-called practical -ideas, demands an unusually strong man, a man -well founded in principles and able to convince -others of the wisdom of his views.</p> - -<p>It is true that the President of the United -States now in office has many of the traits that -seem necessary to a correct conduct of the situation. -A man who had the training of a mere -politician might well be less than able to deal -with the situation that faces us. President Wilson’s -knowledge of history enables him to think -in terms of large national movements. That is -the chief value of historical training to a statesman. -If he knows the history of the attempts to -settle the affairs of the nations after the great -world struggles of the past, he is better able to -understand how the various suggested plans will -work in the crisis that is to be passed through.</p> - -<p>President Wilson has, also, the unusual faculty -of doing what he wishes to do. When he has -formed a purpose it is not generally a compromise -with a number of men whose chief concern -is how the result of action will affect their -party support. At least this is true in matters<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193">193</a></span> -not clearly within the bounds of party activity. -Moreover, he has spoken and written words -which seem to show that he understands the need -of providing for such a course of conduct between -the nations as will assure us of coöperation for -the elimination of future wars. In his long delay -in urging war and in his early pronouncement -for a league of peace, he gave us the assurance, -if nothing else, that he understands the situation -and is capable of holding a firm course in -accordance with his principles.</p> - -<p>If the submarines fail, therefore, and if we -come to a settlement of the largely new world -problems that will confront us, and if our policy -is in the hands of wise men, what principles will -guide our actions and the actions of the rest -of the world? This is a question that all intelligent -citizens should consider, since it cannot be -answered well unless there is a restrained and -broad-minded public opinion to support the leaders -of the people. It is a matter for the consideration -of Germans as well as their opponents; for -their attitude toward any policy adopted will -have a strong effect upon the continuation of the -policy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194">194</a></span> -The first question we should ask ourselves is: -What are we to do to the Germans? How shall -we punish them for what they have done to make -the world miserable? My answer to that is: -Let God punish them. For us it is not a question -of giving the Germans their deserts but a -question of coming out of this cataclysm with -a clear gain for the cause of human happiness. -Let us look upon the Germans as suffering from -a kind of disease of the mind which produces -bad results on those with whom they are in contact. -It is ours to prescribe a cure, both for -their sake and for ours. I suggest that we first -put them on a liquid diet to reduce their exuberant -vitality and then give them the rest cure. -At any rate, that is better than cropping their -ears or putting them into strait-jackets. To -treat an impassioned man you do not kick and -beat him but try to bring him to his senses. To -bring the Germans into a realization that this -world is run on the principle of live-and-let-live, -we ourselves must show a willingness to let live.</p> - -<p>We had a large amount of the opposite spirit -in the United States from 1865 to 1875. The -South, passionately convinced that slavery was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195">195</a></span> -no evil, had made as good a fight to preserve her -cause as Germany has made or can make. She -held out to the last with what her own people -called a stout heart, but her foes said with a -stiff neck. For a year and a half after the outside -world concluded that she could never win, -she held on in the hope that her adversaries would -tire of war and make peace without victory. -Now all this was exasperating, and the mass of -the Northern people felt in 1865 that some punishment -should be inflicted on the perverse people -who had inflicted so much unnecessary misery on -the country. But Lincoln did not feel that way. -There is no reason to think that he gave a moment’s -thought to making the South suffer for -her course. For him all thought was how to -smooth the wrinkles out of the present, and how -to make the Southern people cast out their hatred -of the union and come back to their former loyalty. -The Lincoln spirit should guide the world -at the end of the present struggle.</p> - -<p>War lives on hatred. To make your people -put all their energy into the fight make them -hate the other people; and you may rest in the -assurance that the leaders of the others are striving<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196">196</a></span> -to make their followers hate the men on your -side. The mill of hate grinds steadily and at a -high speed while war lasts. In Germany in these -days is a vast amount of industrious abusing of -England. That makes the German people support -the war. In Great Britain is a great activity -in describing atrocities in Belgium and -Armenia, and it exists in order to make the British -people mad for war. When you see a new -crop of the testimony concerning the torturing -horrors of the first month of war in Belgium, -you may know that the war spirit is running low -in Britain. Unhappily, such propaganda is a -necessary feature of war. We are naturally -good-hearted, and we do not go out to kill men -until we are made to hate them.</p> - -<p>The moment war ends all this kind of thing -should cease. The time will then have come for -the propaganda of peace. Unfortunately there -are few men whose mission it is to spread such -ideas. Merchants and tourists may do what is -their nature to do, but they are not sufficient; and -it generally takes years for the fires to cool off.</p> - -<p>The aftermath of our civil war was as unhappy -a series of events as we have encountered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197">197</a></span> -within our national history. Undertaken as a -means of making sure of the gains of the civil -war, it became a procession of passion in which -stalked all the worst feelings that divided the -people in actual warfare. There are still men in -the North who have Andersonville in mind when -they vote, and men in the South who can never -respect the republican party because it was responsible -for the reconstruction acts of 1867. It -will be extremely unfortunate if we take up the -problems that are soon to be upon us in the spirit -with which we assumed the duties of reconstructing -the South.</p> - -<p>During the civil war the South was possessed -of a fixed idea: the same thing is true of Germany -today. The South was committed to a -position that the rest of the world had abandoned: -Germany is committed to a type of bureaucratic -government which is as much out of date in a -modern world as slavery. No ordinary system -of reasoning could show fair and honest Southern -men in what respect they had the sentiment of -civilization against them: the German is thoroughly -convinced that he is fighting for the preservation -of the most efficient type of government<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198">198</a></span> -the world has seen. The South went to her defeat -after a long and astonishingly effective resistance: -Germany seems to be destined to a similarly -long and steady process of reduction into -complete prostration. The South was ruled by -a small but able class of landed proprietors who -refused to see the plain truth of the situation -before them and prolonged the struggle until -they were exhausted, although by making a favorable -adjustment in accordance with the logic -of the conditions before them they might have -ended the war in 1864 and saved their people -from the uttermost bitterness of defeat: the Germans, -ruled by their Junkers, are equally deaf -to argument, equally determined to die at their -posts, and equally opposed to a compromise by -which they will have to give up their antiquated -“institution,” relinquish their special privileges, -and make their country like the rest of the world. -There are so many parallels between the two -countries that we wonder if there will not also be -a disposition of the victorious opposing allies to -degrade Germany in her defeat.</p> - -<p>Probably her best adjusted punishment will be -the reflection that her “peculiar institution”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199">199</a></span> -proved a failure in time of need. For a century -she has been training an army, but it is not the -army that has failed her. It has done all that -could have been expected of it. Nor did the -Southern army fail the South. It is not the -sense of loyalty, nor the scientific efficiency, nor -the unity of purpose within the empire, that have -failed her. They are all splendid and have done -what could be demanded of them. The thing -that has failed is the peculiar way in which the -German ruling classes have made use of these -forces. They have used army, scientific efficiency, -loyalty, and unity of purpose to promote -the ends of an aggressive ruling class. Now the -best treatment is to defeat them in the war and -allow them plenty of time, with no unnecessary -antagonisms, to learn that their system does not -pay, and that any attempt to revive it in the -future will be followed by another punishment as -severe as that which this war brought. The support -of a military caste and the training of all the -men in a great army are heavy burdens on the -economic life of the state. Will any nation continue -to bear them if they come to nothing in the -day of trial? Armies for defense do not demand<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_200">200</a></span> -the great expenditures that Germany has made -in the last decades.</p> - -<p>No penalty that the victors could lay on Germany -would be permanently effective in reducing -her. So great are her economic energies that -they would restore her to prosperity within a short -time, and she would be ready to take advantage of -any favorable combination to strike in revenge. -Disarmament would not be a guaranty that she -would cease to be troublesome to her neighbors; -for she would still have her excellently trained -soldiers who could be reassembled in a great army -at short notice. She might well be required to -dismantle her great armament factories; and since -they are essential to the re-arming of a great -army some check on her restoration would come -from such dismantling. But it would be a temporary -check. It is only necessary to remember -that the beginning of the present German army -was the attempt of one conqueror, Napoleon, to -limit the Prussian army to 42,000 men.</p> - -<p>Moreover, what nations could be expected to -agree among themselves while standing guard -over Germany? Under the Balance of Power, -we might expect a fair amount of mobility of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_201">201</a></span> -alliances. We have just seen that not even the -Triple Alliance was proof against the skillful -hands of Delcassé. If Italy could be withdrawn -by France from that powerful combination, how -can we doubt that a humiliated Germany would -find means of weakening the combination against -her? She would have the greatest inducement -to do so; and it is not probable that complete harmony -would prevail long between the victors, if -they were held together only by the bonds of -mutual friendship. The history of diplomacy is -the record of broken friendships.</p> - -<p>To see what readjustment might occur with -respect to a humiliated Germany, it is only necessary -to recall the position of France after the -Napoleonic wars. Beaten beyond resistance, -suspected of carrying the germs of bad government -from which all other nations felt that they -must be protected as from deadly disease, and -held down by great armies of occupation, her situation -would seem to have been most deplorable. -But her isolation lasted for only a moment. She -was admitted to the Congress of Vienna,—called -to pass on the future arrangements of Europe,—because -there was division among her conquerors.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_202">202</a></span> -From that time she was suspected less and -less, and at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, -1818, she was admitted to the Concert of Europe, -but not with full fellowship; for the other powers -made a secret agreement to watch her for a while -longer. She progressed so rapidly in eliminating -the republican virus in her system that in -1823 she was entrusted with the task of suppressing -the constitution of Spain. Thus in eight -years after the battle of Waterloo France was -again in full accord with the other powers. -Probably few people would have said in 1815 that -her restoration would come about so rapidly. It -would be no more singular if within ten years -after the end of the present struggle a conquered -Germany were to forget her antipathies of 1918 -and be ready to give and be given in diplomatic -alliances with as little regard for the past.</p> - -<p>If, for example, a restored and highly nationalized -Russia becomes a threat against Western -Europe some years hence, the antagonisms of -today would be forgotten and Germany, France, -and Great Britain would probably be found -fighting side by side to restrain the Muscovite -giant. The old system is intensely selfish and it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_203">203</a></span> -lends itself to rapid changes in policies. But it -is an expensive thing to keep up the system. -Large armies are necessary, great debts are -created, and a vast amount of nervous strength is -diverted from the normal activities of humanity. -It is small hope for him who longs to see war put -down permanently that only by fighting a war -like that now raging may we expect the nations -to defeat any future aspirant for universal -power.</p> - -<p>Finally, if the submarines fail and the anti-German -allies break down the defenses of their -enemies and thus are able to determine the kind -of peace that is to be made, the treaty of peace -should not have for its end the prolongation of -the power of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> group. The history of -the first half of the nineteenth century shows how -easy it is for such a group to be re-arranged -with the result that new wars threaten. We -must trust the fair mindedness of human nature -and the logic of the situation to do much for the -Germans. It is on their acceptance of the issue -that we must rest our hopes for a peaceful future.</p> - -<p>These truths are especially pertinent to the interests -of the United States. We are not fighting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_204">204</a></span> -Europe’s war, but the world’s. We are the -only nation in the struggle that has not a special -interest at stake. We are the only member of -our group of allies that has a right to take the -side of the weakest member of that group against -the desire of the strongest. If any one member -should in a moment of more or less pardonable -forgetfulness of the common good advance -claims that would be based on a desire to recoup -herself for her sufferings, we best of all could -demand equal treatment and see that the seed of -future discord are not sown. These are principles -that every American citizen should understand.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_205">205</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X<br /> - -<span class="subhead">OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>By an enduring peace I mean a peace that -shall last as long as we can see into the future. -It is such a peace as has in it, so far as we can see, -no fact that would seem to make for its ruin. If -we adopt a peace that has the seed of destruction -in its very nature, we cannot hope for relief from -the evils of war. We must, under such a condition, -take account of war as one of the permanent -burdens of civilization, with the full consciousness -that it will become increasingly expensive in -life and property, and with the result that at recurring -periods an intelligent world will drop its -peaceful tasks to try to reduce its population to -a nullity. From the possibility of such a strife -we turn to ask the question: “Can nothing be -done to save humanity from such madness?”</p> - -<p>The answer is very simple: All people are -unreasonable to some extent. In connection -with the question now under consideration, each -of the great states of the world, our own included,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_206">206</a></span> -has its own special form of unreasonableness, -which acts as an obstacle to the formation -of a régime of peace. If the immense disaster -by which we are depressed could serve as a means -of bringing us to a state of entire reasonableness, -the present war would be worth all it costs. -Whether or not it can lead to such a result the -reader must determine for himself.</p> - -<p>An important obstacle to such a result is the -economic competition of nations. Economic -competition by individuals has ugly sides, but it -is not dangerous in the sense in which national -competition is dangerous. When two merchants -undersell until one breaks down the business of -the other, the victim passes out of sight in the -business world, and the current of trade soon goes -on as before. When two corporations, however -great, engage in a business “war” and one is -crushed or absorbed by its competitor, the ripple -that was made is soon obliterated, and the victor -serves the human wants with which it has to do -without serious damage to humanity.</p> - -<p>But when one nation finds itself in strong competition -with another in the hope of controlling a -sphere of trade, it is apt to seek territorial annexation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_207">207</a></span> -to gain the desired field of exploitation. -The competitor can only follow the same course. -It is the only thing it can do, if it is not willing to -give up the contest. If it is strong enough to dispute -the will of the rival, its very sense of individuality -demands that it shall not tamely yield before -the aggression of a rival. When France -acquired Morocco, Italy acquired Tripoli, and -Great Britain acquired the southern part of -Persia, economic advantage was a strong motive, -but not the only motive. When Germany laid -out the field of her future expansion in Turkish -lands and when she expected to establish a permanent -influence over the Balkans, the extension -of her sphere of commerce was a chief motive.</p> - -<p>Probably the fundamental wrong here was -the idea, widely held by the present generation, -that a nation has a right to establish bars around -her national territory to keep the trade of other -nations out, so that her own citizens shall have -preferential advantages in the exploitation of the -territory. That idea is so firmly held today -that one must be a rash man who attempts to get -the nations to give it up. But it is a fundamental -obstacle to permanent peace in the world. Probably<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_208">208</a></span> -it is not too much to say that as long as the -business men of the world insist on dividing -themselves into national groups with these -national preferences, so long may they expect -business at recurring intervals to be burdened -with the waste and ruin of war.</p> - -<p>Against the existing practice we may place the -“open door” policy, which we have known chiefly -in connection with the trade of the undeveloped -nations. It means the free opening of the trade -of a given state to all the nations that may care -to have it. We heard much of the “open door” -in China a few years ago, and most of the benevolent -governments approved of the suggestion. -To have been perfectly logical they should have -applied the same idea to their own commerce; -and if the world ever comes to a perfect state of -international comity, it is likely that national -tariff barriers will be broken down.</p> - -<p>It is true, however, that we can have enduring -peace and have national protective tariffs, also. -If nations agree that tariffs are one of the unhappy -excrescences of an unreasonable world, -they may find it in their hearts to tolerate such -growths. To tolerate them would be, no doubt,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_209">209</a></span> -better than going to war. But when a state sets -its eyes on a certain part of the earth which it -feels it must acquire in order to enlarge the territory -in which it can trade without fair competition, -the peace of the world is imperiled.</p> - -<p>It is probable that this kind of motive played -a large part in Germany’s decision to begin the -present war. For a long time her industries -had been developing at a rapid rate. Protected -at home by tariffs they were able to sell goods -to the German people at high prices, while they -sold at cheap prices in foreign markets in order -to drive their competitors away. The volume of -German trade increased immensely, factories -were multiplied, and large credits were extended -by the banks in order to support this great -structure. At last the situation became unsteady. -The expansion of the foreign part of the -national trade at small profits was a clog on the -home trade, which could not be made to yield -enough profit to keep the business of the country -in a healthy condition. Then the manufacturers -and capitalists came to the conclusion that it was -to their interest for the country to go into a war -of conquest in which new national territory should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_210">210</a></span> -be laid at their feet for profitable exploitation. -Thus, the large business interests, usually supporters -of peace, swung to the support of the militarists. -It is significant that the liberals, that -party in the Reichstag which speaks especially for -the traders, capitalists, and manufacturers, have -been among the most outspoken advocates of annexation.</p> - -<p>In a powerful, if indirect, way the laborers -are reached by this argument. They see that if -the manufacturers and transportation companies -expand their business wages are better and employment -more abundant, and this leads them -to favor a policy of expansion. To what extent -the remote organs of the business world are thus -reached it is difficult to say. But it is evident -that in a phase of human activity which has been -organized most intricately the influence of the initial -idea that a war of annexation helps business -is far reaching.</p> - -<p>We frequently encounter the assertion that -economic laws are unchangeable; but the statement -is not true, as it is made. Many economic -processes that appeared fundamental in their -time have changed as the minds of men have taken<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_211">211</a></span> -new grips on human life. The world has outgrown -the mercantile school of economic ideas. -The attitude toward private property and -monopolies, and the view of the right of individual -bargaining have been greatly modified in the -process of time. If a so-called economic law -stands in the way of a reasonable adjustment of -human relations, it can be altered, if enough time -and effort be given to the attempt to change it. -Although it may seem to be fundamentally fixed -in the minds of business men and laborers that -a war for annexation is in their interests, if reason -shows that they are mistaken, there should -be a way of bringing reason to their minds, even -as it has come to ours.</p> - -<p>Another obstacle to enduring peace is a false -sense of patriotism. If a man extols his own virtues -we say he is a boaster: if he extols the good -qualities of his town, state, or nation, we say he -is a patriot. I am inclined to say that it is not -permitted to a man to praise his country—I do -not say love his country—in any sense but that in -which he may praise himself, modestly and with -reservations. At any rate, he should praise and -magnify his country in the most restrained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_212">212</a></span> -spirit possible. Patriotism does not demand -national egotism in the good citizen. Those -writers and teachers who try to create a national -spirit should be careful lest they make men mere -chauvinists.</p> - -<p>Especially perilous is the doctrine that “self-preservation -is the first law of nature” as applied -to nations. Times come when a man is not justified -in preserving his life. So to nations come -crises in which they are not permitted by the rules -of morality to save themselves by what appear to -be the only means left. In the present war Germany -asserted that she was justified by this principle -in adopting the ruthless war of the submarine, -since it was the only thing that would -save her from destruction. It is better for a -state to go to destruction, just as it is better for -a man to go to his death, with clean hands than -to live foully.</p> - -<p>It is but an extension of this doctrine for men -of normal morality to say they may do things -for the benefit of the state which they may not -do for their own benefit. A statesman has no -more right to make his state steal another state’s -lands than he has to take his neighbor’s watch.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_213">213</a></span> -It is not a virtue if he lies for his state. The -state cannot speak of itself: it speaks through its -agents. It is sullied, even as a man is sullied in -his character, when its only voice, the words and -acts of its servants, is not true. Judged by the -standards here set up, the world’s diplomacy -needs amendment, and if amended one of the -obstacles to peace will be removed.</p> - -<p>A false sense of patriotism may lead to acts -that imperil peace. When France acquired Morocco -her object was not wholly to extend her -economic interests. To increase the national -strength was also a motive. Likewise, Germany’s -desire to establish control over the territory -southeast of her was not entirely economic -in its origin. She also wished to increase the -glory and strength of the Fatherland. How -much we are to condemn this desire of a citizen -for the glory of his country it is hard to say; but -it seems to be clear that such a desire may manifest -itself in such a way as to become a serious -obstacle to peace.</p> - -<p>At the end of the present war the victorious -nations will be in a position to abate national -glory in the interest of enduring peace. Our<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_214">214</a></span> -own citizens are supposed to be particularly -proud of the achievements of the United States. -If our efforts should contribute as much as we -wish to the triumph of our own side, we should -be careful lest we forget that we entered the -war with the modest purpose of making the world -a fit place of habitation for <em>all</em> people. Likewise -we should be justified in using our influence -among our allies to see that the desire of no -statesman to enhance the glory of his nation leads -to action which may imperil peace in the future. -When we shall have fought long and suffered -greatly our hearts are likely to become harder -than now, in the beginning of the war; and there -is danger that we shall forget early resolutions -if we are not firmly committed to them at the -outset.</p> - -<p>Another obstacle to enduring peace is the sense -of nationality. The older men of this generation -who were students in Germany in their youth -acquired much respect for the passionate desire -of Germans to build up unity among all German -speaking people. It was a sacred idea to young -men and imaginative writers. Long had North -Germany been disunited, stumbling forward under<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_215">215</a></span> -the lead of the Hapsburgs. To be able to -form a dominating group among all the Germans -in the world seemed no more than was their just -due. We did not realize in those days to what -an end these people who lost so many opportunities -through internal weakness would put their -strength when they had at last developed it. -And yet, it was the right of the Germans to unite -themselves into as strong a nation as they might -form. The wrong came in the improper extension -of the idea. When men like Treitschke talk -about including Holland in the German Fatherland -we may well ask where nationality’s pretensions -are taking us?</p> - -<p>It was natural, also, that the sense of nationality -should be manifested in many other European -countries. Each of the Balkan states had its -own phase of it. Russia had a large hope of -uniting in her control all the peoples of Slavic -blood. Italy demanded Trieste as a part of the -Italian-speaking world. Greece lived for the -acquisition of Macedonia and the Greek Islands, -and France never diminished her pathetic longing -for Alsace-Lorraine, where lived French-speaking -peoples.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_216">216</a></span> -Often the desire for nationality runs directly -counter to economic laws. For example, what -are we to do when we have Austria holding on -to her only great Adriatic seaport as the essential -outlet of her trade to the sea, and nationality -proclaiming that this port shall be handed -over to Italy? Moreover, different peoples are -so intermixed in some parts of Europe that it is -impossible for any but a scientific specialist to -say which states, or sections of states, are occupied -by a majority of one race and which by -a majority of another. If we are to set out to -divide Europe according to nationality we shall -have a large task on our hands. In the United -States the principle of nationality is not to be -pleaded, since we are so intimately intermixed -that it would be hopeless to try to range us into -racial groups. Moreover, we get along very well -as it is, having once agreed that we shall have to -get along together. Perhaps if the nationalizing -propaganda ceased in Europe race antagonism -would subside.</p> - -<p>Autocratic classes in society constitute still another -obstacle to peace. We have heard much on -this subject of late, and some of the things that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_217">217</a></span> -have been said have been so ill-established in truth -that they must make the real autocrats smile. It -will probably help us to understand the situation -if we undertake to enumerate the good things an -autocracy can do. For truth never profits by -falsehood, and the most autocratic people in the -world have sense enough to know when they are -misrepresented.</p> - -<p>Let us remember that under favorable conditions -an autocracy is composed of the more capable -people in the community in which it exists. -They are more capable because they have been -brought up most carefully, that is, because they -have the best trained minds. There is no law of -nature by which more fools are born in an aristocracy -than in a proletariat. In fact, the tendency -is the other way; for since the aristocrats -are in a position to cultivate themselves in a given -generation, it is natural that a comparatively -large portion of their children shall be well endowed -mentally. To this gift of nature add the -influence of better educational training, and you -see how natural it is to expect an autocracy to be -stronger mentally than those who would have to -replace it if it were overthrown.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_218">218</a></span> -Again, an autocracy is not necessarily unpatriotic. -Of course, it has its own idea of what -patriotism is, but so have the classes below the -autocracy. Its patriotism usually embraces an -honestly held opinion that the autocratic state is -the best form of society. On this basis it is willing -to sacrifice much for the state. We see it -putting “lives, fortunes, and sacred honor” literally -at the entire command of the state. No -man can do more than give his all for that which -he holds right.</p> - -<p>An autocracy may be composed of men of the -best private manners and principles. They frequently -include the best poets, historians, novelists, -philosophers, and teachers of the nation. It -is they who encourage art, and set standards of -taste in architecture, landscape gardening, and -general culture. Compared with the leisure class -of a prosperous industrial country they may be -more courteous, more unassuming, and less given -to offensive use of their wealth. They are the -kind of men whom any of us could love if we -knew them personally. These words do not, of -course, apply to all members of the class, but to -the group as a whole in ordinary conditions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_219">219</a></span> -Of the German autocracy most of these things -can be said, and more. It is a hard working -group and generally speaking it is honest. In -the service of the state it has a record of efficient -government that few democratic countries can -show. The officials of German towns and cities, -provinces and states, taken from the hereditary -upper classes, are well trained, faithful, and free -from the suggestion of corruption. It will take -New York or Chicago many years to develop -the state of good government that exists in Berlin. -Moreover, the German autocracy has the -respect of the German people.</p> - -<p>Up to last winter the Russian autocracy was -an obstacle to peace. Many who looked forward -to a reign of reason wondered how they were going -to make the theory work while the largest -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> nation was in the hands of an autocracy -that was less tolerable than the German autocracy. -Fortunately, fate has settled the question, -for the time at least. So uncertain is the condition -of affairs in Russia, that no one can say what -will be the outcome. It is by no means certain -that the peasants, workers, and soldiers, will not -make actual war against the former autocrats,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_220">220</a></span> -leading to a state of chaos like the worst phases -of the French Revolution. If such a thing happens, -a reaction in favor of the former ruling -class may well follow. If the war ends before -the newly established government is firmly -seated in power some such upheaval may be -expected. Certainly the time of danger is not -yet passed.</p> - -<p>The German autocracy is better than that -which ruled Russia. In fact, it would be less -dangerous if it were less serviceable. Its sins are -not the patent sins of peculation, cruelty, laziness, -or despotism. It offends in that it takes -away the confidence of nation in nation. It offends -because it is filled with unfortunate purposes. -It is possible to think of an autocracy -that would be no menace for the peace of the -world, an autocracy filled with no ambition for -world conquest. It is true that most autocratic -governments have not been of this kind, and they -seem militarists by nature, whence arise the ideals -with which they trouble the world.</p> - -<p>When Hegel preached the philosophy of war -that underlies the German’s devotion to -war, he was largely right from the Prussian<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_221">221</a></span> -standpoint. He held that the mind becomes -sluggish through inactivity and that war burns -up its waste matter and leads to energy of character. -This doctrine would not be essentially -true in any normally organized society; for there -are as many opportunities for self-expression in -commerce, finance, manufactures, art, and other -peaceful occupations as in war. But a century -ago Prussia was filled, even more than today, with -a mass of small nobles, unaccustomed to any ordinary -form of labor, and with slender incomes. -They were just the class that would fall into the -effete vices of an aristocracy. To them the military -life was an avenue of steady and moral employment. -They took places in the great machine, -and by 1870 they had been bred into its -very spirit. The process saved the German -nobles from vapidity. At the same time, as -a class, they preserved their political privileges, -and it has happened that they, with their official -heads, the kaiser, kings, and princes, have been -able to unite political power and military purposes -until they have made of their country the -most military state of modern times. If Germany -has fought the present war with great ability,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_222">222</a></span> -it is the organized autocracy that deserves the -credit.</p> - -<p>It is, therefore, the union of the political and -military power in the hands of a privileged class -in Germany that now constitutes the greatest -obstacle to peace. It enables a small and efficient -portion of the German population to wield the -rest of the people for the ends they have decided -are best. If this union of functions could be -broken up, and if political power could be distributed -as in the countries governed by the people, -the obstacle would be reduced in size. It is -not necessary to suppose that it would be removed -altogether; for even if equal suffrage were -established in Germany, and if autocracy were -shorn of its preponderating electoral power, -the nobles would still be the most capable class in -the empire. Their personality would go a long -way in perpetuating their influence. If they -played the game of trying to lead the people -they might remain rulers of Germany for a long -time after losing their present electoral advantages.</p> - -<p>It is fair to assume that a democracy will be -less likely to go to war than an autocracy. It is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_223">223</a></span> -the middle and lower classes that bear the chief -burdens of war. They fight for no promotions. -Generally the happiest thing that can come to one -of them is a disabling wound to send him home -with his head safely on his shoulders. Kings and -their sons are rarely killed in battle. When this -war began the kaiser was one of the proud Germans -who had five tall sons of military age. -After nearly four years of fighting none of them -have been seriously injured. It would be interesting -to know if there is another German father -of five sons who has been so gently treated by fortune. -Report says that fifty thousand schoolmasters -were killed in Germany during the first -two years of the war. It would be interesting to -learn whether or not the titled class has given up -so large a proportion of its members for the cause -of the Fatherland.</p> - -<p>And yet, it must not be thought that wars cannot -exist in democratic countries. When Rome -was a republic war was a constant thing. Athens -in her republican days had many wars. In the -region that is now the United States of America -have been several wars. The war for independence -was essentially popular. It was organized<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_224">224</a></span> -by that part of the population which resented -British aristocratic institutions, the class we -should today call “the plain people.” In the civil -war the demand that slavery be destroyed did not -come from the wealthy men of the North, the -class that stood for the American aristocracy, but -from the middle classes, men who filled the -churches and who followed the common impulses -of the heart. It was resisted by the South, as -democratically organized as Germany would be -with the Junkers turned out of power, and the -struggle was as bitter as any the world had -seen up to the fatal year 1914. Democratic -states can fight, and they do fight, but they are -less likely to go to war than autocratic states.</p> - -<p>If it seems to any of us a necessary thing that -autocracy must be removed from the earth, it is -well to remember that autocracy can be removed -only through the operation of a long and slow -process. It can be reduced by some great catastrophe, -but it cannot be smitten out in a day. -Take away its political power, and perhaps its -financial power will be left. Undermine that by -raising up a rich bourgeoisie, and its social influence -will perhaps still exist. You do not abolish<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_225">225</a></span> -it by decree; you banish it only when you have -substituted a better thing.</p> - -<p>What force exists in Germany with which the -autocracy can be supplanted? Next to the radicals, -a small faction at best, we have the socialists, -numerous enough to have great influence, -but committed to a theory of society which cannot -be established until humanity has gone -through centuries of development in the principles -of equality. Then we find the national liberals, -whose name is likely to mislead liberals in -other parts of the world. They would be called -the stand-pat, capitalistic portion of society in -the United States, men who believe first of all in -the protection of their large interests. In the -present struggle they are committed to the Pan-Germany -policy since it means the expansion of -markets for German wares. Next come the centrists, -Catholics in their primary interests, and -fundamentally opposed to the doctrines for which -the socialists stand. Finally we come to the conservatives, -who believe in the autocracy. What -magician can fuse these parties into a solid movement -for the establishment of really parliamentary -government?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_226">226</a></span> -Last obstacle of all that I shall mention here -is the accumulated machinery of war that has -been built up in modern states. I do not refer -to ideas but to materials and men. Much has -been written to show that munition makers have -deliberately fostered a belief in war, so as to make -a market for their products. Probably some exaggeration -exists in most of these arguments -and statements. The Krupps and their brethren -have plausible grounds for saying that war is -inevitable, and that they serve it but do not promote -it. But giving them as much benefit of the -doubt as they can expect, it must be true that -their very existence, and their fine application of -science to their business, have led states to count -on war as a matter of course. These great aggregations -of capital have vast influence in political -circles. They have so many stockholders that -they affect a large number of influential men. -So much are they committed to the cause in which -their fortunes and hearts are enlisted that they -ought not to have the opportunity to wield their -peculiar influence. When this war is over, it -would be a real service if every munitions factory -as such were taken into government hands and its<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_227">227</a></span> -capital stock closed out as a business enterprise. -It is only the state, and the state in the hands of -the people, that can safely be trusted with this -powerful weapon for the creation of war sentiment.</p> - -<p>The professional soldiers are also a part of the -war machinery which stands in the way of an -enduring peace. They can hardly be expected to -become pacifists. They are trained to regard -war as a necessity. All their ideas of virtue are -wrapped up in the fine qualities of a brave soldier. -Any other standard is strange to them. They -may be expected to throw all their weight of influence -in favor of recurring wars. Not that -they wish wars to recur, but that they consider -it improper to contemplate anything else in the -natural order of events. This is a hard problem -to deal with. A few professional soldiers may be -brought to set their faces against war; but as to -the great majority, I fear that those who try to -abolish war will have to count on the opposition -of the professional warriors until the end of the -chapter.</p> - -<p>This array of obstacles to enduring peace, is it -not formidable? Economic competition, the actual<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_228">228</a></span> -if false sense of patriotism, the desire for -nationality—which is liable to run into extreme -assertions and sometimes to run counter to the -strongest economic interests—the existence of -autocratic government, and the powerful influence -of munition makers and professional warriors—these -are some of the obstacles against -which those must contend who try to convince -the world that peace is the better way. They -may well appal the stoutest hearted friend of enduring -peace.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_229">229</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI<br /> - -<span class="subhead">ARGUMENTS FOR A FEDERATION OF STATES</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>The arguments against attempting to establish -an enduring peace are undoubtedly formidable, -but they do not leave the idealist entirely -vanquished. On his side fight humanity and -reason, and it is his function to stand by humanity -and reason. He has long ago formed the habit -of attacking obstacles. In this case the objections -he meets are all rooted in the opinions of -men, and he loves to change opinions, or, if he -does not change them, to hammer away at them -as long as life lasts. For his fine optimism we -can but have great respect, and in this chapter I -intend to summarize his arguments and give them -to the public in as strong a light of plausibility -as possible. If the stolid opposition of the -“practical” world is not to be broken down, let it -be shaken as much as may be. The time of its -defeat is written in the book of fate. It may be -that the time is near at hand.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_230">230</a></span> -In the first place, let me recall a statement -made in the preceding chapter. To get any -desired reform adopted and carried out, it is -first necessary to get the people to imagine the -reform in operation. I mean that they must -have a clear mental picture of themselves living -contentedly under the proposed plan. Let the -proposition be made in such a way that the effective -people who direct the government can not, or -will not, in the mind’s eye see it in operation, and -it will surely fail. Let them imagine its successful -use and they will most likely find it unobjectionable. -Likewise, if the people of the world -could imagine a great coöperative union to promote -peace, with enough force behind it to enforce -the will of the union, if in their minds they could -see themselves adjusted into such a system, with -all its economy in taxes, human suffering, and -ordinary governmental effort, it would not be -very difficult to make such a scheme work in -actual experience.</p> - -<p>The “practical” man has but little imagination. -He has to be deceived into the acceptance -of reforms. Make him believe that a given plan -has been made to work and his objections are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_231">231</a></span> -diminished, if not overcome altogether. This is -not said for scolding but as a sober fact confronting -the man who reasons his way through matters -that perplex him. The “practical” man is not -responsible for his weakness, and he is in the majority -among men. On the other hand, the man -with imagination is not to be faint-hearted. If -he can see and talk, he may, by reiteration finally -make his brothers see also.</p> - -<p>Fundamentally his position rests upon the reasonableness -of his proposition: war is madness, -brutality, useless waste of wealth and life, and the -negation of civilization. It proceeds from the -unnecessarily irritated state of the public mind. -Reason demands that she be allowed to have an -opportunity to exert her influence in a reasonable -world over reasonable beings. Since law is the -expression of the will of reasonable beings, let law -be given the supervision of all the disputes which -may possibly lead to war. How true all this -sounds! And the preacher of peace says boldly -that it is more worth while to plan, spend money, -and take a chance in a great world effort to bring -such a reasonable situation to pass than to go on -planning, spending, and risking things in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_232">232</a></span> -efforts to make a system work that has ever led -us around in a circle to the same old end, war and -misery.</p> - -<p>The advocate of peace points to the duel. -There was a time when every man felt it his right -and duty to settle his own quarrels. He was his -own judge and his own sheriff. The result was -so bad that law was created to enforce peace between -individuals. The old condition survived -in the duel, but in most countries this at last was -brought under the authority of law. Private -combat in its nature does not differ from public -combat, and if one was eliminated by the creation -of a law that was strong enough to forbid it, the -other can be abolished by creating a still stronger -law, powerful enough to restrain states as criminal -law restrains individuals.</p> - -<p>Kant’s argument for perpetual peace ran like -this, but he, in sympathy with Rousseau’s social -contract theory, argued that the law that restrained -individuals was the result of agreement -between individuals; and he went further and -argued that all that was necessary to secure perpetual -peace would be for the states to agree to -establish a league, or a federation, to enforce it.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_233">233</a></span> -Now there was a fallacy in Kant’s argument that -has a bearing on the subject immediately before -us today. There is no reason to suppose that any -state ever arose from an agreement of individuals. -The ordinary process was growth out of -several conditions. An enlarged family might -become a state, or one tribe might conquer another -and enlarge itself into a state. Kinship -and force were probably the chief causes in producing -the state; and reason seems to have played -a small part. Similarly, law grew up, not as the -result of reason, but as a body of tribal customs, -reasonably interpreted by the wise men of the -early state.</p> - -<p>There is, therefore, no analogy between the -proposed method of forming a great super-state -with its own body of law, the object of which is to -restrain the states from going to war, and the -method by which the early state was created. In -fact, if one great nation were to conquer the rest -of the world and impose its peace on all the world, -as it would do, we should have a process more -analogous to the origin of the early state. And -that is one way of having peace. Within the -last years it has seemed a horribly possible<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_234">234</a></span> -method; for if Mittel-Europa becomes a fact, it -will have such predominating power that it is -difficult to see what will stop its march to general -authority.</p> - -<p>Pointing out Kant’s fallacy weakens his argument -as such, but it leaves us in such a dilemma -that we are prone to pronounce his suggestion -worth trying as an escape from conquest by one -great power. For if the world is tending toward -unity through conquest, who can doubt that it -would be better to anticipate the process, save a -great sum of human suffering, and by agreement -found the world federation which is the same -result to which ages of war will lead us. That -we could have such a super-state by contract is -not to be doubted. It would be as possible as the -creation of the United States of America by -agreement.</p> - -<p>Another argument of the peace advocate is that -the old system by which the world was kept in -equilibrium, the balance of power, has broken -down, and cannot be trusted to preserve the peace -of the future. Its chief characteristic was that -several states mutually checked one another. If -one manifested an intention that was alarming<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_235">235</a></span> -to the rest they combined to restrict the action of -the aggressor. The several states were with regard -to one another in a condition mobile enough -to permit any state to shift from one side to another -as the situation demanded. Now this condition -no longer exists. There has developed a -mid-continental alliance, apparently expecting -to continue to act as one state for practical -purposes, which in itself threatens to dominate -Europe. To hold it in check calls forth all the -united force of the other states and then success is -obtained only through the greatest amount of -preparedness. Such a condition is anything but -the old system which was to work through balance -and concert of action.</p> - -<p>The central position of the Germans and Austrians -gives them an immense advantage, if the -world is to go on in its national rivalries. On the -west lie the two nations who are today doing most -to hold them in restraint, France and Great Britain. -The former could never stand against Germany -alone, and the latter is remote enough from -the German frontier to make it improbable that -her forces could reach that spot in time to prevent -the Germans from gaining the initial advantage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_236">236</a></span> -which, in a state of efficient preparation is the -only military success that either side can hope -to win. In the face of a strong and threatening -Germany it would be very likely that these two -nations would have to make a more than formal -alliance. Even if that happened, it is possible -that Germany would construe it as a threat and -begin war.</p> - -<p>The only other strong check on the central -powers is Russia, now in a sad state of change. -What her future is going to be is still problematic. -It is a stupendous task for so large a nation, -composed of landlords and peasants for the -most part, to pass from an autocracy to a self-governing -nation. It took France, a smaller -country, from 1789 to 1879 to pass through the -various changes and counter-changes by which -she reformed her government into a republic. It -is safe to say that in the Russian development -the changes will come more rapidly, but it is not -impossible that in this country a period of prolonged -unrest is ahead. Under such circumstances -Russia could hardly be counted on to give -much aid to the Western nations who wished to -restrain Germany. In fact, so fluid would be the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_237">237</a></span> -state of her society that she might well become -the victim of German ambition and contribute -valuable parts of her empire to swell the resources -of her aggressive western neighbors.</p> - -<p>One insecure spot must be pointed out in this -argument. It is the continuous close alliance of -Germany and Austria-Hungary. If that breaks -down the whole argument fails. At the present -time it is impossible to say what may happen in -this respect. Much will depend on the new emperor -of the Dual Empire. That he has a very -difficult problem before him is without question. -On one hand is the intense Hungarian -aversion to absorption by Germany, on the other -the passionate desire for union by the German -people in the Dual Empire. It is supposed that -the emperor does not favor absorption; but it -seems certain that he is not able at this time to -take an open stand against it.</p> - -<p>The strong part Germany has taken in saving -Austria from Russia gives Germany a firm hold -over the imagination of the Austrian people. It -is possible that financial aid has also been extended -to such an amount that Austria would be -embarrassed if called on to pay back. Nor is the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_238">238</a></span> -kaiser in Berlin in a mood to brook defiance from -Vienna. If, therefore Kaiser Karl wishes to be -free of his too intimate dependence on Kaiser -Wilhelm, he will find it to his advantage to conceal -his desire for the time being. It is probable -that we shall not know the present true state of -feelings in Austria for several years after the -war. But unless she is very well Germanized, it -would seem that she must soon realize that she is -playing a losing game in the combined movement. -The real advantages of this war, if any are obtained, -are German advantages. It is German -trade, German <em xml:lang="de" lang="de">kultur</em>, and German prestige that -are being enhanced by the war. Austria as Austria -is not reaping advantages commensurate -with the gains of her greater partner.</p> - -<p>The financial argument seems to be much on -the side of the peace advocate. Let us consider -the situation in which the European states will -find themselves after the return of peace. Bankruptcy -is a relative term, if we so interpret it. -That is to say, if the people are willing to bear -patiently their great burdens they will bear them, -and the debts that have been acquired will be -shouldered. If one nation repudiates this debt,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_239">239</a></span> -or scales it down, it is probable that the others -will do the same, since to continue to carry the -debt would leave the faithful nation at a disadvantage -with the other nations in reference to -future struggles with one another.</p> - -<p>No one knows as yet just who owns the bonds -in the several nations. From Germany we hear -that they are widely held. It is the policy of the -government of any nation to distribute a heavy -debt as widely as possible; and we have in recent -history instances of great patriotism in assuming -debts of this kind. Now it is fair to say that -the more widely the debt is distributed, the -greater its likelihood of permanency. The -larger the number of poor people who own it, the -harder it will be to lessen the burden of the nation. -It follows that in this case the immense -interest charge is likely to persist as a permanent -encumbrance on the economic life of the country.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, let us say that it turns out -that the debt is not very widely distributed after -all, or that after the war it follows the course of -most national debts and passes into the hands of -the rich. Then we have the situation likely to -promote class friction. The taxes necessary to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_240">240</a></span> -pay the interest will fall on the mass of people, -who will probably come to believe that they are -taxed for the benefit of the wealthy. Class jealousy -will lead to suggestions of repudiation. -Such a course is more than ordinarily easy in -Germany, France, and Russia, where there are -well organized socialist parties, already keenly -suspicious of the capitalists.</p> - -<p>Thus, whether the debt is widely distributed or -not, it contains a menace to society. In one case -it constitutes such a burden that it absorbs the -financial strength of the government. In the -other it invites the most formidable struggle of -the poor against the rich that the world has seen -in a century.</p> - -<p>Such a situation is bad enough in itself, but it -does not directly affect the question of peace, our -main consideration at this time; for the debt will -exist as a result of the war, and nothing in the -view of the friends of peace can prevent it. But -through whichever of the two contingent courses -it goes, the state will have difficulty in continuing -the old system.</p> - -<p>Let us say that we have a permanent great -debt with a huge interest fund, and the state<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_241">241</a></span> -wishes to add to the taxes in order to keep up its -measures of preparedness. The result must be -to produce uneasiness in the minds of the taxpayers. -In Germany, for example, the interest -charge and the provision for pensions on account -of the present war will probably be considerably -more than a billion dollars a year. Added to the -ordinary expenses of government it will make a -burden more than double that of 1913. Can the -government go on providing armaments, that -may lead to another war, without jeopardizing -the loans that are already issued? In the face of -such heavy taxation it would not be surprising -if the people sold their holdings of bonds to the -capitalists and later turned toward repudiation. -On the other hand, it would be to the interest of -the capitalists to favor moderate expenditures -for armaments and armies, lest the patience of the -people under their burdens might be exhausted.</p> - -<p>But suppose the debt was not distributed -widely in the first place, and suppose it was repudiated -after a class struggle, or for any other -reason scaled down. The result would be a severe -blow to credit, and in the future it might -be so difficult to raise funds that war could not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_242">242</a></span> -be carried on. No nation can afford to contemplate -war if it has not borrowing capacity. If -the debts of one war are repudiated those of another -may also be repudiated. It behooves the -capitalists, therefore, to support a policy which -will make armed conflict impossible. While -bonds benefit the banker when issued up to a certain -point, they can in some conditions become -his most serious difficulty. So many perils await -the capitalist from a renewal of struggles like the -present, that it is not too much to count upon -him as a supporter of peace until the financial -situation in Europe shall become better than it -will be for many a day. It is his true interest to -support a federated peace, which will tend to -make his bonds secure.</p> - -<p>As to the influence of autocracy, the advocate -of peace must admit that it is by nature hostile -to his system of coöperative peace. Such coöperation -must depend on mutual confidence and -trust between nations; and it is natural for distrust -to exist between republican and autocratic -states. The whole trend of autocracy is to self-assertion. -As it exists in Germany today it -could hardly be relied on to take its place in any<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_243">243</a></span> -union of states which would involve the subordination -of individual national interests to the common -good.</p> - -<p>Granting this, the advocate of peace can assert -that Germany must eventually give up autocracy. -As the only great nations that hold to this -relic of a departed age Germany and Austria-Hungary -are becoming anachronisms. They are -set against the spirit of the twentieth century. -If they tide over the crisis that now confronts -them they will encounter more furious storms at -a later time, and eventually autocracy must be -broken down. The argument rests on faith in -progress. It is the result of confidence in the innate -qualities of human nature. So many times -in the past ages have the people risen against -bad government, that it is safe to say they will -repeat the process until all inequality shall have -been reduced.</p> - -<p>German autocracy, a survival of a past century, -exists only because it takes for its object -the good government of a parliamentary system. -In intelligence and honesty it is not like the ancient -system. The resemblance is only in forms. -The republican says: “I will give the people<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_244">244</a></span> -just, intelligent, and honest government.” The -German autocrat says: “I will do all these -things”; and he redeems his promise. His -brother of the eighteenth century had no such -purpose, being so certain of his position that he -did not have to promise the people anything. -The German autocrat lives in fear of an overthrow. -Perhaps some day he will make a slip—it -may be from the action of an unwise emperor -or a selfish party clique—and away will go the -whole system.</p> - -<p>Last summer a crisis arose in Berlin. The -very life of the autocracy seemed about to be -taken. It was saved finally by a narrow margin, -and with the making of promises which seem -a long step forward. The people were assured -that such was their meaning. If the promises are -broken, there will be a reckoning. It may be -said that there will never again be so good an -opportunity to force the granting of parliamentary -reforms. That statement is contestable. -The autocracy needs the support of the people at -present, in order to bring Germany through the -crisis that has arisen from the action of the -autocracy, and it may seem from that standpoint<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_245">245</a></span> -that the people never had and will never have an -equally good opportunity to strike a blow. But -the call of patriotism is strong in Germany, and -if the liberally minded persons were to stand deliberately -for the defeat of the war credits unless -they were given the reforms they demanded, it is -doubtful if the people would support them. It is -hard to carry a country through a great political -revolution while the very life of the country is -threatened.</p> - -<p>After war comes a time of questioning. The -German people will have reason to ask themselves -what has been done to them. The burdens -of taxes, the loss of commerce, the wrecks of -human life through maiming, and the great gaps -in population through death, all these things can -but come to the minds of the people. At that -time the press must lose something of its rigorous -control, for it is impossible that when the Germans -get over the feeling that their country is in -danger they will continue to tolerate a press -whose every word is dictated by the one thought -of keeping the people solidly united in war sentiment. -If it should happen that the empire has -an emperor who is not trusted by the people it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_246">246</a></span> -may be that the questioning will sweep away -many old doubts and forms.</p> - -<p>These things should not be taken as prophecy, -but as possibilities for tempering the opinion that -Germany is destined to be permanently autocratic. -The advocate of an enduring peace has -a right to think a self-governing Germany well -within the bounds of possibility before another -decade has elapsed. If such a thing happens, -certainly one of the most serious obstacles to -peace will have been removed.</p> - -<p>I shall venture to put one more argument into -the mouth of the advocate of peace. Probably -he has not used it as I am going to use it, but it -works his way; for it shows that a tremendous -fate threatens, unless some coöperative movement -is established to avert it. Stated briefly it -is this: Through the ages runs a law of unification -in society, and it seems probable that the -world has today come to the point at which the -unifying force is likely to take a long stride forward, -a force which may operate in one of two -directions. I mean that with the next century -unification seems imminent by conquest, if not by -common consent.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_247">247</a></span> -It is not easy to say that the process of concentration -in human society is a law in the sense in -which there is law in natural science. But there -is a general social tendency, seemingly irrepressible, -operating steadily from the beginning of -history, for the political units to be larger and -ever larger. If this tendency is not a law it is an -extremely strong force; and we may well ask if it -is not about to take one of its great steps forward.</p> - -<p>A glance at the past will show how the process -has gone on. In ancient times diminutive states -were absorbed by larger but still very small -states, which in turn were welded into so-called -confederacies, or leagues, which at last became -integrated states. The concentration went forward -in cycles, one empire rising in power until it -ruled most of its known world, and then it broke -into pieces through its lack of cohesive power. -Thus it was with Babylon, Assyria, Persia, -Greece, and Rome. Whenever the bubble burst -the process of unification began again immediately, -and on a larger scale. After the fall of -Rome it was again set in motion in an area that -included most of Europe, the unifying hand belonging -to Charlemagne, king of the Franks.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_248">248</a></span> -His personal valor won the triumph of his will, -but his empire fell away soon after he relaxed his -hold upon it.</p> - -<p>Then began a rebuilding process. Feudal -states evolved out of clashing duchies, counties, -and bishoprics. Immediately feudal states began -to devour one another. With each century -the unit of government became larger. At last -rose the great power of Spain, so great that it -became a threat to other powers, and then followed -a series of wars to decide whether or not -Spain should be the supreme state in Europe, -and Spain lost. A century later France seemed -to be seeking to establish herself in the same kind -of supremacy, and again the combined force of -Europe was necessary to break her purposes. -Still later came the Napoleonic wars, in which -Europe seemed for a moment to be subjected by -one central will, but again it was saved through -great suffering. To some people it seemed that -the Napoleonic attempt would be the last.</p> - -<p>Of these modern struggles in Europe it is seen -that each has been harder than the struggle that -preceded it. That is because in each the implements<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_249">249</a></span> -and organization of warfare were improved -as compared with the former struggle, and -because states were stronger and more capable of -endurance. It is also evident that each of these -great wars was the result of the ambition of one -sovereign, supported by a strong and well united -nobility, while in each case the most effective resistance -was offered by the states in which some -degree of self-government had been adopted.</p> - -<p>The struggle that now exists is the highest -manifestation of this tendency to unification that -the world has seen since the fall of Rome. Although -Napoleon seemed at certain moments in -his career to stand nearer absolute success than -Germany now stands, he never really gained as -much as the kaiser now holds; for he won his successes -against the poorly trained and dispirited -troops of Prussia, Austria, and Spain, while the -Germans have won what they have won against -some of the best troops of history. Moreover, -Napoleon’s power was founded on his success -solely, while the German victories rest on -the long established and certain foundation of the -German empire. It seems reasonable to say that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_250">250</a></span> -Europe stands today nearer to unification than -it has stood since the fall of Charlemagne’s -power.</p> - -<p>Two great combinations are fighting for mastery. -One has the avowed purpose of extending -its power until it is in a fair way to absorb the -rest of the states one after the other. The other -group fights to beat off the fate that threatens, -and it acknowledges that it cannot succeed unless -it crushes its opponents into such a state as will -take from them the desire and the power to attempt -another war for supremacy. Whichever -side wins, the other will feel an impulse to continue -to act in alliance. And we may have a -Europe of two great federal states, with the -little states at their mercy.</p> - -<p>For example, how can Great Britain and -France ever be opponents again, as in the old -days? The sense of common sacrifices would of -itself make them more than friends, but the consciousness -that each depends on the other in dealing -with the great danger will never fail them, -and it will force them into some kind of political -union. In the same way, we should expect to -see a greatly altered relation between Great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_251">251</a></span> -Britain and her colonies. Three-quarters of a -million of colonial defenders constitute a contribution -that demands reward. As the colonies -depend on the mother country for some important -elements of defense, and Great Britain cannot -comfort herself with the assurance of safety unless -she has a broad imperial power for its basis, -it would seem natural to expect some kind of imperial -union. As to Belgium, when she escapes -from the grasp of Germany, what mind has the -ingenuity to foresee her fate? If she relies on -the promise of neutralization, she is again tempting -fate. If she is annexed to France, with some -kind of autonomy, German enmity will be -aroused.</p> - -<p>Probably her fate is to be bound up with the -fate of the other small states of Europe, states -which in the present war are hardly entirely -sovereign. Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, -Switzerland, Greece, and Portugal have lost -something of the power to direct their internal -affairs. In war they have had a lesson of the -necessity of bending to the will of an external -government, which they will probably remember -many times in the days of peace. When once a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_252">252</a></span> -state has yielded at the dictation of a neighbor, -and made money out of it, the next time it is -pressed yielding becomes an easier thing. The -fate of these small states in a possible era of fierce -competition between two great groups would be -very perplexing. In an era of peace through -federation, says the advocate of peace, it would -be much happier.</p> - -<p>In short, it is a practical question that our -idealist puts to us. Here is a world that has gone -mad, shall it not turn to reason again? The old -system has broken down, shall we try to make it -work again? To do so will lead us to just the -disaster that now overwhelms us. Shall we -not try a plan which will not cost us in money -half what the old system of preparation cost, and -which if it fails cannot be more of a failure than -the old system has proved? If autocracy stands -in the way, let us hope that autocracy will give -way before the march of the spirit of the times. -And finally, the law of unification is working so -strongly in these days of international relations, -that we are at last at the point at which we -cannot longer elect to remain distinct in our national -activities. We must choose between a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_253">253</a></span> -world state through conquest, and a world state -through mutual agreement. Which shall we -take? To try to go on with the states entirely -distinct, is to invite their conquest by a great -state.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_254">254</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 class="vspace"><a id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII<br /> - -<span class="subhead">A FEDERATION OF NATIONS</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>Taking into consideration the obstacles and -the advantages summarized in the two preceding -chapters what are we going to do when the war -comes to an end? The easiest and most likely -thing is to adjust ourselves as quickly and quietly -as possible to the peace that is given to us, take -up the old problems of living as nearly as we can -where we left them in 1914—or in 1917, when -the war began for the United States—and trust -to our good stars to guide us to a happy haven. -But if there is one thing this war has shown, it -is that trusting to stars is not a safe protection -against war. The only thing sensible people -ought to count on in these days is the judgment -of their capable and efficient minds. And it -seems that the suggestion of the men who wish to -obtain peace by coöperation is worthy of the most -careful debate by men who have the best interest -of humanity at heart.</p> - -<p>When the war ends it may be that the world<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_255">255</a></span> -will not have arrived at the time when such a -scheme can be adopted, but we should not be -hasty in saying so. It is not a scheme to be disposed -of by newspaper editors, who rarely have -time to weigh the conditions of such a serious matter, -or of senators and representatives, whose -views arise out of party interests, or of high -officials as a class, who are usually overburdened -with administrative matters. It is a thing for -all the people to consider, and in order that it -may have the fairest and most conspicuous hearing, -there should be a great world congress, not -composed of theorists merely, but of the most -practical statesmen, who will take up the matter -in a spirit of friendliness, with the intention of -adopting the scheme if it can be received in a -manner that warrants the hope of success.</p> - -<p>Every nation in the world has reason to desire -the establishment of an enduring peace; but the -United States has a larger interest in such an -issue of the war than any other nation. Since we -became a nation we have gone on developing -along peaceful lines. Having had no reason to -fear our neighbors and being so remote from -Europe that we were not likely to be molested<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_256">256</a></span> -from that part of the world, we formed our institutions -on the basis of peace. Our public ideals, -our sense of citizenship, the aims of our law-making -have all been such as are natural for a nation -that has nothing to fear from external enemies.</p> - -<p>One result of the present war is to relegate -these ideals into the junk-heap of institutions, unless -we can be assured that peace is a certainty. -Under a system of competition between states we -cannot afford to be less ready for war than any -other great nation. We must have a large navy -and a great army ready to meet the blows of any -power that feels that it has reason to interfere -with our peaceful development. We must become -a militaristic republic, a thing which seems -against nature. When such an attempt has been -made in the past, the result has been an oligarchy. -In the United States it would probably lead to a -sad clash of social classes mingled with vicious -party politics and timidity in the national legislature. -And yet, under a continuation of the old -system it would be folly to endeavor to get along -without an army and navy large enough to protect -us from the initial swoop of some powerful -adversary.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_257">257</a></span> -If from this fate the advocate of coöperation -can offer an escape, it behooves us to listen to -his scheme. We should weigh it carefully and -be willing to take some kind of a chance to secure -its adoption, if in it there is the possibility of successful -operation.</p> - -<p>To be perfectly fair to those who suggest -leagues or federations we should remember that -we are not dealing with the ideas of pacifists, as -such. The schemes that are set forth by the -friends of lasting peace come from men who are -giving all their energies to the prosecution of the -war. They believe, as much as any of us, that -the war should be pressed with every ounce of the -nation’s strength. They are fighting as hard as -any one in the country, and they desire the defeat -of Germany as much as any soldier or statesman -in the world. They are fighting to establish a -basis on which the peace of the world can be built. -They are not cranks, and even if they are mistaken, -they are honestly trying to call mankind -to the better way.</p> - -<p>One of their suggestions is a league of peace, -to be composed of the civilized nations. As we -have seen, it is loosely organized and does not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_258">258</a></span> -allow the central authority of the league enough -power to punish a state that tries to withdraw -from the league. Nor does it grant the central -authority the right to punish a state which, after -submitting its case to the proposed tribunal of -arbitration and losing the decision, decides to go -to war in defiance of the tribunal’s judgment. -What would Germany do, for example, if she -had lost such a judgment and did not wish to -accept her defeat? Strong and well prepared -for war, she might disregard all respect for the -opinion of the world, if she felt that her future -was at stake, and we can hardly doubt that her -own people would support her.</p> - -<p>Connected with the idea of a league is the plan, -advocated by those who place respect for law -above all other considerations, for creating a high -court of judicature, with judges selected from all -nations, which shall have authority to try and -give judgment on all disputes of nations. As a -part of a strongly organized federation such a -court would have great influence, but if it existed -under a league it could hardly have enough -authority to secure the obedience of the great -states. As for the small states, they never give<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_259">259</a></span> -trouble any how, except as they act in association -with some great state, or as they are threatened -by some great power. No union for peace can -accomplish its object that does not deal with the -great states, and any scheme suggested may leave -the small states out of consideration. On the -other hand, the small states are deeply interested -in forming such a union, since it would give them -a safety they could hardly get otherwise.</p> - -<p>The proposed plans for a league of peace and -for an international court of arbitration were announced -before the war or in its early stages. -They were made with an eye to the most that -the nations could be induced to give up of their -control over their own actions. It is possible that -their authors would not follow the same plans if -they were forced to make them today. The war -has shown us several things. It has revealed -Germany’s reason for opposing steadily all the -real peace plans at the Hague conferences. It -has shown us what fate awaits the world after -the war, unless there is a return to reason and -coöperation. It is possible that in writing out -a plan for peace today the gentlemen who met in -Carpenters’ Hall, Philadelphia, in June, 1915,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_260">260</a></span> -would feel justified in supporting a stronger -proposition.</p> - -<p>Mr. H. N. Brailsford, in a book called <cite>A -League of Nations</cite>, London, 1917, announces the -outline of a working scheme, which he hopes the -friends of peace will consider. Its chief features -are: 1. An international court of justice to consider -and pass on justiciable cases, with a council -of conciliation to pass on non-justiciable cases, -and a pledge by the states that they will not make -war nor mobilize their troops until the court or -council has within a stipulated time passed on the -several matters in dispute. 2. An executive of -the league to take steps, military or economic, -to enforce the obligations of the members of the -league. 3. The guarantee of the right of secession -together with the possibility of expelling a -state. 4. A consideration of disarmament on -land and sea. 5. An international commission -to see that all the signatory powers have access to -raw material in manufactures, with a pledge to -permit trading among themselves without discrimination -and to follow the “open door” policy -in trade with the undeveloped regions of the -world.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_261">261</a></span> -In this scheme we see the influence of the war. -The author is brought to see that some form of -central authority to coërce a state is necessary. -On the other hand, he does not allow his league -to become a law-making body, an omission that -goes far to weaken the united efforts of the -league. Guaranteeing the right of secession, also -shows that the author of the plan is unwilling to -merge the nations into a great state, in which they -will each give up a portion of their sovereignty. -His plan is a little stronger than the American -plan but it nevertheless falls short of being a federation.</p> - -<p>If we are to make a serious attempt to obtain -enduring peace by coöperation it behooves us to -start on the basis of sufficient force to insure -that the attempt will be worth while. If that -cannot be done, it is unwise to make the attempt, -since to trust ourselves at this juncture to that -which we have good reason to believe insufficient -only lulls us to a false sense of security and dissipates -resolution that might with better effect -be used in an opposite direction. If we do not -have peace through coöperation we must maintain -a sharp state of preparation for war.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_262">262</a></span> -Furthermore, no people can be rallied to a scheme -which seems insufficient to them. Give them that -which they can trust and they can perhaps be -made to support it, in spite of the inconveniences -they find in it.</p> - -<p>Probably it is not too much to say that the only -form of united action that can be relied on is a -federation with enough cohesive force to guard -against secession, repress any constituent state -that defies the united will, make laws that concern -the purposes for which the federation is formed, -exercise the right of interpreting those laws by a -system of federal courts, and maintain an executive -that can make itself obeyed. It need not -have these extensive functions for all the areas of -government, but it should have them for those -things that concern the declaration of war and the -preservation of peace. It means that to escape -an era of conflict ending, perhaps, in a world -united through conquest as the Roman Empire -was united, we establish by agreement a world -united through federation, as the United States -of America were united. A league of nations, -under the plans suggested above, would be only -a half-way house that would lead to rupture and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_263">263</a></span> -failure or to some future struggle out of which -a world taught by experience might possibly form -“a more perfect union.”</p> - -<p>Some of the fundamental ideas of a federation -were embodied, as we have seen, in the plans of -the Abbé St. Pierre and the philosopher, Kant. -Living at a time when the state was conceived as -the seat of power, they trusted to force to execute -the will of the suggested government that was to -provide peace. Bentham, however, was deeply -impressed with morality as a force for good government, -and he was willing to trust his proposed -system to the reasonable impulses of men. To -him it is possible to reply that if men were so -reasonable that they would respect an agreement -to settle disputes by arbitration, they would be -reasonable enough to avoid the differences which -run into such disputes. In our modern world -reason thrives best when it is reënforced by authority.</p> - -<p>The attempt of Alexander I, of Russia, to obtain -some practical realization of the principle of -a federated Europe in behalf of peace followed -these lines as closely as could be expected, but, it -must be confessed, in a very lame way. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_264">264</a></span> -failure of his efforts has been taken as proof that -the idea is impracticable. But it does not follow -that it is impracticable to the same extent and -in the same way today as in 1815. No Metternich -now controls the policy of the majority of -the European courts. Republican institutions -exist to an appreciable extent in most of them. -The mind of Europe is more nearly a unit today -than a century ago, and commerce, travel, and -international sympathy bind nations together as -never before. Moreover all these unifying forces -are growing rapidly. When the feeling engendered -by the war subsides, and it always does -subside after a war, the nations will be more conscious -of one another and less willing to challenge -one another than before they engaged in -the present appalling struggle. In these things -there is a hope that the federation of Europe for -the preservation of peace would be more possible -than in the times of Metternich. I do not mean -that all obstacles are removed, but they are fewer -than formerly.</p> - -<p>Considering these things I find myself driven, -in closing my essay, to a serious examination -of the possibility of creating a world federation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_265">265</a></span> -out of the chaos that now floats over the -globe—not an integrated world empire, with -power over all phases of political action, but a -federation that will have authority to regulate the -forces that make for war. If such a thing could -be created and accepted by the states of the world, -it would make the present struggle, with all its -horrors, the best and most fortunate event that -has come to humanity since the beginning of the -Christian era. If the war should result in the -thorough defeat of the present régime in Germany, -followed by the creation of a world federation -into which Germany should be forced to -come, with her pride so reduced that she could -be kept obedient to the federation until the virus -of world power should get out of her system, the -world would have passed a milestone in civilization, -and for our part in it future generations -would thank us to the end of time.</p> - -<p>The organization of the American Union in -1787–1789 was a similar process on a smaller -scale. So many of its features are analogous to -conditions that suggest themselves in connection -with the proposition of a world federation that it -is worth while to recall them. If we are not led<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_266">266</a></span> -to conclude that a similar step should be taken -at this time in the larger sphere, we shall at least -have a clearer idea of what such a federation -would mean, and it may happen that we shall -conclude that it is not so difficult a thing to establish -as appears on first sight.</p> - -<p>Before the war for independence the American -colonies it is true, were not as separate as the -present European states, but they were so distinct -in their ideals and purposes that no one -thought their union possible. When Franklin -proposed a very mild sort of concentration in -1754 his suggestion was rejected in the colonies -because it involved the surrender of some of the -colonial separateness. Had no pressure come -from the outside it is difficult to see what would -have forced the thirteen colonies to come together.</p> - -<p>The external pressure was the conviction that -Great Britain was about to adopt a policy by -which the interests of the colonies would be subservient -to the interests of British traders, thus -destroying their partially avowed hope of a distinctly -American policy. Then came seven years -of war and four years of fear lest Great Britain -should recover through American dissension<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_267">267</a></span> -what she had lost in the trial of arms. Under -such conditions the newly liberated states were -willing to form the American union.</p> - -<p>A similar pressure on the nations will exist in -the burden of preparedness and the danger of a -renewal of the present struggle. The last three -years of conflict are more burdensome to the -world than the seven years of the American revolution -to the states engaged against Great Britain. -Moreover, the danger of chaotic conditions -in the future is as great as the danger that confronted -the Americans in 1787. Every period is -a critical period in history, but that which follows -the present struggle is especially important.</p> - -<p>When our revolution ended a majority of our -people thought the old system good enough. -The men—and there were many of them—who -pointed out the advantages to the western world -of a great federated state were pronounced idealists. -“Practical” men meant to go on living in -a “practical” way. But the idealists were led by -Washington, Madison, and Hamilton, and the -logic of events came to their aid. Dissensions -appeared, taxes were not paid, and the national -debt seemed on the verge of repudiation. Then<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_268">268</a></span> -the country was willing to listen to the idealists; -and the American federated state was established.</p> - -<p>It was received with derision by the publicists -of Europe. They could not believe that republican -government would succeed in an area as large -as that of the thirteen states. Their fears were -not realized and today most of their descendants -live under republican government of some form -or other. We should not blame them too much. -They had never seen republican government operated -on a large scale, and they were not able -to imagine that it could operate on a large -scale. If they could have seen it working with -their mind’s eye, they would have had confidence -in its operation. The Americans were accustomed -to using their imagination, and seeing the -“experiment” working in their imagination, they -could adopt it and make it work.</p> - -<p>The greatest obstacle to “federation” in the -American constitutional convention was the jealousy -of small states toward the large states. -Since it would have been unwise to leave any -state out of the proposed system, the small states -were in a position to make demands. When they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_269">269</a></span> -were allowed equality in the senate they became -quite reasonable. This obstacle could hardly -exist in the formation of a great federation for -the elimination of war; for the small states would -probably be the first to accept such a plan, as our -small states were most willing to adopt our constitution, -once it was prepared. It would give -them as perfect security as they could desire, -and without such a guaranty their continued existence -is always precarious.</p> - -<p>Next to the fears of the small states was the -unwillingness of many people in the states to give -up the idea that only a state should control the -happiness of its citizens, and that the union, if -formed, would destroy or lessen individual liberty. -This idea inhered in whatever idea of state -sovereignty the people of the day held. To form -a federation to enforce peace would undoubtedly -limit to some extent the sovereignty of the present -states of Europe. But sovereignty in itself is -worth nothing. It exists to give in general some -forms of life and dignity to states. If a surrender -of part of a state’s sovereignty will give -that state immunity from wars perpetually, is it -not sovereignty well exchanged? No American<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_270">270</a></span> -state suffered because it gave up control over its -right to make war, but, on the contrary, it gained -immensely. Such a right is a costly necessity, a -thing to be held tenaciously as long as we are in -a condition which makes wars necessary, but to -be given up as quickly as we can do without it.</p> - -<p>To enter a federation would mean that individual -nations would give up the right to expand -their territories. Germany could not acquire -more territory under such a system, unless she -got it by agreement of the parties concerned. -The British empire could become no larger by -any forceful process. But this would not be a -hardship. The only real justification of expansion -is to enlarge trade areas. A federation to -eliminate war would necessarily adopt a policy -which allowed all states an “open door” in trade. -This was one of the essential things in the formation -of our union; for we read that no state shall -interfere within its borders with the rights of the -citizens of other states to trade there. Under -such circumstances territorial expansion becomes -useless.</p> - -<p>When the American states were trying to form -that simple kind of union that was expressed in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_271">271</a></span> -the articles of confederation, Maryland long refused -to join. She was jealous of the great size -of her neighbors and especially of Virginia, -whose claim to the Northwest was in general not -disputed. Experience showed that her fears -were groundless. Virginia not only never became -a menace to Maryland, but she soon realized -that her wide boundaries were worthless to her -under a system which guaranteed her against -quarrels with her neighbors, and as a result she -surrendered her Northwestern lands. Under a -federation an undeveloped part of Asia or Africa -would be open as freely to Germans as to others -for trade, settlement, and the happiness of life, -just as our Northwest was open to Virginians, -Pennsylvanians, and New Englanders alike. -The only thing that Virginia gave up in relinquishing -her lands was the right to call herself a -big state, that is, self-glorification, a thing the -nations would have to give up in a federation. -But might it not be well exchanged for the right -to call themselves safe from warfare?</p> - -<p>When the American constitution was being debated -the small states declared they would not -“federate” unless they were given privileges<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_272">272</a></span> -which guaranteed them against absorption by the -large states, while the large states declared they -would not “federate” unless it was arranged that -the small states should not have the power to defeat -measures that were for the common good. -Each side was very honest in suspecting the other, -and great patience and persistence were necessary -to bring them together in a compromise which -gave neither what it at first demanded. For -us it is interesting to observe that in actual practice -there has never been a time when the large -states seemed to threaten to devour the small -states, nor a time when the small states placed -their welfare against any measure that concerned -the general good of the country. The union -formed, the people began to debate questions that -had nothing to do with this or that state, general -policies that cut across great sections of the federation, -without regard to the states as such.</p> - -<p>It seems that if a federation of Europe were -once formed a development might be expected of -a somewhat similar nature. At least, it is not -unlikely that the clashes predicted by the doubters -would not be as violent as they fear. It -seems certain that at once a new class of issues<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_273">273</a></span> -would engage the minds of the politicians, issues -that would spring from the general interests that -were conceived essential to life in the new grouping. -It is not possible to say what clashes might -grow out of these general issues, but it is probable -that the genius of man would be as competent to -take care of them as to direct the issues that -will arise if the world goes on under a system -like that now in use; for clashes we must have in -any event. After all, humanity has to manage -its own problems, and there will never be a government -under which it will not have all it can -do to make the doubts of today resolve themselves -into the confidence of tomorrow.</p> - -<p>In our American constitution-making one -often heard the question, “What will become of -the liberties of the citizen of the state under the -federation?” The answer was well made at the -time: “Will not the citizen of the state still be the -citizen of the state, and will not the state continue -to guarantee him all that it can now guarantee -him? Does he not also pass under the protection -of the federation as truly as the citizens of any of -the states? All that the federation proposes to -do is to take charge of the functions that concern<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_274">274</a></span> -the things for which the federation is founded, -and these are things to which the states are not -so well adjusted as a united government.” And -so it proved in practice. No American has ever -had reason to think his liberty lessened because -the union was formed; and he has been immensely -stronger in all his rights on the high seas, in traveling -abroad, in being safe from the burdens of -foreign wars, and in his rights of trade in the uttermost -parts of the earth; for he has been the -citizen of a great federation of small states.</p> - -<p>Applying the analogy to the suggested federation -of the world it appears that under such a -system the citizen of France, Great Britain, Russia, -or the United States would in nowise lose his -rights under his own government, and he would -gain vastly in relief from burdens. He would -no longer have to think of wars, his trade relations -would be adjusted in such a way that no -other man could have what he did not have. In -short, for all the purposes for which the federation -was founded he would stand on equal footing -with any other man, and for the purposes for -which his own state existed he would have all the -rights he had before. His only losses would be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_275">275</a></span> -in casting off the burdens that grow out of international -rivalry under the present system.</p> - -<p>One of the things for which the American -union was created was the payment of the revolutionary -debts. Compared with the debts the -colony had incurred individually before the revolution, -and compared with their ability to pay -them at the time, these debts were large, although -they proved, under the union, a very small burden. -It was the sense of security under a government -which had eliminated the possibility of -interstate wars that made the burden light.</p> - -<p>The amount of indebtedness that the several -nations in the present war have contracted seems -appalling. It would become a comparatively -light burden, if we could feel that for the future -the world had nothing to do but to pay it. The -waste of interstate rivalry, the burden of preparations -for future wars, the loss to industry through -uncertainties on account of wars, all these things -would disappear from the consideration of the -financiers, the credit of a federated world would -become excellent, and bonds that are likely to be -quoted very low when the artificial stimulus they -get from patriotism is taken away would be considered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_276">276</a></span> -better investments than any bonds ever -offered under the existing system of states. The -capitalists of the world, like the American capitalists -of 1787–1789, should be the most earnest -supporters of federation.</p> - -<p>In the United States a great deal has been said -about “entangling alliances.” As the term was -used a century ago it meant an alliance that was -likely to make us parties to the quarrels of European -states, one against the other. Into such a -maze of selfish maneuvers it would never be well -for us to enter. But to take our place in a federation -to preserve peace would be quite another -thing. That it would pledge us to the discharge -of a duty is not to be doubted; but we should be -entering no intrigue. We should be doing the -most patriotic thing possible; for the very essence -of the act would be to protect ourselves -from the possibility of being drawn into “entangling -alliances” with Europe. Let us suppose -that the old system is continued, and that -Germany has a mind to pay off what she may -consider an old score. Suppose she tries to set -Mexico up against us, or to induce Japan to -attack the Philippines, or to interfere with any<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_277">277</a></span> -weaker American government in such a way as -to threaten the integrity of the Monroe doctrine, -have we not an “entangling alliance” on hand? -If Germany emerges from the present war strong -enough to threaten the world as before the war, -when other nations found it necessary to form -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ententes</i> against her, we shall not dare remain -outside of some kind of alliance that will be -formed to check her pretensions. World federation -is the guaranty against the formation of -“entangling alliances” on the part of the United -States.</p> - -<p>In drawing the parallels between the formation -of our union and the possible creation of a -federation of nations, it is hard to avoid the inference -that the two systems lead to the same end, -federated general government. And yet they -are not the same. Our union was created to take -over a large area of government which the individual -states could not conduct successfully. It -has a direct bearing on the citizens of the states, -it even has its own citizenship, although it was a -long time after 1787 before it was defined. It -has popular elections, a postal system, and hundreds -of other things which no one would allot to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_278">278</a></span> -the kind of federation discussed here. It has -been cited only for the argument that can legitimately -be derived from analogous conditions relating -to the difficulties of forming the union.</p> - -<p>A world federation, on the other hand, could -have only one main purpose, the preservation of -peace. No other bonds should knit it together -except those which exist for that purpose. They -would be strong enough for the strain that would -be put upon them, and no stronger. They would -be made for a specific object by persons who -would be careful that they were properly made. -A federation of this kind could not be adopted -until it was approved by the authorities in the -constituent nations, which would guarantee that -it did not sacrifice the individuality of those -nations. In fact, so great would be the obstacles -at this point that it is safe to say that there would -be more danger that the federation would be too -weak rather than that it would be too strong.</p> - -<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div> - -<p>Here ends this statement of the arguments for -the only possible plan of coöperation that will, if -adopted, give the world enduring peace. It -would be easier to form a league to enforce peace<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_279">279</a></span> -by arbitration and moral suasion than to form a -federation with power sufficient to enforce its -decrees. But a league would in all probability -be flouted by the states as often as their interests -seemed to them to make it advisable. Reverting -to the analogy of our own formative period in -national government, a league would be like our -articles of confederation, weak and insufficient -because they did not authorize the central government -to coërce a recalcitrant state. As a step -toward a more desirable end the articles of federation -were worth while: as a similar step a -league of nations might be better than nothing, -but it would not lead to the end to which the -world is looking.</p> - -<p>The idea of a federation of nations has been -behind many a philosopher’s dream. Jesus -looked forward to it when he offered the world -“my peace,” and many another has held that -somewhere in the shadowy future a millennial era -of super-government and peace will fall upon -the earth. It would be a great thing if at this -day we could take a step toward the realization -of an ideal whose universality attests its desirability. -The “fruits of Waterloo” were lost a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_280">280</a></span> -century ago by a wide margin, due to the less perfect -comprehension the world then had of the -advantages of federated peace. If they are lost -at the end of this war it will be by a smaller -discrepancy. Some time they will be secured, -not because men have dreamed of them; but because, -in such a case at least, dreams are but “suppressed -desires.”</p> - -<p>The writer of a book can do no more than raise -his voice to the people who do things. To that -large class who make things happen he can only -give impulse and hope. His cry goes to those -who govern, to those who direct the press, and to -all citizens who feel responsibility for the formation -of good public opinion. If he speaks to -them faithfully and without prejudice or mere -enthusiasm, he has done all he can do. The results -are on the knees of the gods.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_281">281</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><a id="INDEX"></a>INDEX</h2> - -<ul class="index"> -<li class="ifrst">Adams, John Quincy, and the Monroe Doctrine, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Agadir, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Aix-la-Chapelle, Conference of, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Albania, in the Balkan war of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">origin of, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Alexander_I"></a>Alexander I, of Russia, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his peace plans, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45–63</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his personal qualities, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his education, <a href="#Page_46">46–48</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Treaty of Tilsit, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">eyes opened to Napoleon, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his friendship for France, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">“grouped” by Castlereagh, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">signs treaty of Chaumont, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">enters Paris in 1814, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">at Congress of Vienna, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Poland, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Holy Alliance, <a href="#Page_59">59–64</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Baroness Krüdener, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">at Conference at Troppau, <a href="#Page_68">68–70</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his change of policy, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Greek war of independence, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and a federation of nations, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Algeciras, Conference at, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Alliance"></a>Alliance, the Treaty of, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">the Quadruple, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">the Quintuple, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">disruption of, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See <a href="#Holy_Alliance">Holy Alliance</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Alsace and Lorraine, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">American Peace Society, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Armageddon, <a href="#Page_1">1–5</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Austria"></a>Austria and the Greek war of independence, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the revolution of 1848, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Congress of Berlin, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Triple Alliance, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">acquires rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the revolt in Crete, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">takes over Bosnia and Herzegovina, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">interest in the Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_124">124–126</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See <a href="#Metternich">Metternich</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Austria-Hungary, see <a href="#Austria">Austria</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Autocracy"></a>Autocracy, an obstacle to permanent peace, <a href="#Page_216">216–224</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">qualities of, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in Germany, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220–222</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in Russia, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">future bearing of German finances on, <a href="#Page_242">242–246</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Balance of Power, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">under Bismarck’s policy, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">after Bismarck, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">affected by the <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente Cordiale</cite>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">by the Triple <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Balance of Power, failure of the theory, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">breaks down in practice, <a href="#Page_234">234–236</a>.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_282">282</a></span></li> - -<li class="indx">Balkan States, history of, <a href="#Page_103">103–131</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Turkish rule over, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">spirit of nationality in, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">growing power of, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">a “tinder-box,” <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">the war against Turkey, <a href="#Page_122">122–127</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">The Balkan League, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Belgium, and the revolution of 1830, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bentham, Jeremy, on perpetual peace, <a href="#Page_32">32–34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and a federation of nations, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Berlin, Congress of, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bethman-Hollweg, and the Moroccan question, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Bismarck"></a>Bismarck, builder of the German Empire, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">policy towards France, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Three Emperors’ League, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Triple Alliance, <a href="#Page_93">93–94</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his retirement, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his German policy, <a href="#Page_140">140–143</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">not for Pan-Germanism, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his foreign policy, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Boer war, Germany’s attitude in, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bosnia, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Austria acquires rights in, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">taken over by Austria, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Brailsford, H. N., his idea of a league of nations, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bryce, Lord, attitude toward federated peace, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bulgaria, origin of, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">its position under Turkey, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">national feeling in, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">at the Conference of Paris, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in the war of 1877, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">“Big Bulgaria,” <a href="#Page_114">114</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">acquires East Rumelia, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">growing power of, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">declares complete independence, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in the Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_122">122–127</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bülow, Chancellor von, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Canning, George, and the Spanish Colonies, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Monroe Doctrine, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">welcomes end of the Alliance, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cartels, compared with trusts, <a href="#Page_xiii">xiii-xvi</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Castlereagh, Lord, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his relations with Alexander I, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and treaty of Chaumont, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">goes to Paris, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his idea of the Concert of Europe, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Treaty of Alliance, <a href="#Page_65">65–67</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">at Troppau, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his relation to the Concert of Europe, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his object, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Chaumont, Treaty of, <a href="#Page_52">52–53</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Castlereagh on the application of, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">“Christian Republic” of Henry IV, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Concentration, laws of, in society, <a href="#Page_xii">xii-xvi</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">progress of, <a href="#Page_247">247–251</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Concert of Europe, theory of, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">its character, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">its condition after the end of the Alliance, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the struggle of Mehemet Ali, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Crimean War, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and other mid-century wars, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Congress of Berlin, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124–127</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">its new meaning, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_283">283</a></span></li> -<li class="isub1">and the revolution of the Greeks, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Crimean War, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">defied by Moldavia and Wallachia, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Congress of Berlin, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Crete, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">defied by Balkan League, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">incompetent to deal with the situation of 1913–1914, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Moroccan incidents, <a href="#Page_167">167–173</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">failure of, in 1914, <a href="#Page_180">180–182</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234–236</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Conference of Paris, see <a href="#Paris">Paris</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Congo, French, given up, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Congress of Berlin, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Congress of Vienna, disappointments of the, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">cause of its failure, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Congress of London on Balkan situation, 1913, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Contract theory of the origin of the state, <a href="#Page_232">232–234</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Crete, revolt in, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Crimean War, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cuza, John, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cyprus, handed over to Great Britain, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Debt, public, makes for federation, <a href="#Page_238">238–242</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Delcassé, Théophile, his foreign policy, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163–168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Fashoda incident, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">building up French colonial power, <a href="#Page_163">163–168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">dismissed at the demand of Germany, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Democracy, not an absolute safeguard against recurring wars, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Dual Alliance, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Dueling, how abolished, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Dum-dum bullets, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Economic competition as an obstacle to peace, <a href="#Page_206">206–211</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Economic laws not unchangeable, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">sometimes opposed to nationality, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">England, see <a href="#Great_Britain">Great Britain</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">“Entangling alliances” and a federation, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente Cordiale</cite>, The, formed, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Fashoda Incident, the, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Federation, definition of, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Federation_of_Nations"></a>Federation of Nations, why it would now have better chance of success than in 1815–1818, <a href="#Page_72">72–76</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">discussion, <a href="#Page_261">261–264</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">why a federation is better than a league, <a href="#Page_261">261–273</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">analogy with the American constitution, <a href="#Page_267">267–276</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">differences pointed out, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">the idea held up, <a href="#Page_278">278–280</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">arguments for, <a href="#Page_229">229–253</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Austria, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Fez, the French in, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Finances, national debts make for federation, <a href="#Page_238">238–242</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">France, attitude toward federated peace, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Alexander I’s friendship for, <a href="#Page_51">51–53</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Spanish colonies, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">the revolution of 1830, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the wars of Mehemet Ali, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the revolution of 1848, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Crimean War, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">War against Prussia, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in Franco-Prussian War, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">later relations with Germany, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_284">284</a></span></li> -<li class="isub1">new attitude towards Great Britain, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">influence of Delcassé, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente Cordiale</cite>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Triple <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the revolution of the Greeks, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">extends rule over Tunis, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in Franco-Prussian War, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">military training in, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">foreign policy under Delcassé, <a href="#Page_163">163–168</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in Morocco, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166–173</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">gives up the Congo for Morocco, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">her position after war with Prussia, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">future relations with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Francis Joseph, of Austria, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Franco-Prussian War, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Balance of Power, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Franklin, Benjamin, his proposal for union, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Frederick_William_III"></a>Frederick William III and the Holy Alliance, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Freedom of the seas, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Gentz, Frederick von, on the Congress of Vienna, <a href="#Page_55">55–57</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">George, Lloyd, attitude toward federated peace, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Gerard, James W., <a href="#Page_xiii">xiii</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Germany"></a>Germany, attitude of, toward federated peace, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">opposed plans of Hague Conference, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the revolutions of 1848, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">under Bismarck’s policy, <a href="#Page_93">93–95</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">under his successors, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">policy during the Boer War, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">growing antagonism toward Great Britain, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">later relations with Austria, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Three Emperors’ League, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his influence for peace, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">under his successors, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">attitude during the Boer War, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">gets nothing at the Congress of Berlin, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">ideals and organization of, <a href="#Page_132">132–153</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">her broken faith, <a href="#Page_132">132–134</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Mittel-Europa, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">a better Germany, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146–148</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">development of pernicious ideals in, <a href="#Page_136">136–138</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">under the heel of Napoleon, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">re-making the army of Prussia, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">under Bismarck’s lead, <a href="#Page_140">140–143</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1"><i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kultur</i> of, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Militarism, <a href="#Page_146">146–148</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">the work of intellectual leaders, <a href="#Page_148">148–152</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">national egotism, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">peaceful attitude under Bismarck, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">under Wilhelm II, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">growth of manufactures, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">building a navy, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">growing military power of, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Pan-German hopes, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">isolated by Delcassé during the Boer War, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">eyes turned to Turkey, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in the Moroccan incidents, <a href="#Page_166">166–173</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">attempt to win over Great Britain, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">alarmed by growing power of rivals, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">her plans in beginning the Great War, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">short-sighted policy in war, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">a mild treatment after her defeat, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196–202</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">economic reasons for engaging in war, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">autocracy in, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220–222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">parties in, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">influence of munition makers, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_285">285</a></span></li> -<li class="isub1">influence of the military men, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">future influences on surrounding nations, <a href="#Page_235">235–240</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">future relations with Austria, <a href="#Page_237">237–239</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">influences of finances, <a href="#Page_238">238–242</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">autocracy threatened, <a href="#Page_242">242–246</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in a possible league of peace, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">reasons for opposing, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See also <a href="#Bismarck">Bismarck</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">see <a href="#Prussia">Prussia</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><cite>Grand Design</cite>, of Henry IV, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Great_Britain"></a>Great Britain, attitude toward federated peace, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">attitude towards peace in the Napoleonic wars, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">approached by Alexander I to establish a peace agreement, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Spanish American colonies, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Turkey, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Crimean War, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Conference of Paris of 1856, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">policy during Bismarck’s era, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">new attitude towards Germany, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">new attitude towards France, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">forms the <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente Cordiale</cite>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the revolution of the Greeks, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in the Crimean War, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">at the conference of Paris, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">influence over Turkey, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–117</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">at Congress of Berlin, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115–117</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Cyprus, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Suez Canal, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in Persia, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">imperiled by German success, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">former isolation in Europe, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the German naval program, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">reënters Continental politics, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">position in Egypt recognized, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">supports France in third Moroccan incident, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">necessary for her to enter the war, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">probable course if Russia becomes aggressive, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">future relations with France, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Greece and Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Greece, beginnings of modern, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">the revolt against Turkey, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">acquires Thessaly, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Cretan revolution, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">growing power of, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in the Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_122">122–127</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Greek war of independence, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Hague Conferences to promote peace, the, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hague tribunal and the Moroccan question, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hatred as an implement in war, <a href="#Page_195">195–197</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hegel, his relation to the peace plans, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">philosophy of war, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Henry IV, his <cite>Grand Design</cite>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hertling, Chancellor von, on federated peace, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Herzegovina, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Austria acquires rights in, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">taken over by Austria, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Holy_Alliance"></a>Holy Alliance, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">history of, <a href="#Page_59">59–64</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">terms of, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">discussed, <a href="#Page_62">62–64</a>;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_286">286</a></span></li> -<li class="isub1">compared with the Treaty of Alliance, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">taken up by Metternich, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Internationalism, <a href="#Page_10">10–12</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Italy, attitude toward federated peace, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">wars for liberation, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Triple Alliance, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and her right to Tripoli, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">weakened relation with the Triple Alliance, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">war in Tripoli, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Japan—effect of her war with Russia, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">alliance with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Junkers, character of, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See <a href="#Autocracy">Autocracy</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Kant, Immanuel, his plan for peace, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">error in his theory, <a href="#Page_232">232–234</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and a federation of nations, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Krüdener, Baroness, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kultur</i>, discussion of, <a href="#Page_144">144–146</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">La Harpe, Fréderic César de, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">League, definition of, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">League of peace, probable working of, <a href="#Page_257">257–261</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See <a href="#Federation_of_Nations">Federation of Nations</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">“League to Enforce Peace,” formed in 1915, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Lincoln, President, his way of dealing with conquered people, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Mars, his <em>Day</em>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Maryland, hesitating to accept union, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mehemet Ali, <a href="#Page_84">84–86</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Metternich"></a>Metternich, Prince, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, and the Holy Alliance, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Treaty of Alliance, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">on the situation in Naples, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">at Troppau, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">gets support of Alexander I, <a href="#Page_70">70–72</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Greek war of independence, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">end of his power, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his influence not existent today, <a href="#Page_264">264–276</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Military Class in Germany, influence of, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mittel-Europa, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>,<a href="#Page_185">185</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">its strength, if established, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">how to prevent its formation, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">future of, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Moldavia, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">united with Wallachia, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Monroe Doctrine, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Montenegro, origin of, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">opens the Balkan War, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">takes Scutari, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Morocco, French rights in, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">position of, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">German interference in, <a href="#Page_167">167–173</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Munition makers, influence of, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Naples, revolution in, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Napoleon I, repressing his spirit, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">hatred felt for, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Russia in 1807, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his severe treatment of Prussia, <a href="#Page_138">138–140</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Napoleonic wars, and permanent peace, <a href="#Page_17">17–21</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Nationality, an obstacle to permanent peace, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_287">287</a></span></li> - -<li class="indx">Nicholas II, of Russia, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Novi-Bazar, sanjak of, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Obstacles to permanent peace, <a href="#Page_205">205-228</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Pan-Germanism, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">behind the Great War, <a href="#Page_177">177–179</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Panther</i>, the, at Agadir, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Paris"></a>Paris, conference of, <a href="#Page_86">86–110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Declaration of, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Patriotism, false, an obstacle to peace, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Peace Societies, development of, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Penn, William, his plan for peace, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Persia, occupied by Great Britain and Russia, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Phillips, W. A., on the Quadruple Alliance, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pitt, William, reception of Alexander I’s suggestions, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Poland, Alexander I’s support of, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">revolution in, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Prussia"></a>Prussia, supported peace policy of tsar in 1815, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">war against Austria, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">against France, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">creates the German Empire, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See <a href="#Germany">Germany</a>, <a href="#Holy_Alliance">Holy Alliance</a>, and <a href="#Frederick_William_III">Frederick William III</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Quadruple Alliance. See <a href="#Alliance">Alliance</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Quintuple Alliance. See <a href="#Alliance">Alliance</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Revolutionary movement of 1830, <a href="#Page_79">79–80</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Rousseau, his plan for peace, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Rumania, origin of <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">under Russian protection, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">national feeling in, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Russian protectorate abolished, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">union of Moldavia and Wallachia, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in the war of 1877, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">growing power of, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">enters the Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Russia, recent progress of events in, <a href="#Page_8">8–11</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">friendly to peace under Alexander I, <a href="#Page_17">17–19</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Greek war of independence, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Turkey, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in the Crimean War, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and war of 1877, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Bismarck, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Dual Alliance with France, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">effect of Russo-Japanese war, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">enters Triple <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the revolution of the Greeks, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">nourishes Balkan hopes, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">at the Conference of Paris, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">war against Turkey in 1877, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">her hopes for a “Big Bulgaria,” <a href="#Page_114">114</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">unable to aid Serbia in 1908, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_126">126–128</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in Persia, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">possible future aggression of, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">autocracy in, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">uncertain part in the future, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See <a href="#Alexander_I">Alexander I</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">San Stefano, treaty of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Scharnhorst, military reforms in Prussia, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Serbia, in Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">origin of, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">desire for Bosnia and Herzegovina, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_288">288</a></span></li> -<li class="isub1">national feeling in, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">becomes autonomous, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in the war of 1877, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">growing power of, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Austria’s assumption of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, <a href="#Page_120">120–122</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in the Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_122">122–127</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">“Self-preservation, the law of,” <a href="#Page_212">212</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Shuster, Morgan W., <a href="#Page_175">175</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">South, reconstruction of not a model for Germany, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196–199</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Spain, revolution in, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Alexander I and, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">revolution of its colonies, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">St. Pierre, Abbé Castel de, <a href="#Page_27">27–29</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Stein, Baron von, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Submarines, and the United States, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">if they succeed, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">if they fail, <a href="#Page_185">185–204</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Suez Canal, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sully, Duke of, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Tariffs and obstacles to perpetual peace, <a href="#Page_207">207–209</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Three Emperors’ League, the, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Tilsit, Treaty of, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Treaty of Alliance, the, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Treitschke, Heinrich von, his ability, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his ideals, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his influence, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his histories, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Triple Alliance formed, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">its influence, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">balanced by the Triple <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">weakened by Italy, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Triple <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Entente</i> formed, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">its influence, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Tripoli, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Troppau, conference at, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Trusts compared with cartels <a href="#Page_xiii">xiii-xvi</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><a id="Turkey"></a>Turkey and the Greek war of independence, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Mehemet Ali, <a href="#Page_84">84–86</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Crimean War, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and war of 1877, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">rule over Balkan States, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">revolt of Greece against, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Crimean war, <a href="#Page_109">109–111</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">under British influence, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">war of 1877, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Crete, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the Balkan War of 1912–1913, <a href="#Page_122">122–127</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">position of in 1913, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">approaching friendship with Germany, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and the war in Tripoli, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Turks, conquer Constantinople, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">hold on the Balkans, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See <a href="#Turkey">Turkey</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">“Turks, the Young,” <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Tunis, under French rule, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst"><a id="Union_the_American"></a>Union, the American, as a model for a federation of nations, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">United States, the, their part in the Great War, <a href="#Page_189">189–193</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">constitution of, the adoption of, <a href="#Page_267">267–276</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">an “experiment,” <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">See <a href="#Union_the_American">Union, the American</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Venezelos, Eleutherios, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Vienna, threatened by Turks, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_289">289</a></span></li> - -<li class="ifrst">Wallachia, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">united with Moldavia, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">War, the Great, the real cause of, <a href="#Page_154">154–156</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Pan-Germanism, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">the beginning of, <a href="#Page_177">177–179</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">the changing character of, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Wilhelm I, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">II, ideals of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his part in the war, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his character, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">changed German policy under, <a href="#Page_158">158–160</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">lands in Tangiers, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">his sons uninjured in the war, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Wilson, Woodrow, his attitude toward a federated peace, <a href="#Page_v">v</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">address of January <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, 1917, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">peace views of, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>.</li> -</ul> -</div> - -<p class="p2 smaller center">PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</p> - -<hr /> - -<blockquote class="newpage p4 bbox"> - -<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> following pages contain advertisements of Macmillan -books by the same author.</p></blockquote> - -<p class="newpage p2 in0 xlarge bold">The Middle Group of<br /> -<span class="in1">American Historians</span></p> - -<p class="p1 sigright"> -<i>Cloth, 12mo, $2.00</i> -</p> - -<p class="p1">Back in the middle of the last century there was a greater -demand for history than today, when there are more historians. -Sparks, Bancroft, Prescott and Motley as well as -Col. 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